The Secret Diplomacy of the Habsburgs, 1598–1625 9780231897297

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The Secret

Diplomacy

of the Habsburgs,

1598-1625

CHARLES H O W A R D

CARTER

The Secret Diplomacy of the Habsburgs, 1598-1625

r

Hh \

Columbia University Press New York and London 1964

Charles H o w a r d Carter is Associate Professor of History at Tulane University.

Copyright © 1962, 1964 Columbia University Press First published in book form 1964 Library of Congress Catalog Number: 64-10291 Manufactured in the United States of America

To Professor Garrett

Mattingly

This study, prepared under the Graduate Faculties of Columbia University, was selected by a committee of those Faculties to receive one of the Clarke F. Ansley awards given annually by Columbia University Press.

Preface This book is an outgrowth of a doctoral dissertation which received an Ansley Award, sponsored by Columbia University Press; study and research for it (and for other related projects) were made possible by Gilder and Lydig Fellowships from Columbia University and by a Fulbright grant and extension. I am most grateful to all those responsible for these awards. One is always deeply indebted to libraries and librarians, archives and archivists, for facilities provided and the many services rendered. In the United States I am especially indebted to the staff of the Columbia University libraries, and abroad to the staffs of the Archives Générales du Royaume de Belgique and the Bibliothèque Royale (now Bibliothèque Albert I) in Brussels, the Archivo General de Simancas and the Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid in Spain, and the British Museum and the Public Record Office in London. In Spain I must thank Don José Antonio Garcia Noblejas, Director General of Archives and Libraries, for special permissions he most graciously granted me; Don Ricardo Magdaleno Redondo, Director of the Archivo General at Simancas, for his warm welcome to a stranger and for much indispensable aid since our first meeting; Don Jesus Millaruelo Clementez of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for his help and his friendship, both highly valued; and Don José Ibânez Cerdâ of the Biblioteca Nacional for his willing and timely assistance. After two years of living and working in Belgium a list of all those to whom I am indebted would be impossibly long. I must express special thanks to Mrs. Dorothy Moore Deflandre of the United States Educational Foundation in Belgium, who assisted me in many ways,

viii

Preface

all greatly appreciated; to Professor Jean de Sturler, whose advice, assistance, conversation and friendship are all highly valued; and to Miss Andrée Scufflaire of the Archives Générales for her ready cooperation in microfilming documents, and for the remarkable quality of the product. And no list of "Belgians" to whom I owe thanks would be complete without Frank Smolar Jr., of great help both in criticizing the manuscript and in its preparation. Finally, it is no exaggeration to say that this book would not have been possible without the understanding cooperation of M and Mme George Torchin, who violate all the received precepts about in-laws. My friend Geoffrey Pond has criticized the manuscript with the usual devoted honesty to which he subjects my writing—sometimes to my chagrin but always to my profit. Professor Robert K. Webb and Professor Benjamin Hunningher have done me the honor of detailed criticism, for which I am grateful. A special sort of appreciation must be expressed for the advice and criticism of the late Professor Walter Dorn, who willingly read and appraised a difficult early draft of the manuscript shortly before his death. I was never able to find words which would give proper expression to my deep appreciation of the help, the advice, the criticism and, above all, the friendship of Professor Garrett Mattingly. I find it completely impossible now, since we have lost him. The one who has participated most in this travail has been my wife, who provided timely encouragement, cheerfully assumed much of the drudgery involved, criticized the results most helpfully, and (not least) tolerated me throughout. Mr. Robert E. Bonner helped prepare the manuscript for publication. The maps were prepared by Mr. Keith Newsome. All of these people, and others unnamed, are very largely responsible for whatever merit the book may have, and I alone for its faults. CHARLES HOWARD CARTER

July 31, 1964

A Note on Method Being largely concerned with intelligence reports and various other forms of written information, this study is, in the last analysis, primarily about documents; it follows that it should be based almost entirely upon documents, which it is. The material contained in them has been summarized where this can be done without loss, but the nature of these documents—their character, their tone, and the attitudes, the preconceptions and misconceptions, emphases and other aspects shown in them—is of as much importance to the subject as the contents themselves, viewed strictly as data. For this reason the documents have often been allowed to speak for themselves. Moreover, this practice has opened the way to a procedure of utmost importance to recapturing a picture of these documents functioning actively as sources of information for sovereigns and councilors: so far as possible, details about events, etc., have been allowed to emerge from the documents themselves, as they did for the policymakers who used them. The writer has intruded himself and the writings of others into the recounting of historical events only so far as seemed necessary to provide a framework and to fill in those gaps left by the documents chosen (though not by the whole body of documents available for use). T w o standards have been applied in selecting documents, from the vast amount which exist, to perform this double function of filling in background or details of events in addition to serving their primary purpose as illustrations of types of information gathered, methods of gathering it, the use to which it was put, and so forth. In the beginning chapters documents have been chosen for relevance either to earlier parts of the period or to the period as a whole, with

X

A Note on Method

the intention of filling in the more general picture. Later, in the examination of information-gathering in England, the intelligence reports and related material have been limited as strictly as possible to the months preceding the closer narrative which follows, which deals with a pair of important cases of espionage in that time of special crisis in European affairs in late 1620 and early 1621, between the Battle of the White Mountain and the expiration of the Truce of Antwerp. The documents in question also provide confirmation of a number of general statements about background made in the text and thus allow one (happily) to avoid an excess of conventional footnoting which, in these particular cases, would not be especially useful to the reader. That English ships were raiding in the Indies, for example, is "common knowledge," but to say that Spanish policymakers were concerned about it might require citation of some sort of evidence. Since the evidence is profuse, such a citation would necessarily be made at random; where reference to the same subject occurs later on in documents quoted or paraphrased, this reference has been allowed to function as "confirmation" of statements made in text to the same effect. Because of easier access should the reader wish to consult them, printed sources have often been cited together with or instead of the originals, especially the fraction of Gondomar's correspondence published in DIE, vols. I-IV, and the Madrid-Brussels documents calendared in LCL. Some use has been made of Birch's Historical View without consulting the originals. Unless otherwise noted, the responsibility for all translations rests with the present writer. Some words left in the original language are also left in their contemporary form (vota, for example). Unless otherwise indicated, all dates in the text are N e w Style. In all citations of documents, dates are those the documents bear; when the writer is a Continental, even though writing from England, these are uniformly New Style. For the convenience of the English-language reader, the equivalent in contemporary pounds sterling has been given in place of, or in addition to, amounts originally stated in other currcncies. The Span-

A Note

on

Method

xi

ish ducado and the ecu of the Spanish Netherlands are converted at the rate of four to the pound sterling; the florin the Dutch used is converted at ten to one. 1

Contents Preface

vii

A Note on Method

ix

About Spies and Such

3

Part One: The Context for Policymaking

9

1.

The Peacemaking Phase and Its Product

11

2.

International Quarrels, Religious and Irreligious

23

3.

International Attitudes and Outlooks

39

Part Two: The Making of Spanish Habsburg Policy

51

4.

The Ultimate Question: War or Peace?

53

5.

The Policymaking Apparatus—Madrid

65

6.

The Policymaking Apparatus—Brussels

77

7.

Parenthesis: Portrait of a Bureaucracy

88

8.

The Informational Base of Foreign Policy

92

Part Three: Intelligence from England 9.

107

The Court and Character of James I

109

10.

Gondomar: The Classic Machiavelli

120

11.

Jean-Baptiste Van Male: A Renaissance Spymaster

134

12.

William Sterrell: A Jacobean Letter Writer

153

Part Four: Spanish Espionage Put to the Test

169

13.

A Problem of Espionage

171

14.

An Extraordinary Embassy from France

182

15.

The Laying Bare of Secrets

192

Contents

XIV

16.

Denouement: The Bassompierre Mission to Madrid

207

17.

Van Male and the Six Dutch Deputies

21 ^

18.

Secrets Not Laid Bare

2:5

19.

Gondomar in Mid-February, 1621

233

20.

Van Male Blunders On

245

21.

Denouement: The Pecquius Mission to The Hague

258

Epilogue

266

Notes

271

Bibliography

305

Index

315

Maps The Overmeuse Area

18

The Strategic Situation in Europe after the Battle of the White Mountain (November 8, 1620)

175

The Secret Diplomacy of the Habs burgs,

1598-1625

About Spies and Such A few weeks before the expiration of the Twelve Years Truce Charles della Faille, secretary of the Privy Council and of the Council of State in the Spanish Netherlands, received a report from one of his informants along the Dutch frontier. There was a plot afoot to load a ship in Holland with salt and several large tuns filled with prunes from France, and to put into the barrels, along with the French prunes, two detonators and "a certain quantity" of gunpowder, then to bring the ship into the city of Bois-le-duc and transfer the explosive cargo to a house occupied (the report said) by a French marshal and his wife, the widow of a sea captain who used to live in Calais and who was now occupied in selling brandywine to the soldiers of the Bois-le-duc garrison; their house was right next to the Porte de Grave, the city gate on the side toward Grave and Nijmegen. T h e plot—presumably aimed at blowing up the gate, breaching the town's defenses and laying it open to attack—involved an uncertain number of other conspirators both within the walls and elsewhere, and the Dutch themselves were reinforcing their garrisons nearby "to better cover their design." T h e government had the alternative open to them of breaking up the conspiracy now by arresting the marshal and his wife or letting the conspiracy go on for a time in hope of discovering their accomplices, in order to punish them too. One of della Faille's contacts, a Frenchman, had offered to get more information about the project, being willing even to go so far as to board the ship when it entered Bois-le-duc and let himself be taken prisoner to learn more of the plot, provided the archdukes were willing to give him

4

About Spies and Such

"good assurances of his person." Delia Faille had a summary of the report made for the Archduke Albert, to inform him of the matter and to help him decide how best to cope with the situation. 1 Though the affair has a certain melodramatic interest, this sort of thing was commonplace and its outcome does not concern us here; but the report itself is a useful example of an important species. T h e government of the Spanish Netherlands received secret intelligence of this sort constantly, ranging from reports of rowdiness in the taverns of Brussels (which was considered incompatible with orderly government), to reports of the perennial plots to suborn one or another of the Spanish garrisons, to detailed accounts, often complete with diagrams, of newly invented siege engines the Dutch reportedly planned to use against Antwerp. T h e same was true also in Spain. T h e importance of this secret knowledge to the management of Spanish affairs is obvious—not only in maintaining their frontier positions (as in the case of Bois-le-duc) and governing their own lands, but in the broader field of European diplomacy as well. G o v ernments normally use espionage, of course, but the Spanish Habsburgs did it on a striking scale, and perhaps more striking than the quantity of secret intelligence they used was the even greater amount of material of all kinds, from formal advices of experts and ministers to old historical records to accounts of the latest rumors running through Europe—but with secret information always most important—which formed the "informational basis" for the high-level decisions made in Brussels and Madrid concerning both immediate action and long-term policy. This side of European history has received scant attention, and the same is true of the whole question of policymaking in the period, as distinct from policy itself. What follows is a study of that subject of policymaking (specifically at Madrid and Brussels) from about 1598 to about 1625, viewed from the inside and from the special point of view of information and its use. In any period such a study's focus ought to be on the power with the widest interests, whose policy decisions would generally have the greatest effect upon the course of events, and in this period

About Spies and Such

5

the predominant power of course is Spain—or, more properly speaking, the Spanish Habsburgs, including both Spain and the "Spanish Netherlands" under the Archdukes Albert and Isabella. For the area of their espionage in practice, the place to study is England, which was generally recognized as the head of Spain's Protestant opponents and largely for this reason provided the best locale for getting the information the Habsburgs needed. England was the main focus in these years not only of Spanish diplomacy but of that of many other powers, large and small, hostile to Spain or potentially so, whose representatives flocked to the court of James I seeking alliance or arbitration or on some other business. Knowledge of their activities and of a wide range of other matters was indispensable to the conduct of Spanish affairs. There were various French and Dutch negotiations to learn the secrets of; Dutch, Venetian, and Savoyard troop levies to keep track of; plans for incursions into the Indies (by French and Dutch as well as English) to discover before they could start; and the myriad developments in Germany to keep an eye on, ranging from reports from the Continent, to the activities of the Count Palatine's agents in England, to such lesser matters as the City of Brunswick's efforts to throw off its allegiance to the Duke of Brunswick (the duke, like many others, came seeking the aid of James I). In addition there was a constant stream of English envoys going forth to deal with Denmark, Sweden and Poland, Venice, Savoy and the Turk; the secrets of these missions Spain needed to know. All these things, and the various ways open for learning about them (discussed later on), served to make England the finest of hunting grounds for information vital to Spain. One might note parenthetically as well, in order to gauge the advantage these espionage activities gave Spain, that a comparable opportunity did not exist for England (or anyone else) in the Peninsula, for the Spanish normally conducted their most important diplomatic business through their ambassadors at other courts rather than through foreign ambassadors at Madrid. Even had this not been so, however, they still would have had the advantage, for

6

About

Spies and Such

the Spanish Habsburgs had a far-flung, well-organized, extremely effective network for gathering information, while English efforts and results were generally quite poor. The nations which should play the leading roles in such an examination thus dictate themselves, and so does the rest of the Dramatis Personae. In dealing, as we must, with the effect of particular intelligence reports on particular decisions, it is better to concentrate on matters involving third parties, as they offer more subtleties and ramifications than those involving the power at whose court the information was gained. So to round out the cast of nations the supporting roles fall naturally to the two powers most dangerous to Spain at the time, France and the United Provinces. The period at hand is an especially good one for a study of the subject, and can best be described as having two phases. The first begins with the Treaty of Vervins (or more properly with the negotiations leading up to it), embraces the Treaty of London (1604) and the cease-fire between Spain and the Dutch,2 and ends with the conclusion of the Truce of Antwerp in 1609: a time of peacemaking after a long period of general warfare. The second, damped with fears of even greater wars and filled with hasty, apprehensive formation of new alliances and reaffirmation of old ones, starts before Phase I is well completed and ends with the opening of the tangle of tragedies known collectively as the Thirty Years War. The first phase was one of peace settlements; the other was filled with doubts and fears about their permanence and even their desirability, and with nervous preparation for the return to general war which was widely expected. This had an important effect on the policymakers' job: in Phase I the main order of business was to decide whether or not to make peace, in Phase II to decide whether or not to begin war anew, which is really two ways of saying the same thing: that, although circumstances changed markedly around 1609, the ultimate policymaking question in the period was the very basic one of choosing between war and peace. This greatly simplified the business of policymaking, and that of gathering information for policymakers' consideration. What was needed most was intelligence about such

About Spies and Such

7

concrete specifics as fleets being readied for sea, money being raised to buy arms, troops being levied, armies on the move, and secret negotiations and secret plans concerning such things; the decisions to be taken, based on this information, were generally as concrete and specific as the information itself. Matters thus being simplified by the nature of the basic problem —though, as will be seen, it was only a relative simplicity—a period of open war might seem better to study, but the nature of "spying" (in all its forms) makes this untrue. Most important information, and almost all that was really crucial, had to be obtained in the enemy camp; otherwise it would be learned too late and possibly never, for much of it was available only there. And possibilities for getting it in the quantity and with the continuity necessary for it to be even adequate were simply too limited in wartime. This between-wars period, on the other hand, combined a preoccupation with the concrete data of warfare with the opportunity, which only peacetime conditions allowed, for getting such data in quantity. Formal peace meant greater freedom of movement, more (and more varied) contacts, a certain relaxing of security and, most important of all, the restoration of normal diplomatic relations. At the time of the peace settlements England exchanged resident envoys with both Spain and the Spanish Netherlands (as did France, but not the United Provinces), and most information, one way or another, was procured through them. There were free-lance spies as well, independent of resident envoys, and their effectiveness, including the volume of intelligence they sent, was greatly enhanced by peacetime conditions, not least of which was the operation of a regular mail service. One more observation, before plunging on. International affairs can be dealt with in grand generalities, and often perhaps justifiably —but not in the present case. Serious history must strive for accuracy, and the subject in hand, to be accurate, is less than abstruse. In examining the issues which had to be dealt with, problems involved, and the machinery and process of policymaking one is dealing with nothing more (perhaps more properly, nothing less)

8

About Spies and Such

than the down to earth components of diplomacy, of the day to day handling of one state's affairs with others, and in examining in turn the particular business of procurement and use of information as a basis for policymaking one is involved in what amounts to a spy story—for it is a time when the whole matter, as truly as in any period, can fairly be called the "diplomacy of intrigue."

PART ONE

The Context for Policymaking

The Peacemaking Phase and Its Product T o w a r d the end of the sixteenth century the major western European powers, all then at war, began a series of negotiations through which France, England, and the United Provinces all eventually made peace with the Spanish Habsburgs. Though it took more than a decade to complete, it was still a visible movement away from war. T h e very process of negotiating the first treaty, that of Vervins with France in 1598, may have given impetus to this movement, but perhaps more important, in an age in which international affairs were controlled b y a relative handful of key figures, was the continuing presence among them of an effective f e w determined to continue the effort toward settlement. This was especially important as those who dominated such affairs at the time of Vervins receded into the background or disappeared from the scene entirely: after the Franco-Spanish treaty Henry I V was of course no longer a principal; Philip II died shortly after that treaty was signed; and Elizabeth of England died in 1603. T h e English played a major role in arranging the first treaty, and Elizabeth continued to seek an acceptable settlement for England, and for the Dutch. 1 Neither had been achieved at the time of her death, but the trend toward settlement had already been enhanced by the emergence of the first of three new men in high places, each of whom, f o r his own reasons, sought peace. T h e earliest of this trio to appear on the scene was the Archduke

The Context for

Policymaking

Albert of Austria, who assumed the rule of the Spanish Netherlands in 1596, first as governor general, then, with the Archduchess Isabella, as sovereign ruler. During his first years of governing the Burgundian lands Albert fought the Dutch war tenaciously and bravely, but with little success: the main thing his efforts brought him (besides an undeserved reputation as an incompetent soldier) was a firm conviction that the war was causing much more misery for his people than a victory over the rebels could ever be worth— if indeed such a victory was possible. H e was also convinced that it was in the Habsburgs' interest to make peace with England as well. In both cases he was far ahead of opinion in Madrid, and of that of some of his own counselors in Brussels. There was a special reason for reluctance to make peace with England so long as Elizabeth lived, for many believed that her death would bring a disputed succession, civil war, and an opportunity to intervene and place a Catholic on the throne. When a peaceful succession dissolved these sanguine hopes, that obstacle to Albert's peacemaking plans was removed. An even better augury was the attitude of the new king, James V I and I, for he soon disspelled any doubts that remained (and a great many did) about his distaste for war and his disgust for those who, as he saw it, wished everyone at war to help them gain their own ends. When the Venetians, for example, wanted him to join them in their feud with the Austrian Habsburgs over the Adriatic hinterland, he could not see w h y he should get himself into a w a r to give them peace. 2 Not only did James's attitude give Albert encouragement; his actions provided opportunity. Since James V I of Scotland had never been at war with Spain he was not personally involved, and by the time he became James I of England there remained little at issue between his new kingdom and Spain save English claims to a right to trade to the Indies. Acting decisively, he ordered an end to hostilities by royal proclamation. 3 Albert and Isabella had been carrying on a friendly exchange of letters with both James and Queen Anne for some years, 4 and this simplified matters for the archdukes—as well as for James, who

The Peacemaking Phase

»3

was willing enough to negotiate. Albert took the initiative, dragging a reluctant Spain behind him. He sent a blue-ribbon body of peace commissioners off to London, leaving the truculent government in Madrid with little choice but to send a mission of its own. 5 James held out for some time and managed to obtain favorable commercial terms for the English, though he failed in his efforts to have them cover Dutch merchants as well.® T h e Dutch were indeed not included at all in the Treaty of London (signed in August of 1604), but they were well represented in London during the negotiations for it—in fact, James arrived to ascend the English throne only a f e w days before Frederick Henry (brother to Prince Maurice and youngest son of William the Silent) and Jan van Oldenbarneveldt arrived at the head of a Dutch delegation 7 —and their case was much discussed. During the next few years both Albert and James, each for his own reasons and in his own way, pressed hard to achieve that third and last settlement. Meanwhile, yet another man who was interested in securing and preserving peace, and in a key position for bringing it about, had come on the scene—from a somewhat surprising quarter. In 1602 Federigo Spinola, naval commander in the Spanish Netherlands, planned and began mounting an invasion of England. It was a bold project that involved seizing and holding two English ports while reinforcements and supplies were ferried across the Channel as opportunity served, thus avoiding a fatal dependence on precise timing, a major weakness of earlier projects. It was, on the whole, probably as sensible a plan as any that had been devised for an attack on the island. Spinola's main problem in making his preparations, as was usual with Spanish projects, was a lack of money. His procedure for filling this need was not unusual f o r the times, but the eventual results of it were. Federigo wrote to his older brother Ambrogio, a banker in their home town of Genoa, asking him to pay for the invasion. T h e stay-at-home brother (who long had yearned for a military career) agreed to supply the money, but on condition that he be given command of all the land forces involved. Money and kin-

H

The Context for Policymaking

ship being of more weight in the matter than military experience, this was agreed to, and Ambrogio, taking up the soldier's life, set out with a body of troops to join his brother. T h e story so far has all the markings of an ordinary case of nepotism and venality in the bestowing of a military command, but at this point the plot took an unlikely turn. First the Dutch attacked the invasion fleet in its anchorage and a savage fight ensued which the attackers won handily. Federigo fought from the forecastle of one of his ships; a cannonball tore off his right arm, he was riddled by the fragments of his own shattered sword, and in two hours he was dead. His armada was left a shambles and the invasion was called off, but almost immediately his brother was given the most important command to be had at the time in any of the Spanish forces. 8 At the time, the Dutch war centered on the siege of Ostend, an operation which Albert himself was directing. It was a long and difficult affair in which the Spanish had been faring badly. W h e n the archduke decided to give over the task to another he surprised most everyone by ignoring his many proven commanders and appointing Spinola instead. Contrary to general expectation (the appointment dumfounded Madrid) it proved to be an excellent choice. While Albert was pressing his negotiations for a treaty with England, Spinola was performing the military feat of the age and establishing his reputation as a military genius by taking Ostend, while Europe watched in amazement.9 Ambrogio Spinola was the Marquis de Sesto and later became the first Marquis de los Balbases, a title created for him by the king of Spain; the thoroughness with which he was accepted on his own merits, as a "self-made man," is emphasized by the extreme rarity with which even the latter title was used by his contemporaries. He was simply—incorrectly but flatteringly—"the Marquis Spinola." T h e importance he quickly attained and the unique position he held in the minds of others is underlined further by the fact that even this much was seldom specified: for most people, including the archdukes and the king of Spain, it was sufficiently clear to refer just to "the marquis."

The Peacemaking Phase

15

Perhaps the best testimony of all to Spinola's stature was the speed with which resentment of the parvenu faded away among the career soldiers he had superseded, and the readiness and ease with which these proud, often volatile commanders—even the hotblooded Luis Velasco—worked in harness under the new captaingeneral of the army of Flanders. These men were thoroughly sure of their own abilities (sometimes to the point of arrogance) and they sought military glory and high command with great eagerness, but they knew a soldier when they saw one and recognized their master in Ambrogio Spinola.10 But Spinola, the master of warfare, regretted the destructive consequences of war, for victor as well as for vanquished, as much as Albert did; the general much preferred peace. This now made three highly placed men seeking peace, to whom should be added Albert's right-hand man Juan de Mancicidor, head of the powerful "secretariat of state and war" which the Spanish maintained in the Netherlands. With the king of Spain dead set against making peace with the rebel Dutch, along with many of his councilors in Madrid and not a few in Brussels, with no one ever sure of the king of France's intentions, and with counsels bitterly divided among the Dutch, it was of considerable importance to the course of events that these four men—the king of England, the ruler of the Spanish Netherlands, the commander of the army of Flanders (the force upon which fighting the rebels devolved), and the principal Spanish minister on the scene (Mancicidor)—all strongly desired peace. A cease-fire was arranged with the Dutch soon after the Treaty of London; Albert sent off a delegation with Spinola as its head and Mancicidor as a member to negotiate with the commissioners of the Estates General of the United Provinces; with the participation of English and French ministers "who played the role of mediators and whose patience was several times put to the test" peace was finally arranged.11 It was not an easy thing for Albert. He first had to swallow the bitter pill of accepting (if not formally recognizing) the independence of the rebel provinces, and of accepting as well the Dutch

16

The Context for

Policymaking

blockade of the port of Antwerp; then he twice had to send his confessor to Spain to extract a ratification from the reluctant Philip I I I . " T h e treaty made with the Dutch was not, in fact, even a true peace settlement, according to conventional usage. Though it contained the various stipulations one generally finds in a peace treaty it was really only an extension of the cease-fire which already existed, only a simple truce made for a limited number of years. But the twelve-year period ( 1 6 0 9 - 2 1 ) specified in the T r u c e of Antwerp was considerably better than nothing; it was longer in fact than the lifetime of a good many "perpetual" treaties. And, most significant, the major western powers were all once more at peace with one another, and as thoroughly so as the times would allow. This last, however, is a considerable qualification. H o w very relative this peace was is demonstrated by the many disputes which persisted and by the amount of warfare which continued to occur in fact, though not in name. In northern Italy, especially in the Alps, the struggle between Spain, the emperor, and their local protégés on the one hand and France, Savoy, Venice, and their protégés on the other went on unabated, giving rise to a long series of international crises and local bloodlettings. Other regions produced their full quotas of crises as well, but among those which preceded that of Bohemia and the beginning of the Thirty Years W a r , the one which arose over the disputed succession to Cleves-Jülich was as important as any and may serve as a definition by example of the term "peace" in these years. T h e "indivisible" complex of territories generally referred to by the name of one or both of these duchies (but which contained much else) was a collection of various lands much like the larger one put together by the House of Burgundy and, like the latter, was destined for partition. 13 Since it spread across one of the strategically most important areas in Europe, the reason f o r the attention the succession to it received from the major powers is not far to seek.

The

Peacemaking

Phase

'7

The main issue at stake was control of the two broad, angular wedges of land between the Meuse and the Rhine, and the Rhine and the Lippe. The former, lying in the borderland between the Spanish Netherlands and Germany proper, covered the northern half of the Spanish Netherlands' eastern flank and overlapped the inland flank of the Great River defense line, the effective military barrier formed by the Meuse, Rhine, and Waal (a channel of the Rhine) below the point where they turned westward toward the sea (the formal frontier between the Spanish Netherlands and the United Provinces was somewhat south of this). The easternmost provinces held by the archdukes were almost wholly in this between-the-rivers wedge which the Spanish Habsburgs called the "Over-Meuse": 14 Spanish Gelderland, in the north, spreading across the bend of the Meuse, and Limburg, covering much of the southwest part of the triangle. This gave the Spanish a substantial foothold in this crucial area; holding these territories they also held the two principal strongholds on the Meuse, Venlo in Spanish Gelderland and Maastricht in Limburg; and with the Electorate of Cologne stretched out along the left bank of the Rhine the eastern edge of the triangle was in friendly hands (the bishop-elector was Ferdinand of Bavaria, brother of Maximilian of Bavaria, head of the allied Catholic princes in Germany). Yet the Spanish position was not good, for in the middle of all this sprawled the large Protestant Duchy of Jiilich, taking up about half the area between the rivers, not only lying across the route from the Spanish Netherlands to Cologne and to that part of the Rhine, but jutting out to the west between Spanish Gelderland and Limburg and to the northwest deep into Spanish Gelderland itself, almost to the key bastion, Venlo. With the Duchy of Jiilich in friendly hands, even if not their own, the Habsburgs' military position in the area could hardly have been improved upon; with it in hostile hands their strategic position was, at best, very difficult. This alone would have drawn the Habsburgs—and their enemies—into any dispute over a questionable succession, but there were other lands involved as well. The Lippe flowed due west to the Rhine on a line with the lower Meuse, putting the Rhine-Lippe junction (not too far east

The Overmeuse •

T h e Cleves-Jülich Patrimony

Area

The Peacemaking Phase

19

of the Meuse bend) on the same latitude as the southernmost part of the Great River barrier—an important flanking position in any Spanish-Dutch conflict. This junction was dominated b y a third key stronghold, Wesel; later, for a time, it was perhaps most important of the three. T h e Rhine-Lippe junction and Wesel, and the area for some distance around, were all included in the Duchy of Cleves; that duchy also extended westward beyond the Rhine as far as the Meuse bend, covering the entire area on the eastern flank of the Great River line, from Spanish Gelderland north to the Waal. If Cleves was second to Jülich in military importance, it was so by a narrow margin. T h e "Cleves-Jülich" patrimony included three other large units of some strategic importance: Berg, Mark, and Ravensberg. 1 5 Across the Rhine from the Electorate of Cologne was the large triangle of land between the Rhine and the Lippe, a strategically important slice of territory because it lay along, and sometimes across, a considerable length of the Rhine, because of its nearness to the RhineLippe junction and Wesel, and because it lay between the Catholic Netherlands and central and northern Germany. T h e tip of this triangle, at the Rhine-Lippe junction, lay in Cleves; except for an isolated enclave belonging to the Electorate of Cologne, the rest was taken up by the Duchy of Berg, its frontier on the Rhine, and the contiguous County of Mark, extending to the north bank of the Lippe. T o the northeast of this lay the fifth large unit, the County of Ravensberg, beginning near the Ems and extending to the northeast all the w a y to the Weser, putting a major section of the patrimony deep in the heart of north-central Germany. It was in this setting, with the signing of the Spanish-Dutch truce still two weeks in the future, that the succession crisis arose when, on March 25, 1609, the duke of Cleves died without issue. T h e principal claimants were two of his Lutheran in-laws, the elector of Brandenburg and the Count Palatine of Neuburg. 1 6 These lands, especially Cleves, Jülich, and Berg, had by this time been "très travaillés" by the Reformation, and it was expected at first that in the hands of either Protestant claimant, Brandenburg or

2o

The Context for

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Neuburg, the last chance of returning them to the Roman Church would be lost, a factor which may have contributed to the hectic manner in which the question was handled from the beginning. Almost simultaneously the emperor insisted that the matter be settled by an imperial court, Brandenburg and Neuburg reached an agreement between themselves (the Compromise of Dortmund), and imperial troops were rushed into the City of Jülich. T h e latter move served to turn the muddled affair into a serious international crisis as French intervention loomed, Henry I V preparing to send a force to drive out the imperial troops. On February 12, 1610, he signed an alliance with the Protestant princes of Germany, pledging himself to match their 4,000 foot and 1,000 horse, and to double this force if his Protestant allies themselves were attacked in return. 17 As armies went at the time, this was a fairly large force, and any fighting which commenced on that scale would almost certainly turn into a major war. There were indications, in fact, that such a war was what the French king had in mind. On the Habsburg side, Spinola and the archdukes, on whose shoulders any serious fighting against the French would fall, knew as well as anyone the importance to their cause and their interests of the Cleves-Jülich succession, but they also knew their own financial and military condition at the moment, and they wanted no war. Yet it seemed they could not escape one, though they had barely returned to peace: on April 25, 1610, when Henry signed an offensive treaty with Charles-Emmanuel of Savoy, "the irons were in the fire, and everything ready to accomplish the Grand Design, not of Sully but of Henry I V . " T h e imperial forces were increasing; the German Protestant forces began to march; early in May, Henry demanded free passage through Luxemburg, placing the archdukes neatly on the horns of a dilemma. But a week later (May 14) Henry was dead, stabbed when on the point of departure, and the situation was radically changed. 18 With Henry suddenly gone and the problems of a regency upon them the French were not nearly so eager for war, yet France was publicly committed to the expedition and could not with honor abandon it entirely. But the archdukes, w h o were rather

The Peacemaking Phase good at avoiding unwanted wars, found a w a y out of this French dilemma, and their own as well. Playing their cards carefully, they allowed the passage through Luxemburg that had been requested for the French forces; the French, apparently taking the hint as well as the opportunity, sent only a token force. T h e imperial troops were withdrawn, and a compromise settlement was reached in the treaty of March 18, 1 6 1 1 . 1 9 This settlement, patterned after the Compromise of Dortmund, created a condominium under which, among other provisions, both of the "Possessor Princes" were allowed to keep troops in the City of Jülich. Such an arrangement would be of doubtful duration under the best of conditions; its end was hastened when both princes changed their religions, moving, in doing so, to the opposite ends of the spectrum. Ernst von Brandenburg, the elector's vicegerent on the scene, turned Calvinist as early as 1610 and began actively fostering the Reformation in spite of Neuburg's opposition, and the Elector Johann Sigismund himself followed suit toward the end of 1 6 1 3 ; meanwhile Neuburg turned Catholic. This gave Brandenburg the support of the Dutch, Neuburg that of Philip III, the archdukes, and Spinola. In 1613 W o l f g a n g Wilhelm of Neuburg added further to the support he might count on by marrying the sister of the duke of Bavaria, head of the Catholic princes of Germany. In the circumstances, in spite of long-standing friction between the Possessors, and a serious falling-out between them in 1613, one would not have expected Brandenburg to entertain any very ambitious plans. Y e t "one fine day in May, 1 6 1 4 " he reopened the crisis by chasing Neuburg's Catholic garrison out of Jülich, and the fat was once more in the fire. Spinola, based on Maastricht and Venlo, moved promptly on the free city of Aix-la-Chapelle in Jülich and on Wesel in Cleves at the Rhine-Lippe junction. T h e Dutch predictably moved to counter the Spanish forces. But Spinola did not want to fight the Dutch on any scale that might be considered a breach of the truce made with them in 1609; after considerable negotiation a treaty was signed at Xanten, in Cleves, in November of 1614. Yet even the Treaty of

22

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for

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Xanten did not end the matter, and in the following years there continued to be rashes of violence and of occupying and reoccupying of key positions by force by both sides. But in spite of all this military activity, no one considered that the truce between the two combating parties had been violated. Nor was the armed intervention of the Dutch a few years later in the Palatinate war, once more fighting Spinola's army, considered a formal violation of the "peace."20

International Quarrels, Religious and Irreligious The period dealt with in the present study was very much caught up in the counterstreams of Reformation and Counter-Reformation: one must wait until 1620, almost the end of the period, to reach even the halfway mark between the Peace of Augsburg and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. It was predictably a time when religion was a major factor in international affairs; such matters as preserving and extending the reformed religion or stamping out that heresy and reestablishing the old faith (depending on the point of view) were missions of great importance. Gaston Zeller describes these basic religious issues as emerging then from a period of quiescence. At each Imperial Diet in recent times, Protestants and Catholics had argued over the manner of execution of the Peace of Augsburg, but everyone knew that to put the principle of cuius regio eius religio itself in question would automatically reopen the religious civil war in Germany, so no one ever spoke of that. But beginning in 1608 the principle began to be disputed again, and "on one side and the other, from that moment on, they began to prepare for war." 1 The replacement of Pope Clement VIII (1592-1605), "pacifique médiateur," by Paul V (1605-21), "in whom lived again the ideas and the ideal of Gregory V I I and of Innocent III," has been cited as a prime factor in this;2 but the resurgence at this time of the fundamental disputes of Reformation and Counter-Reformation was not entirely a case of renewed aggressiveness. There was in this

24

The Context for

Policymaking

period, as has been described in the previous chapter, a considerable desire for peace. But at the same time there was little real faith that it would last, and, just as the Cleves-Jülich crisis began before the Truce of Antwerp was signed, the series of peace settlements between 1598 and 1609 had not yet been completed when there began an overlapping series of new military alliances, accompanied by the preparations for war which Zeller describes (for Germany) as having become inevitable. T h e first of these alliances was the Evangelical Union formed among the Protestant princes of Germany in 1608, which soon had a counterpoise in a similar Catholic Union (generally referred to as "League," not "Union"). And, although there was aggressiveness aplenty to be found at the time, the formation of the opposing unions should probably be credited less to religious militancy than to widespread apprehension on both sides. In such dangerously unstable times it was natural that small states should seek shelter in a larger group, and it seems likely that almost any apparent threat to one of the religions would have served to start the banding together. T h e incident which Zeller singles out as having precipitated this movement is the sending of troops by Maximilian of Bavaria in 1608 to occupy Donauwörth and protect the Catholics there, which led to the formation of the Evangelical Union because of a need felt for self-defense among German Protestants, which in turn led to the formation of a countervailing alliance of German Catholics headed by Maximilian. 3 This alignment according to religion was b y no means limited to Germany alone. In Europe as a whole "les deux protectorats" were widely recognized—that of England over the Continental Protestants and that of Spain over all Catholics, the latter exercised mostly by the archdukes when it involved Catholics in England or English Catholics on the Continent. 4 Yet religion was far relations, and it alone European states. One this was the alignment

from the only force at work in international formed no clear-cut line of cleavage among of the more conspicuous demonstrations of of the major western powers behind the t w o

International

Quarrels

25

German unions, one or the other of which, officially or unofficially, those powers either soon joined or promised to support. England and the United Provinces predictably aligned themselves with the Protestant Union, the Spanish Habsburgs, as well as the Austrian branch, with the League. But the alignment of Catholic France was another matter. Henry I V is supposed to have said that there were three things he did not believe: that Queen Elizabeth was really a virgin, that the Archduke Albert was a great soldier, and that the king of Spain was a good Catholic. 5 Whether Henry really said this or not, the king of Spain might pass in some quarters as the universal protector of Catholics and Catholicism, but the king of France took another view of Spanish motives in foreign affairs. For Henry, Habsburg power was not the secular arm of the Roman Church, but the military means of attaining Spain's own secular ambitions, of maintaining the "Spanish preponderance," of completing Habsburg domination of Europe in the footsteps of Charles V ; it was a danger to France (and an impediment to her own grandeur). France backed the Evangelical Union and opposed the Catholic League. This French alignment with Protestant powers against the Habsburgs was quite consistently followed. France as well as England guaranteed the Truce of Antwerp by separate treaties with the Dutch, and the ties between these two guaranteeing powers were made closer still, shortly after the death of Henry I V , by an AngloFrench defensive league.6 Henry was rather less than zealous, of course, in matters of faith, but nothing more need be read into his actions than into those of others in his time, including his opponents, for, pious protestations notwithstanding, their actions did not differ greatly from his; he was just being realistic about the world in which he had to conduct his diplomacy. And in that world, though the religious issue was the most conspicuous and perhaps the most dangerous, it was not the only area of friction, not the only issue in dispute, and thus, though it was a factor in most questions, there was nevertheless a limit to the relevance of religion in international affairs.

26

The Context for

Policymaking

As suggested above, France was not the only one to break ranks, from the point of view of religious alignment. Spain herself spent most of this period in one stage or another of the famous marriage negotiations with heretic England, though any use of that complicated affair as an example must be hedged with many qualifications. A better example can be taken from affairs touching Spain's interests in northern Europe, where her problems included such specific ones as alliance of the Hanse towns with the Dutch and such general ones as the permanent need for foodstuffs and naval stores from the Baltic. In an effort to solve these, Spain spent a good part of the period negotiating with Protestant Denmark—whose king was brother-in-law to James I, "head of all the heretics of Europe"—a long affair which included both Danish missions to Spain and the Spanish Netherlands and Habsburg missions to Denmark. 7 And the Dutch, who had no formal relations with Madrid, made several attempts to get permission to maintain a permanent commercial consulate in Spain—requests which the Spanish gave long and careful consideration, though finally refusing each time. Negotiating with and seeking ties with states across the religious line was only one side of this non-confessional aspect. Open rivalry, sometimes open fighting, between states of the same religion was perhaps of even more consequence—perhaps to the events of the time, more surely to the eventually fairly complete (though, alas, not permanent) removal of ideology from its position of influence on foreign affairs. T h e most conspicuous case of this among the Protestants was the growing rivalry between the English and Dutch, especially in the Indies, in the whaling grounds off Spitzbergen, and in the fishing grounds off Scotland and England, as well as in the markets, both new and old, on the Continent. Some aspects of this rivalry, which did much to complicate the forming of a common front against the Catholic Habsburgs, will be touched on later as they intrude themselves into the affairs dealt with. On the Catholic side, the Spanish had to live with the fact that the Milanese, the key central stronghold in their attenuated, dis-

International

Quarrels

27

jointed "empire" in Europe, was flanked on both sides by fellowCatholics to whom religion meant little in foreign affairs. T h e republic on the eastern flank was by long tradition "Venetian first, Catholic second"; on the western flank the alignment of Savoy was seemingly dictated by even narrower self-interest, for the opportunistic duke, following what also came to be a traditional "policy," was concerned with advantage to himself and to his dynasty first, to his Church (if ever) apparently dead last. Spain's most potent rival of all, the one who eventually brought her European preponderance crashing down, was of course France— the eldest daughter of the Church. France's anti-Habsburg posture was, to be sure, not a new one, and even though conditions within France gave Spain a breathing space during these years, the Spanish had no illusions about the course events would sooner or later take; they placed the reconquest of the County of Artois, for example, on the French agenda of delayed-but-certain expansionist moves long before France was in any position to consider it seriously herself. Each of the three main Spanish treaties in the period restored commercial relations with the power in question; each time the agreement proved to work to the fiscal disadvantage of the Spanish; it also proved each time, by widening the area of contact, to be a major source of trouble. Vervins was no exception to this, and commerce 8 provided a principal area of conflict between France and the Spanish Habsburgs. It also provides an excellent example of the intertwining of religious motives, economic factors, and plain power politics in the conduct of foreign affairs at the time. In the years between the peace with France and the truce with the Dutch the principal route for a good deal of Spain's imports was that of transshipment through France, in order to evade Dutch sea power. This made peace and peacetime commerce with France seem, at first, a great advantage to Spain, but it also led to a vulnerable position of dependence upon French cooperation. This dependence was increased by Albert's reluctance to permit wartime commerce with the rebel provinces for the large-scale imports without which the southern Netherlands could not survive. Spain herself imported directly from France as well.

28

The Context for

Policymaking

Holding this advantage, France plagued her neighbors to north and south—especially before the truce of 1609 and the death the next year of the aggressive Henry IV—with an erratic medley of tariff wars and economic blackmail (by threats of tariff increases, of prohibitions, and so forth), a disruptive and damaging struggle in which the Habsburgs, economically weak, fought back as best they could. 9 These commercial conflicts between nations of the same religion serve to illustrate the limits which temporal interests, or at least temporal factors, imposed upon religion as a guide in international affairs, but there is an important difference between the two cases. As the two greatest seafaring nations of the time, England and the Dutch had the greatest conflict of interests and the most deepseated economic rivalry, and, as these interests led them to the same places (the Indies, the fishing and whaling grounds, the cloth marts of Europe), their rivalry was a matter of constant encounter and their "conflict of interests" burst frequently into conflict of the most literal sort, with losses and grievances measured in the concrete terms of money, ships, and men. Compared to this, the degree of real economic rivalry between France and Spain was trivial. T h e main cause of economic conflict between the latter pair was simply the French use of an economic weapon in a rivalry that had little to do with economic interests: economic factors seem to have been about as nonoperative in dividing France and Spain as religious ones were in bringing them together. From the point of view of events of the preceding years, the difference between the two cases is at least symbolized by the fact that one commercial conflict was between former allies while the other was between former enemies. Viewed over a longer span of time this difference is even more apparent: later in the century the English and Dutch fought open "trade wars" just as they had earlier fought more than one open battle over the same conflicts of material interests, but the end of the century saw them fighting once more alongside each other against the winner of that other, noncommercial rivalry. One may venture a twentieth-century generalization which only repeats what was then widely considered

International

Quarrels

29

an obvious fact of life, one which was not only frequently stated but often treated as an axiom by the makers of foreign policy: that, regardless of the fluctuations in day-to-day relationships, England and the United Provinces were not only former allies but were natural allies, France and Spain not only former enemies but natural enemies. The present study being concerned with these four powers' relations with each other—more specifically with Spain's relations with the other three, more specifically still with one aspect of her contact with one of them (her information-gathering activities in England) and its effect on her policy-making regarding the other two—this distinction is of some importance. For in practice conflicts of interest and disputes arising over them had a much more limited effect on current developments when they occurred between former and future allies against the predominant power in Europe than did similar conflicts and disputes, even those of lesser substance, between one of those three powers and the former enemy, the predominant power. T h e effect of the former type of frictions, in practice, was merely to hamper cooperation against Spain; the effect of the latter type was to produce a constant series of crises which repeatedly threatened a renewal of war. This circumstance has been extended to more general terms because mention has been made so far of only two of the six possible combinations of these four powers in bilateral disputes of the sort in question. The remaining two between former allies (France and England, France and the Dutch) may be passed over here as of little consequence, but not so the final two, between Spain and her two Protestant former enemies. Not all of these secular areas of contact were of a sort to lead directly to real war-threatening crises, but their cumulative effect cannot be ignored. From 1612 on, for example, relations between England and the Spanish Netherlands were seriously complicated by extended negotiations, arguments, and litigation over commercial and financial matters. The main questions involved were the return of the English cloth staple to the archdukes' territory and the repayment of an ancient debt which the Estates General had incurred

3°

The

Context for

Policymaking

(in 1577) under vastly different circumstances; the only practical results of entering into these questions were to provide a large area of friction in one case and considerable irritation in the other. Even those cases in which one party was clearly the offender often served to complicate relations, sometimes seriously, without really threatening to bring on hostilities over the issues in question alone. Discriminatory tariffs applied in Spain in violation of treaty agreements were a typical Spanish offense on this intermediate level. English handling of piracy cases involving Spanish victims provides an example on that side. The Dutch, who offended often, provide several. One of the things which rankled the Habsburgs most was the blockade of the Scheldt; both Brussels and Madrid dreamed of reopening the mouth of the river and returning Antwerp to its former greatness as a center of commerce and finance. It was a matter which touched both the Habsburg economy and the Habsburg honor—but the damage and the dishonor had been done, in a sense, by the Habsburgs themselves when they agreed to the closure as a condition of the truce; the Dutch blockade was merely one of the many armed precautions taken on both sides to insure compliance with that (or any) treaty. It was assumed that Spanish arms would one day force the Dutch to give up the closure, just as it was assumed that force of arms would someday bring the rebels back to their proper allegiance, but the Spanish calculated by generations and centuries and they had no intention of breaking a much-needed truce of only twelve years to bring about a bit sooner either the one or the other. The issue was not worth a war for other reasons as well. On the one hand, no one deceived himself that the City of Antwerp would regain its former glory and wealth, even with free access to its port, without a major cloth mart there, preferably the old Merchant Adventurers' staple—and long negotiations for the return of that staple from Middleburg and elsewhere continued to fail. On the other hand, the "blockade" did not really prevent ships from entering the port; exemptions from the ban could be had readily enough for cash. In the end, one has only to look at the

International

Quarrels

3i

elaborate and expensive canal project, beginning at Ostend and designed to skirt the blockaded estuary of the Scheldt, to see the degree to which the blockade's continuance had been accepted. Another Dutch practice which angered the Habsburgs was their persistent smuggling, both of legitimate imports to avoid paying the tariffs (always high, generally thirty percent) and of prohibited goods (the heretic rebels' traffic in religious images was especially resented in the Catholic Netherlands). But as thorny as any such problem was the Dutch smuggling of counterfeit coins into Spain. Especially in the peninsula there was a desperate need both for currency reform itself and for a remedy for the treasury's chronic shortage of silver. A solution was attempted by expanding the supply of vellon. The idea was to put a large issue of devalued copper coins into circulation in order simultaneously to relieve the shortage of small money (which was hampering the economy) ;;nd to bring to the surface the large quantities of domestically hoarded silver (which, it was hoped, would be channeled into the treasury by the attractive exchange rates established for the government's copper). But the Dutch, never ones to pass up a chance to do damage to Spain (especially when they could make money at it), intruded themselves unofficially into this official currency operation, unloading in the peninsula large quantities of "Spanish" coins of their own making. Since the Dutch coins bore the same face value but had carefully been given a greater intrinsic value than the official ones— causing the Spanish to lament their inability to obtain copper of a high enough quality to compete with the brash interlopers—this phony money was in great demand, while the king's coin was humiliatingly ignored. The Dutch not only turned a neat profit in the operation and made off with a good deal of silver for which the king of Spain was desperate, but added insult to injury by reversing Gresham's Law, driving the king's bad money out of the market with their own "good" counterfeit product.10 But in terms of its potential as a possibly serious cause of war, the frequent seizure of ships, goods, and men (especially English)

32

The

Context

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Policymaking

in Spain was a much more serious matter. T h e seizures of men were sometimes made by the Inquisition, although the security of Protestant sailors and merchants had been guaranteed in the Treaty of London (the terms of which were followed in the Truce of Antwerp), under the assumption that they would cause no "religious scandal." Their manner of conduct was prescribed sev eral times by the English government (for example: stay off the streets when religious processions are passing, to avoid giving offense by not showing reverence to the images), but it is not clear—to the present writer at least—how well they obeyed; it seems certain in some cases, however, that the overzealous English Protestants brought their troubles on themselves. At any rate, one can generally find a couple of dozen or so Englishmen pulling oars in Spanish galleys, most of whom probably reached there through the hands of the Inquisition—but this religious side-effect of trade with Spain is minor compared with the entanglements of merchants in the Spanish legal system. Through ignorance or intent the English trading to Spain broke many customs regulations and other laws, and many were arrested for real or supposed infractions. By Spanish legal procedure, if the defendant were convicted the goods in question (often an entire cargo and the ship itself) were immediately divided equally among the judge, the informer, and the crown, a custom which led to a high percentage of convictions by corrupt local judges. T h e defendant could appeal his conviction to the higher courts in Madrid, which were famous for their honesty (hardly a single English case was appealed unsuccessfully), but the procedure was so long and involved that a decision generally took two or three years. During this delay either the merchant or his agent had to be present, and only the wealthiest could afford the expense. But even a successful appeal was of little avail. T h e informer was almost always a pauper, and even if he could be found there was no hope of recovering his third of the goods. The judge had likely been transferred by now, perhaps to the Indies; if not, it was difficult to get the law to act against a powerful judge sitting in his own court. T h e king's third was generally the only part of the loss

International

Quarrels

33

there was any chance of recovering, but the treasury was so low that it usually took another two or three years to obtain payment on the royal warrants. 11 T h e merchants caught in the toils of this system often turned to privateering to recover their losses, with Spanish shipping their target, and with "letters of marque and reprisal" legitimizing their raids.12 But the Spanish were more concerned with the damage being done to them by these raiders than impressed by such legalistic niceties as letters of marque; the English might make fine distinctions and call their activities "privateering," but to the Spanish victims it was all piracy. T h e Spanish struck back where they could, which called forth more English reprisals, then Spanish, the whole matter becoming an endless chain of self-generating hostility. T h e way was opened for such disputes by the commercial clauses of the peace treaties, which allowed the English (and the Dutch as well) to resume trading with the Habsburg lands in Europe. An even greater source of trouble was the question of traffic with Spain's empire outside Europe—a sore subject on both sides, and one whose ghost pervades the treaties although not a word is mentioned about it. T h e trouble is hardly surprising. When one finds the greater part of the globe in the domain of a single monarch, one whose grip on his far-flung empire is most tenuous but who nevertheless is determined to deny access to it to the two most powerful seafaring nations in the world, and this at a time when their power is in the ascendant and his in decline, they in a belligerent mood, bold and eager for expansion, refusing to be denied, and he with more lands than he can well preserve, more fronts than he can well defend, then conflict between them seems inevitable—though the course that convict took often seems grotesque. Spain's overseas empire was certainly worth fighting to keep, or fighting to gain a share of. Besides Brazil and Atlantic islands, everything east of the Cape of Good Hope was the exclusive domain of the crown of Portugal, an area rich in many products but above all in spices, a commodity which brought extremely high prices in

34

The Context for

Policymaking

Europe and rivaled silver and gold as a magnet to attract unwanted interlopers, f o r one good trip could make a trader's fortune. In the Western Hemisphere, everything that was not Portuguese was in the domain of the Spanish crown, lands which contained such riches as the hardwood forests of the Mosquito Coast and the silver lodes of Mexico and Peru. Since 1580 both crowns and both empires belonged to the king of Spain. One would not have expected him to agree amiably to share these riches with others, and since they were his by right it was less than obvious to him that he should. But there were other reasons, and sound ones, for wanting to keep the Dutch and English out. Religion was one. T o admit Protestants into the Indies would be to allow the seed of heresy to be planted, but the problem went deeper than that. It was one thing to permit heretic traders into the Spanish peninsula under close surveillance; quite another to allow them into far-off lands where their conduct could not be controlled and where, in the case of the English especially, the danger was of permanent and growing colonies, not just of occasional trading stations. And, matters of conscience aside, the overseas empire was hard enough to govern as it was, without adding a body of Dutch rebels and English Puritans; the Spanish had already had some little experience with the former, the latter gave little enough obedience to their own king, and neither could be expected, in the Indies, to be either loyal subjects or peaceful neighbors to the Spanish crown. T h e king of Spain, in sum, had no desire to match the king of France in the size of his "Huguenot problem." These considerations of conscience and of political stability would have sufficed to dictate a prohibition; so would the simple matter of guarding the riches of the Indies, for the Spanish treasury was in chronic and desperate need of its prescribed share of all the silver mined in the N e w World (though a good deal of the treasure shipped went undeclared and entered Europe without payment of the crown's percentage), and the rickety Spanish economy could not survive without the remainder. T h e desire

International Quarrels

35

that the Spanish economy should get both the direct profit and the indirect stimulation which the Indies trade would provide, and avoid a fatal specie drain in the process, as well as the desire that the practice of this trade should serve to build up Spanish naval strength, all provided additional motives, motives accompanied by a converse disinclination to strengthen potential (and probable) enemies, already too powerful by far in Spanish eyes, by yielding these same advantages to them. Both Portugal and Spain had in the past wielded great power at sea, and they were far from contemptible still, especially now that they were united. But the peninsula faced two ways, and a good part of the Spanish naval strength not only was needed in the Mediterranean but, for service under sailing conditions there, had to be made up largely of vessels (especially galleys) which were badly suited, sometimes almost worthless, for use west of Gibraltar. And the rest, the ocean fleets, were inadequate for patrolling so vast an empire and monopolizing its trade. 13 Traffic to the Indies was an official operation, and all ships going there were either the king's own or acting for him under license. Thus he had complete logic on his side in his fixed reply to the constant demands of others for free entry into this enormous restricted preserve: if his own subjects were not allowed to go there, why should foreigners be? It is amusing, in view of this firm determination to keep others out, to read the steady stream of instructions to the archdukes from the master of this great domain, urging them on to greater efforts in the recruiting of Dutch pilots to guide Spanish fleets to the Indies.14 That the king of Spain, hating the rebels as he did, would bring himself to this admits the very real inadequacy of Spanish sea power; but there are better indexes of naval strength. A more important implication contained in the king's frequent quest for rebel pilots is the tacit admission that the Dutch knew their way around the forbidden Indies better than the Spanish did themselves. And this was the actual case, for the Dutch would not be denied, and neither would the English. Illicit trading had been going on with both Indies for some

3*

The Context for

Policymaking

time. T h e various Dutch companies trading to the east merged, improving their effectiveness, in 1602, two years after the various English traders had likewise pooled their operations in 1600. Each of these East India Companies had, in its own lights, a monopoly on trade in the area. Obviously this ran somewhat counter to the Spanish claims to having exclusive rights there. T h e Spanish claim to these enormous tracts was based first of all on prior discovery; since the discoveries the lands hid been garrisoned, divided into administrative units, and provided with governments; Spain and Portugal had recognized each other's claim, and the pope had recognized both. But none of this meant anything to the Dutch or the English. T h e Dutch simply ignored these claims; the English applied their own standard to measure rights to an area: that of effective settlement. Since this handy yardstick was never calibrated to show just how many settlers or settlements in an area were required to qualify a nation as its sole possessor, the measure had an inexactness which was, practically speaking, its greatest virtue. In practice, whenever this standard was applied to any area the English wanted and thought they could hold on to, the Spanish were found not to have established sufficient claim bv settlement; this allowed the English to move in with complete justice, whereupon the settlement requirements were found to have been quite amply filled by whatever number of bold or desperate spirits they could land and keep alive. This theory was designed of course for use in arguments between governments. T h e real rights that were being applied were those of the aggressive merchant to make a killing wherever he can, and those of the freebooter to rob his neighbor whenever he can get away with it. T h e first of these "rights" went under the more inspiring heading of "freedom of the seas," a principle which the English applied to all seas except those they themselves claimed exclusive rights to, and which the Dutch applied to all seas, having none of their own. (Grotius' arguments for open seas were doubly relevant, having been written with the Spanish in mind, published with the English in mind.) T h e second went

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37

under the heading of legitimate warfare whenever a legitimate war could be found; when not, its status was a bit more complicated. T h e Spanish were not prepared for the way this developed, though there were many among their counsels who were not surprised. The assumption that the wartime raids by the English would be ended by the treaty played no little part in the archdukes' desire to make peace with them, and it was a principal argument for getting Madrid to join in the peacemaking. As the archduchess put it about the time of James I's accession, that monarch "will be the master of the Ocean. His amity is precious above all because of the Indies." 15 T h e main argument raised by councilors against this was that the Dutch would continue their own raids and the English would join them without their government's sanction; once peace had been made with the Dutch as well, there was hope for an end to the raids of both. This hope was to be disappointed, however. At both peace conferences free access to the Indies was demanded; in both cases it was refused; in both cases the problem was passed over in the capitulations. And thereby hangs the tale, for treaties of peace and friendship were indeed signed with both England and the Estates (forever with the one, for twelve years with the other), but they applied only to Europe (as was true of the Vervins treaty). T h e war went on unabated outside Europe and European waters, for there was "no peace beyond the line" according to the reading the English, the Dutch, and the French gave the treaties. Under this interpretation, open attacks could be made at will on Spanish shipping, towns, and installations without violating "peace and friendship" with the country whose empire was being plundered—an interpretation profitable to the raiders, and understandably vexing to the Spanish. Rapine being a pragmatic affair, the validity of this interpretation and the exact location of this imaginary line are rather irrelevant (roughly, the area "beyond the line [or lines]" was everything west of the Azores, everything south of the Canaries, including West Africa). Nevertheless, since this law of convenience

38

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served, along with letters of marque and reprisal when the raiders had them, to provide a color of legality, or at least a claim to one, the corsairs themselves adhered to the letter of it with great punctilio—after their own fashion, of course. There was always the dream of intercepting the silver fleet, but in practice the juiciest plums were merchantmen bearing valuable cargo. When one was intercepted both ship and cargo were sometimes brought back as a prize; sometimes the cargo was transferred and the ship sunk; sometimes the corsairs' own ship was abandoned and the prize sailed home alone. But whatever the method, according to the rules of the game it had to be done "beyond the line" or it would constitute piracy, and that of course was a crime. Much of the best Spanish plunder was to be found not beyond that justifying "line," however, but right in European waters— plying between the ports of Spain and Flanders, for example. One could not, of course, pass up such opportunities, even if encountered right in the English Channel, and of course one did not. It was necessary, however, to keep up appearances by claiming that the prize had been seized "beyond the line," so in order to avoid embarrassing arguments over just where the event had occurred, whatever Spanish crew and passengers might remain alive after the boarding fight were, as a matter of routine, thrown over the side. Though this procedure had a certain neatness from the captors' point of view, the Spanish government found it reprehensible. This whole business, in fact, caused considerable ill feeling in Spain, and reprisals and counterreprisals were the order of the day. 18

CHAPTER 3

International Attitudes and Outlooks It was in the complex tangle described in the foregoing chapter (with similar convolutions within the empire and in the rest of Europe), and not in the simple world one often finds pictured, that foreign affairs were conducted and Spanish Habsburg policymakers functioned. It was an ambiguous world in which two main cleavages existed simultaneously among the same powers: one between t w o hostile religious blocs, the other between the dominant power and those w h o opposed her preponderance. And to complicate matters still further, these same powers also existed and functioned as individual states with specific, conflicting interests. T h e oversimplification of that complex world and of the attitudes of its nations and governments toward it and toward each other is especially marked in regard to that power which was at once head of one of the hostile religious factions, the predominant power opposed b y many, and the state with the most varied and widespread specific interests. In the genre of oversimplified generalizations on the subject, Garcia Morente's platitude is as representative as any: "It can be said that the theme of Spanish history in both the 16th and 17th centuries is the Catholicization of the world. T h e peninsula having been conquered for the faith, it remained to conquer the world for Christ." 1 This theme in fact crops up constantly in the Spanish documents of state of the period, sometimes as a rationale for Spanish predominance and its further expansion, sometimes as idle dream-

4°

The

Context for

Policymaking

ing, sometimes as a serious mission (though a mission which, from force of circumstance, must be postponed). But to suppose that the men who controlled Spanish policy were unanimously or consistently or (most important) effectively in favor of an armed crusade is to suppose too much. It seems very probable that this sort of generalization about Spanish plans for "the Catholicization of the world" is the product of the "categorization" of history. In textbooks, the chapter on " T h e Renaissance" is followed by one on " T h e Reformation and Counter-Reformation," but reality was not arranged in such a neat sequence. If the term "Renaissance" means anything beyond the sack of Constantinople and the flowering of the graphic arts in Italy—if it refers, say, to the increasing secularization of European society, including its international affairs—then the Renaissance chapter must be expanded, carried to a much later date, with the story of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation stuck somewhere in between (since it would be impractical to interleave it) as an extended parenthesis of simultaneous development. In the practical matter of textbook writing this, of course, presents difficulties. In the practical matter of conducting Spanish affairs there was no doubt in policymakers' minds that they lived in just such a world. Or rather, being part of that world—one of disruptive religious strife interposed in a period of growing secular elements, such as the expansion of commerce, a period which would end with the chapter on "the Enlightened Despots" and the secular wars of the eighteenth century—the disentanglement of secular and religious factors probably never occurred to Spanish policymakers. T h e Counter-Reformation being in full swing, religion naturally colored most questions these policymakers handled. The effect that a given course might have on the advancement of the Faith received due consideration and, all other things being fairly equal, it might decide the matter—though generally by tipping scales that were weighing many other factors as well. And of course what "religion would allow" placed an occasional limit on possible courses of action.

International

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41

But beyond this the role of religion in the making of Spanish policy was fairly restricted. As for the Catholicization of the world, Spanish policymakers strongly suspected that the date when that would occur was just what it turned out to be, the Greek Calends. Nevertheless, however, the notion did exist, and by its very existence complicated Spain's international affairs. The mission to Catholicize the world did not govern her foreign policy, pushing her forward on an inevitable, unrelenting crusade which an armed Protestant Europe must defeat if it did not wish to be crushed—but a good many Protestants thought it did and acted accordingly. This forms a part of the key, so far as there is any single one, to what really did govern Spanish actions: the simple fact of Spain's position in the world, and the practical situations which arose from it. A part of this position was indeed confessional; a part was political; a part was simply geographical. This basic situation, whose influence was heavy on events of the time, might be summed up rhetorically as the simple existence of the "Spanish heritage," for in the three aspects mentioned above, the mediocrities who sat on the Spanish throne in these years found themselves in the place of Philip II, of Charles V, of Ferdinand and Isabella, and of Lothar, grandson of Charlemagne. As the heir of Philip II, the Spanish king found himself faced by militant Protestantism, which was sometimes aggressive in mood, sometimes defensive to the point of desperation, generally hostile, always dangerous. As the heir of Charles V he was faced by a similar phalanx of those jealous or fearful of the Spanish preponderance and the likelihood of its increase. But the danger presented by a Spanish-led crusade and Spanish imperialism was greatly exaggerated; though the desire for both existed, Spain had little chance of effecting either, as her policymakers well knew. T o go forth to conquer the world for Christ and/or the crown was, for the Spaniards, their true mission, but no one was in a better position than they to appreciate the full meaning of Cervantes' sobering phrase: No puede correr sin caballo (you can't be a knight errant if vou don't have a horse). And, unfortunately for Spain,

42

The Context for Policymaking

rather than giving her an unmerited position of strength, the exaggerated fears of others served only to increase opposition to her and decrease her relative strength. T o make matters worse, Spain had to face this opposition not only almost sin caballo but from an almost impossible geographical position as well. The overseas heritage of Ferdinand and Isabella, with that of the Portuguese crown now added, has already been mentioned. The Spanish empire in Europe, stretching in disjointed fashion from the North Sea through old Lotharingia and beyond to the Straits of Messina, with hostile neighbors—France, Savoy, Venice, the Rhine Palatinate—flanking it on both sides and dominating strategic bottlenecks, was equally untenable, a factor which will be discussed later in its military context. Charged with conducting the affairs of a decaying empire that faced opposition at almost every turn, an empire often under open attack, in economic chaos and military decline, too large to defend, and strategically untenable even if it had been smaller, it is not surprising that Spanish policymakers, under the unremitting pressure of circumstance, found themselves far too busy coping with day-to-day events to entertain grandiose plans, except in dreams and desperation. Such is the mundane context—and not one of sweeping abstractions—in which one must contemplate the more general aims and outlooks of the Spanish Habsburgs and of England, France, and the United Provinces. In a purely functional sense, Spain's difficult position had two important effects on her policymaking. On the one hand it placed a limit on the number of possible courses of action, and often enough dictated the decision outright. On the other hand the problems which arose from force of circumstance dictated the questions which had to be considered, questions which had two marked characteristics: they were very numerous and they tended to be, although very pressing, of limited scope. As has been suggested above, this steady stream of urgent day-to-dav business —which sometimes swelled to a cascade of current crises—left

International

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43

little time for formulating long-term policy, even less for devising coherent long-term plans for putting it into effect. However, though in practice most Spanish decisions on the policymaking level were perforce only short-term decisions and the Spanish had neither leisure nor means for long-term "policy" in the sense of a specific program capable of execution, this is not to say that they had no long-term policy in the sense of desiderata. By that broad application of the term one might even say, in spite of the previous seeming denial, that the "Catholicization of the world" was a long-term "Spanish policy"; it was just that most of the Spanish knew there was no chance of carrying that policy out at the moment. Another very real policy, one which was held with surprisingly little calculation either of means or effects and which overrode many other considerations, was summed up in the statement that it was unthinkable ever to make war on the Austrian branch of the family. Other Spanish policies of some permanence can be detected as well, some only pious wishes, others intended for enforcement so far as possible. Of these, those affecting the other three major western powers are of special relevance, as they form in varying degrees the framework of desiderata within which policy decisions, no matter how momentary the subject in hand, were taken. Spanish policy toward the self-proclaimed United Provinces was not, in the Habsburg view, foreign policy at all, though outside intervention made this internal problem an international one. So far as the Habsburgs were concerned the dukes of Burgundy continued to be the legitimate rulers of all seventeen provinces and, although it was not certain how soon it could be done, there was no question but that the rebels must eventually be returned to obedience to their rightful sovereigns (and at the same time, of course, to the True Faith). Regarding attitude was Spanish war English and

France, up to the death of Henry I V the Spanish one of extreme apprehension that a new Francowould be upon them before they had ended their Dutch wars and properly recovered from all three.

44

The Context for

Policymaking

After Henry's death—which served Spain extremely well—circumstances were very much changed, and Spain's approach to her French problem then centered around the double royal marriage in which Louis XIII and the future Philip I V each took to wife a sister of the other. This is often seen as an attempt to absorb France into the collection of Spanish domains. Maybe it was, but such an attempt would have required more optimism than the Spanish usually had, and one has only to look at the union's denouement at the other end of the century to see how vain such hopes would have been. T h e Franco-Spanish marriages, in fact, seem less a grandiose scheme than a cautious hedging of bets by trying to win the active alliance of dangerous former enemies by means which, failing this, might serve at least to neutralize them—an approach which was used toward the English as well. Since active alliance was unlikely, any move which would weaken France was seen in Madrid as beneficial to Spain, but conscience complicated this. Religion dictated that the Catholic King help the Most Christian King put down his heretic rebels; prudence suggested refusing to become entangled; interest made the idea of supporting the rebels (just as France supported the Dutch) a sore temptation. T h e fact that Spain did not yield to temptation and exploit the Huguenot crisis during the period dealt with here may be credited to piety and inability. T h e most immediately dangerous aspect of Spain's relations with France was the strategic position which France, even though "surrounded" by Spanish territory, held on Spain's line of communications between Italv and the Netherlands (as well as with the Empire), a question which will be of some importance later in the present study and will be discussed at that point. In their view of England, the frame of reference of Spanish policymakers was a double one, contradicting itself, which goes far to explain whv at times Spain seems to have no English policy at all. Among Spanish affairs with these three powers, it was in those with England that the religious question made itself felt most strongly. France had its Protestants, but it was easy enough

International

Attitudes

45

for Madrid to see disposing of them (if that were to be done) as the responsibility of the French crown, which was after all Catholic. The Dutch, at least those who held power, were of course heretics, but the Spanish saw them first as rebels; in any case, if they were disposed of as rebels any duty Spain might have to put down heresy would automatically have been fulfilled. But it was not possible to evade the question so easily in the case of England, and whether Spain did not really have a crusading mission was a more prominent consideration regarding England than the other two. This question remained insoluble so far as policymakers were concerned, Spain not having the resources for such a crusade anyway, but it was vastly complicated by the widespread belief in Spanish counsels that a real reign of terror existed in England, that that country was a living hell for members of the Faith, and that the fate of those persecuted brothers could not, in humanity and religion, be ignored. This led frequently to impractical excesses of zeal, but these were generally confined to the council table in this period and only once, about the time of Elizabeth's death, came close to being translated into an actual invasion of England. Some of Spain's actions, such as abetting (or at least sanctioning) plots of assassination or rebellion, sometimes ran serious risk of war, but her support of English Catholics was mostly limited to attempting to alleviate their condition through diplomacy, giving exiles asylum on the Continent, supporting missions, and sending some financial relief. Not much more could be done without violating that old maxim of Charles V : "Peace with England and war with the whole world." Giving due credit to this advice, the Spanish tried more moderate ways than a repetition of '88 to settle issues of religion as well as other problems such as the Indies. Their main approach to more general relations with England paralleled that made toward France. The first part of this approach was continually to break up the recurring negotiations for an Anglo-French marriage alliance, a match which would not only strengthen the bonds between those two countries, but would nullify the effect of the Franco-Spanish marriage ties; it was a delicate task which, to gain the ends desired,

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had to be done without antagonizing either party, and which was performed with surprising success for nearly a quarter of a century. T h e second part was, through marriage negotiations with England herself, to gain a positive alliance if it could be profitably done and if this were not possible to keep her neutralized by negotiation for as long as it could be managed. T h e point of view of the United Provinces in foreign affairs was complicated by schism within the Reformed Church and division over questions of war and peace; yet the former had only a weakening effect and the latter was more a question of means than of ultimate ends. One may safely say that the same goal was basic to both parties: to insure the survival both of the Protestant religion and of the independence of their state. T o achieve this goal, the United Provinces must, first, regain, keep, or increase the support of England and France, and, second, give all necessary or possible aid to the lesser Protestant and anti-Habsburg states. T h e disputes of the Dutch with both England and Spain, and the fact that they caused relations to be merely strained with England but generally hostile with Spain, have been discussed above. T h e Dutch, then in their age of expansion, were active elsewhere in Europe, from the Baltic to the Adriatic, but to do more than note this here would go beyond the scope of the present study. A first-hand look at the underlying Dutch attitude toward the Habsburgs will be given in some detail later. France was the first to regain peace and the last to return to war, thus gaining a longer opportunity than any of the others for recovering from war and growing stronger and richer in peace— a fact which did not go unnoticed in Spanish councils. Enjoying this advantage, France was nevertheless faced with two problems, each of which called for decision. One was the Huguenot problem, which would probably demand a "solution" sooner or later; the question was that of choosing the proper time to attempt it. T h e second was that of Habsburg encirclement, which entailed the problem of deciding whether to try to break out by force of

International

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47

arms—which was Henry IV's way—or to try to preserve a tenuous peace by remaining quiescent—a course which was followed, but with no real consistency, after Henry's death. The comparatively small day-to-day contact which France had with the other three nations contributed much toward giving her the freest hand in foreign affairs of any of them, which in turn seems a likely factor, along with internal strife and others, in her having the least consistent policy lines of any of the four in the period. Her foreign policy was far too erratic in these years to allow a true summary, but in general terms it may be characterized as aggressively anti-Habsburg until Henry's murder, cautious during the next few years while the queen regent sought marriage alliances with both Spain (completed) and England (unsuccessful), vaguely pro-Spanish until the murder of Concini in 1617, 2 doubtful for a time under the guidance of Luynes, and preoccupied with the Huguenot campaigns for some time after the Treaty of Madrid in 1621. Only after the close of the period under consideration did France manage to resume, to any effective degree, her old antiHabsburg stance. James I's most basic long-term policy, made more imperative still by the double marriage between France and Spain, was to continue to be fundamental English policy for a long while. As Secretary of State Winwood explained it to the ambassador to Paris, the king governed his diplomacy in the knowledge that "the preservation of the welfare of Christendom . . . cannot but run a great hazard if Spain shall become incorporated with France." 3 But even if they were successfully kept apart (and they were), the problem remained of how to go about keeping a proper balance of power between the two in order to keep either from overrunning Europe. The fundamental question, though difficult to answer, was simple enough to pose: that of judging the proper moment to stop supporting France against Spain and turn English opposition instead against the growing power of France. That England should answer this question properly was a matter of importance to her-

4

8

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Policymaking

self and to Europe; a correct answer hinged on an accurate estimate not only of the two powers' present capabilities but of their future potential. A half dozen years after James's accession he was given one such estimate by Sir George Carew, just returned from a tour of duty as ambassador to France. Carew, stylistically a child of his times, strained over-hard for images with which to embellish his speech, but his florid language does not lessen the merit of his analysis, and his report is useful as a representative summary of the more perceptive English thought on the subject. Carew was much impressed by Spanish grandeur, by what he described as the greatest empire ever attained in history. But to him Spain was, withal, only "a huge unwieldy giant," while France was "a well proportioned knight." He recognized that the "knight" was in poor condition at the moment and would not be able to do combat with the "unwieldy giant" until he had pulled himself together, but Carew still considered the French "the most dangerous neighbors that we have. T h e Almains are disunited; Denmark not potent; Spain remote, and busied about other matters; but France gathering force as it were to wrestle with some body." 4 Awareness of this situation informs James's foreign policy throughout the period. T o cope with it he had both a short-term and a long-term policy: refrain from helping the Huguenots so as to avoid prolonging the internal religious wars of France and weakening the French monarchy vis-a-vis the Spanish, and establish permanent friendship and cooperation in European affairs with Spain. He had some slight success in both, and by the end of his reign France was in better condition than before to defeat the current dominant power, while Spain was feeling ever-stronger inclinations toward friendship with England. 5 From the point of view of balance of power, the correctness of these policies is clear. T h e fundamental soundness of the former is well symbolized by the fact that the fall of Breda, as well as other Spanish successes of that time, came while English aid was being sent to the Huguenots—not enough to save La Rochelle, just enough to keep the French armies tied down in an operation that

International

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49

should have been completed long ago, pushing any possible "Battle of Rocroi" several years into the future. T h e essential correctness of the latter policy is underlined by the French successes later in the century when blessed with Charles II's diplomacy. It was this basic point of departure of James's conduct of foreign affairs that Spain had to deal with—agreeable enough in the main but put in doubt by the increasing power of English Puritans with a contrary view, which might prevent his carrying it out; by Anglo-Spanish disputes, which might make him change his view; and by the intrusion of the Palatinate problem, which made James at once more desirous of a friendly settlement with Spain and more vexed at Spain's procedure.

PART TWO

The Making of Spanish Habsburg Policy

m CHAPTER 4 m

The Ultimate Question: War or Peace? In spite of the great number and variety of questions that came before policymakers for consideration, there was underlying each one the same fundamental problem, the same basic decision which, directly or indirectly, had to be made over and over as each important issue came up for discussion. Whatever the specific subject might be, the ultimate question was the same: the simple, impossible choice between war and peace. T h e constant presence of this factor, of this ultimate question lying behind all questions of substance, has been alluded to previously, and some of its more conspicuous manifestations have been discussed—the peace treaties, the Cleves-Jiilich crisis, disputes such as those over commerce and piracy which threatened to lead sooner or later to war. Yet one aspect remains unmentioned: the immense complexity, not only of the tangle of surface issues and current developments, but of reaching a decision on the ultimate question itself. For Spanish policymakers this complexity existed even in the years just prior to the Treaty of London, when the Spanish Netherlands especially felt a desperate need for at least temporary respite from war and when in the circumstances one might have expected the decision, bitter though it was, to be a fairly simple one to make. Yet the determination for peace with England was reached only after a great many facts, factors, and arguments had been considered; even then there remained councilors who were not convinced that peace was the proper course.

Making Spanish Habsburg

Policy

The need for peace in Albert's domains was not just a matter of the government's financial straits, nor even of the chaotic state of the country itself (in purely economic terms); it also involved the more fundamental political problem of making at least possible the difficult task of governing the restive population. Albert was advised on this point that the treaty under discussion would "give satisfaction and contentment to the people, who, seeing that Your Highness has already brought about peace with two such great and powerful enemies, will enter into firm expectation that the third peace settlement, which is that with Holland and the most important, must now follow, and in this expectation they will [no longer] stir up trouble; on the contrary they will bear all things more patiently, [will show] more love, more rcspcct, more obedience to the prince and will yield more and more to his will and commandments. In the same way, they will be rid of the suspicion that some have conceived (although in error) that one tries only to perpetuate war here in order to maintain the domination of the foreigner, and meanwhile the prince will have some months in which to put his affairs in order, which will be enough time. "It will cast great credit on Your Highness and bring stabilization to Your Highness's affairs, which is no small thing at this conjuncture, and will serve as honey to sweeten the gall of so many mutinies and so much bad news, which embitter and cast down the hearts of the people completely." Still, the wisdom of this was not so certain as it was made to sound. If the people were led to such expectations of benefit from the peace and were then disillusioned, they might very well, it was pointed out, become even harder to govern than they were now. 1 In any event, however, domestic considerations were far from the only ones which had to be taken into account. Until 1603, for example, there was the fact that heretic England was ruled, as one unfriendly critic put it, by "a decrepit princess on the edge of the grave." The fact that Elizabeth, childless, was nearly seventy was to the Habsburgs a vital statistic indeed, and one whose impli-

Ultimate Question: War or Peace?

55

cations were frequently discussed. Opinion on what course of action the bare fact dictated for Spain was, as usual, at opposite poles. " B y means of this peace," it was argued by one side, "one will be able to go freely all over the kingdom and gain supporters there for the eventuality of the death of the Queen (which according to the course of nature can hardly delay much longer) in order to advance our affairs in the best way it can be done." Making peace at this conjuncture would be "the true road to the installation there of a prince of the House of Austria, or at least some Catholic prince with the heiress of that kingdom, which would not be a small foundation for maintaining there the good friendship and correspondence between [us] which can never be firm and durable between princes of contrary religion." Against this it was urged that there was "a great likelihood of a war for the crown," and that "if the Queen should die during this peace . . . the King of Spain could not then interpose himself in it with as much claim and foundation as he could being in open war with that kingdom." It is worth noting that, while both sides in the above exchange were concerned with putting a Catholic on the English throne, neither mentions anything about the advancement of the Faith there (though both may simply have felt it too obvious to mention). T h e one in favor of making peace is concerned with maintaining long-term peaceful relations—with making the English government friendly, not with making the English people Catholic. T h e other debater, a sanguine type who thought England's power far overrated and was sure the island could be taken by Spanish invasion simply by avoiding the now-obvious mistakes made in '88, advocated a new "Enterprise of England" simply because, from a strategic point of view, that was the most advantageous country the Spanish crown could possess, carrying with it domination of the Narrow Seas and of all Spain's enemies in northern Europe. T h e latter's argument that there would be no great difficulty in invading England was based on a whole series of doubtful assumptions but his motives were sound enough, for he viewed the

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Making Spanish Habsburg

Policy

invasion as a single solution to Spain's three greatest problems: the Indies, the Dutch rebellion, and the danger from France. H o w peace with England would affect these three problems informs much of the debate on the subject. T h e importance of the overseas empire (for which the all-inclusive term "Indies" was commonly used) was so basic that the above adviser's opponent not only ranked the beneficial effects he foresaw for it first among the reasons for making peace with England, but so thoroughly identified the two that he began his discussion of the Indies by saying, "First of all to speak of Spain. . . ." He was certain that once peace was made "the fleet from the Indies will be able to come and go more surely without being troubled and belabored." Leaning heavily on the sort of imagery common at the time, he described the flow of treasure from the Indies and commerce with them as "the lifeblood of the kingdom and of all the others that depend upon it," and the routes to the Indies as "the very veins which give life to this great and vast body." 2 As for the English raiders, "with this peace thev will immediately and completely withdraw all their armadas, without further molesting either the states or the shipping of Spain." But this was the optimistic view, and it had ample (and more prescient) opposition. N o w that she was delivered from the Irish war that had been causing her so much travail, it was pointed out, Elizabeth was free once again to infest the seas with her ships, treaty or no treaty, just as she had done before when "her Drake" had robbed the king of Spain of so much treasure, excusing his acts under various pretexts, even before the opening of the war. As for promises Elizabeth might make, Spain had had plenty of such assurances in Drake's time, but that had stopped him not at all. And if the treaty did stop openly English raids, it would in fact stop nothing, for the Hollander would not leave off "plaving his game," the English would simply "mix themselves in pell-mell" with the Dutch, and they would all go divide up their booty in Holland. This seeming certainty was just one more reminder to Spanish policymakers of how circumscribed they were by simple, unpleasant facts, and this one, the continuing war with the Dutch,

Ultimate Question: War or Peace?

57

was the bitterest of all. Much consideration had to be given to the effect peace with England would have on that war. It was frequently argued that the rebel provinces would "be left alone, feeble, fearful, without support other than that of two or three princes on the German frontier." But would peace with England really end aid to the Dutch from that quarter? Not likely. Even with fine promises aid would continue covertly, just as French aid continued regardless of the Treaty of Vervins. F o r one thing, the cause which had led Elizabeth to take up the defense of the rebels in the first place would be motive enough for continuing it. For another, she knew her own interests and could be counted on to continue sustaining the weaker side, thus nourishing a perpetual war between "these lands" in order to extend her own—an unkind but not wholly inaccurate description of English balance-of-power tactics. Her motives hardly mattered, however, for "the effects will always be the same." T h e critic quoted here often vented his spleen in rather rabid vilification of Elizabeth, but he had considerable respect for her judgment, just as others had. She was a heretic, but she was certainly no fool, and she was credited, if not with having a proper sense of honor, at least with having sensible care for her reputation. Appreciation of these elements in the queen could, when applied to specifics, lead to a sound estimate of probabilities. T h e question of what could be expected to happen to the strong places she held in the Low Countries provides a case in point. " I f there were at least some appearance of enfeebling Holland," the same critic said, "or of putting them in a worse case by this peace, which would be done if she liquidated with us in terms of close alliance or returned into our hands the places she holds, . . . that would be an advantageous peace in all ways. But it cannot at all be presumed that she would ever do such a thing, as much so as not to wound her honor and reputation as not to increase our forces bv this means, in spite of the fact that she well knows that others hold these places only by usurpation. And thus, in place of begrudging them to them, she will strengthen them by turning these places over to them, and thus they will come to the capping

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of their little act and render themselves stronger and more powerful than before, having their hands freer and the control over their state more absolute." T h e same critic also expressed an opposite view of the value of the United Provinces' German allies, asserting that they formed a more important appui than England—and implying as well that they were less troublesome as allies than Elizabeth was. T o draw England out of Holland's set of alliances would be, he said, like plucking a feather from an eagle: "it is nothing done." Ridicule by metaphor is a standard weapon in debate, and this sally may have brought the derisive laughter desired, but the man who made it did not really believe that depriving the Dutch of English support (even if it could be contrived) would have no effect. On the contrary, his real convictions he showed in a maxim counseling against any such attempt: "II ne faut iamais remuir les choses non necessaires." This advice to let sleeping dogs lie (and eagles as well) was based on a commendably frank estimate of the Dutch attitude toward reunion with the southern provinces. If deprived of English support, the Dutch, seeing that in the end they could not survive by themselves, would give themselves up "body and soul" to the king of France—or to the Turk, if they could. T h e y would do this, even this, this realist said, "to avoid falling into our hands." This was, he said, "a very important Reason of State" for not taking their English ally away. Obviously not the strongest of arguments against a treaty with England, it was really a warning not to make the rebels too desperate for outside help. T h e reason for his warning and his worry is not far to seek, for, in a world a great part of which was ruled by the Spanish Habsburgs and much of the rest of which lived in mortal terror of their power, they and their counselors pondered the problems of empire, of war and peace, sitting nervously in the growing shadow of France—a source for them of much worry and no little irony. O f the three most important considerations involved in making peace with England, that of the Indies was a special case, one of guarding a necessary source of revenue; that of Holland was

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largely a short-term matter of effects on a war which the archdukes hoped to end soon anyway; but that of France was of a special seriousness, for it was a long-term problem which made unusual demands on policymakers' powers of insight and foresight. There was considerable of both in Spanish counsels, and the possible effects on the growing French danger were thoughtfully weighed—as always—in considering peace with England. It was hoped that once peace was made there would be "a renewal of the old alliances that have always been between these provinces and England," alliances which had seldom been infringed because of their mutual profitability, and which had often served to guarantee the Burgundian lands from French invasion. What was needed in the present circumstances was "a salutary counterweight to the grandeur and might of France, which nation, because of the repose and order which [that] king has at present, will soon be in a position to terrorize all the princes of Christendom, who are for the most part at war while he takes the high road and forges his grandeur from the ruin of these provinces. I say this principally," this particular adviser explained, "because of the manufacturing industries [migrating] to France, to the great and irreparable damage of these provinces. For, if France should break with Spain, and if England should not be in amity with Spain, obviously Spain will suffer, which is surely one of the most pregnant considerations which ought to make these three states [England, Spain, and the Spanish Netherlands] come together, and the

strongest bond of this peace (ornmunio necessita facit communes amicos), and the same reason which brought about the confederation of France and England in these latest wars, that is, the grandeur of the King of Spain, should now bring together Spain, England and this country." This statement and others like it (on other details of France's economic recovery and growth while Spain continued at war) show, on the whole, remarkable perception not only of the economic factors involved, but of the change of orientation in English intervention on the Continent which should logically follow from the rising power of France and the declining power of Spain.

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Such a shift in English foreign policy did indeed begin,3 but it was neither the complete reversal hoped for nor nearlv so rapid a change as expected. James I, though often roundlv abused for playing into the hands of the Spanish in his conduct of foreign affairs, seems in fact to have made a more moderate estimate than this Habsburg adviser, and many others, both of the present danger from France (which was, of course, much less later in the period, in the years between Henry IV and Richelieu) and of the stage Spain had so far reached in her power decline. But James in any case knew that the English Puritans would not allow him to follow an all-out pro-Spanish policy even if he wanted to.4 English hatred of papists played its ample part in this but so did a widespread attitude toward Spain herself, yet another fact of irrational life with which her policymakers had to deal, one which, like that of religious hostility, was bound to affect the viability of an Anglo-Spanish alliance even if one could be arranged, a factor which, in a perceptive counselor's mind, argued strongly against such an anti-Bourbon alliance precisely because it would strengthen France. Such were the frustrations of trying to devise a policy for the Spanish Habsburgs. The adviser whose warning against throwing the Dutch into the arms of the French is cited above was one who saw this unlikely circumstance clearly. He knew as well as anyone (his occasional bombast notwithstanding) the unpromising state of Spanish power over the long pull and the contrasting increase in Bourbon strength. But he also knew whose power it was that most everyone was afraid of as the century began—as events of the next few decades were to confirm. He, and others, sensed with real perception the widespread fear throughout northern Europe of any increase in the power of Spain. The suggested alliance with England against the French danger would only, he feared, act as a catalyst for panic, and the effects of the alliance would recoil on its makers. The alliance was never realized, and it took the slow and complex developments of a full Thirty Years to make his predictions come true, but one can forgive him for that. Such an alliance, he said, would only

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serve to alarm a world already fearful of Spanish domination, would only serve to bind Holland, Scotland, Denmark, and the other princes, cities, and imperial towns more closely than ever to France. As he summed it up, in an untranslatable image, "toutes se cueilleront au bruit de ceste paix." It was of the utmost importance that these factors all be studied carefully—a job which, as will be seen, required great quantities of information on all aspects of each—in order to arrive, it was hoped, at a correct evaluation of the situation, the possibilities, the probabilities, and the proper course to take. It was an enormous job, but it is just possible that a solution that was "satisfactory in all w a y s " (as counselors liked to describe their own comprehensive solutions) might have been hammered out if those problems that have been mentioned, important as they were, had been the only ones to consider. But the list of problems was long; in seeking art over-all decision one sought the answer to a conundrum made up of endless lesser ones. Balancing economic factors, for example, when compared with evaluating such nebulous ones as religious hatreds and exaggerated fears of conquest, seems a relatively straightforward task. A f t e r all, the Habsburg treasuries were in no fit condition to continue financing a war; the domestic economy, especially in the Netherlands, cried out for respite from the chaos that had come (and was worsening now) with warfare; and with France at peace while Spain continued her ruinous wars there was an increasing danger from what today would be called a widening economic "recovery gap." T h e solution seems obvious—make peace—and in 1604 they did just that. But it was strictly a pis aller, for the problems the Habsburgs faced were not that simple. It was true, for example, that Spain was "ruining herself" in war while France prospered in peace, but Elizabeth was also at war. So long as the Dutch war continued (and Spain was thus still at war), it was a serious question whether England should be given the advantage France now had, for that would increase, not lessen, the danger. Might Elizabeth not, in fact, need peace as badly as Spain?

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Some thought that she did, that "her kingdom is poor, the people weary of war, and she financially exhausted from having made such expenditures to arm so many ships, which have brought her nothing but great expense and ruin, having fished, as the saying goes, with a hook of gold. She will be able in the interim to catch her breath as France is doing, and leave us to ruin one another." It was argued by some, as well, that the treaty would have to allow England "commerce and free navigation everywhere" (and it was the mere opportunity for trading "in which consisted the principal wealth of the English"), including Spain and the Spanish Netherlands (the eventual treaty did) and the Indies as well (the treaty did not). This would not only drain off great quantities of specie, as well as commodities, to the immense profit of England and the ruin of Spain and the provinces, but the rebels as well would come to enjoy the same benefits "by oblique means," and thus be able to repair the damage done to their economy by the breaking off of licensed trade. Furthermore, the resulting flow of specie to the Dutch through their illicit participation in any commerce allowed England (the "oblique means" in question) would permit Elizabeth to recover the money she had furnished them during the rebellion and strengthen her position even further thereby. Still, the English staple that had been moved away from Antwerp was accounted to be worth two million ecus [half a million pounds sterling] a year to the southern Netherlands, and if, in making peace, one could arrange for its return, that would surely offset other disadvantages. The Renaissance world was patently not a simple one, and especially not for Habsburg policymakers. Each decision involved several problems, each problem several factors, each factor several aspects—and on, it seemed, forever, like an addled nursery rhvmc. But somehow, out of this morass, coherent evaluations were mule. On the decision in question here, that of making peace with England, a superior example of such evaluations was submitted to Albert by Joachim Butkens about the time the wide-ranging arguments quoted above were being made.5 Butkens' analysis of this complex problem can be read without agreement, but not without

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admiration. An excellent example of the best thinking in Spanish counsels, it is well informed, carefully thought out, closely reasoned, concisely presented; the conclusions are buttressed by sound argument based on a perceptive selection of significant data; the author foregoes religious diatribe, bombast, wild speculation, and verbosity, setting down a remarkable fund of hard-headed Flemish common sense in less than five folio pages of excellent Spanish. His conclusions (which he was not alone in holding) can be summed up briefly: Finding the present limits to Spain's capabilities of greater weight than future danger from French recovery, he felt that having made peace with France alone was good for Spain, for that was the most troublesome enemy strategically: Spain had too much to defend on the northeast border of France, requiring too big a force and excessive expense. Peace with England was a different matter if it did not include peace with Holland too. Among his reasons: England would agree not to attack the flota or the Indies, but officially unsanctioned raids would surely continue. England could not send a large army anyway, so there was little danger of damage from England on land. The only real gain from a peace would be to end the costly war with the rebels. Peace with England would not help Spain militarily in that war because England would unofficially continue to help Holland with men, arms, and money. With peace, in fact, England would become richer through increased trade and would then be able to give even more aid to Holland than she did now. In addition, England (along with Holland) would control the whole Baltic trade and Spain, still fighting the Dutch, would be dependent on her for naval stores. Meanwhile, by gaining commercial supremacy while others were fighting, England would become the most powerful nation in the world. In sum, Butkens was for either a general peace or one with Holland alone, against one with England without Holland. The one consideration he and others seem to have overlooked is that better terms could surely be had by dealing with these two re-

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maining enemies at separate conference tables at separate times. But one doubts that this was in Albert's mind either; it need not have been, as he was willing to take his first steps toward peace in whatever workable direction he could find. England was more ready to settle than the Estates General, so the 1604 treaty preceded the cease-fire and truce with the Dutch. Yet, within a short time, a general peace was achieved along the lines of Butkens'

aviso. Affairs being of such complexity, it seems remarkable that conclusions could ever be reached, but policy decisions were being made constantly and one must turn here to the question of how they were made, and by whom.

CHAPTER 5 s p p p p p p p p f i

The Policymaking Apparatus Madrid Inasmuch as Spanish policymaking constitutionally revolved around the monarch it seems useful to note, before examining the policymaking machinery itself, that no such thing as a "king of Spain" existed, except in vernacular usage. He was king of the Spains (plural), and ruled most of his various kingdoms in the Spanish peninsula by means of viceroys just as he did his other kingdoms—Naples, say, or Peru. 1 Though semantically this is a quibble, historically it is not, for what the world's predominant power was actually like is of some importance to viewing in proper focus that power's actions and the attitudes of others toward it. There was no neat division in any effective sense between a "kingdom of Spain" on the one hand and its "possessions" outside the peninsula on the other. T h e man who was sovereign of the kingdoms of the peninsula (including Portugal now) was also sovereign of a great deal else: the kingdom of Naples, Sicily, Sardinia, and the Balearics, the Canaries and the Azores, Brazil, Mexico, and many other kingdoms (viceroyalties) and provinces outside Europe. T o the northeast of his Spanish seat of empire lay the Milanese which, by a legal fiction, he merely "governed" for the emperor; farther north still he ruled-but-did-not-reign in the Southern Netherlands; between these latter two lay other lands under the ill-defined but undoubted hegemony of the same monarch, and beyond were scattered still other states in various degrees of dependency.

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The holder of all these crowns lived and died in the peninsula, the center of the "Spanish Habsburg" world, and (for all his titles) referred to himself simply as king of Spain. But as one looked out from Madrid or the Escorial it was hard to tell just where "Spain"—in a political sense—left off and where territory which did not and ought not to pertain to the Spanish king began. And if one agreed that, at a given moment, the limits of the king's power lay here on the map, it was also understood that the line was in no way permanent. The enemies of Spanish grandeur would of course try to push it back, and the forces of Spain would advance it wherever they could. Philip II died at the age of seventy-one on September 13, 1598, barely four months after Vervins, leaving all this to his onlv son, who was then twenty-one. A good many descriptions of Philip III exist, largely eulogies written by well-meaning monks praising the virtues of Philip the Good or by sycophants praising his wisdom. But the man as he really was probably fits no description better than that included in the conventional "Relation" the Ambassador Simon Contarini made to the doge and senate on his return to Venice in 1605: what gives this description its special ring of authenticity is how little it tells, although returning Venetian envoys (including Contarini) usually gave long, detailed, and quite useful descriptions of the monarch they had just left. Even after the end of his tour of duty in Spain and after Philip had been several years king, the ambassador still knew little that he could say of him: small of body, twenty-seven or twentyeight years old, agreeable in appearance, moderately stout, beard and hair very red; a Catholic, though no one knew how good a one; loved justice and peace; devoid of pleasures and likes, showing them onlv in the chase, which was his usual form of exercise. The Venetian summed up: "He is a friend of solitude, and eight months out of the year he spends in country houses, especially in the Escorial." 2 T o some he was a simpleton, to some he was a saint; but although he was an authentic enigma, he was one in the manner

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only mediocrities can be: if no one really understood his character, it was mostly because there was precious little to understand. 3 Philip the Prudent, paperbound though he was, had managed to a considerable degree to run his empire himself; as his successor, Philip the Good was patently not the man f o r the job. Ciriaco Perez Bustamente, a conspicuous (though less than great) recent Spanish writer of histories, says that "the year 1598 marks a transcendental moment in the History of Spain. It signifies the transition from [a system o f ] personal rule personified in Philip II to one of rule by favorites, favor and favoritism which characterizes the epoch of Philip III and his successors until the extinction of the dynasty." 4 There was and is little agreement over whether this was a good thing or not. Rule b y "favorite," giving the monarch a chief minister w h o was above party—a member of no existing strong faction, whose ties to the king were personal and who depended on the king f o r support—was not new in Europe, but it was becoming more conspicuous as the favorites became more gorgeous. T h e desirability of this mode of government was much discussed at the time, and there is disagreement among modern writers as well, generally hinging on the quality of government under the system. Strangely enough, Bustamente himself, while sounding as though he deplored the institution of the privanza, paints a favorable picture 5 of Francisco Gomez de Sandoval, duque de Lerma—the first privado of the period, whose "reign" lasted almost as long as that of Philip III. In his "final considerations" on the subject he sees Lerma's government as "well done." 6 But little value can be attached to Bustamente's judgments. 7 Antonio Canovas del Castillo, who made his scholarly reputation chronicling the "decadence" of Spain from the accession of Philip III onward (and whose opinions carry more weight) avoided the more scathing criticisms common among Lerma's critics and found him just not big enough for the job, a man "accustomed to small means and small questions" who was simply out of his depth. 8 But, in the still weightier opinion of Ranke, if the duke of Lerma did plenty of looting from his privileged position, enrich-

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ing himself and his family, he also played a statesmanlike role in government deserving serious evaluation: the giving of a new direction to Spanish foreign policy, turning it toward peace, reversing the trend under Philip II. Ranke speculates on whether Lerma should not be considered the heir to the policy of Ruv Gómez.9 The question of the quality of the Spanish privados as statesmen is a difficult one, not least because the whole question of favorites as such is very much colored by the spectacular rise, career, and fall of Don Rodrigo Calderón, a favorite who became legendary in song and story and, in the process, became widely accepted as a sort of archetype of the species. What makes this misleading as a yardstick for measuring the value of the privanza as a method of governing is that, although a "favorite," he never controlled the government. Calderón was not in fact even the king's favorite, but the favorite's favorite. When Philip III acquired the throne and Lerma the privanza in 1598, Calderón was twenty years old and a page in Lerma's household. Calderón seems to have functioned as Lerma's lieutenant in about the same way Lerma did as the king's and, like Lerma, he was rewarded for his trouble and profited from his connection. Lerma showered him lavishly with favors and offices, and he became (in addition to lesser distinctions) conde de Oliva, marqués de Siete Iglesias, secretary to the king, rich, famous, admired, and hated with venomous passion. When Lerma fell from power two decades later it was not a matter that involved him alone, but a general upheaval in which many great ones in power were caught up, including with little delay the duke of Uceda, who had brought Lerma down in the first place. With more powerful men who held the actual reins of government falling, with his patron Lerma in disgrace and in danger of his life, and with their enemies seizing power on all sides, it was not likely that Calderón would escape the debacle. Calderón was arrested and imprisoned in 1619, charged with numerous offenses the real substance of which seems to be that he had made himself rich while others were denied. His trial lasted

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a cruel two years and four months, a considerable part of which he spent in the torture chamber while his newly powerful enemies took extra measure of revenge; his noble bearing under this unusually prolonged and severe "putting of the question" brought a reversal of popular feeling, turning it to deep and wide-spread sympathy. When everyone had done with torturing him he was convicted, and on October 21, 1621, after he had confessed himself, "the executioner arrived and, the knife being drawn three times across his throat, his soul passed to the abode of happiness."10 The trial and death of Calderón was among the most notorious passages of its time; even in an age deluged with "True Accounts" and "Famous Chronicles" of the latest developments (real or imagined) of notable or sensational events, the life and ordeal of Rodrigo Calderón got remarkable "coverage." 11 All this notoriety tended to make Calderón, being so widely known in such an imagination-catching way, something of a "typical" favorido. Yet, although people sympathized with his fate, deplored his treatment, admired his courage in adversity, no one could claim that he had had the qualities of a statesman. Calderón, the archetypical privado, was a mediocrity, and so to the question of whether Spain and her destiny should be governed by a privanza the answer has often seemed to follow naturally in the negative, and to prove a priori that government by favorites automatically meant government by mediocrities. This tendency has not left modern treatment of the subject untouched. Cánovas, for example, in chronicling the decline of Spain quite naturally deals with the series of king's favorites who were actually chief minister, but uses Calderón as his descriptive, explanatory example.12 The question of whether or not Lerma's overthrow in 1618 was, either by intent or effect, a blow struck for good government is further clouded by the element of jealousy and resentment of his self-enrichment at the time, and by recent historians' preoccupation with the fact that the blow was struck by his own son, Cristóbal Gómez de Sandoval y Rojas, duke of Uceda. Uceda's own privanza expired with the king in 1621, and although

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the documents indicate that his role in government was not unlike that of his father, the period was too unsettled and his time in power too short to provide much basis for judgment of the man. Baltasar de Zuniga was in control for a short time at the beginning of Philip IV's reign, but for an even shorter time than Uceda. His early death ( 1 6 2 1 ) seems to have anticipated an imminent fall, as his relations with his nephew Gaspar de Guzman, duke of San Lucar, later count-duke of Olivares, who shared in his power and was destined to succeed him, seem to have been deteriorating rapidly; in any case, this first-rate diplomat's career as a statesman was cut off too soon to be judged. 1 3 More indicative of the problem is the case of Olivares himself, who certainly lasted long enough (though his privanza was only beginning as the period under consideration came to a close). The late Dr. Gregorio Maranon made a lifetime career of telling and retelling the story of Olivares' "passion to rule," yet managed throughout to skirt the real questions of the effectiveness and wisdom of that rule. 14 All this confusion and evasion over these fundamental historical questions of political reality seems to stem from a deep-seated habit of viewing the matter oversubjectively, with a strange insistence on treating "favorite" and "chief minister" (or some equivalent designation for the highest agent of the crown) as mutually exclusive terms. Since this usage involves not rational distinction between two types of function but moralistic distinction between " g o o d " and "evil" men, its application is as irrational as one might expect. There seem to be four important criteria one or more of which clearly identifies as a "favorite" a given man to whom the monarch has delegated the greatest power: ( 1 ) he is a mignon, which accounts for his close personal ties with the monarch, (2) he has no traditional claim to high position by virtue of his origins, (3) he is incompetent, and (4) he exercises dictatorial powers. B y w a y of testing the applicability of these criteria to the Spanish favorites, the duke of Lerma may fairly be used as an example, since he was hardly a brilliant exception among the species. Lerma was definitely a "favorite"—there is no doubt about that.

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He not only was so called in a pejorative sense then and has been since, but it was universally recognized in Spain that he exercised the privanza, which itself was a recognized method of governing, an institution with quasi official status. Since it is ludicrous to think of Felipe el Buejio involved with a mignon, the first criterion cannot be applied. Since Lerma's origins gave him a greater claim to high position than, say, Burleigh before him in England or Richelieu after him in France; since he was about as adequate for the task as Robert Cecil, earl of Salisbury, his counterpart in England as chief minister of the crown until Cecil's death in 1612 (neither can be ranked as a great statesman but both got the job done; any edge Cecil might have had in competence is hardly worth arguing); and since he exercised less "dictatorial" administrative power than, say, Thomas Cromwell under Henry VIII (hardly a weakling), no more than Walsingham under Elizabeth—and since these others were all indubitably "statesmen" and not "favorites"—the last three criteria must also be disallowed in Lerma's case.15 All that remains is the bare fact that he (as well as others later on) was indeed the king's favorite, his confidential adviser, his chief minister and perhaps even his alter ego, a fact which tells nothing at all about how much actual power for running the government that position entailed. On this subject the documentary remains of the policymaking process in Spain in the period (of which vast quantities exist) show the conclusion Canovas drew from his studies to be the correct one: "The truth is that, with less power and less fortune, neither Philip III nor Philip IV professed any other principles of government than Philip II established and practiced." Canovas is of course not saying that Philip II had engaged in rule-by-favorite as his successors did; he is merely saying that the year 1598, signifying a transition to such a method of governing, was not nearly so transcendental a moment in the history of Spain as Bustamente imagined, for (as Canovas puts it) it was not the privanza but the king's councils "in which resided in reality all the political power at that time." 16 Having performed a positive service in pointing this out, Ca-

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novas also performs a lesser, negative one. He describes the government's conciliar structure in some detail, but in hurrying on to the problems and mistakes of this conciliar government he misses a point of some importance, and in doing so provides an example of the fairly common confusion regarding the councils themselves. In the Estudios he lists eleven separate councils, in the Decadencta, ten, while twelve appear in one list or the other. The former list leaves out the Council of Flanders and relegates the Council of State to second place; the latter not only lacks the Council of Portugal but leaves out the Council of State entirely. Having identified the conciliar locus of power he is concerned with the general, not the particular, failing to discriminate about the latter: one might say that Canovas hit the target but missed the bull's eye, for the fact is that Spain and her empire was not ruled by this conciliar structure as a whole. Just as he said, it was not the privanza "in which resided in reality all the political power at that time," but neither was it the king's councils in general: it was the Council of State in particular. The formal structure was real enough and had a role to play, but a subordinate one. The councils of Castile, Aragon, the Cruzada, las Ordenes, the Inquisition, all dealt with domestic matters, some of greater importance (e.g., the Council of the Inquisition), some of lesser (e.g., the Consejo de las Ordenes, which dealt with the three honorific "orders"); individual questions of importance, however, were referred by these councils to the Council of State. In addition to the Consejo de la Hacienda there was a separate treasury apparatus which often bypassed that council and dealt directly with the Council of State. The Council of Portugal had heavy duties but it too was subordinate to the Council of State. So was the Council of the Indies, the more important of whose affairs were handled in the first instance by the Council of State. Membership in the Council of War was often merely honorific (as was often true of other councils); its members who were present and functioning were also Councilors of State, and it is largely academic, when they were discussing military matters, whether they were sitting as Councilors of War or of State: the

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only times (which are frequent) when it is wholly clear is when they are discussing large issues—of war and peace, not the details of military administration—and then it is clearly the Council of State in action. This is even more true of the regional councils for matters outside the peninsula (Council of Flanders, Council of Italy). T h e y performed a useful function, but it was that of handling the constant load of trivia that ruling the areas entailed—processing requests of local petty nobles for honors, of minor functionaries for back pay, and so on. T h e y handled nothing of importance. 20 In the final analysis the important decisions (and many lesser ones) of the Spanish government were made by the Consejo de Estado. 21 A t first glance its structure seems redundant, for it is made up of various juntas bearing titles analogous to those of the other councils. But there is a real practicality in the arrangement. The most important Spaniards (those best qualified and those who could not be denied places) were members of the Council of State: the great nobles of the old houses, who were accustomed to positions of command and had a traditional "right" to them, and new men who had raised themselves from the ranks of the "gentry" by service and force of ability, as well as less qualified favorites. Concentrated in one body, they were available for joint consultation and debate on large matters. When several prolonged matters were in hand they could be divided into juntas, these committees dissolving and multiplying as changing needs required—a flexibility that the formal conciliar structure did not have. Regular day-to-day business could be handled by more or less permanent juntas (Junta de Italia, Junta de Alemania); these could be given special commissions (as was the Junta de Inglaterra for special stages of the marriage negotiations), and could become at will sittings of the full council, with the junta itself either continuing to exist or expiring, to be reconstituted later, if desired, with the same members or others; whenever desired, expert advisers not members of the Council could sit with the junta as well. This happened frequently in negotiations for the marriage of Prince Charles with the Infanta Maria. Diplomatic correspondence

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would be handled for a time by the whole council; then it might be decided to have a special junta of councilors examine the question more thoroughly; their opinions and recommendations would be considered by the whole council; it might then be decided to turn the question over to a junta made up entirely of theologians, of whom only a couple might be councilors; later, after a further period of handling in full Council of State, it might go again to an entirely newly constituted junta, mostly councilors. This system of distribution of conciliar duties on a strictly ad hoc basis has much to be said for it. It is not unlike the system of appointing commissioners to handle special matters in use in England at the time. It has the virtue of providing that at least some of those studying a problem in detail will be from the same group (the Council of State as a whole) that will make the final policy decision, while not tying down the whole council with one problem when several matters might be pressing, and allowing the best use of the knowledge of the councilors in question: the opinion of the king's confessor or the bishop of Segovia was necessary in deciding whether "religion allowed" marrying an infanta to a heretic prince of Wales, but of little value on how best to defend against an English attack on the Spanish coast. This was a manner of handling a work load, not a formal constitutional structure. If one is concerned with finding the "causes" of the "decline of the Spanish Empire," then this unsystematic procedure seems disorderly, may even appear chaotic, and is obviously a symptom and/or a cause of the decadencia de España. On the other hand, if one is impressed with the overextension of that empire and the disproportion between its burdens and its resources and finds it surprising that that empire could be held together as long as it was, then this unsystematized procedure, in view of both the enormity and the variability of the work load, seems not so unwise. The administrative end of the handling of the business of the Council of State was divided between two or three secretaries of

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state, each responsible for a certain part of the affairs of Spain. In this period the most important of these secretaries were Andrés de Prada, Antonio de Arostegui, and Juan de Ciriza. The "affairs of England" (which are the most directly relevant to the present study) were in Prada's domain early in the period; when he moved to another area of business Arostegui took over English affairs; Prada died in 1611 and Arostegui took over his papers, whereupon Ciriza moved from the Council of War to take over those of Arostegui.22 Ciriza, an extremely able man, thus began a long period in charge of the papers relating to the asuntos de Inglaterra. Although the distribution of council work among the councilors, as described above, was variable, the procedure in handling the work was quite consistent, whether in special junta or in the whole council. The secretary of state in charge of English business, for example, would receive the dispatches from the Spanish ambassador in London—letters to himself, to the chief minister-favorite, and to the king, and occasional further memoranda of advice and information; he would also receive information pertaining to England from various other sources. The king, the favorite, and perhaps others, would read these. Based on these and other documents (dispatches, for example, from ambassadors in areas under the purview of another secretary, relaying reports of doings in England; or perhaps a memorial presented to the council by the English ambassador to Madrid) and on whatever other motive might prevail, a royal order would be issued for the council (or junta) to read the relevant documents (sent back to the secretary and circulated by him) and to meet to discuss the problem. When it involved a simple matter (a suggestion, say, that a small gift be sent to King James) and everyone was in immediate agreement on the course to take, the secretary would draw up a brief consulta stating that His Majesty having commanded the Council of State (or a junta) to consider, for instance, the contents of the letters of the ambassador to England of the first and tenth of last month, this had been done in the consejo of the fifteenth of this

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month and the opinion of the council (or junta) is as follows. . . . This would be sent to the king, who would generally initial a marginal note saying that it should be done so. More complex matters required more debate, and often the councilors, especially the more important ones, submitted written pareceres (opinions), often at great length, either to be read before the meeting, during it or (if submitted at the meeting) before a later reassembling. The votes would be recorded, often qualified or with a brief explanation of the person's reasons for voting so. If there was a consensus, or a majority opinion acceptable to the rest, this would be stated in the consulta and sent, with the pareceres and votas, to the king for approval. Sometimes no agreement could be reached, in which case the whole group of papers would be sent to the king, constituting various advices to him rather than a council resolution to be approved. In a case of this sort he (or someone acting for him) would make a recommendation which might lead to a council resolution in that sense, or decision of the question might await further information or developments. In any case, the procedure was well established: consideration of the data of the problem (generally in some written form), statement of the problem in council (or junta) assembled, discussion of the problem (with written opinions often submitted and often themselves becoming part of the data), votes taken, and decision (when and if reached) submitted to the king for ratification, whereupon orders or instructions were issued by the king or council or favorite to the parties concerned to do such and such. If it were not an order to the Hacienda to pay out money to someone (the Hacienda was unlikely to have any) or if the conditions of the problem had not, by the time the order was received, changed so much that compliance had become impossible, the odds were fairly good that it would be carried out.23

The Policymaking Apparatus Brussels Although the center of Spanish power lay in the peninsula and the most important threads of Spanish diplomacy led to Madrid, a good deal of the Spanish Habsburgs' diplomatic activities took place in the Spanish Netherlands: there were, for example, more high-level negotiations and conferences in Brussels in the period than in Madrid. A good deal of their policymaking took place there as well, a circumstance which has been touched on previously, especially in regard to the making of peace in the early part of the period. One reason for this was geographical. T h e Spanish Netherlands happened to be in the area where many of the most important events of the period which were involved in the Spanish Habsburgs' diplomacy and policy decisions took place: the conflict with the rebel provinces (of course), the Cleves-Jülich crisis, the war for the Lower Palatinate. Geographical position also made the Spanish Netherlands the communications crossroads of the Habsburg world. Madrid not only received its correspondence from England, Northern Europe, and the emperor via Brussels, but often even that from Rome, a fact which put Brussels in much closer touch with events, both in Habsburg lands and elsewhere, than Madrid could hope to be, and in a better position to deal with them. This fact of greater proximity of course included England, making the Spanish Netherlands the Habsburgs' most frequent

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point of contact with that country. Things of course had changed greatly between England and the Burgundian lands in recent years. In the old days relations between them had been mainly commercial and generally friendly. N o w the old channels of commerce were mostly dry; the stream of trade from England to the Low Countries had long since turned toward the rebel provinces—and along with it money, men, and diplomatic support for the heretics in the north; England of course was heretic too. But if the two countries had moved away from each other spiritually they had stayed just as close geographically, which increased the intensity of frictions and the frequency of problems, and if the commercial channels between England and the Southern Provinces seemed dry, the channel of diplomacy between London and Brussels was full to overflowing. One result, as will be seen, was that the bulk of information-gathering to provide a basis for the making of Spanish Habsburg policy was done by Brussels, not Madrid. As will also be seen, the Brussels government, being more directly concerned than Spain in some matters, being more conveniently "on the spot" in others, and having a right to at least a voice in most, could and did take a large hand, on its own, in the making and conducting of that policy. This being the case, the anomalous position of the Spanish Netherlands in the Spanish Habsburg world requires some attention. T h e situation was very irregular, primarily because it had developed unexpectedly; it would not have arisen had Philip III not been born. As Philip the Prudent grew older he began to give up hope of leaving a male heir and expected that his daughter Isabella would succeed him. When a son was born after all and gave signs of surviving his father, the king decided to provide some other crown for his daughter. T o this end he reestablished as a separate sovereign state the family inheritance descended from Mary of Burgundy. As a part of these proceedings Philip arranged a rather late-inlife marriage for Isabella with his then governor of the Netherlands, the Archduke Ernest of Austria, but Ernest was dead before he

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could be married and the job fell to his brother, the CardinalArchduke Albert (who of course had to doff the cardinal's hat he had worn since youth). The cousins were duly married and about the time of Vervins, shortly before Philip's death, he ceded the Netherlands to Isabella.1 Her actual ruling powers were devolved onto her husband, which was largely the point of the wedding—to have a man in the house. Besides a shadow claim to the Northern Provinces, this cession carried to the archdukes what remained of the Pays de pardeça (roughly, present-day Belgium plus Luxemburg plus Artois), and of the Pays de pardelà (Franche-Comté), plus smaller areas here and there between the two.2 T o what extent the archdukes were really independent sovereigns over this "state" is of some importance here, as it involves the question of how much "right" they had to make independent policy decisions in their own affairs and those more closely concerning Spain herself; historians' opinions are very divided. Most of the attention to the question has understandably been given by modern Belgian historians,3 and—the independence of their country being a matter close to their hearts—their conclusions have been more indicative of individual attitudes than of the evidence. Ernest Gossart's treatment of the subject is typical of the frequent strong resentment of Spanish domination and of the ritual accusations of Spanish duplicity: Spain obviously had every intention from the beginning of continuing to rule the new, supposedly-sovereign state, and the terms of the cession itself "reduced" the archdukes "to the role of simple governors." Real independence was never intended and the archdukes accepted dependence knowingly. Had he not signed the cession himself as heir-apparent, making it impossible for him to reverse himself honorably, Philip III would have revoked it outright; unable to do this, he tried peevishly to get Albert and Isabella to exchange their "throne" for the government of some other Spanish territory.4 Other historians accept subordination to Spain as a fact, though

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in varying manner—Alphonse Wauters, for example, with resignation,5 Jean de Sturler with irony: the archdukes enjoyed "a sovereignty more nominal than real over the collection of Netherlands States."4 The prolific Victor Brants tried to explain the relationship otherwise, only to become entangled in a maze of ambiguities and contradictions: simply because the ties between Spain and the Netherlands were already so close, independence tended to be limited and Spanish authority strong, but one cannot, because of this, deny the will on both sides to make Europe believe in this independence. Having said this (which is not very much) Brants then goes overboard: "In reality Belgium during this period was once again exercising in international law the prerogatives of sovereignty, despite the superficial ties with the Empire, which no one treated as of much importance, despite the entente, the subordination in fact and the contractual restrictions vis-a-vis Spain." It appears that Brants, having taken the "international autonomy" of his country for his subject, found the appearance of autonomy to outweigh the mere fact of subordination.7 Joseph Lefevre, author of many excellent monographs on government structure under the archdukes, seems closer to the truth of the matter: "The international status of the Netherlands from the death of Philip to that of Albert is abnormal. Belgium is, during those twenty years [sic], neither an independent state nor a province of the Spanish monarchy. The Archduke is, for the king of Spain, neither a foreign sovereign nor a simple governor."8 As a manner of speaking this is correct enough, but the fact that the sovereign-of-record was not wholly either fish or fowl does little to explain what sort of power he did exercise. The fact is, Albert played different roles as he dealt with different affairs, and he can just as easily be seen as both an independent sovereign and a simple governor of a Spanish province (rather than neither), with an intermediate role discernible as well, that of the dependent sovereign of a client state. Then, as now, a good deal of government business was on a lower

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level of importance or, though important, was of local interest only or, though of wider interest, could be handled best by the man on the spot; in such matters Albert was usually allowed to be "absolute." It required military force to rule the area, and the army which furnished coercion was not under his control; in this regard he was not even fully a "simple governor" but a civil governor only. In such a matter as making a peace treaty with England or a truce with the Dutch he was in the position of a sovereign prince who can, if he chooses, chart his own course, but who is dependent on the support of one more powerful, on whom he can impose his will only by persuasion or outmaneuvering. The three roles which ruling the Spanish Netherlands entailed are reflected in the three separate hierarchies by which that rule was effected, in each of which Albert took an active part, though not always a commanding one: Albert's own personal court and councils (or those of both the archdukes, if one prefers); a separate Spanish ministerial apparatus; and the military. In his role as independent sovereign, the archduke had his own Audience,9 Privy Council and Council of State (along with lesser bodies). These were extremely well integrated, and administered by first-rate secretaries. The Audiencier was simultaneously first secretary of state; one of the ablest men in the Netherlands, Louis Verreyken, had served in an equivalent capacity under the governors of Philip II since 1578, and he continued in the post under the archdukes; he was succeeded in 1620 by his son, Louis-François Verreyken, who served with a distinction worthy of his father. 10 The chief officer of the Audience was thus also the chief officer of the Council of State, as well as a leading member of the Privy Council. T o complete the integration of those three institutions, the secretary of the Privy Council also wore a second hat, that of secretary of state. This dual secretariat was held by Philippe Prats until 1617, whereupon he was replaced by two men, the work being divided between them. 11 The dual character of the secretariat was kept, however: both men were both secretary of state and of the Privy Council. Of these, it was normally

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Charles della Faille who handled the correspondence and other papers of the archdukes' English affairs—including, as will be seen, their English espionage. Spanish direction of those affairs which they chose not to leave to Albert's discretion was exercised by means of a special organization known consistently, and somewhat deceptively, by its French title, the secrétairerie d'état et de guerre. The original "secretary of state and of war" was Juan de Mancicidor, who came to the Netherlands with Albert in 1596 especially to assume this newly created and still-tentative office. One corollary of the cession of the Netherlands to the archdukes in 1598 was the definitive establishment of this ministry (which occured in 1600). Mancicidor served in this position until his death in 1618. Albert then divided the duties of the office between two secretaries, Mathéo de Urquina, who had been with the secrétairerie since its beginning in 1596, and Pedro de San Juan, who had entered the service in 1605. Urquina handled military documents, San Juan diplomatic documents, a division of labor which lasted until the end of the first quarter of the century.12 The secrétairerie d'état et de guerre functioned "under" the archduke in the same pattern as, for example, his own council of state. The secretary handled Albert's correspondence with Madrid, and countersigned the orders and patents issued in his name relating to Spanish troops. But as Lefèvre, the authority on the subject, has said, the secretary was a long way from being secretary to the archduke. He was a royal minister, not an archducal one, and in his own right corresponded constantly with the king directly, reporting on events in the archduke's provinces and in neighboring states with the object, as Lefèvre sees it, of providing the king with a means of comparing reports on the same matters made by Albert, Spinola, and the Spanish ambassadors. "In short," concludes Lefèvre, "he was the principal liaison agent between the administration in Brussels and that in Madrid." 13 So much for Albert's own administrative structure and the separate Spanish ministry—for Albert as "independent sovereign" and as "simple governor" of a Spanish province. As for military administration, the position of the Army of Flanders in Flanders

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(the usual vernacular term for the whole area) is, if one wishes to continue the three-role image of Albert as ruler, an excellent example of a "foreign" armv stationed in the territory of a dependent state, one including troops from that state but with the dependent power exercising little final control over it. 14 The Army of Flanders was directly under the command of the captain-general, Ambrogio Spinola, and the captain-general was responsible directly to the king of Spain; the army was paid and paid for with Spanish money, which was stored in and dispersed from army treasuries (the main one at Antwerp) under the direct control of the captain-general; the main part of the army was stationed in garrisons guaranteed to Spain in the Articles of Cession, and in this and its position vis-á-vis the local judiciary it functioned under something very like a modern "status of forces" treaty. The archdukes' control over this army was very restricted. One encounters occasional cases of intervention in minor matters: in 1623, three soldiers in the Franche-Comté were caught eating cheese and eggs during Lent, a crime for which the king's edicts demanded the death penalty. The archdukes' Privy Council considered the case and recommended clemency, as the offenders were foreigners and did not know the local rules. The devout infanta consented and reprieve was granted in her name.15 But this was about the limit of real control. For years both Albert and Spinola had been trying to reform the army to check its deterioration as an effective fighting force and, both being veterans of warfare in the area and experienced in the problems of peacetime garrisoning of a large army there, they might well have been left alone. One of the main problems was simply that of manpower, of raising it and keeping it long enough to create veteran forces. But Felipe el Bueno conceived the notion that married soldiers cost too much and were too much trouble. This of course was no help to the archduke or the general, but there was nothing either could do about it. Madrid had spoken its will, and an order was issued in Albert's name: no more married men were to be accepted into the army, and soldiers getting married after the end of the current month were not to get the usual (microscopic) extra pay for

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married men and were not to be promoted above their present rank or position.16 As to Albert's "power" vis-a-vis the captain-general, the records are deceptive. One finds many dispatches from the archduke ordering troop movements, for example,17 and one gets the impression that it is he who is in command. But these orders came from him —were really channeled through him—only as a matter of form, a question of courtesy in deference to his position as sovereign ruler of the area, as well as to give them the added weight of his rank; the orders themselves were those of the king's general, not the archduke.18 But Albert had a much more important role than that to play in the military sphere, one which devolved upon him because of his constitutional position even more necessarily than the above. It was by his authority that lodging of troops was imposed on the local authorities, that disputes between the local population and the troops were settled (chicken stealing was an especially thorny problem), and that arrangements were made with allied, semiautonomous governments for passage of troops.19 This does not mean, however, that Albert was Spinola's lackey. He did have the power—and used it—to see that the conditions agreed to for stationing Spanish troops in the Netherlands were complied with. 20 And in any case, the two men sought the same ends, favored the same means, and (perhaps most important) got on very well together. One searches in vain for a sign of disagreement between them: 21 Albert respected and accepted the military advice of the best soldier in Europe, while Spinola deferred willingly to the sovereignty of the archduke. But Spinola was subordinate to Madrid and Albert was dependent on Madrid for his military force. Ergo, no newly married men could be promoted. The important point, in the present context, which this ambiguous government structure raises is that of the position in which it left the archduke in terms of power, or lack of it, to form and execute policy, as well as the scope one might expect in his diplomatic activities (and thus in the gathering of information to provide a basis for policymaking either in Brussels or Madrid).

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By one constitutional yardstick the question of ultimate sovereignty is fairly clearly answered. The lands in question were the patrimony of the House of Burgundy, and regardless of whatever other titles he might bear, it was to the duke of Burgundy that these lands pertained. And, although by the terms of the Cession Isabella received the title of duchess of Burgundy, the more meaningful title of duke of Burgundy was reserved for the heir to the Spanish throne, soon (shortly after the cession) to become Philip III. 22 An answer must be sought behind the façade of the Cession, however, for the formal status of the "country," if not a constitutional fiction (or, as some would put it, a constitutional fraud) was still merely an ad hoc arrangement designed to fit the circumstances of the moment, the two most conspicuous of which were Philip II's desire to provide his daughter a crown, and the need to placate the restive population—the southern provinces (to say nothing of the northern) were alarmingly rebellious—by granting them a sovereign "of their own." This latter need of giving a local color to the ruling authority has been marked by historians, but generally in a way which adds to the confusion instead of clearing it up. Victor Brants, for example, interpreted the appointment of local men to office as an attempt to placate the "Belgians," but in doing so he attributed far greater power to these "Belgian" ministers than they really had and almost entirely ignored the presence of Spanish ministers.23 Lefèvre, by contrast, tended to err in the opposite extreme. His detailed (and excellent) research on Spanish ministers and functionaries led him to a conclusion based on their role, as well as on Albert's military and financial dependence on Spain: "The permanence in the high administrative spheres of this series of Spaniards, as well as the maintenance in the country of a Spanish army and the regular dispatch of funds destined to pay this army and its functionaries, are all manifest signs by which one is able to recognize a priori how relative was the independence of our provinces, even in the best years of the reign of the Archduke Albert." 24 But Lefèvre's argument is misleading, largely because of his tendency to line up all the characters as "Belgian" and "Spanish." The sovereigns themselves—an Austrian archduke and a Spanish

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infanta—are of course at the head of his list of local folk in power, but Lefévre finds only three first-rate Belgians in office under them—the Audiencier Verreyken, Jean Richardot, president of the Privy Council, and Pierre Pecquius, chancellor of Brabant—while finding "no less than nine" Spanish ministers of the first rank, plus many lesser ones.25 However, if one disregards these racial statistics and forgoes the nationalist approach, addressing oneself instead to the practical question of what position these individuals took in those cases in which the archdukes' desires regarding important policy matters were markedly different from Madrid's, then one finds that the side of the angels was not so badly outnumbered. Viewed thus, simply in terms of support or opposition, several of the nine principal "Spaniards" in positions of power, and some lesser ones as well, should be moved over to the pro-Albert list of three. The first of these is Ambrogio Spinola, who was an Italian anyway, not a Spaniard, and whose actions—such as those already described during the Cleves-Jülich crisis and regarding the truce with the Dutch—conformed with Albert's policy, not Madrid's. As mentioned previously, most of the important business Brussels had with Madrid went through the Spanish secrétairerie d'état et de guerre, but it was largely Albert's own correspondence, and though it passed through a Spanish-staffed channel the secretary himself was an old and trusted friend and servant: Mancicidor, in the direct pay of the king of Spain though he was, must be counted as "pro-Albert." Among others who must be considered in the same light, it should be recalled that it was Iñigo Brizuela, Albert's confessor (classed by Lefévre as the most important of the "Spanish ministers of the second rank") who so ably executed for Albert the delicate and difficult task of getting Philip Ill's signature on the Truce of Antwerp—hardly a "pro-Spanish" action in opposition to the archdukes—and (because of a subsequent change in terms) did it not once but twice.29 In addition to those "Spaniards" who supported Albert's policies rather than Madrid's, it is worth noting that, although Madrid refused consistently to allow appointment of "Flemings" to im-

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portant positions in the judicial, financial, and administrative hierarchies of the A r m y of Flanders (refusing with an offensive manner often enough 27 but with a certain logic, since it was a Spanish army), whenever Albert sent to negotiate a peace or a truce—which was usually against Spanish wishes to begin with— the men w h o formed the backbone of the missions were invariably Pecquius, Richardot, and Verreyken. And the rest of the roll call of a given mission had a decidedly non-Castilian ring, filled with such names as Conrad Schetz, seigneur de Grobbendonck, baron d'Hoboken. T h e fact is that in practice Albert's "powers" to form and execute a foreign policy of his own consisted entirely of his literal (not formal) power to do so. That is, though limited by military, financial, and other dependence on Spain, he had the partially compensating advantage of usually being nearer the scene of action, which enabled him to present Madrid with an occasional fait accompli, such as sending a peace delegation off to London in 1603, leaving Philip to send one of his own or be left out, or, as in the case of the T r u c e with the Dutch, to exercise pressure and persuasion to gain the agreement and support of the Spanish government. Albert did this with varying degrees of success. T h e examples of his diplomatic activities mentioned so far can be counted as well done for the Habsburg cause, even as modest victories over Madrid. A later attempt to execute Habsburg affairs from Brussels (shortly before Albert's death) which was blessed with less fortune will be dealt with in some detail later in the present study.

CHAPTER 7

Parenthesis: Portrait of a Bureaucrat In order not to overlook a crucial, if mundane, aspect of the present subject, it is well to cast a brief glance from a more intimate angle at the same administrative structures which have been discussed above, "examining" now not that more distinguished organism, the policymaking apparatus, but the bureaucratic machine. The existence of a special Spanish-staffed "secretariat of state and of war" alongside Albert's regular conciliar apparatus had the advantage of keeping his correspondence with Madrid flowing through a special and specialized channel while his contacts with foreign powers were conducted through his own councils—the latter a necessary procedure if one hoped to maintain the appearance of archducal sovereignty. Along with its virtues, however, the system had an inherent functional flaw, for it involved a clumsy bureaucratic detour. Things coming into the archduke's Council of State or his Privy Council had to be communicated to Madrid in vast quantities, and even if this had been done directly it would have entailed plenty of work. By doing it via the secretairerie d'etat et de guerre, the routine of sending this material off had to be done twice, the latter ministry had to receive it as well before sending it on (which involved memos acknowledging receipt, and then memos of notification that it had been sent on), and the instructions for sending which the archduke had given his own secretaries had to be repeated by them in turn to those who would do the actual sending to Madrid.1

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Time-honored passages crept into this constant stream of memos with unsurprising frequency: a secretary, for example, has been ordered to get a certain document prepared and sent off to Albert; it is overdue and he still does not have it ready; he explains with a note of desperation that he would like very much to send it tonight but he has been unable to prepare it and cannot send it because of the sudden load of work given him by the arrival of the ordinary post from Italy. 2 His desperation was real, for—added to the already enormous work load—this awkward routine threatened to bury the lot of them, efficient and hard-working though they were, under a mountain of paper. T o be effective this dual structure also required a coordination of information, and since the original sources of information could not always be sent back and forth this entailed much correspondence between officials who would otherwise have shared the same sources. A more than ordinarily useful example of this voluminous inter-office correspondence, one which combines brevity with a number of elements which typically occurred, is a message from Pedro de San Juan, secrétaire d'état et de guerre, to Charles della Faille, secretary of the Privy Council and Council of State, of J u l y 29, 1620—not the least typical aspect of which is that the overworked sender wrote it at home: 3 I am most grateful f o r the service you have done me in sending me the letter f r o m the Seigneur Boisschot. 4 I have not been able to answer Y o u r Lordship's letter until now because I understood from a dispatch that His Highness was waiting. 5 T h e news that this mail f r o m G e r m a n y has brought is that the Duke of Bavaria was on his w a y with his army, returning from Bohemia to succor the Emperor, and that Saxony also was coming in with his to the same effect, with which, with the forces the Emperor has there and our army entering from here in order to divide those of the Protestants, one has high expectations that shortly His Imperial Majesty will be restored in that which he has lost and in his entire dignity and authority; may O u r L o r d permit it thus. Of neither the Count of Bucquoy 6 nor of the Bohemians w h o are opposing him is there any news. M a y G o d protect you. . . .

Sometimes there was not even leisure to express "high expectations" or other private thoughts, and at such times this correspond-

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ence, hewing even closer to its intended line of function, can be still more revealing of the pressure of work, by its brevity; of the immense complexity of affairs handled, by the number of matters covered in this brevity. During the Cleves-Jülich crisis, for example, the following two are typical 7 of the memos being constantly sent from Mancicidor and his aides to their Flemish counterparts. Yesterday I received Y o u r Lordship's of the 28th and with it the [letters] that came f o r the ambassadors in France and England, which I sent right off with the posts that were dispatched for [those parts], and the Marquis Spinola w r o t e with each, and this Y o u r Lordship can tell H i s Highness. I herewith send Y o u r Lordship His Highness's dispatch which I spoke of this morning, with a c o p y of it so that Y o u r Lordship may write to the Ambassador Boisschot, 8 and in M y L o r d the Secretary's letter to S r D o n Diego Sarmiento® is added the news of what has been taken since the army's having occupied the city of Wesel.

These rivers of interbureau papers flowed not just between the t w o "administrations" in the Netherlands but between the Netherlands and Spain as well. That of the secrétairerte (Tétat et de guerre has been mentioned; a parallel stream (running in both directions) flowed between the Spanish secretaries in Madrid and their fellow bureaucrats in Albert's own councils. 10 Much of this correspondence can be classified as "official business," but even then its form is often governed by the clubby custom of keeping friends as current as possible on latest developments so they would be one up on rival career men. In April, 1624, f o r example, a new junta was set up in Madrid to consider the English marriage; Jacques Bruneau, then a second-level secretary, fired off a list of the eleven junta members chosen from the Council of State to his colleague (and good friend) Charles della Faille in Brussels even before he could learn all their names—two he could list only as "a secret minister," adding that some said one would be the duke of Alba, others the duke of Feria, others the count of Oñate. 1 1

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One might contend that this was legitimate government business withal, but these channels of communication were clogged with more than their share of documents which did not concern matters of state but of career, with friends promoting and protecting friends and subtly knifing, when possible, aspirants not in their clique. Understandably, such messages were not meant for the eyes of outsiders—were certainly not meant to become part of the official records—and one smiles on encountering a compromising letter1-' a forgetful recipient failed to destroy as he should have done over three centuries ago: Monsieur. You will already have heard how Mr Routart has obtained the title of Secretary to the King, but without salary, which he is claiming now for otherwise this would be a merced that was honorable but expensive since it obliges him to [put up a costlier front]. He makes no mention of succeeding to your place, and whenever he should try it (quod no credo) I think he will obtain nothing, for what likelihood is there of naming a successor to you, [considering] your age and health? God protect you. Well, after the said Sr Routart shall have achieved his pretentions it will be time to think about what one will be able to ask for Monsieur Finia, for at the moment he will have no favors at all, and [the favors] of M. the Bishop will not be lacking to him [later on], nor my desire to render him service for his merits and [as a service to you]. I beg of you to tear up this letter. . . .

Spanish diplomacy and government, on which hinged much of the fate of Europe in this period, dealt with matters of high policy, and the side it presented to the world was peopled with kings and archdukes, ambassadors and commissioners. In practice, however, it also took place in a world (as will be seen) of harlots and spies and mud-slinging mobs, and, not least important, of functionaries fighting their own little wars of bureaucratic advancement, overburdened in any case, falling behind in their work, struggling desperately to get these papers finished before the post departed and (above all) before the next one arrived. Sovereigns and envoys, forming Spanish Habsburg policy and in the process shaping the history of the world, played out the drama center stage, but the backdrop was made of—paper.

The Informational Base of Foreign Policy T h e policymaking machinery of the Spanish Habsburgs was designed specifically to take in large quantities of information of many sorts, digest it, and come to a conclusion. Some of the information was good, some bad; some was well used, some badly. But well done or ill done, it was an operation in which information was the raw material fed into the machine and "foreign policy" the product. A great deal of this material was either of local origin (such as the avisos on making peace with England discussed in Chapter 4) or otherwise locally available, generally in the government archives. This was true in commercial and financial matters, as in others. In deciding on acceptable commercial terms (as well as religious ones) for a truce with the northern provinces, not only were the documents relating to the negotiations for the Treaty of London and the terms of the treaty itself used as a guide, but councilors also consulted a great many documents pertaining to similar negotiations in Queen Elizabeth's time. These latter seem to have been given long and careful study; some (perhaps all) of them were copied for use as early as May, 1605. 1 A bit later ( 1 6 1 8 ) , when James I began pressing for repayment of old debts owed by the "Netherlands" to the English crown from the previous century, contemporary intelligence on the matter was supplemented by many earlier documents, including copies of the original agreements in question, which dated from 1577. 2 Prac-

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tically any question that came up was thus thoroughly documented: any changes in English tariff policy, for example, invariably brought forth new compilations both of present English tariff schedules and of past ones, sometimes reaching back to the time of Henrv VII, often of exhaustive thoroughness.3 Perhaps at no time did the Spanish avail themselves of more inform ition, past and present, than they did during the debates over the marriage of a daughter of Spain with the Prince of Wales; this was especially so during the early twenties, the most crucial period of the negotiations. Members of the Council of State, of the Junta de Inglaterra, and of various special juntas (sometimes made up exclusively of theologians) pored over reams of documents, old and new, pertaining to the present condition of the Faith in England; the character of the prince and his heretic father; the Elizabethan Oath of Supremacy, the Oath of Allegiance to James I and the oaths officeholders must take, including the texts of all these in both English and Spanish; the marriage of Henry VII and (predictably subjected to close scrutiny) those of Henry VIII; the more recent marriages of the Princess Elizabeth to the Count Palatine and of the Infanta Ana to Louis XIII (to compare doweries given, in order to judge what should be offered); and large quantities of material from the time of Mary Tudor's marriage to the later Philip II. This mass of material was consulted primarily to decide whether the match was desirable. In addition it was found necessary to consult St. Thomas to see whether such a match, if desired, were permissible and then, the councilors and advisers having seen what he said, it was necessary to consult the commentators and recent analysts to see what he meant. Father Juan Federico Xedler, for example, submitted a thorough discussion of relevant canon law legalities, based largely on St. Thomas, as a parecer in 1615, and the same document was used again (with the date scratched out) as a basis for debate on the same matter in 1622.4 Yet in spite of the fact—perhaps because of the fact—that so much information was used in the exhaustive inquiry into the advisability of the marriage, the material was not always well

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used. T h e Spanish translations from English are unusually good (for ones made in Madrid in the period) but one is surprised, considering the number of theological scholars involved, at the frequency of faulty translations from Latin, even of such important texts as those of James's various draft articles for the treaty itself. 6 Even when they were properly translated, present danger was often read into the records of the past, but this was sometimes less damaging to the Spanish cause that it is amusing now in retrospect, as in the case of the Spaniards' preoccupation with Henry VIII's infatuation with Anne Boleyn and its consequences, which led them to make insistent demands for all sorts of oaths, guarantees, and pledges of the royal word that this sort of thing would not happen again. As it turned out, both James and Charles were perfectly willing to give these; 8 one perhaps cannot expect the worried Spaniards to have foreseen that Charles was to prove virtuous almost to a fault. T h e correct interpretation of the information under consideration was of course of great importance. One of the primary ends for Spain in contracting any marriage with the heretic Prince of Wales (the end, so far as the theologians were concerned) was the eventual return of England to the Catholic fold, or at least the amelioration of the condition of English Catholics—preferably entailing the repeal of all anti-Catholic legislation, which many believed sufficient for gaining the former end as well as the latter. One aspect of the problem, as considered, was what influence, if any, the infanta would have on her heretic bridegroom and, conversely, whether her faith would be in danger from contact with both father and son, a danger not only to her soul but potentially damaging to the Church as well because of the effect her corruption would have on public opinion. An advice submitted on the latter aspect of the problem, based on a comparison of circumstances a century before with those of the present, makes a certain amount of sense, though rather surprising reading, since it was addressed to the king: in the former case, Henrv VIII had been brought up a Catholic but had turned

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heretic in spite of a wife of great ability and firm faith; in the present case the bridegroom had been born a heretic and reared as one, and was in fact the son of the greatest of all heretics, head and mentor of all the heretics of Europe, while the blood of the Spanish royal family was corrupt and its members were inclined to vice and laxity, so obviously the infanta, though now a good Catholic, could not be expected to remain one. This was more an abuse of royalty than of reason, but it was not always the case. Sotomayor, father confessor to Philip I V , in arguing against the likelihood of any religious good ever coming from the marriage, unnecessarily stood logic on its head to make his point, arguing that when the ruler of England had been Catholic the people had been Catholic and when the ruler had been a heretic the people had been heretic too. Sotomayor, starting with the fact that the king and the future king were heretics, maintained that that would make England remain so; he might have argued with better justice what James himself was thoroughly convinced of, that as long as so large and powerful a segment of the population of England was made up of determined Puritans there was little he could have done toward returning England to the Roman Church even if he had wanted to. 7 But archives and logic—good or bad—were not enough. T o deal with events and conditions abroad one could not do without information which originated abroad. T h e more common sources of information from abroad were, however, either inadequate or unreliable. Englishmen present in Spain or the Netherlands, such as William Semple or Father Baldwin, were sometimes consulted and sometimes they volunteered information but they were too often buried in controversy to be of much use.8 Those lands also received a steady stream of friendly persons who appear in Spanish records with such names as "Moriarti," "Osuliban," "Moroghi" (Murphy) and "Queli," but they were one sort or another of refugee, and even if they brought any useful information with them they were in no position to supply more. Printed accounts of the latest happenings all over Europe and even in the Indies were available in abundance, including both

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established newsletters and one-shot relations of particular events, and these could potentially have served to keep ministers abreast of events in a manner analogous to that of present day newspapers, but unfortunately they were of little worth as factual sources. Henry Wotton cited an example of this to his nephew shortly after Princess Elizabeth's marriage to Frederick V : " M y Ladie Elizabeth and the Count Palatine . . . at length on Sunday last . . . did put to sea, some 8 dayes after a booke had been printed and published in London of her intertaynement at Heidelberge, so nimble an age it is."® This was of course just a case of an overeager printer and, although such blatant frauds were common enough, one might expect better of works which had a more serious intent: little reliance, however, could be placed even on these. T h e well-known history of the times b y Matias Novoa (which used to be attributed to Barnabe Vibanco) is a case in point. Novoa pirated his narrative of the Palatinate campaigns from the account written by Francisco de Ibarra, a captain in Spinola's army, which was a common enough practice but made ludicrous in this case by an unintentional pitfall Ibarra had laid, causing Novoa, in his almost word-for-word plagiarism, to get his words thoroughly mixed up. Spelling was not Ibarra's forte, and instead of his usual spelling of " V o r m s " he refers at one point to Spinola's taking the road to "Cams." Novoa repeated Ibarra's description of the town, including its great strategic importance, and its siege and capture, but Ibarra happened not to have mentioned the place by name again for some time and Novoa blithely used all this detail not to describe the fall of Worms (which he gets to in good time) but to relate how at this point Spinola "went on to take the [nonexistent] City of Kams." 1 0 Printed accounts such as these of course got read and, reliable or not, there seems no reason to suppose thev did not affect the thinking of policymaking ministers. But the real need in any case was for information that was not only more reliable but fuller and more up to date (authentically) than that which could be had from printed sources. T h e bulk of this was provided by resident ambassadors. Much of the information needed by the home government was of

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the routine sort that one might expect f r o m a commercial consul: news of business conditions, of shipping movements, and so on. V a s t quantities of data of this sort w e r e included in the ambassi dors' reports, and whatever ancillary documents seemed relevant were f o r w a r d e d as well: in 1609, f o r example, the East India Company's n e w patent was available f o r consultation in Brussels, already in Spanish translation, almost before the ink could have been d r y on the original. 1 1 T h e reports of the Spanish and Flemish ambassadors, however, ranged f a r beyond those of a commercial consul. In the case of those resident in England, their accounts of the speeches, bills, and other business of Parliament w e r e surprisingly full and, as a rule, remarkably accurate; these w e r e generally accompanied b y the writer's o w n analysis of the background, nature, and import of these things and of likely future developments. 1 2 T h e y gave an almost continual running account of the condition of Catholics in England, as well as the turbulent course of domestic politics at the English court. Especially in times of crisis English fleet movements w e r e reported minutely, f o r (whatever the declared mission) there was never any certainty in Spanish minds that the English raids of the previous reign w o u l d not be repeated, and there was increasing suspicion that the English planned sometime to fall on the Flemish coast in conjunction with a land thrust b y the French to recover the C o u n t y of Artois:

the Spanish Habsburgs watched the warlike

naval preparations f o r a campaign against (the English said) the T u r k i s h pirates 1 3 as carefully as they later did the preparations f o r an actual attack on Cadiz. iMuch of this material could be had simply b y collecting what was being said in public, especially in that center of exchange f o r news, rumor, and gossip, Paul's W a l k , 1 4

w h i c h was a prolific

source of information regarding both English affairs and affairs which did not pertain so exclusively to England: domestic politics, the latest events on the Continent, the progress of English negotiations (in L o n d o n or elsewhere) with foreign powers, and so on. But both f o r detail and f o r confirmation one had to relv on more particular sources of information. Besides these factors of the inadequacy or uncertainty of much

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of the information more generally and openly available, it would obviously be the more important, more valuable information that others would guard with the greatest secrecy. In addition, secret information gamed secretly provided a distinct advantage over rival powers who lacked that information, as well as over the power itself whose plans had been secretly discovered and whose moves could be anticipated b y countermeasures. It is thus not surprising that information of a secret nature was the most vital element in the informational base of foreign policymaking. 1 5 T h e principal agents in furnishing policymakers with this vital element were diplomats and spies—which were not mutually exclusive terms. This being the case, one must glance briefly at the nature of diplomacy in the period, at the diplomatic milieu in which the diplomat-spies operated. T h e early seventeenth century (often taken together with adjacent periods) has been given a number of appellations, characterizing the aspect with which a particular writer was most concerned. T h e period was, among other things, the "age of the wars of religion" and the age of the "Spanish preponderance"; it might with some justice also be termed " T h e A g e of Diplomacy," for the role of the diplomat looms very large. T h e most characteristic thing about the diplomacy of the period, in fact, was that there was so very much of it. Maintaining resident ambassadors abroad had become a well-established practice b v then among most major western powers and lesser ones as well, and the activities of these permanent envoys were many and varied. In addition to these, in special circumstances (which existed most of the time) extraordinary embassies were also about in great numbers. Short of a comprehensive survey of the subject, 16 perhaps nothing better demonstrates the amount of diplomatic activity in these years than the plethora of negotiations for marriage alliances between ruling houses. Part of the motive for adding a marriage to a treaty that was desired on its own merits was of course dynastic, but treaties in general and alliances in particular were something of a drug on the market at the time and (besides such mundane con-

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siderations as dowry payments) this procedure had the special function, theoretically and hopefully, of making agreements more binding by means of family ties: one might say that the parents ratified the marriage and the young lovers consummated the treaty. This sort of diplomacy flourished on a scale far beyond any conceivable possibility of fulfillment. T h e hand of almost any marriageable prince or princess was constantly being sought on all sides, and offered on all sides as well, sometimes sincerely, sometimes as a ploy to keep a power negotiating instead of fighting, sometimes just a matter of shopping around for the best available deal. James I, for example, could be found more often than not discussing at least two or three possible matches for the prince of Wales at one time. Philip III was said to be seeking the hand of James's teen-age daughter Elizabeth with his own latest wife hardly in her grave, but the extremes which such marriage projects could reach, in reality or in imagination, is perhaps best exemplified by a document touching on such a marriage between the Infanta Ana (who later married Louis X I I I ) and James I himself, at a time when James's wife was still very much alive and was to continue to be so for some years. 17 T h e impracticability of such projects was a result, however, of a policy of aiming for far targets in hope of at least reaching nearer ones and of using a shotgun approach in doing so, and not a result of naïveté—for these people were somewhat less than guileless. Henry Wotton, stopping off at Augsburg while on a diplomatic errand for the king of England, coined a Latin epigram to the effect that an ambassador was an honest man sent to lie abroad in the service of his country ("Legatus est vir bonus, peregre missus ad mentiendum reipublica causa"). Written in a moment of whimsy, this was much criticized then (and has been much quoted since), but the real fault found with Wotton's little pun was not that it was false but that it was indiscreet, stating a fact which everyone knew but which one did not admit for one's own part, for Wotton's critics knew full well that the diplomatic world was indeed a world of deceptions. T h e aura of duplicity and subterfuge which surrounds the

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diplomacy of the time—hardly a unique period in that respect— is nowhere more apparent than in the long-drawn-out negotiations f o r an Anglo-Spanish marriage. T h e Spanish attitude to the alliance changed often with changes in circumstances and personnel and simple changes of mind, so that over the years one may find almost e v e r y possible official position at one time or another. One of the prerequisites of such a match was papal dispensation, and t o w a r d the end of Philip Ill's reign the Spanish had been seeking one f o r c e f u l l y enough to be on the verge of success. T h e n around the time of Philip Ill's death and Philip I V ' s accession another weather-vane change occurred in Spanish

desires. T h e v

suddenly

no

longer

wanted the dispensation, though they w e r e willing enough to have its refusal delayed as long as possible. T h e i r envoys to R o m e were charged with the delicate task of seeing that further impediments w e r e put in the w a y but without their seeming to be desired (much less inspired) b y Madrid, inasmuch as the Spanish had so recently been pushing so hard to get the same dispensation granted. T h e pope no more than anyone else was exempt f r o m the deceptions of the Catholic K i n g . 1 8 Such deviousness sometimes reached exaggerated and often unworkable extremes. F o r this sort of diplomacy on a relatively restrained level, however, an opinion expressed in council

earlv

in 1624 b y the Count of G o n d o m a r is a more than usually useful example since he was one of the least devious of the lot. A t that time James I's primary concern was the restoration of the Palatinate, and his recent efforts had been directed toward m i k i n g that an inseparable condition of the Anglo-Spanish marriage. G o n d o m a r had favored the marriage itself f r o m the beginning and still did; his particular concern at the moment was to avoid a break with James that would increase that king's European stature and, as he saw it, any break at all with James at that time would have that effect. F o r this reason if f o r no other he was convinced that the Palatinate had to be restored, but this too had to be handled in such a w a y that James's stature w o u l d not be increased. T o compass all this, G o n d o m a r recommended that Philip decline to give James a direct answer to his latest insistence that the t w o matters be handled

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together and propose instead that a new conference be set up in Brussels to negotiate the Palatinate question, between representatives of the king of England and the Count Palatine on the one hand and those of the emperor and the duke of Bavaria on the other, presided over bv the Infanta Isabella with the aid of whatever advisers Philip chose to appoint. Gondomar was convinced that in any case James would have to be given full satisfaction in the matter, but by doing so in this manner the concession would come from the grace and good intentions of the king of Spain rather than from Spain's having been forced to it in the course of the marriage negotiations. 19 Nothing came of this plan. About a month later, the Council of State was informed b y Walter Aston, the English ambassador, that James had broken off negotiations in both these matters. T h e Spanish did not want this to happen, so they did their best to breeze blithely on as though it had not, at least not in any final and decisive way. Philip's reply was carefully drawn up to obtain this effect—to impose an illusion that nothing definite had been done at all—but its delivery to Aston was delayed while a copy of it and of Aston's memorial were rushed to the Spanish embassy in London, to give the Spanish ambassadors there a chance to discuss the matter with James before he himself had received the answer through his own diplomatic channels, giving them time to demonstrate the strong feelings of "brotherhood, friendship, and esteem" Philip had for James and to assure him that "like a good friend and brother" Philip was still eager to arrange a settlement of the Palatinate question to James's liking—the ambassadors acting (in both senses of the word) under strict orders not to show any particular concern about the break one way or another. 20 Madrid was eager at the time to keep James negotiating; this roundabout approach was not uncommon at all to Spanish diplomacy. The resident ambassador had of course many duties to perform, ranging from ceremonial to routine "consular" duties, to such tasks as that of Jacques Bruneau in the autumn of 1625, when it devolved upon him to warn the king of England (Charles I by then) that if his armada came into Spanish waters, even if it came in the name of

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the Count Palatine, the act would be taken as a declaration of war. 21 But the role of the resident ambassador was something more than that of a simple liaison agent between governments. As Zeller puts it, "to justify his existence, in fact, and satisfy that which was expected of him, he showed himself inexhaustible; he accumulated in his dispatches to his government all that which he knew and that which he did not know, information of every nature and of every origin, a pell-mell of news authentic and invented. . . . T h e permanent ambassador, in sum, was a privileged spy." 2 2 A cross section of the sort of information which made up the intelligence from England which the Spanish Habsburgs received from the "privileged spies" who served as their envoys to that country (and some ordinary spies as well) is given in later chapters, along with two specific instances of the role this information played in the taking of major policy-level decisions. Such examples could be multiplied almost indefinitely, but for brevity's sake perhaps nothing better illustrates the importance of having such information than the comparative lack of such information that the English had of Spanish actions and intentions. One of the things that would have been of great advantage to the English would have been the procurement of copies of the secret half of sets of parallel letters to ambassadors in London, for such double correspondence was a common Spanish practice. T h e device was quite simple: the king of Spain would send his ambassador a letter meant for his eyes only, stating Madrid's real views and intentions, accompanied by another on the same subject designed to be seen by James or his ministers. This was not a case of gulling fools, for the letter designed to be shown was convincingly done. It was, in fact, the king's regular letter to his ambassador, and while certain parts of it were overridden by the secret letter the rest was perfectly legitimate, for it was in this letter and not the secret one that the king said all the other things he might have to communicate. How the trick was used varied with circumstances. T h e ambassador might simply show it to James as a matter of routine, to underline what he had been saying about Spanish intentions, good faith, and so on; he might reveal its con-

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tents by calculated indiscretion in an "unguarded moment"; or he could, if he chose, simply make it easy f o r English spies to gain access to it, which would make the discovered contents even more effectively convincing. Some two months before the Battle of the White Mountain, for example, Philip III wrote to Gondomar approving all he had done recently in the negotiations for the Anglo-Spanish marriage and pointing out that the principal cause that had moved him to enter into those negotiations was ("as you k n o w " ) concern for the welfare of Christianity and the service of the Lord, and also in order to establish close ties of friendship with the king of Great Britain. In order to pursue those two ends, the things which remained to be settled in the negotiations were important: a good understanding on all the separate terms and principally on those that touched religion. Philip would of course have preferred that Gondomar be able to procure all the religious conditions that Spain desired, but one had to consider that the t w o negotiating powers were of different religions and that concession of all the Spanish desires was hardly to be expected. T h e thing to make sure of was that the religious terms that were procured be such that, when it came time to seek the papal dispensation, the pope would find them acceptable and would be willing to go along with Spanish wishes for the marriage and grant the dispensation. Philip said he would write directly to James regarding this, in answer to James's latest letter, and that Gondomar could tell him the same in Philip's name. On the same day—it was September 2, 1620, and Spinola was beginning his invasion of the L o w e r Palatinate—Philip wrote a second letter to his ambassador. H e said he had dealt with the marriage in question in his other letter of the same date but that he wanted to say "aparte" that he would accept no treaty that did not include full liberty of conscience f o r Catholics in England and adequate security that this clause would be complied with. If this could not be obtained (and even Philip III could not have been dullard enough to think that it could), the negotiations were ended—but that final step must not be taken until winter had

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begun and it was seen h o w affairs were progressing in Germany, at which time Gondomar would be advised of the form the talks should then take. 2 3 Gondomar had long insisted that his secretary, Father Diego de la Fuente, should be sent to R o m e in order to expedite the granting of the dispensation. In the confidential letter mentioned above, Philip expressly forbade Fuente's departure on this mission. In the following weeks Gondomar continued to press his arguments and b y early December—about the time the news of Frederick's defeat at the W h i t e Mountain was reaching England—Madrid decided to send Fuente after all, though

for reasons quite different

from

Gondomar's. T h e standard pair of letters in such a case was sent. T h e one for showing was full of good

faith and serious intentions in

the

marriage negotiations, and ordered Gondomar to send Fuente off on his mission to R o m e to perform all the good offices he could to obtain the dispensation. T h e second letter was somewhat different: Fuente was to be sent to Rome with the securing o f the dispensation as his goal, but precisely because Madrid was confident that at the moment such a mission would be unsuccessful. Madrid was convinced that the marriage negotiations were going to break down very soon anyway, and b y sending Fuente to Rome the actual breakdown of the whole marriage project would take place there and the blame would conveniently fall on the papacy, not on Spain. 24 Had something analogous to these secret dispatches reposed in some other embassy in London or among the papers of English ministers themselves, documents as important to Spain as these were in the actual case to England, it is extremely unlikely that notice of their contents—perhaps exact copies—would not very soon have been in the hands of Spanish policymakers. Obviously, had this correspondence been seen b y the English they would have been in a much better position to gauge Spanish sincerity in the negotiations at the moment. T h i s is not to say, however, that the discovery of one or two

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secret documents would b y itself have put the English on the right track in their relations with Spain, arming them with an accurate knowledge of Spanish desires and intentions regarding any AngloSpanish marriage alliance, proving that the whole negotiation was a long-sustained Spanish deception. It was just not that simple. Spanish policy on the matter changed constantly (when there was any agreed-upon policy at all), and if the English were to deal with the problem on the basis of accurate information they

needed

constant information on a constantly changing situation. T h e need, on the English side, was not limited to documents in London such as those mentioned above. Had James had as accurate information about the goings on at the Spanish court as the Spanish had about the inner secrets of his own he would not have had to proceed so much in the dark. A t the time of the acrimonious dissolution of Parliament in December,

1621, for example, when James was at his wits' end

trying to find a means of procuring the restoration of Frederick V , it would have been of incalculable value for him to have known that it was the considered opinion of the special junta considering the marriage alliance ( o f which he wanted to make the restoration a condition) that to fail to carry that alliance to completion would be the worst possible course for Spain. T h e junta pointed out that the fleet from the Indies, bearing the annual transfusion of silver, had arrived safely only b y a miracle

("the

sea being so full of enemies") and even with that there was not enough money in the treasury for even the most pressing needs, while the "enemies of Spain's greatness" were many and the forces she had to maintain to defend herself against them were

com-

parably large. It was of the greatest importance to avoid a break with England for, as the junta caustically put it, "this Monarchy has greater need to keep friends than to lose them." 2 5 James I could have negotiated the Palatinate question (in which nothing could be done without Spain) from a position of much greater strength—had he onlv known that he had one. But James did not have this sort of information available to

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him. H e ruled, however, over a court and kingdom which supplied in one way or another a very large part of the information the Spanish Habsburgs needed for their own policymaking, a subject which is examined in the following chapters.

PART THREE

Intelligence from England

i

CHAPTER 9

I p p p p p p p p p i l

The Court and Character of James I In 1623 there was published in Aberdeen a work of a genre fairly common at the time entitled A brief Chronicle of all the Kings of Scotland: Declaring in what Year of the World, and of Christ, they began to reign, how long they reigned, of what Qualities they were, and how they died. The author points out that James I of Scotland "began to reign in the Year of the World 5394, and in the Year of Christ 1424," and that "This good prince was slain treacherously (alas!) at Perth." . . . James II was "slain at the siege of Roxburgh"; James III "was slain at the Field and Battle of Bannock Burn"; James IV was "slain at Flowden, bv England"; while James V had "died at Falkland." James VI, now also James I of England, had begun to reign "in the Year of the World 5537, and in the Year of Christ 1567." At the time of this compilation the latter had reigned for 56 years, almost double the previous record for kings of Scotland named James, and, what was more surprising, bid fair to die a natural death in his own good time. The author was justifiably impressed by this performance. 1 Almost from birth (or before birth if one counts the murder of Rizzio before his mother's eyes) James lived nearly constantly— and somehow managed to survive—in a vortex of violence, hostility, and general mistreatment. More or less continually someone or other was trying, with varying degrees of success and failure, to kidnap him, imprison him, stab him, or blow him up along with all the knights and burgesses of the commons and all the peers of

I IO

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the realm. He was in his own day, and has been since, handled almost as roughly in print. Between the more violent attacks with daggers or barrels of gunpowder James was under a steady barrage of hostile writings, both from Catholic opponents abroad and from Puritans and Parliamentarians at home. The Jesuit polemics he answered; the partisan, often scurrilous, literature originating in England he generally ignored—but not so later historians and "historians." As is pointed out in a famous comic history, "James I slobbered at the mouth and had favorites: he was thus a Bad King." 2 As the authors of this sentence well knew, both of the charges are true but the verdict is silly. As to favorites, the unwisdom of governing a body politic made up exclusively, it seemed, of incompatible warring factions by means of a chief minister dependent exclusively upon, and loyal first of all to the sovereign is not so axiomatic as has generally been held. As to the charge of slobbering, James's tongue was a bit too large for his narrow jaw, or his jaw too narrow for his tongue, however one would have it, and he really was guilty of drooling a bit. But the traditional verdict on his quality as a sovereign, based to no small degree on these things and a good many others like them, cannot be agreed with so readily. It is of some importance, in fact, in dealing with his court (as in the present work) to give some attention to the time-hallowed acceptance of James I as so indubitably a Bad King—though one must admit from the start that those who cannot abide a king with a narrow jaw will not be convinced. The key piece in the evolution of this tradition is Sir Anthony Weldon's History of the Court and Character of King James and of the Intrigues and Tragical Events of His Life, a compilation of backstairs court gossip, much of it salacious, laced with just enough undoubted fact to give it plausibility; as a historical work it falls in just about the same position that it does in time between Suetonius and modern "scandal magazines." There were others of this genre, including one by Arthur Wilson, but this "school" was not universally respected in its own time. William Sanderson wrote a creditable history in irate, contemptuous, and express refutation

Court and Character of fames I

HI

of Weldon and Wilson, and Bishop Godfrey Goodman wrote an excellent account of his times.3 These and similar works lay in the public domain at the beginning of the nineteenth century when Sir Walter Scott, in the role of dilettante historian, published a "secret history" of the reign. Perhaps predictably, Scott ignored both Sanderson and Goodman and reprinted instead the works of Weldon and others of that stripe.4 The art of writing history owes much to Scott's success in evoking the past, but the reputation of the first Stuart suffered thereby, for the character the novelist had discovered in Weldon was tailor-made for a historical romance and almost inevitably that is the "James" which one finds in The Fortunes of Nigel. Subsequent years saw Weldon both imitated5 and republished in his own right (1817), and although Goodman was republished in 1839, it was Scott's novel that was a best seller, read by almost every English schoolboy (and thus by most every future English historian), and the ghost of the "James" seen by Weldon, Scott, and Nigel was hard to lay, especially when this agreeably disgusting portrait was confirmed by the well-preserved and wellknown works of a very quotable but disgruntled country gentleman, an imaginative anti-Spanish zealot, a venerated member of the pantheon of martyrs of the fight against the royal prerogative (whose objectivity might well have been doubted inasmuch as his opposition to James caused him to have an ear cut off), 6 and others. At least the shadow of this ghost appears in the works of the best historians: one finds it even in S. R. Gardiner—who may have equals but, in this writer's opinion, has certainly no superiors among English historians. Gardiner's research, however, went beyond—far beyond—the partisan or professionally sensationalist writings of James's reign and the subsequent glosses on them. He dug deep in the documents of the time, performed a superb job of scholarship, and made great advances in revising the traditional concept of both the man and the reign—but with perplexing results. In one sense Gardiner was unsuccessful, in another too successful. Some subsequent writers have ignored his findings almost

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completely, though they cite him as an authority often enough while telling their own versions. Others seem to have considered that his exhaustive research produced definitive findings which require no further study (though no one knew better than he what an enormous mountain he was mining), an attitude which has left the historical portrait of James in the midstream of correction for almost a century now. Gardiner's chief work began coming out in two-volume installments in the 1860s, but he being (of all things) an Irvingite those of the Establishment managed to ignore it for a good while. B y the end of the century, however, it was widely accepted, praised, and even read (although Gardiner, a master of detail that is both significant and interesting, has had an unmerited reputation for being unreadable), and was brought out in a slightly revised tenvolume edition; 7 but the same period still saw much writing about the old James, with variations on the theme which were perhaps encouraged by the ill-defined historical portrait, caught in revisional transition. A random sampling shows James in 1902 being "proved" by the most preposterous reasoning and mishandling of evidence and "evidence" to have been not the intended victim but the perpetrator of the Gowrie Conspiracy. 8 T w o years later A . O. Meyer resurrected the old treacherous, two-faced James, this time regarding his dealings with the papacy. In 1912 one is rather surprised to find a Jesuit critic leveling accusations of duplicity and lack of religious principle at James for his having simultaneously raised his three sons and two daughters in diverse religions. B v 1921 the literature on James had reached some sort of landmark in a demonstration that James was really the original of Hamlet.® T h e most prolific purveyor of the traditional James, Major Martin A . S. Hume, flourished during the 1920s, presenting in several works a picture of the old, slobbering, simpering king that could not fail to digust the reader (with the king or with the author, depending on the reader). 1 0 This sort of thing is, of course, still with us. Only recently William McElwee, perhaps as an antidote to reason inasmuch as D. H. Willson's fine biography had

Court

and Character

of James

I

113

been published two years before, has brought forth yet another rehearsal of the same nonsense, citing often (when he deigns to cite anyone) the durable Sir Anthony Weldon. 1 1 Thomas Birch, speaking of the slanderous statements made against Robert Cecil at the time of his death which had found acceptance by subsequent historians, wrote in 1749: "But it would be but justice to the character of so eminent a person as the Earl of Salisbury to consider him as he now appears to us from fuller and more impartial lights than the ignorance or envy of his own time would admit of, and which may be opposed to the general invectives and unsupported libels of Weldon and Wilson, the scandalous chroniclers of the last age." 1 2 This seems a just proposal. It seems, too, that after another two centuries we should have acquired enough "fuller and more impartial lights" to do the same for that minister's sovereign. There has been much excellent work done in recent years on James's reign, especially in the field of economics, but how much remains to be done, especially the more personally it touches the king himself, is to be seen in what is by far the best biography yet done on him, D. H. Willson's King James VI and I, as for example: " 'King James was the most cowardly man that ever I knew,' wrote the country gentleman, Sir John Oglander. 'He could not endure a soldier or to see men drilled, to hear of war was death to him, and how he tormented himself with fear of some sudden mischief may be proved by his great quilted doublets, pistolproof, as also his strange eyeing of strangers with a continual fearful observation.' His fear of assassination played no small part in his foreign policy." 1 3 On hearing of the death of Henry I V , "James, refusing at first to believe the news, was profoundly moved, not from love of the French King, for he had none, but from fear and horror of assassination, a horror increased a hundredfold because the victim was a king." 14 But if James was really so much a coward as is supposed (and asserted ad infinitum), he practiced his cowardice with his usual duplicity, for he was, among other things, a reckless horseman.

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T o further deceive (one supposes) those who thought him panicked at the sight of bare steel (another tradition), once the hell-forleather rider had brought down his game he customarily took knife in hand and laid the carcass open himself. The key to James's disapproval of the murder of Henry I V lies in the last phrase of Willson's assertion. Queen Elizabeth before him and, in general, any important sovereign whose continued living was felt to be counter to the interests of the Spanish HabsburgCatholic cause, had been and continued to be perennial assassins' targets, just as Henry I V had been. James was so far from being an exception to this that one of the most plausible tricks that Englishmen traveling on the Continent fell victim to was the sale of "information" about planned attempts on James's life.16 The "plots" European confidence men traded on were imaginary, but what made their "market" was that the large number of real plots was common knowledge. James was anyhow opposed on principle to the needless killing of people (not in itself a proof of cowardice), but he was especially opposed to the murder of the king of England. A few years after the assassination of Henry IV, Sir Thomas Edmondes had already started off for Paris as ambassador when James heard of the assassination of the pro-Spanish favorite Concino Concini. Edmondes was already carrying with him the usual list of persons to whom he was to give James's affectionate regards; an addition to this list was sent after him posthaste: "His Majesty would not have you, by any means, omit one whom your letter doth not mention, and that is Monsr. de Vitry [the captain of the guard who had done Concini in], but would have you let him know how glad his Majesty is that he hath been an instrument to do his master so good service as to deliver him from that thraldom whereunto he was brought." 1 6 Then James wrote directly to France's young king to congratulate him " 'on this brilliant stroke' which made him recognize 'the true son of such a father.' " " Which indicates that James approved of assassinations when they served a worthy purpose; he did not so much object to assassinations in general as to his own in particular. He could see no advantage in that.

Court and Character of James I

115

Three further things have impaired historians' approach to the man and his reign: an exaggerated contrast with the preceding sovereign and her reign; a surprising lack of familiarity with customs and conventions of the time, which has made perfectly ordinary actions by James seem unique and thus meaningful; 18 and a distressing insistence on passing pointless judgments on his every act. James's critics in his own time often contrasted him unfavorably with the great queen who had preceded him, especially as the passing of time mellowed recollections of that tough and wily sovereign. James of course suffered then and has since from this comparison (as who would not?), but the difference between their policies, their attitudes, and a good deal else about them was more apparent than real. Gardiner, for example, discovered and quoted a statement made by James to Gondomar in 1614 (which has been much quoted since) regarding his prerogative. This statement has generally been treated as a unique bit of foolishness, but in 1593 Elizabeth told the Speaker of the House the same thing almost word for word: "It is in me and my power to call parliaments: it is in my power to end and determine the same: it is in my power to assent or dissent to anything done in parliaments." There is in fact only one real difference between the two statements: that of James, the enemy of parliaments, reflects a slightly more moderate and definitely less dogmatically stated view of the royal prerogative than that of Elizabeth, the retrospective friend of parliaments.19 One in fact encounters frequent parallels between Gloriana and the Wisest Fool in Christendom and, for one who admires the former greatly but who has long since grown impatient of the usual carping about the latter, there is a perverse pleasure in seeing a historian of judgment describe the royal literary style as having "a tincture of pedantry and affectation" and be referring not to James but to Elizabeth.20 T w o examples should suffice regarding the implications read into actions supposedly peculiar to James. He visited his daughter Elizabeth and Frederick V on the morning after their wedding while they were still in the nuptial couch; he did the same when

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Buckingham was married. This supposedly demonstrates (at the very least) his lack of a sense of moral fitness: Willson, for example, tut-tuts that "with shocking pruriency he questioned Frederick minutely about what had happened during the night." 21 It may have shocked Professor Willson; at the time it was simply roval custom. When the Spanish ambassador Sarmiento (later the count of Gondomar) arrived to be presented at his first audience, James came forward to greet him hat in hand; this is often cited or recounted as an illustration of the craven king abasing himself as a suppliant, begging the friendship of Spain. But the king always took his hat off in the presence of an ambassador unless he was mad at him or at his sovereign; James was not being craven, he was only being polite. Willson also provides an example at several points (lesser scholars provide them by the bookful) of the third aspect mentioned. "Moreover," he says, "James quarrelled with the Dutch at this inopportune moment. The Dutch were offering to do more than their part for the defense of the Palatinate. But in May 1620 news arrived of outrages inflicted by the Dutch upon English merchants in the Spice Islands. The King had a right to be angry; but he had no right to take his complaints to Gondomar or to speak of the Dutch as his enemies." 22 But the king most definitely had a right not only to be angry, but to complain to whomever he chose and to say whatever he liked, without seeking the approval (least of all) of historians. For that was another time, and the king—a fact so often overlooked—was

the King. Europeans in his own time, in fact, did not consider him either contemptible as a man or weak as a monarch, and European historians have often held a like opinion.23 Historical treatment of the reign in English is changing, though slowly. The desirability of such a change was well stated more than two decades ago: C. J . Sisson, examining the monarch through his writings, pointed out that Hearnshaw in 1926 had included James "among the great thinkers of the 16th and 17th centuries whose social and political

Court and Character of James I

117

ideas repay study. Such a view is rarely met with, and y e t is certainly nearer the truth than the abusive contempt and ridicule which has f o r long been generally associated with the name of James. . . ." T h e sum of Sisson's opinion, commendable when written in 1938, has been given even greater validity b y events of the world since: T h e time will come, and may well come soon, when popular views concerning his character, and his policy and its results, will sway strongly in his favor. T h e man who wrote, or inspired, The Peacemaker, a tract of 1618, deserves better things of the twentieth century, if not of the nineteenth, when more dashing policies in international affairs had not yet brought the wisdom of disillusionment. 24

J . B. Black says: W e become aware that the apparent complacency [of the Elizabethan period] is shot through with a good deal of discontent, and that the T u d o r ideal of government, now at its zenith, was already entering upon a period of disintegration. T r u e , the question of defining where sovereign power lav in the constitution had not y e t arisen, for the great corporation and body politic of the kingdom, consisting of king and parliament, was still one and undivided. But to the observant eye the germs of the later conflict, that made definition a necessity, were not only latent but active in Elizabeth's reign. 2 5

A s James's reign progressed this beginning disintegration developed into an ever-widening rift between king and parliament which, reinforced by a similarly growing religious division (partly parallel to and partly complementary to, but not synonymous with the former) made it more difficult than usual to rule England. It also, by the nature of the case, complicated the business of information-gathering at the English court. T h e most conspicuous effect of the recalcitrant-to-hostile attitude of James's Puritan-Parliamentarian critics was the impossibility of carrying out anv coherent and sensible foreign policy with the support of Parliament. James had not the common touch that his

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predecessor had used so masterfully, and one doubts in any case that b y this time even Elizabeth, with all her remarkable genius at that difficult art, could have got along with the commons, given the heightened dispute over the prerogative of the crown and the "rights" of Parliament, and given as well the erratic nature of the parliamentarians. But, more important, Elizabeth had had the enormous advantage of having a policy to pursue which, as it involved war with Spain, coincided with the wishes of that section of the population where the greatest potential constitutional trouble lay, while the reverse was true with James—a difference pointed out long ago by Ranke. It is difficult to see what could have been done with them a n y w a y . In 1614, for example, when their own desires should have dictated a policy of giving James enough financial support to insure that he would have no desperate need of a Spanish dowry, and of supporting the pro-French faction against the pro-Spanish one, they broke up the session with attacks on Scots in government —that is to say, on the very heart of the pro-French element. In 1621, when James asked for money f o r an expeditionary force as part of his efforts to recover the Palatinate, they made redundant but high-sounding demands that James come to the aid of the Protestant cause in Europe—and then, instead of voting sufficient funds, fell to conjuring up new bills for the greater persecution of their Catholic countrymen; as to actual aid to the Palatinate, they insisted (though the problem at hand was the defeat of the Habsburg armies in the field) that any supply they voted be used for plundering the Indies. James often said, in his own impolitic w a y , that they did not understand the "Mysteries of State" and should leave the conduct of foreign policy to him, whose prerogative it was anyway. He was right on both counts. As a result, James had to play his diplomatic hand in his own way. T h e opposing factions he had to deal with extended to the privy council, where he was able to keep some sort of balance between them. T h e pro-Spanish faction, built mainly around the H o w a r d family, was counterweighted by a Puritan archbishop of Canterbury, George Abbot, and (during much of the reign)

Court and Character of James I Lord

119

Chancellor Ellesmere, and their followers. T o

provide

a

"balance of p o w e r " there was a highly useful third group, made up of those whose attachment was either to James or at least not to either faction, such as James H a y , Lennox, or Buckingham.

(Hay

f o r some time handled the dispensing of patronage, and I believe it was he w h o was referred to b y a French observer, in w h a t is surely the most atrocious bilingual pun on record, as the " G u a r d des S c a u x . " ) F o r the conduct of foreign policy James delegated much of the work

(especially time-consuming investigations and negotiations,

handled either b y the whole p r i v y council or b y specially appointed commissions), many affairs w e r e debated in council, and he often sought the support of ministers and councilors and asked or heard their advice, but he kept the strings of English diplomacy largely in his o w n hands, with the routine paper w o r k handled b y secretaries of state; after Cecil's death in 1612

two

(and a period of t r y -

ing to get along without formally appointed secretaries), a balance w a s sometimes managed between these also, as in the case of the Puritans'

candidate,

Sir

Ralph

Winwood

H o w a r d faction's candidate, Sir Thomas L a k e

(1614-18),

and

the

(1616-19).

A s has been mentioned, James's procedure in conducting foreign affairs and

other matters of

interest

complicated

the

business

of information-gathering. Unlike Elizabeth, w h o received ambassadors in council, James normally sent the councilors out of the room during an interview. 2 6 T h i s made it difficult to find out w h a t had gone on. 2 7 Other aspects of his handling of foreign affairs made it equally difficult to plumb his diplomacy truly or to gather reliable information on related matters. T h e r e were, however, t w o possible approaches f o r Spanish Habsburg diplomats. T h e one was to maintain a network of spies and informants; this the Flemish e n v o y did. T h e other was to ask James himself; this was the role of the count of Gondomar.

Gondomar: The Classic Machiavelli A f e w years after the Treaty of London Spain found its English relations deteriorating again. After much indecisión the Spanish finally replaced their resident ambassador in London, Don Alonso de Velasco, with Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, later ennobled as the count of Gondomar; it was his task to try to put things in order. There has probably never been a more able diplomat sent to England, nor a more influential one, nor one more passionately hated by so many Englishmen. Neither can one imagine anyone being more thoroughly misrepresented in his own time and after (the much-abused James I not excepted). Rumor and "common knowledge" had him, by use of diverse diabolical tricks, in complete control of the king (he was not). Contemporary literature on him generally took the form of fantasies showing him performing his necromancy "in the guise of Machiavelli," or, as the subtitle of one of Thomas Scott's tracts puts it, "Gondomar appearing in the likeness of Matchiavell in a Spanish Parliament, wherein are discovered his treacherous & subtile Practises, to the ruine as well of England, as the Netherlandes." (This imaginary account of the ambassador's diabolical workings against the good cause during his year-and-a-half leave of absence in Spain [ 1 6 1 8 - 2 0 ] , "Faithfully translated out of the Spanish coppie by a well-wilier to England and Holland," is a masterpiece of false propaganda and was apparently widely accepted at the time as a true account.) 1

Gondomar

12 1

Modern literature has tended to accept and rehearse a good bit of this version.2 The present writer has been able to find little accurate modern work on Gondomar's diplomatic activities. Pérez Bustamente's account of Gondomar's role in the Raleigh affair provides a detailed and quite useful filling in of the man's antecedents and early career, but when it reaches the subject of its title it becomes fairly worthless, especially since it is based mostly on a chance sequence of about a hundred consecutive folios of documents on the subject at the Biblioteca Nacional, quite inadequate by themselves.3 A potentially excellent work is that of Sánchez Cantón, but its form precluded its fulfilling its potential. Prepared as an inaugural address for the Academia de la Historia, the study paradoxically skips over Gondomar's English embassy (which is what makes the man historically significant in the first place) because that subject had already been treated before in a similar address by VillaUrrutia. Sánchez Cantón obviously does not accept that travesty but cannot refute it before the same august body; he bows deeply (but one doubts sincerely) in the direction of Villa-Urrutia and diplomatically avoids Gondomar's diplomacy.4 Among modern works in English, the present writer has seen nothing that comes even close to an accurate treatment except for the excellent chapter devoted to his English embassy—entitled "A Game at Chess," after the contemporary play by Thomas Middleton in which Gondomar is found in his usual Machiavellian role—in Garrett Mattingly's Renaissance Diplomacy. The worst of the usual travesties are rather handily epitomized by Martin Hume in the March, 1902, Nuestro Tiempo.5 But if one is to point out the inaccurate treatment commonly given it seems best to take examples from a far better historian. As in the previous chaptcr, the burden of supplying these falls on Willson's generally commendable life of James. Willson preserves the traditional picture of a crafty ambassador gulling the king, but since Willson has a higher opinion of James's abilities than most writers he is as much surprised as disgusted as he recounts how "by some subtle art, Sarmiento contrived to con-

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v e y an impression of candor and frankness and to convince the King of his personal integrity. It is astonishing that James, an experienced and sophisticated ruler, should have been deluded b y such blandishments." 9 One should allow the author what he sometimes allows James and concede that he "has a right" to be astonished that this should be true. For his part, Gondomar only wished he could be sure that it was; as often as not it seemed that James was deluding him. A key part of Gondomar's original mission was to do what he could to block completion of an Anglo-French marriage. In Willson's account, "His first impression when he arrived in London in 1 6 1 3 was that the French marriage could not be prevented. But he hinted in his insinuating way that the King could easily obtain better terms in Madrid than in Paris." 7 T h e situation, to Gondomar's despair, was not nearly so simple. Spain's objective was to prevent a French marriage alliance in a second direction that would nullify the Franco-Spanish alliance then being rather shakily concluded; but to alienate France and lose the latter alliance (which was still in doubt) in the course of preventing a counterweight to it would be to gain nothing except a hostile neighbor. T h e "Spanish faction" at court importuned the ambassador constantly to interpose himself in the matter; he refused to touch it for fear of French reaction. T h e crux of the matter was that if he mentioned a Spanish marriage to James without formal instructions to do so the French would see it not as a serious offer (which they would probably have accepted as legitimate competition for the prince) but simply as malicious wrecking of their diplomacy. Gondomar spent his time not in hinting of a Spanish marriage but in constantly begging Madrid to send the necessary instructions so he could at least mention it. Another tradition which one finds even in Willson is that James dissolved the Addled Parliament ( 1 6 1 4 ) only after consulting with the Spaniard; 8 Gondomar in fact had intentionally kept away from James f o r weeks and they did not see each other until several days after the dissolution.® Gondomar in fact, although he was surely one of the ablest

Gondomar

" 3

diplomats who ever lived, is something of a disappointment as a villainous arch-intriguer. Contrary to tradition, he had little use f o r spies, partly because he did not trust anyone who would betray secrets for money, partly because few spies (properly so-called) had access to information of the order of importance in which he was most interested. His accounts show that he averaged only about ¿ 3 50 a year for spies, and these mostly in special cases where he had no other access, as in the case of the Anglo-French marriage negotiations at the beginning of his embassy, when he procured an agent in the French resident's household who made all of Buisseaux's correspondence available to him. T h e foundation on which Gondomar's success in procuring information rested was the group of well-wishers whom he referred to as the bien intencionados, and especially those with whom he was in most intimate contact, his confidentes. These people are commonly referred to as the "Spanish party" or the " H o w a r d p a r t y " (after the family group which formed its nucleus); in this relationship a certain amount of Spanish money changed hands. Both these matters require examination. There had, of course, been no resident Spanish ambassador in England during the latter part of Elizabeth's reign. Diplomatic relations were resumed after James's accession with the arrival of the extraordinary embassy come to negotiate the T r e a t y of London, headed b y D. Juan Bautista de Tassis, count of Villamediana. In negotiating the peace, and looking forward to future needs, Villamediana dispensed a good deal of largesse, in both cash and promises. When he left he submitted a memorandum to Pedro de Zúñiga, the first holder of the newly reestablished permanent embassy, recommending that a permanent pension list be set up and suggesting particular persons and amounts they should be offered. 1 0 This list of pensioners was duly set up, with some alterations in membership and stipends. The top level pensions, for such as the earl of Dorset (lord high treasurer) and the earl of Nottingham (lord high admiral) were raised from Villamediana's suggested figure of 3,000 felipes [ / 7 5 0 ] to 4,000 felipes [ ¿ 1,000]; Robert Cecil's originally suggested 3,000 felipes was doubled [to jT 1,500],

Intelligence

>24 giving

him half

from

England

again as much as any

of

the others, an

apt

recognition of his predominant position in the government. Counting the smaller f r y , Villamediana's originally suggested total of 29,000 felipes

[¿7,250]

was swollen to 36,500 felipes

[¿9,1251

per y e a r . 1 1 It would be difficult to compile a definitive list of these pensioners even f o r any one given time because they were normally referred to b y code names which w e r e changed f r o m time to time, and the several lists of designators which exist do not correspond with any certainty to the existing coded lists of pensioners. Gardiner did an excellent job of identification, but in i d e n t i f y i n g names f o r 1605 he had to resort to a list of designators f o r 1 6 1 7 . T h e more important persons can generally be identified in one w a y or another f r o m internal evidence (often with the help of uncoded similar references to the same person in other documents), and one can generally depend on Gardiner's identifications. But the difficulty of the task (especially f o r one less familiar with the personalities and affairs of the time than he) is illustrated b y the attempts of Antonio Ballesteros y Beretta in his f o u r volumes of Gondomar's

correspondence.

Based on a kev

to code names of

a later

date,

Ballesteros

identifies el Cid as early as 1 6 1 3 as G e o r g e Calvert—well before Calvert emerged as important enough to merit a pension—when in f a c t (this is one of the cases where no doubt exists) until his death in 1 6 1 4 el Cid

was H e n r y H o w a r d , earl of Northampton.

The

code name choosers apparently were rcluctant to give up such a felicitous designator, and applied it later to Calvert. The

periodic

changes in designators

caused

Ballesteros

con-

siderable trouble. It led him, f o r instance, to identify at least three separate code names in the same period as the countess of S u f f o l k , which makes rather strange reading at times. Ballesteros

should

have been more alert in cases like that, but the Spanish scholar m i y readily be forgiven something of a howler he commits elsewhere: In a routine list of English commissioners, in a perfectly innocuous context with no need f o r secrecy, Ballesteros discovered w h a t was obviously a code name—such names w e r e usually taken

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125

from classical literature, mythology, ancient history, etc.—and identified the party in question (on one knows not what grounds) as the earl of Arundel. 1 2 The name was not in code at all, but it seems understandable that it did not occur to the Spanish historian that an English minister's name might really be Julius Caesar. But the compiling of precise pension lists is of little value in any case, for the fact that a good many top ministers and other key figures at the English court were in the pay of the Spanish king is really of small importance. Gardiner, in the ten-volume edition of his major work published at the turn of the century, expresses deep shock that such a state of affairs could exist, that English ministers would do such a thing. But he expresses no shock at all in his original notes for the beginning of the period, made decades before, and one suspects that the head-down, plowing-through research technique for which he is often criticized may explain the difference in attitude— that he acquired his strong distaste f o r the Howard clan and their practices gradually and experienced only a delayed sort of shock in the matter. 13 However, he need not have been shocked, for the implications are very misleading. T h e English court had long had a reputation as a place where it required money to open doors, but this requirement (whatever its nature in the beginning) had been customary for so long that it was purely conventional; it had become more a perquisite, a simple tip, than a bribe. But although this practice was not uniquely Jacobean, prices took a sudden upward surge at the beginning of the reign, at least partly due to a special set of circumstances. T h e Dutch did not come to terms with the Spanish until 1609, but they were very much present in England during the negotiations for the Treaty of London, almost from the moment of James's accession—he in fact beat the Dutch envoys to London by only about a week. For reasons of his own, James put off seeing them for some time and, as one Belgian historian describes it, The Dutch turned this delay to advantage by using it to seek to win the favor of influential persons in government. From the beginning, they

12 6

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sowed gold about them with a prodigality that ended b y scandalising the city and the Court. . . . T h e y spent more than 300 crowns per day, which the people found monstrous and the king found ridiculous on the part of men w h o complained of their miserable state. 1,1

Only three months after Elizabeth's death Albert's envoy wrote home, " T h e United Provinces have already spent in England 30,000 pounds sterling, of which Cecil has received the big part." Arenberg was plainly unhappy about this, but his complaint was not that the Dutch had succeeded in bribing the English into taking a position unfavorable to the Habsburgs—he naturally assumed they would work for their own ends—but simply that it took so much money in England, especially with Dutch openhandedness pushing up prices, to make the mare go at all. "In this country," he discontentedly concluded, "if one wants to negotiate a matter, y o u have to put up the money." 1 5 But as regards the "Spanish party" this was only partly true, and when true was not always very meaningful, was often ineffective, and in fact often backfired, causing a loss, not a gain, in the good will Spain was trying to buy. Villamediana had recommended a pension of 3,000 ducats for Salisbury, but he ended up with double that amount. One may reasonably assume that Salisbury himself forced the Spanish to raise the ante, but that does not mean that he struck a traitorous bargain with them; there was nothing unusual in his taking Spanish money. T h e Venetian envoy Contarini, returning from Madrid, told the senate, "Those princes of Italy, the most take from the King of Spain; the Duke of Saxony takes much from him . . . and even the Queen of England, I have heard, took 30,000 ducats [ ¿ 7 , 5 0 0 ] . " 1 S Be the latter as it may, the Spanish themselves (pension or not) considered Robert Cecil barely less hostile to their interests than Elizabeth herself had been. 17 Salisbury's pension in perquisite of the position ship: a point had simply would create more than in control of its hireling,

fact came to be treated as a normal of chief minister. It did not buy friendbeen reached where refusal to grant it normal hostility. Spain, far from being was rather in the position of a hapless

Gond ornar

ni

diner who must "bribe" a surly waiter with tips to avoid getting soup spilled on him. When Somerset succeeded to Salisbury's predominant position in government he made certain that he succeeded to his pension as well. He married into the Howard family and gave every sign of being willing to go along with that faction's policies, but he first held out for Salisbury's 6,000 ducats per year. T h e Spanish yielded to his demands, 18 and as early as 1618 agreed that Buckingham in turn should succeed to this perquisite. 19 In the matter of pensions, the Howards themselves fail miserably to live up to their money-grabbing reputation. Suffolk refused from the beginning to accept one 20 (though his wife, whose reputation for greed seems only too well founded, readily enough accepted ¿ 1 , 0 0 0 per year). Nottingham—conqueror of the Invincible Armada in '88 and still lord high admiral of England— accepted in the beginning but apparently lost interest in the matter, f o r his name soon drops from the lists.21 Northampton, leader of the clan, stayed on the list; actual payment of his annual stipend, however, was years overdue, a fact which was of little concern to him. He told Gondomar from time to time that he would indicate someone else the money might be given to; at the time of his death he had not even done this. 22 T h e pensions were often of little consequence even among the lesser f r y whose more limited means did not allow them to turn down a windfall with the ease of a Howard. Sir William Monson was admiral of the Channel fleet, and the thought of the commander whose job it would be to oppose another Armada being in the pav of Spain might seem shocking; but a decade after his pension had begun the Spanish still knew little about him or his attitude towards them. When he first met him (at a formal audience with the young prince) Sarmiento was pleasantly surprised to find that the admiral was at least not openly hostile. 23 T h e Spanish went to great lengths to cultivate Queen Anne (who was a Catholic) and, to wield greater influence over her, they cultivated her confidante Mrs. Drummond as well. T h e latter was a pensioner from the start; it was not until almost the time of

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the Queen's death that it began to dawn on the Spanish that her influence on affairs was not worth mentioning. Thomas Lake, secretary to the king, then Secretary of State, was a Spanish pensioner, but he was a long-time protege of the Howards and followed their lead, not that of Spain. The distinction between the aims of the Spanish and those of the Howard faction is considerably obscured by the practice (then as well as since) of referring to the latter as the "Spanish party." These people were pro-Spanish in the sense that they favored an alliance with Spain over the one with France which their Scottish rivals for political influence favored and over the open (though undeclared) war which the more zealous English Puritans wanted to wage against Spain in the Indies and elsewhere. But perhaps the best method of definition, so far as foreign policy is concerned, is by a modern analogy: if one were to label those who today advocate a general war against Russia as the "anti-Russian party" and those who advocate a peaceful relationship and an attempt to maintain a status quo "co-existence" as the "Russian party," then one would closely approximate the nature of what passed for an "anti-Spanish party" and a "Spanish party" in the reign of James I. The same group was also referred to pejoratively as the "Catholic party," with perhaps even less relevance. Most of them were, it is true, Catholics—but so were a good many other Englishmen. The members of the "Catholic party" preferred that Catholics, including themselves, not be persecuted, but one searches in vain for religious zeal among them. They were not of course supporters of the policies, either foreign or domestic, of the more rabid Puritans (which somehow get treated as synonymous with "the interests of England"), but neither were they a Fifth Column working for or even hoping for another Enterprise of England. As to the extent of the partiality of the Howard clan and such other highly placed pensioners as Robert Cecil toward Spanish interests and the militant "Catholic cause," the witnesses in the

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129

best position to know are their contemporaries on the Catholic, Spanish Habsburg side, because they felt the sting of their opposition. Of the four most important ministerial pensioners, Cecil and Suffolk were both found to be "verv partial to the Dutch" by one ambassador from the archdukes, while another, shortly after the Gunpowder Plot, when extradition of some of the Catholic plotters from their refuge in the Spanish Netherlands was being sought, reported that Northampton and Nottingham were "those of the Council who insist the most" on it, against the advice of several other Councilors.24 Just how much confusion there has been over this question of the servants of one king accepting money from another, especially over how much treachery to the king of England this implies, is amusingly illustrated by an episode of 1613, at the time of Sarmiento's first coming to England. The current list of Spanish pensioners at the English court formed a part of his instructions, and John Digby, James's ambassador to Madrid, managed to get his hands on it. Gardiner 25 describes Digby as shocked at this discovery, then draws a number of strange conclusions based on the assumption that James, too, was surprised to find that there were such highly placed Englishmen accepting pensions from the king of Spain. The fact is that John Digby, who was perhaps James's most dutiful servant and would never have withheld this information from his sovereign, may well have been shocked but was even more embarrassed bv the duty of sending it. For although the pension list was, of course, in code, he had also managed to obtain the key to it; one of the pensioners was listed as "Leandro"; and "Leandro" proved to be the Spanish designator for the king of England. 28 In any case, however, for a person to be "in the pay of the king of Spain" did not mean that in practice he was actually paid— and that, so far as Gondomar was concerned, was the rub. He seldom had enough money to pay his own expenses (he was one of the London moneylenders' best customers, including an account with Burlamaqui) and payment of pensions was always well in

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arrears; 27 this caused him some anxious moments, as the disgruntled pensioners, whose good will the pensions were intended to buy, threatened to become openlv hostile to retaliate for the delay. 28 Nevertheless, though the confidentes exerted more pressure on Gondomar to support their policy than he did on them to support that of Spain, they were a frequent and fruitful source of important information. When James was still undecided whether or not to dissolve the Addled Parliament, for example, the king went one night to visit Northampton (who was laid up with a tumor on his leg in Greenwich), seeking reassurance that if he did break with Parliament a solution to his pressing financial troubles would be available to him through a Spanish marriage alliance (with accompanying dowry). Northampton assured the king that a Spanish offer would be forthcoming; James took his decision and Parliament was dissolved. Sarmiento (he was not yet count of Gondomar) had been for some time in the most delicate of situations. He was unable to make such an offer to James without instructions but had so far been unable to get them from Madrid, and was thus in a position where he had to know James's precise state of mind in order to judge how to handle the precarious matter with him until he did actually receive instructions. He had avoided seeing James for some time, but James was getting angry at him for this and he could not delay an audience much longer. But when the unavoidable audience arrived shortly after the dissolution he had just the information he needed. James had arrived at Greenwich at ten o'clock on a Saturday night and spent the better part of an hour, in considerable anguish, discussing the matter with his lord privy seal; the latter's precise account of James's state of mind was written and sent to Gondomar at eleven o'clock the same night. 29 Gondomar's easiest source of information about James's thoughts and plans, however, was usually James himself—a confidential relationship only recently described accurately: The real key to Gondomar's success in England lay in his relation to James I. It was not a simple one; certainly it was not, as has sometimes

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been represented, just the dominance of a weak character b y a strong one; m u c h less, the gulling of a fool by a knave. James was a complex character in w h o m elements of weakness were surprisingly mixed with traits of real strength; G o n d o m a r , at least, never made the mistake of underrating him. N o r did he achieve his influence at a stroke, or storm the king's favor with a mixture of bullying and flattery. It was a w o r k of years. In part it was because G o n d o m a r was able to make James like him. . . . 3 0

They got on famously together, and this of course was a great help, especially given James's practice of conferring with ambassadors alone. In Gondomar's case they spent a good deal of time together simply enjoying themselves in the chase (both were expert huntsmen) or discussing a variety of subjects (history was one) which interested them both and on which both were well informed. With warm friendship, common interests, and mutual respect as a basis for their relationship, it is not surprising that Gondomar had ready access to the king's ear, or that in the course of their conversations—which ranged over many topics—James would reveal much to the alert ambassador. Perhaps the most famous of these indiscretions on James's part was in the case of Raleigh's gold-seeking expedition to the Orinoco. Spain of course claimed the area, and though the two nations used differing and conflicting standards to establish a "legitimate" claim to an area, if the Spanish had already established a settlement on the spot in question as they said they had (correctly, as it turned out) then this fulfilled even the English standard and there would be much justice, even by English standards (if applied), to objections to the enterprise. But James was in a quandary. He wanted to keep the peace with Spain, but he was under great pressure to let Raleigh make the trip. So he took the middle course of making Raleigh sign a promise not to violate any Spanish settlements, which Raleigh claimed did not exist there anyway. When Gondomar registered a protest, trying to get James to stop the expedition, James, in a moment of weakness, showed him the terms of Raleigh's charter and the promise itself, in which all responsibility for any violations of Spanish settlements was accepted by Raleigh.

Intelligence

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Although this indiscretion was much reviled b y the English, when Raleigh did attack the

Spanish

settlement

of

San T h o m e

the

Spanish, for all their outrage, accepted the thesis that James and the English as a nation could not be held to blame. Raleigh lost his head (as he had agreed he should) but James kept his peaceful relations with Spain in spite of this provocation. A couple of years later when the Roger N o r t h expedition to the Amazon

was projected,

Gondomar

raised the same

objections.

Once more the indiscreet king naively showed him the secret promise Captain North had signed not to violate Spanish territory. W h e n North returned, his promise broken, Gondomar demanded justice and N o r t h was thrown into prison. O n c e again the peacc was kept—an increasingly important matter to James now, as he wanted no war until he had exhausted all possible means of recovering certain

the Palatinate resemblance

by

negotiation—but

between

this and

the

Madrid Raleigh

noticed affair,

a

and

pointed it out to Gondomar. 3 1 After another four years, Count Mansfeld raised a body of troops in England and proposed to land them in northern France, bv agreement with that government, and march them directly to the Lower Palatinate. Under the rules of the game at that time this was legitimate enough, but both Madrid and Brussels were afraid that this was a collusive deception in which the French planned to join their forces to Mansfeld's and in which the object was not to recover the L o w e r Palatinate for Frederick V but to recover the County of Artois for France. Spain's resident in

London,

Jacques Bruneau at that time, of course protested, demanding that James not allow the force to leave England. But James had extracted promises from Mansfeld that he would march directly to the

Palatinate

without

violating

the

territory

of

the

Spanish

Netherlands, and additional promises from the subordinate commanders not to obey if Mansfeld gave orders in violation of his pledge. James confidentially

revealed these

documents to

Bru-

neau. . . . But b y that time, after two successes, the trick had worn too thin. It was obviously the Raleigh gambit all over again. 32 It was this sort of business that Gondomar had to put up with.

Gondoviar

«33

He was able to exercise considerable influence over James, partly by his intuitive genius at forcing an issue at just the right time, partly because he made it a set policy to deal openlv with James (who was never in doubt that Gondomar served his own sovereign first of all, and respected him for it), partly because of a real mutual friendship, but perhaps most of all because the courses they sought to pursue (though not the ultimate goals they hoped to attain) happened to coincide. But when it came to gaining concrete secret information, Gondomar had little success. Disdaining common spies, he chose the high road: when he wanted to know what James's plans were he would ask James himself—they were friends, after all, the "two Diegos"—and James would answer him outright; but that helped very little, for when it came to information about his secret plans, his real beliefs, his true intentions, James proved to be a great kidder. If James told Gondomar that something was so (and he told him a great many things), it meant either (a) that it was so, or (b) that it was not so. Obviously, as a method of gaining secret intelligence, the high road did not often prove to be the right road. But this did not greatly matter, for an excellent spymaster was simultaneously traveling the low road.

Jean-Baptiste Van Male: A Renaissance Spymaster It would be hard to find a greater contrast between two diplomats serving the same cause at the same court than that between the count of Gondomar and Jean-Baptiste Van Male, the archdukes' resident envoy in England from 1615 to 1629. V a n Male was a conscientious m m , but one who lacked both the rank—he was promoted from the post of embassy secretary when Fernand Boisschot returned to Brussels to take up other duties—and the ability to exercise high-level influence in the manner of a Gondomar; his most valuable function, one at which he was very good, was the ferreting out of secret information. But the difference between the two men went deeper than just rank and function. Their personalities were at opposite poles, their characters as unlike as possible. Gondomar was a man of broad interests and wide-ranging view, and his title, though he came from ancient and honorable lineage, was mainly an honorific reward for service rendered through his native ability, an acknowledgment, in effect, of what the man himself was and continued to be; V a n Male, too, rose above his original station without changing fundamentally, for though he progressed from mere embassy secretary to ambassador he remained the eternal clerk. J.-B. Van Male was an ill-tempered, small-minded, unimaginative man who for fourteen years wrote a long weekly report to his sovereign and a short weekly report to the secretary of state in charge of English affairs, full of complaints ranging from justifi-

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135

able to ridiculous. 1 It is characteristic of this one-sided man that, although engaged in espionage at the English court on as large a scale as he could manage, he constantly complains that the English government (who of course tried to conceal their secrets) practiced base deceptions on ambassadors. He hardly let a week go b y without describing a f e w examples of James's duplicity and the treachery of the English in general, concluding that " f r o m this we can take the maxim [he was always taking maxims of gloom and distrust] that it is never good to have faith in this King's w o r d " 2 or that "the English on all occasions habitually use some stratagem and seek their advantages." A small-souled man full of carping criticism, resentment, and a sour malevolence, the fellow betrayed his only trace of humor when he could gloat sardonically over his opponents' misfortunes or their folly (real or imagined). Perhaps least creditable of all was the subtly contemptuous innuendo with which he reported Gondomar's activities, casting oblique aspersions, in the most unjustifiable circumstances, on the Spaniard's judgment and abilities (while his own lack of understanding of large affairs kept him from recognizing Gondomar's real mistakes and failures); this was especially uncalled f o r inasmuch as Gondomar made a point of speaking highly of him both to Madrid and Brussels, recommending him energetically f o r promotion, rewards, and honors. 3 When Gondomar returned to England in 1620, as he was passing along a crowded gallery in the palace on the w a y to be received by the king, the gallery collapsed just in front of him, with a good many others falling to the floor below, several seriously hurt. It was rumored that the pillars supporting the gallery had been cut through, with the intention of trapping the hated ambassador as he passed over; in any case he was almost caught in the debacle, but as he started to fall he was caught and held b y those near him. Several accounts of this occurrence exist, and those who caught him are either said to have been guards or to have been some of the English courtiers walking with him; Gondomar himself does not specify.

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Van Male's reports of the incident have three characteristic aspects: he misjudges the scope of the danger in the face of conflicting evidence, assuming automatically that Gondomar would have been killed (though none of those who fell were); he manages to paint a ludicrous picture of the dignified count dangling head-down, held by his coattails; and he gives sole credit for saving the ambassador's life to himself.4 But although his malicious nature made him try to make Gondomar appear small, in practice he tacitly recognized their relative stature. For example, since Gondomar's mail came via Brussels, Van Male asked della Faille, whenever he was sending money, to send it with Gondomar's mail addressed to the latter, for under Gondomar's name (but not his own) it would arrive safely, immune from tampering in transit.5 T o a considerable extent, however, the man's limitations may have benefited his work. Gondomar operated on one level, Van Male on another, and they were both, in the end, working for the same cause. For Van Male to have had the flair and the savoir faire of the Spanish count would have been redundant; but not having the qualities that might have made him, too, the intimate of great nobles and the king himself, he did his best service in a field the Spaniard was ill-suited for, collecting and sending home a large and steady stream of intelligence. Some of this data he collected himself; some, of a general "public" nature, was collected for him bv his confidentes; much of it, the more important part, was secret information, ferreted out and passed on to him by his secret agents. For while Count Gondomar was galloping through the roval parks in the company of the king, killing stags and sharing the same bottle, the sober-minded ex-secretary was operating an excellent network of spies. Van Male was thus able to send Brussels a wide range of information, from long and remarkably accurate reports of speeches in Parliament (written strictly from memory after he had attended a session), to reports on Calvinist ministers infiltrating the Catholic Netherlands from Holland and Zeeland," to (during the

Jean-Baptiste

Van

Male

137

Bohemian crisis) copies of letters from the Count Palatine to a wide variety of people—not only to the king but to his most zealous Puritan supporters as well. 7 The archdukes and their ministers were so accustomed to Van Male's proficiency in procuring information that, although they always acknowledged a job particularly well done and congratulated him warmly on his more difficult feats, they were never surprised by even his best performances. Much of his information was passed on to Madrid, and his work was much appreciated there too.8 But Van Male's efforts quite naturally met with varying success. Some of his projects were successes and some were failures; in some cases it was hard to tell which. In late August, 1620, a rumor ran through London that some of James's secret agents had intercepted the Commissions of the Marquis Spinola (then marching into the Lower Palatinate), and that they had already reached the hands of the king. When the rumor reached Van Male he began at once to take all possible steps to find out the truth of the matter. In very short order he discovered that rather than Spinola's Commissions the pieces in question were two letters from the count of Onate, Philip's influential ambassador to Vienna, to the Archduke Albert himself, dated the 2d of June and the 2d of J u l y past. Van Male also heard that one of them was in the hands of "a certain person" famous for being able to decipher any document. Van Male sought this fellow out, made friends with him, and gained his confidence to the extent that he showed the ambassador not one but both letters, neither of which he had as yet deciphered. The man allowed him to take them with him and Van Male was able to keep them "a good while" before the man obliged him to return them; meanwhile he had made haste to have copies taken of them "almost to the letter," which he sent off to Brussels by the next post. The man told Van Male that he understood the letters had been sent by Prince Maurice to the Dutch resident, Noël Caron

I

3

8

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(who presumably had passed them on to James). But Van Male thought it "far more certain" that the letters had really been seized by agents of James himself, and that the English were merely using the Dutch, shifting the blame in order to exonerate themselves. Van Male had no evidence for this but it seemed the most likely to him, as intercepting letters and opening parcels of dispatches was "a very usual thing" in that court. Van Male suggested to Albert that Onate be advised of what had happened, since he, as the writer, would know what code had been used and who had done the encoding in Vienna, which would enable him to "examine into and find out about the case." (Van Male did not elaborate, but the phrasing of his advice that Albert should "order that it be seen whether it would not be well to give notice of this" to Onate suggests that he assumed that the possibility of a leak in Brussels would first be checked on, and whether the mail in question had been tampered with en route, which would leave the encoder the most likely suspect and almost the only one, a suspicion which could probably be verified with a few turns of the screw.) In the meantime, "because of what they could contain," Van Male busied himself trying to persuade the cryptography expert to decline the commission and not decipher the letters.9 During the next few days, as Van Male plied his persuasions, the man showed him some other coded originals which also proved to be letters from Onate, and he was able to get copies of these, too, off to Albert. T h e expert made it clear that he knew how to decipher them, but Van Male "negotiated with him in such a manner" that he agreed not to take the job, "confident in this of some recompense." B y this time of course Van Male had found out a little about him. He described him to Albert as a "person of many talents." In times past he had had extensive dealings with the Secretary Juan de Mancicidor (now dead), for which he had spent six years in the T o w e r of London. In those days he had been called "Vincentio" (no one mentions what name he was living under now), and he told Van Male of having received much reward

Jean-Baptiste

Van

Male

i39

from the archduke in return for his services; now he offered Van Male the continuation of those services should Albert be willing to assign him a pension and to order some further recompense for him besides. Van Male asked Albert urgently to instruct him as to what he could do along these lines in order to get and keep the man's services. The ambassador was especially interested in this not only because he understood that a connection with this man was "of much consideration and importance"; he was also most anxious about it because Noel Caron was trying to gain the connection himself, bidding against Van Male to get Vincentio to serve the Dutch instead of Albert.10 Before another week was out it was apparent that the English were well pleased with their success in getting hold of the letters (though they were still undeciphered). On the n t h of September Van Male wrote to Albert, in code: "With the two past ordinaries I sent Your Highness various letters from the Count of Onate which the agents of this King had intercepted and now I have learned that several persons departed from here for Germany and for Your Highness's States, to be employed in similar seizures, and that the principal authors of this . . . are the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Secretary of State Robert Naunton." He advised Albert to order that the emperor and Onate be warned of this.11 By the time he sent off his third weekly dispatch since the affair had begun, Van Male still had had no reply in the matter from Brussels, though he had received dispatches written since the time his first urgent notice should have arrived. He was "much astonished," he wrote della Faille, at this lack of response. He begged della Faille to inform him by the first mail if his notice and the copies had arrived since, for by now he had become seriously alarmed about the security of his own mail, "for," he explained, "as I see it, there is very little assurance now in the sending of our letters, since our adversaries avail themselves of this method of holding up the couriers and opening the packets, which we cannot very well avoid unless one establishes some

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private courier, seeing that the couriers of the Antwerp ordinary are for the most part Huguenots and extremely easy to corrupt." 1 2 But Van Male's worries were unfounded; della Faille replied to his first notice, of August 28th, on the 12th of September. He was writing from the archdukes' country residence at Mariemont, a good distance from Brussels, and apparently had just not received it in time to get an answer off in the next post from the capital. The copies of the first two Onate letters Van Male had sent corresponded to duplicates they had there; Albert wanted him to find out if they had been able to decipher the originals vet and to tell della Faille what he had learned the soonest possible, as it was a matter of great importance. One doubts that Van Male, having thus been ordered in the archduke's name to be especially diligent in this case in his usual activities in the shadow-world of espionage, was much inspired by the righteous exhortation which immediately followed in the secretary's letter: "You are right in being shocked by this malice," he said (referring to James's "malicious act in violating the archdukes' mail"), "but the integrity of our Sovereigns will never permit that one should do the same between friends and allies, and that one should come to violate the laws of man." Having unburdened himself of this—most likely wishing it were not so—della Faille went on to speak of other things. When the draft of his letter was finished, he apparently had second thoughts about this exhortation, fearing that the ambassador might take the archduke's pious precept too literally to heart, for he interpolated right after it a note saying that he had urged the archduke that Van Male would most certainly require monev if he was to gain his ends in the matter. Albert's answer to this (apparently governed more by insolvency than integrity) was to note that Van Male had already been granted funds, but that if his expenses in the present matter caused him to exceed this he (Albert) would order the Council of Finance to consider the matter—an answer which della Faille was confident meant that the necessary bribe money would be had one way or another. 13 But three days later Albert's notion of the matter had changed

Jean-Baptiste

Van Male

141

somewhat. In spite of what Van Alale had said of being convinced that the man could very well break the code used in the Onate letters, Albert believed the contrary since it was a very "difficult and artificial" one. Always a careful man with an ecu, the archduke did not intend to bribe a man not to do something until he was absolutely certain the man could do it. His intention now was that Van Alale induce the man to demonstrate his ability by deciphering an encoded letter that della Faille was enclosing, paying the man a little something for his trouble, of course. Then they would know for certain whether he was capable of deciphering the Onate letters or not. 14 By the time Van Alale learned of this plan the precautions seemed a little irrelevant. He had used all the means at his disposal to keep the cryptographer from deciphering the Onate letters, and for a long while he had succeeded. But Robert Naunton, the secretary of state, had been watching these proceedings. Naunton knew, Van Alale said, that the man was really capable of breaking the code, and the fact that Van Alale had gone to the trouble and expense of keeping him from decoding and returning the letters for what now amounted to a period of five whole weeks had convinced Naunton (who was well aware of what Van Alale was doing) that they must contain important information, for if it was of that much importance that their contents not be known by the English government, it was clearly of great importance to the English that they should know. Having come to this conclusion, Naunton simply applied pressure and forced the man to decipher them. Van Male could only console himself (and his masters) with the thought that instead of five weeks it was only four days that James had known the contents of the letters, and with the certainty that Vincentio would not have deciphered them at all if he had not been forced to by "the threats of severe punishment" (which apparently meant torture). 15 Van Alale, for all his uncharitableness in other ways, understood the position of his contacts and the limits to which they felt committed or could reasonably be considered committed to the

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cause or interests of their employers. It was one thing for a Jesuit missionary to suffer the rack willingly for his faith; it was something else to expect a specialist whose services were for sale to anyone to choose punishment for refusing to decipher a few documents in exchange for the relative pittance Van Male could pay him. Van Male not only did not resent Vincentio's submission, he was in fact still eager to procure his services as a regular agent. But a hitch had developed in this too, for as soon as James saw the deciphered copies of the Onate letters he ordered that the cryptographer not leave London, because he himself wanted to employ him "in many things in his service." The deciphered letters were causing a great stir at the English court. Van Male learned on the 24th (the day before he reported all this) that several councilors were busily occupied in some way over the letters, and that the king and his court were much worried and troubled over the enterprise which the Marquis Spinola had undertaken in the Palatinate. The same person who told him this also told him, in confidence, that he had heard from a good source that they had in hand there "some strange enterprise" for succoring the Palatinate, but that until now he had not been able to learn what it was; he promised Van Male that when he heard more clearly about it he would give him notice of it at once. As one reads Van Male's dispatch reporting this, one becomes aware of a peculiar circumstance, and of what a wily world it was in which Van Male practiced his espionage. Van Male of course had never seen the Onate letters except in the coded originals; the copies he had had taken from these were of course also in code. Vincentio had convinced him that he was capable of decoding them, but this had not been done by what might seem the obvious way, that of simply having him decipher a few words or a few lines to prove that he could; this would have involved the enormous principal task of breaking the whole code (or most of it), which was not only too great a task to demand as a simple demonstration of ability but, most of all, was

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precisely the one thing Van Male and the Brussels government did not want. When Vincentio finally did break the code and decipher the letters, the deciphered copies went to Naunton, and then to James. Neither the king nor the secretary of state of course sent Van Male any copies, and Van Male had clearly not been told of their contents by the councilors laboring over them. Vincentio would have had no chance to make Van Male a copy while deciphering them under English eyes (which would have been of no use to Van Male's government anyway, since they had facilities for decoding the copies he had sent even if they had not had their own duplicates), though he could have given the ambassador a general account of their contents later; but presumably Vincentio was still in the hands of the English, for it is perfectly clear from the wording of Van Male's report of these latest developments that he still did not know the letters' contents except by implication from what his informant had said the court was concerned about in connection with them; that and the "strange enterprise" to come to the aid of the Palatinate was all that the informant told him of. Van Male's lack of knowledge of the letters' contents becomes a certainty when one considers that he omitted mention of it even in code, though he entrusted many important things to cipher— and that it would not have mattered at all if the English had seen (by violating his mail) whatever information he might report on the contents of deciphered copies they themselves possessed; but these considerations only confirm the clear indications of his manner of referring to the matter. This circumstance takes on added interest from Van Male's continuation of his report. Still speaking of the informant who had told him of the councilors' being occupied somehow with the Onate letters, of the court's concern over Spinola's activities in the Palatinate, and of the "strange enterprise" the English had in hand (with more information promised when he had it), Van Male goes on to say: H e also assured me of the punctuality and fidelity with which he would make sure to serve Your Highness, confident that Your Highness will

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order him compensated as he was in past times when he maintained a correspondence with the Secretary Mancicidor, and in order to give Your Highness evidence that he knew how to decipher the said letters, I send with this the translations taken from his own hand and in his own handwriting which [he was able to do so readily] that I take for very necessary and to advantage that they change their cipher in Spain, since that which they now have will be so well known and easy to decipher. T h u s it turns out that V a n Male's informant, w h o had not told him of the letters' contents, was Vincentio himself. V a n

Male,

oddly enough, gives no indication that he had even noticed this omission, or had thought to ask about the letters' contents. T h i s raises an intriguing possibility. T h e letters Vincentio deciphered as proof of his ability were those della Faille had sent f r o m Brussels, not the Onate letters. A n d , although he could not have reproduced his deciphered version of the Onate letters verbatim, it seems

reasonable

to suppose

that

(if

he had

really

succeeded in deciphering these latter) he would have cited that feat—which should have impressed A l b e r t greatly—as sufficient proof, hoping to avoid the bother of cracking the cipher of the trial letters della Faille sent in another code, or at least to reinforce his suit f o r entering Albert's service and pay. In his o w n interest he should not only have mentioned his success in breaking the code of the Onate letters, but he should also have given at least a summary account of their contents both as proof of his success and to ingratiate himself with V a n Male, on whose intervention he was dependent in his efforts to procure a pension and

"other

recompense" he was seeking f r o m Albert; while, on the other hand, he had nothing to gain f r o m withholding the contents f r o m V a n Male, f o r if the latter wanted this information f o r some reason badly enough to pay f o r it he could instead get it f r o m Brussels simply f o r the asking. But Vincentio made no such o f f e r of the contents, nor did he bring up the matter of his deciphering feat at all. 18 It w o u l d have been interesting to have seen just what Vincentio did give the English as the deciphered version of the Onate letters, f o r V a n Male was much more convinced of his ability to p e r f o r m

Jeaji-Baptiste

Van

Male

145

cryptographic miraclcs than Brussels was, and it looks very much as though the latter was right. T h e test letters for Vincentio to decipher as proof of his ability had been sent with della Faille's letters to Van Male of the 12th and 15th of September. In replv Van Male said Vincentio had "indubitably deciphered the letters, as you will be able to see by the copies which I am sending to His Highness himself. I have this belief in him, that there is not a cipher in the world of which he could not make himself master in very little time, so much so that I submit it to your judgment whether it would not be to our advantage to [make sure to] keep a person of this quality [in our service] or not." Van Male was eager to do so, but complained that the "sickness of his pocketbook" was keeping him from this and from much else in the service of the archdukes. 17 But Van Male did not know what the test letters were supposed to contain, while Brussels did; Van Male was highly impressed by Vincentio's facility in deciphering them, while Brussels was decidedly unimpressed by the deciphered text he submitted. Either his rendering was unsatisfactory or (perhaps) they just decided they had used too easy a code to prove real ability. In any case, Albert ordered another test letter prepared and sent. Pedro de San Juan, secretaire d'etat et de guerre, prepared one himself in a different cipher, and dclla Faille sent this to Van Male. 18 When Van Male sent the new test letter to Vincentio he was surprised to find him reluctant to decipher it. Vincentio began complaining about not having received "better recompense" for the services he had already rendered; by the time Van Male was writing his regular letter to della Faille next day he still had heard no news from Vincentio about the test letter. Van Male worked hard nevertheless trying to keep him interested with "fine promises of good expectations" so he would decode and return the paper, trying simultaneously to get the wherewithal from Brussels to pay him with when promises no longer sufficed. 19 But in the next week's post Van Male had to write della Faille that It is o n l y too true, that w h i c h I told y o u in m y last of the personage to w h o m I had had delivered the ciphered letter w h i c h y o u w e r e pleased

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to send me, for he has withdrawn himself from correspondence with us, very discontented that he has not received further satisfaction, in spite of the fact that he has since received three hundred florins [ ¿ 3 ° ] f r o m the Count of Gondomar b y m y intercession, saying that his service merits a better recompense, and that not having been otherwise agreeable to T h e i r Highnesses, that he had resolved to embrace that of his king, from which he expected to gain better reward, which I have not been able to remedy, being as destitute as I am. Nevertheless, giving close consideration to how important it is to us to keep this personage, I have arranged to engage the Ambassador from Spain to the end that by his [financial] means w e should be able to attract him anew to our devotion, and in fact I am most eagerly pursuing him, most vigorously, to this effect, believing that he will send the paper back to me deciphered and that he will show himself to be an honest man, as previously. 2 0

But Vincentio never did return the paper to V a n Male deciphered. Delia Faille, in answer to Van Male's letter of the 16th, told him to do what he could to keep the man from going over to the service of his own king and promised whatever help he could provide. 21 About the same time, however, Van Male was writing the secretary that "he had in the end used such persuasion" that their "bonhomme" had sent back the paper—deciphered, but "in the form which you shall see." 22 It is plain that b y now Vincentio wanted to drop the subject of his famed genius at cryptography. A f t e r having had the coded test letter in his hands just short of two weeks he returned it with only a little bit decoded. With it he sent a covering letter, brushing the matter aside as having been deciphered "as much as there is need in order to make known that I was able to do it." T h e rest of his letter was a long account of his past services and past experience at the center of high affairs of state, replete with much name-dropping and emphasizing all the good he could do for the archdukes as an informant; he carefully omitted mention of his services as a cryptographer. 23 His eagerness makes it appear that his services were not so much in demand by now at the English court; the whole affair makes one wonder what on earth he really gave to Naunton and James as a decipher of the stolen Onate letters.

Jean-Baptiste

Van

Male

147

These passages took place at the beginning of a crucial time: Spinola's forces had not long before invaded the Lower Palatinate; by the time of the above dispatches the Count Palatine's crushing defeat at the White Mountain near Prague was only a few days in the future. In a few weeks a conjuncture of affairs was to arrive whose outcome would depend greatly on intelligence from London and would make especially heavy demands on the espionage apparatus of the Flemish envoy. This "conjuncture of affairs" will be dealt with in some detail in later chapters, but the story requires beforehand a fuller picture of the milieu, and this can be gathered most conveniently by picking up the thread of Van Male's multi-faceted reports as / ' a f f a i r e Vincentio dwindled to a close, and seeking, by selective sampling of these, the taste and texture of the world of intrigue which revolved around the court of James I. A t the time of his reporting the deciphering for the English of the Onate letters, Van Male's informants had alerted him (and he had alerted Brussels) to the fact that William Trumbull, James's resident envoy to the archdukes, had been sent letters of credit on which he was to be paid in Antwerp two thousand Spanish doubloons in specie, which Van Male understood were destined to be spent in payments to spies and informants he had "in the Court and States" of the archdukes. Van Male pointed out (not without purpose) that it was absolutely certain that the English "lacked neither the one nor the other" (that is, neither spies properly so called nor high level informants) since James ordered them paid such large amounts— which led nicely into one of the ambassador's recurring themes: that he had managed so far to fulfill his duties for His Highness, but was already extended so far beyond what His Highness provided and his own private means that if His Highness was to continue to be served in the future money would have to be forthcoming. T h e present system of expecting satisfactory results from his usual allowance (of which he often claimed half was devoured by ordinary living expenses) would most certainly not be adequate for procuring the increased intelligence required in

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a time of special crisis like the present, and he begged Albert now to set up a fixed and regular annual secret service fund in order to keep the contacts he now had, "because at times an opportunity presents itself to discover some important matter, and here nothing is done without large recompense." This impoverishment did not, however, leave the resourceful Fleming without means to accomplish the miscellaneous tasks of a spy-master: he was able to conclude the same dispatch by saying that " I have got my hands on a certain letter written in Hamburg that treats of twenty-two barrels of gunpowder and 200,000 reichsthalers that the King of Denmark sent to the Palatine of which, because of its having seemed to me of some importance, I send Y o u r Highness herewith a copy." 2 4 N o t long after this Van Male was informed of the arrival in England two months before of a Frenchman called the Viscount Delormes who had offered James "a certain secret and invention" he said he had that would make any piece of artillery blow up, no matter how strong. Apparently a lack of success in making contact with important persons at court had kept his presence from coming to V a n Male's attention, but now, the ambassador learned, Delormes was having extensive consultations with the marquis of Buckingham. As soon as he heard of this, Van Male began trying "all means" to corrupt the viscount's servant in order to learn what he could of the details of the contrivance. T h e servant finally affirmed that he had been present when his master made his compounds and that he had also seen them demonstrated; they were apparently all Delormes claimed them to be, but Van Male was unable to report any details about the process itself. T h e servant was certain Delormes had made an agreement with Buckingham to go in person to Spinola's camp and apply his secret compounds to the artillery the captain-general had with him, planning to secure a place as a soldier in Spinola's army to facilitate the undertaking. Van Male said he did not know whether there was any basis for believing the Frenchman really intended carrying this out, or if he really expected his project

Jean-Baptiste Van Male

149

to succeed even if he were serious, but thought he should advise Albert, and also sent along a written declaration about it signed by the servant. Van Male planned to have an account of the viscount's "every step" and in the meantime advised Albert to warn Spinola so the general could take the necessary precautions and be prepared to seize Delormes should he turn up in his army. V a n Male had also been told that Delormes intended to leave at once after he had again seen Buckingham (who was out of town at the moment). His informant understood that he would go b y w a y of Holland to treat of his enterprise with Maurice. As usual Van Male promised to give Albert a detailed account of the matter as soon as he could. As they generally did, V a n Male's dispatches during this time touched on a number of items, ranging from reports of news and rumors regarding matters of the first importance (the affairs of Bohemia, the Valteline, the Turkish pirates) to minor incidental intelligence: "This Ambassador from Venice had notice that that republic had ordered a Councilor to be hanged b y his feet f o r having written a certain letter to the Ambassador from Spain resident in that quarter and that the following day several Venetians stabbed to death three of the Ambassador's servants, and that the Senate had placed a guard at his house so that the people would not harm his person. . . ." 2 S But it was the alleged plan of the Viscount Delormes to join Spinola's army, get into that general's camp, get access to all his artillery, and plant in each piece his secret compound which would make them all destroy themselves the first time they were brought into action—in all, a rather daring plan—which prompted Van Male to remark to della Faille: A s you know that the soil of England always produces new mushrooms, thus you need not be astonished b y that which I represent to H i s Highness in the enclosed, and although I can give no other assurance of the fact, even though it seems to me that the good man has the appearance of a true charlatan, nevertheless I am of the opinion that one would do well to be on one's guard f o r that which might happen, for it is not good to have too much faith in these brigands, and much less in this

15o

Intelligence

from

England

state of affairs. I will try to penetrate and discover further the circumstances of this enterprise. 26 ( T h e "state of a f f a i r s " in the w o r l d was in fact most precarious and unpredictable f o r the Habsburgs. A f t e r signing his letter to della Faille and just before sending it off, V a n Male added a hasty postscript of news he had received that " v e r y instant," including a report that Maurice's agents had intercepted all the letters of the ordinary post of that week f r o m both G e r m a n y and Italy.) B y next week's mail V a n Male was able to report a happy ending—from his point of v i e w — t o the Delormes affair. A c c o r d ing to his information, the viscount had made another demonstration of his invention in Buckingham's presence but it had made something of a fizzle; the English w e r e understandably unimpressed and had made no deal. Delormes himself had already departed f o r Holland, 2 7 and perhaps he was able to demonstrate his invention to Maurice with a bigger bang, but the pages of history remain silent about Spinola's artillery ever having subsequently

blown

itself to bits. Perhaps because

of

a lack

of

the

usual

quota

of

ordinary

"straight" news to give it the usual balance, V a n Male's dispatch of October 30th, 1620, all in code, seems exceptionally steeped in intrigue of many sorts: A person very devoted to the service of Your Highness just now advised me that this King several days ago secretly sent a gentleman to the states of Your Highness to reconnoitre all the strong places and fortifications of the County of Flanders, and that the same person had returned and made a report to this King of how he had found them very weak and ill-provided. 1 do not know to what end he has done it, nor the basis that this might have, but being a thing of such consideration it has seemed well to me to give Your Highness notice of it. In the interim I am continuing all efforts to inform myself more particularly of this case, although already there is a rumor that those of this Council of State have in hand great machinations and ideas, and that they are trying by cunning and artifice to engage this King in many things against his own interest. Also they tell me that a gentleman named "Maconel" who was for some time at Your Highness's Court was reconciled a few days ago in

Jean-Baptiste Van Male the good graces of this King, and that he revealed to him strange designs of the Earl of Argyll who for the present is also at Your Highness's Court, in such a way that they affirm to me that this King appears to be warned and persuaded that His Catholic Majesty has some enterprises and designs to execute in Scotland and Ireland, from which secret grumbling appears to have resulted here, although I take it for more certain that this would have been an invention and stratagem of the ?nalintencionados. Here they treat of nothing except getting together great sums of money [i.e., for aid to the Count Palatine] and in order that the people be more easy and liberal in contributing, they go little by little persuading this King that he should order proclaimed publicly the declaration that he made lately in favor of the Palatine, and at the same time they counsel him that he should try by all ways and means to collect the debt he claims at the charge of the Estates of Your Highness, although [the proposal for recovering this amount] is extended to the giving of letters of reprisal, of which it has seemed well to me to advise Your Highness, and also of how I have met by chance here with a certain person who, for some recompense, offers to prove that the obligations of the Estates which this King has are null and of no worth, telling me that he will make it thus apparent by the accounts of a merchant named "Horacio Palavisini," who in times past had large dealings with the Queen Elizabeth, and according to what he says all the business from which these obligations resulted passed through his hands, and thus Your Highness would be served by ordering it seen whether it would not be well that a definite sentence not be given in the lawsuit which William Trumbull has begun until what this person says is investigated, and inasmuch as the accounts of Palavicini are in the archives of this King, it appears it will be necessary to make a request that they show them to me and give copies of them. [He asks instructions in the matter.] 28 The military reconnaissance in Flanders proved really to have been made, but Van Male was certain that James had not the means to mount an invasion and did not pursue the matter further. 29 T h e matter of the Palavicini accounts was dragged out for some time but in the end came to nothing. 30 During the next few weeks Van Male was mainly occupied, along with reporting the prospects for the coming Parliament and such, with negotiations with a number of prospective new secret agents, some of whom looked promising (though one of these was an "atheist" and too "politique" for the devout Fleming's taste),

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England

some not so promising, some of whom he procured and some not. 3 1 But b y mid-December this relatively quiet time had ended, for news of the W h i t e Mountain had arrived and been confirmed to the Puritan public beyond doubt. Van Male well knew where the people's sentiments lay, but even he was taken aback b y the depth of their feeling over the disaster Frederick had met: it penetrated their entrails, he said. In the violent public reaction to the news both the Spanish Habsburg envoys found themselves in considerable danger. T h e r e was rioting around Gondomar's residence, and James had guards posted there to protect him. V a n Male, brave enough to be prudent, stayed indoors as much as possible. W h e n affairs demanded that he go out he did so as secretly as possible, and to "guarantee" himself against the " f u r o r e populi"

he wore a corselet under his

casaque and armed himself—to his own amusement—with a brace of pistols, an epee, and a dagger, giving him "more the appearance of a furious soldier from Germany than of the poor clerk that I am." He recognized clearly that a crisis was at hand, and kept reporting the continually changing conditions in detail to the

arch-

duke. T o della Faille he made not so much a vow as a simple statement: " I confess m y frailty, but I will never lose the courage nor the desire to sacrifice my life for the service of our master and the public good, although I expect that I will have nothing to fear. . . . " 3 2 V a n Male was correct: he was not called upon to sacrifice his life. T h e services which his cause was to be in the greatest need of were those he was best equipped to render, the procuring of vital information through his network of spies, informers, and informants. As will be seen, he did this both remarkably well and unbelievably badly—first providing information which allowed a Madrid in political chaos to resolve a critical problem to great advantage, then leading his master and the "public good" to the brink of disaster.

William Sterrell: A Jacobean Letter Writer N o t all of the "intelligence from England" which the Spanish Habsburgs received came through their diplomatic apparatus, and as an example of "other" sources of information the choice of William Sterrell is well-nigh irresistible, for although he is surely the most unclassifiable he is also surely the most engaging and in many ways the most paradoxical "spy" one is apt to encounter. William Sterrell was an Englishman who spied for the Habsburgs at the English court, but he did not work for either Gondomar or Van Male. Charles della Faille was a secretary at the archdukes' legation in London earlier in his career, and apparently became acquainted with Sterrell during that time; after della Faille returned to Brussels they began an exchange of information by mail that lasted for a good many years. 1 Sterrell had access to a good many highly placed persons, was present at court much of the time, and attended important banquets and other ceremonies, but it is not clear what his official function might have been; it seems likely (from strictly circumstantial evidence) that he held some post at court on an intermediate level. Whatever his official function may be have been, Sterrell went to considerable pains in carrying out his duties as a spy, collecting and passing on his information, together with much advice-giving and a great deal of well-thought-out analysis of difficult matters. But his motives for doing this are not clear. It seems certain he

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did not do it for the money; some money did change hands, but it was in small amounts and seems mostly to have been for expenses, including payment for whatever information he had to buy and for the care of agents and others who were often sent his way by the ministers in Brussels. Nor was he a Catholic: English Catholics are a frequent subject of his correspondence, but he always uses the pronouns "they" or "them" and refers to them as "our recusants" and even as "Papists." Neither was he "unpatriotic": except for the rather contradictory fact that he was constantly sending intelligence reports to the "enemy," his attitude is one of complete loyalty to king and country—he was, in fact, a bit of a chauvinist. T h e main thing he received in exchange for the information he sent della Faille, oddly enough, was news of affairs on the Continent, especially the doings of Englishmen there, for he was much interested in his countrymen, their welfare, and their accomplishments—he was much concerned, for example, over the fate of the English troops fighting against the archduke's forces in the Palatinate. This was part of the bargain, and della Faille often fulfilled it grudgingly enough, though even when the secretary was not remiss in writing, his means of delivery were often not fast enough to satisfy the anxious Englishman. In a fairly typical exchange della Faille replied grumpily to his importuning contact across the Channel, "You needn't find it strange that my letters are sometimes delivered to you late, because the same often happens to me with regard to yours." But Sterrell had been anxious to hear how an extraordinary embassy from James had been received in Brussels—being a patriotic spy, he of course wished them success—and he wrote back to the placid della Faille, "I perceave by your last, you are somewhat angrie that I thought longe to heare of your receipt of mvne, I pray you to pardone me if I am curious of myne owne, your rase & myne are not alike." 2 Sterrell also belonged to that rare race of men who write with an effortless, natural mastery of sinewy, vernacular English—the straightforward sort who says much with few words, the simple

William

Sterrell

1

55

narrator who (without knowing how artful he is, and how welcome when encountered in sudden contrast with empty, labored rhetoric) tosses off a Latin phrase easily enough on occasion but more often takes the perfect mot juste from the street or, sometimes, from the gutter. His handwriting (he never bothered with code) was rather illiterate—not bad enough to be a noble's, not good enough to be a secretary's; about, in fact, on the level of an English ambassador's —and his spelling was atrocious even for the time, but his reporting was thorough, his analyses often amazingly shrewd, and the whole was recounted with rare, unforced imagination. Gondomar was a master raconteur w h o knew just where to put in the touches that made a hilarious story, and V a n Male, when his bile reached a certain level, could be sardonically funny, but both dealt with the commonplace in a commonplace way. Only William Sterrell would begin a letter, as a matter of course, " I receaved yours of the 8th of J u l y newe style, and they came to my handes the 8th olde style." 3 Delia Faille often expressed his appreciation of the quality of Sterrell's reports, and it seems strange to see how bad were some of the translations made for others to read—though one may perhaps forgive a Spanish-speaking Netherlander for rendering "this day senight" as " o y " . 4 T h e appreciation was not unmerited; his report of June 22, 1620, is a fairly typical example of how much various material Sterrell normally dealt with in his usual single folio page: Right horl [i.e., honorable] I have smale alteration of occurrents to wright unto you. T h e greatest is that w e have no newes of any victories of the protestants side. W e heare the A r c h d u k e Albertus is dead [treating this as of no importance is no slight to the A r c h d u k e here; people had been hearing that he was dead for years]. T h e Collection for the Count Palatine goeth foreward still, but it is voluntarie. I m y selfe refused to give any thinge, and was dismissed kyndly. T h e rumore that 6000 men shall be sent to defend the Palatinate doth yet holde, & sir Horatio V e r e to be generall, the Earles of O x f o r d and Essex to have companies under him for they are young men. But

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as yet, all is but wordes. It may be they attende the issue of the Collection. If the Emperour give but one sownd blowe to his Enemies the case will alter much. T h e match with spaine still holdeth f o r concluded. T h e perticulers we knowe not, but the reporte is that the L o w countries shall be given in dowrie after the decease of the Archdukes, and six hundreth thowsand pownde in m o n y . T h e r are letters comen in behalfe of m y olde friend. I thank you f o r them, and they shall be used as time serves. T h e r e is one Alured that hath made a W r i g h t i n g e against the mariage with Spaine, and directed it to the Marcus of Buchingame. H e is comitted f o r his labor f o r in truth it is Idle and sclanderous [sic]. T h e fleet of 20 shipps against the Turkish pyrats goeth f o r w a r d , & so doeth mv L o r d Digbie his J o u r n e y into Spaine. T h u s longinge to hcere some of the Almaigne newes I rest, 22th J u i n g 16620 [sic] Stylo veteri

Yours

most faithfull att Commaunde W i l l m : Sterrell 5

In early 1620 the outcome of the Spanish marriage was generally considered to hinge on what w o u l d happen after the return of Gondomar from an extended sick-leave in Spain. H e was anxiously awaited in England for months, b y some with longing, b y others with loathing. B y

late F e b r u a r y

Sterrell reported that he

was

now expected daily, " b u t he cometh alia spagnola." 6 In mid-March he reported the narrow escape the ambassador had shortly after his arrival. A f t e r longe expectation the Count de Gundemar is come and Sunday last had an audience att Whitehall in publique, but nothing dune but comlement. H e had like to have had a misfortune by the breakinge of the T a r r a s as he was to enter up to the grand chamber, y o u mav remember the place. M a n y of those that folowed fell to the grownd, but too of the guard layd holde of him & saved him f r o m the fall. His cloake and his hatte fel downe. T h e Earle of Arundel and the younge L o r d G r a y , w h o were his supporters fel to the grownde, with many others, yet god thanked ther was no hurt done which was of moment. T h e r is one Coronel G r a y a scottishman, that hath leave to take up all voluntaries to serve the Palatine but he findeth none but poore fellowes that would faine gett his mony and then rune f r o m him. T e n dayes hence they make their rendez vous in St G e o r g e his fieldes, then w e shall knowe more. . . . 7

William Sterrell

157

T h e progress of the levy Captain A n d r e w G r a y was making and the fate of his recruits was a subject of Sterrell's observation for some weeks: It is trewe that Captaine G r a y had leave to strick up his Drume and gett what voluntaries he could to goe to the count Palatine, but he had no commission to press any. His first rendevous was in Westminster Hall whither came aboute 100 shakragges, hopinge to have gotten press mony & then he might have sought them. H e rejorned the matter to st George his fieldes, as to fore I have written, but ther was no appearance, & so that matter inded. . . , 8 T h e soldiers f o r the Palatine are gone this Daye f o r Hambourge; they are poore creatures, yet many of them are runne a waye. I do not thinke ther will arive 400. . . .» Sterrell's reports provide frequent sidelights on familiar episodes, as, for example, the complicated domestic dispute which entailed the fall of Secretary of State Sir Thomas Lake: T h e count de Gundemar is in some distast with Sir Thomas Lake and Sir Nicholas Fortesque upon some letter written from your parts by a religious man, charging them that they maintoine one William Jones, who writeth against the mariage with spaine, & against him in perticuler. It is some plot f r o m hence to withdrawe Gundemar his affection from sir Thomas Lake, f o r feare he should come into his majestis favor againe, f o r Sir Thomas sworne to me that mr Jones had no letter from him verie neare this Twelfmoneths. T h e r is a Spaniard in Andwerpe called Diego de Silva, w h o was the Lord Ross his man, and a great agent f o r the countes of exeter his unter enemie. It is suspected that the devise cometh f r o m him. It is not well that the count should be drawen to dislike his friendes. L e t me entreat you to doe some good offices, as you may, f o r sir Thomas Lake with the count. William Jones is an honest man, of whome I have written unto you longe agoe. H e is att the spaa, as I heare, with Sir Edward Somersett; if he had but some notice of the matter, he would quicly cleare that imputation. H e knoweth Diego verie welle. It seameth Embassadors are jelaous of all perticular writers, and such I am that I never did wright unto you any thinge against but f o r the count Gundemar, and f r o m Jones have not receaved any letter nor he f r o m me, att leastt these twoe yeares. . . . 1 0 N o w h e r e does William Sterrell acquit himself better than in a penetrating analysis he made about this same time of the true magnet which drew the Dutch and English to the Indies; of the

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Intelligence from

specialized specie requirements

England

f o r capitalizing

that trade

(his

simple solution drawn f r o m this is not so naive as at first it seems); of the effect exporting that capital f o r that trade had on the English money supply and thus on the economy; and of the failure of the English e c o n o m y to expand under the influence of

this

" n e w " trade because of uncalculated operating costs and the disproportion between total shipping employed and shipping successf u l l y employed.

hands

might

have taken on the air of a formal thesis on economics

Characteristically,

w h a t in other

occurs

rather matter-of-factly in the midst of a report of military intelligence: Right honorable I have receaved the 17 of August oldc style 3 letters from vou. T h e last was the 19 dated, newe style, which came with some speed; the other stayed longe in the waye. W e are furnished for the present with smale newes. The newes we had was controlled by yours, for it was written hither that the Duke of Baviere and saxony refused to meddle in the matter because Leopoldus his army had done such great spoils in their march towardes the Emperuere, & that Spinigola durst not goe forwardes for feare of the Hollanders, but nowe they doubt what he will doe, and wc finde the States to be Bragadocios, [saying that] it is not the 2000 english they have receaved that serve to make up their Army, & of more, here is no speache. Our fleet against the Turkishe pyrates is but nowe going towardes Plymouth, so many wants ther are allwaies in such preparations, but I hope they shall not be stayed, and sir Robert Maunsell who is the Admirall sayeth that if they be in the Stravghts by Michaelmas it will serve the terme, howe soever from London they are gone. Our marchants have yet no answere from his Majestie concerninge their Petetion to have his leave to right them selves against the States both in the Indies and here allso; it seameth that it is put off 'till the Kinge meets with the Councell. It seameth a strange matter to all understandinge men that the spaniardes shoulde suffer the Hollanders to trade in the East Indies, it beinge in his [i.e., their] power to hinder all men, if they had but the witt to keepe their mony and not lett the Hollander steale it out, for with out the spanish Reales none can have any spice ther, & this is & ever was most certeine, our mony will not be taken ther, much less theirs, which I wright upon certeine knowledge. For our parts in England, we curse the East Indian voyage because it carieth a way all the spanish Bullion, which was wont to be brought to the minte, so that our silver

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is greatly decayed; the minte hath coyned no silver coyne to any porpose, never since our men traded that w a y ; our T y m b e r , oure Mariners, our victualls are infinitly diminished dayly. O u r Mariners dye in the way, of 80 ther seldome restorneth 20, the shipps rotte, the victualls perisheth, & spyce is as deare as it was before; a few Marchants getteth & the hole lande wingeth for it. Great complaints are dayly made, but they make friendes. It is thought that the Emperoure will not confiscate the palatinate for our kings sake, but the zelous doe doubt that if he shoulde come into his handes, that he would keepe his Eldiest sonne as a pledge for his future cariage, & soe the Gospell might chaunc to be in danger if god sould take our prince without issue (which god for bidd). I heare nothinge of the partie you mencioned; I pray you, as before, let him alone, & move him no more. W e longe here like woemen with childe to heare of the Germaine affaiers; let me intreat you (accordinge to your promise) that I may understande the event of all actions, with the first if it may stande with your convenientcie, for your advertisments serve to great use. If spinigola prevayle nowe he will be famous fore ever. It is much doubted [i.e., feared] that he will take Nurenberge either going or retorning, because it is the Tresurie chamber for the Bohemians, & all exchanges made with them are made by that towne. T o one pointe in my last I still doe pray your answere; in the meane time, I ever remayne 24 Auguste Stylo veteri 1620

Y o u r honors faithfull it redie att commande, W i l l m : Sterrell

Since I had endid my letter I was told from one Mr Willyams, who is an agent for the Count Palatine, that the Marcus Spigniola was sett downe before Francfort, ten daies gone, but it is so improbable that I can not believe it, for it is this day but 16 dayes since he passed the Reine according to your avises. 11 If Sterrell always did b a d l y at spelling the captain

general's

name ( " S p i g n o l a " w a s as close as he ever g o t ) it w a s f r o m lack of familiarity w i t h spelling and not w i t h military affairs; he was an excellent military observer, w i t h an unusually fine grasp of military realities. H e saw clearly, f o r example, w h a t w o u l d surely result f r o m an abortive attempt to use England's limited capability in land warfare to settle matters on the Continent: Right honorable I have receaved yours of the 9 of June, wherby I perceave you have

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England

receaved myne, which was good newes. W e have smale occurente here, only a great question is whither his Majestie shall defende the palatinat or not. T h o u g h he doe not meddle with Bohemia, friendes to ametie with spaine doe answere that it were Idem per Idem; as y e t nothinge is done but in wordes, and verely I thinke the Kinge will not deale in that matter. A l l the ayde in that behalfe which is spoken of is but 6000 foote and 400 horse, which might prove sufficient to breake the match with spaine, but not to defende the count palatine. T h e hollanders have spoiled five English shipps in the East Indies in a most bass and c o w a r d l y manner. . . . 1 2 H i s portrait of the reality behind the bellicose talk of those w h o w o u l d save the Palatinate and the T r u e Religion with their armed might is illuminating, explaining much: R i g h t honorable T h i s is the third letter I have written since I had any f r o m y o u , and y o u r last was dated in June. W e have no newes but his Majestie hath sent Ambassadors, Sir H a r r y W o t t o n to venice, and to take the A r c h d u k e s in the w a y & then to the Princes of the union, after to the Emperour, and from him to venice. H e is with you I think b y this time; he is to perswade a concord if it may be. Sir E d w a r d c o n w a y is to goe to Bohemia, and to take the Princes on that svde in his w a y f o r like propose; they are both gone f r o m hence the last weeck. W e have Drumes goinge about London everie day to reteine 6000 soldiers to goe to the Palatinat under Sir Horacio vere. T h e y have gone aboute this 14 or 16 dayes, but as yet their numbers are smale. T h e Earles of O x f o r d & Essex beinge young men, & one Sir E d w a r d sackfielde brother to the Earle of Dorset grand child to the old Buchurst, give out that they will goe with Sir Horacio, but they are men of smale meanes, & the journey will be costly. T h e y must be all voluntaries therefore they come v e r y slowly to the Drume [i.e., because they receive no "press m o n e y , " V e r e having no license to impress]. His Majestie will do nothinge in the matter but permitt others. Sir Horatio goes b y holland as it is reported, if the voyage holde, but it is breakinge off everv dav. H e Majestie here is verie earnest in the reformation of evill officers in the lawe courts; mr Attornv generall leadeth the Daunce, w h o is suspendid f r o m the execution of his place & is brought into this star chamber, & will be put out as all suppose with a sownd fine upon his hedd. W e heare the E m p e r o r hath great forces; I longe to heare f r o m y o u , f o r newes was written f r o m Nurenberge that his men had receaved a

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great blowe to the loss of jooo soldiers & that Bucquoij was forced to flie, which is not yet controlled; as things goe ther, so will resolutions goe here. T h e spanish Embassador holdeth his grace with out Kinge, & the lord Digbie holdeth his journy f o r spaine. Concerning mony matters I have writt my opinion; I would wish y o u to observe it punctually, and so I rest. . . . 1 3 This open-eyed observer missed v e r y little. A single-page report could range from pirates to the Onate letters to the latest intelligence on one of the great figures of legend: Right honorable I have receaved yours of the 26th of sept, wherby att the last I finde something in action. Y e t the newes holdes here still that Bucquoij hath reccaved a great blowe. A n d Yisterday it was current upon the exchange that spignola had bine mett with and lost 1000 men, that he is much distressed with want of victualls, & the protestants, since the English aryved, are exceedinge strong. Our Fleet of shipps are gone out of the N a r r o w e seas, & by this upon the coast of spaine, to joyne with the spanish. Much practising ther was to stay them, not withstandinge the great loss our marchants have susteined by the pyrates. T h e cittie of Bristowe hath lost this yeare 7 shipps. Of the Hollanders shippinge ther is no newes; it was but a devise to stay our men. T h e letter sent to the Archduke from his Embassador att vienna and longe since intercepted is here nowe discyphered; it was sent from Holland hither, & one mr Thomas Phillipps did discypher it. H e is an olde acquaintance of mvne; we joyned together in the Queen Elizabeths time. I have seen the copie, but I am tolde that it hath bine shown to your Agent Eidger here f o r the Archduke, therefore I leave the perticulers. If it be a trewe letter, the Embassador is but a simple cypherer. A friend of yours taught you longe agoe a better way. It seameth verie strange that avises differing so much in time should be written all att once in one letter. One thinge I note is that the Archduke is to conquere the Palatinate f o r him self; the Avises are above 2 sheets of paper. Perhapps the Hollanders have devised them & put them into cypher of propose to be discovered here, to move his Majestie to enter into action, but his Majestie will doe no more then is allredie done. F o r any thinge I can learne of your Bohemian newes & allso of spignola his actions I pray you make me pertaker. W e heare of such great preparations of Bethelem Gabors that except the Polonians stepp in strongly the Emperor will be in hard distress, for

iÓ2

Intelligence from

England

it seameth the Duke of saxonie standeth a loose to see who shall winne. & so I rest Your honors most faithfull 27 of September at commaunde olde style 1620. The stay of our shipps so longe was the Amirall & captaines providing to be brave, which did aske time Willm Sterrell and cost. W e have great newes here of a walkinge Jewe which hath walked ever since christ his passion & they tell us that he is cominge for Englande; ther is a book out in print. Some such Man ther is, I heard of him nowe above 28 yeares past. 14 ( T h e Wandering J e w was not alone in being a hardy perennial: over a year later Gondomar was in touch with a decipherer, an "insolent" old man past seventy w h o claimed he could "decipher the hearts of Kings and men"; Gondomar watched him perform, was convinced he could indeed decipher anything, and tried to hire him and ship him off to Flanders—the outcome of which is unclear; this was one "Maestre F e l i p e . " ) 1 5 T w o weeks after the above letter, Sterrell wrote della Faille: The last I receaved from you was dated the 26 of September your style and this is my third letter that I have written since. Our Fleet is certenly gone; the causes of the longe stay were the unskilfull victuallers who had salted the Biefe in the hott time & so it took not salt well, & much of it was faine to be changed & much beare newe Brewed. Allso the captaines & their traine would be brave. Ther were many devises to stay them, but his Majestie continewed resolute. His Majestie hath declared in full counsell that neither the Kinge of spaive, nor the Archdukes, nor Gundomar did ever projnise that spignola should not enter the Falatinat, hath cortvnaunded the Marcus of Buckinghame to certifie so much by letter to Gundomar which he did, & I have seene the copie. So his Majestie will defende the Falatinat, either by sending of men or by waginge of some ther. God graunt quiet to all good people. W e heare that the letters from vienna were the last weecke intercepted by the count Henry [i.e., Frederick Henry, younger brother of Prince Maurice], whoe we suppose to be in the Palatinat by this time. I can not believe but that the Hollanders have gotten a copie of the character that passeth from the Emperor his court; monv

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may doe much in spaine, or in vienna, or in Bruxelles. I have knowne it a common trick to give out that letters were descyphered by skill when it was done by a copie gotten of the Alphabet. Yet foolish cyphers are easely discovered, for I can doe as much in that arte as another & if my rules be followed no arte can discypher it. It is not changing the Alphabet everie line (which is a fonde troble) that will helpe the matter, though some thinke otherwise, but I assuere you that the cyphers which goes by a secret word are not worth a pin. (Experto credo Roberto). Let me intreat some newes as you may impart of thos Germaine broyles. & so I rest 11 of Octo. Your honors most faithfull att 1620 olde style. commaunde it is in vayne to Invent newe cyphers when ther is treacheries att home. Willm: Sterrell 1 « B y the 2d of N o v e m b e r , English style, the slow-starting expedition against the T u r k i s h pirates had finally got under w a y and was really intending to attack pirates and not the Flemish coast—a w o r r y on the part of the Flemings which Sterrell (having seen the fleet's p e r f o r m a n c e so f a r ) thought excessive. R u m o r s about events on the Continent, meanwhile, w e r e running riot to such an unusual degree and there was so much to report that (a sure sign of extraordinary crisis) Sterrell w r o t e on both sides of his usual single sheet: I have att last receaved your letter of the 21 Octobir your style, which was verie welcome for I was in despaire to heare from you any mor. I have written two letters unto you since that of the 17th of Septembir but I doubted [i.e., feared] they had been intercepted, considering vou have had such store of occurents, as by others I understood, but till I heare from your selfe it will not serve my tourne. It may be you conceave that what some friende hath is as good as if I had it, but it is not soe; I pray you therfore faile me not as longe as this busines lasteth, ther after nowe & then will be sufficient to wright. Our fleet for spaine went from Famouth 16 dayes since upon Sunday last past, & this is Thursday. Frist they went from hence to the Downes & post went to court they were gon, but the wind stayed them ther diverse dayes, then they put out & went to portsmouth & packets came that thev were gon, yet ther they stayed diverse daies changing their mariners, & ther they began to find great fault in the victualls. Ordre was presently sent to provide for them att plimouth and soe they were,

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both Flesh fish and bere, but they spent att least a fowrtennight about it after they came thither, & had stayed twice as longe more had not the Fleet of Fishermen from greenlande comen in ther unexpected, b y which meanes they had plenty of newe fish and mariners, so they changed 200 mariners taken up in this river & put to sea with saylers of practise, & speedy w o r d was sent of their departure; but being allmost out of the narrowe seas a south west wind came with such violence as they were faine to put back to Famouth, from whence they departed as before, & since w e have not heard of them, & windes have bine good, so that w e account them to have dubled the cape vincent b y this time, & so readie to enter the straits att the least. T h e 2 pinnasses eache of them 200 tuns a piece are going after them with more provision; with in ten dayes w e make account they will be redie to put to sea. So you finde nowe that I writt what I did knowe. 1 can not blame though you beyonde sea did doubt of the matter when it was generally reported here that they were stayed, but they were such as would have it soe. A l l doubts are nowe cleared concerning that affaire; the spanish west indian Fleet was saffly arived in spaine before our fleet put out the last time & ther of came notice. & from the coast of Flanders they fare inough; your foolish poeple need not now run in to the countrie from your coast. T h e r are 16 Hollanders shipps gone after them lately to joyne with them as they pretend, & 1 believe it; they give out they will send after them 12 more accordinge to the articles between our King and them, for 28 of their shipps will hardly equalle the Tunnage of this his Majeste Navie, which they should. . . . G o d sent them good speed, I trust it will establish much ametie between the English & spanish. His majestie here hath shewed him selfe most noblie constant in this action, for if the witt of puritans could have wrought it they had bine stayed. T h e T u r c k s are 200 sayle, as our saylers comen out of the straits affirme. A s f o r our newes it is thus, the same day after your last came unto me came from Bruxelles ( f o r avises from Nurenburg & Amsterdam have so lost their credit that nowe Bruxelles is the place, because when they reported to me, tangua ad lvdium lapidem, they even fownde it trewe that you sent.) It is written from mr Tromball (as they say) that in Bohemia those from Baviere & with Bucquoij have had a great overthrowe, lost 4000 . . . men and forced to take the woodes; but they are strongly besett. T h a t Damprier is slaine by the Hungarians, many or most of his men are cut in pieces, his head cut off & sent to the palatine. T h a t Bethlem G a b o r is entered into Austria with 40000 men & killeth & Burneth all. T h a t the count palatine hath 40000 men more than he needeth & hath sent them into Bavaria, w h o doe the like ther.

William

Sterrell

That spignola is sick, his men goe from him by 30 & 60 att a time having passports dayly from count Henrick & Sir Horatio Vere to pass into france & else were. That his campe was assaulted by thos in the palatinate aboute Mentz, and they entred the trenches, drave them into the towne & have slayne great nombers, braken his Bridge, though it were with great loss, for most of the English were slayne and the Hollanders could not escape free. That the Prince of Orange hath fortified an Hand about Bonna in the middest of the Reine, which the Bishope of coelen would hinder, that the Archduke hath sent him 3000 men ledd by the governour of VI as trick, that newe fort will bringe as great a gabelle to the Palatine as pfalts did which spignola tooke in. That the spanish Embassador here confesseth that Dampriere is slaine but it was by a traine; he had intelligence in Presburg & intendid a surprise, was willed to come such a day with forces and him selfe to goe to a certeine plot of grownd assigned and hold up his pistoll which should be a token; he did soe, & a muskettier shott him threwe the neck. I am tolde de bone lieu that the Embassador confessed so much, but neither of them affirmed that they heard him them selves. I conclude that if he were killed this way and not the foremer he was taken like a woodcock in a cockshute. He might have sett an other to holde up a pistoll. When I tell your last avises, they answere me that [they] are stale, all was done since. Ther is a great collection begune of mony. Everie Earle giveth 1000 [pounds], everie Baron joo, Knights 300 & 200 the least; the Lordes of the privie counsell are beginning but all must be given of Freewill & no man compelled, & this is to defende the Palatinate, where of his Majestie is carefull for his grand childrens sake, though he be offended with the Palatine him selfe for not following his Fatherly advise. I had thought that spignola would have marched directly up to Nurenberge, till your letters came, & would have gaged 100 [pounds] opon it, but seinge it is otherwise it seameth other men are wiser than I am; yet my opinion is that it will prove more difficult then it was taken to be. If matters had bine setled above, these belowe would have followed ex consequenti; it is ill fightinge with cocks upon their owne Dunghilles. I intrcat some letters from you, and so I rest, the 2 of November Yours most faithfull att commaund 1620 olde style Willm: Sterrell T h e newes of the overthrowes are alredie in Balletts [i.e., ballads] & books printed, & plotts made of the places, with . . . directorie, and great joy is everie where. Your six weecks scilence made me scilent. I writt 2 letters unto vou since that of the 17 of September; I would

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gladly heare they were come to y o u r handes. I have writt nothinge of the overthrowes but great persons are nominated f o r the Authors. 1 7 Right honorable [he wrote in late N o v e m b e r ] : I have receaved yours of the ioth of this present, newe style, w h i c h style I will use hereafter that our dates may correspond. Our newes is that our Lordes & gallants are retorned f r o m the Palatinat & doe confess ther was never a blowe stroken between spignola & them since they went. Count Henrick with all his horse & f o o t convoye are either n o w e gon f o r Hollande or presently are to goe, f o r the States have sent f o r him. Sir Horatio vere remaineth ther with such English as are left. S o that all our Books, ballets & plots of spignolas great losses are proved lyes. Of spignola they speake much honor; both f o r valor & worthie usage of the countrie; they holde the Duich f o r cowardes, & ther is no English ther that would stay if spignola did not stop passage. These that are come home came by Loraine, I mean the Earles of oxford, Essex, coronell Cecill, sir E d w a r d sacfielde & all their chiefe followers, w h o e all agree in this, that spignola ever was & is the master of the field. T h e r is proclamation out f o r a parliament to begine upon the 16th of Januarie next our style. T h e proclamation was indighted b y his Majestis owne selfe; it imparteth to debate of waightie matters both at home & abroade but nameth no perticulers; he would have none chosen, either of superstious blindnes or of turbulent Humors, no Banckrupts nor young men, no curious & wranglinge Lawers. Our Marchants have freshe newes that 24 hollande shipps did suddenly set upon 8 English shipps in the East Indies, intending to spoile all, but as they were in fight 7 shipps more of English & portingalls came in unto them, did sett upon the Hollanders joyntly, they killed 1500 & 60 of their men, so spoyled shipps, that in the night they fledd, went into a habor not f a r o f f , Landid with their hurt men, but those of the Ilande perceaving them so weake & f e w e came downe & cut all their throates. So it is thought that ther is not one Hollander lefte in the East Indies. T h e English & portingalls joyne. T h e last 7 shipps came newly thither f r o m England and portingall in comfort. T h i s newes is certenly sent to our East Indian companye. W e heare nothing out of Bohemia nor f r o m vienna, but great talles are tolde of G a b o r his spovling of Austria, of many thowsands of Hugariane horse men sent to the palatine, that the Duke of saxony is retorned home & is like to be put out & the Heier of Frederick put in, that the Bohemian hope is in the T u r c k , w h o maketh great preparations of 80000 men against the springe. T h e puritans plainly affirme that it is better f o r the germaines to be under the T u r c k then the Emperor, f o r the T u r c k grants Libertie of religion. W h a t will be

William Sten ell done from hence in the behalfe of the palatinate we shall knowe this parliament. W e heare that our shipps have taken one notable pirate & that Warde, the first English pirate that joyned with the Turcks, hath promised to yealde up the shipps under him (which are 16) to have his pardon. Ther are some called in question for making a collection to ayde the Emperor, but it proveth a false devise of a spie whoe thinkes he may charge recusants with any thinge; one of those questioned is called mr Carvell, a gentleman of Northfolke, but nothing is fownde & therfore he will be sett att libertie & perhapps the informer well punished. I woundred much you did not wright of the Killing of Damprier, which is so much bruted here; if that prove false allso, then no man will believe any rumors of victories. . . , 1 8 English Protestants had indeed been over-willing to believe; in early December came the first intimation that something had gone w r o n g in Bohemia. Sterrell wrote, " I can assure y o u the newes hath put water into the puritans wine here. It came just upon the devulginge of the Bohemians victories." 1 9 T h e n came full confirmation

of the W h i t e Mountain disaster:

I receaved yours of the 2 of December, which came to my handes just as the newes of the count Palatine his glorious victorie was in height, which was Joyfully taken, & the rather for that the spanishe Ambassadore had sent before to the Kinge that Prague was taken, & the more he affirmed it the less was it believed; the rumore was so secundid both by letters from Norenberge & from great persons here that I doubt his Majestie was allso abused. T h e r wanted not some whoe threatened to the Ambassador I knowe not what, for a letter was sent to Sir Lewis Leuckner with out a name, where uppon the Ambassadors house was guarded satterday night & Sunday night. Uppon the moneday yours came to me & that stayed the rumore. . . . T h e r is no certentie what is become of the Palatine & his 20 Ladie

PART FOUR

Spanish Espionage Put to the Test

A Problem of Espionage A f t e r the White Mountain the Protestant forces were scattered, disorganized and discouraged, and Frederick, "king for a winter" as his doubters predicted, was in flight. For the victors all that remained was a mopping-up operation, and in Bohemia itself that was simple enough. Lands were confiscated; Protestants were massacred, jailed, or forced to flee the country in large numbers, and those remaining came under repression. One may well sav that after 1620 Protestant Bohemia ceased to exist. Elsewhere, at first glance, the military problem for the Catholic forces was equally simple. T h e enemy still had armies in the field, but they were on the run and it was mostly a matter of catching them; the enemy still held some of their strong places, but taking these was only a question of time. Y e t it was time that complicated the matter, along with certain military imperatives and the uncertainty that existed about a pair of dangerous contingencies concerning the plans of two major powers. T h e governing military imperative was simple: the emperor had won back his Bohemian crown, but to avoid having, in practical terms, nevertheless lost the war it was necessary to conquer the Palatine's hereditary lands by force of arms—a circumstance which requires a moment's attention. There were those who insisted (as there had been from the beginning) that the whole German question could be settled b y negotiation and agreement, but the emperor could not do this. Questions of personal revenge, religious zeal, and restoring imperial prestige aside, the Palatinate had to be conquered so that

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at least a part of it could be kept. T h e desire to do so was not a matter of greed on the emperor's part, but one of necessity, if he were not to come out a great loser in spite of having crushed his enemies. T h e reason was simple enough. Neither as ruler of the Austrian Habsburg lands nor as Holy Roman Emperor per se could Ferdinand have raised the military force required to recover Bohemia; without the army of the Catholic League he could hardly have defended Vienna itself—and Ferdinand came a long way from controlling the league of Catholic German princes. T h e man he had to deal with was the head of the League and the commander of its forces, Maximilian, duke of Bavaria. Max of Bavaria was an able man; he was also other things: a devout Catholic who was ready to fight to the last for the sake of the Faith, a loyal vassal of His Imperial Majesty, and a landhungry, ambitious dynast. One hesitates to suggest that he put his own ambitions ahead of his duty to God and to God's vicegerent on earth, but he at least seems to have found a way to serve the Houses of God, Habsburg, and Bavaria simultaneously, fighting the good fight for the Church and for his imperial sovereign and managing to come out of it with the Bavarian lands greatly expanded and their ruler become an elector. It was simply that Maximilian felt he should be rewarded for doing his duty, and that the delivery of this reward should not be left open to chance. When the Czechs threw Slavata and Martinitz out an upstairs window and announced that Ferdinand was not, after all, king of Bohemia, there was not much Ferdinand could do about it without the Leaguer army. Max agreed, like a loyal vassal, to put that army in the field; but it would be an expensive operation and he would, of course, have to be allowed compensation from the lands that would be conquered from the enemy. This was standard procedure, and Ferdinand agreed to it readily enough. But the immediate aim was not conquest of new lands but reconquest of lands already pertaining to the emperor himself, and the compensation agreed to would hardly come from these. So, to be on the safe side, Max added that he

A Problem

»73

would, of course, need some security as a pledge for his future reward, until compensation had been conquered elsewhere and was safely in his hands, formally granted to the House of Bavaria. If Ferdinand would just hand over part of his oivn lands in the meantime—say, Upper Austria, adjacent to Bavaria itself—then Max would be delighted to do his duty. This had been agreed to, and by the end of 1620 both God and the emperor had been served—but as yet Maximilian had not. The Bohemian crown was restored and the Bohemian heresy well on the way to being stamped out, but no new lands had been conquered, Max had not yet been rewarded for his trouble, and Upper Austria was still pledged to and occupied by Ferdinand's Bavarian ally. It was unreasonable to expect that any negotiated settlement, without further resort to arms, could entail depriving the Palatine of any of his hereditary holdings. James of England himself, who would be the keystone of any such settlement (as father-in-law of the Palatine and the recognized head of Protestant Europe), had already said that although he would not fight for the Bohemian crown for Frederick he would be honor-bound to help him defend his hereditary lands; and the Palatine himself made it clear that he would not agree to a negotiated settlement that would leave him onlv part of his patrimony. But Ferdinand had to have at least a part of it—it was the Upper Palatinate Maximilian had his eye on— in order to get a major part of his own family lands out of pawn. There was no course open to him but to continue the conquest of the Upper Palatinate. The conquest of the Upper Palatinate was thus a sine qua non, and for strategic reasons (if no other) it could best be done if the operation encompassed the conquest of the Lower Palatinate as well, in order to deprive the Palatine of his last and best territorial base for present and future resistance, crush his present forces in the course of the conquest, and further disorganize and dishearten his supporters in the Protestant Union; as events were to show, these latter would, in adversity, be easily neutralized. Free from outside interference this could be done fairly easily.

Spanish Espionage Flit to the Test

174

but it had to be done quickly. Frederick and his allies must not be given time to regroup their forces and to arrange for help from outside G e r m a n y ; things seemed safe enough for the moment to the north and east, but would surely not stav that wav for long; the Palatine's agents, those of Venice, and the English themselves (unofficially, for the moment) were all levying troops in England to fight the emperor, and the operations in the Palatinate had to be carried off before the current trickle of troops to the Continent

had

become

a dangerous

factor;

and, not

least

in

importance, one could not be certain how long James would keep up his hope of a negotiated settlement without resorting to arms, an intervention

which

was expected

to

entail

a stiffening

of

Protestant resistance within the empire to an imponderable degree. So, what had to be done was clear, and it was clear that it had to be done quickly; but it was not at all clear that it could be done safely. T w o specific current dangers were present, from two separate sources, either one of which could lead to disaster for the Habsburg cause if it were not handled correctly—and if, of course, as a prerequisite to that, it were not judged

correctly

from accurate information. O n a military map o f Germany the double operation against the two

areas of

the

Palatinate

was a tactician's

dream,

and

imperial position was perfect. In the eastern theater the Palatinate was tucked into a fatal corner,

the

Upper

hemmed in b y

the

newly reconquered Bohemia to the northeast and cast and b y Bavaria to the southeast and south; the imperial and

Leaguer

armies could c o m e pouring over the borders at will. In the western theater the L o w e r Palatinate sprawled along the Rhine, much marveled at as a paradise of green fields and bountiful vineyards, famous for its cities and its learning, but with

few

really useful strong places and, on the whole, almost impossible to defend in its present state. In relation to its enemies it was situated as badly as the eastern half of the patrimony: to the northwest lay the Spanish Netherlands, base of the A r m y of Flanders (which had already begun its invasion operation)—the best army in Europe

The Strategic Situation in Europe after the Battle of the White Mountain (November H B Austrian Habsburg lands Lines of actual or potential =s> Catholic-Habsburg forces

8,1620)

• Anti-Habsburg states attack: — Anti-Habsburg forces

176

Spanish Espionage Fut to the Test

under the best commander in Europe; to the southwest lay the archdukes' Franche-Comté, source of their excellent Burgundian cavalry; farther to the south lay the Milanese, where waited the main body of reinforcements, Spain's veteran Lombard army. Neither Spain nor the archdukes were at war with anyone, and it was a considerable advantage to the emperor to have their army available to him through the legalistic hairsplitting of an imperial execution: the Netherlands were no longer really part of the Empire, not since 1548; technical grounds for naming Albert executor of the imperial ban, justifying the use of "his" army for the execution, could also be found in the fact that Albert was clearly subject to the emperor through minor lands which pertained to him in his own right along the western edge of the Empire (though they were in Dutch hands at the moment). T h e A r m y of Flanders at the time was by far the finest military force in Europe, under the command of Ambrogio Spinola, the last of the great Spanish generals, supported by a coterie of subordinate commanders any one of whom was capable of full command and could be sent with full confidence and full effect on any assignment of diversion, flanking, covering, or whatever, exercising a common genius for strategic instinct and tactical initiative, forming collectively an enormous asset in an age of bad communications and complex military situations. T h e later decline of Spanish military preponderance in Europe has often been anticipated in retrospect, with historians occasionally pointing out, as a cause of that decline, that there were no longer any great commanders of Spanish nationality. 1 But even if they had all been Spaniards before (they of course were not), the army continued to be built around the still-formidable Spanish infantry (it was a maxim of Spinola's that if you had the Spanish in the vanguard the battle would go well, but if you used them elsewhere things were bound to go badly), backed up by the powerful and dependable Walloon infantry, supported by crack Burgundian cavalry, and able to draw heavily on the Lombard veterans of the Milan command for reinforcements; the lower levels of com-

A Problem

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mand were still sought eagerly by Spanish dons and nobles (to which must be added the cream of the Walloon soldiery); and any army which could boast the services in subordinate commands of such men as Luis Velasco, Carlos Coloma, and Fernández Gonsalvo de Córdoba (a worthy descendant of the Great Captain himself), and still be able to spare the likes of Tilly and Bucquoi on loan to the emperor, can hardly have been (in spite of very real problems) in as bad straits as is sometimes represented. 2 W i t h this formidable two-pronged attack against an enemy whose forces were divided by two hundred miles of hostile territory, the prospect could hardly have been better, except for two things: a French attack was expected any moment against a most vulnerable bottleneck in Spain's communications lifeline between Italy on the one hand and the Netherlands and the empire on the other; and in moving his army out of the Spanish Netherlands and into the Lower Palatinate Spinola had left himself vulnerable to attack from the Dutch, with considerable likelihood that they would take advantage of it. South of Bavaria, beyond the Tyrol, lay the permanent Achilles' heel of the entire Habsburg military structure, the Valteline, a green and gently rising Alpine valley on the eastern edge of the Swiss cantons, the upper Adda flowing from it southward into the Spanish-held Milanese, its northern end not far from the headwaters of the Inn (and the route to Austria) and of the Rhine (and the route to the Netherlands). It was the only pass at that time available to the Habsburgs for the communications on which their empire depended—and their fate in any war. T h e valley itself was peopled largely by Catholic peasants ruled over by the neighboring Protestant Grisons; these two groups had long made a practice of seizing whatever opportunity presented itself for massacring each other, and this occurred fairly often. In these periodic crises the Spanish king, acting from his stronghold in the Milanese, played the role of protector of the downtrodden and/or massacred Catholics, while France bore the same relation-

178

Spanish Espionage Put to the Test

ship to the Grisons, with whom she was allied b y treaty. Beneath this cover of religious strife, the Spanish were of course protecting their own interests (or more specifically their lifeline), while France's actions were clearly part of her general political involvement in the Swiss area, her traditional drang nach ltciiien, and her increasing rivalry with the Habsburgs. Disputes between the t w o powers were nothing new in the area; what complicated matters f o r the Habsburgs now was the potentially disastrous timing of the newest crisis. T h e imperial armies, the armies of the League, and the A r m y of Flanders had all begun their movement in force into the Upper and L o w e r Palatinate at the end of the previous summer. Almost simultaneously had occurred the "little Saint Bartholemew's" in the Valteline, a fourteenday bloodbath which saw countless atrocities committed and left some 600 dead, an enormous number for such a small region. T h e Grisons' allies showed signs of retaliating; the Spanish governor of Milan moved troops in strength into the area and erected new fortifications; a large French army was reported moving toward the border to oust him b y force. 3 It was soon known that the French were sending an extraordinary embassy to London to seek military aid from James. If they got it, there was every indication that they would attack; if they did not, then another of the many settlements could be arranged by negotiation, securing a permanent solution in a perpetual treaty of peace and friendship that would hold up long enough for the Habsburg forces to complete the Palatinate operations. But until one knew the result of the London negotiations—that is, until there was some sure indication of whether the French would actually attack or not—the Habsburg armies could not be committed irrevocably in the Palatinate. Yet it was imperative that that campaign be completed as quickly as possible. Someone had to learn what went on in the secret conferences between France and England. T h e second problem was just as clear-cut and just as dangerous. T h e defense of the Spanish-held remainder of the Netherlands was

A Problem

179

directed primarily in this period toward the "rebel provinces" to the north. The danger of invasion from France being slight since the death of Henry IV, one needed only to give routine cover to the rear and face the principal defenses toward the most dangerous potential enemy, the United Provinces, fortifying the common land frontier and providing the necessary cover on the flanks—the Flemish coast on the left, the Meuse-Rhine area on the right. During the years of the armed truce, however, the situation had altered, entailing a fundamental shift of emphasis. As fortification of the common border continued on both sides it reached something close to mutual impregnability; with the "front" almost impregnable, the flanks became more important. Though the Dutch commanded the water off the coast of Flanders, it was quite another thing to mount a large-scale amphibious attack there, and a few well-placed garrisons were sufficient to cover the left. The real danger was from a Dutch swing round the Spanish right, putting their field forces behind the static defensive positions of the common frontier, which would allow them to attack in any direction, lay waste as they chose, cut off relief routes to the Spanish frontier positions and besiege the positions themselves, or even, at worst, set up new Dutch defenses on a forward line, cutting deeper into the Southern Netherlands. This danger had not been overlooked by Spinola and the archduke. Only too conscious that the Twelve Years Truce would not last forever, only too conscious that some in the United Provinces were eager to resume the war, that they had in Maurice a first-rate general, that the Hollanders' gold would support large and well-equipped armies manned with the choicest specimens from the European flesh markets, they had devoted the years of truce to a constant effort to strengthen the inland flank against the expected attack. By now, with the truce nearing its end (the expiration date was April 10, 1621) and that attack expected to come soon, the right flank—which comprised the whole overMeuse area, with the defense system anchored on the river fortresses of Maastricht and Venlo—was well built up, well fortified, well supplied, well garrisoned.

180

Spanish Espionage

Put to the

Test

Or rather, it had been so; but now the Army of Flanders, whose role it was to man and back up these frontier defenses, was away, busying itself with the conquest of the Lower Palatinate, a good long march away from the archdukes' defenses, while behind lay the Dutch forces masked only by a light covering force under Luis Velasco. This made it of the greatest importance to discover what the Dutch intended: whether thev would negotiate a continuation of the truce, giving Spinola, during the negotiations, time to complete the subjugation of the Palatinate, or whether they planned to attack without trying for a negotiation. If the Dutch could mount an overwhelming attack while Spinola's forces were tied down elsewhere, outside the Spanish line of fortifications, it would obviously mean disaster, though the matter was really a bit more subtle than that—or at least was to prove to be so in practice. W h a t Spinola needed was time. N o one really doubted that there would again be war with the United Provinces, but to defeat the rebels it was necessary to fight them alone and with the Spanish forces in full strength. Therefore it was vital to delay hostilities with the Dutch until the enemy forces in the Palatinate had been finally defeated and the strong places there and that rich land itself were in Habsburg hands; until the princes of the Union had been reduced by arms or negotiation; until the Army of Flanders was completely free to turn its full attention to the Dutch and the latter had been shorn of their allies. T h e problem was much like that of the French and the Valteline: it was imperative to find out the States General's exact position concerning an extension of the truce, so as to know what sort of terms to offer them in order to induce them to delay hostilities (in favor of negotiation) for the length of time the success of the Habsburg cause so gravely required. In short, it was vital that at this particular juncture Madrid and Brussels know the current plans and official state of mind of both France and the States General. This depended on knowing what went on secretly during the following weeks while two

A Problem

181

extraordinary embassies from those governments were in London. In both cases the fate of a campaign, probably of an army, perhaps even of a cause, was to depend on the success of Habsburg espionage in England.

An Extraordinary Embassy from France It was N e w Year's D a y (as it was reckoned on the Continent), but events were breaking fast, the news was urgent, and JeanBaptiste V a n Male was a conscientious ambassador, so he wrote his first report of 1621 on the first day of the year: seven folio pages to the archduke, much of it in code, plus a covering letter to Secretary della Faille—for the extraordinary embassy from France was expected hourly. 1 T h e head of the mission, the extraordinary ambassador, was to be the maréchal de Cadenet, brother of the favorite and chief minister of the king of France, the duc de Luynes. Cadenet had already advised the comte de Tillières, ambassador-in-ordinary, of his coming so that the latter could notify James. This had been done, and James seemed more than eager to receive him, more than eager to please: he had already sent ships to France for the ambassador's cross-Channel passage, and coaches and horses awaited him and his party at Dover to bring them on to London in state when they arrived. Obviously, this was f a r from a routine mission. According to Cadenet's memorial his party (in addition to servants and others) numbered more than fifty persons of quality: this was expected to cause the English a problem in housing them, and it definitely indicated a problem of a more serious sort for the Habsburgs. V a n Male had learned on good authority that the maréchal was coming to propose the marriage of the Most Christian King's sister

Extraordinary

Embassy from France

183

with the Prince of Wales, and to offer to join armed forces for the securing of a combined settlement of the affairs of Germany and the Valteline—which would mean settlement of the Palatinate (if not of Bohemia) in favor of Frederick V , and of the current crisis in the Valteline in favor of the French (this much, at least, of the purpose of the mission was in fact already common knowledge in most European chancelleries). T h e French had a further goal as well: by aiding James in gaining the restoration of his son-in-law they would, in addition to receiving parallel aid in their dispute with the Spanish over the Valteline, oblige James to refuse aid to the Huguenots. Rather, James would be asked to counsel them to give obedience to their sovereign, and in return everything necessary would be done to guarantee the security of their religion and their persons, "in the form and manner that should seem just and reasonable" to James. But it was not the fate of the Protestants of Béarn and La Rochelle that concerned Van Male, nor what the French and English might decide to do about them (though he saw an opportunity in that domestic crisis that might give Spain a good diplomatic lever in dealing with the French). W h a t alarmed Van Male was the possibility of a French marriage for the Prince of Wales, binding France and England in an alliance and, more important, in a joint military operation in Germany and the Valteline. Such a marriage alliance had long been a major fear of the Spanish. T h e last previous effort, begun by the Protestant duke of Bouillon at the time of the negotiations for the marriage of the Princess Elizabeth with the Count Palatine in 1612, had nearly come to fruition. 2 On that occasion the Spanish, concerned almost to the point of panic, had replaced the incumbent resident ambassador (Don Alonso Velasco), and in their new appointment had—by a stroke of luck or uncanny judgment—come up with the greatest diplomatic asset they had ever had at the English court: Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, later count of Gondomar. Beginning at an incredible disadvantage the Spaniard had, during three years of intricate maneuvering, first blocked and then

184

Spanish Espionage

Put to the

Test

broken up the Anglo-French negotiations. For nearly five years since then the threat had remained dormant; now it was erupting again. Van Male in fact had good cause to worry. Only two days before, the mail from Spain had arrived with a dispatch for Gondomar—which had not contained the definite answer James had expected about the Spanish marriage alliance. James, Van Male feared, was not likely to cling much longer to his hope of concluding that alliance, which was the keystone of his European diplomacy—and it was this hope which Spain currently found to be her only means of keeping him neutralized as "head" of the Protestant forces of Europe. Yet from what Van Male could gather from the dispatch sent to Gondomar they seemed to be stalling in Madrid; and now this extraordinary embassy of the French threw the entire Habsburg position into danger. Van Male was alarmed. As Van Male put it in his dispatch to the archduke, this way of thinking on the part of the Most Christian King could cause trouble, and the devout Fleming made what was for him a drastic suggestion: If Lesdiguieres'3 movements in the Swiss area were really being made in concert with the duke of Savoy, if together they were planning an attack on the Milanese (as was widely rumored in England), if it should be, as it now appeared, that the Most Christian King were not "proceeding sincerely" with His Catholic Majesty and the archduke, but rather intended to continue his assistance to the Hollanders after the expiration of the truce, then Albert and Philip should reply in kind regarding Louis' own vassals in Béarn and La Rochelle: if the Spanish reversed the game and began aiding the French rebels, or at least threatened to do so, the king of France would have to change his plans and put himself on a good footing with the House of Habsburg. As to the English, the desire of the malintencionados to resolve the affairs of Germany was so great, he said, that they were "studying day and night to find means of doing so." Now they had persuaded James to send Albertus Morton (former secretary to the Countess Palatine and James's agent at Heidelberg, now a

Extraordinary Embassy from France

185

secretary of his council) on a special mission to the Princes of the Union to "force and persuade" them to the defense and recovery of the Palatinate: James promised them he would try to procure "peace and conformity" in the affairs of Germany before the winter was out and that if unsuccessful in this he would, in the spring, send a large amount of aid in both men and money, adding that having made this resolution and with this intention he had called a meeting of Parliament for "the 26th of this month" (January 16th, Old Style). V a n Male understood that Morton was to leave on his mission "presto"; that before seeing the princes he would go straightaway to the Palatine and his w i f e (who were believed to be in Silesia at the moment); and that James was trying to get together / 30,000 f o r aid to the Palatinate. As to this last, "el mercador Felipe Burlamachi" had already sent off two agents to the Continent to negotiate the exchange and to arrange for credit in various places f o r all the money they could, and Van Male had no doubt that James would be able to raise "a lot of money in a short time" -—even more if he and the coming Parliament managed to get on together. This latter consideration introduced another uncertainty which put everything in doubt—to V a n Male's consternation, f o r he liked things to be simple and clear-cut. T h e Puritans were currently inclined to some form of attack against James's "policies and pretensions," but they were also in favor of aid to the Palatine; it was doubtful which w a y things would go. V a n Male's concern was much increased by rumors that Prague had been recaptured and that the Palatine had begun to retake "haleine"; he complained to della Faille of the lateness of this week's mail, being anxious for news of what had really been happening. " M a y it please G o d , " he wrote, "that w e be not so much asleep that we give him leisure to regroup his forces, f o r in my opinion if he is only able to hold on f o r just a little while they will brew some potages here that we will find plenty hard to digest, in spite of all the fine words with which they try to string our masters along, assuring you [shifting now into code] that the

186

Spanish Espionage Put to the Test

propositions of the King of Great Britain are so far from his designs and intentions that it is no good to have any faith in the rubbish he puts out." 4 In the next f e w days it turned out that the Palatine had not retaken Prague after all, which was of course a relief to Van Male, but Frederick's crushing defeat (the full effects of the White Mountain now being felt in England) had caused such a wave of hostility—with anti-Habsburg pamphlets appearing daily, Calvinist ministers preaching with "extraordinary violence," and the "common people" speaking "with such liberty"—that, at the instance of V a n Male and Gondomar, James ordered publication of a proclamation forbidding his subjects, in all ranks of society, from writing or speaking of matters of State, under grave penalties, and this quieted the people somewhat. 8 About the same time, Albertus .Morton left on his mission to the Princes of the Union. Van Male had learned for certain that he not only carried with him the instructions Van Male had previously reported, but actually had the / 30,000 in letters of exchange on Philip Burlamachi, payable in various German cities, as aid to the princes and to the people of the Palatinate (of this money, Burlamachi already had £ 20,000 "de buena quenta" from various sources). And, thinking that the conferences with the princes and the distribution of all this money in so many places would be too great a task for Morton alone, James had decided to send Sir Edward Villiers, brother of the marquis of Buckingham, on the mission to the Palatine himself. Van Male's informants told him that Villiers' orders were to persuade Frederick to make an accord with the emperor on faith that the Palatinate would be restored, and if it was not done and if James himself could not get a peaceful restoration before then, by spring he would (repeating his promise to the princes) send large forces into the Palatinate. V a n Male's opinion of all this was mixed. H e did not think that James was in a position to do much without the help of others, it being certain that what aid he would be able to give depended on Parliament, and the outcome of the scheduled session was com-

Extraordinary

Embassy

from France

187

pletely uncertain. But there was also reason to believe that Villiers might be carrying instructions completely contrary to those that had been made public (though Van Male had not been able to find out their contents, if they did exist) because, as Van Male said, he took it "as an infallible maxim that this king governs himself in these affairs with much artifice," so that what he said about the matter of the restitution of the Palatinate could not be believed until it had been seen what he actually did. This was a maxim Van Male often repeated in one form or another, but he especially meant it this time, for he had been completely astonished by a new turn of events, one which he did not profess to understand. In addition to the missions James was sending off to Frederick V and the Protestant princes—and with the special mission from France expected momentarily—James had now turned his diplomacy toward the archduke. This had happened on Tuesday, January 5th (December 26th for the English) when Van Male had gone to court to give the customary Christmas greetings to the king. As he was leaving he was sent word that Lord Digby had to see him, and when he went to Digby's quarters he was told, in formal terms, that the king his master found himself an interested party in the affairs of the Palatinate, and that thus with the expiration of the truce with Holland James would feel himself obliged to take their part; that he was much desirous of the public good (which was diplomatese for desiring to get one's own way without causing bloodshed); and he requested the archduke to take upon himself the task of securing a negotiated settlement for the Count Palatine and the restitution of his lands. Lord Digby assured him that James was serious about the matter and in the proposal. Van Male, perplexed, asked Brussels for instructions as to what to answer.6 When the ambassador wrote his weekly dispatches on the 8th of January, recounting all this and begging instructions, he had reason for some consternation, for he was under considerable pressure of events. The day before, the earl of Arundel had gone down-river with a great many barges to meet the French ambassador extraordinary and his party at Gravesend; as Van Male was

188

Spanish Espionage Put to the Test

writing, they were expected to arrive in London that evening. T h e y were to stay as the king's official guests at the palace of the late Queen Anne, at a reported cost of ¿ 2 0 0 per day.7 Van Male was not only perplexed but outraged. France was bound to Spain—doubly bound—in a treaty of peace and friendship, for the double marriage between the two dynasties (Louis X I I I and the heir to the Spanish throne, soon to become Philip I V , each marrying the other's sister), had finally been completed. Now, with the arrival in England of an extraordinary embassy from the same king of France, with the ambassador so close to the throne and the embassy on such a magnificent scale, things were appearing in their true colors, and it was to be feared that the king of France (here Van Male began to write discreetly in code) was not proceeding with buenos terminos with the royal house of His Highness the archduke, but rather wanted to join up with the king of England, the Venetians, and the Dutch to stir up the Swiss and the Grisons in order to provoke a new war in the Valteline, and by that means to divert the forces of His Catholic Majesty; it was also believed [correctly] that the Dutch were sending deputies to France on this same business, and to ask for continued payment of the French regiments now in the service of the United Provinces. 8 T h e French mission was conducted on a surprising scale. On Sunday afternoon January 10th (December 31st for the English) the maréchal de Cadenet had his public audience with the king, the conventional opening ceremony. His company alone came to around three hundred persons, and, accompanied by the marquis of Buckingham and other members of the nobility, there was no place to be found at court large enough to hold them all—though the audience chamber was normally more than adequate for such a ceremony—and the affair had to be held in the Great Hall of Parliament. T h e alarming magnificence of the reception was more than equaled by the secrecy of the negotiations themselves, which began almost immediately. T h e same night, after the public audience was finished and the maréchal had returned to Denmark House,

Extraordinary

Embassy

from

France

189

Buckingham came there and took him back to the court, going by river in the utmost secrecy. There Cadenet was alone with the king for an hour and a half. T o the wonderment of Van Male, thev had not even allowed Tillières, the French resident ambassador, to be present during their talks, nor would they allow him even to know what was treated of (a procedure which had resulted in some serious differences and arguments between the two French envoys). On Monday Cadenet had his audience with the Prince of Wales. On Tuesday the 12th Van Male himself went to call upon the maréchal. In the course of their conversation the Frenchman declared that his sovereign was an interested party in the affairs of the Valteline because of the "league and confederation" he had with the states in that area, and this had obliged him to send another special embassy to Spain to request that Philip order withdrawal of the Spanish presidios and put things back in their original state. Van Male reported later than he had answered Cadenet that it seemed to him the king of France had neither cause nor basis for this, since it was known that what the king of Spain had done there was solely in order to liberate the poor Catholics from the oppression of the "Puritans," and to no other end; that this ought to have given pleasure to all Catholic monarchs, and that if the king of France had assisted in such a good undertaking in the first place, His Catholic Majesty would with pleasure have paid the expenses. Tillières was present during this exchange and showed himself to be satisfied with Van Male's answer, but Cadenet replied violently. The Catholic religion, he said, was not a good pretext for Spain's actions; in France thev understood the problem differently, and (subsiding now into veiled terms) it would aggrieve him greatlv if one did not try to give some other form of satisfaction. His manner was such, Van Male wrote the archduke, that he was able to recognize from Cadenet's discourses that the king of France and the duke of Savoy were favoring the evil designs of the

iço

Spanish Espionage Fut to the Test

Venetians, a matter of such consequence that it would oblige the king of Spain to withdraw from the area he was now occupying, in view of the present military preparedness of those two princes. T h e w a y the world was going at the moment, V a n Male thought the best course was to try to win over the duke of S a v o y — b y some means, as he put it, without giving him either money or arms to make war with—and to conserve the peace with the Venetian Republic, which could be done without loss of reputation. T h e festivities and honors for the ambassador extraordinary continued. On Wednesday the 13th, the day after V a n Male's encounter with him, Cadenet was given a sumptuous banquet at Hampton Court by Prince Charles, the prospective bridegroom. Thursday Cadenet dined in public with the king in the Great Hall of Westminster, James making a conspicuous and public demonstration of contentment with him. V a n Male wrote his report of this on Friday, adding that that night the maréchal was to attend the masque ordinarily given in the English court on the D a y of Kings, after which he was to be feasted by the duke of Lenox and Viscount Doncaster. ( T o add to V a n Male's worries at this point, James was planning now to send a special envoy to try to induce the king of Denmark to aid Frederick in the defense of the Palatinate by all possible means.) 9 In order to reinforce his proposition for joint Anglo-French action in the Palatinate and the Valteline, Cadenet was doing his best to procure the support of the marquis of Buckingham. On the 20th he had a secret conference with the favorite, again not even allowing Tillières to be present. V a n Male also learned that Cadenet had had secret conferences with the ambassador from Venice and with Baron Dohna, the Palatine's agent. On top of all this, according to reports that had arrived in London, the French extraordinary ambassadors who were negotiating in Germany at the moment were definitely not "proceeding sincerely" but instead seemed to be favoring the side of the Palatine rather than that of His Imperial Majesty, and were in contact with the Transylvanians, which the emperor should be warned of so that he could proceed with them with the necessary caution.

Extraordinary Embassy from France

191

On Wednesday the 20th, the maréchal de Cadenet took his formal leave of James, shortly after which they were closeted once more for over an hour. Cadenet was publicly feted with "the greatest ostentation"; the king gave him a gift of jewelry whose value Van Male reported at ¿ 2 , 5 0 0 , and Buckingham gave him a half-dozen ponies complete with their rigs and four albino falcons 1 0 (much prized by huntsmen). On Sunday 24th the ambassador extraordinary finally left England, after James had, at his request, freed all the imprisoned priests (who were now to leave England), 1 1 a customary boon—on an unusual scale—granted to an ambassador with whom the king was well pleased. Meanwhile, the archdukes and their ministers, as soon as they had received Van Male's report of N e w Year's Day announcing Cadenet's impending arrival in England, wrote him of their concern and instructed him to find out what went on in the negotiations. 12 A n d now, though the maréchal had left England, they still had received no news from Van Male since his report of the request James had made through Digby. On the 27th the archdukes sent instructions f o r a cautious, conciliatory answer to Digby. 1 3 Brussels was obviously worried.

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CHAPTER 15

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The Laying Bare of Secrets While the Cadenet mission was in England William Sterrell was so busy trying to find out what was going on in the negotiations that he did not even get his weekly letter off to della Faille. Four days after Cadenet had left England, Sterrell finally reported that the French ambassador had put them "in a great expectation, but in conclusion he moved nothing. Came only f o r complement." Sterrell had not even been able to get accurate information on the many very conspicuous public functions, much less the secret conferences: the ambassador, he said, "was feasted bv his Majestic once and by the Lord of Doncaster, & b y no man else. It seames that he did strive to make the french to knowe how great a man he was here. T h e prinse neither feasted him, nor was att any of the feastes. T h e Lord Marcus of Buckinghame did make an offer to have feasted him, but the kinge would not lett him which I suppose he was not sorrie for." (He also reported, probably with more accuracy, the value of James's gift to Cadenet at £2,000, lower by ¿ 5 0 0 than V a n Male's figure.) In fact Stcrrell's dispatch, when it touched the French embassy at all (for it dealt with a number of other matters), was concerned almost exclusively with the social side of the visitors' sojourn in England. A t a banquet given in their honor, for example, some of the French had refused to sit with the lord chancellor and the lord treasurer, declaring themselves to be "of the blood Royall, & would not sitt with advocates." After the high-born guests had

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marched out in a huff without dining, Sterrell and the others asked the remaining Frenchmen who their offended compatriots were, and were told thev were the sons of the comte d'Auvergne. This raised a question in Sterrell's inquiring mind which led him to the conclusion that the English dynastic rules were superior to those of the Frcnch: T h e comte d'Auvergne "they say was a Bastarde to henrv the 3 King of France. I remember well that henry the 3 was sayed to love Andragues his wiffe, & soe did Henry the 4th love D'avernes sister, if the blood Royall in France followe Bastardie ther are many of that Royaltie but with us no Bastarde can challenge a place b y his bloode." T h e main item concerning the French that Sterrell had for Brussels, however, involved the Continental coins Cadenet's party had brought with them: "His followers brought great store of pistoletts, & bought many things to a great value, & nowe the pistolls & pistoletts prove many of them counterfeit if not all. T h e y have made good Bootie of us. A hoore was the first that founde the fraude. T h e r came a french gallant unto hir, Whoe had his desire, & when he had done, gave hir 8 pistolls. She thought she had made a good marchett, but When she sent to change some of them they were fownde copper. T h e r came an other unto hir & she up with hir steeletto & stabbed him in the shoulder where of he was in some danger, the wuman changed hir lodging & no man fownde hir out, nor ever will. & this is the historie of this french Ambassage." 1 And for some days "the historie of this french Ambassage" remained one of arrogant royal bastards, counterfeit-passing foreigners and knife-toting English whores. It was not until the 4th of February, three and a half weeks after Cadenet's first audience, that Sterrell was able to send his first report of what had actually happened in the negotiations themselves. 2 But not so with V a n .Male. It is reasonable that V a n Male should be able to get this sort of information from his contacts before Sterrell could find it out and send it directly to delta Faille. Sterrell had access to some sources of information that Van jMale did not—one has trouble imagining

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that dour Fleming keeping up with the doings of London prostitutes—but V a n Male's informants were highly placed, including the king's own privy councilors. And no one was more prompt than Sterrell in acknowledging that Van Male had done himself proud in finding out those things which were being kept secret even from the French resident ambassador himself. 3 T h e winter of 1620-21 was especially severe, and caused a great deal of suffering among the common people of England which touched Van Male deeply. T h e ambassador himself had been seeking some means of countering the cold, and had observed that the English were having some success in this w a y b y wearing corselets of leather under their outer clothing; he tried this and was well pleased with the result. Supposing that the weather in Brussels was not much better and that della Faille would be in the same discomfort he himself had been in, and being concerned for his friend's health, V a n Male had bought a pair of doeskins and sent them to the secretary of state. In his letter to della Faille on N e w Year's Day, Van Male let him know he was sending them. In his letter of the same day to the archduke, in which he had given his alarmed and alarming account of the coming of the French ambassador extraordinary and the reported object of his mission, he had added rather blithely that he would arrange to find out what went on during the secret negotiations, and had promised to send along a detailed account. 4 Van Male was in no way boasting, nor was he making a reckless promise to his master. He had known that the secretary would need something to protect him against the cold, so he had gone into the market and bought him a pair of hides for a corselet and sent them on; he knew also that the archduke needed certain information that would protect him and his House from the diplomacy of the enemy, so he would go into the market and procure that too, sending it along in due course. When Cadenet had his first audience with the king on Sunday the 10th the regular mail to Brussels had left London two days before; by the time the next regular mail left on Friday the 15th

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V a n Male was able to send his first report. Though even at that early date he could give a precise account of James's answers to each of the French proposals, he continued his efforts, and by the time the next week's mail left on the 22 nd he was in a position to confirm it all, and to add a report of what had been said in the secret conference between Cadenet and Buckingham on the 20th.5 V a n Male was far from unaware of the importance of this information to the Habsburg cause. His dispatch to Albert of the 15th was accompanied by the usual covering note to della Faille, in which the ambassador told him the enclosed report "will give you a taste of the substance of this French extraordinary embassy, and according to the propositions made you will be able to see the profit we get from the new [Franco-Spanish] alliance. Y o u may believe, sir, that our adversaries will benefit from this if we are tardy in deciding what course to take. Above all, we should settle the affairs of Bohemia in good fashion, and then well f o r t i f y the Palatinate and the Valteline, and, that done, we will be out of danger." 8 F o r what had Van Male discovered of the supersecret conferences? First of all (besides what he had reported on N e w Year's Day, that they would treat of an Anglo-French marriage treaty and of joint military action in both the Palatinate and the Valteline), he had learned that the French envoy had insisted strongly that James not give assistance to the Huguenots, and had specifically proposed that France and England join in a confederation in the matter of the Truce with the United Provinces [apparently to the end of forcing a prolongation or aiding them militarily if one could not be had on Dutch terms]. A n d the answers given b y the king of England? Van Male reported these in code on the 15th: As to the French proposal of a marriage between Louis XIII's sister and the Prince of Wales, James said he was already engaged with Spain and was unable to hear any other proposal until he knew what resolution the pope would take regarding the granting of a dispensation. James's answer regarding the Valteline was brief and to the

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point: the Valteline was France's affair, and he did not see what he was able to do in the matter. H e was equally to the point about helping the Dutch out at this particular time: those provinces had puffed themselves up so much recently and had been conducting themselves in such a highhanded manner that in order both to bring about some moderation on their part and to encumber Spain in the process, it would be well to let them be knocked about a little. Regarding the Count Palatine, James said he had never either counseled or aided in the acceptance of the Crown of Bohemia but on the contrary had been much disturbed by it; that this good conduct of his obliged the king of France and all other just princes to help in seeing to it that his children and his grandchildren—the Count and Countess Palatine and the numerous progeny they had already begun to spawn—were not left defrauded and dispossessed of their patrimony; and that he intended to help them with [diplomatic] intercession and force by every possible means. But it was on the matter of the French Protestants that the king and the special envoy found themselves farthest apart. James, greatly upset over the offensive against the Protestants in Bearne, complained that France was being governed b y Jesuits. In addition he declared flatly that he could not and would not consent to the mistreatment of the Protestants of La Rochelle or of any others of the Protestant religion. Once on the subject, James became furious about this, and warned that the king of France would be ill-advised to follow such a course, as he would learn from experience, for it would end in the cantonizing of his kingdom. B y the time Van Male reported again on the 22d, it was not only confirmed by his informants that this was an accurate account of James's own answers to the French proposals, and that Cadenet had made a great effort to draw James into the struggle for the Valteline with offers of French assistance for the recovery of the Palatinate with continuing lack of success, but James's position had been further confirmed by what had passed in the secret conference the Frenchman had held with Buckingham just two days ago.

The Laying Bare of Secrets "Persons in a very good position assurance that the marquis had terms" (speaking of course from and in conformity with what the to the maréchal.

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to know" had given Van Male answered Cadenet "in good the Habsburg point of view), king himself had already said

Regarding the Valteline Buckingham repeated James's words that this was the private concern of the king of France, and added that, although it grieved his sovereign to see what was taking place in those parts, the king found himself neither in any state nor of any disposition to take up arms against the king of Spain, that what was important to him above all else was to see to the affairs of his children and grandchildren, trying to arrange both peace and a just settlement for them, which he hoped to do by means of a negotiated settlement and not by arms, and in this the king of France should help him, as he had offered to do. Concerning the Huguenots of La Rochelle, Buckingham told him the king was absolutely determined to assist them in case the king of France should attempt anything against "the body of the religion" and that having taken this decision he was going to order his ambassador to France to make a protestation of this to the king of France. Buckingham also spoke to Cadenet regarding the truce along the same lines as the king had, in such a manner that it led Van Male to add that "I understand that the king of France reaped very little fruit from this embassy, and much loss of reputation, and that it has provided a basis for settling the affairs of Your Serene Highness and the king of Spain in this kingdom in a different manner." Along with this report of the 22d Van Male wrote to della Faille: "You will see la suite des affaires by the enclosed, which I will vouch for, assuring you that I went to great pains to find out the truth of all the passages of this extraordinary embassy, and that I am certain that I have laid bare all that has passed between the maréchal de Cadenet and the king, so much so that it looks to me as though France counted her chickens before they were hatched, and that they could have managed this folly without making such a public show of it all." 7 From this affair, Van Male

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predictably added, " W e should draw this maxim, that it is never good to have faith in French frivolity and inconstancy." T h e reaction in Brussels to this report was one of sincere appreciation of the service Van Alale had performed, and of absolute lack of surprise that he had been able to deliver the goods so quickly. The deerskins Van Male had sent della Faille at the beginning of the year had gone via Dunkirk, while his dispatches of January 15th and 22d had gone, as usual, via Antwerp. B y the 2d of February all had arrived, and the manner (if not the order) of the secretary of state's acknowledgment of them is revealing: Monsieur. T h e pair of doeskins that you were good enough to send me . . . have come in very handy to protect me against the new cold spell which is assailing us at the moment . . . and I thank you for them with all m y heart. . . . T h e reports that you gave to His Highness in yours of the 15th and 22d . . . were most agreeable to him f o r the special care that he has recognized you took to discover [these things] and to keep him constantly informed of the occurrences at the court, and one may well believe that both His Highness and His Majesty will not fail to consider them fully and to draw from them all the profit they can f o r the good and advantage of their affairs. 8

Van Male had done the journeyman work in laying bare what went on inside Cadenet's secret conferences, and he had done it well. Gondomar, for his part, wrote a rather perfunctory report on the 16th,9 retailing what Van Male had already related, but he waited to send even this off (along with material from as far back as the 7th) until he saw what the outcome of the embassy would be, explaining this delay in a running letter that covered Cadenet's last two days in England. 10 As a report of intelligence procured, the letter had little to add (and that of little value) to what Van Male had reported many days before: a bit more detail, for example, based partly on what he had heard and partly on appearances, about Cadenet's secret talk with Buckingham. Gondomar was pleased with the marquis's performance, since he seemed to have replied to the Frenchman "like an honest man." Buckingham had, in addition to reaffirming that James had no inclination to get involved in the Valteline question on its own merits, pointed out that the present state of the king's

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affairs left him in no position to entangle himself in a war with the king of Spain. Most important, perhaps, Gondomar was able to confirm all that his Flemish colleague had discovered about the meeting, including the favorite's reiteration of James's plain-speaking threat that should the French Protestants be mistreated the English would defend them. In Gondomar's view, the broader aim of the mission had been to disrupt England's present connection and projected marriage with Spain by convincing James that the same end—the Count Palatine's restoration—could be gained with the aid and alliance of an altruistic power with no expansionist ambitions of her own (that is, of course, France), thus avoiding promoting through cooperation the ambitions which, as Gondomar put it, "the French say we the Spanish have." But aside from whatever obligation the French had put James under by their offer of help for the Palatine, Gondomar thought they had gained little. He was of course in a special position to know just how things stood; while Albert's ambassador was plumbing the secrets of private conferences and furtive consultations, Gondomar was specializing as usual in personal contacts with the main actors themselves, aided by both his talent for them and the opportunity for them which accompanied his more exalted position as ambassador of the king of Spain. When Cadenet first arrived Gondomar called on him, and the call was returned; after that there were frequent courteous "visits" exchanged by proxy, Cadenet giving an account of what he was about and apologizing for being too busy to come to visit him personally every day, Gondomar assuring the maréchal that he understood and would forgo seeing him frequently. Cadenet often spoke highly of Gondomar in his absence and (of course hearing of this) Gondomar was careful to reply in kind. The fact was, Gondomar had no desire to see much of him, especially not in private conferences and not about "business," because he did not want to give anyone the impression that he was in the least concerned about this special embassy, nor about the solicitations the Venetian ambassador had made to Cadenet, nor,

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in general, about the current French demands that Spain dismantle her fortifications in the Valteline. Any arguing with him over the latter point that needed to be done Gondomar found had already been performed by Van Male anyway, and so well, in spite of the "high terms" with which Cadenet had begun his dialogue with the Fleming, that the French resident ambassador had ended up arguing on the Spanish side. So Gondomar could well afford to remain above the battle. The French had stepped into the Valteline affair using (in Gondomar's words) "high terms," demanding that Spain make a major withdrawal, on the assumption that they would be able to get their way by force at the head of a strong coalition in which the presence of England was to be a key factor. 11 But they had proceeded on their bellicose way without first assuring themselves of English support, and had got too far ahead of themselves; as Van Male had put it, ilz ont fait leur comte sans lear hoste, and once James had refused to play their game they found that they had indeed committed their "folly" with undue public display and found themselves in an extremely awkward position vis-a-vis their intended (but not now so desirable) enemy. A low-comedy sequence followed in which the embarrassed ambassador extraordinary tried to repair the damage. If there was any diplomatic fact at that time more universally a matter of common knowledge than the wide-open secret that France had sent Cadenet to propose an Anglo-French marriage alliance, it was the not-secret-at-all fact that France's Spanish ally had been negotiating over just such an English marriage alliance for years, and that those negotiations were at present in a most crucial phase. Yet in the face of this, once France's counter-proposal for the Prince of Wales's marriage to Louis XIII's sister had fallen flat, apparently hoping to brazen his (and his country's) way out of the bungled affair, Cadenet busied himself with trying to make Gondomar believe that, although France would have liked a marriage alliance with England, since it had turned out on his arrival that there was already a negotiation going on for a Spanish marriage, respect for the king of Spain had constrained him from bringing the matter up with James.

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Cadenet, whose main qualification for his present diplomatic mission was that he was the due de Luynes's brother, was of course badly overmatched in this battle of wits. Besides this he fought at a certain disadvantage in trying to convince the Spaniard, inasmuch as Gondomar had already confirmed Van Male's information about what had really gone on in the secret conferences with James and Buckingham and had received further confirmation of Cadenet's doings " f r o m that which the marshal has said to those he takes for his confidants," including persons who had been present at Cadenet's "extended and secret nighttime colloquies with the Baron Dohna." This naive attempt on the Spaniard's credulity began in earnest on the zoth of January, the day of Cadenet's official leavetaking of the king (and his fruitless conference with Buckingham). One of Cadenet's regular go-betweens with Gondomar during their exchange of proxy courtesy calls had been Zamet, commander of the Picardy regiment. On the morning of the 20th Cadenet sent Zamet to Gondomar's residence to give him the ambassador's ex officio assurances that the king of France had not and would not treat of a marriage alliance with England. Zamet presented this assurance under an assumed cloak of secrecy and as a gesture of friendship to Spain, but the intended impression that it was done as a simple demonstration of ordinary friendly and open relations between the French ambassador extraordinary and the Spanish resident in the course of their routine exchanges of proxy visits, and that Zamet had not been specially sent on this errand, was rather unconvincing. T h e deception was in fact rather badly conceived, inasmuch as Zamet had dined with Gondomar the evening before and had already taken his formal and supposedly final leave of him at that time. But the farcical aspect of these proceedings continued. Zamet had not even managed to finish his own protestation of France's benevolent intentions when his discourse was interrupted by the entry of the ambassador of the duke of Savoy. Zamet, to Gondomar's amusement, disappeared in haste toward Gondomar's chapel, saying—rather a non sequitur in the circumstances—that he was going to hear mass.

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The Savoyard, after having come on stage too soon, went nevertheless directly into his lines, telling Gondomar that the maréchal de Cadenet had asked him to speak to Gondomar in his name, assuring him of the respect the king of France had for the king of Spain and that he, Cadenet, knowing the stage in which the Spanish marriage negotiations were, had not wanted to disturb them, nor would he speak to James in the matter, nor would his sovereign by any other means. The ambassador from Savoy acting as ambassador from the ambassador from France begged the ambassador from Spain to give more credit to this assertion than to those who asserted the contrary, and asked that Gondomar in turn present this protestation to the king of Spain, performing "good offices" in the matter. Gondomar, undismayed, replied diplomatically that he would do so, "explaining" that the king of England had proposed the marriage business to the king of Spain and that the latter had listened to the proposal because of the good that could come of it for Christianity if James and the prince did as they had given him to understand they would do in matters of religion, adding that all Catholic princes ought to help in this and ought to desire that the Spanish negotiations be concluded in such a way that these good effects would be attained. Gondomar ended on this generality, adding nothing more, giving no greater detail, simply concluding with an expression of esteem for the substance and manner of this message from the maréchal and of the proceedings of the king of France and his ambassadors, assuring the Savoyard that the king of Spain and his ministers would be found to share this esteem. By now it was dinner time and, Zamet having (presumably) heard his mass, Gondomar had both of them stay to dine with him. One suspects he extended the invitation so the comedy could be continued, for after dinner Zamet went on to conclude his own reassurances to Gondomar, but continued to do it apart from the ambassador from Savoy, both of them wanting to keep their errands secret from the other. The comic-opera diplomatic intriguers finally left, and next day

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Gondomar wrote a full account of all this to Philip. At this point Cadenet himself showed up at the Spanish embassy and Gondomar was treated once more to a rehearsal of the same French assurances, this time improved to the point of Cadenet's hoping that James would fulfill the necessary conditions so that the Anglo-Spanish marriage could be successfully concluded. This ritual having been completed once more, the two ambassadors exchanged comments about English ladies, and Cadenet recounted his formal leave-taking of the king the day before and declared his present call to be his formal leave-taking of Gondomar, as he was departing England the day after next, having, as he put it, no further business to conduct there, though Gondomar himself intended to make a formal last call on Cadenet next day. That night Lord Digby called and spent some time with Gondomar, giving him an account of the whole affair on behalf of the king (all of which Gondomar already knew "from other reliable sources"). Digby also told him—this too on the king's behalf— that James would write to Philip to tell him that the king of England and everything in England were at the Spanish king's disposal, as truly and surely (and rhetorically) as were the Archduke Albert and his states, as (Gondomar was promised) events would show. But Gondomar and James had been reciprocally pouring forth elaborate protestations of good and highest intentions for years, to the point of mutual near-immunity to each other's blandishments at face value. Aside from the king himself, Digby was Gondomar's most respected opponent in the long diplomatic tug of war, and if he had come to respect John Digby as a tough but friendly opponent he had also come to trust his frankness (at least far more than the king's). He asked Digby now to tell him, on his own, if he could with assurance write the king of Spain to this effect; Digby told him yes, adding that James would write to his ambassadors in iMadrid and Brussels ordering them to confirm it all there in the same words Digby had used. Withholding comment, Gondomar recounted these passages, too, to the king of Spain, in a letter that was beginning to take on the air

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of a diary. He delayed the courier long enough to complete his formal last call on the maréchal next morning, so he could advise Philip of the steps taken by the French envoy "to the last line." His call on Cadenet took the form of a mutual display of good will of rather extreme proportions, the two diplomats soon working their way up to the Frenchman's exaggerated praises of the virtues of the queen of France (who was the king of Spain's daughter) and Gondomar's of those of the princess who was soon to be queen of Spain (and who was the king of France's sister). Cadenet said he had his sovereign's word that he would be sent as extraordinary ambassador to Spain at the first opportunity, and it was agreed between them that Gondomar would act as procurer for Cadenet there and Cadenet would perform the same service for Gondomar whenever he passed through Paris. This entente cordiale arranged, Cadenet told him "marvels" of the friendly inclinations of his brother (Luynes) and himself and of the advantage to his sovereign of good relations with the king of Spain, declaring that there would be nothing that could disturb those relations. Gondomar replied to this (as he described it) as best he knew how, whereupon they embraced each other three or four times and (as Gondomar put it) conducted themselves like brothers. Cadenet told him he had nothing left to do and no one left to take leave of, and would depart next day, taking the post on from Calais. Gondomar returned home, where the courier for Madrid was waiting, and recounted this final episode in an aside to the Secretary of State Juan de Ciriza, thus sending off a detailed report that was complete, as he had intended, "to the last line." With a note of satisfaction he was able to conclude (so far as his end of the job was concerned): "and thus there is no more to say in this." 12 Bv the 8th of February, however, as the matter proceeded toward its ultimate denouement in Madrid, he was able to contribute one more report on the subject: 13 Señor The last dispatch which I sent Your Majesty concluded with the letter of the 21st of last month, January, with the final reply which this

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king had given to the Marshal de Cadenet, Ambassador Extraordinary from France, to the propositions of his embassy, [indicating] that the main thing he obtained consisted of ceremonies without any substance, and it having seemed to him that he had found this king to be completely Spanish, he accordingly said so to his confidants, and the French gave [James] the name of "Don Jacques," and this pleased the Puritans so much that they already refer to him among themselves by the name of " D o n " without daring to say more. It would please me greatly if he more truly merited the "Don," although the Marquis of Buckingham and others have told me that the Marshal de Cadenet said that he had omitted proposing many things to the king because he knew he would probably thereupon tell me of them, and they told the king himself this. T h e Marshal de Cadenet departed from here resolved to persuade the King of France that, at whatever price of indignities and of treasure, he should make peace with the Huguenots, and gave to understand that his brother and he had wished it so even before they knew the declaration of this king on aiding them, and a well-informed source has told me that the Duke de Luynes fears war, and that he arranged that one so close to him should [be the one to] come here, and only with powers to propose and reply, so that he could make the relation [of the embassy] in Paris accordingly, and that he will do it, giving great consideration to the power of this king and his determination to assist the Huguenots in case of war, in order that the king and the Prince of Conde, and the others in that kingdom who show themselves to want to make war against the heretics, should be moved to avoid it. And thus it has appeared here to the judicious and dispassionate that all the adulation and complacence that the King of France has shown toward the King of England with this embassy has brought a great diminution of his authority and advantage, because the declaration that this king has made has raised his credit with the Huguenots and has brought strength to them so that every day they may go on multiplying (as they are doing) the fortifications of the places they hold, and their audaciousness and boldness in uniting themselves openly, and it has made this king that much more obstinate in his heresy to see the friends and dependents he has because of it, and also [his worries on that score] have been quieted by [its becoming apparent that with religious division] France will never be entirely and securely united with Spain. [I recounted] in my letter of the 22d how I had repaid the Marshal de Cadenet's visit of leave-taking, and the protestations he had made to me of the good will of the duke his brother and himself toward the interests of Your Majesty and the advantage there was for his sovereign in [the prospering of Spain's affairs], making a show of satisfaction with

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the relations he had had with me, and I expressed pleasure in having them with him, observing the requisite decorum, because of the family connection that France has today with Your Majesty as well as because the government of France (as Your Majesty will know better than I ) is [solely in the hands of] the Duke de Luynes and this Marshal de Cadenet, as, although in the Cabinet Council (as they say in France) there are some others who see and know all that is treated of, the final decision is ordinarily taken by the king with just these two brothers. I also expect that with the relation of this Marshal and with having recognized that this king does not want to intermeddle in the business of the Valteline, France will speak on the subject less loudly, and they notify this king that they have detained the embassy of Monsieur de Bassompierre to Spain until they know what the outcome was of Cadenet's efforts here. God protect Your Majesty. London, 8 February 1621.

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CHAPTER 16

Denouement: The Bassompierre Mission to Madrid T h e French had indeed deferred Bassompierre's departure for Spain to treat of the Valteline dispute until they knew the outcome of Cadenet's mission to London, and by the time Gondomar was writing the above on the 8th of February they knew the outcome only too well. As Gondomar had expected, they were not talking so belligerently now. When the extraordinary ambassador finally set off on the ioth he was carrying a letter of credence of moderately strong tone for presentation to the King of Spain; 1 but his instructions, which in routine manner ordered him to state the French position and get it agreed to, commanded him specifically to use only "terms which could not be interpreted as menacing." 2 French diplomacy, which had seemed well started on a course of expansion, was contracting rapidly now: France's interest in the Valteline was fading fast; her interest in the Palatinate had disappeared entirely. 3 François de Bassompierre, colonel-general of the king's Swiss Guards, was, like Cadenet, a councilor of state and a marshal of France, but there their similarity (or that of their extraordinary embassies) ceased—so far at least as the manner of their going forth and their reception was concerned. For Madrid was in ferment at the time: great men had been toppling like ninepins, and the unrest increased with the worsening health (and expected death) of Felipe el Bueno. Bassompierre hesitatingly got under way, then kept halting in

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suspense at various places along the route, keeping up an uncertain communication with the worried government behind and the seeming chaos ahead. H e was not yet out of the country when he received verbal reports from Madrid that the French

resident

ambassador was under house arrest and his servants and other Frenchmen cast into prison under various charges. 4 Bassompierre hesitantly entered Spain. T h e n , on advice from the capital, he delayed in the countryside while these troublesome matters were settled before he entered Madrid. Fortunately for the situation, Baltasar de Zuniga, the n e w man in power, smoothed things over with an apology to Louis X I I I and the prisoners' release. B y this time it was mid-March.® The

reports to London

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the

generally

crcdulous

English

ambassador, W a l t e r Aston, are about up to his usual par at this juncture: completely w r o n g about the contents of Bassompierre's instructions, fairly accurate on what the Spanish attitude would be, completely taken in b y Spanish pretenses that any concessions they made would be out of deference to James. On the 16th Aston reported to Calvert: Toutchinge the business of Valtelina I must here acquaint y o u r honor that Monsr. Bassompierre is at the instant in this towne, with an extraordinary Embassage from the French Kinge his Master, meerly abouce that business as I am credibly informed, as yett he hath not had audicnce with the Kinge in respect of his Majesties late indisposition, but doth expect itt with in 3 or 4 days, in the meane time it is given out that he hath order to speake very lowde and freely to this kinge, that if he shall not instantly resolve to command the with drawinge of his forces from thos fortified places, his master must of necessitie assist the Grisonns, with his Sword, f o r the freeinge of that passage. Some extraordinary means I have used to understand what answeare is likely to be given him, and from so good a place I have it as I dare assure your honor itt wilbe iust the same that hath been given me, and farther, he wilbe told that the kinge our master hath already seriously imploved his intercession and that whatsoever may be expected of Grace to the Grissons, shalbe f o r his Majesties sake, but that the Duke of Feria hath already order to compound the business, on sich conditions as I have formerly adverticed b y m y letters; what further shall pass in this French Embassage I wilbe carefull to give your honor notice of."

Denouement

209

W h e n Aston w r o t e to the secretary six days later he had further developments to report: Right honorable. M y last unto you was of the 6 of this month [OS], (by one M r A t y e ) in answeare of yours of the 10th of Feb. but this going by ordinary post, I conceave itt will arrive before the other, for which I shall not be sorry being now able to advertice you, the greate change in the estate of the business of the Valtelina. In that letter I told your honor how Monsr de Bassompierre was here with an axtraordinary Embassage from the French kinge his master abowte the business and how he had order to press his majestie here very hard in itt, but whilst he is attendinge for his audience (which hytherto he hath nott [had] in respect of this kings indisposition) adverticement is brought by a speedy post from Mylan (who arrived two days since) that the Duke of Feria is like to compound that business to the satisfaction of the Grisonns and the notable advancement of his Masters service, for 4 of the 6 Commissioners deputed by the Grissonns for that treaty have already signed articles for a league offensive and defensive with the kinge and amongst other particulars have condiscended that for some certain yeers the kinge of Spaine shall remayne with his forts. I also understand that provision is made in the treaty for reservinge the ancient league which the Grissonns have with the French, but dowteless the Venetians will herewith all find themselves much agreeved if it grow to a conclusion: I have receaved this from so good a place that I do confidently wright itt you for a certainty, and thus not having else for the present I committ your honor to Gods holy protection. . . .T The

fact was

that Bassompierre

had

discovered

there

were

p o w e r f u l men in the council of state w h o did not approve of Feria's aggressive moves of late, 8 including D o n Augustin de Messia, whose opinions w e r e usually concurred in b y a good part of the council, and—most important at the moment—Don Baltasar

de

Zuniga himself, currently the most p o w e r f u l man in the government. W i t h the information gleaned b y V a n Male and G o n d o m a r in their hands, telling them of the collapse of France's

projected

military alliance, Zuniga and his supporters w e r e thoroughly aware that the French would be happy to get out of their contretemps. It was well that they

knew

this, f o r Bassompierre's

letter

of

credence gave no such indication—though not openly threatening,

2 IO

Spanish Espionage

Put to the

Test

it was certainly stern in its demands—and his instructions allowed him only to press those demands and hear Spain's reply, actually forbidding him to make any treaty. If the Spanish ministers had taken these indications at face value they could hardly have failed to back Feria, for they could not be expected to yield to simple demands from another power and meekly withdraw the Spanish forces, leaving the Valteline lifeline open to a French attack at will. Whether large-scale warfare had broken out or not, the crisis would continue, large forces would be tied down there, and the strategic designs of the Habsburgs still could not be executed without grave risk of a French thrust whenever the imperial and Leaguer armies were sufficiently committed in operations in the Upper Palatinate and the Army of Flanders at least partially diverted, perhaps wholly committed, in the Lower Palatinate. But if a formal treaty were made, even if it involved (as it must for a time) a Spanish withdrawal from their new positions, even if the settlement were not permanent (as settlements never were in that area), still Spain could give the French enough formal assurance to make them feel free to turn to domestic matters: to turn their armies against the Huguenot forces at home where, once arms were joined, they would not be free for some time to disturb Habsburg plans. But thanks to intelligence received from England Zuniga, Messia, and the rest had other information available to them about France's real desires and intentions than that contained in official French letters of credence and instruction; and it was much better information. For the fact was that in spite of Bassompierre's being formally forbidden in his written instructions to conclude a treaty, at his leave-taking in France he was specifically ordered by both the king and Luynes to do just that. 9 The Spanish had no way of knowing this—but given the information they had received from London they were able to proceed in the matter just as though they did. The making of the treaty had to be delayed for a time. Philip the Good took the rest of the month in dying; finally (and at great length) he expired en jamille on March 31 st; then came the funeral,

Denouement

2II

the formalities of the new king's accession, and, at last, those of the negotiation itself. During this time the Spanish continued to convince the simple Walter Aston about their motives—they kept assuring him that they were determined to do more than justice in order to please the king of England—and Aston kept offering both the dying Philip III and the new sixteen-vear-old Philip I V his personal services in arranging the whole settlement. Finally, on the 25th of April, Juan de Ciriza—that wise and able secretary of state carefully keeping all the diplomatic threads straight and writing, one suspects, with an amused tongue in cheek—was able to advise the well-intentioned English ambassador that T o d a y w a s c o n c l u d e d and signed the capitulation and settlement of the affairs of the Valteline at the instance of the M o s t Christian of

France,

seigneur

de

who,

as Y o u r

Bassompierre

Most with

Illustrious

Lordship

an e x t r a o r d i n a r y

knows,

embassy

King

sent

about

the this

business, as one w h o had a longstanding c o n f e d e r a t i o n w i t h the G r i s o n L e a g u e , and H i s Catholic M a j e s t y ( m a y G o d p r o t e c t h i m ) has agreed that all things there shall return to their original state, w i t h both

the

one

and

party

and

the

other

withdrawing,

each

one,

the

presidios

garrisons that have been n e w l y placed, and has also taken m u c h c a r e t o settle this business a c c o r d i n g to the intercession made o v e r it b y

the

M o s t Serene K i n g of

and

G r e a t Britain, as one so highly

esteemed,

thus Y o u r M o s t Illustrious L o r d s h i p will be able to advise him of

it

b y the post that is to be dispatched f o r that purpose. . . .

In declaring that great care had been taken to comply with the expressed desires of the "Most Serene" king of Great Britain, Ciriza at first entirely forgot to include that formula of respect, and when he did remember he could only squeeze it in (even when using the conventional abbreviation) part here, part there. T h e obvious emptiness of the formula seems to symbolize the degree of sincerity of the letter itself. 10 F o r just as the good offices volunteered by the trusting ambassador had been politely ignored, James's intercession had had little enough to do with the terms of the treatly. Spain had played her own game, and James's effective part in the matter had been played when he told Cadenet

212

Spanish Espionage

Put to the Test

that he had no intention of joining in any military action over the Valteline, when news of this reached Louis XIII and his ministers, and, most of all, when confirmation of it reached Madrid. It may well have been in the same post whose services Ciriza offered to Aston that Bassompierre sent his report to Puissieux on the 27th: The treaty had been made, France could count herself secure on the Spanish side, there was no need to fear making war now against the Huguenots. 11 And that, to the great relief of the Habsburgs, was precisely what the French did.

Van Male and the Six Dutch Deputies Back at the beginning of the year, along with the more pressing matters Van Male had to deal with in his dispatch to the archduke on N e w Year's Day—principally the coming of the Cadenet mission—he made routine mention that a ship out of Amsterdam had arrived at Portsmouth from the East Indies laden with merchandise from those parts to the value of ¿75,000, and that the ship had been impounded by the king's order; it was said the sequestration had been made with the intention of recovering, to this extent, the losses the English had suffered at the hands of the Dutch in the Far East during the past year. Noel Caron, the long-time resident agent of the United Provinces in England (but formally acknowledged as such only by those who formally recognized the government he represented; to V a n Male he was "the one who takes care here of the affairs of those rebels"), was busy trying to get the ship liberated, and Van Male thought he would probably succeed because it was certain James would not want to anger the Dutch at the moment, 1 and they furthermore had many friends in England who could exercise influence. There was also a report that the Dutch were sending some deputies to England, but Van Male had not yet found out what they were coming about. 2 There was nothing new in this sort of thing; there had been disputes, and deputations shuttling back and forth to negotiate over disputes, between England and the United Provinces as long as

2i4

Spanish

Espionage

Put to the

Test

Van Male had been in England, and before. 3 As competing nations of traders they were clashing continually in the Far East—this was the period of Coen's empire-building in the East Indies (with the massacre at Amboyna in the near future to embitter the whole affair further)—with reciprocal sinkings and seizures of ships and goods: it was a state of affairs which of course could not meet with complete Spanish approval, since in the Spanish view neither had any right to be there in the first place but, as it proved impossible to keep them out, Madrid was happy enough to see them fighting each other. And as competing nations of fishermen the English and Dutch were constantly at odds—and often in open combat—over fishing rights in the North Sea and whaling rights off Spitzbergen. All of this Spain could view with satisfaction, as it kept a constant wedge of discord between her principal enemies— a term which was applied to them in Madrid with equal consistency, both in war and in peace. An excellent example of the often-realistic Spanish approach to the Anglo-Dutch disputes and their value to Spain exists in regard to the Spitzbergen whaling grounds (which the Spanish generally referred to as "Greenland"). At the time of Sarmiento's coming to England in 1613 that particular dispute had of late flared up seriously, with France and Spain also involved (whalers from both countries had been chased out of the grounds), and this was one of several matters he had been sent to settle. Sarmiento (he was not yet conde de Gondomar) recognized immediately that anv settlement of the dispute would be a general one, that if the settlement were to Spain's advantage it would also benefit the Dutch, and (more important) that Spain was gaining much more from the continuing friction over the matter between the two Protestant powers than she was losing by English attacks on the f e w Spanish Biscayan whalers in the area. So with Madrid's approval he simply let the matter drop.4 Anglo-Dutch friction was a continuing subject on which Van Male had made regular routine reports for years, 5 and he continued to do so now. A few days after the Dutch ship at Portsmouth had been sequestered another squabble arose, this one over the latest

Van Male and the Dutch Deputies

215

English prize taken by the Dutch in the East Indies. T h e English were insisting that the damage settlement be paid in England; the Dutch conceded that reparation was due, but insisted that it be paid in the Indies.6 T h e kind of logic at work here was not unusual in an age in which governments at war sold export and import licenses to the enemy and armies could wage open warfare without violating the truce between the powers they really pertained to; it was a sort of logic especially common where events "beyond the line" were concerned. In this case, to make restoration in England of property seized in the Far East would be unfair to those who had committed the offense because they would, in effect, be assuming the regular cost of shipping the booty half w a y round the world, which would have fallen to the English had the Dutch not stolen the goods. But the Dutch view did not suit the English victims, and the English East India Company had sent two of their own deputies to Holland to settle their differences there. 7 T h e deputies from Holland, for their part, were still expected hourly. 8 B y the time of Cadenet's leave-taking, Van Male's prediction about the Dutch ship at Portsmouth seemed to have been justified: the embargo was lifted with the concurrence of the English East India Company; the latter expected its claims for reparation would be settled through negotiation by its deputies now in the United Provinces. 9 Cadenet was barely out of the country when, on January 25th, the six deputies expected from Holland finally arrived; from the beginning their "extraordinary embassy" presented a striking contrast to the recent one from France. In place of the earl of Arundel meeting them with an army of welcomers at the mouth of the Thames, Sir Lewis Lewkinor, the master of ceremonies whose job it was to take care of such routine matters, met them at the T o w e r of London with a single royal coach and a mere half-dozen private ones. N o r was a royal palace provided for them by the king; they had to put themselves up, and took lodging at a common tavern. In reporting this on February 2d, Van Male mentioned in passing that, as James had arrived in London the day before, it was

216

Spanish Espionage Put to the Test

understood that the deputies would have their first audience next Sunday (a delay of five days after the king's arrival). Van Male added that the Dutchmen had brought some extraordinary pieces of artillery to present to Prince Charles, and that nothing was known as yet of their commission. 10 H e was not greatly disturbed by their presence in any case: it was not until three days later that he bothered to report (perhaps even to find out) w h o the deputies were, and then only as an afterthought; to a complacent letter about the current state of affairs with England he added the postscript: The names of the six deputies from Holland Le seigr de Benthuysen de la Haye Le seigr Brunneg de enchuysen Le seigr sonche de Horn Le seigr Varrowou de la haye Le seigr Scot de Middelbourg Le Pensionaire Camerling de Delft 1 1 On the afternoon of Sunday February 5th the Dutch deputies had their public audience as scheduled, and Van Male reported it to Albert in the circumspect terms one addresses to an archduke and one's sovereign: T h e y had been accompanied to court by the Baron Clifford in one of the king's coaches, and twenty other coaches belonging to private persons. Their private audience with the king in the council chamber had lasted more than two hours. Before the private audience, the public one had lasted half an hour, the king remaining standing and uncovered the whole time. T h e one who made the oration and had authority to speak and answer for the delegation "was called Jacques de Wingarde Sr de Benthuysen," who they said was a councilor of the Province of Holland. 1 2 T h e ambassador's account to della Faille was a bit different. I have to tell you something [he wrote] about your deputies from Holland, who, like perfect courtesans, in their first audience, and being in the presence of the king, almost forgot to make their bows, and the head of them, who is the seigneur de Benthuysen, in commencing his harangue said in fine terms of courtesy, "Sire, the Prince of Orange commends himself strongly to your favor," without using any other Ceremony [that is, not even addressing James as "Your Majesty"], and

Van Male and the Dutch

Deputies

217

then, delivering their letters of credence, they gave the king the one they had for the prince, and the prince the one they had for the king. T h e y had, on the whole, comported themselves in such a manner that the whole town was amusing itself, he said, with banter about the Dutch "bravesse" and "gallantise." 13 Delia Faille appreciated the joke immensely. A f t e r complimenting Van Male on his "perfect account" of the opening of Parliament (recently received in Brussels), he agreed that what the ambassador had written of the "terms and manner of conduct made usage of by our good neighbors the Hollanders in their first audience with the King of Great Britain was truly laughable." Then, thinking of the long rebellion of the Dutch against their sovereigns, he added w r y l y that this was not surprising, "they not being accustomed, as you know, to conversing much with lords and princes." 14 B y the time Van Male wrote February 19th, things had taken a in realizing this. It was the first of judgments—a plain mishandling of serious consequences.

the next week's dispatch, on serious turn, but he was slow a series of oversights and mishis job—that was to lead to

Parliament was pressing James to let Frederick, Elizabeth, and their children come over from T h e Hague; if he gave in and allowed this, their presence (already too near when just across the Channel) would inevitably stir up popular pressure for a war of restoration, pressure which James would be hard put to resist. Van Male was aware that this could cause trouble; his closer contacts were already convinced of it. But he only mentioned the subject in passing after discussing and offering a solution to a matter he considered much more important: William Trumbull, James's resident agent at the Brussels court—who, like Van Male, was always complaining about something—had sent some loud complaints to James that a great many tracts were being printed in the Spanish Netherlands against the Palatine and his allies; some privy councilors had brought the matter up with V a n Male, and shown themselves to be very upset about it. So he advised the archduke to order the printing of this sort of literature in his states stopped, in order to put James under obligation to recipro-

; 18

Spanish Espionage Put to the Test

cate by suppressing the "excesses" of the Puritans in England who were constantly writing and publishing "seditious" tracts and pamphlets against Albert and the House of Habsburg. 1 5 Such was the scope of Van Male's view at the moment; it was in this dangerously complacent frame of mind that he observed the unfolding of the Anglo-Dutch negotiations that were then beginning. After the Dutch deputies had had their second private audience with the king, James had ordered the privv council convened and turned the negotiations over to them. T h e first meeting was held on Sunday, February 14th, and Van Male soon had information on what had taken place. T h e Dutch had begun their discourses, he reported, by pointing out the great outlays the States General had made in support of Frederick, both in Bohemia and the Palatinate, and renewed their offer of assistance for the recovery of his lands. T h e y had pointed out that the truce was about to expire and said that, because they had seen that the archduke and the king of Spain were making great preparations f o r war, it was necessary that they have indicated to them the resolution and intention of the English king and of the form and manner in which he was thinking of assisting them in case war broke out. T h e y had registered strong complaints that the archduke and the king of Spain had contravened the treaty of the truce various times (by taking prizes and detaining Dutch ships in Spanish ports). This, Van Male concluded, was "everything they have proposed up till now." A matter that had given much pause to the English privy council was the fact that the deputies had declined to reveal completely the commission they carried. T h e Flemish resident added that it was certain the deputies were trying to buy themselves many friends at court with gifts, and that they were going about performing all the "bad offices" they could to break up the English negotiations for a Spanish marriage treaty. But V a n Male had also learned that the councilors (obviously not bought or brought over) had themselves brought up various grievances on the English side about things which the king and his vassals had suffered at the hands of the Dutch. T h e councilors had spoken of the matter very excitedly, telling the Dutch that if they

Van Male and the Dutch Deputies

219

wanted to be friends with the king of Great Britain they would see to remedying many disorders that there were in Holland, and that they should once and f o r all get out of the English and Scottish fishing grounds so the inhabitants themselves could enjoy them, and that they should also reform a certain ordinance prejudicial to English merchants which they had issued concerning the cloth trade. According to Van Male's information, the Hollanders had replied that they would give an account of these complaints to the States General, but had told the councilors plainly that they did not expect that the States would do anything about any of it. Van Male's information about the meeting with the privy council was very incomplete (as will be seen), in spite of his confidence that "this is everything they have proposed up till n o w " ; but further "information" he received, from what he considered a completely reliable source, was completely false—and, in believing it, Van Male began a strange course leading toward difficulty and danger, perhaps disaster, for the Habsburg cause. An informant he described (in code of course) as one of the most important of the privy councilors and one of the best-inclined toward the Habsburgs had told him confidentially that these Dutch deputies had made a secret request that King James perform all possible offices to procure a continuation of the truce, and that he (the privy councilor) had perceived that those Estates were very eager to continue the truce, on the same conditions and terms as before. T h e privy councilor had assured him that this was certain, and that in conformity with this the archduke could with absolute certainty dispose his affairs and set his own plans in motion. This information V a n Male swallowed whole; it convinced him that the Dutch were desperate for a continuation of the truce and that Albert and Philip could get it renewed or extended on just about any terms they liked. He therefore advised the archduke that "in case Y o u r Highness should be pleased to permit a continuation of the truce" (and he of course knew that Albert desired nothing more), he should order proposals made to the States concerning the free navigation of "Antwerp River," a matter of much importance to "the service of Y o u r Highness and the common good of Your

2

20

Spanish Espionage

Put to the Test

Highness's vassals," demanding that the Dutch give up their power of granting extraordinary licenses for entering and leaving that port. Supposing, Van Male said, that they cling to their own interest, it would not be so difficult to force it onto them, mostly because the opening of the Scheldt was a matter that affected this king too, and which he desired in order to establish the staple for cloths and other merchandise of his kingdom at Antwerp. 18 One wonders just what privy councilor gave him such specific and repeated assurance that the Dutch and their deputies wanted the truce continued and would accept a continuation on almost any terms. He may well have been one of the most important, as Van Male describes him, but he was either not very bright, or not a good listener, or not nearly so bienintencionado as the ambassador thought. For the Dutch had definitely not come to beg James to arrange a continuation of the truce. It could readily be assumed that England, as well as France, would take all the part she could in any negotiations that might come up regarding the truce, and it could be assumed almost as readily that James (and probably France) would once more at least nominally guarantee any new truce settlement. This was one fact of diplomatic life that seems not to have dawned on Van Male. A second (and more obvious) one he was overlooking was that if the United Provinces had any difficult end to attain that had caused them to send an extraordinary embassy, one whose mission he knew now definitely had nothing to do with the usual Anglo-Dutch disputes and whose members (though there were no royal bastards among them) were of high enough station that the Pensionary of Delft did not even rank as their spokesman —if they had such a difficult end in mind, it was most certainly not to convince a man who gloried in the name of Peacemaker and held Beati Pacifici as his motto that a continuation of the truce was preferable to a general European war. And Van Male should have known better. According to his own information, the deputies had told the English frankly that the States General would not yield anything in regard to the antiEnglish cloth trade ordinances nor to the habitual Dutch incursions

Van Male and the Dutch

Deputies

221

in the fishing grounds along the English and Scottish coasts. This intransigent attitude alone should have told him that the Hollanders had not come hat-in-hand, desperate over the rapidly approaching end of the twelve-year armistice—though it was due to expire on April 10th. He should have remembered that there were two parallel agreements involved. One was the truce itself, between the States General on the one hand and Spain and the archdukes on the other; the second was a pair of treaties between the States and England and France, making those two powers guarantors of the truce and allies of the Dutch; both the truce and the alliances expired simultaneously. Had he considered these things Van Male might have doubted his highly placed informant and withheld his dangerous advice to his sovereign, suspecting the truth: Bethuingen, Camerlink, and Company were not eager for a continuation of the truce, and peace; they were in England to get James to agree to a continuation of the alliance, and war. On the 15th, the day after the conference Van Male had his information about, the six deputies and Caron, the resident, presented a memorial to the privy council stating formally in writing the position which they had stated verbally in conference the day before. Whether or not Van Male knew of the document's existence, he obviously did not see it; perhaps he did not even try. It seems unlikely that at this particular moment his informationgathering apparatus broke down. More likely, the usual spread of information was available to him, from which he made an uncritical choice. He was, after all, only dealing with "those rebels," "our good neighbors, the Dutch," those "parfaitz courtezans" who almost forgot to bow to the king and who got their credentials all mixed up; perhaps it was this that made him complacent. Or perhaps it was only that dangerous laxity that sometimes comes from knowing that God is on your side. In any case, the privy councilor who gave him his account of the conference of the 14th had presumably been present, and even if not present would have been duty-bound to have read the memorial of the 15th, having

222

Spanish Espionage Put to the Test

been ordered b y the king, along with the rest of the council, to participate in the negotiations; Van Male accepted this version and gave policy-making advice, concerning war and peace and the fate of his country and cause, based solely upon it. H e seems not to have double-checked at all; it was two full months—after

the

expiration of the truce, in fact—before he got his hands on the document. Jean-Baptiste

Van

Male, that master of the art

espionage, the man who had déchiffré

of

au vif (as he phrased it) the

supersecret conferences of a marshal of France, had been led up the garden path by a bunch of rebel

fishmongers.

Secrets Not Laid Bare T h e memorial V a n Male did n o t see deserves examination

both

because o f the difference his having seen it w o u l d have made in the intelligence and advice he passed o n t o Brussels ( a n d t h e n c e t o M a d r i d ) and for the light it sheds on t h e nuances o f A n g l o - D u t c h relations at the time a n d — m o s t important in the present c o n t e x t — the official D u t c h outlook on the p r o s p e c t o f full-scale war w i t h Spain. 1 T h e memorial begins: Milords: W e render our most humble thanks to His Majesty for the Public Audience which His Majesty most graciously accorded us, and inasmuch as it is His Majesty's good pleasure that we make further clarification before Your Excellencies and Lordships of the contents of our Instructions, we declare that, following the greeting made to His Majesty, we are charged to treat of affairs touching the general state of Christendom, and in particular the service of His Majesty, the state of the United Provinces, and that of their good friends, allies, and confederates. Milords the Estates General of the said Provinces confess and recognize that the management of their state has largely, rather for the most part, depended on the royal care and authority of His Majesty, who by his prudent and salutary counsels has deigned to kindly assist them in their most urgent need, which truly royal benefice never has and never will be forgotten, but will remain imprinted in the hearts of the said Milords [of the Estates General] and of all their posterity. T h e o n l y real enlightenment V a n Male w o u l d have g o t

from

reading this opening was that " t h o s e r e b e l s " ( o r their secretaries, w h i c h in the case o f a w r i t t e n statement w o u l d in e f f e c t be t h e s a m e ) c o u l d on occasion c o m e up with the requisite " b o n n e termes

224

Spanish Espionage Put to the Test

de courtoisie." But in their following paragraphs he would have noted that they also had a well-defined Weltanschauung showed them as less than optimistic,

also showed

which, if it them to

without hope of gaining anything b y peaceful temporizing

be and

definitely without any intention of purchasing a continuation of the truce at any price. V a n Male's information was correct, that the deputies had pointed out their service to the Palatine's cause, for they in fact spelled out the extent of it in some detail:

And now: to enter into the principal subject of this Embassy, Their Lordships have charged us to remonstrate that the goal and design of the King of Spain, with his adherents, does not tend to any other end than to extend under false pretext of religion, day by day, their unbridled ambition and domination, to the prejudice and hurt of His Majesty, the State of the United Provinces, and of their Friends, Allies, and Confederates, Attempting by this means to pull by their lead-strings all the Roman Catholic clergy and the princes who are dependent on them in order to usurp an unjust monarchy over the whole of Europe, following the footsteps and designs of their predecessors, T o obviate which our said Lords the Estates, careful above all to support their Friends and Allies against the ambitious efforts of the said King, have furnished a very remarkable aid in money amounting to 50,000 florins [ £ 5,000] per month to the King and the Estates of Bohemia, and a similar sum to the Princes of the Union, having continued the said contributions for the space of 19 entire months to the said King and Estates and of 11 months to the said Union, Putting in the field, in addition, in the Pays de Cleves, near the City of Wesel, a very powerful army, under the conduct of Milord the Prince of Orange, to prevent the aid which, without this, the Archdukes of Austria would have sent from the Netherlands to the greater burden of the said Lord Princes, For the more certain defense of whom the said Milords the Estates have sent to them at the expense of their republic 34 mounted companies and six hundred elite troops from the best of their infantry, all under the personal command of the Lord Prince Henry of Nassau, For all of which tasks [performed] and efforts, however, Milords the Estates have not been sufficient by themselves to resist the Invasions of the enemies in Germany, But already, before the arrival of the said Lord Prince Henry, a

Secrets Not

Laid Bare

225

large part of the Electoral Palatinate had been seized, as are the Cities of Aitzem and Oppenheim, assigned in Domain to Madame the Electrice Palatine, Bachrach, Coub, Pfaltz, and several other Cities and territories appertaining to the Princes of the Union, to which they had no pretensions whatever, besides which, by violence and threats to put the remainder to the torch and the sword they have extorted the payment for their soldiers, putting to ransom in this way all the Wetteravie and a good part of the County of Hannau and of Hesse. [Then the deputies, speaking not as humble suppliants but as parties to a previous agreement, brought that agreement u p : ] But seeing that the said Milords the Estates, by the proposition of Milord Carleton, His Majesty's Honorable Ambassador, made in their assembly the 21st of October of the past year, received the boon of being advised of the good resolution which it had pleased His Majesty to take for the defense of the liberty of Germany and the recovery of the Palatinate, the said proposition being confirmed by several advices of [Noël Caron] Seigneur de Schoonewalle, Ambassador in Ordinary to His Majesty, T h e said Milords the Estates thank His Majesty for this most humbly, with the firmest assurance that he, as an all-powerful and all-wise prince, will have the said resolution earnestly executed, opposing himself with simple courage to the efforts of the enemies in order to recover that which they have unjustly seized, and that by this means will be cast into confusion all those who have no other end but to subject the whole world to the whip and trample under foot all law and Justice, in order to attain such an unjust [universal] monarchy, Following which the said Milords the Estates resolved to second the good and heroic resolution of His Majesty by the continuation of the aforesaid assistances, although in truth the charges which a war of 40 years against so powerful a king has left on their hands are so extremely great, and weigh heavily upon them still, as would be the case for anyone who, for their own defense, find themselves constrained to undertake at their expense the number of some 40,000 foot and 40 companies of cavalry, besides the ordinary charges of the navy and the excessive annual [expenses of defending their shipping] against the pirates, Our Instructions further include [instructions] to point out with the utmost reverence how it has pleased His Majesty to recommend, advance, and conclude the treaty of the truce between the King of Spain, the Archdukes, and the Republic of the United Provinces to restore her to a firm and assured state, but under caution and promise of His Majesty as well as the Most Christian King, that all the contents of the said treaty would be punctually observed,

2 26

Spanish

Espionage

Put to the

Test

Notwithstanding which, the said King of Spain and Archdukes have contravened the said treaty of T r u c e in several points, having had arrested in their kingdoms and lands without any reason the goods, merchandise, and ships of subjects of the United Provinces, constraining the officers to accept sale of their ships and to serve them without anv pay or recompense, the damages suffered by the said subjects, with their interest, amounting to the sum of 2,111,147 florins [ jf 111,114/14S] according to the full accounting. A n d although the said Milords the Estates by earnest letters to the King of Spain and the A r c h d u k e s have requested reparation of the said damages and interest they have not up till n o w [sought to r e c t i f y ] these extortions and injuries [themselves, as would be reasonable], neither ways nor means was lacking to the said .Milords the Estates; if they have always nevertheless preferred the respect due to His Majesty and found it more proper to have him particularly informed of the said contraventions, [it was] to the end that [it be] by his roval authority [that] the said torts and damages be amended, upon which we have express commission to hear the good pleasure of His Majesty. Further, as the time of the T r u c e is expiring and with it the alliances and close relations between His Majesty and the said Milords the Estates, their Lordships have charged us to enter into most earnest communication on this with His Majesty to hear the overtures which it shall please His Majesty to offer us on this subject. W e beseech finally in all reverence that it please His Majesty in his grace to grant us Benefice and benign dispatch in all the above, f o r which the said Milords Estates will be found greatly obliged to His Majesty, in view especially of the expiration of the said T r u c e and the little time [five days short of two months] that remains to them to take up arms and put themselves in a posture of good and effective resistance. [Signed by the six deputies and N o e l Caron.] O n e t h i n g is clear f r o m this: t h e States G e n e r a l h a d m a d e u p their m i n d s t h a t t h e y h a d n o t h i n g t o gain f r o m a p r o l o n g a t i o n of t h e t r u c e , b e i n g firm in t h e c o n v i c t i o n t h a t t h e fixed p o l i c y of

the

Spanish w a s to c o n t i n u e at all times, in p e a c e as well as w a r , t o exert pressure against all t h e states of E u r o p e n o t v e t u n d e r t h e i r d i r e c t o r i n d i r e c t c o n t r o l , a p o l i c y carried o u t u n d e r t h e p r e t e x t of reestablishing t h e R o m a n C h u r c h in P r o t e s t a n t areas b u t r e a l l y d i r e c t e d t o w a r d c o m p l e t i o n of t h e l o n g - s t a n d i n g Spanish

secular

goal of d o m i n a t i n g t h e e n t i r e C o n t i n e n t , reestablishing t h e n e v e r quite-solidified e m p i r e of Charles V

a n d e x t e n d i n g it o v e r

the

Secrets Not Laid Bare

227

whole of Europe. T o the Dutch this meant both the loss of their independence and the destruction of the True (Reformed) Faith. If the Spanish were successful in establishing their complete preponderance (the Dutch deputies did not far miss using Hauser's famous term) it would, in their eyes, entail both their own enslavement and the utter defeat of God's just cause. It is self-evident that they would not want this to happen. That which matters here is that the Dutch had become convinced that even when the Spanish were not extending their conquests by war they were continuing to do so and would continue to do so in times of peace; on a lesser scale and at a slower pace, to be sure, but with continuing effort and continuing progress and the same eventual success—unless they were opposed in time. T h e truce would expire in a few weeks, and the guaranteeing alliances along with it; it was natural enough that this was the date upon which decisions were focused. But what the Dutch wanted from James was not his help in getting the truce extended; they were not after his help in arranging a temporary respite from war for themslves during which the armies of Spain, of the emperor, of the League, would be free in their own good time to reduce the Protestant princes of Europe—the disunited last outposts of independence from Spain, lacking cohesion, helpless without financial support from the mercantile powers—and then turn on their remaining heretic enemy on the Continent, the United Provinces. In the Dutch view a continued peace was the road to destruction; their only salvation—and that of the Reformed Faith—lay in their opposing Spain with all the force they could muster before their allies had been eliminated one by one and it had become too late. It was simple Dutch logic: they and their allies might or might not be able to defeat the enemy (and they thought that they could), but if they could not do it now together the Dutch could obviously not do it later, alone. So the Dutch were not interested in extending the truce. But a second point of policy appears as well: whether or not they would in fact go to war against Spain did not in any way depend on whether or not they were successful in gaining the support of the

228

Spanish Espionage

Put to the

Test

king of England. T h e y were going to war anyway; in their view they had no choice. W h a t depended, in their plans, on James's decision was not whether they would go to war with Spain, but merely how and when. A t the moment they were maintaining a sort of stalemate with the enemv. Spinola naturally wanted to get at the disorganized forces of the Protestant princes to the north, to knock out this last remaining German support for the Palatine. Above all a man who knew how to play position, he had carefully arranged, over the past several years, to cover this invasion route by building up his forces in the Cleves area

(which the Spanish had

successfully

penetrated), his fortifications centered on the main stronghold of Wesel. T h u s if and when he moved his armies up from the south their left would be covered b y these fortifications lying between him and the Dutch forces in the United Provinces themselves. If the Dutch chose to attack the invasion forces they would either have to take these well-prepared strong places first or, swinging around them, leave them to the rear, athwart their supply lines and free to sally out at will to attack the Dutch rear. But the Dutch had neither committed their forces to the long and costly (in both men and m o n e y ) business of reducing the strong places, nor had they moved past them into a false position. Being just as patient strategists as the Genoese general, they had instead simply moved their field forces into Spinola's

defensive

area in strength and, while not really getting themselves out of check, had deftly put Spinola into check also. T h e Spanish forces in the area, performing a covering action against the Dutch, were themselves being covered by the same Dutch forces. This situation had both an advantage and a disadvantage for the States. B y delaying the movement of strong Spanish forces into Northern Europe it gave them time to build up their own forces and to gain any additional support they could. T h i s latter they were now trying to do in their embassy to James; the former they were doing both at home and b y arranging levies abroad, including the one currently going on in England. T h e y needed a little time for the levies to be completed and the troops to arrive,

Secrets Not Laid Bare

229

including any that might be under James's own flag; then they would be able to judge the proper time to move out of the stalemate, when their forces would be at optimum strength vis-a-vis those of the enemy. T h e y also needed time to find out what military support if any James would be giving. T h e y were going to fight anyway, but where and when to attack depended on where and when (and if) James himself attacked. As will be seen, an English invasion force had a definite part to play in their ideal plans. The disadvantage to the Dutch lay in the fact that while they could profitably use the time on their own (and the English) side, time worked against them both in the south and the north of Germany. The Spanish forces to the south were continuing their reduction of the Palatinate, which not only seriously reduced Protestant strength in terms of losses of men, strong places, and territorial base for supporting their forces, but increased the scale of the war that would have to be fought: every badly defended bastion that fell to the enemy now would, as a general rule, have to be retaken later, and that after Spinola had had time to strengthen the fortifications (which he was already doing in the places taken so far). Meanwhile, by threats and promises, Habsburg arms and diplomacy were reducing the will of the princes of the Union themselves to continue fighting. On the other hand, while present stalemate had both its good side and its bad side for the Dutch and the anti-Habsburg cause, it had nothing but advantages for the Habsburgs. What was a disadvantage to the Dutch was automatically an advantage to the Spanish: they could go on conquering and fortifying the Palatinate with a free hand, and continue their efforts to neutralize the princes of the Union before those currently demoralized "allies" were mobilized in an organized effort by the Dutch. And, unlike the Dutch case, there were no compensating disadvantages. T h e old Spanish proverb was never truer: time was most certainly on their side. T h e danger now—of which they were blissfully unaware— was that this priceless advantage might be thrown to the winds by a bit of diplomatic folly. T h e basic circumstance has been described:

23o

Spanish Espionage Put to the Test

if an extension of the truce could not be had on acceptable terms, it was overwhelmingly to their advantage to begin whatever pourparlers there might be in such a manner that the Dutch could be kept talking, and not fighting, for as long as possible. T o accomplish this the archdukes had a choice of three or four possible courses. They could simply let the truce expire, making no overtures at all to the United Provinces, in which case there would be no outbreak of war until one side or the other attacked and, since the Dutch had not yet settled their negotiations with James nor completed their levies of troops, one may assume that the Army of Flanders would have been granted at least part of the time needed to wind up the Palatinate operation. They could make an offer of terms too advantageous to the Dutch to be refused, and thus buy all the time the Spanish forces might need; but this would involve concessions that would be inadmissible to either the archdukes or Madrid (almost certainly it would have to include free access to the Indies), and cannot be counted as a real possibility. They could, and should, offer negotiable terms which the Dutch would at least listen to for a while, even if no final agreement were ever actually reached, which would give the Spanish forces the time required; this they could do only if they had an accurate notion of how badly the Dutch wanted the truce continued, and thus knew what sort of terms the Dutch would consider negotiable. Or they could, if sufficiently ill-informed and ill-advised, make an offer on such onerous terms that the Dutch would immediately be convinced that the archdukes wanted no truce, wanted war instead, and planned to attack as soon as they were ready: that is, when they had finished off the Palatinate and freed that army for an assault on the Northern Provinces. In such a case, unless they were complete simpletons, the Dutch would surely attack as soon as possible, forcing Spinola to pull his main forces out of the Lower Palatinate to defend in strength against the attack—spoiling an almost-completed operation and turning a near-perfect military position into one of desperation.

Secrets

Not

Laid

Bare

231

One way the archdukes could be steered onto such a disastercourse was by being assured that the States were so desperate for an extension that such concessions as the opening of the Scheldt (an issue the archdukes considered important and the Dutch a matter of life and death) could be demanded safely and profitably, only to have the demand confirm to the Dutch that the Spanish planned an attack unless they could get victor's terms without war and thus panic the Dutch into immediate reaction. And that was precisely the information and advice they were currently getting from their envoy in London. Delia Faille's response2 to Van Male's report was unworried enough: the news seemed excellent from all fronts, military, diplomatic, and even conjugal (though he almost forgot to congratulate Van Male on the recent birth of a child and to send the envoy's good wife the best wishes of both the della Failles). Van Male's latest dispatches had been "most agreeable" both for this happy news and for the good footing Habsburg affairs were now on, thanks to Van Male's good work and that of the Spanish ambassador; as to the latter's present task of keeping James's last hopes alive for as long as possible in the seemingly dying-out marriage negotiations, della Faille thought Gondomar could never demonstrate his talent and dexterity at negotiating at a more opportune conjuncture. Delia Faille apologized for the small amount of news he had to offer Van Male in return, but he was well satisfied with what he had. In the past days Spinola had taken a major town, captured the whole Protestant garrison of four hundred foot and a hundred cavalry, and marched them away prisoner under the very noses of the Protestant forces in Worms "without their having had the assurance" to move to their defense. He said Brussels had heard from that quarter that the Protestants were making "great solicitations" to the marquis to obtain a suspension of arms; what would come of this question, however, still awaited the arrival of James's extraordinary ambassador, the "Baron d'Igbey." Meanwhile the levies in the Spanish Netherlands were proceeding steadily, and the new forces were expected to be fully ready within a month. Their

232

Spanish Espionage Put to the Test

fortunes had even been spared the usual vagaries of a papal election (Paul V had died on January 28th): " T h e ninth of February at six o'clock in the evening the Cardinal Ludovisio was created Pope and is called Gregory the Fifteenth, a thing over which w e have every reason to rejoice, because of the inconvenience that would have redounded to all of Christendom from a delay in the creation of a new Head." T h e secretary closes with "may Our Lord guide you by the hand . . ."; but from the w a y things were going it appears that either the Lord had let go of the Fleming's hand or, alas, the Lord was a Protestant after all. For not only was the archduke's agent still wandering down the wrong path, but the ambassador of the king of Spain was also in the dark.

Gondomar in Mid-February, 1621 Gondomar was even less attentive to the Dutch mission than V a n Male was. After having noted in passing on the 16th of January that the States were sending some deputies to England, he did not bother to mention their arrival (on January 27th) until the 14th of February. 1 B y that time he was able to report just who the deputies were: the head of the delegation and its spokesman was "Jacques de Wingarden, señor de Venthuysen," and the others were "Juan Camerlin," councilor and Pensionary of Delft; "Alberto Sonck," burgomeister of H o m e ; "Alberto Bruyning," deputy in Sluys; "Jacques Schot," burgomeister of Middleburg; and "Frederico de Barrovi," deputy from the Estates of Friesland. But the rest of his report was characterized by carelessness. His account of their first audience, for example, has their salutation coming after their harangue (if this had really happened he would have noted the irregularity). H e adds some details Van Male omitted about the audience with the prince, but in the sequel seems to have lowered his guard, like V a n Male, and left himself vulnerable to the sort of English blandishments—the assumed attitude of eagerness to comply unquestioningly with every Spanish wish in all things—he had long since learned to take with a grain (or more) of salt: to the deputies' request that Charles intercede with the king in their behalf, he reported: The prince replied to them that he would do what he could, but that

234

Spanish Espionage Put to the Test

his father kept his affairs so much in his own charge that little intercession was necessary [sic]. They have had no further audience until now [they in fact had had their second audience with James four days before, on the ioth], and the prince asked me very confidentially to advise him what Your Majesty would like one to reply to them and to do with them here. Gondomar was being fed the same sort of line as Van Male about the present Dutch frame of mind ("they tell me that truly the most of the people of those rebels desire peace"), but at least the counsel he offered based on this (much wiser than that of the Fleming) was simply that Brussels should work through contacts with the peacefully inclined part of the population in order to create division. A f t e r reporting that it was understood the Dutch intended to stay a long while so they would not miss any opportunities, especially with Parliament, and that they had brought "very fine jewels" and funds with which to gain friends, Gondomar concluded his dispatch with the assurance that this was all there was up till then in the matter. As a postscript he added a last-minute item: he had just learned that James "had turned these Hollanders over" to the privy council in order that their proposals be made there and the discussions of them be held there, which, according to Gondomar's information, was how it was going to be done. But Gondomar was about as f a r behind events as his Flemish colleague: James had turned the business over to the council days before, and the first session was held on the date of his letter; if he happened to be writing at a late enough hour on the 14th it is quite possible that at the very moment he was giving this account to his secretary the Dutch deputies were engaged in a writing task of their own, the revealing first memorial which they presented next day. But if V a n Male's attention was diverted from the Dutch mission b y petty considerations Gondomar can be acquitted of this, for he was very busy at the time. He was pressing hard to continue an established pattern of cooperation regarding the punishment of Englishmen guilty of seizing Spanish ships and goods—a pattern of important ramifications, for it provided a continuing admission of English guilt and, perhaps to greater effect, skillfully kept James in

Gondomar

in Mid-February,

1621

235

a posture of acquiescence to recurring Spanish demands in the midst of dangerously shifting events and conditions. And this was only one of many things with which he was occupied, for it was, indeed, a time when his experience, his connections, his deftness of action, and his remarkable intuition had all to be drawn upon heavily—and when the accuracy of the information he furnished to Madrid and the correctness of the advice he rendered were of the utmost importance. On the date of the first Dutch memorial, Gondomar sent off to Madrid (as Van Male had to Brussels) an excellent account of the opening, early proceedings and prospects of the reconvened Parliament.2 But he had much else to report: A servant of the Count Palatine had arrived in London with letters from him to James, advising of how the Silesians had obliged him to get out of that province, and that he had gone into the lands of the margrave of Brandenburg, where the Princess Elizabeth was recently delivered of a son, and Elizabeth too had written James— both of them pleading their miserable state and (something neither had done before) begging mercy of him and help by whatever means he could, putting it all in his hands. They had written in the same vein to others, which had caused a new outburst of anger and tumult among the malintencionados, who were so powerful in all the Estates of the Realm, Gondomar said, that James's advisers had persuaded him to set up a council of war as a sop to quiet them, choosing ten or twelve persons of quality, partisans of the Palatine and experienced in war, to meet and discuss the feasibility of armed recovery of the Palatinate and the means which would be required for it. The ploy, however successful it was in its broader aim, at least convinced the new councilors of war. Obviously malintencionados (they were mainly chosen, of course, for that quality), most of them inclined to the opinion that the easiest way to restore the Palatinate was for James to make war on Philip III in Flanders. They proceeded to draw up a grandiose plan for sending a force of 25,000 infantry and 5,000 horse to be landed at Sluys, to go on from there conquering that province; Gondomar sardonically related that

236

Spanish Espionage

Put to the

Test

they had carefully drawn up a detailed accounting of what would be needed for this. Both James and Buckingham laughed at all this (at least when they were with him, Gondomar cautiously adds) because James had already made up his mind to try the method of negotiated settlement

first.3

This was of course agreeable to Gondomar, but he was driven almost to distraction b y the chopping and changing on the king's part about how this was to be done—the Spaniard

perceiving

through the maze of changes and counterchanges the dangerous possibility that James might carry out his diplomatic plans with such dispatch that their failure (which Gondomar expected at the time) and the consequent falling out with Spain would come sooner than they otherwise would have, perhaps disastrously soon

for

Spain, the emperor, and the T r u e Faith. 4 Having firmly decided on seeking a negotiated settlement, and quickly, James in a sudden burst of determination resolved that Digby (who was due to go to Brussels soon to negotiate there, then to Vienna, and, it was supposed, eventually to Spain) should instead leave b y the next post for Madrid. W h e n Gondomar was notified of this decision

(a conventional courtesy which

could

hardly be omitted) he raised what objections he could to prevent it, falling back for lack of better on his often-successful method of mixing very general objections, high principle, and dogged—at its best, unexpected—resistance. In this case, he pointed out that it would do no good to send D i g b y to Spain as Philip neither could resolve this matter nor wanted to (because it would be unjust) without the emperor, whom it directly touched, and without having sought the opinion of the Archduke Albert. Unexpectedly encountering these objections from the Spanish ambassador and finding him completely obdurate, James becamc flustered,

and faltered in his determination. Perplexed and unde-

cided, he would take one decision on the matter, then change it, then change again. Finally he dccided once more that Digby should go to Madrid, with Arundel to go to Vienna and Viscount Doncaster to Brussels, it seeming to James that there was great urgency in appointing these men to these missions and sending them off at

Gondomar in Mid-February,

1621

237

once if the business were to succeed, as well as to quiet his subjects in England and his friends elsewhere. This put Gondomar right back where he had started, for both the emperor and Albert would thus be consulted and treated with, meeting his spur-of-the-moment objections fully, and he had still gained no delay in the sending of Digby to Madrid. For a moment he was in a tight corner which, as he himself related, he barely managed to get out of: This decision of the king was taken and completed so quickly that I found no remedy by which to delay the going of the Baron Digby to Spain and prevent anyone's going to Flanders other than to propose that it would be to advantage for no one else to go to Brussels but the same Baron Digby, and thus, although with difficulty, it has been set on foot, and all the rest suspended until his return. As James described it to him, Digby's mission to Brussels would be much the same as before, simply expressing good will and seeking the intercession of the archdukes in the peacef"! restoration of the Palatinate, without speaking at all of any alliance with Spain. Gondomar thought Digby would depart at the end of the month. T h e advice which Gondomar gave to Madrid was a great deal more to the point than that which Van Male had given the archduke. Greatly moved, he said he hoped to G o d the Catholic armies would make more haste than this embassy to Brussels and finish off the conquest and the securing of whatever was to advantage in Germany, and all of the Palatinate. T o this end and for the handling of the affairs of Holland in general he said it seemed fitting to hear Digby's propositions graciously, but without getting down to particular details. Instead, one should keep the proceedings going as long as possible with "pleasing and general expectations" of a good settlement of the question, emphasizing the large part there would be to be played in this by the authority and intercession of the king of England and by his proceeding properly, obliging him thus really to stick to this proper course. This last, keeping James in a state of neutrality, was of the greatest importance to "the disunion and discomfort of the enemies and of those envious of the greatness of the House of Austria," f o r if

238

Spanish Espionage Put to the Test

James declared himself an enemy they would do the same, and would be joined by others who were not allied with them now only because they dared not without England. This consideration by itself he thought was of sufficient weight to dictate what should be done. And if this worked out, as it appeared it would (and as would be indicated by proofs and securities given in the matter), one could then proceed with further delaying tactics, negotiating the question of the restoration of the Palatinate with much publicity, with treaty conferences and embassies, in order to make James's subjects expect that an accommodation could be achieved by these means, making them feel no pressure in the matter so they would take no resolution to give James a vote of supply (in which the shrewd ambassador was aware they would be taxing themselves) until they saw how this less expensive course turned out. All this delay would also allow time for the anger of the English to fade, for their choler and hunger for war to pass, and it would create the same sort of indecision among the Protestant princes and others—during which time the Habsburg armies could continue completing their work. James was serious about trying to get a peaceful settlement, and he took a thoroughly realistic view of the problem, not concerning himself with the constitutional niceties involved: he did not claim to understand the Bohemian constitution, but even if the Estates really had the privilege of choosing their own king they had already chosen Ferdinand themselves, and it was apparent that his deposition could be "justified" only by the "right of rebellion," which (even had the principle been acceptable to James) was hardly a valid legal basis for negotiating the complete restoration of the lands of an impetuous prince who had met disaster while trying to replace the now-victorious emperor on his Bohemian throne. There were of course broader, Europe-wide matters involved, both religious and secular, but the negotiations in question were on a specific matter which, when considered as such, was solely a dispute between the emperor and one of his vassals, while England,

Gondomar in Mid-February, 1621

239

Spain, and the archdukes (though interested parties and friends of one or the other principal) were in reality only in the position of mediating agents. And, if his more zealous subjects had not, James had accepted the realities of the case: that between the two Frederick was plainly the offender and Ferdinand the offended; that Frederick had lost his own patrimony as a result of his offense; that in effect what was being asked was that the offended, having now defeated the offender and won back what had been taken from him, should agree to forgive and forget, restoring Frederick to his original comfortable and powerful state without any compensation to Ferdinand for the expenses of regaining his own from the usurper and moreover with part of Ferdinand's Austrian lands still in pawn to Bavaria as the price of recovering Bohemia; and that in negotiating this unlikely cause from a position of such disadvantage it was necessary to give some assurance that the foolish, incompetent, and thoroughly irresponsible Count Palatine would not violate any peaceful restoration himself. This latter necessity led James to offer to guarantee his son-inlaw's good conduct; since the bad conduct anticipated was that Frederick would resort to arms again in violation of agreements (which he later persisted in doing in the most senseless manner and at the worst conjunctures for his affairs), James's guarantee of course included a promise to use force if necessary to make Frederick behave. But this assurance (almost a matter of form, given the context) led Gondomar to follow his shrewd analysis and sage advice with a detour into cloud-cuckoo land—albeit of potential merit for prolonging the Palatinate negotiations, potentially dangerous to Spain's own negotiations for an English marriage: In this restitution of the Palatinate my opinion would be that Your Majesty should be pleased to join the negotiations for this with those for the marriage, and with this king making war on Holland, following the propositions he has made over it, and the restitution to Your Majesty of Virginia and Bermuda, to abandon and undo all the causes of disputes for the future, because if the King persecutes the Catholics of his Kingdoms and gives aid to the Hollanders, and wants to conquer the Indies, Your Majesty neither can nor ought to keep the peace with him, and if one has to have war it is better to have it possessing the

Spanish Espionage

240

Put to the

Test

Palatinate and [having its resources] on Your Majesty's side and not on his, and with that meat make him chew on the bones, which is what the liberty and benefit of the Catholics and Your Majesty's subjecting and reducing the States of Holland to obedience would be for him. In anv case, G o n d o m a r had contrived t o drag out

everything

possible f o r as long as possible, especially D i g b y ' s going t o Spain, f o r no preparations w e r e being made f o r that nor f o r the embassy t o the e m p e r o r until it was seen w h a t had been negotiated Flanders, w h i c h w o u l d give time, he said, f o r discovering

in

what

f u r t h e r steps should be taken. 5 In the meantime, keeping up his usual

bold

front

and—typical

of

the

constant

jockeying

for

position w h i c h characterized Anglo-Spanish relations o f t h e t i m e — keeping the initiative in Spain's hands, G o n d o m a r rmintaincd the pressure on J a m e s b y c o n t i n u e d

firmness

in that critical area

of

f r i c t i o n , those activities w h i c h the English carricd on at sea under various euphemistic names but w h i c h w e r e plain p i r a c y

to

the

Spanish. His r e p o r t o f the latest episode describes a fairly typical c h a p t e r in the c o n t i n u i n g m a t t e r and at the same time reveals b o t h the forwardness o f his actions in such cases and the f r a m e o f mind he was in at the m o m e n t : A t Dartmouth, a seaport of this kingdom, arrived a small Spanish ship of thirty tons, taken by a pirate. I knew of it at once and I sent an order from the marquis of Buckingham [sic] that those who came in it be made prisoner and brought here and the ship be embargoed. It was done thus, and he who came as captain, who is English and named King, confessed that this ship belonged to Spaniards and that the pirate who took it was one Thomas "Alveri," Englishman, who claimed to have letters of reprisal for debts and claims which he had in Flanders, in which he had not been done justice, and that they not having wanted to give him these letters of reprisal here he had gone to Holland and departed from there with a ship for the sea to rob Flemings and Spaniards to recover his debts; that he captured this ship on the coast of Galicia and that the crew had been put into a boat and had gone ashore; that in the ship there was found only a little iron. It was turned over to six of the crew "Alveri" had brought with him and this captain; and that sailing together the two ships encountered two Turkish ships so strong that they captured that of "Alveri," and seeing that he could not help him and that [the prize] was swift for flight he [i.e., K i n g ] fled, going back to Holland, and that

Gondomar

in Mid-February,

1621

241

the wind obliged him to put into the Port of Dartmouth, the vice-admiral of that place having assured him beforehand that they would do him no harm. It has been requested on the part of Spain that these pirates be hanged, and that the ship be turned over at once; the criminal action is in process, and the ship has already been ordered turned over; I intend to send it to Bayona in Galicia so that it can be found out there whose it is and be turned over to him. And although in a case of such small importance, it is such a good example [i.e., to discourage piracy], along with having done thus in other cases like this, that already there is no pirate who dares to bring a prize here [this is overstated, but not greatly], as has also been a very good example the imprisonment of Captain North, who is here in the T o w e r , his assets impounded and [also] the ship in which he went to the Amazon River. . . . T h e pressure that was being exerted b y "so many highly placed m e n " both on him and on James in the N o r t h case was making it difficult f o r him not to yield in his demands, but he knew he could manage it as an act of clemency

(as he had done in similar

circumstances in the past), turning a retreat and a concession into a demonstration of " p o w e r " to grant reprieves more impressive than that merely to get men punished, and in the process reap the additional benefit of putting the king under an obligation b y cooperating and allowing him to avoid what could be a troublesome situation: 6 James had enough disgruntled subjects on his hands already, and always appreciated help in avoiding having more. W i t h these things so well in hand and with V a n Male fallen into a momentary complacent somnolence at this critical juncture in D u t c h affairs, one tends to expect G o n d o m a r , master diplomat that he was, to come through and save the day once the time- and attention-consuming

matter

of

Digby's

mission

to

Spain

had

successfully been disposed of. But G o n d o m a r seems to have been suffering f r o m too much success. A s oversanguine of further success as V a n Male was complacent about current conditions, he unk n o w i n g l y paints, in his next dispatch to the king, a telling portrait of his state of mind: On the jth of January I gave an account to Your Majesty of how I had given this king the letter from Your Majesty, and how he had read

242

Spanish Espionage Put to the Test

it in my presence, and what he had said to me and I had replied to him over that which Y o u r Majesty said in it, he remaining in the end very satisfied with Your Majesty's manner of proceeding, and the going to Rome of Fray Diego de la Fuente, and that it was still up to him to get to work disposing here the things [he had agreed to concerning] the Catholic religion and the security and repose of the Catholics in such a manner that the end desired be arrived at, that His Holiness have just causes to approve of it and give it his blessing, and since then we have spoken about it several times to the same effect. And every day the practice and effects go on demonstrating that Your Majesty has managed this as it should have been, for the service of God and the universal good, because, to the propositions of France, of Holland, and of Venice, it is certain that he would have responded differently, and this is of even much less consideration than the souls that have been gained here and are gained daily, becoming converted and declaring themselves Catholics in infinite numbers with the silencing of the persecution, a thing which even those who themselves see it and enjoy it cannot bring themselves completely to believe; so much so that the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Secretary Naunton having heard or invented that the imprisoned priests had a printing press in the jail where they were and that they were printing books and libels against this king and that having gone to make search they did not find the printing press but they found with them all the Catholic books and controversial works against the heretics and against this king in great quantity and of great forcefulness; they were seized, and the money that they found with them. I spoke to the king about this, and finally he has ordered that the money be returned to them, and the books down to the last page, which has been a considerable thing; and these days this king has done many other magnificent acts in benefit of the Catholics without permitting that any vexation or molestation be done to anyone. But it is certain that the persecution in Ireland is very great, and that should the force that the Catholic religion has there today be lost through the artifices that this government manages insensibly to go on practicing. Your Majesty will lose the biggest advantage and position of strength [la mayor autoridad] that Your Majesty can have vis-a-vis this king in peace and in war, and it is accordingly a matter worthy of great consideration, and [one] which one should lose neither sight of nor time in finding a remedy for. In Scotland the Catholics are augmented every day, and much more the desire to be [Catholic] . . . I have given aid punctually (until now to the extent that I could) to that mission with the 1,200 ducats [ ¿ 3 0 0 ] per year that Y o u r Majesty sent me. . . . This king sent to me to say that I should see him Friday afternoon,

Gondomar in Mid-February, 1621

243

the 12th of this month. He told me what he customarily does of his amicable inclinations, and that in reply to the letter I gave him he would write to Your Majesty and was sending the letter to his ambassador, of which I have procured a copy, and I send it herewith to Your Majesty. He recounted to me in much detail the discourse he had made in Parliament, and that which he said in the matter of religion, sweetening it and putting the best construction on it, and offering the true manifestation by the effects, of which he told me much, and that he was still resolved to venture his all at the side and on the side of Your Majesty. And of the Puritans he said strong things to me over that which they print and attempt every day against Your Majesty and against him. H e told me also that from all parts his ambassadors and his friends were sending him copies of the declaration that he made and gave me that neither Your Majesty nor any minister of Your Majesty had given his word not to conquer the Palatinate, taking it as an invention on Spain's part, and certainly the pledge that he had confirmed the paper and the declaration that he also gave me against his son-in-law about the kingdom of Bohemia before his losing it, with which was well proved his respect for Your Majesty in not letting pass and be accepted as the truth the opinion they have everywhere contrary to this. H e gave me an account of his entry into the Church of Westminster when he went to Parliament, how the clergy came forth to receive him, how they gave him a pillow and he went to his knees. [ H e described] the procession that was made in the church and how everything that was sung was in Latin, and asked me if it did not seem to me that up to there it had gone in conformity with the Catholic Church. I asked him to tell me before I replied if the following day he had heard mass. But being much obliged by what he had told me I spoke with him truly with sincerity and love in the questions of religion, in that of his return to the Church and to the obedience of the pope, it being said in such a manner that he knew my good will, and appreciating it he told me that if these things are treated of without passion he took it f o r certain that an accord could be reached on them. W e conversed a little on the recognition of the pope as universal head, and in the end he came to submit to this, and told me gravely and with resolution that he would agree to recognize the pope as the universal head, of himself and of all Christianity, in things spiritual and ecclesiastical, and that the appeals of all the bishops in his kingdoms might be made to the pope, on condition that the pope not intermeddle in the temporal jurisdiction of his kingdoms, particularly in deposing and setting up kings at his will, and that his having written in his books that the pope was the Anti-Christ was because of his acting the part, but that if he

244

Spanish Espionage

Put to the

Test

did not do so he would accept him as pope and universal head. I asked him if he would carry it out as he had told it to me. He said that he would, and I asked for his hand on it, and he gave it to me, and permission to write of it to Your Majesty. It is certain that if I were recently arrived now in England I would weigh and extend these points further, but as I have already told Your Majesty so much about it, nothing need be added, more than that as a cause of God it could be that He is disposing and performing today that which seemed impossible yesterday. Gondomar was able to relate much more, of his further progress in the particulars o f the marriage agreement and of the ready acquiescence of James, Charles, Buckingham, and their advisers in all that Spain required. " W i t h which," he concluded, "it appears for now that all of this is going on well and with benefit and surety for the service of Y o u r Majesty in all occurrences." 7 But Gondomar was not keeping his eve on "all occurrences," and it was only next day that he got a rude jolt. 8 Before he had a chance to send off the advance copy he had procured of James's highly acquiescent letter to Philip, the man who had given it to him begged him frantically

to give it back, and to keep

no

duplicate. Something had obviously changed: the man claimed not to know if he was safe from one hour to the next, for if it were known what he had done it would cost him his life. Gondomar returned the letter at once and, as the man had asked, kept no other copy; he did, however, describe it to Madrid so it could be identified if it still were

sent, and

recounted

its

contents

as well as he could remember them. T h e letter, in substance, had spelled the success of Spanish policy; now it appeared it would not be sent, implying a reversal of English attitude, and Spanish failure. Gondomar was anxious to know from Madrid if what the English ambassador said was in conformity with the letter or a reversal of its position. 9 F o r Spain's own position, it turned out, was not so safe and secure after all. But still he did not suspect that anv of the danger, or clues to it, lay with the Dutch mission now in London: he made no further mention to Madrid of that mission until the month of May.

Van Male Blunders On As cases of espionage, there is something almost ludicrous in a comparison of the recent Cadenet mission and the present Dutch one. T h e former negotiations had been so tightly closed that not even Tillières was allowed to know their secrets, yet Van Male had known everything that had gone on almost immediately. N o w , instead of one envoy there were seven (the six deputies plus Caron), and their negotiations were open to the whole privy council, but what went on in these sessions was learned only sketchily, tardily, and with the true import still hidden. (Sterrell was not doing much better; even by the 24th of February he had little to report: " T h e Commissioners from Holland are here still his Majestie gave them audience long since & referred them to his counsell but as yet they have not declared what thcv woulde have, they are hammeringe some matter and doe attend the event of our Parliament & soe seeke delayes they are in number six, but to France they have sent sixteen.") 1 In V a n Male's role as a "privileged s p y " there were at the moment three principal things for him to watch: the Palatinate crisis, currently centering on Digby's mission to Brussels; the special embassy from the States General; and the current parliamentary session, which could end in a break with James, leaving him financially powerless to make war, or in the extremists' carrying the day, which would mean war against Spain (openly or b y subsidizing others). Since he could not devote the necessary attention to more than one if any one was to be "déchiffré au v i f " as the Cadenet mission

246

Spanish Espionage Put to the Test

had been, he was somewhat in the position of a man trying to beat the shell game: he had to guess under which shell the most immediate danger to the Habsburgs was concealed while daily events shuttled the pieces around like a carnival pitchman. As the Digby mission was an open book and going well, he knew it was not under that shell. H e had been "touted o f f " the Dutch mission (had not "one of the best and best-inclined" privy councilors assured him personally that that shell was empty?), while the great amount of activity in Parliament attracted and held his attention. It was on the latter that he placed his money. A s V a n Male sent off a further detailed account of the dangerous passages in Parliament, he wrote della Faille that a crisis was at hand between Parliament and the king that must come to a conclusion soon. "These waters," he said, "begin to overflow extremely. W e will soon know the determination of all these affairs." 2 T h e same day he wrote Albert that last Tuesday (the 23d) the Dutch deputies had met once more with the privy council over the same matters he had reported in his letter of the 19th. He had learned that they had run into opposition, that James was insisting that the Dutch quit the English and Scottish fishing grounds, which would upset them considerably since the Dutch gained so much from those fisheries, but in spite of all this it was understood that they would not break off with James whatever he said and for all his menaces because they knew they had to suffer all " f o r their own good and advantage." T h e Dutch in fact seemed pretty hopeless all the way round. As he told Albert, "In my letter of the 12th of this month I also told Y o u r Serene Highness how several officials from Holland had arrived here to make some levy of men to reinforce their companies, who have employed themselves in this secretly and until now I do not see that they have been able to get together more than two hundred. . . ." That, he concluded, was all that there was to report from there. 3 T h e parliamentary waters, where Van Male saw the immediate

Van Male Blunders On

247

danger, seemed indeed to be overflowing their banks, but "the determination of these affairs" was not to be known so soon—not until the eventual dissolution at the end of the year. Instead, he might well have looked under the Dutch shell, for "those rebels" were not as fearful of the Habsburgs and as anxious for a truce at any cost as he thought: the same day he wrote the above (February 26th) they proposed an invasion of Flanders. The memorial which the Dutch had presented to the privy council eleven days earlier, on the 15th, had been read and pondered by the king, and on the 20th his answer had been presented to the Dutch in a memorial from the council, in which James gratefully acknowledged the aid the States had given to Frederick and expressed the hope that they would continue to do so on the same scale, "His Majesty being resolved for his part to employ in this all his efforts, should his son-in-law wish to listen to his counsels and govern himself according to his paternal advice, following the resolution that His Majesty has already taken in this and declared to the world and which His Majesty will put into effect in the proper time and place." As to the second point of the deputies' instructions as elaborated on the 14th and 15 th, James asked for a list of specific charges of Spanish violations of the truce, with the particulars of the offenses and citing truce articles violated; he would send this to his ambassador to France for presentation to Louis XIII, in order that the two guarantors could take joint action to obtain satisfaction. As to who should make overtures regarding the expiration of the truce and the related alliances, James insisted that the Dutch were in the best position to know the state of their affairs and thus what would be most useful to propose: if they would propose something to James that would be for the good of their affairs, he "would be ready, like a true friend," to give it his most careful attention. James asked that they clarify their interpretation of the present treaties and how it was that they were expiring along with the truce (a point which seems not to have been clearly established); then

248

Spanish Espionage Tut to the Test

if things required it he would order commissioners to treat of this with them, but with the understanding that whenever these negotiations began they would come furnished with full powers and commission to treat of the fishery matter and other things that were left "suspended" at the last conference between his commissioners and those of the States because the latter had insufficient powers to treat of them. 4 T h e Estates had been ducking a settlement of these matters f o r a long time and James, while willing enough to hear their proposals about the expiring treaties and showing no signs of taking undue advantage of the nearness of the expiration date, showed no opposite signs of accepting this pressing time element as an excuse for further delay. In the language of diplomacy, the Dutch were told that James made this condition "to the end that by this means the ancient alliance and close relationship between the crowns of His Majesty and your provinces may be in all ways perfect and solid and consequently more useful and salutary to both the one and the other"; when this condition had been met James would, with all promptitude and expedition, do all that he could, "assuring himself that Your Lordships also will not fail in that which depends on your part." 5 The only thing Van Male knew of all this was the part about the fisheries, with no inkling of James's willingnesss to discuss military matters. T h e Dutch deputies, he reported, "still go on continuing their offices in order that this king declare himself over the particulars of the truce"; on this particular subjcct the ambassador's information continued to be unbelievably bad. He assured his sovereign with confidence that "many affirm to me that they [the Dutch] desire the continuation of it even though in public they give to understand the contrary. . . ." 6 One wonders if Van Male were still getting his information from the same privy councilor. On the 26th of February the Dutch presented their reply to James in a second memorial to the privy council. 7 "Those rebels" of whom Van Male was so contemptuous displayed considerable diplomatic finesse in this document, declaring that in the question

Van Male Blunders On

249

of the best means of redressing the affairs of the Palatinate (an altruistic-sounding phrase that covered the affairs of the United Provinces as well) they carried no instructions nor orders from the Estates to be so forward with His .Majesty as to prescribe to him the method required for the execution of the resolution he had taken "in favor of those of his royal blood" and their allies. The deputies had taken this tack from the beginning of the negotiations and they held to it at length now, dealing not with overtures of a new matter but inquiring blandly (and with much more deftness than Van Male suspected they possessed) what steps James intended to take to fulfill an assurance made in the Estates General by his ambassador the previous October that James would second their aid to Frederick, which they chose to regard as a firm commitment. 8 This ploy served a double purpose: it allowed the Dutch to escape the role of suppliants begging support, leaving James instead with his pledged word to fulfill; and it allowed them to make suggestions for implementing this though they had no commission at all to make proposals for renewing the expiring treaty—a useful distinction without, practically speaking, a difference. After having ritually declined to presume to suggest how James should go about giving the aid which they kept reminding him he had promised, they made their suggestions quite plainly—and in a manner quite unlike persons trembling for an extension of the truce. It was the manner, in fact, of men who had already firmly decided on the course they would take in their own defense, a course which they blandly admitted they had been ordered to employ "all sorts of persuasions" to get James to follow as well: to "proceed promptly from words to actions, from threats to blows." Without instructions they of course could not propose what James should do, but to be certain (since he had asked for some sort of statement) not to give him any reason for discontent, they stated to him "in all respect and reverence" that in their opinion there were only two apparent ways for the support of the Palatinate: for James either to send an army up the Rhine, or to divert

Spanish Espionage Put to the Test the enemy by "cutting out a job of work for him" in the Province of Flanders. At the moment, they pointed out, the difficulties of the first course were so evident that it would be completely unseasonable to wish to induce James to take it, not only because the enemy had had the advantage of much time during which they had seized "such a large number of towns and districts" in that area, besides fortresses they themselves had constructed "for their defense in several places," but also because the long period of lodging of troops of one side and the other had made such a drain on those lands, although very fertile, that James's armies could hardly find the wherewithal to maintain themselves. On the other hand, facility itself ought to he the principal argument for the diversion in Flanders and make James resolve on that course, as he was not unaware of how short and easy the passage was from the English coast to the Flemish one and how, being favored with the slightest winds, the supplies that would have to come from England could be sent on a day-to-day basis rather than having to build up large reserves, by which one could see that the expenses of this would be of small importance. And (to complete the case for how inexpensively it could be done), "it being the good pleasure of His Majesty to assail the enemy towns and fortresses in those parts with the force of a competent number of men of war, well armed and well led, we dare to assure him that he will find there a country endowed with an extraordinary abundance of foodstuffs and all sorts of other commodities very sufficient to keep the soldiery in fresh vigor and health." T h e y did not fail to point out that this soldiery would arrive in good condition to begin with, not having been subjected to "a long and painful voyage, the effects of which appeared only too clearly in the latest contingents which His Majesty sent to Germany [via Hamburg], a great number of which having been left along the way." Together with which, the deputies pointed out, the Estates already held "a notable part" of that province, and "so many fine towns and fortresses" in it, well supplied and "trusty," that all

Van Male Blunders On

251

that could be required to second James's efforts could be provided (by way of these Dutch-held parts of Flanders) from their neighboring provinces of Holland and Zeeland: this they pointed out especially, they said, for there would be "neither need to denude their country nor to overwork their cavalry, as not without risk to their own fortunes they have lately been constrained to do. Thus by these same means they would provide for their own defense and close the [lines of communication] to the enemy." On the other hand the archdukes would be in a bad way; for, not having provided sufficient forces in this province to guarantee it against invasion, they would find themselves forced to recall their army from the Palatinate and save that which touched them more closely. "These are in detail," the deputies said, "the means to which Your Majesty is gravely exhorted to agree, being the only remedy for the recovery of that which is already lost and particularly for guaranteeing of that which by the grace of God is still remaining." T h e y pointed out that this latter, fortunately, still included the areas in which the united princes had their principal forces and fortresses, but that once lost ( G o d forbid) to enemy conquest there was no likelihood at all that the loss would ever be restored. As to a peaceful restoration of the Palatinate, they begged James "in all humility" not to let himself "be duped by any fraudulent baits of accord," imagining that there would be any more chance of recovering a country after it was totally lost than when still only half lost. On the contrary, James should accept the fact that the long-time design of Spain was this: completely to incorporate all of Germany with themselves. T h e y reinforced this by citing letters that had passed between the emperor and the admiral of Aragon, verifying that the admiral had had a commission from the emperor to do just that; and by pointing out that "besides this the Spanish maxims are notorious to everyone, never to return by capitulations what has been conquered by arms, as witness the keeping of the Kingdoms of Naples and Navarre, the Duchv of Milan, the City of Wesel in our quarter, and since then the aggression of the land of the

252

Spanish Espionage Put to the Test

Valteline, and so many other famous examples, the recitations of which we need not go on to here." T h e y argued that it would not even be in the power o f the King of Spain or the archdukes to undertake the restitution of the Palatinate, as it would be put bv the emperor into the hands of "his Electors and other Papist princes" who at one stroke would bring in the Jesuits and with them "the horrors o f the Roman Idolatry" under the color o f maintaining it all for the emperor, subterfuges bv which James would find himself "delayed from day to day and deluded to the detriment of his reputation and the total ruin of his children and his closest allies." T h e deputies bore down heavily on the point they hoped would clinch their argument with the same finality with which it had convinced the Dutch themselves that prolonging the truce now would only leave them open to easy and certain conqucst later, which had decided them

firmly

that their only salvation lay in

making full-scale war, soon, against the Habsburgs: that if they were reduced to despair in default o f a prompt and "tempestuous" resolution the princes of the union would individually decide to seek "the last refuge of capitulation, which it is known several are already thinking of and to which thev have been incited b y way of promises and threats." Once these allies had been eliminated it would be only a short time before the Palatinate was completely beyond hope, "the T r u e Religion extirpated, the universal liberty of Germany trampled under foot and, of greatest consequence, the imperial crown transported to the House of Spain," to which, the deputies vowed,

"they

could never imagine

that

His

Majesty

would choose to open the way or give the slightest opportunity." In their closing exhortation the Dutch deputies did not even reiterate their request for help from James, simply "assuring themselves" that he would do his duty as "Protector of the Reformed Christian religion." In doing so they somewhat undermined their own proposals for military action on James's part; more important in the present context, they made it abundantly clear—a fact which Van Male and Albert could most profitably have known—that they intended to make every effort they were capable of, with

or

Van Male Blunders On

253

without James, to prevent the catastrophe they foresaw before it was too late. T h e government in Brussels was still proceeding on the basis of Van Male's advice and the false information that had been planted on him. T h e v were sorely in need of being disabused, and William Sterrell in fact passed on a rumor that might have undeceived the archdukes and their advisers. Delia Faille's correspondent had found " b y some that converseth with their comissioners that they give out that if his Majestie will send 20,000 men to joyne with their forces they will force the Archdukes to recall Spigniola, & soe restore the Palatinate whether the Emperor will or nott." But Sterrell missed the implication of the proposal, noting only the unlikelihood that James would actually launch such an expedition : "But they speak f o r themselves, but I am of the opinion his Majestie followe a peaceable course if it may be done upon reasonable tearmes." 9 T h e whole final sentence was perfectly accurate but, pleased with the latter prospect, Brussels was to prove as blind as Sterrell to the real truth of the first part of it: T h e Dutch were indeed speaking for themselves, and what they were speaking of was an early attack on the largest possible scale. As for Van Male, the further information he received was fragmentary and inaccurate, misleading or misinterpreted, and in timeliness he was falling even further behind. On the 5th of March he reported to Albert on a meeting of the 2d between the Dutch and the privy council. T h e Dutch had thanked James once more for past favors and said that they had come to ask his advice and consent on matters because the truce was expiring; they begged to be told what they should do, begged for a continuation of their alliance with James, and made great complaints about Spanish violations of the truce. Van Male recounts the answers James had ordered given to them: that they knew their own circumstances best and should make the suggestions themselves, in writing so he could see them (James had given this answer two weeks earlier, of course, and the Dutch response was by now a week old), and "that he did not

254

Spanish Espionage Put to the Test

k n o w what they meant" b y the continuation of the treaty with England since they had treated it so badly on various occasions (James had not complained on this point, but had simply asked for clarification, a definition of terms, to facilitate

negotiation,

and the deputies were at that very time preparing the statement he had asked). James had actually only insisted that the Dutch commissioners w h o would treat of an extension of the treaty be armed with powers to negotiate at the same time a settlement of other disputes, y e t V a n Male reported that James demanded full settlement of these first "and that then he would see what would be advisable to do with them." James had asked for specifics of their charges of truce violations so he could send them to the king of France, his fellow guarantor, for joint action, seeking satisfaction for the Dutch; V a n

Male's

report says approximately this, but in very different terms: [James said] that neither did he know what grounds they had for making complaints against Your Highness and the king of Spain and that thus they could put their grievances in writing for him to send to the king of France as an interested party in the treaty of the truce, and after having examined them, whatever was just would be done. T h e deputies acted very dissatisfied with this reply and commenced to grumble, but they still do not lose hopes of negotiating successfully by means of the many friends they have in this court and other new ones they go on conquering with gifts and bribes. 10 In the same mail, in code and with obvious alarm, Van Male revised his previous estimate of the success of the Dutch levies going on in England. H e saw now that troops were being raised at such a pace there was not a ship departing for Zeeland (which would include all merchant ships going to the staple at Middleb u r g ) that did not carry up to sixty or seventy men, and he had been given confirmation that in the past two weeks close to t w o thousand had left London for those parts. " A n d every day they continue the levy, giving to understand that they are only volunteers, which is the pretext they have always held t o . " V a n Male found this last distinctlv unfair. U n d e r the T r e a t y of

Van Male Blunders

On

255

London anyone could levy volunteers freely, but impressments were strictly regulated. Van Male complained that the way these regulations were applied, levies could be raised and sent off "without difficulty so long as they were going to serve the Hollanders, but those who want to serve Your Highness are judged to have been impressed, or have to have a special license, or take the oath, and are held to be traitors. . . ." He was most upset about this, and perhaps this explains why his attention was still so badly focused; in any case he seems not to have asked himself if the Dutch might not have been raising these troops for an offensive action. 11 On the 8th of March the deputies from Holland reinforced their case—and put their bellicose intentions beyond doubt—with a long memorial (ten folio pages, with twice the usual wordage crowded into each), 12 to which they attached the declaration James had requested of specific violations of the truce, the money damages in each case, and the articles violated. They forcefully reiterated their request that James invade Flanders in conjunction with their own military operations, urging strongly the critical need for prompt action since the state of affairs was such that the princes of the union were reduced to a position in which, without prompt military support, they would be constrained to choose between having (in defeat) "their necks under the yoke of their enemies" or to seek terms of settlement individually as best they could. This was already proceeding apace, the princes, in their trouble, having been subjected for a long time now to the "fallacious blandishments" of the enemy, and this the Dutch were sure will be in every case the highway of their universal route to the ruin of their hereditary lands; to the suppression of the liberty of G e r m a n y ; to the misery and calamity of so many souls, w h o in place of the T r u e Religion, the sharing of which for years G o d has granted them the blessed enjoyment, will be crushed once more under the Roman abominations; and finally to the advancement of the Papistical League, b y means of which the monarchy of Europe will be reduced into the hands of such w h o at all times look to nothing but that [universal monarchy].

2j6

Spanish Espionage Put to the Test

The Dutch made it completely clear why they were asking James's aid in this: they felt they did not have the resources bv themselves to do what was necessary, as the truce was running out and they had to concentrate their efforts on "the defense of their own state and provinces against the assaults of their powerful hereditary enemy"—that is, they must anticipate the inevitable attack by the Spanish, who would not fail "to inflate the vanity of their ambitions with the wind of their victories and conquests." The Dutch had only one thing in mind: to prevent that "wind of . . . victories and conquests" from blowing through Germany so that it would not then, as they knew it must, sweep over their own petit coin de terre. The deputies thanked James politely for his request for their opening proposals regarding a continuation of the truce and for his concern to help them procure it; having said this they then made certain that misunderstanding on that point was cleared up once and for all: it had not been their intention in any way to go into the business of the truce at all. That, they said (begging the king's pardon), could not have been "the sense of the words" of their proposal, "such in the end being neither the charge nor the instruction" that they held from the States. The States had seen plainly enough the Spanish preparations for war against them, and they were not seeking a continuation of the truce, but rather were preparing to fight. The deputies spelled it out clearly: the truce was expiring and along with it the English alliance; "Forget the truce," they said in effect, but added explicitly that they did have "orders to enter into serious communication" with James about the latter—to hear what he had to offer and to receive his answer to their own suggestion of a joint military operation in the Province of Flanders. As Van Male and della Faille had found so amusing, these Dutch rebels were not the refined and genteel sort one was accustomed to in diplomatic circles. The quality of their French ranged from bad to worse, and their command of conventional rules of rhetoric was no better. Instead of building up carefully to their main point they stated it bluntly, idiomatically, graphically

Van Male Blunders On

25 7

and—most of all—tenaciously, over and over again. Sterrell had chosen the right word: they not only were "hammeringe" something out but hammered at the same point constantly: the only salvation for all lay in attacking the enemy as soon as possible. T h e y explained in detail the history of the making of their treaty with England and specified each side's military obligations under it. This, they said, was the alliance whose renewal they had been ordered to hear overtures on, as, with the truce ending, they needed to guarantee themselves on all sides, not waiting for the war to begin again. W h a t they were especially after was to know what sort of aid they could count on from James: precisely "where, what and how." T h e y went to great lengths to explain their difficult position in regard to a settlement of the fishery question at such a critical moment (their presentation was full of contradictions and logically untenable, but the sheer quantity of the difficulties they described did much to offset this), and promised James full satisfaction in this and other disputes as soon as the crisis was over. Whereupon they urged once more, in conclusion, that James declare himself for a renewal of the military alliance—promptly, for the truce was running out.

Denouement: The Pecquius Mission to The Hague T h e Spanish Hahsburgs were as conscious as the Dutch were that the truce was running out. Counsels were badly divided in Madrid on what should be done about it and, especially considering the turmoil and confusion that existed there at the time, it was to be expected that the lead in the matter would be taken by the archdukes, and that the bellicose wishes of the numerous hotheads in Spain would not greatly affect the decision as to whether an extension should be tried for. Albert, for his part, had been laying the groundwork for such negotiations for some time through a secret and subtle intrigue with the prince of Orange himself. Much mystery remains about the details of this affair, but the central facts of the case are well known: 1 One Mme 't Serclaes, a Catholic living in Holland, had been acting as intermediary, and all winter the old lady had been shuttling back and forth across the border arranging a deal according to which the archdukes would send an embassy to the States General just before the truce ran out, stating Albert's terms for opening negotiations, and Maurice would come out strongly in favor of accepting them; his support, thrown into the balance of divided counsels in the States almost at the zero hour, would assure agreement to all that Albert demanded. T h e old Dutch warhorse, son of William the Silent, and Albert's own redoubtable opponent for a decade before the truce, had evidently changed his ways considerably; Van Male's intelligence from England had only reinforced Albert's belief in this scheme.

Denouement

259

The truce was due to expire on April 10th. On March 16th the archduke made his formal request that the mission be received, in carefully worded letters to Maurice and the States General, and had the Audiencier Verreyken do likewise in a letter to Frans Aerssens, heer van Sommelsdyck, Keeper of the Rolls, whose job it would be to arrange the details. Confident of a compliant answer, Albert and Isabella that same day signed the instructions for the extraordinary ambassador, Pierre Pecquius, seigneur de Bouchaut, councilor of State, chancellor of Brabant. Albert's confidence was quickly rewarded: on the 18th—about as soon as was humanly possible—Aerssen replied that the States had ordered accommodations provided for Pecquius and his party whenever they found it convenient to come.2 Pecquius set out almost immediately, accompanied by a suite headed by Jean de Gavarelle, Pensionary of Antwerp, and Cornelius van Haymbeke, secretary of the City of Brussels. They arrived in Rotterdam on the 21st, and were to proceed to The Hague by way of Delft the following day. The public had learned of their coming through the letters sent on the 16th, word had spread quickly through Holland, and the Reformed ministers in The Hague, Delft, and Rotterdam had been preaching violent sermons "to make the said commission [believed to be for a continuation of the truce] odious to the people, saying that it was for no other end than to trick them and that, just as the first treaty of the truce had been a kiss of Judas, the proposition of the said Chancellor would be the second." Thus it was not entirely unexpected when there was a large crowd gathered at Pecquius' door next morning, nor when he and his party were followed by large crowds in an ugly mood all the way to the place where they were to embark to pass over to Delft. 3 Nevertheless, Pecquius sent word ahead to Maurice and others that "it had missed by very little that the Rotterdammers and particularly the mariners had done him an affront"—or worse. The party arrived in Delft without further incident and stopped in a lodging there to eat and await notice about the house to be occupied in The Hague. Lodewijck van Tempel, the mayor of Louvain, and three other gentlemen from Brabant already in The

2Óo

Spanish Espionage Put to the Test

Hague came to Delft to bid Pecquius welcome and to tell him that the prince of Orange and the States General had ordered a house readied for him in T h e Hague, which they would pay for. During the meal the chancellor received a warning that the people of Delft [le menu peuple] were gathering in all parts of the city "and were commencing to use indiscreet and insolent words at the door of the said lodging and in other parts." Pecquius had the chief constable of Delft called "so he could put this in order," and, as Pecquius conceded, he did the best he could. But as soon as Pecquius and his company had embarked (one of their two boats was not yet covered and gave no protection) "it was an amazing thing to see the people run beside them on the bank on one side and the other," hurling abuse, reviling them savagely, exactly as though "they had seen their worst enemies and traitors to the country." T h e mob did not stay satisfied for long with mere insults and threats; they soon began showering Pecquius and his party with clods of dirt and chunks of peat. Instead of obeying the chief constable's commands to desist, they began throwing stones as well, and kept up the barrage all the way to the edge of the city and beyond, following alongside and trailing after, pelting the embassy with whatever came to hand, for another quarter league. At that point the envoys encountered the majordomo of the States General, come to meet them in a boat which had been sent on the part of the prince of Orange to conduct them the rest of the way. T h e majordomo was hit on the hat several times with clods, but they finally got away from the mob and about a quarter league from T h e Hague were met by the prince himself, accompanied by his brother Frederick Henry "and other principal lords of his court." T h e mission—a pleasant change—was well received by them. T h e prince of Orange had Pecquius enter his own coach and did him "much honor"; the chancellor was seated on Maurice's right, Frederick Henry, the mavor of Louvain, and Dom Miguel of Portugal, son of Dom Antonio, all entered the carriage, the rest of the embassy got into others, and they all rode together to the

Denouement

261

excellent lodgings the States General had provided for them in T h e Hague. T h e prince of Orange made a further show of courtesy to the ambassador and returned to his palace. There had been no such disorders in T h e Hague as had marred their passage through Delft. It was time now to begin putting into effect the plan Mme 't Serclaes had traveled so many winter miles to arrange. Next morning Pecquius sent a circumspect note to the Dutch principal in the conspiracy "to find out if he thought it well that he come to kiss hands and treat of the business of his commission"; but Maurice replied that it would be better first to address himself to the States General. Pecquius accordingly sent an envoy to beg audience of the States, but instead of answering they sent back to ask to see his letters of credence before they proceeded further. A f t e r they had seen these—and made certain they were being addressed properly therein, and not as vassals—they sent two of their deputies with a pair of coaches, and in these he was conducted at eleven that morning (March 23d) to the meeting place of the States General. When he entered the chamber he found the prince of Orange seated at the head; the session was being presided over by a deputy from Overysel, and Pecquius was seated opposite him. Pecquius made his "reverences" and went directly into his discourse. It was a speech that had been worked over long and carefully, read and approved (in French) by the archduke, and translated into Dutch f o r delivery before the States in that language. It was a most touching speech, filled with the archdukes' heartfelt concern over the prospect "in these final days of the truce" of their "common motherland, the L o w Countries" being plunged anew into bitter and bloody war, and their strong desire to preserve the peace they had all enjoyed for twelve years. T h e most cynical could not doubt the sincerity of the words Pecquius spoke for the archdukes, could not doubt their deep humane sentiments, their desire above all for the good of their country; it was truly a most beautiful speech. But it was also a stupid speech, for the operative part of the whole

2Ó2

Spanish Espionage

Ftit to the

Test

proposal was the unqualified condition that the Northern Provinces return to the obedience of their rightful sovereigns, their "natural princes," prior to any negotiations regarding an extension or renewal of the truce. T h e condition was couched in the most amicable terms, but its tone did not one whit change its meaning—especially when everyone knew that (the archdukes being childless) the sovereignty in question would soon revert to the king of Spain, and there was probably not a Dutchman present who would not sooner have given allegiance to Antichrist. T h e deputies were dumfounded at such a demand; while some sat shaking their heads in protest and amazement the presiding officer skipped the usual courtesies and told Pecquius coldly that he should put the proposal in writing, signed by his own hand, and they would consult about it. When Pecquius had done this the two deputies who had brought him returned him to his lodging. T h e archduke's demand had obviously not gone down so well with the States; now it was time for Maurice to do his part. Having granted Pecquius an audience, the prince right after lunch sent his majordomo for him with two coaches. W h e n he arrived at the palace Pecquius found the prince awaiting him at the carriage stop, an especially courteous gesture; Maurice conducted him personally into his apartments with "much honor" and even seated him in a better chair than his own. It was proceeding nicely; Pecquius presented his letters of credence and made some preliminary discourses "to make the proposition agreeable to him and induce him to interpose himself in it with his authority." Maurice replied in what Pecquius described as "grave (but courteous) terms"—but he offered no help. T h e members of the States, Maurice said, had been astonished to hear the ambassador's proposition; such a proposal could be nothing but odious there, for the Dutch took it as "an undoubted and infallible maxim" that they had "absolute and entire liberty" which had been recognized and declared both before the truce was made and by the tenor of that document. T h e States were so firm in this position (a fact he had failed to mention to Mme 't Serclaes) that there was not anyone among them who would dare mention a word that

Denouement

263

would bring it even indirectly into question, for fear of paying f o r it with his head. In his judgment, Maurice said, they must be extremely illinformed in Brussels about the United Provinces, about the disposition of affairs and of men's hearts there, to think that such a proposition could have any other effect than to animate the States all the more resolutely to maintain their independence. When Pecquius protested, Maurice told him there was not the slightest possibility of any such agreement ever being reached—not even under some such innocuous title for the archduke as "protector," f o r after the truce negotiations had been completed in 1609, he said, a document of instruction had been found in the house in T h e Hague where Richardot had lodged, according to which the slightest sort of recognition would give "an opening and a means" by which the rule of the United Provinces could be usurped (the prince's word, Pecquius pointed out in his report). Pecquius continued to argue, Maurice remained unmoved, and finally there was nothing left for the ambassador to do but leave. T h e prince later told the mayor of Louvain the same as he had Pecquius, and added that even if Pecquius had commission to speak of extending the truce in its present form and tenor, "it would be very difficult to lend an ear to it" now that so unacceptable a demand had been made and taken so ill. Van Tcmpel was told that never since the Estates had been the Estates had any prince used such language to them as the chancellor had, and that as a result of his proposition "all the United Provinces, not only Gomarist but also Arminian and Catholic, had reunited and redoubled their determination to maintain themselves against the Spanish" even if the effort consumed everything they had in the world. Pecquius, however, kept hearing that there were some in the Estates General of a much different opinion. Hoping for the best, and keeping in contact with the French and English ambassadors to engage their aid in reaching some sort of accord, he stayed around for two days waiting for the Estates' reply. That body meanwhile was dividing its time between arguing over how ac-

264

Spanish

Espionage

Put to the

Test

curately their sentiments could fittingly be stated in that reply and demands that payment for lodging this outrageous embassy be stopped and Pecquius be told to leave. The same two deputies came with the States' formal answer on the 25th; it was definitely in the negative. Although Pecquius had it on good authority that it had been very much watered down in committee from its earlier more virulent versions, it took considerable effort for him to retain his composure while he read it in their presence; he succeeded in controlling himself, however, and managed to tell them with icy detachment that he had believed that his proposition would be given better consideration, more in keeping with the spirit in which it had been made. His last words to the deputies who had delivered the document were that he would see what there was to be done—but there was nothing at all to do. Maurice declined even to allow a formal leave-taking at the palace, but did come to see him off next morning, repeating that it was impossible to treat with the Estates of anything concerning peace in the mood they were now in. When the ambassador complained of his treatment in Delft and asked a safe-conduct for himself and his party, the prince granted him one willingly, deploring the fury of the populace but remarking that they were so rabid for war that it was hard to control them. Maurice provided an escort, including the majordomo of the States General and the captain and twelve musketeers of his own guard, to spirit them back to safety; the party left T h e Hague very early in the morning, managed to get past Delft before the city gates were open, and arrived back in Rotterdam at seven. There, the governor and the principal captains of the garrison had also risen early for the occasion, deployed their soldiers to hold a passage against the citizenry, and awaited the party at the water's edge; when he arrived they put the unhappy ambassador in their midst and marched the convoy through the center of Rotterdam. The precautions were timely, for "a large multitude of people who had recognized him" gathered and followed, and began stoning Pecquius and his party in spite of all the protection provided. Had he not had that protection the crowd would, he was sure, have

Denouement

265

"done worse"; with it, they all reached the other side of the city and the armed ship the prince of Orange had waiting for them there and, the escort still with them, they all got away safely b y water. This was the 27th of March, 1621. Somewhere in the south of Germany the first of the great condottieri of the Thirty Years W a r , Count Ernest Mansfeld, was rampaging through the countryside, headed west, with Tilly in pursuit. T h e Habsburgs had hoped to catch Mansfeld between Tilly's army and Spinola's Palatinate forces, but Spinola had to start pulling the greater part of the A r m y of Flanders back to the Netherlands to face the Dutch, leaving only a small force in the Palatinate under Fernández Gonsalvo de Córdoba. N o b o d y knew when the Dutch blow would fall (they were already attacking outposts, beheading garrisons); nobody knew where A4ansfeld would strike; all anyone knew for certain was that something near panic was beginning to spread, and that on April 23d Ambrogio Spinola, who should have been finishing off the Palatinate and guarding against Mansfeld, arrived back in Brussels to begin, ready or not, the fight against the Dutch. 4

Epilogue In the w o examples recounted in the foregoing chapters Spanish Habsburg policymakers proceeded, in their conduct of foreign affairs, on the basis of intelligence reports f r o m England. In both cases what was needed was time, a period of quiet in troubled areas which would enable them to postpone imminent and seemingly inevitable conflicts until a more propitious time. In the case of the Valteline the information from England was good, the decision taken was good, and the necessary time was gained; in the case of the Dutch attitude toward a continuation of the truce the information was bad, the decision equally so, and the time, necessary or not, was lost. H o w sweeping are the more general conclusions that one may draw from this? N o t very. T h e present writer finds himself unable to subscribe to single-cause theories, even when he himself has expended considerable time and labor on the causative factor in question, and there is no attempt here to expound a single-cause thesis of "espionage-report determinism," nor even to credit the Decline of the Spanish Empire to the error of complacency of Jean-Baptiste Van Male. T h e goal of the present work has been, rather, to delineate the making of policy decisions, right and wrong, and to underscore the importance of the role played in this process by information. T o this end it seems sufficient to concentrate on effects in given cases and to draw conclusions no more generalized than Gardiner's summary of the Pecquius fiasco: To the utter consternation of all but the one man [Maurice] who held the thread of the ['t Serclaes] intrigue, the ambassador made a formal demand that the Provinces should return to their allegiance. . . . Maurice

Epilogue

16-j

had gained his end. The insult was resented equally by Calvinisr and Arminian, by the seamen of Holland and the farmers of Utrecht. The Archduke had supposed that if his first proposition were rejected there would be time to negotiate upon a fresh basis. He now found that he had roused a spirit which made all negotiations impossible. The renewal of hostilities followed almost immediately.1 Just as Maurice told the Chancellor Pecquius, they were rather badly informed in Brussels about the Dutch feelings at the time; if Van Male's performance had been up to its usual standard this would not have been so. This latter assertion (my own, not Gardiner's) is of course selfevident, yet the importance of the role played by information (or in this case the lack of it) in the making of foreign policy decisions requires some emphasis. T h e same fine historian quoted above, for example, says that, during the other extraordinary mission to London which has been described, Cadenet "could get no definite answer to his suggestions about the Palatinate and the Valteline." 2 T h e contrary of course was the case, and knowing that he did get a definite answer (and knowing what that answer had been) was, as has been shown, of considerable help to Spanish Habsburg policymakers in gaining a more accurate view of the problem at hand; one hopes that knowing they did have that information (and that it influenced the course of events) may contribute, however slightly, to the slow and laborious process of gaining a more accurate view of the past. If, in contributing that particular fragment of knowledge, a small but sound stone is contributed to the large and rambling edifice of History as we know it, then the modest goal of the present work will have been fulfilled. Still, one must seek whatever broader significance such bare facts contain—a much more subjective matter. T h e scope of the conclusions to be drawn regarding the role played by secret intelligence in the shaping of human history is largely governed by the degree of influence one allots, in one's deterministic interpretations, to impersonal and perhaps immutable forces, and how much remaining credit one allots to the positive acts of men. Regardless of what Van Male reported to Brussels, it seems most

268

Epilogue

unlikely that a renewal of the Spanish-Dutch war, on the old full scale, would not have occurred sometime not too long after the expiration of the truce. This seeming inevitability might be described as the working out of the historical equation; the fulfillingO of the two nations' historic missions;7 the resolution of the inevitable conflict between two antithetical forces. It is perhaps as accurate a measure as any of the present writer's commitment to such deterministic notions that it seems much nearer the point to suggest that a renewal of open warfare was merely "in the cards," f o r an overemphasis on the inevitability of that conflict (or almost any such example) leads insensibly to the assumption that its outcome was also predetermined (which mav or mav not be true), and even the very details of the course events would take. T h e present writer's chief objection to the latter is that it removes the actors from the stage and has the drama acted out by the scenery, giving a much-distorted view of the human comedy, f o r when it is denied that the "historical equation" is a human equation there is no room for evaluating the effect on events of the accession to the Spanish throne of an arrogant sixteen-year-old with adolescent dreams of military glory, determined to prove he was really king, whose signature became in a matter of days (did he use a stencil?) indistinguishable from that of his dead father; no room for wondering w h y the register book of James's correspondence in French (which he used with the Dutch) shows nothing written either to Maurice or to the States from before the White Mountain until well after the expiration of the truce, and then only to complain about Dutch offenses against the English; no room for pondering the effect of replacing the supple Gondomar in London with so inflexible a man as Don Juan Hurtado de Mendoza, marques de Hinojosa, the last man in the world who should have tried to use Gondomar's methods, and with Carlos Coloma, a singleminded soldier whose only thoughts were to get back into action; no room for considering Olivares' desire at least as early as 1626 (shortly after Spain's smashing victory at Breda) to renew the truce—why he desired it, whv he failed; and perhaps most important of all there is no room in over-impersonal theories for

Epilogue

269

considering how much of the "inevitability" of war, both in the Netherlands and in Europe as a whole, was caused by the plethora of diplomatic activity—a long, redundant, and increasingly futile series of positive acts bv men—leading to a situation in which the principal characteristic of diplomacy was that there was too much of it, the currcncy of diplomacy so debased that that last alternative to war (save surrender) was no longer of any practical use. Faulty intelligence from Van Male of course affected nothing more than the timing of war's renewal and in that regard is rather ill-suited to a discussion of broad deterministic forces, but its very irrelevance—or rather the degree of it—is most relevant here, for one wishes to assert that the History of the course of human events undoubtedly involves causes, but being made up of events—a series of specific occurrences—it is the events (and not History) that have, in the first instance, "causes," and that humans take a prominent part in "causing" human events. In sum, international affairs of the time in question here involved certain existing conflicts which no one was likely to avoid and entailed circumstances mere humans could hardly control (such as the geographically deterministic fact that the Valteline was the only pass through the Alps available to Spain, and thus a strategic bottleneck), but the conduct itself of international affairs was a series of positive acts (or refusals to act) resulting from specific decisions made by men; latent conflict between peoples, ideologies, or interests of course underlay overt hostilities, but it was individual ministers, councils, and kings who issued the orders that set armies marching. And men, be they policymakers or candlestick makers, can form decisions only on the basis of what they know or believe to be true. T h e generalization ventured here is a simple one: that foreign policy is fundamentally a matter of decisions made; that the quality of those decisions (and thus of the foreign policy) is governed by the quality of the men making them and by the quality of the information on which they are based; and that the quality of the information is even more important to the quality of the decision than that of the men.

270

Epilogue

It is probable that, in the two examples that have been detailed, the quality of the policymakers was higher in Brussels than in Madrid; the conditions for decision-making were at least far better in Brussels than in the climate of overthrow that prevailed in Spain. Yet in the case of the Madrid decision the information was accurate and the results were good, while the decision to send Pecquius on his fool's errand was based on faulty information and the result was a shambles, giving some basis for the assertion that the quality of the informational base of policymaking was even more important than the quality of the ministers and councilors guiding the destiny of nations. Men of sufficient incompetence could of course make wrong decisions no matter how good the information available to them, but no matter how able the persons involved correct information was a sine qua non of right decisions. Inasmuch as it is usually considered that the Spanish won the long diplomatic fencing match they were engaged in with James, it may be fitting to conclude "hammeringe" out the argument by quoting one more report of secret intelligence, this one written in Madrid by an Englishman on the day of Cadenet's secret conference in London with Buckingham (every detail of which Van Male knew within forty-eight hours), for the information and guidance of the English king in the conduct of his Spanish affairs. The Spanish at the time had no intention of going through with the longnegotiated marriage and were sending Fray Diego de la Fuente to Rome so the breakdown could be blamed on the pope's refusal to grant a dispensation; to give the device an extra twist of deviousness Fuente had been made to travel via Madrid so as to drag out the denouement as long as possible. On this crucial matter, and at this crucial time, the intelligence James received from Madrid was: "The fryer that came lately out of England (who was this Kings Agent there) is now going to Roome and they Speake here of that business [the marriage] as if it were already effected."3

Notes ABBREVIATIONS

Add. Ms. BCRH CSPV

DNB

Est. LCL

SP

USED IX T H E

NOTES

Additional Manuscripts, British Museum Bulletin de la Commission royal d'histoire (Brussels) Calendar of State Papers . . . Venice Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid Documentos inéditos para la historia de España (new series): vols. I-IV: Correspondencia oficial de Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, Conde de Gondomar, ed. A. Ballasteros Beretta, Madrid, 1936-45 Dictionary of National Biography Sección de Estado, Archivo General de Simancas H. Lonchay, J. Cuvelier, and J. Lefèvre, eds., Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne sur les affaires des Pays-Bas au XVlie siècle, 6 vols., Brussels, 1923-37 Microfilms de Vienne, Archives Générales du Royaume de Belgique, Brussels Papiers d'Etat et de l'Audience, Archives Générales du Royaume de Belgique, Brussels Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire (Brussels) Revue des cours et conférences (Paris) Secrétairerie d'Etat et de guerre, Archives Générales du Royaume de Belgique, Brussels State Papers, Public Record Office, London

N O T E TO

A Note on

Method

i. Though necessarily approximate because of fluctuations in exchange and interest rates and conversion fees, the ratios used are as accurate as any single set can be when applied to the whole period. The Spanish ducat, including the felipe, usually contained ten reales, and the écu of the Spanish Netherlands was about equal in value; the pound sterling was usually considered worth forty reales. For the ducado see, e.g., DIE, 1, 128, and III, 270; and Add. Mss 3 1 1 1 1 - 2 , esp. 31111/iff, where Gardiner also uses the 4:1 ratio. For the écu see, e.g., Lonchav, "Recherches sur l'origine et la valeur des ducats et des écus espagnols. Les monnaies réelles et les monnaies de compte," Bulletin de VAcadéniie royale de Belgique, Classe des lettres . . . , 1906, pp. 517-614; and Add. Ms 14006/149-167V., an undated discourse on the "Brabant ducat" (some confusion is caused by the contemporary habit of referring to the écu in Spanish as ducado, and to the ducado in French as écu). Many contemporary documents indicate the 10:1 ratio for the florin; a more convenient confirmation: the Dutch debt to Elizabeth is stated by Birch (Historical View, p. 395, citing Rymcr, Rushworth, and the Cabala) as 8,000,000 florins and by Davies (Early Stuarts, p. 49) as £ 800,000.

N O T E S TO

About Spies and Such

1. Delia Faille's summary was sent to Albert under cover of [della Faille] to [?], [Brussels], 27 Feb. 1621; both are in PEA 1890/3. 2. Joseph Lefèvre, "Juan de Mancicidor, secrétaire d'Etat et de guerre de l'archiduc Albert, 1 5 9 6 - 1 6 1 8 , " RBPH, I V

( 1 9 2 5 ) , 6 9 7 - 7 1 4 , dates the

cease-fire from 1606 (p. 701), which is probably accurate from a practical point of view, though the formal declaration of cessation of arms did not come until 24 April 1607, for which see, e.g., Add. Ms 14027/183&V.

N O T E S TO C H A P T E R

I.

The Peacemaking

Phase and Its

Product

i. See, e.g., "Correspondance de l'Archiduc Albert avec les députés d'Angleterre pour négocier le traité de Vervins," Jan.-Sept. 1598, in PEA 429/2. The strength of Elizabeth's desire for a peace settlement shows in many of the documents relative to Vervins and to the subsequent negotiations at Boulogne, Calais, London, etc.; see, e.g., PF.A 367 passim.

Notes

to i. The

Peacemaking

Phase

273

2. G . Scaramelli (secretary, Venetian embassy in London) to the Doge and Senate, 26 June 1603, CSPV, X , 55. 3. Da vies, Early Stuarts, pp. 49-50. This did not violate England's obligations to the United Provinces as arranged by treat)' in 1598. 4. S e e , e.g., PEA 640/4 and 1 9 7 6 / 1

passim.

5. Joseph Cuvelier, "Les préliminaires du traité de Londres (29 août 1 6 0 4 ) , " RBPH, II ( 1 9 2 3 ) , 279-304, 4 8 J - 5 0 8 passim.

A l b e r t made his

first

overtures by means of a conventional embassy of congratulation to James on his accession to the English throne, performed by Charles, count of Arenberg; his instructions, dated 3 June 1603, are on microfilm in MV 44. T h e peace commission went early the following year, headed by Arenberg (whose offices included those of chef des finances and amiral de la mer), Jean Richardot, sire de Barly (chef-président of the Privy Council) and Louis Verreyken (audiencier and first secretary); all were councilors of state. Their instructions, of 12 April 1604, are on microfilm in MV 4 j , a volume relating mostly to the treaty negotiations. Originals of these and the more extensive minutes for them are at PEA 358/398-410. PEA 358 also contains (ff 372-397) the instructions for Richardot, V e r reyken, and J . B. de Tassis for negotiations with England at Vervins, 28 Jan. 1598; for Jérôme Cooman's mission to England, 31 Dec. 1598; Verreyken's to England, 16 Feb. 1600; and that of Richardot, Verreyken, Fernando Carrillo, and Balthasar de Zuniga for peace talks at Boulogne, 20 May 1600 (along with the preliminary minutes). Regular and additional instructions for Conrad Schetz, baron of Hoboken, the archdukes' first resident envoy to England, 3 March 1605, are at ff 411-424 (and on microfilm in MV 45). 6. E.g., "Correspondance du Comte d'Aremburg et du président Richardot, et de l'audiencier Verreyken. 1604," in PEA 364; Cuvelier, "Traité de Londres," pp. 485 ff. 7. Cuvelier, "Traité de Londres," p. 284; Birch, Historical View, p. 216. Both cite Van Meteren. 8. T h e best work on the man remains Rodriguez Villa's Ambrosio Spinola, primer Marqués de los Balbases (770 pp.) though, consisting mainly of documents joined together by brief narrative bridges, it is more valuable as a sourcebook than as a true biography. The shorter Ambrosio Spinola y su tiewpo, Garcia Rodriguez (210 pp.), provides a convenient summary of the main events of his life; for the above events see pp. 27 ff. 9. Contemporary accounts are numerous; the siege of Ostend, which involved a Herculean effort on both sides, the tenacious defenders holding out under concentrated attack for a surprising thirty-nine months, was by far the most prominent "news story" of the time.

2 74

Notes to i. The Peacemaking Phase

10. Birch (Historical View, p. 221) sees resentment still extremely high as late as Mav 1605, but his view was based on a "character" of Spinola by Sir Thomas Edmondes (English envoy to Brussels), and Edmondes was not nearly so acute an observer as Birch let himself believe. 11. Lefèvre, Spinola et la Belgique, p. 41; "Mancicidor," p. 701. 12. Lefèvre, " L e ministère espagnol de l'archiduc Albert, 1 J 9 8 - 1 6 2 1 , " Bulletin de rAcadémie Royale d'Archéologie de Belgique (Antwerp, 1924), part II, pp. 202-24; s e e especially p. 207. The documentation f o r the Truce of Antwerp is very extensive; the various foregoing aspects may be confirmed conveniently in, e.g., PEA 1191/32 passim. Albert's confessor was Fray Iñigo de Brizuela, a Dominican. Oddly enough (though perhaps he was influenced by the convivial atmosphere of the occasion), Belgium's greatest historian claimed at one point that the closing of the Scheldt had no effect at all on Antwerp trade until included in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648; Pirenne, "L'Espagne et la Belgique dans l'Histoire," in VArchiduchesse-Infante Isabelle-Claire-Eugénie au Musée du Prado, pp. 59-60. 13. For the slow assembling of this "state" and its breakup in this crisis see Rousset, Histoire de la succession aux duchez de Cleves, Berg & Juliers, aux comtes de la Marek et de Ravensberg et aux seigneuries de Ravenstein et de Winnendael; Müller, "Der Jülich-Clevische Erbsfolgestreit im Jahre 1614," Forschungen zur Geschichte Bayerns, V I I I (1900), 20—105.

14. This whole wedge of land between the rivers was sometimes referred to by the Spanish Habsburg side as l'Outre-Meuse, a usage which reflects the place the area held in men's minds as a single strategic unit and gives convenient expression to a strategic concept, although in strict usage the term refers specifically to a few small terres, the Pays d'Outre-Meuse, in the neighborhood of Maastricht. i j. There were also minor dependencies, of small importance to the succession dispute: an enclave (the seigneurie de Ravenstein) extending from the lower Meuse southward into Dutch Brabant, and some scattered fragments in the archdukes' provinces of Brabant and Flanders. 16. Duke Johann Wilhelm (r. 1592-1609) was the son of Duke W i l helm der Reiche (r. 1539-92). The latter had had one other son, who had died before him, and four daughters; the claims of Brandenburg and Neuburg derived from the marriages of Wilhelm der Reiche's two eldest children, Marie-Eleanor and Anna. Marie-Eleanor, the eldest, married Duke Albrecht Friedrich of Prussia; their daughter Anna married Johann Sigismund of Brandenburg, her claim thus being carried to her husband by marriage. The second eldest, Anna, married Philipp

Notes

to i. The Peacemaking Phase

Ludwig, Count Palatine of Neuburg, her claim also being carried to her husband. The rules of succession being sometimes rather fluid in this area, this tended to make the pretensions of the two male claimants about equally strong, or at least equally plausible: both claims were derived through marriage rather than by direct descent, and while the Brandenburg claim descended from the elder daughter it was one generation further removed from the common ancestor (Wilhelm der Reiche) from whom both claims descended. The actual claimants at the beginning of the dispute in 1609 were the two above named, Johann Sigismund, Elector of Brandenburg, and Philipp Ludwig, Count Palatine of Neuburg, but this rather fundamental fact gets obscured in most accounts of the crisis, for the Brandenburg usually mentioned at the beginning of the dispute is not Johann Sigismund but Duke Ernst of Brandenburg, with Johann Sigismund mentioned only later, while Philipp Ludwig is usually not mentioned at all, the Neuburg claimant being given as Wolfgang Wilhelm. The apparent cause of the confusion is that each of the two actual claimants sent another to act as his proxy in pressing his claims and as his vicegerent in exercising his "rule" when a settlement had been made. Johann Sigismund sent his younger brother Ernst; on Ernst's death (18 Sept. 1613) he was replaced by Johann Sigismund's son Georg Wilhelm; it is at this point that Johann Sigismund enters most accounts, and it appears that he took a greater personal part in the matter (until his own death in 1619) than he had before Ernst's death. Philipp Ludwig, for his part, sent his son Duke Wolfgang Wilhelm of Neuburg; the latter, unlike the Brandenburg representative, seems to have been considered almost from the beginning more as the claimant himself than as a substitute for his father (Rousset, Succession, I, 93, asserts as a fact that he was soon so considered), a circumstance reflected in the fact that he is almost universally referred to in accounts, from the beginning of the crisis, as the Palatine of Neuburg though he is not correctly so called until his father's death in 1614. The genealogy involved in these claims may be seen in more detail in Miiller, "Erbsfolgestreit," p. 23. 17. Zeller, Guerre de Trente ans, pp. 22-23. 18. Hauser, Prépondérance espagnole, pp. 266-67. 19. Zeller, Guerre de Trente ans, p. 23, says that, although the permission was granted, the reduced French force did not in fact pass through the territory of the archdukes. The treaty is printed in Dumont, Corps universel diplomatique, vol. V , part III, p. 160. 20. Zeller, Guerre de Trente ans, pp. 22-24; Miiller, "Erbsfolgestreit," pp. 25-26; see also, passim, PEA 628, SEG 176 ff., and LCL, vol. I. The treaty of Xanten is at Rousset, Succession, II, 59 ff.: Brandenburg

276

Notes to /. The Peacemaking Phase

got Cleves, Mark, and Ravensberg; Neuburg, Jülich and Berg. This verv relative truce also left the frontier between the northern and southern Netherlands quite badly defined, and there was continual conflict there also, with much open fighting, especially over rights to the area around Bois-le-duc (see PEA 1425/5-8 passim).

NOTES

TO

CHAPTER

2. International

Quarrels,

Religions

and

Irreligious 1. Zeller, Guerre de Trente ans, p. 21. 2. Elias, "L'Eglise et l'Etat. Théories et controverses dans les PaysBas Catholiques au début du XVII* siècle," RBPH, V (1926), 454. 3. Zeller, Guerre de Trente ans, p. 22. 4. J . Willaert, "Négotiations politico-religieuses entre l'Angleterre et les Pay-Bas Catholiques (1598-1625)," Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique, V I - I X (1905-8); see especially VII (1906), 585-89. For the religious conflict between England and the Spanish Netherlands in this period see passi?n this excellent series of articles; on the Spanish Netherlands as the center of resistance to the Oath of Allegiance to James I, see Elias, "L'Eglise et l'Etat," pp. 456-57. 5. Garcia Rodríguez, Spinola, p. 112. 6. Edward Lord VVotton took the queen regent's oath to this treaty on 11 Sept. 1610; see Birch, Historical view, pp. 322-23. 7. See, e.g., Add. Ms 14010/203 ff. 8. See "Ratification des arles faits sur le Rétablissement du Commerce avec la france et revocation des trente pourcent," PEA 1479/2. 9. For the above summary the present writer is much indebted to the extensive work done on the subject bv Professor Jean de Sturler, having drawn heavily on his findings both from his publications and in many amiable conversations. His principal findings may be seen in three early articles (all of which have been reprinted separately) cited in the bibliography. 10. The archives of both Spain and the Spanish Netherlands are replete with complaints about Dutch counterfeiting in general and many specific instances of it, as well as analyses of and suggested cures for the whole currency problem, and of course much relevant ordinary correspondence. The broader subject of Spain's financial problems, on which much work has been done in English, extends far beyond the present subject and can only be alluded to here. Aspects of the specific vellón problem and suggested cures for it are conveniently summarised in Cristóbal Espejo, "Las dificultades económicas en España en el primer tercio del siglo X V I I y las soluciones particulares," Revista de

Notes

to 2. Internatioval

Quarrels

277

la Biblioteca, Archivo y Museo. Ayuntamiento de Madrid, III ( 1 9 1 6 ) , 463-99. Espejo savs (pp. 478-79) that profits from this counterfeiting (counting everyone concerned) ran as high as joo percent, and that there was nearly as much counterfeit as legitimate copper in circulation; the government's mode of devaluation was to double the face value of the copper coins without increasing their metal content. 1 1 . Gardiner, England, II, 149-50; see also pp. 134-35, 163. See also Ambassador Sir Charles Cornwallis's correspondence with various Spanish ministers on the subject, 1605-09, Cotton Mss, Vespasian C.v. passim. i i . See, e.g., " D r a f t of articles whereupon letters of reprisal against the Spanish king's subjects were grounded in 1585," drawn up (in his own hand) bv Sir Julius Caesar, chancellor of the exchequer, for use as a precedent regarding the correct form, etc., Add. Ms 14027/20-24V. A "Commission of reprisal" (of 1615) may itself be seen at Eg. Ms 2552/7-9V.; for a case ( 1 6 1 0 ) involving division of profits from letters of marque against Spain see Add. Ms 12496/100&V. 13. This inadequacy was compounded by the difficulty in making ships function effectively as both merchantmen and warships; if a ship were loaded with a worthwhile cargo it could not fight effectively, but if it were left unencumbered it was not only economically worthless but (in Spain's case) had to be sent halfway around the world at the crown's expense with the maximum possible financial benefit simply the prevention of further losses to pirates and interloping traders. T h e northern maritime powers had fairly well solved this problem of making a single ship carry cargo and still fight effectively; that Spain had not is shown, for example, in Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones, p. 534 (entry of 16 N o v . 1 6 1 3 ) : " D e diez navios en que el capitan Vasconcellos partió de Lisboa con 400 hombres, para socorrer las Filipinas, porque habia nueva que salian algunas escuadras de navios de olandeses para aquellas partes, se ha sabido que entre las Molucas y las Filipinas se fueron á fondo tres con recio temporal que les sobrevino, habiendo cargado de mercaderías en lugar de ir desocupados, para poder pelear, que es uno de los grandes daños que allá hay para no poderse haber efecto con los enemigos." 14. See SEG 176 and subsequent volumes passim. 15. Isabella to the duke of Lerma, 16 April 1603, Rodriguez Villa, Correspondencia de la Infanta Archiduquesa Doña Isabel Clara Eugenia de Austria con el Duque de Lerma y otros personajes, p. 83. She adds, "'et enfin, par son intervention, on pourra faire la paix avec la Hollande et enlever à mon frère la lourde charge de la guerre. Voilà bien des choses à considérer." 16. References to the "line" in question and incidents involving it are frequent in the documents of the time. Late in 1613, f o r example.

278

Notes to 2. International Quarrels

Marie de Medici stated the official French position in two letters to James I, the second of which reads in part: "I consider that there is no manner of peace between the vassals of these two crowns [of France and Spain], as bear witness all the treaties that have passed between them since King Francis the First, nor that [at any time when commissioners of the two crowns have negotiated] has any resolution been arrived at except that verbally . . . it has been determined and concluded between the said commissioners that such acts of hostility and enmity as may be committed beyond the meridian of the Azores [in that direction] and the Tropic of Cancer on the south will [not constitute grounds for complaint or for reparation demands], and that whoever [is strongest] in those parts will pass for [legitimate] master." Spanish translations of the two letters are in DIE, 111, 179-83; quotation is from pp. 181-82. During an audience in April 1614 in which the Spanish ambassador, Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuna, was registering a strong protest against English raids in the Indies, James cited in support of English actions this same interpretation as voiced in letters to him from the queen regent (apparently the same ones). Though James was putting it forward as a widely held justification for such raids, he obviously brought it up mostly for the sake of argument, and argument was just what he got from the ambassador: "I never heard of such a thing. It is unlawful to rob another's house, and I refuse to accept their argument as an excuse for robbery. How can it be lawful for the English even to enter the Spanish king's overseas domain when his own subjects cannot go there without a royal license? There are evil men both in England and Spain who are trying to bring on a war [here he told of many proposals in Spain for war similar to those heard in England], But the greatest wickedness of all is this talk about 'this side of the line' and 'that side of the line' [daca linea y toma lined], when it is all robbery no matter where it is done." Sarmiento to Philip III, London, 9 May 1614, DIE IV, 52-58. This is a succinct statement of the position which the Spanish government held consistently throughout the period under discussion. Much further documentation on the subject in its various aspects may be seen in DIE, vols. I - I V passim. N O T E S TO C H A P T E R

3.

International

Attitudes

and

Outlooks

1. Garcia Morente, Ideas para una filosof'ta de la historia de Espana, p. 81. 2. It seems generally agreed that so far as the French foreign policy had any recognizable orientation during the Concini period it was pro-

Notes to 4. Ultimate Question

2

79

Spanish. A very readable account of Concini's death is in Batiffol, Le Roi Louis XIII a vingt arts, chapter 1, which is also printed separately in Revue 264-88.

Historique,

XCV

( 1 9 0 7 ) , 292-308 and X C V I I ( 1 9 0 8 ) , 2 7 - 7 7 ,

3. Sir Ralph YVinwood to Sir Thomas Edmondes, Windsor, 5 Sept. 1615, printed in Birch, Historical View, p. 388. 4. Sir George Carew, A relation of the State of France -with the character of Henry IV and the principal persons of that Court, in Birch, Historical View, pp. 413-528; pp. J04-J, 522-23. The formal, nearritual "relation" by returning envoys, often customary elsewhere, was rarer in England. 5. As the consultas of the time make clear. NOTES TO CHAPTER 4. The Ultimate Question: War or Peace? 1. "Sil est expedient de faire paix avec l'Angleterre," in PEA 367. Making peace with England was exhaustively debated, as were all such problems of war and peace, and manuscript records exist in large numbers. The considerations mentioned in the present discussion, which are only some of the more important, all appear in the aviso cited, which conveniently includes arguments both for and against peacemaking made by opposing advisers; quotations used are from the same document. Internal evidence shows it to have been prepared around 1600, for presentation to Albert. 2. Cabrera de Cordoba's entry for 3 May 1614 (Relaciones, p. 555) is typical of the concern of many on this subject: on 9 April "los cinco navios gruesos con otros menores [partieron] para la India de Portugal, cuya dilación daba grande cuidado por la importancia, que es la vuelta, y que el año pasado se volvieron á Lisboa los que iban á la India por llegar tarde a doblar el cabo de Buena Esperanza; y si este fuese lo mesmo seria total destrucción de Portugal." 3. Though Elizabeth's foreign policy, especially in her last years, was not so thunderously anti-Spanish as used to be said, there seems no need here to try to pinpoint categorically a beginning of the shift in orientation discussed here prior to James I's reign. Prudence does not, however, forbid crediting her with acumen equal to that of the Habsburg counselors in question. 4. Sarmiento to Philip III, 16 Nov. 1613, DIE, III, 169; Sarmiento to Philip III, 9 May 1614, DIE, IV, 74. 5. "Discurso del Assessor Joachim Butquens sobre la Paz de Inglaterra," PEA 367. Undated, internal evidence places it between Vervins and Elizabeth's death, and shows that it was addressed to Albert.

28o

Notes to

Policyviaking

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5. The

Apparatus

Policymaking

Madrid

Apparatus—Madrid

1. A summary made in 1612 of various aspects of Spanish government lists six of the old kingdoms of the peninsula governed at that time as vicerovalties: Aragón, Valencia, Navarra, Galicia, Portugal, and Catalonia. T h e on-the-scene ruler is referred to in each case specifically and only as "viceroy," except for Galicia, where the reference is to "Los gobernadores o Virreyes del Reyno de Galicia." Regarding the viceroys' tenure and the scope of their rule the writer says: "Estos Virreynados no son Perpetuas, sino á Voluntad del R e y , y los Virreyes Ponen en los demás Reynos, Provincias y Ciudades, Castillos, y fortalezas de sus distritos, sus lugares y Tenientes, Gobernadores y Alcaydes como lo ha^e El de Ñapóles, en la Pulla y Calabria, y otras partes" (Add. Ms 10236/479-80). 2. Simon Contarini, Relazione, printed in Spanish translation under the title "Relación que hizo á la República de Venecia Simon Contareni [sic], al fin del año de 1605, de la embajada que habia hecho en España," in Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones, pp. 563-83; p. 563. 3. Ranke's ironic view of Porreño's pious eulogy of a royal saint is certainly merited, but so far as the truth of the king's religious preoccupations goes, Porreño's offense is surely only gross exaggeration, not complete incorrectness. See Porreño, Dichos y hechos de el Señor Rey Philippe III el Bueno, pp. 222-46; and Ranke, UEspagne sous Charles-Quint, Philippe II et Philippe III, pp. 140 ff. 4. Pérez Bustamente, Felipe III., p. 75. Ibid., esp. pp. 58-62. 6. Ibid., pp. 1 1 2 ff. 7. Certainly not when he praises an inaccurate job of plagiarism transparently committed on a second-rate book: "admirable" is his word for the marquis of Villa-Urrutia's " L a embajada del Conde de Gondomar," an address read before the Royal Academy of History in 1913, which in places is an almost literal translation, though often a poor one, of F. H . Lyon's El Conde de Gondotnar, itself a compendium of silly traditions on its subject. Bustamente (p. v and note on p xx) gratefully acknowledges that his work leans heavily on the "magnificent discourse of the Marquis of Villa-Urrutia, who with masterful pen drew a marvelous portrait of the great ambassador." One wonders in passing what the good Porreño would have thought of Bustamente's portrait (pp. 63-64) of Felipe el Bueno gambling like a drunken sailor. 8. Cánovas del Castillo, Decadencia de España, p. 60. 9. Ranke, VEspagne sous Charles-Quint, Philippe 11 et Philippe III, pp. 219-23. Ranke sees a fairly clear alignment of aristocrats in favor of peace and poptdares in favor of war.

Notes to