The Sculpted Word [Reprint 2020 ed.] 9780520312135

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The Sculpted Word

Bust of Epicurus.

The Sculpted Word Epicureanism and Philosophical Recruitment in Ancient Greece

B E R N A R D FRISCHER

University of California Press Berkeley

Los Angeles

London

University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University of California Press, Ltd. London, England © 1 9 8 2 by The Regents of the University of California Printed in the United States of America 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Frischer, Bernard. The sculpted word. Bibliography: p. Includes indexes. 1. Epicurus. 2. Philosophy, Ancient. B

573-F74

187

ISBN O - 5 2 O - O 4 1 9 O - 9

81-13143 AACR2

I. Title.

ACADEMIAE AMERICANAE ROMAE SITAE

Contents

List of Illustrations ix Preface xiii Abbreviations xxv Chapter i Introduction: Philosophy and Society in Greece Chapter 11 A Reconstruction of the Epicurean Policy on Recruitment and Conversion Chapter HI From Theory to Practice: Quantitative and Qualitative Problems of Epicurean Images Chapter iv Iconographical Problems: O n the Identification, Reconstruction, and Dating of Epicurus' Portrait Statue Chapter v Iconological Problems: An Interpretation of Epicurus' Portrait Select Bibliography 283 Index 307 Plates following 326

List of Illustrations

Frontis Map

Bust of Epicurus (Capitoline Museum). Villa Ludovisi. Deborah N o u r s e Lattimore after Schreiber.

133

PLATE ONE

Figure Figure Figure Figure

1. 2. 3. 4.

Bust Bust Bust Bust

of of of of

Epicurus (Capitoline M u s e u m ) . Metrodorus (Paris). Hermarchus (Copenhagen). "Colotes" (Capitoline Museum).

PLATE T W O

Figure 5. Bouchardon-Preisler engraving of "Epicurus philosophus," f r o m Statuae Antiquae (1732). Figure 6. Reconstruction of Epicurus' statue according to Frischer, by Deborah Nourse Lattimore. PLATE THREE

Figure 7. Ludovisi Epicurus (=statue 243 Schreiber). Photo: DAI Rome. Figure 8. Bouchardon-Preisler, "Socrates philosophus," f r o m Statuae Antiquae (=statue 240 Schreiber). PLATE FOUR

Figure 9. "Puteanus" Epicurus, frontispiece to P. Gassendi, De Vita et Moribus Epicuri (1647 1 ). Figure 10. " H o w e n i u s " Epicurus, frontispiece to P. Gassendi, De Vita et Moribus Epicuri (1656 2 ). Figure 11. Ludovisi statue 245 Schreiber, as restored after 1900 ( = N a u d é ' s and Howenius' "Epicurus"). Photo: Arndt-Amelung, Einzelaujhahmen. PLATE FIVE

Figure 12. Bottari's illustration of the Epicurus-Metrodorus double h e r m found in 1742 under S. Maria Maggiore IX

x

List of Illustrations in Rome and now in the Stanza dei Filosofi in the Capitoline Museum. Figure 13. Dontas A Epicurus torso, with ancient book-roll preserved. Photo courtesy Prof. G. Dontas.

PLATE SIX

Figure 14. Engraved gem with the bust of Epicurus, published in 1707 by MafFei as an "Unknown Philosopher." Figure 15. "Dorsch" Epicurus, from J . M. von Ebermayer, Capita Deorum et Illustrium Hominum (1721). Figure 16. Stosch "Xenocrates" engraved gem, now in Berlin. Photo: Staatliche Museen Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Antikenabteilung Berlin. PLATE SEVEN

Figure 17. Bellori's engraving of a bust of "Xenocrates" in Veterum Illustrium . . . Imagines (1685). Figure 18. Stanza dei Filosofi, bust 21 (=Stosch "Epicurus" and Albani "Diogenes"). PLATE EIGHT

Figure 19. Stanza dei Filosofi, bust 88. Photo: DAI Rome. Figure 20. Stanza dei Filosofi, bust 88, as illustrated by Bottari before removal of Albani's fake "Epicurus" inscription. PLATE NINE

Figure 21. Montfaucon "Diogenes" relief on the Sarcophagus of the Muses (now in the Louvre). Figure 22. Line drawing of the Socrates relief from the Sarcophagus of the Muses, as illustrated by Maffei, Raccolta di statue (1704). PLATE TEN

Figure 23. Statuette of Socrates in the British Museum. Photo: British Museum. Figure 24. Miniature bust of Epicurus in the J . Paul Getty Museum. Photo: J . Paul Getty Museum. PLATE ELEVEN

Figure 25. Damaged bust of Epicurus in the J . Paul Getty Museum. Photo: J . Paul Getty Museum. Figure 26. Hekler's reconstruction of the seated portrait of Plato.

List of Illustrations

xi

PLATE TWELVE

Figure 27. Lekythos relief of Timotheos (Conze, nr. 752). Figure 28. Hercules Farnese from Salamis. PLATE THIRTEEN

Figure 29. Asklepios of Melos with Ashmole's positioning of the head. Source: BSA 46 (1951) plate 1 (a). Figure 30. Head of Asklepios on a statuette from Epidaurus in the Athens National Museum. PLATE FOURTEEN

Figure 31. Wreath of the Phaidros Sphettios inscription ( I G II 2 682). Figure 32. Wreath on the Elgin Throne. Photo: J . Paul Getty Museum. Figure 33. Wreaths of IG II 2 4594a. Source: AM 67 (1942) plate 16, nr. 2. PLATE FIFTEEN

Figure 34. The Elgin Throne. Photo: J . Paul Getty Museum.

Preface

i The Stanza dei Filosofi in the Capitoline Museum in Rome is a room filled with scores of busts of famous ancient poets, orators, and philosophers. The busts have been renumbered and rearranged several times in the past three centuries. 1 Since its arrival in the museum in 1743, the double herm of Epicurus and his placid follower Metrodorus has stood in the same place at the end of the main axis of the room (see the frontispiece and figure 12). That the piece has stayed put through the centuries is remarkable, for the position is special and hence vulnerable. It is a place of focus, orientation, and power. That Epicurus has occupied it against the competition of virtually the whole corpus of ancient Greek portraits speaks volumes about the magnetism of his image. This book is a study of that magnetism. It is a test of the validity of my suspicion that my own experience of overwhelming power in Epicurus' portrait when I first saw it in the Capitoline Museum seven years ago was not merely a personal reaction but the response intended by the thirdcentury B.C. artist who sculpted it and by the Epicureans who commissioned it. Ancients like Cicero's friend Titus Pomponius Atticus and moderns like the distinguished art-historian Frederik Poulsen have described how unforgettable the portrait of Epicurus is and how strong a hold it takes upon the 1. See H. S. Jones, A Catalogue of the Ancient Sculptures Preserved in the Municipal Collections of Rome. The Sculptures of the Museo Capitolino, vol. 1 (Oxford 1912) 8 - 9 , where one such rearrangement is discussed.

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minds o f those w h o v i e w it. 2 M y purpose in writing this b o o k is to give a philosophical, art-historical, and sociopsychological explanation o f that fascination. O f course, the fascination o f a statue is not a topic about w h i c h one can sensibly write at great length, since it involves intuitive and emotional faculties that do not lend themselves to extended analysis. M o s t o f this b o o k is taken up w i t h matters a g o o d deal m o r e mundane, w h i c h serve to prepare a secure route for approaching this elusive goal. Because the itinerary involves taking several vie tortuose, it will be well to begin b y g i v i n g an overview. In the first chapter ("Philosophy and Society in Greece"), I discuss the Epicurean school's manner o f interacting w i t h Greek society compared to that o f the other philosophical schools. Whereas the other schools f o r m a subculture w h o s e m e m b e r s ' status in the dominant culture ranges f r o m high integration to complete alienation, the Garden o f Epicurus is an alternative c o m m u n i t y under the charismatic leadership o f a godlike master. In alternative communities, like the Garden, that do not recruit f r o m within b y training members' children to perpetuate the organization, n e w converts must be sought f r o m the dominant culture. Since the Epicureans i m posed on themselves rules limiting contact and even c o m m u nication w i t h the w o r l d outside their school, the manner in w h i c h they could recruit members f r o m the dominant culture is problematic. In the second chapter ("A Reconstruction o f the E p i 2. See Cicero, De finibus 5.1.3; F. Poulsen, "Au jardin d'Epicure," Gazette des Beaux-Arts (1937.1) 8 - 9 . Poulsen's statement, while a valuable subjective report of the experience of seeing Epicurus' portrait, is very bad scholarship. He writes: "Selon Cicéron, son ami Atticus, qui lui-même était epicurien, écrivait: 'nec tamen Epicuri licet oblivisci, si cupiam.' Ces mots peuvent aussi être employés au sujet de la tête d'Epicure, car c'est un des portraits antiques qu'on oublie le moins et qui se confond le plus difficilement avec d'autres." Note, first of all, that according to Cicero (De fin. 5.1.3), Atticus spoke these words, he did not "write" them. Furthermore, he was already applying them to the subject o f Epicurus' bust, despite what Poulsen might lead one to believe. Finally, for interesting reasons that will be discussed at the end o f Chapter III, Epicurus' head is easily confused with other ancient heads, namely, those o f his followers Metrodorus and Hermarchus.

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curean Policy on Recruitment and Conversion"), I reconstruct the Epicurean policy on recruitment as a hypothetical Epicurean theorist might have done. The Epicureans faced the dilemma of how to retreat from the dominant culture while still bringing a message of salvation to mankind. I suggest that they solved this dilemma in accordance with their own theory of motivation. According to this theory, in a healthy individual perception, cognition, feeling, and motivation occur simultaneously. What we perceive, we understand and experience as pleasure or pain. If a percept is painful, we naturally try to suppress it as soon as possible. If it is pleasant, we are motivated to preserve it and to imitate it so that we become a source of pleasure to ourselves. The problem of recruitment can be viewed as the problem of motivating people to become Epicureans. Applying their own general theory to this special case should have made the Epicureans recruit by disseminating pleasing images of wisdom—that is, of the blessed and happy wise man—among as great a number of people as possible. In this way, the dilemma of recruitment could be solved by permitting the sage to perfect himself—and his image—in retreat from the world, while sending his image out into the world to do the work of recruitment for him. The solution to this dilemma creates another problem. There are obvious practical limitations on the sage's ability to transmit his image. It cannot penetrate the physical barriers separating the Garden from the rest of the city. It cannot outlive the sage. It cannot always show the sage at his best. An artistic (or, "secondary") image of the sage's actual (or, "primary") image can make up for these shortcomings by being erected in public places in the city, by surviving long after the sage's death, and by presenting the sage to his best advantage. In the third chapter ("From Theory to Practice"), I survey the archaeological remains of Epicurean artistic images to show that the statistics concerning preserved portraits of ancient philosophers confirm the guess that, because of their approach to recruitment, the Epicureans commissioned far more portraits of their masters than did their competitors, whose philosophies made interaction with the dominant culture far more direct and easy. After a digression justifying use

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of the tabu term fetishism in analyzing Greek religion, I link the Epicureans' use of portraits as effective means o f c o m m u nication and motivation to this fundamental feature o f Greek popular religion. That Epicurean theology is today recognized to be a theoretical version of Greek popular religion I take as important evidence in favor of this claim. If many Greeks attributed powers of communication and motivation to statues, then the Epicureans were likely to have agreed, although they would have linked these powers to materialistic, not magical, processes. While the policy reconstructed in Chapter II gains statistical and cultural support in Chapter III, that support cannot weigh as heavily as a study of the iconology o f Epicurus' portrait. In lieu o f explicit written documentation of the p o l i c y — which w e are, alas, unlikely ever to recover—the best possible available evidence in favor of the reconstruction is proof that the portrait is a "sculpted w o r d " conveying crucial messages about Epicurus' character and mission to mankind. B e fore the iconology can be studied, the fragmentarily preserved ancient statue of Epicurus must be put back together and dated and its original location determined, in order to provide the hermeneutical framework for interpretation. This is the purpose of Chapter IV ("Iconographical Problems"), 3 in which I show that the statue was probably commissioned by the Epicurean school for public erection in 3. M y titles in Chapters I V and V are inspired b y E r w i n Panofsky's distinction between iconography and iconology, on which see C . Hasenmueller, "Panofsky, Iconography, and Semiotics," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 36 (1978) 2 8 9 - 3 0 2 . N o t e that Panofsky's terms are specifically designed for application to Renaissance art (see his essay, " A n Introduction to the Study o f Renaissance A r t , " in Meaning In the Visual Arts [Garden City, N e w York 1 9 5 5 ] 2 6 - 5 4 ) . A s applied to Hellenistic art, they must, I think, be somewhat modified in substance, if not in method. For Panofsky, iconography deals with "images, stories, and allegories" (p. 35); iconology concerns "the intrinsic meaning o f the w o r k . . . [in comparison with] the intrinsic meaning o f . . . other documents o f civilization historically related to that w o r k " (p. 39). A s I use the terms here, iconography deals w i t h w h a t might be called the "philological" discipline o f reconstructing, identif y i n g , dating, and attributing the w o r k o f art (cf. pp. 3 1 - 3 2 , where Pano f s k y speaks o f iconography as a descriptive discipline), whereas iconology deals with the interpretation o f the w o r k o f art in both werkimmanent and -transcendent terms.

Preface xvii Athens (near the Pompeion?) during the period 2 8 0 - 2 5 0 B.C. Reconstructing the lost original version o f the statue takes up most o f this chapter, primarily because a g o o d deal o f space must be spent on a digression in which I explain w h y a recent reconstruction based on an eighteenth-century engraving is w r o n g . M y o w n reconstruction is based upon ancient copies o f the statue that show Epicurus deep in thought and about to speak, dressed in a himation and seated on a solid-sided throne. In his left hand he holds a book-roll. T h e left arm rests across Epicurus' waist, and he stretches his right hand f o r w a r d toward an imaginary observer, in a gesture o f teaching or greeting. In the last chapter ("Iconological Problems"), the icono l o g y o f the statue is examined, with the result that Epicurus is seen to be portrayed according to the conventions o f contemporary Greek art as a philosopher, father-figure, A s k l e p ian healer, Herculean culture-bringer, megalopsychos ("greatsouled" man), and god. Such a c o m p l e x message could be designed into Epicurus' portrait because its sculptor w a s ingeniously able to fill in details left undetermined b y the requirements o f one type with the details dictated b y the other types. T h u s , the philosopher-type dictated the clothing, coiffure, and book-roll. T h e father-figure determined the pose and gesture o f the body. T h e Asklepian type inspired the e x pression on the face. T h e Herculean type governed the p r o portions o f the head. T h e megalopsychic type w a s responsible f o r many, seemingly trivial, physiognomical traits. T h e g o d - t y p e influenced the shape o f the throne on w h i c h E p i c u rus is seated. In order to add a final degree o f plausibility to m y interpretation o f the iconology and propagandistic function o f Epicurus' portrait, I conclude the b o o k with discussions o f late fourth-century B.C. theories o f the typological presentation o f character in the arts and of twentieth-century theories o f conscious and unconscious motivation f o r renewal o f the self. B o t h discussions are intended to show the historical and universal reasons w h y the Epicurean approach to recruitment is likely to have been effective in drawing to the school precisely those strangers w h o , upon immersion into Epicurean doctrine, w e r e dispositionally best suited to accepting the be-

xviii Preface liefs of the school, viz., the personality-type that J u n g characterized as extraverted thinking-sensation. II

T h e manuscript of this book was essentially completed in January 1979, so literature appearing in or after 1978 could only rarely be taken into account. A . F. Stewart's important monograph, Attika: Athenian Sculpture from c. 320 B.C. to 14 A.D., JHS Supp. Paper 14 (1979), did not reach Los Angeles in time to be consulted, nor did H. Protzmann's equally valuable essay, "Realismus und Idealität in Spätklassik und Frühhellenismus," JDAI 92 (1977) 1 6 9 - 2 0 3 (it did not arrive here until 31 M a y 1978). I am pleased to note that on page 1 7 7 Protzmann has independently observed the similarity of the expressions of Epicurus and the Asklepios of Melos (a similarity I first pointed out in public lectures during J a n u a r y March 1976 at the University of North Carolina [Chapel Hill], Wesleyan University, and the American Academy in Rome). For an excellent new study of what in Chapter IV I call the "civic pride movement" of the first and second centuries A.D., see now C . P. Jones, The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom (Cambridge, Mass. and London 1978). T h e Hellenistic sources of Diogenes Laertius—on which I rely in m y wissenssoziologische analysis o f Greek philosophy in Chapter I—have been studied anew by J . Mejer, Diogenes Laertius and His Hellenistic Background, Hermes Einzelschrift 40 (1978). T h e appearance o f H. Funke's article on Götterbild in RAC 85/86 (Stuttgart 1981), with its full discussion of fetishistic aspects of Greek beliefs about divine statues (in cols. 7 1 3 - 1 4 ) , makes me feel much less lonely than I did when I originally wrote m y digression on fetishism in Greek religion in Chapter III. M y discussion o f the presentation of character in Hellenistic art may now be supplemented by the brief, but stimulating, remarks in J . Onians, Art and Thought in the Hellenistic Age (London 1979). Finally, I am pleased to be able to report that m y Kopienkritik and reconstruction of Epicurus' statue in Chapter IV are in substantial agreement with the results re-

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cently published by V Kruse-Berdolt in her Göttingen dissertation on the Epicurean portraits. 4 In this book, I discuss again two topics on which I have previously published. In Chapter II, the discussion of the Epicurean policy on recruitment supersedes that to be found on pp. 1 9 9 - 2 2 2 of m y At Tu Aureus Esto: Eine Interpretation von Vergib 7. Ekloge (Bonn 1975). M y analysis in Chapter IV of the background of the Bouchardon-Preisler engraving of Epicurus' portrait replaces that in m y article in California Studies in Classical Antiquity for 1979. Besides being justified by the demands of m y present argument, the inclusion of this material here is, I think, warranted by the incorporation of insights and evidence that have come to m y attention since I wrote the passages in question. 4. V Kruse-Berdolt, Kopienkritische Untersuchungen zu den Porträts des Epikur, Metrodor, und Hermarch (Diss. Göttingen 1975) (despite the publication date of 1975, the work was not available—at least at the DAI Rome—until late 1980). Kruse-Berdolt and I are in agreement that B i Richter ( = £ 3 2 K - B ) belongs to the small group of excellent copies (my Group I, in Chapter IV, section xiii below) on the basis of which a reconstruction of the lost Hellenistic original may be attempted. Thus, it is not surprising that our reconstructions of Epicurus' face are quite similar (cf. Kruse-Berdolt, pp. 1 2 8 - 2 9 with Chapter IV, section xiv below). Kruse-Berdolt may, however, be criticized for including in this group a very damaged head in Copenhagen (her E I 3 = B 21 Richter) and a head in the Louvre (her E 2 7 = B 18 [not B 17, as Kruse-Berdolt erroneously states] Richter) that does not quite reach the highest degree of fidelity and state of preservation required for inclusion in this group. She may also be criticized for omitting from this group the excellent bronze bust B 8 Richter ( = E 21 K - B ) as well as the marble bust inv. nr. 197306 in the Museo Nazionale delle Terme in Rome ( = E 34 K - B ) . (I do not mention her omission of the small marble bust G 23 in thej. Paul Getty Museum, because I am publishing it here for the first time.) Kruse-Berdolt has admirably increased the list of known copies of both the torso and the bust of Epicurus. First listed by her in a comprehensive catalogue of Epicurus copies are: E 4 (a marble torso in the Bursa A r chaeological Museum); E 1 1 (a small basalt head, inv. nr. Sk 1 8 1 1 in the Berlin Staatliche Museen); E 16 (a small bronze bust in the Archäologisches Institut der Universität Leipzig); E 19 (a marble head, inv. nr. 540 in the Museo Arqueológico in Málaga); and E 34 (a marble head in the magazines of the Museo Nazionale delle Terme in Rome; the head apparently lacks an inventory number). Except for E 34, all the other newly reported copies

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b e l o n g t o m y G r o u p I V (heavily restored, unfinished, w o r n , a n d / o r f r a g m e n t a r y c o p i e s ) — a t least t o j u d g e f r o m K r u s e - B e r d o l t ' s v e r b a l d e s c r i p tions o f t h e m (unfortunately, she publishes n o p h o t o g r a p h s o f the p i e c e s ) — so that their absence f r o m C h a p t e r I V , sections xiii and x i v , w i l l n o t affect the v a l i d i t y o f m y results. K r u s e - B e r d o l t has a h i g h r e g a r d f o r E 34, and so it is a p i t y that she w a s n o t able to publish the piece o r take it into a c c o u n t f o r her o w n w o r k . I regret that I h a v e also n o t been able to d o so. O n e p o i n t o f significant d i s a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n m e and K r u s e - B e r dolt c o n c e r n s the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f E p i c u r u s ' right a r m . Since this is the o n l y m a j o r e l e m e n t o f the statue n o t attested b y ancient e v i d e n c e , d i s a g r e e m e n t is understandable and, perhaps, inevitable. N e v e r t h e l e s s , since the rec o n s t r u c t i o n o f the r i g h t a r m is rather i m p o r t a n t f o r interpretation o f the portrait, I take this o p p o r t u n i t y to bolster m y h y p o t h e s i s that the r i g h t a r m w a s e x t e n d e d f o r w a r d in a gesture o f teaching or g r e e t i n g b y

arguing

against K r u s e - B e r d o l t ' s speculation that the a r m w a s turned b a c k t o w a r d the u p p e r chest as i f s t r o k i n g — o r a b o u t t o s t r o k e — t h e beard. K r u s e - B e r d o l t m a k e s the f o l l o w i n g f o u r a r g u m e n t s in f a v o r o f her r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the r i g h t f o r e a r m and hand: (1) t w o copies p r e s e r v e s u p p o r t s f o r the e l b o w o n the inner side o f the w r i s t . If the right f o r e a r m j u t t e d f o r w a r d , w e w o u l d h a v e e x p e c t e d the e l b o w t o rest " d i r e c t l y o n the w r i s t " (p. 149). (2) T h e " s p e a k i n g " o r " d i s p u t i n g " gesture o f the hand is " p r a c tically n o t attested" in the s u r v i v i n g c o r p u s o f G r e e k portraits (p. 149); the possible parallel o f P o s e i d i p p o s (Vat. i n v . nr. 7 3 5 = R i c h t e r , Portraits of the Greeks, v o l . 2, p p . 2 3 8 - 3 9 , figs. 1 6 4 7 - 5 0 ) is n o t applicable " o n a c c o u n t o f the different p o s i t i o n i n g o f the a r m s " (p. 149). M o r e f r e q u e n t is the f o r e a r m a n g l e d b a c k t o w a r d the beard (p. 150). (3) A " d i s p u t i n g "

gesture

w o u l d c o n t r a d i c t the "stern and self-contained s t r u c t u r e " o f the portrait (p. 150). (4) T h e gesture o f b e a r d - s t r o k i n g accords w e l l w i t h the p o s i t i o n o f the head, w h i c h , a c c o r d i n g to K r u s e - B e r d o l t , w a s " n o t o n l y turned t o w a r d his left side, b u t w a s also inclined a bit t o w a r d the r i g h t " (p. 150). T h u s , the attitude o f the head s u g g e s t s a pose o f i n w a r d m e d i t a t i o n , n o t teaching. N o n e o f these a r g u m e n t s w i t h s t a n d s scrutiny. T h e s e c o n d a r g u m e n t is based o n the statistics o f the s u r v i v i n g c o r p u s o f G r e e k portraits. It is i n v a l i d n o t o n l y because t o o f e w torsos s u r v i v e to p e r m i t such statistical a r g u m e n t s , b u t also because f o r e a r m s raised u p and b a c k t o w a r d the u p p e r chest (to w h i c h t h e y w e r e s o m e t i m e s braced) w e r e m u c h m o r e likely t o s u r v i v e intact than w e r e v u l n e r a b l y f o r w a r d - t h r u s t i n g f o r e a r m s . T h e p o i n t a b o u t P o s e i d i p p o s is m e r e l y special p l e a d i n g , and n o c o g n i z a n c e is t a k e n o f ancient literary sources (like Sidonius, epist. 9 . 9 . 1 4 ) w h i c h attest portraits w i t h oratorical gestures. T h e first a r g u m e n t p u r p o r t s t o present a technical reason against a f o r w a r d - t h r u s t i n g r i g h t f o r e a r m , b u t w h y the e l b o w o f s u c h an a r m c o u l d n o t rest o n the inner side o f the w r i s t escapes m e . E q u a l l y m i s t a k e n is the third a r g u m e n t . H e r e w e m a y readily accept the principle that the b o d y l a n g u a g e o f the statue o u g h t t o reflect the e x p r e s sion o f the face. H o w e v e r , K r u s e - B e r d o l t misreads the face b y failing t o

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III It is a p l e a s u r e t o p u t o n r e c o r d m y

gratitude to

two

g r o u p s o f readers w h o w e r e k i n d e n o u g h t o g i v e m e their r e a c t i o n s t o v a r i o u s d r a f t s o f s e c t i o n s o f this b o o k .

Margarete

B i e b e r , F r a n k B r o w n , S t a n l e y B u r s t e i n , D a v i d Furley, D a v i d Konstan,

Knut Kleve,

Ingrid R o w l a n d Lacy,

Steven

more, W o l f g a n g Lötz, Charles Mitchell, Martin

Latti-

Robertson,

a n d B r u c e R o s e n s t o c k all e x p r e s s e d their s u p p o r t o f m y p r o j e c t — w h i c h at t i m e s s e e m e d i n t e r m i n a b l e — a n d , d e s p i t e d i s a g r e e m e n t s o v e r details, e n c o u r a g e d m e t o p e r s e v e r e w i t h it w h e n I w a s beset w i t h s e l f - d o u b t . M a l c o l m Bell, Peter C a r l , Helga

von

Heintze,

Eva

Keuls,

Rebecca

Miller,

Thomas

S c h w e i t z e r , A n d r e w S t e w a r t , and an a n o n y m o u s reader f o r

consider the m e a n i n g o f the slightly parted lips that she herself notes o n p. 128 o f her study. A r e w e to i m a g i n e that Epicurus is m u t t e r i n g to h i m self as he is lost in meditation? Parted lips i m p l y an expression o f speaki n g — a s does an outstretched right forearm. T h e fourth a r g u m e n t gets to the heart o f the matter. K r u s e - B e r d o l t is motivated to restore the right f o r e a r m as she does and to ignore the open m o u t h because o f her dubious reconstruction o f the inclination o f the head. A c c o r d i n g to her, bust E 33 ( = M u s . C a p . inv. nr. 577, Stanza dei Filosofi nr. 53; Richter, Portraits of the Greeks, v o l . 2, p. 195, nr. 2, figs. 1 1 5 1 - 5 2 ) is our best c o p y for the "hair s y s t e m " ; her detailed study o f this system has persuaded her that Epicurus' hair is falling in such a w a y that the head o f the original (if n o t o f bust E 33) m u s t have been directed slightly d o w n w a r d and to the left. T h e r e are t w o decisive objections that m u s t be raised against this a r g u m e n t . First, K r u s e B e r d o l t n o w h e r e establishes the reasons for g i v i n g bust E 33 pride o f place w h e n the p r o b l e m o f analyzing Epicurus' coiffure is c o n f r o n t e d . Second, bust E 33 is a particularly unreliable witness o f the m a j o r p h y s i o g n o m i c a l details o f the face, as K r u s e - B e r d o l t herself o p e n l y admits (p. 128). T h u s , far f r o m establishing the priority o f bust E 33, K r u s e - B e r d o l t succeeds o n l y in disqualifying it f r o m consideration as a useful witness o f any o f the characteristics o f the Hellenistic original o f Epicurus' portrait. O n c e E 33 is eliminated, n o evidence remains in favor o f K r u s e - B e r d o l t ' s restoration o f the inclination o f Epicurus' head. O n c e w e have n o reason to i m a g i n e E p i curus' head turned d o w n w a r d to the left, w e also h a v e n o reason to i m a g ine E p i c u r u s lost in t h o u g h t and completely o b l i v i o u s o f the w o r l d around h i m . T h e w a y is thus reopened to restoring the right f o r e a r m in a w a y that accords w i t h the sympathetic f u r r o w across Epicurus' forehead, his f o r w a r d - g a z i n g , sharply focused eyes, and w i t h his slightly parted l i p s — v i z . , as thrusting f o r w a r d in a gesture as c o m m u n i c a t i v e as is the expression on his face.

xxii Preface the University of California Press played in their various ways the role of Horace's Quintilius by insisting that I put aright even the smallest flaws they could discover. Deborah Nourse Lattimore put her talented services at m y disposal in preparing drawings of m y reconstruction of the statue of Epicurus and a map of the Villa Ludovisi. B r u nilde Ridgway and Helga von Heintze sent me useful c o m ments about an earlier drawing reconstructing the statue of Epicurus. M a d a m e Peppas Delmousou kindly sent me p h o tographs of Greek inscriptions in the Epigraphical M u s e u m in Athens, and she also went far beyond the call of duty in measuring all the herms in her charge. I must also thank George Dontas, Karin Einaudi, and Jiri Frel for sending me the photographs I requested. Crucial clerical help in preparing a complicated manuscript was provided by Tracy Caulfield, Elizabeth Farny, Monica Rothschild, and Charitini Velissariou. M y copy editor, Jane-Ellen Long, deserves m y gratitude for her work in correcting m y manuscript, as do m y editors Doris Kretschmer and Mary Lamprech for their help in seeing this book through to publication. Various acts of Epicurean amicitia were performed during the writing of this book by m y friends Princess Minnie de Beauvau-Crâon, Karin and Roberto Einaudi, Maria Julia de Ruschi Crespo, Gesche and Volkart Olbrich, Ann and Russell T. Scott, and Antonio and Annabelle von Marx. M y wife's devotion to m e during the period w h e n this book was being written surpassed, if it is possible, even the infinite limits of the m a r riage vow. I am extremely grateful to the following museums, libraries, and archives for allowing me to use, and in some cases to publish, material in their collections: Algemeen Rijksarchief (Den Haag); Archivio Segreto Vaticano; Biblioteca Hertziana; Biblioteca Nazionale (Rome); Biblioteca Vallicelliana; Biblioteca Vaticana; Bibliothèque Nationale (Paris); British Museum; Cabinet des Dessins du Musée du Louvre; Epigraphical M u s e u m (Athens); J. Paul Getty Museum; the Library of the American Academy in Rome; the Library of the C. G. J u n g Institute (Los Angeles); the Library of the German Archaeological Institute (Rome); Musée du

Preface xxiii Louvre; Musei Capitolini; Musei Vaticani; Museo Nazionale di Napoli. I could never have visited all of these research institutes or have had the time necessary to write this book were it not for the generous financial support given me by the American Academy in R o m e and the Academic Senate of the University of California at Los Angeles. For their help in supporting m y applications for research grants and in providing a stimulating environment in which research could be undertaken, I wish to thank m y colleagues in the U C L A Department of Classics. T h e dedication of this book is m y small w a y of thanking the American Academy in R o m e for giving me: a research fellowship in the years 1 9 7 4 - 1 9 7 6 ; an appreciation for h o w interdisciplinary work in classics and archaeology can still be pursued in this age of specialization; and a model for what life must have been like in the Garden o f Epicurus. Los

Angeles

31 March

1981

Abbreviations

For periodicals, the abbreviations of L'Année Philologique have been used, with minor modifications. For standard works of reference I have used the abbreviations recommended by Lexikon der Alien Welt (Zurich and Stuttgart 1965), again with some minor modifications. M y footnotes follow the style formerly recommended by the American Journal of Archaeology (see AJA 65 [1965] 1 9 9 - 2 0 1 ) . The footnotes to each chapter are self-contained, so that, unless otherwise indicated, a reference to a previous note is always to a note in the same chapter. The following special abbreviations need to be listed here: AGB ARA Arrighetti Arrighetti 2 ASVFB-L D.L. Edmonds W. Helbig, Führer

KD SV Travlos, PDAA Usener

Association Guillaume Budé, Actes du Ville Congrès (Paris 1969). Algemeen Rijksarchief (The Hague). G. Arrighetti, Epicuro, Opere (Turin i960'). G. Arrighetti, Epicuro, Opere (Turin 1973 2 ). Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Fondo BoncompagniLudovisi. Diogenes Laertius, cited according to the L C L edition of R. D. Hicks. J . M. Edmonds, The Fragments of Attic Comedy, 3 vols. (Leiden 1 9 5 7 - 6 1 ) . W. Helbig et al., Führer durch die öffentlichen Sammlungen klassischer Altertümer in Rom, 4 vols. (Tübingen 1963- 4 ). Kuriai Doxai (or, Ratae Sententiae). Sententiae Vaticanae (or, Gnomologium Epicureum Vaticanum). J . Travlos, Pictorial Dictionary of Ancient Athens (New York 1971). H. Usener, Epicurea (Leipzig 1887). xxv

Chapter i

Introduction: Philosophy and Society in Greece

i.

Approach

There are two basic categories into which one might classify the historiography of ancient philosophy. The first is the doxographical, wherein the historian traces the development of philosophical ideas and systems of thought through time and space. Opposed to this is what could be called the sociological approach, which focuses on the various reciprocal relationships linking the abstract thought of philosophy to the concrete societal conditions under which a philosophical system comes into being and thrives. The first approach could be assigned a place in the larger project of intellectual history initiated by Hegel in the nineteenth century. T h e second can be viewed as a small part of the domain of the sociology of knowledge, itself a part of the larger project of cultural history that was one offshoot of the evolutionist sociologies of Positivism and Marxism. The underlying assumption of the doxographical approach is that ideas generate ideas by the processes of destructive and constructive criticism. All that is needed to reconstruct the history of Greek philosophy, according to this view, is to collect the ideas of the ancient philosophers, reassemble them into systems, and arrange these systems into chronological sequence in order to facilitate determination of the criticisms that were—or must have been— i

2

The

Sculpted

Word

made by each philosopher concerning his predecessors and contemporaries. The sociological approach can accept the results thus achieved by doxography and can set to work at precisely the point where doxography stops, by asking such questions as: What were the social, political, economic, and affective experiences o f the world that influenced one philosopher's reactions to another's ideas? What were the interactions between a philosopher's system o f thought and the society to which he belonged? What were the goals—practical and philosophical—that motivated a philosopher's decision to institutionalize (or not institutionalize) his system as a school? H o w did the philosophical institution relate to other societal institutions? Which groups in a society responded positively, and which negatively, to a philosophical system and school, and why? 1 Philosophical historiography as practiced rarely corresponds to either approach. Although most historians o f ancient philosophy have concentrated on doxography, praci . Three theoretical issues involving the sociological approach to Greek philosophical history which, in lieu o f a detailed excursus into methodology, should at least be taken note o f here are: (i) the perennial problem o f historical sociology; (2) the possibility o f considering such purely rational systems o f k n o w l e d g e as mathematics or philosophy to be socially determined; and (3) the particular position o f a sociological analysis o f philosophy within the field o f the sociology o f knowledge. For a review o f recent literature on the first problem, see D . Zaret, "Sociology and Historical Scholarship," American Sociologist 13 (1978) 1 1 4 - 2 1 . O n the second problem see the brilliant but uneven w o r k on the sociology o f mathematics b y David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London, Henley, and B o s t o n 1976), and note the critical review article b y G. Freudenthal, " H o w Strong Is Dr. Bloor's 'Strong Programme'?" Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 10 (1979) 6 7 - 8 3 (an article kindly brought to m y attention b y m y colleague Robert Westman o f U C L A ) . In m y view, the social determination o f scientific or philosophical thought is an issue that cannot be settled in advance o f detailed empirical research. Social determination cannot be ruled out, but neither can the autonomy o f the creative mind w o r k ing purely within an ongoing tradition o f thought. Where it seems to me that a sociological approach is almost always applicable is in explaining (1) the timing and location o f n e w thought and (2) the reception o f the n e w thought by the community. From the point o f v i e w o f d o x o g r a p h y (or what historians o f science call the "internal" approach), advances in thought are characterized by continuity with the past and by logical inev-

Philosophy

and Society in Greece

3

itability. From the sociological (or, "external") point of view, what is striking about new thoughts is the historical particulars and discontinuities associated with their appearance. Thus, for example, the internal approach may uncover an inner logic to the development of Greek philosophy, but it cannot explain why that logic took 5, 50, or 500 years to unfold, nor can it explain how the thought was received by its audience. A concern with such questions may be a "weak program" for the sociology of Greek philosophy, but it is one, I would argue, that is likely to yield more concrete and verifiable results than Bloor's strong program of showing how thought itself (and not just the function and use of it) is socially determined. For a critical account of the basic approaches to the sociology of knowledge, see P. Hamilton, Knowledge and Social Structure (London and Boston 1974); K . H. Wolff, The Sociology of Knowledge in the U.S.A., Current Sociology 1 j , 1 (1967). For a basic bibliography, see J . Wolff, Hermeneutic Philosophy and the Sociology of Art (London and Boston 1975) 139—46, and add J . Wilier, The Social Determination of Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, N . J . 1971). Very little work has been done applying the wissenssoziologisch approach to the history of Greek philosophy. Perhaps the best k n o w n — and, unfortunately, least satisfying—is that of G. Gurvitch, The Social Framework of Knowledge, trans. M. A. and K. A . Thompson (Oxford 1971) 1 4 8 - 6 1 . To his credit, Gurvitch admits that "the time has not yet come for studies in depth of the sociology of philosophical doctrines" (p. 99, and cf. pp. 3 6 - 3 7 ) . He does not, however, explain w h y the time is not ripe for such work, and his own study of Greek philosophy and society may be criticized for difficulties which are not so much methodological as informational. More useful is A . W. Levi's new book, Philosophy as Social Expression (Chicago and London 1974), which suffers, as far as Greek philosophy is concerned, from: (1) conceptual narrowness probably owing to unfamiliarity with the literature of the past twenty-five years on the sociolo g y of knowledge; (2) insufficient knowledge of Platonic scholarship after Paul Shorey and of Greek history; (3) narrowness of focus on the aristocratic class in Greece; and (4) an overly ambitious program of dealing with four major Western philosophers and their societies (Plato, Aquinas, Descartes, G. E. Moore). In his preface, Levi claims more importance for his method than for his results, and we may agree that the book's importance lies herein. Advances over Levi will need to remedy the faults just enumerated, and if better results are to be achieved, a much more modest focus will be needed. Equally disappointing is E. M . Wood and N . Wood, Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory (New York 1978), on which see the review of H.-J. Gehrke in Gnomon 52 (1980) 1 7 9 - 8 0 (a taste of the Woods' tendency to oversimplify is the following quotation from p. 3: "Denouncing democratic politics, many of the nobles considered it to be a sign of gentlemanly virtue to remain aloof and detached from civic life, a trend culminating in the aristocratic [!] Epicurus' withdrawal into the Garden"). A useful general study of the sage appears in F. Znaniecki, The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge (New York 1965).

4

The

Sculpted

Word

tically none has done so with perfect methodological consistency. Even Hegel, who conceived of the history of philosophy as something "produced by the World Spirit in its thinking consciousness of itself," 2 saw clearly enough that thought is not generated by thought alone but is affected by material condition^.3 The leading practitioner of doxographical history active today, W. K . C. Guthrie, has recognized, if not a sociological element, then at least a biographical factor operative in the development of Greek philosophy.4 Nor has the sociological method always been applied with perfect consistency. For example, J. S. Morrison, a leading exponent of the study of the ancient philosophical schools as institutions, has suggested that Plato modeled the organization of the Academy after the Pythagorean school; yet, in seeking to explain this fact, he attributes to Plato a motive that is purely cognitive and of a piece with Plato's adoption of Pythagorean ideas about geometry, politics, and the fate of the soul. 5 For Morrison, then, the organization of the philosophical school is studied as simply another kind of philosophical idea. These kinds of inconsistencies in the application of the two methods are not to be condemned but recognized as signs of scholars' 2. G . W. F. Hegel, Einleitung

in die Geschichte

der Philosophie,

ed. J .

Hoffmeister (Berlin 1966) 2 5 1 (my translation). 3. C f . , e.g., ibid., p. 286, and see also Hegel's introductory remarks on Epicureanism and the decline o f the Greek polis in Vorlesungen Geschichte

der Philosophie,

vol. II in G . W. F. Hegel

über die

Werke, vol. 19 (Frankfurt

1 9 7 1 ) 2 9 7 . O n the Hegelian concept o f intellectual history, see the perceptive analysis o f K . M a n n h e i m in Essays on the Sociology

of Culture

(London

1 9 5 6 ) 26£F. 4. W. K . C .

Guthrie,

A

History

of Greek

Philosophy

(Cambridge

1 9 6 2 - ), vol. 2, pp. 1 2 2 - 2 3 , vol. 4, pp. 5 - 7 . For an incisive critique o f Guthrie's—and d o x o g r a p h y ' s — m a j o r assumptions, see M . L. West, Greek

Philosophy

and the Orient

Early

( O x f o r d 1 9 7 1 ) 2 1 8 - 1 9 . West's o w n ap-

proach is doxographical, too, but he expands the repertoire o f relevant m a terial to include the East. He, too, recognizes the important role played b y political and social factors (see pp. 2 2 7 , 2 3 9 - 4 1 ) . For an interesting critique o f West's doxographical historicism from a comparatist's point of view, see C . Kahn, The Art and Thought

ofHeraclitus

(Cambridge 1979) 2 9 7 - 3 0 2 .

5. J . S. Morrison, " T h e Origins o f Plato's Philosopher-Statesman," C Q n.s. 8 ( 1 9 5 8 ) 1 9 8 - 2 1 8 ; review of W. Burkert, Weisheit und ( N ü r n b e r g 1962) in Gnomon

3 7 (1965) 3 4 7 .

Wissenschaß

Philosophy

and Society in Greece

5

intuitive awareness that the two approaches are complementary, not mutually exclusive. The subject of the history of philosophy is hard to define but, like the history of any human activity, must include as major components elements both cognitive and noncognitive, conscious and unconscious, individual and social.6 Thus the historiography of philosophy ought ideally to combine a doxographical concern for philosophical content with a sociological concern for the societal surroundings in which content develops and to which it responds. Of course, the subject may sometimes neither demand nor permit such comprehensive treatment. Evidence may be lacking—even more lacking than it unfortunately usually is in ancient studies—and the area under investigation may be technical enough to preclude noncognitive, unconscious, or social explanation. The philosophical problems that will be studied in this book present a case of a different sort. They cannot be raised— let alone solved—by either methodology. The primary question to be asked is: "How did the Epicurean school overcome in a philosophically consistent way the contradiction latent in its philosophical system between its basic mission of bringing salvation to mankind and its basic existential method of withdrawal from the world?" As will be seen, this question can be—and, if it is to be answered, must be—restated in several different ways, involving the doxographical question of motivation in Epicureanism, the institutional question of recruitment of new members for the Epicurean school, the psychological question of conversion, and the art-historical question of the nature and function of Epicurus' portrait. The validity of the solution to be proposed will then be tested by an interpretation of the portrait-statue of Epicurus, which, if the proposed solution is correct, ought to be not a depiction of Epicurus as he really looked but the self-conscious artistic expression of Epicurus' philosophical self-consciousness, commissioned and publicly erected primarily for purposes of 6. For the intellectual-historical background behind this assumption of a linkage between the noncognitive and the cognitive, see R. K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York 1968 3 ) 562.

6

The Sculpted Word

p r o p a g a n d a . 7 H e n c e , not o n l y the p r o b l e m to be investigated but the v e r y evidence that will be p r o d u c e d to solve it are d e pendent o n an interdisciplinary approach. It w i l l not surprise readers acquainted w i t h recent d e v e l o p m e n t s in the s o c i o l o g y o f k n o w l e d g e to see that it is this relatively n e w branch o f s o c i o l o g y w h i c h can m o s t readily s u p p l y the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l insights needed to link the various disciplines w e shall be studying.8

II.

Greek

Philosophy

and Politics:

The

Problem

T h e p r o b l e m o f the E p i c u r e a n s ' ambivalent relationship to the w o r l d outside the G a r d e n is o f interest f o r m a n y reasons, not least o f w h i c h is that it signals the b e g i n n i n g o f the last o f the f o u r stages o f d e v e l o p m e n t traceable in the relationship o f p h i l o s o p h y to society in ancient G r e e c e b e f o r e the Roman

period.

The

evolution

of

Greek

philosophical

t h o u g h t and organization can be profitably and briefly traced t h r o u g h a consideration o f the function o f p h i l o s o p h y in the context o f the d e v e l o p i n g political and social structure o f the G r e e k city-states. T h e basic pattern that will e m e r g e f r o m 7. "Propaganda" is here understood in R. K. Merton's value-free sense, as "any and all sets of symbols which influence opinion, belief, or action on issues regarded by the community as controversial. . . . Given a controversial issue, propaganda becomes possible and, it would seem, almost inevitable. . . . In many quarters, propaganda is often identified with lies, deceit or fraud. In our view, propaganda has no necessary relation to truth or falsity." See Merton, ibid., p. 563. 8. Important for this linkage of the sociology of knowledge and an interdisciplinary approach to the humanities is the recent theoretical work of Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford 1977), in which the concept of culture is broadened to include concerns normally exclusively in the care of the humanist (see especially pp. 1 1 - 2 0 , 1 3 6 - 4 1 ) . Equally important is E. Panofsky's dictum that in the final stage of iconological research the boundaries between art history and other humanistic disciplines will vanish, since "the art historian will have to check what he thinks is the intrinsic meaning of the work . . . to which he devotes his attention, against what he thinks is the intrinsic meaning of as many other documents of civilization historically related to that work . . . as he can master. . . . It is in the search for intrinsic meanings or content that the various humanistic disciplines meet on a common plane instead of serving as handmaidens to each other" (Meaning in the Visual Arts [Garden City, N.Y. 1955] 39).

Philosophy

and Society in Greece

7

w h a t can b e o n l y a sketch is that the h i s t o r y o f G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y is, f r o m this p o i n t o f v i e w , the s t o r y o f f o u r parallel d e velopments. T h e s e developments, w h i c h occurred inevitably as G r e e k society c a m e to terms w i t h the cultural i n n o v a t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y , are: h o w the n e w philosophical p r o d u c t — i d e o l o g y 9 ^ f o u n d its p r o p e r function and w a s l e g i t i m i z e d in G r e e k s o c i e t y ; h o w the a u t o n o m o u s maturation o f G r e e k politics and p h i l o s o p h y resulted in m o m e n t s o f dislocation and m o m e n t s o f h a r m o n y b e t w e e n the t w o ; h o w the p h i l o s o p h e r f o u n d security and sustenance f o r h i m s e l f as an i n d i v i d ual o r as a m e m b e r o f a school; and h o w p h i l o s o p h y g r a d u ally b e c a m e i d e o l o g i c a l l y differentiated to c o r r e s p o n d

and

appeal to intellectuals o f virtually all s o c i o p s y c h o l o g i c a l t y p e s in G r e e k society. 1 0 9. On the social and political role of ideology see N . Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, trans. T. O'Hagan (London 1973) 1 9 5 - 2 2 4 . 10. C f . R. K . Merton, op. cit. (supra n. 6) 536: "Men of knowledge do not orient themselves exclusively toward their data nor toward the total society, but to special segments of that society with their special demands, criteria of validity, of significant knowledge, of pertinent problems, etc. It is through anticipation of these demands and expectations of particular audiences, which can be effectively located in the social structure, that men of knowledge organize their own work, define their data, seize upon problems. . . . B y linking each of these typologically defined audiences to their distinctive social position, it becomes possible to provide a wissenssoziologische account of variations and conflicts of thought within the society." On the sociology of intellectuals, see the contributions of T. Parsons and J . P. Nettl in On Intellectuals, ed. P. Rieff (Garden City, N . Y . 1969) 3 - 2 4 , 53-122. In this book, I will use Max Weber's typology of class stratification (on which, see N . Birnbaum, "Conflicting Interpretations of the Rise of Capitalism: Marx and Weber," British Journal of Sociology 4 [1953] 1 2 5 - 4 1 ) and C . G. Jung's typology of psychological types (see Psychological Types, trans. H. G. Baynes [London 1923]). Because Jung's work is less well known and perhaps more controversial than Weber's, some explanation of it and justification of its use is in order here. First, it should be pointed out that the importance of Jung's typology is still acknowledged by his successors, who have in recent years studied its place in Jung's intellectual history (M. Fordham, "Note on Psychological Types," Journal of Analytical Psychology 1 7 [1972] 1 1 - 1 5 ) , its utility in analysis (C. J . Groesbeck, " P s y chological Types in the Analysis of Transference, "Journal of Analytical Psychology 23 [1978] 2 3 - 5 3 ) , and its measurability in empirical tests (C. A . Meier and M . A . Wozny, "An Empirical Study ofjungian Typology," Journal of Analytical Psychology 23 [1978] 226-30; N . L. Quenk, " O n Empirical

8

The Sculpted Word

Studies of Jungian Typology," Journal of Analytical Psychology 24 [1979] 2 1 9 - 2 5 ) . Meanwhile, outside Jung's school there is some evidence of a "rediscovery" of Jung's typology along with independent empirical studies testing its validity (see, especially, R. Carlson and N . Levy, "Studies in Jungian Typology: 1. Memory, Social Perception, and Social Actions," Journal of Personality 41 [1973] 559-76). A useful and brief description of the Jungian typology is given by Carlson and Levy on pp. 560-61 of their article: "The typology involves a set of interlocking variables—the 'attitudes' of extraversión and introversion, and the four 'functions' of sensing, intuiting, thinking, and feeling, which are manifested at two levels of conscious development. Extraversión and introversion represent general orientations or foci of cognitive activity. Extraversión attends to the object, to the external world, while introversion focuses upon internal representations of experience. Extraversión and introversion operate in four functional modes. Two of these—thinking and feeling—are ways of organizing and judging experience. Thinking organizes and evaluates in terms of logical, intellectual features, while feeling organizes experience in terms of affective value judgments. The other two functions—sensation and intuition—lack this organizing/judging aim, and rather are ways of perceiving. Sensing notes the presence and qualities of things; intuition leaps beyond sensory notation to recognize latent possibilities in things and events. Through innate predisposition and environmental opportunity, one of each pair is the more 'natural' or developed in conscious functioning. A person characteristically directs his cognitive functioning either toward the outer world (extraversión) or toward subjective experience (introversion), and comes to emphasize one of the judging functions (thinking or feeling) and one of the perceptual functions (sensation or intuition) as his preferred, more characteristic mode of dealing with experience. The 'dominant' function, whether judging or perceptual, is supported by an 'auxiliary' function from the other domain. . . . Descriptively, the typology yields sixteen type-categories, each based upon a particular combination of a dominant attitude, and a dominant and an auxiliary function which characterize the individual's developed preferences." Throughout this book, I will assume that Epicurus and his followers exemplify the extraverted thinking-sensation-intuition type, with feeling the inferior function. This assumption can be justified, first of all, because any system of philosophy freely developed and adopted must be viewed not only on its own terms as a set of objective prescriptions for arriving at the truth, but also as a set of subjective descriptions of the philosopher's own view of the truth. As far as the Epicurean type is concerned, this assumption can also be justified because: (1) as a materialistic philosophy, Epicureanism may fairly be called object-oriented and hence extraverted; (2) as philosophers who advocated a sensationalistic epistemology, the Epicureans were clearly thinkers whose thoughts arose from sensations, not intuitions; (3) intuitional thinking is nonetheless important in the doctrines of atomism, inductive logic, and the clinamen (see J. Vuillemin, "Trois phi-

Philosophy

and Society

in Greece

9

T h e keys to these four developments are the philosophical product, ideology—understood here to mean the ensemble of an individual's values and beliefs about the world and his place in it—and the philosophical activity, which is education." The social function of ideology is to provide the cognitive basis for legitimating the factual socioeconomic status or putative claims of individuals, groups, and institutions in a society. To perform this function, philosophical ideologies must become as differentiated as the social agents to whose integrative needs they respond. We cannot here explain or even trace the pattern of this differentiation, for that would require a subtle and lengthy account of Greek political and cultural history. We may simply note that the young Marx's observation that with Hellenistic philosophy, Greek philosophy had realized all moments of the Spirit, is an idealistic Hegelian expression of the same insight (see below, n. 60). In the history of philosophy, legitimation is a recurrent problem that must be faced with each stage o f differentiation. 12 Philosophy not only provides social agents with legitimating ideologies, but during its first phase it also had to legitimate itself as a valid part of culture; and in every succeeding stage it had to be legitimized anew by the new groups o f intellectuals w h o found philosophy a necessary tool for their social adaptation. The potential allure, and danger, of philosophy at every stage was that it provided a conscious and critical ideological system for the alienated intellectual, w h o was thereby enabled to proceed beyond mere alienation in some positive direction; and that it could, and usually did, define the community into which the intellectual was to be integrated as distinct from the traditional polis. To the extent that philosophy could disrupt the legitimacy of solosophes intuitionnistes: Epicure, Descartes, et Kant," Dialéctica 35 [1981] 2 1 - 4 1 ) ; and (4) as believers in ataraxy as the highest state of mind, and as amoralists, the Epicureans certainly attempted to repress feelings and values. 1 1 . See A . H. Halsey, " T h e Sociology of Education," in Sociology: An Introduction, ed. N . J. Smelser (New York 1967) 2 4 7 - 3 0 2 . 12. The importance of this problem was noted in passing by A . Gouldner, Enter Plato (New York 1965) 17, and S. C . Humphreys, Anthropology and the Greeks (London 1978) 2 1 1 .

io

The Sculpted

Word

ciety at large, legitimation o f p h i l o s o p h y itself w i t h i n the polis b e c a m e all the m o r e difficult. T h e social f u n c t i o n o f higher education (the branch to w h i c h p h i l o s o p h y belongs) is b o t h to transmit a d v a n c e d f o r m s o f k n o w l e d g e and, t h r o u g h research, to t r a n s f o r m these and the m o r e elementary f o r m s . T h e thrust o f the first f u n c t i o n is conservative b o t h o f a society's repertory o f k n o w l e d g e and, because o f the expense i n v o l v e d in h i g h e r education, o f the personnel m a k i n g u p its elite. 1 3 T h e s e c o n d function, creating n e w k n o w l e d g e , is potentially disruptive, especially since the n e w k n o w l e d g e discovered b y p h i l o s o phers w a s a l m o s t a l w a y s ideological, not practical. In v i e w o f these t w o functions, it is n o surprise that philosophy's role in education b o t h furthered its claims to l e g i t i m a c y insofar as it c o u l d be conservative and endangered its claims in times w h e n it w a s revolutionary. In discussion o f the f o u r parallel d e v e l o p m e n t s m e n tioned above, w e can o n l y g o into detail w h e n w e reach the final stage, in w h i c h E p i c u r e a n i s m appears. T h e choice o f aspects singled out f o r discussion in the earlier periods and schools can a c c o r d i n g l y o n l y be j u s t i f i e d as necessary f o r p r o v i d i n g the b a c k g r o u n d required to link E p i c u r e a n i s m to m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m s historically faced b y p h i l o s o p h y in Greece, in order that Epicureanism's distinctive solutions can b e better u n d e r s t o o d and appreciated. T o the extent that a c o m m o n thread can be said to run t h r o u g h this sketch, it w i l l be the t h e m e o f the relationship o f the theory-practice p r o b l e m in philosophical t h o u g h t to the p r o b l e m o f p h i l o s o p h y ' s l e g i t i m a c y in social life. T h i s t h e m e has been chosen as a f o c u s because it is apparent that philosophical theory's relationship to practice and society's treatment o f p h i l o s o p h y in l a w and politics are t w o nodal points o f contact b e t w e e n realms o t h e r w i s e quite distinct, n o t to say a u t o n o m o u s . T h e basic plot o f the story o f this relationship is that p h i l o s o p h y w a s (i) d e v e l o p e d b y P y t h a g o r a s as the d o m i n a n t i d e o l o g y f o r an aristocratic institution that controlled its c i t y state; it (2) suffered various dislocations o f i d e o l o g y f r o m the d o m i n a n t class and o f the p h i l o s o p h e r f r o m social institutions 13. Cf. A. H. Halsey, op. cit. (supra n. 11) 278.

Philosophy

and Society

in Greece

11

during the democratic fifth century; in most of the next century it (3) discovered protection within its city-state by isolating itself either in the religious association or in socially sanctioned individual deviance, and it generated new ideologies which were to appeal to the new dominant and dominated classes of early Hellenistic society; and, finally, it (4) either institutionalized deviance in the form of group secession into an alternative community (Epicureanism) or serviced the various Greek monarchies between Alexander's death and the Roman conquest with ideologies, an educated elite, prestige, and legitimacy. HI. Preconditions for the Emergence of Philosophy The subject of the preconditions, necessary and sufficient, for the emergence of philosophy in Greece has recently been discussed by G. E. R. Lloyd. 14 Since Lloyd's goal is to specify the social causation of philosophy, his study is relevant for our own not only because of its timeliness but also because of its similar focus. For both reasons, it will be fruitful to introduce our own discussion of the preconditions for philosophy with an examination of Lloyd's work. Lloyd's approach is tacitly to distinguish between causes that are necessary and those that are sufficient. His method of making this distinction is to assume that causes that are merely necessary can also be found at work in Near Eastern and primitive societies, where philosophy never developed. A cause that is sufficient, on the other hand, must in some sense be as uniquely Greek as is philosophy itself (pp. 2 3 4 35). 15 Lloyd quickly establishes four causes as necessary but not sufficient: improvements in technology; creation of an economic surplus; knowledge of foreign societies and belief14. See G. E. R. Lloyd, Magic, Reason, and Experience (Cambridge 1979) 2 2 6 - 6 7 . 15. The summary following is of Lloyd, ibid., pp. 2 3 4 - 6 4 passim, to which the pages in the parentheses that follow above refer. The demand for a uniquely Greek (as opposed to Near Eastern) explanation of the origin of philosophy may be traced back in recent English scholarship to J . Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (London 1930 4 ) 1 - 3 0 . Burnet also went to great pains to establish a fundamental discontinuity between Greek phi-

12

The Sculpted Word

systems; and the introduction, or (in the case of archaic Greece) the re-introduction, of literacy (pp. 235-40). In all these cases, Lloyd rightly claims that these undeniably important factors were operative not only in Greece but also in earlier and contemporary Near Eastern societies where philosophy never emerged. Lloyd's fifth and decisive factor—the one where "the contrast between the Greek world and the rest of the ancient Near East is generally most marked" (p. 240)—is the rise in the Greek city-states of participatory forms of government based on procedures and habits of rational discussion and debate (pp. 240-46). Participatory government, Lloyd argues, in two ways promoted the emergence of philosophy. First, since abstract thought about world order generally reflects the model of a society's legal system, changes in Greek constitutional systems involving greater rationality and participation may have led to parallel changes in the Greeks' world-view (pp. 247-48). Second, once personal power in the political sphere diminished and was replaced by logical argumentation as the basis for achieving consent, the same substitution of force by persuasion was to be expected in other, nonpolitical spheres of activity (pp. 248-57). Impressive as Lloyd's analysis is (and the account of it given here is admittedly only the barest outline of a learned and sophisticated discussion), it is open to attack on several fronts, as Lloyd himself is to some extent aware (pp. 2 6 0 64). First of all, even assuming that Lloyd's fifth cause is both necessary and sufficient, then it at most accounts for the method, not the content, of Greek philosophy. 16 One may suspect that Lloyd's emphasis on the method of philosophical discourse at the expense of the subjects being argued derives from his failure to consider the ideological nature of philosolosophy and N e a r Eastern thought, and in this project may be included in an "anti-barbarian" tradition going back to Diogenes Laertius. See W. von Kienle, Die Berichte über die Sukzessionen und spätantiken

Literatur

der Philosophen

in der

hellenistischen

(Diss. Freie U n i v . Berlin 1 9 6 1 ) 99.

16. Indeed, L l o y d introduces his discussion o f the origin o f philosophy b y stating that his area o f concern is "the development of certain a r g u mentative techniques and o f empirical research": op. cit. (supra n. 14) 2 2 6 .

Philosophy and Society in Greece

13

phy and the political meaning of statements that are not explicitly political in content. As a result of these failures, Lloyd is forced to eliminate most of the doctrines of the early philosophers as irrelevant to his investigation and even to express doubts as to whether the Milesians are to be considered full-fledged philosophers (p. 262). Finally,'Lloyd's notion of the emergence of philosophy as purely derivative from a changing political system is overly simplified. Philosophy, according to this view, is purely parasitical on society; it has no function to perform within the social system generating it except that of imitation and reflection. More importantly, Lloyd errs in linking the emergence of philosophy to the rise of participatory (and especially democratic) government in Greece. First of all, this thesis grows out of an inadequate understanding of the Near East, from which Greece is supposed to differ markedly (cf. p. 240). According to Lloyd, in the Near East the "political systems remained very largely static. Each state was governed by an autocratic (sometimes divine) king, supported by a strong central bureaucracy and subordinate regional authorities" (pp. 2 4 1 - 4 2 ) . Thus, the Near Eastern potentate could achieve by fiat what his Classical Greek colleague could only bring about by persuasion and argument (pp. 249-50). Lloyd himself remarks that in Greek literature of the fifth and fourth centuries "freedom, especially political autonomy . . . is precisely what marks out the Greeks from most Barbarians" (p. 246). Thus the origin of Lloyd's own antithesis between Greek participatory government and Oriental despotism is itself Greek—a sign, surely, that caution is in order. In fact, although no one would want to claim that, "primitive democracy" aside,17 democracy was ever a characteristic of Near Eastern societies, the dark picture painted by Lloyd and his ancient Greek sources does not correspond to the views of contemporary Near Eastern scholars. 17. On "primitive democracy" as a possible stage of Near Eastern political development before the monarchies of the historical period, see T. Jacobsen, "Primitive Democracy in Ancient Mesopotamia," Journal of Near Eastern Studies 2 (1943) 1 5 9 - 7 2 ; Toward the Image of Tammuz and Other Essays in Mesopotamian History and Culture, ed. W. L. Moran (Cambridge, Mass. 1970) 370-74.

14

The Sculpted Word G r a n t e d that d e m o c r a c y cannot be attested f o r the N e a r

E a s t in the historical period, s o m e degree o f participatory g o v e r n m e n t can nevertheless be f o u n d at m a n y times and places. Far f r o m being authoritarian despots, N e a r Eastern k i n g s often had to take into account public opinion. F o r e x ample, the correspondence o f Z i m r i l i m , the king o f M a r i {fi. 1 8 0 0 B.C.), and K i b r i - D a g a n , the g o v e r n o r o f the p r o v i n c e o f T e r q a , s h o w s a recurrent concern f o r pî âlim ("the m o u t h o f the t o w n , " i.e., public opinion). 1 8 T h e Hittite king Hattusilas III h a d to publish an apologetic a u t o b i o g r a p h y j u s t i f y i n g to his subjects the o v e r t h r o w o f his n e p h e w . 1 9 M o r e o v e r , N e a r Eastern kings f r o m A s i a M i n o r to Palestine w e r e often b o u n d to recognize the legal authority o f a council o f elders, w h o s e p o w e r s could include control o v e r military affairs, regulation o f tribute, presiding over certain courts, and direction o f religious affairs. In rare instances, records o f even larger a s s e m blies o f the people survive. 2 0 A l t h o u g h none o f the debates that m u s t h a v e taken place in such councils happens to be p r e served, w e do h a v e documentation o f a tradition o f rational debate in the S u m e r i a n school curriculum in the f o r m o f " w i s d o m disputations." 2 1 S u c h disputations m u s t have had 18. See J . - R . Küpper, "L'opinion publique à Mari," Iraq 25 (1963) 1 9 0 - 9 1 , especially p. 191: "Sous le règne de Zimrilim, nous n'avons donc pas affaire, comme on l'a dit, à 'une société où le bon plaisir du prince fait loi'; ce bon plaisir avait ses limites." On the history of Zimrilim's reign, see Kupper in CAH, vol. 2, part 1 (Cambridge 1973 3 ) 1 - 2 2 . 19. I owe my knowledge of this interesting text to my colleague Jaan Puhvel. 20. See H. Klengel, "Die Rolle der 'Ältesten' (LÜ M E ä SU.GI) im Kleinasien der Hethiterzeit," Zeitschrift für Assyriologie 57 (1965) 2 2 3 - 3 6 , and cf. p. 223m for parallel studies of councils of elders in Mesopotamia, northern Syria, and Palestine, to which may be added D. G. Evans, "Rehoboam's Advisers at Schechem, and Political Institutions in Israel and Sumer," Journal of Near Eastern Studies 25 (1966) 273-79. One of the earliest references (only semi-historical, to be sure) to a council of elders is especially interesting as a demonstration of just how independent of its king a council could be. In the epic of Agga and Gilgamesh, the elders of Erech disagree with Gilgamesh's proposal to resist submitting to Agga, king of Kish. Gilgamesh must take his case to the assembly of the warriors of Erech, who support him in overriding the elders' policy of submission. See S. N . Kramer, "Gilgamesh and Agga," AJA 53 (1949) 1 - 1 8 . 21. See J. J. van Dijk, La sagesse suméro-accadienne (Leiden 1953); C.

Philosophy

and Society

in Greece

15

their practical application in the councils of elders (and in other institutions, of course), but they never resulted in the emergence of a philosophical tradition, as Lloyd's thesis might have led us to expect. Lloyd's thesis cannot be salvaged by making a distinction between the degree of participation to be found in these Near Eastern oligarchies and that in the city-state democracies of Greece, because Lloyd himself includes oligarchical government as a form of participatory government based on institutions where laws and policy are debated through logical argumentation (p. 261). Lloyd is forced to do this because, as he is well aware, philosophy in Greece is just as frequently encountered in oligarchical states as in democratic ones. This brings us to our last, and most important, criticism of Lloyd's thesis. Not only is philosophy to be found in nondemocratic Greek states, it is to be found there before democracy itself was devised (for the sake of argument, we can agree with Lloyd's dating of the emergence of democracy as in the age of Cleisthenes, at the end of the sixth century). 22 This makes its failure to emerge centuries, or even millennia, earlier in the Near East highly problematic, and makes its appearance in Greece paradoxical. If Lloyd is correct, one can imagine philosophy filtering into areas enjoying a lower degree of participatory government from those having a higher level, but hardly the opposite, at least if political participation is as important a factor in the birth of philosophy as Lloyd contends that it is. Lloyd's solution to this problem can only be called question-begging. He denies that the early sixthcentury Milesians are full-fledged philosophers, and he as-

Wilcke, "Sumerische Streitgedichte," in Kindlers Literatur Lexikon,

vol. 6

(Zurich 1965) cols. 2 1 5 1 - 5 4 . I wish to thank m y friend Piotr M i c h a l o w s k i for bringing the Sumerian w i s d o m disputations to m y attention. 22. O n the origin o f democracy, see V Ehrenberg, Polis und Imperium (Zurich and Stuttgart 1965) 2 6 4 - 9 7 (where the argument for dating the origin of Athenian democracy to the late sixth century is not invalidated b y the author's incorrect dating of Aeschylus' Suppliants); and cf. C . Meier, "Entstehung und Besonderheit der griechischen Demokratie," für

Politik

25

(1978)

1-31

Zt.

(where a distinction is made between the

"Hoplitenpoliteia" o f Cleisthenes and the "radikale D e m o k r a t i e " o f the mid-fifth century [p. 17]).

16

The Sculpted Word

sures us that philosophy did not appear at one time and place but was a gradual development "which certainly took time to gather momentum" (p. 262). We must therefore conclude that Lloyd's fifth cause may be necessary, but it is certainly not sufficient. Further progress will depend on (1) viewing philosophy as socially functional, not parasitical; (2) looking more closely at the concrete historical situations in which philosophy appeared and developed; and (3) paying more attention to philosophical content—i.e., to ideology—than to philosophical method, and attending to the social implications of that seemingly abstract content. iv. Philosophy and Society: The First Stage (600-500

B.C.)

Fulfillment of the five preconditions of philosophy explains why philosophy could develop in Greece when it did, but not, as we have seen, why it did. To understand the latter, we must look for the peculiar ideological needs that could be satisfied by the creation of what later came to be called philosophy. Here, a difficulty at once arises concerning the definition of terms. Is the word philosophy to be applied retroactively, as it usually is,23 to Thales, who probably called himself a sophos, not philosophos, or is it to be reserved for Pythagoras (or, as Lloyd implies, for even later thinkers of the mid- to late fifth century), the man who coined the term? Much hangs on this quibble, for, as we will see, Thales' sophia is the attempt to legitimate tyranny, whereas the philosophia of Pythagoras and of later thinkers is designed to provide a nondemocratic alternative to post-tyrannical society. We must assume that Pythagoras coined his term in conscious opposition to the older word—both in order to differentiate his enterprise from the many kinds of skills that in archaic Greece could be designated by the term sophia and in order to distinguish his system of thought from the Milesians'. We ought therefore to respect the distinction ourselves, while recognizing that the relationship between sophia 23. A tradition starting no later than Aristotle, Met. 983b.20-21.

Philosophy and Society in Greece

17

and philosophia requires us to e x a m i n e the f o r m e r b e f o r e p r o ceeding to the latter. T h a t the preconditions o f p h i l o s o p h y are n o t sufficient causes f o r its appearance is n o w h e r e m o r e clearly p r o v e n than b y the fact that T h a l e s (not to m e n t i o n P y t h a g o r a s , Socrates, and D i o g e n e s o f Sinope) did not w r i t e . T h i s fact doubtless affected his t h o u g h t as p r o f o u n d l y as it affects o u r ability to k n o w w h a t T h a l e s actually believed. E v e n the m o s t skeptical m o d e r n d o x o g r a p h e r s are w i l l i n g to allow that w e m a y feel c o n f i d e n t a b o u t k n o w i n g a f e w o f T h a l e s ' doctrines and acc o m p l i s h m e n t s . H e predicted an eclipse o f the sun (probably that o f 585 B . C . ) . H e said that the earth floats u p o n water, and he p r o b a b l y also said that in the b e g i n n i n g e v e r y t h i n g w a s water. H e claimed that all things, including stones, are filled w i t h g o d s . H e u r g e d the Ionian cities to unite to m e e t the adv a n c i n g Persians after the defeat o f C r o e s u s in 5 4 7 - 5 4 6 . 2 4 P r o b a b l y the first a c c o m p l i s h m e n t w a s the m o s t i m p o r tant as far as T h a l e s ' career w a s concerned. T h e o p h r a s t u s n o t e d that there w e r e m a n y men like T h a l e s b e f o r e Thales. 2 5 W h a t distinguished h i m f r o m t h e m m u s t have b e e n s o m e i m pressive intellectual feat w h i c h p r o v e d that his opinions had s o m e basis in reality. T h e prediction o f as a w e s o m e an e v e n t as a solar eclipse (an achievement unprecedented in the G r e e k w o r l d b e f o r e Thales) could have p r o v i d e d j u s t such a p r o o f . If the eclipse really occurred in $85, and if T h a l e s really received the title o f sophos in 582/1 (as is reported b y D e m e t r i u s o f Phaleron apud D . L . 1.22), then the p r o x i m i t y o f the t w o events is perhaps n o t accidental. 2 6 A t any rate, o n c e T h a l e s 24. C f . D . R . D i c k s , " T h a l e s , " C Q 53 (1959) 2 9 4 - 3 0 9 ; W. K . C . G u t h r i e , o p . cit. (supra n. 4) v o l . 1, pp. 4 5 - 7 2 . O n the sources o f the i m p o r t a n t w a t e r - d o c t r i n e , see B . Snell, Gesammeite Schrijien ( G o t t i n g e n 1966) 119-28. 25. T h e o p h r a s t u s , apud Simplicius Phys. p. 23, 29 Diels. 26. S. C . H u m p h r e y s , o p . cit. (supra n. 12) 222, c o n c u r s in c o n n e c t i n g T h a l e s ' p r e d i c t i o n o f the solar eclipse w i t h his attainment o f the status o f sophos. S o m e ancient s u p p o r t f o r this h y p o t h e s i s m a y c o m e f r o m the r e m a r k attributed t o C h i l o n (apud D . L . 1.68) that arete is the ability t o p r e dict the future. A . G o u l d n e r , o p . cit. (supra n. 12) 16, less plausibly links T h a l e s ' title o f sophos w i t h his o l i v e - o i l press m o n o p o l y , e v e n t h o u g h the s t o r y o f the m o n o p o l y p r e s u m e s that T h a l e s is already r e c o g n i z e d to b e a sophos (cf. A r i s t o t l e , Pol.

1259a.9).

18

The Sculpted Word

w a s certified as a sophos, his opinions w e r e w o r t h taking serio u s l y and r e c o r d i n g f o r the n e x t f o r t y years or so o f his l o n g career, the last datable e v e n t o f w h i c h (the advice to the I o nian cities in 546) s h o w s that Dicaearchus w a s u n d o u b t e d l y correct in e m p h a s i z i n g h o w deeply concerned w i t h politics those opinions o f t e n were. 2 7 U n t i l T h a l e s received this certification, he w a s j u s t another o f T h e o p h r a s t u s ' nameless deviants f r o m the aristocratic i d e o l o g y articulated b y poets like H o m e r and H e s i o d , w h o s e c o s m o g o n i e s , a n t h r o p o g o n i e s , genealogies, and h e roic epic cycles reflected and reinforced the aristocratic s o ciety b y w h i c h the poets w e r e patronized. T h e p o e m s o f these bards celebrated, in b o t h the divine and h u m a n w o r l d s , the chief value o f the aristocracy, arete, w h i c h w a s defined as physical beauty, athletic p r o w e s s , w e a l t h , a distinguished f a m i l y b a c k g r o u n d , eloquence, and martial valor. 28 T h a t the values and b e h a v i o r o f the g o d s corresponded to those o f m a n k i n d i m p l i e d n o t o n l y that the w o r l d o f the g o d s reflected the h u m a n w o r l d but also that the g o d s sanctioned the e x i s t ing social and political order o f m a n k i n d . T h i s sanction w a s buttressed b y the aristocracy's claims to control access to the g o d s t h r o u g h c o m m u n a l cults and to b e descended f r o m the g o d s t h r o u g h illustrious ancestors. For e x a m p l e , Pindar, in Pythian I V , praises the v i c t o r y o f Arkesilas I V , k i n g o f C y rene, at the P y t h i a n g a m e s o f 462 b y tracing the victor's g e n e a l o g y back to Poseidon and b y recounting, a l o n g the way, the m y t h s in w h i c h divine sanction w a s g i v e n to A r k e s i l a s ' f a m i l y f o r its rule o v e r C y r e n e . W h a t e v e r reason T h a l e s had for claiming that w a t e r w a s the primal substance f r o m w h i c h arose all matter and life, 29 his reason f o r d e m y t h o l o g i z i n g c o s m o g o n y and c o s m o l o g y is clear. L i v i n g in a city ruled b y T h r a s y b o u l o s , one o f Ionia's first tyrants, T h a l e s p r o p o u n d s a n e w i d e o l o g y that supports 27. C f . D i c a e a r c h u s , apud D . L . 1.40. 28. C f . T y r t a e u s , fr. 9 D i e h l ( = 9 Prato) f o r an implicit definition o f aristocratic arete (neither the a u t h o r s h i p n o r the unusual e m p h a s i s o n m a r tial v a l o r d i m i n i s h e s the v a l u e o f this f r a g m e n t f o r o u r present p u r p o s e s ) . O n arete as the leading aristocratic v a l u e see, e . g . , W. Jaeger, Paideia, v o l . 1, trans. G . H i g h e t ( N e w Y o r k 1945 2 ) 3 - 1 4 . 29. F o r speculation c o n c e r n i n g T h a l e s ' reasons, see G u t h r i e , o p . cit. (supra n. 4) v o l . 1, pp. 6 1 - 6 2 .

Philosophy

and Society in Greece

19

the tyrant's new dominant class of nonaristocratic hoplites by debunking the aristocratic myth o f descent f r o m the gods w h o created the world. 3 0 Having thus removed f r o m the old aristocracy its aura o f special status, Thales next begins a process—to be completed by his continuator Xenophanes—of further discrediting the aristocratic claim both by redefining the gods as something other than anthropomorphic (exactly what nature Thales' gods had w e cannot say) 31 and by very "democratically" infusing them in all things, animate and inanimate. Whether or not w e believe the interesting report of the obscure writer Minyes (apud D . L . 1.27) that Thales actually lived with Thrasyboulos, we must understand his philosophical program as political collaboration designed to provide a compelling ideology for Thrasyboulos' tyranny. Thales' social role was thus to provide Thrasyboulos with the same kind of cultural legitimacy that the poets had given to the aristocrats. This does not, o f course, mean that all tyrants patronized thinkers like Thales, nor does it mean that tyranny had to bring forth philosophy by some law of the sociology of knowledge. In fact, such patronage was rare, and artists, architects, and poets seem to have been much more useful to the tyrants than intellectuals in building popular support by changing the physical appearance and culture of the city-states. 32 Still, this was the age of the Seven Wise M e n (several of w h o m — l i k e Thrasyboulos' friend Periander—were tyrants), in which a reputation for w i s d o m was an especially valuable asset in bringing a man to power and keeping him there. Thrasyboulos, w h o seems not to have been considered particularly wise, discovered that if he could not be a sophos himself, he could at least patronize one. 30. O n the hoplites as the class supporting most tyrants, see A . A n drewes, The Greek Tyrants (London 1956) 3 4 - 3 8 . T h e only evidence that T h r a s y b o u l o s ' power w a s based on the hoplites is indirect. H e ruled Miletus during Alyattes' twelve-year siege o f the city, and m a y have c o m e to p o w e r — a n d certainly w a s kept in p o w e r — i n order to meet the emergency posed b y the siege (cf. Herodotus 1 . 2 0 - 2 3 ) . 3 1 . W. Jaeger's treatment o f Milesian theology focuses almost exclusively on Anaximander (doubtless because the sources for Thales are so scanty): see The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers ( O x f o r d 1 9 4 7 )

18-3732. See, e.g., W.Jaeger, op. cit. (supra n. 28) 2 2 3 - 3 3 .

20

The Sculpted

Word

In view of this analysis of Thaïes, w e may now explain the failure of philosophy to emerge in the Near East as a direct result of the failure of any known Near Eastern society to evolve beyond the religious-political model of a divinely sanctioned and engendered monarchy and aristocracy. A s far as w e know, this step was first taken where philosophy first emerged—in early sixth-century Greece. When it was taken, philosophy's role was not that of an imitative parasite but of a powerful transformer of the mentality of the city-state as well as a consolidator of the power of the new tyrannical regime. 3 3 T w o can play the same game, and although some aristocrats like Theognis and Alcaeus could resist tyranny only by issuing jeremiads, it did not take very long for the threatened aristocracy to discover a spokesman w h o could provide a positive philosophical justification for aristocratic values and government. This spokesman was Pythagoras (/?. 520). D e claring himself a philosophos (i.e., a lover of wisdom) rather than a sophos, Pythagoras explained that "only god is sophos" (Heraclides o f Pontus apud D . L . 1.12). 3 4 Both the title and the piety motivating its coinage distinguish—and doubtless were meant to distinguish—Pythagoras from Milesian sophoi like Thaïes. Pythagoras' reintroduction of the gods into serious discourse is of a piece with his project of legitimizing anew the old aristocracy, whose status was dependent on the gods', through the institution of philosophy. 35 Pythagoras' aristocratic leanings reflect both his embitterment with Polycrates, the tyrant of his native city of Samos (so Aristoxenus 33. B y now it should be clear that my explanation of the emergence of philosophy in Miletus is diametrically opposed to the theory of S. C . Humphreys that the Milesian philosophers are to be understood as "intellectuals who withdrew from political life . . . the immediate impulse toward [scil. their] search for justice in nature came not from the establishment of a new form of justice in the city, but from its disruption": op. cit. (supra n. 12) 2 2 1 - 2 2 . 34. See W. K. C . Guthrie, op. cit. (supra n. 4) vol. 1, pp. 2 0 4 - 5 , for discussion of the terms philosophos and philosophia. Cf. also C . J. de Vogel, Pythagoras and Early Pythagoreanism (Assen 1966) 9 6 - 1 0 2 and 2 1 8 - 2 0 for Pythagoras as an inventor of names. 35. M y understanding of Pythagorean politics has been greatly influenced by the excellent study of E. L. Minar, Early Pythagorean Politics in Practice and Theory (Baltimore 1942).

Philosophy

and Society in Greece

21

apud Porphyry VP 9), and his self-proclaimed descent from Hermes (so Heraclides of Pontus apud D.L. 8.4). It is no surprise that when he was forced to flee Polycrates, Pythagoras should have chosen to escape to Croton, because Magna Graecia was a bastion of aristocratic government in the last quarter of the sixth century. The reception given Pythagoras by the Crotoniates was spontaneously enthusiastic. The rootless exile quickly found an audience ready to patronize ideas that in Samos were considered dangerous and deviant. The leading ideas of Pythagoreanism are clearly as aristocratic as Pythagoras' theology and genealogy. Pythagoras makes explicit, i.e., philosophical, the aristocratic definition ofjustice by calling the rule of the gods the foundation o f j u s tice (Aristoxenus apud Iamblichus VP 137.86-87). Hence, Pythagoras was concerned to foster old religious superstitions among the common people (cf. symbola 1 - 3 , 6, and 25 in Iamblichus Protr. 21), and he based his philosophy on the principle of "following god" (so Aristoxenus apud Iamblichus VP 137). The philosopher was "the best of men" (D.L. 8.8) and most fit to rule, since he understands and imitates the gods. Pythagoras' aristocratic attitude is best expressed in his famous simile of life as a festival: "Life is like a festival, for just as some come to the festival to compete, others to do business, but the best as spectators, so, too, in life servile men are hunters after fame or profit, but the philosophers are hunters after the truth" (D.L. 8.8). The Pythagorean philosopher, the "best of men," arrogantly rules over his state with divine sanction and inspiration and with contempt for his unenlightened "servile" subordinates. O f course, Pythagoreanism represents the attempt to justify, not the old aristocracy of birth, but a new, philosophically trained aristocracy of merit, and Pythagoras' openness to the low-born is most strikingly clear in the history of his own reincarnations, for despite his noble lineage he was the humble fisherman Pyrrhus of Delos in his penultimate incarnation (cf. Heraclides of Pontus apudD.L. 8.4). If Pythagoras' great soul could inhabit such a humble station, then surely it was magnanimous enough to recognize philosophical talent wherever it was to be found. Nevertheless, this theoretical lack of class bias and the laudable project of creating an aris-

22

The Sculpted Word

tocracy of merit were undercut by Pythagoras' insistence that his closest associates study for three, or possibly five, years before even being admitted into his presence (Timaeus apud D . L . 8.10). Given the expense and time needed to reach this level of acceptance in the Pythagorean school, it is safe to assume that, in practice, Pythagoras' new aristocracy of merit was staffed primarily by members of the old aristocracy of birth. To conclude, in the first period of its existence, philosophy—whether Milesian or Italian—played an essential role in constituting the societies that harbored it. The first stage of philosophy's relationship to society was thus one of high integration, and philosophy and society were mutually legitimating. For philosophy, then, geography is destiny, since theory and practice are so undifferentiated. Where the philosopher is not tolerated, from there he must leave; where he is tolerated, it is in order to rule or serve the interests of the ruling class. v. Philosophy and Society: The Second Stage (500-399

B.C.)

B y definition, this kind of philosophy could never exist in a democratic polis, and it is no accident that the political opposition to Pythagoreanism in Magna Graecia was almost always democratic.36 Whenever philosophy did appear in a democratic polis after Pythagoras, it could do so only with high and varied forms of differentation between theory and practice, indicative of its inability to find legitimacy within a democratic state. The result was new versions of philosophy which often contained puzzling contradictions or gaps, almost as if in this second stage the discontinuity between theory and practice was glossed over and unconsciously suppressed in the hope that crises of legitimacy could thereby be avoided. However uneasy the relationship of philosophy and society was during this stage, the crucial fact is that it was at this time that the question of whether philosophy could be36. Cf. K. von Fritz in RE X X I V s.v. Pythagoreer (Stuttgart 1963) cols. 2I5ÍF.; and see also E. L. Minar, op. cit. (supra n. 35) 132.

Philosophy

and Society

in Greece

23

come a universal feature of culture—and not just a local experiment in southern Italy and Ionia—was answered in the affirmative. It was also in this period of political obstacles to the development of philosophy that professional and psychological differences between philosophers came to the fore. These differences further added to the complexity of the philosophical scene. Empedocles combines a pre-Pythagorean Milesian concern for physics with a Pythagorean preoccupation with mystical metaphysics. 37 He is a democrat—at least at one stage of his career—and one of the first masters of the symboleutic rhetoric so necessary in a democracy. Yet he also defines himself quite undemocratically as a god with special powers of healing and prophecy (fr. 1 1 2 D-K). He becomes, not the founder of a school or a philosopher-king, but a homeless exile. If Empedocles is a "philosophical centaur," as Jaeger aptly put it,38 then Parmenides, his senior by 10 to 20 years, is a hippocentaur. Empedocles' contradictoriness is seen only when we—perhaps posing an artificial question 39 —try to find a unity of thought behind his two works (the physical " O n Nature" and the mystical "Purifications"). Parmenides', on the other hand, arises because of his insistence on combining in a single work his two apparently irreconciliable ways of truth and opinion.40 In this contradiction we may find expressed Parmenides' ambivalent attitude toward his profession—the intended audience of the way of truth—and his society—the audience of his way of opinion. The same kind of ambivalence can be seen in Parmenides' reaction to his Pythagorean and Milesian predecessors. Parmenides studied with the Pythagorean philosopher Ameinias, and he revered his teacher enough to build a tomb for him (D.L. 9.21). It is therefore not surprising to find Pythagorean influences in 37. See A . A . Long, "Thinking and Sense-Perception in Empedocles: Mysticism or Materialism?" C Q 60 (1966) 2 5 6 - 7 6 . 38. W. Jaeger, op. cit. (supra n. 28) vol. 1, p. 295, also cited by Long, op. cit. (supra n. 37) 256. 39. See Long, ibid., especially p. 256. 40. C f . L. Taran, Parmenides (Princeton 1965) 2 0 2 - 3 0 for a review of scholarship about this problem.

24

The Sculpted

Word

Parmenides' thought. 41 However, in his politics Parmenides is very much a Milesian, in that he rejects the role of philosopher-king in favor of that of lawgiver and advisor (D.L. 9.23; Plutarch Adv. Col. 32, 1226a). Even within the Eleatic school we find differences between the leading members with respect to the proper political role of the sage. Zeno, influenced perhaps by the aristocratic and activist Pythagoreans, was reportedly killed after unsuccessfully attempting to assassinate the tyrant Nearchus (A 1, 2, 6 - 9 D-K); Melissus was active in Samian politics and even served as a quite successful admiral of the Samian fleet during the revolt against Athens in 4 4 1 - 4 4 0 (A 1, 3 D-K). The divorce of theory from practice and the failure to institutionalize philosophy are also to be encountered in Heraclitus and Anaxagoras. Their relationship to their societies was, however, much less positive. Anaxagoras' trial in Athens on a charge of impiety and his conviction and exile all attest— as does Diopeithes' decree of c. 430, under which Anaxagoras may have been tried—to intolerance (always latent in a democracy) of philosophers and, as the case of Diagoras of Melos shows, even the quasi-philosophical.42 Heraclitus' alleged refusal of the hereditary kingship of Ephesus and the host of misanthropic anecdotes told about him may be less well founded historically, but they must rest on some core of fact. The arrogant tone of his writings (cf. fr. 1 - 3 Marcovich) is in any case evidence enough on which to build a case for his antisocial orientation; he is likewise haughty toward his professional colleagues (cf. fr. 16 Marcovich) and provides us with some of the earliest explicit evidence of the growing competitiveness of philosophers. The fact that Heraclitus, unlike Thales and Pythagoras, probably published at least one book of his thoughts cannot be taken as evidence of a desire to disseminate his philosophy to a large audience, since, 4 1 . For our purposes, w e need not determine whether it is more correct to call Parmenides a "dissident Pythagorean" (so J. E. Raven, Pythagoreans and Eleatics [London 1948] 22) or to see his doctrines as simply inspired by Pythagoreanism in many cases; cf., e.g., Tarán, op. cit. (supra n. 40) 201. 42. O n Diagoras see L. Woodbury, " T h e Date and Atheism of D i agoras of Melos," Phoenix 19 (1965) 1 7 8 - 2 1 1 .

Philosophy and Society in Greece

25

as Diogenes Laertius noted, the style of the book was intentionally obscure (D.L. 9.$). Like the oracles he admired (cf. fr. 1 4 and 75 Marcovich), Heraclitus published messages the purpose o f which was to increase the public's awe rather than its understanding of him. If philosophers like Heraclitus and Anaxagoras favored theory at the expense of practice, then sophists like Protagoras, Gorgias, and Prodicus promoted (or, at any rate, were accused o f promoting) practice at the expense of theory. For them, success in democratic politics was all that mattered, and they claimed to be able to teach the knowledge (euhoulia) and skill (rhetoric) necessary for achieving such success. However, by servicing the democracies with trained politicians and a new ideology of popular government, the sophists were no more able than their competitors like A n a x agoras or Socrates to escape the dangers of living in democratic cities. Protagoras, too, was driven out of Athens into exile. 43 With Socrates, philosophy remained focused on the human issues of the sophists, but it did not so much serve the state as criticize it, even if implicitly. Socrates may have institutionalized his version of philosophy, though probably not in anything as formal as Aristophanes' comic phrontisterion. T h e picture that emerges in Xenophon and Plato, of Socrates wandering through Athens attended by friends or a f e w disciples, is probably much closer to the truth. 44 The Socratic version of philosophy concludes the second stage o f the relationship of philosophy to society. T h e execution of Socrates made inevitable an awareness that the separation— hitherto unconscious—of post-Pythagorean philosophy f r o m its society could lead to unacceptable risks to safety as well as to unnecessary contradictions o f thought. In the next stage of the relationship, w e find just what w e might logically have expected after the dramatic death of Socrates: con43. SeeJ. S. Morrison, "The Place of Protagoras in Athenian Public Life (460-415 B.C.)," C Q 35 (1941) 1 - 1 6 , especially pp. 4 - 6 . 44. See Guthrie, op. cit. (supra n. 4) vol. 3, pp. 3 7 3 - 7 5 . On Socrates' attitude toward politics see, e.g., K . von Fritz, Platon in Sizilien (Berlin 1968) 3 2 - 3 3 ; O. Gigon, "Theorie und Praxis bei Platon und Aristoteles," MH 30 (1973) 84-85.

26

The Sculpted Word

scious attempts at securing legitimation and integration or at j u s t i f y i n g the philosopher's alienation. vi. Philosophy (399-322

and Society:

The Third

Stage

B.C.)

T h e third stage of the relationship is dominated b y reactions to Socrates and fourth-century Pythagoreanism. D i o g e nes o f Sinope and Plato are both students o f Socrates (Diogenes indirectly via Antisthenes) and o f contemporary Pythagoreans. Since Pythagoreanism continued to survive through the fifth to the fourth century, it could furnish the fourth century with a living example o f the attractions—and d a n g e r s — o f the first stage of the relationship of philosophy and society, j u s t as Socrates could serve to e x e m p l i f y the second. T h e example o f Pythagoreanism was contradictory. O n one hand, it kept alive in the Tarentum o f Archytas the exciting ideal o f integration of school and state. O n the other, the Pythagorean refugees in mainland Greece at Phleius and Thebes, w h e r e Pythagoreans settled after fleeing before the advancing Dionysius o f Syracuse, furnished equally p o w e r f u l testimony to the risks inherent in a perfect identity o f politics and philosophy. T h e pitiful w a y o f life o f these refugees became a stock-motif o f the Middle C o m e d y (cf. D - K 58E, pp. 478-80). Diogenes, w h o m a y have himself suffered exile f r o m his native Sinope during its military troubles with Datames (cf. D . L . 6 . 2 0 - 2 1 and Polyainos 7 . 2 1 ) , took his inspiration f r o m the w a y o f life o f these refugee Pythagoreans and f r o m his social environment. O n l y the wise man can be free, according to Diogenes, because he alone understands virtue; all other m e n are slaves in fact, if not in law. T h e conventions o f society are arbitrary and hence to be defied b y the sage. Private property, marriage, wealth, and social status—the basis of the city-state—are rejected as unimportant. For the sage, the universe is his polis\ he is at h o m e e v e r y w h e r e — a n d n o where. Plato is credited with calling Diogenes a "Socrates gone m a d " ( D . L . 6.45 and Aelian, VH 19.337). T h e remark is perceptive and symptomatic o f Diogenes' success, such as it was. B y loosing his connection with any given polis, D i -

Philosophy and Society in Greece

27

ogenes ceased to present the political threat that Socrates— for good reasons or not—was perceived to represent. Socrates' method of dialectic could be felt to be menacing or at least annoying (cf. Plato, Apology 23C-D). Diogenes' method of repartee (D.L. 6.74) could only be taken as amusing. We are told that the Athenians quickly repented of Socrates' death (D.L. 2.45). Diogenes capitalized on this remorse and achieved personal security and legitimacy for his school precisely by playing his "mad" game of épater les Athéniens,45

Whether or not Plato really called Diogenes a "Socrates gone mad," there are numerous anecdotes preserved attesting the mutual dislike of the two men (cf. D.L. 6.25-26, 40, 41, 53» 54> 58, 67). Even if untrue, these anecdotes are evidence of the awareness of later antiquity of their completely opposite philosophical orientations. Plato is influenced by the tradition of successful Pythagoreanism in Tarentum and by the life, not the death, of Socrates. Although no less critical of existing society than Diogenes (or Socrates) he reacts not with alienation but by attempting a theoretical reintegration of philosophy and society on the model of Pythagorean philosophic!, while achieving practical legitimacy for his school in Athens by giving it the substantively inappropriate but legally convenient form of the religious association (ûiacroç). Hence he draws up precise blueprints for a just state in the Republic and Laws; hence he goes to Tarentum—and to Syracuse. In Athens he founds the Academy and gives it the legal form of a ûiacroç whose internal structure is modeled on that of the Pythagorean school.46 The Academy's purpose is not so much an abstract search for knowledge as concretely to prepare students for politics.47 Its practical results are not only the education of 45. Evidence for Athenian remorse over Socrates' execution is to be found in D . L . 2.43 and anon. com. fr. 386 Edmonds (vol. IIIA, p. 416). 46. See J . S. Morrison, op. cit. (supra n. 5) 1 9 8 " 2 1 8 ; K. von Fritz, Pythagorean Politics in Southern Italy (New York 1940) 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 ; P. Friedlaender, Plato (Princeton 1969 2 ) vol. 1, pp. 9 0 - 9 1 , and for the older literature see p. 352n4. On the veneration of Pythagoras in the Academy see W. Jaeger, Aristotle, trans. R. Robinson (Oxford 1948 2 ) 97. C f . also n. 80 infra. 47. C f . F. A . G. Beck, Greek Education, 450-350 B.C. (London 1964) 199; Guthrie, op. cit. (supra n. 4) vol. 4, p. 22.

28

The Sculpted Word

would-be scholars and philosophers but also the training of would-be philosopher-kings, beginning with Clearchus of Heraclea. 48 Its foundation enabled Plato to take advantage o f Athenian corporate law, which offered the state's protection to groups organized into a private religious cult.49 Thus, the Academy could not be charged with the crime o f introducing new divinities not recognized by the state (Plato, Apology 26B), for, by definition, any gods worshipped by the A c a demics had state sanction. T h e monograph on politically active Platonists requested by G i g o n some years ago has yet to be written. 50 For our purposes, it will be enough to show that Clearchus was not an isolated instance (although he was, admittedly, considered an embarrassment by the Academy) by referring to the list o f twelve Platonic politicians in Plutarch (Adv. Col. 1 1 2 6 C - D ) and the five Platonic attempted tyrants mentioned by Athenaeus ( 5 0 3 C - D ) . To this catalogue of Platonists in the mould of Clearchus w e should add the welcome counterexample of Hermias of Atarneus, whose rule evolved, under the salutary influence of the Platonists Erastus and Coriscus in Assos, into an enlightened monarchy. Plato was thus able to present his school as conservative and legitimate in A t h ens, but as revolutionary in the rest of the Greek world. This explains the puzzling fact that in neither the Republic nor Laws do w e find that Plato's Utopia reflects the actual structure and practices of the Academy in Athens. In making this distinction between the Academy's attitude toward the Athenian state and its attitudes toward other Greek poleis, Plato 48. O n Clearchus see S. M . Burstein, Outpost Emergence

of Heraclea

on the Black

Sea,

of Hellenism:

The

Calif. Pub. in Class. Studies 1 4

(Berkeley and Los Angeles 1976) 4 7 - 6 5 . 49. See P. Foucart, Des associations religieuses chez les grecs (Paris 1 8 7 3 ) 4 7 - 5 0 ; P. Herrmann, RAC

Lieferung 7 3 / 7 4 s.v. Genossenschaft (Stuttgart

1 9 7 6 ) cols. 9 7 - 9 9 ( n o w = R A C vol. 10 [Stuttgart 1978]). 50. O . G i g o n , "Platon und die politische Wirklichkeit,"

Gymnasium

69 ( 1 9 6 2 ) 209. See also the brief remarks on Plato's political adventures in K . Popper, The Open

Society and Its Enemies

1 3 6 - 3 7 ; H . - I . M a r r o u , Histoire

de l'éducation

(Princeton 1 9 6 6 ' ) vol. 1, pp. dans l'antiquité

1 1 0 - 1 3 . T h e recent w o r k b y A . B . Hentschke, Politik Plato und Aristoteles

(Paris 1 9 6 5 6 )

und Philosophie

bei

(Frankfurt 1 9 7 1 ) , which f r o m its title seems to be an

attempt to fill Gigon's desideratum,

w a s not available to me.

Philosophy

and Society in Greece

29

was doubtless influenced in the final analysis by the real economic and political conditions of his time, for fourth-century Athens was, in fact, an unusually stable and prosperous citystate in the Greek world, which elsewhere was often the scene of social unrest and political revolution. Furthermore, Plato may have not only approved of the policies of his friend Timotheos (cf. FHG 328 F223) but, using the Academy as a political instrument, he may also have collaborated with Timotheos' plans to revive the Athenian empire by fomenting pro-Athenian plots in cities Timotheos coveted.51 If this state of affairs gave rise to Plato's very different domestic and foreign policies, it also justified them in practical and theoretical terms. Hermias stands as an exception to the dreary list of names in Athenaeus and Plutarch both because his character and government were admirable and because he was not a philosopher-king (he never studied with Plato in Athens as a young man) but a king tutored by philosophers. The difference between, e.g., Clearchus, who established his tyranny in Heraclea in 364, and Hermias, whose reign probably 5 1 . On fourth-century Athens, seeV N . Andreyev, " S o m e Aspects of Agrarian Conditions in Attica in the Fifth to Third Centuries B . C . , " Eirene 12 (1974) 5 - 4 6 ; S. Isager and M. H. Hansen, Aspects of Athenian Society in the Fourth Century B.C., trans. J. H. Rosenmeier (Odense 1975) 5 2 - 5 5 ; J . Pecirka, " T h e Crisis of the Athenian Polis in the Fourth Century B . C . , " Eirene 14 (1976) 5 - 2 9 (all three correcting the earlier picture of decline presented by C . Mossé, Athens in Decline 404-86 B.C. [London and Boston 1973]). On the state of social and political conditions generally in the Greek world during this period, see A . Fuks, "Patterns and Types of Social-Economic Revolution in Greece from the Fourth to the Second Century B . C . , " Ancient Society 5 (1974) 5 1 - 8 1 . For Plato's attitude toward Athens see R. Harder, "Plato und Athen," in Kleine Schrifien, ed. W. Marg (Munich i960) 2 1 2 - 2 2 . On the relationship of Timotheos and Plato, see the interesting, if at times overly speculative, study of S. Dusanic, "Plato's Academy and Timotheus' Policy, 3 6 5 - 3 5 9 B.C.," Chiron 10 (1980) 1 1 1 - 4 4 . On Hermias, see W. Jaeger, op. cit. (supra n. 46) m - 1 7 . H. Volkmann, Kleine Pauly 2 (Stuttgart 1967) col. 1076 s.v. Hermias, claims that Hermias actually studied with Plato in Athens. He supports this claim by referring to Theopompus FHG 1 1 5 F219. This reference is wrong not only because 2 1 9 should read 291 but also because the passage contains nothing about Hermias in Athens studying with Plato. That story is given by Strabo 13, p. 610, and was long ago rightly rejected by P. von der Miihll, RE Supp. Ill s.v. Hermias nr. 1 1 (Stuttgart 1918) col. 1 1 2 8 .

30

The Sculpted Word

commenced some ten years later, may not be accidental. Themistius credits Aristotle with modifying Plato's saying that "kings must be philosophers or philosophers kings" by urging that kings should not be philosophers but should heed the advice of philosophers (Aristotle, I l e p i fiacrLKeia