The SAGE Encyclopedia of Theory in Psychology (2 Volumes) [1-2, 1 ed.] 9781452256719

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The SAGE Encyclopedia of

Theory in Psychology

Editorial Board Editor Harold L. Miller, Jr. Brigham Young University

Editorial Board Susan T. Fiske Princeton University Kathy A. Hanisch Iowa State University Christopher H. Ramey University of Kansas Tomi-Ann Roberts Colorado College Kurt Salzinger Hofstra University Brent Slife Brigham Young University

The SAGE Encyclopedia of

Theory in Psychology 1

Edited by Harold L. Miller, Jr. Brigham Young University

FOR INFORMATION:

Copyright © 2016 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

SAGE Publications, Inc. 2455 Teller Road Thousand Oaks, California 91320 E-mail: [email protected]

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Miller, Harold L., Jr., editor. Title: The Sage encyclopedia of theory in psychology / edited by Harold L. Miller, Jr., Brigham Young University.

India SAGE Publications Asia-Pacific Pte. Ltd. 3 Church Street #10-04 Samsung Hub Singapore 049483

Description: Thousand Oaks, California : SAGE, [2016] | “A Sage reference publication.” | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016005365 | ISBN 978-1-4522-5671-9 (hardcover: alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Psychology. Classification: LCC BF121 .S234 2016 | DDC 150.3—dc23 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2016005365

Acquisitions Editor: Andrew Boney

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Developmental Editor: Carole Maurer Reference Systems Manager: Leticia Gutierrez Production Editor: David C. Felts Copy Editor: Linda Gray Typesetter: Hurix Systems Pvt. Ltd. Proofreaders: Caryne Brown, Scott Oney Indexer: Julie Grayson Cover Designer: Candice Harman Marketing Manager: Kay Stefanski

16 17 18 19 20 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents Volume 1 List of Entries   vii Reader’s Guide   xi About the Editor   xvii Contributors  xix Introduction  xxxi Entries A 1 G 345 B 67 H 399 C 123 I 445 D 229 J 479 E 245 K 483 F 327 L 493

Volume 2 List of Entries   vii Entries M 525 S 819 N 589 T 929 O 619 U 945 P 635 V 949 Q 777 W 967 R 785 Appendix A: A Propaedeutic Chronology   975 Appendix B: Resource Guide to Scholarly Journals and Professional Associations   977 Appendix C: Bibliography   985 Index  1033

List of Entries Achievement Motivation Addiction Adolescent Development, Theories of Adulthood Aggression and Violence Altruism Altruism and Sociality Ancient and Medieval Sources of Therapy Ancient and Premodern Theories of Personality Animal Consciousness Anxiety Disorders Applied Behavior Analysis Artificial Intelligence Attention Attitude Formation and Change Attraction Auditory Perception Auditory System

Cognition and Language Cognitive Behavioral Therapies Cognitive Development Cognitive Evolution Cognitive Illusions Cognitive Neuroscience Cognitive Therapies Communication and Language Concepts and Language Consciousness, Categories of Consciousness, Disorders of Consciousness, Functions of Consciousness, Origins of Consciousness and the Unconscious Consumer Psychology Contemporary Trends in Psychotherapy Cooperation Coping Strategies Creativity Cross-Cultural Methods of Research Cultural Evolution Cultural Psychology Culture, Origins of Culture and Cognition Culture and Development Culture and Personality Culture and Psychopathology Culture and Social Relations Culture and the Dialogical Self

Bandura, Albert Behavior Therapies Behavioral Development Behavioral Economics Behavioral Health Behavioral Perspectives on Psychopathology Behavioral Theories of Personality Behaviorism Big Five Model and Lexical Trait Theory Binet’s Tests Biological Constraints on Learning Brain and Consciousness Brain and Intelligence Brain and Nervous System: Macroarchitecture Brain and Nervous System: Microarchitecture

Darwin, Charles Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Dissociative Disorders Dreams Drive and Motivation in the Brain

Cancer. See Psychosocial Factors and Cancer Childhood Chronic Illness, Psychological Aspects of Classical Conditioning Close Relationships

Eating and Drinking Ekman’s Theory of Basic Emotions Embodied Cognition vii

viii   List of Entries

Embodied Grounding Emotion, Detection of Emotion, Evolution of Emotion, Expression of Emotion, Theories of Emotion and Culture Emotion and Motivation Emotion and Scientific Reasoning Emotional Disorders Emotional Intelligence Emotions, Universality of Employee Motivation Employee Satisfaction Epigenetics Epistemology and Sensation Erikson’s Theory of Psychosocial Development Ethics of Therapy Event Perception Evidence-Based Therapy Evolutionary Psychological Perspectives on Human Nature, Critical Evaluation of Evolutionary Psychology Exceptional Memory and Expertise Existential Theories of Personality Extended Mind Factor Analysis and Personality Theory Failure of Memory Feminist Approaches to Psychology and Gender Flynn Effect Freud’s Psychosexual Stage Theory of Personality Frontal Lobe Functions

Group Processes Group Selection Gustatory System Habits Hamilton, W. D. Health Psychology Heightened Consciousness Hermeneutics and Developmental Psychology Heuristics for Memory and Decision Making Historical Roots of Theories of Psychopathology Homeostasis Human Agency Human Factors in Organizations Human Information Processing Human Nature Humanistic Theories of Personality Humanistic Theories of Psychopathology Hypnosis Individuality Versus Collectivity Intellectual Disability Intelligence, Environmental Influences on Intelligence, Evolution of Intelligence, Heritability of Intelligence and Individualism Intelligence and Schooling Intelligence Testing Intelligence Testing and Ethnicity Intergroup Behavior International Classification of Diseases Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Motivation Job Analysis

Gender, Evolutionary Perspectives on Gender and Cognition Gender and Culture Gender and Emotion Gender and Language Gender and Sex Gender and Violence Gender Development Gender Identity Gender Roles Gender Stereotypes General Aggression Model Gestalt Psychology Grammar, Psychology of Grief and Bereavement

Kinesthetic System Knowledge Kohlberg, Lawrence Language, Evolution of Language, Interaction, and Culture Language and Development Language Development Language Disorders Law and Psychology Law of Effect Leadership Long-Term Memory: Processes Long-Term Memory: Structures

List of Entries   ix

Mating Strategy Evolution and Development Measurement of Intelligence Measuring Treatment Outcome Medical Therapies Medicalization of Psychopathology Meditation and Relaxation Memory as Reconstructive Metatheoretical Issues in Personality Psychology Mixed Methods Mixed-Method Philosophies Mood Disorders Moral Development Morality and Moral Emotions Motivation and Cognition Motivation and Culture Motivation and Personality Motor Development Multiple Intelligences Music Perception Natural Selection Nature Versus Nurture Needs Neurodevelopmental Disorders Neuroendocrine System Neuroethics Neuropsychology Neuroscience as One-Sided Dualism Neurotransmitters and Neuromodulators Nonvisual Memory Objectivity in Diagnosis Occipital Lobe Functions Olfactory System Operant Conditioning Organizational Climate and Culture Pain Parent-Offspring Relations Parietal Lobe Functions Passion Pavlov’s Legacy Perception and Art Perception and Cognition Perception and Culture Perception and Epistemology Perception and Language Perception and Motivation Perceptual Contrast

Perceptual Development Perceptual Disorders Perceptual Illusions Performance Management Personality, Heritability of Personality, Measurement of Personality Development Personality Disorders Personality Testing Personality Traits Versus Situations Personality Types Versus Personality Traits Personnel Development Personnel Evaluation Personnel Selection Phenomenological, Existential, and Hermeneutical Therapies Phonology Piaget’s and the Neo-Piagetian Theories of Cognitive Development Pinker on Language Placebo Effect Play Positive Psychology and Human Frailty Prenatal Development Problem Solving Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Personality Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Psychopathology Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Therapies Psycholinguistics Psychological Wellness and Well-Being Psychoneuroimmunology Psychopathology and Stress Psychophysics Psychosocial Factors and Cancer Psychotherapy and Individualism Punishment Qualitative Research Quantitative Research Reading Process, Models of Reasoning and Decision Making Reinforcement Relational Theory Rescorla-Wagner Model Research Design Research Methods in Health Psychology Research Methods in Neuroscience

x   List of Entries

Schizophrenia Self Self-Control Self-Determination Self-Esteem Semantics, Psychology of Sensory Disorders Sensory Transduction Sex Sex Reassignment Sexual Selection Short-Term and Working Memory Signal Detection Theory Single-Subject Research Designs Skinner’s Legacy Sleep Disorders Sleep Stages and States Sleep: Functions Social Cognition Social Construction Social Emotions Social Factors in Health Social Influence Social Motives Social Neuroscience Social Psychology: Is It Truly Social? Social Role Theory Spirituality

Statistics in Psychology Stigma Stimulus Control Stress and Gender Stress and Resilience to Life Challenge Stress Syndromes Stressors and Stress Syntax, Psychology of Systems and Organizations Temporal Lobe Functions Terror Management Theory Time Perspective Theory Training and Personnel Development Triarchic Intelligence Unconscious Motivation Values Verbal Behavior Vestibular System Visual Perception Visual System Watson, J. B. Workforce Psychology Working Memory, Improvement of

Reader’s Guide The Reader’s Guide is provided to assist readers in locating articles on related topics. It classifies articles into 21 general topical categories: Cognition, Consciousness, Culture, Development, Emotion, Evolution, Gender, Health, Intelligence, Language, Learning, Motivation, Neuroscience, Organizations, Perception, Personality, Psychopathology, Research Methods, Sensation, Sociality, and Therapy. Entries may be listed under more than one topic. Cognition

Consciousness and the Unconscious Dreams Heightened Consciousness Hypnosis Meditation and Relaxation Sleep Disorders Sleep: Functions Sleep Stages and States

Attention Cognition and Language Cognitive Illusions Creativity Embodied Cognition Embodied Grounding Exceptional Memory and Expertise Extended Mind Failure of Memory Gender and Cognition Heuristics for Memory and Decision Making Human Information Processing Knowledge Long-Term Memory: Processes Long-Term Memory: Structures Memory as Reconstructive Motivation and Cognition Nonvisual Memory Perception and Cognition Problem Solving Reasoning and Decision Making Short-Term and Working Memory Working Memory, Improvement of

Culture

Cross-Cultural Methods of Research Cultural Evolution Cultural Psychology Culture, Origins of Culture and Cognition Culture and Development Culture and Personality Culture and Psychopathology Culture and Social Relations Culture and the Dialogical Self Emotion and Culture Gender and Culture Language, Interaction, and Culture Motivation and Culture Perception and Culture Social Construction

Consciousness

Animal Consciousness Brain and Consciousness Consciousness, Categories of Consciousness, Disorders of Consciousness, Functions of Consciousness, Origins of

Development

Adolescent Development, Theories of Adulthood Behavioral Development Childhood xi

xii   Reader’s Guide

Cognitive Development Epigenetics Erikson’s Theory of Psychosocial Development Hermeneutics and Developmental Psychology Kohlberg, Lawrence Language and Development Moral Development Motor Development Nature Versus Nurture Neurodevelopmental Disorders Perceptual Development Personality Development Piaget’s and the Neo-Piagetian Theories of Cognitive Development Play Prenatal Development

Gender

Emotion

Health

Emotion, Theories of Emotion, Detection of Ekman’s Theory of Basic Emotions Emotion, Evolution of Emotion, Expression of Emotion and Culture Emotion and Motivation Emotion and Scientific Reasoning Emotional Disorders Emotional Intelligence Emotions, Universality of Morality and Moral Emotions Passion Social Emotions

Addiction Behavioral Health Chronic Illness, Psychological Aspects of Coping Strategies Health Psychology Objectivity in Diagnosis Positive Psychology and Human Frailty Psychological Wellness and Well-Being Psychoneuroimmunology Psychopathology and Stress Psychosocial Factors and Cancer Social Factors in Health Stress and Gender Stress and Resilience to Life Challenge Stress Syndromes Stressors and Stress

Evolution

Aggression and Violence Cognitive Evolution Cooperation Darwin, Charles Evolutionary Psychological Perspectives on Human Nature, Critical Evaluation of Evolutionary Psychology Group Selection Hamilton, W. D. Human Nature Mating Strategy Evolution and Development Natural Selection Parent-Offspring Relations Sexual Selection

Feminist Approaches to Psychology and Gender Gender, Evolutionary Perspectives on Gender and Cognition Gender and Culture Gender and Emotion Gender and Language Gender and Sex Gender and Violence Gender Development Gender Identity Gender Roles Gender Stereotypes Sex Reassignment Stress and Gender

Intelligence

Artificial Intelligence Binet’s Tests Brain and Intelligence Flynn Effect Intellectual Disability Intelligence, Environmental Influences on Intelligence, Evolution of Intelligence, Heritability of Intelligence and Individualism Intelligence and Schooling Intelligence Testing Intelligence Testing and Ethnicity

Reader’s Guide   xiii

Measurement of Intelligence Multiple Intelligences Triarchic Intelligence Language

Cognition and Language Concepts and Language Gender and Language Grammar, Psychology of Language, Evolution of Language, Interaction, and Culture Language Development Language Disorders Perception and Language Phonology Pinker on Language Psycholinguistics Reading Process, Models of Semantics, Psychology of Syntax, Psychology of Verbal Behavior Learning

Applied Behavior Analysis Bandura, Albert Behavioral Economics Behaviorism Biological Constraints on Learning Classical Conditioning Law of Effect Operant Conditioning Pavlov’s Legacy Punishment Reinforcement Rescorla-Wagner Model Skinner’s Legacy Stimulus Control Watson, J. B. Motivation

Achievement Motivation Drive and Motivation in the Brain Eating and Drinking Emotion and Motivation General Aggression Model Habits Homeostasis

Human Agency Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Motivation Motivation and Cognition Motivation and Culture Motivation and Personality Needs Perception and Motivation Self-Control Self-Determination Self-Esteem Sex Social Motives Terror Management Theory Unconscious Motivation Values Neuroscience

Brain and Consciousness Brain and Nervous System: Macroarchitecture Brain and Nervous System: Microarchitecture Cognitive Neuroscience Frontal Lobe Functions Neuroendocrine System Neuroethics Neuropsychology Neuroscience as One-Sided Dualism Neurotransmitters and Neuromodulators Occipital Lobe Functions Parietal Lobe Functions Research Design Research Methods in Neuroscience Social Neuroscience Temporal Lobe Functions Organizations

Communication and Language Consumer Psychology Employee Motivation Employee Satisfaction Human Factors in Organizations Job Analysis Leadership Organizational Climate and Culture Performance Management Personnel Development Personnel Evaluation Personnel Selection Systems and Organizations

xiv   Reader’s Guide

Training and Personnel Development Workforce Psychology Perception

Auditory Perception Event Perception Gestalt Psychology Music Perception Pain Perception and Art Perception and Cognition Perception and Culture Perception and Epistemology Perception and Language Perception and Motivation Perceptual Contrast Perceptual Disorders Perceptual Illusions Psychophysics Signal Detection Theory Visual Perception Personality

Ancient and Premodern Theories of Personality Behavioral Theories of Personality Big Five Model and Lexical Trait Theory Existential Theories of Personality Factor Analysis and Personality Theory Freud’s Psychosexual Stage Theory of Personality Humanistic Theories of Personality Metatheoretical Issues in Personality Psychology Motivation and Personality Personality, Heritability of Personality, Measurement of Personality Testing Personality Traits Versus Situations Personality Types Versus Personality Traits Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Personality Psychopathology

Addiction Ancient and Premodern Theories of Personality Anxiety Disorders Behavioral Perspectives on Psychopathology Culture and Psychopathology

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Dissociative Disorders Historical Roots of Theories of Psychopathology Humanistic Theories of Psychopathology International Classification of Diseases Medicalization of Psychopathology Mood Disorders Neurodevelopmental Disorders Personality Disorders Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Psychopathology Psychopathology and Stress Schizophrenia Research Methods

Cross-Cultural Methods of Research Mixed Methods Mixed-Method Philosophies Qualitative Research Quantitative Research Research Design Research Methods in Health Psychology Single-Subject Research Designs Statistics in Psychology Sensation

Auditory System Epistemology and Sensation Gustatory System Kinesthetic System Olfactory System Sensory Disorders Sensory Transduction Vestibular System Visual System Sociality

Altruism Altruism and Sociality Attitude Formation and Change Attraction Close Relationships Grief and Bereavement Group Processes Individuality Versus Collectivity Intergroup Behavior Law and Psychology

Reader’s Guide   xv

Relational Theory Self Social Cognition Social Influence Social Psychology: Is It Truly Social? Social Role Theory Stigma Time Perspective Theory Therapy

Ancient and Medieval Sources of Therapy Behavior Therapies

Cognitive Behavioral Therapies Cognitive Therapies Contemporary Trends in Psychotherapy Ethics of Therapy Evidence-Based Therapy Measuring Treatment Outcome Medical Therapies Phenomenological, Existential, and Hermeneutical Therapies Placebo Effect Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Therapies Psychotherapy and Individualism Spirituality

SAGE was founded in 1965 by Sara Miller McCune to support the dissemination of usable knowledge by publishing innovative and high-quality research and teaching content. Today, we publish over 900 journals, including those of more than 400 learned societies, more than 800 new books per year, and a growing range of library products including archives, data, case studies, reports, and video. SAGE remains majority-owned by our founder, and after Sara’s lifetime will become owned by a charitable trust that secures our continued independence. Los Angeles | London | New Delhi | Singapore | Washington DC | Melbourne

About the Editor Harold L. “Hal” Miller, Jr., is a professor of psychology in the Department of Psychology at Brigham Young University. He received his BS degree in psychology from Arizona State University and then studied with Richard Herrnstein at Harvard University, where he received a PhD in experimental psychology. He joined the psychology faculty of Brigham Young University, where he has remained. In addition to a full teaching

load throughout his career, he has maintained an active lab in the experimental analysis of behavior and behavioral economics and has been an educational consultant in the United States and China. Among his scholarly interests is the philosophy of the behavioral sciences. He has coauthored an introductory psychology textbook and has served as a member of the board of editors and as associate editor of the Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior. Currently, he is a member of the Provo (UT) City Municipal Council.

xvii

Contributors Henk Aarts Utrecht University

Brandon Balzer Carr University of California, Santa Cruz

Tiziano Agostini University of Trieste

Michael Bamberg Guangdong University of Foreign Studies and Clark University

Tracy Packiam Alloway University of North Florida

Claudio Barbaranelli Sapienza University of Rome

Martina Amanzio University of Turin

Christopher P. Barlett Gettysburg College

Ben Ambridge University of Liverpool

David H. Barlow Boston University

Elissa M. Aminoff Carnegie Mellon University

Sally H. Barlow Brigham Young University

Craig A. Anderson Iowa State University

Kiera Bartlett University of Manchester

Sharon Anderson Colorado State University

William M. Baum University of New Hampshire

Allison J. Applebaum Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center

Daphne Bavelier University of Geneva

Dan Ariely Duke University

Hall P. Beck Appalachian State University

Christopher J. Armitage University of Manchester

D. Vaughn Becker Arizona State University

Christopher D. Aults Florida Atlantic University

Kreshnik Begolli University of California, Irvine

Melanie M. Ayres University of Wisconsin–River Falls

Suzanne T. Bell DePaul University

Heesoon Bai Simon Fraser University

Alexandra Bendixen University of Oldenburg

Gregory F. Ball University of Maryland

Aaron S. Benjamin University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Jacques Balthazart University of Liege

Jeanette M. Bennett University of North Carolina at Charlotte

xix

xx   Contributors

Kent C. Berridge University of Michigan

Gene Brewer Arizona State University

G. E. Berrios University of Cambridge

Gary P. Brown Royal Holloway

Joan Berzoff Smith College

Gillian R. Brown University of St. Andrews

Deborah L. Best Wake Forest University

Shanique G. Brown DePaul University

Larry E. Beutler Palo Alto University Mark H. Bickhard Lehigh University Erin D. Bigler Brigham Young University Wendy C. Birmingham Brigham Young University Sidney J. Blatt Yale University Lucas Bloc Universidade de Fortaleza Alison Blodorn University of California, Santa Barbara Catherine M. Bohn-Gettler College of Saint Benedict–Saint John’s University Ashley L. Boris University of Manitoba Jan Born University of Tübingen Robert F. Bornstein Adelphi William Bradshaw Brigham Young University

Ross Buck University of Connecticut Lynn F. Bufka American Psychological Association Claus Bundesen University of Copenhagen Jennifer Byrd-Craven Oklahoma State University John T. Cacioppo University of Chicago Stephanie Cacioppo University of Chicago Christine A. Caldwell University of Stirling Jessica L. Calvi Oklahoma State University Margaret E. Cameron Wake Forest University Belinda Campos University of California, Irvine Jessica J. Carnevale The Ohio State University Astrid Carolus Wuerzburg University Kyrié Sue Carpenter AgeSong/Pacific Institute

Julia Brandl University of Innsbruck

Matthew Carter Williams College

Michael T. Brannick University of South Florida

Wayne F. Cascio University of Colorado Denver

Michael T. Braun Virginia Tech

Clive Cazeaux Cardiff Metropolitan University

Paul A. S. Breslin Monell Chemical Senses Center

Kai Qin Chan Radboud University Nijmegen

Contributors   xxi

Steven A. Chance University of Oxford

Ruud Custers University College London

Anthony Chemero University of Cincinnati

Martin Daly University of Missouri

Jie-Qi Chen Erikson Institute

Stephen Darling Queen Margaret University

Benjamin Y. Cheung University of British Columbia

Janet E. Davidson Lewis and Clark College

Joseph Chilcot King’s College London

Alan Davies University of Edinburgh

Hyein Cho San Francisco State University

Denise D. Davis Vanderbilt University

John Chambers Christopher Dartmouth University Evangelia G. Chrysikou University of Kansas A. Timothy Church Washington State University Jan Cieciuch University of Finance and Management (Poland) D. Angus Clark Michigan State University Frederick D. Clavél Iowa State University Maurizio Codispoti University of Bologna Avraham Cohen City University of Seattle (Vancouver, BC, Canada)

Edward L. Deci University of Rochester Cody R. DeHaan University of Rochester Andrew R. Delamater Brooklyn College–City University of New York Andreas Demetriou University of Nicosia Kaleda K. Denton Carson Graham Jessica Dere University of Toronto Scarborough Bailey Devine Texas Christian University

Ruth M. Colwill Brown University

Sally S. Dickerson University of California, Irvine

Patrick J. Cooper Florida Atlantic University

Kristin M. Divis University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Evan Copello University of North Florida

Michael Domjan The University of Texas at Austin

Alison D. Cox University of Manitoba

M. Brent Donnellan Texas A&M University

Thomas S. Critchfield Illinois State University

Marc D. Donohue Johns Hopkins University

Catharine P. Cross University of St. Andrews

John F. Dovidio Yale University

Christine Cuskley University of Edinburgh

Todd DuBose The Chicago School of Professional Psychology

xxii   Contributors

Lee Alan Dugatkin University of Louisville

William Fish Massey University

Frank Dumont McGill University

Jane E. Fisher University of Nevada, Reno

Alice H. Eagly Northwestern University

Donovan E. Fleming Brigham Young University

Paul Eastwick The University of Texas at Austin

Roland W. Fleming University of Giessen

John E. Edlund Rochester Institute of Technology

James R. Flynn University of Otago

Christopher Edwards Palo Alto University

Meghan R. Fortune University of Illinois at Chicago

Mark G. Ehrhart San Diego State University

Rebecca Rose Frausel University of Chicago

D. L. Eisenstein VA Healthcare System

Steven Frenda University of California, Irvine

E. M. Eisenstein VA Healthcare System

Carly K. Friedman University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio

Lauren Emberson University of Rochester Jacob Feiner Engelskirger AgeSong/Pacific Institute Tracy Epton University of Manchester K. Anders Ericsson Florida State University

Marcello Gallucci University of Milano-Bicocca Edwin E. Gantt Brigham Young University Christina Garrison-Diehn University of Nevada, Reno

Brenda Farnell University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Omar C. G. Gelo University of Salento and Sigmund Freud University

Allison K. Farrell University of Minnesota

Charles J. Gelso University of Maryland, College Park

Gordon B. Feld University of Tübingen

Walter Gerbino University of Trieste

Greg Feldman Simmons College

Kenneth J. Gergen Swarthmore College

Pere J. Ferrando Universitat Rovira i Virgili

James I. Gerhart Rush University Medical Center

Vera Ferrari University of Parma

Nancy Getchell University of Delaware

Alexander J. Field Santa Clara University

Timo Giesbrecht Maastricht University

Rengin B. Firat University of Lyon

Roger Giner-Sorolla University of Kent

Contributors   xxiii

Peter Glick Lawrence University

Kathy A. Hanisch Iowa State University

Ilya A. Gokhman Georgia Institute of Technology

Blake D. Hansen Brigham Young University

David A. Gold Washington University

Daniel R. Hanson Marshfield Clinic

Nitsan Goldstein Williams College

Shlomo Hareli University of Haifa

Gregory Gorelik Southwestern University

Trevor A. Harley University of Dundee

Joseph P. Green The Ohio State University, Lima

Elise H. Harris Tufts University

Kathleen N. Greenman Tufts University

Stephen N. Haynes University of Hawaii at Manoa

John D. Greenwood City College and Graduate Center, City University of New York

Jia He Tilburg University

Jeff Greeson University of Pennsylvania Jeremy D. Gretton The Ohio State University Elena L. Grigorenko Yale University Johanna Grosse Rush Unviersity Medical Center Akira S. Gutierrez Tufts University Thomas Hadjistavropoulos University of Regina Sebastian Hafenbrädl University of Lausanne Douglas Hall Hawaii Pacific University

David M. Hedges Brigham Young University Dawson Hedges Brigham Young University Judith Hendry University of New Mexico Christine Hennighausen Wuerzburg University Gregg R. Henriques James Madison University Allan J. Heritage Vanderbilt University Hubert Hermans Radboud University of Nijmegen Jacob R. Hickman Brigham Young University J. Dee Higley Brigham Young University

David Z. Hambrick Michigan State University

Clara E. Hill University of Maryland, College Park

Nayla R. Hamdi University of Minnesota

Steven Hitlin University of Iowa

J. Kiley Hamlin University of British Columbia

Stevan E. Hobfoll Rush University Medical Center

Beate Hampe University of Erfurt

Guy Hochman Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya

xxiv   Contributors

Shaul Hochstein Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Flávia M. Julio University of Manitoba

Ulrich Hoffrage University of Lausanne

Ellen M. Kaisse University of Washington

Stefan G. Hofmann Boston University

Marc Kalin University of Miami Miller School of Medicine

Rob W. Holland Radboud University Nijmegen

Rachel W. Kallen University of Cincinnati

Emily D. Hooker University of California, Irvine

Irene P. Kan Villanova University

Mardi Horowitz University of California, San Francisco

Ruth Kanfer Georgia Institute of Technology

Arpine Hovasapian University of California, Irvine

Annette Karmiloff-Smith Birkbeck College, University of London

Lei Hu University of Manitoba

Richard R. Kilburg RRK Coaching and Executive Development

Kate Hughes Birkbeck College

Peter R. Killeen Arizona State University

Stephen Hupp Southern Illinois University Edwardsville

Satoko Kimpara Palo Alto University

Roos Hutteman Utrecht University

Edward W. Kinghorn Brigham Young University–Hawaii

Daniel C. Hyde University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Brock Kirwan Brigham Young University

Paul Ibbotson The Open University Spencer Irish Fresno State Joshua J. Jackson Washington University in St. Louis Eun Young Jang Brigham Young University Duane Jeffery Brigham Young University Jolanda Jetten University of Queensland Jeremy Jewell Southern Illinois University Edwardsville R. Burke Johnson University of South Alabama Donald Jones University of Central Florida

Julian Kiverstein University of Amsterdam Andrzej Klimczuk Warsaw School of Economics, Poland Ai Koizumi Columbia University Bryan Kolb University of Lethbridge Spee Kosloff Fresno State Margaret Bull Kovera John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York Steve W. J. Kozlowski Michigan State University Grzegorz Krajewski University of Warsaw Dennis L. Krebs Simon Fraser University

Contributors   xxv

Morten L. Kringelbach University of Oxford

Karen M. Lionello-DeNolf University of Massachusetts Medical School

Jane Kroger University of Tromsø

David A. Lishner University of Wisconsin Oshkosh

Robert F. Krueger University of Minnesota

Stefano Livi University of Rome “Sapienza”

Revathy Kumar University of Toledo

Elizabeth F. Loftus University of California, Irvine

John E. Kurtz Villanova University

Alexandra Woods Logue City University of New York

Jennifer S. Labrecque University of Southern California

Barbara Loken University of Minnesota

Michael J. Lambert Brigham Young University

Susan Longchamp University of Nevada, Reno

Donald M. Lamkin University of California, Los Angeles

Kelsey Loy Williams College

Shelly J. Lane Virginia Commonwealth University

Ruth Luckasson University of New Mexico

Hakwan Lau University of California, Los Angeles

George F. Luger University of New Mexico

Helmut Leder University of Vienna

Patrick Luyten University of Leuven

Jeong Min Lee University of Delaware

Steven Jay Lynn Binghamton University

Cristine H. Legare The University of Texas at Austin

Carolyn MacCann University of Sydney

Nicole Legate University of Rochester

Jennifer K. MacCormack University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Mallorie Leinenger University of California, San Diego

Edouard Machery University of Pittsburgh

Richard M. Lerner Tufts University

James E. Maddux George Mason University

David Lewkowicz Florida Atlantic University

Kirby Q. Maguire Simon Fraser University

Kenneth L. Lichstein University of Alabama

Brenda Major University of California, Santa Barbara

Scott O. Lilienfeld Emory University

Ken Manktelow University of Wolverhampton

Kristen A. Lindquist University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Jeanne Marecek Swarthmore College

xxvi   Contributors

Julian N. Marewski University of Lausanne

Jay Moore University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee

M. Jackson Marr Georgia Institute of Technology

Jorge Morales Columbia University

Takahiko Masuda University of Alberta

Caitlin E. Moran University of Alabama

Lourdes Mattei Hampshire College

Virginia Moreira Universidade de Fortaleza

M. Pilar Matud Aznar Universidad de La Laguna

Beth Morling University of Delaware

Kurt Matzler Universität Innsbruck

Ezequiel Morsella San Francisco State University

Joanne Mayoh Bournemouth University

Katherine Muenks University of Maryland, College Park

Kaitlin McCormick The Pennsylvania State University

Gregory L. Murphy New York University

Christina S. McCrae University of Florida

Marcos Nadal University of Vienna

William F. McDaniel Georgia College & State University

Jessica Nave-Blodgett University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Elizabeth McKenney Southern Illinois University Edwardsville

Robert A. Neimeyer University of Memphis

F. Joseph McLaughlin Vanderbilt University

Charles B. Nemeroff University of Miami

Harald Merckelbach Maastricht University

Eryn J. Newman University of California, Irvine

Brian R. Metcalf Hawaii Pacific University

Thuy-vy Nguyen University of Rochester

Chelsey A. Michalyshyn University of Manitoba

Gregory Nixon University of Northern British Columbia

Brett M. Millar Graduate Center, City University of New York

Georg Northoff University of Ottawa

Mike Miller University of Connecticut Ronald Mellado Miller Brigham Young University–Hawaii Dennis E. Mithaug Teachers College Columbia University Aage R. Møller The University of Texas at Dallas

Justin M. Olds Université de Lausanne Anthony J. Onwuegbuzie Sam Houston State University Lisa M. Osbeck University of West Georgia Aliza A. Panjwani Graduate Center, City University of New York

Contributors   xxvii

Laura Parks-Leduc James Madison University

Thomas Rammsayer University of Bern

Rachel E. Pauletti Florida Atlantic University

Keith Rayner University of California, San Diego

Joseph J. Pear University of Manitoba

Jamie Reilly University of Florida

David G. Perry Florida Atlantic University

Chris Reinders Folmer Gent University and Erasmus School of Law

Gretchen Perry University of Missouri

Rainer Reisenzein University of Greifswald

Anna Ingeborg Petursdottir Texas Christian University

Steven Reiss The Ohio State University

Nicholas Phelan Rochester Institute of Technology

Tracey A. Revenson Hunter College and the Graduate Center, City University of New York

David Pietraszewski Max Planck Institute for Human Development

Stacey Reynolds Virginia Commonwealth University

Juliana Pita Universidade de Fortaleza

Mijke Rhemtulla University of Amsterdam

Joseph J. Plaud Applied Behavioral Consultants, LLC

Frank C. Richardson The University of Texas at Austin

Alan Poling Western Michigan University

Michael J. Richardson University of Cincinnati

Robert W. Proctor Purdue University

Lindsey Engle Richland University of Chicago

John Protzko University of California, Santa Barbara

Heiner Rindermann Chemnitz University of Technology

Charis Psaltis University of Cyprus

Eunyoe Ro Southern Illinois University Edwardsville

Sebastian Puschmann University of Oldenburg

John Lloyd Roberts University of West Georgia

Philip Quinlan University of York

Richard D. Roberts Professional Examination Services

Hugh Rabagliati University of Edinburgh

Laura Rogers Tufts University

Howard Rachlin Stony Brook University

Emily Q. Rosenzweig University of Maryland

Timothy P. Racine Simon Fraser University

Stephanie Rothman AgeSong/Pacific Institute

Christopher H. Ramey University of Kansas

Rachel O. Rubin Tufts University

xxviii   Contributors

Shawn Rubin George Washington University

Stephanie A. Shields The Pennsylvania State University

Marika Rullo University of Rome “Sapienza”

Michelle N. Shiota Arizona State University

Daniel W. Russell Iowa State University

Laurie J. Shrage Florida International University

Andrew G. Ryder Concordia University

Adam J. Shriver University of Pennsylvania

Valerie San Juan University of Calgary

Allan Siegel New Jersey Medical School, Rutgers University

Diana Sanchez Rutgers University Curt A. Sandman University of California, Irvine J. S. M. Sarma VA Research System Shannon Sauer-Zavala Boston University Jeremy Sawyer The Graduate Center of the City University of New York

Jeffry A. Simpson University of Minnesota George M. Slavich University of California, Los Angeles Andrew P. Smiler Private Practice Alison Smith Williams College Paul F. Smith University of Otago

Nicholas D. Schiff Weill Cornell Medical College

Joel S. Snyder University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Nathan D. Schilaty Brigham Young University

Cyndy Soto University of Nevada, Reno

Jeff Schimel University of Alberta

Susan C. South Purdue University

Elizabeth R. Schotter University of California, San Diego

George Spanoudis University of Cyprus

Frank Schwab Wuerzburg University

Bettina Spencer Saint Mary’s College

Shalom H. Schwartz The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Len Sperry Florida Atlantic University

Karl Schweizer Goethe University Frankfurt

David W. Staves Brigham Young University–Hawaii

Nader Robert Shabahangi AgeSong/Pacific Institute

Conor M. Steckler University of British Columbia

Todd K. Shackelford Oakland University

Aikaterini Stefanidi Arizona State University

Paschal Sheeran University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Scott C. Steffensen Brigham Young University

Contributors   xxix

Anna Stetsenko The Graduate Center of the City University of New York Jennifer A. Stevens William & Mary Richard J. Stevenson Macquarie University E. L. Stocks The University of Texas at Tyler Jennifer L. Stoner University of Minnesota Timo Storck University of Kassel Jeff Sugarman Simon Fraser University Michael J. Tarr Carnegie Mellon University Nathan A. Tatro American Psychological Association Robert Tett University of Tulsa Robert Thomas Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center

Marcel A. G. van Aken Utrecht University Fons van de Vijver Tilburg University James Van Haneghan University of South Alabama Dalena van Heugten-van der Kloet University of Oxford Ad van Knippenberg Radboud University Nijmegen Christina Vanden Bosch der Nederlanden University of Nevada, Las Vegas Zack Vanderbilt University of California, San Francisco William Vaughan, Jr. Casco Courseware, LLC Javier Virués-Ortega University of Auckland Chockalingam Viswesvaran Florida International University A. Davi Vitela University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Roger K. Thomas University of Georgia

Kim-Phuong L. Vu California State University, Long Beach

Frederick Toates Open University

Matthew W. Wagers University of California, Santa Cruz

Dejan Todorovic´ University of Belgrade

Nils-Frederic Wagner University of Ottawa

Matthew J. Traxler University of California, Davis

Jessica Walburn King’s College London

Stefan Troche University of Bern

Iain Walker CSIRO-CELS

Joshua M. Tybur VU University Amsterdam

Katie Wang Yale University

Bert N. Uchino University of Utah

Russell Jerome Watson Governors State University

Robert J. Vallerand McGill University

Rachel E. Watson-Jones The University of Texas at Austin

Katja Valli University of Turku

Duane T. Theodore Wegener The Ohio State University

xxx   Contributors

John Weinman King’s College London

Robert L. Woolfolk Rutgers University

Ian Q. Whishaw University of Lethbridge

Ceren Yalin Tufts University

Jelte M. Wicherts Tilburg University

Ann-Marie Yamada University of Southern California

Allan Wigfield University of Maryland Jade K. Wightman University of Manitoba Jennifer Wiley University of Illinois at Chicago Brian Wilkey The University of Texas at Austin Carla Willig City University London Paul T. P. Wong Trent University Dustin Wood Wake Forest University Wendy Wood University of Southern California

Jong Sung Yoon Florida State University Jeffrey M. Zacks Washington University in St. Louis Anna Zapiti University of Cyprus Josef Zihl University of Munich Philip G. Zimbardo Stanford University Kristina M. Zosuls Arizona State University Eileen L. Zurbriggen University of California, Santa Cruz

Introduction Psychology is a play of theories, large and small, within the ambit of science. Psychology emerged from earlier sciences, especially experimental physiology, and from philosophy to become its own academic discipline in the late 19th century. Fashioned first in Germany, it soon found ­welcome in other European countries and in the United States. Today, it is worldwide and omnibus in its theoretical reach. Mature science is marked by a vigorous dialectic between theory and data. A theory is a statement intended to account for a category of phenomena. Theoretical statements occur in various forms and are both delimiting and generative of hypotheses. That is, hypotheses generally proceed from theories to inspire empirical marshaling of data that support hypotheses or, alternatively, sound their death knell. Sometimes, data are sufficiently decisive to wield the coup de grace to a theory. Mature science also is marked by convergence on a unified theory of everything. This aspiration remains unfulfilled across the sciences. Their histories are a repository of once-grand theories that dominated for a time, even a long time, but were eventually toppled or largely reframed by the usual nemesis—data. Psychology has had its share of grand theories, but they proved to be pretenders, and each of today’s contenders has a chorus of detractors. What you will learn from this encyclopedia is that the tent of psychological theory is capacious and crowded (see Appendix B). But the vacancy sign is still on. The encyclopedia exists as an invitation.

The Design of the Encyclopedia for the Reader Each volume of the encyclopedia begins with a complete list of entries, which is followed by a Reader’s

Guide. The Reader’s Guide is provided to assist readers in locating entries on related topics and classifies them into 21 thematic categories: Cognition, Consciousness, Culture, Development, Emotion, Evolution, Gender, Health, Intelligence, Language, Learning, Motivation, Neuroscience, Organizations, Perception, Personality, Psychopathology, Research Methods, Sensation, Sociality, and Therapy. Some entries are listed under more than one topic. The number of entries within a topic ranges from 9 to 23. Each entry ends with cross-­ references to related entries and a list of further readings recommended by the entry author(s). These features will further assist the reader in moving between the components of the encyclopedia that are directly relevant to his or her interests and also in extending those interests beyond the encyclopedia.

The Editorial Process An editorial trio from SAGE oversaw the encyclopedia’s genesis and subsequent development and publication. The acquisitions editor was the first to contact me and did so at the urging of a former student of mine (Bill Buskist), who is a SAGE author. Our initial conversation led to my submission of a prospectus for a two-volume work. It was divided into several topics, each containing numerous subtopics. These were meant to demarcate sectors of active theorizing in psychology. All told, originally there were approximately 20 topics and 250 subtopics. In addition to the nominated subtopics, I proposed a distinctive feature of the encyclopedia—namely, the inclusion of “metatheoretical” entries, along with the larger helping of entries highlighting the current state of theory within a specific topic. The metatheoretical entries are marked by a deliberately critical pose toward that current state.

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xxxii   Introduction

The ultimate selection of topics and subtopics was helped by consultation with scholars whom I invited to compose the Editorial Board. In only one case (Brent Slife) was I personally acquainted with the invitee (Brent’s campus office is next door to mine). I asked each to review and revise the draft list of topics and subtopics and to nominate potential contributors as they felt inclined. Their responses were invaluable, and to them I express particular thanks for bringing the list of entries and authors to final shape. At about this same time, the oversight of the project moved to the developmental editor and the reference systems manager at SAGE. My closest interaction was with them. Over a 3-year period, I personally contacted hundreds of scholars throughout the world with the invitation to contribute an entry to the encyclopedia. In addition to designating a specific subtopic, I indicated a desired length and deadline and provided the publisher’s instructions to authors. You will not be surprised to learn that not every invitation was accepted by the initial invitee. In some cases, he or she was kind enough to recommend others in his or her stead. But just as often, it was mine to return to the published literature in search of new prospects. Draft entries began to arrive and continued until recently. I reviewed and edited each, and then returned it to the author with the request to provide further revisions as he or she saw fit before sending the final draft to the reference systems manager. Subsequently, I reviewed the revised draft, sometimes returning it to the author with a request for further revision. Eventually, each entry was accepted in final draft and forwarded to the developmental editor for review and copyediting by her staff. In each case, I received the copyedited draft for final editorial review prior to submission to the production editor. I also compiled the Chronology and Resource Guide (Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively), and the Bibliography (Appendix C) was compiled from the further readings provided by the authors. My final opportunity for review came with the proof copy for each entry as well as the front and back material for the encyclopedia. Throughout this process, my sights were set on the publication of a knowledgeable and extensive resource that would serve well as a new addition

to libraries across the world and, in that way, serve well their clienteles—undergraduate and graduate students, instructors in psychology and related courses, and those in the general public with a hankering to know more about psychology and its potential assets for better living.

Caveats and Expressions of Gratitude From the outset, I sought to bring together a diverse array of authors in terms of ethnicity, nationality, institutional affiliation, specialty, and authorial style. You may sense that on these criteria, certain elements of the encyclopedia’s ­ authorship are underrepresented. Moreover, you may perceive an overrepresentation of authorship from my own institution, Brigham Young University. Please be aware, however, that in each case, I am prepared to argue from the author’s bona fides for his or her expertise. In addition, you may find your own subspecialty or subspecialties of interest to be underrepresented. Even though two volumes are a generous provision, eventually there were hard decisions about the final collection of headwords. I am the first to recognize that the encyclopedia will not be comprehensive to every reader’s liking. Moreover, you may find unevenness between a topic’s entries in terms of the breadth or depth of the presentation of theory therein. Please be advised that there was no template the presentation was required to fit. Authors were on their own to treat theory as they best judged, subject to the constraints of the review process. I considered this granting of latitude to be consistent with the founding desire for diversity. If you are put off by this caveat or the two that preceded it, I accept full responsibility and offer my apology. Finally, I write from the heart. The conception and development of this encyclopedia is the largest sustained project in which I have engaged during my professorial career. It unfolded in the context of full-time teaching, mentorship of undergraduate and doctoral students, research and research-­ centered writing and publication, other faculty assignments, and duties attendant to serving in my community as a member of its municipal council. The project was an ever-present consideration and, over time, became a labor of love.

Introduction   xxxiii

My debt to the authors, the editors, and the members of the Editorial Board is deep and lasting. That these two volumes prove illuminating, instructive, substantive, and inspiring for their readers will be attributable to those I have acknowledged and will be partial reward for what has required thousands of hours by hundreds of devoted contributors.

Last, I humbly recognize the unsurpassing influence of three mentors who taught me about theory in psychology and, in their remarkable work, deftly exemplified its virtues: Richard Herrnstein, Peter Killeen, and Will Vaughan. Harold L. Miller, Jr.

A The 1950s brought three major theoretical developments. First, Julian Rotter distinguished between individuals’ perceptions that they control events and outcomes (internal control) and their perceptions that events are controlled by outside factors (external control). He argued that internal control is optimal, especially for successful outcomes, and is psychologically healthier than external control. Second, in 1957, John Atkinson proposed a comprehensive and influential expectancy-value achievement motivation theory that described how individuals’ expectancies, values, and needs for achievement influence their achievement motivation. He also described approachand-avoidance tendencies, stating that people will approach (or attempt) achievement tasks or avoid them, depending on the strength of their need for achievement. Finally, in a seminal article, Robert White argued that people are inherently motivated to be competent and therefore engage in activities that increase their competence even when basic needs such as hunger and thirst have been met. From the 1970s onward, many achievement motivation theories have had strong social cognitive foci, positing that individuals’ beliefs, values, and goals are fundamental to achievement motivation. These theories emphasize how conscious processes influence motivation. Major theories ­ include (a) attribution theory, which concerns how our understandings of performance outcomes influence our subsequent achievement activity; (b) modern expectancy-value theory, which emphasizes the expectancy and value aspects (rather than

Achievement Motivation Motivation means “to move,” and motivation theories are concerned with why individuals undertake some actions and not others. Achievement motivation refers to doing tasks and activities to which standards of excellence apply. Individuals’ achievement motivation has a strong impact on their performance even when the research controls for previous performance. This entry begins with a brief history of motivation theory, presents the major motivation theories, and discusses interventions to increase motivation using applications of motivation theory.

History Early theorists of motivation and achievement motivation proposed that biologically based drives, learned drives, or both determine action. Learning theorists focused on how consequences of actions determine subsequent achievement behavior. When actions are rewarded or reinforced, individuals repeat them; when punished, they stop. In the 1930s, theorists introduced several germane constructs. Kurt Lewin introduced the term valence to describe individuals’ relative attraction to different tasks. Edward Tolman described expectancies as beliefs about how well one would perform a task based on past experience with the task. And Henry Murray included need for achievement as one of the 24 needs defined in his personality theory. He considered this particular need to be an unconscious one. 1

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Achievement Motivation

the needs aspects) of Atkinson’s theory; (c) social cognitive theory: self-efficacy and motivation, which posits self-efficacy as central to motivation; (d) achievement goal theory, which addresses the types of outcomes individuals pursue; and (e) selfdetermination theory, which includes basic human needs and emphasizes intrinsic motivation.

Theories of Achievement Motivation Attribution Theory

Attribution theory concerns individuals’ explanations (or attributions) of their successes and failures and how these attributions influence subsequent motivation. Initially, attribution theorists identified four primary attributions: ability, effort, task difficulty, and luck. Each was classified into two causal dimensions: stability (stable or unstable) and locus of control (internal or external). Later, a third dimension, controllability, was added. The stability dimension relates most directly to expectancies of success and failure, locus of ­control relates to affective reactions to success and failure, and controllability relates to whether one can affect the outcomes. In this system, ability is classified as internal, stable, and uncontrollable, and effort as internal, unstable, and controllable. These dimensions have psychological consequences that influence subsequent motivation and behavior. For instance, attributing failure to lack of ability leads to lowered expectancies for success and negative affects such as shame, and this ultimately can result in learned helplessness. Self-Theories Self-theories of motivation are based in attribution theory. Some individuals believe that intelligence is a natural, inborn trait that cannot be changed (i.e., they hold entity theories). Others believe that intelligence is malleable and can increase with effort and practice (they hold incremental theories). These beliefs about intelligence form individuals’ self-theories. They also are known as lay theories of intelligence because people are often not explicitly aware that they hold these beliefs, even though these beliefs strongly influence how they behave in achievement contexts. Individuals’ self-theories are pertinent to how they deal with challenge or failure in school,

for example, and other achievement activities. People who hold entity theories tend to give up easily when confronted with challenges and display what researchers call a helpless response. Such individuals believe that exerting additional effort is futile because they have reached the limits of their intelligence. On the other hand, individuals who hold incremental theories tend to show masteryoriented performance when confronted with ­challenges. That is, instead of giving up, they work harder because they believe that, with additional effort, they can improve their intelligence. Modern Expectancy-Value Theory

Current expectancy-value theories link individuals’ achievement performance, persistence, and choice directly to task values and their expectancies of success. These theories provide more elaborate definitions than Atkinson did. Expectancies of success are individuals’ beliefs that they can successfully complete an achievement task. ­ Achievement values refer to how interested the individual is in the task, the importance of the task, and its usefulness. Expectancy-value theorists also consider how developmental and socialization experiences affect individuals’ expectancies and values. Individuals’ cultural milieu, previous achievement experiences, and affect all influence their expectancies and values. Parents’ and teachers’ beliefs about individuals and their behaviors toward them are also influential. Unlike Atkinson’s theory, current expectancy-value theories do not include the need for achievement. Research based in expectancy-value theory has shown that, when individuals believe they can accomplish a task that they value, they do better on the task, work harder to complete it, and choose to perform related tasks in both the shortand long-term future. Children’s expectancies and values for many academic tasks decline across the school years, with the middle school transition having a particularly strong negative influence. Social Cognitive Theory: Self-Efficacy and Motivation

Self-efficacy refers to individuals’ beliefs in their own capabilities to accomplish an achievement task. People with high self-efficacy are confident in

Achievement Motivation

their abilities and believe they are capable of succeeding. Those with low self-efficacy lack selfconfidence and do not believe they are capable of succeeding. Individuals’ self-efficacy influences their motivation, self-regulation, and achievement, even when the research controls for cognitive ability. Additionally, experimental research has demonstrated self-efficacy’s causal influence on achievement. As a whole, the research suggests that individuals who feel confident and capable are more motivated and persistent, have better self-regulation, and attain higher achievement than those who do not. Self-efficacy theorists posit that self-efficacy beliefs arise from four sources of information: mastery experiences, vicarious experiences, verbal persuasion, and physiological states. Mastery experiences are instances in which the individual has succeeded on the task in the past. This source of efficacy information is especially powerful because individuals have proof that they can actually accomplish a task. Vicarious experiences, or observing other people successfully performing an activity, and verbal persuasion, or hearing someone else say that he or she can accomplish a task, also increase individuals’ self-efficacy. Finally, physiological states such as stress and anxiety generate emotional arousal, and individuals’ ­ assessments of these bodily responses affect their sense of self-efficacy. Achievement Goal Theory

Goals are defined as what individuals want to achieve and what gives purpose or meaning to the activities individuals engage in. Achievement goal theory distinguishes two main types of achievement goals or goal orientations that people might adopt: mastery and performance. Those who hold mastery goals are concerned with learning and developing their competence and skills, whereas those who hold performance goals are concerned with demonstrating that they can perform well compared with others. Individuals can hold both types of goals, but classrooms and organizational structures may promote some goals over others. Mastery and performance goals are further categorized into approach and avoidance dimensions that clarify the direction of the goals. Mastery-approach goals focus on increasing

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learning, whereas mastery-avoidance goals focus on not losing one’s competence. Performanceapproach goals focus on outperforming others, whereas performance-avoidance goals focus on not appearing incompetent to others. Individuals with mastery-approach goals tend to be more interested in the achievement activities they pursue and use more elaborate cognitive strategies, but these strategies do not necessarily result in higher achievement. Conversely, individuals with performance-avoidance goals are more likely to be anxious and uninterested and to perform poorly. The relationship of mastery-avoidance and performance-approach goals to motivation and achievement is less clear in that they produce both positive and negative outcomes. Self-Determination Theory

Self-determination theorists propose that humans have three basic, universal needs: autonomy, competence, and relatedness. When these needs are met, individuals exhibit higher achievement, more positive motivation, and greater wellbeing. To date, research has shown that each need is prevalent in a wide variety of cultures, but need satisfaction may be expressed differently across cultures. Intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation are central to self-determination theory. Intrinsic motivation is characterized by interest in or enjoyment of an activity. Extrinsic motivation is controlled by the external rewards obtained by completing an activity. However, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation compose a continuum rather than a dichotomy. At one end of the continuum are amotivation (the absence of motivation) and externally regulated motivation, and at the other, intrinsic motivation. Self-determination theorists propose that healthy development involves moving from extrinsic to intrinsic motivation. They have debated behavioral theorists about whether extrinsic rewards undermine intrinsic motivation, and there is compelling evidence that this may occur.

Motivational Interventions and Applications Researchers have used interventions to increase motivation and improve individuals’ performance

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Addiction

on achievement tasks. Although much of this work has involved college students, many studies have also been conducted with younger students and with employees and athletes in their usual environments. From the 1960s through the 1980s, interventions mainly tried to strengthen participants’ overall achievement motives related to school. Since then, interventions increasingly have targeted motivational variables and constructs from one of the specific theories already discussed rather than focusing on the overall need for achievement. Many interventions derive from self-efficacy theory. Such programs have focused on achievement activities such as playing basketball, graduating from high school, or pursuing a career in medicine and have used techniques such as experiencing success, following role models, and receiving direct or electronic encouragement. Interventions based in expectancy-value theory have targeted individuals’ expectations of success in similar ways as self-efficacy interventions but have also addressed the values people assign to achievement tasks by encouraging them to see the importance or relevance of their work. Interventions based in self-determination theory often involve individuals with disabilities or students at risk who attempt to enhance their experiences of autonomy, relatedness, or competence in their environments. For instance, students might be given more instructional choices or provided with a learner-centered curriculum. Interventions inspired by attribution theory have sometimes t­argeted individuals’ implicit beliefs about intelligence in an attempt to convince them that intelligence is malleable, thus encouraging persistence in the face of challenge. School-based goal-theory interventions have explored the effects of i­ntroducing mastery- versus performance-goal structures in school to enhance performance. Some motivational interventions have drawn from multiple motivational theories and constructs at once. Two notable lines of work are the Motivation and Engagement Wheel, developed by Andrew Martin and colleagues, and the TARGET intervention framework produced by Carole Ames and colleagues. Evidence thus far suggests that these multitheory programs are particularly

effective for improving students’ grades, academic performance, and feelings about school. Allan Wigfield, Katherine Muenks, and Emily Q. Rosenzweig See also Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Motivation; Motivation and Cognition; Motivation and Personality; Needs; Social Motives; Unconscious Motivation; Values

Further Readings Elliot, A. J., & Dweck, C. S. (Eds.). (2005). Handbook of competence and motivation. New York, NY: Guilford. Ryan, R. M. (Ed.). (2012). The Oxford handbook of human motivation. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Wentzel, K. R., & Wigfield, A. (Eds.). (2007). Motivational interventions that work [Special issue]. Educational Psychologist, 42(4). Wentzel, K. R., & Wigfield, A. (Eds.). (2009). Handbook of motivation at school. New York, NY: Routledge. Wigfield, A., & Eccles, J. S. (Eds.). (2002). Development of achievement motivation. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

Addiction Addiction, especially drug addiction, is a chronic, relapsing disorder that has an enormous impact on society. A major goal of research on drug addiction is to characterize the critical neural substrates that are most sensitive to the drug, that adapt in association with chronic consumption, and that drive subsequent compulsive drugseeking behavior. Currently, there are no evidencebased, clinically useful, pharmacotherapeutic interventions that can reverse the neuroadaptive effects of drug dependence. Advancement in the understanding of the brain mechanisms underlying drug use and abuse will pave the way for more effective treatment strategies that could reverse drug dependence and save lives and resources throughout the world. This entry presents current theories of addiction and discusses (a) dopamine transmission in the brain as it relates to rewards, (b) dysregulated dopamine transmission in the brain as it relates to dependence, and (c) the roles of glutamate (GLU) and gamma-aminobutyric

Addiction

acid (GABA) receptors in alcohol dependence. It also includes recent findings related to adaptation of critical neuronal substrates in the brain’s ­pleasure system and a proposed theory of the neurobiological basis of addiction.

Current Theories of Addiction The American Society of Addiction Medicine’s short definition of addiction is this: A primary, chronic disease of brain reward, motivation, memory and related circuitry. Dysfunction in these circuits leads to characteristic biological, psychological, social and spiritual manifestations. This is reflected in an individual pathologically pursuing reward and/or relief by substance use and other behaviors.

Drug addiction is often accompanied by signs of physical or psychological dependence. Physical dependence involves overt tolerance and withdrawal symptoms. Psychological dependence refers to the experience of impaired control over drug usage, with symptoms including anxiety, dysphoria, depression, irritability, and craving. Although there are important differences between addiction and dependence, the terms will be used interchangeably. Many factors influence drug taking and are often grouped under the term biopsychosocial. The biological characteristics of users include genetics, gender, and physiology, and the psychological characteristics include personality, expectancies, and beliefs. Tolerance and dependence are predicated on psychopharmacological mechanisms and principles, which may represent only a fraction of the reasons that people abuse drugs. The discussion in this entry focuses on alcohol and opiate dependence, where chronic use evinces clear signs of withdrawal. Opponent-Process Theory

Two prominent theories of addiction are opponent-process theory and allostasis theory. In opponent-process theory, originally proposed by Richard Solomon and John Corbit in 1974, two reactions are implicated: (a) the initial reaction to a stimulus and (b) the counterreaction to the stimulus.

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In allostasis theory, originally proposed by Peter Sterling and Joseph Eyer in 1988, the same reactions are triggered, but compensatory processes are overwhelmed. Although both t­heories invoke the process of homeostasis, opponent-­ process theory posits stability through compensatory processes, whereas allostasis theory implies an altered or dysregulated homeostasis. As applied to the disease of addiction, both theories assume that a drug or other reinforcing stimulus acts on specific cells in the central nervous system (CNS). In the face of constant or intermittent exposure to a stimulus, the plasticity inherent in the CNS permits the cells to adapt, thereby restoring normal functioning of the system. Although compensation is a critical ­component in both theories, allostasis t­heory has prompted research on the neural ­substrates that are most sensitive to drugs, the underlying synaptic or cellular mechanisms of n ­euroadaptation, and measures for ameliorating or reversing dependence. Allostasis Theory

Allostasis theory posits that the negative-affective state produced by withdrawal from chronic drug exposure is a major factor in relapse to d ­ rug-seeking behavior. Thus, the compulsion to consume alcohol and other drugs stems from their positive-reinforcing properties, including their ­ anxiolytic and euphoric effects, as well as their negative-reinforcing properties, including the aversive withdrawal symptoms that result from abstinence. Indeed, a major goal of basic research on alcohol dependence is to understand the neural basis of its effects, including the pathological progression to dependence. Symptoms of dependence are potentiated by repeated withdrawal, suggesting that the pattern of alcohol exposure is critical for dependence. Multiple physiological processes appear to be involved in the neuroadaptation that accompanies dependence on alcohol, including sensitization, tolerance, and withdrawal. Sensitization is typically ascribed to drugs other than alcohol. However, alcohol stimulates locomotor activity in mice. Tolerance accrues so that its symptoms are often opposite to those of alcohol’s acute effects. The behavioral effects appear to be reflected at the neuronal level. For example, Roger A. Gallegos and colleagues have shown that tolerance develops to ethanol-induced inhibition of

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Addiction

GABA neuron firing rate in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain and that withdrawal from chronic ethanol use markedly enhances the excitability of VTA GABA neurons. Indeed, they found that these neurons discharge at rates exceeding 100 Hz for hours following withdrawal, a fivefold increase from their pre-alcohol exposure baseline.

Dopamine Transmission in the Brain and Its Relation to Reward Dopamine functions as a neurotransmitter and hormone in humans and in a wide variety of vertebrates and invertebrates. It is associated with emotional behavior, cognition, voluntary movement, motivation, punishment, and reward. Dopamine is produced in several brain areas, including the midbrain substantia nigra (SN), VTA, and hypothalamus. The primary function of the midbrain SN dopamine system, termed the nigrostriatal system, is for initiating and terminating planned movement and involves dopamine neurons that project to the dorsal striatum. The VTA dopamine system, termed the mesolimbic system, is important for motivation and involves dopamine neurons that originate in the midbrain VTA and project to the ventral striatum, otherwise known as the nucleus accumbens (NAc). The function of the hypothalamic dopamine system is to inhibit the release of prolactin from the anterior lobe of the pituitary. The nigrostriatal and mesolimbic dopamine systems exhibit analogous neurons, circuits, neurotransmitters, and receptors. The mesolimbic dopamine system constitutes part of the brain reward system that has evolved for mediating natural motivated behaviors such as feeding, drinking, and drug reward. There is considerable evidence that dopamine release in the NAc induces motivational drive and is modulated by past experience of reward and punishment. Mesolimbic dopamine is believed to code the magnitude of aversive and rewarding stimuli. Lowfrequency, irregular firing of dopamine neurons, or “tonic” activity, generates a low basal level of extracellular dopamine, but burst firing, or “phasic” activity that is driven by afferent input, markedly enhances dopamine release and is believed to be the signal that modulates reward and goaldirected behavior. Nucleus accumbens GABAergic

medium spiny neurons (MSNs) containing one subtype of dopamine (D1) receptor project to the VTA via the “direct” pathway while others containing a different subtype (D2) project to the pallidum and then to the VTA via the “indirect” pathway. Stimulating D1 MSNs of the direct pathway induces persistent reinforcement, whereas stimulating D2 MSNs in the indirect pathway induces transient punishment, indicating that ­activation of these bidirectional circuits modifies goal-directed behavior.

Dysregulated Dopamine Transmission in the Brain and Its Relation to Dependence Dysregulated dopamine transmission has been implicated in the allostasis theory of drug dependence. The specific claim is that any drug or behavior that increases midbrain dopamine neuron activity will be rewarding and potentially addictive. However, the neurobiology of the addiction process certainly involves multiple, complex neural circuits, including the mesolimbic dopamine system. Drugs enhance dopamine release, resulting in feelings of pleasure, euphoria, and well-being. The level of dopamine release by some drugs can be 10 times that produced by naturally rewarding behaviors, such as eating, drinking, and sex. However, massive dopamine release is transient and often results in neuroadaptations, i­ncluding progressive, compensatory lowering of baseline dopamine levels. Ultimately, addicts c­ ontinue their cycle of abuse, in part, as a result of maladapted and depleted dopamine levels, resulting in feelings of anxiety and dysphoria that m ­ otivate subsequent drug-seeking behavior. Figure 1 illustrates the dynamic properties of dopamine release during and after repeated drug use. Enhancement of dopamine release during drug taking, and progressive, protracted decreases in release of dopamine during withdrawal represent a persuasive neural correlate of the opponent-process and allostasis theories of addiction. A session of drug taking may involve multiple drug administrations. For example, multiple drinks may be taken within a given period of time—a session. In Figure 1, a drug session is denoted by the horizontal bar. During the first session of drug taking,

Addiction

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Figure 1  Brain Dopamine Allostasis and Drug Dependence

dopamine levels in the brain are markedly increased and fall after drug binging. Feelings of pleasure, or euphoria, are highest when dopamine is at its peak level. However, dopamine levels fall after the drug session and return to pre-drug-taking levels, or baseline. Although it depends on the session interval, the second session of drug taking is characterized by increased levels of dopamine, as in the first session. However, the peak increase in dopamine release is slightly lower, the return to baseline is slightly faster, and dopamine levels drop below the baseline, likely the result of homeostatic compensatory mechanisms. Dopamine levels return slowly to baseline. Note that with each subsequent session of drug taking the peak dopamine level is progressively reduced, while the kinetics of recovery are faster and the lowering below baseline is enhanced. This model proposes that the progressive lowering of dopamine levels and return to baseline is an exponential function of the amount of drug exposure and the interval between exposures. Depending on interval, dopamine levels may not return to baseline before the next session. Although the recovery of dopamine to baseline levels is directly related to the number of drug exposures, a p ­ ersistent lowering (shown by the delta symbol) of ­baseline dopamine levels may accrue due to maladaptive changes in dopamine homeostasis. The drive to consume the drug or reinforcer is highest when dopamine levels are the lowest. Dopamine lowering is associated with psychological and physical withdrawal, which is often accompanied by drug craving, anxiety, d ­ ysphoria, and depression. With some drugs, such as alcohol, withdrawal can be so severe

as to result in seizures and even death. If drug sessions occur at recurring intervals that are less frequent than the recovery time from the previous session, compensatory mechanisms for maintaining dopamine homeostasis are compromised, resulting ultimately in allostasis, or drug dependence. Although this model seems straightforward in concept, it is likely oversimplistic in scope in that dopamine release may be only one determinant of addiction, just as the dopamine projection from the VTA to the NAc is only part of a larger motivational circuit that includes cortical and subcortical structures. Indeed, modifications in dopamine release may be an epiphenomenon of a larger maladaptive process involving multiple neuronal substrates and inputs. Still, tolerance accrues to repeated drug use, resulting ultimately in persistently lowered dopamine release in the NAc. Although addiction begins as a personal choice to consume a drug or other reinforcer, the motivation to continue to seek the reinforcing stimulus is influenced greatly by genetic, environmental, and experiential factors that lead to a spiraling dysregulation of dopamine release. The emerging view is that dysregulated homeostasis that accompanies the development of drug addiction may result from experience-dependent neuroadaptations that replace normal synaptic transmission in the mesolimbic dopamine system. More specifically, the neuroadaptations that result from alcohol and opiate dependence may result from plasticity associated with inhibitory GABA and/or excitatory glutamate (GLU) synaptic transmission in the VTA (Nugent & Kauer, 2008).

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Addiction

The Roles of Glutamate and GABA Receptors in Alcohol Dependence Synaptic transmission in the CNS is depressed by acute intoxicating doses of ethanol, which might result from an attenuation of excitatory GLU, an enhancement of inhibitory GABA transmission, or both. Glutamate is the most abundant excitatory neurotransmitter in the brain and is fundamental to synaptic plasticity. The most widely accepted view is that the reinforcing properties of addictive drugs are mediated by the mesolimbic dopamine system via enhancement of GLUergic synaptic transmission. The GLUergic projection from the prefrontal cortex (PFC) to the NAc serves as a final common pathway for drug seeking in terms of the executive control of stimulus salience. Longterm potentiation (LTP) of GLU signaling may result from continuous exposure to the reinforcer, resulting in strengthening of synapses and other long-lived changes in neural networks that may be manifested as a transition from thoughtful, balanced decision making to automatic, compulsive reaction to stimuli. The neuropharmacology of alcohol withdrawal has implicated GABA, as GABA mimetics decrease symptoms of alcohol withdrawal in animals and GABA antagonists exacerbate many of the symptoms of alcohol withdrawal. Modification of GABAergic synaptic transmission is regarded as one of the main factors underlying drug withdrawal-related phenomena. A specific type of GABA receptor, GABA(A)R, is modulated by ethanol, anesthetics, benzodiazepines, and neuro­ steroids and has been implicated in the acute as well as the chronic effects of alcohol, including tolerance, dependence, and withdrawal.

A Functional Switch in GABA(A) Receptors on VTA GABA Neurons The accumulating evidence strongly suggests that GABA neurons in both the VTA and the NAc appear to play critical roles in ethanol and opiate reward and dependence. Although the prevailing view is that GABA neurons inhibit midbrain dopamine neurons, some researchers have shown that VTA GABA neurons actually have much more GABA input than dopamine neurons. At first glance, this would seem like a trivial point. However,

it is becoming increasingly obvious that the GABA input to VTA GABA neurons is particularly important for reward and aversion and that GABA(A)Rs postsynaptic to GABA inhibitory input are particularly adaptable and indeed switch from inhibitory to excitatory subsequent to GABA activation during the development of dependence. In a series of publications from the lab of Derek van der Kooy at the University of Toronto, it has been demonstrated behaviorally and electrophysiologically that GABA(A)Rs on VTA GABA neurons serve as a potential switching mechanism in addiction by gating opiate reward transmission through one of two motivational systems: a dopamine-independent (opiate-naive) or a dopamine-dependent (opiatedependent or opiate-withdrawn) system. Research collaborations with van der Kooy’s lab demonstrated that this switch in GABA(A)Rs on VTA GABA neurons results from activation of brainderived neurotrophic factor (BDNF). BDNF is one of the important neurotrophins expressed in the mammalian brain. It is most often associated with neuronal growth, plasticity, survival, neuroprotection, and repair of the CNS. BDNF has high affinity for tyrosine kinase B (TrkB) receptors, whose activation triggers a series of intracellular messages that switch the driving force of ions in the cytoplasmic milieu, resulting in a switch in GABA(A)R function in VTA GABA neurons and, ultimately, in a switch to drug dependence (Ting et al., 2013; Vargas-Perez et al., 2014;Vargas-Perez et al., 2009). Presumably, BDNF is responding to the aversive stress response that is characteristic of the allostatic state. It could induce neuroplastic changes that drive and maintain addiction.

A Proposed Theory of Addiction Identifying the mechanisms underlying the transformation from drug use to dependence is crucial for our understanding of substance addiction. A theory of alcoholism and opiate dependence that integrates opponent-process theory, allostasis theory, and van der Kooy’s GABA(A)R switching theory has been proposed. Opponent-process theory provided a model of homeostasis that was the impetus for allostasis theory, which proposed that homeostasis could become dysregulated by persistent adaptations in the neuronal substrates implicated in drug reward. Van der Kooy’s theory

Addiction

helped narrow the pathology to a specific population of neurons in the mesolimbic dopamine reward system. In one proposed theory, van der Kooy’s switching theory is further extended to include the molecular underpinnings of the switch. Although GLU plasticity is an important factor in dopamine allostatic mechanisms, this new theory from experienced VTA GABA researchers proposes that they are mostly short term and that persistent, long-term adaptations in the mesolimbic pathway with drug dependence involve GABA(A)Rs on VTA GABA neurons. It has been demonstrated in multiple reports that acute ethanol inhibits the firing rate of VTA GABA neurons in rats with an IC50 of 1.0 g/kg, which is one order of magnitude more sensitive than ethanol enhancement of dopamine neuron activity reported by others. Most important, tolerance accrues to ethanol inhibition of VTA GABA neuron firing rate, while hyperexcitability accompanies withdrawal and decreased dopamine neurotransmission. This theory proposes that ethanol, as a positive allosteric modulator of GABA(A)Rs, directly inhibits VTA GABA neurons, which results in disinhibition of dopamine neurons and dopamine-dependent reward. Ultimately, continued alcohol consumption causes a switch in GABA(A)R function, which is driven by BDNF,

9

resulting in hyperexcitability of VTA GABA neurons during withdrawal, due to the switch in GABA(A)R function. The trigger for BDNF stimulation may result from the oxidative stress induced by generation of reactive oxygen species (ROS) produced by hyper-release of dopamine. Overproduction of ROS may lead to a failure of normal endogenous antioxidant systems to manage the ROS, resulting in stimulation of BDNF. Specific molecular substrates in VTA GABA neurons underlie the switch to opiate and alcohol dependence. With dependence, GABA(A)Rs on VTA GABA neurons switch their signaling properties from inhibitory to excitatory. This is the critical and dysregulatory allostatic neuroadaptation in this theory. Figure 2 illustrates the role of VTA GABA neurons in regulating normal dopamine neurotransmission (the sober condition), its modulation by alcohol (the intoxicated condition), and the role of GABA(A)Rs and other factors in mediating the switch to dependence (the dependent condition). In the Sober condition, dopamine neurons in the VTA of the midbrain project to the NAc in the striatum. Dopamine neuron excitability is regulated by dual inhibition from local circuit VTA GABA neurons and by VTA GABA projections to dopamine

Figure 2  Theoretical Framework of Neuronal Mechanisms Underlying Dopamine Allostasis

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Adolescent Development, Theories of

terminals in the NAc. Reciprocal projections from MSNs in the NAc project back to VTA GABA neurons. In the Intoxicated condition, it is proposed that VTA GABA neurons are the most sensitive substrate to ethanol owing to their strategic ­location (i.e., local circuit with dopamine neurons), wide bandwidth (i.e., high firing rates), rapid and synchronous electrical network connectivity (i.e., via gap junctions), widespread axonal distribution (e.g., cortical and limbic projections), and ­pronounced synaptic regulation (e.g., robust ­glutamate and GABA inputs). They are inhibited (lighter shading) by opiates via opiate receptors, or by ethanol via enhancement of GABA release from yet to be characterized afferents. Inhibition of GABA neurons reduces GABA release (fewer dots), which results in disinhibition, or enhanced excitability, of dopamine neurons (darker shading). Excitation of dopamine neurons results in enhanced release of dopamine in the NAc (more dots), which results in activation of reciprocal MSNs (darker shading). The net effect is a profound direct and indirect inhibition of VTA GABA neurons by ethanol. In the Dependent condition, persistent ­ stimulation of dopamine release might result in overproduction of ROS at terminals in the NAc. Generation of ROS leads to production of BDNF, which activates TrkB receptors on VTA GABA neurons, leading to a switch in GABA(A) receptor function on these neurons that results in excitation of VTA GABA neurons rather than the typical inhibition by GABA. Repeated episodes of alcohol consumption alternating with intermittent periods of withdrawal result in persistent hyperexcitability of VTA GABA neurons, reduced dopamine neural activity, and depressed dopamine release in the NAc. It is hoped that further understanding of these molecular substrates will elucidate the mechanisms underlying alcohol addiction and will lead to therapies to reverse alcohol dependence. Scott C. Steffensen, Nathan D. Schilaty, David M. Hedges, and Eun Young Jang See also Brain and Nervous System: Microarchitecture; Drive and Motivation in the Brain; Neurotransmitters and Neuromodulators

Further Readings Gallegos, R. A., Criado, J. R., Lee, R. S., Henriksen, S. J., & Steffensen, S. C. (1999). Adaptive responses of

γ-aminobutyric acid neurons in the ventral tegmental area to chronic ethanol. Journal of Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics, 291, 1045–1053. Ludlow, K. H., Bradley, K. D., Allison, D. W., Taylor, S. R., Yorgason, J. T., Hansen, D. M., . . . Steffensen, S. C. (2009). Acute and chronic ethanol modulate dopamine D2-subtype receptor responses in ventral tegmental area GABA neurons. Alcohol: Clinical & Experimental Research, 33, 804–811. Nugent, F. S., & Kauer, J. A. (2008). LTP of GABAergic synapses in the ventral tegmental area and beyond. Journal of Physiology, 586, 1487–1493. Steffensen, S. C., Bradley, K. D., Hansen, D. M., Wilcox, J. D., Wilcox, R. S., Allison, D. W., . . . Edwards, J. G. (2011). The role of connexin-36 gap junctions in alcohol intoxication and consumption. Synapse, 65, 695–707. Steffensen, S. C., Walton, C. H., Hansen, D. M., Yorgason, J. T., Gallegos, R. A., & Criado, J. R. (2009). Contingent and non-contingent effects of low-dose ethanol on GABA neuron activity in the ventral tegmental area. Pharmacology, Biochemistry, and Behavior, 92, 68–75. Stobbs, S. H., Ohran, A. J., Lassen, M. B., Allison, D. W., Brown, J. E., & Steffensen, S. C. (2004). Ethanol suppression of ventral tegmental area GABA neuron electrical transmission involves N-methyl-D-aspartate receptors. Journal of Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics, 311, 282–289. Ting, A. K. R., Vargas-Perez, H., Mabey, J. K., Shin, S. I., Steffensen, S. C., & van der Kooy, D. (2013). Ventral tegmental area GABA neurons and opiate motivation. Psychopharmacology (Berl), 227, 697–709. Vargas-Perez, H., Bahi, A., Bufalino, M. R., Ting, A. K. R., Maal-Bared, G., Lam, J., . . . Van der Kooy, D. (2014). BDNF signaling in the VTA links the drug dependent state to drug withdrawal aversions. Journal of Neuroscience, 34, 7899–7909. Vargas-Perez, H., Ting, A. K. R., Walton, C. H., Hansen, D. M., Razavi, R., Clarke, L., . . . Van der Kooy, D. (2009). Ventral tegmental area BDNF induces an opiate-dependent-like reward state in naive rats. Science, 324, 1732–1734.

Adolescent Development, Theories of For about the first 85 years of the scientific study of adolescent development, the field was framed

Adolescent Development, Theories of

almost exclusively by deficit-theoretical ideas about this period of life. Today, however, adolescents are seen as possessing strengths and, as such, as being what have been termed “resources to be developed.” To describe the nature and evolution of theories of adolescent development, it is useful to begin by focusing on the work of Granville (G.) Stanley Hall (1844–1924). This entry describes the deficit model of adolescence and then moves to current theoretical models, with a more detailed discussion of the Positive Youth Development perspective. The entry ends with suggestions for future research.

The Deficit Model of Adolescence The first published text on adolescence was Hall’s two-volume Adolescence: Its Psychology and Its Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion, and Education, published in 1904. It framed the scientific study of the field through the use of an evolutionary (Darwinian) conception of the basic process accounting for change. Translating the ideas of Ernst Haeckel, an early contributor to embryology, Hall advanced Haeckel’s idea of recapitulation— that the adult stages of the ancestors comprising a species’ evolutionary (phylogenetic) history were repeated in compressed form as the embryonic stages of the organism’s ontogeny. Hall extended the idea of recapitulation beyond the prenatal period. As noted by Richard M. Lerner in a chapter in The Oxford Handbook of Positive Psychology, Hall believed that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny”: The changes that occur in a person’s life mirror the changes that occurred in the evolution of the human species. Human evolution, he believed, involved changes that moved us from being beast-like to being civilized. Adolescence corresponded to the period in evolution when humans changed from being beasts to being civilized. Therefore, adolescence is a time of overcoming one’s beast-like impulses. (2011, p. 150)

Hall described adolescence as a universal and inevitable time of storm and stress, as a biologically based period of psychological, behavioral,

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and social disturbance in which the young person lacks characteristics of the adult person; that is, the young person is deficient. Although some scholars of this period (e.g., Edward Thorndike) quickly rejected Hall’s recapitulationism on both empirical and methodological grounds, other theorists, such as Anna Freud and Erik Erikson, shared Hall’s biological-reductionist, deficit view of adolescence. Freud “viewed adolescence as a universal period of developmental disturbance that involved upheavals in drive states, in family and peer relationships, in ego defenses, and in attitudes and values,” and Erikson “spoke of adolescents as enmeshed in an identity crisis” (Lerner, 2011, p. 150). Hall’s prominence in American psychology influenced the general conception that scientists, and society, held—namely, that adolescence was a time of upheaval and falling short. For the first half of the 20th century, most writing and research about adolescence was based on this deficit ­conception of young people.

Beyond the Deficit Model In the 1960s, research began to dispute that storm and stress in adolescence, as theorized by Hall, was universal, finding that most young people did not have a stormy second decade of life. This research found that most adolescents, despite spending increasingly more time with peers than with parents, greatly valued their relations with their parents and shared their parents’ core values (e.g., the importance of education in one’s life, social justice, and spirituality). Furthermore, adolescents selected friends who also shared these values. Researchers also discovered that only some of the numerous identified pathways across the adolescent years showed changes consistent with storm and stress. Given the view of adolescence as involving diverse developmental pathways, the adolescent decade (approximately ages 10 to 20 years) emerged in the 1970s as a period of great theoretical and empirical interest for developmental scientists. There were several interrelated, conceptual reasons for this focus. First, the considerable physical and physiological changes associated with puberty were understood through a theoretical lens that rejected biological reductionism

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Adolescent Development, Theories of

associated with the deficit model and focused instead on the interdependence of biology and context in human development. Second, in contrast to infancy, the cognitive abilities, social relationships, and motivations of adolescents can serve as active influences on their own development. In addition to context relations in development, represented as biology↔context relations, there are relations between individuals and their varied and changing contexts—that is, individual↔context relations. Developmental scientists working during the 1970s and early to mid-1980s (e.g., Paul Baltes, Urie Bronfenbrenner, and Richard Lerner) propounded developmental models that rejected reductionistic biological or environmental accounts of development and instead focused on interdependent, or fused, levels of organization as a developmental system involving individuals embedded in multilayered contexts. A third reason for the focus on the adolescent period arose from the growing emphasis on systemstheoretic models. By the second half of the 1990s, what were termed relational developmental systems models were regarded as defining the cutting edge of theory in developmental science. Multiple individual and contextual transitions into, during, and out of the adolescent period involve the major institutions of society (e.g., family, peers, schools, the workplace, and the neighborhood or community). As such, the study of the individual’s relations to these contexts engaged scholars interested in the dynamics of both ecological and individual levels of organization. A focus on adolescents’ varied social relations across the ecology of human development afforded a rich opportunity for understanding the nature of multilevel systemic change. In short, beginning in the 1970s, the scientific study of adolescence elicited the increasing interest of developmental scientists, who, in studying the interrelations of individuals and contexts across the period, made it a “natural developmental laboratory” for the extended study of developmental systems across the entire life span. Indeed, at the beginning of the 1970s “the study of adolescence, like the comedian Rodney Dangerfield, ‘got no respect,’” but increasing “reliance on adolescence research to inform fundamental questions in developmental science”

hastened its emergence as a “dominant force” (Lerner & Steinberg, 2009, p. 11).

Current Theoretical Models and the Positive Youth Development Perspective Today, the study of adolescence is marked by at least three theoretical foci. One is on relational developmental systems ideas as a frame for research. Another is a theory-predicated application involving interactions among, and occasionally collaborations between, researchers and practitioners in the field of youth development. The third is an individual↔context, strengthbased conception of adolescence, the Positive Youth Development (PYD) model. Across the life span, development is marked by relative plasticity—that is, by the potential for systemic change in the structural and functional features of an individual’s development. Even more so than infancy, adolescence is a period of relatively extensive plasticity in that adolescents have the capacity to actualize that plasticity through intentional self-regulatory processes. These processes enable youth—who are in the midst of the numerous physical, psychological, behavioral, and social dimensions of change characterizing this period—to contribute actively to the individual↔context relations that shape the remaining course of life. The roots of currently favored models of adolescence may be linked to ideas in developmental science that were presented at least as early as the 1930s and 1940s (e.g., Alex Novikoff and Ludwig von Bertalanffy), if not substantially earlier. All instances of developmental systems models emphasize the basic process of human development as mutually influential relations between the developing individual and the multiple levels of his or her changing context, including history (temporality). This ecology of human ­development creates the potential for systematic (compared with stochastic, or random) change in relative plasticity across the life span. The potential for change represents a fundamental strength of human development. Plasticity means that change for the better or worse can characterize any individual’s developmental trajectory. Nevertheless, a key assumption of relational

Adolescent Development, Theories of

developmental systems theories—and of the use of these theories both to understand adolescent development in general and to frame the PYD conception of developmental processes more specifically— is that the developmental system is sufficiently diverse and complex that some means may be found (by researchers or practitioners or both) to link individual with context to enhance the probability of change for the better—that is, promoting the more positive features of human development. Accordingly, the PYD model suggests that all young people have strengths that may be capitalized on to promote their thriving across the adolescent years. There have been several instantiations of the PYD model. However, all share an emphasis on relational developmental systems thinking and a concern with individual↔context relations that are beneficial to both person and context, to produce what has been termed adaptive developmental regulations. To illustrate the role of this individual↔context relational view of the PYD process, the Lerner and Lerner model is briefly described. A key hypothesis in this approach is that if the strengths of youth (e.g., a young person’s cognitive, emotional, and behavioral engagement with the school context; possessing the “virtue” of hope for the future; or already having the intentional self-regulation skills of selection, optimization, and compensation) can be aligned with the resources for positive growth found in families, schools, and communities, then young people’s healthy development may be optimized. In addition, given that positively developing youth should be involved in adaptive developmental regulations, a thriving young person should contribute to the context that is benefiting him or her. There should be contributions to self, family, community, and civil society. In other words, if positive development rests on mutually beneficial relations between the adolescent and his or her ecology, then thriving youth should be positively engaged with and act to enhance their world. As well, they should be less prone to engage in risky or other problem behaviors.

Future Directions The theoretically interesting and socially important changes of adolescence constitute one reason

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this age period has attracted increasing scientific attention. It is clear that the stereotype of a single trajectory through the adolescent years—for instance, one characterized by inevitable storm and stress—must give way to a diversity of trajectories through adolescence. Contemporary developmental science, which relies on developmental systems theories to study the dynamic relations between diverse individuals and contexts, attempts to integrate research with the promotion of positive human development. Thus, one focus of future research of adolescence should be, according to Lerner, “the changing relations between the individual characteristics of a youth and his or her complex and distinct ecology” (2011, p. 160). To advance basic knowledge and to enhance the quality of the applications aimed at promoting positive and healthy youth development, scholarship should be directed increasingly to theory and its application to research that elucidates the developmental course of diverse adolescents. In turn, policies and programs related to interventions must be specific to individuals’ developmental and environmental circumstances. Richard M. Lerner, Elise H. Harris, Ceren Yalin, Rachel O. Rubin, Akira S. Gutierrez, and Kathleen N. Greenman Note: The preparation of this article was supported in part by grants from the John Templeton Foundation and the Poses Family Foundation.

See also Behavioral Development; Cognitive Development; Culture and Development; Erikson’s Theory of Psychosocial Development; Freud’s Psychosexual Stage Theory of Personality; Gender Development; Hermeneutics and Developmental Psychology; Language and Development; Language Development; Moral Development; Motor Development; Perceptual Development; Personality Development; Prenatal Development

Further Readings Damon, W. (2008). The path to purpose: Helping our children find their calling in life. New York, NY: Free Press. Gestsdóttir, G., & Lerner, R. M. (2008). Positive development in adolescence: The development and

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Adulthood

role of intentional self-regulation. Human Development, 51, 202–224. Lerner, R. M. (2006). Developmental science, developmental systems, and contemporary theories of human development. In W. Damon & R. M. Lerner (Eds.), Handbook of child psychology (pp. 1–17). New York, NY: Wiley. Lerner, R. M. (2011). The positive youth development perspective: Theoretical and empirical basis of a strengths-based approach to adolescent development. In S. J. Lopez & C. R. Synder (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of positive psychology (pp. 149–165). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Lerner, R. M., Lerner, J. V., Bowers, E. P., & Geldhof, G. J. (2015). Positive youth development: A relational developmental systems model. In R. M. Lerner (Editorin-chief) & W. F. Overton & P. C. Molenaar (Vol. Eds.), Handbook of child psychology and developmental science: Vol. 1. Theory and method (7th ed., pp. 607–651). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Lerner, R. M., & Steinberg, L. (2009). The scientific study of adolescent development: Historical and contemporary perspectives. In R. M. Lerner & L. Steinberg (Eds.), Handbook of adolescent psychology: Vol. 1. Individual bases of adolescent development (3rd ed., pp. 3–14). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Overton, W. F. (2013). A new paradigm for developmental science: Relationism and relationaldevelopmental systems. Applied Developmental Science, 17(2), 94–107. Petersen, A. C. (1988). Adolescent development. In M. R. Rosenzweig (Ed.), Annual Review of Psychology, 39, 583–607. Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews. Rhodes, J., & Lowe, S. (2009). Mentoring in adolescence. In R. M. Lerner & L. Steinberg (Eds.), Handbook of adolescent psychology: Vol. 2. Contextual influences on adolescent development (3rd ed., pp. 152–190). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Roth, J. L., & Brooks-Gunn, J. (2003). What exactly is a youth development program? Answers from research and practice. Applied Developmental Science, 7, 94–111. Spencer, M. B. (2006). Phenomenology and ecological systems theory: Development of diverse groups. In W. Damon (Series Ed.) & R. M. Lerner (Vol. Ed.), Handbook of Child psychology: Vol. 1. Theoretical models of human development (6th ed., pp. 829–893). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Steinberg, L., & Lerner, R. M. (2004). The scientific study of adolescent development: A brief history. Journal of Early Adolescence, 23(1), 45–54. Susman, E. J., & Dorn, L. D. (2009). Puberty: Its role in development. In R. M. Lerner & L. Steinberg (Eds.),

Handbook of adolescent psychology: Vol. 2. Contextual influences on adolescent development (3rd ed., pp. 116–151). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Thorndike, E. L. (1904). The newest psychology. Educational Review, 28, 217–227. von Bertalanffy, L. (1933). Modern theories of development. London, England: Oxford University Press.

Adulthood Adulthood is usually defined as the period of human development in which the physical development, cognitive development, and psychosocial development of women and men slow and reach their highest level. Although scholars strive to build consistent theories, the description of the developmentally highest level differs between countries and cultures due to economic factors and sociocultural factors. After presenting some basic concepts of adulthood from different cultures, this entry continues with a psychological definition of adulthood, a discussion of characteristics of maturity, and brief descriptions of various theories about what constitutes adulthood. It ends with suggestions for the direction of future discussions on adulthood.

Basic Concepts A biological or physical approach to adulthood defines an adult as a person who is fully grown. Of course, different people grow at different rates; thus, physical maturity may be attained at a chronological age of 15, 20, or 25 years, for example. Moreover, bodily organs or organ systems usually age and mature at different rates. For instance, the reproductive system ages more rapidly than the nervous system. In countries that are technologically least developed, adulthood tends to be considered as coinciding with sexual maturity, with the conception and birth of a child or with the completion of a series of initiation rituals that demonstrate the child’s readiness for adulthood. Western and non-Western societies and cultures differ in their designations of life stages or the age grading of development. For example, the St. Lawrence Eskimos use a two-stage

Adulthood

system consisting of boys and men or girls and women. The Arusha people of East Africa group males according to age—for example, youths, junior warriors, senior warriors, junior elders, senior elders, and retired elders. In technologically advanced countries, adulthood is identified with events or rites of passage, such as graduation from school, starting a job, having a family, or reaching the legal adult age. The latter varies but now usually is 18 years (historically, it was 21 years), with exceptions—for example, Scotland (16 years), Nebraska and Alabama in the United States and South Korea (19 years), and Indonesia and Japan (20 years). The legal meaning of adulthood also varies and includes factors such as being capable of assuming responsibility for one’s own affairs; engaging in an employment contract; assuming financial responsibility for oneself; and being eligible to marry, vote in elections, possess a firearm, obtain a driving license, travel abroad independently, and use legal drugs such as nicotine or alcohol.

Psychological Definition In psychology, adulthood is usually defined as a stage of human development that occurs after the stage of adolescence and puberty (approximately 13–19 years of age). Adulthood lasts until the end of life and is divided into young or early adulthood (20–39 years), middle adulthood (40–59 years), and late adulthood or old age (60 years and older). Old age is usually divided into young old (60–80 years) and old old (80 and older). Successfully entering adulthood constitutes a constructive solution by a young person to the conflict over separation from parents. Adults are characterized by postformal thinking—that is, thinking that takes into account the contradictory elements of intellectual life or social interactions in a meaningful whole, while establishing the relative stability of emotional expression as well as a system of values ​​ as the basis for life decisions. Developmental changes during this period are the result of biological maturity and ­ psychoso­ cial  maturity, which allow adults to take effective actions related to building relationships, educat­ ­­ ing  children, and maintaining occupational employment. Adulthood is also characterized by

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commitment to a multiplicity of social roles that sometimes conflict with each other. Among the criteria for demarcating adulthood are independent living, economic independence, participation in public life, concern for the persons closest to oneself, being married, being a parent, or serving in the armed forces. Personality traits are also attributed to adulthood in most cultures, although there is not always a close correspondence between such traits and the legal adult age. The traits include self-control, social stability, responsibility, tact, self-reliance, seriousness, strength, experience, objectivity, and independent decision making. Other psychological characteristics of an adult are being able to formulate answers to questions about oneself as a person and as a member of society; being able to make choices about personal values ​​and one’s place in the world; gaining experience through participation in different types of situations, contacts with other people, and internal experiences that affect the formation of identity and self-esteem; and the ability to improve one’s personal and professional qualifications.

Maturity In terms of personality, psychologists distinguish between full maturity and partial maturity, for example in the following categories: biological maturity (of individual organs), academic maturity (completing a minimum number of school grades), emotional and intellectual maturity, spiritual maturity, moral maturity, and social maturity (the ability to perform different social roles). There are also recognized maturational delays (such as infantilism) and accelerations (such as premature sexual interest, child labor, or taking care of younger siblings or a parent). Problems related to biological aging have an impact on the individual’s adaptation to new conditions and allow a distinction between middle adulthood and late adulthood. The former is related to “midlife balance”—that is, the feeling of being halfway through life, which introduces destabilization and may reveal a “midlife crisis.” The crisis may be influenced by changes due to andropause or menopause or events such as the death of parents, unemployment, a disappointing career, or children leaving home (the empty nest syndrome).

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Adulthood

By contrast, adapting to old age takes different forms depending on the lifestyle and activities undertaken by people during middle adulthood. Reaching the stage of late adulthood is accompanied not only by the end of one’s professional career and ensuing retirement but sometimes by relocation to assisted-living facilities or retirement communities. Such transitions may be difficult and may be related to depression, anxiety, and the increased rate of suicide among older adults. Late adulthood is also characterized by “transcendent wisdom,” which is defined as a philosophical or moral approach to life characterized by no longer evaluating one’s attitudes toward the course of events, other people, or oneself. It is characterized by serenity, understanding, humility, the ability to self-limit, the ability to resolve dilemmas, accuracy in predicting events, and strength of will and strength to endure adversity while maintaining mental balance. Transcendent wisdom also may contribute to reconciliation with one’s impending death. There are age-normative and nonnormative developmental challenges in adulthood. The former include, for example, physical and cognitive functioning. Nonnormative challenges are unpredictable and include cancer. Adult development is characterized by the possibility of illness associated with aging, such as cancer, arthritis, cardiovascular disease, and a weakened immune system. Dementia is another frequent challenge to “successful aging,” which may be defined as maintaining a good state of health (functional independence), maintaining family and social ties, continuing one’s education and self-realization, and maintaining financial independence and independent living. Dementia may be defined in terms of cognitive deficits in memory, language, and visuospatial skills. Although the progression of nondegenerative forms of dementia (such as head trauma and brain infections) may be slowed, there is no cure for most degenerative forms of dementia (such as Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimer’s disease, and Huntington’s disease).

Theories of Adulthood in Developmental Psychology The initial theories in developmental psychology focused on childhood and adolescence. With the

rise of the life span perspective in the 20th century, promoted, for example, by Paul B. Baltes, attention to old age and to young and midlife adulthood increased. Sigmund Freud described human development as a series of psychosexual stages completed by adolescence. The resolution of these stages in interaction with the social environment, especially with one’s mother, influenced the p ­ ersonality of adults. The theory of adult personality development introduced by Charlotte Bühler included a phase of relative stability, followed by the phase of menopause or andropause. Relative stability is characterized by directing one’s will and one’s participation in life events. Menopause and andropause are characterized by the predominance of regressive changes that detract from the quality of life. What is experienced during this phase depends on previous experiences of life fulfillment, resignation, or failure. In Gordon Allport’s theory, adulthood is related to achievement of seven objectives: 1. An extension of “I” (as one is involved in more meaningful interpersonal relationships and in sharing feelings and experiences with others) 2. Good contacts with others (intimacy and sensitivity to the needs of others) 3. Emotional security (self-acceptance, acceptance of one’s own emotions, resistance to frustration, free expression) 4. Realistic perception (effecting an objective perception of reality) 5. The enhancement of qualifications and competencies (in particular activities) 6. Knowledge of oneself (what one can do, cannot do, should do) 7. A stable and coherent philosophy of life (the ability to determine balanced life goals and to cope with failures)

In Erik Erikson’s theory of psychosocial development, adulthood is characterized by three developmental crises. Early adulthood (19–40 years of age), characterized by intimacy versus isolation, refers to love relationships and the development of intimate relationships or feelings of isolation.

Adulthood

Middle adulthood (40–65 years) is characterized by generativity versus stagnation in terms of ­supporting the next generation. The individual must decide whether to take action in the interest of those who are younger or to focus only on his or her own interests and to defend already-acquired status against younger, stronger competitors. Late adulthood (65 years– death) is characterized by integrity versus despair as one reflects on one’s life. If one accepts it, this may result in a sense of oneself as one is and a feeling of fulfillment. In Daniel Levinson’s theory, adulthood includes psychosocial “seasons.” The transition to early adulthood (16–24 years of age) has as its aim separation from family and initiation and entry into life in the world of adults. The ensuing season (24–28 years) entails forming a life structure—that is, creating a bridge between personal values and ​​ the values ​​recognized by society. Settling down (29–34 years) and becoming one’s own person (35–40 years) are characterized by the formation of a satisfactory structure of personality, by the breach of temporariness, finding one’s surer place in society, and successfully striving. This stage is also characterized by the peak of physical fitness and the sometimes dramatic necessity of setting goals in life and other major decision making. Finally, midlife transition (early 40s) and restabilization into late adulthood (45+) is a period of social productivity, with a tendency to integration and synthesis. According to Robert J. Havighurst’s theory, young adulthood (ages 18–35 years) is characterized by developmental tasks, such as the choice of spouse and learning to live with him or her, the enlargement of one’s family and raising children, directing one’s own home, undertaking a professional career, engaging in civic responsibilities, and finding a corresponding social group. In middle adulthood (35–65 years), the most important developmental tasks are these: making one’s own changes and challenges, overcoming a midlife crisis, spiritual development, supporting the development of others, taking on more tasks and social responsibilities than in one’s youth, ­taking up work with an eye to benefiting future generations, giving greater meaning to one’s life and assisting one’s spouse to do so, further professional development and managing one’s own career, achieving one’s intended standard of living,

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supporting the development and growth of one’s children, caring for aging parents, and reconciling the signs of aging and old age. The creative fulfillment of these tasks allows people to continue their self-development in transitioning to the developmental period of late adulthood. Carl G. Jung showed that middle adulthood is the age period of midlife crisis. The emergence of crisis depends on the individual’s need to respond to oppositions—such as youth or old age, creation or destruction, masculinity or femininity, and attachment or isolation. This theory emphasizes the importance during middle adulthood of reorientation and focusing on the further improvement of the spiritual personality. Otherwise, the person is threatened by fixations, wrongly chosen defense mechanisms, stagnation in development, or premature aging. According to Robert F. Peck, the transition from middle adulthood to late adulthood is characterized by the excessive involvement of the individual in his or her professional work or by a preoccupation with oneself. The transition from middle adulthood to late adulthood is also part of Robert C. Atchley’s continuity theory, which describes the process of retirement. Individuals either want to retire (and are satisfied with that condition) or are forced to retire (to be initially unhappy and then satisfied) or retire due to a health condition (such a person often is initially unhappy, but his or her health often improves in a short time). Contemporary adulthood theory also includes influential studies of scholars such as George E. Vaillant, Nancy Chodorow, Jean Baker Miller, Carol Gilligan, Mary Belenky, Jane Loevinger, Roger Gould, Bernice Neugarten, Irene M. Burnside, Elaine Cumming, and William E. Henry.

Future Directions Contemporary societal changes such as aging populations, longevity, extending one’s working life, gender equality, diversification of family types, and later parenting require modification of a­ dulthood theories. There is a need to develop theoretical frameworks that include the multidimensionality of the contemporary transition to adulthood as well as transition from young a­ dulthood to middle adulthood to late adulthood. New theories need to (a) address individual differences, cross-cultural variations of adulthood, and

18

Aggression and Violence

gender issues; (b) avoid the androcentric bias—that is, the male-focused interpretations of personal development; and (c) avoid the assumption that Western and industrialized culture is a model for all people. Future theoretical frameworks need to take into account the diversity of gender, age, sexual orientation, race, socioeconomic status, physical and emotional disabilities, and cultural backgrounds. Among the challenges for adulthood theory are to link psychosocial functioning with biomedical factors (such as the immune system, health behaviors, the development of preventive behaviors focused on the problems that emerge in the later stages of development) as well as to link life span development with emotion and cognition theories.

organism. Such a definition may be expanded to include, at least at the human level, verbal statements that could do harm by more subtle means. Moreover, in association with aggression but not necessarily included as part of the definition of aggression, “threat” and related affective states designed to intimidate a target, which are present at the human as well as the nonhuman level, may be included. This entry describes types of aggression, discusses the neural circuits underlying aggression, and raises the question of whether aggression in society or individuals can be controlled.

Andrzej Klimczuk

A number of properties inherent in aggressive behavior need to be identified. First, aggression is not a unidimensional process. There are two basic and distinctly different forms of aggressive behavior. In the animal literature in which the prototype for the present discussion is the feline, types of aggression include predatory aggression or attack and affective defense. They may be viewed as two different behaviors, which are often identified under a single category—namely, “aggressive behavior.” As described in what follows, terms for homologous forms of human aggression include instrumental aggression and reactive (or hostile) aggression, respectively. These two forms of human aggression contain features unique to each type as well as being strikingly equivalent to the respective forms in animals such as felines. In addition, each form of aggression is mediated through distinctly different neural circuits, which are likely governed by different neurotransmitter systems. The characteristics of these two forms of aggression and their distinctive differences are described later.

See also Behavioral Development; Cognitive Development; Culture and Development; Erikson’s Theory of Psychosocial Development; Freud’s Psychosexual Stage Theory of Personality; Gender Development; Hermeneutics and Developmental Psychology; Language and Development; Language Development; Moral Development; Motor Development; Perceptual Development; Personality Development

Further Readings Austrian, S. G. (Ed.). (2008). Developmental theories through the life cycle (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Bentley, E. (2007). Adulthood. London, England: Routledge. Demick, J., & Andreoletti, C. (Eds.). (2003). Handbook of adult development. New York, NY: Kluwer Academic/Plenum. Smith, M. C., & DeFrates-Densch, N. (Eds.). (2009). Handbook of research on adult learning and development. New York, NY: Routledge. Whitbourne, S. K., & Sliwinski, M. J. (Eds.). (2012). The Wiley-Blackwell handbook of adulthood and aging. Chichester, England: Wiley-Blackwell.

Aggression

and

Violence

Aggression may be defined as a behavior that causes harm, damage, or destruction to another

Types of Aggression

Behavioral Features in Animals

Predatory attack occurs in a wide spectrum of animals but has been studied most intensively in felines. The response is triggered by the presence of a prey object, usually within the visual field of the predator. The attack is not necessarily initiated immediately but often involves planning until the predator determines the most opportunistic moment to attack. The response is clearly directed

Aggression and Violence

only at the prey object and at no other species and typically involves biting the back of the neck and twisting it until the prey object is dead. The physiological parameters include mild elevations in heart rate and blood pressure to a level not significantly different from those that occur following similar movements by the animal in association with nonaggressive responses. In particular, there is little or no affect present in the response, and there is a typical absence of vocalization. In essence, it may be viewed as “cold-blooded murder” not unlike the parallel situation for humans. The motivation for this behavior is the need for food and the presumed underlying fear of not being able to feed itself. Because of the association of the attack response with the subsequent act of feeding, it has occasionally led others to conclude incorrectly that attack behavior is a form of ­feeding, which it is not. Affective defense behavior occurs when an animal perceives that it is threatened by another of the same or of a different species. In the cat, it is characterized by intense sympathetic arousal of blood pressure and heart rate, marked vocalization (i.e., hissing and/or growling), pupillary dilation, arching of the back, retraction of the ears, and piloerection. A key point to note here is that the behavior is impulsive, as it is an immediate response to a perceived threat. The nature of the threat can vary widely from territorial intrusion to a direct threat by the opponent animal in some manner. In the animal world, affective defense can have important survival value by possibly causing an intruding animal to withdraw from a potential conflict situation. Behavioral Aspects of Human Aggression

Five characteristics of predatory aggression are indicated here: First, similar to predatory aggression in felines, few sympathetic signs are inherent in the expression of predatory aggression in humans. The second characteristic is an absence of emotion (and moral judgment) during the commission of a predatory aggressive act. This reflects the presence of a psychopathic personality as a component of this form of aggression. Moreover, the individual committing such an act of aggression may have a sense of exhilaration, which is positively reinforcing for the perpetrator.

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A third characteristic is that the response is purposeful and planned. The planning may range from hours to months and is directed against another human (in contrast to subhuman species where the target is mainly a potential source of food). A fourth feature is that the target does not reflect a perceived threat. Instead, the predatory act is often associated with a form of stalking parallel to that described for a nonhuman species when stalking a prey object. A fifth feature is specific objectives of the aggressive act, which may include acquisition of power, money, property, or gratification from sadistic feelings. The term instrumental is sometimes ascribed to this form of aggression. An example of this form of aggression involves the hit man hired by one criminal to murder an opponent, where the job of the murderer is a simple business matter. The murderer does not know the victim, expresses little or no emotion regarding his or her act, and plans and premeditates the act. Similar to the characteristics ascribed to the behavioral patterns in animals in response to the presence of a threatening organism, a parallel pattern of affective defense responses occurs at the human level in response to a threat. These include key characteristics of intense sympathetic arousal and an immediate, impulsive attack directed at a real or perceived (perhaps delusional) threat to the individual. The response could include posturing prior to the attack, and it may be displaced onto another individual. The attack is usually of limited duration, and its objective, as in the animal world, is to eliminate or reduce the object of the threat from the environment of the aggressor. Various other names have been used to describe the overall pattern of this behavior. These include episodic dyscontrol, intermittent explosive disorder, and reactive or hostile aggression. In clinical studies designed to study aggression, this form of aggression has been most widely studied, but only a paucity of studies have been published regarding human predatory aggression. An example of this form of aggression is “road rage,” where an individual may perceive that another person had tried to do harm by cutting him or her off on the road or otherwise driving in a threatening manner. Consequently, the individual displaying road rage attempts to do harm to the one perceived as the aggressor.

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Aggression and Violence

Neural Circuits Underlying Predatory Attack and Affective Defense The overwhelming basis for an understanding of the neural circuitry governing the two forms of aggressive behavior is derived from studies conducted in the cat. Primary sites of origin for the expression of predatory attack lie within the perifornical lateral hypothalamus. Sites underlying affective defense lie within separate regions of the hypothalamus— namely, the rostrocaudal extent of the medial hypothalamus. Neurons in the lateral hypothalamus communicate with those in the medial hypothalamus but in an inhibitory manner and vice versa. The inhibitory neurons from the medial to lateral hypothalamus and vice versa are gammaaminobutyric acid (GABA). What this means from a behavioral perspective is that, when predatory attack is preeminent, affective defense is suppressed. Likewise, when affective defense is preeminent, predatory attack is suppressed. In this manner, the suppression of one behavior allows for greater effectiveness of the other behavior. In addition to the hypothalamus, neuronal sites in the midbrain periaqueductal gray (PAG) are also associated with the expression of these forms of aggression. Specifically, neurons in the dorsal half of the PAG mediate affective defense, and a smaller group of neurons in the ventrolateral PAG contribute to the expression of predatory attack. These two groups of neurons presumably participate in these forms of aggression by functioning as part of the descending circuit that mediates these behaviors (see discussion that follows). The afferent connections to hypothalamic attack zones associated with the expression of the two forms of aggression include the limbic system and the monoaminergic neurons. Limbic inputs to the hypothalamus include the hippocampal formation, amygdala, septal area, prefrontal cortex, and anterior regions of the cingulate cortex. These inputs powerfully modulate the aggressive responses. Structures such as the amygdala, hippocampal formation, and septal area differentially modulate defensive rage and predatory attack, and they do so by virtue of their inputs to either hypothalamic or PAG neurons associated with these forms of aggression. To cite one example, the medial amygdala potentiates affective defense behavior by

virtue of fibers passing through the stria terminalis to the medial hypothalamus acting through substance P neurokinin 1 receptors in the medial hypothalamus. In contrast, the central and lateral nuclei of the amygdala powerfully suppress affective defense by virtue of descending connections to the dorsal PAG in which these effects are mediated through μ opioid receptors in the dorsal PAG. However, modulating effects on predatory attack that are opposite to those generated from each of these regions of the amygdala on affective defense have been described and are likely due to the modulating effects of the dorsal PAG and medial hypothalamus on the lateral hypothalamus. In contrast, the prefrontal cortex generates powerful inhibition on both affective defense and predatory attack, presumably by direct or indirect inputs to the hypothalamus from the prefrontal cortex. The importance of the prefrontal cortex in one’s ability to control aggression is considered in the last section of this entry. Other elements that modulate aggressive behavior include monoamine inputs and sex hormones. Noradrenergic and dopaminergic inputs generally have excitatory effects, but serotonergic inputs are largely (but not exclusively) inhibitory. Circulating testosterone presumably acts through neurons in the hypothalamus to potentiate affective aggression and fighting in wide groups of species. The efferent pathways mediating affective defense and predatory attack originate from the perifornical lateral hypothalamus and project to the ventrolateral aspect of the PAG and adjoining regions of the midbrain reticular formation. Axons from these regions then project to autonomic and somatomotor nuclei of the lower brain stem and ultimately to autonomic and somatomotor regions of the spinal cord. Engagement of these groups of neurons allows for both the biting (via connections to the trigeminal motor nucleus) and striking (via connections to the spinal cord motor neurons that supply forelimb muscles) components as well as to autonomic nuclei of the thoracico-lumbar spinal cord that mediate subtle changes in blood pressure and heart rate. The transmitters associated with these pathways are not known, but it is suspected that excitatory amino acids play a significant role. With respect to affective defense, the primary output originating mainly from the anterior half of the medial hypothalamus projects to the dorsal

Aggression and Violence

aspect of the PAG. The primary neurotransmitter includes excitatory amino acids that act through N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptors, causing a massive discharge of dorsal PAG neurons. Axons from the dorsal PAG supply the lower brain stem, including the ventrolateral medulla, and then project to the intermediolateral cell column of the thoracico-lumbar spinal cord, resulting in significant activation of the sympathetic system (as shown by marked increases in heart rate and blood pressure, piloerection, and pupillary dilatation). Motor manifestations of affective defense result from dorsal PAG projections to trigeminal and facial motor neurons, allowing for jaw opening, to motor nuclei of the vagus and glossopharyngeal nerves, allowing for vocalization, and to motor nuclei of the cervical cord, which mediate striking by the forelimb as part of the defensive component of the attack response.

Can Society and Individuals Control Aggressive Tendencies? Most approaches to the control of aggression have focused on the regulation of affective defense. One major approach has been treatment with drugs. One class of drugs includes serotonin reuptake inhibitors, which preserve circulating levels of serotonin in the brain, and drugs that are normally used for the treatment of epilepsy involving limbic structures. Both approaches have been somewhat successful. A second approach, which applies also to predatory aggression, has been intensive psychotherapy, where success depends on the insight of the therapist and the motivation of the patient. Societal approaches can be traced back to biblical times, and several examples can be mentioned. During the course of war, the rape of women by soldiers (which is more an act of aggression than sex) is common. The reason, in part, is that during stress and fighting, soldiers experience significant increases in testosterone levels, therefore increasing the likelihood of acts of aggression, especially on civilian populations. The Bible’s remedy is stated in Deuteronomy 21:10–14. If, during the course of war, a soldier captures a woman, he must do the following: shave off her hair, let her nails grow long, remove the garments of her captivity, and let her stay in his house for a month. After that time, the woman

21

would become his wife, if he desired. In reality, by that time, testosterone levels may have long since returned to baseline levels, and the appearance of the woman after a month would normally be a sufficient stimulus to allow her to return to her home. Another example occurs when a person accidentally kills another person. Numbers 35:22–28 states that such a person would be allowed to go to one of a number of designated cities of refuge, where he would be confined until the High Priest died. In effect, the person was given asylum from relatives of the person who was killed and whose anger at the moment after the accident would be great. Since affective defense typically diminishes over time, the separation of the person who caused the death from the relatives of the one who died may be an effective buffer against harm to the former. Can individuals control their impulsive affective aggression? There is reason to believe they can, but not necessarily easily. In terms of the neural circuitry that needs to be engaged, the prefrontal cortex is a key structure in achieving such an effect because it is now known that this region of cortex can powerfully suppress hypothalamic functions, including aggression. Moreover, it is also known that neurons can display classical conditioning in which a neutral stimulus that previously had no effect on those neurons can eventually discharge at significantly higher rates over time. How might this work in the real world? Assume for a moment that an individual has read an article articulating the value of not responding to insults and subsequently has given much thought to the article. Sometime afterward, the person is subjected to an insulting remark in a public domain such as at a party or in a meeting. Upon hearing the insulting remark, the person’s anger would begin to be aroused, but, at the same time, the conditioning produced by reflection on the article might produce the net result of silence by the person rather than an impulsive, threatening response. In effect, activity in the prefrontal cortex, activated by recall of the article’s admonition, would be of sufficient strength to inhibit the impulsive affective aggression generated by the hypothalamus. Allan Siegel See also Brain and Nervous System: Macroarchitecture; Drive and Motivation in the Brain; Emotion,

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Altruism Evolution of; Emotion, Expression of; Emotions, Universality of; Frontal Lobe Functions; Gender and Violence; General Aggression Model; Social Emotions

Further Readings Bhatt, S., Bhatt, R. S., Zalcman, S., & Siegel, A. (2009). Peripheral and central mediators of lipopolysaccharide (LPS)-induced suppression of defensive rage behavior in the cat. Neuroscience, 163, 1002–1011. Siegel, A. (2005). The neurobiology of aggression and rage. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Siegel, A., & Douard, J. (2011). Who’s flying the plane: Serotonin levels, aggression and free will? International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 34, 20–29.

Altruism Altruism is reflected in actions by one individual that benefit another, even when there is no expectation of reward. Altruism is often equated with selflessness and contrasted with selfishness, or alternatively, altruism is seen as other-regarding as opposed to self-regarding behavior. The latter usage is sometimes preferred because of difficulties in classifying behavior for which the individual acting altruistically receives a “warm glow” from helping others. The question raised in this instance is whether such an individual is actually selfish and, if so, whether there is any behavior that, after the fact, could not be interpreted as selfish. The need to preserve altruism as a meaningful behavioral category leads to an emphasis on objective, observable measures of welfare. Thus, an individual who sacrifices health, material wealth, or physical comfort to benefit another can be viewed as exhibiting altruism whether or not he or she receives personal satisfaction from doing so. In biology, altruism refers to behavior by an organism that improves the reproductive fitness of another at the cost of reducing the reproductive fitness of the actor. This entry discusses altruism as it has been explained and defined over the years.

Explaining Altruism Philosophers and behavioral scientists continue to ask whether humans have innate tendencies

toward altruism or whether proclivities in that direction are the result of socialization or acculturation alone. One view is that any such behavior is purely the consequence of a “thin veneer of civilization.” Rend that fabric, and humans will be at each other’s throats, tearing each other apart for the slightest advantage. One sees this in Sigmund Freud’s work (e.g., Civilization and Its Discontents), in literature (Robert Golding’s Lord of the Flies), and in much traditional sociology and anthropology. The problem with this view is that, based on the archeological record, it is difficult to push the ability of humans and their progenitors to develop and transmit culture across generations further back than 500,000 years or, at a maximum (based on evidence of the use of fire), perhaps 1 million years. Language abilities are almost certainly much more recent. And yet the common ancestor of the three surviving chimpanzee species—Homo sapiens, Pan troglodytes (the common chimp), and Pan paniscus (bonobos)—who lived roughly 7 million years ago, must have exercised some restraint on harming other members of the same species (conspecifics). By far the most important aspect of altruism, as Alexander J. Field points out in his book Altruistically Inclined? The Behavioral Sciences, Evolutionary Theory, and the Origins of Reciprocity, is not harming others when doing so can be justified defensively (as a means of forestalling attack) and, further, as a means of acquiring more resources. In most instances, one can confer much greater benefits by not harming another as opposed to affirmatively helping. One of the key realms within which to observe altruism is the family. Evolutionary biologists approach the phenomenon of altruism genetically, viewing individual organisms as, in a sense, envelopes or vessels for genes. Genes themselves have no theory of mind or independent volition, but the theory of natural selection tells us that genes predisposing toward behavior that increases their frequency in subsequent generations should be favored. In most cases, the “interests” of the gene in increasing its frequency over time and the interests of the organism in survival and reproduction are the same. But not always, and that, from a biological perspective, is the problem of altruism. Suppose genes predispose toward behavior that might

Altruism

reduce the survival probabilities or reproductive success of the individual while helping another. How could such genes gain a foothold and increase in frequency within a population? In the 1960s, William Hamilton proposed an elegant solution to the problem of explaining how such genes could become established. It is a commonplace observation that parents are often prepared to sacrifice their material welfare or, in some cases, even their lives, for their children. Because biological children share half the genes of a parent, a gene predisposing to sacrifice could increase in frequency if such behavior tended to lead to the survival of at least two offspring (or two siblings or eight first cousins and so on). Hamiltonian kin selection is today widely understood as a key part of the explanation of altruism within families. In other words, tendencies toward parental sacrifice have a hardwired component; they are not purely a cultural construct. Indeed, such behaviors can be observed throughout the animal kingdom, including among species that do not have the ability to develop and transmit culture. The more difficult challenge is to explain altruism beyond the immediate family. Genetic relatedness drops off quickly—first cousins share just an eighth of each other’s genetic makeup—so even in the small bands of 50 to 100 hunter-gatherers out of which human society emerged, kin selection by itself is too weak a force to explain the emergence of the cooperation essential for group survival. Cooperation is not the same as altruism, but it depends on altruistic predispositions in order to get started. Why? Because a self-regarding individual not already embedded in a fabric of reciprocal interaction faces a Prisoner’s Dilemma, that is, the dilemma of deciding whether or not to cooperate (e.g., refrain from attacking) when confronting a stranger for the first time. Attacking first and asking questions later has much to recommend it from the standpoint of both prudence and wealth maximization. The worst outcome would be to sit tight and be attacked (since offense often has an advantage). The best for each individually would be to attack while the other sat tight. The next best outcome (and the best for the two individuals considered jointly) would be to refrain mutually from attack, which would open up the possibility of beneficial cooperation and exchange.

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The next-to-worst outcome would be for each to attack the other. The dilemma is that the best response to whatever the other does is to attack, even though this leads away from the outcome that is collectively the most beneficial.

Influence of Genes It is easy to understand how gene(s) predisposing toward attack might be favored, particularly if being attacked while sitting tight means death. It is more difficult to understand how genes favoring restraint could be favored. Several approaches have been proposed. The first is to argue that the restraint necessary to allow initial cooperation among those not closely related is simply an extension of the operation of kin selection within small groups. But this involves a certain amount of hand waving since, as has been shown, genetic relatedness falls off too quickly for this to be a complete explanation of how the behavior originated. The second approach is associated with the work of Robert Trivers, who developed the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here, the idea is that if A at small cost can confer a large benefit on B, then B, being grateful, might at some small cost return the favor at a subsequent point. But this does not explain why a self-regarding B would not simply take the initial benefit and run. Nor, since A should figure this out, does it explain why he or she would initially bear the small cost of helping. Assuming no selection higher than the organism level, one would expect evolutionary forces to reinforce this calculus. Game theorists understand that once individuals are embedded in a fabric of reciprocal interaction, self-regarding individuals may find it to their benefit to continue cooperation. The problem of explaining the origin of cooperation is distinct from the challenge of explaining why it might be sustained. Altruism (in the form of restraint on harm) may be necessary to initiate a cooperative relationship, but once embedded in a social context, the behavior can appear drained of altruistic context. As Adam Smith said in The Wealth of Nations, people do not depend on the benevolence of the butcher or the baker for their sustenance but on his self-interest. A third approach acknowledges that in the evolutionary past, natural selection may have

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Altruism and Sociality

operated at levels above the individual organism. The possibility of group or multilevel selection remains controversial within biological discourse, but many evolutionary biologists, including some who originally distanced themselves from the idea, such as E. O. Wilson, have now embraced the view that it provides the most coherent explanation of how the altruistic predispositions that favor human cooperation among non-kin could, upon first appearance, have been favored. Proponents of group or multilevel selection do not dispute that the gene is the ultimate unit of selection. But they seek to extend the principle, acknowledged uncontroversially in the case of kin selection, that in certain instances, genes predisposing toward behavior not in the survival or reproductive interest of the organism containing them might nevertheless be favored by selection pressures. In the case of kin selection, the argument is simple and straightforward. In the case of genes predisposing toward restraint on harming others who are not closely related, the mechanics are more complex. If human populations are dispersed in small groups and if there is some random variation in the frequency of genes predisposing toward restraint, groups characterized by higher frequencies of such genes will likely grow more rapidly. And if the groups periodically pool and then reassort into smaller groups, the apparently paradoxical conclusion is that genes losing out in terms of reproductive fitness at every moment of time in every group may nevertheless increase over time in a global population.

Final Thoughts The history of mankind is of course marked by horrendous violence and the premature deaths of hundreds of millions of individuals at the hands of other humans. Unprovoked preemptive attack is a feature of human history. At the same time, one can look at a world of more than 7 billion individuals and marvel not at the extent of conflict but at its relative infrequency, which is one of the reasons conflict is newsworthy. Is this entirely the result of a thin veneer of civilization or culture, and, if so, why were and are individuals prepared to accept some of these norms? It is likely that humans have, in addition to their proclivities toward self-regarding behavior, some

hardwired predispositions toward altruism. The most empirically significant are those leading to restraint on harming others. There is also a somewhat weaker predisposition toward affirmatively helping others, including those who are non-kin. Each of these predispositions can be strengthened or weakened by training or acculturation. Research in social psychology has demonstrated that humans are quick to divide conspecifics into in-groups and out-groups, with members of an in-group most likely to benefit from both types of altruism. These categorizations are, however, malleable. Identifiable ethnic or racial markers play a role, but culture can be as important. This is a reminder that, although much behavior, including that predisposing toward altruism and selfishness, has a genetic and biological substrate, culture and socialization are important influences on how these predispositions manifest themselves. Alexander J. Field See also Altruism and Sociality; Close Relationships; Cooperation; Culture and Social Relations; Group Selection; Hamilton, W. D.; Human Nature; Morality and Moral Emotions; Parent-Offspring Relations; Social Cognition; Social Emotions; Social Motives

Further Readings Field, A. J. (2001). Altruistically inclined? The behavioral sciences, evolutionary theory, and the origins of reciprocity. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Field, A. J. (2014). Prosociality and the military. Journal of Bioeconomics, 16, 129–154. Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behaviour I, II. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7, 1–16, 17–52. Trivers, R. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 35–57. Wilson, D. S., & Sober, E. (1994). Reintroducing group selection to the human behavioral sciences. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17, 585–654.

Altruism

and

Sociality

For centuries, altruism has intrigued and vexed philosophers and social scientists. Of primary concern are two questions: Does altruism exist?

Altruism and Sociality

And if it does, what are the implications for understanding human social behavior? This entry offers two definitions of altruism, considers the question of whether motivational altruism exists, and discusses the implications of motivational altruism for understanding human social behavior.

Defining Altruism Before one can answer the question of whether altruism exists, one must first determine how best to define the concept. Historically, two major approaches have been used. One defines altruism as helping behavior. A second defines it as a motive to increase the welfare of another as an end goal. Altruism as Helping Behavior

Defining altruism as helping behavior proves problematic for several reasons. First, helping behavior may take a wide variety of forms, and it is not always clear which type of helping should count as altruism and which should not. One way to address this limitation is to narrow the definition of altruism to consist of only those forms of helping behavior that entail high cost to the helper, provide no benefit to the helper, or both. When defined in this more limited manner, evidence of altruism can be found in both humans and nonhumans of varying degrees of cognitive complexity (e.g., nonhuman primates to amoebas). Unfortunately, this more limited behavioral definition also proves challenging because it is difficult to know how costly a helping behavior must be before concluding that it is appropriately classified as an instance of altruism. Even in the absence of clear benefit for the helper, the anticipation of such benefit may be a factor. In other words, reliance on a restricted behavioral definition of altruism fails to take into account the reasons an individual helped another, which is particularly problematic in a­nalyses of altruism as it relates to social behavior. Altruism as Motivation

Defining altruism as motivation addresses limitations of a behavioral definition of altruism because it focuses on the intentions or motives of

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an individual. Altruism can be defined as a motive to increase the welfare of another as an end goal. Altruism is often contrasted with egoism, a motive in which the end goal is to benefit oneself. It is important to note that the existence of motivational egoism need not preclude the existence of motivational altruism. Both may operate within the same person or within the same situation at the same time. Indeed, considering the interplay between egoistic and altruistic motivation makes possible a more fine-grained understanding of the causes and forms of different social behaviors.

Does Motivational Altruism Exist? Although the existence of altruism is not in dispute when defined in behavioral terms, there remains some debate about its existence when defined in motivational terms. By its very nature, motivation is not easily verified by focusing on a single instance of behavior. People help others in order to achieve many nonaltruistic goals, and the consequences of helping typically provide little insight into the nature of the motives initially responsible for such help. To address this challenge, psychologists have relied on patterns of behavior in carefully controlled experiments to determine whether motivational altruism exists. The Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis

Surprisingly, there is fairly strong evidence that motivational (as opposed to behavioral) altruism exists. This evidence comes from experimental tests of the empathy-altruism hypothesis, which was proposed by social psychologist C. D. Batson. According to this hypothesis, feeling empathy for a person in need creates an altruistic motivation to increase that person’s welfare as an end goal. In this instance, the term empathy refers to an emotional state of concern within oneself that is congruent with the perceived welfare of another. This empathic concern is best captured by emotion-related words such as compassion, tenderness, softheartedness, and sympathy and is typically elicited by perceiving need in another while adopting his or her perspective (i.e., while imagining what he or she is thinking and feeling). Perspective taking of this form is most likely to

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Altruism and Sociality

occur when the other’s welfare is valued and when no antipathy toward that person exists. Alternative Hypotheses

The idea that feeling empathic concern produces altruistic motivation appears plausible, given the prevalence of research linking empathy or ­conditions that increase empathy to higher rates of helping those in need. However, it may be that the empathy–helping association is due to motivational egoism rather than motivational altruism. Indeed, at least four general classes of potential egoistic motives have been suggested to account for the empathy–helping association. Aversive-arousal reduction explanations propose that feeling empathy is unpleasant, and individuals are motivated to reduce or avoid this unpleasant state. Reward-attainment explanations propose that people are socialized to associate empathy with potential self- and social rewards that accompany the act of helping. Punishment-avoidance explanations propose that people are socialized to associate empathy with self-administered and social punishments for failing to help. Identity-confusion explanations propose that the conditions that produce empathy also create a blurring of the sense of self and other. These egoistic explanations assume that feeling empathy for another in need does not create increased helping strictly as a means to increase the welfare of the person in need. Instead, empathy increases helping because helping (a) eliminates the cause of unpleasant arousal (i.e., the other’s need); (b) produces positive feelings in oneself or elicits approval, respect, or tangible reward from others; (c) enables one to avoid guilt, shame, or censure from others; or (d) allows one to benefit aspects of one’s self that are recognized in the other. More than 25 experiments since 1980 have tested these alternative explanations against the empathy-altruism account. With the exception of identity-confusion explanations, the vast majority of experiments have supported the empathyaltruism hypothesis over each of the first three categories of egoistic explanations. Experiments testing identity-confusion explanations against the empathy-altruism hypothesis have produced either weak or ambiguous results. The findings support the empathy-altruism hypothesis or may be

interpreted as being consistent either with the empathy-altruism hypothesis or with identityconfusion explanations. Although some questions remain, the weight of the evidence strongly favors the empathy-­altruism hypothesis and, with it, the claim that motivational altruism exists.

Implications of Motivational Altruism for Understanding Human Social Behavior A number of important implications for human social behavior emerge from the assumption that psychological altruism exists. It should be noted that some of these implications are better supported by research than are others. The order of discussion will move from those with more empirical support to more speculative ones. One implication of altruism is that both egoism and altruism may jointly influence social behavior and mental processes. The awareness that another person is in need can elicit both egoistic and altruistic motives, and the behavioral outcomes of the two are a blend of motives, all of which may operate in either a congruent manner or in conflict with one another. Examples of conflict between altruism and egoism have been documented in research. For example, research suggests that under certain conditions, altruistically motivated individuals will undermine principles of fairness in order to benefit one person at the expense of a second person. Other research suggests that altruism may lead one member of a social collective to allocate resources to a second member of the collective, even when doing so undermines the collective as a whole. Furthermore, unlike public awareness of benefit to the self, public awareness of altruistic benefit to another does not reduce its likelihood of occurrence. This finding suggests there are weaker norms against undermining the common good in the service of altruism than there are against undermining the common good in the service of egoism. Given that altruism is most likely evoked in response to feeling empathy for valued others in need, these findings reveal another challenge to increasing individuals’ commitment to the common good: Not only must one be convinced to make sacrifices of the self in order to promote the common good, but one also must be convinced to make sacrifices for valued others to promote the

Altruism and Sociality

common good. Indeed, when committing to the common good, many individuals may be more willing to give up self-benefits than to give up benefits for their children, family, and friends. These examples demonstrate how altruism may conflict with other prosocial motives, but other examples reveal how it may reinforce them. For example, the altruistic goal to increase the welfare of a victim of injustice may promote the desire to uphold broader principles of justice or to benefit victims of similar injustice by participating in social activism. Likewise, the altruistic goal to improve the welfare of a single member of a disadvantaged group may spur a goal to improve the welfare of the disadvantaged group as a whole. Thus, it becomes important to consider how altruism may energize other prosocial motives and behavior. A second implication is that altruism may affect the quality of help and not just the quantity of help one offers to others. For example, altruism may lead to more effective helping because it involves primary attention to the other’s welfare rather than one’s own. As a result, one may more carefully attune helping behavior, better accommodating the needs and values of the other, than may occur when not altruistically motivated. Ironically, research suggests that altruism can actually reduce helping another in instances where that helping is perceived as undermining the long-term welfare of the other. Because altruism may compel individuals to incur high levels of cost in order to increase the welfare of valued others, a third implication of altruism is that people may at times attempt to avoid feeling empathy and the altruistic motive it creates. For example, if an individual anticipates that successful helping will involve high personal cost, he or she may attempt to avoid feeling emotions that lead to motivational altruism, such as empathy. Note that for this type of emotional avoidance to occur, one must anticipate that knowledge of an opportunity to help exists prior to feeling empathy for a person in need. Once empathy is experienced, the desire to avoid the costs of helping presumably will be offset by an increased altruistic desire to improve the person’s welfare. Empathy and, consequently, psychological altruism may also be avoided when increasing

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or improving the welfare of an individual in need is anticipated to be impossible. Research suggests that the inability to satisfy an altruistic motive leads to negative emotion. An implication of this finding is that exposure to repeated instances in which one’s helping is perceived as costly, taxing, or ineffective may create caregiver burnout. Burnout may in turn lead caregivers to become disengaged from the needs of others, in part from active empathy avoidance produced by the routine anticipation of the high costs, by the impossibility of helping others, or both. A final implication of altruism is that it may help inform an understanding of aggression. Theorists have long speculated that emotions such as empathy, which produce altruism, may inhibit or impede aggressive motivations when one is provoked or antagonized. However, the counterinfluence of altruism on aggression likely occurs only under specific conditions. For example, it may occur only when aggressive tendencies are directed toward a provoking or antagonizing individual who is perceived as acting in such a manner due to a compromise in his or her welfare (e.g., he or she is mentally incapacitated, under extreme stress, or misinformed). Note that such a perception may require intense perspective taking by an observer because provocation will often generate antipathy, which undermines empathy and, consequently, altruism. Thus, it may be important for educators, clinicians, and those negotiating or moderating conflict situations to consider techniques for training individuals to actively adopt the perspective of others so that antipathy does not derail the possibility of empathy and subsequent altruism in contexts where conflict is present. Finally, when one believes another’s need results from the actions of a “harm doer,” altruism may trigger altruistic aggression, in which aggression is directed against the harm doer on the behalf of the person in need. In such instances, aggression may be considered an instrumental means of addressing the other’s need if the aggression is perceived as an effective means of rendering the harm doer less able to victimize the other presently or in the future. David A. Lishner and E. L. Stocks

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Ancient and Medieval Sources of Therapy

See also Altruism; Close Relationships; Cooperation; Culture and Social Relations; Group Selection; Hamilton, W. D.; Human Nature; Morality and Moral Emotions; Parent-Offspring Relations; Social Cognition; Social Emotions; Social Motives

Further Readings Batson, C. D. (2011). Altruism in humans. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Penner, L. A., Dovidio, J. F., Piliavin, J. A., & Schroeder, D. A. (2005). Prosocial behavior: Multilevel perspectives. Annual Review of Psychology, 56, 365–392. Sober, E., & Wilson, D. S. (1998). Unto others: The evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Ancient and Medieval Sources of Therapy It is helpful for therapists to have knowledge of the roots of their profession. Since the earliest times, humans, being social creatures, have been sitting together, discussing matters of suffering along the continuum of birth, life, and death. Such dialogic practices, later dubbed talking cures and what is now called therapy, had the intent of alleviating human suffering and existential despair. Early healing efforts took the form of spiritual exercises, religious ceremonies, study, ethical practices, and discipline. Healing practices were based on naturalistic and holistic worldviews about the nature of being human and the cosmos. In addition to alleviating human suffering, such practices aimed to relieve individuals of existential despair and help them find some peace and connection within themselves and with that which was greater than their individual self. Healing practices in ancient times are chronicled in records of ancient history (circa 3200 BCE to 476 CE) and medieval history (circa 476 CE to 1482 CE). Some brief descriptions of the ancient and medieval sources of therapy follow. Our limited selections emphasize the continuity between contemporary therapies based in humanistic and naturalistic worldviews and early sources in religion, spirituality, and philosophy.

Healing Practices in Ancient Greece The ancient Greeks (circa 8th century BCE to 600 CE) established many Asclepian temples for the sick. Asclepius was the Greek god of medicine and healing. Journeys to partake in Asclepian healing were often arduous and dangerous (note that the English word heal comes from Old English hælan with the etymological meaning of “to make whole”). Asclepian treatment emphasized the whole person: a recognition that human beings are composed of mind, body, heart, and spirit and that treatment of physical illness required work within the inner world of the sufferer for the integration of these dimensions. Treatment included discussing dreams, making commitments, taking oaths, and praying to Asclepius. The idea that the human psyche is complex and is a site of distress is evident in the writings of the Greek philosopher Plato (428/427 BCE to 348/347 BCE) who, along with his mentor Socrates and his student Aristotle, laid the foundations of Western philosophy and science. He developed the tripartite theory of the soul: (a) the rational or intellectual (logistikon) that reasoned and reflected, (b) the appetitive (epithumetikon) that drove base desires such as sex and survival, and (c) the emotional (thumoiedes) that dictated feelings. Plato saw the healthy mind as having these dimensions in a perfect balance with the rational and the emotional governing the appetitive. In the Hellenistic period (323 BCE to 30 BCE) that followed the Classical Greek period, sources of therapy again emanated from philosophy. The word therapy comes from the Greek therapeia, meaning “healing.” The guiding idea behind therapy in ancient Greece was that strong passions and desires—for example, hatred, anger, aggression, fear, anxiety, worries, lust, and greed—all buffeted human beings. Hence, freedom from being controlled by these desires was considered central to human wholeness and well-being. Different philosophical schools proposed different conceptions of, and practices for, well-being. The Epicureans, Stoics, and Skeptics were philosophers who taught people how to work with personal passions and desires. They recommended spiritual exercises such as meditation, contemplation, visualization, study, physical exercise, and the cultivation of meaningful relationships. However,

Ancient and Medieval Sources of Therapy

most schools, particularly the Epicureans and Stoics, saw tranquility (ataraxia) as essential to human happiness and well-being. The Galilean Jew Jesus of Nazareth (circa 7–2 BCE to 30–33 CE), commonly known as Jesus Christ, was a renowned healer and taught these practices to his disciples, which included prayer and “laying on of hands.” Unconditional love, faith, humility, and other virtues were understood and promulgated as powerful healing agents. The psychospiritual role of healing is evident in this tradition.

Healing Practices in India In ancient India, the historical Buddha (Siddhartha Gautama, circa 563 BCE to 483 BCE) offered, through discourses and meditation instructions, a way to gain a clear and expansive consciousness that facilitated transcendence beyond life’s challenging experiences. To that end, his followers cultivated positive human capacities, known as Brahmavihara, or the four immeasurables: lovingkindness (metta), compassion (karuna), empathic joy (mudita), and equanimity (upekka). The guiding idea here was that, although one cannot control life and the universe, one can control one’s responses to what life presents. Through practices aimed at establishing a calm, lucid, positive inner environment, and learning how to inhabit this inner space, the suffering person can come to accept human life as it is, without unrealistic views and expectations of what life should be.

Healing Practices in China In Ancient China, there was a similar emphasis on mental cultivation as a source of therapy that enabled practitioners to gain a deep and abiding sense of balance, harmony, and calmness in the midst of life’s vicissitudes. The classical Chinese worldview saw mental, physical, and social dimensions as part of a whole. Humans and all other beings were imbued with vital energy, known as qi (or chi). Healing modalities, as revealed in Huangdi Neijing, The Yellow Emperor’s Classic of Internal Medicine (a core source for Chinese medicine for more than two millennia), were naturalistic, holistic and integrative. Lao-Tzu (a legendary figure and reputed author of the Dao De Jing, circa the 6th century BCE) and

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Confucius (551–479 BCE) were exemplary teachers of morals and virtues. Their teachings aimed to help human beings attune to the cosmic order as contiguously manifested in nature and the social world. Attunement was viewed as essential to engendering peace and harmony in human life and the universe. Both Daoism and Confucianism were based in the classical Chinese worldview that viewed the cosmos as governed by the dynamic and ceaseless interplay of polar opposite, yet complementary, forces, known as yin and yang. Knowing the particular patterns of yin–yang interplay that govern a person constitutionally or environmentally is central to manifesting health and well-being. Within this context, Chinese sages carefully observed everything, including human beings, and sought to work with the dynamic forces of yin and yang to achieve balance and harmony. Various self-cultivation practices were developed to aid this balancing and harmonizing work, including study and practice of ethics, rituals, reading of classics, divinatory arts, poetry, martial arts, and meditation.

Healing Practices in the Mayan Culture The Mayan civilization (established circa 1800 BCE) in Mexico and Central America had a holistic philosophy of health and well-being similar to that of the ancient Chinese, with a focus on mind, body, emotions, spirit, and earth as interconnected and needing to be in harmony. The healer’s job was to restore, through rituals and remedies, balanced life energy (ch’ulel) to a suffering person.

Healing Practices in North America Similarly, the oral teachings of indigenous people throughout the North American continent understood healing as a process of restoring balance to the individual’s ruptured relationships with community as well as with natural and spirit worlds. Their healing practices may have originated in the Paleolithic period with Siberian shamanic traditions. The shamans and medicine men and women were considered healers of the soul. Mental and physical illness in an individual was seen as a symptom of rupture and imbalance within the community of all beings.

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Ancient and Premodern Theories of Personality

Sweat lodge activity was part of these indigenous cultures and is apparently older than recorded history. It continues to be used for healing to this day by North American indigenous peoples. The aim of these practices is realignment with the natural order and to facilitate healing connections within the relational field.

Healing Practices in Europe In contrast to the significant visibility of naturalistic, spiritual, and humanistic paradigms of mental well-being from diverse ancient cultural contexts, the medieval culture of Europe was largely dominated by the belief that mental disorders were the devil’s work. The treatment was exorcism and torture. (Note: Demonology was not confined to medieval Europe; for example, the Ancient Babylonians, Egyptians, and Chinese also believed in demon possession.) During the Middle Ages in Europe (5th–15th centuries CE), exorcism by burning and other tortures became widespread. The death of the person was viewed as the successful liberation of the person’s soul from possession by dark forces.

Healing Practices in the Muslim World During the Dark Ages in Europe, the Muslim world was carrying on the humanistic worldviews of the ancient and Hellenistic Greeks. For example, Ibn Sina (980 CE–1037 CE), greatly influenced by the Greek philosophers, developed a systematic account of human psychology and healing. Other Muslim scholars, such as Al Ghazali (1058 CE–1111 CE) as well as Ibn-Khaldun (1332 CE–1406 CE), further developed views of human personality that were ­precursors for modern psychology. Avraham Cohen and Heesoon Bai See also Ancient and Premodern Theories of Personality; Historical Roots of Theories of Psychopathology

Further Readings Bankart, P. C. (2007). Talking cures: A history of Western and Eastern psychotherapies. Mason, OH: Cengage Learning. Hadot, P. (1995). Philosophy as a way of life (M. Chase, Trans.). Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell.

Smith, H. (1991). The world’s religions: Our great wisdom traditions (2nd ed.). New York, NY: HarperCollins. (Original edition published 1958)

Ancient and Premodern Theories of Personality This historical review treats psychology as the science of behavior, both individual and social, and its visceral, endocrinological, neurological, and genomic determinants. The review includes studies of human development that emanated from the classic works of the Ancients, including their architecture, biology, medicine, child psychology, and even their drama. These early sources of psychology, formerly simply labeled philosophy, are tantamount in many respects to theories of personality. They are evident, for example, in the work of Sophocles and the other great Hellenic tragedians and of Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Lucretius, Augustine, Aquinas, Petrarch, Chaucer, and preeminently, William Shakespeare, the Bard from Stratford-on-Avon. This entry is restricted to human psychology, although the psychologies of other cohabitants of this planet have always had much to teach humankind—not least, the mouse and the chimpanzee. A modern history of theories of personality can plausibly be thought to have begun with the classic works of the Greek epicist Homer or the historian Herodotus (whose celebrity was enhanced by the novel and film The English Patient in the mid-1990s). Their works are interlaced with psychological principles (as well as folklore and myth) often depicted in poignant prose. Some scholars, however, have gone further than this and aver that psychology found its origins not only in the Aegean basin and on the Attican peninsula but in Crete, the eastern Levant, and Egypt as well as in the Sumerian, Persian, Indian, and earlier Indo-European cultures. One synoptic view of the overarching culture of Near Eastern and Eurasian civilizations has been limned in Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization, a three-volume study of earlier non-European wellsprings of modern civilization. Of course, there are indigenous psychologies

Ancient and Premodern Theories of Personality

arising in ancient “Far Eastern” non-European cultures that have begun to influence the modern paradigms disseminated in Western sources. (Note: “Far East” is a Eurocentric label. The peoples of Asia could plausibly designate the Americas, in their languages, as the Far East.) Popular psychology has propagated the myth that all ancient peoples, including the Greeks, believed that the heart and various viscera rather than the brain were the seat of mental activity. Basing himself on previous scientists (e.g., Alcmaeon), Hippocrates, among the greatest of the Hellenist scientists, wrote this in his tract On the Sacred Disease: Some say that we think with the heart, and that this is the part which is grieved, and experiences care. But it is not so. . . .

Men ought to know that from nothing else but the brain come joys, delights, laughter and sports, and sorrows, griefs, despondency, and lamentations. And by this, in a special manner, we acquire w ­ isdom and knowledge, and we see and hear and know what are foul and what are fair, what are bad and what are good, what are sweet and what are unsavory. . . . And by the same organ we become mad and delirious, and fears and terrors assail us . . . all things we endure from the brain when it is not healthy. . . . In these ways I am of the opinion that the brain exercises the greatest power in the man.

He continued, “with regard to the disease called Sacred . . . [m]en regard its nature and cause as divine from ignorance and wonder,” but they have natural causes like other illnesses.

The Four-Factor Model of Trait Psychology Among the many-factored models of trait psychology designed in the 20th and 21st centuries, a highly regarded one can be traced back to the Hippocrates-Galen theoretical axis. Relative to temperament, their biological principles bore, as do those today, on endocrinological and humoral products. They further conjectured that once understanding has occurred in the brain, a

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correlative event occurs in the gut. Perception of a joyful or sad event creates a commotion in the viscera. Dissections of the human body by their predecessors Alcmaeon, Erasistratos, and Herophilos, among others, grounded the later Pythagorean and Platonic views on the humoral determinants of temperament—to wit, the sanguine, the choleric, the phlegmatic, and the melancholic. This paradigm became salient in the secular literature of the Middle Ages, faded once again for centuries, and then vividly resurfaced in the work of Immanuel Kant, Pierre Janet, Carl Gustav Jung, and Hans Eysenck. Eysenck’s conclusions, for example, were a reaffirmation of the Hippocratean paradigm, and his view that temperament as well as intellective potential is largely heritable has now become widely accepted.

Mentation The Greek philosopher Aristotle was among the greatest empiricists of the 4th century BC. He spent 2 years studying marine biology on the island of Lesbos. He was also a student of statecraft and political institutions, gathering and studying scores of state constitutions before writing his Politics. He advanced formal logic, wrote tracts on the senses and sensible objects, and produced studies of the mind, as in De Anima, astronomy, poetics, metaphysics, and many other domains. Though students may know him only as the promulgator of the “blank slate” (tabula rasa) theory of mind, they will be greatly rewarded by attending to his psychological work—keeping in mind that he did not have access to magnetic r­esonance imaging technology and neuroscience. The Ancients knew, epistemologically, that people come to know more than they can tell; they also knew people tell more than they could possibly know. This latter principle, that humans are prone to fabricate memories, disturbs moderns more than the former principle does. The pervasive and innocent confabulations revealed in social circles can embarrass, but in courts of law, they beget dilemmas and occasions for serious injustice. The Ancients were aware of the tendency to proffer illusory explanations for phenomena one does not and could not fully understand; hence,

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Ancient and Premodern Theories of Personality

Hippocrates’s view that humans “out of ignorance and wonder” often attribute mental diseases and seizures to a divinity. The importance of harmony, system, order, rhythm, and balance, as well as the disciplines of mathematics and music, all elements of Hellenist thought, were developed largely by Pythagoras and the members of his school. Resonating through Western history, it found its finest classical expression in Plato’s Academy. At the entrance, the inscription “None may enter here except mathematicians” welcomed qualified scholars. The political institutions and legal codes of the Greco-Roman world are gravid with the rich psychological principles developed within a Pythagorean ethos. The classic Hellenist definition of happiness as “the exercise of vital powers along lines of excellence in a life affording them scope” remains a core principle of current positive psychology.

Human Development In Laws, Plato provided many principles of sound child-rearing and human development. He explained how character flaws can result from severe disciplining of children for immature, innocent childhood behaviors, turning them into spiritless and servile adults. Spoiling children, on the other hand, can make them fretful, peevish, and easily distraught by trifles. A moderate environmentalist, he repeatedly warned that the character of the adult was shaped by the fairness, care, and gentle instruction the home may or may not have provided the child at appropriate ages in its development. As for pedagogy per se, his demonstration of the efficacy of the Socratic method, say, in Protagoras or Meno, is persuasive. The late pedagogue and statistician Ira Stanley Cohen contrasted the Socratic method’s contributions to programmed learning with many of the didactic methods that had become the norm in modern academia. Plato argued that girls should be provided the same education, training, and opportunities provided to boys, for “nothing can be more absurd,” he averred, than not permitting women to engage in the same pursuits as men. His pleas for obligatory education from the earliest years

for both genders have begun, after two millennia, to be widely instituted. On the other hand, he was also a hereditarian. For example, he wrote, Now of all wild young things a boy is the most difficult to handle; while the fount of his intelligence “has not yet run clear,” he is the craftiest, most mischievous, and unruly of brutes . . . and he must be held in check by more than one bridle.

A Bifurcated Zeitgeist The human body per se was respected in the Greco-Roman culture, as were the pursuits of scientific knowledge, and that culture valued the quotidian experiences that social and physical lives could afford one. This perspective was a major stream in the Mediterranean ethos of that time. Horace, deemed by many as the greatest of all lyric poets, placed great emphasis on embodied existence. Carpe diem (seize/enjoy the day) is a quin­ tessentially Epicurean and Horatian principle of mindfulness, best exemplified in Lucretius’s The Way Things Are. Both Merleau-Ponty and Horace affirm that culture is sedimented in one’s body, but the principle is also reminiscent of Antonio Damasio’s “somatic marker hypothesis” and many other contemporary psychologies of emotion and wellness. This Mediterranean ethos was riven by Gnosticism, a second major and countervailing approach to the world. Gnostics of various shades introduced dichotomous schemas into the mental world such as good and evil, light and dark, spiritual and carnal, truth and error, knowledge and ignorance, faith and infidelism. This basically otherworldly, religious approach to human existence encouraged a disdain for the body, the pursuit of spiritual verities, and the spurning of worldly sciences. The desert Fathers of the nascent Christian Church and the later ascent of Augustinian asceticism dampened the investigation of the natural world, engendered a suspicion of the sexual, and extinguished the Pythagorean pursuit of natural science. The Augustinian spirit, which prevailed over Horatian Epicureanism, continued by and large until the 12th century.

Ancient and Premodern Theories of Personality

The Rational Psychology of the Schoolmen A resurgence of Aristotelianism took shape in the work of the Persian Islamist Ibn Rushd and great Arabic philosophers, the eminent Hebrew scholar, Maimonides, and Thomas Aquinas, the Christian philosopher who, in his short life, created the foundation for the Schoolmen of the 13th century, that is, scholars at universities. The influence of these three streams of thought—Islamist, Judaic, and Christian—has endured to this day, in one form or another. Aquinas was a Cartesian before Descartes; he developed a rational psychology within his cathedral-like Summa, attempting to explain how the senses and accommodative reasoning faculties “shake hands” with the soul. Its popularity has waned, but interested scholars should consult Mortimer J. Adler’s The Syntopicon: An Index to the Great Ideas, a superb guide to these late medieval psychologies.

The Troubadours and Minnesingers Of greater interest to the laity and a rich manifestation of a nascent individualism were the poignant, often tragic love songs of the German minnesingers, Provençal troubadours, and other wandering minstrels who sang of unrequited love, the ecstasies and the “flameouts” of classic love affairs, and other sorrows and disappointments of life. The tragic tales of Dido and Aeneas, Anthony and Cleopatra, Lancelot and Guinevere, Peter Abelard and Héloïse Garlande, and Tristan and Isolt helped spur the rediscovery of “personality”—sharply distinguished from earlier visions of the human seen through an essentialist lens. This existentialist, genderized humanism started emerging in the work of Petrarch, Boccaccio, and Chaucer. The latter, for example, gave us brilliant depictions of village life, of the revelries and the ale that coursed through pubs and squares—even public celebrations in which a flitch of bacon was awarded to any newlyweds who had lived for a year without a major altercation or current regrets.

contemporary Western human, a diagnostic guide to a frail, anxious species. From his oeuvre emerge 120 personalities, the foremost of which are depressives like Hamlet, sanguine bon vivants like Falstaff, cunning Machiavellians like Iago, sociopaths like Caliban, dements like Lear, heroes like Henry V, and strong and willful women like Katherine and Lady Macbeth. But the Bard himself is heavily indebted to Ovid’s Metamorphoses, Plutarch’s Lives, and Virgil’s Aeneid, not to mention his contemporary Montaigne and an Ancient like Homer. His character analyses have become the accoutrements of contemporary personality theorists. And if it is accurate to say that a rebirth of personality occurred in the 12th century, it was Shakespeare who propelled it and other complex disciplines into modernity. This entry ends on the cusp of modern psychology with Jaques’s soliloquy on human development in As You Like It (Act II, Scene VII): All the world’s a stage, And all the men and women merely players: They have their exits and their entrances; And one man in his time plays many parts, His acts being seven ages. At first the infant, Mewling and puking in the nurse’s arms. And then the whining school-boy, with his satchel And shining morning face, creeping like snail Unwillingly to school. And then the lover, Sighing like furnace, with a woeful ballad Made to his mistress’ eyebrow. Then a soldier, Full of strange oaths and bearded like the pard, Jealous in honour, sudden and quick in quarrel, Seeking the bubble reputation Even in the cannon’s mouth. And then the justice, In fair round belly with good capon lined, With eyes severe and beard of formal cut, Full of wise saws and modern instances;

The Invention of the Human Shakespeare, in the view of American literary critic Harold Bloom, is the “Designer” of the

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And so he plays his part. The sixth age shifts Into the lean and slipper’d pantaloon, With spectacles on nose and pouch on side,

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Animal Consciousness

His youthful hose, well saved, a world too wide For his shrunk shank; and his big manly voice, Turning again toward childish treble, pipes And whistles in his sound. Last scene of all, That ends this strange eventful history, In second childishness and mere oblivion, Sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans everything.

Frank Dumont See also Behavioral Theories of Personality; Culture and Personality; Existential Theories of Personality; Factor Analysis and Personality Theory; Freud’s Psychosexual Stage Theory of Personality; Humanistic Theories of Personality; Metatheoretical Issues in Personality Psychology; Motivation and Personality; Personality, Heritability of; Personality, Measurement of; Personality Development; Personality Disorders; Personality Testing; Personality Traits Versus Situations; Personality Types Versus Personality Traits; Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Personality

Further Readings Bernal, M. (1987). Black Athena: The Afroasiatic roots of classical civilization. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Cantor, N. F. (1993). The civilization of the Middle Ages (Rev. ed.). New York, NY: Harper/Collins. Dumont, F. (2010). The biology of personality. In A history of personality psychology: Theory, science, and research from Hellenism to the twenty-first century (pp. 115–148). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Eyres, H. (2013). Horace and me: Life lessons from an ancient poet. New York, NY: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux. Hippocrates. (1991). Hippocratic writings: Galen on the natural faculties: Vol. 10. Great books of the Western world (Encyclopædia Britannica, Francis Adams, Trans.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. (Original work from 400 BCE) Koestler, A. (1959). The sleepwalkers: A history of man’s changing vision of the universe. London, England: Penguin Group. Plato. (1991). Laws: Vol. 7. Great books of the Western world (Encyclopædia Britannica, B. Jowett, Trans.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. (Original work from 340 BCE)

Animal Consciousness Assessing the presence of consciousness in nonhuman animals is one of the most vexing challenges in psychology. There is little consensus on the best way to study the topic or indeed whether it can be meaningfully studied at all. Nevertheless, it is an important topic because it has potential policy implications and has important similarities to the challenges of assessing consciousness in infants or behaviorally unresponsive humans. Moreover, psychologists presumably cannot claim to truly understand what consciousness is in humans unless they have some principles for recognizing its presence or absence in other species. There are some ways in which nonhuman animals are trivially conscious. For example, many animals can be conscious in the sense of being awake rather than asleep. Likewise, animals can be conscious of features of the environment by virtue of attending differentially to stimuli. However, the challenging question is about phenomenal consciousness: That is, which species subjectively experience their surroundings? This question is sometimes framed as asking whether or not there is “something it is like to be” a particular animal. This entry begins with two historical considerations of the question of animal con­ sciousness and then discusses present thinking about the issue.

Historical Background Two pre-20th-century views remain influential. René Descartes, the 17th century philosopher famous for arguing that the mind cannot be reduced to physical processes, claimed that animals lacked minds because their behavior can be explained entirely mechanistically by referencing simple reflex reactions. In contrast, Descartes believed that the creativity and rationality exhibited in human language meant that human behavior could not be explained purely by appeal to mechanistic processes. Today, Cartesian dualism has largely fallen out of favor; it is widely believed that even human behavior can be explained by reference to physical processes. Nevertheless, Descartes’s idea that language might be a necessary precondition for consciousness persists.

Animal Consciousness

On the other end of the spectrum, Charles Darwin famously argued that the difference between humans and other species was one of degree and not of kind. Darwin cited a number of examples of what he described as animal emotions to make the case that the mental lives of nonhuman species were roughly continuous with humans’ mental lives. Though Darwin’s reliance on anecdotes has been criticized, he is still widely cited as an early advocate of the view that other animals experience the world similarly to humans. The early 20th century saw the rise of behaviorism in psychology, a movement that held that the discipline should be concerned only with the study of observable behavior in response to environmental stimuli. Many behaviorists were openly critical of the anecdotal stories offered by Darwin and his supporters. It followed straightforwardly from their view that any talk of consciousness or mental states independent of observed behavior patterns in animals was extravagant or, at the very least, outside the bounds of what psychology should be studying. However, with the cognitive revolution in psychology later in the 20th century, animal consciousness made a comeback as a legitimate subject for empirical investigation. Both psychologists working in controlled settings and ethologists observing animals in their natural environments argued that some nonhuman animal behavior could not be explained purely in terms of associative processes and that cognition had to be invoked in some explanations. Thus, there was room once again for theorizing about nonassociative processing. Moreover, new techniques for observing brain activity in awake, behaving nonhuman animals as well as in humans opened up new possibilities for investigating and interpreting the inner workings of both.

Contemporary Approaches Even following the cognitive turn in psychology, there is still much debate about how to go about studying consciousness in other species. In humans, the primary tool is self-report, something arguably impossible to elicit from nonlinguistic species. Though tasks have been designed to get nonhuman animals to “report” preferences or perceptions using choice tasks, the exhibited

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behaviors are often open to interpretations that don’t appeal to conscious states. Even species that arguably come the closest to linguistic behavior (e.g., chimpanzees, dolphins, and gray parrots) are not able to “describe their experiences” in the way humans do. Proponents of consciousness in nonhuman species often appeal to the notion of evolutionary continuity. That is, if humans are typically conscious when engaging in a particular behavior and a nonhuman animal engages in the same behavior (specified at the appropriate level of detail), then arguably, the simplest explanation for the behavior in the nonhuman animal is that it was caused by the same mechanism responsible for the behavior in humans, given the conservative principles of evolution. Critics of this argument, however, point out that similar behaviors can often be caused by quite different mechanisms. On the other hand, skeptics about animal consciousness often refer to what is known as Lloyd Morgan’s Canon—namely, that animal behavior should never be interpreted as caused by “higher” psychological processes when simpler explanations are available. Thus, one might think that any behavior that can be explained without appeal to conscious mental states should be assumed to be unconscious unless otherwise demonstrated. However, the precise interpretation and implications of Morgan’s Canon are debated, and many critics object to the idea that simpler explanations should always be preferred. Other theorists have suggested that more cognitively demanding capacities are required for consciousness, such as possession of a concept of a self distinct from the world or the ability to be aware of one’s perceptions. Results from the mirror recognition task developed by Gordon Gallup, a task wherein nonhuman animals are tested for their ability to recognize an image in the mirror that shows their own bodies, have been invoked to argue that only a small number of nonhuman species are conscious. However, this test might better capture a sense of “self-consciousness,” which can be kept distinct from phenomenal consciousness, as it is at least conceptually possible that an organism could consciously experience the world without having a sophisticated concept of “self.” Others have argued that consciousness requires not just perception but an awareness of one’s

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Anxiety Disorders

perceptions, suggesting that consciousness requires multiple levels of representation (including representations of representations, or “higher order” representations). In this view, consciousness is likely to be restricted to humans and perhaps higher primates and dolphins. In the wake of the cognitive revolution, most current arguments about animal consciousness (pro or con) rely on neuroanatomical data in addition to behavioral evidence. Some researchers have argued that the ability to elicit certain motivated behaviors via direct stimulation of ­ subcortical regions suggests that consciousness ­ exists across most vertebrate species. Other theorists have hypothesized that dense thalamocortical connections play a crucial role in conscious ­experience, which would imply that most mammals and possibly other vertebrate species are conscious. Those more inclined to higher order views of consciousness often emphasize the importance of higher level integrative brain centers, such as the prefrontal cortex or the anterior insula, which (depending on the details) could suggest that consciousness is restricted to humans. In most cases, when scientific experts have convened to evaluate consciousness in other species, they have tended to conclude that the safest point for “line drawing” on the question of consciousness is between vertebrates and invertebrates (with the possible exception of cephalopods). Adam J. Shriver See also Behaviorism; Brain and Consciousness; Consciousness, Origins of

Further Readings Allen, C. (2011). Animal consciousness. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ win2011/entries/consciousness-animal/ Andrews, K. (2014). The animal mind. New York, NY: Routledge. Griffin, D. R. (1981). The question of animal awareness: Evolutionary continuity of mental experience (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Rockefeller University Press. Panksepp, J. (2005). Affective consciousness: Core emotional feelings in animals and humans. Consciousness and Cognition, 14, 30–80.

Seth, A., Baars, B. J., & Edelman, D. B. (2005). Criteria for consciousness in humans and other mammals. Consciousness and Cognition, 14, 119–139.

Anxiety Disorders Anxiety disorders are the most common mental disorders and are often associated with significant distress and functional impairment in social, occupational, and health-related domains as well as with significant economic costs. The lifetime prevalence rates of anxiety disorders vary between 4.7% for panic disorder and 12.5% for specific phobia. This entry names the major categories of anxiety disorders and discusses their defining features, the causes of anxiety, and therapeutic treatments for it. Anxiety disorders frequently occur together with and in the presence of other disorders, such as substance use and mood disorders. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (5th ed. [DSM-5]) from the American Psychiatric Association groups the main anxiety disorders into the categories of specific phobia, social anxiety disorder, panic disorder, agoraphobia, and generalized anxiety disorder. Also included are separation anxiety disorder, selective mutism, substance/medication-induced anxiety disorder, and anxiety disorder due to another ­ medical condition. The most substantial change from the previous edition of the DSM (DSM-IV) was that obsessivecompulsive and related disorders and trauma- and stressor-related disorders (e.g., posttraumatic stress disorder) now compose new categories separate from other anxiety disorders. In addition, the DSM-IV diagnoses included panic disorder with agoraphobia, panic disorder without agoraphobia, and agoraphobia without a history of panic disorder; these have been replaced in the DSM-5 by two separate diagnoses: agoraphobia and panic disorder. Finally, the 6-month duration, which was limited to individuals under the age of 18 in the DSM-IV, is extended to all ages in the DSM-5.

Defining Features of the Major Anxiety Disorders Specific phobia is the common form of anxiety disorder. It is characterized by an intense and

Anxiety Disorders

persistent fear triggered by the presence or anticipation of specific situations or objects. Commonly feared objects or situations include animals (e.g., fears of snakes, spiders, or insects), natural environment events (e.g., fear of stormy weather, heights, or being close to water), blood-injectioninjury-related situations or objects (e.g., fear of needles, seeing blood, or surgical procedures), situational type (e.g., fear of small places, elevators, or airplanes), and other types, such as fear of vomiting or choking, loud noises, or contracting an illness. When individuals with specific phobia encounter the phobic situation or object, they experience an immediate fear response. The anxiety and avoidance associated with the feared situation or object lead to significant impairment of day-to-day activities, of occupational or academic functioning, and in relationships. People with specific phobia recognize that their fear of the object is excessive and unreasonable. Social anxiety disorder is a chronic disorder characterized by excessive anxiety and fear of one or more social or performance situations. Individuals with this disorder are able to recognize that these fears are unreasonable and excessive. They typically avoid these situations because of a fear of negative evaluation. If these situations cannot be avoided, patients with social anxiety disorder endure a great deal of distress. Typical social situations that are feared or avoided by those individuals include initiating and carrying on conversations, interacting with authority figures, and dating, as well as performance situations that involve speaking, writing, or eating in front of others. If the primary fears are limited to performance situations, patients may be diagnosed with the performance-only subtype of social anxiety disorder. Individuals with agoraphobia excessively fear or avoid two or more situations. In the DSM-IV, agoraphobia was linked to panic disorder, because it was assumed that people avoid agoraphobic situations because of their fear of panic. However, epidemiological studies questioned this assumption. This led to the unlinking of panic disorder from agoraphobia in the DSM-5. Agoraphobia is further differentiated from specific phobia by the focus of the fear, with specific phobia characterized by fear of a specific situation and agoraphobia characterized by a fear of being unable to escape or seek help during a physical crisis.

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Panic disorder is characterized by repeated and unexpected panic attacks, which are defined as discrete periods of intense fear and discomfort that develop abruptly and peak within 10 minutes. These attacks are often associated with feelings of choking, dizziness, shortness of breath, nausea or stomach pain, pounding heart, sweating, shakiness, chest pain, numbness, and chills or hot flashes. They may also be accompanied by feelings of unreality or detachment, fear of losing control, and fear of dying. After a panic attack, individuals with panic disorder often experience persistent concern related to having another attack, worry about the consequences or implications of the panic attack, or experience a substantial change in behavior related to the attacks for at least one month. The defining characteristic of generalized anxiety disorder is persistent and excessive worry that is difficult to control. Worrying is not the same as merely anticipating a future event. Rather, it is a maladaptive cognitive avoidance strategy that preserves cognitive-affective fear structures. Individuals with this disorder typically worry about a number of things, including finances, health, family, performance at work or school, foreign affairs, and minor events. These worries are typically exaggerated, excessive, and maladaptive and are characteristically associated with physiological symptoms, such as muscle tension, irritability, restlessness, feeling keyed up or on edge, being easily fatigued, difficulty concentrating, restless sleep, and difficulty falling asleep or staying asleep.

Theories of Etiology Numerous factors contribute to the development and maintenance of an anxiety disorder, including genetic factors, neurobiological factors, and environmental and psychosocial factors. Early theories of anxiety disorders were dominated by psychoanalytic thinking. Freud believed that anxiety is an expression of unconscious and unresolved conflicts. Although his experience with anxiety patients contributed substantively to the formulation of psychoanalytic theory, his patients did not show significant improvements even after years of analysis. With the advent of behavioral and cognitive approaches to psychology, research on and the treatment of anxiety disorders underwent radical

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Anxiety Disorders

changes and improvements. The first influential technique for treating anxiety states was based on behavioral principles. This approach was rooted in learning theories that appeared in the early 1900s. One of the most influential behavioral theorists was Orval Hobart Mowrer, who hypothesized that fears are acquired through repeated presentations of a neutral stimulus (which subsequently became a conditioned stimulus, or CS) and a pain-producing or fear-eliciting stimulus (unconditioned stimulus or US). He observed that the strength of the fear response in rats was determined by the number of repetitions of the CS and US and the intensity of the unconditioned response. Mowrer further noted that the repeated presentation of the CS in the absence of the US produced extinction, the gradual decrease of the conditioned response. This process has been regarded as primarily responsible for the effects of exposure therapy in humans from the early beginnings of experimental studies in psychology to ­contemporary neuroscience. In the famous 1920 case study of Little Albert, John Watson and Rosalie Rayner first presented an 11-month-old infant with several objects, including a rat, a rabbit, a fur coat, and a dog. The boy showed no signs of fear or other negative emotional reactions toward these objects. However, he cried in response to the US, which was a loud noise made by banging a heavy hammer against a steel bar. During the conditioning trial, the experimenters presented the boy with a rat (CS). Each time the boy reached for the rat, the US was also presented. After seven trials over the course of one week, the boy was presented with only the rat. As predicted, he exhibited signs of fear and avoidance. The experimenters then presented other furry objects, including a rabbit, a fur coat, and a dog. The infant was similarly distressed by each of these objects, suggesting that the fear response generalized to other objects with fur. Similar reactions were observed 5 days and, to a lesser degree, 31 days after the initial conditioning trial. When the boy was tested in a different context (by moving him to a different room), the fear response was still noticeable but substantially diminished. Watson and Rayner’s classical experiment is often used to illustrate the basic principles of fear conditioning, generalization, context, and extinction in humans.

Subsequent learning theories suggested that fear and anxiety can be acquired three ways: (a) classical conditioning (as with Little Albert), (b) modeling, and (c) vicarious information transmission. The latter two approaches feature cognitions— that is, thoughts that determine the perception and interpretation of an event and resulting behaviors and emotions. One of the pioneers of the cognitive perspective on anxiety disorders is Aaron T. Beck. According to his model, emotional problems are caused by maladaptive thoughts (cognitions). Some of them are based on general, overarching core beliefs, or schemas, that the person has about self, the world, and the future. These core beliefs or schemas determine how a person interprets a specific situation, giving rise to specific, automatic thoughts. These contribute to maladaptive cognitive appraisal of the situation or event, leading to an emotional response. This model is not unique to anxiety disorders and applies to virtually all mental disorders. It has been supported by extensive studies.

Treatments The combination of behavioral principles and cognitive interventions gave rise to what has ­ become known as cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT). This type of therapy helps patients identify and evaluate their maladaptive thoughts and higher order beliefs in combination with exposure and other behavioral strategies. CBT is typically administered in 12 to 16 individual hour-long sessions. Pharmacological agents known as anxiolytics have demonstrated efficacy in the treatment of anxiety disorders. They include tricyclic antidepressants (TCAs), monoamine oxidase inhibitors (MAOIs), reversible inhibitors of monoamine oxidase-A (RIMAs), selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), serotonin-norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors (SNRIs), and other drugs, such as anticonvulsants and atypical antipsychotics. Some were developed based on the observation that anxiety states are related to abnormalities in neurotransmitters, especially serotonin and dopamine. However, no particular anxiety disorder is specifically linked to any particular neurotransmitter abnormality. Although CBT and anxiolytic medications are efficacious, there is clearly room for improvement.

Applied Behavior Analysis

Unfortunately, combining these treatment modalities has produced disappointing results. A newer approach toward combining therapies is to enhance CBT using other types of pharmacological agents. Some of these approaches are promising as strategies to further enhance the efficacy of CBT. Stefan G. Hofmann See also Ancient and Medieval Sources of Therapy; Behavior Therapies; Behavioral Perspectives on Psychopathology

Further Readings Beck, A. T. (1979). Cognitive therapy and the emotional disorders. New York, NY: New American Library/ Meridian. Hofmann, S. G. (2008). Cognitive processes during fear acquisition and extinction in animals and humans: Implications for exposure therapy of anxiety disorders. Clinical Psychology Review, 28, 199–210. Hofmann, S. G., Asmundson, G. J., & Beck, A. T. (2013). The science of cognitive therapy. Behavior Therapy, 44, 199–212. Hofmann, S. G., Asnaani, A., Vonk, J. J., Sawyer, A. T., & Fang, A. (2012). The efficacy of cognitive behavioral therapy: A review of meta-analyses. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 36, 427–440. Watson J. B., & Rayner, R. (1920). Conditioned emotional reactions. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 3, 1–34.

Applied Behavior Analysis Applied behavior analysis (ABA) is the application of the principles of behavior described by psychologist B. F. Skinner to problems faced by humans and other organisms. Principles described in Skinner’s experimental and ­theoretical work—including positive reinforcement, negative reinforcement, extinction, and punishment—have been applied to a range of problems: addiction, anxiety, depression, intellectual disabilities, self-control, traumatic brain injury, and many others. These applications take place in clinical and educational environments and in other settings where the behaviors of interest occur.

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Beyond its rich experimental and theoretical tradition, ABA is recognized as a unique ­practitioneroriented discipline featuring professional organizations that support practice and a prominent role in addressing problems associated with autism spectrum disorders. This entry begins with a historic overview of behavior analysis; outlines the basic principles of ABA, their applications, and dimensions; touches on verbal behavior and additional applications of ABA principles; and ends with a brief review of ABA as a discipline.

Historical and Philosophical Precursors ABA is rooted in the experimental tradition of Skinner, but his science of operant conditioning did not emerge without its own antecedents. The work of Ivan Pavlov on conditioned reflexes, John Watson’s experimental work on classical conditioning and theoretical work on child-rearing, and the research of Edward Thorndike on the law of effect in trial-and-error learning were among the precursors to Skinner’s analysis of behavior. The guiding philosophy of ABA is clearly behaviorism, but more specifically, Skinner’s radical behaviorism, which addresses the role of the environment in the selection of behavior. Radical behaviorism does not deny private events or the species’ history. Thus, it is distinct from other behaviorisms, including the methodological type that Watson proposed. Most behavior analysts view behavior as anything an organism does. The unit of analysis is the rate of responding. This does not preclude a focus on other dimensions of behavior such as response duration, intensity, or latency. For example, the rate at which a person is observed to hit another person may be important, but the strength (i.e., the intensity) of the hitting response may also be important. Depending on the problem presented by a client, a behavior analyst may choose to focus on one behavioral dimension over another. Skinner’s science of behavior, known as the experimental analysis of behavior (EAB), is consonant with the philosophy of radical behaviorism. In EAB, there are formal arrangements of reinforcing consequences, known as schedules of reinforcement, which have been demonstrated over many decades and in ongoing ways to ­influence behavior in highly sensitive ways.

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Applied Behavior Analysis

Basic Principles Positive reinforcement refers to a stimulus that follows a response and strengthens that response in terms of rate, duration, intensity, or latency. In ABA, reinforcers are considered putative until they demonstrate a strengthening effect on behavior. That is, reinforcing a behavior with a piece of candy is reinforcement only if the behavior increases. In ABA-based therapies, the selection of reinforcers often is a critical aspect of the procedure. Negative reinforcement refers to conditions in which behavior is strengthened as a result of stimulus termination. An example of negative reinforcement occurs when the behavior of fastening a seatbelt terminates the sound of a warning beeper but only if that termination is observed to strengthen seatbelt fastening in the future. Negative reinforcement is frequently used in programs for children who engage in undesirable behavior to avoid low-preference tasks. They are frequently taught more adaptive ways to gain the negative reinforcer of a break from the task. Although it is often confused with negative reinforcement, punishment refers to a stimulus that is delivered following a behavior and has the effect of decreasing the likelihood that the behavior will occur in the future. Punishment decreases the response in terms of rate, duration, intensity, or latency. There are two subtypes. Positive punishment is observed when a stimulus is added that decreases the behavior. Negative punishment is observed when a stimulus is removed and behavior decreases. For example, if a child is teasing his or her sibling and a parent subsequently reprimands him, if behavior decreases, then positive punishment has occurred. However, if the parent removes a preferred activity and behavior decreases, then negative punishment has occurred. A fourth principle that affects behavior is extinction, which takes place when the previously reinforced behavior is no longer reinforced, causing the behavior to decrease. For example, when a vending machine that previously provided snack foods contingent on inserting money and making a selection no longer does so, people typically stop using the machine. Extinction may be used in ABA, but most extinction procedures (e.g., time-out) are negative punishment procedures. Reinforcement and punishment contingencies are effective in shaping behavior as well as

maintaining and eliminating it. Behavior can be shaped naturally through contact with existing contingencies or through rule governance. Contingency-shaped behavior occurs when the behavior of an individual is reinforced or punished directly. Rule-governed behavior occurs when behavior occurs under the control of a verbal rule. For example, the children’s game “Hot or Cold” uses verbal cues to direct the behavior of the player who seeks to find a hidden object. Alternatively, the player could be instructed where to find it (no doubt adversely affecting the fun of the game). In the natural environment, few behaviors are reinforced each time they occur. Reinforcement schedules can be based on ratios, where the reinforcer occurs after a fixed or variable number of responses. Behavior can also be reinforced under schedules based on intervals of time, as when a response is reinforced after a fixed or variable interval of time has elapsed. Fixed and variable ­ schedules produce different patterns of responding.

Applications of Basic Principles Behavior principles are applied through “technologies of behavior.” Technologies are the procedures that create the conditions in which reinforcement or punishment is more or less likely to occur. For example, a classroom teacher might design a program to increase compliance in her classroom by reinforcing compliance and rule-following behaviors. Positive reinforcement can be primary or conditioned. Primary reinforcers (also known as unconditioned or unlearned reinforcers) are reinforcing irrespective of the organism’s learning history. Primary reinforcers include food, water, and sexual stimulation. Conditioned reinforcers (also known as secondary or generalized reinforcers) are reinforcing as a result of the individual’s learning history. Conditioned reinforcers include money, points, and attention. Applications of reinforcement are often misunderstood and misused. The term reward is not synonymous with reinforcer. Although a reward can be a reinforcer, the two are different because a reinforcer is not a reinforcer until it produces an increase in behavior. Rewards have no such requirement. Simply providing candy contingent on good behavior does not mean that the behavior has been

Applied Behavior Analysis

reinforced. The impact on a behavioral dimension (e.g., rate of response) is what separates reinforcement from reward. Another misunderstanding is the target of reinforcement. In ABA, behavior is reinforced. One does not reinforce a person. Primary reinforcers can be used as stand-alone reinforcers, especially when the practitioner lacks other clearly defined sources of reinforcement. In addition, primary reinforcers can be paired with nonreinforcers and thereby produce conditioned reinforcers. For example, behavior analysts frequently recommend pairing spoken praise with the delivery of food when training animals, with the aim that praise eventually becomes effective by itself.

Dimensions of Applied Behavior Analysis In their seminal definition of ABA, Donald Baer, Montrose Wolf, and Todd Risley identified seven dimensions of the discipline: applied, behavioral, analytic, technological, conceptual, effective, and generality. Applied means that ABA is the application of basic behavioral processes discovered in the laboratory that are applied to socially important problems. This includes the assessment and treatment of challenging behaviors in individuals with neurodevelopmental disabilities, educational interventions, and animal training. Behavioral recognizes that the measures and targets of change in ABA are observable, quantifiable behaviors. Although an individual’s verbal descriptions of a private event may change, ultimately, the target is sustained nonverbal behavioral change as well. The measures associated with applied research differ from those in basic research. For example, in laboratory settings, lever pressing has been used in thousands of studies to measure rats’ response rate. However, in applied settings, the behavior of concern is measured typically through direct observation. Therapists who use ABA principles to treat human problems are typically concerned with rate of response, but humans rarely show the same rate of response for socially important behaviors that rats do with levers. For example, if a client has difficulty speaking in social situations, the rate of speaking would be measured when the opportunity to speak arose.

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Analytic refers to the research designs used in ABA. Although between-groups designs and randomized controlled trials are not unknown, the flagship journal in ABA, the Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis (JABA), publishes primarily single-subject (within-subject, single-case, or smallN) designs. In other words, practitioners of ABA prefer to view an individual’s behavior continuously over time using objective measures rather than a group of people’s behavior at two (or more) different points in time using indirect or inferred measures. Technological indicates that the procedures used to change behavior are replicable. That is, ABA researchers and practitioners must be able to describe the treatment in operationally defined terms. Conceptual refers to the requirement that all procedures should rely on principles of behavior. Likewise, any treatment effects should be explained in terms of the principles of behavior. For example, in a token economy program, the procedures and resulting behavior could be accounted for using the principles of conditioned reinforcement and schedules of reinforcement. Effective means that ABA treatments improve behavior to a socially meaningful degree. In social science research, statistical significance has had long precedence in validating treatments. In ABA, the treatments should change behavior to an extent that is meaningful to the stakeholders. For example, if an individual engages in selfinjurious behaviors 20 times per hour and a program reduces the incidence to 15 times per hour, a statistically significant effect size may result, but the person still engages in self-injury with a frequency that is unacceptable to practitioners. An effective treatment would reduce the behavior sufficiently to eliminate skin or other tissue damage. Generality affirms that the effectiveness of ABA treatments extends beyond the context where the treatment took place. This means that the changes extend over time to other behaviors and to other settings. For example, the generality of a treatment designed to teach a child with autism to request food at home might also teach him to request preferred toys, request food at school, and maintain the requesting behavior at home until he is independent enough to get the food himself.

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Applied Behavior Analysis

Verbal Behavior

Additional Applications

Verbal behavior refers to the functional aspects of language, communication, and thinking as described by Skinner. Applied behavior analysts continue to engage in experimental research on the topic and apply their findings to children and adults with developmental disabilities. Skinner’s analysis of verbal behavior requires close attention to the functional role of the speaker and the listener’s environment when analyzing their verbal behavior. Skinner introduced several terms to describe such behavior: the mand, tact, echoic, and intraverbal, for example. Mands are defined as requests or demands and are reinforced by the item that is requested by the individual emitting the mand. Tacts name or label an object or state of being. Echoics are verbal imitation where there is strict correspondence between a verbal stimulus and a response. Intraverbals are defined as responses likely to occur when there is no correspondence between a verbal stimulus and a response. Verbal behavior plays an important role in ABA therapy for individuals with neurodevelopmental disorders. One of the skills most impacted by autism, for example, is communication. ABA therapies frequently target expressive and receptive communication, and Skinner’s analysis of the operant functions of language informs ABA therapists. Mand instruction plays an important part in ABAbased programs because requesting items tends to have an inverse relationship with challenging behavior. That is, if a child is hungry, requesting food and receiving it is more adaptive than engaging in aggressive behavior without a request for food. In addition, the interchanges that characterize conversation (i.e., mands and intraverbals in particular) can be enhanced in individuals with autism. Verbal behavior also plays a role in cognitive behavioral therapies, although the terms used in Skinner’s analysis are rarely used by therapists as part of treatment. Two ABA-based therapies that rely heavily on verbal behavior are acceptance and commitment therapy and functional analytic psychotherapy. A common theme in these approaches is the analysis of clients’ language and of how that language is related to avoidance behaviors that are maladaptive.

Several other therapeutic approaches are derived from principles described by Skinner. Behavioral activation treatment is a treatment approach for depression in which clients commit to and monitor their engagement in desired but currently low-rate activities. In addition, dialectical behavior therapy is a treatment approach for adults diagnosed with personality disorders, depression, or anxiety. Skinner’s interest in education led to instructional technology in the form of a teaching machine. The goal was to increase the rate of academic learning. ABA includes several approaches to teaching and learning derived from Skinner’s work, including direct instruction, precision teaching, and programmed instruction. A newer application is schoolwide positive behavior support. It is a whole-school program that uses common procedures to teach and reinforce prosocial behaviors in children and adolescents.

ABA as a Discipline Even though ABA has impacted disciplines such as clinical psychology and education, behavior analysts (i.e., those who use behavior principles to treat behavior problems) consider themselves a unique discipline. The Behavior Analysis Certification Board provides certification for applied behavior analysts across the globe. State and regional entities in the United States recognize and license applied behavior analysts. Blake D. Hansen See also Attraction; Behavior Therapies; Behavioral Development; Behavioral Economics; Behavioral Health; Behavioral Perspectives on Psychopathology; Behavioral Theories of Personality; Behaviorism; Cognitive Behavioral Therapies; Pavlov’s Legacy; Skinner’s Legacy; Verbal Behavior

Further Readings Baer, D. M., Wolf, M. M., & Risley, T. R. (1968). Some current dimensions of applied behavior analysis. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 1(1), 91–97. Cooper, J. O., Heron, T. E., & Heward, W. L. (2007). Applied behavior analysis (2nd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson.

Artificial Intelligence Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behavior. New York, NY: Macmillan. Skinner, B. F. (1957). Verbal behavior. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

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whether AI represents focused engineering or human cognitive modeling, and summarizes three predominate themes in AI.

Early History of Automating Intelligence

Artificial Intelligence Artificial intelligence (AI) may be defined as “that branch of computer science that is concerned with the automation of intelligent behavior.” This definition has several important components. First, as currently practiced, AI is part of the computer science discipline and is based on the theoretical foundations and applied principles of that field. Actually, AI was practiced long before computer science was itself seen as a discipline. Indeed, many of computer science’s representation techniques—for example, neural networks, search strategies (as in computer game playing), and other aspects of problem solving—were first explored in the late 1940s and early 1950s by the AI community. Also, early computer-language design—for example, the list structures and recursive control of Lisp (a computer language)—came from the AI community in the late 1950s. The early and continuing research concerns of AI have had a strong influence on modern computer science. The second component of AI’s definition is the goal of automating intelligent behavior. AI’s definition, however, does not include any necessary description of what intelligence is or how it might be built on a computational device— important issues that will be discussed further. It is important to note that AI in general is unconcerned with what a computer is made of—tubes, silicon, protoplasm, or Tinkertoys—as well as with what languages or representational structures are used in the computation. AI is not necessarily fixated on building human intelligence either, as can be seen in automating control systems for deep-space vehicles, the Mars rover, or coordinated swarms of bots. This entry begins with the history of automating intelligence and discusses the general purpose of computation and the birth of AI. It then describes the emergence of AI as a discipline, addresses the question of

The notion of building intelligent artifacts has a long tradition found primarily in efforts focused on improving the quality of human existence. The Chinese built early water clocks, and of course, the wheel was created to move heavy objects. An interesting early mention of building robot automatons came from the Greek god Hephaestus, who is said to have fashioned tripods that could walk to and from Mount Olympus and could serve nectar and ambrosia to the gods. Interestingly, Aristotle mentioned that, if these automatons were indeed possible, slavery would not be justified! A cultural phobia of “stealing knowledge that belonged only to the deities” accompanied the building of intelligent machines. Prometheus stole fire from Hephaestus, as well as early medicinal treatments for use by humans, and as a result of his daring, Aeschylus portrayed him as bound to a boulder, his innards plucked eternally by ravenous birds. Daring to understand and devise algorithms that capture the nature of human intelligence and to build them into computational devices still causes fear of diminishing human or divine ­attributes and values. Challenging the domain of the deities notwithstanding, the automation of aspects of human intelligence continued with the building of clocks, ­astronomical instruments, algebraic calculators, and much else. At the beginning of the 19th century, Charles Babbage asked if a general-purpose computing machine could be built and reconfigured to solve different kinds of problems. Although the technology of that time did not support his desire to build such a general-purpose computing device, called the analytic engine, the idea was spelled out in detail by his research collaborator, Ada Lovelace. The later 19th century brought flexibly programmed devices, including the Jacquard loom that was controlled by a sequence of punched cards that produced different weaving patterns. However, it remained for mathematicians in the 20th century to finally specify what was meant by the notion of a general-purpose computing machine.

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General Purpose Computation and the Birth of AI From the 1930s to the 1950s, mathematicians created abstract specifications for a universal computing device—that is, an abstract specification of what general-purpose computation meant. These specifications included Post-style (referring to E. L. Post) production systems, probabilistic calculi, the predicate calculus, and Alan Turing’s finite state machine that read from and wrote to a movable tape. In the early 1950s, Turing and Alonzo Church showed that these various specifications for computation were equivalent and equally powerful and hypothesized that any of these machines could be used to compute whatever it was possible to compute. Interestingly enough, Turing (and others) also demonstrated algorithms that had no computable solution. An example is the halting problem— whether or not a computer program could be created that could determine whether any program sent to it would terminate. (The answer is no; send the program a copy of itself!) In 1950, in a critically important paper published in the journal Mind, Turing asked whether a computer could be said to be “intelligent.” He proposed an imitation game to test whether a computer’s solution of a problem might be judged to be intelligent. The imitation game isolates the human user (the interrogator) from the computer and another human. Either may answer the interrogator’s questions and any question can be asked. After the session concludes, the interrogator is asked whether she or he was communicating with a computer or another human. If the interrogator cannot determine whether the computer or the human was answering the questions, the computer must be said to be “intelligent.” The Turing challenge remains an annual event in parts of the AI community. The Loebner Prize offers a sizable reward to the first computer program that successfully passes Turing’s challenge. The most important result of the Turing test, as it came to be called, is that it forever separated the notion of “intelligence” from a commitment to “human intelligence.” The responses of both the computer and the human could be submitted to blind evaluation and judged simply for their quality. For his early writing and research, Turing is often referred to as the “father of AI.”

The AI community still uses forms of Turing’s imitation game to test whether programs are ready for actual human use. For example, when computer scientists and medical faculty at Stanford University were ready to deploy their MYCIN program, an expert system for medical diagnosis, they tested it against medical experts skilled in the diagnosis of meningitis infections. The results, from a double-blind evaluation, showed that the MYCIN program outperformed the human experts. (It is interesting to note that the human medical experts evidenced only about 70% agreement on how to treat the patients in this complex situation!) A form of the Turing test is often used for evaluating AI-based video games, chess and backgammon programs, human language processing, and various forms of web agents. The historical failure of computers to succeed as general-purpose thinking machines sheds light on what it means for a computer to fail the Turing test. Specifically, the test offers no hint of a definition of intelligent activity, nor does it offer specifications for building intelligent artifacts. Deeper issues remain. What is intelligence? What is grounding (i.e., how might a human’s or a computer’s statements be said to have “meaning”)? Finally, can humans understand their own intelligence in a manner sufficient to formalize or replicate it in a computational device?

The Emergence of the AI Discipline During the late 1940s and 1950s, a number of research programs reflected the growing belief that “intelligence” could be produced using generalpurpose computational devices. This early research included the development of models by Warren S. McCulloch and Walter Pitts at MIT demonstrating how neurons could compute and and or relationships. In 1959 at IBM, Arthur Samuel introduced a program that played world-class checkers on IBM’s first commercial computer, the 701. Also at IBM, Herbert Gerlernter developed a program that produced proofs in high school–level geometry. At the Carnegie Institute of Technology in 1959, Allen Newell, J. C. Shaw, and Herbert Simon created a program they called the logic theorist that solved many of the logic problems found in Albert North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell’s Principia Mathematica. Interestingly, the Carnegie researchers studied how humans solved these problems and

Artificial Intelligence

used this data to help formulate the computational solution strategies. This “architecture” for human problem solving became known as the general problem solver. Motivated by these and other projects focused on building computer-based intelligence, John McCarthy of Dartmouth College, Marvin Minsky of Harvard University, Nathaniel Rochester of IBM, and Claude Shannon of Bell Telephone Laboratories organized a 2-month workshop at Dartmouth College in the summer of 1956 that drew the principal researchers in the new field of AI. McCarthy is said to have created the term artificial intelligence during the conference. Artificial comes from the Latin verb facere (to make) and the noun ars (the same root as artisan) to indicate production by skilled effort. An important component of early work in AI was the design of a representational medium and a set of control structures to support the goal of intelligent computing. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, after exploring recursive mechanisms in other languages (for example, Fortran’s FLPL), McCarthy and his research group created Lisp, a language optimally designed to compute recursively with listbased structures. List-based representations could be used to encode predicate calculus and rule-based or other problem-solving artifacts. Recursive c­ ontrol can support sophisticated graph-search algorithms for game playing, logic-based problem solving, robot control, and much more. The general zeitgeist of early work in AI was open-ended. There were no rules for what was and what was not to be called AI. In subsequent years, this absence of formality proved a major strength, as bright researchers and challenging AI projects continued to come from around the globe. This phenomenon suggests an alternative definition of AI as the set of projects, languages, and researchers that work in the field of artificial intelligence. This definition reflects the fact that as both computational representations and computing power evolve, a vast number of talented people are taking up Turing’s challenge of producing “intelligence” on a machine.

AI: Focused Engineering or Human Cognitive Modeling? The question commonly arises as to whether the AI practitioner relies on the understanding of human information processing or simply uses engineering

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technology to produce intelligent solutions to problems. To get a computer to understand human language, for instance, is it important to use human language (i.e., formal linguistic) knowledge? In fact, the AI community is divided on this issue, with many claiming that fast-and-deep search capability with appropriate representational structures is all that is needed to produce intelligent solutions. IBM’s Deep Blue chess-playing program is an example in that it searched a huge array of chessboard positions faster than a human grand master could. Deep Blue’s designers have commented that when the exhaustive chess-search space is considered (a space so large that it never could be fully searched), it is critical to draw from the decisionmaking expertise of the human grand master to guide the search. Another engineered solution, again at IBM, is the Jeopardy-playing Watson, an AI-based computer that answered questions posed in English. Watson was connected to 200 million pages of structured and unstructured data (not stored on the Internet) during its Jeopardy competitions of 2011. Although it won the $1 million prize by outperforming several of the previous game show winners, answering shorter questions with clues of only a few words proved hardest for Watson. Expert system technology offers an intermediate position between the engineering and cognitive approaches to AI. In these systems, expert knowledge is usually gathered by the knowledge engineer from the human domain expert through interviews, focus groups, or some other process. The computational processes used to run the expert system employ a decision tree, a production system, or other algorithmic control. A large fraction of AI researchers and developers are interested in how humans process information while problem solving. This knowledge is important in both good human–computer interface design and supplying humanlike intelligence to the computer solution process. An instructive example was Newell and Simon’s 1963 study of human subjects solving propositional logic problems. The researchers tracked their step-by-step achievement of a solution. There were two important results: The first was a computation-based, recursive difference-reduction algorithm that focused on the rules of propositional logic. The second was the articulation of a general-purpose cognitive architecture for solving problems.

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This architecture, which provided a set of recursive difference-reduction procedures operating on a table of differences specific to the problem under consideration, was called the general problem solver or GPS. When applied to problems in Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica, it was called the logic theorist. Further research at Carnegie Mellon University (CMU), led by Newell, Simon, and their colleagues and students, focused on extending the knowledge of how humans solved problems. They conducted experiments involving master chess players and experts who solved other types of manipulation problems and puzzles. This work produced two notable accomplishments, the first a book titled Human Problem Solving in 1972, and the second the Association of Computing Machinery’s (ACM’s) Turing Award in 1975. In accepting the prize, Newell and Simon shared a seminal paper, “Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search.” In it and other papers, they claimed that “the necessary and sufficient condition for a physical system to exhibit general intelligent action is that it be a physical symbol system (Newell, 1980, p. 170). This conjecture became known as the physical symbol system hypothesis. The primary software architecture developed at CMU and elsewhere that embodied the hypothesis was based on production systems and was extended in the 1990s by Newell and his colleagues to become the SOAR (which originally stood for state, operator, and result) architecture. Although many other AI research groups have focused on developing models of aspects of human intelligence (frame ­systems, semantic networks, and conceptual dependency theory, to name a few), the Newell and Simon research program dominated this approach. Arguments by many philosophers, psychologists, and AI researchers refute or support the physical symbol system hypothesis. Its boldest claim is the “necessary and sufficient” argument. Although the “necessary” component of the argument is often considered unprovable, the “sufficient” component has been supported by much of the research effort in cognitive science, where the requirement of having falsifiable computational models to support conjectures related to human intelligent activity is paramount.

The Three Predominant Themes of Modern AI It is possible to summarize continuing research in AI under three related themes: the symbolic, the subsymbolic or connectionist, and the stochastic. The symbolic approach to AI requires that explicit symbols and sets of symbols reflect the world of things and relations within the problem domain. Several forms of representation are available, especially the predicate and the propositional calculi. Examples of this approach include game-playing programs such as chess and checkers; expert systems, where knowledge is encoded in explicit rule relationships; and control systems for robotics as well as directing spacecraft for exploring deep space. The explicitsymbol system approach has been hugely ­successful, but critics point out that the resulting product can be inflexible and brittle. For example, what happens if the world changes over time and isn’t exactly as encoded in the AI program? The second approach, the connectionist or subsymbolic, began with psychologists’ conjectures in the late 1940s (especially McCulloch, Pitts, and Donald Hebb). The “neuron net” approach ran into supposed computational limitations with the perceptron research of the 1960s. Although algorithms for network convergence continued to be explored in theoretical physics and other disciplines, the neural network approach didn’t flourish in AI until the seminal 1986 publication of David Rumelhart and James McClelland’s Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP). Rumelhart and McClelland demonstrated the utility of neural networks for solving cognitive tasks, including aspects of human language production. Simultaneously, the “back-propagation” algorithm was shown to produce convergence in hidden-layer networks. PDP models of many aspects of human perception, including vision and speech, led to large-scale mining of large data sets, using deep belief networks, that is, networks with multiple levels, for example. The final important research theme for contemporary AI is found in the stochastic approach. In the mid-18th century, Thomas Bayes offered a formula for relating prior patterns extracted from data

Attention

to newly observed (posterior) patterns. Although the computation of the full Bayesian relationship can be complex in situations involving multiple hypotheses and related data, it was used in several early expert systems—for example, in searching for minerals and in diagnostic systems for internal medicine. In a 1998 paper by Judea Pearl, titled “Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of Plausible Inference,” the Bayesian belief network technology was introduced. Relying on the assumptions that a reasoning network graph was directed and acyclic (i.e., had no loops), several efficient algorithms became available for causal reasoning. In 2000, Pearl wrote Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference, in which his do-calculus offered a mathematical framework for causal models in which the integration of data can support causal relationships. The stochastic approach has been used extensively in machine learning, robotics, and especially in language processing, leading to important results in computer-based speech and written language understanding. For his research in probabilistic reasoning, Pearl received the ACM’s Turing Award in 2011. The final line of Alan Turing’s 1950 paper reads, “We can see only a short distance ahead, but we can see plenty there that needs to be done.” George F. Luger See also Cognitive Neuroscience; Embodied Cognition; Knowledge; Problem Solving; Reasoning and Decision Making

Further Readings Jurafsky, D., & Martin, J. H. (2008). Speech and language processing (2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Luger, G. F. (2009). Artificial intelligence: Structures and strategies for complex problem solving (6th ed.). Boston, MA: Pearson Education. Newell, A., & Simon, H. (1976). Computer science as empirical inquiry: Symbols and search. Communications of the ACM, 19(3), 113–126. Russell, S. J., & Norvig, P. (2003). Artificial intelligence: A modern approach (2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

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Attention Attention is a general term for the intensity and selectivity of information processing, where selectivity implies that, at any instant, the perceiver focuses on certain aspects of the stimulus situation to the exclusion of other aspects. This entry discusses theories of attention and models of attention based on those theories.

Theories of Attention The first modern theory of attention was the filter theory proposed by Donald Broadbent in 1958. It was formulated in the language of information processing: Information flows from the senses through many parallel input channels into a shortterm memory store where the information can be retained for a period on the order of seconds. Some of the information that reaches the shortterm store is selected for entrance into a limitedcapacity channel with much smaller capacity than the total capacity of the parallel input channels. The selection occurs through a filter, which acts as an all-or-none switch that selects information from one of the parallel input channels at a time. Broadbent defined an input channel as a class of sensory events that share a simple physical feature. For example, the class of sounds emanating from a certain spatial position forms one input channel. Except for analysis of the simple physical features defining the input channels, stimuli on unattended channels should not be perceived. This assumption accounted for the results of studies in the early 1950s by E. Colin Cherry on the cocktail party problem: the ability to restrict attention to messages from a particular speaker in the presence of other speakers. Cherry instructed his participants to repeat a prose message while it was still being presented rather than waiting until it finished. When the message to be repeated (shadowed) was presented to one ear while a message to be ignored was presented to the other ear (so-called dichotic presentation), subjects were usually unable to recall any words from the unattended message. Later studies by Neville Moray and others produced findings different from Cherry’s.

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Attention

For example, subjectively important words such as the participant’s own name tended to be recognized even if presented on the nonshadowed channel. To explain such effects, Anne M. Treisman proposed a variation of Broadbent’s filter theory in which the filter operates in a graded rather than an all-ornone fashion. In Treisman’s theory, unattended messages are weakened (attenuated) instead of being blocked from further analyses. Both selected and attenuated messages are transmitted to a recognition system that contains word-recognition units. The thresholds of recognition for important words are lower than those for unimportant words, which explains why important words tend to be recognized even if appearing in attenuated messages. In the filter theories of Broadbent and Treisman, attentional selection occurs earlier in perceptual processing than does pattern recognition. Conse­ quently, such theories are called early-selection theories. By contrast, in late-selection theories, attentional selection occurs only after pattern recognition. Late-selection theories were introduced by J. Anthony Deutsch and Diana Deutsch in 1963. They considered the early-filtering mechanism in Treisman’s theory redundant. For theoretical simplicity, they argued that attended and unattended messages receive exactly the same amount of analysis by the pattern recognition system. The effect of attention comes later: After a stimulus has been recognized, the importance of the stimulus is retrieved, and the stimulus with the greatest importance is selected for further processing, including conscious awareness. The theories of Broadbent, Treisman, and Deutsch and Deutsch became general frameworks for the later development of more specific, quantitative models of attention. Most of these models were based on experimental findings with visual processing and the ability to divide attention between multiple, simultaneous targets and to focus attention on targets rather than on distractors.

Serial Models of Attention Simple Serial Models

In most experiments on visual search, the observer’s task is to indicate “as quickly as possible” whether or not a certain type of target is

present in a display. Positive (target present) and negative (target absent) response times subsequently are analyzed as functions of the number of items in the display (the display set size). In a simple serial model, items are scanned one at a time, and the order in which items are scanned is independent of their status as targets versus distractors. As an item is scanned, it is classified as a target or as a distractor. A negative response is initiated when all items have been scanned and classified as distractors. Hence, the number of items processed before a negative response is initiated equals the display set size, N, and the rate of increase in mean negative-response time as a function of display set size equals the mean time taken to process one item, Δt (pronounced “delta tee,” where Δ refers to change and Δt is the average time required to process one item). In a self-terminating serial search process, a positive response is initiated as soon as a target is found. Because the order in which items are scanned is independent of their status as targets or distractors, the number of items processed before a positive response is initiated varies at random between 1 and N, with a mean of (1 + N)/2. Hence, the rate of increase in mean positive-response time as a function of display set size N equals one-half of the mean time taken to process one item, Δt/2. Treisman introduced a widespread distinction between feature and conjunction searches. In feature search, the target possesses a simple physical feature that distinguishes the target from all the distractors. For example, the target can be a red T presented among distractors that are green Ts. In this case search is fast and little affected by display set size. In conjunction search, the target differs from the distractors by possessing a particular conjunction of physical features (e.g., both a particular color and a particular shape), but the target is not unique for any of the component features of the conjunction (i.e., in color or in shape). For example, the target can be a red T presented among distractors that are green Ts and red Xs. In many experiments on conjunction search, positive and negative mean response times have been approximately linear functions of display set size with substantial slopes and positive-to-negative slope ratios of about 1:2. This pattern of results agrees with predictions from simple selfterminating serial models, and Treisman and her

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colleagues have concluded that conjunction search is performed by scanning items one at a time. Experiments on feature search with low target– distractor discriminability have yielded similar results. Selective Serial Models

In a selective serial model, items in the stimulus display are attended one at a time, but the serial order in which items are attended depends on their status as targets versus distractors. When a target and a distractor compete for attention, the target is likely to win. In 1994, Jeremy M. Wolfe, Kyle R. Cave, and Susan L. Franzel proposed a selective serial model called guided search. As in the feature integration theory developed by Treisman, simple stimulus features such as color, size, and orientation are registered automatically, without attention, and in parallel across the visual field. As also assumed by Treisman, the registration of objects (in terms of elements defined by conjunctions of features) requires a further, serial stage of processing at which attention is directed to the objects one at a time. In guided search, the outcome of the first, parallel stage of processing guides the serial processing at the second stage. For each feature dimension (e.g., color, size, or orientation), the parallel stage generates a spatial map of activation values (attention values). The activation value at a given location on the map is a sum of a bottom-up and a top-down component. For a particular location within a map for a given feature dimension, the bottom-up component is a measure of differences between the value of the feature at the given location and values of the same feature at other locations. The top-down component for a feature dimension at the given location is a measure of the difference between the value of the feature at the given location and the target value for the feature dimension. After the activation values have been computed in separate maps for each feature dimension, they are summed across feature dimensions to produce a single, overall activation map. (In computer simulations, a certain level of random noise, that is, random error, is also added at each location.) The final overall activation values constitute the evaluation produced by the parallel stage of how

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likely it is that the stimulus at each location is actually the target. In the serial stage, items are processed one by one in order of decreasing activation value in the overall activation map. Each item that is processed becomes classified as a target or as a distractor. This processing continues until a target is found or until all items with activation values that exceed a certain threshold have been processed. The guidedsearch model can explain many findings from experiments on visual search. The model was motivated, to a large extent, by demonstrations of fast conjunction search. It assumes that, for some feature dimensions, top-down control is very effective. Other demonstrations can be explained by assuming that in some participants, the level of random noise is very low.

Parallel Models of Attention In a parallel model of attention, several stimuli can be attended at the same time. Unlimited-Capacity Models

The first detailed parallel model of visual processing of multi-element displays was the independent channels model developed by Charles W. Eriksen and his colleagues in the 1960s. It was based on the assumption that display items presented to separate foveal areas in the eye are processed in parallel and independently up to and including the stage of pattern recognition. The independent channels (unlimited-capacity parallel processing) model has been useful in accounting for cases in which visual search is highly efficient (i.e., cases in which display-set size has only a small effect). Limited-Capacity Models

The linear relations between mean response time and display-set size predicted by simple serial models are difficult to explain using parallel models with independent channels (unlimited-capacity parallel models). However, the linear relations can be explained by parallel models with limited processing capacity. In 1969, the following example was published independently by James T. Townsend and by Richard C. Atkinson and his associates.

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Consider a display of N objects that are processed in parallel. Let the processing speed for an object (technically known as the hazard function for time required to process the object) equal the amount of processing capacity allocated to the object. Suppose (a) the total processing capacity spread across objects in the display equals C object/s and (b) whenever processing the object is completed, the capacity that was allocated to the object is instantaneously redistributed among any objects that remain to be completed. Under these conditions, the mean time taken to complete processing of the display increases as a linear function of display-set size N. Race Models of Selection

In race models of selection from multi-element displays, objects are processed in parallel, and attentional selection is determined by the order in which processing is completed (i.e., the order of the finishers of the race). Accordingly, the selection of targets rather than of distractors is based on the processing of targets being faster than the processing of distractors. In 1988, Hitomi Shibuya and Claus Bundesen proposed a fixed-capacity, independent race model (FIRM). The model describes the processing of a stimulus display as follows. First an attentional weight is computed for each object in the display. The weight is a measure of the strength of the sensory evidence that the object is a target. Then the available processing capacity (a total amount of C objects/s) is distributed across the objects in proportion to their weights. The amount of processing capacity that is allocated to an object determines how fast the object can be encoded into visual short-term memory (VSTM). The encoding race between the objects ensues. The time taken to encode an object is assumed to be exponentially distributed with a rate parameter equal to the amount of processing capacity that is allocated to the object. The objects that are selected (i.e., stored in VSTM) are those objects for which the encoding process is complete before the stimulus presentation terminates and before VSTM has been filled. Detailed tests of FIRM have occurred in partialreport experiments in which subjects report as many targets as possible from a briefly exposed

display showing a mixture of targets (e.g., red letters) and distractors (e.g., black letters). FIRM has provided accurate accounts of the effects of selection criterion, exposure duration, and numbers of targets and distractors in the display. The Theory of Visual Attention (TVA)

The theory of visual attention (TVA) proposed by Bundesen in 1990 is a generalization of FIRM, which accounts for many findings on single-stimulus recognition, whole report of multi-element displays, partial report, search, and detection. In TVA, both visual recognition and the selection of objects in the visual field consist in ascribing features to objects (i.e., encoding categorizations into VSTM). When a participant makes the perceptual categorization that a given object has a certain feature, the object is said to be selected and the feature is said to be recognized. Recognition and selection depend on the outcome of a biased race between possible perceptual categorizations. According to the central equation of TVA, the rate at which a possible categorization (“object x has feature i”) is processed is a product of three factors: (a) the strength of the sensory evidence that supports the particular categorization, (b) the subject’s general bias in favor of seeing the feature, and (c) the relative attentional weight of the object. When a possible categorization has been processed, the categorization enters VSTM if memory space is available there. The span of VSTM is limited to about four objects. Competition between mutually incompatible categorizations of the same object is resolved in favor of the categorization that is first to be completed.

Neural Network Models Formal models like TVA are highly abstract. Neural network modeling is an attempt to theorize at a level that is closer to neurobiology. In neural network models, information processing consists in a flow of activation through a network of neuron-like units, which are linked by facilitatory and inhibitory connections. Many neural network models of attention have appeared since the mid1980s. Influential examples are models based on the adaptive resonance theory (ART) of Stephen Grossberg, the multiple-object recognition and

Attention

attentional selection model (MORSEL) of Michael C. Mozer, the selective attention model (SLAM) of R. Hans Phaf, A. H. C. van der Heijden, and Patrick T. W. Hudson, the search via recursive rejection model (SERR) of Glyn W. Humphreys and Hermann J. Müller, the selective tuning (ST) models of John K. Tsotsos and others, and the computational saliency map (SM) models of Laurent Itti and his collaborators.

The Biased Competition Model In TVA, all possible visual categorizations ascribing features to objects compete to be selected, and the competition is biased by attentional weights and perceptual biases. With this assumption, TVA may have been the first theory based on the principle that was later called biased competition. Another special type of biased competition is integrated competition, which can be implemented in a neural network by arranging the connections so that (a) units representing mutually compatible categorizations of the same object facilitate each other, but (b) units representing incompatible categorizations inhibit each other, and (c) units representing categorizations of different objects also inhibit each other. The search for a blue target, for example, occurs by pre-activating units representing blueness. If a blue target is present, the pre-activation will directly facilitate the correct categorization of the target with respect to color. The pre-activation will also indirectly facilitate categorizations of the target with respect to properties other than color but will inhibit categorizations of items other than the target.

Normalization Model The normalization model of attention by John H. Reynolds and David J. Heeger was originally suggested as a way of implementing biased competition in ways consistent with the responses of cortical visual neurons to simultaneously presented pairs of stimuli. In the normalization model, the excitatory neural activation caused by the stimuli (the stimulus drive) is represented in a map that shows the activation as a function of both the locations of the receptive-field centers of neurons and their feature preferences. The stimulus drive map is first multiplied point by point with an

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attention field and then is normalized by being divided point by point with the suppressive drive. This yields the output neural-firing rates. Division by the suppressive drive implies that the attention-weighted stimulus drive from a preferred stimulus is normalized with respect to the activity in other neurons that respond to the surrounding spatial and featural context. This model may be able to explain the way in which the shape of contrast-response functions for attended and nonattended stimuli changes depending on both the size of the stimulus and the size of the attentional field. The effect of the normalization in the model is akin to the effect of using relative (i.e., normalized) instead of absolute attentional weights in the central equation of TVA.

Conclusion Current theories of attention have sprung from the theoretical frameworks developed by Broadbent and others in the 1950s. The first detailed models of visual attention were the simple serial and parallel models, respectively. Early tests of these models yielded important findings, but no simple resolution of the serial versus parallel processing issue. Analyses of the empirical findings led to selective serial and parallel models, respectively, including race models of selection and related models based on biased competition and normalization. No theory has yet accounted for the full range of empirical findings, but substantial progress has been made. Claus Bundesen See also Auditory Perception; Brain and Consciousness; Cognitive Neuroscience; Embodied Cognition; Event Perception; Extended Mind; Human Information Processing; Motivation and Cognition; Perception and Cognition; Signal Detection Theory; Visual Perception

Further Readings Bundesen, C., & Habekost, T. (2008). Principles of visual attention: Linking mind and brain. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Johnson, A., & Proctor, R. W. (2004). Attention: Theory and practice. London, England: Sage. Nobre, A. C., & Kastner, S. (Eds.). (2014). The Oxford handbook of attention. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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Attitude Formation and Change

Schneider, W., Einhäuser, W., & Horstmann, G. (Eds.). (2013). Attentional selection in visual perception, memory and action [Special issue]. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Series B, 368(1628).

Attitude Formation

and

Change

The attitude construct has been defined in various ways: as an evaluation of a person, object, or idea; as a mental association between an object and an evaluation; and more colloquially, as one’s likes and dislikes. No matter which definition one prefers, it is clear—and important—to recognize that attitudes are not static. Attitudes change. Sometimes attitudes change because the person is persuaded to evaluate the object differently. Other times, attitudes change because a prior attempt at attitude formation or change decays in its effectiveness. This entry is divided into sections describing different approaches to the study of persuasion, but it should be understood that these theories are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. The final section, describing the elaboration likelihood model and Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM), discusses models of persuasion that organize and subsume many of the theories described earlier in the entry.

Conditioning and Modeling Approaches The study of attitudes and persuasion has long been a central component of social psychology, with related studies in more applied domains such as health, consumer behavior, education, and politics. Ultimately, attitude formation and change are of great importance because attitudes often influence human behavior, such as people’s voting behavior, health choices, and other consequential actions. In classical (or Pavlovian) conditioning, a conditioned stimulus (CS), such as a bell, is presented before an unconditioned stimulus (US), such as food. The US elicits an unconditioned response (UR), such as salivation. After repeated pairings of the CS followed by the US, the CS comes to elicit a response (e.g., salivation) similar to the US. This new response to the CS is, fittingly, known as a conditioned response (CR). By contrast, in operant

conditioning, one’s actions are reinforced or punished; actions that are reinforced tend to increase, whereas actions that are punished tend to decrease. Attitudes may be formed through classical conditioning. For example, pairing a neutral target word with negative experiences, such as electric shocks, can create negative attitudes toward that word. Evaluative conditioning is a more general term that refers to attitude formation via associative processes, including classical conditioning, though other mechanisms may explain evaluativeconditioning phenomena. For example, evaluative conditioning may at times occur via implicit misattribution, in which one’s attitudinal reactions to one stimulus (e.g., a word) may “bleed” onto another simultaneously presented stimulus (e.g., a photo), leading one to misattribute feelings from the former stimulus onto the latter stimulus. Whereas classical conditioning is most effective when there is contingency awareness—that is, the person is aware that the US consistently follows the CS—implicit misattribution is more likely to occur when people are unaware of the contingency between stimuli. Attitudes may also be formed through operant conditioning. In a typical experiment, individuals are rewarded for expressing certain attitudes (e.g., pro-vegetarianism) in subtle ways, such as through verbal expressions of approval (e.g., “good”). Just as a rat may learn to press a lever if lever pressing yields a reward, humans may learn to hold certain attitudes if other individuals reinforce those attitudes. Of course, people may form and change attitudes based on observational learning, such as when a child learns to like a sports team by observing that his or her parents like and cheer for that team.

Message-Learning Approaches Carl Hovland and his colleagues at Yale developed the message-learning approach in the 1950s. Treating attitude change similarly to skill acquisition, these researchers divided the process of message-based persuasion into four steps: attention, comprehension, yielding, and retention. In other words, effective persuasion requires that a message recipient be focused on the content of a message, be able to understand it, and take the position of

Attitude Formation and Change

that message as his or her own attitude. Lasting persuasion would depend on the recipient’s ability to remember the content of a message over time. The Yale group considered incentives to be a key aspect of the yielding stage—a message recipient would change his or her attitude only if he or she believed that the rewards for holding the new attitude exceeded the rewards for holding the initial attitude. The Yale group examined the roles of the message source, the message itself, the recipient, and the message channel (medium) in the four processes. For example, they posited that holding a correct attitude is one incentive for attitude change. Given that experts tend to be correct, Hovland and colleagues proposed that expert sources would tend to be especially persuasive. Indeed, credible sources—that is, those who possess expertise and trustworthiness—tended to be more persuasive, especially in studies that used relatively uninvolving topics. Later research demonstrated that source credibility is not always associated with greater persuasion and that the mechanisms involved are not limited to the incentive mechanism proposed by the Yale group. In fact, the message-learning perspective as a whole has been overtaken by perspectives that acknowledge the importance of one’s reactions to a message rather than one’s mere memory for the content of a message. This newer emphasis on cognitive responses is a key element of contemporary models such as the elaboration likelihood model described later. Nonetheless, Hovland’s group is to be lauded for their pioneering work examining the process of persuasion.

Judgmental Approaches Muzafer Sherif and colleagues, including Carl Hovland, devised social judgment theory in the 1960s. According to the theory, one’s existing attitude can serve as an anchor to influence perceptions of the positions expressed in related messages. Sherif and colleagues posited that perceptions of messages falling relatively close to one’s initial attitude—in one’s latitude of acceptance—will be assimilated (i.e., viewed as more similar to the person’s own position than the messages would have been without the context of the existing attitude). However, messages that fall

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farther from one’s own attitude—in one’s latitude of rejection—will be contrasted (seen as even more dissimilar from one’s own attitude). According to social judgment theory, these distortions determine the extent to which one is persuaded, such that a more extreme position falling within one’s latitude of acceptance will result in maximal persuasion, whereas more extreme positions that fall within one’s latitude of rejection will result in reduced persuasion. Evidence for social judgment theory has been mixed. On the one hand, greater message discrepancy leads to more attitude change initially, then to reduced attitude change for more extreme levels of discrepancy. On the other hand, individuals’ specific latitudes of acceptance and rejection do not consistently predict when assimilation or contrast effects will occur or when the increases and decreases in persuasive impact occur; rather, people with wider latitudes of acceptance may be more persuadable in general with regard to the topic in question.

Motivational Approaches Various theories of attitude formation and change involve motivations. Similar to biological drives to eat, sleep, and so forth, people are also motivated by psychological drives such as a need for consistency among their thoughts and a desire to be able to make free decisions. Balance Theory

Fritz Heider’s balance theory posited that people seek harmonious social relations and avoid disharmonious social relations. In the most prototypic balance setting, a triad of elements included an individual person (P), an other (O), and an object or idea (X). The situation was said to be balanced if P likes O and both like or dislike X. On the other hand, if P dislikes O, then the setting is balanced if the two people disagree rather than agree in their evaluations of X. Symbolically, these relationships are represented by positive signs (+) for positive relations and negative signs (–) for negative relations. If the product of the three signs (e.g., +, –, –) is positive, then the triad is balanced, but, if negative (e.g., +, +, –), then the triad is imbalanced.

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Empirically, people consistently describe hypothetical triads as being more pleasant if the triads are balanced. Individuals also demonstrate an attraction effect, such that triads are perceived as more pleasant if they involve liking rather than disliking the other person, and an agreement effect, such that triads are more pleasant if the two people have the same rather than different evaluations of the object. Whereas balance involves three relations (P-O, O-X, and P-X), these latter two effects require only one or two relations, respectively. Thus, researchers have found that attraction and agreement effects are more likely than balance effects to occur under conditions of low ability or motivation to think about the interpersonal setting. Cognitive Dissonance

Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance is not only one of the most influential of the consistency-oriented theories; it is also one of the social psychological theories to have had the most impact. Cognitions (thoughts) may be consonant, dissonant, or irrelevant. In the case of consonance, two cognitions are in harmony with one another (e.g., “I have a positive attitude toward health” and “I just ate a nutritious salad”). In the case of cognitive dissonance, however, the cognitions are incongruent (e.g., “I frequently tan” but “tanning causes cancer”). Dissonance produces an unpleasant state of arousal that people aim to reduce. The individual experiencing dissonance may reduce it in three ways. An individual may change one of the cognitions. For example, a person who frequently tans but knows that this causes cancer may stop tanning, thereby changing the cognition “I frequently tan” to “I never tan.” A person can also reduce dissonance by adding a consonant cognition that helps reconcile the previously dissonant cognitions. For example, adding the cognition that “research linking tanning and cancer is inconclusive” could reduce dissonance in the preceding example. Last, because dissonance is greatest when the cognitions are important, one may reduce dissonance by minimizing the importance of one or more of the cognitions. In this example, one may decide that one’s physical attractiveness in the

present is much more important than one’s likelihood of cancer in the future. Researchers have examined dissonance using paradigms including induced compliance, insufficient and sufficient justification, effort justification, and postdecisional dissonance. Induced compliance describes situations in which a person is induced to comply with a request, such as a request to tell another person that a task was enjoyable, even though the task was boring. People who are rewarded little (or not at all) for their actions are said to be in a situation of insufficient justification because their behavior cannot be justified by an extrinsic reward. This situation tends to yield attitude change, such as an individual’s coming to view the task as being enjoyable and thus seeing the act of compliance as justified given this evaluation of the task. In a case of sufficient justification—such as when the individual received $20 for telling another person that the task was enjoyable—the reward justifies one’s compliance; thus, dissonance does not occur, and one does not need to change one’s attitude. Insufficient deterrence is the flipside: Receiving a mild threat (as opposed to a severe threat) in order to not do something may lead one to form a negative attitude toward the object in order to justify one’s avoidance of the object. Effort justification describes situations in which people justify effort pursuing an object or goal by forming more positive attitudes toward those objects or goals. For example, fraternities often require intense initiations. A newly initiated member may come to like a fraternity, in part, in order to justify having gone through the severe initiation. In postdecisional dissonance, people who have decided between similarly appealing options (e.g., deciding between two universities) later form a more positive attitude toward the chosen option and a more negative attitude toward the unchosen option. This is known as spreading of alternatives and is theorized to occur in order to reduce the dissonance associated with turning down an option that has at least some attractive features and choosing an option that has at least some unattractive features. Psychological Reactance

As well as being motivated to be consistent, people are motivated to restore their freedoms

Attitude Formation and Change

when these freedoms are restricted. This motivation, known as psychological reactance, has consequences ranging from increased attractiveness of a forbidden romantic partner (the “Romeo and Juliet effect”) to increased desirability of banned books. Often, prohibiting certain actions or beliefs can lead to increased attractiveness of these behaviors and beliefs.

Cognitive Approaches Whereas the theories just described emphasize “hot,” motivational processes, other prominent theories developed during and after the “cognitive revolution” emphasize “cold,” cognitive processes. Self-Perception

Attribution is the process by which people assign causes to others’ behavior. Situational attributions emphasize external, situational factors, whereas dispositional attributions emphasize internal factors such as one’s personality and attitudes. Daryl Bem provided an attribution-based alternative to cognitive dissonance, known as self-perception. According to this theory, people sometimes infer their attitudes based on their behaviors, similarly to how individuals infer others’ attitudes based on those people’s actions. Russell Fazio and colleagues helped resolve the dissonance versus self-perception debate by examining the writing of an essay that was as discrepant as possible within research participants’ latitude of acceptance or as near as possible to one’s attitude but still within one’s latitude of rejection. Dissonance drove attitude change based on writing an essay within one’s latitude of rejection but was not responsible for attitude change based on writing an essay within one’s latitude of acceptance (a change that could be due to selfperception). Combinatory Approaches

In the 1960s and 1970s, William McGuire and Robert Wyer developed probabilogical models of beliefs and belief change that emphasized the syllogistic structure of attitudes and beliefs. For example, a person who believes that Canada is peaceful and that peacefulness is desirable may

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infer that Canada is desirable. If a belief (e.g., “Canada is a good country”) has a large horizontal structure, in which many sets of premises (e.g., “Canada produces maple syrup. Maple syrup is excellent.”) all reach the same belief as their conclusion, then this belief will tend to be resistant to change even if a single set of premises were changed. A belief could also have a large vertical structure, where multiple syllogisms follow one after the other. If so, then changes in one’s belief can reverberate through the system and create changes in different beliefs and attitudes that occur later in the syllogistic chain. Norman H. Anderson’s information integration theory and Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein’s theory of reasoned action (now incorporated into the theory of planned behavior) each provide mathematical approaches to attitudes and persuasion. These are known as cognitive-algebra approaches because they describe how one’s thoughts (e.g., attitudes toward specific policies within a politician’s platform and perceived probabilities that the politician will enact those policies) are combined to form overall attitudes (e.g., those toward the politician).

Dual- and Multiprocess Models The most prominent contemporary models of attitude change are Richard Petty and John Cacioppo’s elaboration likelihood model (ELM) and Shelly Chaiken’s heuristic-systematic model (HSM). Both models emphasize the importance of the amount of thought an individual is engaged in at the time of persuasion. The ELM refers to this depth of processing as elaboration. In lower-elaboration situations, such as when one is unable or unmotivated to deeply process a message, relatively peripheral aspects of the persuasion setting can influence people’s attitudes. The HSM would refer to this as reflecting heuristic processing. Although the term heuristic describes a “rule of thumb” (e.g., “experts are usually correct”), the ELM suggests that other lowthought processes such as conditioning (described earlier) can also lead to persuasion when elaboration likelihood is low. In higher-elaboration situations, such as when one is able and motivated to think carefully, people

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are more influenced by central features of the persuasive appeal (ELM); they engage in systematic processing (HSM). For example, in high-thought situations, people might analyze a message carefully and be persuaded by arguments about the central merits of the object or issue rather than by more peripheral aspects of the communication. However, as the multiple-roles postulate of the ELM states, the same persuasion variable, such as source expertise, can be influential across levels of elaboration. For example, under higher elaboration, source expertise may serve as a direct argument in support of the appeal or may bias processing of the persuasive message (especially if available arguments are ambiguous). Under lower elaboration, source expertise may serve as a peripheral cue to message acceptance or may be persuasive via a heuristic such as “experts are correct.” When elaboration is not constrained to be high or low, a persuasion variable may affect the amount of elaboration in which one engages. Attitude formation and change under higher elaboration tends to create stronger attitudes, characterized by persistence over time, resistance to future persuasion attempts, and influence over relevant behaviors and judgments. This finding is of great importance because, as noted at the beginning, persuasion attempts aim to change not only people’s attitudes—what people like or dislike— but also people’s behaviors—what people do. Jeremy D. Gretton and Duane T. Wegener See also Communication and Language; Consumer Psychology; Group Processes; Motivation and Cognition; Performance Management; Personnel Development; Social Cognition; Social Influence; Terror Management Theory; Time Perspective Theory; Values

Further Readings Albarracín, D., Johnson, B. T., & Zanna, M. P. (Eds.). (2005). The handbook of attitudes. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Briñol, P., & Petty, R. E. (2012). The history of attitudes and persuasion research. In A. Kruglanski & W. Stroebe (Eds.), Handbook of the history of social psychology (pp. 285–320). New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Clark, J. K., & Wegener, D. T. (2013). Message position, information processing, and persuasion: The discrepancy motives model. In P. Devine & A. Plant (Eds.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 47, pp. 189–232). Burlington, England: Academic Press. Maio, G. R., & Haddock, G. (2009). The psychology of attitudes and attitude change. London, England: Sage. Petty, R. E., & Briñol, P. (2014). The elaboration likelihood and meta-cognitive models of attitudes: Implications for prejudice, the self, and beyond. In J. Sherman, B. Gawronski, & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dualprocess theories of the social mind (pp. 172–187). New York, NY: Guildford Press. Petty, R. E., Briñol, P., Tormala, Z. L., & Wegener, D. T. (2007). The role of meta-cognition in social judgment. In A. W. Kruglanski & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (2nd ed., pp. 254–284). New York, NY: Guilford Press. Wegener, D. T., & Petty, R. E. (2013). Attitudes and social cognition as social psychological siblings. In D. Carlston (Ed.), Oxford handbook of social cognition (pp. 118–143). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Attraction Attraction is the process by which two entities are drawn toward each other. In the physical world, attraction is evident when gravitational and electromagnetic forces cause objects to move toward one another. Within the context of human relationships, attraction is similarly evident in the observable behavior exhibited by two people. However, attraction in humans is also a psychological experience, and attraction is typically evaluative in that it consists of a positive or negative emotional or gut-level response to another person. Contemporary research on human attraction examines the behaviors that indicate attraction as well as the psychological experience of attraction. In many cases, this psychological experience is the precursor to approach behavior, and these behaviors subsequently facilitate survival and reproduction. Attraction is a large and diverse area of psychological research, and over the years, many theories have arisen that describe both the psychological and behavioral aspects of attraction. For example,

Attraction

self-verification theory proposes that people feel especially attracted to partners who validate their own sense of self; people with negative self-images are attracted to partners who see them in a negative light, whereas people with positive self-images are attracted to partners who see them in a positive light. Additionally, theories that focus on unconscious mimicry propose that people feel especially attracted to partners who mimic their movements and speech patterns. These theories posit that attraction emerges from a partner’s validation of some aspect of self-concept, but the theories focus on very different elements of the self (e.g., positive vs. negative self-views and unconscious mannerisms, respectively). These and other midlevel attraction theories follow one guiding (though often unarticulated) principle: People are attracted to partners who provide them with rewards. This simple theoretical postulate supports the entire subfield of psychological research on attraction. After a brief discussion of attraction and rewards, this entry outlines evolutionary theories of attraction and goal-based theories of attraction.

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the operant-conditioning process contributes to the formation of cohesive groups as well as stable mateships. However, the guiding theoretical principle that people are attracted to partners who reward them lacks explanatory power, because the rewards that one person can provide another are vast and varied. That is, this principle does not explain what specific behaviors or traits are rewarding or, perhaps more important, why these specific behaviors and traits are rewarding. Furthermore, because the principle is so broad, it is difficult to create empirically testable predictions to disprove it. Researchers have since honed the rewards principle by combining it with other psychological theories to generate more precise predictions. Two of these perspectives are discussed here: evolutionary theories of attraction and goal-based theories of attraction. Each contributes to an understanding of not only what humans find rewarding but also why it is rewarding (and subsequently attractive). Also, despite the seemingly obvious differences between attraction to friends and attraction to mates, many principles apply in both situations; the focus here is largely on the principles that encompass both contexts.

Rewards The roots of the guiding principle of rewards lie in the behaviorist tradition of B. F. Skinner and his colleagues. Skinner’s classic experiments with rats (and eventually humans) demonstrated that, when an animal’s performance of a certain behavior (e.g., pressing a lever) is followed by a reward (e.g., a food pellet), the animal increases the frequency of the behavior (e.g., more lever pressing occurs in the future). This process, called operant conditioning, is also directly applicable to human attraction. That is, consistent with the Skinnerian perspective, humans evaluate positively and find themselves drawn to partners whose presence has previously generated rewards. In other words, the more Joe’s presence has rewarded Mary in the past, the more Mary will be drawn to Joe’s presence. The rewarding partner could take the form of a mate who regularly provides valued intimacy and social support or a friend who offers advice for achieving a professional aspiration. Because humans frequently provide such rewards for one another,

Evolutionary Theories of Attraction The Evolutionary Psychological Perspective

Evolutionary perspectives offer two distinct theoretical frameworks for understanding attraction. One draws from the field of inquiry known as “evolutionary psychology.” According to this view, ancestral humans faced natural- and sexualselection pressures (e.g., the need to find trustworthy social partners and mates). These pressures subsequently gave rise to domain-specific, psychological adaptations that guide thought and behavior in all human descendants. For example, early humans faced specific challenges to their safety (e.g., “Will a newcomer to my group hurt or deceive me?”), and those who possessed mental adaptations that allowed them to detect aggressors and cheaters survived to reproduce more successfully than those who did not. Also, early humans faced specific challenges to reproduction (e.g., “Which opposite-sex peers are most fertile?”), and those who possessed mental

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adaptations that allowed them to assess a mate’s fecundity produced more offspring than those who did not. Thus, selection pressures created mental adaptations such as preferences and decisionmaking capabilities that solved adaptive problems in ancestral Homo. These preferences and capabilities were thus strategic in the sense that they aided ancestral humans in achieving the goals of survival and reproduction, including the important subgoal of attracting a mate. This evolutionary framework, like the behaviorist perspective, also emphasizes the importance of rewards in attraction. Yet a major contribution of the evolutionary perspective is that it links these rewards to the ultimate goals of survival and reproduction, thus connecting the literature on attraction to the vast theoretical framework provided by the theories of natural selection and sexual selection. For example, women who are ovulating tend to report more attraction to men with high levels of facial symmetry than do women who are not ovulating. Facial symmetry may be an indicator of genetic fitness, and thus men with symmetrical faces may be more likely than men with asymmetrical faces to produce offspring who can resist pathogens and parasites (thus constituting a reproductive reward for the women attracted to them). In other words, women evolved a very specific psychological mechanism that motivates them to seek men with pathogen-resistant genes precisely when women are more likely to conceive. The Attachment-Evolutionary Perspective

A second evolutionary framework also links rewards to successful survival and reproduction. However, this attachment-evolutionary perspective focuses more narrowly on one extremely important set of processes: the formation and maintenance of the bonds that people share with peers and with romantic partners (i.e., pair bonds). Specifically, this perspective highlights two kinds of rewards that were critical to ancestral humans’ ability to survive and reproduce: protection from the environment (including other, unfriendly humans) and the acquisition of food and other essential resources. Affiliating with peers and romantic partners often enhances the availability of these rewards.

For example, in hunter-gatherer groups such as the Hadza, long-term bonds lead to resource sharing within the household as well as within the broader community. Stated plainly, human beings receive rewards in the form of protection and resources when they affiliate with each other, and attraction serves as an important precursor that motivates this affiliative process. Thus, this perspective also links the process of attraction to survival and reproduction, but it does so by emphasizing the formation of bonds that keep small bands and mateships together. A focus on attachment and pair bonding provides unique insight into a number of the “classic” findings in attraction research. For example, many studies demonstrate the importance of proximity in promoting attraction: People who are physically close to each other are more likely to form bonds than people who are farther from each other. In a famous study, Leon Festinger and colleagues found that college students were more likely to befriend those who lived nearby than those who lived farther away. From an attachment-evolutionary perspective, proximity played an important role in humankind’s ancestral past. If early humans were often attracted to distant, infrequently encountered peers and mates, they might have lived a solitary existence and failed to achieve the benefits of group living. Instead, early humans were likely attracted to physically close partners, thus enabling them to band together and protect themselves from predators, rival groups of humans, and other environmental threats. These bands also provided a stable pool of possible mates. Therefore, proximity may have evolved as a precursor of attraction because it enabled ancestral humans to form small groups and mateships with people close by and readily available. A second important principle of attraction is familiarity. Research has shown that repeated exposure to the same person produces more liking for that person. In one experiment, four female confederates attended the same college class throughout a term. The researchers manipulated the number of sessions each confederate attended: one confederate attended no sessions, one attended five sessions, one attended 10 sessions, and one attended 15 sessions. At the end of the term, students in the class were shown pictures of the

Attraction

confederates and were asked to rate the attractiveness of each of them. The confederates who came to class often were rated more attractive than the confederates who came infrequently. That is, more familiarity with the confederate promoted more positive evaluations. The attachment-evolutionary perspective frames familiarity as a reward for humans’ early ancestors because familiarity likely would have been associated with trust. Repeated norm violations harm small-group welfare, and ancestral hominids who violated norms and failed to maintain their standing in the group would have been unlikely to be allowed to remain with the group. Thus, early hominids should have been attracted to familiar partners because these partners had likely demonstrated their trustworthiness in the past by obeying norms and contributing to the group’s well-being. In other words, frequent contact with a partner who has contributed to and did not harm the group would have increased confidence that the partner was more likely to provide security than harm in the future. As with the principle of proximity, familiarity facilitates attraction because it helped ancestral humans procure the important reward of safety. Similarity is a third important predictor of attraction. Research has demonstrated that the perception of similarity to another person is associated with attraction to him or her. For example, if Joe places importance on careful preparation when pursuing an important task, he is more likely to feel attracted to Mary, who also feels the need to prepare, than to Janine, who instead favors quick, decisive action. Perceived similarity predicts attraction even when people are meeting for the first time. One study found that participants who reported that they “seemed to have a lot in common” with a speed-dating partner also reported more attraction to that partner. From an attachment-evolutionary perspective, perceived similarity was also beneficial in ancestral bands of humans and pair-bonded partners. Similarity may have been associated with smoother interactions and commitment to the pursuit of similar goals. In other words, similarity would have coordinated the outcomes for two individuals and thus allowed them to capitalize on combined efforts toward the goals of survival and reproduction. For this reason, perceived similarity

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would have predicted attraction within ancestral human groups.

Goal-Based Theories of Attraction Goals are concrete (e.g., get a date for Friday) or abstract (e.g., create a healthy relationship) objectives that people set for themselves, and people achieve their goals using specific strategies called means (e.g., ask Adam to the movies). Humans pursue many different goals on a daily basis, both consciously and unconsciously, and the goals that have high motivational priority can strongly influence thoughts and actions. The integration of the study of attraction with the literature on goals has enabled attraction researchers to examine the interpersonal implications of the dynamic goalrelevant motivations that humans experience in their daily lives. Instrumentality

Goal achievement is especially important in attraction research, given that some goals can be more easily achieved with the assistance of another person. Therefore, goal achievement can be construed as a rewarding experience that generates attraction: If a partner can facilitate his or her personal goals (e.g., lose weight or relax) or professional goals (e.g., obtain a promotion or complete a project), then that partner may be perceived as rewarding and hence attractive. The extent to which a partner can serve as the means of goal achievement is called instrumentality. Research has demonstrated that people are generally more attracted to partners who are instrumental than to partners who are not. But goal-based theories and the concept of instrumentality also generate counterintuitive predictions that have received empirical support in the attraction literature. Gráinne M. Fitzsimons, James Shah, Tonya L. Chartrand, and John A. Bargh demonstrated that partners who are instrumental for goals that are nearing completion are actually perceived as less attractive than partners who are instrumental for goals that are further from completion. For example, imagine that Mary is instrumental for Joe’s academic goals and Janine for Joe’s fitness goals. If Mary has recently helped Joe make progress toward his academic goals and his

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fitness goals are languishing, Joe may actually experience less attraction to Mary (despite the fact that she recently helped him) and more attraction to Janine. Goals vary on three important dimensions— chronicity, importance, and multifinality—and these affect the extent to which instrumental partners will be perceived as attractive. First, chronicity is the extent to which a goal is repeatedly present. Goals that must be achieved repeatedly (e.g., nightly homework) have more motivational strength than goals that need to be achieved less often (e.g., a major exam). Thus, a partner who is instrumental in the repeated achievement of a goal (e.g., a homework study buddy) likely will be more attractive than a partner who is instrumental for achieving a rarer goal (e.g., a major exam study buddy). The importance of a goal reflects its motivational priority (i.e., its value relative to other goals), and goal importance can also influence attraction to instrumental partners. Partners who are instrumental for important goals (e.g., pass a final examination) are more attractive than those who are instrumental for unimportant goals (e.g., eat dinner tonight). Thus, it is possible on occasion for a study buddy to be more attractive than a romantic partner if the goal of passing a test is currently more important than eating the dinner a romantic partner has prepared. Multifinality refers to the extent to which a particular means can facilitate more than one goal. When applied to attraction, this concept suggests that a partner who is instrumental for multiple goals will be more attractive than a partner who is instrumental for fewer goals. Thus, if one partner has the potential to help someone achieve multiple goals (e.g., fix a computer and provide a ride to school), then that partner should be more attractive than another partner who can help achieve only one goal (e.g., only fix a computer). Willingness and Capacity

Some theorists have posited that the emotional, gut-level experience of attraction is preceded by two specific, instrumentality-related cognitive evaluations: the partner’s willingness to help achieve a goal (i.e., “Will this person help me?”) and the partner’s capability to help achieve a goal (i.e., “Can this person help me?”). This willingness-and-capacity

framework asserts that the impetus for any subsequent attraction-related evaluation or behavior results from these two cognitions. The willingness-and-capacity framework offers a new perspective on some of the classic findings in attraction research. For example, similarity may inspire attraction, but perceptions of benevolence (i.e., willingness) and competence (i.e., capability) play an important role in shaping similarityattraction effects. Specifically, partners who are perceived as similar are seen as more willing to offer benefits, more competent at offering benefits, and subsequently more attractive than dissimilar partners. That is, perceived willingness and competence mediate the effect of similarity on attraction. Brian Wilkey and Paul Eastwick See also Close Relationships; Culture and Social Relations; Relational Theory; Sexual Selection; Social Cognition; Social Emotions; Social Influence

Further Readings Finkel, E. J., & Eastwick, P. E. (2015). Interpersonal attraction: In search of a theoretical Rosetta Stone. In J. A. Simpson & J. F. Dovidio (Eds.), Handbook of personality and social psychology: Interpersonal relations (Vol. 3, pp. 179–210). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Hazan, C., & Diamond, L. M. (2000). The place of attachment in human mating. Review of General Psychology, 4, 186–204. Montoya, R. M., & Horton, R. S. (2014). A twodimensional model for the study of interpersonal attraction. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 18, 59–86.

Auditory Perception Auditory perception is the process by which sound vibrations stimulate the middle and inner ear mechanically, leading to neural encoding of these vibrations in the peripheral and central auditory nervous system and, ultimately, to conscious experience of speech, music, and environmental sounds. A prevalent approach to understanding auditory perception is the identification of one or

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more regions of the nervous system that are responsible for specific abilities and the positing of computational transformations that occur in the identified neural structures. This entry first describes how sound is processed, from the vibration of air particles to neural activity until it reaches the auditory cortex. It then discusses the sound characteristics of frequency and intensity, how the auditory system sorts sounds in noisy places, and how speech is comprehended.

The Auditory Pathway Sound is the result of a physical vibration that disturbs surrounding air particles, causing them to move back and forth in a wavelike manner. This vibration pattern is transmitted to the ear, where it is turned into neural activity. The peripheral auditory system is separated into three parts: the outer, middle, and inner ear. To fully appreciate the initial encoding of sound, one must have a general understanding of the auditory pathway from the ear to the auditory cortex. Sound first enters the auditory system through the outer ear (the pinna and ear canal). It then reaches the tympanic membrane (or eardrum), a thin layer of tissue that is highly sensitive to sound vibrations. The tympanic membrane is set into motion and transmits the vibrational pattern to a chain of three tiny bones (called ossicles) that reside in an air-filled cavity (middle ear). The last ossicle pushes on the cochlea (inner ear), a snailshaped organ filled with fluid, and displaces the fluid. Running along the length of the cochlea is the basilar membrane, above which sits the organ of Corti. Inner and outer “hair” cells (named for the tiny stereocilia or hairlike structures on top of them) reside within this organ. The basilar membrane is uniquely structured so that it will be displaced maximally at different points along its length when the fluid disturbs it, depending on the frequency of the sound vibrations. At this place of maximal movement, the fluid bends the “hairs” of the inner hair cells, leading to the generation of action potentials by the auditory nerve fibers. From here, the signal is sent through the brain stem and midbrain and processed further at each area, until it reaches the auditory cortex. In order, the sequence of brain areas is as follows: cochlear nucleus, superior olive, lateral

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lemniscus, inferior colliculus, medial geniculate nucleus of the thalamus, and last, the auditory cortex in the temporal lobe. Importantly, the superior olive is the first point at which information is integrated from both ears. The outer hair cells make up the cochlear amplifier. When a low-intensity (or quiet) sound sets the basilar membrane in motion, the outer hair cells grow and shrink to enhance the movement of the basilar membrane and increase the likelihood that the inner hair cells will be deflected. Interestingly, there are efferent fibers that run from the auditory cortex through subcortical areas to the outer hair cells, which may mediate the cortical control of subcortical processing of sound or access to precise information about the frequency, timing, and spatial properties of sound that are available only in early stages of processing.

Auditory Feature Extraction Two important characteristics of sound are frequency and intensity. Frequency (the number of times per second a sound-producing object vibrates, measured in units called Hertz, abbreviated as Hz) is encoded as early as the inner ear in the form of a place code. The basilar membrane vibrates maximally to different frequencies at different “places” along its length from high to low frequencies (called tonotopic organization). Thus, different inner hair cells respond to different frequencies, depending on their location along the basilar membrane. In the central nervous system, this tonotopic arrangement is preserved in the form of tonotopic maps, meaning that neurons are arranged based on the frequency they encode. Frequency is also encoded in the form of a temporal code: neurons in the auditory nerve fire rhythmically in time with the sound vibrations. The perceptual property associated with frequency is pitch (e.g., the perceived difference between different notes on a piano). Most sounds are complex because they are made up of multiple frequencies. For a complex sound, pitch is usually determined by its lowest frequency component, known as the fundamental frequency. Auditory nerve fibers transmit action potentials up to about 1,000 times per second, meaning that the temporal code works best for sounds that are less than 1,000 Hz and completely breaks down around

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5,000 Hz. Interestingly, melodies are difficult to recognize when composed of sounds with fundamental frequencies above 5,000 Hz. Neurons in specific parts of the auditory cortex may play an important role in the perception of pitch in complex sounds, such that the same neurons would be active as long as their preferred pitch is perceived, even if the sound differed in superficial features that do not affect perceived pitch (e.g., whether the note C-sharp is sung or played on a piano). Intensity (or sound pressure level, measured in decibel units, abbreviated as dB SPL) largely determines perception of loudness. The neural encoding of intensity is less well understood than that of frequency, but it is believed that more-intense sounds result in an increased number of action potentials in the auditory nerve or an increased number of activated neurons. Some neurons in the auditory nerve fire action potentials in response to very low-intensity sounds, but other neurons fire in response only to highintensity sounds, which could result in an additional code for intensity or loudness in terms of which neurons are responding. Note that frequency can also have a big influence on the perception of loudness, especially for less-intense sounds, as can be seen in the well-known Fletcher-Munson curves. Unlike frequency and intensity, information related to the location of a sound is probably not encoded until the central auditory system because sound localization requires integrating information from both ears. For example, a sound that comes from the right will arrive at the right ear slightly faster and will be slightly more intense than at the left ear. These very small differences in arrival time and intensity are the two main cues that listeners use to localize sound in the horizontal plane and cannot be encoded until neural signals reach the superior olive from both ears. To encode sound in the vertical plane (i.e., at different elevations above or below the head), listeners use small differences in the intensity of specific frequencies passed into the ear, a filtering process known as the head-related transfer function (HRTF). These frequency changes are likely computed in the cochlear nucleus, the inferior colliculus, and other central auditory structures that are able to compare intensities across different

frequencies. Remarkably, the physical differences in sound depending on the location of vibrating sources are not perceived directly but instead are used to create perception of an auditory image coming from a specific location in space.

Auditory Scene Analysis and Auditory Objects A complication in understanding how auditory perception works in everyday situations is that sounds from different sources, such as speech from various people talking in a noisy restaurant, are mixed together when they reach the ear. Thus, the auditory system must sort out which sounds occurring around the same time are from the same source versus different sources, a process known as auditory scene analysis. One type of auditory scene analysis mechanism, known as primitive or primary, includes relatively automatic auditoryfeature processing of the sort described earlier, which occurs in the peripheral and central auditory nervous systems. For example, sounds that have similar or related frequencies or that come from similar spatial locations tend to be perceived as arising from the same source. The second type of mechanism, known as schema based, includes processes in which attention and prior experience are used to shape perception according to one’s current goals or to take advantage of previous experience with similar acoustic situations. For example, when listening to a friend speak in a noisy restaurant, paying attention to the pitch or rhythm of the friend’s voice might help segregate it from the voices of other people talking in the background. Furthermore, having prior experience talking to people in noisy situations or listening to music composed with several instruments playing at the same time might lead to the enhancement of various sensory or cognitive processes that ultimately lead to better segregation ability. Researchers widely assume that once auditory scene analysis has been performed, the result corresponds roughly to an internal representation of what sources are present in the current environment. When relatively discrete sounds are segregated and perceived, such as a word or a musical note, the representations are referred to as auditory objects. However, when sequences of sounds are heard as coming from a particular source, such

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as a sentence or a melody coming from a particular person or a musical instrument, the representations are referred to as auditory streams. Although auditory scene analysis is the result of many primary and schema-based processes in the peripheral and central auditory systems, conscious perception of auditory objects and streams is likely related to activity in the cerebral cortex. However, it is also possible that there are complex interactions between subcortical and cortical brain areas that determine perception.

Speech Perception Speech perception is the ability to extract meaningful, linguistic information from the speech signal. The ease with which listeners understand speech belies the complexity of the task. For 70 years, researchers have studied how listeners overcome the immense challenges of comprehending speech in all its variety. Initially, it was assumed that there would be a simple code between the properties of the physical sound and the percept of the listener. For example, if the words dude and deed were recorded and analyzed, the acoustic properties of the d sound were expected to be similar across all instances of d. However, this is not the case. The physical properties (acoustics) of speech sounds (also called phonemes) are directly influenced by the phonemes that precede and follow them. The d sounds in dude and deed are acoustically quite different from one another, even though the perception of each of them is the same. The surrounding phonemes are just one source of variability in the speech signal. Other factors that influence the acoustics are a speaker’s gender, dialect, and speaking rate. As the extent of the variability in the speech signal became clear, one of the early theoretical positions was that listeners could not simply be recognizing phonemes by looking for simple patterns in the acoustics. Instead, it was proposed that listeners must perceive only the stable characteristic of speech, which was presumed to be how the phonemes were produced. This led to the motor theory of speech perception, which claimed that speech was unique to humans and was processed differently than other sounds were via a specialized mechanism that extracted articulatory information. So instead of

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perceiving d from the acoustics solely, a listener was considered to represent the phoneme in terms of the motor commands it takes to produce it (e.g., the tongue tip touching the back of the teeth). This theory persisted for 30 years before several empirical findings called it into question. One was that articulations are not always precise and clear, especially when talkers speak at faster rates. This means that there is a high amount of variability in speech production, just as there is in the acoustics of the signal. Also, nonhuman animals can distinguish human speech sounds, and their responses often suggest similarity to those of adult human listeners. If speech truly relied on a special mechanism, it would not make sense for nonhuman animals to have this mechanism as well. These findings have led back to the idea that speech may be perceived via general auditory processes. Unlike the motor theory, a general auditory approach posits that listeners perceive speech through the same mechanisms as they perceive all other sounds and assumes that listeners are capable of extracting information from a variable speech signal based on their language experience and general abilities to process sound and form categories. Joel S. Snyder and A. Davi Vitela See also Attention; Auditory System; Communication and Language; Event Perception; Language Development; Language Disorders; Music Perception; Perception and Language; Perceptual Development; Perceptual Disorders; Perceptual Illusions; Psychophysics; Signal Detection Theory; Temporal Lobe Functions; Visual Perception

Further Readings Holt, L. L., & Lotto, A. J. (2008). Speech perception within an auditory cognitive science framework. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 17, 42–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8721 .2008.00545.x Liberman, A. M. (1996). Speech: A special code. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Moore, B. C. J. (2012). An introduction to the psychology of hearing (6th ed.). Bingley, England: Emerald Group. Snyder, J. S., Gregg, M. K., Weintraub, D. M., & Alain, C. (2012). Attention, awareness, and the perception of auditory scenes. Frontiers of Psychology, 3, 15. http:// dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00015

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Auditory System The term auditory system refers to the set of brain structures subtending the processing of sounds, including their anatomy and the processing functions ascribed to them, as well as their functional interplay. The complex processing performed by the auditory system underlies the psychological experience of sound—a capacity that is foundational both for the appreciation of music and for the ability to understand speech. As such, the auditory system is key to many aspects of interaction with the world. This entry describes the principal design and functions of the healthy human auditory system, as well as prospects for restoring auditory system functioning in cases of major impairments.

The Physical Properties of Sound Acoustic information is transmitted via changes in air pressure. These changes (sound waves) can often be described as a superposition of several sinusoidal oscillations of specific frequencies— for instance, a human speaker emits speech sounds of a certain fundamental frequency with multiple upper harmonics. Sound frequency is specified in Hz (Hertz; oscillation cycles per second). Faster oscillations are perceived as higher tones; slower oscillations as lower tones (e.g., a high- vs. a low-pitched voice). Only frequencies within the range of 16 Hz to 20 kHz are audible for human beings. The audible frequency range narrows with age, especially at the upper end. Besides frequency, oscillations are physically characterized by their amplitude, which roughly translates into perceived loudness in psychological terms (although loudness is codetermined by several other factors). Natural sounds typically do not have steady amplitudes, but they change in amplitude over time. These amplitude fluctuations are called the sound envelope. A perceptually important aspect of the envelope is the time course at sound onset, called rise time. Some sounds are characterized by sharp onset (e.g., a piano note), whereas others rise gradually in amplitude (e.g., the same note played by an organ), thus creating very different perceptions.

Transduction Into Brain Signals The hearing apparatus transduces (converts) any oscillation within the audible frequency range into a neural excitation pattern. Sound waves are first focused and amplified by the outer and middle ear to then reach the inner ear, where the actual sensory organ (the cochlea) is situated. Sound frequency is neurally coded via the place of excitation on the basilar membrane of the cochlea. This place code for sound frequency on the cochlea is called tonotopy. (Note that lower frequencies are additionally coded by phase coupling of neural oscillations, that is, a combining of signals for different oscillations at a higher level of the auditory system.) Tonotopic coding is the most important organizing principle in the auditory system. It can be found across all anatomical stages of the ascending auditory pathway in the brain. Auditory tonotopy is thus equivalent to retinotopic coding in the visual system (i.e., by the place of excitation on the retina) and to somatotopic coding in the somatosensory system (i.e., by the place of excitation on the body). The receptor-based (i.e., direct) codes in vision and touch correspond to spatial location in the outer world. However, this is not the case in the auditory system. In contrast, the auditory system computes the location of stimuli indirectly in later processing stages. For this reason, sound localization is a major function of the auditory system. It is largely based on integrating the input from the two ears (i.e., binaural hearing), exploiting interaural time differences (ITDs) and interaural level differences (ILDs). A sound signal that comes from the left will reach the left ear earlier in time (the ITD) and will cause more intense activity in the left ear (the ILD) due to loss of energy with longer traveling times and due to the shadow caused by the head. ITDs and ILDs are not perceived directly (i.e., one does not hear that the left ear received sensory input earlier), but they are integrated to create the perception of directionality of the emitting sound source. These binaural cues mainly assist in horizontal (left/right) location discrimination. Vertical (up/down) location discrimination is achieved by exploiting monaural cues, which are produced by reflections and bending of the sound waves in the outer ear. Perceptual ambiguities in the location of a sound source can be resolved by

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small head movements, which are often performed to assist auditory perception without the listener being aware of such movements.

The Ascending Auditory Pathway Although some features of the auditory signal, such as intensity, are already resolved at the level of cochlea, most features have to be extracted from the signal. This takes place along the ascending auditory pathway. Compared with vision, the auditory system contains a large number of relay stations known as nuclei (aggregations of neuronal cell bodies) between the cochlea and the primary auditory cortex, implying a high degree of preprocessing. These are the cochlear nucleus, the superior olivary complex, and the lateral lemniscus in the brain stem; the inferior colliculus located in the posterior rim of the midbrain; and the medial geniculate nucleus of the thalamus. Signal transduction occurs in a largely hierarchical manner, although most nuclei receive input from more than one peripheral station of the pathway. Tonotopy is retained as an organizing principle in all key nuclei of the auditory system and all the way up to the cortex, which means that adjacent neuronal populations code for similar frequencies. The processing cascades for signals reaching the left and right ears meet at several nuclei along the ascending auditory pathway. The first major site of such a binaural integration of information is the superior olivary complex, where runtime and intensity differences between signals arriving at both ears are used to compute ITD and ILD cues for sound source localization. The human auditory cortex is located bilaterally on the superior temporal plane of the temporal lobe, largely hidden within the lateral fissure. It consists of the primary auditory cortex, which covers the medial portion of the transverse temporal gyrus (Heschl’s gyrus), as well as of several secondary and association areas located in the adjacent parts of the anterior (the planum polare) and posterior (the planum temporale) superior temporal plane. The anatomical structure of the auditory cortex can vary notably between persons and also between the left and the right hemispheres. It is commonly assumed that these interhemispheric differences reflect different functional specializations with respect to the processing of music and speech.

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In close correspondence with the dual-stream model proposed for visual processing, experimental evidence suggests the existence of two major sensory processing pathways originating from the primary auditory cortex. The ventral stream traveling through the anterior temporal lobe toward the frontal lobe is involved in sound recognition and identification. The dorsal stream, which connects the auditory cortex with the parietal lobe, plays an essential role in spatial tracking of sound sources. The description of the auditory system as an ascending pathway should not imply that information is transmitted only in a bottom-up manner. On the contrary, it is important to note that there are feedback loops at each of the intermediate processing stages. Their functions range from the initiation of reflex actions (e.g., protecting the inner ear from noise damage) to top-down modulations that adjust neuronal processing at earlier stages of the auditory pathway. This latter function is essential for favoring the processing of some aspects of the acoustic information over others, providing the basis for attending to some components of the environment (e.g., one’s conversation partner) while ignoring others (e.g., street noise over which the conversation occurs).

Major Functions of Auditory Information Processing Sound localization is a major challenge for the auditory system, as mentioned earlier. Arguably, even more difficult problems for auditory information processing arise from two further properties of the acoustic signal: the ephemeral nature of sounds and the quasi-transparent overlap of signals emitted from multiple sources. Sound’s ephemeral nature refers to the fact that acoustic information is always defined by change over time. This poses severe real-time analysis requirements on the auditory system because it is usually not possible to revisit information that the listener missed (in contrast to vision, where many aspects of the environment are stationary and hence can be reinspected). This is most obvious in speech comprehension. To avoid missing information in the first place, temporal attention is a crucial mechanism in auditory information processing. Auditory overlap describes the fact that the emitted signals of concurrently active sound

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sources summate to create a physical mixture of sound waves that needs to be disentangled before information from any of the sources can be meaningfully analyzed. This again contrasts with vision, wherein simultaneous objects occlude each other, causing a fundamentally different problem (the occluded [i.e., missing] information must be restored). The process of sorting a mixture of auditory signals into the underlying sound sources is called auditory scene analysis. This analysis process operates remarkably smoothly in everyday listening environments— much better than, for instance, in the sense of taste, which is likewise confronted with a mixture of overlapping signals. One explanation is that the auditory system exploits the temporal unfolding of the various sources’ activity patterns, which is often predictable to some extent, thus linking auditory processing to the more general theory of predictive coding. After sorting an acoustic mixture into the underlying sources, a further challenge for the auditory system lies in focusing selective attention on one of the sound sources (e.g., the conversation partner) as opposed to others (e.g., other persons talking nearby). Current theories posit that this is achieved by a combination of temporal attention mechanisms and receptive-field sharpening in favor of the acoustic attributes of the target sound source. Prior knowledge of the properties of the sound source of interest (e.g., the pitch and voice quality of the conversation partner as well as his or her spatial location) enhances these mechanisms in real-life environments. Although it is sometimes difficult to focus attention on a desired sound source (e.g., having a conversation on a busy street), it can be even more difficult not to focus attention on certain auditory events. The auditory system is equipped with a powerful mechanism of attracting attention to salient acoustic events in a bottom-up (involuntary) manner, even when top-down (voluntary or selective) attention was previously focused elsewhere. This is also reflected in the relative lack of input regulation to the auditory system. It extends in three dimensions (as opposed to the circumscribed visual field) and is functional even during sleep. From an ecological point of view, these properties of the auditory system allow the sense of hearing to provide an important warning function for the organism.

Auditory System Impairment and Rehabilitation The sense of hearing declines in a substantial fraction of the elderly population. These impairments often arise from a combination of degraded peripheral input (reduced sensitivity and selectivity of sound coding in the cochlea) and changes in central auditory processing. Changes in the latter can arise as a consequence of, but also independent from, degraded peripheral input. Loss of sensitivity in the periphery can be compensated for by a hearing aid that amplifies the sound input (often selectively for certain frequencies). Even more strikingly, should peripheral components of the auditory system be completely dysfunctional, they can be bypassed by direct electric stimulation via a cochlear implant (CI). Central components of the auditory system can learn to process the information transmitted by a CI, leading to remarkable listening success in many CI users. This success illustrates the tremendous plasticity of the brain structures and processes involved in the auditory system and makes CIs the most successful form to date of restoring a nonintact sense. Alexandra Bendixen and Sebastian Puschmann See also Attention; Auditory Perception; Cognition and Language; Music Perception; Perception and Language; Psychophysics; Sensory Transduction; Signal Detection Theory; Temporal Lobe Functions; Visual System

Further Readings Kral, A., & Sharma, A. (2012). Developmental neuroplasticity after cochlear implantation. Trends in Neurosciences, 35, 111–122. Moore, B. C. J. (2013). An introduction to the psychology of hearing. Bingley, England: Emerald. Poeppel, D., Overath, T., Popper, A. N., & Fay, R. R. (2012). The human auditory cortex (Springer handbook of auditory research). New York, NY: Springer. Schnupp, J., Nelken, I., & King, A. (2011). Auditory neuroscience: Making sense of sound. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Shinn-Cunningham, B., & Best, V. (2008). Selective attention in normal and impaired hearing. Trends in Amplification, 12, 283–299.

B the performance of new behavioral patterns. In studies conducted with Richard Walters, he found that transmission of aggression within the family was mainly due to models of aggressive orientation provided by parents. These results were further confirmed in the “Bobo Doll” laboratory experiments wherein children who previously had observed adult aggressive models were mildly aroused and produced physical and verbal aggressive behaviors that were substantially the same as those produced by the models. By observing social models, children learned to combine different response elements into new, complex, aggressive behavioral patterns. They did so without the presence of reinforcers provided to the models or to themselves. The results were replicated when children were exposed to aggressive models in real-life aggression, as well as to filmed aggression featuring human or cartoon models. These studies of the social modeling of aggression clarified the relevant social impact that televised violence might have on children’s and adolescents’ actual aggression, specifically, by teaching new aggressive patterns, reducing the resistance to behaving aggressively, or habituating to aggressive behavior. According to Bandura’s social learning theory, people have the capacity for observational learning, which allows them to expand their knowledge and skills rapidly and to generalize what is learned to produce new patterns of behavior. This learning occurs typically in the absence of any reinforced performance. Social learning research is grounded in the analysis of basic psychological processes.

Bandura, Albert Albert Bandura was born December 4, 1925, in Mundare, Alberta, Canada. He received a BA degree in psychology at the University of British Columbia and an MA and a PhD in psychology at the University of Iowa. In 1953, he joined the department of psychology at Stanford University, where he remained for his entire academic career, becoming full professor in 1964. In 1974 he was named the David Starr Jordan Professor of Social Science in Psychology. He served as department chair in 1976–1977. Bandura has been president of the American Psychological Association and of the Western Psychological Association and has received honorary degrees from 15 universities and numerous scientific awards. He has served on the editorial board of 30 scientific journals as well as on numerous advisory boards, research panels, and congressional committees. This entry reviews Bandura’s work, including studies of social learning and social modeling, behavior modification, and social cognitive theory.

Social Learning and Social Modeling Bandura’s initial program of research focused on social learning and social modeling. Moving from early conceptualizations of Neal E. Miller and John Dollard, Bandura developed a large-scale project to study social modeling, convinced that it is from observing others that people form concepts about 67

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Attention determines what is selectively observed, retention allows the construction of cognitive representations, behavioral production translates symbolic concepts into appropriate actions, and motivation determines which learned behavior will actually be performed.

From Behavior Modification to Self-Efficacy The influential role of mechanisms governing vicarious learning was further addressed by Bandura in his development of the behavior modification approach to psychotherapy in which mastery experiences were the principal vehicle of change. For example, behavior modification applied to phobic behavior is based on altering environmental conditions in order to enable people with phobias to overcome their fears and to eliminate attendant anxiety and stress. Guided-mastery experiences are focused on strengthening competencies, coping skills, and self-beliefs, enabling people to exercise control over perceived threats. The basic principles of social learning theory that contribute to behavioral change are counterconditioning, extinction, discrimination learning, reward, punishment, and social imitation. Guided-mastery treatment not only reduced phobic reactions but also produced a radical change in patients’ beliefs about their ability to control efficaciously their own lives. Evidence for the treatment came from a large research program (conducted across the fields of education, health, organization, psychotherapy, sports, and political and social systems) aimed at investigating the origins, structure, function, and effects of self-efficacy beliefs. They are defined as the conviction that one is capable of successfully producing given outcomes. They are related to the evaluation of personal capability, but they are not judgments of self-worth or beliefs related to the internal or external origin of outcomes (i.e., to the locus of control), nor are they outcome expectations per se. Instead, efficacy beliefs are major determinants of the activities people choose, of the effort expended in these activities, of perseverance when faced with setbacks and failures, and of causal attributions for successes and failures. Efficacy beliefs are dynamic factors, not general, static personality traits. They vary in magnitude depending on the difficulty of the task, generality (some

beliefs are related to specific domains, others involve a more generalized sense of mastery), and strength. The sources of efficacy beliefs are four different processes. Primary sources are personal mastery experiences—that is, direct experience of the successful effects of one’s own behaviors. A robust sense of efficacy is built on successes, but failures undermine belief, especially when failures occur in the early stages of efficacy development. A resilient sense of efficacy is based on gradual experience in overcoming obstacles through persevering efforts. The vicarious experience of seeing others performing successfully also enhances self-efficacy by generating the belief in observers that they, too, will have success as a result of persistent efforts. Failures by the model being observed can undermine efficacy by instilling self-doubts about the observer’s own capacity to manage similar tasks. The more similar the model is to the observer, the greater the model’s effectiveness in enhancing the observer’s efficacy. Social persuasion can further contribute to efficacy beliefs when associated with realistic appraisals of one’s performance. However, because persuasion does not provide actual experiences of efficacy, it has a weaker impact on efficacy beliefs. Physical and emotional arousal is the final source of influence on personal efficacy. Positive affect and low emotional arousal enhance efficacy; negative mood and high emotional arousal diminish it. The concept of self-efficacy is extended to collective agency when considering people’s shared belief in their collective power to produce desired results. Perceived collective efficacy beliefs refer to judgments that people make about a social system (a family, team, organization, or community) and about its level of effectiveness in specific domains of action. These beliefs thus correspond to emerging group-level characteristics, different from the self-efficacy beliefs of single individuals who make up the group, although not completely independent of them.

Social Cognitive Theory The most recent theoretical framework developed by Bandura is termed social cognitive theory (SCT) to distinguish it from other social learning theories.

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SCT is focused not only on the acquisition of cognitive, social, emotional, and behavioral competencies but also on the motivation and self-regulation of behavior. SCT is framed in an agentic perspective: People are self-organizing, proactive, selfreflecting, and self-regulating, not merely reactive organisms. An agent is, in fact, capable of influencing intentionally his or her own functioning and life circumstances. This conceptual framework stresses the importance of basic cognitive and affective processes in order to understand human functioning. Cognitive and affective processes are considered within a social environment, where they develop, and where they are activated by elements of social settings. At the core of SCT lies triadic reciprocal determinism. This principle states that personal functioning arises from interactions among physical and social environments, cognitive and affective systems constituting the person, and the individual’s behavior. Each of these factors causally influences the others; that is, they reciprocally determine one another. In this model, human basic capacities allow people to learn about the world and themselves and to regulate behaviors and individual experiences. Symbolization is the capacity to use symbols that represent knowledge. Self-regulation is the capacity to set goals and to evaluate one’s behaviors vis-à-vis internal standards of performance. Through self-regulation, people motivate themselves, evaluate activities in which they can invest, and react positively or negatively to their own performance. Forethought adds to self-regulation the dimension of temporality, making it possible to anticipate future contingencies. Self-reflection is the capacity to reflect about oneself. Finally, vicarious capacity allows the acquisition of knowledge, skills, and affects through observation and modeling. These capacities work in concert with the selfsystem, which represents the core constituency of human personality, providing for perception, evaluation, and the regulation of behavior. The self operates as a regulative system through a set of subfunctions. Self-observation provides the information necessary for setting realistic goals and for evaluating progress toward them. Explicit, challenging goals increase motivation by defining the conditions that give rise to positive self-evaluation

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and activating self-reactive processes wherein knowledge of one’s performance level is compared against personal standards of performance. Judgmental processes give rise to self-reactions according to personal standards of performance, referential performances, valuation of activities, and attribution of performance. Self-reactions provide the mechanism by which personal standards regulate the course of action through positive or negative self-evaluation. The self-system functionally operates through self-efficacy beliefs that partly determine how the various subfunctions of the self-regulatory system affect causal attributions, motivation, performance, and goal setting. The social cognitive units of analysis are beliefs, competencies, goals, standards for performance, expectations, and evaluations of one’s own abilities. SCT deals not only with the self-regulation of behavior in achievement and competence but also with moral reasoning. From an agentic viewpoint, moral reasoning is translated into moral action by means of self-regulatory mechanisms, selfsanctions, and moral standards. People proactively behave in accordance with their own moral standards because doing so provides a sense of self-satisfaction and self-respect. People avoid transgressing moral standards because of selfblame. Violations of moral standards usually generate much stronger affective self-reactions than failures of achievement. Moral standards do not function invariantly; they can be deactivated by moral disengagement mechanisms. This deactivation process allows transgressive behavior that avoids self-sanctions. Moral disengagement, thus, refers to those social cognitive processes by which a transgressive behavior is transformed. Some disengagement mechanisms operate by deconstructing transgressive behavior through moral justification, advantageous comparison, and euphemistic labeling. Other mechanisms operate by obscuring or distorting the relationship between actions and their effects through displacement and diffusion of responsibility. Others operate by disregarding or distorting the consequences of a transgressive action. A final type of disengagement practice operates on the victim by dehumanizing or attributing blame. The effects of moral disengagement have been documented in studies of children and adolescents’

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aggressive and transgressive behaviors, corporate transgressions, and organizational corruption. Claudio Barbaranelli See also Human Agency; Reinforcement; Self-Control; Self-Determination; Social Cognition; Social Influence

Further Readings Bandura, A. (1969). Principles of behavior modification. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Bandura, A. (1973). Aggression: A social learning analysis. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Bandura, A. (1977). Social learning theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Bandura, A. (1997). Self-efficacy: The exercise of control. New York, NY: Freeman.

Behavior Therapies Emerging in the 1950s through the work of different behavioral scientists and clinicians, behavior therapy (in the singular as it was then known) referred to clinical applications of the principles of learning to modify human maladaptive behaviors. Put another way, behavior therapy from the very beginning involved clinical applications of the science of psychology that rest on empirically validated principles and procedures. Seventy years later, that basic description of behavior therapy, or behavior therapies as some refer to the applied movement in the 21st century, remains intact. The emergence of behavior therapy in the United States can be traced to the work of Ogden Lindsley, B. F. Skinner, and Harry Solomon, who discussed behavior therapy as a natural human application derived from the principles of operant conditioning. At almost the same time, Joseph Wolpe introduced the first practical application of behavior therapy, which he called systematic desensitization. In the United Kingdom, Hans Eysenck specifically used the term behavior therapy as the application of respondent (or Pavlovian) conditioning principles to human

behavior. This entry reviews the development of behavior therapies from their beginnings to the present day.

The Foundation of Behavior Therapy The foundation of behavior therapy (or therapies) lies in the theoretically coherent principle that human behavior is caused by both biological and environmental factors, many of which can be defined through systematic study and observation. This approach is generally termed behavioral assessment but also referred to as functional assessment. The central role of a behavior therapist is to both isolate and change human behavior through direct modification of human–environment relationships as well as through verbal (cognitive) rule-changing strategies. The combination of direct behavioral and rule-based or cognitive strategies is now termed behavior therapies. Although different traditions in behavior therapy selectively emphasize either the external environmental or internal cognitive or emotive aspects of human functioning, it is important to emphasize that even behavior therapists who adhere more to an operant conditioning–focused approach to behavior change (i.e., Skinner or Edward Thorndike) integrate cognitive constructs (e.g., self-efficacy, self-esteem, bias, attitudes, beliefs, etc.). The primary difference between behavioral and cognitive approaches in the behavior therapies is how much causal status is ascribed to cognitive constructs in understanding psychopathology and changing maladaptive behaviors. For behavior therapists who are more behaviorally focused, cognitive events generally do not explain behavior and emotive states in humans. Rather, such internal (or covert) events are essentially more behavior in need of explanation and intervention. Putting this age-old central philosophical debate concerning the causal role of internal events aside, both traditions have produced empirically validated approaches to alleviating human suffering and psychopathology during the past 70 years. Behavior therapies have influenced and continue to influence a broad spectrum of maladaptive behaviors, from neurodevelopmental disorders to anxiety and depressive disorders to schizophrenia spectrum disorders.

Behavior Therapies

Operant Conditioning as a Foundational Element of Behavior Therapy From its inception, behavior therapy has focused on a central finding from research in the science of learning: the law of effect. Behavior therapy techniques that rely principally on the principles of operant conditioning have also been termed behavior modification in various contexts. Originally articulated by Thorndike, the law of effect posits that definable behavior, which occurs in specific environments, is a function of its consequences in those environments. This first major subdiscipline of behavior therapy was defined in a nonclinical context by Skinner, who expanded on Thorndike’s work in differentiating the parameters of stimuli (what precedes behavior in the environment or within the organism), responses (the behavior in question and whether it occurs within or outside of the organism), and consequences (what follows the emission of overt or covert behavior). Skinner employed the term operants to describe behavior that organisms emitted and that operated on the environment to produce certain consequences. The consequences of behavior are generally classified as reinforcing or punishing. Positive reinforcement refers to a contingency between a behavior and its consequences such that their occurrence increases the probability of the response in the future. Negative reinforcement refers to a contingency between a behavior and its consequences such that removal of the latter increases the probability of that behavior. Punishment refers to a contingency between the occurrence of a behavior and an aversive consequence such that the probability of the behavior decreases. Behavior therapists seek to understand and change the relationships among stimulusbehavior-consequence patterns (also known as three-term contingencies) in real-world environments in order to both increase adaptive behaviors (which include positive thoughts and functional emotive states) and decrease maladaptive behaviors. This is the essence of the behavior therapies.

Respondent Conditioning and the Emergence of Behavior Therapy The second major subdiscipline in behavior therapy was pioneered by Wolpe, who drew from behavioral

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conceptualizations and research that preceded Skinner’s. Wolpe paid close attention to the research of Ivan Pavlov. The essential parameters of respondent conditioning involve an originally neutral stimulus that becomes a conditioned stimulus (CS) through its contingent pairing with a stimulus (an unconditioned stimulus, or US) that naturally elicits a behavior (an unconditioned response, or UR). The resulting behavior (a conditioned response, or CR) might resemble the UR but is elicited by the CS. Emotive responses (e.g., fear, anxiety, or depressed mood) are particularly sensitive to the parameters of respondent conditioning. For example, in 1924, Mary Cover Jones demonstrated that respondent conditioning was critical to the production and elimination of what was termed neurosis—that is, underlying anxiety states. In this condition, there is an interaction between both operant (Skinnerian) and respondent (Pavlovian) conditioning in that a CS elicits fear responses and leads to both the acquisition and maintenance of avoidance responses through the mechanisms of negative reinforcement. For example, in the case of obsessive-compulsive disorder, a strict, ritualized behavior serves the function of reducing the intensity of an aversive CS and, by definition, will be strengthened as a result. Joseph Plaud has reported that clinical applications of Pavlovian conditioning principles began as early as 1912, when Maria Eroféeva, a student of Pavlov’s, established the counterconditioning effect in the laboratory. Wolpe adapted the principles of respondent conditioning in research on what was then known as “experimental neuroses.” As Eroféeva had earlier demonstrated, when a mild electric shock to a dog’s skin preceded food delivery, the procedure produced defensive behaviors (analogous to anxiety in humans). She also found that, as long as the aversive CS was applied to only one part of the dog’s body, defensive behaviors were eliminated and replaced by a conditioned salivary response. This effect was termed counterconditioning, as it demonstrated that conditioning methods could neutralize the impact of the aversive event when it was paired with an appetitive stimulus. When the shock was later applied to other parts of the dog’s body not conditioned in earlier training phases, there was no

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generalization of the CR, and it virtually disappeared, leading the animal to become agitated. As Wolpe correctly surmised, this respondentbased procedure could not only produce behaviors described as neurotic but also eliminate them. It was his systematic application of counterconditioning measures that laid the groundwork for the development of behavior therapy in the 1950s. Respondent-based, anxiety reduction behavior therapy procedures, such as Wolpe’s systematic desensitization, combined with operant-based strategies (e.g., exposure and response prevention) have demonstrated efficacy in treating anxiety disorders.

The Advent of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy The 1960s brought a new wave of interest in whether internal states play a causative role in maladaptive behavior, including the irrational, n ­ egative, and dysfunctional nature of cognitive processing in humans, as well as the relationship of these processes to other behaviors. A focus of this cognitive approach was on the attributions that individuals make about events in their lives and how those attributions affected subsequent thinking, emotive states, and overt behaviors in their daily lives. Martin Seligman, for example, posited that many individuals who suffered from mood disorders were likely to make particular attributions about the world around them. Cognitive behavioral approaches, as discussed by Plaud and Georg Eifert, focus on the interaction between the presence of an acute or chronic life stressor and the presence of maladaptive cognitive strategies to deal with these stressors. Cognitive behavior therapy techniques evolved over the next several decades as research identified how individuals cognitively appraise the world around them, their role in this appraisal, and the dysfunctional thoughts that lead to maladaptive behaviors, including negative ­emotive states. From a behavioral perspective, the cognitive approach to behavior therapy involves stimulusstimulus (S-S) relationships and posits that ­learning processes do not rely only on associative relationships but also on beliefs or expectancies c­ oncerning the contingencies of reinforcement or punishment. In cognitive behavioral therapy, emphasis might be placed, for example, on a person’s belief system

concerning how and why an event occurred, as well as on that person’s expectations or beliefs about how the event will affect future experiences. Human information storage, information processing, cognitive schema, cognitive networks, and other ­constructs borrowed from experimental cognitive psychology started to appear in the behavior therapy lexicon next to terms and principles derived from the principles of operant and respondent ­conditioning under the more expansive definition of behavior therapies. Whether the focus of the intervention is on overt or covert (cognitive) processes in structuring therapeutic behavior change, the particular types of behavior therapy strategies employed typically follow from behavioral or functional assessment. That is, specific behavior-change regimens are developed based on a detailed analysis of cognitive and ­environmental factors. In particular, (a) the implementation of the regimen should be individualized to each person being evaluated, (b) behavioral responses should be directly measured, (c) behavior patterns should be charted (e.g., graphed using a standard charting system), (d) functional and descriptive definitions of behavior are optimal in implementing behavior-change regimens, (e) there should be an emphasis on shaping new and appropriate behaviors as well as general behavioral skills, and (f) a behavior-analytic investigation of the impact of environmental influences on each client’s behavior should be conducted.

Modern Behavior Therapies By the turn of the 21st century, behavior therapies incorporating the elements of operant and responding conditioning principles, as well as those drawn from cognitive therapy, represented a major force in clinical psychology and psychiatry. Over the past 70-plus years, a variety of specific techniques have been developed, researched, and applied in multiple clinical contexts for many forms of human psychopathology. More generally, behavior therapy techniques range from behavioral skills training (e.g., social skills, assertiveness skills, communication skills, parenting skills) to real-world application strategies. Other behavior therapy techniques include relaxation training, cognitive restructuring, multiple behavioral-contingency management, and many differential-reinforcement

Behavioral Development

approaches. In addition, behavior therapy techniques have been developed for human functioning not typically addressed, such as personality disorders (e.g., dialectical behavior therapy) and rule-governed behavior (e.g., acceptance and commitment therapy). Joseph J. Plaud See also Applied Behavior Analysis; Behavioral Development; Behavioral Health; Behavioral Perspectives on Psychopathology; Behavioral Theories of Personality; Behaviorism; Cognitive Behavioral Therapies; Cognitive Therapies; Pavlov’s Legacy; Skinner’s Legacy

Further Readings Chandler, L. K., & Dahlquist, C. M. (2014). Functional assessment: Strategies to prevent and remediate challenging behavior in school settings (4th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Higher Education. Hayes, S. C. (2004). Acceptance and commitment therapy, relational frame theory, and the third wave of behavior therapy. Behavior Therapy, 35, 639–665. Plaud, J. J. (2003). Pavlov and the foundation of behavior therapy. Spanish Journal of Psychology, 6, 147–154. Plaud, J. J., & Eifert, G. H. (Eds.). (1998). From behavior theory to behavior therapy. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon. Spiegler, M. D., & Guevremont, D. C. (2015). Contemporary behavior therapy (6th ed.). Boston, MA: Cengage Learning.

Behavioral Development Behavioral development refers to systematic changes in the actions of living creatures over time. Phylogenetic development involves changes in behavior over long periods of time as natural selection changes the genetic makeup, physiology, and behavioral characteristics of a species, such as Homo sapiens. Ontogenetic development involves changes in behavior over the life of an individual. In humans, dramatic changes in behavior occur early in life, and child development was the focus of nearly all early research and theorizing in American psychology, but systematic changes in behavior that occur later in life are now widely

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recognized as important. Behavioral development has been studied from several conceptual perspectives and at multiple levels of analysis. The ­purpose of this entry is to overview how psychologists envision and attempt to explain behavioral development. Psychologists recognize that evolution is responsible for the behavioral capacities of all species, but there is disagreement about the value of attempting to explain the actions of contemporary humans by relating them to patterns of behavior that were supposedly adaptive for humans’ ancestors. Evolutionary psychologists propose that the human brain functions as a computer and contains circuits that were designed to solve problems faced during Homo sapiens’ evolutionary history. These circuits were selected because they effectively solved a particular kind of adaptive problem, and they are responsible for many important human behaviors, such as avoiding incest, supporting close family members, fearing snakes and spiders, and automatically categorizing people by race. Although this analysis is appealing, critics of evolutionary psychology point out that the neuronal circuits posited to control behavior have not been isolated and are hypothetical, not physical, and it is impossible to actually determine what patterns of behavior (and neural circuits) were and were not of adaptive value for humans’ ancestors. Nonetheless, evolution clearly is a powerful, albeit distal, cause of contemporary human behavior. Ontogenetic development begins at conception, and much is known about the process in which a human develops through the zygotic, embryonic, and fetal (from 9 weeks to birth) stages, including what can go wrong. For example, genetic abnormalities, such as the presence of a third chromosome at the 21st site, which causes Down ­syndrome, and teratogens, such as alcohol, can harm the developing person, as can inadequate nutrition or reduced oxygen. Unless such factors produce devastating harm, however, the neonate, as a baby is called during the first 2 weeks of life, arrives in the world fully prepared to learn about, and adapt to, his or her world. As the neonate ages and passes into childhood, his or her unique genetic endowment works in concert with environmental variables to generate new patterns of responding. Although many psychologists, like laypeople, once debated the importance of

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nature versus nurture—that is, of heredity versus the environment—in determining how a person behaves, it is now clear that all human behavior is jointly determined by genetic and environmental variables. The term genotype is used to refer to the genetic makeup of a person, and the term phenotype is used to refer to her or his physical characteristics, including designated patterns of behaving. Genotype influences but does not determine phenotype, and the two interact in complex ways at multiple levels of analysis. Developmental plasticity, which refers to an individual’s ability to respond to environmental changes by adjusting aspects of its phenotype, often in an adaptive manner, is the rule, not the exception. Research in epigenetics and related areas has provided overwhelming evidence that the mechanism of environment-sensitive development allows a single genotype to yield very different phenotypes, and the mechanics involved are becoming clear. Although researchers continue to work hard to identify sequences of genetic material, or genes, linked to important phenotypic traits, such as the patterns of behavior that lead to a diagnosis of alcoholism or autism, they recognize that all important behaviors are influenced by multiple genes, as well as by environmental factors. The importance of a given factor often varies with a person’s age, and developmental plasticity is greater in young people than in older individuals. All behavior arises from neurochemical activity in the brain and spinal cord, and the human brain grows rapidly in the first 5 years, quadrupling from birth size to 95 percent of adult size. Many neural connections are made during these years; these connections affect brain functions and behavior throughout life. A failure to establish important neural connections, which can occur if a child is neglected and deprived of the opportunity to interact with other humans, can have serious and enduring adverse effects on, for example, the development of language and social skills. Early experiences play a critical role in behavioral development, and in some cases, there is a limited period of time, termed a sensitive period, during which an individual is exceptionally susceptible to the effects of a particular experience. Critical periods, which are evident if susceptibility to an experience is limited to a very brief period of

time and absence of the experience during this time produces permanent behavioral abnormality, are much rarer, and there is debate about whether they occur with humans. As a baby ages, parts of the body other than the brain also grow, and new behaviors start to appear. Psychologists use the term maturation to refer to a genetic plan of biological development that is relatively independent of experience (i.e., interactions with the environment). Maturation and learning work together to increase the diversity and sophistication of behavior during childhood. Any meaningful attempt to understand behavioral development requires a strategy for dividing the behavioral stream into meaningful, measurable categories, such as sexual behavior and verbal behavior (language use). For example, one can consider motor behavior, which allows an individual to move about in and physically manipulate its environment, as one general category, and define and measure specific responses within this category, such as grasping and manipulating objects, crawling, walking, and running. Both everyday observations and scientific studies show that these behaviors typically develop in a predictable sequence and usually appear at about the same age for all healthy, typically developing people. For instance, most babies sit on their own between 4 and 10 months of age, soon thereafter begin to crawl, and begin walking from about 10 to 19 months of age. Changes in behavior that are correlated with changes in age are termed ­normative changes. Knowing the age range at which important behaviors emerge is important for recognizing developmental delays and developing interventions for engendering the behavior in question. For instance, if a child has not spoken by 2 years of age, then his or her language development is considered to be delayed and a reason for concern. Normative information is also of crucial importance to psychologists, and others, who propose stage theories of human development. The best-known stage theorist is Jean Piaget, who argued that children develop behaviorally and adapt to their surroundings by changing their cognitive structures and associated schemata, which are mental activities used to organize and respond to the environment. For Piaget, observations of children’s behavior revealed these structures and

Behavioral Economics

schemata, which develop through a fixed series of stages, becoming ever more complex and allowing for more effective adaptations to the ­ environment. Piaget’s stages of cognitive development are sensorimotor (0–2 years), preoperational (2–7 years), concrete operational (7–11 years), and formal operational (12 years and up). Although still widely accepted, Piaget’s theory is circular—there is no evidence of the four stages other than the behaviors that they are supposed to explain—and of no real value in explaining why human behavior changes over time. The same criticism can be applied to most stage theories. Another approach to explaining behavioral development is to examine the function of particular actions—that is, how those actions interact with the environment. This approach, characteristic of behavior-analytic psychologists, emphasizes that some responses change the environment in ways that are reinforcing; this increases the likelihood that such responses will recur under similar circumstances in the future. Other responses have punishing consequences that make them less likely to occur. This learning process, termed operant conditioning, is said to be an important determinant of behavioral development across the life span. So, too, is classical conditioning, in which learning is mediated by stimulus-stimulus pairings. From the behavior-analytic perspective, behavioral development can be viewed as a series of systematic and progressive changes in environmental relations that lead to learned alterations in behavior and the underlying neurophysiological structures and processes. The task of a psychologist who adopts this perspective is to isolate the environmental relations that account for the development of important behaviors across the life span. For example, late in life, physical changes, such as reduced testosterone production in men, might reduce the importance of sexual stimulation for them, and behaviors that historically produced such stimuli begin to occur less often, if at all. Here, a change in motivation (i.e., the reduced importance of a class of stimuli) is responsible for the change in behavior. Behavior analysts who study human development focus on delineating how reinforcement, punishment, and related processes lead to changes

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in behavior across the life span. Although there is abundant evidence that learning is crucial to behavior development, critics argue that behavioranalytic concepts are often circular and that cognitive psychology offers broader and more powerful alternative concepts that account for the same phenomena. General consistencies in behavior are often evident across the course of a person’s life, and these consistencies constitute the “personality traits” of interest to many psychologists. Nonetheless, “nothing endures but change,” according to Hericlitus’s famous aphorism, and certainly it applies to human behavior, which changes and develops from cradle to grave. The possibility that change for the better is possible is a fundamental belief of all psychologists who work in applied areas—that is, who devote themselves to helping others. Research on behavioral development has revealed a wide range of variables that can be manipulated to reduce undesired patterns of responding and to engender gainful ones, and this is one of the ­greatest achievements of this area of study. Alan Poling See also Cognitive Development; Culture and Development; Epigenetics; Evolutionary Psychology; Language and Development; Operant Conditioning; Perceptual Development; Piaget’s and the Neo-Piagetian Theories of Cognitive Development

Further Readings Salkind, N. (2004). An introduction to theories of human development. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Schlinger, H. D. (1995). A behavior-analytic view of child development. New York, NY: Plenum. Schneider, S. (2012). The science of consequences: How they affect genes, change the brain, and impact our world. Amherst, NY: Prometheus.

Behavioral Economics The definition of behavioral economics seems straightforward: Behavioral economics deals with the way people behave in different economic situations. But economics is all about human behavior, so what is so unique about behavioral economics,

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and how it is different from standard economics? According to standard economics, individuals are perfectly rational. They are fully aware of all the options they have, can consistently evaluate their options based on their preferences, and always choose the option that maximizes their expected return. By contrast, behavioral economics does not rely on the assumption that people are rational. Instead, the field of behavioral economics applies scientific research and insights from social sciences to develop a better understanding of human nature and the emotional, cognitive, and social forces that shape people’s economic decision making. The next section discusses how behavioral economics grew, as an independent field, out of neoclassical economics. Later, the entry focuses on the main ideas in behavioral economics and presents some of the key applications of the field.

The Emergence of Behavioral Economics Behavioral economics differs from standard economics in that it acknowledges the effects of psychological factors (such as emotions, hopes, or past experiences) on economic decision making. These types of psychological influences were part of economics in its early years. For example, Adam Smith, who is considered by many one of the fathers of modern economics, was a big proponent of the idea that emotions and thoughts can affect how people make economic decisions. However, during the late 1800s and early 1900s, economics took a more rational approach, and the specifically psychological principles were mostly eliminated from economic models in favor of mathematical (normative) theories that describe how rational, self-interested agents operate in different economic situations. Despite the reliance of economics on mathematical models, important advancements in psychology and cognitive science paved the way for the eventual reunification of psychology and economics in behavioral economics. Perhaps the first step was Herbert Simon’s seminal work on “bounded rationality.” In the 1950s, Simon, who later received a Nobel Prize for his contribution to economics, advocated the notion that people work under cognitive constraints, including limited informationprocessing abilities. Although Simon’s theory had a

substantial effect on psychology, economists were slow to embrace the principles of bounded rationality in their mathematical models. Behavioral economics gained impetus with further advancements in cognitive science and decision-making research. This was facilitated by two independent (albeit related) scientific advancements. On the one hand, the shift of psychology from the dominant behavioristic conception to a more cognitive approach led researchers to start investigating judgment and decision-making processes. On the other hand, the acceptance of normative models for economic decision making by economists provided decision-making researchers with benchmarks against which to examine human behavior. In a striking contrast to long-standing economic assumptions, the experiments that emerged from cognitive examinations of how people make decisions provided strong evidence that economic decision making deviates substantially from the statistical and mathematical principles and axioms of the standard economic models. The accumulating evidence in behavioral decision making started to attract attention, but the fundamental ideas in economics largely remained unchanged. In part, this was because most economists discounted the new findings as not representing economic behavior that people actually exhibit in real life. Rather, they were seen as mere anecdotes and random judgmental errors that stemmed primarily from ill-defined designs and methodological limitations in psychological research. Despite these early days of doubt, behavioral economics emerged as an interdisciplinary field, a school of thought on its own, aiming to reunite the insights of psychology with the basic principles of neoclassical economics.

The Main Ideas in Behavioral Economics Unlike standard economics, behavioral economics makes no a priori claims about human nature and rationality. Instead, the starting point of behavioral economics is to apply scientific research to the elucidation of how people actually behave in different economic situations and thus to gain a better understanding of the forces and factors that shape economic decisions. The findings from this basic

Behavioral Economics

research, which now spans more than half a century, provide valuable insights into the rationality (or irrationality) of individuals and unveil influences that shape their decisions. The major insights and principles of behavioral economics can be roughly grouped into three main ideas. The first idea in behavioral economics is that people are limited in their cognitive abilities. Thus, rather than treating information in an optimal way and basing decisions on rational calculations, people tend to rely on simplified rules of thumb known as heuristics—mental shortcuts that facilitate decision making with minimal time and effort. In many cases, these rules of thumb can serve as good approximations to the optimal solution, but they can also lead to systematic judgmental errors and biases. For example, think about the rule “things that are easily remembered are more prevalent.” In many cases, this rule might be true, as prevalent events can come to mind more easily. However, people might also recall more easily events that are recent, vivid, or emotionally laden, factors that have nothing to do with the likelihood of the event. Although heuristical reasoning is not inherently biased, behavioral economics research suggests that people tend to rely more heavily on irrelevant information, which is more accessible and salient, rather than on the information essential for the task at hand. But heuristic thinking is not the only way by which cognitive limitations affect economic decisions. Behavioral economics research shows that judgments and reasoning depend not only on information but also on the way in which it is presented, a phenomenon called framing. To illustrate, consider that a product retails at $10. To increase sales, the company can offer a promotion that could be framed as either 30% or $3 off the original price. In both cases, the final price is the same, and standard economics suggests that both promotions should thus have a similar effect. However, because “30% off” sounds more appealing than “$3 off,” the former framing is more likely to have an effect on the consumer. In a similar vein, think of a juicy steak, which can be presented as either having 3% fat or being 97% lean. Again, the decision should be the same, because objectively the claims are identical. In fact, positive frames are evaluated more favorably, so it would be easier to sell the 97%-lean steak than the 3%-fat one. Thus, instead of objectively evaluating the

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information at hand, cognitive bias means a focus only on one attribute of the situation or on subjective judgments, and this, in turn, leads decision making astray. That people operate under cognitive limitations is more than a claim that people deviate from the rational models of economics. It highlights the fact that people are not completely irrational. They do the best they can, given their limitations. Moreover, understanding these limitations enables behavioral economists to understand the systematic (and thus predictable) biases that underlie human behavior and to construct more realistic models of how people actually behave in economic situations. The second main idea in behavioral economics is that people do not hold constant, well-defined preferences. Human behavior, economic behavior included, results from individual preferences. According to the standard economic models, these preferences should not be affected by factors irrelevant to the task at hand, such as decisions made in the past, relative value, and emotional states but rather should reflect the endogenous (i.e., internal) value of the available alternatives. However, behavioral economics clearly shows that preferences are subjective, affected by situational factors, previous decisions, and utilities that are judged relative to external reference levels. A good example is the endowment effect. Put simply, the endowment effect states that people value the things they own more than the same things if they do not own them. In the traditional economic view, if a scarf retails at $25, its value should be the same both before and after people purchase it. However, behavioral economics research has shown that people tend to value goods they own twice as much as they value the same goods if they do not own them. Nor is the effect on preferences and valuations limited to ownership. Research has also shown that preferences change, depending, for example, on the distance from the reference level (think about saving $10 on a $15 item versus saving the same $10 on a $115 item), emotional states (think how hard it is to resist temptation when people are sad or exhausted), and numerous other factors deemed irrational by economics. The third main idea in behavioral economics is that social norms play an important role in economic decisions. Standard economic models assume

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that people are selfish agents who are motivated only by their material self-interest. Under this view, no room is given to (irrational) social considerations. But behavioral economics research demonstrates the importance of social factors such as reciprocity, fairness, cooperation, and other pro-social behaviors in motivating economic behavior. People tend to reciprocate kind actions with another kind action and unkind actions with unkind ones even when doing so comes at a cost to themselves. In a similar vein, the norms of fairness suggest that people consider how fair they (or others) are being treated and not just their material opportunity when making a decision. To illustrate, consider a street vendor who sells flowers at a usually competitive price. However, due to an increase in demand, the vendor decides to raise prices just before Valentine’s Day. Standard economic theory suggests that the decision of whether to buy flowers or not should be affected only by the price. If the vendor’s prices are competitive even after the price increase, people who wish to buy their spouse flowers should continue to do so with this vendor. In reality, however, the majority of people will buy their flowers elsewhere, even if they will have to pay more. Why? Because economic decisions are not based solely on “cold,” rational calculations of cost and benefit but also on the motivations and preferences of others. Thus, the vendor might pay a price by calling attention to raising the price.

Applications of Behavioral Economics Behavioral economics research has led to theories of the forces that shape economic decision making and has identified situational and environmental factors that attenuate or enhance the effect of these forces. These theories have been applied to a variety of domains such as law, health care, education, marketing, management, and finance. Applications typically include policy recommendations designed to affect the way people think and make decisions, as well as interventions for teaching people how to overcome their cognitive limitations in order to better manage their lives. Consider, for example, the framing effect presented in the previous section. Marketing companies use insights about framing to highlight a single attribute of the product (like % lean vs. % fat) in an attempt to influence the information that

consumers take into account while making decisions. Or consider the mode of expenditure. Behavioral economics research has shown that paying with cash is more aversive than paying with a credit card. When people pay with cash, there is a direct link between the consumption experience and the payment experience. However, when paying with a credit card, there is a time delay between consumption and payment. The delay enables people to pay without feeling the pain of paying, and thus they are more inclined to pay with a credit card. Applying these insights, financial institutions intent on addressing the needs of low- and middleincome individuals can do so by limiting the number of credit cards or the credit line. On the other hand, institutions that wish only to increase their business volume can offer 0% interest rates on credit card purchases, cash back, and other promotions to motivate people to use their credit cards more often. The insights provided by behavioral economics can be used by organizations to establish a competitive edge, but they can also be used for the greater good (e.g., to help people make better financial decisions). Many behavioral economic applications have been focused on developing “debiasing” techniques ranging from suggestions for how to use irrationality in one’s favor to more complicated and complex policies and regulations that limit individual discretion in favor of better management of one’s life. Institutions and policymakers increasingly apply behavioral economics to enhance public policies, educational interventions, and choice architectures that will help people make better decisions. Guy Hochman and Dan Ariely See also Cognitive Illusions; Consumer Psychology; Drive and Motivation in the Brain; Eating and Drinking; Heuristics for Memory and Decision Making; Law of Effect; Motivation and Cognition; Perception and Cognition; Reasoning and Decision Making; Reinforcement; Self-Control; Skinner’s Legacy

Further Readings Ariely, D. (2008). Predictably irrational: The hidden forces that shape our decisions (Rev. and exp. ed.). New York, NY: Harper Perennial.

Behavioral Health Ariely, D. (2010). The upside of irrationality: The unexpected benefits of defying logic at work and at home. New York, NY: HarperCollins. Kahneman, D. (2013). Thinking, fast and slow. New York, NY: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux. Simon, H. A. (1957). Models of man: Social and rational: Mathematical essays on rational human behavior in a social setting. New York, NY: Wiley. Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2009). Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness. New York, NY: Penguin Books.

Behavioral Health Behavior has a substantial impact on a wide variety of physical health conditions such as heart disease, HIV/AIDS, diabetes, and cancer. Behavioral health researchers aim to understand what factors influence a person’s health behaviors and to design interventions to promote health behavior change. This change might involve adopting a new health-protective behavior, such as increasing physical activity, or stopping a health-compromising behavior, such as smoking. This entry outlines the historical context of behavioral health research and describes key theories in the field.

Historical Context Until the 19th century, the biomedical model of health and illness prevailed. Health was defined as the absence of illness, and illness was thought to be caused by factors outside individuals’ control. The behavioral health field developed from the understanding that health is not merely the absence of illness but also involves the presence of positive states, such as physical fitness and well-being. Furthermore, people’s emotional state, decision making, and social situation, among other factors, can all influence their health. Rather than viewing health as a distinct state that someone either has or does not have, health came to be seen as a continuum, and people’s decisions about their behavior could engender better or worse health. The earliest theory in this area, the health belief model (HBM), was developed to explain the failure of a free tuberculosis screening program during the 1950s. The key insight of the HBM was to specify people’s beliefs (subjective estimates of the

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likelihood of particular outcomes) as the factor that mediates between social structural position (e.g., socioeconomic status, education, sex, age) and health behaviors. Whereas it is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to modify people’s social structural position, beliefs can be changed by information and persuasion. The implication was that researchers and practitioners could design interventions that would be effective in changing health behaviors by targeting key beliefs. Health behavior theories differ in terms of the types of beliefs that are proposed to influence behavior and also with respect to whether the behavior change process is viewed as a continuum or a sequence of stages. The key distinction between the types of beliefs is whether beliefs about both the threat (disease, illness) and the recommended health behavior are emphasized or whether beliefs about the behavior only are emphasized. Theories in the former category include the HBM, protection motivation theory (PMT), and the extended parallel process model (EPPM). Theories that emphasize beliefs about the behavior include the theory of reasoned action (TRA), the theory of planned behavior (TPB), social cognitive theory (SCT), and self-determination theory (SDT). These theories are all continuum models; that is, behavior is assumed to lie on a continuum between “likely to change” and “unlikely to change,” depending on people’s beliefs. Stage models, on the other hand, assume that people pass through distinct phases of behavior change and that different factors influence change at different stages. The most extensively researched stage model is the transtheoretical model (TTM, also known as the stages of change model).

Key Theories Theories That Emphasize Beliefs About the Threat and the Behavior

Health Belief Model Irwin M. Rosenstock and colleagues developed the HBM in the 1950s. The original model proposed that three constructs influence the likelihood of performing a health behavior: (a) threat appraisal, which was derived from beliefs about susceptibility to, and the severity of, an illness; (b) behavior appraisal, derived from beliefs about

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benefits and costs of the recommended behavior; and (c) cues to action. For example, someone who is deciding whether to attend tuberculosis screening might see an advertising campaign (an external cue to action) or notice that he or she has a cough (an internal cue to action). The person might believe that there is a high likelihood of catching tuberculosis (a high perceived susceptibility) and that it is a serious health condition (a high perceived severity). Finally, the person might think that attending the screening would help identify and treat tuberculosis (a perceived benefit) but that the screening itself would be unpleasant (a perceived cost). When the model was applied to a wider range of health behaviors, two new components were identified as important for improving the predictive value of the model—namely, health motivation and self-efficacy. Health motivation refers to the level of importance someone places on her or his health, and self-efficacy refers to people’s confidence in their ability to perform the behavior. Self-efficacy is the key component of Albert Bandura’s social cognitive theory (described later) and is specified in most health behavior theories. Protection Motivation Theory and the Extended Parallel Process Model PMT was developed by Dr. R. W. Rogers in the 1970s to explain the role of fear in health decisions. PMT proposes that when faced with a potential threat to health, people are motivated to protect themselves. Protection motivation is operationalized by measures of intentions (conscious decisions) to perform a recommended health behavior and is determined by appraisals of threat and coping. Like the HBM, threat appraisal is thought to be influenced by perceived vulnerability and perceived severity of the threat; PMT includes fear as an additional influence on threat appraisal. A disease will be appraised as especially threatening when people believe they are at risk of contracting the disease, the disease is serious, and the disease engenders fear, worry, or anxiety. Coping appraisal refers to people’s ability to manage the threat of disease and also has three components: (a) Response efficacy refers to people’s beliefs about the extent to which the recommended behavior will be effective in reducing disease risk. (b) Self-efficacy is people’s confidence in their

a­bility to undertake the recommended behavior. (c) Response costs refer to the disadvantages of, or barriers to, performing the behavior. People will believe they can manage the threat of disease (i.e., have high coping appraisal) when response efficacy and self-efficacy are high and response costs are low. The EPPM differs from PMT in terminology (coping appraisal is termed efficacy appraisal in the EPPM) and constructs (response costs do not form part of the EPPM). However, the two models make similar predictions. In particular, PMT and the EPPM both propose that if threat appraisal is high but coping or efficacy appraisal is low, then people will not be motivated to protect themselves; instead people are likely to engage in defensive processing of health communications (i.e., attempt to control their fear rather than to control the danger to their health). Both models also propose that threat appraisal and coping/efficacy appraisal interact to predict outcomes. Protection motivation and subsequent performance of the recommended health behavior will best be promoted when the relevant disease is appraised as threatening and people believe that they can effectively manage that threat. Theories That Emphasize Beliefs About the Behavior

The Theory of Reasoned Action and the Theory of Planned Behavior The TRA was developed by Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen to explain behaviors under volitional control and has been used extensively to understand health-related behaviors. According to the TRA, the most immediate and important predictor of behavior is behavioral intention. Intention, in turn, is determined by one’s attitude toward the behavior (one’s overall assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of undertaking the behavior) and by one’s subjective norm (perceptions of social pressure to perform, or not to perform, the behavior). Attitudes are derived from beliefs about the likely outcomes of performing the behavior, multiplied by evaluations of those outcomes. Thus, one’s attitude toward cervical cancer screening might be based on beliefs about how effective the screening will be in detecting abnormalities that can be

Behavioral Health

treated, how embarrassing or uncomfortable the screening is believed to be, and other salient beliefs, each weighted by how good or bad those outcomes would be. Similarly, the subjective norm is derived from beliefs about what specific referents (e.g., spouse, friends, medical practitioner) think one should do (normative beliefs), weighted by the motivation to comply with the views of those significant others. The TRA is thus designed to uncover (a) the outcome expectancies and outcome evaluations that determine whether people have a positive or negative attitude toward a health behavior and (b) the key normative beliefs that underlie perceptions of social pressure to undertake (or not undertake) that behavior. Identifying these key beliefs should then make it possible to design persuasive communications that are effective in changing intentions and health behaviors. Although the TRA takes account of personal factors (attitude) and social influences (subjective norm), accumulated research indicates that beliefs about the ease versus difficulty of performing the behavior should also be considered. Ajzen added the construct of perceived behavioral control as an additional determinant of both intention and behavior to the TRA, forming the TPB. Perceived behavioral control is highly similar to the concept of self-efficacy and has been shown to improve the prediction of intentions and behavior over and above the effects of attitude and subjective norm. Social Cognitive Theory and Self-Determination Theory SCT includes each of the variables specified by the TRA and the TPB and offers several refinements and extensions. Self-efficacy lies at the heart of the theory, as confidence in one’s ability to execute a behavior is assumed to influence outcome expectancies, perceptions of impediments to action (barriers), and proximal goals (intentions). SCT specifies that three types of outcome expectancies are important in determining health behavior goals—namely, physical (e.g., disease protection), social (e.g., praise or sanction from other people), and self-evaluative (e.g., feelings of pride or shame). SCT also specifies that impediments to action arise both from the health system and from personal and situational factors (e.g., lack of skills, resources, or opportunity) and can influence proximal goals

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and behavior over and above self-efficacy. A distinctive feature of SCT research has been the focus on developing and testing strategies for enhancing selfefficacy, such as social persuasion, modeling, and affordance of mastery experiences. SDT was developed by Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan and concerns the implications of the goals people pursue and why goals are pursued for goal attainment and well-being. According to SDT, humans have a basic need for autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Goals that satisfy these needs—such as good health—engender greater intrinsic motivation and well-being compared with other goals (e.g., fame, wealth). SDT research on health behaviors has predominantly focused on how reasons for acting influence behavioral performance. The theory extends the classic dichotomy between intrinsic motivation (behavior is undertaken for its own sake, for the inherent satisfaction it offers) versus extrinsic motivation (behavior is undertaken for external reasons such as obtaining rewards or avoiding punishment) and makes two key distinctions. First, amotivation (where the person lacks the intention to act) is distinguished from intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and second, external, introjected, identified, and integrated regulation are each delineated as a different type of external motivation, differentiated by increasing levels of autonomy. SDT research also examines the types of social contexts that support amotivation, extrinsic motivation, and intrinsic motivation, as well as individual differences in people’s orientation to such contexts. Stage Theories

Transtheoretical Model The transtheoretical model (TTM) was developed by James O. Prochaska and Carlo C. DiClemente. It proposes that people go through five distinct stages as they change their behavior: 1. Precontemplation: There is no intention to change, or there is the recognition that there might be a need to change. 2. Contemplation: The need to change has been recognized, and the person is considering making a change.

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3. Preparation: The individual begins making small changes in preparation for behavior change. 4. Action: The individual makes the change. 5. Maintenance: The individual continues to perform (or not to perform) the changed behavior over an extended period (usually 6 months).

Progress through the different stages is reflected in changes in (a) beliefs about pros and cons of performing the behavior and (b) self-efficacy. The key drivers of stage transitions are the processes of change—behavioral and experiential strategies (e.g., consciousness raising, self-reevaluation, or stimulus control) that are more or less influential, depending on the person’s current stage. The TTM’s claim that behavior change involves distinct stages has provoked considerable debate.

Contemporary Developments Two notable developments in research on behavioral health concern understanding the “gap” between intention (or preparation) and action, and specifying the role of implicit processes. Evidence indicates that people successfully translate their health-related intentions into action only 50% of the time. Peter M. Gollwitzer developed the concept of implementation intentions as a strategy for bridging the intention–behavior gap. Implementation intentions are if-then plans that specify, in advance, how opportunities to advance one’s health goals will be exploited (e.g., “If it is 5p.m. on Friday, then I will jog home from work!”) and how threats to one’s health goals will be managed (e.g., “If I don’t feel like jogging, then I tell myself ‘just do it!’”). If-then planning has been shown to help people see opportunities to act, better seize those opportunities when they arise, and so increase rates of performance of health behaviors. Although most health behavior theories focus on the role of conscious beliefs as determinants of health behaviors, there is increasing interest in the role of implicit or nonconscious factors—variables that influence behavior without people intending or being aware of that influence. For instance, studies show that measures of automatic, affective reactions to tempting stimuli (assessed using

reaction-time measures) can influence health behaviors over and above the influence of conscious attitudes and intentions (assessed via selfreport questionnaires). Related research indicates that even modest changes to the environment (e.g., altering the availability, proximity, packaging, or size of unhealthy foodstuffs or the use of incidental prompts) can change behavior. Greater understanding of the interplay between conscious, nonconscious, and environmental processes holds the promise to improve health behavior theories, behavior change interventions, and health policy initiatives. Kiera Bartlett and Paschal Sheeran See also Chronic Illness, Psychological Aspects of; Coping Strategies; Grief and Bereavement; Health Psychology; Meditation and Relaxation; Neuroendocrine System; Pain; Positive Psychology and Human Frailty; Psychological Wellness and Well-Being; Psychoneuroimmunology; Psychosocial Factors and Cancer; Research Methods in Health Psychology; Social Factors in Health; Stress and Resilience to Life Challenge; Stress Syndromes; Stressors and Stress

Further Readings Bandura, A. (1997). Self-efficacy: The exercise of control. New York, NY: Freeman. Borland, R. (2014). Understanding hard to maintain behavior change: A dual-process approach. New York, NY: Wiley. Connor, M., & Norman, P. (Eds.). (2005). Predicting health behavior (2nd ed.). Maidenhead, England: Open University Press. Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (2010). Predicting and changing behavior: The reasoned action approach. New York, NY: Psychology Press. Sheeran, P., Harris, P. R., & Epton, T. (2014). Does heightening risk appraisals change people’s intentions and behavior? A meta-analysis of experimental studies. Psychological Bulletin, 140(2), 511–543.

Behavioral Perspectives Psychopathology

on

Behavioral perspectives on psychopathology include interrelated concepts about the nature of

Behavioral Perspectives on Psychopathology

behavior problems, associated causal relations, and the best strategies for measuring and influencing them. This entry focuses on how behavior problems are conceptualized, the assumptions about causality in psychopathology within a behavioral paradigm, and how these behavioral tenets affect measurement strategies. The pivotal aspect of a behavioral paradigm in psychopathology is a science-based approach to understanding behavior and the events and contexts that influence it. The fundamental aspect of a scientific approach to psychopathology is measurement—the process of assigning numbers to properties or attributes of things or events. Without measurement, there is no science. A scientific approach also mandates that hypotheses, concepts, and constructs be expressed in ways that are measurable and subject to empirical refutation.

Characteristics of Behavior Problems Stephen Haynes, William O’Brien, and Joseph Kaholokula have outlined several empirically supported characteristics of behavior problems that are consistent with a behavioral paradigm in psychopathology. They have also noted how these characteristics affect assessment strategies in clinical and basic research contexts: •• High rates of co-occurrence of behavior ­problems: Persons with a behavior problem (such as episodes of depressive symptoms, ­excessive use of alcohol, or stealing) have an ­elevated risk for additional behavior problems. The majority of persons who seek behavioral health treatment have multiple, functionally related behavior problems. •• Behavior problems have multiple response modes and aspects: Most behavior problems involve behavioral, cognitive, emotional, and physiological responses. •• Behavior problems have multiple dimensions: Behavior problems have multiple dimensions (e.g., rate, intensity, duration, cyclicity, and recovery) that can differ in importance. •• The dynamic nature of behavior problems: The symptoms, patterns of co-occurrence, response modes, dimensions, and conditional nature of a person’s behavior problem can change over time.

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•• Individual differences in the response modes, dimensions, and dynamic nature of behavior problems: There can be important differences across persons with the same behavior problem in terms of comorbidity (the additional problems that co-occur), response modes, and dimensions. For example, persons experiencing manic ­episodes can differ in the ways in which they are impaired (such as in social interactions or ­financial decision making), in co-occurring behavior problems (such as excessive substance use or associated depressive episodes), and whether they are experiencing brief but rapidly cycling or infrequent but long-lasting episodes. •• The conditional nature of behavior problems: The dimensions and aspects of a behavior problem (such as its likelihood of occurrence or associated symptoms) can vary across environmental ­settings, social contexts, and the person’s state (such as fatigue or medication states). For ­example, the likelihood and manner of expression of children’s aggressive behavior can vary between school and home as a function of which teacher or parent is present, the child’s recent social interactions with others, and recent sleep quality.

The Concept of “Behavior Problem” in the Behavioral Paradigm The terms behavior disorder and behavior problem have overlapping but different meanings. Behavior disorders most often refer to a formal psychiatric diagnosis and usually refer to a set of symptoms that are (a) presumed to covary (i.e., to compose a syndrome); (b) associated with substantial, adverse personal outcomes (such as social or physical health impairments) for a designated period of time; or (c) not accounted for by a ­psychiatric disorder listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.) of the American Psychiatric Association, published in 2013. Behavior problems usually refer to more specific, narrowly defined thoughts, emotional responses, physiological events or states, or observable actions. A behavior problem can often be studied in terms of its time course, severity, degree of associated functional impairment, contextual influences, and comorbidity. For example, as many

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as 25% of persons in the United States might experience distressing obsessive and compulsive ­ symptoms, but only a small percentage of those meet the formal DSM criteria for obsessive-compulsive disorder. Within a behavioral paradigm in psychopathology, the symptoms are important research and clinical foci, independent of whether or not they meet formal diagnostic criteria. The distinction between a behavior disorder and a behavioral problem illustrates the specificity of constructs in a behavioral paradigm. It also illustrates a shift in theories of psychopathology away from a categorical orientation to a multidimensional conceptual framework that facilitates the measurement of specific behaviors in terms of their severity, frequency, and other dimensions. Most behavior disorders and many behavior problems are composed of higher order (i.e., molar) and heterogeneous sets of symptoms. A complication for research in psychopathology, assessment, and intervention is that the symptoms that lead to a formal diagnosis often vary across persons given the same label and often exhibit low-to-moderate levels of covariation. This between-person diversity of symptoms can impede assessment and treatment when research samples are not sufficiently large or diverse. Research on the causes of behavior disorders such as generalized anxiety disorder or autism spectrum disorder can be difficult to interpret because the use of nonspecific, heterogeneous labels might impede the description and explanation of the behavior problems those labels ostensibly are based on.

A Focus on Functional Relations and Functional Analysis A defining characteristic of the behavioral perspective on psychopathology is an emphasis on the identification and analysis of functional relations associated with a behavior problem. The focus on functional relations and functional analysis exemplifies the confluence of conceptual and methodological aspects of the behavioral paradigm, which emphasizes not only the precise description and measurement of behavior problems but also the identification of variables that influence their rate, intensity, likelihood, duration, or cyclicity. Functional relations can be identified using investigative strategies such as experimental

functional analysis (e.g., A-B-A'-B' and multiplebaseline designs), functional assessment (such as a parent questionnaire about events associated with a child’s headaches), and multivariate time-series designs (such as daily, momentary assessment of the associations between stressful life events and depressive symptoms). These strategies are designed to be sensitive to the idiosyncratic and dynamic nature of behavior problems across persons and time.

Behavioral Concepts of Causation in Psychopathology Concepts of causality are central to assessment, intervention, and prevention strategies in any paradigm. Concepts of causality in the behavioral ­sciences and in the behavioral approach to psychopathology have been articulated by several authors. The inference within the behavioral paradigm that two variables have a causal relation depends on judgments that (a) the two variables reliably covary, (b) the putative causal variable precedes its effect, (c) the observed covariance and temporal relations cannot be attributed to other influences, and (d) the putative causal relation is credible. The requirement that the causal connection be credible implies that the mechanisms of causal action be identifiable. The identification of these mechanisms often introduces additional ways of achieving beneficial effects in the treatment of psychopathology. Concepts of causality in a behavioral perspective further imply that causal variables and causal relations can form chains; can be described at different levels of specificity; can be unidirectional, bidirectional, and nonlinear; and can have multiple dimensions and attributes (such as intensity and duration) that can differ in their effects across time, contexts, and persons. Hundreds of studies have also shown that a behavior problem can result from multiple, interacting causal variables and can differ across contexts and time and across persons with the same behavior problem. Certain classes of causal variables have been most influential in behavioral approaches to psychopathology. The class of causal variables most closely associated with the behavioral paradigm is contiguous environmental events. These include antecedent stimuli, environmental settings and

Behavioral Perspectives on Psychopathology

contexts, and response contingencies contemporaneous with the behavior in question. Other classes of causal variables are also useful in developing a functional analysis of a person’s behavior problem. These include conditioned emotional responses; neurophysiological factors; ­ ­cognitive, physical, or emotional impairments; psychophysiological and psychosocial contexts; prior learning history; and cognitive events and processes. Causal models in the behavioral paradigm of psychopathology differ in the types of causal variables they emphasize, but all acknowledge the importance of measurable, well-specified, modifiable, contemporaneous, and environmental variables; individual differences in causal relations; and the importance of contextual and systems-level factors (e.g., for a schoolchild’s behavior problem, the degree of teacher training, class size, and teacher–administrator relations).

Behavioral Assessment in Psychopathology Assessment from a behavioral perspective includes conceptual and methodological aspects and emphasizes the importance of precision—the degree to which a measure is valid and sensitive to change. Precise measurement is necessary for the description of behavior problems, the identification of causal variables and causal relations, the development of valid and useful clinical-case formulations, and the demonstration of intervention effects. Because of its conceptual emphasis, behavioral assessment is methodologically flexible and dynamic in that it incorporates advances in strategies that are consistent with its emphasis on a science-based approach to assessment. Although ­ direct observation in naturalistic and analog environments remains the distinctive measurement strategy of behavioral assessment, additional measurement strategies, such as ecological momentary assessment, ambulatory biomeasurement, and laboratory-based cognitive and psychophysiological assessments are also useful. Consistent with the multimodal, multivariate, conditional, and dynamic nature of behavior problems and causal relations, the precision of measurement and the validity of inferences drawn from assessment data are strengthened by the degree to which the assessment process includes

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data acquired (a) in multiple settings, contexts, and sources; (b) on multiple occasions; (c) using multiple instruments and methods of assessment (such as analog observation and self-report); (d) using multiple response modes and dimensions; (e) from a person’s natural environment.

Limitations A behavioral perspective on psychopathology is limited primarily by measurement-related issues. Ultimately, causal inferences remain a judgment, and biases, errors, and other limitations on clinical judgments have been well documented. Additionally, cognitive and neurophysiological events and processes, as well as events that occur in the natural environment, can be difficult to measure precisely. It can also be difficult to obtain measures that are sufficiently sensitive to the dynamic qualities of behavior and causal events. Finally, measurement instruments and methods are associated with reactive effects (i.e., the measurement process can affect the events being measured) and idiosyncratic sources of measurement error. Stephen N. Haynes See also Applied Behavior Analysis; Behavior Therapies; Behaviorism; Classical Conditioning; Cognitive Behavioral Therapies; Dissociative Disorders; Law of Effect; Medicalization of Psychopathology; Pavlov’s Legacy; Skinner’s Legacy

Further Readings Cooper, J. O., Heron, T. E., & Heward, W. L. (2007). Applied behavior analysis. Columbus, OH: Pearson. Haynes, S. N., Mumma, G. H., & Pinson, C. (2009). Idiographic assessment: Conceptual and psychometric foundations of individualized behavioral assessment. Clinical Psychology Review, 29, 179–191. http:// dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2008.12.003 Haynes, S. N., O’Brien, W. H., & Kaholokula, J. K. (2011). Behavioral assessment and case formulation. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley. Haynes, S. N., Smith, G., & Hunsley, J. R. (2011). Scientific foundations of clinical assessment. New York, NY: Taylor and Francis/Routledge. McLeod, B. D., Jensen-Doss, A., & Ollendick, T. H. (Eds.). (2013). Diagnostic and behavioral assessment

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in children and adolescents. New York, NY: Guilford Press. Sturmey, P. (Ed.). (2008). Behavioral case formulation and intervention. New York, NY: Wiley.

Behavioral Theories Personality

of

Behavioral theories of personality propose that the patterns of thinking, feeling, and behaving that characterize individuals (i.e., their personalities) are the product of life experiences. The essential idea is that personality is a result of learning. This entry discusses theories of behavior and personality, social learning and social cognitive theories, and the strengths and limitations of the behavioral approach. At their most extreme, behavioral theories portray human nature as a “blank slate” that is shaped exclusively by environmental influences. Such a philosophy was best embodied by the influential behaviorist movement, a school of thought that had a profound impact on psychological science in the United States during the first half of the 20th century. Behaviorists believed that visible behavior was the proper subject for psychological study because it could be directly observed and measured. Mental processes could not be directly observed and thus the mind was considered a “black box,” inappropriate for scientific inquiry. Social learning theories of the mid-20th century, however, departed from this stance and argued that mental processes were a critical conduit between environmental factors and actual behavior. Extending this insight even further, contemporary social cognitive theories of personality describe complex webs of perceptual processes, memory structures, and behavioral scripts that produce behavior in response to environmental inputs. However, no matter the level of complexity, all behavioral theories of personality emphasize the importance of environmental factors and learning.

Behaviorism and Personality The behaviorists built on a foundation laid by Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov to develop a

theory of behavior and behavioral change that has been used to explain personality. Pavlov discovered the learning process known as classical conditioning when he observed that dogs in his lab could learn to salivate at the sound of a buzzer. The core idea of classical conditioning is that an initially neutral stimulus gradually produces a behavioral response when it is repeatedly paired with an unconditioned stimulus that normally produces that behavioral effect (i.e., an unconditioned response). Unconditioned stimulus–unconditioned response patterns are typically associated with reflexive behaviors, such as salivating at the sight of food. Through experience, a neutral stimulus (e.g., a buzzer) can become paired, or associated, with an unconditioned stimulus (e.g., food). As a neutral stimulus becomes a conditioned stimulus, it will begin to elicit a conditioned response (e.g., salivation). The father of behaviorism was John B. Watson, who applied the principles of classical conditioning to an infant known as Baby Albert. Any time Albert reached out to play with a white rat, Watson struck a steel bar with a hammer. This unpleasant sound startled Albert, and eventually, he became distressed whenever he was exposed to the rodent and to objects that resembled it. Although Albert initially enjoyed playing with the rat, repeated pairings of the rat with the metal clang resulted in the neutral stimulus (the rat) becoming a conditioned stimulus that produced fear. Thus, classical conditioning principles could be used to influence behavior in humans at an early age. This revelation prompted Watson to declare that he could take a dozen healthy infants and shape them into any profession from doctor to thief by means of conditioning. B. F. Skinner extended classical conditioning to develop a theory of behavior that went beyond reflexive or naturally occurring stimulus-response relations. His theory of operant conditioning describes how individuals learn to produce particular behaviors to receive rewards or to avoid aversive events. Operant conditioning is rooted in Edward Thorndike’s “law of effect,” which states that behaviors that produce favorable outcomes are likely to be repeated, whereas behaviors that produce unfavorable outcomes are likely to diminish over time. In other words, the consequences of

Behavioral Theories of Personality

a particular behavior dictate whether it will be more or less likely to be repeated in the future. Operant conditioning covers at least three key processes: positive reinforcement, negative reinforcement, and punishment. Both positive and negative reinforcement increase the probability a behavior will be emitted in the future. Positive reinforcement occurs when a behavior produces a pleasant outcome, whereas negative reinforcement occurs when a behavior avoids or removes a negative state. Drug withdrawal symptoms are negative reinforcers because the addict avoids unpleasant feelings by consuming the drug. In contrast to reinforcement, punishment is an unpleasant consequence that decreases the probability a behavior will be emitted in the future. For example, traffic tickets are designed to deter future speeding because of the money lost in paying a fine. Both classical and operant conditioning can be used to explain personality. Simply put, people behave in particular ways because of their previous exposure to patterns of reinforcement and punishment. Therefore, personality merely reflects the repertoire of behavioral responses that have been rewarded and punished in the past. The idea that there are at least some intrinsic differences in personality due to temperamental differences or genetic variation was an anathema to behaviorists. In fact, B. F. Skinner sought to show that all individual differences could be explained by individual histories of reinforcement and punishment.

Social Learning and Social Cognitive Theories Traditional behaviorists regarded a focus on mental processes as unscientific. However, psychological research has consistently indicated that mental processes are critical for understanding behavior. Several theorists therefore attempted to expand behavioral insights about the importance of environmental influences by finding ways to incorporate mental processes—such as motivation and memory—into learning theories. The crux of these newer social learning theories was that it is necessary to “get inside the head” to better understand the connections between learning and behavior. Many social learning theories emphasized beliefs regarding the outcomes of behavior—that is, expectations—in influencing behavior. One

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critical source of such expectations was observing the consequences of others’ behavior. The notion that humans could learn from others was at the center of Albert Bandura’s social learning theory. Observational, or vicarious, learning was demonstrated in the classic “Bobo Doll” studies. These experiments showed that children were more likely to aggress against an inflatable clown doll if they had recently watched an adult being rewarded for such behavior. The children in the study had no prior direct experience with the dolls and thus no history of being rewarded or punished in relation to them. Therefore, their actual behavior toward the dolls was dependent on their observations and not their actual histories of rewards and punishments. Bandura also developed the idea that individuals have different expectations about their ability to successfully perform behaviors. These “efficacy beliefs” turn out to be important determinants of whether or not a behavior is performed and how well that behavior is performed. A basketball player who believes that he or she can shoot a free throw tends to perform better than a player who doubts his or her ability, even if both players have observed others being rewarded for making a similar shot. Bandura also recognized that people and their environments were mutually linked through the concept of reciprocal self-determinism. Reciprocal self-determinism refers to how individuals select and shape their environments in real-world settings, thereby influencing the kinds of environments that impact their experience. Bandura’s key insight was that psychological processes play an important role in producing behavior. Social cognitive theories are a natural extension of this perspective because they attempt to depict in exquisite detail the mental processes that translate environmental stimuli to behavioral outputs. This perspective is perhaps best reflected in Walter Mischel’s cognitive affective personality system (CAPS) model. Notably, CAPS is the only theory in the behavioral/learning tradition that was explicitly devised to explain personality. CAPS proposes a variety of cognitive processes that serve to receive and process environmental input, including particular ways of encoding information (e.g., focusing on negative attributes as opposed to positive attributes), personal constructs

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(the ideas that people use to understand themselves and others), expectancies (see the previous discussion of efficacy beliefs), and strategies for controlling behavior in the face of certain stimuli (e.g., focusing on the abstract qualities of tempting foods in order to avoid consuming them). Together, these cognitive processes create a stable internal system that continuously responds to environmental stimuli to produce behavior. Central to the CAPS model is the notion that specific details of the overall personality system vary considerably across individuals (i.e., different people might process the same situation differently). This variability is what leads to individual differences in behavioral output given a similar environmental input. The personality system produces consistent “if . . . then” behavioral signatures for each individual such that a person will behave in a characteristic fashion when exposed to a certain kind of environment. If two environments are similar, behavioral output across both will be similar. However, if the environments are different, the behavioral output will also be different. There is behavioral consistency for a given individual only when he or she occupies similar environments across time. Importantly, individual differences in the personality system and subsequent behavioral signatures are thought to largely reflect one’s learning history. In short, environmental factors are critical for producing behavior according to CAPS. This is one reason that the CAPS model and social cognitive approach to personality align well with the behaviorist perspective; both ultimately view personality as a characteristic behavioral response produced by environmental factors. The crucial difference is that the behaviorist perspective purposely overlooks mental processes, whereas both the social learning and social cognitive perspectives posit a number of mental mechanisms that help connect environmental inputs with behavioral outputs.

Strengths and Limitations The behavioral perspective highlights the importance of learning and previous experience for understanding current patterns of behavior. There are several laudable strengths of this approach. Foremost is that behavioral perspectives have

provided psychologists with a set of techniques for shaping behavior through the use of reinforcement schedules that apply to nonhuman animals and humans alike. These techniques are used today in many settings. The behavioral perspective also emphasizes the importance of taking a rigorous scientific approach to the study of psychology and behavior. It is perhaps not surprising that the rise of behaviorism was partially a reaction to concerns about introspection as a reliable method for generating scientific knowledge and to the general difficulties researchers faced when trying to test many psychodynamic predictions. On the other hand, the behavioral approach to personality suffers from a few limitations. One concern is that this perspective underestimates the active roles that individuals can play in shaping and selecting their own environments. There might be a tendency to view the person as a relatively passive recipient of environmental stimuli from a behavioral perspective. Across all behavioral theories, personality is seen as primarily the product of one’s environmental learning history. This blank slate approach is becoming increasingly difficult to reconcile with scientific advances in behavioral genetics and temperament. Behavioral genetic research highlights the complex ways that genetic and environmental factors work together to shape individual differences. Research concerning temperament highlights the importance of early-emerging individual differences in young children as a factor in understanding psychological development across the life span. More important, although the techniques inspired by behaviorism have created a technology for producing short-term behavioral changes, it remains to be seen if these approaches are as successful for producing long-lasting changes in patterns of behavior and personality. D. Angus Clark and M. Brent Donnellan See also Ancient and Premodern Theories of Personality; Bandura, Albert; Behaviorism; Classical Conditioning; Culture and Personality; Factor Analysis and Personality Theory; Humanistic Theories of Personality; Nature Versus Nurture; Personality, Measurement of; Personality Development; Personality Traits Versus Situations; Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Personality

Behaviorism

Further Readings Bandura, A. (1997). Self-efficacy: The exercise of control. New York, NY: W. H. Freeman. Beck, H. P., Levinson, S., & Irons, G. (2009). Finding Little Albert: A journey to John B. Watson’s infant laboratory. American Psychologist, 64(7), 605–614. Bouton, M. E. (2014). Why behavior change is difficult to sustain. Preventive Medicine, 68, 29–36. http://dx.doi .org/10.1016/j.ypmed.2014.06.010 Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y. (1995). A cognitive-affective system theory of personality: Reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and invariance in personality structure. Psychological Review, 102(2), 246–268. Skinner, B. F. (1974). About behaviorism. New York, NY: Knopf. Watson, J. B. (1930). Behaviorism. New York, NY: W. W. Norton.

Behaviorism In its most general sense, behaviorism is the point of view that the appropriate subject matter of psychology is behavior and that the appropriate methods for studying it are grounded in the standard observational methods of the natural sciences. Although this statement appears to be admirably succinct, a review of the history of psychology suggests behaviorism has been interpreted in several different ways over the years. This entry examines these different interpretations to better understand behaviorism.

Classical S–R Behaviorism A frequently cited date for the inception of behaviorism is 1913, when John B. Watson published a controversial article titled “Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It.” Watson’s version of behaviorism is called classical S–R behaviorism and asserts that psychology should study the responses (R) that are “called out” by environmental stimuli or situations (S). For Watson, this relation involves overt, explicit activity such as the movement of arms and legs, as well as covert, implicit activity such as changes in heart rate or other visceral functions. The activity could be either unlearned or learned. Unlearned

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meant that certain responses were called out by certain stimuli right from birth. Learned meant the responses were called out by previously neutral stimuli after those stimuli had been recently or frequently associated with stimuli that originally evoked the response. Classical behaviorism may be contrasted with the dominant point of view in psychology at the time, according to which the appropriate subject matter of psychology was mental life—for ­example, the sensations, images, and feelings that contribute to “consciousness.” The appropriate method for studying that subject matter was introspection, understood as the rigorous, contemplative ­description of one’s own mental phenomena. For his part, Watson zealously sought to reformulate psychology as a natural science concerned with the prediction and control of behavior. He did not see behaviorism as merely a methodological approach but rather as an entire worldview. For example, in Behaviorism, Watson argued that mental life qua mental was nothing but a fiction engendered by cultural forces such as religion. Watson clearly recognized that people do think. However, he argued that thinking could be construed as a behavioral rather than a mental process, consisting largely but not exclusively of subvocal speech. His explanations of such traditional concerns as thinking and images were not particularly sophisticated by today’s standards. Nevertheless, they can be understood today as honest efforts to formulate an effective science of behavior based on naturalistic principles as he understood them. Despite Watson’s extensive efforts, many classical behaviorists continued to accept the existence of mental phenomena as distinct from behavioral. However, they interpreted behaviorism as meaning that the mental could be safely ignored. The assumption was that the resulting explanations were just as good as those appealing directly to mental variables. Mental variables could be included in philosophy or religion, but science required observability and measurement that produced agreement about its explanatory concepts. Therefore, if psychology was going to be considered a member in good standing of the scientific community, psychologists should not speak directly about the mental but only about what was observable. This approach was later called methodological behaviorism.

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Behaviorism

Mediational S–O–R Neobehaviorism By around 1930, many psychologists began to view the various forms of classical S–R behaviorism as inadequate. The principal problem was that behavior was richer and more flexible than seemed to be recognized by the S–R formulation, even if unobservables were incorporated in Watson’s terms of 1925. To overcome such apparent limitations, psychologists began to argue that by modifying the accepted S–R formulation somewhat, they could admit such unobservables as mental after all. Their first move was to conceive of the mental variables as inside the organism in some sense. There, the mental variables were inferred to mediate the relation between S and R. The concept of mediation means that the S was inferred to initiate some state or process inside the organism and the mediating state or process then caused the R. Variations in the mediating state produced variations in response, thereby accommodating the richness and flexibility of behavior. More formally, the mental variables were designated as “organismic” variables and symbolically represented as O, resulting in an S–O–R formulation. Initially, the mediators were designated as theoretical concepts and later as hypothetical constructs. The mediationists’ second move was to appeal to the principle of operationism, which had been developed by the physicist P. W. Bridgman in 1927. According to operationism, psychologists should appoint some publicly observable measure as evidence or justification for the mental phenomenon in question so that it could be agreed upon. As a result, mental variables could be known by inference, and talk of them was justified by the data from the operations entailed in their supposed measurement. Importantly, an emphasis on publicly observable measures meant that the approach could be considered scientific because psychologists were speaking only indirectly about mental phenomena instead of directly as in introspection, and their inferences about the mental phenomena were supported by data. This approach is now called mediational S–O–R neobehaviorism, reflecting the new way to deal with the mental. Mediational neobehaviorism is also a version of methodological behaviorism, in the sense that observable behavior is taken as a proxy for unobservable causes inferred to be

operating elsewhere. Thus, neobehaviorists can avoid speaking directly of the mental and defend themselves against charges that they were being mentalistic themselves. An important feature of mediational neobehaviorism is antecedent causation. According to this concept, the cause of behavior is to be found and expressed in terms of some antecedent factor, in the tradition of the reflex. If an environmental stimulus could not be found, then some mediating internal or physiological state or process was inferred. If this could not be found, then some mediating mental or cognitive state or process was inferred. In every case, causal processes were inferred to follow a linear chain of events, the last of which was an independent contribution of the organism from a nonenvironmental dimension. In American psychology, the mediational approach dominated learning theory during the second quarter of the 20th century and into the third quarter—for example, in 1956, in the work of Edward C. Tolman, Clark L. Hull, and Kenneth W. Spence. Tolman’s mediating hypothetical constructs tended to have a cognitive flavor, Hull’s tended to have a physiological flavor, and Spence’s a strictly logical flavor, although all three disputed that they were mentalists because their mediators were based on operationism rather than introspection. The mediational approach has remained prevalent in much of the rest of American psychology, such as in clinical work, social psychology, personality theory, and developmental psychology. Different researchers and theorists have different conceptions of the mediators, but the approaches remain mediational nonetheless. Sometimes the term behaviorism is used in the popular literature to indicate a form of psychology that doesn’t speak directly of the mental. However, classical behaviorism has actually been superseded by the mediational S–O–R form of methodological behaviorism in which the direct talk concerns observable data, and mental antecedent causes are inferred but spoken of only indirectly through operational definitions.

Behavior Analysis B. F. Skinner developed an entirely different interpretation of behaviorism beginning in the 1930s,

Behaviorism

or roughly the same time as the mediational approach just described. Skinner’s view is called behavior analysis. A good source is Skinner’s Science and Human Behavior. The philosophy of science that underlies Skinner’s behavior analysis is called radical behaviorism. Radical here means a thoroughgoing or comprehensive behavioral orientation rather than an extreme or fanatical commitment to observable variables strictly. Behavior analysis recognizes that some behavior developed during the evolutionary history of the species. Often, this behavior is called innate. Nest building and song learning in birds are examples. Thus, in behavior analysis, not all behavior is learned, although behavior analysis does emphasize that important forms of behavior might depend critically on environmental circumstances during development. Other behavior occurs according to the traditional reflex model, where an antecedent stimulus elicits behaviors with food-elicited salivation in Pavlov’s dogs, for example. Behavior analysis calls this elicited form of behavior respondent behavior. The process of conditioning is concerned with how respondent behavior develops to previously neutral stimuli, as when Pavlov’s dogs salivated to a light or tone (called a conditioned stimulus) that Pavlov had presented with food (called an unconditioned stimulus). According to behavior analysis, some human behavior is indeed respondent, as when a person becomes anxious when entering a dentist’s office if he or she has experienced pain on a prior visit or when a person salivates in response to sights, sounds, or aromas associated with food preparation. Still other behavior occurs as a function of its consequences, and thus behavior analysis goes far beyond classical S–R behaviorism, which disregarded any influence of consequences. One previous account that did emphasize the importance of consequences was E. L. Thorndike’s law of effect. It posited a hypothetical connection between a stimulus setting and a response, which was inferred to be “stamped in” when the response produced a satisfying effect and “stamped out” when it produced an annoying effect or discomfort. However, behavior analysis goes beyond Thorndike’s view by setting aside the various appeals to hypothetical causes and proposing the concept of operant behavior. According to this

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concept, it is sufficient to state the fact of the observation: An organism emits some response, and the probability of the response increases when it is followed by a reinforcing consequence or decreases when it is followed by a punishing consequence. A prior stimulus serves by signaling the correlation between the response and its consequence in the relation called stimulus control. In other words, there is no need to appeal to hypothetical, mediating processes to explain what is observed. Indeed, it might be harmful and misleading to do so. To be sure, physiological processes participate in the observed behavioral relations, and neuroscience may tell what they are. However, it will do so by directly investigating those processes and not by inferring that a hypothetical process is at work. For behavior analysis, the relation between (a) the circumstances in which behavior occurs, (b) the behavior itself, and (c) the consequences of the behavior is called the three-term contingency of reinforcement. A contingency is symbolically expressed as follows: SD : R => SR+ This expression says that a discriminative stimulus (SD) sets the occasion (:) for a response (R) to produce (=>) a reinforcer (SR+). This contingency is the unit of analysis for operant behavior. In a standard, nonhuman example, when a tone is present, a hungry rat presses a lever in the presence of the tone, and a small food pellet follows. The tone is the discriminative stimulus, the lever press is the response, and the food pellet is the reinforcer. Most human behavior is operant behavior. When the telephone rings, a person answers, and talking with a friend is the reinforcer. The concept of operant behavior relies on the principle of selection by consequences, rather than antecedent causation. The principle of selection became prominent in biology with Darwin, and its application to the study of behavior is straightforward. Just as evolution through natural selection selects organisms that have the morphological characteristics necessary to satisfy the environmental demands for survival, so also does reinforcement select responses that have the behavioral characteristics necessary to satisfy the environmental demands of contingencies.

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Behaviorism

In this way, operant repertoires emerge and develop through the lifetime of the organism: Reinforcing consequences select responses that satisfy the contingencies in an organism’s environment; that is, those responses occur more often in the future. Some consequences reinforce operants without any special history, as does food for a hungry organism, water for a thirsty organism, and so on. Many, but not all, of these consequences are related to the organism’s survival needs. In addition, some consequences acquire their reinforcing effectiveness during the lifetime of an organism as a function of its experiences in the environment. Money is one example. Another is the interpersonal attention a person receives in social interactions. A further feature of behavior analysis is that it actually admits unobservable variables. However, it regards them as just as relevant and just as much a part of the behavioral dimension as observable phenomena rather than from a mental dimension. Thus, when people talk about their aches and pains, they are in principle talking about conditions that are just as physical as lights and tones are. The difference is that the aches and pains are covert and accessible only to one person, whereas lights and tones are overt and accessible to others. Similarly, when people think, they are engaging in covert forms of behavior that do not differ from overt forms such as writing notes, reminders, or shopping lists. Covert forms of behavior serve the same function as overt: They contribute to stimulus control. In this way, private or covert behavioral events are not the same as introspection because the talked-about events, variables, and relations (a) occur in the same dimension as observable behavior; (b) function in the same way as observable events, variables, and relations; and (c) originate and influence subsequent behavior through interaction with environmental circumstances during one’s lifetime. A summary of potentially helpful comparisons and contrasts follows: 1. Behavior is important as a scientific subject matter in its own right rather than merely as evidence to justify inferences about causes in another dimension. The study of behavior is a branch of biology but is not reducible to neuroscience. Neuroscience is an independent science concerned

with how the systems of the body work when an organism interacts with the world. The study of behavior is an independent science concerned with the relation between the behaving organism and the parts of the world with which the organism interacts. Neuroscience and behavior analysis thus provide complementary knowledge. 2. Behavior is a function of “selection by consequences” at the levels of phylogeny (species), ontogeny (individual organisms), and culture (society). The thesis of selection by consequences makes clear how behavior and the physiological systems that underlie it are adaptations selected through interaction with the environment at the three levels. 3. Elicited or respondent behavior may be distinguished from emitted or operant behavior. Respondent behavior is a function of the presentation of an eliciting stimulus. Operant behavior is a function of its consequences. 4. Explanations of behavior follow from analyses of the relations that cause the behavior. a. Explanations of respondent behavior follow from analyses of the relations among stimuli that elicit the behavior. b. Explanations of operant behavior follow from analyses of contingencies of reinforcement. These contingencies operate across time for the species to which the individual belongs, for individual organisms, and for the social-cultural group to which the individual belongs. c. Explanations of behavior do not subscribe to mentalism. Mentalism consists in explaining behavior by attributing its cause to phenomena from a dimension that differs from the one in which behavior takes place. Neither the study of behavior nor neuroscience is important because they validate inferences about mental causes. Mental causes are “explanatory fictions.” Appeals to these fictions are cherished for quite incidental and irrelevant sociocultural reasons that are unrelated to prediction and control.

5. Verbal behavior is regarded as operant behavior. It is to be given the same analysis as any other form of operant behavior—that is, in terms

Behaviorism

of contingencies. In particular, it is not caused by underlying mental processes or mental phenomena. 6. Private behavioral events (verbal reports or covert operants) are important. The relevant questions are (a) how they develop and (b) how they subsequently enter into the contingencies that influence subsequent behavior. 7. Analytic and explanatory terms are generic in nature and are functionally defined. For example, responses and stimuli are members of classes of similar phenomena and are not individual, isolated entities. In addition, they are defined functionally in terms of the environmental relations in which they participate rather than in terms of their physical properties as such. 8. The truth criterion in radical behaviorism is pragmatic—that is, successful working. To ask whether a statement is true is to assess how well and on what basis it promotes effective action, which in science means to predict and control natural events. A statement is a verbal discriminative stimulus. It ultimately enters into contingencies of adaptation in which the reinforcer is a beneficial outcome in a person’s interactions with the natural environment. 9. Cultures should actively encourage practices that increase, and should actively discourage practices that decrease, the quality of life for their members. This is most reasonably implemented according to known behavioral principles.

Behavior Analysis Versus Mentalism and Methodological Behaviorism As suggested earlier in paragraph 4(c), Skinner’s behavior analysis is vigorously antimentalistic. However, there is much misunderstanding about the relation between behavior analysis and mentalism. Older forms of mentalism, such as those in Watson’s time, claimed the mental could be known through introspection. Contemporary mentalism differs. It says the mental can be known through objective inference by following the experimental method. For contemporary mentalism, behavior is said to be explained through the appeal to the operating characteristics and capacities of antecedent causes in a

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dimension beyond the one in which behavior actually takes place. Some terms that are often used in connection with this dimension are mental—cognitive, spiritual, and subjective—in short, the dimension of “mind.” Some terms that are often used in connection with these mental causes are acts, states, mechanisms, processes, entities, and structures. Contemporary mentalism charges that behaviorism naively tries to explain behavior in terms of observable factors and thereby ignores or denies unobservable mental or cognitive factors that are necessary to explain behavior. Thus, contemporary mentalism strongly disputes that behavior can be explained through an analysis of the relation between behavior and environmental circumstances at a descriptively consistent level for phylogeny, ontogeny, and culture. Mentalism is the dominant orientation in culture as evidenced in cultural patterns of religion and jurisprudence. When compared with behaviorism, mentalism is especially dominant in psychology. For behavior analysis, if a mental explanation appears to be successful, there are behavioral reasons for that success, not mental reasons, and it is the job of psychology to formulate what those reasons are. In any event, the useful distinction is actually not between (a) behaviorism, which includes all forms ranging from classical S–R behaviorism to mediational neobehaviorism to behavior analysis, and (b) mentalism. Rather, the useful distinction is between (a) behavior analysis and (b) other forms of psychology, such as the overt mentalism of cognitive psychology and methodological-behaviorist positions ranging from classical S–R behaviorism to a mediational S–O–R neobehaviorism. Methodo­ logical behaviorism is at least incomplete if it doesn’t ­ recognize private behavioral events and can be mentalistic in its own right if it appeals to mediating hypothetical constructs as mental causes, which it generally does. Behavior analysis is concerned about mediational approaches, mentalism, and methodological behaviorism because they uncritically reflect dominant social-cultural preconceptions, such as the dualistic preconceptions of “folk psychology.” For example, many people comfortably invoke “mind” as a cause of behavior, as when they say

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Big Five Model and Lexical Trait Theory

that they “made up their minds” to stop at the market on the way home from work to purchase a loaf of bread. For behavior analysis, such an account fails to identify what led them to make up their minds. A more useful approach is to identify that purchasing a loaf of bread is relevant because there is no bread at home, that one has prior experience with the market’s operating hours and with purchasing bread at the market, and that the market is conveniently on the route from work to home. All these factors exist in one, behavioral, dimension. Ultimately, behavior analysts are concerned about mentalism and methodological behaviorism on pragmatic grounds. Behavior analysts argue that a critical examination of those traditions reveals that they obscure and thus actively impede the search for important details about the genuinely relevant relations between behavior and environment. Moreover, they allay curiosity by urging fanciful “explanatory fictions” as causes. Finally, they misrepresent the facts to be accounted for, and they offer false assurances about the state of knowledge. Consequently, mentalism and methodological behaviorism seriously interfere with effective prediction, control, and explanation of behavior, despite their claim to offer a superior form of psychology. Jay Moore See also Applied Behavior Analysis; Behavior Therapies; Behavioral Development; Behavioral Economics; Behavioral Health; Behavioral Perspectives on Psychopathology; Behavioral Theories of Personality; Classical Conditioning; Habits; Human Agency; Law of Effect; Operant Conditioning; Pavlov’s Legacy; Punishment; Reinforcement; Self-Control; Skinner’s Legacy; Watson, J. B.

Further Readings Moore, J. (2011). Behaviorism. The Psychological Record, 61, 449–464. Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behavior. New York, NY: Macmillan. Watson, J. B. (1913). Psychology as the behaviorist views it. Psychological Review, 20(2), 158–177. Watson, J. B. (1925). Behaviorism. New York, NY: People’s Institute.

Big Five Model Trait Theory

and

Lexical

Many sciences have a fairly standard language for classifying or characterizing the “things” in their discipline. For instance, chemistry has its periodic table of elements for classifying atoms, and biology has its Linnaean and phylogenetic systems for classifying species. These and other sciences have benefited immensely from their taxonomic frameworks. Beyond providing a common language, such taxonomies direct attention to the basic units researchers and theorists have determined to be particularly important to their discipline and their properties (e.g., which atoms are metals, which plants are most closely related genetically). This entry discusses the lexical strategy in psychology for the development of a taxonomic framework, especially the Big Five model. Personality psychology has historically had nothing approximating a widely accepted taxonomy. Since Gordon Allport’s early work in the 1920s, many personality psychologists have considered traits—which can be considered “relatively enduring characteristics”—to be the basic unit of the field. However, there has been less agreement about which traits to focus on. Simple thought experiments can demonstrate that individuals have an infinite number of traits. For instance, it is possible to characterize how responsibly individuals act generally or just toward their friends or just toward their best friend, how much they like ice cream or just vanilla ice cream or just French vanilla ice cream, how fast they walk on level ground or on 5% inclines or 6% inclines, how much they like animals or just cats or just Siamese cats, and so on. In examples like these, traits differ in breadth (i.e., how many tendencies they pertain to) and in importance. For much of the 20th century, different personality psychologists had their own preferred frameworks. These often emphasized different traits or described roughly the same traits by different labels or even used the same label to describe different traits. This variety in taxonomic frameworks represented a challenge to the development of a cumulative science of personality.

Big Five Model and Lexical Trait Theory

The Lexical Strategy The lexical strategy is a prominent approach to identifying the most important personality traits and to forming a more unified trait language. The seeds of this approach originated with Francis Galton, who suggested in an 1884 article, “Measurement of Character” published in The Popular Science Monthly, that one might “gain an idea of the number of the more conspicuous aspects of the character by counting in an appropriate dictionary the words used to express them.” This strategy for identifying the most important traits follows logically from the lexical hypothesis, which submits that the most important traits within a culture are reflected by more terms in the language that refer to it. Consequently, examining a particular concept’s lexical density can help reveal its importance. A particular trait concept can be considered more densely reflected in the lexicon if it has more synonyms or if the associated words are used more frequently. For instance, there are many more words in language to describe how attractive people are than how left-handed they are, and this might be taken as an indication that attractiveness is a more important trait than handedness is. Systematic work to explore the structure of ­personality via the lexical strategy was not fully initiated until many decades after Galton. As an important first step, in 1936, Allport and Henry Odbert culled a major English dictionary to identify nearly 18,000 terms that could be used to describe individuals. Later researchers determined that only approximately 3,000 of the terms referred to stable psychological or behavioral traits (e.g., responsible, shy, kind), whereas the remaining could be classified as mood-related terms (e.g., happy, irritated, gloomy), abstract terms (e.g., boring, horrible, exceptional), and into various other categories (e.g., physical descriptors, social roles, obscure terms). Most trait investigators have limited their analyses of trait structure to sets formed by including terms only classified as stable psychological and behavioral traits. However, even when reduced in this manner, it is an unwieldy set. A subsequent major difficulty

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concerned how to establish whether two terms refer to the “same” personality dimension. For instance, does punctual reflect the same dimension as responsible? To reduce the role of subjective judgment, researchers generally have asked a large number of raters to describe the extent to which a representative sampling of person-descriptor terms are descriptive of themselves. These ratings are then correlated with one another. Many terms are highly related to one another, and other terms are largely unassociated. For instance, individuals who describe themselves as responsible are more likely to describe themselves as dependable and reliable, whereas they are not particularly more or less likely to describe themselves as dominant or happy. Items that are highly correlated with one another can be considered to “go together” and to concern similar traits. In turn, these correlations between terms can be examined using statistical techniques, such as ­factor analysis. This technique reduces the correlations observed between terms to a much smaller number of dimensions that best summarize how different terms go together. In this way, trait investigators have established empirically informed solutions to identifying the personality dimensions most reflected in language.

The Big Five An increasing number of lexical-trait studies were conducted in the 1950s and onward, and investigators began to arrive at a surprisingly consistent conclusion. The wide range of ways in which individuals vary from one another in their personality traits can be reduced in a relatively satisfactory manner to five distinct dimensions. They are typically referred to as the Big Five. Although different investigators have preferred different labels and although the specific nature of the factors will shift somewhat from study to study, there is an emerging consensus that these five factors can be labeled extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability (versus neuroticism), and intellect/openness. A summary of specific traits within each trait domain appears in Table 1.

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Table 1  The Big Five Dimensions and Some Major Subdimensions Factor I: Extraversion Assertive (bold, direct vs. cowardly, submissive) Sociability (sociable, cheerful vs. withdrawn, seclusive) Activity/adventurousness (daring, active vs. unadventurous, unenergetic) Unrestrained (talkative, verbal vs. quiet, reserved) Factor II: Agreeableness Warmth/affection (compassionate, sentimental vs. cold, insensitive) Gentleness (agreeable, cordial vs. harsh, combative) Generosity (helpful, charitable vs. greedy, selfish) Modest/humble (modest, humble vs. egotistical, vain) Factor III: Conscientiousness Industriousness (ambitious, conscientious vs. aimless, lazy) Orderliness (neat, meticulous vs. sloppy, unsystematic) Reliability (dependable, prompt vs. undependable, unreliable) Decisive/consistent (decisive, steady vs. indecisive, inconsistent) Factor IV: Emotional Stability vs. Neuroticism (Low) Irritability (undemanding, tranquil vs. temperamental, moody) (Low) Insecurity (relaxed, unenvious vs. unstable, nervous) (Low) Emotionality (unemotional, unexcitable vs. high-strung, excitable) (Low) Depression (depressed, sad) Factor V: Intellect/Openness Intellect (knowledgeable, complex vs. unintellectual, unreflective) Imagination/creativity (artistic, innovative vs. uncreative, unimaginative) Perceptiveness (insightful, foresighted vs. unobservant, shortsighted) Openness to experiences (open-minded vs. close-minded) Note. Summary of some of the more specific facets (or aspects, subcomponents) of the broader Big Five as identified in structural investigations; see especially Saucier and Ostendorf (1999).

Each factor is very broad (indeed, this is what lexical investigators mean when referring to these factors as “big”), and within each dimension, there is a wide range of more specific dimensions. For instance, the dimension of extraversion includes the more specific tendencies to be assertive, sociable, active, and unrestrained. As noted, these Big Five factors have been surprisingly robust across different studies, not just across different samples of lexical terms but also across different methodologies. For instance, they tend to emerge in relatively recognizable form in analyses of trait structure regardless of whether self-reports of personality characteristics are used (i.e., participants describing themselves) or peer reports (i.e., participants describing someone else) or whether sets of terms that include mood-related and evaluative person-descriptor terms are used that otherwise are typically excluded.

Factors largely resembling the Big Five have also been found when factor analysis is applied to other widely used personality inventories designed for other purposes, such as Harrison Gough’s California Personality Inventory (CPI) and Adjective Check List (ACL), Jack Block’s California Adult Q-Sort (CAQ), and Raymond Cattell’s 16 Personality Factor Test (16PF).

Issues and Extensions The Big Five framework has also served a central role in the development of widely used inventories such as the Big Five Inventory (BFI), Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI), Abridged Big Five Circumplex (AB5C), Big Five Aspect Scales (BFAS), and NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI). Research using scales developed to assess the Big Five dimensions has rapidly increased since the

Big Five Model and Lexical Trait Theory

1980s to the point that such inventories now represent the most common way to assess an individual’s personality in current psychological research. However, a number of important questions remain concerning whether factor structures involving different numbers of factors (e.g., two, three, six, seven) might serve as better organizing frameworks for personality traits. Additionally, questions remain about how the nature of these factors should be understood. These issues are elaborated next. Cross-Cultural Studies

One of the larger goals of lexical researchers has been to identify a structure that captures personality trait dimensions that are particularly important in any society. However, most of the studies that led to the identification of the Big Five structure depicted in Table 1 have been conducted in Western countries, particularly the United States. Although factors resembling the Big Five have emerged consistently in other lexical studies conducted in Germany, Poland, Turkey, the Netherlands, and the Czech Republic, they have emerged somewhat less consistently in many other cultures. The fifth factor (intellect/openness), in particular, sometimes does not emerge in lexical studies conducted elsewhere. For instance, in studies conducted in Italy, Hungary, and Korea, factors largely resembling the first four of the Big Five depicted in Table 1 appeared, but the fifth resembled a factor that would most resemble a second agreeableness factor in the Big Five framework, such as integrity/ sincerity. This disparity has led many researchers to suggest that the Big Five is not an optimal framework for a transcultural personality structure. Various alternatives have been proposed. Some theorists have suggested that perhaps only two or three factors that are even broader than the Big Five are fully replicable across different cultures. When analyses have been conducted in diverse cultures where only two (rather than five) factors are extracted by factor analysis, these factors reliably resemble a broad communion, stability, or moral self-regulation factor (which can be considered an even broader, overarching combination of agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emotional

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stability) and an agency, plasticity, or dynamism factor (a broader combination of extraversion and intellect/openness). Some theorists have considered the communion/ moral self-regulation factor the extent to which one follows group or societal rules and norms, whereas the agency/dynamism factor reflects the extent to which one has characteristics associated with power, dominance, and status. More briefly, the communion and agency dimensions refer to the extent to which one is likely to get along with others and get ahead of others, respectively. Alternatively, there are indications that, although the Big Five (or any other five-factor structure) might not replicate as well as hoped across cultures, a six-factor solution is surprisingly consistent. A prominent alternative to the Big Five model of personality structure is the HEXACO model, which consists of five factors that are largely recognizable as the Big Five (labeled emotionality, eXtraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness) plus an additional dimension referred to as honesty/humility, which includes traits such as sincerity, modesty, fairness, and greed. Although this sixth factor emerges inconsistently in studies of trait structure conducted in English-speaking countries, it appears to emerge with surprisingly high regularity in other languages. Given current evidence regarding its crosscultural generality, the HEXACO model has received considerable attention as a possible alternative to the Big Five as a unifying organizing framework for describing diverse personality traits. What Do Lexical Personality Factors Correspond To?

A deeper theoretical question concerns how lexical factors such as the Big Five should be regarded. They emerge consistently in lexical studies of trait structure . . . but what are they? There are several different perspectives on this issue. First, many researchers regard the Big Five as source traits—that is, as deep sources of an individual’s behavior or an individual’s “basic tendencies.” Using some of the characteristics listed in Table 1, this perspective would assume that the reason a person typically acts in a highly assertive, active, sociable, and unrestrained manner is because she or he is high on extraversion.

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If this is how factors such as the Big Five should be regarded, then a reasonable goal might be to find the biological origins of these factors. For instance, some researchers have linked an individual’s level of extraversion to reward sensitivity or sensitivity to arousal, which, in turn, might be linked to the dopaminergic system in the brain. More generally, researchers have pointed to evidence that levels of Big Five traits are highly heritable (i.e., tend to be strongly correlated among twins and other biological relatives) and are highly stable over time, consistent with the source-trait view. Another perspective is that the Big Five might first and foremost represent factors that are not necessarily important sources of an individual’s behavior but rather are important to perceivers of the individual. Perhaps the reason that there are many words to describe an individual’s level of Big Five–related traits is that these are particularly important in determining how best to interact with a person (or indeed, whether to interact with the person at all). For instance, agreeableness-related terms (e.g., generous, combative) indicate whether the individual will promote or impede one’s interests. Conscientiousness-related terms (e.g., reliable, lazy) indicate whether an individual can be depended on to complete tasks in a group. And extraversion-related terms (e.g., sociable, submissive) might indicate whether the individual “brings people together” and where he or she might be likely to place in a group’s pecking order. From this perspective, structural analyses might help identify the behavioral tendencies that are most socially consequential, but perhaps not the sources or ­reasons for an individual’s behavior.

Babel in Reverse Although the state of personality psychology in most of the 20th century can be likened to the Bible’s Tower of Babel myth, it is useful to recognize that the progression of lexical studies in personality psychology actually represents the myth in reverse. In the beginning, there was no common language and taxonomy, and the goal of lexical researchers was to identify an empirically informed trait taxonomy that would enable better

communication across researchers and accumulation of scientific findings. Although important questions remain as to the ideal number of personality factors, contemporary debates on this topic—such as whether to use the Big Five versus HEXACO frameworks—are beginning to feel more like decisions about whether to speak Spanish versus Portuguese (or even just Mexican Spanish versus Castilian Spanish) than like decisions about whether to speak Spanish versus Mandarin Chinese. That is, contemporary debates often feel more like differences in degree than in kind. Although many questions remain as to the optimal trait taxonomy, it seems likely that the Big Five—or a closely related lexical trait structure such as the HEXACO—will ultimately be determined to satisfactorily serve this role. Important questions also remain regarding the nature of lexical factors such as the Big Five. These factors might not be analogous to the atoms one finds in chemistry’s periodic table of elements in the sense that they might not be best considered as “basic building blocks” of personality. Perhaps they are better regarded as the most valuable pieces of information about someone’s personality that can be learned in five quick strokes. However, it seems fair to say that the benefits of the lexical strategy are increasingly felt in personality psychology more broadly. Research has demonstrated that the lexical strategy has identified a set of traits that is among the most important for social interactions and life outcomes. Trait structures—and especially the Big Five—now represent touchstones for the majority of personality researchers. Researchers increasingly use inventories developed to measure Big Five or other lexical traits (e.g., HEXACO) as their measures of personality. Showing how newly developed trait measures correspond to the Big Five can quickly give researchers a sense of what the new measure is actually measuring and how it is associated with personality characteristics. The Big Five also frequently serve as a useful guide to the relation between different personality traits and other variables (e.g., gender, age, IQ measures) and as a guide for combining findings from different studies. Dustin Wood

Binet’s Tests See also Ancient and Premodern Theories of Personality; Behavioral Theories of Personality; Existential Theories of Personality; Factor Analysis and Personality Theory; Humanistic Theories of Personality; Personality, Measurement of; Personality Development; Personality Traits Versus Situations; Personality Types Versus Personality Traits; Terror Management Theory; Time Perspective Theory

Further Readings Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2007). Empirical, theoretical, and practical advantages of the HEXACO model of personality structure. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11(2), 150–166. Buss, D. M. (2011). Personality and the adaptive landscape: The role of individual differences in creating and solving social adaptive problems. In D. M. Buss & P. Hawley (Eds.), The evolution of personality and individual differences (pp. 29–57). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. John, O. P., Naumann, L. P., & Soto, C. J. (2008). Paradigm shift to the integrative Big Five trait taxonomy: History, measurement, and conceptual issues. In O. P. John, R. W. Robins, & L. A. Pervin (Eds.), Handbook of personality: Theory and research (3rd ed., pp. 114–158). New York, NY: Guilford. Ozer, D. J., & Benet-Martínez, V. (2006). Personality and the prediction of consequential outcomes. Annual Review of Psychology, 57, 401–421. Saucier, G., & Ostendorf, F. (1999). Hierarchical subcomponents of the Big Five personality factors: A cross-language replication. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76(4), 613–627. Srivastava, S. (2010). The five-factor model describes the structure of social perceptions. Psychological Inquiry, 21(1), 69–75. Wood, D. (2015). Testing the lexical hypothesis: Are socially important traits more densely reflected in the English lexicon? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 108, 317–335.

Binet’s Tests Alfred Binet (born in Nice, France, in 1857) was the developer of the first valid psychometric scale of intelligence. This contribution makes him the most well-known French psychologist. In December 1904, the French Ministry of Public ­

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Instruction assigned Binet to construct a diagnostic tool that would reliably identify children who experience learning difficulties at school. A year later, in collaboration with Theodore Simon, Binet presented the first version of what became known as the Binet-Simon test of intelligence. This entry traces the development of Binet and Simon’s tests for assessing intelligence, including subsequent intelligence tests based on their efforts. The Binet-Simon test was constructed on a rather broad definition of intelligence, which included adapting to new circumstances, using good judgment, comprehending language, and reasoning well. The items in the test were constructed to address these abilities. Moreover, Binet assumed that intelligence grows with age. Thus, he scaled the items in difficulty so that they differentiated between children of different ages. Some of the most widely used contemporary tests of intelligence, such as the Wechsler tests, still use Binet’s tasks or tasks very similar to them. For example, vocabulary, paper folding, sentence recall, copying figures, attention, and memory tasks were present in the original Binet-Simon test. The first version of the test was published in 1905 and included 30 items designed to measure intelligence from infancy to 11 years of age. In 1908, this test was revised and extended to include 58 items over the age span from 3 to 13 years. In 1911, the final version appeared, which included five items for each age level and extended the ages from 14 years to adulthood. Binet attempted to measure individual differences in intelligence in terms of two intertwined factors—education and age. He thought of intelligence as a system of processes that can be measured on an ordinal scale, assuming that older children and more-educated individuals would perform ­better. His intuition to use age as an independent criterion for scaling intellectual performance was probably the most enduring contribution to intelligence testing. The intuition generated the idea that mental age is distinct from chronological age. Technically, mental age is a score that quantifies performance on the test by dividing the highest mental age level attained on the test by the chronological age of the examinee. Thus, a developmental continuum can be used to specify differences between individuals’ intellectual attainments.

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It should be noted that Binet used the term mental level, not mental age, to highlight the developmental dimension of children’s attainment. He was fully aware of the limitations of intelligence scales and suggested that a single number cannot describe intellectual abilities. For Binet, diagnosing an individual’s intellectual possibilities requires both a quantitative specification of an individual’s attainment relative to other individuals and a qualitative analysis of the individual’s responses to the test. The tests he developed implemented this functional view of intellectual attainment. It is of further note that Jean Piaget, at the beginning of his career, worked with Binet and was inspired by his theories and methods.

Binet’s Tests After Binet In 1908, Henry Goddard translated the BinetSimon scale and began using it to identify children with intellectual disabilities in the United States. Goddard promoted the test as a measure of inherent intellectual capacity, contrary to Binet’s stance that students’ performance on the test reflects an interaction between biological and environmental factors. The introduction of Binet’s intelligence scale to America launched the modern era of intelligence testing. In 1916, the Stanford University psychologist Lewis Terman standardized a revised version of Binet’s scale with 2,300 children in the United States and published it as the Stanford-Binet intelligence test. It was an individually administered test and was soon accepted as an important diagnostic tool in clinical, organizational, and educational settings, fulfilling Binet’s main aspiration when he initially developed his test. “Intelligence quotient,” or IQ, which is a notion that has since become both influential and controversial, was first used in the Stanford-Binet test. It results from the division of mental age by chronological age and the multiplication of this number by 100. It is intended to represent the individual’s overall attainment and has been considered a pure measure of general intelligence. For example, a child with a mental age of 11 and a chronological age of 10 would have an IQ of 110 (11/10 × 100). The Stanford-Binet test was the main vehicle for the dissemination of Binet’s method as a valid tool

for the measurement of intelligence. It was the gold standard for the measurement of intelligence until the appearance of Wechslerʼs test in 1939. Five editions of the test were published. After the first publication in 1916, in collaboration with Maud Merrill, Terman further developed the test and created two parallel forms of it. These forms were published as Form L (for Lewis) and Form M (for Maud) in 1937. In 1960, Merrill published the revised Form L-M by selecting the best items from the two previous forms; the test was renormed in 1973. The fourth edition of the test, published in 1986, represented a turning point in its development. It adopted the point scale format wherein the main tests were arranged into subtests. This allowed the psychologist to assess various factors in intellectual ability instead of a single general factor. This reflected an important theoretical change—namely, that intellectual abilities are hierarchically organized. The hierarchy includes general intelligence, or g, at the apex of a pyramidal structure and two layers below it. The first includes Raymond Cattell’s constructs of fluid and crystallized intelligence, and the second includes subdivisions of each of these two broad abilities into more specific abilities, such as verbal, visual, and quantitative reasoning and short-term memory. The fourth edition of the test was normed with 5,013 children, ranging from 2 to 23 years of age. Finally, the practice of multistage testing was adopted. According to this method, performance on a scale determines the starting point of subsequent tests. In 2003, the fifth edition was published. It differed substantially from the fourth edition. Specifically, it reintroduced the age scale format (i.e., the arrangement of items on the basis of developmental information) without abandoning the point scale format. Also, it added verbal and nonverbal routing tests (specifying where to start testing). Administration and scoring of the fifth edition is much simpler than the previous editions. Other advantages of the fifth edition are the extended age range (covering 2 through 85 years), flexibility of administration, child-friendly format, and additional subscales. George Spanoudis and Andreas Demetriou

Biological Constraints on Learning

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See also Brain and Intelligence; Intelligence, Environmental Influences on; Intelligence, Evolution of; Intelligence, Heritability of; Intelligence and Individualism; Intelligence and Schooling; Intelligence Testing; Intelligence Testing and Ethnicity; Measurement of Intelligence; Multiple Intelligences; Triarchic Intelligence

reviews general process learning theory and exceptions to it. The entry also discusses the challenges of biological constraints on learning.

Further Readings

Nature is characterized by tremendous diversity in size, shape, color, speed of movement, chemical composition, and so on. Scientists deal with diversity by identifying general principles that provide a framework for understanding individual variations. The periodic table of elements was created to provide this type of general underlying framework, as was Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution and James Watson and Francis Crick’s discovery of the structure of DNA. A general process approach has been fundamental to the study of classical conditioning and instrumental or operant conditioning from its inception. Classical conditioning involves the association of a conditioned stimulus (CS) with an unconditioned stimulus (US). The CS is a stimulus that initially is ineffective in eliciting much more than a mild orientation response. In contrast, the US is a stimulus that elicits vigorous responding, without prior training. Once the CS becomes associated with a US, the CS also comes to elicit strong responses related to that US. The general process approach originally assumed that the rules of classical conditioning were the same regardless of the type of CS or US that was used. In instrumental or operant conditioning, the delivery of a biologically significant event (the reinforcer) depends on the prior occurrence of an instrumental or operant response. The future probability of the response is increased by responsecontingent delivery of an appetitive reinforcer such as food and decreased by the delivery of an aversive reinforcer such as shock. The general process approach originally assumed that once an effective reinforcer was identified, the principles of instrumental conditioning would be the same, irrespective of the type of response required by the procedure.

Becker, K. A. (2003). History of the Stanford-Binet intelligence scales: Content and psychometrics (Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales, Fifth Edition Assessment Service Bulletin No. 1). Itasca, IL: Riverside. Binet, A. (1975). Modern ideas about children (S. Heisler, Trans.). (Original work published 1909) Binet, A., & Simon, T. (1905). Application of the new methods to the diagnosis of the intellectual level among normal and subnormal children in institutions and in the primary schools. L’Année Psychologique, 12, 245–336. Fancher, R. E. (1998). Alfred Binet, general psychologist. In G. A. Kimble & M. Wertheimer (Eds.), Portraits of pioneers in psychology (Vol. 3, pp. 67–83). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Biological Constraints Learning

on

The phrase “biological constraints on learning” was coined around 1970 in reference to various phenomena of classical and instrumental conditioning that were unexpected on the basis of traditional, general process learning theory. The term constraint was used to convey limitations on the scope of traditional general learning processes. The term biological was used in reference to evolutionary factors that presumably created these constraints. Phenomena originally identified as biological constraints on learning served to ­motivate substantial revisions of general process theory, but they did not result in abandonment of a general process approach. Contemporary perspectives provide a new conceptualization of classical and instrumental ­ conditioning and view these learning effects as incorporated into preexisting systems of behavior activated by the learning procedures. This entry

Traditional General Process Learning Theory

Exceptions to Traditional General Process Theory Challenges to the traditional general process approach were evident in Edward Thorndike’s

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Biological Constraints on Learning

original investigations of instrumental conditioning at the turn of the 20th century. Thorndike noted that kittens would readily learn to manipulate a latch or pull a ring to escape from a “puzzle box,” but they had difficulty learning to scratch themselves or yawn in order to escape. However, these apparent oddities were ignored until the 1960s, when discoveries of biological constraints on learning substantially accelerated. The new examples were uncovered during the course of efforts to train pigs, raccoons, and other animals to perform in amusement park displays. Other examples of constraints on learning were discovered during the course of laboratory experiments. These studies showed that animals could be easily trained with food reinforcement to pick up a token or other object, but food could not be used to train them to release the token and put it into a slot. Other studies showed that rats would readily freeze (become motionless) or run from one side of a shuttle box to the other to avoid a shock, but they had difficulty learning to press a lever with the same outcome. Investigators of classical conditioning also discovered various biological constraints on learning. In one prominent example, rats readily learned a taste aversion if the taste was paired with illness but not if an audiovisual cue was paired with illness. In contrast, pairing the audiovisual cue with foot shock resulted in a conditioned aversion, but pairing a taste with foot shock did not. A corresponding selective-association phenomenon was discovered in pigeons. Specifically, auditory cues were more effective than visual cues if the task involved shock avoidance, but visual cues were more effective than auditory if the task involved food reinforcement. In addition to various limitations on learning, investigators discovered several remarkable instances of very rapid learning under circumstances where such learning was not predicted to occur. Experiments showed that rats could learn an aversion to a taste that was followed by illness even if the illness (the US) did not begin until 6 to 8 hours after exposure to the taste (the CS). In other studies, pigeons came to peck a key light paired with food even if pecking the light was not necessary for the delivery of the food. Remarkably, the pecking also occurred when an omission procedure was implemented that canceled food

delivery at the end of a key light trial if the pigeon pecked the key. The discovery of the phenomena just described indicated that it was wrong to assume that conditioning would proceed pretty much the same way irrespective of the cues, responses, and reinforcers involved in a conditioning procedure. Rather, there were serious limitations or “constraints” on learning. Furthermore, these constraints appeared to reflect the “biology” or evolutionary history of the animals involved.

Meeting the Challenges of Biological Constraints on Learning The examples of biological constraints on learning that accumulated during the latter part of the 20th century effectively discredited traditional general process learning theory. The idea that learning phenomena are the same regardless of the cues, responses, and reinforcers (or unconditioned stimuli) used has largely been abandoned. However, investigators have not walked away from efforts to formulate a general process theory of classical and instrumental conditioning. Rather, they have worked to create a new general theory that accommodates the challenges. Efforts to create a new general theory have not retained the idea of biological constraints on learning because that phrase is fairly vacuous. To posit a biological constraint on learning suggests that there are nonbiological constraints. However, it is not clear what a nonbiological constraint might be. All learning phenomena are mediated by the nervous system and are therefore “biological.” Moreover, the distinction between biological and nonbiological is indefensible even if one restricts the term biological to evolutionary influences. Learning is constrained by all sorts of factors (the number of training trials, the spacing of those trials, motivational factors, the timing of events within a trial, the presence of distracting events, etc.). It is impossible to sort out which of those constraints were selected for directly or indirectly during the course of evolution. The concept of ­biological constraint is also impossible to use in theory development because it does not refer to a common, underlying process. As noted, a c­ onstraint on learning can occur for a variety of different reasons.

Biological Constraints on Learning

Greater understanding of the learning phenomena classified as biological constraints on learning has come from two different sources. One has been detailed empirical investigation of the behavioral factors responsible for specific constraint phenomena. These investigations have substantially changed the accepted view of classical conditioning and its relationship to instrumental or operant conditioning. Traditionally, the two types of conditioning were considered to be different forms of learning that could interact but could be easily separated. Conditioned responses that developed through classical conditioning were assumed to be primarily autonomic, involving smooth musculature (as exemplified by Ivan Pavlov’s studies of salivary conditioning). In contrast, the responses learned through instrumental or operant conditioning were assumed to involve skeletal muscles (as exemplified by a rat pressing a bar in a Skinner box). This distinction has been abandoned. Numerous studies have shown that through classical conditioning, a localized CS (a small light or object) will come to elicit skeletal approach and manipulatory responses if it is paired with food. With pigeons, these Pavlovian-conditioned responses consist of pecking a key light. With rats, they include approaching, handling, and holding on to a token. Many instances of constraints on instrumental conditioning consist of skeletal Pavlovianconditioned responses that intrude and interfere with the response required by the instrumental conditioning procedure. Thus, rats will not learn to release a token for food because the token has become associated with food and thereby elicits Pavlovian-approach and manipulatory responses. Another major change has occurred in the view that classical and instrumental conditioning alter the probability of a single response. Rather, the new perspective is that learning occurs in the context of systems of behavior that have evolved to solve important problems that organisms faced in their natural history. Different systems of behavior deal with foraging and procuring food, defending against intruders and potential predators, and finding and securing a sexual partner for reproduction. A learning procedure is superimposed on the behavior system that is activated by that learning protocol. For example, if food is used as the US or

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the reinforcer, the experimental participants are usually mildly food deprived, and food is doled out in small portions. Under these conditions, the feeding behavior system is activated. The foraging/feeding system includes various components that involve search for food (general and focal search modes) and components that involve handling and ingestion of the food. Each component involves heightened sensitivity to a certain set of stimuli, as well as an associated set of responses. General search, for example, involves heightened sensitivity to contextual cues and an increase in the probability of nondirected locomotion. Focal search, in contrast, is activated by spatially restricted cues and involves spatially directed locomotion. According to the behavior systems view, the outcome of a learning procedure is best understood by considering how the learning procedure interacts with the underlying behavior system that is activated by the procedure. If food is used as the US or the reinforcer, responses that are highly compatible with the feeding behavior system will be learned more easily than responses not compatible with the system. In addition, the particular behavior that emerges depends on which component of the system (general search, focal search, or food handling) is most readily activated by the conditioning procedure. That, in turn, depends on the cues used in the learning procedure and when those cues are presented in relation to the time of food delivery.

Contemporary Views The various biological constraints on learning that were identified in the latter part of the 20th century led to rejection of traditional general process learning theory. However, investigators of these phenomena did not abandon a general process approach to science. Rather, they sought to create new formulations that would provide more successful general characterizations of classical and instrumental conditioning. These new formulations include a new perspective on what kinds of responses can be conditioned by these procedures and how the behaviors activated by classical and instrumental conditioning interact. Michael Domjan

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See also Applied Behavior Analysis; Behavioral Theories of Personality; Behaviorism; Brain and Intelligence; Classical Conditioning; Law of Effect; Operant Conditioning; Pavlov’s Legacy; Punishment; Reinforcement; Skinner’s Legacy

Further Readings Domjan, M. (1983). Biological constraints on instrumental and classical conditioning: Implications for general process theory. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation (Vol. 17, pp. 215–277). New York, NY: Academic Press. Domjan, M. (2008). Adaptive specializations and generality of the laws of classical and instrumental conditioning. In J. Byrne (Editor-in-chief) & R. Menzel (Vol. Ed.), Learning and memory: A comprehensive reference: Vol. 1. Learning and behavior theory (pp. 327–340). Oxford, England: Elsevier. Timberlake, W. (2001). Motivational modes in behavior systems. In R. R. Mowrer & S. B. Klein (Eds.), Handbook of contemporary learning theories (pp. 155–209). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Brain

and

Consciousness

How brain activity gives rise to consciousness remains a mystery. This refers to the most basic form of consciousness, such as the awareness of pain or of an afterimage. Thomas Nagel proposed that a creature possesses this basic form of consciousness if there is something it is like to be that creature. Such experiences can be detected experimentally only through self-report: The subject indicates consciousness of an event (e.g., a bright flash of light) but not of other events (e.g., subliminal stimuli, the pupillary reflex, or peristalsis). This entry reviews theories about the brain’s function in consciousness.

Two Points of View Scientists have no real clue regarding how anything, brain or not, could ever create consciousness. Despite this challenge, there are two growing consensuses regarding brain and consciousness.

Subset Consensus

The first consensus is that consciousness is associated with only a subset of all brain regions and information-processing structures (we can refer to this as the subset consensus, for short). Not all brain activities seem to be directly associated with consciousness. Accordingly, consciousness occurs despite the nonparticipation of each of several important brain regions, including cerebellum, amygdala, hippocampus, nondominant cerebral cortex, cerebral commissures, and basal ganglia. Most theories composing this consensus also propose that consciousness arises from activities at the level not of the single neuron but of specific neural populations. At odds with this consensus are views in which consciousness is a property of all matter (i.e., panpsychism) or arises from processes below the level of the individual neuron (e.g., microtubules). Controversy remains regarding which regions form a network capable of constituting consciousness. There are several accounts, each of which is corroborated by strong evidence. Some theorists propose that the frontal cortex is necessary for consciousness of any kind. However, some researchers who study the effects of frontal lobotomies or of anencephaly have challenged these accounts, as have some investigators who investigate perception-and-action phenomena. For example, brain stimulation of posterior perceptual regions of the brain induces the illusion that one has acted (e.g., moved a finger), and stimulation of anterior motor areas induces overt action but no consciousness of the action, consistent with theories in which consciousness is intimately related to perceptual processing. In contrast to cortical accounts of consciousness, Wilder Penfield popularized the notion that, though the cortex elaborates the contents of consciousness, it is not the seat of consciousness, which he believed was constituted by subcortical activities instead. There are also accounts in which consciousness depends on thalamocortical interactions or on frontoparietal interactions. A further theory, based on neurological findings, proposed that the “dorsal stream” of the brain is unconscious and controls motor action, whereas the “ventral stream” is for conscious knowledge representation. A unique hypothesis

Brain and Consciousness

proposed that modules in the brain (e.g., modules for color perception) can each generate their own “‘micro-consciousness” without being part of a larger network. Integration Consensus

The second emerging consensus is that consciousness integrates neural and cognitive processes that would otherwise be independent (this is known as the integration consensus). It includes field ­theories, theories in which consciousness serves as a hub (or “dynamic core”) that integrates diverse ­processes, theories in which consciousness serves to couple perception to novel actions, and the influential global workspace theory. Consistent with this consensus, the conscious processing of a mental representation involves a wider and more diverse network of brain regions than does the unconscious (e.g., subliminal) processing of that representation, in that the latter is subjected only to “local” processing. Evidence for the consensus stems from research on perception, action, anesthesia, and unresponsive states (e.g., coma). Consistent with the integration consensus, it has been proposed that consciousness might require not just the activations of certain loci in the brain but certain kinds of interactions (“neurodynamics”) among these loci. Controversy surrounds the brain rhythms (oscillations generated by neural populations) that are associated with these peculiar neurodynamics. Some theorists propose that consciousness is linked to the gamma rhythm (high frequencies such as 40 Hz), and others propose that it is associated with lower frequencies (e.g., beta; 15–30 Hz) or to a combination of a high and lower frequencies (e.g., “gamma over beta”). Regarding neurodynamics, there is controversy as to whether attention and consciousness are distinct and, if so, whether the latter requires the former. One theory about the neurodynamics of consciousness proposed that consciousness involves “reentrant” processing, a kind of feedback in which information first travels from lower-level to high-level processing structures (the “feedforward sweep,” associated with unconscious ­processing) and then, critically, travels back to the lower-level structures (a “feedback” wave, associated with consciousness). In this view, multiple

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structures interact when crafting a conscious mental representation, achieving “multiple-­ constraint satisfaction.” Consistent with this consensus, Wilhelm Wundt’s notion of “apperception” proposes that, prior to the conscious representation of a stimulus, there are multiple (unconscious) interpretations of the stimulus (a notion similar to Daniel Dennett’s “multiple drafts” hypothesis). Such unconscious processing is evident in intersensory illusions such as the McGurk effect in which an observer views a speaker mouthing /ga/ but hears the sound /ba/. Surprisingly, the observer is unaware of any intersensory interaction and reports hearing /da/. The conscious representations thus reflect not low-level sensory processes (e.g., detecting spatial frequency in vision) or high-level processes (e.g., abstract concepts such as “living thing”) but, rather, intermediate levels of processing. Inter­ sensory interactions such as those in the McGurk effect also reveal a limitation of the integration consensus—namely, that not all integrations require consciousness. In fact, research suggests that those interactions requiring consciousness are not intimately related to perceptual integrations but to later-stage, “voluntary” processing that is associated with skeletal musculature. Hyein Cho and Ezequiel Morsella See also Consciousness, Categories of; Consciousness, Disorders of; Consciousness, Functions of; Consciousness, Origins of; Consciousness and the Unconscious; Heightened Consciousness

Further Readings Dehaene, S. (2014). Consciousness and the brain: Deciphering how the brain codes our thoughts. New York, NY: Viking. Goodale, M., & Milner, D. (2004). Sight unseen: An exploration of conscious and unconscious vision. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Gray, J. A. (2004). Consciousness: Creeping up on the hard problem. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Morsella, E. (2005). The function of phenomenal states: Supramodular interaction theory. Psychological Review, 112, 1000–1021.

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Brain and Intelligence

Brain

and Intelligence

Perhaps the first issue one should consider about the relationship between the brain and intelligence is that one is attempting to relate a physical entity, the brain, the activities of which must conform to the laws of physics and chemistry, with a nonphysical entity, “intelligence.” This entry discusses the relationship between the brain and intelligence and reviews suggestions for future research. Intelligence has no isomorphic physical correspondent; rather, it is a conceptual category used to characterize one type of functional activity of the brain. Another issue is that there has never been agreement on a definition of intelligence. However, one constant about intelligence is that it depends on an animal’s ability to learn and remember, and what an animal can learn and remember is constrained by its learning capabilities. For example, a species that is incapable of concept learning can never be considered to show the intelligence of a species that is capable of concept learning. Despite these formidable issues, for approximately 2,500 years scholars have sought to understand the relationship between brain and “mind” (another nonphysical entity). For present purposes, mind is interchangeable with intelligence, and the abbreviation M/I will be used.

Historical Overview During the 17th and 18th centuries, philosophers debated whether brain and M/I were identical (e.g., Thomas Hobbes’s materialistic monism) or whether they were independent entities. René Descartes argued for independent entities that interacted, and Gottfried W. Leibniz argued for independent entities that functioned in perfect parallel. George Berkeley believed that the brain was only an idea in the mind (idealistic monism). The Greek philosopher Galen and earlier physician-scholars attempted to investigate brain functions, and Descartes added neuroanatomy and physiology to his brain-M/I interactionist view. Nevertheless, scientific investigation of the brain and M/I did not emerge strongly until the early 19th century. Franz Joseph Gall correlated bumps and depressions on the cranium with psychological faculties that he believed constituted M/I. Gall assumed that

bumps and depressions reflected the underlying development or lack thereof of brain tissue. Larger brain areas (located via cranial protrusions) reflected the superior development of a particular faculty while depressions reflected a deficiency in a faculty. Such a correlational approach is scientifically legitimate; however, Gall was careless about experimental control when seeking evidence for the manifestations of the faculties in his human ­subjects. Nevertheless, the “science” or “pseudoscience” of phrenology was born, a term Gall disavowed in favor of craniology or organology. Gall’s enduring legacy is that he established the view that ­M/I-related functions are localized in the brain. Phrenology was soon denounced by Pierre Flourens, who experimentally ablated parts of the brains of frogs, rabbits, and pigeons and observed changes in their behavior. Flourens concluded that, although different parts of the brain might have their proper functions, many or most parts of the brain functioned together as a unit. Flourens’s antilocalization view soon eclipsed Gall’s localization view. However, localization reemerged strongly in the second half of the 19th century with the discovery that a specific area of the cerebral cortex controlled human speech (Jean-Baptiste Bouillaud, Simon Alexandre Ernest Aubertin, and Paul Broca), and using electrical stimulation in the brains of dogs, Gustav Fritsch and Eduard Hitzig determined that a specific area of the dog’s cerebral cortex controlled motor movements. Subsequent extensive cortical mapping of sensory and motor areas led to the discovery, ­ especially for human and nonhuman primates, ­ that large cortical areas were unassigned. Asso­ ciationism, a largely British philosophy about how knowledge is acquired, was prevalent, and soon it was suggested that the unassigned cortical areas comprised an “association” cortex. It was suggested that activities in the sensory cortex and motor cortex were integrated in the association cortex for higher order brain activities such as learning, memory, and intelligence. Based on histological examination of the cerebral cortex, cortical mapping reached its zenith early in the 20th century with the general acceptance of Korbinian Brodmann’s identification of 52 areas; Brodmann speculated that each cytoarchitecturely distinct area had a distinct function. The antilocalization view reemerged strongly in the first half of the 20th century with Shepherd

Brain and Intelligence

Ivory Franz and Karl Lashley, who used cortical ablation and research tasks intended to measure learning, memory, and intelligence. Both accepted that there were well-defined sensory and motor processing areas, but both believed that learning, memory, and intelligence involved most of the cerebral cortex. Lashley was such a scholarly force that localization of higher order functions was again eclipsed. Within two or three decades following Lashley’s death (1958), localization of function reasserted itself especially among brain-imaging researchers. Localization of function was often taken to such extremes by these researchers that William Uttal, in 2003, felt compelled to refer to such research as the “new phrenology,” a view shared by other contemporary, reputable critics. Meanwhile, views regarding the association cortex were also changing. Summarizing decades of careful neuroanatomical and behavioral studies mostly by Irving T. Diamond and his colleagues, Diamond concluded that the neocortex consists only of the s­ensory and motor cortex and that there is no association cortex per se. Further, in 1979 Diamond identified the cortical areas only in the sensory categories (vision, audition, etc.) and concluded that “every area of the cortex could be viewed as a motor area, or layer V itself could be termed the ‘motor cortex’” (p. 35). The neocortex has six cytoarchitecturely distinct layers from the surface (Layer I) of the brain to the deepest (Layer VI). Many contemporary scholars agree with Diamond that the entire central nervous system is a sensory-motor processing system, together with memory processing and formation, and that as the brain evolves, it becomes increasingly capable of highly complex sensorymotor-memory processing. Although motor is the term most used historically, the more general term effector processing is better. Motor usually implies skeletal muscle responding, but smooth muscle activation and glandular secretions have critical roles in emotions and behavior. For example, embarrassment manifested as blushing involves cutaneous vasodilatation. Fear and anger are usually associated with neurosecretions of the adrenal glands. Moreover, important results of sensory-effector activities are physical changes in the brain that enable memory. Memories can modify ongoing sensory-effector

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processing; thus, the brain is constantly changing as a result of sensory-memory-effector processing.

Brain Size and Intelligence Somewhat independently of what was happening in the brain-behavior-M/I laboratories, investigation of the relationship between brain size and intelligence was occurring. This began in the late 19th century with the simple notion that bigger brains implied greater M/I. Little attention was given to measuring intelligence; rather, this line of research proceeded on the assumption that the best brain-size index of intelligence will place humans at the top. Data such as the elephant’s brain size of 5,700 grams compared with the human’s of about 1,350 grams quickly suggested that absolute brain size should be discarded in favor of a measure that took into account body weight. Using this approach, the human brain accounts for about 2.2% body weight compared with elephants’ 0.08% of body weight. However, squirrel and cebus monkeys have brainto-body weight ratios of 4% to 5%; thus, simple brain-body weight ratios are not acceptable. Harry Jerison’s empirical approach might be the most accepted today. Using logarithmic coordinates, Jerison plotted brain weights on the Y axis and body weights on the X axis. He plotted data from a large number of vertebrates and saw, for example, that if he connected the outermost data points for “lower” vertebrates (fish, amphibians, and reptiles) and, separately, the outermost points for “higher” vertebrates (birds and mammals), there was no overlap between the polygons that enclosed the data points for the two sets of vertebrates. Furthermore, the best fit line for each group had a slope of 2/3, and the line for lower vertebrates crossed the Y axis (the intercept) below where the best fit line for higher vertebrates crossed. Similar best-fit lines were seen with other groups, such as mammals, or orders among mammals, such as primates. Jerison expressed the general linear ­ equation as follows: E = kP2/3, where E is brain weight, P is body weight, the slope of 2/3 was used as a constant, and k is the empirically determined intercept on the Y axis. Related to

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the 2/3 constant, Jerison has reported a near-­ perfect correlation between two-dimensional brain area (cm) and three-dimensional brain volume (grams or cc). One application of this equation might be as follows. Having determined that the best-fit line for mammals resulted in k = 0.12, one might use the equation to solve, for example, the “expected” brain weight (Ee) of humans compared with other mammals of human body size. Using 58,275 grams for typical human body weight, the expected brain weight needed by a human to be a typical mammal of human body size is 180.36 grams. As the average human brain weight is about 1,350 grams, Jerison calculated an encephalization quotient using EQ = Ei/Ee, where Ei is the individual or representative brain weight for a species and Ee is the expected brain weight, calculated as just shown. Thus, the human EQ (1,350/180.36) is 7.5, or one might say, the human has 7.5 times more brain than needed to function as a typical mammal of its body size. The EQs of other mammals mentioned earlier are 1.25 (elephant), 2.80 (squirrel monkey), and 4.79 (cebus monkey). Clearly, one prospect is that EQs might be correlated with IQs to determine a relationship between brain and intelligence.

Guidance for Future Research Regarding Brain and Intelligence First, there are ways to proceed now with better research. Jerison has provided a way to calculate the EQ, and Roger K. Thomas has provided a way to determine a numerical index for intelligence that can be used with any species. Further research might be needed to refine EQ measures, as they do not always agree with a priori expectations. For example, the EQ for squirrel monkeys (2.80) exceeds those of all the great apes (chimpanzee, 2.48; gorilla, 1.76; orangutan, 1.91), yet few contemporary primate researchers would accept that squirrel monkeys are more intelligent than chimpanzees. In any case, that is an empirical question that might be decided best with further research. However, it seems likely that some brain-weight adjustment might be needed to optimize the EQ measure; for example, a squirrel monkey’s brain weighs about 25 grams, whereas a chimpanzee’s brain weighs about 385 grams. Thomas proposed an eight-level hierarchy of learning that includes all types of learning.

Complexity of tasks at Levels 7 and 8 can be increased systematically to challenge even the most intelligent humans. Rarely has a variety of species of animals had their intelligence assessed using a common testing approach. When such has been done, results have been confounded by the failure to take into account variables, such as that animals are not equal in sensory and effector capabilities, in what motivates them, and in how the testing environment affects them (e.g., a room too bright results in fear in rats and a room too cold for reptiles might make them torpid and appear less intelligent than they are). Tasks are needed that can be adapted to be administered optimally for each species; Thomas’s approach provides that. Finally, to accomplish the best possible research regarding the relationship between brain and intelligence, one must think clearly about that relationship. Figures 1 and 2 might be helpful. In both figures, the large open arrow entering the brain reflects sensory processing that is initiated outside the brain as a result of external, observable antecedents. The solid arrow exiting the brain reflects effector processing associated with the initiation of external observable consequents, such as behavioral (e.g., speech) or physiological (e.g., vasodilatation associated with blushing occurs only after one knows one has a reason to blush) responses. Note that sensory and effector processing may be assessed inside the brain with electrical recordings, chemical samplings, brain imaging, or invasive manipulations (e.g., chemical or electrical stimulation and targeted ablations). Note also that memory processing also involves physicochemical activities resulting in physical changes within the brain. The gears in the figures symbolize that sensory, effector, and memory processing constantly interact and might modify one another’s physicochemical activities. Nowhere in the brain does anything happen that can be said to be isomorphic with intelligence. Rather, “intelligence” is a linking concept used to represent certain sets of observable external and internal antecedents and consequents. Most concepts that behavioral neuroscientists investigate are linking concepts that are equally fictitious in that they have no isomorphic physical manifestations. Behavioral scientists refer to them as intervening variables that function as shortcut terms to link

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Brain

Sensory sory

Ef Effector

External Observable Antecedents

External Observable Consequents

Also Known as Stimuli Causes Correlates

Also Known as Responses Effects Correlates

Memory

Linking Concepts, Such as Intelligence Mind Fear Anger Cognition

Figure 1 A static representation of the brain and how its physicochemical sensory, effector, and memory processing systems are affected by material-antecedent events and how these processing systems determine and effect material-consequent events. The linking concepts used to describe or summarize such processes and events are fictitious, immaterial constructions.

EOAs

Brain at Time 1

Same Brain at Time 2

See Figure 1

See Figure 1

EOCs

LINKING CONCEPTS

Figure 2 This dynamic representation of the processes and events associated with the brain in Figure 1 shows that processes and events are constantly changing as time passes and that consequent events at Time 1 may become part of the antecedent events at Time 2. Note: EOA = external, observable antecedents; EOC = external, observable consequents.

myriad antecedent and consequent observations. Physicists, for example, refer to similar, nonobserved entities as hypothetical constructs. Kenneth McCorquodale and Paul E. Meehl suggested that behavioral scientists might propose hypothetical constructs when they believe that isomorphic physical manifestations may be observed eventually. An example of a biological hypothetical construct is that the “gene” was hypothesized well before DNA and its biochemical composition were determined. Perhaps the only hypothetical construct in behavioral science is the engram, Lashley’s term for how memory is manifested in the brain, something still being investigated.

Figure 2 illustrates that the brain is always active, and for example, some of the consequents of Time 1 might become part of the antecedents at Time 2. Comparable to Heraclitus’s aphorism “You cannot step twice into the same river,” the brain is never the same from moment to moment. Meanwhile, tagging along in parallel with the brain’s activities are linking concepts such as intelligence, mind, fear, anger, perception, cognition, and so on, the meanings of which are always limited to observable external and internal antecedents and consequents. Roger K. Thomas

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See also Childhood; Cognitive Development; Cognitive Evolution; Evolutionary Psychology; Intelligence, Evolution of; Intelligence Testing; Measurement of Intelligence

Further Readings Coltheart, M. (2006). Editorial: What has functional neuroimaging told us about the brain (so far)? Cortex, 42, 323–331. Diamond, I. T. (1979). The subdivisions of neocortex: A proposal to revise the traditional view of sensory, motor, and association areas. In J. M. Sprague & A. Epstein (Eds.), Progress in psychobiology and physiological psychology (Vol. 8, pp. 1–43). New York, NY: Academic Press. Jerison, H. (1973). Evolution of the brain and intelligence. New York, NY: Academic Press. Thomas, R. K. (1980). Evolution of intelligence: An approach to its assessment. Brain, Behavior & Evolution, 17, 452–474. Thomas, R. K. (1996). Investigating cognitive abilities in animals: Unrealized potential. Cognitive Brain Research, 3, 157–166. Uttal, W. R. (2003). The new phrenology: The limits of localizing cognitive processes in the brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Brain and Nervous System: Macroarchitecture Until late 20th century, the visible anatomy and study of the nervous system was based on postmortem dissection and histological examination. In this tradition, the visible structures of the nervous system were divided into two general systems: (a) the central nervous system, or CNS, which included the brain and spinal cord, and (b) the peripheral nervous system, or PNS, which housed the autonomic nervous system, further divided into the sympathetic and parasympathetic divisions. This entry discusses how neuroimaging has advanced knowledge about the structure of the brain and nervous system. Since there are estimated to be 100 to 200 billion brain cells that comprise the human brain, the intricacies of how cellular function, brain

anatomy and structure relate to behavior is an inferential process. Psychology has established theories to guide this inferential process and research with the assumption that there is an anatomy that underlies behavior. In the 21st century, this is studied using neuroanatomical techniques. Over the last two centuries, the macro or observable aspects of the nervous system have been well characterized by neuroanatomists using these techniques. However, with the introduction of computed tomography in the 1970s and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) in the 1980s, much of the contemporary study of the nervous system shifted to neuroimaging. The great advantage of studying the macroarchitecture of the nervous system via neuroimaging techniques is that all imaging can be done in the living individual, whether healthy or ill. Figure 1 compares a postmortem horizontal slice (left) with a similar slice taken of the author’s brain (right) using MRI technology. The similarities at this macroscopic level are remarkably analogous. Figure 1 also demonstrates a fundamental macrostructure distinction within the CNS, whether viewing a postmortem brain or in a view derived from MRI. At the macroscopic level, there are two general tissue types, white matter and gray matter, and a centrally located series of chambers referred to as the ventricular system, filled with pressurized cerebrospinal fluid (CSF). Neural tissue is soft, and with the average brain weighing approximately 1,350 grams (about 3 pounds), it would collapse in on itself if it were not for the pressurized CSF-filled ventricular cavities that create an outward pressure gradient. The nervous system has a rich and complicated vascular supply, but most of the blood vessels embedded in the brain are capillaries and therefore not visible at the macroscopic level. When viewing the macroscopic anatomy as in Figure 1, the distinction between white matter (shown in white) and gray matter (shown in gray) is readily apparent. The fundamental unit of the nervous system is the neuron, and although there are numerous types with very different and specialized roles, they all have common characteristics, and all are involved in some fashion with transferring or relaying information. All have a cell body with numerous

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Figure 1 (A) postmortem horizontal (axial) view of the brain compared with an MRI section at a similar cutting plane, although not identical. The similarity between the postmortem section and the in vivo MRI is apparent. This view of the brain also demonstrates the general symmetry of the brain, where each hemisphere is a duplicate of the other. The gray matter cortical ribbon and gray matter subcortical nuclear structures appear with distinct boundaries from the white matter in both the postmortem view and the MRI view.

elements that form the input (dendrite) side but only a singular process referred to as the axon that projects to the next cell. Figure 2 is a schematic of a CNS neuron showing numerous dendritic inputs surrounding the cell body but just the singular axonal output emanating from the cell body. The inset shows an actual cell, which also reflects how small neural cells are. The bar indicates that the cell body is no more than 10 microns in diameter at its widest point, with a clearly protruding singular axon that is no more than 1 to 2 microns in width. Cell bodies congregate together, and their collective density gives rise to the darker appearance seen even in the postmortem brain. Out of convention, the MRI scan “colorizes” the image based on signal characteristics of radiofrequency wave that differ between white and gray matter where the gray scale metric depicts gray matter as gray and white matter as white. A variety of nonneuron CNS cells play supportive roles; one that is key to neural transmission is the oligodendrocyte, which provides the myelin

coating to axons. The myelin coating, which is a fatty sheath that facilitates neural transmission, is also the basis for white matter literally appearing white. Myelinated axons, tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands compacted together, form tracts that run through the brain connecting different regions subserving different functions. This is discussed in greater detail later. Gray matter in the CNS reflects the highly compacted regions of cell body organization, whereas white matter reflects the connections either in or out of gray matter regions. Another important benefit of studying the macrostructure of the brain via neuroimaging is that the brain may be sliced and viewed in any orientation, as shown in Figure 3, again depicting the general appearance of gray matter, white matter, and CSF-filled spaces. The densely compacted neuronal cell bodies that form on the outer surface of the cortical folds, referred to as gyri (Latin for “circle”), create the irregular surface contour of the brain. This cortical ribbon of gray matter, also referred to as the cortical mantel, provides greater

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Figure 2 Schematic showing the different parts of the neuron, the fundamental unit of the nervous system. Although there are numerous dendritic protuberances, there is but a single axonal projection that comes from the cell body, although axon collaterals may branch out at different levels of the axon. The inset depicts an actual neuron cell body, with a distinct nucleus and the protruding axon. The small size of the neuron is reflected in the 10-micron (µm) calibration bar.

surface area dedicated to neuronal function. The clefts between each fold, referred to as sulci (Latin for “furrow”), form creases between gyri that are also filled with CSF held within what is referred to as the subarachnoid space. A tough, sinewy structure, the dura mater, covers the brain; a much more gossamer-like membrane, the pia mater, actually covers the brain and houses the surface vasculature. On the MRI illustrations in Figures 1, 3, and 4, the CSF within the ventricle and the subarachnoid surface, between the dura mater and subarachnoid space, has a dark appearance. The CSF, whether contained within the ventricular system internally or that which coats the outer surface, functions to protect the brain from movement and trauma, acting like a shock absorber; it also removes unwanted byproducts from the brain. Macro divisions in brain anatomy also derive from embryological development. Figure 4 shows the classic divisions of the CNS related to the neural tube formation. These distinctions, in turn, form

the basis for the macro divisions of the brain and spinal cord. These differences in embryological development provide useful anatomical landmarks for gross brain classification as shown in the midsagittal MRI view from a typically developed adult, also in Figure 4. Using the embryological classification scheme, above the midbrain (see Figure 4) is referred to as the cerebrum, which is then divided into cortical and subcortical regions. Subcortical nuclei of the cerebrum are characterized by their gray appearance, just as seen at the level of the cortical mantel (see Figures 1 and 3). At the cortical level, conventionally the cerebrum is divided into two hemispheres with each hemisphere possessing four lobes: frontal, parietal, temporal, and occipital (see Figure 5). The embryological division of the hindbrain, in part referred to as the cerebellum (Latin for “little brain”), represents another aspect of the motor system, although it is more involved in background movement, coordination, and balance.

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Figure 3  An MRI of the brain shows how scan images may be generated in any plane.

Figure 4 (Left) Early embryological development of the neural tube and early formulation of the central nervous system (CNS)—brain and spinal cord. When viewed from the sagittal plane, these divisions are straightforward to identify where the colorization points to the different embryological distinctions.

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Figure 5 Three-dimensional MRI-rendered brain depicting the surface anatomy of the brain, with two major landmarks. The central sulcus is the fissure that divides the frontal (anterior) lobe from the parietal (posterior). The gyrus just in front of the central sulcus is the precentral gyrus and immediately behind is the postcentral gyrus. The Sylvian fissure divides the frontal (anterior) from the temporal lobe (inferior), and where the fissure ends defines a general boundary between the bottom of the parietal lobe and the top of the temporal lobe. (A) Lower brain stem. (B) Approximate posterior boundary of the temporal lobe and beginning of the occipital lobe toward the back of the brain. Below “B” is the cerebellum.

Using a specialized MRI technique referred to as diffusion tensor imaging (DTI), aggregate white matter tracts of the brain may be derived. As shown in the midsagittal view of Figure 3, the corpus callosum is the most prominent white matter structure viewed in this plane and connects the two cerebral hemispheres. At postmortem, with careful blunt dissection techniques, the congregated white matter fiber tracts can be teased apart as shown in Figure 6. By applying DTI techniques to this midline white matter structure, the aggregate projections that course between the two hemispheres can be readily viewed, as also shown in Figure 6, along with a variety of other tracts. The aggregate yet individualized white matter tracts visualized in DTI are made up of tens of ­thousands of individual axons. By following where certain tracts connect brain regions, critical neural networks that relate to function may be derived.

Figure 6 (A) Dorsal view of a postmortem dissection with meticulous teasing apart of large, aggregate white matter tracts of the brain showing their back-and-forth projections between the two hemispheres. The top of the hemisphere has been removed. Also note at the cortical level, how the white matter tracts form a U-shape, which represents the connection between adjacent gyri. (B) Human in vivo diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) capable of deriving some of the same aggregate tracts. (C) Using DTI, individual tracts may be extracted from the background white matter as plotted on this midsagittal MRI: (a) corpus callosum, (b) cingulum bundle, (c) uncinate fasciculus, (d) superior longitudinal fasciculus, and (e) occipitotemporal fasciculus. Information about brain networks is gathered by studying DTI-identified networks.

In a general sense, many of the so-called functional neural networks related to motor, sensory, cognitive, or behavioral functions have been established. For example, the central sulcus is the dividing line that separates the frontal from parietal lobes where the precentral gyrus at the back of the frontal lobe governs strength and motor control and just behind; the postcentral gyrus

Brain and Nervous System: Microarchitecture

relates to tactile perception. The superior temporal gyrus houses critical regions involved in hearing and auditory processing, and the visual cortex within the occipital lobe relates specifically to visual processing. The inner part of the temporal lobe, referred to as the mesial temporal cortex, is critical for memory, especially the hippocampus, as well as emotional functioning, especially the amygdala. Attentional networks involve parietal, temporal, and frontal cortical areas as shown in Figure 6. Executive functioning involves large networks of the frontal lobes, and the corpus callosum houses the pathways that transfer and integrate information between the two hemispheres. Erin D. Bigler See also Brain and Nervous System: Microarchitecture; Cognitive Neuroscience; Frontal Lobe Functions; Neuroscience as One-Sided Dualism; Occipital Lobe Functions; Parietal Lobe Functions; Research Methods in Neuroscience; Temporal Lobe Functions

Further Readings Fumagalli, M., & Priori, A. (2012). Functional and clinical neuroanatomy of morality. Brain, 135 (Pt. 7), 2006–2021. doi:10.1093/brain/awr334 Lezak, M. D., Howieson, D. B., Bigler, E. D., & Tranel, D. (2012). Neuropsychological Assessment. New York: Oxford University Press. Mai, J. K., Voss, T., & Paxinos, G. (2007). Atlas of the human brain. New York: Elsevier. http://www .thehumanbrain.info/ Pukenas, B. (2011). Normal brain anatomy on magnetic resonance imaging. Magnetic Resonance Imaging Clinics of North America, 19(3), 429–437, vii. doi: 0.1016/j.mric.2011.05.015

system at the macro level, it is advisable to have at least a basic understanding of its small-scale workings. Specifically, theories that relate psychological phenomena to the brain and nervous system often specify cellular and subcellular mechanisms as the substrate at which the psychological phenomena have their origin. This entry introduces cell components, cell interactions, and the varieties of cells found in the macrostructures of the brain and ­spinal cord, including the central and peripheral nervous systems. The neuron is the ubiquitous, fundamental cellular unit of the nervous system. Typically consisting of a cell body containing the nucleus, multiple dendrites receiving neural input via synapses, and an axon transmitting outgoing signals, neurons take various forms that facilitate their different roles (Figure 1). They vary by morphology in terms of cell body size, shape, number, and extent of ­dendrites and axonal extension; they also vary in neurochemical expression, producing different neurotransmitters and expressing different receptor combinations at their synapses. Additional cell types also contribute to the variation in function within the nervous system, notably (a) Schwann cells, which contribute the myelin sheath in the peripheral nervous system, thereby influencing neural conduction time, and

Brain and Nervous System: Microarchitecture In addition to their macroarchitecture, the brain and nervous system also exhibit a microarchitecture at the level of cells, subcellular structures, and cell aggregates. To properly understand the functions and mechanisms of the brain and nervous

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Figure 1  Diagram of a Neuron Source: Wikimedia Commons/Nick Gorton.

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(b) several types of glial cell, which play a variety of roles, contributing to immunity and inflammatory responses as well as neurotransmitter production and synaptic maintenance. The multipolar astrocytes are the most common brain cell with multiple functions supporting neural processing and inflammation. The oligodendrocytes are the central nervous system equivalent to the Schwann cells, creating the myelin sheath. The microglia perform a phagocytic immune response. The gray matter of the nervous system primarily consists of the cerebral cortex and the various nuclei and ganglia that contain the cell bodies. The white matter is comprised primarily of the communicating tracts, which are bundles of myelinated and unmyelinated axons.

Cerebral Cortex The neocortex of the cerebral hemispheres typically consists of six layers descending (I to VI) from the pial surface spanning about 3 to 4 mm to the boundary with the underlying white matter. Depending on cortical region, there is variation in the absolute and relative thickness of these layers. In areas of the allocortex, for example, within the insular cortex or in the piriform cortex (the primary olfactory area), there are fewer layers (usually three) thought to reflect the older or less derived evolutionary history of those brain regions. During corticogenesis in brain development, cells migrate up to the brain surface to form the cortex, stacking up in an “inside-out” order, forming columns of cells. This creates a vertical, columnar, organization in the cortex, in addition to the horizontal layering. Descending from top to bottom, the top layer, Layer I, described as the molecular layer, is cell sparse and mostly consists of dendritic branching, although it contains a few neurons, in particular Cajal-Retzius cells, which play a substantial role in the developmental organization of the cortex and might be implicated in some neuropsychiatric disorders. Layer II is a cell-dense layer, described as the external granular layer, mainly consisting of relatively small, nonpyramidal neurons and glia, which gives way to Layer III below it where

the cells are less densely distributed and consist of a mix of glia, nonpyramidal, and a larger number of pyramidal neurons. The pyramidal neurons are aligned roughly vertically in the cortex, with a triangular shape “pointing” up to the cortical surface due to the presence of an apical dendrite extending from the top of the cell body, and they become larger toward the bottom of Layer III. Layer III is usually a relatively wide layer contrasted with Layer IV, the internal granular layer, which contains, once again, a densely packed collection of nonpyramidal cells as well as some small pyramidal neurons. Below that, Layer V contains, once again, a more sparse distribution of nonpyramidal cells, as well as large pyramidal neurons vertically aligned. The boundary between Layer V and VI is often challenging to discern. Layer VI usually contains a similar mix of cell types but with disorientation of the pyramidal neurons and a gradual thinning of cell distribution down to the white matter boundary. Below the cerebral cortex, there can be found a scattering of interstitial neurons within the white matter that might be relevant for some neurodevelopmental disorders as cells that have not completed migration and are “ectopic.” The connectivity of the cerebral cortex follows a broad pattern involving excitatory glutamatergic pyramidal neurons in Layers II and III that receive cortical inputs and project axons to other regions of the cortex and the major output pyramidal neurons in Layers V and VI. The latter receive inputs from the cortex (including overlying Layer III cells) and the thalamus and project axons to the thalamus, basal ganglia, brain stem, and spinal cord. There is inhibition from ­interneurons in a variety of forms, including double-bouquet cells in Layer II, chandelier cells in Layer IV, and spiny stellate cells. These GABAergic cells may be identified by their production of several calcium-binding proteins, including calbindin, parvalbumin, and calretinin. The vertical columnar organization established during development is characterized by the “minicolumn,” which is approximately one cell  thick with a periodic spacing of approxi­ mately 50 microns and which may be seen as a

Brain and Nervous System: Microarchitecture

fundamental modular unit spanning the cortical depth. It constitutes a local circuit with selective responsivity to stimuli.

Spinal Cord The ascending and descending fibers of the spinal cord white matter surround the cell bodies of the central gray matter. The distinctive shape in horizontal cross-section in the human gives a clear indication of the spinal level (Figure 2).

Figure 2  Spinal Cord Cross Section Source: Wikimedia Commons/OpenStax College.

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Broadly, the ascending tracts are positioned dorsally and laterally, consisting dorsally of the gracile and cuneate fasciculi from the lower and upper limbs and laterally of the dorsal and ventral spinocerebellar tract and the spinothalamic tract. The descending fibers are mainly positioned ventrally and mediolaterally and compose the ­lateral corticospinal tract and rubrospinal tract laterally and, medially, the ventral corticospinal, tectospinal, rubrospinal, vestibulospinal, and

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reticulospinal tracts and the medial longitudinal fasciculus. The ventral position of the descending tracts and the dorsal distribution of the ascending tracts may be considered to reflect the motor output role of the cortex at the front of the brain and the receptive input role of the sensory cortex distributed posteriorly in the brain. The cytoarchitectural organization of the spinal cord gray matter forms a laminar arrangement known as Rexed’s Laminae I through X. Arranged in dorsal-ventral order, the dorsal horn of the cord consists of Laminae I through VI, and the ventral horn continues VII through IX, with Lamina X positioned medially. Lamina I at the dorsal tip of the cord consists of medium-sized neurons with a low-density distribution, which contrasts with the high density of small neurons found in the neighboring “substantia gelatinosa” of Lamina II. A transition occurs ventral to Lamina II where the neurons become larger and more sparsely distributed across Laminae III through VI. In the ventral horn, motoneurons are clustered in three lateral columns forming Lamina IX. Medially, a collection of neurons of varied size, although smaller than the Lamina IX motoneurons, constitute Laminae VII and VIII. The medial laminar boundaries are more difficult to discern, and by some definitions, based on dendritic morphology, this intermediate gray matter has been grouped together. Finally, the small neurons surrounding the central canal form Lamina X. Variations in the laminar proportions exist, depending on the level of the cord section. Indeed, some neuronal groups, such as the central cervical nucleus, Clarke’s dorsal nucleus, and the parasympathetic sacral nuclei are present only at certain levels. Below the fourth sacral segment, the laminae progressively vanish.

Peripheral Nervous System Cranial Nerves

The cranial nerves are present bilaterally and are classically numbered I to XII from front to back and top to bottom as they emerge from the brain and mostly from the brain stem (Figure 3). With the exception of the optic nerve (II), the cranial nerves project beyond the brain and are considered part of the peripheral nervous system. They

have a mix of roles contributing to sympathetic, parasympathetic, and motor functions. The cranial nerves are as follows: I (Olfactory) smell II (Optic) vision III (Oculomotor) IV (Trochlear) V (Trigeminal) facial sensation VI (Abducens) eye movement VII (Facial) facial expression VIII (Vestibulocochlear) hearing and balance IX (Glossopharyngeal) oral sensation, taste, and salivation X (Vagus) autonomic regulation of the heart, airways, pancreas, and proximal gastrointestinal tract XI (Accessory) shoulder elevation and head-turning XII (Hypoglossal) tongue movement

Autonomic System

The peripheral autonomic nervous system (ANS) comprises all neurons lying wholly outside the central nervous system (CNS), excluding cells that project into or out of the CNS. The ANS consists of three main groups: sympathetic neurons, receiving input from neurons in the thoracic and lumbar spinal cord; parasympathetic neurons, with input from the brain stem and the sacral spinal cord; and enteric neurons, which receive their input from the gastrointestinal tract. Sympathetic neurons of the ANS form two main collections of ganglia (groups of cell bodies): the paravertebral ganglia forming the sympathetic chain on either side of the vertebral column and the prevertebral ganglia, which are associated with the abdominal aorta and its major branches. Sympathetic neurons project to most tissues of the body, commonly following major sensory and somatic motor nerves. The cranial parasympathetic pathways derive from neurons that lie within four pairs of major autonomic ganglia positioned bilaterally within the head: the ciliary, sphenopalatine, submandibular,

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Figure 3  The Cranial Nerves Source: Wikimedia Commons/OpenStax College.

and otic. They are closely associated with the cranial nerves. The sacral parasympathetic neurons are found in pelvic ganglia, which in many cases also contain sympathetic neurons. Together, the pelvic ganglia innervate the ureters, bladder, urethra, male and female genital tracts, colon, and associated blood vessels. The cell bodies of the enteric ANS are grouped into ganglia that form a vast interconnected network in the wall of the gastrointestinal tract throughout its length. The ganglia are grouped into two plexuses: (a) the myenteric plexus lying between the outer longitudinal and inner circular muscle layers and (b) the submucous plexus, which lies between the circular muscle and the mucous muscle. The enteric neurons are multipolar and form two main classes. Type I have relatively short dendrites with irregular shapes and a prominent axon, and Type II have several long processes with unclear morphological distinction between axons and dendrites. Enteric neuron activity can be modulated by the CNS via the vagus, pelvic plexus, and prevertebral ganglia (see section on the autonomic system). Interactions between the CNS and peripheral nervous system are of increasing

interest in neurodegenerative and neuropsychiatric conditions, such as Parkinson’s disease and autism, respectively. The interface between the nerves and muscle fibers is achieved by the muscle spindles. The muscle nerves that control the muscles have been grouped into four types based on variation in diameter and consequent differences in conduction velocity. The largest are Group I myelinated axons, and Group IV, which are small, unmyelinated axons. Outgoing muscle fibers consist of (a) large myelinated alpha fibers arising from motoneurons in the anterior horn of the spinal cord that innervate the contractile bulk of the muscle (skeletomotor), (b) small myelinated gamma efferents that innervate the modified muscle fibers inside the muscle spindle, and (c) unmyelinated sympathetic efferents that innervate intramuscular blood vessels.

Central Nervous System Cerebellum

The cerebellum architecture is reminiscent of the cerebrum and consists of two hemispheres

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with a highly folded structure that includes an external gray matter cortex and an underlying white matter containing several nuclei. The cerebellar cortex has a very characteristic microstructure consisting of three layers (Figure 4). The molecular layer is the top layer, which consists of parallel fibers running “horizontally” beneath the surface, where they intersect with the vertical “fanlike” arrangement of dendrites arising from Purkinje cells. This layer also contains stellate cells and basket cells, which are both interneuron populations that form GABAergic synapses onto the Purkinje-cell dendritic trees. Delineating the bottom of the molecular layer is a relatively thin ribbon of cells consisting of the Purkinje cell bodies and some glia, which is the Purkinje layer. Below that, the granular layer is relatively wide and contains a high density of small granule cells and interneurons, including Golgi cells. The axons that form the parallel fibers in the molecular layer arise from the granule cells. Two other axonal inputs arise from outside the cerebellum: the mossy fibers synapse with the granule cells (as well as deep cerebellar nuclei) and the climbing fibers (from the inferior olives) synapse with the Purkinje cells.

Figure 4 Diagram of the Cerebellar Glomerulus in the Context of the Layers of the Cerebellum Source: Wikimedia Commons/Microanatomy and Wiring of Cerebellum.tif. Modifications made by Iamozy.

Brain Stem and Midbrain

Multiple clusters of cells are recognized as separate nuclei with distinct roles within the brain stem. In the reticular formation that forms the core of the human brain stem, neurons are intermingled with bundles of axons. Additional groups of neurons at the midline form the raphe nuclei that consist of neurons of the neuromodulatory 5-HT system that innervate the cortex. The locus coeruleus and the lateral tegmental nuclei contain noradrenergic neurons, both of which also innervate the cortex. The ventral tegmentum is a site of dopaminergic neurons, which are important in motivation and addiction; the substantia nigra also contains dopaminergic neurons, which innervate the striatum and are lost in Parkinson’s disease. Numerous additional nuclei form important junctions for the ascending and descending tracts of the spinal cord and for the visual, auditory, and vestibular systems. Hippocampal Formation

The dentate gyrus appears to lie at the heart of the hippocampal formation. It is typically a C-shaped formation of three layers in coronal ­section. The remaining fields of the hippocampal formation compose the hippocampus, the subicular complex, and the entorhinal cortex and form a series of structures that fold around and into the dentate. The characteristic connectivity of the hippocampal formation subregions has been interpreted as a modular/lamellar structure so that the full set of connections between subregions would be present within any coronal slice. However, additional rostro-dorsal connectivity along the length of the formation has been clearly established. The most prominent defining characteristic of the entorhinal cortex is the presence of clusters or “islands” of relatively large pyramidal and stellate cells in Layer II. As with other cortical regions, Layer II lies beneath a cell-sparse Layer I and, with the addition of a cellular gap beneath the islands, Layer III is a broad layer of pyramidal neurons. However, the entorhinal cortex is also distinct from other cortices due to the absence of an internal granular Layer IV. Owing to the proliferation of nonhuman animal studies of the hippocampal formation, it is worth

Brain and Nervous System: Microarchitecture

noting some differences in the human brain. Unlike the two regions (medial and lateral) of the rodent entorhinal cortex, in the primate there is a gradient of cytoarchitectonic changes from rostral to caudal limits that can be differentiated into at least seven fields. Within the hippocampus, the subfields CA1 to CA3 also have untidy boundaries in the human and have a more overlapping, almost laminate appearance in contrast to the rat. Between the entorhinal cortex and the hippocampus, the subicular complex composes the presubiculum, subiculum, and parasubiculum. The subiculum contains three layers: The molecular layer is uppermost, and beneath it are the external and internal pyramidal layers. The subiculum gives way to CA1, which has a single cellular layer of pyramidal cells. Beneath this pyramidal-cell layer is the stratum oriens containing basal dendrites of the overlying pyramidal neurons as well as a variety of interneurons. The layer below that is the stratum radiatum, which together with the stratum oriens receives the projections from CA2 and CA3 known as the Shaffer collaterals. Meanwhile, the perforant path projections from the entorhinal cortex pass to the dentate gyrus through the hippocampus via the stratum lacunosum-moleculare. The deepest layer in the hippocampus is the alveus, which consists of the axons of the pyramidal neurons. Progression from CA2 to CA3 is often unclear but marked by the presence, in CA3, of the stratum lucidum containing the mossy fibers above the pyramidal cells with which they form en passant synapses. Finally, the dentate gyrus contains a layer of granule cells, which send a unipolar dendritic tree into the overlying molecular layer. The third layer is the hilus of the dentate described as polymorphic. It is often similar to the hippocampus pyramidal-cell layer and therefore sometimes labeled CA4. Amygdala

The main subnuclei of the amygdala compose the cortical nucleus, which lies anteriorly and merges with the laminated structure of the polar temporal cortex that lies in front of it; the medial nucleus that extends toward the optic tract; the central nucleus, which may be conceptually extended on the basis of neurochemical and

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developmental continuity with the ventral striatum; and the much larger lateral and basolateral subnuclei. The lateral and basolateral (and basomedial) subnuclei are interconnected, and the amygdala in general is highly connected with the cerebral cortex and hippocampus. Thalamus

The thalamus composes a collection of s­ubnuclei-containing neurons that project to the cortex and receive input from the spinal cord, brain stem, pallidum, and cerebral cortex. The anterior thalamic nucleus receives input from the mammillary bodies and subiculum and is highly connected with the cingulate cortex. The mediodorsal nucleus is connected with the cerebral cortex anteriorly, notably the prefrontal cortex. Posteriorly, the pulvinar is relatively highly connected with the temporal lobe and posterior regions. The ventrolateral and ventral anterior nuclei are connected to the motor cortex, and the ventroposterolateral nucleus connects with the somatosensory cortex. Hypothalamus

The nuclei of the hypothalamus form a small compartment between the mammillary bodies and the anterior commissure, divided mediolaterally around the descending tract of the fornix. Multiple nuclei are divided into medial and lateral portions of the anterior, middle or tuberal, and posterior hypothalamus. These include (but are not limited to), from front to back, the medial preoptic nucleus, influencing gonadotropic hormone release; the paraventricular nucleus, influencing oxytocin release and therefore bonding behavior; the suprachiasmatic nucleus, influencing melatonin release and circadian rhythm; the dorsomedial hypothalamic nucleus, influencing heart rate; the arcuate nucleus, influencing growth hormone–releasing hormone; the lateral nucleus, influencing thirst; and the posterior nucleus, influencing blood pressure. Basal Ganglia

Most prominently, the basal ganglia consist of the caudate, putamen, and globus pallidus (two other structures are related: the subthalamic nucleus and substantia nigra). The caudate and

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putamen together are often named the striatum, and the striated appearance of their common structure arises from the penetration of ascending and descending axons passing through the internal capsule between them. The striatum receives much input from the cortex and projects topographically to the globus pallidus, from which there is heavy output to the thalamus and brain stem. The nucleus accumbens is another prominent feature of the ventral striatum. Islands of small granule cells in the nucleus accumbens constitute the islands of Calleja. Some of the small cell islands there and in the putamen coincide with reduced acetylcholinesterase. Cholinesterase-poor striosomes are also identified as patches within the

widely cholinergic matrix of the striatum, and compartmentalization is thought to contribute to striatal information processing. Steven A. Chance See also Brain and Nervous System: Macroarchitecture; Cognitive Neuroscience; Neuropsychology; Neurotransmitters and Neuromodulators; Research Methods in Neuroscience

Further Readings Paxinos, G. (Ed.). (2012). The human nervous system (3rd ed.). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

C A number of subtle yet crucial cognitive and social developments occur during infancy, including an understanding of object permanence, basic categorization abilities, stranger awareness, imitation of others, caregiver attachment, and joint-attention abilities. Spoken language emerges during infancy in typically developing children. Despite these enormous changes, infancy is characterized by complete dependence on caregivers for basic needs and survival. (It should be noted that some experts consider infancy a distinct period from childhood.) Toddlerhood is the period of early childhood between about 18 months to 4 years and is characterized by further behavioral and cognitive development. Spoken language expands from short utterances to more complex sentences that resemble mature language. Dexterity and other finemotor skills are refined, and gross-motor strength increases. Although social and emotional development is present in infancy, it becomes more apparent in toddlerhood. Children begin to establish relationships beyond their immediate family, including peers. Self-awareness and consciousness of others become more evident. Particular skills, such as counting, matching, rule learning, and following multistep directions begin to emerge at the end of toddlerhood. Toddlers are still dependent on caregivers for most basic needs, but independence in focused tasks such as toileting begins to emerge.

Cancer See Psychosocial Factors and Cancer

Childhood Childhood is the period of life from birth to adulthood. Childhood is characterized by enormous physical and psychological change—that is, development. Thus, childhood has important implications for subsequent cognitive, social, emotional, and behavioral functioning. This entry reviews the development periods of childhood and discusses the study of childhood in psychology, including the implications of the psychological study of childhood.

Developmental Periods of Childhood Early Childhood

Infancy is the period of early childhood between birth and about 18 months of age. It is characterized by rapid physical, behavioral, and cognitive development. During this period, typically developing children show a threefold increase in weight and nearly a twofold increase in length. Motor development proceeds from seemingly erratic movements during early infancy to controlled mobility (crawling and then walking) during later infancy.

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Middle Childhood

Middle childhood is the period of time between about 4 years and 8 years of age. Moderate physical growth and substantial behavioral growth occur during this period. Children increase substantially in their cognitive functioning, including gains in short-term memory, inhibition, planning, rule learning, and task-switching abilities. During this period, most children begin formal schooling. More complex social interpersonal relationships emerge, especially with increased participation in formal social conventions such as school. Although children in this period are still largely dependent on their caregivers for the resources required to meet basic needs, they are more independent in their ability to carry out self-care and other basic day-to-day tasks. Late Childhood

Late childhood is the period of time between about 8 years until the onset of puberty. In contrast to early childhood, which is characterized by exuberant change, the cognitive, behavioral, and physical changes in late childhood are nuanced. Cognitive abilities combine into more complex, reflective reasoning systems. As a result, strategic reasoning skills such as planning, monitoring, and evaluating emerge in the course of amassing factual knowledge, experience, and conceptual understanding. Children become independent of caregivers for some basic needs and most all self-care responsibilities, although the age at which such independence appears is highly influenced by the child’s culture and individual environment. Physical development during this period is sometimes characterized as awkward, including some clumsiness, changes in body proportions, and nonuniform bodily growth as the body prepares for puberty. It should be noted that the age ranges of the periods that constitute childhood are debated and differ between cultures and over historical time periods. Although most experts agree that childhood begins at birth, there is disagreement about whether it ends at the onset of puberty or at its end. Furthermore, some view the periods of childhood as temporally defined, beginning and ending at precise ages. Others prefer to view childhood as

a sequence consisting of developmental stages, beginning and ending with particular changes in functioning or in prominent cultural milestones.

The Study of Childhood in Psychology Childhood and its scientific study are important to psychology for both practical and theoretical reasons. From a practical perspective, the ­ psychological study of childhood can provide an understanding of how typical development unfolds; how and when cognitive, behavioral, and emotional differences between people arise; the types of environments that produce optimal or suboptimal development; and how to recognize and potentially correct abnormal development. From a theoretical perspective, the study of childhood informs understanding of the nature and origin of the mind, learning, human uniqueness, and disorder. Philosophical Foundations of the Study of Childhood

The study of childhood has its roots in philosophy. The British empiricist John Locke (1632–1704), for example, advocated an influential conception of the child as a tabula rasa or blank slate. According to Locke, humans are born devoid of prior knowledge and had to gradually build this knowledge through sensation, perception, and other life experience. Others, however, proposed that humans are born with knowledge prior to experience. For example, René Descartes (1596– 1650) and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) proposed that humans are born with innate understanding that structures and constrains further learning. Early Scientific Theories of Childhood

Theories of childhood depended increasingly on empirical data to bolster their claims. Early scientific theories, like philosophical ones, revolved around the question of whether childhood is better explained by nature or nurture. Empiricists took the side of nurture to propose that childhood is best described as a reaction to the experiences of life. William James (1842–1910), in Volume 1 of The Principles of Psychology (1890), described early childhood “as one great blooming, buzzing, confusion,” implying that early childhood

Childhood

is characterized by little, if any, innate knowledge about the world. The empiricist position was further elaborated by the behaviorists of the early 1900s (such as Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner), who strove to explain human behavior, particularly early behavioral development in childhood, as responses to external stimuli. The role of nature, according to behaviorists, was largely irrelevant to explanations of childhood. In the 1950s, the cognitive revolution prompted the inclusion of internal, mental states, as well as behavior, in the study of childhood. Psychologists began to focus on the structure of thoughts, perceptions, and emotions and their role in childhood. The acceptance of internal states in psychological accounts of childhood gave rise to new ideas about the role of nature in child development. One example is Noam Chomsky’s (1928–) ideas regarding language development. His theory of universal grammar (UG) posited a specialized, innate cognitive structure, and his language acquisition device (LAD) was an attempt to explain the universal phenomenon of first-language learning. Emerging scientific theories of childhood were also influenced by a middle position called constructivism, which posited that the mind is formed through one’s experience of interacting with the environment according to one’s current abilities. The eminent Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget (1896– 1980) developed an elaborate, constructivist theory of childhood that divided childhood into developmental stages defined by cognitive and behavioral competencies that were qualitatively distinct and progressive from stage to stage. Contemporary Scientific Theories of Childhood

Current theories of childhood recognize that development is a product of nature and nurture rather than one or the other. However, contemporary theorists differ principally in at least three respects: the depth of early-knowledge structures, the nature of early mechanisms for learning, and their focus of inquiry. More specifically, they differ on whether (a) nature provides deep conceptual structures or general biases for learning, (b) there are specialized and distinct mechanisms for learning about different things or a general ability to learn, and (c) the focus of study should be on characterizing structure or process in childhood.

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Core Knowledge The theory of core knowledge proposes that humans are born with rich conceptual knowledge in a limited number of areas or core domains. The brain and cognitive structures supporting knowledge in each of these areas are distinct and specialized for content. As development proceeds, knowledge in the domains can be enriched, changed, combined, or overridden by further experience and learning. Researchers interested in core knowledge aim to document the nature and extent of knowledge in each of the domains in early childhood, investigate how these systems change during development, and determine the mechanisms and experiences that drive developmental change, specifically, in core physical, quantitative, social, and linguistic knowledge during early childhood. Neuroconstructivism The neuroconstructivist approach to childhood asserts that development is best characterized as an interaction between nature and nurture. Under this view, nature predisposes or biases perception of the world in particular ways to provide experience critical for further survival and learning. Indeed, child development is ultimately determined by the interaction between these biases and individual experiences. General biases develop into specialized biological systems. Researchers working under this framework are primarily interested in documenting how interactions between nature and nurture explain change and the individual differences in developmental trajectories. Neuroconstructivist theories have been proposed to explain developmental changes in the brain and behavior over childhood ranging from typically developing face recognition to adaption in response to visual and auditory impairment, as well as developmental disabilities such as autism and Williams syndrome. The Dynamic Systems Approach This dynamic systems perspective proposes that psychological, motor, and cognitive development are best characterized by the process of constant, multilevel interactions between multiple factors, including genetic and environmental factors. This interaction shapes individual developmental paths.

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Past development is important to current development, and childhood is seen as a cumulative ­process. This view focuses on understanding individual rather than universal paths of development, in that individuals can take different paths to the same developmental outcomes in childhood. Researchers within this framework focus on general-purpose learning mechanisms broadly applied to a variety of learning situations rather than genetically specified mechanisms for learning in particular domains. Dynamic systems theory has been applied most successfully to the understanding of sensory-motor development in childhood. Mathematics-Based Approaches Mathematical models might accurately predict and ultimately explain change in childhood. Some models use a connectionist framework in which humans are born with general-purpose learning mechanisms that allow complex knowledge to emerge from the selective strengthening and weakening of connections between simple processors. Researchers create a computational system (likely based on a particular theory of child development) and then provide differential inputs to the system in order to determine how it changes as a function of the input. Connectionist models attempt to simulate as closely as possible actual learning processes in ways that suggest how such learning could occur in the brain. Connectionist models have been used to explain language learning and higher cognitive abilities. Other researchers apply Bayesian statistics in an attempt to predict and explain changes that occur in childhood. The main thrust of such techniques is to account for the prior state of knowledge or development in predicting current behavior or developmental trajectories. Bayesian techniques have been applied to a variety of domains—most notably, categorization abilities, language development, and social cognition in childhood.

Implications of the Psychological Study of Childhood Attachment

The formation of early social bonds is referred to as attachment and influences emotional development in childhood and beyond. According to attachment theorists, the bonds between the

primary caregiver and the infant are particularly consequential. It is in this relationship that the child first learns to regulate emotions and to interact with others. More positive social and emotional developmental outcomes are achieved when attachment is appropriate, or secure, than when it is disrupted. Abuse or neglect often results if attachment is disrupted or insecure. Sensory Deprivation

Children deprived of sensory experience during early childhood often do not develop typical sensory, perception, or, in some cases, higher cognitive systems. For example, children deprived of typical visual input during early childhood do not develop typical depth perception. Children who do not hear language spoken around them during early childhood will likely show atypical or incomplete language development later in childhood and adulthood. Socioeconomic Status

Low socioeconomic status (SES)—which includes social class, income, and education—has been identified as a major risk factor for development in childhood and subsequent mature functioning. Children raised in homes with low SES tend to show lower-than-average psychological, emotional, and cognitive functioning, as well as lower levels of life success and satisfaction later in life. SES is also correlated with lower levels of resources, including food, health care, cognitive stimulation, schooling, and extracurricular activities, all of which could contribute to diminished developmental outcomes. Low SES is also correlated with styles of parenting that might be a risk factor. Schooling

The study of childhood also interfaces with schooling environments and curricula. Studies of children’s learning allow researchers to determine optimal content and conditions that favor school learning. Law

Most agree that children should not be held to the same legal standards as adults, because it is during childhood that one moves from parental

Chronic Illness, Psychological Aspects of

dependency to autonomous behavioral competency, as well as developing a sense of moral responsibility and accountability. In most cases, it is not until after childhood that individuals are judged accountable for their actions under the law. Daniel C. Hyde See also Behavioral Development; Behaviorism; Cognitive Development; Language and Development; Neurodevelopmental Disorders; Perceptual Development; Piaget’s and the Neo-Piagetian Theories of Cognitive Development; Prenatal Development

Further Readings Fox, S. E., Levitt, P., & Nelson, C. A. (2010). How the timing and quality of early experiences influence the development of brain architecture. Child Development, 81(1), 28–40. Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2009). Nativism versus neuroconstructivism: Rethinking the study of developmental disorders. Developmental Psychology, 45(1), 56–63. Nelson, C. A., Furtado, E. A., Fox, N. A., & Zeanah, C. H. (2009). The deprived human brain. American Scientist, 97(3), 222–229. Schoot, R., Kaplan, D., Denissen, J., Asendorpf, J. B., Neyer, F. J., & Aken, M. A. (2014). A gentle introduction to Bayesian analysis: Applications to developmental research. Child Development, 85(3), 842–860. Smith, L. B., & Thelen, E. (2003). Development as a dynamic system. Trends in Cognitive Science, 7, 343–348. Spelke, E. S. (2000). Core knowledge. American Psychologist, 55, 1233–1243.

Chronic Illness, Psychological Aspects of Chronic illnesses are enduring health conditions that might involve ongoing pain, periods of incapacitation, and sustained symptom management. They are not curable, but they are not always fatal. Approximately 117 million Americans live with one or more chronic illnesses, including arthritis, asthma, cancer, diabetes, HIV/AIDS, and heart disease.

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The central question of this entry is, When facing the serious, long-term prospect of living with a chronic illness, why do some people adapt well, but others become depressed or anxious and have trouble coping effectively? Despite the potentially overwhelming challenges of chronic illness and its treatment, many people do not experience clinical levels of depression or anxiety, although they often experience short-term depressive symptoms, negative affect, or even grief. For example, psychological distress often peaks immediately before and after diagnosis, at the beginning of treatment, or when treatment fails. At the same time, living with a chronic illness can result in positive outcomes, such as improved close relationships, an increased sense of purpose, and newfound inner strength. Although there are many risk factors for poor adjustment, there are also protective factors that enhance psychological wellbeing. This entry describes theories that address both positive and negative adjustment outcomes. Chronic illnesses do not have a universal trajectory. An illness might develop or worsen gradually but can also arrive unexpectedly, disrupting one’s sense of self as healthy and fully functional. The timing of the illness is a critical factor. The onset of a life-threatening cancer might present very different, adaptive tasks for a teenager, a new parent, a middle-aged executive, or a retired person.

Theories of Coping With Chronic Illness Living with chronic illness forces individuals and their families to adjust to a “new normal” and cope with illness-related intrusions that can affect daily life, close relationships, work, and personal goals. An early conceptualization of adjustment to illness involved the adaptive tasks of illness. People diagnosed with a chronic illness face multiple adaptive tasks that demand substantial psychological adjustment, from managing uncertainty about the future to accepting bodily changes to managing relationships with health care professionals. Richard Lazarus’s stress and coping paradigm has been the gold standard for theories of coping with illness since the 1980s. This theory focuses on the individual’s perceptions of the illness—­ specifically, cognitive appraisals of stress—as essential predictors of coping efforts and psychological adjustment. Cognitive appraisals occur

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when individuals evaluate whether or not an event is a stressor—that is, whether it poses a threat to their well-being (primary appraisal) and whether they have the resources to cope with the stressor (secondary appraisal). Coping refers to behavioral and cognitive efforts directed toward the goal of adjustment to illness and might involve both approach and avoidance strategies. One typology of coping distinguishes those who focus on minimizing or removing the stressor (problem-focused coping) versus those who focus on managing the emotions caused by the stressor (emotion-focused coping). Though coping with a chronic illness often involves both types, emotional-approach coping (including both emotional expression and emotional processing) is more commonly used by women than men and is more effective for them. A third type of coping, relationship-focused coping, refers to cognitive and behavioral efforts to sustain social relationships during stressful times. Relationship-focused coping includes attending to others’ emotional needs, managing one’s own stress without creating relationship conflicts, and showing empathy. Shelley E. Taylor’s theory of cognitive adaptation to threatening events was developed through research with breast cancer patients. Chronic illness can disrupt the sense of control an individual has over his or her life and can also challenge existential beliefs, such as the belief in a just world, in a benevolent God, or in the meaning of one’s existence. Adjusting to illness involves three central tasks: making meaning of the illness experience, restoring a sense of mastery or control, and preserving self-esteem. Each involves a different psychological pathway. People make meaning of their illness via causal attributions to answer the question “Why me?” The type of attribution is not as significant as making the attribution in the first place, which allows people to fit the illness into their existing worldview. To regain a sense of mastery, people cope with illness by maintaining an illusion of control if real control is not possible. They preserve selfesteem by making downward comparisons or comparing themselves to others who are less fortunate. For example, Taylor found that breast cancer survivors could always make a downward comparison: A woman who had less-invasive surgery

compared herself with someone who had a mastectomy; a woman who had a mastectomy compared herself with someone whose cancer had spread; an older woman was glad she was not young; and a younger, married woman compared herself with an unmarried woman.

The Social Context of Adjustment to Illness Most of the theories just described focus on how individuals adjust to illness, but coping does not take place in a social vacuum. Individuals cope with chronic illness within the context of their families, friendship networks, workplace, and community. Several epidemiological studies found that having larger social support networks was related to better health and well-being. Having even one person in a network was better than having no one (social isolation). Social Support Theories

There are many types of social support. Emotional support includes expressing positive emotion, caring, and love. For instance, a family member might reassure a loved one undergoing chemotherapy and subsequent changes in physical appearance that he or she is still valued. Instrumental support (also called tangible assistance) involves practical help with logistical concerns such as transportation to treatment, finances, household tasks, and child care. Informational support provides information or advice on how to cope with the illness as well as feedback on coping efforts. Belongingness support refers to social companionship with similar others, often garnered through support groups and interactions with other patients. Conservation of resources theory emphasizes the endeavor to preserve, promote, and protect all that a person holds dear. This includes health, wellbeing, family, and a positive sense of self. Resources include object resources (e.g., one’s home or car), condition resources (e.g., a job or marriage), personal resources (e.g., self-efficacy or optimism), and energy resources (e.g., income or knowledge). The loss of any of these resources is felt more keenly than parallel gains and is the primary cause of distress. One’s personal reservoir of resources might counteract current or potential loss.

Chronic Illness, Psychological Aspects of

Unfortunately, with long-term stressors such as chronic illness, this reservoir might deplete quickly and be harder to rebuild. The stress-buffering hypothesis posits that social support is particularly effective for individuals facing higher levels of illness-related stress. For example, emotional support is increasingly effective when individuals are in pain or about to undergo major medical treatment. This theory is more strongly supported when social support is measured in terms of perceptions that the support will be available rather than actual, received support. The matching hypothesis suggests that social support is most beneficial when it matches features of the illness. For support to be effective, the type of support received must match (a) the type of support that is needed or desired, (b) the provider of the support, and (c) its timing. For example, studies of people with arthritis or cancer have shown that emotional support is more helpful when provided by a spouse or partner, informational support by a medical professional, and tangible support by a friend. Timing is also important: Support provided at times when it is no longer needed—for example, when chemotherapy is finished—might create more distress than succor. Another theory conceptualizes social support as coping assistance—that is, the actions of others to assist individuals in coping. This approach may be considered a variation of the matching hypothesis: The types of support “match” the types of coping. For instance, emotional support and emotionfocused coping both are directed at reducing illness-related emotional distress. In all the theories described here, social support enables people coping with illness to use effective coping strategies by helping them reach a better understanding of the issues, increasing motivation to better their lives, and reducing the emotional stress that might impede other coping efforts. Social support also encourages positive health behaviors and reduces risky behaviors. How Social Support Might Hinder Adjustment

Social support is not always helpful. Support that is unwanted or unneeded might have undesired effects. Providing too much support might develop into social control, taking away the patient’s autonomy. The efficacy of “invisible

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support” in reducing distress suggests that support is less effective when the person is aware of receiving it, in that others’ overt efforts to help sometimes cause distress. Recognizing that one needs support might lower self-esteem or draw attention to one’s limitations. People with illness do not want to be infantilized. The social cognitive processing model was developed to illustrate how social relationships might both help and hinder adjustment. It is common for people to want to disclose thoughts and feelings related to their illness in an attempt to make sense of it. However, they need to do so in a safe and accepting social environment. This model expanded earlier cognitive theories of adjustment by emphasizing that in addition to needing social support, cancer patients might also experience social constraints on emotional disclosure. Social constraints refer to verbal or nonverbal interactions in social relationships that result in individuals feeling unsupported, misjudged, or isolated. Consequently, they are less likely to disclose their illness-related thoughts and feelings, which can lead to poorer adjustment. Interestingly, social constraints emerge not only as a result of negative social interactions but also as well-intentioned interactions “gone wrong.” Consider an individual recently diagnosed with multiple sclerosis (MS) who is receiving unsolicited advice from her healthy friend. Although the friend means well, the person with MS might perceive the social exchange as unwarranted and withhold expressing illness-related thoughts in the future. If emotional disclosure (and consequently, emotional processing) is discouraged, then cognitive processing or emotional reactions to the illness might be silenced and coping efforts thwarted.

Dyadic Coping Perhaps the most salient human relationship is the intimate bond with a romantic partner. People rarely experience illness alone; rather, patients and their partners confront disease-related challenges together. This interdependence in adjustment is referred to as dyadic coping. Theories such as the systemic transactional model assert that an individual’s coping depends not only on his or her own coping but also on that of his or her partner. Dyadic coping involves thinking of illness not as

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Classical Conditioning

“my illness” or “your illness” but as “our illness.” Specifically, the couple’s ability to cope as a team includes engaging in joint problem solving and decision making as well as coordinating dayto-day tasks, such as household chores.

Conclusion Theories aid an understanding of how psychosocial variables affect adjustment to chronic illness. Theories have expanded in two important ways: (a) to focus on people with the illness as well as their intimate partners, family members, and caregivers, not only as support providers but also as individuals who must adjust to the illness and (b) to include positive as well as negative adjustment outcomes. Tracey A. Revenson, Brett M. Millar, and Aliza A. Panjwani See also Behavioral Health; Coping Strategies; Health Psychology; Social Factors in Health; Stress and Resilience to Life Challenge

Further Readings Lazarus, R. S., & Folkman, S. (1984). Stress, appraisal, and coping. New York, NY: Springer. Lepore, S. J., & Revenson, T. A. (2007). Social constraints on disclosure and adjustment to cancer. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 1(1), 313–333. Revenson, T. A., & DeLongis, A. (2011). Couples coping with chronic illness. In S. Folkman (Ed.), Oxford handbook of stress, health, and coping (pp. 101–123). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Stanton, A., Revenson, T. A., & Tennen, H. (2007). Health psychology: Psychological adjustment to chronic disease. Annual Review of Psychology, 58, 13.1–13.28. Uchino, B. N. (2004). Social support and physical health. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Classical Conditioning For many years after Ivan Pavlov discovered that dogs would salivate to a sound (the conditioned stimulus, or CS) that had been repeatedly followed by food (the unconditioned stimulus, or

US), it was widely accepted that classical conditioning was a simple learning process strengthened by repeated CS–US pairings. But all this changed during the cognitive revolution of the late 1960s when evidence rapidly accumulated that the principle of CS–US temporal contiguity as proposed by Pavlov was insufficient to explain conditioning. The challenge for contemporary theories of classical conditioning has been to account for this evidence, which suggests that conditioning depends on a predictive relationship between the CS and US. There is, as yet, no consensus on precisely how this should be accomplished, but there are some ingenious possibilities. This entry selectively reviews current theories of classical conditioning and highlights their relative merits. The effects of classical conditioning permeate the everyday lives of humans and other animals. Many are adaptive and benign. Consider the veteran coffee drinker who springs into action after inhaling the aroma of a fresh morning brew or the energetic, tail-wagging, pirouetting canine whose human companion has just grabbed the leash for its regular evening stroll. Classical conditioning is such a reliable and obligatory process that the hearts of thousands of moviegoers raced during the signature melody that presaged the inevitable demise of some unwitting swimmer at the jaws of a fictional great white shark. In a few cases, however, the effects of classical conditioning may be problematic; the weight gain of diet beverage consumers, the tolerance to pain medication in patients, and the relapse and overdose in drug addicts are well-documented examples. Theories of classical conditioning are essential to understanding and managing these effects.

Basic Concepts in Classical Conditioning In a simple classical conditioning procedure, a neutral cue (CS) is paired with a biologically relevant event (US) that naturally elicits a measurable behavior (the unconditioned response, UR). After repeated pairings, the CS will eventually elicit a response (the conditioned response, CR), which in many preparations resembles the UR. Most current theories attribute the emergence of conditioned responding to the acquisition of a CS–US association.

Classical Conditioning

The learning curve for this association is presumed to be negatively accelerated, meaning that the increments in the strength of the CS–US association get progressively smaller on each successive trial, and to reach an asymptote, the point at which the CS–US association has been fully learned. The learning asymptote depends on the intensity or magnitude of the US and is formally represented by the symbol λ (lambda). A benchmark for any modern theory of classical conditioning is the ability to account for stimulus interaction effects that demonstrate that a CR to a CS is not an inevitable consequence of repeated CS–US pairings. Blocking, for example, refers to the lack of a CR to a CS that was paired with the US in the presence of another CS that already predicts the US. If two CSs (a light and a noise) are presented together and paired with a shock US, conditioned fear will be evoked by the light CS when it is subsequently presented alone. However, this conditioned fear response to the light CS is not observed if the noise CS had been paired with the shock US before the light–noise pairings with that same US. Current theories of classical conditioning are differentiated by the concepts used to explain these types of cue interaction effects. Most have their roots in the idea of US surprise or CS-dependent attention, both of which directly impact learning about the CS. The Rescorla-Wagner Model of Classical Conditioning

The Rescorla-Wagner model, introduced by Robert Rescorla and Allan Wagner in 1972, is one of the most influential and important theories of classical conditioning. Not only has it been successful in explaining common failures of CS–US temporal contiguity to produce learning, but it has generated novel predictions about conditions for learning that were subsequently confirmed in behavioral experiments. At the heart of the Rescorla-Wagner model is the notion that learning occurs to the extent that the US is surprising. Surprise is defined as the difference between the US presented on the trial and the degree to which that US was expected on that trial. The Rescorla-Wagner model uses the concept of associative strength (V) to denote CS–US learning. The change in the associative strength of a

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CS (ΔVCS) is calculated on each trial that the CS is presented. If only one CS is presented and it is paired with the US on every trial, the associative strength of the CS (VCS) will increase in successively smaller increments until the value of VCS is equal to λ. At this point, CS–US learning has reached asymptote and the CS fully predicts the US. However, if two CSs are presented together and paired with the US on every trial, the associative strength of each CS will grow but only until the sum of their individual Vs is equal to λ. The Rescorla-Wagner model incorporates two important concepts: One is the idea that the US must be surprising for VCS to change, and the other is that CSs are in competition for association with the US. These ideas are captured formally in the following equation used to determine the amount of CS–US learning on each trial: ΔVCS = αβ(λ – VSUM) Surprise is represented as the discrepancy between the maximum associative strength that a US can support (λ) and the sum of the associative strengths of all CSs present on the trial (VSUM). If there is no discrepancy, (λ – VSUM) will equal zero, and there will be no further learning. If (λ – VSUM) is greater than zero, then the US is still surprising, learning will occur, and the associative strengths of the CSs on the trial will be incremented. The magnitude of this increment is modulated by two fixed-rate parameters, α (alpha) and β (beta), with assigned values between 0 and 1 depending on the saliences of the CS and US, respectively. These fixed-rate parameters permit more rapid conditioning of more salient CSs and faster conditioning when CSs are paired with stronger USs. Competition between CSs for association with the US is represented by the term VSUM, which can be close or equal to λ even when the associative strength of an individual CS on the trial is at zero. This situation occurs in blocking. By conditioning one CS to predict the US, there is no discrepancy when a second CS is paired with that US in the presence of the pretrained CS because VSUM is equal to λ even though V for the added CS is zero. Put simply, blocking occurs because the added CS is paired with an expected or unsurprising US.

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Thus, the pretrained CS may completely block or prevent the formation of an association between the added CS and the US on the first compound trial. Similarly, when two neutral and equally salient CSs are presented together and paired with the US, their associative strengths will grow but only until each reaches ½λ. If the CSs differ in salience, the associative strength of the more salient CS will increase faster and exceed that of the less salient CS. This competition between neutral CSs is called overshadowing. An important contribution of the RescorlaWagner model has been to show how blocking can explain why no conditioned response is observed to a CS that is randomly correlated with the US— that is, when the probability of the US is the same during the CS as in its absence. The USs presented in the absence of the CS will be associated with the context in which conditioning is carried out. This context-US association can then interfere with CS–US conditioning through the contribution of VCONTEXT to VSUM on the trials in which the CS is presented. Consistent with this analysis, ­signaling those USs with a different stimulus to prevent their association with the context restores the effectiveness of the CS–US pairings. Attentional Theories of Classical Conditioning

It is well established that CS–US pairings are less effective if the CS is repeatedly presented without consequence prior to those pairings, a phenomenon called latent inhibition. Attentional theories of classical conditioning attribute such variations in the efficacy of CS–US pairings to changes in CS processing. There are two opposite but potentially reconcilable perspectives on how CS processing is influenced by experience. One approach, represented by the Mackintosh model, developed by Nicholas Mackintosh in 1975, involves learning to attend to the best predictor of a US and learning to ignore irrelevant or redundant CSs; the other approach, represented by the Pearce-Hall model, developed by John M. Pierce and Geoffrey Hall in 1980, involves learning to attend less to CSs that are followed by expected USs and more to CSs that are followed by surprising USs. In both models, the consequences of the current trial determine how much processing the CS will receive on its next trial. This feature

generates an important prediction about blocking that distinguishes these CS-processing models from US processing models. The Mackintosh Model According to the Mackintosh model, attention will increase to the CS that is the best predictor of the US on a trial and decrease to any other CSs present on that trial. These changes in the associability or processing of the CS regulate the amount of CS–US learning that will take place the next time the CS is presented. The rules for modifying attention to a specific CS take into account the associative strengths of the other CSs on the trial, but the rule for calculating the change in the associative strength of a specific CS does not. To determine if attention to a CS (αCS) should increase or decrease, the absolute values of two discrepancies are compared. One discrepancy or error term is |λ – VCS|, which measures how close the associative strength of the CS is to asymptote; the other discrepancy or error term is |λ – VOTHER|, which measures how close the sum of the associative strengths of all the other CSs on the trial is to asymptote. Comparison of these differences is used to determine if the CS is a better predictor of the US than all the other CSs on the trial or if it is an equal or poorer predictor of the US relative to all the other CSs on the trial. This information is used to adjust the value of αCS (0–1), which will influence future learning about the CS. The Mackintosh model asserts the following: αCS will increase if |λ – VCS| < |λ – VOTHER| (CS is the best predictor of the US on the trial) αCS will decrease if |λ – VCS| ≥ |λ – VOTHER| (CS is an equal or worse predictor of the US on the trial)

The formula for calculating a change in the associative strength of a CS that includes the US-dependent fixed-rate parameter β (0–1) is as follows: ΔVCS = αCSβ(λ − VCS) This approach provides explanations of blocking and overshadowing in terms of reduced CS attention. When a CS is paired with a US in the

Classical Conditioning

presence of another CS that already predicts that US (blocking), attention to that added CS will plummet after the first compound trial because the pretrained CS is a much better predictor of the US. This is because the quantity |λ – VCS| will be larger than the quantity |λ – VOTHER|, which will be close to zero for the added CS. Thus, αCS for the added CS will decrease, resulting in little to no change in the associative strength of the added CS on subsequent compound conditioning trials. Note that in contrast to the prediction of the Rescorla-Wagner model, there will be some conditioning of the added CS on the first compound trial. If a CS is paired with a US in the presence of another novel and equally salient CS (overshadowing), attention to both CSs will decline because neither is the best predictor and their associative strengths will be less than if they had been paired separately with the US. The Pearce-Hall Model The Pearce-Hall model is founded on the intuition that attention is directed toward events that are uncertain or surprising and reallocated as that uncertainty is resolved. In contrast to the Mackintosh model, the Pearce-Hall model assumes that CS processing (αCS) remains high when the US is surprising but declines as the US becomes increasingly predictable. Thus, over the course of repeated CS–US pairings, αCS decreases as the associative strength of the CS increases. According to the Pearce-Hall model, the consequence of reduced CS processing is that new learning about the CS will be more difficult. Evidence of such a handicap comes from (a) studies demonstrating interference of CS–US learning (tone-strong shock) if the CS had been previously paired with a less intense version of the US (toneweak shock) and (b) comparisons of CSs that are either partially or continuously paired with a US. Two equations are used in the Pearce-Hall model; one determines the change in the associative strength of a CS (ΔVCS) on each conditioning trial, and the other determines how much processing that CS (αCS) will command on its next conditioning trial. Increments in VCS are considered a product of a fixed-rate parameter, S (related to CS and US salience), a variable-rate parameter, αCS (amount of CS processing), and another fixed

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parameter, the asymptote λ (the maximum learning the US can support). The values of S and αCS have limits (0–1). This rule is transcribed as follows: ΔVCS = S × αCS × λ The variable-rate parameter αCS is just that— variable. Its value on the current trial is based on the outcome of the previous trial on which the CS was presented. CS processing or αCS is equal to the absolute value of the discrepancy between λ and the sum of the associative strengths of all CSs (VSUM) present on that trial. This rule is transcribed as follows: αCS = |λ − VSUM| Blocking occurs in this model because VSUM will be equal to λ and αCS for the added CS will be set to zero after its first pairing with the US in the presence of the pretrained CS. Consequently, there can be no learning about the CS beyond that which occurred on the first compound trial. Overshadowing between two CSs occurs because once their combined Vs reach λ, the αCS values for each CS will equal zero and then neither of the individual Vs can reach λ. Evaluation, Reconciliation, and Alternative Models

Since the 1970s, research has examined the contrasting predictions of US-processing and CS-processing models of classical conditioning. Studies of blocking, for example, have scrutinized whether or not learning about the added CS occurs on the first compound trial. Studies of unblocking have dissected what is learned about the added CS if the US is made surprising on compound trials by reducing its magnitude. These issues have been challenging to resolve in part because of the potential for an association to develop between the added CS and the pretrained CS, the effect of which is difficult to disentangle from that of an association between the added CS and the US. Further complicating assessment of these models is that learning that a CS predicts the omission of an expected US (inhibitory conditioning) is no longer conceptualized as the

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opposite of learning that a CS predicts the delivery of the US (excitatory conditioning), which was considered a major strength of the RescorlaWagner model. Nevertheless, there continues to be widespread confidence in the core principles of US-processing and CS-processing models. This is clearly evident in the proliferation of various hybrid processing models of classical conditioning. The MackintoshPearce model, for example, combines the Rescorla-Wagner model, the Mackintosh model, and a modified Pearce-Hall model. Additionally, many connectionist models of conditioning make use of a discrepancy or prediction error, and neuroscience studies have found evidence for an error-signaling mechanism in midbrain dopamine neurons. On the other hand, there is skepticism about the fundamental vision of classical conditioning shared by these US and CS processing models in large part because of their failure to represent learning about the timing of the US. Indeed, the Gallistel-Balsam information theoretic approach, developed by Charles Gallistel and Peter Balsam in 2014, completely dismisses the associative learning framework in favor of temporal coding (duration and time) of individual events such as CSs and USs and the use of algorithms to compute degrees of CS–US contingencies to guide conditioned responding on a current trial. A novel aspect of this approach is that it records the entire conditioning history of individual CSs, information that is lost in models that keep track of only the current associative strengths of CSs. It also eliminates the need to define a trial that is not always self-evident, as is the case in studies of CS– US contingency effects where the probability of the US is manipulated both during the CS and in its absence. Current models of classical conditioning reveal an underappreciated complexity in the analysis of what looks to be a simple task, learning to predict the US given a CS, and the intellectual capital they represent is staggeringly creative. Ruth M. Colwill See also Attention; Behavior Therapies; Biological Constraints on Learning; Operant Conditioning; Pavlov’s Legacy; Reinforcement; Rescorla-Wagner Model; Watson, J. B.

Further Readings Bouton, M. E. (2007). Learning and behavior: A contemporary synthesis. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates. Domjan, M. (2015). The principles of learning and behavior (7th ed.). Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning. Pearce, J. M. (2008). Animal learning and cognition (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Psychology Press. Schwartz, B., Wasserman, E. A., & Robbins, S. J. (2002). Psychology of learning and behavior (5th ed.). New York, NY: Norton.

Close Relationships The study of close relationships lies at the center of the broader study of interpersonal relationships. When people are asked, “What is it that makes your life meaningful?” most mention close relationships with romantic partners, friends, or family. Despite such agreement, there has been considerable debate over two issues. The first is over the definition of closeness in a relationship, and the second is about how closeness should be assessed. This entry reviews definitions and theories of closeness in relationships.

Kelley’s Interdependence Theory Before the 1960s, closeness in a relationship was assumed to exist when partners shared norms about how to communicate with each other, took responsibility for the relationship, held positive beliefs and attitudes about one another, or viewed the relationship as important and unique compared with other involvements. Harold Kelley’s interdependence theory, however, suggested that ­relationship partners could be unhappy and still have a close relationship. In the 1980s, Kelley and his colleagues introduced a new theoretical model that defined closeness between individuals and could be applied to different types of relationships (e.g., those involving romantic partners, family, friends, or coworkers). According to this model, close relationships are those in which one partner’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviors have a strong, frequent, diverse, and sustained impact on the other partner’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviors over time. Less close

Close Relationships

relationships, on the other hand, are those in which one partner has little, if any, impact on the other partner’s thoughts, feelings, or behaviors across time and domains. According to the model, therefore, the valence of the impact partners have on each other—whether it is positive or negative— does not determine how close their relationship is. In fact, closeness may be unrelated to perceptions of relationship quality or satisfaction, and perhaps counterintuitively, some of the closest relationships might actually be between people who do not like one another, such as unhappy marital couples or long-standing enemies. Consider two examples of close relationships that differ markedly in their emotional tone. Brad and Sally are in a rocky relationship that has been falling apart for several months. They argue incessantly about all kinds of issues, which often results in one of them becoming irate and storming out of the house. When they have arguments, what Sally thinks, feels, and does clearly impacts Brad’s thinking, feeling, and behaving in turn. Sally’s impact on Brad, though undoubtedly negative, is strong, frequent, diverse, and sustained, and the same is true of Brad’s impact on Sally. They have a definitively close relationship, according to Kelley’s definition. Now consider a comparably close relationship that is much more positive and harmonious. Michael and Holly have been living together happily for many years. When they discuss issues, they often feel better about themselves and what their future together holds. What Holly thinks, feels, and does strongly affects how Michael reacts and vice versa. Holly’s impact on Michael, which is unquestionably positive, is also strong, frequent, diverse, and sustained, as is Michael’s impact on Holly. It is also possible for relationship partners to have different levels of closeness in the same relationship. If, for instance, Jake depends on his friend Finn to meet all his important needs, Finn’s daily impact on Jake may be greater than Jake’s daily impact on Finn. Over time, Jake should become closer to Finn than Finn is to Jake, unless Jake also satisfies some of Finn’s most important needs. One important implication of Kelley’s model is that individuals may not realize how close they are to their partners until the relationship ends and the ties that constitute daily impact are completely

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severed. Individuals usually habituate to and “take for granted” the numerous ways in which their partners affect their most important and basic routines, plans, and goals. Once this influence is absent, its impact is felt strongly, which partially explains why people become so distressed even when relatively unhappy relationships end.

Other Theories of Closeness Although Kelley’s model of closeness remains the most widely accepted one, others have gained adherents. Arthur Aron, for example, claimed that Kelley’s objective and behavioral conceptualization of closeness ignores some of the cognitive and affective properties that define closeness, leading him to introduce a model of subjective closeness. According to this model, closeness implies a metaphor for the degree of proximity (overlap) between the self-concepts of the two relationship partners. Higher levels of subjective closeness are reflected by greater overlap between one’s self and the partner’s self, a long-standing concept in psychology that goes back to William James’s seminal writings. Aron describes self-other overlap as perceiving central aspects of the partner (e.g., his or her resources, beliefs, values, interests, personal characteristics, and so on) as being part of one’s own self-concept. This overlap produces cognitive interdependence in which the conceptualization of the self is revised to become a more collective self-inrelationship, which is revealed by the regular use of pluralistic pronouns such as we, us, and our and by the centrality of the relationship in one’s self-concept. Aron proposes that subjective closeness develops over time as a result of many interactions between partners. As partners self-disclose more to one another and display greater understanding of, validation of, and caring for each other, subjective closeness increases. The partners’ mutual impact, however, is a consequence of closeness, not closeness per se. Margaret Clark and Edward Lemay have offered another definition of closeness, one that focuses on the extent of responsiveness that exists between partners. Responsiveness is defined as any action that supports or promotes the partner’s welfare, such as giving emotional support, affirming

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the partner, or buffering the partner from negative outcomes. Unlike Kelley’s model, Clark and Lemay’s model conflates relationship closeness and quality in that only supportive and positively impactful relationships are considered close. They also argue that responsiveness must be mutual if the relationship is to be close, unless the type of relationship is normatively asymmetrical (such as parent–young child relationships). Clark and Lemay describe the process that generates closeness using an integrative model of responsiveness. According to their model, the traits of the perceiver, of his or her partner, and of the environment shape the perceiver’s confidence in his or her partner’s responsiveness as well as the desire for a mutually responsive relationship. Desire and confidence, in turn, predict the extent to which the perceiver seeks responsiveness from his or her partner and how responsive he or she is likely to be in return. However, in order to seek responsiveness, one must recognize the need for support from the partner; similarly, in order to provide responsiveness, one must recognize the partner’s needs. The model also anticipates how partners influence one another. Specifically, Partner A’s responsiveness predicts Partner B’s confidence in responsiveness, relief of need, and promotion of well-being, and Partner B’s responsiveness seeking predicts Partner A’s perception of B’s need for responsiveness. To illustrate this process, imagine that Sam and Beth have a relationship that is high in mutual responsiveness. Sam’s relationship history, Beth’s empathy, and Sam’s stressful job all combine to motivate him to seek a mutually responsive relationship and to feel confident that Beth will be responsive, especially when he needs her to be. This condition motivates Sam to talk to Beth whenever he feels stressed. When Beth is supportive during these discussions, Sam immediately feels better and becomes more confident that she will be responsive in the future. On her side, Beth recognizes that Sam may need more support than usual in the coming weeks, and Sam, in turn, tries to be equally helpful when Beth indicates she is feeling stressed. In conclusion, although scholars continue to debate what constitutes closeness in different types of relationships, the construct remains the central organizing principle in the field of interpersonal

relations. It is the glue that binds partners together, both behaviorally and emotionally, and it makes the dissolution of long-standing relationships— even acrimonious ones—difficult to endure. Allison K. Farrell and Jeffry A. Simpson See also Culture and Social Relations; Individuality Versus Collectivity; Relational Theory; Social Motives; Social Role Theory

Further Readings Aron, A. P., Mashek, D. J., & Aron, E. N. (2004). Closeness as including other in the self. In D. J. Mashek & A. P. Aron (Eds.), Handbook of closeness and intimacy (pp. 27–41). Mahwah, NJ: Laurence Erlbaum. Clark, M. S., & Lemay, E. P., Jr. (2010). Close relationships. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (5th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 898–940). New York, NY: Wiley. Kelley, H. H., Berscheid, E., Christensen, A., Harvey, J. H., Huston, T. L., Levinger, G., . . . Peterson, D. R. (1983). Analyzing close relationships. In H. H. Kelley, E. Berscheid, A. Christensen, J. H. Harvey, T. L. Huston, G. Levinger, . . . D. R. Peterson (Eds.), Close relationships (pp. 20–67). New York, NY: Freeman.

Cognition

and

Language

How is language related to other cognitive processes? Language in some form mediates symbolic representations for all language users, but what is the nature of that mediation? This entry presents four possibilities for the way in which language and thought might be related, all of which have been adopted at some point in history and all of which have their adherents still.

Four Views The first possibility is that language determines (the strong version) or influences (the weak version) thought. This idea has become known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. It originally gained credence in anthropological research on vocabulary differentiation—that is, the reasons why speakers of different languages apparently assign words to

Cognition and Language

categories in very different ways. The most famous example of vocabulary differentiation is the debate about how many words the Inuit use to describe snow. The original idea proposed by the linguist Benjamin Lee Whorf was that different linguistic constructions led speakers of different languages to perceive the world in different ways. This conclusion was speculative and depended on the idiosyncrasy of the translation. It is also implausible that different words lead to different perceptions, given that language users can easily construct new categories by combining words and that differences in categorization merely reflect differences in expertise. More substantial evidence for the hypothesis came from the study of color categories, specifically the finding that “focal colors”—that is, colors that are the best exemplar of their categories—are better remembered and have simpler names. However, the distribution of names across languages follows a clear pattern, with the names corresponding to sensitive regions of the color­ vision system, suggesting that both language and perception are determined biologically. More recent research on color naming suggests that there might also be an additional component by which language affects memory. Studies from a wide range of tasks, including memory and problem solving, show that, at the very least, having ready linguistic categories available facilitates cognitive processing. The second possibility is that human cognitive architecture determines the form of language. This idea has been pursued by the developmental psychologist Jean Piaget and those working in the same tradition and has become known as the cognition hypothesis. For example, it should be impossible for a child to start using names to refer to objects in any systematic way until she or he has grasped the idea that objects exist as distinct entities—that is, until the child has acquired the concept of object permanence toward the end of the sensorimotor stage of development at around 18 to 24 months of age. However, in general, it is difficult to find any clear mapping between stages of cognitive development and landmarks in development and stages and landmarks of linguistic development or even if clear stages exist at all.

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The third possibility is that language and cognition are related developmentally in some complex way. This position was advocated by the Russian linguist Lev Vygotsky. He argued that language and thought have different origins. For Vygotsky, early speech was “pre-intellectual” and early thought, nonverbal. He was particularly intrigued by the way in which young children talk to themselves—their monologues—wherein they appear to give a running commentary on what is happening in their world. At about the age of 2, these monologues disappear from their overt speech. Vygotsky argued that at this point the monologues become internalized to become “internal speech.” From this point on, children’s thoughts become linguistic and their language “intellectual.” The final possibility is that language and thought are completely independent; that is, language is a special faculty and a special module in the brain. This position has been adopted by Noam Chomsky and researchers in his tradition with some important consequences. The first is that in stressing the role that the innate universal grammar plays in language development, this approach emphasizes innate, domain-specific knowledge rather than the role of general-purpose learning mechanisms. The second consequence is that researchers within this tradition tend to emphasize the modularity of mind, with a module being a processing structure that delivers an output given some input and does so without the assistance of any other module. To some extent, this approach fits well with the development of cognitive neuroscience specifically, with mapping cognitive modules onto brain structures. The third consequence has been an a priori commitment to the modularity of language processes themselves. The idea of modularity has been particularly important in word recognition and syntactic parsing. In both cases, modularity leads to the theoretical commitment that the automatic processing of language comprehension is bottom-up—that is, purely data driven. This presumption leads to models of speech and visual word recognition wherein only lexical information can influence the recognition process, meaning that extra-lexical priming (e.g., sentential context) effects can only be postaccess. It similarly leads to models of parsing where only syntactic information can affect the construction of the initial parse tree.

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Semantic bias can only affect later stages. Hence, there is a separation between the class of garden path models in which the interpretation of garden path sentences (most famously, “the horse raced past the barn fell,” known as a “reduced relative construction”) is initially influenced only by attachment preferences and the constraintbased parsing models in which the initial ­construction can be influenced by many sources of information. This dichotomy between different types of models led to a prolonged phase in psycholinguistics when the literature was filled with debates between their proponents, often taking the form of experiment and model, reply, and counterreply (and still does to some extent). More recently, advances in brain imaging, particularly fMRI, have shown that the mapping between brain and language is complex and that most language processes involve a wide range of subprocesses, usually including many that are general purpose (e.g., involving working memory and executive processes). Indeed, the extent to which language involves executive processing in both development and skilled performance has been a revelation over the last few years. In particular, the role of different components of working memory has received a great deal of attention. It is clear that the phonological loop, in particular, far from being a separate component of the cognitive architecture, plays a role in learning ­language and in integrating material in comprehension. Deficits of the phonological loop or reduced span lead to impairment in learning ­language, difficulties in language comprehension, or even in repeating short strings of words. Trevor A. Harley See also Communication and Language; Concepts and Language; Language, Evolution of; Language and Development; Language Development; Language Disorders; Language, Interaction, and Culture; Perception and Language

Further Readings Gaskell, M. G. (Ed.). (2007). The Oxford handbook of psycholinguistics. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Harley, T. A. (2010). Talking the talk. London, England: Psychology Press.

Harley, T. A. (2014). The psychology of language (4th ed.). London, England: Psychology Press. Sedivy, J. (2014). Language in mind: An introduction to psycholinguistics. Sunderland, MA: Sinaeur Associates. Traxler, M. J., & Gernsbacher, M. A. (Eds.). (2006). Handbook of psycholinguistics (2nd ed.). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier.

Cognitive Behavioral Therapies The term cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) is often described as a single intervention; however, the actual definition of CBT is considerably more complex. There are many variations of behavioral therapies with varying degrees of emphasis on the individual’s internal experience (e.g., cognitions). Thus, when describing CBT in a broad context, it is sometimes more useful to talk in terms of the cognitive behavioral therapies or the behavioral and cognitive therapies. These broader descriptions better represent the continued evolution of approaches that target both overt behaviors (i.e., those observable by others) and covert behaviors (i.e., those observable only by the self). The evolution of the cognitive-behavioral therapies has included a few major shifts in focus. Steven Hayes has described these shifts as three waves, in which the first wave includes the early behavioral approaches, the second wave shifts to a greater emphasis on cognitions, and the third wave represents a shift toward experiential change. Each of these waves is described in this entry.

Behavioral Approaches: The First Wave Behavior therapy began with the recognition that human behavior can be defined, measured, and observed both as a phenomenon unto itself and in relation to environmental events. This conceptualization of behavior, which first arose in the early 20th century, was a departure from predominant biological and psychodynamic explanations of the day. The first environmental events studied in terms of their impact on human behavior were those that could be observed to co-occur with another event to produce a physiological response, such as the pairing of a white rat (a neutral stimulus) with a loud noise (a stimulus that ­

Cognitive Behavioral Therapies

independently produces a startle reflex) to condition fear of white rats in an 8-month-old baby who is often referred to as Little Albert. Prior to John B. Watson’s earliest exploration of the associations between environmental events and human behavior, Edward Thorndike had demonstrated that pleasurable events immediately following an animal’s response had the effect of strengthening the response. However, it was not until B. F. Skinner and his associates began widespread study of the effect of consequences and other environmental conditions on behavior, some decades later, that the full extent to which both animal and human behavior could be influenced by environmental events was thoroughly explored and documented. Behaviorism, as originally titled by Watson and refined by Skinner, regards human behavior, whether a discrete event (e.g., crying) or a complex sequence of events (pursuing a Ph.D. in psychology), as made more or less likely to occur by specific events that occurred before and after similar behaviors in a person’s experience. Unlike other explanations of human learning and development, however, no analysis of the previous events (e.g., the childhood experience of an adult) is needed to observe the ways in which the environment is influencing current behavior, because all such relationships between stimuli and responses are able to be measured in the present. Thus, individuals seeking to change a behavior have only to detect the contingency between the current response and associated environmental antecedents and consequences. Once those antecedents and consequences that have functional relationships with the behavior are identified, they can be modified in such a way as to decrease undesired behaviors and increase desired ones. In an early application of behavioral principles, and following from her mentor’s study of Little Albert, Mary Cover Jones used gradual exposure to treat Little Peter’s fear of rabbits. This case study is a major contributing factor to Jones being labeled “the mother of behavior therapy,” as behavior therapy involves using behavioral principles to change behavior associated with clinical problems. In his book The Practice of Behavior Therapy, Joseph Wolpe credits Skinner and c­olleagues as being the originators of the term behavior therapy. Wolpe’s book provides an

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early descriptive collection of behavioral interventions such as systematic desensitization and assertiveness training. Other early behavioral approaches include techniques such as the urine alarm, differential reinforcement, and token economies. The alternative term, behavior modification, has also been used to describe some behavioral interventions; however, more modern applications of behavioral approaches are also referred to as applied behavior analysis (ABA) and tend have a greater emphasis on the function of behavior. One of the principles considered foundational to modern ABA is a focus on changing behaviors that are of primary interest to the client and/or caregivers responsible for the client’s well-being. This concept, known as social validity, guides the identification of behaviors in need of change, as well as the procedures used to change them. The emphasis on supporting and increasing positive behaviors has had a large impact on discipline and social development curricula in school and juvenile settings, via procedures such as positive behavioral interventions and supports. A positive behavior and reinforcement emphasis also dominates other behaviorally based interventions, which are still in use, such as behavioral parent training, Internet-facilitated exercise, and/or nutrition interventions, job-training programs, academic interventions, and treatment of a variety of psychological and developmental disorders.

Cognitive Approaches: The Second Wave The second wave of behavior therapy is marked by a shift away from viewing overt behavior as the primary target of intervention and toward focusing on the role that irrational and distorted thinking plays in the development of psychopathology. An important early pioneer of this movement was Albert Ellis, who, beginning in the 1950s, developed rational emotive therapy (RET), which he later modified to be called rational emotive behavior therapy (REBT). The focus of REBT is summed up in a five-stage therapeutic process known by the acronym ABCDE. In REBT, the therapist and client focus on the activating event (A) that precipitated some sort of unpleasant emotion. Then, the beliefs (B) that were activated are identified. Discussion then turns

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to the emotional and behavioral consequences (C) that followed the beliefs. The effectiveness of the therapy is realized when these client beliefs are vigorously disputed (D) by the therapist, leading to a more effective (E) pattern of emotional, ­cognitive, and behavioral functioning. Several years after Ellis, in the early 1960s, Aaron Beck independently created what he would later term cognitive therapy. Beck’s approach to therapy, like the Ellis approach, focused on the role of irrational thinking as the originator of dysfunctional behaviors and emotions. Beck stressed that it was not difficult situations that the client experienced that led to psychopathology but rather the beliefs through which the client viewed these situations. For example, a client with a depressive pattern of thinking who has not been contacted by her friend in several days might think that this friend is avoiding her in order to eventually end their friendship. Beck would emphasize that the irrational thinking, not the activating situation, is responsible for this client’s consequential depressed affect and associated depressive behaviors. Like Ellis, Beck focuses on identifying these irrational thoughts and replacing them with more rational thinking (in the previous example, the replacement thought might be that the friend has been especially busy with work). In doing this, Beck posited that changes in a client’s pattern of irrational thinking would create a positive change in the client’s related emotions and behaviors. In the previous example, the client who accepts the more rational belief that her friend has not called recently because the friend is busy (not because the friend is purposefully ignoring the client) would not experience significant sadness ­ and would also not withdraw from that friend. Beck emphasized the importance of the client and therapist working together to frequently examine the client’s thoughts in order to replace irrational thinking with more rational thinking. Beck also referred to various levels of belief, which his daughter and psychologist Judith Beck elaborated on further in her book Cognitive Behavior Therapy: Basics and Beyond. Judith Beck specifies the three levels of belief: automatic thoughts (which are situation specific), intermediate beliefs (which are broader rules or assumptions), and core beliefs (that are general judgments on the world, self, and others). Judith Beck also emphasizes the

importance that all three levels of belief have in maintaining psychopathology, with situation-­ specific automatic thoughts originating from ­irrational core and intermediate beliefs. In the cognitive approach, therapists often begin by identifying and replacing irrational thinking at the level of automatic thoughts and move on to intermediate and core beliefs in later sessions. There are several hallmarks of cognitive therapy, including the importance of cocreating an agenda for each session with the client, creating and frequently testing hypotheses regarding the client’s irrational beliefs, and using therapeutic homework to support the process of replacing irrational thoughts with more rational thoughts. Although the cognitive approach has early roots in treating adults with depression, practitioners quickly found other applications, including the treatment of ­anxiety, eating disorders, and many other issues in adults and children.

Experiential Approaches: The Third Wave Hayes and colleagues spearheaded the merging of seemingly diverse treatment approaches under the third wave terminology, which encompasses interventions such as acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT), dialectical behavior therapy (DBT), functional analytic psychotherapy (FAP), and mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT). Behavioral approaches in the third wave are founded on behaviorism and behavior analysis principles, and like ABA, interventions in the third wave are often purported to have a greater emphasis on the function of behaviors. In addition to the existing behavioral principles, the third wave approaches also actively embrace newer principles of verbal behavior based on relational frame ­theory. Relational frame theory is most strongly interwoven into ACT; however, its principles ­generalize across various third-wave approaches. Third-wave approaches share some common mechanisms of change. For example, the therapies emphasize interventions striving toward contextual change. Such contextual emphasis is most evident in the incorporation of acceptance. The goal of acceptance is to change the individual’s relationship (i.e., context) with problem behaviors, which may ultimately decrease the level of psychological ­struggle and increase psychological flexibility.

Cognitive Behavioral Therapies

Relatedly, third-wave therapies naturally focus on experiential learning and experiential change strategies combined with direct didactic ones. It is common for third-wave approaches to have an emphasis on mindfulness, in which the individual learns to focus on the present moment. The mindfulness approach is used to serve various purposes, such as preventing undue weight given to negative thoughts, being more aware of therapeutic interactions, and providing a competing response to rumination. As a point of comparison, in traditional cognitive therapy the client is taught to counter specific cognitive distortions with more rational thoughts; however, in ACT, the individual is taught to notice and accept the negative thoughts without necessarily changing them. Finally, third-wave approaches also emphasize the use of traditional behavioral strategies in helping individuals commit to behavior change that supports their goals. In addition to some of the areas of treatment described in the previous waves, third-wave approaches have also focused on areas such as borderline personality disorder, chronic pain, and couples therapy, to name a few.

Continued Integration of the Three Waves Each of the new waves prompted debate about whether the shift really represented a distinct new wave at all. For example, Wolpe argued that cognitions were a type of behavior that had always been a part of behavior therapy, and his argument minimizes the unique contributions of the second wave. Others have provided critical evaluations of the notion of a third wave. At the core of this debate is the question of whether the third wave is indeed qualitatively distinct from the earlier approaches. However, regardless of whether there really have been three distinct waves, there has indeed been an evolution of behavioral (and cognitive) approaches. Importantly, each new wave did not replace the one that came before it; practitioners of cognitivebehavioral therapies commonly incorporate aspects of each wave. Though distinct approaches for a while, traditional behavior therapy and traditional cognitive therapy merged into cognitive behavioral therapy with help from early integrationist p ­ ositions such as Albert Bandura’s theory of self-efficacy and Donald Meichenbaum’s cognitive behavior modification. Similarly, regarding the third wave

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controversy, even critics acknowledge that interventions such as ACT have some unique attributes that may help provide improved treatment for some individuals. One problem with the “three waves” metaphor is that this metaphor suggests there have been only three major developments in the cognitive behavioral therapies over the last century. In fact, there have been hundreds of significant developments, each of which substantially influenced the work of thousands of practitioners and helped improve millions of lives. Perhaps a better metaphor for the evolution of the cognitive-behavioral therapies would be that of a river with countless rapids rather than an ocean with only three waves. A partial listing of the many rapids could include broad approaches such as behavior therapy, ABA, cognitive therapy, DBT, and ACT, but it would also include many of the specific techniques imbedded within these types of interventions, such as exposure, token economies, cognitive restructuring, and acceptance. Taken together, the many variations of the cognitive behavioral therapies target most areas of human suffering, and there is a considerable body of research showing that most variations are effective forms of intervention. In fact, one of the unifying themes connecting each of the three waves has been an emphasis on testable hypotheses regarding the intervention’s effectiveness. Hans Eysenck is often credited with the early widespread adoption of behavior therapy; he emphasized that not all treatments are equally effective while also arguing that behavior therapy does work. Others, such as Scott Lilienfeld, have needed to continue making the case that some treatments are considerably more effective than others, and in fact, that some treatments are ineffective or even harmful. Of the recognized effective psychosocial treatments, the majority of them fall under the cognitive behavioral umbrella. Indeed, the cognitive behavioral therapies continue to be well represented in categorizations of evidence-based treatments for both adults and children. The Association for Behavioral and Cognitive Therapies is an organization that shares information and resources about the cognitive behavioral therapies. Stephen Hupp, Eunyoe Ro, Elizabeth McKenney, and Jeremy Jewell

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See also Applied Behavior Analysis; Bandura, Albert; Behavior Therapies; Behaviorism; Cognitive Therapies; Evidence-Based Therapy; Measuring Treatment Outcome; Psychotherapy and Individualism; Skinner’s Legacy; Watson, J. B.

Further Readings Beck, A. (1963). Thinking and depression: I. Idiosyncratic content and cognitive distortions. Archives of General Psychiatry, 9, 324–333. Beck, J. S. (2011). Cognitive behavior therapy: Basics and beyond. New York, NY: Guilford Press. Ellis, A. (1999). Why rational-emotive therapy to rational emotive behavior therapy? Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training, 36, 154–159. Hayes, S. C. (2004). Acceptance and commitment therapy, relational frame theory, and third wave of behavioral and cognitive therapies. Behavior Therapy, 35, 639–665. Hofmann, S. G., & Asmundson, G. J. (2008). Acceptance and mindfulness-based therapy: New wave or old hat? Clinical Psychology Review, 28, 1–16. Hupp, S. D. A., Reitman, D., & Jewell, J. D. (2008). Cognitive behavioral theory. In M. Hersen & A. M. Gross (Eds.), Handbook of clinical psychology: Volume II. Children and adolescents. New York, NY: John Wiley. Lilienfeld, S. O. (2014). The dodo bird verdict: Status in 2014. The Behavior Therapist, 37, 91–95. Linehan, M. M. (1993). Cognitive-behavioral treatment of borderline personality disorder. New York, NY: Guilford Press. Meichenbaum, D. (1977). Cognitive-behavior modification. New York, NY: Plenum Press. Skinner, B. F., & Lindsay, O. R. (1954). Studies in behavior therapy (Status Reports II and III, Contract N5 ori-7662). Arlington, VA: Office of Naval Research. Watson, J. B., & Rayner, R. (1920). Conditioned emotional reactions. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 3, 1–14. Wolpe, J. (1978). Cognition and causation in human behavior and its therapy. American Psychologist, 33, 437–446.

Websites Association for Behavioral and Cognitive Therapies (ABCT): www.abct.org Effective Child Therapy: www.effectivechildtherapy.com/ content/ebp-options-specific-disorders Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS): www.pbis.org Society of Clinical Psychology, Website on ResearchSupported Psychological Treatments: www.div12.org/ PsychologicalTreatments/index.html

Cognitive Development Theories of cognitive development seek to explain the dynamic processes through which human minds grow and change from infancy throughout the life span. Cognition refers to capabilities including memory, thinking and reasoning, spatial processing, problem solving, language, and perception. Importantly, theories of cognitive development aim to explain mechanisms of change, thus development, rather than to merely describe the capabilities of children across ages or between children, adults, and aging populations. This entry reviews historical thinking about whether cognitive development is the result of individual characteristics or of the environment and discusses current models of cognitive development.

The Individual Versus the Environment At the core of all developmental theory is the question of whether observed changes in an individual’s abilities can be attributed to changes or mechanisms functioning within the individual himself or herself, what is often called nativism, or whether these changes can be attributed to environmental mechanisms, empiricism. This debate can be traced to early debates within ancient philosophy, when Plato argued for nativism in relation to concepts such as God or a triangle because there is no evidence in the world from which to evaluate these principles. Aristotle, conversely, claimed that all knowledge was imprinted on individuals from external inputs. Over the next 2,000 years, these debates resurfaced with a more explicit model of empiricism, famously articulated through John Locke’s notion of a tabula rasa, in which he argued that people enter the world as “blank slates” entirely shaped by their environment. In contrast, the philosophers Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant focused on innate human nature, with Rousseau arguing that it is pure, noble, and biologically determined and that one should look to those “outside of societal influences” to learn about true human nature. Kant more specifically argued that human minds have common features and structures that guide the way one experiences the world. Thus, to understand human development, one must better understand

Cognitive Development

the way infants’ and young children’s internal, innate mental structures process information that comes from the external environment. Modern theories of cognitive development still grapple with these foundational questions of the individual versus the environment, though the discussion has moved from determining which is the more important influence to seeking to explain how these two influences interact. Also, the methodologies have changed to be more data driven, including observation, experimentation, longitudinal data collection, computational computer modeling to test predictions through simulations, and gathering information on the biological and, specifically, neurological underpinnings of cognition and behavior. As the data collection methods have increased in precision, so have the theories, which are increasingly biologically plausible and able to describe both how infants enter the world and the mechanisms by which their cognition changes over time. Major theories that have led to current models of development are described in what follows.

Domain-General Versus Domain-Specific Theories Two lines of theory have emerged within the contemporary debates about empiricism and nativism. Domain-general theories seek to identify generalized cognitive developmental mechanisms that explain change across all types of cognition within an individual, such as “brain maturation” or “equilibration.” Domain-specific theories are theories that explain changes only in specific types of processes within an individual, such as numerical thought or language. Contemporary empiricism tends to be more domain general, and contemporary nativism, domain specific. Domain General: Foundational Psychological Studies of Cognitive Development

Behaviorism Psychological research in the late 19th century and the first half of the 20th century added a data-driven approach to the landscape of cognitive developmental theory. Because of reticence to infer or make assumptions about internal mental processes, in this period of psychological study the theory of behaviorism was favored, a theory

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premised on the idea that one cannot gain direct information about mental processes from experimental or observational studies, so one should exclusively focus on documenting behaviors in environmental contexts. Behaviorists such as B. F. Skinner were largely empiricists, arguing that development can be explained as learning, which proceeds through classical and operant conditioning. These are processes by which animals or humans develop associations between environmental stimuli and their emotional and other behaviors. Although still highly influential, the model of development as learning was limited in its ability to explain or thoroughly characterize children’s trajectories of cognitive growth. Piaget and Constructivism Modern cognitive developmental psychology emerged when the Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget (1896–1980) combined experimental methods with close observations of children over time to produce a constructivist theory of child development. He posited a stage theory of cognitive development, meaning that the mind proceeds through a predictable series of “stages” as it develops. According to Piaget, mental development occurs in a series of four major stages: sensorimotor, preoperational, concrete intellectual operations, and formal operations. All babies begin at the sensorimotor stage, and progress through the next two stages, but not all children reach the formal operation stage. Each stage is characterized by capacities and skills that emerge in a series of regular substages, followed by a major shift from one stage to another. Because these shifts between stages were theorized to be complete breaks in which the child became a fundamentally different sort of thinker, they were described as qualitative changes rather than quantitative changes—that is, a gradual or slow accumulation of skills (e.g., knowing two, then four, then five vocabulary words). One of many ways Piaget and his longtime collaborator Barbel Inhelder contributed to the field was to develop a set of tasks that revealed differences between the way younger and older children behave and think about the world. For example, Piaget identified the “A not B error” as a key pattern exhibited by infants in the sensorimotor stage and that differed from those at any other stage.

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The A-not-B-error task involved the experimenter showing a baby a toy and then hiding it in one of two locations. The baby was allowed to search and typically found the toy in the location where it was hidden (Location A). Next, the toy was hidden in Location B, but the baby continued to search in Location A. An older child, by ­contrast, would search in Location B. This phenomenon is well documented and has prompted theoretical accounts of why it occurs. Explanations include fully understanding that the object continues to exist (Piaget’s concept of object permanence), impulse control, and memory failure. Piaget brought many other phenomena to the attention of developmentalists, including theory of mind, conservation, gender roles, moral development, hypothetico-deductive reasoning, and propositional thought. Piagetian tasks revealed unintuitive cognitive patterns in children that decades of researchers have continued to study in order to contest and build cognitive developmental theory. The phenomena that Piaget identified have been well replicated, meaning that many researchers have observed them. Subsequent studies, however, have also shown that Piaget underestimated young children’s capacities so that certain skills appear earlier if different tasks are used. Moreover, children’s abilities may grow in one domain at a different pace than in another, which is inconsistent with the stage theory. Piaget’s theory integrated nativist and empiricist elements. He posited that infants enter the world with innate capacities, in particular, sensorimotor reflexes. He argued that children then operate on the world using these sensorimotor reflexes. Doing so leads them to refine and combine reflexes based on experience (empiricism). He described the processes by which experience impacted cognition as processes of equilibration. Children develop from having mental models of the world that can explain what they experience to disequilibrium—finding that they can no longer understand or explain something in the world. They return to equilibration by either accommodation— that is, refining, breaking down, or combining existing thought or behavior patterns—or assimilation, wherein they extend existing thought or behavior patterns to new experiences. Some of Piaget’s contemporaries, referred to as neo-Piagetians, developed new stage theories,

including central conceptual structure theory, skill theory, relational complexity, and stage theories for specific domains (e.g., in mathematics and science). All these theories assert that children develop by moving through a series of discontinuous stages marked by qualitative changes. Vygotsky’s Sociocultural Theory of Development Lev Vygotsky (1896–1934) also posited an interplay between biological and environmental influences, though he drew influential attention to the role of caregivers and culture in the developmental environment. Vygotsky’s theory underscored the role of social interaction, and, in ­particular, interaction with expert social partners, in supporting children’s cognitive development. Of critical importance was his concept of the zone of proximal development (ZPD), which is the difference between what a learner can do on his or her own and what he or she can do with the assistance of someone who possesses more expertise. Vygotsky argued that children acquire knowledge by participating in cultural activities, such as preparing food, in which they observe and mimic, and eventually internalize, expert action. This internalization process is mediated by the child’s language use and involves cultural artifacts, tools, and icons (e.g., spoons and recipes for preparing food). Subsequent theorists continued to build on this model, emphasizing the role of the child’s environment in development and privileging social factors over biological. Current Domain-General Theory

Information Processing The information-processing model of cognitive development is a domain-general developmental theory that derives from a metaphorical equivalence between a computer and a mind. Researchers posit that the infant mind develops a set of cognitive processes that work together to create a reasoning system. The system is limited, so the reasoner cannot overload any particular capacity or process within the system. The notion is that information enters the mind through the sensory-motor buffer. Information that receives attention is moved into the working-memory system, and if not maintained, this information is lost. If maintained or further

Cognitive Development

encoded, this information then passes to long-term memory, and ideally is usable at a future date. Much current developmental research seeks to understand the brain pathways through which individual elements of the information-processing model develop and which brain regions are responsible for each element. For example, one line of study examines children’s development in the frontal lobe, which seems to be responsible for the ability to filter information into the working-memory system and to manipulate that information, which are two key elements of the information-processing model of the mind. Dynamic Systems Theory This theory argues that development is a complex combination of many physical and cognitive processes that converge without innate or guiding principles.

Domain-Specific Contemporary Theories of Development Domain-specific theories posit that cognitive development proceeds in distinct ways across different domains. This idea seems to be in line with modern versions of constructivism, which claims that, because development occurs through interactions with the environment, development may proceed at a different pace in different domains, depending on the quality and quantity of a child’s interactions within a particular domain. Alternatively, modern nativists have proposed further that development begins with innate or biologically driven predispositions to learn in distinct ways in specific domains, thus providing a foundation for learning and broader development based on experience in the world. Contemporary Nativism: Modular Foundations

Contemporary nativism’s two main theoretical frameworks derive from Noam Chomsky and Jerry Fodor. Chomsky studied the foundations of language development and raised the theoretical possibility that behaviorist theories of learning by association could not account for the development of intricate language structures. This is known as the poverty of stimulus (POS) argument, which proposes that there is not enough

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information available from the language experienced by children to enable them to learn the complex patterns of grammar they display in speech. Thus, Chomsky argued, children must have innate linguistic constraints that guide efficient, invariable learning and that predispose children to produce grammatical forms. Although a limited number of different grammatical forms appear across the world’s languages, children who make grammatical errors in their own language tend to make errors similar to those in other languages. Chomsky took this finding as evidence that a constrained set of grammatical forms are innate and that one or another becomes activated through environmental experience with one’s native language. This assertion has been widely contested, but Chomsky’s influence on contemporary nativists is clear. Specifically, current nativism enshrines the idea that there might be innate early-knowledge structures, or even predispositions to attend to certain types of environmental stimuli, that enable children to develop more quickly in some domains than should be feasible by simply engaging with the environment. This model of development aligns theoretically with a different model of domain-specific development posed by Fodor, who argued that new knowledge builds on previously established basic concepts. Thus, no learning could occur unless there were innate representations to build on. Fodor postulated a set of neural modules that potentiate skills in each domain—for example, a language module, a number module, and so on. This theory has found support in evolutionary psychology, where there is interest in demonstrating how specific modules may have developed from prehuman to human versions. Contemporary Domain-Specific Theory: Core Knowledge Theory

Core knowledge theory posits that there is a set of innate capacities, or learning devices, that allow the rapid development of learning in certain areas and not others. Contemporary developmental scientists also have proposed core cognitive constraints that organize a child’s mind to support knowledge development in at least four domains: objects (naive

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physics), number, space (naive geometry or reorientation), and people (naive psychology). The theory uses three criteria to determine the validity of a domain as distinct. First, knowledge acquisition and early patterns of behavior must have unique characteristics when compared with other domains. For example, in the object domain, there are specific characteristics of the progression in which children learn to reason about objects. One is that they make judgments that show their understanding that objects are usually complete. For example, if they see a partially obscured triangle—that is, an object consisting of dis­ connected line segments—they nevertheless demonstrate familiarity with the complete triangle rather than mere line segments. Second, the domain must possess core principles that explain patterns of behavior. The patterns may be identified in nonhuman animals as well, suggesting an evolutionary history in which early capacities are reflected in later skills. For example, many nonhuman species show the ability to count small numbers and compare magnitudes in the same way children do. Third, the domain must have signature limits at which the postulated early core structures break down and thereafter require learning. To illustrate, children seem to have an early ability to use quantitative information to distinguish between quantities of objects in ratios of 1:2 (e.g., two versus four or four versus eight objects) but not smaller ratios (e.g., 2:3 or 4:5). Lindsey Engle Richland, Rebecca Rose Frausel, and Kreshnik Begolli See also Childhood; Cognitive Evolution; Cognitive Illusions; Cognitive Neuroscience; Language Development; Nature Versus Nurture; Perceptual Development; Piaget’s and the Neo-Piagetian Theories of Cognitive Development

Further Readings Carey, S. (2009). The origin of concepts. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Gopnik, A. (2010). How babies think. Scientific American, 303(1), 76–81. Newcombe, N. S. (2013). Cognitive development: Changing views of cognitive change. WIREs Cognitive Science, 4, 479–491.

Schwartz, M., & Fischer, K. W. (2004). Building general knowledge and skill: Cognition and microdevelopment in science learning. In A. Demetriou & A. Raftopoulos (Eds.), Cognitive developmental change: Theories, models, and measurement (pp. 157–185). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Spelke, E. S., & Kinzler, K. D. (2007). Core knowledge. Developmental Science, 10, 89–96. Spencer, J. P., Blumberg, M. S., McMurray, B., Robinson, S. R., Samuelson, L. K., & Tomblin, J. B. (2009). Short arms and talking eggs: Why we should no longer abide the nativist–empiricist debate. Child Development Perspectives, 3(2), 79–87.

Cognitive Evolution In the 1800s, Charles Darwin created a wave of controversy by suggesting that evolutionary processes, including natural selection, have shaped not only the bodies of humans and other animals but their minds, too. Furthermore, because Darwin argued that these evolutionary processes are common to all living organisms, he implied that human minds differed from those of other animals in degree but not necessarily in kind. Robust debates ensued, with critics insisting that there is a discontinuity between the mental capacities of human beings and nonhuman animals (henceforth, “animals”). The question of whether animals have similar mental processes to human beings goes farther back in time than Darwin. For example, ancient Greek philosophers discussed whether animals can be considered “rational” and whether animals can engage in complex thought processes in the absence of language. René Descartes famously argued that animals could be described as automatons. Although the idea that animals engage in thought processes and exhibit emotional states is now widely supported, vigorous discussions still surround key questions such as these: Do animals have a theory of mind? Do animals engage in referential communication? Is the human mind still evolving? This entry discusses some examples of contemporary, empirical research on the evolution of cognition and reviews a range of theoretical perspectives and methodologies in this research area.

Cognitive Evolution

Cognition is a broad term that refers to psychological mechanisms by which individuals acquire, process, and act on information from the environment, including perception, attention, communication, learning, memory, decision making, and causal reasoning. Inferences about cognitive mechanisms are generally based on observable behavioral outcomes, which means that researchers in the field of cognitive evolution must caution against inferring complex psychological mechanisms when simpler ones also fit the observed data (a practice commonly referred to as employing “Lloyd Morgan’s Canon”). Researchers are also discouraged from taking an anthropomorphic perspective (i.e., inappropriately attributing human characteristics to animals) and relying on anecdotal accounts, although both of these approaches suited Darwin and his contemporary, George Romanes, who collated examples of animal “intelligence” so as ­ to emphasize the continuum between human and animal cognition.

Animal Cognition Empirical research on the cognitive abilities of animals has flourished over the last 30 years, supplying evidence from both laboratory and field settings. Such studies reveal that some of the variation in abilities between closely related species is related to species differences in life history parameters (e.g., diet, predation risk, and mating strategy). For example, male meadow voles (Microtus pennsylvanicus) mate with several females and range over large distances when searching for mating partners, which potentially explains the better performance of males than females on laboratory tasks that require spatial ability in this species. In contrast, male and female prairie voles (M. ochorogaster) mate monogamously in small territories and perform similarly to each other on spatial tasks. Other studies provide evidence that behavior patterns that apparently require complex cognitive abilities are found across taxonomically diverse groups. For example, the ability to use or construct an appropriate tool for extracting a food source has been reported in ants, finches, crows, dolphins, monkeys, and apes. Such findings indicate that apparently complex behavior can be exhibited by species with

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relatively simple nervous systems. However, the exact psychological mechanisms involved in apparently sophisticated behavior patterns potentially vary across species. For example, “teaching” (defined as the active facilitation of learning in others) could arise via a number of social learning mechanisms, including local enhancement, observational conditioning, and imitation. A range of methods have been used to study cognitive evolution. For instance, state-of-the-art comparative statistical techniques allow researchers to test evolutionary hypotheses using large, cross-species data sets while controlling for the phylogenetic relatedness between species. These methods reveal, for example, that measures of brain size are positively associated with cross-species rates of innovative behavior in both avian and primate taxonomic groups. Comparing the behavior patterns of a large number of species can shed light on the convergent evolutionary selection pressures that might have favored particular cognitive abilities (e.g., tool use, innovation, and teaching). Researchers have also examined the psychological precursors of human cognitive traits by studying the related abilities of primate relatives, particularly chimpanzees and other great apes, and by comparing the cognitive abilities of human children with those of other primates. Such studies have revealed, for example, that chimpanzees are able to respond to cues that indicate the goals and intentions of others but show no evidence of understanding that other individuals can have false beliefs. By contrast, human children can identify the false beliefs of others at around 3 to 4 years of age.

Further Issues Although understanding of the cognitive abilities of animals has grown substantially since Darwin’s works were published, his question of whether human cognition differs from that of other species in kind or just in degree remains to be fully answered. Abilities that were previously thought to be uniquely human, such as tool use, teaching, imitation, and episodic memory, have been reported in other species, although the complexity of these traits in humans often outstrips the performance of even the closest primate relatives.

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However, one aspect that appears to set humans apart from other species is the extent to which humans rely on culturally transmitted information (e.g., values, beliefs, and knowledge about the world) that is often cumulative; that is, cultural information is accumulated over time, and improvements in technology and institutions follow an iterative process. Cultural information can lead to substantial construction and modification of environments (e.g., agriculture, dwellings, and medications), altering the selective environment and resulting in further changes in both genetically and socially transmitted information. Human cognitive capacities for social learning have thus substantially influenced the evolutionary trajectory of the species. Evidence from the Human Genome Project confirms that human beings have continued to evolve during the past few tens of thousands of years. For example, numerous lines of evidence support the idea that a history of dairy farming (a practice that is transmitted and sustained by culture) has resulted in selection favoring genes that allow human adults to digest lactose in cows’ milk. Analyses have identified dozens of genes that have undergone selection across relatively brief time periods, often apparently in response to human activities. A substantial proportion of these genes appear to be important in brain growth and neural signaling, with potential implications for a broad range of cognitive processes. In contrast, evolutionary psychologists commonly argue that human cognitive traits evolved in response to stable features of human ancestral environments, referred to as the “environment of evolutionary adaptedness,” and generally represented as the Pleistocene African savanna. These researchers have suggested that evolution by natural selection is too slow for the human mind to have evolved considerably since the end of the Pleistocene and that human beings thus are endowed with “Stone Age” brains. A gene–culture coevolutionary perspective instead suggests that human cognitive abilities, particularly the reliance on culture, led to behavioral traits that modify the environment, in turn creating selective pressures on cognitive abilities. Future research will reveal how human cognitive capacities have played, and continue to play, an active role in the cognitive evolution of the human species. Gillian R. Brown and Catharine P. Cross

See also Animal Consciousness; Cognitive Development; Cultural Evolution; Evolutionary Psychology; Human Nature; Intelligence, Evolution of; Natural Selection

Further Readings Bolhuis, J. J., Brown, G. R., Richardson, R. C., & Laland, K. N. (2011). Darwin in mind: New opportunities for evolutionary psychology. PLoS Biology, 9, e1001109. Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2008). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years later. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12, 187–192. Heyes, C. (2012). New thinking: The evolution of human cognition. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 367, 2091–2096. Laland, K. N., & Brown, G. R. (2006). Niche construction, human behavior and the adaptive-lag hypothesis. Evolutionary Anthropology, 15, 95–104. Laland, K. N., & Brown, G. R. (2011). Sense and nonsense: Evolutionary perspectives on human behaviour (2nd ed.). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Laland, K. N., Odling-Smee, J., & Myles, S. (2011). How culture shaped the human genome: Bringing genetics and human sciences together. Nature Reviews: Genetics, 11, 137–148. Plotkin, H. (2004). Evolutionary thought in psychology: A brief history. Oxford, England: Blackwell. Shettleworth, S. (2010). Cognition, evolution, and behavior (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Shettleworth, S. (2010). Clever animals and killjoy explanations in comparative psychology. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14, 477–481. Wynne, C. D. L. (2007). What are animals? Why anthropomorphism is still not a scientific approach to behavior. Comparative Cognition and Behavior Reviews, 2, 125–135.

Cognitive Illusions An illusion is a false perception of reality. Even though one may argue, as, for instance, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant did, that reality cannot be perceived as such—simply because every perception is, necessarily, a subjective representation—it is, in practice, often easy to establish a mismatch between a subjective representation and some

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aspect of the external reality it is referring to. Given that such subjective representations are generated by the human mind and given that those scientific disciplines that study the workings of the mind are subsumed under the term cognitive science, it is straightforward to state that every illusion is necessarily a cognitive illusion. Conceptualizations of cognitive illusions can be divided into two categories. Some authors see cognitive illusions as a special type of perceptual illusion and subdivide such cognitive illusions into ambiguous, distorting, fictional, and paradox illusions. In contrast, other authors focus on “higher” cognition rather than on the cognition involved in vision. These authors distinguish between illusions of thinking, judgment, and memory. Each of these conceptualizations is described in a major section below. Before turning to these, however, features of cognitive illusions that apply to either of the two conceptualizations are noted. A cognitive illusion is a mismatch between a subjective representation and some underlying reality. The mismatch needs to be systematic—that is, predictable; random distortion would not qualify as illusion. Moreover, cognitive illusions appear spontaneously and involuntarily—that is, without specific instructions or intention. Although people usually notice their optical illusions as such, illusions of thinking, judgment, and memory are often unnoticed. Most optical illusions are hard, if not impossible, to avoid. In contrast, for thinking, judgment, and memory illusions, the situation is less clear. Some of these illusions can be reduced (if not eliminated) through instruction, training, or selection of stimuli; others have been proven to be quite robust and resistant to such interventions. Finally, cognitive illusions attract laypeople’s and researchers’ special attention—usually more than for “normal” failures of the cognitive system, such as forgetting (leading to omission errors) or schema-based inferences (leading to commission errors). One facet of the special attention that cognitive illusions evoke is that people’s reactions are usually not neutral. These reactions tend to vary with the type of illusion: When the perceptual system is fooled, people usually find corresponding illustrations entertaining and funny. In contrast, they tend to be upset and react defensively when confronted with evidence that they fell prey to a cognitive illusion in thinking, judgment, or memory.

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Cognitive Illusions in Visual Perception Some optical illusions are attributable to the perceptual system. For instance, overstimulation of visual-processing channels can lead to physiological illusions. Other optical illusions are attributed to cognition: What people see is not an exact “live stream” from what the eyes perceive, but it is a (slightly) edited version, an image created by the brain. In particular, gaps and blind spots are filled based on previous experiences and knowledge. To accomplish this, the cognitive system makes assumptions, and under certain circumstances, these assumptions are faulty, which leads to cognitive optical illusions. If there is more than one way to interpret the same image, it is an ambiguous illusion. For instance, the “Rubin Vase” can be seen as either a vase or as two faces in profile, or the “Necker cube” is a cube in which any given corner can be seen as being either on the front or on the back of the cube. A systematic failure to correctly infer a physical property, such as size or shape, is a distorting illusion. An example is the Müller-Lyer illusion, which commonly involves a set of two horizontal arrow-like figures. Although both lines have the same length, the line with two arrow heads appears shorter than the line with two arrow tails. Awareness of the distortion is not sufficient to correct for it. For instance, in the “café wall illusion,” the distortion persists even after people have used a ruler to ascertain that the lines are straight. Seeing things that are not really there constitutes fictional illusions or hallucinations (although many authors do not conceive of hallucinations as cognitive illusions). A paradox illusion is one in which the figure being perceived is physically impossible. Prominent examples are the Penrose triangle or several Escher figures—for instance, those involving infinite staircases.

Cognitive Illusions in Thinking, Judgment, and Memory Although the constructive nature of the cognitive system and its contribution to optical illusions have been known since the origin of psychology as a science, illusions in “higher” cognition became popular with the rise of the heuristics-and-biases program initiated by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman in the 1970s. Much of this research

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program has focused on documenting and explaining deviations from what is considered normative. If reasoning violates normative principles, it creates illusions in thinking. For instance, in syllogistic reasoning, people often commit the inverse error; that is, from p → q (p implies q) and not-p (p is not observed), they erroneously conclude not-q (q also is not observed), or the converse error—from p → q and q (q is observed), they erroneously conclude p (p is also observed). Another way in which people often fall prey to fallacious reasoning is updating the probability of a hypothesis in light of new diagnostic evidence. Such probability updates can be achieved through Bayesian reasoning—that is, through the application of Bayes’ rule, which updates prior beliefs in light of what actually occurred (posterior beliefs). A common mistake is to confuse the two conditional probabilities, p(hypothesis|data) and p(data|hypothesis). This mistake can be seen as an example of the representativeness heuristic proposed by Kahneman and Tversky. Numerous studies have convincingly shown that Bayesian reasoning can be improved if statistical information is not provided in terms of probabilities but in terms of natural frequencies. Another example of fallacious reasoning occurs in inductive inference. In Peter Wason’s 2-4-6 problem, people are presented with a sequence of three numbers (2-4-6), and their task is to discover an underlying rule by generating such sequences themselves and by integrating feedback of whether or not the sequence they generated confirms the hidden rule. Having received positive feedback about sequences such as 4-6-8, 8-10-12, 20-22-24, many people are convinced that they now know the rule—namely, x, x + 2, x + 4—but this conviction is illusory. They failed to seek disconfirming evidence (to test the rule “differences of 2,” they should have probed 1-2-3), an error that is known as the confirmation bias. Illusions in judgment under uncertainty have in common that people’s judgments (e.g., of probabilities, veracity, pleasantness, or statistical parameters) are systematically biased when compared with some norm. Various factors—such as feelings of familiarity, the availability of information, selective activation of memory—may bias people’s judgments in a certain direction. An example is overconfidence: People’s confidence in their

judgments, inferences, or predictions is often too high when compared with the corresponding accuracy. Overconfidence that appears in the extreme case of 100% confidence amounts to an illusion of certainty about one’s knowledge. Even though this illusion is ubiquitous and robust, it has been shown that it can be moderated and even eliminated by the type of question format (e.g., asking for frequency estimates of correct responses vs. asking for probability judgments of the correctness of a single response) or item selection procedure (representative sampling vs. a selected sample). Another example of cognitive illusions in judgment is illusionary correlation. Even though many studies demonstrate that humans and animals are able to accurately detect correlations between environmental events, an even larger number of studies show the opposite: Subjective assessments of correlation differ markedly from the actual correlation, and people erroneously perceive correlations that are not really there. More generally, illusionary correlations not only refer to overestimations of zero correlation but to all kinds of systematic deviations between actual correlations and their subjective assessment. Such deviations have been attributed to (a) expectations that lead to selective attention and selective encoding and, in turn, bias which information is processed; (b) biased information retrieval from memory; and (c) unequal weighting of information during processing, be it when information is encoded or retrieved. Illusions of memory may emerge when earlierencoded material has to be remembered later on, whether through recall or recognition. For example, the hindsight bias is a systematic memory distortion. Specifically, people first give an (unbiased) answer to a question, and then, after having received the correct solution, they are asked to recall their original answer. It turns out that the estimates made in hindsight tend to lie closer to the solution than those made in foresight. In a variant of this bias, often referred to as the I-knew-it-all-along effect, people receive the solution right away and are then asked to provide the answer they would have given without this knowledge. The responses lie, on average, closer to the correct solution than those of people who did not receive the solution beforehand. Similarly, people’s

Cognitive Neuroscience

subjective confidence that they would have been able to correctly predict outcomes is inflated; that is, the belief that their predictions are unbiased by outcome knowledge is illusory.

Implications In addition to their entertainment value, optical illusions are important because they may reveal the workings of the cognitive system. Kahneman and Tversky’s heuristics-and-biases program in general, and cognitive illusions in thinking, judgment, and memory in particular, in contrast, had implications above and beyond academics. This program gained much attention and also produced heated debates in psychology, economics, law, medicine, management, and political science. Numerous new jobs have been created in the process. For instance, thousands of business consultants now teach managers and other executives how to avoid biases, fallacies, pitfalls, and illusions. Critics argue that human (intuitive) judgment and decision making are not as flawed as often is claimed and that not everything that looks like a fallacy is one. Challenges to alleged demonstrations of cognitive illusions include inefficient representations (e.g., in the context of Bayesian reasoning), selective sampling of items (e.g., in the context of overconfidence and availability), and too-narrow norms (e.g., in the context of the conjunction fallacy). Many scholars have firm views in this debate, but from an elevated view, it seems illusory to think that these issues will be settled soon. Ulrich Hoffrage and Sebastian Hafenbrädl See also Perceptual Illusions; Problem Solving; Reasoning and Decision Making

Further Readings Gigerenzer, G., Hertwig, R., Hoffrage, U., & Sedlmeier, P. (2008). Cognitive illusions reconsidered. In C. R. Plott & V. L. Smith (Eds.), Handbook of experimental economics results (Vol. 1, pp. 1018–1034). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: North Holland/Elsevier Press. Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (Eds.). (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

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Pohl, R. F. (Ed.). (2012). Cognitive illusions: Fallacies and biases in thinking, judgement and memory. Hove, England: Psychology Press.

Cognitive Neuroscience Cognitive neuroscience is the study of the relationship between brain and cognition. It sits at the conjunction of several disciplines, including psychology, neuroscience, and cognitive science. Although cognitive neuroscience is mainly associated with neuroimaging methods (particularly functional magnetic resonance imaging, or fMRI), cognitive neuroscientists employ a number of research methods to address basic questions about the relationship between brain and behavior. Other, complementary methods may include behavioral studies of patients with focal brain lesions or other neurological or neurodevelopmental conditions, electroencephalography (EEG), magnetoencephalography (MEG), or positron emission tomography (PET). Cognitive neuroscientists may also draw from behavioral neuroscientists whose work involves nonhuman models of cognition and who typically use more invasive techniques, such as electrophysiological recording, direct brain stimulation, brain lesions, or genetic manipulations. This entry describes an example of the kind of study cognitive neuroscientists conduct and discusses unresolved issues in cognitive neuroscience. The use of converging methods is often critical in determining if a certain brain region that is active during a given cognitive task is actually necessary for the performance of that task. For example, consider studies of learning that employ the trace eyeblink conditioning procedure. The participant hears a brief tone of 2,000 milliseconds (ms), for example (the conditioned stimulus, or CS), followed by a brief delay of 500 ms, for example, and an air puff (the unconditioned stimulus, or US) to the eye. With repeated tone–air puff pairing, the participant begins to demonstrate the conditioned response (CR; in this case, blinking) to the tone when it is presented alone. Functional MRI studies demonstrate increased activation in the cerebellum during late acquisition trials when compared with early acquisition trials.

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There is also increased activation in the hippocampus during the trace period between the tone and the air puff. Thus, based on fMRI studies alone, one might conclude that both the cerebellum and hippocampus are needed in trace eyeblink conditioning. However, brain lesion experiments with nonhuman subjects have demonstrated that although damage to the cerebellum impairs performance on this task, damage to the hippocampus does not. This finding is further corroborated by studies with patient populations who have damage limited to the hippocampus and are unimpaired in trace eyeblink conditioning. It seems, then, that when the hippocampus is intact, it is activated during the trace eyeblink conditioning task, but it is not necessary for successful performance of the task. The hippocampal activity likely reflects processes related to encoding the declarative-memory representation of the tone–air puff pairing, an encoding unnecessary for performing the task and impaired in cases of hippocampal damage. Thus, the use of converging methods (in this case fMRI and brain lesion studies) has enhanced the understanding of when a specific brain region is required for the performance of a task versus when it is active but not required. As the preceding example demonstrates, a major focus of cognitive neuroscience has been mapping the neural correlates of different cognitive processes within the brain. The idea of functional localization in the brain is nothing new (indeed, it was a major tenet of 19th-century phrenology), but the advent of functional neuroimaging techniques such as fMRI has allowed scientists to track activity in the intact brain as research participants perform cognitive tasks. Although early neuroimaging studies focused on localizing functions to specific brain structures, contemporary neuroimaging studies tend to focus more on how the brain performs specific functions by using advanced analysis techniques such as multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA). Cognitive neuroscience parallels cognitive psychology in focusing on the following broad research areas: sensation and perception, attention, memory, language, problem solving, reasoning, and decision making. There have been great advances in the past half century in each of these areas regarding the functional localization

of cognitive processes, but major questions remain. What follows are a few of the unresolved issues.

Unresolved Issues in Contemporary Cognitive Neuroscience Sensation and Perception

Much of the research in sensation and perception has focused on the visual system. This is, in part, because humans (along with other primates) are highly visual creatures. Some researchers estimate that approximately 70% of neurons in the human brain have a visual-processing function. An added advantage of studying visual processing is that it is relatively easy to do in a laboratory setting: Visual stimuli are easily controlled and presented using standard computer equipment. One of the early findings of the cognitive neuroscience of visual processing was the separate processing streams for identity of objects and their locations—streams that occur in the inferior temporal and posterior parietal lobes, respectively, and known as the “what” and “where” pathways. Damage to the inferior temporal lobe leads to the inability to name objects based on their visual characteristics, a conditioned termed object agnosia. Patients with this disorder do not have difficulty with object identity per se, as they are able to name an object if they are allowed to pick it up. Conversely, patients with damage to the dorsal visual processing stream are able to name visually presented objects but are unable to use the visual information to guide their actions—a condition termed optic ataxia. These findings are corroborated by fMRI studies that have demonstrated greater activity in the ventral visual-processing stream for tasks that require identifying objects and greater activity in the dorsal visual-processing stream for tasks that require monitoring object locations. There is some debate, however, about whether the tasks used to identify what versus where might be better characterized as “vision for conscious perception” and “vision for action,” respectively. Within the ventral visual-processing stream, there is some evidence that faces are processed differently than other stimuli. For example, there are neurons in the inferior temporal lobe of the

Cognitive Neuroscience

macaque monkey that respond selectively to faces but not to facial parts (e.g., eyes or mouths alone). Indeed, prosopagnosia patients with damage to the fusiform gyrus in the inferior temporal lobe exhibit a selective inability to identify people by their faces. Neuroimaging studies have identified a location in the fusiform gyrus that shows increased activation while the individual is viewing faces compared with viewing other complex objects. This region, known as the fusiform face area, overlaps with the damaged region characteristic of prosopagnosia. There is other evidence, however, that the fusiform gyrus may be generally involved in visual expertise. For example, case studies indicate that patients with fusiform gyrus damage not only have impairments in face identification but also have impairments in other domains in which they were formerly expert, such as visually identifying birds or cars. Memory

One of the most thoroughly studied regions of the brain is the hippocampus, partly because of the landmark case of patient HM, who underwent bilateral medial temporal lobectomy as a treatment for intractable epilepsy. The brain tissue removed included the medial temporal lobe cortex and the anterior two thirds of the patient’s hippocampus. A side effect of the surgery was that HM had profound amnesia and could not form new long-term memories for facts and events. He could, however, form new memories in other domains and was able to learn new skills, could be classically conditioned, and was responsive to priming. Additional studies of patients with hippocampal damage, as well as brain lesion studies with rodents and primates and fMRI studies, have supported the conclusion that the hippocampus is involved in forming and retaining long-term declarative memories. Studies with amnesic patients and of nonhuman animal models further demonstrate that the hippocampus plays a time-limited role in the retention of declarative memories and that these memory representations become independent of the hippocampus over time. For example, following damage to the hippocampus, recent autobiographical

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memories are more impaired than remote memories. Such temporally graded retrograde amnesia offers evidence for a process of consolidation whereby memory representations go from being dependent on the hippocampus and other medial temporal lobe structures to being dependent on other cortical structures. This account has come to be known as the standard consolidation theory but has been challenged by other accounts such as multiple-trace theory. According to this latter account, episodic memories are always dependent on the hippocampus and its ability to associate memories with a distinct context. Over time, memory representations become increasingly context free or semanticized as the hippocampus “plays back” the representation to the cortex. Evidence for multiple-trace theory comes from both fMRI studies that show hippocampal activation for episodic memories regardless of the age of the memory and autobiographical memory impairments in amnesic patients (including HM) for both recent and remote memories. In spite of the ample evidence that the hippocampus is involved in long-term memory for facts and events, there is still debate regarding the exact memory processes performed by the hippocampus. One influential account is that the hippocampus is involved in the process of recollection, whereby contextual details, such as time or location, are recalled. According to this account, the medial temporal lobe cortex supports the process of familiarity whereby individual items might be ­ recognized without any associated contextual ­ information. To illustrate the difference between recollection and familiarity, imagine that you see someone on the bus who is very familiar to you, but you cannot recall how you know that person. That is, there is no recollection associated with the person, as recollection occurs only if you are able to retrieve contextual information about that person (e.g., if you recognize the person as the butcher from the grocery store). Studies of recollection and familiarity often employ the “remember/know procedure,” in which participants are given a recognition memory test and instructed to respond by saying “remember” in response to all stimuli that are retrieved with contextual information about previous encounters

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with the stimulus and to respond by saying “know” if the stimulus is one they know they have seen before but for which they are unable to retrieve any contextual information. In fMRI studies that use the remember/know procedure, researchers have consistently observed greater activation in the hippocampus for “remember” trials than for “know” trials, leading to the conclusion that the hippocampus ­supports recollection. Research in cognitive psychology, however, has called into question the internal validity of the remember/know procedure and suggested that subjects treat the two types of responses as a confidence scale. They respond “remember” when they are sure about having previously encountered a stimulus and “know” when they are less sure about their memory of the stimulus. Indeed, fMRI studies in which recognition confidence remained constant have failed to observe changes in hippocampal activity as a function of recollection or familiarity. There is evidence that the hippocampus is also involved in other processes besides long-term declarative memory. For example, when asked to imagine a possible future event, patients with hippocampal damage do not provide the same level of detail as age- and sexmatched control participants. Also, similar levels of fMRI activation are observed in the hippocampus when neurologically unimpaired participants are asked to remember the past or imagine the future. These observations have led to the claim that the hippocampus is involved whenever one engages in ­ “mental time travel,” either reconstructing past events or constructing possible future events. Other studies have demonstrated that the hippocampus and other medial temporal lobe structures may be involved in visual perception in addition to long-term memory. Patients with damage to the medial temporal lobe, including the hippocampus and perirhinal cortex, display impaired performance on difficult visualdiscrimination tasks, even when the tasks are delay free. These results are supported by brain lesion studies in rats that also show visual discrimination impairments following damage to the perirhinal cortex and also by fMRI studies that demonstrate increased medial temporal lobe activation on visual discrimination tasks. Results such as these

undercut the assumption that the hippocampus is a “memory structure” and suggest that perhaps the hippocampus is involved in certain computational processes regardless of the time delay between stimulus presentations. One active area of research focuses on the computational process of pattern separation, whereby similar-appearing patterns of neural firing are rendered as dissimilar as possible. Computational models based on neuroanatomy suggest that the hippocampus is especially suited for this process. According to the predictions of these models, the hippocampus is needed to encode memory representations for overlapping events in order to reduce interference between similar ones. Also, if difficult visual discrimination tasks tax the process of pattern separation, then the hippocampus is more likely to be involved in such tasks. Mirror Neurons

Researchers using single-unit electrophysiological recording techniques in monkeys have observed neurons in the motor control system that respond to specific actions, regardless of whether the animal is performing the action itself or whether the animal is observing another animal perform the action. These neurons have been termed mirror neurons and are thought to underlie the ability to learn an action through imitation. Others have claimed that mirror neurons may enable human emotions, such as empathy and the ability to take another’s perspective. Doing so is sometimes called theory of mind. A further proposal is that dysfunction in the mirror neuron system may be at the root of developmental disorders such as autism, wherein the individual’s theory of mind is impaired. In spite of the wide-ranging claims made about mirror neurons, to date they have been observed directly only in nonhuman animal models, although fMRI studies have demonstrated activity consistent with mirror neuron function. Furthermore, there is little evidence of dysfunction or damage to the putative mirror neuron system from either functional or structural MRI studies of individuals with autism. Brock Kirwan

Cognitive Therapies See also Brain and Nervous System: Macroarchitecture; Cognition and Language; Cognitive Development; Cognitive Evolution; Human Information Processing; Neuroscience as One-Sided Dualism; Perception and Cognition; Research Methods in Neuroscience; Social Neuroscience

Further Readings Cheng, D. T., Disterhoft, J. F., Power, J. M., Ellis, D. A., & Desmond, J. E. (2008). Neural substrates underlying human delay and trace eyeblink conditioning. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105(23), 8108–8113. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/ pnas.0800374105 Kanwisher, N., & Yovel, G. (2006). The fusiform face area: A cortical region specialized for the perception of faces. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 361(1476), 2109–2128. http:// dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2006.1934 Migo, E. M., Mayes, A. R., & Montaldi, D. (2012). Measuring recollection and familiarity: Improving the remember/know procedure. Conscious and Cognition, 21(3), 1435–1455. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/ j.concog.2012.04.014 Nadel, L., Winocur, G., Ryan, L., & Moscovitch, M. (2007). Systems consolidation and hippocampus: Two views. Debates in Neuroscience, 1(2–4), 55–66. http:// dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11559-007-9003-9 Westwood, D. A., & Goodale, M. A. (2011). Converging evidence for diverging pathways: Neuropsychology and psychophysics tell the same story. Vision Research, 51(8), 804–811. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/ j.visres.2010.10.014

Cognitive Therapies The term cognitive therapy covers a range of similar approaches that were initially developed in the 1960s by Aaron Beck (cognitive therapy) and Albert Ellis (rational emotive therapy). The approach was further elaborated in the 1970s by  theorist–practitioners such as Donald Meichenbaum, Michael Mahoney, Marvin Goldfried, and Gerald Davison. Cognitive therapy and its accompanying theory were a direct response to what were seen as the limitations of purely behaviorist approaches, which restricted the allowable information attended to in therapy

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to objectively ascertainable stimuli and reactions, specifically excluding as valid subject matter subjective events ascertained through introspection. For cognitive therapists, in contrast, these subjective events are the linchpins of emotion. Over time, less restrictive versions of behavioral therapy developed that incorporated cognitive elements, and the whole range of approaches has merged into what has come to be referred to as cognitive behavioral therapy. Although currently the distinction is infrequently made, cognitive therapy might still be used to distinguish approaches, such as Beck’s, in which cognition is viewed as primary. This entry focuses on cognitive therapy as distinguished from behavioral therapy historically and, where the distinction is still useful, in differentiating between approaches that originated on either side of the cognitive-behavioral dichotomy.

Cognitive Therapy Versus Behavioral Therapy Whereas Beck and Ellis came to their respective cognitive approaches following disillusionment with Freudian psychoanalysis, most academic clinical psychologists subsequently drawn to cognitive therapy had groundings in behaviorism. In the view of cognitive therapists, the strict behaviorist perspective excluded from consideration key intervening psychological phenomena that better accounted for the occurrence of undesired emotional responses. From this standpoint, individuals with emotional difficulties did not develop their problems because of their reactions to objectively identifiable, “real” objects in the environment, as characterized in behavioral accounts, but rather because of their reactions to their subjective ­perceptions of these objects. In one frequently used example illustrating the distinction, a person reacting with fear to a loud noise following the takeoff of his airplane is not viewed as responding to the purely external noise itself but to an internal perception of what the noise might signify—for example, the loss of an engine. The forms of cognitive representation that are capable of mediating experience include appraisals, beliefs, expectations, images, and attributions, which, accordingly, serve as the focus of intervention efforts in cognitive therapy.

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Cognitive therapy has freely drawn on techniques from other schools of therapy, including behavioral therapy, where these can serve as vehicles for the modification of problematic internal representations. Both cognitive therapists and behavioral therapists might ask a phobic client to enter a feared situation repeatedly (e.g., boarding a subway train) to experience the fact that it does not lead to a feared result (e.g., suffocation). However, the strict behavioral therapist understands the process as extinguishing a learned association between the train and the fear response, both of which are externally ascertainable facts (the fear response might be measured by monitoring heart rate in the presence of the train or as the time taken to approach and enter the train). In contrast, for the cognitive therapist, boarding the train typically is framed as a behavioral experiment. The client is asked to predict what will happen if she or he enters the feared situation (i.e., to state what his or her internal representation is, which might take the form of an expectation such as, “I will run out of air and suffocate”). The outcome of the experience (“It was a little stuffy, but I had no problem breathing”) is then compared with the prediction. The cognitive therapist next collaboratively discusses the experience with the client using Socratic questioning in order to guide the client to an updated and more benign representation of the feared situation, a process called guided discovery. The principle that guides interactions between therapist and client in which they jointly investigate the salient issues in a spirit of shared inquiry has been called collaborative empiricism. The practical distinctions between cognitive and behavioral approaches have blurred over time, and theoretical developments have extended behavioral theories to encompass phenomena such as expectancies that could be understood in cognitive terms. As a result, the basis for distinguishing separate approaches has largely collapsed, and as already noted, the more inclusive term (cognitive behavioral therapy) is now used for the continuum of approaches.

Cognitive Therapy for Depression As previously noted, Beck, a psychiatrist, and Ellis, a clinical psychologist, were both trained in

Freudian psychoanalysis, but both came to view it as an inadequate explanation of what they were encountering in everyday practice. Beck had concentrated on the treatment of depression and had initially intended to provide evidence to support the psychoanalytic account of the origins of depression. In Freudian theory, depression is understood as resulting from the unconscious redirection toward the self of anger that is unacceptable to express outwardly. Beck set out to discover traces of this internalized anger within dream content, which, consistent with Freudian theory, should provide glimpses of unconscious processing. Failing to find this evidence, Beck felt compelled to consider the more parsimonious explanation that the negativity being described by his depressed clients was not a subterfuge for unexpressed conflicts but rather a direct reflection of how they experienced their lives. In taking the accounts of depressed people at face value, Beck began to notice characteristic thinking patterns that distinguished depressed people from nondepressed people in similar circumstances and from the thinking of formerly depressed people compared with their thinking while depressed. The thinking of people in the midst of a depressive episode was arbitrary, rigid, and categorical. This was particularly true of selfjudgments, which would often take the form of an ongoing critical “voice in the head” that provided a running commentary on the individual’s mistakes and shortcomings. Within cognitive therapy, such stream-of-consciousness cognitions are called automatic thoughts, and they represent a central focus of psychotherapy intervention. In addition to self-criticism, clients’ construal of the world at large and the future were also pervaded by negativity. To describe this overall pattern, Beck coined the term negative cognitive triad of depression (i.e., a negative view of the self, world, and future). Finally, from the fact that certain individuals appeared to be at risk for recurring episodes of depression and seemed to return to similar thinking patterns across episodes, Beck inferred the operation of more enduring mental structures such as core beliefs (categorical attitudes toward the self, such as “I am unlovable”) and associated underlying assumptions (if-then conditional propositions governing responses to arising circumstances; for

Cognitive Therapies

example, “If other people know what you are really like, they will think less of you”). The schema became the central construct in Beck’s cognitive model, with activation of schematic content (i.e., core beliefs and assumptions) providing the guiding mechanism for operation of the information-processing system. Information congruent with schematic processing would be preferentially processed whereas schema-incongruent material would be ignored or minimized. In research contemporary with his development of cognitive therapy, Beck brought greater rigor to the measurement and diagnosis of depression, and this same systematic style came to characterize the therapy that he and his collaborators developed to address depressive thinking patterns and alleviate the resulting mood difficulties. Standardized, session-by-session therapy manuals were assembled, and these guided a series of influential outcome studies in the late 1970s and early 1980s in which cognitive therapy was found to be at least as effective as medication in the treatment of the most common form of depression. However, it should be noted that cognitive therapy has not been shown conclusively to be superior for depression compared with other approaches, such as those based more narrowly on behavioral techniques (e.g., behavioral activation therapy). Indeed, whereas cognitive change has been shown to accompany recovery, research has failed to demonstrate definitely that it is necessary for recovery from depression.

The Extension of Cognitive Therapy to Anxiety Disorders and Other Diagnoses In 1976, Beck introduced the cognitive content specificity hypothesis, which argued that thematic differences in cognitive content could provide a critical basis for distinguishing between diagnostic categories. This hypothesis served to crystallize the theory first established with reference to depression and laid the groundwork for the extension of cognitive therapy to the broad spectrum of clinical psychology phenomena. There was a particular need to address anxiety problems, which often co-occurred with depression and represented a major proportion of referrals for psychological services. According to Beck, if depression was colored by themes of personal failure, anxiety was

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characterized by the central theme of danger. Whereas individuals with depression looked to the future with hopeless resignation, those with anxiety problems anticipated it with dread. A consequence of extending cognitive therapy to anxiety disorders was an increased reliance on behavioral techniques, given that behavioral therapy had been most usefully applied to difficulties such as fears and phobias. Despite considerable overlap in approach, the versions of cognitive therapy for different disorders that were developed by Beck’s close associates (e.g., the treatment for panic disorder developed by David Clark and Paul Salkovskis) differ subtly in emphasis and application of specific techniques compared with approaches from a more behavioral lineage (e.g., the panic treatment developed by David Barlow and Michelle Craske). Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, cognitive therapy extended the template of the cognitive specificity hypothesis, and therapies became available for virtually the whole range of emotional problems, such as posttraumatic stress disorder and obsessive compulsive disorder. Cognitive therapy has also been extended to problems once assumed to be restricted to a more medical approach, such as bipolar disorder and psychosis.

Modified Forms of Cognitive Therapy Despite cognitive therapy’s demonstrated effectiveness for a broad range of issues encountered in psychotherapy, the very nature of certain problems makes them less amenable to standard cognitive therapy, and the need to address these has given rise to variations and offshoots. For example, the collaborative and cooperative basis for setting therapy agendas and behavioral experiments was soon recognized as something that could not be expected of people with serious personality disorders, such as borderline personality disorder, who, although very much in need of therapeutic support, had often been victims of abuse, which frequently gave rise to a chaotic interpersonal style. Jeff Young developed schema-focused therapy as a form of cognitive therapy that did not presume the ability, at least initially, to engage in a collaborative and orderly manner with the therapist. Further, as the name implies, the focus was less on the momentary automatic thoughts and

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more on the enduring schemas that could be viewed as underlying more chronic difficulties. Another approach addressed to the same considerations but based on behavioral theory is dialectical behavioral therapy, originated by Marsha Linehan. Christine Padesky has introduced a set of techniques for addressing personality disorders that are based on mainstream cognitive therapy principles and, unlike schema therapy, are less reliant on psychodynamic concepts. Finally, the fact that cognitive therapy seeks to empower clients to change their internal representations can unintentionally imply that they are to blame for their problems, something particularly undesirable where there is a history of victimization. Paul Gilbert’s compassion-focused therapy was developed in part as a response to this issue. Another basic feature of cognitive therapy is direct engagement with and critical reconsideration of the client’s internal representations. However, a significant aspect of a number of emotional problems, including psychosis, obsessive-compulsive disorder, depressive rumination, and worry, is overengagement with internal mental phenomena. Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy was developed by John Teasdale to provide an alternative to disputation for engaging with arising thoughts, and Steven Hayes developed a related approach, acceptance and commitment therapy, from a strictly behaviorist perspective. Gary P. Brown See also Behavior Therapies; Behavioral Perspectives on Psychopathology; Cognitive Behavioral Therapies; Contemporary Trends in Psychotherapy; Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; Ethics of Therapy; Evidence-Based Therapy; Measuring Treatment Outcome; Medical Therapies; Phenomenological, Existential, and Hermeneutical Therapies; Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Therapies; Psychotherapy and Individualism

Further Readings Beck, A. T. (1976). Cognitive therapy and the emotional disorders. New York, NY: International Universities Press. Clark, D. M. (1986). A cognitive approach to panic. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 24(4), 461–470.

Clark, D. A., & Beck, A. T. (2011). Cognitive therapy of anxiety disorders: Science and practice. New York, NY: Guilford Press. Dobson, K. S., & Dozois, D. J. A. (2010). Historical and philosophical bases of the cognitive-behavioral therapies. In K. Dobson (Ed.), Handbook of cognitivebehavioral therapies (3rd ed., pp. 3–38). New York, NY: Guilford Press. Longmore, R. J., & Worrell, M. (2007). Do we need to challenge thoughts in cognitive behavior therapy? Clinical Psychology Review, 27(2), 173–187.

Communication

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Language

The academic field of communication focuses on how people use symbols (or language) to create meaning within and across channels, media, cultures, and contexts. The extraordinary ability to use symbols is a unique and defining characteristic of the human animal. Symbols take many forms, but the most prevalent symbol system is language. A word is a symbol used to represent something else. Symbols do more than just allow people to communicate with one another. Symbols serve as the vehicles of conceptual thought, knowledge, imagination, and artistic expression. Philosopher Suzanne Langer referred to humans’ ability to create and use symbols as both the most “momentous” and the most “mysterious” aspect of humanness. This entry begins with a general discussion of symbols before reviewing two theories about the role of language in communication.

Symbols Symbols come in multiple forms, such as words, paintings, music, and dance, but all symbols have at least three common characteristics. They are representative, arbitrary, and ambiguous. They are representative in that they stand for or signify ­ something other than themselves. A word is a ­symbol used to represent something else such as an object, idea, event, or relationship. Symbols are arbitrary because they have no necessary connection or real association to the things they represent—they are merely conventionally agreed-upon representations. The symbol dog, for

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example, represents the four-legged animal that barks and wags its tail only because users of the symbol have agreed that it does and not because there is any kind of natural connection between the word dog and the four-legged animal. Symbols are ambiguous because their meanings are not fixed or permanent but variable and changeable so that a single symbol can have multiple interpretations. Adding to a word’s ambiguity is the abstract nature of words that allow for multiple interpretations. Highly abstract symbols such as prosperity, progress, and success have multiple layers of meaning that vary from culture to culture and even from person to person and can change across contexts and over time. Thus, any given symbol may evoke different meanings in different people, creating the potential and, indeed, the likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding. Despite the ambiguous and arbitrary nature of symbols, they exert a powerful influence on the perception of reality—particularly in how humans perceive the world around them. Communication scholars have long concerned themselves with understanding the role of symbols (language) in influencing or constructing perceptions of reality. Many believe that language actually causes reality to come into existence and take shape and form. Language gives order to the disorder of sensations; that is, naming things sets them apart from the disorder of sensation and gives them meaning. In this way, language constructs or creates reality. Although construction theorists don’t deny the existence of an objective, extant reality independent of language, they suggest that, if there is no language with which to talk about or think about a given reality, it remains in the chaos and clutter of sensation. In other words, only when symbols become assigned to reality does it take form and shape.

posits that the structure of any culture’s language determines or at least greatly influences the ways of thinking and the habits of that culture. Sapir believed that thought and action are linguistically and socially mediated—that there is a systematic relationship between the structure of the language and how people who speak that language understand the world and behave in it. According to this theory, the way in which a person sees, hears, and experiences the world is influenced or, in some cases, determined by the biases and the choices of interpretation that the language of the person’s community makes available. Thus, different languages create different realities, and no two languages are sufficiently alike to construct the same social reality. Whorf spent many years investigating Hopi language and behavior in order to enhance and support the idea of linguistic relativity. One of his findings was that the Hopi language creates a very different view of time from the traditional Western view of time. For Hopis, time is not a noun or a point in time (such as noon or summertime) but is conceived as an always ongoing process or passage in which experiences accumulate. As a result of these linguistic differences, Hopis think about and behave differently toward time than do those in a culture where time is viewed as an objectified point or location. Although many of Whorf’s claims have been disputed, the theory of linguistic relativity has a great deal of heuristic value and has inspired many scholars to investigate the effects of language on thought and behavior. The work Whorf carried out has multiple, relevant applications and has served as the theoretical basis for studies in numerous fields, including psychology, philosophy, linguistics, and anthropology.

The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis

Arguably the most noted and quoted of languageconstructionist theorists is Kenneth Burke. Through his extensive writings, spanning a period of more than 60 years, he developed one of the most comprehensive symbol theories. His ideas have been applied to the enrichment of theories in communication, rhetoric, literature, history, political science, linguistics, and philosophy.

Many theorists have attempted to explain the reality-constructing nature of symbols. One of the most influential theories is the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, also known as the theory of linguistic relativity. Based on the work of Edward Sapir and his student and colleague Benjamin Lee Whorf, the theory

Burke’s Theory

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According to Burke, humans are by nature symbol-using animals, and language is at the very center of human being. Language is not a neutral tool used to describe an objective reality. Rather, symbols are the core of human existence and reveal much about what it means to be human. They are the instruments by which humans understand the world and by which they bring about change. The linguistic alternatives humans employ when they speak shape their perspectives and reveal their intentions. One of the key concepts of Burke’s theory is the notion of the “terministic screen.” Language creates a screen through which humans see the world. The screen filters sensation and, like a camera lens, provides only a selective reality, reflecting and coloring parts of it and screening out or deflecting others. Any set of terms used to describe an object or event directs attention toward some of its aspects and away from others. Thus, language presents a world that is filtered and categorized by vocabulary, creating a partial perspective and concealing alternative interpretations available through the use of a different vocabulary. For example, the vocabulary of capitalism employs terms such as profit and loss and costs and benefits. Money is the medium of exchange, and capital is the unit that defines success. Now consider the perspective that this vocabulary of economic exchange might bring to an environmental issue such as endangered species. In terms of profit and loss or costs and benefits, there is little chance for the endangered silvery minnow or the Alaskan polar bear because their contributions to the ecosystem don’t easily translate into capital and profit. In this case, the vocabulary of capitalism deflects attention from intrinsic ecological or aesthetic value independent of contribution to the “bottom line.” If reality has been created through symbols, it could not exist except for symbolic systems. Thus, Burke argues that language is magical in that it actually creates the substance of human life through symbolic action. Judith Hendry See also Cognition and Language; Concepts and Language; Gender and Language; Language, Evolution of; Language and Development; Language Development; Language, Interaction, and Culture; Psycholinguistics

Further Readings Burke, K. (1966). Language as symbolic action: Essays on life, literature, and method. Berkeley: University of California Press. Langer, S. K. (1951). Philosophy in a new key. New York, NY: New American Library. Whorf, B. L. (1956). Language, thought, and reality: Selected writings (J. B. Carroll, Ed.). Cambridge, MA: Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Concepts

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Language

Concepts are the mental units that allow people to identify, represent, and reason about things in the world around them. One reasonable claim about concepts is that if one can think about something (like the animal called a dog, the number 2, the event of jumping, or the color blue), then one has a concept of it. Adults have a diverse array of concepts and are able to combine them into a potentially infinite number of more complex thoughts (such as thinking about two blue dogs jumping). It is critical to note that it is not necessary to keep these thoughts to oneself: Language provides a tool for communicating concepts to other people. This entry discusses the relationship between the concepts that compose complex thoughts, and the language people use to express those thoughts to others. In particular, how do the thoughts that a person thinks (the person’s set of concepts) influence the language the person speaks (its vocabulary, syntax, and semantics)? And (more controversially) might the language that the person speaks influence the concepts that the person represents?

What Are Concepts? Concepts are the mental representations that serve to organize and explain diverse experiences. For instance, the concept of dog allows people to predict that, following a loud bark, they might feel teeth in their leg. Probably the most important theoretical claim about how concepts are mentally represented is that each concept is a combination of many different features. These are links to more basic concepts (e.g., the concept dog will have

Concepts and Language

features like “has ears,” “has a tail,” “is alive”), which are themselves composed of even more basic concepts, all the way down to the most basic (or “primitive”) concepts of all (e.g., the concept of ears has the features “used for hearing,” “made of skin,” etc.). Feature-based theories of concepts (including prototype theories, exemplar theories, and theorytheories) have provided considerable traction for investigating some of the critical psychological questions about concepts. In addition to explaining how people represent concepts, these theories can explain how people categorize things (e.g., dogs have more dog features, cats have more cat features) and how they learn new concepts (e.g., by combining old features in new ways). They have also been used to explain how people determine the meanings of words.

How Concepts Affect Language: Word Meanings The English word dog is meaningful. It allows speakers to agree on its referent (unlike a nonsense word, such as tove). When someone says dog, listeners understand that the speaker is referring to furry things with four legs and wagging tails. The mechanism by which they understand this—how words get their meaning—is one of the most debated issues in the cognitive sciences and particularly in the philosophy of language. Psychological theories typically assume that words are meaningful because they are linked to concepts: Hearing the word dog would activate the concept of a dog (i.e., activate its features), similarly to how seeing a dog’s face or hearing its bark would activate the same concept. The major reason psychologists believe that word meanings are simply “concepts with labels” is that the two serve similar or complementary purposes. For example, although concepts are used for categorization (e.g., which things are dogs?), meanings are used for labeling (e.g., which things are called dog?), which is a form of categorization. Concepts are also used to build more complex concepts (e.g., combining the concepts blue and dog), just as words build phrases. The simplicity of this theory makes it an excellent baseline for evaluating alternative theories. The first challenge has been to stress the role of

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conventions: Meanings are not only concepts; they also reflect how speakers of a language use those words. For example, the use of dog by English speakers would be determined by a mutually agreed convention as to what should be named dog (e.g., should a dingo, a wild dog found in Australia, be called a dog?). The best evidence that these cultural conventions influence meanings comes from differences in how names are used across languages. Different languages divide the world up in different ways, even if those languages are spoken by people from similar places. For example, there is no word in English that directly corresponds to the Spanish word frasco; some of the objects labeled as frasco are called bottles, but others are called jars. Importantly, these differences in labeling do not seem to derive from underlying conceptual differences. Spanish and English speakers may differ in how they talk about bottles and jars, but they do not differ in how they think and reason about them. The second challenge to the concept-and-labels theory has been to argue that words do not have a single, well-defined meaning. Evidence for this comes from the phenomenon of polysemy. A word is polysemous if it has multiple related, but different, usages (e.g., dog describes both an animal and an unpleasant person). Almost all commonly used words exhibit these subtle context-dependent variations in meaning, and more frequent words are more ambiguous: run has 109 different senses (as a noun only) in the Oxford English Dictionary. Polysemy suggests that words do not simply map to individual concepts but instead are somehow linked to a larger part of conceptual structure, containing multiple related concepts. By this theory, words do not have a specific “meaning” until they are put into context, which allows the most appropriate concept to emerge. The challenge for this account is to explain, precisely, what this “larger part of conceptual structure” might be.

How Concepts Affect Language: Combination Both concepts and language are compositional. It is possible to generate new concepts by combining old concepts together (e.g., it is possible to think of an apple-flavored computer) and also to create new sentences by combining words in new ways

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(like the phrase apple-flavored computer). If concepts play an important role in the meanings of words, then it stands to reason that the way concepts are combined must also play an important role in how words are combined. The challenge for theories of concept combination is to determine the most appropriate features of the combined concept or phrase. The earliest theories assumed that complex concepts contained the same features as their component concepts, but this was quickly proven wrong. For example, although dogs have four legs, bark, and wag their tails, only one of those features holds for the complex concept “stone dog” (which describes a lifeless statue of a dog). As another example, guns are made of metal, but a fake gun is typically made of plastic. However, “made of plastic” is not a property of being fake (e.g., fake paintings are made of paint but painted by forgers). To explain how people determine the features of complex concepts, theories now assume that they must bring all their relevant world knowledge to bear (e.g., figuring out the most plausible way that something might be fake). This has the unfortunate side effect of making these theories rather unconstrained, as it is impossible to predict how people should interpret complex concepts without having a full listing of everything they know about the world. Developing a more constrained theory that can still predict the output of conceptual or linguistic combination remains one of the ­foremost challenges for cognitive science.

How Language Affects Concepts One of the oldest questions in cognitive science is whether people need language to think and reason. If they do, then how people think should be affected by the large and important differences in how languages express ideas. For instance, languages differ in the set of concepts they label (e.g., dividing up the color space differently), and they also differ in the semantic distinctions that speakers have to make (e.g., Turkish grammar notes whether a speaker’s claims were directly observed or learned from others). The theory that language determines how people think is called linguistic determinism, and it has not fared well. For example, despite radical

cross-linguistic differences in color naming (e.g., some languages collapse the colors green and blue under one label), speakers of different languages do not show similar differences in how they perceive color. Perhaps more important, there is good evidence for elaborate conceptual structures in individuals who do not even have a language, such as young infants and nonhuman animals. Linguistic relativity provides a less extreme, and more widely accepted, alternative. In this view, language only shapes thought (rather than determining it). There have been a number of claims as to how this shaping might occur. One proposal relies on habits: Speakers of different languages need to attend to the world in different ways, and these linguistic habits might cause differences in nonlinguistic attention. The evidence for the “habits” theory is mixed. Probably the best-studied example concerns how people encode spatial relations between objects. Some languages tend to use terms relative to the speaker’s perspective (e.g., “the dog to the right of the cat” [from the speakers perspective]). Others preferentially use terms that are relative to another object (e.g., the dog in front of the cat” [based on the cat’s orientation]). When speakers of these different languages are asked to reconstruct arrays of memorized objects without talking, they tend to base their reconstruction on the language they speak (e.g., objects encoded on the right stay on the participant’s right, even if the participant turns around, reversing the absolute positions of left and right). This suggests that the way people encode visuospatial information is influenced by language. Unfortunately, it is difficult to demonstrate that language is the causal factor here, as differences in language are often confounded with differences in culture and environment. An alternative version of linguistic relativity claims that language does not change cognition but can act to support learning and the use of certain abstract, complex concepts. As an example, consider the number 7. It is not difficult to think of things in sets of seven: seven goldfish, seven jumps, seven ideas, even a set of seven different things. These sets have nothing in common except their numerosity, but numerosity is not itself physically perceivable. Instead, learning the abstract concept of seven would involve noticing (by chance) the

Consciousness, Categories of

abstract commonality across all these sets and realizing that it is different from similar sets with slightly different numerosity. Without appropriate guidance, this is very hard to do. There is now good evidence that linguistic labels play an important role in guiding children to acquire concepts of number and also in facilitating the use of those concepts. For instance, speakers of languages that lack words for precise numbers (such as the Pirahã tribe of Amazonia) have difficulty reasoning about precise numbers (e.g., matching sets of objects based on numerosity), suggesting that they lack (i.e., never learned) a precise representation of at least some numbers. Relatedly, when adults who do have precise number concepts, such as English speakers, are asked to do numerical or arithmetic tasks at the same time as other verbal tasks (e.g., repeating words under their breath), they show large decrements in mathematical ability. These decrements are much smaller when the second task is nonverbal (e.g., holding a visual scene in memory), suggesting that language plays an important role in reasoning about number concepts. In sum, concepts are the units by which people think, and language provides a means for expressing those units to other people. This entry has touched on how meanings (of both words and phrases) might relate to concepts and how concepts might be influenced by the acquisition of certain words and other linguistic devices. But the entry is necessarily selective, and interested readers may want to explore other areas of contact between concepts and language, such as the role of conceptual structure in syntactic structure and how theories of embodied cognition attempt to link concepts to language. Hugh Rabagliati See also Cognition and Language; Embodied Cognition; Grammar, Psycholoogy of; Language, Evolution of; Language and Development; Language Development; Language, Interaction, and Culture; Perception and Language; Psycholinguistics; Semantics, Psychology of;

Further Readings Frank, M. C., Everett, D. L., Fedorenko, E., & Gibson, E. (2008). Number as a cognitive technology: Evidence

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from Pirahã language and cognition. Cognition, 108(3), 819–824. Frank, M. C., Fedorenko, E., Lai, P., Saxe, R., & Gibson, E. (2012). Verbal interference suppresses exact numerical representation. Cognitive Psychology, 64(1), 74–92. Li, P., & Gleitman, L. (2002). Turning the tables: Language and spatial reasoning. Cognition, 83(3), 265–294. Murphy, G. L. (2004). The big book of concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Rabagliati, H., & Snedeker, J. (2013). The truth about chickens and bats: Ambiguity avoidance distinguishes types of polysemy. Psychological Science, 24, 1354–1360.

Consciousness, Categories

of

Philosophers and psychologists struggle to find a satisfactory definition of consciousness. Even finding a working definition can prove elusive. This is not particularly surprising; the naive understanding of consciousness is quite broad, which gives rise to diverse, and sometimes conflicting, intuitions about it. The multifarious, pretheoretical understanding of consciousness has yielded an equally heterogeneous theoretical landscape. Theoreticians and experimenters often make distinctions between conscious creatures and conscious states, first-order and higher-order consciousness, phenomenal and access consciousness, and objective and subjective measures of consciousness. These different conceptions of consciousness do not need to be incompatible, yet it is not trivial to find a common ground among them. This entry describes a number of ways in which consciousness can be understood. Regardless of how it is defined exactly, it is common to understand consciousness as a firstpersonal, subjective phenomenon. Unlike other third-personal, objective natural phenomena, being conscious means, among other things, having a subjective point of view. This makes the scientific study of consciousness challenging, in that most scientific methodologies are precisely designed to eliminate both the experimenter’s and the subject’s subjectivity.

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Conscious Creatures Mapping the heterogeneous territory of the study of consciousness begins by highlighting a twofold way in which the term is used in the literature. Consciousness and its cognate adjective conscious can be applied either to whole organisms (creature consciousness) or to mental states of such organisms (state consciousness). There are important phylogenetic and ontogenetic questions regarding creature consciousness: What animals are conscious? And at what point in their development did they become conscious? These questions have been extended within artificial-intelligence research to nonorganic creatures as well. From a clinical perspective, it is common to identify consciousness with wakefulness. Research focuses on identifying the neural correlates of different states of awareness within a continuum that goes from being fully awake to being drowsy or asleep to being in a coma or in a persistent vegetative state. Self-consciousness—being aware of one’s awareness—is perhaps the most common under­ standing of consciousness, second only to wakefulness. Self-consciousness is much more demanding than merely being conscious. Different theories construe self-consciousness in different ways, and hence the creatures that are selfconscious and the conditions in which they are self-conscious vary accordingly. Being aware of one’s awareness can be a conceptual exercise that is realized mainly in linguistic form, and, hence, it intuitively leaves babies and other animals out of the picture. More lenient approaches conceive of self-awareness as a rudimentary reflection on one’s awareness that can be achieved nonconceptually and without a linguistic capacity, making it present across the phylogenetic and developmental spectra.

Conscious States In addition to conscious creatures, philosophers and scientists often refer to conscious states. From the golden years of behaviorism, along with disciplines as dissimilar as psychoanalysis and cognitive science, it is well established that much of human perception, reasoning, and decision making can be explained without appealing to consciousness. Several questions arise: What makes a mental state

conscious? Do conscious states perform different functions from nonconscious states? Are conscious states of one type (e.g., visual states) conscious in the same way and for the same reasons as conscious mental states of other types (e.g., beliefs and desires)? First-Order and Higher Order Consciousness

What makes a mental state, in particular a perceptual state, conscious is hotly debated at both the theoretical and the neurophysiological levels. The split in the debate can be captured by presenting two rival views. First-order theories hold that a mental state’s being conscious is determined solely by the neural or representational character of the perceptual state itself. The conscious experience of seeing, say, a face is determined solely by what is required for representing the face. Higher order theories of consciousness, by contrast, argue that, for a mental state to be conscious it is required that another mental state represent being in the first-order mental state. At the neural level, first-order theories maintain that conscious perceptual representations depend on neural activity in early sensory regions, whereas higher order theories consider conscious representations to depend on neural activity mainly in prefrontal and parietal cortices in humans and primates. Phenomenal Consciousness

Besides causal origins, there are at least two ­ ifferent senses in which a mental state can be d conscious. First, a state is conscious if it involves qualitative or phenomenal features. Put differently, a state is conscious only if there is something it is like to be in such state. This implies that qualitative or phenomenal conscious states have ineffable, subjective, and private properties of what it is like to have an experience. Among philosophers’ ­favorite examples of phenomenal features are the redness of a visual sensation, the sharp quality of pain, or the taste of wine. Although it might be easy to account for representational properties of a sensory experience of wine tasting (e.g., this experience is about red wine, the wine tastes like a Cabernet and not like a Pinot Noir, etc.), the phenomenology of the experience is hard to describe. What exactly makes the

Consciousness, Categories of

experience of tasting a Cabernet different from the experience of tasting a Pinot Noir? In other words, what makes them different experiences qua experiences, independently of their representational contents? The discussion about phenomenal consciousness can be extended to cognitive states such as beliefs and desires or, more generally, thoughts. On many occasions, when a person entertains a thought, it is accompanied by a phenomenal quality (e.g., visual imagery or auditory phenomenology). These facts can give the impression that qualitative features of mental states are not limited to perception. However, the question about whether there is a distinct cognitive phenomenology remains. Does the phenomenology of thoughts consist entirely in the phenomenology of imagery, auditory qualities, emotions, or feelings of familiarity and confidence? The answer to this question raises radical disagreement. It is important to note that such uncertainty regarding the nature of what should be a conspicuous trait of everyday conscious experiences has been taken to be a sign of the limitations of introspective capacities. Access Consciousness

Mental states can be conscious phenomenally but also due to their accessibility properties. A mental state is conscious if it is accessed by other mental states for report and for making further inferences. For a mental state to be accessible for this kind of further cognitive control, it has to cross a certain processing threshold. Note that access-conscious states do not need to have phenomenal or qualitative features. Unconscious perception can mean consciously accessed states that lack a phenomenal character. Alternatively, unconscious perception can be achieved by sufficiently processing a perceptual stimulus for above-chance performance while the processed signal remains below the accessibility threshold, rendering most of the perceptual information unaccessed for further cognitive control. Access is hardly an all-or-nothing phenomenon. For instance, some patients with brain lesions in early visual regions (e.g., blindsight) or even normal participants in psychophysics experiments under certain controlled conditions (e.g., masking)

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can identify the stimulus and yet report not being (phenomenally) conscious of the stimulus. The degree of access in these cases may be limited, however, as subjects are able to convey only basic properties of the stimulus in a forced-choice task. Although it is controversial whether completely unaccessed states have phenomenology, it is important to emphasize that the lack of a detailed or accurate report does not necessarily imply a lack of phenomenal consciousness. For example, in normal conditions, looking at a speckled hen gives rise to a rich phenomenological experience, yet it is difficult to make a verbal report of the details of the specks. Making this methodological distinction is of the utmost importance when performing or assessing research on consciousness. Unlike phenomenal consciousness, the similarity between perceptual and other mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires, etc.) is more straightforward when consciousness is understood as access. For instance, beliefs are conscious if they are explicitly reported or if they figure in explicit inferences. If they do not reach a certain threshold of awareness, beliefs remain unaccessed. Implicit biases have been shown to be pervasive among otherwise selfaware subjects. People may deny explicitly being racist or sexist, but they still have unaccessed racist or sexist beliefs and motives that drive their behavior.

Objective and Subjective Measures of Consciousness Finally, there is yet another distinction regarding conscious states that appears in experimental conditions. The proper measurement of consciousness— both behaviorally and neurophysiologically—has proved challenging. Besides the multiple classes of consciousness already discussed, there are confounding factors in experimental task designs that create a twofold distinction: stimulus awareness and metacognitive awareness. Although it is often the case that researchers rely on participants’ explicit subjective reports of seeing a stimulus as the measure of consciousness (metacognitive awareness), sometimes objective performance itself is taken as a measure of consciousness (stimulus awareness). Thus, when attempting to distinguish between conscious and unconscious states, task performance capacity should be considered a

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confound (i.e., an uncontrolled variable that biases the results of an experiment or study). An experiment that looks for the neural correlates of consciousness compares two conditions: one in which participants report seeing a target and a control condition wherein participants report not seeing it. Ideally, the only difference between these two conditions is conscious awareness. A problem with this approach is that performance capacity frequently correlates with consciousness but not necessarily. This is true in most detection and discrimination tasks, as well as in procedures such as binocular rivalry, in which detecting changes in the suppressed image is usually harder. Comparing a condition wherein the participant was able to detect or discriminate stimuli with one in which the participant was unable to perform above chance, taking the latter as an indication of lack of awareness confounds consciousness and performance. In this case, stimulus awareness reflects sensitivity to the stimuli (often estimated with the signal detection theoretic measure d'), which is orthogonal to conscious awareness. In contrast, when performance is matched (i.e., ­subjects have the same d'), yet a difference in subjective reports (metacognitive awareness) is obtained, these reports track consciousness only and not performance. In conclusion, consciousness can be understood in several ways. Various theoretical and experimental approaches reveal some aspects of these different types of consciousness, which are not necessarily exclusive. On the contrary, it can be expected that more than one approach is necessary to fully account for the complexities of consciousness. Jorge Morales and Hakwan Lau See also Animal Consciousness; Attention; Behaviorism; Brain and Consciousness; Consciousness, Functions of; Consciousness, Origins of; Frontal Lobe Functions

Further Readings Block, N. (2011). Perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(12), 567–575. http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.11.001 Dehaene, S., & Changeux, J.-P. (2011). Experimental and theoretical approaches to conscious processing. Neuron, 70(2), 200–227. http://dx.doi.org/ doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2011.03.018

Irvine, E. (2013). Measures of consciousness. Philosophy Compass, 8(3), 285–297. http://dx.doi.org/ doi:10.1111/phc3.12016 Lau, H., & Rosenthal, D. (2011). Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(8), 365–373. http://dx.doi .org/doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.05.009 Schwitzgebel, E. (2011). Perplexities of consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Consciousness, Disorders

of

Disorders of consciousness test the current limits of neuroscience to explain mechanisms underlying the human conscious experience. These conditions present both conceptual challenges for theory and many practical challenges, including the crucial problem of prediction of recovery of brain function in individual persons. New theory draws on strong comparisons of mechanisms underlying disorders of consciousness to changes in brain function during general anesthesia in order to offer an integrative framework for these problems. Such theoretical inroads have significant implications for psychology—ranging from the critical challenges of understanding the potential for recovery of consciousness to the measurement of conscious brain function in persons appearing otherwise unconscious—in guiding the care of patients and communication with their caregivers. The latter face unique burdens that mental health professionals need to understand within a theoretical framework so as to accurately and effectively communicate and provide support. This entry outlines a general theoretical framework for conceptualizing disorders of consciousness and briefly illustrates the use of this framework in the context of the example of Lewy body disease, thus to highlight a more general set of problems faced by caregivers of patients with disorders of consciousness.

Disorders of Consciousness It is difficult to advance a definition of consciousness that is not tautological or self-referential. Perhaps the most enduring and successful

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definition is that of William James, often paraphrased as follows: Consciousness is one’s awareness of self and the environment. Brain injuries that profoundly disturb consciousness are often grouped under the heading disorders of consciousness (DOC). They affect both arousal level and the contents of consciousness. The four main categories of DOC are coma, vegetative state, minimally conscious state, and confusional state. Coma typically arises from very severe brain injury. Comatose patients are unresponsive, and coma reflects a profound disruption of brain arousal function. Comatose patients remain with eyes closed and show no response to the most vigorous stimulation. Grimacing, limb movements, and stereotypical withdrawal responses to painful stimuli may be present in coma, but not localizing responses or discrete defensive movements. Thus, in a coma, patients show no evidence of self- or environmental awareness. The first phase of recovery from coma is typically heralded by brief periods of spontaneous eye opening. If an eyes-open state coexists with no evidence of response to the environment (such as visual fixation or tracking, turning the head to sounds, or following commands) or organized movements (such as reaching to the location of a painful stimulus), the condition is known as vegetative state (VS). It may give way to greater recovery or reflect an endpoint of the return of brain function. Once even very limited evidence of environmental responsiveness is present—for example, turning of the head or the eyes toward a sound— the patient has transitioned into the minimally conscious state (MCS). A wide range of behaviors are spanned by MCS patients, including the ability to follow simple commands and even intermittently communicate. Once reliable communication is established, patients are considered to have emerged from the MCS. In practice, this transition can be somewhat difficult to establish as the next level of recovery, the confusional state (CS), often is characterized by an inconsistency of response to the simple situational questions used to evaluate communication in MCS. CS patients have a communication system, but deficits in orientation to person and situation define this condition. CS patients are often agitated, are disoriented to time and space, have perceptual distortions, and show distractibility, anterograde

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amnesia, emotional lability, and sleep disorders. CS is in all other aspects consistent with delirium, an acutely presenting syndrome of confusion in many medical contexts.

A Theoretical Model for Disorders of Consciousness Neurobiological models that have been developed from physiological studies of DOC and general anesthesia offer a unifying theoretical framework for understanding the mechanistic basis of DOC. The wakeful conscious state depends on brain arousal levels, which are determined by a variety of cellular and large-scale brain circuit mechanisms that show consistent functional patterns. These appear across unconscious and conscious brain states of different levels of responsiveness in DOC and also across variations in the effects of anesthetics from coma to light sedation. Similarities of functional changes in brain activity across stages of sleep (from unconscious Stage 3 slow-wave sleep to the conscious imagery of rapid eye movement, or REM, sleep) and DOC are present, but sleep states are distinctly different in their physiological profile. All severe brain injuries associated with DOC produce widespread disconnection and loss of neurons across the corticothalamic system. At one extreme, if all inputs to the cerebral cortex are removed, only a very slow (low-frequency) electrical oscillation or none at all may be recorded from the brain. Typically, such complete or near-complete loss of neuronal function is seen only in very severe brain trauma or total loss of blood flow resulting from a cardiac arrest. However, general anesthesia produced by a range of different drugs or inhaled gases causes a very similar state of slow oscillation of electrical activity across the brain. General anesthesia is, in fact, a reversible drug-induced coma and serves as an excellent model for the profound depression of brain function associated with coma. Most cases of DOC arise in the setting of partially connected corticothalamic systems. Neurons in the cortex, thalamus, and striatum are sensitive to the amount of synaptic background activity they receive and can change patterns of firing or cease firing in response to small shifts in this input. Thus, patients with DOC might not demonstrate the necessary neuronal dynamics to establish brain

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activity states consistent with conscious awareness, which seem to require that a sufficient number of connected neurons be driven strongly enough to allow both local processing and long-range synchronization with other brain regions. When such capacities are preserved in patients with DOC, the interplay between during-the-day variations in the activity of brain stem “arousal systems”—specifically, those that provide specific neurotransmitters such as acetylcholine and dopamine to the thalamus, striatum, and cortex—probably accounts for often wide behavioral fluctuations. Recovery of consciousness at the level of MCS through CS and the restoration of more normal patterns of brain function has a theoretical basis in the “mesocircuit model” of recovery of consciousness. The mesocircuit model considers the underlying state of neurons within the cerebral cortex, thalamus, and striatum and the circuit level interactions of these components. The model posits that a common failure mode arises when brain activity is markedly down-regulated as a result of widespread disconnection or neuronal death following severe injury. A crucial role is proposed for neurons within the central thalamus that are known to show progressive loss in proportion to the severity of structural brain injuries. Loss of the input of these neurons to the cortex and striatum, along with loss of cortical and striatal neuronal populations themselves, is expected to produce a broad failure of the connections between the frontal-cortical regions of the brain and subcortical structures. Expressed behavior and the level of conscious content can be demonstrated to increase with restoration of normal patterns of activity in the anterior forebrain mesocircuit of the frontal cortex, striatum, and central thalamus. The mesocircuit model also offers a unifying account of the effects of several activating medications used in DOC and novel strategies such as deep brain stimulation (DBS), all of which have the first-order effect of restoring activity of frontal-cortical, striatal, and central-thalamic neurons, as well as the paradoxical behavioral activation observed during the early stages of anesthesia. Activity in the mesocircuit is further correlated with that in regions in the posterior-medial complex of the brain that show a graded functional relationship across the levels of DOC from VS to CS.

Scientific Challenges of Disorders of Consciousness Studies have shown that recovery from DOC can occur slowly, even over decades. These observations prompt strong interest in developing a better understanding of the recovery mechanisms and in identifying approaches to speed the recovery and realization of cognitive abilities in patients with DOC. An important clue in many patients with DOC is the presence of fluctuations that may arise spontaneously or dramatically in response to medications influencing the brain stem arousal systems or the anterior forebrain mesocircuit. One example of fluctuations is the transition from MCS to CS seen in several patients following administration of the drug zolpidem. This effect has been compared to the phenomenon of paradoxical excitation in anesthesia and is thought to reflect release of activity within the anterior forebrain mesocircuit, allowing interactive behavior to be expressed and supported by neuronal systems within the frontal cortex and basal ganglia. A particular challenge in DOC is the finding that some patients who appear behaviorally to be in VS or MCS with only very limited motor responses can nonetheless demonstrate willful motor imagery through brain activations as measured using functional magnetic resonance imaging or electroencephalography techniques. These patients cannot be in VS by definition and are likely to retain a level of cognitive functioning far beyond that observed in MCS patients when there are testable means of communication. In all reported cases, this syndrome arises in the setting of severe impairment of motor function and is associated with many physiological markers of the integrity of relatively normal wakeful and sleep electrical activity in the brain. Collectively, the weight of evidence currently suggests that these patients are closer to the locked-in state than to the level of cognitive activity measured in VS and CS patients.

The Caregiver Burden in DOC Unsurprisingly, perhaps the greatest psychological burden of patients with DOC falls on their informal caregivers (ICs), who are left to consider possible very late recovery or chronically reduced cognitive

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capacity that even they cannot discern in a loved one. ICs are defined as relatives, friends, or partners who have a significant relationship with and provide assistance (physical and emotional) to a patient with a life-threatening, incurable illness. The 2009 Institute of Medicine (IOM) report titled “Retooling for an Aging America: Building the Health Care Workforce” highlighted the responsibility of health care professionals to prepare ICs for their role and the need to establish programs to assist them in managing their own stress that results from providing care. Mental health professionals—psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers—are tasked with understanding the unique burden experienced by caregivers of specific groups of patients and with developing psychotherapeutic interventions that attend to their unique burden. The caregiver burden is a multidimensional biopsychosocial reaction resulting from an imbalance of care demands relative to caregivers’ personal time, social roles, physical and emotional states, financial resources, and formal care resources, given the other multiple roles they fulfill. ICs are often unprepared to take on all the aspects that this new role entails and often have a wide range of unmet needs. Additionally, the DOC patients for whom they provide care no longer are able to provide them with the emotional support that they once did, and therefore ICs are often in great need of emotional support themselves. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, ICs experience a range of psychological complications, including fear, hopelessness, and mood disturbances. The burden experienced by ICs of patients with DOC is anticipated to be as great, if not greater, than that experienced by patients with other forms of chronic medical illness (e.g., cancer). The significant cognitive limitations that are the hallmark of DOC, coupled with advancing therapeutic technologies that now allow for the prospect for recovery of function, create the possibility of prolonged periods of caregiving in which ICs are responsible for acting as voices and advocates for patients, in addition to attending to their instrumental and emotional needs. A suggested framework for psychologists engaging with caregivers of patients with DOC is presented here. It is illustrated by considering the  patient with Lewy body disease (LBD), a

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progressive neurodegenerative illness in which patients may intermittently and abruptly present with syndromes across the full range of DOC and yet harbor a retained capacity for fully oriented and capacitated consciousness. ICs of LBD patients may represent the most extreme case of the DOC-related burden. In LBD patients with marked loss of dopaminergic inputs to the anterior forebrain mesocircuit, exposure to typical antipsychotic medicines, such as Haldol, may precipitate a profound loss of consciousness barely distinguishable from coma. More typically, LBD patients present with intermittent, confusional state features similar to delirium. These states, known as LBD fluctuations, are typically linked to the alteration of cholinergic modulation of sensory-cortical regions in the posterior aspects of the cerebral cortex. Thus, LBD patients may at times appear similar to MCS or CS patients with rapid state transitions. Yet often, such persons retain considerable cognitive abilities. This dichotomy presents the caregiver of a LBD patient with a more severe burden of understanding the nature of the illness and also advocating for the patient who appears to be hopelessly out of contact as a result of a progressive degenerative illness. Recognition of the lived experience of caregivers of LBD patients—characterized by the requirement to cope with their loved one’s often rapid fluctuations in consciousness in addition to that person’s general emotional and physical deterioration—is critical for understanding the unique burden of such patients’ ICs and hence how best to provide effective psychotherapeutic interventions. Specifically, the possibility that the symptoms shift from day to day, or even minute to minute, creates a particularly challenging burden for the IC. They are faced with the uncertainty of their loved one’s capacity to communicate and hence are often required to take greater responsibility in advocating for their loved ones than are other groups of ICs. The confusional state in LBD often produces visual hallucinations that may themselves be negatively toned and disturbing to the IC, as well as to the patient, and periods of confusion may spontaneously arise amid periods of apparent clarity. As a result, caregivers of patients with LBD and other DOC require ongoing education about the nature,

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presentation, course, and treatment of altered consciousness in these conditions. Such education should focus on the patient’s anticipated behavioral presentations in order to normalize the experience of fluctuations and help ICs anticipate and plan for shifts in a patient’s function level, including the possibility of gradual but limited gains in function. In most instances, change in cognitive capacity in DOC is not linear, and caregivers experience unpredictable periods of anticipatory loss and grief or raised expectations. In LBD patients, this nonlinearity is made extreme by the fluctuations in consciousness, cognitive capacity, and overall function that provide the possibility of repeated experiences of anticipatory loss and then relief and hope. With each fluctuation in the patient comes the potential for ICs to cycle through grief and sadness, followed by hope and happiness. Hence, in addition to education about DOC, psychotherapeutic interventions should attend to caregivers’ capacity for emotional regulation—that is, their ability to concurrently allow themselves to feel both negative and positive emotions. Such emotional flexibility is critical to the preservation of the emotional well-being of an IC for a DOC.

Coda Individuals with DOC sit at the cutting edge of theoretical models of consciousness and the most intimate and challenging interpersonal human relationships. As such, DOCs provide the field of psychology with an extraordinarily rich set of theoretical issues to explore and advance. Progress at this frontier of medicine and science will have immediate and consequential impact on the social contacts of persons with DOC, particularly their ICs. Allison J. Applebaum and Nicholas D. Schiff See also Brain and Consciousness; Consciousness, Categories of; Consciousness, Functions of; Consciousness, Origins of; Consciousness and the Unconscious; Heightened Consciousness

Further Readings Applebaum, A. J., Farran, C. J., Marziliano, A. M., Pasternak, A. R., & Breitbart, W. (2014). Preliminary

study of themes of meaning and psychosocial service use among informal cancer caregivers. Palliative and Supportive Care, 12(2), 139–148. http://dx.doi .org/10.1017/S1478951513000084 Brown, E. N., Lydic, R., & Schiff, N. D. (2010). General anesthesia, sleep, and coma. New England Journal of Medicine, 363, 2638–2650. Giacino, J. T., Fins, J. J., Laureys, S., & Schiff, N. D. (2014). Disorders of consciousness after acquired brain injury: The state of the science. Nature Reviews Neurology, 10(2), 99–114. http://dx.doi.org/ doi:10.1038/nrneurol.2013.279 Institute of Medicine. (2009). Retooling for an aging America: Building the health care workforce. Washington, DC: Author. Laureys, S., & Schiff, N. D. (2012). Coma and consciousness: Paradigms (re)framed by neuroimaging. Neuroimage, 61, 478–491. Schiff, N. D. (2010) Recovery of consciousness after brain injury: A mesocircuit hypothesis. Trends in Neuroscience, 33, 1–9.

Consciousness, Functions

of

What are the functions of consciousness? One way to answer this question is to find out what functions people can perform only in the presence of consciousness. Traditional theories posit that a function of consciousness is to enable higher functions such as cognitive control. These theories assume that only consciously perceived stimuli can trigger such functions. This entry compares the traditional view of functions of consciousness with contemporary findings and discusses potential problems with using subliminal priming to study the functions of consciousness.

Challenges to the Traditional View The traditional view is challenged by specific empirical findings. For example, even subliminally presented cues can influence task preparation— that is, the way in which people prepare to respond to upcoming stimuli. In one such experiment, a consciously perceived visual cue indicated whether an upcoming task was to make a phonological or a semantic judgment about a target word. Critically, the conscious cue was preceded by a subliminal cue

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that indicated either the same or a different task as the conscious cue indicated. When the subliminal cue indicated a different task, performance on the judgment task has been reported to be hampered. This suggests that the unconscious cues triggered a task set that specifically interfered with the alternative task set initiated by the conscious cue—a conclusion further supported by neuroimaging results. Likewise, other studies have shown that subliminal stimuli can trigger inhibitory control. Taken together, these recent findings challenge the traditional view of the functions of consciousness and are more compatible with the philosophical view that consciousness may have little function. However, it is important to note that these studies have a common methodological limitation: They used the subliminal priming method to manipulate consciousness. In a typical subliminal condition, a stimulus is considered to be an unconscious one because it is presented very briefly (e.g., 17 milliseconds) and it is masked by another stimulus. A stimulus is considered subliminal when perceptual accuracy is no better than chance level (i.e., the signal detection theoretical measure of perceptual sensitivity, d', is zero). Such subliminal stimuli can be tested to determine whether they affect cognitive control functions. If they do not affect such functions, the standard conclusion is that consciousness is a prerequisite for such functions.

Problems With Subliminal Priming This procedure is problematic because subliminal stimuli are associated with a lower level of conscious awareness as well as lower perceptual ­accuracy (d'). Even though subliminal stimuli have little effect on cognitive control functions, this could be due to lower perceptual capacity rather than reduced consciousness per se. Thus, it might be erroneous to conclude based on this kind of result that the function in question requires consciousness. Instead, what may be required is only stronger perceptual accuracy, not consciousness per se. One might argue that consciousness and perceptual accuracy always covary and thus there is no point in distinguishing them. But this is not true; dissociations between consciousness and perceptual accuracy have been shown in clinical

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conditions such as blindsight (i.e., the ability of sightless individuals to nevertheless correctly orient to the visual environment without being conscious of doing so) as well as in normal observers under specific psychophysical manipulations such as metacontrast masking. To avoid such confusion, it is critical to distinguish different aspects of ­conscious perception. One way is to distinguish between stimulus awareness and metacognitive awareness. Stimulus awareness is the ability to effectively process stimulus information (i.e., detection or discrimination). It is stimulus awareness that is manipulated with the subliminal priming method. By contrast, metacognitive awareness can be defined as a higher order process that is often assessed as the subjective sense of perceptual certainty. For example, a person may feel more confident that his or her perceptual decision (e.g., discrimination) is accurate on some occasions than on others. Although there is a tendency to be more certain about one’s perception when the perception is accurate, some evidence suggests that perceptual confidence and perceptual accuracy are dissociable. As mentioned earlier, blindsight provides one good example. Blindsight patients claim that they do not have confidence in their perception even when their perceptual accuracy is better than chance level. If one considers stimulus awareness equivalent to consciousness, blindsight patients should be ­considered perceptually conscious. This conclusion clearly contradicts the patients’ subjective experience. Thus, metacognitive awareness can capture another aspect of consciousness that is not captured by stimulus awareness alone. Indeed, studies are starting to focus on metacognitive awareness. These studies manipulate metacognitive awareness (i.e., perceptual confidence) while maintaining perceptual accuracy constant. Such manipulation allows researchers to study the functions of consciousness while eliminating the possible confound of perceptual accuracy and is likely to reveal important future insights. Ai Koizumi and Hakwan Lau See also Brain and Consciousness; Consciousness, Categories of; Consciousness, Disorders of; Consciousness, Origins of; Consciousness and the Unconscious; Extended Mind; Heightened Consciousness; Unconscious Motivation

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Further Readings Fleming, S. M., & Dolan, R. J. (2012). The neural basis of metacognitive ability. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 367(1594), 1338–1349. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2011.0417 Lau, C. H., & Passingham, R. E. (2006). Relative blindsight in normal observers and the neural correlate of visual consciousness. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 103(49), 18763–18768. http:// dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0607716103 Lau, C. H., & Rosenthal, D. (2011). Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness. Trends in Cognitive Science, 15(8), 365–373. http:// dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2011.05.009 van Gaal, S., de Lange, F. P., & Cohen, M. X. (2012). The role of consciousness in cognitive control and decision making. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6. http:// dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2012.00121

Consciousness, Origins

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To explain the origin of anything, it is necessary to be clear about that which is being explained. There seem to be two main meanings for the term consciousness. One might be called open in that it equates consciousness with awareness and experience and considers rudimentary sensations to have evolved at a specific point in the evolution of increasing complexity. But certainly, the foundation for such sensation is a physical body. It is unclear, however, exactly what the physical requirements are for a “central experiencer” to emerge in the course of evolution. Some suggest that it would require a basic brain, others a central nervous system, and others stipulate only a cellular membrane. The open definition is most often assumed by the so-called hard sciences. The closed meaning of consciousness differentiates between a special sort of experience (i.e., conscious experience) and a special sort of awareness (i.e., self-awareness). This is the approach of psychoanalysis and psychology that accepts the existence of an unconscious mind. It is also the view of most phenomenological philosophers and psychologists (Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jacques Lacan, etc.). This entry discusses several scientific and philosophical views of consciousness and its origins.

Because of humanity’s unique social invention of symbolic communication—especially as in formal language but also in many other areas from music to mathematics—humans have learned to take the perspective of others and, in doing so, have become aware of their own existence, indeed, aware of their own embodied experience. Arguably, a few other species with large brains and complex social lives have occasionally exhibited self-awareness. Otherwise, species may learn from experience, but they live in the moment and have no knowledge of their own distinct lives, so it is assumed that they are unconscious in this sense. To seek an answer to the question “What is the origin of consciousness?” one must first assume a perspective within the most fundamental ontological questions in philosophy. These questions include the following: What is ultimate reality? Is it ultimately one thing (monism, say, matter or spirit), two things (dualism, say, matter and spirit or mind), or many things? Is it timeless and unchanging or a process of continual change? Is the universe God-created, self-created, or perhaps an accident?

The Scientific Worldview and the Origin of Consciousness The most common and almost sacrosanct worldview in public education and most universities today is that of mechanistic materialism, aka reductive materialism, aka realism, aka “naturalism,” but probably best known as the scientific view—or, to be more exact, the ontological assumption of the sciences. Various degrees of commitment to this worldview seem to be religiously adhered to in the so-called hard sciences of the laboratory and the theories associated with them, but less so as one moves along the continuum into the social sciences. Scientific views range along a continuum from scientism, which asserts that only scientific materialism can ultimately provide correct answers, to science as open-ended exploration, always ready to correct its errors when new evidence appears and making no pretense of answering the question why? In the scientific perspective, the ultimate reality is material, which is to say matter–energy, and all that exists has evolved by permutations,

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combinations, or mutations within matter–energy. Of course, as physical bodies evolved in complexity and brains grew larger, consciousness complexified and grew, too. The origin of consciousness is explained via evolutionary science, for at some point, it must have become advantageous for organisms to actually feel their response mechanisms, perhaps to make other responses possible. The scientific worldview has been supremely successful in explaining (and often making use of) all sorts of phenomena that were once explained by myths, magic, superstition, or wild guesswork. Phlogiston (the presumed hidden fire within combustible material) and the luminiferous ether (the presumed medium necessary for the propagation of light) were still accepted by some scientists early in the 20th century, and science is still in the process of convincing an often-doubtful public of the reality of organic evolution. Using experimental evidence and hypothesis testing, science has explained much that was once considered miraculous and, in the process, has made religious beliefs difficult for many people to sustain. Now, it seems inevitable that science will explain consciousness and its origin within its reductionist system. Minds will be shown to be predictable and material. In this view, the seat of consciousness is the dynamic, material object called the brain. Though many popular science writers indicate that the brain is itself conscious, it is more often assumed that the brain creates consciousness through certain as-yet-unspecified processes or modules; that is, the brain is the machine of consciousness. Beginning in the 1990s, the “decade of the brain,” and continuing today, one of the goals of brain research is to find the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), a view propounded by neuroscientists and self-proclaimed neurophilosophers (including Daniel Dennett, Patricia Churchland, and Paul Churchland). To explain the origin of consciousness, it is necessary to know which processes or modules are activated when the individual is conscious. As noted earlier, there is some question whether consciousness in the open definition appeared with the first rudimentary sensations in living units that had no central processor (like a complex nervous system) and so likely no central experiencer, or whether it appeared only when the apex of the

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nervous system, the brain, began to process information. If the former, then what is needed is a detailed description of how momentary sensations evolved to combine into the prolonged sense of awareness found, it is assumed, in most adult human brains. If the latter, then it must be determined just which modules or processes in the brain produce consciousness. Once this matter is settled, presumably, it is a short step to explain the origin of consciousness. As an aside, it should be noted that the brain is not universally accepted as modular in its functioning. Some theorists posit that consciousness emerges when the interaction of overlapping neural nets reaches certain levels of complexity (in the same way as parallel processing of information or learning from feedback works in computers). There are two corollaries to this view. One is that, although the human brain may take up more body space than most other brains, it is structurally not very different from other mammalian brains, so there is no reason to think humans have a special sort of mind or consciousness. Second is the implication that if tiny microchips could replace complex neurons, they could serve as a satisfactory substrate for consciousness. Thus, consciousness could emerge in computers or computer networks. At this point, however, how the brain produces consciousness or where in the brain consciousness is produced remains uncertain.

The Search for Neural Correlates There have been many suggestions for the NCC, beginning with René Descartes in the 17th century, who fancied the pineal gland as the seat of the soul,  to many well-researched alternatives today, ­ especially those informed by brain-imaging techniques such as EEG (electroencephalography), PET (positron emission tomography) scans, fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging), and fEITER (functional electrical impedance tomography by evoked response). A number of specific brain modules or neural processes have been suggested— too many to list—but among them are the prefrontal cortex, high-frequency (gamma band) oscillations, and recurrent oscillations in the thalamocortical systems. But there is uncertainty about whether brain imaging can ever find the NCC, much less explain their origin.

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Problems With Scientific Reductionism One of the problems with brain-imaging techniques is that the brain seems to be always electrically and chemically active, even when the individual is not conscious. This fact implies that the interpretation of brain images cannot determine whether the images indicate conscious or nonconscious activity. Another well-known difficulty is the so-called binding problem, which states that diverse activities throughout the brain’s vast complexity could not combine fast enough to produce the continuity of consciousness. Furthermore, if consciousness exists as a result of predetermined brain activity, then individuals would behave no differently without it. In other words, it has no function. This claim has become known as the zombie problem: Others would appear to have consciousness but would not. This problem is related to the so-called hard problem of consciousness articulated by David Chalmers: Aside from how it functions, what is consciousness or awareness in itself (including its origin and why it exists)? The hard problem of origin asks, “How can nonconscious matter produce conscious experience, because consciousness itself is both invisible and immaterial?” How can even the first twitch of rudimentary sensation suddenly be felt by an entity in a world that presumably had, up until then, evolved entirely without feeling or sensation? This is a logical chasm, not least because a nonexperienced world is unimagin­ able. If one tries to imagine it, one is experiencing it vicariously.

Denial of Consciousness One way around this problem is to simply deny that consciousness exists, to consider it an illusion of language and that that is how its origin must be understood. When humans began speaking, they found themselves in the position of the subject in sentences about objects and so began to imagine a sort of little person—the homunculus—inside their heads who was the decision maker of their actions—that is, the self each person calls “I.” But this scenario is an illusion for, as many experiments in cognitive psychology have shown, conscious decisions appear to come after the readiness potential (the beginning of the action) has

already been activated in the brain. Therefore, consciousness, at least as the decision-making CEO of one’s decisions, is an illusion. In this view, actions are biologically determined, and consciousness originated as a side effect of language. It is at best an epiphenomenon (an after-the-fact delusion).

Quantum Consciousness Another way of dealing with the quandary of how immaterial awareness could arise (or emerge) from inanimate, nonconscious matter–energy is to delve into the realm of subatomic particles or fields, better done with quantum mathematics than with visual tools. Postulated quantum consciousness, which exceeds the worldview of reductive materialism, is famously abstruse. (Some have speculated that quantum consciousness was likely because both quantum physics and consciousness are mysterious and apparently inexplicable, so they must be connected!) Quantum consciousness is too paradoxical to be dealt with in this short space, but it can at least be noted that many of the classical laws of physics do not exist at this infinitesimal level, where matter is revealed as fields of energy. For example, light has been shown to have the properties of both waves and particles (photons), so could not reality be both mind (or spirit) and matter, as in the worldview of double-aspect monism? Examples of the contradictions to the laws of classical physics that may allow for a mental aspect to reality include nonlocality or entanglement, which asserts that a submicroscopic particle (or field) such as a photon or electron may be in more than one place at the same time, allowing for what is perceived as instantaneous action at a distance. Notable also is the uncertainty principle, which maintains that observation affects that which is observed so that it is impossible to simultaneously determine both the position and velocity of a quantum unit (like a photon or electron). According to the observer effect, which is related to the uncertainty principle, observation or measurement is necessary for the indeterminate superposition of a wave energy field to “collapse” into particles of measurable substance. For some quantum philosophers, the superposition is the universal state of preconsciousness, a view also

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known panprotopsychism or panexperientialism. When the observer causes the indeterminate wave function of light to collapse or be transformed into matter–energy particles, consciousness begins, along with the perceptible world of form and matter.

Dualism and Dual-Aspect Monism For most people, quantum physics is just too abstract to really grasp, especially in explaining the origin of consciousness. However, the concept of the superposition wave state hints at two prescientific worldviews that point to the origin of consciousness in other ways entirely. One is the religious worldview that states that God or the gods, either accidentally or purposefully, created the world, life, and consciousness. For some quantum physicists, the ultimate observer is God, who brought forth form and consciousness from chaos. In this view, lived reality is secondary, an illusion, compared with the primary reality of God or the gods, but at least consciousness is explained, God and the world being separate substances—the worldview known as dualism. Descartes famously stood with dualism, saying that both mind and matter are real, but only mind feels, thinks, and is consciously connected to God. Before gods were even conceived, however, it seems that tribal ancestors or archaic cultures felt Nature to be alive. If Nature is taken as God, this is pantheism, which has little support today. However, panpsychism, which is similar to the animism of archaic cultures in which all things have souls, seems to be making a comeback. It gets around the hard problem by claiming that Nature and psyche are two aspects of the same ultimate reality (dual-aspect monism), the perspective of ecopsychology. Psyche becomes embodied consciousness in animals, which matches the animal’s physical attributes. Psyche, in ancient thought and alchemy, as well as in the writings of psychoanalysts like Carl Jung, manifests both consciously and unconsciously. Unconscious psyche implies unconscious experience, as in panexperientialism, which is instinctive experience. Only humans can make unconscious experience into conscious experience, into a conscious mind, via their ability to symbolize their own experience, share it with others, and reflect on

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it. But doing so is just a particularization of the universal mind or psyche.

Intersubjective Origin of Human Consciousness This line of argument leads to what is currently the only other widely accepted origin-of-consciousness theory, one that claims the brain is not enough to create human minds; this is what has been called intersubjectivity or the social construction of consciousness. Psychoanalysts or psychologists who accept the existence of an unconscious mind understand that the conscious mind—the self or the ego complex—is the product of social interaction and language. People learn ego; they learn to refer to themselves as “I”—that is, both the inner self whom people experience as guiding their choices and the subjective position in social interaction, especially in symbolic discourse (language). People learn to be conscious. This position is very similar to phenomenology, which sees the self as either thrown into consciousness or led into consciousness via social learning for the sake of group identity, or in a sense more in accord with totalitarian cultures, individuals are socially conditioned into being consciously controlled (via mechanisms such as shame, guilt, pride, etc.). Some developmental psychologists who have studied the stages of growth of individuals compare such stages in a broad sense to the prehistoric evolution of the human mind and have concluded that there is a specific stage when children attain consciousness of self, often after spending time identifying with the consciousness of others. In paleoanthropology, the first signs of symbolic communication or expression (beyond mere functional tool use) coincide with the emergence of cooperative minds within the shared intentionality of a group. From this view, self-awareness only becomes possible once one has assumed the position of others and objectively sensed one’s existence from the outside, as it were, as a self among selves—intersubjectivity. A great many steps are needed before individuals learn to place themselves in the position of the other and begin to communicate person to person. Language acquisition and symbolic communication are signs of self-consciousness, which is, again,

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the only consciousness humans recognize, though they often do imaginatively project the same sort of self-aware consciousness into their pets and other animals or even when they personify natural phenomena. People imagine deities with a mind similar to theirs as well. This socially constructed consciousness is very different from the illusory consciousness mentioned earlier by the eliminative materialists as an accidental side effect (an epiphenomenon) of language use that has no actual effect on behavior. In the culturally constructed consciousness view, individuals learn to listen, speak, and become intersubjectively engaged in the course of becoming conscious of themselves. This may lead to the development of actual selfagency and self-directed behavior (but not necessarily). In other words, culture births the sense of self, and that self can then act to change the culture. From this perspective, brains are necessary for consciousness but not sufficient. Other brains are needed, both living and dead, to which the individual must connect via channels of communication that act like extended synapses to exceed those of an individual brain in order to give shape to a cooperative culture. Only then does selfawareness or what has come to be called consciousness emerge.

Final Thoughts This intersubjective theory of origin is the closed sense of consciousness that rises above a sea of unconscious experience because of language and culture. The most widely accepted view of the origin of consciousness (at least among academics), however, seems to be that of neuroscience, which views the brain alone as producing consciousness, all the way down—the open definition of consciousness. Ultimately, given the various origins of consciousness that have been hypothesized, the most acceptable will likely be the one most in accord with one’s already-present set of assumptions about reality. Gregory Nixon See also Cognitive Evolution; Consciousness, Functions of; Consciousness and the Unconscious; Extended Mind; Heightened Consciousness; Unconscious Motivation

Further Readings Chalmers, D. J. (2010). The character of consciousness. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Damasio, A. (2012). Self comes to mind: Constructing the conscious brain. New York, NY: Vintage. Nagel, T. (2012). Mind and cosmos: Why the materialist neo-Darwinian conception of nature is almost certainly false. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Rochat, P. (2009). Others in mind: Social origins of selfconsciousness. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Stapp, H. P. (2011). Mindful universe: Quantum mechanics and the participating observer (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Springer.

Consciousness and the Unconscious In psychology and related disciplines (i.e., psychiatry, philosophy of mind, etc.), consciousness and the unconscious have an uneven relationship. Even though psychoanalysis has tethered these fields of inquiry together, the human sciences do not historically enjoy paradigmatic unity at any given stage of research. Consequently, consciousness and the unconscious have received mostly fragmented attention among the dominant approaches to psychological life. This entry reviews the traditional Western philosophy of consciousness, contemporary views of consciousness, and both psychoanalytic and cognitive views of the unconscious.

The Western Tradition For philosophical thinking in the West, consciousness becomes—via Cartesian doubt, which dismisses the possibility of dreaming, illusion, or error as the foundation of all other pursuits (i.e., external reality, morality, etc.)—a central feature of modern subjectivity. Indeed, according to John Locke, personhood was established on the selfreflexive memory of itself. The vanishing point of self-reflexivity found its protocognitive origins in the Kantian incorporation of epistemological limit as the positive condition for knowledge itself.

Consciousness and the Unconscious

These earliest forays in consciousness studies foreground contemporary debates, including substance and property dualism (the former holding that mind and body are distinct substances, and the latter that the mind is emergent from physicality) and varieties of monism (idealism and materialism).

Contemporary Views of Consciousness Contemporary philosophical debates that inform psychology have often revolved around the socalled hard problem of consciousness. In other words, what relation and correlates do qualia (or subjective states of consciousness) have with brain matter and at what level and function? Among these disputants, John Searle rejects the “strong AI (artificial intelligence)” thesis that mind–brain is just a vastly intricate computational device, noting through his well-known “Chinese room” argument that syntax (or algorithmic efficiency) is not identical with semantics (or meaning), which requires a neurobiologically emergent consciousness. Searle’s solution (“weak AI”), however, stands in opposition to the growing tendency to proffer monistic, material explanations. Daniel Dennett, in parallel with the “eliminative materialism” of Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland, argues that there is no consciousness (or qualia) apart from computational features of the connectionism of “neural net modeling,” also known as “parallel distributed Roger Penrose processing.” Alternatives to these views include the physicist Roger Penrose, who, relying on a mathematically inspired argument via Kurt Gödel’s theorem, speculates that consciousness possesses noncomputational features, most likely originating on a subneural, quantum level. Other quantum approaches include Karl Pribram’s holonomic theory of consciousness, informed by the work of physicist David Bohm. In contrast stands David Chalmers’s idiosyncratic understanding of consciousness as a combination of nonreductive functionalism and property dualism. Among neuroscientists and psychologists working within the materialist, neurobiological frame, Gerald Edelman proposes what he calls “neural Darwinism,” where brain development via natural selection facilitates structures allowing neural maps, which maintain a recursive relationship with each

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other. For Edelman, primary consciousness results from the temporal interaction of memory, value categorizations, and global neural mapping. Antonio Damasio is notable for his research into the inextricable role of emotions and feeling states in decision making and social cognition, as well as his analysis of the evolutionary benefits of consciousness, extending from the nonconscious neural signaling that makes possible a protoself (primordial feelings of the body), a core self (“here and now” consciousness), and an autobiographical self (past and future represented narratives). Such an approach toward integrative holism is taken up differently by Giulio Tononi, who asserts an integrated information theory, making the claim that consciousness, as qualia, is the sheer quantity of integrated information generated by a complex of elements and that the quality of experience is generated by the specific information relationships within such a complex, which have putative mathematical coordinates. According to Christof Koch—drawing on the foundational work of Francis Crick—this results in a form of panpsychism, which would be manifested in organisms or devices with sufficient integration, whether a human being, a fruit fly, or a nonorganic machine. Another, entirely different intellectual tradition takes consciousness as a starting point rather than as a phenomenon to be explained reductively. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, phenomenology— under the influence of Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Martin Heidegger—asserts a putative transcendental, integrative stance toward dualistic conceptions of consciousness that later pervaded existential and humanistic psychologies. The injunctions of phenomenology are to attend to the intentional dimension of consciousness, to bracket expectations and assumptions, and to adhere to description of experience spanning subject and object. Phenomenological psychology is concerned with the application of the phenomenological method to, among other things, the topoi (i.e., topics or motifs) of perceptions, memory, emotion, and the experience of self and others, as well as other discretely human experiences (e.g., psychopathology, loneliness, or chess playing). Existential-phenomenological psychology, explicitly hermeneutic and heavily indebted to existential philosophy, concerns itself with the structural

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conditions that make experience meaningful. These conditions include being-in-the-world (the subject’s world relatedness), temporality, and being-towarddeath. Existential-humanistic psychology endures as a robust alternative to dominant, Western approaches to consciousness. From this perspective have arisen potent critiques of the computational, AI-related understandings of consciousness. Loosely within the frame of phenomenological psychology is the emergent field of transpersonal psychology, which inquires into spiritual consciousness—that is, beyond the ego or person—and includes many related themes (e.g., spiritual development, altered states of consciousness, peak experiences, pedagogy). Unlike other perspectives that have been mentioned, transpersonal psychology has been heavily influenced by Eastern philosophical and spiritual outlooks.

The Unconscious in Psychoanalysis and Related Theories In stark contrast to the transparency of reflection theorized in phenomenological and transpersonal psychology, the unconscious consists in processes of mind—in thought, affect, and memory—that resist the introspective gaze of reflective awareness but still have influence on cognition, feeling, and behavior. Historically, many antecedents have been offered for the unconscious—including the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche and Friedrich Schelling and the 19th-century theories and practices of mesmerism and hypnotism; however, for contemporary discourse, psychoanalytic theory has had by far the most significance. For Sigmund Freud, the unconscious is initially rendered topographically, the “unconscious” referring to repressed contents, which have been barred from admission to the preconscious–conscious system. Consciousness, for early Freud, is egoic consciousness. The contents of the unconscious, as originally formulated, are representatives of the instincts, usually spoken of as eros and aggression. These dynamics are submitted to the mechanisms of primary process: condensation and displacement, the former involving the notion that a sole idea represents several associative chains infused with unbound instinctual energy, and the latter indicating that the energetic investment in an idea could be detached from it and passed off to associated, less initially charged, ideas.

Freud produced a major revision of this t­ heory wherein the unconscious fell under the direction of the id and other agencies of ego and superego attained their own unconscious dimensions. Importantly, in Freud’s classical psychoanalysis, contents of the unconscious move into consciousness only as compromise formations that bear the distortions and disfigurations of repression. Unconscious life is also notably manifested in dreams, jokes, and parapraxes (slips of the tongue). Psychoanalysis has the aim of providing a dyadic context for the discernment of these unconscious movements through the free association method and the analysis of transference. Psychoanalysis has undergone many shifts and splintered into many schools of thinking regarding the unconscious, among them the analytical psychology of Carl Jung, the ego psychology of Anna Freud and her opponents and successors, the various object relations theorists, and Lacanian psychoanalysis (based on the work of French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan). Jungian conceptions of the unconscious depart significantly from ­earlier, classical formulations. For Jung, the unconscious has both personal and collective aspects, the former related to the subject’s early, biographical experience, and the latter relating to innate and archaic a priori ­patterns of image, feeling, and behavior (e.g., persona, shadow, animus/anima, mother, father, trickster). Significantly, the Jungian unconscious is productive, teleologically rather than regressively oriented, and is regulated or directed by the Self, which is a central archetype to conscious and unconscious life. Individuation is the process of achieving wholeness (becoming oneself) but also the integration of conscious and unconscious aspects of the personality. The relative emphasis on developmental, biographical, and archetypal facets of the unconscious is a matter of difference among Jungians. Subsequent psychoanalytic approaches to the unconscious have often emphasized “experiencenear” formulations. Chief among these is Anna Freud’s ego psychology, extended by Heinz Hartmann and others, which focuses on ego defenses and social adaptation at the expense of examining more primordial (id-related) dynamics. Melanie Klein, in opposition to ego psychology, helped inaugurate the object relations tradition within psychoanalysis, and her view of the

Consumer Psychology

unconscious requires an understanding of the manner in which unconscious phantasy mediates primordially occurring objects existing in reciprocal relationship between the infant’s world and its interior. This trajectory is continued in the object relations theories of Ronald Fairbairn, Donald Winnicott, and Heinz Kohut, where the emphasis is increasingly on the unconscious, libidinal attachments to internal objects (for Kohut, “selfobjects,” the vestiges of early relational experience), and the capacities of the analyst to vicariously introspect, or empathically understand, the subject’s ostensibly unconscious experience. Lacanian psychoanalysis has revitalized the Freudian enterprise by simultaneously returning to Freud’s irreducible notions, such as that of the inaccessibility of the unconscious. Lacan interprets Freud’s notion of “representatives” in the unconscious to refer to “signifiers,” which leads to the striking and oft-repeated formulation that “the unconscious is structured like a language.” Rather than having a kind of privileged depth, the Lacanian unconscious is pervaded with the ventriloquism of the Otherness of language. The foreign body of the discourse of the Other structurally governs the subject’s utterances. However, it does not do so in the mode of usual conscious meaning making, and the Lacanian unconscious is not interior to the subject but rather exterior. Moreover, the subject’s relation to the unconscious is not that of an identifiable location or one of access, but that of a division—a lack in Being—between two forms of otherness, that of the symbolic and that of the imaginary registers. The practice of analysis, thus, cannot be to make the unconscious conscious but rather to trace the movements of desire and jouissance (enjoyment) as they pertain to the subject’s destitution and submission to language. Critiques of the Lacanian (such as that of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guatarri) unconscious as structured like language have argued for a “machinic,” nonsymbolic unconscious founded on the production of desire rather than lack thereof.

The Cognitive Unconscious In contrast to the psychoanalytic tradition, cognitive research involving the unconscious refers to information-processing mechanisms operating outside of awareness (such as implicit and working

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memory). Moreover, connectionist perspectives on consciousness theorize an unconscious simultaneity of neural networks, many of which are outside of awareness. Under these allied approaches, it may be profitable to distinguish the unconscious from the preconscious, the former completely unavailable to consciousness and the latter (such as declarative knowledge) existing just under the threshold. The adaptive function of such cognitive formulations is speculated to be the relative speed and efficiency of nondeliberative responses to ­environmental stimuli. John Lloyd Roberts See also Brain and Consciousness; Consciousness, Categories of; Consciousness, Disorders of; Consciousness, Functions of; Consciousness, Origins of; Embodied Cognition; Embodied Grounding; Extended Mind; Heightened Consciousness; Hypnosis; Unconscious Motivation

Further Readings Damasio, A. (2010). Self comes to mind: Constructing the conscious brain. New York, NY: Pantheon. Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston, MA: Little, Brown. Freud, S. (1961). The ego and the id. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 19, pp. 3–6). London, England: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1923) Jung, C. (1969). The archetypes and the collective unconscious (R. H. C. Hull, Trans.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1959) Kihlstrom, J. F. (1987). The cognitive unconscious. Science, 237, 1445–1452. Lacan, J. (2006). Position of the unconscious. In Écrits: The first complete edition in English (B. Fink, Trans., pp. 703–721). New York, NY: Norton. (Original work published 1966) Searle, J. (1997). The mystery of consciousness. New York, NY: New York Review of Books.

Consumer Psychology Consumer psychology theories are concerned with understanding how consumers make

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Consumer Psychology

decisions about buying and using products (e.g., buying shampoo) and services (e.g., purchasing an airline ticket). Theories of consumer psychology can also be applied to social issues, such as how to increase healthy behaviors (e.g., improved eating choices), environmental behaviors (e.g., ­ reducing one’s carbon footprint), and safe behaviors (e.g., development of product warnings that are easy for consumers to comprehend). These theories derive from numerous sources in psychology, such as social, cognitive, personality, developmental, and evolutionary psychology. They also include theories of marketing, economics, and communications. A single, unified theory of consumer psychology does not exist. Instead, depending on the phenomenon being studied, theories from other disciplines are adapted and applied to understanding consumers’ perceptions, preferences, and choices. This entry reviews how companies use theories of consumer psychology to market and sell their products and services. Consumer psychology is the study of consumers’ responses to four elements of marketing: product, price, promotion, and place (the 4Ps). Each of these elements is important for understanding how to market or sell a product, service, or idea. Information relevant to them is merged by companies to develop a marketing plan or strategy for selling a product or service.

Product and Brand Decisions Theories of consumer psychology seek to understand consumers’ perceptions of product features, the benefits of using a brand, the visual look of a product package, and the design of a product. For example, in forming their meal decisions, some consumers may prefer buying a ready-to-eat deli product, focusing on convenience, but others may prefer to buy ingredients to cook from scratch, focusing on fresh and healthy ingredients. Some consumers may buy an Apple iPhone because it is easy to use, but others may buy an Apple iPhone because of its downloadable apps. A product decision that is frequently studied is consumer response to new-product introductions with existing brand names. Every year, the marketplace introduces thousands of products with recognizable brand names, such as new Nike

products or new Reese’s products. Consumer categorization theories show that products with a particular brand (Nike athletic shoes, Nike shorts, Nike pedometers) have the properties of a ­category with similar features across products. For example, the Nike category is associated with athleticism and the Reese’s category with chocolate peanut-buttery taste. Prototypical features of the brand, such as Nike’s athleticism, are more likely to transfer to new branded products (say, a Nike pedometer) when those new products are consistent with the mental image consumers have of the brand. Nike athletic shoes are more typical of the Nike brand than Nike pedometers are, yet because both shoes and pedometers may be viewed as athletic products, both may be viewed as a “good fit” for the Nike brand. In contrast, were Nike to introduce a cheap fashion necklace, this would not fit the brand well and could even dilute or harm the athletic image of Nike. If Reese’s came out with a new line of frozen dinner entrees, inferences about the chocolate peanut-buttery taste would be unlikely to transfer to this product, and the new frozen dinner line may change the overall perception of Reese’s. It is also important to take into account potential conflicts in cultural associations when evaluating extension fit. A new espresso machine would not be a good fit for the Sony brand even though Sony is associated with technology because espresso connotes Italian rather than Japanese cultural associations. Another area of interest in consumer research is how to retain customer loyalty. For example, consumer cognition theories argue that tiring of or becoming satiated with a product can be altered. People who use self-control in their healthy food choices are less likely to tire of these foods because they view the category of healthy foods as having lots of variety. They may associate “salad greens” with romaine, escarole, and baby lettuces, whereas a consumer whose choices are unhealthy may not think of these subcategories.

Pricing Decisions Theories of price perception have been used to understand how consumers judge prices. Consumers have reference points or expectations about what price one should pay for a product or

Consumer Psychology

service, and these reference points are often used to judge the value of the item. To some consumers a Louis Vuitton handbag is perceived as a waste of money, but to others, the high price is a signal of the brand’s prestige. Consumers sometimes make trade-offs such that they are willing to pay more for a luxury product if they judge it as conferring prestige benefits. Consumer choice theories examine how consumers choose among a set of options when trade-offs must be made. One phenomenon that has been studied is the compromise effect. When a consumer considers three automobile options that trade off two attributes, such as performance and gas mileage (a price-related attribute), most consumers will “compromise” and opt for the automobile that is moderate on both attributes rather than high on one attribute and low on another. Consumers sometimes rely on simple rules of thumb, also known as heuristics, in order to simplify the buying process. They may use heuristics without consciously being aware that they are doing so. One such rule of thumb is that a higher price equals higher quality. Heuristics can speed up decision making but can also lead to errant conclusions. Although higher prices do often mean an increase in quality, this is not always the case. Marketers may boost a price in order to increase perceptions of quality.

Promotion Decisions Consumer psychology theories also are used to understand how consumers are persuaded by messages that appear in advertising, are delivered by salespersons, or come through word-of-mouth communications such as social media. Consumers are bombarded with media messages every day, and marketers attempt to break through the clutter to increase exposure to their messages, capture consumers’ attention, and persuade them to buy their products. Theories of persuasion have been used in consumer psychology to study the influence of advertising and sales messages. One theory, the elaboration likelihood model, proposes that the manner in which consumers are persuaded depends on how much effort they expend in processing an advertisement. When consumers view a television commercial, for example, they may consider it intently and be persuaded

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because the message arguments are very strong (called central route processing). Other consumers may elaborate very little and be persuaded because of seemingly superficial cues, such as background music or the humor in the advertisement (called peripheral route processing). Another theory, the theory of reasoned action (and the subsequent variant known as theory of planned behavior), has been used in many subdisciplines of psychology, including consumer psychology. According to this theory, a consumer’s purchase of a product is determined by the person’s intention to purchase the product, which, in turn, is influenced by two factors—one’s favorable disposition toward purchasing it (an attitude) and whether other people want the consumer to purchase it (subjective norm). If consumers see an advertisement for a new restaurant, they may intend to eat there if either they form a favorable attitude toward doing so or they believe important others would want them to. Favorable attitudes and subjective norms, in turn, are determined by consumers’ beliefs. For example, the ad may persuade consumers that the restaurant has excellent cuisine and a comfortable atmosphere, which may favorably affect the consumers’ attitude and intentions toward dining there. In some cases, behavioral intentions do not predict behavior accurately, often because of unforeseen circumstances. A lack of money or the restaurant’s burning down would prevent people from trying the new restaurant even though their intentions were strong.

Place Decisions Consumer psychology theories can be used to understand place decisions such as the location at which a product is purchased (online or at a bricks-and-mortar retailer) or the experience one has while consuming a product. When consumers enter a retail store, they may be bombarded with sensory information, such as loud music in Abercrombie & Fitch, the aroma of coffee in Starbucks, the visual stimulation of a luxury shopping mall, or the touch of fabrics in an apparel store. Consumer psychology theories can be used to understand how these sensory cues can be used to influence consumers’ perceptions, inferences, moods, and purchase choices.

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For example, a higher ceiling in a shopping mall may lead consumers to think more abstractly, the scent of lavender may induce them to feel relaxed, and pleasant music may increase their browsing and lead them to underestimate the amount of time spent in a store. Even when their eyes are closed, consumers could infer from other senses whether they are in a Meineke Car Care Center or a Victoria’s Secret store. In a hotel room, the smell of bleach may automatically trigger inferences of cleanliness. Direct sensory experience with a product, such as a taste test in a grocery store, can be so influential as to overrule other perceptions about a product, such as brand name. Consumers’ moods at the time of shopping can affect their evaluations of products. For example, a person in a bad mood may mistakenly attribute her mood to a negative shopping experience, such as a crowded store, and may evaluate the store or products more negatively. However, in some cases a negative mood is beneficial if it matches the consumption experience. Viewers of sad movies may evaluate the movies more favorably when they are in a depressed mood. People in a bad mood may also purchase or consume items that they believe will put them in a better mood. Someone may purchase a pint of Ben and Jerry’s ice cream after a breakup with a boyfriend because of a belief that the ice cream may trigger a better mood. Consumer psychology theories also seek to understand the pleasure or displeasure that ­consumers derive from using or consuming products. For example, theories of evolution, which consider the environments in which human ancestors evolved, have been used to understand food consumption processes and preferences. People respond strongly to cues that food is tainted or spoiled, such as torn packaging, expiration dates, or a “funny” taste, smell, or color. Although the likelihood is low that food in a torn package or slightly past the expiration date will make someone sick, most consumers still throw it away rather than take the chance. This bias against questionable food would have been very beneficial to human ancestors because ingesting food that was spoiled or poisonous could have been deadly.

Theories of self-regulation have been used to understand the struggle between consumers’ impulses, on one hand, and their restraint, on the other, in behaviors such as overextending credit cards or eating unhealthy foods. A piece of chocolate cake may look delicious, but a goal of trying to lose weight may cause a person to refrain from eating it. Theories of self-regulation state that people have limited cognitive resources to devote to self-control, and once these resources are expended, people are more likely to submit to temptation. A person who has exerted self-control by working out at a gym might stop at McDonald’s on the way home because he or she has no selfcontrol resources left to devote to resisting that impulse. Theories of consumer psychology are varied, as these examples show, and can be applied to very diverse phenomena. Research guided by these theories assists both profit-making and nonprofit organizations in understanding product benefits, price offerings, messaging, and place decisions. Research based on these theories is also important for academic researchers in many disciplines interested in the applied context of marketing. Barbara Loken and Jennifer L. Stoner See also Attitude Formation and Change; Emotion and Motivation; Evolutionary Psychology; Perception and Cognition; Reasoning and Decision Making; Social Cognition

Further Readings Haugtvedt, C. P., Herr, P. M., & Kardes, F. R. (Eds.). (2008). Handbook of consumer psychology. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Loken, B. (2006). Consumer psychology: Categorization, inferences, affect, and persuasion. Annual Review of Psychology, 57, 453–485. Loken, B., Ahluwalia, R., & Houston, M. J. (Eds.). (2010). Brands and brand management: Contemporary research perspectives. New York, NY: Psychology Press. Meyers-Levy, J., & Zhu, R. (2007). The influence of ceiling height: The effect of priming on the type of processing that people use. Journal of Consumer Research, 34(2), 174–186.

Contemporary Trends in Psychotherapy

Contemporary Trends Psychotherapy

in

Trends are evident in all fields of knowledge. Some trends pass quickly, as their major tenets are scientifically or clinically disproven. Other trends emerge over longer periods of time and may even become a part of the fundamental knowledge and belief systems of a field. This entry focuses on trends that have persisted over a significant period of time in the area of psychotherapy theory. The emphasis is on individual psychotherapy, although much of this discussion also applies to group, couples, and family psychotherapy.

The Integration Movement Perhaps the major, overarching trend in psychotherapy theory over the past decades is theoretical integration, which Charles Gelso defines as “the combining or putting together of different elements into some broader element or whole” (2011, p. 182). Such integration is generally understood as a sign of the maturation of the field of psychotherapy. Knowledge about the process and outcomes of therapies of all major orientations, and factors associated with these processes and outcomes, has burgeoned. As this has happened, the trend toward theoretical integration seems to have expanded at an equal rate so that at the present time, more psychotherapists describe themselves as integrative than any other theoretical orientation. The tendency toward integration in psychotherapy is in stark contrast to views held in the mid20th century when new theories abounded, each seeking to differentiate itself from existing theories and demonstrate its superiority. By the late 1970s, it was estimated that more than 200 different approaches existed. During those times, the practitioner generally picked a theory and stuck to it. Indeed, the term eclecticism (of which the modernday term, integration, is a derivative) seemed to have the status of a dirty word. It was thought of as a selection of techniques from different theories, without a thoughtful examination of the often deep and irreconcilable differences and contradictions among those approaches and techniques.

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This proliferation of theories, along with other empirical, theoretical, social, and economic forces, came together to foster the shift toward therapists integrating different theories rather than adhering to the tenets of a single school. As it now stands, according to George Stricker, integration in psychotherapy can be divided into four types: common factors (integration of curative factors common to all therapies), assimilative integration (identification with one approach but willingness to use techniques of others), theoretical integration (blending of compatible concepts from different approaches), and technical integration (choice of techniques that fit each case regardless of theoretical differences). Although the trend toward integration has been a powerful one, there has also been considerable development within the major theoretical approaches. Developments within what for many years have been the three dominant theoretical approaches are described next.

Trends Within Psychoanalytic/ Psychodynamic Psychotherapy Psychoanalytic/psychodynamic theories (PPT) of personality development and psychotherapy naturally began with the seminal work of Sigmund Freud, starting in the early part of the 20th century. As psychoanalysis developed, a number of separate theories emerged, although there was still a set of common elements. The primary aim was to help patients develop insight into their unconscious processes, with the ultimate goal of working through and resolving the patient’s complexes and conflicts. The main technique used to facilitate insight is interpretation, which may be of defenses, transference and countertransference, dreams, and so on. The analyst’s role was to maintain neutrality so as not to contaminate the patient’s free expressions of thoughts and feelings and to allow the process of transference to develop. There have been major changes in PPT approaches to treatment. Relatively greater emphasis in now placed on briefer treatments, and the therapist’s role is seen as more active. There is also a greater emphasis on the development and resolution of problems in the person-to-person relationship between therapist and patient.

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Furthermore, in contrast to past decades during which the idea of therapist self-disclosure was frowned upon, therapists now share more of their thoughts and feelings with the patient.

Trends Within Cognitive/ Behavioral Therapies Behavior therapy emerged in the mid-20th century as a reaction to the focus in psychoanalysis on inner experiences, insight, and treatment. The focus in behavior therapy was on external behavior, at both motoric and verbal levels. A wide range of therapist techniques was employed, generally based on classical and instrumental conditioning and modeling. In the 1970s, the cognitive revolution in psychology affected psychotherapy through, for example, the cognitive therapies of pioneers such as Albert Ellis and Aaron Beck. Cognitive therapy subsequently joined with behavior therapy, to form a combined cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT). As CBT has evolved, it has broadened to include greater attention to patient affective experiences. To be sure, the focus on external behavior and cognition has continued, but CBT practitioners are now more likely to view patients’ feelings as important to take into account and work with. Relatedly, CBT approaches have been incorporating c­ onstructs such as mindfulness and acceptance, and these changes have been heralded as representing the “third wave” of behavior therapy. Coinciding with the trend in CBT toward work with patient affect is the greater attention paid to the patient–therapist relationship. Although the relationship alone is not seen as curative, a caring and empathic therapeutic relationship is thought to foster the effective use of CBT techniques.

Trends Within Humanistic/ Experiential Therapies Within this broad cluster, the two major theoretical approaches are person-centered (formerly clientcentered) therapy originally developed by Carl Rogers and gestalt therapy developed by Fritz Perls. Humanistic/experiential therapies (HET) were developed as a reaction to both psychoanalysis and behavior therapy, and they share the philosophical assumptions that humans are fundamentally

trustworthy and tend toward self-actualization, that the subjective aspects of life are the most important, and that psychotherapy should be an authentic human encounter. A major trend in HET has been the integration of humanistic approaches into emotion-focused therapy. This approach combines the deep empathic and caring relationship of person-centered therapy with the more active ­techniques of gestalt therapy.

Trends Cutting Across Major Theory Clusters Although there are many trends in psychotherapy, it appears that three dominant trends cut across the major theory clusters. The first trend has been the expanded attention to cultural and diversity factors in psychotherapy. Perhaps starting with the civil rights movement, then the women’s movement, followed by the men’s movement, and more recently the gay rights movement, the more recent emphasis is on culture and diversity broadly. The strength of this movement is probably due to increasing attention to matters of social justice and, relatedly, to the therapeutic needs of minority populations, including racial/ethnic, gender, sexual orientation, and religious minorities. Within psychotherapy, the trend manifests itself in the form of what is now often called feminist or multicultural therapy, with treatments tailored to the needs of minority populations. A second major trend has been the emphasis on positive psychology and human strengths. Actually, focus on the positive has waxed and waned over the past half century or more. The present trend was stimulated by Martin Seligman. In psychotherapy, the trend is evidenced both in how strengths are addressed in traditional therapies and in new therapies focusing on the positive. Third, an unmistakable trend during the past decade has been the effort to understand the mind– body connection, or how what happens in psychotherapy is related to what happens in the body, especially the brain. The connection of therapy to neuroscience, or what may be termed the neuroscience of psychotherapy, has been vigorously addressed and holds great promise to help understand change in therapy and develop techniques that foster such change.

Cooperation

Psychotherapy Research In concert with the growing sophistication of psychotherapy theory, empirical researchers have been busy trying to document the effects of psychotherapy. Much evidence now exists for the effectiveness of psychotherapy, although no differences are typically found among the established psychotherapy approaches. In addition, considerable evidence now supports the effectiveness of psychoanalytic treatments, CBT, and humanistic-existential approaches. Furthermore, the most robust predictor of therapy outcome is the therapeutic alliance with considerable research examining aspects of the therapeutic relationship such as the working alliance, transference and countertransference, and the real relationship. Further research also supports working with the relationship using techniques such as immediacy. These are exciting times within psychotherapy as major theories have been coalesced and integrated, external factors such as culture and biology have been incorporated, and empirical support has been found for the effectiveness of treatment approaches. Many more exciting changes in the future in this vibrant area can be expected. Charles J. Gelso and Clara E. Hill See also Ancient and Medieval Sources of Therapy; Ethics of Therapy; Evidence-Based Therapy; Measuring Treatment Outcome; Psychotherapy and Individualism

Further Readings Butler, A., Chapman, J., Forman, E., & Beck, A. (2006). The empirical status of cognitive-behavioral therapy: A review of meta-analyses. Clinical Psychology Review, 26, 17–31. Cappas, N. M., Andres-Hyman, R., & Davidson, L. (2005). What psychotherapists can begin to learn from neuroscience: Seven principles of brain-based psychotherapy. Psychotherapy, 42, 374–383. Davis, D. M., & Hayes, J. A. (2011). What are the benefits of mindfulness? A practice review of psychotherapyrelated research. Psychotherapy, 48, 198–208. Divino, C. L., & Moore, M. S. (2010). Integrating neurobiological findings into psychodynamic training and practice. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 20, 337–355. Elliott, R., Greenberg, L., Watson, J., Timulak, L., & Friere, E. (2013). Research on humanistic-experiential

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psychotherapies. In M. J. Lambert (Ed.), Bergin and Garfield’s handbook of psychotherapy and behavior change (6th ed., pp. 495–538). New York, NY: Wiley. Gelso, C. J. (2009). Confessions of a non-believer: The merits and mythology of psychotherapy Integration. Journal of Applied and Preventive Psychology, 13, 14–16. Gelso, C. J. (2011). Emerging and continuing trends in psychotherapy: Views from an editor’s eye. Psychotherapy, 48, 182–187. Gelso, C. J. (2014). A tripartite model of the therapeutic relationship: Theory, research, and practice. Psychotherapy Research, 24(2), 117–132. Greenberg, L. S. (2011). Emotion-focused therapy. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Hill, C. E., & Knox, S. (2009). Processing the therapeutic relationship. Psychotherapy Research, 19, 13–29. Prochaska, J. O., & Norcross, J. C. (2007). Systems of psychotherapy: A transtheoretical analysis. Belmont, CA: Thomson Brooks/Cole. Seligman, M., Rashid, T., & Parks, A. (2006). Positive psychotherapy. American Psychologist, 61, 774–788. Shedler, J. (2010). The efficacy of psychodynamic psychotherapy. American Psychologist, 65, 98–109.

Cooperation Within the field of evolutionary biology the word cooperation refers to the outcome of an interaction between two individuals. When each individual in an interaction receives a net benefit from some joint action taken, the outcome is referred to as cooperation, even if individuals pay a cost for their actions. An individual cooperates by behaving in a manner that makes the outcome of cooperation possible, even if its partner fails to cooperate. In other words, to cooperate means to behave such that benefits might be obtained by joint action, even if joint action doesn’t occur. This entry discusses questions about the influence of genetic relatedness on cooperation and reviews thinking about what leads to cooperative behavior.

Darwin’s Dilemma Researchers who study the evolution of social behavior can trace their obsession with

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understanding the nature of cooperative behavior back to Charles Darwin. In On the Origin of Species, Darwin wrote of his concerns regarding the hypercooperative behaviors seen in social insects like bees, ants, and wasps. How, he pondered, could natural selection ever favor the cooperative nest defense, the cooperative provisioning of food, and so on, seen in these creatures? After all, if, as he wrote, “Only those variations which are in some way profitable will be preserved or naturally selected” (p. 117), then how could this process ever favor helping others, as seen in the cooperative behavior of social insects and so many other species? In a section of The Origin titled “Objections to the Theory of Natural Selection as Applied to Instincts: Neuter and Sterile Insects,” Darwin proposed that cooperation can evolve when one realizes “selection may be applied to the family, as well as the individual and may thus gain the desired end” (p. 237). In other words, cooperative behaviors that benefit genetic kin can be favored by natural selection. At some level, that fundamental insight still drives much work on the evolution of cooperation. But that is where Darwin stopped. He did not address questions such as whether the degree of kinship affects the evolution of altruism. For example, should siblings be more cooperative than cousins and, if so, why? Moreover, does it matter how costly it is to be a cooperator? Does it matter how great the joint benefits are? If so, why? If not, why not? These questions have lain dormant for 100 years.

Hamilton’s Model A little over a century after The Origin was published, a short paper titled “The Evolution of Altruistic Behaviour” appeared in The American Naturalist. The author, W. D. Hamilton, began his paper by reminding the reader that the evolution of cooperation and altruism still largely remained a mystery, in part because there were no mathematical models that examined such prosocial behaviors. So Hamilton built his own model, and in so doing, he formalized the role of genetic relatedness in the evolution of social behaviors, including cooperation. In Hamilton’s model, natural selection favors any prosocial behavior, including cooperation,

whenever r × b > c. In this equation, which has become known as Hamilton’s Rule, b is the benefit that a recipient of a prosocial act receives, c is the cost paid by an individual undertaking the prosocial act, and r is the genetic relatedness between individuals involved in the interaction. The equation is easily modified for a cooperator who helps any number of relatives. In terms of cooperative behavior, what Hamilton says is that a gene for cooperative behavior will be favored by natural selection when the cost (c) of being cooperative is compensated by the benefits (b) accrued by genetic relatives of the cooperator, because genetic relatives, by definition, are likely to be cooperators as well. In this model, cooperators receive a sort of genetic kickback from helping one another. Hamilton’s Rule predicts whether natural selection favors cooperation for any set of r, b, and c. For example, (a) because the equation is more easily satisfied when r is large, the more related individuals are, the more likely cooperation is to evolve, and (b) the greater the benefit/cost ratio for the cooperator in the equation, the more likely cooperation is to evolve.

Other Paths Besides kinship, evolutionary biologists have identified at least three other paths to cooperative behavior—namely, reciprocity, by-product mutualism, and group selection. Cooperation via reciprocity centers on the possibility that individuals reciprocate acts of cooperative behavior. In this model, the cost of being a cooperator at Time T can be compensated if the cooperator is helped at some time, T + 1, in the future. The mathematical tool used to model the evolution of a reciprocal exchange is called the prisoner’s dilemma game. In this game, individuals who use a strategy called tit-for-tat (TFT) do very well. TFT is a conditionally cooperative strategy that instructs individuals to start off interactions with others cooperatively and then to copy what their partners do. If an individual’s partner cooperates, then the individual continues to cooperate; if the partner doesn’t cooperate, the individual stops cooperating. TFT has three characteristics that make it a successful cooperative strategy: (a) “niceness”—a

Coping Strategies

TFT player is never the first to stop cooperating; (b) “retaliation”—an individual playing TFT immediately stops cooperating when the partner stops cooperating; and (c) “forgiving”—TFT instructs players to do what their partner did on the last move, and as such, TFT has a memory window only one move back in time. Since the original models of TFT have appeared, dozens of variants of this strategy have been ­ examined, but most share these essential three characteristics. Another path to cooperation is through byproduct mutualism. This type of cooperation occurs when individuals incur immediate penalties for not cooperating (often referred to as cheating) so that the immediate net benefit of cooperating outweighs that of cheating. Mathematical models of by-product mutualism indicate that cooperation is more likely to evolve in environments in which resources are scarce than in environments where resources are plentiful. When by-product mutualism is in play, there is no temptation to cheat because of the net cost to cheating. But such temptation exists in most other models of reciprocity, because it always pays more to be helped and then fail to help in return than it does to be helped and subsequently return the favor. The final path to cooperation considered here is through group selection. In this case, natural selection operates on two levels: selection within groups and selection between groups. Because cooperators often pay a cost for being cooperative, such individuals have lower payoffs than their groupmates who do not cooperate. As such, natural selection within groups favors cheating. But groups with many cooperators outproduce groups with fewer cooperators, and so natural selection acting between groups favors cooperative behavior. The relative strength of within-group and betweengroup selection determines whether cooperation evolves: The stronger between-group selection is relative to within-group selection, the more likely cooperation is to evolve. Lee Alan Dugatkin See also Altruism; Behavioral Economics; Consciousness, Origins of; Cultural Evolution; Group Processes; Group Selection; Hamilton, W. D.; Human Nature; Social Cognition; Social Motives

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Further Readings Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation. Science, 211, 1390–1396. Darwin, C. (1859). On the origin of species. London, England: J. Murray. Dugatkin, L. A. (1997). Cooperation among animals: An evolutionary perspective. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Dugatkin, L. A. (2013). Principles of animal behavior. New York, NY: W. W. Norton. Hamilton, W. D. (1963). The evolution of altruistic behavior. American Naturalist, 97, 354–356. Nowak, M. A. (2006). Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science, 314, 1560–1563. Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 189–226.

Coping Strategies People have diverse ways of coping with stressful situations. Some coping styles are ineffective and are associated with psychopathology or problematic traits. Beginning in the 1880s, early theorists of coping differentiated between how one characteristically copes as his or her personality “style” or trait and one’s situational or statelike coping “strategies.” Richard Lazarus and Susan Folkman are credited with the first efforts to apply empirical methods to understanding coping strategies. Although many researchers have identified dispositional factors in coping styles associated with responses to aversive situations, Lazarus and Folkman, as well as others, also have looked at the way dispositional factors interact with situational factors. Still others have studied the relation between coping strategies and clinical change. This entry focuses on how people cope with stressful situations and reviews relevant theories, analytic approaches, and cultural influences.

Early Coping Theories Sigmund Freud can be credited with the first serious efforts to classify distinctive ways in which people cope with change and threat. Early psychoanalytic conceptualizations of neurosis identified the individual’s efforts to control and manage unwanted internal states as the nucleus of psychic

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dysfunction or neurosis. The distinctive and persistent ways in which one sought to control these internal states were labeled defense mechanisms or coping styles, and some theorists considered them forms of personality. Freud described defense mechanisms as an individual’s attempt to alleviate unconscious sexual and aggressive conflicts. Anna Freud later theorized that the role of defense mechanisms is to distort or suppress the individual’s internal conceptualization of the anxiety, thereby reducing the psychological tension. Common elements among the defense mechanisms a person characteristically used constituted one’s coping style. The relative success of these efforts to manage internal psychic conflicts was a rough measure of the severity of the neurosis. As classic psychoanalytic formulations gave way to ego psychology, social psychiatry, and then to object relations theories, descriptions of defense mechanisms gave less emphasis to enduring internal states and more to their roles in establishing social distance. These approaches sought to identify situational sources of stress, positing that individuals move away from, toward, or against others in an attempt to resolve internal conflicts. Over time, neurotic and other destructive symptoms were associated with the failure of coping strategies to protect the individual from interpersonal fears.

The Empirically Based Analysis of Coping Behaviors Although early theorists presented elaborate descriptions of the variations of coping styles and strategies, these descriptions were based almost entirely on subjective impressions and uncontrolled observations. Empirical methods have been relied on to differentiate coping patterns. The term cope is defined as the process of enduring, struggling, or confronting change or threat, typically in reference to unfavorable situations in which achievement or survival is involved. Statistical methodologies are frequently used to identify the enduring patterns that compose coping styles. Some researchers rely on direct measures of behavior, whereas others examine patterns of thought and cognitive structures that underlie overt patterns of behavior. Thus, some perspectives focus on the behavioral patterns themselves, but others differentiate between the form that coping

styles (traits) and strategies (states) take, on one hand, and coping competence or the adequacy with which individuals reduce stress, on the other. The theory of coping introduced by Lazarus and Folkman is currently the most widely used, empirically based theory. Unlike the theories of coping preceding it, Lazarus and Folkman’s theory emphasizes situational factors. For example, they theorized that, during the process of coping, an individual first evaluates the event through a process called “primary appraisal” to determine if the event is a stressor. The individual then proceeds to “secondary appraisal” prior to choosing how to cope with the stressor. The individual can choose between an emotion-focused, meaning-focused, problem-focused, or avoidance-focused strategy but often prefers one over the others. Today, most theories emphasize that the strategies one uses cannot be attributed solely to the individual’s preferences or personality. One must consider the adaptive demands and limits imposed by the situation and also the influence of one’s cognitive appraisal in identifying the personal meaning of those demands. Increasingly, coping styles occupy a continuum, often anchored by one or more preferred coping strategies. When faced with problems, individuals first turn to their most preferred style or trait but will use more statelike alternatives (strategies) if the preferred and dominant style is unsuccessful in managing the situational demands. In contrast to the single continuum of strategies advocated by Lazarus and Folkman, Larry Beutler and colleagues, after reviewing factor analytic models of coping, argued that enduring coping styles are located along two continua, “internalizing” and “externalizing.” The relative contribution of each describes the variations in coping styles. Internalizing styles, such as emotion-focused styles, are defined as using cognitive resources to regulate emotional distress, including denial or suppression. Externalizing (i.e., problem-focused) coping styles use external situations and behavior to solve problems, including direct avoidance or distraction. Contemporary research on coping styles confirms that one’s preferred style is a joint function of the nature of the situation and one’s behavioral dispositions. Studies have revealed that dominant coping styles predict the way one deals with situational demands but that situationally induced

Coping Strategies

coping strategies do not consistently predict one’s preferred coping style. That is, situations rather than personalities are more predictive of the strategies people use. Therefore, much of contemporary research focuses on the predictive power of preferred coping styles across different situations.

Cultural Factors in Coping Whatever coping style one prefers, one may use it with various degrees of success. Some ways of coping may be more effective than others. Employing coping styles that rely on strategies such as hypervigilance and rumination, for example, may actually increase the amount of distress one experiences. Whether individuals tend to prefer attributing the cause of their distress to internal factors or to external factors, their perceptions of cause and the resolution of distress are influenced by the culture to which they belong. Factors such as religion or spirituality, social background, gender or sexuality, psychological maturity, ethnic or racial identity, and family background and history all color the conclusions one reaches and the solutions one tries. Jerome Kagan recognized that, across cultures, one’s disposition to rely on internalizing or externalizing styles led to distinctive traits and temperaments. He found that some infants were highly reactive (i.e., very responsive to internal events, resulting in a higher degree of emotionality and behavioral instability). In contrast, others were observed to be less reactive to these internal events and, instead, were more sensitive to external events. These individuals were found to be less emotional and more stable. These patterns in temperament have been described in different terms. Introversionextroversion, internalization-externalization, and “fight/flight–freeze” are examples of cross-cultural descriptions of ways in which people characteristically respond to novelty, change, and threat. The bimodal descriptors function as the anchor points on one or more continua of behavioral dispositions. Across cultures, one group of individuals protect themselves from unwanted experience by being self-critical, avoiding change, and withdrawing in the face of anticipated discord. In contrast, another group of individuals prefer to engage

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novelty and change and demonstrate personal assertion of control over others or the physical environment. They seek contact with others, enjoy change, have a high tolerance for stimulation, and are gregarious in their social interactions. Within each culture, there also are those who rely on ­combinations of these patterns. In virtually all cultures, individuals with highly reactive temperamental styles are described as internalizing, avoidant, restrained, or introverted. Those with a low-reactive temperamental style, in contrast, have been described as externalizing, gregarious, and extroverted. Western cultures tend to foster the development of external, assertive, and individualistic styles of adjusting to change, whereas Eastern cultures prefer more avoidant, self-inspecting, and internalizing styles, even sharing attachments across communal groups.

Coping Styles as Predictors of Change Psychotherapy researchers have studied the relation between coping strategies and the effects of therapeutic interventions. Beutler and colleagues first reviewed the research literature and classified coping strategies. Then they developed instruments to measure these strategies as well as therapeutic interventions. The cross-match of coping styles and interventions were then assessed against change over time. The researchers found predictable fits between coping styles and interventions. In fact, the degree of predictability of change improved over that produced by each of the factors alone. Specifically, the coping-style principles they identified in their work were the following: Clients whose personalities are characterized by relatively high “externalizing” styles (e.g., impulsivity, social gregariousness, emotional liability, and external blame for problems) benefit more from direct behavioral change and symptomreduction efforts, including building new skills and managing impulses, than [clients] do from procedures that are designed to facilitate insight and self-awareness. Clients whose personalities are characterized by relatively high “internalizing” styles (e.g., low levels of impulsivity, indecisiveness, s­ elf-inspection, and over-control) tend to benefit more from

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­rocedures that foster self-inspection, selfp understanding, insight, interpersonal attachments, and self-esteem than they do from procedures that aim at directly altering symptoms and building new social skills. (Holt et al., 2015, p. 186)

Satoko Kimpara, Christopher Edwards, and Larry E. Beutler See also Behavioral Perspectives on Psychopathology; Culture and Psychopathology; Psychopathology and Stress; Stress and Resilience to Life Challenge; Stress Syndromes; Stressors and Stress; Terror Management Theory

Further Readings Beutler, L. E., Clarkin, J. F., & Bongar, B. (2000). Guidelines for the systematic treatment of the depressed patient. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Beutler, L. E., Moos, R. H., & Lane, G. (2003). Coping, treatment planning, and treatment outcome: Discussion. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 59(10), 1151–1167. Carver, C. S. (2011). Coping. In R. J. Contrada & A. Baum (Eds.), The handbook of stress science: Biology, psychology, and health (pp. 221–230). New York, NY: Springer. Holt, H., Beutler, L. E., Kimpara, S., Macias, S., Haug, N. A., Shiloff, N., Goldblum, P., Temkin, R. S., & Stein, M. (2015). Evidence-based supervision: Tracking outcome and teaching principles of change in clinical supervision to bring science to integrative practice. Psychotherapy, 52(2), 85–189. Lazarus, R. S., & Folkman, S. (1984). Stress, appraisal, and coping. New York, NY: Springer. Moos, R. H., & Holahan, C. J. (2003). Dispositional and contextual perspectives on coping: Toward an integrative framework. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 59(12), 1387–1403.

Creativity In studying creativity, researchers make a point of clarifying their definition of the construct. Although most describe a process or an ability by which something new is produced, they might differ in the valuation of the final product. Is

someone judged as more creative if his or her output is viewed as more important or acknowledged as more significant than another’s? Can someone be considered creative without social evaluation of the product? For example, some people might not consider a virtuosic performer to be truly creative, since he or she is reproducing the work of a composer or a playwright—that is, someone else’s creative product. Others might argue that the performer’s personal interpretation stands as its own unique re-creation of the original work. This entry considers the elements of creativity as defined by the product, the person, and the p ­ rocess. Further, it reviews attempts to measure creativity and its relationship to intelligence and to other traits. Finally, the development of creative ability is discussed in terms of cultural considerations.

The Creative Product It is often difficult to distinguish between the creative process and the creative product (i.e., the outcome of the process). A product is generally considered creative if it is judged to be new or original in some sense and also is somehow useful, meaningful, or aesthetically pleasing. The product itself might be concrete or abstract, as with inventions, paintings, compositions, theories, and the like. It might also be formed from preexisting elements that are configured in a new way. Is creativity necessarily tantamount to genius? Many researchers make the point of distinguishing between eminent-level and everyday creativity. Eminent-level creativity might receive much attention due to its rarity. Attention is clearly drawn to masterpieces and other unprecedented, transformative works. These creators are often lauded with fame, if not financial success. However, many disciplines (e.g., education and technology) encourage creative output on a regular basis, such as lesson plans, software applications, and video games. This everyday creativity might not signal genius, but its importance is unquestioned. The Four C model is useful in its acknowledgment of different levels of creative accomplishment, and it expands the everyday and eminent domains of creativity. The mini-c level incorporates creative experiences that produce personal meaning or awareness and are usually associated with the learning process. The little-c level describes

Creativity

everyday creative output and problem solving. The Pro-C level is demonstrated by professionals in a given discipline, and Big-C is recognized as eminent. For example, people interested in fashion might take classes in design and sewing and, by improving their skills and knowledge, create mini-c experiences. If they then begin to create clothes for themselves and friends, this would represent the little-c level. At the Pro-C level, they would then be able to sell their clothing and even make a living doing so. Finally, the Big-C level is reserved for those few individuals who are universally recognized for their contributions to haute couture.

The Creative Person To measure creativity, researchers have often sought a correlation with intelligence. The threshold hypothesis proposed that a positive correlation between intelligence and creativity exists only up to a certain threshold (often cited as an IQ of 120) and above which the relationship dissipates. However, further research, including meta-analyses, have shown only weak correlations and have not supported the threshold hypothesis, leading most researchers to consider intelligence and c­reativity as separate abilities and constructs. Other research has examined possible connections between creativity and mental illness, especially mood disorders. Indeed, the incidence rates of mood disorders are notably higher in artistic professionals (e.g., writers, composers, and dancers) than in individuals in nonartistic occupations (e.g., scientists and engineers). In particular, creative artists are more likely to report diagnoses of bipolar II disorder and to note more creative experiences during their hypomanic episodes. Some creative individuals with mental illness have reported that they were able to transform their distress through creative expression. Studies of resilience find that creativity might serve as a means of coping with stress and adversity and promote personal development. Major personality theorists have attempted to explain the role of creativity. Sigmund Freud believed that creativity was an attempt to resolve an unconscious conflict. B. F. Skinner considered creativity as a distinctive behavioral response that could be conditioned through parenting. Abraham

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Maslow considered creativity an indication of selfactualization and the growth available to individuals unburdened by other needs. Though there is no single personality type for creative people, a number of personality traits correlate with creativity, including self-confidence, preference for complexity, openness to new experience, tolerance of ambiguity, introversion, and independence. There are also certain life events that creative people frequently report, such as possessing a special ability, overcoming a difficulty during childhood (e.g., an illness or a disability or having a mentally ill parent), finding a mentor, or persisting in the development of a skill or talent. Whether creativity can be fostered in children (and possibly in adults) leads to the recognition that the development of creativity, like that of other skills, requires a commitment of time and energy. The creator seeks to strike a balance between traditional expectations while allowing for something original and innovative to appear. For this reason, attempts to subdue creative responses generally should be avoided by parents, educators, and supervisors.

The Creative Process The process of creativity is often viewed in magical ways, such as inspiration coming from a muse. One of the earliest models of the creative process was a stage model proposed by Graham Wallas. The preparation stage involves identification and exploration of the problem to be solved. This is followed by an incubation period in which a break from active work is taken, and the problem is temporarily internalized. The creator might then experience illumination—a sudden insight into the problem with a potential solution. The final stage is verification, in which the idea is worked through more consciously and applied to relevant issues. This model has been criticized by those who argue that the order of the stages might not be relevant to all creative processes and that rapid shifts and cycles between the stages might be characteristic of creativity. Therefore, it might be more helpful to describe the types of processes that a creator might experience rather than assuming that they occur in a fixed sequence.

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For example, consider a student tasked with creating a term paper. According to the stage model, in the preparation stage, he or she does some preliminary research and reading in an area of interest. This might be followed by an incubation stage in which potential theses or research questions are formed. Suddenly, as if a lightbulb went on, shaping an idea into a basic outline of a paper occurs. Finally, the verification stage might involve several rounds of drafting and revising until the final product is formed. Of course, the same outcome might come at the end of a different sequence in which one or more stages are missing or one or more are repeated. American psychologist J. P. Guilford stressed the value of creativity and promoted research in its assessment. He distinguished convergent thinking (searching for a single outcome considered to be the only correct one) versus divergent thinking (creating multiple potential solutions to a problem). A common example for promoting divergent thinking is to think of as many possible uses for a brick as one can. Initially, one might think of obvious uses such as a building element, then recognize that its weight allows it to be a doorstop or paperweight, and eventually that its hardness makes it a weapon, a hammer, a nutcracker, and so on. Many creative individuals have described a sense of becoming lost in their work. This experience has been extensively researched by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, who labeled the phenomenon flow. While in this state, the creator might become intensely focused on his or her work and so highly motivated in the activity at hand as to lose track of time. Research suggests that one is more likely to attain flow after finding a balance between the challenge of a task and confidence in one’s level of skill. An imbalance is more likely to result in ­boredom or anxiety. Another puzzle is why some creators find that the creative process comes easily and others struggle to create. The answer might lie in differences in motivation. Those who are intrinsically motivated might find reward in the task itself; doing it is personally fulfilling. Those who are extrinsically motivated might focus on an external reward, such as praise or financial success. Additionally, some stages of the creative process might be more motivating than others. For example, starting a brand

new project might be more appealing than continuing one already in progress.

Culture and Creativity Cultural views of creativity vary. Most Western cultures view creative people as highly individualistic and nonconforming, consistent with the myth of the “lone genius” who toils and triumphs in isolation. Although an understanding of the self might be useful, creativity also seems to require a social context. In collectivistic cultures where conformity is valued, creativity might be an attribute by which individuals contribute something useful to society. Conversely, individualistic cultures might value creators who demonstrate some form of personal expression, and collectivistic cultures might value more those c­ reators whose products have practical use. It should be noted that cross-cultural research on creativity has by no means been comprehensive. It has been especially lacking in studies of African and Latin American cultures. Certainly, all cultures demonstrate creative products (e.g., music, literature, art, folklore), but the meaning and value of creativity can be difficult to research. Cultures also change over time in their support and appreciation of creativity. According to evolutionary psychology, creativity might be one of the greatest abilities of the human species. It demonstrates humans’ adaptability to changing environments by means of tools that extend human potential. Unfortunately, many of the innovations in technology developed by humans have had consequences for the natural world that now threaten the species. Potential solutions will not come by suppressing human creativity but by supporting it. Douglas Hall See also Extended Mind; Heightened Consciousness; Individuality Versus Collectivity; Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Motivation; Multiple Intelligences; Triarchic Intelligence

Further Readings Dacey, J. S., & Lennon, K. H. (1998). Understanding creativity: The interplay of biological, psychological, and social factors. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Cross-Cultural Methods of Research Kaufman, J. C., & Sternberg, R. J. (Eds.). (2010). The Cambridge handbook of creativity. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Runco, M. A., & Richards, R. (Eds.). (1998). Eminent creativity, everyday creativity, and health. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.

Cross-Cultural Methods Research

of

In cross-cultural psychology, the taxonomy of bias and equivalence provides a framework to enhance methodological rigor. Bias and equivalence are generic terms referring to measurement issues that challenge inferences from research studies. The concepts equally apply to qualitative and quantitative studies, but because they originate in quantitative cross-cultural studies, the following discussion mainly derives from the quantitative tradition. Bias refers to systematic errors that threaten the validity of measures administered in different cultures. The existence of bias implies that differences in observed scores might not correspond to genuine differences in the target construct. If not taken into account, bias can be misinterpreted as substantive cross-cultural differences. Equivalence refers to the level of comparability of scores across cultures. Minimizing bias and maximizing equivalence are the prerequisites for valid comparison of cultures. In this entry, three types of bias and three levels of equivalence and strategies to deal with the methodological challenges in cross-cultural research are considered. The entry also includes ways of dealing with bias and enhancing equivalence.

The Taxonomy of Bias Construct bias, method bias, and item bias are distinguished on the basis of the sources of incomparability. Construct bias occurs in a cross-cultural study when the target construct varies in meaning across the cultures. For example, filial piety in most cultures is defined as respect for, love of, and obedience to parents; in East Asia, however, this concept broadens to bearing a large responsibility to parents, including caring for them when they grow old and need help.

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Method bias involves incomparability resulting from sampling, assessment instruments, and administration procedures. Sample bias refers to the difference in sample characteristics, such as age, gender, and socioeconomic status, which have a bearing on observed score differences. Instrument bias refers to artifacts of instruments, such as response styles when Likert-scale responses are used, and stimulus familiarity (the different levels of familiarity of respondents with the assessment instrument). Administration bias can arise from cross-cultural variations in the impact of the conditions of administration of the assessment (e.g., computer-assisted administration), clarity of instructions, or language differences. Item bias, also known as differential item functioning, occurs if persons with the same trait (or ability) level, but coming from different cultures, are not equally likely to endorse the item (or solve it correctly). As a result, a test item might have a different psychological meaning across cultures. The sources of item bias can be both linguistic (e.g., lack of translatability or poor translations) and cultural (e.g., inapplicability of an item in a culture).

The Taxonomy of Equivalence Three hierarchically nested levels of equivalence— namely construct, metric, and scalar equivalence— have been established. Construct equivalence means that the same theoretical construct is measured across all cultures. Without construct equivalence, there is no basis for cross-cultural comparison. Metric equivalence implies that different measures at the interval or ratio level have the same measurement unit across cultures but different origins. An analog is temperature measurement using degrees Celsius and Kelvin; the measurement unit (the degree) of the two measures is the same, yet their origins are 273.15 degrees different (degrees Kelvin = degrees Celsius + 273.15). Scores may be compared within cultural groups (e.g., male and female differences can be tested in each culture) but cannot be compared directly across cultures unless the measurement scales have the same measurement unit and origin (i.e., scalar equivalence). In this case, statistical procedures that compare means across cultures, such as analyses of variance and t tests, are appropriate.

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Cross-Cultural Methods of Research

Dealing With Bias and Equivalence in Quantitative and Qualitative Studies Methodological problems are a perennial issue in cross-cultural research, in both qualitative and quantitative studies. Dealing with bias can be split up into approaches that focus on design (a priori procedures) and approaches that focus on analysis (a posteriori procedures). The former aim to change the design (sampling, assessment instruments, and their administration) in such a way that bias can be eliminated or at least controlled as much as possible. For example, items that are difficult to translate can be adapted to increase their applicability in the target culture. Design changes to avoid bias issues are often equally applicable to qualitative and quantitative studies. By contrast, the procedures to deal with bias after the data have been collected are often different for qualitative and quantitative studies. Quantitative researchers have a large set of statistical procedures available to deal with bias in data, as outlined in the next section. However, there are also various procedures—such as in-depth and cognitive interviews, a probing technique to reveal the thought processes of respondents who are presented with test items—that can be used in both qualitative and quantitative studies to reduce bias. For example, follow-up interviews with participants or subgroups that manifested an extreme position on the target construct can be useful for understanding the extent to which the extreme position is a consequence of extreme response styles or reflects a genuinely extreme position on the construct. Dealing With Construct Bias

In quantitative studies, equivalence can be empirically demonstrated by confirming the crosscultural invariance (identity) of the structure of the construct and the adequacy of items used for assessment. Both exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) can be used to detect construct bias or to ensure construct equivalence. When an instrument is lengthy or does not have a clearly defined expected structure, EFA is preferred. The rationale of this approach is that the identity of factors (or dimensions) in an instrument used to assess the target construct across cultures is sufficient evidence for equivalence.

The identity of factors is tested through target rotations of the factor structure across cultures. When the expected structure of the target construct can be derived from theory or previous research, CFA is more appropriate in confirming or disconfirming equivalence. CFA can test hierarchical models with a systematically increasing or decreasing number of parameters, which can ­satisfy construct, metric, and scalar equivalence. Given the high level of detail and statistical rigor that exist in CFA, it is perhaps the most advanced procedure for establishing quantitative equivalence. When there is construct bias, researchers should acknowledge the incompleteness of the construct and might compare equivalent subfacets, such as the comparison of the common operationalization of filial piety in Western and East Asian cultures, omitting the culturally specific elements. In qualitative studies, there are fewer established procedures to deal with construct bias. The definition of the target construct may be clarified through the interactions of investigators with cultural experts. An in-depth analysis might reveal the common and unique aspects of a construct across cultures. The need to evaluate existing, usually Western-based theoretical frameworks vis-à-vis local conceptualizations also arises in noncomparative studies that involve non-Western participants. The procedures for reducing construct bias in quantitative and qualitative studies have their own strengths and weaknesses. The power of the quantitative approach is statistical rigor, which provides a firm basis for drawing conclusions about construct bias. Comparable rigor cannot be achieved in a qualitative approach. However, the weakness of the quantitative approach is its dependence on standard instruments to gauge specific constructs. Statistical analyses can reveal whether, say, depression, as measured by the Beck Depression Inventory, has the same underlying factors in all cultures that a particular study involves, but these analyses cannot demonstrate that the instrument addresses salient aspects of depression in specific cultures. This latter aspect—namely, exhaustively identifying the culturally relevant components of a construct—is the strength of the qualitative approach. Quantitative and qualitative approaches to construct bias are compatible and often complementary.

Cultural Evolution

Dealing With Method Bias and Item Bias

Method bias is an often-overlooked aspect of cross-cultural studies. Frequently observed sources of method bias are (a) small, biased samples, especially when target respondents are difficult to recruit (thus challenging the generalizability of findings to new samples from the same population); (b) response styles (such as social desirability); and (c) the obtrusiveness of interviewers or observers (a well-known issue in ethnographic research involving observation). ­ Changes in the research design so as to minimize the impact of the method used can be implemented in quantitative and qualitative studies, such as lengthy introductions or sessions without actual data collection to minimize experimenter or observer obtrusiveness. In quantitative studies, it is sometimes possible to statistically estimate the impact of method bias sources by adapting the design of a study. An example is the administration of a social desirability inventory in conjunction with the target instrument in order to be able to statistically control for the effect of social desirability on target construct scores; in operational terms, social desirability becomes a covariate. In qualitative studies, it is possible for the research team to develop a coding scheme, provided the team is involved in every stage of the qualitative study. If necessary, external cultural experts, as well as interviewees, can be invited to scrutinize the interpretation of qualitative data, and a second interview can be arranged if further clarification is needed. Problems with the cultural appropriateness of specific words in items or of entire items or the poor translatability of words often underlie item bias. For example, an item that asks for the number of times a woman has been pregnant might be perceived as an indirect question about the number of abortions she has had, notably in countries where abortion is illegal. Numerous quantitative procedures have been developed to analyze item bias, such as structural equation modeling, item response theory, the Mantel-Haenszel approach, and logistic regression. Cognitive interviewing is a powerful tool that can be used in qualitative studies. Jia He and Fons van de Vijver

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See also Qualitative Research; Quantitative Research; Research Methods in Health Psychology; Research Methods in Neuroscience; Single-Subject Research Designs

Further Readings Denzin, N. (2006). Sociological methods: A sourcebook (5th ed.). Piscataway, NJ: Aldine Transaction. Harkness, J. A., van de Vijver, F. J. R., & Mohler, P. P. (Eds.). (2003). Cross-cultural survey methods. New York, NY: Wiley. Matsumoto, D., & van de Vijver, F. J. R. (Eds.). (2011). Cross-cultural research methods in psychology. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Van de Vijver, F. J. R., & Leung, K. (1997). Methods and data analysis for cross-cultural research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Cultural Evolution Cultural evolution is the term given to the process of change over time as a result of repeated social transmission (through, for example, imitation or teaching). Such changes might affect any socially heritable feature of a population, including overt behaviors such as skills and social customs, but also ideas and attitudes, societal structures, or cultural products such as material artifacts. The children’s game “Telephone” offers a simple example of cultural evolution in action: Messages (transmitted between individuals by whispers) typically accumulate errors as they are passed along a chain of players, such that the final player’s statement often differs considerably from the ­original utterance. Cultural evolutionary theories are important in psychology because these have sometimes been put forward as alternative explanations of complexity in human behavior that do not depend on strong, nativist assumptions of function-specific biological endowment. In addition, theories of gene–culture coevolution, which posit interactions between genetic and cultural evolution, have been proposed to offer accounts of aspects of human social behavior that are otherwise difficult to explain from an evolutionary perspective. This entry reviews cultural evolutionary and gene–culture coevolutionary theories.

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Historical Context The idea that social transmission can generate an evolutionary process is not a new one. Charles Darwin drew attention to the parallels between the origins of species and the origins of languages, noting that, for each, there was evidence of homology (similarities due to common descent) and analogy (similarities due to common processes of formation). However, this idea came to widespread public attention as a result of Richard Dawkins’s popular text The Selfish Gene (1976), in which he first coined the term meme to capture the notion of a unit of cultural replication analogous to the gene. Academic research on the topic began in a concerted way at around the same time, with ­ prominent research teams developing mathematical models of cultural inheritance, often adapted from models of population genetics. The contributions of Luca Cavalli-Sforza and Marcus Feldman, and Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson, were particularly influential. These two research teams were also notable for introducing the notion of dual inheritance, or gene–culture coevolution. It assumes that the two inheritance systems (genetic and cultural) impact one another such that changes in one trigger changes in the other, creating coevolutionary dynamics that can be modeled mathematically. The evolution of adult lactose tolerance in some human populations is a widely recognized example of just such an interaction. In the majority of the world’s populations, individuals are unable to digest fresh milk products beyond infancy. However, in cultures with a ­history of dairy farming (e.g., in Europe and in parts of Africa and the Middle East), consumption of dairy products in adulthood is the norm. In combination with archaeological evidence and analyses of data from the human genome, mathematical models of gene–culture coevolution have provided strong support for a cultural history account of the relationship between dairy farming and adult lactose tolerance. Specifically, a culture of dairy farming appears to have preceded an increase in the prevalence of alleles associated with lactose tolerance rather than the other way around. Academic research on the topic of cultural evolution has continued to flourish, with empirical approaches supplementing the theoretical analyses.

Laboratory-based experimental studies have investigated the effects of transmission on behavioral complexities and efficiencies, and phylogenetic methods borrowed from the biological sciences have been used to analyze the relationships between different languages, alternative societal structures, and sequences of archaeological artifacts. At present, the field of cultural evolution is at the center of vigorous debate within the evolutionary sciences. As cultural evolutionary theories have gained ground, and empirical research on the topic has continued to proliferate, some theorists have disputed the idea that such explanations can be regarded as alternatives to explanations in terms of genetic selection. Critics have argued that cultural evolutionary accounts should be viewed as different (proximate) levels of explanation, with successful traits nonetheless requiring ultimate functional explanation at the genetic level. However, advocates of cultural evolutionary theories have reacted strongly to these criticisms, arguing that the reciprocal causation implicated in models of gene–culture coevolution explains the evolution of many traits better than unidirectional adaptationist accounts. In this respect, cultural evolutionary (and gene–culture coevolutionary) theories can be viewed as alternatives to more traditional evolutionary-psychology interpretations, which typically propose more straightforward adaptationist accounts.

Cultural Evolution and Human Nature Cultural variation (in the sense of populationspecific patterns of behavior apparently supported by social learning) has been identified in a range of nonhuman species. Between-group differences have probably been investigated most intensively in chimpanzees, but similar findings have been documented in other species much less closely related to humans. However, given that social learning appears to be relatively common in the animal kingdom, examples of cultural evolution are surprisingly scarce. Evidence of socially transmitted behaviors changing over time (in a manner reminiscent of human culture and characteristic of an evolutionary process) thus far is limited to only a few exceptional cases. These include the transmission of vocal dialects documented in marine mammals as well as bird species.

Cultural Evolution

In nonhumans, it appears that most behaviors are transmitted with relatively low fidelity. Such transmission seems to be enough to bias learners toward developing the particular cultural variants displayed by their group members, but it appears to be insufficient to support cultural evolution. For species with a capacity for vocal mimicry, however, this might represent a special case where reproduction of novel variants is sufficiently accurate to support such a process. Human cultural evolution also exhibits the particularly remarkable, and possibly unique, feature of ratcheting, a term coined by Michael Tomasello. The analogy with a ratchet mechanism was drawn in order to capture the way in which cultural change accumulates over generations, with beneficial modifications typically preserved with little backward slippage until further improvements emerge. This particular ratchet-like property of human culture, which appears to be ubiquitous in human societies, is often referred to by the term cumulative cultural evolution or just cumulative culture. Although a number of researchers have argued that there is evidence suggestive of cumulative culture in some nonhuman species, there is nonetheless widespread agreement that this phenomenon is, at the very least, extremely rare in other species. In terms of psychological theory, the notion of cumulative culture is a particularly important one. The idea of behavioral complexity building gradually over many generations opens the door to new interpretations of many uniquely human behaviors, sometimes previously viewed as facets of a “human nature.” Tomasello has argued that the striking differences between humans and the other great apes can be explained primarily as a consequence of cumulative cultural evolution and that this accounts for the rapidity of these changes relative to typical biological-evolutionary time frames. The crucial implication of this view is that some features previously regarded as aspects of human biology (most notably, language) can be viewed alternatively as products of cultural evolution. With regard to language, James Hurford, Simon Kirby, and colleagues have extended this line of reasoning to contend that many common features of language have, in fact, arisen as a consequence of the cultural-transmission process rather than as

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a language-specific biological endowment (as proposed by others, such as Steven Pinker). The cultural evolutionary view provides an alternative interpretation of the apparently remarkable ability of young children to infer the rules of language from the incomplete and imperfect input of others’ speech (often referred to as the poverty of the stimulus problem). Instead of appealing to the existence of genetically encoded language rules to explain this, the cultural evolution account asserts that language has been progressively filtered through countless generations of users and learners and, as such, it has become intricately tailored to non-language-specific learning biases, rendering it highly learnable.

Gene–Culture Coevolution and Human Cooperation Gene–culture coevolutionary accounts have similarly significant ramifications for understanding other uniquely human behaviors. Large-scale cooperation between unrelated individuals, which is pervasive in human societies, is notoriously ­difficult to account for from an evolutionary perspective. Models of kin selection and reciprocal altruism, which appear sufficient to explain most instances of cooperation in nonhumans, do not account well for the patterns of cooperation observed in human societies. Some researchers have therefore proposed that the anomaly of human cooperation can be explained by humans’ equally unusual capacities for cultural evolution. Specifically, this is proposed to have produced novel selection pressures that favored social instincts for group living. This proposal is partially analogous to the account of the evolution of adult lactose tolerance described earlier. In this instance, however, the selected traits are proposed to be psychological rather than physiological. As such, the story is much harder to verify, and specific alleles favored by selection cannot be readily identified in the manner that they have been for lactose absorption. Therefore, in contrast to the gene–culture coevolutionary account of lactose tolerance, which is now uncontroversial, the proposal regarding human social behavior remains highly contentious. According to this view, human capacities for social learning permitted the development of

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relatively large social groups in which noncooperation could be policed in a basic fashion through culturally transmitted norms of acceptable behavior and punishment of norm violators. Because cultural evolution also generates cues that individuals can use to identify others’ group membership (through styles of dress, social customs, or vocal dialects, for example), the most cooperative groups were able to outcompete their more self-serving neighbors. In this new social environment, individuals possessing traits suited to group living were more likely to survive and reproduce than those who were less well equipped. The characteristics proposed to have been favored as a result of this sequence of events include the tendency to identify with, and feel loyalty toward, particular groups, as well as the emotions of guilt and shame. Cross-cultural research has confirmed that the tendency to behave in a manner inconsistent with pure self-interest appears to be universal across a wide range of human populations. Furthermore, cultural differences in the extent to which norms of altruism and punishment are observed have also been held up as evidence in support of a gene–culture coevolutionary account. However, critics have contended that population differences could be a consequence of locally adaptive behavior and have challenged the gene–culture coevolutionary account of the evolution of human cooperation on this basis. The issue remains an area of ongoing debate. Christine A. Caldwell See also Cognitive Evolution; Culture, Origins of; Darwin, Charles; Evolutionary Psychology; Language, Evolution of; Natural Selection; Nature Versus Nurture; Pinker on Language

Further Readings Dawkins, R. (1976). The selfish gene. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Laland, K. N., & Brown, G. R. (2011). Sense and nonsense: Evolutionary perspectives on human behaviour (2nd ed.). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Mesoudi, A. (2011). Cultural evolution: How Darwinian theory can explain human culture and synthesize the social sciences. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Richerson, P. J., & Boyd, R. (2005). Not by genes alone: How culture transformed human evolution. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Scott-Phillips, T. C., Dickins, T. E., & West, S. A. (2011). Evolutionary theory and the ultimate–proximate distinction in the human behavioral sciences. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6, 38–47. Tomasello, M. (1999). The cultural origins of human cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Cultural Psychology According to Geert Hofstede (2001), “Culture is to a human collectivity what personality is to an individual” (p. 10). Cultural psychology examines how culture influences people’s behaviors and thoughts, although what culture means differs from one scholar to another. While Hofstede’s pithy statement makes intuitive sense, a more comprehensive definition considers how different fields of cultural studies approach this topic. In one of the most extensive summaries of academic definitions of culture, Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn compiled definitions used by scholars across various fields of study and distilled them into several categories. Most relevant to cultural psychology are Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s psychological definitions of culture, which describe culture as a mixture of tools and methods for problem solving, learned behaviors, motivations, customs, and forms of moral reasoning. According to these definitions, culture results from humankind’s adjustment to the natural environment and to transmission between individuals. Indeed, a fundamental tenet of cultural psychology is that the human mind and its environment are inextricably linked: The mind is a by-product of the environment, and the environment is subsequently shaped by the mind. Thus, theories in cultural psychology address various parts of the aforementioned aspects of culture while also incorporating this fundamental tenet. They do so in order to (a) conceptualize the distribution of cultural variability across human social groups, (b) explore how culture is formed, (c) understand how culture changes, and (d) describe how culture differs between human social groups.

Cultural Psychology

This entry presents theories about the impact of culture on what people do and how they think.

Conceptualizing the Distribution of Cultural Variation Hofstede’s Three Levels of Mental Programming

The human mind is made up of two components. Using the computer as an analogy, the first component is the hardware (i.e., the brain), and the second is the software (i.e., one’s psychology). The human brain has a composition that is universally similar (i.e., it includes the cerebellum, the thalamus, the hippocampus, etc.). How the brain responds to the environment, though, depends on the software in the brain—what Hofstede refers to as one’s mental programming. This is invisible, just as the computer’s software is, but just as it is possible to understand the logic behind the software by examining the relation between inputs and outputs, one’s mental programming is manifested in one’s behavior. In fact, according to Hofstede, there are three levels of mental programming: universal, collective, and individual. The Universal Level of Mental Programming. Mental programming at this level is shared by humankind and likely reflects inherited genetic information. For example, one’s instinctive response to quickly withdraw one’s hand after it contacts a hot surface can be assumed to be a universal phenomenon stemming from the survival benefit it confers. This level is most relevant for studies examining the aspects of mental programming that might have played an important role in human evolutionary history. The Collective Level of Mental Programming. At the collective level, mental programming is shared among members of certain societies and not others. The assumption is that most, if not all, of such programming has been learned within an environment shared by those that constitute the society. For example, some societies share the tendency to prioritize communal moral goals over personal moral goals, whereas others might have very different moral priorities. This level of mental programming is of most interest to cultural

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psychologists—what kinds of mental programming differ from one society to another, and how are those differences best studied? Moreover, what do these differences indicate about the environmental conditions that led to their emergence? The Individual Level of Mental Programming. Mental programming at the individual level is unique between individuals and reflects idiosyncratic experiences. Consequently, no two people are programmed exactly alike, and thus members of the same society exhibit different behaviors. This is why even identical twins behave differently from each other.

The Hierarchy of Universality Culture exhibits different levels of universality. Some aspects of culture are evident across most, if not all, societies, but other aspects are only found in a limited number of societies. Ara Norenzayan and Steven Heine’s framework conceptualizes how cultural attributes range from being isolated in only a few societies to being shared among all humans. According to their framework, there are four categories of cultural universality: nonuniversal, existential universal, functional universal, and accessibility universal. Nonuniversal Aspects. Nonuniversal aspects of culture are found in some societies but not others and are considered cultural inventions that serve specific functions. An example is the Japanese emotion of amae. Defined as a pleasant feeling resulting from the freedom of being allowed to express one’s dependence on a close other, it is manifested in inappropriate actions that demon­ strate the security one feels in that relationship. The emotion is one that non-Japanese individuals are unlikely to fully understand or to have felt. Existential Universal Aspects. There are aspects of culture that exist in societies around the world, but they might serve different functions for different societies and might be more common among certain societies than others. For example, people in some cultures might verbalize their thoughts while reasoning about problems. Such verbalization facilitates problem solving in North Americans, but it hinders problem solving in East Asians.

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Functional Universal Aspects. Some aspects of culture might exist around the world and serve the same functions, but they might be more prominent in some societies than others. One example of a functional universal is altruistic punishment— punishment intended to penalize someone who acted unfairly and at the cost to the punisher. People are universally willing to bear the cost of punishing an unfair person, but societies differ in how much of a cost people are willing to bear. Accessibility Universal Aspects. These are the aspects of culture that exist around the world, serve the same functions, and are manifested to much the same degree. Social facilitation is an example—performing well-learned tasks better and poorly learned tasks worse in front of others.

The Origin, Transmission, and Persistence of Culture The Cultural Brain Hypothesis

The brain is an energetically expensive organ. The fact that the human brain evolved to reach its current size means that it must have conferred enormous survival benefits over alternative phenotypes. One of the greatest challenges in the study of human evolution is explaining this phenomenon. According to Maciej Chudek, Michael Muthukrishna, and Joe Henrich, the cultural brain hypothesis posits that the evolution of complex, cultural information led human brains to increase in size through a feedback loop involving social learning and sociality (i.e., larger social-group sizes). Cultural information involves either individual learning through trial and error or social learning through observation or instruction. A drawback of individual learning, though, is its inefficiency. Without models who direct the novice’s attention to what is relevant for learning, the novice must independently filter information that is irrelevant to the development of culture. In this case, one would require an increasingly large brain to accommodate increasingly complex information. Such a brain would have been prohibitively expensive to maintain, making it an unlikely phenotype to survive natural selection. Conversely, social learning is much more efficient, relying on faithfully copying cultural information available from models, rendering the

evolution of larger and larger brains initially unnecessary. This mode of cultural learning is beneficial because the individual need not start anew when problem solving. Instead, each can build on information from others, including previous generations. Subsequent generations could add increasingly to cultural knowledge, thereby conferring increasing adaptive value such that, over time, it would be almost impossible for any individual to create the same complex set of cultural information through trial and error. This cumulative process of cultural evolution becomes even more beneficial in larger groups, in that there are more models to teach and more cultural information to pass on. The need to mentally track the increased cultural complexity, as well as the complexity inherent in learning information from multiple models, drove the evolution of larger brains. Whereas individual learning obviated the evolution of larger brains due to energy unsustainability, social learning resulted in more adaptive and sophisticated cultural information, such as that for cooking or foraging. This advantage would have compensated for the energy demands of larger brains. An important consequence of this evolutionary process was a feedback loop in which larger brains facilitate the coordination of social interactions, allowing for richer sociality. This allowed for greater complexity to be added to previous cultural knowledge because of the presence of more models and cultural information, fueling the evolution of even larger brains, which allows for further sociality—and so on. The cultural brain hypothesis is, thus, a comprehensive evolutionary framework explaining how human brains came to be so large and how the human brain is related to the immense cultural complexity evident today. Berry’s Ecocultural Framework

An important question in cultural psychology is explaining how culture comes about at the individual level. A fundamental assumption about the origins of culture is that it does not emerge within a vacuum. The ecocultural framework developed by John Berry and colleagues proposes that culture—a particular people’s psychology— consists of adaptations to the environment. These adaptations are transmitted from the population to the individual and subsequently affect the

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environment in a feedback process. According to this framework, there are three general classes of variables: background variables, process variables, and psychological variables.

conceptualization is a 2 × 2 matrix in which both dimensions are represented as high or low.

Background Variables. These are the environmental factors that affect one’s psychology and adaptations. Specifically, they entail the ecological context (i.e., the physical environment) and the sociopolitical context (i.e., the social environment representing a population’s norms, beliefs, and attitudes). These then lead to biological adaptations (i.e., biological changes) and cultural adaptations (i.e., changes in social variables such as norms and beliefs).

In the context of nondominant groups, four acculturation strategies emerge in this matrix: assimilation, integration, separation, and marginalization. Moreover, in parentheses following each of the strategies listed next is the ideology within the dominant culture that allows for, or enforces, this strategy:

Process Variables. The adaptations that result from interaction with the environment are transmitted to individuals via several processes. Adaptation is primarily achieved through genetic transmission (i.e., reproduction) and cultural transmission (i.e., social learning), although it is possible for ecological influences (i.e., the ecological context’s direct influence on an individual) and acculturational influences (i.e., interactions with other cultures) to more directly impact an individual without the need for genetic transmission. Psychological Variables. These are the behaviors that an individual exhibits and the mental characteristics that can be inferred from behavior. Frequently, cultural psychologists are most interested in this class of variables. Furthermore, psychological variables restart this process by impacting the background variables, thus continuously affecting a society’s psychology.

How Cultures Change Berry’s Model of Acculturation

Acculturation refers to psychological changes resulting from intercultural contact in which one culture is more dominant than the other. Such change might occur in both cultures. It can result in people’s adopting different acculturation strategies, which are summarized in Berry and colleagues’ model of acculturation. The model assumes that the result of acculturation depends primarily on two dimensions: motivation for intercultural contact and motivation to maintain the group’s heritage culture. The simplest

Strategies and Ideologies

Assimilation (or the melting pot). One adopts this strategy if one opts to participate in, and embrace, the dominant culture’s identity at the expense of one’s heritage culture. Integration (or multiculturalism). This strategy describes someone who wants to adopt the dominant culture’s identity while simultaneously maintaining his or her heritage culture. Separation (or segregation). People who adopt this strategy have chosen to solely maintain their heritage-cultural identity and have no motivation to engage with the dominant culture. Marginalization (or exclusion). Those in this category have little interest in identifying with the dominant culture but also opt not to maintain their heritage-cultural identity. As an extension of the model, Berry and colleagues further argued that, when the strategy that a nondominant group adopts conflicts with the ideology of the dominant culture, acculturative stress results, potentially leading to poor psychological and societal outcomes for the nondominant group. Importantly, these strategies are not stagnant; instead, they might change as time passes, suggesting that the experience of acculturative stress might also change over time.

Descriptions of Culture Hofstede’s Value Dimensions

A particular challenge is figuring out how to empirically differentiate societies from each other. To that end, Hofstede used a large international sample to determine that societies differ from each other on at least five dimensions: power distance,

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uncertainty avoidance, masculinity and femininity, long- versus short-term orientation, and individualism and collectivism. Power Distance. Every society decides how much human inequality it accepts (e.g., differences in wealth, power, and prestige). People in societies higher in power distance are more accepting of strict hierarchies, and those with little social status expect an unequal distribution of power. Uncertainty Avoidance. One problem that all societies need to solve is how people deal with uncertainty, such as when meeting strangers or entering new situations, and the discomfort these bring. Efforts to manage this discomfort involve technology and norms and allow some societies to be more comfortable with uncertainty. Societies that are higher in uncertainty avoidance have stricter social norms and legal systems that dictate people’s behavior more directly. Masculinity and Femininity. A separate issue from power distance is the role one’s gender plays in the distribution of social and emotional roles. More “masculine” societies prescribe more traditional male and female roles. Conversely, more “feminine” cultures evince less gender differentiation, instead showing more gender equality in role expectations. Long- and Short-Term Orientation. A more recent development in Hofstede’s model describes whether a society is more focused on future goals than on immediate ones. Societies that are more long-term oriented emphasize perseverance and thriftiness, while societies that are more short-term oriented focus on the need to respect tradition and protect one’s “face.” It should be noted that this dimension is unique in that it is an indigenous Chinese dimension that has been examined internationally. Its values are reminiscent of Confucian teachings. Unsurprisingly, societies that are higher on this dimension tend to be located within East Asia. Individualism and Collectivism. One of the most popular and oft-studied of Hofstede’s dimensions is individualism and collectivism. It describes the degree to which people in a society see themselves as isolated units or as a part of an integrative social group, such as families and religious groups. More

individualistic societies think of social ties between individuals as weak, so one’s primary concern is either the self or one’s nuclear family. Conversely, people in more collectivistic societies are born already belonging to tight-knit groups that require one’s primary concern to be for the group rather than the self. Independent/Interdependent Self-Construal

One of the most influential and generative theoretical frameworks in cultural psychology has been Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama’s (1991) independent versus interdependent self-construal. In this view, people generally identify themselves in two different ways: Independent Self-Construal. Independent selfconstrual is more characteristic of American culture and entails selfhood that is a singular, autonomous, and self-sufficient unit. Each self is a unique constellation of abstract attributes and selfdescriptions (e.g., “I am generous”), which are assumed to be core aspects of the self and thus should remain stable across social situations. The primary goal of someone with an independent selfconstrual is to maintain self-consistency across different contexts and to express oneself and one’s own uniqueness. Interdependent Self-Construal. This form of selfconstrual is characteristic of East Asian, African, Southern European, and Latin American societies. The selfhood in this perspective is intricately interwoven with other people such that one can only understand oneself in the context of others. As such, one’s actions are heavily reliant on the perceived psychological state of others, and one’s self-descriptions differ, depending on specific contexts (e.g., “I am extraverted when I am with my friends”), as opposed to the broad, abstract statements about the self that are more evident in an independent self-construal. Furthermore, because of this strong sense of connectedness, one often takes the goals of close others as one’s own goals. It is important to note that the motivation to help others is reserved for those with whom one closely identifies or has long-lasting relationships. Strangers and people with whom one has weak social ties do not benefit

Culture, Origins of

from such altruistic tendencies. Importantly, the primary goal in this case is not to express one’s autonomy and uniqueness but rather to fit in with others. Benjamin Y. Cheung See also Cultural Evolution; Culture, Origins of; Culture and Cognition; Culture and Development; Culture and Personality; Culture and Psychopathology; Culture and Social Relations; Culture and the Dialogical Self; Emotion and Culture; Gender and Culture; Language, Interaction, and Culture; Motivation and Culture; Perception and Culture

Further Readings Berry, J. W., Poortinga, Y. H., Breugelmans, S. M., Chasiotis, A., & Sam, D. L. (2011). Cross-cultural psychology: Research and application (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Chudek, M., Muthukrishna, M., & Henrich, J. (2015). Cultural evolution. In D. M. Buss (Ed.), The handbook of evolutionary psychology (2nd ed., Vol. 2, pp. 749–769). New York, NY: John Wiley. Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture’s consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. Psychological Review, 98(2), 224–253. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.98.2.224 Norenzayan, A., & Heine, S. J. (2005). Psychological universals: What are they and how can we know? Psychological Bulletin, 131(5), 763–784. http://dx.doi .org/10.1037/0033-2909.131.5.763

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of

The debate over how best to understand culture and its origins has been highly contested and extends far beyond psychology proper. Psychological theorists and researchers have contributed substantially to this broader social science debate. The myriad positions taken in psychology—often more implicit than explicit—and arguments for and against particular understandings of culture are worth weighing as one seeks to understand how human culture (in the abstract) came into

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being and changes over time, as well as how human cultures (in particular) factor into the understanding of human experience in different social contexts. Understanding these different positions requires consideration of how the debates have cut across disciplinary lines. This entry considers aspects of the origin and evolution of human culture. The entire discipline of anthropology was founded—in part as an outgrowth of psychology— to address these questions, and contemporary debates that cut across psychology and anthropology have spawned a number of subdisciplines that deal with the intersection of mind and culture in different ways—cultural psychology, cross-cultural psychology, ethnopsychology, psychological anthropology, cognitive psychology, behavioral psychology, and evolutionary psychology. General psychological scholarship in the West also entails an implicit approach to culture that dominates contemporary research, and this implicit approach is also embroiled in the broader social science debate. Culture is not a variable! The importance of this point cannot be understated, despite the fact that the modal approach to “culture” in Western psychology is to treat it as a simple variable. In other words, the most common “measure of culture” is as a categorical variable indicating some type of group membership, which then figures in a model that controls for group membership in research that addresses various psychological constructs. The reasons for the limitation of the culture-as-a-variable approach will become clear, but it is worth noting that the variable-oriented approach to culture is pervasive in contemporary psychological scholarship. It is also the leastexplicated mode in which psychologists from many subdisciplines treat culture (cultural psychology and psychological anthropology are the major exceptions here). As the default methodological treatment of culture, it is ultimately rooted in the lack of a critical awareness of the broader debate in social science research about the nature and origins of culture. Before dealing with the nuances distinguishing different subdisciplinary views of culture and change over time, one must understand the debate surrounding the emergence of culture in humans.

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The Origin of Culture as a Dimension of Human Experience The evolution of culture can be separated into two primary considerations: (a) when and how culture come to constitute such a significant portion of the ecological context for the entire species of Homo sapiens and (b) how social scientists can best understand and explain the divergence of particular forms (i.e., kinship systems, religion, subsistence strategies, political systems, etc.) that are considered human cultural difference. The terms of the debate over the latter consideration have been much broader and more fundamentally paradigmatic than over the first. In other words, scholars who debate the when and how of culture’s coming to constitute something that sets the human species apart from other nonhuman primates tend to agree on some fundamental assumptions. Thus, the debate lies in more surface-level details, such as precise time frames (e.g., which features evolved during the early Pleistocene?) and sequences (which came first, settlements or agriculture?). There tends to be closer agreement that certain features set the evolutionary stage for the emergence of culture in the broadest sense and that this emergence led to an increasing degree of separation between humans and nonhuman, acultural primates. As with any evolutionary process, the emergence of culture was a long time coming. The substantive shifts toward culture included the evolution of language, creation of tools, inertia toward more permanent settlements, and the emergence of agriculture and domestication of animals. For example, one of the tenets of linguistic relativity theory is that language is not just a means of communicating about the world but rather a mode of thinking about the world. Cognition itself changes as language becomes a new way (and, ultimately, divergent new ways) of thinking about one’s reality. Critically, these cultural developments coevolved with the higher cortical structures of the human nervous system that allowed for this emerging complexity. Moreover, the evolution of these structures also played a critical role in selecting for this social complexity. The scope of debate about these elements tends to revolve around developing models of evolution in which these

elements played differing roles in relation to one another in the emergence of culture in the first instance. To be sure, tool use and even rudimentary elements of language-like communication can be observed today in nonhuman primates, but the large scale of these interspecies differences is generally accepted. This scale sets Homo sapiens apart in that these cultural elements have come to constitute a significant portion of the ecological context in which humans live, and therein lies the fundamental difference that sets them apart as a species.

What to Make of Cultural Difference? In contrast to the first consideration posed in the previous section, the second one—how to understand and explain cultural difference and change over time—entails fundamental philosophical disagreements across theoretical camps. For example, one axis of disagreement entails whether or not culture is really just icing on a more fundamental psychological cake. Scholars who adopt this universalist stance argue that cultural difference is relatively superficial and that if looked at closely enough, all cultural traits are really just unsubstantial variations on a more universal human psychology. Humanity is characterized by what can be termed a central processing mechanism—the “mind” of universalist psychology. The concept of psychic unity of humankind is one way this psychic nature has been characterized, and the universalist position buys into a strong form of psychic unity in which the human mind is essentially universal in nature. An opposing cultural relativist stance argues that cultural differences run deep and that the nature and basic functions of mind itself vary for people in different cultural contexts. This stance still applies a concept of psychic unity, but a much weaker version in which it is the potential form of any given human mind that is universal, whereas the particular forms that inevitably develop in different cultural contexts are seen to vary widely. For example, Clifford Geertz pointed to the fact that the higher cortical structures of the brain were evolving over the same period in which the practices and strategies now labeled as culture came to

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constitute such a significant proportion of the very ecological context itself. In this coevolution of mind and culture, emerging cultural traits set new terms for the selective pressures being exerted on the evolution of the higher cortical functions of the brain. This process gave rise to the modern human nervous system and means that, according to Geertz, “There is no such thing as a human nature independent of culture” (1973, p. 49). Mental capacity sets humans apart and is the basis for human cultural capacity. From this point, Geertz argued that once culture came to constitute such a large proportion of the human ecological context, this opened the door for intraspecies differences that run deep. The modern human brain evolved as a malleable organ in a way that other organs were not, and this malleability (i.e., neuroplasticity) allowed for a broad divergence in cultural forms that were deeply intertwined (for Geertz, they were inseparable) and signaled fundamental differences in how humans view, experience, and interact with the world. Geertz sought to fashion an “interpretive science in search of meaning” that was capable of grasping and describing fundamental cultural differences. This was a radically different take on observed differences in human culture vis-à-vis the universalist view.

The Evolution of Thinking on the Origins and Evolution of Culture A fuller description of the intellectual history of the debate raised here is beyond the scope of this entry. However, it is worth noting that several important historical trends underpin the debate. Karl Marx proposed one version of human history wherein the changing mode of production led to varying social forms (political structures, religion, etc.) over time. The central idea was that the material-economic infrastructure of society gave rise to the more ideological cultural patterns in any given society. Hunting and gathering gave rise to “primitive communism,” or egalitarianism, and (several evolutionary stages later) capitalism gave rise to the class structures observed in industrialized economies. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the “unilineal” evolutionists offered competing explanations

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based on developments in evolutionary theory. Henry Morgan, James G. Frazer, and E. B. Tylor described differences between societies in terms of their relative state of evolution within a linear framework that all societies must pass through. In this view, hunting-and-gathering tribes in Africa and elsewhere were seen as the “contemporary ancestors” of Northern Europeans (who, as it turned out, were at the top of the evolutionary hierarchy). That is, hunter-gatherer cultures represented a state of evolution that the actual ancestors of Northern Europeans passed through in order to reach their advanced state of social complexity. Critically, the unilineal evolutionary view was based on a notion of psychic unity in which all humans had the same inevitable evolutionary potential, but observed differences in cultural forms were to be understood as differences in the evolved realization of that potential. The scientific racism inherent in unilineal evolutionary theory brought a response by Franz Boas and a generation of anthropologists who were trained in psychology but whose research and theory on cultural difference led to defining anthropology as a distinct discipline in American academia. The Boasians articulated the idea of cultural relativism and dismissed the racial hierarchies inherent in unilineal evolution in favor of a brand of historical particularism. Structural functionalism was another competing framework that grew out of evolutionism. For structural functionalists, evolution was more of a metaphor for understanding how different cultures—social “bodies”—maintained equilibria in the arrangement of distinct institutions rather than thinking of them as existing in explicitly evolutionary hierarchies. In the mid-20th century, however, cultural evolutionism made a resurgence in the work of Leslie White, Julian Steward, and others. Their neoevolutionism retained the basic evolutionary tenets while discarding the moralistic dimensions of unilineal evolution and substituting a more heavily ecological determinism. These theories coincided with the rise of behaviorism in psychology. The parallel frameworks of behaviorism and neoevolutionism both operated from a notion of psychic unity as the fundamental potential for various behavioral expressions, and each developed methods for understanding the microbehavioral ­

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(i.e., behavioristic) and macrocultural (i.e., neoevolutionary) manifestations of human behavior in the context of different environmental constraints. Reactions to behaviorism and neoevolutionism led to further competing frameworks, such as the interpretive anthropology of Geertz and the cognitive revolution headed by Jerome Bruner and others. The cognitive revolution forked into two contemporary subfields—cognitive psychology, which emphasizes the cognitive mechanics of the brain, and interpretive psychology, which was aligned with the work of Geertz and focused on meaning and lived experience. The contemporary landscape of theoretical approaches to the origins and evolution of culture includes competing schools of thought that are rooted in these competing historical movements. Evolutionary psychology seeks to understand human psychological characteristics in terms of the “evolutionary environment of adaptedness” (EEA) in which certain cognitive forms emerged. In this view, cultural forms are generally seen as collective manifestations of neurologically rooted behaviors that served some adaptive function in the human evolutionary past. Contemporary behaviorism has continued to push toward a more nuanced understanding of how behavior is shaped by particular environmental constraints but has generally broadened to include psychological phenomena that B. F. Skinner considered beyond the purview of his brand of behaviorism. Behavioral psychology views culture as a collective and interconnected web of contingencies that both alter and are altered by behavior within this web. Contemporary Marxist anthropologists, such as Marvin Harris, offer explanations of cultural variation in terms of the material conditions of a given society, such as resource availability and population growth. Interpretive psychology and interpretive anthropology, however, emphasize the semiotic dimensions of culture. Interpretivists seek to understand cultural variation in terms of how the meanings inherent in different cultural views of the world constitute the reality in which lives are lived. They do not attribute causal efficacy solely to an arrangement of evolved (largely mechanistic) behaviors or conditioned sets of behaviors but rather seek to understand how culture and

mind co-constitute one another in different ways in different contexts. Contemporary cognitive psychology is largely dominated by neuropsychological perspectives that seek an understanding of human behavior (including cultural behavior) in terms of neurological substrates. Here, culture is largely viewed as a macrolevel arrangement of constellations of neurologically driven behaviors. It is critical to note that these different explanations of culture and cultural change represent deep philosophical disagreements about the nature of cultural variation and what constitutes a viable theory of cultural variation. Two subdisciplines of psychology deal specifically with the interactions of culture and mind, and the differences between these subdisciplines are worth delineating. Cross-cultural psychology tends to take its theoretical cues from the more materialist and universalizing assumptions about culture outlined earlier as the culture-as-merelyicing-on-the-cake view. In this mode of research, the goal is to examine culture in order to delineate ways that universal psychological processes are manifested in superficially distinct ways in different cultural contexts. The idea here is that what appear to be cultural differences are really just manifestations of the same psychological mechanisms. Observed cultural differences are synonymous with variations in the personality traits observed in a population. A competing view is embodied in the field of cultural psychology, as articulated in the work of Michael Cole and Richard Shweder. Cultural psychologists tend to employ ethnographic and other contextually sensitive methods to reveal fundamental variations in human psychological function, arguing that the mechanisms themselves are plastic and culturally malleable. Rather than seeing culture as a superficial coating, they view it as co-constituted with mind (building on Geertz’s argument about the coevolution of mind and culture). Cultural psychology draws more heavily from the interpretive fields mentioned earlier and argues for an approach to culture that takes difference more seriously. One of the exciting developments in psychological and anthropological scholarship on culture points to a potential bridge between these distinct views. An understanding of the plasticity of the

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human brain is becoming increasingly important in cognitive psychology, and an emerging subdiscipline of neuroanthropology builds on that understanding to reveal ways that neurological substrates are themselves subject to cultural fashioning. This is not to say that this new interest will bridge the deep philosophical divide between these camps, but many researchers seeking to reconcile their differences are finding good evidence to support an evolutionary, neurologically informed theoretical perspective on psychological function that is still able to take seriously the fundamental variation in cultural and psychological forms. Jacob R. Hickman See also Behavioral Development; Communication and Language; Cognitive Evolution; Cross-Cultural Methods of Research; Cultural Evolution; Cultural Psychology; Culture and Development; Culture and Social Relations; Culture and the Dialogical Self; Evolutionary Psychology; Extended Mind; Human Nature; Motivation and Culture; Skinner’s Legacy; Social Motives

Further Readings Downey, G., & Lende, D. H. (2012). The encultured brain: An introduction to neuroanthropology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretation of cultures. New York, NY: Basic Books. Harris, M. (2001). The rise of anthropological theory: A history of theories of culture (Updated ed.). Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press. Linton, R. (1936). The study of man: An introduction. New York, NY: Appleton-Century. Shweder, R. A. (2003). Why do men barbecue? Recipes for cultural psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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The study of cognition and culture concerns how universal features of human cognition interact with cultural variation. Culture is broadly defined as information shared among groups of individuals. Of central interest is how basic human

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cognitive processes (e.g., reasoning, learning, problem solving, and decision making) constrain culture and how culture shapes cognition. This entry describes the major theoretical traditions associated with the study of cognition and culture. To understand how cognition shapes and constrains culture, psychologists study both cross-­ cultural variation and recurrence. Due to different environmental and historical factors, cultures around the world vary widely in a variety of aspects, such as practices, norms, and styles of social interaction. The global diversity of parenting practices provides one example of this variation. Whereas parents in Western cultures typically engage in direct one-to-one instruction with their children, children in many other cultures spend significantly more time in peer groups or with nonparental caregivers, learning through observation of others. These differences exemplify the substantial variation in teaching and learning styles found in cultures around the world. Cultural variation affects multiple aspects of cognition—how people reason, categorize, make decisions, solve problems, remember, and generally perceive the world. Here, how cultural variation impacts cognition is discussed first, including cultural-historical and culturally situated perspectives on cognition. Theories of how cultural differences between Western and Eastern nations might affect cognition are discussed next. The last section discusses theories of cognitive constraints on culture, including cognitive developmental theories of core cognition and cognitive-anthropological accounts of how culture is transmitted from generation to generation.

The Impact of Cultural Variation on Cognition Cultural influences on the development of cognition have been of interest to the field since William James, often considered the founder of American psychology. In the 1950s, psychologists began to systematically investigate the effects of cultural phenomena on cognitive development. After finding differences in how individuals from diverse settings in Central Asia engage in logical reasoning, Alexander Luria and Lev Vygotsky proposed what is known as the cultural-historical view of cognition.

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This perspective views cognition as a product of one’s interactions with other members of one’s social group and one’s engagement with cultural materials (e.g., language and cultural artifacts, such as tools) and proposes that historical factors contribute to variation in cultural forms. In the domain of language, Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf developed the theory of linguistic relativity, arguing that the language a person speaks influences the way that person thinks about and categorizes the world. For example, there is evidence that the discrimination of different color categories is affected by the language a person speaks. Sociocultural theorists have proposed the theory of culturally situated cognition in which cognition is shaped throughout childhood via participation in the daily activities of the child’s cultural group. For example, how children attend to the activities around them might be affected by caregiver practices and the ways in which learning opportunities are presented to children. In cultures that do not emphasize direct caregiver–child pedagogy, c­ hildren are able to pay attention to a variety of activities simultaneously. The nature of the caregiver–child interaction requires that children must be able to attend to a variety of ongoing activities to learn relevant behaviors. Thus, cultural practices surrounding expectations for learning impact ­ ­cognition in meaningful ways. Many theorists argue that to understand how people think requires understanding the context in which thinking develops. Contextualizing the study of cognition requires consideration of the ecological, cultural, and historical factors that might influence how a person thinks about the world. For example, to understand how children in particular cultures develop a greater ability to attend to multiple activities simultaneously when compared with children from other cultures, researchers must consider that caregivers in the former do not engage in as much dyadic and direct instruction with children. Considering the ecological factors associated with daily life in these cultural contexts reveals that parents and other caregivers are most often attending to the activities of daily life, such as maintaining gardens and preparing food. In these contexts, children learn cultural activities from observing them and via active participation. Thus, researchers seek to study cognition within specific cultural contexts and to develop predictions about

how different cultural factors might affect the development of cognition.

Cross-Cultural Psychology Cross-cultural psychologists study cognitive flexibility, or how shared cognitive systems can accommodate diverse information from the environment. They argue that although there might be some universal, basic operating principles of the human mind, these principles are heavily shaped by the cultural environment over the course of development. One of the most widely studied dimensions of cultural variation within this tradition is the distinction between individualistic and collectivist cultures. The former emphasize self-reliance and competition, and the latter, social interdependence and cooperation. Research in cross-cultural psychology has often focused on how cultural differences between East Asian cultures, identified as predominately collectivist, and Western cultures, identified as predominantly individualistic, might contribute to differences in how individuals in these cultures reason and make decisions. Research has examined how even a person’s self-concept and the importance of self-enhancement versus self-criticism in improving self-esteem are derived from the cultural experience within the differing social systems. There is also evidence that Westerners reason analytically by employing rules of formal logic and making use of categories to understand the world. In contrast, East Asians tend to reason holistically by considering multiple perspectives and are not as likely to divide the world into ­discrete categories. Although there is evidence that human cognition is quite flexible and that culture has profound effects on how individuals view and understand the world, most researchers concede that there are core universals of human cognition. Aspects of cognition that develop relatively consistently, regardless of cultural influences, might constrain, or limit, the forms that cultural activities and beliefs can take.

Cognitive Constraints on Culture: Developmental Cultural Psychology Early in psychology’s history as a formal field of inquiry, researchers worked under the premise that

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there were universals of human cognition. The mind was seen as an information-processing ­center with inflexible operating principles for handling environmental input, much like a computer. For example, Jean Piaget, one of the founders of developmental psychology, proposed that the mind uses formalized rules of induction and deduction to understand the world. The rules, or operating principles, were considered inflexible and independent of the content the system received (i.e., information from the environment). Whereas these operating principles were thought of as universal aspects of human cognition, they were considered domain general, or equally applicable to all aspects of cognition. Theories of cognitive development, however, have favored a view of cognition as domain specific; that is, humans have evolved to acquire knowledge about things of evolutionary importance, such as understanding physical forces and cause and effect, knowledge of the animate and biological nature of living things, and understanding the psychology of other people. Thus, cognition constrains culture because there are species-typical ways in which cognition develops that might limit the variety of cultural forms. Research has demonstrated that core knowledge emerges early and requires minimal learning. For example, research has demonstrated that infants expect objects to continue to exist when out of view; they also expect objects to be solid and are surprised if objects are shown violating physical laws. Infants make distinctions between inanimate and animate and also expect things that are animate, that are able to move around and act on their own, to have insides (i.e., to not be hollow). Young children also demonstrate intuitive understanding of biological inheritance—specifically, that the nature of members of a biological category (e.g., a particular kind of animal, such as a snake) share common properties. Finally, young children also show early emerging understanding that other people have beliefs about the world and act with intentions toward goals. This fundamental comprehension of important aspects of the world is thought to be a universal principle of human cognition. Core knowledge limits how people think about and categorize the world. For example, research has demonstrated that there is consistency in how

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people from diverse cultures categorize living things (e.g., based on a hierarchical taxonomy). Despite this consistency, developmental evidence has also demonstrated that there are interesting ways in which interaction with the environment might influence categorization. In cultures that have more direct and routine interaction with nature, children more often categorize plants, animals, and nonliving natural kinds (e.g., the sun, rocks, and water) in relation to how people might interact with them (e.g., using leaves to make a mat) than do children in cultures that do not routinely interact with the natural world. This provides evidence of how core knowledge of living kinds might interact with the environment to produce both cross-cultural similarities and variation in patterns of reasoning about the natural world. In terms of children’s intuitive understanding of psychology, evidence suggests that although there is cross-cultural variation in the age at which children begin to understand other people’s mental states, such understanding develops in consistent ways across cultures. The concept of core knowledge can also be used to explain how individuals understand their social roles and interactions and how cultural information is spread throughout a population and across generations, the topic of the following section.

Cognitive Anthropology Many cognitive anthropologists have considered how knowledge is transmitted horizontally between individuals and groups and vertically from generation to generation. Cultural transmission is thought to be constrained by properties of the mind, such as core knowledge, so that some ideas and concepts are more easily transmitted and learned. There is also substantial cultural variation in the concepts, patterns of social interaction, practices, and beliefs that are transmitted from generation to generation. Thus, existing knowledge structures must form a base on which ­complex belief systems and cultural systems can be built. To understand how cultural inputs build on preexisting knowledge structures, cognitive anthropologists have proposed the concept of cultural schemas. Schemas are frameworks of knowledge about events, situations, objects, and people that are built through experience with the environment. Thus, the formation of schemas is heavily shaped

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by cultural inputs. Cultural schemas are thought of as shared frameworks of knowledge, or as cultural models, and are made up of specific cultural scripts that define how individuals should behave in particular situations. For example, when going to a wedding, it might be expected that people wear nice clothing, that everyone is quiet during the ceremony, and that cake is involved. Shared cultural knowledge allows individuals to successfully navigate social interactions and provides insight into how diverse cultural input can build on core knowledge.

Continued Research Humans are capable of substantial cognitive flexibility and are able to thrive in a striking variety of ecological conditions. Examining the interplay of cognition and culture provides unique insight into the remarkable flexibility of human cognition and into the ways in which cognition is constrained by culture. Across the four areas of cognition and culture described in this entry—cultural-historical, cross-cultural, cross-cultural developmental, and cognitive anthropology—the organizing principles are (a) that culture plays a profound role in shaping human cognition and (b) that some aspects of cognition are universal across cultures. Interactions with cultural group members and cultural activities influence cognition in a number of ways, from color discrimination to decision making. Young children, and even infants, possess core knowledge of critical domains of human experience (physics, biology, and psychology) on which culture elaborates. Thus, much of the research on cognition and culture examines how culture builds on cross-culturally recurrent themes as well as how universal aspects of cognition limit cultural variation. Continued research in this area will contribute much-needed perspectives on what is universal about human cognition and how ecological, historical, and cultural factors shape shared cognitive systems. Rachel E. Watson-Jones and Cristine H. Legare See also Biological Constraints on Learning; Cognitive Development; Cross-Cultural Methods of Research; Cultural Psychology; Culture and Development; Culture and Social Relations; Emotion and Culture; Problem Solving; Self

Further Readings Atran, S., & Medin, D. L. (2008). The native mind and the cultural construction of nature. Boston, MA: MIT Press. Deutscher, G. (2011). Through the language glass: Why the world looks different in other languages. London, England: Arrow Books. Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. Psychological Review, 98(2), 224–253. Medin, D., Ojalehto, B., Marin, A., & Bang, M. (2013). Culture and epistemologies: Putting culture back into the ecosystem. In M. Gelfand, C. Y. Chiu, & Y.-Y. Hong (Eds.), Advances in culture and psychology series (Vol. 4, pp. 177–212). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Rogoff, B. (2003). The cultural nature of human development. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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Culture is one of the most contested and ambiguous terms in the social sciences, with a conflicted legacy and complicated history. Yet it is also vital (if not central) to many social science disciplines, including psychology. Culture has become prominent in Western philosophy and sciences in the past few centuries, and attempts to incorporate it into psychology specifically have historically encountered difficulty. This has occurred because psychology has been largely dominated by the “naturalistic” approach, an attempt to study what is “inside” individuals as biological organisms ­isolated from their environments. There is still scant mention of culture in many basic texts in psychology, and it is often absent from psychological experiments and other forms of research. However, culture has been moving toward center stage and is becoming increasingly influential in psychology and beyond. Reflective of this shift was the emergence of cross-cultural psychology and, later, cultural (sociocultural) ­psychology in the 1970s and 1980s. The latter discipline is the focus of this entry. The term culture carries varying meanings in the many disciplines employing it. The term remains subject to continuous debate and, thus far,

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has no straightforward, broadly accepted definition. Colloquial understandings typically found in dictionaries and Internet entries define culture as the arts and other manifestations of human “high” achievement collectively. In psychology and other academic fields, however, the concept of culture is much broader and can be divided into three large clusters: The first is human variation across social groups, communities, and societies. The second comprises the distinctive features of humans as a biological species, especially compared with other species, including their origins in evolution (i.e., phylogeny). In the third cluster are the driving forces of human development across the life span (i.e., ontogeny). Each of these clusters has given rise to relatively distinct, partly overlapping research directions within psychology, sometimes at its intersection with sociology, anthropology, and biology.

Culture: Various Meanings and Research Directions Research concerned with human variation addresses more or less systematic differences in how people collectively function and develop in groups. These vary from smaller groups, such as cultures of particular institutions, to bigger ones, such as “youth culture” or “working class culture,” to overall societies defined by state boundaries, such as “American culture.” In this research, culture refers to variation across groups and communities that reflect differences in behavior, cognition, beliefs, attitudes, ­traditions, customs, and so on. This understanding is most systematically applied across societies. Cross-cultural psychology had its heyday in the 1980s and 1990s and is still popular today, though heavy critique has been leveled against its grounding assumptions, and as a result, its influence has waned. Much of the initial cross-cultural research explored the effects of cognitive tasks developed in Western psychology within populations in nonWestern countries, typically without adjusting the tasks to local contexts. Later research addressed topics such as variations in attachment and patterns of perception. One topic of particular interest has to do with the patterns of behavior and beliefs within what are considered to be distinctly individualistic versus collectivistic cultures (Western societies versus

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countries in the East such as China, Japan, etc.). Findings from this research have been far from clear-cut, although large-scale meta-analysis confirms that some populations value personal independence relatively more, while feeling duty to in-groups relatively less, when compared with other populations. These observations of sometimes systematic variations across cultures are notable because they cast doubt on assumptions about a universal nature of psychological processes. They also undermine research that attempts to apply Western models and constructs, such as self-concept, on a global scale. Especially important was the early finding that people who performed poorly on traditional cognitive tasks in laboratory conditions could perform with much greater success in their everyday lives and on tasks that matched their experiences, including exposure to formal schooling. This led to the revision of Jean Piaget’s universal stages of cognitive development, including Piaget’s own admission that the achievement of formal operations, rather than being a “culture free” universal stage, is, in fact, tied to culturally specific experiences. Later critiques also strongly challenged assumptions that people can be accurately tested using methods and instruments developed in drastically different cultural contexts and using activities that are unfamiliar or irrelevant to the participants. The assumption of cultural uniformity within a given country, especially one as vast and diverse as China or the United States and composed of varying groups with distinct traditions and customs, also was challenged. Another critique was that Western patterns of behavior were often taken as the normative standard against which other cultures were compared, an approach that could be considered hegemonic. The second broad meaning of culture is applied in studying the origins of the human species in evolution, specifically, in similarities with, and often especially in differences from, other biological species. In this research tradition, culture refers to human-made environments and tools and to associated changes in behavior. These include social interactions that, taken together, constitute a specifically human developmental niche that played an important role in the emergence of Homo sapiens. This meaning of culture is

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prominent in comparative, evolutionary, developmental, and cultural psychology, although the basic assumptions in each field differ substantially and sometimes oppose each other. Evolutionary psychology downplays the role of cultural change and instead is interested in a universal architecture that underwrites the capacities of the mind and is the product of evolutionary adaptations inherited from ancestral humans. This line of research was popular especially in the 1990s but has since come under critique for its reliance on notions about preestablished templates for human development and for its lack of direct evidence of how early evolutionary adaptations could have persisted so as to characterize contemporary humans. Gaining influence today is the interdisciplinary approach of relational developmental systems, a synthesis of developmental biology and developmental psychology. This approach asserts that culture continues to indeed be critically important in human evolution. The related perspective, known as niche construction theory, posits the simultaneous evolution of humans and their constructed environments, the latter consisting of human-made artifacts (e.g., tools) and concepts that can be learned and improved. In this view, the human organism is part of the environment, and changes in both humans and the environment occur during the trajectory of evolution. Important to this approach are demonstrations that culture operates according to various kinds of “knowledge-carrying” systems (e.g., language and other symbolic systems) that allow for nongenetic transmission of experience within and, especially, across generations. Although certain other species may be said to have “protocultures,” it is generally agreed that Homo sapiens relies on cultural systems to a degree unprecedented in the rest of the animal world. The third approach to culture in contemporary psychology, partly overlapping with the second one, is concerned with regularities and factors affecting the development of individuals across the life span, regardless of affiliation with specific groups or societies. This line of research and theory concerns the relationship of culture to nature, sometimes phrased as a relationship of nurture to nature or of culture to biology. Research focuses on studying the differential impact on human development of what are

considered to be acquired versus “naturally given” (or inborn, inherited) characteristics and factors. In this area, an especially strong impact was made by cultural psychology in the tradition of Lev Vygotsky, whose cultural-historical theory of psychology, developed in the 1920s and 1930s, was the first systematic attempt to treat culture as central to human psychology in a dialectical relation to biology.

Cultural Psychology in the 21st Century Cultural psychology does not view culture simply as a “black box” variable that produces differences in human development without regard to the specific practices, institutions, and tools that compose each cultural setting. Instead, culture is viewed as the foundation of human psychology and understood as the dynamic flow of collectively achieved, cumulative experiences of humanity stretching through history and embodied in various forms of social practices and their artifacts. These insights were initially developed within Vygotsky’s focus on development as engaging in practical, social activities with others in cultural contexts, beginning with the simplest forms of adult–child interaction and involving cultural tools, such as language. These tools continuously evolve in human practices and social interactions as each new generation acquires and further expands on them. This process is expressed in Vygotsky’s law of cultural development, which states that all psychological functions first appear between people on the social plane and only later “within” the child on the psychological plane. Vygotsky’s psychology also inquired into human evolutionary origins, with an emphasis on the role played by collective labor in the transition from ape to humankind and the simultaneous evolution of the environment. Contemporary cultural psychology continues to use the core tenets of Vygotsky’s approach in studying how children develop through joint activities and practices in everyday contexts. Development is situated in cultural contexts that are participatory, co-constructed, mediated by cultural tools, and “distributed” among the participants. For example, Barbara Rogoff’s research applies cultural models of teaching and learning to observations of toddlers and caregivers in different cultural communities as they collaborate on

Culture and Personality

everyday tasks. Michael Cole’s research highlights development as a process inextricable from the cultural and historical aspects of children’s lives. These approaches do not assume universality across or even within communities but seek to understand both similarities and variations in the processes of cultural practices. Vygotsky’s project remains to be further developed in overcoming unproductive dichotomies between culture and nature, as well as mechanistic thinking about their relationship as if culture and nature were separate and independent forces acting on individuals from “outside.” Vygotskian ideas are coalescing with the conceptual revolution in the social and biological sciences focusing on relational processes that connect rather than dissociate development from culture and social practices. This includes a transition from a ­relational to a transformative worldview on the basis of Vygotsky’s project to highlight human agency in instigating social change as central to development. The message that human differences are not based in innate, biologically determined capabilities but are products of life histories and experiences within the human world, composed of dynamic cultures that evolve through history, is a powerful message that is as important today as it was in the early 20th century when first introduced. It unfolded at the height of the so-called eugenics movement, countering its dehumanizing and discriminatory ideas and practices, and continues to be of prime importance today. Anna Stetsenko and Jeremy Sawyer See also Cognitive Development; Cross-Cultural Methods of Research; Cultural Evolution; Cultural Psychology; Culture, Origins of; Culture and Cognition; Culture and Social Relations

Further Readings Cole, M. (1996). Cultural psychology: A once and future discipline. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lickliter, R., & Honeycutt, H. (2003). Developmental dynamics: Toward a biologically plausible evolutionary psychology. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 819–835. Oyserman, D., Coon, H. M., & Kemmelmeier, M. (2002). Rethinking individualism and collectivism: Evaluation of theoretical assumptions and meta-analyses. Psychological Bulletin, 128, 3–72.

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Rogoff, B. (2003). The cultural nature of human development. New York: Oxford University Press. Stetsenko, A. (2008). From relational ontology to transformative activist stance: Expanding Vygotsky’s (CHAT) project. Cultural Studies of Science Education, 3, 465–485.

Culture

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Personality

Culture and personality is a field or focus of study that addresses questions such as the following: Are there universal dimensions that describe individual differences in personality in all cultures, or are some personality dimensions culture specific? Can existing personality inventories be validly applied across cultures, or should inventories be developed that are unique to particular cultures? Do cultural groups differ in the extent to which they exhibit particular personality characteristics? What is the nature of the relationship between culture and personality? Does culture primarily cause personality, or do they influence each other? What aspects of culture affect personality, and how can they be measured? An even more basic question is whether the very idea of personality is the same in different cultures. For example, people in Western or other individualistic cultures might think of personality as internal dispositions or attributes that are relatively stable over time and useful in understanding how people behave across various situations. In contrast, some psychologists question whether people in all cultures think of personality as an “internal package of attributes” or expect such attributes to predict behavior as well as social roles, norms, or situational factors do. Often, an underlying issue in culture and personality studies is the extent to which personality dimensions and processes are biologically based universals or mediated by culture. This entry starts with a historical overview. Subsequently, alternative theoretical perspectives and their possible integration are addressed.

Historical Overview Although psychologists became interested in cultural differences in the mid-19th century, the field referred to as culture and personality first emerged

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in anthropology in the first half of the 20th century. Contributors to the field, which flourished in the 1930s and 1940s, linked culturally patterned childhood experiences or cultural configurations to basic or modal personality types that were thought to characterize most individuals in a society. During and after World War II, however, efforts to apply the ideas and methods of culture-and-personality studies to describe the national character of people in large, complex nation-states (e.g., “fanatical” Japanese or “authoritarian” Germans) led to a crisis in the field and its virtual abandonment by 1960. In one particularly controversial example, Russians’ purported preference for authoritarian leadership under Stalin and the Czars was attributed to Russian children having been swaddled (i.e., tightly wrapped in cloth) as infants. Critics of the field questioned the assumption that childrearing practices could be linked to predictable adult personality characteristics, and the national character studies tended to ignore the considerable variability in personality within any cultural group. Other limitations included an overreliance on projective techniques, such as the Rorschach inkblot test with its uncertain interpretive validity, and the potential for biased or ethnocentric descriptions of cultural groups. Although interest in culture and personality was limited during the 1970s and 1980s, a number of developments since then have contributed to a reemergence of the field in psychology while largely avoiding the problems associated with earlier efforts. These developments included •• the rehabilitation of the concept of personality traits, which had become controversial in the late 1960s, as researchers questioned the ability of traits to predict behavior; •• the emergence of the Big Five dimensions of ­extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability (vs. neuroticism), and openness to experience (or intellect) as a comprehensive and possibly universal model of personality structure; •• the identification and measurement of cultural dimensions such as individualism and collectivism that might link ecology, culture, and personality; •• the emergence of indigenous psychologies in ­various countries, in part, as a reaction to the exportation of Western psychological models of uncertain relevance to these countries;

•• the infusion of studies of culture and self into mainstream psychology; and •• the ongoing refinement of procedures for addressing conceptual, linguistic, and ­measurement equivalence issues in cross-cultural studies. Presently, the study of personality across cultures is thriving and is characterized by ­several theoretical approaches, which are usefully classified as cross-cultural, indigenous, and ­cultural psychology perspectives.

Cross-Cultural Perspectives In the cross-cultural approach, researchers study multiple cultures in a search for cross-cultural universals or cultural differences amid these universals. A common strategy is to transport existing personality constructs and measures to new cultural contexts and to examine (a) how well they generalize across cultures, (b) whether the cultures differ in their average scores or trait levels, and (c) whether the personality constructs predict or correlate with other variables in a comparable manner across cultures. The extensive cross-cultural investigations of the Big Five model of personality provide a prominent example. Theorists have proposed that the Big Five dimensions are biologically based, basic tendencies that are relatively independent of culture and should thus describe the organization or structure of ­personality in all cultures. Indeed, the Big Five dimensions have been identified in many cultures, providing support for their universality. Evolutionary psychologists have offered an explanation for the apparent cultural universality of the Big Five traits. Specifically, the universality of individual variation in the Big Five traits could reflect trade-offs in all human groups between the costs and benefits of each dimension for reproduction and the survival of one’s genes. For example, both extraversion and introversion might be adaptive, given their costs and benefits, so that genes associated with both poles of the extraversion dimension might persist in a population. Cross-cultural comparisons of trait levels have also been made, with mean scores on the Big Five traits exhibiting geographical patterning. For example, European and American cultures have generally contrasted with Asian and African cultures, with the latter averaging lower in extraversion and

Culture and Personality

openness to experience but higher in agreeableness. However, given the many sources of conceptual and measurement disparity that can affect such comparisons, the meaningfulness of such trait comparisons across cultures remains unresolved. Also, in contrast to the view that the Big Five traits are relatively independent of culture, other cross-cultural researchers favor an ecocultural or environmental model, which postulates a causal sequence from ecology to culture to socialization to personality to behavior. For example, some researchers have linked aspects of ecology (e.g., climate) and culture (e.g., individualism–collectivism) to aspects of personality.

Indigenous Perspectives Whereas cross-cultural psychologists often anticipate cultural universals, indigenous psychologists endorse a culture-relativistic perspective and emphasize the need to formulate theory, constructs, and methods that reflect local cultural contexts. For example, indigenous psychologists have described a number of personality concepts thought to be salient in specific cultural groups. Examples include Japanese amae (dependence); Korean cheong (human affection) and chemyon (dignity); Chinese renqing (relationship reciprocity) and yuan (predestined relationship); Mexican simpatía (avoidance of conflict) and abnegación (self-sacrifice); and Filipino pakikipagkapwa (shared identity), pakikiramdam (sensitivity), and pakikisama (going along with others). Although approximate English translations of these concepts are possible, the behaviors and situational contexts associated with them might not generalize well across cultures. These concepts suggest that relational attributes are particularly salient in collectivistic (i.e., group centered) cultures. One important question is whether indigenous concepts are truly culture-specific rather than culture-relevant expressions of universal traits such as the Big Five. This has been investigated using the combined emic–etic (indigenous–universal) method, in which measures of both indigenous and hypothesized universal traits are administered to the same cultural samples. For example, research with the Cross-Cultural (Chinese) Personality Assessment Inventory, which combines Western and indigenous Chinese constructs, has found that

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several indigenous traits (e.g., harmony, renqing) define an interpersonal relatedness dimension that is relatively independent of the Big Five dimensions.

Cultural Psychology Perspectives Like indigenous psychologists, cultural psychologists tend to endorse a culture-relativistic perspective on personality. Conceptions of ­ ­personality and self are viewed as socially constructed (i.e., produced through shared cognition and experiences within a culture) and, hence, variable across cultures. For example, in individualistic cultures, the person might be viewed as an autonomous entity with distinctive attributes or traits that cause behavior (i.e., the independent view of personality). In contrast, in collectivistic cultures, the person might be viewed in terms of encompassing social roles and relationships, and behavior is viewed as responsive to others and the social context (i.e., the interdependent view of personality). These disparate conceptions of personality lead to a number of predictions. For example, in collectivistic cultures, compared with individualistic cultures, trait attributes are expected to be less emphasized in self-concepts and in explanations of behavior, and behavior is expected to be less consistent and predictable from traits. In addition, because traits are a more central aspect of identity in individualistic cultures, people in individualistic cultures are expected to exhibit greater selfenhancement tendencies in describing their traits. For East Asian cultures specifically, the hypothesized reduced consistency of both self-concepts and behavior has also been attributed to Asian dialecticism, which is a broad cognitive tendency characterized by an acceptance of inconsistency, expectations of complexity and change, and holistic thinking. In addition, there are dynamic constructivist approaches to culture, which posit the ability of bicultural individuals to switch between different “personalities” and cultural meaning systems, as revealed, for example, in the tendency of their personality scores to shift toward the mean of the associated cultural groups when responding in the different languages. Evidence continues to accumulate for some of these predictions, but most

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comparisons have been limited to North American versus selected Asian cultures.

Toward Integration The boundaries between these theoretical perspectives are fuzzy, and their integration might be ­possible. In this regard, it is useful to distinguish four aspects or “levels” of personality. Evolved universal human nature includes the needs, emotions, and psychological mechanisms that are adaptive in facilitating psychological well-being, survival, and reproduction for all humans. Dispositional traits refer to broad dimensions of individual differences such as the Big Five that are expected to account for behavioral consistency in all cultures. Characteristic adaptations refer to the values, goals, motives, beliefs, and self-concepts that underlie additional individual differences and result from the interaction of dispositional traits and environmental influences, including culture. Finally, life narratives refer to the integrated personal stories that individuals construct to attain a sense of coherence, meaning, and identity. The alternative theoretical perspectives noted here differentially address these four aspects of personality. Evolutionary psychologists focus foremost on evolved universal human nature. Cross-cultural approaches have focused most on dispositional traits but also on characteristic adaptations. The concepts described by indigenous psychologists might represent culture-specific manifestations (i.e., characteristic adaptations) of universal basic tendencies or dispositional traits. Finally, cultural psychologists de-emphasize dispositional traits and focus most on characteristic adaptations, particularly self-processes (e.g., selfconcepts, self-enhancement, self-regulation). Culture might affect characteristic adaptations and life narratives most strongly, but it might also influence how dispositional traits are expressed in various cultural contexts. These levels of personality are interrelated, yet distinct, so integration of the alternative theoretical perspectives that address them can lead to a more comprehensive understanding of personality across cultures. A. Timothy Church See also Big Five Model and Lexical Trait Theory; CrossCultural Methods of Research; Cultural Psychology;

Culture and the Dialogical Self; Evolutionary Psychology; Personality, Measurement of; Personality Development; Self

Further Readings Benet-Martínez, V., & Oishi, S. (2008). Culture and personality. In O. P. John, R. W. Robins, & L. A. Pervin (Eds.), Handbook of personality: Theory and research (3rd ed., pp. 542–567). New York, NY: Guilford Press. Cheung, F. M., van de Vijver, F. J. R., & Leong, F. T. L. (2011). Toward a new approach to the study of personality in culture. American Psychologist, 66, 593–603. Church, A. T. (2008). Current controversies in the study of personality across cultures. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2, 1930–1951. Church, A. T. (2010). Current perspectives in the study of personality across cultures. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5, 441–449. Levine, R. A. (2001). Culture and personality studies, 1918–1960: Myth and history. Journal of Personality, 69, 803–818. McAdams, D. P., & Pals, J. L. (2006). A new big five: Fundamental principles for an integrative science of personality. American Psychologist, 61, 204–217.

Culture

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Psychopathology

Cultural psychopathology refers to cultural influences on abnormal behavior and is important for considering when, and in what circumstances, behaviors are abnormal. In other words, cultural psychopathology theorists assert that behaviors labeled as abnormal are relevant only within the context of a particular time, setting, or population. Within specific mental disorders, cultural influences are typically described as variations not caused by genetic or biological determinants. This entry reviews the study of cultural influences on mental illness, including historical approaches, challenges scholars face, and the methods researchers use. The influence of culture could result in different expressions of behavioral symptoms, different explanations for symptoms, or different reactions when the symptoms are experienced. For instance, within East Asian cultures, symptoms of depression

Culture and Psychopathology

might be expressed through somatic difficulties, such as stomachaches or headaches. In the United States, depression is sometimes described using colors (blue) and metaphors (being down in the dumps) to describe sad feelings. These differences in presenting symptoms might lead to misdiagnoses. For example, when a Japanese immigrant in the United States tells her doctor she has been experiencing headaches since leaving Japan, she might be offered aspirin rather than supportive mental health care. Once symptoms or abnormal behaviors are exhibited, explanations vary across cultures. To illustrate, in Pacific Islander cultures, people might describe causes as spiritually based, such as receiving punishment for sins. European Americans in the United States might be more likely to attribute mental disorders to genes or stress. Given the variations in perceived possible causes, it logically follows that reactions to the symptoms would also vary across and even within countries or cultural groups. In rural Chinese villages where communal living is the norm, people might express fear and publicly shun or exclude persons known to be experiencing symptoms. In cosmopolitan urban areas, such as Shanghai, people might have unfavorable attitudes yet also provide hospitalization and medical treatment for persons deemed ill. Access to resources and exposure to Western (i.e., Judeo-Christian values based) cultures might alter responses to psychopathology. The most recent version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), the manual used to diagnose major mental disorders in the United States, references culture in several ways. Across disorders, reminders are provided to consider the cultural context before making the diagnosis. In addition, the section of the manual pertaining to emerging measures and models includes a structured interview to facilitate assessment of social and cultural influences on the experience of distress. This cultural-formulation interview includes questions regarding cultural identity, perception of distress and the causes of distress, and preferred ways of seeking help or of coping. The impact of culture on the interaction between the individual and clinician is also assessed. Finally, the manual offers a very brief description of

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cultural idioms of distress (everyday expressions for discussing distress), cultural syndromes (patterns of symptoms within specific cultural groups), and cultural explanations (the meaning and causes of distress as understood by a group of people) that are considered to be relevant for assessing psychopathology. Understanding the influence of culture on psychopathology is important to ensure that people are not arbitrarily judged as having a mental illness simply because their values or way of life differ. Differences are not to be assumed to be deficiencies. Cultural variation can also help scientists better understand mental disorders in ways that otherwise might never be possible. Observing new symptoms or a different response to treatment promotes the development of new theories and expands psychology’s knowledge base. The consideration of cultural influences on mental illness also leads to improvements in treatments for persons from cultural groups that have been underserved by formal mental health clinics or hospitals. Culturally relevant treatment approaches are meant to respond to the needs or preferences of individuals whose experiences or worldviews do not lend themselves to the Western medical model of formal mental health services. Particularly in culturally diverse cities, culturally relevant approaches to psychopathology often entail the use of community resources, such as faith-based organizations, schools, and public housing complexes to provide support and improve the quality of life of persons and their families experiencing long-term mental health issues.

Defining Culture and Its Contribution to Psychopathology Understanding the cultural component of psychopathology requires pinpointing what is meant by culture. It has been defined in many ways, but in general, culture refers to the attitudes and behaviors shared within a group of people to guide their adaptation to the environment. Culture includes the values, traditions, and norms passed from one generation to the next, usually without explicit instruction. Culture, thus, embodies how one’s group views the world, and this perspective, in turn, influences how health and illness, including mental disorders, are viewed.

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Of course, cultural influences on psychopathology do not occur in isolation. Psychopathology is influenced by an interaction of universal principles, cultural variation, and individual differences. Individual variation is not considered to be part of culture but represents a separate sphere of influence, alongside universal or global responses to one’s environment. For example, the desire for a mate or significant other might be universal. The appropriate ways to choose a mate and the desirable traits of a mate, however, are likely to be sanctioned and to vary across cultural groups. The extent to which people follow the guidance of their culture when they select their mates reflects individual differences. When applied to mental illnesses, the biological or genetic aspects are considered to be universal because little variation has been observed in physiological factors, such as abnormal brain structures or levels of neurotransmitters. Cultural influences affect how mental illnesses are perceived, the causes they are attributed to, and the ways in which people cope when experiencing a disorder. Individual differences add another layer of complexity to understanding psychopathology because the differences among people within a culture are often greater than those among people from different cultures.

Historical Context and Approaches to the Study of Cultural Psychopathology The origin of the scientific study of culture’s influence on psychopathology in the early 1900s is often attributed to the work of one of the founders of modern psychiatry, Emil Kraepelin. This early work is best described as a comparative analysis of variation in mental disorders across nations or distinct cultural groups with different languages, values, or environments. Better known as crosscultural psychopathology, this approach has been labeled as etic (coming from outside the culture); it is built on a theoretical premise of ultimately demonstrating the universality of normal and ­ abnormal behavior. This approach tends to involve complex statistical calculations in an effort to identify cultural variation and thus focuses largely on documenting differences in psychopathology across cultural groups. This cross-cultural approach has developed into a specialized discipline, with social psychologists,

community psychologists, and other health care professionals around the world making significant contributions. Juris G. Draguns, Anthony J. Marsella, and Junko Tanaka-Matsumi are some of the scholars recognized for their cross-cultural research on psychopathology. The World Health Organization is one of the major institutions with a history of designing large-scale comparative research studies to document rates of mental disorders around the world. Not all scientists, however, favor this comparative approach to the study of psychopathology across countries or cultural groups. Psychologists from outside of the United States are credited with early contributions to a movement that rejects the notion of one universal psychology (usually the one prescribed by Western culture scholars). These scientists dismiss the validity of superficial grouplevel comparisons to determine universal behaviors, especially when studies are conducted from an outsider perspective. Instead, they encourage in-depth study of the influence of culture on psychopathology only within one’s cultural group. The term emic is used to reflect the insider perspective. Referred to as indigenous psychology or psychologies, this approach often involves qualitative, ethnographic methods to illustrate intricate patterns of culture. The theories and methods of indigenous psychologists are embedded in the context of the culture studied. Yet the ultimate goal is to transfer the cultural-specific findings into theories for use within mainstream psychology. Some of the most prominent psychologists associated with this movement are Rogelio DíazGuerrero (Mexico), Virgilio Enriquez (Philippines), Uichol Kim (South Korea), Durganand Sinha (India), and Kuo-Shu Yang (Taiwan). Within the United States, notable psychologists have examined the experiences of American Indians (e.g., Joseph Trimble) and Native Hawaiians (e.g., William C. Rezentes). Cultural psychology, the third major approach, has been described as an interdisciplinary study of culture and behavior (including abnormal behavior) with close ties to sociology and anthropology. Although also rejecting the universalism of crosscultural psychology, cultural psychology differs from indigenous psychologies in that psychologists are not necessarily affiliated with the cultural groups they study, and the focus is primarily on

Culture and Psychopathology

studying developing nations, especially village or rural populations within “non-Western” nations. Once described as solely addressing pressing problems in Third World nations, cultural psychologists often spend considerable time within cultures or countries that have not been widely studied. Research topics with relevance to psychopathology include studies of inequality, interpersonal and financial exploitation, delinquency, disenfranchisement, racism, ethnic conflict, and suicide. George Alphonse De Vos is recognized as a pioneer in cultural psychology. Jerome Bruner, Michael Cole, Patricia Greenfield, and Marsella have also been recognized as influential scholars therein. Various other specialty approaches with relevance for understanding cultural psychopathology have also emerged. A global or international psychology movement has emerged in the United States with a focus on internationalizing the training of psychologists. In regard to psychopathology, curricula are being developed to (a) teach the importance of considering how mental disorders are conceptualized in other countries and (b), more important, how treatments are used in other parts of the world. Intercultural psychologists take an applied approach to developing solutions to problems attributed to culture. For instance, these applied scholars might design and test a workshop to help new immigrants adjust to a different culture or to help business executives with stress related to extended time working abroad. Whereas these applications rarely recognize their relevance to major mental disorders, the search for solutions to problems occurring when people from distinct cultures come into contact holds great potential for more explicit application to the study of psychopathology. All these approaches have developed sophisticated data analysis techniques, specialized journals, outlets for their work, and organizations to connect their members and further build shared communities. Today, it is possible to find professional journals focused on comparative cross-cultural studies (e.g., Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology), journals specializing in international views of culture and mental illness (e.g., Transcultural Psychiatry), and those with articles addressing cultures within the United States (e.g., Cultural Diversity and

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Ethnic Minority Psychology) or specific ethnic or racial groups (e.g., Journal of Asian American Psychology and Journal of Latino Psychology). The International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology and the International Union of Psychological Science link members from more than 65 countries who share an interest in the intersection of culture and psychology.

Challenges to the Study of Culture and Psychopathology If culture is so important to understanding psychopathology, why are these issues not automatically considered when studying mental disorders? Some of the greatest challenges include the following: A. Emotional reactions: Accepting that certain unusual or even objectionable beliefs are normative within another culture might cause discomfort to scholars. For instance, researchers visiting a remote island nation observed a man speaking to the trees and grass. Later, they learned that communication with all living things was a common practice in that society and was not considered abnormal. Still, the researchers were uncomfortable accepting this as normal and instead wondered if the entire village might be exhibiting a shared psychosis. B. Skepticism and limited proof: There has not been enough research to determine the precise influence of culture on the various forms of psychopathology, and some of the existing research has flaws. Reporting outcomes of multicultural studies where the definitions of disorder provided by the DSM are applied to people in countries outside North America is potentially problematic. For instance, although Vietnamese older adults typically do not report depressive emotions, such as feeling sad when expressing distress, in a crosscultural study, they could be contrasted to participants from Australia, based on the presumption that, universally, depression is characterized by depressed mood or sad affect. C. Limited measures and other assessment tools: Limited resources are available to scholars wanting to consider culture in their work. Many psychological measures or assessments are intended only for English (and sometimes Spanish) speakers.

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Few measures have been tested for use in Asian languages, so researchers studying psychopathology rates of Chinese and Thai young mothers might be required to pay translators to adapt measures and might then need to conduct additional tests to demonstrate the measures’ acceptability for use. These additional steps might not be funded and could distract from the intended objectives of the research. D. Expense: It is expensive to travel abroad or to hire staff members to collect data across different countries. E. Varied definitions of culture: It is challenging to isolate the influence of culture because the parameters of culture vary widely. When proxy variables, such as ethnicity, represent culture, there are many related variables to consider. For example, a researcher’s data suggest that Mexican American clients have visited the mental health clinic fewer times than the European-American clients visited. To attribute this finding to a cultural difference in health seeking, the researcher must first consider whether language skills, income, access to transportation, time off work, or other factors differ across the groups. Then, the weight of these potential factors in accounting for the cultural differences must be carefully considered. This untangling of culture from multiple, other determinants of behavior is difficult and, at times, impossible.

Methods Used to Study Cultural Influences on Psychopathology Despite many challenges, there are effective procedures that can be used to advance knowledge of the role of culture on psychopathology. Several common approaches are described here. Informal international collaboration among scientists is one approach to expanding the knowledge of psychopathology. For example, suppose three researchers collect data from each of their clinics to address their respective research questions. Often, they will assist with interpreting the data from their own locations. A researcher in Hawaii could ask clinical patients in Honolulu first to complete her survey on depressed mood. Then, she could ask the same patients to complete her German colleague’s

survey on phobias. Finally, she would administer another survey on anxious behaviors developed by a professor in Japan. The affiliated researchers in Germany and Japan could likewise collect responses to the same three surveys. Each researcher would then be able to compare mood disorder experiences across three cultures with theoretically different attitudes toward mental illness. Formal collaborations are less common than the approach just illustrated, yet they can be substantive when undertaken. These large-scale projects can involve comparisons across many cultures and are often funded by major international organizations or foundations. The World Health Organization supported research on the mental health experiences of persons with schizophrenia residing in 10 countries, including developed and developing nations. Local teams conducted the study, and the data were pooled for analyses by a group of scholars specializing in schizophrenia. These large-scale studies are not without flaws, but they provide opportunities to analyze unexpected findings that are not consistent with existing theories. For example, better outcomes were found for some individuals with schizophrenia who lived in developing nations than for others living in developed nations. This finding encouraged scholars to rethink theories of patient outcomes by challenging the assumption that greater access to medications and formal treatment results in improved quality of life. Unfortunately, studies like these are usually unable to offer definitive insight as to why differences might have occurred. This limitation challenges researchers to consider follow-up studies that explore and test other, hypothesized explanations of the findings. Social scientists also increase what is known about culture and psychopathology by studying mental illnesses among immigrants and refugees. One approach involves the study of emerging immigrant groups in locations that, in the past, were culturally homogeneous and now have substantially greater ethnic or racial diversity. In the Netherlands, for example, observed changes in rates of depressive disorders and types of symptoms among native Dutch residents and TurkishDutch and Moroccan-Dutch immigrants enabled researchers and clinicians to expand their understanding of cultural and immigration-specific influences on mental health. Another approach,

Culture and Social Relations

advanced by John Berry (Canada), is to study psychopathology as it presents among people with different acculturation strategies (i.e., assimilation, separation, integration, and marginalization).

Further Considerations Cultural influences on psychopathology have been consistently considered within mainstream psychology for the past 40 years. Today, there is increasing acceptance that psychopathology cannot be studied using a culture-free framework because mental illness represents impairment and distress that are experienced in ways outside the norms or expectations of the researcher’s culturalreference group. Understanding the context of behaviors makes it less likely that individuals are blamed for difficulty in adapting to stressful or unhealthy environments. In some cases, the community itself might be the source of the distress, such as when people are forced to live in overcrowded urban neighborhoods with high rates of unemployment and crime. As a result, for the disenfranchised residents, psychopathology might be a reasonable outcome. Ann-Marie Yamada See also Cultural Psychology; Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; Ethics of Therapy; Historical Roots of Theories of Psychopathology; Psychopathology and Stress; Psychotherapy and Individualism

Further Readings Allwood, C. M., & Berry, J. W. (2006). Origins and development of indigenous psychologies: An international analysis. International Journal of Psychology, 41(4), 243–268. http://dx.doi .org/10.1080/00207590544000013 Draguns, J. G., & Tanaka-Matsumi, J. (2003). Assessment of psychopathology across and within cultures: Issues and findings. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41(7), 755–776. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0005-7967 (02)00190-0 Lopez, S. R., & Guarnaccia, P. J. (2005). Cultural dimensions of psychopathology: The social world’s impact on mental illness. In J. E. Maddux & B. A. Winstead (Eds.), Psychopathology: Foundations for a contemporary understanding (pp. 19–37). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

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Thornicroft, G., Ruggeri, M., & Goldberg, D. (Eds.). (2013). Improving mental health care: The global challenge. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley. Yamada, A.-M., & Marsella, A. J. (2013). Culture and mental health. In F. Paniagua & A.-M. Yamada (Eds.), The handbook of multicultural mental health: Assessment and treatment of diverse populations (2nd ed., pp. 3–23). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

Culture

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Social Relations

Human beings are a social species—we depend on other people to physically survive and psychologically thrive. Therefore, forming social relationships such as kinships, friendships, and partnerships is fundamentally human. All humans are endowed with various motivations that promote sociality, but human relationships are also shaped by culture. The first section of this entry describes elements of human social relations that may be universal, including the five core social motives and four elementary models of relationships. The second section details aspects of social relationships that are different in different ­cultural contexts.

Human Social Relations Living and working in groups is evolutionarily adaptive for many species, humans included. Humans have evolved psychological qualities that enable them to function effectively in groups. In fact, one explanation for the exceptionally large neocortex region of the brains of humans and other primates (compared with other animals) is that the neocortex helps them keep track of large and complex social networks: Large brains aid a ­species’ ability to be social. Besides having the cognitive capacity to keep track of networks, humans also developed psychological motivations to ensure their social survival. A key component to human survival is fitting in and gaining acceptance from a group. Thus, humans might have evolved to be motivated to belong, understand others, engage in control, selfenhance, and trust others. According to psychologist Susan Fiske, these five core psychological motives guide the way people think, feel, and act in

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social situations to allow them to function smoothly in social groups. Belonging refers to the motivation to affiliate and develop strong relationships with others. People cannot benefit from group living if they aren’t motivated to build bonds with one another. To achieve belonging, people strive to accurately understand one another and the environment. When people see things the same way, they can communicate and work together more efficiently, as well as increase group bonding by discussing shared information. People are also motivated to control, or feel competent in dealing with their surrounding environment. Groups function better when people gain appropriate types of control, because feeling efficacious can increase cooperation and encourage the understanding motive. People who see themselves and their group in a positive light also make better group members. Therefore, enhancing the self, or the motivation to feel socially worthy either by maintaining selfesteem or focusing on self-improvement, facilitates group cohesion. The last core motive is the motivation to believe that people are benign and that the world is a benevolent place. When people trust, they can connect with others in their group without being suspicious or fearful, which is important for successful group life. Humans around the world participate in a variety of relationships. They interact with their inlaws, children, and teachers and with au pairs, shamans, clients, servants, best friends, flight attendants, and so on. However, according to Alan Fiske’s relational models theory (RMT), all the possible human relationships may fit into one of four elementary categories, discussed next. Communal sharing (CS) relationships emphasize collective responsibility; in these relationships, people pool resources so they can share with each other. Members have something meaningful in common that differentiates them from nonmembers, and most important, there is social equivalence among group members. An example of a CS relationship is a family, in which members pool their resources (such as food or income) to support all members. In contrast to CS, authority ranking (AR) structures, such as the military, emphasize linear hierarchy in asymmetrical relationships. In AR structures, high-ranking members receive prestige

and respect from their inferiors, and low-ranking members receive protection and care from their superiors. Privates carry out the orders of officers, and lieutenants provide instruction and command units. Similarly to CS, equality matching (EM) structures emphasize an even balance. However, EM structures do not have a joint pool of resources like CS; rather, members see everyone’s resource pool as separate. Resources are separate, but everyone is deserving of the same amount, so people keep track of an even balance and do their best to reduce any imbalance. Western examples of EM are turn-taking friendships, such as dinner party invitations or carpooling, in which equally ranked members alternate driving or split gas money. Market pricing (MP) structures also emphasize equality, but rather than an exchange in direct terms, MP involves symbolic representations of worth, usually with money. People in MP calculate exchange ratios to ensure that the value of products in an exchange is equivalent. An example of MP happens at the market when a person pays $3 for a pound of apples: The buyer and seller have agreed that the taste, nutrition, and labor involved in the harvesting of the apple are equivalent to $3 per pound. Although nearly all relationships can be organized into these four relational models, more than one relational model can also exist within the same relationship. For example, in a football game, there is EM with the two teams, such that each team has 11 players and takes turns playing offense and defense. The two football teams also operate on AR, in that the teams might differ in their ranking in the division, and therefore receive different treatment based on their standing.

Cultural Variability in Social Relations People are taught to experience the self differently in different cultural contexts. According to Shinobu Kitayama and Hazel Rose Markus, European American and East Asian cultural contexts privilege independent and interdependent modes of self, respectively. People are encouraged by their c­ ultural contexts to relate to others in culturally specific ways. In European American cultural contexts, each person in a relationship not only carries

Culture and Social Relations

values but is also willing to express high selfesteem. “Good” relational others affirm these positive qualities by encouraging and praising each other. By exerting this type of prosocial influence, people also reinforce positive beliefs about themselves, because complimenting others makes them generous and friendly. In contrast, in East Asian cultural contexts, each person in a relationship acknowledges his or her own shortcomings and is motivated to improve upon them. Therefore “good” partners adjust to others by expressing understanding and compassion. In this manner, people from independent contexts stay connected with their relational o ­ thers through prosocial influence, and people from interdependent contexts stay connected with o ­ thers through prosocial sympathetic adjustments. Another sociocultural factor that affects relationships is residential mobility, which refers to how often people move, or the percentage of people who have moved in a neighborhood. Shigehiro Oishi found that high residential mobility is linked to independent cultural contexts, whereas low residential mobility is characteristic of interdependent cultural contexts. In societies with high residential mobility, people are more likely to emphasize their personal, rather than their collective, selves. This is because when people move around often, their group membership can change, but their personal identity does not. On the other hand, people are more likely to emphasize collective selves in societies with low residential mobility. Groups become relatively stable when people move around less, and therefore people are more likely to identify by their memberships and roles. Residential mobility also influences how people select relationships. Joanna Schug found that people who had moved a lot preferred to be friends with people who were similar in interests and personality with them for friends. High residential mobility allows people to feel that they are able to leave relationships that do not fit them and create relationships based on their personal preferences (relational mobility). Residential mobility seems to make people feel more independent in their social relationships; other cultural practices also shape how people define social relationships. People from cultural contexts with atomistic independent constructions, such as the United States, see individuals as

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separate from their friends. This is sometimes known as having high relational mobility; relationships are voluntary, and people can feel free to leave existing relationships or create new ones. In relational interdependent contexts, such as Ghana, people are inseparable from their groups. This is also known as having low relational mobility; relationships are inflexible or obligatory. Surrounding people are here to stay, even if they might be enemies. Reflecting this representation, Glenn Adams and Victoria Plaut found that Ghanaians had smaller friendship networks than Americans, judged people with too many friends as foolish, and felt suspicion, rather than pity, toward people with no friends. Ghanaians also considered practical rather than emotional support as a key feature of friendships, which also reflects their view of friendships as more duty based. Because relationships are task and duty based and relationships are stable, it makes sense to have fewer friends and choose them more carefully. Cultural contexts also seem to affect levels of “general trust,” which is the level of trust toward an unspecified other (such as a stranger) rather than a close friend or relative. Perhaps surprisingly, people from independent cultural contexts, such as the United States, report higher levels of general trust than do people from interdependent cultural contexts, such as Japan. One explanation is that interdependent or collectivistic cultural contexts have strict norms to identify, cooperate, and maintain close ties with their in-group. This creates a closed society with high levels of assurance. Assurance refers to the belief that another person will act in a benign way, not necessarily because the person has goodwill but because of strong norms in the group. In assurance systems, general trust is not necessary to function in a group—the incentive structure and norms of the group make sure that people act faithfully. However, assurance norms also mean that people interact less with out-groups, which reduces people’s need to have general trust of strangers. A different trust process plays out in independent or individualistic cultural contexts, which emphasize separateness of individuals from the group. In such independent contexts, people have opportunities to develop trust with others, irrespective of group membership. Therefore,

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according to Toshio and Midori Yamagishi, general trust “emancipates” people from secure but closed relationships and allows people to interact with out-group others (strangers). When such interactions go well (which they usually do), people develop the belief in benevolent others. Culture also shapes how people work together cooperatively. Sometimes, when people work cooperatively, they engage in social loafing. Social loafing happens when people put in less effort when they are working in a group compared with when they are working alone toward a goal, such as pulling a rope or clapping out loud. People tend to exert less effort when working in groups when they do not feel that their contributions are important and when they don’t value the outcome. When people are working in a group with close others, social loafing happens less, especially when they care about their relationship with group members. Steven Karau and Kipling Williams found that culture shapes social loafing because in some cultures, such as interdependent cultural contexts, people feel their contributions are more valuable and they value a group’s shared outcome more. Christopher Earley explored whether cultural contexts that are relatively group rather than individual focused would show less social loafing. People from interdependent cultural contexts, such as China and Israel, actually show signs of social striving, in which people have improved performance when working in a group. This effect is particularly pronounced when Chinese and Israelis worked with in-group members. In contrast, Americans performed the best when they worked alone and showed similar levels of social loafing with both in-group and out-group members. Jeong Min Lee and Beth Morling See also Cross-Cultural Methods of Research; Cultural Psychology; Culture and Cognition; Culture and Development; Culture and Personality; Individuality Versus Collectivity; Intergroup Behavior; Language, Interaction, and Culture; Social Cognition; Social Influence; Social Motives

Further Readings Adams, G., & Plaut, V. C. (2003). The cultural grounding of personal relationship: Friendship in North

American and West African worlds. Personal Relationships, 10, 333–347. Earley, P. C. (1993). East meets West meets Mideast: Further explorations of collectivistic and individualistic work groups. Academy of Management Journal, 36, 319–348. Fiske, A. P. (1992). The four elementary forms of sociality: Framework for a unified theory of social relations. Psychological Review, 99, 689–723. Fiske, A. P., & Fiske, S. T. (2007). Social relationships in our species and cultures. In S. Kitayama & D. Cohen (Eds.), Handbook of cultural psychology (pp. 283– 306). New York, NY: Guilford. Fiske, S. T. (2014). Social beings: Core motives in social psychology (3rd ed.). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Karau, S. J., & Williams, K. D. (1993). Social loafing: A meta-analytic review and theoretical integration. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 681–706. Kitayama, S., & Markus, H. R. (2000). The pursuit of happiness and the realization of sympathy: Cultural patterns of self, social relations, and well-being. In E. Diener & E. M. Suh (Eds.), Culture and subjective well-being (pp. 113–161). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Oishi, S. (2010). The psychology of residential mobility: Implications for the self, social relationships, and wellbeing. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5, 5–21. Schug, J., Masaki, Y., Horikawa, H., & Takemura, K. (2009). Similarity attraction and actually selecting similar others: How cross-societal differences in relational mobility affect interpersonal similarity in Japan and the USA. Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 12, 95–103. Yamagishi, T., & Yamagishi, M. (1994). Trust and commitment in the United States and Japan. Motivation and Emotion, 18, 129–166.

Culture

and the

Dialogical Self

The intimate relationship between self and culture becomes evident if both are thought of in terms of a multiplicity of positions among which dialogical relationships can develop. This view permits the study of the self as “culture inclusive” and of culture as “self inclusive.” Doing so avoids the pitfalls of treating the self as individualized and self-contained and culture as abstract and reified. From this perspective, the self is seen as popu­ ­lated and dynamized by a multiplicity of cultural

Culture and the Dialogical Self

positionings and counterpositionings, and culture is viewed as contested, innovated, or confirmed by living selves involved in a variety of interactions. This entry discusses the close connection of self and culture as seen through the lens of dialogical self theory.

What Is a Dialogical Self? Dialogical self theory weaves two concepts, self and dialogue, together so that the interconnection of self and culture becomes visible. Usually, the concept of self is understood as something internal, a self-reflective process that takes place within the skin of the individual person, but dialogue typically refers to something external, a process that takes place between people involved in communication. The composite concept of “dialogical self” transcends this dichotomy by bringing the external to the internal and, in reverse, introducing the internal into the external. From this point of view, cultures are not seen as surroundings of the self or as causal factors influencing the self’s content and organization but as a dynamic multiplicity of positioning, repositioning, and counterpositioning that takes place inside and outside the self at the same time. This view provides a view of self as located at the interface of different cultures in a globalizing society, as illustrated by these examples: An English technician married to a Japanese artist and visiting a Shinto shrine with their children A French art collector traveling regularly from France to Australia to become more deeply involved in the artistic creations of Aboriginals Algerian women playing football in an international competition and praying afterward in a mosque Young immigrants from all parts of the world ­looking for jobs in wealthier economies Students studying for some time in another country to prepare themselves as candidates in an increasingly international job market

All these people are located at the interface of ­different cultures and faced with a diversity of contrasting, conflicting, or mutually complementing cultural positions.

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Inspired by American pragmatist views of the self (William James and George H. Mead) and by the Russian dialogical school (Mikhail Bakhtin), the multivoiced dialogical self can be described as a dynamic multiplicity of I-positions in the “society of the mind,” extended as it is to the positions of other individuals, groups, or cultures in society at large. As part of sign-mediated social relationships, I-positions can be voiced so that dialogical relations among them develop unless they overpower each other so that monological relationships prevail. The voices interact like characters in a story or movie that are caught up in processes of question and answer, agreement and disagreement, conflict and struggle, negotiation and integration. Each has the potential to tell a story about its own experiences from its own specific point of view. As different voices involved in dialogical relationships, the I-positions exchange knowledge and experiences about themselves or others, creating a multivoiced, polyphonic, and narratively structured self.

Cultural Positioning in a Globalizing World: Living in Diaspora An insightful example of the multivoiced, dialogical nature of cultural positions is Sunil Bhatia’s study of Indian immigrants living in diaspora in the United States. He showed how people living in diaspora attempt to maintain real or imagined connections and commitments to their homeland (India) while considering themselves members of a collective community in their host country. This situation invites them to negotiate constantly between past and present, homeland and host land, and self and other. The author found that these immigrants, who were Indian professionals, such as medical doctors and technicians, felt integrated (“We are as good as they are and feel part of this community”) and discriminated against (“You don’t belong here. When do you go back?”) at the same time. As a consequence, they spoke about their identity in plural and conflicting voices involved in dialogical relationships, both within their own selves and with the selves of others. Bhatia’s study demonstrates that the acculturation experiences of immigrants living in diaspora can be understood as a constant back and

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forth between the contrasting voices of being both privileged and marginalized. Along these lines, the author argued that mainstream acculturation models in which immigrants follow a linear path of becoming assimilated or marginalized or integrated are insufficient to account for the simultaneity and hybridity of these cultural positionings. He even holds that integration is not necessarily an end goal of acculturation, that the “diasporic self” is never completed or necessarily harmonious. It is a process rather than a product per se. A similar view was offered by other scholars following an in-depth study of Kenyan immigrants in the United States.

Constructing Third Positions in the Context of Culture An example of hybridization less affected by issues of power and marginalization is the phenomenon of “third culture” in which two or more original cultural positions are combined into a new one. In the globalizing society, an increasing number of children and adults do not fully belong to any group in the world. They might be Britishers who grew up in Singapore or Americans raised in China or Japanese children learning in Europe. Common to their lives is that they are spending, or have spent, at least some part of their childhood in cultures or countries other than their own. They are called third-culture kids (TCKs) and, later, third-culture adults. Typically, TCK families belong to the higher socioeconomic levels of a society. The parents are working in international business, the military, the diplomatic corps, or religious organizations. The family lives first in one culture, then moves to one or more other cultures or even moves back and forth among them. As a result, many TCKs develop a third culture in which elements of other cultures, including their own original culture, are integrated into a new form. The phenomenon of third culture resonates with the notion of “third position” in which two or more different, contradicting, or conflicting I-positions are reconciled in such a way that a higher level of integration of the self is achieved. Inspired by this view, Jutta König investigated the patterns of cultural positions in the lives of 13 global nomads or “expatriates,” who had spent part of their lives in the contact zones of different cultures.

She invited her participants to identify different cultural positions (e.g., I as Dutch, I as German, I as American) and to simulate a dialogue between them. The dialogue had three steps: (a) The participants formulated a sentence from Culture 1; (b) they then formulated a sentence from Culture 2; and (c) they reformulated the sentence from Culture 1 under the influence of the sentence from Culture 2. The results showed, in agreement with the author’s hypothesis, that in the majority of cases, ratings of novelty increased as the result of dialogue between the different positions. This finding confirms the theoretical idea that dialogical relationships between I-positions have the potential to contribute to the innovation of the self.

Speaking With the Tongue of the Other: External Positions in the Self of Indian People The dialogical self is an extended self; that is, the positions and voices of other people are not simply outside the self but are viewed as constitutive parts of it. They are indicated as “external positions in the self.” So one’s mother is not only a reality in the outside world but also part of one’s multivoiced, dialogical process (a person might often have inner conversations with his or her mother, including when she is not physically present). Apparently, some cultures make more explicit use of such external positions than others. Three phenomena, among others, are extensively discussed by Nandita Chaudhary in her study of the interactions of mothers and children in Indian families. 1. Position shift: This linguistic strategy is used by adults when, in addressing a child, they refer to other people who are not physically present. When a mother wants a child to come in, she might say, “Father is calling you.” In this case, a significant other (father) takes the position of I, which can be considered a sign of a strong interconnection between the several positions. There is a fluent shift from the internal domain of the self (I as mother) to the external domain of the self (I as father who is invisibly present). 2. Social ventriloquism: One of the strategies to de-emphasize the individuality of the I is to talk on behalf of other persons and let them say what I want to say. In such situations, the pronoun we

Culture and the Dialogical Self

may be used instead of I. For example, if a woman does not wish to join her friends for a visit, she might say to them through (and in behalf of) her child, “Say that we have a headache and would rather stay home.” Such ventriloquism provides the person with an acceptable opportunity for saving face in an otherwise embarrassing situation by not directly addressing the other from an explicit personal point of view but from a generalized and less visible “we.” 3. Using kin terminology for referring to non­ family people: In Indian culture, visitors are usually taken into the fold of family terminology. There is an explicit application of kin terms to make people feel included and accepted in a person’s family life. For example, close friends of the mother can be addressed as Masi (mother’s sister in Hindi), with the intention of giving them a special place in a child’s life. As this example suggests, the newcomer is introduced to the child in the identity of a nonpresent family member so that the inclusion of the new person in the life of the child is facilitated. Even if these examples are viewed via Western eyes, they are not entirely unfamiliar. Like the Indians, people from Western countries may speak on behalf of implicit or invisible others. However, Chaudhary’s observations suggest that the shift from internal to external positions in the self is less inhibited when there are no sharp boundaries between self and nonself.

A Multiplicity of Positions Conceiving of culture in terms of a dynamic multiplicity of I-positions and we-positions in the extended self with the possibility of mutual

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dialogical relationships seems to be a fertile way to study cultural processes at the interface of different cultures and communities. The transcendence of the traditional Western self–society dichotomy allows one to abandon a conception in which the self is regarded as essentialized and encapsulated in itself. Moreover, it avoids the limitations of a “selfless society” that lacks the opportunity to profit from the richness and creativity that the individual human mind has to offer to the innovation of existing social practices. Hubert Hermans See also Cultural Psychology; Culture and Personality; Culture and Social Relations; Self; Semantics, Psychology of; Social Cognition; Social Construction; Social Influence; Social Motives

Further Readings Bhatia, S. (2007). American karma: Race, culture, and identity in the Indian diaspora. New York: New York University Press. Chaudhary, N. (2012). Negotiating with autonomy and relatedness: Dialogical processes in everyday lives of Indians. In H. J. M. Hermans & T. Gieser (Eds.), Handbook of dialogical self theory (pp. 169–184). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Hermans, H. J. M., & Gieser, T. (2012). Handbook of dialogical self theory. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. König, J. (2009). Moving experience: Dialogues between personal cultural positions. Culture and Psychology, 15, 97–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354067X08099617 Wamwara-Mbugua, L. W., & Cornwell, T. B. (2009). A dialogical examination of Kenyan immigrants’ acculturation in the United States. Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, 8, 32–49.

D one or more creatures analogous to humans, but unimaginably more powerful, must have designed and created life. Unfortunately, such creationist theories are scientifically worthless for two main reasons: They shift the unexplained complexity to an invisible creator, thus solving nothing, and they have no testable implications. For want of a better idea, however, even biologists were creationists before Darwin discovered the natural process that automatically generates adaptive complexity. Fossil animals and the geographical distributions of related species convinced the young Darwin that life forms had changed over millennia and that similar species shared common ancestors. This scenario of “transmutation” was not in itself a novel idea. Darwin’s originality lay in recognizing that the refinement of adaptive complexity over generations can occur without anyone intending it. He named the process “natural selection” by explicit analogy with the “artificial” selection practiced by farmers to improve their stock. The theory entails three essential premises:

Darwin, Charles Charles Robert Darwin (1809–1882) was the primary architect of the fundamental theory of the life sciences—namely, the theory of evolution by natural selection. The son of a well-to-do English doctor, Darwin entered medical school at age 16 but disliked his studies and pursued a more general university education, with a growing focus on natural history. After graduating in 1831, he was rescued from becoming a country parson when his botany professor recommended him for the post of gentleman naturalist aboard the HMS Beagle, a Royal Navy ship embarking on a 2-year survey of South America. The voyage actually lasted almost 5 years, most of which Darwin spent ashore collecting geological and biological specimens. By the time he finally returned to England, his correspondence and collections had established his scientific reputation. He was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society shortly before his 30th birthday, and 5 days later, he married his cousin Emma Wedgwood, who eventually bore him 10 children. In 1842, the couple moved from London to a rural property, Down House, where Darwin spent the rest of his life, chronically unwell but scientifically prodigious.

a. Consequential variation: Individuals differ in ways that affect their survival and reproduction. b. Heritability of variation: Parents and their offspring are more similar, on average, than unrelated pairs of individuals. c. Overproduction of young: Parents produce more young than can possibly survive to become parents in their turn, resulting in competition for the limited means of reproduction.

Darwin’s Theory of Evolution by Natural Selection Whence the adaptive complexity of organisms? Pre-Darwinian thinkers could only suppose that 229

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Combine these three propositions, each of which is clearly true, and the potential for populations to evolve as a result of the reproductive advantages of the best adapted forms follows logically. That natural selection indeed occurs in wild populations and causes them to evolve has since been abundantly demonstrated. (See any standard textbook of evolutionary biology, such as Evolutionary Analysis by Scott Freeman and Jon C. Herron.) Darwin’s notebooks show that he developed this theory many years before he made it public. He might have waited even longer, but another biologist, Alfred Russel Wallace, had essentially the same insight and sent a manuscript to Darwin that provoked a quick joint paper in 1858 and the first edition of the Origin of Species in 1859. Biologists were soon persuaded. No other viable explanation for the adaptive complexity of life has been proposed, nor is there any evident need for one. Like the atomic theory, which is still, after all, “just a theory” of the nature of matter, Darwin’s theory has attained the status of factuality.

Sexual Selection Most animal attributes seem well “designed” for staying alive and healthy, but some do not. Darwin once wrote that the sight of a peacock’s tail made him ill. His meaning was that this extravagant attribute could not plausibly enhance survival. Producing a new tail each year is energetically expensive, makes the peacock conspicuous to predators, and impedes his movements. How could it have evolved? The key insight for resolving this puzzle is that what selection maximizes isn’t longevity but, instead, the abundance of one’s progeny. Ultimately, the attributes of any creature have been “designed” by the selective process to achieve one outcome: out-reproducing same-sex rivals. Obviously, traits that keep one alive often contribute to reproductive success, but there are trade-offs. Indeed, if the sole objective were longevity, one would never reproduce at all! In 1871, Darwin elaborated on this issue with his theory of “sexual selection” in the specific context of differential mating success. He divided the topic into the evolution of attributes that function

to defeat same-sex rivals in mating competition and those that function to “charm” the opposite sex, and then showed how traits of both sorts were often costly with respect to survival. Despite arguments for carving selection conceptually in other ways, Darwin’s bipartite organization of the topic remains popular.

Darwinism and Psychology In the Origin, and to an even greater extent in his treatment of sexual selection, Darwin recognized that selection must affect not only anatomy but physiology and psychology as well. In 1872, he published his most explicitly psychological book. The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals is widely considered to have been the first substantial tome in comparative psychology. Evolutionary ideas are of growing prominence in social and developmental psychology and in the study of psychopathology. For several decades, psychologists interested in human sex differences and in the ways in which women and men interact have derived much of their theorizing from Darwin’s ideas about sexual selection. Studies of close relationships, of how parents allocate their limited resources, and of factors affecting maturation and adolescent development have also relied heavily on evolutionary thinking. More generally, if the theory of evolution by selection is sound, then it provides a sort of metatheory for psychological science: All the basic perceptual, emotional, motivational, and inferential elements of the human mind should, in principle, be intelligible as means to the end of reproduction in environments such as those in which humans evolved. This proposition is the guiding premise of evolutionary psychology. Martin Daly See also Attraction; Biological Constraints on Learning; Cognitive Evolution; Emotion, Evolution of; Emotion, Expression of; Evolutionary Psychology; Evolutionary Psychological Perspectives on Human Nature, Critical Evaluation of; Gender, Evolutionary Perspectives on; Group Selection; Hamilton, W. D.; Human Nature; Intelligence, Evolution of; Language, Evolution of; Mating Strategy Evolution and Development; Natural Selection; Sexual Selection

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders

Further Readings Buss, D. M. (Ed.). (2015). Handbook of evolutionary psychology (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Wiley. Darwin, C. R. (1859). On the origin of species by means of natural selection, or the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life. London, England: John Murray. Darwin, C. R. (1871). The descent of man and selection in relation to sex. London, England: John Murray. Darwin, C. R. (1872). The expression of the emotions in man and animals. London, England: John Murray. Desmond, A., Moore, J., & Browne, J. (2007). Charles Darwin. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Freeman, S., & Herron, J. C. (2013). Evolutionary analysis (5th ed.). San Francisco, CA: Benjamin Cummings.

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association has been for many years the primary authority in the United States and many other countries for the diagnosis and classification of mental illness. Together with the World Health Organization’s International Classification of Diseases (ICD), it is the most widely used classification system of mental disorders. Its first edition was published in 1952; the current fifth edition was published in 2013. The DSM aims to offer a standard language and standardized criteria for the classification and diagnosis of mental disorders. Many insurance companies structure their reimbursements according to the DSM, and it has not been unusual for scientific journal and research-funding agencies to require submissions and proposals to focus on DSM categories. This entry covers the history of the DSM, its assumptions and criticisms, and alternatives to the DSM.

Historical Background, Major Assumptions, and Criticism In 1950, the Public Health Service commissioned the American Psychiatric Association (APA) to

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standardize the then-existing diagnostic systems. This resulted in the first edition of the DSM (DSM-I) in 1952, which listed 108 disorders based primarily on the psychobiological views of Adolph Meyer, a famous American psychiatrist. Strongly influenced by psychodynamic thought that was popular at the time, in 1968, the APA published a second edition of the DSM (DSM-II) with 182 disorders that distinguished between neurotic and psychotic disorders based on the best clinical judgment of a committee of experts. Unable to establish acceptable levels of reliability for diagnostic criteria and concerned about the predominant psychodynamic orientation of the DSM-II, the APA sought to establish both reliability and validity in a more empirically based “multiaxial” and “theoretically neutral” descriptive taxonomy (or lexicon) of 265 symptom-based (Axis I) and personalitybased (Axis II) mental disorders in the DSM-III, published in 1980. Because of insufficient research, however, many decisions were again based on the consensual judgment of experts. Fine-tuning of this multiaxial diagnostic system led to the DSM-III-Revised (DSM-III-R) in 1987, the DSM-IV in 1994, and the DSM-IVText Revision (DSM-IV-TR) in 2000. All these editions shared the problems and limitations of the DSM-III: (a) the use of outdated concepts of psychopathology (i.e., conceptualizing mental disorders as categorically distinct from normal personality); (b) insufficient attention to issues of the validity of the diagnostic concepts; (c) the artificial distinction between psychopathology in childhood and adolescence and in adulthood (neglecting evidence for the developmental nature of many mental disorders); (d) a proliferation of the number of disorders (from 182 in the DSM-II to 265 in the DSM-IV-TR), leading to criticism that DSM increasingly considered normal behaviors as pathological; (e) the lack of any consideration of issues of etiology and the nature of therapeutic intervention; and (f) potential cultural bias. In addition, the expert judges involved in the DSM-III and subsequent editions represented a wide range of theoretical positions about the nature of psychopathology, resulting in a potpourri of categories that were often based on the assumption of an underlying biological base for many of the disorders.

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The current DSM-5 largely continues the theoretically neutral descriptive approach but with the hope that emerging psychosocial and neurobiological research will disambiguate the nature and etiology of mental disorders. However, in the DSM-5, disorders are no longer seen as categorically distinct from normality. The multiaxial system has been abandoned (further emphasizing potential links between normal personality features and psychopathology). Further, considerations concerning etiology have gained greater prominence, as is shown, for instance, by the introduction of a category of trauma- and stressorrelated disorders. But the DSM-5 has also been criticized for a lack of empirical support, continuous problems with interrater reliability of diagnoses, and concerns about the influence of the pharmaceutical industry, the lack of transparency of the DSM-5’s development, and the medicalization of mental problems—concerns that have been expressed over many years.

Alternatives to the DSM Criticisms of the DSM have led to the development of several alternatives. The National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), for instance, has launched the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) initiative to reorient research away from DSM categories to a more process-oriented, dimensional, diagnostic system that would be predictive of treatment response and based on underlying mechanisms of dysfunction across different descriptive disorders. The RDoC distinguishes five basic dimensions: systems of negative and positive valence, cognition, social processes, and arousal or modulation that cut across the polythetic categories of the DSM. Other dimensional alternatives have been developed based on theories of normal and disrupted psychological development that are rooted in studies demonstrating essential continuity between adaptive personality development and the emergence of psychopathology. These include several multivariate approaches that focus on broad temperament dimensions underlying personality development: for example, the tripartite model and the five-factor model as well as theory-driven models

of adaptive and maladaptive personality development such as so-called two-polarities models that focus on broad developmental issues of relatedness and self-definition. All these alternative approaches provide an empirically supported theory for understanding the nature of normal and disrupted personality development, with important implications for conceptualizing the interrelatedness, course, and treatment of mental disorders. Current research indicates growing integrative trends between these approaches, making it clear that the next version of the DSM is likely to be very different from the categorical, symptom-based orientation of its current version. Sidney J. Blatt and Patrick Luyten See also Addiction; Anxiety Disorders; Behavioral Perspectives on Psychopathology; Consciousness, Disorders of; Culture and Psychopathology; Dissociative Disorders; Emotional Disorders; International Classification of Diseases; Language Disorders; Medicalization of Psychopathology; Mood Disorders; Neurodevelopmental Disorders; Neuropsychology; Objectivity in Diagnosis; Pain; Perceptual Disorders; Personality Disorders; Psychopathology and Stress; Schizophrenia; Sleep Disorders; Stressors and Stress

Further Readings American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (5th ed.). Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Press. Blatt, S. J. (2008). Polarities of experience: Relatedness and self-definition in personality development, psychopathology, and the therapeutic process. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Cuthbert, B., & Insel, T. (2013, May). Toward the future of psychiatric diagnosis: The seven pillars of RDoC. BMC Medicine, 11. Available at http://www .biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/11/126 Luyten, P., & Blatt, S. J. (2011). Integrating theory-driven and empirically-derived models of personality development and psychopathology: A proposal for DSM-V. Clinical Psychology Review, 31, 52–68. Luyten, P., & Blatt, S. J. (2013). Relatedness and selfdefinition in normal and disrupted personality development: Retrospect and prospect. American Psychologist, 68(3), 172–183.

Dissociative Disorders

Dissociative Disorders Since around the turn of the 20th century, when the French neurologist Pierre Janet proposed that dissociation is caused by psychological traumas that split (or “disaggregate,” as he called it) the personality, dissociative disorders have compelled the attention of theorists, who have struggled to explain their puzzling symptoms. Janet’s legacy persists to this day in the posttraumatic model (PTM) of dissociation championed by scholars such as Bethany Brand, Constance Dalenberg, David Gleaves, Richard Kluft, Colin Ross, and David Spiegel, who conceptualize dissociation as a defensive response to highly aversive events. Advocates of the sociocognitive model (SCM or fantasy model, as it is sometimes called), including Timo Giesbrecht, Scott Lilienfeld, Steven Lynn, Harald Merckelbach, August Piper, and Nicholas Spanos, have vigorously challenged the PTM and rejected the idea that a unique psychological mechanism is necessary to account for dissociative symptoms. There are encouraging signs that an integrative perspective is emerging that melds elements of these two models into a more encompassing scheme and provides the framework for a theoretical rapprochement. This entry presents the symptoms and prevalence of dissociative disor­ ders, reviews the theories about and controversies surrounding these disorders, and discusses the association of dissociative disorders with d ­ isrupted sleep cycles.

Dissociative Disorders: Symptoms and Prevalence Dissociative experiences are so named because they reflect a marked disruption or discontinuity in the normal integration of identity, emotion, memory, perception of the self and surroundings, motor control, and behavior. In the case of the three main dissociative disorders included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.; DSM-5)—depersonalization/derealization disorder, dissociative amnesia, and dissociative identity disorder (formerly called multiple personality disorder)—dissociative experiences are disturbing

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and impair the ability to function in social, academic, or occupational realms. To qualify for a diagnosis, the symptoms of the disorder must not be caused by a medical condition or substance abuse. In depersonalization/derealization disorder, individuals experience (a) depersonalization, or feelings of detachment, unreality, or a sense of observing one’s feelings, thoughts, sensations, or actions from an outsider’s perspective; (b) derealization, or feelings of detachment or unreality with respect to one’s surroundings; or (c) both depersonalization and derealization. Dissociative amnesia is marked by the inability to recall important autobiographical information that often pertains to a stressful or traumatic event. It cannot be explained by ordinary forgetting, brain damage, seizures, or another medical condition. The most serious of the dissociative disorders is dissociative identity disorder (DID), the hallmark of which is severe identity disturbance. The disorder is diagnosed when two or more distinct personality states, along with recurrent gaps in the recall of everyday events, are present. Such individuals often assume radically different identities and names and act very differently on different occasions. DID can also be diagnosed when there are sudden discontinuities or alternations in the sense of self and recurrent symptoms of dissociative amnesia. Estimates of the prevalence of the dissociative disorders vary, with estimates of depersonalization/derealization disorder being most consistent and in the range of 1% to 3% among the general community and psychiatric patients. Prevalence rates for dissociative amnesia range from a low of 0.2% in China to a high of 7.3% in Turkey, with cultural factors probably playing a role in these divergent estimates. Estimates of the lifetime prevalence of DID are also highly variable and differ as a function of whether the sample is from the general population or college students (the range is typically 1%–2%) as opposed to a psychiatric or inpatient population (the range is 1%–14% in a chemical-dependence unit, for example). Estimates probably vary as a function of the assessment instrument used; attitudes, beliefs, and biases regarding dissociative disorders; and the base rates of diagnosis in the settings of the

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patients who were sampled. Questions have arisen concerning whether prevalence rates of DID are inflated, as many of the reports of this disorder are limited to a small number of therapists in only a few countries (e.g., the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands). These therapists are typically “dissociative identity disorder specialists,” implying that they are either (a) especially adept at detecting DID or (b) more prone than other therapists to mistakenly diagnosis it or to create its symptoms by means of suggestive therapeutic practices.

Theories and Controversies According to the PTM, dissociative disorders arise in direct response to traumatic circumstances. In cases of DID, the PTM highlights the traumainstigated compartmentalization of identity into what are often referred to as discrete identities, personalities, personality states, or “alters.” The apparent splitting or compartmentalization of the sense of self or identity gave rise to the description of the condition as “multiple personality disorder” in earlier versions of the DSM. Such fragmentation of identity supposedly occurs as a defensive maneuver to mitigate the arousal and negative emotions associated with traumatic events, such as childhood sexual or physical abuse. In cases of depersonalization/derealization, people are thought to achieve a measure of emotional distance from the harsh reality of the current environment or to defend against the emotional repercussions of a highly aversive event or reminders of the event. In this view, it is not surprising that the numbing, dampening, or turning off of emotional responses frequently accompanies ­depersonalization/ derealization. According to the PTM, ­ dissociative amnesia for traumatic events is an extreme, yet essential, defensive strategy to ease the psychological burden of stressful events. Dissociative amnesia has proven to be controversial. Some researchers, including John Kihlstrom, Elizabeth Loftus, Cameron Pope, and Richard McNally, have argued that trauma-related memories are typically not dissociated or repressed from consciousness. Rather, they are well remembered due to their emotional salience and often return as troubling, unbidden memories in conditions such as posttraumatic stress disorder.

Moreover, ordinary memory mechanisms, such as not wanting to think about anxiety-related events (e.g., motivated forgetting or memory suppression), could account for failures to report autobiographical information, particularly when the information would evoke embarrassment or shame. Finally, most studies of dissociative amnesia have not ruled out alternative explanations for amnesia, such as traumatic brain injury and seizures. The most convincing evidence for the PTM comes from studies that find positive correlations (average = 0.32 as reported by Dalenberg and colleagues) between dissociative symptoms and a history of highly aversive experiences, such as reported child abuse and neglect. Moreover, some, but not all, studies that follow people over time and use objective measures of traumatic events report positive correlations between stressful events or traumatic reactions and later dissociation. In contrast, proponents of the SCM have suggested that social and cognitive variables should be included in a comprehensive theory of dissociation and have challenged the claim of a strong and consistent link between trauma and dissociation. For example, Lynn and colleagues have suggested that (a) the correlation between trauma and dissociative symptoms is variable, ranging from 0.06 to 0.44 in nonclinical samples and from 0.14 to 0.63 in clinical samples, with 40% of the correlations falling below 0.30; (b) many studies that report an association between traumatic events and dissociation do not provide adequate evidence for corroboration of the aversive event, such as childhood abuse; (c) the onset of dissociative disorders is not invariably preceded by highly aversive events; (d) the authenticity of some reports of memories and symptoms is questionable, as highly dissociative individuals tend to exhibit a low threshold for reporting unpleasant memories and symptoms; (e) some studies supportive of a trauma–dissociation link are difficult to interpret due to methodological problems, such as the failure to prevent researchers’ access to trauma reports; (f) comorbid conditions, such as depression, anxiety, personality disorders, schizophrenia, and substance abuse, are common in dissociative disorders but are rarely considered in studies of trauma and dissociation; and (g) hallucinogenic drugs, such as ketamine and LSD, can produce dissociative

Dissociative Disorders

reactions in the absence of a history of childhood abuse or other traumatic events. The SCM focuses on DID and posits that the occurrence of traumatic events is but one possible antecedent of dissociation and need not be present for the formation of dissociative symptoms. According to the SCM, DID is a socially constructed and reinforced condition sculpted by sociocultural expectations, including media influences in the form of books, film, and television, as well as suggestive methods in psychotherapy, such as hypnosis and leading questions. These diverse sociocultural influences, separately and in combination, foster the conviction that people possess multiple, indwelling selves. Moreover, cognitive variables—including high suggestibility, fantasy proneness, cognitive failures (e.g., attentional lapses or absentmindedness), negative emotionality, and serious coexisting psychopathology— increase the probability of a DID diagnosis. Researchers and theorists, including Giesbrecht, Lilienfeld, Lynn, Merckelbach, and Spanos, rely on the following findings in support of the SCM: First, the number of patients diagnosed with DID and the number of alters or personalities per patient has increased dramatically, coinciding with media portrayals of “multiple personalities” in movies such as The Three Faces of Eve and Sybil and the television series The United States of Tara. The case of Sybil, which played a profound role in shaping the cultural narrative regarding a potent connection between abuse and dissociation, has been met with considerable skepticism regarding the genuineness of the claims of abuse and the accuracy of the diagnosis, as dramatized in the book and later the film. Second, the role of psychotherapy in creating many symptoms of DID is bolstered by findings that clear-cut signs of the condition typically emerge only after therapy is initiated. Third, laboratory research indicates that one can readily use suggestive procedures to create complex (e.g., witnessing an exorcism or riding in a hot air balloon) and often compelling false memories in approximately 25% to 30% of participants, implying that an abuse history might be inadvertently fabricated or exaggerated in more lengthy and emotionally involving psychotherapy. Fourth, some studies find support for a link between dissociation and false memories, suggestibility, and fantasy proneness.

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Fifth, studies reveal that highly dissociative individuals typically do not exhibit signs of amnesia or avoidance of threat-related information and, to the contrary, exhibit better memory for emotion-laden words when directed to forget them. Sixth, there exists scant, credible evidence for an amnesic barrier that separates purportedly distinct personalities or identities; in contrast, there is clear evidence of transfer of information across identities when objective or behavioral measures are used. Finally, role players in the laboratory can successfully mimic many of the characteristics of patients diagnosed with DID, including florid emotions and behaviors consistent with discrete “personalities” that display very different and often contradictory attributes. Proponents of the PTM have defended their perspective by asserting that (a) the evidence for links among fantasy proneness, suggestibility, false memories, and dissociation are neither compelling nor consistent; (b) the generalizability of findings derived from laboratory role-playing studies to clinical populations is questionable; (c) studies that use objective measures and follow people over time provide compelling evidence of an association of trauma with dissociation; and ­ (d) trauma accounts for variance in dissociation beyond that predicted by fantasy proneness but not vice versa.

Toward a Convergence: Sleep and Dissociation Disagreements aside, over the past decade or so, the competing perspectives have found common ground in acknowledging that psychiatric history, family dynamics, biological influences on symptoms, social support, and developmental factors each contribute to a comprehensive explanation of dissociative disorders. Moreover, a consensus now exists that DID is a disorder of self-understanding marked by the erroneous belief that one harbors multiple, indwelling identities. Whereas adherents of the PTM now acknowledge that fantasy proneness might produce inaccurate or exaggerated trauma reports, the SCM concedes that trauma might play a nonspecific causal role in dissociation by increasing negative emotions and stress, particularly with respect to the depersonalization/derealization that arises

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after highly aversive events, such as combat and natural disasters. Most proponents of both perspectives have come out strongly against the use of suggestive procedures in psychotherapy that might create, shape, or reinforce the presentation of “multiple personalities.” Dalena van Heugten-van der Kloet, Merckelbach, Giesbrecht, and Lynn argued in 2012 that stressful life events might produce disruptions in the sleep cycle that, in turn, produce intrusions of sleep phenomena (e.g., feelings of unreality) into daytime consciousness. These dreamlike intrusions engender or exacerbate dissociative experiences and symptoms. This hypothesis provides a potential bridge between the posttraumatic and sociocognitive models. More specifically, it acknowledges a role for both traumatic experiences and sleep disturbances that increase suggestibility, fantasy proneness, and cognitive failures, all of which are posited to increase vulnerability to a dissociative disorder diagnosis. Studies consistent with this hypothesis have revealed that measures of sleep disturbance are correlated with dissociation, that sleep deprivation produces increases in dissociation, and that interventions that improve sleep decrease dissociation. Accordingly, sleep disturbances might stand in a causal relation with dissociation or otherwise might influence the relation between traumatic events and dissociation. Theoretical rifts between the two major perspectives have stimulated much research and reflection regarding dissociation. Although theoretical disputes persist, it has become increasingly apparent to proponents of the competing perspectives that multifactorial theoretical models promise to yield a fuller but nuanced understanding of dissociative disorders and experiences. Steven Jay Lynn, Harald Merckelbach, Scott O. Lilienfeld, Timo Giesbrecht, and Dalena van Heugten-van der Kloet See also Consciousness, Disorders of; Consciousness and the Unconscious; Culture and Psychopathology; Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; Hypnosis; International Classification of Diseases; Perceptual Disorders; Psychopathology and Stress; Schizophrenia; Sleep Disorders; Stress and Resilience to Life Challenge; Stress Syndromes; Stressors and Stress

Further Readings Dalenberg, C. J., Brand, B. L., Gleaves, D. H., Dorahy, M. J., Loewenstein, R. J., Cardeña, E., . . . Spiegel, D. (2012). Evaluation of the evidence for the trauma and fantasy models of dissociation. Psychological Bulletin, 138(3), 550–588. Giesbrecht, T., Lynn, S. J., Lilienfeld, S., & Merckelbach, H. (2008). Cognitive processes in dissociation: An analysis of core theoretical assumptions. Psychological Bulletin, 134, 617–647. Simeon, D., & Abugel, J. (2006). Feeling unreal: Depersonalization disorder and the loss of the self. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Spiegel, D., Loewenstein, R. J., Lewis-Fernández, R., Sar, V., Simeon, D., Vermetten, E., . . . Dell, P. F. (2011). Dissociative disorders in DSM5. Depression and Anxiety, 28(12), E17–E45. Van der Kloet, D., Merckelbach, H., Giesbrecht, T., & Lynn, S. J. (2012). Fragmented sleep, fragmented mind: The role of sleep in dissociative symptoms. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 159–175.

Dreams Dreaming refers to having subjective experiences during sleep and is the most frequent, naturally occurring, universal altered state of conscious. The complexity of subjective experiences during sleep varies from static, temporally discontinuous images to full-blown, rich, temporally continuous, and organized narratives. Currently, the most widely accepted characterization of dreams is that they are simulations. In this view, dreams are internal, virtual realities created by the sleeping brain and feature the immersive presence of a virtual self in a virtual world model. Although the first scientific studies of dreams were conducted in late 1800s, dreaming remains an elusive phenomenon. The most optimal physiological state for dreaming to occur is the rapid eye movement (REM) sleep stage, but dreams also occur in non-rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep as well, and thus REM sleep is not the sole neural correlate or constituent of dreaming. In fact, there is no known objective, physiological marker for dreaming, and to gain access to other people’s dream content, researchers have to rely on retrospective dream reports. The accuracy of dream recall, however, is limited.

Dreams

People do not recall all their dreams, and the dreams they remember might be subject to memory distortions. Thus, the dream reports researchers have to work with are mere verbal descriptions of previously experienced, sometimes rich, complex, immersive experience and therefore not identical to the original experience. The question of the possible function or functions of dreaming is yet to be solved. Although several different types of theories have been proposed, what the function of dreaming might be, or whether dreaming serves any function at all, is debatable. This entry describes the currently mostinfluential theories of dreaming, ranging from theories that do not attach any function to dreaming to theories that consider dreaming to be biologically functional.

Dreaming Has No Function The random activation theories (RATs) are a cluster of views that consider dreaming to be a byproduct of neuronal activity during sleep. The neuronal activation patterns during REM sleep stimulate long-term memory networks and randomly activate different types of memories. The brain then creates or constructs dream content based on these randomly activated memories, building a more or less coherent dream narrative. The form and content of dreams is thus seen as a disorganized side effect of sleep-related brain activation, a biological epiphenomenon that serves no evolutionarily adaptive function at all. The major problem the RATs face is that although they strive to explain dreaming in terms of neurophysiological REM-sleep mechanisms, humans dream also during NREM sleep and at least some NREM dreams are as rich and complex in content as typical REM-sleep dreams. Further, the RATs do not manage to specify why or how the brain during sleep creates such a rich and coherent world simulation from randomly activated memories. The cognitive and neurocognitive theories of dreaming postulate that dreams reflect waking experiences and are comprised of thoughts, ­conceptions, concerns, emotions, preoccupations, fantasies, and behaviors that occur during ­ ­wakefulness. That is, what people dream about is also what they think about or do when they are awake. Dreams are believed to be created by the

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same underlying neural processes that are actively involved in creating waking thought, including mind wandering and daydreaming, and thus dreams form a continuum with waking experiences. This view is called the continuity hypothesis, but it does not take a stand whether the continuity between dreaming and waking serves any function. Even though it has been shown that many dream elements are continuous with waking experiences, many quite frequent waking experiences very rarely appear in dreams, such as reading, writing, or using a phone or computer. It is still unclear why certain waking experiences are incorporated in dreams, but others are not. Suggested factors include, for example, personal significance, emotional valence (intensity of experiences), or preoccupations with personal issues. However, the continuity hypothesis does not specify in any detail what counts as “continuity” and what as “discontinuity” would mean between waking-life experiences and dream simulations of them. It also does not predict in any detail how and why waking and dreaming might be causally related.

Dreaming Has a Psychological Function One of the earliest and the most influential psychological theories of dreaming was the psychoanalytical Freudian view. Sigmund Freud proposed that the manifest content of dreams (i.e., the content that is experienced) is only a reflection of the latent (or hidden) content. The true content of dreams needs to be hidden, disguised beneath the manifest, observable content because if one were to become aware of one’s subconscious wishes, which are often of a sexual or an aggressive nature, the resulting anxiety would interrupt sleep. Thus, anxietyprovoking desires need to be transformed into the “safer” manifest content of dreams. The true content can be accessed only with dream interpretation techniques. In Jungian dream theory, dream images were also seen as symbols but as symbols with meaning in and of themselves, not in disguise. Although dreams for Carl Jung were a means of communication, the language of dreams—that is, their images and symbols—makes dream messages difficult to understand. When the psychoanalytical theories were formulated, very little was known about the form and

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content of dreams. The theoretical ideas were based on unsystematically collected, small samples of dreams reported by only a few individuals, a far remove from the large, systematic samples of dream reports that are required in modern research to satisfy scientific criteria. Thus, the psychoanalytical theories are not considered scientifically valid explanations for dreams or for why people dream, although these theories have been and continue to be influential in personality psychology. In more modern psychological dream theories, dreaming is believed to enhance the individual’s coping capabilities in dealing with his or her current concerns, to help solve current waking-life problems, and to help recovery from traumatic experiences. Dream content is built from the ­negative-emotional memory traces stored in longterm, autobiographical memory. Negative memory traces mark situations that cause psychological imbalance, and these traces need to be integrated with other material in the memory networks for the individual to become psychologically adjusted to the aversive events. Dreams thus become a form of built-in, nocturnal psychotherapy that nearly everyone has access to. In this view, the function of dreams is to regulate mood and emotions and ­promote psychological well-being. Even though the psychological mood regulation and well-being theories are intuitively appealing and even though a strong correlation exists between first experiencing a significant negative life event or trauma and later dreaming about it, there is no evidence that dreaming about the trauma causally contributes to psychological recovery. The currently available empirical evidence on the mental health or emotion regulation function of dreams is correlational at best, and research findings imply that posttraumatic dreams depicting terrifying dream images do not lead to recovery or psychological healing. In fact, the data show quite the contrary. Thus, although dreams definitely reflect negative and traumatic events stored in long-term memory, dreams might not necessarily help one feel better about these events.

Dreaming Has an Evolutionary Biological Function Dreams are experienced by nearly all individuals in all cultures. Thus, the brain’s capability to produce

subjective experiences during sleep seems to be part of human biological mechanisms that are inherited. The possibility that dreaming is an evolved adaptation that enhanced the survival and reproductive success of human ancestors has become more prominent. Although there are currently several evolutionary psychological views on the function of dreaming, only the two most influential theories are described here. The threat simulation theory (TST) states that the function of dreaming in the ancestral human environment was to repeatedly produce simulations of real threatening events that had been encountered during waking hours. Because these encounters marked events critical for survival, memory traces representing the threatening experiences were permanently stored in long-term memory networks. Then, during sleep, these memory traces were selected for simulation in dreams, and the simulations were repeated night after night in various versions. In terms of evolutionarily effective adaptations, a threat simulation system that retrieved memory traces representing life-threatening experiences from long-term memory and constructed frequent threat simulations based on them could have provided human ancestors with a selective advantage in the form of practicing threat recognition and avoidance skills. During dreaming, threat-coping skills could have been rehearsed without the risks of hazardous consequences that accompany threats in waking situations. Thus, the function of threat simulation in dreams could have been the repeated, nocturnal rehearsal of the neurocognitive mechanisms essential for threat recognition and avoidance behaviors while awake. Modern humans might still possess this ancestral defense mechanism, although the threat simulation system most likely does not fulfill its original biological function in the modern environment, because it is remarkably different from the one in which the system evolved. TST has gained empirical support from studies that have shown that threatening events are frequent in dreams and resemble the types of dangerous and disturbing events people have encountered in their waking lives. Exposure to real threat cues, such as accidents or violence, increases the frequency and severity of threat simulations in

Drive and Motivation in the Brain

dreams. The main weakness of TST is that there is no direct evidence that rehearsal of threatening events in dreams leads to enhanced performance in comparable situations during wakefulness. Another currently popular, evolutionary psychological explanation of dreaming is that it simulates human social interactions and is a means for rehearsing social perception and social skills. Social interactions in dreams, known to be universal and frequent features of human dream content, can thus be seen as simulations of human social reality, containing social skills, bonds, interactions, and networks that figure prominently in waking life. In the ancestral environment, social factors exerted strong selection pressures on human cognitive faculties, and those individuals most adept in social interactions were able to acquire more allies, higher status in the group’s hierarchy, more resources, and access to more-desirable mates. Attachment relationships also might have figured in dream simulations. Based on dream content studies, it is well known that social perceptions and interactions are frequent in dreams. However, the predictions of the social simulation hypotheses have not been directly tested in detail. For them to gain support, evidence would need to show that dreaming overrepresents and actively supplies social simulations in dreams that strengthen the skills of social perception and social bonding. Katja Valli See also Brain and Consciousness; Cognitive Neuroscience; Consciousness, Functions of; Evolutionary Psychology; Natural Selection; Sleep: Functions

Further Readings Barrett, D., & McNamara, P. (2007). The new science of dreaming. Westport, CT: Praeger. Clow, A., & McNamara, P. (Eds.). (2011). International review of neurobiology: Dreams and dreaming (Vol. 92). New York, NY: Academic Press. Hartmann, E. (1998). Dreams and nightmares: The new theory on the origin and meaning of dreams. New York, NY: Plenum Press. Hobson, J. A., Pace-Schott, E. F., & Stickgold, R. (2000). Dreaming and the brain: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of conscious states. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23(6), 793–842.

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Revonsuo, A. (2006). Inner presence: Consciousness as a biological phenomenon. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Valli, K., & Revonsuo, A. (2009). Sleep: Dreaming data and theories. In William P. Banks (Ed.), Encyclopedia of consciousness (Vol. 2, pp. 341–355). Oxford, England: Elsevier. Windt, J. M. (2015). Dreaming: A conceptual framework for philosophy of mind and empirical research. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Drive

and

Motivation

in the

Brain

There is a long history in psychology and neuroscience of considering concepts of motivation and drive in order to understand behavior and, in particular, to help better understand the variability of behavior as well as the short-term stability of goal-directed and threat-avoidant behaviors. This entry reviews a number of early behaviorist theories of drive and motivation and discusses their relative merits before turning to contemporary theories of motivation and reward. It discusses how current experimental data suggest a key role of motivation in the wanting, liking, and learning processes underlying the pleasure cycle. It also sketches the underlying brain circuitry supporting these processes over time. The main goals of research on drive and motivation have been to answer important questions of (a) why individuals react to affectively important stimuli, (b) why individuals seek specific stimuli at particular times, and (c) why individuals choose to do different things at different times when faced with identical and constant stimuli. Initially, progress was slow in addressing these complex ­ questions, but over the last two decades, affective neuroscience has made substantial inroads for understanding how motivation is driven by interactions over time between specific networks in the brain. In particular, it has become clear how motivation plays a role in the pleasure cycles that help allocate the necessary brain resources for behaviors promoting survival (see Figure 1). In addition, there is a much better understanding of the functional neuroanatomy of underlying wanting, liking, and learning processes that have been linked to dissociable networks of specific subcortical and cortical regions of the brain.

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Figure 1 The pleasure cycle. The cyclical processing of rewards has classically been proposed to be associated with appetitive, consummatory, and satiety phases. Research has demonstrated that this processing is supported by multiple brain networks and processes, which crucially involve liking (the core reactions to hedonic impact), wanting (motivational processing of incentive salience), and learning (typically, Pavlovian or instrumental associations and cognitive representations). These components wax and wane during the pleasure cycle and can co-occur at any time. Importantly, however, wanting processing tends to dominate the appetitive phase, but liking processing dominates the consummatory phase. In contrast, learning can happen throughout the cycle.

Early Theories of Homeostatic Drive In the 1920s, drawing heavily on the earlier work of Claude Bernard and other physiologists, Walter Cannon developed the idea of homeostasis as the ability to maintain a stable internal state. Subsequent research came to regard homeostasis as a specific type of regulatory system that uses a setpoint, or built-in goal value, to maintain a stable physiological state. Constant comparisons between the current setpoint and the desired physiological state drive a mismatch regulator, triggering a homeostatic mechanism for the correction of the current state. The temperature thermostat found in many homes is often used as a simple analogy of this principle, yet presumably, homeostasis in the human body must have many more error detectors. Thus, homeostasis for, say, hunger would entail error detectors embedded in neural, hormonal, and physiological systems with setpoints for body weight, blood glucose, nutrient storage, neural metabolism, and other physiological variables relevant for hunger and satiety, for example. Such ideas have dominated the behavioral neuroscience of hunger, thirst, salt appetite, and other ingestive behaviors. Following this view, a better understanding of motivation and problems with motivation becomes a question of a more-detailed

understanding of homeostatic-deficit triggers and their receptors. Much interesting research has arisen from this view, yet it has also become clear that homeostatic drive alone cannot account for many known problems, such as the current ­pandemic of obesity. Instead, it has become clear that what might appear to be a homeostatic balancing of physiological systems can be achieved without homeostatic setpoint mechanisms—for example, through the use of anticipatory mechanisms (i.e., drinking and eating in anticipation of hunger and thirst) or through “settling points” (i.e., a stable balance between opposing forces). Consider the example of obesity, which is difficult to explain as a purely homeostatic drive. The homeostatic theory would hold that the regulation of eating behavior requires a body weight setpoint from which hunger would be triggered. Yet such a setpoint has not been found. Instead, it would appear that body weight settles around a moderately stable point according to many factors, including internal appetite and satiety mechanisms as well as the availability and palatability of foods. In other words, the pleasure of food can lead to overeating in the absence of a homeostatic deficit. Interestingly, Cannon never actually wrote about homeostasis in terms of setpoints, setpoint

Drive and Motivation in the Brain

comparisons, or error detection. These concepts instead came from cybernetic theories in engineering and computer science. Cannon thought about homeostasis exclusively in terms of opposing reflexes. For example, a more-intense stimulus triggered an internal reflex that reduced the stimulus and restored homeostasis; that is, essentially, there was a settling point rather than a setpoint. Another way to think about drive and motivation came with the rise of behaviorism. Behaviorists were obsessed with describing behavior only in terms of observable stimuli and responses. However, this view quickly gives rise to ever more complex relationships when adding mappings between additional stimuli and responses. One way to simplify these relationships is to introduce drive as an intervening variable—for example, by adding thirst as an intervening variable. This becomes a common route through which stimuli and responses can be mapped. It is meant to be a purely objective relationship, yet it is also clear from the data that thirst can have very different effects on responses.

Flexible Goals and Affective Displays Rather than continuing with the fairly sterile behaviorist concept of drive and motivation as intervening variables, researchers began to explore the idea of internal motivational processes. In the 1960s and early 1970s, Philip Teitelbaum suggested that motivation effects flexible instrumental behavior. This view built on the insights from the beginning of the 20th century, when ethologists and physiologists such as Wallace Craig, Charles Sherrington, and others proposed that all motivated behavior can be divided into two sequential phases: an appetitive phase and a consummatory phase. The appetitive phase of motivated behavior contains the flexible-approach behavior that an individual emits before the motivational goal is found. Similarly, the consummatory phase follows, consisting of stereotyped and species-specific patterns, whether for ingestive behaviors or sex and aggression. Teitelbaum drew attention to the appetitive phase as essential for motivation in order to drive instrumental, associative learning by which new operant responses are shaped.

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More generally, Alan Epstein proposed that three additional criteria are needed to distinguish motivated behavior: (a) flexible goal directedness, (b) goal expectation, and (c) affect. The first criterion builds on Teitelbaum’s operant-learning idea by emphasizing the need to rule out simple forms of learning and simple drive activation of behavior. Although instrumental learning is interesting, it is still much less complex than cognitive inferences, for example. Similarly, various forms of expectation, from classical conditioning of an anticipatory conditioned response to declarative, cognitive forms of goal expectation, are central to motivation. Finally, Epstein proposed that real motivation is always accompanied by affective reactions to the goal itself. That is, motivation is always directed toward hedonically laden goals, and the presence of hedonic reactions confirms that a given behavior is motivated. Building on these insights, psychologist Richard Solomon proposed opponent process theory as a useful general concept for thinking about how many processes with different valences can interact. All hedonic stimuli elicit not only their own hedonic reactions but also an opponent process of opposite hedonic value, which helps maintain homeostasis. Yet there are limits to the explanatory power of this theory in that the opposite processes do not occur for every affective event and are not always the chief motivational factor. Another very popular concept in the history of motivational drives is the idea that drive reduction is the main mechanism of reward. According to this concept—which, in its day, was seen to be so powerful as to be self-evident—food is a reward because it reduces the hunger drive, and water is a reward because it reduces the thirst drive. Yet overwhelming evidence has clearly shown that this concept is false. Even for food and hunger, reducing physiological drive via intravenous feeding is not particularly effective at stopping eating. Similarly, evidence from brain stimulation reward showed that stimulation of brain sites associated with eating behavior almost always coincided with sites where stimulation was rewarding rather than with a reduction of reward as posited by the drive reduction theory.

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Incentive Motivation Concepts These findings instead led to a revival of the old idea from ancient Greek philosophers, such as Aristotle, that hedonic reward or pleasure is at the heart of what motivates people. Early pioneers such as Carl Pfaffmann argued that neural encoding of rewards, such as sweet taste and sex, must be rewarding and motivating in and of itself, without the need for drive reduction. Similarly, later researchers such as Eliot Stellar asserted the need for behavioral neuroscience to study affective reactions. The failure of various theories of homeostatic drive, intervening variables, and drive reduction to explain real motivation, coupled with the realization of the centrality of pleasure for understanding motivation, led to the development of incentive motivation concepts during the 1970s and 1980s. First, Robert Bolles argued that individuals are motivated by incentive expectancies rather than by drives or drive reduction. Such incentive expectancies are learned expectations of hedonic reward. Dalbir Bindra furthered this concept by rejecting expectation per se as the important factor for incentive motivation for rewards. Instead, Bindra proposed that a conditioned stimulus for a reward evokes the same incentive motivational state caused by the reward; that is, it becomes a reward in and of itself. Frederick Toates then added to this concept by suggesting that physiological depletion states can enhance incentive motivation for appropriate incentives and cues. According to the theories of incentive motivation, individuals will select the available reward with the highest incentive value. These concepts fit well with the alliesthesia concept coined by Michel Cabanac showing that physiological states can modulate the perceived hedonic value of rewards—for example, how a warm bath is delicious when the bather is cold but not on a very hot day. Adapting these insights, Kent Berridge and colleagues realized in the 1990s that the incentive motivation value of reward can be further split into incentive salience (i.e., “wanting”) and the hedonic impact (i.e., “liking”), each with partly dissociable brain networks and neurotransmitters. Incentive salience makes a hedonic reward more attractive, attention grabbing, and ultimately available for Bindra-Toates goal-directed strategies.

This is different from the hedonic impact, which triggers the brain reaction to pleasure. Normally, liking and wanting imply the same incentive value, but there are situations where they are different. It is possible, for example, to have wanting without liking as was the case for brain stimulation, where stimulation of the lateral hypothalamus in rats triggered motivated eating behaviors without the associated hedonic face expressions (such as licking) associated with eating in rats. One important further insight from this body of research is the incentive sensitization theory of addiction, which combines neural sensitization of  dopamine-related brain systems with incentive salience to propose that sensitized wanting might explain compulsive long-lasting addiction and relapse. Many addictive drugs, such as cocaine, heroin, amphetamine, nicotine, and alcohol, cause neural sensitization in brain mesocorticolimbic systems, which can trigger both sensitization (through increase in dopamine release) and tolerance (through decrease in dopamine receptors). The tolerance mechanisms usually recover within days, whereas neural sensitization can last for years. This might explain why some addicts might not like drugs but still want them and why the relapse can occur in the context of drug-associated cues, such as paraphernalia or places and social settings. Thus, there is increased understanding of why motivation and the unbalancing of the associated brain networks can have devastating consequences. These insights also open up the development of potential new treatments. A growing body of evidence has started to map the underlying brain networks and transmitters involved in parsing reward in the pleasure cycle, linking wanting, liking, and learning. This affective neuroscience endeavor has mapped wanting processes to changes in dopamine, which is not related to the liking processes. Alternatively, liking processes have been linked strongly with opioids. In terms of brain regions, wanting rewards is generated by a large and distributed brain system, but liking is served by a much smaller set of discrete hedonic regions, with pleasure “hot spot” and “cold spot” regions in subcortical areas of the brain, such as the nucleus accumbens and ventral pallidum (see Figure 2). Manipulations of these regions with opioids have been shown to causally change pleasure-elicited reactions.

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Figure 2 Liking and wanting circuits in the rat brain. The figure shows a sagittal view of wanting (incentive salience, in light gray) and liking (hedonic impact) regions in the rat brain. The widespread wanting regions include the dorsal striatum, lateral hypothalamus (LH), ventral tegmental area (VTA), parabrachial nucleus (PN), amygdala (Am), nucleus accumbens (NAc), ventral pallidum (VP), insula cortex, and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). Within these regions there are hedonic hot spots in much smaller regions of NAc, VP, and PN as well as, putatively, in the insula cortex and OFC. Hot spots (medium gray) depict sites where opioid stimulation enhances liking reactions elicited by sucrose taste (with a stippled line indicating putative hot spots). Cold spots (dark gray) show sites where the same opioid stimulation oppositely suppresses liking reactions to sucrose.Other regions involved in wanting and liking have been found using human neuroimaging in the orbitofrontal, cingulate, medial prefrontal, and insular cortices. These interacting networks do not act in splendid isolation but are embedded within much larger brain networks. Researchers are beginning to understand the metastable, topological, and functional features of these networks using advances in network science and graph theory, together with advanced whole-brain computational models.

Conclusion Over the last century, much progress has been made in understanding motivation in the human brain. Fascinating new insights have tied motivation closely to the pleasure system of the brain, and it has become clear that wanting, liking, and learning processes are carefully choreographed in the healthy human brain. Through this careful, growing body of brain research, researchers have a much clearer idea about why individuals react to affectively important stimuli, as well why they seek specific stimuli at particular times and why they choose to do different things at different times when faced with identical and constant stimuli. Moreover, there is

increased understanding of how the unbalancing of these processes can lead to the diverse symptoms of anhedonia found in affective disorders. Ultimately, carefully characterizing the interactions between brain networks involved in motivation during a healthy pleasure cycle might offer new, early biomarkers for affective disorders and perhaps novel, more effective interventions in the years to come. Morten L. Kringelbach and Kent C. Berridge See also Addiction; Brain and Nervous System: Macroarchitecture; Brain and Nervous System: Microarchitecture; Homeostasis; Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Motivation; Motivation and Cognition;

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Needs; Neurotransmitters and Neuromodulators; Operant Conditioning; Perception and Motivation; Reinforcement; Research Methods in Neuroscience

Further Readings Berridge, K. C., & Kringelbach, M. L. (2013). Neuroscience of affect: Brain mechanisms of pleasure and displeasure. Current Opinions in Neurobiology, 23(3), 294–303. doi: 10.1016/j. conb.2013.01.017

Berridge, K. C., & Kringelbach, M. L. (2015). Pleasure systems in the brain. Neuron, in press. Deco, G., & Kringelbach, M. L. (2014). Great expectations: Using whole-brain computational connectomics for understanding neuropsychiatric disorders. Neuron, 84, 892–905. Kringelbach, M. L., & Berridge, K. C. (2010). Pleasures of the brain. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Schulkin, J. (2003). Rethinking homeostasis: Allostatic regulation in physiology and pathophysiology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

E Eating

and

It is crucial to remember, however, that the environment in which humans evolved is not—for most people—the environment in which they live now. Thousands of years ago, food was often scarce, and foods high in sugar, fat, and salt were rare. The situation is very different today. Therefore, although the human body may be well adapted to an environment similar to the one in which humans evolved, the human body may be ill adapted to the environment in which humans live now.

Drinking

Eating and drinking are essential to life. From birth, in order to survive, humans and other animals must consume nutrients (including water) and consume them in proper proportions. It is therefore not surprising that so much behavior revolves around eating and drinking and that there has long been a fascination among scientists, as well as others, about how and why humans and other animals eat and drink as they do. This entry discusses the evolutionary theory of eating and drinking. Researchers have studied many different aspects of eating and drinking, resulting in many complex fields of inquiry. They have developed and employed a wide variety of theories to guide their investigations and explain their findings—theories such as the glucostatic theory of hunger and the pattern theory of taste coding. However, there is one theory that can productively encompass much of eating and drinking behavior: evolutionary theory. Given that eating and drinking are essential to survival, it should not be surprising that humans and other animals would have evolved to eat and drink in ways that would promote survival. Animals (including humans) that eat and drink so as not to starve or die of thirst have more opportunity to reproduce. In this way, an individual’s anatomical and behavioral characteristics (assuming those characteristics have a genetic component) become more frequent by being passed to some or all the individual’s offspring.

Taste Preferences and Aversions Consider the specific example of the preference for sweet. This preference is present in many species in addition to humans and is present in humans from birth. Sweet foods and drinks tend to have a high concentration of sugar and, therefore, of calories. Calories provide energy for the body and are necessary for the body to function. Given that food was scarce in the environment in which humans evolved, a preference for a concentrated source of calories would have aided survival. One example of such a source is ripe fruit, which in addition to providing sugar provides many vitamins and minerals necessary for body function and growth. It was therefore advantageous for evolving humans to prefer the taste of sweet, thus ensuring that they consumed ripe fruit whenever it was available. Now, thanks to the advances of industry and technology, most people in developed countries can count on having a huge variety of cheap, readily available foods and drinks that contain sugar but very little else. 245

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As a result, people tend to consume these foods and drinks instead of others. In fact, the preference for cheap, easily available sweet soft drinks is substantially blamed for the large numbers of calories that Americans now consume in the form of sugar—an average of 760 calories per person per day. These daily, empty, sweet calories promote obesity and substitute for calories from healthier foods such as milk, which contains the important nutrients protein and calcium. In addition, excess sugar consumption can increase the incidence of medical problems such as dental decay and heart disease. In contrast, bitter foods and drinks are generally aversive, and people tend not to consume them. Similar to the preference for sweet, these aversions are present from birth, and similar to the preference for sweet, they can be explained by evolutionary theory. In nature, foods that are bitter are also often poisonous. Therefore evolving humans (and other animals) would have been more likely to survive and reproduce if they had an aversion to bitter foods. However, not all food preferences and aversions are present from birth and difficult to modify. Many food preferences and aversions are the result of experience. The most closely studied of such aversions are those that form to foods and drinks following nausea. Similar to rats and many other species, if someone eats something just once and gets sick afterward, that person can develop an aversion to the taste or smell (or both) of what was eaten that lasts for many years. The evolution of this extremely quick, long-lasting form of learning has helped protect humans—as well as rats—from many poisons over the millennia. It is also why many people have aversions to certain kinds of alcohol. It is fairly common among those who drink to excess to feel nauseous and subsequently develop a strong aversion to what they were drinking. Unfortunately, the aversion may be specific to a particular kind of drink, thus preventing this kind of aversion learning from being used as a successful treatment for alcohol abuse. Someone with an illness-induced aversion to a particular type of drink can just switch to another type. Animals, including humans, can also learn to prefer certain foods. For example, animals learn to prefer foods that are high in fat. Fat has twice as

many calories per gram as do proteins or carbohydrates, so over time, as people eat fatty foods, they come to prefer those foods. Again, a perspective based on evolutionary theory is helpful in understanding this aspect of eating and drinking behavior. A preference for high-fat foods when humans were evolving would have been very useful in times of food scarcity. A learned preference for caloriecontaining foods and drinks may also help explain the preference for alcoholic drinks: Alcohol contains calories, and this is one reason that tastes associated with alcohol become preferred over time.

Weight Gain and Loss Another example of how evolutionary theory can help explain eating and drinking behavior involves dieting and weight control. The human body evolved so as not only to take in as many calories as possible (behavior that is facilitated by the preferences for sweet and fatty foods) but to store those calories and keep them stored. If there is a famine, bodies that have stored calories are more likely to survive. However, in developed countries, if someone is food deprived, it is much more likely to be due to that person’s dieting or engaging in a religious fast than to famine or poverty. Unfortunately, the bodies of humans and other animals do not discriminate among the different sources of deprivation. The response is the same whether the food deprivation was by choice or not: Metabolic rate decreases, and motivation to find and eat food increases. In addition, when deprivation ends, metabolic rate can stay low, making it very easy to gain back whatever weight was lost during the period of deprivation. There are many other examples of ways in which humans’ and others animals’ bodies have evolved in order to retain as many calories from the environment as possible. One is the cephalic phase reflexes, such as the salivation that occurs in response to cues in the environment that are associated with food. When someone sees a delicious piece of chocolate cake, that person’s mouth waters. However, this is not the only way that the body reacts to the cake. In addition to salivation, other, unobservable, reflexive chemical responses take

Eating and Drinking

place inside the body. One of these is the release of insulin by the pancreas. Insulin causes blood sugar to decrease, and this, in turn, makes the person feel hungry, increasing the probability of eating. In addition, if the person eats while the insulin level is high, she or he will be more likely to store calories as fat. In these ways, the human body tends to eat food when it is available, to store some of what is eaten as fat, and to keep that fat stored if possible. All this was quite adaptive in the environment in which humans evolved, but now it is the cause of people gaining weight easily, losing weight more slowly while on a diet, and gaining weight back quickly when the diet is over.

Food Choice and Cuisine Evolutionary theory is also useful in understanding how humans choose foods and how particular types of cuisines develop. Humans are omnivores, eating fruit, vegetables, and meat. However, this means that humans must put together a balanced diet by eating foods that provide the appropriate nutrients in the appropriate amounts. In part humans do this by means of the food preferences and aversions discussed earlier. However, these preferences and aversions explain only why people like and do not like certain foods; it also is important to explain why people end up choosing to eat or not eat those foods. Explanations of food choice must therefore also take into account factors such as the energy necessary to obtain certain types of foods. Foods that take very little energy to obtain will be more likely to be eaten than foods that take much energy to obtain. Thus, people are more likely to eat the chocolate cake in the refrigerator than the chocolate cake being given away at a bakery opening around the corner. Each cuisine consists of certain basic elements: the foods present in the surroundings (particularly pleasurable, digestible foods), the available technology (including cooking techniques), the nutrition provided by particular foods, the financial or energy cost of obtaining particular foods, cultural beliefs, and the cuisine’s characteristic flavor principles. Consider the example of Cajun cuisine. Cajuns are descendants of people who were transported

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involuntarily to Louisiana from Nova Scotia in French Canada by British soldiers in the 18th century. The area where they arrived has also been inhabited by, among others, the French, Native Americans, and Africans brought there as slaves. The Cajuns’ locale, the bayou, is near the Gulf of Mexico and is filled with swamps, lakes, and islands. Seafood is plentiful, particularly oysters, crawfish (a larger form of crayfish), and crab. Chile peppers also grow well in the area. At the time of the Cajuns’ arrival in Louisiana, okra was a popular food among the Africans, and a popular seasoning among the Native Americans was a powder made from sassafras leaves. The various groups of people in the area at that time had their own unique cooking techniques. Both the Cajuns and the French were familiar with roux, a sauce base that is made by combining melted butter and flour. The Africans used a slow-tempered cooking fire along with a heavy iron pot. The combination of all these ingredients and techniques resulted in a nowfamous Cajun dish called gumbo. This particular dish, more than any other, is identified with Cajun cooking because it represents the Cajun mixture of cultures. Gumbo is a nutritious food that can be cooked using available ingredients and known cooking techniques. Those who prepare and consume such foods may be more likely to survive and reproduce, promoting the existence of others, who prepare and consume similar foods. Thus cuisines are born and maintained within the context of human evolution. Alexandra Woods Logue See also Darwin, Charles; Evolutionary Psychology; Evolutionary Psychological Perspectives on Human Nature, Critical Evaluation of; Gustatory System; Human Nature; Natural Selection; Nature Versus Nurture; Olfactory System

Further Readings Logue, A. W. (2015). The psychology of eating and drinking (4th ed.). New York, NY: Brunner-Routledge.

Websites Appetite: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/appetite

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Ekman’s Theory of Basic Emotions

Ekman’s Theory Basic Emotions

of

Paul Ekman is best known for his influential version of basic emotions theory—a perspective that defines emotions as evolved, distinct, and functional responses to a small number of universal adaptive challenges faced by humans’ primate ancestors. For example, fear is defined as an emotional response to the threat of physical or psychological harm, and sadness is defined as a response to significant interpersonal loss. Basic emotions theory seeks primarily to account for observable—that is, objective—aspects of emotional responding, including facial expressions, physiological changes, and behaviors, rather than the subjective aspects of emotion, such as feelings and thoughts. Because of its emphasis on discrete categories and observable responses, basic emotions theory is often contrasted with “dimensional” theories of subjective emotional feeling (e.g., James Russell’s core affect theory) and with theories emphasizing a common set of dimensions used to interpret or “appraise” the environment (e.g., Klaus Scherer’s component process model). This entry discusses Ekman’s theory of emotions and its applications for research on emotions.

Ekman’s Theory Ekman’s theory reflects two major sources of influence: (a) writings by earlier theorists, including Charles Darwin, William James, and Sylvan Tomkins on the nature of emotion, and (b) his own and others’ cross-cultural data on facial expressions of emotion. Early in his career, Ekman believed that the dimensions of pleasantness and activity were sufficient to describe emotional experience and that facial expressions of emotion were entirely learned and should differ across cultures. Starting in 1966, at the advice of Tomkins and in collaboration with Wallace Friesen and Richard Sorenson, he conducted a series of studies asking whether people around the world would interpret a small number of strong emotional expressions in different or similar ways. Contrary to his own expectations, Ekman’s data showed that photographs of Americans’ expressions of happiness, fear, anger, sadness, disgust,

and surprise were recognized (i.e., the intended word was chosen by participants as the label for the photograph, or the expression was chosen as the best fit for an emotional situation) modally and at rates well above chance, not only in developed countries such as the United States, Brazil, and Japan but also in preliterate societies in New Guinea and Borneo. Dozens of studies in additional cultures also suggested that at least some emotional expressions had similar meaning around the world and thus were likely to be part of evolved human nature rather than acquired entirely through learning. Ekman’s basic emotions theory, developed alongside his program of research on facial expressions, incorporates the strong evolutionary perspective seen in Darwin’s and James’s work. Although some details of his perspective have changed over time, its core consists of a set of characteristics expected to differentiate basic emotions from each other and from other kinds of psychological states: •• Distinctive universal signals. A basic emotion should be reliably displayed in the face, posture, or voice to communicate one’s situation and intentions to others. The core features of the signal should be universal and automatic or involuntary, although cultures may elaborate on the core and signals can be voluntarily suppressed, masked, or faked (e.g., forcing a smile when receiving an unwanted gift). •• Distinctive physiology. A basic emotion should involve patterns of activity in both the brain and the autonomic nervous system that distinguish it from other emotions and psychological states and promote an appropriate behavioral response to the situation (e.g., heart rate and blood pressure rising while fleeing from a predator). •• An automatic appraisal mechanism that generates the emotion. Appraisals are interpretations of what an event in the environment means to the individual. Although the appraisals associated with basic emotions are shaped in part by evolution (e.g., an appraisal of something as physically diseased or dirty automatically evokes disgust), cultures may elaborate extensively on these foundations (e.g., sexual acts that are interpreted by a culture as “dirty” and therefore disgusting).

Ekman’s Theory of Basic Emotions

•• Universal antecedent events. Certain abstract ­categories of objects in the environment, such as “predators,” should universally evoke the same emotional response, although specific details (e.g., which animals are considered predators) may be learned. •• Distinctive developmental emergence. An emotion need not be apparent at birth in its fully differentiated form in order to be considered “basic,” but it should appear on a universal timeline that is consistent with the emotion’s proposed function and the child’s cognitive ability to make the necessary appraisals (e.g., for anger, the ability to understand that another ­person is blocking one’s goals). •• Presence in other primates. As Darwin had first proposed, emotions are adaptations to ancient problems and thus are likely to be shared with other primate species and perhaps with other mammalian species as well. •• Quick onset and brief duration (minutes or seconds, although if the eliciting situation continues, there may be multiple bursts of emotion). •• Unbidden or automatic. Individuals do not choose to have emotions; they happen. •• Distinctive thoughts, memories, and subjective feelings (the latter resulting, in part, from distinctive emotional physiology, as proposed originally by James).

Importantly, none of these characteristics are considered an absolute requirement; a state with all but one of them would not necessarily be ruled out as a basic emotion. Rather, the list is meant to generate research questions about the properties of a given emotion that differentiate it from other emotions or from nonemotion states. Whether an emotion should ultimately be considered “basic” depends on whether its properties can be accounted for coherently by an adaptive function that clearly distinguishes it from other basic emotions. Some aspects of Ekman’s approach to basic emotions are commonly misunderstood. Three misinterpretations are especially common. The first and most widespread is that Ekman posits exactly six basic emotions. Although his original facial-expression research examined six emotions, Ekman has often written that evidence may eventually be found for several more and has suggested as many as 15 likely candidates.

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Second, Ekman has never claimed that facial expressions of emotion are entirely universal—that is, occurring without influence of culture or social learning. His earliest writings on facial expressions emphasize important roles for both evolution and culture in shaping emotional expressions and their interpretation. Third, although Ekman’s basic emotions theory is sometimes interpreted as a claim that incontrovertible evidence already exists, it is intended, rather, as a framework for guiding future research.

Applications to Emotion Research Ekman’s basic emotions theory has had a powerful influence on emotion research. There is still considerable controversy over the neural mechanisms of emotion and whether these are best characterized in a basic or a dimensional perspective. However, Ekman’s emphasis on adaptive function is now widely accepted among emotion researchers, with functional analysis commonly used as a basis for emotion construct definition and hypothesis generation. The six emotions included in Ekman’s facial expression studies have been included in much subsequent work on basic or discrete emotions, although a growing number of studies now include additional emotions as well. The methods Ekman used in studying expressions of emotion and their interpretation set the standard for future research. In particular, the Facial Action Coding System (FACS), developed in collaboration with Wallace Friesen, is considered the gold standard for quantifying and describing facial expressions. Michelle N. Shiota See also Cultural Psychology; Darwin, Charles; Emotion, Detection of; Emotion, Evolution of; Emotion, Expression of; Emotion, Theories of; Emotion and Culture; Emotion and Motivation; Emotional Intelligence; Emotions, Universality of; Evolutionary Psychology; Gender and Emotion; Human Nature; Social Emotions

Further Readings Ekman, P. (1992). An argument for basic emotions. Cognition & Emotion, 6(3–4), 169–200.

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Embodied Cognition

Ekman, P. (1999). Basic emotions. In T. Dalgliesh & M. Power (Eds.), Handbook of cognition and emotion (pp. 45–60). New York, NY: John Wiley.

Embodied Cognition A cognitive process is embodied if the process either causally or constitutively depends on aspects of the body of the agent beyond the brain. Some theories of embodied cognition take cognitive processes to be functional, computational processes fully realized in the brain but causally dependent on processes taking place in the rest of the body. Other theories of embodied cognition deny that cognition is realized exclusively in the brain. Instead, cognitive processes are conceptualized as temporally extended, embodied activities to be explained using the theoretical tools of dynamical systems theory and ecological psychology. This entry describes empirical research in which these ideas have been applied to the scientific study of consciousness. The research reviewed here is representative (but by no means exhaustive) of how the concept of embodied cognition has been applied to consciousness.

Developmental Factors Findings in developmental psychology point to the importance of the sense of the body for the infant’s sense of self. Philippe Rochat has shown, for instance, how newborns of 24 hours old show a differential rooting response that distinguishes selfgenerated from other-generated stimulation. Rochat argues that newborns make this discrimination on the basis of correlations between proprioceptive, tactile, and visual information that occurs only for self-generated stimulation. This multisensory information provides the infant with a sense of its own body as a unified discrete entity, which, Rochat argues, is the basis for an implicit self-experience. Similar reasoning has been applied to the wellknown (but controversial) experiments by Andrew Meltzoff and colleagues on neonatal imitation. Imitation requires the infant to have some form of proprioceptive experience of its own unseen movements that it can use to copy the facial gesture it

sees the adult make. This process of matching observed with produced gestures requires the different senses (proprioceptive and visual) to be in communication. The facial expression the infant sees must somehow be compared with the infant’s proprioceptive sense of its own body. Meltzoff and colleagues argue that no translation process is required because the visual and the motor systems already “speak the same language”—that is, one that makes possible a primitive form of intersubjective communication between the infant and other subjects.

Body Ownership A second and related area of research is concerned with the experience of body ownership—that is, the experience each person has of his or her body as being intrinsically his or her own. Body ownership has been extensively studied using the rubber hand illusion (RHI). In this experimental paradigm, subjects see the finger of a rubber hand being stroked with a brush at the same time as they feel their own finger being stroked. When the stroking occurs in synchrony (i.e., the stroking the subject sees on the finger of the rubber hand is temporally congruent with the stroking of the subject’s hand), subjects report having a strange experience—namely, that the rubber hand feels like it is their own hand. They even report feeling the sensation of being stroked on the rubber hand and not on their own, hidden hand. The illusion doesn’t occur when stroking is asynchronous. The illusion is generated (in part) by the different weightings the multisensory integration process assigns to visual, tactile, and proprioceptive information, respectively. Variations on the RHI have been employed in combination with virtual reality to induce a full-body version of the illusion in which subjects report feeling tactile sensations in the body of an avatar projected in virtual reality.

Visual Consciousness Visual consciousness has also been argued to strongly depend on the body and not only on the brain. The core claim of the so-called sensorimotor theory of visual consciousness is that although

Embodied Grounding

brain processes are necessary for visual consciousness, they are not sufficient. Visual consciousness is a temporally extended interactive process of engaging with the world. It is in this dynamic interaction of the whole embodied individual with the environment that the elusive, qualitative properties of consciousness are to be found. Consider the redness of a rose as an example of a qualitative, conscious experience that typically is considered difficult to explain in terms of brain processes. The sensorimotor theory claims that the quality of redness comes from patterns of dependency that relate one’s activities (e.g., the movement of one’s eyes) and differences in environmental-viewing conditions to changes in ­sensory input. In some versions of the sensorimotor theory, the perceiving individual is said to have an implicit understanding or skillful mastery of the sensorimotor contingencies. In other versions of the theory, the perceiving individual is said to be conscious because it (the perceiving individual) has cognitive access to the sensorimotor dependencies that apply to its current perceptual engagement with the environment. Both views share the claim that sensorimotor laws govern the dynamic sensorimotor interaction of the perceiver with the environment and that these laws explain the qualities of experience.

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See also Animal Consciousness; Artificial Intelligence; Brain and Consciousness; Cognitive Evolution; Cognitive Neuroscience; Consciousness, Functions of; Consciousness, Origins of; Consciousness and the Unconscious; Embodied Grounding; Emotion and Scientific Reasoning; Evolutionary Psychology; Extended Mind; Human Nature; Neuroscience as One-Sided Dualism; Perception and Cognition; Research Methods in Neuroscience; Self; Social Neuroscience

Further Readings Chemero, A. (2009). Radical embodied cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Hutto, D., & Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing enactivism: Basic minds without content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Mandrigen, A., & Thompson, E. (2015). Own-body perception. In M. Matthen (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of perception (pp. 523–529). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Noë, A. (2009). Out of our heads: Why you are not your brain and other lessons from the biology of consciousness. New York, NY: Hill & Wang. Rochat, P. (2010). Others in mind: Social origins of selfconsciousness. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Stapleton, M. (2013). Steps to a “properly embodied” cognitive science. Cognitive Systems Research, 22(3), 1–11.

A Current Issue A lively theoretical issue in embodied cognition research concerns the exact role of the body in cognition, and this is equally an issue in consciousness research. In the first two examples described earlier in this entry, processes of multisensory integration that take place in the individual’s brain provide the subject with a conscious sense of being embodied. Sensorimotor theories, by contrast, explain visual consciousness as emergent from the whole individual’s active engagement with the environment. These theories have come under attack in the literature for neglecting the role of interoceptive processes in shaping conscious experience. If these new arguments are correct, consciousness may depend on the internal states of the whole body in an even deeper sense than other theories have recognized. Julian Kiverstein

Embodied Grounding Traditional theories in cognitive and behavioral psychology assume that mind and the mental states of the central nervous systems are trivially dependent on the physical states of the human body and the environment. This implies that the psychological processes of perception, conceptual thinking, language, social interaction, and affect can be largely investigated and understood without meaningful reference to the sensorimotor system of the human body. This disembodied perspective is rooted in the dualistic philosophies of Plato, St. Augustine, and Réne Descartes and has shaped most theoretical approaches to perceptual, cognitive, and social psychology over the course of the 20th century. This entry discusses the

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Embodied Grounding

relationship between the mind and the body in how information is perceived and processed. During the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century an increasing number of theorists and researchers embraced the simple insight that the central nervous system did not evolve for abstract cognition but rather for the adaptive control of environmentally situated action. That is, the human mind and the mental activity of the central nervous system evolved within a body acting within an environment and are, therefore, fundamentally dependent on and meaningfully grounded by sensorimotor and perceptual-motor processes. Although the importance of this embodied perspective for understanding and investigating the psychological and cognitive processes of human behavior and sociality has yet to be fully realized, its methodological and theoretical implications have influenced nearly all areas of psychological research.

Perception The term perception can be defined in many different ways. In general terms, though, perception refers to the process by which humans know about objects and events in the world around them. It is understood to involve the detection and unconscious mental transformation (information processing) of sensory information into meaningful representations and knowledge of the environment. What defines any theory of perception, be it visual, auditory, haptic, or otherwise, however, are the details of these detection or transformational processes and how they are able to extract meaningful representations from raw and often ambiguous sensory information. Central to the embodied perspective is the argument that perception and the sensory detection of information evolved in the service of action and are therefore contingent on action. In other words, a perceiver’s perceptual knowledge and experience—how a perceiver knows the world around her or him—is grounded in the physical-action capabilities and motor processes of the body. This assertion has led to the understanding that sensation and perception are active rather than passive processes and that rather than introducing unwanted variation into sensory inputs, motor activity can actually facilitate perception.

This occurs by resolving informational ambiguities in sensory stimulation, as well as enabling the discovery and generation of multimodal associations and information that specifies the manner in which a goal-directed behavior could or should be performed. Accordingly, many embodiment researchers no longer employ the term perception but instead use the term perception-action, taking the theoretical stance that perception and action are reciprocal and mutually defining and cannot be understood without reference to each other.

Cognition Within psychology and other cognitive sciences, cognition is traditionally assumed to involve a modular collection of separate representation- or computation-based information-processing capabilities centralized within the human brain. The implication is that the intellectual capabilities of cognition, such as judgment, reasoning, memory, conceptual understanding, and language, can be investigated independently from one another. Laced to the theoretical belief that abstract cognition is trivially dependent on the human body and the environment in which behavioral activity occurs (i.e., is disembodied), the traditional perspective of cognition also implies that any material substrate that allows for symbolic computation can provide an effective framework for studying and understanding human cognition. Such implications underlie the computer metaphor of cognition that took hold in psychology in the 1950s and 1960s during the cognitive revolution. It further motivated research efforts aimed at producing silicon-based artificial intelligence (AI) in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s and connectionist networks underlying cognition and cognitive development. What proved to be a substantial challenge to these endeavors, however, as well as to traditional theories of cognition in general is how best to account for the origin of the meaningful representational, conceptual, and linguistic structures that provide the foundation for cognition. In other words, how do the mental or symbolic constructs of cognition come to represent in a meaningful way the objects and events of the world they stand for? In concert with the topic of this entry, this inquiry is what is now commonly referred to as the symbolic grounding problem.

Embodied Grounding

The theory of embodied grounding argues that the grounding problem can be solved, at least in part, by dispelling the dualistic assumption that the processes of cognition and mind are separate from and nondependent on the physical and sensorimotor processes of the human body and the environment. Recall that the theoretical cornerstone of the embodied approach is that the physical and biophysical processes of the human body and nervous system are deeply implicated in the ability of humans to know and understand the world around them. Accordingly, the theory asserts that the constituent and symbolic properties of abstract cognition gain their meaning in ways bound to those same physical, biophysical, and sensorimotor processes. Empirical support for this claim has come from research investigating the embodiment of a wide variety of cognitive activities. This includes research demonstrating how the neural structures involved in motor control and action prediction both influence and support higher order cognitive processes such as attention, memory retrieval, and language understanding. Related research has also demonstrated how bodily sensations such as weight and warmth can have a significant impact on problem solving and decision making. There is also a significant body of research demonstrating that everyday bodily experiences, such as walking around or standing, provide the metaphorical mappings that shape the conceptual processes involved in things such as planning, evaluation, moral judgment, and comprehension. These research endeavors are primarily directed toward understanding how the abstract properties of conceptual cognition and meaning might be grounded by the actions and sensorimotor processes of the human body. Supportive findings have led some authors to propose that the cognitive system is not simply encapsulated within the brain or central nervous system but extends to the peripheral nervous system so as to include the entire human body. A more radical view of the embodied-cognition hypothesis is that the system of cognition can also include portions of the nonbodily environment. Everyday examples of how individuals employ pen and paper to solve abstract problems or to simply write notes to help them remember a list of tasks to be performed provide evidence for the

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hypothesis. Empirical research demonstrating how an individual’s concept of personal space or object ownership changes when he or she holds a stick or rod that extends his or her functional reach has also been cited as evidence that environmental tools and objects can become embodied extensions of the human cognitive system. Not surprisingly, the latter proposition is controversial, and it remains to be seen whether it will lead to a deeper understanding of how the symbolic and conceptual properties of cognition are grounded. At a minimum, however, the hypothesis has revitalized a valuable debate within the cognitive and philosophical disciplines about what “cognition,” “knowledge,” and “meaning” really are.

Social Cognition and Interaction By advocating that psychologists expand what they consider to be the system of cognition—from isolated and disembodied mind or brain processes to more holistic brain-body-environment systems—the embodiment perspective endorses the hypothesis that social cognition and interaction should also be grounded in the bodily states, movements, and other actions of individuals. A wide body of research has demonstrated the influence of sensorimotor states of the body on fundamental constructs in social cognition such as person and mind perception, attribution, prejudice, stereotyping, behavioral regulation, self-concept, and attitude formation and change. Research has examined how behavioral mimicry and movement synchrony between interacting individuals can affect perceived interpersonal differences, ­affiliation and liking, and behavioral co-regulation (i.e., the regulation of social interaction). It has further extended the embodied grounding perspective by indicating that perceptual-motor processes can also operate to ground the way in which individuals conceptualize their social world. The related field of social neuroscience, which emerged as its own field of study in the early 21st century, has also provided empirical support for perceptual-motor grounding of interpersonal affiliation and social responsiveness. Research has uncovered networks of neurons within the human brain that are active during both the perception and the production of goal-directed actions.

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The behavior of these neural structures is consistent with the discovery of mirror neurons in macaque monkeys—cells in area F5 of the premotor cortex that fire when a monkey both executes and observes a particular action—and indicates that a similar system of mirror neurons may exist within the human brain. The role that these neural systems play in shaping social cognition and behavior remains a contentious issue among embodiment theorists. Some have argued that the human mirror-neuron system might be fundamental to sociality by providing a mechanism by which individuals are able to perceive, anticipate, and understand the actions and behavioral intentions of others.

Affect and Emotion With respect to affect and emotion, the theory of embodied grounding maintains not only that an individual’s affective or emotional response to environmental or social events is shaped by the biophysiological and sensorimotor states of the body, but that the individual’s conceptual understanding of an experienced or observed affective or emotional response is represented within the brain in sensorimotor terms. This implies that the production, perception, and awareness of what an affective or emotional state is and means, whether it is one’s own or that of an observed other, cannot be fully understood without understanding the sensorimotor processes that both produce and physically articulate the feelings associated with that affective or emotional state. Further, this implication extends to all aspects of psychological behavior. Indeed, for the embodied-grounding perspective, the ability of humans to perceive, think, act, and socialize is made possible only by means of sensorimotor processes and, therefore, can be realized, grounded, and understood only with reference to these processes. Michael J. Richardson, Rachel W. Kallen, and Anthony Chemero See also Artificial Intelligence; Cognitive Evolution; Consciousness, Origins of; Embodied Cognition; Emotion and Scientific Reasoning; Epistemology and Sensation; Event Perception; Extended Mind; Gustatory System; Heightened Consciousness; Human

Nature; Kinesthetic System; Meditation and Relaxation; Olfactory System; Perception and Cognition; Self; Social Neuroscience; Vestibular System; Visual System

Further Readings Barrett, L. F., Mesquita, B., & Smith, E. (2010). The mind in context. New York, NY: Guilford. Calvo P., & Gomila, A. (2008). Handbook of cognitive science: An embodied approach. San Diego, CA: Elsevier. Semin, G. R., & Echterhoff, G. (2011). Grounding sociality: From neurons to shared cognition and culture. New York, NY: Psychology Press. Semin, G. R., & Smith, E. R. (Eds.). (2008). Embodied grounding: Social, cognitive, affective, and neuroscientific approaches. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Emotion, Detection

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The detection of emotion is the act of perceiving emotional states in other people and oneself. For example, when Kate listens to a friend’s apology, she wants to know, “Is he really genuine? Does he feel guilt or sadness or something else?” To figure out what her friend is feeling, Kate could attend to the look in his eyes, his body posture, his tone of voice, or the words he chooses. Kate could also draw on situational knowledge to help her interpret his feelings, as well as on her past experiences and cultural knowledge about emotion in general. By relying on these various cues or signals, and the context in which they occur, Kate—or anyone—is able to detect what another person is feeling with some degree of accuracy. This entry describes what emotion detection is, from both a classic and a contemporary perspective, and explains how people come to detect emotions in others and themselves. The term detection harks back to signal detection theory, which was first developed by the military for reading radar screens and later applied to psychology. In this classic framework, the information being conveyed is the signal, the person receiving the signal is the observer, and the person projecting the signal is the sender. Applied to

Emotion, Detection of

emotion detection, signals can be nonverbal (e.g., facial expressions, posture, gestures, or actions) or verbal (e.g., tone of voice or word choice). Successful emotion detection occurs when the emotion felt by the sender produces strong, clear signals and the observer successfully separates the emotion signal from nonrelated signals or noise. According to this classic interpretation of emotion detection, emotion signals are unambiguous, and most observers can successfully identify the ­sender’s emotion.

Contemporary Views Several shifts in scientists’ thinking about emotion detection have occurred over the last half-century. First, scientists today talk about emotion perception rather than emotion detection. Evidence from psychology and neuroscience suggests that much of what an individual sees, hears, and feels is actually an imperfect representation of reality filtered through the lens of prior experience, motivation, attention, and cultural knowledge. Just as tinted lenses in eyeglasses transform one’s subjective experience of colors, so, too, do previous experiences, motivation, attention, and cultural ­ knowledge transform how people perceive and experience others’ facial, vocal, and bodily changes as specific emotions. The implication is that the observer brings as much to bear on the perception of emotion as does the sender. Indeed, research demonstrates that a person’s schemas for categorizing emotions— whether derived from prior experience, linguistic categories, or cultural values—shapes what emotions he or she perceives in others. Second, scientists today recognize that emotion signals themselves are inherently “noisy.” Sometimes when a person is angry she scowls, but at other times she could smile, cry, or do nothing. Thus, an emotion does not necessarily map onto specific signals in a perfect 1:1 manner. This variability of signals means that observers need to rely more on context in interpreting emotion signals than classic detection theory assumes. For instance, a frown in one context might mean a person is sad, but in another context, that the person is pensive. For this reason, the situations in which emotions occur are as influential in signaling what someone is feeling as are changes in his face, body, or voice.

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Finally, researchers today acknowledge that emotion perception does not occur just between two people. It also occurs when individuals try to understand what emotion they feel in their own bodies. For example, Dan might realize that he is nervous when observing his sweaty hands and clenched stomach on the way to a blind date. Although the focus of this emotion perception is internal rather than external, research suggests that the same psychological mechanisms apply: An observer detects and makes meaning of somewhat ambiguous signals in light of the situational ­context and his or her emotion schemas. The process by which an observer detects his or her own bodily signals is known as interoception. Whereas some people are highly sensitive interoceptors, others are not. For instance, some people are good at detecting their own heartbeats, whereas others are unable to do this. As in emotion perception in others, individuals can rely on social knowledge and the situation to clue them in about the meaning of body states. In one context, a quickly beating heart might be experienced as fear, in others, excitement, and in still others, merely evidence of ingesting too much caffeine. Just as detecting emotion in others, emotion detection in oneself can resemble probabilistic guesswork. For example, people whose hearts beat quickly after walking over an unsteady suspension bridge are likely to find a person at the end of the bridge attractive—in this case, individuals misinterpret a racing heart as attraction toward another person rather than fear at crossing the bridge. Emotion perception is a nuanced process with sweeping implications for individual and social functioning. Without the ability to perceive emotions, people would be limited in their ability to know their feelings and to relate to others. Indeed, some mental disorders are characterized by an inability to understand one’s own or others’ emotions. On the other hand, individuals with greater ability to perceive emotions generally have better mental, physical, and social outcomes. Fortunately, research shows that emotion perception—whether in oneself or others—can be learned, providing all individuals with the ability to understand the ­emotional world within and around them. Jennifer K. MacCormack and Kristen A. Lindquist

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See also Emotion, Expression of; Emotional Intelligence; Perception and Cognition; Signal Detection Theory; Social Cognition

Further Readings Gendron, M., Mesquita, B., & Barrett, L. F. (2013). Emotion perception. In D. Reisberg (Ed.), Oxford handbook of cognitive psychology (pp. 379–389). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Lindquist, K. A., & Gendron, M. (2013). What’s in a word? Language constructs emotion perception. Emotion Review, 5, 66–71. Weisbuch, M., & Adams, R. B., Jr. (2012). The functional forecast model of emotion expression processing. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 6/7, 499–514.

Emotion, Evolution

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Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theory is widely accepted for the evolution of the human body. That is, most scientists agree that the human species is the product of a long evolutionary process of adaptation. However, in terms of the human brain, its functioning, and particularly, human emotional systems, the evolutionary theory is not always prominent. The basic assumption of this entry is that the human mental and emotional architecture and its basic functional principles— just like all other human bodily structures—are a product of evolution. The brain is one of the most complex organs. Psychology tends to regard the brain and its mental architecture as an “all-purpose remedy” consisting of general and specific mechanisms. In contrast, the evolutionary perspective considers the human mind an “adaptive toolbox” consisting of evolved, specific, functional mechanisms designed for specific evolutionary problems, including individual reproduction and survival, which were crucial for ancestral humans’ evolutionary success (e.g., finding a mate, raising offspring, avoiding illnesses, or fleeing from predators). Charles Darwin and Alfred R. Wallace described the mechanisms leading to the evolutionary process by explaining how natural and sexual

selection produce species and shape their design features. Their theory has important implications for research on emotions: (a) All evolved mechanisms must serve some function that ultimately increases the reproductive success of the organism, and (b) the design of each mechanism will be best understood in relation to the environment in which it evolved. Nevertheless, the last century’s social sciences could be characterized as having “de-biologized” human nature and thus mostly ignored Darwinian thinking. However, it gained renewed prominence in the latter 20th century, and today’s evolutionary (or Darwinian) psychology focuses on mental architecture and attempts to explain mental traits, states, and cognitive architecture as adaptations. These adaptations are functional products and processes of natural or sexual selection. Thus, a functional (technomorphic) way of thinking about biological mechanisms entered the field of psychology. Technicians primarily ask about the functional capability of objects and their structures. Similarly, Darwin wondered about changes in the shape of bird beaks in order to identify their purpose. In evolutionary thinking purpose is a prevalent research heuristic. In addition, evolutionary explanations aim at an integrative understanding of behavior, including both proximate (how?) and ultimate (why?) analyses of behavior, as well as an understanding of both phylogenetic and ontogenetic (developmental) histories in terms of mechanism.

Simple Organisms and Their Phylogeny The evolutionary perspective on emotions considered here first looks at simple organisms (e.g., worms, insects, or crabs) in terms of successful behavior that is mainly stored in their genome. Sensory detectors monitor the environment as well as the organism’s physiological needs and lead to specific behavior—specifically, to (fixed) motor patterns. Ethology refers to these mechanisms as “instincts.” Evolutionary psychology later introduced the term evolved psychological mechanisms as at least a partial equivalent. To live in social aggregates, organisms had to regulate the diverse motifs, instincts, or intentions of the different individuals that composed the group. Emotional communication allowed them to

Emotion, Evolution of

coordinate different drives and motives. Emotional coordination within groups was the basis for altruism, kin selection (aid to genetic relatives), and reciprocal altruism (mutual aid). However, various degrees of manipulative emotion—that is, emotional persuasion—were also possible. A detector system for emotionally expressive signals led to the induction of emotional states. Consequently, social organisms were able to take their own or another organism’s emotional states into account when organizing their behavior (e.g., in forms such as emotional contagion, empathy, or perspective taking). Although simple organisms express their action tendencies immediately, the expression of emotions allowed eventually for the communication of these tendencies before their associated, subsequent actions occurred. Thus, acting out (e.g., attacking) became possible but was no longer the only action in response to sensory information. This “moratorium” on action permitted socially intelligent actions and problem solving. In addition to the communicative function of emotion-induced actions, evolutionary approaches emphasize organizing functions in behavior. The individual is able to react quickly and flexibly to environmental events. Compared with instincts and drives, the evolution of emotions is a story of the plasticity of what was formerly fixed. Evolutionary thinking assumes a relationship between aspects of one’s past environment and the design of one’s mental and emotional system. This makes evolutionary thinking highly relevant and potentially fruitful for emotion researchers. Ancestral environments have left a footprint on human mental systems and their interaction. Just as sunlight shaped the structure and functions of the human eye, ancestral groups shaped the functions and processes of human emotions.

Evolutionary Theories of Emotions Charles Darwin

In The expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, Darwin sought to explain visible, facial changes in terms of the activity of certain facial muscles. According to his view, emotions are revealed not only by facial behavior but also by typical behaviors, such as tossing, turning, or

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screaming in anger, and bodily changes, such as breathing faster. Ekman’s Neurocultural Theory

Paul Ekman’s theory of emotions stands in the tradition of Darwin’s work and identifies five components involved in the production of emotions: 1. The affect program controls emotional reactions by organizing the processes of the reaction systems; it is based on genes but can also be influenced by experiences. 2. The evaluative system decides if a trigger stimulus is emotionally relevant and, if so, activates the affect program. The system is partly controllable; it is linked to memories, images, expectations, coping behaviors, and display rules. 3. A trigger stimulus can become the cause of a certain feeling; that is, the particular stimulus and the response it produces are not initially connected. 4. Display rules regulate facial expressions in different social contexts (even automatically). Emotional responses can be interrupted, reduced, enhanced, or masked by the appearance of another emotion. 5. Coping with emotions involves the cause of the feeling. Coping is highly influenced by learning and can become a sophisticated system. It includes a variety of cognitive processes and organized behaviors (e.g., fight or flight).

The activities of these components of Ekman’s theory are highly interwoven. Each emotion can be characterized by specific patterns of interactive processes in the individual reaction systems.

Emotional Expression Human ethology, as well as other Darwinian systems of thought, assumes that emotional expressions have mainly developed from rudiments of intentional behavior (akin to Darwin’s concept of serviceable habits). Certain rudiments gained a communicative function during phylogenesis.

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Darwin postulated three principles of the evolution of expressive behavior: (a) serviceable associated habits, (b) antithesis, and (c) constitutional agitation. The first refers to expressive behavior that originally served a nonemotional target stimulus and evolved from it. Such behaviors had instrumental functions (e.g., attack behavior) and evolved to include emotional signals (e.g., anger expression). The second principle is perfectly described by the body posture of a dog approaching a stranger (stiff and erect) versus approaching a familiar person (relaxed and crouching). The third principle is illustrated by a dog’s slight shaking of its body as a sign of pent-up energy. From an evolutionary perspective, a general tendency to express emotions may not seem to be adaptive. An organism communicating its emotional states runs the risk of being victimized by antisocial exploiters. This could lead to an “arms race” between emotional deception and deception detection. Therefore, the adequacy of expressed emotions should depend on (a) the relationship between sender and receiver, (b) the relevance of the communicated information to both, and (c) a cost-benefit calculation of emotional expression in a specific social situation. William McDougall’s and Robert Plutchik’s Theories

William McDougall was an English psychologist who focused on emotional behavior instead of on perception and thoughts in the control of emotion. In contrast to the radical behaviorism of John B. Watson, McDougall stressed the goal directedness of behavior and internal drives—instincts, drives, motives, and will. In his view, all animals, including humans, possess a species-specific set of innate instincts. The human instincts include combat, defense, escape, curiosity, parental care, selfpreservation, and self-abasement. Each expresses a motive and an accompanying emotion and is goal directed. The nexus between motive and the accompanying emotion is invariable, whereas triggering stimuli and behavioral responses can be learned. Thus, emotions are more flexible than instincts per se. This flexibility refers to (a) the triggering process (the primarily perceptual and cognitive subprocesses) and (b) the associated actions, which are

less fixed than those that compose instincts. In his Social Psychology, McDougall focused on how the individual is able to “moralize” emotions by modifying them into socially acceptable versions. Another influential evolutionary theory of emotional expression was introduced by Robert Plutchik. He arranged eight basic emotions (fear, anger, joy, sadness, acceptance, disgust, expectation, and surprise) in a wheel, with more similar emotions positioned closer to each other. Each emotion in the wheel exists in various degrees of intensity and is connected to an action tendency. For example, fear is connected to an escape tendency. Plutchik distinguished two kinds of emotions: (a) primary emotions that are composed of two adjacent emotions and (b) secondary emotions as a composite of moredistant emotions. If opposite emotions are combined, their effects neutralize. These theories have mainly been criticized for inconsistency regarding the number and kind of basic emotions, including differences in the terms applied to them.

Emotion, Cognition, and Rationality There is an old debate about the first step in emotional processing, specifically, whether affect occurs before cognition. Affect First

Some theorists assume that affect as an instinctual reaction precedes the cognitive processes considered necessary for an emotion. Robert B. Zajonc, for example, regards affect as the initial reaction triggered by certain stimuli. He suggests that affective reactions can occur without extensive perceptual and cognitive processes and assumes that affective decisions are faster and surer than are cognitive judgments. Cognition First

Richard S. Lazarus, among others, argued that affect follows cognition. Thus, emotions are postcognitive (this is referred to as the Zajonc-Lazarusdebate). Emotions are activated only after a certain amount of cognitive processing has been accomplished. Prior cognitive processes distinguish between a variety of contents and judgments that, in turn, lead to differential emotions.

Emotion, Evolution of

Both Are Possible

Some scholars take the perspective that affect or emotions occur both pre- and postcognition. Specifically, initial emotional responses produce thoughts that, in turn, lead to affect. Neither Nor

If the term cognitive is used to describe mental or neurophysiological processes, a strict distinction between emotion or affect and cognition may disappear, because emotions can also be described using this same language. That is, if cognition is understood as a process providing potentially effective representations of the environment, emotion may be understood as a mental process that appears to be rational but is not consciously accessible and thus ostensibly cognitive.

Further Views If contrasted with the analytical rationality and logical reasoning characteristic of decision making, one might get the impression that emotions are simplistic and inferior. Similarly, a tongue-in-cheek distinction between logical and “psycho-logical” decisions exists. The latter are often disregarded as emotional and hence irrational, providing a distorted representation of the world. In contrast, analytical cognitions depict the world in a correct manner. Alternatively, emotions may be considered archaic, fast, and frugal heuristics that provide highly efficient solutions even without taking every piece of relevant information into account. Some theorists distinguish between hot, holistic, direct (emotion-like) cognitions and analytical, cold, sequential cognitions. In an evolutionary perspective, representations of the world are true if the organism’s perceived world “almost” matches the real world. Because they have evolved, emotions are not designed to be infallible. They proved useful in solving adaptive problems involving individual reproductive success in ancestral environments. Accordingly, evolved emotional problem-solving strategies are not exclusively designed as short-term solutions but also as long-term life strategies. Even in the context of economic decision making, emotions

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facilitate and guide decision making in complex and uncertain situations. Emotions may be considered as the conductor of a cognitive orchestra. They select adaptive combinations from the tool box of mental skills and use them to solve adaptive problems. Environmental stimuli operate as signals in fitness-relevant situations. The organism responds to these signals with an orchestration of cognitive subroutines that lead to a behavioral response. An emotional adaptation meets the following criteria: (a) It is the result of an evolutionarily recurrent condition of the environment, and (b) it can be understood as responding to an adaptive problem that is signaled by relevant cues. Furthermore, the organism responds to these cues with (c) innate situation detection algorithms and (d) activated mental algorithms that assign priorities. An internal communication system then (e) organizes the coordination of mental modules in which specific algorithms control the cognitive subroutines that produce emotionspecific behavior. Frank Schwab, Astrid Carolus, and Christine Hennighausen See also Darwin, Charles; Ekman’s Theory of Basic Emotions; Emotion, Expression of; Evolutionary Psychology; Evolutionary Psychological Perspectives on Human Nature, Critical Evaluation of

Further Readings Ekman, P. (2006). Darwin and facial expression: A century of research in review. Los Altos, CA: Malor Books. (Original work published 1973) Gigerenzer, G., & Selten, R. (2001). Bounded rationality: The adaptive toolbox. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Plutchik, R. (2003). Emotions and life: Perspectives from psychology, biology, and evolution. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (2008). The evolutionary psychology of the emotions and their relationship to internal regulatory variables. In M. Lewis, J. M. Haviland-Jones, & L. Barrett (Eds.), Handbook of emotions (3rd ed., pp. 114–137). New York, NY: Guilford Press. Zajonc, R. B. (1980). Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences. American Psychologist, 35(2), 151–175.

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Emotion, Expression

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Emotion expressions have a rich history as a subject of interest to Western philosophers and scientists. In ancient Greece, philosophers regarded emotions that were felt in moderation and expressed in controlled and rational ways as consistent with a virtuous character. In the European Middle Ages, expressing emotions in the service of combating sin was valued even if done in an uncontrolled fashion (e.g., righteous anger). Contemporary psychological theories of emotion expressions began with Charles Darwin’s book, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, and current theories continue to draw on Darwin’s insights. This entry reviews psychological theories and findings relevant for understanding emotion expressions. Facial expressions of emotion are the most extensively studied feature of emotion expression, and, for this reason, the primary focus in this entry is on expressions of emotion via the face. However, research documenting emotion expressions that occur via body movements, touch, and vocalizations is also reviewed. At the end of the entry, an overview of major theoretical controversies is provided to help readers better understand the questions that have guided the study of emotion expression: To what extent are emotion expressions the same across all people? What are the roles of evolved biology and culture in shaping emotion expression? What happens first—feeling or expression?

What Is an Emotion? The first necessary question for understanding emotion expressions is, What is an emotion? Psychologists define emotions as brief, automatic reactions to self-relevant stimuli that are evaluated as promoting or obstructing an individual’s intentions and goals. Once emotion is elicited, it sets in motion a biologically based response pattern that includes perception, physiology, experience, and communication signals. For example, the sight of a loved one after a separation may evoke love. Once elicited, love focuses attention on the loved one, releases the hormone oxytocin into the bloodstream, is subjectively experienced as the feeling of

love, and is expressed to others via a combination of head movements, body moments, and Duchenne smiling, a special type of smile associated with felt positive emotion. The specific stimuli that elicit emotion are flexible and vary across individuals and societies, but the response patterns themselves are impressively consistent. Thus, people may not agree about who counts as a loved one or what situations should elicit love, but the perception, physiology, experience, and expression via face and body movements of love are likely to be consistent across individuals and societies. The second necessary question for understanding emotion expressions is, What functions do emotions serve? Drawing on Darwin’s early insights, contemporary psychologists regard emotion as facilitating processes important for physical survival, reproduction, and successful navigation of humans’ very complex social lives. In this view, emotions are evolved solutions to the opportunities and problems that humans have repeatedly encountered over their long history as a species. For example, love is a solution to humans’ need for committed caregiving, and fear is a solution for successfully avoiding threats. Emotions accomplish this work quickly and efficiently by preparing an organism to engage in particular actions and signaling to others the likelihood that a particular action will occur. Emotion expressions, specifically, are valuable signals of behavioral intentions because of their association with internal feelings. Emotion expressions are also valuable because of the responses they evoke in others. For example, one person’s happiness may make another person happy too (a complementary response) or another’s sadness may make one want to cheer that person up (an incentivized response). In these ways, emotions and their expressions help people manage life so that they approach rewards, avoid or confront threats, establish mutually beneficial alliances, and resolve conflicts.

Expressing Emotion Across theoretical orientations, most researchers agree that emotion expressions serve adaptive social functions. Nonetheless, there has been a great deal of debate about the nature of those

Emotion, Expression of

functions. Do facial displays express emotions or do they communicate motives and intentions? For example, does one smile because one is experiencing genuine happiness? Or does one’s smile reflect a social communicative tool, such as indicating approval of another’s action, greeting a passerby, or sending a flirtatious hello, regardless of whether the underlying emotion of happiness is actually felt? This important theoretical question has received much empirical attention. Researchers have sought to answer this question using a variety of methods that span from self-report to observed behavior and include experimental as well as nonexperimental study designs. One important approach has been to identify and classify facial muscle movements in order to identify those that are implicated in emotion expressions. The Facial Action Coding System (FACS), which identifies nearly any anatomically possible facial expression by deconstructing it into muscle contractions or relaxations, is one such system. FACS allows researchers to distinguish muscle movements that are reliably associated with felt emotion states. Paul Ekman, a major figure in the study of emotion expression, codeveloped FACS to test his theory that faces are platforms that reflect privately felt emotional states. In this view, a subset of emotions can be considered “basic” because the internal emotional states are hardwired to elicit distinctive facial displays found in all human societies. This approach draws on Darwinian principles that posit experienced emotion and its corresponding muscle movements to have evolved via natural selection and thus to be fairly fixed. From this perspective, cultural learning via socialization practices teaches individuals what to get emotional about and when to control expressions, but the sociocultural environment is believed to build on innate, biologically driven systems. The basic emotions that Ekman proposed are happiness, fear, disgust, sadness, anger, and surprise. For example, happiness is expressed via the Duchenne smile (named for French neurologist Guillaume Duchenne), a distinct facial muscle configuration that involves contraction of the orbicularis oculi around the eyes and the zygomaticus major muscle found near the corners of the mouth. Although other muscles can simulate a smile, only the Duchenne smile has been reliably

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associated with genuine experiences of positive emotion. Indeed, happiness expressed via the Duchenne smile is the emotion expression that best meets the universality criteria. In studies using samples from different parts of the world and a variety of methods, happiness signaled by the Duchenne smile was recognized by over 90% of people studied. Others have theorized that facial expressions primarily serve social communicative functions and are not tightly linked to internal feelings. Alan Fridlund’s behavioral ecology theory posits that faces are better thought of as tools for communicating social motives and intentions. In other words, faces are tools for sharing and transmitting information about upcoming, intended behaviors rather than surfaces from which internal emotional states are expressed. According to this perspective, smiles are not always true reflections of internal states. For example, smiles that engage only the zygomaticus major muscle are referred to as social smiles, polite smiles, or deceptive smiles. These smiles are often used to mask true emotions or to express politeness. The social smile thus serves a social purpose instead of a reflective one. This theoretical perspective predicts that angry faces can occur even when there is no subjective experience of anger. In addition, this perspective would predict that experiencing anger might not necessarily produce an angry face unless there is also a social motive and a present target to receive the transmitted signal of intended harm. A third theoretical line of thinking integrates the two functions of emotion expression discussed earlier. In this third view, emotion expressions are conceptualized as reflecting genuine feelings and also as social tools. The work of Ross Buck and others, for example, considers expressivity to be a vital signal of the cooperative tendency that indicates trustworthiness to others in the social environment. Drawing from an evolutionary perspective, this theory posits that emotion expressions are adaptive because they facilitate social communication and social coordination. That is, people coordinate their actions by “reading” others’ motivational-emotional states in a continuous and reciprocal manner. Those who are good at sending emotional information (“expressive”) and easy to “read” emotionally are favored.

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Other theories that emphasize the communicative aspect of emotion expression focus on how emotion expressions are influenced by the presence of others. For example, having others present can either facilitate or inhibit expressiveness, depending on the emotion being felt and the quality of the social relationship involved. In one study, people who viewed slides in the company of friends were more expressive when viewing amusing, tender, and sad slides than people who viewed them with strangers. In addition, studies of infants show that at 18 months, smiling is almost entirely dependent on the primary caregiver’s (mother’s) visual attention. There is also evidence that the presence of others can inhibit expressiveness in some cases, such as the finding that pain expressions are reduced when people in pain are being observed by others.

Recognizing Emotion Expressions The preceding theories all emphasize the importance of emotion expressions in communication processes. The usefulness of emotion expressions, however, depends on whether others are able to accurately recognize the expressions and infer their intended meaning. Classic cross-cultural studies conducted by Ekman and Carrol Izard in the 1970s found that photographs of faces of Americans expressing the basic emotions of happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, and disgust were recognized across a wide range of people, including people who had no previous exposure to Western societies and no written language. These studies provided strong evidence for the existence of a subset of emotions that are recognizable across all humankind, but they also supported the notion of cultural variation in emotion recognition. The rich literature that has resulted from this debate points to an interactionist perspective—that facial recognition has both universal and socially constructed elements. Across all cultures, emotions are recognized at better-thanchance levels. However, recognition accuracy is higher in members of the same national, ethnic, or regional group. This in-group advantage is partly the result of culturally specific display rules and language (e.g., the words for emotion

concepts or labels convey different meaning across cultures). Emotion recognition is a vital skill, and a wide array of evidence supports the existence of universal elements and culturally specific elements. Infants, for example, learn to be guided by the expression of adults’ faces as early as 10 months of age. In a classic experiment employing the “visual cliff,” infants were placed on a plexiglass table that had what appeared to be an apparent, sudden drop in the middle. In this ambiguous and potentially frightening situation, infants typically looked at the facial expression of their mothers and used her facial expression as the guide for proceeding. Smiles encouraged the infants to go across the table, whereas fear expressions discouraged the infants from going across the table. These findings suggest that recognizing facial expressions is an important part of socioemotional development. Researchers have also discovered the importance of facial mimicry in facilitating emotion recognition. During a social exchange, people unintentionally mirror each other’s nonverbal displays and, in so doing, interpret the emotion of the other person by sensing what is embodied on their own face. Furthermore, deficits in facial affect recognition are implicated in a number of psychological disorders, such as schizophrenia, psychopathy, depression, and autism spectrum disorder. Such deficits often contribute to difficulties in social interactions and mood regulation. Studies of sex differences in emotion recognition further highlight the dual role of universal and culturally specific contributions to emotion expression processes. Researchers have found that women demonstrate greater accuracy in interpreting nonverbal cues than men do. Two types of explanation have been offered for this difference. In early life, female brains mature at a faster rate than those of males. These neurological gains may allow women to better recognize complex patterns in facial features and to understand the intricacies of human emotions. However, socialization factors also play a large role in maintaining and amplifying these sex differences. For example, parents socialize gender stereotypes by behaving in ways that prioritize nonverbal sensitivity in daughters while emphasizing emotion suppression in sons.

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Regulating Emotion Expressions Theorists of emotion expressions recognize that human social life involves times when an individual may want to control his or her emotion expressions—to be polite, to emphasize intentions, or to hide feelings. Psychologists who study emotion regulation have long been interested in the effects of efforts to control expressions of emotion either internally or externally. One example is the study of expression suppression. Some researchers theorize that expression is such an important part of the emotional response system that if it is inhibited, other aspects of the response (i.e., subjective experience and physiological arousal) are also diminished. However, suppression leads to physiological responses (i.e., decreased heart rate, increased blinking, increased blood pressure) but no clear decrease in the subjective experience of emotion. A second example is provided by the study of whether emotion expressions can change internal states. The facial feedback hypothesis theorizes that changing facial movements, such as smiling at a party (when all one wants to do is go home to one’s cat), can actually influence one’s feelings. In one study, participants were asked to hold a pen in their mouth using either their teeth or their lips. This action resulted in facial expressions that emulated either a smile or a frown but left participants unaware of the researchers’ motives. Those in the forced smile condition reported higher levels of amusement when subsequently watching a cartoon. These results suggested that facial expressions are so closely tied to particular emotional states that felt emotion can be controlled by altering expression.

Body Language, Touch, and Vocalization Facial displays are the most commonly studied and most prominent avenue of emotion expressions, but emotions can also be communicated via other modalities. Emotion expressions often involve body movements. For example, the prototypical display of pride includes an expanded posture, with the head tilted back. These body expressions likely originated to serve a functional purpose and, over time, also came to serve as tools for social communication. For example, the expanded

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posture for pride allows the individual to appear larger and assert dominance. Over time, this display may have come to serve a secondary function of communicating prestige and social status. Similarly to body expression, touch is another way that emotions are communicated. Researchers have found that people can recognize anger, fear, love, and gratitude simply by being touched on the arm by a stranger. Last but not least, vocalizations also covey emotional information. Vocalizations that communicate basic emotions are recognized across different cultures, indicating that they are universal. The evidence thus far, however, indicates that this seems to be limited only to negative emotions; vocalizations for positive emotions seem to be more culturally specific.

Major Controversies The universality hypothesis has engendered much scientific attention and is situated in a larger debate in the study of emotion. On one side of the debate are those who believe that the evidence supports a short list of basic emotions that evolved to serve adaptive biological and social functions and are expressed using the same facial movements across all cultures. As mentioned earlier, this view was supported by early studies that found that people from very different cultures could identify basic emotions when shown photos of Americans posing facial expressions. Opponents of this view criticized the use of forced-choice procedures and posed-expression methodology in these studies. Many of these opponents contended that facial expressions are conditioned, and emotion expressions are largely socially constructed. Another major controversy involves the sequential order of emotion experiences. Darwin proposed that emotion displays are consequences of the physiological changes that he considered to be one component of the emotional experience. In contrast, the James-Lange theory of emotions, developed by William James and Carl Lange, proposed that physiological changes precede the subjective experience of emotion. Contrary to common belief, James argued that instead of first feeling an emotion and then experiencing the physiological (bodily) response, people first experience the bodily response and then interpret the experience as a specific emotion. The classic

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example is that rather than feeling embarrassed and then blushing, one experiences facial blushing, and then feels embarrassed. Current evidence supports both accounts, but researchers have yet to delineate why and when particular sequences occur. These theoretical controversies have motivated researchers to try to provide data that conclusively support one view or another. Data that conclusively support one theory and rule out others, however, have proved elusive. At this time, there is an emerging consensus that the full complexity of emotion expressions may be best understood via integrative approaches that incorporate the elements of theories that have the strongest empirical support. In this vein, emotion expressions are increasingly recognized to have universal components (e.g., Duchenne smiles for happiness) as well as components that are more socially and culturally variable (e.g., crying with happiness). They are also understood to be profoundly social processes that coordinate social interaction by reflecting internal states and informing internal states. Future research will surely build on this integration to further delineate the ways in which emotion expressions enable individuals to meet the rich array of opportunities, threats, and challenges that characterize human social life. Arpine Hovasapian and Belinda Campos See also Ekman’s Theory of Basic Emotions; Emotion, Detection of; Emotion, Theories of; Emotion and Motivation; Emotions, Universality of; Evolutionary Psychological Perspectives on Human Nature, Critical Evaluation of; Morality and Moral Emotions; Social Emotions

Further Readings Darwin, C. (1998). The expression of the emotions in man and animals (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1872) Ekman, P. (1999). Basic emotions. In T. Dalgleish & M. J. Power (Eds.), Handbook of cognition and emotion (pp. 45–60). New York, NY: John Wiley. Keltner, D., & Lerner, J. S. (2010). Emotion. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindsay (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (5th ed., pp. 312–347). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

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of

The task of emotion psychology is to create an accurate and comprehensive theory (or model) of the structure and functioning of the human emotion system, including its relations to other subsystems of the mind. The central subtasks of this task are to answer these questions: (a) How are emotions elicited or generated? (b) What effects (in particular, what adaptive or functional effects) do emotions have on subsequent cognitive processes and behavior? (c) Related to the first two questions, what kinds of mental and computational states are emotions themselves? That is, how are they to be theoretically defined? This entry focuses on theories of the generation, nature, and effects of emotion—that is, on proposed answers to these three questions. Answering these questions amounts to reconstructing the blueprint of the emotion system. To achieve this goal, it is helpful, and may even be necessary, to address two further questions that are also of independent interest: (d) Which parts of the emotion system are inherited, and which are acquired through learning? (e) How are emotions biologically realized or implemented (i.e., which neural structures and processes underlie them)? A generally accepted, unified theory of emotions that gives detailed answers to all these questions— or even just to questions (a) through (c)—still does not exist, although progress has been made.

Theories of the Causal Generation and Nature of Emotions The dominant theories of emotion generation today are the cognitive emotion theories. Although these theories date to Aristotle (350 BCE), the ­pioneers of cognitive emotion theory in modern psychology are Magda Arnold and Richard Lazarus, who proposed a variant of cognitive emotion theory known as appraisal theory. The basic assumption of appraisal theory is that the mental states presystematically subsumed in the category “emotion” (e.g., happiness, sadness, fear, anger, pity, guilt, and many more) are produced via a process of appraisal in which the eliciting objects or events are evaluated (appraised) with respect to their relevance for the person’s goals and values.

Emotion, Theories of

According to Arnold, for example, Ann feels happy about a state of affairs, p (e.g., that she won a prize in the lottery), if she comes to believe that p is the case (or as Arnold says, that p is “present”) and if she evaluates p as good for herself. Analogously, Ann experiences grief about p if she believes that p is the case and evaluates p as bad for herself. Generally, according to Arnold and Lazarus, pleasant emotions occur if a state of affairs is appraised as positive, whereas unpleasant emotions occur if it is appraised as negative. Further differentiations of emotion depend on certain factual cognitions about the eliciting events. According to Arnold (and, similarly, Lazarus), the relevant factual appraisal dimensions are presence–absence (present and certain versus still in the future and uncertain) and coping potential (whether one can bring about or prevent a state of affairs or adapt to it). Since the 1960s, appraisal theory has become the dominant model of emotion generation in psychology. Over the years, however, the original theory proposed by Arnold and Lazarus has been found wanting in some respects, and accordingly, several improved appraisal models have been developed. The newer theories share with the Arnold-Lazarus theory the basic assumption that emotions are products of factual and evaluative cognitions. However, unlike Arnold and Lazarus, the newer theories typically distinguish between different kinds of evaluations of the eliciting events (e.g., personally desirable or undesirable versus morally good or bad) and postulate additional, as well as partly different, factual appraisal dimensions (e.g., probability of the event, unexpectedness of the event, responsibility for the event). Perhaps the most elaborated appraisal theory to date was proposed by Andrew Ortony and colleagues, who specified the appraisal patterns for 11 positive and 11 negative emotions and argued, with some plausibility, that other emotions are subspecies of these 22 emotions. In addition to differences concerning the details of the appraisal process, different appraisal theories also make different assumptions about the relationship between appraisal and emotion and, relatedly, about the nature of emotion. Three main positions can be distinguished: First, according to the causal theory, appraisals are typical or even

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necessary causes of emotions, with the latter being separate kinds of states—for example, action tendencies or feelings of pleasure or displeasure. Second, according to the part–whole theory, appraisals are components of emotions together with one or several other components (e.g., action tendencies or feelings of bodily activation). A closely related theory holds that emotions are the product of a synthesis of appraisals and other mental states, such as feelings of arousal. Third, according to the identity theory, emotions are identical with appraisals (especially with evaluative appraisals); hence emotions are but a special type of cognition. This “radically cognitive” theory of emotion is rarely found in psychology but has prominent proponents in contemporary philosophy (e.g., Robert Solomon) and is, at least implicitly, assumed in some computational models of emotion. The basic assumption of appraisal theory—that emotions are based on patterns of appraisal specific for each emotion—has been reasonably well supported. Probably even more important for the success of appraisal theory, however, has been the fact that it agrees well with implicit commonsense psychology and has unmatched explanatory power. Concerning the latter issue, it is simply hard to see how else than by assuming intervening cognitive processes of at least approximately the kind postulated by appraisal theory one can explain the ­ following basic facts of human emotions: a. Emotions are highly differentiated (there are many different emotions). b. Different individuals can react with entirely different emotions (e.g., joy versus sorrow) to the same objective events (e.g., the victory of a soccer team). c. The same emotion (e.g., joy) can be elicited by events that have objectively nothing in common (e.g., the victory of a soccer team and the arrival of a friend). d. The same concrete emotional reaction (e.g., joy about the arrival of a friend) can be caused by information acquired in widely different ways (e.g., when seeing the friend approach, when hearing the friend’s voice, when being told by others that he or she has arrived).

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e. If a person’s appraisal of an event changes, then, in most cases, the emotions about that event change as well.

Notwithstanding the virtues of appraisal theory, several criticisms have been raised against it. The most important is that cognitions of the kind proposed in appraisal theory are, in fact, not necessary for emotions or, at least, not for all emotions. For example, it has been argued that fear does not always require an anticipation of danger but can sometimes be directly elicited by certain perceptions, such as loud noises or the visual impression of an abyss. However, the existence, or at least practical significance, of such “noncognitive” pathways to emotion elicitation is controversial. Furthermore, attempts have been made to answer the criticisms of appraisal theory by developing alternative versions of cognitive emotion theory, such as the cognitive-motivational (or belief-desire) ­theory of emotion or the perceptual theory of emotion.

Theories of the Effects of Emotions A major reason that emotions interest both laypeople and scientists is that they can have a strong impact on thought and action. Traditionally, the negative, dysfunctional effects of emotions have been emphasized. However, since the 1990s, the view has increasingly gained acceptance that despite their occasional negative consequences, emotions are overall (i.e., across all relevant situations) adaptive. The adaptive effects of emotions are their evolutionary functions—the reasons the emotion mechanisms have emerged in the process of natural selection. However, thus far, only partial consensus has been achieved regarding the question of what, exactly, the functional effects of emotions are. Three main proposed functional effects of emotions are their attention-directing, informational, and motivational effects. These can be viewed as different facets of a single, overarching function of emotions: to improve the adaptiveness of action, at least in the evolutionary environment of humans. According to the attention-direction hypothesis, a primary function of emotions is to focus

attention on the eliciting events or to give them priority in information processing. According to the informational (epistemic) hypothesis, emotions serve to provide other cognitive subsystems with adaptively useful information, especially information about the results of unconscious appraisal processes and, simultaneously, the value of objects and events, including actions and their consequences. Finally, the motivational hypothesis asserts that a main function of emotions consists in their adaptive effects on the action goals of the person. In particular, emotions are held to generate desires to regulate them. This path from emotion to motivation is central in hedonistic theories of motivation, according to which a fundamental motive or desire of humans, if not their only basic motive, is to maximize pleasure and to minimize pain. It is assumed that this hedonistic motive can be activated by both currently experienced and merely anticipated emotions. Negative emotions create the desire to reduce them (if they are already present) or to avoid them (if they are still in the future). Positive feelings produce the desire to maintain them or to bring them about. Hedonistic theories of motivation play an important role in contemporary psychology, and there is now a substantial body of supportive empirical evidence. However, a number of emotion and motivation theorists have argued that hedonic regulation is not the only way in which emotions influence motivation. Rather, according to these theorists, at least some emotions influence motivation more directly, by creating adaptive goals or action tendencies without the mediation of hedonistic desires. This nonhedonistic theory of the relationship between emotion and action may be better able than the hedonistic theory to explain the motivational effects of some emotions, such as the impact of pity on helping or of anger on aggression. Apart from affecting thought and goal-directed action, emotions can also manifest themselves in bodily changes, especially in physiological activation (e.g., an increase of blood pressure or heart rate), facial expressions, changes of the voice, and certain gestures and postures. To explain the fact that emotions have such bodily manifestations, as well as to explain the specific form that they take, several theories have been proposed.

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The best known of these is the evolutionary theory of discrete basic emotions. According to this theory, humans have a small number of inherited emotion mechanisms or affect programs (according to Paul Ekman, these include at least happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, fear, and surprise). Their activation generates adaptive, emotion-specific patterns of mental (e.g., emotional feelings, action tendencies) and bodily (e.g., facial expression, physiological changes) reactions. Specifically, physiological activation is assumed to prepare the organism for necessary activity (e.g., fight or flight), whereas the facial expression of emotions is thought to have primarily a communicative function—that is, to inform other people about the emotions of the experiencer. The theory of discrete basic emotions is supported by the finding that photographs showing prototypical facial expressions of the basic emotions are assigned the “correct” emotion names with high agreement by observers. On the other hand, the theory is put into question by the finding that only a minority of people who experience a basic emotion show the characteristic facial expression. The relationship between the experience of basic emotions and peripheral-physiological arousal is even weaker. Likewise, according to Kristen Lindquist and colleagues, the search for neural emotion modules corresponding to the basic emotions has so far not yielded convincing results. Rainer Reisenzein See also Ekman’s Theory of Basic Emotions; Emotion, Detection of; Emotion, Evolution of; Emotion, Expression of; Emotion and Culture; Emotion and Motivation; Emotional Intelligence; Emotions, Universality of; Evolutionary Psychological Perspectives on Human Nature, Critical Evaluation of; Morality and Moral Emotions; Social Emotions

Further Readings Ellsworth, P. C., & Scherer, K. R. (2003). Appraisal processes in emotion. In R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, & H. H. Goldsmith (Eds.), Handbook of affective sciences (pp. 572–595). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Lindquist, K. A., Wager, T. D., Kober, H., Bliss-Moreau, E., & Barrett, L. F. (2012). The brain basis of emotion: A meta-analytic review. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 35, 121–143.

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Reisenzein, R. (2014). A short history of psychological perspectives on emotion. In R. A. Calvo, S. D’Mello, J. Gratch, & A. Kappas (Eds.), Oxford handbook of affective computing (pp. 21–37). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Roberts, R. C. (2003). Emotion: An essay in aid of moral psychology. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

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Culture

Psychological theorizing on culture and emotions has its origin in the work of Charles ­Darwin. In The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals (1899), Darwin argued that universal evolutionary processes have led to cross-­ ethnic and cross-species similarities in emotional expression. Notably, he also observed that these similarities do not preclude cultural variation: Englishmen rarely cry, except under the p ­ ressure of the acutest grief; whereas in some parts of the Continent the men shed tears much more readily and freely.

Most theories of emotion proposed since Darwin’s time have agreed that both biology and culture are implicated in emotion; the major point of contention is the relative contribution of the two. Indeed, the most prominent contemporary theories of culture and emotion can be roughly organized along a continuum from naturalist to constructivist perspectives. Theories about the naturalist pole emphasize biological universality but acknowledge that certain domains of emotion can be shaped by cultural context. Theories about the constructivist pole emphasize cultural variability but acknowledge that certain constituents of emotion are shaped by evolutionary heritage. This entry reviews several theories of emotion and its expression across cultures.

Neurocultural Theory and Its Variations Paul Ekman’s neurocultural theory posits that certain basic emotions can be observed across species and across cultural contexts. In the classic expositions of this theory, there are six basic

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emotions: anger, fear, surprise, sadness, disgust, and happiness. He subsequently added contempt. As basic emotions, each of these states involves an affect program that is evolutionarily adaptive, biologically hardwired, and psychologically primitive. Each program is characterized by distinctive signals, physiology, causes, associated thoughts, and subjective experiences, and can serve as the building blocks of other emotions. Cultural variations, when observed, are understood as display rules—that is, conscious management techniques that allow the person to override the affect program. This might occur through minimization, exaggeration, or attempts to display a different emotion than the one whose affect program has been activated. Many contemporary theories of culture and emotion take the neurocultural theory as a starting point, maintaining the central idea of basic emotions but expanding the role of culture. Theorists in this tradition now propose that decoding rules should be considered alongside display rules as a second pathway to cultural influence. Decoding rules guide whether and how a person witnessing an emotional expression should acknowledge that he or she has recognized the emotion. Some theorists have distinguished between biological emotions, corresponding to the idea of the basic emotions, and cultural emotions, corresponding to those emotional states that do not meet the criteria for a basic, biological emotion. Within a given emotional state, moreover, the degree of biological versus cultural involvement is understood as depending on domain of emotion considered. Priming responses, or immediate responses to stimuli, are predominantly biological; emotion meanings, or attitudes, values, and beliefs about emotions, are predominantly cultural; and subjective experiences involve a blend of the biological and cultural. The dialect theory of emotions, meanwhile, posits two distinct types of affect programs. Adapted from neurocultural theory, the universal affect program is the same for all cultural groups, although the theory acknowledges that individual people might express any given emotion in a variety of ways. The specific affect program, in contrast, differs depending on cultural context. This second program is acquired through social

learning and results in subtle variations across groups. As with linguistic dialects, these emotional dialects emerge through deviations in usage across separated subgroups of people and do not necessarily convey specific meanings. Cultural variation in emotion expression results from a combination of the specific affect program and display rules, and cultural variation in emotion perception results from a combination of the specific affect program and decoding rules. One consequence is that in dialect theory, there is a direct link between group differences in expression and perception: Both are shaped in part by differences in each group’s specific affect programs.

Cultural Psychological Theories Although dialect theory breaks from the various iterations of neurocultural theory by proposing specific affect programs, the overall picture is still one of broad cultural similarities with subtle variations. After all, the universal affect program continues to operate, promoting universal similarities that have emerged from evolutionary processes. Cultural psychologists take a different view. Starting from Richard Shweder’s claim that culture and psyche “make each other up,” these theorists argue that one cannot reduce culture to either psychological or biological processes. Culture and mind (and, in other formulations, brain) exist in a relation of mutual constitution: Each element can be understood only in reference to the other(s). Emotions, therefore, cannot simply be understood as fundamentally biological with some minor degree of cultural adjustment; rather, they are deeply shaped by the cultural context. Many cultural psychologists studying emotion have based their work on the proposition that cultural groups differ in the extent to which they promote an independent self-construal or an interdependent self-construal. Whereas the former primarily defines the self through internal attributes, the latter primarily defines the self through social interconnections. Cultural meanings, practices, and products are differently understood, enacted, and produced, based on the predominant model of self-construal, and shape the sociocultural environment in which emotions occur.

Emotion and Culture

For example, the independent self-construal promoted in individualistic societies will foster socially disengaging positive (e.g., feelings of pride or superiority) and negative (e.g., feelings of frustration or anger) emotions, whereas the interdependent self-construal promoted in collectivistic societies will foster socially engaging positive (e.g., feelings of closeness or friendliness) and negative (e.g., feelings of shame or guilt) emotions. One example of a specific perspective that has emerged from this general approach is affect valuation theory. This theory proposes that ideal affect—the emotional states that a person would ideally experience—differs from actual affect. Moreover, whereas actual affect is determined primarily by temperament interacting with situational demands, ideal affect is shaped by the cultural context. Affect valuation theory can also be linked to the distinction between individualistic and collectivistic cultural contexts to make specific predictions—for example, that people will value and pursue high-arousal positive states (e.g., excitement) or low-arousal positive states (e.g., calm), respectively. Other cultural psychologists have considered the moral emotions, thinking of at least some ­emotional states as responses to the fulfillment or violation of moral precepts. For example, the CAD-triad hypothesis, in which CAD stands for contempt, anger, and disgust, posits that although all three emotions involve condemnation of others, the specific emotion elicited depends on the kind of moral precept that was violated. Specifically, violations of community standards will elicit contempt, violations of personal autonomy will elicit anger, and violations of the “natural order”—as culturally constructed—will elicit disgust. Cultural variation then emerges, based on the relative importance of each kind of moral precept. This is not to say that an emotion such as disgust lacks an evolved function—for example, avoidance of poisons. Rather, through a process of scaffolding, these emotions are constructed over the course of cultural history out of raw materials that have emerged over the course of evolutionary history. Social constructivist theories similarly argue that although some of the constituents of emotion may best be understood at a biological level, they do not constitute emotions by themselves. Rather, emotions emerge as combinations of various

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constituents within specific situations that are themselves located within specific sociocultural contexts. These ideas have echoes in the earlier attribution theories of emotion, in which emotions depend on the attributions given to situations. In this view, people respond to situations in terms of their interpretations of these situations—their apparent reality, personal relevance, anticipated consequences, and so on. Emotions emerge in context. Although the consequence of this position could involve considerable cultural variation, attribution theorists have tended to hold that situations themselves are broadly similar across cultural contexts. As a result, emotions also show cultural universality. The social constructivist theories maintain the central importance of attribution but raise questions about the universality both of situations and of the processes of attribution. According to the conceptual act model, the neurophysiological constituents of emotion can be organized according to a two-dimensional system of core affect, with axes of valence (positive to negative) and arousal (low to high). Core affective experiences are then interpreted and categorized according to the person’s models of emotion. Cultural extensions of the conceptual act model propose that cultural context profoundly shapes these categorization processes, providing culturally specific models of discrete emotional states. These theories tend to emphasize that situations are not fixed but, instead, change dynamically over time. For example, emotions are very often expressed in social relationships. Rather than having discrete emotional reactions to single events, people express a number of different emotions over the course of a single interaction. These emotions emerge dynamically in response to what is happening in the interaction, including the emotions of the other person. They are shaped by the specific qualities of the relationship extending beyond this specific interaction. These models of emotions and relationships are, in turn, shaped by the cultural context.

Influential Theories From Other Disciplines Beyond psychology, the other social sciences have contributed several influential theories pertinent to

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culture and emotion. For example, psycholinguists interested in emotion have noted that much of the culture-and-emotion literature is determined by the specific characteristics of the English language. Anna Wierzbicka has proposed the natural semantic metalanguage, a small set of linguistic primitives thought to exist in all languages. Different cultural contexts have different cultural scripts for specific emotions, but these scripts can be defined using linguistic primitives, allowing language-neutral cross-group comparison. The affect control theory from sociology posits that people use consensual linguistic categories to interpret social situations in affectively meaningful ways and that people are motivated to maintain these meanings as the social situation unfolds. In this approach, a person’s identity—as constrained by the specific situation, by social roles and institutions, and by available linguistic categories—is the major determinant of emotional response. Some sociologists consider the contributions of emotional labor, whereby certain social roles carry particular emotional expectations (e.g., the empathic nurse or the friendly salesperson). Finally, many anthropologists have expressed skepticism about overarching theories of culture and emotion, instead advocating for an ethnographic approach in which individual emotional narratives are used to infer the experiences of particular people in particular situations, inhabiting particular social worlds. At this point on the continuum, the theories are purely constructivist: The break from naturalism is complete. Andrew G. Ryder and Jessica Dere See also Culture and Social Relations; Ekman’s Theory of Basic Emotions; Emotion, Detection of; Emotion, Evolution of; Emotion, Expression of; Emotion, Theories of; Emotional Intelligence; Emotions, Universality of; Evolutionary Psychological Perspectives on Human Nature, Critical Evaluation of; Gender and Emotion; Morality and Moral Emotions; Relational Theory; Social Construction; Social Emotions

Further Readings Boiger, M., & Mesquita, B. (2012). The construction of emotion in interactions, relationships, and cultures. Emotion Review, 4, 221–229.

Darwin, C. (1899). The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals. New York: D. Appleton and Company. Retrieved from http://www.gutenberg.org/ files/1227/1227-h/1227-h.htm#linknoteref-609 Ekman, P. (2011). What is meant by calling emotions basic. Emotion Review, 4, 364–370. Elfenbein, H. A., & Ambady, N. (2003). Universals and cultural differences in recognizing emotions. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 12, 159–164. Kitayama, S., & Park, H. (2007). Cultural shaping of self, emotion, and well-being: How does it work? Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 1, 202–222. Matsumoto, D., & Huang, H. S. (2012). Culture and emotion: The integration of biological and cultural contributions. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 43, 91–118. Tsai, J. (2007). Ideal affect: Cultural causes and behavioral consequences. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2, 242–259.

Emotion

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Motivation

The study of the relationships between motivation and emotion is fundamental to the understanding of behavior. It has been proposed that emotions are action dispositions and reflect sequenced somatic and autonomic reflexes, organized by brain circuits that developed over evolutionary history to ensure individual survival. Although emotional expression is highly varied, many researchers view its motivational basis as having a much simpler, two-factor organization. This approach proposes that emotion fundamentally stems from varying activation in centrally organized appetitive and defensive motivational systems that have evolved to promote the survival of individuals. This entry describes the connection between motivation and emotion, the motivational model of human emotions, and empirical findings supporting the model.

The Connection Between Motivation and Emotion The words motivation and emotion come from a common Latin word, movere, which means “to move,” and both are internal processes used to explain the energy and direction of observable

Emotion and Motivation

behavior. Although motivation and emotion were derived from the same verb and have a number of similar properties, they also differ in several aspects. Motives are activated by specific conditions (e.g., hunger is activated by food deprivation). Motivated behavior is instrumental because a variety of means may be employed to achieve the desired end. Emotions are more general with regard to “object.” The same emotion can be produced by more than one motive. For example, the emotion of happiness, which is a generally pleasant state, can be prompted by obtaining food, running into a dear friend, or succeeding on a stressful exam. There are many examples of the intimate and complex connection between motivation and emotion. Therefore, an adequate account of behavior must include both motives and emotions that direct behavior under different conditions and in different ways. Typically, emotions take precedence over motives. Unpleasant emotions, such as anxiety or sadness, might result in loss of libido or sexual drive, appetite, and social motivation. By contrast, pleasant emotions, such as joy, can increase those motives. Thus, emotions are major sources of motivation. After all, people seek objects or activities that make them feel good, and they avoid objects or activities that make them feel bad (the Freudian pleasure principle). This is the basic motivational assumption of theories across all areas of psychology, including theories of emotion, learning, and decision making.

The Dual Motive Model of Human Emotions The concept of the relationship of innate survival functions to emotions goes back at least to Charles Darwin. Following his ideas, it has been suggested that motivational circuits in the nervous system evolved to mediate transactions in the environment that threaten or promote physical survival. From this perspective, emotions evolved to adaptively regulate an organism’s behavior by helping the individual evaluate important aspects of his or her environment, such as environmental dangers, predators, or potential mates, and to take quick action to assess, avoid, or approach them, depending on whether something or someone constituted an imminent concern or not.

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A number of theorists have posited the existence of two basic motivational systems responsible for emotional behavior. This approach postulates that emotions are driven by two motivational systems: the appetitive/attractive system and the aversive/ defensive system, both activated by a wide range of events and stimuli. Polish neurophysiologist Jerzy Konorski was a key figure in the history of the modern attempt to understand motivation, emotion, and cognition. He took as a starting point the classification of the basic activities, such as reflexes, and their motivational roles. He classified exteroceptive reflexes into two categories: preservative (e.g., ingestion, copulation, and the nurture of progeny) and protective (e.g., withdrawal from or rejection of noxious agents). Preservative reflexes, such as ingestion of nutrients, are considered absolutely indispensable to the survival of the organism whatever the conditions in which it exists. Protective reflexes, by contrast, prompt behavioral actions only when the organism has to deal with emergency situations of threat and danger. Konorski further suggested that drives are the processes controlling the basic preparatory activities and guiding the organism to the accomplishment of consummatory reflexes or protecting it from harm. In his view, emotions are the subjective experiences corresponding to particular drives and become familiar to humans through introspection. Additionally, it has been proposed that the aversive and appetitive systems have reciprocal inhibitory connections that affect perception and learning. In this Konorskian model, affective valence (i.e., whether an emotion is positive or negative) is determined by the dominant motive system: The appetitive system prompts positive emotions; the defensive system is the source of negative emotions. Building on the work of Konorski, since the 1980s researchers Peter Lang, Margaret Bradley, and their colleagues have developed a systematic research program in which they have investigated bodily, behavioral, and brain reactivity associated with aversive or appetitive cues, making numerous seminal contributions to this field of research and theory. They have postulated that emotion fundamentally stems from differential activation in centrally organized appetitive and defensive motivational systems.

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Thus, according to this view, emotion can be considered an emergent property of motivationally initiated neural activity. In their Konorskian model, they also have proposed that emotions are grounded in motivational circuits that feed back to sensory systems, heightening vigilance and information gathering, and importantly, prompting reflexive autonomic and motor responses. The activation of these motivational circuits is therefore twofold: On the one hand, these circuits engage sensory systems that increase attention and facilitate perceptual processing, and on the other, they initiate reflexive responses that mobilize the organism and prompt motor action. Since Wilhelm Wundt’s work, the view that emotions might be organized by overarching motivational factors has been suggested by several researchers who have focused on verbal reports of emotions. Despite the large number and diversity of emotional words, several studies of emotional/ evaluative language have consistently found two main factors to account for the variance among affect descriptors: Emotional valence (positive/ pleasant/appetitive vs. negative/aversive/defensive) and arousal (intensity of activation). The valence dimension indicates how pleasant or unpleasant participants judge their reactions to the stimuli to be. The arousal dimension reflects how much arousal participants feel during stimulus presentation. According to Lang and Bradley, valence and arousal represent primitive parameters that define both a general disposition to approach or avoid stimulation and the vigor of the directional tendency. Thus, judgments of pleasure or displeasure indicate which motivational system is active, and judgments of arousal indicate the intensity of motivational activation. Reports of emotion are not, of course, direct readouts of activity in motivational circuits. They are affected by many factors, including personal, situational, and cultural factors. Nevertheless, the consistency of the two-factor view across varying languages and cultures encourages the view of a more general, underlying, motivational and biological determination of behavior. In their research program, Lang, Bradley, and colleagues have developed different sets of emotional stimuli, which have been standardized on the basis of valence and arousal ratings, including affective pictures, nonlinguistic sounds,

single words, and descriptive sentences. Their goal has been to examine human emotion using stimuli that are ecologically appropriate—that is, stimuli that would prompt a wide range of emotional reactions as reflected in human culture and yet be replicable by other researchers. Since the beginning of their research program, Lang and Bradley have suggested that emotions are reflected in three measurable response systems—(a) expressive and evaluative language, (b) physiological changes mediated by the somatic autonomic systems, and (c) behavioral acts—and that theories of emotion should be based on them. Consistent with the motivational model, findings from this research program have shown that subjective ratings of valence and arousal covary systematically with the biological reflexes associated with activation of appetitive and defensive motivational systems. In the context of emotional perception (e.g., emotional responses to natural scenes), distinct autonomic and somatic reflex responses have been observed, paralleling those found when animal subjects confront cues associated with threat or appetite. Moreover, these measures are strongly related to standard ratings of valence and arousal. Thus, for example, it has repeatedly been shown that viewing either pleasant or unpleasant stimuli activates the autonomic system—specifically, increased perspiration and a widening of the pupils. Both reflexes covary with standard arousal ratings. Unpleasant pictures also prompt reflexive facial action (flexion of the corrugator “frown” muscle) and heart rate deceleration similar to the “fear bradycardia” found in prey animals orienting to a predator at a distance. Neuroimaging studies have shown that these emotional stimuli (pictures, sounds, etc.) engage the same mediating neural structures (e.g., amygdala, striatum, sensory cortices) in humans that are activated in other mammals by survival-threatening cues. These physiological changes are evoked directly by the presentation of a picture cue. Another measure of emotional activation can be obtained by presenting a startling stimulus (i.e., a “startle probe”), which is often a brief burst of noise presented during picture viewing. This additional stimulus elicits a startle response that is modulated by the motivational state evoked by the picture cue.

Emotion and Scientific Reasoning

The startle response is a defensive reflex to an aversive stimulus and is characterized by a set of evolutionarily adaptive defensive behaviors, such as blinking the eyes, forward and downward movement of the head, and drawing in the shoulders. In humans, the startle reflex is typically quantified by the magnitude of the eyeblink response to the startle probe. Lang, Bradley, and colleagues conducted a series of studies using the startle reflex to probe the emotional states of human beings. If startle probes are administered while participants view pictures, the startle reflex is potentiated when participants view unpleasant stimuli. Moreover, the reflex is reliably inhibited during viewing pictures judged as pleasant. The authors explained these findings by introducing the concept of motivational priming. Assuming that emotion reflects a “readiness for action,” unpleasant emotions will activate defensive, avoidance-related response systems, and pleasant emotions will activate appetitive, approach-related responses. The startle probe was conceptualized as a defensive, slightly unpleasant stimulus. When it is preceded by a foreground stimulus (such as a natural scene), either an approach or avoidance response is primed, depending on the valence of the stimulus. When there is congruency in response motivation—that is, when the foreground stimulus is unpleasant—the resulting response is facilitated; a mismatch following pleasant stimuli will result in an attenuation of the response. Furthermore, the emotional modulation of the startle response has been investigated in a number of psychopathological populations, extending the validity of the dual-system model of emotions and indicating the utility of this approach for clinical research. For example, pathological fear in phobic patients has been associated with enhanced startle responding to aversive stimuli. Conversely, pathological lack of fear in psychopathy has been associated with a diminished startle response to aversive stimuli. Appetitive stimuli produce comparable levels of startle response inhibition in both groups, as they do in control participants. Other studies that have investigated emotional modulation of the startle response in people with depression have found an altered pattern of affective startle response modulation. Depressed patients demonstrated larger startle responses to positive pictures and smaller startle responses to

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negative pictures than nondepressed participants demonstrated. Taken together, these findings support the motivational approach, which asserts that emotion is organized around two motivational systems, one appetitive and one defensive, that have evolved to support individual survival. Maurizio Codispoti and Vera Ferrari See also Drive and Motivation in the Brain; Emotion, Evolution of; Emotion, Expression of; Emotion, Theories of; Emotional Disorders; Emotions, Universality of; Employee Motivation; Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Motivation; Motivation and Cognition; Motivation and Personality; Perception and Motivation; Unconscious Motivation

Further Readings Bradley, M. M., Codispoti, M., Cuthbert, B. N., & Lang, P. J. (2001). Emotion and motivation I: Defensive and appetitive reactions in picture processing. Emotion, 1, 276–298. Konorski, J. (1967). Integrative activity of the brain: An interdisciplinary approach. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Lang, P. J., Bradley, M. M., & Cuthbert, B. N. (1997). Motivated attention: Affect, activation, and action. In P. J. Lang, R. F. Simons, & M. Balaban (Eds.), Attention and orienting (pp. 97–135). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Emotion

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Scientific Reasoning

The idea that emotion bears an important and advantageous relation to scientific reasoning is a relatively contemporary one. The idea remains controversial, not least within the broader scientific community to whom the theoretical assumptions apply. The points of controversy are best understood against the long tradition by which science is regarded as a class of rational activity leading to the production of knowledge and the even longer tradition by which rational activity is compromised by the influence of “passion.” In turn, a popular conception of “heart” and “head” as being at cross-purposes has contributed to a long-standing tendency to regard emotion as the enemy of science and science as the adversary

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of art and poetry (e.g., Robert Louis Stevenson’s Pan’s Pipes, published in 1881). This brief overview first situates the conceptual rupture between emotion and reason and notes its implications for science. It then acknowledges a revised view of emotion and cognition relations in the 20th and 21st centuries, with attention to developments in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience. Reflections on the implications for science and scientific reasoning follow. This traditional view of the relation between emotion and reason has kept emotion from entering into scientific theorizing in any serious or important way. Yet the assumption of the disinterested stance on the part of philosophers of science is at odds with the reports of scientists themselves, who describe a host of feelings in relation to their practice, not only in the discovery but in the justificatory aspects. Relevant to the topic is that cognitive science and neuroscience have been increasingly converging on the conclusion that so-called rational decision making occurs in conjunction with activity in the emotional centers of the brain, leading to a need to rethink the emotionrationality relations on empirical and conceptual grounds. This research should have important implications for scientific reasoning, but in fact, there has been relatively little effort in this direction. As a preliminary caution, the study of emotion in relation to any phenomenon, including scientific reasoning, is complicated by the variety of terms, historical and contemporary, used in reference to the realm of experience in question: mood, affect, appetites, passions, feeling, sensibilities, and other words are overlapping, yet all might be distinguished. Furthermore, emotion overlaps with or clusters around a set of additional processes or realms of analysis such as motivation, aesthetics, and even values in science. Texts aimed at understanding the nature of emotion provide conceptual and historical analyses of these relations and supply helpful background. An overview of “affective science” is also useful in considering fundamental issues in contemporary emotion research, methods, and terminology. Also important is that the conceptual relation between cognition and rationality or cognition and reasoning is not straightforward. For example, it is unclear whether reasoning and cognition are synonymous or whether reasoning is a subclass of

the broader category of cognition. Therefore, the role of emotion in scientific reasoning constitutes a subproblem within the larger problem of the cognition–emotion relation about which the literature is extensive.

Reason and Emotion: Historical Models “Pure” Rationality

The origin of an oppositional, even adversarial relation of emotion and reason is often attributed to Plato’s Phaedrus, expressed there in the metaphor of the harried chariot driver struggling to steer a pair of mismatched steeds (reason and passion). Although Aristotle articulated a more nuanced view, particularly in relation to moral reasoning, Stoic epistemology retrenched the ideal of reason uncorrupted by the influence of the body, including emotion. René Descartes’s notion of reason as a “spark of the divine” in human nature contributed to the view of reason as an ideal, able to ascertain certainty through the intuitional grasp of mathematical and logical relations. The notion of “pure” rationality was much later promoted in the artificial-intelligence community as the idea that intelligence entails the manipulation of abstract symbols. The purity of reason is attributable to its status as the disembodied processing of intelligence. Emotion and Science

Although not identified specifically as emotion, the corrupting influence of dispositional particularities and personal interests (“idols of the cave”) was important to Francis Bacon’s 17th-century defense of the need for systematicity, for method, in the pursuit of scientific knowledge. The crosspurposes of emotion and scientific reason were underscored with special emphasis during the 19th century. To clarify, it is not that scientists are assumed to lack emotion. Rather, the received view is that emotion is something for the scientist to discipline, control, and abate in the cause of science. These views contribute to the association of “objective” with being free from the influence of personal feeling or value; the customary ideal is

Emotion and Scientific Reasoning

detachment in the pursuit of scientific knowledge. At most, emotion might be welcomed in the discovery phase of science, but it has no place in the justification of theories, which requires public verifiability.

Contemporary Models Michael Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge reflected a groundbreaking rejection of the ideal of detachment as important to scientific reasoning. Polanyi emphasized that strong emotion not only is an ineliminable feature of science but that it is beneficial, even necessary, to scientific progress. ­ The most obviously beneficial scientific emotions include delight in discovery, awe in contemplating mystery, and passionate engagement in a research problem that drives and sustains the scientist in the face of failure and tedium in everyday practice. These aspects of scientific practice were emphasized in Abraham Maslow’s Psychology of Science and Michael Mahoney’s Scientist as Subject as well. “Historians of science have reexamined the role of emotion in scientific practice by means of historical case study analysis. Some of the new work is interdisciplinary, drawing from models across cognitive science, neuroscience, and sociology to provide new configurations and reconsiderations of traditional relations between emotion and science. Several lines of theory are worth considering in terms of their implications for science. Cognitive Emotion and Emotional Cognition

The relation between bodily and cognitive processes in the experience and expression of emotion has never been straightforward. The mid20th century brought new models of the emotion– cognition relation that specifically emphasized the propositional content of emotional experience. Increasing evidence from cognitive science has contributed to a view of emotion and cognition as so intricately connected in function that terms such as emotional cognition and hot thought arose to capture the relation. Well-known examples include the boon to reasoning associated with mildly depressive affect and a strong connection between emotion and moral

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judgment, especially empathy and disgust. Some have conceptualized the relation between emotion and cognition as emotion underlying rational processes, emphasizing that logical operations alone are not effective in selecting relevant data or filtering out what is not relevant to a given problem. Emotions contribute to perceptions of salience; they heuristically minimize the cognitive load by reducing the need to deliberate the overall information that is available. Cognition as Embodied

The relation between emotion and cognition also appears in the growing trend toward the “embodied” character of reasoning and thought processes. An extensive body of literature spanning more than 20 years has made the terms embodied mind and embodied cognition commonplace and relatively uncontroversial. The meanings of embodiment vary, but all depart from traditional computational models wherein cognition entails “disembodied manipulation of abstract symbols.” Instead, the body is seen as enabling and constraining the individual’s forms of thought and repository of concepts. The central line of the research on embodiment is the metaphorical basis of thought, including conceptual, even mathematical systems, with metaphors assumed to have their origin in lived experience, even if it is obscured by a language system. The question is then one of discerning the involvement of emotion in metaphor. More to the point, little is gained by separating distinct realms of emotion and cognition if cognition is fundamentally embodied in the ways described. Advances in neuroscience and neuroimaging technology also cohere with the embodiment of cognition. Among the most important is Antonio Damasio’s finding that the accuracy and efficiency of decision making are reduced under conditions of blunted affect that accompanies prefrontal ­cortical damage. Emotion as Socially Produced and Distributed

Whatever the participation of the body, the fact that emotions are felt and displayed in social contexts that give them meaning and categorization has led some authors to characterize emotion as

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socially and culturally determined, constructed, or produced. Evidence from both anthropological and historical studies points to differences in emotion across cultures and historical periods, ­ suggesting a strong role for culture and language in shaping emotional experience. A different but related project proceeds from the idea that cognition is “distributed” across a problem space that includes other actors, instruments relevant to the problem or practice at hand, and other features of the environment, including traditions and norms. This work has attempted to formulate an account of emotion as distributed across a community of practice. Contemporary ideas about the social construction of emotion resonate with the earlier view of emotion as a “transaction” between actor and environment, a theory of emotion that is rooted in a “language of relationships” and stems from the later work of John Dewey and his version of organism–­ environment systems theory in which emotions are understood as transactions within a situation that includes other organisms.

Implications for Science: Scientific Reasoning as Integrated Activity The lines of theory briefly reviewed here have important implications for understanding the role of emotion in science. Like other forms of reasoning, scientific reasoning could be expected to be enabled and constrained by the body, including emotional processes. There is little reason to suppose that this would be any less the case when the reasoning tasks involve justification of hypotheses. Moreover, scientific cognition is distributed in contexts of practice, the scientific community’s network of traditions and norms. Indeed, studies emphasizing the integration of cognitive and emotional processes at a neural level and those that consider emotion to be socially constituted are complemented by historical research and qualitative analyses of real-world scientific practices. Paul Thagard, for example, found abundant emotion words in James Watson’s account of the discovery (with Francis Crick) of the structure of DNA. In an ethnographic investigation of biomedical engineering laboratories, Lisa M. Osbeck and colleagues analyzed the contributions of emotion

to the “sense-making” practices of science. Drawing from interviews with research scientists with different levels of expertise, they analyzed emotional language through identification of overt expression of emotion, figurative and metaphorical expressions, and anthropological expressions, particularly involving the attribution of emotional states to cells but also including attribution of experiential states to models of phenomena. They concluded that interweaving emotional language into descriptions of problem solving evinces the integrated functioning of cognitive and emotional processes in scientific practice.

A Further View Attention to emotion by philosophers of science has increased as philosophy has become more “naturalized,” drawing from insights in psychology and sociology and from analysis of the actual practices of scientists, living and historical. However, there is concern that attention to emotion may imply “subjective” aspects of science and thereby neglect knowledge that can properly be called objective. Hence, resistance to acknowledging that emotional experience is integral to scientific practice may be found not only on the part of philosophers of science but among scientists themselves. Further, Jeff Kochan has suggested that the appeal to emotional factors introduces an irreducible mystery and ineffability to accounts of science that are fundamentally at odds with attempts to explicate its nature in terms of logical operations. By appealing to emotion as both a bodily and social phenomenon, Kochan attempts to free the study of emotion in science from the trappings of traditional conceptions of subjectivity. Like Polanyi, part of his project is to understand specific emotions that are good for science (not just the scientist) and the ways in which they function to enhance its operations—what he terms epistemic emotions. Lisa M. Osbeck See also Cognitive Neuroscience; Creativity; Embodied Cognition; Embodied Grounding; Knowledge; Problem Solving

Emotional Disorders

Further Readings Griffiths, P. (2013). Current emotion research in philosophy. Emotion Review, 5(2), 215–222. Gross, J. J., & Barrett, L. F. (2013). The emerging field of affective science. Emotion, 13(6), 997–998. Kochan, J. (2013). Subjectivity and emotion in scientific research. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 44, 354–362. Osbeck, L., & Nersessian, N. (2011). Affective problem solving: Emotion in research practice. Mind and Society, 10, 57–78. Osbeck, L. M., & Nersessian, N. J. (2013). Beyond motivation and metaphor: “Scientific passions” and anthropomorphism. In V. Karakostas & D. Dieks (Eds.), Perspectives and foundational problems in philosophy of science (pp. 455–466). New York, NY: Springer.

Emotional Disorders Emotional disorder is an umbrella term used to identify mental disorders characterized by the experience of frequent and intense negative emotions, including anxiety, fear, anger, sadness, and disgust. Individuals diagnosed with emotional disorders tend to evaluate these exaggerated emotional experiences negatively, often leading to avoidant coping styles. Disorders that are commonly considered emotional disorders include anxiety disorders, mood disorders, dissociative disorder, somatic symptom disorders, and some personality disorders. This entry describes the hallmark features of emotional disorders in terms of their nature and origins.

The Nature of Emotional Disorders The primary feature of emotional disorders is the propensity to experience frequent and intense negative emotions in response to stressors. Because of its conceptual overlap with the symptoms of emotional disorders, the personality trait of neuroticism, which is defined as a global tendency to experience a broad range of negative emotions, is considered a risk factor for the development of emotional disorders. In addition to exaggerated negative emotionality, individuals high on the trait of neuroticism are more likely to view the world as

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threatening and believe that they will be unable to cope with life’s obstacles. Longitudinal studies have demonstrated that individuals high on neuroticism are more likely to develop emotional disorders than those with lower levels of this trait. In addition to the frequent experience of negative emotions (neuroticism), how individuals relate to such emotions when they occur has also emerged as an important risk factor in the development of emotional disorders. Studies have shown that patients diagnosed with emotional disorders are less accepting of their emotions and more likely than healthy individuals to rate their emotional experiences as aversive. Prospective studies have also demonstrated that individuals who evaluate their emotional experience negatively are more likely to develop anxiety and depressive disorders and that becoming more accepting of one’s emotions during treatment predicts symptom improvement. In view of these reactions to negative emotions, it is not surprising that individuals with emotional disorders also display a range of cognitive and behavioral strategies aimed at mitigating the intensity and duration of those reactions. In fact, many of the maladaptive behaviors associated with emotional disorders (e.g., engaging in self-injury, binge eating, substance use, or situation avoidance) are aimed at reducing negative emotions. For example, a person with panic disorder may avoid taking public transportation or consuming caffeine in an attempt to reduce the likelihood that she or he will experience anxiety symptoms. In addition to blatantly avoiding situations where strong emotions may arise, avoidance can also be evidenced in cognitive styles, such as emotion suppression and rumination. Emotion suppression refers to purposeful attempts to push unpleasant, emotion-inducing stimuli out of awareness. Although emotion suppression appears to provide short-term relief, studies have shown that this strategy produces a rebound effect in which suppressed stimuli paradoxically return with greater frequency and intensity. High levels of emotion suppression have been demonstrated across emotional disorders, and use of this strategy has also been shown to exacerbate symptoms. Rumination, defined as repetitively focusing on one’s negative mood and its causes, meanings, and consequences, is another type of avoidant coping

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that is common across emotional disorders. Rumination may also provide short-term emotional relief in that a passive focus on surface matters may protect individuals from deeper, more distressing concerns. However, like emotion suppression, rumination has been shown to intensify negative affect and to predict the onset of ­emotional disorders. Overall, the research literature suggests that individuals diagnosed with emotional disorders experience strong negative emotions frequently and evaluate these experiences as aversive. They are more likely to engage in avoidant coping strategies to manage emotional experiences. These strategies, in turn, paradoxically increase the frequency or intensity (or both) of negative emotions.

The Origins of Emotional Disorders The etiology of emotional disorders is viewed within the context of the triple vulnerabilities model, which posits that the development and maintenance of anxiety, mood, and related disorders relies on the interaction of three distinct ­vulnerabilities—general biological, general psychological, and specific psychological. The manner in which these vulnerabilities interact determines not only whether an emotional disorder develops but also which specific disorder is likely to develop. Biological vulnerability accounts for genetic contributions to the diathesis (i.e., the inherent likelihood) of emotional disorders. Overall, there is strong support for the heritability of emotional disorders and, more specifically, for the trait neuroticism that underlies the development and expression of such disorders. However, a person with a biological vulnerability must also have concurrent psychological vulnerabilities in order to activate gene expression. Without the addition of concurrent psychological vulnerabilities, the individual would likely experience exaggerated responses to stressors but within a normal range of functioning. General psychological vulnerability refers to a sense of unpredictability or uncontrollability of life events, and the belief that one may not be able to adequately handle negative events should they occur. This belief arises from generally disruptive, early-life events and learning experiences in the context of parent–child interactions. Parenting

styles that are contradictory and dismissive or overprotective can limit a child’s opportunity to develop a sense of self-efficacy regarding his or her ability to exert control over the environment, putting that child at risk for emotional disorders. The specific psychological vulnerabilities are related to distinct learning experiences that create conditions for a targeted focus of anxious or neurotic reactions. Specifically, direct contact with aversive objects, situations, or contexts may result in learned anxiety and fear responses. For example, if a person observes behaviors that suggest that being negatively evaluated in social situations is catastrophic, the individual may be more likely to develop social anxiety disorder versus other emotional disorders. Although general biological and psychological vulnerabilities account for susceptibility to emotional disorders, specific psychological vulnerability explains the emergence of a particular disorder. Meghan R. Fortune, Shannon Sauer-Zavala, and David H. Barlow See also Anxiety Disorders; Dissociative Disorders; Emotion, Expression of; Emotion, Theories of; Emotion and Motivation; Frontal Lobe Functions; Mood Disorders; Personality Disorders

Further Readings Barlow, D. H., Sauer-Zavala, S., Carl, J. R., Bullis, J. R., & Ellard, K. K. (2014). The nature, diagnosis, and treatment of neuroticism: Back to the future. Clinical Psychological Science, 2, 344–365. Brown, T. A., & Naragon-Gainey, K. (2013). Evaluation of the unique and specific contributions of dimensions of the triple vulnerability model to the prediction of DSM-IV anxiety and mood disorder constructs. Behavior Therapy, 44, 277–292.

Emotional Intelligence Emotional intelligence is set of skills for processing, manipulating, and using emotional information. People with high emotional intelligence are able to perceive emotions accurately, use emotional information to help with other tasks, understand how emotions link together and change

Emotional Intelligence

over time, and manage emotions in themselves and in others. People with low emotional intelligence might have difficulty interpreting other people’s facial expressions and tone of voice, might pick bad moments to approach others about sensitive issues, might not be able to see the emotional consequences of a particular action, and might have difficulty comforting others or cheering themselves up after a setback. Compared with those with low emotional intelligence, people with high emotional intelligence are likely to get higher grades and to perform better at work, especially in jobs that require workers to express positive emotions (e.g., wait staff or child care workers). This entry reviews the history of research on emotional intelligence and how it is defined and measured. It also discusses how emotional intelligence relates to the real world and the future of research on emotional intelligence.

The History of Emotional Intelligence Until the early 1990s, there was little research on emotional intelligence, and the general public had almost no interest in the concept. This changed rapidly after 1995 when a science journalist named Daniel Goleman published Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More Than IQ. This book was influential in bringing the public’s attention to emotional intelligence. After its publication, “emotional intelligence” appeared on the front cover of TIME Magazine, Goleman’s book was added to Oprah Winfrey’s book club, and many businesses sought to use emotional intelligence as a way of selecting, training, and motivating their personnel. Unfortunately, there was not much research about emotional intelligence in 1995, so the situation was one in which businesses were eager to embrace emotional intelligence, but no one knew very much about its scientific status. Because of the high demand for information on emotional intelligence, a lot of different research teams began to study the concept at the same time. Most of them did not know what the others were doing, however, so research occurred in parallel, with different researchers using different definitions and different ways of measuring emotional intelligence. This led to a lot of confusion among researchers and practitioners as different kinds of tests and theories showed different results.

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By the end of the 1990s, researchers realized that there were two different ways in which emotional intelligence was defined and also two different ways in which it was measured. The definitions were known as (a) ability models and (b) mixed models. Ability models defined emotional intelligence as an ability. Just as spatial intelligence involves processing spatial information or numerical intelligence involves processing numbers, emotional intelligence involves processing emotional information. By contrast, mixed models defined emotional intelligence as a mix of abilities, character traits, motivation, and other positive qualities that might relate to better emotional functioning. For e­ xample, one popular definition of emotional intelligence included five aspects of intrapersonal abilities, three aspects of interpersonal abilities, three aspects of adaptation, two aspects of stress management, and two aspects of general mood. There were many slightly different definitions of emotional intelligence that could be considered mixed m ­ odels, but only one definition that could be considered an ability model. The one ability definition of emotional intelligence is now the definition most commonly used by psychologists. It is called the hierarchical fourbranch model of emotional intelligence. There are four sets of skills, known as branches. The first branch is emotion perception, which involves perceiving or recognizing emotions, such as noticing that someone is sad based on his or her facial expression. The second branch is emotion facilitation, which involves using one’s mood or emotions to help with other tasks—for example, going for a run rather than studying for a difficult math exam to take advantage of an energetic, excited mood. The third branch is emotion understanding, which involves understanding the transition between emotions over time and the ways emotions combine, such as when one understands that an unfair situation is more likely to make people feel angry than afraid. Emotion management is the fourth branch and involves regulating one’s own emotions and the emotions of others. An example is helping a friend see the bright side of a difficult situation. The four-branch model is hierarchical, meaning that the abilities found in the higher branches depend on those in the lower branches.

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To manage emotions effectively, a person first needs to correctly perceive the emotions as well as know how they likely will change over time.

The Measurement of Emotional Intelligence Just as there are two main ways of defining emotional intelligence, there are two ways of measuring it: (a) ability scales, which involve test takers evaluating possible answers to questions about ­ emotions, and (b) rating scales, which involve test takers rating themselves (or someone else) on a series of statements that indicate high or low emotional intelligence. Rating scales can measure mixed models and the ability model of emotional intelligence, whereas ability scales can measure only the ability model of emotional intelligence. There are many rating scale measures of emotional intelligence, but there are fewer ability scales. In fact, there is only one commercially available, abilitybased test—the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT). Sample items representative of the two types of scales are given next. Sample Ability-Based Item Measuring Emotion Management

Clayton has been overseas for a long time and returns to visit his family. So much has changed that Clayton feels left out. What action would be the most effective for Clayton? (a) Nothing—it will sort itself out soon enough. (b) Tell his family he feels left out. (c) Spend time listening and getting involved again. (d) Reflect that relationships can change with time. (Best answer = c) Sample Rating-Scale Items Measuring Emotion Management

Please read each statement carefully and then choose the number that corresponds to how accurately each statement describes you (1 = very inaccurate; 2 = moderately inaccurate; 3 = neither accurate nor inaccurate; 4 = moderately accurate; 5 = very accurate). (a) I can handle stressful situations without getting too nervous. (b) I know the strategies to improve other people’s moods. (c) I know how to keep calm in difficult or stressful situations.

Sample Rating-Scale Items Measuring Emotional Awareness

Instructions are similar to the previous rating scale. Example items are as follows: (a) I am aware of my emotions as I experience them. (b) I am aware of the nonverbal messages I send to others. Test takers are not always accurate when they are rating themselves. One issue is that people who are low in emotional awareness cannot really tell whether they are calm or nervous in particular situations. Another issue is that these types of tests are easy to fake, especially if used to select people for jobs or admission to graduate programs such as medical school. Test takers may be tempted to exaggerate their levels of emotional intelligence if they are taking the test as part of a selection procedure. Indeed, researchers have found that test takers score 12.5 points higher when they try to fake a high score on a self-report scale of emotional intelligence compared with when they answer honestly. Because of concerns about faking, most psychologists, as well as human resources and education professionals, do not use self-report rating scales of emotional intelligence to select people for jobs or for education programs.

How Does Emotional Intelligence Relate to the Real World? Emotional intelligence develops as people grow and learn more about emotions and social interactions, so adults tend to be more emotionally intelligent than teenagers. Women tend to be more emotionally intelligent than men, but the differences are small and may be stronger for the management branch of emotional intelligence than for the other branches. Personality traits show much stronger relationships to rating scales of emotional intelligence than to ability scales. Ability scales show small relationships to two of the five major personality traits (agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism, and openness). Specifically, people who are highly agreeable tend to have better emotion management skills, and people who are open to new experiences tend to have higher emotional intelligence across all branches.

Emotional Intelligence

Rating scales of emotional intelligence have strong to very strong relationships with personality traits. The personality traits of emotional stability and extraversion are so strongly related with some rating scales of emotional intelligence that the scales of emotional intelligence mainly measure these personality traits (rather than anything else). In contrast, intelligence test scores show much stronger relationships to ability scales of emotional intelligence than to rating scales. However, research has found that emotional intelligence is a different kind of ability from other known abilities such as quantitative ability, memory, and reasoning. Early writings on emotional intelligence suggested that it might be very important for explaining why some people succeed in their work, whereas others fail. Newer research shows that emotional intelligence can explain differences between people in job performance, but the effects are generally smaller than previously claimed. For rating scales based on mixed-model definitions, emotional intelligence explains approximately 17% of the differences between people on job performance. For rating scales based on ability definitions, this figure is 5%, and for ability scales it is 3%. Results were stronger for jobs that involve emotion labor (i.e., the requirement to express positive emotions as part of the job). When jobs require emotion labor, emotional intelligence explained 22%, 7%, and 5% of the differences between people on job performance using mixed-model rating scales, ability rating scales, and ability scales, respectively. Emotional intelligence is also related to students’ achievement in high school, college and university, and vocational schools. It is also related to lower levels of attrition (i.e., emotionally intelligent students receive higher grades and are less likely to drop out). Research also suggests that emotionally intelligent students use better coping strategies to deal with stress and that this contributes to their success.

The Future of Emotional Intelligence Research suggests that emotional intelligence might be better defined in terms of only three

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branches: emotion perception, emotion understanding, and emotion management. Other research is exploring the assessment of emotional intelligence with multimedia clips. These provide a more realistic portrayal of emotional situations and decrease the need for highly literate test takers who can read and comprehend text-based descriptions (an important consideration for younger test takers as well as for English language learners). A potential direction for rating scales is the development of forced-choice methods. For example, test takers might be asked, “Which is more like you? (a) I am good at recognizing emotions, or (b) I understand how my mood changes over time.” Forced-choice formats are less amenable to faking. Carolyn MacCann and Richard D. Roberts Authors’ note: The views expressed in this entry are the authors’ and should not be taken to reflect the official opinions or policies of the authors’ host institutions.

See also Ekman’s Theory of Basic Emotions; Emotion, Detection of; Emotion, Evolution of; Emotion, Expression of; Emotion, Theories of; Emotion and Culture; Emotion and Motivation; Emotion and Scientific Reasoning; Emotions, Universality of; Social Emotions

Further Readings Brackett, M. A., Rivers, S. E., Shiffman, S., Lerner, N., & Salovey, P. (2006). Relating emotional abilities to social functioning: A comparison of self-report and performance measures of emotional intelligence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 780–795. Grubb, W. L., & McDaniel, M. A. (2007). The fakability of Bar-On’s Emotional Quotient Inventory short form: Catch me if you can. Human Performance, 20, 43–59. Joseph, D. L., & Newman, D. A. (2010). Emotional intelligence: An integrative meta-analysis and cascading model. Journal of Applied Psychology, 95, 54–78. MacCann, C., & Roberts, R. D. (2008). New paradigms for assessing emotional intelligence: Theory and data. Emotion, 8, 540–551. Mayer, J. D., Roberts, R. D., & Barsade, S. G. (2008). Human abilities: Emotional intelligence. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 507–536.

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Emotions, Universality

of

The issue of whether emotions are universal or culturally variable has been the subject of one of the most long-lasting and contentious debates in the history of the social and behavioral sciences. Three aspects to the universality of emotion correspond to three aspects of emotional responding: (a) The universality of subjective experience, or affect; (b) the universality of expression, or display; and (c) the universality of peripheral physiological responding, or arousal. Of these, the universality of the display has been the most contentious, the more so because it involves emotional communication. This entry discusses theoretical approaches to the issue of the universality of emotions—particularly, the universality of affect and display.

Behavioristic and Ethological Approaches In Charles Darwin’s 1872 work, Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, he argued that the expression and communication of emotion is a critical factor in the adaptation of species to the environment. These ideas were largely rejected by psychologists in the United States, where behaviorists emphasized publicly observable stimuli and responses in developing laws of behavior. The behaviorist critique emphasized learning in the control of behavior—classical and operational conditioning—and largely discounted concepts such as inherited, innate instincts (a.k.a. fixed action patterns). Behaviorists particularly rejected the study of emotion because subjective experiences of feelings and desires (affective qualia), a critical aspect of emotion, are, by definition, unobservable. Early studies of facial expression by Carne Landis seemed to support the behaviorist critique. For example, Landis observed that participants often smiled during unpleasant experimental tasks, and he concluded that facial expressions are not universally tied to specific emotions but rather are learned behaviors like any other. Darwin’s ideas influenced the study of the biology of behavior, or ethology, in Europe. Konrad Lorenz analyzed the principle of imprinting in greylag geese. Exposure to a releasing stimulus

during a critical period of development led to longterm changes in behavior. For example, Lorenz demonstrated that goslings confronted with a moving stimulus (e.g., Lorenz himself or a box on a model train) shortly after hatching followed that stimulus as they would follow their mother. Lorenz’s colleague Nikolaas Tinbergen added a hierarchical model of instinct that posited motivational potential unleashing a cascade of innate releasing mechanisms. And Karl von Frisch analyzed the meaning of the waggle dance in determining the flight paths of honeybees. The three investigators won the 1973 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine. The concepts and methods of ethology— particularly the observation of behavior in natural settings—were applied to human behavior and particularly to the analysis of the expression and communication of emotion by Irenaus EiblEibesfeldt. He identified innate responses to releasing stimuli in human beings, such as the caring response released by a “cute” infantile facial configuration, feelings of intimidation released by a threat stare and an accentuated shoulder-hip ratio, and sexual responses released by a low waist-hip ratio.

Theories of Facial Expression of Emotion In his affect theory, Silvan S. Tomkins combined the insights of the ethologists with increased appreciation of the role of facial expression in emotion. Tomkins posited eight primary affects (enjoyment–joy, distress–anguish, fear–terror, anger–rage, surprise–startle, disgust, interest– excitement, and shame–humiliation) associated with universal and pancultural (existing across all cultures) facial expressions. Tomkins suggested that facial feedback from one’s facial expression plays a causative role in the subjective experience of emotion. Tomkins’s work influenced both Carroll Izard and Paul Ekman, who sought and found empirical support for Tompkins’s view. In particular, Ekman and his colleagues carried out groundbreaking studies of the ability of preliterate tribespeople from the Fore tribe in New Guinea to judge six of the primary affects (happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, and disgust) from facial expressions posed by Americans, as well as the ability of

Emotions, Universality of

Americans to judge expressions posed by Fore tribe members. Ekman’s neurocultural theory recognized both innate and learned factors in facial expression: Primary affects are universal, pancultural, and associated with discrete patterns of facial expression. Their actual expression, however, can be altered by learned facial management techniques that follow culturally learned display rules. Ekman, Wallace Friesen, and Phoebe Ellsworth’s Emotion in the Human Face reviewed this research and provided detailed critiques of the Landis studies and other previous work on facial expression and emotion. For example, Landis’s observations of smiles in response to unpleasant events were seen as involving qualification of the expression of a negative emotion by a smile in accordance with display rules. Other facial management techniques included neutralization (e.g., a poker face), modulation, and masking. The research tradition begun by Tomkins revolutionized and energized the scientific study of emotion, but perhaps overemphasized facial expression as opposed to other displays, such as touch, eye movement, paralanguage, body movement, and posture. Also, the facial feedback hypothesis has been largely supplanted by demonstrations of the role of neurochemical systems associated with the brain’s limbic system (made up of the allocortex plus the amygdala) in the subjective experience of feelings and desires, independent of facial expression.

Alternative Views and the Role of Culture Primary affect accounts were questioned by theorists who follow dimensional views of emotion proposed early in the history of psychology by Wilhelm Wundt and later by Harold Schlosberg that referred to dimensions of pleasantness or unpleasantness, high or low activation, and attention or rejection. Lisa Feldman Barrett and James Russell suggested a two-dimensional circular model of emotion or a circumplex, with pleasantness–unpleasantness on the horizontal axis and arousal on the vertical axis. They further suggested that prototypical emotion or core affect can be represented as combinations of levels of pleasure and arousal. A problem with this view is that anger and fear are difficult to

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distinguish: Both are strong and negative. Also, though studies often find evidence for valence and arousal dimensions in emotion, they often fail to demonstrate satisfactory levels of goodness of fit, suggesting that important variance is unexplained. Hierarchical models containing both primary affects and valence and arousal dimensions have proven more successful. Some ethnological and anthropological scholars have criticized the hypothesis of emotion universality on the basis of cultural differences in e­ motion. However, culture-specific differences in labeling, regulating, and expressing emotion can be explained by the display rule concept. Scholars who take this view often emphasize linguistic differences in emotion, pointing out that some cultures have no words for some emotions or even for the concept of emotion itself. However, most basic emotion terms are easily translated, and the absence of a word for a given emotion in a given culture or language does not mean that emotion does not exist. For example, the Raramuri Indians of Mexico have only one word for guilt and shame but nevertheless differentiate between what is conventionally regarded as guilt (e.g., I did something bad) and shame (e.g., I am a bad person). Also, such extreme cultural relativism does not recognize emotion in animals, and it tends to discourage empirical research on cultural differences and similarities in emotion. The cultural-relativist critique does point to the necessity of understanding how emotions come to be labeled and understood. It is noteworthy that a major figure in behaviorism, B. F. Skinner, in Science and Human Behavior, acknowledged the existence of private events that “may be distinguished by [their] limited accessibility but not, so far as we know, by any special structure or nature” (p. 257). He presciently acknowledged that future technology might make private events objectively observable. Skinner noted that such events differ in their “degree of accessibility to the community” (p. 262), which makes it difficult to establish a reliable vocabulary to describe such events. In his operational analysis of psychological terms, Skinner noted that children learn about their subjectively experienced feelings and desires largely through feedback from others’ responses to their

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expressive behaviors. Ross Buck termed this phenomenon social biofeedback because the behavior of the other provides the child with feedback that, like biofeedback, is about a bodily process that is ­otherwise inaccessible to the child. The inaccessibility of subjectively experienced affects—feelings and desires—makes emotion unique from a social learning point of view. Specifically, the process of achieving emotional education and competence differs substantially from other forms of social learning. It requires emotional communication involving expressive display on the part of the child and social biofeedback on the part of the child’s partners in interaction. From this point of view, subjectively experienced affects are biologically based in interacting neuropeptide systems that underlie a “symphony” of feelings and desires that is accessible to the individual, although often ignored, much like the feel of one’s shoe on one’s foot. This affective symphony is usually playing in pianissimo but occasionally is aroused in a crashing, irresistible crescendo. Understanding and labeling aspects of this complex, subjective symphony requires emotional communication. Consider a young boy, Tommy, who is building with blocks when they suddenly fall. Tommy screams and throws a block. His mother, who is nearby, says, “Tommy, you are frustrated and angry, but you should not throw things. Go to your room and relax, and come back when you are feeling better.” In this brief statement, she teaches a great deal about the feelings Tommy was experiencing: They are caused by frustration, they are labeled “anger,” and when they occur, it is permissible to scream but not to throw things. Moreover, such feelings will subside if one relaxes. This emotional education fosters emotional competence— that is, knowing what to do and what not to do about feelings and desires when they occur. Conversely, a young girl, Jane, who behaves similarly, may not receive the same instruction. Her mother might say instead, “You are a bad girl!” Consequently, Jane associates her feelings not with a label and course of recommended action but rather with punishment and rejection. She may therefore learn to suppress or even repress such feelings. Later, at puberty, when new aggressive and erotic feelings and desires emerge, Jane

may be unlikely to express such feelings and desires to parents, teachers, or other adults who could provide social biofeedback. Instead, she may rely on watching others and modeling their behaviors, including the often-distorted sex and violence observable in entertainment media.

An Evolving View The analysis of emotional education and competence reflects a developmental-interactionist approach that regards other theories as correct as far as they go but as ultimately incomplete. Biologically based emotion and rational processes of learning, cognitive processing, and language interact in a developmental context. Subjectively experienced feelings and desires are universally felt but are private events accessible only to the respondent. The patterns of labels, explanations, and evaluations associated with feelings and desires vary greatly from culture to culture and are of great importance for understanding a given culture. In sum, the currently prevailing theories of emotion are correct but incomplete: Emotion is universal, and it is patterned and structured by culture. This evolving view of emotion has been greatly enhanced by the fact that its two essential aspects— affect and display—are accessible as never before. Brain-scanning techniques provide a technology that makes private, subjective feelings and desires more objectively observable than previously, as Skinner predicted. And inexpensive, low-light video technology makes observable and measurable the nuances of nonverbal expression and communication—body language—that were previously invisible. The two aspects represent natural kinds; that is, they are not artificial combinations invented by the human mind but rather are natural categories. However, they are natural kinds that exist at two levels. Affects result from the interaction of specifiable neurochemical systems, each of which contributes particular qualia, like musical instruments act together to make a symphony. Because these systems are dictated by genes, affects may be said to function ultimately as voices of the genes. They are a way by which genes can influence behavior. In contrast, displays are natural kinds organized by their functions in the ecology—that

Employee Motivation

is, physical and social environments. At this ecological level, emotions can be organized and defined in terms of specifiable, observable displays, including but not restricted to facial expressions. Ross Buck and Mike Miller See also Ekman’s Theory of Basic Emotions; Emotion, Detection of; Emotion, Evolution of; Emotion, Expression of; Emotion, Theories of; Emotion and Culture; Emotion and Motivation; Emotion and Scientific Reasoning; Emotional Intelligence; Social Emotions

Further Readings Breugelmans, S. M., & Poortinga, Y. H. (2006). Emotion without a word: Shame and guilt among Raramuri Indians and rural Javanese. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 1111–1122. Buck, R. (2010). Emotion is an entity at both biological and ecological levels: The ghost in the machine is language. Emotion Review, 2, 286–287. Buck, R. (2014). Emotion: A biosocial synthesis. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Feldman-Barrett, L., & Russell, J. A. (1999). The structure of current affect: Controversies and emerging consensus. Current Directions in Psychological Sciences, 8, 10–14. Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behavior. New York, NY: Macmillan.

Employee Motivation Employee motivation is a branch of human motivation that pertains to the study and management of person and situation factors that affect an individual’s attitudes, behaviors, adjustment, and achievement related to work, careers, and occupational health and safety. Given that the majority of one’s adult life is spent in a job, employee motivation is of great interest to workers, the organizations that employ them, the societies in which they live, and research scholars. This entry describes the history of research on employee motivation, the relationship between motivation and goals, the roles of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, determinants of employee motivation, and “directions.” During most of the 20th

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century, the study of employee motivation focused on the impact of motivation on technical aspects of job performance and on job attitudes. Changes in the nature of workforce, workplace, and sociocultural and economic conditions have considerably broadened the field of study. Contemporary research examines the determinants, mechanisms, and consequences of motivation in the contexts of work teams, job and work role transitions, different age cohorts and cultures, and specific forms of performance (such as innovation). Most employee motivation theories develop as advances in the basic sciences are applied to the work context. The primary contributions to the field during the 20th century were made by scholars in industrial and organizational psychology, industrial and labor relations, and human resources management. Subsequent expansion of the field has led to further contributions by other disciplines, including sociology, communications, and labor economics. Interaction among researchers in these fields has resulted in synergistic production of new theories and research methodologies that have served to identify previously unknown gaps in knowledge and have provided evidence-based findings about the effects of different organizational practices on employee motivation in different industries and parts of the world.

History and Trends Interest in and research on the topic of employee motivation can be traced over hundreds of years, but the systematic study of employee motivation in the United States dates to only about 100 years ago and can be organized into four periods of development. During the early 1900s, research on employee motivation focused primarily on the role of incentives in promoting job performance in male-dominated production jobs. The mid-1900s witnessed theoretical and empirical advances that focused on a broader array of person and situation motivational determinants and the processes by which motivation influences job performance. Cognitive models of work motivation, such as Victor Vroom’s seminal work on expectancy-instrumentality-valence (VIE) theory, demonstrated the importance of employee beliefs and attitudes about job conditions as important determinants of work behavior.

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Sociopsychological and sociotechnical systems theories addressed the impact that changes in technology and corresponding changes in social interactions exert on employee motivation. During the 1970s and through the end of the century, the expansion of behavior-based theories, from operant behavior modification to social learning and social cognition, spurred new research and management practices that focused on the impact of goal setting, self-efficacy, and self-management processes on job attitudes and performance. Since the late 20th century, theoretical work on employee motivation has concentrated on understanding how employee traits, work role design, leadership practices, and the sociocultural context of the workplace affect employee engagement and facets of job performance, such as organizational citizenship and creativity. The near-ubiquitous adoption of team and multiteam systems in accomplishing organizational goals, new communication technologies, and the steady increase in service sector jobs have encouraged research on understanding how differences in culture and work design affect intrinsic work motivation and worker stress and well-being. Findings show the powerful impact that the social context in which work is performed can have on sustaining employee motivation and performance. Although most research in work motivation continues to focus on the determinants of motivation among employed persons, changes in the employment contract and economic turbulence over the past two decades have also led to growing interest in the factors that influence an individual’s motivation to work and to seek opportunities for new skill learning at different ages in the life course. Research has indicated the importance of understanding work motivation from a personcentric rather than a performance-centric perspective. The growing focus on the role of a worker’s goals and resources and the fit of these factors to the demands of the job provides the conceptual foundation for research on employee motivation for skill development, job search following job loss, and postretirement work. Taken together, these trends are stimulating a paradigm shift away from understanding motivation as a single influence on job performance and toward understanding motivation as the result of complex

person–environment dynamics that affect job engagement and worker well-being.

Goal Choice and Pursuit Goals are an essential construct in work motivation. In modern management theory, employee motivation is maximized when the employee’s goals are well aligned with those of the team and the organization in which the employee works. However, work-related goals have long been recognized to vary both between individuals and within individuals over time. Individual differences in abilities, personality traits, self-efficacy, and interests, as well as situational factors (e.g., performance incentives, goal assignment by the supervisor), affect goal selection in a given context, such as the choice of task and task difficulty level. Theories that predict goal choice, such as VIE theory and attitude-behavior models of motivation, generally provide good predictive validity for employee choices between specific goals, such as the number of sales to be made by the end of the year. Also, when goals can be readily accomplished, such as choosing whether to accept a job in a new location or whether to retire, these models tend to provide good prediction of subsequent behavior. In many instances, however, accomplishing work goals requires sustained motivation over time. That is, individuals must maintain their commitment to the goal despite distractions and setbacks. Employees must regulate their environment, thoughts, and affective responses to frustration in a way that maintains effort toward goal accomplishment. Self-regulation or goal-striving theories delineate the factors and processes by which individuals manage their cognitions, affect, behavior, and the environment over time in order to accomplish difficult or complex goals. Findings from goal-striving studies show that sustaining high levels of employee motivation involves helping workers set specific, challenging subgoals, providing them with clear feedback about goal progress, and helping them maintain a moderate to high level of self-efficacy.

Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation Although there is broad agreement that extrinsic incentives for performance, such as pay, bonuses,

Employee Motivation

and time off frequently have a positive influence on employee motivation, the optimal arrangement and lasting impact of such incentives remains controversial. Theories of self, such as self-determination theory, posit universal motives for performing work that is enjoyable and interesting and provides a sense of competence, autonomy, and control. Research in the 1970s and 1980s showed that the presence of extrinsic rewards (such as performance-based bonuses) actually undermined intrinsic motivation, and subsequent research showed that the undermining effect was a result of the employee’s perceived loss of control. Researchers have found that extrinsic rewards may be positive or negative in their effects on intrinsic motivation depending on how they are formulated. Extrinsic rewards can be used to facilitate skill learning, particularly during the early and late stages of training when intrinsic motivation for the task may be low. In these situations, extrinsic rewards can encourage higher levels of competence that, in turn, encourage intrinsic motivation. Extensive research over the past five decades has addressed the potential for enhancing intrinsic work motivation by job or work role redesign. Building on mid-20th-century theories of job characteristics, findings show that employee motivation may be increased by changing the work role or job environment in ways that provide the individual with more interesting or meaningful tasks and greater autonomy in how work is performed. Alterations of the work role to enhance job performance by increasing intrinsic motivation have been particularly effective in jobs that involve knowledge creation or quality of service.

Determinants of Employee Motivation An employee’s motivation is determined by his or her personal characteristics and the situational constraints and affordances of his or her job, which interact and change over time. These diverse influences have been organized into three broad categories: (a) content, (b) context, and (c) change over time. Content variables include person-related variables, such as knowledge, skills, abilities, personality traits, motives, and values. Context variables refer to influences on motivation and performance that are external to the

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individual and associated with the environment in which the job is performed, such as job demands (e.g., technical skills, supervisory style, and organizational policies), nonwork demands and activities (e.g., caregiving and social clubs), and the broader sociocultural and economic context (e.g., workplace norms and job security). Change variables refer to the impact of time on personal attributes (e.g., learning) and situational factors (e.g., company reorganization). Theories that detail the impact of content (person) variables on work motivation and job performance have tended to focus on individual differences in relatively stable personality traits, such as extraversion, emotional stability, need for achievement, and conscientiousness. Many studies have used the five-factor model (FFM) of personality structure. Results of research investigating the influence of FFM traits on job performance indicate, for example, that persons who are higher in conscientiousness tend to set higher goals and monitor their goal progress more effectively than individuals low in this trait. During the past two decades, research on the role of personality on job performance has broadened beyond the FFM to consider how changes in affect (e.g., positive or negative affect), motivational traits (e.g., action orientation), and self-related traits (e.g., self-evaluation and personal initiative) relate to work motivation and job performance. Taken together, research to date supports the notion that person characteristics often play a role in employee motivation and performance but are not the sole determinants of work motivation. Rather, the effects of person characteristics on employee motivation must be understood as a joint function of the situation and person–situation dynamics. Individuals high in achievement motivation, for example, may show a high level of motivation to perform a routine job, such as cashier, initially (when motivation is supported by the challenge of learning a new job) but may subsequently devote less attention and effort to the job as the task becomes routine and is experienced as boring and lacking further challenge. Similarly, individuals high in extraversion may be less motivated to exert effort in a job that is performed in isolation from others than in the same job performed in a team context, where there

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are greater opportunities for rewarding social interactions. To effectively maximize employee motivation and minimize job stress, supervisors and human resource managers should regularly assess the fit between person characteristics and job demands over time. Motivation theories that emphasize contextual determinants have frequently focused on features of the work itself, such as whether the job affords the employee with a high level of task variety, feedback, or control over the tasks to be performed. However, the changing nature of work has placed greater attention on the effects of the sociocultural environment in which jobs are performed. Social information theories of job performance, for example, emphasize the impact of social norms and cues on employee perceptions of the value of increased job effort. Culture-based theories of performance have shown that a mismatch between extrinsic reward structures and more broadly held societal values (such as collectivism) may nullify the positive impact of such rewards on employee motivation. From a practical perspective, these studies suggest that supervisors and human resource managers who seek to enhance employee motivation in a workplace characterized by high employee diversity should pay greater attention to aligning work motivation incentives with the social values of their employees. It is important to note that employees, like organizations, change over time. Findings from experience-sampling studies show that employee motivation waxes and wanes as a function of numerous factors both big and small, including, for example, workweek fatigue, perceived task goal progress, and new work and nonwork demands. Research on the regularities in motivation cycles has identified periods when employees may be less attentive to job demands and more likely to produce an accident or make other errors. Another research variable is employee age. In an age-diverse workforce, age-related changes in employee abilities, skills, knowledge, and goals should be taken into account when developing human resource management practices to sustain employee motivation. Among younger workers, for example, opportunities for advancement and learning new skills represent potent incentives for the increased allocation of time and effort toward accomplishing job goals.

Among older workers, however, such strategies may be less effective than programs that provide the employee with opportunities to apply existing knowledge and skills to new problems and to enhance job security. In a related vein, researchers have begun to explore fluctuations in motivation related to nonwork demands and the depletion of self-regulatory resources, as well as the effectiveness of strategies for resource replenishment. Change dynamics related to employee motivation are likely to receive increased attention over the next decade as new methods for examining such change become available and the degree of complexity in simultaneous job demands increases. For example, employees increasingly work on multiple projects concurrently that require complex and interrelated resource allocation.

Challenges and Future Directions Understanding of the determinants and consequences of employee motivation for workers, organizations, and the societies in which they live has advanced dramatically over the past century. Although extrinsic rewards, such as pay, obviously continue to play a key role in workers’ decisions about whether and how much of their personal resources (time and effort) they devote to their job, such rewards often account for little of the variance in work motivation between employees. An array of motivation theories and associated research findings document the importance of understanding employee motivation in the dynamic context of worker goals and attributes of the sociotechnical environment in which the employee works. Despite this progress, many important questions about employee motivation remain. Most theories of work motivation were developed during the industrial period and tested with ­ ­predominantly male samples. As developed countries have moved into the postindustrial period, and workforce diversity has increased, it is unclear whether or how these theories will need to be revised. Changes in the nature of work have also created new organizational structures that emphasize social interactions and teamwork, not just taskwork, as critical determinants of job performance—for example, new work designs that

Employee Satisfaction

increase off-site work place greater demands on employee self-management. The changing nature of job performance, from production to innovation, further suggests that managers should rely more heavily on enhancing intrinsic employee motivation for performances that are less easily assessed. To date, most motivation theorizing and research has taken place in developed countries. Little is known about employee motivation in developing countries, where societal values and norms for individual effort on the job may be substantially different. Similarly, increasing longevity and improved health among older persons in many countries has led to a steady rise in the number of older workers. To sustain and improve motivation among this growing group of employees requires a better understanding of older workers’ goals and the development of incentive systems for learning new skills that appeal to these workers. Ruth Kanfer and Ilya A. Gokhman See also Achievement Motivation; Employee Satisfaction; Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Motivation; Motivation and Cognition; Motivation and Culture; Perception and Motivation; Performance Management; Unconscious Motivation

Further Readings Bennett, S., Miller Franco, L., Kanfer, R., & Stubblebine, P. (2004). Determinants and consequences of health worker motivation in hospitals in Jordan and Georgia. Social Science and Medicine, 58, 343–355. Cordery, J., & Parker, S. K. (2012). Work design: Creating jobs and roles that promote individual effectiveness. In S. W. J. Kozlowski (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Organizational Psychology (pp. 247–284). Oxford, England: Blackwell. Kanfer, R. (2012). Work motivation: Theory, practice, and future directions. In S. W. J. Kozlowski (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of organizational psychology (pp. 455–495). Oxford, England: Blackwell. Kanfer, R., Chen, G., & Pritchard, R. D. (2008). Work motivation: Past, present, and future. New York, NY: Taylor & Francis. Park, G., Spitzmuller, M., & DeShon, R. P. (2013). Advancing our understanding of team motivation: Integrating conceptual approaches and content areas. Journal of Management, 39, 1339–1379.

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Employee Satisfaction Employee satisfaction is an attitude that employees show toward their work that indicates how pleasurably they experience it. Employee satisfaction can be studied in general or with a focus on particular facets of work (e.g., colleagues, job content, and salary). The assessment of employee satisfaction has occurred since the 1930s, when the Human Relations School postulated the importance of satisfaction for job performance. Today, employee satisfaction is a key measure in research on work-related stress, psychological well-being, and the quality of work life. Since the 1930s, numerous researchers have studied employee satisfaction and proposed various theories to explain its causes and consequences. The most important theories are motivator-hygiene theory, job characteristics theory, equity theory, range of affect theory, and the dispositional approach. This entry reviews each of these theories.

Motivator-Hygiene Theory Motivator-hygiene theory emerged from Frederick Herzberg’s empirical studies in the 1960s. Herzberg asked employees to narrate incidents that either increased or decreased their work satisfaction and found that the factors cited as the determinants of satisfaction (i.e., motivators) differed from the determinants of dissatisfaction (i.e., hygiene factors). Herzberg concluded that satisfaction and dissatisfaction were not opposites but independent, requiring two separate scales. Although the absence of hygiene factors led to dissatisfaction and their presence was not enough to cause satisfaction, motivators led to satisfaction, though their absence did not cause dissatisfaction. The motivators identified in Herzberg’s research were achievement, recognition, responsibility, advancement, and the work itself. Company policy and administration, supervision, interpersonal relations, and working conditions were identified as hygiene factors. Herzberg concluded that employees had two different basic needs: the need to avoid being controlled by other people and the need to develop personally. As such, Herzberg’s theory is sometimes called the

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two-factor theory. Though follow-up research has not consistently supported the theory, it remains one of the most popular frameworks for assessing satisfaction. Furthermore, it has contributed to the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation and has stimulated research on job design and satisfaction.

Job Characteristics Theory Richard Hackman and Greg Oldham’s job characteristics theory (JCT) addresses how job design influences employee satisfaction. JCT models a causal relationship between five job characteristics and the employee’s psychological state. If this relationship is positive, then employee satisfaction increases, along with other outcomes, including motivation and performance. The five job characteristics are skill variety (i.e., the extent to which a job requires different skills and knowledge), task identity (i.e., the extent to which a job leads to a visible outcome), task significance (i.e., the importance of the job for others), autonomy, and feedback. JCT suggests that employees in jobs that rate high in these characteristics experience their work as meaningful, take responsibility for their results, and remain aware of their performance. A particular job’s satisfaction potential is moderated by the employee’s job-related knowledge and skills, need for growth, and need to find satisfaction in the work context, including social relationships and job security. Hackman and Oldham developed two instruments for evaluating jobs that are still widely used today: (a) the job diagnostic survey, which assesses jobs by direct contact with the jobholders themselves, and (b) the job rating form, which is used by external observers. Similar to the motivatorhygiene theory, JCT underscores the importance of job enrichment for satisfaction outcomes. Unlike the motivator-hygiene theory, however, JCT acknowledges that job enrichment does not automatically increase employee satisfaction. For example, an employee with a low need for growth, low context satisfaction, or low skills is less likely to experience satisfaction if his or her job is enriched. Though research has supported JCT, applying it to study employee satisfaction and to redesign jobs often raises the problem of

discrepancies between the evaluation of job characteristics by jobholders and external observers.

Equity Theory J. Stacey Adams’s equity theory stresses the roles of fairness and social comparison in employee satisfaction. Equity theory builds on the premise that employees strive for balance and seek to reduce tension and discrepancy. In addition, employees compare other employees’ efforts (e.g., hours worked and level of education) with their own in relation to rewards (e.g., salary and job status). Job satisfaction results when employees see that others receive a ratio of efforts to rewards that is similar to their own. Perceptions of being under- or overrewarded result in dissatisfaction. In these situations, employees adjust their efforts in order to equalize the ratio. For example, they might reduce their efforts if underrewarded or increase their efforts if overrewarded. Equity theory implies that organizations should avoid offering rewards that cause employees to feel inadequately rewarded relative to their peer groups (e.g., coworkers and others in their profession). Equity theory also sheds light on the consequences of dissatisfaction in the workplace and makes clear that the satisfaction potential of a job depends on the employee’s comparison of the self with the peer group.

Range of Affect Theory Edwin A. Locke’s range of affect theory (or value percept model) defines satisfaction as “a pleasurable or positive emotional state resulting from the appraisal of one’s job or job experience” (p. 1300). This emotional response reflects a dual value judgment: the discrepancy between what an employee wants and perceives himself or herself receiving and the importance of what the employee wants. As such, satisfaction results from the interaction between the have-and-want discrepancy and importance, as job-related factors (e.g., remuneration, responsibility, and working conditions) vary from person to person. With respect to importance, more important factors produce a wider affective reaction, ranging from great satisfaction to great dissatisfaction, than do less important factors. In other words, the personal

Epigenetics

importance of job-related factors determines the range of satisfaction judgments. Also, the discrepancy between wanted and received remuneration has a stronger effect on employee satisfaction for individuals who consider remuneration more important than for individuals who value remuneration less. Although this theory has been supported by empirical studies, it remains problematic because it does not explicitly consider exogenous factors that may account for differences in employee values (e.g., cultural and dispositional factors).

The Dispositional Approach This approach assumes that individual differences in disposition partly explain differences in job satisfaction. Although early research recognized dispositions as a potential source of satisfaction, not until the 1980s did empirical evidence emerge to support the dispositional approach. The earliest studies provided indirect evidence by showing that job satisfaction remained remarkably stable across situations, even when individuals changed jobs and employers. At the same time, twin studies showed considerable similarity in satisfaction levels, which suggests a dispositional source of employee satisfaction. Other studies have directly related personal traits to employee satisfaction by hypothesizing different classes of dispositional sources of satisfaction, the most important of which are positive and negative affectivity, core self-evaluations, and the Big Five personality traits. High energy, enthusiasm, and pleasurable engagement (i.e., positive affectivity) and distress, unpleasant engagement, and nervousness (i.e., negative affectivity) were found to predict satisfaction. Core self-evaluations, defined as fundamental premises that individuals hold about themselves and their functioning in the world (e.g., selfesteem, generalized self-efficacy, neuroticism, and locus of control) are also sources of employee satisfaction. Several studies have related the five-factor model of personality to employee satisfaction, and an extensive meta-analysis found that of the Big Five (i.e., neuroticism, agreeableness, extraversion, openness, and conscientiousness), only neuroticism and extraversion were related to satisfaction. Julia Brandl and Kurt Matzler

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See also Big Five Model and Lexical Trait Theory; Employee Motivation; Motivation and Personality; Personality Traits Versus Situations; Personality Types Versus Personality Traits

Further Readings Adams, J. S. (1965). Inequality in social exchange. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (pp. 267–299). New York, NY: Academic Press. Hackman, J. R., & Oldham, G. R. (1976). Motivation through the design of work: Test of a theory. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 16(2), 250–279. Herzberg, F., Mausner, B., & Snyderman, B. B. (2011). The motivation to work (Vol. 1). New York, NY: Transaction. Judge, T. A., Hulin, C. L., & Dalal, R. S. (2012). Job satisfaction and job affect. In K. S. W. J. Kozlowski (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of industrial and organizational psychology (pp. 496–525). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Locke, E. A. (1976). The nature and causes of job satisfaction. In M. D. Dunnette (Ed.), Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology (pp. 1297– 1343). Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.

Epigenetics With the explosion of molecular genetics and the recognition in 2003 by the journal Science that gene-by-environment (G × E) interactions were the second-most important discovery of the year (second only to the discovery of black matter in the universe), epigenetic research has expanded exponentially. Epigenetics has its roots in the Greek term epi and genetics, essentially meaning “over or above genetics”—that is, the resultant effect of controlling genes by turning them “on” or “off.” Epigenetics received a formal definition at a 2008 meeting of epigenetic researchers when they defined it as a stable “heritable phenotype resulting from changes in a chromosome without alterations in the DNA sequence.” In psychology and psychiatry, the term is often used to describe an interaction between genetic and environmental influences, particularly by psychologists interested

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in explaining the development of individual differences. Epigenetic discoveries have radically altered the common perception that simple Mendelian inheritance determines genetically mediated traits. This entry defines epigenetics, discusses how the process works, reviews its behavioral and neurobiological effects, and presents implications for research. From an evolutionary perspective, genetically mediated traits are selected for and maintained for decades, if not centuries, and as long as the environment remains stable, individuals with such traits remain fit to survive and reproduce. As environments undergo rapid change, however, these stable, genetically mediated traits can place a previously well-adapted species in settings where conspecifics are less able to compete and, as a result, the species may be at risk of extinction. Epigenetic modification of genetically mediated traits was likely selected to allow relatively rapid adaptation when environments change and to allow adaptation to a wide variety of environments. Some have posited that the relatively amenable nature of epigenetic regulation provides a substrate for selective processes on which selective processes can act.

Epigenesis in Development Epigenetic modifications of DNA can occur prenatally, early in life, and even in adulthood, allowing for swift change in DNA expression and relatively rapid changes in heritable traits. This can lead to a modification of previously stable behavior traits in a single generation, and when it occurs prenatally or early in life, it can result in epigenetic modification in the germ line, allowing the change to be passed on to the succeeding generation. In somatic cells, epigenetic changes can be widespread if they occur prenatally or early in life, or they may be somewhat limited if they occur later in development. Identical twins, for example, show limited epigenetic differences early in life while living together and experiencing the same stressors and experiences, but as twins age and spend time apart, they show increasing epigenetic DNA changes. The older in age, the longer pairs of twins are separated, and the more varied the experiences while separated, the greater the epigenetic modifications

to the DNA, although this may not be uniform across brain regions. Twin studies show that epigenetic methylation (see the next section) can appear early in life but then disappear later in development. Moreover, some genes show high epigenetic stability, whereas others show a high degree of instability, suggesting that epigenetic changes are not always stable and may depend on both the gene studied and consistency of environmental input. Such epigenetic effects may explain why, at times, monozygotic twin pairs behave differently and even appear different while possessing the same genes.

Epigenetic Mechanisms Epigenetic regulation of genetic expression, although not altering the DNA sequence, results when gene expression is altered via one of three processes. The most studied mechanism is methylation of a DNA sequence, which interferes with gene transcription, therefore altering its expression. Second, histone modification essentially binds DNA, preventing it from being “read,” thereby silencing the expression of a particular gene. Third, chromatin restructuring leads to modifications of gene folding, altering the gene’s capacity to unfold for transcription. These molecular changes typically result in reduced or silenced RNA production. A classic example of a long-term epigenetic change was demonstrated in people born in the Netherlands following the Dutch Hunger Winter of 1944–1945. Not surprisingly, children born during this period of malnutrition were smaller than expected and suffered an increased rate of a variety of illnesses. Unexpectedly, however, as these famine-exposed individuals became adults and had offspring, their offspring were also smaller than average, suggesting that the physiological processes of sustained hunger in the mothers led to an epigenetic change that was then passed on to their own offspring. The second-generation offspring were also more likely to suffer from a variety of diseases, such as diabetes and cardiovascular disease as well as various forms of psychopathology. Molecular studies of the famine-exposed, first-generation offspring showed increased methylation of a variety of genes implicated in growth and metabolic disease.

Epigenetics

These correlational studies were clues to the potential epigenetic regulation of developmental outcomes and led to a variety of experimental studies. The most well known was Michael Meaney’s now-classic study of infant rat pups that were neglected or well cared for by their mothers, as measured by rates of maternal grooming. Meaney and colleagues then measured glucocorticoid-receptor methylation, showing that the pups that received suboptimal grooming exhibited significantly higher methylation of the glucocorticoid receptor gene, resulting in increased stress and high glucocorticoid levels, thus establishing an epigenetic cause-and-effect relationship.

Behavioral and Neurobiological Effects of Epigenesis Numerous studies show behavioral and neurobiological changes resulting from epigenetic processes. Perhaps the best demonstrated mechanisms leading to epigenetic changes are related to early environmental adversity. Nonhuman primates have often been used to model the effects of early stress and parental treatment on the development and acquisition of psychopathology. Because they share with humans complex social norms that are developmentally acquired as well as parallel postnatal central nervous system (CNS) organization and development and because they show substantial genetic homologies (93%–94% in rhesus monkeys, for example), they are ideally suited to provide models of epigenetic effects. From an evolutionary perspective, there is a clear genetic road map for primate brain maturation. For normative brain development, young primates must have specific, critical environmental input during sensitive periods of development. This is often referred to as the experience-expectant brain, indicating that early in life, age-appropriate input must occur for the active formation of new synapses and the maintenance of connections between brain areas. Absent such input, systems that normally work together in concertlike fashion lose communication and proper regulation. Parental nurturing and instruction, as well as reprimand, result in appropriate communication between cortical and emotional brain centers. Studies of nonhuman primates, for example, show that parental absence during sensitive

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periods results in long-term, impaired CNS serotonin (5HT) functioning, particularly in frontal cortex regions. Epigenetically, the effects of parental absence during this period of sensitive brain growth are modulated by G × E interactions. Peeronly reared infants (infants reared without adults but with constant access to age mates) have shown impaired CNS 5HT functioning as measured by low cisternal CSF 5-HIAA concentrations but only if they possessed the short-allele variant of the serotonin transporter gene. Peer-reared subjects homozygous for the ancestral long-allele genotype have shown more or less normal CNS 5HT functioning. Subjects reared with their mothers are relatively unaffected centrally, even if they possess the short-allele variant of the serotonin transporter gene. This central effect leads to a variety of behavioral pathologies, including increased rates of aggression, depression, and alcohol abuse, and also results in impairments in coping with stressors. Most often, however, these deleterious outcomes are seen only in the peer-reared subjects with the short allele and not in peer-reared monkeys that were homozygous for the long allele of the serotonin transporter gene nor in mother-reared subjects, even if the mother-reared subjects possess the short allele, thus demonstrating a clear G × E interaction. A study assessing the effects of maternal aggression on infant serotonin transporter-gene expression showed reduced serotonin-transporter RNA expression in subjects that had received high rates of aggression from their mothers. When rates of methylation were compared between motherreared and peer-reared subjects, the peer-reared subjects showed increased methylation of a variety of genes in the frontal cortex. Similarly, in humans, children who were abused and developed posttraumatic stress disorder showed significantly higher rates of methylation 30 to 40 years later compared with adults who were not abused as children.

Implications At this point, research on epigenesis illustrates the growing sense that the phrase “genes versus environment” or the often asked question, “Which is more important, genetic or environmental influences?” are, in a broad sense, obsolete. This is

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particularly the case, given that genetic effects are not unidirectional and deterministic but depend on early experience, or put another way, environmental effects on behavior depend on the genetic background of an individual. This statement also serves to remind those interested in genetic and environmental influences that estimates of heritability are likely to be different when the subjects to be tested are selected from varied populations or different environments. It also suggests that epigenetic regulation of developmental processes, developmental norms, and the resulting behavioral and psychopathological outcomes are not static but are age related, environmentally sensitive, and potentially reversible. The epigenetic findings suggest that the timing and targets for intervention are critical to consider when designing programs of prevention or treatment. Epigenetic effects on CNS functioning, for example, and the resulting behavioral outcomes serve as an important bridge between genetic influences, life experiences, and ultimately, behavioral phenotypes, including vulnerability to adversity across the life span. Epigenetic changes may protect the individual or result in unfavorable behavioral and psychopathological outcomes. Attention to epigenetic processes is likely to facilitate understanding of the etiological basis of risk for psychopathology as well as resilience to stress. J. Dee Higley See also Adolescent Development, Theories of; Adulthood; Behavioral Development; Childhood; Cognitive Development; Culture and Development; Intelligence, Environmental Influences on; Intelligence, Heritability of; Language Development; Motor Development; Natural Selection; Nature Versus Nurture; Neurodevelopmental Disorders; Neuropsychology; Perceptual Development; Personality, Heritability of; Prenatal Development; Psychosocial Factors and Cancer; Stressors and Stress

Further Readings Bateson, P. (2014, November 19). Why are individuals so different from each other? Heredity. http://dx.doi .org/10.1038/hdy.2014.103 Higley, J. D., & Barr, C. S. (2008). Neurochemistry and behavior: Nonhuman primate studies. In T. M.

Burbacher, G. P. Sackett, & K. S. Grant (Eds.), Primate models of children’s health and developmental disabilities (pp. 161–200). New York, NY: Academic Press. Kinnally, E. L. (2014). Epigenetic plasticity following early stress predicts long-term health outcomes in rhesus macaques. American Journal of Physical Anthropology, 155, 192–199. http://dx.doi .org/10.1002/ajpa.22565 Mehta, D., Klengel, T., Conneely, K. N., Smith, A. K., Altmann, A., Pace, T. W., . . . Binder, E. B. (2013). Childhood maltreatment is associated with distinct genomic and epigenetic profiles in posttraumatic stress disorder. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 110, 8302– 8307. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1217750110 Wong, C. C., Caspi, A., Williams, B., Craig, I. W., Houts, R., Ambler, A., . . . Mill, J. (2010). A longitudinal study of epigenetic variation in twins. Epigenetics, 5, 516–526.

Epistemology

and

Sensation

Sensation refers to sensory experience, and epistemology is the philosophy or theory of knowledge, after the Latin episteme, meaning “knowledge.” Epistemology and sensation are side by side because they have a long, complex, and sometimes tense relationship, and the relationship is important for appreciating that what is theorized as knowledge can affect what is understood by sensation. The kinds of questions addressed in epistemology include the following: What is knowledge? What distinguishes knowledge from belief and opinion? What makes a statement true? What are the sources of knowledge? Sensation is recognized by epistemology as one of the sources of knowledge, alongside memory, testimony, reason, induction, and introspection, but this has not always been the case. It is a defining feature of modern epistemology that the senses provide valuable information about the world that cannot be reached through reason alone. However, because the senses can have an intensity and uniqueness that are difficult to describe, it is sometimes not entirely clear what they offer as knowledge or even whether epistemology has a secure and adequate grasp of them.

Epistemology and Sensation

This entry explains some of the key theories of sensation in the history of epistemology, from ancient Greece to the present day, and shows how competing views of the relation between philosophy and science inform contemporary ideas about the senses.

Sensation in the History of Epistemology The history of epistemology is to a large extent a history of different attitudes toward sensation in relation to knowledge. A variety of views existed in ancient Greek thought. The first systematic account to identify five senses was by Democritus (ca. 460–370 BC), but he saw sensory knowledge as imperfect. This is because sensation presents us with colors, sounds, smells, tastes, textures, and the like, when as an atomist, he believed that only atoms and emptiness truly exist. Plato (427–347 BC) also disregarded sensation, but this time it was on the grounds that it offered detail and change, when true knowledge of any subject consisted in perception of its singular, perfect, unchanging essence, which he called its “form.” Plato’s pupil Aristotle (384–322 BC) turned things around with yet another epistemology. Categories used in the production of knowledge, he maintained, were not derived from the forms but were ordering principles active in sensory perception. The value of the five senses lay in that each sense was a distinct form of perception (now called a “modality”) attuned to objects of a certain kind, which he termed its “special objects”—that is, sight is attuned to colors, hearing to sounds, and so on—and as such, contributed to the discrimination required for knowledge. The fact that there are objects that can be perceived by more than one sense—movement (e.g., it can be seen and heard), rest, number, figure, and magnitude, what Aristotle termed “common sensibles”—posed a problem that he sought to explain by claiming that the senses can form a unity. Modern epistemology is widely held to start in the 17th century with the French rationalist philosopher René Descartes (1596–1650). Faced with the conflict between the Catholic Church and early astronomy over the place of humanity in the universe, Descartes sought to establish the foundations of knowledge that were beyond doubt. He judged these to be the process of doubt itself and

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statements true by definition (e.g., 2 + 2 = 4)—in other words, certain operations of reason and ideas that reason could determine as “clear and distinct” without recourse to experience. The senses were dismissed as sources of knowledge because of their changeable nature. The devaluing of sensation because it displays difference and directs attention away from unity was redolent of Plato. Making reason the foundation of knowledge was opposed by John Locke (1632–1704), an empiricist, on political grounds: Reason is universal and, as such, does not assign sufficient importance to the particularities of experience, such as the fact that different communities live their lives according to different customs. In contrast to rationalism, empiricism argued that the foundation of knowledge was experience, and Locke introduced the notion that sensation comes to people in the form of “simple ideas,” ideas that cannot be broken down or preempted by reason because they contain unique, particular information from the world that only experience can supply. Aristotle’s assertion that there are five discrete senses was reinforced by Locke’s view that simple ideas are received according to their appropriate channels whose course should not be confused or corrupted if fidelity to the world is to be maintained. The contest between rationalism and empiricism brought epistemology to an impasse in the 18th century: Descartes could not build on his foundations without relying on the problematic notion of “clear and distinct ideas,” and the developers of empiricism, most notably David Hume (1711–1776), found that an epistemology rooted in experience could not explain abstract, structural concepts such as causality, number, and the self. Both systems had run aground as a result of their own internal commitments. To overcome the impasse, one of the most important moves in modern philosophy was made by the Prussian thinker Immanuel Kant (1724– 1804). Rather than see reason and sensation as competing, divergent principles, he introduced the idea that each requires the other for its own possibility. The concepts of reason must apply to sensation; otherwise, they become abstractions detached from experience and inclined toward the construction of dogmatic metaphysical schemes.

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Moreover, sensation requires conceptual organization supplied by reason; otherwise, it is blind and incapable of constituting knowledge. According to Kant, sensation is not just a series of channels receiving simple impressions but a facility whose capacity for sensitivity is shaped and organized by factors intrinsic to human beings’ situation in the world. The consequences of Kant’s philosophy are still being felt today, for it affects how people handle boundaries, especially the boundaries between thought and sensation and between self and world.

Contemporary Epistemology and Its Relation to Science In contemporary epistemology, there is a division between philosophical studies that seek to work alongside science, clarifying or critiquing its concepts, and others that are wary of how science is carving up human experience. This has come to be known as the analytic–continental divide. It originated in the “science versus metaphysics” contest between Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970) and Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) in 1929. For Carnap, the true view of the world was the scientific one, because of the success with which science explained the natural world and because scientific statements could be verified by experience. However, for Heidegger, science represented a forgetting of metaphysics because, in concentrating on what was measurable, it failed to address all the aspects of human life that eluded classification, including the structures beyond experience that allowed experience to arise in the first place. Present in Heidegger’s thinking were the Kantian notions that experience is organized by a structure that doesn’t necessarily divide up neatly into “human subject” and “world” and that with different structures in place, different forms of experience might be possible.

Analytic and Continental Approaches to the “Given” A case in point to illustrate the difference between analytic and continental approaches is the question What is given in experience? An analytic

answer is H. H. Price’s attempt to determine what seeing itself actually is. Price suggests that when something is presented to consciousness—for example, a tomato—although it can be doubted that it is a tomato, what cannot be doubted is that there is a red, round patch in front of the perceiver. This state of being present to consciousness Price terms “being given,” and the item that is present he calls a “sense datum.” Price’s endeavor to identify the constituents of sensation as they are experienced is widely criticized within analytic epistemology on the grounds that the notion of immediate acquaintance is undermined by its reliance on general, mediating concepts such as red, patch, round, and so forth. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) is frequently invoked to make the Kantian point that all references to sensation, no matter how private, presuppose a shared language. Nonetheless, the idea that we sense the world not directly but indirectly through intermediaries, still often referred to as sense data, has become a widely held view, known as the representational view. It persists because it is judged to be consistent with scientific, physical, and causal theories of perception that rely on units or intermediaries within perception. In terms of continental epistemology, due to interest from Kant to Heidegger in what makes experience possible, human subject and world are not assumed as the starting points, so there is no talk of a subject in receipt of the given. Instead, starting from the fact that there is experience, attention is paid to what happens when the flow of experience is interrupted by the decision to describe it. Sensation is not seen as a datum whose contents can be individuated. Rather, experience is taken to be a condition of being-in-the-world (the hyphens signal that the subject–object distinction does not apply), and focusing on and describing sensory qualities are taken as “interruptions” that are valuable because sensations have been identified and situated within a wider context. Here is an indication of the difference between the analytic and continental approaches: The former aims to clarify concepts; the latter to revivify experience or change what it is understood to be. Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980), a critic of Heidegger, arguably does the most to show how description stimulates

Erikson’s Theory of Psychosocial Development

sensation, with his philosophical novel Nausea being a highlight.

Epistemology and Sensation Naturalized? Developments in the science of sensation have had an impact on analytic epistemology. Attempts to understand the senses from a purely philosophical perspective have been challenged on the grounds that any understanding of sensation is theoretically informed, and scientific studies are regularly revising the concepts from which theories of perception are constructed. In philosophical terms, this means epistemology and sensation have become naturalized; that is, the facts and descriptions generated by science are more accurate than logical deductions based on observation. For example, one of the long-standing questions in the philosophy of the senses is, How many senses are there? A widely cited criterion for what counts as a sensory modality, offered by H. P. Grice, is the introspectable character of sensation—for example, first-person, inward ­ reflection on how seeing differs from touching. However, according to Brian Keeley, there is growing evidence from science that people possess a vomeronasal system, the ability to detect pheromones, without being consciously aware they are doing so. In other words, pheromone detection has no introspectable character. This suggests that Grice’s criterion has to be abandoned. However, it should be noted that Keeley’s definition of a sensory modality is one that, as he admits, is useful to science, couched in terms of wired-up organs that facilitate behavior with regard to a specific physical class of energy. Against this, some argue that such science-friendly accounts are effectively changing the subject and defining the senses in such a way that they are no longer what they are commonly held to be. It is a problem that is hard to avoid once it is recognized that knowledge is always structured by concepts. As soon as an instrument or definition or theory is applied, a commitment is made, a particular section of reality is placed in a frame and given a meaning and value, and everything outside that frame is subordinated or dismissed. On the plus side, it means that the study served by the frame can go ahead, the meaning and value can be put to

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work in a method, and conclusions can be drawn. On the minus side, a lot of reality is excluded that given a different frame, could have had a bearing, if not on the study in question, then on a related one. The situation is pertinent to epistemology and sensation because the senses change depending on which epistemology is adopted. Sensation can enter discourse only through description, but the description, far from merely capturing what is there, imposes its own frame, and emphasizes a particular character within, or even assigns a character to, sensation. This conundrum ensures that the relation between epistemology and sensation remains complex. Clive Cazeaux See also Auditory Perception; Culture and Cognition; Embodied Cognition; Extended Mind; Knowledge; Perception and Cognition; Perception and Epistemology; Visual Perception

Further Readings Abram, D. (1996). The spell of the sensuous: Perception and language in a more-than-human world. New York, NY: Vintage. Bernecker, S., & Dretske, F. I. (Eds.). (2000). Knowledge: Readings in contemporary epistemology. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Macpherson, F. (Ed.). (2011). The senses: Classic and contemporary philosophical perspectives. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Magee, B., & Milligan, M. (1995). On blindness. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Morgan, M. J. (1977). Molyneux’s question: Vision, touch and the philosophy of perception. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Sartre, J.-P. (1963). Nausea (R. Baldick, Trans.). London, England: Penguin.

Erikson’s Theory of Psychosocial Development Erik Erikson proposed an eight-stage sequence of psychosocial tasks, identifying key issues that are important to resolve in each stage for optimal personality development across the life span.

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Erikson’s Theory of Psychosocial Development

Drawing on Sigmund Freud’s work that emphasized the roles of biological and psychological processes in personality development, Erikson added social factors to his theory of optimal development. He further proposed that the development of personality does not end in adolescence, as Freud thought, but rather evolves across the life span. This entry discusses the historical backdrop to Erikson’s theory, key concepts, the theory itself, and practical applications.

Historical Context and Importance Erikson immigrated to the United States from Vienna as Hitler rose to power. With training in psychoanalytic child psychology that emphasized psychological conflict and dysfunction, Erikson focused on the question of what constitutes healthy personality development over the life span. He developed his eight-stage sequence of psychosocial tasks basic to personality development, and in 1950, the White House Conference on Children and Youth adopted this scheme to serve as the template for improving the lives of children and youth across the nation.

Key Concepts Personality development, in Erikson’s view, occurs through resolution of a sequence of eight psychosocial tasks over the course of the life span. According to the epigenetic principle, the resolution of one developmental task depends on resolution of preceding tasks and also sets the foundation for the resolution of subsequent tasks. Each task is described in terms of a polarity, with the outcome being a dynamic balance between positive and negative ends of the pole. Finally, optimal resolution of each task results in what Erikson terms a virtue, or an attitude toward life.

Erikson’s Theory of Psychosocial Development Erikson proposed the following series of psychosocial tasks in describing optimal personality development over the life span.

Trust Versus Mistrust

The first psychosocial task occurs in infancy. Through the minutia of everyday interactions between caretaker and child, the child ideally learns that most of his or her needs will be met most of the time. At the same time, the child learns to trust selectively. The virtue of hope emerges through optimal resolution of this task. Erikson believed nonoptimal resolution of the trust versus mistrust stage underlies many adolescent and adult psychopathologies. Autonomy Versus Shame and Doubt

This stage emerges in toddlerhood as the child develops motor skills sufficiently to move in selfdetermined directions and the linguistic ability to say “no.” Recognition of and respect for the child’s developing “I” by those in the social context are critical for optimal resolution of this task. However, the child must learn that he or she is not omnipotent. Thus, an optimal balance between autonomy and shame or doubt promotes self-regulation. The virtue of will emerges from this resolution. Initiative Versus Guilt

The virtue of purpose results from this stage in which the preschool child can imagine and initiate activities, although commonly there is little followthrough. The child also becomes cognizant of sex differences. A social context that fosters the child’s initiative while setting limits to certain activities is most likely to instill a sense of purpose, enabling some childhood dreams to become eventual adult goals. Industry Versus Inferiority

This stage emerges during the primary school years. A sense of industry enables the child to practice skills and carry activities through to completion. Ideally, social recognition and reward, with limited experiences of fallibility, help the child emerge from this developmental stage with the virtue of competence. Erikson believed that identifying with role models who are knowledgeable and proficient is crucial for optimal resolution in this stage.

Ethics of Therapy

Identity Versus Role Confusion

Developing a sense of personal identity arises in the face of the biological changes in puberty, where newfound psychological desires and social expectations prepare the adolescent to assume adult roles. Erikson stressed the importance of role experimentation and role confusion in achieving resolution. The virtue of fidelity—that is, the capacity to make and keep commitments—is the result.

work then involves the provision of a context of astute, age-appropriate interventions to facilitate optimal task resolutions to earlier psychosocial challenges. Educational systems should provide experiences primarily supporting a task’s positive pole and distancing the negative. The youth justice system can play a critical role in facilitating identity development during adolescence by avoiding negative labels that an adolescent in search of his or her identity may only too willingly accept. Jane Kroger

Intimacy Versus Isolation

Balancing the need for intimacy with isolation is the psychosocial task in young adulthood. For Erikson, intimacy involves sexual fulfillment but also committing oneself to a relationship of mutuality that cherishes identity. In Erikson’s view, genuine intimacy is not possible before an identity is in place. Experiences of isolation ultimately deepen one’s capacity for intimacy. The virtue of love emerges.

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See also Adolescent Development, Theories of; Adulthood; Childhood; Personality Development; Self

Further Readings Erikson, E. H. (1963). Childhood and society. New York, NY: W. W. Norton. Erikson, E. H. (1968). Identity: Youth and crisis. New York, NY: W. W. Norton.

Generativity Versus Stagnation

This mid-adulthood task involves the struggle between the desire to care—for one’s children, profession, community, and the world at large—and the desire for self-absorption. Here, one must learn to care for both oneself and others to achieve optimal resolution and the virtue of care. Integrity Versus Despair

This is the task of late adulthood. Integrity is the capacity to accept one’s life cycle without major regrets and to accept one’s own mortality. It also involves a feeling of comradeship with others living in distant places and times. A favorable balance results in the virtue of wisdom—the capacity for mature judgment and an understanding of one’s accidental place in the historical scheme of life.

Applications Erikson provided numerous examples of how the psychiatric, educational, and legal professions might benefit from this theory. Clinically, the therapist first must identify the psychosocial task at which the client’s difficulty arose. Therapeutic

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Therapy

The therapy relationship is a unique relationship, a one-of-a-kind relationship for the client and different from other types of professional relationships. It is powerful and delicate at the same time. Clients typically meet with psychotherapists to grow in and improve an area of their lives. At the same time, the relationship calls for a unique type of caring and concern for the client. Although the relationship may feel like a “friendship” to the client or have attributes of a close, emotionally intimate relationship, it is a complex professional relationship that requires special handling by the therapist. Most psychotherapists have proper motives and positive character traits to draw on, but there is still a need for sound ethical guidelines that uphold the work of psychotherapy. The ethics of therapy work toward two goals in psychotherapy: (a) to establish important, unique aspects of the professional relationship, and (b) to provide a foundation for the work that occurs between a therapist and a client. At a minimum,

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Ethics of Therapy

ethics in therapy are the agreed-on standards of behavior or norms that the therapist will uphold in the therapist–client relationship. Another way to say this is that ethics indicate what the therapist “ought” to do or how the therapist “ought” to behave in the therapy relationship for the benefit of the client. Otherwise, the client will not receive the benefit of therapy and, worse yet, may be harmed by the therapy process. This entry reviews several dimensions of ethics in therapy and discusses key ethical issues in the therapeutic relationship.

Multiple Dimensions Ethics in therapy can be discussed in terms of different dimensions or levels. The most basic dimension includes professional rules or guidelines. These have been established by a professional organization to which the therapist belongs. For example, the American Psychological Association (APA) offers the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct. Within this document there is a specific standard, Standard 10, that speaks to the ethics psychologists are to uphold while doing therapy with a client. These rules or guidelines that the standard includes communicate to the psychologist what ethical behavior and unethical behavior are in therapy. For example, it is unethical for psychologists to “engage in sexual intimacies with current therapy clients/patients.” Other mainstream helping profession organizations (e.g., the National Association of Social Workers, American Counseling Association, and American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy) have ethical codes of conduct that differentiate ethical or unethical behavior. When a therapist joins a professional organization or association such as the APA or the National Association of Social Workers, he or she agrees to uphold the professional code of ethics. Another dimension of ethics in therapy has to do with principle ethics. Codes of conduct or standards of behavior developed by professions such as the APA have limitations. Because therapy and the therapy relationship are complex and change in today’s culture is a constant, ethical rules of behavior or professional codes of conduct cannot address all the issues that therapists face. For example, a current issue is “telepractice” or therapy provided

over the Internet. The therapy professions are just beginning to address concerns that can arise when doing therapy in this mode. Current codes of conduct for therapists do not yet state what constitutes ethical and unethical Internet therapy except by extension from the traditional settings. Ethical principles, such as respect for autonomy (the right of clients to make decisions for themselves), beneficence (the responsibility of the therapist to do good work with the client), nonmaleficence (the therapist’s responsibility to do no harm to the client), justice (the responsibility of the therapist to treat the client fairly), and fidelity (the therapist remains faithful to the promises he or she made to the client), help therapists think through ethical dilemmas or problems when their professional code does not address the issue at hand. Virtue ethics is a further dimension of ethics in therapy. Whereas principle ethics speak to how a therapist will behave in interactions with the client, virtue ethics speak to the character of the therapist or who the therapist will be in the relationship. Virtue ethics includes character strengths, such as integrity, prudence, truthfulness, respectfulness, compassion, and humility. Overall, the disciplines that train psychotherapists (e.g., psychology, social work, counseling, and human development) and provide ethical guidelines or codes of conduct for psychotherapists to follow when working with clients agree on the primary requirements: competence, being proficient in one’s work; appropriate boundaries, remaining free of personal and professional conflicts of interests; confidentiality, maintaining privacy for the client; informed consent, giving clients important information up front so they can make wise decisions and truly consent to the work of therapy; beneficence, doing good for the client; nonmaleficence, avoiding harm to the client; justice, treating the client with respect and fairness; fidelity, being truthful and keeping promises to the client; and autonomy, respecting the client’s right to make decisions.

Key Ethical Issues in Therapy The relationship between the therapist and client ought to be different from other types of relationships. Key ethical issues in therapy are related to

Event Perception

the uniqueness of the therapy relationship and the outcome of treatment. They include confidentiality, boundaries, and competence. Confidentiality and the trust that comes with confidentiality form a cornerstone of the ­therapist– client relationship. The therapist agrees to keep confidential (with a few legal exceptions) the information received from the client. This means that whatever the client says to the therapist, as well as whatever the therapist says to the client, is kept between the two of them. Because of confidentiality, the client is in a position to share his or her deepest secrets with the therapist. Another key ethical issue in therapy has to do with the nature of the therapy relationship. The emotional intimacy that can occur within the relationship may feel like a friendship to a client. The therapist is kind, listens well, and communicates caring. The client may hope for reciprocal interaction, such as an equal level of self-disclosure and access to the therapist outside of professional visits. But the relationship is a professional one, and the therapist’s responsibility is to maintain professional boundaries. If a therapist becomes lax and begins to let professional boundaries slip, the consequences for the relationship and the client can be devastating. The third major ethical issue in therapy is therapist competence. This is an ongoing issue for professionals. It is expected by the profession and the public that therapists will maintain their competence and not seek to serve a client unless they are proficient or can receive the necessary supervision to achieve proficiency according to the standards of the profession. Sharon Anderson See also Contemporary Trends in Psychotherapy

Further Readings Anderson, S. K., & Handelsman, M. M. (2010). Ethics for psychotherapists and counselors: A proactive approach. Malden, MA: Wiley/Blackwell. Knapp, S. J., & VandeCreek, L. D. (2006). Practical ethics for psychologists: A positive approach. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Pope, K. S., & Vasquez, M. J. (2010). Ethics in psychotherapy and counseling: A practical guide. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

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Event Perception Event perception is how people process information as they experience events. What is an event? An event can be defined as a segment of time at a given location that is conceived by an observer to have a beginning and an end; events are the building blocks of human experience. The sorts of events that are best understood by psychology are everyday ones, such as visiting a doctor, watching a football game, or finding one’s way to a museum. Event perception relies on the dynamic interaction of perceptual and conceptual information in order to help individuals efficiently manage vast amounts of stimuli in the world. The ability to segment ongoing activity into meaningful units supports both memory for specific events and the performance of everyday activities, suggesting its important role in real-world functioning. This entry discusses the perceptual and conceptual processes involved in perceiving, assessing, and remembering events. Perceivers of events perform a number of impressive cognitive feats: They recognize where and when events take place and locate the components of events within that spatial and temporal framework. They recognize objects and people and categorize them as members of classes. They extract information about where things are moving and what actions are being performed. They make predictions about what may come next. They segment the continuous stream of activity into discrete, temporal parts. In doing so, people process a tremendous amount of information, rendering it as a manageable set of representations that enable them to remember events that previously took place, control behavior in the present, and plan for actions in the future. To do so, perceivers make use of two major kinds of information in events: perceptual features and conceptual features.

Perceptual Features Play an Important Role in Event Perception Some important perceptual features of events are the spatiotemporal context, objects and actions, and movement. One important set are those features that individuate objects, such as form, size,

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Event Perception

color, and salience. The objects in a scene are important event components in and of themselves, and they also provide information about what actions are being performed. For example, identifying a steaming coffee pot and a sizzling frying pan help perceivers to recognize a morning breakfast routine. Different objects afford different actions. Eggs, for instance, afford cracking, whereas coffee pots afford pouring. If an actor moves from interacting with eggs to interacting with a coffee pot, an observer of that action is cued to switch from representing an eggfrying action to a coffee-related action. Observers track the identities and locations of objects through eye movements, delays, and occlusions. Changes in objects are associated with the judgment that one event has ended and another has begun. However, object tracking is fallible; surprisingly large changes in objects can be missed. For example, when watching a movie featuring a conversation over coffee, individuals may fail to notice that one of the people at the table was replaced in the middle of the film. This effect is called change blindness. Movements of people and objects are particularly important for event perception. Perceivers make causal attributions based on physical movements. For example, when one billiard ball contacts a second ball and the second ball begins moving, viewers perceive the first ball as causing the movement of the second. Albert Michotte pioneered the laboratory study of this sort of causal perception using simple animations. He showed that two moving dots were sufficient to produce the perception of “launching,” just as in billiard ball collisions. Changes in the perceptual features of ongoing activity, such as points of high acceleration in ­geometric figures, are associated with event bound­ aries. Demonstrating these effects with the simplest possible stimuli is desirable, because doing so minimizes the contribution of conceptual knowledge about objects and settings to viewers’ perceptions. Animals and people move in characteristic ways, and biological movement has salience in event perception. One way it has been studied is by using point light displays. In these experiments, an actor is depicted only by points of light located at his or her joints. As these lights move, observers obtain information about body motion but little

static information about form, identity, or facial expression. Based only on the motion information, viewers are able to reliably infer the activity that the actor is engaged in and even the emotional state of the actor from the point light array. Characteristics of biological motion are also associated with the perception of boundaries in events. The ways bodies move when interacting with objects provide information about characteristics of objects. For example, motion trajectories differ depending on whether an object is heavy or light and whether it is sharp or soft. When people view the motion of others manipulating objects, this influences how they plan their own actions directed toward those objects. For instance, judgments of the weight of a box lifted by an actor tend to be inaccurate if viewers are lifting a box themselves; they judge the box to be lighter if they are lifting a heavy box and heavier if lifting a light box. Thus, perception influences action, and at the same time action influences perception.

Perceptual Features Cannot Solely Explain How Events Are Perceived Beyond perceptual features such as objects and movement, event perception is also influenced by top-down processes, such as inferring goals, tracking actions that tend to follow another action, and knowing how events typically unfold. When people perceive actions or movements, they try to understand the goal of the activity. For instance, when children are asked to imitate adults’ behaviors, they tend to do so in a way that does not directly recapitulate the demonstration but rather in a way that achieves the same goal as the adults did. Descriptions of events typically focus on the goals and subgoals of activities. For example, “doing the laundry” might be described by listing subgoals: sorting clothes, transferring them into the washing machine, adding detergent, and starting the washing machine. Studies of point light displays indicate that motion information is sufficient to infer rich information about goals. Converging evidence comes from studies using animations constructed from simple geometric objects. A simple cartoon of a triangle bumping into a circle is routinely described in terms of the triangle’s goal to bully the circle.

Event Perception

Sequential dependencies form another set of conceptual features that feed event perception. Certain actions tend to follow other actions reliably. For instance, grasping a knife is typically followed by a cutting movement. Studies in the laboratory indicate that viewers can learn new sequential dependencies and use them to guide their detection of relevant event features. Studies of infants indicate that they are sensitive to statistical dependencies. Because sequences of predictable actions tend to correspond to goals, infants may use this statistical information to help acquire adultlike representations of goals. One way that statistical information about activity may be encoded is in terms of knowledge representations called schemas. Schemas bring together information about how an activity typically unfolds with information about the typical actors and their goals, the typical objects involved, and the spatial and temporal settings in which the activity usually occurs. A schema for a fancy dinner might include units representing actions such as being seated, being presented with a menu, placing an order for food, being served the meal, having the dishes removed, being presented with a check, and paying for the meal. It might also include units representing the actors, such as diners and wait staff, and objects, such as menus, silverware, tables, and chairs. This knowledge can bias the perception of objects, people, and actions and can influence subsequent memory for the activity. Schemas are flexible and can be modified with experience. As airport security regulations have changed, for example, experience with partial disrobing, unpacking, and X-ray imaging at the security checkpoint has modified passengers’ schemas for air travel. Representations of sequential structure and goals and schematic knowledge about events interact with the processing of perceptual features of events. A brief glimpse of a long-handled object in the context of making breakfast in a kitchen may activate a “spoon” representation, whereas in the context of constructing a chair in a wood shop, the same visual input may activate a “chisel” representation. This can result from sequential dependencies between the preceding input and the glimpse, from representations of the actor’s goal to stir eggs or to turn a chair leg, or from schematic

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knowledge about the sorts of objects that typically occur in making breakfast or making a chair.

Event Segmentation Establishing a spatial and temporal framework for an event is a particularly important component of event comprehension. Things that happen in contiguous space and time are much more likely to causally influence each other than things happening at different places and times. Therefore, one of the more important things that perceivers do is segment the ongoing stream of activity into discrete events. If a researcher asks viewers to segment movies of everyday activity by pressing a button, the resulting segmentation is reliable across observers and within observers across time. Event boundaries tend to be identified at points in time with the largest changes in both perceptual features and conceptual features. Movement features are more closely tied to finer-grain segmentation than to coarse-grain segmentation, suggesting that observers rely on broader conceptual goals to understand the hierarchy of events. Specifically, events are segmented hierarchically, with finegrained event boundaries clustering into larger coarse-grained events. This organization tends to correspond to the hierarchical organization of goals, suggesting that it reflects the influences of conceptual as well as perceptual features. People spontaneously segment events into larger units when they are confident about what to expect; when they are less certain of how an event is going to unfold, they tend to segment it at a finer grain. One account of event segmentation proposes that it results from predictive processing during event perception. According to event segmentation theory, viewers are constantly making predictions about what is going to happen next in order to facilitate perception. For instance, suppose someone is hiking in the woods and stops to photograph a blue jay perching on a maple tree. If the person recognizes that the branches and the bird are holding still, he or she can use that information to infer that now may be a good time to capture the perfect photo. One’s stable working model of the event includes information about the relative location of the trees, path, and bird; the objects one has ready in hand for taking the picture; and one’s current goal.

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Evidence-Based Therapy

The event model enables a person to make adaptive predictions that may include envisioning the bird’s trajectory and anticipating its next landing point. Now suppose that the person begins receiving unpredicted information: Branches begin shaking, and he or she hears shuffling and sees a flash of brown fur. These perceptual cues produce a prediction error. When this type of error arises, the working model is updated with information from perception (e.g., detection of bear-related features) and event schemas (e.g., schemas for animal attacks) to form a new working model that may involve abandoning the bird-watching mission in favor of escape. Thus, at event boundaries, perceivers update their working models based on perceptual information and knowledge that are available to them. According to the account offered here, the segmentation of continuous activity into discrete events corresponds to this updating.

From Event Perception to Memory and Action Planning Event boundaries are points of convergence of perceptual and conceptual features. Evidence suggests they are psychologically privileged, serving as anchors for memory and action planning. Event boundaries are better remembered than other points within events (midpoints). For instance, a movie stripped of its boundaries is not remembered nearly as well as one presented without event midpoints. That is, the beginning and ending of a movie are recalled more readily than intermediate scenes are. The extent to which individuals segment an event normatively provides a unique prediction of subsequent event memory above and beyond individual differences in general cognitive factors such as working memory capacity, knowledge, and speed of processing. In addition, segmentation ability also predicts how well individuals perform everyday tasks. The way that individuals “scaffold” events—that is, overlay them—is related to memory for events and their enactment, consistent with the hypothesis that common mechanisms underlie the perception and enactment of action. Event segmentation also may have important clinical and applied implications. Individuals with neurodegenerative disorders, such as early Alzheimer’s disease, often

struggle with everyday event perception and memory. However, studies indicate that the extent to which individuals with neurological and psychiatric disorders can efficiently segment an everyday event is related to the quality of subsequent memory. Thus, a potential target for therapeutic intervention could be facilitating the identification of the event boundary structure. Jeffrey M. Zacks and David A. Gold See also Attention; Auditory Perception; Cognitive Neuroscience; Embodied Cognition; Neuropsychology; Perception and Cognition; Perceptual Disorders; Signal Detection Theory; Time Perspective Theory; Visual Perception

Further Readings Baldwin, D. A., & Baird, J. A. (2001). Discerning intentions in dynamic human action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5(4), 171–178. Johansson, G. (1973). Visual perception of biological motion and a model for its analysis. Attention, Perception & Psychophysics, 14(2), 201–211. http:// dx.doi.org/10.3758/BF03212378 Newtson, D. (1973). Attribution and the unit of perception of ongoing behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 28(1), 28–38. http://dx.doi .org/10.1037/h0035584 Sargent, J. Q., Zacks, J. M., Hambrick, D. Z., Zacks, R. T., Kurby, C. A., Bailey, H. R., . . . Beck, T. M. (2013). Event segmentation ability uniquely predicts event memory. Cognition, 129(2), 241–255. http://dx.doi .org/10.1016/j.cognition.2013.07.002 Zacks, J. M., Speer, N. K., Swallow, K. M., Braver, T. S., & Reynolds, J. R. (2007). Event perception: A mindbrain perspective. Psychological Bulletin, 133(2), 273–293. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.133.2.273

Evidence-Based Therapy Evidence-based practice is generally defined as the integration of the best research evidence with clinical expertise in making decisions about patient care. There are several definitions of “best research evidence” within therapy research and practice. A 1998 report by a committee of the Society of Clinical Psychology of the American Psychological

Evidence-Based Therapy

Association (APA) described a widely accepted criterion that in order to be considered “evidence based,” treatments must have demonstrated efficacy “based on randomized controlled trials (RCTs) or their logical equivalents” conducted by independent researchers (see the website of the APA Society of Clinical Science for a list of therapies considered to be evidence based). To date, RCTs evaluating psychological treatments have focused on treatment outcomes and not on treatment process. This lack of research on treatment process limits the conclusions that can be drawn about the specific characteristics of a treatment experience (e.g., the therapeutic relationship vs. a particular treatment ingredient) that are responsible for observed differences in treatment outcomes. This entry discusses the relationship between psychological theory and therapy practices.

What Is the Role of Theory Within Therapy and Why Is Theory Important? Human behavior and human suffering are obviously complex. Theory can be very powerful in explaining, predicting, and changing behavior. A theory can serve as a guide for therapists in identifying and determining how to effectively manipulate relevant variables in order to reduce a patient’s suffering. In addition, unanticipated, idiosyncratic events during the course of a client’s treatment (e.g., sporadic client attendance, scheduling conflicts, etc.) can affect how closely a therapist is able to adhere to a treatment protocol. Theory can guide the therapist in identifying the treatment ingredients—the process—that are critical to maintain when introducing or making adjustments to a treatment protocol.

Evidence-Based Therapies Are Predominantly Cognitive Behavioral Therapies The majority of evidence-based therapies are cognitive behavioral therapies (CBTs) rooted in learning theory, particularly operant and respondent (or classical) conditioning models of learning. A basic tenet of learning theory is that behavior is a product of an individual’s genetic and learning histories. Within this model, behavior includes

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everything a person does—the person’s observable behavior as well as what the person thinks and feels. The concept of an individual’s genetic history encompasses behaviors that are natural, biologically driven responses that are not learned (e.g., salivating at the smell of food or blinking at a bright light). Behavior that is the product of an individual’s learning history includes responses influenced by environmental experience via operant or respondent conditioning. The behavioral model posits that to the extent that behavior (including abnormal or dysfunctional behavior) is learned, it can be unlearned—that is, modified or eliminated.

Operant Conditioning Is the Theoretical Basis for Many Evidence-Based Therapies Operant conditioning has been applied to explain, predict, and modify both normal and abnormal behavior. The operant model is concerned with behavior in context, specifically, the relationship between events that reliably precede (antecedents) and follow (consequences) the occurrence of a ­particular behavior. B. F. Skinner labeled the continuous interaction of antecedent, behavior, and consequence over time the operant contingency. Contingent behavior–context relationships are said to occur when an antecedent reliably increases the probability that a behavior will be emitted, and the emitted behavior increases the probability that a consequence will be delivered. Consequences are defined based on their effect on behavior—that is, whether the consequence increases or decreases the probability that the behavior will be emitted in the presence of similar antecedents. If the probability of a behavior occurring increases over time (i.e., its frequency increases), then the consequence is labeled a reinforcer; if the probability of the behavior decreases over time, then the consequence is considered a punisher. The adjectives positive and negative are used to distinguish different types of reinforcers. If a behavior results in access to a stimulus (e.g., laughter follows the telling of a joke), the reinforcer is considered positive. If the behavior results in a reduction or removal of the consequence (e.g., the intensity of pain is reduced

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after a rock is removed from one’s shoe), the consequence is considered a negative reinforcer. Reinforcement contingencies are described based on their effects on behavior rather than their application per se. To illustrate, a teacher frowns and scolds a student when he or she whispers to other students in class. If the frequency of the student’s whispering increased over time, the teacher’s scolding would be said to function as a positive reinforcer. If the whispering decreased, the scolding would be said to be a punisher. Breaking the contingency between the problematic or maladaptive behavior and its reinforcement or punishment is the mechanism underlying many evidence-based, cognitive behavioral therapies.

reaction (unconditioned response) of salivating to the food. Classical conditioning has been applied to explain the conditioning of many physiological and emotional responses, including fear, anxiety, sexual arousal, and responses associated with drug abuse. For example, an individual who has experienced a traumatic event may later experience anxiety when in contact with stimuli (e.g., smells, sounds, or scenes) similar to those present during the traumatic event. The previously neutral stimuli have become conditioned stimuli in that they elicit a conditioned response (anxiety) in the absence of the traumatic event (the unconditioned stimulus).

Classical Conditioning Is the Theoretical Basis for Several Evidence-Based Therapies

Learning-Theory-Driven Psychological Assessment Indicates Appropriate Treatment Strategies

Classical conditioning involves learning by association. Classical conditioning explains the development of many normal and abnormal behaviors and provides the theoretical foundation for several evidence-based therapies (e.g., exposure therapy and systematic desensitization for anxiety). This form of learning was first described by the Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov (1849–1936). In experiments on the salivary and gastric secretions of dogs, Pavlov placed a bowl of meat powder in front of a dog and measured the volume of secretions naturally produced. During his studies, Pavlov observed that over time, dogs would start salivating when he entered the laboratory where they were kept, regardless of whether meat powder was presented. Pavlov’s chance observation of this phenomenon led to a series of experiments in which he systematically manipulated the presentation of a neutral stimulus (the sound of a bell or tuning fork) prior to presenting meat powder. He observed that by repeatedly pairing the sound with the presentation of the meat powder (an unconditioned stimulus because it naturally elicited a response), the dogs started to salivate when the sound was presented, demonstrating that it had obtained functional properties similar to the food. That is, the sound had become a conditioned stimulus (CS) in that it elicited a learned reaction (called a conditioned response) that was similar to the natural

The primary goal of theory-driven behavioral assessment (or functional analysis) is understanding the purpose or function that a particular problematic behavior serves for the client within his or her unique life context. By identifying regularities in the relationship between a client’s behavior (including both overt behaviors and private or internal behaviors, such as thoughts and emotions), the specific circumstances in which the client engages in the behavior (i.e., the presence of specific external or internal antecedent stimuli), and the consequences of the behavior (e.g., the behavior results in the escape from or avoidance of pain or in the experience of a pleasurable sensation), the function can be identified (i.e., the reasons the behavior is occurring are clarified). Functional assessment produces data that are prescriptive in that they imply strategies that are likely to be effective for producing behavior change in the client. Strategies include (a) the manipulation of the antecedent stimuli that are reliably associated with the occurrence of the problem behavior, (b) the manipulation of the client’s behavioral repertoire (e.g., increasing the frequency of adaptive behaviors and decreasing ­ problematic behaviors by teaching new behaviors incompatible with or that result in more powerful consequences than the problem behavior), and (c) the manipulation of the short- and long-term

Evidence-Based Therapy

consequences of the problematic behavior (e.g., withdrawing reinforcement or increasing reinforcement for desired responses). The following examples of evidence-based therapies illustrate the logic and strategies of theorydriven treatment. Dialectical Behavior Therapy for Borderline Personality Disorder

Dialectical behavior therapy (DBT) was developed by Marsha Linehan as a treatment for chronically suicidal clients, primarily women who meet diagnostic criteria for borderline personality disorder (BPD), which is characterized by deficits in emotion regulation skills and accompanied by problematic behaviors such as suicide attempts, nonsuicidal self-harm (cutting, burning, punching, etc.), and other out-of-control, impulsive behaviors (impulsive sex, excessive alcohol intake, etc.). These behaviors are conceptualized as regulating the overwhelming emotions experienced by the client. For example, from a DBT perspective, a client engaging in a suicide attempt is attempting to regulate seemingly inescapable emotions, such as sadness or hopelessness. Within the operantconditioning model, the problematic behaviors function to reduce aversive emotions (negative reinforcement). Additionally, suicidal behavior may be positively reinforced by family and friends, who provide sympathy and care as a response to suicidal behaviors. DBT aims to build the client’s skill repertoire in four domains: mindfulness, distress tolerance, interpersonal effectiveness, and emotion regulation. In this way, suicidal, self-harm, and impulsive behaviors are gradually replaced with skillful, alternative behaviors that are maintained by naturally occurring reinforcers in the client’s environment. DBT was designed to be delivered in an intensive outpatient setting in which the client attends both individual therapy and a skills group each week, typically over the course of a yearlong commitment to therapy. Clients engage in daily ­ monitoring of thoughts, emotions, skills, and problematic behaviors using a diary card. The generalization of skill use is encouraged by techniques such as out-of-session skills coaching via phone and family involvement. In sessions, therapists

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respond to client behaviors in particular ways to promote behavior change. Avoidance of emotion is a common in-session behavior. The client may attempt to change the subject when asked about emotion or respond with an inappropriate expression, such as laughing when describing sadness. The therapist might encourage accurate expression of emotion and prevent avoidance while validating how difficult it is to talk about painful emotions. Behavior Activation for Depression

Behavior activation therapy is based on the behavioral theory that people experience depression when they are in contact with proportionately more punishment than positive reinforcement in their daily lives. In 1973, Charles Ferster (1922– 1981) proposed that individuals operating in a deprived state of positive reinforcement and an excessive state of punishment develop behavioral patterns that avoid punishment and, in doing so, reduce their access to positive reinforcement. In 1974, Peter Lewinsohn reported a treatment based on this behavioral model that focused on increasing client access to positively reinforcing stimuli and events. This initial version of behavior activation has evolved to include increasing opportunities for positive reinforcement and conducting a functional analysis of avoidance behavior to determine how it limits the person’s repertoire for a fulfilling, goal-directed life. The goal of behavioral activation is to increase the client’s activity and reduce avoidance behavior so that the client has opportunities to contact natural reinforcers in his or her environment. Every client has a unique learning history and preferences, so treatment is necessarily individualized. Behavior activation starts with a functional analysis of client behavior. This is accomplished through daily activity monitoring, wherein the client records behaviors and moods throughout the day. A behavior that initially appears to be positively reinforced may, on further examination, be seen as avoidance. For example, a client might list the behavior of “playing video games” as a pleasant activity. A functional analysis would determine whether playing video games was functioning solely as positive reinforcement or if it was also negatively

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reinforcing (i.e., functioning to maintain avoidance of behavior that elicits aversive emotions, such as anxiety associated with an unfinished school project). In this example, if academic success is an important goal for the client, the therapist and ­client might work together to complete the school project. Ideally, the client would come to know when playing video games functions as a positive reinforcer versus a negative one, thus becoming his or her own behavior activation coach. Exposure Therapy for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder

Exposure is based on O. H. Mowrer’s (1907– 1982) two-factor theory, first published in 1947. This theory proposed that negative responses to reminders of the traumatic event are attributable to classical conditioning and that posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms are maintained by operant conditioning; the individual engages in negatively reinforced behavior to reduce exposure to painful reminders and emotions related to the trauma. This avoidance behavior results in a highly restricted behavioral repertoire. Behavioral restriction is a problem in that it reduces the individual’s opportunity to experience natural reinforcement, and the classically conditioned negative response to internal and external reminders of the traumatic event continue to produce great distress. Exposure therapy for PTSD, developed by Edna Foa and her colleagues, is conducted over several sessions and focuses on imaginal exposure to the traumatic event or on in vivo exposure to feared and avoided trauma-related stimuli, or it uses a combination of both. In imaginal exposure, the ­client repeatedly describes the traumatic event in the present tense in great detail within the therapy session(s), resulting in habituation or a reduction in negative responding to reminders of the events. In the in vivo exposure the client and therapist create a hierarchy of trauma-related stimuli, and the ­client progresses through these stimuli, weakening the negatively reinforcing contingencies. Clients may be instructed to engage in exposure exercises as homework between sessions. CBT for Panic Disorder

CBT for panic disorder has the central assumption that a heightened fear of anxiety symptoms is

responsible for the disorder. David Barlow and Michelle Craske hypothesized that anxiety symptoms are further aggravated by a generalized conditioning of fear responses to a range of stimuli, including internal (e.g., bodily sensations) and environmental events, the avoidance of stimuli that elicit anxiety, and biases in the processing of information (e.g., overestimating the risk of danger or unrealistically predicting catastrophe). CBT for panic disorder, as developed by Craske and Barlow, seeks to reduce the client’s fear of anxiety symptoms by employing a variety of techniques, including (a) education about panic and the role the client’s interpretation of bodily sensations and avoidance of feared stimuli plays in producing and maintaining anxiety, (b) self-­ ­ monitoring, (c) training in responses incompatible with anxiety (e.g., deep, diaphragmatic breathing rather than shallow breathing and deep-muscle relaxation), (d) cognitive “restructuring” (teaching the client to recognize when she or he engages in anxiety-inducing verbal behaviors and to engage in more objective interpretation of anxiety-producing experiences), and (e) exposure (i.e., collaborating with the client to arrange avoidance-reducing experiences over the course of 10 to 20 weekly individual sessions). Within the evidence-based therapy developed by Kristin Vickers and Richard McNally, a therapist working with a client experiencing panic attacks strives to provide the client with experiences that provide evidence that disconfirms dysfunctional beliefs about the danger of the anxiety symptoms. For example, a therapist might ask a client, who fears that he is having a heart attack when he experiences a racing heart and shortness of breath, to run in place in order to actually induce the feared bodily sensations in the absence of a heart attack. This technique is referred to as interoceptive exposure and promotes behavior incompatible with avoidance behavior. CBT for Depression

CBT for depression is the predominant e­ vidence-based treatment approach for depression and is rooted in Aaron T. Beck’s model of depression. According to this model, negatively biased information processing is a critical feature of depression and involves depressed clients’ negative view of themselves, their environment, and their

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future. In addition, distorted interpretations of events and maladaptive thoughts have a key role in maintaining depression. CBT for depression seeks to reduce the frequency of depressogenic internal language by teaching clients more objective evaluations of themselves, their environment, and the future. Treatment is typically provided within a structured, didactic format consisting of individual ­sessions in which therapists guide clients in identifying their maladaptive thoughts and depressive behaviors (e.g., social isolation, aversive interpersonal behavior, or inactivity), using techniques such as thought monitoring, homework assignments, and Socratic questioning of dysfunctional beliefs. The therapist might ask a client to develop hypotheses based on a high-frequency, dysfunctional thought and to gather evidence for and against the thought via planned activities throughout the week. The goal is to provide naturally reinforcing consequences for altered thinking within the client’s repertoire and the reduction of depressive behaviors. Jane E. Fisher, Christina Garrison-Diehn, Cyndy Soto, and Susan Longchamp See also Behavior Therapies; Classical Conditioning; Cognitive Behavioral Therapies; Cognitive Therapies; Measuring Treatment Outcome; Operant Conditioning; Pavlov’s Legacy; Skinner’s Legacy; Watson, J. B.

Further Readings APA Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice. (2006). Evidence-based practice in psychology. American Psychologist, 61, 271–285. Barlow, D. H. (Ed.). (2008). Clinical handbook of psychological disorders: A step-by-step treatment manual (4th ed.). New York, NY: Guilford Press. Beck, A. T., Rush, A. J., Shaw, B. F., & Emery, G. (1979). Cognitive therapy of depression. New York, NY: Guilford Press. Fisher, J. E., & O’Donohue, W. T. (Eds.). (2006). Practitioner’s guide to evidence-based psychotherapy. New York, NY: Springer. Linehan, M. M. (1993). Cognitive behavioral treatment of borderline personality disorder. New York, NY: Guilford Press. Marks, I., Lovell, K., Noshirvani, H., Livanou, M., & Thrasher, S. (1998). Treatment of posttraumatic stress

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disorder by exposure and/or cognitive restructuring: A controlled study. Archives of General Psychiatry, 55, 317–325.

Website APA Society of Clinical Science: http://www.apa.org/ about/division/div12.aspx

Evolutionary Psychological Perspectives on Human Nature, Critical Evaluation of Although there has been an explosion of interest in evolutionary perspectives on human nature in psychology and related social sciences, it was Charles Darwin himself who laid the foundation for the use of evolutionary theory in the study of mind and behavior. Indeed, Darwin famously concluded his groundbreaking 1859 book The Origin of Species by predicting the following: In the distant future I see open fields for far more important researches. Psychology will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation. Light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history. (p. 523)

This entry discusses the study of human psychology from an evolutionary perspective, with attention to potential misunderstandings that can arise therefrom. Although The Origin of Species and Darwin’s subsequent The Descent of Man clearly set the stage for an evolutionary analysis of human nature, it was Darwin’s 1872 publication of The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals that many see as the first sustained attempt to employ an evolutionary perspective to explain human psychological (as opposed to biological) phenomena. However, throughout the late 19th century and into the 20th, the critical response to Darwin’s ideas was mainly focused on the question of whether human existence was, in fact, the product of blind evolutionary processes. And even though psychologists often drew inspiration from Darwin’s

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ideas (see, e.g., John Bowlby’s theory of attachment), it was not until Harvard entomologist E. O. Wilson’s 1978 publication of On Human Nature that psychologists began to systematically explore the possibilities of incorporating Darwinian explanations directly into their accounts of human mental events and social behavior. Wilson’s work, which he termed sociobiology, was immediately controversial, given its reliance on biological reductionism and genetic determinism to explain human and animal behaviors. In time, however, Wilson’s sociobiology gave rise to what has come to be more popularly known as evolutionary psychology (EP). Despite adopting much of the basic theoretical framework of sociobiology and many of its assumptions about the nature of human nature, EP has typically placed less emphasis on identifying the direct genetic determinants of human behavior and focused more on identifying particular psychological (rather than biological or behavioral) adaptations and their consequences. Further, although there is still debate, many advocates of the evolutionary perspective in psychology deny any fixed or universal human nature distinct from that of other animals. Rather, many argue that human nature is simply, as Edouard Machery has stated, “the set of properties that humans tend to possess as a result of the evolution of their species” (p. 323).

Basic Premises of Evolutionary Psychology In general, advocates of EP do not see it as a distinct or specialized branch of psychology but rather as a broad, theoretical framework that can undergird and inform all branches of psychology. The basic premises of evolutionary psychology are these: a. Natural selective, evolutionary forces are solely responsible for the form and functioning of the human brain. b. The human brain houses the “evolved psychological mechanisms” that give rise to thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. c. These evolved psychological mechanisms are best understood as psychological adaptations that arose as solutions to problems that prehistoric hominid ancestors faced in the struggle for survival and reproduction.

d. Though useful to species in the distant past, these psychological adaptations, along with their cognitive, affective, and behavioral by-products, are now activated in modern environments that differ in important ways from ancestral environments. e. The workings of most psychological mechanisms are unavailable to consciousness. f. Human nature is best understood as the ongoing evolutionary product of both genes and environment. g. Most important, the notion that evolved psychological mechanisms have adaptive functions is a fundamental, and not an optional, component of EP as a comprehensive approach to psychological science.

There can be little doubt that evolutionary accounts of human nature have born scientific fruit in psychology, especially as they have given rise to a number of new avenues of research, breathed new life into some that had grown stale, and offered interesting new accounts of a variety of human behaviors. The other entries about evolutionary theory that can be found in this ­ encyclopedia—as well as a steadily increasing ­ number of textbooks, journal articles, research grants, and professional conferences—attest to the growing impact that evolutionary theory is having on contemporary psychology’s understanding of human nature and behavior. However, although novel hypotheses, research reports, and conferences are key features of the scientific enterprise— and when taken together, offer evidence for the popularity and possible viability of a particular theory—there are other, important considerations that should be taken into account when critically evaluating the utility and validity of psychological theories of human nature. For example, in critically evaluating a particular theory of human nature, it is vital to ask whether it is well grounded in empirical referents; whether it is able to adequately explain the ­phenomena of interest while preserving the rich reality of those phenomena; whether the logical structure of its explanations is, in fact, coherent and consistent; whether it, in fact, advances scientific understanding or is ultimately self-stultifying; and what, if any, intellectually problematic

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i­mplications are entailed by the theory’s basic assumptions. Of course, these questions do not exhaust the concerns one might have in critically evaluating a psychological theory, but they provide a useful starting point for careful reflection on some of the conceptual claims advanced by those in psychology seeking to articulate an evolutionary perspective on human nature. Although it obviously is not possible here to comprehensively explore the issues engendered by the questions just listed or to consider more than a few responses to the critical objections such questions might raise, it is nonetheless worthwhile to briefly discuss a few reasons to be cautious when considering the merits of evolutionary accounts of human nature and behavior.

Explanatory Basis: A Critical Evaluation Perhaps the most important starting point for critically evaluating any theoretical perspective that prides itself on its commitment to scientific empiricism is to ascertain whether, in fact, the principle explanatory constructs of the theory possess actual empirical content or material referents. That is, does the theory rely on the specifiable, causal properties of actual, physical mechanisms that exist in the real world in accounting for the effects observed there, or does the theory ultimately rely on metaphors and analogies to carry the burden of its explanatory work? In other words, is a given account of the causes of behavior one that can actually point to material referents as the causal mechanisms behind behavior, or does it, in fact, employ only analogues for such mechanisms—mechanisms only by way of metaphor? Evolutionary biology, for example, offers a richly articulated, causal account of biological change and adaptation to environment in terms of natural selection. In this account, the gene constitutes the empirically demonstrable material referent that is conceptually responsible for transforming heredity by natural selection from merely an intriguing simile (i.e., “adaptation is like a struggle to survive in a world of scarce resources”) to a verifiable mechanism capable of bringing about biological change over time. Contemporary evolutionary perspectives in psychology often seem to lack empirical referents with which to ground theoretical accounts of the causes

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of human behavior. As noted earlier, the central causal entities in most EP accounts of human thinking and behaving are “evolved psychological mechanisms,” entities presumed to be in some way “housed” in the human brain. Unfortunately, it is difficult to know how something psychological—such as a fear or a desire or a cognitive heuristic—can be literally housed in something physical such as a brain or strand of DNA or how it might have arisen from the meat and chemicals of such things in the first place. It is one thing to assert that a physical entity, such as a gene or a brain, is the causal mechanism for a physical event (e.g., gene transcription, cellular transformation, core body temperature, visual feature detection, etc.), but it is an entirely different matter to show directly how something physical is responsible for something psychological. However, this is what the notion of “evolved psychological mechanisms” is meant to do. It is relatively easy to understand how a biological characteristic might result from a prior biological condition (e.g., eye color from genetic sequences). It is also relatively easy to understand how a psychological characteristic might be caused by a prior psychological condition (e.g., racial prejudice from socialization in the cultural norms of the antebellum South). However, it is quite a different matter to understand how a psychological characteristic might be caused by a prior biological condition (e.g., the all-too-common abuse of stepchildren by stepparents from genetic propensities). Moreover, the problem is only compounded when trying to establish such causation originally in the evolutionary context of hominid ancestors struggling to survive in the ancient savannah. Indeed, the notion that there are such things as psychological mechanisms is deeply problematic inasmuch as a mechanism is fundamentally a physical entity and psychological phenomena, such as thoughts, feelings, and purposes, are not physical entities or, at least, not exclusively physical. A mechanism is a piece of machinery, an assemblage of moving parts, or a system of material components operating in sequence or in conjunction. In the natural sciences, a mechanism is a material linkage or ordered sequence of events in a biological, chemical, or other physical process. To speak of a psychological mechanism— evolved or otherwise—is, however, to employ a

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metaphor to make what is at best an analogy between the characteristics and operations of two fundamentally distinct realms (i.e., the psychological or cultural and the physical). Thus, to speak of psychological mechanisms is to conflate two different kinds and to do so as though there were no conceptual problems. For Alistair McGrath, “There is a massive gap between analogy and identity— and, as the history of science illustrates only too painfully, most false trails in science are about analogies which were mistakenly assumed to be identities” (p. 137). Ultimately, metaphors, no matter how intriguing or persistently and confidently employed, cannot sustain the heavy conceptual weight required of scientific explanation in psychology. However, the real problem for evolutionary accounts of human behavior that employ the concept of evolved psychological mechanisms is that they can never be more than metaphorical in nature because they are meant to account for phenomena (cultural, religious, intentional, emotional, etc.) that have no material—and, therefore, no genuinely mechanical—referents. Thus, EP accounts of human nature, culture, social behavior, and psychological events—despite the prevalent rhetorical use of mechanistic terms, such as devices, systems, and mechanisms—are impossibly far removed from the material referents necessary to legitimate an ultimately scientific account. A further concern in critically evaluating evolutionary accounts of human nature is the relationship between scientific theories and the phenomena they are meant to explain. As the philosopher of science Holmes Rolston III noted, science must “save the phenomena.” That is, scientific accounts must always take care to ensure that the phenomena they seek to explain are not in fact explained away. This requirement of legitimate science is particularly relevant to psychology. Unfortunately, one consequence of many evolutionary explanations of human behavior is that the experiential and relational richness of behavior is stripped of meaning and purpose and rendered in terms entirely alien to meaning and purpose. For example, John Tooby and Leda Cosmides have famously suggested that human beings are really just “self-reproducing chemical systems, multicellular heterotrophic mobile organisms,” and thus, “human minds, human behavior, human

artifacts, and human culture are all biological ­phenomena—aspects of the phenotypes of humans and their relationships with one another” (pp. 20–21). Here the richness of human psychological and cultural life is reduced to the products of chemical systems. In such a view, human purposes, meanings, and relationships are no longer explicitly human (psychological) phenomena at all but rather biological phenomena that serve intrinsically meaningless, biological purposes. Thus, the individual human experience of loving and being loved, for example, ceases to be a real phenomenon in its own right— and, as such, worthy of thoughtful attention and description—becoming instead just one more instance of the mindless playing out of reproductive imperatives situated in complex interactions of oxytocin, serotonin, and other neurotransmitters in the limbic system. What suffers in this account of such a central and important human phenomenon is the phenomenon itself, becoming little more than a sort of signpost that reveals the presence of a deeper and more substantial underlying chemical and mechanical reality. Insofar as contemporary evolutionary theories in psychology rely on biologically reductive approaches to explanation, they deform psychological phenomena in such a way that their fundamentally social, contextual, and moral richness disappears. A final concern relates to the question of whether an evolutionary account of human nature is not, in the end, self-stultifying and incoherent. A theory is self-stultifying when, once it is taken seriously, it eventually renders itself ridiculous, trivial, or absurdly inconsistent, and, therefore, useless. Because of their commitment to determinism, advocates of EP claim that all human thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are rooted in unthinking, nonrational, noncaring processes and causes aimed solely at ensuring successful reproduction of genes. As Patricia Churchland noted, Looked at from an evolutionary point of view, the principle function of nervous systems is to enable the organism to move appropriately. Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in the four F’s: feeding, fleeing, fighting, and reproducing. The principle chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where

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they should be in order that the organism may survive. . . . Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost. (pp. 548–549)

It is interesting that Churchland’s assertion that truth (“whatever that is”) comes in last is presumably an assertion of scientific truth. The irony of such thinking, and the reason it is self-stultifying, is that if thoughts are the results of determinate and mechanical biochemistry moving body parts toward reproduction, then the thought “nervous systems function to move body parts appropriately” is itself not a rationally defensible thought; it is not an idea whose origins can be traced to rational thinking at all. Rather, it is simply something the brain has unselfconsciously, mechanically, deterministically, and thus nonrationally produced under the particular circumstances at hand. The irony doesn’t end here, however, for whether one accepts the notion that evolutionary psychological theories of human nature are viable or rejects them as pseudoscientific would seem to depend primarily on which genes are influencing one’s current neurological interactions with the environment and, thereby, determining one’s thoughts and not on whether one has been, or could ever be, persuaded by evidence or carefully reasoned argument. To put it another way, if EP is supportable, then the only reason one would advocate it is because one must do so because of the causal force of individual evolutionary history coupled to the dictates of particular psychological mechanisms that one’s genes have generated as a consequence of their complex interactions with personal environments over the course of a lifetime. Likewise, critics of the theory—at least on an EP accounting—are really only critics because they do not happen to possess the particular mechanisms that would produce in them assent to the proposition that EP is a viable scientific theory of behavior. Although EP may have some insights to offer psychological theory in the way of deepened understanding of the sources of human behavior, a careful and critical evaluation of the internal consistency of its logical foundations, as well as its explanatory implications, is very much in order. Edwin E. Gantt

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See also Cognitive Evolution; Emotion, Evolution of; Evolutionary Psychology; Human Nature; Intelligence, Evolution of; Natural Selection; Nature Versus Nurture; Social Role Theory

Further Readings Churchland, P. S. (1987). Epistemology in the age of neuroscience. Journal of Philosophy, 84, 544–553. Darwin, C. (1859). The origin of species. London, England: John Murray. Machery, E. (2008). A plea for human nature. Philosophical Psychology, 21, 321–329. McGrath, A. (2005). Dawkins’ god: Genes, memes, and the meaning of life. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (1992). The psychological foundations of culture. In J. H. Barkow, L. Cosmides, & J. Tooby (Eds.), The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture (pp. 19–36). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Evolutionary Psychology Evolutionary psychology is an approach to psychology in which principles of natural selection are used to inform hypotheses about the information-processing structure of the mind. It can be applied to any area of psychology. This entry explains what information and natural selection are, discusses how they are combined to generate predictions, and then gives a brief summary of representative research and common misunderstandings of this approach.

Information Processing Information processing refers to a level of description below conscious awareness (phenomenology) and above physical implementation (neural wiring), in which rule-governed contingency systems are described in terms of their input, process, and output (called functionalism). All processes occurring in the mind, including emotion and motivation, can be described at this level, which means it does not refer just to “thinking” but to everything the mind does. At this level, there is no unitary agent making decisions (no “you,” no homunculus or little

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person in the head) but, rather, only rule-governed input-process-output systems. This is an engineering or functional approach to psychology and is exactly analogous to understanding a computer or robot in terms of its software. In this view, humans are “squishy robots” and the goal of psychology is to reverse engineer humans’ software.

Natural Selection Natural selection is the only known process that produces complex, engineered outcomes without someone’s being in charge. Instead, nature does the designing. The process works through the differential replication of design variants (more copies are produced of one design than another). To see how, consider an example of artificial selection: Suppose a farmer has cows, and some of them produce more milk than others, even when they all eat the same amount of food. (This represents variation in the design of milk production systems across cows.) The farmer—wanting to maximize milk production—selects for breeding the cows that produce the most milk. (Milk production is the selection criterion.) To the degree variation in milk production is inherited by calves, there will be a greater proportion of high-milk-producing cows in the next generation. (There is inheritance of milk production.) Given enough generations, with the same selection criteria applying every generation, the efficiency of milk production will be increased in all the cows. (The design of the milk production system in the farmer’s cows has changed.) In this example, the farmer doesn’t know (or care) about what’s going on inside of the cows or even the mechanism of inheritance. He or she cares only about the outcome: milk production. Natural selection works in exactly the same way. In natural selection, the natural consequences in the environment select the design variants: If you get eaten, don’t have sex, or fail to raise your offspring, your design will not show up in the next generation. If there is variation in design, nature selects some variants over others, and this causes change in design over time without anyone’s making design decisions. This process is slow and gradual compared with the human time scales, so it’s normal to feel skeptical that such a process could build anything big or

complex. The right way to think about this is like geology: Slow and gradual processes, like erosion, have very minor effects within an individual human lifetime, but over long spans of time, they accumulate to build massive geological features such as the Grand Canyon. It is over similarly long spans of geologic time that natural selection ­creates biological complexity.

Adaptations, the Products of Natural Selection The process of natural selection involves randomness and variation in design. But the outcome of natural selection is the opposite: nonrandom, uniform design. These “pieces” of design are called adaptations, and all living things can be thought of as bundles of adaptations. Because of the way natural selection works, all adaptations are designed to interact with the environment in such a way as to lead to the survival and reproduction of that design over multiple generations. (Technically, the things being preserved over time are genes; genes are theoretical constructs—you can’t directly see them—and can be best thought of as “units of design” that get transmitted with fidelity over multiple generations.) From a gene’s eye view, the time spent in each body is temporary; the gene will be in multiple, different bodies over time. And although genes are the things that continue to exist or not over time, all the action is in the environment: Did you get eaten? Did you have sex? In the same way the farmer didn’t care about the mechanism of milk production, the environment doesn’t care about genes; it just cares about outcomes and behavior over geologically long spans of time. Adaptations can be thought of as contingency systems, meaning they produce different outcomes given different inputs via a series of “if-then” rules. (Anglerfish, for example, develop into males only if they are exposed to an adult female at the right time during development; otherwise, they develop into females. This is an example of a developmental contingency.) Contingency systems include mechanisms of gene expression, developmental processes, immune systems, digestive systems, and brains. Natural selection (the interaction of longterm features of the environment with units of design) is the process that has engineered all contingency rules in all living things.

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Combining Information Processing and Natural Selection Brains are a bundle of adaptations that orchestrate rapid, complex, and delayed contingencies between an organism and the environment (which can technically include things both outside and inside the body envelope). Recall that information processing refers to thinking about the mind at the level of rules that orchestrate inputs and outputs. This is also precisely the way to think about adaptations. Whenever researchers study a rule-governed inputprocess-output device—such as those in the human mind—they are studying adaptations. All the adaptations in the mind are designed around the following logic: They take as inputs features of the environment present over long spans of evolutionary time, and they generate outputs that would have been selected for over evolutionary time. Therefore, to gain traction on what inputprocess-output systems exist in the mind, evolutionary psychologists focus on these questions: What problems did the mind have to solve over evolutionary time? What features of the world could and would work as inputs to these systems? What kinds of outputs would be selected for (favored by natural selection)?

Mental Software for Solving Specific Problems Modern Skulls House a Stone Age Mind

It takes a long time for natural selection to engineer the hardware and software that make up the human mind. This means the mind is designed to solve the problems of the past, not of the present day. Human minds (and bodies) are designed to solve survival and reproduction problems in the context of living as hunter–gatherers, living in relatively small groups, without access to grocery stores, modern medicine, police protection, birth control, or rapid intercontinental travel. Research in evolutionary psychology therefore focuses on the mental adaptations (software) that would solve the problems posed by survival and reproduction in such a world. These include figuring out what is safe to eat, figuring out who your friends and enemies are, finding and attracting a mate, assessing the quality and safety of food, cooperating and making gains in trade, making

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decisions about how to trade off your welfare for someone else’s, navigating, foraging, hunting, competing for status, learning artifact construction, and much more. Domain Specificity

This focus on solutions to evolutionarily recurrent problems (problems that show up with regularity over generations) has led evolutionary psychologists to a view of the mind that includes specific and detailed kinds of information processing. This is called domain specificity. Domain specificity contends that general processes—such as memory, logic, association, or reasoning—are not sufficient on their own to solve problems (if you build a robot with just these things, it would do nothing). Instead, additional processes are necessary that define the scope of inputs, provide solutions as to how the problems may be solved, and provide rules that determine the eventual outcome chosen. Domain specificity is also a central tenet of modern artificial intelligence and software engineering. In a domain-specific view, content matters (e.g., memory for faces may be fundamentally different from memory for landscapes), and the different kinds of memory and reasoning processes are designed around solving different evolutionarily recurrent problems. The “specificity” of domain specificity has a precise meaning: Informationprocessing systems must be specific enough to solve a problem but still general enough to deal with the variation that occurs. For instance, every human has had a mother, but who that mother is will be different in every generation. The processes that solve the problem of correctly identifying who one’s mother is on average over evolutionary time require using a set of cues in the environment that would be robust across generations (e.g., chemical cues during gestation and birth, chemical and visual cues during breastfeeding and caregiving, time spent during youth, etc.) but could not be as simple and specific as a prespecified face. Thus, the “specificity” of domain specificity refers to the specificity of the problem (identifying one’s mother) and class of things it applies to (mothers), not necessarily a specific individual thing out in the world (e.g., Bob’s mother).

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Relationships in the Mind Are Built Along Phylogenetic Time, Not Just Ontogenetic Time

In addition to domain specificity, evolutionary psychology contends that the software in the mind is constructed around relationships that occur over multiple generations and therefore cannot be based only on the information available within an individual’s life span. (The time across generations is called phylogenetic time; the time across an individual life span is called ontogenetic time.) Therefore, this perspective rejects views of the mind that assume or argue that all content in the mind is based on experiences within an individual lifetime (theories holding such views include blank-slate empiricism and behaviorism). One reason for this has to do with the criteria of success when it comes to solving a particular problem—that is, what counts as successfully solving a problem. One example of this is what criteria to use in choosing a mate. Across sexually reproducing species, natural selection designs organisms to find attractive in a mate those things that correlate over time with being a good parent. Being a good parent in this sense means producing more offspring, grandoffspring, great-grandoffspring, and so on. Therefore, knowing what criteria to use to choose a mate requires knowing which cues best predict the greatest number of offspring generations from now. But it is impossible for any single organism to determine which cues would be best within its lifetime, because the feedback from the environment will occur after death. (The organism can’t use one set of cues, count his or her grandchildren, then use another set of cues, count grandchildren, use a third set, count grandchildren, then after all this, select one set of optimal cues to actually use. This would be like trying choose the best life insurance policy by dying multiple times with a different policy each time.) Determining which criteria lead to the greatest number of grandchildren by trial and error simply doesn’t work; there is not enough information provided by the environment within an individual lifetime. Instead, natural selection can “see” across time and selects those organisms (design variants) that select the most predictive criteria. This particular example is intuitive, but evolutionary psychologists (and biologists) have discovered that nearly all problems—from successfully learning what to eat, to knowing what aspects of

others’ behavior to attend to, what to assign value to, and so on—require understanding relationships in the world across generations (over phylogenetic time). This view is not anti-ontogenetic or antidevelopmental, however. Ontogeny is the time course over which adaptations are designed to operate: Developmental adaptations build organisms via evolved contingency rules (such as in the Anglerfish example), and these developmental processes, in turn, build adaptations designed to react contingently with the environment over ontogeny (examples of contingency adaptations include gene expression/epigenetics, digestive systems, immune systems, and brains). Whereas the if-then rules organizing these adaptations are built over phylogenetic time, the outcomes of these rules occur over ontogeny. Evolutionary psychology therefore posits that different adaptations may be designed to express at different stages of the life span, thus disagreeing with strict nativist or “innate” theoretical perspectives that posit that things must be present at birth to be “evolved” or that all “core” structure in the mind is present at birth.

Sources of Hypotheses Behavioral Ecology and Hunter–Gatherer Societies

If the mind is designed to solve survival and reproduction problems in the context of making a living as a hunter–gatherer, then studying the life of a range of modern hunter–gatherers can be important for informing hypotheses about what problems the mind is designed to solve. Examining cultural, social, and subsistence variation across the globe also allows researchers to guard against biases (such as assuming the mind is designed to learn about the biological world from textbooks or examining only cooperation in modern market economies). For both reasons, evolutionary psychology is deeply entwined with the fields of anthropology, biological anthropology, and behavioral ecology. Selection Dynamics

Adaptations produce outputs that would have been selected for in the context of a small-scale

Evolutionary Psychology

hunter–gather way of life. But how do evolutionary psychologists know what outputs would be selected? This is where evolutionary biology and the subfields of evolutionary game theory and behavioral ecology come in. These fields examine this very question, exploring which design variants would do well compared with other design variants, given certain features of the environment (based on their behavior in the modeled world over multiple generations). The outputs that would be selected for are called evolutionarily stable strategies (or ESSs). These analyses are used to make informed predictions about the outputs that specific mental adaptations should produce.

Research Examples Psychologist Leda Cosmides and anthropologist John Tooby pioneered the approach of evolutionary psychology (along with Martin Daly and Margo Wilson), and their research provides some of its best examples. Cheater Detection

Selection dynamic models had suggested that design to cooperate in social exchange is an ESS, as long as the design is able to detect and respond to strategies that cheat (taking the benefits of cooperation without paying the agreed-on cost). Using an experimental method called the Wason Selection Task, Cosmides and Tooby were able to (a) demonstrate that there is software in the mind designed to detect cheaters, (b) identify the inputs to that software as well as its outputs, and (c) demonstrate that more domain-general reasoning processes could not account for the system’s outputs. Kin Detection

Selection dynamic models of kinship suggest that design to avoiding mating with close relatives (inbreeding avoidance) and upregulating benefit conferral will be selected for. Evidence for these outputs was found using diverse measures of sibling relations. These studies furthermore reveal the social inputs of the “sibling” category for this adaptation (how the mind knows who one’s siblings are), which includes co-residence for younger siblings and observing mother-infant interactions

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for older siblings. These inputs operated independently from participants’ explicit beliefs of who was a sibling. Racial Categorization as a By-product of Coalitional Categorization

Social psychologists had not found any contexts capable of reducing the degree to which people categorize others by their race, leading some to conclude that the mind may be designed to categorize others by race. However, “race” would not have been a feature of ancestral environments, making it unlikely that there would be adaptations for tracking race per se. Instead, racial categorization may be caused by an adaptation for tracking patterns of social affiliation and interactions (coalitions), and under modern circumstances, certain shared physical features may correlate with patterns of interaction over ontogeny and thus get picked up by this adaptation. Using the same implicit measure of social categorization that had always shown categorization by race, this evolutionary hypothesis led to the discovery of experimental contexts capable of reducing and in some cases eliminating categorization by race.

Misunderstandings Evolution Is the Opposite of Learning

Evolutionary psychology rejects the innate versus learned distinction. Many adaptations are designed to pick up information over the course of ontogeny, and “learning” is one of the core functions of adaptations. Viewing learning as the opposite of “evolved” is to commit to a false choice: That is, if phylogenetic relationships are important, then nothing that changes over ontogeny is the product of an adaptation. The truth is that adaptations are what allow changes over ontogeny. It’s Only “Evolved” if Monkeys Do It

A common misunderstanding is to think that traits in humans evolved only if nonhuman primates also share that trait. This implies that uniquely human traits are not the product of adaptations, which is false (all traits in living things are

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Exceptional Memory and Expertise

either the products of adaptations, by-products of adaptations, or entropy or noise from adaptations). Many species have unique adaptations; humans are no exception. The belief that uniquely human traits are not produced by nature (natural selection) is an archaic idea called the Great Chain of Being.

Intelligence, Evolution of; Language, Evolution of; Mating Strategy Evolution and Development; Morality and Moral Emotions; Natural Selection; Nature Versus Nurture; Pinker on Language; Sex; Sexual Selection; Social Cognition; Social Motives; Social Role Theory; Stigma; Unconscious Motivation

Further Readings

Dualism

A related misunderstanding is that in humans there are evolved and nonevolved parts of the mind and that a homunculus (a little man or woman in the head) drives behavior and is pushed and pulled by struggles between these evolved and nonevolved parts (with the evolved parts being not very well designed and the nonevolved parts using reasoning and logic to make decisions). This is an archaic view of the mind called dualism. Modularity

A related misunderstanding surrounds the notion of modularity, which means different things to different researchers, but generally refers to those things in the mind that feel easy, automatic (do not feel volitional), and are separate from things people can talk about (i.e., they do not occur in phenomenology). The misconception is that natural selection produces only things with these properties (“modules”). In fact, natural selection builds all the nonrandom information-processing systems that make up the mind. To suggest that natural selection builds only some of the structures (those with specific kinds of phenomenology) is to believe that certain parts of the mind did not evolve and to confuse an information-processing level of description (the level at which evolutionary psychology operates) with that of phenomenology (conscious experience). David Pietraszewski See also Aggression and Violence; Altruism; Attraction; Close Relationships; Cognitive Evolution; Consciousness, Origins of; Consciousness and the Unconscious; Cooperation; Cultural Evolution; Cultural Psychology; Culture, Origins of; Darwin, Charles; Emotion, Evolution of; Emotions, Universality of; Epigenetics; Gender, Evolutionary Perspectives on; Gender and Cognition; Gender Roles; Group Selection; Hamilton, W. D.; Human Nature;

Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1997). Evolutionary psychology: A primer. Retrieved from http://www.cep .ucsb.edu/primer.html Dawkins, R. (1976). The selfish gene. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Exceptional Memory Expertise

and

There are individual differences in adults’ ability to remember information, but some people’s memory is so vastly superior that it is referred to as exceptional memory. The main question is whether exceptional memory is due to qualitatively different factors, such as innate genetic endowment, or whether it is an extreme example of what normal memory mechanisms can attain under special conditions, such as extended experience and training. This entry reviews research on exceptional memory and discusses its structure and development. Most of the research in the 19th century and early 20th century primarily found that there were individuals who were able to rapidly memorize essentially meaningless information, such as lists of hundreds or thousands of random digits. Investigators discovered that those who exhibited superior memory did so only for information related to their domain of expertise. For example, international chess masters were able to exactly recall briefly presented positions from chess games with 20 to 25 chess pieces, whereas beginning chess players could recall only four to five pieces. But the extraordinary memory of the chess masters was restricted to meaningful chess positions and did not generalize to other types of materials. Similarly, when individuals with exceptional memory capability for digits were tested in the laboratory, their memory for meaningful information, such as stories and poems, was unexceptional,

Exceptional Memory and Expertise

and their superior memory was restricted to seemingly meaningless information, such as lists of random digits and words. Evidence emerged that superior memory for meaningless information represented memory skills that had been acquired over an extended period of time. The acquired nature of exceptional memory was supported by a series of training studies in which college students with average memory abilities were given several hundred hours of practice memorizing lists of random digits for immediate recall presented at a rate of 1 digit per second. These participants increased their recall performance for lists of random digits (i.e., the digit span) from around seven digits to more than 80 digits. These students and other individuals with exceptional memory for essentially meaningless information, such as lists of random digits and words, were studied in the laboratory, where they gave retrospective verbal reports immediately after each memory trial about their thoughts during the memorization of the presented information. On the basis of these verbal reports, investigators generated hypotheses about the cognitive processes mediating superior memory performance and designed special experiments to validate the hypotheses about the memory mechanisms used. The following sections further describe the essential characteristics of the structure and development of exceptional memory.

The Structure and Development of Exceptional Memory and Its Generalizability When individuals originally display their exceptional memory, they are in control of the presented information and might agree to publicly memorize only specific types of information—for example, digits. Thus, exceptional individuals were observed only while staring at the presented information. This led to the assumption that they were endowed with the ability to form vivid imagery copies of the presented information (what is often referred to as photographic memory). When these individuals were invited into the laboratory and instructed to memorize a range of different types of materials, researchers found that their superior memory was limited to a few types of meaningless materials. When individuals exhibit superior memory, it is difficult to study if and how memory performance changed during development and whether only

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certain people can develop such performance. To address these questions, William Chase and K. Anders Ericsson recruited two average college students to participate in memory training study. Both of the participants displayed immediate memory for digits in the normal range of around seven digits. After several hundred hours of practice, both participants were able to recall more than 80 digits in the digit span task. More important, an analysis of the participants’ posttrial verbal reports about their thought processes identified the cognitive mechanisms that mediated the increases in memory span. In the beginning, the participants simply rehearsed the digits before recall. The first major increase was associated with encoding groups of three digits in long-term memory (LTM) as running times because the participants were avid cross-country runners (e.g., 358 was encoded as 3 min and 58 s for a very fast running time for the mile). With further practice, the participants were able to store many threedigit numbers in LTM and developed techniques for retrieval at recall. These studies showed that exceptional memory can be achieved through acquired skills, which explains why it is limited to a certain type of material. Studies of individuals who had already acquired exceptional memory showed that they also encoded the digits before they were able to store them in LTM. For example, many individuals had memorized a fixed conversion table in which each twodigit number was associated with a concrete image, such as 11 being envisioned as a set of chopsticks. They had also memorized a fixed sequence of physical locations (known as the method of loci), such as different places in their home. Thus, 11 in a given list might be matched with the bathtub as an image of chopsticks piercing the soapsuds in the bathtub. The skilled-memory theory was proposed to account for the evidence of the structure of exceptional memory. First, exceptional individuals encode seemingly meaningless materials using meaningful information already acquired in their LTM. There is no reliance on photographic memory. Second, they acquire sets of retrieval cues to retrieve the encoded information from LTM. Several laboratory studies of individuals who have Guinness records for memorizing 30,000 to 60,000 random digits as well as memory tournament champions have concluded that exceptional memory is an acquired skill.

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Existential Theories of Personality

The skilled-memory theory was later expanded into long-term working memory (LTWM) theory to explain the exceptional performance that allows experts with no generalized memory superiority to reproduce briefly presented typical situations from their domain of expertise. Many types of experts need to keep abundant information accessible in working memory, such as when a doctor diagnoses a patient, a cab driver selects the best route for a passenger, and a chess master searches for the best move in a match. For example, a chess master will consider a number of different moves and countermoves in considerable depth, which requires the ability to form an accurate image of future positions deep into the match. The acquired nature of experts’ exceptional memory was further evidenced by brain scans of taxi drivers in London. The results showed how parts of their brains changed during their years-long memorization of some 25,000 streets in London. K. Anders Ericsson and Jong Sung Yoon See also Long-Term Memory: Processes; Long-Term Memory: Structures; Short-Term and Working Memory; Working Memory, Improvement of

Further Readings Ericsson, K. A. (2003). Exceptional memorizers: Made, not born. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 233–235. Ericsson, K. A., & Kintsch, W. (1995). Long-term working memory. Psychological Review, 102, 211–245. Maguire, E. A., Spiers, H. J., Good, C. D., Hartley, T., Frackowiak, R. S., & Burgess, N. (2003). Navigation expertise and the human hippocampus: A structural brain imaging analysis. Hippocampus, 13, 250–259.

Existential Theories Personality

of

Existentialism is a branch of philosophy that arose in 19th-century Europe. It was largely a reaction against rationalism, science, and the industrial revolution, which were seen as cold,

dehumanizing forces out of touch with the emotional realities of lived human experience. Existentialists emphasize that, first and foremost, every person is alone in the world, without any blueprint or road map to rationally guide decisions or the sense of self. No set of religious or secular doctrines truly determines a person’s existence. One is left only with the troublesome awareness that I am here, I exist right now, unguided in an indifferent world where death is the only certainty, and I must somehow choose my own destiny on the fly. The influence of this existential attitude on 20th-century personality theory emerged most notably following the Holocaust of World War II, which had caused many people—psychologists and nonpsychologists alike—to question human nature and the assumption that life has any meaning to it beyond the momentary, arbitrary decisions people make. This entry reviews both qualitative and quantitative existential theories of personality. Existential theories of personality may be identified as qualitative or quantitative. Whereas qualitative theories apply existentialism to day-to-day human experiences and struggles, quantitative theories emphasize the use of laboratory methods to test causal mechanisms related to the existential condition. The former are arguably nonscientific approaches and constitute the majority of theoretical work found in the existential sections of personality textbooks. The latter have served as the basis for empirical laboratory studies since the early 1980s.

Qualitative Theories Qualitative theorists’ primary goal is to characterize, express, or otherwise get in touch with what it is like to be a person facing particular existential challenges. Sometimes these theories consist of purely philosophical efforts to develop and organize concepts related to existential states. Terms such as angst, authenticity, and bad faith were created by renowned existential thinkers and have become common parlance in modern society. Existential psychologist Ludwig Binswanger introduced concepts by which to characterize three primary components of conscious experience: Umwelt (bodily experience), Mitwelt (social

Existential Theories of Personality

experience), and Eigenwelt (the inner experience of having experience). For many theorists, words and introspection alone do not suffice to express what it means to be a person. Most prominent, qualitative, existential theorists prefer a more hands-on and compassionate approach to the challenges of human life and often have strong ties to clinical psychology and other therapeutic practices. Notable figures—such as Irvin Yalom, Viktor Frankl, and Rollo May— oriented much of their theorizing around existential psychotherapy, a philosophical approach to therapy that assumes that inner conflict ultimately stems from difficulties in confronting the givens of existence. In this view, personality is a reflection of the ways people fail or succeed in dealing with universal human anxieties. That is, should one be unwilling or unable to cope with mortality, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness, the self will be overcome with anxiety. And even if one can muster enough hardiness and courage to engage the facts of existence, the risk of faltering remains. The pursuit of security from existential anxiety is thus a lifelong challenge and the principal process by which personality acquires its form and function. Importantly, qualitative theorists differ in their views of mental health. Although existential ­psychotherapists emphasize the possibility of cultivating a healthy personality, others criticize designations of mental health as obscuring rudimentary struggles that all humans share. For example, in the 1950s, Scottish psychiatrist R. D. Laing famously antagonized his profession with claims that psychiatry was inhumane and had failed to consider the existential context in which so-called madness arises. He sought to transplant himself deep into the mental and social world of individuals suffering from schizophrenia, going so far as to set up a townhouse asylum literally run by his schizophrenic patients for 7 weeks. This resulted in the discovery of unique and debilitating forms of anxiety, including engulfment (fear of being absorbed into others), implosion (fear that one’s own emptiness is a vacuum that the world will rush into), petrification (fear of turning into something dead or robotic), and depersonalization (treating others like mere things to make

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them less threatening). Arguably, by approaching schizophrenia as a torturous struggle for existence—and not solely as a disease—Laing ­ managed to develop a valuable model of personality distortion.

Quantitative Theories Qualitative theories tend to focus on philosophizing and applying existentialism to the concrete, emotional lives of individuals. In contrast, quantitative theories tend to have an analytical focus on identifying specific, testable mechanisms by which existential concerns motivate human behavior. Although existential themes featured prominently in the works of early, eminent psychologists such as William James and Sigmund Freud, systematic laboratory investigations of existential processes began only in the 1980s. Since the early 2000s, this work has been organized into a distinct subdiscipline within psychology known as experimental existential psychology, or XXP. XXP organizes diverse views of existential processes around a set of conflicts termed the existential big five: death, isolation, identity, freedom, and meaning. The most extensively examined conflict has been death. Terror management theory states that people routinely deny their anxiety about mortality by clinging to grand, seemingly immortal ideologies and visions of themselves as cosmically special. Being a functioning person in the world requires psychologically “transcending” one’s mortality. Experiments supporting this view have shown that when individuals are reminded of their death, they act and think in ways that defend their cultural ideologies and bolster their sense of selfesteem. This research is often interpreted as showing that much human thought and behavior is a response to death-related anxiety—a functional, yet ultimately deluding, effort to replace the basic fear of annihilation with a securing sense of continuance. Various theoretical platforms have enabled study of the other four conflicts of XXP. Regarding isolation, the theoretical construct of “I-sharing”— the belief that others share one’s subjective experience—has been identified as a mechanism by which people cope with feeling alone in the universe. Experiments show that people generally

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Extended Mind

gravitate toward those who I-share with them (e.g., giggling simultaneously) and do so especially intensely after being experimentally primed with thoughts of alienation. Regarding the struggle to maintain a coherent identity, research on “defensive zeal” has shown that if people are cued to think about particular uncertainties about themselves, they try to compensate for the resulting threat by expressing particularly robust certainty about their attitudes and self-concept as a whole. A similar process unfolds following threats to freedom. Research based on reactance theory has shown that threatening people’s beliefs about their freedom motivates them to reassert their free beliefs and attitudes more strongly than if their freedom had not initially been threatened. Further, work related to self-determination theory suggests that people experience greater well-being when their choices arise from internal preferences (what one intrinsically enjoys) rather than what others might offer (e.g., a monetary incentive). But freedom is a double-edged sword. People are motivated to feel that they have free will, yet too much freedom leads to feelings of groundlessness and uncertainty. For instance, studies of the “tyranny of choice” indicate that people experience more satisfaction with their decisions when choosing from a small rather than a large number of alternatives. Finally, research shows that people are disinclined to see the world as a meaningless wasteland. On a daily basis, individuals interpret otherwise indifferent objects and events around them as sets of coherent relationships and stories with impressive order and significance. This desire to find meaning seems deeply ingrained in the human mind. Studies of “coherence formation” show that people can unconsciously perceive meaningful associations between concepts, even when they cannot consciously, logically explain such relationships.

Comparing Both Theories Over time, existential theories of personality have shifted focus from conceptual development and therapeutic application to rigorous empirical study in laboratory contexts. However, the influence of both qualitative and quantitative approaches remains potent, with each feeding the other. Both

approaches emphasize the human need to come to grips with basic problems of existence; both characterize this need as one born from confrontation with indeterminacy and vulnerability; both concentrate on struggles with anxiety; and both see this struggle as fundamentally incomplete, requiring painful labor for the duration of the human life span. But by way of contrast, qualitative theories focus more directly on engaging with an individual’s emotional experiences and coping efforts and thus, arguably, are truer to the original intent of existential philosophy than their more analytic, quantitative counterparts. However, quantitative theories have the advantage of speaking in scientific terms and may thus be more amenable to integration with a wider range of scholarly disciplines. Spee Kosloff and Spencer Irish See also Humanistic Theories of Personality; Motivation and Personality; Phenomenological, Existential, and Hermeneutical Therapies; Schizophrenia; Self-Esteem; Terror Management Theory

Further Readings Greenberg, J., Koole, S. L., & Pyszczynski, T. (2004). Handbook of experimental existential psychology. New York, NY: Guilford. Laing, R. D. (1969). The divided self. New York, NY: Pantheon Books. Yalom, I. D. (1980). Existential psychotherapy. New York, NY: Basic Books.

Extended Mind The thesis of the extended mind states that the mind is not exclusively an intracranial phenomenon. That is, the mind does not end at the skull, let alone the brain, and extends beyond an organism’s body, to include physical objects and sometimes other people. In its extreme, this thesis is not currently widely adopted, but since the 1990s, a growing number of psychologists and philosophers of mind have found its arguments difficult to ignore. Indeed, although there may be nothing for most psychologists, philosophers of mind, and

Extended Mind

laypeople more obvious than that the mind is “in the head”—even, specifically, in the brain—this position has not always been mainstream. For Homer and the ancient Greeks, thinking was described as something emanating from the diaphragm. In the same vein, in English one still speaks of “heartache” in the context of emotions instead of “amygdala ache.” Even the term consciousness once had a more public sense, the remnants of which are evidenced still in phrases such as “social consciousness” or “ecological consciousness.” According to proponents of the thesis of the extended mind, locating the mind, something by definition nonspatial and immaterial, in any place whatsoever is wrongheaded and only a remnant of Western philosophical prejudices. This entry discusses the concepts of internal and external minds and the implications of the idea of the extended mind.

Internal Minds Traditional cognitive scientists assume a divide between the internal mind and the external world. The internal mind represents the external world. Within this mind are intermediary thoughts, beliefs, and perceptions about the external world. Thoughts have intentionality; that is, they are about things. Cognitive scientists also hold that the mind supervenes on the brain. This means that the mind (and whatever processes are of interest to psychologists) could not exist without the brain. Further, if two brains were physically identical, there would be no difference in the minds each supported. Two identical minds, however, could be realized with physically different structures (e.g., a brain made of neurons or a computer made of silicon chips or something even more alien). The physical differences of the supporting structures would not matter because cognitive psychologists are also wed to a form of functionalism. To understand functionalism, consider the following example: The president of the United States, Congress, and the Supreme Court function with respect to one another according to rules set forth by the U.S. Constitution. An understanding of how a bill is signed into law and then is struck down can be understood without an account of how a president, for example, is physically realized by a specific individual in the flesh. A political

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scientist or historian could give a civics lesson without specifying any of the biochemistry of the person who fulfills the role of president. According to a functionalist account of the mind, an explanation is complete when it specifies the role an internal thought plays in a complex web of interactions among the external world, the thought itself, and some action. There is no requirement to do neuroscience. One can do psychology without any knowledge whatsoever of how the brain works or that it exists at all. One’s internal thoughts cause one’s actions in and on the external world. Having a thought with one kind of content (“I’m hungry”) leads to one course of action (e.g., making a sandwich) and having a thought with different content (“I’m thirsty”) leads to another (e.g., getting a drink). Presumably, it is the specific representational content of a thought that accounts for its role in a subsequent action, and without such content, there would be no rational explanation of why one does what one does. This approach has been immensely productive and has benefited from advances in linguistics, cognitive development, and computer science. One of the central draws of adopting a broadly functionalist account of the mind is the computational theory of mind and its solution to a long-standing and vexing philosophical dilemma. If one thinks of the mind as a kind of software running on a brain, manipulating symbols according to internal rules, one can dissolve the so-called mind–body problem. A computer program can be run on different physical computers. If the hardware is of the right kind, even a human mind could run on it. No one finds there to be a great metaphysical mystery when one boots up a computer. Perhaps the relation between mind and brain is something mundane like that.

External Minds Traditional cognitive scientists hold that an internal thought is about the external world, and it may seem intuitive that the content of this thought (i.e., what it is about) would also be internal. A thought is in some sense a copy of the world held internally and, therefore, separate from that external world. The symbol is separate from the symbolized. Decades before the thesis of the extended mind,

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Extended Mind

however, philosophers of mind introduced a kind of content externalism, in which mental processes may be internal to an individual but the content of these processes did not supervene on physical properties intrinsic to the individual. In other words, the contents of an individual’s beliefs or the meanings of one’s words depend crucially on aspects of the external world such as one’s social community or physical history of interaction. How one means a word depends on others’ use of the word, and what one is referencing physically requires knowledge of one’s actual past interactions with a particular physical world. What a thought is about causes one action as opposed to another (e.g., making a sandwich or not). But if what a thought is about or how one means a word depends on properties outside the brain, then, famously, “meanings just ain’t in the head.” The thesis of the extended mind takes this content externalism further and proposes a cognitive externalism in which cognitive processes themselves (not just their contents) are external to the skull and brain. Cognitive processes extend to include physical tools such as pens and hammers, symbols and representational structures such as language and maps, and even the minds of other people (e.g., memories held by a close family member to which one has access). Cognitive processes must be realized physically, but an encased brain or computer is not necessarily enough, and a psychology that studied only the brain would be incomplete. This argument follows rather naturally from functionalism: What matters are the roles that cognitive processes play in one’s life, not how they are physically realized. There is nothing in principle that requires cognitive processes to be in the head. Brains (or something like them) are, of course, necessary for cognitive processes, but a complete neuroscience is, in itself, insufficient for an account of the psychological. An additional argument for the extended mind is parity. Imagine someone with a memory deficit who is forced to write down important information such as directions or a telephone number in a notebook. Later, when he or she consults this notebook for a piece of information, proponents of the extended mind argue that this retrieval of information is a kind of memory (e.g., the process of recall). If retrieval of information were to happen “in the

head, or brain,” it would be called memory without hesitation. There seems to be nothing but some kind of old prejudice that limits only what’s in the head being called memory. By argument of parity, retrieval of what is in the head and of what is in the notebook ought to be considered on equal footing. Newer arguments for the extended mind, in contrast, do not rely on parity or similarity between external processes and some internal processes. Instead, perhaps the most convincing reason for considering the mind as extended is to consider how people in the real world (not in the laboratory or the philosopher’s armchair) think and actually behave and solve problems. Human beings seemingly enhance and complement their internal processes with external artifacts (e.g., a smartphone or calculator). One can readily imagine what a debilitating blow it would be to lose one’s smartphone or to be unable to use a calculator on an exam as planned. Allowing someone tools such as a pencil and a piece of paper allows one to externalize symbols to solve complicated multiplication or long-division problems that would be difficult or impossible otherwise. Rather than needlessly internally represent all the elements of a problem in one’s head, it is also possible and natural to offload some elements to external storage. By manipulating parts of the external world, one can make a problem simpler, especially without having to rely on limited internal resources. In a ­ ­videogame such as Tetris, for example, rather than mentally rotating a falling piece and scanning the visual environment for the best placement of the blocks on the bottom of the screen before acting, it is much easier to act first, to rotate a piece on the screen and simply visually recognize where it ought to go. It turns out that this is what actual gamers do. Internal mental rotation can be replaced by an external rotation that fulfills the needs of the cognitive task at hand. No proponent of the extended mind argues that a tool such as a joystick, smartphone, or piece of paper actually thinks, feels, perceives, or acts. They are not capable. Cognitive processes do not occur in objects external to the individual. These tools simply participate in a larger physical network of activities and objects (e.g., with the individual’s brain, body, etc.) to accomplish some task. Psychology is properly the study of these extended systems.

Extended Mind

Implications of the Extended Mind According to proponents of the extended mind, the mind is not simply embodied or embedded in a physical environment. This simply preserves the gap between an internal mental realm and an external world. If the mind is truly extended, then objects otherwise taken to be external to the ­individual help constitute what it is capable of. That is, without one’s notes, one cannot remember what one wanted to say in just such a way to get one’s point across. Without a calculator or a slide rule, scientists and engineers could not think to get to the moon. External aids are not optional crutches that one could do without, without loss. Tools and the technology of one’s culture allow and enable human minds to accomplish cognitive feats and so play a principled role in converting thought into action. If one’s cognitive processes are, indeed, supported by physical objects “external” to the individual (i.e., minds are realized by elements ­ beyond the brain and skull), this poses exciting new ground for study in the cognitive and brain sciences, including psychology and philosophy. It also serves to highlight the formative role of one’s surroundings in cognition and cognitive development. The claim from extended-mind theorists is not that “nurture” or the environment is causally important. Of course it is. The claim is that one has

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a right to a certain physical and sociocultural environment because, without such, one’s mind is stunted and deprived of what it needs to function and flourish. Without proper study of the physical and symbolic tools at one’s disposal, extendedmind theorists hold that psychology would be ignoring a large portion of its subject matter. Christopher H. Ramey See also Artificial Intelligence; Cognitive Evolution; Cognitive Neuroscience; Consciousness, Functions of; Consciousness, Origins of; Consciousness and the Unconscious; Creativity; Embodied Cognition; Embodied Grounding; Heuristics for Memory and Decision Making; Operant Conditioning; Problem Solving; Reasoning and Decision Making; Relational Theory; Unconscious Motivation

Further Readings Adams, F., & Aizawa, K. (2008). The bounds of cognition. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. J. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis, 58, 7–19. Levy, N. (2007). Neuroethics: Challenges for the 21st century. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Menary, R. (Ed.). (2010). The extended mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Robinson, D. N. (2008). Consciousness and mental life. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

F research by Hans Eysenck, also reported in 1947. He collected ratings by psychiatrists of 700 male patients being treated at a London hospital. The items concerned patients’ social histories, personalities, and symptoms. An exploratory factor analysis of these ratings found evidence of two personality dimensions that Eysenck labeled neuroticism and introversion-extraversion. This work led to the development of the Eysenck Personality Inventory, which added a third dimension, labeled psychoticism.

Factor Analysis and Personality Theory For more than 80 years, researchers have employed exploratory factor analysis in an attempt to identify the basic dimensions of personality. The assumption is that the correlations among various personality characteristics will provide evidence of underlying dimensions. So, for example, a dimension such as introversion-extraversion will lead to positive correlations between traits that reflect being outgoing (e.g., friendly, talkative) as well as negative correlations between these characteristics and traits that reflect being introverted (e.g., shy, unsociable). This entry reviews the use of factor analysis in studies of the structure of personality. One early attempt to identify the basic dimensions of personality using exploratory factor analysis was by Raymond Cattell in 1947. He began with the approximately 4,500 personal trait descriptors identified by Gordon Allport and Henry Odbert’s earlier review of Webster’s New International Dictionary. Cattell reduced this list to 35 bipolar variables that he employed in factor analyses, finding evidence of 12 factors underlying the items based on self-reports, ­ratings by others, and observational data. These factors were eventually incorporated into the 16 Personality Factor (16PF) measure Cattell developed that included dimensions such as warmth, emotional stability, sensitivity, and openness to change. Another example of using exploratory factor analysis to identify personality dimensions was

Development of the Five-Factor Model Subsequent research evaluating the factors underlying measures of personality led to the development of the five-factor model. Although the labels for these factors varied somewhat from study to study, the generally accepted names for these five factors are neuroticism, extraversion, openness, conscientiousness, and agreeableness. The first ­evidence of these five dimensions was reported by Donald Fiske in 1949. Clinical interns rated themselves on 22 of the bipolar items developed by Cattell and were also evaluated by other interns using these items. Results of Fiske’s factor analyses provided support for the five-factor model. Subsequent factor analyses of a variety of personality measures in the late 1950s and 1960s also provided support for the five-factor model. Although several measures have been developed to assess the factors included in the five-­ factor model, the measure that is most closely associated with this model is the Neuroticism 327

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Extraversion Openness Personality Inventory, Revised (NEO-PI-R) developed by Paul Costa and Robert McCrae in 1992. The original version of this scale was designed to assess the first three dimensions (i.e., neuroticism, extraversion, and openness). Subsequently, the measure was revised to add assessments of the other two dimensions (i.e., conscientiousness and agreeableness). This measure comes in a long version consisting of 240 items (six facets per factor) or a short version consisting of 60 items (12 items per factor).

Issues With the Five-Factor Model Culture and Personality

Studies have shown a fair degree of cross-cultural overlap in the structure of personality. Early research across multiple nations, including Japan, the Philippines, Germany, the United States, and Israel, demonstrated that the five-factor model replicated reasonably well across cultures. However, research in East Asian cultures (e.g., China) has suggested that the five-factor model might lack universality. This could indicate that there were flaws in the ways early evidence for the cross-­ cultural similarity of personality structure was obtained. Specifically, by simply translating items developed in English with North American samples, researchers are likely to verify the Western conceptualizations of the five-factor model across cultures, at the same time overlooking culturespecific dimensions that might systematically contribute to the underlying structure of personality for a given population. Relationship With Other Factor Models

One issue with the five-factor model involves the relationship between the model and other models that hypothesize fewer dimensions. One possibility is that different conceptual models simply reflect a hierarchical organization of personality dimensions. For example, a two-factor structure such as that originally found by Eysenck might reflect second-order factors, with more specific dimensions, such as the five factors, emerging when additional factors are extracted. Data from a meta-analysis of relationships among scores from a variety of personality measures in 52 studies

indicated a hierarchical structure to the dimensions of personality. For example, the researchers found evidence of the two-factor model identified by Eysenck when they extracted two factors. Their results supported the five-factor model when they extracted five factors. It therefore appears that the specific factor model researchers derive is, in part, a function of the number of factors they decide to extract, and that the five factors identified by the five-factor model are nested within the two major factors identified by Eysenck. Confirmatory Factor Analyses

Previous analyses of the factor structure underlying measures of personality have all been based on exploratory factor analyses. The specification of the five-factor model permits confirmatory factor analysis, a rigorous test of the model where one can directly test the fit of the hypothesized factor structure to the data. However, evidence for the utility of confirmatory factor analysis in delineating the five-factor structure of normal personality has been sparse. Early attempts to validate the ­five-factor model using confirmatory factor analysis suggested that the model provided a poor fit to the data. Critics of the confirmatory factor analysis approach have argued that this approach might be unnecessarily restrictive in its assumptions about the association among personality traits, often due to statistically forcing the five personality factors to be orthogonal. Also, several aspects of the five factors are not trait specific. For example, selfcontrol is featured as an aspect of extraversion (via sensation seeking), neuroticism (via impulsiveness), and conscientiousness (via behaviors reflecting self-discipline). Testing the five-factor model by specifying that facets of personality, such as self-control, are uniquely captured by only one of the “Big Five” dimensions might necessarily result in poor-fitting models of personality structure. Prediction of Behavior

A number of studies have demonstrated ways in which personality traits corresponding to the fivefactor model manifest themselves in actual behavior across a number of domains. For example, one

Failure of Memory

study has shown that neuroticism predicts an increased likelihood of intimate partner violence in newlywed couples over the first 4 years of marriage; the effect is stronger among partners who experience greater stress. In another study, daily diary research on extraversion and social engagement has shown that highly extraverted individuals tend to more frequently create or enter situations that involve socializing, although they do not necessarily derive more pleasure from such situations than do less extraverted individuals. Experience sampling research has also shown systematic variation in people’s day-to-day activities as a function of the five factors. For example, individuals high on extraversion tend to spend less time alone, whereas both highly agreeable individuals and highly conscientious individuals tend to use fewer offensive words in conversations with others. It is clear that the five-factor model has become the dominant model of the dimensions of personality. One comparative review indicated that over a 5-year period 1,500 studies were based on the fivefactor model, whereas fewer than 250 studies were based on the models developed by Cattell or Eysenck. Despite the dominance of the five-factor model, it is important to note that according to McCrae and Costa it is not a theory of personality. Instead, it is a description of the structure of personality. Understanding the causes and consequences of these dimensions of personality and integrating them into a comprehensive model of personality remains for the future. Daniel W. Russell and Frederick D. Clavél See also Behavioral Theories of Personality; Big Five Model and Lexical Trait Theory; Cross-Cultural Methods of Research; Culture and Personality; Existential Theories of Personality; Humanistic Theories of Personality; Metatheoretical Issues in Personality Psychology; Personality, Measurement of; Personality Types Versus Personality Traits; Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Personality

Further Readings Cattell, R. B. (1947). Confirmation and clarification of primary personality factors. Psychometrika, 12, 197–220.

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Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (2009). The five-factor model and NEO inventories. In J. N. Butcher (Ed.), Oxford handbook of personality assessment (pp. 299–322). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Eysenck, H. J. (1947). Dimensions of personality. London, England: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Fiske, D. W. (1949). Consistency of the factorial structures of personality ratings from different sources. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 44, 329–3434. John, O. P., Naumann, L. P., & Soto, C. J. (2008). Paradigm shift to the integrative big five trait theory. In O. P. John, R. W. Robins, & L. A. Pervin (Eds.), Handbook of personality: Theory and research (3rd ed., pp. 114–158). New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Failure

of

Memory

In the same way that a muscle is easily overlooked until it is strained, memory is most frequently considered when it fails. A man who forgets a recently learned name or walks into a room but cannot remember why he went there is likely to chalk such experiences up to having a “bad memory.” However, memory failures are often reflections of the design of a system that is intended to do more than simply store past events and regurgitate on demand. On the contrary, memory plays an important role in all cognitive processes by supporting inference as well as remembering. Understanding the nature of what memory allows helps explain why memory failures occur—and how some of them can be remedied. Memory failures fall along a broad spectrum of consequentiality. On one end are inconsequential failings to encode irrelevant information (e.g., the color of a car parked at the other end of a parking lot); on the other end are ubiquitous and severe impairments that accompany memory disorders (e.g., Alzheimer’s disease). In this entry, the focus is restricted to key components of nonpathological memory failure, including information loss during encoding, the nature and causes of forgetting, and false memory.

Information Loss During Encoding Which color appears at the top of a traffic light? Does Lincoln face right or left on a U.S. penny?

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If it is difficult to answer those questions based on memory alone, it is likely because of a failure to properly encode those details into long-term memory. Exposure alone is not enough to ensure that something makes it into memory. Memory is not like a video camera, passively recording every detail for later viewing. To remember something later, one must direct one’s attention to the relevant information in the environment. To foster effective storage, that information must be encoded in such a way as to relate it to information already in long-term memory—a process sometimes called elaborative rehearsal. Imagine a woman surrounded by multiple conversations at a party. Although the sound waves from all those conversations arrive at her ears, she pays attention only to her own conversation and is able to ignore competing conversations. To have a good chance of later remembering information within that specific conversation (such as the name of a new acquaintance who was part of the conversation), she must build meaningful associations between her current knowledge and the new information. For example, she might effectively remember a new name by trying to relate that name to information she already has stored about that person, about the person’s profession or conversational habits, or about the ongoing party. The nature of that specific association will have ramifications for later situations in which she will be able to remember the name and the likely errors she will make if she fails to do so (such as by mixing up that name with the name of another person at that party). Many common memory failures are a reflection of choices about what and how to encode—and what to ignore.

forgotten. For example, a man who studied ­Spanish for 2 years in high school and then did not study it again likely had a high rate of forgetting for Spanish vocabulary during high school. However, 20 years later, he is likely to remember almost as much Spanish vocabulary as he did 19 years after high school. His rate of forgetting slowed with time. Decay Theory

One of the more intuitive theories about how forgetting occurs is the decay theory of forgetting. This theory posits that memories grow weaker (or decay) over time, which causes forgetting. Certainly one’s memory for an experience just encountered is generally stronger and more vivid than for an experience 10 years ago. The weakening of memories over time falls in line with such results. However, the decay theory cannot explain other findings in the field of memory. For example, sometimes people remember things after having previously “forgotten” them—a phenomenon called hypermnesia. Being unable to remember the name of a high school classmate, only to recall it successfully a few hours later, indicates that some failures to remember are not due to memory decay but rather to a retrieval failure. The decay theory of forgetting has no way of accounting for recovery of previously forgotten memories, nor does it capture why some conditions lead to more rapid forgetting than others, as discussed later.

Forgetting Once information is encoded into long-term memory, memory failure can occur through forgetting, which is the inability to access previously learned information. Most forgetting occurs immediately after acquiring the information and then drops off in the shape of a power function (see Figure 1). Thus, one is most likely to forget information shortly after studying it, but if that information remains in long-term memory for a longer period of time, it is less likely to be

Figure 1  General Forgetting Function

Failure of Memory

Interference Theory

The interference theory of forgetting posits that competing memories hinder one’s ability to retrieve a target memory. The greater the similarity between the competing memories and the target memory, the greater the interference and the more likely one is to be unsuccessful in accessing that target memory. Imagine searching for a specific key in a pile of other keys. The more keys there are and the more similar they are to the target key, the more difficult it is to find the target key (and the more likely it is that the wrong key will be picked). Similarly, potentially interfering memories “clutter” the search for a target memory. Forgetting occurs when the interfering memories block access to the target memory or are unintentionally accessed. There are two main types of interference that vary with respect to the timing of the interfering items: proactive and retroactive interference. Proactive interference occurs when previously learned material hinders one’s ability to successfully recall later-learned material. In contrast, retroactive interference happens when later-learned material hinders one’s ability to successfully recall previously learned material. In proactive interference, the interfering items come before the target item; in retroactive interference, the interfering items come after the target item. If one were to read a textbook straight through, both retroactive and proactive interference would likely occur. Difficulty remembering information from Chapter 3 due to competing information in Chapter 4 is an example of retroactive interference. Difficulty recalling information from Chapter 3 due to competing information in Chapter 2 is an example of proactive interference. Notably, the degree of interference from competing items is related to the similarity between those competing items and the target item. The more similar they are, the more interference will occur. In the previous textbook example, if the content of Chapter 2 was significantly different from that of Chapter 3 (e.g., research methods in psychology versus biological psychology), Chapter 2 would be less likely to proactively interfere with memory for Chapter 3. Using the earlier key example, similar memories are like similarly colored keys, but less similar memories are like keys of different colors. It is much easier to find a red key amid blue keys than a red key amid red keys.

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Imagine going to a party and meeting 10 new people. The next day, you are easily able to recall five of their names, but it is difficult to remember the rest. Part of the difficulty in recalling the rest of the names is due to retrieval-based interference, which occurs when the retrieval of some of the target items hinders the retrieval of others. In other words, retrieving some of the names actually makes it more difficult to access the other names. A related effect is part-set cuing impairment. If one is given part of a set of target memories without having to retrieve them (e.g., a list containing the names of five of the people met at last night’s party), it is more difficult to successfully retrieve the other target memories than if one was never initially given a partial set of target memories. The influence of part-set cuing impairment is prevalent in everyday life. For example, trying to remember the name of a famous actor after a friend says similar (but not quite right!) names induces part-set cuing impairment. All the previous examples of interference are incidental; they occur without intentionally trying to forget. However, sometimes the goal is to forget. In these cases, people often rely on motivated forgetting. Remember that time you tripped on the stairs in front of your crush? Or you witnessed a tragic car accident? When faced with painful memories, it is common to avoid successful retrieval of those memories. This can occur through inhibiting retrieval of the memory or by intentionally thinking about something other than that memory.

False Memory Although memory failure is most often associated with errors of omission (forgetting), false memory effects are also prevalent. False memory errors occur when one “remembers” something, but that memory is not entirely accurate. The distortion of the memory can be due to a variety of causes. A few examples are discussed here, including schematic errors, misinformation errors, and source confusions. Because one thinks he or she is remembering an item—and believes that memories are usually ­correct—false memory errors are often more easily overlooked than forgetting is. False memory errors are particularly difficult to detect in everyday life

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compared with forgetting because the inaccurate memories often feel “right” to the rememberer. For example, a woman might give a very confident, convincing testimony of meeting Bugs Bunny at Disneyland as a young girl. However, Bugs Bunny is not a Disney character, so she would not have met him at Disneyland. Schematic Errors

Every day, people rely on general schemas to interact with novel situations. For example, when one goes to a new restaurant, a more general ­“restaurant schema” is activated so that one knows to wait to be seated, order items from a menu, and so on. Reliance on schemas enables the application of limited resources for attention and encoding to novel aspects of the situation—say, making lively conversation—and not to the stereotyped aspects. However, reliance on schemas to fill in unattended details can lead to memory errors. For example, if your usual routine when coming home is to unlock the door, set the keys on a side table, take off your coat, and greet your family, you might later falsely remember setting the keys on the table when you actually left them in the door lock. Unlike a video recording, many memories reflect the “gist” that is stored about events or procedures. The Misinformation Effect

Simply encountering false information about an event after it is experienced can change memory for the original event. The misinformation effect occurs when exposure to information after an experience alters memory for the original event. For example, a witness to a car accident will give a higher estimate when asked how fast the cars were going when they “crashed” into each other compared with when they “bumped” into each other. The word crashed implies a more dramatic accident than the word bumped and, in turn, influences the original memory for the severity of the accident. As this example illustrates, it is particularly important for officers of the law to avoid biasing eyewitness testimony via the misinformation effect. However, the influence of misinformation pervades everyday life. Talking to optimistic or

pessimistic friends after watching a soccer game together can, in turn, alter one’s original memory for the actual game. Source Confusion

A final example of false memory is when the memory itself is accurate but the source of the memory is lost or misattributed (source confusion). For example, one might forget where he or she originally heard a specific piece of information and then later give that information more weight than it merits when making a decision. Slanderous information about a political candidate from an unreliable source should not be used to decide for whom to vote on Election Day. However, if one cannot remember where the information originated, it might still factor into one’s decision at the polling place. Failures of memory occur in a variety of ways— from the commonly encountered forgetting of everyday, inconsequential information to unintentional false memory errors in important eyewitness testimony. Although memory failures are ubiquitous, it is important to consider them in light of the vast duties of the general information-processing system that is the brain and the many, competing demands on that system. Such a view highlights that failure is really the wrong term to describe those moments when memory leads to error and that such events should not be disheartening but rather serve as a reminder of just how much the memory does. Kristin M. Divis and Aaron S. Benjamin See also Exceptional Memory and Expertise; Long-Term Memory: Processes; Memory as Reconstructive; ShortTerm and Working Memory; Signal Detection Theory; Working Memory, Improvement of

Further Readings Anderson, M. C., & Levy, B. J. (2009). Suppressing unwanted memories. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 18(4), 189–194. Baddeley, A., Eysenck, M. W., & Anderson, M. C. (2009). Memory. New York, NY: Psychology Press. Ebbinghaus, H. (1913). Memory: A contribution to experimental psychology. New York, NY: Teachers College Press.

Feminist Approaches to Psychology and Gender Loftus, E. F., & Pickrell, J. E. (1995). The formation of false memories. Psychiatric Annals, 25(12), 720–725. Underwood, B. J. (1957). Interference and forgetting. Psychological Review, 64, 49–60.

Feminist Approaches to Psychology and Gender Feminists are people who are committed to the social, political, and economic equality of the sexes. In the United States, feminists first organized to obtain the vote for women, a campaign that spanned more than three decades. It was ­during this time (the latter part of the 19th ­century and the early 20th century) that psychology emerged as an independent discipline. This entry reviews the emergence of feminism in psychology. Although few women were permitted to study psychology and even fewer were granted academic positions, some of them spoke against the characterizations of women in the psychological literature. In a 1910 article published in the Psychological Bulletin, for example, Helen Thompson Woolley lambasted psychological theories about female nature as little more than “logic martyred in the cause of supporting a prejudice, unfounded assertions, and even sentimental rot and drivel . . . run riot” (p. 340).

Confronting the Question of Sex Differences Questions about whether and how women’s ­psychological makeup differs from men’s arise at times when women are challenging ideologies about their proper place in the social order. The 1960s and 1970s—the era of the Women’s Liberation Movement—was such a time in the United States. To address these questions, the developmental psychologists Eleanor Maccoby and Carol Jacklin undertook the monumental task of assessing the extant psychological ­evidence. Their book, The Psychology of Sex Differences, published in 1974, examined more than 1,600 research studies that compared women and men on more than 80 traits and behaviors. In only four instances did they find credible evidence for male– female differences. Moreover, like Woolley, the

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researchers found that large corpus of work riddled with conceptual and methodological flaws. Roughly 30 years later, in 2005, Janet Shibley Hyde, using the statistical technique called metaanalysis, demonstrated yet again that scientific studies reveal few psychological differences between men and women. Still, paradoxically, dramatic claims of innate differences in the cognitive, emotional, and relational capacities of the two sexes never fail to garner popular attention.

Making the Personal Political The 1960s and 1970s were times of social unrest and progressive social movements. Discontent erupted among middle-class suburban women consigned to being full-time homemakers, making Betty Friedan’s 1963 The Feminine Mystique a runaway best seller. At the same time, left-leaning young women rose up in anger when they were shunted to the side in student protest movements. Such discontents galvanized the Women’s Liberation Movement (as the U.S. feminist movement of the 1970s was called). A watchword of the Women’s Liberation Movement was the slogan “The personal is political.” This slogan proved to be remarkably durable and capacious. Its spirit has animated much of the psychology of gender. Consider an influential article by Naomi Weisstein, first published in 1971 and republished subsequently three dozen times: “Psychology Constructs the Female.” Weisstein did not mince words: “Psychology,” she said, “has nothing to say about what women are really like . . . because psychology does not know” (1993, p. 197). Weisstein argued that psychologists’ claims about female nature were little more than recycled cultural myths. Knowing about women required taking close account of the context of their lives— their societal, political, cultural, and material circumstances and the relations of power of which they are part. The insistence that psychologists train their eyes on the social context has been central to feminist psychology, paving the way for an expansive and rich research program. Researchers have examined interpersonal situations (such as romantic relationships and job interviews) and local settings (such as classrooms, gyms, and online chat rooms). ­Others have examined women’s place in societal hierarchies

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of power, privilege, and status. Yet o ­ thers took a step back to examine social ­institutions—such as marriage, motherhood, religion, and law—that underwent radical transformations in the waning decades of the 20th century.

Violence Against Women Perhaps the starkest expression of gendered power relations is the prevalence of intimate violence and sexual coercion and rape. A defining feature of feminist psychology has been its focus on the manifold forms of violence against women and sexual abuse. These include violence by intimate partners, sexual assault and coercion, childhood sexual abuse and incest, and sexual harassment at work and in educational settings. Feminist psychologists have examined many aspects of violence and sexual abuse, including the cultural ideologies that legitimize men’s domination over women; tacit assumptions about men’s prerogatives in heterosexual encounters; normative expectations that lay blame on women and girls who are victims of rape and assault; the psychological aftermath of rape, incest, and domestic violence; and the “secondary victimization” that rape victims often experience in criminal justice and court proceedings.

Which Women? Intersectional Thinking Seeing women’s lives in context quickly leads one to see that little can be said about women qua women—that is, about all women regardless of their social status, material circumstances, and social identities that intersect with sex category, such as ethnicity, class, and sexual orientation. Feminist psychologists have long been acutely aware of the folly of building a knowledge base solely from the experiences of White, middle-class women in the United States. The task of developing fuller accounts of women’s experiences has begun, but it is far from completed. The concept of intersectionality offers a broad framework for analyzing differences among women (or among members of any social group). Intersectional thinkers note that various oppressions operate in concert to shape opportunities, desires, and conditions of possibility. That is, categories of identity (for instance, lesbian and White)

cannot be partialed out one by one for analysis. Moreover, the social meanings of such categories are fluid, not immutable; they are always under negotiation. The salience of these categories shifts as the circumstances surrounding the individual shift.

Moving Beyond the Individualist Framework: From “Women” to “Gender” Many feminist researchers have come to regard the conception of gender as a set of attributes or qualities that reside “inside” individuals as limited. In place of such an individualist focus, the idea of “doing gender” focuses instead on the interactions and societal structures that continually create and uphold gender. Proposed by sociologists Candace West and Don Zimmerman, this view holds that gender is a social process; that is, social groups “do” (or produce) gender. Gender is brought into existence through the expectations that people hold for members of a sex category and their desires to live up to (or defy) those expectations. Gender is further created and maintained by societal structures and cultural ideologies. For example, gender is produced by the way that sex categories are used as a basis for segregating much of social life (including work and leisure activities), as well as the way family labor is divided. Moreover, gender is inextricably entangled in other social categorizations, for example, sexual orientation.

Soft Power and the Turn to Culture and Language From the 1980s onward, many feminist psychologists turned to questions about the cultural scaffolding of gender. Drawing on theoretical ­ frameworks such as social construction, poststructuralism, and discursive psychology and influenced by the writings of Michel Foucault, they have investigated the implicit cultural ideologies that hold the gender order in place. Their research seeks to identify taken-for-granted meanings that give shape to what people take to be reality. Consider, for example, how words such as ­sexual harassment, domestic violence, and date rape (words coined in the crucible of the feminist movement) named commonplace actions that previously had gone unnamed. Naming these actions

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changed their moral valence and placed them under scrutiny in the broader culture. Researchers who draw on these frameworks often make use of research tools developed by sociolinguists, ethnomethodologists, and discursive psychologists.

well as interventions for problems of high prevalence among women, such as eating problems and depression. Carol Z. Enns has provided an extended discussion of feminist approaches to therapy and counseling.

Feminists in Clinical Psychology Practice

Methodology: Critiques and Innovations

The field of psychology comprises more than the academic research discipline; it is also a mental health profession. The majority of psychologists in the United States today are mental health providers. In the early days of the Women’s Liberation Movement, many activists were leery of psychotherapy and critical of the entire mental health establishment. They disputed many of the misogynist aspects of Freudian theories about women (such as the notion that all women experienced “penis envy”). In addition, activists worried that because of its focus on the individual, childhood experience, and psychic life, psychotherapy deflected attention away from the sociopolitical bases of suffering and personal distress. Instead of making the personal political (as feminists strove to do), they feared that therapy “made the political personal.” In short order, however, therapists and counselors who were feminists began to devise practices and principles that brought a feminist sensibility into therapeutic work. These innovations have been many and varied. They include helping women clients to identify the external factors that might be playing a part in their difficulties, paying careful attention to the power dynamics in therapy relationships, helping women to revalue aspects of women’s roles that were denigrated by the larger culture, and attending to particularities of diverse cultural groups. Among psychodynamic therapists, feminists developed new theories about subjectivity, femininity, and early experience, as well as new approaches to working with female clients. Feminists in family therapy and marital/couples therapy pressured their colleagues (with success) to come to terms with the high incidence of violence in couple relationships and of the sexual abuse of children in families, as well as the serious consequences that both often have. Feminist practition­ ers have developed treatments for victims of rape, childhood sexual abuse, and domestic violence, as

What of the flawed research designs, biased measurements, and questionable findings that have so often dogged psychologists’ efforts to understand gender? Feminist psychologists do not argue against core elements of the scientific method (e.g., systematic observation, controlled variation, and transparent procedures). However, many have come to believe that researchers—like all k ­ nowers— see the world through the lens of culture. The ­presuppositions and tacit understandings of their culture inevitably inflect scientific knowledge. This does not negate the value of psychological research, but it demands that psychologists develop disciplinary reflexivity—that is, critical acumen that goes beyond expertise in statistics or research design. Many feminist psychologists have been engaged in interdisciplinary programs devoted to the study of gender. As a result of their close familiarity with other disciplines, they have expanded their repertoire of research approaches. Instead of relying exclusively on quantitative measurements (such as scales and tests), statistical hypothesis testing, and laboratory experiments, some have incorporated research methods that allow for more fine-grained, experience-near, naturalistic ways of gathering data. Some examples are participant observation, semistructured interviews, video diaries, and ­participatory action research.

Contributions Feminist psychologists have diverse interests; they are united, however, by value commitments that include gender equality but go further to encompass social justice for all. That is, feminist researchers pursue topics that not only contribute to knowledge but also promote social justice. Feminists who are therapists strive not only to relieve personal distress but also to foster equality and dignity in their clients’ lives. Many feminist psychologists are further engaged in community-based

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activism. All in all, feminists have contributed not only to the psychology of gender but also to the development of the field of psychology overall. Jeanne Marecek See also Gender, Evolutionary Perspectives on; Gender and Cognition; Gender and Culture; Gender and Emotion; Gender and Language; Gender and Sex; Gender and Violence; Gender Development; Gender Identity; Gender Roles; Gender Stereotypes; Stress and Gender

Further Readings Crawford, M. (2011). Transformations: Women, gender and psychology (2nd ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. Enns, C. Z. (2004). Feminist theories and feminist psychotherapies: Origins, themes, and diversity (2nd ed.). Binghamton, NY: Haworth Press. Hyde, J. S. (2005). The gender similarities hypothesis. American Psychologist, 60(6), 581–592. http://dx.doi .org/10.1037/0003-066X.60.6.581 Magnusson, E., & Marecek, J. (2012). Gender and culture in psychology: Theories and practices. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Weisstein, N. (1993). Psychology constructs the female. Feminism & Psychology, 3(2), 194–210. (Original work published 1971) http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/ 0959353593032005 Woolley, H. T. (1910). A review of recent literature on the psychology of sex. Psychological Bulletin, 7, 335–342.

Flynn Effect The Flynn effect refers to the increase in intelligence test (IQ) scores that has been documented by James R. Flynn and others to have occurred since the early 20th century in many countries in both the developed and developing world. The Flynn effect is named after James R. Flynn, who was the first to collate wide-scale evidence for the increase in average IQ scores in the United States and other developing countries in the 1980s. However, the effect was already noted previously by others in more specific contexts, such as Read D. Tuddenham, who in the late 1940s compared the IQ scores of U.S. recruits of both world wars and found the World War II recruits to outscore

the recruits from World War I. This entry describes the Flynn effect, its implications, and explanations for it.

Evidence for the Flynn Effect The Flynn effect is often referred to as a generational gain or cohort effect. It is normally studied by pitting more recent IQ norms against older IQ norms among the same test takers or by comparing similar cohorts that differ not in age per se but rather in the year they were born and took the IQ test. In the Netherlands, for instance, the mandatory military draft involved the administration of the same, unaltered intelligence test between 1952 and 1982 to young adult males. Flynn found the later cohort (Dutch men born around 1964) to outperform the earlier cohort of Dutch males of the same age (but born around 1934) by around 20 IQ points. Because these cohorts included almost all young, able-bodied men, these Dutch data suggested that over the course of only one generation (25 years), the increase in average IQ could amount to one standard deviation unit (which equals 15 IQ points). This result from the Dutch draft was even more surprising because the test used was a version of a well-known and highly regarded measure of fluid reasoning developed by John Raven (the Raven Progressive Matrices) that was often thought to be less affected by cultural influences. Later work has shown similar trends in other countries, over alternative periods, and with women, other tests, and additional age-groups. The Flynn effect has been shown to occur in developing nations and among preschool samples as well. Despite some variation across different tests (e.g., the effect appears to be larger on fluid reasoning tests than on crystallized tests), periods (e.g., some data suggest a leveling off of the Flynn effect in some countries), and ability level (some results suggest larger gains at the high end of the distribution, but other results suggest otherwise), the Flynn effect represents a robust phenomenon in the study of human intelligence. Because of the trend it names, test developers and test publishers need to regularly update the norms of IQ tests, or else the average IQ in countries will not remain at the prescribed level of 100. The average Flynn effect is generally ­estimated to be around 3 IQ points per decade.

Flynn Effect

Implications of the Flynn Effect The Flynn effect is relevant for understanding the meaning and development of individual differences and the nature of group differences in IQ, as well as related cognitive-ability measures for which it has also been found. The Flynn effect raises various questions about what such tests measure and which cultural, educational, demographic, biological, genetic, social, and socioeconomic variables might affect IQ-test performance. Such a large gain in mean IQ over the course of even a decade might appear to contradict behavior-genetic twin studies showing the sizable heritability of IQ differences. However, between-cohort differences do not formally contradict estimates of high within-cohort heritability. Nonetheless, the Flynn effect has played an important role in the debate about the nature (and nurture) of group and ethnic differences in IQ. Specifically, it highlights the potency of the social environment in shaping mean IQ levels. Some authors, including Flynn, have argued that the Flynn effect casts serious doubt on the hypothesis proposed by Arthur Jensen and others that Black– White differences in average IQ in the United States (and other ethnic group differences in IQ reported by Jensen and others) have some genetic component. Either way, the Flynn effect does suggest that mean IQ levels of (sub)populations are subject to sizable changes and are therefore not carved in stone. Also, changes in the average IQs of populations might complicate international and cross-cultural comparisons of IQ scores.

Accounting for the Flynn Effect Although there currently is no consensus on which is the single, best explanation, various explanations of the Flynn effect have been offered. A core problem in uncovering the causes of the Flynn effect is that major changes in many potentially relevant variables have occurred over the course of the 20th century alongside the Flynn effect. The changes that have been related to the Flynn effect include the following: A trend toward smaller families in which parents can devote more attention to their children Improvements in health care and health (e.g., ­vaccination programs)

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Urbanization Improvements in educational quality Growth in educational attainment Improvements in nutrition Multiplying effects of increasingly higher IQs in the social environment Increases in the exposure to cognitive testing, ­leading to more test savviness (e.g., tendencies to use ­guessing) A genetic effect called heterosis (related to outbreeding) Society’s increased demand for and stress on abstract and logical thinking The widespread dissemination of visuospatial media and toys

There are scholarly debates on many of these proposed causes. One debate concerns the question of whether the gain relates to the general intelligence factor (Spearman’s g) or to other, more specific factors underlying cognitive ability tests. Psychometric results suggest that the gain in average IQ scores is partly an artifact of the testing and so cannot be solely attributed to the underlying cognitive abilities that the IQ tests are supposed to measure. Currently, the Flynn effect is attributed to various causes that might differ across time periods, populations, and types of abilities presumed to affect IQ-test performance. Jelte M. Wicherts See also Brain and Intelligence; Intelligence, Environmental Influences on; Intelligence, Evolution of; Intelligence, Heritability of; Intelligence Testing; Intelligence Testing and Ethnicity; Measurement of Intelligence; Multiple Intelligences; Triarchic Intelligence

Further Readings Flynn, J. R. (2009). What is intelligence? Beyond the Flynn effect. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Neisser, U. (Ed.). (1998). Rising curve: Long-term gains in IQ and related measures. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Williams, R. L. (2013). Overview of the Flynn effect. Intelligence, 41, 753–764.

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Freud’s Psychosexual Stage Theory of Personality

Freud’s Psychosexual Stage Theory of Personality What causes one person to be sociable and outgoing and another to be shy and introverted? Why are some people brash and aggressive, whereas others are docile and dependent? Psychologists, psychiatrists, and other mental health professionals have long grappled with the question of how people develop different personality styles or personality “types.” One of the most influential— and controversial—efforts to address this question is Sigmund Freud’s psychosexual stage theory of personality, which posits that personality styles in adulthood result from sexual feelings first experienced early in life and that evolved throughout childhood, adolescence, and beyond. This entry describes Freud’s psychosexual stage theory and briefly discusses its implications.

Context and Importance It has been more than a century since Sigmund Freud published his initial writings outlining psychoanalytic theory. More than 100 years after its birth, the psychodynamic model remains one of the more influential theoretical perspectives in psychology. Although psychodynamic ideas are often criticized, Freud is one of the most widely cited authors in contemporary psychology and in other disciplines as well, such as literary criticism, anthropology, and the arts. Some psychologists love the psychodynamic model, others hate it, but few ignore it. One of the most controversial aspects of the psychoanalytic perspective is Freud’s psychosexual stage theory, which argues that early in life, people progress through a sequence of developmental stages, each with its own unique challenge and mode of sexual gratification. Freud hypothesized that humans have a strong sex drive that is present from birth and that first reveals itself in infancy. It evolves throughout life, expressing itself in different ways as the individual ages. Freud’s five psychosexual stages—oral, anal, Oedipal, latency, and genital—are well known even to nonanalytic psychologists. So are the oral, anal, and Oedipal (or phallic) personality types associated with these stages.

The Core Elements of Psychosexual Stage Theory Table 1 illustrates the basic organization of Freud’s psychosexual stage theory. Frustration or overgratification during the infantile, oral stage is hypothesized to result in oral fixation and an inability to resolve the developmental issues that characterize this period (i.e., conflicts regarding dependency and autonomy). Psychosexual stage theory further postulates that the oral-dependent person will continue to (a) rely on other people for protection and support, even in adulthood, and (b) exhibit behaviors in adulthood that reflect the oral stage (preoccupation with activities of the mouth, reliance on food and eating as a means of coping with anxiety). Research generally supports the former hypothesis but has generally failed to confirm the latter. A parallel set of dynamics (i.e., frustration or overgratification during toilet training) are assumed to lead to anal fixation and the development of an anal (obsessive) character type. Because toilet training involves learning to control one’s body and impulses, the anally fixated individual is thought to be preoccupied with issues of control, and his or her behavior is characterized by a constellation of three traits, sometimes termed the anal triad: obstinacy, orderliness, and parsimony. Findings support the existence of an anal triad in adults, but they do not support the critical role of toilet training in the ontogenesis of these traits. A control-oriented personality style actually stems from a parent–child dynamic where conflicts over power and control occur across a broad range of situations, not just toilet training. (Freud’s inferences were partially correct.) According to psychosexual stage theory, the next stage—the Oedipal stage—is marked by competition with the same-sex parent for the affections of the opposite-sex parent (i.e., little boys compete with Dad for Mom’s affection, and little girls compete with Mom for Dad’s affection). Fixation during the Oedipal stage is hypothesized to result in a personality style marked by aggressiveness, competitiveness, and preoccupation with status and influence—the type of personality one might find in a successful athlete or politician. The Oedipal stage has been not only the most controversial stage in Freud’s theory; it is also the one that has garnered the least empirical support. There is only

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Table 1  Freud’s Psychosexual Stage Theory Associated Personality Traits in Adulthood

Stage

Age Range

Developmental Task

Oral

0–18 months

Anal

18–36 months

Moving from infantile dependency toward self-sufficiency Learning to exercise control

Oedipal

5–6 years

Mastering competitive urges

Latency

6 years–puberty

Genital

Puberty onward

Investing energy in productive, rewarding tasks and activities Mature sexuality (sexuality blended with intimacy)

modest evidence suggesting that the Oedipal dynamic plays out as Freud conceived it. The last two stages in psychosexual stage theory—the latency and genital stages—are not ­ associated with specific personality styles. According to Freud’s theory, once the Oedipal dynamic is resolved, children enter the latency stage, where sexual feelings are strongly repressed (i.e., kept out of consciousness) for the next several years. Around the onset of puberty, the genital stage commences, where sexual urges are expressed as adults experience them—that is, as a desire for adult sexual activities. As Table 1 shows, the struggle to achieve mature sexuality—sexuality blended with intimacy and commitment—is a lifelong task.

Implications Some aspects of Freud’s psychosexual stage theory have held up well over the years (e.g., the oral and anal personalities). Others (such as the Oedipal conflict) have not fared as well. Nonetheless, the theory has had a tremendous influence on contemporary psychology. Many shorthand descriptors commonly used to describe someone’s personality (as in “He’s so anal!”) are rooted in this model. The same is true of many personality disorder diagnoses in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (e.g., dependent personality disorder, which has its origins in Freud’s theory, and obsessive-compulsive personality disorder, the symptoms of which include all three elements of

Dependency Obsessiveness over one’s body and impulses Competitiveness and acquiring gender-role-related behaviors — —

Freud’s anal triad). As noted at the outset of this entry, some psychologists love the psychodynamic model, others hate it, but few ignore it. Robert F. Bornstein See also Motivation and Personality; Personality Development; Personality Disorders; Personality Types Versus Personality Traits; Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Personality

Further Readings Bargh, J. A., & Morsella, E. (2008). The unconscious mind. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3, 73–79. Bornstein, R. F. (2010). Psychoanalytic theory as a unifying framework for 21st century personality assessment. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 27, 133–152. Luborsky, L., & Barrett, M. S. (2006). The history and empirical status of key psychoanalytic concepts. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 2, 1–19. Solms, M., & Turnbull, O. H. (2011). What is neuropsychoanalysis? Neuropsychoanalysis, 13, 133–145.

Frontal Lobe Functions The human frontal lobes modulate the behaviors most often seen as distinguishing humans from other animals. Even chimpanzees, considered the next most advanced species, lack characteristics

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such as empathy, regret, sarcasm, a sense of social propriety, judgment, advanced planning, and the lasting expression of knowledge and culture. These frontal-lobe-mediated functions define the essence of what it means to be human. With these features, however, comes vulnerability. The frontal lobes are more susceptible to injury due to their location at the front of the cranium. The so-called higher, or executive, functions of the frontal lobes can be compromised by a variety of neurological illnesses and disorders, including stroke, neurodegenerative disorders, neurochemical imbalances, and traumatic brain injury. Disorders during development frequently have their most severe expression in this brain region. This entry reviews the anatomy and functions of the frontal lobes of the human brain and discusses theories about how they interact with the rest of the brain.

Neuroanatomy of the Frontal Lobes The frontal lobes of the brain are one of the four main portions of the cerebral cortex (also known as the cerebrum), along with the parietal, occipital, and temporal lobes. These lobes are named for the four bony plates overlying them that form the skull. Each lobe is found in the left and right hemispheres. The prominent features of the cerebral cortex, as seen on the surface, are gyri (plural for gyrus), which are the protruding folds of the tissue, and sulci (plural for sulcus), which are the crevices between the gyri. The frontal lobes form the anterior (front) portions of the cortex, with the central sulcus forming the posterior (rear) border with the parietal lobe and the lateral (or Sylvian) sulcus forming the ventral (bottom) border with the temporal lobe. The longitudinal fissure (another name for a large sulcus) divides the right and left frontal lobes. ­ The cerebral cortex forms a large percentage of the volume of the brain, and the frontal lobes are the most prominent lobe of the cortex, making up approximately 30% of the cerebrum. Each frontal lobe is divided into a lateral, polar, orbital (also called basal or ventral), and medial portion. Each of these parts is composed of gyri. The lateral portion consists of the precentral gyrus, the lateral part of the superior frontal gyrus, the middle frontal gyrus, and the inferior frontal

gyrus. The polar portion consists of the transverse frontopolar gyri and the frontomarginal gyrus. The orbital portion is made up of the lateral orbital gyrus, anterior orbital gyrus, posterior orbital gyrus, medial orbital gyrus, and gyrus rectus. The medial portion includes the medial part of the superior frontal gyrus, and the cingulate gyrus.

Major Functions To understand frontal lobe functions, it is perhaps best to consider them in the context of evolutionary origin. The oldest portions and the first to develop are the posterior portions, known as the motor and premotor cortex, and are responsible for what might be called conscious initiation of movement and movement itself, respectively. For example, deciding to wiggle one’s index finger and then doing it involves engagement of the premotor cortex just a fraction of a second before it induces the motor cortex just posterior to it to initiate the actual movements. However, this important movement function of the frontal lobes in humans is often overlooked when considering the more advanced role this lobe plays in higher cognitive features, such as personality expression, emotional processing, thinking, decision making, and planning. The role of the frontal lobes is largely the adaptation of the organism to its environment. This is profoundly the case for the so-called prefrontal cortex, which lies just behind the eyebrows and anterior to the motor and premotor gyri. These gyri are among the latest to evolve in species that have them and the slowest to develop and connect in the individual’s life span. In humans, the frontal lobes generally don’t reach full maturity until a person is in her or his 20s. The frontal lobes are uniquely endowed with the function of preadapting humans to their environments and are connected to v­ irtually every other structure of the brain. The two most distinctive human functions reside within the prefrontal cortex—namely, language and the ability to predict. Preadaptation can be described as anticipating, planning, decision making, and organizing behavior, all displaying advanced concepts of time and the ability to recognize the consequences of behavior and to “simulate” what those consequences will feel like ahead of time.

Frontal Lobe Functions

The basic functions of the prefrontal cortex are associated with pyramidal motor circuits and involve the conscious control of continence, the control of movement, and olfaction. The urethral and anal sphincter muscles are controlled by the medial inferior frontal cortex, just below the area controlling the legs in the primary motor cortex. Although they may be considered basic, more primitive functions, the control of urination and defecation have major social implications for humans; thus, it is not surprising that their volitional control resides here. Olfaction is mainly mediated in the olfactory bulbs, nerves, and tracts on the inferior (bottom) surface of the orbitofrontal cortex, just above the nasal sinuses. Olfaction is an early evolutionary development, and the frontal lobes developed around this primitive set of structures. The olfactory tracts project into the septal region of the basal forebrain within the inferior medial frontal lobe and have many direct connections to limbic system structures involved in emotions. This explains why certain odors elicit such immediate, strong emotional responses. Emotions can strongly influence and guide behavior, which is consistent with their being fundamental processes of the frontal lobes. The primary motor cortex is located anterior to the central sulcus, which serves as the border with the parietal lobe. Extending anteriorly out of the sulcus onto the precentral gyrus, the primary motor cortex is bordered by a set of areas that lie on the precentral gyrus and that are known as the lateral premotor cortex. Posteriorly, the primary motor cortex is bordered by the primary somatosensory cortex, which lies on the posterior wall of the central sulcus and is part of the parietal lobe. Ventrally, the primary motor cortex adjoins the insular cortex in the lateral sulcus. The primary motor cortex extends dorsally to the top of the hemisphere and then continues onto the medial wall of the hemisphere within the longitudinal fissure. Motor representation within the motor cortex is arranged in an odd but orderly fashion from the toe (at the dorsal surface) to the mouth (at the ventral) along the fold of the central sulcus. Some body parts are controlled by partially overlapping regions of cortex, and the primary motor cortex in each cerebral hemisphere contains a motor representation of the contralateral (opposite) side of the body.

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Across the central sulcus in the parietal lobe lies a corresponding strip (the primary somatosensory cortex) that processes the sensory input from the body and is mapped out in similar fashion. However, the amount of cortex devoted to a body part is not absolutely proportional to the size of the body surface but, instead, is proportional to the relative density of motor neuron junctions with muscles and sensory receptors in each body part. For example, the human hands, face, and lips have a much larger representation than the legs do. The pyramidal motor tracts, named for the large, pyramid-shaped neurons (also called Betz cells) inhabiting the motor cortex in the posterior portion of the frontal lobes and serving as origins of conscious movement, project downward, forming a landmark of white matter known as the internal capsule. This band of fibers projects downward through the thalamus, pons, medulla, and other structures to the spinal cord. It is also sometimes called the corticospinal tract and contains mostly axons originating in layers of the motor cortex consisting of pyramidal cells. These cells synapse directly with anterior horn cells within the spinal cord, which, in turn, synapse directly with their target muscles. Concerned primarily with discrete, voluntary, skilled movements, such as the precise arm, hand, and finger movements needed to type on a keyboard, the commands descending down this tract cross over at the level of the brain stem, meaning that the left frontal motor cortex controls the right hand and vice versa for the other hemisphere and hand. Likewise, this region of cortex controls the fine motor coordination of the lips and tongue, allowing the precise movements needed for speech. A region called the frontal eye fields, anterior to the motor strip of the cortex, controls the voluntary movements of one’s eyes, as when reading, for example.

Theories of Frontal Lobe Function Theories of frontal lobe function center primarily on the “higher” prefrontal cortex structures and how they interact with other frontal structures and other brain regions. Theories from the 1980s used the term executive functions to describe four essential components of function: goal formulation (the ability to generate and select desirable future actions), planning (selection of the steps needed to

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Frontal Lobe Functions

achieve a goal), carrying out activities (the ability to start, stop, maintain, and switch between planned actions), and effective performance (the ability to monitor and modify activities). Other theorists added three further components. The first, the selection and execution of cognitive plans, entails being able to describe goals and methods, to determine the action sequences needed to initiate activity, to modify these plans, and to persist until a task is completed. A second component is time management, the ability to generate schedules and to perform activities within time constraints. The third component, self-regulation, involves use of feedback to modify behavior. This requires being able to inhibit impulses that would trigger behaviors inappropriate for the task at hand. Concepts based on artificial-intelligence principles led to a view of the frontal lobes as a supervisory attentional system (SAS) that affects a ­reactive production system. This feature of the frontal lobes inhibits undesirable responses and generates and executes desirable ones instead. In one instantiation, the SAS algorithm includes the following steps: detect a problem, generate a plan, prime the memory organization package (MOP) triggering conditions incident to the plan, interrupt activity when the triggering conditions are primed, assess the difficulty of triggering the MOP, replan if ­necessary, and then execute the MOP. Executive function theory can be summarized as involving the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in the stages of cognitive activity known as volition, planning and recall, motor program, implementation, monitoring, and adjusting and stopping. More specifically, these functions consist of organizing volitional responses, recalling past events and planning actions in the present with an eye to the future, organizing and initiating motor acts to follow these volitional commands, implementing programs to achieve the intended goal, monitoring the results of the action to determine the success of the response, and altering or stopping the action depending on that assessment. The executive function theory of frontal lobe function is illustrated in the following scenario from the life of a typical student. You realize that a very busy week of school is coming up. In addition to your usual routine of

attending classes, working, taking care of personal responsibilities, and taking at least a little time for recreation and relaxing, you have a couple of big exams, and a paper is due. Even for the best organized and most ambitious student, these tasks present real challenges and present wellknown as well as potential obstacles. There are goals to be formulated (you must generate and select desirable future actions), plans to be made (selecting the steps needed to achieve these goals), planned activities to carry out (requiring the ability to start, stop, maintain, and switch between planned actions), and activities to be coordinated effectively (requiring monitoring and modifying the planned activities and inhibiting others).

The behavioral requirements involved in this sequence can be described as the temporal organization of behavior, and this is one of the chief functions of the frontal cortex. The control systems that implement different behavioral strategies respond to both internal and external cues. The premotor and prefrontal regions contribute quite differently to this functioning, so they are considered separately here. Functions of the Premotor Cortex

Although the motor cortex provides for the execution of individual voluntary movements, the premotor cortex selects the movements to be executed. A moment before a student makes the movements necessary for opening a textbook or to swat away a fly buzzing nearby, the prefrontal cortex is activated, initiating the motor-cortical ­ activity necessary to produce the movements. The premotor cortical activation occurs in response to an internal, cognitive cue, but that of the motor cortex can be regarded as a response to an external environmental cue. It is suggested that supplementary motor regions of the medial motor cortex make greater contributions when no external cues are available, and the lateral premotor regions function primarily to select movements in response to external cues. In addition to the movements of the limbs, eye movements directed to the relevant targets are also selected. The frontal eye fields lying anterior to the premotor cortex are responsible for the selection. Just as limb movements made in response to

Frontal Lobe Functions

internal or external cues are mediated in different regions of the frontal cortex, so too are eye movements in response to specific external targets (the fly buzzing around) or internal cues (deciding to open a textbook). One of the chief functions of the premotor cortex, in conjunction with the prefrontal cortex, is “response selection.” Many movements are said to be “programmed” or “routinized,” much like programming routines authored using computer languages. They are stereotypical—that is, performed virtually identically each time—and are largely or entirely nonconscious, even when consciously initiated. Functions of the Prefrontal Cortex

Although the motor cortex is responsible for producing movements selected by the premotor cortex, the prefrontal cortex controls cognitive processes to ensure that appropriate movements are selected at the right time and place. This may occur in response to internal or external cues, to the context of the situation, or to self-knowledge. The internal record of what has taken place is referred to as temporal, working, or short-term memory. Dorsolateral areas of the prefrontal cortex are involved in the selection of behavior based on internal temporal memory. External cues also affect the selection of behavior, but this does not always occur under the control of temporal memory. For example, consider someone who walks into the kitchen to get a pen because she realized that there wasn’t one on her desk, then sees her cell phone on the counter and decides to check for messages, then is prompted by the sight of the refrigerator to grab a snack and something to drink, and then forgets just what it was she went into the kitchen for. In this example, several external cues contributed to unplanned behaviors that were unchecked by inhibition. Behavior is also dependent on context cues, which can be a mixture of internal and external

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cues. People are quiet during a classroom lecture, loud and raucous at a club, conscious of their manners around other people, and perhaps quite the opposite while lounging alone at home when no one else is around. The choice of behaviors in social contexts requires detailed sensory input, which is conveyed to the inferior frontal cortex from the temporal lobe, and affective context that comes from the amygdala and other limbic system structures. People with orbitofrontal damage have great difficulty performing appropriate behavior in context. Last, behavior is not only under the control of sensory input, temporal memory, and context, but it is profoundly affected by a lifetime of memories, experiences, goals, and reason giving. This is called autonoetic awareness (self-knowing), the continuous awareness of oneself through time (the autobiographical self). Impairments of such awareness affect the self-regulation of behavior. Patients with orbitofrontal damage often lose autonoetic awareness and struggle with the loss of influence of personal, past experiences and life goals as contexts for current behavior. Brian R. Metcalf See also Brain and Nervous System: Macroarchitecture; Occipital Lobe Functions; Parietal Lobe Functions; Temporal Lobe Functions

Further Readings Kolb, B., & Whishaw, I. Q. (2008). Fundamentals of human neuropsychology. New York, NY: Worth. Macmillan, M. (2000). An odd kind of fame: Stories of Phineas Gage. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Miller, B. L., & Cummings, J. L. (Eds.). (2006). The human frontal lobes: Functions and disorders (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Guilford Press. Stuss, D. T., & Knight, R. T. (Eds.). (2013). Principles of frontal lobe function (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

G sex differences are expected and, indeed, observed in humans, as in other species, in behaviors related to mating but also in other social interactions such as competition and cooperation.

Gender, Evolutionary Perspectives on Sexual dimorphism, or the differences in traits or behaviors between males and females of a given species, is seen throughout the animal kingdom. Sexual dimorphism often allows males or females of a species to signal to individuals of the other sex a particularly desirable characteristic for mating, such as the male peacock’s tail, as a signal of genetic quality and parasite resistance. This entry reviews the development of differences in human gender roles and behavior from an evolutionary psychology perspective. Charles Darwin described mechanisms by which individuals in a species will compete with members of the same sex for access to mates (i.e., intrasexual competition) and choose opposite-sex mates (i.e., intersexual choice), thereby facilitating sexual selection for traits. For example, in humans, sex differences have been observed in many traits and behaviors, such as muscle mass, facial-attractiveness preferences as indicators of mate fitness, and risk-taking behaviors. A multitude of cross-cultural, anthropological, historical, and psychological studies have used evolutionary theory as a basis for predictions about biological human sex differences in behaviors, traits, and mating strategies. Like many female mammals, human females have limited reproductive rates because of gestation and postnatal care, whereas males’ limitations are determined by their access to mates. Therefore, some

The Perspective of Evolutionary Psychology Human sex differences display two important ­features from an evolutionary psychology perspective. First, males and females in the evolutionary past faced many of the same selection pressures and thus are more similar than dissimilar. In humans, there are higher levels of paternal (father) investment compared with many nonhuman species, and both males and females engage in both intrasexual competition and intersexual choice rather than in a strict pattern of male competition and female choice that typically is seen in other species. In other words, human females are expected to, and do, compete with each other for males’ paternal investment, and human males are selective in their mate choice, particularly in long-term relationships. Second, it is important in the discussion of sex and gender to differentiate between basic sex differences based on biological, sexually selected traits and behaviors over the history of the species and gender, which is defined as a given society’s definition and expectations of an individual based on his or her sex and is therefore context dependent. Whereas gender and gender roles are variable from culture to culture, evolutionary psychology predicts some universals in sex differences in human behaviors, mating strategies, and psychological 345

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Gender and Cognition

processes based on evolved tendencies over the species’ history. This is not to say that evolutionary psychology disregards culture as an unimportant aspect of understanding sex differences. On the contrary, culture is regarded as seminal to the understanding of how sex differences in psychological phenomena manifest themselves. The context remains consistently important for understanding the nuances of mate selection in humans. For example, in polygynous cultures, underlying sex differences, such as the tendency for males to be more (physically) aggressive than females, are often exaggerated and directly encouraged by parents and others during the course of development. In this context, where the most competitive males have many wives, and thus offspring, aggression is often rewarded with reproductive resources. In modern Western cultures, on the other hand, socially imposed monogamy and the ability for women to possess resources often reduce the payoffs for exaggerating male aggression and lead to fewer gender differences in aggressive displays and competitiveness. Research has found sex differences in many behaviors across cultures, including risk-taking behaviors, physical aggression, and empathy. Evolutionary psychology posits that the relative flexibility of culture has allowed for these basic, biologically based sex differences to manifest themselves in and be tailored to various cultural norms. Thus, although gender norms in one culture may be different from another culture’s, these norms are sometimes rooted in sex differences seen regardless of culture. For example, even in Western cultures, males engage in organized sports as a manifestation of coalitional competition more often than women do. Thus, although culture adds a layer of understanding to the human experience, basic sex differences are evident regardless of culture. Given the fluidity of culture and its influence on individuals, it is both interesting and surprising that across cultures and over time, these sex differences persist despite appearing in different forms (e.g., boys’ rough-and-tumble play in culture-specific games). By examining sex differences in the context of evolutionary theory, gender and its cultural sources can be better understood as a manifestation of underlying differences. Jessica L. Calvi and Jennifer Byrd-Craven

See also Gender and Culture; Gender and Sex; Gender Development; Gender Stereotypes; Social Role Theory

Further Readings Buss, D. (1989). Sex differences in human mate preferences: Evolutionary hypotheses tested in 37 cultures. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 12, 1–49. Gangestad, S. W., Thornhill, R., & Garver, C. E. (2002). Changes in women’s sexual interests and their partners’ mate-retention tactics across the menstrual cycle: Evidence for shifting conflicts of interest. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B, 269, 975–982. Geary, D. C. (2010). Male, female: The evolution of human sex differences. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Geary, D. C., & Flinn, M. V. (2002). Evolution of human parental behavior and the human family. Parenting: Science and Practice, 1, 5–61. Wood, W., & Eagly, A. H. (2010). Gender. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (5th ed., Vol. 1, pp. 629–667). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Gender

and

Cognition

The topic of gender differences in cognition is a widely studied and frequently controversial topic. The importance of this topic, and the controversy, comes from its relevance in popular discussion about the “smarter sex” but also in academic discussions about the underrepresentation of women in STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) fields and the merits of single-gender versus coeducational schools. Most of the theoretical literature refers to gender or sex differences in cognitive abilities, although it is important to keep in mind that what is measured is actually some kind of performance on a test of achievement in a specific field of knowledge. Under the general term gender and cognition are gender differences in cognitive abilities, learning style, and communication style. This entry discusses the theoretical approaches that attempt an explanation of how gender differences emerge.

Gender and Cognition

Gender and Cognitive Abilities Three major differences in cognitive abilities between men and women have been frequently reported: (a) higher verbal abilities in women, (b) higher spatial abilities in men, and (c) higher arithmetical abilities in men. However, differences in arithmetical abilities have at times been interpreted as a result of men’s superior spatial abilities. Various studies indicate that women develop language more rapidly than men do and have a broader vocabulary, more accurate speech production, and greater fluency. They also do better in spelling and grammatical usage as well as verbal memory, object location memory, and speed in fine-motor skills. They average higher scores than men on computational tests and tests of depth of processing, perceptual speed, and incidental memory. Female superiority on verbal tasks is established around the age of 10 or 11 years and remains throughout the college years. The most consistent and reliable evidence for male performance exceeding that of females is found on tests of mental rotation of spatial stimuli. Men outperform women in navigation strategies and geographical orientation. However, the size of these differences is usually small and varies according to age and the testing procedure involved. Male superiority in visual-spatial ability appears from 6 to 8 years of age and remains until adulthood. Cross-cultural comparisons of results from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) of 15-year-old students in several nations at the end of compulsory education have found that females outscore males on reading tasks. However, the picture for mathematics and science is different; girls actually outperform boys in both subject areas in some countries, underperform in others, and in others there is no significant difference. An important, but often overlooked, finding related to nonsignificant differences in mathematics achievement is that boys might be overrepresented at the two ends of the score distribution— that is, among very low and very high performers. In line with this finding, the largest gender-specific differences have been found in gifted populations, where males outperform females by approximately half a standard deviation. Other results show little difference in average mathematics achievement in the fourth- to eighth-grade levels but show a

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significant gender difference among students in the final year of high school. Gender and Learning Styles

Gender differences in learning styles have also been reported, despite the fact that the notion of learning style as a theoretical construct has been criticized for leading to essentialist thinking about gender categories. Learning style preferences typically refer to the manner in which and the conditions under which learners most effectively perceive, process, store, and recall what they are attempting to learn. Several studies have reported that women tend to prefer concrete learning styles, whereas men are more likely to favor modes involving abstract conceptualization. Males also preferred multimodal instruction, which is a combination of visual (learning from graphs, charts, and flow diagrams, for example), auditory (learning from speech), read-write (learning from reading and writing), and kinesthetic (learning from touch, hearing, smell, taste, and sight) modalities. Females, on the other hand, preferred single-mode instruction with a preference for kinesthetic learning. In general, women tend to experience more anxiety and to be more pessimistic than men about their academic success. Their performance on motivation scales indicates that women are more intrinsically motivated and men more extrinsically and achievement motivated. Gender and Communication

Empirical findings about gender differences in communication appear in the literatures of sociolinguistics, gender development, and education. Differences in communicative styles emerge early in children’s development and persist throughout life. Males are generally more concerned with selfassertion and dominance, whereas females are generally more concerned with collaboration and responsiveness to others.

How Did Gender Differences Evolve? Learning about gender differences tells little, if anything, about their origins. It commonly is assumed that both biological and environmental factors account for the differences that have been demonstrated. Among the biological factors

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identified are differences in neurological structure and function. Some authors have found that hormones are associated with certain aspects of brain differentiation. Among the environmental factors, sex roles, gender stereotypes, and sex typing, as well as processes of social construction of gender identity through socialization in peer culture, are considered influential in the emergence of gender differences. There are also more integrated theories that attempt a biopsychosocial explanation. Theories from evolutionary psychology favor the claim that men developed superior spatial and navigational skills compared with women because such abilities reflect sex differences in ancestral hunter-gatherer societies, where men traveled far from home in search of animals to hunt and kill and women stayed closer to their homes in their role as caregivers and plant gatherers. Biopsychosocial theories claim that some variables are inextricably biological and social and cannot be classified as one or the other. In this approach, prior learning experience and neurochemical processes predispose the learning of some behaviors and concepts rather than others. Prior experience and neurochemical processes can even change the structure of the brain. According to this approach, nature and nurture are not independent processes but always are intertwined. Such claims are in line with developments in epigenetics and its central finding that the environment affects gene expression. The role of culture is crucial in the formation of equality or inequality between the genders, and it has been hypothesized that the lower position of women in a society might be related to the emergence of gender differences in cognitive abilities. However, cross-cultural comparisons of PISA findings in relation to composite gender-inequality indices at the national level show inconsistent correlations, although there are some indications that the smaller the Gender Gap Index (GGI) is in a country, the lower is the gender difference in mathematics achievement. Interestingly, the reading gap that favors girls and the spatial-abilities gender gap that favors boys both increase in more gender-equal countries, which is often interpreted as the result of educational interventions that favor both girls and boys, thus leaving the gender gap intact. Additionally, when measures become more specific and more closely

related to education, such as gender differences in the relative share of research and science positions at the national level, they are often positively correlated with gender differences in mathematics and science. Measures of attitudes toward women in STEM-related fields or of gender stereotypes about the relative abilities of males and females are also found to correlate positively with gender d ­ ifferences in mathematics and science. These findings, along with the timing of the emergence of gender differences in early and late childhood, suggest that social interactions with peers in childhood during the school years could be an important arena for the social construction of gender differences in cognition. In terms of gender identity development, it has been argued that gender differences in communication style could be attributed to increases in gender separation in coeducational institutions. Gender segregation begins in preschool and becomes sufficiently pronounced in elementary schools that it is often meaningful to speak of separate girls’ and boys’ “worlds.” As a result of separated peer play in childhood, with girls playing predominantly with other girls and boys playing predominantly with other boys, the genders might evolve quite different goals for social interactions and communication styles. Girls might learn that talk is for (a) creating and maintaining relationships of closeness and equality, (b) criticizing others in acceptable ways, and (c) interpreting accurately the speech of other girls. By contrast, boys might learn that talk is for (a) asserting a position of dominance, (b) attracting and maintaining an audience, and ­(c) asserting themselves when another speaker “has the floor.” The concept of separate worlds, however, often exaggerates the differences between the genders and overlooks the fact that both girls and boys share the same social representations of gender and the same social markings of various aspects of their material and social world, such as academic subjects. The gender comparison approach also fails to distinguish between varieties of masculinity and femininity and the way they are expressed in social interactions. Research suggests that the communicative style of an individual in a conversation is much more context dependent than might be understood from popular but superficial comparisons of men’s and

Gender and Cognition

women’s linguistic styles. Such comparisons mask the variability that is a function of the gender of the particular other, the nature of the matter about which the communication is occurring, and the knowledge asymmetry between the two partners in communication. The gender of the partner in communication plays a substantial role in differences in communication. Many of the studies that took place in educational settings were sophisticated enough to explore differences in communication in the context of same or mixed-gender dyads or groups. Boys in mixed dyads are consistently more influential in group decisions than are girls. Also, in structured group work, girls ask for help to a greater extent than boys do, both girls and boys prefer to ask boys for help, and girls are more likely than boys to answer requests for help that are addressed to them. More important, gender comparisons might overlook the fact that conversational styles might be contingent on the actual or perceived balance of expertise about the matter at hand. This is clearly seen in the often-contradictory findings from mixed-sex pairs of their communication styles. For example, some studies found that both boys and girls are more inconsistent in their use of traditional “assertive” and “mitigating” styles in mixed-gender groups than in same-gender groups. Also, some studies reported that girls adopt more heavyhanded persuasion techniques when interacting with boys, but other studies report that girls are more passive in those interactions. Such apparently contradictory findings seem to be reconciled once the balance of expertise and its differential management by the two genders in mixed-gender social interactions is taken into account. For example, a consistent and now well established finding is that a gender difference in the Piagetian spatial and conservation of liquid tasks (e.g., tasks in which liquid is emptied from one container and poured into a container of a different shape, and the child is asked whether the amount of liquid in the new container is the same as in the original) can be experimentally produced at the ages of 6 to 7 years in mixed-gender interactions between an expert and a novice. In particular, the reported “Fm effect” (where Fm refers to a female-male dyad in which the female is more knowledgeable about the task than the male is) refers to situations in which novice

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boys are more likely to show better performance on an individual posttest after social interaction with an expert girl. This effect might be due to the boy’s higher engagement in active manipulation of the task material and in argumentation. Moreover, the performance increment for novice boys is stable over time and is often accompanied by the novel use of argument or by generalization to more difficult items, thus satisfying Piaget’s strict criteria of what counts as cognitive development. These findings can be viewed as the social co-constructive parallel to the intraindividual or ­ internalized dynamics of a gender stereotype boost for boys and gender stereotype threat for girls that hinders girls’ performance in difficult math p ­ roblems when the fear of verifying the negative stereotype that “girls are not good at math” creates anxiety that undermines their performance, even when working alone. That stereotype threat is related to the internalized, previous experience of alienation from the specific task in social interactions with actual or assumed expert boys. In fact, researchers reported that women experiencing stereotype threat while taking a math test showed heightened activation in the ventral stream of the anterior cingulate cortex, a brain region associated with social and emotional processing. Gender differences appear to have a complex, biopsychosocial quality and need to be analyzed at various levels. The study of social representations of gender, as a process, and gender identity relates to the gender marking of tasks, abilities, and fields of knowledge and seems promising in resolving various paradoxes. It is important to keep in mind that to attempt predictions about or evaluations of the achievement of an individual boy or man or girl or woman on the basis of average differences between genders is ill advised. This is because there is substantial variability within each gender category and considerable overlap between them. Even in the case of the larger effect sizes in gender differences in cognition, only a small percentage of variance typically is explained by the gender difference per se. Charis Psaltis and Anna Zapiti See also Gender and Culture; Gender and Language; Gender and Sex; Gender Development; Gender Identity; Gender Roles; Social Role Theory

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Further Readings Ardila, A., Rosselli, M., Matute, E., & Inozemtseva, O. (2011). Gender differences in cognitive development. Developmental Psychology, 47(4), 984–990. Halpern, D. (2012). Sex differences in cognitive abilities (4th ed.). New York, NY: Psychology Press. Krendl, A. C., Richeson, J. A., Kelley, W. M., & Heatherton, T. F. (2008). The negative consequences of threat: A functional magnetic resonance imaging investigation of the neural mechanisms underlying women’s underperformance in math. Psychological Science, 19(2), 168–175. Psaltis, C., & Zapiti, A. (2014). Interaction, communication and development: Psychological development as a social process. London, England: Routledge. Severiens, S. E., & Ten-Dam, G. T. (1994). Gender differences in learning styles: A narrative review and a quantitative meta-analysis. Higher Education, 27, 487–501.

Gender

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Culture

When talking about similarities and differences between men and women, boys and girls, sex is often used to describe biological differences. Gender, on the other hand, is used to describe masculinity and femininity—that is, the psycho­ logical differences in learned behaviors and expectations that are shaped by culture. However, such a distinction is false. It is impossible to separate the biological and social influences that shape gender identity, behaviors, and roles. Sexual differentiation begins with sex chromosomes working through hormonal mechanisms that are influenced by the prenatal and postnatal physical and cultural environment. This entry describes theories of gender and culture, looking first at theories of gender development and then at theories of adult gender-related behaviors.

Theories of Gender Development Perhaps one of the oldest theories of gender development is social learning theory. In the 1960s, Robert Sears and colleagues combined Sigmund Freud’s ideas about gender development and the learning theory principles of reinforcement and modeling. Parenting behaviors were thought to shape children’s gender-related behaviors, with

mothers giving warmth and emotional support and fathers providing discipline and control. Albert Bandura expanded these ideas by emphasizing the role of modeling and differential treatment of girls and boys. Children were assumed to learn gender roles by observing models, such as parents, other adults, older siblings, and peers, as well as seeing the reactions of others to various gender role behaviors. A girl may watch her mother bathe and dress a younger sibling, and later she may imitate those actions with her dolls. However, if a boy does the same, he may be teased by his peers or be given a “boy toy,” such as a truck, to play with instead. It is obvious that social learning influences gender development. However, boys and girls have different role models and are treated very differently across cultures. One study showed that instead of being aloof and uninvolved, Mexican fathers were as warm and affectionate as mothers were, joking with their children as they played dominoes or showing them how to polish their shoes. In some cultures, girls are not allowed to go to school or play sports, and adolescents are not allowed to have other-sex friends; in other cultures these differences do not occur. Expanding on the importance of role modeling, social role theory proposes that gender-related behaviors are the result of the different social roles that females and males play. These different roles are based on the sexual division of labor. In many cultural groups, women cook, clean the house, take care of children, and generally manage the household. Men are away from home providing financial support for the family or doing physically demanding household tasks, such as yard work and taking care of the car. These varying roles lead to differences in women’s and men’s social and political power. Gender stereotypes about femininity and masculinity have evolved to support these cultural roles. Because women are more frequently associated with the homemaker role, they are thought to be more domestic, warm, and caring than men. Likewise, men are the breadwinners, so they are considered more powerful and politically savvy than women. Cultural norms and expectations push people to conform to cultural gender roles and shape how they think about themselves and others.

Gender and Culture

A classic study of children’s activities across cultures suggests that one way children learn gender-related social roles is in the context of tasks that they are taught and must assume within the family. Caring for younger siblings is more ­frequently performed by girls, but boys and girls who provide caregiving show more nurturance, a stereotypically feminine characteristic. Although social role theory arguments are convincing, the theory does not explain why the same gender division of labor is found across most cultural groups. Indeed, the theory does not explain how these gender-related social structures influence individuals or groups across very different cultural settings. One question that has been at the forefront of most gender theories is to discover how children learn gender roles. Children are not born knowing their culturally appropriate gender roles. As is obvious from the theories just discussed, socialization (learning norms and customs of oneʼs social group) by parents, peers, and others shapes children’s gender-appropriate activities, behaviors, and toy and playmate choices. Hence, these gender-related behaviors and beliefs may differ according to the child’s cultural context. How do children construct their understanding of gender roles? Building on Jean Piaget’s ideas about children’s cognitive development, Lawrence Kohlberg’s cognitive stage theory focused on how children build cognitive schemes or structures that represent their understanding of the world. Children seek information and experiences that are consistent with their sex, and their understanding of gender develops in stages across the first years of life. By age 2.5 years, children have developed gender identity and can label themselves and others as males and females. Around age 3, children know that their gender is stable over time. Boys will grow up to be men, and girls will grow up to be women. Finally, around age 5 years, children achieve gender constancy or consistency. They know that a person’s gender remains the same regardless of changes in appearance or activities. Thus, even if a boy dresses up in girl’s clothes or plays with dolls, he is still a boy. Children’s cultural experiences help shape these cognitive schemes and stages. These cognitive stages usually unfold before age 5, and when children reach gender constancy,

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they prefer to play with traditionally genderappropriate toys, they reward peers for genderappropriate behaviors, and they imitate same-sex models. Contrary to the theory, children learn gender-appropriate behaviors before they can translate those behaviors into words. Gender schema theory has delved further into how schemes develop, along with how they organize and bias behavior, thinking, and attention to cultural information about gender. These theorists assume that gender information in the child’s cultural environment shapes what it means to be female or male, creating gender-related cognitive structures or schemes (also called schema). When children achieve gender identity and can label themselves and others, gender schemes help them understand their world. Social experiences automatically activate gender schemes and guide how children process new gender-related information and experiences. As a result, children see themselves and others in terms of gender differences (e.g., girls versus boys, females versus males), and they use these schemes to evaluate the appropriateness of behaviors. Children categorize gender information and make generalizations about what girls and boys are like. These generalizations, or stereotypes, simplify the child’s world, guide social interactions, and help the child learn about appropriate gender roles. As children grow older, they become more flexible in how they think about gender and appropriate role behaviors. A 3-year-old boy may not want to play with girls, but 10-year-olds often happily play on mixed-sex sports teams.

Theories of Gender at the Adult Level In addition to general theories of gender development, ideas have flourished that concentrate on the relationships between males and females at the adult level. The ambivalent sexism theory, developed by Susan Fiske and Peter Glick, identifies two related subtypes of sexism—benevolent sexism (BS) and hostile sexism (HS). BS represents the more positive, accepting, yet passive beliefs about a sex, whereas HS is the negative, more openly prejudiced view of a sex. A man who shows BS might compliment, appreciate, and acknowledge a female coworker’s hard work and her invaluable assistance to him in getting a job done. In contrast,

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a man who shows HS might say that men are better workers than women and women should be at home, not in the workforce. These two components of sexism work together to keep traditional gender behaviors constant. Although BS appears to show acceptance of females, it promotes the idea that women should behave in more traditional ways. HS, on the other hand, openly appears to punish women for rejecting the traditional lifestyle, such as working in a predominantly male job in the workforce. People who show more BS also have more HS beliefs. Even though BS does not seem to be directly negative or harmful, it is quite subtle. By idealizing women as pure and in need of protection, it confines them to conventional gender roles. Both HS and BS are prevalent across cultures. Within individual countries, when men have high levels of sexism, women do as well. Women in all cultures are more resistant to HS than men, but in some of the most sexist countries, women have shown more BS than men have. Although this may be surprising, BS is an insidious form of prejudice that may have benefits in very sexist cultures. Being provided for and protected by men may be beneficial for women, but it also is paternalistic and disrespectful. It implies that women are incompetent and not suited for important high-status roles. Alice H. Eagly and Steven J. Karau’s role congruity theory suggests that two other sorts of prejudice arise when females are in leadership positions. These occur because there is an imbalance between the perception of a woman’s gender and the leadership role she is in. The first prejudice is thinking of women as less able than men for a certain position. If the leadership role is typically seen as a very masculine role, such as that of an ice hockey coach, and a woman occupies that position, then there likely will be substantial prejudice against her. However, if the woman is a soccer coach, a somewhat less masculine role than a hockey coach, there would most likely be less prejudice against her. The sex of the observer also plays a role in the level of prejudice toward the leader. Men’s views of a woman coach may differ from women’s views. To reduce such prejudice against women, leadership roles need to be defined differently, with fewer masculine characteristics. The same would hold true for women’s traditional roles.

The second prejudice views women as doing worse than men in a traditional male role. Because they are women, they are not perceived as competent or as qualified compared with their male counterparts. Together, these two prejudices suggest that women who are more congruent with the stereotypical, traditional gender role schema are viewed more positively than women who differ from these norms and from more traditional views of women. Research across cultures has found limited support for role congruity in the workplace. Less prejudice toward women leaders occurs in cultures where social relations are emphasized, such as more collectivistic, embedded societies. Madeline Heilman’s lack-of-fit model of bias in work settings extends role congruity theory. This model suggests that the larger the discrepancy between the individual and the workplace role, the more likely the person will be judged as unfit. Employees in an organization with their first female president might consider her to be less competent than previous male presidents. Their negative expectations could affect the woman’s self-evaluation and lead to lower appraisals by her colleagues. This traditional male-led organization scenario parallels cultural settings where men and women might view leaders according to traditional role expectations. If a new leader does not fit the previously defined role, it might be difficult for the leader to be successful and respected. Most of the theories discussed thus far have looked at specific cultural behaviors of children and adults. Evolutionary theory takes a broader view, looking at mechanisms, such as natural selection, that shape the human species. Evolutionary mechanisms create the physical aspects of humans and animals, their bodies and brains, and these shape behaviors and psychological tendencies as they adapt to their environments. Inherited sex chromosomes influence gender development indirectly through sex hormones that produce sex differences in the brain and behavior. Evolutionary success is measured not by the survival of the organism but by its reproductive success. Two mechanisms that contribute to reproductive success are mate selection and parental caregiving for offspring, both prenatally and postnatally. One hypothesis growing from evolutionary theory is that men are innately

Gender and Emotion

programmed to be more aggressive and sexually promiscuous than women, and women are more capable in child care than men. These differences confer an advantage for men’s and women’s reproductive success. The minor differences seen across cultures in mate preferences and child care behaviors are the result of variations in environment and in learning from the cultural social group. Thus, females and males enter the world biologically prepared to experience their environments differently, and their experiences shape sex-appropriate behaviors as well as sex segregation in activities and occupations. Even though some of the general, evolutionary explanations of sex differences may be correct, it has been difficult to show links between long-ago evolutionary events and current behavior or to test evolutionary hypotheses. It is highly doubtful that hormones lead to either sex’s being incapable of taking on a particular cultural social role. Hormones are never the only influence on behavior. Cognitive abilities, personality, motivation, prior experience, and other psychological factors influence gender-related behaviors. Indeed, evolutionary mechanisms cannot account for gender differences found in values, beliefs, expectations, and norms seen across various cultural groups. Deborah L. Best and Margaret E. Cameron See also Culture and Cognition; Culture and Social Relations; Gender and Cognition; Gender and Language; Gender and Sex; Gender Identity; Gender Roles; Gender Stereotypes; Social Role Theory

Further Readings Bronstein, P., & Quina, K. (Eds.). (2003). Personality, gender, and culture. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Cohen, A. B. (Ed.). (2014). Culture reexamined: Broadening our understanding of social and evolutionary influences. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Ding, S., & Littleton, K. (Eds.). (2005). Children’s personal and social development. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Magnusson, E., & Marecek, J. (2012). Gender and culture in psychology: Theories and practices. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

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Emotion

Emotion and emotion-relevant qualities occupy a central place in stereotypes of the “generic” woman and man. Like other gender stereotypes, gender– emotion beliefs influence evaluation of others’ ­emotion. For example, because of stereotypes about women’s emotion, physicians tend to focus more on psychosomatic symptoms in diagnoses involving women than in those involving men. Most psychological research that explores the connection between gender and emotion approaches the question in terms of when and why gender differences in emotion occur. Gender differences in emotion-related beliefs and behavior are modality specific and context dependent. That is, the extent to which there are differences depends on what is measured and how the research context is framed. This entry discusses gender difference within different aspects of emotion as well as future directions for the study of gender and emotion. It also notes that the large majority of research on gender and emotion has been conducted in North America and Europe, so readers should be cautious about generalizing to other nations and cultures.

Differences and Context Although empirical research on gender and emotion shows that there are no appreciable gender differences in people’s knowledge about their own and others’ emotion, there are gender differences in the way knowledge about emotion is deployed. The way a study is designed can create contextual factors that influence whether or not gender differences in emotion are observed. Among the factors influencing gender differences are (a) whether the measured behavior occurs publicly; (b) whether the behavior is identified as “feminine”—such as something girls or women tend to do well; and (c) whether responses are obtained via retrospective self-report. In the case of self-reports about emotion experience, for instance, gender effects more closely resemble gender stereotypes (overgeneralized beliefs about women and men) when reports are taken retrospectively than when reports about the emotion occur in real time. For example, when

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women and men are asked about their ability to empathize with others, women tend to report more capacity than do men; however, the difference diminishes or disappears when empathic behavior in an actual situation is measured.

Specific Aspects of Emotion Emotional Expression

Gender differences in emotional expression are intertwined with gendered expectations and socialization processes. For example, by adolescence, women are better at decoding the nonverbal behaviors and expressions of others. However, when people are asked to decode expressions of dominance or other expressions that are stereotypically important for men to decode, these differences disappear. Another gender difference often reported is that women’s emotion expressions tend to be more easily “read” than men’s. These differences typically disappear, however, when participants, regardless of gender, are motivated to convey particular emotions. In addition, women and adolescent girls tend to smile more than men and adolescent boys do. Importantly, however, gender differences in smiling are larger when people are concerned with acting in a gender-appropriate manner, the situation is ambiguous, or emotion is salient. These differences also vary with culture and age. The facial configuration of men and women, rather than differences in the emotion being experienced, leads to differences in the way emotional expressions are perceived. For instance, perceptual markers of anger (e.g., lowered eyebrows) on an androgynous face are more quickly recognized as male, and markers of happiness (e.g., smiling, which creates a rounder face) and fear (e.g., the eyes appear larger) are more quickly recognized as female. Emotion Regulation

Gender differences in the physiological experience of emotion (e.g., heart rate, blood pressure, and skin conductance) have been shown to be specific to certain tasks, situations, emotion types, and physiological markers. These differences may be moderated, or explained entirely, by the type of

emotion one is experiencing, one’s ethnicity, and one’s age. In terms of regulating emotion, both women and men engage in social sharing of emotion with equal frequency. There are reported gender differences in strategies that women and men use to regulate emotion, with men reporting more use of suppression, problemsolving, and externalizing strategies, and women reporting more use of internalizing methods, social support, and emotion-focused strategies (such as rumination). In addition, although gender differences are found in the self-reported tendency to suppress emotions, suppression varies depending on the emotion type and situation (e.g., women report suppressing anger, disgust, and contempt, but men report suppressing fear and surprise). Over and above gender, personality traits and motives also influence individual emotion regulation. Future Directions

Current studies of gender and emotion rely largely on U.S. and European samples. It is important to think about how gender–emotion linkages are culturally situated, how they develop, and how they may change over time. For example, although few gender differences are found in children’s understanding of emotion, parents’ and other adults’ treatment of girls’ and boys’ emotion is gendered. Additionally, neuroscientific research on emotional expression and experience is rapidly progressing. It is important that the investigation of gender and emotion is theoretically grounded and considers the influence of social context on the structure of neural networks and brain functioning. Emotion researchers have begun to emphasize the interpersonal nature of emotion. In this view, emotion is not a self-contained, private experiential event but emerges from interaction (or imagined interaction) with others. This approach moves the focus of the study of gender and emotion from intrinsic factors in individuals to examining the situational factors that affect people’s experiences. For example, researchers can examine how expectations, interaction goals, and online responsiveness of interaction partners modify gendered emotional behavior. An emphasis on cultural aspects is also needed to better understand gender–emotion linkages.

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Many questions in the study of gender and emotion call for an alternative to the description of differences that interrogates how gender, as an aspect of social identity, is influenced by and influences understanding of one’s own and others’ emotion. For example, beliefs about emotion play a role in the formation of a child’s, and an adult’s, sense of gendered identity. How and why does emotion (as beliefs, behavior, interpersonal interaction) take on a substantive role in ideas about self and other as gendered people?

the reason for these differences. Some theories suggest that there are biological explanations for these differences, whereas others focus on how these differences are a result of social context, power differences between men and women, or socialization. This entry begins with a review of some of the main research methods and findings and continues with a discussion of the theories that attempt to explain gender and language.

Kaitlin McCormick and Stephanie A. Shields

The large field of research that examines gender and language is interdisciplinary, including studies done by scholars within the areas of psychology, sociology, linguistics, education, human development, communication studies, and biological sciences. Although most of these studies observe people talking to one another and then analyze one aspect of language production, use, or reception, the specific way in which communication is measured differs. Some studies simply measure the amount people speak in a given time, whereas other studies measure the use of language. Biological research on language often uses brain imaging to explore how the brain responds during language production (i.e., speaking) or language reception (i.e., listening and comprehension). Developmental research uses all three methods (amount of language, use of language, and brain imaging) to investigate how these factors change over time. Because of the many studies across disciplines on gender and language, meta-analyses are useful in providing an overview of this field. Metaanalyses use statistical methods to pool data from a large number of studies, thereby providing information about whether gender differences are found across studies, details about the size of the difference, and possible mediators. Overall, these meta-analyses have found a few statistically significant differences between males and females that are considered negligible or small in size. A few findings from these meta-analyses are notable. First, women demonstrate greater language ability. Second, differences have been recorded in the use of speech. Men are more likely to use assertive speech (used to assert agency or dominance, such as directions or criticism). In ­contrast, women are more likely to use affiliative

See also Emotion, Detection of; Emotion, Evolution of; Emotion, Expression of; Emotion and Culture; Emotion and Motivation; Emotion and Scientific Reasoning; Emotional Intelligence; Emotions, Universality of; Feminist Approaches to Psychology and Gender; Gender, Evolutionary Perspectives on; Gender and Cognition; Gender and Culture; Gender and Language; Gender and Sex; Gender and Violence; Gender Development; Gender Identity; Gender Roles; Gender Stereotypes; Social Emotions; Social Role Theory; Stress and Gender

Further Readings Brody, L. R., & Hall, J. A. (2008). Gender and emotion in context. In M. Lewis, J. M. Haviland-Jones, & B. L. Feldman (Eds.), Handbook of emotions (3rd ed., pp. 395–408). New York, NY: Guilford Press. Fischer, A. (Ed.). (2000). Gender and emotion: Social psychological perspectives. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Shields, S. A. (2013). Gender and emotion: What we think we know, what we need to know, and why it matters. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 37, 423–435.

Gender

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Language

According to common belief and popular media, men and women communicate differently. Perceptions that “women talk more than men” and “men interrupt more than women” have led social scientists to examine whether these stereotypes hold true. Research has indeed found gender differences in language development and use, and therefore many theories have been developed to explain

Research

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speech (used to engage with or support, such as agreements or reassurance) and tentative speech (used to express uncertainty, such as “kind of”). Meta-analyses have also demonstrated that parents and peers communicate differently with boys and girls in childhood, which may therefore lead to gender differences in language in adolescence and adulthood. The next section discusses how these and additional research findings apply to three different theoretical approaches to gender and language.

Theories Because of the complexity as well as the interdisciplinary nature of this topic, there are many theoretical approaches that explain how the genders communicate. Some take a biological or essentialist approach, whereas others suggest that gender is socially constructed. Those taking an essentialist approach emphasize gender differences in language, whereas those taking a constructionist view examine how features of the individual or the situation shape communication. Three theoretical approaches—neurobiological, social-constructionist, and socialization—are summarized here. Neurobiological Approach

Neurobiological approaches are based on the idea that gender differences in language are due to brain structure, function, and development. This perspective often takes an essentialist approach and emphasizes that biological differentiation causes gender differences in language ability. Neurological gender differences may be due to hormonal or genetic factors. However, given the level of plasticity especially seen in children’s brains, the biological approach does not rule out the possibility that environmental factors may play a role in how the brain develops with age. Brain imaging techniques such as fMRI are often employed to examine brain function during language production and reception. Early research showed that specific sections of the brain are responsible for language. For example, the left lobe of the inferior frontal gyrus, including an area commonly known as Broca’s area, is largely responsible for language production. The superior

temporal gyrus, including an area commonly known as Wernicke’s area, is largely responsible for the comprehension of language. One consistent finding in this area is that girls and women demonstrate superior language ability. This difference emerges early in childhood and continues into adulthood. Research that takes a biological approach often finds statistically significant but small differences that may explain females’ greater general language ability. For example, the areas of the brain that are responsible for language may be larger in females. Females may also demonstrate more bilateral activation during production or reception. This, in turn, may make females more efficient in producing and comprehending language. One significant strength of the neurobiological theoretical approach is that it sheds light on potential causes for gender differences in language ability. It can also suggest connections between brain maturation and gender differences across the life span. However, it has less application in research examining the use of language. Social Constructionist Approach

Social constructionism starts with the assumption that gender is socially constructed. This means that rather than being a fixed trait, gender is considered fluid and malleable. According to this perspective, the social context (e.g., one’s cultural background, who one is with, where one is, the topic of conversation) shapes how a person thinks about and enacts gender. Furthermore, the social constructionist view explores how language is used in particular ways based on many individual and situational factors. For example, status plays an important role in how people communicate. In patriarchal societies, men hold more power and status. As a result, men may talk more, interrupt others more often, and use more assertive speech to establish and maintain their dominance. In other words, language is a resource used in social interactions. Psychologists have studied how people act and speak differently depending on demand characteristics, or features of the context that elicit particular behaviors or speech. When talking to strangers, men have been found to be more talkative and to use more assertive speech, whereas women have

Gender and Language

been found to use more affiliative speech. However, these findings depend on the conversation partner; women talk more with friends and family members than do men. People may alter their language depending on whether they are in a same-gender or mixed-gender group. Research has suggested that men are more talkative in mixed-gender interactions, whereas no gender differences were observed in same-gender interactions. Although context is clearly important, this theory also examines how individual factors interact with the context to affect communication. Men and women may alter their speech in different situations as a result of beliefs concerning what others expect of them (called self-presentation), the need to be true to themselves (called self-verification), or their own sense of themselves as male or female (called gender identity). As stated earlier, gender composition of a group is related to how men and women within that group communicate. This may be due in part to cognitive factors such as gender identity. For example, a woman in a group of all men may be more likely to be thinking about her gender (due to the increased salience of gender in this context) and thus may be more likely to speak in genderstereotyped ways. The most notable strength of the social constructionist approach is the examination of how the social environment may elicit observed gender differences in language. This perspective is also helpful for researchers who have the goal of reducing or eliminating gender differences in language. By relating social dominance and language, this perspective suggests that addressing inequality in social power and roles may also influence language use. Further, this approach examines how thoughts about the self and others may interact with situational factors to affect how males and females communicate. However, this approach does not address at what stage in development these differences emerge or how social influence may have a compounded impact on individuals over development. Socialization Approach

Like the social constructionist theory, the socialization approach also views gender as malleable. However, whereas the social constructionist view

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is social-psychological in nature, the socialization view is a developmental model. The socialization approach looks at how environmental influences might lead to or increase gender differences in language use across development. This theory posits that males and females might communicate differently due to socializing influences, such as parents and peers. Parents might encourage the development of gender differences in language. Research has found that parents talk more with female infants than they do with male infants. The topic of parent– child communication also differs in that parents are more likely to discuss emotions with girls and use more directions with boys. However, the form of play that the parent–child dyad is engaged in may influence communication. Research has found that controlling for the toys and form of play reduced or eliminated gender differences in childdirected speech. Gender-typed peer groups and gender-typed activities also play an important role in the development of communication. Most children prefer to play with same-gender peers (known as gender segregation) starting around 2 to 3 years of age and continuing for much of childhood. In particular, girls tend to play in small groups or dyads, and their play is more likely to be cooperative in nature. One of the main goals of their play is to work together in games such as playing house. Conversely, boys are more likely to play in larger groups, including sports. The form of play that boys are more likely to engage in often includes competition or establishing a leader. This theory suggests that gender segregated play may lead to differences in the development of language. Through cooperative play, girls might be more likely to use affiliative speech such as making suggestions or agreeing with others to maintain connections, whereas boys engaged in competitive play might be more likely to give directives as a way to achieve and maintain dominance. Further, disagreeing with or criticizing others might serve to help boys resist dominance from others. Socialization approaches contribute to the field by studying how early interactions with parents and peers can lead to or exacerbate gender differences in language. However, most socialization research either examines only one age-group or is cross-sectional in nature. This area of research on

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gender and languages needs more longitudinal research that examines one group of people across development in order to link early differences in parent and peer interactions to later differences in language.

Implications for Future Research This entry summarized three theories on gender and language and related these theories to the main findings from this large field of research. Although the theories were discussed separately, they are by no means mutually exclusive. For example, the socialization approach can be applied alongside either neurobiological or social constructionist perspectives. Early differences in how much parents talk with infants might lead to longlasting differences in the parts of the brain responsible for language. Similarly, gender differences in play might lead boys and girls to learn how to construct their gender through language. One future direction in the field of gender and language is research that brings together these theories. Future research could also examine how other facets of identity (e.g., ethnicity, sexual orientation) interact with gender to affect how men and women communicate. Since these facets of identity are also connected with status, this could further explain why there are gender similarities and differences in language. Perhaps the most important finding to emerge from research and theory on language is that the few gender differences that are observed are considered negligible or small in size. Whether these differences are due to biology, the social construction of gender, or socialization influences in childhood, the field as a whole suggests that males and females are not nearly as different in how they communicate as media and popular perception would suggest. Melanie M. Ayres and Carly K. Friedman See also Cognition and Language; Communication and Language; Concepts and Language; Gender, Evolutionary Perspectives on; Gender and Cognition; Gender and Culture; Gender and Sex; Gender and Violence; Gender Development; Gender Identity; Gender Roles; Gender Stereotypes; Language, Evolution of; Language and Development; Language Development; Language, Interaction, and Culture;

Perception and Language; Pinker on Language; Social Role Theory

Further Readings Crawford, M. E. (1995). Talking difference: On gender and language. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Deaux, K., & Major, B. (1987). Putting gender into context: An interactive model of gender-related behavior. Psychological Review, 94, 369–389. Leaper, C., & Ayres, M. M. (2007). A meta-analytic review of gender variations in adults’ language use: Talkativeness, affiliative speech, and assertive speech. Personality & Social Psychology Review, 11, 328–363. Ruigrok, A. N. V., Salimi-Khorshidi, G., Lai, M., BaronCohen, S., Lombardo, M. V., Tait, R. J., & Suckling, J. (2014). A meta-analysis of sex differences in human brain structure. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 39, 34–50. Tannen, D. (1994). Gender and discourse. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Thorne, B., & Henley, N. (1975). Language and sex: Difference and dominance. Rowley, MA: Newbury House.

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Sex

Sex and gender represent a popular area of psychological inquiry that includes various domains of psychology (e.g., intergroup relations, close relationships, self and identity, and health). Peerreviewed journals (e.g., Sex Roles, Psychology of Women Quarterly, and Psychology of Men and Masculinity) and Divisions 35 and 51 of the American Psychological Association are dedicated to the science of gender and sex. The focus on understanding sex and gender is not surprising, given that men and women represent a unique social relationship. Unlike the divides that often permeate intergroup relationships, such as race or socioeconomic status, men and women are not segregated from one another. On the contrary, men and women are largely interdependent, yet, like other intergroup relationships, power is not evenly distributed between them. Thus, the psychology of gender and sex is an important and complicated area of research with wide implications and applications. This entry discusses the relationship between sex

Gender and Sex

and gender, prescribed and proscribed gender roles, and the similarities and differences between gender roles.

Sex and Gender and Their Relationship Though often used interchangeably, sex primarily refers to biological or physiological characteristics that distinguish men and women, and gender refers to the sociocultural characteristics, roles, and attributes assigned to men and women. For example, there are sex differences in height and the ability to bear children, and gender differences in salaries and the amount of housework that men and women perform. Although these definitions may appear simple, they become more complicated when one considers the relationship between sex and gender. For example, some theorists (e.g., evolutionary theorists) contend that differences between men and women are largely explained by biological, genetic, or physical differences. According to parental investment theory, biological factors (such as the ability to bear children) drive women to invest more in the care of their offspring than men do. In contrast, social role theory largely points to social structures as the origin of such differences. Social role theory proposes that differences between men and women can be explained by the division of labor—that is, those who historically have been primarily expected to work (men) and those expected to take care of children (women). Because of this division of labor, men were socialized to take on more dominant, assertive traits that served them in the workplace, and women were socialized to take on more communal traits that abetted motherhood. This division of labor is observed in gender roles that permeate societies today.

Prescribed and Proscribed Roles Although the origin of gender roles is hotly debated in psychology, most theorists agree about the gender roles and sexual scripts men and women are expected to follow. These roles involve rules about what men and women should be (prescribed roles) and what men and women should not be (proscribed roles). For example, men are expected to be career oriented, exert leadership ability, and be aggressive and assertive, whereas

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women are expected to be emotional, warm, interested in children, and sensitive to others. In addition, men are expected not to be emotional, naive, weak, or insecure, whereas women are expected not to be aggressive, intimidating, dominant, or arrogant. Not all these traits can be described as positive or negative, but they are consistently associated with status. Specifically, the gender roles that are prescribed to men are consistently associated with higher status and those proscribed are consistently associated with lower status. For women, gender prescriptions are relatively mixed in status; however, the proscriptions are consistently associated with high status. What does this mean? The rules and roles men are expected to follow afford them higher status as they are consistently told that it is okay to be dominant but not to be weak. On the contrary, women are expected to avoid being dominant or expressing assertive traits that would afford them greater status. But what happens when an individual breaks the gender rules? Backlash theory and status incongruity theory argue that when women or men break the status rules—for example, men showing weakness or women showing dominance—they are viewed negatively and sometimes even actively undermined or sabotaged in their pursuits. Generally, backlash toward people who violate gender rules leads to a vicious circle of men and women hiding the talents or traits that violate gender rules for fear of rejection. Gender rules may have long-reaching consequences from the boardroom (e.g., workplace discrimination) to the bedroom (e.g., differences in sexual satisfaction).

Differences or Similarities? At the same time that psychological theorists are trying to understand how gender roles maintain differences between men and women, proponents of the gender similarities hypothesis assert that, in general, men and women share more similarities than they have differences. A team of researchers gathered the existing evidence assessing men’s and women’s cognitive abilities, personality traits, physical motor skills, communication, well-being, leadership, moral character, and job preferences. They found that, although many researchers and

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the popular media tend to focus on the differences between men and women (e.g., men hailing from Mars and women from Venus), the actual data demonstrate little to no difference between men and women (78% of studies) for the variables in question. The most reliable differences between men and women appeared in motor domains, such as throwing distance, aggressive behavior, and attitudes about sex (e.g., masturbation and casual sex). But even some of these differences can be misunderstood. For example, adolescent boys and girls do not differ in aggression per se but rather in the type of aggression they engage in. Boys tend to be more physically aggressive than girls, but girls tend to be more relationally aggressive (e.g., hurting others by damaging their social relationships or reputations). Diana Sanchez See also Culture and Social Relations; Feminist Approaches to Psychology and Gender; Gender, Evolutionary Perspectives on; Gender and Culture; Gender and Language; Gender Development; Gender Identity; Gender Roles; Gender Stereotypes; Sex; Social Role Theory

Further Readings Hyde, J. S. (2005). The gender similarities hypothesis. American Psychologist, 60, 581–592. Koenig, A. M., Eagly, A. H., Mitchell, A. A., & Ristikari, T. (2011). Are leader stereotypes masculine? A metaanalysis of three research paradigms. Psychological Bulletin, 137, 616–642. Rudman, L. A., Fetterolf, J., & Sanchez, D. T. (2013). What motivates the sexual double standard? More support for male versus female control theory. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 39, 250–263. Rudman, L. A., Moss-Racusin, C. A., Phelan, J. E., & Nauts, S. (2012). Status incongruity and backlash effects: Defending the gender hierarchy motivates prejudice against female leaders. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48, 165–179. Sanchez, D. T., Fetterolf, J., & Rudman, L. A. (2012). Eroticizing inequalities in the United States: Determinants and consequences of traditional gender role adherence. Journal of Sex Research, 49, 168–183.

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Violence

Gender and violence offer a broad field of inquiry that encompasses violence between men and women, violence that arises because of ­gender (such as rape or sexual harassment), and gender differences in violence perpetration and victimization. This entry reviews several types of theories that help explain these phenomena.

Theories of Gender and Violence Biological and Evolutionary Theories

These theories use physiological sex differences (e.g., testosterone levels) or evolutionary adaptations (e.g., natural selection of sexually aggressive traits) to explain higher rates of violence perpetration among men. Although these theories are sometimes criticized for being ­simplistic and deterministic when interpreted as the sole cause of violence, they are unique in highlighting the importance of physiology and genetics. Social Learning Theories

Albert Bandura’s research on learned aggression led to the development of several theories that explain violence through a process called social learning, where children learn the behaviors that are expected in their cultural and family groups. Social learning theories typically explain violence by pointing to instances where people learn that violence is useful or acceptable, thus enabling their own violent behavior. Gender Socialization

Gender socialization is a prominent social learning theory that argues that boys and girls are socialized into different gender roles and therefore differ across a variety of behaviors. Because boys—more so than girls—are socialized to be aggressive, dominant, and tough, gender socialization theory is used to explain the increased rates and severity of violent perpetration by men and boys.

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Feminist Theories

Feminist theories typically argue that patriarchy, a social system in which men are granted authority over women, and sexism, the societal oppression of women, help explain why and how gender-related violence happens. Feminist theories typically argue that violence is used by men to control and disempower women and to maintain their own masculinity when they are threatened.

Domestic Violence Gender plays a contentious and pivotal role in the effort to understand domestic violence. Although same-sex couples experience domestic violence, most instances occur between men and women in heterosexual relationships, making domestic violence an inherently gendered form of violence. Theories of domestic violence are organized within the gender symmetry debate in which violence is seen as being perpetrated equally by both genders (gender symmetry) or disproportionately by men (gender asymmetry). Family violence theory, a social learning theory, argues that domestic violence arises because families are inherently conflict prone, violence is a culturally acceptable means of solving conflict, and perpetrators were socialized in their childhood families to solve conflicts through violence. Because this theory proposes that domestic violence results from the situational context of a family, something that applies to both genders equally, family violence theory is a gender symmetry theory. It is supported by Murray Straus’s survey research showing that domestic violence is perpetrated by both genders with similar frequency. Family violence theory acknowledges that there are some gender differences: Men typically perpetrate more lethal forms of violence and perpetrate more consistently. Critics of this theory have argued that in addition to assessing amount and severity of violence, the intended use of the violence should be considered because women more frequently engage in violence as self-defense. The feminist perspective locates domestic violence within a process of control used by men to maintain dominance over women, making it a gender asymmetric theory. Control can include

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manipulation, isolation, and intimidation. The feminist perspective argues that unfair pay and hiring practices result in women’s economic dependence on men, leaving them vulnerable to domestic violence. Society makes women dependent on men, and men exploit that dependence to control women; domestic violence is one way that exploitation occurs. This perspective also argues that low rates of arrest and prosecution of domestic violence perpetrators indicate a patriarchal society’s ambivalence toward, or even approval of, domestic violence as a means of controlling and oppressing women. Margo Wilson and Martin Daly’s male proprietariness theory provides an evolutionary explanation for domestic violence. This theory is gender asymmetric and argues that men typically perpetrate domestic violence because they are jealous of their female partner’s interactions with other men; such jealousy is an evolutionary adaptation. Men who used violence against their partner when they were suspicious that she might have sex with another man would more likely prevent her from doing so, thereby ensuring the reproduction of their own genes over the genes of a rival. In contrast, nonviolent men would be less likely to prevent their partners from procreating with other men, thus leading to a lower likelihood of genes reproducing. Men’s domestic violence is thus understood as the product of natural selection. Michael Johnson’s typology of domestic violence attempts to resolve the gender symmetry debate by proposing four distinct types of domestic violence based on whether violence is used to control one’s partner and whether one’s partner is also violent. Situational couple violence, in which one or both partners are violent but neither is controlling, appears with equal frequency among men and women. Violent resistance, in which one partner uses violence in self-defense against a violent and controlling partner, occurs mostly among women. Intimate terrorism, in which one partner is violent and controlling toward a noncontrolling partner, occurs mostly among men. And mutual violent control, in which both partners are violent and controlling, appears to be very rare. The typology of domestic violence provides a plausible explanation for how seemingly contradictory theories about domestic violence can be

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valid. When considering situational couple violence, domestic violence is perpetrated with similar frequency across genders, as postulated by the family violence theory. On the other hand, when considering violent resistance and intimate terrorism, there is support for the feminist perspective that men use violence to control, whereas women use violence to resist.

Rape and Sexual Aggression Sexual aggression is highly gendered, in that the vast majority of such acts involve men aggressing against women. The most prominent theory of sexual aggression perpetration is Neil Malamuth’s confluence model of sexual aggression, which states that two important factors lead to sexual aggression: hostile masculinity and a promiscuous-impersonal orientation to sex. Sexual aggression is most likely to occur when there is a “confluence,” meaning both factors are present. Hostile masculinity is a defensive, hypersensitive, distrustful, and hostile orientation toward women combined with a desire to dominate women. Promiscuous-impersonal sex refers to an orientation in which sex is seen as a game, with winners and losers, and in which casual sexual relations are preferred over intimate ones. Numerous studies have supported the basic tenets of the confluence model; these include longitudinal studies showing that the combination of a promiscuous-impersonal orientation toward sex and hostile masculinity predicts sexual aggression as much as 10 years later. Subsequent research has included other factors: alcohol consumption, psychopathy, the tendency to misinterpret women’s friendliness as sexual interest, empathy, and peer norms that accept aggression. Another prominent multivariate theoretical model is Gordon Hall and Richard Hirschman’s quadripartite model of sexual aggression, which proposes that four major factors lead to sexual aggression: physiological (experiencing physical sexual arousal to forced sex), cognitive (believing rape myths, such as that women enjoy rape and want to be dominated), affective (the presence of depression or negative emotions), and personality (low empathy, psychopathy, or antisocial behavior). Sexual aggression is most likely to occur when all four factors are present; however, different subtypes of rapists can be identified, depending on the predominant factor.

A third multivariate model was proposed by Jacquelyn White and attempts to explain all types of violence against women, not just sexual aggression. Her integrative contextual developmental model integrates multiple levels of analysis: sociocultural (community traditions and values or historical factors), social network (experiences within family, peer, school, or work networks), dyadic (the nature of the victim–perpetrator relationship, such as differences in power or status), situational (aspects of the situation, such as the presence of alcohol), and intrapersonal (attitudes, motives, or other characteristics of the individuals involved, especially those of the perpetrator). She also argues that whereas some factors are common across all types of violence against women (e.g., patriarchal beliefs, use of alcohol, need for dominance, or family experiences that normalized violence), other factors are relevant to only some types of violence against women. For example, the belief that children should be obedient is relevant to child sexual abuse but not to dating violence or spousal battery. Each of the preceding models includes elements from multiple theoretical frameworks, including biological, social learning, and gender socialization. In contrast, evolutionary theories of rape are situated solely within an evolutionary biological framework. These theories argue that the genes that contribute to men’s rape behavior constitute a reproductive advantage, thereby leading to increases in the number of children fathered and ultimately the continued presence of such genes. These theories have been subject to critique, especially by evolutionary biologists and feminist psychologists.

Sexual Harassment Sexual harassment refers to threatening or unwelcome sexual behavior in the workplace. Typically, such behavior contributes to a hostile work environment. Women are more often the victims of sexual harassment than are men. There are several types of sexual harassment. Sexual coercion is the most severe, involving threats, blackmail, or promises of rewards for explicit sexual activity. Unwanted sexual attention includes unwanted touching, groping, or explicit sexual remarks. Gender harassment, the most common form of sexual harassment, involves repeated exposure to

Gender and Violence

degrading jokes or offensive material related to gender or sexual orientation. Numerous motives for engaging in sexual harassment have been proposed. A desire for sexual gratification may be the primary motivation for the sexual-coercion form of sexual harassment; however, typically, other motives are involved as well. As predicted by feminist theories of gendered violence, a need for power over the victim is often a main cause of sexual harassment. Anne Maass’s theory of gender identity protection argues that men sexually harass when their identity as men is threatened. This might occur if women are hired for jobs that traditionally were filled only by men or when men interact with feminist women who upset traditional gender norms. John Pryor developed the person × situation theory of sexual harassment in which only some men sexually harass women and only in certain situations. Men more likely to sexually harass have difficulty understanding other people’s perspectives, endorse traditional gender roles, believe there is hostility between men and women, and connect sex with social power. The theoretically most important aspects of the situation are workplace norms, such as tolerance for sexual harassment and sexist behavior toward women. These norms enable men disposed to sexual harassment to act on these tendencies. Other situational factors include environments that are highly sexually charged and workplaces in which men greatly outnumber women. Another theory developed to explain the gendered nature of sexual harassment is sex role spillover theory. This theory argues that widely held beliefs about gender roles and expectations of women’s behavior “spill over” into the workplace, with the result that men believe they should be able to dominate women and that women’s function is to support and service men. Feminist perspectives that describe sexual harassment as a structural force that suppresses women’s economic equality highlight similar issues as does sex role spillover theory.

Violence Against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) People Violence against LGBT people is classified as a hate crime, which is defined as threats, harassment, or violence based on prejudice toward a group that

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the victim is perceived to be a member of. Scholars have theorized that hate crimes against LGBT people are motivated, in part, by hostility toward those believed to be violating traditional gender roles. Violence against and prejudice toward LGBT people is further theorized as being a way for heterosexual people to secure their own gender ­ identity by distancing themselves from people who are perceived to be violating gender norms. Hate crimes against LGBT people and antiLGBT attitudes are more prevalent among men. This gender difference may exist because gender roles are enforced more rigidly among men, with the result that men may have a strong need to prove their heterosexual masculinity and may do so by assaulting or expressing prejudice toward LGBT people.

Gender Differences in Violence Perpetration and Victimization Men show higher rates of direct physical, verbal, and psychological aggression, whereas women show higher rates of indirect aggression such as passive-aggressive behavior. These differences can be attributed to biological factors, such as testosterone levels, as well as to gender-socialization practices, such as valuing politeness in girls more than in boys. Men are also more likely to perpetrate and to be the victims of violent criminal offenses, such as homicide; however, gender is rarely considered as a reason why these crimes occur. Women show higher rates of nonsuicidal selfharm and reporting suicidal thoughts and attempts than men do, but suicide mortality is higher among men than women because men tend to use more lethal methods of suicide than women do. Men are more likely to perpetrate childhood sexual abuse, and girls are more likely to report being victims of it. When boys are abused, their perpetrator is more likely to be a stranger, whereas girls are more likely to be abused by family members. Across the world, women and girls are more likely than men and boys to be aborted, have their genitalia cut, be killed for dishonoring their families (e.g., for being homosexual or having premarital sex), and be trafficked (i.e., sold into slavery). However, men and boys are more likely than women and girls to be involved in violent military conflict. Brandon Balzer Carr and Eileen L. Zurbriggen

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See also Aggression and Violence; Feminist Approaches to Psychology and Gender; Gender, Evolutionary Perspectives on; Gender Roles; General Aggression Model; Mating Strategy Evolution and Development; Sex; Social Role Theory

Further Readings Cooper, L. B., Paluck, E. L., & Fletcher, E. K. (2013). Reducing gender-based violence. In I. M. Ryan & N. R. Branscombe (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of gender and psychology (pp. 359–377). London, England: Sage. Franklin, K., & Herek, G. M. (1999). Violence toward homosexuals. In L. Kurtz (Ed.), Encyclopedia of violence, peace, and conflict (pp. 139–151). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Frieze, I. H., & Li, M. Y. (2010). Gender, aggression, and prosocial behavior. In J. C. Chrisler & D. R. McCreary (Eds.), Handbook of gender research in psychology: Vol. 2. Gender research in social and applied psychology (pp. 311–335). New York, NY: Springer. Kurz, D. (1989). Social science perspectives on wife abuse: Current debates and future directions. Gender and Society, 3, 489–505. Zurbriggen, E. L. (2010). Rape, war, and the socialization of masculinity: Why our refusal to give up war ensures that rape cannot be eradicated. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 35, 538–549.

Gender Development Gender categories are associated with a range of beliefs about people’s capabilities and what they should be like—from physical appearance to interpersonal relationships to intellectual capabilities and professional occupations. People tend to be highly invested in their beliefs about the nature of gender differences and how those differences originate—that is, how and why gender differences come about. The beliefs that people have may be contained in developmental theories, that is, theories of change across the life span, although their primary focus typically is on infancy through adolescence. Contemporary theories of gender development have moved beyond oversimplified “nature versus nurture” perspectives, and most researchers now

believe that multiple processes are at work. This entry takes this multidimensional approach and discusses three major perspectives on gender development: biological, social, and cognitive/selfsocialization. Although debates persist among theorists, researchers are increasingly focused on how these perspectives complement each other and can be integrated into a more comprehensive picture of gender development.

Gender Differences Gender differences as in whether and how much males and females differ from one another are what most often come to mind when people think of gender research. However, the focus of theories on gender development has to do with the processes by which these differences come about. Without providing a review of the complex data on gender differences, it is important to note their dynamic nature. Although some differences show considerable stability across time and place, many do not. For example, while there appear to be consistent, early gender differences in preferences for dolls versus vehicles, differences in mathematics ability paint a more complex picture. Overall, girls and boys are more similar than different across a range of attributes. This similarity is especially apparent when taking into account how many individual males and females in the full population overlap in their skills, abilities, interests, and other characteristics. The average differences between males and females are often quite small. Furthermore, individual children tend to change over time in terms of their “gender typing.” A girl might be very interested in all things “girlish” when she is younger, but her focus on a feminine appearance might give way to a relatively greater focus on her physical strength and athletic skill later in her development. Theories of gender development shed light on these complexities and indicate that fascinating processes are involved in the creation and perpetuation of gender differences. Perhaps even more important, they indicate ways in which interventions might be used to change the outcomes of gender development in order to better facilitate skills in both males and females and enhance their opportunities.

Gender Development

Theories Three prevailing theoretical perspectives—­biological, socialization, and cognitive/self-­socialization—have historically driven theoretical debate about gender development. However, it is difficult to make clear distinctions between the three perspectives, especially socialization and cognitive/self-socialization, because of increased theoretical intersection. This is due in large part to a movement away from a binary nature–nurture point of view toward perspectives that recognize the complex interplay of biology and the social environment in gender development. Biological Theories

Biological theories of gender development emphasize links between physical and psychological factors in sexual differentiation. More specifically, they posit how factors that govern the sexual differentiation of the body—genes and hormones— also influence the sexual differentiation of the brain and thus behavior. Although genetic sex is determined at conception by sex chromosomes, sexual differentiation is subsequently and largely determined by the secretion of hormones, such as androgens. The influence of hormones has been the primary focus of research on biological mechanisms. Although it is not possible to ethically investigate hormonal effects on gender development in humans experimentally, much has been learned from research on nonhuman primates and research on children and adults whose hormone levels were atypical for their sex during early development. These “natural experiments” in humans include research on populations such as girls with congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH), a genetic disease that results in exposure to high levels of androgens early in gestation. Research has found links between abnormal variations in hormone levels and gender-typed behaviors. For instance, elevated prenatal androgen levels have been directly associated with male-typed activity preferences in girls with CAH. Hormones do not have direct, causal effects on human behavior; all aspects of behavior are mediated by the brain. However, although gender

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differences have been found in brain structures and brain activation, the brain is not static. It changes in response to the environment. Thus, it is difficult to know whether gender differences in the brain cause or are the result of gender differences in behavior, and bidirectional effects are likely. Furthermore, it is important to understand that current biological theories are not deterministic. They stress that hormones influence but do not necessarily determine gender-related characteristics. Biological changes do not occur in a vacuum, and biology and the environment, including the social environment, work together to produce behavior. Some of the most striking examples of this interaction come from research on nonhuman primates. For example, studies of rhesus monkeys have found links between prenatal hormonal exposure and gender-differentiated play preferences (e.g., more frequent rough-and-tumble play among males), but that the degree of gender-differentiated play behaviors is affected by the socialrearing environment. The distal (indirect) explanations of biological effects on gender differentiation are typically based on evolutionary psychology approaches. The theory of sexual selection has been a dominant perspective and predicts that males and females will exhibit different behaviors related to their reproductive roles. These theories have been controversial for their application, as when they are used to justify social inequalities and also for the ways in which they have been tested. Despite the enduring appeal of the theory of sexual selection, many empirical studies have failed to support it in species ranging from fruit flies to nonhuman primates. It is important to recognize that evolution involves environmental adaptation, and evolutionary theories are likely to succeed in explaining gender development when they invoke the importance of the environment in human evolution. Socialization Theories

Gender-related norms, values, and beliefs permeate every level of a child’s developmental niche, including the physical and social setting of daily life, caretaking customs, and the beliefs and expectations of caretakers. Socialization theories seek to

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explain how various features of the social environment influence gender development. Thus, researchers with this perspective are interested in studying the factors in children’s social environments, such as parental behaviors and peer interactions, and understanding how they translate into the development of gender-typed characteristics. Social learning theory was foundational to theories of gender-related socialization processes. This theory first drew attention to the direct reinforcement of conformity to gender norms. Actions, such as complimenting a girl for the way she plays with a doll but not a toy dump truck, are an important mechanism by which children acquire gender-typed characteristics. Although the idea of reinforcement may be considered mechanistic, observational learning highlighted the role of vicarious learning and the cognitive processes involved in it. More specifically, in observational learning, children’s differential exposure to samegender models, as when boys spend more time than girls do in activities with their fathers, leads them to engage in more same-gender rather than othergender behaviors. Early ideas from social learning theories have been considerably expanded and modified over the years. Most prominently, social cognitive theory emphasizes the role of cognitive factors in observational learning. More specifically, it explains in detail how children do not just simply imitate the behavior of models but learn stereotypes for what is “appropriate” for each gender, match their behavior to these stereotypes, and respond to incentives and sanctions for doing so. Furthermore, this theory explains that children have outcome expectancies about the likely outcomes of engaging in certain behaviors and selfefficacy beliefs about their ability to successfully perform those behaviors (such as a boy’s belief that he can play properly with an electronic toy). Thus, alongside children’s developing gender concepts, their beliefs about the consequences of their attempts to conform to those concepts play an important role in motivating gender-typed behaviors. Cognitive/Self-Socialization Theories

Like socialization theories, cognitive/self-socialization theories emphasize the pervasiveness of the

influence of gender in the social environment. Gender is both salient, as in the use of pink and blue to signify females and males, and functionally significant in terms of organizing behavior, as when children are divided into girls’ and boys’ teams. These features of the social environment lead children to identify with a gender group. In contrast with socialization theories, cognitive/selfsocialization theories emphasize the role of identity processes in the acquisition of gender-typed characteristics. Until recently, these theories have frequently been referred to as cognitive theories because of their origins in social cognitive theory. That theory proposed that children’s developing understanding of gender categories, starting with an understanding of basic gender identity (“I am a girl”) and later gender constancy (understanding that a person’s gender remains stable over time and remains constant despite superficial changes in appearance or behaviors), plays a key role in children’s acquisition of gender-typed behaviors. This theory and subsequent theories derived from it have stressed that gender development involves an active construction of the meaning of gender categories. Like “gender detectives,” children seek information about gender and develop gender-typed attributes as a way of constructing their gender identities. For instance, gender schema theories propose that children develop schemas, or mental representations, of each gender and that, once they identify themselves with one gender, they selectively seek and learn details and scripts for same-gender activities, show biases for their own gender, and become more sensitive to gender differences. In this way, children not only become experts about their own gender but also show attachment to their own gender through their behaviors and attitudes. As the role of cognition has become increasingly prominent in socialization theories, theorists have increasingly embraced the term self-socialization to reflect this focus on self-initiated motivational processes. These theories shift the focus away from the role of external socialization agents who model and reinforce gender role behaviors toward children’s motivation to attain a sense of identity, including belonging to a gender group. Nevertheless, the social, cognitive, and motivational processes addressed by socialization and cognitive/

Gender Identity

self-socialization theories are intricately linked, and more complex models of gender development are emerging.

Implications Children’s developing gender-related characteristics are likely the result of multiple influences that exert different levels of impact at different points in development. For instance, although the influence of biological mechanisms might be particularly apparent and influential in early infancy and adolescence, cognitive/self-socialization processes might be especially impactful when children first construct their gender identities and when they undergo transitions in those identities. Layered on these effects are socialization processes. For example, parental influence might give way to relatively greater peer influence across the school years. Just as contemporary perspectives take a nuanced, interactionist view of various theoretical orientations, they recognize that biological does not necessarily mean inevitable or immutable and that the term socialization (whether socialization or cognitive/self-socialization) does not necessarily imply being easily manipulated or influenced. This emerging perspective will likely lead to increasingly complex theoretical models and advances in understanding about how to minimize genderbased inequality and promote healthy concepts of what it means to be male or female. Kristina M. Zosuls See also Gender, Evolutionary Perspectives on; Gender and Cognition; Gender and Culture; Gender Identity; Gender Roles; Gender Stereotypes; Social Role Theory

Further Readings Berenbaum, S. A., & Beltz, A. M. (2011). Sexual differentiation of human behavior: Effects of prenatal and pubertal organizational hormones. Frontiers in Neuroendocrinology, 32, 183–200. Hines, M. (2010). Sex-related variation in human behavior and the brain. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14, 448–456. Leaper, C., & Friedman, C. K. (2007). The socialization of gender. In J. E. Grusec & P. D. Hastings (Eds.), Handbook of socialization: Theory and research (pp. 561–587). New York, NY: Guilford Press.

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Ruble, D. N., Martin, C. L., & Berenbaum, S. A. (2006). Gender development. In N. Eisenberg, W. Damon, & R. M. Lerner (Eds.), Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 3. Social, emotional, and personality development (6th ed., pp. 858–932). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Tobin, D. D., Menon, M., Menon, M., Spatta, B. C., Hodges, E. V., & Perry, D. G. (2010). The intrapsychics of gender: A model of self-socialization. Psychological Review, 117, 601–622.

Gender Identity Nearly all individuals learn that they are either male or female, but what meaning do they give to this knowledge? In all cultures, males and females are expected to behave differently, and thus it is likely that people worldwide occasionally reflect on questions such as these: Am I living up to the expectations of my sex? Am I fortunate or am I disadvantaged to be the sex I am? Must I limit my actions to same-sex typical behavior, or am I free to explore cross-sex options? People’s answers to such questions constitute their gender identity and influence their well-being and behavior. This entry summarizes the ways that gender identity has been conceptualized, reviews the development of several components of gender identity, and discusses the implications of gender identity for well-being and behavior.

What Is Gender Identity? Gender identity is a multidimensional construct encompassing a person’s knowledge of his or her membership in a gender collective, felt compatibility with that collective, quality of motivation to fit in with it, and evaluation of the collective. Major components of gender identity include the following: a. Membership knowledge (i.e., self-assignment to a gender category) b. Felt gender typicality (self-appraised similarity to a gender collective) c. Gender contentedness (satisfaction with one’s gender) d. Felt pressure for gender differentiation (feeling pressure to avoid cross-gender behavior)

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e. Intergroup bias (believing that one’s own sex is superior to the other) f. Gender centrality (assigning more importance to gender than to one’s other identities—e.g., student, daughter, or Asian American)

These are conscious aspects of gender identity and are measured by interview or self-report questionnaires. However, unconscious gender identity can be measured too—for example, with use of the Implicit Association Test, though it is unclear which dimension of gender identity this test captures. Gender identity is more than people’s selfperceptions of specific sex-typed attributes, such as instrumental or expressive personality traits, gender-typed activities, or sexual orientation. It involves the overall conscious and unconscious appraisals people make of their gender and their fit with it.

The Development of Gender Identity The membership knowledge component of gender identity begins early. By 3 years of age, most children have attained “basic gender identity” (i.e., they can answer correctly to “Are you a boy or a girl?”). However, it is not until around age 6 that children conserve gender—that is, understand that their gender does not depend on superficial factors such as the clothes they wear. Preschoolers also show signs of four other components of gender identity—gender contentedness, felt pressure for gender conformity, intergroup bias, and gender centrality. Most preschoolers voice happiness with their gender, feel it important to avoid cross-gender behavior, display “intergroup cognitions” (such as the belief that their sex is the superior one), and regard gender as the most important part of their identity. By the school years, children can also estimate their gender typicality, though different children of a given sex feel gender typical (or atypical) for different reasons (e.g., one boy may derive feelings of typicality from athletic prowess, another from competence in science). Although it is clear that many specific sex-typed attributes (e.g., children’s toy preferences or sexual orientation) are influenced by biological factors (e.g., genes, hormones, or brain structure), it is not clear that biology influences gender identity as well. Some children

develop a strong wish to be the other sex and to dress and behave as other-sex children do. In extreme cases, these children may be diagnosed with gender identity disorder. Some may later undergo transgender procedures. Because the dimensions of gender identity are not strongly correlated with one another, as well as the fact that different children of the same sex can feel gender typical (or atypical) for different reasons, gender identity does not boil down to a person’s location on a single, hypothetical continuum of masculinity versus femininity. In fact, gender scientists today rarely use the terms masculinity and femininity to refer to people’s gender identity.

Implications of Gender Identity for Well-Being and Behavior Controversy surrounds the implications of gender identity for mental health. A classic position, often attributed to Sigmund Freud, is that perceiving the self to be similar to same-gender others and different from other-gender persons is good for mental health. In the 1970s, a challenge to this position was offered by Sandra Bem, who argued that a person who identifies with only one gender is probably experiencing strong internalized societal pressure for gender differentiation that ­ limits the person’s options for happiness and undermines the person’s sense of autonomy, thereby undermining mental health. Neither position has yet been adequately evaluated. It is true that persons who feel compatible with their own gender (i.e., who feel gender typical and gender content) tend to be happier (e.g., have higher self-esteem or are less depressed) than people who feel alienated from their gender. However, the question of whether perceiving the self to be similar to other-sex persons reduces or enhances well-being has yet to be tested adequately. Bem attempted to show that persons who feel both masculine and feminine (androgynous) are better off than persons who identify with only a single gender, but her measures failed to capture gender identity as conceptualized today. (Instead, her measures merely captured people’s self-­ perception of instrumental and expressive personality traits.) Still, Bem was correct to believe that felt pressure for gender differentiation undermines well-being, because persons who believe that cross-gender behavior is blameworthy and

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must be avoided exhibit poorer adjustment, ­especially if they are female. Thus, persons who feel gender typical, who are content with their gender assignment, and who do not feel it is necessary to shun cross-gender options enjoy benefits from their pattern of gender identity. It might be characterized as “secure.” Children who possess insecure gender identity (especially those who feel incompatible with their own gender yet feel they must be different from the other gender) not only have poorer well-being but also tend to harass gender-nonconforming peers. Gender identity interacts with other information in the self-system to affect people’s adjustment and behavior. For example, several dimensions of gender identity motivate people to adopt the attributes they perceive as appropriate for their sex (i.e., their gender stereotypes). This starts soon after children attain basic gender identity at around 3 years of age. Even unconscious identification with a gender collective motivates adults to incorporate gender-stereotyped attributes into their self-concepts. Thus, to understand how gender identity affects adjustment and behavior, it is necessary to assess not only an individual’s gender identity but also the particular gender stereotypes and standards that the person holds. If, for example, one girl defines being female as being a compassionate leader, whereas another girl defines being female as being subservient and dependent, gender identity may bear different relations to adjustment for the two girls. Gender identity works in concert not only with other information in the individual’s mind but also with environmental factors (e.g., home, peer groups, school, workplace, culture) to affect well-being and behavior. David G. Perry, Rachel E. Pauletti, Patrick J. Cooper, and Christopher D. Aults See also Feminist Approaches to Psychology and Gender; Gender, Evolutionary Perspectives on; Gender and Cognition; Gender and Culture; Gender and Language; Gender and Sex; Gender Development; Gender Roles; Gender Stereotypes; Social Role Theory

Further Readings Ashmore, R. D., Deaux, K., & McLaughlin-Volpe, T. (2004). An organizing framework for collective identity: Articulation and significance of

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multidimensionality. Psychological Bulletin, 130, 80–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909 .130.1.80 Bem, S. L. (1974). The measurement of psychological androgyny. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 42, 155–162. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/ h0036215 Egan, S. K., & Perry, D. G. (2001). Gender identity: A multidimensional analysis with implications for psychosocial adjustment. Developmental Psychology, 37, 451–463. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.37 .4.451 Pauletti, R. E., Cooper, P. J., & Perry, D. G. (2014). Influences of gender identity on children’s maltreatment of gender-nonconforming peers: A person × target analysis of aggression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 106, 843–866. Tobin, D. D., Menon, M., Menon, M., Spatta, B. C., Hodges, E. V. E., & Perry, D. G. (2010). The intrapsychics of gender: A model of self-socialization. Psychological Review, 117, 601–622. http://dx.doi .org/10.1037/a0018936

Gender Roles Blue for boys and pink for girls. Trucks and superheroes or dolls and dress-up clothes? Auto mechanic or nurse? Engineer or elementary teacher? When psychologists discuss gender roles, they are talking about a culture’s expectations for an individual based on that person’s sex. In the United States, most people talk about two sexes, female and male, and their corresponding genders, feminine and masculine. Most people say that the primary difference between females and males is related to chromosomes and genitalia. Specifically, females have an XX for the 23rd chromosome, which leads to the creation of vagina, ovaries, and high levels of estrogen, whereas males have an XY chromosomal pair, leading to the creation of a penis and high levels of testosterone. Psychological research and researchers also focus heavily on these two groups, although there is an ever-increasing awareness that reality is not this simple. For one thing, some people are “intersexual.” They suffer from “disorders of sexual development” in clinical language. The majority of cultures have different expectations for boys and girls and women and men. But some cultures—often those of island nations that

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have long histories of independence—make few, if any, real distinctions between how these two sexes should act. Moreover, different cultures have different rules. In the United States, men don’t greet each other with kisses on each cheek as they might do in France or Italy, nor do they wear kilts like the Scottish, Irish, or Colombians. In the United States, women are not required to register with the Selective Service and have never been part of the draft, but they do and have been in Israel. Multinational surveys have demonstrated both similarities and differences in gender-based expectations and behaviors throughout the Western world of Europe and North America, as well as across Asian countries. For example, “being a man of honor” was the most important of 13 characteristics according to Japanese men but ranked seventh among Korean men for whom “being a family man” was most important. Gender roles vary not only by nation but also across historical time periods. In 1920s America, many people thought that women who played sports would damage their ability to have children; some talked about the risk that women’s ovaries might become dislodged and fall out of their bodies. In 1960s America, relatively few women attended college; those who did usually became nurses or teachers. Things are different today. More than half of high school girls in the United States play at least one sport, and women make up more than half of all college students. Expectations for American men have also changed. Until the end of the Victorian era in the early 1900s, men were expected to have ­“passions” and spoke openly about their love and affection for other men. In the 1950s, male promiscuity was seen as problematic, as something to be controlled and hidden. Today, American men are often considered unemotional, although they’re allowed to be angry and, in certain special situations such as weddings or the Super Bowl, shed a few tears of happiness or sadness. They’re also allowed to brag about having multiple sexual partners, and every year seems to bring an “American Pie” film clone about a group of guys trying to get laid. This entry discusses several approaches to the psychological study of gender. The first section examines different approaches to the measurement of gender roles. The second section describes

theories that examine why gender roles exist and where they come from.

What Is the Content of Gender Roles? Gender roles are typically referred to as feminine and masculine or as femininity and masculinity. Through much of the 20th century, psychological researchers conceptualized them as opposites and measured them using a single score. Lewis Terman and Catherine Cox Miles published the first gender measure in 1936; positive scores indicated that someone was masculine and negative scores indicated femininity. In response to the feminist critique of psychology in the 1970s, femininity and masculinity were reconceptualized as independent constructs, not opposites. Since that time, most researchers have measured femininity and masculinity on separate scales that allow individuals to have low or high femininity scores as well as low or high masculinity scores and thus provide classification options such as androgynous or “a-gendered” in addition to feminine and masculine. Measures of masculinity and femininity that focus on gender roles take a variety of forms. Regardless of the approach, it is clear that both femininity and masculinity are made up of several factors and are not single, easily defined, internally consistent constructs. Some measures assess personality traits, including the two most frequently used measures, the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) and the Personal Attributes Questionnaire (PAQ). Others focus on general attitudes or perceived norms, such as the Conformity to Masculine Norms Inventory (CMNI) and the Conformity to Feminine Norms Inventory (CFNI). Measures of sexism that assess power differences and double standards also provide a way to quantify gender. Femininity

Psychological measures of femininity revolve heavily around being emotionally expressive, putting other people before oneself, and being concerned with or interested in one’s appearance. The latter two explicitly emphasize taking a responsive or passive role that prioritizes other people’s responses (taking care of others, being visually appealing).

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Masculinity

Psychological assessment of masculinity has focused heavily on emotional stoicism, obtaining status, and avoiding being perceived as feminine. Being independent, violent or tough, and not homosexual have also received attention. In many ways, these attributes define masculinity as a set of active traits. Although current measures typically assess femininity and masculinity as independent constructs, many measures of masculinity assess an individual’s efforts to be nonfeminine. Femininity measures do not assess an individual’s efforts to be nonmasculine, however. This reflects the fact that American culture still routinely tells boys not to act girlishly but rarely tells girls not to act like boys. Intersectionality

Psychological examination of the meanings and implications of race and ethnicity expanded dramatically in the 1980s. For researchers interested in the combination of race and gender, it quickly became apparent that the primary definitions of masculinity and femininity did not necessarily fit all ethnic groups within a country. For example, African American men often mention responsibility to family as a primary component of masculinity, and African American women include decision making in their definitions of what it means to be a woman. Masculinities

In reaction to the emphasis on specific sets of attributes, sociologist R. W. Connell argued that members of different social groups, and especially members of different social classes, may define masculinity in different ways and may encounter structural barriers that limit their ability to enact the dominant or “hegemonic” form of masculinity. Those who are able to enact the hegemonic form, such as high school “jocks,” are rewarded with societal benefits, such as power, prestige, and the ability to violate rules with impunity. Other men who are able to be reasonably similar to the hegemonic form but aren’t quite dominant are seen as “complicit” because they help uphold the status quo. They, too, receive cultural benefits, although not to the same degree as those enacting the hegemonic form.

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Some men enact a “subordinated” form of masculinity. They have few or no attributes of the hegemonic form, do not receive social benefits, and do not challenge the status quo. High school “nerds” belong here. A fourth group enacts a “marginalized” form of masculinity. They reject masculinity as defined by the status quo, whether through direct protest or refusal to conform, and thus receive no societal benefits. Rather, the system often attempts to punish them. High school ­“druggies” exemplify this category. Although a similar approach may be applied to women, to date there has been very little work on “femininities.”

Why Do Gender Roles Exist? There are two primary theoretical approaches to the question of why gender roles exist: constructionism and essentialism. The constructionist approach, which is also sometimes called social constructionism, relies heavily on the fact that gender roles vary across places (nations) and time periods and must be taught to young children. The essentialist approach centers on findings that gender roles are quite similar across nations and over time and argues that gender differences are fundamental and inherent—they rely on people’s “essence” as females or males—and typically emphasizes inborn, biological factors. One commonly referenced theory is Alice Eagly’s social role theory (SRT). According to SRT, the social roles women and men typically inhabit are confused with their characters. For example, women are viewed as people who are tender, caring, and loving, particularly with children. As such, their professional options were long restricted to caring for others as nurses, teachers, nannies, or parents. In part, this stance came from a practical history. Prior to the invention of infant formula and modern contraception in the last century, women often had multiple children over a span of 15 to 20 years and needed to stay near their infants and younger children so they could nurse. This restricted women’s tasks to things that could be done with children in close proximity, could be started and stopped quickly without loss of quality, and did not require extended (or any) absence from the home. This role—caretaker—requires people who

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are tender, caring, and loving. It helps if they are also content to be in the same place day after day after day. From the perspective of SRT, being caring, ­loving, understanding, and patient are required for one role that nearly all women adopted for one part of their adult life. Because women are so ­visible in and so closely associated with this role, people generally came to believe that those characteristics are relevant for all women at all times in their lives and in all settings. A parallel analysis can be performed for men. They had the ability to work outside the house, whether that meant on the family farm, in a storefront across town, or at some other workplace. They often worked for themselves (or their family) and used their physical abilities (strength, agility, or fine motor skills) to produce things their family needed. This role required men to be active and do things (versus having certain characteristics), create objects (crops or goods), and make decisions. These traits remain central to the common expectations of what it means to be a “real man.” SRT has received support from studies that examine cross-cultural variations (differences between cultures) and historical variations within a culture. For example, Eagly and Wendy Wood reanalyzed data from 37 nations that demonstrated male versus female differences in the attributes that people desire in a potential mate, as described by the sexual strategies theory (discussed later). When they included a measure of women’s status that the United Nations developed, most of the female versus male differences disappeared. Similarly, changes in the American educational system have led to the disappearance of a longstanding gender difference: Whereas girls used to perform worse than boys on the math section of the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), the two groups now perform about equally. No psychological theory explains everything, of course. One of the persistent criticisms of SRT focuses on its difficulty in explaining why certain traits and roles have appeared across so many cultures in so many time periods. The paucity of women in positions of power (heads of state or religion) is one such example. Another popular approach is Janet Shibley Hyde’s gender similarities hypothesis. She argues that women and men and girls and boys are more

similar than different, at least psychologically. Hyde’s argument is based on the findings of multiple reviews of the psychological literature. For example, Allen Feingold reviewed approximately 120 studies published between 1940 and 1992 that focused on personality traits. Consistent with gender stereotypes, he found that males were more assertive than females, and females were more extraverted, anxious, trusting, and tender minded (or nurturing). However, he noted that these differences were fairly small and only evident across groups of individuals. If a single individual were to be randomly picked from the population, knowing that the individual is male or female would not particularly increase the odds of guessing how assertive or anxious that person is. In his review, Feingold also found that men and women did not differ on some of the traits that U.S. culture says they should differ on, including (feminine) characteristics, such as social anxiety, ideas (self-reflection), impulsiveness, and orderliness, and (masculine) ­ characteristics, such as activity level and seeing oneself as controlling one’s fate (locus of control). The gender similarities hypothesis has also been criticized. Challenges have focused on the difficulty of identifying which subgroups of women or men actually differ from the larger group that is similar. Another challenge is methodological: Psychological research is designed to identify statistically significant differences between groups, and the ­ demonstration of similarity—or nondifference—is controversial and challenging. Sexual strategies theory (SST), developed by David Buss and David Schmitt, is a popular theory in evolutionary psychology (EP) and is rooted in difference. The theory argues that biological constraints regarding reproduction (women can bear one child per year, men can sire hundreds), certainty of parentage (definite for women, probabilistic for men), and physical limitations due to pregnancy and breast-feeding (high for women, not applicable to men) have led men and women to adopt ­different approaches to “mate selection.” Although both groups are capable of engaging in either short-term or long-term mating, SST’s authors argue that men have evolved to engage in short-term mating at significantly higher rates than women. In addition, males choose more attractive mates because attractiveness is a reliable (but not

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perfect) indicator of good health, but females choose higher status men because they have access to higher levels of resources (food or shelter) necessary for the mother and her infant(s). Evidence of these gender differences comes from historically persistent differences in sexual behavior as well as robust female versus male differences in cross-cultural comparisons. However, SST has been criticized for relying on data about hypothetical (versus actual) behavior, overinterpreting research results, ignoring aspects of its own research, and inconsistencies with the larger EP framework. Genes and Hormones

Another approach rooted in biological differences comes from the study of children and adults who have a disorder of sexual development and are commonly known as intersex, intersexual, or intersexed. There are several disorders, all of which focus on either the 23rd pair of chromosomes—the “sex chromosomes”—or on the “sex hormones” of testosterone and estrogen. Chromosomal disorders include Turner’s Syndrome, characterized by having one X and no second chromosome (XO), Klinefelter’s Syndrome, characterized by two X and one Y chromosome (XXY), and other atypical combinations. Hormonal disorders include congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH) and androgen insensitivity syndrome (AIS). Females (XX) and males (XY) with CAH are exposed to high levels of androgens, including testosterone, in utero, and males (XY) with AIS are unable to process testosterone and certain adrenal hormones. XX females with CAH and XY males with AIS demonstrate a variety of symptoms related to their condition, including ambiguous genitalia. Researchers have often compared the behavior of children with these disorders to other children without them. This research typically reveals that, on average, girls with CAH have higher levels of masculine traits or more masculine interests than biologically typical XX girls. The parallel finding holds for boys with AIS; on average, they have higher levels of feminine traits and more feminine interests than biologically typical XY boys. However, this work has been criticized for positioning femininity and masculinity as opposites

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(i.e., either-or) instead of separate entities that may be possessed in any combination.

Criticism and Codicils Each theory listed here has generated a substantial amount of research support as well as criticism. At the most general level, essentialist and constructionist approaches disagree on the interpretation of data, such as cross-national findings, where essentialists tend to highlight cross-national similarities and constructionists point to cross-national differences. Because they focus on broad principles, the theories are necessarily fuzzy on the specific mechanisms that connect the “cause” to the gender roles per se. Instead of asking, “Does culture or do genes cause gender roles?” it may be more effective to ask, “How do these forces create such behavior?” or to examine individuals who conform to gender-based expectations (or who do not) and ask why (or why not) they do so. Andrew P. Smiler See also Feminist Approaches to Psychology and Gender; Gender, Evolutionary Perspectives on; Gender and Cognition; Gender and Culture; Gender and Language; Gender and Sex; Gender Development; Gender Stereotypes; Social Role Theory

Further Readings Eagly, A. H., Wood, W., & Diekman, A. B. (2000). Social role theory of sex differences and similarities: A current appraisal. In T. Eckes & H. M. Trautner (Eds.), The developmental social psychology of gender (pp. 123–174). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Gilmore, D. D. (1990). Manhood in the making: Cultural concepts of masculinity. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Hyde, J. S. (2005). The gender similarities hypothesis. American Psychologist, 60, 581–592. http://dx.doi .org/10.1037/0003-066X.60.6.581 Schmitt, D. P. (2005). Fundamentals of human mating strategies. In D. M. Buss (Ed.), Handbook of evolutionary psychology (pp. 255–291). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Smiler, A. P. (2004). Thirty years after the discovery of gender: Psychological concepts and measures of masculinity. Sex Roles, 50(1–2), 15–26. http://dx.doi .org/10.1023/B:SERS.0000011069.02279.4c

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Smiler, A. P. (2013). Challenging Casanova: Beyond the stereotype of promiscuous young male sexuality. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Vilain, E., Achermann, J. C., Eugster, E. A., Harley, V. R., Morel, Y., Wilson, J. D., & Hiort, O. (2007). We used to call them hermaphrodites. Genetics in Medicine, 9, 65–66.

Gender Stereotypes Stereotypes are socially shared beliefs concerning attributes associated with a group and its members. Gender stereotypes can include physical characteristics (e.g., men are taller than women), roles (e.g., women are caretakers), activity preferences (e.g., women like to shop), and personality traits (e.g.,  men are independent). Research into gender stereotypes, however, focuses mainly on personality traits encompassed by two broad trait dimensions, communality (nurturing, warm, kind, or understanding) and agency (competitive, ambitious, active, or competent), alternatively labeled expressive and instrumental traits or warmth and competence. This entry reviews the processes and content associated with gender stereotyping, why gender stereotypes about women’s communality and men’s  agency developed and persist, how gender ­ stereotypes lead to discrimination, and how gender stereotypes may or may not be changing.

Implicit and Explicit Stereotyping Like other group stereotypes, gender stereotypes can be unconscious associations, known as implicit ­stereotypes, or consciously held beliefs, known as explicit stereotypes. Implicit stereotypes are most popularly measured by the Implicit Association Test. Due to constant exposure to gender stereotypes (e.g., in the media), an individual who rejects explicit stereotypes may still implicitly ­stereotype. For example, a person might believe that women are equal to men but unconsciously associate status with men more than women, leading to biased behavior, such as preferring a man for a high-status role.

Why Stereotype? Descriptive and Prescriptive Functions Stereotypes serve as mental shortcuts. Knowing a new person’s social category, perceivers can infer

traits and how to interact with that person. Descriptive stereotypes set up expectations about what people in a group are like. All stereotypes serve this function. Some stereotypes are also ­prescriptive, specifying how people in a social category ideally “should” be. A stereotype is prescriptive when people punish someone who fails to match the stereotype. For example, a person might believe that “Norwegians like to ski” (descriptive stereotype) but probably would not punish a Norwegian who did not ski. In comparison, stereotypes about men’s bravery not only describe how men “are” but how they ideally should be. People would probably judge a man who uses his girlfriend as a human shield when the couple is attacked as a terrible person. Gender stereotypes tend to be prescriptive, leading people to punish those who fail to fit these stereotypes.

Why Stereotype Based on Gender? Why stereotype men and women? Gender represents the most basic, earliest learned social category. Consider the first question often asked when a baby is born? Boy or girl? Categories associated with physical differences, such as gender, are more likely to be used to classify others because people can readily apply the category (i.e., people usually perceive gender in an instant). That’s not the whole story, however. Gender is important because it links to social roles. Because women bear children and lactate, societies typically developed a gendered division of labor with women as the primary caregivers for children and men as protectors and providers. In her social role theory, Alice Eagly proposes that men’s and women’s differing roles create gender stereotypes and social pressures to fit those roles.

Gender Stereotypes Are Rooted in Social Roles and Hierarchy Social role theory explains why women are stereotyped as communal and men as agentic. What traits are required for being an excellent caregiver? What traits are required for a protector and provider? Given that similar gender roles exist across societies, women are stereotyped as communal and men as agentic across the globe. The link between gender stereotypes and social roles also explains

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their prescriptive quality: Societies have a stake in fostering women’s communality to shape them into ideal caretakers and in fostering men’s agency to shape them into effective protectors and providers. Thus, socialization prepares boys and girls for their differing adult roles. Social approval for acting in line with one’s gender roles and disapproval or punishment for failing to do so maintains the established division of labor. Importantly, the traditional division of labor favors men over women when it comes to status, power, and resources. Alice Eagly and Wendy Wood suggest that early hunter-gatherer societies had less inequality because women’s gathering, which could be accomplished while caring for children, was an important resource. Once agriculture developed, women were confined to the home, and men monopolized economic resources. Societies became more complex and hierarchical as resources (e.g., land or grain) could be accumulated. Without child-bearing and child-rearing responsibilities, men were able to amass resources and dominate leadership roles. Hierarchy adds to the prescriptiveness of gender stereotypes. Dominant groups, like men, seek to justify and reinforce their power and privileges. Male advantage is maintained by encouraging men’s (but discouraging women’s) expression of “agentic” traits (e.g., ambition, assertiveness). Jennifer Bosson and Joseph Vandello’s precarious manhood theory proposes that to maintain their higher status, men must constantly prove they are “real men” by never showing weakness. Thus, male stereotypes are highly prescriptive, and men react strongly (even violently) to threats to their masculinity.

Discrimination Due to Descriptive Versus Prescriptive Stereotyping Gender stereotypes can lead to discrimination in two ways. Descriptive stereotypes set up assumptions about others—for example, that a woman lacks sufficient toughness or assertion for a ­management position. Such assumptions bias perception because people interpret ambiguous behaviors as consistent with the stereotype. Individuals can combat descriptively based discrimination by providing clear evidence that they do not fit the stereotype, which leads others to view an individual as an exception to stereotypes about his or her group.

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Unfortunately, although individuating information can puncture discrimination due to descriptive stereotyping, providing such individuating information can lead to prescription-based discrimination. Women are not merely expected to be less assertive than men (descriptive stereotype) but are prescribed to avoid being assertive. Therefore, a woman might win the initial battle against descriptive stereotypes by proving she is sufficiently assertive for a job but lose the war because prescriptive stereotypes cause hostility toward assertive women. Thus, women face a double bind: Conform to gender stereotypes and be liked but not respected, or defy stereotypes and be respected but disliked. Laurie Rudman’s research on “backlash” confirms that assertive women gain in perceived agency but lose perceived communality, causing them to be disliked and discriminated against relative to similar men. However, this double bind can be overcome. Women who carefully stress their communal traits while also clearly demonstrating their agency can avoid both types of discrimination. Doing so requires women to spend extra time and energy on self-presentation compared with men’s expenditure.

Subtypes and Intersectionality Gender divides people into two groups, “male” and “female,” that encompass tremendous variety within them. Such broad categories often get divided into “subtypes” that account for withingroup variations. Subtyping occurs, in part, because some people do not fit traditional gender stereotypes. When there are enough exceptions to the general stereotype, subtypes develop. For example, when women moved into the paid workforce in large numbers, the subtype “career women” developed. Similarly, when many women started questioning traditional gender roles, “feminists” became a subgroup. Career women and feminists are stereotyped as having masculine traits (e.g., power ­hungry) because they represent women who take on “masculine” roles or seek equal status to men. Similarly, there are subtypes for men who violate masculine prescriptions, such as being a wimp or a sissy, who are stereotyped as having “feminine” traits. Such nonconforming subtypes tend to elicit social disapproval. Additional female and male subtypes represent different ways of being a

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Gender Stereotypes

traditional woman (e.g., mother, cheerleader, or princess) or traditional man (e.g., macho man, businessman, or jock). These subtypes represent more fine-grained versions of broader gender stereotypes. The intersection between gender and other social categories, such as race and ethnicity, also leads to subtyping (e.g., Black woman, Asian woman, or White woman). Such “intersectionality” modifies broad gender stereotypes. For example, Black women are stereotyped as more masculine than White women. In contrast, although stereotypes describe Black men as highly masculine, they prescribe Black men not to show these traits (i.e., not to be “the angry Black man”), perhaps because Black men are stereotyped as “dangerous.”

Are Gender Stereotypes Accurate or Unfair . . . or Both? Physically, some evolved gender differences exist: Men tend to be taller and have more upper-body strength than women. For traits and aptitudes, however, there is little evidence for genetic sex differences: Most traits show much more overlap than difference between men and women. From this perspective, gender stereotypes are exaggerated and unfair. However, research shows that gender stereotypes are roughly in line with average differences in men’s and women’s behavior, which suggests that they are accurate. But accuracy does not mean that gender stereotypes are “fair” or nondiscriminatory. Recall that men and women behave differently because society pressures them to conform to gender stereotypes. As a result, men and women develop different traits (on average), not necessarily because they are born different, but because they are socialized to differ. For example, boys who play with dolls often face pressure to change; parents may shove footballs into their hands, and male peers taunt them as “sissies” until they “man up.” Prescriptive gender stereotypes create conformity pressures to enact gender even among individuals who would rather bend gender “rules,” encouraging girls to develop communal and boys to develop agentic traits. In short, gender stereotypes become self-fulfilling prophecies, creating a reality that corresponds to the stereotypes and, as a by-product, make the stereotypes “accurate.”

Thus, stereotypes can be accurate yet still unfair. If women become less assertive to avoid punish­ ment, they are being treated unfairly, but the stereotype that “women lack assertion” gains accuracy. There is another sense in which applying stereotypes, even if they are generally accurate, is unfair. Stereotypes refer to average differences between groups but are applied to individuals who may not fit the stereotype. For example, even though men typically have more upper-body strength than women (an accurate stereotype), it is not fair to assume that an individual woman lacks the strength to be a firefighter.

Are Gender Stereotypes Changing? The social role perspective on gender stereotypes suggests that as social roles change, so too will stereotypes. For example, as women move into “masculine” occupations, the agentic traits those jobs require should become associated with women, undermining traditional stereotypes. Indeed, as women’s participation in the paid workforce increased, so did their self-perceived agency. Further, people generally believe that women are becoming more agentic and will converge with men on this trait in the future. But gender stereotypes persist for at least two reasons. First, women still tend to be the primary caretakers, which reinforces the “women are communal” stereotype. Second, despite more participation in the paid workforce, women are overrepresented in “communal” (e.g., nurse) jobs, and men are overrepresented in “agentic” (e.g., firefighter) and high-status (e.g., CEO) jobs. Therefore, gender stereotypes may lessen but do not seem likely to disappear completely anytime soon. Peter Glick See also Gender, Evolutionary Perspectives on; Gender and Cognition; Gender and Culture; Gender and Language; Gender and Sex; Gender Development; Gender Roles; Social Role Theory

Further Readings Eagly, A. H., & Wood, W. (2011). Social role theory. In P. A. M. Van Lange, A. W. Kruglanski, & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of theories of social psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 458–476). London, England: Sage.

General Aggression Model Hyde, J. S. (2005). The gender similarities hypothesis. American Psychologist, 60, 581–592. Prentice, D. A., & Carranza, E. (2002). What women and men should be, shouldn’t be, are allowed to be, and don’t have to be: The contents of prescriptive gender stereotypes. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 26, 269–281. Swim, J. K. (1994). Perceived versus meta-analytic effect sizes: An assessment of the accuracy of gender stereotypes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 21–36. Williams, J. E., & Best, D. L. (1990). Measuring sex stereotypes: A multination study (Rev. ed.). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

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aggressive behavior, including L. Rowell Huesmann’s script theory, Albert Bandura’s social learning ­theory, Berkowitz’s cognitive neo-associative theory, Crick and Dodge’s social information processing theory, and others. The GAM delineates causal processes that link learned and situational variables to subsequent aggressive behavior. The overall model can be partitioned into two highly related sets of processes: proximate processes and distal processes. Proximate processes detail how variables in the immediate situation influence aggressive behavior through changes in state-based thoughts, emotions, arousal, and decision processes. Distal processes detail how repeated learning episodes develop into long-term aggressive tendencies that shape personality.

Implicit Association Test: www.implicit.harvard.edu

Proximate Processes

General Aggression Model Aggression is defined by Craig A. Anderson and Brad J. Bushman as behavior intended to harm another who is motivated to avoid that harm; it is conceived as a continuum ranging from mild (e.g., insult) through moderate (e.g., hitting) to extreme harm (e.g., murder). Various types of aggressive and violent behaviors are commonplace worldwide. Enumerating factors that predict aggression is important and useful at informing interventions. However, the wealth of research on predicting aggressive behavior reveals that no single predictor accounts for much variance in any one aggressive act. Rather, myriad risk factors are likely present in extremely aggressive behaviors. Understanding aggression requires sound theoretical models that account for underlying ­ psychological processes, personality predictors, and situational factors involved in producing inappropriate (and appropriate) aggression. This encyclopedia entry describes one comprehensive model: the general aggression model.

Overview The general aggression model (GAM) is a dynamic developmental social-cognitive model of aggression. The GAM was derived from the theoretical underpinnings of several domain-specific theories of

Input Factors

Proximate processes in the GAM begin with two types of inputs: situational and person factors. Situational factors are variables in the immediate social environment that likely foster (or inhibit) aggressive behavior. Many such factors have been identified, such as provocation, alcohol consumption, heat, and media violence, among others. Person factors are variables that people bring with them to the situation, such as dispositional characteristics related to aggression (e.g., disagreeableness, trait aggression), beliefs, attitudes, and mood. Present Internal State

The input factors influence aggression by influencing at least one of the three types of present internal-state variables: aggressive cognition, aggressive affect, and physiological arousal. Internal-state variables are intercorrelated, each influencing the others. For example, hot temperatures increase aggressive behavior primarily by increasing aggressive affect and arousal, whereas media violence seems to increase aggression primarily by increasing aggressive cognitions. ­ Additionally, person and situational input factors may influence internal-state variables (and therefore aggression) either additively or interactively. For example, Bruce D. Bartholow and colleagues

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found that the presence of hunting guns increases aggression for one type of person (e.g., nonhunters) while having little impact on another (e.g., hunters). Outcomes

Input factors affect the next GAM stage, appraisal and decision processes, through changes in internal state. This stage of the GAM includes several complex appraisal and decision processes that range from automatic to more controlled. The process begins with an immediate appraisal (or attribution) regarding an event. This immediate appraisal is largely automatic—relatively effortless, spontaneous, and without awareness. Such immediate appraisals have implications for behavior. For example, if the event is some type of harm (e.g., getting bumped) and the immediate appraisal implies that it was intentional, the implication is that some type of retaliation or escape behavior is needed. If no further processing of the event occurs, the ensuing behavior will be impulsive. However, if three conditions are met, then efforts are made toward further processing: There must be sufficient time, cognitive capacity, and motivation to accurately appraise the event to trigger reappraisal processes. In other words, if an individual is satisfied with the immediate appraisal or the immediate appraisal is deemed unimportant or there is insufficient time or cognitive capacity, then the immediate appraisal stands as a guide to behavior. Reappraisal is defined as actively seeking out additional information to clarify one’s current feelings, the environment, or both and is a highly controlled cognitive process. One or several reappraisal searches may occur. At some point, the reappraisal process concludes and the ensuing behavior is termed thoughtful. Note that reappraisal does not guarantee a nonaggressive outcome. Indeed, the reappraisal process may confirm an immediate hostile appraisal or even foster a more hostile interpretation and rumination processes that can yield more seriously aggressive behavior. However, if an alternative view of the situation is generated, one that is not hostile, the result will be thoughtful nonaggressive behavior.

In sum, the proximate processes delineated by the GAM flow as follows: event → input factors → immediate appraisal → reappraisal (if necessary) → thoughtful or impulsive behavior, either of which can be aggressive or nonaggressive. Furthermore, whatever behavior is enacted feeds back into the situational input of the next episodic cycle. Also, the consequences of the behavior (i.e., how others respond, success, f­ ailure) feed into long-term distal processes.

Distal Processes A single episodic cycle of the proximate processes acts as a learning trial. Using a developmental lens, the GAM delineates how multiple learning trials influence the development of aggression-related knowledge structures and subsequent aggressive personality. The GAM postulates that repeated learning, rehearsal, and positive reinforcement of aggression-related events influence the accessibility, ease of activation, and automatization of several aggression-related knowledge structures. Although not an exhaustive list, the GAM explicitly includes (a) aggressive attitudes and beliefs, (b) aggressive behavioral scripts, (c) aggressive perceptual schemata, (d) aggressive expectation biases, and ­ (e) desensitization processes. One distal learned knowledge structure is the formation of aggressive attitudes and beliefs. The GAM predicts that continued positively reinforced aggressive behaviors will lead to the development of aggressive attitudes and beliefs. If one learns that aggression is acceptable, that such behavior is not punished, and that it sometimes is rewarded, the result can be more positive beliefs about and feelings toward using aggression in the future. A second learned aggression-related knowledge structure is the formation and automatization of aggressive behavioral scripts. Scripts are mental representations of the usual progression of events in typical social situations. Such behavioral scripts provide people with a mental “road map” for how a social event or interaction is likely to unfold. When activated, scripts guide interpretations of observed events as well as one’s own subsequent behavior. Rehearsal of scripts that end in aggression increases the likelihood that such scripts will be activated in similar future social interactions.

General Aggression Model

If those scripts include successful outcomes from behaving aggressively and fail to include other harmful side effects (such as pain and suffering of others or oneself), then such aggressive scripts will likely be used to guide behavior. With repeated practice, aggression-facilitating scripts can become highly accessible and automatized, effectively displacing nonaggressive scripts that would be used to defuse conflict situations out of consideration. Similarly, aggressive perceptual and expectation schemata can be formed. Perceptual schemas are used to identify everything, from common objects (e.g., chair) to complex social situations (e.g., provocations). Related to aggression, the accessibility of aggressive perceptual schemas is related to the interpretation of ambiguous situations as aggressive rather than benign. Aggressive expectation schemas are knowledge structures that prompt individuals to infer or perceive hostile intent from others’ behavior. In other words, we expect others to behave in an aggressive manner toward us (e.g., the hostile attribution bias). This has clear implications for aggression, because if we expect a passerby to physically attack us or if we misattribute hostile intent where there was none, we become more inappropriately aggressive ourselves. Another developmental aspect of the GAM concerns emotional reactions to scenes or thoughts about violence. Specifically, desensitization is defined as a decrease in emotional reactivity to real-life violence, often indexed by emotion-related physiological measures such as heart rate and skin conductance. Media violence has been found to produce such desensitization to real violence, resulting in lowered empathy toward and less desire to help victims of violence as well as increased aggressive behavior. The latter effect likely results from the lack of negative emotional reactions to thinking about and choosing aggressive scripts to enact. The GAM postulates that the continued development, rehearsal, and automatization of these (and perhaps other) pro-aggressive knowledge structures leads directly to increases in what is generally termed aggressive personality. In short, knowledge structure changes become a part of one’s constitution, and these changes in personality feed back into the proximate GAM processes as a person input variable.

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The Whole Picture A strength of the GAM is the developmental interplay between the proximate and distal processes. The GAM predicts that each cycle of the proximate processes serves as a learning trial. If aggression is reinforced in many or most such learning trials (including observational learning), then the distal processes lead to increased accessibility and favorability of aggression-related knowledge structures; the person becomes more aggressive at the personality level. Thus, situational variables (e.g., repeated exposure to aggression in the home, community, or school as well as through media) can increase aggressive personality over time; in turn, the increased aggressiveness of one’s personality later influences the proximate processes by changing the person input factors. Similarly, the GAM also notes that the development of an aggressive personality can even influence the situational input variables within the proximate aspect of the GAM. Aggressive individuals sometimes seek out antisocial activities and friends in order to reaffirm their aggressive tendencies. They also change the aggressiveness of common, everyday interactions, turning them into conflict situations and forcing others to behave aggressively toward them. The GAM explicitly notes that distal learning processes are affected by biological and environmental modifiers, variables that likely change the developmental learning trajectory of aggressionrelated stimuli. For instance, being maltreated as a child (environmental variable) has especially harmful effects on those with certain genetic profiles, dramatically increasing violent criminality. As noted by Julia Hosie and colleagues, the GAM is useful at predicting the likelihood of a single aggressive episode and the development of an aggressive and violent personality. Its strength lies in its integration of other domain-specific aggression theories, ability to incorporate both short-term and long-term learning processes, level of sophistication regarding mediating processes, and level of understanding regarding complex interactions between myriad situational and personality variables that predict a complex social behavior such as aggression. Craig A. Anderson and Christopher P. Barlett

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Gestalt Psychology

See also Altruism and Sociality; Emotions, Universality of; Social Emotions; Social Motives

Further Readings Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2002). Human aggression. Annual Review of Psychology, 53, 27–51. Anderson, C. A., & Carnagey, N. L. (2004). Violent evil and the general aggression model. In A. Miller (Ed.), The social psychology of good and evil (pp. 168–192). New York, NY: Guilford. Anderson, C. A., & Huesmann, L. R. (2003). Human aggression: A social-cognitive view. In M. A. Hogg & J. Cooper (Eds.), The Sage handbook of social psychology (pp. 296–323). London, England: Sage. Bandura, A. (1973). Aggression: A social learning theory analysis. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Barlett, C. P., & Anderson, C. A. (2013). Examining media effects: The general aggression and general learning models. In E. Scharrer (Vol. Ed.), Media effects/media psychology: Vol. 5. International encyclopedia of media studies (pp. 1e–20e). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. Bartholow, B. D., Anderson, C. A., Carnagey, N. L., & Benjamin, A. J. (2005). Interactive effects of life experience and situational cues on aggression: The weapons priming effect in hunters and nonhunters. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41, 48–60. Berkowitz, L. (1993). Aggression: Its causes, consequences, and control. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. Crick, N. R., & Dodge, K. A. (1994). A review and reformulation of the social information processing mechanisms in children’s adjustment. Psychological Bulletin, 115, 74–101. DeWall, C. N., Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2011). The general aggression model: Theoretical extensions to violence. Psychology of Violence, 1, 245–258. Hosie, J., Gilbert, F., Simpson, K., & Daffern, M. (2014). An examination of the relationship between personality and aggression using the general aggression and five factor models. Aggressive Behavior, 40(2), 186–196. Huesmann, L. R. (1988). An information processing model for the development of aggression. Aggressive Behavior, 14, 13–24.

Gestalt Psychology Gestalt psychology is a psychological school that arose in the first half of the 20th century in Germany. Its main interest was visual perception, but its founding members and their followers also

worked in the psychology of thinking and reasoning, social psychology, and psychology of art and affected such diverse disciplines as design and psychotherapy. The founder of Gestalt psychology was Max Wertheimer, together with his younger colleagues, Wolfgang Köhler and Kurt Koffka. Although it does not exist as an active movement anymore, its approach continues to be influential. One of the main features of Gestalt psychology is its stress on the role of wholes in the analysis of psychological phenomena, and the phrase most associated with this school is “the whole is different from the sum of its parts.” In this entry, the historical context in which Gestalt psychology arose is briefly sketched, several examples of so-called Gestalt grouping principles are given, and some unresolved issues are recounted.

The Historical Context of Gestalt Psychology Gestalt psychology arose in part in opposition to structuralism, a school of thought that dominated academic psychology toward the end of the 19th century and the beginning of 20th century. One of structuralism’s claims was that in analogy to other, more established sciences, psychology should search for basic building blocks out of which all psychological contents are composed, similar to atoms in physics, elements in chemistry, or cells in biology. The content of consciousness was to be analyzed into elementary sensations of color, sound, taste, smell, and so on. Thus, given an image on a computer screen composed of a large number of pixels, according to structuralism, the experience of that image would be equivalent to a set or sum of corresponding elementary sensations of color. In his 1923 paper, Wertheimer pointed out that in spontaneous visual observation, such elementary sensations were not present; rather, people see everyday objects, such as houses, trees, sky, and the like. Aside from the fact that these objects are recognizable and meaningful, one feature that is missing in an account based on pure, atomlike elementary sensations is the organization of visual experience: Whole regions of the visual field (such as those corresponding to objects) are experienced as belonging together and forming separate visual units. The simplest situation involves a patch of one color (the figure) on the background of another color (the ground).

Gestalt Psychology

A related aspect of visual organization is the fact that elementary figures or units are themselves integrated into higher order visual wholes or groups that are segregated from the rest of the visual field. The rules that describe this feature of visual perception, which are now often called the “grouping principles,” remain as perhaps the most popular contribution of Gestalt psychology. The best-known and most comprehensive early formulation of these principles was published by Wertheimer, although his work was preceded by that of other researchers. Some of these principles are described and illustrated in the following.

Examples of Gestalt Grouping Principles Figure 1a contains a set of seven figures or elements that form a distinctive group or visual whole. In Figure 1b, two groups of seven additional similar elements were added to the right and to the left of the original group. Note that in Figure 1b, the

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original group is hard or impossible to see as a separate visual whole anymore because of the presence of additional elements and the formation of a broader visual whole. Its visual identity as a group has been lost. However, when the two new groups are shifted some distance to the left and to the right, as in Figure 1c, the original seven elements once again are perceived as a distinct visual whole. These examples show the effects of the Gestalt principle of proximity. According to this grouping principle, a set of elements that are located relatively near to each other tend to be seen as a separate visual whole or Gestalt. It is true that even in Figure 1b, one is able, with some conscious effort of will, to mentally group the members of the middle set into a separate, integrated visual entity in spite of the fact that its formation is not favored by the principle of proximity. However, such deliberate, attention-guided, and fleeting mental unification in Figure 1b is quite different from the stable, spontaneous, and effortless visual grouping of the middle set in Figures 1a and 1c.

Figure 1  Illustrations of Gestalt Grouping Principles of Proximity and Similarity Source: Dejan Todorović. Reality and Illusions: The Effect of Context in Visual Perception (in Serbian), p. 128. Belgrade, Serbia: Philosophical Faculty, University of Belgrade (2011).

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The relativity of the notion of proximity is illustrated in Figure 1d, in which the members of the middle set are located in the same positions as in previous figures, but the members of the two flanking sets are pushed nearer to them and to each other, thus decreasing their mutual distances. In consequence, the middle set, the members of which are located at now relatively larger distances (compared with other elements), again loses its visual identity as a whole. Instead, a different organization with two new distinct visual wholes is formed, and the members of the middle set are split between them. In Figure 1e, all 21 elements are in the same positions and mutual distances as in Figure 1b, so the principle of proximity does not favor the visual unification of the members of the middle set. Nevertheless, they do form a separate visual whole because the flanking sets appear in different shades of gray. This figure illustrates the Gestalt principle of similarity, according to which a set of elements that are similar to each other tend to be seen as a separate visual group or whole. In this case the similarity involves color, but similarity with respect to size, orientation, or shape can also be effective in forming visual groups. In Figure 1f, the positions of the elements are the same as in Figure 1d, but their shades of gray are the same as in Figure 1e. This is an example of

how two grouping principles can favor the formation of different visual wholes based on the same set of elements; as a consequence, neither grouping is as salient as in the preceding figures. Such configurations can be used to assess the relative strengths of different grouping principles. The elements used to demonstrate the grouping principles in Figure 1 are all compact and lack a salient orientation. However, there are additional grouping principles that are better demonstrated with elongated oriented ­elements such as straight or curved line segments. Figure 2a contains such an element, denoted as ABC. In Figure 2b, elements CDE and CFG were added, which touch ABC at C. This contiguity of the elements is another difference from the examples in Figure 1, where the elements were nonadjacent. The question is whether element ABC will be visually grouped with CDE or CFG. Although ABC should be grouped with CFG according to the principle of proximity, it, in fact, groups with CDE into the longer segment ABCDE. This is an illustration of the principle of good continuation, according to which elements tend to be grouped into visual wholes if they are smoothly continuous with each other. In Figure 2c, the principle of good continuation is put into competition with the principle of similarity, because element ABC is similar to CFG

Figure 2  Illustrations of Gestalt Grouping Principles of Good Continuation, Closure, and Shape Similarity Source: Adapted from “Gestalt Principles,” by Dejan Todorović, 2008, Scholarpedia, 3, p. 5345.

Grammar, Psychology of

rather than to CDE. The outcome is that both groupings are somewhat ambiguous and unstable. In Figure 2d, element AHC is added, with the consequence that ABC now groups neither with CDE nor with CFG but with AHC. This is an illustration of the principle of closure, according to which elements tend to be grouped if they form closed contours. Figure 2e contains a large number of short elements grouped into two irregular wirelike shapes, one black and one white. Note that in addition to color similarity, this grouping is also favored by good continuation. In Figure 2f, color similarity is excluded as a grouping factor, but good continuation should still be effective. Nevertheless, in this figure, the two irregular shapes from Figure 2e are not spontaneously seen. Rather, two more-regular shapes tend to be seen, a part of a cogwheel and a rectangular “snake.” The grouping principle that is effective here is a variant of the principle of shape similarity.

Unresolved Issues Several issues concerning the grouping principles remain unresolved. One problem is that there are no general predictions as to what happens when two or more principles are applicable to the same configuration but favor different groupings (as in some of the preceding examples), except in some particular cases. It is not clear how to apply the principles to more complex or even realistic images. There is no agreed-on final list of grouping principles, and a number of new ones have been added in recent decades. It has been suggested that most principles are special instances of a single general principle of Prägnanz (a German word meaning, approximately, “conciseness” or “succinctness”) or good Gestalt, according to which there is a tendency for those groupings to be perceived that are as regular, salient, ordered, simple, lawful, compact, and so on as possible, given the stimulation at hand. However, it is not clear to what extent the introduction of such a notion is a conceptual advance. Finally, little is known about the neural bases of the principles or about their origin—that is, to what extent they are innate or learned. Dejan Todorović

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See also Human Information Processing; Perception and Art; Perception and Cognition; Perceptual Development; Perceptual Illusions; Visual Perception; Visual System

Further Readings Brooks, J. L. (in press). Traditional and new principles of perceptual grouping. In J. Wagemans (Ed.), Oxford handbook of perceptual organization. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Peterson, M. A. (in press). Low-level and high-level contributions to figure-ground organization. In J. Wagemans (Ed.), Oxford handbook of perceptual organization. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Todorović, D. (2011). What is the origin of the Gestalt principles? Humana Mente, 17, 1–20. Wagemans, J., Elder, J. H., Kubovy, M., Palmer, S. E., Peterson, M. A., Singh, M., & von der Heydt, R. (2012a). A century of Gestalt psychology in visual perception: I. Perceptual grouping and figure–ground organization. Psychological Bulletin, 138(6), 1172–1217. Wagemans, J., Feldman, J., Gepshtein, S., Kimchi, R., Pomerantz, J. R., van der Helm, P. A., & van Leeuwen, C. (2012b). A century of Gestalt psychology in visual perception: II. Conceptual and theoretical foundations. Psychological Bulletin, 138(6), 1218–1252. Wertheimer, M., Sarris, V., & Sekuler, R. (2012). On perceived motion and figural organization. Boston, MA: MIT Press.

Grammar, Psychology

of

Grammar is the knowledge a speaker uses to combine smaller pieces of language into bigger ones in a meaningful way. For example, grammar underlies the intuition an English speaker has that dog bites man expresses a different concept than man bites dog; what the past tense of tweet should be; and why baby food is food for babies, not food made of babies. This knowledge is typically implicit to the language user; he or she might struggle to articulate why it is tweeted but not swimmed, for example. Somehow, almost all people learn what the fundamental principles are that govern these kinds of patterns and thousands of others like them. This is

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true regardless of whether a child is learning an Indonesian tone language, Mandarin Chinese, or the intricacies of the Finnish case system (intricate from the perspective of the English language). Clearly, any psychological theory of grammar has a lot to explain, including how children acquire grammar, how it is processed in the mind, and why the grammars around the world are so diverse. This entry reviews theories that address these questions.

Chomsky’s Grammar The first comprehensive attempt to explain the cognitive foundations of grammar was by Noam Chomsky, and he did so in a way that was heavily based on a computational metaphor of mind. Speakers generated grammatical sentences by cranking through operations in a way analogous to a computer running a program. For example, an English active sentence “the cat chased the mouse” could be transformed into a passive sentence, “the mouse was chased by the cat,” by altering the structure underlying the sentences. Chomsky claimed that despite the different words and sounds languages used, they could all be built from the same innate grammatical blueprint—what he called a universal grammar. Chomsky’s proposal was hugely influential, but is there psychological evidence for (a) the transformational processing of underlying grammatical structure and (b) a universal grammatical blueprint? According to the theory, sentences that require more transformations should take longer to process. This prediction is not well supported by psycholinguistic experiments and, in general, it has been difficult to demonstrate that speakers are actually using the kind of grammatical operations first proposed by Chomsky. The second claim—a universal grammar—has not fared well in the face of cross-linguistic diversity. The problem is this: Any grammatical blueprint needs to be general enough to capture the huge diversity in the world’s grammars. To accomplish this, the content of a universal grammar is no longer specific enough to be of use when constructing the particular grammar a child is confronted with. Despite Chomsky’s being seen as a father of the cognitive revolution in psychology, he himself thought psychology did not have much to say

about grammar and language. This was because he was keen to separate language from communication, and he thought that there were aspects of language completely encapsulated from the rest of cognition.

Functional Grammars There were others theorists, such as Ronald Langacker, Leonard Talmy, and George Lakoff, who thought differently. Whereas Chomsky and his followers had focused on the formal, structural, and deductive properties of language (generative rules and algorithms), the new theorists focused on the functional, communicative, and inductive properties of language (rules of thumb and heuristics). They were particularly interested in how processes that were well documented in psychology— such as categorization, analogy, memory, and attention—could be used to understand how grammar works. This approach has been called ­ cognitive linguistics or the usage-based approach to emphasize that grammar is part of cognition and that language is shaped by how people use it. Instead of a universal grammar, they proposed universal aspects of cognition and a universal set of social motives that make people want to communicate. For example, William Croft suggests that there are three basic “information packaging” functions of language—reference, predication, and modification. And there are also three basic categories of concepts—objects, actions, and properties. Crosslinguistically, prototypical nouns involve reference to objects, prototypical verbs involve predication of actions, and prototypical adjectives involve modification by properties. Chomsky’s vision of grammar was, of course, psychological in the sense that it was instantiated in the mind. But, importantly, his grammar contained rules with no meaning and operating on disembodied symbols, which were modular or separate from the rest of cognition. By contrast, functionalists such as Croft suggested that grammar is built out of symbolic schemas, pairs of form and meaning, that capture patterns in language and share many features of the category schemas used in nonlinguistic categorization. Far from being modular or informationally encapsulated, these schemas embody semantic, pragmatic, and

Grammar, Psychology of

even sensory-motor properties of the communicative context in which they are used. This view of language presents less of a problem for the task of children acquiring grammar, because children seek meaningful communicative content and human languages are composed of meaningful social conventions and constructions. Is this conceptualization of grammar more “psychologically real” than the one proposed by Chomsky? First, the empirical psycholinguistic evidence favors the view that people process and acquire grammatical knowledge in a way that is consistent with the usage-based patterns they hear and that they use the cognitive resources available to them, such as categorization, analogy, and social skills such as intention reading. Second, they do not need bespoke (or custom made) mental modules (such as a language acquisition device) if grammatical knowledge can be explained by features that are independently motivated. The functional approach to grammar has also been applied to how language changes from generation to generation. Interestingly, it calls on the same set of cognitive processes that it used to explain language processing, acquisition, and diversity. For example, relative clauses are quite common in the world’s languages and very often derive from a meshing of separate sentences from discourse. Thus, someone might say, “My brother . . . He lives over in Arkansas . . . He likes to play piano,” which, due to various information-processing mechanisms is altered over historical time in the linguistic community to become something like, “My brother, who lives over in Arkansas, likes to play the piano.” Or conjoined sentences, such as “I pulled the door, and it shut,” congeal into “I pulled the door shut.” This general process has been characterized by Talmy Givón in an aphorism: “Today’s syntax is yesterday’s discourse.” All languages have to pass from generation to generation through the bottleneck of what is learnable by children. This requisite places psychological constraints on what the grammars of the world can look like. There are also general principles of communication that shape grammars, such as redundancy—in noisy environments, encode the message in multiple ways (e.g., case marking and word order)—and efficiency, such as making ­frequently used structures short.

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Grammar as Normative Another important aspect in which grammar is psychological is that it is normative. Norms are the set of expectations that a group has of others and that they are also willing to enforce. For example, English speakers are expected to put adjectives before the noun they modify—that is, brown hair, not hair brown. And if they don’t, then they may be told that they should! The same expectations are not held for French or German speakers, and one would not use normative language (should, ought) to enforce the norm. This is an important point for the psychology of grammar because it necessitates consideration of the sociohistorical context of how grammar is used and of its role in group identity. Grammar is a team sport and can be thought of as an adaptation to problems of coordination and to cultural life in general. As people have a tendency to ­conform to the norms of the group, languages evolve, and there must be room for inventiveness. A psychology of grammar must take account of both of these forces that shape human grammars. Another way grammar is psychological is that like all psychological phenomena, it ultimately has to be instantiated in the neural networks of the brain. Research has shown that the morphological and syntactic operations that apply to words (e.g., the inflection of nouns for number versus the inflection of verbs for tense) have distinct neural organization in the brain. Studies of brain-­damaged patients demonstrate deficits that are grammatical category specific (i.e., restricted to either nouns or verbs) but also modality specific (i.e., restricted to either spoken or written output). These individuals can be left with intact knowledge about words but are unable to put them together in a meaningful way to form a sentence. The precise nature of the mental representation of grammar remains a controversial topic. But it appears that grammar is the product of competing psychological motives. It is a trade-off between efficiency and being understood. It is social conventions that have been passed from generation to generation by cultural learning and a skill that is acquired early in childhood. Paul Ibbotson and Grzegorz Krajewski

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See also Cognition and Language; Communication and Language; Concepts and Language; Gender and Language; Language, Evolution of; Language and Development; Language Development; Language Disorders; Language, Interaction, and Culture; Perception and Language; Pinker on Language

Further Readings Altmann, G. T. M. (1999). The ascent of Babel: An exploration of language, mind, and understanding. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Croft, W., & Cruse, D. A. (2004). Cognitive linguistics (Cambridge Textbooks in Linguistics). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Ibbotson, P. (2013). The scope of usage-based theory. Frontiers in Psychology, 4(255). http://dx.doi .org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00255. Available at http:// journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/ fpsyg.2013.00255/full Tomasello, M. (Ed.). (1998). The new psychology of language (Vol. 1). New York, NY: Psychology Press. Tomasello, M. (Ed.). (2004). The new psychology of language (Vol. 2). New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Grief

and

Bereavement

In a sense, the history of humanity can be understood as the history of grief. Indeed, long before written accounts chronicled human events, prehistoric burial rituals gave evidence of the enduring concern of early Homo sapiens with members of their families or tribes who had died. Likewise, as cultures evolved, so too did these rituals of remembrance, giving rise to elaborate practices of collective mourning prescribed by nearly every religion and implicit attitudes toward bereavement inscribed in nearly every culture. But it was not until the early 20th century that formal psychological theories of grief began to shape clinical practice and research, beginning with the seminal contributions of Sigmund Freud. This entry reviews several theories about grief and different perspectives on understanding it.

In the Beginning: The Psychoanalytic View The scientific attempt to understand the responses of bereaved people dates to Freud’s Mourning and

Melancholia, first published in 1917. In it he posited that, just as death was a universal fact of life, there were also universal dynamics in grieving the death of a loved one. Freud defined mourning as the nonpathological response to such bereavement. Its distinguishing features include painful dejection, withdrawal of interest in the outside world, loss of the capacity to love, and inhibition of all activity. The work of mourning is accomplished gradually as the mourner’s psychic energy or libido, once invested in the attachment to the lost person or “object,” is systematically recalled, reexperienced, and then released, resulting in detachment from the lost object. This concept of emotional disconnection or decathexis as the natural end point of mourning has had an enduring impact on both professional and public understandings of bereavement. Freud’s second major contribution was his effort to delineate how processes of mourning can go awry and become unhealthy. Melancholia was defined as a pathological outcome marked by an insistent, narcissistic identification with the lost object—in effect, a refusal to “let go.” Instead, the mourner’s self or ego incorporates the lost object into itself as a way of warding off the loss while also denying its reality. This assertion of the pathological implications of identification with and “holding on” to the lost love object was carried over to many subsequent theories and is only recently being contested by newer ones.

Stage Theory Perhaps the most influential theory of grief, at least for the general public, stems from Elisabeth KüblerRoss’s book On Death and Dying. From consultation interviews with patients hospitalized for terminal illnesses, she derived her framework, featuring five stages in the dying process: denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance. Her concepts have since been generalized to describe how the reality of death—even for the bereaved, as well as the dying themselves—is assimilated gradually rather than all at once and then only after a series of psychological protests, delaying tactics, and mourning. As such, stage theory captures some of the ambivalence of accepting one’s own death or that of another, while at the

Grief and Bereavement

same time providing a simple framework for organizing the turbulent emotional responses that can be experienced in the process. The intuitive appeal of stage theory notwithstanding, serious criticisms of Kübler-Ross’s work have been lodged from several quarters. Critics argue that its “one-size-fits-all” approach constitutes too narrow a formula to explain individual and cultural variations in bereavement experiences and that it focuses on emotions to the near exclusion of cognitive and behavioral responses to loss. Most seriously, it simply receives little support from studies of the actual adaptation of bereaved people, most of whom experience high levels of “acceptance” from the earliest weeks of grieving, particularly when the loss is from natural, as opposed to violent, death. As a result, bereavement scholars have turned to a new generation of theories to inform their research and practice.

Task-Based Theories Now in its fourth edition, William Worden’s Grief Counseling and Grief Therapy conceptualized the tasks of mourning in active terms rather than viewing the impact of bereavement in terms of the dominant negative emotional states engendered. Worden’s model involves four basic tasks. Task 1 is to accept the reality of the loss—that is, to acknowledge that the person is gone forever and that reunion, at least in this life, is impossible. Task 2 is to work through the pain of grief, an unavoidable consequence of losing someone to whom the mourner was deeply attached. Task 3 is defined as adjusting to an environment in which the deceased is missing, a task that varies depending on what the relationship was with the deceased and the various roles the deceased played. Originally, Worden described Task 4 as withdrawing emotional energy from the deceased and reinvesting it in another relationship, akin to Freud’s notion of detachment from the lost object. In later revisions, however, he refined Task 4 as finding a new form of connection to the deceased and moving on with life. In part, this reflected a growing acceptance of the view that “continuing bonds” with the deceased are possible and potentially healthy. Other important contributions to task-oriented models of mourning have extended

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Worden’s basic framework, refining the treatment of complicated and violent-death bereavement.

The Dual Process Model Rather than emphasizing universal stages or tasks, the dual process model (DPM) of Margaret Stroebe and Henk Schut proposes that people deal with loss dialectically, oscillating between loss-oriented coping and restoration-oriented coping. The former process entails experiencing and managing the negative emotions of grieving triggered by the loss of the loved one, missing and longing for the lost person, and reorganizing the attachment relationship with the deceased. Importantly, coping in this way entails temporarily denying or distracting oneself from the demands of the external world that has been changed by the loss. Restoration-oriented coping, on the other hand, entails attending to the many life changes required to adjust to one’s world after the loss of a close person. This can include learning new skills, assuming new roles, and forming new relationships. This outwardly focused coping involves denying or distancing from the pain of grief in order to “learn to live again.” One of the distinctive features of the DPM is its implication that individuals normally self-regulate their bereavement by confronting their loss and, alternately, avoiding the emotional pain of grieving. Rather than proposing a phasic progression through grief, this model posits waxing and waning, an ongoing flexibility over time, with lossoriented coping dominant early in bereavement and restoration-oriented coping more prevalent later. Finally, Stroebe and Schut argue that their model provides a means of understanding gender differences in bereavement in that women tend to be more emotion focused and hence more loss oriented, but men tend to be more problem focused and hence more restoration oriented in their coping behaviors. The DPM has proven attractive to grief therapists as well as researchers, linking with attachment theory to help counselors loosen clients’ insecure attachments to the deceased through greater restoration coping and to mitigate their avoidant attachment through greater confrontation with the loss.

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Meaning Reconstruction A final contemporary perspective on bereavement is not so much a theory about grief as it is a metatheory—that is, an approach that can inform a variety of models by emphasizing that a central process of grieving is the attempt to reaffirm or reconstruct a world of meaning that has been challenged by loss. In this meaning reconstruction view advanced by Robert Neimeyer and his ­associates, the death of a loved one is seen as posing two narrative challenges to the survivor: (a) to process the event story of the death in an effort to “make sense” of what has happened and its implications for the survivor’s ongoing life and ­ (b) to access the backstory of the relationship with the loved one as a means of reconstructing a ­continuing bond. In a sense, then, the bereaved are prompted to “rewrite” important parts of their life story to accommodate the death and to project themselves into a changed, but nonetheless meaningful, future. A good deal of research has demonstrated a link between the inability to find meaning (whether spiritual or secular) in the loss and the intense, prolonged, and complicated grief reported by bereaved young people, parents, older adults, and homicide survivors, among others. The meaning reconstruction view has also extended the range of creative strategies incorporated within grief therapy. Although the experience of loss may be timeless and characteristic of human beings from their remote origins as a species to the present day, the theories by which to understand grief have changed considerably even over the past 100 years. Models have evolved in interaction with cultural values, and research on their basic premises and on new approaches to bereavement counseling offer a more ample frame for understanding the human encounter with life-altering loss and adaptation in its aftermath.

Further Readings Freud, S. (1957). Mourning and melancholia. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (pp. 152–170). London, England: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1917) Holland, J. M., & Neimeyer, R. A. (2010). An examination of stage theory of grief among individuals bereaved by natural and violent causes: A meaningoriented contribution. Omega, 61, 105–122. Kübler-Ross, E. (1969). On death and dying. New York: Macmillan. Neimeyer, R. A. (Ed.). (2001). Meaning reconstruction and the experience of loss. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Neimeyer, R. A. (Ed.). (2012). Techniques of grief therapy: Creative practices for counseling the bereaved. New York, NY: Routledge. Neimeyer, R. A., Harris, D., Winokeur, H., & Thornton, G. (2011). Grief and bereavement in contemporary society. New York, NY: Routledge. Stroebe, M., & Schut, H. (2010). The dual process model of coping with bereavement: A decade on. Omega, 61, 273–289. Worden, J. W. (2009). Grief counseling and grief therapy (4th ed.). New York, NY: Springer.

Group Processes Being part of a social group is a common experience for all individuals: from three children playing with marbles at the seaside to a platoon while fighting a war to a jury in a trial to employees of a company. In all these cases, individuals’ behaviors are affected both directly and indirectly by being part of a group and for this reason are affected by what this entry calls group processes. Following a review of three levels of group processes, this entry discusses the study of group processes and the group processes involved in everyday life.

Robert A. Neimeyer See also Close Relationships; Coping Strategies; Emotion, Evolution of; Emotion, Expression of; Emotion, Theories of; Emotion and Culture; Emotions, Universality of; Gender and Emotion; Memory as Reconstructive; Relational Theory; Spirituality

Three Levels of Analysis The study of group processes (or group dynamics) is generally defined as an examination of the emerging properties of behaviors or psychological events occurring within (intragroup processes) or between groups (intergroup processes). The study

Group Processes

of these processes can be analyzed at three different levels. The first level looks at the individual, analyzing cognitive, motivational, or physiological processes involved when members are part of a group (intrapersonal level)—for example, when members regulate their efforts as a function of how they believe that group will satisfy their personal needs. A second level of analysis asserts that some processes also emerge when two or more members of a group interact (interpersonal level)—for example, when members have to cooperate within a group in a problem-solving task, interpersonal attraction between members may affect the quality of the performance. Finally, specific group processes emerge, for example, when a group is in conflict with another group (intergroup level)—for example, during a university sports team competition where groups and their members face another university team with a historical rivalry. Although these levels are conceptually separated, they are strictly interconnected since each level plays a part in interpersonal behavior in society. Hence, the performance of a soccer team could be affected by individual commitment toward the group goals of each member, by members’ interpersonal relationships, and also by the level of competition against the opponent team. In all these cases, for group processes to be activated, members should perceive their group as a salient social psychological entity (called groupiness), and members need to feel that they are part of their group.

Evolution of the Study of Group Processes The study of group processes has passed through alternating phases: From the 1930s, cited as the beginning of systematic research on groups with the study of norms development, interest in small groups remained strong until the 1950s with several new theoretical developments of specific measures on a variety of topics, including leadership, conformity, conflict, and interaction within groups. The study of group processes lost its appeal in the 1960s, mostly because findings emerged that did not support an adequate general theoretical container at the group level. Nevertheless, the study of group processes emerged again in the 1980s, thanks to renewed

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interest in intergroup relations (e.g., social identity processes or stereotyping), although to the detriment of other important topic areas that involve intragroup processes (e.g., group composition, norms, or structure). Since the study of group processes has important repercussions in applied settings, from studies in work organizations to psychotherapy groups, different theories and research methods were developed that analyzed group processes mostly at the intrapersonal level or at the group level.

Theories Explaining Group Processes A social cognitive explanation of group processes has become a major reference theory following current trends in social psychology. In this view, group processes focus mainly on cognitive processes involved in how people acquire, store, and use information that derives from the social environment. Social cognition covered a wide range of topics, including self and interpersonal perception, changing perception through interaction, or stereotypes, and also how group members collaborate in encoding, storage, and retrieving information (a process called transactive memory system), which allows group members to recall more information in a socially shared cognition than individuals can by themselves. In this sense, theories such as social identity theory (SIT) and social categorization theory (SCT) that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s may be included in the social cognition approach and remain two of the most used explanations, especially for intergroup processes. SIT and SCT, the so-called social identity approach, have the value to identify processes that could explain intergroup behavior and some intragroup dynamics. SIT identifies the motivation to belong to a group in order to derive important aspects of personal identity as the reason people tend to favor their own group in relation to others. This theory assumes that individuals derive important information about themselves from the groups they belong to, and often they tend to confirm the value of these groups in order to contribute to the development of a positive group image that influences their personal image. SCT extends this concept to explain the motivation for being part of some groups as the result of

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the categorization processes that individuals apply to organize and store information about themselves, which derive in large part from the social environment (social self). The principle that manages these processes consists of continuous comparisons between elements very different from one another and very similar elements (metacontrast) that allow individuals to “choose” which of these are most useful to describe themselves. For example, a soccer player will be perceived as who he is when he identifies characteristics similar to other soccer players and different from another athlete, such as a basketball player. This process is reiterated with continuous comparisons that conduce people to better know themselves and to behave coherently with who they are. Other interesting but less diffused approaches to group processes follow positions of cultural psychology (or symbolic interaction) that state that each group develops an idiosyncratic and unique culture, analyzing members’ subjective point of view as expressed in particular in their language expression and communication within the group. There has been much interest in the links between social cognition and brain function that may provide an additional key to understanding group processes. For example, neuroimaging studies have investigated some relevant topics related to intergroup behavior. Summarizing the contribution to social neuroscience, the studies investigate the categorization of group members, the difference in the perception of faces of in-group or outgroup members, and how people empathize more with the groups to which they belong. Some findings on the neural correlates of social categorization have shown, for example, that when people engage in social categorization, some structures such as the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex and posterior anterior cingulate cortex are more active than in other conditions. Also, the difference between automatic (e.g., using stereotype, prejudice, social schemas) and controlled social cognition (e.g., emotion regulation, moral judgments, manipulation of others) could be investigated starting from the neural structures. Not only are neural correlates investigated by social neuroscientists to understand social cognition, but also biopsychosocial models, for example, take into consideration physiological indicators to assess

some aspects related to social identity such as the physiological threat response as a function of a social threat. Another promising approach is based on evolutionary theories that group behaviors are based on natural selection processes that provided humans with many psychological adaptations in their environment. Using Darwinian selection theories, group processes can be described as both natural selection and sexual selection that allowed humans to evolve a set of psychological adaptations. This evolutionary constraint predisposed individ­ uals, for example, to be more cooperative to their in-group members or more nasty to out-groups and also to punish unfair in-group members who violate in-group norms.

Group Processes in Everyday Life Group processes in everyday life involve a wide range of phenomena that can be distinguished in five broad topics: 1. Temporal change issues relate to group development and socialization. In fact, groups are not static entities, and internal dynamics are often affected by changes over time that involve the group as a whole or individual members. The traditional model of group development proposes that a group moves through four different phases: From the forming stage the group passes then through a storming stage where the group identifies resources and may experience conflict and polarization; the group then reaches the norming stage where group members agree about roles and processes for problem solving that allow the group to develop a supportive structure for the final ­performing stage. One model of group socialization was proposed that describes the temporal changes in the relationship between a group and its members through different steps. In this model, members and the group evaluate each other’s contribution, determining different levels of commitment toward socialization that mark five kinds of membership: prospective, new member, full member, marginal member, and ex-member. 2. Social influence within a group includes all topics related to influences that a group and

Group Processes

individuals exert toward behaviors and attitudes of the group’s members. The social influence processes can be direct through persuasion when group members or leaders attempt to bring into line individuals or subgroups of dissenters. Power asymmetries of members (such as leaders or oldtimers) may reflect different degrees of power that allow them to produce behavioral compliance that is not necessarily related to a deep cognitive or attitudinal change. Nevertheless, group or legitimate authorities can also indirectly influence their members through reputation or expertise, especially when members are uncertain about their beliefs. In this case, the group exerts informational influence that produces deep attitudinal or cognitive change of their beliefs. 3. Group decision making concerns all studies that relate how groups make decisions in order to reach optimal choice; in fact, although group performance is potentially better than individual performance when all members can provide their best expertise, groups often underperform compared with individuals because group dynamics may impair group decision performance due to coordination problems or conflicts among members. For example, a group can make bad decision solutions when it engages in groupthink: This mode of thinking is typical of high-cohesive groups and is characterized by a strong desire of members to reach unanimous agreement that leads them to underestimate rational decision-making procedures. Moreover, group members often tend to rely on knowledge that is shared by the majority of the group’s members or shift toward more extreme decision alternatives in a group decision bias called group polarization. Group decision-making research proposes a social combination model that allows prediction of the likelihood of a particular group decision (e.g., unanimity, majority wins, truth wins), depending on the task, in which there is a clear correct solution as opposed to judgmental tasks where solutions are based on personal preferences of their members and are not directly demonstrable. 4. Group dividing and unifying forces include processes involved in a group when members have different personal goals, attitudes, or opinions. This topic also includes social dilemmas that analyze when individual short-term preferences

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“conflict” with a group’s long-term benefits, such as in many environmental or political issues. Often, opinion disagreement involves subgroups (such as minority and majority groups) increasing group complexity dynamics. In this case, early literature focused on how the majority influences minorities through conformity pressure as a function of the size, power, and immediacy of the majority; however, the minority is often successful in innovating groups, converting the majority to adopt new ways of thinking, albeit using tactics (particularly consistent with their opinion) that involve a personal shift in private opinion of the majority members. 5. Intergroup topics focus on competition and cooperation between groups, analyzing the consequences of categorizing members of groups to which they belong (in-groups) as opposed to members of other groups (out-groups). These differences lead to important judgmental biases such as stereotypes that lead to seeing out-group members as similar to each other or favoring in-group members in the evaluation or allocation of resources. In this case, whereas social identity theories explain this bias in order to maintain a positive distinct social identity, realistic conflict theories focus on intergroup conflict that emerges when opposing groups have conflicting goals or compete for limited resources. The stereotype content model proposes that stereotypes possess two basic dimensions, warmth and competence, and social groups are perceived competent if they have higher status and warmth when they do not have to compete for limited resources. Stefano Livi and Marika Rullo See also Group Selection; Intergroup Behavior; Relational Theory; Social Influence; Social Motives

Further Readings Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (2002). Self and social identity. Annual Review of Psychology, 53(1), 161–186. Hackman, J. R., & Katz, N. (2010). Group behavior and performance. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (5th ed., pp. 1208–1251). New York, NY: John Wiley.

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Hewstone, M., Rubin, M., & Willis, H. (2002). Intergroup bias. Annual Review of Psychology, 53(1), 575–604. Levine, J. M., & Moreland, R. L. (2011). A history of small group research. In A. Kruglanski & W. Stroebe (Eds.), Handbook of the history of social psychology (pp. 233–255). New York, NY: Psychology Press. Molenberghs, P. (2013). The neuroscience of in-group bias. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 37(8), 1530–1536. Wittenbaum, G. M., & Moreland, R. L. (2008). Smallgroup research in social psychology: Topics and trends over time. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2(1), 187–203.

Group Selection After publishing On the Origin of Species, Charles Darwin became concerned that evidence of altruism in the animal kingdom threatened his theory of evolution. How could behaviors such as the self-sacrificial acts of social insects evolve if they reduced the fitness of the individuals that emitted them and increased the fitness of other members of their groups? This entry reviews the history of and different perspectives on the theory of group selection. In an attempt to account for the evolution of altruism, Darwin entertained the idea that although biologically altruistic acts emitted by individuals reduce the probability that they will survive and reproduce, such behaviors could benefit the altruistic individuals’ groups. That is, if groups replete with altruists fared better than groups replete with selfish individuals, then altruism could evolve through group selection—a process through which traits that benefit groups are selected even though they may be costly to the individuals that possess them. However, Darwin immediately saw a problem with this explanation of the evolution of altruism. Even if altruistic groups fared better than more selfish groups, the selfish members within the altruistic groups would out-produce the altruistic members, eventually leading to the extinction of dispositions to behave in altruistic ways. Although Darwin never solved this problem, he implied a solution when he considered the possibility that if the blood relations of altruists possessed the same

altruistic trait, the trait could evolve through their reproductive success. In modern terms, Darwin implied that genes that dispose individuals to behave in altruistic ways could evolve if the genes contributed to the propagation of replicas of ­themselves possessed by kin—a process called “kin selection.”

The Rise and Fall of Group Selection Theory The idea of group selection has been highly controversial among evolutionary theorists. In 1962, Vero Wynne-Edwards published a book that accounted for a variety of animal behaviors in terms of group selection. In particular, he suggested that some species emit displays that enable them to estimate the density of their populations and then regulate their rate of reproduction to match the carrying capacity of their environments. Wynne-Edwards suggested that such altruistic behaviors could evolve through group selection, even if they lowered the individual fitness of the animals enacting them. Several eminent biologists took exception to Wynne-Edwards’s thesis. Although most critics acknowledged that group selection is theoretically possible under ideal conditions, they argued that it is unlikely that these conditions could be met in the real world. For altruism to evolve through group selection, groups would have to produce new generations of groups like themselves more rapidly than the individuals in the groups produced offspring like themselves. Even if these conditions were met, selfishness would inevitably prevail over altruism within the groups unless the groups disbanded and reconstituted themselves into new groups. Critics argued that few, if any, examples of group selection have been documented in the animal kingdom. As a result of such critiques, the idea of group selection fell into disrepute in biology.

The Resurrection of Group Selection In 1998, philosopher Elliot Sober and biologist David Sloan Wilson explained how the obstacles to group selection could be overcome. They listed five conditions under which the number of altruists could increase in a population while decreasing

Gustatory System

within groups. First, the population must be made up of many groups. Second, these groups must have varying quantities of altruistic and selfish individuals. Third, groups containing more altruists must be more fit than groups containing fewer altruists. Fourth, the groups must compete with each other and form new groups. Finally, the amount by which altruistic groups benefit must be greater than the amount by which selfish individuals benefit within groups. According to Sober and Wilson, groups of altruists could reap the benefits of altruism in contests with selfish groups, grow in size, and reconstitute themselves before the devastating effects of within-group selfishness prevailed.

The Group Selection Controversy Many prominent scientists, including Richard Dawkins, rejected the case for group selection. Dawkins argued that evolutionary change occurs at the level of the gene, because genes—unlike groups or organisms—have the ability to form exact copies of themselves, which are transported into future generations. Organisms come into play as “survival machines” to host genes and propagate them through reproduction. When a trait develops in an individual, it is a phenotypic product of its genes and evolves because it benefits the individual, not the individual’s group. Dawkins acknowledged that individuals may use groups to their advantage—fish may swim in schools for safety, lionesses may hunt in prides— but ultimately, these tactics benefit the individual. Dawkins endorsed kin selection, as it works at the level of the gene: When an individual helps a biological relative, the individual’s genes are, in effect, propagated. Kin selection works independently of group selection. However, not all evolutionary biologists agreed with Dawkins. For example, in 2007, the eminent biologist Edward O. Wilson, who had previously accounted for the evolution of altruism in terms of kin selection, concluded that group selection offered a superior account.

Different Perspectives on Evolution The heat generated by the controversy about group selection stems in large part from the qualitatively different perspectives from which theorists view evolution. Like reversible figures, the process

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of evolution can be viewed in different ways. Several biologists have demonstrated that models of group selection are mathematically equivalent to models of kin selection. In the end, the essence of these models is the idea that genes that dispose a unit of selection—such as individuals, families, or groups—to behave in altruistic ways can evolve when they confer biological benefits on comparable units of selection that possess copies of them. Dennis L. Krebs and Kaleda K. Denton See also Altruism; Altruism and Sociality; Animal Consciousness; Darwin, Charles; Hamilton, W. D.; Individuality Versus Collectivity; Mating Strategy Evolution and Development; Natural Selection; Sexual Selection

Further Readings Dawkins, R. (1989). The selfish gene (2nd ed.). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Sober, E., & Wilson, D. S. (1998). Unto others: The evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wilson, D. S., & Wilson, E. O. (2007, November). Survival of the selfless. New Scientist, 42–46. Wynne-Edwards, V. C. (1962). Animal dispersion in relation to social behavior. Edinburgh, Scotland: Oliver and Boyd.

Gustatory System The mammalian sense of gustation or taste detects chemicals via taste buds, the micro-organs embedded within select epithelia of the oral cavity and pharynx, to stimulate conscious perceptions of these chemicals. The gustatory system of humans is one of three analytical chemosensory systems of the upper airways, working in concert with olfaction (smell) and chemesthesis (chemical somesthesis—chemically induced skin and epithelial sensations). Collectively, taste, smell, and chemesthesis protect and inform people of the chemical composition of solids, liquids, and gases entering the mouth and nose and that may enter the gastrointestinal tract or the lungs if swallowed or inhaled. From there, they can be absorbed into the body, either sustaining life or injuring it.

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Taste is a principal sensory modality of most animals, together with olfaction, hearing, vision, and somatosensation. Chemical activation of taste bud cells via protein receptors on the cell surface (or via direct contact with internal signaling pathways) results in gustatory perceptions as well as reflexive motor, excretory, and secretory responses. This entry describes the categories of taste, the function of the gustatory system, and conscious and unconscious aspects of gustatory perception.

the color pairings red and green or blue and yellow, which cannot co-occur due to color opponency. Thus, it is possible to taste a food or beverage that is simultaneously bitter, sweet, sour, salty, and savory, for example, as in tomato ketchup.

Categories of Tastes

2. To generate perceived palatability, which directly influences liking and disliking and the decision to ingest or to reject the sampled food (usually associated with pleasure or displeasure) and simultaneously triggers brain-stem-driven motor reflexes of licking and accepting, as with sweet stimuli, or gaping and rejecting, as with strong bitter stimuli

Typically, the tasted compounds are associated with food items placed in the mouth and can be divided into three major categories of (a) macronutrients (carbohydrates, amino acids, and fats), (b) micronutrients (minerals and, potentially, vitamins), and (c) toxins from plant and animal foods. The four principal qualities of taste that are perceived are labeled salty, sweet, bitter, and sour and are elicited by prototypical stimuli: sodium salts, sugars, toxins, and acids at low pH, respectively. These four taste qualities have been recognized for well over 2,000 years, dating back to Aristotle. There has been growing agreement that most humans perceive a taste quality commonly labeled savory in English and umami in Japanese. It is an important taste in many soups, broths, and sauces (dating back to Roman garum or fish sauce), all of which tend to be high in free amino acids. There is also mounting evidence that two additional taste qualities exist. One is the salty or ioniclike, metallic taste labeled as sparry after the class of potassium and calcium minerals known as feldspar. This might be experienced, for example, in the nonsalty but briney taste of fresh raw oysters, which are high in ocean minerals. The second is the malty taste of short-chain glucose oligosaccharides (including maltose) that some people perceive. The latter two tastes are less noticeable in daily life and are not yet well understood. In addition, other chemicals, including free fatty acids and water (H2O), may activate the taste system but not elicit their own unique taste qualities. Why they may act on taste bud cells but not elicit a unique taste quality is discussed later. All these taste qualities are intercompatible and are not mutually exclusive, unlike sensations such as

Gustatory System Functions The gustatory system serves five principal roles: 1. To perceptually identify the presence of a variety of nutrients and toxins in foods

3. To integrate with other sensory modalities, especially olfaction and those of the oral epithelia, to create perceived flavors of foods or any orally sampled substances 4. To signal the digestive organs in the handling, digestion, and metabolic processing of nutrients and toxins 5. To integrate with the reward and punishment states arising from both sensory and metabolic signals to create learned associations between tastes and consequences, which, in turn, influence food’s subsequent palatability and future decisions of whether to ingest it

In addition, invertebrate animals also use the gustatory system to guide social interactions, such as aggregating, fighting, and mating. It is not clear at this time what role gustation plays in mammalian social interactions, but almost all mammals, including humans, lick conspecifics, thereby providing an opportunity for gustatory social signaling.

The Gustatory Perceptual System: Conscious Taste As already noted, the conscious perception of taste arises from oral-pharyngeal stimulation with chemicals that gives rise to taste sensations

Gustatory System

recognized as having distinct qualities. Other sensory qualities have been documented from oral foods and beverages, including warm, hot, cool, cold, piquant, burning, irritating, viscous, slippery, mouth coating, metallic, astringent, and others. These oral food sensations, however, are thought to originate from other sense modalities, especially epithelial somatosensations and olfactory sensations. They are not tastes. It is critical to note that a chemical within the upper airways can act on multiple modalities simultaneously. One of the best examples is l-menthol, which is added to candies, gums, and toothpastes. It is primarily added to elicit a minty odor, but the ­ same chemical is quite bitter tasting at the levels generally used. It is warming on the epithelia at low concentrations and cooling at higher concentrations; but it is also an irritant on the epithelia, mimicking a noxious stimulus. This phenomenon of multiple modalities being activated by a single stimulus may lead to the erroneous conclusion that qualities associated with the same physical stimulus, such as astringency and bitterness, originate from a common sensory modality. But minty odor is not a taste sensation, and bitter taste is not an odor. The Lower Senses: Die niederen Sinne

In the early 1900s, the German psychophysicist Emil von Skramlik classified the senses as occupying two realms—the higher senses and the lower senses, or Die niederen Sinne. The higher senses are vision and hearing. The lower senses of olfaction and gustation are ultimately skin- or epithelialbased systems and, therefore, all three systems are linked by their common matrix. When eating, they are stimulated simultaneously via the epithelia of the upper airways (nose, mouth, and throat), and come together perceptually to interact and form flavors. Furthermore, there are sensory qualities from these different epithelial-based modalities that blend—such as oral irritation from compounds like capsaicin or thiocyanates and bitterness from a variety of plant alkaloids such as quinine or nicotine—to create a “gray” perceptual region ­ wherein the two skin modalities merge and can enhance one another. Thus, the lower senses act in concert to give rise to the overall gestalt of what is

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affecting the skin and epithelia, such as a mouthful of apple pie, which is perceived as a single, ­integrated food entity. Qualia of Taste

Sensations from an oral stimulus result in ­multimodal inputs. Thus, it is difficult to taste a stimulus—for example, a bite of food or a drink— without also feeling its touch and its temperature in the mouth. Within the gustatory realm, the total subjective experience or “qualia” of taste are themselves rich, multifaceted perceptual states that may be analyzed into their component parts. Dimensionality of Taste Qualia Taste qualia can be subdivided into the attributes of quality, intensity, location, time, and affect. Quality is the most distinctive subfeature and is labeled salty, bitter, sour, sweet, savory, and so on. Many chemical stimuli elicit more than one taste quality at the same time—for example, the sweetness and bitterness elicited by the noncaloric sweetener saccharin. Intensity is the strength of the sensation. Typically, it is perceived as the strength of the taste quality. The taste sensations within the oral cavity also can be localized, similar to tactile sensations, such as touch. Thus, when a high-potency sweetener is perceived to be sweetest in the posterior oral cavity and sucrose sweetest in the anterior, it is the spatial dimension of these sensations that helps one distinguish between caloric and noncaloric sweeteners. Taste sensations also have duration and vary with time. For example, stimuli that continue to be ­perceived for long periods are said to linger or have an “aftertaste.” Last, taste stimuli elicit affective responses that may interact with the other traits of the taste qualia. Peripheral Coding of Taste Qualia: Independent or Combinatorial Coding Colored lights are not encoded by independent sensory channels. The current understanding of color coding suggests that the combination of activation of multiple input channels determines the color perceived. For taste, however, the understanding of coding is less clear. Because taste qualities can be elicited simultaneously, a higher degree of

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independence of those qualities exists than for color vision. The simplest explanation is that each quality of taste is coded by a fully independent sensory channel. There is, however, an abundance of evidence that tastes influence one another. Sodium salts inhibit bitter tastes, salty and sour stimuli enhance one another at low concentrations, salty and savory stimuli interact to enhance palatability, and many strong taste stimuli tend to suppress one another. Still, in favor of the independent coding argument, it is the case that within a taste quality, different stimuli can elicit the same taste; these stimuli are called metamers. One-to-one metameric matching among stimuli—that is, when different stimuli elicit the same taste—suggests that the quality of taste is encoded in a unidimensional way either at the receptor or higher in the gustatory system. Furthermore, the reduction of one quality of taste by adaptation or pharmacological inhibition tends not to affect other qualities of taste. For example, either adapting to a strong sugar solution or inhibiting the sugar receptor with the compound lactisole greatly diminishes the sweet taste of many sweeteners but has minimal effects on salty, sour, bitter, or savory taste stimuli. It is also important to recognize that the coding of tastes at all levels, from the receptors up to the highest cortical centers, includes the encoding of all the taste traits—including intensity, spatial, temporal, and even affective properties of the taste sensation—and not just taste qualities. Thus, when recording from or imaging neurons activated by taste stimuli, one should not assume that the neurons are involved in coding only quality or that they encode quality at all. Individual Differences Although most people can perceive all taste qualities, no one is sensitive to all the known taste chemicals. How sensitive one is to any given taste chemical is determined by the specific forms of the taste receptors. There are perhaps as many as 50 or 60 different taste receptor genes, and most of them are polymorphic. If a particular gene codes for a receptor that is poorly responsive to a taste compound, then there will be diminished ability to taste that compound.

Bitterness is the most variable of all the tastes. No two people, except perhaps identical twins, taste multiple bitter compounds to the same degree. The most famous examples are the compounds phenylthiocarbamide (PTC) and propylthiouracil (PROP), which some people taste very well and others have great difficulty tasting. Different Roles of the Anterior/Superior Versus Posterior/Inferior Oral Cavity

The anterior tongue and soft palate appear to play a different evaluative role than the posterior tongue and pharynx do. First, the anterior tongue and soft palate are used to sample foods and evaluate their contents in order to identify what is present. The tip of the tongue typically is dipped into or samples the food in question and is then retracted into the mouth and flicked or rubbed against the roof of the mouth, an action labeled “lip smacking.” This informs the decision to either continue with the stimulus (food) or to disengage. Second, once fully taken into the mouth, the posterior tongue and pharynx determine if the food will be swallowed or ejected. Curiously, pharyngeal taste receptors are stimulated only ­ ­during and after swallowing. Thus, rejection could occur only following pharyngeal stimulation via either metabolic action or gastric containment and regurgitation, and acceptance could be influenced by the facilitation of absorption and metabolism. This leads to the question of how taste inputs influence chemical transit and metabolism.

The Gustatory Autonomic System: Unconscious Taste Taste receptors are found in the cells of taste buds in the oral cavity and pharynx. These same receptors and transduction elements are also found in cells of the stomach, small intestine, large intestine, pancreas, and liver. They have even been identified throughout the upper and lower airways and the thyroid. Clearly, conscious taste is not perceived from the activation of taste receptors within the gastrointestinal tract, digestive organs, or lungs. They have other functions, such as reflexive autonomic and metabolic signaling and motor reflexes.

Gustatory System

There is also mounting evidence that the gustatory system within the oral cavity not only signals conscious taste, but gives rise to unconscious autonomic signaling. For example, nutrients, such as carbohydrates, elicit a sweet or malty taste and also initiate early pre-absorptive insulin responses that anticipate the rise in plasma glucose. Sodium salts elicit a salty taste and also reduce the volume of urine produced, presumably to maintain plasma osmolarity. And strong bitter-tasting stimuli have been shown to alter gastric emptying. Although fat and water do not stimulate distinctive taste qualities of their own in humans, there is evidence that they can elicit autonomic responses. For example, oral fat stimuli that are not swallowed have been shown to elevate plasma triglycerides and to increase plasma anandamide levels, whereas orally introduced artificial fats do not elicit these responses. Paul A. S. Breslin See also Eating and Drinking; Olfactory System; Sensory Disorders; Sensory Transduction

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Further Readings Breslin, P. A. S. (2013). An evolutionary perspective on food and human taste. Current Biology, 23, R409–R418. Breslin, P. A. S., Beauchamp, G. K., & Pugh, E. N., Jr. (1996). Monogeusia for fructose, glucose, sucrose and maltose. Perception & Psychophysics, 58, 327–341. Lim, J., & Green, B. G. (2007). The psychophysical relationship between bitter taste and burning sensation: Evidence of qualitative similarity. Chemical Senses, 32, 31–39. Mandel, A. L., & Breslin, P. A. S. (2012). High endogenous salivary amylase activity is associated with improved glycemic homeostasis following starch ingestion in adults. Journal of Nutrition, 142, 853–858. Mattes, R. D. (2011). Oral fatty acid signaling and intestinal lipid processing: Support and supposition. Physiology and Behavior, 105, 27–35. Shikata, H., McMahon, D. B. T., & Breslin, P. A. S. (2000). Psychophysics of taste lateralization on anterior tongue. Perception and Psychophysics, 62, 684–694. Spector, A. C. (2000). Linking gustatory neurobiology to behavior in vertebrates. Neuroscience Biobehavioral Reviews, 24, 391–416.

H only gradually with repeated experience. As a result, habits are little influenced by single episodes of counterhabitual behavior or current goals. However, goals can be important in the formation of habits. In fact, habits typically are the residue of past-goal pursuit. Goals often promote initial repetition of a behavior in a given context to allow habitual associations to form over time. The insensitivity of habits to current goals and evaluations was illustrated in a study of habitual popcorn eating among movie theater patrons. Half the participants received fresh popcorn while the other half received week-old, stale popcorn. On average, participants agreed that the fresh popcorn tasted good and the stale tasted bad. However, despite disliking it, patrons with strong habits of eating popcorn at the movies and who received stale popcorn ate just as much as those who received fresh popcorn. Current evaluations were largely irrelevant for those participants whose behavior was automatically cued by a strong habit. There are conditions in which current goals and attitudes may influence habit performance. When people have sufficient self-regulatory resources, or willpower, they may be able to monitor and thereby inhibit their unwanted habits in order to perform more desired behaviors. Yet under many everyday conditions, people do not have the ability or motivation to consciously monitor behavior. For example, when people are distracted or not thinking about using a new product they recently purchased, they are more likely to fall back into old habits and fail to use the product despite their intentions to do so.

Habits Habits are an essential part of daily life. It seems that nearly everyone has at one time or another struggled to break a “bad” habit or form a “good” one (e.g., stop snacking on the couch or start flossing each day, respectively). In fact, diary studies have shown that nearly half of a person’s everyday behaviors may be habitual. The term habit has been interpreted in various ways within the research literature, including sometimes being used as a general term for automaticity. Habits are learned. They develop when similar responses are repeated in a stable context. Through repeated experience, associations gradually form between features of the context and the performance of a response, and these context–response links are stored in procedural memory. Once strong associations have formed, simply perceiving the context activates the associated response in memory. Context cues may include environmental factors (e.g., location or time of day), internal states (e.g., mood), interpersonal relationships (e.g., significant others), and temporal cues (e.g., the preceding actions in a sequence). This entry discusses the relationship between goals and h ­ abits, the neural foundations of habits, measuring the strength of habits, forming new habits, and ­overcoming unwanted habits.

Goals and Habit Performance Habit learning proceeds through a slow, incremental process in which association strength changes 399

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Similarly, when people do not think deliberatively, they may rely solely on routinized knowledge to guide their navigation through a maze task, even when this strategy does not use available shortcuts. Finally, when willpower is low, habits may emerge despite current intentions. This effect was demonstrated in a field study of habitual social drinkers. These individuals consumed more alcohol on days when they had decreased ­self-­regulatory control.

Neural Foundations of Habits Habit learning is primarily supported by neural activity localized in the basal ganglia. As people form new habit associations, two functional pathways are particularly important. The associative loop, which links the prefrontal cortex to the caudate nucleus and the anterior putamen, supports working memory and goal-directed action. The sensorimotor loop, which links the somatosensory and motor cortices to the medial and posterior putamen, supports the stimulus–response associations underlying habits. As behaviors are repeated and context–response associations are strengthened, behavioral control shifts from the associative loop to the sensorimotor loop. A study of instrumental learning for food rewards demonstrated the functional differentiation of intentional and habitual behavior systems. Participants pressed a button in response to an image presented on a computer screen. If the button was pressed at the correct time, then participants received a food reward, either chips or candy. After completing the final training session, participants were asked to continue to consume either the chips or the candy until the food item was no longer appealing. Then they received a final opportunity to perform the button press task. The participants presumably had responded automatically to the image as a result of training and continued to respond for the food reward despite not wanting to eat more of it. Their continued responding regardless of contrary intentions provides behavioral evidence of habit formation. Participants showed more activity in the areas of the basal ganglia associated with the sensorimotor loop, indicating that response control had indeed shifted with task repetition from goal-directed control to being habit driven.

Measuring Habit Strength Habit strength has been measured in multiple ways by researchers. Traditional measures captured only the frequency with which a specific behavior was performed in the past. Frequency alone, however, neglects context and does not capture the automatic, cognitive component of habit performance. Newer measures of habit strength often incorporate assessments of context stability. Because strongly habitual responses arise from frequent repetition in a stable context, this approach separately assesses reports of the frequency of performance and reports of the stability of the performance context (e.g., location, time of day, or whether others are present). Strong habits are considered to be highly frequent behaviors that take place in highly stable contexts. Lower ­frequency responses and responses in unstable contexts may be categorized as weaker habits or nonhabits. Another popular measure, the Self-Report Habit Index (SRHI), conceptualizes habit strength in terms of response frequency and the subjective experience of automaticity. This 12-item scale is based on the idea that people repeat habitual behaviors automatically, and the scale items address aspects of the automaticity experience (e.g., Behavior X is something I do automatically or I do without having to consciously remember or I do without thinking, etc.) in addition to performance frequency. Including this automaticity component discriminates habits as (a) behaviors that occur frequently but automatically from (b) other behaviors that may be performed frequently but intentionally (e.g., characteristically eating salad for dinner despite craving the pizza one’s partner is eating). Some researchers have focused solely on the automaticity component of habit strength and removed the frequency measure from the SRHI or have used the Self-Report Behavioral Automaticity Index (SRBAI), a subscale of four subjective experience items taken from the SRHI. By focusing on the automaticity component of habit strength, these measures assess the psychological mechanisms that produce a ­ ­behavior instead of assessing patterns of performance ­frequency and stability. Nonetheless, such

Habits

measures may fail to discriminate habits from other types of experienced automaticity.

Forming New Habits People often struggle when attempting to incorporate new behaviors into their daily routines. For instance, successful health behavior change involves not just the short-term alteration of diet, exercise, and substance use but the long-term maintenance of healthful behaviors, including the formation of new, healthy habits, such as eating more fruits and vegetables or exercising regularly. One representative study investigated the development of habits of eating, drinking, and exercise behaviors over a 12-week period. Participants selected a behavior from one of these categories and tried to perform it under the same circumstances (i.e., in a stable context) each day for 12 weeks. Participants completed (a) a report of whether they had performed the behavior and (b) the SRHI each day. Repetition during the early weeks resulted in greater increases in the perceived automaticity of a behavior than did later repetition. In addition, individuals differed in how quickly they acquired the perception of automaticity in their selected tasks, ranging from 18 to 254 days, with an average of 66 days. Longer periods of repetition may have been required for morecomplex health behaviors to become habitual. Other research on the formation of health ­habits has examined the factors that contribute to successful habit development. For instance, an intervention emphasizing the effects of behavioral intentions on performing a new exercise routine and on perceived control over exercise performance was effective in promoting exercise habits over a 5-week period. Those participants who exercised regularly throughout the initial 5 weeks were more likely to continue to exercise for the remaining 7 weeks of the study; that is, they ­maintained the habits they had formed. Along with forming simple intentions to exercise, further specifying the when, where, and how details of the intended actions may be useful for promoting physical activity habits. In addition to intentions, a sense of self-efficacy in the face of setbacks can be crucial for maintenance of exercise habits. One study of runners over a 2-year period found that particularly for those who experienced

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lapses in their running schedules, recovery self-efficacy predicted long-term maintenance of ­ running habits. It seems that strong behavioral intentions—at times bolstered by specific action plans—can yield sufficient response repetition to form initial habit associations. Maintenance of these habits, however, relies on context consistency and, in some cases, sufficient self-efficacy to assist in resuming the behavior after a lapse.

Overcoming Unwanted Habits Intentions might be important for the formation of new habits, but intentions appear to have ­limited influence once habits have formed. A meta-­analytic review of 47 behavioral intervention studies of whether participants’ intentions changed their behavior depended on the habit strength of that behavior. When intentions involved only occasionally performed, nonhabitual behavior, such as class enrollment, behavior changed. However, when intentions involved behaviors that could be habitual—for example, exercising or using seat ­ belts regularly—an intention to change was less likely to produce behavioral change. Instead of trying to change habits by means of intentions, greater success might come from addressing the habit mechanism itself. That is, people could break the link between the context cue and the response by altering the cue in some way. Habit discontinuity studies examine the effects of naturally occurring context changes that disrupt individuals’ habits. One study examined college transfer students’ habits of exercise, reading the newspaper, and watching TV. When the context at the new campus was similar to that at their previous campus, students were likely to continue performing their habitual behaviors. However, when the context changed substantially, transfer students’ current goals and intentions determined which behaviors they performed. Because habitual responses are directly linked to their triggering cue, changing the context and thereby disrupting this association frees individuals to act more successfully from their intentions. Successful habit change efforts also could involve taking control of environmental cues as a means to enact change. Studies by Brian Wansink and colleagues have demonstrated that the

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contexts associated with food powerfully determine what and how people eat. By modifying the structure of these contexts (e.g., putting food out of reach and out of sight or serving only small portions), people can alter their habitual eating patterns. Another promising approach to changing a habit is to use strategies to alter the habitual, automatic components of performance. In a follow-up to the study of popcorn eating described earlier, participants with strong habits consumed stale and fresh popcorn, just as before. However, this time they were obliged to eat the popcorn with their nondominant hand, thus reducing the automaticity of the behavior. Unlike in the original study, when the popcorn was stale, in this case, participants avoided it. Eating with their nondominant hand disrupted the automatic-cuing process, and participants behaved according to their evaluations (Eww!). Whether habit associations are disrupted incidentally or intentionally in this way, people may be able to take advantage of these windows of opportunity for change, once again act according to current intentions, and perhaps, start down the path to forming new habits. Jennifer S. Labrecque See also Classical Conditioning; Consciousness and the Unconscious; Self-Control; Social Neuroscience; Stimulus Control

Further Readings Danner, U. N., Aarts, H., & de Vries, N. K. (2008). Habit vs. intention in the prediction of future behaviour: The role of frequency, context stability and mental accessibility of past behaviour. British Journal of Social Psychology, 47, 245–265. http://dx.doi.org/ doi:10.1348/014466607X230876 Lally, P., van Jaarsveld, C. H. M., Potts, H. W. W., & Wardle, J. (2010). How are habits formed: Modelling habit formation in the real world. European Journal of Social Psychology, 40, 998–1009. http://dx.doi .org/10.1002/ejsp.674 Neal, D. T., Wood, W., Labrecque, J. S., & Lally, P. (2012). How do habits guide behavior? Perceived and actual triggers of habits in daily life. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48, 492–498. http://dx.doi.org/10 .1016/j.jesp.2011.10.011

Neal, D. T., Wood, W., Wu, M., & Kurlander, D. (2011). The pull of the past: When do habits persist despite conflict with motives? Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 37, 1428–1437. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/ 0146167211419863 Sobal, J., & Wansink, B. (2007). Kitchenscapes, tablescapes, platescapes, and foodscapes: Influences of microscale built environments on food intake. Environment and Behavior, 39(1), 124–142. http:// dx.doi.org/10.1177/0013916506295574 Wood, W., & Neal, D. T. (2007). A new look at habits and the habit-goal interface. Psychological Review, 114, 843–863. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X .114.4.843 Yin, H. H., & Knowlton, B. J. (2006). The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 7, 464–476. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/ nrn1919

Hamilton, W. D. William Donald (“Bill”) Hamilton (1936–2000) was an English biologist who is best known for his theory of inclusive fitness, which formalized how natural selection acts on traits that are “social” in the sense that they have effects on other parties besides the trait-bearing individuals themselves. The theory, which constituted Hamilton’s PhD thesis at the University of London, has been of great interest to psychologists and other social scientists trying to integrate their fields with biological understandings of social evolution. This entry reviews Hamilton’s theory of inclusive fitness and its contribution to the field of psychology.

Inclusive Fitness Theory In evolutionary biology, the Darwinian “fitness” of an individual or a trait refers to its intrinsic capacity to increase its representation in subsequent generations. It is thus the quantity that natural selection tends to maximize, and every evolved trait should, in principle, be explicable in terms of its contributions to the fitness of those with the trait. Since Charles Darwin, biologists had equated fitness with personal reproduction: The attributes that enable individuals to produce the most

Hamilton, W. D.

descendants are obviously the attributes that will come to prevail numerically. However, as Darwin himself realized, this interpretation of natural selection could not readily explain cases in which animals apparently fail to maximize reproduction, helping others instead. Most female ants, for example, work to help their “queen” reproduce, and never lay an egg of their own. This is an extreme example, but helping others at some potential cost to oneself is common, and all forms of costly help raise the same theoretical “problem of altruism”: How can such behavior arise and persist in creatures shaped by natural selection? In 1964, Hamilton solved this conundrum by recognizing that selection favors social action that facilitates the replication of the actor’s particular genes, regardless of whether those genetic replicas reside in the actor’s descendants or in other kin. Fitness must therefore be defined more inclusively, to encompass not only effects on reproduction but also “nepotistic” effects on other relatives, who have an above-average probability of carrying copies of the actor’s genes. More specifically, according to “Hamilton’s rule,” altruistic action that imposes a cost (c) on the actor’s expected reproduction can nevertheless increase under natural selection if rb > c, where r is a measure of the genetic relatedness of the actor to a beneficiary of his or her action, and b is the expected reproductive benefit that the latter gains thereby. (Another common name for inclusive fitness theory is kin selection, but this term has engendered confusion, particularly with respect to whether “kin selection” parallels “natural selection” in referring to an evolutionary process or instead refers to the nepotistic discrimination that is an expected consequence of that evolutionary process.) Most contemporary students of animal behavior consider Hamilton’s theory the cornerstone of understanding how social behavior evolves. So do evolutionary psychologists who have used the theory to predict, explain, and further explore the circumstances under which people help or harm one another.

Other Contributions of Relevance to Psychology Social evolution remained a focus of Hamilton’s work after 1964, and three of his subsequent

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theoretical contributions have particular relevance for psychologists. Why do parents sometimes invest resources inequitably between daughters and sons? Assume that the sexes garner equal shares of the parenthood of future generations. If either sex chronically received less parental investment (PI) in total, that sex would provide more long-term fitness per unit of PI and thus be less costly. This would ­ create selection pressure for parents to reallocate more resources to the better investment, thus driving the sex ratio of investment back to unity. By this reasoning, the only “evolutionarily stable” parental strategy is equal investment in daughters and sons, and this was the prevailing theory. But in 1967, Hamilton described cases in nature where PI in the two sexes remains highly unequal and explained them as resulting from the fact that the marginal fitness gains from incremental investment may differ between the sexes. This insight paved the way for the influential theory of Robert Trivers, explaining why preference for sons is sometimes correlated with rank or status, and for much further work on discriminative PI in humans, mainly by anthropologists. In another highly influential paper in 1981, Robert Axelrod and Hamilton outlined conditions that provide an escape from the social trap of a “Prisoner’s Dilemma.” In this game’s theoretical paradigm, mutually beneficial cooperation can be thwarted by individual incentives to defect, but Axelrod and Hamilton’s analysis showed that cooperative play can be stabilized when interactions with familiar acquaintances recur with no predictable end point and when defection is then punished. Much theoretical and empirical work has built on their insights. In the 1970s, the idea that mate choice can evolve to recruit “good genes” for one’s offspring was rejected by most biologists, on the grounds that “good genes” would soon become universal, obviating selection for choosiness. In 1982, Hamilton and Marlene Zuk proposed, however, that the coevolution of parasites and their hosts could maintain the genetic benefits of mate choice because the particular genes that promote health would vary over generations. This theory launched another fruitful field of research.

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For these and other accomplishments, Hamilton has often been called the most important evolutionary theorist since Darwin. For a fuller account of his career, contributions, and eccentricities, see Alan Grafen’s 2004 article in the Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society of London. Martin Daly See also Close Relationships; Cooperation; Culture and Social Relations; Evolutionary Psychological Perspectives on Human Nature, Critical Evaluation of; Human Nature; Mating Strategy Evolution and Development; Natural Selection; Parent-Offspring Relations

Further Readings Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation. Science, 211, 1390–1396. Buss, D. M. (Ed.). (2015). Handbook of evolutionary psychology (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Wiley. Grafen, A. (2004). William Donald Hamilton. Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society of London, 50, 109–132. Hamilton, W. D. (1964a). The genetical evolution of social behaviour: I. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7, 1–16. Hamilton, W. D. (1964b). The genetical evolution of social behaviour: II. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7, 17–52. Hamilton, W. D. (1967). Extraordinary sex ratios. Science, 156, 477–488. Hamilton, W. D., & Zuk, M. (1982). Heritable true fitness and bright birds: A role for parasites? Science, 218, 384–387. Krupp, D. B., DeBruine, L. M., & Jones, B. C. (2011). Cooperation and conflict in the light of kin recognition systems. In C. A. Salmon & T. K. Shackelford (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of evolutionary family psychology (pp. 345–364). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Summers, K., & Crespi, B. (Eds.). (2013). Human social evolution: The foundational works of Richard D. Alexander. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Trivers, R. L., & Willard, D. E. (1973). Natural selection of parental ability to vary the sex ratio. Science, 179, 90–92. West, S. A., & Gardner, A. (2013). Adaptation and inclusive fitness. Current Biology, 23, R577–R584.

Health Psychology Health psychology is primarily concerned with the role of psychological processes in physical health, illness, and health care. It is a very broad field that has made use of a wide variety of models both for explaining variation in health-related behavior and for understanding the causal links between psychological factors and health outcomes. In addition to their explanatory function, these models are increasingly used as the basis for psychological interventions aimed at changing behavior and improving health outcomes. Because the field of health psychology is so broad, the discussion of models in this entry is limited to overviews of models and approaches that have been widely used in three areas—namely, health behavior, illness-related behavior, and stress and health.

Models of Health Behavior Behavior has major impacts on one’s health, and a number of distinct categories of health behavior have been described. These include health-­ maintaining behaviors (e.g., regular exercise, good dietary choice, etc.), protective and preventive behaviors (e.g., brushing and flossing teeth, wearing a cycling helmet, undergoing physical exams, etc.), and risk behaviors (e.g., smoking, excessive alcohol use, etc.). Many epidemiological studies have demonstrated the importance of these behaviors in determining long-term health outcomes, and the selected models described here have been developed to explain why people do or don’t engage in these behaviors. A major emphasis in these models is on the role of one’s beliefs in influencing motivation, but there is increasing interest in factors influencing behavioral enaction and in the role of feelings and more habitual processes. The Health Belief Model

The health belief model (HBM) was developed to explain why people often fail to adopt disease prevention recommendations. It proposes that the likelihood of someone engaging in a health behavior, such as screening for cervical cancer, is a function of the person’s beliefs about the potential

Health Psychology

health threat of the disease as well as beliefs about the costs and benefits of the recommended behavior. Threat beliefs are based on a combination of the person’s beliefs about the seriousness of the health threat and one’s own susceptibility to it. Thus, according to the HBM, a health behavior is more likely to be carried out if someone not only perceives the possible disease outcome as threatening but also perceives that the benefits of the recommended behavior outweigh the costs of ­ engaging in it. Typically, a cue, such as an invitation to participate in screening, is needed to activate these beliefs. Other factors, such as motivation, have been added to the original model. Although the HBM has been around for some time, it is not particularly successful in predicting behavior because the variables in the model tend to correlate only weakly with behavior. The Theory of Planned Behavior

The theory of planned behavior (TPB) is a general model that has been developed to describe and explain the links between beliefs, attitudes, and a wide range of health and other behaviors. It proposes that the formation of an intention precedes and predicts behavior and that intentions are determined by three factors: attitudes toward the behavior, subjective norms (i.e., what others think about the behavior), and perceived behavioral control (i.e., the extent to which the person perceives that she or he has control over the behavior). Thus, according to the TPB, a health behavior, such as exercising, is more likely to occur if someone has a positive attitude about exercise, believes that others think it is a good thing to do, and is confident in his or her own ability to do it. The TPB has generally been found to be better than the HBM at predicting and explaining a range of health behaviors, but the three core variables are better at predicting intention than actual behavior. As a result, researchers have added other variables, such as affective attitudes and anticipated emotions (e.g., how one thinks one will feel if one doesn’t engage in the behavior) to increase its explanatory power. Also, for intervention purposes, some researchers have focused on additional factors that increase the likelihood of turning intentions into actual behaviors. These include implementation

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intentions, which are behavioral plans that specify where, when, and how an intention will be turned into an action. It has been shown that in addition to having positive attitudes and intentions, individuals who have also made action plans are more likely to engage in the recommended health behavior. Social Cognitive Theory

Social cognitive theory (SCT) was developed as a general model that emphasizes the role of selfefficacy beliefs and outcome expectancies as the core predictors of health behavior. Self-efficacy beliefs are very similar to the perceived behavioral control construct in the TPB in that they describe the person’s level of confidence in his or her own ability to carry out a particular behavior. Outcome expectancies relate to the belief that the behavior (e.g., exercising) will result in positive health outcomes (e.g., feeling better, remaining healthier, etc.). Not only is self-efficacy a consistent predictor of a range of health behaviors, but it has also been shown to be important in other health psychology contexts, such as recovery from illness and coping with stress. Stage Models

Whereas the models outlined previously assume that health behavior is determined primarily by particular combinations of beliefs and attitudes, a number of models propose that individuals must pass through a number of discrete stages in order to engage in behavior change. The best known of these is the transtheoretical model, which describes five stages, beginning with not even thinking about the behavior (precontemplation) to beginning to consider it (contemplation) and then toward increasing levels of engagement with it (preparation, action, and maintenance). Although this model has been widely used and has intuitive appeal, it has also been criticized for the lack of specificity and predictive power of the separate stages. Nevertheless, the idea that health behavior is achieved through different stages or types of psychological process has received support in other models. A good example is the health action process approach, which makes a useful distinction

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Health Psychology

between pre-intentional motivation processes that lead to a behavioral intention, and postintentional volition processes that give rise to the planning, carrying out, and maintenance of a health behavior.

Theories of Illness-Related Behavior

beliefs about its likely timeline (e.g., acute or chronic), consequences (e.g., effects on an individual’s life), and the extent to which it can be controlled or cured. These core representations directly influence how an illness threat is responded to and predict the coping procedures undertaken to tackle the health problem.

Illness Perception

Help-Seeking Behavior

The study of illness-related behaviors focuses on understanding the psychological and behavioral responses to physical health problems. Several theoretical models have been proposed to help explain illness-related behaviors and often serve as the basis of psychological interventions used in clinical health psychology. One of the most widely applied models is the common-sense model of self-regulation (CS-SRM). The CS-SRM provides a framework for how individuals attempt to make sense of a health threat (e.g., a symptom or a diagnosis). They do so by developing cognitive and emotional representations in response to threat that then activate behavioral procedures for tackling the problem (e.g., taking pain relief). These specific coping procedures are then appraised for their effectiveness (e.g., has the pain decreased?). If the health problem has persisted or even worsened, alternative coping procedures may be adopted (e.g., seeking medical attention), or the initial representation of the health threat may be altered (e.g., “This apparent headache has lasted longer than I expected and has not improved with pain relief. Maybe it is a more serious condition than I thought.”). Central to the CS-SRM are the individual’s own representations of the health threat—that is, structured perceptions about the problem and its nature. Following the detection of a symptom or receiving a diagnosis, individuals seek to affirm an illness identity. For example, if physical symptoms are present, individuals will attempt to link these symptoms and provide them with a “label.” Alternatively, if given a label (e.g., a diagnosis), individuals will attempt to identify symptoms congruent with it. Once an identity is established, individuals typically seek causal explanations of the problem (e.g., lifestyle factors or inherited factors) in addition to

The CS-SRM can help explain how individuals perceive symptoms and enact help-seeking behaviors. Other approaches to understanding helpseeking behaviors include dispositional factors (e.g., gender differences or personality) and factors related to the health care system. According to the health care system approach, the identification of problems concerning access to health care influences help-seeking decisions. Five access-related domains have been proposed: availability (e.g., the extent of existing services), accessibility (e.g., the location of the service), affordability (e.g., costs of the service), accommodation (e.g., times when the service is available), and acceptability (e.g., attitudes about the service provider’s personal and professional characteristics). Psychosocial approaches to help seeking include symptom perception and appraisal, illness perceptions, and attitudes toward use of health care services. The three-stage model provides a framework for the help-seeking process. The first stage (appraisal delay) asserts that individuals evaluate physical symptoms and decide whether they are suggestive of an underlying condition. The second stage (illness delay) consists of appraising whether the illness requires professional attention. Finally, a decision is made whether help seeking has benefits that outweigh the costs, which is termed utilization delay. Utilization delay has been refined further by the notion that once an individual has decided to seek help, he or she then plans whether to actually undertake the behavior (behavioral delay), make an appointment with a health care professional (scheduling delay), and finally, begin treatment (treatment delay). Adherence to Treatment

Following the decision to seek help from a health professional, receiving a diagnosis, and

Health Psychology

starting a relevant treatment, there is a further need to then adhere to the advised treatment regimen. The extent to which patients adhere to treatment is often problematic, with approximately half of patients failing to take a prescribed medicine as recommended, for example. Treatment nonadherence can be defined as either unintentional (e.g., forgetting, a lack of understanding, or physical or mental impairment) or intentional (e.g., a conscious decision not to take the treatment). According to the CS-SRM, deciding whether to take a particular treatment is a coping procedure determined by underlying illness perceptions. Considerable attention has been given to the ways in which individuals perceive their treatment. According to the necessity concerns model, treatment beliefs play a critical role in influencing intentional nonadherence. Perceived necessity refers to beliefs about the need to take the treatment in order to manage or improve the condition, whereas perceived concerns reflect worries about taking the treatment and its harmful long-term side effects. Patients are more likely to adhere to treatment if they hold strong beliefs about treatment necessity, whereas intentional nonadherence is reported more often when individuals have greater perceived concerns.

Psychological Theory, Stress, and Health Stress is a complex construct that is difficult to define. Researchers have interpreted it as a “stressor,” or challenge to the individual, as well as the emotional response to an event. The link between stress and health can be understood from two perspectives: as a risk factor for disease or as a consequence of having a disease. Stress as a Risk Factor for Disease

Stress has been associated with negative outcomes across a range of diseases. However, no single theory can predict whether an individual will experience stress in response to an event and then, as a consequence, go on to develop disease. The absence of a single theory is partly because of the difficulty of demonstrating a causal link and identifying the mediating mechanisms responsible for that link. The stress diathesis model

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provides a framework for understanding the potential risk factors involved (e.g., vulnerability to disease or physiological stress reactivity) but not the details of how they interact. Instead of providing an o ­verarching theory, researchers have focused on specifics, such as associations between the stress hormones and immunological changes or linking life events to disease incidence. Biobehavioral Links Between Stress and Disease

There are two pathways by which stress can influence health. The physiological changes associated with the neuroendocrine stress (the “fight or flight”) response have a direct impact on the body. How the individual behaves in order to cope with stress (e.g., smokes more) causes physiological changes that may lead to disease. The direct-route concept builds on the early work of Hans Selye, whereby if fight or flight is perpetuated, it has progressive, negative physiological consequences ­ (the general adaptation theory). Bruce McEwen further developed this idea and used the concept of ­“allostatic load” to describe the physiological price of adaptation to stress. Others have described how these “biobehavioral” routes interplay in different health contexts, such as surgical recovery (see Figure 1). Psychoneuroimmunology (PNI) researchers have concentrated on the “bio”—that is, detecting bidirectional links between the neuroendocrine stress response and immune factors. A substantial body of evidence supports the proposal that chronic stress is associated with dysregulation of the immune system, but it is more difficult to connect the “micro” immune changes with clinically relevant changes in disease. Wound healing, vaccination response, and susceptibility to viral infection are conditions in which stress-induced immune modification has been connected to clinically meaningful change. Despite the fact that stress has been shown to increase maladaptive health behaviors, the potential impact of these behaviors on the immune system has attracted comparatively little research. It generally is understood that they compound the negative impact already being delivered by neuroendocrine pathways.

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Health Psychology

HEALTH BEHAVIORS; HEALTH STATUS

DECISION TO HAVE SURGERY

PSYCHOLOGICAL STATUS

ANESTHETIC

TYPE/EXTENT OF SURGERY

IMMUNE FUNCTION

WOUND HEALING

PAIN

NEUROENDOCRINE FUNCTION

Figure 1 A Biobehavioral Model of the Psychological, Behavioral, and Biological Pathways That Influence Wound Healing: The Central Short-Term Outcome in Recovery From Surgery Source: Kiecolt-Glaser, Page, Marucha, MacCallum, and Glaser (1998).

Stress as a Consequence of Having a Disease

Living with a chronic condition can reduce psychological well-being. The transactional model of stress (TMS) has been used to explain why stress occurs and to understand coping with a disease. According to the model, stress results from a twopart appraisal process: primary appraisal in which an event is assessed for its potential to be a threat (“Am I in trouble or being benefited, now or in the future, and in what way?”) and secondary appraisal, wherein viable resources, personal and environmental, are assessed to meet the demands of the situation (“What, if anything, can be done about it?”). Incongruence between demands and resources evokes a stress response. TMS is a dynamic model with processes occurring in parallel whereby the evaluation of demands is influenced by the appraisal of resources available for coping. Coping can refer to anything that is done to address is the problem of exceeding one’s resources. Similar to the CS-SRM, the TMS proposes that individuals cope with stress in two ways: by doing things that reduce distress (emotion-focused coping) or things that tackle the source of stress

(problem-focused coping). The latter is best suited for controllable stressors and the former for those beyond control. Using the “wrong” strategy can result in distress and may account for poor adjustment to chronic disease. Apart from describing coping with the stress of ill health, the model does not provide details linking stress and health or of the multidimensional nature of the stress response. There is no overall theory that combines the psychological processes that evoke the stress response with the biobehavioral processes underpinning the link between stress and health. Future research may start to connect the two. For example, the perseverative cognition hypothesis proposes that cognition allows the effects of past events to linger and stress responses to future events to occur, thereby increasing exposure to chronic stress and chronic physiological activation.

Future Possibilities In this overview, a number of core areas of health psychology have been described, together with a selection of the main models that have been used. Because there is overlap between these different

Heightened Consciousness

areas, there are also similarities in the models and the ways in which they focus on the role of cognitions and emotions in their attempts to explain variation in behavior and in health outcomes. Because health psychology is a relatively new and fast-moving field, there is now considerable scope not only for evaluating and comparing models but also for developing new and better ones. John Weinman, Joseph Chilcot, and Jessica Walburn See also Behavioral Health; Research Methods in Health Psychology; Social Factors in Health

Further Readings French, D., Vedhara, K., Kaptein, A. A., & Weinman, J. (Eds.). (2010). Health psychology. London, England: John Wiley. Kiecolt-Glaser, J. K., Page, G. G., Marucha, P. T., MacCallum, R. C., & Glaser, R. (1998). Psychological influences on surgical recovery: Perspectives from psychoneuroimmunology. American Psychologist, 53, 1209–1218. Sutton, S., Baum, A., & Johnston, M. (Eds.). (2005). The SAGE handbook of health psychology. London, England: Sage.

Heightened Consciousness Heightened consciousness has become a common expression in daily conversations, but it expresses a number of different concepts depending on the meaning of the speaker and is related to other phrases or terms that have slightly ­different connotations. This entry explores the different meanings of the term heightened ­consciousness and similar phrases in regard to personal development. The phrase may merely refer to a state of increased alertness, as when one feels endangered or on the verge of an exciting breakthrough. One may also use the phrase to indicate a sense of new understanding or awakening to a new perspective; expanded consciousness is used in this same way, without the vertical implications. One may make reference to getting high or being on a high, both implying simply feeling good, although the former

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also hints that externally supplied chemicals are involved. Politically, certain groups such as ­feminists or critical theorists (for example, Paulo Freire) have written of consciousness-raising, meaning to awaken to the oppression that one has been conditioned to accept. Another meaning of heightened consciousness refers to breaking through the habitual patterns or limitations of one’s ego or self-concept to new awareness. Beyond these meanings is the use of the phrase to express transcending the isolation of one’s inner self in a mystical experience in which self and world or self and God are united.

Stages of Development It is generally assumed that infants can make little differentiation between self and world, and it is this differentiation that marks a first, early stage. The discovery of one’s body, motion, and control of the environment soon follows. However, it is only when the toddler begins to interact (play) cooperatively with others that a sense of self and other emerges. This is soon followed by the beginnings of language acquisition late in the second year, enabling the child to refer to himself or herself as me or I (the so-called mirror stage) and to gain self-consciousness around 5 years old when narrative memories usually begin. Cooperative play and shared intentionality are necessary for language development and cultural integration, so the child who enters this stage is able to learn with others and to gain a similar understanding of the culture–world in which he or she is immersed. As children mature, they gain independence, the ability to control their impulses and to think in the abstract more freely. At this point, they are usually thought to enter adulthood and guide themselves (and significant others) through a lifetime. Except in the more mundane definitions previously mentioned (e.g., being on a high or expanding consciousness with knowledge), most widely cited developmental psychologists do not postulate a heightened-consciousness stage that transcends or at least decenters the mature ego. The bestknown stage theory is Jean Piaget’s, but his final stage—“formal operations,” meaning abstract thought—begins when the child is 11 or 12 years old, and no further cognitive stages are ahead.

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Heightened Consciousness

Albert Bandura views the individual as having achieved full personhood with adult self-efficacy— that is, confident decision making. Erik Erikson’s stages of psychosocial identity may suggest a sort of heightened consciousness when one enters old age and fully embraces one’s past, but this is more like the generalized wisdom sometimes attributed to the elderly. There are notable exceptions, however, as well as whole areas of thought beyond developmental psychology in which such higher states of awareness are the purpose of life. Lawrence Kohlberg, who modeled his early moral stages of development on Piaget’s, went further than Piaget in positing a postconventional sixth stage wherein individuals use abstract thought to take the ­ ­perspective of another and possibly stand against the conventions of their own culture. Kohlberg then moved into controversial territory by speculating a last, seventh stage only a rare few ever attain that he called transcendental morality—that is, the discovery of universal morality, which sounds much like the highest stage of attainment of the philosopher–king in Plato’s Republic. Similarly, Abraham Maslow’s well-known hierarchy of human needs originally had self-­ ­ actualization at its pyramidal summit; this is the state of mature confidence in which one can express oneself creatively without anxiety over being judged by others. After discovering the human potential movement, Maslow added another level, even rarer (presumably floating above his pyramid) that he called self-transcendence. Influenced by postmodernism, Robert Kegan also added a stage of consciousness beyond his previous final stage of mature, loving adulthood in which even the sense of oneself as a distinct individual is transformed into interindividuality. To this list must be added Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi’s concept of flow, which also refers to a stage of heightened, or even self-transcendent, consciousness.

Heightened Consciousness as Self-Transcendence It appears, then, to many psychologists, developmental or otherwise, that there naturally exists an attainable state that might be known as heightened consciousness. Most people, however, will be lucky to achieve and retain the confident ego of mature

adulthood, as they often slip back to earlier stages of cognitive or emotional development (and some never manage to leave them). A few of the theorists consider the state of heightened consciousness so rare that they list examples from the usual great suspects such as Gandhi, Mother Teresa, Martin Luther King, Buddha, and Socrates, but the majority opinion seems to be that heightened ­ consciousness is a state that implies degrees of ­ self-transcendence (going beyond the inner ­ ­monologues of self-centeredness) that are, at least occasionally, attained by most people. The psychoanalyst Carl Gustav Jung wrote of individuation as the crisis that, for many, begins after middle age in the discovery that their economic stability or social achievements leave them craving for deeper meaning. This is why he called his work depth psychology. (Jung obviously did not work with the poor or disenfranchised.) If an individual successfully negotiated the trials and tribulations of doubt, fear, anxiety, and disturbing dreams and fantasies, that person would have decentered his or her ego-self (the objective self, learned from the outside-in) and found a new ­center of consciousness in the Self (the capitalized version suggests soul, though Jung avoided that term because of its religious connotations). The Self is the doorway to what Jung called the collective unconscious, the bottomless repository of all life experience on Earth, which he sometimes characterized as being the anima mundi, the soul of the world. One who had individuated appeared no different on the outside, except that he or she was more alive, more focused outwardly on the world and other people for reasons that had nothing to do with personal gain. The individual’s heightened consciousness indicated that he or she had discovered (or created) a meaning to life that was beyond the superficial needs of the ego for acceptance or recognition. This state will sound familiar to anyone who has read so-called Eastern philosophy. Transcending the ego, in both Buddhism and certain sects of Hinduism, means awakening to higher consciousness. Often, after years of meditation or asceticism, a transcendent experience occurs—sometimes called moksha in India and satori in Japanese Zen Buddhism. In Indian Buddhism, Jainism, and some Hinduism, the ¯ tman (much like ego dissipates and becomes the A Jung’s Self), which, in Hinduism, identifies with

Heightened Consciousness

Brahman (absolute reality; here, now, and beyond; a deity). Buddhism calls this entering Nirvana (absolute nothingness, egolessness, not a deity). These “Eastern” disciplines that seek awakening or the highest consciousness by extinguishing the ego appear much different from those of the West that more often portray the ego only as ­decentered— that is, put aside until needed as a social mask (persona). D. T. Suzuki, a Japanese monk who taught the West about Zen Buddhism, has suggested that transcending the self does not mean attaining hidden spiritual treasure or finding union with God. In fact, he makes the point that moderns have lost their sense of meaning by losing touch with the very real world around them in the self-made prison of ego (or self-consciousness). For Suzuki, “‘To transcend’ suggests ‘going beyond,’ ‘being away from,’ that is, a separation, a dualism. I have, however, no desire to hint that the ‘something’ stands away from the world in which we find ­ourselves” (p. 196).

Transformative Experience It seems clear that heightened consciousness is an actual state of awareness beyond mundane, daily consciousness, but its interpretation into words limits understanding and draws it into cultural relativity. A reader who has never had such an experience may well wonder what it is like. A famous answer from Zen Buddhism is, “Nothing special.” Because, in satori, void consciousness is thought to replace ego consciousness, this statement is at least ironical. However, if putting aside the idea of extinguishing the ego, heightened consciousness may be more common than is usually thought. If one of the major indicators of being in this state is inner silence—the loss of the critically self-absorbed, interior monologue and loss of attention to oneself—along with intensely awakening to the ­ moment at hand, then there may be occasions when individuals experience moments of heightened awareness. Users of psychedelics or entheogenic (spiritawakening) substances, such as ayahausca, mescaline, or LSD, claim to have attained breakthroughs in consciousness, but many natural experiences may also lead to momentary forms of breakthrough. For

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example, athletes “in the zone” become self-­forgetful for the moment, and as they have often expressed, it is as if they performed unconsciously, perhaps caught in Csikszentmihalyi’s flow. Those lucky enough to be caught up in a moment of aesthetic arrest while viewing or hearing or participating in an artwork seem also to have united self and world. In the same way, the creator of art may be caught up in the fervor of inspiration in which all else melts away while he or she attempts to give form to this fleeting vision. In a sudden a crisis, many have spontaneously acted and done just the right thing, without taking time to plan their actions. These examples show that one need not be deep in prayer, suffering years of self-denial, ingesting chemicals, or chanting a ­mantra while in meditation in order to experience transformed consciousness. Heightened consciousness used as a term for a permanent state of exalted spiritual awareness with a largely extinguished ego is something else again. But if there is no ego-self, there is no observer and no memory, so there is little one can say about such a state. Gregory Nixon See also Consciousness, Categories of; Consciousness, Functions of; Consciousness, Origins of; Consciousness and the Unconscious; Meditation and Relaxation; Spirituality

Further Readings Bentov, I. (2000). A brief tour of higher consciousness: A cosmic book on the mechanics of creation. Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions/Bear. Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1990). Flow: The psychology of optimal experience. New York: Harper & Row. Maslow, A. (1993). The farther reaches of human nature (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Penguin. Suzuki, D. T. (1964). The awakening of a new consciousness in Zen. In J. Campbell (Ed.), Man and transformation: Papers from the Eranos yearbooks (Bollingen Series XXX–5, pp. 179–202). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1954) Warren, J. (2007). The head trip: Adventures on the wheel of consciousness. New York, NY: Random House. Wilson, C. (2009). Super consciousness: The quest for the peak experience. London, England: Watkins.

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Hermeneutics and Developmental Psychology

Hermeneutics Psychology

and

Developmental

Hermeneutics or interpretation theory is best known in psychology as a qualitative research methodology that focuses on revealing meaning, typically by viewing human lives as texts to be interpreted. This dimension of hermeneutics has roots that go back to the 18th century in works by Friedrich Schleiermacher and others, who were concerned with the problem of understanding the meaning and intent of the text and author. This entry discusses hermeneutics and its contribution to developmental psychology.

Development and Hermeneutics Since Martin Heidegger’s (1927) Being and Time, hermeneutics has evolved into a rich philosophical framework that can help us to think about the nature of the self, personhood, and agency in a comprehensive way. Hermeneutics goes far beyond being a method. It is a view of human nature that provides a corrective to the dualistic and individualistic nature of much of Western thought. Heidegger was attempting to correct what he saw as the distortions introduced by René Descartes, in particular, with his belief that the core of the person is the “cogito,” the “I” or the thinking subject. By focusing on early experience, developmental psychology clearly recognizes that the kind of agency that Descartes saw as fundamental, the kind of “I” consciousness that can step back from the world, is a developmental achievement and cannot be the foundational mode of agency. And yet developmental psychology might still tend to see the Cartesian “I” as the pinnacle of human development, that to which we should aspire as we leave the constraints of early dependencies behind. Consider, for instance, Lawrence Kohlberg’s postconventional stages of moral development and the kind of differentiated or detached self that they presuppose.

Culture and Development Philosophical hermeneutics rests on a different vision of the person. From this perspective, the most basic way of thinking about the person is not

as a separate individual, as much of Western thought has done for the last three centuries, but as an embodied and engaged agent that is immersed within social practices and the cultural meanings they presuppose. Heidegger attempts to capture this view of the person with his famous example of the craftsman. As he sees it, the craftsman is not most basically a separate subject, set over and against a world of objects (hammers, nails, boards, etc.). Instead, Heidegger argues for an agent that is subsumed into a task in such a way that his or her subjectivity or self-consciousness recedes as does the separateness of the hammers and nails, which become more aptly described as extensions of the person or, perhaps even more precisely, of the task at hand. So the most fundamental form of agency, the mode we reside in most of the time, is found in engaged action, like making a bookshelf. And we come to create a world of discrete and separate selves and objects only when we run into resistance or problems, like having the wrong kind of hammer for the task. At that point, we are interrupted from the flow of the task and are forced to step back and see the hammer as an object with the kind of qualities we tend to think of as the true facts of the hammer. Although we can construe objects and others and ourselves as discrete things, this is really often the result of a kind of breakdown of a more fundamental level of reality where things flow in the ongoing process of accomplishing tasks.

Development and Human Agency This hermeneutic view helps us to envision agency or personhood in a way that is prior to the kind of dualisms that so deeply undergird Western thought (subject and object, self and other, mind and body, fact and value, self and society or culture). The task for psychology then becomes to explain how it is that developmentally we can come to construe the world such that it is experienced and understood in such dualistic terms. Of course, developmental psychology has already accomplished much in this arena. For instance, in the Piagetian insight our most basic representations come from action—an infant learns what kinds of interactions with an object,

Hermeneutics and Developmental Psychology

like a chair or a hammer, are possible far prior to being able to have the kind of snapshot-like internal image of a chair that can be captured in the mind as narrative memory. Similarly, there is much in object relations and attachment theory about the emergence of a sense of self out of a more intersubjective matrix. Less considered in developmental psychology, like all psychology, is the ability to discern the ways that these kinds of interactions with the world of objects and people are deeply shaped by cultural meanings. Heidegger provides help. In the example of the craftsman, when building a bookshelf, the craftsman is working on not just a job but a cultural project. The craftsman is involved in what Pierre Bourdieu calls a social practice. Notice that regardless of how the craftsman subjectively feels about books, or even if he or she is literate, by building a bookshelf, the craftsman’s actions are supporting and reinforcing the value of books. And books and the emphasis upon the written word presuppose a host of additional cultural values and assumptions. From the hermeneutic perspective, there is virtually nothing that human beings do that is not shaped by cultural meanings. These meanings are both ontological, defining what the world and things like people are, and ethical or moral, prescribing what is good, desirable, and beautiful. So something as seemingly mundane as building a bookshelf can be unpacked to reveal a deep vision of what life is all about. Thus, there is, from the hermeneutic view, no separate world of facts that comes to be subjectively valued or appraised by humans in certain ways. This is because humans are, beginning with infancy, thrown into a social world that is structured by social practices. And these social practices always presuppose a worldview and an ethos or ethical framework. An infant, for instance, is introduced to the practices of bathing far prior to being a self-­ conscious Cartesian “I.” Practices of bathing, though, are not just personal or individual practices; they are social practices. When a person turns a faucet to get water, a whole worldview is already ­implicated—for instance, the technology of plumbing. And a moral dimension is involved: Societies have different norms for how to bathe and why one should bathe, as well as consequences

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for those who don’t bathe in an adequate or timely manner (e.g., norms for being labeled a slob or even schizophrenic). Before we are self-directed, thinking agents, we have already learned social practices such as bathing and are taking over and reinforcing the cultural meanings that are implicit in these social practices. Initially, primary caregivers introduce the infant to the social practices that constitute daily life. Although culture clearly shapes child-rearing beliefs, hermeneutics tries to make plain how much of enculturation and socialization comes unmediated through conscious thoughts and beliefs. Rather, it comes from repeating coordinated sets of actions and behaviors that are imbued with meanings. Moreover, these meanings do not need to be explicit or consciously known in order to deeply shape each person. Because these cultural meanings are inherently moral—that is, they are in large part about what constitutes the good infant, the good child, and later, the good adolescent and the good adult— primary caretakers are, in a sense, guardians of a moral order. Emotional reactions from parents and other authority figures—for instance, disappointment or anger—carry moral implications. The ubiquity of these social practices and the pervasiveness of the moral dimension in all aspects of life cannot be overstated, especially given the long-standing tendency in Western culture to assume that people can be both value and culture free, on the one hand, and independent, differentiated, and self-conscious selves who are self-defining, on the other. So bookshelves, bathing, or any social practice rests on an interpretation of life that entails a view of what the self is and what the self should be or become. Jerome Bruner has referred to these kinds of cultural meanings as folk psychologies and explains that they are ubiquitous—that we could not function without them. However, as emphasized in the example of bathing, they need not be consciously held or known in order to shape what a person does and feels. From a hermeneutic perspective, all people are not just folk psychologists, they are developmental psychologists. They have a sense of what good babies are and what babies need, how teens are, what maturity looks like, and so forth. And they have a sense of when these assumptions are violated and how deviancy should be dealt with.

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Heuristics for Memory and Decision Making

Scientific or academic developmental psychology stands in an interesting relationship to the developmental folk psychology that precedes it, both at the level of society and at the level of the individual, who becomes in a functional sense a de facto developmental psychologist. Hermeneutics argues that we can never be culture free, and as a consequence, the social sciences are much more deeply shaped by the Western cultural tradition then they tend to acknowledge. Developmental psychology, then, would seem to be always necessarily shaped by the individualistic background of Western culture. And yet it is not a one-way relationship—it is dialectical. Just as culture shapes psychology, psychology, in turn, comes to shape culture. For example, although psychoanalysis was deeply informed by Judeo-Christian cultural meanings, the ideas of psychoanalysis have, in turn, shaped Western culture, and it is commonplace for people in the West to use terms such as denial, projection, and repression. Developmental theory, research, and interventions will necessarily rest on assumptions about what the self or person is as well as a notion of what the self or person should be or become. Hermeneutics encourages critical self-reflection and the ongoing attempt to gain more clarity about the background assumptions that shape us. Through its relational ontology, philosophical hermeneutics helps to make explicit how cultural meanings, including a host of psychological assumptions, are inescapable. Given this, it would seem promising for developmental psychology to spend more effort studying the different developmental folk psychologies that actually exist across time and culture. As a method, hermeneutics can provide tools for approaching different cultures’ social practices as interpretations of what the person is and should be and for making the reigning folk psychologies more explicit. By studying a broad range of developmental folk psychologies, developmental psychologists can potentially discern dimensions of human life and possibilities for ways of being that were not previously noticed. For instance, crosscultural explorations of the amount of time a child is in close proximity to an adult has led to a move from initially pathologizing other cultures to revising closely held child-rearing theories and practices.

Within the social sciences and psychology, the development of grand theories or meta-narratives, like those of Eric Erikson or Kohlberg, have long been out of favor. Although there are many good reasons for this, the result has been what many see as the fragmentation of psychology and the establishment of hyperspecialties that often have little communication with each other. Hermeneutics potentially offers powerful theoretical resources that can offer a compelling model of the person that is developmentally sophisticated and culturally sensitive. John Chambers Christopher See also Childhood; Culture and the Dialogical Self; Kohlberg, Lawrence; Moral Development; Morality and Moral Emotions; Personality Development

Further Readings Bruner, J. (1990). Acts of meaning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). New York, NY: Harper & Row. (Original work published 1927) Shweder, R. A., Mahapatra, M., & Miller, J. G. (1990). Culture and moral development. In J. W. Stigler, R. A. Shweder, & G. Herdt (Eds.), Cultural psychology: Essays on comparative human development (pp. 130– 204). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the self: The making of the modern identity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Heuristics for Memory Decision Making

and

Throughout their daily lives, people are faced with countless decisions, such as, “Have I seen this person before?” or “Which product is better q ­ uality?” Many times, judgments just like these are shrouded by uncertainty. The following statement by H ­ erbert Simon (1996) points to at least one source of such uncertainty: I have, however, no desire to hint that the “something” stands away from the world in which we find ourselves. (p. 104)

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That is to say, some of the critical information for decision making is not present in “the environment sensed through eyes and ears.” Instead, ­people must often rely on the “second environment”: their memory. This entry summarizes research related to the following two interrelated questions: (a) In what ways do people rely on memory to make decisions? (b) How are judgments of remembering influenced by contextual expectations? Within the literature of human decision making as well as the literature on human memory, the term heuristic has been adopted to describe simple rules or strategies for making judgments. Some historical background for studying heuristics is given next, along with a discussion of research on memory-based heuristics, such as relying on memory to make judgments about the objects in the external environment (e.g., inferences about product quality) as well as strategies for making judgments about objects in the internal environment (e.g., gauging memory for prior exposure).

The Emergence of Heuristics Research In the wake of World War II and the dawn of the so-called cognitive revolution, researchers began to model human judgment with computer systems. To start with, a model of human judgment might incorporate all available information about a given decision scenario to compute an optimal solution. Models of this kind are often referred to as optimization models, and although they can provide sophisticated solutions to decision problems, they tend to ignore the “human” aspect of the decision process. Much of the foundation for understanding these more human aspects of decision making was developed by the highly influential and Nobel Prize–winning scientist Herbert Simon (1957). He promoted the idea that humans are bounded by a limited cognitive capacity for search and computation. In line with this notion, the term heuristic has been adopted to describe simplified, yet efficient, decision-making principles. Currently, the notion of heuristics is commonplace within psychological science and beyond. Critically, optimal strategies are implausible from the start since humans have a limited and often fuzzy capacity to remember information. The next section describes the highly impactful heuristics and

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biases research program spearheaded by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, which ignited a great deal of interest starting with publications from the early 1970s. Their work describes a ­number of memory-based heuristics that can lead people to focus on incorrect or misleading information. Following the description of Kahneman and Tversky’s program is a discussion of the fast-andfrugal heuristics research program, which gained much traction with the publication of Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart, by Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter Todd, and the ABC Research Group, as well as other publications in the 1990s. This research group suggests that memory-based heuristics are efficient and adaptive ways of dealing with uncertainty. Finally, the discussion of heuristics moves into the area of memory research by describing some heuristics for guiding memory judgments. The entry concludes by noting the inherent connection between heuristics for memory judgments and decision-making heuristics that rely on memory. Indeed, the strategies adopted for navigating the internal environment have a direct impact on the strategies adopted for navigating the external environment.

The Heuristics and Biases Research Program One curious phenomenon is that in some circumstances, people’s judgments can be based on information that is poorly related to the particular criterion. For example, when mental health workers make a clinical assessment, they may focus on the characteristics of a particular case (e.g., thinking that a patient shows characteristics that overlap with schizophrenia) over the baseline rates of ­certain mental disorders (e.g., the probability of schizophrenia in the relevant population). If ­people often attempt to answer questions about prediction and probability with problematic information, what determines the information used? Kahneman and Tversky provided a compelling answer to this question. They suggested that information within memory that is readily accessible and strongly associated with a particular judgment often takes precedence over more appropriate information.

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At the center of the heuristics and biases research program, Kahneman and Tversky described three memory-based heuristics for decision making: representativeness, anchoring, and availability (see Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow for a review). All three heuristics are driven by the principle that certain information within memory can be more readily accessible for a particular task. Basically, instead of calculating probabilities in a step-by-step and rational fashion, this work shows that humans often use different— more accessible—information as a substitute. This process of substitution is not limited to judgments of probability (although it does seem more strikingly prone to error here). Kahneman and Tversky suggest that the representativeness heuristic is applied when people use highly related information as a substitute during decision making. In other words, people tend to be biased toward information that is strongly associated with a decision criterion. In a classic experiment, participants read a personality description for a fictitious graduate student (e.g., for Tom W: high intelligence, not creative, orderly, tidy, detail oriented, dull writer, not sympathetic, does not enjoy social interactions). Then, participants were asked to make one of three judgments. One group of participants was asked to judge how closely the graduate student in the description resembles a typical student from a particular field of study (e.g., business, humanities, social science). This is a representativeness judgment. Another group of participants was asked to estimate the likelihood that the described student was enrolled in each field. This is a probability judgment about a particular person. A third set of participants were asked to estimate the percentage of all graduate students in the United States that were enrolled in each field of study. This is a general probability judgment without reference to any specific personality characteristics. Critically, the authors found that the likelihood rankings that fictitious students were enrolled in a particular field were nearly equivalent to how much they seemed to represent students of that field, and these probability estimates differed from the general probabilities for each field of study. Thus, participants were making probability judgments based on how representative the student was for a particular field,

neglecting the a priori probability of a person being enrolled in a subject. A second heuristic proposed by Kahneman and Tversky is the anchoring heuristic. Anchoring is conceptually similar to “leading questions” that hint toward an answer (e.g., “How fast was the car going when it smashed into the other car?”). Specifically, the anchoring heuristic occurs when a participant is provided with a salient or conventional value (or response) before providing a judgment. An example of the anchoring heuristic would be to ask people if a jar of jellybeans has more or less than a certain number and then to ask them to estimate the exact number of jellybeans. Typically, people’s estimates tend to be close to the value presented in the initial question. That is, the value given in the first question can act as an anchor for values generated for the second question. It is interesting that this occurs even if the value initially provided to participants is explicitly arbitrary. A third heuristic espoused by Kahneman and Tversky is the availability heuristic, which refers to the tendency to use ease of information accessibility within memory as a substitute cue on a given judgment such as estimating event probability or category membership. For example, apple would likely be a more available category member for fruits than kiwi. In an early demonstration of the availability heuristic, participants were asked if there are more words that begin with the letter r or if there are more words that have the letter r in the third position. Most participants estimated that there are more words with r at the beginning. In reality, there are more with r in the third position. This can be explained by the fact that people have a harder time generating examples of words with r in the third position than the first, and in turn, this accessibility of information is substituted to answer the question of likelihood. Importantly, a sense of retrieval ease can stem from either true availability of memories or contextual manipulations that influence memory access. Because of this, the notion of availability is often used interchangeably with accessibility. Because of this imprecision, some work has adopted more specific definitions of accessibility, such as fluency, which refers to the response

Heuristics for Memory and Decision Making

speeds for retrieving information. Overall, all the three heuristics described in this section relate to memory accessibility, whether through similarity (representativeness), priming (anchoring), or prior occurrence/contextual ease (availability). It is hard to overstate the impact of the heuristics and biases research. Indeed, Kahneman and Tversky’s work has motivated many other lines of research and effectively made heuristics a prominent term in psychological science as well as other fields of study. These ideas sparked much controversy and debate about the rationality or irrationality of human decision making, and many of their initial demonstrations have been qualified to point out that slight variations in experimental context (such as how a question is worded) can lead to more rational decision making. Also, other researchers have argued that the heuristics presented by Kahneman and Tversky are poorly defined such that any of the three can accommodate nearly any experimental finding. The fast-and-frugal heuristics research program, discussed next, has partially taken root and grown out of these and other criticisms.

The Fast-and-Frugal Heuristics Research Program Whereas the findings from the heuristics and biases research program suggest that the use of heuristics can lead to biased and erroneous decisions compared with seemingly more rational solutions, the fast-and-frugal heuristics line of research generates a very different message. Instead of focusing on if questions about the presence of heuristics, this body of work tends to focus on when questions related to understanding the conditions that lead people to use heuristics. With this perspective in mind, this research group argues that the use of heuristics is vital for humans to behave adaptively in the face of uncertainty. The fast-and-frugal heuristics line of research strongly emphasizes ecological rationality, suggesting that most decision heuristics are quite “smart” because they typically rely on core human capacities (such as the memory system) and exploit the statistical structure of the environment (such as the intercorrelation of cues). In addition, as the name “fast and frugal” implies, this body of work underscores that most decisions are not

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worth all the effort and time required to determine a sophisticated answer. Regarding methodology, this program emphasizes comparison between formal (i.e., mathematical or computational) models of decision making for which search rules, stopping rules, and decision rules are specified. This section describes prominent examples from the fast-and-frugal heuristics line of research, including heuristics based on memory accessibility and heuristics based on the content of memories. According to ecological rationality, heuristics based on memory accessibility are useful when a decision criterion (such as quality of a product) is positively correlated with recognition (probability of recognizing a product). The recognition heuristic, described by Julian Marewski and colleagues, suggests that when a person is deciding which of two alternatives has a higher value on a given criterion (e.g., “Which of these two cities has a larger number of residents, A or B?”), if one alternative is recognized and the other is not, that person will select the recognized alternative. Furthermore, the more highly correlated with recognition that a given decision criterion is, the more likely people will rely on the recognition ­heuristic. This finding has been shown in a number of experiments and across a variety of judgment environments such as geographic domains (e.g., predicting the size of lakes, rivers, mountains, or cities, based on recognition), sports, political elections, quality of U.S colleges, wealth of individuals, and stock performance. The recognition heuristic is not beneficial in all decision environments. For example, if a person is asked which of two diseases occurs more frequently, recognition might not be useful since rare and severe diseases might be mentioned more often (e.g., from news media) than more common diseases. In fact, use of recognition memory in this instance might lead to erroneous decision making similar to that of the availability heuristic described earlier from the heuristics and biases research. However, a central thesis of the fast-and-frugal heuristics research group is that the statistical structure of natural environments typically leads to situations where the use of heuristics is beneficial. Furthermore, when recognition is poorly or negatively correlated with a decision criterion, the responses that participants have during

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experiments agree less with responses predicted by the recognition heuristic. Indeed, the common analogy is that humans have a toolbox of heuristics to select from adaptively, depending on the situation. In conjunction with the recognition heuristic, this body of work also suggests that when both objects in a forced-choice task are recognized, people can use speed of recognition as a cue to guide decisions. This is referred to as the fluency heuristic within this body of work. Conceptually related to this, other research has explored how fluency can influence a wide variety of judgments as well, such as recognition memory judgments (discussed later). Similar to the recognition heuristic, the take-thebest heuristic assumes decisions are determined by one singular piece of evidence. Take-the-best suggests that when people are faced with the decision of selecting which of two alternatives has a larger value on a criterion, they will search through available cues (pieces of information that are relevant to the judgment) based on their prediction validities and use only the cue that is the most predictive while ignoring the rest. This relatively simple decision strategy can be very accurate and often outperforms more optimal decision strategies in environments where cues are highly redundant. In addition, even when optimal decision strategies are equally accurate or better, take-the-best is far more computationally frugal such that one can easily argue that the accuracy achieved relative to the amount of effort required is superior to more complicated algorithms. The take-the-best heuristic has proved to be an effective decision strategy across a wide variety of judgments ranging from consumer choice to the safety of residential properties.

Memory Heuristics The discussion so far has been about multiple heuristics that rely on memory accessibility (e.g., recognition status). However, what determines if a person claims to recognize a particular object? The aforementioned research on heuristics often estimates recognition based on environmental frequency such that more frequently occurring objects are recognized more often. Yet as mentioned earlier, contextual conditions also influence memory accessibility. This section describes two heuristics

that guide memory judgments based on contextual conditions: the fluency heuristic and the distinctiveness heuristic. Both of the following memory heuristics have been studied most within recognition memory experiments, which typically consist of presenting participants with a list of items during a study phase and later testing their memory for these items. During the memory test, items are p ­ resented— half of which were presented during study and half of which are novel (often called lures)—and participants are asked to identify whether each item was studied or not. These memory decisions, just like other judgments, are often shrouded with uncertainty and set the stage for heuristics to be adopted. One heuristic strategy that influences recognition memory judgments is the fluency heuristic. The fluency heuristic suggests that participants can, based on response speeds, use a metacognitive feeling of fast processing to guide judgments. The typical fluency heuristic finding, exemplified by the work of Meredith Lanska and colleagues, is that contextually enhancing the processing speed of some stimuli during a recognition memory test (via perceptual or conceptual means) increases the rate of recognition responses for studied items as well as novel items. Generally, fluency is used to guide recognition judgments under conditions of uncertainty. A commonly used manipulation of fluency is perceptual priming, in which the stimulus about to be tested for recognition is briefly flashed (e.g., 34 ms) between visual noise masks. Manipulations of fluency such as this have also been shown to influence a wide variety of judgments, such as pleasantness, perceptual clarity, and truth. Critically, the use of fluency during recognition memory judgments is directly tied to contextual expectations. That is, if participants have reason to think that the speed of retrieving information is related to some factor other than the availability of information within memory, they often discount it. In addition, authors have underscored the importance of relative fluency, such that the speed of retrieving information for a particular object is gauged as fast or slow relative to other stimuli within the context. Indeed, if all stimuli are processed faster by means of a contextual manipulation, no effect of fluency is observed. In some recognition memory experiments, the items presented during study are semantically

Historical Roots of Theories of Psychopathology

related to items that are not presented. For example, a participant might see the words candy, sugar, and bitter, all of which relate to the unstudied word sweet. During a later recognition memory test, these unstudied semantic associates (often called critical lures) are tested and lead to high rates of false recognition (e.g., 80%). Named after the researchers that popularized it, this approach to studying false recognition is called the Deese/ Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Following up on this phenomenon, multiple studies revealed that the rate of false recognition for unstudied semantic associates decreases if the study list includes more distinctive information, such as accompanying pictures. Critically, a study by Daniel Schacter and colleagues tested if the suppression of false memory after studying words with pictures is due to (a) the availability of distinctive information encoded during presentation or (b) whether participants adopt a decision strategy related to an expectation of distinctive information during the test. Their results were in favor of the latter option. Thus, the distinctiveness ­heuristic refers to a metamemorial decision strategy in which participants rely on the availability of distinctive details for making memory judgments. All the heuristics discussed in this entry rely on assessments of memory whether to make inferences about uncertain states of the outer world (such as product quality) or to make inferences about uncertain states of the inner world (such as if one has heard of a product before). Like Russian dolls that fit snuggly within one another, the study of how recognition decisions are made fits snuggly within the study of how a sense of recognition is paramount for everyday decision making. Justin M. Olds and Julian N. Marewski See also Exceptional Memory and Expertise; Long-Term Memory: Processes; Long-Term Memory: Structures; Memory as Reconstructive; Nonvisual Memory; Reasoning and Decision Making; Short-Term and Working Memory

Further Readings Gigerenzer, G., Hertwig, R., & Pachur, T. (2011). Heuristics: The foundations of adaptive behavior. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

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Lanska, M., Olds, J. M., & Westerman, D. L. (2014). Fluency effects in recognition memory: Are perceptual fluency and conceptual fluency interchangeable. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 40, 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10 .1037/a0034309 Marewski, J. N., Pohl, R. F., & Vitouch, O. (2011). Recognition-based judgments and decisions: What we have learned (so far). Judgment and Decision Making, 6(5), 359–380. Schacter, D. L., Israel, L., & Racine, C. (1999). Suppressing false recognition in younger and older adults: The distinctiveness heuristic. Journal of Memory and Language, 40, 1–24. Simon, H. A. (1990). Reason in human affairs. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Historical Roots Psychopathology

of

Theories

of

The term psychopathology has become vague to the point of meaninglessness. Qualified as “descriptive” or “general” in some European countries, it refers to the study of mental symptoms and of associated theoretical issues. In the United States, psychopathology tends to be used as a synonym of psychiatry—that is, as a “science” dealing with the description, classification, and explanation of mental disorders. This polysemy is not new: G. Ionescu was able to identify up to 14 referents for psychopathology. This entry reviews the history of the term psychopathology and its use in the field of psychology. Early in the 19th century, alienists (this was the 19th-century term for psychiatrists) were enjoined to compose a language of description specially designed to capture madness. The said language included a lexicon, a grammar, and professional rules for its clinical application and was molded after séméiotique, a general discipline constructed to deal with the demands of the anatomo-clinical model of disease. As a result, this language of alienism was made to converge with the term psychopathology and with an ever-increasing number of clinical observations. In addition to describing the signs and symptoms of madness, by the early 20th century, psychopathology had started to offer explanatory accounts. In the United States, Joseph Jastrow

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(1902) defined it as “the general study of diseased mental conditions; a synonym of psychiatry and abnormal psychology, but rather more comprehensive than either, because it emphasizes the general scientific study of all forms of mental aberration” (p. 391). Influenced by psychoanalysis, the English alienist Bernard Hart stated, “Psychopathology” connotes, not a mere description of mental symptoms, but an endeavour to explain disorder or certain disorders in terms of psychological processes. The distinction expressed here is of the greatest importance for a clear understanding of the subject. The description of mental symptoms constitutes clinical psychiatry, and is as distinct from psychopathology as clinical medicine is from pathology. (p. 2, italics in original)

Soon enough, psychopathology also became embroiled in issues concerning its autonomy, the nature of its objects of inquiry, and its relationship to psychology and other disciplines. For example, it was asked whether the signs and symptoms of madness were mere exaggerations of “normal” behavior or whether they constituted forms of behavior met with only in disease. This ­continuity–discontinuity debate still lingered in the 20th century. Similar issues arose in relation to the relationship of psychopathology with the neurosciences, sociology, anthropology, and other fields.

The Term Psychopathology Psycho-Pathologie (hyphenated) was coined by Ernst von Feuchtersleben, an Austrian physician, in 1845. Two years later, he translated it as psychopathology. He did not use the term to refer to the signs and symptoms of madness but to a discipline that might investigate mechanisms linking the mind and the body: “Über diese kritischen Vorgänge hat wohl die Psycho-Pathologie noch nicht genug Licht” (“Psychopathology has not yet acquired ­sufficient light respecting these critical processes”). A few years later, however, other physicians used psychopathologie to refer to the clinical description of mental symptoms and disorders. German etymological dictionaries are silent as to whether the 1847 English transliteration was

relevant in this. The word took decades to achieve popularity in Europe. For example, in Germany, it became established only after the publication of the canonical works in the latter part of the century. Early in the 20th century, the term Allgemeine Psychopathologie became fashionable. In France, Italy, and Great Britain, the term took even longer to become established. The descriptive discipline to which the term referred was already in full swing, but it was some years before the term appeared in publications. In spite of the fact that the English term psychopathology had been around since 1847, British alienists found no use for it. Daniel Tuke defined a subtype of “PsychoPathology” (hyphenated): “(Forensic) as the science which treats of the legal aspects of insanity, i.e. the rights and responsibilities of lunatics” (p. 1014). This was a strange definition indeed! In its current meaning, the term started to be used in English only in the wake of Sigmund Freud’s writing.

The Construction of Psychopathology Up to the 1870s, particularly in its German usage, psychopathology was a name for a “semiology,” or symptomatology of mental disorders. The early 19th-century cultural and ideological context that made its construction possible included at least six factors: 1. The medicalization of madness. This epistemological and social alliance between medicine and madness was an offshoot of postEnlightenment philanthropic ideology. 2. The adoption by medicine of an anatomoclinical model of disease and the consequent descriptive needs thereby engendered 3. The new belief that it is possible to describe (or capture) the essence of a disease by analyzing and naming its component parts—that is, its signs and symptoms 4. The availability of a linguistic theory of signs, as it was to emerge from the exchanges between Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Johann Gottfried Herder, and later the work of Joseph-Marie Dégerando and Wilhelm von Humboldt. This new view of “sign” provided a theoretical basis for the construction of the new concept of symptom.

Historical Roots of Theories of Psychopathology

5. The availability to observation of stable patient cohorts made possible by the construction of mental asylums 6. The adoption of a psychological theory (associationism) on the basis of which to justify the breaking up of the flow of behavior into fragments

Some of the fragments became privileged as “symptoms” of disease. Later in the century, another psychological theory (faculty psychology) allowed mental disorders to be redefined as “clusters” of symptoms. Much debate was then had on the nature of the “glue” (biological, statistical, or psychodynamic) that kept the clusters together. Eventually, psychopathology became the official language of alienism. That is, alienists were trained in and examined on it and were required to use it to communicate with other disciplines such as the law (as expert witnesses in court). The same language was also used to uniformize clinical samples and provide new bases for research. Sympathy, which had been a popular etiological mechanism earlier in the century, was gradually replaced by postmortem and histopathological accounts. The latter reigned supreme until the arrival of Freudian hermeneutics. Freud’s Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens both broadened the meaning of psychopathology and contributed to its dissemination. From then on, and in conceptual terms, psychopathology became a “hybrid” discipline. For example, until the arrival of the German psychiatric refugees, psychopathology textbooks in Great Britain were all imbued by psychoanalytical concepts. It is important to add that in addition to the Freudian influence, 20th-century psychopathology was also influenced by phenomenology. Some writers considered Husserlian concepts as a useful foundation for a new “descriptive” psychopathology in contrast to the classical descriptive approach the refugees had brought.

The Concepts and Objects of Psychopathology Since its inception, the descriptive power of psychopathology has depended on the quality of (a) the theories of the mind it has related to and (b) its

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clinical database. During the 19th century, as ­previously noted, two theories of mind were its favorite companions: associationism (which justified the fragmentation of behavior) and faculty psychology (which encouraged clustering of the fragments). After the 1880s, evolutionism, in both its Spencerian and Darwinian versions, influenced psychopathology. The data sets on which psychopathology based its original descriptions mostly came from the observation of mentally disordered young and middle-aged adults. Because children were admitted less often into the mental asylums, a specific child psychopathology remained unformulated for most of the 19th century; indeed, “child psychiatry” started to be constructed only after the 1880s. The same was the case with geriatric psychopathology. Before 1900, the cutoff point for old age was 55, and average life expectancy was around 31. Thus, no observational critical mass was ever achieved. Only after the Second World War did a psychopathology of old age start to be put together. Those who claim that descriptive psychopathology is complete, and hence obsolete, neglect the fact that the age bias just mentioned may threaten the validity of clinical and neurobiological research into mental disorders. Another issue worth mentioning concerns the nature of the relationship between psychopathology (as a cognitive instrument) and its “objects” of inquiry: Does it simply capture symptoms and disorders that exist fully formed in nature (because they are natural kinds), or does it actively participate in their construction? In the field of psychopathology and the social sciences, “carving nature at its joints,” as the former position has been characterized, is becoming increasingly hard to defend. Instead, a moderate constructionist account may work better in relation to the narratives of mental disorders. In this regard, German Berrios has proposed a model according to which mental symptoms are “hybrid” objects consisting in a culturally configured kernel of biological information. Related to this is the question of whether psychopathology should be considered a “Periodic Table of Elements”—that is, as a closed system bounded by brain-related research criteria on the basis of which it should be possible to predict all mental disorders known or unknown—or whether

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it should be considered as a culturally determined, open-ended narrative. It has been argued that the latter is the case, that because both biological and cultural objects are known to change over time, psychopathology needs to be periodically updated. Clinicians, not basic scientists, would need to undertake such recalibration, for they are the ones who work at the clinical coalface. If this were to become the case, then the psychopathological characterization of mental disorders would become a Sisyphean task in the sense that symptom and disorder descriptions would need to be periodically changed and, with them, their attending neurobiological narratives. G. E. Berrios See also Behavioral Perspectives on Psychopathology; Culture and Psychopathology; Humanistic Theories of Psychopathology; Medicalization of Psychopathology; Psychopathology and Stress

Further Readings Berrios, G. E. (2014). History and epistemology of psychopathology. In K. Kendler & J. Parnas (Eds.), Philosophical issues in psychiatry: Vol. 3. The nature and sources of historical challenge (pp. 30–50). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Craighead, W. E. (Ed.). (2008). Psychopathology: History, diagnosis, and empirical foundations. New York, NY: Wiley. Feuchtersleben, E. (1847). The principles of medical psychology (H. E. Lloyd & B. G. Babington, Trans.). London, England: Sydenham Society. Hart, B. (1929). Psychopathology: Its development and its place in medicine. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Jastrow, J. (1902). Psychopathology. In J. M. Baldwin (Ed.), Dictionary of philosophy and psychology. New York, NY: Macmillan. Scull, A. (1993). The most solitary of afflictions: Madness and society in Britain, 1700–1900. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Tuke, D. H. (1892). A dictionary of psychological medicine, Vol. 2. Philadelphia, PA: P. Blakiston, Son & Co. Zorumski, C. F., & Rubin, E. H. (Eds.). (2005). Psychopathology in the genome and the neuroscience era. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.

Homeostasis Homeostasis is a key concept in biology and appears in the simplest single-cell organism to the most complex organism. The term was initially coined by Walter B. Cannon. It can be defined as a state of dynamic equilibrium of the internal environment of the organism that is maintained by feedback in response to both internal metabolic and external environmental changes. This entry defines the term homeostasis and discusses the concept in relationship to behavior. Homeostasis has qualities of both state and process. That is, it is a set of processes by which to maintain internal stability and appropriate responses to both internal and external changes and achieve and maintain a state of dynamic ­equilibrium. In mammals the autonomic nervous system is that part of the nervous system that regulates homeostatic balance among internal systems. In phylogenetically less complex organisms, such as protozoa, biochemical pathways often serve many of the same homeostatic purposes as does the autonomic nervous system. Commonly, the term homeostasis is used to refer to maintaining internal metabolic e­ quilibrium—for example, maintaining a mammal’s body temperature during external changes in temperature. However, in addition to changing internal metabolism, external behavioral changes also may be used. For example, as the external temperature increases, the organism may move to a shady area, increase its surface to volume ratio by spreading itself out in order to lose heat, or it may lose heat by sweating. If the external temperature decreases, organisms may “huddle” to decrease their surface-to-volume ratio to conserve heat or increase their metabolic activity—for example, by shivering and thereby generating more heat. All these internal metabolic and external behavioral changes help to maintain the body temperature and thus enhance survival. Likewise, if the organism faces an external stimulus that may be life threatening (e.g., a predator), there is also likely to be a rapid instinctive reaction in the form of internal metabolic changes as well as rapid overall external behavioral changes to prepare and activate the organism to fight or either flee or hide from this event.

Homeostasis

In addition, the organism may approach and engage with a life-enhancing event or simply remain as before if the event is neutral. In other words, an external event becomes a stimulus to an organism when the event activates sensory receptors in the organism and the organism can rapidly alter both its internal metabolic and external behavioral activity to an appropriate level in order to cope with the situation it faces.

The Concept of Behavioral Homeostasis Although the word homeostasis commonly refers to a maintained internal metabolic level as already noted, the concept of behavioral homeostasis emphasizes the role of both the rapid internal as well as external motor system (i.e., behavioral) changes. Such changes produce readiness to cope with any new external-stimulus situation, as well as to maintain appropriate internal metabolic equilibrium. How long any new, rapidly achieved metabolic and behavioral changes remain in place depends, of course, on the nature of the stimuli the organism faces at any given point in time. In mammals, internal metabolic changes primarily involve the autonomic nervous system, but external behavioral changes involve motor systems, such as voluntary and reflexive skeletalmuscular activity. Depending on the significance or insignificance of the new external stimulus the organism faces, the levels of both physiological (internal) and behavioral (external) activity may be raised or lowered to an appropriate level to cope with the new stimulus and to reduce energy expenditure. Clearly, behavioral processes play a key role in achieving and maintaining an optimal level of homeostatic balance.

The Possible Role of the Simple Learned Behaviors of Habituation and Sensitization Because organisms are not always at “maximal alertness” when a new, repeated, external stimulus occurs, it is essential for the organism to have ways to rapidly increase its “initial level of alertness” to assess and cope with the stimulus and, at the same time, minimize wasted energy. That is, an organism has to rapidly reach a certain level of alertness

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before it can make an assessment regarding the possible threat of the new stimulus to its survival. Habituation and sensitization are two examples of simple behavioral learning that appear to be very important in rapidly achieving and maintaining an organism’s optimal level of alertness. Habituation refers to a decrease in responding to a repetitive external stimulus. Sensitization refers to increased responding to the repeated stimulus. The response changes seen in these two rapidly learned behaviors are remarkably similar in organisms from aneural protozoa to humans. One interpretation of habituation and sensitization is that they represent behavioral homeostatic processes across the phylogenetic tree. Research on their possible evolutionary significance has included the protozoan Spirostomum, as well as mammals, including humans. Across the phylogenetic tree, high initial responders to a new nonthreatening repetitive stimulus generally show habituation, but low initial responders often showed sensitization. The alertness level of an organism varies over time according to many factors. An important one is circadian rhythmicity. Thus, the alertness level just prior to the first occurrence of a new stimulus can vary substantially, depending on when the stimulus occurs. Organisms high in pre-initial stimulus alertness make a larger initial response. If the stimulus is assessed as insignificant for survival, they then habituate, presumably in order to conserve energy and to be ready to cope with other stimuli that may occur. Organisms at a low level of pre-initial stimulus alertness make a smaller initial response to the new stimulus and rapidly sensitize in response to the second stimulus whether the stimulus is significant or not. Then, on the third iterative stimulus, their response may go up, remain the same, or go down, presumably after their alertness level was raised to a level needed to make an assessment of the significance of the stimulus. In mammals the suprachiasmatic nucleus in the hypothalamus serves as the master clock. It synchronizes the organism’s rhythmic cycles and determines the organism’s overall alertness level at any point in time. Thus, it likely determines whether habituation or sensitization initially occurs. E. M. Eisenstein, D. L. Eisenstein, and J. S. M. Sarma

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See also Attention; Behavioral Development; Classical Conditioning; Coping Strategies; Evolutionary Psychology; Natural Selection; Neuropsychology; Operant Conditioning

Further Readings Cannon, W. B. (1939). The wisdom of the body. New York, NY: W. W. Norton. Dempsey, E. W. (1951). Homeostasis. In S. S. Stevens (Ed.), Handbook of experimental psychology (pp. 209–235). New York, NY: John Wiley. Eisenstein, E. M., & Eisenstein, D. (2006). A behavioral homeostasis theory of habituation and sensitization: Vol. 2. Further developments and predictions. Reviews in the Neurosciences, 17, 533–557. Eisenstein, E. M., Eisenstein, D. L, Sarma, J. S. M., Knapp, H., & Smith, J. C. (2012). Some new speculative ideas about the behavioral homeostasis theory as to how the simple learned behaviors of habituation and sensitization improve organism survival throughout phylogeny. Communicative and Integrative Biology, 5(3), 233–239. Eisenstein, E. M., Eisenstein, D., & Smith, J. C. (2001). The evolutionary significance of habituation and sensitization across phylogeny: A behavioral homeostasis model. Integrative Physiological and Behavioral Science, 36(4), 251–265.

Human Agency Human agency is understood in terms of individual freedom of choice and action. A pillar of Western civilization and individual life, the idea of human agency is infused in natural language, ­ethics, morality, law, religion, and everyday understanding and experience of personhood and ­selfhood. This entry discusses the need for human agency and its relationship to psychology. Agency is of monumental importance. If human beings do not have the freedom to choose and act, personal life is stripped of its possibilities and moral accountability. In the absence of agency, it is difficult to comprehend how people can be said to bear responsibility for their deeds; deserve the fruit of their accomplishments; merit the praise or blame of others; or invent, create, or be capable of entering into relations, such as friendship and love, that demand agentive moral and ethical commitments.

However, agency is a contentious term that presents ontological, epistemological, social, ­cultural, political, moral, and psychological problems that have proven difficult to resolve. At the core of these problems is a fundamental opposition between freedom and determinacy—that is, whether human choices and actions are free in a way such that they can be said to originate with the agent or if they are effects determined ­necessarily by antecedent causes.

Context and Importance for Psychology In philosophy, the opposing poles of freedom and determinacy traditionally have been instantiated in libertarianism and hard determinism. Libertarians assert the premise that free choice exists. Given that free choice and complete causal determinism are logically incompatible, it follows from the principle of noncontradiction that complete causal determinism must be false. Likewise, hard determinists assert the premise that complete causal determinism is true. According to the doctrine of complete causal determinism, everything that happens, including human behavior, has conditions preceding and necessitating its occurrence: Every event has a cause. If complete causal determinism is true, hence, also according to the principle of noncontradiction, free choice must not exist. Framed in this way, the contrariety of these two positions presents an intractable problem for ­psychology. On one hand, since its inception, the discipline of psychology has progressed by defining itself as a deterministic science modeled on the explanatory and methodological approaches of physical science. On the other hand, the professional practice of psychology assumes as substantial and influential the agentive freedom of ­individual persons to choose and act in ways that can make a difference in their lives. It is precisely such freedom that many psychotherapists emphasize in empowering their clients to seek and initiate change. At the risk of courting incoherence, psychology seemingly must abandon either its ­ ­scientific ambitions or the common understanding of agentive personal existence. In attempting to reconcile the antithesis, some philosophers and psychologists have argued for compatibilism—namely, that free will and determinism are not inconsistent. Typically, compatibilists

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claim that freedom of choice is itself a causally determined sequence of events that is the product of self-determination. The latter can be said to occur when the determinants of a choice or action are features and properties of the person making it. Libertarians and hard determinists both accept that free choice means that decisions could have been otherwise up until the very point they were made. Libertarians and hard determinists also adhere to the further stipulation that to have free choice, decisions must evince both voluntarism and origination. Voluntarism is the ability to choose and act in accordance with one’s desires. Origination refers to the agent being the ultimate source of initiating intentional action. Compatibilists contend that agentive choice and action require only voluntarism; that is, people need to be free only to the extent that “free” is opposed to “compelled” or “coerced.” However, compatibilism falls prey to the criticism that without origination, agents are left subject to external determination, especially by “hidden controllers” beyond agents’ awareness. Philosophical consideration of agency has a rich history that dates to at least the 2nd century BCE. The Stoic sage Chrysippus defended a form of compatibilism in which the cosmos and everything that has happened in it are determined by fate, but human choice pertains to the future and thus is not constrained by preceding events. Since Chrysippus, the intervening millennia have witnessed a spate of attempts by philosophers to address the question of human agency. By comparison, and given its evident importance, human agency has been relatively underexplored by psychologists when placed against the voluminous psychological literature as a whole. However, agency came to increased attention in psychology during the closing decades of the 20th century, and a ­variety of psychological perspectives on the subject have since been proposed. These perspectives can be divided broadly between internalism and externalism, a distinction that cuts across freedom, determinism, compatibilism, and incompatibilism.

Internalism Internalism, which currently dominates accounts of human agency in psychology, situates its source

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within individuals. Internalism owes a debt to Cartesian dualist and Kantian idealist philosophical conceptions of humans as autonomous individuals ­possessed of inherent capacities that enable them to construct meaning and knowledge. Psychological internalism upholds dualism and idealism by assuming a fundamental separation of individual minds from each other and from an external physical world and by attributing agency to interior psychological features and capacities. In psychological internalism, the source of human agency is traced to a transcendent quality of mind or complex of interior psychological structures and processes (e.g., executive, metacognitive, self-regulatory, or other forms of internal control) by which agentive choice and action are conceived, made manifest, and experienced. The notion of agency as existing prior to, or independently of, causality or as produced by interior psychological structures and processes furnishes both voluntarism and origination. For psychological internalists, voluntarism and origination are essential to establishing the connection between agency and its assumed inner sources. In turn, the interiority of sources of agency distinguishes agent causation from event causation, which operates in an external material world that not only is absent the freedom and rationality attributed to human agents but that presents constraints and impediments to it. Psychological-internalist arguments for agent causation often entail humanistic and phenomenological appeals to the everyday understanding and experience of oneself as capable of reflexive thought, self-influence, self-control, and acting freely in the pursuit of self-determined ends. These self-referential capabilities are taken to account not only for agent causation but also for the sense of personal agency experienced in choosing and acting. A second form of internalism, materialist internalism, also maintains the assumption of the separateness and autonomy of individuals. However, it asserts that the psychological experience of agency is simply an artifact of causal interactions of structures and processes operating at the level of the physical constitution of human individuals. For material internalists, all mental states, including the experience of psychological agency, can be reduced to neurophysiological mechanisms

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internal to individuals but that function prior to and outside their awareness and control. In support of this position, internal materialists cite research that points to unconscious automatic processes involved in thought and action that are beyond the periphery of awareness and conscious control. For example, studies have found a readiness potential in the nervous system that precedes subjects’ awareness of initiating action.

Externalism By contrast with internalism, externalism postulates that there are sources of human agency that originate beyond the boundaries of the individual. Externalists assert that agency is manufactured in the interaction between individuals and their environments. At one end of the spectrum of externalist positions, minimal externalism holds that for decisions and actions to be intentional, they must be oriented and coordinated in relation to external objects. Agentive action is necessarily intentional; that is, it always is about or points toward something. Thus, by definition, intentional choice and action can occur only in relation to the external objects, locations, and events toward which thought and action are directed. Consequently, according to minimal externalism, human agency cannot be severed completely from the contexts in which it exists. At the other end of the spectrum, naturalistic or biophysical externalism explains agency as the result of biophysical and evolutionary processes that produce specific dispositions that have proven adaptive to the physical and social conditions in which human agents have evolved to live. From this perspective, agency has resulted not only from the biophysical constitution of human brains and bodies but also from a specific evolutionary history in which Homo sapiens came to possess agentive characteristics selected for their advantages in coping with their environments and promoting reproductive success. For example, attributing people’s actions to their intentions and reasons (i.e., agent causation) may have proven useful for anticipating individuals’ behavior, which, in turn, would be advantageous for both cooperation and competition. Naturalistic externalism is founded on the idea

that human agency is governed by presiding forces of evolution that determine the structure, function, and survival of all living entities. Akin to naturalistic externalism, strong social– cultural externalism also attributes the source of agency to superordinate forces by which the features of human psychology are configured. Strong social–cultural externalism conceives agency as an effect of social and cultural forms and practices. According to strong social–cultural externalism, the psychological capacities and subjective experience of human individuals are produced by features of social and cultural contexts that shape and regulate their understanding of themselves as intentional actors. From birth, people are immersed in material and relational contexts of human interaction structured by social, cultural, moral, ethical, political, economic, religious, and educational practices and institutions. These practices and institutions make possible and also constrain the kinds of human activity and interactivity within which human individuals develop. Moreover, their designs and ­purposes operate in ways to induce individual conformity with the various roles, beliefs, conventions, responsibilities, and ways of acting and interacting aligned with the organization and coordinated functioning of societies. Strong social–cultural externalism considers agency less an individual attribute and more an outcome of the features of social structures, the effects of which are to produce individuals who comprehend themselves as autonomous, agentive individuals capable of independent thought and action. In turning to the context of development in order to account for sources of agency, some psychologists have adopted a moderate social–cultural externalism that rejects both the concept of a transcendent agent and complete biophysical or ­ social–cultural determination and reduction. Incorporating the ideas of notable developmental theorists Jean Piaget, Lev Vygotsky, and George Herbert Mead, these compatibilist accounts present a view of persons as self-interpreting and ­self-determining and maintain that such capacities are not fixed entirely by either human nature or the conditions within which they have evolved. Rather, moderate social–cultural externalism focuses attention on concrete social–cultural activity and interactivity in a world of others, objects,

Human Factors in Organizations

and events that supports the developmental emergence of gradually expanding capacities for reflexive thought, self-regulation, self-determination, and a sense of agency. Moderate social–cultural externalists vary in their explication of the means by which the developmental emergence of these capacities are accomplished (i.e., by the construction of representational schemes, appropriation and internalization of linguistic and relational practices, or the ability to adopt perspectives of oneself as both subject and object). Nevertheless, they are united in emphasizing the role of individuals as agents of their own psychological development. In other words, although agency may originate with the biophysical and social–cultural conditions of human existence, it has developmentally emergent properties that cannot be reduced to these origins. With the developmental emergence of psychological capacities for reflexive thought, the agent’s own interpretations figure in the constitution of his or her choices and actions in a way that is both free and determined. The subject matter of psychology is concerned with human action and experience. Consequently, it appears imperative that any adequate account of human psychology demands a defensible explanation of agency, especially if psychology is to forge coherence across its theoretical, research, and professional endeavors. Jeff Sugarman See also Culture and the Dialogical Self; Embodied Grounding; Extended Mind; Relational Theory; Self; Skinner’s Legacy

Further Readings Bandura, A. (2006). Toward a psychology of human agency. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 1, 164–180. Martin, J., Sugarman, J., & Hickinbotton, S. (2010). Persons: Understanding psychological selfhood and agency. New York, NY: Springer. Martin, J., Sugarman, J., & Thompson, J. (2003). Psychology and the question of agency. Albany: State University of New York Press. Sugarman, J., & Sokol, B. (Eds.). (2012). Human agency and development [Special issue]. New Ideas in Psychology, 30, 1–85.

Human Factors

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The interdisciplinary field of human factors involves psychology, industrial engineering, computer science, and many other disciplines. The field is devoted to research and theory applicable to the design of systems and products for safe and effective human-system performance. In psychology, the study of human factors is based heavily on experimental cognitive psychology for the microergonomic aspects and on industrial-organizational psychology for the organizational, or macroergonomic, aspects. This entry reviews the major theoretical foundations of the field, beginning with the human information-processing approach, and discusses how the capabilities and limitations of individual operators can influence the system’s performance. Because much of the work in human factors involves the integration of groups of individuals within the system, the entry also discusses theories related to team performance. It ends with a discussion of sociotechnological theories as a foundation for human–systems integration at the organizational level. At each level of analysis, examples are provided of how the theories are applied in practical situations.

Human Information Processing by the Individual Operator The emergence of the field of human factors in the late 1940s and 1950s coincided with the “cognitive revolution” that occurred in psychology. Consequently, the information-processing approach came to predominate psychology. This approach is oriented toward characterizing the cognitive representations and processes that mediate between perception and action. Human performance models are used to explain and predict behavior of individuals in simple and complex tasks. Because these models characterize stages of human information processing similarly to the way that processing would occur in nonhuman systems, researchers are able to characterize human–system interactions in a manner that allows overall models of human–system performance to be derived. For example, when a user enters a password to access a computer system, the user must perceive

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the password prompts on the computer monitor, retrieve the password from memory, and enter the password into the computer. The computer must identify the password field, compare the entered password with the stored password for the user, and signal to the user whether access was allowed or denied based on the comparison. Because the processes of perception, cognition (i.e., memory and decision making), and action by each system component can be captured and analyzed in a similar manner, researchers are able to systematically study the human–computer interaction. The information-processing approach continues to dominate the field of human factors, although alternatives, such as the situated cognition and ecological approaches, have been developed and applied. The following reviews major theories of human information-processing demands that are critical to a variety of applied settings. One of the major principles that has emerged is that the capacity for attending to multiple events in the environment is limited. A demonstration of this limitation is the phenomenon of change blindness, wherein if people are not attending to the location of an easily identifiable object that is directly in front of them, they do not “see” that it changes. Similarly, limitations in short-term memory capacity are most evident in circumstances in which one is interrupted and cannot recollect what one had in mind immediately before the interruption. The principle of capacity limitations in attention and short-term memory has driven design guidelines in human factors, with the goal being to minimize the attentional and memory loads placed on the human operator. This task is more difficult than it may seem because of the wide variation across individuals due to both innate factors and differences in experience. Two widely used theoretical constructs in human factors based on attention and memory research are mental workload and situation awareness. Mental workload refers to the demands placed on an operator relative to the cognitive resources available to the operator for performing the task. Mental workload typically needs to be measured and evaluated in a variety of contexts, including driving, air traffic control, health care, equipment operation, and so on. When the workload is too high, operators cannot engage in the level of information processing typically required

for optimal decision making and often rely on other, less relevant cues. There are two theoretical approaches to measuring mental workload—the unitary-resource view and the multiple-resource view. According to unitary-resource theories, there is a single pool of attentional resources that can be allocated to a variety of tasks, and performance decrements occur when the demands exceed the available resources. In contrast, multiple-resource theories emphasize the type of processing demands that various tasks require rather than the overall level of demands. For instance, visual and auditory sensory modalities, perceptual and cognitive information-­ processing stages, and vocal and manual responses may draw on different resource pools. As such, task combinations that do not overlap in terms of resource pools usually result in better performance than task combinations that draw from the same pools. Multiple-resource theories can explain why it would be easier to perform combinations of tasks that draw on different resources, such as driving and listening to music, than on other combinations that draw on the same resources, such as driving and reading a map. Techniques for measuring mental workload fall into three categories: subjective ratings, performance, and psychophysiological indices. The method a researcher adopts for measuring workload depends on the purpose of the research, the attributes of the test, the practicality of test administration, and the theoretical approach taken by the researcher. For example, subjective ratings can be at a global level (e.g., “Rate your overall workload on a scale of 1 to 10”) or on several dimensions of workload (e.g., mental demand or temporal demand). Although different workload assessment methods have their own advantages and disadvantages, most provide converging evidence for differential performance on high workload tasks compared with low ones. Situation awareness refers to an operator’s understanding of what is going on in the task environment. Situation awareness can be influenced by mental workload (i.e., when workload is high, awareness can decrease), but it is considered to be a separate construct. A theory of situation awareness based on the information-processing approach assumes that the operator forms a dynamic mental

Human Factors in Organizations

representation of the task environment. For example, when driving along a highway, the driver notes the current locations and movements of other vehicles and projects their movements and interactions in the future. More generally, the mental representation is in terms of the elements present, an understanding of how the elements interact, and the projection of future states of the elements. Other theoretical views of situation awareness do not assume that an operator has a complete mental representation of the task environment. Situated theories assert that operators off-load much of the task information to the displays and tools in their environment. Their awareness consists in knowing where to look to access the information instead of retrieving that information from memory. Returning to the driving example, the situated approach would assume that drivers will reference their rearview mirrors prior to making a lane change rather than trying to keep track mentally of all the vehicles’ locations. Similar to measures of workload, measures of situation awareness can be characterized by general categories: subjective ratings (rate one’s awareness), performance metrics (good performance equals better awareness), and objective probe questions (accuracy of answers to questions about the task environment). The use of probe techniques to assess situation awareness often requires that a task analysis be performed to determine what should be known. Different probe methods can be used to capture what was actually known by the operator. The selection of situation awareness metrics depends on the nature of the research being conducted. One area in which situation awareness measurement is critical is the evaluation of automation. When tasks are automated, the operator is taken “out of the loop,” and as a consequence may not have the situation awareness needed to intervene in emergencies.

Team Cognition and Performance To accomplish complex tasks, individuals must work together in teams. For example, in a surgery suite, the doctor is the person performing the surgery, but he or she relies on support from nurses, the anesthesiologist, and other members of the

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surgical team. For the operation to be successful, all members of the team must work together in a coordinated manner and be able to communicate unambiguously with each other. Team cognition and performance have been studied increasingly, with the general idea that team cognition ­ultimately determines team performance. According to the shared-cognition approach, a team will have a shared goal, and the role of each member of the team is to contribute his or her skill to help the team achieve its goal. For successful team performance, the members should have a shared mental model, or common understanding, of the task. However, for any given task, the mental models for all individuals do not need to be identical. That is, each person’s mental model needs to contain the critical components that will allow completion of the component tasks. Just as important as the accuracy of the mental model are the transactions or communications between the team members. Again, not all team members need to know everything that is going on at a given moment, but all members need to know the state of shared information and other resources required for their individual tasks. This latter knowledge is typically referred to as shared awareness. An alternative to shared cognition is the theory of interactive team cognition, which places emphasis on actions in specific naturalistic environments. Thus, it shares the tradition of approaches such as situated cognition and ecological psychology. Whereas the level of analysis of the shared-­ cognition approach is the individual team members, that of the interactive approach is at the team level. The approach assumes that team behavior is an emergent property, which means that the team’s performance can never be understood through an analysis performed at the level of the individual team members. One key aspect of the theory is that team cognition is highly context dependent. Given that teamwork is required in any organization, there has been a focus on training team cognition in order to improve team performance. The type of training schedule used is specific to the nature of the team. For homogeneous teams, in which everyone does basically the same task, increasing the performance of any given individual will improve team performance.

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However, most teams are heterogeneous in that each member plays a specialized role, and, in this case, team coordination and communication are critical. In heterogeneous teams, the roles and responsibilities of individual members should be established unambiguously. Leadership is also critical, because decisions have to be made, and progress toward the team goal needs to be monitored. However, as illustrated in the next section, the nature of the interaction between individual team members as well as interactions of the team with other teams in the same system depends on the organization’s structural culture and philosophy.

Macroergonomics Individuals and teams are often part of a larger organization. The area of human factors that studies how humans are integrated within the larger organization is called macroergonomics. It incorporates the microergonomics of individual and team performance within the context of the higher organizational goals. The basic idea is that the organization’s goals may not be achieved if only the subsystems and individual-operator components are considered. Macroergonomics is closely related to industrial/organizational psychology, as already noted, but the emphasis goes beyond work design and personnel selection. Studies of macroergonomics examine how technology is implemented in organizations and how that technology can be combined effectively with the organization’s cultural goals. Macroergonomics is based on sociotechnical systems theory, which recognizes that any organization has both social and technical components that must be integrated for successful functioning. Because organizations have different structures, with some being strictly hierarchical and others more distributed, care must be taken to select the appropriate technologies to support the day-to-day functioning of the organization. The organizational structure also determines both how individuals and teams will function and interact with each other and the role of authority in the decision-making process. For example, an organization responsible for air traffic management is often hierarchically structured because safety is so critical that the operators working

within the system must follow rigid rules and regulations to prevent accidents from occurring. In contrast, a Web design organization may benefit from a more distributed structure, where individuals and teams are given more freedom in their design choices because a higher premium is placed on creativity and innovation. Among the macroergonomic factors that must be considered is that of organizational culture. The organization’s culture (also known as climate) drives the behaviors of the individuals working in it. Related questions are the following: Does the organization encourage or discourage opinions from minority groups? Does it encourage safety practices, such as work breaks that can prevent fatigue and cumulative-trauma disorders? Does the organization promote camaraderie or competition among individuals? Are the employees viewed as workers who have little say in management decisions, or are they seen as collaborators who contribute to the decision-making process of the organization? Advocates of macroergonomics favor a participatory design that views individuals within an organization as an integral part. For example, the participatory approach incorporates procedures to ensure that the employees’ input is solicited when new technologies are being introduced into the organization. It assumes that individuals who are invested in an organization will be more satisfied and more likely to contribute to the organization’s success. Finally, the globalization that has occurred as a consequence of advances in technology has created new challenges for organizations. A major challenge is the distribution of work across different components of the organization that are not colocated and that may be distributed around the world. For example, a global design team may have different groups of people in different places working on a product so that work occurs around the clock. Because information must be transferred from one individual or team to the next, technology is essential for this type of cooperative work. The transfer of information must take into account the nature of the information being transferred, the characteristics of the receiving team, and the means by which the transfer of information will take place. Transfer of information outside the

Human Information Processing

confines of a single work site poses security issues related to the storage and transfer of information. For example, privileged information needs to be accessible only to the appropriate parties. Kim-Phuong L. Vu and Robert W. Proctor See also Human Information Processing; Job Analysis; Perception and Cognition; Short-Term and Working Memory; Signal Detection Theory; Training and Personnel Development; Workforce Psychology; Working Memory, Improvement of

Further Readings Endsley, M. R., & Jones, D. G. (2012). Designing for situation awareness: An approach to user-centered design (2nd ed.). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Hendrick, H. W., & Kleiner, B. (Eds.). (2002). Macroergonomics: Theory, methods, and applications. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Proctor, R. W., & Van Zandt, T. (2008). Human factors in simple and complex systems (2nd ed.). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Proctor, R. W., & Vu, K.-P. L. (2010). Cumulative knowledge and progress in human factors. Annual Review of Psychology, 61, 623–651. Salas, E., Fiore, S. M., & Letsky, M. P. (Eds.). (2012). Theories of team cognition: Cross-disciplinary perspectives. New York, NY: Routledge.

Human Information Processing Human information processing refers to the internal activities of the mind that mediate the ­ relationship between stimulus and response. In contrast to behaviorism, this cognitivist perspective underscores the value of covert processes such as attention, perception, or memory for human thought and behavior. This entry discusses the study of human information processing. The circuitry that relays, analyzes, and transforms stimuli to produce responses has been ­likened to the wiring of a calculational c­ omputer— one that appropriately weighs input in order to generate successful output. The middle stage, the one in which the stimulus information is derived and considered, is central to information-­processing theory.

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Indeed, the use of the computer as a metaphor for thought began in the 1950s, as the cognitive revolution in psychology began to take hold. The computer provided a tangible icon for researchers and the public alike to use as a model for the workings of mind. Just as the computer might be used to predict an outcome using a highly complex algorithm, the human mind could examine and encode a series of environmental stimuli in order to develop a complex, behavioral response. Ulric Neisser’s 1967 text, Cognitive Psychology, provided the first formal characterization of the internal processing that mediated human response to the environment. The text provided a thesis for the field. A large portion of it focused on visual and auditory processing—two of the most accessible systems to measure. But it also provided a springboard for cognitivists as they began measuring covert systems in the laboratory. Unlike the introspective approaches that claimed to reveal an individual’s innermost voice or urges, the study of human information processing produced clever paradigms that led to the identification of distinct cognitive phenomena. The “black box” was no longer considered an invisible stage between stimulus and response. Rather, the processes residing within it were exposed as an organized system. For example, spatial processing could be distinguished from linguistic processing, human categorization was found to be highly deterministic, and rational decision making could be characterized as involving three distinct stages.

The Structure of the System At the outset of information processing, data are gathered from the environment. The stimuli attended to are then compared with the internal state of the observer. The mind and brain coordinate the relationship between the external world and the ­internal state in order to generate a response that satisfies both inputs. Often, this perception-action cycle is seamless. Consider a person reaching for a glass of water. Driven by an internal state, the observer perceives, approaches, reaches, and retrieves the desired stimulus. Rich circuits of perceptual and biomechanical systems are coactivated to achieve this seemingly automatic event, one that begins with a stimulus and ends with a response.

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The processes mediating the perception-action cycle may often be a simple translation from stimulus perception to response selection. The brevity of the cycle may require only use of short-term or working memory. In the previous example, the observer need only remember the location or material of the glass as an appropriate reaching response is generated. But other circumstances may require the use of long-term memory as well. For example, the glass may be tagged as special because it was one given to the observer as a gift. The long-term memory store may cause the manner of movement to be more precisely controlled. It can be difficult to understand that the information incorporated into reaching for a glass, in fact, may be processed in detail because the movement typically occurs at a relatively fast pace. The proper characterization of human information processing can be challenging because it is most often covert and automatic in nature.

Methods of Measurement Researchers have devised overt and covert methods for studying human information processing. From the domains of perception and action to those of consciousness and imagery to language and memory, the methods often incorporate psychophysical measures such as reaction time, accuracy, or item recall. Reaction time is among the simplest and most direct measures and has been used to assess a variety of processes, including level of difficulty, mental imagery, and network associations. For example, the time taken to label a picture of a cat after viewing a picture of a dog may be briefer because the two concepts are categorically similar and are processed by overlapping circuits. In contrast, more time would be needed to label a house after viewing a baseball mitt because the two concepts have little, if any, overlap in terms of processing circuits. Covert techniques for examining internal processes include the use of surprise or “catch” trials. In these types of experiments, test conditions are quickly altered in order to reveal the internal processing already occurring. For example, in an application of information processing to robotics, a leftward force field built into a robotic arm and that is removed without warning may result in the uncontrolled movement of the arm to the right.

Because the internal model governing the action plan was generated to anticipate the presence of the force field, quick removal of the field doesn’t allow enough time for correction. A simple version of this task can be demonstrated at home. Ask an individual to balance a heavy book on the palm of his or her hand. Later, when the book is suddenly removed, the hand reflexively rises up. Because a motor plan generated to hold the weighty object was already under way, quick removal of the stimulus unveiled the plan. Finally, neuroimaging techniques that depict the neural activation associated with information processing have provided some of the most concrete evidence of the mind at work. The demonstration of activation patterns that correspond to distinct types of internal processing reveal localized areas of function in the brain. For example, visual-cortex activation that shifts as a function of the size of the visual image offers one of the most compelling arguments for the spatial structure of the representation performed by the mind’s eye. From hemispheric specialization and the generalized processes associated with each of the four lobes of the brain to the specialized regions of the cortex for the senses, executive function, memory, and even faces, neuroimaging has unlocked much of the mystery long associated with the how and where of human information processing. Jennifer A. Stevens See also Attention; Cognitive Neuroscience; Embodied Cognition; Exceptional Memory and Expertise; Frontal Lobe Functions; Human Factors in Organizations; Memory as Reconstructive; Neuropsychology; Nonvisual Memory; Perception and Cognition; Reading Process, Models of; Signal Detection Theory

Further Readings Chubb, C., Dosher, B. A., Lu, Z.-L., & Shiffrin, R. M. (2013). Human information processing: Vision, memory, and attention. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive psychology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Pinker, S. (2009). How the mind works. New York: W. W. Norton.

Human Nature

Human Nature A few decades ago, E. O. Wilson’s On Human Nature put forward a controversial picture of human nature based on what he considered the best behavioral sciences of the time. Even today, it is not uncommon to call the behavioral sciences—including psychology, linguistics, and ­ anthropology—“sciences of human nature.” But is the notion of human nature scientifically acceptable? What should be done with it in light of evolutionary biology and contemporary genetics? This entry reviews the controversy about the existence and scientific importance of the idea of human nature. In 1986, in an influential article on the issue, David Hull wrote, All the ingenuity which has been exercised trying to show that all human beings are essentially the same might be better used trying to explain why we must all be essentially the same in order to have such things as human rights. . . . Until this question is answered, I remain suspicious of continued claims about the existence and importance of human nature. (pp. 11–12)

Michael Ghiselin concurred in his book Metaphysics and the Origins of Species: “What does evolution teach us about human nature? It tells us that human nature is a superstition” (p. 1). And David Buller wrote, The idea of a universal human nature is deeply antithetical to a truly evolutionary view of our species. . . . A truly evolutionary psychology should abandon the quest for human nature and with it any attempt to discover universal laws of human psychology. (p. 419)

A growing group of philosophers, including Edouard Machery, Karola Stotz, Paul Griffiths, Richard Samuels, Grant Ramsey, and others, have challenged the rejection of a human nature. These philosophers agree that the considerations put forward by Hull, Ghiselin, Buller, and others show that a traditional conception of human nature (the essentialist notion) is untenable, but they hold that instead of rejecting the notion of human nature,

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philosophers should reconceptualize it in light of contemporary science. The first section of this entry describes the notion of human nature targeted by its critics. The second section presents Hull’s influential argument against the notion of human nature, and the third reviews attempts to develop new notions of human nature that are both immune to Hull’s argument and c­ onsistent with contemporary science.

The Essentialist Notion of Human Nature What does it mean to say that human beings have a nature? Traditionally, human nature is viewed as the set of properties that are each necessary and jointly sufficient for being human. Human nature thus has a classificatory function: It defines human beings; it identifies what all humans have in common and what only humans have. Furthermore, each property is distinctive of human beings: Human nature distinguishes human beings from nonhuman animals. Finally, human nature has a causal function: It accounts for other properties human beings tend to have. Philosophers historically have characterized human nature in various ways. Ancient philosophers highlighted rationality (logos in Greek and ratio in Latin) as the distinctive feature of humans. Descartes singled out language and the distinctively human capacity to produce an infinite number of novel sentences. Human nature has also long played a normative role: It is taken to imply that some behaviors, thoughts, character traits, and so on are good and others bad and condemnable. The notion of human nature has thus played an oppressive role, justifying limits imposed on various groups (e.g., women).

Hull’s Criticism of the Notion of Human Nature Hull put forward a devastating criticism of the essentialist notion of human nature. According to that notion, human beings have a nature if and only if there is a set of properties that all human beings, and only human beings, possess. However, the existence of such a set is biologically unlikely, and if it happens to occur during the evolution of a species, its occurrence is temporary and contingent. Hence, there is no human nature.

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The first premise of the argument follows from the essentialist notion of human nature. The second, and crucial, premise of the argument expresses an evolutionary understanding of the concept of species. Belonging to a species is not a matter of possessing particular properties; rather, it is a genealogical matter. For instance, one belongs to the human species if and only if one’s parents belonged to the human species. Furthermore, the process of evolution does not require homogeneity among conspecifics. Although some forms of natural selection reduce diversity (e.g., stabilizing selection), others don’t (e.g., frequency-dependent selection). When conspecifics live in distinct environments, stabilizing selection may increase diversity within a species; genetic mutations and ontogeny create diversity, too. Hull’s conclusion follows from these two premises. One could perhaps respond that species should be defined statistically instead of in terms of necessary and sufficient properties. That is, to belong to a species means having a sufficient number of properties from a set of properties. Hull considered this possible response and rejected it. He rightly noted that a similar approach characterized “phonetics,” an influential, but ultimately failed, approach to cladistics (the science of biological classification). For Hull, as for most biologists, the only satisfying way to define species membership is genealogical.

Reconceptualizing Human Nature Most philosophers grant that Hull’s argument invalidates the essentialist notion of human nature, but many believe that there is room for a new, scientifically valid notion of human nature, although they disagree about its content. Machery has proposed a nomological notion of human nature: Human nature is the set of properties that human beings tend to possess as a result of the evolution of their lineage. Thus, bipedality, smiling, biparental investment in offspring, cognitive development, and the structure of the human brain are all part of human nature. The nomological approach contrasts sharply with the essentialist. The former notion does not define what it is to be a human being since it does not consist in a set of properties that are separately necessary and jointly sufficient for belonging to the

human species. Bipedality is constitutive of human nature, but being a human being is not a matter of being bipedal. According to the nomological notion, the properties that are constitutive of human nature need not be universal; they simply need to be widespread among human beings. Some humans cannot speak, although language is part of human nature according to the nomological view. These properties need not be distinctive either. They can be common to human beings and to other animal species, as is, for instance, smiling. They are not fixed: Human nature can change and probably will continue to as the species evolves. Moreover, human nature is not normative. There is nothing wrong in failing to have one or more properties that are constitutive of human nature. Finally, not all properties that human beings have are constitutive of human nature. Rather, it is only those widespread properties that human beings have because of evolutionary ancestry that are included in human nature. Samuels has proposed a different notion of human nature: the causal-essentialist notion. In this view, human nature is a set of empirically discoverable, proximate, causal mechanisms that causally explain the covarying properties that human beings tend to possess. Samuels and Machery agree on key points. Human nature does not define human beings, and as a result, Samuels’s notion, like Machery’s, is immune to Hull’s argument. Both also acknowledge the existence of properties that human beings tend to possess. What they disagree about is whether to identify human nature with these properties or with the proximate mechanisms that causally explain why human beings tend to have them in common. For Machery, but not for Samuels, bipedality is constitutive of human nature. For Samuels, the proximate mechanisms that causally explain bipedality and other covarying properties are what is meant by human nature. Ramsey’s life-history trait cluster view of human nature differs substantially from Samuels’s and Machery’s proposals about human nature. In Ramsey’s view, human nature is the set of all possible life histories human beings can have. Although it encompasses not only all the traits humans have but also all those they can have, it occupies only a small part of the primate life histories space and an even smaller part of the mammalian life histories

Humanistic Theories of Personality

space. Ramsey’s notion does not single out either those traits that are widespread among human beings or those traits that are the product of evolution. It does not identify causal mechanisms but, instead, the products of the causal mechanisms that shape human phenotypes. Edouard Machery See also Cultural Evolution; Culture, Origins of; Evolutionary Psychology; Natural Selection; Nature Versus Nurture

Further Readings Downes, S., & Machery, E. (2014). Arguing about human nature. New York, NY: Routledge. Ghiselin, M. T. (1997). Metaphysics and the origins of species. Albany: State University of New York Press. Hull, D. L. (1986). On human nature. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 2, 3–13. Machery, E. (2008). A plea for human nature. Philosophical Psychology, 21, 321–330. Machery, E. (2012). Reconceptualizing human nature: Response to Lewens. Philosophy & Technology, 25, 475–478. Ramsey, G. (2013). Human nature in a post-essentialist world. Philosophy of Science, 80, 983–993. Samuels, R. (2012). Science and human nature. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 70, 1–28.

Humanistic Theories Personality

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For humanistic psychologists, wellness involves immersion in an ongoing experience of the authentic self. Humanistic theories of personality place emphasis on the development of authenticity as the focal quest of being human. Authenticity, which arises in the striving for congruence, refers to the genuine consistency among a person’s experiences, thoughts, and behavior. The work of humanistic psychologist Carl Rogers (1902–1987) may represent the core tenets of humanistic personality theory most fully. Rogers revolutionized psychology with his development of a personcentered theory wherein the individual is conceived of as growing toward wholeness. For

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Rogers, subjective experiences of the self in the world innately direct the individual to grow toward wholeness, even through states of what some would refer to as mental illness. A healthy person exercises free will in the context of existential constraints, thereby generating meaning. Humanistic psychologists privilege the conscious state of being human as an innate orientation toward the generation of meaning. Rogers proposed that the core conditions for meaning making are unconditional positive regard, empathy, and congruence. The latter term refers to the internalized alignment between the individual’s ideal self and the self-image, which is subject to external constraints and evaluative frameworks, so it does not always align clearly with the ideal self. Striving for congruence, or genuineness, represents a condition necessary for growth toward wholeness. This entry reviews the history and contributions of humanistic psychology and touches on challenges to the theory.

Cultural Precipitants of Humanistic Theories of Personality Cultural perspectives on the nature of human experience have shifted dramatically over the course of history. Traumatic human events during the mid-20th century provoked a widespread cultural reevaluation of the human experience. World War II and the European Holocaust reflected an era of the devaluation of the sanctity of the human being. In many ways, humanistic theories of psychology arose in response to the collapse of the myth of human progress, including the mystery and complexity of human experience. In sharp contrast with biomedical emphases on the observation and modification of behavior, humanistic psychology assumes a human self coming into being. Indeed, the word psychology refers to the study of the soul. Psychological theories in the mid-19th century echoed a cultural reduction of humans to simple behaviors and neuroses. Biologically oriented psychological theorists conceptualized the human personality using the mechanistic culture of the period. Steam-driven and hydraulic engines, machines that drew from opposing forces, were reflected in the opposing drive forces conceptualized by Sigmund Freud. Freud’s psychoanalytic

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theory introduced a comprehensive view of dynamic human personality, but retained a biomedical emphasis and deterministic view of the human experience. A century later, B. F. Skinner’s behaviorism denied the existence of mind and soul, thereby limiting human being to an amalgam of moldable behaviors. Humanism regained support in Europe and the Americas when deterministic, mechanistic views of the human being failed to provide an adequate framework for the complexities of conscious human experience. For personality theorists, such conceptualizations of human experience neglected free will in the quest for meaning. Mechanistic views classified people as good and evil, true and false, and healthy and ill. The predominant Western, Judeo-Christian concepts of morality were congruent with these categorizations. In this way, conditional judgments of worth could be placed on human beings. Such judgments are categorically abolished in humanistic theories of personality. Rather, human beings are viewed as whole persons, irreducible to mechanistic, biological processes.

Salient Theoretical Contributions In reaction to the limitations of internal and external worlds, humanistic theorists advocated a study of human beings based in the subjective, experiential truth of the individual. Humanistic theories of personality emerged with the growing cultural interest in being as opposed to doing. That is, rather than privileging the study and refinement of measurable and quantifiable abilities, humanistic psychologists emphasized the subjective quality of meaning derived from lived experience. From the perspective of humanistic psychologists, human experience is not a stable state but rather a mode of becoming, a process of growth toward greater meaning. Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) described a phenomenological method of perceiving the essence of immediate human experience in its unique context. He proposed that truth could be established only by analyzing phenomena apart from any generalized theoretical assumptions. Later, humanistic theorists recognized the impracticality of this bracketing of subjectivity and held that consciousness implicates intentionality—an ancient term

that refers to the ability to represent phenomena mentally as the defining experience of consciousness. Thus, the role of intentionality is foundational in the study of being from the perspective of the subject. Humanistic psychologists now recognize the limitations of bracketing generalized knowledge about human experience. Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) pointed out the impracticality of abandoning all subjectivity. Indeed, being was the only reliable methodology for understanding conscious human experience, so all attempts to understand human experience must be undertaken from a stance of humility. Heidegger called for a phenomenological view of the human “being” through ontology, the study of being. He broadened the definition of phenomenology to describe that which is being studied from the perspective of the subject. In this way, Heidegger gave preference to a study of being wherein the subject, being, speaks for itself. The process, then, is necessarily iterative. A being, studied, speaks for itself, and thereby comes more into its own “beingness,” which, in turn, is capable of speaking more for itself, thus evoking a more authentic beingness and perpetuating the cycle of self-study. Ludwig Binswanger (1881–1966) expanded on Heidegger’s concept of being-in-the-world as a human condition constrained by social, physical, and internal mental frameworks. Humanistic psychologists tend to describe the focal human process of development as one advancing toward the engagement of needs at the highest level, which is meaning making. Selfactualization denotes the ultimate mode of an innate human tendency of growth toward wholeness, wherein the individual acts freely while acknowledging the reality of inevitable constraints in life. Abraham Maslow (1908–1970) departed from deterministic theories of psychology by separating the essential being from the symptoms that it experienced. He understood symptomatology as the expression of innate needs and went on to hierarchize these universal needs in his seminal work on self-actualization. He posited that the thwarting of a basic need can manifest symptoms of pathology. In a particularly salient human­ istic theory of personality, Maslow’s peak of

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hierarchical needs represents engagement in ­progressively self-­actualizing modes of being. Rogers drew on phenomenological imperatives to postulate the value of unconditional positive regard as complete acceptance of another human being in all circumstances, thereby occupying an empathic relational stance in alignment with the individual’s innate growth orientation. Distressing psychological symptoms reflect an individual’s experiencing of the world in such a way that the inner world becomes available for expression in the exterior world. Authenticity in creative meaning making, then, provides an antidote for the incongruence that emerges in distressing experiences of the self-image in relation to the ideal self. For many humanistic theorists of personality, free will presents the individual with certain responsibilities in the context of existential limitations. Rollo May (1909–1994) emphasized the personal responsibility of the human being to assert the subjective experience of her or his authentic self. James Bugental (1915–2008), deeply influenced by both May and Rogers, advanced a conceptualization of the human being as a self-in-process, as opposed to a self-as-content. He emphasized present-moment awareness as a device for making conscious, existential decisions in the process of creating value through intentional meaning making. R. D. Laing (1927–1989) founded the antipsychiatry movement. He was interested in the subjective experience of all humans, especially those with stigmatizing diagnoses. He took the psychoanalytic perspective that environment and history constrained the individual to the point of hysterics. Rather than segregate the ill from the healthy, he chose to integrate them as a way of understanding that all individuals are the same in their uniqueness, thereby humanizing those diagnosed with mental illness.

Challenges to Humanistic Psychology Modern biomedical science values the strict objectivity of mechanistic conceptualizations of human behavior. Current trends in psychological science favor rigorous objective analysis. In stark contrast with humanistic principles of personality, clinical interventions for expressions of human suffering are designed to effect behavioral modification primarily through reinforcement or medication or

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both. Rather than accepting behavioral expressions of human need as fully human attempts at growth, experiences that seem to fall outside of the “normal” range of functioning receive diagnoses of pathology. In reaction to what they consider a disempowering and simplistic understanding of human existence, many personality theorists assert humanistic concepts to account for comprehensive processes in the human psyche. Nader Robert Shabahangi, Jacob Feiner Engelskirger, Kyrié Sue Carpenter, and Stephanie Rothman See also Existential Theories of Personality; Humanistic Theories of Psychopathology; Phenomenological, Existential, and Hermeneutical Therapies

Further Readings Golomb, J. (1995). In search of authenticity: Existentialism from Kierkegaard to Camus (Problems of modern European thought). London, England: Routledge. May, R., Angel, E., & Ellenberger, H. F. (1958). Existence: A new dimension in psychiatry and psychology. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. Rogers, C. (1980). A way of being. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin.

Humanistic Theories Psychopathology

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Humanistic psychology, which began as a movement against psychoanalysis and behaviorism in the 1950s and 1960s, remains a viable “third force” in psychology, because it provides a unique perspective on mental health and psychopathology. It questions the medical model and the usefulness of the ever-increasing labeling of mental disorders. Instead, it emphasizes the study of the whole person, especially each person’s potentials. It assumes that individuals have the freedom and courage to transcend biological and environmental influences to create their own future. Adopting a holistic approach, humanistic psychology emphasizes the phenomenological reality of the

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experiencing person in context. This entry describes both historical and current humanistic perspectives of mental health. It also indicates how deficiencies in meeting basic psychological human needs can result in psychopathology.

Historical Overview of Humanistic Psychology Humanistic psychology can restore human dignity to mainstream psychology by means of values, such as personal agency, freedom of the will, selfactualization, authenticity, and an innate motivation to make life better for the self and society. In terms of methodology, humanistic psychology argues that the subjective and conscious experience of the individual is more important than the objective observation of behavior. Thus, it favors a phenomenological approach over scientific experimentation. The three leading figures of the humanistic movement were Carl Rogers, Abraham Maslow, and Rollo May. They all shared the orientation described earlier but differed in their views of psychopathology. Carl Rogers (1902–1987)

American psychologist Carl Rogers was optimistic and positive about human nature. He believed that people are innately good, creative, rational, and motivated by the universal tendency to fulfill their potential and become self-actualized. A positive childhood experience and a supportive environment facilitated self-actualization. However, people become maladapted and destructive when environmental constraints ­damage a person’s self-concept and override the ­positive, organismic-valuing process that enables individuals to make value judgments and constructive choices. The lack of congruence between a person’s “ideal self” and actual self-concept is the main source of psychopathology. Rogers also recognized that people experience existential ­anxiety when they conform themselves to other people’s expectations rather than accept themselves the way they are. Their growth tendency is arrested, and emotional problems ensue when pleasing others and receiving rewards become more important than listening to their inner voice and creating their own future.

Rogers advocated a person-centered approach to counseling, education, and management. He believed that when there is a supportive, trusting environment characterized by empathy, unconditional positive regard, and congruence (genuineness), individuals have the potential to solve their own problems and find their own ways to move forward. A therapist needs to possess these qualities in order to be effective. Rollo May (1909–1994)

May shared Rogers’s belief that people have the freedom and courage to be authentic and fulfill their potentials. They are motivated to become fully functioning human beings and develop positive self-identities as beings of worth and dignity. A major source of malady and anxiety is the loss of traditional values and erosion of human dignity. Paradoxically, to preserve their sense of self, people need to learn to give up self-centeredness and reach out to others. In other words, self-transcendence may help restore a sense of personal significance. For May, addressing existential anxiety is more important than coping with situational or realistic anxiety. However, unlike Rogers, May believed that people are capable of both good and evil. He postulated that the daimon system involving anger, sex, and power has the potential to get out of control and limit one’s potential for authentic living and thus propel a person to engage in evil deeds, when the daimon is not properly integrated with the self. Thus, when one is not able to develop a balanced and integrated sense of self, the daimon system may take control of the person, resulting in psychopathology or self-destructive acts or both. Abraham Maslow (1908–1970)

Maslow was best known for his hierarchy of needs, a theory of psychological health based on fulfilling innate human needs, culminating in selfactualization. Self-actualized people have fulfilled all their potentials and enjoy a healthy and balanced personality. They demonstrate the best of humanity as described by the B-values, such as being loving and creative. They are not only fully functioning but also spiritual.

Humanistic Theories of Psychopathology

In his later years, Maslow realized that some people may become selfish and evil by seeking selfactualization and peak experiences as the highest good. They may act like prima donnas, by being selfish and mean to others. As a result, he revised the hierarchy of needs to include s­ elf-transcendence as the highest need, an antidote to excessive preoccupation with self-actualization. He was moving toward the position of Viktor Frankl, the founder of logotherapy, which focuses on meaning seeking and self-transcendence.

Contemporary Perspectives Although the heyday of humanistic psychology is over, there are signs of a renaissance in contemporary spokespersons who have broadened the base of humanistic psychology to incorporate fresh ideas in transpersonal, existential, cross-cultural, and positive psychology. Kirk Schneider

Schneider is the leading spokesperson for contemporary humanistic psychology. His approach is more integrative and broader minded than earlier humanistic approaches. He is concerned with the question of why people develop extreme behavior patterns that can be detrimental to mental health. In The Paradoxical Self, he proposed the “paradox principle” to deal effectively with a variety of dysfunctional syndromes. Schneider also proposed a new theory to account for extreme, destructive behaviors in The Polarized Mind: Why It’s Killing Us and What We Can Do About It. Drawing from existential psychology and historical cases, the book details the polarized mind and shows why it has been a pervasive ­mental health and societal problem, manifesting as addiction, bullying, violence, and tyranny. He attributes it to dogmatic thinking and deep-rooted anxiety about the insignificance and smallness of one’s life. To combat polarization, Schneider proposes awe-based wisdom, which encourages acceptance of existential anxieties and vulnerabilities, at the same time embracing the wonder and mysteries of being. When people recognize that they are part of something much greater than themselves, they will have the capacity to be both courageous and fluid

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in dealing with disappointments, anger, and suffering. In other words, cultivating a nondogmatic sense of awe may inspire a larger, spiritual vision of life and reduce polarized thinking and psychopathology. Schneider’s existential-integrative psychotherapy employs concepts such as balancing individual freedom with interpersonal connectedness, selftranscendence, and the paradoxical principle. In sum, an awe-based approach to psychotherapy empowers clients to live and experience a more fluid, humble, and spiritual life and move away from self-centered values, such as consumerism and competiveness. Louis Hoffman

Hoffman favors a postmodern view that conceptualizes the self as complex and ultimately unknowable. He argues that personal and collective myths are important for making sense of the human condition, human destiny, and mental ­illness. His main contribution to humanistic-existential psychology is his emphasis on culture, especially cultural myths, in sustaining mental health. Psychotherapy consists of addressing existential anxieties in terms of personal and cultural myths. According to Hoffman, meaning is of central importance to humanistic-existential psychology. Meaning is holistic and involves cognitive, emotional, interpersonal, unconscious, cultural, and spiritual factors. The dynamic meaning system enables individuals to recognize their own potentials and transcend their limitations and negative emotions. Psychopathology is likely to occur when ­ people ­cannot accept existential anxieties as normal or universal. Therapy helps clients gain a deeper understanding of the human condition and develop a personal myth that makes sense of the predicaments of life and the limitations of personal freedom. Paul T. P. Wong

Wong’s meaning-centered approach to humanistic psychology expands Frankl’s work on logotherapy and Rogers’s person-centered approach. The best way to understand the person or the self is to understand the ever-evolving, dynamic meaning system that is the basis of flourishing and resilience. People are more likely to live fully when they have

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a sense of personal significance and a worthy life goal; they are more likely to survive adversity when they give meaning to their suffering. Wong shares the core tenets of other contemporary humanistic-existential psychologists. However, unlike them, he is committed to integrating positive psychology with humanistic psychology in both research and psychotherapy. His meaningcentered approach is an attempt to achieve that integration in order to understand the personal meaning that governs people’s everyday lives and enables them to cope with suffering, death, and other existential anxieties. Wong critiques positive psychology for using a reductionist and molecular approach to meaning and for focusing only on the positive aspects of life. He considers a reformulated humanistic psychology to hold the most promise for creating a better future for individuals and humanity. It does so by virtue of its ability to confront the dark side of human existence and human nature and, at the same time, to affirm the inherent dignity and worth of each individual regardless of his or her circumstances. According to Wong, humanistic psychology not only puts forward a noble vision of humanity that can uplift the spirit of every suffering person but also proposes a research and applied program to transform individuals and society through meaning management. In meaning therapy, Wong focuses on restoring clients’ sense of human dignity and worth as well as empowering them to find ways to meet their basic human needs for meaning, such as meaningful engagement with life and meaningful relationships. Failing to meeting these fundamental human needs is responsible for many mental health problems, such as depression, anxiety, and suicide. Applications of meaning therapy include exploring one’s self-identity and what really matters in life. Meaning is defined in terms of purpose, understanding, responsibility, and enjoyment (PURE). Another major intervention strategy is ABCDE, which stands for acceptance, belief (affirmation), commitment, discovery, and evaluation. It encourages clients to accept whatever life pre­ sents them while still believing that life is worth living. Doing so provides for commitment to responsible action, discovering resources and solutions, and evaluating progress. In sum, the therapist helps clients see life and human existence with

a meaning mind-set rather than a happiness or success mind-set. This switch from ego to meaning may be effective in resolving personal problems and moving forward.

Conclusions Since the mid-1960s there have been remarkable scientific and technological progress and material prosperity. However, materialism, hedonism, the digital revolution, cutthroat competition, and exploitation have resulted in the loss of human dignity and perceived worth of individual lives. The value of the humanistic perspective is that it confers inherent dignity and value on human life and each person. This serves as an antidote to the prevailing tendency toward dehumanization, which accounts for many of the miseries in society. The reformulated humanistic theory can be summarized as follows: a. It is person centered and therefore holistic and integrative. The person as a whole is always more than the sum of its parts. b. It is meaning centered and therefore encompasses existential psychology, transpersonal psychology, and the positive psychology of meaning. c. It affirms the intrinsic meaning, value, and dignity of every human life because of its inherent capacities for spirituality, autonomy, growth, uniqueness, and creativity and because of the personal responsibility to self-actualize through self-transcendence. d. It also recognizes the dark side of human nature and the human condition and therefore empowers people to accept, overcome, and transcend their individual and collective shadow. e. It affirms the human potential for growth in spite of the limitations of the human condition. f. It affirms that the person is a being in the world and cannot be understood apart from his or her social and cultural world and personal circumstances. g. It recognizes that mental health can be sustained by cultivating personal growth and cocreating an environment with humanistic values.

Hypnosis

h. It takes a postmodern stance toward research and thus recognizes the legitimacy of and need for different research methodologies in order to understand complex human phenomena.

Paul T. P. Wong See also Behavioral Perspectives on Psychopathology; Culture and Psychopathology; Historical Roots of Theories of Psychopathology; Humanistic Theories of Personality; Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Psychopathology

Further Readings Maslow, A. H. (1970). Religions, values, and peak experiences. New York, NY: Penguin. (Original work published 1964) May, R. (1999). Freedom and destiny. New York, NY: W. W. Norton. Rogers, C. (1961). On becoming a person: A therapist’s view of psychotherapy. London, England: Constable. Schneider, K. J. (2013). The polarized mind: Why it’s killing us and what we can do about it. Colorado Springs, CO: University Professors Press. Wong, P. T. P. (Ed.). (2012). The human quest for meaning: Theories, research, and applications (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.

Hypnosis Hypnosis has, by turns, fascinated, challenged, and inspired theorists to account for phenomena as diverse as alterations in memory, perception, sensation, and the ordinary sense of volitional control over actions. From the time of Franz Anton Mesmer (1734–1815), hypnosis theorists have been impressed by radical changes in subjective experiences brought about by hypnotic suggestions, but they have disagreed sharply over the reasons for such extraordinary transformations in consciousness. In this entry, the focus is on modern theories of hypnosis, starting with Sigmund Freud and continuing to the present, in which hypnosis has moved slowly but surely into the sphere of mainstream scientific investigation.

Psychoanalytic Views Freud equated hypnosis to being in love. Although contemporary psychoanalytic theorists

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reject the idea that hypnosis promotes a sexualized connection between therapist and patient, some have proposed that hypnosis promotes openness (ego receptivity), primary process thinking (e.g., fantasy, imagination), and regression in service of the ego (e.g., creativity)—all concepts derived from ego psychology, an ­offshoot of psychoanalysis. Contemporary psychoanalytic theorists argue that hypnotic age regression (i.e., suggestions to mentally revisit an earlier time in life) does not bring about a literal regression or reinstatement of childhood experience. Indeed, people who are hypnotized do not behave like children. Rather, they behave like adults acting “as if” they were children. Michael Nash’s comprehensive review based on more than 100 studies suggested that hypnosis promotes a psychological regression associated with increased fantasy, intense and spontaneous emotion, unusual body sensations, the experience of automaticity of actions, and transference of ­feelings onto the hypnotist. Although several studies suggest that hypnosis increases primary process thinking, additional research is necessary to determine why this is the case. For example, increased fantasy and imagination and unusual body sensations may be the byproduct of suggestions for eye closure, relaxation, and attention to imagery rather than any special properties of hypnosis. Studies have found that reports of unusual perceptual and bodily experiences during and after hypnosis are comparable to the reports of nonhypnotized subjects who are tested with their eyes closed or when they are instructed to relax, imagine suggested events, and focus on body parts (e.g., hands) targeted by hypnotic suggestions. Accordingly, there seems to be nothing particularly special or unique about subjective reports obtained during hypnosis. The same may be true for the contention that hypnosis is marked by a strong rapport with the hypnotist. More specifically, rapport may be engendered by feelings of success generated by response to the hypnotist and the suggestions administered rather than arising from a special feature of hypnosis or the hypnotic relationship. Although some studies indicate that hypnotized subjects experience greater emotionality compared with nonhypnotized subjects, other findings are less conclusive.

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Neodissociation Theory

Sociocognitive Theory

Ernest Hilgard’s neodissociation theory, proposed in 1977, is one of the most influential perspectives on hypnosis. It is based on the idea that an “executive ego” is responsible for bringing multiple cognitive systems or cognitive structures under control by planning and monitoring what is occurring in the body and the external world. Hilgard hypothesized that an amnesic barrier prevents ideas, imaginings, and fantasies from reaching consciousness. One’s normal sense of control is dissociated from consciousness while diminished executive control and monitoring of actions produce the feeling of nonvolition during hypnosis. The impetus for the theory was Hilgard’s discovery of a fascinating phenomenon he called the hidden observer. He coined the term to describe what occurs when a person appears to register and store information in memory without being aware that the information already had been processed. In a typical study, high-hypnotizable participants are able to recover concealed experiences or memories of pain during hypnotic suggestions for analgesia when they are informed that they possess a hidden part that can experience high levels of pain during analgesia and that the hypnotist can contact this part with a prearranged cue. Hidden-observer studies of hallucinations, hypnotic deafness, and hypnotic blindness have stirred controversy. Nicholas Spanos and his associates have shown that hidden-observer reports depend on the instructions conveyed about the hidden observer (e.g., whether the hidden observer is to report on more-or-less hidden pain), implying that the hidden observer is actually a suggested phenomenon, much like other suggested phenomena shaped by expectations and beliefs. Others have proposed that hypnotic suggestions trigger responses by activating the subsystems of control directly, thereby bypassing the subject’s executive control. Thus, these researchers rejected Hilgard’s idea that amnesia is integral to hypnosis. John Kihlstrom extended neodissociation theory by emphasizing how failures to monitor thoughts and actions could account for many hypnotic phenomena, including hypnotic analgesia and posthypnotic suggestion. Although the neodissociation perspective continues to provoke controversy, it drives much contemporary hypnosis research.

The sociocognitive perspective competes with neodissociation theory for support. As its name implies, the theory emphasizes social and cognitive determinants of hypnotic responding and holds that despite profound alterations in consciousness, hypnotic behavior and experience can be accounted for in terms of participants’ expectancies, attitudes, motivation, and beliefs—the same variables that govern many nonhypnotic social behaviors. The origins of the sociocognitive perspective can be traced to Theodore Sarbin’s challenge to the traditional concept of hypnosis as an altered or trance state of consciousness. Sarbin argued that participants experience hypnotic phenomena when they come to believe in suggestion-related imaginings and become engaged in a role they associate with being a good hypnotic subject, much like an actor gets involved in a theatrical role. The hypnotist assumes the role of “director,” scripting the hypnotic proceedings. Sarbin and his colleague William Coe highlighted the importance of the participants’ (a) knowledge of what it means to be a good hypnotic subject and the role that is to be enacted, (b) selfand role-related perceptions, (c) expectations, (d) imaginative skills, and (e) the situational cues or demand characteristics that guide hypnotic performance. T. X. Barber was inspired by Sarbin’s critique and found further fault with the altered-state concept because of its logical circularity (i.e., hypnotic responsiveness can both indicate the existence of a hypnotic state and be explained by it). In the 1960s and early 1970s, Barber and his associates identified antecedents of hypnotic behaviors, including (a) participants’ ability to imagine suggested events; (b) their attitudes, beliefs, expectations, and interpretations regarding how to respond; and (c) their motivations to respond to suggestions. The finding that motivated participants who do not undergo hypnosis and participants who do undergo hypnosis respond comparably to suggestions provided evidence for the contention that hypnotic responses are not the product of radically altered consciousness. In the late 1990s, Barber suggested that the great majority of people respond to hypnosis as a function of “sociocognitive variables,” including

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expectancies, beliefs, and attitudes. Nevertheless, a subset of participants’ responses reflects a natural by-product of their extensive history of fantasy involvements, and a still smaller subset of participants experience profound dissociations (e.g., spontaneous amnesia). Barber’s theory thus integrates sociocognitive and dissociation accounts. Spanos highlighted social-psychological processes and evaluated the hypothesis that hypnosis is a stable trait. His research demonstrated that hypnotizability can be increased substantially with a social learning, cognitive skills–based training program that debunks myths about hypnosis (e.g., hypnosis is a trance, people lose control), encourages participants to imagine as the suggestions are presented, and enhances participants’ expectancies about successful responding. This program has successfully modified the hypnotizability of about half of low-hypnotizable participants so that after training, they test as high hypnotizable. Participants who complete suggestibility training respond to novel suggestions across test situations not associated with the original training. Still, because not all individuals test as highly suggestible, it implies that variables other than those delineated by sociocognitive theorists play a role in hypnotic responding. Spanos also contended that hypnosis involves strategic, goal-directed responding, a view shared by Steven Lynn and his colleagues, who considered hypnotizable subjects as creative problem-solving agents who seek to integrate information from situational, personal, and interpersonal sources to respond to hypnotic suggestions. This view placed less emphasis on mere compliance with hypnotic suggestions than does Spanos’s. Irving Kirsch’s response expectancy theory proposed that expectancies generate nonvolitional responses. According to Kirsch, hypnosis is a nondeceptive placebo that enhances participants’ beliefs and expectancies about successful responding. Kirsch has shown that when experimenters increase participants’ expectancies about their ability to respond to suggestions (e.g., amnesia, suggestion-related nonvolition), it increases the likelihood of their successful response. Kirsch suggested (a) that there is a close tie between responsiveness to nonhypnotic and hypnotic suggestions and (b) that expectations of increased responding during hypnosis, combined with the motivation to

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respond to suggestions perceived as “hypnotic,” account for the small advantage of “hypnotic” suggestions. Kenneth Bowers, Campbell Perry, and Nash have each maintained that sociocognitive models exaggerate the goal-directed and strategic nature of hypnosis. Moreover, purposefulness and nonvolition may coexist in hypnosis. For Bowers, research demonstrated that (a) compliance and social ­influence may account for the behavior of lowhypnotizable participants, but different (dissociative) mechanisms apply to those who are high hypnotizable; (b) responses can occur in the absence of suggestion-related fantasies and imaginings (e.g., imagining a hand is light and lifting); and (c) even when such fantasies accompany suggested responses, dissociation provides a better account for why people respond to suggestions. According to Kirsch and Lynn’s response set theory, all actions occur automatically at the moment they are activated rather than by conscious intentions. Response sets (i.e., intentions, expectations) prepare actions for automatic activation, and hypnotic suggestions trigger response sets that influence thoughts, feelings, and actions. Similarly, Zoltán Dienes and Josef Perner’s ­cold-control theory of hypnosis argued that unconscious intentions influenced by beliefs and expectations can account for the feelings of involuntariness that often accompany hypnotic suggestions. These theories bridged sociocognitive and dissociation perspectives. Like sociocognitive theories, phenomenological/ interactive theories underscore the participant’s experience and the interaction of multiple variables. In the late 1950s, Martin Orne was impressed with the rich, subjective experiences that often accompany suggestions and contended that subtle cognitive changes occur during hypnosis. Orne devised a method that involved instructing lowsuggestible participants to role-play (i.e., simulate) hypnosis in order to identify subtle cognitive characteristics he believed constituted the “essence” of hypnosis. If highly suggestible participants’ performance was indistinguishable from that of simulators, Orne reasoned, the responses of the former could potentially be attributed to the same social cues or demands that shaped the latter’s performance. Research using Orne’s simulation method

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demonstrated that many hypnotic responses that had been assumed to reflect a hypnotic state could instead be the product of expectations transmitted to participants by the social demands of the experimental situation. Peter Sheehan’s contextual model was strongly influenced by the work of J. Philip Sutcliff and highlights the variability in hypnotic responses produced by the interaction between the participant and the hypnotic context. Sheehan contends that hypnosis can be distinguished from waking behavior by hypnotized individuals’ “motivated cognitive commitment” to respond to s­uggestions—a commitment fostered by a special rapport between the hypnotist and the participant. According to Kevin McConkey, the impressive variability that typifies responses to suggestions can be explained in terms of the ways participants interpret and ascribe meaning to suggestions, the ways they process suggestions cognitively, and the strategies they implement to respond to suggestions. McConkey’s research and studies by Amanda Barnier and Richard Bryant implied that high hypnotizability reflects the ability to process information that is both consistent and inconsistent with a suggested event but that facilitates belief in the reality of the event. Theoretical controversies have propelled research on hypnosis and hypnotic phenomena to

illuminate what was once a poorly understood and often-maligned domain of inquiry. Continued work on sharpening similarities and differences among theoretical perspectives, identifying possibilities for rapprochement among theories, and pursuing the neural underpinnings of suggestion and suggestibility will further the understanding of hypnosis. Joseph P. Green and Steven Jay Lynn See also Consciousness, Consciousness and the Unconscious; Categories of; Extended Mind; Pain; Reinforcement; Short-Term and Working Memory; Working Memory, Improvement of;

Further Readings Barber, T. X., Spanos, N. P., & Chaves, J. (1974). Hypnosis, imagination, and human potentialities. New York, NY: Pergamon Press. Lynn, S. J., & Rhue, J. W. (1991). Theories of hypnosis: Current models and perspectives. New York, NY: Guilford Press. Nash, M. R., & Barnier, A. J. (2008). The Oxford handbook of hypnosis: Theory, research, and practice. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Spanos, N., & Chavez, J. F. (Eds.). (1989). Hypnosis: The cognitive-behavioral perspective. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.

I differences, uniqueness, and individualism over similarity, sameness, and collectivism. Collectivity refers to a focus on groups that individuals belong to. These groups can be small (e.g., a family) or large, encompassing many ­people that are not all personally known to the individual (e.g., a society). When individuals value collectivity, they prioritize the achievement of collective over personal goals. Because of their focus on the group, individuals are willing to make sacrifices for the common good and are concerned with maintaining harmonious relationships with other group members. Those who adopt collectivity as a worldview are also more likely to draw sharp boundaries between those who are members of the group (i.e., in-group members) and those who are outsiders (i.e., out-group members).

Individuality Versus Collectivity Whereas individuality refers to a focus on the individual, collectivity involves a focus on the group or the collective whereby the individual is not so much recognized in terms of the person’s unique features but as a member of a group. This entry first elaborates on these definitions and then reviews the measurement of individuality and ­collectivity. The second part of the entry addresses the consequences of individuality and collectivity and discusses how the two concepts relate to each other. Specifically, although individuality and collectivity are often thought of as opposites on a continuum (so that more of one implies less of the other), many researchers now argue that individuality and collectivity can (and often do) go hand in hand.

Levels of Analysis Individuality and collectivity can be studied at different levels of abstraction. At the lowest level (the microlevel), the concepts can be used to refer to an individual’s self-construal and personality (e.g., Jane likes to think of herself as different from others, and Michael values being a part of teams). At the macrolevel, the concepts are often used to describe different cultures, societies, or nations. Western cultures and more industrialized cultures (e.g., North American, Northern European) have been characterized as individualist. In contrast, Eastern cultures and societies (e.g., Japan, China), as well as more traditional societies, have been labeled collectivistic.

Defining Individuality and Collectivity Individuality and collectivity may also be referred to as individualism and collectivism, independence and interdependence, or ideocentrism and allocentrism. What these terms have in common is that they refer to a wide range of behaviors, beliefs, attitudes, and self-definitions. Broadly conceived, individuality refers to a focus on the individual self. This includes a focus on the pursuit of one’s personal goals, on a self-definition as separate and independent of others, on individual rights, autonomy, and personal freedom, and on the tendency to give priority to individual 445

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Although there is a large body of work focusing on collectivity and individuality at the micro- and macrolevel, there is growing recognition that the mesolevel should not be ignored. Specifically, many subgroups in society differ in the extent to which they can be characterized as individualist or collectivist. For example, minorities are typically more collectivist than the majority is, and lower status groups (e.g., the lower class) are more collectivist than higher status groups (e.g., the middle or upper class). Moreover, in every society and culture, there may be subgroups that differ in the extent to which they cherish individuality and collectivity. For example, soldiers in an army are socialized to value the collective and to make sacrifices for the collective. By contrast, in a group of artists, it may be normative to be “an individual” and emphasize one’s differences and uniqueness. Some theorists have argued that there needs to be more attention to the variability within countries because there may be as much or even more within-country variation in individuality and collectivity as there is variation between countries.

Individuality and Collectivity as Group or Cultural Norms Individuality and collectivity are not only ways to describe individuals’ orientation or to describe cultures; they also reflect what is valued and ­ ­normative in a particular culture. For example, in the Western world, individuality is valued, and those who act in accordance with this cultural value are perceived in a more positive light than those who go against it. The value of individualist thinking can be clearly observed in Western literature and films. In many classic Westerns, the hero is the maverick and nonconformist. He or she dares to stand out, rebels, or does not appear to experience any pressure to adhere to social norms.

Three Ways in Which Individuality and Collectivity Have Been Measured One way in which individuality and collectivity have been measured is by comparing a sample of individuals in an individualistic culture with a sample from a collectivist culture in term of scores on key psychological measures. More specifically,

most cross-national comparison research involves studies whereby American undergraduate students (i.e., participants from an individualistic culture) are compared with undergraduate students from China, Japan, Hong Kong, or Korea (i.e., all ­collectivist cultures). Despite the fact that the samples from both types of culture are largely matched in terms of age, socioeconomic status, gender, and education, there are problems with these studies. Aside from the obvious limitations associated with drawing conclusions from unrepresentative and homogeneous samples (such as undergraduate students), it is often assumed a priori that the cultures differ on the key individualism–collectivism dimension without explicitly examining whether this is, in fact, the case. This is a problem because other differences between these cultures—for example, d ­ ifferences in the importance of honor or power differences— may be driving the cross-cultural differences. Another problem is that more fine-grained meta-analyses have shown that Asian cultures often vary considerably in the way they are collectivistic. For example, in Japan, it is not so much the group but relations with others that are important. Finally, such typologies run the risk of pigeonholing countries by failing to give sufficient consideration to changes over time and to contextual influences. For example, even though the United States might be characterized as an individualist country, in the aftermath of 9/11, responses by U.S. citizens predominantly reflected collectivity and a concern for the group rather than a concern for individual freedom and individuality. A second popular way in which individuality and collectivity are measured is by asking individuals to complete measures that assess individuality and collectivity alongside other outcome measures after which the correlation between different constructs is determined. For example, to assess individualism, individuals may be asked about the extent to which they agree with items such as “I am unique—different from others in many respects” or “I like my privacy.” To assess collectivism, individuals are asked to what extent they agree with items such as “How I behave depends on who I am with, where I am, or both” or “I make an effort to avoid disagreements with my group members.” There are problems with

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this methodology. Despite careful translation, items may not mean the same thing in different cultures. More problematic is that this methodology does not allow drawing causal inferences, thus standing in the way of a claim that it is because of differences in individuality or collectivity that outcome variables are affected in a particular way. Because of the lack of experimental control, researchers have started to use priming procedures to temporarily make salient an individualist or collectivist orientation. For example, researchers may ask participants to complete either an individuality or a collectivity scale at the outset of a study so that the particular orientation is salient when participants complete the measures that follow. Other researchers have primed participants with pronouns such as I or me to make individualist selfdefinitions temporarily more salient. In another condition, collective self-definitions are made temporarily more salient by priming participants with words such as us and we. Alternatively, researchers have asked participants to think about their relations in such a way that encourages them to focus either on the individual self and differences from others (“please think of what makes you different from your family and friends”) or on how they are similar to others (“please think of what you have in common with your family and friends”). In other studies, researchers have primed individualist or collectivist self-definitions at the group level. For example, a group norm was manipulated by describing a company as characterized either by collectivist values and norms (e.g., employees focus on achieving departmental production goals, and it is believed that maintaining the group’s well-being is the best guarantee of success) or by individualist values and norms (e.g., employees focus on achieving their personal production goals, and it is believed that maintaining the individual’s wellbeing is the best guarantee of success).

Consequences of Individuality and Collectivity A large literature has examined the differences in cognition, communication style, emotions, selfperceptions, values, motivation, and attributional style associated with individuality or collectivity. For example, whereas those who have adopted

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individualist worldviews are motivated to develop or achieve a positive sense of self, those who value collectivity are more likely to prioritize collective needs over individual needs. It has also been argued that individuality is associated with egofocused emotions that are primarily concerned with individual achievement and individual-level concerns such as anger and pride. In contrast, collectivity is associated with other-focused emotions, such as guilt, shame, and sympathy, whereby ­others are the primary referent.

Is Individuality the Opposite of Collectivity? Most research has assumed that individuality and collectivity are opposites. In many surveys, low collectivity is assumed to be identical to high individuality and vice versa. However, collectivity and individuality are also closely connected. For example, in many countries where individuality is an important value (e.g., the United States or Australia), living up to the normative expectations often means that the importance of individuality is celebrated collectively. Indeed, the value of individuality can become a collective value (“we all value our individuality”) whereby those who identify most strongly with the culture are most likely to express their individuality (“because I care for my group and because my group values individuality, I express my individuality and difference from others”). The relation between individuality and collectivity can also be observed in subgroups that aim to set themselves apart from the mainstream by expressing their difference, individuality, or uniqueness. Consider those who decide to get piercings or tattoos or, several decades ago, hippies and punks who rebelled against the establishment and the mainstream. Paradoxically, in these subgroups, individuality is expressed in normatively prescribed ways (e.g., by everyone adopting a particular dress or hair style or by everyone adopting a similar type of body ornamentation). As a result, individuality is expressed by conforming to norms and values of the collective. Jolanda Jetten See also Cooperation; Cross-Cultural Methods of Research; Cultural Evolution; Culture and Cognition; Culture and Personality; Culture and the Dialogical Self; Self; Social Cognition; Social Motives

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Further Readings Hornsey, M. J., & Jetten, J. (2004). The individual within the group: Balancing the need to belong with the need to be different. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8, 248–264. Jetten, J., Postmes, T., & McAuliffe, B. J. (2002). “We’re all individuals”: Group norms of individualism and collectivism, levels of identification, and identity threat. European Journal of Social Psychology, 32, 189–207. Markus, H., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. Psychological Review, 98, 224–253. Oyserman, D., Coon, H., & Kemmelmeier, M. (2002). Rethinking individualism and collectivism: Evaluation of theoretical assumptions and meta-analyses. Psychological Bulletin, 128, 3–72. Postmes, T., & Jetten, J. (Eds.). (2006). Individuality and the group: Advances in social identity. London, England: Sage.

Intellectual Disability Intellectual disability (ID) has been known over history by a variety of formal and informal names, including mental retardation, mental deficiency, idiocy, imbecility, and feeblemindedness. The names as well as the definitions emerged from influences of the particular time, but a common influence for the choice of name and definition has been the theory that was used to explain ID during that time. This entry describes the four main theories of ID: biomedical, psychological, sociocultural, and justice theories. For each theory, there is a description of how it shaped what was thought to be the primary locus of ID (e.g., whether within the individual or external to the individual), an account of ID using language specific to that theory, an application to a classification system consistent with the theory in order to subdivide ID into subsets, and a description of methods that are consistent with the theory and by which to potentially address or alleviate ID. Initially, each theory is described in its extreme form; a more nuanced way of understanding and using the theories is provided at the end of the entry.

Biomedical Theory The biomedical theory, at its extreme and as used in the field of ID, assumes that a biological problem located within the individual is the ID. Effort is focused on diagnosing the biological cause and location of the problem so that it can be cured, treated, or prevented. ID is explained using terms such as injury, deformation, deficiency, retardation, illness, or infection. Today, with the enormous advances in genomic mapping and diagnosis, biological causes of ID can even be located at the microscopic level, such as precise chemical or physiological problems on a particular gene. In terms of classification, the problem might be subdivided into smaller groups by using a medical disease-classification system that stipulates levels or stages. The biomedical theory has a long history in the field of ID because of early physicians, such as Jean Marc Gaspard Itard, the French physician who in the late 1700s insisted on treating Victor, the Wild Boy of Aveyron, and Samuel Gridley Howe, who developed the Perkins Institute in the United States. In some ways, these early physicians, trained in biomedical theory, created the scientific field of ID. Physicians constructed and managed the early colonies, training schools, and treatment facilities that eventually became the segregated hospitals and institutions where many people with ID were placed for long-term, often lifelong, medical treatment. In addition, physicians joined together to create respected professional groups to scientifically study ID through organizations such as the American Association of Superintendents of State Schools for the Feebleminded (now the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, or AAIDD) founded in 1876 by Dr. Edward Seguin.

Psychological Theory The psychological theory of ID grew out of the early biomedical model and became strong after the invention and standardization of tests of ­intelligence in the early 20th century by psychologists such as Alfred Binet, Theodore Simon, and Lewis Terman. In this theory, mental normalcy is the standard against which all individuals are

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measured. Normal intelligence is statistically defined as the middle of the bell curve, with IQs between 85 and 115, and ID is defined in terms of deviation from normal intelligence. On the basis of statistical standard deviations, people who score two or more standard deviations below the mean on an intelligence test are determined to be or have ID. This theory locates ID within the individual as an internal psychological problem of abnormal intelligence. In terms of a classification system, people with ID are subclassified on the basis of their IQ scores into four levels or bands: mild, moderate, severe, and profound. Potential alleviation of ID is based on the use of psychological principles and techniques, but because IQ is regarded as a lifelong trait of the individual, s­ ignificant recovery is not anticipated.

Sociocultural Theory At the other end of the spectrum in terms of location of the ID, the sociocultural theory locates the problem of ID primarily at the societal level rather than at the individual level. The sociocultural theory grew out of the work of Soviet psychologist Lev Vygotsky in the early 1900s. Vygotsky was influenced by the work of Jean Piaget and Kurt Lewin. The sociocultural theory of ID posits that meaning is created through human interaction in the context of social consensus. Thus, ID is the meaning derived from society’s common beliefs, behaviors, language, and events involving people identified as having ID. Sociocultural theory acknowledges that there may have been an initial biological root of the problem in an individual, but that it is society’s hostile responses, characteristics, and language that create the actual meaning of the problem. In sociocultural theory, the explanation of ID is based on these interactions. Subclassification might be focused on differentiating the nature of the social interactions, qualities of the social context, or the intensity of supports needed for the individual with ID to function more effectively in the society.

Justice Theory The justice theory of ID is a relative newcomer to the field, although the idea of a person’s rights

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generally has been evolving for hundreds of years, going back at least to the Magna Carta of 1215 in the Western world and even earlier in the Eastern world. John Rawls described his theory of justice as applied to individuals in this way: “Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. . . . Therefore in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled” (pp. 3–4). In its purest form, the justice theory posits that all human beings have equality and liberty and that people with ID have been unfairly deprived of those rights. The justice theory shares with the sociocultural theory a focus on society’s response to people with ID, especially concerning oppression, segregation, economic deprivation, exclusionary politics, and discrimination. The subcategorization of ID is based on whether justice is present and, if not, on which rights are denied, how and why they are, and how to remedy their denial. Often, alleviation of the problem is framed in terms of how justice can be restored and rights supported and exercised. Legislation and litigation are used to try to resolve the problem. This theory is embodied in documents such as the U.N. Declaration of Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006).

Multitheoretical Approach The four theories described here do not represent a linear progression from bad theory to good theory but rather illustrate the development of multiple theoretical approaches to understanding the complex factors that result in ID. The theories provide tools to guide understanding, develop definitions, design research, and pursue improved responses to ID. One useful example of the joint influence of multiple theories is that the use of intellectual disability is now widely accepted both in the United States and internationally as the preferred name for the disability formerly known as mental retardation. For example, the new name suggests that ID primarily reflects intellectual functioning (the psychological theory) and that it is best understood as a disability rather than a biological deficiency. The distinction between a disability and a handicap arises from the idea that a person with a

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biological impairment (the biomedical theory) is in a state of interaction with an environment in such a way that the interaction produces a mismatch between the ability of the individual and the demands of the environment (the sociocultural theory). This mismatched interaction is the disability. This perspective moves ID beyond a mere biological impairment into a social problem. Individuals with ID and their families fought for this name change because they asserted, in part, that it was unjust to impose on them such a stigmatizing label that provided no hope for the future (the justice theory). A similar analysis is useful when comparing definitions of ID, for example, those provided by the AAIDD, the American Psychiatric Association, and the World Health Organization. All the widely accepted definitions of ID require three elements: (a) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, (b) impairments in adaptive behavior, and (c) manifestation during the developmental period prior to age 18. But the terms used, how the three elements are defined, and the dominant classification system associated with the definition provides important clues to the underlying theory or theories behind the definition. Although some writers or researchers may be firmly ensconced in a single theory, most people in the field of ID are more accurately described as multitheoretic, using more than one theory to understand different aspects of the phenomenon and to pursue research and practice. At this point, no single theory completely explains the complexity of the functioning of people with ID. Ruth Luckasson See also Brain and Intelligence; Cognitive Development; Intelligence Testing; Neurodevelopmental Disorders; Social Construction

Further Readings De Valenzuela, J. S. (2014). Sociocultural views of learning. In L. Florian (Ed.), The Sage handbook of special education (2nd ed., Vol. 1, pp. 299–314). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Florian, L. (2014). Reimagining special education: Why new approaches are needed. In L. Florian (Ed.), The Sage handbook of special education (2nd ed., Vol. 1, pp. 9–22). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Luckasson, R., Coulter, D. L., Polloway, E. A., Reiss, S., Schalock, R. L., Snell, M. E., . . . Stark, J. A. (1992). Mental retardation: Definition, classification, and systems of supports (9th ed.). Washington, DC: American Association on Mental Retardation. Rawls, J. (1999). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Schalock, R. L., Borthwick-Duffy, S., Bradley, V. J., Buntinx, W. H. E., Coulter, D. L., Craig, E. M., . . . Yeager, M. H. (2010). Intellectual disability: Definition, classification, and systems of supports (11th ed.). Washington, DC: American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities. Shakespeare, T., & Watson, N. (2002). The social model of disability: An outmoded ideology. Research in Social Science and Disability, 2, 9–28.

Intelligence, Environmental Influences on How can the environment alter, either positively or negatively, the intellectual performance of individuals? Despite the large amount of evidence for the role of the environment, the result of such research remains controversial. This entry discusses the role of environmental variables in both lowering and raising a person’s level of intelligence. For the purpose of this entry, the environment refers to any influence that begins outside the individual. If an individual’s intellectual curiosity, for example, leads him or her into environments that can increase intelligence, that evidence is not uniquely environmental because something inside the person (intellectual curiosity) was a contributing cause. When considering the impact on intelligence, the word environment is too broad a term. Scientists’ interest is almost always in very specific environments. Therefore, the appropriate way to think about environmental influences on intelligence is to think about the effect of specific environmental variables. To make sure the focus is on variables that begin outside the individual, only experimental manipulations of environments are considered here. Environmental factors are generally contrasted with genetic determinism, the view that one’s intelligence is encoded and determined by his or her

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genetic architecture. Hard versions of this argument allow no room for the environment. Softer versions allow only extreme environments to stifle intelligence; normal development occurs in environments that allow only the predetermined genetic designs to unfold—unaltered. The work considered here shows that environmental effects are more powerful than assumed by such theories.

Interpreting the Effects of Environmental Variables It is important to first differentiate lowering and raising intelligence. The decisive question is this: Lowering or raising compared with what? What is the baseline? How intelligent was the individual before exposure to the environmental variable? How intelligent would he or she be without the exposure? Consider breast-feeding as an example. Suppose breast-feeding raises an infant’s intelligence. Is this the same as saying that not breast-feeding lowers their intelligence? From one perspective, these two statements are the same. Each says that the breastfeeding variable causes a change in intelligence. From a social policy perspective, the two statements are different, though they both imply that new mothers should be encouraged to breast-feed their babies. What distinguishes policy is how common the practice already is in a given population. If a society is one where every new mother breast-feeds, it would make more sense to state that not breastfeeding an infant lowers its intelligence rather than saying that every mother in this population is raising her child’s intelligence. However, in a population where mothers do not breast-feed their children, it makes more sense to state that the mother who does breast-feed is raising her child’s intelligence rather than saying that every other mother is lowering her child’s intelligence. Therefore, whether an environmental variable is considered to raise or lower intelligence in some instances is not a scientific ­ ­distinction but a policy one. It is also important to differentiate an environment that can lower intelligence from one that can interfere with intelligence. An interfering environment is one in which the context temporarily inhibits intellectual performance without actually decreasing intelligence as a trait. A stressful

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situation, for example, can interfere with intellectual functioning. When people are placed in a context in which they feel threatened or fearful, their performance on many tasks, including intellectual ones, suffers. The same is true with sleep deprivation, which has an impact on many intellectual functions. An environment that lowers intelligence has a more lasting effect beyond immediate interference.

The Role of the Environment in Lowering Intelligence The environment can lower intelligence in either short-term or permanent ways. Instances where intelligence is permanently lowered are often of less theoretical interest as there is little that can be done to restore what was lost (e.g., traumatic brain injury, sustained neglect, and abuse). Otherwise, knowledge about what causes a genuine decrease in intellectual ability comes from instances in which such decreases have been removed. For ethical reasons, researchers do not purposefully expose people to environments that could cause serious negative effects. Instead they attempt to identify people already exposed to intelligence-decreasing environments and remedy the negative effects. Nutritional deficiencies are the most common source of evidence for ways in which the environment can lower intelligence. Given access to individuals who are not receiving enough of a certain vitamin, mineral, or class of nutrients, researchers can randomly assign people to receive those missing nutrients. The nutrients that have been studied most include B vitamins, iron, iodine, zinc, thiamine, and long-chain polyunsaturated fatty acids. If remedying a nutritional deficiency can raise intelligence, there is good reason to believe that the initial deficiency caused a decrease in intelligence. Supplementing individuals who have mild to severe nutritional deficiencies is one way to raise their intelligence. What can be said when nutritional supplements are given to individuals who are not deficient? Although multivitamins can increase intelligence in people with nutrient deficiencies, those who have adequate diets receive no such benefit from multivitamins. Thus, it is evident that because an environmental variable can lower intelligence does not mean that variable can also raise intelligence.

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The Role of the Environment in Raising Intelligence Some environmental variables are able to raise intelligence as well. They include, but are not ­limited to, the following: •• Breast-feeding a newborn (versus feeding the newborn an unenriched formula) •• Sending a child to preschool (versus not sending the child to preschool) •• Learning to play a musical instrument (versus not learning to play a musical instrument) •• Engaging in cardiovascular exercise (versus not engaging in cardiovascular exercise)

There does not appear to be a single unifying theme to the environments that can raise intelligence. Some involve increasing the cognitive complexity of everyday life (e.g., sending a child to preschool), and others involve more directly physiological components that alter brain functioning (e.g., engaging in cardiovascular exercise). The preferred approach to identifying environmental variables that raise intelligence is by running experiments. A group of people are randomly assigned to a new environment (e.g., learning to play a musical instrument) or to one that is unchanged. Subsequent comparison of the intelligence of the groups allows a conclusion about whether the environmental variable causes an increase in intelligence. Without running an experiment, there is a chance that what looks like an environmental effect is spurious. People who were already more intelligent could have selected the environment, or an internal variable (e.g., curiosity) could have guided them to it.

The Role of the Environment in Raising Intelligence Long Term Having established that the environment can raise intelligence, the next question is this: Can an environmental variable raise intelligence permanently? One must look at each environmental variable under consideration to understand such a ­question. When researchers manipulate an environment, they are able to establish whether that variable causes a change in intelligence. All experiments, however, must end. This leads to the question of longevity. Can temporary exposure to an

environmental variable create lasting improvements in intelligence? To create long-term improvements in intelligence, a variable would either have to directly affect intelligence permanently or initiate a series of reciprocal interactions. Such reciprocal interactions would be a case in which exposure to an environmental variable raises intelligence, which leads to seeking out new and more cognitively demanding environments, which sustain the elevated intelligence and possibly even increase it, and so on. In the absence of permanent effects or reciprocal interactions, the observed increase in intelligence could begin to fade after exposure to the environment ends. Some of the most famous experiments that have exposed impoverished children to enriched environments gave evidence for this fadeout effect. Although the enriched environment raised the children’s intelligence, over time, once the experiment ended, the effects went away. Whether temporary exposure to an environmental variable can create lasting increases to intelligence is an area for future work. Alternatively, it is possibly to ask whether permanent exposure to an environmental variable creates a permanent increase in intelligence. Because of practical limitations, such an experiment is nearly impossible to conduct; it is difficult to retain participants in a long-term experiment and maintain procedural integrity. One source of evidence, however, is adoption studies. To understand the effects of adoption, it is critical to ask another question: The effects of adoption compared with what? The strongest adoption studies are those that compare the effects of being adopted to remaining in the original home. In most Western countries, poor families are generally the ones who put their children up for adoption, and higher income families are the ones allowed to adopt. These studies are appropriately rare, but they often show that children who are adopted into wealthier families are more intelligent than their siblings who were raised in the original homes. Unfortunately, there are no comparisons of such children during adulthood. These gaps in knowledge about the permanency of environmental effects on intelligence provide areas for future research. They also show that demonstrating that an environment can raise

Intelligence, Evolution of

intelligence may not mean it raises it permanently. Whether the effects last must be investigated and cannot be assumed. Research demonstrating the effects of environmental variables should not suggest that the environment is the only determinant of intelligence. The strong effect of genes is relatively unquestioned in the scientific literature. However, in genetic research, the environment usually takes a backseat and is analyzed as a unitary factor and not as an array of specific variables. The effects of the environment on intelligence can now be seen in the following way: Environmental exposures can alter one’s intelligence. Lasting damage through traumatic brain injury and criminal neglect/abuse is possible, though of less theoretical interest. The environment can create temporary shocks up and down to intelligence either through contexts that can interfere with the expression of intelligence or through genuine effects. Whether an environmental variable can count as raising intelligence or its absence as lowering intelligence is a value and policy judgment. With experimental methods, researchers can confidently say an environmental variable alters intelligence. As in the context of vitamin deficiency, just because a variable can lower intelligence does not mean it can also raise intelligence. There are environmental variables that can raise intelligence. These variables come in many forms and do not yet have a unifying feature. However, showing that an environmental variable can raise intelligence does not mean it can raise intelligence permanently. For that, temporary exposure versus permanent exposure must be differentiated. Temporary exposure could raise intelligence permanently either directly or through reciprocal interactions, though mounting evidence suggests that temporary exposure may create only temporary gains. Permanent exposure may confer permanent benefits, but the evidence is difficult to acquire. Overall, there is plenty of room for future work in the field of environmental influences on intelligence; as long as there is a hope to make ourselves more intelligent, an understanding of the conditions discussed here can show the merits of such a pursuit. John Protzko

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See also Brain and Intelligence; Cognitive Development; Intelligence, Evolution of; Intelligence, Heritability of; Intelligence and Individualism; Intelligence and Schooling; Intelligence Testing and Ethnicity; Measurement of Intelligence; Piaget’s and the Neo-Piagetian Theories of Cognitive Development

Further Readings Benton, D., & Buts, J. P. (1990). Vitamin/mineral supplementation and intelligence. The Lancet, 335(8698), 1158–1160. Dickens, W. T., Turkheimer, E., & Beam, C. (2011). The social dynamics of the expression of genes for cognitive ability. In K. Kendler, S. Jaffee, & D. Romer (Eds.), The dynamic genome and mental health: The role of genes and environments in youth development (pp. 103–127). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Herrnstein, R. J., & Murray, C. (1994). The bell curve: Intelligence and class structure in American life. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. Jensen, A. R. (1997). Adoption data and two g-related hypotheses. Intelligence, 25(1), 1–6. Nisbett, R. E. (2009). Intelligence and how to get it: Why schools and cultures count. New York, NY: W. W. Norton. Protzko, J., Aronson, J., & Blair, C. (2012). How to make a young child smarter: Evidence from the database of raising intelligence. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8(1), 25–40. Schellenberg, E. G. (2004). Music lessons enhance IQ. Psychological Science, 15(8), 511–514.

Intelligence, Evolution

of

Seemingly, no two investigators agree on what intelligence means or includes, but presumably all would agree that learning ability and memory are substantially involved. Most investigations of animal intelligence have used learning tasks or tasks that depended heavily on learning ability. Approaches to the study of the evolution of intelligence vary widely among investigators, but two common approaches are (a) studying nonhuman primate intelligence as it might bear on human intelligence and (b) determining which species appear capable of performing tasks that were previously deemed to be uniquely human, such as

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having a language, using tools, self-awareness, and having a “theory of mind.” This entry discusses the theoretical-methodological approach to studying the evolution of intelligence. Little if any effort is being made to study the evolution of intelligence in a broader context. For example, there appears to be little interest in determining what might be learned by comparing representative species of fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds, and mammals (not to overlook the importance of invertebrate animals). The theoretical and methodological approach described here is one that can be applied to all animals, including humans. The idea of a theory of evolution can be found in the writings of Anaximander (c. 610–585 BC) and a scala naturae wherein animals were hierarchically organized from lowest to highest and where intelligence was an important consideration as described by Aristotle (384–322 BC). However, if there is a pioneer in the modern study of the evolution of intelligence, he was George John Romanes (1848–1894). A native of Canada, Romanes lived all but the first year of his life in England. His books Animal Intelligence (1882), Mental Evolution in Animals (1883), and Mental Evolution in Man (1887) remain today as having provided the most systematic theoretical approach to the study of evolution of intelligence. Unfortunately, soon after Romanes’s death, notable psychologists, including Wilhelm Wundt, began to ridicule Romanes’s use of anecdotal data, which were almost the only relevant data about animal intelligence available to him. It has been well documented that most of the criticism was unjustified; nevertheless, it resulted in Romanes’s theoretical work never having been considered seriously by those who study the ­evolution of intelligence.

A Theoretical-Methodological Approach to Investigate the Evolution of Intelligence As summarized in the next section, there are eight fundamental types of learning that rank from lowest to highest because lower levels, generally, are prerequisites for higher levels. The principal uncertainty is whether signal learning at Level 2 is a prerequisite for stimulus-response learning at Level

3 or whether they are parallel levels. The lowest form of learning, habituation, has been shown to be within the capability of relatively simple invertebrates, whereas evidence for the highest level, concept learning involving biconditional processing, has been limited to humans. Any example of learning, no matter how ­complex, can be analyzed in terms of these eight fundamental types. This theory of learning is inseparable from a theory of intelligence, because an animal’s intelligence is determined by and limited by the highest level of learning of which it is capable. In view of this inseparability, the hierarchy described next is referred to as a learning ­intelligence hierarchy, or LIH. The Learning Intelligence Hierarchy

Drawing from work by Robert M. Gagné and Lyle E. Bourne, Jr., Roger Thomas synthesized a hierarchy of learning abilities. He also proposed a methodological approach to assess those learning abilities as fairly as possible for any and all species. The LIH is summarized as follows: Level 1: Habituation and its complement, sensitization Level 2: Signal learning (also known as classical ­conditioning) Level 3: S timulus-response learning (also known as operant conditioning) Level 4: C  haining, learning a series of units from Level 3 Level 5: M  ultiple discrimination learning, including (a) concurrent discrimination learning and (b) learning set formation Level 6: Absolute and relative class concept learning Level 7: R  elational concept learning involving conjunctive, disjunctive, or conditional ­ ­processing Level 8: R elational concept learning involving ­biconditional processing

Levels 6, 7, and 8 also have applicable complementary processes. When learning a complex task, an animal might use several levels of learning ability concurrently or serially. Increasingly complex

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tasks can be constructed systematically using multiple levels of learning, especially at Levels 6 through 8, and these can be used to differentiate intelligence among humans. Alternatively, any complex learning task can be reduced to or analyzed in terms of the levels of learning ability involved. Applying the LIH Fairly to All Species

Fundamental to comparing species fairly in any learning experiment is that confounding contextual variables (e.g., sensory, effector, motivational, or environmental differences) that might influence performance and obscure learning ability must be neutralized to the extent possible. Species’ sensory and motor differences must be taken into account, and motivational incentives appropriate for each species must be used. Environmental variables, such as illumination, temperature, humidity, and the like, must be rendered optimal for each species. In brief, the emphasis is on the level of learning to be assessed, and the task used to assess it must be adapted optimally for each species. Quantitative performance differences should not be used to compare species. If an animal can master a task representative of a given level in the LIH, it should not matter how many trials were required or how many errors were made; quantitative differences might be due to shortcomings in achieving fairness in testing conditions. On the other hand, for example, if the contextual variables are the same for tasks at two levels—for example, learning set formation (Level 5) versus class concept learning (Level 6)—and success at the lower level is followed by failure at the higher level, it is reasonable to attribute that failure to learning ability at Level 6 and not to the contextual variables. It has been shown that fish, reptiles, birds, and mammals (amphibians were not tested) are capable of some success at Level 5 on concurrent discrimination learning tasks. It seems reasonable to conclude that had amphibians been tested, they would have shown some success at Level 5. Thus, all vertebrates appear to be capable of some success at Level 5, although which species may or may not be able to form learning sets has not been determined. Comparing the intelligence of species that fail to succeed at Level 6 can be based on the number of

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concurrent discrimination problems (Level 5) the animal can learn or whether it can or cannot form learning sets. The LIH can be applied to invertebrates as well. No matter at what level of the LIH a species can succeed, its intelligence is limited to what it can accomplish with its learning abilities up to and including that level. It appears that differentiation among birds and mammals on learning ability and intelligence is determined by the degree to which they can learn to use concepts. To demonstrate an animal’s use of a concept, it must succeed on trial-unique or ­first-trial presentations of the discriminanda that embody the concept; correct responses to subsequent presentations of the discriminanda are ­subject to being explained as rote learning. Discriminanda is a better term to use than objects or stimuli, because objects have many discriminable properties—such as color, shape, size, weight, texture, and so on—and one may not know which properties served as the discriminable stimulus or stimuli for a particular species or individual animal. In addition, discriminanda may not be in the form of objects; rather, they may be sounds, odors, flavors, or discriminanda associated with other sensory modalities. Absolute class concept learning involves discriminanda whose inherent features manifest the concept. For example, the properties enabling the concept of “bird” are embodied in each bird, although individual species of birds may differ widely. In absolute class concept learning, the possibility of stimulus generalization must be ­ minimized if not eliminated. For example, two ­ ­discriminanda that are perceptually distinguishable may appear so similar to the animal that it may fail to discriminate one from the other. Stimulus generalization is a complicated issue that requires greater consideration than can be given here. Stimulus generalization is not an issue in relative class concept learning, as the discriminanda that manifest the concept involve a relative property, such as oddity. The most used relative class concept task with nonhuman animals has been the oddity task. Typically, the animal is presented with three discriminanda, two identical (or highly similar) and one distinctly different; the latter ­ manifests the oddity concept. On later trials, a ­discriminandum that was odd at one time may now be one of the non-odd discriminanda; hence,

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the animal cannot rely on inherent properties of the discriminanda but must rely on their relative properties. Relational concepts are concepts that include one or more class concepts being used in conjunctive, disjunctive, or conditional relationships (Level  7) or biconditional relationships (Level 8). Although relatively few studies have been conducted that meet the trial-unique (or first-trials only) testing requirement, those that have been done generally indicate that at least some avian, perhaps all, and likely most, if not all, mammalian species are capable of learning absolute class concepts. Although relatively few investigators have acknowledged the LIH, fortunately it can be applied retroactively to determine how any learning task used in the past fits within it. The findings are not as clear for relative class concept learning, but among nonhuman animals the more convincing studies have been done using primates. The best-controlled examples of relational concept learning using animals have confounded conjunctive with conditional processing. Nevertheless, Level 7 learning has been shown in some nonhuman animals. No one, it seems, has designed a conclusive test of conditional or biconditional processing that can be used with ­ nonhuman animals.

The Evolution of the Brain and Intelligence A potentially important use of the LIH is in correlational studies with indices of brain evolution. Perhaps the best known contemporary index of brain evolution is Harry Jerison’s “encephalization quotient” or EQ. It is an empirically determined measure of how much brain an animal has compared with members of an appropriate comparison group with the same body size. For example, compared with the average mammal having an ­ ­average human’s body weight, humans have an EQ of about 7.56, which suggests that humans have 7.56 times as much brain as needed to function as a mammal of that size. However, the EQ may have flaws. For example, according to Jerison, a Cebus albifrons monkey had an EQ of 4.79, and a squirrel monkey an EQ of 2.81, but four chimpanzees’ EQs ranged between 1.63 and 2.48. Few would agree that squirrel monkeys and Cebus monkeys are more intelligent than

chimpanzees; however, that is an empirical question that has yet to be investigated fully. Finally, and unfortunately for the LIH, Jerison endorsed Euan Macphail’s view that the fundamentals of learning are similar in all vertebrate species that have been studied. Macphail identified four types of learning: habituation, classical ­conditioning, operant conditioning, and complex learning. Had he considered the LIH, which was available to him, Macphail might have understood that “complex learning” reduces to components of Levels 4 through 8 as described here and that it is highly unlikely that all vertebrate species are equally capable of learning at the higher levels. Roger K. Thomas See also Classical Conditioning; Cognitive Evolution; Evolutionary Psychology; Intelligence Testing; Measurement of Intelligence; Operant Conditioning; Problem Solving

Further Readings Bourne, L. E., Jr. (1970). Knowing and using concepts. Psychological Review, 77, 546–556. Reznikova, Z. (2007). Animal intelligence: From individual to social cognition. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Sternberg, R. J., & Kaufman, J. C. (Eds.). (2012). The evolution of intelligence. New York, NY: Psychology Press. Thomas, R. K. (2012). Learning set formation and conceptualization. In N. Seel (Ed.), Encyclopedia of the sciences of learning: Part 12 (pp. 1966–1968). New York, NY: Springer-Verlag. Thomas, R. K. (2012). Conditional reasoning by nonhuman animals. In N. Seel (Ed.), Encyclopedia of the sciences of learning: Part 3 (pp. 742–745). New York, NY: Springer-Verlag.

Intelligence, Heritability

of

Even before the notion of intelligence had crystallized as a construct, there was persistent interest in understanding the etiology of the phenomenon (wisdom as identified by Socrates, understanding by Thomas Hobbes, genius by Francis Galton, to name a few) that captured individual differences

Intelligence, Heritability of

in how people cognitively process the world. Moreover, there has always been a notion that the influences that create and shape those individual differences originate from both inside and outside the individual. The differentiation between inner and outer influences has taken multiple forms, with the two extremes being that they are completely different entities or that they are two sides of the same entity, with many positions in between. This differentiation has remained central to modern theories of intelligence. This entry reviews different methods for determining how much of intelligence is inherited and how much is the result of other factors. In fact, all modern theories of intelligence presume that what distinguishes individuals within any group (e.g., age, ethnicity, or socioeconomic cohort) develops throughout the life span, as inner capacities are shaped into manifested traits (intelligence, however named or defined) by ­outside influences that are differentially influential at different stages of the life span (e.g., family most early, then different types of socialization ­settings—kindergartens, schools, clubs, places for religious or other existential experiences, labor contexts, and leisure settings). Nobody today really disputes the importance of both inner and outer influences shaping intelligence. Instead, ­current discussions focus on ways of obtaining estimates of their relative importance at different stages of life and for different groups of individuals.

Methods Multiple methodologies have been proposed to acquire the estimates of relative importance. One, among many, is the calculation of so-called heritability estimates. As a statistic, heritability was initially developed to capture the role of the internal (referred to by different authors at different historical periods as “heritable,” “congenital,” “inborn,” or “genetic”) sources of individual differences in intelligence. Needing some metric, heritability was conceived as the portion of all the trait (phenotype) variance in the general population that could be attributed to the internal, as opposed to external, influences that shape individual differences in intelligence.

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A clever advance was to establish ways of collecting the information to decompose total phenotypic variance into its parts; this was proposed to be accomplished by comparing different types of genetic relatives. Specifically, a set of assumptions was worked out for observed phenotypic similarities conditioned on presumed genetic similarities. Thus, as identical (i.e., monozygotic, MZ, differentiating from the same egg fertilized by a single sperm) twins are assumed (with caveats) to be genetically identical, if a trait is genetically controlled, they are expected to be highly similar on this trait phenotypically. By contrast, fraternal (i.e., dizygotic, DZ, developing from two different eggs fertilized by two different sperms) twins are assumed (also with caveats) to be genetically similar only by approximately 50% (in fact, they could share anywhere from 0–100% of their genes). Their degree of similarity is expected to be much lower for genetically controlled traits. Yet as it is quite typical in the West for twins, whether MZ or DZ, to be placed in the same or very similar environments, their phenotypic values can be manipulated computationally such that estimates of heritability can be obtained. The essence of this manipulation is that under the assumption that within-pair environments are similar for MZ and DZ twins, the difference between MZ and DZ correlations can be explained by genes, as MZ twins share, on average, twice the amount of genes shared by DZ twins. Thus, twice the difference between MZ and DZ correlations is expected to provide a good initial estimate of heritability. What started as a simple exercise—one in which the most difficult phase was to obtain phenotypic correlations between MZ and DZ twins and in which the analyses amounted to doubling the difference between these correlations—had grown by the end of the last century into a sophisticated industry of statistical model fitting. These models initially were simple in that they only considered twin correlations, but gradually they became much more sophisticated. Other presumably important variables (e.g., gender, age, or indicators of family and school environments) were included in the model to enhance the precision of the heritability estimates. The height of such model fitting was reached in the 1990s, when both statistical and computer

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technology gave researchers the capability to “model away” whatever indicators they could collect while working with MZ and DZ twin pairs. Interestingly, the estimates obtained through sophisticated model fitting did not differ much from those obtained by the simple computational operation of doubling the difference between MZ and DZ correlations. Either way, the heritability estimates were sizable, from 0.5 to 0.8, indicating that 50% to 80% of the variance in intelligence in the general population is genetic in origin.

Current Directions With the estimates of heritability settled, the challenge has been in translating heritability into its molecular mechanisms—that is, understanding how, actually, they generate individual differences in intelligence. Unfortunately, multiple attempts to define such mechanisms with the help of either ­so-called genome-wide association studies (GWAS, in which the whole genome is considered) or so-called candidate genes studies (when only ­ ­specific genes are considered) have resulted in no consistent answers. In other words, given the magnitude of heritability estimates for intelligence, it was hoped that the translation of these estimates into corresponding molecular processes would be easy. This hope has proved false. The lack of convergence between the two different types of analyses—that is, quantitative-genetic analyses (whereby heritability estimates are produced) and molecular-genetic analyses (where specific molecular mechanisms are searched for)—has resulted in the formulation of the so-called missing heritability problem. The existence of this problem has been explained by a variety of factors (e.g., invalid assumptions of twin studies, the nonlinear nature of molecular mechanisms, lack of statistical power, imprecision of theoretical ideas), yet it remains inscrutable. Today, there is no real way to substantiate molecularly the mechanisms underlying the high heritability of intelligence, although some attempts might be promising. The future will determine whether those heritability estimates are incorrect or they are being interpreted incorrectly. Elena L. Grigorenko See also Brain and Intelligence; Intelligence and Individualism; Intelligence, Environmental Influences

on; Intelligence, Evolution of; Intelligence and Schooling; Intelligence Testing and Ethnicity; Measurement of Intelligence

Further Readings Brant, A. M., Munakata, Y., Boomsma, D. I., Defries, J. C., Haworth, C. M., Keller, M. C., . . . Hewitt, J. K. (2013). The nature and nurture of high IQ: An extended sensitive period for intellectual development. Psychological Science, 24, 1487–1495. Briley, D. A., & Tucker-Drob, E. M. (2013). Explaining the increasing heritability of cognitive ability across development: A meta-analysis of longitudinal twin and adoption studies. Psychological Science, 24, 1704–1713. Plomin, R., Haworth, C., Meaburn, E. L., Price, T. S., & Davis, O. S. P. (2013). Common DNA markers can account for more than half of the genetic influence on cognitive abilities. Psychological Science, 24, 562–568.

Intelligence

and Individualism

The study of intelligence impinges on a person’s sense of self in a number of ways. First, when IQ variance (what distinguishes one person’s IQ from another’s) is analyzed, it shows genes so dominant that an individual may feel that his or her life history, the events that seem to explain who she or he is, has diminished importance. Second, genetic determination may seem to compromise the autonomous choice that lies at the heart of individualism. Finally, IQ tests attempt to measure intelligence and can deliver a verdict that threatens (or enhances) self-esteem. This entry discusses the study of intelligence and the relationship between intelligence and one’s sense of self.

Kinship Studies Individual differences in IQ are influenced by three factors: genes, family effects, and events that have little to do with genes or family such as the good luck (a charismatic teacher) or bad luck (being dropped on your head as an infant) that life confers. When you are a small child, family is ­ overwhelmingly dominant in determining your cognitive ability. As you age, family gradually loses a tug of war with the larger world—that is, the

Intelligence and Individualism

current environment outside the family, including school, peers, teachers, and others. Crucial is the fact that as this occurs, one’s genetically influenced cognitive performance gets matched to the quality of one’s current environment. People whose genes give them unusual verbal ability find reading more congenial, join a book club, are noticed by teachers who encourage them, do better at school, get into an honors program. In a word, good genes get matched to a good environment, while “bad” genes get matched to an ever-worsening environment (little reading, no book club, no honors program). Within the family, parents tend to treat their children alike (ignoring that one child has more genetic promise than another). The outside world is not so kind. The results of kinship studies show that by maturity, the match between quality of genes and quality of environment is near perfect. Family effects have all but disappeared. Kinship studies include studies of identical twins reared apart from birth; by maturity, their IQs are close enough to indicate that what family they were raised in does not count for much. This finding is reinforced by adoption studies; as adopted children age, their IQs tend to resemble their natural parents more than those of the “unadopted” siblings with whom they are raised. The fact that there is some difference between identical twins, even when raised in the same home, attests that there are lesser factors that affect their IQs, chance factors quite unconnected with having either genes or family in common.

Family History The gist of the kinship studies seems to be that family history is a fleeting factor and that genes and chance determine adult cognitive performance. You might just as well have been raised in a randomly selected family (assuming, of course, it was not characterized by extraordinary factors such as starvation or neglect). In sum, family history emerges as a mere epiphenomenon, something with no causal potency in its own right. It may affect your dress and accent and taste in food, but has little to do with a rather important part of who you are—namely, your intellect. The Bell Curve, by Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray, went so far as to say that by the age of

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18, one’s genetically influenced IQ largely determines one’s fate. Careful scrutiny of what actually determines the fate of an 18-year-old in America tells a different story. Family effects may account for only 5% of IQ variance at that age, which looks trivial. However, young people whose vocabulary puts them at an IQ equivalent of 115 are still very much affected by the cognitive quality of their family. The difference between coming from an elite home (perhaps an academic home at the 97th percentile of cognitive quality) and a substandard home (say at the 12th percentile) would be worth the equivalent of 9 IQ points. Those who want to go to a college or university must take the Scholastic Aptitude Test, or SAT. On the SAT reading test, 9 IQ points equate with 66 points (the test’s standard deviation is 110). Colleges and universities use SAT (or comparable) scores to isolate the bottom 25% of their admissions, because that is the cutting line below which a student is at risk. The difference between a score of 566 and 500 determines whether you are viable at great universities from UCLA to the University of California at San Diego to the University of Minnesota to the University of Texas at Austin or must settle for a less prestigious university. A student may take solace in the fact that by age 35 (assuming he or she is typical), his or her current environment for vocabulary will closely match his or her genetic promise. But no one can relive those 15 years. Occupation, the advantage of influential friends, and choice of spouse may have been set long before 35.

Autonomy Family is a bittersweet legacy. Whatever contribution one’s home has made to define a person as an individual, once he or she has identified the handicaps it confers, an individual may want to overcome them by exercising his or her autonomy. Often overlooked is the fact that throughout life, long after family effects have faded, a constant 20% of IQ variance is uncorrelated with genes. James Flynn has described this as the result of chance (good or bad luck), but it also reflects the effects of autonomy—that is, making a conscious choice to improve one’s mind or character.

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How to split the 20% between chance and choice is presently unknown. But choice can enhance cognitive ability substantially (e.g., deciding whether or not to retire is the difference between keeping an extra 7 IQ points). Assuming that choice accounts for 10% of IQ variance (half of the percentage available), a mature student who leaves a substandard environment (say, the 33rd percentile of cognitive quality) for university study (assigned rather optimistically at the 84th percentile) can upgrade his or her level of cognitive performance. He or she would move from a verbal score of 111.66 (78th percentile) to 118.44 (89th percentile), which is to say leapfrog half of the people who were formerly higher on the vocabulary scale. Whether to study, whether to retire, whether to read widely and cultivate a literate circle of friends, whether to fill leisure with chess or TV, whether to welcome rather than avoid cognitive challenge— all these decisions relate to one’s level of cognitive competence.

Morality No one is fully self-aware without a personal code of ethics—that is, self-examined principles that allow one to reject prevailing social norms. Here, the study of intelligence gives good news. Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, each generation has made massive IQ gains over the preceding generation. At least some of these gains were because people were freed from simply manipulating the concrete world for benefit and could now use logic to analyze abstractions and began to take the hypothetical seriously. Thanks to these new habits of mind, it became much easier to reject the three forces that turn “my” moral code into the mores of the herd: racism, nationalism, and inflexible codes of honor. Islamic fathers shock the world when they kill a daughter because she has been raped. Many might ask the father, “What if you had been knocked unconscious and sodomized?” He may well be unwilling to take the hypothetical seriously or to strive for logical consistency. His code of honor is like a precious jewel inherited from his parents. He does not see his principles as universal criteria to be generalized. They are like concrete things, no more subject to logic than any other concrete thing.

In America, many of our immediate ancestors were premodern in regard to race. In 1955, when Martin Luther King, Jr., began the Montgomery bus boycott, young people, home from college, had dialogues with their parents or grandparents. Question: “What if you woke up tomorrow and had turned black?” Reply: “That is the dumbest thing you have ever said. Who do you know that turned black overnight?” The hypothetical was simply not taken seriously. It is easy to believe that intellectuals were immune. Some rejected racism but few rejected nationalism: They still classified people as alien or morally irrelevant by whether they belonged to the wrong tribe. Consider intellectuals on the eve of World War I. Thomas Mann felt the need for a war in order to subordinate materialism to “German Kultur.” The poet Rainer Maria Rilke called the outbreak of the war the resurrection of “the God of hosts.” Philosopher, sociologist, and political economist Max Weber gushed, “This war is great and wunderbar.” Even the saintly philosopher Martin Buber, who later opposed the identification of Zionism with Jewish nationalism, was deluded: “I know personally that Belgian women amused themselves by putting out the eyes of wounded German soldiers and forcing buttons ripped from their uniforms into the empty eye sockets.” Some 50 years later, we began to see our “enemies” through moral rather than purely partisan spectacles. In Vietnam and, more recently, Iraq and Afghanistan, there was widespread concern about killing foreigners who played no military role (collateral damage). No U.S. general today would echo General Curtis Lemay, who listed “bombing the North Vietnamese back to the Stone Age” as a policy option. Treating abstractions (including abstract principles of conduct) as subject to logic and taking the hypothetical seriously are the foundations of mature moral argument. The advent of these new habits of mind was detected by the analysis of IQ gains over time. What has made people more intelligent also helps make them more morally autonomous.

Self-Image Intelligence is a prized trait, and knowing one’s IQ can either raise or lower self-esteem. Two thinkers

Intelligence and Schooling

have proposed an antidote. Robert Sternberg makes the point that IQ tests, as they stand, measure analytic ability at the expense of creative and practical intelligence. His tests include asking for a strategy designed to defuse a competitive work situation and assigning an essay on the “octopus’s sneakers.” These are important cognitive skills that deserve measurement (you may, of course, do badly on all three abilities). Howard Gardner goes further to label eight kinds of performance as “intelligences”: linguistic, logical-mathematical, musical, spatial, bodily kinesthetic (sports, ballet), self-knowledge, knowledge of others, and naturalistic (interpreting sounds and novel patterns in the environment). Setting aside whether these competencies gain or lose coherence by all being called “intelligences,” someone could do badly at most of them and if doing well at one intelligence (say, softball) entails being below average on the remaining seven, the price may be too heavy. Moreover, parents tend to assign them different weights and are devastated to find that their child, while a bit above average at sports (which earns a living only if you are superlative), cannot do very well at anything else. Some who use Gardiner’s tests try to conceal shortcoming by playing the game of “positive feedback”— that is, never telling children or their parents where they rank on anything but only reporting the child’s strengths. Most people see through this rather quickly. It may be that the only long-term answer to this problem is that people become less obsessed with ranking one another, and focus on more sensible foundations of self-esteem. Society ought to aim at giving everyone a decent life—that is, the chance to participate in the rich range of rewarding behavior that society affords. If everyone could do that, selfesteem will take care of itself.

Last Word Bishop Joseph Butler said, “Everything is what it is, and not an other thing.” The genetic model of human behavior is not the same thing as the whole person. It is terribly important but does not monopolize explanation: Autonomy and the moral integrity of the individual survive. James R. Flynn

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See also Binet’s Tests; Flynn Effect; Intelligence, Environmental Influences on; Intelligence, Evolution of; Intelligence, Heritability of; Intelligence and Schooling; Intelligence Testing; Intelligence Testing and Ethnicity

Further Readings Adam, S., Bonsang, E., Germain, S., & Perelman, S. (2007). Retirement and cognitive reserve: A stochastic frontier approach to survey data (CREPP Working Paper 2007/04). Liège, Belgium: University if Liège, Centre de Recherche en Economie Publique et de la Population. Available at http://www2.ulg.ac.be/crepp/ papers/crepp-wp200704.pdf Bouchard, T. J. (2013). The Wilson effect: The increase in heritability of I with age. Twin Research and Human Genetics, 16, 923–930. Flynn, J. R. (2007). What is intelligence? Beyond the Flynn Effect. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Flynn, J. R. (2013). Intelligence and human progress: The story of what was hidden in our genes. London, England: Elsevier. Herrnstein, R. J., & Murray, C. (1994). The bell curve: Intelligence and class in American life. New York, NY: Free Press.

Intelligence

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Schooling

Since the seminal study of Stephen J. Ceci in 1991, it is well known that the amount of schooling— that is, years of school attendance—is positively and highly correlated with the results of psychometric intelligence tests. Years in school and IQ correlate at r = 0.70–0.90 at the level of individuals and at r = .78 at the level of populations. Individuals who went longer to school show better psychometric intelligence test results than individuals who spent less time at school. Nations with populations that attended school for more time on average have smarter people. The empirical evidence is highly robust across samples, authors, decades, tests, and indicators of schooling (length of attendance or highest grade completed). Therefore, education is frequently used by economists as a proxy for “human capital,” implicitly referring to intelligence. Of obvious interest are these questions: Why is there a positive correlation? And why is it so strong? The

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following answers are offered in this entry: (a) Tests reflect curriculum content, (b) school signals ability, (c) schooling furthers intelligence, (d) intelligence furthers schooling, and (e) common factors underpin both school success and cognitive development.

Test Content Reflects Curriculum Content “Intelligence” scales contain items that refer to knowledge explicitly taught in school. For instance, in the Cognitive Abilities Test (CogAT), the verbal scales include items dealing with concepts such as “editorial” and “centipede,” and the quantitativenumerical scales feature items about division and angles. Without education, a person likely would not be able to answer the items correctly. Schooling delivers knowledge relevant for solving such items. Therefore, if the knowledge required to do well on such tests is taught at school, the extent of school attendance is likely to correlate with IQ test scores. However, two replies to this claim are important—one empirical and the other theoretical. A positive correlation is also found for intelligence scales not dealing with knowledge at school—that is, for “fluid” intelligence scales. For example, a study conducted in 1995 found that the effect of 1 year of school attendance on the Cattell Culture Fair Intelligence Test (CFT) was only slightly weaker than that on the more “crystallized” CogAT (7.6 vs. 8.6 IQ points, respectively). Moreover, the concept of intelligence should refer to the ability to think—to solve new cognitive problems by thinking, to infer, to think abstractly, and to understand. Thus, knowledge should be excluded from intelligence per se and be measured as a broader concept such as cognitive ability or cognitive competence, which includes intelligence, knowledge, the intelligent use of knowledge, and basic abilities such as mental speed and working memory.

School Signals Given Ability Staying in school is costly: Instruction is not only sometimes boring but also challenging. According to the signal theory, staying in school and enduring day in and out all these cognitive challenges merely signal to students, teachers, parents, and the job ­market that a person has to be smart and adaptable.

It is correct that qualifications and grades reflect intelligence (see the high empirical correlations) and that individual differences are rarely changed by school education: Good students in, good students out. Institutions such as Harvard University are maybe not good at all or at least not better than others; they admit only relatively smart persons and at the end deliver them some years older and by general experiences more mature to the job market. However, two replies are necessary: First, at the international level any signaling is not plausible. Why should Japan signal by longer education its smartness, for example, to China? Second, in its radical version, denying positive effects of education on cognitive development, a signaling theory is empirically refuted.

Schooling Furthers Intelligence There is overwhelming evidence that schooling furthers not only knowledge but also intelligence. Individual differences in intelligence are not altered, but the level of cognitive development is. The optimal study of school effects would involve a sample of 50 pairs of identical twins, with one of each pair attending school and the other member of the pair not attending. School attendance could be also varied more gradually by years and quality. Ethical considerations prevent such a study: Education not only has positive effects on intelligence and knowledge; it also positively affects social competences, attitudes, and personality. Therefore, only quasi-experimental studies are possible in which school attendance varies independently as possible from student, family, and other background factors. For instance, in some countries, there are strict rules for age at the time of school enrollment. If a child is 6 years and 0 days old on August 1, he or she is enrolled in school, but if the child is only 5 years and 364 days old, then he or she is obliged to enroll 1 year later. Such children in their older ages—for example, at age 7 or 10—could be compared for cognitive development given the 1-year lag in formal education. In addition, the effects of long summer vacations, wars, and changes in laws on compulsory education similarly create school-age-lagged cohorts of students. One study published in 1997

Intelligence and Schooling

controlled for background variables and age at maturation and found the mean effect of 1 year of schooling to be 3 IQ points. Cross-cultural and within-nation studies show also large, acrossyears, summed effects in the results from Piagetian tests of cognitive development. More difficult to address are questions such as these: Is there a sensible period for learning? If a child’s entry into school is delayed for a year, but the student receives the same course of education as the earlier-enrolled children until age 25, will any negative effects of delayed enrollment persist? Does home schooling impede or further cognitive development? Most probably, the quality of education itself counts for more than the institution where the education was received. At this point, the empirical evidence is ambiguous not least because of the inordinate difficulty of adequately controlling potentially confounding variables. Does any special content have positive effects, such as mathematics or Latin? The empirical evidence is not definite; however, all subjects dealing with logic—for example, mathematics, science, and grammar—show closer affinity to principles of thinking than does remote learning or reception of ideology, especially if the ideology taught refuses thinking, epistemic rationality, and meritoric orientations. A further question involves the attributes of educational quality and their effects on cognitive development. Because student assessment tests theoretically and empirically differ only gradually from fluid intelligence tests, those results can be used. The quality factors can be classified in three groups: time and time efficiency, structure and institutional achievement orientation, and other supportive conditions. Time as years in school, days taught per year and week, and hours per day all positively correlate with cognitive ability. However, the correlations with amount of instruction (per year to per day) are much lower than the correlations with years attending school—indicating that there are also intelligence effects on attending school. Especially important is the efficient use of allotted time, which can be reflected in teachers’ classroom management and other discipline-related practices. Disturbances and absenteeism reduce effective learning time. Schools like KIPP schools (Knowledge Is Power Program) try to be more effective here.

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Preschool education is effective (especially for later school success). It also extends the length of education. Education may be more effective when focused in a structured way on achievement in cognitive domains. Norm-based exams; achievement tests; ability tracking; autonomous schools; well-­ structured, direct instruction; and clarity in instruction are all variables that influence a student’s level of cognitive competence. Less relevant are smaller class size and class repetition. Other salient variables are teacher qualification, school climate, provision of feedback to teachers about student learning, and the use of innovative instruction methods, such as discovery learning, computer-based instruction, and group learning. Of course, students need to understand the language in which instruction is provided. They need to learn the language in and outside school, and school needs to support this learning.

Intelligence Furthers Schooling More intelligent students spend more years in schooling, including postsecondary education, and select more demanding tracks and schools. More intelligent persons more probably go to universities. Others more frequently choose vocational training. For society, both are important, but in modernity, the nonroutine cognitive jobs become increasingly relevant. Smarter students learn more quickly, especially when the content is complex. Interested students invest more time and attention in learning, thinking, and knowledge acquisition, and their attitudes and behaviors (e.g., listening and asking content-related questions) motivate teachers. In addition, the presence of peers with sufficient abilities and favorable attitudes and behaviors promote successful instruction and a more supportive learning climate (e.g., less “nerd” harassment). In a class of competent students there are fewer disturbances, students are more achievement orientated, and the teacher can invest more of the given time in instruction. As a result, time is more efficiently used for learning, instruction occurs at a faster pace, the teacher can deal with more complex content, and students stimulate themselves and their peers with questions, objections, and assistance. Intelligence begets intelligence.

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Common Factors Underpin Cognitive and School Development Education supports intelligence and intelligence supports education. Behind them stand supportive factors in personality, culture, and genes. What counts in regard to personality are those traits, attitudes, and behavior styles that support both schooling and cognitive development: diligence, motivation (interest in learning, knowledge, and thinking), reasonable adaptability to achievement situations and institutions, psychological and physical health (e.g., low levels of anxiety), and a healthy lifestyle (e.g., not taking drugs and little or no smoking and consumption of alcohol). Cultures differ in their valuation of education and thinking. For example, Confucianism stresses effort, achievement, learning, and extended time in education. East Asian countries lead in international comparisons of school achievement and intelligence. Judaism stresses literacy, traditionally viewed as the ability to read and understand ­religious texts. This was extended to modern education, including mathematics and science. Jewish people, especially Ashkenazi Jews, are often overrepresented in reputable universities, exhibit above-average results in intelligence tests, and are predominate among leading scientists. From the Middle Ages on, Christianity supported education, initially for a clerical elite, later for the entire population. Protestantism especially stressed the ability to read and understand the Bible and to think independently. A Burgher culture stressed achievement, education, thinking, and a rational lifestyle. Modern societies function based on achievement, learning, openness, thinking, and rationality. From behavioral genetics it is known that individual differences in school attainment and ­ intelligence have heritabilities of 60% to 80% as individuals grow older. Individual differences in education and intelligence can be largely explained by genetic factors. However, the genes and how they work to express themselves in behavior in schools and cognitive tasks are not known. Heiner Rindermann See also Brain and Intelligence; Cognitive Development; Intelligence, Evolution of; Intelligence, Heritability of; Intelligence and Individualism; Intelligence Testing

and Ethnicity; Measurement of Intelligence; Motivation and Cognition; Perception and Cognition; Piaget’s and the Neo-Piagetian Theories of Cognitive Development

Further Readings Artman, L., Cahan, S., & Avni-Babad, D. (2006). Age, schooling and conditional reasoning. Cognitive Development, 21, 131–145. Ceci, S. J. (1991). How much does schooling influence general intelligence and its cognitive components? A reassessment of the evidence. Developmental Psychology, 27, 703–722. Hattie, J. A. C. (2009). Visible learning: A synthesis of over 800 meta-analyses relating to achievement. London, England: Routledge. Rindermann, H., & Ceci, S. J. (2009). Educational policy and country outcomes in international cognitive competence studies. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4, 551–577. Winship, C., & Korenman, S. (1997). Does staying in school make you smarter? The effect of education on IQ in The Bell Curve. In B. Devlin, S. E. Fienberg, D. P. Resnick, & K. Roeder (Eds.), Intelligence, genes and success (pp. 215–234). New York, NY: Springer.

Intelligence Testing Intelligence testing is a complex process that aims to estimate a person’s intelligence. The theoretical background and the underlying conceptions of an intelligence test, as well as the conventions of the testing procedure, are critical elements of intelligence testing. Furthermore, the obtained intelligence score must be interpreted by considering properties of the statistical procedures involved, the reference group, and the assessment situation. This entry discusses the changing meaning of intelligence and describes how intelligence is measured.

The Meaning of Intelligence The definition of intelligence has changed over the years and so have the measures for its assessment. Initially, intelligent behavior was assumed to be the outcome of the coaction of a general intelligence and highly specific abilities. Early research

Intelligence Testing

concentrated on this general intelligence, also referred to as the g factor of intelligence, which was considered an indicator of a person’s mental energy. Later conceptualizations of intelligence suggested that there is an assortment of seven independent primary mental abilities and introduced the dichotomy of fluid and crystallized intelligence. These became very popular definitions. The latest development is characterized by the integration of various views. Intelligence is now considered a hierarchical structure composed of three strata. The first stratum includes more than 70 rather narrow abilities, and the second stratum has nine broader abilities, including fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, quantitative reasoning, reading/writing ability, short-term ­ memory, long-term storage and retrieval, visual processing, auditory processing, and processing speed. The g factor of intelligence is assigned to the top of the hierarchy. The notion that intelligence has a hierachical structure is based on the psychometric approach to intelligence. The word psychometric refers to the fact that the science of test construction plays an important role so that definitions of intelligence are derived from empirical studies of various specific measures of intelligence. In addition to the psychometric approach, there are two other major approaches: the biological approach and the social-cultural approach. Although intelligence testing occurs mainly within the psychometric approach, these other approaches open further possibilities. The biological approach is concerned with the biological basis of individual differences in the ability to solve the problems that characterize the measures of intelligence. The aim of this approach is to identify the neural underpinnings of the complex cognitive processes required for problem solving and other aspects of mental ability. This approach is explanatory and promises to provide basic information on why a person’s intelligence is excellent or poor (or otherwise). This basic information on the individual level of intelligence can be obtained by using so-called elementary cognitive tasks (i.e., simple tasks that require only a small number of mental processes) or neuroimaging techniques. These measures are considered to be largely free of influences originating from learning and culture.

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The social-cultural approach is the attempt to extend the meaning of intelligence from the ability to solve problems typically included in an intelligence test to the ability to solve problems in everyday life situations and to consider environmental influences—such as educational, socioeconomic, and cultural factors—on a person’s intelligence. Within this approach, the meaning of intelligence even extends to a person’s ability for successful mental self-management, which includes the ability to successfully adapt to and cope with social environmental challenges.

The Measurement of Intelligence Intelligence tests are composed of a number of tasks that the test taker has to solve. In most cases, these tasks have a well-defined solution that can be reached by applying logical, numerical, or relational rules, simple information-processing skills, or knowledge. Auxiliary material is not necessary. Commonly, tasks in an intelligence test are selected to cover a large range of task difficulty. As a consequence, some tasks can be solved by most persons, whereas other tasks are too demanding for the majority. Each measure of intelligence should be composed of tasks that are homogeneous with regard to the specific ability to be assessed or should contain homogeneous subsets of such tasks. A homogeneous set of tasks constitutes a scale for the psychometric assessment of a given ability. An intelligence test is adminstered by an examiner. Some tests require individual testing because test administration requires various interactions between the examiner and the person to be tested. For example, the examiner may have to read the instructions, present a verbal task, or take notes. The majority of intelligence tests are paper-andpencil tests that also can be administered to groups of persons. In this latter case, instructions and task descriptions are printed on a sheet of paper that is also used by the test takers to provide their answers. Quite obviously, with group testing, the interaction between the examiner and the persons to be tested is minimized. Fairness has been and still is a big issue in the measuement of intelligence. Originally, tests were designed to be as free as possible from cultural influences, as such influences were suspected to give well-educated persons an advantage over

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those who are less educated. Although it proved to be impossible to develop tasks that are completely culture free, some tasks are less prone to cultural influences than others. Figural tasks were shown to be less affected by cultural influences compared with verbal or numerical tasks, and they were referred to as culture fair. Furthermore, empirical investigations revealed that differences in performance on intelligence tests might emerge as a function of age, gender, socioeconomic status, area of residence, and so on. However, performance differences between two groups on a test do not necessarily mean differences between the two groups in the underlying ability. Fairness can be established in two ways: by modifying the test or by adjusting the results. The latter is achieved by relating a person’s test performance to the scores of a reference group consisting of a large sample of people with similar demographics (i.e., gender, educational level, age, etc.). Another important issue in the measurement of intelligence is the type of task administration. A task can be adminstered as a power or a speed test. A power test has no time limit. The tasks are ordered with increasing task difficulty. The level of task difficulty a person can master is indicative of his or her individual level of intelligence. By contrast, the tasks in a speed test are easy enough that (almost) each person is able to solve all problems if there is enough time. Because of the time limit, the number of successfully completed tasks within the specified time interval represents an estimate of the person’s individual level of intelligence. Many intelligence tests employ combinations of both power and speed testing. A generous time limit may be combined with an increasing degree of difficulty. The time limitation is mainly used to improve the efficiency of administration. Efficient testing can also be achieved by adapting task difficulty to the person’s individual level of ability. With this procedure, only tasks that are neither too easy nor too difficult for a given person are presented. The testing procedure starts with a task of intermediate difficulty. If the test taker fails to correctly solve this task, an easier task is presented next. If the test taker successfully completed the intial task, the next task is somewhat more difficult. The advantage of this method is that a smaller number of tasks is necessary to achieve a good estimate of a person’s intelligence.

A major consideration, however, is that adaptive procedures require computer-based testing.

The Meaning of Test Scores Intelligence testing results in a raw score that reflects the test taker’s performance directly but is not very meaningful by itself. It may indicate good performance for a child aged 6, for example, but poor performance for an adolescent aged 18. Therefore, the raw score is transformed to a scaled score, which enables either a norm-referenced or criterion-referenced interpretation. In the case of the norm-referenced interpretation, the score indicates the person’s performance relative to the performance of other people of similar demographic background. In the case of the criterion-referenced interpretation, the score is related to specific criteria. Traditional intelligence testing has been dominated by the norm-referenced interpretation. Intelligence-test norms are adjusted to the intelligence quotient (IQ) distribution of the appropriate reference group. Although the acronym IQ originally referred to the computation of a ratio, currently it is a statistic that indicates the person’s position within a standardized IQ distribution that is characterized by a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15. The raw score is adjusted to this distribution by computing the scaled score. It is important to be aware that the scaled score represents only an estimate of the person’s intelligence. It is an estimate because intelligence is a construct that is not observable directly but must be inferred and estimated by means of statistical procedures using observed scores that are to a greater or lesser extent distorted by the error of measurement. The precision of the scaled score should be represented by computing a confidence interval.

Situational Influences The validity of the results of intelligence testing depends not only on the quality of the test but also on the appropriateness of the assessment situation. Adverse influences can become effective in that situation. The examiner may become a major source of interference, for example. Thus, an important requirement is that the resulting test score should be independent of the examiner. This requirement is addressed as objectivity but is not

Intelligence Testing and Ethnicity

to be equated with the passivity of the examiner. Rather, the examiner takes a leading role in intelligence testing in many ways. He or she must establish a trustworthy relationship with the person or persons to be tested and has to ensure appropriate concentration on completing the tasks of the intelligence test. Fulfilling this requirement is especially important for the psychometric assessment of intelligence in disadvantaged and disabled persons. Furthermore, the examiner’s responsibility is to ensure an appropriate testing environment and to eliminate any possible disturbance. Finally, the examiner should be informed of test takers’ state of health and other possible impairments. Thus, the main challenge for the examiner is to administer the test under the standardized conditions specified in the test manual and, concurrently, to enable the person to be tested to achieve his or her best possible performance. Karl Schweizer, Stefan Troche, and Thomas Rammsayer See also Brain and Intelligence; Emotional Intelligence; Intelligence Testing and Ethnicity; Measurement of Intelligence; Multiple Intelligences

Further Readings Flanagan, D. P., & Harrison, P. L. (2012). Contemporary intellectual assessment: Theories, tests, and issues. New York, NY: Guilford Press. Fletcher, R. B., & Hattie, J. (2011). Intelligence and intelligence testing. New York, NY: Routledge. Kaufman, J. C. (2009). Intelligent testing: Integrating psychological theory and clinical practice. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Maltby, J., Day, L., & Macaskill, A. (2010). Introduction to personality, individual differences and intelligence (2nd ed.). Harlow, England: Pearson Education. Murphy, K. R., & Davidshofer, C. O. (2014). Psychological testing: Principles and applications (6th ed.). Harlow, England: Pearson.

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and

Ethnicity

To understand the construct of intelligence it is important to understand how various definitions

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and tests of intelligence have shaped perceptions of oneself and others. The concept of intelligence is so complex, multifaceted, and, at times, subjective that many psychologists do not exactly agree on a precise meaning. This entry looks at two early theories of intelligence, discusses views of the interaction of race and ethnicity with intelligence, and reviews current research on the influence of testing situations on test scores for intelligence. Older theories of intelligence relied more heavily on the idea of a single entity of intelligence. These ideas were more formally included in psychological theory in 1904, when the English psychologist Charles Spearman developed the concept of “general intelligence” or, simply, “g.” Spearman’s g was considered innate and unchangeable; a person was born with a certain amount of g and that amount could not change over time. Similarly, American psychologist Lewis Terman developed the idea of an “IQ” (intelligence quotient) that provides a single number that is the ratio of mental and physical age. Like g, IQ was also considered to be innate and heritable. Later, other psychologists argued that there are multiple dimensions and various levels and types of intelligence. Although the exact scope, and thus method of measurement, of intelligence is debatable, in the 1990s a group of researchers agreed that intelligence broadly relates to the abilities of thinking, adapting, and learning from experience.

Interaction of Race and Ethnicity With Intelligence The theory of general intelligence grew out of work that occurred around the turn of the 20th century. At this time, French psychologist Alfred Binet and physician Theodore Simon were tasked by the French government to design a measure of intelligence for the public school system. Together, they designed the first formal intelligence test in order to identify which schoolchildren would benefit from remediation. A revised version of the original test, renamed the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale, is still widely used. Although, by all accounts, the Binet-Simon test was designed to avoid bias, other psychologists were less objective in intelligence testing. For example, American psychologist Henry Goddard

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tested immigrants arriving through Ellis Island for “feeblemindedness” and determined that several groups, including Italians and Russians, were intellectually inferior to other ethnic groups. As a result, the U.S. government passed the Immigration Act of 1924, which imposed immigration restrictions on people arriving from Southern and Eastern Europe. Again, these ideas were not new. The concept of intelligence and its possible interaction with race and ethnicity had been a topic of interest for scholars in multiple disciplines and countries. During the 18th and 19th centuries, many philosophers, psychologists, and theorists argued that people from different regions and ethnic backgrounds differed in their levels of intelligence. These assertions were often based on subjective observations and erroneous systems of measurement, such as counting the number of “eminent men” in a particular group of people or measuring the sizes of skulls. Essentially, the goal of many of the early, single-entity intelligence tests was to attempt to document racial differences in abilities. Simultaneously, and perhaps not coincidentally, the concept of “race” and, thus, racial differences also emerged and solidified throughout the 19th century. Prior to the 18th century, perceived ethnicity tended to be based on differences in religion and language, and ethnicity was not necessarily seen as stable and heritable. However, the construct of race eventually superseded the construct of ethnicity in regard to how academics and the public viewed human diversity. Unlike ethnicity, racial groups were viewed as genetic subdivisions of humanity rather than fluid identities. As such, from the 18th century on, people could now be classified in distinct groups, and those groups could be placed in a hierarchy depending on perceived fixed differences in abilities. This timing coincided with the rise of slavery in the North American colonies and the intellectual justifications for forcibly abducting people from Africa to be used as slaves in the “New World.” Just a few years after the end of the American Revolution, which hinged on the idea that all people are created equal, American president Thomas Jefferson wrote about the racial differences he observed between free people and the people he enslaved at his Virginia plantation.

He suggested that the former were naturally superior. Some scholars questioned the impermeable racial categorizations and subsequent justifications. Writing in the 1830s, French political theorist Alexis de Tocqueville argued that the current theories about the inherent nature of race and intelligence were indeed rationalizations for slavery and racial oppression. In the 1990s, American biologist Joseph Graves argued that there are two traditions regarding the study of intelligence, the science and the pseudoscience, with the latter reducing the constructs of intelligence and race to fixed entities, thereby perpetuating racist ideology. These large-scale public debates were widely revisited in the mid-1990s due, in part, to the publication of the book The Bell Curve, authored by American psychologist Richard Herrnstein and American political scientist Charles Murray. In the book, the authors conjectured that differences in intelligence were primarily genetic, and thus, some races were more or less intelligent than others. Again, this argument presumes that both race and intelligence are fixed, impermeable, and unmalleable. The book was also reminiscent of Jefferson’s writings about enslaved humans in that, in observing human behavior, the authors drew a causeand-effect connection between race and social status rather than considering how racism, rather than race, can impact status via discrimination and access to resources and opportunities. Herrnstein and Murray were not alone in their assessment; more than 50 established psychometricians signed a statement in the Wall Street Journal in support of The Bell Curve’s theories. However, it did not go without critique and ultimately restarted the long debate on race and intelligence. Many social scientists found methodological and theoretical problems with the arguments posited in the book. American social psychologist Richard Nisbett took a more hard-line approach to the dispute by clearly stating that genes play absolutely no role in differences in IQ scores between ethnic groups. Rather, environmental ­factors account for those differences.

Current Research Newer research on the origins of intelligence tend to focus on gene and environment interactions and

Intelligence Testing and Ethnicity

on other situational factors, such as stress, access to resources, and nutrition. Additionally, since the 1990s, there has been further research on the influence of the testing situation on test scores. For example, American social psychologists Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson developed the theory of stereotype threat. According to this theory, stereotype threat occurs when members of a stigmatized group perform poorly on a task with which they strongly identify but are negatively stereotyped. In the original set of studies, African American and White American college students completed a section of a standardized test that is routinely used to measure academic aptitude and, theoretically, intelligence. In one study, half the participants were told that the test measured intellectual ability and the other half that the test did not measure intellectual ability. Immediately after receiving this prime, all the participants completed a section of the standardized test. African American participants who were told that the test measured intelligence underperformed compared with African American participants who were told that the test did not measure intelligence. They also underperformed compared with White participants across conditions (whose test scores did not vary based on the prime). This outcome suggested that, when African American college students, who are stereotyped as being less intelligent than White college students, feel that they are being measured on a stereotyped domain, the situation itself, and not actual ability, will lead to underperformance. Furthermore, when the stereotype, and thus the stereotype threat, is removed from the situation, African American and White college students perform equally well. The original set of studies demonstrated that even minor details in the testing situation can create stereotype threat. Aside from a test being presented as a test of intellectual ability (as these tests usually are), Steele and Aronson also found that simply reporting ethnicity before taking the test was also enough of a situational cue to invoke stereotype threat for African American students. Similar to the previous study, African American participants who indicated their ethnicity before taking the test underperformed compared with African American participants who did not indicate their ethnicity

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and White participants across conditions. Again, when stereotypes were removed from the situation, African American and White college students performed equally well; the long-standing “racial gap” in testing had been removed. Follow-up studies have shown that, for people who are experiencing stereotype threat, the underperformance does not result from believing or internalizing the stereotypes but rather from just simply knowing that the stereotypes exist and that someone else might judge the test taker based on the stereotypes. This phenomenon is not specific to African Americans but occurs in any group that is stereotyped as being less intelligent. Indeed, Nigerian-American anthropologist John Ogbu found that, across cultures, stigmatized groups, regardless of ethnicity, score on average 15 points lower on IQ tests than dominant groups do. This holds true for most stigmatized groups, including those who are stigmatized based on a facet of their identity that is not connected to race or ethnicity, such as occupation or caste. Therefore, any claims that IQ score differences are due to genetic differences between races are in serious question. In an interesting twist on stereotype threat, social psychologists Margaret Shih, Todd Pittinsky, and Nalini Ambady administered mathematics tests to Asian-American women and either primed the participants with their ethnicity or gender or asked identity-neutral questions before they completed the test. Asian-American participants who were primed with their female gender identity before taking the test performed the worst across the three groups (i.e., participants primed with ethnicity, participants primed with gender, and participants asked identity-neutral questions), consistent with women being stereotyped as “bad at math.” But Asian-American participants who were primed with their Asian ethnicity before taking the test performed the best across the three groups consistent with the stereotype of Asians being “good at math.” This performance boost is referred to as stereotype lift, although stereotypes, regardless of content, are still limiting and restrictive.

Where to Go From Here? Given the long-standing issues with defining and measuring intelligence, one might ask, Why test at

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Intergroup Behavior

all? And why separate standardized-test scores by group? Both race and intelligence are fluid constructs, and ranges of intellectual abilities tend to be greater within ethnic groups than between ethnic groups. In fact, there is more genetic variation among the people of the African continent than there is among all the rest of the human s­pecies combined. Although the concepts of intelligence and race can be unclear, it is clear that both constructs matter in real and impactful ways. “Intelligence,” however it is measured, continues to correlate with long-term outcomes, such as health, wealth, and educational achievement. Because “race” also correlates with many of the same outcomes, educators and policymakers need to understand that although intelligence and race as concepts are open to interpretation, intelligence tests and racism matter. The two topics have been forcibly intertwined in public and academic discourse, and their historical connection has had real and long-lasting impact on everyday lives. As Joseph Graves and Amanda Johnson succinctly stated in their critique of The Bell Curve, “Without the elimination of the toxic conditions to which African Americans have been and are exposed, the debate concerning genetic differentials in generalized intelligence is scientifically meaningless” (1995, p. 209). Bettina Spencer See also Brain and Intelligence; Cognitive Development; Epigenetics; Flynn Effect; Intelligence, Environmental Influences on; Intelligence, Evolution of; Intelligence, Heritability of; Intelligence and Individualism; Intelligence and Schooling; Intelligence Testing; Measurement of Intelligence; Multiple Intelligences; Social Influence; Triarchic Intelligence

Further Readings Graves, J. L., & Johnson, A. (1995). The pseudoscience of psychometry and The Bell Curve. Journal of Negro Education, 64, 277–294. Ogbu, J. U. (1978). Minority education and caste: The American system in cross-cultural perspective. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Shih, M., Pittinsky, T. L., & Ambady, N. (1999). Stereotype susceptibility: Identity salience and shifts in quantitative performance. Psychological Science, 10, 80–83.

Steele, C. M. (1997). A threat in the air: How stereotypes shape the intellectual identities and performance of women and African Americans. American Psychologist, 52, 613–629.

Intergroup Behavior Intergroup behavior refers to exchanges between groups or between individuals who think of themselves or one another in terms of their membership in different groups. Although psychology has traditionally focused on the individual as the primary unit of analysis, intergroup behavior has received substantial attention since World War II. This entry discusses the study of intergroup behavior and how individuals in groups perceive those who belong to other groups. The postwar period produced several classic studies in intergroup behavior. They examined how competition fosters intergroup bias and conflict, how individual differences (e.g., differences in attitudes toward authority) affect intergroup attitudes, and how contact between members of different groups can reduce intergroup prejudice and promote social harmony. Research on intergroup behavior was further stimulated in the late 1970s by new major theoretical developments in two areas: (a) social cognition, which illuminated the critical ways that perceiving others as a member of a social category bias the ways people think about and act toward others, and (b) social identity, which emphasized fundamental differences in how people behave when they think about their group or personal identity. By the mid-1990s, intergroup behavior represented one of the most popular topics for research in social psychology. People tend to respond very differently to members of the in-group, the group to which they belong, than to members of out-groups, the groups in which they are not a member. As evolutionary psychologists have pointed out, humans are social animals, and forming in-groups (and distinguishing them from out-groups) was critical for survival. Most of contemporary work on intergroup behavior focuses on intergroup bias—negative orientations between groups—and the three major facets of it: prejudice (negative attitudes),

Intergroup Behavior

stereotyping (beliefs about typical qualities of groups), and discrimination (unfair behavior).

Social Contexts: Functional Relations Between Groups Much of the early research on intergroup behavior examined functional relations between groups (i.e., whether groups are, or are perceived to be, in competition or are cooperatively interdependent) and identified competition as a fundamental cause of intergroup prejudice and conflict. A classic field study conducted at a summer camp (often known as the “Robbers Cave experiment”) illustrated this interest very well. Among boys randomly assigned to two separate groups, repeated competitive activities in which only the winning group received prizes produced escalating conflict (e.g., name-calling and fistfights) over the course of a single week. However, when researchers introduced a series of challenges that required cooperation (superordinate goals), the relationship between the two groups became more harmonious. In short, changing the functional relations between groups significantly altered intergroup relations. In everyday life, groups do not have to be in actual competition for negative intergroup behavior to result. In the absence of explicit competition, people tend to assume that their group is in competition with other groups. For example, research on the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect has revealed that in novel situations involving the distribution of resources, two groups, as compared with two individuals, behave in a greedier, less trustworthy manner. As a consequence, interactions between members of different groups are more fragile than exchanges between members of the same group. Because of heightened wariness and vigilance in monitoring negative intentions and behaviors from out-group members, even minor disruptions or disagreements can prove extremely problematic in the context of intergroup interactions. Indeed, although both Whites and Blacks in the United States are personally interested in intergroup interaction, they often avoid these interactions because they anticipate that their overtures will be rejected by members of the other group.

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Whereas research on functional relations between groups provides explanations of why intergroup interactions can be more difficult to manage than interpersonal ones, it does not account for the fact that group-based biases can arise even when no realistic functional relationship exists between two particular groups. Research on social cognition and social identity offers ­complementary explanations.

Categorizing Others and Oneself: Social Cognition and Social Identity Psychological research on social cognition, the study of how people think about one another, ­highlights the distinction between perceiving and thinking about others as unique individuals or as members of social categories and groups. People tend to engage in category-based processing more readily than person-based processing, because thinking of others in terms of their group membership requires less cognitive effort and allows people to make inferences about the characteristics of an individual by drawing from their prior knowledge of the group as a whole. Although this may be an extremely useful cognitive shortcut, the tendency to categorize people as members of different groups has substantial cognitive, perceptual, ­affective, and behavioral implications. Cognitively, when social categorization is in effect, members of the same group are perceived to be more similar than they previously were, and the distinctions between members of different categories become exaggerated (thus increasing ­ stereotyping). Perceptually, people are less able to distinguish faces among different out-group members than among in-group members. Emotionally, people spontaneously like and trust others more after learning their status as in-group rather than out-group members (thus contributing to prejudice). Behaviorally, people act in a more cooperative manner and are more generous in their reward allocations to in-group than to out-group members (thus reflecting discrimination). In addition to the effects related to how people categorize others, whether people think about themselves as individuals or as members of a group also shapes the way they behave. According to social identity theory, a person’s experience of identity varies along a continuum, from the self as

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a separate individual with personal motives, goals, and achievements (personal identity) to the self as the embodiment of a social collective or group (social identity). At the individual level, one’s personal welfare and goals are most salient and important; at the group level, the goals and achievements of the group are merged with one’s own, and the group’s welfare is paramount. To satisfy the basic human drive for positive self-regard, people spontaneously value in-group members more than out-group members or unaffiliated individuals, even when the basis of group membership is arbitrary (i.e., minimal groups). Along these same lines, people are also motivated to increase the perceived worth of the social groups to which they already belong, often by ­discriminating against other groups. Self-categorization theory further emphasizes that when people’s social identity is made salient, they come to see themselves and other in-group members as similar in fundamental ways and experience depersonalized attraction to other in-group members—attraction based more on group membership than on individual qualities. This sense of solidarity and like-mindedness makes people feel secure and reduces uncertainty in social life.

Promoting Positive Intergroup Behavior Functional relations, social categorization, and social identity processes, when left unmanaged, often contribute to intergroup bias and social conflict. However, when appropriately directed and structured, these mechanisms can be harnessed to improve intergroup relations. Research on contact theory, one of the most prominent theories of how to improve intergroup relations, originally revealed that intergroup contact most effectively reduces bias when the interaction involves (a) equal status within the contact situation, (b) intergroup cooperation, (c) common goals, and (d) the support of authorities, law, or custom. Later work further highlighted the importance of intergroup friendships and, more broadly, opportunities for personal acquaintance between members of different groups to the reduction of intergroup bias and conflict. Appropriate intergroup contact can be a powerful tool for improving intergroup behavior. For example, even simply imagining contact with a member of another

group can promote positive intergroup behavior; similarly, the mere knowledge that other in-group members have out-group friends can lead to more positive intergroup attitudes and behavior. Why is intergroup contact so effective? Three processes may be at work. First, positive intergroup contact can encourage decategorization, motivating people to think of themselves and others primarily as individuals rather than as group members. When people from different groups exchange personal, intimate information with one another, this information can often contradict group stereotypes and facilitate the perception of the out-group as more heterogeneous, which, in turn, leads to more positive intergroup attitudes and reduced biases. Second, intergroup contact can also promote recategorization, which involves replacing the original categorization of members of different groups with an overriding, shared identity. Social categorization and identity are malleable: People tend to think in terms of different social categories and identities in different situations. For example, those who are typically thought of as members of a different group in one situation (e.g., based on their gender) can be viewed as an in-group member in another context (e.g., other students at one’s college). According to the common in-group identity model, recategorization reduces intergroup bias through cognitive and motivational processes involving in-group favoritism: The more positive beliefs, feelings, and behaviors usually reserved for in-group members are extended or redirected to former out-group members because of their recategorized in-group status. Third, intergroup contact enables individuals to maintain distinctions between groups within a common in-group identity or in terms of cooperative functional relationships. For instance, members of different ethnic groups can come to see themselves as distinct parts of an inclusive national identity. This process is most effective when the particular out-group members encountered within the common identity (or the cooperative relationship) are seen as typical representatives of their groups. John F. Dovidio and Katie Wang See also Altruism and Sociality; Attraction; Culture and Social Relations; Group Processes; Social Cognition

International Classification of Diseases

Further Readings

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The International Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems is typically referred to in its truncated form, International Classification of Diseases (ICD) and is a publication maintained and promulgated by the World Health Organization (WHO). The ICD is the international standard diagnostic tool for reporting information on deaths, diseases, and injuries for epidemiological, health management, and clinical purposes and is used to monitor the occurrence of diseases and other health problems, including mental and behavioral disorders. The ICD contains codes for all manner of diseases and injuries and organizes these by chapters such as “Mental, Behavioral and Neurodevelopmental Disorders” or “Diseases of the Nervous System.” This entry provides a description of the ICD, including the history of its development.

classification system intended to capture population health statistics. The first attempt at collecting these data came at the first International Statistical Conference (ISC) held in 1853, in Brussels, where the primary focus was to ascertain causes of death across nations by developing the International List of Causes of Death. The conference was ­succeeded by the International Statistical Institute, which still exists today and presently cooperates with WHO (among others) in the ­ continual ­revision of the ICD. The ICD has undergone 10 revisions, with the 11th scheduled for release in 2017. Each revision has been propelled by international field trials sponsored by WHO to further illuminate new conditions related to morbidity and mortality, as well as to differentiate certain conditions into new diagnoses or subtypes under the umbrella of existing diagnostic criteria. Beginning with the ICD-9, the United States (among other countries) began adapting certain diagnoses to align with cultural phenomena that affect nosology and has published these adaptations as “clinical modifications”; hence the use of the qualifier CM in the editions of the ICD used in the United States (i.e., ICD-9-CM, ICD-10-CM, etc.). In the 1960s, WHO took a particular interest in developing an improved classification and diagnostic system for mental disorders. Although the content and structure of the ICD have undergone numerous, substantial changes over the past century, perhaps the most germane of these to ­psychology occurred with the release of the ICD-6, which included a category called “Mental, Psychoneurotic, and Personality Disorders.” By the 1970s, WHO had included narrative descriptions for mental disorders that were similar to those published and promoted by the American Psychiatric Association in its third revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-III). Of course, other chapters of the ICD are relevant to psychologists working with individuals diagnosed with cancer, neurological disorders, sexual disorders, eating or feeding problems, and a wide variety of other health conditions.

A Brief History

Mental Disorders

The current incarnation of the ICD is predated by several historic attempts at synthesizing a universal

Presently, mental disorders are detailed within Chapter 5 (demarcated by the letter F) of the

Abrams, D., & Hogg, M. E. (2010). Social identity and self-categorization. In J. F. Dovidio, M. Hewstone, P. Glick, & V. M. Esses (Eds.), SAGE handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (pp. 179– 194). London, England: Sage. Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (2010). Intergroup bias. In S. T. Fiske, D. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (Vol. 2, 5th ed., pp. 1084–1121). New York, NY: Wiley. Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (2007). Social cognition: From brains to culture. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (2012). Reducing intergroup bias: The common ingroup identity model. In P. A. M. Van Lange, A. W. Kruglanski, & E. T. Higgins (Eds.). Handbook of theories of social psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 439–457). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2011). When groups meet: The dynamics of intergroup contact. New York, NY: Psychology Press.

International Classification of Diseases

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International Classification of Diseases

ICD-10, and include 11 different categories of diagnoses, including organic mental disorders; mental and behavioral disorders due to psychoactive substance use; schizophrenia, schizotypal, and delusional disorders; mood (affective) disorders; neurotic, stress-related, and somatoform disorders; behavioral syndromes associated with physiological disturbances and physical factors; disorders of adult personality and behavior; mental retardation; disorders of psychological development; behavioral and emotional disorders with onset usually occurring in childhood and adolescence; and unspecified mental disorders. The development of these categories is the result of a decades-long collaboration between WHO, a variety of international psychiatric bodies, independent expert consultants, and scientists. The foundation for this process was laid in 1978, when WHO began collaborating with the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA) in the United States, with the intention of refining the classification and diagnosis of mental disorders and problems related to substance abuse. Subsequent research initiatives paved the way for the continued illumination of new or revised categories related to, among others, the use of psychological assessment in informing diagnostic research, the inclusion of personality disorder classification and diagnosis, and so on. Similar efforts continue today as WHO and its member nations and increasing numbers of other stakeholders, including the International Union of Psychological Science, continue to revise the classification and diagnostic nosology in anticipation of the release of the ICD-11.

Theoretical Orientation It is important to note that, despite its vast revision history, the content of the ICD has not necessarily been influenced by any particular theoretical orientation in psychology (i.e., cognitive, behavioral, humanistic, etc.). Rather, the primary focus of its development has been to capture data pertaining to the mortality and morbidity of health-related conditions. As such, the diagnostic categories are expansive and inclusive, regardless of the presumed etiological or phenomenological explanations of the conditions they enumerate.

However, more recent revisions have begun to take the clinical and research utility of the ICD into account, with field trials attempting especially to demonstrate the former. Concordantly, beginning with the ICD-9, published in 1979, WHO has published a “Blue Book,” which contains diagnostic descriptions of the various psychopathologies, and it is anticipated that updates to this publication will be released with future iterations of the ICD. Early editions of the ICD were less focused on the clinical utility of classification systems but were particularly focused, first, on simply classifying disorders and, second, on reliably classifying disorders for statistical and population health purposes. However, with the increased use of classification, more attention is now being paid to its everyday usefulness to practitioners in a wide variety of health care settings, specifically, whether they find the ICD appropriate, accessible, practical, and acceptable. One focus of the current revision of the ICD mental disorders chapter is to better help clinicians communicate with patients and others, make diagnoses, and determine current and future treatment needs. This is a particularly relevant focus for the ICD, given that the audience for the classification is an entire international, interconnected community of health systems and providers. Unlike in the United States, many locales do not have specialty mental health providers who evaluate and treat individuals with mental and behavioral problems. In fact, in some settings, community health workers are the first, if not primary, source of classification (often referred to as using “folk taxonomies”) and care. Therefore, the ICD must have clinical utility and generalized applicability for a wide variety of users possessing varying levels of expertise. To accomplish that aim, WHO has conducted large-scale international field trials evaluating ease of use and goodness of fit of the ICD to the clinical task of diagnosis and case management. Field studies are being conducted with specialty and ­ primary-care clinicians in a global network to evaluate the clinical utility of the ICD-11. In addition, the structure of the ICD-11 classification is being developed to better reflect how users tend to think about diagnoses. The categories are intended to be intuitively used and easily determined by clinicians when making differential diagnoses and

Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Motivation

not overburdening them with excessive specifiers and subtypes. Thus, the revision process behind the ICD-11 is intended to enhance, at a minimum, the face validity of the classification. However, the tension between clinical utility and the possibly greater use of “unspecified” when making a diagnosis contrasts with greater precision of more specific codes provided by subtypes and other specifiers. Balancing this tension when using the ICD for all classification purposes contributes to overall data collection in regard to mortality (cause of death) and morbidity (current health problems) and enables countries to track information for public health purposes and to contribute to worldwide data collection. Within the United States, the ICD-9-CM (1979) is the version used currently. Transition to the ICD10-CM has been delayed twice, with current implementation planned for 2015. With the currently planned release of the ICD-11 in 2017, it is hoped that the regular updating process of the classification will bring the ICD-10-CM closer in alignment to the ICD-11 so that there will not be such a long delay between publication of the 11th version by WHO and implementation within the United States. Efforts have historically been made to harmonize the ICD chapter on mental disorders with the latest version of the DSM, such that users of one classification will find noticeable similarities with the other. Lynn F. Bufka and Nathan A. Tatro See also Anxiety Disorders; Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; Health Psychology; Mood Disorders; Neurodevelopmental Disorders; Personality Disorders; Psychopathology and Stress; Schizophrenia; Sleep Disorders

Further Readings Goodheart, C. D. (2014). A primer for ICD-10-CM users: Psychological and behavioral conditions. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Reed, G. M. (2010). Toward ICD-11: Improving the clinical utility of WHO’s International Classification of Mental Disorders. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 41(6), 457–464. World Health Organization. (1992). The ICD-10 classification of mental and behavioural disorders: Clinical descriptions and diagnostic guidelines.

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Retrieved from http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/ en/bluebook.pdf World Health Organization. (1993). The ICD-10 classification of mental and behavioural disorders: Diagnostic criteria for research. Retrieved from http:// www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/GRNBOOK.pdf

Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Motivation For more than half a century, psychological scientists have used the term intrinsic motivation to refer to the phenomenon of individuals performing an activity simply because they find the activity interesting and enjoyable. At that time, a few psychologists had begun to realize that it is in people’s nature to be active in relating to their social and physical environments, and intrinsic motivation is a manifestation of this inherent tendency. As Harry Harlow showed 60 years ago, even nonhuman animals can be intrinsically motivated. The introduction of this concept into psychology was noteworthy because, prior to that time, motivation was addressed in terms of reinforcement by the behaviorist theories of B. F. Skinner and C. L. Hull, who were very prominent. Thus, when discussed, intrinsic motivation was typically contrasted with extrinsic motivation, which pertains to performing an activity in order to achieve separable consequences such as rewards, avoidance of punishment, or compliance with pressures or demands. This entry discusses the differences between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. In 1959, Robert White published a very important paper proposing that theories focused on primary drives, such as hunger, thirst, and sex, with the corresponding reinforcers of food, water, and physical contact, as the source of all motivation were inadequate for explaining a range of behaviors that included exploration and curiosity. White maintained that people have an innate need to interact competently with their environments, and this was the beginning of theorizing about intrinsic motivation, using the concept of competence, which is still considered an important component of intrinsic motivation.

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Another essential component of intrinsic motivation is the experience of self-determination. When self-determined, individuals experience a full sense of willingness and choice about what they are doing, and they perceive the locus of causality of their behaviors to be internal rather than external, which is the case when behavior is motivated by rewards and punishments. With this distinction, in 1968, Richard de Charms suggested that when people perceive their behavior to be of their own choice, they enjoy and appreciate the activity more, compared with when they see themselves as pawns being imposed on or moved by external circumstances. Although neither White nor de Charms focused on intrinsic motivation per se in their writings, their works contributed substantially to the conceptualization of this basic human experience. Subsequently, in 1985, Edward Deci and Richard Ryan used the concepts of both competence and self-determination (or autonomy) in their formulation of intrinsic motivation. They argued that intrinsic motivation would flourish only when people experience the feelings of both efficacy and choice in their behaviors.

Are Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations Additive or Interactive? After psychologists recognized the two types of motivation, they wondered whether they were additive so that a person’s total motivation for an activity would equal the sum of his or her intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. To test this possibility, Deci argued that if the types of motivation were additive, then rewarding people who were intrinsically motivated for an activity would increase their total motivation. Subsequently removing the extrinsic-reward contingency would remove their extrinsic motivation for the activity and return them to the same level of intrinsic motivation they were at before the rewards were introduced. Deci reported experiments showing that giving people tangible monetary rewards for engaging in an intrinsically motivated activity actually decreased their intrinsic motivation for the activity so that after the rewards were removed, their intrinsic motivation was lower than it had been before the rewards were introduced. In contrast, other experiments showed that positive feedback (sometimes called verbal rewards) enhanced

intrinsic motivation. Thus, tangible extrinsic motivators, such as money, tend to negatively interact with intrinsic motivation, whereas interpersonal, verbal rewards tend to be positively interactive with it. Authority figures often use tangible rewards, as well as threats of punishment, deadlines, evaluations, and surveillance, to motivate people. The research has shown that these practices tend to have negative effects on intrinsic motivation. From these findings, Deci and Ryan introduced cognitive evaluation theory (CET), which later became a minitheory within self-determination theory (SDT). CET suggested that the extrinsic motivators such as monetary rewards and deadlines tend to initiate a shift in the perceived locus of causality from internal (intrinsically motivated) to external, which leads people to experience themselves as less self-determined and thus less intrinsically motivated. With positive feedback, however, people experienced an affirmation of their competence, which led them to be more intrinsically motivated. Deci and Ryan further suggested that extrinsic motivators have two components: (a) a controlling component that limits people’s self-determination or choice and undermines their intrinsic motivation and (b) an informational component that provides positive competence information without being limiting and enhances intrinsic motivation. This general area of research has been controversial, and the finding that extrinsic rewards can decrease intrinsic motivation has been the source of considerable debate. However, a meta-analysis of 128 experiments showed that, in fact, the finding is robust and consistent and has now been widely accepted in psychology. Other studies looked not only at specific events in an environment, such as the offer of a reward or provision of choice, but also at the general ambience or climate within a setting such as a classroom or a workgroup and found that these settings can be characterized as either autonomy supportive or controlling and thus tend to be either enhancing or undermining of intrinsic motivation, respectively.

The Internalization of Extrinsic Motivation: Becoming More Autonomous Intrinsic motivation is observed prevalently in early childhood, but as children grow older, part of

Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Motivation

the socialization process requires them to adapt to social demands and responsibilities that are often not intrinsically motivating and yet are beneficial in terms of functioning effectively in the world. It is often the case that individuals carry out behaviors less for the fun and enjoyment of doing so than for the instrumental value of the behaviors— for example, to attain a personal goal, to gain selfesteem, or to earn social approval. Engagement in such activities is thus extrinsically motivated, and the important question becomes whether the children can take on the regulation of these ­ uninteresting behaviors in an autonomous or ­ ­self-determined way. SDT and, more specifically, another of its minitheories—namely, organismic integration theory (OIT)—posits that being extrinsically ­motivated does not necessarily mean that people experience an external perceived locus of causality for their behaviors. They can internalize that type of ­motivation just as they can internalize beliefs and values from the external environment. Furthermore, people can internalize the motivation for a behavior to varying degrees, and it turns out that the more fully they internalize a motivation or the regulation of it, the more the behavior will be autonomous or self-determined when they enact it. For instance, there is a difference between going to medical school because one’s parents have pressured one to do so and pursuing medical school because one has internalized the value and importance of helping others who are sick or injured. Although both cases involve an extrinsic motivation to obtain a medical degree, the latter entails choosing to pursue the goal that one personally endorses, whereas the former reflects mere compliance with external demands. The two examples differ in the degree of autonomy one experiences while pursuing one’s goals. According to Deci and Ryan, internalization, or the transformation of motivation that was initially external into motivation that is internal, can become part of a person’s integrated sense of self. They specified four types of extrinsic motivation that reflect different degrees of internalization. Specifically, OIT locates the four types of extrinsic motivation on a continuum of autonomy that is anchored on the nonautonomous end by amotivation (i.e., lack of intentionality) and, on the highly autonomous end, by intrinsic motivation. The four types of extrinsic motivation, in order, are external

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regulation, introjected regulation, identified regulation, and integrated regulation, each with distinct sets of associated processes and levels of perceived external–internal loci of causality. External regulation is a category of extrinsic motivation that colloquially can be thought of as the carrot-and-stick approach, whereby behaviors are carried out mainly to receive rewards or avoid punishments. Such behaviors are entirely dictated by external demands and thus involve little control by the person, who is said to have an external perceived locus of causality (E-PLOC). External ­ regulation is the type of motivation central to behaviorist theories, and it is what people most commonly refer to when they use the term extrinsic motivation. The next type of extrinsic motivation is introjected regulation, which is a partial internalization that relies on internal pressures and controls rather than external ones. With introjected regulation, people tend to reward themselves internally with the experience of contingent self-esteem and to punish themselves with the feelings of shame and guilt based on the degree to which certain standards are met. Thus, although it is not strictly a function of external demands, it is a function of internal demands that were initially external, and it entails little choice and autonomy. As such, it still has a fairly strong E-PLOC. The other two forms of extrinsic motivation are identified regulation and integrated regulation. The first refers to the regulation of a behavior that the individual personally endorses and values and that is meaningful to his or her sense of self. Examples are students who study hard for the Graduate Record Examination (GRE) because they understand the importance of the test for their deeply valued career goals. Because identified regulation results when people have accepted a value and the corresponding regulatory process as their own, the ensuing behaviors are relatively autonomous. Holding such a value might, however, conflict with other identifications, so the final type of extrinsic motivation involves integrating the value with other aspects of their integrated selves. Once identified regulations are assimilated, they become integrated regulations, which are the most autonomous or self-determined form of extrinsic motivation. They signify a state of congruence and consistency in people’s experiences and behaviors,

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and as such, they share features with the selfdetermined experience of intrinsic motivation. Thus, behaviors for which the regulation is integrated have a high internal perceived locus of causality. Integrated and intrinsic types of motivation are different, however, because integrated motivation is based in the importance and value of the behaviors in people’s lives, whereas intrinsic motivation is based in their interest and enjoyment of the behaviors.

Facilitating Organismic Integration: Basic Psychological Needs and the Social Context Within SDT, the issue of enhancing autonomous motivation is addressed with the concept of basic psychological needs. Earlier, when considering the maintenance and enhancement of intrinsic motivation, it was noted that satisfactions of the basic needs for autonomy and competence are essential. When it comes to the internalization of extrinsic motivation, the satisfaction of those two needs is also very important, but so is satisfaction of a basic need for relatedness. Stated differently, the internalization process occurs naturally in optimal social contexts that facilitate growth and integration by supporting satisfaction of the autonomy, competence, and relatedness needs. Such support is important during children’s early years, and it continues to be important across the contexts of their later lives.

Applications to Life Domains SDT proposes that life flourishes through the cultivation of intrinsic motivation and the full internalization of extrinsic motivation. Researchers have studied this premise across many domains, including parenting, health care, education, work organizations, athletics, video games, sustainability, and personal relationships. They have observed greater

well-being, enhanced performance, better problem solving, better physical health, and more satisfying close personal relationships in conditions that support the satisfaction of basic psychological needs. Social contexts can provide such support by offering choices, encouraging exploration, minimizing pressures and controlling language, offering a rationale when requesting a specific behavior, providing meaningful feedback, understanding people’s perspectives, and being respectful of them. In contrast, ill-being, poorer performance, negative affect, dissatisfaction, poorer physical health, and more superficial learning have been observed in contexts that thwarted satisfaction of the basic needs. Social contexts tend to do so by providing conditional regard, administering rewards and punishments, being critically evaluative, or preferring controlling language. Thuy-vy Nguyen and Edward L. Deci See also Achievement Motivation; Drive and Motivation in the Brain; Emotion and Motivation; Employee Motivation; Motivation and Cognition; Motivation and Personality; Perception and Motivation; Reinforcement; Self; Self-Determination; Social Motives; Unconscious Motivation

Further Readings de Charms, R. (1968). Personal causation. New York, NY: Academic Press. Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behavior. New York, NY: Plenum. Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being. American Psychologist, 55, 68–78. White, R. W. (1959). Motivation reconsidered: The concept of competence. Psychological Review, 66(5), 297–332.

J Lillian Gilbreth are acknowledged as providing the first applications of job analysis. They watched workers with an eye to improving efficiency in the workplace. For example, surgeons used to spend much of their time searching for tools. As a result of job analysis, the tools eventually were prearranged, and another person became responsible to hand the surgeon the tools he or she needed. The U.S. Employment Service developed a ­system for job analysis in the 1930s and 1940s. This system was based largely on Sidney Fine’s functional job analysis method, which is described in the next section. From the 1940s to the 1960s, many different systems of job analysis were developed. Newer developments include the ­ O*NET, which essentially replaced the original U.S. government system for job analysis. As jobs have become increasingly cognitive rather than physical, activities per se have become less visible to the analyst. As a result, techniques of cognitivetask analysis have been developed.

Job Analysis Job analysis is the process of understanding the nature of a job. There are many different methods and applications of job analysis to human resources practices in organizations. Traditionally, job analysis procedures consider (a) what the worker does and (b) what characteristics the worker needs to get the job done. Consider the job of a high school mathematics teacher. One of the teacher’s tasks is explaining equations to students, perhaps using a chalkboard, a whiteboard, or an electronic means (perhaps an equation editor found in Microsoft Word or PowerPoint). Presenting an equation is an example of what the worker does and would be the focus of a work-oriented job analysis. Of particular interest is what the teacher must know in order to be successful at teaching math. Knowledge of the mathematical operations used in proofs would probably be useful, as would the ability to speak English (if teaching in the United States), and perhaps knowledge of the use of an equation editor. Identifying the knowledge required for such a job would be the focus of a worker-oriented job analysis. This entry offers a brief history of job analysis, discusses methods and systems for job analysis, and reviews various applications of job analysis.

Methods and Systems Systems of job analysis often focus on both work and worker. With some methods, analysts observe people doing the job. With others, they may interview jobholders away from the job or ask workers to complete surveys. Some are hypothetical, because the job does not yet exist.

A Brief History

Functional Job Analysis

Modern forms of job analysis may be traced to early studies of work efficiency and scientific management. Typically, Frederick Taylor and Frank and

This method views any job as requiring involvement with data, people, and things. The analyst’s 479

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task is to determine the worker’s level of involvement with each and to describe the task content of the job. For example, a math teacher likely will have a high level of involvement with data (including symbols and concepts), a midlevel involvement with people (instructing students), and a low level of involvement with things (using a computer or a whiteboard marker). A description of work content for such a teacher might look like this: “Explains equations in order to teach secondary students elementary algebra.”

their representations and processes. For example, a novice math teacher may have to work out the steps of a proof, whereas an expert will have the same proof readily available in memory.

O*NET

The job description includes a narrative description (typically, a paragraph) of the job’s content—what the worker does. It is meant for people who don’t hold the job, essentially, telling them what it is. Job descriptions are helpful to people applying for a job, those making the hiring decisions, and those who resolve disagreements about whether specific activities are included in a job. It may also be used in determining salary level for the job as well as issues contained in employment law (e.g., whether overtime pay applies to the job).

The O*NET (Occupational Information Network) is a comprehensive set of descriptors for both worker- and work-oriented analyses. On the worker side, it includes (among other things) descriptions of the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) required, along with general educational requirements and specific vocational preparation. On the work side, it lists (among other things) tasks, work content, and work context. The results are collated in a searchable electronic database, where they are available for exploring potential career opportunities as well as providing a general picture of the world of work. Critical Incidents

A different but very useful technique involves critical incidents. Rather than analyzing the job as a whole or watching people while they work, the analyst asks them for stories that illustrate particularly good or bad performances. Math teachers, for example, may have stories about a particularly clear and compelling example of the use of an equation or, conversely, about mumbling into the whiteboard rather than speaking directly to the class. This method provides insights into the critical requirements of the job and the attributes that people need for successful job performance. Cognitive-Task Analysis

This method seeks to understand the ways in which people represent knowledge for themselves and the ways in which they process knowledge while at work. This method often compares experts to novices in order to determine how they differ in

Applications Some of the more important applications of job analysis are briefly described in this section. Job Description

Personnel Selection

Because the job analysis may suggest that certain KSAs are necessary for success in the job, they may form the basis for job screening or tests for potential employment. A school district might test an applicant’s knowledge of algebra, for example, for a job as a math teacher. Or it may ask for a video sample of the applicant’s classroom instruction. Training

Because job analyses provide a description of the tasks to be completed and the context in which the work occurs, training programs may be developed to ensure that workers have the required skills. For example, a school district may provide training in the use of a particular equation editor for all math teachers. Other Applications

Job analysis is fundamental to the management of people at work. It is used in equipment

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design (controls, displays, safety mechanisms), performance appraisal (evaluating the work of individuals), job evaluation (setting the salary for jobs), designing jobs, and human resource planning, such as recruiting programs and developing career ladders. Michael T. Brannick See also Employee Motivation; Employee Satisfaction; Leadership; Performance Management; Personnel Selection; Workforce Psychology

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Further Readings Brannick, M. T., Levine, E. L., & Morgeson, F. P. (2007). Job and work analysis: Methods, research and applications for human resource management. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Fine, S. A., & Cronshaw, S. F. (1999). Functional job analysis: A foundation for human resources management. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Wilson, M. A., Bennett, W., Jr. Gibson, S. G., & Alliger, G. M. (Eds.). (2012). The handbook of work analysis: Methods, systems, applications, and science of work measurement in organizations. New York, NY: Routledge.

K they work in concert with each other and with neurons in the brain (the somatosensory region of the cerebral cortex) to keep track of body ­movement and position. One class of neurons lies in the deep fatty tissue under the skin and responds to p ­ ressure. A second class surrounds the internal organs, and a third acts as receptors in the muscles, tendons, and joints of the body. As the muscles function when bodily parts move, various patterns of pressures on these receptors provide essential information for guiding motor action. Kinesthesia also allows assessment of the weight of an object. When one picks up an object, the change in muscle tension generates signals that adjust one’s posture accordingly. In addition, although sometimes distinguished as the vestibular system, the perception of spatial movement and orientation of the body as a whole also involves a fluid-filled receptor system located in the vestibules of the inner ear. More than body balance, this structure provides the means by which one is aware of being tilted, shaken, or whirled about and how, most of the time, one knows “which way is up.” This is made possible by three semicircular canals in the inner ear that contain fluid that, when moved, stimulates sensitive hair cells. These cells send signals to the brain via the auditory nerve. Also involved are two vestibular sacs in each ear, located between the cochlea and the semicircular canals and filled with tiny crystals that also bend hair cells when moved. The impulses generated in the inner ear in response to bodily movements contribute to the sense of one’s position as

Kinesthetic System The kinesthetic system is that part of human physiology that provides each person with sensory awareness of the position and movements of his or her body. It is by means of the kinesthetic system that individuals are aware of posture and a whole repertory of motor actions, from raising an arm to walking and even to turning the eyeballs and swallowing. For example, if the eyes are closed and one raises an arm and moves it around above one’s head, it is the kinesthetic system that tells one where the arm is located and that it is moving. The kinesthetic system is also referred to, somewhat inconsistently, as the kinesthetic sense (or kinesthesis) and the proprioceptive sense (or proprioception). The various names combine the concepts of movement (Greek kinein “to move”) and sensation (aesthesis), as well as the Latin proprius (“individual,” “one’s own”) and perception. This entry describes the kinesthetic system, its role in learning new skills, and its relationship to the five senses. The entry ends with a brief discussion of pioneers in training the kinesthetic system. The human kinesthetic system is believed to acquire sensory information from two sources: proprioceptors, which are sense receptors distributed throughout the body, and the inner ear. These are different from specific receptors for other sensory experiences such as light, temperature, and sound. Proprioceptors are specialized types of neurons that are responsive to stretching and touch and so register kinesthetic sensations. As the body moves, 483

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well as providing information about the speed and direction of body rotation and of gravitation as well as movement. Motion sickness originates from excessive stimulation of these vestibular organs. Without the kinesthetic system, it would be impossible to walk without watching one’s feet or to walk in the dark without losing one’s balance. It would also be impossible to learn how to drive because one could not steer or use the foot pedals while looking at the road ahead. The neurologist Oliver Sacks reported the case of a young woman who lost her entire sense of proprioception due to a viral infection of her ­spinal cord. At first, she could not move properly at all or even control her tone of voice. She relearned to walk by watching her feet and using her inner ears and had to judge her voice modulation by actively using her hearing. She eventually recovered nearly normal speech and many of her former basic movement skills, although her performance remained rather stiff and slow. She could no longer judge the amount of effort required to pick up objects, however, and would grip them painfully to be sure she did not drop them. Sacks believed this to be the best possible recovery in the absence of her kinesthetic sense.

Learning New Skills The kinesthetic system works in conjunction with physical strength and flexibility to produce skill. Learning any everyday physical skill, as well as developing athleticism in bodily practices such as sports, dancing, or martial arts, involves stimulating, enhancing, and “educating” the kinesthetic system to improve balance, coordination, alignment, spatial awareness, and efficiency of action. Kinesthesia is thus a key component of muscle memory and hand-eye coordination. For example, catching a ball or executing a ­triple axel jump in figure skating requires a finely tuned sense of the position of the joints and limbs. Training can improve this kinesthetic sense, and the skill needs to become automatic (out of awareness) for performers and athletes so that they can focus on other aspects of performance, such as locating other people in the same space or communicating pleasing, aesthetic factors.

Some primarily noncompetitive movement practices, such as the Chinese martial art Tai Chi Chuan and the Indian exercise practice of Yoga, focus especially on developing kinesthetic awareness in the body, in contrast to most competitive sports, where the focal emphasis is on the goaldirected results of action rather than the action itself once skills have been acquired. Although researchers have found that the kinesthetic system is fully functional in the first few months of life, little research has been done on age-related changes in kinesthetic sensation and how aging affects the kinesthetic receptors. Indications suggest that older adults experience some impairment in balance due to changes in the kinesthetic receptors and that these changes might be more extreme in the lower limbs.

Kinesthesia and Perception It is interesting to note that, as a human sensory capacity, kinesthesia has been excluded from the Western classification of the “five senses” (sight, hearing, taste, smell, touch) despite the fact that many scholars of perception acknowledge body movement as the unexamined ground of all ­sensory perception. Historically, traditional ­theories have divided human perception into two parts that separate body from mind, reason from feeling, and inside from outside. In contrast, James Gibson argued that, instead of thinking of perception as the activity of a mind working like a computer within a body, it should be considered as the exploratory activity of the whole organism within its environmental setting, as active participation through practical, bodily engagement. This view places kinesthesia and bodily actions at the heart of being-in-the-world and hence critical subject matter for the social scientific and cultural study of human movement and the senses. Research in neurophysiology during the 1980s and 1990s supported a unified perspective of human perception that combines auditory, visual, kinesthetic, and spatial-temporal sensory modalities. This replaced an earlier model in which each sensory system was seen as providing unique sensations that the developing infant has to learn to integrate. The unified perspective is more

Knowledge

consistent with Gibson’s ecological perspective of perception and action.

Training Proprioception Training the kinesthetic system in ways that engage both the body and mind of the mover began in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. One of the pioneers was Mabel Elsworth Todd (1880–1956), who addressed the problems of poor posture and lack of general coordination with new ideas about achieving balance in the skeletal structure rather than imposing fixed ideas about what was correct or ideal. Victorian moral influences of the time advocated maintaining a rigid verticality as a sign of uprightness of spirit. In contrast, Todd stressed maintaining a finely tuned balance of the structure and a stress-free readiness for action, absent any strain or holding. Todd’s student Barbara Clark (1889–1982) continued this approach to training the kinesthetic sense. She considered it to be a more natural use of the body and a counter to the faster pace of industrialized life, which confused the kinesthetic sense with unnatural mechanized body movement or lack of movement. Todd also introduced the concept of using ­imagery—for example, concentrating on a picture involving movement—to initiate changes in the neuromuscular system and skeletal alignment. This was achieved by the student lying on a table in a rest position and being taught to locate an image in his or her own body so as to assist the understanding of the principle being discussed and to effect changes in alignment. The student was assisted with sensations of touch and pressure from the teacher but also had a sense of cooperating in the procedure. Visual imagery was suggested for practice during rest or in simple movement as a way of maintaining balance in everyday life. Lulu Sweigard (1895–1974) developed this work further, grounding it in her formal training in the sciences of anatomy and bodily mechanics, as well as neurology and physiology, and drawing on developments in psychology. Her approach has become known as ideokinesis. Sweigard identified a series of principles for increasing body awareness relative to movement in order to help prevent injury, especially among dancers.

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Sweigard’s insistence that movement imagined in the body can result in changes in established patterns of neuromuscular coordination and that movement resides in thinking, not muscle action, were, and remain, controversial because they run contrary to the emphasis on activity in most approaches to physical education. Sweigard insisted on bringing mind (imagination and imagery) into the education of the kinesthetic system, understanding that it is subcortical controls in the nervous system, not voluntary muscle actions, that determine postural habits, movement patterns, and neuromuscular coordination. Experiential techniques for re-educating the neuromuscular system are often referred to as bodywork or somatic education and involve gently training the kinesthetic system in more accurate sensing of the physical self, ease of movement, and freedom from tensions and pain. Practitioners such as Frederic Mathias Alexander (1869–1955) and Moishe Feldenkreis (1904–1984) developed additional techniques, their surnames identifying each approach as well as opportunities for professional teacher certification in their methods. Brenda Farnell See also Embodied Cognition; Motor Development; Perception and Cognition; Perceptual Development; Perceptual Disorders

Further Readings Haywood, K. M., & Getchell, N. (2009). Life span motor development (5th ed.). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Matt, P. (1993). A kinesthetic legacy: The life and works of Barbara Clark. Tempe, AZ: CMT Press. Sacks, O. (1985). The disembodied lady. In The man who mistook his wife for a hat and other clinical tales (pp. 43–54). New York, NY: Perennial Library. Sweigard, L. (1978). Human movement potential: Its ideokinetic facilitation. New York, NY: Dodd, Mead. Williams, D. (2011). Teaching dance with ideokinetic principles. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Knowledge In everyday usage, knowledge refers to awareness of or familiarity with various objects, events,

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ideas, or ways of doing things. As human culture became increasingly more complex and refined, intellectuals began grappling with the problem of knowledge, which is perhaps the most basic problem in philosophy. Namely, the task that many early philosophers set out to either contribute to or achieve was the development of a theory of knowledge, one that explained how humans could come to know things, what truly existed in the world, and the complicated relationship between the two. This entry discusses how humans know things; the question of reality—that is, what really exists in the world; what kind of justification is necessary to constitute knowledge; three domains of reality; empirical and rational ways of knowing; modern versus postmodern conceptions of human knowledge; and modern theories of knowledge.

Epistemology and Ontology: The How and What of Knowledge Embedded in the description in the first paragraph of this entry are perhaps the two broadest angles philosophers take regarding knowledge in general—namely, epistemology and ontology. Epistemology refers to how humans know things. In contrast, ontology refers to the question of reality and is about determining what can be said to really exist in the world. One of the oldest and most venerable traditions in the philosophy of knowledge characterizes knowledge as “justified true belief.” Although not all philosophers agree that justified true belief does, in fact, adequately characterize the nature of knowledge, it remains the most dominant conception of knowledge. Thus, for many, knowledge consists of three elements: (a) a human belief or representation ­ about a state of affairs that (b) accurately corresponds to the actual state of affairs (i.e., is true) and that the representation is (c) legitimized by logical and empirical factors. To be clear about this last element, it is not considered knowledge if, for example, a child, when asked about the molecular nature of water, says “H 2 O” simply because he or she is parroting what previously was heard, because the child has no meaningful knowledge of what the phrase actually means. In contrast, a chemist who answers “H 2 O” has knowledge because his or her representation is meaningfully networked

and justified by much prior knowledge and careful deductive work.

Approaches to Justification The question of what kind of justification is necessary to constitute knowledge is the focus of much reflection and debate among philosophers. Three prominent approaches have been taken in an attempt to articulate how justifiable beliefs are formed: (a) foundationalism, which attempts to articulate foundationally true beliefs from which other conclusions can be derived; (b) coherentism, which argues that knowledge consists of systems and must be evaluated by the degree to which each system has logical coherence; and (c) reliablism, which argues that there are good and bad ways to develop beliefs and that justified beliefs are those that are based on reliable methods. Although philosophers disagree on which is most fundamental, most agree that justification can involve all these elements, that they are not ­mutually exclusive.

Three Kinds of Knowledge Philosophers often divide knowledge into three broad domains: personal, procedural, and propositional. Personal knowledge relates to firsthand experience, idiosyncratic preferences, and autobiographical facts. Procedural knowledge refers to knowledge of how to do something, such as play basketball or ride a bike. Propositional knowledge refers to general truth claims about the world and how people know it. An important difference between philosophy and psychology can be seen in these various kinds of knowledge. Whereas philosophers have generally been concerned with propositional knowledge, psychologists have generally concerned themselves with how people acquire both personal and procedural knowledge.

Ways of Knowing: Empirical and Rational By what mechanisms do humans come to achieve knowledge? The two most dominant answers to this question have come from the rationalists and the empiricists. The former argue that people use reason to arrive at deductive conclusions about the

Knowledge

Although several modern philosophers seriously doubt whether a successful theory of knowledge can be built, there nonetheless have been identifiable developments in mapping knowledge domains and attempting to develop educational systems that begin with the basic structure and domains of knowledge. One such development is the Theory of Knowledge International Baccalaureate Diploma Program that teaches students about the ways of knowing and the domains of knowledge (see ­Figure 1) so that they can approach many different areas of inquiry with a grounding in how human knowledge systems are built. A second development is the Tree of Knowledge System (Figure 2). Gregg Henriques has argued that the unique feature of this system is that it offers a way to conceptualize reality as an unfolding wave of energy and information that has developed in four major phases—matter, life, mind, and

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The birth of science gave rise to the Enlightenment, which was founded on the belief that humans could use reason and scientific observation to develop increasingly accurate models of the world. Such models were conceived to be “true” in the sense that they described ontology (the way the world was) in a manner that was separate and distinguishable from subjective impressions. Perhaps the group of philosophers most famous for attempting to remove all subjectivity and values from knowledge were the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle, who sought to build theories of knowledge based solely on analytical reasoning and empirical fact. Most critics agree that the logical positivists failed in their quest. In many disciplines, including psychology, since the 1960s an increasing chorus of voices has challenged the conception of scientific knowledge as being a pristine, objective map of the one true reality. Instead, often under the banner of terms like critical theory, constructionism, and constructivism, many intellectuals have emphasized that all knowledge is inherently based on context and is jointly created both by the way the human mind organizes and constructs perceptions and also by

Modern Theories of Knowledge

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Modern Versus Postmodern Conceptions of Human Knowledge

the way social forces legitimize certain ideas in various historical and political contexts. These scholars fall under the broad term postmodernism to highlight the contrast in assumptions regarding the nature of knowledge from the modernist assumptions of the Enlightenment.

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most justifiable claims. Rationalists tend to think more in terms of propositions, deriving truths from argument, and building systems of logic that correspond to the order in nature. René Descartes and Immanuel Kant are some of the most famous rationalists, in contrast to John Locke and David Hume, who are famous empiricists. Empiricists tend to argue that the most basic knowledge people achieve about the world comes from the senses—that is, from direct observations of the world. The distinction between the rationalists and empiricists in some ways parallels the modern distinction between philosophy and science. As the scientific method emerged and became increasingly distinct from the discipline of philosophy, the fundamental distinction between the two was that science was constructed on empirical observation, whereas the initial traditions in philosophy (e.g., Aristotle) were grounded more in using reason to build systems of knowledge.

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culture—and that this new view can solve longstanding problems of psychology and thus offers a new way to bridge philosophy and psychology and integrate human knowledge s­ystems into a more coherent, holistic view. Gregg R. Henriques See also Epistemology and Sensation; Extended Mind; Relational Theory

Further Readings Henriques, G. R. (2003). The Tree of Knowledge System and the theoretical unification of psychology. Review of General Psychology, 7, 150–182. Henriques, G. R. (2008). The problem of psychology and the integration of human knowledge: Contrasting Wilson’s consilience with the Tree of Knowledge System. Theory and Psychology, 18, 731–755.

Kohlberg, Lawrence Lawrence Kohlberg (1927–1987) is best known for his theory of moral development. He described the development of children’s reasoning about moral conflicts from their earliest understanding of right and wrong actions through adolescent and young adult judgments about social obligations and general welfare by asking people to answer questions about hypothetical and real-life moral dilemmas. In his later work, he was interested in helping schools and other social institutions promote active moral engagement and development by creating what he came to call “just communities.” This entry provides a brief description of Kohlberg’s work, especially as it applies to education. As a graduate student in developmental and clinical psychology, Kohlberg became interested in

Kohlberg, Lawrence

Jean Piaget’s work on children’s moral and social development. Piaget viewed morality as a system of rules that children must acquire in practice and in consciousness, and he observed and questioned children playing the game of marbles to learn how the process of acquiring rules in childhood worked. Based on his studies of boys aged 4 to 13 years, Piaget described two stages representing the development of children’s understanding of rules. First, children perceive rules as fixed and understand that the moral authority of rules is based on the authority of adults. Later, they come to look on rules as deriving from mutual consent and as changeable if there is agreement. Piaget also noted that the way children use the rules (practice) follows an inverse sequence, from using rules as they please (in an egocentric manner) to feeling constrained by the power of traditions and the peers with whom they are playing. These paradoxes of constraint and cooperation regarding the practice and understanding of social rules, perceptions of fairness and justice, and f­ eelings of obligation are often overlooked in summaries of Piaget’s work, but they are crucial to understanding why Kohlberg found Piaget’s work so compelling, especially during a period of American academic psychology dominated by behaviorism. Children’s conceptions of moral rules and moral sentiments might be only one aspect of morality, but until Piaget’s studies, this aspect had been neglected. For his dissertation, Kohlberg wanted to replicate Piaget’s study of the stages of moral judgment in childhood and apply Piaget’s method to the study of moral development through adolescence. Following Piaget, Kohlberg defined moral judgment in terms of issues of justice. He also began with the assumption that children construct meanings rather than inherit them, and so his methods, like Piaget’s, would have to elicit and record ­children’s expressions of their reasoning in response to dilemmas or stories. For Kohlberg, as for Piaget, delineating stages provided a useful way to characterize processes that, although complex and multidimensional, also had regularities.

Stages of Moral Development Kohlberg explicitly stated that he was studying stages of justice reasoning and not the emotions, aspirations, or actions often associated with the

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moral domain. He focused his investigations not only on the acquisition of rules and conceptions of fairness and responsibility, the key concepts of justice, but also on how opportunities for taking the role of others might promote children’s development. His method, presenting children and young adults with hypothetical dilemmas that posed conflicts in the rights or claims of different persons, was consistent with his conception of the central concerns of morality. By analyzing responses to the same dilemmas over time (the longitudinal method) and by revising his methods of textual analysis, Kohlberg’s description of stages of justice reasoning evolved from brief descriptions of orientations to highly detailed analyses of social perspectives and the normative justifications offered by participants (presented in an extended coding manual). The best-known dilemma tells the story of Heinz, a man whose wife may die because he lacks the money needed to obtain medical treatment. The protocol presents a series of questions to the participant asking what Heinz should do (e.g., should he steal the drug to save his wife?), and then, for every answer, the participant is asked why he or she thinks that is the right thing to do. Using this interview method, and following his participants through childhood and adolescence, Kohlberg expanded the two stages of moral judgment identified by Piaget to six stages. He also defined the underlying structures of social perspective and articulated the moral adequacy of each stage relative to the others. Put simply, children begin understanding morality (at Stage 1) by applying the terms good and bad or right and wrong to actions, and they believe that good actions will bring reward and bad actions will be punished, by definition. Children later begin to grasp the reciprocal nature of moral actions in terms of fairness (Stage 2), a concept to which they become acutely attuned. Kohlberg often described both the advance and the limits of reasoning at Stage 2 by describing children’s interpretation of the Golden Rule: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.” At Stage 2, children describe the imperative as doing to others what they have done or will do to you; at Stage 3, they begin to understand the importance of trust and loyalty and of adhering to social norms of generosity and care. They

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understand the Golden Rule as an ideal or norm rather than as an exchange, and they adopt the perspective of persons in shared relationships when answering questions about moral goodness and rightness. At Stage 4, the interpersonal-relationship orientation of the earlier stage is viewed as too limited, and moral right and wrong are believed to derive from social institutions (religious or legal, for example) and require adherence from all individuals to ensure social coherence, even when the individual believes there are conflicting moral claims. To resolve these conflicting claims, Kohlberg described a “postconventional” perspective that follows this system-oriented perspective. At Stage 5, individuals construct the complex interplay between social mandates (including religious and legal systems) and prior moral principles when considering the dilemmas of human rights and social welfare. Kohlberg used his articulation of Stage 6, the final stage he identified, with its emphasis on philosophical and universal principles, to provide the foundation for arguing that the sequence of moral stages not only was increasingly complex but also provided increasingly morally adequate solutions to human dilemmas.

Development as the Aim of Education Kohlberg continued to work on clarifying the theoretical assumptions and implications of his ­ empirical research on the development of moral judgment, including the concepts of stage, structure, and sequence in cognitive development. At the same time, he became increasingly interested in the role of education in fostering or constraining ­development. He elaborated an approach to education designed to promote cognitive and socio-moral development that was distinct from the educational traditions he described as rooted in either “cultural transmission” or “romanticism.” In the progressive tradition, the one Kohlberg argued for, learning is viewed as a creative process arising from the explorations and encounters of the child in the world—a world that offers both challenges and support. Through his research on and engagement in schools and prisons, Kohlberg shifted from focusing on developing curricula that would support social development (through the use of dilemmas in group discussions) to exploring how the moral c­limate of schools and other institutions affected the

development of children and youth. He concluded that the best way to support development was to build just communities in classrooms, schools, and other contexts so that the ideals of justice and cooperation could organize the roles, rules, relationships, and interactions within the community. In this way, those ideals became not simply curricular content but lived realities of children and adults. He drew on the theoretical work of John Dewey and Piaget in creating the “just community” approach to moral education through classroom democracy and cooperative learning projects. His work advanced systemic educational approaches that are consistent with contemporary formulations of social and emotional learning.

Context and Critics Kohlberg began his studies of how children develop their moral ideas in the immediate aftermath of World War II, and his postwar experiences influenced his sense of the importance of tackling moral development in a global context rather than as a purely culturally relative phenomenon. Kohlberg and many of his contemporaries were asking, How could it happen that a country of good citizens condoned or tolerated the ethnic hostilities of the Holocaust? What are the obligations of individuals to confront injustice on any scale, whether near to home or far away? The relativism of the social sciences that viewed morality as a cultural product acquired solely through social acculturation seemed insufficient, and Kohlberg sought sturdier principles underlying the universal development of moralities that could be used to evaluate the adequacy of widely diverse moral systems. In choosing to expand the theoretical work of Piaget and to focus on justice as the core principle of moral reasoning, Kohlberg was responding to the questions of his era as well as to philosophical traditions that stressed universality of moral principles. Kohlberg’s work has been criticized on a number of grounds. Some argue that his definition of moral development is too narrow and focuses too exclusively on moral reasoning at the expense of moral conduct. Others argue that his theory is too rooted in masculine and Western liberal cultural traditions and excludes forms of moral reasoning centering on care and responsibility (as opposed to justice and obligation).

Kohlberg, Lawrence

Still others argue that because social reality itself is constructed and reciprocal in a way that they believe physical reality is not, the use of Piagetian principles of development toward adaptation to endorse the adequacy of some forms of thought over others is flawed. Kohlberg considered his critics’ statements seriously. He typically responded by dissecting their comments to identify points of agreement and disagreement, and if he became convinced of the merit of their arguments, he modified his own position. More recent critiques focus on the primacy of intuition over conscious judgment and rational justification in driving moral decision making. This view diminishes the role of judgment and stresses the power of emotional responses rather than moral ideals and principles as the determinants of moral decisions and behavior. These so-called neurobiological approaches, however, fail to address the central concerns of Kohlberg’s study of moral development: The natural history of an individual’s moral reasoning and the importance of an individual’s moral understandings on belief and aspirations. Some social commentators have suggested that by rejecting Kohlberg’s constructive-developmental approach and the questions he tackled, there is no basis for moral education or for the moral aspiration to become better persons. Laura Rogers

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See also Adolescent Development, Theories of; Cognitive Development; Culture and Development; Erikson’s Theory of Psychosocial Development; Gender and Culture; Gender Development; Heightened Consciousness; Hermeneutics and Developmental Psychology; Moral Development; Morality and Moral Emotions; Personality Development; Piaget’s and the Neo-Piagetian Theories of Cognitive Development

Further Readings Kohlberg, L. (1968). The child as a moral philosopher. Psychology Today, 2(4), 24–30. Kohlberg, L. (1984). Moral stages and moralization: The cognitive-developmental approach. In L. Kohlberg, Essays on moral development: Vol. 2. The psychology of moral development (pp. 170–205). San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row. Kohlberg, L. (1984). Stage and sequence: The cognitivedevelopmental approach to socialization. In L. Kohlberg, Essays on moral development: Vol. 2. The psychology of moral development (pp. 7–169). San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row. Kohlberg, L., & Mayer, R. (1981) Development as the aim of education: The Dewey view. In L. Kohlberg, Essays on moral development: Vol. 1. The philosophy of moral development (pp. 29–100). San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row. Power, C., Higgins, A., & Kohlberg, L. (1989). Lawrence Kohlberg’s approach to moral education. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

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formation rules allow new forms to enter the language (e.g., podcast). Finally, human language uniquely allows reference to objects and events distant in space and time (displacement) and allows speakers to talk about themselves and the language more generally (reflectiveness). An open question is whether language is required for displacement and reflectiveness or whether the ability to engage in displacement and reflectiveness supported the evolution of language. Most researchers agree that whichever came first, there was likely a general “ratchet effect” between language and the cognitive abilities that supported or resulted from it.

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A key component of understanding language is to understand its evolution. The serious study of the subject is in its relative infancy because of the seemingly intractable nature of the problem: Spoken language predated written language and left no fossil record. Thus, the study of language evolution remains largely open, with no single theory holding sway over others. This entry reviews major themes in the study of language evolution, touching on methodological approaches that have sought to overcome the difficulty inherent to the problem.

Major Themes in Language Evolution

What Makes Language Unique?

The study of language evolution is inherently diverse and interdisciplinary, relying on psychology, linguistics, biology, anthropology, and complex-systems science, among other disciplines. Although there is little consensus, most researchers agree on two crucial points: Human language did, in fact, evolve, and it is unique among communication systems in the animal kingdom. When exactly language evolved is not known, and some researchers even argue that other hominid species (e.g., Neanderthals) may also have had language or at least something like it. Currently, a broad consensus holds that language likely evolved between 150,000 and 200,000 years ago, although extreme estimates range from 2 million years ago to 50,000 years ago. Many researchers propose an intermediate stage prior to full-blown human language known as

Language is central to almost all human interaction and is a uniquely human trait. Its uniqueness can be summed up in four major qualities: arbitrariness, generativity, displacement, and reflectiveness. Language is arbitrary in that the signs that compose it are symbolic; words have no necessary connection to their meanings. In other words, a rose, by any other name, would still smell as sweet. Among communicative systems, this feature is relatively rare. More commonly, communicative signs are related to their meanings (i.e., a deep growl means a large animal). Language is also generative; that is, it can expand infinitely to generate new sentences and words. The structure of language allows users to create theoretically infinite utterances (John knows that Mary knows that Sue knows . . .), and word 493

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protolanguage, which is generally characterized as similar to the language of young children and language-trained apes: a small vocabulary, a focus on meanings related to concrete objects, actions, and attributes, and relatively free word order. Whether there was a single protolanguage or, instead, multiple protolanguages evolved in parallel remains a point of debate. Some theories have proposed that protolanguage was predominantly or entirely gestural, but an emerging consensus is that it was likely an integrated combination of speech and gesture, much like modern language. Conceptually, protolanguage theory avoids uniformitarianism—the assumption that language was the same when it evolved as it is now. Instead, it dovetails with the broad consensus that language evolved gradually, having some continuity with other communication systems rather than arising fully formed. Other theorists disagree with the general picture of gradual language evolution, proposing a more discontinuous transition to language sometimes known as saltation. Research in historical linguistics and language change indicates that human languages change rapidly. Therefore, early language was likely qualitatively and quantitatively different from its modern form. Most research on language evolution focuses on the biological evolution of language or the cultural evolution of language. Biological perspectives focus mainly on the evolution of physical, neurological, or individual cognitive structures required for language. On the other hand, cultural perspectives focus more on language itself and examine how social interactions between individuals may have shaped the evolution of language. These approaches are largely complementary and paint an overall picture of language evolution as a complex relationship between nature and nurture.

The Biological Evolution of Language Biological accounts of the evolution of language emphasize common properties across human languages that point to shared genetic and cognitive underpinnings. Many accounts even argue that the genetic underpinnings of language were specifically selected for. This view is consistent with the discovery of specific genes that seem to be related to language development. Most notably, the human variant of the FoxP2 gene appears to have undergone selection between 10,000 and 100,000 years ago.

This gene regulates oral and facial development, among other things, and mutated forms of the gene are related to an inherited condition known as selective language impairment (SLI). Generally, there is still very little known about the genetic underpinnings of language. It is likely that the capacity for language is polygenetic, involving a complex interplay of multiple genes. Some biological accounts refer to a biological language faculty. In this view, the core property of the language faculty is a syntactic operation known as recursion, which underlies much of the generativity in language, allowing humans to create and understand theoretically infinite utterances. Other biological accounts focus on specific physiological adaptations such as the vocal tract. For example, the human vocal tract allows a broader set of sounds than a chimpanzee vocal tract, but it is not without downsides: The larger resonant chambers in the oral cavity make lethal choking more likely. Comparing human language to the communicative behavior of other animals focuses on both analogous structures (those similar to other animals but that likely developed independently under different selective pressures) and homologous structures (those shared with humans’ closest animal relatives). Analogous structures have the potential to reveal the selective pressures that led to the emergence of language. For example, complex syntactically structured birdsong emerged primarily as a result of sexual selection, leading some researchers to suggest that sexual selection may have also played a role in language evolution. Other species also exhibit surprising parallels to human language. Bees, for example, engage in a communicative “dance” inside the hive that conveys information to other bees about the direction, distance, and attractiveness of pollen sources (thus resembling displacement). Dolphins have a complex communication system that includes name calls (thus resembling reflectiveness). The study of homologies of language via humans’ primate relatives has revealed aspects of language that may have been present in the last common ancestor with chimpanzees (which lived approximately 6 million years ago). The homologous approach focuses mainly on studying the communicative behavior of other great apes (e.g., chimpanzees and gorillas). Studies of behavior in the wild have revealed that chimpanzees have a far

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richer natural communicative system than previously thought, including a diverse set of calls, facial signaling, and gestures that contribute to complex social group dynamics and coordinated behavior (e.g., the cooperative hunting of red colobus monkeys). Studies of captive primates have also illuminated issues surrounding language evolution, most famously in the case of Kanzi, the bonobo chimpanzee. Kanzi has learned to use hundreds of lexigrams (arbitrary pictographic symbols, each with a specific meaning) expressively, can understand thousands of spoken words, and even shows sensitivity to word order. However, other chimpanzee studies have been less successful. Perhaps most notably, a chimpanzee named Nim Chimpsky (a play on Noam Chomsky) acquired a sign language vocabulary but never showed definitive sensitivity to word order. Although nonhuman primate studies have revealed sophisticated communicative behavior, they also reveal specific shortcomings. Ape communication systems in the wild are more complex and rich than previously thought, but they show little evidence of generativity, displacement, or reflectiveness. Although the use of alarm calls for deception has been documented, such innovative use is not widespread, and alarm call systems are limited to only a handful of meanings. Based on the behavior of language-trained apes, such as Kanzi, it appears that some primates have the capacity for unique aspects of language, but this capacity is limited. Kanzi’s overall linguistic repertoire seems to have plateaued at the level of a human toddler (around 2–3 years old), and data from other language-trained chimpanzees are less encouraging, indicating that there may be considerable individual variation in language capacity among nonhuman primates. Kanzi may be a particularly cognitively advanced chimpanzee, but it is difficult to know if this is because of his language training or if he was successful in language training precisely because he is particularly intelligent.

The Cultural Evolution of Language Biological accounts of language evolution provide an essential context of the evolution of human language by focusing primarily on contrasts between humans and other animals. Cultural

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approaches to language origins emphasize the role of social interaction and learning in the evolution of language, highlighting similarities and differences across languages in order to identify cultural pressures that constrain the evolution of language. Cultural accounts consider language behavior and structure to be the phenomena under investigation in language evolution. Methodologically, they rely primarily on computational models, psychological experiments, and linguistic data. Computational models of language evolution generally focus on the hypothesis that cultural interaction and learning biases played a large role in the evolution of language. Specifically, language evolves and adapts to the selective pressures imposed by learners. To “survive,” a language must be learnable, or else it will not be passed on. A successful language must also be useful: It must express the meanings its users need to communicate. These two pressures combine to favor languages that are structured, because structure can enhance learnability and expressivity. For example, learning a single rule (e.g., add -s to the singular to form the plural) is less demanding cognitively than learning a rote list. Simultaneously, this rule generalizes to new forms (e.g., the plural of selfie is uncontroversially selfies), allowing for increased expressive power. Evidence for cultural accounts of language evolution focuses primarily on agent-based modeling and more traditional psychology experiments, particularly in artificial-language learning. A pioneering model examining the role of interaction in language evolution is known as the Naming Game (NG). The NG focuses on a population of interacting artificial agents tasked with agreeing on the name for a particular meaning. Although communicative success within the population is initially low (i.e., agents do not agree on naming conventions), a simple bias to coordinate with other agents results in convergence on naming conventions and high communicative success over time. This finding emphasizes the role of communicative function in language evolution: The pressure to communicate successfully, and the process of communication itself, shape language over time. A social learning perspective also emphasizes coordination but focuses on coordination in individual learning. Language learners do not receive disembodied input; rather, they learn from the

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output of other language users. The iterated learning model (ILM) begins with agents learning a subset of an initially random artificial vocabulary. The output of this first “generation” of agents then becomes the input of the next generation. Because agents receive only a subset of the input but are tested on a broader set of the vocabulary, they generalize patterns to unseen items (much like knowing blog–blogs leads to selfie–selfies), and structure begins to accumulate within the vocabulary over successive generations of learners. The ILM has also been implemented experimentally. Participants were tasked with learning

initially random pairings of nonsense words and meanings, and their output was transmitted as the learning input for the next participant. As in the computational implementation, results showed that initially random languages become structured (i.e., similar words referred to similar meanings), supporting the notion that weak biases are amplified by transmission and shape the structure of language.

Interacting Timescales Although biological and cultural perspectives are often characterized as alternatives, the emerging

Figure 1  Interacting Timescales of Language Evolution Source: Adapted with permission from Kirby, S. (2002). Natural language from artificial life, Artificial Life 8(2), 185–215.

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view of language evolution is that they both interact with individual learners to shape language. From the biological perspective, there is broad agreement that, at the very least, some biological adaptation primes humans for language, because no other species has all the key components of language in a single system, and even when raised in a rich environment (like Kanzi), they do not develop full human language. On the other hand, language requires cultural input for its development, as evidenced by unfortunate cases of feral children in which language does not develop, as well as by the existence of a critical period in early childhood for language learning. Current theory in language evolution has largely shifted toward characterizing the interaction of biological and cultural factors (see Figure  1). Any biological underpinnings of ­language necessarily evolve on the relatively slow genetic ­timescale—that is, on the order of ­thousands of years at a minimum. The cultural or glossogenetic timescale, on the other hand, changes rapidly; for example, new words emerge and ­others die within mere years. The ontogenetic timescale represents an individual’s language development, where the input received by individuals, in turn, feeds back into the cultural timescale. The cumulative language behavior of a population of individuals has the potential to affect the input of new learners and thus shape the selective pressures that are at work on the genetic scale, resulting in a complex and ongoing coevolution of genes and culture.

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Language, Interaction, and Culture Viewing language and culture within a unifying theoretical approach can be successful only if alternative options have been given due respect. Thus, this entry begins with theoretical approaches that define language as a (cognitive) competence unique to humans and located “inside” their minds or brains. This theory posits culture and interaction as “outside domains” in which language finds its application and usage. An alternative theory of the relation between language and culture is also offered—one in which they mutually constitute and enrich each other. Within this theoretical approach, interactive practices—that is, those between speakers—are the domain wherein existing language structures are strengthened; simultaneously, interactive practices also contribute to gradual change in the formal properties of language. Similarly, within this general approach, interactive practices are the means by which cultural belonging and membership categories are strengthened and simultaneously called into question and occasionally even subverted, resulting in the potential of cultures to gradually change. Thus, theorizing interaction as the central connective tissue between cultural and linguistic conventions opens a new and exciting area for inquiry into psychological phenomena such as interpersonal relations, personal identity, and the sense of self.

Christine Cuskley See also Cognition and Language; Cognitive Evolution; Communication and Language; Cultural Evolution; Intelligence, Evolution of; Language Development; Natural Selection

Further Readings Fitch, W. T. (2010). The evolution of language. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Kenneally, C. (2007). The first word: The search for the origins of language. New York, NY: Penguin. Pinker, S., & Bloom, P. (1990). Natural language and natural selection. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 13(4), 707–727.

Language and Interaction Languages differ. However, in principle, they all are learnable, and this is assumedly the case because each language follows a set of rules—rules that native speakers have acquired, typically as children and rather effortlessly, and are able to apply when communicating with other native speakers of the same language. Although they have “native understanding” of their language-specific rule system, they usually are not able to explicate it. This is the business of linguists, and typically, their purpose is to find out what kinds of rules are shared by all languages—that is, are universal— and which rules are language specific, as well as

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differences in rule systems between regional dialects or between categories of gender, age, ethnicity, and the like. Whether universal rules exist and, if so, whether they actually have a material basis are matters of debate. Although theorists who follow a traditional, structuralist approach to language maintain that linguistic structures can be studied from actual spoken-language corpora that have been recorded and transcribed (e.g., Ferdinand de Saussure and Kenneth Pike), the more widely accepted theory since the turn to cognitive processes in the 1960s is that the human mind or brain possesses language structures that enable speakers to produce evernewer units of language—even ones that have never been heard or spoken before (e.g., Noam Chomsky). In this way, the study of language became a part of cognitive psychology. Theorizing about language as linguistic structures in the mind or brain was a reaction to behavioristic theorizing that viewed the human organism as responding to outside forces or stimuli, especially social stimuli, in learning to speak a language. Behind the subsequent turn to cognition were new psychological theories grounded in biology and evolutionary psychology (e.g., Steven Pinker) and, in contrast to behavioristic views, arguing for the person as a mindful and intentional being. This turn inspired waves of new research, especially in language processing and language acquisition and in specialties such as language impairment, artificial intelligence, and machine translation. However, these new theories resulted in a problematic split between language as the capacity to speak (linguistic competence) on the one hand and language in actual use (performance) on the other hand. Or put more directly, the object of inquiry with regard to language became almost exclusively the capacity to speak (competence) without a focus on the real-time speech of speakers embedded in real contexts. Furthermore, over time, it became obvious that speakers in their mundane and situated conversations actually deviate from theoretical rule systems but nevertheless are perfectly able to communicate effectively.

Language in Interaction A very different tradition of theorizing about language, one that is more pertinent to social

psychologists but also to clinicians and one that also views the person as an intentional, meaningmaking agent, emerged in parallel to the cognitive theory and its focal interest in linguistic algorithms. This alternative view had roots in symbolic interactionism (George H. Mead and Herbert Blumer), in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, in speech act and discourse theory (John Austin, John Searle, and Jonathan Potter), in movements in ethnomethodology (Harold Garfinkel and Erving Goffman), and in conversation analysis (Harvey Sacks and Emanuel Schegloff). This broad orientation predominantly asks what people do when they use language: (a) how they regulate their interactional order with each other, (b) how they reach local understanding and intersubjectivity, (c) how they navigate their social relationships in terms of belonging with others and simultaneously differentiating themselves from others, (d) how they develop a sense of agency but simultaneously view themselves as affected by a world impinging on them from the outside, and (e) how they manage to view themselves across time as continuously changing while simultaneously holding onto an essential self that is unchanging. This approach to language is deeply embedded and ultimately rooted in interaction and poses a number of potential difficulties for traditional theories of language that locate language in individual cognition. In addition, it attracts psychologists who are interested in the formation of social relationships as well as personal identity and sense of self. A communicative, interactive approach to language aligns with broader theories of human development, such as the Vygotskian orientation toward language and language learning, inasmuch as it focuses on a theory that explains social (and individual) meaning making in terms of intentional and dyadic practice rather than innate structures. In addition, starting from the functional and semantic dimensions of linguistic communication, this usage-based approach to language, which is consistent with a usage-based theory of language acquisition (e.g., Michael Tomasello), is able to explain the emergence of linguistic structures from usage patterns, thus turning the cognitivist or nativist approach inside out in terms of both the phylogenetic development of language and the ontogenetic socialization process of the child.

Language, Interaction, and Culture

Perhaps most relevant, the interactionist orientation changes the traditional focus for psychologists from the individual to the communicating dyad, with intentional interaction as the engine that facilitates change and development. Moreover, this orientation may turn out to be equally relevant for theorizing not only about language but also about human development more generally. That is, language in interaction is no longer the independent (cognitive) system that develops on its own due to its own specific learning device but is closely interwoven with (other) bodily practices of intersubjective sense making. Finally, inquiry into language and language acquisition has to take place in vivo and in situ; that is, researchers have to get out of the practice of making up artificial sentences for use in laboratory investigations and then submitting them to native speakers in order to test hypotheses. Instead of decontextualized studies, by using the alternative framework, researchers directly investigate how humans interact with one another in everyday, mundane, and situated practices, often with the extensive use of nonverbal cues for the construction of meaning.

Language in Interaction: As Situated in Cultural Contexts At this point, it should be apparent that the question of whether languages have common linguistic parameters—that is, language universals—has lost its centrality in the psychological study of language. Instead, the study of minute, fine-grained, interactively situated processes is moving onto center stage in research and theory. Although interactive practices typically follow certain routines in patterned usage, they operate on and are embedded in highly cultural traditions. Consider, for instance, diverse routines such as greetings or leave takings, formal meetings or informal mealtimes, or classroom rituals. In all of them people routinely “know” how to coordinate their bodies and speech and to align them with the conversational other. They know how and when to take turns in conversations. However, the particulars of how and when to perform a particular behavior appropriately—for instance, the handshake in a greeting routine— require the fine-tuning of all the following

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modalities: choosing what to say (as, for instance, a friendly “How are you today?” versus a more formal introduction) and synchronizing the verbal modality with hand and arm mutually reaching out to seize and shake the other’s hand, accompanied by a slight leaning forward and directing one’s gaze at the other’s eyes, along with a facial expression, usually in the form of a smile. Again, although people know how to perform these modalities in vivo, and are able to tune them accordingly as they feel more or less familiar with the other (e.g., performing the greeting with a hug or just a head-nod), they also adjust to accepted cultural conventions that display rich cultural variation. Irrespective of whether the conventions associated with different modalities of language use can be considered universally shared, the interesting aspects of how individuals piece together the different modalities and are able to modify and accommodate them to new situations underscore their flexibility and dynamism in situated practices. Moreover, as much as these interactions are confined by and conform to preexisting cultural norms and habits, the daily and mundane practices of language use also allow interlocutors to play with, challenge, and even subvert the boundaries that hold those norms and habits. Thus, although it may be correct to argue that different cultures shape the ways of using language and that different ways of speaking shape the way cultures develop their worldviews, theorizing that both language and culture emerge from their particular interactive practices helps explain the evolution of cultural views of the world.

Relevance for Psychology A psychology that traditionally centers on the individual and on relatively isolated persons typically has little interest in interaction and culture. The theoretical push toward the relevance of interaction and culture for the construction of self and identity opens possibilities for theorizing in new and innovative ways. Cultural, discursive, and narrative psychology all center on issues of social relationship formation, personal identity, and the sense of self. Such work examines the way these phenomena are under construction in processes of social interaction.

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Everyday and mundane interactive practices form the empirical field in which alignments with others and affiliations within membership categories (gender, race, age, etc.) take place. How people differentiate themselves from others but simultaneously form a sense of belonging is a central question for social and developmental psychologists. In addition, discursive psychologists investigate how people construct their agency and ­ responsibility through interactive practices and attribute blame and guilt to themselves as well as to others. For narrative psychologists, narratives in interaction are the focus of study that is guided by the assumption that in interactive narratives, people form and practice identities that are continuous but simultaneously open to transformation and development. Michael Bamberg See also Behaviorism; Cognition and Language; Communication and Language; Cultural Psychology; Pinker on Language

Further Readings Bamberg, M. (2008). Selves and identities in the making: The study of microgenetic processes in interactive practices. In U. Müller, J. Carpendale, N. Budwig, & B. Sokol (Eds.), Social life and social knowledge (pp. 205–224). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Goffman, E. (1967). Interaction ritual: Essays on face-toface behavior. New York, NY: Anchor Books. Potter, J. (2012). Discourse analysis and discursive psychology. In H. Cooper (Editor in chief), APA handbook of research methods in psychology: Vol. 2. Quantitative, qualitative, neuropsychological, and biological (pp. 111–130). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association Press. Tomasello, M. (2003). Constructing a language: A usagebased theory of language acquisition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Language

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Development

Acquiring language is a fundamental and uniquely human aspect of development. Across different cultures and types of language, language acquisition is universal and often develops in a relatively predictable and sequential manner. However,

language development can also be highly variable. Across different languages, there is great variability in the manner and types of information that can be expressed. Between individuals, there is also variability in the rate and contexts within which language can be acquired. What impact might this variability have on development? The purpose of this entry is to examine the role of language in development and, more specifically, how variability in language acquisition can affect learning in other domains. The entry begins with a review of theories that propose a relationship between language and thought and then examines evidence of this relationship across domains of cognitive and social development and within special populations.

Theories of Language and Thought The theoretical framework that most directly relates linguistic variability to thought is the SapirWhorf hypothesis. According to this framework, how people perceive and think about their world is largely influenced by the structure of their native language. Because languages vary in the manner and type of information they encode, speakers of different languages may therefore develop different ways of organizing and processing information. The strongest form of this hypothesis, known as linguistic determinism, predicts that thought is entirely dictated by linguistic structure. To test this account, research attempts to determine (a) whether speakers of different languages differ in their perception and processing of specific concepts and (b) whether the acquisition of certain concepts depends on the acquisition of related linguistic structures. For example, many early studies focused on whether the memory and perception of color could be influenced by cross-­ linguistic differences in color vocabulary. Theories of linguistic determinism have largely fallen out of favor because of evidence that certain kinds of information, such as color categorization, can be processed and learned independently of language experience. Weaker versions of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis have been adopted to explain how language may still facilitate, if not dictate, the development of thought. For example, some theorists have distinguished between thought that is necessary for

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completing nonlinguistic tasks and thought that is used for speaking. Because differences between languages may dictate how information is communicated, linguistic variability may therefore have direct impact only on how information is processed in verbal contexts. Alternatively, theorists such as Lev Vygotsky have posited that language is an effective medium for thought. That is, language provides a rich, symbolic system for expressing and representing preexisting internal structures. Critically, Vygotsky proposed that the symbolic nature of language also makes it a unique psychological tool for transforming knowledge. This is because language facilitates the retention, organization, and restructuring of thought. It also allows for the social transfer of knowledge between individuals. Thus, according to Vygotsky’s theory, language makes it possible to engage in complex levels of thinking that would otherwise be difficult to achieve in its absence.

Language and Cognitive Development Theories relating language and thought have continued to influence research in cognitive development. In particular, the effect of language acquisition has been closely examined in relation to the cognitive abilities of (a) categorization, (b) inductive reasoning, and (c) analogical reasoning. Word learning is said to facilitate categorization by directing individuals’ attention to similarities between different objects. For example, infants are more likely to group two distinct objects together when the objects are labeled with the same noun (e.g., “This one is a dax”) or adjective (“This is a dax one”) than when they are presented without a label. Similarly, infants are more likely to distinguish between different objects—a process known as individuation—when objects are presented with distinct, spoken labels. Over time, infants learn to use the grammatical forms of words to make more accurate inferences about the type of conceptual categories being referred to. For example, they learn that nouns typically denote a shared object category (by 14 months of age), that adjectives denote common object properties (by 21 months of age), and that verbs denote common event properties (by 24 months of age).

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Labels have also been shown to promote inductive reasoning about shared object properties. Inductive inferences are those in which properties associated with a known object or event are generalized to novel objects or events that share the same category. For example, a child might infer that two animals sharing the same category, such as “dog,” share a common property, such as barking. Inductive reasoning is a powerful tool for learning because it allows children to extend their knowledge beyond instances of direct experience (i.e., the child does not have to observe all dogs barking to reason that this property is shared). Moreover, because labels are so effective in guiding inferences of category membership, they also facilitate the transfer of knowledge about category properties. Research has shown that infants as young as 13 months of age use common labels to generalize nonobvious properties (e.g., function) between objects, even when those labels conflict with more salient features of the objects, such as shared appearance. Other findings have further demonstrated that children use labels to form inductive inferences only when the labels are (a) indicative of category membership (i.e., count nouns) and (b) presented with referential intent. This suggests that labels do not simply act to increase children’s attention to objects but, rather, guide their conceptual understanding of category membership. The acquisition of terms (e.g., verbs and prepositions) that highlight relational patterns between items and events also facilitates analogical reasoning. Such reasoning involves the process of comparing two items or events in order to draw inferences about their underlying similarities or structure. It is involved when making judgments about category membership. It is also involved when perceiving more abstract relational patterns between two objects or events (e.g., inferring how spatial configurations on a map relate to spatial configurations in the real world). Studies have demonstrated that both adults and children are more likely to perceive underlying relational patterns when they are presented with language that denotes these relations. For example, spatial terms (e.g., top, middle, bottom) have been demonstrated to help preschoolers transfer spatial relations between objects across disparate displays. Thus, like labels, relational terms are said to invite

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comparison between events and thereby facilitate the perception of underlying conceptual structures.

Language and Social Development By virtue of being a social and communicative act, language is also integral to the development and sharing of social norms and behaviors. One area of social development closely associated with language is the development of theory-of-mind understanding. Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to perceive and reason about mental states, such as intentions and beliefs. ToM is integral to social understanding because it provides a basis for both interpreting and predicting the behaviors of others. Although research has shown that most children develop ToM by the end of the preschool years, the age at which children first begin to display explicit ToM understanding varies considerably (e.g., between 3 and 5 years of age). As a result, much research has been devoted to examining individual differences in ToM development and the extent to which this variability can be accounted for by differences in language ability. Current evidence suggests that individual language ability plays a significant role in ToM development. First, there is evidence to suggest that acquiring mental-state vocabulary is positively related to ToM development. Children who show a greater comprehension of words that denote mental states (e.g., think, know, guess) are also more likely to achieve higher measures of ToM understanding. Second, research has demonstrated that acquiring the unique grammatical structure associated with mental-state verbs may also facilitate ToM. Across different languages, mental-state verbs typically occur in syntactic constructions that allow a proposition (“the moon is made out of cheese”) to be embedded within a main clause (“Sally thinks that . . .”). Critically, these types of sentences are uniquely suited for expressing conflicting beliefs because they express the perspective of the subject (Sally) and not the speaker. Current evidence suggests that children’s acquisition of these sentence structures not only precedes but also predicts later ToM development. Finally, research has demonstrated that pragmatic understanding is also important for ToM

development. Specifically, children who engage in more frequent and interactive forms of communication with their caregivers, siblings, and peers have been shown to perform better on ToM measures. It has subsequently been argued that communicative interactions are integral to ToM ­ development because it is through joint communication that children gain insight into the differing perspectives of others.

Special Populations If cognitive and social development have been shown to benefit from typical language acquisition, what might the developmental effects of atypical language development be? To address this question, one can first look at the developmental outcomes of populations that experience delays or impairments in language development. Research has primarily shown that delays in language acquisition are often associated with deficits in social and academic functioning. For example, deaf and hard-of-hearing children who are born to hearing parents are often delayed in their language acquisition due to late and, sometimes, impoverished exposure to language. Impaired development of spoken communication, theory of mind, and literacy skills have, in turn, been associated with greater delays in language acquisition among this population. Similar social and cognitive outcomes have been reported for children diagnosed with disorders that are, at least in part, characterized by ­language impairments (e.g., autism spectrum disorder and specific language impairment). This suggests that factors that compromise the quantity and quality of language acquisition may also negatively affect outcomes in other ­developmental domains. Another way to address the role of language in development is to examine the developmental outcomes of children acquiring more than one language. In North America, bilingual, school-aged children often show delays in language and literacy development when compared with their monolingual peers. Differences in academic achievement, however, are often conflated with factors related to lower academic success (e.g., socioeconomic status and decreased exposure to the primary language of instruction).

Language Development

When socioeconomic factors are controlled for, acquiring more than one language has been shown to improve and maintain cognitive functioning through the life span. Specifically, bilingual persons have been shown to perform better than monolingual persons on nonlinguistic cognitive control tasks (e.g., monitoring, task switching, and working memory). These advantages have been attributed to the fact that bilingual persons have to both (a) contend with two competing language systems and (b) actively switch attention between these systems during communication. The cognitive demands associated with bilingualism are therefore said to restructure information processing in the brain. Neuroimaging data have supported this hypothesis by demonstrating that in bilingual persons, distinct neural networks are activated when processing nonlinguistic information. Similar activation does not occur in monolingual persons. Overall, findings from special populations have provided further evidence of the link between language and the development of cognitive and social processes. It remains for future research to clarify how individual differences in language development map to distinct trajectories of development. Valerie San Juan See also Childhood; Cognition and Language; Cognitive Development; Communication and Language; Concepts and Language; Gender and Language; Language, Evolution of; Language Development; Language Disorders; Language, Interaction, and Culture; Perception and Language; Pinker on Language

Further Readings Arunachalam, S., & Waxman, S. R. (2010). Language and conceptual development. WIREs Cognitive Science, 1, 548–558. Gentner, D., & Goldin-Meadow, S. (Eds.). (2003). Language in mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Harris, P. L., de Rosnay, M., & Pons, F. (2005). Language and children’s understanding of mental states. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14(2), 69–73. Keates, J., & Graham, S. A. (2008). Category markers or attributes: Why do labels guide infants’ inductive inferences? Psychological Science, 19, 1287–1293.

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Kroll, J. F., & Bialystock, E. (2013). Understanding the consequences of bilingualism for language processing and cognition. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 25, 497–514. Lederberg, A. R., Schick, B., & Spencer, P. E. (2013). Language and literacy development and deaf and hard-of-hearing children: Successes and challenges. Developmental Psychology, 49(1), 15–30.

Language Development Language development (or language acquisition) is the process by which babies, who do not use, produce, or comprehend (understand) language at all, ultimately achieve an adultlike command of language. The term generally refers to the development of spoken language (written language is addressed in the entry “Models of the Reading Process”). Theories of language development address not only the acquisition of one’s native language (first-language acquisition) by typically developing children but also second-language acquisition, bi- and multilingualism, and language development among children with disorders such as specific language impairment. This entry reviews two theories of how children acquire language: nativism and constructivism.

Nativism Versus Constructivism Why do researchers favor the terms language development and language acquisition over language learning? The answer is that under a certain class of theories, many important aspects of language (e.g., grammatical categories such as noun and verb) are not learned at all; rather, they are innate, meaning that children have them from birth. These theories are known as nativist theories, and the general approach is known as linguistic nativism (the word comes from the same root as nativity, meaning “birth”). Nativist theories of language acquisition are also known as formalist, generativist, principles-and-parameters, wordsand-rules, or universal grammar theories. Linguistic nativism—the best-known proponent of which is the linguist Noam Chomsky—is an example of the more general concept of psychological nativism, the idea that certain abilities or

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aspects of knowledge are not learned but “hardwired”—that is, native to the human brain. As a general approach, nativism has its origins in the philosophy of Plato, René Descartes, Gottfried Leibniz, Immanuel Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Jerry Fodor. A second class of theories holds that virtually all aspects of language (including, e.g., grammatical categories such as noun and verb) are not innate but rather learned or constructed by children on the basis of the language they hear (the “input”). These theories are known as constructivist, functionalist, emergentist, input-based, usagebased, social-pragmatic, and social-interactionist approaches. Although most constructivist theories would accept some role for innate knowledge or abilities at a nonlinguistic level (e.g., the tendency to perceive the world in terms of people who have goals and desires, objects that have stable properties), they reject the idea of innate linguistic knowledge. Linguistic constructivism is an example of the more general concept of psychological empiricism— the idea that knowledge is not hardwired and can be acquired only through observation, experience, and evidence. As a general approach, empiricism has its origins in the philosophy of Aristotle, Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, George Berkeley, David Hume, and John Stuart Mill and the psychological approaches of Jean Piaget and Lev Vygotsky.

Typical First-Language Development Basic Syntax

As an illustration of the difference between nativist and constructivist approaches, consider the example of how children learn to produce very simple sentences, such as “John ate” (an important part of learning basic syntax, or grammar). The nativist approach assumes that children are born with the empty categories of noun and verb and are able to identify the words they hear as members of the relevant category. Under one particularly influential nativist account—namely, Steven Pinker’s semantic bootstrapping hypothesis—this is accomplished with the aid of innate rules that assign words for people, objects, and concepts (e.g., John) to the noun

category, and words for actions, events, or changes of state (e.g., ate) to the verb category. In addition to innate categories, children have innate rules for combining these categories into phrases and sentences. For example, the simplest rule combines a noun and a verb. All children have to do is learn the ordering of the noun and verb in the particular language they are acquiring (e.g., [noun] [verb] in English, [verb] [noun] in Korean; “John ate” versus “Ate John”). Under parameter-setting accounts—perhaps most famously associated with Nina Hyams and Janet Fodor—children use the input language to set a parameter, a kind of mental switch, to the setting that corresponds to, among other things, the relative order of the noun and the verb. By contrast, the constructivist approach assumes that children have neither innate categories (e.g., noun, verb) nor innate rules for combining them into sentences. Instead, children form generalizations on the basis of the language they hear. For example, a child might hear and store the utterances “Mommy ate,” “Daddy ate,” “Baby ate,” and so on, and then schematize across these utterances to arrive at a lexically specific slot-and-frame pattern or lexical schema such as “[eater] ate.” This idea dates back to Martin Braine’s pivot schemas of the 1960s and 1970s. This schema allows the child to generate sentences that he or she has not heard previously, by inserting—for example—a new eater into the [eater] slot (e.g., “John ate”). Later in development, children analogize across these schemas (e.g., across “[eater] ate,” “[kicker] kicked,” and “[dancer] danced”) to form an adultlike [noun] [verb] construction. The basis for the analogy is relational similarity; all these schemas express some kind of agent–action (or doer–thing done) relationship. Perhaps the best-known currently active researchers who advocate this position are Michael Tomasello and Brian MacWhinney. Inflectional Morphology

Inflectional morphology is the process by which words (e.g., play) undergo changes to indicate, among other things, tense (e.g., present tense “I play” versus past tense “I played”), person (e.g., the speaker, the listener, or a third party; “I play” versus “You play” versus “He plays”), and number

Language Development

(e.g., plural “John and Sue play” versus singular “John plays”). Nativist and constructivist approaches offer contrasting accounts of children’s acquisition of morphology. Under nativist accounts—for example, those of Steven Pinker and Kenneth Wexler—children are born with knowledge of (a) the category verb (e.g., play, walk, laugh), (b) the category inflectional morpheme (e.g., -s, -ed, -ing), and (c) some kind of abstract rule for combining the two (e.g., play + s = plays; walk + ed = walked). All that children have to do is recognize the verbs and inflectional morphemes in the language they hear. Most generativist theories assume that children are aided in this task by innate knowledge of the types of distinctions that inflectional morphemes often encode (e.g., tense, person, and number). Exceptions to these rules, for example, English verbs that do not form their past tense with ed, are stored as families of irregulars (e.g., sleep/slept, keep/kept, weep/wept). Constructivist accounts—for example, those of Joan Bybee and Jay McClelland—assume that children do not possess innate knowledge of inflectional morphology but form generalizations on the basis of the language they hear. For example, a child who heard the past-present tense pairs miss/missed, wish/wished, and kiss/kissed could infer that the past tense of hiss is hissed, even if he or she had never heard it. Importantly, this process of analogical generalization does not require the aid of an explicit “rule” that combines the verb and the regular past-tense morpheme ed. Rather, exactly as for basic syntax, children are assumed to gradually build up slot-and-frame patterns (e.g., [verb]ed) on the basis of the language they hear. Word Meanings

Suppose that a child hears the word doggy in the presence of the family dog. How does the child know that doggy is the label for the dog rather than, for example, what the dog is doing (e.g., walking), some part or property of the dog (e.g., leg, black, furry), or something else altogether (e.g., Look!). This is a problem raised by the philosopher Willard Quine in the 1960s. A strong nativist account—the lexical constraints or principles account—holds that children

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are born with some knowledge of how words work, including, for example, the assumption that words generally label whole objects (e.g., dog) rather than their parts (e.g., leg) or properties (e.g., black, furry). (More recent versions of the account—for example, that of Kathy Hirsh-Pasek and Roberta Golinkoff—relax the assumption that these constraints are necessarily innate and inviolable.) Constructivist social-interactionist accounts, such as that of Jerome Bruner, include no roles for constraints or principles but instead emphasize the role of sociopragmatic factors in word learning. For example, the adult speaker and child listener often share joint attention to the relevant object in the world (e.g., the adult looks back and forth between the child and the dog such that the child knows that the adult is attending to the dog). Furthermore, children are argued to be adept at intention reading, using social cues to figure out that, for example, the speaker’s intention is to label the dog rather than to instruct the child to perform an action (e.g., Look!). Finally, both attention and intention reading are facilitated by the fact that word learning often takes place in social routines that the child understands well. For example, a word heard in the context of a naming game probably labels an object, but a word heard in the context of a temper tantrum is most likely some kind of instruction to behave or a request for cooperation. Other Domains

The debate between nativist and constructivist approaches to language acquisition plays out in a similar way in various other domains of typical first language acquisition. These include the production and comprehension of particular speech sounds (phonology), of more advanced sentence types such as passives (e.g., “The cake was eaten by John”), questions (e.g., “What did John eat?”), and relative clauses (e.g., “John ate the cake that Sue had made”), and of sentences in which pronouns (e.g., he, she) refer back to other nouns in the same sentence (e.g., John and he can refer to the same person in “John said that he liked cake” but not in “He said that John liked cake”).

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In every case, generativist approaches assume that children rely critically on rules and categories that are innately specified (i.e., that children are born with), but constructivist approaches assume that children instead form generalizations on the basis of the language that they hear.

Second-, Multiple-, and Impaired-Language Development Second-Language Acquisition

Second language (or L2) acquisition refers to the subsequent acquisition of a second language after the process of acquiring the child’s first (i.e., native) language has begun. The main theoretical debate is whether there is a critical or sensitive period in which any number of languages can be learned to a nativelike level, with second-­language learners who miss this critical period unable to ever achieve nativelike command of the language, a claim popularized by Eric Lennenberg in the 1960s. An alternative is that there is no critical period per se but that second-language learners are disadvantaged by interference from the first language and, in many cases, spend fewer hours “on task” than do native learners. These alternatives are often, though not necessarily, linked to the nativist and constructivist positions, respectively. Bilingualism and Multilingualism

Bilingual children are those who acquire two languages to a native standard more or less simultaneously or, at least, with significant overlap (multilingual children acquire three or more). The main debate is whether children use the same system for both languages—the unitary language hypothesis, most famously associated with Virginia Volterra and Traute Taeschner—or maintain a separate system for each language. For researchers who favor the latter possibility, a further question is whether the two systems remain entirely separated (e.g., Annick De Houwer’s autonomous systems or differentiation hypothesis) or interact with each other (e.g., Jim Cummins’s interdependent systems theory), such that children show cross-linguistic influence—that is, the

transfer of a linguistic rule or pattern from one language to the other. Specific Language Impairment

Language impairment can be caused by many different conditions, such as autism, Williams syndrome, Down syndrome, and hearing impairments. However, some children fail to acquire language normally despite the lack of any apparent cognitive or hearing impairment. This condition is known as specific language impairment (SLI). The grammar-specific deficit approach, most famously associated with Mabel Rice and Heather Van Der Lely, holds that SLI is caused by a deficit that is specific to syntax or inflectional morphology (or both). The alternative is that children with SLI suffer from a general information-processing deficit that adversely affects the maximum speed or capacity (or both) of processing and storage for linguistic and nonlinguistic information alike—a position most famously associated with Larry Leonard and Paula Tallal. The grammar-specific and information-processing deficit accounts of SLI are generally, though not necessarily, associated with n ­ ativist and constructivist approaches to language acquisition, respectively. Ben Ambridge See also Cognitive Development; Concepts and Language; Language, Evolution of; Language Disorders; Nature Versus Nurture; Piaget’s and the Neo-Piagetian Theories of Cognitive Development; Pinker on Language; Psycholinguistics; Reading Process, Models of; Syntax, Psychology of; Verbal Behavior

Further Readings Ambridge, B., & Lieven, E. V. M. (2011). Child language acquisition: Contrasting theoretical approaches. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Guasti, M. T. (2004). Language acquisition: The growth of grammar. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Rowland, C. F. (2013). Understanding child language acquisition. London, England: Routledge. Tomasello, M. (2003). Constructing a language: A usagebased theory of language acquisition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Language Disorders

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Language Disorders Semantics/Meaning

A glance at the respective literatures addressing childhood and adult language disorders might logically lead the reader to conclude that these disciplines catalog two entirely different species. Nevertheless, there are commonalities that unite the study of language disorders across the life span. This entry outlines principles that yield a broad frame of reference for conceptualizing the lexicon of language disorders. The study of language disorders represents a nexus among many disciplines, both theoretical and applied. The development of effective treatments for language disorders requires a mechanistic understanding of the problem(s) at hand. Thus, applied clinical disciplines that address language disorders often dovetail with classically theoretical fields, such as developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, and linguistics. The study of language disorders now also falls under the purview of biological psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and neurobiology. Thus, the contemporary study of language disorders is highly multidisciplinary, with psychological methods and ­psycholinguistic ­theories offering prominent and essential contributions. A language disorder can arise from impair­ ment(s) at many distinct levels of a processing hierarchy composed nominally of input, output, and word meaning. For example, failure to name an object (i.e., anomia) might result from perceptual deficits in visual object identification (i.e., agnosia), degradation of the core concept that underlies object meaning (i.e., semantic impairment), or failure to accurately link a word form to a target concept (i.e., lexical retrieval deficits). One way of isolating the particular cause of a language disorder is to first pursue a broad, psycholinguistic modeling approach. Figure 1 represents a highly stylized model of some of the key systems that support language, and the discussion that follows focuses on the selective vulnerability of these systems.

Language as a Complex System Most language researchers acknowledge the existence of separate, but highly interactive, pathways that access word meaning. Language input arrives

Lexicon

Input Phonology

Output Phonology

Perceiving Spoken, Written, Signed Words

Producing Spoken, Written, Signed Words

Figure 1 A Simple Interactive Model of Single-Word Processing

from a variety of representational modalities, including orthography (i.e., text), manual gesture (i.e., signs), speech, and nonverbal means (e.g., facial expression). This incoming detail reverberates through language pathways to engage a vast repository of stored word forms known as the mental lexicon. Many psycholinguists believe that these lexical representations subsequently engage a more central pool dedicated to word meaning (i.e., semantic memory). If the input-processing pathway functions successfully to this point, a person has now comprehended a single word. Language expression proceeds by selecting an appropriate target word (e.g., lexical selection) and subsequently encoding its phonological, orthographic, or gestural properties. Finally, during the act of overt speech, the body (especially, lips, tongue, palate, diaphragm) executes a precise series of motor programs that shape acoustic detail into intelligible speech output. Most researchers draw a sharp divide between language and motor speech production. Consequently, speech and language disorders are typically regarded as unique entities. In reality, this distinction is often murky. Parents, for example, often report speech delays when, in fact, their child is experiencing delayed expressive language. Figure 1 represents a starting point for understanding single word production. The limitation of this box-and-arrow modeling approach is that

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language involves far more than single-word production. It also demands syntactic competence to impose structure on running discourse. Moreover, people are sensitive to variations in pitch, amplitude, and duration (i.e., prosody) that convey information about emotional states and grammatical class. In addition, social pragmatic abilities and theory of mind are supralinguistic elements of communication that are critical for maintaining the flow of conversational narrative and adapting messages to the unique needs of a conversation partner. Language competence requires the integration of all these components in rapid-fire succession and with great precision. It is a marvel that speakers accomplish this feat with such little effort. Yet the complexity of this dynamic system offers numerous potential points of breakdown.

Language Disorders Most researchers and clinicians approach language disorders by reducing global impairments to a set of receptive and expressive components. Deficits in receptive language affect comprehension by compromising the input pathway illustrated on the left side of Figure 1. In contrast, expressive language deficits emerge in the context of impairment to one or more output processes illustrated on the right side of Figure 1. This expressive–receptive dichotomy often serves as an anchor point for assessment of and intervention in language disorders. Standardized tests of language functioning typically assess receptive and expressive abilities through a range of unique subtests. Composite scores on such assessments tend to be relatively uninformative in isolation. Some of the primary loci of receptive and expressive language disorders are discussed next. Phonology and Orthography

Through listening exposure very young infants implicitly learn phonemic distinctions within their native language. They also gain rapid proficiency with regularities and rules that govern the ways that phonemes combine (i.e., phonotactic probability), and during typical language development, infants make active use of this knowledge to parse incoming speech into chunks of discrete words.

Thus, the early acquisition of the sound system or an alternate mode of input (e.g., manual signs) is crucial for early word learning. A variety of language disorders are associated with deficits that affect early stages of acoustic and phonological input processing. Various forms of hearing loss (e.g., congenital deafness and transient middle-ear infections) reflect input deprivation. Other conditions affect more central cognitive abilities. Examples of related language disorders include central auditory processing disorder and specific language impairment (SLI). Among these conditions, the associated phonological impairments are not attributable to peripheral hearing loss. People with SLI, for example, often have no trouble detecting tones or discriminating between two spoken words. Yet SLI is also characterized by difficulties with “meta-tasks” that demand phonological awareness or explicit knowledge of phonological rules in addition to working memory (e.g.,  rhyme judgments or explicitly segmenting phonemes or syllables). In addition to receptive phonological disorders, there exists a range of expressive phonological impairments. Adult patients with nonfluent forms of aphasia commonly produce phonemic paraphasias, characterized by the production of unintended, distorted, or omitted syllables (e.g., “umbwellug” for “umbrella”). These errors are not typically related to speech motor deficits or peripheral coordination of the tongue or lips. Expressive phonological deficits are also apparent as children learn difficult phonemic transitions (e.g., moving rapidly between sounds made in the front of the mouth relative to the back). Many such expressive phonological problems often involve processes or patterns of sound production deficits (e.g., fronting of sounds that should be made in the back of the mouth) rather than isolated difficulties producing particular phonemes (e.g., /s/). English orthography uses 26 letters to convey 44 or so distinct phonemes. This mapping between letters and sounds is imperfect (i.e., apple and ate use the same letter to convey two distinct phonemes). These irregularities present difficulties for some readers. Dyslexia is a multifaceted disorder of reading that manifests as a variety of subtypes (e.g., surface, phonological). People with dyslexia may experience letter reversals or

Language Disorders

other impairments related to visual letter crowding. They may also show difficulties extracting the “correct” sound conveyed by unique sequences of letters. Some researchers believe that people with dyslexia experience difficulties processing fundamental implicit phonological rules of their native language. These difficulties are also often apparent in the production of written language, a disorder known as dysgraphia. It is important to note, however, that although dysgraphia and dyslexia often co-occur, they are unique and dissociable language disorders. Word Meaning: Semantic Memory

Much of the ability to understand and express language relies on a unique system of human memory. Semantic memory composes the multimodal knowledge of word and object meaning. Such conceptual knowledge is essential for naming and understanding spoken words in addition to nonverbal interactions. Thus, semantic memory forms a substrate for language. Deficits in semantic memory tend to produce profound language impairments. The most compelling evidence for this relation between language and memory is seen in neurodegenerative conditions such as Alzheimer’s disease and the semantic variant of primary progressive aphasia. Patients with these conditions typically have great difficulty with both expressive and receptive language, producing narratives that are empty (uninformative). Language disorders with a basis in degraded semantic memory typically pre­ sent with comparable deficits in language and nonverbal modalities. In contrast, semantic access ­disorders (e.g., aphasia and agnosia) often reflect impairment of one or more unique pathways either to or from semantic memory (see Figure 1). Morphology

Relatively little is known about the nature of focal language impairments that affect morphology. SLI appears to affect morphological development during childhood; for example, people with SLI have trouble acquiring verb tense and irregular constructions (e.g., run – ran). Morphological deficits are also present in the production of adults

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with nonfluent aphasia who show telegraphic speech, a condition characterized by clipped utterances and the deletion of bound morphemes. Syntax

Language is not simply a succession of single words. People combine words and morphemes into discourse using a set of grammatical rules (i.e., syntax). Natural languages vary in their syntactic structures, and one of the great challenges for linguistics has involved uncovering a deep structure, or universal grammar, that is common to all languages. Many language disorders are characterized by deficits in comprehending or producing complex syntax. Broad deficits in syntactic competence, termed agrammatism, are strikingly evident in a form of left frontal lobe stroke known as Broca’s aphasia. People with this form of aphasia often produce only very short, canonical (subject-verb-object) sentence structures devoid of morphology and function words (e.g., “Mary go store”). During language acquisition, early syntactic competence is a key component of language learning from which children “bootstrap” more complex linguistic skills (e.g., understanding noncanonical sentence structures, such as passives). Pragmatics

Numerous language disorders, both acquired and congenital, affect pragmatic language skills. Children with autism often have great difficulty mastering pragmatic aspects of language (e.g., taking turns in conversation or maintaining eye contact). During adulthood, traumatic brain injuries and right-hemisphere neurological damage also compromise many aspects of pragmatics, including response inhibition and apparent apathy. The treatment of pragmatic language deficits remains notoriously difficult to execute, and much remains to be learned about effective means of promoting generalization of treatment gains to naturalistic interactions. Prosody

Expressive and receptive prosody appear to be dissociable (i.e., vulnerable to selective impairment).

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Further lending complexity to the expressive–­ receptive distinction is the fact that prosodic deficits (i.e., aprosodia) fractionate along an emotional versus syntactic line. Expressive prosodic deficits that are often perceived as flat, monotonic speech are a common consequence of a right-hemisphere stroke. In contrast, people with Parkinson’s disease sometimes have difficulties matching the emotional content conveyed by prosody to an appropriate ­ situation. Children who show early difficulties with linguistic prosody may have difficulty acquiring grammatical distinctions (nouns vs. verbs) later during development.

Language and Other Cognitive Processes Language competence relies on a strong supporting cast of other cognitive processes, such as working memory, attention, and inhibitory control. Working memory helps offset the rapid decay of information. Attention and inhibitory control are necessary in order to select intended targets and suppress competing alternatives. Moreover, functional sensory channels (vision and audition) allow people to name and monitor their own production. Some language disorders reflect focal impairment of the language system proper (e.g., syntax and phonology), whereas other disorders reflect the loss of a “supporting cast.” Patients with Alzheimer’s disease, for example, often have great difficulty understanding sentencelevel material, and these deficits are exacerbated with increased sentence length and syntactic complexity (e.g., passive versus active voice). One lingering question is whether these deficits reflect a true language disorder or more generalized limitations in working memory. Although debatable, the current consensus points toward memory as a primary etiology. Alzheimer’s disease provides just one example of a literature that is rife with cases where a domain-general cognitive or perceptual deficit might masquerade as a focal language disorder. Other examples include visual disturbances in dyslexia and central auditory processing deficits in specific language impairment. These cases highlight the inherent complexity involved in understanding and treating language disorders. Jamie Reilly

See also Cognition and Language; Communication and Language; Concepts and Language; Language, Evolution of; Language Development; Language, Interaction, and Culture

Note: This work was funded by U.S. Public Health Service grant R01 DC013063 from the National Institute on Deafness and Other Communicative Disorders (NIH/NIDCD). Further Readings Coltheart, M. (2004). Are there lexicons? Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A: Human Experimental Psychology, 57(7), 1153–1171. http:// dx.doi.org/10.1080/02724980443000007 Hauser, M. D., Chomsky, N., & Fitch, W. T. (2002). The faculty of language: What is it, who has it, and how did it evolve? Science, 298(5598), 1569–1579. Paivio, A. (2014). Intelligence, dual coding theory, and the brain. Intelligence, 47, 141–158. http://dx.doi .org/10.1016/j.intell.2014.09.002 Pinker, S. (1994). The language instinct: How the mind creates language. New York, NY: Harper Collins. Reilly, J., Harnish, S., Garcia, A., Hung, J., Rodriguez, A. D., & Crosson, B. (2014). Lesion symptom mapping of manipulable object naming in nonfluent aphasia: Can a brain be both embodied and disembodied? Cognitive Neuropsychology, 31(4), 287–312. http:// dx.doi.org/10.1080/02643294.2014.914022

Law

and

Psychology

The interdisciplinary field of law and psychology has a broad scope encompassing many subfields of psychology (e.g., clinical, cognitive, developmental, social, and organizational). Research topics may have little in common other than their shared links to both law and human behavior. For example, the psychological mechanisms underlying why people commit crimes may be very ­different from those that determine whether an eyewitness is mistaken. Because of the breadth of topics studied by psycholegal scholars, it is not surprising that there are no general, unifying theories. Theory development has also been limited by the applied focus of much of the research. When invoking theory in their work, psycholegal scholars often draw on theories developed by psychologists

Law and Psychology

from other subdisciplines in addition to developing unique theories to explain law-related behavior. The remainder of this entry focuses on the theories that have been used to predict three very different legal behaviors: criminal offending, jury decision making, and eyewitness identifications.

Criminal Behavior Why do some people commit crimes and others follow the law? Is there something unique about the people who engage in criminal behavior that would allow prediction of who will offend? Psychoanalytic theory predicts that offenders commit crimes because they have insufficiently developed superegos (i.e., consciences) to control the aggressive tendencies of their ids (i.e., biological drives). Social learning theory suggests that offenders may become violent because they have learned to be aggressive either on their own or through observation of others’ aggression. Operant-conditioning theory predicts that offenders commit crime if their criminal behavior is rewarded and will cease criminal activity if it is punished. In each case, the theory was developed outside a criminal context but then borrowed by law and psychology to explain criminal behavior. One theory that has been particularly well developed is the role of psychopathy, or antisocial personality disorder, in the commission of crimes and in reoffending after release from prison. People with a psychopathic personality tend to be very charming, manipulative, prone to lying, lacking in remorse and empathy, and impulsive. Psychopaths may be less likely to experience anxiety in response to negative experiences, suggesting that they may be less likely to learn from past punishments for aggressive, violent, or criminal behavior. This diminished response to punishment, combined with their lack of concern about the consequences of their behavior, may explain why imprisonment does not do much to decrease the likelihood that prisoners with psychopathy will reoffend postrelease.

Jury Decision Making Most research on jury decision making is atheoretical, asking questions about whether certain types of evidence influence the verdicts that

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juries render. However, when scholars have adopted a theoretical frame for predicting whether and how evidence will influence jurors, they have typically chosen dual-process theories of persuasion. These theories predict that jurors will be persuaded by stronger, higher quality evidence when they are motivated and able to process the information. Most scholars presume that jurors are motivated to process because of their task but that when the evidence is complex or highly technical, as scientific evidence can be, jurors may be unable to evaluate the strength of the evidence (a deliberative process) and instead will rely on extra-­ evidentiary cues, such as a witness’s attractiveness or a defendant’s race to make decisions (an ­automatic process). Of the theories that have been developed to explain decision making in the jury context specifically, the story model is the most widely adopted. According to this theory, jurors actively construct the evidence that they hear during trial to create a story that incorporates as much of the evidence as possible (coverage) and that is the most plausible and internally consistent (coherence). To the extent that jurors create multiple stories that are equally high in their coverage of the evidence and their coherence, each will be discounted because it does not uniquely account for the evidence. Once a jury adopts a preferred story, the jury members learn the possible verdict options (generally through instructions from the judge) and then map their story onto the verdict categories to determine which verdict is the best match for the story.

Eyewitness Identification Some scholars of eyewitness identification accuracy have adopted global matching models of recognition memory from cognitive psychology to explain how eyewitnesses make identification decisions. These models suggest that people directly access their representation of previously encountered information in memory and assess its match with a currently available target. In the case of eyewitness memory, people determine whether a lineup member is the perpetrator who committed the witnessed crime by directly accessing their memory for the perpetrator and comparing it with

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each member of the lineup. If the match between a lineup member and their memory of the perpetrator exceeds some threshold of similarity, they make an identification. Other scholars developed the relative judgment theory of eyewitness identification specifically for the eyewitness context to explain why witnesses often identify innocent suspects from traditional lineups that do not include the perpetrator and to guide the development of new lineup procedures that might reduce eyewitness mistakes. Relative judgment theory proposes that in a lineup procedure in which all the lineup members are presented at the same time, witnesses identify the lineup member who looks most like the perpetrator (which, unlike the direct-access matching model, requires comparisons of the lineup members), even when the suspect in the lineup is not the perpetrator. A sequential procedure in which lineup members are presented one at a time, forcing witnesses to compare the lineup member to their memory of the perpetrator rather than to other lineup members, results in fewer mistaken identifications. Both direct-access matching and relative judgment theory have been supported by existing data. Margaret Bull Kovera See also Aggression and Violence; Attitude Formation and Change; Failure of Memory; Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Psychopathology; Reasoning and Decision Making

Wells, G. L. (2014). Eyewitness identification: Probative value, criterion shifts, and policy regarding the sequential lineup. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23, 11–16.

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The law of effect states that if an organism engages in some behavior (e.g., a rat presses a bar or a person requests the salt) and certain consequences follow (a bit of food is delivered, the salt is passed), then that behavior is more likely to occur in the future under those conditions. In other words, the consequences of a behavior have an effect on the probability that that behavior will reoccur in the future in that circumstance. Although the law was originally stated in terms of satisfaction, because such states cannot be directly observed, it has been recast in terms of observable events, such as the delivery of food. If a stimulus is presented and increases the behavior it follows, that stimulus is called a reinforcer. Conversely, if it decreases the behavior it follows, it is called a punisher. This entry discusses the law of effect in terms of wants and needs, reinforcement, punishment, consequences, contingencies, natural selection, and shaping, or creating new behavior.

Wants and Needs Further Readings Brown, S. L., Gottschall, S., & Bennell, C. (2015). Criminal behavior. In B. L. Cutler & P. A. Zapf (Eds.), APA handbook of forensic psychology: Vol. 1. Individual and situational influences in criminal and civil contexts (pp. 219–256). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Clark, S. E. (2003). A memory and decision model for eyewitness identification. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 17, 629–654. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ acp.891 Kovera, M. B., & Levett, L. M. (2015). Jury decision making. In B. L. Cutler & P. A. Zapf (Eds.), APA handbook of forensic psychology: Vol. 2. Criminal investigation, adjudication, and sentencing outcomes (pp. 271–311). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

It can be useful to distinguish between wants and needs in discussing the law of effect. A want is something an organism desires, as demonstrated by its behavior, and a need is something an organism requires in order to maintain its biological integrity, as demonstrated by its health. For example, food is both a want and a need: When deprived of it, an individual seeks it out (behavior), and without it, the individual’s body would become debilitated (health). Oxygen, however, is a need but not a want: When deprived of it (by, for example, the presence of carbon monoxide), people do not seek it out. They simply go to sleep and die. If a person holds his or her breath, it is not the lack of oxygen that makes the person want to breathe but rather the buildup of carbon dioxide. For most people, sugar, salt, and fat are wants but

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not needs. They seek out sweet food, but most of them have as much (or more) than they need. During human evolutionary history, sugar, salt, and fat were important, so presumably, a tendency to be reinforced by them evolved. In spite of the fact that most people have enough of all three items, they remain reinforcers. The law of effect is based on wants but not on needs. If the consequence of behavior is something the organism wants, the future probability of the behavior increases. If the consequence is something the organism needs (but does not want), there may be no effect on behavior. One might speculate that if every need corresponded to a want, people would be better off. Notice that the intensity of most wants varies, based on level of deprivation. Food and water are obvious examples. As an individual goes longer and longer without water, water becomes a stronger reinforcer. (However, because food and water are both wants and needs, going too long without either one will have deleterious effects on health.)

Primary and Secondary Reinforcement Certain kinds of stimuli are innately reinforcing. Food, for example, becomes more reinforcing as deprivation occurs, because of the genetic makeup of an organism. If all members of a given species find a specific kind of stimulus reinforcing, it is likely due to the evolution of that species. Such stimuli are called primary reinforcers (and primary punishers). However, other kinds of stimuli are reinforcing because of past events in the organism’s life. Money, to take a prime example, is not innately reinforcing to humans. But because money is paired with numerous primary reinforcers, it, in turn, becomes a reinforcer itself. Such stimuli are called secondary reinforcers (and secondary punishers). Certain stimuli are reinforcing, but whether they are primary or secondary reinforcers is unclear. Most people enjoy music, but is this ability to be reinforced by music innate or learned?

Schedule of Reinforcement The relation between behavior and its consequence can be varied. Every response could produce a specific consequence, some responses could ­

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produce the consequence, or no responses could produce the consequence. The first case is called continuous reinforcement, the second intermittent reinforcement, and the third extinction. Although continuous reinforcement might be thought to produce the strongest behavior (meaning the most persistent behavior following removal of the consequence), intermittent reinforcement actually does a better job. This probably occurs because, with continuous reinforcement, when extinction is begun, the organism can discriminate that the schedule has changed. Intermittent schedules are categorized as interval schedules or ratio schedules. The former deliver reinforcement based on the passage of time (in conjunction with a response). For example, a rat might receive food for the first response to occur 1 minute following the previous food delivery. On a ratio schedule, reinforcement is based on behavior. A rat might receive food for responding 50 times on a lever. Interval and ratio schedules are common in everyday life. For example, a person can vote when he or she becomes 18 years old (an interval schedule). A person can get a driver’s license when he or she both reaches a certain age (interval) and passes a driving test (ratio). One can only wonder what driving the roads would be like if only an interval component were required to drive. A number of schedules based on time could be based on responses. For example, in most states, a person can drink at age 21. What happens at midnight on one’s 21st birthday? Nothing in particular. One is, by and large, the same person one was 24 hours earlier. Legislators have simply assumed that by that age, most people are mature enough to handle alcohol. If there were a test for maturity, that would allow for a switch from the reliance on time to a reliance on observed behavior.

The Symmetrical Law of Effect So far, little has been said about punishment. The symmetrical law of effect holds that some stimuli (called reinforcers) tend to increase (or maintain) behavior, but other stimuli (called punishers) tend to decrease behavior (or maintain behavior at a lower rate than otherwise). If food is contingent on behavior (and deprivation is in effect), then

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behavior that produces food will increase above its “operant level” (i.e., the level at which it occurs with no consequence). If electric shock is then added, the behavior will decrease below the level maintained by food. The symmetrical law of effect is not accepted by all researchers. Rather than a punisher reducing behavior, the alternative version holds that negative reinforcement is at work. For example, if a rat is shocked while pressing a bar, the symmetrical law of effect would account for the decrease in response rate by postulating that the shock punished bar pressing. The alternative version holds that some other form of behavior, such as walking away from the bar, is reinforced by stopping bar pressing and hence escaping the shock.

Four Kinds of Consequences Besides reinforcers and punishers, there are cases in which stimuli are removed as a consequence of behavior. Negative reinforcement involves the removal of an aversive stimulus, which tends to maintain behavior. If a person moves into the shade on a hot, sunny day, that is negative reinforcement. Negative punishment (sometimes called response cost) involves the removal of a positive stimulus, which tends to reduce behavior. If one insults one’s friend, he or she may leave, which may tend to reduce the frequency with which one insults people in the future. Critics of this four-ply scheme have asked whether a behavior increases, for example, when the presentation of food immediately follows the behavior (such as when rats press a bar) because food was presented (reinforcement) or because deprivation was reduced (negative reinforcement)? As a general rule, a scientific principle should not tolerate ambiguity at this basic level. An alternative approach holds that if behavior results in an increase in value (whether from removing aversive stimuli or from presenting positive stimuli), that behavior will be maintained. Conversely, if behavior results in a decrease in value (whether from removing positive stimuli or from presenting aversive stimuli), that behavior will be reduced. This version, then, does not involve the removal or presentation of stimuli per se.

The Three-Term Contingency The law of effect is part of a larger framework called the three-term contingency, which states that in the presence of a discriminative stimulus, a response produces a consequence. For example, in the presence of a red key, a pigeon might learn that pecking the key produces food. In the case of what is called a multiple schedule, two (or more) stimuli alternate, based on the passage of time (e.g., each might be present for 1 minute). In the presence of one stimulus, responses might produce food, but in the presence of the other, they might have no effect (extinction). Eventually, the organism responds at  some rate in the presence of the first stimulus but not in the presence of the other. Many people notice that they tend to behave in different ways while with their friends than they do while with their parents or teachers. They can discriminate between the two kinds of environments and learn that in the presence of friends, certain kinds of behavior are reinforced, but in the presence of parents or teachers, those same behaviors might be punished and other kinds of behavior reinforced.

The Parallel With Natural Selection There is a parallel between Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution (which involves variation and selection) and the law of effect. With respect to the latter, behavior shows variation, and if certain forms of behavior produce positive consequences, those forms are selected for (meaning that they become more frequent). Extinction within the theory of evolution means that members of a species all die, but extinction within the law of effect means that no consequence follows a behavior, and so the behavior eventually falls to its operant level. Evidence of adaptation—that is, a fit between an organism (including its behavior) and the environment—abounds. Certain forms of adaptation are due to evolution. For example, mammals are homeotherms—organisms that maintain a constant internal temperature. Mammals living in a cold climate are likely to have a thick coat, which provides insulation. The animals are also likely to frequent locations where food can be found. The latter occurs because of the law of effect. Both the

Leadership

thick coat and the behavior with respect to food are adaptive. Notice, however, that the existence of the law of effect is due to the genetic makeup of the individual and so is ultimately due to evolution. Evolution occurs at a time scale measured in generations. Because different organisms have widely varying life spans, the timescale for evolution varies widely. The law of effect, on the other hand, occurs at a timescale on the order of seconds or minutes.

Shaping The law of effect can be used to create behavior that never previously appeared within an organism’s repertoire. Suppose, for example, that a parent would like his or her child to play Chopin on the piano. Would it make sense to wait until the child plays Chopin and then reinforce the behavior? Such a complex form of behavior is very unlikely to occur on its own. On the other hand, it is possible to reinforce behavior that approximates playing Chopin. One could begin by reinforcing pressing a piano key (a form of behavior so simple it might occur spontaneously). One could then reinforce certain sequences of key pressing (perhaps those that approximate playing a scale). Very gradually, the behavior called “playing Chopin” can be shaped. Such a process can be applied to a wide range of desired behaviors, including solving differential equations, learning to type, and driving a car. What is usually called education may be viewed as the creation of behavioral repertoires by means of the law of effect. If current practices often fall short, that may occur in part because the perspective discussed here is seldom brought to bear within the field of education. William Vaughan, Jr. See also Applied Behavior Analysis; Behavioral Economics; Behaviorism; Biological Constraints on Learning; Habits; Natural Selection; Needs; Operant Conditioning; Punishment; Reinforcement; SelfControl; Skinner’s Legacy

Further Readings Mazur, J. E. (2012). Learning and behavior (7th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson.

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Rachlin, H. (1991). Introduction to modern behaviorism (3rd ed.). New York, NY: W. H. Freeman. Skinner, B. F. (1971). Beyond freedom and dignity. New York, NY: Knopf.

Leadership Every day, leaders are faced with making and implementing decisions within their organizations. In doing so, most rely on implicit or explicit leadership models to help them construct a framework for their organization and environment. Unfortunately, there is no universal theory of leadership; in fact, there is not even a generally accepted definition of leadership. Therefore, leaders must piece together a view of what good ­leadership is largely on their own. The following definition was offered by Richard Kilburg and Marc Donohue in 2011: Leadership is a complex, multidimensional, emergent process in which the leader(s), follower(s), and other formal and informal stakeholders in a human enterprise use their characteristics, capabilities, thoughts, feelings, and behaviors to create mutually influencing relationships that enable them to coevolve strategies, tactics, structures, processes, directions, and other methods of building and managing human enterprises with the goal of producing adaptive success in their chosen niche(s) in the competitive, evaluative, and evolving global ecology of organizations. (p. 15)

This entry offers a description of eight major approaches to leadership that have appeared in the scientific literature over the past 60 years.

Style/Behavior (Charismatic, Servant, Authentic) Theory This theory focuses on how leaders actually behave, what they do to change how others perceive them as leaders, and how they change the performance of their organizations. Leaders focus on creating and using vertical and lateral relationships inside and outside of organizations to do their work. They engage in influence, intellectual

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stimulation, inspirational appeals, and interpersonal support aimed at key individuals to change their imaginations, values, emotions, attitudes, and behaviors. Leaders consistently try to change their organization and the external environments of the organization in order to transform and improve the organization’s performance. To be effective, leaders must focus on what is really going on in themselves, their colleagues, and their organizations. Authentic leaders demonstrate self-awareness, moral perspective, and an ability to balance what they experience emotionally and cognitively; they act transparently with their colleagues. Effective leaders first emerge in organizations through their efforts in serving others. Over time, they become more effective at identifying the needs of their colleagues, helping them become better servant leaders themselves, and becoming more involved in community life.

Skills/Capacities/Competencies Theory Central to this theory is that effective leadership depends on the individual’s ability and skill to solve novel, complex, and amorphous problems that threaten the organization for which he or she is responsible. Problem solving and other leadership competencies and skills can improve with experience and can be developed deliberately and systematically. The demonstration of effective leadership skills in contextually sensitive ways improves organizational performance.

Trait Theory According to this theory, effective leaders demonstrate combinations of extraordinary qualities, including cognitive abilities and personality traits,  as well as physical traits, such as height, strength, and appearance. Psychological leadership traits include integrity, persistence, humility, dominance, competence, decisiveness, and vision. One aspect of trait theory is that the perception of others about a leader’s traits can be as important as the reality. Hence, gender and other forms of diversity can have profound effects on how leaders behave and how they are perceived. However, ongoing organizational success depends on the leader’s having the right traits for

the evolving environment and circumstances. Often, executives who fail are deficient in some or all the psychological traits listed in the preceding paragraph.

Ethical/Moral Theory Ethical/moral theory is based on the belief that developing and using an ethical perspective in the day-to-day operations of any organization is at the heart of effective leadership. Ethical leaders respect and serve others, demonstrate justice, behave honestly, and create community within their organizations by transcending their own self-interests in the ways they make and implement decisions. They also engage their colleagues to address moral issues, value conflicts, and personal struggles, thereby moving everyone to higher standards of ethical behavior. Leaders who develop their character strengths and consistently try to behave and treat others in a virtuous way are less likely to behave immorally and are more likely to perform more effectively over time.

Effectiveness/Outcome Theory This theory derives from an extensive literature that examined executive effectiveness as a ­function of others’ perception of leadership performance. However, there is considerably less research on the impact of leadership on actual organizational outcomes. Although effective leaders can make a substantial and measurable difference in the performance of their organization, leaders make their biggest impact by how they influence the other leaders with whom they work most closely.

Contingency/Path–Goal/Situational Theory That leadership involves efforts to influence and motivate people and systems is this theory’s primary assertion. Effective influence leads to collaborative behavior in which people work toward common goals. However, different organizational and environmental situations, as well as the differential capacities of subordinates, call for different approaches to influence and can place limits on how effective a leader can be. Hence, to meet the situation, a leader may need to evolve his or her influencing strategies.

Leadership

Leaders often use a dyadic paradigm of leader– follower relationships. The paradigm focuses on behaviors that a leader uses either to direct subordinates in ways that help them better accomplish their goals (path–goal interventions) or to improve their satisfaction with their overall work experience (need-satisfying interventions). In this approach, participative leadership behavior is emphasized as a means to clarify path–goal relationships, alignment with organizational objectives, and attainment of goals. This approach can also improve subordinates’ autonomy, work effort, and performance, as well as their alignment with organizational goals and objectives. Several different types of leadership behavior are involved, including achievement orientation, empowering, work facilitation, and values-directed activities. Leaders focus on behaviors directed toward improving task performance and creating and managing effective relationships with subordinates. Leaders are expected to understand and respond to the continuously evolving environmental conditions within their organization as well as the environment in which it exists. They are also expected to evaluate the capabilities of their subordinates and help them choose those ­ approaches that would best work in a given set of circumstances.

Ecological Systems (Evolution, Integration, Context, Evaluation) Theory This theory embraces the notion that leadership is an interdependent, emergent process that arises from the mutual interaction of all members of an organization. Hence, leadership can occur at all levels in an organization and can have complex characteristics at every level. Organizations selforganize in different ways and use feedback loops in response to various internal and external environmental pressures. Individuals who consistently demonstrate creative and useful responses and approaches to organizational challenges at the right time are more likely to emerge as leaders and to remain in those roles. Shifting internal and external environments and pressures suggest that alternative forms of leadership may be needed at different times to ensure the survival and success of the

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organization. All leaders have inherited attitudes, values, beliefs, and a wide variety of behaviors from their history and ancestors. These are the sources of the leader’s performance and style. In almost any situation, one can choose to lead or to follow. However, it should be noted that leaders derive their legitimacy from the engagement and investment of their followers. Leadership is defined by the context in which it occurs, but leaders influence their organizations to promote positive contexts. Successful leadership derives from cognitive, social, personal, political, technological, financial, and staffing challenges and processes.

Relationship/Leader–Member Exchange/ Attachment/Social Network Theory According to this theory, leadership is an emergent property of groups in which leaders and followers work together. Leadership can be expressed by all members of the groups, and everyone contributes to the organization’s processes, structures, and outcomes. Positive emotional exchanges and relationships between leaders and followers improve ­ organizational performance, including decreased turnover, career progress, and the increased influence of subordinates. Social networks that operate within and between organizations have been shown to improve structural, process, social, psychological, and economic performance.

A Unified Theoretical Approach Although each of these theories has been pursued within its own paradigm and makes a valuable contribution to the collective understanding of leadership, unless they are integrated, those trying to understand leadership are often left holding useful bits, ideas, and suggestions without an overarching and useful scheme by which to integrate them. Thus, it is easy to understand the arguments advanced by Warren Bennis and by J. Thomas Wren for a comprehensive theory. Richard R. Kilburg and Marc D. Donohue (2011) attempted to develop a unified approach to

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leadership by drawing several conclusions from the theories previously described: a. L  eadership can be demonstrated by any and all members of an organization. b. Leadership is an emergent property of highly complex systems that are mostly situational and appear random and chaotic. What makes leadership effective is difficult to predict, achieve, and sustain. It is highly dependent on the personal characteristics and capabilities of the leaders, followers, and other stakeholders involved in a specific organization, a specific external environment, and a specific time frame. c. Research suggests that many aspects of organizational outcomes are reliably and validly tied to certain features of the personality and skills of leaders. Although these characteristics make a substantial contribution to a leader’s performance in specific situations, at the present time they do not appear to be the only or even dominant factor in a person’s success as a leader. d. C  onsistently ethical behavior by leaders can transform the social interactions within the organization and can dramatically improve performance. e. Increasing the leader’s level of individual development and self-awareness can improve the performance and the success of his or her organization. f. The effectiveness of the exchange of thoughts, emotions, and behaviors between leaders and those they work with greatly depends on the ability of those involved to properly assess, choose, and deploy the correct behavior in any given situation. Contingency models provide complex frameworks within which leaders, followers, stakeholders, and organizational behavior can be analyzed. However, establishing the predictive validity of any particular model or approach remains elusive. Leadership behaviors have been shown to fall reliably into two broad classes: (a) those that focus on directing attention and effort toward

specific work-related tasks and goals and (b) those that focus on creating and maintaining the psychological and social environments within which work takes place. g. The interactions and exchanges that take place between a leader and his or her key subordinates on an executive team regarding the goals they pursue and the mutual psychosocial support they provide are crucial determinants of how a particular organization will perform. h. The efforts of individuals in leadership positions to influence the psychosocial, technical, political, economic, and other features of the organization are, of necessity, multidimensional. i. Research on the effectiveness of the strategies and initiatives that leaders choose for their organizations demonstrates how complex, difficult, and elusive the pursuit of success can be. Current data on the average tenure of CEOs of major corporations indicate that the rate of turnover has been accelerating and the amount of time leaders have to demonstrate their capabilities has decreased dramatically. j. Leaders who can create inspirational visions and transformational pathways for their subordinates will be perceived as highly effective in attracting and motivating strong teams of subordinates. However, few studies of the true effectiveness of such charismatic leaders have demonstrated long-term organizational success. The research suggests that individuals who possess and enact virtues such as modesty and persistence in the face of obstacles tend to be more successful than those who are classically described as charismatic. However, results using different methodologies have contradicted that claim.

Marc D. Donohue and Richard R. Kilburg See also Attitude Formation and Change; Cooperation; Employee Motivation; Employee Satisfaction; Group

Long-Term Memory: Processes Processes; Human Factors in Organizations; Intergroup Behavior; Job Analysis; Organizational Climate and Culture; Performance Management; Personnel Development; Personnel Evaluation; Personnel Selection; Training and Personnel Development; Workforce Psychology

Further Readings Bennis, W. (2007). The challenges of leadership in the modern world: Introduction to the special issue. American Psychologist, 62, 2–5. Goethals, G. R., & Sorenson, G. L. J. (Eds.). (2006). The quest for a general theory of leadership. Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar. Kilburg, R. R., & Donohue, M. D. (2011). Toward a grand unifying theory of leadership: Implications for consulting psychology. Consulting Psychology Journal: Research & Practice, 63(1), 6–25. Van Vugt, M., Hogan, R., & Kaiser, R. B. (2008). Leadership, followership, and evolution: Some lessons from the past. American Psychologist, 63, 182–196. Wren, J. T. (2006). A quest for a grand theory of leadership. In G. R. Goethals & G. L. J. Sorenson (Eds.), The quest for a general theory of leadership (pp. 1–38). Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar.

Long-Term Memory: Processes Long-term memory refers to the permanent retention of information in the human memory system that can last from several minutes to a lifetime. An influential model of the organization of long-term memory proposed by Larry Squire (and subsequently corroborated by cognitive neuroscience research) suggests that long-term memories can be classified in either of two distinct systems: (a) a declarative system, specializing in the processing of memories for facts (semantic memory) and events (episodic or autobiographical memory), and (b) a nondeclarative system, specializing in the processing of procedural skills, habits, and different kinds of learning. This entry focuses on the theories surrounding two interdependent processes that largely determine the successful functioning of longterm memory: memory encoding and memory retrieval.

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Although the capacity for long-term memory is theoretically unlimited, its effectiveness depends on whether the right kind of information is accessible at the right time and in the right context and on whether the information is sufficient by itself or requires amplification from other memories. For example, remembering that Paris is the capital of France (a fact) is relevant during a geography test, but not during a chemistry exam, and remembering how to swim (a procedural skill) is critical when one is in the pool, but not when riding a bike. Similarly, remembering to bring a dessert to a friend’s dinner party (an event) might be supplemented by the memory that one is allergic to peanuts (an autobiographical memory). Viewed in this context, long-term memory encompasses a set of dynamic processes that underlie its remarkable flexibility.

Memory Encoding The process of encoding pertains to the active translation of information about the world into long-term memory in a manner that allows access of this information in a useful way. Fergus I. M. Craik and Robert S. Lockhart proposed one of the early theories of encoding that focused on the influence of the level of processing of the presented information on later memory retrieval. According to the depth-of-processing approach, information can be experienced at different levels of specificity, ranging from superficial processing of the physical characteristics of a stimulus (e.g., the color of the font in which a word appears or how it sounds) to “deeper” features pertaining to stimulus identity (e.g., the meaning of the word) or its personal relevance to the participant (e.g., whether the word describes him or her). Evidence from studies involving both intentional learning paradigms (wherein participants are aware that their memory for the studied material will be assessed following learning) and incidental learning paradigms (wherein participants are unaware that memory will later be tested) have shown that the deeper the level of processing of the experienced information, the higher the likelihood this information will be remembered easily and accurately. Although the depth-of-processing theory helped shape early thinking about long-term memory function, it is frequently difficult to define a priori

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what the processing level of a given stimulus feature should be unless memory for that feature has already been assessed. In addition, whether the level of processing of a feature leads to better memory appears to depend on how the memory is tested. This has called into question the broad applicability of this approach to long-term memory phenomena. Beyond any influences of processing depth, long-term memory encoding can be affected by the context in which to-be-remembered information is presented. According to the encoding specificity principle, memory performance is better when the context of memory retrieval matches the context of memory encoding. For instance, English–Spanish bilinguals presented with different kinds of information in English and Spanish remembered that information better when their memory was assessed in the language in which the stimuli were originally presented than when assessed in the other language. Similarly, participants who learned lists of words either on land or underwater recalled the words better when the retrieval context matched the original learning environment. Changes in physical context are typically weaker than changes in mental context, and they depend on the extent to which physical context was attended to during encoding. In a related phenomenon, known as state-dependent recall, changes in the internal context (e.g., due to drugs or alcohol) can also introduce measurable, but modest, effects on memory retrieval. Overall, these effects are stronger in more naturalistic, as opposed to experimental, settings. Nevertheless, the exact circumstances under which changes in context influence memory remain controversial and are not yet fully understood. Long-term memory is further influenced by emotional context. People tend to remember pleasant events better than unpleasant events and positively judged stimuli better than negatively judged stimuli, with neutral stimuli associated with poorer memory, overall. Several studies have demonstrated that people tend to recall more accurately information that is aligned with their current mood, a phenomenon known as the mood congruency effect. This finding can have certain clinical implications; it suggests that people diagnosed with depression might remember negative events

better than positive events, which could perpetuate their depressive symptoms. Aside from context effects, memory performance is significantly enhanced when materials are organized in a meaningful and intuitive way during encoding. For example, remembering one’s grocery list will improve if the items on the list are not presented randomly but rather are organized according to grocery store sections (e.g., produce, dairy, personal care, etc.). The level of distinctiveness in the encoding of new stimuli relative to one’s past memories can further determine later retrieval. For instance, remembering, among all other new acquaintances, the name of a particularly interesting person one has met at a party requires additional time and depth of processing. Actively integrating new information with one’s prior knowledge, a process known as elaboration, can likewise facilitate memory encoding, although it is also possible for new memories to become distorted so as to conform to past experience. In addition, research has shown that spacing learning over longer periods of time is associated with better memory, an effect attributed to multiple encodings and repeated elaboration of the new information. The benefits of elaboration are further augmented by self-referential strategies— namely, processing new information in ways that relate to the self (e.g., visualizing oneself using a novel object as opposed to visualizing the object alone). Several studies have shown that not only are cues related to the self richer, more highly interconnected, and more distinctive, but they also tend to be rehearsed more frequently, leading to successful memory retrieval.

Memory Retrieval Long-term memory retrieval refers to the process of accessing existing memories in a useful way. Successful memory retrieval is directly linked to the process of memory encoding in that access to long-term memories depends on the similarity between the cues used during retrieval and those present during encoding, as discussed earlier. Memory retrieval can be intentional (or explicit) and typically involves the recall (i.e., reproduction) of learned material as a response to a question or a cue or the recognition of whether a particular item has been encountered before.

Long-Term Memory: Processes

For example, responding with the definition of the mood congruency effect on an essay exam question would rely on recall processes, whereas answering a multiple-choice question on the topic would rely on recognition processes. In contrast, implicit memory retrieval occurs when there are no explicit memory prompts, and it typically involves access to long-term memories outside one’s awareness. For example, in repetition priming, exposure to a particular story increases the likelihood that words from that story will be recognized faster in a seemingly unrelated follow-up task. As Squire’s taxonomy of memory suggests, explicit and implicit memory retrieval depend on dissociable cognitive and neural systems, such that information that cannot be retrieved explicitly can nonetheless influence performance on implicit memory tasks. This distinction becomes evident in certain cases of amnesia or memory loss. Patients with retrograde amnesia have difficulty remembering information that occurred prior to their injury, whereas patients with anterograde amnesia have difficulty forming new memories following their injury. Interestingly, these deficits are observed only in explicit memory but not implicit memory tasks. In the latter, a patient’s performance typically remains intact. Models of Long-Term Memory Retrieval

An early, influential model of long-term memory was proposed by Allan M. Collins and M. Ross Quillian and focused primarily on the retrieval of semantic knowledge (i.e., one’s memory for facts). The model proposed that one’s knowledge of the world is organized hierarchically, forming a network of associations composed of nodes that represent ideas or concepts (structured from broad to specific) and links between those nodes indicating the relationship between them (e.g., dog is an animal). According to this model, memories are activated from node to node following this organizational hierarchy until an answer has been reached (e.g., the answer to the question Is a dog an animal?). Experiments measuring how long participants took to answer such questions provided some verification for this model. However, variability in memory retrieval across different items in a category (e.g., due to how typical an item is of

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the category), in addition to the difficulty the hierarchical model has in accounting for complex (i.e., not simple inclusion) relationships or false responses, limits its explanatory potential. An extension of the hierarchical model was proposed by John R. Anderson in the context of his adaptive control of thought (ACT) theory and its revision ACT*. According to this approach, activation spreads across networks of nodes and links. However, these are organized into more complex units of meaning or propositions that can account for a wide variety of memory phenomena, including facts and events. The model has largely been supported experimentally, with its main strength being its ability to address the retrieval of knowledge that is relevant to a given task. The parallel distributed processing (PDP) model of memory introduced by James L. McClelland and David E. Rumelhart offers a very different view of memory in that concept representations that pertain to both semantic and episodic information are distributed across multiple nodes, with the strength of the connections between them varying depending on context. The appeal of PDP models has increased because of their ability to capture complex cognitive phenomena and their compatibility with models of human brain function.

Prospective Memory Long-term memory processes do not pertain exclusively to the formation of and access to a record of past events. Indeed, one of the most fundamental aspects of memory is that it allows people to think about events in the future. This mental time travel toward planned future events is known as prospective memory. Prospective remembering is prevalent in everyday life— remembering a doctor’s appointment, picking up a friend at the airport, or remembering to take one’s high blood pressure medication are all instances of prospective memory. This aspect of memory has become the subject of experimental investigation. Contrary to retrospective retrieval processes that are typically achieved in response to an explicit memory cue, prospective retrieval can be achieved as a result of multiple mechanisms, including active monitoring and spontaneous retrieval, both of which

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emphasize the timing of a particular future event in addition to its content. These processes are the focus of current research, due to the potential detrimental consequences of prospective memory failures (e.g., for a patient’s health or for transportation safety). Evangelia G. Chrysikou See also Failure of Memory; Knowledge; Long-Term Memory: Structures; Memory as Reconstructive; Short-Term and Working Memory; Working Memory, Improvement of

Further Readings Baddeley, A. D., Eysenck, M., & Anderson, M. C. (2009). Memory. Hove, England: Psychology Press. Bjork, R. A. (2011). On the symbiosis of learning, remembering, and forgetting. In A. S. Benjamin (Ed.), Successful remembering and successful forgetting: A Festschrift in honor of Robert A. Bjork (pp. 1–22). London, England: Psychology Press. Kensinger, E. A. (2009). Emotional memory across the adult lifespan. New York, NY: Psychology Press. McClelland, J. L. (2011). Memory as a constructive process: The parallel-distributed processing approach. In S. Nalbantian, P. Matthews, & J. L. McClelland (Eds.), The memory process: Neuroscientific and humanistic perspectives (pp. 129–151). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Squire, L. R. (1986). Mechanisms of memory. Science, 232, 1612–1619. Tulving, E., & Craik, F. I. M. (Eds.). (2000). The Oxford handbook of memory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Long-Term Memory: Structures Long-term memory (LTM) refers to the manner in which the central nervous system stores information in a record of previous experience. Unlike short-term memory (STM) and working memory that can only store information temporarily over brief periods of time, LTM can store information indefinitely and often permanently. Several types of information can be stored in LTM, including experience, knowledge, and skills. Researchers often refer to these different types of memories as existing in different memory structures or systems.

This entry reviews declarative and nondeclarative memory structures and discusses the idea of prospective memory.

Background William James was one of the first psychologists to suggest that human memory is composed of structurally distinct subsystems when he wrote separate chapters on memory and habits in his Principles of Psychology. By the 1980s, the existence of multiple memory systems had become widely accepted. Researchers distinguished between different memory subsystems based on the nature of the information they stored, the method of acquisition and representation of that information, and the expression of that information through behavior. Several human-memory classification systems have been proposed. Memory structures were classified as declarative or nondeclarative memory structures depending on whether memory was expressible through language. This classification system is the most widely accepted across introductory psychology books.

Declarative Memory Declarative memory (also known as “explicit memory”) refers to the conscious memory for experiences and facts that can be intentionally remembered and verbally expressed. This memory structure is what most people have in mind when they think about human memory. Declarative memory models the external world and enables people to remember information such as what they had for dinner last night (episodic) or what the capital of China is (semantic). Declarative memory can be accessed accurately or inaccurately, thus leading to false memories. For example, one might think that the capital of China is Shanghai. Declarative memory is subdivided into two major subsystems: episodic and semantic memory. Episodic memory is defined as memory for events and is a record of personal experiences in which any event is remembered as an “episode.” These memories are unique in that they are not memories about facts but rather memories of the surrounding context of an event. Context includes time, place, sounds, smells, and emotions. One has to retrieve at least part of the context in order to retrieve the event. For instance, answering the

Long-Term Memory: Structures

question “What did you have for dinner last night?” may require the rememberer to recall the location where he or she went to dinner, who else was there, and what he or she chose to eat. Often, providing contextual information during memory search, such as whether the rememberer liked the dinner, might prompt more details about the episode. It is currently accepted that the emotional context of an event is a very important factor in the formation of episodic memories. For instance, the strength of emotional engagement associated with an event enables most people to remember where they were when they heard about the attack at the World Trade Center on 9/11. Memory of salient, emotional events is known as flashbulb memory. Semantic memory represents the general knowledge a person has about the world. It includes memory of common facts, concepts, ideas, and higher level knowledge about word meaning, schemas, and scripts. This knowledge is mostly independent of personal experience as well as the context it was learned in. Semantic memory is the system that enables a person to answer that Beijing is the capital of China without specifically remembering when and where this information was first acquired. Unlike most subdivisions of memory, semantic memory is well sustained over time and exhibits a slower decline with age. It is important to note that the two types of explicit memory are not independent entities. The way people acquire new knowledge and create semantic memories is through their experiences. Semantic memories are initially episodic memories. Thus, episodic memory supports semantic memory. Over time, a gradual transition occurs through which context is stripped from episodic memories so that the factual information is more readily available. On the other hand, making sense of one’s experiences requires the knowledge stored in semantic memory. Episodic and semantic memories constantly interact with each other to help the individual make sense of the world.

Nondeclarative Memory Nondeclarative memory (also known as “implicit memory”) is the second subsystem of LTM. Implicit memory is thought to unconsciously influence behavior by using past experience to help people remember information without bringing it into

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awareness. Unlike declarative memory, nondeclarative memory is neither accurate nor inaccurate but dispositional. This type of memory is most often expressed through performance and not overt retrieval. For example, it is the nondeclarative memory system that enables a person to ride a bike or send a text message. It is divided into three subsystems: procedural memory, priming, and conditioning. Procedural memory is “how-to” knowledge. It allows a person to perform a specific physical task, such as brushing one’s teeth or tying a shoelace. Importantly, procedural memory allows the carrying out of a previously learned task without having to constantly recall either episodic or semantic memories. Through practice, learning, and repetition, new motor skills form procedural memories that later become automated motor behaviors. Priming refers to an implicit memory effect in which exposure to a stimulus influences later responses to that stimulus. Research on priming flourished after David Meyer and Roger Schvaneveldt demonstrated that a word (e.g., dream) is recognized more quickly after having been primed with a semantically related word (e.g., sleep) than with a semantically unrelated word. Consider the case of someone who just purchased a new car and begins to notice more frequently that other people are driving the same model. Priming effects can also have serious consequences. For example, visual media exposure to alcohol consumption can prime alcohol consumption by the viewer. The third subsystem of nondeclarative memory is classical conditioning. It refers to the formation of an association between environmental stimuli. For instance, although hearing the song of the ice cream truck means nothing to a child initially, he or she gradually begins to associate it with ice cream. Later, hearing the song of the ice cream truck makes the child’s mouth water and brings a sudden craving for ice cream. Classical conditioning is implicit because it involves learned behaviors that are directly evoked by the environmental stimuli and do not require conscious remembering.

Important Open Questions Although the distinction between declarative and nondeclarative memory has been influential, there exists no generally agreed-on classification system for human memory. Researchers continue to

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explore different memory structures as they seek a unified taxonomy of memory. Research has also focused on temporal subdivisions of memory. In 1984, although emphasizing the importance of “remembering to remember,” John Harris alternatively classified LTM, based on the temporal direction of memories, into retrospective and prospective memory. Retrospective memory is what most people mean when they think about memory. It refers to memory for something that was learned or experienced in the past. Retrospective memory includes episodic, semantic, and procedural memories. Conversely, prospective memory ­ is memory for the future. Specifically, prospective memory enables a person to remember to perform an intended action at the appropriate time in the future. Simple, everyday examples of prospective memory are taking a pill at the appropriate time or meeting a friend for lunch. These two forms of memory are not completely separate. Retrospective memory is a necessary component of prospective memory. One needs to be able to remember the time or location for an upcoming action, as well as the action to be performed. This is referred to as the retrospective component of prospective memory. The prospective component is identifying the right future context (e.g., time and location) for the intended action. Additional memory subdivisions have been suggested that are primarily distinguished by the type of information they store. Autobiographical memory refers to memory about one’s own experiences, and although it is similar to episodic memory, it stores only information that is directly connected to the individual. Emotional memory is another subdivision that has been extensively investigated. It refers to memory for exceptionally emotional events. These memories can be consciously available, but they also elicit a strong, unconscious reaction that is often physiological. Therefore, emotional memories implicate both the declarative and ­nondeclarative subsystem. Often, they are referred

to as flashbulb memories. However, flashbulb memories are memories for salient events, which can include emotional events but can also encompass important historic events that did not necessarily elicit a strong emotional reaction in the individual. It should be evident that despite extensive investigations, there exists no agreed-on, comprehensive classification system for memory structures. Neuroimaging techniques have allowed researchers to localize brain structures that appear to be linked to specific memory subtypes (e.g., emotional memories and the amygdala). Importantly, it is currently unclear whether different memory structures really exist, because all the aforementioned memory subtypes could simply be different manifestations of a single LTM system. Gene Brewer and Aikaterini Stefanidi See also Exceptional Memory and Expertise; Failure of Memory; Heuristics for Memory and Decision Making; Long-Term Memory: Processes; Memory as Reconstructive; Nonvisual Memory; Short-Term and Working Memory; Working Memory, Improvement of

Further Readings Baddeley, A., Eysenck, M. W., & Anderson, M.C. (2009). Memory. New York, NY: Psychology Press. Conway, M. A., & Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. (2000). The construction of autobiographical memories in the selfmemory system. Psychological Review, 107(2), 261–288. Harris, J. E. (1984). Remembering to do things: A forgotten topic. In J. E. Harris & P. E. Morris (Eds.), Everyday memory, actions and absentmindedness (pp. 71–92). London, England: Academic Press. McDaniel, M. A., & Einstein, G. O. (2007). Prospective memory: An overview and synthesis of an emerging field. London, England: Sage. Tulving, E. (1985). How many memory systems are there? American Psychologist, 40, 385–398.

The SAGE Encyclopedia of

Theory in Psychology

Editorial Board Editor Harold L. Miller, Jr. Brigham Young University

Editorial Board Susan T. Fiske Princeton University Kathy A. Hanisch Iowa State University Christopher H. Ramey University of Kansas Tomi-Ann Roberts Colorado College Kurt Salzinger Hofstra University Brent Slife Brigham Young University

The SAGE Encyclopedia of

Theory in Psychology 2

Edited by Harold L. Miller, Jr. Brigham Young University

FOR INFORMATION:

Copyright © 2016 by SAGE Publications, Inc.

SAGE Publications, Inc. 2455 Teller Road Thousand Oaks, California 91320 E-mail: [email protected]

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Description: Thousand Oaks, California : SAGE, [2016] | “A Sage reference publication.” | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016005365 | ISBN 978-1-4522-5671-9 (hardcover: alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Psychology. Classification: LCC BF121 .S234 2016 | DDC 150.3—dc23 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2016005365

Acquisitions Editor: Andrew Boney

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Developmental Editor: Carole Maurer Reference Systems Manager: Leticia Gutierrez Production Editor: David C. Felts Copy Editor: Linda Gray Typesetter: Hurix Systems Pvt. Ltd. Proofreaders: Caryne Brown, Scott Oney Indexer: Julie Grayson Cover Designer: Candice Harman Marketing Manager: Kay Stefanski

16 17 18 19 20 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents Volume 2 List of Entries   vii Entries M 525 S 819 N 589 T 929 O 619 U 945 P 635 V 949 Q 777 W 967 R 785 Appendix A: A Propaedeutic Chronology   975 Appendix B: Resource Guide to Scholarly Journals and Professional Associations   977 Appendix C: Bibliography   985 Index  1033

List of Entries Achievement Motivation Addiction Adolescent Development, Theories of Adulthood Aggression and Violence Altruism Altruism and Sociality Ancient and Medieval Sources of Therapy Ancient and Premodern Theories of Personality Animal Consciousness Anxiety Disorders Applied Behavior Analysis Artificial Intelligence Attention Attitude Formation and Change Attraction Auditory Perception Auditory System

Cognition and Language Cognitive Behavioral Therapies Cognitive Development Cognitive Evolution Cognitive Illusions Cognitive Neuroscience Cognitive Therapies Communication and Language Concepts and Language Consciousness, Categories of Consciousness, Disorders of Consciousness, Functions of Consciousness, Origins of Consciousness and the Unconscious Consumer Psychology Contemporary Trends in Psychotherapy Cooperation Coping Strategies Creativity Cross-Cultural Methods of Research Cultural Evolution Cultural Psychology Culture, Origins of Culture and Cognition Culture and Development Culture and Personality Culture and Psychopathology Culture and Social Relations Culture and the Dialogical Self

Bandura, Albert Behavior Therapies Behavioral Development Behavioral Economics Behavioral Health Behavioral Perspectives on Psychopathology Behavioral Theories of Personality Behaviorism Big Five Model and Lexical Trait Theory Binet’s Tests Biological Constraints on Learning Brain and Consciousness Brain and Intelligence Brain and Nervous System: Macroarchitecture Brain and Nervous System: Microarchitecture

Darwin, Charles Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Dissociative Disorders Dreams Drive and Motivation in the Brain

Cancer. See Psychosocial Factors and Cancer Childhood Chronic Illness, Psychological Aspects of Classical Conditioning Close Relationships

Eating and Drinking Ekman’s Theory of Basic Emotions Embodied Cognition vii

viii   List of Entries

Embodied Grounding Emotion, Detection of Emotion, Evolution of Emotion, Expression of Emotion, Theories of Emotion and Culture Emotion and Motivation Emotion and Scientific Reasoning Emotional Disorders Emotional Intelligence Emotions, Universality of Employee Motivation Employee Satisfaction Epigenetics Epistemology and Sensation Erikson’s Theory of Psychosocial Development Ethics of Therapy Event Perception Evidence-Based Therapy Evolutionary Psychological Perspectives on Human Nature, Critical Evaluation of Evolutionary Psychology Exceptional Memory and Expertise Existential Theories of Personality Extended Mind Factor Analysis and Personality Theory Failure of Memory Feminist Approaches to Psychology and Gender Flynn Effect Freud’s Psychosexual Stage Theory of Personality Frontal Lobe Functions

Group Processes Group Selection Gustatory System Habits Hamilton, W. D. Health Psychology Heightened Consciousness Hermeneutics and Developmental Psychology Heuristics for Memory and Decision Making Historical Roots of Theories of Psychopathology Homeostasis Human Agency Human Factors in Organizations Human Information Processing Human Nature Humanistic Theories of Personality Humanistic Theories of Psychopathology Hypnosis Individuality Versus Collectivity Intellectual Disability Intelligence, Environmental Influences on Intelligence, Evolution of Intelligence, Heritability of Intelligence and Individualism Intelligence and Schooling Intelligence Testing Intelligence Testing and Ethnicity Intergroup Behavior International Classification of Diseases Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Motivation Job Analysis

Gender, Evolutionary Perspectives on Gender and Cognition Gender and Culture Gender and Emotion Gender and Language Gender and Sex Gender and Violence Gender Development Gender Identity Gender Roles Gender Stereotypes General Aggression Model Gestalt Psychology Grammar, Psychology of Grief and Bereavement

Kinesthetic System Knowledge Kohlberg, Lawrence Language, Evolution of Language, Interaction, and Culture Language and Development Language Development Language Disorders Law and Psychology Law of Effect Leadership Long-Term Memory: Processes Long-Term Memory: Structures

List of Entries   ix

Mating Strategy Evolution and Development Measurement of Intelligence Measuring Treatment Outcome Medical Therapies Medicalization of Psychopathology Meditation and Relaxation Memory as Reconstructive Metatheoretical Issues in Personality Psychology Mixed Methods Mixed-Method Philosophies Mood Disorders Moral Development Morality and Moral Emotions Motivation and Cognition Motivation and Culture Motivation and Personality Motor Development Multiple Intelligences Music Perception Natural Selection Nature Versus Nurture Needs Neurodevelopmental Disorders Neuroendocrine System Neuroethics Neuropsychology Neuroscience as One-Sided Dualism Neurotransmitters and Neuromodulators Nonvisual Memory Objectivity in Diagnosis Occipital Lobe Functions Olfactory System Operant Conditioning Organizational Climate and Culture Pain Parent-Offspring Relations Parietal Lobe Functions Passion Pavlov’s Legacy Perception and Art Perception and Cognition Perception and Culture Perception and Epistemology Perception and Language Perception and Motivation Perceptual Contrast

Perceptual Development Perceptual Disorders Perceptual Illusions Performance Management Personality, Heritability of Personality, Measurement of Personality Development Personality Disorders Personality Testing Personality Traits Versus Situations Personality Types Versus Personality Traits Personnel Development Personnel Evaluation Personnel Selection Phenomenological, Existential, and Hermeneutical Therapies Phonology Piaget’s and the Neo-Piagetian Theories of Cognitive Development Pinker on Language Placebo Effect Play Positive Psychology and Human Frailty Prenatal Development Problem Solving Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Personality Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Psychopathology Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Therapies Psycholinguistics Psychological Wellness and Well-Being Psychoneuroimmunology Psychopathology and Stress Psychophysics Psychosocial Factors and Cancer Psychotherapy and Individualism Punishment Qualitative Research Quantitative Research Reading Process, Models of Reasoning and Decision Making Reinforcement Relational Theory Rescorla-Wagner Model Research Design Research Methods in Health Psychology Research Methods in Neuroscience

x   List of Entries

Schizophrenia Self Self-Control Self-Determination Self-Esteem Semantics, Psychology of Sensory Disorders Sensory Transduction Sex Sex Reassignment Sexual Selection Short-Term and Working Memory Signal Detection Theory Single-Subject Research Designs Skinner’s Legacy Sleep Disorders Sleep Stages and States Sleep: Functions Social Cognition Social Construction Social Emotions Social Factors in Health Social Influence Social Motives Social Neuroscience Social Psychology: Is It Truly Social? Social Role Theory Spirituality

Statistics in Psychology Stigma Stimulus Control Stress and Gender Stress and Resilience to Life Challenge Stress Syndromes Stressors and Stress Syntax, Psychology of Systems and Organizations Temporal Lobe Functions Terror Management Theory Time Perspective Theory Training and Personnel Development Triarchic Intelligence Unconscious Motivation Values Verbal Behavior Vestibular System Visual Perception Visual System Watson, J. B. Workforce Psychology Working Memory, Improvement of

M The distinction between fast and slow life histories is a relative one. Although some species employ faster or slower life history strategies than others, there are relative differences in investment in shortterm versus long-term mating within individual species, as well. For example, although insects are much faster strategists than humans, some humans are faster strategists than other humans. In humans, a host of differences distinguish fast from slow life history strategists. One is the timing of pubertal maturation and the onset of sexual behavior. Some individuals experience earlier puberty and initiate sexual activity at an earlier age, which leads to earlier reproduction and more frequent turnover of sexual partners. The social costs of teenage pregnancy and sexually transmitted infection cannot be overstated, but the biological benefits of fast life histories are often overlooked. Slow life history strategists experience a later onset of pubertal maturation and when they do initiate sexual activity are prone to monogamy and later reproduction. So, for example, when slow life history strategists do engage in sexual activity, they are often conscientious about issues of contraception and the forgoing of immediate reproduction in favor of educational and vocational development. Although mating strategies are highly heritable (i.e., the population-wide differences in the propensity to engage in a short-term versus a longterm mating strategy are substantially accounted for by genetic differences between individuals), there is evidence that an organism’s developmental environment affects its sexual maturation.

Mating Strategy Evolution and Development Mating strategies fall along a spectrum ranging from short-term, quantity-centered reproduction at one end, to long-term, quality-centered reproduction at the other. Albeit simplistic, this division between short-term and long-term mating strategies can aid in understanding the variety of sexual behaviors and relationships that humans and nonhumans practice. This entry discusses human mating behavior in terms of short-term and long-term strategies for reproduction.

The Childhood-to-Adolescence Transition Short-term mating strategies are those in which organisms apportion most of their metabolic resources toward the production of numerous offspring, without much left for parenting. Long-term mating strategies are characterized by heavy investment in the production and parental care of a small number of offspring. In the jargon of evolutionary biology, organisms that invest more in immediate reproduction and in the pursuit of multiple sexual partners (tending to practice a short-term mating strategy) are said to be employing a “fast life history strategy,” whereas organisms that invest more heavily in growth, learning, longterm mate acquisition, and parenting (tending to practice a long-term mating strategy) are said to be practicing a “slow life history strategy.” 525

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For example, girls who come from father-absent homes often experience an earlier onset of menarche (menstrual cycle initiation) The hypothesized reason is that female sexual development has evolved to be context dependent, such that when a girl’s social environment includes men who are not likely to exhibit long-term romantic commitment or paternal behaviors (as indicated by father absence), a hormonal switch triggers early puberty and the development of a short-term mating strategy—a reasonable reproductive strategy in such an environment. In contrast, when a girl experiences paternal care and resource investment, she is physiologically primed for later sexual development and a higher probability of finding a committed mate for herself and a devoted father for her future children. As boys enter adrenarche—a stage characterized by the influx of adrenal hormones and occurring during the juvenile transition—they display an increase in typically “male” behaviors, such as rough-and-tumble play and hierarchy negotiation. Although the developmental characteristics of male mating strategies is a product of both genetic and nongenetic factors (e.g., it may be that boys who experience an avoidant style of attachment to caregivers might be more likely to transfer such an attachment style to their romantic relationship partners in adulthood), given a species-typical environment, individual differences in aggression (which is a proxy indication of investment in a short-term mating strategy) largely result from genetic differences. For example, although a pair of boys might show similar rates of aggression in early childhood, one of the boys might exhibit more aggression because of his specific genetic makeup once adrenarche is initiated. Just as a host of genes are activated as a result of the influx of androgen and estrogen hormones during the pubertal period, so are a host of genes activated by the influx of adrenal hormones during a child’s (whether a boy or girl) juvenile transition. It is not yet known how each of the activated genes contributes to the developing phenotype, but it is likely that such effects include boys’ increasing pugnacity and competitiveness and girls’ increasing interests in child care and indirect aggression toward other girls in the form of gossip or social exclusion. In general, the evidence indicates that

specific mating strategies, whether fast or slow, short-term or long-term, are initiated during either adrenarche or puberty. Specific influences on the timing and characteristics of mating strategy development are ongoing areas of investigation.

Adult Mating Strategies The mating strategies that are initiated during late childhood and early adolescence come to fruition during adulthood. Some men and women engage in short-term mating strategies (i.e., they invest in immediate reproduction and more promiscuous sexual habits), whereas other men and women engage in long-term mating strategies (i.e., they invest in long-term physical and social stability and monogamous parenting). However, there are average differences between the sexes as well. Women are more likely, on average, to invest in a long-term mating strategy than are men. According to parental investment theory, the sex with the larger minimum mandatory investment in offspring (in mammals, this is usually females, as indicated by their mandatory investment in gestation and lactation) will be the choosier sex when it comes to mate selection. Women risk their reproductive future by having children with men who are either of low quality (whether due to genetic abnormalities, illnesses, or undesirable traits) or who are unable or unwilling to provide resources for the woman and her offspring. In short, being picky when it comes to mates constrains the extent to which women can invest in a short-term mating strategy. Men are not as constrained by the costs of reproduction as are women because their mandatory minimum investment in reproduction is the few minutes that it takes for them to copulate. Therefore, it was more reproductively advantageous for ancestral men to engage in a short-term mating strategy than it was for ancestral women. Whether such a strategy is adaptive in modern environments is debatable, but the fact that men, on average, are more likely to express a willingness to engage in casual sex, are more likely to fantasize about having sex with multiple and anonymous partners, and generally, have a higher sex drive than women suggests that men’s sexual behaviors are still under the influence of their ancestral past.

Mating Strategy Evolution and Development

Although there are heritable dispositional influences on the extent to which individuals adopt one strategy over another, there is also evidence for contextual effects on individuals’ mating decisions and on the characteristics they find attractive in potential mates. For example, women’s preferences for masculine and dominant men are especially heightened during the fertile phase of their ovulatory cycle. Specifically, when evaluating potential short-term mates, women report an increased preference for more socially dominant and physically masculine men during the fertile phase. Furthermore, women who are mated to unattractive boyfriends or spouses are more likely to have a roving eye during the fertile phase. The reason for this shift is the reproductive benefits that ancestral women received by mating with men who possessed good genes and healthy bodies. Not only are the women more likely to bear healthy children, but the children are more likely to be attractive and, thus, to attract mates and pass on their parents’ genes. Conversely, when a woman is not ovulating, partner characteristics such as kindness, agreeableness, and a propensity to be a good father might secure her commitment to her longterm partner. Just as women sometimes engage in a shortterm mating strategy, men are sometimes prone to valuing commitment and fatherhood over promiscuity. This is not always by choice, however, as less dominant and physically attractive men are less able to attract short-term sexual partners than more dominant and physically attractive men are. What less sexually attractive men can offer, however, is commitment in the form of investment as a long-term mate and father. Therefore, in societies in which there are fewer women than men, men are more likely to offer long-term commitment as a selling point when attempting to attract women. Because men are less likely to find a sexual partner when there are fewer potential sexual partners, if they do find a mate, men are more likely to provide long-term commitment in order to prevent relationship dissolution. Another context-dependent factor that influences men’s and women’s adoption of either of the two mating strategies is age. Younger individuals are more likely to adopt a short-term mating strategy. As individuals mature and the prospect of forming

527

stable, lifelong commitments increases, they are more likely to adopt a long-term mating strategy. Evidence also indicates that a man’s testosterone level, which contributes to aggressiveness and sex drive (and, hence, to a predilection for shortterm mating) is sensitive to context. For example, with increasing degrees of romantic commitment (e.g., being in a long-term relationship, being married, having children), a man experiences corresponding decreases in his baseline testosterone level. The reason for this change stems from the ultimately incompatible nature of a short-term versus a long-term mating strategy. If a man were to engage in both, he might not succeed in either. For example, a man cannot be a watchful and caring father at the same time he is going to a bar or a strip club (though this does not preclude individuals from adopting a dual mating strategy whereby their sexual behavior changes in different contexts). Therefore, men’s testosterone decreases to enable them to engage in activities associated with a long-term, parenting-oriented reproductive strategy—that is, attending to children’s nurturance-eliciting cuteness, changing their diapers, cooking, cleaning, and forming a loving attachment to a long-term partner. Similarly, when a man experiences a victory in a competitive task against another man, his testosterone level rises. Conversely, if he experiences a loss, his testosterone level decreases. That these competitioninduced shifts in testosterone might be related to sex drive is suggested by studies of pornography viewership following presidential or congressional elections. Specifically, states whose male residents overwhelmingly voted for a winning candidate in U.S. elections showed a rise in pornography viewership, whereas states whose male inhabitants overwhelmingly voted for a losing candidate showed a decrease. This phenomenon suggests that male sexual motivation might be reserved for contexts where it is most likely to lead to reproductive success. Thus, ancestral men who were defeated by their reproductive rivals might have down-regulated their aggressiveness and sex drive to save themselves from the costs of pursuing uninterested women or being defeated by bigger and stronger rivals. With enough losses, perhaps a man would have forgone a short-term mating strategy

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altogether and focused on the formation of a longterm romantic relationship.

Mating Strategies and Mate Selection Although there is much overlap between the characteristics that humans seek in both short-term and long-term sexual partners, there are also some differences. For example, although women place a premium on a man’s social status and resource holdings when seeking either short-term or longterm partners, they are more likely to value immediate investment from their short-term partners than from their long-term partners. Presumably, this is because the potential costs of short-term mating (e.g., in time spent away from the mating market due to pregnancy and child rearing) must be outweighed by other factors, such as an immediate inflow of material or financial resources from their short-term mates. The costs of short-term mating might likewise be outweighed by the genetic quality of a woman’s short-term partner, as gauged by such characteristics as height, symmetry, masculinity, and athleticism. That is, if a short-term mate cannot contribute either material or financial resources, a woman might still have sex with him if he can bequeath his health and attractiveness to the children that he sires with her. Whether seeking short-term or long-term mates, men put a premium on a partner’s physical attractiveness. A woman’s lack of social status and resource holdings is a lesser barrier to successful conception and gestation than is her fertility (at least in environments where a woman is likely to receive assistance in child-rearing from mates, family members, or friends). Consequently, a man’s reproductive priority is to select mates who display fertility cues as embodied in physical attractiveness. Women’s physical attractiveness is gauged similarly across the world, among tribal hunter-gatherers as among people residing in urban-industrial centers. Specifically, women are judged attractive if they possess symmetry, femininity, a low waist-to-hip ratio, and signs of youth and health, such as unwrinkled and unblemished skin and lustrous hair. Men are more likely to compromise their preferences for beauty in short-term mating contexts, but when seeking long-term mates, men tend to prefer partners who are kind and intelligent (in addition to

being physically attractive). A geographical region’s food availability can influence the specifics of men’s mate preferences. In nutritionally scarce environments, for example, men tend to prefer women who have more body fat than would be ideal in an environment filled with supermarkets and fast-food restaurants. Individuals can adopt reproductive behaviors that are not limited to either investing in an exclusively short-term or an exclusively long-term mating strategy. For example, some might pursue one type of strategy when they are younger, and switch to a different strategy when they are older, whereas others might pursue different strategies in different social contexts (e.g., at home with family versus at a bar with friends). Many of the complexities of human mating behaviors are nevertheless explicable when tracked along the short-term versus longterm mating dimension. Gregory Gorelik and Todd K. Shackelford See also Adolescent Development, Theories of; Adulthood; Attraction; Close Relationships; Culture and Social Relations; Evolutionary Psychology; Evolutionary-Psychological Perspectives on Human Nature, Critical Evaluation of; Gender, Evolutionary Perspectives on; Human Nature; Nature Versus Nurture; Parent-Offspring Relations; Sexual Selection; Social Role Theory

Further Readings Buss, D. M. (1989). Sex differences in human mate preferences: Evolutionary hypotheses tested in 37 cultures. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 12, 1–49. Del Giudice, M., Angeleri, R., & Manera, V. (2009). The juvenile transition: A developmental switch point in human life history. Developmental Review, 29, 1–31. Figueredo, A. J., Vásquez, G., Brumbach, B. H., Schneider, S. M., Sefcek, J. A., Tal, I. R., . . . Jacobs, W. J. (2006). Consilience and life history strategy: From genes to brain to reproductive strategy. Developmental Review, 26, 243–275. Rowe, D. C. (2002). On genetic variation in menarche and age at first sexual intercourse: A critique of the Belsky-Draper hypothesis. Evolution and Human Behavior, 23, 365–372. Schmitt, D. P. (2005). Sociosexuality from Argentina to Zimbabwe: A 48-nation study of sex, culture, and strategies of human mating. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28, 247–311.

Measurement of Intelligence

Measurement

of Intelligence

The observation that people differ in intelligence is not a recent one. Over 2,000 years ago, in the Odyssey, Homer remarked, “So it is that gods do not give all men the gifts of grace—neither good looks nor intelligence nor eloquence.” However, as a scientific enterprise, intelligence testing is little more than a century old. This entry discusses how intelligence in humans is measured and how the results are used in different settings and for different purposes. The first standardized test of intelligence was developed in the early 1900s by the French psychologist Alfred Binet (1857–1911), who was commissioned by the Education Ministry in France to develop a test to identify children  ­ in  need of special assistance in school. Binet identified judgment as the core faculty of intelligence. Accordingly, he and his collaborator, Théodore Simon, developed a test with a series of problems to assess the quality of children’s judgment. In one of the easiest problems, the child was presented with half a chocolate bar and a block of wood to see whether he or she would make a distinction between the objects before trying to eat one or the other. In one of the most difficult problems, the child was asked, “Before making a decision about a very important affair—what must one do?” The Binet-Simon test was translated into English by Stanford University professor Lewis Terman (1877–1956), who incorporated the German ­psychologist William Stern’s concept of the intelligence quotient (IQ) as a way of expressing a ­person’s score on the test. Now in its fifth edition, the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales and other standardized intelligence tests are used for a variety of critical purposes—from diagnosing ­ learning disabilities and neurological disorders to determining whether a person is competent to stand trial in a court of law to deciding whom to admit to college or hire for a job. In states in the United States that have capital punishment, intelligence tests are even used to determine whether a person is eligible for execution, as the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 2002 that it is unconstitutional to execute persons with

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mental retardation (now referred to as intellectual disability), which is, in part, diagnosed based on IQ score.

Intelligence Testing Although contemporary psychologists disagree about the specifics of intelligence, virtually all define it in terms of mental functioning—that is, as a property of the mind. There is also consensus about the sorts of mental activities that intelligence encompasses, including learning from experience, solving problems, and adapting to one’s circumstances. An intelligence test is a psychological instrument that is used to elicit and record observable behavior that reflects these mental activities. The questions—or “items”—on intelligence tests have two basic characteristics: They make minimal physical demands, and they have a correct answer. A prototypical example is a question on a vocabulary test in which the goal is to identify an alternative that is most similar in meaning to a target word. For example: RECONDITE (A) Refurbished (B) Obscure (C) Famished (D) Educated

There is a correct answer (B), which can be indicated by the test taker with a verbal or written response or a key press. Intelligence tests come in two major formats: individual tests and group tests. Individual tests are administered to one test taker at a time by a trained test administrator. The Stanford-Binet is one example; the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) is another. Developed by the clinical psychologist David Wechsler (1896–1981) in the 1930s, the original WAIS provided a verbal IQ based on subtests with linguistic content and a performance IQ based on subtests with nonlinguistic content. The current version of the test, the WAIS-IV, provides scores reflecting verbal comprehension, perceptual reasoning, working memory, and processing speed. The Wechsler Intelligence

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Measurement of Intelligence

Scale for Children (WISC) is the companion test for children. Group tests are administered to multiple test takers at a time. An example is the Wonderlic Personnel Test, named after its creator, the industrial psychologist Eldon F. Wonderlic. With a 12-minute time limit, the Wonderlic includes 50 items designed to measure mathematical, verbal, and reasoning abilities and is widely used for employee selection and classification. (The National Football League administers the Wonderlic to entrants in its annual Scouting Combine, a weeklong event in which college football players hoping to play professionally perform mental and physical tests.) Another example is the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), which millions of high school students take each year as part of the college application process. Although the SAT, like its counterpart, the ACT, is marketed as a test of scholastic aptitude rather than intelligence, scores on it correlate very highly with scores on intelligence tests. Intelligence Test Construction

Whether it is fair to use scores on an intelligence test to make critical decisions comes down to whether the test is properly constructed. The process, which can take years and millions of dollars to complete, involves four major steps. The first step is to develop a preliminary version of the test—a “beta” version—that includes test items that fit a definition of the specific factor the test is intended to measure. For example, if intelligence is defined as the ability to solve novel problems, then the test would include problems that can be assumed to be unfamiliar for the intended test takers, such as logic problems in which the test taker must provide the logical continuation of a series of digits—for example: 1 4 8 13 ___ (answer: 19). The second step is to administer the beta version of the test to a standardization sample—a sample that is representative of and thus accurately portrays the population for which the test is being designed. For example, if the goal is to design a test to assess intelligence in adults of all ages, then the standardization sample would include people between the ages of, say, 18 and 90, with roughly equal numbers of people across the age range.

The third step is to evaluate the psychometric properties of the test—its reliability and validity. Reliability refers to the accuracy of a measure and is assessed by testing correlations between scores on different sets of items (internal consistency reliability), such as odd versus even items, and by ­having participants take a test on two different occasions and testing the correlation between the scores (test-retest reliability). Validity refers to whether it measures what it is supposed to measure and is assessed by determining whether scores on the test predict the sorts of outcomes they should predict. The final step is to refine the beta version of the test, eliminating items that reduce its reliability and validity, replacing them with new items, and repeating the preceding steps until acceptable levels of reliability and validity are achieved.

Do Intelligence Tests Work? The question of whether intelligence tests work— whether they are valid—has generated a great deal of controversy in society. Critics of intelligence testing make two major arguments. The first is that scores on intelligence tests are essentially meaningless—that is, that they capture a narrow range of skills that have little, if any, relevance outside the test-taking situation. This argument is contradicted by extensive empirical evidence. Scores on intelligence tests predict a wide range of socially relevant outcomes to a statistically and practically significant degree, including income, job performance, academic achievement, and expertise in specific domains. They also predict health outcomes and even longevity. For example, in a large sample of over 2,000 individuals who initially took part in the Scottish Mental Survey of 1932 , Scottish researchers found that IQ at age 11 robustly predicted survival to old age; a 15-point IQ advantage at age 11 was associated with a 21% greater chance of living to the age of 76. Longitudinal follow-up studies of the original respondents have confirmed the relation between intelligence and longevity. The second argument against intelligence testing is that if intelligence tests measure anything at all, it is not intelligence but some other factor, such as socioeconomic status (SES). This argument is also contradicted by empirical evidence.

Measurement of Intelligence

That is, although scores on intelligence tests do correlate with a host of other factors, they predict outcomes even after influences of these factors are taken into account. For example, in a study of nearly 150,000 college students from 110 colleges and universities, statistically controlling for the students’ SES (reflecting parental education and income) had almost no impact on the sizable and statistically significant correlation between their scores on the SAT and their college grade point average (GPA). Correlations between intelligence test scores and longevity also persist after statistically controlling for SES. Advances in the Measurement of Intelligence

Although it is clear that intelligence tests are useful in predicting a wide range of outcomes, no intelligence test has perfect validity. That is, the correlations between intelligence test scores and other outcomes are nearly always found to be far from 1.0. For example, in large samples, the correlation between SAT score and college GPA is generally found to be no greater than 0.50. In relative terms, this is an impressive level of validity, because few (if any) variables have been found to have better validity. At the same time, there is room for improvement in intelligence testing. One approach to improving the prediction of real-world outcomes is to augment, or even replace, standardized intelligence tests with tests that are explicitly developed to capture cognitive or neurological factors (or both) that are believed to be important for particular outcomes. In a study of Navy personnel, a measure of the ability to continuously update the contents of working memory—a person’s mental workspace for simultaneously storing and processing information— added to the prediction of multitasking performance above and beyond the scores from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). In another study, a composite measure reflecting scores on tests of executive functioning, which is assumed to reflect the functioning of the prefrontal cortex, correlated moderately with supervisor ratings of employees in a manufacturing plant. There is also interest in reducing the adverse impact of intelligence tests. Adverse impact refers to a situation in which members of a minority

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group are disadvantaged because they are represented at a lower rate than members of other groups. It may occur when intelligence tests are used for selection in employment and academic admissions decisions, given that there are welldocumented group differences in scores on intelligence tests. On the theory that group differences in test scores reflect individual differences in testtaking sophistication, one approach to reducing adverse impact is to use tests of basic capacities, such as working memory, that are designed to minimize the use of strategies.

Significance No technology to develop from psychological research has had more impact on society than intelligence testing. There have been egregious misuses of intelligence tests in the past, as when non-English speaking immigrants arriving at Ellis Island in the early 1900s were labeled as “feebleminded” and denied entry to the United States based on scores on intelligence tests requiring fluency in English. Controversy surrounding the use of intelligence tests has arisen from misunderstandings about the available evidence and its implications for the fairness of intelligence testing. Scores on intelligence tests predict outcomes far removed from the test-taking situation, even after controlling for confounding variables such as socioeconomic status, and exhibit similar levels of validity for these outcomes within different groups of test takers. Goals for future research are to augment intelligence tests to improve their validity while minimizing their adverse impact on disadvantaged groups. David Z. Hambrick See also Cognitive Development; Intellectual Disability; Intelligence, Environmental Influences on; Intelligence, Heritability of; Intelligence and Individualism; Intelligence and Schooling; Intelligence Testing; Intelligence Testing and Ethnicity; Multiple Intelligences; Triarchic Intelligence

Further Readings Deary, I. J. (2001). Intelligence: A very short introduction. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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Measuring Treatment Outcome

Deary, I. J., Whalley, L. J., & Starr, J. M. (2009). A lifetime of intelligence. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Hunt, E. (2011). Human intelligence. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Jensen, A. (1998). The g factor: The science of mental ability. Westport, CT: Praeger.

also generates quality assurance data that separate the professional from the charlatan or huckster. The latter relies on selected case testimonials to justify using marginal treatments. By contrast, the professional therapist understands the ethical obligation to provide objective evaluation of the effects of services.

Measuring Treatment Outcome

Moving From Theoretical Constructs to Operational Definitions

Measuring treatment outcome is an important aspect of the scientific study of the effects of psychological interventions for persons suffering with mental health problems. It provides a means of turning subjective experience into quantifiable degrees of suffering. Measuring treatment outcome is a specialized area of psychological testing. Such testing has many purposes, such as quantifying the ability to spell or to solve math problems or indentifying individuals to be admitted to law school. In the specialized area of measuring treatment outcomes, researchers are less interested in measuring human abilities than they are in measuring mental health. Thousands of measures have been created for this purpose. All define mental health and mental dysfunction, attempt to quantify it, and then apply this knowledge to estimate the degree of benefit patients derive from psychological interventions. This entry discusses ways in which mental health functioning is measured and treatment outcomes are assessed. Creating measures of mental health functioning allows researchers to quantify the nature and degree of psychological disturbance in order to study a wide variety of topics ranging from estimating how many individuals in a population experience a mental disorder in a given year or over a lifetime to estimating how many sessions of treatment may be needed to substantially reduce suffering to normal levels. Not only is standardized outcome measure­ment a requirement of scientific rigor, but measurement of treatment outcome is also an ethical obligation. Empirical evidence about the effects of interventions, whether positive or negative, provides a basis for improving them. When used with the individual client, standardized outcome assessment

The measures used to quantify mental health functioning grow out of ideas about mental health and wellness versus mental dysfunction and psychopathology. With regard to this later construct, the disciplines of psychology and psychiatry have made progress toward defining and describing disorders, such as bipolar disorder, unipolar depression, substance abuse disorder, and the like. Such disorders are best described as a complex pattern of symptoms with a co-occurrence common enough to suggest the presence of a syndrome. For example, depressive illness is manifested not only by depressed mood but also by loss of hope, loss of energy, poor appetite, difficulties with concentration, sleep disturbance, loss of sexual interest, indecision, helplessness, and other symptoms. Measures of depression typically quantify the degree of disturbance for each of these symptoms and report a total score that provides an estimate of the severity of depressive symptomology. When treatment is offered for depression, the score an individual attains on a measure of depression prior to treatment is expected to be lower at the end of treatment. Thus, the measurement of constructs is at the heart of the ability to ascertain whether a treatment is working. Classical test theory (CTT) has been the foundation for measurement theory since the 1930s. The conceptual foundations, assumptions, and extensions of the basic premises of CTT have allowed the development of excellent psychometrically sound scales. For example, domain sampling theory, one type of CTT, assumes that the items that have been selected for any one test are just a sample of items from a potentially infinite domain items. Domain sampling is the most common CTT for practical purposes because no test can contain all the possible items that could be created for the purpose of, say, measuring depression.

Measuring Treatment Outcome

In addition, CTT makes certain assumptions about the degree to which a test item measures a symptom of depression. Items are created and used with the assumption that a test score includes the true score but also some error. Thus, when constructs such as depression are measured, the interest is in the reliability (amount of error) of the test score as well as the degree to which it measures what it is intended to measure (its accuracy or validity). Extensive efforts to understand the psychometric qualities of a test are undertaken before such a test is used for treatment outcome research; that is, when a test or related assessment device is used, it is critical to ensure that it provides an accurate assessment of the construct of interest and that the test is actually measuring what it purports to measure. After a series of studies aimed at selecting and testing items that capture the essence of a construct of interest is completed, further studies are conducted to refine the interpretation of treatment outcome scores. CTT helps direct research toward questions of particular importance to measuring treatment outcomes. For example, when changes are not detected in an outcome measure, it is likely that either the treatment did not work or that the instrument was inadequate in detecting the changes that did occur. In psychotherapy outcome assessment, the ­sensitivity to change of an outcome measure refers to the degree to which it accurately reflects changes that occur following the patient’s participation in therapy. Therefore, sensitivity to change is directly related to the construct validity of the instrument (i.e., the extent to which the instrument measures what it is intended to measure). In an attempt to synthesize and build on the literature on change sensitivity, two criteria are essential: (a) Patient change indicated by the score on an item, a subscale score, or the total score of an outcome measure should occur in the theoretically proposed direction (most often, the change is considered to be reflective of patient improvement over the course of treatment); (b) the change indicated by the score indicates significantly more improvement in treated than in untreated individuals.

Reasons for Failures to Detect Change Though the aforementioned CTT-based methodology offers a means of assessing change sensitivity, it does not ascertain the factors underlying lack of

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change sensitivity. One possibility is that the measures may include items that are not relevant to the group under investigation. Another possibility is that measures containing items that are “categorically arranged” (e.g., yes–no or true–false) or that offer only a limited range of response options (e.g., a scale range from 0 to 2) may be scaled in units too gross to detect change. A third possibility is that measures may contain instructions not conducive to the detection of change. For example, an instrument that asks respondents to answer items according to how they have felt over an extended period of time (e.g., the past 6 months) is not likely to be useful in detecting changes resulting from interventions that have been delivered weekly over a brief period of time. A further possibility is that measures may contain items that assess factors that are relatively stable or that are not a feasible target of assessment (e.g., assessment of stable personality characteristics). Finally, measures may contain items that are susceptible to floor or ceiling effects and, therefore, limit the ability of the item to detect meaningful growth or deterioration.

An Example of Practical Application Michael Lambert and his colleagues wanted to measure mental health functioning for the purpose of evaluating and managing it in much the same way that physicians measure vital signs, such as blood pressure or blood sugar, to manage the treatment of heart disease or diabetes, for example. The management of psychological disturbance begins with a definition of mental health functioning. Adults who enter treatment, regardless of their specific diagnosis, experience symptoms of anxiety and depression, and it is important that a measure of mental health assess these symptoms. In addition, patients often also experience interpersonal problems (such as isolation and conflict) that they find very uncomfortable. No matter the kind of symptoms they experience, patients spend much of their time in treatment talking about their spouses, friends, parents, and intimate others. Most patients are also having difficulties in their social roles. In fact, impairment in this area of functioning is usually required to indicate the presence of a psychological disorder. Paid employment

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Measuring Treatment Outcome

is central to the social role construct, but it can also include the homemaking role or the role of student. Social role impairment has drastic effects on society and the family. After creating and selecting items that captured the degree of disturbance within the three domains described earlier, they developed a 45-item, selfreport scale that provided a total score based on all 45 items, as well as symptom distress, interpersonal relations, and social role subscale scores. Individuals who take this measure are asked to reflect back over the last week and to rate their functioning on a 5-point scale. For example, to measure symptom distress, patients rate items such as, “I feel hopeless about the future” (a depression item), or “I feel something bad is going to happen” (an anxiety item). Interpersonal relations items include, “I am satisfied with my relationship with others,” or “I feel lonely.” Social role items include, “I feel angry enough at work or school to do something I might regret,” or “I am not working or studying as well as I used to.” Items are rated from never (0)—I never felt lonely during the last week—to almost always (4). Higher scores on these scales are indicative of greater levels of psychological disturbance. Following development of the scale and research studies examining its psychometric qualities (such as, how reliable are the scores?), the measure was administered to separate samples of healthy and dysfunctional individuals. Knowing how well healthy individuals are feeling provides a contrast to how well patients are feeling and serves as one way to interpret a test score. A cutoff score for healthy/unhealthy functioning was established. Individuals who enter treatment typically report their level of functioning at the onset of treatment, thus allowing the clinician to know how it compares to the typical outpatient, inpatient, or patient who receives treatment at a community mental health center. It also is possible to estimate whether a given person is at the 99th percentile of a normal population (highly disturbed) or at the 10th percentile (unusually free of psychological pain). Because the scale was intended for use in monitoring and managing a patient’s response to treatment and to judge whether that response was adequate or problematic, the scale was given on a

weekly basis to individuals undergoing treatment in routine care settings. Statistical models of treatment response were developed to inform therapists and patients of whether the patient was at risk for treatment failure. The use of test scores for making such predictions was much more accurate than using clinicians’ predictions. This fact provides strong ­evidence for the value of formally measuring treatment outcomes. When the patient’s progress deviates from that of typical patients, treatment failure can be predicted, therapists and patients informed, treatment progress discussed, and steps taken to modify ongoing care. Such procedures are a substantial variation from typical mental health treatment, where monitoring the response to treatment occurs informally and without the use of standardized measures.

Criteria for Selecting Outcome Measures The development of selection criteria (i.e., the characteristics of instruments that lead to the most accurate measurement of patient change) for outcome measures has received increased attention. Because professional practices may come to rely heavily on the demonstration of measured effects of treatments, it is imperative that outcome measures provide the most accurate reflection of patient improvement. Some authors have proposed selection criteria aimed at measuring changes in the symptomatology associated with a specific disorder (e.g., major depressive disorder) or a major diagnostic category (e.g., personality disorders). Others have focused on the development of universally accepted selection criteria that can be applied to the evaluation of any outcome measure. Although there are differences between the selection criteria proposed, there appears to be considerable overlap as well. Synthesizing and building on the available literature suggests that the following 13 criteria consistently emerge as appropriate for selecting ­methods and measures of outcome: 1. Relevance to target group 2. Simple, teachable methods 3. Use of measures with objective referents 4. Use of multiple respondents

Measuring Treatment Outcome

5. Psychometric strengths and the availability of norms 6. Low costs of the measure relative to its use 7. Understanding by nonprofessional audiences, easy feedback, uncomplicated interpretation 8. Usefulness in clinical services 9. Compatibility with a variety of clinical theories and practices 10. The possibility of multiple administrations 11. Comprehensiveness 12. Ties to a diagnostic classification system (e.g., the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) 13. Sensitivity to change (i.e., the ability of an outcome measure to detect change following an intervention)

The importance of selecting one or more appropriate outcome measures in light of the ­target patient population cannot be overemphasized, as the success of the entire outcome measurement system is largely contingent on the measure used. Attention to the aforementioned criteria for outcome test selection, particularly the change sensitivity of a measure, increases the likelihood of selecting a measure that provides the most accurate reflection of patient outcome. Accurate assessment of patient outcome, in turn, allows clinicians to demonstrate treatment effectiveness more convincingly and alter treatment strategies if patients are nonresponsive to or deteriorating in treatment.

The Consequences of Measuring Treatment Outcomes Much of what is known about the effects of psychological treatment and psychoactive medication depends on the use of outcome measures. In highly controlled experimental conditions, researchers typically employ six or seven specific measures. Although the essential source of ratings is the patient’s view as captured by self-report scales, many other sources can be used. These often include objective-judge ratings; parent ratings (in the case of children); objective records, such as

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school records; arrest records; hospital readmission rates; urine analysis to test for drug use; and the like. Research findings from the use of formal measures make clear that psychological treatments are more effective than no treatment, that formal theory-based interventions surpass the effects of placebo treatments, that about 50% of patients return to a state of normal functioning after 18 sessions, and that the effects of treatment can be long lasting. The use of outcome measures also suggests that a multitude of different treatments are equally effective and that there is considerable variability in outcome depending on the specific therapist who delivers treatment. These findings suggest that the public can rest assured that the psychological treatments delivered by clinicians rest on a strong empirical foundation and can speed recovery and substantially improve mental health functioning.

Developments in Using Outcome Measures A trend in treatment outcome research is the increased emphasis on regularly monitoring or tracking the patient’s mental health “vital signs” throughout the treatment process. Regular monitoring of patient progress has, in addition to answering questions related to the general efficacy and effectiveness of treatment, allowed researchers to explore more sophisticated questions related to psychotherapy outcome. For example, by regularly monitoring patient mental health functioning throughout treatment, researchers have been able to better understand patterns of change in psychotherapy, as evidenced in the growing and evolving body of literature related to the dose–response relationship in psychotherapy. (How much therapy is enough? How early does change occur?) However, similar to what has historically occurred in studies involving the pre- and posttreatment assessment of outcome, researchers have not typically used data from studies that involved the regular monitoring of patient progress in real time. Although this is not a substantial concern in relation to the large number of patients who respond well to treatment and attain a positive outcome, it can be particularly problematic for the large minority of patients who proceed completely through a course of treatment and experience no

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Medical Therapies

change (approximately 30%–40%) or actually deteriorate (5%–15%). In fact, it has proven possible, given enough data, to identify expected changes in individuals who recover and those who do not and thereby inform therapists and patients that the treatment, as delivered, is not likely to produce positive outcomes. The use of outcome measures and caveats premised on them can substantially improve patient mental health functioning. Michael J. Lambert See also Behavior Therapies; Cognitive Behavioral Therapies; Cognitive Therapies; Contemporary Trends in Psychotherapy; Ethics of Therapy; Evidence-Based Therapy; Medical Therapies; Phenomenological, Hermeneutical, and Existential Therapies; Placebo Effect/Response; Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Therapies

Further Readings Aiken, L. R., & Groth-Marnat, G. (2006). Psychological testing and assessment (12th ed.). Boston, MA: Pearson. Lambert, M. J. (Ed.). Bergin and Garfield’s handbook of psychotherapy and behavior change (6th ed.). New York, NY: Wiley. Maruish, M. E. (Ed.). (2004). The use of psychological testing for treatment planning and outcome assessment (3rd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Ogles, B. M. (2013). Measuring change in psychotherapy research. In M. J. Lambert (Ed.), Bergin and Garfield’s handbook of psychotherapy and behavior change (6th ed., pp. 134–165). New York, NY: Wiley. Strupp, H. H., Horowitz, L., & Lambert, M. J. (Eds.). (1997). Measuring patient changes in mood, anxiety and personality disorders: Toward a core battery. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association Press.

Medical Therapies Medical therapies in psychology are those interventions for psychological disorders that directly affect a biochemical or physiological process in the brain. There are several different types of

medical therapies, although all are united by directly affecting brain function in some way. Medical therapies include drugs that affect the brain, electroconvulsive therapy, transcranial magnetic stimulation, and deep-brain stimulation are widely used to treat many psychological disorders, such as mood disorders, psychotic disorders, anxiety disorders, substance abuse disorders, and dementia. This entry briefly describes the medical therapies mentioned earlier. Treatment efficacy of the medical therapies used to treat psychological disorders varies between treatments, disorders, and people. Human use of exogenous substances to alter mental function dates has existed for centuries. The use of electroconvulsive therapy—the induction of a seizure to therapeutically alter brain function—and the mood-stabilizing properties of lithium were first reported in the mid-1900s. Since the 1950s, hundreds of drugs have been developed with the primary aim of treating psychological disorders.

Theoretical Foundations The theoretical foundations of medical therapies to treat psychological disorders rest on the assumption that some psychological disorders are associated with brain dysfunction. That is, a disordered biology is thought to be associated with the psychological disorder under treatment. Medical therapies are assumed to affect either the brain dysfunction itself or a related biological function to produce an improvement in the signs and symptoms characterizing the psychological disorder under treatment. Accordingly, the use of medical therapies to treat psychological disorders is considered to be a branch of medicine.

Types of Medical Therapies The types of individual therapies used to treat psychological disorders are extensive but can be classified as drugs or medications, electroconvulsive therapy, transcranial magnetic stimulation, and deep-brain stimulation. Drugs

Several categories of drugs are widely used in the treatment of psychological disorders. These

Medical Therapies

include antidepressants, antipsychotics, anxiolytic medication, mood stabilizers, stimulants, and drugs to slow the cognitive deterioration associated with dementia. Like all medications, the drugs used in the treatment of psychological disorders can cause adverse effects, which, like drug effectiveness, vary between drugs, disorders, and people. Antidepressants The antidepressants are a group of drugs united by evidence supporting their role in treating depression. Overall, the different antidepressants appear to be equally efficacious in alleviating depression, although treatment response can vary from person to person. Each class of antidepressant has a different presumed initial mechanism of drug action; ultimately, however, antidepressants are thought to influence gene activation, resulting in altered patterns of protein synthesis in brain cells. Monoamine-Oxidase Inhibitors. Among the ­earliest antidepressant drugs are the monoamineoxidase inhibitors, which appear to initiate therapeutic effects by inhibiting monoamine oxidase, an enzyme that breaks down neurotransmitters such as norepinephrine and serotonin into metabolic by-products and thus terminates the ­ action of these neurotransmitters. The monoamineoxidase inhibitors increase synaptic concentrations of norepinephrine and serotonin. Dietary restrictions and the potential for interactions with other drugs have limited the use of monoamine-oxidase inhibitors, although some newer monoamine-­ oxidase inhibitors have mechanisms of action enabling fewer dietary restrictions. Nonetheless, the clinical use of monoamine-oxidase inhibitors is generally reserved for people who have not adequately responded to other classes of ­ antidepressants. Tricyclic Antidepressants. The tricyclic antidepressants, like the monoamine-oxidase inhibitors, are among the earliest of the antidepressants. Their principal mechanism of  action is to block the transport of norepinephrine and serotonin back into the presynaptic neuron, thereby increasing serotonin or norepinephrine or both in the synapse. Once widely prescribed, they have potential for adverse effects has limited their clinical

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use. They continue to be used, however, for people who have not had an adequate response to other antidepressants. Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors. Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors exert their initial antidepressant effects by inhibiting the transport of serotonin into the presynaptic neuron and thereby increasing synaptic concentrations of serotonin. In addition to reuptake inhibition of serotonin, the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors have other pharmacological properties that differ from drug to drug. The adverse-effect profile of the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors differs from those of the monoamine-oxidase inhibitors and the tricyclic antidepressants. The selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors are widely prescribed. Other Antidepressants. Several other newer antidepressants are available that have different mechanism of action from the monoamine-oxidase inhibitors, the tricyclic antidepressants, and the  selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors. Some inhibit the presynaptic uptake of both norepinephrine and serotonin. Others inhibit the presynaptic uptake of norepinephrine and the neurotransmitter dopamine or increase the release of serotonin into the synapse and block certain types of serotonin receptors to achieve a more selective serotonin effect. Several of these newer antidepressants are widely used. Antipsychotics Although antipsychotic medications are used to treat psychosis that occurs in several types of illnesses, their main uses are in schizophrenia and related psychotic disorders and in bipolar disorders. There are two broad types of antipsychotics. First-Generation Antipsychotics. First-generation antipsychotics, sometimes referred to as typical antipsychotics or neuroleptics, antagonize the dopamine-2 receptor and thus decrease dopamine transmission in critical brain regions. Dopamine-2 antagonism is also associated with a variety of adverse effects, including movement disorders similar to those observed in Parkinson’s disease. The adverse effects of the first-generation antipsychotics and their incomplete efficacy in

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treating schizophrenia prompted the search for other antipsychotic agents. Second-Generation Antipsychotics. The secondgeneration antipsychotics share dopamine-2 ­antagonism with the first-generation antipsychotics but also antagonize serotonin-2 receptors and have other effects, resulting in a complex pharmacology that appears to reduce the movement d ­ isorders associated with dopamine-2 antagonism and p ­ossibly improve response, although some studies have questioned whether s­econdgeneration antipsychotics actually provide a substantial ­therapeutic advantage over first generation. The second-­ generation antipsychotics are associated with ­ metabolic changes, such as weight gain and diabetes mellitus. Anxiolytics Anxiolytic medication is used to reduce anxiety and is prescribed for disorders with primary anxiety, such as generalized anxiety disorder, and for other disorders in which anxiety is an associated feature, such as depression or schizophrenia. Of note, antidepressant medications, such as the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, are often considered to be first-line treatments for many primary anxiety disorders. In addition to antidepressants with anxiolytic effects, benzodiazepines and buspirone also have anxiolytic effects. Benzodiazepines. Benzodiazepines are used for the treatment of several anxiety disorders, including generalized anxiety disorder and panic disorder. Although the benzodiazepines as a class can be  effective for these disorders, concerns about abuse and dependence, together with evidence for the effectiveness of some antidepressants for anxiety disorders, have limited the use of benzodiazepines in the treatment of anxiety disorders, although they continue to be widely prescribed. Benzodiazepines initiate anxiolytic effects by facilitating the action of the neurotransmitter gamma-amino butyric acid, the brain’s most prominent inhibitory neurotransmitter. Buspirone. Buspirone can be used to treat generalized anxiety disorder. Its mechanism of action does not involve the gamma-amino butyric

acid receptor like the benzodiazepines do but instead affects serotonin transmission. Mood Stabilizers In addition to lithium, other drugs have been found to possess varying degrees of mood-stabilizing properties, generally the ability to treat mania but, in some cases, to improve depression. Accordingly, the mood stabilizers are primarily, although not exclusively, used to treat bipolar disorder. In addition to antipsychotic medications, lithium and certain anticonvulsant medications— drugs used to treat seizure disorders—have some mood-stabilizing properties. Lithium. A basic element, lithium has both antimanic and antidepressant properties and remains a main drug for the treatment of bipolar disorder, although many people with bipolar disorder require the addition of other drugs with mood-stabilizing properties for optimal control of their bipolar disorder. Despite its widespread use, the mechanism of action of lithium in mood stabilization is poorly understood. Lithium is associated with a variety of adverse effects, including tremors, cognitive dysfunction, low levels of thyroid hormone, and kidney dysfunction. Anticonvulsants. Several drugs used for the treatment of seizure disorders, including valproic acid and lamotrigine, have also been found to possess mood-stabilizing properties and are used in the pharmacological treatment of bipolar disorder. The mechanisms of action of the anticonvulsants relevant to their mood-stabilizing properties are poorly understood and likely differ from drug to drug, although they seem to involve changing the excitability of brain cells. A variety of adverse effects characterize the anticonvulsants, including sedation, weight gain, and polycystic ovaries for valproic acid and the potential for severe and even life-threatening rashes in the case of lamotrigine. Stimulants Stimulants, which include drugs such as methylphenidate (Ritalin and others) and amphetamines, are widely used in the treatment of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Their ­ mechanisms of action include presynaptic

Medical Therapies

reuptake inhibition of the neurotransmitters dopamine and norepinephrine to increase synaptic concentrations of these neurotransmitters, and in the case of amphetamines, reuptake inhibition and increased release of dopamine and norepinephrine into the synapse. Another stimulant-like drug is modafinil, which appears to have a different, but incompletely understood, mechanism of action from that of methylphenidate and amphetamines. Adverse effects of stimulants include elevations in heart rate, diminished appetite, and the potential for abuse and dependence. Drugs Used in the Treatment of Alzheimer’s Disease Two classes of drugs are available to treat the cognitive deterioration associated with Alzheimer’s disease. Acetylcholinesterase Inhibitors. These drugs increase the amount of the neurotransmitter acetylcholine in the synapse and thus improve cognition by inhibiting acetylcholinesterase, the enzyme that breaks down acetylcholine. The acetylcholinesterase inhibitors are used to treat Alzheimer’s disease. Unfortunately, they do not cure Alzheimer’s disease or even stop the progression of the cognitive decline that characterizes Alzheimer’s disease. Instead, they slow ­somewhat the progression of the cognitive deterioration, possibly delaying the need for placement in a nursing home or other care facility. Acetylcholinesterase inhibitors can cause nausea, vomiting, and muscle cramping. N-Methyl-D-Aspartate Inhibitors. One currently available drug antagonizes the N-methyl-Daspartate receptor, an action that may help protect brain cells. Like the acetylcholinesterase inhibitors, this drug does not reverse or cure Alzheimer’s disease but rather appears to slow its progression. Electroconvulsive Therapy, Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation, and Deep-brain Stimulation

In addition to pharmacological treatment of mental disorders, several treatments use nonpharmacological methods to alter brain function to treat certain mental disorders.

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Electroconvulsive Therapy Electroconvulsive treatment is used for some cases of depression, mania, and catatonia. Electrical current passes into the brain to induce a seizure, which appears important for a therapeutic response to occur. Although it remains unclear exactly how electroconvulsive therapy elicits a therapeutic response, it is associated with several biochemical changes in the brain, some of which are similar to changes observed after treatment with antidepressants. Adverse effect from electroconvulsive treatment can include headaches, delirium, and what appear to be temporary memory deficits. Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation Transcranial magnetic stimulation is used for the treatment of depression. In contrast to electroconvulsive therapy, transcranial magnetic stimulation does not depend on seizure induction for a therapeutic response, although it does generate an electrical field in the brain and causes biochemical changes there. It is usually well tolerated, although pain can occur over the application site. Deep-Brain Stimulation Deep-brain stimulation remains primarily a research modality for psychological disorders, albeit one with potential for the treatment of treatment-resistant depression. Electrodes are placed in brain regions thought to be involved in mood regulation, although the exact mechanism of action remains unknown. A stimulator connected to the implanted electrodes is inserted in the chest wall. Adverse effects include infection, hemorrhage, and agitation. Dawson Hedges See also Anxiety Disorders; Dissociative Disorders; Emotional Disorders; Medicalization of Psychology; Mood Disorders; Personality Disorders; Schizophrenia

Further Readings Hedges, D., & Burchfield, C. (2006). Mind, brain, and drug: An introduction to psychopharmacology. Boston, MA: Pearson Education. John M. Eisenberg Center for Clinical Decisions and Communications Science. (2013, April 10). Firstgeneration versus second-generation antipsychotics in

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adults: Comparative effectiveness. In Comparative effectiveness review summary guides for clinicians [Internet]. Rockville, MD: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (US). Available from http:// www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK142851/ Stahl, S. M. (2013). Stahl’s essential psychopharmacology: Neuroscientific basis and practical applications. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Medicalization of Psychopathology The medicalization of psychopathology is a growing process that affects human suffering in today’s world as well as the search for effective alternatives in the struggle against mental illness, which increases by the day. The term medicalization refers to a process in which problems not previously considered to be medical begin to be defined and treated as medical while acquiring the status of disease or at least disorder. This change in perspective produced the current, dominant trend toward the use of medication in the type of care provided to individuals diagnosed with psychopathology. The medicalization of psychological problems, difficulties, and suffering to become diseases or disorders poses the risk of turning everyday existential aspects of human experience into pathology. This is observable in the growing number of diagnostic categories. Suffering, in its various forms, gradually ceases to be part of the human condition and becomes an experience to be eradicated or treated with a particular drug. This entry discusses the issue of treating psychopathology with medication and calls for caution in understanding psychopathology in medical terms only.

A Brief History The term psychopathology was introduced by German psychiatrist Hermann Emminghaus in 1878. However, it was not until 1913 that psychopathology became a full-fledged field of study with the publication of General Psychopathology by Karl Jaspers. This was the initial attempt not only

to understand psychopathological conditions from an objective perspective, as had traditionally occurred in psychiatry but also to take into consideration the subjective perspective of the patient. Psychopathology is no longer a robust discipline in psychiatry only but has become a major component of other disciplines, such as psychology and public health. As the scientific study of abnormal psychological processes, it has been augmented by lists of symptoms and signs such as those presented in the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-10) and the Diagnostic and Statistical of Mental Disorders (DSM-5). Thus, it has become the psychopathology of what is observable more than of the psychopathological experience per se. For instance, the DSM-5 lists over 300 types of psychiatric diagnoses. The more people who are sorted in a cataloged disorder, the greater the so-called supermedicalization of normality. This issue cannot be separated from ideological and political issues associated with the psychopharmaceutical market. According to a 2001 report from the World Health Organization, beginning with the development of antidepressant drugs in the 1950s, the disease category known as depression has become epidemic. In other words, it is since depression medication was developed that the reported incidence of depressive disorders has skyrocketed.

Issues There is a certain confusion about what psychopathology actually is and about its role in ­scientific discourse on mental disturbance. Psycho­pathology is a term applied to both the study of mental disturbance and to mental disturbance itself. The more psychopathology is viewed as a pragmatic and quantitative concept, the more psychiatric medication establishes itself as an evident and natural form of treatment. Rather than disregarding undeniable advancements by the ­ pharmaceutical industry, the aim here is to understand the process of medicalization and to avoid trivializing it. It is important to make it clear that psychopathology is not symptomatology, although ­symptoms are considered. Its main concern is not only the assessment of symptoms and their potential

Medicalization of Psychopathology

eradication using medication. It also includes the understanding of a certain type of experience of the lived world. Psychopathology is not nosography either, because it does not rely on an objective nosographic diagnosis. When these caveats are ignored, which often happens, there is the risk of restricting the psychopathological experience solely to what is diagnosable. Psychopathology is viewed as a basically indispensable science that informs clinical psychiatry and psychology. It loses its space in a general sense, as Jaspers proposed, if it remains hostage to dominance by symptoms. The medicalization process directly affects how scientists, clinical practitioners, patients, and the public think about what it means to be sick in a psychopathological way. Once psychopathology was deemed to be part of the medical domain by means of psychiatry, mental disturbance (i.e., what was historically referred to as madness) was progressively approached in a positivistic and individual way. With the birth of psychiatry and the establishment of psychiatric hospitals, medicalization became useful for social and economic reasons. No real attention was given to the segregating and exclusionary structure that such treatments imposed on patients and that remains in place. Michel Foucault observed that norms are built by society and that madness may be conceived only within the society that has constructed it. By restricting the treatment of psychopathology to medication, only a palliative treatment is realized, one that aims to eliminate the symptoms without requiring reflection on the origin and the experiential meanings of illness. In the contemporary world permeated by consumerism and a pathologization of suffering, the medicalization market gains momentum. Phenomenological perspectives present themselves as answers to the current dilemma. Inspired by Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, psychopathology might be regarded in multiple frames—biological, cultural, social, and psychological. It would not be limited to the view presented by psychiatric diagnostic manuals that parameterize the medicalization process. To Merleau-Ponty, person and world exist in mutual constitution; that is, there is no longer a submission to dichotomous thought between internal and external, individual and social, objective

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and subjective, conscious and unconscious. Persons can be understood only in their worldliness, and once the dualistic view is overcome, MerleauPonty’s phenomenological lenses allow for a critical understanding of psychopathology that goes beyond the individual and excessively biological character of the psychiatric tradition. To Merleau-Ponty, science—in this case, psychopathology—is a “second expression” built on the experienced world, because psychopathology is preceded by the lived experience itself. Therefore, there is an ever-present necessity to be in contact with this experience. The more “technified” psychopathology has become as a consequence of the dramatic, technological advances in medical practice, the less possible it is to establish such contact. Consequently, as Osborne P. Wiggins and Michael Alan Schwartz have maintained, “The best evidence for psychopathology is in the clinical encounter” (p. 19). Despite the scientific identity of psychopathology in which knowledge is produced, it is of fundamental importance to be in contact with the experience of those who get sick. In this sense, although it is stated that someone presents a certain diagnosis based on an authoritative catalog, it is necessary to always consider the person’s Lebenswelt (lived world). A psychopathology that seeks an understanding of Lebenswelt depends on effective contact with the lived experience of the ill person, which allows for his or her reinvention and, importantly, the questioning of diagnosis. It is impossible to deny that the scientific advancements that originally propelled the medicalization process are fundamental to the treatment of mental disorders. However, this process must be examined critically and cautiously. By interfering in the human biological dimension through treatment with medication, one takes the risk of simplifying the understanding of mental disorders according to a technical perspective in which one might lose sight of other constitutive aspects of the ill person’s lived world that are equally important. The medicalization of psychopathology as an exclusive way to understand and treat pathological suffering ultimately results in trivialization, with the prospect of more serious health consequences. Virginia Moreira, Lucas Bloc, and Juliana Pita

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See also Anxiety Disorders; Dissociative Disorders; Emotional Disorders; Medical Therapies; Mood Disorders; Objectivity in Diagnosis; Personality Disorders

Further Readings Aho, K. (2008). Medicalizing mental health: A phenomenological alternative. Journal of Medical Humanities, 29(4), 243–259. Conrad, P. (2007).The medicalization of the society: On the transformation of the human conditions into treatable disorders. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Stanghellini, G., & Fuchs, T. (2013). One century of Karl Jaspers’ general psychopathology. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Szasz, T. (2007). The medicalization of everyday life: Selected essays. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Wiggins, O. P., & Schwartz, M. A. (2013). Phenomenology and psychopathology: In a search of a method. In G. Stanghellini & T. Fuchs (Eds.), One century of Karl Jaspers’ general psychopathology (pp. 16–26). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press

Meditation

and

Relaxation

Meditation includes a variety of practices intended to cultivate greater attention to and awareness of one’s experiences. An outcome of meditation may be achieving a state of relaxation. However, other cognitive changes may result from meditative practices, including increased mental clarity and concentration as well as changes in attitudes. Relaxation is a state of rest characterized by low physical arousal and a sense of emotional calm and well-being. The aims of this entry are to describe several of the most widely practiced meditation and relaxation techniques, summarize major theories of how meditation and relaxation techniques produce their effects, and highlight research findings in support of these theories. Relaxation techniques are structured activities that people use to manage the emotional and physical effects of stress. Different forms of meditation have been practiced for centuries in both Eastern and Western religious and cultural traditions. Today, a range of health care professionals,

including clinical psychologists, teach different forms of meditation and relaxation to help people cope with daily stresses; to help treat psychological disorders, including anxiety, substance use disorders, and depression; and as alternative and complementary medical treatments for conditions such as chronic pain, hypertension, irritable bowel syndrome, HIV, and cancer.

Meditation and Relaxation Techniques Although the terms meditation and relaxation are often used interchangeably, it is important to note that not all relaxation techniques involve meditation and that not all meditation practice has relaxation as its goal. Herbert Benson, M.D., coined the term relaxation response to describe the physical state of deep relaxation that occurs when practicing meditation and other relaxation exercises. One technique for cultivating the relaxation response is a modified form of Transcendental Meditation (TM), which was introduced by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi in India during the late 1950s and is based on practices described in ancient Hindu texts. TM began to gain popularity in Western cultures in the 1960s. Individuals practicing TM are taught to sit comfortably with their eyes closed for  two 20-minute sessions per day and to focus their attention on a mantra, a Sanskrit word or sound that is silently repeated and that allows the mind to settle. If distracting thoughts and feelings arise while meditating, the person calmly dismisses them and returns attention to the mantra. The goal of TM is to transcend the ordinary state of consciousness in order to experience a blissful state of transcendental consciousness, pure consciousness, or the effortless state of being (without thinking or concentration). Instruction in TM is typically provided by teachers who have undergone a specific training program. Like TM, the practice Benson helped popularize involves sitting in a quiet space, adopting a passive attitude toward one’s thoughts, and focusing one’s attention on a silently repeated mantra while exhaling. However, the practice was simplified to be easier to learn outside of specialized TM training settings. For instance, the Sanskrit mantra was replaced with an English word, such as one. TM and Benson’s procedure emphasize a passive, effortless state in which relaxation comes at its

Meditation and Relaxation

own pace. Putting pressure on oneself to achieve relaxation may paradoxically increase stress and negative emotions. Both TM and Benson’s modified version are sometimes referred to as concentration meditation because the practitioner fixes his or her attention on a particular mental object. Although originating in different traditions, many other meditation and relaxation techniques include mentally focusing on a word, phrase, or image. For instance, guided-imagery exercises involve mentally creating a pleasant scene, such as relaxing on a beach, by imagining the various physical sensations of being in that setting (imagining the sounds of waves and the feeling of warm sand). Autogenic relaxation procedures rely on the power of suggestion by silently repeating phrases such as “My arms feel heavy and warm” in order to increase the perception of physical sensations of relaxation. Loving-kindness meditation includes the use of phrases such as “May I be happy” and “May I live with ease and well-being” first directed to oneself, then visualizing different individuals, such as friends and loved ones (as well as people who are difficult to get along with) and sending them similar wishes. Mindfulness meditation is a form of meditation that has gained considerable popularity and has been the subject of theory development and psychological research. Mindfulness is defined ­ as the process of intentionally paying attention to moment-to-moment experiences in a nonjudgmental manner. Jon Kabat-Zinn is credited with introducing mindfulness meditation to a broad ­ audience and conducting some of the first studies of this approach. He developed an 8-week stress management course—Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR)—that combines several meditation practices by which people learn to be aware of internal experiences, such as physical sensations of the body at rest and in movement, sensations of breathing, thoughts, and feelings. Ultimately, a person learns to integrate these practices so as to meditate without a specific focus and instead be aware of sensations, feelings, or thoughts entering the mind without becoming preoccupied with any of them. Mindfulness meditation is sometimes contrasted with both ­ concentration meditation and the relaxation exercises described earlier in that a person does not

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intend to change his or her experience but rather to become more aware (or mindful) of what is already present in the body, mind, and one’s surroundings. Other forms of relaxation involve actively changing one’s physical experience to directly produce a relaxation response. For instance, in ­diaphragmatic breathing exercises, a person intentionally slows and deepens breathing by inflating the abdomen with each in-breath (“belly breathing”) rather than breathing in a shallow manner (“chest breathing”). Another popular technique is progressive muscle relaxation in which one reduces muscle tension by sequentially tensing and relaxing various muscle groups (e.g., muscles of the feet, legs, torso, arms, neck, shoulders, and face) and focusing on the feeling of relaxation that is ­produced in the specific muscles.

Theories of Meditation and Relaxation Extensive research has demonstrated that meditation and relaxation exercises have wide-ranging psychological and physical benefits when applied in both clinical and nonclinical settings such as workplaces and schools. The mechanisms by which these practices produce these benefits are an area of ongoing research. Several theories have been advanced to account for how meditation and relaxation produce beneficial outcomes. As noted previously, Benson introduced the theory of relaxation response to explain the physical changes that result from meditation and relaxation practices. In this biologically oriented theory, a key concept is that two forces in the body’s nervous system work together to maintain homeostasis. The sympathetic nervous system (SNS) can produce a “fight-or-flight” response that increases alertness and coping with a perceived danger. After the danger has passed, the parasympathetic nervous system (PNS) returns the body to a more relaxed state, for instance, by slowing heart rate and breathing. Although this recovery process occurs naturally, some people may find themselves in a state of prolonged physiological activation due to chronic stressful experiences or their own way of coping with stress—for instance, by mentally dwelling on negative topics. Chronic activation of stress responses has been linked to a range of negative

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health consequences, such as hypertension, coronary heart disease, insomnia, and chronic pain. Laboratory research involving people who practice meditation and relaxation techniques supports the theory that they may help counteract stress-related health conditions by engaging the PNS. Another prominent theory is cognitive behavioral self-regulation. If people can voluntarily control their thoughts and actions, they can, in turn, influence their emotions, physiology, and ultimately, their health. It is important to clarify that within meditation, there is an emphasis on controlling one’s response to thoughts and emotions rather than their content or frequency—an idea discussed in more detail later. A major psychological process people learn to self-regulate is attention. During times of stress, people tend to increase the attention they pay to potential threats. Concentration meditation provides an alternative mental focus in the form of emotionally neutral mantras. Relaxation exercises call to mind pleasant phrases or images. The self-regulation of attention is a central aspect of mindfulness meditation as well. One mindfulness practice is the body scan and involves systematically moving one’s attention throughout various regions of the body, noticing when one’s attention has wandered, and returning it to body sensations. By repeatedly refocusing attention, meditation may strengthen the metaphorical “muscle” of attention. Emerging research evidence suggests that participation in meditation training can improve attention regulation as measured by performance-based neuropsychological tests. Brain imaging studies are also increasingly used to examine changes in the prefrontal cortex, limbic system, and other regions involved in regulating attention, emotions, and behavior. Some theories focus on the idea that relaxation and meditation cultivate the increased awareness of internal experiences, which, in turn, can facilitate the replacement of unhealthy, automatic habits with healthier, intentional responses. For instance, through meditation or relaxation exercises that focus attention on the body, a person may become aware that he or she has been tensing his or her shoulders all afternoon and then proceed to relax those muscles. Programs using progressive muscle relaxation and meditation training have been effective in treating generalized anxiety

disorder in which chronic muscle tension is a common symptom. Meditation practices have also been shown to help people recover from substance use disorders. Through meditation, people can learn to recognize when they are experiencing the physical sensations of cravings and to closely observe the shifting intensity of these sensations moment by moment. Such focused monitoring can become an alternative to using substances to relieve cravings. This technique has been called urge surfing. A related idea is decentering, a process in which people observe their thoughts as mere “mental events” without necessarily believing them to be true. For instance, if the thought “I am a loser” arises while a person is meditating, the person might instead say silently “Right now, I am having the thought that I am a loser” and allow the thought to pass without further reflection or analysis. Meditation practices help people accept difficult internal experiences. Several lines of research have shown that efforts to suppress unwanted thoughts or emotions can have the paradoxical effect of actually increasing their frequency. Certain mindfulness meditation techniques encourage people to give up the goal of suppressing unwanted experiences and instead turn attention toward unpleasant feelings in the body, explore them with gentle curiosity, and adopt a compassionate, accepting attitude toward them. When feelings are acknowledged in this way, it may temporarily produce discomfort, but the approach suggests that the unwanted thoughts and feelings are then more likely to pass on their own without causing longer term distress. This acceptance-based approach may be contrasted with relaxation techniques in which the goal is to directly change one’s feelings by imagining pleasant scenes, slowing breathing, or relaxing muscles. There well may be a time and place for each of these approaches. A skillful clinician could introduce relaxation and meditation techniques in a way that best suits the particular needs of the client. In some cases, it may be most important to help a person feel less overwhelmed by emotions using a technique that can reduce arousal, produce relaxation, and enhance the feeling of being in control of emotions and, by extension, life.

Memory as Reconstructive

However, it may be important to help people learn to live with uncomfortable thoughts, feelings, and sensations without investing a lot of energy in the potentially frustrating and ineffective process of trying to get rid of them. The integration of mindfulness practices with cognitive behavioral psychotherapies has catalyzed a rich theoretical discussion of how to balance the goals of change and acceptance in psychotherapy across a range of psychological disorders. Greg Feldman and Jeff Greeson See also Attention; Behavioral Health; Chronic Illness, Psychological Aspects of; Cognitive Behavioral/ Therapies; Cognitive Therapies; Contemporary Trends in Psychotherapy; Coping Strategies; Health Psychology; Heightened Consciousness; Hypnosis; Placebo Effect/Response; Psychological Wellness and Well-Being; Psychoneuroimmunology; Spirituality; Stress and Resilience to Life Challenge; Stress and Stressors

Further Readings Baer, R. (2003). Mindfulness training as a clinical intervention: A conceptual and empirical review. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 10, 125–143. Kabat-Zinn, J. (2013). Full catastrophe living: Using the wisdom of your body and mind to face stress, pain, and illness. New York, NY: Bantam Books. National Center for Complementary & Alternative Medicine. (2013). Relaxation techniques for health: An introduction. Retrieved from http://nccam.nih.gov/ health/stress/relaxation.htm Shapiro, S. L., Carlson, L. E., Astin, J. A., & Freedman, B. (2006). Mechanisms of mindfulness. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 62, 373–386. Walsh, R., & Shapiro, S. L. (2006). The meeting of meditative disciplines and Western psychology: A mutually enriching dialogue. American Psychologist, 61(3), 227–239.

Memory

as

Reconstructive

In a nationwide survey in the United States, 63% of people said they believed that memory worked like a video recorder, recording information about

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what they see and experience so it can be accurately played back later. But scientific research makes clear that the video analogy is wrong. And tragic stories from the criminal justice system, where innocent people have been convicted based on someone’s faulty memory, provide further evidence. Memory is imperfect, much more like a Wikipedia entry than a video recording. That is, just like Wikipedia entries, memories can be updated and revised; they are ongoing reconstructions that can be modified by anyone who has access to them. This reconstructive nature of remembering the past means that they cannot always count on their ability to recall their experiences accurately. Sir Frederic Bartlett, a legendary British psychologist, tried to make this point nearly a century ago. He showed that when people recall an event, they are not recalling an intact record of their past; instead, they are reconstructing. In his well-known studies, British subjects who read a Native North American story made systematic errors when they tried to recall details from that story later on. They remembered the story so as to be consistent with their own knowledge—remembering the seal hunt as a fishing trip, for example. Bartlett suggested that memory is not simply “played back.” It is crafted and molded by people’s prior knowledge and experience. Since Bartlett, hundreds of studies have documented the flexible, reconstructive nature of memory. This entry reviews a small sample of that research on the flexibility and reconstructive nature of memory, focusing on how new information— details, and even whole events—can enter into memory and become part of what a person recalls. The entry also considers the various sources that can influence and distort memory and concludes by considering the function of reconstructive memory and the question of why humans have such a flexible memory system.

Eyewitness Evidence On September 21, 2011, a death row inmate named Troy Davis was executed via lethal injection after being convicted in 1991 of murdering an off-duty police officer in Savannah, Georgia. As reported by John Rudolf in The Huffington Post,

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Davis, in his final words before being pronounced dead at around 11 p.m., said, “I know all of you are still convinced that I’m the person that killed your father, your son and your brother, but I am innocent. . . . I am so sorry for your loss. I really am—sincerely. All I can ask is that each of you look deeper into this case, so that you really will finally see the truth.” Unless further evidence comes to light exonerating Davis beyond all doubt, whether his claims were truthful will never be known. However, according to one member of Davis’s legal team, eyewitnesses to the murder included a man who at first claimed he could only identify the clothes the shooter was wearing, a woman who first reported that she saw Davis in almost complete darkness from 120 feet away, and a man who saw the murderer through tinted car windows and reported being only “60 percent” confident that it was Davis he had seen. Eventually, seven of the nine eyewitnesses who placed Davis at the scene of the murder had changed their testimony or had recanted it completely (see Cohen, 2009; Sturgis, 2011). The trial—and the decades of appeals that followed—brought intense scrutiny and media attention to the questionable reliability of eyewitness evidence and the ethics of capital punishment in cases that are primarily argued on the basis of such evidence. Although some courts have begun to address the concerns surrounding eyewitness evidence, psychologists and other researchers have been studying the phenomenon of faulty eyewitness memory for decades.

The Misinformation Effect How is it that multiple eyewitness can see the same event and later provide accounts that sometimes directly contradict one another? How is it possible for people to remember an event one way and later remember it quite differently? Research on the misinformation effect has shown that postevent information (e.g., the accounts of other witnesses or suggestive questioning) can have a distorting effect on memory, altering or introducing new details into otherwise accurate memories for events. In one typical study, participants were shown a series of slides depicting a woman who encounters

several people on a city street, including a man who steals her wallet and hides it in his jacket. Later, participants read narratives that described the story they had viewed earlier. However, some read narratives that contained subtle inaccuracies. Some were told, for instance, that the thief hid the wallet in his pants pocket. Finally, participants took a memory test that asked them to recall where they actually saw the thief hide the wallet. In this study (and numerous others), exposure to inaccurate information reliably caused memory errors—those who read inaccurate narratives were strongly influenced by those inaccuracies in their responses to the test. Moreover, memories and beliefs about details of witnessed events are often held with confidence even when they are patently false. Researchers have identified factors that increase the chances of postevent information compromising the accuracy of memories for events. For example, memories are more easily altered by misinformation when more time has elapsed since the original event, when the source of the misinformation is perceived as especially trustworthy, or when the misinformation is repeated multiple times. Attempts to ward off the distorting effects of misinformation using warnings and deliberately nonsuggestive interviewing procedures have yielded mixed results—sometimes these efforts seem to protect the integrity of memory but not always. Some people are more vulnerable to misinformation effects than others. Young children and elderly adults, compared with adolescents and younger adults, appear more susceptible to the effects of misinformation. Other studies have shown that measures of intelligence and working memory capacity may predict resistance to misinformation effects. Although these studies imply that some individuals may be especially vulnerable to the distorting effects of misinformation, it should be noted that it seems everyone is at risk of having memories changed by exposure to suggestive information after experiencing an event. Details can be added and altered from otherwise accurate memories.

False Memories for Entire Events Memory can depart from reality in more dramatic ways; it can be altered to incorporate whole events

Memory as Reconstructive

that never happened. In the 1980s, patients who had entered psychotherapy seeking treatment for various psychological problems came out of therapy with memories of traumatic childhood events. In many instances, these memories were false. In the case of Elizabeth Gale, a patient who entered therapy seeking help for depression, she came away from therapy with a memory of having suffered satanic ritual abuse as a child. Gale later discovered that her memories were false and won a lawsuit against the people who helped her remember this completely false event (see Napolitano, 2004). Many patients who conclude therapy with false memories were exposed to therapeutic techniques—imagination, guided imagery, and repeated suggestions—that can make people susceptible to memory errors. Indeed, the cognitive psychological literature makes plain that these techniques can make suggested events seem more real. They add characteristics, such as sensory and perceptual details, that usually are associated with reality. But most of the empirical evidence came from research where imagination, repetition, and imagery had altered people’s memory for fragments of events, not where they had led to wholly false autobiographical memories. In the 1990s, researchers developed a paradigm for examining the influence of these therapeutic techniques. They asked whether these techniques do more than just alter people’s memory for words, shapes, and stories, and for instance, lead people to remember an entire event from childhood that never happened. In one study, participants read four descriptions about events in their childhood and repeatedly tried to remember them. All the events were real except for one that was planted by the researchers (getting lost in the mall). After approximately 2 weeks, 25% of the participants remembered the false event. In similar studies, people (on average 36% of participants) remembered a variety of false events, such as being saved by a lifeguard, spilling punch at a wedding, and being attacked by a wild animal. In other studies, people came to remember even impossible events, such as shaking hands with Bugs Bunny at Disneyland (an event that would not happen, as Bugs is a Warner Bros. character) or having a skin sample taken as a child (as part of a

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national health test that never occurred). These studies documented the dangers of suggestive therapeutic techniques and showed that memory errors were not limited to details but that people could come to misremember wholly false autobiographical events (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). The techniques used by researchers did not need to be combined in order to alter people’s memory. For instance, simply imagining how an event might have happened can boost people’s belief that they experienced an event in their childhood, an effect called imagination inflation. Imagination can alter beliefs about more recent events, too. In one study, just 2 weeks after imagining performing certain actions, participants falsely recalled having actually done them (even bizarre actions, such as proposing marriage to a Pepsi machine). Other cognitive efforts, such as explaining how an event could have happened, can exert similar influence on memories and lead people to become more confident that a false event really happened. One reason this occurs is that engaging in such efforts may help people generate a vivid mental representation of an event that looks just like a real memory. Photographs can make mental events seem especially vivid. In one study, researchers asked people to try to recall childhood events depicted in a series of photographs. The trick was that one of those photos was doctored to depict an event that never happened. After reviewing the doctored photograph (embedded in a series of authentic images), half the participants remembered the false childhood event—riding in a hot air balloon. In other studies, participants have remembered false events even when the photos did not depict anything about the events in question. For instance, reviewing an old school class photo led 64% of subjects to remember having played a prank on a teacher— an event suggested by the researchers but one that never happened. In all these studies, researchers deliberately inserted information, details, or suggestions that were incorrect in order to influence people’s memory. But just like Wikipedia, people can edit memory on their own. Research on storytelling has shown that the exaggerations and fabrications that make a story seem more interesting can actually become incorporated into memory. Perhaps more surprisingly, research shows that if people

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knowingly describe a false childhood event, they can actually become more confident that they experienced the false event when asked about it later, an effect called fabrication inflation. These findings, taken together, suggest that people can lose track of what is real and what is not and that the memory system allows them to update, change, and revise events from their past—even unintentionally.

Making Decisions About What Is Real and What Is Not The research reviewed thus far asserts that the human memory system involves a constructive and reconstructive process. It can change in small and large ways as a result of suggestions from others, the act of imagination, and the individual’s own retellings. This aspect of memory implies a need to sort through the mental contents of memories and decide whether the details are the result of someone else’s edits, whether new information was added personally, or whether the details are accurate—whether the information that is retrieved is the result of a recent thought, a daydream, something seen on television, or the result of a genuine experience. Sorting false from true memories can be particularly difficult, because information that has come from other sources may look and feel just like a real memory. Research on false memories indicates that they can be indistinguishable from real memories. They are filled with the kinds of detail—people, places, actions, perceptions and emotions—that are characteristic of an authentic experience. For ­ instance, Ira Hyman and F. James Billings report that one participant falsely recalled spilling punch at a wedding, and described the memory with rich detail: I just picture him getting up and being kind of irritated or mad, then the woman, I see her in a light coloured dress that has like flowers on it, I think I see flowers on it and stuff, and I see like a big red punch thing down the front of them. (p. 10, Table 2)

False memories don’t just look like true memories; they feel like true memories and can produce similar biological responses in the body. When persons who had reported being abducted by aliens recalled their experiences, they exhibited a

physiological stress reaction comparable to patients with PTSD—their false memories felt real.

The Function of a Reconstructive Memory System Most of the time, the human memory system serves well; people say they remember when they really do remember and the small details that change from one occasion to the next are often inconsequential. But at other times, the accuracy of memories matters, and errors can have devastating consequences, especially in the context of the criminal justice system. A growing body of work suggests that one of the major functions of a reconstructive memory system is that it helps individuals imagine the future and reconsider the past. That is, memories of past events function as raw material for future thinking. If it were possible to “play back” the past in one’s memory with accurate detail, this might complicate thinking about the future or reconsidering how an event from the past might have played out differently. That is, memory is flexible so that a person can recombine elements from past scenarios to imagine novel future events and rethink the past. Recognizing the reconstructive nature of memory should help people be more tolerant of the memory mistakes their friends, family members, and even they themselves make. When someone utters something that others are confident is not true, that person may not necessarily be deliberately lying; he or she could simply have a distorted memory. Recognizing the reconstructive nature of human memory may also lead to new methods in the legal system that reduce the chances innocent people will be convicted based on faulty memory. A new method might have saved Troy Davis, who, if he was innocent as he claimed, was the victim of false memory. Eryn J. Newman, Steven Frenda, and Elizabeth F. Loftus See also Exceptional Memory and Expertise; Failure of Memory; Heuristics for Memory and Decision Making; Long-Term Memory: Processes; Long-Term Memory: Structures; Short-Term and Working Memory; Working Memory, Improvement of

Metatheoretical Issues in Personality Psychology

Further Reading Bernstein, D. M., & Loftus, E. F. (2009). How to tell if a particular memory is true or false. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4, 370–374. Cohen, A. (2009, May 7). The long road to the Davis case. Retrieved from http://www.cbsnews.com/ stories/2008/10/14/opinion/courtwatch/main4522093 .shtml Frenda, S. J., Nichols, R. M., & Loftus, E. F. (2011). Current issues and advances in misinformation research. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20, 20–23. Garry, M., & Hayne, H. (Eds.). (2006). Do justice and let the sky fall: Elizabeth F. Loftus and her contributions to science, law, and academic freedom. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Hyman, I. E., Jr., & Billings, F. J. (1998). Individual differences and the creation of false childhood memories. Memory, 6(1), 1–20. Lindsay, D. S. (2008). Source monitoring. In H. L. Roediger, III (Ed.), Cognitive psychology of memory (pp. 325–348). Oxford, England: Elsevier. Loftus, E. F., & Pickrell, J. (1995). The formation of false memories. Psychiatric Annals, 25, 720–724. Napolitano, J. (2004, February 13). Ex-patient wins suit. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes .com Rudolf, J. (2011, October 7). Troy Davis’ last words released by Georgia Department of Corrections. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 2011/10/07/troy-davis-execution-last-words_n_ 1000648.html Schacter, D. L., & Addis, D. R. (2007). Constructive memory: The ghosts of the past and future. Nature, 445, 27. Sturgis, S. (2011, September 22). Troy Davis case shows need for eyewitness identification reform. Retrieved from http://www.southernstudies.org/2011/09/troydavis-case-shows-need-for-eyewitness-identificationreform.html

Metatheoretical Issues in Personality Psychology What is personality? What is a person? A channel for the discharge of psychic energy? A collection of behavioral traits? These are issues of the ontology (i.e., what it is to be) of persons and personality,

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and they are largely overlooked in the contemporary literature of psychology. This is a serious omission, one that hinders and distorts the study of personality. This entry focuses on some of the issues involved in the ontology of persons and personality.

Ontologies to Traits to Ontologies Early personality theorists, such as Sigmund Freud, Alfred Adler, and Carl Jung, postulated explicit ontologies about the basic nature of persons and personality. These are mostly not taken seriously in contemporary research—for example, researchers “know” that “psychic energy” is a false ontology. In the mid-20th century, the study of personality was overtaken by the behavioristic restriction to external behaviors and properties, which led, for example, to pure trait theories, such as the Big Five. There was no theory at all about the nature of persons and their characteristics, other than the assumption that everything of relevance could be captured in behavioral trait theory. The study of personality has been struggling within this framework since then. Behaviorism avoided any ontological focus, but clinical concerns cannot avoid considerations at the level of the whole person, not just small-scale empirical, behavioral patterns. Clinical perspectives, thus, have tended to maintain classical personality theories but to treat them as instrumental (i.e., heuristically useful) rather than as capturing something of the reality of persons. With academic psychology focusing on data patterns, there was little at the level of the whole person for clinicians to make use of. Some approaches to therapy were developed around learning theories, but these approaches, too, acknowledged that the person and the relationship between the client and the therapist could not be ignored, in spite of there being no acceptable model of the ontology of persons available. There has been a move to consider (statistical) interactions between traits and characterizations of situations. But this requires some model of how those individual-level characterizations work, how they are constructed, and what their nature is. These are person-level ontological considerations.

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What Kind of Ontology? This move is to be greatly applauded, but taking ontology into account also opens the possibility of getting the ontology wrong. It does not suffice to simply have an ontology of persons and personality. The ontological models and frameworks involved must comport with the actual nature of persons and personality. Psychopathology

In particular, it is arguable that structure ontologies create problems—for example, for modeling and explaining psychopathology and therapeutic change. Structure ontologies assume the rigidity of structure and thus make it difficult to account for change. Conversely, if persons are recognized as alwaysongoing processes, always engaged in learning and development, it can no longer be a background presupposition that personality structures tend to be persistently rigid, but it becomes a theoretical problem about how and why people do not “simply” learn their way out of their psychopathologies. It becomes a theoretical problem to explain how and why dysfunctional modes of being in the world are maintained—how they are rigid—in the face, at times, of massive negative feedback. It is difficult for structural models to even ask this question, because as already noted, structures are intrinsically rigid. One of the few attempts to address the question arises in models of cycles of self-fulfilling prophecy. A common characteristic of dysfunctional modes of being is to approach the world, and especially other people, with anticipatory assumptions and already-active defenses that tend to elicit precisely the kind of responses that confirm the “prophecy” expectations, thus keeping those anticipations and dysfunctional ways of dealing with them intact. Such processes certainly occur, and it is crucial to understand how they work. But they do raise the question of how and why such self-confirming cycles are themselves stable. In particular, other people differ in the kinds of “confirming” feedback they provide and, at times, may offer straightforwardly contradictory feedback to the anticipations involved. That feedback depends not only on the defensive stance of the initial individual but also on the personality and current mood of the other

persons involved. So why doesn’t the self-fulfillingprophecy individual differentiate such cases and “simply” learn his or her way out of the cycle? Again the problem of the rigidity of psychopathology arises. Differing assumptions about the underlying ontological nature of persons yield differing conceptions of what psychotherapy is doing: altering structures versus freeing up “stuck” learning and developmental processes. It would help to understand more about how such “stuckness” could occur. Representation and Cognition

Another realm in the study of persons and personality in which background ontological assumptions are crucial has to do with the constituent processes that make up individuals, such as cognition, learning, emotions, consciousness, language,  the nature of persons per se, and so on. One theme that permeates these processes is a common assumption about the nature of representation. It is assumed to be constituted as some sort of special correspondence between the representation and the represented—perhaps an informational, causal, or structural correspondence— that somehow constitutes a mental encoding of that which is being represented. Such assumptions are the basis for the dominant informational or computational approaches in psychology. The issues here are complex and long-standing (extending back to the classical Greeks in Western thought), and this is not the place to elaborate them. But it should be pointed out that there is a whole family of problems with these approaches, none of which is solved in the literature, and also that there is an approach, within the pragmatic tradition, that claims to resolve them. Just to mention one such problem. It must be possible for an organism, at least in principle, to detect (however fallibly) error in its own representations. That much is required in order for learning to occur. Because learning occurs, such organismdetectable error is, in fact, possible, and any model that renders it impossible is thereby refuted. This one relatively simple point suffices to invalidate almost all the candidates in the contemporary ­literature for a model of the nature of representation. This is a refutation at the level of ontology

Mixed Methods

and requires work in terms of ontology to attempt to resolve or transcend it.

Implications If these and related critiques are sound, then ontology, and theory more generally, must become an explicit level of consideration within academic psychology (just as it is in physics and other sciences). The ideology of operational definitions, however (among other barriers) makes this a difficult move. Operational definitions do not and cannot provide genuine theoretical definitions. It is useful and necessary to be precise about methods of measurement, categorization, and intervention, but to consider these as definitions renders genuine theory impossible and confuses the distinction between theory and theory testing. Further, it is arguable that those ontologies of persons and other psychological processes must be framed within a process metaphysics. Standard, background structure and substance ontologies create serious, even unsolvable, problems of presupposition (e.g., What is the weight of ­phlogiston? What is the basic structure behind obsessive-­ compulsive disorder?). This problem has been illustrated here for modeling and explaining psychopathology and for the nature of representation. It holds for understanding all aspects of persons. Mark H. Bickhard See also Ancient and Premodern Theories of Personality; Behavioral Theories of Personality; Culture and Personality; Culture and the Dialogical Self; Existential Theories of Personality; Factor Analysis and Personality Theory; Freud’s Psychosexual Stage Theory of Personality; Humanistic Theories of Personality; Humanistic Theories of Psychopathology; Personality Development; Personality Disorders; Personality Types Versus Personality Traits; Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Personality; Self

Further Readings Bickhard, M. H. (2009). Interactivism. In J. Symons & P. Calvo (Eds.), The Routledge companion to philosophy of psychology (pp. 346–359). London, England: Routledge. Bickhard, M. H. (2013). The emergent ontology of persons. In J. Martin & M. H. Bickhard (Eds.), The psychology

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of personhood: Philosophical, historical, socialdevelopmental, and narrative perspectives (pp. 165– 180). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Martin, J. (2012). Coordinating with others: Outlining a pragmatic, perspectival psychology of personhood. New Ideas in Psychology, 30(1), 131–143. Martin, J., & Bickhard, M. H. (2013). The psychology of personhood: Philosophical, historical, socialdevelopmental, and narrative perspectives. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Martin, J., Sugarman, J. H., & Hickinbottom, S. (2010). Persons: Understanding psychological selfhood and agency. New York, NY: Springer.

Mixed Methods In general, an empirical research study—or, more simply, a research study—represents research wherein data are collected by one or more persons (i.e., researchers) in a systematic way, such as via direct observation or experiment in order to advance knowledge. More specifically, researchers conduct research by collecting data to address one or more research questions (i.e., questions of interest to researchers) or to test one or more hypotheses (i.e., proposed explanations of observable phenomena). The analysis undertaken on the data collected yields findings. Therefore, findings that stem from (empirical) research studies are based on actual evidence and are interpreted to enhance, support, refute, or modify an existing theory, proposition, assumption, or the like. Over the years, in the social, behavioral, and human sciences, including the field of psychology, three major research traditions or approaches have emerged: quantitative research, qualitative research, and mixed-methods research. After brief descriptions of quantitative and qualitative research, this entry discusses mixedmethods research in more detail. Broadly speaking, quantitative research studies primarily involve the collection, analysis, and interpretation of numeric data that stem from numerous sources (e.g., standardized test scores, rating scales, self-reports, symptom checklists, personality inventories) that typically involve the assignment of numbers to quantify certain attributes and with goals that include to explore, describe, explain, and predict phenomena.

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In contrast, qualitative research studies primarily involve the collection, analysis, and interpretation of nonnumeric data that naturally occur from one or more of the following four sources: talk (data obtained directly from the voices of the participants using data collection techniques such as individual interviews and focus groups), observations (data collected by systematically watching or perceiving one or more events, interactions, or nonverbal communication in order to address or inform one or more research questions), images (still images, such as photographs and drawings; moving images, such as videos; visual data that are observed or perceived), and documents (collection of text that exists either in printed or digital form). Finally, mixed-methods research involves mixing quantitative and qualitative research approaches in a way that involves the collection, analysis, and  interpretation of numeric (quantitative) and nonnumeric (qualitative) data in various combinations within a single cohesive research study. Whereas quantitative research and qualitative research traditions have a long history, the formal use of mixed-methods research is relatively new.

A Brief History of Mixed-Methods Research With respect to Western philosophy and theory, mixed-methods research tradition can be traced back to ancient times wherein it was represented by realists, such as Aristotle (384–322 BCE), whose goal was to obtain understandings of what humans see and experience in their everyday lives. Alongside the quantitative and qualitative research traditions, the mixed-methods research tradition continued to be supported by proponents such as Peter Abelard (1079–1142 CE)—a French scholastic philosopher, logician, and theologian—who took a middle position between the supporters of the quantitative and qualitative research tradition by contending that whereas universals exist in the minds of humans, particulars exist in specific objects. The following decades through the 18th century witnessed the emergence of new philosophies and theories associated with these three research traditions, with the mixed methods research tradition being represented by a combination of reason and imagination by advocates such as Giambatista Vico (1668–1774)—an Italian political philosopher,

historian, rhetorician, and jurist—and by transcendental idealism, whose founder, German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), theorized that the human experience of elements is consistent with the way they appear. As chronicled by Charles Teddlie and R. Burke Johnson, since the 19th century the mixed-­methods research movement has moved through the following methodological stages: 1. The traditional period (1900 to World War II) marked by the discrediting of logical positivism (which originated in the Vienna Circle, a group of European scholars during the 1920s and 1930s who rejected theoretical constructs and causality and emphasized reductionism) and the limited use of mixed-methods research 2. The postpositivist era (end of World War II to 1970), which was characterized by the emergence of multimethod designs (involving the use of more than one method of data collection within the same study) 3. Diversification of and advances in mixed methods in the human sciences (1970 to 1990), which was characterized by the promotion of mixed-methods research; the exacerbation of the paradigm wars between philosophers, theorists, and methodological purists representing the quantitative and qualitative research traditions; the relentless criticism of mixed-methods research that included the assertion that it was invalid to mix quantitative and qualitative methods because of their immutable differences; the promotion of various forms of pragmatism (a philosophical worldview that emerged in the United States in the 1870s wherein most philosophical topics are framed with respect to their practical utility); and the continued development of rationales for conducting mixedmethods research 4. The institutionalization of mixed methods as a distinct methodological orientation (1990 to the present), which has been characterized by the onset of dialogue between quantitative and qualitative researchers, the publication of important works (e.g., handbooks on mixedmethods research) promoting mixed-methods research as a separate research tradition, and

Mixed Methods

the widespread publication of mixed-methods research studies across many disciplines, including psychology

The mixed-methods research movement has made great strides in the last 25 years. In this period, it has been driven by several theories. The most important theory justifying mixed methods research has come to be known as the compatibility thesis, which posits that the qualitative and quantitative research traditions, including their associated methods, can and should be mixed when the research question justifies this action. It refutes the claim made by methodological purists and the incompatibility thesis (i.e., mixing cannot and should not be undertaken). Another important theory is that mixed-methods research represents a unique research methodology because, as demonstrated by Jennifer Greene, it provides a coherent basis for conducting research with tightly interrelated elements that include the theory of justification (i.e., providing a warranted reason for propositions and beliefs held), stance, procedures, and situatedness (context) of findings stemming from the research. One feature that the mixed-methods research tradition has in common with both the quantitative tradition and qualitative tradition is that it involves the following four phases: research conceptualization, research planning, research implementation, and research dissemination. However, the mixed-methods research tradition differs from the other two traditions inasmuch as mixing quantitative and qualitative approaches occurs to varying degrees at each of the four phases. Further, each mixed-methods research phase is guided by several unique theoretical and conceptual frameworks. Some of these frameworks are outlined in the following sections.

Research Conceptualization Phase In the research conceptualization phase, an important theoretical consideration is the philosophical underpinning of the mixed-methods researcher. To date, more than a dozen research philosophies have emerged that have been associated exclusively with mixed-methods research. Abbas Tashakkori has subdivided these research

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philosophies into the following six contemporary conceptual stances: 1. A-paradigmatic stance: Philosophy is not considered important for the conduct of a mixed-methods research study. 2. Substantive theory stance: Theoretical orientations (e.g., critical race theory) are more important to the conduct of a mixed-methods research study than are philosophical orientations. 3. Complementary strengths stance: The quantitative and qualitative research components are kept as separate as possible in order for the strength of each approach to come to the fore in a mixed-methods research study. 4. Multiple-paradigms stance: Different research philosophies are used for different mixedmethods research designs. 5. Dialectic stance: Multiple research philosophies are used for the same mixed-methods research study. 6. Alternative paradigm stance: A single research philosophy is used for the conduct of a mixedmethods research study.

The most common of these mixed-methods research philosophies has been pragmatism in its various forms, which provides a practical and outcome-based method of research that stems from action and leads to further action via an iterative process, such as the hermeneutic circle, which involves the interpretation of human behavior, thoughts, beliefs, values, situations, and events. However, despite the popularity of pragmatism, increasingly, mixed-methods researchers are engaging approaches that address philosophical considerations and implications of combination. Another important theory associated with the research conceptualization phase is the theory of justification for mixing. According to this theory, there are four broad justifications for mixing: participant enrichment, instrument fidelity, treatment integrity, and significance enhancement. Participant enrichment refers to the use of both quantitative procedures (e.g., example, using random sampling techniques to select a representative sample for the

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quantitative phase[s]) and qualitative procedures (e.g., using purposive sampling techniques to obtain information-rich participants for the qualitative phase[s]) to optimize the sample(s) of interest for the mixed-methods research study. Instrument fidelity pertains to the use of both quantitative and qualitative procedures to maximize the utility of the instrument(s) used in the mixed-methods research study, for example, by conducting a pilot study whereby all instruments are refined by assessing construct-related validity (i.e., the extent to which the instrument can be interpreted as a meaningful measure of some characteristic or quality—quantitative validation techniques) and criterion-related validity (i.e., how well one instrument predicts another theoretically related instrument administered at the same time or in the future—quantitative validation techniques) and content-related validity (i.e., the extent to which the instrument items represent the content to be measured, which often is assessed by asking a panel of experts to review the i­ nstrument— qualitative validation techniques). Treatment integrity refers to the use of both quantitative procedures (e.g., using an observer checklist) and qualitative procedures (e.g., observing the intervention) to maximize the fidelity of the intervention that is being implemented in a mixed-methods research study. Finally, significance enhancement refers to the use of both quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis to enhance the mixed-methods researchers’ interpretation of  the findings. In theory, at least, consideration of  the justification for mixing in the conceptualization phase helps the researcher plan and implement the mixed-methods research study in a way that maximizes the meaning derived from the findings and interpretations.

Research Planning Phase In the research planning phase, mixed-methods researchers plan the study that will address the research question(s)—particularly, the sampling design, or the number of participants selected and the sampling scheme used to select them (e.g., random vs. nonrandom) and the research design, or the framework (e.g., outline or plan) used to address the research question(s). The sampling design represents a very important step in the

mixed-methods research process because it determines the type of generalizations of the findings that the researcher can make. This sampling design primarily relies on s­ ampling theory, which determines the type of ­ sampling needed to obtain an appropriate representation of the population of interest. In the quantitative phase of mixed-methods research studies, the goal typically is to make external statistical generalizations of data yielded from a representative statistical (i.e., optimally random and large) sample to the population from which the sample was drawn (i.e., ­universalistic generalizability). By contrast, although the goal of the qualitative phase of mixed-methods research studies is not usually to make external statistical generalizations, it is necessary to apply sampling theory to ensure that the qualitative data are rich enough to represent adequately the phenomenon being studied (i.e., particularistic generalizability). More specifically, application of sampling theory is needed to attain (a) data saturation, which occurs when information occurs so repeatedly that the researcher can anticipate it and the collection of more data appears to have no additional interpretive value, or (b) theoretical saturation, which occurs when the researcher can assume that his or her emergent theory is sufficiently developed to fit any future data collected, which, in turn, helps knowledge and theory construction.

Research Implementation Phase In the research implementation phase, mixedmethods researchers collect, analyze, validate, and legitimate data. One step that particularly relies on theory is the data analysis step. For example, the analysis of quantitative data in general, and inferential analysis in particular, relies heavily on probability theory, which represents the mathematical study of (random) phenomena—with the normal distribution via the central limit theorem underlying many, if not most, inferential analyses. Another example of a theory used for inferential analysis is Thomas Bayes’s theorem, wherein current probability is related to prior probability. Some qualitative analyses also rely on Bayesian analysis. For example, qualitative comparative analysis (developed by Charles Ragin) represents a theorybuilding approach most commonly used to

Mixed-Method Philosophies

examine the conditions under which a phenomenon has arisen and is based on the rules of logical inference that stem from Boolean algebra, wherein the values of the variables of interest are dichotomous (e.g., 0 and 1). As another example, the popularized constant comparison analysis, developed by Barney G. Glaser, relies on theoretical sampling, which involves an iterative process of data collection, coding, analysis, and additional data collection, allowing the data and the emergent theory to inform the researcher’s subsequent sampling decisions. Interpreting data also relies on probability ­theory. In particular, the confidence that the mixedmethods researcher attaches to a given set of interpretations reflects (a) the theoretical method of assigning probabilities (via p values—quantitative inferences), (b) the relative frequency method of assigning probabilities (internal replication, such as cross-validation—quantitative inferences), or (c) the subjective method of assigning probabilities (reflecting the researcher’s personal judgment about how likely a particular finding is stable for the participant[s]).

Research Dissemination Phase Finally, in the research dissemination phase, mixedmethods researchers communicate their research findings and interpretations to consumers (e.g., readers, stakeholders) in some coherent way (e.g., orally, visually, in writing) that incorporates simultaneously both the quantitative and qualitative interpretations into what is referred to as a metainference. In this phase, as noted by James W. Dearing, mixed-methods researchers can use diffusion and dissemination theories that involve complex organizations as the unit of adoption and center on implementation goals that lead to translation research wherein findings are applied to enhance human health and well-being.

Significance Theory plays a central role in all four phases of the mixed-methods research process. However, theories do not only inform the conduct of mixedmethods research. Even more important, because most studies involve the generation, testing, falsification, confirmation, modification, or expansion

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of theory—with two or more of these theorybuilding activities taking place within the same mixed-methods research study (e.g., the qualitative phase being used to generate theory and the quantitative phase used to test the emergent theory)— the use of both quantitative and qualitative research approaches is necessitated not in a dichotomous manner but, as surmised by Isadore Newman, as an interactive continuum that operates in the service of theory. Anthony J. Onwuegbuzie and Joanne Mayoh See also Cross-Cultural Methods of Research; MixedMethod Philosophies; Qualitative Research; Quantitative Research; Research Design; SingleSubject Research Designs

Further Readings Greene, J. C., Caracelli, V. J., & Graham, W. F. (1989). Toward a conceptual framework for mixed-method evaluation designs. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 11, 255–274. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.3102/01623737011003255 Johnson, R. B., & Gray, R. (2010). A history of philosophical and theoretical issues for mixed methods research. In A. Tashakkori & C. Teddlie (Eds.), Sage handbook of mixed methods in social and behavioral research (2nd ed., pp. 69–94). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Onwuegbuzie, A. J., Johnson, R. B., & Collins, K. M. T. (2009). A call for mixed analysis: A philosophical framework for combining qualitative and quantitative. International Journal of Multiple Research Methods, 3, 114–139. http://dx.doi.org/10.5172/mra.3.2.114 Tashakkori, A., & Teddlie, C. (2010). Sage handbook of mixed methods in social and behavioral research (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Mixed-Method Philosophies When compared with researchers in the physical and life sciences, psychologists, as social and behavioral scientists, have at their disposal a larger range of methodologies when conducting scientific inquiry. However, because the subject matter of psychological research is often centered in and seeks to explain human experience,

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philosophical presuppositions held by the researcher are perhaps more important than in the “harder” sciences for informing the methods to be used and the weight conferred on any conclusions reached through those methods. This entry discusses the philosophy behind using mixed methods for psychological research. Throughout the history of psychology, research has traditionally been conducted using a monomethodological approach—that is, using a single methodology answer a research question. Monomethodological approaches can be further categorized as quantitative or qualitative, where the former is concerned with quantifiable data in the form of numbers that can be analyzed statistically and the latter uses a more subjective approach that does not necessarily lead to data that are easily quantitized. A simple example of the differences between these approaches would be a quantitative questionnaire made up of Likert-type scales designed to assess participants’ attitudes toward a given phenomenon versus a qualitatively focused researcher directly asking a participant about the phenomenon of interest and recording the participant’s response verbatim.

Philosophical Assumptions of Qualitative and Quantitative Methods Although quantitative and qualitative methodological approaches have a long history in psychological research, they have traditionally been thought of as separate and largely incompatible because of the underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions inherent in each. Ontological assumptions are those concerned with what exists in the universe and how these things may be categorized according to type. By contrast, epistemological assumptions are concerned with how one can be said to know this content of the universe—or even whether it can be known at all. It is critical to distinguish ontological and epistemological issues, as conflation of the two has led to no small amount of confusion about the content and methods of science, including psychology. The philosophical presuppositions of quantitative methods can be described in terms of an ontological belief that absolute forms of objectively verifiable knowledge exist in the world and, in terms of the epistemic belief, that these sources of

knowledge can come to be known through scientific inquiry, which confers on them an attribution of truth. What follows from these beliefs is a positivistic research paradigm, positivism being the philosophical position that valid knowledge can come only from sensory experience or from logical (or mathematical) first principles. Thus, the quantitative approach aims at nomothetic findings, those that are law-like and widely generalizable, if not universal. This is the approach that reigned over psychology throughout much of the 20th century; it was not until the 1980s that a resurgence of interest in qualitative methods appeared. In contrast to quantitative approaches, qualitative research is based on the ontological assumption that knowledge is not absolute but rather intrinsically tied to perspectival factors and that, to gain epistemic access to this knowledge in the world, one must examine the context in which it resides. For psychology, these are worthwhile considerations, given the situatedness of human experience it purports to study. In contrast to the positivist paradigm, the approach represented by the philosophical precepts of qualitative methodology has been termed the metaphysical paradigm, given its emphasis on the connection between ontological and epistemological beliefs about the world.

The Philosophy of Mixed Methods Contrary to the beliefs of many psychologists, the quantitative and qualitative paradigms are not incommensurate. Given the diversity of research interests that fall under the broad label of “psychology,” each is capable of making worthwhile contributions to the discipline. Because of the potential for complementarity, there has been a proliferation of mixed-methods research that uses both quantitative and qualitative methodologies to answer a research question. This is contrasted with mono-methodological as well as multimethodological approaches that involve additional procedures of data collection or analysis, sometimes several, when approaching a relevant research question. Multimethodologies do not necessitate the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods, as researchers may simply use multiple forms of inferential statistics when analyzing their quantitative data. In this context,

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multimethodologies are not necessarily novel or innovative. One of the earliest forms of mixed methods was the process of triangulation, which takes its name from the geometric principle of determining the location of a third point based on the known coordinates of two others. In methodological terms, this implied a mixing of quantitative and qualitative methods where the results would converge, or “triangulate,” on the same conclusion to confer on it greater certainty by way of having been reached through separate and disparate methodologies. However, this form of mixed methods came under criticism for the irresponsibility with which methods were mixed. Specifically, it is not guaranteed that two methods, when combined, confer greater robustness in studying a phenomenon if neither alone would be adequately suited to observing it. Thus, to use the method of triangulation when a mono-methodological approach would be better suited to the research question is nonsensical. A useful concept that arose from methodological triangulation was the notion of a diverse mixed-methods test to demonstrate the independence of findings relative to methodology. This is subtly different from the theoretical basis of triangulation in that a diverse test contributes to claims of external validity and generalizability of findings rather than their robustness. To overcome the criticism of triangulation discussed earlier, a mixedmethods procedure must be chosen by the researcher on the basis of its representing a superior methodology compared with quantitative or qualitative methods alone. Precisely how to assess the superiority of a mixed methodology over mono-methodological alternatives remains a source of much debate. Unlike with quantitative methods, researchers do not have the luxury of a common metric of statistically inferential power with which to compare the efficacy of mixed methodologies—or even most qualitative approaches for that matter. Some theorists propose the necessity of identifying an epistemological link between the quantitative and qualitative methodologies being used in a mixedmethods design. This link is meant to justify the mixing of methods by elucidating the connection between them on the basis of the knowledge they are being used to obtain. However, this form of

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justification is most applicable to sequential mixed methodologies, which, though mixed, are either quantitatively or qualitatively focused overall. For example, researchers may use qualitative coding of participant narratives to identify the criteria for a subsequent quantitative analysis in which the research findings will be framed. The epistemological link is that the qualitative component of the research makes an ontological statement about what sort of knowledge is there to be found from the participants’ narratives, and the quantitative component sets out to make this knowledge epistemically accessible. Although such an attempt represents a mixed methodology, the primary analysis on which conclusions are based is quantitative, with the qualitative component merely serving to generate research questions. The manner in which quantitative and qualitative methodologies are mixed so that a dynamic interaction exists between them, as opposed to the sequential approach just described, predominantly derives from philosophical pragmatism. In an epistemological sense, this school of philosophy places emphasis on the utility of ideas or theories for explaining phenomena in the world rather than attempting to make descriptive attributions of truth or falsity. The pragmatist is also likely to assume the ­ontological position that there are many ways to conceptualize the content of the universe—albeit some more fitting than others according to the explanatory capacity of each. Consideration of this interaction between concerns about the world and how one comes to know it are typical of the metaphysical paradigm associated with qualitative methodologies and are especially pertinent to researchers whose subject of study is approached from a constructivist perspective. Some theorists prefer to posit that mixed methodologies stem from a philosophical eclecticism inherent to psychology insofar as the discipline has appropriated ideas and concepts from a variety of sources over time. Not all these sources are amenable to mono-methodological investigation and may well benefit from the procedural eclecticism of mixed methods. However, though such philosophical eclecticism has surely informed major movements within psychology, it is potentially misleading to justify the employment of mixed methods on this historical basis alone.

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Arguing for a mixed-methods approach for the sake of giving credence to a philosophically eclectic heritage, especially when specific research questions may be best addressed by mono-­ methods, is to fall afoul of the same criticisms directed at triangulation. It will generally be pragmatic considerations that mediate between the extremes of the positivist and metaphysical paradigms that lead researchers to identify the ­ methodology best suited to a given research ­question. When researchers’ ontological and epistemological presuppositions are eclectic, mixed methods may be optimal. But this is not to rule out mono-methodologies should researchers’ presuppositions be firmly rooted in a single location on the philosophical spectrum.

Implications For those mixed methodologies in which the quantitative and qualitative components are equally matched in responsibility for the ontological identification of the construct of interest and the establishment of epistemic access, it is unclear whether an exhaustive matrix of methodological typologies could ever be established to provide a common metric of comparison across the possible permutations of procedures. It may be further argued that such a goal is misguided and inconsistent with the philosophical aims of mixed methods in general. The concept of comparing procedures in terms of power and robustness is situated in the domain of quantitative mono-methodological practice. To claim that philosophical justification alone is insufficient cause for adoption of a mixed-methods approach in the absence of standard rules for comparison against a mono-methodological approach is to foreclose on the possibility before granting it consideration. The positivistic quantitative paradigm and its epistemological assumptions about nomotheticism are not entirely incommensurate with the qualitative approach of the metaphysical pragmatic paradigm and its emphasis on a contextualism in which knowledge is more specific and context dependent. Given potential complementarity, the disparity between these paradigms is not sufficient to bring about scientific revolution according to Kuhnian principles and has led

many researchers to adopt a pragmatic approach toward mixed methodologies. As previously mentioned, psychologists are in a unique position relative to the natural sciences in terms of the variety of methodologies available to them and in their subject of study, which may include generalizations across groups or an idiosyncratic case. Because of this diversity, mixed methodologies ought not to be prima facie considered a superior approach compared to monomethodologies but must be employed on the basis of philosophical justification at the discretion of the researcher. Given that no common metric of comparison exists for the suitability of mixed methodologies for a given question, it is the responsibility of researchers to be active in identifying the philosophical presuppositions inherent in both their own and others’ work so as to distinguish the procedure most suitable to answering the question at hand. On this basis, even if a mixed methodology is found unsuitable, a mono-methodological practice may be chosen, not because it represents a de facto standard but because of its appropriateness as identified through a pragmatic and philosophically reasoned process. Kirby Q. Maguire and Timothy P. Racine See also Epistemology; Mixed Methods; Qualitative Research; Quantitative Research; Research Design

Further Readings Johnson, R. B., & Onwuegbuzie, A. J. (2004). Mixed methods research: A research paradigm whose time has come. Educational Researcher, 33, 14–26. Kroos, K. (2012). Eclecticism as the foundation of metatheoretical, mixed methods and interdisciplinary research in social sciences. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 46, 20–31. Morgan, D. L. (2007). Paradigms lost and pragmatism regained: Methodological implications of combining qualitative and quantitative methods. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 1, 48–76. Tebes, J. K. (2012). Philosophical foundations of mixed methods research: Implications for research practice. In L. Jason & D. Glenwick (Eds.), Methodological approaches to community based research (pp. 13–31). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Mood Disorders

Mood Disorders Two major categories of psychiatric disorders may compromise emotional well-being. They are depression and bipolar disorders and present in an array of diagnoses. This entry describes each category, its primary clinical expressions, and its pathogenesis, and then considers psychological theories of the disorders.

Major Depression To the lay public, depression is a short-term period of sadness and gloom that occurs in response to an environmental event, such as a relationship breakup or other loss. To mental health professionals, major depression differs from normal sadness in that it is a syndrome characterized by signs and symptoms that substantially interfere with functioning. Thus, depression is associated with alterations in sleep, appetite, concentration, memory, psychomotor function, and the ability to experience pleasure. Depressed patients miss work or school, become isolated, and are at great risk for suicide. Major depression is a devastating and crippling illness that affects more than 350 million people worldwide. It is frequently recurring or chronic and is a leading cause of disability, costing the United States more than $83 billion annually. The prevalence of major depression in the United States over a 1-year period is 7%, whereas the lifetime prevalence is approximately 12% (21% of women and 11% of men). The average age of onset of major depression is in the mid- to late 20s. Major depression commonly co-occurs with other psychiatric illnesses. For example, 50% to 75% of patients with major depression also suffer from an anxiety disorder. Many patients with schizophrenia also suffer from depression. It is very common in patients with posttraumatic stress disorder, substance and alcohol abuse, and eating disorders. In evaluating patients with depression, it is important to rule out medical causes; patients with underlying medical disorders that cause depression, such as hypothyroidism or Vitamin B12 deficiency, do not respond to antidepressant treatment or psychotherapy. The most common medical cause of depression is primary hypothyroidism; such individuals usually respond to thyroid hormone replacement therapy.

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Patients with other medical disorders, including neurological diseases such as Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, Huntington’s, and multiple sclerosis also commonly become depressed, as do those with certain forms of cancer (breast, pancreas), cardiovascular disease, and diabetes. However, in most patients who fulfill criteria for major depression, an underlying medical cause is not found. These individuals form the vast majority of depressed patients and are considered to suffer from primary depression.

The Diagnosis of Major Depression The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), published by the American Psychiatric Association, provides the criteria for diagnosing mental illnesses, including depression. The fifth edition, termed DSM-5, was published in 2013. It delineates a number of different types of depressive disorders. In what follows, the specific DSM-5 criteria for the different subtypes of depressive disorders are described. Major Depressive Disorder

Major depressive disorder (MDD) is defined by DSM-5 as an episode of depressed mood or loss of interest in the pleasures of life that lasts for at least 2 weeks and has at least five of the following symptoms: •• Depressed mood •• Decreased interest or loss of pleasure in normal activities •• Significant weight loss when not dieting or a change in appetite •• Insomnia or hypersomnia •• Psychomotor agitation or retardation •• Fatigue or loss of energy •• Worthlessness or guilt •• Inability to concentrate or indecisiveness •• Recurrent thoughts of death or recurrent suicidal ideation

Persistent Depressive Disorder (Includes Chronic Depression and Dysthymia)

This is a less-severe form of MDD that is characterized by a depressed mood for most of the day

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for at least 2 years. While depressed, one must have two or more of the following: •• •• •• ••

Decreased appetite or overeating Insomnia or oversleeping Decreased self-esteem Decreased concentration or an inability to make decisions •• Hopelessness

Atypical Depression

This condition is a specifier of MDD and includes mood reactivity—specifically, responsiveness to positive events—plus two or more of the following: •• Weight gain or increase in appetite •• Increased sleep •• Leaden paralysis, heavy feelings in the arms or legs (or both) •• Interpersonal rejection sensitivity

Major Depression With Psychotic Features

This is a very serious form of depression characterized by the presence of delusions or hallucinations (or both). An estimated 15% to 20% of people who suffer from a depressive episode experience psychotic features. The delusions (fixed false beliefs) mainly involve inadequacy, disease, imminent death, or guilt, and the hallucinations are usually auditory. Seasonal Pattern

This condition is a specifier of major depressive disorder when there is a relationship between the onset of depression and the time of the year, such as fall or winter. Moreover, the depression remits at a certain time of the year, such as spring or summer. At least two major depressive episodes must have occurred within the last 2 years that showed this relationship with the seasons. Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder (Late Luteal Phase Dysphoric Disorder)

This is a depressive disorder related to menses, when in most of the menstrual cycles, five or more

symptoms of depression are present in the week prior to its onset and resolve within a few days after it ends. Substance- or Medication-Induced Depressive Disorder

This disorder is an effect of an illicit substance or a medication. There must be evidence from a medical history, physical exam, or laboratory analysis that substantiates that the depression is due to a substance or medication. For example, there may have been withdrawal symptoms, or the substance or drug is known to cause depressive symptoms. Depressive Disorder Due to Another Medical Condition

This disorder is due to another medical condition that can be identified through a medical history, a physical exam, or laboratory findings. Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder

This disorder manifests in childhood and is characterized by extreme temper outbursts that are recurrent and can be either verbal or physical and that occur three or more times per week. The diagnosis has to be made before the age of 18 and after the age 6, and a baseline irritable mood is required. Finally, it is important to note that bereavement is not an exclusion criterion for DSM-5 major depression, which is a clear departure from DSM-IV.

The Pathogenesis of Depression The pathogenesis (i.e., the factors related to its development) of depression remains poorly understood but is known to be the result of a complex interaction between genetic predisposition and environmental factors. Family studies have demonstrated a threefold increase in the risk of developing depression if an individual has a first-degree relative with a history of depression. Twin studies have shown that genetically identical monozygotic twins have a concordance rate of approximately 37% for major depression.

Mood Disorders

The significant environmental component in the risk for depression includes child abuse and neglect, as well as other life stressors. Personality style, temperament, anxiety, and a female sex are additional risk factors. Children with temperaments characterized by extreme introversion or excessive emotional reactivity are more vulnerable to depression and anxiety later in life. Of particular relevance is research demonstrating persistent and pervasive effects of early adversity, including increased levels of stress hormones and structural and functional changes in brain regions that mediate emotion. Experiencing life stressors in adulthood also increases the risk of depression. Progress has been made in identifying genetic polymorphisms of candidate genes that interact with early-life trauma to render individuals vulnerable to MDD and anxiety disorders. Epigenetic mechanisms also mediate the deleterious effects of childhood trauma. Taken together, individuals who are the most vulnerable are those with a combination of genetic and environmental risk factors. There has been considerable progress in elucidating the neurobiology of depression. There is evidence for the preeminent role of monoamine systems in both the pathophysiology of depression and its treatment. Norepinephrine, serotonin, and dopamine are major neurotransmitters. In the 1950s, reserpine, a drug used to treat high blood pressure, was reported to cause depression. Reserpine was quickly shown to decrease the level of the three neurotransmitters in the brain. Although subsequent research has confirmed their role in the pathogenesis of certain forms of depression, the story is more complicated. Other studies have demonstrated depressionrelated alterations in a multitude of neural circuits, cellular, and genetic mechanisms, as well as in neuroendocrine regulation and intracellular signaling systems. Although monoamines are not the entire story, virtually all the effective antidepressants are thought to work, at least in part, by increasing levels of one or another monoamine in the synapse. The hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis is an important mediator of the stress response, and altered function of this hormonal system has been linked to depression. In response to stress, corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH) is released from a part of the brain called the hypothalamus.

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CRH stimulates the anterior pituitary gland to release adrenocorticotrophic hormone (ACTH), which is released into the bloodstream and travels to the adrenal cortex, where it causes the release of cortisol, which functions to help organisms physiologically adapt to stress, mediating the “fight or flight” response. Increased activity of the HPA axis has been demonstrated in a sizable percentage of patients with depression, implicating both stress and the HPA axis as etiological factors. Other data from animal and human studies suggest that a failure of the HPA axis to adapt to chronic stress is one factor in the pathogenesis of depression. Evidence suggests that altered inflammatory processes may be associated with depression. Increased activation of the immune system, as demonstrated by increases in inflammatory cytokines, has been repeatedly identified in some patients with depression. In addition, the administration of interferon, which produces an inflammatory state in patients for the treatment of certain medical illnesses, such as malignant melanoma, induces a syndrome that overlaps with depression. Of particular interest is the demonstration that pretreatment with antidepressants can block the induction of depression secondary to interferon administration.

Bipolar Disorder Bipolar disorder is a characterized by mood instability in which patients suffer not only from depression but also from a pathologically elevated mood known as hypomania or mania. This pattern is very different from the normal fluctuation in mood that most people experience. Individuals with bipolar disorder have either abnormally elevated or depressed moods for weeks to months at a time, are impaired socially and occupationally, and are at high risk for suicide. Fortunately, bipolar disorder is eminently treatable, and affected individuals can lead productive and meaningful lives. According to the World Health Organization, bipolar disorder accounts for the loss of more disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) than all forms of cancers and Alzheimer’s disease. The depression associated with bipolar disorder is extremely disabling, costing the $45 billion in the United ­ States annually. Bipolar disorder affects 1% to 3% of the population but, unlike major depression, is

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equally prevalent in both genders. The average age of onset is between 18 and 20 years of age, and its duration is lifelong. Moreover, 20% to 50% of patients with bipolar disorder attempt suicide, and approximately 19% die from suicide.

The Diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder In addition to depression and mania, there are two subtypes of bipolar disorder, termed Bipolar I and II. The DSM-5 criteria for bipolar disorder are given next. Bipolar I Disorder

To meet the DSM-5 criteria for Bipolar I disorder, the patient must meet the criteria for a manic episode, and that episode might be preceded by or followed by hypomania or depressive episodes. Manic Episode • D  istinct period of abnormally and persistently elevated, expansive, or irritable mood and abnormally and persistently increased goaldirected behavior or energy lasting at least 1 week and present most of the day nearly every day (or of any duration if hospitalization is necessary) • D  uring this period of elevated mood, three or more of the following, or four if the mood is only irritable, must be present: Distractibility Increase in goal directed activity Grandiosity or inflated self-esteem Flight of ideas or experience of racing thoughts Talkative or pressured speech Decreased need for sleep Increased involvement in high-risk behavior (spending sprees, sexual behavior) The mood disturbance must cause functional impairment or necessitate hospitalization

Hypomanic Episode • D  istinct period of abnormally and persistently elevated, expansive, or irritable mood and abnormally and persistently increased goaldirected behavior or energy lasting at least 4 consecutive days and present most of the day nearly every day.

• D  uring this period of elevated mood, three or more of the following, or four if the mood is only irritable, must be present: Distractibility Increase in goal-directed activity Grandiosity or inflated self-esteem Flight of ideas or experience of racing thoughts Talkative or pressured speech Decreased need for sleep Increased involvement in high-risk behavior (spending sprees, sexual behavior) The mood causes changes in function that are uncharacteristic of the individual when not present The mood disturbance must not cause marked functional impairment and does not necessitate hospitalization Mood is observable by others Mood is not due to the effects of drugs

Psychosis Associated With Bipolar Disorder Psychosis related to bipolar disorder is very common. In fact, reports estimate that between 15% and 61% of patients with bipolar disorder have had at least one psychotic symptom in their lifetime. Psychosis is defined by having impaired reality testing, with symptoms of fixed false beliefs (delusions), perceptual disturbances (usually auditory hallucinations), and disorganized thought. Bipolar II Disorder

To meet the DSM-5 criteria for Bipolar II Disorder, the patient must meet the criteria for a hypomanic episode and the criteria for a current or past major depressive episode. Moreover, the patient must have never met the criteria for a manic episode. Cyclothymic Disorder This is a less severe form of bipolar disorder that is characterized by multiple periods containing depressed symptoms that do not meet criteria for MDD and multiple periods of hypomanic symptoms that do not meet the criteria for hypomania. These symptoms must last for at least 2 years, with 1 year occurring in childhood or adolescence.

Mood Disorders

Rapid Cycling This condition is defined by the presence of at least four mood episodes within the last year. These can be mania, hypomania, or depression. Substance/Medication-Induced Bipolar and Related Disorder This disorder is due to an illicit substance or a medication. There must be evidence from a medical history, physical exam, or laboratory analysis that confirms that it is due to a substance or medication, such as withdrawal or the substance being known to cause an elevated mood. Bipolar and Related Disorder Due to Another Medical Condition This disorder is due to another medical condition that can be confirmed by a medical history, a physical exam, or laboratory findings.

The Pathogenesis of Bipolar Disorder Relatively little is understood about the pathogenesis of bipolar disorder. It is the most heritable of all major psychiatric disorders, with approximately two thirds of the risk for developing the disease being assigned to genetic factors and one third to environmental factors. Genome-wide association studies (GWAS) are attempting to identify the genetic basis of bipolar disorder. At present, it appears that there is no single “bipolar gene” but a number of variants that have a relatively small effect on risk for the disease. Functional brain-imaging studies using magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) have revealed brain areas for mood regulation that are altered in patients with bipolar disorder. More specifically, ventral prefontal networks and the limbic system are involved, and some evidence suggests that these alterations are present during development.

Psychological Theories Cognitive theorists attribute depression to distorted views of the world and how individuals view themselves in it. Aaron Beck, the originator of cognitive therapy, hypothesized that the development of depression is related to a triad of

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negative thinking patterns adopted early in life. The triad consists of negative thinking about oneself, negative thinking about the environment in which one lives, and negative thinking about the future. Moreover, early in life, individuals develop cognitive schemas or templates that help them understand and organize their perception of the environment. Distortions of these schemas during development are believed to contribute to negative or maladaptive thought, which increases risk for developing depression. Behaviorists, such as Peter Lewinsohn, posit depression as the result of a lack of positive reinforcers. Depressed people feel poorly—that is, they receive little or no joy from any activities. This lack of positive reinforcement diminishes motivation. This leads to inactivity, withdrawal, and increasing sadness. Friends or support system may feel bad for the patient and so sympathize with him or her, thereby reinforcing the negative behaviors. This results in a vicious cycle that is difficult to change. Based on laboratory animal experiments, Martin Seligman termed this state “learned helplessness” and attributed it to an individual’s belief that there is no way to feel better. Psychoanalytic theorists, such as Sigmund Freud and Karl Abraham, believed that depression is related to one’s reaction to object loss in early-childhood experience, a loss that has been internalized. After threatened or an actual loss, the individual turns his or her anger inward. This leads to sadness and depression. A more adaptive response would be for the individual to express the anger toward the lost object. Psychoanalytic theorists view bipolar disorder as an imbalance between the ego and superego. An overactive superego is related to the depressive phase, whereas an unrestrained ego, carefree and excited, is active in the manic phase. Eventually, guilt overcomes the ego, and the individual switches from mania to depression, and sadness and despair take over. Marc Kalin and Charles B. Nemeroff See also Addiction; Anxiety Disorders; Chronic Illness, Psychological Aspects of; Culture and Psychopathology; Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; Emotional Disorders; Gender and Emotion; Humanistic Theories of Psychopathology Neuroendocrine System

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Further Readings Cuijpers, P., Sijbrandij, M., Koole, S. L., Andersson, G., Beekman, A. T., & Reynolds, C. F., III,. (2014). Adding psychotherapy to antidepressant medication in depression and anxiety disorders: A meta-analysis. World Psychiatry, 13(1), 56–67. Kempton, M. J., Zainab S., Munafo, M. R., Geddes, J. R., Simmons, A., Frangou, S., & Williams, S. C. R. (2011). Structural neuroimaging studies in major depressive disorder: Meta-analysis and comparisons with bipolar disorder. Archives of General Psychiatry, 68(7), 675–690. Kessler, R. C., Birnbaum, H., Bromet, E., Huang, I., Sampson, N., & Shahly, K. (2010). Age differences in major depression: Results from the National Comorbidity Survey Replication (NCS-R). Psychological Medicine, 40, 225–237. Lau, J., & Eley, T. (2008). Disentangling geneenvironment correlations and interactions on adolescent depressive symptoms. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 49(2), 142–150. Nemeroff, C., & Schatzberg, A. (2009). Textbook of psychopharmacology (4th ed.). Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing.

Moral Development Theories of moral development provide descriptive and explanatory frameworks for how humans acquire morality—that is, a set of rules about how people should and should not treat one another. These frameworks vary on several interrelated dimensions, including the role of biologically versus environmentally driven processes in initiating moral development, the extent to which children actively shape their own developmental trajectories, and whether those trajectories are best characterized as a continuum or as qualitatively distinct stages. In addition, theorists vary in the extent to which they focus on issues of reason versus emotion in driving moral development and on moral judgment versus moral action as a marker of change This entry reviews theories of moral development and theorists who hold these views.

Freud One early, influential view of moral development was Sigmund Freud’s. Freud discussed the

importance of both internal, innately specified maturational factors as well as parental and societal influences on moral development. He viewed the mind as separated into three components that develop at different times: the id, the ego, and the superego. The first is present from birth and consists of the most basic human instincts and desires. Operating by the “pleasure principle,” the id’s primary goal is to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. The ego operates by the “reality principle” and attempts to satisfy the id within the constraints of reality. The ego is considered the basic sense of self and emerges in late infancy. Finally, the superego, described as an “inner authority” or conscience, develops last and constrains both the id and the ego through notions of “ought” and “ought not.” Initially, the superego is immature, driven solely by social anxiety or the “dread of losing love,” but it gives rise to a genuine conscience later in development. Thus, Freud saw the mind as consisting of different, often conflicting but interacting parts rather than as a unified whole. He characterized development as an increasing ability to resolve those conflicts. His theory was an important attempt to explain the struggles that occur within individuals as moral standards clash with thoughts and behaviors. Moreover, he viewed the child as playing an active role in overcoming the internal conflicts. Freud’s view of moral development has been criticized, however, for relying too much on subjective and unobservable—and therefore unfalsifiable— psychological phenomena.

Skinner Arising in part from negative reactions toward inferred entities, such as Freud’s focus on unobservable aspects of the mind, behaviorists sought to study organisms solely via their observable behaviors. Specifically, they noticed that an animal’s likelihood of repeating an action changes based on the action’s consequences, a phenomenon known as operant conditioning. This discovery led to a new theory of moral development that focused on external reinforcers and punishers of moral behavior. Children learn that an action is morally good if the action has been praised (or otherwise rewarded) and learn that an action is morally bad if it has been punished.

Moral Development

B. F. Skinner viewed moral development as continuous and humans as amoral by nature. They are passively induced to behave morally by reinforcement and punishment from parents and other aspects of the social environment. By emphasizing external consequences, behaviorists were among the first to note the importance of environmental inputs on moral development. However, behaviorism has been criticized, most notably by Noam Chomsky and Jean Piaget, for ignoring the role of internal states.

Piaget A third influential theorist of moral development was Piaget, who criticized behaviorists for failing to consider the role of children’s active interpretation of the external environment in their moral development. After observing and interviewing multiple groups of children of different ages, Piaget concluded that children’s moral reasoning developed in two discontinuous stages, one in which children before age 7 distinguish right and wrong based on objective states of the world (for instance, what leads to good outcomes and what gets punished). The other stage begins after age 10 when children draw the distinction based on subjective considerations (for instance, why individuals act as they do and what works for the group). Piaget’s theory grew out of studying children playing games, noticing that younger children were likely to accept game rules exactly as presented and viewed any instance of rule breaking as “wrong.” Older children, in contrast, were actively involved in the creation, refinement, and enforcement of game rules and were willing to reject rules that proved not to be useful. To Piaget, moral development reflects similar changes: Whereas younger children view any action that breaks a rule or is punished as wrong, they develop to consider others’ perspectives and engage in mutual negotiations. These processes allow children to actively construct notions of right and wrong.

Kohlberg Lawrence Kohlberg elaborated on and expanded Piaget’s stage theory of moral development. He presented subjects with various moral dilemmas and examined the process by which children determine an act’s moral permissibility. This work led

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him to characterize moral development as consisting of three qualitatively distinct levels. In the earliest level, on average before age 13, the child considers an act as right or wrong based on the consequences of the action on the self, such as whether it brings about reward or punishment. At the middle level, from adolescence to adulthood, moral reasoning is centered on social relationships, such as adhering to socially created laws or in upholding a socially defined role, such as “friend.” At the latest level, reached during adulthood, if at all, reasoning reflects ideals, such as universal rights and freedoms. Like Piaget, Kohlberg focused on children’s active consideration of what makes something right or wrong. His extension of this work into adolescence and adulthood was a significant accomplishment, reflected by his stages’ widespread use across subdisciplines of psychological science. That said, some of Kohlberg’s claims are controversial. In particular, although there is considerable cultural variation in when and whether individuals reach the latest stages, Kohlberg believed that the last stage reflects some sort of moral ideal. His critics on this issue, most notably Richard Shweder and Jonathan Haidt, assert that cross-cultural variability reflects a true diversity of moral concerns present throughout the world and that Kohlberg’s focus on issues of harm and fairness is a culturally narrow view of morality.

Social Domain Theorists Other theorists approve of Piaget and Kohlberg’s focus on harm and fairness and of their focus on children’s active role in the development of moral reasoning. But they believe that Piaget and Kohlberg sharply underestimate the moral capacities of young children. In particular, Larry Nucci, Judith Smetana, Melanie Killen, and Elliot Turiel argue that even very young children reason differently about moral versus conventional rule violations—for instance, hitting versus wearing one’s pajamas to school. For example, although young children are willing to change conventional rules if an authority figure says it is allowed, they are not willing to break moral rules regardless of what the authority mandates. From this and other domain-specific reasoning patterns, domain theorists conclude that the developing mind separates the social world

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into qualitatively different realms, a tendency that is reinforced by domain-specific experiences from parents and peers.

Empathy and Moral Development Other theorists have noted that the study of moral development has a fairly narrow scope, often failing to give emotional processes sufficient consideration. For example, Carol Gilligan famously claimed that Kohlberg’s version of morality was male-centric, ignoring traditionally feminine concerns of community and care. Although Gilligan’s claims have not withheld empirical scrutiny, others, such as Martin Hoffman, have pointed out the role of emotional processes, such as empathy and sympathy, in shaping moral judgments and action. To Hoffman, moral development is facilitated both by experiencing emotions while being the victim of moral transgressions and by witnessing others’ emotions when they are victimized. The latter may be the result of a biologically based tendency to find others’ distress aversive. Nancy Eisenberg has similarly pointed to the importance of emotions for moral development and, in particular, for prosocial reasoning.

Moral Development and Evolution Evolutionary theorists of morality view the capacity for social evaluation as a functional component of the human mind instilled by natural selection to help the individual navigate the social world. For example, some cooperative feats require large amounts of trust between individuals, and much can be gained in defecting (breaching that trust) and being antisocial. From this perspective, some kinds of social partners should be sought out (e.g., those who are prosocial), but others should be avoided (those who are antisocial). The persistence of these kinds of social “games” across evolutionary time and the importance of picking the right social partners may have resulted in an adaptation or set of adaptations for being concerned with how individuals should and should not treat one another. A growing body of evidence with preverbal infants provides some support for the evolutionists’ view of the individual’s capacity for social evaluation. In particular, already from

early in infancy and before significant learning in the socio-moral domain is likely to have occurred, young babies evaluate others based on their proand antisocial actions, as demonstrated by their tendency to approach prosocial characters and avoid antisocial ones. In addition, infants show consistent but flexible expectations about the fair distributions of resources among unknown individuals. Supporting the view that there is a cooperative side to human nature, both human toddlers and chimpanzees spontaneously help those in need, and capuchin monkeys prefer equity over inequity. Importantly, evolutionary theorists of morality acknowledge that much of moral development is the result of socialization and cognitive development; however, they also assert that the foundation on which morality is built is rooted in human nature. Critics of the “nativist” view of socio-moral development, however, maintain that the infant is learning rapidly from birth and thus it is impossible to rule out learning-based accounts of these tendencies. Conor M. Steckler and J. Kiley Hamlin See also Adolescent Development, Theories of; Behavioral Development; Childhood; Culture and Development; Freud’s Psychosexual Stage Theory of Personality; Kohlberg, Lawrence; Morality and Moral Emotions; Nature Versus Nurture; Piaget’s and the Neo-Piagetian Theories of Cognitive Development; Skinner’s Legacy

Further Readings Eisenberg, N. (2000). Emotion, regulation, and moral development. Annual Review of Psychology, 51, 665–697. Geraci, A., & Surian, L. (2011). The developmental roots of fairness: Infants’ reactions to equal and unequal distributions of resources. Developmental Science, 14, 1012–1020. Hamlin, J. K. (2013). Moral judgment and action in preverbal infants and toddlers: Evidence for an innate moral core. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 22, 186–193. Hoffman, M. L. (2000). Empathy and moral development: Implications for caring and justice. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Killen, M., & Smetana, J. G. (Eds.). (2014). Handbook of moral development (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis.

Morality and Moral Emotions

Morality

and

Moral Emotions

In the past 20 or so years, the study of morality in psychology has evolved from a limited and largely developmental pursuit to a rich enterprise studying decision making, emotions, and philosophical concepts in adult and child populations. This entry addresses important themes and developments in morality research.

The Shadow of Kohlberg Lawrence Kohlberg is widely credited as a pioneer in moral psychology, with his scheme of progressively more abstract and universal stages of moral-dilemma reasoning that develop through childhood. However, this scheme has attracted criticism; specifically, it did not account well for the moral development of women or in nonWestern cultures. The assumption that the stages follow a necessary sequence has also been questioned. More broadly, Kohlberg’s research had two limits. First, it explicitly concerned itself only with the sophistication of the reasoning processes in a dilemma and judged as unimportant the actual decision in the dilemma. Second, it studied mainly cognitive and deliberative thinking rather than emotions or intuitive judgments. By contrast, subsequent research on morality has largely focused on what determines which moral decision is made and has been very interested in moral emotions and moral intuition.

Psychology of Moral Judgments Research on morality in psychology is often reported without defining what morality is. Writers often assume that the word morality is a basic concept. However, there is an ongoing debate over whether morality can be reduced to one view or is best thought of as several views that people endorse to different degrees. Building on traditional views in moral-psychology research, the dyadic morality position argues that morality is essentially people helping each other and refraining from harming each other. Another position, moral foundations theory, proposes that other moral concerns, such as loyalty to the group or

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purity of one’s body, cannot be reduced simply to the issue of harm. A useful definition of a moral principle is one that people believe should be held over other principles and that imposes the concerns of a higher level of social organization on a lower one (e.g., that obliges people to act in the best interests of their families, families to act in the best interest of  the nation, or nations to act in the best interest of the world). Supporting this view is the finding that political and social positions that are moralized behave differently than do those that are not, leading to their characterization as “moral mandates” because of their greater perceived importance. Research on “taboo trade-offs” shows that people resist decisions that would trade away moralized goods, such as human life or sexual chastity, for money. People also tend to think that moralized goals should be pursued no matter the cost and that opponents of moralized positions are not just factually wrong, but bad people. People also view morality-related traits as more important than traits related to social warmth or competence when judging other persons and groups. Another active area of interest in moral psychology has examined the degree to which people resolve moral dilemmas using hard-and-fast deontological moral rules, such as “Do not kill” versus utilitarian concerns about outcomes, such as “Save the maximum number of lives possible.” The most popular form of experiment proposes a life-ordeath dilemma. For example, in the footbridge dilemma, one imagines being able to stop a train from killing five people by pushing one large person off a footbridge. This research has included laboratory manipulations, brain-imaging studies, and studies of people with abnormal social emotions to show that intuitive, emotional processes are involved in making deontological decisions— not pushing the person—but more rational processes are implicated in making utilitarian decisions—saving five people. Although much research has focused on moral judgments of single acts, other work has shown the importance of information relevant to a person’s character. For example, if a man is described as punching another person versus punching a cat, the person abuser is judged as having committed the worse act, but the cat abuser is judged as having the worse moral character because of the

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action’s bizarre nature. This distinction may help explain why some people view seemingly harmless acts, such as dressing unusually, as morally objectionable. Research on infants shows that the concept of moral character emerges early on as a way of judging “good guys” and “bad guys.” Interesting paradoxes also arise because people keep a running judgment of their own moral character. The phenomenon of moral credentialing or moral licensing refers to people who have just performed a morally virtuous action being less likely to help others, act without prejudice, or refrain from cheating immediately afterward. This occurs even if the morally virtuous action was largely symbolic in nature, such as buying a “green” ecological product. People apparently maintain a cognitive ledger of their moral and nonmoral deeds, as illustrated by phrases such as, “I’ve done my good deed for the day.” In some way, they view acting morally as relieving them of immediate obligations to keep doing so.

Moral Emotions Moral psychology is also concerned with the role of feelings, intuitions, and emotions in moral judgment. Jonathan Haidt is the best-known proponent of moral intuitionism, a position with roots in the sentiment-based moral philosophy of David Hume. Haidt argues that dilemmas that depend on deliberative thought are rare in real life and that most moral judgments are made quickly, intuitively, and with feeling. If people do reason about a moral judgment, they usually do so after the judgment is made, in order to anticipate social reactions to their decision. Experiments in moral dumbfounding have shown that people sometimes cannot justify their immediate moral reactions. For example, when asked to explain why consensual sibling incest is wrong in a scenario where no plausible harm comes of the act, participants tended to refer to the basic idea that incest is wrong or disgusting. However, critics have argued that these experiments leave room for moral reasoning to play an important part and that people can form moral judgments without feeling moral emotions. In spite of controversy about whether emotions are necessary for moral judgment, there is no question

specific emotions can influence moral judgment and action. Anger

In laboratory studies of social interaction and judgment, moral anger rises when participants perceive that someone else is violating a social norm about harm or fairness. In addition to the moral use of anger, it is also clear that people may feel anger when their own interests are harmed. This has led to debate and experiments on whether socalled moral anger is anything more than a byproduct of feeling empathy for someone who has been harmed. In other words, a person may react as if he or she had been harmed rather than defending an abstract norm. On the whole, these experiments show that although empathy increases moral anger, it can be felt even when not empathizing with a victim. In most contexts, anger leads to hostile expression and retaliation aimed at wrongdoers in an attempt to make them reform their actions. Disgust

The contrast between the primal nature of physical disgust and its involvement in the higher minded process of judging moral wrongdoers may account for the popularity of disgust in moralemotion research. All the same, there is controversy about what moral acts make people disgusted. Some evidence shows that when disgust is separated from anger, it is primarily directed toward moral violations involving rules about the body, such as abnormal sexual acts or cannibalism. Other studies that control for anger show that disgust arises in response to unfairness. It is well established that feelings of disgust lead to avoidance of the wrongdoer and cleansing of oneself and that this is unlike anger, which promotes argument and confrontation with the wrongdoer. (The related emotion of contempt also has a distancing function but has not been studied as intensively as has disgust.) Compared with anger, disgust is also less sensitive to contextual factors, such as whether the wrongdoer is aware of the act, and people have a harder time justifying their disgust reactions compared to anger. In fact, most of the examples used in

Motivation and Cognition

moral-dumbfounding research have used morally disgusting acts, such as incest. Shame and Guilt

Shame and guilt are also moral emotions, but they arise when people judge themselves negatively. As with anger and disgust, the distinction between shame and guilt is also controversial. Perspectives developed by June Tangney from Helen Block Lewis’s psychoanalytic work have shown guilt to be a socially beneficial response to single acts of wrongdoing, but shame is a selfdefeating, withdrawing emotion based on perceiving the whole self as bad. Indeed, research from this perspective shows shame proneness to be related to a wide range of pathological behavioral outcomes. However, other theories and research emphasize the potential benefits of shame, showing that it can encourage prosocial behavior as well. Shame may even be a stronger prosocial emotion than guilt because it encourages people to address their whole moral character rather than being satisfied with offering reparations for a single instance of wrong. The difference may hinge on an alternative definition of shame that views the reputation of part of the self as in danger rather than judging the self as irredeemably spoiled. Other-Helping Emotions

Moving from the negative to the positive moral emotions, a long-standing tradition in moraldevelopmental research has demonstrated how empathy, sympathy, and compassion underlie moral behavior and how children develop these prosocial feelings. Psychologists distinguish between empathy, which involves coordinating one’s own feelings with those of another on a conscious or unconscious level, and sympathy or compassion, which are feelings motivating helpful action toward another person. However, the two are related. Studies using brain imaging or involving persons with deficits in the parts of the brain correlated with empathy show that these feelings are powerful determinants of the motivation to act morally by helping others and refraining from harming them.

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Finally, research has identified a number of emotional states specific to recognizing praiseworthy deeds in others: admiration for demonstrations of skill and competence, elevation when a specifically moral act is admired, and gratitude when the recipient of helping is oneself. These other-centered feelings, especially elevation and gratitude, tend to make the person who feels them more generous and helpful. Importantly, feelings of gratitude do not just encourage action to “pay back” the person who helped but to “pay forward” the good deed by helping other people. Roger Giner-Sorolla See also Adolescent Development, Theories of; Bandura, Albert; Childhood; Cultural Psychology; Emotion and Culture; Emotional Intelligence; Hermeneutics and Developmental Psychology; Human Agency; Heightened Consciousness; Lawrence Kohlberg; Moral Development; Neuroethics; Relational Theory

Further Readings Cushman, F., & Greene, J. D. (2012). Finding faults: How moral dilemmas illuminate cognitive structure. Social Neuroscience, 7(3), 269–279. Giner-Sorolla, R. (2012). Judging passions: Moral emotions in persons and groups. Hove, England: Psychology Press. Gray, K., Young, L., & Waytz, A. (2012). Mind perception is the essence of morality. Psychological Inquiry, 23(2), 101–124. Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108(4), 814–834. Skitka, L. J. (2010). The psychology of moral conviction. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 4(4), 267–281.

Motivation

and

Cognition

Motivation and cognition are fundamental processes that underlie many human actions. Importantly, they also influence each other in fundamental ways. When people are motivated, they engage in more elaborate cognitive processing

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as a way to attain goals and accomplish different tasks. Performance on many tasks is often thought to be primarily due to cognitive activity; however, outcomes may actually be heavily influenced by motivation. Individuals’ cognitions can also direct their motivation in meaningful ways through goal setting and activation, monitoring action, and helping the individual understand why certain outcomes occur. This entry defines the terms motivation and cognition separately and then discusses their mutual influences on one another.

Motivation Motivation means “to move” and deals with why individuals undertake some actions and not others. From the 1960s until the present, many of the major motivation theories have had strong social cognitive foci in that individuals’ beliefs, values, and goals are the major components of these theories. For instance, Bernard Weiner’s attribution theory accounts for how individuals’ attributions or explanations of their actions influence their subsequent achievement activity (e.g., Did I fail because I did not try hard enough or because I lack ability?). Modern expectancy value theory emphasizes how individuals’ expectancies concerning whether they can accomplish a task and the values they attach to the task influence their motivation to do the task. Several theories focus on how different kinds of goals (e.g., proximal versus distal goals) and broader goal orientations toward learning (e.g., Am I focused on mastering a task or on demonstrating that I am smart?) influence motivation. Albert Bandura’s social cognitive theory of motivation emphasizes the role of self-efficacy beliefs, defined as individuals’ beliefs that they can accomplish a task; individuals with positive efficacy beliefs take on more difficult tasks and persist more in the face of difficulty. Self-determination theory also emphasizes how competence and mastery are important influences on motivation; these theorists state that feeling autonomous and having positive relationships with others can improve motivation. Another important social cognitive motivation construct is interest, which affects how deeply individuals engage in different activities.

There are at least three important current trends in motivation research. First, researchers in achievement motivation increasingly focus on how the achievement context influences motivation and achievement, and they describe motivation as part of that context rather than being solely part of the person. Second, some motivation researchers are studying how brain function relates to ­motivation— that is, which areas of the brain control different kinds of motivation. Third, there is a growing emphasis on implicit or unconscious aspects of motivation, or how individuals’ actions and thoughts are influenced by things other than explicit thought processes. These unconscious aspects of motivation can be quite powerful.

Cognition Cognition refers to the mental processes by which humans encode, manipulate, store, and use information. Cognition encompasses broad processes, such as problem solving and learning, but it also refers to more specific and narrow processes, such as attention, memory, language, conceptual change, and reasoning. The contemporary understanding of cognition was heavily influenced by the tenets of the cognitive revolution, which began in the 1960s. This movement changed psychology from a strong behavioral focus to an emphasis on the role of cognitive processes in many aspects of learning and performance. One important part of this movement was the formulation of informationprocessing approaches to cognition, which focused on using the rule-based, symbol manipulation techniques of the computer as a way to model the workings of the human mind. Models of cognitive processing are widespread and varied, and often such models address only one small piece of overall human cognition, such as how an individual switches from using one problem-solving strategy to another. However, several common trends in these models speak to an overarching concept of cognition. First, models often emphasize the cognitive mechanisms, or architecture, that individuals have in common with one another and that cause individuals to process information in common ways. Second, many models assume that memory and knowledge are stored in the mind in a network form, with salient environmental features activating

Motivation and Cognition

particular nodes of the network. Third, cognitive models describe information processing that can be either conscious and explicit or unconscious and implicit (or even both, as is argued by dual process models of cognition). During the early phases of the cognitive revolution, researchers treated motivational factors merely as one source of input to a cognitive process. This effectively separated the fields of motivation and cognition, suggesting that although motivation could influence a cognitive model’s output, it could not affect the cognitive process itself. However, cognitive researchers have increasingly incorporated motivational elements, such as values and needs, into their working models of particular cognitive processes. Such a movement was first proposed with the so-called New Look in perception, spearheaded by Jerome Bruner in the 1950s as a critique of prevailing cognitive models, but the movement was not broadly accepted until the late 1980s. Since the resurgence of Bruner’s ideas, motivational factors have more frequently been integrated into cognitive models rather than being treated as parts of a system completely independent of cognition.

The Mutuality of Motivation and Cognition The next two sections describe major ways in which motivation and cognition influence one another. Motivation influences the intensity and length of engagement in cognitive activities as well as the outcomes of those tasks, and generates affect (positive, negative, or both) related to performance. Cognitive processes can affect motivation through selective attention to environmental stimuli, goal setting, priming, and self-regulation. Motivation Affecting Cognition

One way motivation affects cognition is by determining the intensity of the individual’s engagement in a cognitive activity. Does the individual approach the activity with a great deal of energy, or is it treated as something not worth that kind of effort, even if it is a challenging activity? When individuals engage intensively in a task, higher order cognitive processes are likely involved, often resulting in better performance, especially on complex tasks.

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Similarly, motivation can help determine an individual’s focus or lack thereof on cognitive tasks. When individuals are highly focused and intensely engaged in an activity, they exert the maximum possible effort. Such effort likely is needed for successful completion of activities that require deep cognitive processing, including complex reading activities, solving difficult mathematics problems, and so on. One’s motivational evaluations of an activity may help the individual when this high level of engagement is needed or when successful completion can result with less effort expended. Motivation also helps determine an individual’s persistence at a set of cognitive activities. When the activity is one that is important to the individual and one the individual believes can be accomplished, then he or she persists at it even when encountering stern challenges. Doing so helps the individual complete these kinds of cognitive tasks successfully. The intertwining of motivation and cognition means that reasoning processes once thought to exist solely in the cognitive domain are, in fact, affected by motivation. For instance, development of expertise in a domain has been shown to relate to interest in a particular domain, as well as to willingness to engage in deliberate practice to improve one’s skills in that domain. Thus, without motivation (in the form of interest, in this case), individuals could not become experts in their fields. Similarly, individuals need to have the right incentive structure to engage with a situation thoughtfully. They do not engage in deep thinking about every task that they are given. More broadly, individual differences in the strength of particular motives, such as individuals’ needs to feel competent or their preferences to pursue certain types of goals, have been shown to affect a number of basic outcomes that at first glance seem purely cognitive in nature, such as evaluating information as part of an argument, making a reasoned decision between two choices, organizing concepts in memory, or solving challenging math problems. Motivation and affect are highly related, and both can influence the cognitive processes in which the individual engages. When an individual engages in a cognitively challenging activity or engages in cognitive processes that are pleasurable, he or she enjoys both the activity and completing it

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successfully. If an activity is perceived as boring, little pleasure is obtained from successful completion. Last, if a set of cognitive activities is anxiety provoking, then the individual will likely try to disengage from it as soon as possible. Research suggests that the relations between affect, engagement, and outcomes are complex, however. Cognition Affecting Motivation

Humans’ motivational beliefs, values, and goals affect their subsequent cognitive processes, but their cognitive processes can also reciprocally affect their motivation. Specifically, if an individual attends to some stimulus in his or her environment, that stimulus can change the individual’s goals, values, and the intensity of behavior from what they might have otherwise been. Studies documenting the effects of cognitive processing on motivated behavior have led researchers such as Arie Kruglanski to conclude that motivation is colored by cognition in the same way that cognition is pervasively affected by motivation. Many motivational constructs incorporate cognitive elements in their actual structures, emphasizing the interdependence of motivation and cognition. For instance, a goal is considered to be a cognitive construct: Goals are chosen and activated because individuals use evidence from their surroundings to draw conclusions about what they should be doing. Similarly, attribution theorists argue that individuals’ attributions about their outcomes dictate their future goal pursuits and behavior choices. The processes of synthesizing information and drawing conclusions from that information are cognitive, and thus cognition is required for some motivational constructs. Beyond the structure of motivation, individuals’ cognitive processing can also affect the goals or values they endorse and how they pursue them. Research documenting such effects began in the 1990s through the work on priming conducted by John Bargh and colleagues. Priming is an experimental technique in which certain ideas, concepts, or words are shown to an individual, and these stimuli subsequently affect motivated behavior. Priming can induce cognitive processing that activates which goals individuals pursue or which values they endorse.

The perception of environmental stimuli can also activate how individuals pursue their goals or which means they use to achieve desired outcomes. Finally, priming-induced cognitive processing affects how individuals move between goals, including whether individuals stop pursuing a goal or how much progress they feel they have made toward a goal. Importantly, priming can be effective when it is unconscious or implicit without individuals ever being aware that their goals and values were manipulated. Some motivational processes once thought to be purely conscious, such as choosing a goal to pursue or a way to pursue it, in fact, can be unconsciously determined in many situations. Another way in which cognition affects motivation is through processes of self-regulation. Humans effectively engage in motivated behavior by regulating themselves in response to their surrounding environments. Doing so requires a great deal of cognitive monitoring, control, and other similar processes that fit under the umbrella of cognition. Motivated behavior requires substantial self-regulation and hence, cognition, to be executed successfully. For instance, individuals need sufficient cognitive capabilities in order to switch from one goal to another, shield competing temptations from interfering with a current motivated behavior, or alter motivated behavior in response to feedback from the environment. Allan Wigfield and Emily Q. Rosenzweig See also Attention; Bandura, Albert; Embodied Cognition; and; Emotion and Motivation; Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Motivation; Motivation and Personality; Needs; Perception and Motivation; Social Motives; Unconscious Motivation; Values

Further Readings Dai, D. Y., & Sternberg, R. J. (Eds.). (2004). Motivation, emotion, and cognition: Integrative perspectives on intellectual functioning and development. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Eccles, J. S., & Wigfield, A. (2002). Motivational beliefs, values, and goals. Annual Review of Psychology, 53, 109–132. Kruglanski, A. W., & Kopetz, C. (2009). The role of goal systems in self-regulation. In E. Morsella & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), Oxford handbook of human action: Social

Motivation and Culture cognition and social neuroscience (pp. 350–367). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Molden, D. C., & Higgins, E. T. (2005). Motivated thinking. In K. J. Holyoak & R. G. Morrison (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning (pp. 295–317). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Zimmerman, B. A. (2011). Motivational sources and outcomes of self-regulated learning and performance. In B. J. Zimmerman & D. H. Schunk (Eds.), Handbook of self-regulated learning and performance (pp. 49–64). London, England: Routledge.

Motivation

and

Culture

For decades, psychologists and researchers have studied the motivational underpinnings of achievement—that is, performance evaluated against a standard of excellence. Interest in the role of culture in understanding motivation—the internal state that energizes, directs, and sustains behavior—has reemerged. Researchers are becoming mindful that culture, often defined as membership in a racial, ethnic, or religious group, is not merely one of many predictors of motivation. Rather, individuals’ motivations and behaviors synchronize with the cultural practices, norms, and values in which they are embedded. This entry briefly describes culture, reviews the history of culture in the study of achievement motivation, and surveys major theories in motivation research and the efforts to understand their culturally situated meanings. It concludes by highlighting the need for a greater emphasis on sociocultural approaches to motivation.

Culture, Achievement Motivation, and Cultural Psychology Culture is the framework for human life. It is invisible, unnoticed, and ubiquitous. It is a complex, multifaceted aspect of the constructed environment that is both structural (societal institutions and organizations) and symbolic (heritage, tradition, values, and behavioral expectations). Culture is enacted in the ways groups perceive, represent, interpret, and assign values and meaning to their experiences.

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A situated perspective of persons in context— that is, thinking about persons in the context of their culture—has been evident in motivational research since at least the 1930s when Kurt Lewin emphasized that a person’s behavior is a function of the person and the environment. The study of achievement motivation—the desire to perform well in achievement situations—focused primarily on the need to compete and excel as the root cause of achievement. David McClelland, for example, argued that the key to an economically successful society is creating individuals motivated to achieve high levels of personal success. In The Achieving Society, he demonstrated how stressing the motive to achieve personal success in elementary school textbooks was related to the economic growth of a country 25 or more years later. He has since been criticized by motivational psychologists and anthropologists as being culturally insensitive for judging the world’s population as motivated or unmotivated based on a male- and Eurocentric standard of individual achievement—a criticism that is still valid and reflected in the methods used by many motivational researchers. Most motivational researchers study motivation as an individual phenomenon. They emphasize individual needs, goals, task values, and self-regulatory mechanisms while acknowledging that social and cultural factors also influence motivation. Cultural psychology, however, considers the varied ways members of a group interpret a culture’s norms and values. It examines the dynamic and reciprocal relationship between cultural and psychological processes. Researchers working from the cultural psychology perspective assert that culture and psyche are mutually constituted. From this perspective, it stands to reason that motivation is culturally grounded. For example, in an important study of self-construal, Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama explored culture’s role in shaping cognition, emotion, and motivation. They demonstrated that individualistic Western culture (including the United States and Europe) fosters an independent self-construal characterized as egocentric, autonomous, and unique. By contrast, collectivist Eastern culture (including China, Japan, and India) promotes an interdependent self-construal characterized as sociocentric

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and connected. Thus, in individualistic cultures, success is defined in individual terms and arises from a need to discover and express one’s unique attributes. In collectivist cultures, motivation to succeed stems from a desire to fulfill expectations of significant others and to achieve group goals. In achievement situations, attribution biases for the independent self are likely to be self-serving and self-enhancing based on social comparisons, but for the interdependent self, they are likely to be self-effacing. As cultural psychology advances in understanding the self, achievement motivation theories, or more specifically, sociocognitive theories of motivation—namely, self-efficacy, self-determination, expectancy value, attribution, and achievement goal theories—have broadened their focus to examine how cultural forces shape and inform individuals’ beliefs about autonomy and choice, expectations of success, causes of success and failure, goals they pursue, and paths they take to achieve these goals.

Self-Efficacy, Autonomy, and Choice A fundamental assumption of all sociocognitive theories of motivation is that individuals have an inherent need for independence, personal agency, responsibility, and control. Albert Bandura, the original proponent of self-efficacy theory, stresses the key role of beliefs in one’s own capabilities— efficacy beliefs—in accomplishing a task. Simply put, when people can decide their own destiny by shaping the environment to meet their specific needs and goals, they develop self-efficacy and competence. The assertion is that perceived personal efficacy contributes to the productive functioning for members of both individualistic and collectivistic cultures. Though self-efficacy does not necessarily exalt the self or produce an individualistic lifestyle, it can be argued that the underlying criteria for self-efficacy—personal choice and autonomy in shaping and molding one’s environment—are individualistic perspectives. Thus, people in less individualistic cultures, where choices are often made on their behalf, may be perceived as having lower levels of efficacy. Western scholars have tended to associate choice and autonomy with motivated behavior. Learning

that stems from an internal need to achieve personal goals serves as the basis for another set of motivational theories—namely, self-determination and intrinsic/extrinsic motivation theories. The underlying premise is that people value and engage in activities they find personally satisfying. They experience a sense of autonomy and intrinsic motivation when they choose to engage in a course of action, not when they are externally controlled. Self-determination theory is often criticized for adopting a Eurocentric perspective on autonomy, as it seems to suggest that the Eastern emphasis on doing one’s duty and placing a higher value on others’ expectations and needs is tantamount to losing autonomy and agency. Because Western thought conflates the different dimensions of agency and relatedness, an interdependent orientation is often thought to exclude autonomy because it emphasizes relatedness. However, based on cross-cultural research that included individualistic and collectivistic nations, self-determination theorists argue that autonomy, like relatedness, is a basic and universal motivational need. Individuals across individualistic and collectivistic cultures experience autonomy to the extent to which they volitionally endorse cultural values and practices.

Valuing Achievement and the Expectation of Success John Atkinson advanced an expectancy and value theory of achievement motivation according to which, in achievement situations, the value of succeeding in the task is an inverse function of the difficulty of the task or the probability of success or failure in performing it. Thus, people are motivated to select a task that is perceived as neither too easy nor too difficult but rather of intermediate difficulty, because it provides them the most information about their effort and capabilities. However, Atkinson and his colleagues paid little attention to the situated nature of these two orientations—that is, that choices and options for action in the real world are significantly framed by social norms, group expectations, and the feelings, actions, and thoughts of significant persons and groups. In the contemporary expectancy value theory— the Eccles-Wigfield model—expectations of success and subjective task value are the two most

Motivation and Culture

important predictors of achievement behavior. Subjective task value answers the question, “Why should I do this task?” and the answers might be interest in, the importance of, or the usefulness of the task. Individuals are likely to have a greater expectation of succeeding in a task they find relevant, meaningful, and important. Thus, in this model, expectations of success and subjective task value are positively, rather than inversely, related. Of particular relevance to understanding achievement motivation according to the model is the culturally embedded nature of subjective task value. Culture plays a critical role in shaping individuals’ values and expectations—and consequently, the choices they make and the options they eliminate. Thus, culture and context frame the opportunities for and constraints on individuals’ beliefs, motivations, and behavior.

Attributions for Success and Failure Individuals make attributions—that is, perceived reasons or causes—for both their successes and their failures. People across cultures have proffered various explanations of or attributions for their successes and failures. An attribution in terms of ability or effort to account for success or failure has a profound effect on individuals’ feelings about their capabilities and competences, consequent affective reactions, and future behaviors. Studies indicate that in the West, effort and ability share a reciprocal relationship. Someone who exerts considerable effort is viewed as possessing lower ability, but success achieved with little effort indicates high ability. Research provides some evidence that Asian students are more likely to attribute their academic setbacks or successes to effort than to ability. However, research also suggests that ability attributions may play a greater role in the achievement cognitions of Asian and Asian American children than previously thought, and in  studies where effort attributions are significantly associated with achievement, these associations are relatively small in magnitude.

Achievement Goals Achievement goal theory seeks to understand why people pursue certain tasks and the ways by which they judge and evaluate the tasks in which they

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engage. The theory postulates that individuals pursue mastery goals or performance goals (or both). Mastery goals emphasize learning, self-improvement, and task mastery; performance goals are focused on demonstrating ability or avoiding demonstrating low ability, including interpersonal comparisons. Considerable evidence has documented relationships between students’ mastery goal orientations and their use of cognitive, metacognitive, and resource management strategies (e.g., help seeking), and positive affect while engaged in a learning task. Performance goals, which can be distinguished as either approach or avoidant, are focused on gaining favorable judgments of ability (performance-approach) or not doing worse than others (performance-avoid). Performance goals have been consistently linked to maladaptive achievementrelated outcomes, such as lower self-efficacy, increased worry, and helpless behavior. Conceptions of mastery, performance-approach, and performance-avoid goals are closely tied to Western individualistic notions of achievement behavior, ­ reflecting an emphasis on self—be it self-­ improvement, self-enhancement, self-esteem, or self-protection. Current research is examining social goals in conjunction with achievement goals to identify goals that are culture-specific versus goals that are universal.

Cultural Minority Status and Motivation An understanding of culture and motivation is incomplete without a discussion of lost and blocked opportunities for cultural minority youth and the consequences for their motivation and achievement. Cultural minority adolescents are often at risk for maladaptive motivations and behavioral choices. Such motivations and choices are the consequence of exclusion experiences in the school context, perceptions that education cannot help them access blocked economic opportunities, fear of fulfilling low-ability stereotypes, or fear of not fulfilling high academic expectations associated with model minority stereotypes. Though racial discrimination has been associated with stronger achievement motivation for some African American youth, it also has the potential to lower achievement motivation.

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On the basis of a series of studies on stereotype threat, Claude Steele suggests that such awareness of negative perceptions about one’s sociocultural group is sufficient to undermine achievement. Negative stereotypes (“blacks are lazy” or “girls are bad at math”) convey attributional information that often results in long-term negative motivational and psychological consequences for group members. The attributions associated with the stereotype impose obstacles to success for stigmatized youth because attributions regarding the stigmatized group’s intellectual capacity are seen by group members and others as being relatively stable, internal, and uncontrollable qualities. Such attributions impair cognitive functioning as stigmatized group members dis-identify with academic achievement and focus their energy and efforts on protecting self-worth.

Implications Much of the achievement motivation research is based on middle-class White samples and is, therefore, culturally bound. When included, culture is treated as a categorical variable for cross-cultural comparisons, with motivation still treated as an individual and internal attribute. An expansion of sociocognitive motivational theories that accounts for the social and cultural aspects of motivation is essential. There is growing recognition that achievement motivation research needs to move beyond cross-cultural comparisons to a sociocultural and situated perspective wherein cultural context and individual characteristics are mutually instantiating. Revathy Kumar See also Achievement Motivation; Cultural Psychology; Motivation and Cognition; Self-Determination

Further Readings Elliot, A. J., & Dweck, C. S. (2005). Handbook of competence and motivation. New York, NY: Guilford Press. Kumar, R., & Maehr, M. L. (2010). Schooling, cultural diversity and student motivation. In J. L. Meece & J. Eccles (Eds.), Handbook of schools, schooling and human development (pp. 308–323). New York, NY: Routledge.

Wigfield, A., & Eccles, J. S. (2000). Expectancy-value theory of motivation. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 25, 68–81. Wolters, C. A. (2004). Advancing achievement goal theory: Using goal structures and goal orientations to predict students’ motivation, cognition, and achievement. Journal of Educational Psychology, 96, 236–250. Zusho, A., & Clayton, K. (2011). Culturalizing achievement goal theory and research. Educational Psychologist, 46, 239–260.

Motivation

and

Personality

William McDougall stated: Every man is constituted to desire certain goals which are common to the species, and the attainment of which goals satisfies and allays the urge or craving or desire that moves us. These goals are not only common to all men, but also . . . [to] their nearer relatives in the animal world, such goals as food, shelter from danger, the company of our fellows, intimacy with the opposite sex, triumph over our opponent, and leadership among our companions.

McDougall used the term instinct to refer to universal goals deeply rooted in human nature and common to all. Others have used the terms psychological need, intrinsic motive, and basic desire. Regardless of which term is used, universal goals motivate significant behavior and appear to motivate many personality traits. Indeed, Steven Reiss has argued that all human motives can be considered efforts to manage an individual’s experiences with one or more universal goals and that many, or all, personality traits are motivated by these goals. This entry discusses the relationship between personality and motivation. McDougall identified the following principal instincts by studying anthropological accounts of primitive societies and published observations of primates: •• Flight from danger •• Repulsion by pain •• Curiosity in response to new places or things

Motivation and Personality

•• Pugnacity when angered or threatened •• Parenting (protecting and cherishing the young) when feeling tender emotions •• Self-abasement (or subjection) when feeling ­negatively about oneself •• Self-display (or dominance) when in the presence of spectators •• Gregariousness (herd instinct) when lonely •• Sex (reproduction) when aroused

Murray’s Response to McDougall Many scholars objected to McDougall’s concept of human instincts. Henry Murray suggested that universal motives are influenced by the unconscious mind and are best understood as “psychological needs” rather than as instincts. He recognized a biological basis to psychological needs but offered few details. Murray considered needs to be the organizing themes of one’s personality. Based on in-depth case studies, he initially identified the ­following 20 needs: 1. Abasement—the need to surrender and accept punishment 2. Achievement—the need to overcome obstacles and succeed 3. Affiliation—the need for friendships 4. Aggression—the need to injure others 5. Autonomy—the need to resist others and stand strong 6. Counteraction—the need to defend honor 7. Defendance—the need to justify actions 8. Deference—the need to follow a superior 9. Dominance—the need to control and lead others 10. Exhibition—the need for attention

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15. Play—the need to relieve tension, have fun, or relax 16. Rejection—the need to exclude another 17. Sentience—the need for sensuality 18. Sex—the need for erotic relationships 19. Succorance—the need for support 20. Understanding—the need to analyze and know

Murray acknowledged that his list of needs was not very different from lists constructed by McDougall. Nevertheless, his work was enormously influential for about 35 years.

A Later List Psychologists have created many additional lists of needs, but none have received wide endorsement. Susan Havercamp and Reiss embraced a new approach in which they asked people to rate the extent to which each of 328 goals—every psychological goal they or their colleagues could produce—motivated them. Many psychologists had assumed that people do not know what their true motives are; they assumed that the most substantial motives are part of the unconscious mind and not readily called into awareness. These psychologists based their lists of needs on methods that did not ask people direct questions but instead produced psychological interpretations of the stories people made up in response to various drawings and pictures of psychologically suggestive scenes. Havercamp and Reiss used questionnaires that identified 16 psychological needs, which they variously called “basic desires” or “intrinsic motives.” It is the first empirically derived list of psychological needs, and subsequent research has established its reliability and validity. The 16 basic desires, or psychological needs, are as follows:

11. Harm avoidance—the need to avoid pain 12. Infavoidance—the need to avoid failure/shame or conceal weakness 13. Nurturance—the need to protect the helpless 14. Order—the need to arrange, organize, and be precise

1. Acceptance—the desire for positive self-regard 2. Curiosity—the desire for understanding 3. Eating—the desire for food 4. Family—the desire to raise children and spend time with siblings

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5. Honor—the desire for upright character 6. Idealism—the desire for social justice 7. Independence—the desire for self-reliance 8. Order—the desire for structure 9. Physical activity—the desire for muscle exercise 10. Power—the desire for influence or leadership 11. Romance—the desire for beauty and sex 12. Saving—the desire to collect 13. Social contact—the desire for peer companionship 14. Status—the desire for respect based on social standing 15. Tranquillity—the desire for safety 16. Vengeance—the desire to confront those who offend

The 16 basic desires may have a genetic origin. They have been demonstrated in samples from three continents (North America, Europe, and Asia), and in multiple cultures. Further, a number of them can be observed in nonhuman animals. For example, they raise their young (indicating a desire for family), defend themselves (indicating a desire for vengeance), have sex (indicating a desire for romance), show fear (indicating a desire for tranquillity), display dominance (indicating a desire for power), eat (indicating a desire for food), and exercise (indicating a desire for muscle exercise). This is not to say that culture and upbringing play no role in determining the strength of the desires. Certain desires may be encouraged in some cultures or families and suppressed in others. Parents, for example, might encourage their children to start reading at a very early age, and others might encourage early sports participation. Parents in a very small apartment might discourage uninhibited running around. Such differences in upbringing, especially in the early years, may strengthen or diminish the natural desires with which a child is born. The 16 basic desires appear to motivate personality traits. Strong and weak intensities of the 16 basic desires, but not average intensities, are

associated with 16 pairs of opposite personality traits. To satisfy a strong need for social contact, for example, a person might seek frequent social experiences and many friends and acquaintances. Typically, the individual is gregarious, likable, friendly, and socially skilled, because these personality traits lead to frequent social experiences and, thus, produce not only what the individual wants but also “how much” the person wants in terms of approximate intensity, frequency, or amount of social contact. On the other hand, a person with a weak need for social contact seeks only occasional social experiences. This individual might be a loner, private, or perhaps even difficult because these traits lead to infrequent social experiences. They produce not only what the individual wants but also how much in terms of infrequent or only occasional social experiences. As these examples show, to understand the connections between psychological needs and personality traits, it is important to consider not only what the individual wants but also to what extent, which is suggested by the intensity of the need. Average-intensity needs do not appear to be associated with personality traits. Apparently, average-intensity psychological needs do not require distinctive forms of behavior in order to be satisfied. A person who seeks an average amount of social contact does not need to be uncommonly friendly or uncommonly difficult to get what he or she wants. Everyday life might provide the amount of social contact required to ­satisfy an average need. Only when the intensity of a need is unusually strong or unusually weak is the individual unusually friendly or unusually difficult. Table 1 shows the personality traits theoretically motivated by strong and weak versions of the 16 basic desires. It potentially explains why personality traits are oppositional. The table is intended to show how certain personality traits might be the result of the same motive at different intensities of motivation. Consider, for example, the need for acceptance. Everybody is motivated to be accepted but to different extents. People who have a strong desire to be accepted may appear to others as insecure. Those with a weak desire for acceptance may impress others as self-confident. People who have

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Table 1  Basic Desires and Their Associated Personality Traits as a Function of Intensity of Desire Basic Desire

Strong Intensity

Weak Intensity

Acceptance Curiosity Eating Family Honor Idealism Independence Order Physical activity Power Romance Saving Social contact Status Tranquillity Vengeance

Insecure Thinker Hearty eater Doting Righteous Dreamer Independent Organized Energetic Assertive Sensual Thrifty Extrovert Elitist Timid Competitive

Secure Doer Light eater Childless Expedient Realist Dependent Spontaneous Inactive Passive Platonic Wasteful Introvert Egalitarian Courageous Cooperative

an average-intensity desire for acceptance make no distinctive impression on other people with regard to how confident or insecure they are. In addition, they may have confidence in some situations but lack confidence in others. The 16 basic desires contribute to individual uniqueness. Everybody possesses all 16, but individuals prioritize and value them differently. Different priorities are revealed in personal values and identify what is meaningful to the individual. The Reiss Motivation Profile® (RMP) is a standardized personality assessment. Individuals answer questions about their motives, and the results indicate how the person prioritizes the 16 basic desires. The results also provide plain-­ language statements of how the individual’s basic desires might motivate his or her personality traits. People who complete the assessment seek insights into how their motives, values, and personality traits relate to each other. As of this writing, more than 100,000 people from many cultures in North America, Europe, and Asia have completed the RMP. The RMP has been validated against factors such as relationships, the Big 5 personality traits, preference for television shows, the choice of college major, sports participation, and religiosity. Steven Reiss

See also Achievement Motivation; Big Five Model and Lexical Trait Theory; Culture and Personality; Emotion and Motivation; Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Motivation; Motivation and Culture; Personality Development; Personality Types Versus Personality Traits; Unconscious Motivation

Further Readings Havercamp, S. H., & Reiss, S. (2004). A comprehensive assessment of human striving: Reliability and validity of the Reiss Profile. Journal of Personality Assessment, 81, 123–132. Olson, K., & Weber, D. (2004). Relations between Big Five traits and fundamental motives. Psychological Reports, 97, 795–802. Reiss, S. (2013). The Reiss Motivation Profile: What motivates you. Worthington, OH: IDS.

Motor Development Newborn infants have little ability to produce goal-directed movements. However, by the end of their first year, most are able to sit and stand unassisted, crawl or even walk across a floor, and reach for and grasp a toy. This evolving repertoire of

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voluntary movements provides evidence of developmental change. Motor development focuses on changes in movements over the course of a life span and the different factors that drive or underlie these changes. This entry reviews the study of motor development in infants and children. The study of motor development began in earnest early in the 20th century. At that time, theories of motor development included central control mechanism driving change and focused on specific changes in motor behavior (i.e., movements) only. During the late 20th century, a theoretical shift occurred toward perspectives that included distributed control over many different levels and framed motor development within the context of overall development.

Early Theories of Motor Development Early in the 20th century, motor development gained popularity as an area of inquiry within child development as the discipline of child psychology flourished. During this time, the prevailing debate within developmental psychology was the “nature versus nurture” dichotomy. Simply put, were the factors driving infant and child development based on maturation (nature) or environment (nurture)? This debate influenced the study of motor development, which predominantly fell into the nature camp. According to maturational theory, environmental factors (e.g., training) would not influence early motor development until maturation of the nervous system was complete. Psychologists such as Arnold Gesell, Myrtle McGraw, and Nancy Bayley studied movement in infants and children, looking for stagelike change in motor behavior and creating developmental norms for motor milestones. By the 1960s, motor development research had fallen out of vogue within child psychology. At around that time, many researchers in motor behavior began to adopt information processing as their theoretical perspective and to use a computer analogy to understand human behavior. Of paramount importance were cognitive processes that linked a stimulus (e.g., input, perception) to a response (e.g., output, action). Within the general study of motor behavior, researchers investigated reaction time (the most simple stimulus–response arrangement involving

information processing) and different factors that affect it, such as attention, speed, number of decisions or choices, and feedback. A small group of researchers adopted information-processing theory to examine changes in motor behavior in children and young adults. This research focused on how information processing changed (rather than how movement changed) at different points during childhood. It is important to note that during this period, a body of research dedicated to motor development arose from physical education as well as physical and occupational therapy and other health-related fields rather than from psychology. That research focused on changes in movement product or output (e.g., throwing speed, walking distance) described as either normative—that is, related to age-specific norms for particular movement patterns—or descriptive norms related to description of mechanics of the body at different ages. Although researchers frequently adopted a maturational perspective, theory did not drive research as it had in the early part of the century. Instead, researchers focused on application—how they could use their findings within physical education, activity, sport, and rehabilitation. In summary, although the maturational and information-processing theories of motor development invoked different mechanisms of developmental change, both perspectives regarded change as hierarchically driven and originating from cognitive processes that ultimately change motor skills. Furthermore, these theories viewed motor development as a separate process that depended on, but did not contribute to, overall development. As the 20th century progressed, both practitioners and psychologists began to question these two central tenets and to examine motor development in a new way.

Contemporary Perspectives Since the 1970s, interest in motor development has reemerged with a different theoretical perspective. The dichotomy of the nature versus nurture argument gave way to the understanding that both environment and heredity contribute to development, and therefore, new theoretical perspectives were required to understand developmental processes. Similarly, those who studied motor

Motor Development

development grappled with formulating theories that account for intrinsic and extrinsic factors that influence movement across the life span, as well as interactions between those factors. Such efforts mirrored the theoretical unrest in the study of motor behavior as a whole and ultimately resulted in a shift toward an ecological perspective, which is the prevailing theoretical approach today. Inherent to the ecological perspective is a shift away from dualities, such as the individual/­ environment and brain/body frameworks of earlier theories. Further, early theories involved top-down, central-control mechanisms. Both the maturational and information-processing theories placed motor development squarely in the realm of ­control by the central nervous system and, more specifically, the developing cerebral cortex. Alternatively, the ecological perspective examined reciprocal influences and interactions among different systems within and outside the human body at multiple levels. In this framework, the central nervous system represented just one of many interacting systems responsible for overall development. This led to the notion that motor development should not be studied in isolation but rather as an integral part of the entire developmental process. The two branches of the ecological approach used within motor development are frequently termed the dynamical systems or pattern approach and the perception–action approach. These two are not mutually exclusive but do have different foci. The Dynamic-Systems Approach

In the late 1970s, a multidisciplinary group of scientists worked collaboratively in using the tools of nonlinear dynamics as a means to study motor behavior. They applied this framework to development, which caught the attention of Esther Thelen, a developmental psychologist at Indiana University. In the 1980s, Thelen explored the efficacy of an ecological perspective in infant motor development and popularized this perspective as an alternative theory of motor development. The roots of the dynamic-pattern approach come from chaos theory. At the core of this theory is the view that human behavior emerges from the interaction of many elements within a context that is both complex and nonlinear. At any given time,

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individuals move in ways that represent system attractor states; that is, certain movements are stable and have a higher probability of occurring, given the interaction of internal and external systems. For example, when moving from one place to another, human beings are most likely to walk, although they can run, skip, hop, gallop, or crawl. However, if one of the systems or the context of motion is changed, then different movement patterns can emerge. An individual who would walk while on earth would use a different motor pattern (bounding) to get from one place to the other if on the moon. Another important construct is phase transition or a shift among attractor states. Phase shifts are caused by scaling up or down along important variables affecting motion. In the example of the walker, if asked (or forced) to increase locomotion speed, he or she will continue to walk until reaching a certain speed, then break into a run. The walk and run are distinct attractor states, and speed is the control variable responsible for the phase shift between the two. Over the first year of infants’ lives, different attractor states exist (e.g., crawling, cruising, and walking while supported), and the scaling of different control systems (strength, balance, or coordination) mediates the shifts among them. Another model of motor development based on nonlinear dynamics is Newell’s model of constraints. According to this model, movement emerges from the interaction of characteristics of the individual (internal to the body), environment (external to the body), and task (movement objectives) within a movement context. These constraints dynamically interact, and this interaction encourages certain types of movement while discouraging others. For example, a typically developing 7-year-old child (the individual) in an elementary school hallway (the environment) who is in line to go to the lunchroom (the task) may walk (the emergent movement) there. However, if constraints change, the emergent movement may change as well. That same child in the same hallway at the end of the school day may be running, skipping, galloping, or jumping. Over time and with repeated experiences, the interaction of individual, environment, and task constraints lead to stronger attractor states

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Multiple Intelligences

(i.e., more stable movements). This model allows for the changing influence of different constraints at different points during development.

See also Behavioral Development; Childhood; Cognitive Development; Kinesthetic System; Nature Versus Nurture; Neurodevelopmental Disorders; Perceptual Development; Play; Prenatal Development

The Perception–Action Approach

Further Readings

Introduced by J. J. Gibson in the 1960s, this approach suggests direct links between perception and action that do not rely on cognitively m ­ ediated interpretations. In this approach, as individuals interact with their environment, they perceive objects in relation to their own, personal action capabilities. According to Gibson’s notion of affordances, objects afford functions based on their physical properties once those properties are scaled to the dimensions of the individual who observes the objects. These are the actions or movements that the objects permit and are ­perceived directly. For example, when toddlers move to an upright position, they perceive chairs to be support systems on which they steady their bodies as they take steps. Adults, on the other hand, compare the chair to their own dimensions and sit on it. In these situations, individuals use body scaling; that is, they move based on the unique relationship between objects in the environment and their own body dimensions. Within the perception–action approach, infants develop affordances through early exploration of the environment and the reciprocal relations that exist between perception and action. Perception of the environment drives action: An infant sees a toy and attempts to reach for it. The movement of the arm drives further perception. Both the dynamic-systems and perception– action approaches place the motor system in the context of the entire human being rather than as a unique system developing in parallel with cognitive, perceptual, emotional, and other processes. Further, these approaches do not require top-down, cognitively mediated control. The types of questions that develop from these approaches are substantially different from nature versus nurture and have resulted in a growing body of research studies with far-­ reaching implications for rehabilitation, learning, and overall human development.

Adolph, K. E., & Berger, S. E. (2005). Physical and motor development. In M. H. Bornstein & M. E. Lamb (Eds.), Developmental science: An advanced textbook (5th ed., pp. 223–281). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Clark, J. E., & Whitall, J. (1989). What is motor development? The lessons of history. Quest, 41, 183–202. Haywood, K., & Getchell, N. (2014). Life span motor development (6th ed.). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Thelen, E., & Smith L. B. (1994). A dynamic systems approach to the development of cognition and action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Nancy Getchell

Multiple Intelligences The theory of multiple intelligences (MI) was developed by Howard Gardner, a professor of cognition and education at Harvard University. Introduced in his 1983 book, Frames of Mind, and refined in subsequent writings, Gardner’s theory challenges the views of intelligence as measured by IQ and as described by Jean Piaget’s universal stages of cognitive development. Arguing that human intelligence is neither a single entity nor a unified set of processes, Gardner maintains that there are several distinct, relatively autonomous intelligences. Individual intellectual profiles reflect varied configurations of these intellectual capacities. This entry describes the theory of multiple intelligences, how it can be misunderstood, and how it is put into practice.

Basic Claims of the Theory MI theory presents at least three ideas that are revolutionary in the understanding of intelligence: the definition of intelligence, criteria for identifying an intelligence, and identified intelligences. In his later book, Intelligence Reframed: Multiple Intelligences for the 21st Century, Gardner defined

Multiple Intelligences

intelligence as “a bio-psychological potential to process information that can be activated in a cultural setting to solve problems or create products that are of value in a culture” (pp. 33–34). By considering intelligence as a potential, Gardner asserts its emergent and responsive nature, thereby differentiating his theory from IQ, which views human intelligence as fixed and innate. Whether a potential is activated depends in large part on the values of the culture in which an individual grows up and the learning opportunities available in that culture. Development of the intelligences is influenced simultaneously by individual biological dispositions, environmental factors, education, and personal effort. These activating influences contribute to the expression of a range of intelligences from culture to culture and from individual to individual. In the process of developing MI theory, Gardner considered the range of adult end states valued in diverse cultures around the world, such as computer programmers, teachers, lawyers, athletes, scientists, and tribal leaders, to name a few. To identify abilities that support these adult roles, he examined empirical data from disciplines that had not been considered previously in defining human intelligence, including brain function, evolutionary history, special human populations, correlations of intelligence test results, development of symbol systems, and core operations of intelligences. His examination of these data sets yielded eight criteria for identifying an intelligence. Of principal importance to Gardner in developing the criteria was capturing the range of purposes and processes entailed in human cognitive functioning. For Gardner, the criteria developed to identify intelligences are the most original and important feature of MI theory. To date, Gardner has identified eight intelligences: linguistic intelligence, logical-ma intelligence, musical intelligence, spatial intelligence, bodilykinesthetic intelligence, naturalistic intelligence, interpersonal intelligence, and intrapersonal intelligence. Although linguistic and logicalmathematical intelligences have been emphasized in psychometric testing and school settings, no intelligence in the MI framework is seen as inherently more important than the others. Although independent of one another, intelligences

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do not operate in isolation. In fact, human activity normally reflects the integrated functioning of several intelligences.

Common Misunderstandings of the Theory The notion of multiple intelligences is sometimes confused or conflated with the concepts of domain, style, or content. Although related, the concepts of intelligence and domain are readily distinguishable. Intelligence refers to biological and psychological potentials within an individual. Domains are bodies of knowledge valued and applied within a culture. An intelligence may be deployed in many domains. For example, spatial intelligence may operate in the domains of visual arts, navigation, and engineering. Similarly, performance in a domain may require the use of more than one intelligence. For example, an effective clinical therapist relies on at least linguistic and personal intelligences. Style and intelligence are fundamentally different psychological constructs. Style refers to an individual’s characteristic and consistent approach to organizing and processing information; for example, a person can have an impulsive or playful style. MI theory is not a stylistic theory. Rather, it views a person’s intellectual profile as reflecting his or her computational capacities in processing various kinds of content (e.g., spatial, musical, and person related) in the environment. Although the psychological literature thinks of styles as relatively stable attributes of the individual that are evident across a wide range of situations, MI theory suggests the possibility that style is a domainspecific construct as well. According to MI theory, an intelligence is sensitive to specific content but is not itself a content. For example, logical-mathematical intelligence is activated when individuals operate on quantities, written numbers, and scientific formulas. However, the ability to appreciate and use numerical, abstract, and logical reasoning to solve problems entails more than the content of numbers and formulas. Most theories of intelligence, whether unitary or pluralistic, are “horizontal” theories; they posit that there are general capacities—such as attention, memory, or speed of processing—that cut across all manner of content. MI theory is

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“vertical.” It differentiates between memory for music, memory for language, memory for bodily position, and so on and makes no assumption that strength (or weakness) of memory in one intelligence predicts strength (or weakness) in others.

The Theory in Practice Gardner makes no attempt to isolate MI theory from MI practice, and MI theory was almost immediately put to practical use. The commerce between MI theory and practice has been a continuous, and for the most part, productive process. Since its inception, MI theory has touched numerous applied fields of psychology and education, including counseling psychology, developmental therapy, assessment, gifted education, programs for at-risk children, and bilingual education, to name a few. As Gardner’s books on MI have been translated into more than 20 languages, the idea has traveled from one continent to another and one culture to another. MI-inspired practices have made noticeable impacts in many countries and regions around the world. Three areas—the view of children and their development, approaches to curriculum and instruction, and classroom assessment—are described here to illustrate the impact. Development of Children

MI theory contends that all human beings possess a range of intelligences and no two human beings possess exactly the same profile of intellectual strengths and weaknesses. Respect for individual differences in learning and development is a basic premise of effective education. From MI theory’s perspective, development is domain specific and contextual. The development of children’s intellectual abilities is tied to specific bodies of knowledge and skills and is not based on general cognitive structures that operate across domains. Strength in one intelligence does not necessarily predict strength in another. The strengths and weaknesses exhibited in a child’s intellectual profile may change over time. Development is also contextualized. Specifically, intelligence develops among individuals when they interact with others, use cultural tools, and engage

in activities. To foster children’s intellectual abilities, MI theory suggests that educators attend to cultural values and tools, community goals, and motivations of the child. Approaches to Curriculum and Instruction

From an MI perspective, curricula should encompass a broad range of subject areas that include but go beyond literacy and math. Limited exposure to curricular areas decreases possibilities for children to learn and understand varied symbol systems, express themselves with diverse tools, and develop their potentials to the greatest extent. It also reduces the likelihood of discovering interests and abilities that parents and teachers can nurture. An MI-based approach to instruction invites teachers to use multiple entry points to promote students’ in-depth exploration and understanding of topics and concepts essential to disciplinary knowledge. Gardner makes it clear that MI theory is not and should not be the goal of curriculum. Instead, the framework should be used to assist teachers in organizing curriculum around essential topics, in supporting children’s learning of key concepts and skills in relation to these topics, and in promoting the development of intellectual potentials supported by multiple symbol systems. Classroom Assessment

The primary purpose of assessment from the MI perspective is to aid development and learning rather than to sort, track, or label children. In so doing, MI-based assessment samples a wide range of intellectual abilities to help identify children’s strengths. It also uses “intelligence-fair” instruments that assess each intellectual capacity through media appropriate to the domain rather than relying on traditional linguistic or logical methods. This kind of assessment involves students in work on genuine problems and projects that engage them and hold their interest. Students are informed of the purpose of the task and the assessment criteria. They are encouraged to work individually, in pairs, or in a group. The assessment process is meaningful to students, and the results are instructive for teachers.

Music Perception

Significance Since the publication of Frames of Mind in 1983, MI theory has become one of the most influential theoretical forces in the fields of developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, and education. It emphasizes the concepts of diversity, equality, possibility, richness, and expansion. It confirms beliefs about children as individuals that many educators hold and practice and provides them with language to describe children’s distinctive intellectual profiles. It calls for mobilizing resources to help individual children reach their highest potentials and to enrich their contributions to society. Jie-Qi Chen See also Brain and Intelligence; Cognitive Development; Emotional Intelligence; Intelligence and Individualism; Intelligence Testing and Ethnicity; Measurement of Intelligence; Piaget’s and the Neo-Piagetian Theories of Cognitive Development; Triarchic Intelligence

Further Readings Chen, J-Q., Moran, S., & Gardner, H. (Eds.). (2009). Multiple intelligences theory around the world. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Gardner, H. (1993). Multiple intelligences: The theory in practice. New York, NY: Basic Books. Gardner, H. (1999). Intelligence reframed: Multiple intelligences for the 21st century. New York, NY: Basic Books. Gardner, H. (2004). Frames of mind: The theory of multiple intelligence (20th anniv. ed.). New York, NY: Basic Books.

Music Perception Theories of music perception have deep roots going back to classical philosophy. However, a number of more modern theories were inspired in the 19th and 20th centuries by known properties of the peripheral and central auditory system, as well as accepted ideas about the structure of Western music. Most of these theories are testable through scientific studies of human and animal perception, computer simulations, and detailed analysis of composed or improvised music. This

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entry discusses pitch, rhythm, and the connection of music perception to cognitive abilities.

Musical Pitch A fundamental aspect of musical pitch perception is the experience of consonance and dissonance, which refers to the fact that some notes sound good together, whereas other notes do not sound good together when played at the same time. Tones that barely differ in frequency often produce the perception of roughness or beating, which sounds like periodic fluctuations in loudness and, when perceived, lead people to report hearing dissonance. However, it is also the case that pairs of tones created to be inharmonic with each other without any beating (i.e., they have small differences in frequency but not small enough to produce perceptible beating) are similarly heard as dissonant. In the middle to late 20th century, researchers proposed theories that describe the internal representation of musical pitch in geometrical terms. For example, musical pitch can be conceived as having a two-dimensional structure. The first dimension corresponds to the linear relationship between notes that are relatively low or high when compared to each other. A second, circular dimension is necessary because, as musical notes keep rising in pitch, they eventually return to the same note, now an octave higher than the original note (e.g., A at 440 Hz is the same note name as A at 220 Hz). Unifying these two dimensions results in a single-helix (i.e., corkscrew) structure. Musical keys or scales, such as C major, G major, and A minor can also be related geometrically. Musicians trained in Western music are familiar with the fact that C major and G major scales have a strong relationship because they are both major scales, and they share most of the same notes. Likewise, C major and A minor scales contain exactly the same notes but differ in terms of the major-minor distinction and thus their emotional connotations (i.e., major keys connote more positive affect than minor keys do). Using goodness-of-fit ratings for each of the 12 notes within an octave (C, C-sharp, D, D-sharp, etc.) when played in the context of each of the 24 major and minor scales, all scales can be related to each other on a torus (i.e., doughnut) structure,

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with more closely related scales being represented near each other. Movement through this pitch space during the unfolding of music over time likely leads to the feeling of tension and its resolution that generate musical emotion for the listener. Across cultures, the perception of music is often focused on melody, the sequence of performed pitches. Melodies or tunes (e.g., “Greensleeves”) are remarkable because they can be played on a range of instruments (e.g., a fiddle), in various keys (e.g., C major), or in different pitch registers (e.g., sung by a soprano), and still be recognized as the same melody. This is because melodies are encoded by the pattern of pitches going up, down, or staying the same from one note to the next, a structure called contour. Melodies can also be encoded by the more specific pattern of intervals (e.g., the sequence of notes C, G, and E forms intervals of seven semitones up in pitch, followed by three semitones down in pitch). Importantly, melodies are not simply perceived passively and stored for later recognition when played again, but each successive note in a melody leads to strong expectations about which note will come next. Expectations can result from memories for familiar melodies, but expectations are also formed about unfamiliar melodies through general knowledge. According to the implication– realization model, one note followed by a second note that is much higher in pitch generally leads to an expectation of a third note that forms a small, falling interval with the second note. In contrast, one note followed by a second note that is only a little higher in pitch generally leads to an expectation of a third note that continues the upward trajectory with another small interval. The fulfillment and violation of such melodic expectations plays an important role in the emotional ebb and flow during music listening.

Musical Rhythm In addition to melody, music is characterized by timing patterns (the duration between the beginnings of successive notes) known as rhythm. Musical rhythm often creates the feeling of a strong pulse, known as the beat or tactus. When people snap their fingers, clap their hands, or move to the music, they are usually moving in synchrony

with this beat. The beat is often heard in the framework of a recurring pattern of strong (accented) and weak (unaccented) beats called meter. Rhythm is present in the physical properties of music, but beat and meter are internal representations perceived from the music. Several types of theories attempt to explain how people perceive beat and meter in music. Rulebased theories try to fit an internal “clock” that “ticks” to the music depending on the specific pattern of intervals in the rhythm. Unlike a real listener, these models evaluate entire rhythmic ­patterns at once instead of as intervals unfolding in time and do not take into account small timing differences that typically occur during performances. Musicians’ fluctuations in timing are essential in expressing the emotional qualities of music, as well as communicating nuances of the pitch and rhythmic structure. Oscillator models attempt to explain beat perception as the result of an internal rhythmic process that synchronizes to the rhythm of music. These processes oscillate at a frequency dictated by an internally preferred tempo in conjunction with the musical rhythm and generate predictions for when the next beat will occur in time. The oscillators update their predictions constantly in real time, shifting the rate and phase of the internal oscillations to match the perceived beat heard in the music. Oscillator models can also account for meter by assuming the presence of two or more oscillators that simultaneously track the music at different rates and corresponding to the strong or weak beats of the meter. Empirical studies suggest that perception of rhythm and beat in music may result from both auditory-processing mechanisms and mechanisms used for controlling actions. For example, people typically perceive and produce intervals between beats that correspond to the time range of common repetitive behaviors, such as the time between steps while walking or the human heartbeat. Several subcortical and cortical motor control areas of the brain are consistently activated in brain-imaging studies of rhythm perception. However, it is possible that such observations are coincidental and that rhythm perception is mostly determined by auditory system-specific mechanisms. A similar debate exists in studies of speech perception, leaving open the possibility that a

Music Perception

similar theoretical framework will explain aspects of speech and music perception. Another consequence of rhythm is the grouping of sequences of notes, similar to the process of grouping words into phrases in language. A prominent theory suggests that at the lowest level, notes in a rhythm are grouped into patterns based on phenomenal accents—differences in intensity, pitch, and intervals between successive onsets, according to the Gestalt rules of proximity and similarity. For example, notes preceded by a long pause or notes with a comparatively long duration are perceived as accented. Using perceived accents to group notes into repeating patterns compresses a large amount of information into a single unit for ease of processing. There is also some evidence that with training and experience, listeners may be able to group larger sequences of music together to perceive higher levels of musical structure.

The Nature and Nurture of Music Perception People who regularly practice music exhibit perceptual and cognitive advantages in music-related abilities (e.g., hearing speech in noisy situations or detecting small changes in pitch). The transfer of musical abilities to similar auditory and motor tasks likely depends on enhanced representations in auditory and motor brain areas. Greater enhancement in processing is observed in musicians who began their training at an early age (before age 7), and improvements in perceptual and cognitive abilities increase as the duration of musical training increases. Critical or sensitive periods for developing enhanced skills may exist, requiring training to begin early in development when the brain is most malleable. However, older adults taking music lessons for the first time show enhanced auditory and motor abilities and may even show less of the decline associated with old age. These findings demonstrate that plasticity as a result of musical training can occur at any stage of life. Advantages for musicians compared to nonmusicians can be observed in tasks seemingly unrelated to music, as demonstrated by improvements in attention, memory, and even social and emotional abilities. An important question is whether such enhancements are specific to engaging in

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music training or whether other activities might similarly benefit the abilities previously mentioned. Activities that may enhance attention and other cognitive functions in a fashion similar to musical experience include action video game playing and learning a second language. Shared regions of the brain may be used to process information from different domains, such as language and music, and this overlap may lead to the transfer of improvements from one domain to another. The OPERA hypothesis suggests that in order for transfer to occur, brain regions require physical overlap, greater precision in music than the other domain, positive emotion, frequent repetition, and focused attention. Although perceptual and cognitive advantages may occur as a result of prolonged musical training, preexisting differences in the structure, size, or connectivity of brain regions may lead individuals to pursue musical training. Similarly, socioeconomic status and personality traits might affect whether children take costly music lessons and continue musical training. Therefore, the enhanced cognitive abilities linked to musical training may be caused by personality and other individual differences instead. Musical behavior is not limited to individuals taking music lessons. Indeed, many of the abilities involved in perceiving pitch and rhythm described earlier are qualitatively similar for musicians and nonmusicians. As infants, people learn a wealth of knowledge about music through mere exposure and through attending to the infant-directed speech and song of their caregivers. Humans may have uniquely evolved the ability to engage in and enjoy music. Like human music, gibbon, bird, and whale songs consist of sequences of “notes”; however, there is little evidence that such songs are based on the types of complex pitch and rhythmic representations described here or that they serve similar aesthetic or emotional functions. Evolutionarily, music may have conferred advantages to humans through the regulation of emotion between infant and caregiver or may have acted to facilitate social bonding and coordination, helping individuals move or work together. Music may have also been sexually advantageous, indicating reproductive fitness, as with vocal and visual displays (e.g., colorful feathers) in nonhuman species.

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A final consideration is the degree of overlap between music and language processing. Evidence that shared mechanisms are used to process specific features of both music and language could shed light on whether music and language evolved independently or one emerged out of the other. Violations of musical and linguistic rules activate overlapping frontal brain regions, but it remains unclear whether this overlap is due to shared processing resources. Pitch and rhythm are integral to the creation of emotional meaning in music, but they may also underlie speech processing, allowing for rich comparisons to be made between the two domains throughout the life span. Joel S. Snyder, Christina Vanden Bosch der Nederlanden, and Jessica Nave-Blodgett

See also Auditory Perception; Cognition and Language; Perception and Language

Further Readings Deutsch, D. (2013). The psychology of music (3rd ed.). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Academic Press. Huron, D. B. (2006). Sweet anticipation: Music and the psychology of expectation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. London, J. (2012). Hearing in time: Psychological aspects of musical meter (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Patel, A. D. (2008). Music, language, and the brain. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Wallin, N. L., Merker, B., & Brown, S. (2000). The origins of music. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

N This plan was short-circuited when, in July 1858, he received a manuscript from Alfred Russel Wallace, a fellow Englishman pursuing studies in the Malay Archipelago and who had conceived the same ideas as Darwin. Wallace asked Darwin to review his manuscript and, if worthwhile, submit it to a journal for publication. Darwin had taken several friends into confidence about his work, and they arranged for a joint announcement of the idea of NS by Darwin and Wallace in a meeting of the Linnaean Society in July 1858. Darwin abandoned his four-volume project and in November 1859 published the single volume now so famous: On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, commonly referred to simply The Origin. Thus, Wells, Matthew, Wallace, and Darwin all conceived of the idea of NS independently (some authors insist it was clearly “in the air”), but it was Darwin’s extensively developed work, exhaustively considered over many years, that brought the idea to public attention in a way that could not be ignored. As Darwin had feared, strident opposition soon appeared, because the book’s ideas contradicted the prevailing religious views of that day in England and elsewhere. These included the assertions that Earth was only 6,000 years old; that deity, in 6 literal days, had spoken all species into existence fully formed; and that there had been no substantive change in them since that time. Even the idea of extinction was seen as incompatible with the prevailing views, because, to say that one of God’s creations had gone extinct was tantamount to saying that the Creator was

Natural Selection The idea that humans and all other forms of life are interrelated biologically is an ancient one. Though this concept of evolution is commonly associated with the name of Charles Darwin, he was not its originator. What Darwin did provide is the concept of natural selection (NS), the major known mechanism by which evolution has and does occur. At base, NS is a straightforward and simple concept, but that simplicity may be why it has been so often misunderstood and misused, not always innocently. This entry reviews the history of the idea of natural selection and provides a definition for and further discussion of the theory.

History At least two pre-Darwinian authors (W. C. Wells in 1813 and Patrick Matthew in 1831) independently conceived of NS as a critical mechanism in nature. But they published in obscure sources that caught no substantive attention. The insight occurred, also independently, to Darwin as early as 1838. But recognizing the revolutionary nature of his ideas, he delayed publication for years, thinking that he would sort out all the conceivable objections to his theory and address them in a massive, four-volume series of books that would in one, grand sweep announce, elaborate, defend, and establish his ideas while avoiding long, protracted arguments to which he was personally averse. 589

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extinct—or at least was powerless to prevent its demise. NS, it was argued, was being proposed as a substitute for creative power that belonged only to deity. This argument is still alive today in the hands of modern creationists but has been overwhelmingly resolved in Darwin’s favor by mainstream science. The discussion moves, then, to NS itself.

Natural Selection Defined NS is not, as so often characterized, “survival of the fittest.” That phrase was not Darwin’s and was very early recognized as a tautology—uselessly defined in terms of itself. Who are the “fittest”? The survivors, of course. So the phrase becomes “the survival of the survivors”—and devoid of useful meaning. Moreover, the phrase has been variously misconstrued to validate rapacious business and social interests, military campaigns, and so on. Darwin was clear that survival by itself was useless for either individual organisms or groups of organisms except as it permitted them to reproduce. Reproduction, not survival per se, is the basic, fundamental, irreplaceable quality of NS. The strongest, most handsome or beautiful, most intelligent human is of no evolutionary consequence unless the genes underlying those traits are passed to the next generation. Among numerous proposed definitions of NS, a simple and powerful one is “differential reproduction of genotypes.” Genotypes is a modern term, of course, but those four short words summarize what is the usual, detailed, logical presentation of the idea. In its most basic form, it asserts the following: •• Within any biological population there are ­differences between individuals. •• Some of these differences are heritable; they are based on inherited entities. •• Not all individuals in a population are equally successful in reproduction. •• Inherited differences contribute to the unequal reproduction.

Inherited differences favoring increased reproductive success will be preferentially passed on to the next generation; that is, these inherited differences will increase in frequency in the population. The biological (genetic) makeup of the population will change; that is, the population will evolve.

Equally critical, and recognized by Darwin, is the necessity of a mechanism for generating the inherited variations. Today this is referred to as mutation. The inherited entities are called genes and the aggregation of genes (either selected ones or combinations thereof) in an individual is called its genotype. Hence “differential reproduction of genotypes” very concisely defines NS. One need only look at examples of the inherited resistance to antibiotics, herbicides, and pesticides—or to the mutational origins of these resistant strains of organisms—to see multitudinous, well-­documented examples of evolution by mutation and NS in real time.

Further Dimensions of Natural Selection To this point, it might be assumed that NS is positive, that it improves the ability of a population or species to meet the changing demands of the environment. However, there is a negative aspect to it also—namely, that the less successful genetic variations and their possessors are selectively eliminated from the population. Indeed, if this negative selection is severe, it can eventually eliminate the less favored genes entirely from the population. In practice, this is usually difficult, because many disfavored (deleterious) versions of a gene (i.e., alleles) are recessive and thus hidden from selection’s actions unless they occur in a double dose in organisms with paired chromosomes. Further, deleterious entities are characteristically replenished in the population by mutation. Mutation, which refers to inherited changes in genes or in chromosomes, is a basically random process. It just generates changes, having no ability to distinguish changes that are deleterious from those that are beneficial. It is from this menu, this mix, of inherited differences that NS gleans those genes and combinations more successful in meeting environmental challenges. Inherited mutations are nearly always detrimental to a population. Indeed, reference to “mutational load” is reference to what any population must endure in order to have the ability to produce the less common, but still constantly occurring beneficial, variations. Although mutations are largely random, natural selection is definitely not. It constantly acts to improve the adaptation of the organisms involved.

Natural Selection

It is thus common to distinguish three basic qualities of NS: It may be positive, negative, or even effectively neutral. These qualities reflect the effects of NS on the reproductive fitness of individual organisms. Extensive mathematical analyses are routinely employed to derive rigorous quantification and measurement of these effects. Versions of a gene (alleles) favorable in one environment may be detrimental in another, so selection is environment specific. For instance, alleles that give rats resistance to warfarin (a poison) are less successful or even detrimental in environments where that rodenticide does not exist. This leads to the recognition that selection can be reversed, as well-known studies of the beaks of finches on the Galapagos Islands have documented. Extended periods of drought select for different types of seeds eaten by birds than those that grow in periods of plentiful rain. And the sizes and shapes of the birds’ beaks track the types of seeds available to them. Darwin also recognized the power of sexual selection, which refers to traits that can confer great advantages to the individual organism’s reproduction even though they are clearly disadvantageous to an organism otherwise. The classic example is the peacock’s elaborate tail. It is metabolically very expensive to produce and a clear handicap in escaping from predators. But experiments clearly demonstrate that such displays of color and anatomy are attractive to females, and males possessing elaborate tails are markedly advantaged over more drab competitors. NS of any one gene or set of genes is limited by the necessity of those genes to operate in the context of the other genes in an organism’s body. For instance, genes for increased height and weight in humans must be balanced by the demands of skeletal joints to bear the weight and stresses thus placed on them and by the increased demands on the heart and lungs for critical respiratory and metabolic functions. So NS works toward optimization of traits in combination rather than maximization of any one, isolated trait. This leads to the next dimension of NS—namely, whether it can lead to differences that distinguish species. Or are there natural limits to how far it can go? This is the question of speciation and the different mechanisms by which it occurs. But this is a topic for a separate entry. Suffice it say that NS

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definitely contributes to speciation, but it is not the only mechanism. A simple example is the existence of species rings. Consider the genus Larus, a group of gulls found in the North Polar regions. The ancestral population apparently originated in central Siberia, but the gulls eventually spread in new directions. Slightly different selective pressures promoted genetically different “races,” which became sufficiently divergent that where birds at the tips of the ring meet in western Scandinavia and Britain, the birds share the same nesting grounds but no longer interbreed. They have become different species. Hundreds of similar examples exist. The seeming limitless diversity in nature presents many further problems that may be solved by a sweeping, general rule such as NS. Pursuing these, Darwin puzzled over how complex societies, such as those found in many bee or termite species, could evolve, since only the queen reproduces, and she is served by thousands of her children, who labor their entire lives in her behalf but do not reproduce themselves. Today this phenomenon is generally approached via kin selection whereby the genes that produce the workers are possessed and passed on by the queen. The workers’ efforts in her behalf thus pass on their genes indirectly, even though they are sterile themselves. In many such societies, due to particular sex determination mechanisms, the individual worker’s genes are transmitted more effectively by the queen than they would be by the worker herself. NS thus favors reproduction by the queen at the expense of that of the workers. Darwin also speculated about how altruism, or even moral senses, could evolve, because the behaviors associated with them often involve reduced fitness in the form of increased risk or even loss of life to those individuals who behave in ways that benefit others not closely genetically related. Concepts of kin selection provide a starting point, and experiments with nonhuman primates, rats, dolphins, and even pigeons, have demonstrated that nonhuman creatures possess the basics of a moral or altruistic sense. It may be related to cultural selection, wherein different cultures or societies favor characteristics (e.g., cannibalism, human sacrifice, racism, religious rituals) that may or may not be genetically based. Many of these may branch from altruism or

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group cohesion, but the vital connections are complex and as yet not well resolved. An entirely new influence in NS has been opened up with epigenetics—the biochemical modification of genes and their expression by chemical molecules (primarily methyl and acetyl groups). These molecules are attached to specific genes often in response to particular environmental conditions and may, in many cases, persist on those genes for at least several generations. But because their changes do not appear to be permanent, they may offer no long-term influence on the evolution of the genome. But epigenetics serves notice that the human genome is subject to a variety of alterations that are inconsistent with the former, simpler view that humans have a certain amount of DNA that gets molded by mutations and selection but is, and has been, basically “human stuff” through the species’ history and grown larger through the action of a number of well-established mechanisms that can increase gene quantity and genome size. But this is not so. It is now clear that the human genome is loaded with DNA from other sources, primarily viral in origin, that has accumulated over the millions of years of its own evolution. These bits of material mutate like any other DNA and, on rare occasions, acquire real biological functions in their host. A common and important trait is shown by a group of so-called mobile elements, which can move around in the genome and by inserting themselves randomly into active host genes influence the activity of those genes in the process. These insertions appear to be more or less permanent. They are thus a different source of mutation. But they are not limited to effects between one generation and the next. It is now evident that mobile elements take up new positions—and thereby influence gene function—even during the growth of an individual organism. Thus, bodies may be considered mosaics of tissue. This process may be especially active in the brain. The evolution of the brain bothered Wallace to the end of his life. His religious sentiments could not accept that the blind, mindless, process of evolution by NS could produce the human brain and mind, and he became a spiritualist in his search for answers. This greatly strained his long-term friendship with Darwin, but neither could adduce evidence

sufficient to satisfy the other’s concerns. Nor are all the answers available yet. The European Union is presently sponsoring the Human Brain Project. The United States is funding the Brain Research Through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies (BRAIN) Initiative. These are major programs to learn how the brain functions, which is obviously necessary before detailed questions about how it all evolved can be addressed properly. Duane Jeffery See also Animal Consciousness; Darwin, Charles; Evolutionary-Psychological Perspectives on Human Nature, Critical Evaluation of; Group Selection; Mating Strategy Evolution and Development; Sexual Selection

Further Readings Herron, J. C., & Freeman, S. (2014). Evolutionary analysis (5th ed.). Boston, MA: Pearson Education. Pagel, M. (Ed.). (2002). Encyclopedia of evolution. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Zimmer, C. (2009). The tangled bank: An introduction to evolution. Greenwood Village, CO: Roberts.

Nature Versus Nurture It must have been early in human history when someone posed the question, “Why does my neighbor behave like he does?” and presumed answers took the form of metaphors such as “The apple doesn’t fall far from the tree.” That latter sentiment must have given Adam pause as he contrasted the actions of his sons Cain and Abel. This entry discusses the question of what makes people the way they are—nature or nurture or both. One only has to look at family resemblances in the facial features of members of privileged families in Renaissance paintings to confirm the obvious conclusion, of long-standing, that there are hereditary connections between parents and their offspring. Same nose, same ears, “spitting image of their mother.” But it took a long time and a culture that inspired empirical investigation for the mechanisms of inheritance to be uncovered. Charles Darwin’s proposal for natural selection as the primary mechanism of evolutionary change

Nature Versus Nurture

depended on the notion that there were traits, expressed in a diversity of forms, that were passed from generation to generation. But the explanation for heredity available in his day was wrong. Whatever parents contributed was thought to be vaguely blended together: If dad were “red” and mom were “white,” the kids would be “pink.” Intensive research in genetics in the first half of the 20th century corrected this notion, confirming the earlier conclusion of Gregor Mendel that genes were discrete entities, that they were associated with chromosomes, and that mutant versions of genes were responsible for changes in a host of characteristics in both laboratory animals and humans. It is clear that certain traits run in families, including membership in religious denominations, affiliation with a particular political party, and which major league baseball team to root for. But it seems a stretch not to attribute these kinds of connections to parental and cultural influences. Not surprisingly, then, there was considerable controversy accompanying the appearance (in 2005) of a book titled The God Gene: How Faith Is Hardwired Into Our Genes, written by a reputable government scientist, who suggested a possible relationship between religious faith and a gene (VMAT2) that governs the flow of mood-altering chemicals in the brain. “Hardwired?” No, it couldn’t be. Faith must be learned, developed, nurtured. Some people have it; some people don’t. There’s no such thing as a Red Sox gene.

What Genes Do With respect to the great dilemma—nature (genes) or nurture (environment)—the question, for any particular behavior or trait, is whether there is valid evidence on which to base a clear conclusion. Jason and Jarron Collin are identical twins. Fine athletes, they played basketball for Stanford, and later, professionally for different teams in the National Basketball Association. In 2013, Jason made a public announcement that he was a gay man; Jarron is heterosexual. The response to this news in the sports world was overwhelmingly positive; Jason received many expressions of support. Among some proponents of sexual orientation change therapy, however, this circumstance

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was cited excitedly as evidence that homosexuality is a learned condition: How can two persons who are genetically identical not have the same orientation unless the causal factors are environmental? This high-profile example serves as a useful test case in which to examine an often misunderstood aspect of how genes work in determining fundamental human traits and why the interpretation cited in the previous sentence is incorrect. Functionally, genes are discrete, physical entities that specify the characteristics of an organism. They are repositories of information. Biochemically, genes are sequences of nucleotides that constitute a certain stretch of DNA in a chromosome. Nucleotides of four types, with names abbreviated to A, C, G, and T, are the monomeric chemical subunits connected together in very, very long strands, two of which are wound around each other in a double-helical configuration in a DNA molecule. There are lots of genes on any one chromosome, and their sum total on all chromosomes is the genome, the “instruction book” for making a frog, a daisy, or a basketball player. The transmission of genetic information is a two-part process: First, copy the DNA into a related molecule called RNA (transcription). Then use the information encoded in RNA to construct a protein (translation), of which there are thousands of different varieties. Think about building a house: Begin with a blueprint (DNA) and give the working plans (RNA) to the contractors, who then build the vital structures (proteins) that provide the functions (heating, plumbing, electric circuits, etc.). The key concept here is sequence. Just as the order of numbers determines distinctive telephone numbers, so the order of nucleotides in DNA and RNA determine the order in which the subunits of proteins (amino acids) are assembled. Unlike telephone numbers, amino acids appear often by the hundreds in a single protein; it is a long polymer. Changing the order of amino acids changes the shape; changing the shape changes the function. Putting together many cells, each of which has a unique collection of different proteins, results in a living organism. Of the many possible examples of functionally distinct proteins, consider hemoglobin (the carrier of oxygen and carbon dioxide in red blood cells), insulin (a pancreatic hormone that mediates the uptake of sugar by cells), lipase (an enzyme that breaks down fat

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molecules in the intestinal tract), and myosin (a structural protein in muscle). Suppose for a minute that Mrs. Collins hadn’t given birth to twins, just one baby boy. Imagine the developmental journey of that embryo. Sperm meets egg and the fertilized egg (zygote) begins to divide. Soon there are dozens, then hundreds, then tens of thousands of cells. If any two were selected at random and their DNA compared, they would be identical. All the cells have the same chromosomes, same sequence of nucleotides, same genomes, same blueprints. But in the course of time, through a process called cellular differentiation, some of the cells begin to look and act differently. One cohort of cells turns on the insulin gene in the course of becoming a pancreas. Another cohort activates the myosin gene for transcription in the course of becoming muscle, but in that group, the insulin gene is silenced—it remains shut off. Still, any developing pancreas cell and any developing muscle are “identical twins” in terms of gene content. This wonderful process for selectively activating and inactivating genes operates through a series of events called epigenetics.

Epigenesis Epi mean “on top of” or “in addition to.” The key insight is that it is necessary to reduce the volume occupied by all the DNA molecules in order to fit them into the nucleus of a cell (where the “blueprints” are stored). (If lined up end to end, the entire set of person’s chromosomes would be 6  ft.  8  in. long, which is shorter than the Collins twins.) The double helices of DNA are coiled on spherical balls of proteins (histones), and the coiling continues as the material (chromatin) keeps occupying a smaller and smaller space. The genes now exist in a compact organization so that they fit into the cell’s nucleus, but this arrangement has made transcription quite difficult. In such a condensed state, for example, how is the transcription apparatus in a muscle cell going to find the starting place in the myosin gene in order to activate synthesis of the myosin RNA? Many of the epigenetic mechanisms that modify DNA or histones (or both) in the service of turning genes on or off are now defined biochemically. Some consist of adding chemical groups (acetyl, or

phosphate groups, for example) or removing them. The important insight here is that epigenetic control of cellular differentiation during embryonic development is self-contained biologically; that is, it is not subject to external social or psychological modification. This is molecular biology, epigenetic genes coding for epigenetic regulatory proteins that regulate the expression of other genes, consistent in every way with the mechanisms just described. Although genetically identical (monozygotic twins), Jason and Jarron Collins may have been exposed to small, but critical, differences in epigenetic programming of brain structure and function during embryonic life—small variations in time, place, and degree. Existing evidence suggests this as the best explanation for differences in their sexual attractions. If current understanding of how “nature” works is quite advanced (the complexities continue to be unraveled), the workings of “nurture” appear more difficult to get at. Designing experiments to validate the pathway through which social factors imprint behavior, for example, is a daunting task. To return to the issue of homosexuality, empirical investigations have failed to establish a causal link between sexual orientation and family dysfunction, sexual abuse of children or adolescents, early sexual experience, or other psychosocial phenomena. This does not mean that these environmental effects are inconsequential, only that they affect— primarily in a negative way—some other aspects of sexuality or general well-being other than sexual attraction. Overwhelmingly, LGBT individuals self-report that their core erotic attractions are innate or “God-given” or “I was born that way.” Universally, the major professional health care organizations advise against change therapy, including reparative or reorientation counseling, because of its history of failure to effect change and its propensity to be psychologically harmful. Legislation in some U.S. states has made such efforts with those under 18 unlawful. The evidence is that individuals do not choose to be gay, though many pathways remain open as to how that sexuality might be expressed. Any number of issues relative to human behavior continue to raise the “nature or nurture?” dichotomy. And the nearly automatic answer, no matter what the setting, seems to have become

Needs

“Yes.” Conventional wisdom appears to have evolved to the point where “Yes” really means “It’s hard to know. We’re really not sure. It’s probably both. Let’s hedge our bets in order to hide our ignorance about the matter.” Completely ruling out a potential cause is not easy. Clearly, plausibilities need to give way to factual evidence. Consider the case of autism, the incidence of which continues to rise (currently 1 in 68 children in the United States), partly due to improved diagnosis and record keeping. Careful investigation has ruled out early childhood immunizations as a causal factor. In the same week as this entry was being composed, the results of research were reported showing the developing brains of autistic children differ significantly from the brains of unaffected children. In the cerebral cortex, six layers of different cell types become differentiated during the second trimester of embryonic life. There is evidence that the normal neurological connections between these layers are disrupted in the autistic individuals. This important biological information naturally prompted the question of the cause of this anomaly. A genetic explanation will be sought, the investigating scientists said, but they left open the possibility of an environmental cause without citing any specific candidate. “Nature or nurture?” is not just a clever juxtaposition of similar words. Perhaps the appeal of the phrase lies in its success in prompting thoughtfulness and, when possible, even empirical investigation of the mysteries of what humans are and why they do what they do. William Bradshaw See also Cognitive Evolution; Cultural Evolution; Emotion, Evolution of; Evolutionary-Psychological Perspectives on Human Nature, Critical Evaluation of; Evolutionary Psychology; Intelligence, Evolution of; Sexual Selection

Further Readings Habashi, J., & Whitlock, K. H. (2013, February). Genetics and epigenetics in the psychology classroom: How to teach what your textbook doesn’t. Psychology Teacher Network. Available at http://www.apa.org/ed/ precollege/ptn/2013/02/genetics.aspx

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Rice, W. R., Friberg, U., & Gavrilets, S. (2012). Homosexuality as a consequence of epigenetically canalized sexual development. Quarterly Review of Biology, 87(4), 343–368. Stoner, R., Chow, M. L., Boyle, M. P., Sunkin, S. M., Mouton, P. R., Roy, S., . . . Courchesne, E. (2014). Patches of disorganization in the neocortex of children with autism. New England Journal of Medicine, 370, 1209–1219. http://dx.doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa 1307491

Needs Researchers and theorists have used the concept of needs to explain motivation and behavior throughout the history of psychology. In part, this is because the idea that people will behave in ways to get what they need is both intuitive and compelling. Still, the definition of needs has varied widely, and the concept has been used in disparate ways in different types of theories. This entry discusses how needs are defined, different kinds of needs, and theories about the nature of human needs. Consider the distinction between whether needs are inherent in the nature of people or are learned from interactions with social environments. Edward Deci and Richard Ryan’s self-­ determination theory, for example, maintains that all people have certain basic needs. When viewed in this way, needs are defined as universal essentials for ­ wellness and flourishing. In contrast, David McClelland’s approach argued that people develop their needs as they interact with the environment. Moreover, needs are defined as individual differences in the strength of people’s desires or motives, which vary from person to person. Because d ­ ifferent cultures have different values, people in  different cultures are assumed to have learned to need different things. There is also the distinction between whether needs are biological or psychological. Some psychological theories, such as Clark Hull’s drive theory, focused on needs such as hunger and sex, which that are physiological concepts used to ­predict the learning and performance of behaviors. In contrast, theories such as Henry Murray’s ­personology theory focused on needs—such as

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achievement, affiliation, or abasement—examined as psychological concepts. Psychological theories that focus on biological versus psychological needs are organized in fundamentally different ways. A further distinction is between whether needs are deficit oriented or growth oriented. Deficitoriented needs do not act as motivators unless they have been threatened or deprived. When a deficit need, such as safety, is satisfied, people are content, but when it is not satisfied, it becomes an urgent motivator. For example, the need for water is not a salient motivator until people have been deprived of it. It operates cyclically, and following a period of deprivation, it pushes people to behave in ways that reestablish equilibrium. In contrast, growth-oriented needs are ongoing motivators, and they operate whether or not people have been deprived of them. Thus, for example, people do not need to be deprived of relatedness in order for relatedness to motivate them. It is in people’s nature to be nourished by relatedness and other growth-oriented needs; in due course, these needs facilitate movement toward growth rather than equilibrium.

Different Traditions of Needs Two major traditions in the empirical study of needs were developed during the first half of the 20th century. Hull’s drive theory posited that organisms have a set of innate, physiological needs (e.g., for food, water, and sex), which are deficit needs and are referred to as drives. This theory held that all human beings have needs that they must satisfy in order to be healthy, that all behaviors are motivated by these physiological needs, and that the needs arise following deprivation, when there is a disequilibrium. That is, unsatisfied drives create an unpleasant state that pushes the organism to behave in ways that will satisfy the needs and reestablish homeostasis (equilibrium). When need satisfaction occurs, the behaviors that led to it will be reinforced. Drive theory was used not only to explain behaviors closely related to drives—for example, eating is reinforced by satisfying the hunger drive—but also to explain other behaviors, such as achievement. This occurs through secondary reinforcement. In other words, if praise (e.g., “Nice job!”) is often given when a

child eats, the praise will reinforce behaviors just as food does. Hull’s elaborate theory was able to explain some, though by no means all, behaviors. Among the latter were exploration, curiosity, and play, which are behaviors that were later understood as being intrinsically motivated. Further, the theory could not explain why people would actively defy drives, as in the case of eating disorders such as anorexia nervosa. By the 1960s, Hull’s drive theory had fallen out of favor and was replaced by cognitive theories and others that included intrinsically motivated processes. The other major theory of that era was Murray’s personality theory, which examined psychological rather than physiological needs and viewed them as acquired rather than innate. Murray specified over 20 needs that explain what energizes people to behave, positing that many of these needs operate at a nonconscious level. They were assessed using the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), a projective test that measures personality and nonconscious motivations. Research in this tradition has used individual differences in need strength to predict individual differences in personality, psychopathology, and behavior. McClelland subsequently adopted a limited number of needs that emerge to differing degrees and motivate behavior. His work focused primarily on needs for achievement, power, and affiliation. During the mid-20th century, another theory of needs was developed by Abraham Maslow that has been widely discussed but not well researched. Maslow classified needs in five different categories and suggested that these are organized hierarchically according to prepotency. The lowest category included the basic biological needs, such as oxygen, water, and food. Next came the safety and security needs, which would become prepotent when the lowest level needs were well satisfied. The third level of the hierarchy included the more psychological needs for affiliation, love, and belongingness. At the fourth level were the needs for esteem and self-respect, and finally, at the top of the hierarchy was the need for selfactualization, which was a growth-oriented psychological need that involved living up to one’s inherent potential. The general idea in Maslow’s hierarchy is that when the lower order needs that tend to be innate, physiological, and deficit

Needs

oriented are well satisfied, the higher order psychological needs that tend to be more growth oriented become salient. However, there is very little empirical support for this arrangement of hierarchical prepotency.

Self-Determination Theory Self-determination theory (SDT), developed by Deci, Ryan, and their colleagues, is the most widely researched and referenced contemporary theory of human needs. Based on hundreds of published studies, it proposes that three basic psychological needs that are innate, growth oriented, and universal. They are competence, the need to be effective when interacting with one’s outer and inner environments; autonomy, the need to act with a full sense of volition, self-endorsement, and choice; and relatedness, the need to have close, mutually caring, and mutually responsive relationships and to feel a sense of belonging. These three needs specify the psychological “nutrients” necessary for continued growth, full functioning, and well-being. When these needs are frustrated, people experience ill-being and psychopathology. There are many differences between the concept of needs within SDT and the other theories discussed. Nonetheless, like Hull’s conceptualization, SDT defines needs as innate and universal rather than learned. Similar to Murray’s tradition, SDT defines needs at the psychological, as opposed to the physiological, level. And in line with Maslow’s concept of a need for self-actualization, all three needs in SDT are considered growth oriented. SDT proposes that these three needs are universal and that they evolved because their satisfaction allowed humans to more successfully navigate their world and thus to move toward greater growth, flourishing, and integrity. Indeed, it is the frustration rather than satisfaction of these needs that leads people to develop along a negative trajectory toward ill-being and ineffective functioning. Research in SDT has demonstrated that need satisfaction robustly predicts greater intrinsic motivation and internalization of extrinsic motivation, more satisfying close relationships, more successful performance in a wide range of activities, and psychological and physical health. By emphasizing that satisfying the needs for competence, autonomy, and relatedness are essential to

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wellness and flourishing for all people, SDT enables the creation of social contextual conditions that promote optimal functioning—that is, conditions that satisfy people’s needs. For example, when parents or teachers provide choices to children, the children experience the satisfaction of the autonomy need, which contributes to positive outcomes, such as learning. Research has also shown the importance of satisfying the basic psychological needs in order to achieve positive outcomes and well-being in a variety of life domains, including education, work, sport and physical activity, parenting, health care, sustainability, psychotherapy, video games and virtual worlds, religion, politics, and close personal relationships. And substantial research has shown that these outcomes hold across gender, socioeconomic status, culture, and age. Accordingly, even if people are not aware of having these needs, or if they say that they do not value them, if their needs are not satisfied, they are likely to experience negative consequences. Nicole Legate, Cody R. DeHaan, and Edward L. Deci See also Achievement Motivation; Drive and Motivation in the Brain; Emotion and Motivation; Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Motivation; Motivation and Cognition; Motivation and Culture; Motivation and Personality; Unconscious Motivation

Further Readings Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The “what” and “why” of goal pursuits: Human needs and the selfdetermination of behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 11, 227–268. Hull, C. L. (1943). Principles of behavior: An introduction to behavior theory. New York, NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Maslow, A. H. (1943). A theory of human motivation. Psychological Review, 50, 370–396. McClelland, D. C. (1965). Toward a theory of motive acquisition. American Psychologist, 20, 321–333. Murray, H. A. (1938). Explorations in personality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being. American Psychologist, 55, 68–78.

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Neurodevelopmental Disorders

Neurodevelopmental Disorders For decades, scientists assessed the typically or atypically developing brain of a child as if it were merely a smaller version of the adult brain. H ­ owever, technological developments enable increasingly ­precise methods for examining the developing brain, enhancing not only experimental power but also theories. This entry reviews the main neurodevelopmental disorders and different theoretical approaches to their pathogenesis.

Behaviorally Defined Disorders The main conditions in this group are autism, dyslexia, attention deficit hyperactive disorder (ADHD), childhood schizophrenia, dyscalculia, specific language impairment (SLI), and prosopagnosia, the first three of which are considered in the following subsections. Some scientists propose that these conditions are at the extreme end of the normal continuum of development. Others question whether dyslexia and SLI are separate conditions or the same condition at differing levels of severity compared to the normal continuum. Autism

One popular cognitive theory of autism involves a defective theory of mind—that is, an inability to attribute mental states to others’ behavior. This condition was considered an innate, domain-specific impairment along the lines of modular deficits found in adult neuropsychological patients. Some theorists suggested a neurological basis, invoking reduced activation of the medial frontal cortex and superior temporal gyrus in theory-of-mind tasks. Another popular cognitive theory of autism is executive dysfunction, with domain-general implications. This theory stems from observations of symptoms such as obsession and the inability to shift attention or alter schedules, also prevalent in frontal lobe brain injury. Another highly cited explanation of autism is weak central coherence, a domain-general theory focused on the autistic individual’s concentration on local processing, not as a deficit but as an alternative cognitive style.

Dyslexia

The main theories of developmental dyslexia are these: Phonological theory: A deficit in representing/ storing/retrieving speech sounds that directly relates to cognitive and behavioral deficits and neurologically is associated with dysfunction in the left perisylvian area. A weakness of this theory is its failure to explain sensorimotor deficits. Rapid auditory processing theory: A deficit in perception of short, rapidly varying sounds that is neurologically linked to magnocellular abnor­ malities. A weakness of this theory is that it explains only subgroups of dyslexic patients. Visual impairment theory: Emphasizes visual contributions to phonological deficits and is linked biologically to magnocellular disruption and abnormalities of layers of the lateral geniculate nucleus. A weakness of this theory is that it cannot be applied to all subgroups of individuals with dyslexia. Cerebellar theory: A mildly dysfunctional cerebellum affects phonology via motor control and learning via automatization. Support for the theory comes from the altered anatomy, metabolism, and activation of the cerebella in dyslexic individuals. A weakness of this theory includes its failure to explain sensory deficits, incomplete penetrance of motor deficits in the dyslexic population, and refuted links between articulation and phonological abilities. Magnocellular theory: Combines auditory, visual, phonological, and cerebellar theories. As the cerebellum receives input from the magnocellular layer, the visual, auditory, and tactile faculties are affected, purportedly explaining all features of dyslexia. This theory is supported by magnocellular abnormalities in the medial and lateral geniculate nuclei, poor tactile performance, and co-occurrence of visual and auditory impairments. A weakness of this theory is the lack of relationship between auditory and phonological deficits and the failure to explain the lack of sensorimotor deficits in subgroups of dyslexia patients.

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Nowadays, dyslexia is increasingly considered as a multiple cognitive deficit condition. Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder

ADHD has been explained by a number of theories. The executive dysfunction theory explains impaired inhibitory control and executive motor inhibition. The delay aversion theory describes disturbed motivational processing, resulting in impaired delay-reward signaling, causing inhibitory deficits. In addition, the unbalanced energy state regulation theory identifies extreme versions of normal behavior due to an insufficient neuronal supply of lactate. The dynamic developmental theory describes altered dopaminergic function failing to appropriately modulate glutamate or GABA, altering extinction of previously reinforced behavior. Although all the conditions cited thus far are behaviorally defined conditions, it is becoming increasingly clear that pure environmental etiology must be challenged in favor of complex interactions between environment and genes. Indeed, it is now recognized that many of these disorders have clear heritability even though the precise genes remain unknown.

Genetically Defined Disorders The conditions next considered display diverse phenotypes and are defined by the mutation of specific genes. This does not mean that the relationship between genotypes and phenotypes is easy to identify. Well-known conditions within this group include Down syndrome (DS), Williams syndrome (WS), and fragile X syndrome (FXS), with lesser-known conditions being Angelman, Prader-Willi, cri-du-chat, Klinefelter’s, and Turner’s syndromes. The main disorders are reviewed here, followed by examples of why the assumption of a simple genotype-to-phenotype relation is naïve. Genetic mutations range from an entire chromosome to single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs). In FXS, for example, only a single gene is involved—namely, FMR1, which is responsible for the production of the FMR protein. The condition depends on the number of CGG-trinucleotide repeats within the gene (up to 45 repeats is healthy,

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between 45 and 200 repeats is considered a premutation, and over 200 repeats characterizes the full FXS phenotype). FXS accounts for 5% of autism cases. In contrast to single-gene disorders, syndromes such as DS involve healthy genes but chromosomal abnormalities (an extra Chromosome 21). WS is due to a hemizygous deletion of approximately 28 genes on Chromosome 7. In many genetic conditions, uneven cognitive profiles are observed, which promise the potential identification of function-specific genes. For example, initial descriptions of WS led to the belief that genes could be directly linked to specific phenotypic traits. Facial processing and language appeared intact in individuals with WS, whereas spatial and numerical cognition are deficient. Therefore, scientists concluded that some of the missing 28 genes were associated with spatial and numerical cognition, and that none of those genes contributed to facial processing or language. Subsequent research revealed this not to be the case. Although face processing and language seemed proficient, they were not “intact” but involved different cognitive and neural processing than in healthy controls. It is important to recall that if genetic expression is atypical throughout development, then it is unlikely that even seemingly normal behaviors are underpinned by normal cognitive and neural functions.

Environmentally Defined Disorders All disorders are influenced by environmental factors, but in this section the focus is on disorders that are predominantly the result of nongenetic factors. Interestingly, even when environmental conditions are highly defective, not all children respond in the same way, a finding that points to genetic risk or resilience factors. For example, a study of Romanian orphans reported infants who displayed “quasi-autism.” This finding suggested that not only can environmental effects mimic neurodevelopmental conditions but that some infants, although exposed to identically poor environments, are resilient. This further suggests that (a) some individuals are genetically more sensitive to their environment, suffering more in detrimental environments but prospering more in beneficial ones and (b) some individuals are genetically less sensitive, surviving

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better in poor environments but failing to take advantage of beneficial ones. Fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) is caused by alcohol abuse during pregnancy. FAS presents with impairment of multiple brain functions, particularly serious arithmetic and attention deficits. Socioemotional development is impaired more severely than IQ would predict and is not compensated for by socioeconomic status. Less severe are three “fetal alcohol effect” (FAE) conditions: partial FAS, alcohol-related birth defects, and alcoholrelated neurodevelopmental disorder. All FAE conditions display impaired attention, planning, cognitive flexibility, learning, memory, and socioemotional functions. Studies have revealed altered corpus callosum size in both FAS and FAE, with right-hemisphere hippocampal function particularly affected. However, cognitive profiles are inconsistent across research samples and in a manner that cannot be explained solely by reduced IQ, which suggests possible genetic influences. Finally, the environmental effects of neglect or physical or verbal abuse result in reduced brain volume in regions related to behavior and memory. Furthermore, even in the absence of genetic mutations or environmental abuse, socioeconomic status has been shown to alter neural trajectories; for example, lower family income status causes decreased frontal gamma-band activity in infants as young as 6 months old.

Complex Gene–Environment Interactions Neurodevelopmental research is rapidly evolving, and researchers are calling for a more comprehensive approach to developmental mechanisms. Some argue for less reliance on clinical definitions and more emphasis on cognitive mechanisms and their relationship with genetics. Others stress the complex interactions between genes and environment. For example, mutations of the CNTNAP2 gene are probabilistically, not deterministically, linked to a heritable trait in SLI. Initial cross-syndrome phenotypic similarities can result in different adult outcomes, and diverse causes of disorders can give rise to identical end point phenotypes. Moreover, researchers have demonstrated that the autismrelated symptom of repetitive behavior yielded no genetic correlation across different disorders. More

in-depth accounts of phenotypes across conditions are required to fully understand the consequences of gene–environment interactions.

Theories of Neurodevelopmental Disorders There are two main approaches to explaining neurodevelopmental disorders: static cognitive neuropsychology and neuroconstructivist. Proponents of the former equate child brains with adult brains but fail to take into account the developmental history of the disorder; they include the following scientists: Christine Temple: Scottish scientist from Essex University, who studied at St. Andrews, UCLA, and Oxford. Her research focuses on literacy, calculation, naming, memory, and executive function, particularly in WS, DS, and Turner and Klinefelter’s syndromes. Temple focuses on ­modular architectures and their deficits and states that the most informative child is one who has a single deficit, thereby enabling direct genotype/­phenotype links. She strongly recommends the application of adult neuropsychological approaches to explaining developmental disorders. Brian Butterworth:  English scientist from University College, London, who studied at Cambridge. His research focuses on dyslexia and dyscalculia, with a view to demonstrating selective deficits due to damage to an innate capacity embodied in specific neural networks. Justification for his developmental theory stems from studies of adult patients—for example, a dyscalulic 59-yearold with parietal lobe lesion, who had normal language but could only count to 4. Franck Ramus: French scientist, who studied at EHESS (School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences) in Paris and focuses mainly on dyslexia and SLI. He argues that dyslexia is a specific phonological defect, with other symptoms being occasional comorbidities. Although supporting the involvement of complex biological, genetic, and behavioral traits, Ramus suggests that were it clinically possible to separate phonological skills from phonological representations, then SLI would present as having relatively spared skills but severe representational impairments, and

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dyslexia would present the opposite. He argues that developmental disorders can be equated to adult brain damage of specific modules. By contrast, neuroconstructivists place development itself center stage, viewing neurodevelopmental disorders as probabilistic in their effects and likely to cause atypical development in multiple brain regions, not merely in selective areas. Proponents of this view include the following scientists: Annette Karmiloff-Smith:  British/French develop­ mental scientist who studied at Geneva University. She argues that focusing on selective, domain-specific deficits is inappropriate for the study of neurodevelopmental disorders. Instead, she recommends examining domain-relevant processes that become domain-specific over developmental time. Karmiloff-Smith distinguishes developed brains damaged in their mature end state from developing brains, recalling that the WS brain, for instance, described by some as a normal brain with specific parts impaired, is structurally, functionally, and biochemically different from the outset of development onward. She also stresses that not only genetic differences but also environmental changes matter; for example, once diagnoses are confirmed, parent–infant interactions and cognitive expectations tend to change. Mark H. Johnson:  British developmental neuroscientist who studied at Edinburgh and Cambridge Universities. He proposed the interactive specialization theory to explain the dynamic development of the normal brain, extending it to atypical development, particularly the study of infant siblings of children already diagnosed with autism spectrum condition, who have a much higher risk of developing autism. Michael S. C. Thomas: Originally an expert in bilingualism (which also gives rise to brain differences); studied at Oxford University and now is at Birkbeck. Thomas uses neurocomputational modeling at the genetic, neural, and environmental levels to understand developmental disorders and to explain regressive events in autism. Neuroconstructivists argue that domain ­specificity emerges through a combination of

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experience–expectation inputs and domain-­ relevant learning mechanisms and must be studied in terms of dynamic development, not via the mature adult brain.

Potential Opportunities for Further Study Neurodevelopmental disorders rarely, if ever, result in a single behavioral deficit or neural alteration. They must be studied via their complex geneenvironment relations across developmental time. Typical and atypical neurodevelopment is a fascinating discipline and, with continued technological advances, there was never a more interesting time to enter this research area, providing its complexity is fully embraced. Kate Hughes and Annette Karmiloff-Smith See also Behavior Disorders; Childhood; Cognitive Development; Emotional Disorders; Language Disorders; Motor Development; Perceptual Development; Perceptual Disorders; Prenatal Development; Piaget’s and the Neo-Piagetian Theories of Cognitive Development; Social Cognition

Further Readings Bishop, D. V. M. (2006). Developmental cognitive genetics: How psychology can inform genetics and vice versa. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 59(7), 1153–1168. Karmiloff-Smith, A., D’Souza, D., Dekker, T. M., Van Herwegen, J., Xu, F., Rodic, M., & Ansari, D. (2012). Genetic and environmental vulnerabilities in children with neurodevelopmental disorders. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(Suppl. 2), 17261–17265. Mareschal, D., Sirois, S., Westermann, G., & Johnson, M. H. (Eds.). (2007). Neuroconstructivism: Vol. 2. Perspectives and prospects. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Ramus, F., Marshall, C. R., Rosen, S., & van der Lely, H. K. J. (2013). Phonological deficits in specific language impairment and developmental dyslexia: Towards a multidimensional model. Brain, 136(2), 630–645. Thomas, M. S. C., Knowland, V. C. P., & KarmiloffSmith, A. (2011). Mechanisms of developmental regression in autism and the broader phenotype: A neural network modeling approach. Psychological Review, 118(4), 637–654.

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Neuroendocrine System

Neuroendocrine System The neuroendocrine system is responsible for regulating important processes throughout the body. Neuroendocrine organs release hormones, which facilitate communication between the brain and various cells, systems, and organs. This entry discusses the different components of the neuroendocrine system and how it works in the human body. Hormones can regulate physiological arousal, metabolism, internal temperature, growth, and a number of other processes crucial to maintaining health and balance within the body. For example, without proper regulation of metabolism, individuals might gain or lose too much weight, which can strain other bodily systems. An individual who is extremely underweight may not be able to maintain muscle tone in the heart. Poor regulation of body temperature is another example. Extremely high body temperatures can cause organ damage. In sum, the neuroendocrine system balances bodily systems and helps individuals physiologically adapt to the environment. A complex process is involved in maintaining and regulating the body’s internal systems. Neuroendocrine hormones influence target tissues and organs throughout the body, but the process that leads to the release of these hormones starts in the brain. Neurotransmitters are chemical messengers that deliver neural signals. For example, neurotransmitters can signal the hypothalamus, an important brain region that is involved in regulation of systems of the body. When this occurs, the hypothalamus releases corresponding hormones that communicate with the pituitary gland. The pituitary gland is positioned below the hypothalamus in the brain, and when stimulated by the hypothalamic hormones, it also releases hormones into the blood stream. Those hormones travel to bind (or communicate) with different glands and other systems in the body. The glands include the thyroid, adrenal glands, ovaries, and testes, and they, too, release neuroendocrine hormones. This process is constantly active in order to keep the body’s internal systems balanced, but activity can also increase or decrease based an individual’s environment.

Neuroendocrine hormones can be modulated by social and psychological factors in an individual’s environment (e.g., experiencing stressors). Moreover, fluctuations in hormones can actually influence how a person feels. As a result, neuroendocrine processes have been of great interest to psychologists, who have discovered many ways in which psychological processes are associated with neuroendocrine hormones. For example, experiencing acute (short term) and chronic (long term) types of stressful situations can alter the release and regulation of hormones. Researchers also found that neuroendocrine hormones can become dysregulated in individuals with depression. The hormones most commonly studied in psychology are cortisol, oxytocin, vasopressin, and testosterone.

The Hypothalamic Pituitary Adrenal Axis The hypothalamic pituitary adrenal axis (HPA axis) is a central component of the neuroendocrine system. When the HPA axis is activated, the hypothalamus secretes corticotrophin-releasing hormone (CRH). This, in turn, stimulates the anterior (i.e., front) pituitary to release adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH). ACTH travels to the adrenal cortex, which is a part of the adrenal glands, which sit atop the kidneys. Subsequently, the adrenal cortex releases a hormone called cortisol. Once released, cortisol helps to mobilize energy and alters activities of the immune system. The HPA axis is, in part, responsible for the body’s physiological response to stressors. When experiencing psychological or physical stressors, cortisol can help the body by releasing the additional energy resources necessary to combat them. Research has examined how acute changes in stressors, mood, and environmental and social factors contribute to the release or dysregulation of cortisol. For example, experiencing social evaluation, which is the feeling of being judged by others, consistently leads to increases in cortisol. Short-term changes in negative emotion, perceived stress, stressful events, and anxiety can all alter cortisol release throughout the day. In the short term, cortisol is needed to mobilize the body’s resources under stress, but repeated or ongoing stressors (and the concomitant release of

Neuroethics

cortisol and other hormones) can dysregulate cortisol and potentially damage the body. For example, indicators of an individual’s low socioeconomic status have been associated with the altered release of cortisol, which is perhaps due to the chronic stressors these individuals face. Patterns of excessive cortisol release in the long term have been associated with the deterioration of brain regions associated with memory and increased risk for cardiovascular disease and mortality.

Oxytocin and Vasopressin In addition to cortisol, oxytocin and vasopressin are neuroendocrine hormones related to social processes. These two hormones are released by the posterior (i.e., back) pituitary. For years, researchers have known that oxytocin elicits contractions during child labor and stimulates the letdown of milk prior to lactation. Within the past two decades, oxytocin has been implicated in the context of social interactions. For example, when males were given oxytocin, they showed more trust in their partners in a game than when they were given a placebo. There is also some evidence that oxytocin prompts people to seek social relationships, and thereby, reduces stress hormones. This idea is the basis of the “tend and befriend” theory of social relationships, which maintains that in times of stress, individuals may be motivated to affiliate with others. Vasopressin may also play a role in social processes, for example, by promoting affiliative behavior among females and aggressive behavior among males.

Testosterone Testosterone, which is a sex hormone secreted from the adrenal glands (in men and women) and testes (in men), has also been shown to influence social behavior. In a study where testosterone was experimentally administered to men, higher testosterone predicted less generosity, which is considered antisocial behavior. Additionally, higher levels of naturally occurring testosterone have been linked to antisocial or aggressive behavior in higher status, male military veterans. Current evidence suggests that there is an interactive effect between testosterone and cortisol such that social

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dominance is associated with lower cortisol and higher testosterone. Emily D. Hooker and Sally S. Dickerson See also Neuropsychology; Psychopathology and Stress; Stress and Gender; Stress and Resilience to Life Challenge; Stress Syndromes; Stressors and Stress

Further Readings Dickerson, S. S., & Kemeny, M. E. (2004). Acute stressors and cortisol responses: A theoretical integration and synthesis of laboratory research. Psychological Bulletin, 130(3), 355–391. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/ 0033-2909.130.3.355 Gimpl, G., & Fahrenholz, F. (2001). The oxytocin receptor system: Structure, function, and regulation. Physiological Reviews, 81(2), 629–683. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/ 11274341 Mehta, P. H., Jones, A. C., & Josephs, R. A. (2008). The social endocrinology of dominance: Basal testosterone predicts cortisol changes and behavior following victory and defeat. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94(6), 1078–1093. Taylor, S. E. (2006). Tend and befriend: Biobehavioral bases of affiliation under stress. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 15(6), 273–277. Taylor, S. E. (2009). The systems of the body. In Health psychology (7th ed., pp. 17–42). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Higher Education.

Neuroethics The now-established tendency in neurophilosophy and moral psychology to look toward neuroscience for guidance in moral questions has led to the rise of neuroethics as a novel branch of ­interdisciplinary research. In a nutshell, neuroethics can be defined as drawing relationships between neuroscientific observations and ethical concepts—that is, between factual descriptions and normative evaluations of human life. Neuroethics investigates (a) the relevance of neuroscientific findings for the understanding of morality and (b) the relevance of ethics to the application of evidence from neuroscience. The former is concerned with neural and psychological

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mechanisms underlying ethical concepts, whereas the latter is concerned with the implications of those findings for moral practice. This entry describes the field of neuroethics and the kinds of questions it addresses.

Neuroscience of Ethics and Ethics of Neuroscience The rapid growth of neuroscience does not merely pose empirical questions about brain functioning but also raises important ethical concerns. For example, new invasive therapies, such as deep brain stimulation and the use of cognitive enhancement drugs, raise ethical questions about informed consent and moral judgment. Adina Roskies called the application of ethical concepts to neuroscience the ethics of neuroscience. The investigation of neural correlates of mental functions has evoked questions about the neural mechanisms underlying ethical concepts; this has been called neuroscience of ethics. For example, which neural mechanisms underlie informed consent or moral judgment? Empirical evidence supports the claim that informed consent requires activation in specific brain regions. If this activation is constrained, a likely result is that the ability to give informed consent is impaired. In the case of moral judgment, it has been shown that activation produces a higher degree of distribution of reward-dependent biochemical substances (e.g., dopamine) in the brain. Accordingly, moral judgment could be explained in terms of dopamineguided reward mechanisms and their neural underpinnings. It is, however, difficult to draw a clear-cut distinction between neuroscience of ethics and ethics of neuroscience. Reconsider the example of informed consent: How valid is an informed consent of patients whose cognitive and emotional capacities are altered by their disorder—for example, in dementia or schizophrenia? This is primarily discussed in ethics of neuroscience. Yet this question has also triggered empirical investigations of the cognitive and neural functions underlying the possibility of giving a valid informed consent; it thus concerns neuroscience of ethics. Another example of the convergence of both branches in neuroethics is the case of moral judgment. What is a moral judgment and what is its

impact on ethical decisions? This rather conceptual question has concurrently triggered many neuroscientific investigations in the realm of neuroscience of ethics.

Empirical, Social, and Theoretical Neuroethics Many contemporary proponents of neuroethics forcefully presume that moral considerations about actual human lives demand empirically substantiated answers. This stance is based on the assertion that inquiry into the natural world can increase moral knowledge in ways similar to the increase of scientific knowledge. For this reason, current neuroethics is strongly empirically oriented and best characterized as empirical neuroethics. Practical concerns in empirical neuroethics, such as the application of informed consent or advance directives, have been discussed with regard to psychiatric and neurological disorders. The conceptual definitions of, for example, informed consent and moral judgment as presupposed by the ethics of neuroscience are commonly based on neuroscientific findings. This has produced substantial implications for the initially, merely philosophically defined concepts. Moral judgment, for example, is now understood to involve emotions, because imaging studies have shown the involvement of brain regions in moral judgment that are known to be integral to emotional processing. Does it, therefore, follow that people with deficits in emotional processing and empathy have an impaired moral judgment? Psychopaths, for example, show severe idiosyncrasies in their own emotional processing and diminished empathy toward the emotions of others. Are psychopaths therefore unable to make appropriate moral judgments? Social scientific evidence suggests that this is the case. The crime rate of psychopaths is significantly higher compared with the average population and, while committing crimes, psychopaths often remain unaffected by both their own and others’ emotions. This strongly empirical, deterministic line of reasoning brings the danger of an uncritical acceptance of empirical presuppositions and definitions. Proponents of critical neuroscience take issue with this empirical bias. Instead of offering merely neural definitions of ethical concepts, they argue that

Neuroethics

the social and political context of those concepts needs to be taken into account. This is why the “neuronalization” of ethical concepts falls short. In fact, it may have fatal implications, especially within applied questions of neuroethics, which are inevitably considered within the current social and political context. Given these shortcomings, there is a need to complement empirical neuroethics with a subdiscipline that might be called social neuroethics. Besides the neglect of relevant contexts, current neuroethics also often suffers from disregard of theoretical and methodological difficulties. On the theoretical level, the implicit philosophical presuppositions of concepts such as informed consent and free will are often not explicated. On the methodological level, a plausible transition from descriptive concepts of neuroscience to normative evaluations of ethics is not properly developed. The question of how a methodology that allows for a nonreductive linkage of descriptive concepts and normative evaluations could be developed focuses on theoretical rather than on empirical or sociopolitical issues of neuroethics. Consequently, it might be called theoretical neuroethics. A particular challenge in theoretical neuroethics is the aforesaid linkage between norms and facts. Taking the example of informed consent again, the normative act of the person giving or refusing informed consent might be linked with neural activity in order to demonstrate a compelling understanding of informed consent. This formulation already suggests that it is not feasible to merely reduce the person’s decision to his or her neural brain activity. If such a reductive approach is chosen, there is little informative gain for neuroethics because the question of informed consent cannot be answered by exclusively considering the neural activity alone. Rather, the relevant aspects besides the neural correlates of informed consent are the particular social and political contexts in which consenting takes place. An empirical reduction therefore fails to answer the neuroethical question of informed consent; it simply misses the target. This leads to a more general point: How can norms and facts be linked validly within neuroethics? One option that has already been briefly mentioned is to disregard the normative level altogether by reducing it to the factual level. When that

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happens, ethical norms are unilaterally replaced by neural facts. However, this method neglects the principal difference between norms and facts and is thereby subject to the “naturalistic fallacy”— David Hume’s dictum that one cannot infer an “ought” from an “is.” (This is not to deny that the descriptive information from neuroscience can and, in fact, should inform ethical views.) Alternatively, one may accept the norm–fact distinction and consider them in a parallel way. However, parallelism falls short of acknowledging the close interdependence between norms and facts. Both options cannot account for the close intertwining of ethical concepts and neuroscientific observations. The aforementioned examples of moral judgment and informed consent point to the fact that descriptive change may entail normative change and vice versa. Therefore, a methodological strategy is needed that captures the close interdependency between norms and facts while not neglecting their principal difference. One way is to go back and forth between ethical concepts and neuroscientific findings. This can be called norm–fact linkage. The usual starting point of empirical neuroethics is to scrutinize an ethical concept that is linked to neuroscientific observations. The aim is to either neuronalize the ethical concept or to reveal its relevance for neuroscientific research. However, what is often neglected is how this first encounter of ethical concepts with neuroscientific observations bears on the ethical concept itself. What, for example, is implied for the concept of informed consent if it is driven empirically by emotions and empathy rather than higher order cognitive functions? What does the fact of ­empathy involvement in consenting imply for the norms inherent in informed consent? Should con­ ­ cept­ ualizing the linkage between norms and facts in informed consent occur differently if emotions such as empathy are predominant rather than cognitive functions being so? This consideration may lead to conceptual modifications in neuroethical concepts depending on the neuroscientific findings; thus, the initial ethical concept becomes truly neuroethical. The interdependent linkage between neuroscientific findings and ethical concepts goes one step further. What is needed is a method that details the different steps of the norm–fact linkage by giving

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exact methodological prescriptions and measures of validity and reliability. That being so, it needs to be based on a specific methodology rather than on a certain result. Neuroethics needs to be based on the context-dependent linkage between norms and facts in which both levels are alternating adaptively to each other in order to empirically inform and shape questions that traditionally have been believed to be supremely philosophical. Georg Northoff and Nils-Frederic Wagner See also Brain and Consciousness; Cognitive Neuroscience; Ethics of Therapy; EvolutionaryPsychological Perspectives on Human Nature, Critical Evaluation of; Frontal Lobe Functions; Moral Development; Morality and Moral Emotions; Neuropsychology

Further Readings Greene, J. (2003). From neural “is” to moral “ought”: What are the moral implications of neuroscientific moral psychology? Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 4(10), 847–850. Illes, J., & Sahakian, B. J. (Eds.). (2011). Oxford handbook of neuroethics. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Moll, J., Zahn, R., de Oliveira-Souza, R., Krueger, F., & Grafman, J. (2005). The neural basis of human moral cognition. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 6, 799–809. Northoff, G. (2009). What is neuroethics? Empirical and theoretical neuroethics. Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 22, 565–569. Roskies, A. L. (2002). Neuroethics for the new millennium. Neuron, 35, 21–23. Wagner, N.-F., & Northoff, G. (2015). A fallacious jar? The peculiar relation between descriptive premises and normative conclusions in neuroethics. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 36(3), 215–235. http://dx.doi .org/10.1007/s11017-015-9330-z

other psychological deficits resulting from brain trauma and from diseases that affect the brain. This entry discusses the principles of neuropsychology and reviews theories and findings about how altered brain function affects psychological functioning. Neuropsychology is strongly influenced by two experimental and theoretical investigations into brain function: (a) the brain theory, which states that the brain is the source of behavior and (b) the neuron theory, the idea that the unit of brain structure and function is the neuron (or nerve cell). The central topic in neuropsychology is how brain and behavior are related. The contemporary basis of neuropsychology is materialism—that is, that rational behavior can be fully explained by the workings of the nervous system. Neuropsychology is strongly influenced by evolutionary principles, especially that the human brain and the brains of other animals share many similarities. Animals with brains are related because the genes that code for the brain are passed on with modifications from the first animal to evolve a brain. Nevertheless, the environment plays a role in how genes express traits. The science that studies differences in gene expression related to environment and experience is epigenetics. Epigenetic factors do not change the genes individuals inherit, but they do affect whether a gene is active and, in this way, influence an individual’s traits, including the brain’s structure and function. Environment and experience are important tools in neuropsychological studies of the brain’s ability to form new connections and pathways. Neuroplasticity is the nervous system’s potential for physical or chemical change that enhances its adaptability to environmental change and its ability to compensate for injury.

Brain Theory

Neuropsychology Neuropsychology is the scientific study of the relation between brain function and behavior. Neuropsychology draws information from many other disciplines and can identify impairments in behavior that are indicative of cognitive and

Understanding of brain function had its origins in individuals with brain damage. Neuropsychological concepts that have emerged from studying such individuals include the localization of function, the lateralization of function, disconnection, neuroplasticity, hierarchical organization, multiple memory systems, hemispheric disconnection (“two brains”), and conscious and unconscious neural streams.

Neuropsychology

The Localization of Function

In the early 1800s, German anatomist Franz Josef Gall developed the hypothesis of localization of function, that a specific brain area controls each kind of behavior. He assigned each behavioral trait to a particular part of the skull and, by inference,  to the underlying brain part. Among his many observations, Gall gave the first account of a case in which frontal-lobe brain damage was followed by loss of the ability to speak. The patient was a soldier whose brain had been pierced by a sword driven through his eye. The case subsequently came to include discoveries about the brain’s role in language. Although most of Gall’s conjectures, including the idea that bumps on the skull can indicate behavioral abilities, have been rejected, the finding that damage to a specific area of the frontal lobes impairs language has been confirmed. It is now recognized that localized damage to the brain produces changes in specific behaviors. The Lateralization of Function

The principle of lateralization of function holds that one cerebral hemisphere can perform a function not shared by the other and also stemmed from the study of patients with brain damage that affected speech. Paul Broca, a French physician, studied a patient, a Monsieur Leborgne, who had lost his speech and was able to say only “tan” and utter an oath. When Leborgne died, his left frontal lobe was found to have a lesion. By 1863, Broca had collected eight more cases similar to Leborgne’s, all with a frontal-lobe lesion in the left hemisphere. Broca had discovered the brain property of latto be eralization of function. Because speech is thought to be central to human consciousness, the left hemisphere is referred to as the dominant hemisphere in order to recognize its special role in language. The anterior speech region of the left side of the brain is called Broca’s area, and the syndrome that results from its damage is called Broca’s aphasia (from the Greek a for “not” and phasia for “speech”). Disconnection

In the late 1800s, German anatomist Carl Wernicke created the first model of how the brain

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produces language. Wernicke suspected a relation between hearing and speech functioning, and he described cases in which aphasic patients had lesions in this auditory area of the temporal lobe. These patients could speak fluently, but what they said was confused and made little sense. Although Wernicke’s patients could hear, they could neither understand nor repeat what was said to them. Wernicke’s syndrome is called temporal-lobe aphasia or fluent aphasia to emphasize that the person can say words; it is also termed Wernicke’s aphasia. The associated region of the temporal lobe that causes fluent aphasia is called Wernicke’s area. According to Wernicke’s model, if the temporal lobe is damaged, speech movements are preserved in Broca’s area, but the speech makes no sense because the person cannot monitor words. Damage to Broca’s area produces a loss of speech movements without the loss of sound images, and so Broca’s aphasia is not accompanied by a loss of understanding. From his model, Wernicke predicted a new language disorder but never saw such a case. He suggested that if the fibers connecting Broca’s area and Wernicke’s area were cut, disconnecting the areas but without inflicting damage on either one, a speech deficit that Wernicke described as “conduction aphasia” would result. In this condition, speech sounds and movements are retained, but speech is impaired because it cannot be conducted from one region to the other. Wernicke’s prediction was subsequently confirmed and updated by American neuropsychologist Norman Geschwind in the 1970s. He developed what now is referred to as the Wernicke–Geschwind model. Using this same reasoning, the loss of the ability to read (alexia, meaning “word blindness” from the Greek lexia for “word”) results from a disconnection between the brain’s visual area and Wernicke’s speech area. Similarly, an inability to make sequences of movements (apraxia, from the Greek praxis for “movement”) results from the disconnection of motor areas from sensory areas. Disconnection predicts that behaviors are built in assembly-line fashion as information collected by sensory systems enters the brain and traverses different structures before producing an overt response. Thus, disconnecting brain structures by cutting connecting pathways can impair those structures in ways that resemble damage to the structures themselves.

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Neuroplasticity

Many experiments show that after brain damage, both nonhuman animals and people are impaired, but they subsequently display recovery at least to some extent. These observations are the foundation for neuropsychology’s emphases on recovery of function and on promoting recovery by rehabilitation after brain damage. Neuro­ psychologists recognize that the brain’s plasticity can be harnessed to produce significant functional improvements. Hierarchical Organization

In the late 1800s, the English neurologist John Hughlings-Jackson described the nervous system as having three levels—the spinal cord, the brainstem, and the forebrain—that had developed successively in evolution. Hughlings-Jackson suggested that disease or damage that affects the highest levels of the brain hierarchy would produce dissolution, the reverse of evolution: Individuals would still have a behavioral repertoire, but the behaviors would be simpler, more typical of an animal that had not yet evolved the missing brain structure. Multiple Memory Systems

People usually describe memory as unitary, as, for example, “I have a poor memory.” But contemporary research on memory shows that there are many kinds of memory. The case of a famous patient called H. M. reveals that rather than a single memory structure in the brain, a number of neural structures encode memories separately and in parallel. H. M. retained memories from before a surgery that involved both of his temporal lobes, but after the surgery, he was unable to form new memories that endured for more than a few seconds to minutes. Nevertheless, he could acquire motor skills but could not remember having done so. Thus, H. M. demonstrated that the neural structures for learning motor skills and those for remembering when one has learned those skills are separate. The study of amnesia suggests that when people have a memorable experience, they encode different parts of the experience in different parts of the brain concurrently. Spatial location is stored in one brain region, emotional content in another,

events composing the experience in still another region, and so on. In fact, nowhere in the brain do all the aspects of the experience come together to form “the memory.” Two Brains

In the early 1960s, to prevent the spread of uncontrolled epileptic seizures from one hemisphere to the other, two neurosurgeons, Joseph Bogen and Phillip Vogel, cut the corpus callosum and the smaller commissures that connect the two cortical hemispheres. Essentially, the surgeries made two brains from one. It was effective in reducing the seizures and in improving the lives of these split-brain patients. By taking advantage of the anatomy of sensory pathways that project preferentially to the opposite hemisphere, the neuropsychologist Roger W. Sperry presented information separately to splitbrain subjects’ left and right hemispheres. Although mute, the right hemisphere was found to comprehend words spoken aloud, read printed words, point to corresponding objects or pictures in an array, and match presented objects or pictures correctly from spoken to printed words and vice versa. Sperry concluded that each hemisphere possesses complementary self-awareness and social consciousness and that much of internal mental life, especially in the right hemisphere, is inaccessible to analysis using spoken language. Conscious and Unconscious Neural Streams

In February, 1988, near Milan, Italy, a patient known as D. F. was poisoned by carbon monoxide (CO) emitted by a faulty space heater. As the CO replaced the oxygen in her blood, D. F.’s brain was deprived of oxygen, and she sank into a coma. When she recovered consciousness in the hospital, D. F. was alert, could speak and understand, but could not see. Her diagnosis of cortical blindness resulted from damage to the visual cortex at the back of the occipital lobe. Her deficit was visual form agnosia (gnosia, Greek for knowing and so not knowing): She could not see the shapes of objects or recognize objects visually by their shape. D. F.’s visual acuity was normal, but she could not distinguish vertical lines from horizontal lines. She could not

Neuropsychology

recognize objects or drawings of objects. She could draw objects from memory but could not recognize the objects she had drawn. Scottish neuropsychologist David Milner and Canadian neuropsychologist Melvyn Goodale observed that D. F. accurately reached for and grasped a pencil that they offered her. Nevertheless, she could not see the pencil or tell whether its orientation was horizontal or vertical. In further tests, D. F. demonstrated that she could shape her hand correctly to grasp many objects that she could not recognize and even step over objects that she could not see. In sum, D. F. appeared able to see if she was required to make a movement. D. F.’s visual agnosia stands in contrast to the deficits displayed by patients whose visual ataxia (Greek for taxis, meaning “to move toward”) leads them to make errors in reaching for objects while still being able to describe the objects accurately. The brain lesions in agnosia patients such as D. F. occur in neural structures that constitute a pathway, called the ventral stream, from the visual cortex to the temporal lobe for object identification. Brain lesions in patients with optic ataxia are in neural structures that form a pathway from the visual cortex to the parietal cortex, called the dorsal stream, to guide action relative to objects. The ventral stream mediates actions controlled by conscious visual perception, whereas the dorsal stream mediates actions controlled by unconscious visual processes. Thus, vision and motor skill, like language and memory, are not unitary. It follows that other sensory systems are not unitary but consist of separate pathways that mediate unconscious or conscious actions. Nevertheless, people experience a seamless, binding interaction between conscious and unconscious action.

The Neuron Theory The second major source of findings that influences neuropsychology is the neuron theory—the idea that the unit of brain structure and function is the nerve cell. There are three aspects of the theory: (a) Neurons are discrete, autonomous cells that interact but are not physically connected; (b) neurons send electrical signals that have a chemical basis; and (c) neurons use chemical signals to communicate with one another. What makes humans “smarter” than other animals is explained by the

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neuron theory: Humans have more neurons (a lot more neurons) than other animal species. Brain stimulation is a standard part of many neurosurgical procedures. Stimulating different parts of the brain produces different behaviors. The use of this method allows the functions of the brain to be mapped. By using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), researchers induce electrical activation in the brain by passing a magnetized coil across the skull. This noninvasive technique allows investigators to study how the typical brain produces behavior and which parts participate in particular actions. Recording from neurons also shows their individual contributions to behavior. Connections Between Neurons as the Basis of Learning

Charles Scott Sherrington, an English physiologist, theorized in the early 1900s that neurons are separated by junctions. He called these junctions synapses (from the Greek word meaning “clasp”). Scientists later demonstrated that chemicals carry the message across the synapse. The simple experiment showing chemical transmission consisted of electrically stimulating a nerve to the heart of a frog while washing fluid over it and collecting the fluid. When the fluid was applied to the same heart or a second heart, its beating changed in the same way that the electrical stimulation had changed the original heart’s beating rate. The general assumption developed that a synapse releases chemicals to ­influence the adjacent cell. On the basis of this principle, Donald Hebb proposed that when individual cells are activated at the same time, they establish new, connecting synapses or strengthen existing ones and thus become a functional unit. The new or strengthened connections, sometimes called Hebb or plastic synapses, are the structural bases of memory. Families of neurons thus connected form cell assemblies to represent units of behavior, such as an idea, and cell assemblies linked together could underlie thinking and consciousness.

Contributions to Neuropsychology From Allied Fields Neuropsychology draws on numerous contributions from allied fields: neurosurgery; psychometrics—the

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science of measuring human mental abilities—and statistical analysis; and technological advances that allow observation of the living brain. Neurosurgery

Neurosurgery began with the introduction of antisepsis, anesthesia, and the understanding that tumors and malformations of the brain can impair behavior. Many surgeons had success with methods for treating brain abscesses, tumors, and epilepsy-producing scars. Neurosurgery patients can remain awake during surgery and contribute to its success by providing information about the effects of localized brain stimulation. Thus, the surgeon can draw a map of the lesion, sometimes after stimulating the surrounding tissue electrically to discover the exact extent of damage. Correlations can be obtained between focal lesions in the brain and the changes in behavior that result from those lesions. Neuropsychological tests have been developed to assess such behavioral changes and have become part of a methodology for evaluating brain and behavior more generally. Psychometrics and Statistical Evaluation

French developmental psychologist Alfred Binet developed tests to identify children who required special instruction. In the United States, Lewis Terman produced a version of the tests in which the intelligence quotient (IQ)—mental age divided by chronological age times 100—was first used. Terman set the average intelligence level to equal an IQ score of 100. Intelligence tests are composed of subtests, each of which measures different abilities—reasoning, math, memory, and verbal fluency. Neuro­ psychologists use the tests as instruments for measuring brain function. Hebb first gave IQ tests to brain-damaged people, with the surprising discovery that lesions in the frontal lobes —then considered the center of highest intelligence—in fact, did not decrease IQ scores. Lesions to other brain areas formerly not implicated in intelligence did reduce them. This counterintuitive finding revealed the tests’ utility for assessing the location of brain damage and effectively created a bond of common interest between neurology and neuro­psychology.

Brain Imaging

Brain imaging allows a rapid correlation between symptoms and brain pathology and is an essential diagnostic tool. A variety of computerassisted, brain-imaging methods reconstruct twoand three-dimensional images of the brain. •• Computerized tomography (CT) scanning passes X-rays through the head. X-rays are absorbed less by fluid than by brain cells and less by brain cells than by bone. A computer can generate a three-dimensional image of the brain and thus a three-dimensional image of the injured region. •• Positron emission tomography (PET) entails injecting radioactive substances that decay in minutes into the bloodstream to reach the brain. As the radioactivity decays, it gives off photons, allowing a computer to detect their location and produce a two- or three-dimensional reconstruction of the brain. Active areas of the brain have greater blood flow, and so give off more photons; thus brain areas engaged in specific activities such as sight, hearing, or memory can be identified. •• Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) calculates the location of moving molecules by detecting the electrical charge their movement generates. Because brain tissue varies in its concentration of molecules (e.g., in nerve fibers versus cell bodies), MRI can use regional differences to produce highresolution brain images.

CT scans can be obtained quickly and cheaply. PET can use different chemicals; thus, diseases characterized by chemical changes can be imaged. MRI’s high resolution can create lifelike images of the brain and provide excellent detail of brain areas that are active during behavior. Ian Q. Whishaw and Bryan Kolb See also Brain and Nervous System: Macroarchitecture; Brain and Nervous System: Microarchitecture; Cognitive Neuroscience; Emotional Disorders; Failure of Memory; Language Disorders; Neurodevelopmental Disorders; Neurotransmitters and Neuromodulators; Perceptual Disorders; Psychoneuroimmunology; Research Methods in Neuroscience; Social Neuroscience

Neuroscience as One-Sided Dualism

Further Readings Corkin, S. (2000). What’s new with the amnesic patient H. M.? Nature Reviews Neuroscience 3(2), 153–160. Geschwind, N. (1974). Selected papers on language and brain. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: D. Reidel. Goodale, M. A., & D. A. Milner. (2004). Sight unseen: An exploration of conscious and unconscious vision. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Hebb, D. O. (1949). The organization of behavior: A neuropsychological theory. New York, NY: Wiley. Kolb, B., & Whishaw, I. Q. (2015). Fundamentals of human neuropsychology (7th ed.). New York, NY: Worth. Sperry, R. W. (1981, December 8). Some effects of disconnecting the cerebral hemispheres [Nobel lecture]. Available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_ prizes/medicine/laureates/1981/sperry-lecture_en.html

Neuroscience as One-Sided Dualism Neuroscience is sometimes viewed as adhering to a one-sided dualism. The typical dualism is mind– body dualism, with the mind not considered in itself, only the body—thus, a mind–body dualism that is one-sided. When a neuroscience researcher concentrates on body or matter in doing science and considers mind either as a property of that body or matter or as somehow related to that body or matter, then that neuroscientist is adhering to a dualism between mind and body but dealing only with one side of it—body or matter. This entry discusses the interaction between the mind and the body and how their relationship has been viewed over the years.

History Historically, mind–body dualism is associated with the scientist and philosopher René Descartes (1596–1650), who argued in his Meditations and other of his works for a dualism in which mind is composed of mental substance and body of a separate material substance. Thinkers who argue that or proceed as if the mind is either a separate substance or a different kind of substance, mental rather than material, thus are viewed in the

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Cartesian tradition as holding, even if implicitly, a form of mind–body dualism. Because of the difficulties with mind–body dualism, many scientists and other thinkers have sought to distance themselves from the position emphasized by Descartes. The principal difficulty is how to understand mind–body interaction: How could a separate mental substance act on a bodily substance, or how could a bodily substance act on a mental substance? Simple actions, such as deliberately raising one’s arm, because they seem to involve mind acting on body as one chooses to raise one’s arm, seem difficult to make sense of. Mind–body dualism also seems to be a nonscientific position, because it is not clear how, through science, to investigate the mind except indirectly through correlated material properties. Accordingly, some neuroscientists proceed as if they could investigate the mind by investigating the brain. It seems initially plausible that even if one cannot via neuroscience investigate mental properties themselves, still one can investigate their associated brain properties. Evidence is rapidly mounting of the many ways that the brain is substantially related to the activities of the mind. Indeed, some neuroscientists even attribute the properties of the mind to the brain. They talk about the “brain thinking” or the “brain seeing” or the “brain understanding.” Such attributions of mind to brain keep alive the notion of mind while talking about it in terms of what can be done by the brain. They maintain a dualism between mind and body, as between mind and brain, but draw the distinction differently where activities that were once attributed to a person with a mind are now attributed to that person’s brain.

The Brain and the Mind Such a tendency to attribute mental properties to the brain is so prevalent among neuroscientists, especially cognitive neuroscientists—that is, those investigating the neuroscience of cognition—that some philosophers and a few neuroscientists have felt moved to critique the practice, calling it a kind of part–whole fallacy, what is called a mereological fallacy. The neuroscientist M. R. Bennett and the philosopher P. M. S. Hacker in their book History of Cognitive Neuroscience make the case that it is

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Neuroscience as One-Sided Dualism

(whole) persons who think or see or understand, not brains (parts of persons). To blur the distinction between what (whole) persons would usually be said to do and what brains can do, they argue, may seem harmless enough initially, but it is really a disguised dualism that attempts to be a one-sided brain-only view. As is often said in philosophy but surely is a rule in good-quality science, the most insidious kind of assumption is an unnoticed assumption. A neuroscience that aims to be free of mind–body dualism must not take the step of attributing whole-person activities to a part of the brain. That becomes a kind of one-sided dualism, maintaining the dualism but failing to acknowledge it. Some neuroscientists openly acknowledge that neuroscience cannot seem to handle the mind and thus explicitly and consciously hold that some mental phenomena cannot, at least yet, be understood in terms of brain. The world-renowned neuroscientist Christof Koch in his 2012 book Consciousness confesses that he cannot find a way for neuroscience to account for consciousness. He thus does not want to say that consciousness is a property of the brain, or he at least says that right now there is no way to make sense of that claim. The best approach is to proceed trying to understand how the brain is related to consciousness and hope that the understanding will improve. Thus, there is a dualism between consciousness and brain, at least for now and the foreseeable future.

Problems in Neuroscience Research That neuroscience is a one-sided dualism has also become a serious critique of a wide swath of neuroscience research. In their chapter “Neuroscience: Dualism in Disguise,” Riccardo Manzotti and Paolo Moderato argue that much of contemporary neuroscience is thoroughly dualist—worse, they mean to imply, that dualism is unacknowledged. Aiming to be materialist and scientific, much of neuroscience, they argue, is conceptually dualist. It is one-sided in that it emphasizes only one side of a dualism as if it were contrasted with an unmentioned side. That neuroscience adheres to onesided dualism can be taken simply as a description of neuroscience researchers, as a recommended stance for neuroscience researchers, or as a critique

of neuroscience researchers. Further, neuroscientists can knowingly or unwittingly adhere to a onesided dualism. As a reaction to the frustrations with what many see as one-sided dualism in neuroscience, many thinkers are trying to develop what is sometimes called nonmaterialist neuroscience. Those thinkers, for a wide range of reasons, would like neuroscience openly to embrace the mental side of mind–body dualism rather than try to understand it in terms of body, brain, or matter. Some would like to see a science developed that includes mental phenomena as proper subjects of science, thus expanding the domain of science. Reactions to the notion of nonmaterialist neuroscience abound, with the most extreme reflected in the title of contemporary philosopher of mind Professor Andy Clark’s presentation titled, “There Is No Non-Materialist Neuro­ science.” Harking back to the days early in the history of psychology, Clark does not think one can make sense of the notion of a nonmaterialist science. In a slightly different vein, some philosophers, neuro­scientists, and psychologists who are im­pressed with the role of touch, motion, and orientation in perception want to argue for what is popularly referred to as embodiment in perception and in cognition. Thus, in these views, the body plays such a substantial role in, for example, perception, that seeing something cannot be viewed simply as a mental operation made possible by the brain and the visual system. Instead, it is as an embodied operation, one that so involves the body for its constitution that it can no longer be considered as something conceptually dualistic but as an integrated body and mind operation. Sometimes called enactive views of perception, these new theories promise to avoid onesided dualism if the interrelations between body and mind can be backed up by sufficient research. Donald Jones See also Cognitive Neuroscience; Consciousness and the Unconscious; Consciousness, Categories of; Consciousness, Functions of; Consciousness, Origins of; Drive and Motivation in the Brain; Embodied Cognition; Embodied Grounding; Motivation and Cognition; Research Methods in Neuroscience; Social Neuroscience

Neurotransmitters and Neuromodulators

Further Readings Bennett, M. R., & Hacker, P. M. S. (2013). History of cognitive neuroscience. Malden, MA: John Wiley. Clark, A. (2010). There is no non-materialist neuroscience. Cortex, 46(2), 147–149. Koch, C. (2012). Consciousness: Confessions of a romantic reductionist. Boston, MA: MIT Press. Manzotti, R., & Moderato, P. (2014). Neuroscience: Dualism in disguise. In Contemporary dualism: A defense (pp. 81–97). New York, NY: Routledge.

Neurotransmitters Neuromodulators

and

In the course of evolution, when cells began to assemble and later differentiate to form pluricellular organisms, some form of communication had to develop to synchronize the metabolism and also movements of these cells. This entry discusses how cells communicate with each other via signals produced by neurotransmitters and neuromodulators. Two main forms of communication evolved in the evolutionary context. In the entire organism, cells communicate by chemical signals, mostly hormones, that are secreted by specialized endocrine glands, diffuse in the entire body, and affect the metabolism of target cells that contain highly specific receptors for these hormones. In the central nervous system, specialized cells called neurons communicate by propagating electrical signals, the action potentials. Detailed microscopy studies by the pioneering anatomist Ramón y Cajal led him to argue, however, that the “electrical” wiring established by the dendrites and axons of neurons is discontinuous. His position was opposed by Camillo Golgi, who supported a reticular theory in which all neurons are connected directly. Subsequently, it became definitive that a very common pattern in the central nervous system is the occurrence of a 20 to 40 nm separation between neurons called the synaptic cleft. Communication between two neurons is then effected by chemical means. At the end of the axon, the action potential releases a chemical substance that crosses the synaptic cleft and modifies the

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electrical potential in the postsynaptic neuron. This can result in the generation or inhibition of a new action potential. This chemical substance is a neurotransmitter. These discoveries support Cajal’s position, but the later discovery of gap junctions that provide for direct electrical communication between cells showed that Golgi’s position has merit as well.

Neurotransmitters The German-born pharmacologist Otto Loewi is credited for demonstrating in 1921 that neurons in the peripheral nervous system communicate via neurotransmitters. He focused on acetylcholine, previously discovered by Henry Dale, which is released by the vagus nerve and controls heart rate. Several other families of neurotransmitters were subsequently discovered in the central nervous system, and it was soon broadly accepted that this is a very common way for neurons to communicate. The exception is the less common direct method via gap junctions. Neurotransmitters were initially characterized according to the following attributes: (a) They are synthesized by, or at least present in, neurons; (b) they are released and act on very close cellular targets usually just across the synapse; (c) they are stored in synaptic vesicles in presynaptic boutons; (d) they act in a very rapid manner on the excitability of the postsynaptic membrane after binding to specific receptor proteins, usually voltage-gated ion channels; and ­(e) specific enzymes are associated with their synthesis, and specific enzymes or reuptake proteins regulate the inactivation of synaptic transmission. The main types of neurotransmitters that fulfill these criteria are as follows: a. Glutamate and similar amino acids, such as ­aspartate, play an excitatory role in the brain and thus trigger action potentials in postsynaptic neurons; they are the excitatory amino acid transmitters. b. Gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA) and glycine are used in the majority of the inhibitory ­synapses and decrease the probability of action potentials in the postsynaptic neurons.

Collectively, glutamate and GABA are active in nearly 90% of all synapses in the brain. Given

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their ubiquitous presence, these two neurotransmitters influence almost every possible function of the brain, and it is difficult to isolate their function in specific responses. However, each has multiple types of receptors, and injecting carefully selected agonists and antagonists of these receptors into circumscribed brain areas has made it possible to demonstrate their specific implications in several brain functions or behaviors, including, for example, male and female sexual behavior. The monoamines that include the catecholamines (such as dopamine, norepinephrine, and epinephrine) and the indolamines (such as serotonin) form another class of transmitters that share most but not all the characteristics that were described earlier. They are not always released at the synapse, they can act at a longer distances than the typical synaptic cleft, and they can influence the excitability of neurons located in a substantial area around the release site (so-called volume neurotransmission). The time course of their action is also usually slower than that exhibited by amino acid transmitters. The discovery and characterization of the monoamines provided one of the first examples of how the concept of neurotransmitter had to accommodate diversity—specifically, in how neurotransmitters were synthesized and regulated. But other, more profound, challenges were still to come. Although monoamines are synthesized by relatively limited groups of neurons with very discrete localization, the projections of these neurons are diffuse and reach very large areas of the brain. Accordingly, these amine neurotransmitters affect a broad range of dependent variables. Serotonin is associated with the control of mood, as illustrated by the massive use of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) to extend serotonin’s action in the brain and thus improve the mental condition of depressed patients. Another example is the decrease in dopaminergic innervation of the basal ganglia due to a progressive degeneration of dopamine-producing cells in the substantia nigra. This is the molecular basis of the motor troubles that characterize Parkinson’s disease. Its symptoms have been alleviated for more than 30 years by treatment with the dopamine precursor L-Dopa. Acetylcholine, a chemically unrelated transmitter initially discovered in the heart, was later

shown to be ubiquitous at the neuromuscular junction in the peripheral nervous system and also in specific circuits in the brain, where it generally modulates plasticity, arousal, and reward. Degeneration of the brain cholinergic system has been associated with the memory deficits observed in Alzheimer disease.

Neuromodulators The neurotransmitters just described are all small molecules similar in size to a single amino acid. The 1970s brought the discovery that many small peptide hormones that had initially been identified in the peripheral nervous system were additionally synthesized and released in the brain, where they modulated neuronal excitability. They were collectively called neuropeptides. Approximately 100 of them have now been recognized. They are often co-released with “true neurotransmitters,” and they modulate (amplify or decrease) the action of neurotransmitters, which justifies their identification as neuromodulators. A neuromodulator can be conceptualized as a slower neurotransmitter that is not reabsorbed (i.e., there is no reuptake) by the presynaptic neuron or rapidly broken down within the synaptic cleft into a metabolite. Neuromodulators spend a substantial amount of time in the extracellular or cerebrospinal fluid, where they are progressively inactivated by specific peptidases. They modulate the electrical activity of neighboring neurons (i.e., volume transmission), most often via their binding to seven transmembrane domains G-proteincoupled receptors (GPCR). However, they do not normally induce postsynaptic action potentials by themselves, although exceptions have been identified. Based on these features, acetylcholine, catecholamines, and indolamines are sometimes considered as neuromodulators rather than true neurotransmitters. Neuropeptides include molecules such as galanin, Neuropeptide Y, somatostatin, cholecystokinin, Substance P, neurotensin, vasoactive intestinal polypeptide (VIP), oxytocin, vasopressin and the opioid-like peptides, enkephalins, endorphins, and dynorphins. They modulate a broad range of functions, ranging from analgesia, food intake, learning, and memory to and male and female sexual behavior. The neuropeptides oxytocin and

Nonvisual Memory

vasopressin, which were initially identified as posterior-pituitary hormones with clearly defined functions in the peripheral nervous system are released in the brain, and as neuromodulatory neuropeptides, play a key role in the control of social behaviors, including affiliation.

Additional Challenges to the Neurotransmitter Concept The discovery of novel neurotransmitters, such as the free-radical gases nitric oxide (NO) and carbon monoxide (CO), has led to proposals to broaden the criteria for inclusion of a particular messenger in the neurotransmitter category. Obviously, these gases cannot be stored in vesicles as classical neurotransmitters are but are synthesized in neurons in response to intracellular signals (e.g., changes in calcium) and then diffuse to target cells in the vicinity, where they enter and produce biological effects by acting on “enzyme receptors,” such as guanylyl cyclase. These novel chemical messengers in the brain possess some traits in common with traditional neurotransmitters but lack others. This led Solomon Snyder and Christopher Ferris in 2000 to propose that the concept of neurotransmission be liberalized: “A transmitter is a molecule, released by neurons or glia that physiologically influences the electrochemical state of adjacent cells” (p. 1746). Such a broadening suggests that even the distinction between neurotransmitters and hormones should also be reexamined, especially in the case of neuroactive steroids, such as estradiol, which is produced and acts rapidly in the brain to affect both cellular functions and organismal responses, including learning and memory and aggressive and sexual behaviors. Jacques Balthazart and Gregory F. Ball See also Neuroendocrine System; Brain and Nervous System: Microarchitecture

Further Readings Balthazart, J., & Ball, G. F. (Eds.). (2012). Brain aromatase, estrogens, and behavior. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Iversen, L., Iversen, S., Bloom, F. E., & Roth, R. H. (2008). Introduction to neuropsychopharmacology. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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Sheng, M., Sabatini, B. L., & Sudhof, T. C. (Eds.). (2012). The synapses. Cold Spring Harbor, NY: Cold Spring Harbor Press. Snyder, S. H., & Ferris, C. D. (2000). Novel neurotransmitters and their neuropsychiatric relevance. American Journal of Psychiatry, 157, 1738–1751. Valenstein, E. S. (2005). The war of the soups and the sparks: The discovery of neurotransmitters and the dispute over how nerves communicate. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Nonvisual Memory Many theories of mental representations posit a distinction between visual and nonvisual (or verbal) information. Whereas the visual codes are closely tied to the imagery system, the verbal codes are linked to the language system. This entry emphasizes the nonvisual systems but introduces aspects of the visual system when appropriate as points of contrast.

Dual Coding Theory One of the first formal theories to capture the characteristics of the two types of code was Allan Paivio’s dual coding theory (DCT), originally proposed in 1971. According to the DCT, the imaginal system processes visuospatial information, and the physical features of the information are preserved in an analogical manner (e.g., an image of the American flag that encompasses all the perceptual details, such as color, shape, and size). The verbal system, on the other hand, specializes in alphanumeric information and stores information such as symbolic codes or verbal descriptions (e.g., the American flag has 13 alternating red and white horizontal stripes and 50 white, five-pointed stars against a blue background in the canton). Although these systems possess different characteristics, they are highly interactive in that information can easily be translated from one code to the other (e.g., mental image to verbal descriptions). Another critical feature of the DCT is that the representations in both verbal and visual systems are modality specific (in stark contrast to the

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concept of amodal representation, which is discussed later in this entry). Modality refers to the sensorimotor systems that are engaged during stimulus encoding. Consider the concept “apple.” On the one hand, the verbal system contains the visual word form apple (which allows for written production and recognition), the auditory sound ­“/apəl/” (which supports speech production), and the motor program associated with written production (e.g., the movement of the hand to write the word in uppercase letters). On the other hand, the imagery system may consist of a visual picture of the object itself (e.g., an apple hanging from a tree), the crunching sound made as one bites into an apple, the smoothness of the skin when holding an apple, the sweetness of the fruit, and the smell associated with it. The DCT contends that these modality-specific codes can function independently; that is, retrieval of information from one modality (e.g., the crispness of an  apple) need not invoke other modalities (e.g., taste). The notion of modality-specific representations has received support from both ­ behavioral demonstrations of modality-specific interference and neuropsychological dissociations.

Propositional Network In contrast to the DCT, the propositional view posits that what appear to be mental images are simply simulations that occur at the time of retrieval. In other words, mental representations do not exist in a pictorial format; rather, they are stored as verbal codes (or amodal feature lists), and if necessary, images based on these verbal descriptions are produced. Proponents of propositional theories argue that because much of cognition depends on a “language of thought,” it is reasonable to propose that mental representations are also verbally based. The primary advantage of this approach is that information can be stored more efficiently. Rather than storing distinct images of many similar experiences, reconstructible representations, based on a smaller set of verbal descriptions, can be stored. These processes are thought to be less demanding on limited cognitive resources. The strong version of the proposal has fallen out of favor, as there is mounting evidence for the existence of pictorial representations. Nonetheless, researchers such as

Zenon Pylyshyn have remained staunch supporters of this view and have argued that mental images are epiphenomenal.

Working Memory The distinction between visual and verbal representations can also be found in working memory, which was originally proposed by Alan Baddeley and Graham Hitch in 1974. Broadly speaking, working memory is a limited-capacity system that temporarily maintains or manipulates information; this process allows the information to remain available to consciousness. Consider the situation where one needs to perform an arithmetic problem (e.g., what is the product of 16 × 8?) without any external aid. To do so, one relies on working memory to maintain the question while updating the different sums and products as each component is calculated. In the original tripartite model, working memory consists of an attentional control system (i.e., central executive) that oversees two slave systems that specialize in verbal material (i.e., the phonological loop) and visual and spatial information (i.e., the visuospatial sketchpad). A fourth component called the episodic buffer was recently added to the model. The buffer is hypothesized to act as an interface between the slave systems and longterm memory. Baddeley and colleagues proposed that the phonological loop retains speech-based information via the articulatory rehearsal system. If articulatory rehearsal is not engaged, however, the temporary memory trace decays over the period of a few seconds. Articulatory rehearsal is recruited for speech-based information that is received from an external source (e.g., auditory input) and generated from an internal source (e.g., inner speech). The functioning of the phonological loop is typically assessed with a span task, wherein individuals are asked to maintain strings of verbal information (e.g., letters, numbers, words, or sentences) for varying amounts of time. The average number of items that are correctly recalled in their sequential order is an estimate of the individual’s workingmemory span. Traditionally, working-memory span is considered to be between five and nine items for most individuals. However, recent studies have

Nonvisual Memory

suggested that the capacity may be between three and five items instead. In some cases, a concurrent visual or verbal task may be introduced, and individuals are asked to maintain multiple streams of input. Findings of selective interference effects— for example, concurrent verbal information interfering with retention of verbal information but not visual information and vice versa—have been interpreted as support for a dissociation between the two slave systems.

Lexical Memory In contrast to the notion of modality-specific representations forwarded by the DCT, lexical memory systems are generally considered to be amodal. That is, the sensorimotor information typically present at encoding is stripped away, and the representations are abstract and do not resemble the actual referents. Lexical memory is conceived of as a mental dictionary dedicated to the storage of word meanings, syntax, and phonology. Whereas meaning and syntax are stored in the “lemma” (e.g., a candle is made of wax and a wick in the middle; it is typically used as a noun), phonology is stored in the “lexeme” (e.g., how the word sounds, /’kandl/). In addition, words with shared features on the meaning, syntactic, or phonological levels are associated in a network. Thus, retrieval of one word will likely activate other, related words via spreading activation. For example, retrieval of “candle” may lead to activation of words with related meanings (e.g., flashlight), other nouns (e.g., table), and other words that share phonological features (e.g., candy).

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Furthermore, lemma and lexeme activation is thought to occur sequentially, and within the lemma level, meaning activation precedes syntax retrieval. Patterns of speech errors have been interpreted as support for these different levels of representations. Specifically, speech errors tend to be (a) related in meaning (e.g., erroneously producing foot when the intended target is shoe), (b) within the same syntactical category (e.g., erroneously producing one noun, but not an adjective, when retrieving another noun), and (c) similar in sounds (e.g., erroneously producing candy instead of candle). Irene P. Kan See also Exceptional Memory and Expertise; Failure of Memory; Heuristics for Memory and Decision Making; Long-Term Memory: Processes; Long-Term Memory: Structures; Memory as Reconstructive; Short-Term and Working Memory; Working Memory, Improvement of

Further Readings Baddeley, A. (2000). The episodic buffer: A new component of working memory?” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4, 417–423. Levelt, W. M. J. (1989). Speaking: From intention to articulation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Logie, R. H. (2011). The functional organization and capacity limits of working memory. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20, 240–245. Pylyshyn, Z. (2003). Return of the mental image: Are these pictures in the brain? Trends in Cognitive Science, 7, 113–118. Sadoski, M., & Paivio, A. (2001). Imagery and text. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

O Objectivity

in

not all, instances of what are presently labeled mental disorders in the contemporary medical nosologies of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) and the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-10). Objectivists contend that such underlying malfunctions can be discriminated from proper functioning by a value-neutral empirical analysis. According to Robert Woolfolk, this objectivist picture of mental illness as malfunction is fundamentally at variance with normativist or social constructionist accounts. It is not surprising that normativists and objectivists differ notably in how they conceive the evolution of such memorable psychopathologies of the past as drapetomania (a supposed mental illness that caused Black slaves to flee captivity), masturbation, and homosexuality. Victorian physicians regularly performed “therapeutic” clitorectomies on masturbators, who also were considered to be mentally ill. In 1938, Aaron Rosanoff published a leading textbook listing the following among the 40 psychiatric disorders: moral deficiency, masturbation, misanthropy, and vagabondage. Homosexuality, which was universally regarded as a manifestation of mental illness by Western psychiatry, was “officially” depathologized, after a contentious political struggle, by a referendum of the American Psychiatric Association membership in 1974.

Diagnosis

A debate, begun by Thomas Szasz in 1971, has raged within the various literatures of philosophy, psychiatry, and psychology over whether, and to what degree, the concepts that characterize psychopathology are value-laden. Although the majority position among philosophers has been normativist—that is, that the conception of a mental disorder is fundamentally evaluative—a vocal and cogent minority has argued that psychopathology results from malfunctions that can be described by terminology that is objective and scientific. With some notable exceptions (e.g., Szasz), scientists and clinicians have tended to endorse the objectivist and naturalist position. This entry reviews the issues on both sides of the debate.

Objectivist Perspective Objectivists reject and attempt to refute the view that psychopathology is determined exclusively by the values or norms of a particular culture or historical period and therefore is not simply a matter of behavioral fashion. At the core of all objectivist positions is the naturalist view that mental disorders involve a departure from the proper and normal functioning of the human organism. Psychopathology thus represents a breakdown or malfunction of some psychological mechanism that is part of the design of the human species. Objectivists believe that such broken or malfunctioning psychological mechanisms cause some, but

Normativist Perspective Presently, both objectivist and normativist camps regard as clinically benign the desires of slaves to 619

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escape captivity and orgasms achieved either through self-stimulation or sex with a partner of same gender. Normativists, believing that illness categories are essentially social constructions, tend to see such bygone “mental illnesses” as evidence for the cultural relativity of psychopathology and to view developments such as the depathologization of drapetomania and homosexuality as examples of moral, rather than scientific, progress. Among normativists, writers of a social constructionist bent (e.g., Kenneth Gergen and Sheila McNamee) are inclined to conclude from the long lamentable catalog of psychiatric folly that psychopathology is pretty much a matter of what conduct and states of mind are fashionable across history and culture. They hold that mental illness is fundamentally about what a society values, as is the case with musical tastes or standards of proper attire.

Labeling Mental Illness Objectivists, of course, do not deny that social forces determine the application of illness labels, as in the notorious case of Soviet psychiatrists diagnosing political dissidents with “sluggish schizophrenia.” Other conditions commonly regarded as pathologies by many clinicians and researchers— for example, premenstrual dysphoric disorder and masochistic personality disorder—were denied official status as mental illnesses after highly polemical and acrimonious conflicts among the parties who influenced the fashioning of DSM-IV. But objectivists attribute the psychiatric embarrassments of the past to bad science and conceive of nosological revisions as resulting from empirical advances—that is, scientific progress demonstrating that there is no flawed psychological mechanism underlying the desire to escape slavery. An influential account of mental disorder by Jerome Wakefield in 2007 holds that the theoretical and practical dimensions of psychopathology can be separated into a value-free component (a mind/brain malfunction) and a symptom set that is socially disvalued. This view acknowledges the value-laden nature of psychiatric diagnosis while retaining one element of the objectivist position: the necessary condition that a malfunctioning mechanism be present. To the degree one attempts to make psychological mechanism malfunction a necessary condition

for psychopathology, however, one negates a postulate of writers as diverse as Sigmund Freud, Walter Cannon, and Hans Selye. As noted by Dominic Murphy and Woolfolk, this view, which has guided psychiatry and clinical psychology for more than a century, is that in many respects, humans are not cut out for the contemporary world and that many of their emotional difficulties stem from the stresses placed by modern society on a Stone Age psyche reacting exactly as it was designed to. Much theory in evolutionary psychiatry has proposed that some mental illness may result from the mind–brain functioning properly in the evolutionary sense, albeit in an environment for which it was not “designed” by evolution. The social competition theory of depression, for example, hypothesizes that within the small, cohesive tribal groups of the Pleistocene epoch an episode of depression might have been an adaptive response to a fall in status or the loss of resource-holding power. In response to such vicissitudes, Randolph Nesse points out that depression enables the unfortunate individual to conserve energy, reduce costly behavior, and elicit aid from others, thereby providing the opportunity to develop new and potentially more effective tactics for gaining status. The theory has it that depression-eliciting events were relatively rare in the lives of early humans but that in the contemporary world, one is bombarded with stimuli that are continuous reminders of those who are richer, prettier, smarter, and so on. Thus, overloaded relative to their designed capacities, human beings’ status detection mechanisms send them spiraling down into dysphoria. Whether this story about depression turns out to be true is less important than its possibility and potential testability. Not only depression but also the anxiety disorders and several personality disorders have been theorized to be not malfunctions but responses consonant with the species design, albeit in circumstances where “proper” functioning results in psychopathology. Thus, behavior that qualifies for a DSM-5 diagnosis could occur in the absence of any mechanism that is, in the etiological sense, malfunctioning. Alternately, mechanisms selected by evolution, when functioning as designed, may bring about patterns of behavior that, for various reasons, some would choose to classify as pathological. The objectivist conception of mental illness inevitably fails to take into account that clinical

Occipital Lobe Functions

theory and practice are not only mirrors of cultural norms but shapers of those norms as well. Writers such as Ian Hacking have argued persuasively that some mental disorders (e.g., multiple personality disorder) are roles created by the theories and practices of the mental health professions and subsequently enacted by patients. The articulation and dissemination of information about psychopathology through professional activities and by the media provide a symptom set and patient profile that can be assimilated by disturbed individuals with sufficient psychic malleability. Psychiatry is not only a branch of knowledge but also a social institution that fashions, adjusts, and administers what the sociologist Benjamin Nelson termed directive structures, cognitive frameworks that channel and motivate behavior through the articulation of what is “valued” and “normal.” Directive structures are analogous to Talcott Parsons’s normative order: the norms and values instantiated in and disseminated by social institutions and that maintain social solidarity, regulate social action, and control social deviance. Behavior that is undesirably outside social norms often places the offending individual in either the courtroom or the psychiatric consulting room. At an operational level, theory and practice within the mental health professions are very much intertwined with the judicial system and the very basic normative role that the law plays in society. Robert L. Woolfolk See also Behavioral Perspectives on Psychopathology; Culture and Psychopathology; Historical Roots of Theories of Psychopathology; Humanistic Theories of Psychopathology; Medicalization of Psychopathology; Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Psychopathology; Psychopathology and Stress

Further Reading Boorse, C. (1997). A rebuttal on health. In J. M. Humber & R. F. Almeder (Eds.), What is disease? (pp. 3–143). Totawa, NJ: Humana Press. Bloch, S., & Reddaway, P. (1977). Psychiatric terror. New York: Basic Books. Kutchins, H., & Kirk S. A. (1997). Making us crazy: DSM: The psychiatric bible and the creation of mental disorders. New York, NY: Free Press.

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Murphy, D., & Woolfolk, R. L. (2000). Psychopathology: The harmful dysfunction analysis. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 7, 241–252. Nelson, B. (1981). On the roads to modernity: Conscience, science and civilizations. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield. Nesse, R. M. (2000). Is depression an adaptation? Archives of General Psychiatry, 57, 14–20. Parsons, T. (1977). The evolution of societies. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Price, J., Sloman, L., Gardner, R., Gilbert, P., & Rohde, P. (1994). The social competition hypothesis of depression. British Journal of Psychiatry, 164, 309–315. Reznek, L. (1997). Evil or ill: Justifying the insanity defense. London, England: Routledge. Rosanoff, A. J. (1938). Manual of psychiatry and mental hygiene. New York, NY: Wiley. Wakefield, J. C. (2007). The concept of mental disorder: Diagnostic implications of the harmful dysfunction analysis. World Psychiatry, 6, 149–156. Woolfolk, R. L. (1998). The cure of souls: Science, values, and psychotherapy. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Occipital Lobe Functions The occipital lobe is the most posterior of the four cerebral lobes and mediates early visual experience. It is separated from the parietal lobes by the parieto-occipital fissure and is divided dorsally/ ventrally by the calcarine fissure. In the human brain, the left occipital pole is slightly longer than the right and is wider. The occipital lobe is composed of six cellular layers as are other areas of the cerebral cortex, although there are distinctions between sensory and motor cortices. In the occipital lobes, the fourth cellular layer (Layer IV) of the primary visual cortex displays a distinctive, striped appearance; hence, this cortical area is often referred to as the striate cortex. This entry describes the anatomy and theoretical functions of the occipital lobe. It also discusses the effects of damage to this part of the brain as they relate to those functions. The occipital brain receives its primary afferent input from the retina of the eye. Retinal projection fibers have an intermediate synapse in the lateral geniculate nucleus of the thalamus, a subcortical structure, and then synapse in Layer IV of the

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­rimary visual cortex. This pathway has been p described as the retinal-geniculate-striate pathway. From various locations on the retina, there are two classes of retinal projection cells. They make up the magnocellular pathway (large cells) and the parvocellular pathway (small cells). As described in the next section, these pathways mediate different visual functions. The cells synapse in separate layers of the lateral geniculate nucleus and then distribute to separate strata of Layer IV of the primary visual cortex. Approximately half of each visual field is projected onto the contralateral or opposite occipital cortex.

Functional Anatomy Primary and Secondary Visual Cortex: Functions of Areas V1 and V2

Although it has been estimated that there are more than 30 areas of the primate cerebral cortex that mediate visual functions, the perceptual differentiation into color, form, motion, and depth begins in the primary visual cortex (Visual 1 or V1). Among the layers of the visual cortex that take input from Layer IV, three types of cells have been identified. They exist in columns that lie vertical to the cortical surface. One type of cell, called a simple cell, responds to the single orientation of a stimulus figure through its entire column. Separate columns of simple cells respond to orientations of figures along a 180-degree axis. Another cell type, the complex cell, responds to orientation as do simple cells, but complex cells also require movement in order to respond. A third cell type, called the end-stopped cell, responds to orientation, movement, and the length and boundaries of the stimulus. All three cell types display ocular dominance (left- and right-eye separation). The three cell types respond to features of the stimulus and thus are termed feature detectors. Simple cells are found mainly in Layer IV of V1, and complex and end-stopped cells are found in other layers of V1. The retinal mosaic is displayed in the visual cortex by collections of columns displaying location, orientation, and ocular dominance, which are called hypercolumns. Many of these cells are selective to the direction of movement. In the upper layers of V1, discrete c­onstellations of cells that stain positive for cytochrome oxidase, called “blobs,” respond to wavelength.

From the layers of V1, pathways for color, form, motion, and depth project into Visual Area 2 (V2), which borders V1. Although anatomically contiguous to V1, V2 displays a different pattern when stained for cytochrome oxidase. Alternating thin and thick stripes separated by pale stripes dominate V2. Cells in the blobs of Area V1 project to the thin stripes of V2, cells in Layer IVB of V1 project to the thick stripes, and cells from the interblob areas of V1 project to the pale stripes. Pathways for color originate from the parvocellular layer of V1 and project to the thin stripes. Pathways for form also originate from the parvocellular layer of V1 but project to the pale stripes. Depth pathways originate from the magnocellular layer of V1 and project to the thick stripes. The pathways for motion originate from the magnocellular layer of V1 and project directly to the medial temporal lobe (Area MT). There may be some overlap between magno- and parvocellular pathways from V1 to V2 for color. From V2, pathways for motion and depth project to areas of the parietal lobes; color and form follow pathways that project to the temporal lobes. Visual Association Cortex

The information processed and analyzed by neurons in V1 and V2 project axons to surrounding neurons in areas considered to be the visual association cortex. These areas combine the neural activity processed in Areas V1 and V2 to elaborate and expand it. The visual association cortex is critical for the recognition of the visual stimulus and attaching specific meaning to it. There are two distinct processing pathways through the visual association areas. A ventral stream projects axons to the temporal cortex, and a dorsal stream projects axons to the parietal cortex. Association areas of the occipital, temporal, and parietal cortices project axons to the frontal cortex, which is implicated in the formation of intentions and planned movements directed toward a visual stimulus. The Ventral Stream: Functions of the Ventral Visual Association Areas

The ventral (lower) pathways of the occipital lobe (the occipital-temporal pathway) are specialized for object recognition and categorization: the what system. These areas are vital to higher order visual

Occipital Lobe Functions

processing. They project axons from the extrastriate visual cortex to neurons in the ventral aspects of the temporal lobe. The ventral visual association cortex conducts additional analysis of the movement, color, and orientation information initially processed in Areas V1 and V2 in the primary visual cortex. As information is projected through the ventral stream, there are neurons that are specifically implicated in processing information from the contralateral eye and processing color in both the upper and lower visual fields. Neurons in the lateral complex of the occipital lobe contribute to the perception of specific-object recognition and the recognition of body parts other than the face. Neurons in the parietal-occipital or fusiform gyrus are associated with the face recognition. The parahippocampal gyrus, located in the ventral temporal lobe, contributes to the recognition of a particular place in the visual field. This area is also associated with working and short-term memory. The Dorsal Stream: Functions of the Dorsal Association Areas

The dorsal (upper) pathways of the occipital lobe (the occipital-parietal pathway) are specialized for spatial analysis and movement: the where system for locating an object in visual space. The dorsal pathways project axons from the extrastriate association cortex to the dorsal aspects of the parietal lobe. Specific neurons there are vital for the perception of movement, visual attention, and the control of eye movements. The lateral intraparietal areas contribute to additional visual attention and the control of the jerky (or saccadic) movements of the eye when vision fixates on an object in the visual field. The ventral intraparietal areas control visual attention when vision is focused at a particular location in the visual field. Anterior intraparietal areas are associated with the control of hand movements within the perceived visual space. Middle intraparietal areas are specifically devoted to the control of hand reaching within the visual field. Caudal intraparietal areas are associated with depth perception.

Effects of Damage to the Occipital Lobe Primary and Secondary Visual Cortex

Neurons in the primary and secondary visual cortex respond to small areas of the visual field.

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Neuronal damage in these areas disrupts the initial processing of color, light and dark contrasts, the orientation of an angle, motion, depth perception, and the perception of movement. More specifically, damage to neurons in the right or left primary and secondary visual cortex produces varying levels of blindness in the contralateral visual field. This type of cortical blindness is called a scotoma. Extensive unilateral damage to the visual cortex results in a hemianopsia, a visual scotoma covering half of the visual field. Extensive bilateral damage results in complete blindness in both visual fields. A person thus afflicted reports the inability to see, a condition characterized as total cortical blindness. Specific neuronal damage can also produce a condition called blindsight. In this condition, a person interacts correctly with a visual stimulus that lies within a scotoma. At the same time, the person reports that she or he is unaware of the visual stimulus. It has been hypothesized that blindsight is the result of secondary visual pathways projecting from neurons in the brain stem (specifically, the superior colliculus) that provide arousal signals to the secondary and association areas of the visual cortex. Visual Association Cortex

Neurons in the association areas of the visual cortex respond to larger areas of the visual field. Therefore, damage to neurons in these areas would result in more complex deficits of visual perception. Deficits of color vision (achromatopsia— black-and-white vision), the recognitions of objects, and the perception of movement are observed. Specifically, damage to neurons in the ventral stream disrupts visual-pattern recognition and conscious visual perception. Visual agnosia, which is the disturbance of visual object and pattern recognition, is also observed. One form of agnosia is the inability of a person to recognize individual faces while describing their specific features. This condition is called prosopagnosia. Damage to the dorsal stream disrupts the perception of movement, depth perception, the perception of spatial location, and visually guided behavior. A variety of perceptual movement disorders and apraxias (disorders associated with learned, purposeful movements) is observed. Specifically, extensive bilateral dam-

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age results in akinetopsia, the inability to perceive movement. In addition, neuronal damage results in deficits of visual attention, the control of visually scanning eye movements, the control of jerky eye movements, hand reaching, and depth perception. Edward W. Kinghorn and Donovan E. Fleming See also Frontal Lobe Functions; Parietal Lobe Functions; Temporal Lobe Functions; Visual Perception; Visual System

Further Readings Branan, N. (2010, January/February). Wired for categorization. Scientific American Mind, 20, 11. Hubel, D. H., Wiesel, T. N., Yeagle, E. M., Lafer-Sousa, R., & Conway, B. R. (2013). Binocular stereoscopy in visual areas V-2, V-3, and V-3A of the macaque monkey. Cerebral Cortex, 23, 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/ doi:10.1093/cercor/bht288 Hubel, D. H. (1988). Eye, brain, and vision. New York, NY: W. H. Freeman. Koch, C. (2012 March/April). Consciousness does not reside here. Scientific American Mind, 23, 20–21. Martines-Conde, S. M., & Acknik, S. L. (2014, March/ April). David Hubel’s vision. Scientific American Mind, 25, 6–8.

Olfactory System The olfactory system serves to recognize volatile chemical signals that are present in an organism’s environment. A fundamental issue is whether recognition depends on a labeled line, with a particular stimulus generating a particular response, or whether the nervous system learns to associate a particular pattern of receptor input with a particular meaning. It is likely that both labeled-line and patternbased approaches play a role in the olfactory system of animals, but it may be that only the latter is important in humans. This distinction between labeled line and pattern-based approaches to perception represents a basic theoretical problem in the study of olfaction. This entry describes the olfactory system and discusses theories of olfactory reception.

Animal Olfactory Systems Have Two Main Parts Many animals have a two-component olfactory system. The main olfactory system is characterized by its plasticity, which is reflected in the ability to perceive stimuli that the organism has never encountered before and to learn what they signal. The accessory olfactory system is usually smaller and may be located within, adjacent to, or distant from the main olfactory system. It detects chemicals in a labeled-line manner, with receptors sensitive to specific stimuli. These chemicals are usually of biological importance to the organism and, in many instances, they are pheromones (i.e., secreted by other members of the same species). Once these chemicals are detected, substantial changes to the physiology and behavior of the organism may occur. One well-documented example is the Bruce effect. Pregnant mice exposed to the odor of a male mouse that is not the father frequently miscarry. Numerous other pheromone effects have been documented in insects, fish, and vertebrates. These generally rely on specific chemicals triggering a specific, “hardwired” biological response. There has been considerable controversy over whether humans have some form of accessory olfactory system. Two claims have been made. The first is that humans possess an accessory olfactory system that anatomically parallels the accessory olfactory system of other vertebrate species. The second claim is that either particular chemicals that function as pheromones in other mammalian species may exert similar effects on human behavior or there may even be unique human pheromones. Despite three decades of research on these questions, no clear answers have emerged. Many scientists still doubt the existence of an accessory olfactory system in humans, and the evidence for pheromone-like effects remains equally contentious.

The Main Olfactory System Vertebrate olfactory systems contain two distinct routes of perception, and this is also evident in humans. When people think of their sense of smell, they think of sniffing odorants via their nose. What most people do not know is that they also smell odors inside their mouth during eating and

Olfactory System

drinking. This occurs via internal nostrils that are located at the back of the throat. When people eat and drink, chewing expels air laden with chemicals from the food into the nose via these rear nostrils. During swallowing, the rear nostrils are covered by the pharyngeal flap to prevent the entry of food into the nose. After swallowing, and during the expiration of air, the pharyngeal flap is open, and air is again expelled into the nose via the rear nostrils. Food-derived odorants are then detected and perceived by the same set of receptors that detect and perceive odors sniffed via the nose. A key theoretical distinction between sniffing via the nose (orthonasal perception) and smelling during eating and drinking (retronasal perception), is that the former is perceived as “smell,” but the latter is perceived as “taste” or as a more multimodal sensory experience, “flavor.” These distinctions are more than simple confusions and reflect the idea that sensory systems are organized not just by the sense organ (as many psychology textbooks maintain) but also by the functional needs of the organism. In this case, the perception of food requires a combination of senses, one of which is smell. Once a chemical is inside the nose, it moves in the stream of air toward the olfactory receptor sheet. This is located approximately 4 to 5 cm rear of the bridge of the nose. Just as people have two eyes and two ears, they also have “two noses” in that each nostril accesses its own physically discrete receptor sheet. Each receptor sheet is bathed in mucus, and cilia move the mucus in a continuous stream over it. This acts to protect the olfactory receptors, which project out into the mucus. The moving sheet of mucus also serves to move chemicals to the receptors and to remove them once detected, a problem that does not occur in the detection of electromagnetic or sound waves, for example. The importance of this mucosal layer can be readily appreciated when it becomes altered, as happens when people have a cold or the flu. The mucosal layer then changes thickness, significantly impairing the capacity to smell, even with an unobstructed nose.

Theories of Olfactory Perception The development of psychological theories of visual and auditory perception preceded and drove the understanding of receptor physiology and

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function. Unfortunately, psychology has not been the source of inspiration in unlocking the basic secrets of olfactory perception. From the 19th century through the 1970s, the principal aim of olfactory psychology was to solve the stimulus problem. This involved determining which stimulus generates which sensation (e.g., in gustation, sugars generally taste sweet). Historically, two approaches were adopted. The first involved finding the primary dimensions of olfactory experience using increasingly complex statistical tools. Even today this approach finds adherents. The second approach involved searching for evidence that stimulating specific receptors would lead to specific sensations. One important research program of this kind involved finding people who were unable to detect a particular chemical. These people were presumed to lack the receptor necessary to perceive the odor associated with that chemical. Ideally, the results from these two programs of research would ultimately converge, identifying a certain number of key receptors responsible for the primary dimensions of olfactory experience. Unfortunately, these attempts to solve the stimulus problem have not been successful. The major breakthrough in understanding came from studying olfactory receptor neurons and the G-coupled receptor proteins they express, work for which Linda Buck and Richard Axel were awarded the 2004 Nobel Prize for physiology. They found that animals have somewhere in the region of 700 to 800 different olfactory receptors (contrast this with human vision and its four receptor types— three cones and one rod). Humans have a more modest complement of around 300 to 400 receptors. As humans can readily discriminate tens or even hundreds of thousands of different chemicals, it is very unlikely that there is any one-to-one correspondence between a particular chemical, a particular receptor, and a particular sensation. In fact, the evidence that has emerged from olfactory sensory physiology and psychology supports this conclusion. A further reason for thinking that one-to-one mappings are unlikely comes from considering the stimulus. Laboratory research principally focuses on the use of single, pure chemicals. It turns out that most things that people and other animals smell are not single, pure chemicals. Rather, most natural odors—such as those of food, predators, or

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potential mates—are composed of tens or hundreds of different chemicals, each of which may have its own smell. Although some chemicals may be more dominant than others, it is the combination that corresponds to a particular smell. Receptor sensitivity suggests a similar conclusion. It turns out that rather than being narrowly tuned and responsive to just one specific type of chemical ligand, olfactory receptors are broadly tuned. This means that each receptor type responds to a range of chemical features, although the precise way this occurs is not yet understood. In practice, then, when an odorant is smelled, many olfactory receptors are stimulated, some more than others. Moreover, there is an important temporal component to this process, with some chemicals taking longer to bind with particular receptors than others. Information from all the receptors spread over the receptor sheet then converges in a particular way. Neurons from each receptor type converge on a structure called a glomerulus. Consequently, there is rough congruence between how many glomeruli there are in an olfactory system and how many different types of olfactory receptor there are. Thus, each glomerulus reflects the sum of activity of roughly one receptor type, so together, all the glomeruli over a brief period of time reflect the pattern of activity associated with a particular olfactory event. Odor laboratories are completely odorless except for the target stimulus being used. So although in the laboratory the pattern of activity on the glomerular layer reflects just that specific odor stimulus, in the outside world, odors have to be detected in “chemically noisy” environments. This poses a substantial problem. How does the brain know that the activity in the glomerular layer at one point in time is just one “smell versus multiple smells mixed together? One solution suggested by several theorists over the past 20 years is that the brain parses the output of the glomerular layer through a content-addressable memory system. Such systems are able to both recognize patterns and learn them. Thus, if a particular pattern of glomerular activity has occurred before, it will have been previously encoded in the system, and merely entering the same information again, even as part of a more complex pattern, leads to recognition of the previously encountered pattern. This would allow the brain to recognize a pattern of input that had been encountered before,

even if the incoming information contained that pattern and considerable chemical noise. A key finding was that the olfactory system contains a structure that has both the neural architecture to be a content-addressable memory system and appears to function as such—the piriform cortex (or primary olfactory cortex). It allows for the recognition of patterns that have become degraded. Rain, wind, and sun could all interfere with the residual odor of a predator, for example, but a content-addressable memory system would still be able to generate a matching output from a degraded input. Clearly, this would be advantageous to the organism. A second solution to noisy-chemical environments, and one that is almost always used in conjunction with the first solution, is rapid habituation to ambient odors. The term habituation is used advisedly (in contrast to adaptation), as neurophysiological recordings reveal that receptor output is maintained in the absence of cortical activity in response to an ambient odorant. Human neuroimaging data also suggest a similar conclusion— namely, that the brain rapidly filters out ambient stimulation by reducing activity not at the receptor level but in the primary olfactory cortex. An important aspect of visual and auditory perception is the ability to perceive objects in the environment—namely, a cluster of correlated features segregated from the background. The type of pattern recognition system, which also seems to characterize olfaction, and indeed the main olfactory system of vertebrates, would also seem to generate objectlike percepts. It has been the norm to consider these objects as unique perceptual entities characterized by their specific odor (e.g., coffee), but it has also been suggested that olfactory objects may primarily reflect hedonics (i.e., the dimension of liking and disliking). Although hedonic response to odors is an important aspect of olfactory perception, other data suggest that recognition-related processing precedes hedonic reaction, indicating that olfactory objects primarily reflect a pattern-based dimension. Richard J. Stevenson See also Auditory System; Eating and Drinking; Gustatory System; Kinesthetic System; Psychophysics; Sensory Transductionl and Vestibular System; Visual System

Operant Conditioning

Further Readings Doty, R. L. (2010). The great pheromone myth. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press. Stevenson, R. J., & Wilson, D. (2007). Olfactory perception: An object recognition approach. Perception, 36, 1821–1833. Wilson, D., & Sullivan, R. (2011). Cortical processing of odor objects. Neuron, 72, 506–519. Yeshurun, Y., & Sobel, N. (2010). An odor is not worth a thousand words: From multidimensional odors to unidimensional odor objects. Annual Review of Psychology, 61, 219–241. Zucco, G., Herz, R., & Schaal, B. (2012). Olfactory cognition. Amsterdam, Holland: John Benjamin.

Operant Conditioning “Men act upon the world, and change it, and are changed in turn by the consequences of their action.” B. F. Skinner’s opening sentence to his magnum opus Verbal Behavior is the essential definition of operant behavior—behavior controlled by its consequences—and describes the dynamic interactions between ongoing behavior and the environment, engendering a history that controls subsequent behavior–environment interactions. Operant is a word first coined by Shakespeare in Hamlet (Act III, Scene II) and meant “effective.” The organism can be said to act on the environment effectively in the sense of those actions having consequences. For some who are not properly informed, theory in operant conditioning (technically called the experimental analysis of behavior, or simply, behavior analysis) would seem to be an oxymoron as they believe this field eschews theory altogether and adopts the sterile goal of simply describing directly observable behavior. This is profoundly false, as this entry about theory in the analysis of operant behavior is intended to illustrate. “Theory” in behavior analysis can be loosely divided into two major concerns: (a) An overall conceptual framework addressing the goals as well as methodological and explanatory assumptions and schemes that characterize how behavior analysts approach the subject of behavior and (b) theories addressing particular topics or phenomena, for example, choice, stimulus control, and contingency

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analysis. These two broad concerns are in no way independent as, for example, the first may put constraints on the expressions of the second, and in some cases, the second has led to modifications of the first. The entry begins with the first.

How Does One Talk About Behavior? Behavior and Biology

Behavior is what the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein might have called a “family resemblance” term. It has no precise definition and is best approached through examples. Loosely speaking, however, it may be said that behavior is the whole organism’s functional engagement with its environment. As behavior is an essential biological feature of organisms, behavior analysis is a natural science with its proper home in biology. This position raises many questions about how behavior relates to other biological domains, in particular, neurophysiology. This complex and controversial topic is not addressed here, but a quote from the eminent neurobiologist Gordon Shepherd (1988) summarizes the views of most behavior analysts: “Nothing in neurobiology makes sense except in the light of behavior” (pp. 6–7). Perhaps the most salient legacy of the biological sciences to behavior analysis is found in methodology. Although much experimental practice in psychology is steeped in Fisherian inferential-statistical methods, behavior analysis emerged from a different history. B. F. Skinner, the founder of behavior analysis, was first trained in physiology, as well as having been greatly influenced by Ivan Pavlov, a Nobel Prize-winning physiologist. Essentially, the tactic Skinner introduced is to study the behavior of individual organisms under highly controlled conditions that are subject to replications, including systematic replications involving different conditions. The general method goes back to Francis Bacon and Galileo, but is clearly systematized in the classic text by Claude Bernard, An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine. With respect to behavior analysis, the classic methodological reference is Murray Sidman’s Tactics of Scientific Research. Behavior analysis also maintains close conceptual ties to evolutionary biology, particularly to the dynamics of natural selection as a model of how behavioral change takes place and, especially, how complex performances can emerge from the

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s­ elective actions of behavior–consequence relations through shaping. That the behavior of organisms is subject to control by its consequences is, of course, an outcome of natural selection.

Patterns of Explanation Behavior analysis can be distinguished from most other experimental domains in psychology, particularly cognitive psychology, by what it means to provide an account, or an explanation, of a behavioral phenomenon. A principal task in behavior analysis is to study ongoing behavior through a functional analysis—that is, to characterize and explore behavior–environment relations, including possible individual histories, in an attempt to account for current behavior, to predict subsequent behavior, and to intervene, if necessary, to modify the behavior. An essential question is this: What variables control the behavior of interest? Addressing this question characterizes much of the experimental analysis of behavior. A functional account contrasts with patterns of explanation in, for example, much of cognitive psychology, which appeals to mediational “processes” typically described by metaphorical models that are often inspired by computer technology. The cognitive approach is “organism centered” in that it treats behavior more as a symptom of putative, underlying processes rather than as the primary subject matter of interest. Of course, all behavior is mediated and, in some cases, directly elicited by neural and other physiological events. More complete accounts await understanding those behavior–physiology interrelations. But to achieve this goal, many advances in both domains must be forthcoming. Broadly speaking, for behavior analysts, there is behavior, physiology, and their interrelations—and nothing else. That is, there is no “mental,” much less “metaphorical,” realm between the two, with appeals, for example, to magical entities such as a “central executive.”

Some Theoretical Issues in Behavior Analysis The Basic Role of Contingency

Contingency is a word with many meanings, but in behavior analysis, a contingency specifies a relation among events and, in particular, possible

relations among behaviors, their consequences, and controlling stimuli. The concept of contingency is fundamental to the explanatory schemes in behavior analysis. Thus, research focuses principally on how contingencies come to control patterns of behavior. A basic scheme is called the three-term contingency—a controlling stimulus, called a discriminative stimulus (SD), a selected operant class (Ro), and a reinforcing consequence (SR), which may be depicted as follows:

 SD  R   S  Ro  An experimental model of this arrangement is illustrated by a pigeon trained to peck (Ro) a disk when it is illuminated by red light (SD), resulting in food presentation (SR). The pigeon may also have been trained not to peck when the disk is, say, illuminated by green light. Such a stimulus, in the presence of which a selected response class is not reinforced, is called an SΔ. The forward and feedback arrows in the preceding schematic emphasize the interrelations among the components. In an established three-term contingency, each component is functionally dependent on the other. Much of the experimental and theoretical efforts in behavior analysis derive from this basic framework and can be assigned to two general categories: response– consequence relations and stimulus control. Response–Consequence Relations

Any natural science begins with the assumption of a discoverable order in nature based on discerning patterns in the phenomena of interest. One cannot contemplate a natural science of behavior in the absence of discernible patterns in the behavior of organisms. The fundamental questions, then, for behavior analysts are as follows: How should such patterns be described? How do behavioral patterns come about? How might they be changed? In the words of William Morse, “The outstanding characteristic of operant behavior is that it can be differentiated in form and temporal patterning by consequent events [emphasis added]” (p. 52). Fundamentally, what Morse describes here is shaping—the most basic feature of operant ­behavior— and is sometimes called response differentiation.

Operant Conditioning

Shaping is achieved through the selective and strengthening action of consequences that can begin with any set of current behaviors, however “undifferentiated,” and yield utterly different and much more complex forms—from bears trained to ride motorcycles to babbling human infants ultimately acquiring a huge verbal repertoire. The emergence of behavioral complexity through seemingly simple mechanisms is the hallmark not only of analogous processes such as natural selection in evolutionary biology but of many dynamical systems in physics, chemistry, meteorology, ecology, and economics, to name a few. Temporal patterning refers to the sequential organization of behavior. The richest expression of the generation and maintenance of such patterns has been revealed through the study of schedules of intermittent reinforcement. Returning to the threeterm contingency discussed earlier and putting aside the role of the SD, the direct arrow does not imply that every occurrence of the response class, Ro, is followed by the reinforcing consequence, SR. In fact, there are an infinite number of possibilities for response–consequence relations based on response number (e.g., ratio schedules), time (e.g., interval schedules), or particular features of responding (e.g., inter-response times), as well as their combinations and many other arrangements. The analysis of schedules has provided the richest and most compelling source of knowledge about the actions of reinforcement and have resulted in often nonintuitive perspectives as well as sophisticated quantitative models of how consequences create and control patterns of behavior. The study of schedules has raised basic as well as controversial and challenging questions about how best to characterize behavior, especially behavior change. Two interlocking issues continue to motivate much current experimental and theoretical endeavor. The first addresses the problem of the proper functional units of behavior—the socalled molar versus molecular issue. The second harks back to Skinner’s early approach to measuring response strength, a theoretical concept with both basic and applied implications. The Molar–Molecular Issue

Units of measurement, structure, and function are established features of the natural sciences—mass,

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length, time, atoms, molecules, cells, organelles, and so on—but the analysis of behavior holds few comparable examples. At least two aspects of behavior are relevant here: (a) Behavior is essentially a continuous variable in time, as are most consequences, and (b) current behavior is continuously subject to change as the organism interacts with the environment. Skinner’s experimental model simplified these aspects by digitizing behavior and thus establishing a formal unit, like a lever press or key peck, then showing that these actions could become functional units through operant conditioning. Programming intermittent reinforcement with the outcome of extended and consistent patterns of behavior raised the issue of just what was being reinforced: individual lever presses or perhaps an entire temporal pattern of lever presses? What is the functional unit? For example, the performance ultimately generated by a fixed-ratio schedule (a  contingency whereby a reinforcer is delivered following a fixed number of responses) is a short pause after the reinforcer delivery followed by a high, steady rate of responding, terminating in the next reinforcer delivery. During acquisition, before this steady-state pattern is established, there is no consistent pattern to be reinforced; the individual lever presses are followed occasionally by a food pellet. But these deliveries maintain and, indeed, increase the rate of lever pressing until the typical ratio pattern ultimately emerges. Once this has occurred, various experimental methods can demonstrate the functional integrity—that is, the unitary character—of the entire pattern of behavior between pellet ­deliveries. A focus on relatively immediate or moment-tomoment relations between individual responses and their consequences is typically termed a molecular perspective. Alternatively, a focus on relatively longterm relations between responses and their consequences is termed a molar perspective. The latter can refer to the integrity of a response sequence as in the fixed-ratio example mentioned earlier. More generally, molar control refers to outcomes of a correlation between ongoing responding and occasional reinforcer deliveries. Typically, the principal variables of interest are response rate and reinforcer rate. Note that these are statistical aggregates—time averaged over substantial ­numbers of responses or

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reinforcers. The clearest examples are molar feedback functions, which specify the relation between reinforcer rate, r, and response rate, R: r = f(R).(1) A simple example defines a ratio (fixed or random) schedule as follows: r=

R n

,

where n is the (fixed or average) ratio requirement. This simply states that the rate of reinforcement is directly proportional to the rate of responding. Given this expression, one might predict that ratio schedules would engender high rates of responding, as they typically do. Although molar feedback functions can define contingencies, yielding an infinite number of possibilities, actual performance is under the control of multiple, interacting variables. As a result, predicting specific performance outcomes given some feedback function may prove challenging. For example, increasing a ratio requirement (n) can indirectly increase the time between reinforcer presentations. Without a concomitant increase in response rate, emitting the requisite number of responses will take longer. Actual performance requires an experimental analysis in order to determine functional relations of the form: R = g(r),(2) that is, the way in which response rate is controlled by reinforcer rate. Behavior–consequence interrelations thus constitute a dynamical system wherein changes in response rate can control changes in reinforcer rate, which in turn, can control changes in response rate, and so on. Imposing a molar feedback function will ultimately yield at least one metastable pattern, but how is this achieved? To understand the ­acquisition of a molar pattern first requires understanding molecu­ lar, moment-to-moment response–consequence interactions; that is, a molar pattern cannot appear out of whole cloth. The richest expression of the molar approach is found in the analysis of choice. That is, given a

specified set of alternative sources of reinforcement, how will be behavior be distributed among those alternatives? The question has been paradigmatically addressed using concurrent schedules in which two available alternatives are programmed with variable-interval schedules, the values of which can be manipulated. The original study by Richard Herrnstein established the matching law: R1 R1 + R2

=

r1 r1 + r2

,(3)

where R1 and R2 are the rates of responding to Alternatives 1 and 2, and r1 and r2 are the obtained rates of reinforcement from each alternative. Thus, the relative rates of responding equal the relative rates of obtained reinforcers. An alternative expression is this: R1 R2

=

r1 r2

.(4) a

r  = b  1  .(5) R2  r2  R1

The parameter b is a measure of bias, or the degree to which preference may be controlled by factors other than obtained reinforcer rates. The parameter a is a measure of sensitivity—that is, the degree to which shifts in response allocation with shifts in reinforcer allocation deviate from strict matching (where a = 1). Organisms typically undermatch—that is, a < 1—meaning that changes in response allocation with reinforcer allocation are less than predicted by the strict matching law. Such an outcome has been attributed to reduced discrimination of changes in the allocation ­contingencies. Note that these molar matching laws represent empirical findings, not theories of matching that would address the question of how matching comes about. Again, these orderly functions could not appear without initial, molecular acquisition processes. Theories of matching typically invoke appeals to optimality in those conditions controlling either momentary choice or aggregated returns from the distributions of choices.

Organizational Climate and Culture

The Problem of Response Strength Basic functional relations like Equation (2) have been viewed as expressions of response strength— behavior driven by reinforcing consequences, as if reinforcement were a kind of force. In his early exploration of operant conditioning, Skinner proposed a formulation in terms of the probability of a given behavior, which led to a focus on response rate as a primary unit of measure. The matching law expresses such a relation in terms of relative control of responding by relative return of consequences, as demonstrated in concurrent-schedule performance. Herrnstein derived from the matching law an equation (called Herrnstein’s hyperbola) for response rate under a single variable interval (VI) schedule: R=

kr r + ro

,(6)

where k and ro are constants, and k specifies the asymptotic response rate under the VI schedule while ro is a measure of the overall reinforcer rate available from sources other than that programmed by the VI schedule. Equation (6) is sometimes called the relative law of effect and has applications far beyond simple VI schedules. A principal assumption underlying this equation is that all behavior is choice. That is, alternative sources and values of reinforcement are always available, and response strength must be controlled by the relative values of consequences. Another influential (and more intuitive) theory of  response strength is behavioral momentum. Analogous to Newton’s concept of inertia, a measure of a behavior’s strength is what it takes to change it. Various means of “disruption” (extinction, satiation, response-independent reinforcer d ­elivery,  etc.) are imposed in order to observe the comparative rate and magnitude of behavior changes. A  significant aspect of this approach is that response rate, per se, is not necessarily an appropriate measure of response strength. Instead, an important variable is reinforcement rate for a given behavior regardless of the ongoing rate of that behavior. M. Jackson Marr See also Behavioral Development; Behaviorism; Classical Conditioning; Skinner’s Legacy

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Further Readings Herrnstein, R. J. (1970). On the law of effect. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 13, 243–266. Madden, G. J. (Ed.). (2013). APA handbook of behavior analysis: Vols. 1, 2. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Marr, M. J. (2006). Food for thought on feedback functions. European Journal of Behavior Analysis, 7, 181–185. McDowell, J. J. (2012). On the theoretical and empirical status of the matching law and matching theory. Psychological Bulletin, 139, 1000–1028. McSweeney, F. K., & Murphy, E. S. (Eds.). (2014). Operant and classical conditioning. Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell. Morse, W. M. (1966). Intermittent reinforcement. In W. K. Honig (Ed.), Operant behavior: Areas of research and application (pp. 52–108). New York, NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Nevin, J. A., & Grace, R. C. (2000). Behavioral momentum and the law of effect. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 73–90. Shepherd, G. (1988). Neurobiology (2nd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. Skinner, B. F. (1957). Verbal behavior. New York, NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Organizational Climate and Culture The concepts of organizational climate and organizational culture both address how employees perceive, understand, and experience their organizational environments. Although the constructs overlap, the history of their development and the way they are conceptualized and studied by researchers have important distinctions. Importantly, both organizational climate and organizational culture make unique contributions to understanding organizations and organizational change. This entry provides a brief overview of each concept and then discusses their integration and implications for organizations.

Organizational Climate Organizational climate is commonly defined in terms of employees’ shared perceptions of the

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policies, practices, procedures, and reward systems in their organizations. It includes not only a description of employees’ perceptions but also shared meanings that may exist. The early development of the construct of organizational climate was in the field of psychology. Researchers in the 1960s and 1970s began to recognize the need to go beyond a focus on individual differences in order to understand employee behavior by taking into account the role of the environment. The early challenges for researchers included how best to study an organizational concept based on the perceptions of individual employees and how climate could be distinguished from work attitudes, such as job satisfaction. The resolution of these issues formed the foundation of contemporary scholarship on organizational climate. A key distinction involves psychological climate and organizational climate. The former addresses individual employees and their individual perceptions, whereas organizational climate refers to the overall environment shared by the employees within an organizational unit. Most contemporary research on climate focuses on organizational climate, consistent with the history of studying ­ climate as a way to understand the environment of organizations. Another pertinent distinction is between molar climate and focused climate. Research on molar climate attempts to capture the relevant dimensions of the organizational environment in its totality (including autonomy, conflict, leader support, warmth, risk, and structure) and thus is rather broad in its scope. Focused climate research addresses a specific goal or issue, such as the climate for customer service or the climate for safety, and those aspects of the environment that are relevant in communicating to employees the importance of that particular goal. Research on focused climate developed to strengthen the relationship between climate and organizational outcomes, as well as to further distinguish it from other, related organizational constructs. The focused approach has thrived, and a variety of focused climates have been the subject of academic research. As a result, some have suggested that climates be differentiated according to specific strategic outcome (such as service, safety, or innovation) or internal processes (such as justice, empowerment, or diversity).

Research on organizational climate tends to use survey methodologies asking employees to describe the policies, practices, and procedures in their organization. Their responses are then aggregated in higher units of analysis. In other words, researchers take the average of individual employees’ scores within a group, department, or the organization as a whole and use the average score to represent the climate level in that unit. There has also been interest in the variability of climate perceptions within the unit. Research on climate strength has sought to understand the factors that produce more or less agreement within units and how climate level and climate strength work together to influence organizational effectiveness. One of the primary goals of organizational climate research has been to demonstrate its utility for predicting organizational outcomes. Particularly in the area of focused climates, strong relations with organizational outcomes have been shown, for example, between service climate and customer satisfaction and between safety climate and accident frequency. Other research has focused on the predictors of organizational climate, with a particular emphasis on role of leadership. For instance, how leaders act and whether they emphasize particular goals have been shown to play a critical role in the development of organizational climate. It has also been demonstrated that a more positive molar climate creates an important foundation for strategic climates. In other words, it is easier to get employees to focus on important strategic goals when there is a generally positive organizational environment. On the whole, research on organizational climate has revealed that employees’ shared understandings of the priorities in their organization play a critical role in organizational effectiveness.

Organizational Culture Organizational culture is typically defined in terms of the deep-level assumptions and core values shared by employees that are manifested in a variety of ways throughout the organization and that make the organization unique from other organizations. Organizational culture is often described in terms of its layers or levels, usually in terms of how observable or visible they are. The outermost

Organizational Climate and Culture

layers typically include cultural forms such as language, stories, jokes, ceremonies, traditions, behavioral norms, dress, and physical arrangements. These all hold symbolic meaning, but their meaning cannot be understood without delving into the deeper, less visible assumptions and core values that may or may not be in the conscious awareness of employees. To gain insight into these deeper layers, researchers contrast the values espoused within the organization (particularly by management) with the enacted values implied by the behavior of organization members. A critical issue for organizational culture research is how culture emerges and is perpetuated in organizations. The founder of the organization is often highlighted as playing a critical role in that his or her values guide the early direction of the organization. He or she also selects other people who are brought into the organization, who are likely to share the founder’s values. The founder is not the only influence on the culture, of course. Others include the national culture in which the organization operates, the organization’s industry, and the occupational cultures of the organization’s employees. As time passes, the culture continues to be shaped by the attributions made for the organization’s successes and failures. Success acts to reinforce the culture, and members will seek to maintain the culture to the extent it is associated with success. Over time, the norms and beliefs that develop through this reinforcement process become foundational for how the organizational operates. Furthermore, the norms and beliefs are taught to new members and learned by them through socialization processes, contributing to the perpetuation of the culture. A variety of methods have been used to study organizational culture. In line with the anthropological roots of research on the topic, qualitative methods are common. Examples include conducting interviews and focus groups with employees, analyzing organizational documents, and producing ethnographies in which the researcher works side by side with employees. Increasingly, organizational culture researchers have begun to use quantitative methods. Several organizational culture surveys have been developed that capture the values and behavioral norms of the organization.

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There are pros and cons to the choice of methods for studying culture, leading some to advocate the use of multiple methods whenever possible. Whatever methods are used, one question for organizational culture research is whether the focus will be on the organization as a whole or on organizational subcultures. There is no single answer to this question. The best approach is dictated by the aspect of culture under investigation and the organization being studied. Finally, a key issue for research has been the link between culture and organizational effectiveness. Some researchers have asserted that there are ideal cultural attributes that all organizations should pursue. Others have argued that such a perspective is naive, given the complexity of the construct of organizational culture. Some have proposed that it is not the content of the culture that matters as much as having a strong culture, whereas others have argued that too strong a culture can make change difficult when needed. Similarly, some have proposed that an adaptive culture is what is needed in a volatile environment. Although there may be different views on this issue, there is general agreement that the unique culture that has developed in each organization plays a critical role in its functioning and success.

Integrating Organizational Climate and Culture Organizational climate and culture are clearly related. They are both concerned with the organizational environment, employees’ shared experiences of that environment and the meaning they infer from it, and how the environment affects organizational effectiveness. Nevertheless, there are also critical differences, including their theoretical tradition (psychology for climate versus anthropology for culture), the methods used to study them (almost exclusively quantitative methods for climate versus both quantitative and qualitative for culture), their breadth (a narrow focus on policies, practices, and procedures for climate versus almost anything that could be considered a manifestation of culture), and their focus (emphasizing how climates can focus on strategies or processes versus describing the more general culture of the organization).

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Organizational Climate and Culture

Most efforts to integrate organizational climate and culture have viewed the deep assumptions and values of culture as influencing climate rather than the other way around. Although this may be true, it may also be possible for climate to have effects on culture. Such an approach would have a number of implications for organizational change. Culture is very difficult to change, and direct attempts to do so could end up having little impact. A better approach may be to address a specific focused climate and to ensure that employees within it are receiving a consistent message from management about the organization’s priorities. At the same time, an understanding of the organization’s culture is needed in order to anticipate possible challenges in implementing change, as well as how certain cultural values may be leveraged to ensure the success of the change efforts. Perhaps the integration of climate and culture can best be considered through the lens of alignment. To develop a focused climate, all the policies, practices, and procedures need to be in alignment, but the climate needs to also be aligned with the deeper layers of culture. Mark G. Ehrhart

See also Group Processes; Leadership; Workforce Psychology; Values

Further Readings Ashkanasy, N. M., Wilderom, C. P. M., & Peterson, M. F. (Eds.). (2011). The handbook of organizational culture and climate (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Ehrhart, M. G., Schneider, B., & Macey, W. H. (2014). Organizational climate and culture: An introduction to theory, research, and practice. New York, NY: Routledge. Schein, E. H. (2010). Organizational culture and leadership (4th ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Schneider, B., & Barbera, K. M. (Eds.). (2014). The Oxford handbook of organizational climate and culture. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Schneider, B., Ehrhart, M. G., & Macey, W. A. (2011). Perspectives on organizational climate and culture. In S. Zedeck (Ed.), APA handbook of industrial and organizational psychology: Vol. 1. Building and developing the organization (pp. 373–414). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Zohar, D., & Hofmann, D. H. (2012). Organizational culture and climate. In S. W. J. Kozlowski (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of industrial and organizational psychology (pp. 643–666). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

P Gate Control Theory

Pain

Early conceptualizations of pain, most notably Descartes’s 1644 specificity theory, postulated the presence of a direct pathway from the damaged tissue to the brain that provided a direct one-toone correspondence between pain and tissue damage. In contrast to the specificity theory, the contemporary view is that pain and tissue damage do not show a one-to-one correspondence and that a great deal of pain can be experienced in the absence of major tissue damage. The reverse also occurs—that is, low levels of pain in response to major tissue damage. The best supported and most comprehensive theory of pain is Melzack and Wall’s gate control theory of pain. This theory explains the lack of a one-to-one correspondence between pain and tissue damage as well as a wide variety of painrelated phenomena (e.g., the role of the social context in the pain experience). According to the theory, a gating mechanism at the level of the spinal cord can inhibit or facilitate nociceptive messages traveling to the brain. The gating mechanism is influenced by the activity of small (pain pathway) fibers and large-diameter (sensory-neural) fibers. The former facilitate the transmission of nociceptive messages through the gate, and the latter fibers inhibit it. For example, rubbing a painful area may (at least temporarily) decrease the amount of pain experienced because rubbing activates largediameter fibers (transmitting sensations that are unrelated to pain) and inhibits nociceptive signals

According to Merskey and Bogduk, pain is “an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage” (p.  210). This definition has been formally adopted by the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) and contrasts with the definition of nociception, which refers to the processing of stimuli associated with the stimulation of nociceptors (i.e., specific receptors that respond to noxious stimuli) and which has the potential of being experienced as pain. (Nociception is a sensory event, but pain is a perception. Moreover, nociceptive activity does not always lead to the perception of pain). Pain is also associated not only with subjective interpretations of nociceptive stimulation but also with a variety of emotional responses. For example, disgust, anger, and fear have all been related to the perception of pain. Pain can be classified as acute or chronic, with the latter being pain that has been persistent over time or has exceeded the expected period of healing. Sometimes, for research or clinical purposes, chronic pain is operationalized as pain that has persisted for longer than three to six months. It is often associated with a variety of lasting psychological consequences, such as depression, and affects both social and occupational functioning. This entry discusses early and later conceptualizations of pain. 635

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from reaching the brain (i.e., “closing the gate”). In addition to the activity of small- and largediameter fibers, descending signals from the cerebral cortex (e.g., our thoughts or diverting ­ attention) can affect the gating mechanism and either inhibit or facilitate transmission of nociceptive input. For example, diverting attention away from a potentially painful stimulus could, under some circumstances, attenuate the pain experience. The gate control theory’s description of the manner in which cortical input can affect nociceptive signals supports the critical role that psychological processes play in the modulation of pain experience. Melzack supplemented the gate control theory with the neuromatrix model of pain that explains how pain can be experienced in the absence of external stimulation. According to the model, the body is represented in the brain through a widespread network of neurons. This network is described as the neuromatrix and is believed to be partly genetically determined and partly shaped by inputs from the body. Under some circumstances (e.g., phantom limb pain, which refers to pain experienced by many amputees as being located on the missing limb), neuromatrix activity can lead to pain perception.

Biopsychosocial Formulations Following the development of the gate control theory of pain, a variety of biopsychosocial conceptualizations of the pain experience emerged that are consistent with the gate control theory and elaborate on the manner in which pain can be determined by an interplay of biological (e.g., physical injury), psychological (e.g., expectations, beliefs, and attention) and social processes (e.g., the presence or absence of social support). Examples of prominent biopsychosocial models include the operant model and the fear-avoidance model of pain. The operant model emphasizes the role of reinforcement in the maintenance of pain behavior. The fear–avoidance model asserts that pain can be a source of anxiety and that excessive fear of pain can lead to the avoidance of beneficial activity, thus increasing the risk of prolonged disability. Later versions of the fear–avoidance model also

emphasize the role of catastrophic thinking about pain as part of the fear–avoidance cycle. Both models have empirical support but do not explain all the clinical phenomena associated with chronic pain. The cognitive behavioral model of pain also represents a biopsychosocial conceptualization. This model recognizes the role of beliefs and thoughts in pain, as well as the interconnections among thoughts feelings and behaviors. According to the model, false and maladaptive beliefs about pain (e.g., “I cannot be happy until my pain completely goes away”; “I am not a worthwhile human being because I am disabled”) can interfere with both recovery and the quality of life. The model has led to treatment applications and cognitive behavioral pain management (CBPM) that incorporates a variety of techniques, including, but not limited to, challenging the patient’s dysfunctional beliefs about pain, problem solving, pacing (i.e., breaking tasks into smaller components and tackling them gradually), and increasing engagement in meaningful activity. Often, CBPM incorporates elements from a variety of biopsychosocial conceptualizations of pain. For example, influenced by the fear–avoidance model, a cognitive behavior therapist might work toward reducing a client’s excessive fear of pain. CBPM is typically not a substitute for other treatment modalities, such as medical intervention or physiotherapy but is often offered as an adjunct to such treatments. CBPM has been found to be moderately effective in the management of chronic pain. Another psychological approach that shows considerable promise in pain management is acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT). This view encourages pain patients to be mindful and to observe private events rather than fight them. ACT therapists believe that acceptance and mindful observation of one’s situation and beliefs, as part of a commitment to meaningful goals, can reduce psychological distress. In addition to the management of chronic pain, certain psychological procedures, such as hypnosis and relaxation training have been used with success in the management of pain in acute settings, such as dental clinics and burn units. Virtual reality technology has also been used as a distraction strategy in acute pain management.

Parent-Offspring Relations

Biopsychosocial formulations of pain have also encouraged psychologists to develop means for pain assessment. This includes several aspects of the pain experience—self-reported pain intensity; pain behavior; psychological comorbidities, such as depression; beliefs about pain; antecedents and consequences of pain behavior; coping strategies; the impact of pain on social or ­occupational functioning; and other related dimensions. Thomas Hadjistavropoulos See also Aggression and Violence; Animal Consciousness; Behavior Therapies; Brain and Nervous System: Macroarchitecture; Cognitive Therapies; Cognitive Behavioral Therapies; Hypnosis; Neurotransmitters and Neuromodulators; Placebo Effect/Response; Sensory Transduction

Further Readings Hadjistavropoulos, T., Craig, K. D., Duck, S., Cano, A., Goubert, L., Jackson, P. L., . . . Fitzgerald, T. D. (2011). A biopsychosocial formulation of pain communication. Psychological Bulletin, 137(6), 910– 939. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0023876 Li, A., Montaño, Z., Chen, V. J., & Gold, J. I. (2011). Virtual reality and pain management: Current trends and future directions. Pain Management, 1(2), 147– 157. http://dx.doi.org/10.2217/pmt.10.15 Melzack, R. (2001). Pain and the neuromatrix in the brain. Journal of Dental Education, 65(12), 1378–1382. Melzack, R., & Wall, P.D. (1965). Pain mechanisms: A new theory. Science, 150, 971–979. Merskey, H., & Bogduk, N. (Eds.). (1994). Classification of chronic pain: Descriptions of chronic pain syndromes and definitions of pain terms. Seattle, WA: International Association for the Study of Pain Press. Skinner, M., Wilson, H. D., & Turk, D. C. (2012). Cognitive-behavioral perspective and cognitivebehavioral therapy for people with chronic pain: Distinctions, outcomes, and innovations. Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy, 26(2), 93–113. http://dx.doi .org/10.1891/0889-8391.26.2.93 Turk, D. C., & Melzack, R. (2011). The measurement of pain and the assessment of people experiencing pain. In D. C. Turk & R. Melzack (Eds.), Handbook of pain assessment (3rd ed., pp. 242–259). New York, NY: Guilford Press.

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Parent-Offspring Relations Not all animals that reproduce sexually care for their young. Many creatures just release fertilized eggs—or even unfertilized ova and sperm—into the environment and hope for the best. But parental nurture can greatly increase young animals’ survival prospects, and it has evolved independently many times. In mammals, parental care is complex and nowhere more than in Homo sapiens. Perhaps the most intensely parental species on earth, people invest several years and millions of calories in each offspring. Parental care could not have evolved unless it enhanced the genetic posterity (the “Darwinian fitness”) of caregivers. To the degree that care contributes to the young’s survival, growth, and eventual reproductive prospects, it clearly does enhance parental fitness. However, it also imposes costs on parents, and when the fitness benefits no longer cover those costs, natural selection favors the cessation of care. Efforts to identify and measure these costs and benefits have helped scientists better understand the great variability in parental care that nature presents. This entry looks at parenting, parent-offspring conflict, and implications for child development from an evolutionary point of view. The simplest form of parental care is merely guarding eggs against predation, but even this costs time that might have been spent seeking new mates or foraging for food to make more eggs, and guarding can also expose the parents themselves to predation. Thus, when eggs and larvae have a good chance of surviving on their own, parental care beyond the egg stage may be completely absent. Examples include many fish and frog species, especially ones that deposit their eggs in large bodies of water where unguarded eggs have the best survival prospects. The human species has taken a very different evolutionary path, partly shared with related animals and partly unique. An early landmark in the lineage leading to mammals was the advent of copulation, as opposed to spawning. Ovum and sperm could then unite in relative safety inside the mother, setting the stage for the further evolution of important sex differences. First, because the young begin development inside the mother, any

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evolutionarily novel forms of parental nurture were likely to be maternal rather than paternal. The machinery of resource transfer to fetuses during pregnancy, for example, is female machinery. Second, unless biparental care is very much more beneficial than uniparental care, it may behoove males to desert pregnant females immediately, and most male mammals do just that. As a consequence, even those forms of parental nurture that are postnatal also tend to be maternal rather than paternal specializations. Lactation is a major example. A third asymmetry resulting from internal fertilization is that fathers can’t always identify their own offspring: “Mama’s baby is papa’s maybe.” The chance that an attribution of fatherhood may be erroneous raises the average cost of providing paternal care, because a male who unwittingly cares for young he didn’t sire is contributing to a rival’s fitness rather than to his own. Natural selection generally tends to eliminate behavior with such consequences, which is a further reason why internal fertilization is associated with predominantly maternal care. Mammalian parental care is overwhelmingly maternal; indeed, a defining feature of the class Mammalia is that females produce milk. In each of the other vertebrate classes—fishes, amphibians, reptiles, and birds—there are species in which parental care beyond the egg stage is provided solely by fathers, and in birds, care is usually biparental. Not so among the mammals, but the males do sometimes pitch in. Most wild members of the dog family, for example, have stably mated pairs that cooperate in protecting and provisioning the pups. And there is a minority incidence of biparental care in other mammals, ranging from beavers to a few primate species, including humans. The claim that biparental care is part of humanity’s evolved nature may sound odd. Don’t “deadbeat dads” and changing norms about fathering imply otherwise? Not really. Hunter– gatherers provide the best models of how all people lived before the invention of agriculture a few thousand years ago, and it is noteworthy that marriage—long-lasting, socially recognized, sexual, and reproductive partnership between mates— is standard practice in every hunter–gatherer society known to anthropologists. Moreover, men make useful contributions to their wives and children in all such societies, and alloparental contributions by kin other than

parents are also cross-culturally universal. These are ancient elements of human lifeways, and their emergence must have required major psychological and behavioral innovations. In humans’ nearest relatives, the great apes, mothers care for their young unassisted. How and why humans evolved their social peculiarities is not yet fully resolved, but other pair-forming mammals that raise young cooperatively provide some hints. What else do such species have in common? One ecological attribute that apparently predisposes animals to pair formation and paternal participation is carnivory. Unlike a grazer, a hunter can bring something useful home to his family, and in contemporary hunter–gatherers, the special contribution of men is to provide animal protein. Many scientists therefore believe that the emergence of biparental care in human evolution was linked to the novel importance of meat in the human diet.

Parental Investment, Discrimination, and Budgeting What determines how long and how attentively parents will care for their young? What determines the relative contributions of mothers, fathers, and other kin? How and why do caregivers discriminate in their treatment of young? And when conflict occurs in parent–offspring interactions, what is at issue? Evolutionary biologists and psychologists are convinced that questions such as these are best illuminated by considering how natural selection acts on the motives and emotions of the respective parties. Women’s childbearing careers must end at menopause, whereupon holding back resources for future children is no longer necessary. More generally, as a woman ages, any compromising effects that expenditures on the current young impose on her total reproduction shrink. All else being equal, an older mother may therefore be expected to cherish her newborn infant more than a younger mother. A variety of evidence, both behavioral and physiological, supports this expectation. A crucial theoretical construct in this sort of argument is parental investment. This economic metaphor draws attention to the problem of how individuals allocate their time and energy and regulate their exposure to risks. The food, protection,

Parent-Offspring Relations

and other goods that parents provide are limited resources, and not all offspring are equally capable of converting them into increments in the longterm survival of the parent’s genes. Because resources invested in one youngster are, in effect, being withheld from others, evolved parental psyches are discriminative. Natural selection favors preferring one’s own offspring over unrelated little beggars; preferring robust, viable young over lost causes; and preferring those who will profit most from nurture over those better able to fend for themselves. Partitioning parental investment is one aspect of a larger “budgeting” problem. How should energy be divided between growing and reproducing? Between seeking mates and caring for young? Different species answer these questions differently, and the sexes often do, too. Male mammals typically allocate more time and energy to “mating effort” and less to “parental effort” than females, a sex difference that is relatively small in biparental species but seldom absent. To produce viable children, women must pay the costs of pregnancy and, in ancestral environments, of prolonged lactation as well. The minimum required from men is much less, so one big reason why men are less reliable parental investors than women is arguably because they can sometimes get away with diverting time and energy toward the pursuit of additional mates. In most traditional societies, a few successful men take multiple wives, and their reproductive success is thus elevated. But although polygamous men are almost always wealthier than monogamous men, their children are often no better provided for, exhibiting little or no advantage in survival and growth. Polygamists apparently stint on paternal care. In regard to discriminative treatment of one’s own young, there is a large literature on nonhuman parenting showing that parents accept greater costs to protect higher quality young with greater reproductive potential. This principle clearly applies to the human case. Human parents also tend to favor their firstborn children, especially when hard choices affecting survival must be made, and this, too, is predictable on the basis of their higher fitness value: Simply by virtue of having survived longer, older children have a better chance of eventually reproducing than their younger siblings. Somewhat more puzzling is a cross-culturally widespread tendency to prefer sons, but even here

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there have been persuasive evolution-minded analyses of particular cases, especially where highstatus families invest preferentially in sons, who may become polygamists, whereas low-status families actually prefer daughters, who may marry upward.

Parent–Offspring Conflict To understand how evolution shapes parental decision making, it is essential to understand genetic relatedness. According to the Darwinian view of life, expected fitness is the ultimate basis of selfinterest and of proximal perceptions thereof. Two parties have a fundamental commonality of interests insofar as that which elevates the expected posterity of one’s genes also enhances that of the other’s, and a conflict of interests insofar as one’s genetic posterity competes with that of the other. It follows that a major determinant of harmony versus conflict is the extent to which genes are identical. Relatedness (r) equals 0.5 for the parent–child relationship, because (ignoring the sex chromosomes), a person gets half of his or her nuclear genes from each parent. Thus, parent and child have a substantial but imperfect overlap of interests. As Robert Trivers first clearly explained, parent–­ offspring conflict is ubiquitous in sexual species because the division of resources that would best promote a child’s fitness typically differs subtly from that which would best promote its parent’s. To a mother, young of equal quality are equally valuable “vehicles” of fitness: Each carries half her genes, and a grandchild from either carries a quarter. But the young’s perspective is different. An eventual child of mine will carry half my genes, but an eventual child of my sister won’t. Two siblings are equally effective propagators of their mother’s genes, but from either one’s vantage point, one’s self is twice as valuable as one’s sibling as a potential propagator of his or her own genes (and four times as valuable if the two siblings have different fathers). Note that this reasoning does not imply that siblings totally disdain each other’s well-being. Because they are my close kin, the eventual reproduction of my siblings contributes to my genetic posterity, too. I value them less than I value myself, but I still value them. In the parlance of social evolution theory, one’s own offspring are vehicles of direct fitness, and nondescendant kin are vehicles of indirect fitness.

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Together, these make up one’s inclusive fitness, and it is this that natural selection tends to maximize. If by consuming a resource that our mother controls, my brother could gain more than twice as much direct fitness as I can by eating it myself, then I should prefer that he gets it. He’s my competitor, but our rivalry is tempered by relatedness. A major implication of this analysis is that it should not be assumed that parental responses mesh harmoniously with offspring demands. Selection favors inclinations in both parties to strive for their respective optima, partly against the wishes and efforts of the other. In this light, otherwise baffling phenomena such as weaning conflict suddenly make sense. The duration and intensity of nursing that are best for a suckling child’s inclusive fitness usually exceed what is best for its mother, and selection acts against either party’s surrendering to the other’s preferences. The conflict is wasteful, to be sure, but it is just the sort of social trap that organisms cannot readily evolve away from. Indeed, the wastefulness may even increase over generations in an “evolutionary arms race,” because selection chronically favors escalated demands by the young and compensatory parental discounting of this exaggerated begging. Even before birth, such conflict has important effects that have influenced human evolution. In harsh conditions such as famine, a pregnant woman’s fitness may be best served by miscarrying and trying again later. If conditions are so bad that the fetus’s survival prospects are tiny, then even its inclusive fitness might thus be elevated, too. However, a mother’s next child will be of the same relatedness to herself as the current one, whereas from the fetus’s perspective, mother’s future offspring must be discounted relative to self, so conditions must be worse before miscarriage will promote fetal fitness than is the case for mother’s fitness. David Haig has convincingly interpreted several peculiarities of human pregnancy, including the astonishingly high levels of substances that target maternal hormone receptors but are produced by the fetus, as the results of such an evolutionary history of maternal–fetal conflict over both the maintenance of pregnancy and the magnitude of resource transfers during pregnancy. Another important implication of parent–offspring conflict theory concerns divergent views of other relatives. The logic by which parents see

their children as unduly selfish in their attitudes toward siblings extends more widely. Your nephew’s relatedness to you is 0.25, and (all else being equal) he is therefore half as valuable a fitness vehicle as your own son. But from your son’s perspective, your nephew is a mere cousin (r = 0.125), only one eighth as valuable as himself. The implication is a chronic clash of views, with parents wanting their children to take a greater interest in the well-being of extended family members than the children are spontaneously inclined to do.

Implications for Child Development Parent–offspring conflict theory suggests a different perspective on socialization than is prevalent in developmental psychology. Because the interests of parents and offspring are not identical, socializing children is to some degree manipulative rather than selfless. Children face a problem: Becoming successful adults requires cultural competence that can be acquired only by heeding others, and yet a child cannot fully trust even its own parents for advice about how to pursue its interests. This suggests that natural selection should have equipped children with both a receptivity to social learning and a skepticism that protects them from being easily seduced into embracing other people’s pet agendas. The implications for understanding social development may be considerable. Trivers has proposed, for example, that adolescence is a time of “identity reorganization” because attaining independence frees offspring from parental power and thus allows them to define new priorities that reflect their own self-interest. Conflict notwithstanding, parents achieve fitness through their children and are a child’s most reliable allies. Having observed the psychological difficulties experienced by orphans, British psychiatrist John Bowlby first posited that children are predisposed to form a specialized attachment to one dependable caregiver, usually the mother, and argued that this was a necessity in the human environment of evolutionary adaptedness. About 3 months after birth, children begin to pay special attention to the primary caregiver, and by about 6 months, they are distressed if separated from her and exhibit fear of strangers. Developmental psychologists following Bowlby’s lead have identified several distinct attachment

Parent-Offspring Relations

styles called secure, insecure-avoidant, and insecure-resistant that derive mainly from differences in how the primary caregiver behaves toward the child and that may affect the child’s subsequent social relationships throughout life. Several theorists have proposed that these attachment styles help attune children to the social environment they will face. Secure attachment develops when resources and caregivers are relatively dependable and inclines people to become trusting, trustworthy adults who invest prolongedly in their own children. The insecure attachment styles arise in less dependable environments and apparently lead to unstable adult relationships. The “avoidant” child learns that others are undependable, and allegedly becomes an opportunistic, exploitative adult with no deep social ties. The “resistant” child presents as highly dependent and demanding, despite caregiver inconsistency, and is likely to cling to genetic family ties. The idea that these developmental trajectories constitute adaptations presumes that childhood experience constitutes a good predictive sample of what one’s adult social environment will be like; whether this is plausible with respect to traditional societies is debated.

Alloparental Care Children do not, of course, receive care solely from one primary caregiver, nor even just from parents. Others help, too. The most important of these alloparents are grandmothers. Besides being closely related to the children (r = 0.25), human grandmothers are often in a unique situation: robust and productive, but postreproductive. After menopause, the obvious way for a woman to help her fitness is by supporting her children’s reproduction; indeed, a popular but controversial theory is that menopause itself evolved because grandmothering eventually yields better fitness returns than further pregnancies. The personal reproductive prospects of grandfathers are often waning as well, making them potentially available as caregivers, too. Theorists have posited that paternity uncertainty affects grandparental caregiving. Maternal grandmothers have two sure links to the child and ought therefore to provide the most alloparental care. Paternal grandfathers have two

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uncertain links and are expected to invest the least, whereas the other two types of grandparents have one uncertain link and fall between these extremes. Observed grandparental support generally follows the predicted pattern, but skeptics argue that mother–daughter bonds could generate the same pattern regardless of paternity uncertainty. Full siblings are even closer genetic relatives than grandparents, indeed as close as one’s parents. Thus, when siblings stop competing for parental attention and resources, they are good candidates to become alloparents, and in cooperatively breeding birds and mammals, as well as in social insects, older siblings are indeed the main alloparental caregivers. In humans, children and adolescents often babysit younger siblings and otherwise assist with chores, letting parents focus on high-return activities that ultimately enhance their reproduction and the helpers’ inclusive fitness. So why aren’t siblings even more helpful? Probably because they are accumulating “embodied capital” for their own eventual reproductive careers, although some gains in this sphere might be had from alloparenting siblings via practice at parenting and other life skills needed later. Sibling relationships are clearly complex, requiring some balance between self-serving and competitive inclinations that contribute to direct fitness, on the one hand, and solicitude toward siblings as indirect fitness vehicles, on the other. Aunts and uncles are as closely related to a focal child as grandparents are (r = 0.25), but they are often busy raising their own children, which limits their availability as alloparents. In addition, aunts and uncles often have partners who have little or no genetic relationship to the focal child and are less enthusiastic about helping. As would be expected, therefore, research indicates that aunts and uncles indeed provide less alloparental care than do grandparents, but more than is provided by more distant kin. A special and sometimes problematic category of alloparents is stepparents. Establishing a new sexual relationship sometimes puts people and other animals into a “parental” role toward unrelated young. In many species, new partners ignore their predecessors’ young or even kill them, but in others, including humans, stepparental investment is common and sometimes substantial. However,

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such investment is restrained relative to investment by genetic parents, and stepfamilies experience much more conflict than do other families, especially over the children’s entitlements. This is no surprise to those who think of human beings as having evolved by natural selection. Martin Daly and Gretchen Perry See also Adolescent Development, Theories of; Altruism; Childhood; Culture and Development; Evolutionary Psychology; Evolutionary-Psychological Perspectives on Human Nature, Critical Evaluation of; Gender, Evolutionary Perspectives on; Mating Strategy Evolution and Development; Nature Versus Nurture

Further Readings Anderson, K. G. (2006). How well does paternity confidence match actual paternity? Evidence from worldwide nonpaternity rates. Current Anthropology, 47, 513–519. Daly, M., & Wilson, M. (1999). The truth about Cinderella. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Geary, D. C., & Flinn, M. V. (2001). Evolution of human parental behavior and the human family. Parenting: Science & Practice, 1, 5–61. Haig, D. (1993). Genetic conflicts in human pregnancy. Quarterly Review of Biology, 68, 495–532. Hrdy, S. B. (2009). Mothers and others. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Figure 1  Parietal Lobe, Gyri, and Sulci Source: Wikipedia/Sebastian023

Parietal Lobe Functions There are four cerebral cortical lobes—frontal, parietal (from the Latin term paries, meaning wall), temporal, and occipital—with each territory named arbitrarily for the skull plate overlaying the region. The central sulcus is the anterior boundary of the parietal lobe and separates the frontal and parietal lobes. The posterior aspect of the lateral fissure separates the ventral anterior portion of the temporal lobe from the parietal lobe, but more posterior regions of the parietal cortex are contiguous with anterior occipital cortex and posterior/superior temporal cortex. The mergence region is sometimes described as the “parietal-temporo-occipital crossroads,” and this territory roughly corresponds to the inferior parietal lobule shown in Diagram 1. There are several classification schemes for defining subsections of the parietal lobe that the reader might find interesting, some of which are covered in detail by Bryan Kolb and Ian Whishaw in Chapters 8 and 14 of their text Fundamentals of Human Neuropsychology. There are substantial differences in neuroanatomical and functional properties of the anterior portions of the parietal cortex relative to the more posterior sections. Therefore, these areas will be considered separately in what follows.

Parietal Lobe Functions

Parietal lobe territories participate with numerous additional areas located in the frontal lobes and subcortical areas in the coordination and execution of a wide range of behaviors. With respect to the brain and concerning higher functions, no one area is responsible for all aspects of a particular behavioral or cognitive function. The brain consists of connected territories, with each area contributing some unique aspects of function but in collaboration with other territories. This is especially true of the parietal cortex and its intimate connections with frontal lobe motor regions and frontal lobe areas involved in both attentional and executive functions, connections with the cingulate gyrus and its many additional related connections with areas controlling attentional mechanisms, and midbrain and brain stem areas controlling the motor functions. As will be seen, some territories of the parietal lobe are responsible for the integration of information from all sensory/perceptual brain regions in the control of motor behavior that is crucial for survival.

Figure 2  Sensory Homunculus Source: Wikimedia Commons/OpenStax College

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Anterior Parietal Cortex Immediately posterior to the central sulcus is primary somatosensory cortex, which is often labeled SI and is in the postcentral gyrus (see Diagram 1). This region receives body sensory inputs from the ventrolateral thalamic nucleus and is organized into strips 3, 1, and 2 as one examines these tissues while moving from the central sulcus toward the posterior portion of SI along the postcentral sulcus. Area 3 processes information concerning the positions and movements of muscles, and it receives information from both slow- and fast-adapting skin receptors, such as Pacinian corpuscles (fast-adapting vibration detectors), Meissner’s corpuscles (fast-adapting touch detectors), Merkel’s discs (slow-adapting touch detectors), and Ruffini’s endings (slow-adapting stretch detectors). Area 1 processes information from fast-adapting receptors only, and Area 2 from the joints and deep pressure. The organization of the somatosenses along these strips begins in the medial tissue within the sagittal sulcus just above the cingulate gyrus, where

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information from the toes and feet is processed and spreads in a dorsal-to-ventral direction along the lateral surface of the cerebral cortex, where medial tissue processes information from the fingers and hands, and the ventral-most tissues process information from the head, including lips and mouth. This topographical arrangement of the body along these SI strips is often labeled as an inverted homunculus, which means “little man,” and part of the skin surface are represented upside down from the orientation that might have been expected. The amount of brain tissue devoted to the processing of information from a particular part of the body corresponds directly to the sensitivity of the particular peripheral site. For example, far greater cortical territory is dedicated to processing information from the lips, tongue, fingers, and hands than to the back or abdomen. Diagram 2 shows this arrangement Information processed in SI is projected posteriorly to the superior parietal lobule (SPL), which plays a role in tactile (touch) perception. SI and neurons in the superior parietal lobule also project anteriorly to primary motor cortex, supplemental cortex, and premotor cortex in the frontal lobe. These motor connections have been shown to play an important role in the control of movement by providing information about the positions of limbs. Neurons in the SPL also project ventrally to the inferior parietal lobule (IPL), which has visual inputs. The SPL has mutual connections with the frontomotor regions and provides motor systems with information concerning limb position. Most of these conclusions have been determined from studies of rhesus monkeys with experimentally placed lesions in these regions.

Posterior Parietal Cortex The IPL and its mergence with tissues of the posterior temporal lobe along the superior temporal gyrus at the superior temporal sulcus (STS) are multimodal, receiving both somatosensory and visual inputs, while the tissues along the STS additionally receive auditory inputs. Because of the mixing of sensory and perceptual information in this area, this tissue is often labeled and termed parietal association cortex. The term association cortex has been discouraged by some neuroanatomists because the term may convey the implication that the area is involved in learned behaviors via association.

Learning, via association of environmental stimuli that are temporally or spatially connected, as in classical and instrumental conditioning, are well known and well studied, but the term association should not be interpreted as having any connotation related to learning when ascribed to neuroanatomical areas. The use of the term association cortex by many authors is based on the convergence of information from many sensory/perceptual modalities, and therefore the “association” of sensory and perceptual inputs is a real-time representation of the external world and the physical relationship of the animal to these various environmental stimuli. The posterior parietal cortex, along with related connected cerebral tissues (e.g., cingulate cortex, supplemental and premotor frontal cortices), is crucially involved in such functions. Kolb and Whishaw report that the posterior parietal cortex has expanded in size in the evolution of humans and that there is considerable asymmetry between the right and left hemispheres. The right posterior parietal is much larger than its homotypic counterpart in the left hemisphere. The posterior parietal cortex has over than 100 inputs and outputs. What follows is only a summary of some of the more prominent systems. Kolb and Whishaw cite evidence from single neuron electrophysiological recordings in monkeys and functional magnetic imaging in humans that these regions are part of what is labeled the dorsal visual stream conveying visual information processed in the occipital lobe. Posterior parietal regions such as the IPL along with STS are frequently described as processing where visual stimuli are located within visual space. These areas contribute to accurate reaching for objects with the arm and hand and saccadic eye movements, which are small rapid, abrupt movements of the eyes in tracking and fixating on visual targets. These areas are also involved in visuospatial functions—that is, the processing of the positions of visual targets relative to the body in space. Along with some portions of anterior parietal cortex, posterior parietal regions are heavily connected with prefrontal cortical regions and play important roles in visuospatial processing and the coordination of body movements on the basis of environmental stimuli. This includes not only accurately reaching for an object but navigating the body toward an object on the basis of visual

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information and being able to identify an object when it is seen from different perspectives. Finally, posterior parietal cortex also sends projections into paralimbic and hippocampal tissues in the temporal lobe that play key roles in memory formation. The following sections describe functions associated with the anterior and posterior portions of the parietal lobe that derive from numerous studies of brain damage in humans. It must be appreciated, however, that rarely does a natural event, such as traumatic brain injury or cerebrovascular insult, damage only one region of the brain. Usually it includes adjacent regions as well as the underlying white matter.

Clinical Symptoms of Anterior Parietal Injury Damage to Areas SI, SPL, and IPL severely diminish one’s ability to detect and localize tactile information. In particular, stereognosis, which is a failure to detect light touch when applied to the surface of the skin contralateral to the brain injury or a diminished ability to distinguish one from two sharp touches, ensues. Individuals with damage to these regions also make errors when asked to identify fingers that have been touched while blindfolded or with their eyes closed, and for example, they cannot accurately identify Numbers 3 through 6 when drawn on the fingertips. Finger movements, such as touching one finger at a time to the thumb in sequence from the fifth digit to the second digit, are performed poorly, largely because of the impaired perception of finger position. Modeling arm and hand motor sequencing tasks is also often severely impaired. For example, the examiner may demonstrate making a circle near an ear with the thumb and third digit, then extending the arm straight in front of the face to make a fist. The individual with brain damage contralateral to the arm being used will make finger, hand, and even ballistic errors in attempting to copy the movements. Astereognosis is often seen. This is the diminished ability to distinguish common objects from one another on the basis of touch. This can be demonstrated by asking patients to sit with their hands behind their back and to attempt to identify common objects placed in their hands. According

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to Kolb and Wishaw, these symptoms qualify as an agnosia—that is, as a failure to remember objects. There could be other explanations, but this appears to be a likely explanation. Persons with anterior parietal damage often have difficulty identifying common objects such as a coin, key, fork, and pen. Sensory extinction is also often seen. Here, either one or two touches are applied to different parts of the body while the individual either has the eyes closed or is blindfolded. The dorsal surface of the hands, palms, and facial cheeks are common sites for stimulation. Extinction is the term used to indicate that the individual fails to detect single stimulations. Often, when two touches are applied to different sites contralateral to the brain injury and sometimes even at the same sites bilaterally, only one touch will be detected. The term sensory extinction is used to describe this condition, and it can be detected in other sensory modalities when there is damage to primary sensory cortex. In the experience of William McDaniel, detection of only one signal from one side of the body when two are applied is a strong indicator of damage to the contralateral cerebral hemisphere. Finally, individuals with anterior parietal damage or larger lesions, also including posterior parietal tissue, can demonstrate one of more of the symptoms of corporeal (or body) agnosia, which is the failure to recognize the portion of the body contralateral to their injury as their own. For example, soon after the brain injury, persons hospitalized with such injuries may complain that someone else is sharing their bed. Another syndrome is autopagnosia, which is characterized by being unable to name parts of one’s own body. Anosodiaphoria may be diagnosed when the individual is either unaware or indifferent to his or her symptoms or may even deny that they exist. A neurological examination may indicate asymbolia for pain, which refers to abnormal reactions to pain, or finger agnosia (Gerstmann’s syndrome), which is an inability to identify or point to one’s fingers.

Clinical Symptoms of Posterior Parietal Injury There are several problems in describing the functional deficits that accompany posterior parietal injuries. First, different individuals with what

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appear to be highly similar damage often show different degrees of symptomology. Second, there are marked differences in the outcomes of left versus right hemispheric damage. Hal Blumenfeld has suggested that there is considerable hemispheric asymmetry in the attentional mechanisms mediated by the posterior parietal lobes. Specifically, the right posterior parietal cortex attends to visual information “strongly” in the left visual field and less strongly to information in the right visual field. The left posterior parietal cortex does not attend well to information in the left visual field and only weakly to information in the right visual field. This leads to an attentional bias—that is, to a preference for information in the left visual field. With right-hemisphere injuries, the left hemisphere is capable of attending to the right visual field and right side of the body, but in the case of right-posterior parietal damage, there can be total neglect of information in the left visual field and left side of the body (hemineglect and, as described previously, corporeal agnosia). Persons with this injury may fail to process information in the left visual field altogether. McDaniel has had the experience of pushing the wheelchair of patients with right posterior parietal damage in a rehabilitation hospital toward the dining hall to which they have been transported three times a day during their 30- to 60-day treatment and had them answer “I have no idea” when asked “where is the cafeteria?” when immediately in front of the left turn. When the wheelchair is turned left about 90 degrees, they say, “Oh, there it is.” Information from the left visual field is simply not processed or attended to and therefore not available to consciousness. Sometimes there is a mild deficit in attending to or detecting information in the right visual field and on the right side of the body in patients with left-posterior parietal damage, but the severity of the deficit is much less than that with rightposterior parietal damage. Another interesting observation is that deficits observed with formal testing in those with right posterior parietal damage can diminish rapidly, yet at least mild deficits are still detectable years later Some tasks where right posterior parietal damage produces obvious behavioral problems include line bisection, number or letter cancellation,

combining blocks to make patterns, nonverbal reasoning with visual information, and drawing. For example, the individual with right posterior damage, at least shortly after the injury, will bisect a line drawn across a sheet of paper substantially to the right of center. McDaniel has used this technique on many occasions to show the patient and his or her family reasons the individual should not resume driving again soon after a cerebral event unless cleared by the Department of Driver Services. Of course, this is because in the United States, traffic in the oncoming lane approaches from the left visual field. Letter or number cancellation tasks have letters or numbers scattered across a page in various positions. The examinee’s task is to place a slash mark in a selected letter or number (e.g., A or 3). Persons with right posterior parietal damage tend to place all slashes in the right portion of the page, which is assumed to be due to attentional neglect of information in the left visual field. Neuropsychological testing of one with a brain trauma typically involves administration of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale. Deficits on the “Corski” Block Design, Visual Matrices, and Visual Puzzles are common signs of parietal dysfunction. When drawing objects such as a clock face with the hands showing a particular time, the hands are often at least close to the proper location, but the clock face is distorted with the left part of the circle being more like an oval and the numbers aligned on the right side of the oval-shaped clock face. Sometimes the numbers 1 through 12 written are located in the entire 180 to 200 degrees of the right side of the clock. Drawings of bicycles will show far less attention to the left part of the drawing than the right. Acalculia (an inability to do simple mental mathematical calculations) is listed as a component of Gerstmann’s syndrome and is mainly seen with left hemisphere parietal damage. Given the overlap between posterior parietal and posterior temporal areas, problems with language often accompany left hemispheric injuries within these territories.

Caveats Hardly anywhere in the brain are specific functions more difficult to identify than in the parietal lobe.

Passion

For example, about two thirds of those with right parietal lobe injuries have difficulty with unilateral neglect and problems with dressing. Only 13% of those with left parietal damage had problems with these abilities. Nearly 90% of those with right parietal damage had deficits in counting cubes and cutting designs with scissors, but no one with left parietal damage had problems with these tasks. Half of those with right injuries had difficulty processing topographical visuospatial information for navigational purposes, but only 13% of the sample with left parietal damage had problems in this capacity. However, individuals with left parietal damage were far more deficient with egocentric spatial localization (e.g., left-right discrimination) and, therefore, orientation to environmental stimuli with respect to body position. Similar functional problems and hemispheric asymmetry have been found in rats bearing lesions in anatomically similar areas based on thalamic projections and corticortical projection patterns. William F. McDaniel See also Brain and Nervous System: Macroarchitecture; Brain and Nervous System: Microarchitecture; Frontal Lobe Functions; Language Disorders; Occipital Lobe Functions; Perception and Cognitive; Perceptual Disorders; Temporal Lobe Functions

Further Readings Blumenfeld, H. (2002). Neuroanatomy through clinical cases. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer. Kolb, B., & Whishaw, I. Q. (2008). Fundamentals of human neuropsychology (6th ed.). New York, NY: Worth. Lambert, K., & Kinsley, C. H. (2005). Clinical neuroscience., New York, NY: Worth. McDaniel, W. F. (1995). Unilateral injury of the posterior parietal cortex and spatial learning in hooded rats. Behavioural Brain Research, 70, 165–179. McDaniel, W. F., Via, J. D., Smith, J. S., Wells, D. L., Fu, J. J., Bishop, J. F., . . . Ledesma, H. M. (1995). Unilateral injury of the posterior parietal cortex and spatial learning in hooded rats. Behavioural Brain Research, 70, 165–179. McDaniel, W. F., Williams, L. B., Attaway, C. M., & Compton, D. M. (1998). Turn signal utilization by rats with either unilateral or bilateral posterior parietal cortex lesions. Psychobiology, 26(2), 143–152.

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Pincus, J. H., & Tucker, G. J. (1985). Behavioral neurology (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Passion The construct of passion evolved from ancient Greece to the current day. Initially, passion was a philosophical term used to refer to a number of affective constructs (emotions, feelings, sentiments, etc.). Passion was seen as maladaptive by Greek philosophers, such as Plato. This was because passion was perceived as controlling the person, who would eventually become a slave to his or her passion. This entry reviews the history of psychological views about passion and discusses the dualistic model of passion. Other influential philosophers who wrote brilliantly about the pros and cons of passion were René Descartes and Immanuel Kant. It was only later, with the Romantics, that passion was fully celebrated. For instance, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel posited that passion was highly adaptive because “nothing great in this world has ever been accomplished without passion.” And Søren Kierkegaard even suggested that “to exist, if we do not mean by that only a pseudo existence, cannot take place without passion.” Initial attention to passion in psychology started at the turn of the 20th century in France. It did not involve experiments or empirical research as such but armchair psychology. Théodule Ribot wrote a book devoted entirely to passion—Essai sur les Passions (Essay on Passions). In it, he defined passion as an enduring and prolonged intellectualized emotion toward an object that has undergone transformation. According to Ribot, there are three main characteristics of passion: a “fixed” idea (a clear and persistent goal directed toward an object or activity), duration (from a few months to lifetime), and intensity (energy deployed in seeking the object or activity that is the goal). In his book Les Passions Humaines (The Human Passions), André Joussain extended the work of Ribot by positing that passion can serve an integrative function and provide direction in one’s life. He proposed that there are two broad types of passion: the noble passions oriented toward the

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benefit of others or society and the selfish passions that seek personal satisfaction. Joussain also suggested that passions interact among themselves in at least two ways: Some conflicts and others peacefully coexist. In fact, Joussain proposed that an equilibrium of the passions is a virtue. The work of Ribot and Joussain was neglected by other psychologists in large part because of the dominance of behaviorism during the next 50 years or so. It was only in the early 1970s that passion made a comeback. Theorizing and research on passion focused on passionate love and passion as a sexual drive and a component of love. Only later did research on passion turn toward activities as such. Such research was conducted in the workplace and focused on passion as “love for one’s work.” The research of Robert Baum is exemplary of such research. Although most people might agree that love of a specific activity or vocation is an important feature of passion, three points are in order. First, by limiting the definition of passion to love of an activity or of one’s work, passion is equated with intrinsic motivation and loses its identity as a theoretical construct. Second, passion feels “hotter” than mere love of the activity. Finally, different types of passion seem to exist, including some that can be either “good” or “bad” for the individual.

What Is Passion? In 2003, in the first contemporary empirical paper on passion for activities, Vallerand and colleagues proposed a multidimensional definition of passion. Their definition integrated seven important elements. First, one has a passion toward a specific activity and not toward multiple activities. There is a special, idiosyncratic relationship between the person and a specific activity. Second, one likes and even loves the activity deeply. This love is profound and can be long lasting. Third, the person values the activity greatly and finds it meaningful. It occupies a high priority in the person’s life to such a point that the person may come to organize his or her life around the activity. Fourth, the activity is so important that it eventually becomes part of the person, of his or her identity. Fifth, passion entails a motivational tendency that moves the person toward the activity. Sixth, engagement in the activity is without

compromise. It invariably occurs with enthusiasm and energy, does so relatively often (for several months, years, and even a lifetime), and with strict commitment. Overall, these six dimensions may explain why passion for something feels “hot”—that is, that there is something fueling one’s engagement in the activity. Finally, seven, in line with the duality of passion described by philosophers, two types of passion exist and are discussed next.

On Two Types of Passion: Harmonious and Obsessive Passionate activities become part of one’s identity because they are highly valued. The process by which the activity becomes part of one’s identity is called internalization. In other words, what was once external to the self becomes a part of it. What the theory posits is that the internalization process can vary qualitatively, thereby leading to two types of passion. First, harmonious passion results from autonomous internalization, which occurs when individuals accept the activity as important for them and choose to engage in it without any other reasons but love of the activity. With harmonious passion, there is a smooth integration of the passionate activity into one’s identity, meaning that the activity exists in harmony with other aspects of the person’s life. Consequently, people with harmonious passion are able to fully focus on tasks outside the activity and succeed in them. Furthermore, when prevented from engaging in the activity, people with harmonious passion adapt well to the situation and focus their attention and energy on present tasks. Thus, there is little or no conflict between the activity and the person’s other life domains. Finally, with harmonious passion, the person decides when to and when not to engage in the activity. In contrast, obsessive passion is the product of controlled internalization and originates from intra- and interpersonal motives such as selfesteem or social acceptance. With obsessive passion, the activity becomes a part of one’s identity because it is loved but also because it brings other, extrinsic benefits. That is, it has instrumental value. Therefore, people with obsessive passion may find themselves experiencing an ­uncontrollable

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urge to engage in the activity. In this case, the person is not in control of the activity, and conflict between engaging in the activity and engaging in other pursuits takes place, leading to potentially destructive outcomes.

The Dualistic Model of Passion Passion affects activity engagement and plays a substantial role in the quality of outcomes for the individual. The dualistic model of passion (DMP) posits that harmonious and obsessive passions should lead to different affective, cognitive, and behavioral consequences. Specifically, harmonious passion should be conducive to more desirable outcomes than obsessive passion should be. The results of hundreds of studies provide support for this hypothesis in areas such as work, sports and exercise, education, driving, gaming, gambling, religion, ideology, collecting, environmental advocacy, romantic relationships, and leisure activities. Specifically, research has shown that harmonious passion is positively related to ­(a)  adaptive cognitive processes, (b) positive affect during and after activity engagement as well as in life in general, (c) psychological well-being, (d) physical health, (e) expert performance in the activity, (f) the development and maintenance of positive interpersonal relationships and intergroup relations, and (g) sustained engagement in the promotion of a cause likely to help one’s society. In addition, research has found that the model can be applied to romantic passion where having a harmonious passion for the romantic partner leads to positive relationships. On the other hand, obsessive passion is demonstrably related to negative outcomes, such as (a)  rumination, (b) negative affect during activity engagement and also when prevented from engaging in the activity as well as in life in general, ­(c) lower levels of psychological well-being and higher levels of burnout, (d) higher risk of chronic injuries and lower levels of physical health, and (e) lower quality of interpersonal (and romantic) relationships and intergroup relations. At the same time, it should be noted that obsessive passion typically leads to levels of performance just as high as those produced by harmonious passion. In fact, under certain circumstances (i.e., fear of failure), obsessive

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passion may even lead to levels of performance in excess of those produced by harmonious passion.

The Development of Passion There is a sequence of three processes by which someone can become passionate about a given activity: activity selection, activity valuation, and internalization. Activity selection refers to the person’s preference for one activity over others. To the extent that the person feels that such selection reflects his or her real interest and is consonant with his or her identity, then the person is in position for activity valuation. The more valued the activity, the more it is internalized in the person’s identity, and the more passionate the person is toward this activity. Finally, the type of passion that develops depends on the type of internalization that takes place. Harmonious passion develops if the internalization occurs in an autonomous fashion. In contrast, obsessive passion develops if the internalization unfolds in a controlled fashion. The internalization process is influenced by the social environment as well as by personal factors. All things being equal, the social environment that promotes personal autonomy leads to the development of harmonious passion by facilitating the autonomous internalization process. Similarly, personal factors that foster autonomy also facilitate internalization that results in harmonious passion. In contrast, controlling social environments or controlling personal factors either prevent the emergence of passion if they are encountered too early in the internalization process (e.g., prior to activity selection or valuation) or lead to the development of obsessive passion by facilitating controlled internalization.

Other Theories and Constructs The DMP was the first theoretical formulation of passion for activities to be published in the latter 20th century. However, it should be noted that other theories and motivational constructs deal with phenomena related to passion. For instance, zest and grit are related to passion, as they are expected to lead to high engagement and persistence across activities. Conversely, the DMP argues that because passion is highly idiosyncratic and

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reflects an intimate person–activity relationship, one is expected to be passionate only about one or two activities. Passion can also be compared to concepts such as talent-related activities, personal interests, personal strivings, personal projects, current concerns, life tasks, and commitment. Although these phenomena may place high value on activities, in none is the love of the activity the central component of one’s passion for activity engagement. Indeed, one can be highly committed to a given activity because of extrinsic motives (e.g., money) and not for love of the activity. Finally, the passion construct as posited by the DMP is probably more closely related to intrinsic motivation in terms of the “love for the activity” component. However, intrinsic motivation does not include the other elements of passion. Further, intrinsic motivation does not address the duality of passion. Indeed, no theory of intrinsic motivation explains how something one loves can be “bad” by producing negative outcomes. Over a decade ago, the field of positive psychology asked the question “How can people’s lives be most worth living?” The concept of passion represents one answer to this question and the DMP a blueprint of how passion can do so. Robert J. Vallerand See also Achievement Motivation; Drive and Motivation in the Brain; Emotion and Motivation; Emotion and Scientific Reasoning; Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Motivation; Motivation and Personality; Unconscious Motivation

Further Readings Vallerand, R. J. (2015). The psychology of passion. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Vallerand, R. J. (2008). On the psychology of passion: In search of what makes people’s lives most worth living. Canadian Psychology, 49, 1–13. Vallerand, R. J. (2010). On passion for life activities: The dualistic model of passion. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 42, pp. 97–193). New York, NY: Academic Press. Vallerand, R. J., Blanchard, C., Mageau, G. A., Koestner, R., Ratelle, C., Leonard, M., . . . Marsolais, J. (2003). Les passions de l’Ame: On obsessive and harmonious passion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 756–767. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514 .85.4.756

Pavlov’s Legacy Ivan Pavlov was a Russian physiologist working at the turn of the 20th century who initiated an extensive program of research on what is now called Pavlovian or classical conditioning. The conditioning phenomena he discovered and his interpretation of the experimental findings provide the foundations of modern studies of conditioning at both the behavioral and neurobiological levels of analysis. This entry reviews Pavlov’s work on conditioning mechanisms. Pavlov ascribed to nervism, which was a popular approach to the study of biological systems in late 19th-century Russia. The concept of nervism assumed that all biological functions are mediated by the nervous system. Given this assumption, the task of the scientist was to decipher these neural mechanisms. Before turning his attention to studies of the conditioned reflex, Pavlov examined neural innervations of the heart and the digestive system. The discovery in 1902 that pancreatic secretions were hormonally mediated led Pavlov to drop his studies of digestion in favor of examining how a preexisting or unconditioned reflex could become elicited by arbitrary cues presented just before the activation of the unconditioned reflex. Pavlov assumed that the development of new conditioned reflexes would be primarily mediated by the nervous system, an assumption that has been substantially confirmed by modern neuroscience. Because conditioned behavior is primarily mediated by the nervous system, Pavlov considered his studies of conditioning to be studies of how the nervous system works. In particular, he regarded studies of classical conditioning to reveal the functions of the cerebral hemispheres.

Methods When Pavlov’s name is mentioned, many people recall a hypothetical experiment in which Pavlov presumably rang a bell (the conditioned stimulus or CS) just before the presentation of meat powder (the unconditioned stimulus or US) to the dogs that served in his experiments. There is little evidence that Pavlov conducted this exact experiment. However, he and his students conducted

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numerous studies in which a variety of different conditioned stimuli were used (tastes, tactile cues, and various visual and auditory cues). Although the majority of his experiments involved conditioning of salivation and other components of the digestive system, Pavlov also conducted experiments on the conditioning of defensive behavior and the conditioning of reactions to drug stimuli (e.g., morphine). This broader approach to Pavlovian conditioning is reflected in contemporary research on the conditioning of fear and other emotional responses, conditioning of appetitive behaviors with food and water as unconditioned stimuli, conditioning of sexual behavior, and studies of Pavlovian conditioning with various psychoactive drugs as unconditioned stimuli.

Past and Present Research Interests Pavlov and his students were the first to identify many phenomena that continue to command the interest of contemporary investigators. These include acquisition, which refers to the development of a new conditioned response as a result of the pairings of a CS with a US, and extinction, which refers to the decline in conditioned responding that occurs when the CS is presented by itself on subsequent trials. Pavlov regarded extinction to be a form of inhibition, because he found that even though responding declines during extinction, the conditioned behavior is not permanently lost but can be recovered if a novel cue is presented with the CS or if a sufficiently long period of rest is introduced (spontaneous recovery). The view that extinction is not unlearning or the reversal of acquisition but reflects suppression or lack of retrieval of the conditioned response is the basis of much contemporary research on extinction. As a physiologist, Pavlov was interested in other forms of inhibition as well, including external inhibition (which refers to the disruption of learned behavior when a novel stimulus is presented), conditioned inhibition (which refers to the inhibition of excitatory responding caused by the presentation of a cue that signals the absence of the US), differential inhibition (which develops if the US is presented following one CS but not another), and inhibition of delay (which is the suppression of

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conditioned behavior during the early portions of a long CS that ends with presentation of the US). Pavlov was also the first to realize that temporal variables are critical to associative learning. These include the duration of the CS, the interval between the onset of the CS and the onset of the US, and the interval between the termination of the CS and the onset of the US. These temporal intervals remain important in contemporary research, along with the interval between successive trials. Pavlov also identified trace conditioning, which refers to the development of a conditioned response even though there is a brief interval (the trace interval) between the termination of the CS and the presentation of the US. Trace conditioning also remains of considerable interest in contemporary research because it appears to be mediated by neural circuits different from other forms of ­ conditioning. An important part of Pavlov’s legacy is that he used conditioning techniques to study sensory systems. He developed procedures for testing stimulus generalization, which is the transfer or generalization of conditioned responding to cues that were not present during original training, and for training stimulus discrimination, which refers to responding more to one stimulus than to another. He recognized that stimulus generalization does not always reflect the inability of sense organs to distinguish between cues but may reflect lack of discrimination training. He also discovered that discriminations may be acquired more easily if the participant is taught a cruder or easier form of the discrimination initially. The importance of discrimination training in determining the extent of stimulus generalization is now well accepted in contemporary learning theory.

Impact Pavlov’s legacy is evident in many aspects of contemporary research on conditioning mechanisms. Researchers continue to use the basic conditioning procedures he developed and continue to examine many of the conditioning phenomena he discovered. Although Pavlovian conditioning has been extended to many new domains (e.g., fear conditioning, sign tracking/goal tracking, sexual conditioning, conditioned taste aversions, conditioning

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of the immune system, conditioned drug tolerance), Pavlov provided the technical and conceptual framework for much of this research. He also initiated studies of the neural mechanisms of learning, which is a major topic in contemporary neuroscience. He did not view conditioning as a “psychological” phenomenon but as a technique for the study of neural plasticity. Pavlov received the Nobel Prize in 1904, for his research on digestive physiology. In his Nobel acceptance speech in 2000, Eric Kandel characterized his research as motivated by, “What changes occur in the brain when we learn? And, once something is learned, how is that information retained in the brain as memory?” Pavlov would be pleased that these questions remain at center stage in contemporary neuroscience. Michael Domjan See also Applied Behavior Analysis; Behavior Therapies; Behaviorism; Classical Conditioning; Evidence-Based Therapy; Operant Conditioning; Reinforcement Rescorla-Wagner Model; Watson, J. B.

Further Readings Domjan, M. (2005). Pavlovian conditioning: A functional perspective. Annual Review of Psychology, 56, 179–206. Domjan, M. (2015). Principles of learning and behavior (7th ed.). Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning. Kandel, E. (2000). The molecular biology of memory storage: A dialog between genes and synapses. Nobel Lecture. Available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_ prizes/medicine/laureates/2000/kandel-lecture.pdf Pavlov, I. P. (1960). Conditioned reflexes (G. V. Anrep, Trans.). New York, NY: Dover. (Original work published 1927) Windholz, G. (1997). Ivan P. Pavlov: An overview of his life and psychological work. American Psychologist, 52, 941–946.

Perception

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Art

Art is created and appreciated in all human societies. It is a basic manifestation of culture and the result of the complex interplay of perceptual, cognitive, and affective processes. For Rudolf

Arnheim, “Art, as any other activity of the mind, is subject to psychology, accessible to understanding, and needed for any comprehensive survey of mental functioning” (p. 2). Moreover, the psychological richness of artworks makes these creations ideal materials by which to test hypotheses about mental processes ranging from perception and memory to preference and decision making. This entry discusses the role of perception in the appreciation of visual art, in psychological approaches to art, and in theories of art.

The Perception of Art Modern aesthetics has established a close relation between art and perception. In fact, aesthetics, as a philosophical discipline, was introduced in the 18th century as the study of knowledge gained by the senses, art, and beauty. The central issue is the way perceptual features are used in aesthetic objects, such as artworks, to arouse—usually positively—feelings and emotions. Factors other than perception, such as meaning or the confirmation of expectations, also affect aesthetics. The appreciation of modern and conceptual art especially relies on nonperceptual processes. However, even in these cases, the experience of art begins with a percept. Depictions in visual art are interesting to study for at least two reasons. First, artworks deviate from the constraints of the real world and thus require perception in sometimes novel and unusual ways. Second, they include the two fundamental dimensions of content (that which is depicted) and style (the way the depiction is implemented). The processes involved in perceiving these dimensions seem to be independent to a certain extent, but as Helmut Leder and colleagues described, the aesthetic experience of art emerges from cognitive and affective processes related to the perception of both. As for aesthetic preferences for perceptual features, research has shown that people like moderate levels of complexity and arousal, positive valence in the depicted content, a balanced underlying visual composition, and curved and smooth features. It would be a mistake to overlook the contribution of the viewer to the aesthetic experience, however. For instance, knowledge and expertise can change

Perception and Art

preferences. Experts often like abstract art more than nonexperts do and engage in style-related processing more often, because they deploy richer resources and abilities in assigning meaning to art. Part of their expertise is because of refined perceptual behavior, which translates into differences in visual exploration, such as longer fixations and different patterns of global-to-local scanning. Moreover, experts typically rely on initial cognitive classifications associated with the artist’s name rather than content of the image.

The Role of Perception in Psychological Approaches to Art Since the foundation of empirical psychology in the late 19th century, the appreciation of art has been formulated in psychological terms and connected to broader issues, such as human social relations in the case of Wilhelm Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie. It was, however, Gustav Fechner’s Vorschule der Ästhetik in 1876 that set the theoretical and methodological foundations. Fechner applied his psychophysics to explain how art pleases the senses. To do so, he studied compositional features, such as the golden section, as well as aesthetic appeal as criteria for originality in the Dresden dispute over two versions of Holbein’s Madonna. In Fechner’s view, the perceptual elements that contributed to complexity and order were the crucial determinants of aesthetic pleasingness. Such a focus on elements was severely criticized by Gestalt psychologists. They argued that perception, more than the mere recording of the elements in the stimulus, is an active organizing process that tends to form “good gestalts” according to the laws of closure, continuation, similarity, and so on. From this point of view, works of art are special kinds of good gestalts, and the pleasingness of art is a consequence of facilitating the organization of good forms. In the 1970s, Daniel Berlyne explained why art pleases or displeases based on perceptual features that have the potential to influence the perceiver’s arousal, such as complexity or novelty, as well as psychophysical and ecological factors. His framework was used and expanded by cognitive psychologists, who studied evaluations and eye movements and, less frequently, physiological

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measures and their relation to behavioral responses and evaluations. For the most part, cognitive psychologists have continued to study the effects of visual features, such as compositional balance or symmetry, on the appreciation of art while often neglecting higher order cognitive processes. Other approaches have provided a more comprehensive picture of how perceptual processes interact with cognitive (e.g., identification, interpretation) and emotional processes (e.g., valence and arousal associated with the relative ease of processing, insight, tolerance of ambiguity). In these approaches, the perceptual features are linked to specific aesthetic experiences that distinguish art from everyday objects.

The Role of Perception in Theories of Art The study of perception has also played a key role in theories about art. For instance, Ernst Gombrich based his argument concerning representation in art on the psychology of perception. He argued that representation is not about whether depicted objects in artworks look like the real objects but whether those depictions lead viewers to understand them as natural objects. The degree to which they do depends on historical factors, such the purpose of the artworks or the restrictions imposed by technique and traditional schemata on artists’ use of an understandable pictorial vocabulary. They also depend on the influence on perceptual processes of viewers’ expectations, search for meaning, and cultural background. Thus, for Gombrich, What the painter inquires into is not the nature of the physical world but the nature of our reactions to it. He is not concerned with causes but with the mechanisms of certain effects. His is a psychological problem—that of conjuring up a convincing image despite the fact that not one individual shade corresponds to what we call “reality.” (p. 44)

Helmut Leder and Marcos Nadal See also Attention; Creativity; Music Perception; Perception and Culture; Perception and Epistemology; Perception and Language; Perception and Motivation; Perceptual Illusions; Visual Perception

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Further Readings Arnheim, R. (1966). Toward a psychology of art: Collected essays. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Chatterjee, A. (2013). The artful brain. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Gombrich, E. H. (1960). Art and illusion. New York, NY: Pantheon Books. Leder, H., Belke, B., Oeberst, A., & Augustin, D. (2004). A model of aesthetic appreciation and aesthetic judgments. British Journal of Psychology, 95, 489–508. Mather, G. (2014). The psychology of visual art. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Perception

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Cognition

How do humans understand their experiences of the world around them? On the face of it, their sensory organs transform physical energy or physical structures into neural signals, which are then handed off to their perceptual systems for further processing. The outputs of perception are then passed to higher-level cognitive mechanisms and, ultimately, to the mental processes that form conscious experience. This entry discusses the link between perception and cognition and considers questions about what affects perception. This popular view of the human mental world was perhaps best articulated by Jerry A. Fodor, whose theory of modularity included the concept of information encapsulation—that is, that information processing “modules” (and, in particular, perceptual input systems) are unaffected by topdown (e.g., cognitive) influences or feedback. In particular, Fodor argued that although perception may be sensitive to what is already known, demonstrating cognitive penetrability (i.e., that cognition directly influences perception) requires evidence that the locus of any interaction between perception and cognition is internal to the perceptual system (i.e., it is not just at output). In the era in which Fodor articulated his theory— the early 1980s—many psychologists viewed the impressive progress of the past several decades as a strong argument for a roughly modular mental architecture. This general stance was reinforced by a wide variety of neuropsychological studies of

individuals with brain injuries who often appeared to lose specific perceptual or cognitive functions that were highly correlated with damage to specific brain regions. For example, systematic studies of prosopagnosia—the specific impairment of visual face recognition—revealed that prosopagnosia is typically associated with damage to the right temporo-occipital region. Such evidence seemed to make a compelling case for a “new phrenology”—an approach in which generally independent functional and neural mechanisms could be “assembled” to produce complex cognition (note the nonaccidental similarity to the way in which a modern digital computer is built). In the context of perception and cognition, this stance argues for an approach in which the individual first separately characterizes the functional properties of perceptual and cognitive mechanisms and then characterizes how information flows from one domain to the other. Critically, however, this information flow does not directly affect processing within each domain. Rather, it simply makes itself “available” for further processing. In recent decades, the modularity approach has come under increasing scrutiny. At a purely theoretical level, modern computational simulations of cognitive processes suggest that highly specific perceptual and cognitive deficits can arise from “damage” to domain-general, nonmodular mechanisms. That is, the fact that specific brain injuries lead to specific deficits no longer constitutes strong evidence for a neural module dedicated to the lost perceptual or cognitive function. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that such simulations provide only an alternative, albeit plausible, account, but one that does not rule out the original hypothesis. Perhaps more compelling has been the body of empirical data arising from modern neuroimaging methods—most notably, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Arguably, fMRI allows a better view of how various parts of the brain participate in generating thought and behavior. That is, instead of simply measuring the output of a given task (behavior), it is possible to assess the spatially separable neural responses across the entire brain associated with task performance. Thus, it is possible to infer, based on brain activity, whether putatively cognitive processes directly influence perceptual processes, or whether, as articulated by Fodor, interactions between

Perception and Cognition

perception and cognition occur only postperceptually. To foreshadow the conclusions, this entry presents two paradigmatic examples that clearly demonstrate that cognitive processes have a direct and measurable impact on the neural responses of perceptual mechanisms.

Can High-Level Inference Affect Perceptual Processing? Consider the size illusion—a staple of introductory psychology texts for at least a century. The large majority of these illusions consist of two physically identical stimuli (i.e., they cover the same amount of area on one’s retina)—circles, balls, lines and the like—in the context of surrounding perceptual cues that differ in what they tell observers about their current viewing conditions. Consequently, the observer infers—through perceptual and cognitive processes—that the two identical stimuli look different from one another. Specifically, one is assumed to be larger than the other one. When the range of size illusions is examined more carefully, it turns out that they actually may fall into at least two classes: (a) those that are potentially explainable through local interactions between the critical stimuli and their surroundings and (b) those that are explainable only through first interpretation of high-level properties of the scene whereby they constrain the likely size of the critical stimuli. The former class of illusions is exemplified by the classic Müller-Lyer illusion in which two identical lines are perceived as different lengths because one is terminated with outwardfacing arrowheads and the other is terminated with inward-facing arrowheads (see Figure 1a). Although there is a long-standing “high-level” explanation in which these two patterns are interpreted as the inner or outer edges of a corner of a room, there is evidence that local contour (a)

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interactions are sufficient to account for the effect. In particular, replacing the arrowheads with circles terminating inside or outside the lines, thereby removing the appearance of room corners, maintains the illusion (Figure 1b). Thus, there is little need to think about how perceptual and cognitive processes might interact in such cases. In contrast, the latter class of illusions referred to earlier is exemplified by size illusions that are thought to rely on perspective cues to depth—for instance, the classic Ponzo illusion (Figure 2). In this and similar cases, the critical information that leads to the different inferred sizes is related to perspective—a cue to depth that necessarily involves integrating information across the visual field and making inferences as to how this information constrains scene interpretation (i.e., there is no local account of the perceived difference in size). It is these sorts of size illusions that are most interesting with respect to the interaction between perception and cognition. In particular, under the Fodorian account of size illusions, such as the Ponzo illusion, the perceptual systems are not fooled at all—that is, within the neural substrates and mental mechanisms of perception, the two lines are correctly (“veridically”) represented as being the same size. However, postperceptually, the observer deploys inferential cognitive processes

(b)

Figure 1 Two Versions of the Müller-Lyer Illusion. Which of the horizontal lines is longer?

Figure 2 The Ponzo Illusion. Which of the gray lines is longer?

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based on the global appearance of the scene and on prior experience (e.g., having previously learned that converging edges in the 2-D plane typically correspond to parallel lines receding in depth in the 3-D world). Thus, the observer ends up concluding, incorrectly, that the two lines are of different lengths. The preceding explanation of the Ponzo illusion is the sort that held sway in cognitive science for many decades—that perception is an encapsulated input system that simply “serves up” sensory data (albeit transformed) for subsequent cognitive processing. Critically, under this view, perception is cognitively impenetrable with respect to the potential influences of cognitive mechanisms. But is this right? Is it really the case that high-level inferences about the world do not affect perceptual processing? As mentioned earlier, fMRI allows this question to be addressed in a heretofore impossible manner by enabling a view of neural activity across the entire brain, including neural systems that are well established as perceptual or cognitive in nature. Using fMRI researchers can ask whether the neural representation of two physically identical stimuli reflects this identity or whether, reflecting perceptual experience, different neural patterns are associated with the two stimuli. Consider a display inspired by the Ponzo illusion: 3-D balls placed in different locations in a textured “room” that provide strong perspective cues to depth (Figure 3). As in the original illusion, the placement of an image of a ball near the back of the room leads the observer to infer that this ball is larger than a

physically identical image of the ball placed near the front of the room. Because the 3-D room, as compared to the Ponzo illusion, relies on even more complex, inferential cues to depth, any influence of position in the room on the perceived size of the balls is almost surely due to high-level “cognitive”—that is, not local—inferences about size. Deploying such displays during fMRI scanning, in effect, asks which regions of the human brain respond differently to the two perceptually different but physically identical, balls. The surprising result of this experiment is that the earliest component of the cortical visual system—V1, which maintains a retinotopic map of visual input (adjacent neurons represent adjacent spatial fields in the environment)—responds differentially to these two stimuli. More specifically, the ball that is perceived as larger (the more distant ball) activates a larger area of V1 compared with the ball that is perceived as smaller (the closer ball). This result strongly indicates that indisputably perceptual mechanisms are affected by high-level cognitive inferences.

Can Prior Experience Affect Perception? As with size perception, an encapsulated view of perception and cognition suggests that even highlevel visual processes, such object recognition, should not be affected by cognitive knowledge. Yet there are many ways in which object recognition can be modulated by cognition such that it has a direct effect on perceptual processes. For example,

Figure 3  Which ball is bigger? A size illusion based on the perspective cues to depth.

Perception and Cognition

the speed of object detection is strongly influenced by the semantic and spatial relationships it has with its background. For example, if shown a football player in a church, one will be slower to identify the football player compared with viewing the same football player in a football stadium. Similarly, where an object is placed in a scene should not affect the ability to recognize that object, but it does. For example, a fire hydrant in the sky within a picture of a street scene is much more difficult to detect than a fire hydrant on the sidewalk in the same scene. Moreover, if someone’s vision is compromised—for example, if the world is blurry because that person left his or her eyeglasses at home—the individual may perceive the same object very differently, depending on its surrounding context. Figure 4 demonstrates how the very same pixels can lead to very different recognition processing. In the picture to the left, one would be very happy to warm up leftovers in the object the arrow is pointing to. However, the same picture of an object would be perceived very differently if presented in a living room, and one would never mistake that object as a microwave oven but rather a TV. The preceding examples suggest that prior experiences shape one’s perceptual expectations, thereby altering one’s experience of object perception. However, as illustrated here, people do not experience objects in isolation, nor do they think about objects in isolation but rather as embedded within a context, such as a scene. For example, if asked to think about cotton candy, it is hard to think about it in isolation. Many

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associations are brought to mind, such as its shape and texture, the last time one ate it, and the contexts it is typically found in, such as a circus or carnival. Thus, object recognition is not an isolated process but occurs in conjunction with many other high-level cognitive processes. Using neuroimaging, this point was exemplified by examining the neural activity related to passively viewing objects with strong contextual associations (e.g., an oven with a kitchen) compared with passively viewing objects with weak contextual associations (e.g., a folding chair, which can be found anywhere). Strong differential activity was found in this contrast, suggesting that there was increase in processing the objects with strong contextual associations compared with objects with weak contextual associations. Interestingly, the regions of the brain that demonstrated this activity were areas of the brain thought to process only whole scenes (e.g., a whole kitchen). Thus, even though only a single object was being viewed, it had many similarities to the way scenes are processed in the brain. This suggested that the associations of the objects were being processed automatically and immediately. Moreover, perception of the environment is not a passive but rather an active process that incorporates the rich set of associations learned over one’s lifetime. For example, when one sees a refrigerator, one can strongly expect that an oven will appear close by. This automatic associative processing of objects can facilitate but also bias recognition by

Figure 4 What is the object under the black arrow? Context can change one’s interpretation of the same retinal image.

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predicting what is likely going to occur in the environment. Associative processing of the different components of a scene may be inherent in the mechanisms that mediate scene understanding and thus activate similar regions of the brain. Thus, it is necessarily a combination of perception and high-level cognition that gives rise to scene and object perception.

Implications So what is the conclusion? First, perception and cognition are artificial categories invented by psychologists as a means to a clear explanation. In actual fact, the boundary between what is perception and what is cognition is rather fuzzy. Not only do the two domains interact, but their information processing is intimately connected in the formation of moment-to-moment experiences. Second, both empirical methods and theory building have matured to the point where researchers can entertain and test theories that do not rest on explanatory simplifications as a convenience. Elissa M. Aminoff and Michael J. Tarr See also Attention; Cognitive Neuroscience; Concepts and Language; Embodied Cognition; Perceptual Illusions; Visual Perception

Further Readings Aminoff, E. M., Kveraga, K., & Bar, M. (2013). The role of the parahippocampal cortex in cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17(8), 379–390. Davenport, J. L. (2007). Consistency effects between objects in scenes. Memory & Cognition, 35(3), 393–401. Fodor, J. A. (1983). Modularity of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Murray, S. O., Boyaci, H., & Kersten, D. (2006). The representation of perceived angular size in human primary visual cortex. Nature Neuroscience, 9(3), 429–434. Kanwisher, N. (2000). Domain specificity in face perception. Nature Neuroscience, 3(8), 759–763. Tarr, M. J., & Gauthier, I. (2000). FFA: A flexible fusiform area for subordinate-level visual processing automatized by expertise. Nature Neuroscience, 3, 764–769. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/77666

Perception

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Culture

Traditionally, it has been assumed that the main role of psychological research is to investigate universal aspects of human psychological processes. Theories of perception are often developed based on this assumption, and some theoretical strands advocate the universality of perception far more radically, regarding perception as the fundamental process that is least affected by cultural influences. This entry reviews theories about whether and how culture influences perception. For example, Zenon Pylyshyn’s theory published in 1999 favored the universal view and asserted that the perceptual system is encapsulated as an independent architecture, with no room for even basic cognitive processes to penetrate the system. The phenomenon of the Müller-Lyer illusion—in which a horizontal line segment ending in inwardpointing arrows is perceived to be longer than a horizontal line segment of identical length but ending in outward-pointing arrows—is referred as an ideal example of such impenetrability, because the illusion is experienced even by people who consciously recognize that it is an illusion. Such an assertion of impenetrability strongly resonates with the “modularity theory of mind” advocated by Jerry Fodor as well as with evolutionary theories. Researchers who hold these views investigate mainly the bottom-up information processing of perception: how a unit of information is processed through the built-in perceptual architecture and how information processing is a universal and innate biological architecture shared by the human species. However, another strand of theories, called “New Look” psychology, argues that people’s experience, and their subjective and intersubjective interpretation of phenomena such as values, needs, and expectations, are major factors that influence perception. For example, one finding suggested that people’s perception of playing cards is strongly influenced by their experience with them. That is, there are clear differences in reaction speed and accuracy of card recognition when the color and suit of the cards are presented in normal combinations (e.g., red hearts) rather than when they are presented in incongruent combinations (e.g., red spades). The results also indicated that as

Perception and Culture

exposure to incongruent cards increases, recognition speed improves. The New Look theorists claimed that if experience with the combination of color and suit does not matter, such differences in reaction time and accuracy would not be observed. Similarly, they demonstrated that when compared with children from higher economic-status households, children from lower socioeconomicstatus households overestimated the size of disks corresponding to American coins (pennies, nickels, dimes, quarters, and half-dollars). According to the New Look interpretation, the children’s relative values and needs produced the different patterns of judgment across groups. Because of the sociocultural aspects of these theories, researchers who advocate them investigate mainly the top-down information processing of perception—that is, how factors external to human perception (e.g., society, culture, emotion, motivation, and cognition) influence one’s perceptual system.

Cross-Cultural Perspectives Research on culture and perception was initiated by anthropologists in the early 20th century. The early cross-cultural investigations corresponded to Jerome Bruner’s theoretical assertion that one’s experience influences perception. There are two strands of theories about where these cultural variations in perception derive from: The ecological approach and the semantic approach. The ecological approach attempts to explain cultural variations in perception by referring to the habitat—the natural and social environments as well as the economy and associated livelihood—of a given culture. For example, early anthropological and psychological reports indicated that compared with Westerners, Murray Islanders in Melanesia and members of the Toda tribe in India showed significantly smaller errors in judging the relative lengths of the lines in the Müller-Lyer illusion. Furthermore, studies of African agricultural and hunter–gatherer cultures, an Australian Aboriginal foraging culture, a group of horticulturalists in the Philippines, and Midwesterners in the United States showed that the degree of illusion was much stronger among North Americans and that children in some cultures (e.g., hunter–gatherers in the Kalahari Desert) were completely immune to the Müller-Lyer illusion. Cross-cultural psychological

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research in the 1970s and 1980s also supported this approach—for example, under the rubric of field dependence versus field independence. These early works challenged the modularity view of perceptual architecture and indicated that even the magnitude of perceptual illusion varied across cultures. The semiotic approach is advocated by cultural anthropologists and also by cultural psychologists whose target of investigation is the process of mutual constitution between culture and psyche. These theorists maintain that people perceive the world not by accessing the raw reality but by referring to the meaning system that has been historically maintained and intersubjectively shared by members of a given culture, thus creating a sociocultural reality. Theorists who support this approach argue that the initial ecology and economy, as distal factors, contribute to the emergence of the metaphysics and epistemology of a given culture, which, in turn, becomes an “ignition trigger” of a civilization. However, once a civilization emerges, its metaphysics and epistemology may become self­ propelling vehicles independent from the original ecology and economy (sometimes even traveling across continents and settling in new environments) and, as direct factors, influence perception. For example, some theorists contend that the analytic pattern of perception—the pattern produced by selectively attending to focal events, focal objects, and focal people while detaching them from their surrounding context—is dominantly observed in Western societies (e.g., Western Europe, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and the United States). Moreover, the origin of this pattern can be traced to ancient Greek civilization where the metaphysics and the epistemology, especially those of Aristotle, emphasized the mutual independence of phenomena. By contrast, the holistic pattern of perception—the pattern produced by allocating attention to the entire field of a given event and to the relationships and the context among objects— is dominantly observed in East Asian societies (e.g., China, Korea, and Japan). The origin of this pattern of attention can be traced to ancient Chinese civilization, where the metaphysics and epistemology observable in Taoism, Confucianism, and East Asian Buddhism emphasized the complexities and interwoven nature of phenomena.

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Many other theories have been developed under the rubrics of the independent versus interdependent view of self, high context versus low context cultures, and individualism versus collectivism. The theoretical bases of some of these theories, which emphasize the effect of social structure on perception and cognition, are similar to the ecological approach. Other theories focus on the intersubjective interpretation of the self and others, and their bases are similar to the semiotic approach. In general, both kinds of theories assert that people internalize a specific perception through the lens of their experiences of living in a given cultural environment. This assertion is different from the one that is dominant in mainstream psychology. However, these approaches do not have to be mutually exclusive. Rather, other studies have attempted to integrate the ecological and semiotic approaches to perception. For example, researchers have demonstrated that beyond the similarities in the shared meaning systems of a given culture, there are substantial within-culture differences in patterns of attention, and these differences can be explained in terms of recent and past livelihood styles in that culture.

Implications Advances in theories of culture and perception have several implications. First, the cross-cultural examination of human perception elucidates mechanisms that are universally shared by humans, mechanisms that are socioculturally shaped through experience and can differ substantially across cultures, and the extent to which perception is flexibly structured and influenced by systems associated with experience. Future investigations will be able to avoid the pitfalls of the dichotomous view of nature versus nurture and scrutinize human perception with a more balanced view. Second, findings in neuroscience have demonstrated that culture can influence even the neural activity of higher and lower cognitive processes. The evidence suggests the possibility of cultural malleability in perception and its underlying brain functions and neural substrates. Further research on culture and perception has the potential to answer the question, “How deeply does culture influence perception?” Finally, although social and cultural psychologists have identified cultural

variations in social cognition—such as causal attribution, self-perception, judgment, inference, and categorization—a theoretical framework for comprehensively explaining the relationship between social cognition and perception has not been fully established. Advances in cross-cultural theories will allow researchers to scrutinize these underlying relationships as well. Takahiko Masuda See also Culture and Cognition; Perceptual Contrast; Perceptual Development; Perceptual Illusions; Visual Perception

Further Readings Bruner, J. S. (1990). Acts of meaning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Han, S., & Northoff, G. (2008). Culture-sensitive neural substrates of human cognition: A transcultural neuroimaging approach. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 9, 646–654. Imai, M., & Masuda, T. (2013). The role of language and culture in universality and diversity of human concepts. In M. Gelfand, C.-Y. Chiu, & Y.-Y. Hong (Eds.), Advances in culture and psychology (Vol. 3, pp. 1–61). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Kitayama, S., & Uskul, A. K. (2011). Culture, mind, and the brain: Current evidence and future directions. Annual Review of Psychology, 62, 419–449. Nisbett, R. E., & Masuda, T. (2003). Culture and point of view. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 100, 11163–11175. Uskul, A. K., Kitayama, S., & Nisbett, R. N. (2008). Ecocultural basis of cognition: Farmers and fishermen are more holistic than herders. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 105, 8552–8556.

Perception

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Epistemology

Epistemology is the area of philosophy concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge. Perception is the process by which the stimulation of sense organs affects the psychological state of the subject. Perception and epistemology intersect when the question of whether this perceptual process can produce knowledge is considered. On the

Perception and Epistemology

face of it, the answer to this question seems obvious: Perception, across all the senses, is a central— if not the sole—foundation of one’s knowledge about the world in which one lives. Yet as is often the case, things are not quite as straightforward as they appear. This entry begins by clarifying the focal question of whether perception can furnish a person with knowledge and goes on to consider some central challenges to the intuitive idea that perception is a source of knowledge. It will be clear that the epistemological issues surrounding perception are tightly bound up with psychological theorizing on the topic.

Knowledge, Belief, and Justification Discussion of the relationship between perception and epistemology is framed by asking whether perception can justify one’s holding beliefs about the world. The reason for framing the question in terms of belief rather than knowledge is that, traditionally, philosophers have taken knowledge to involve more than just stored information about the world: For a subject to know some proposition, p, it is not enough for that subject to take that proposition to be true—to believe the proposition. Rather, that proposition actually has to be true. One cannot know that the Earth is flat no matter how strongly one believes it. So although a subject’s having knowledge has been taken to involve mental states, inasmuch as it involves the storage of information that the subject takes to be an accurate representation of the world, knowledge has not itself been taken to be a mental state, as it involves something (truth) that is not a fact about a subject’s psychology but rather a fact about the world external to that psychology. Instead, philosophers use the term belief to name the mental state proper: A subject can be in the state of believing that p regardless of how the world is. The reason that justification appears in the framing of the question is that, traditionally, epistemologists have taken justification to be, alongside truth, a necessary element of knowledge proper. For a subject to truly be said to know that p, he or she must not only believe that p but also must have good reason for so doing. Believing truly as a result of a lucky guess, for example, does not suffice for knowing.

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This idea of a subject’s needing to have good reasons for his or her belief is captured by the claim that true knowing requires a subject’s beliefs to be justified. Yet unlike truth, it seems that justification is an appropriate object of study for psychologists, given that the reasons for which a subject believes that p do indeed appear to be facts about that subject’s psychology. So from the point of view of this entry, the question of whether perception can furnish a person with knowledge can be approached via the question of whether perception can produce justified beliefs. As noted earlier, the intuitive answer to this question is yes, it can. For example, right now, I believe that there is a laptop on the table in front of me. Not only does this belief appear to have been caused by the stimulation of my sense organs, but the perceptual experience I have also seems to be the reason I hold this belief. That is, if asked why I believe that there is a laptop in front of me, I would reply that I believe there is a laptop there because I can see it. Such considerations led to the epistemological theory known as foundationalism—the view that, ultimately, the justification for all external-world beliefs can be traced to their foundations in perception.

From Perception to Belief: Founding Justification A familiar psychological framework draws a distinction between perception and cognition. Perceptual states and processes, on this understanding, are those states and processes that occur in what are sometimes called “input modules.” Cognitive states and processes, by contrast, are those that are connected to central processing. A number of theorists—both epistemologists and psychologists—have suggested that (at least a part of) the perceptual process is “encapsulated,” which is to say that it is entirely independent of any influence from cognitive processes. This would provide a stage of perceptual processing that produced output states entirely independent of the particular cognitive makeup of the subject, including, in particular, the range of concepts that the subject possesses. Yet some epistemologists have argued that if this is an accurate picture of perception, then perceptual states thus understood simply could not

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play a role in justifying a subject’s beliefs. As noted, the idea of being justified in holding a belief is connected to things such as the capacity to be able to explain why one holds that belief and to defend it as reasonable if challenged. To be justified, on this account, is not only to have reasons in the broad sense of having a reason to do something that one may or may not be aware of but to be aware of these reasons and able to appeal to them or cite them, if required (for this reason, it is often known as internalism about justification). Yet this requires the subject to give linguistic expression to those reasons, which, in turn, requires those reasons to have a particular (linguistic, conceptual) structure. These reflections have led some epistemologists to the conclusion that beliefs can be justified only by other beliefs and that even though perception can be a source of beliefs, perceptions cannot be reasons for those beliefs. Instead, they endorse an alternative theory of belief justification known as coherentism, which claims that all beliefs—even beliefs about the current layout of the world, such as my belief that there is a laptop in front of me— acquire what justification they have in virtue of the inferential relations they stand in to other beliefs that the subject holds. Yet the majority of epistemologists have been loath to reject the intuitive idea that many beliefs are indeed justified by perception. There has been, however, no consensus as to how this intuition should be defended. For example, one response has been to reject the internalist conception of justification that gives rise to the problem. That is to say, rather than thinking of justification as the internalist does—as a matter of reasons that the subject is aware of—the externalist looks at justification from a more objective, scientific point of view and asks, Do the subject’s perceptual processes typically result in the subject’s having true beliefs? If so, the thought goes, those perceptual processes qualify as “reliable” and the beliefs formed by those processes count as justified. To be justified, in this externalist theory, is to have one’s beliefs caused by processes that reliably yield true beliefs. Even if the subject cannot explain why she or he holds a particular belief, it will still be justified so long as it has been caused by a reliable process. Other epistemologists have responded to this challenge by arguing that there cannot be such a

clear demarcation between perception and cognition, at least not at the level of persons and their mental states. It is left open whether there may be such a demarcation at the subpersonal level of the underlying processing. Instead, it has been argued, the kinds of conceptual capacities that a person deploys in forming beliefs must also be operative in the perceptual processes themselves, with the result that perceptual experiences are, even at their simplest, already structured by the very concepts the subject deploys in thought, talk, and belief. If this is correct, perceptual states can be conceived of as states that have the same sort of linguistic, conceptual content that is possessed by belief, which would enable them to be potential justifiers in the traditional internalist sense. A further response is to challenge the reasoning here by showing how perception could stand in justificatory relationships to belief while involving states that are not themselves beliefs or belief-like. One popular approach makes use of the familiar idea that the perceptual system generates, as outputs, representations. These make claims about how the world is—say, perhaps, that it contains certain colored surfaces at varying distances from the subject—yet it does so in a way unlike that of belief. This is often characterized by saying that the content of perceptual representations is nonconceptual. The question then becomes one of explaining how a state with nonconceptual content can stand in justificatory relationships to a state with conceptual content, such as a belief. In response to this, some epistemologists have argued that if a perceptual representation specifies that a certain part of the space around the subject contains a black surface, then some beliefs about the layout of space around the subject will be inconsistent with this content, others may be made probable by this content, and so on. These are, it is argued, rational relations that can play a justificatory role.

From Belief to Perception: Is the Eye Innocent? A further important issue for the epistemological impacts of theorizing about perception concerns the question of whether perceptions are faithful representations of the external world or whether a subject’s cognitive states affect perceptual processing in

Perception and Language

such a way that what the subject sees is determined, in part, by what the subject already believes. The psychological literature contains numerous examples of experiments that purport to show a cognitive influence on perceptual experience— from Jerome Bruner and Cecile Goodman’s famous findings that a group of poor children, for whom coins were of greater relative value, “saw” those coins as considerably larger than a group of rich children did to experiments suggesting that if one antecedently believes that bananas are yellow, one will see an achromatic picture of a banana as being slightly yellow. Such cases in which cognitive states, such as belief and desire, penetrate perceptual processing in such a way that it affects the end product of that processing are often called cases of “cognitive penetration.” There is, of course, disagreement over whether these findings are best understood as perceptual or postperceptual effects. Suppose at least some of these findings really do report perceptual changes, however: What impact would such cognitive penetration have on epistemology? Susanna Siegel has pointed out that the impacts could be either positive or negative. On the positive side, one would hope that a radiologist’s superior knowledge and training would enable him or her to see things in an X-ray that a layperson could not see. On the negative side, consider a case in which Jill believes that Jack is angry at her, which primes her to experience Jack’s face as expressive of anger, which, in turn, reinforces her belief that Jack is angry at her. In such a case, it would seem that although the perception appears to justify Jill’s belief that Jack is angry at her, this is problematic. If perception is cognitively penetrable, then it remains an open question about what impact this will ultimately have on the capacity of perceptual experiences to justify one’s beliefs. William Fish See also Epistemology and Sensation; Perception and Cognition; Perceptual Illusions; Visual Perception

Further Readings Davidson, D. (1986). A coherence theory of knowledge and truth. In E. LePore (Ed.), Truth and interpretation (pp. 307–319). Oxford, England: Blackwell.

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Fodor, J. (1983). The modularity of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Goldman, A. (1979). What is justified belief? In G. Pappas (Ed.), Justification and knowledge (pp. 1–23). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: D. Reidel. Heck, R. (2000). Nonconceptual content and the space of reasons. Philosophical Review, 109, 483–523. Pylyshyn, Z. (1999). Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 341–423. Siegel, S. (2012). Cognitive penetrability and perceptual justification. Noûs, 46, 201–222.

Perception

and

Language

At present, there is no general agreement among either psychologists or linguists about the relation between perception and language. How this relation is viewed largely depends on the basic tenets underlying existing theories or models in both psychology and linguistics about the relation between the body and the mind. This entry reviews several theories about and models for explaining the relation between perception and language. Long-standing traditions in philosophy, linguistics, and the cognitive sciences have assumed a strict dichotomy between the two. In other words, cognition has been seen as independent from perception—that is, from sensorimotor experience. This view been challenged by alternative approaches that consider the mind to be deeply rooted in bodily experience—that is, as “embodied.” In these approaches, the relation between perception and cognition appears as a continuum, not as a dichotomy. Perception can thus inform cognition.

The Role of Perception in Linguistic Theories To understand how linguistic theories assess the relation between perception and language, it is vital to know whether these theories separate at least parts of linguistic cognition from nonlinguistic cognition by assuming (a) that knowledge of language is autonomous from general cognition and hence also perception, (b) that parts of the

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mind and of language itself are modular, and maybe also (c) that aspects of the language system are innate. Apart from that, how linguistic theories characterize the relation between the language system and language use is also relevant. Since the beginning of modern linguistics, theories of language have mostly been theories of the language system. This is especially true of a number of models that together have constituted the highly influential research paradigm of generative linguistics, initiated in the 1960s by the work of Noam Chomsky. Generative models dominated linguistics for a long time and also inspired the socalled cognitivist turn. They are built on a conception of the language faculty as autonomous from general cognition and of the language system as modular. The dichotomy between the language system and language use reappears as that between an idealized native speaker’s competence—that is, his or her knowledge about the language system, especially syntax, and his or her performance—that is, the use to which he or she puts this knowledge in actual speech events. Crucially, competence is autonomous from language use. Hypotheses about the innateness of parts of the language faculty became widely popular in the 1970s and 1980s under the label of universal grammar (UG). As the acquisition of any linguistic system on the basis of general cognitive principles and an assumedly impoverished (i.e., incomplete and partially faulty) input was deemed impossible, UG was meant to serve as a “language-acquisition device.” Because of the autonomy of (at least the core modules of) the language system from nonlinguistic cognition and perception, issues of embodiment do not arise in generative models of language. As its internal modular architecture entails strict separations between syntax and other linguistic and nonlinguistic modules, the influence of perception on language is necessarily only an indirect one. Although interfaces with nonlinguistic modules (e.g., auditory and visual perception) are certainly required, their output cannot directly influence the encapsulated, internal processes of the modules determining language structure, especially syntax. Perception is thus relevant as a performance factor. As such, it may influence diverse aspects of language use but not shape the core of the language system itself.

Since the late 1980s, a number of alternative linguistic models have been developed, in both linguistics and the cognitive sciences more broadly. These are united by their assumption of the embodiment hypothesis and their rejection of the autonomy, modularity, and innateness assumptions underlying generative models of the language system. Linguists such as Charles Fillmore, George Lakoff, Leonard Talmy, and Ronald Langacker developed a number of new models of linguistic meaning and language structure that became known as frame semantics, cognitive semantics, and cognitive grammar. Together with a growing body of other work, these constitute the interdisciplinary research paradigm of cognitive linguistics. In cognitive-linguistic models, performance data play a central role. Language systems, and thus also the language competence of single speakers, are seen as arising from language use—that is, from myriad speech events. In contrast to modular accounts, the processes making this possible are not domain specific. Syntactic rules are replaced by syntactic constructions. These are schematizations over usage events that preserve structurally and functionally similar aspects of those events. Lexicon and grammar are thus not seen as totally distinct or different in kind (i.e., as separate modules) but as the opposing poles on a continuum of symbolic units (i.e., form-meaning pairings) that differ only with respect to how schematic and how complex the units are. Grammar is thus meaningful. For example, consider the three kinds of units located at different positions along this cline: Simple lexemes are neither complex nor schematic, whereas phrasal and clausal structures are both complex and schematic. Idioms are in between: They are complex but usually not, or only partially, schematic.

Perception in Cognitive-Linguistic Models of Language In all cognitive-linguistic models of language, meanings are mental entities. No distinction is made between world knowledge and word knowledge. Word meanings are considered to be encyclopedic. What is known about category structure in general cognition thus also applies to linguistic meaning. In cognitive grammar, word meanings provide entry points to larger

Perception and Language

conceptualizations (also called “domains”) by “profiling” parts of these. The lexemes mother, aunt, daughter, and sister, for instance, profile different parts of conceptualizations in the kinship domain that serve as its “base” and may, in turn, presuppose further conceptualizations in other domains. Depending on the context of use, the word novel, for instance, can profile aspects of knowledge about physical objects, kinds of texts, or leisure activities in a whole domain matrix. Frame semantics emphasizes that word meanings cannot be defined independently of the knowledge frames constituting domains. From an onomasiological perspective (i.e., choosing language to express a given idea), words with meanings at the middle level of specificity (e.g., bird, chair) as opposed to superordinate items such as animal and furniture or subordinate ones such as redbreast and rocking chair are privileged. They are usually short and simple, most frequently chosen, and learned early in life. At this midlevel, the so-called basic level, categorization is most efficient, as both category-internal coherence and category-external differences are maximized. Perceptual information plays an important role, for the basic level is the most generic level at which all category members can be characterized by generic mental images from one or more perceptual modalities—for example, generic visual images of a chair and typical motor images of interacting with it. However, perceptual information is relevant not only to words with concrete meanings but also to words that profile aspects of knowledge in abstract domains such as emotions, social relations, morality, politics, time, or even mathematics. To understand how this works, image-schema theory and conceptual metaphor theory are valuable. Image schemas have been characterized as preconceptual, highly recurring, dynamic patterns that capture the contours of sensorimotor experience, thereby integrating information from multiple perceptual modalities (including proprioception). They are fully embodied and thus directly meaningful gestalts with internal structure. As yet, there is no final list of image schemas. Typical examples are object/entity, container, source-path-goal, link, contact, near-far, part-whole, full-empty, center-periphery, balance, straight; the

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orientational schemas up-down, front-back, leftright; the force-dynamic schemas force, counterforce, enablement, compulsion, blockage, restraint, removal (of restraint), diversion; and motion schemas such as animate motion/self-motion, inanimate motion/caused motion. Because of their internal structure, many of the schemas on this list are related. For example the container schema defines the logic of both in-out and full-empty. Part-whole relations require both object and link. Balance is created by the effects of force and counterforce. Animate motion follows paths that are not straight—and so on. Image schemas are an important prerequisite for concept formation. The notion of “animacy,” for instance, presupposes the image schema of animate motion. Image schemas play an important role in conceptual metaphor theory, which relates the conceptualizations in abstract domains to those in concrete ones. A conceptual metaphor is defined as the partial understanding of aspects of one domain, the target domain, in terms of aspects of another one, the source domain. It establishes unidirectional mappings between the source and the target, which is typically abstract. Time or event structure, for instance, are understood in terms of location in and movement through space. The invariance hypothesis holds that the image-schema structure of a sourcedomain is not violated in the metaphorical mapping to a target. The logic provided by the imageschematic structure of the source is thus retained in target-domain conceptualizations. Widely known examples of “primary” conceptual metaphors that link the perceptual information provided by image schemas to concepts from abstract target domains with which they are correlated in experience are more is up, happy is up, power is up, intimacy is closeness, states are locations, purposes are goals, change is motion, knowing is seeing, and so on. Other, more complex metaphors such as life is a journey, theories are buildings, or states are ships are based on broader analogical mappings between bigger frames of knowledge that can be motivated by a number of primary metaphors. Linguistically, conceptual metaphors are reflected by semantic change in language such that the words such as see, hear, and grasp, which originally refer to aspects of physical experience,

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acquire nonphysical uses over time. Although outside the scope of linguistics proper, gesture studies have opened another window to embodied thought that complements much work in image-schema theory and conceptual metaphor theory. The spontaneous gestures in spoken discourse are often iconic representations of image-schematic aspects of the source domains drawn on by the verbal metaphors in the language they accompany. In conjunction with conceptual metaphor, image schemas have even been used to explain aspects of grammatical meaning. For example, the so-called root/deontic uses of English modal verbs such as can, may, must, have to, and the like, whose meanings express dimensions of social interactions such as “obligation,” “denial,” “permission,” and so on, have been explained in terms of the metaphorical extension of the force-dynamic schemas to the domain of social space. The relation between perception and language structure is modeled in a highly detailed form in Langacker’s cognitive grammar, which holds that language provides the language user with the means to express highly specific “construals” of conceptual content. The properties of construal reflect major aspects of visual perception. These relate to (a) the choice of the specific object of conception (the “profile”) as the abstract counterpart of the visual focus, (b) the choice of a particular perspective as the counterpart of a vantage point in vision, (c) the choice of a certain level of specificity as the counterpart of image resolution, and (d) the imposition of figure-ground distinctions.

Understanding Language as Embodied Simulation The notion of construal has taken on a new significance in the context of interdisciplinary work that has become known under the labels of embodied simulation or simulation semantics. The embodied simulation hypothesis takes the notion of embodiment one step further. The idea is that understanding language may be based on the mental simulation of the sights, sounds, and actions that actually constitute bodily experience. From this perspective, language provides not only the means for the speaker to express highly specific construals of conceptual content but also

the means to state detailed instructions to the listener about how relevant perceptual experience should be simulated. At the moment, the farreaching question of whether, or under which conditions, metaphorical language about abstract concepts is understood via the simulation of the respective source-domain contents is an unresolved topic. Beate Hampe See also Cognition and Language; Communication and Language; Language Development; Language, Evolution of; Pinker on Language

Further Readings Bergen, B. (2013). Louder than words: The new science of how the mind makes meaning. New York, NY: Basic Books. Gibbs, R. W., Jr. (2006). Embodiment and cognitive science. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Hampe, B. (Ed.). (2005). From perception to meaning: Image schemas in cognitive linguistics. New York, NY: Mouton de Gruyter. Lakoff, G. (2007). The contemporary theory of metaphor. In V. Evans, B. Bergen, & J. Zinken (Eds.), The cognitive linguistics reader (pp. 267–315). London, England: Equinox. (Original work published 1993) Langacker, R. W. (1995). Viewing in cognition and grammar. In D. Philip (Ed.), Alternative linguistics: Descriptive and theoretical modes (pp. 153–212). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Benjamins.

Perception

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Motivation

The senses are affected by a huge amount of sensory input emitted by the physical world. Most of it is not consciously perceived; indeed, if humans were to perceive everything, they would be inundated by an overwhelming multitude of sensations. Only a portion of the sensory inputs are eventually transcribed into percepts or objects of perception. Traditionally, this transcription process was thought to be impermeable by higher order influences, motivation being one of them. But since the New Look era of the 1940s and 1950s, researchers have found that motivation can

Perception and Motivation

play a role in this process. This entry discusses the study of the effect of motivation on perception.

History The influence of motivations on perception can be traced back to Jerome Bruner and his colleagues’ research, which is often called the New Look in perception. In their famous study in which 10-yearold boys estimated coin sizes from memory by adjusting an iris diaphragm, the amount of overestimation was proportional to the monetary value of the coins. In another part of the study, when the boys held coins or equivalent-sized cardboard discs on their palms, the overestimation was observed only for coins, not discs. Further analyses showed that overestimations were particularly pronounced for boys from poor families compared with those from well-to-do families. In other words, the psychological value of the object influenced how size information was processed. Motivation organized perception. This section provides a review of how motivation changes (a) the style of perception, (b) its selective nature, (c) its limits, and (d) qualia. Note that in most lines of motivational inquiry, researchers sometimes study broad motivational states, and at other times, they examine specific emotions that have motivational components. There is no unifying theory that explains all phenomena; rather, each area of research is dominated by its own subset of theories.

Changing the Style of Perception One set of theories relates the influence of motivation to one’s perceptual style in terms of the focus of attention. An important aspect of perception is the way people perceptually distinguish wholes (a global focus) from their constituent parts (a local focus), such as whether one sees the forest or the trees. Global and local perceptual styles are typically studied with visual tasks in which a large letter, shape, or digit is composed of smaller letters, shapes, or digits. Similar effects may be obtained using comparable tasks from other sensory modalities. In a global focus, individuals take in the “big picture” of things, whereas in a local focus, individuals “zoom in” on the details. Each perceptual

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style is presumed to be functional in its own ways, supporting the individual’s goals within the context of his or her environment. Over the decades, researchers have found that whether the focus is global or local is affected by a variety of motivational factors. For example, a global focus is dominant when individuals are in a positive mood, high in power, thinking about love, or low in anxiety. In contrast, a local focus is dominant when individuals are in a negative mood, low in power, thinking about sex, and high in anxiety. Researchers have also proposed novelty, psychological distance, and regulatory focus as potential factors that may unify sometimes disparate findings. There is no consensus yet on which unifying factors are promising or even whether there can be a unifying factor in the first place.

The Selective Nature of Perception Following the New Look, investigators moved beyond examining low-level percepts to examining higher order percepts—that is, those embedded in social contexts. In a classic study, Dartmouth and Princeton students were asked to judge how rugged a football game played between the two schools had been after they viewed footage of the game. Students from each university formed more positive impressions of their own team and more negative impressions of the other team and selected snippets that favored their position. In another demonstration, participants were told that a computer would randomly assign them to drink delicious orange juice or unpleasant wheatgrass, depending on whether an outcome displayed on screen was a letter or a number. When an ambiguous outcome (B or 13) was flashed, people reported “seeing” B or 13 depending on their favored outcome. That is, if seeing B assigned them to the orange juice condition, participants were indeed more likely to see B, and vice versa. Like the original Bruner studies, the stimuli (the football footage; B or 13) were identical across participants, but the interpretation of the stimuli depended on participant’s desires, expectations, and intentions. Effects like these became known as motivated perception: people select what they want to “see.” (Note that this effect is not restricted to vision.) But there are instances where sometimes people do not want to “see” certain things, yet come to see

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them involuntarily. The cocktail party effect is a phenomenon in which people can follow a particular auditory stream (e.g., a particular speaker) while ignoring other potentially interfering auditory streams (e.g., other speakers). Using this dichoticlistening procedure, researchers observed that the participants’ own names were often noticed if they occurred in the ignored auditory streams. Such findings suggested that people have a lower threshold for stimuli that are high in self-relevance.

Changing the Limits of Perception Perceptual selection can operate at various levels. At a high level, motivation selectively influences perceptions in favored interpretations, shaping what people perceive (e.g., “Is it 13 or B?”). At a low level, a more rudimentary form of selection can occur—selection into consciousness—where motivational states influence whether people can perceive (or not). People are not always consciously aware of every sensation impinging on their sensory systems. This is sometimes due to limited processing capacity. For example, when two stimuli are presented in quick succession (the rapid serial visual presentation procedure), the second stimulus is normally not perceived because processing the first stimuli consumes available resources. This effect is known as the attentional blink. However, if the second stimulus is an emotional one, the attentional-blink effect is reduced, and the second stimulus is better detected. Emotional stimuli often connote survival-relevant information and therefore gain priority in processing. Nevertheless, individuals who have sufficient processing capacity and are paying full attention to the task at hand may still find detection difficult or even impossible when the physical intensity of the stimuli is very low. In any modality, perceptual detection depends in part on the contrast between the foreground and the background. Perceiving a stain, for instance, depends on how intensely colored the stain is (foreground) against the material (background). A black stain on white paper is easily detected but not so a faint gray on white paper. In certain motivational states, the perceptual system may be tuned to detect particular stimuli at lowered perceptual thresholds, such that only a tiny amount of physical input is needed to detect them.

For example, when people feel disgust, visualcontrast thresholds for signs of contamination (e.g., detecting black “impurities” against the “purity” of a white background) decrease; when they feel thirsty, detecting “shiny” surfaces indicative of the presence of water presence improves; when they feel fear, visual-contrast sensitivity increases; in ovulating women who potentially are motivated to seek mates, olfactory thresholds are lowered. These findings suggest that perceptual thresholds may have an evolutionary function, aiding survival or reproduction, for example. Although the perceptual system may already be finely calibrated, evidence suggests that the appropriate motivational state can extend the limits of perceptual capabilities.

Changing the Qualia of Perception Qualia are subjective experiences of sensory stimuli (e.g., the redness of red) that are separable from objective characteristics of the stimuli (e.g., the wavelength of “red” is 650 nm). It is difficult to understand the qualia of another person because qualia exist only as personal experiences. Because qualia are subjective, they are prone to top-down influences. The emerging study of how motivations change qualia involves what is known as metaphoric transfer strategy. According to this approach, manipulating psychological states (e.g., emotions) related to one domain changes how individuals process information in another domain in a way that is consistent with what the structure of metaphors implies. Linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson argued that the metaphors people use to understand abstract concepts are selected by repeated pairing with bodily sensations. For example, anger experiences typically co-occur with increased body temperature. Hence, this pairing over time results in the metaphoric structure “anger is heat,” which is why an angry person is described as being “hot-headed” or is urged to “cool off” in order to “dissipate” the anger. Lawrence Barsalou has argued that because abstract concepts are stored together with their sensory components as modal representations (perceptual symbols), when the abstract concept is activated, the associated sensory experience can be activated as well. Therefore, when thinking about

Perceptual Contrast

anger, individuals judge their surroundings as hotter. Similarly, feeling socially excluded (i.e., lonely) prompts people to judge their immediate surroundings as colder. Another line of inquiry deals with the adaptive value of qualia. Motives and emotions provide informational value about the resources one has to deal with features of the environment. The purpose of subjective experiences is to propel action— “perception is for action.” For example, fear signals to the individual that she or he has low resources relative to the demands of the situation. Therefore, while in fearful states, individuals judge hills as steeper, and this becomes a psychological barrier to attempting to climb them. Similarly, fearful individuals perceive sounds as louder and closer, presumably to prompt appropriate action.

Challenges Ahead Despite the evidence supporting the influence of motivation on perception, the idea remains contentious. One reason is that it is sometimes unclear whether the purported influence of motivation on perception indeed reflects changes in perception rather than bias in responding or demand characteristics. Because certain aspects of perception deal with mental content to which only the observer is privy, such as h qualia, how to best measure such aspects of perception remains unanswered. Moreover, the mechanisms by which motivation influences perception are not well understood. Kai Qin Chan, Rob W. Holland, and Ad van Knippenberg See also Attitude Formation and Change; Embodied Grounding; Emotion and Motivation; Epistemology and Sensation; Extended Mind; Motivation and Cognition; Perception and Epistemology; Terror Management Theory; Time Perspective Theory

Further Readings Balcetis, E., & Lassiter, G. (2010). Social psychology of visual perception. New York, NY: Psychology Press. Forster, J., & Dannenberg, L. (2010). GLOMOsys: A systems account of global versus local processing. Psychological Inquiry, 21, 175–197. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1080/1047840X.2010.487849

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Landau, M. J., Meier, B. P., & Keefer, L. A. (2010). A metaphor-enriched social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 136, 1045–1067. Zadra, J. R., & Clore, G. L. (2011). Emotion and perception: The role of affective information. Wiley Interdisciplinary Review of Cognitive Sciences, 2, 676–685.

Perceptual Contrast Perceptual contrast is a label used to describe different psychological phenomena. In general, it refers to phenomena in which the perceptual features of an element (the induced element) change because of the perceptual features of other contextual elements (the inducing elements), and this change goes in the direction of an exaggeration of the perceptual differences. This entry reviews two theories about perceptual contrast and offers three levels of explanation for perceptual lightness contrast. Examples of perceptual contrast can be found in all the sensory modalities (vision, taste, smell, hearing, touch) and for different features within each modality. For example, in vision, when two equal-sized discs are surrounded either by smaller disks or by larger disks, they do not appear of the same size. The first appears larger and the second smaller, and this occurs because the inducing elements (the surrounding discs) provoke perceptual contrast in the induced elements (the two central equal-sized disks). Another example can be found in the domain of temperature perception. If one hand is placed in a bowl of hot water and the other in a bowl of cold water, and then both are placed in a bowl of lukewarm water, the first hand will be perceived as cold and the second hand as hot.

Perceptual Contrast and Lightness Perception The dimension in which perceptual contrast has been most extensively studied in both empirical and theoretical terms is lightness perception. Lightness describes the perceptual intensity corresponding to the reflective physical features of a surface (reflectance) within the achromatic color

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range (black, white, and all the shades of gray). When one of two equally gray patches is placed on a white background and the other on a black background, the gray patch surrounded by white is perceived as darker than that surrounded by black. Each patch acquires a component that is complementary to the color of the inducing background, therefore accentuating their differences. This perceptual-contrast phenomenon is known as simultaneous lightness contrast (SLC) effect because the contrast is simultaneously induced in both patches by the two different backgrounds. An early description of the phenomenon was given by the Arab natural philosopher Ibn Al-Haytham (circa 965–1040), known as Alhazen. Although he was not the first—SLC had already been described by Aristotle—Alhazen claimed that lightness contrast was, in part, due to mental processes, in particular to a faculty of judgment involving a process called inference. In the second half of 19th century, two theories were proposed to explain SLC. The first attributed it to cognitive factors (a high-level account), such as learning and judgment, and used the term unconscious inferences to explain it. In the SLC display, the cognitive system assumes that the gray patch on the white background is under a more intense illumination than the equally gray patch lying on the black background. Because both patches actually reflect the same intensity of light, the former, by inference, is interpreted as being of lower reflectance, and this is how it is perceived. The second theory sought a more tangible, physiological mechanism as the cause, specifically, retinal lateral inhibition (a low-level account). According to this theory, the receptors stimulated by the white background send inhibitory signals to the receptors stimulated by the gray patch, causing its perceptual darkening. However, the receptors stimulated by the black background send little inhibition, and therefore, there is no darkening effect. The strength of inhibition depends on the distance between the gray patch and the white background. Inhibition drops off sharply with distance. The influence of these two theories can be found in current interpretations of SLC.  The  classical

lateral-inhibition explanation, which can be considered the prevalent one, was seriously questioned by Gestalt theorists. In the classic SLC display, all sides of the induced region border the same inducing region (black or white), and the lateral-inhibition explanation derives from this fact. But it is possible to obtain SLC even if this condition is violated. In Figure 1, the gray triangle between the arms of the black cross appears darker than the other triangle, even though both triangles border along the hypotenuse with white and along the catheti with black. This phenomenon has been explained according to the Gestalt principle of perceptual belongingness, which states that perceived contrast occurs among regions that “belong” to each other. The gray triangle lying on the arm of the black cross belongs to it, and therefore it is perceptually contrasted by its color, but the gray triangle placed between the arms of the black cross belongs to the white background, and therefore it is perceptually contrasted by its color. Perceptual belongingness and retinal lateral inhibition have been tested in direct competition, with the former prevailing over the latter in determining SLC.

Figure 1  Wertheimer-Benary Effect.

Perceptual Contrast

Perceptual Lightness Contrast: Low-Level Explanations According to low-level explanations, perceptual lightness contrast depends simply on luminance (i.e., the physical amount of light reaching a viewpoint from a given region of the optical array) distribution on the retina. Most of these models assume that lightness is encoded by banks of narrow-band spatial filters that are retinal and ­ cortical neurons, where receptive fields perform band-pass filtering operations on the distributions of luminance in scenes. Examples are the multiscale spatial-filtering models DoG (difference of Gaussian) and ODoG (oriented DoG). The kernels of the band-pass filters in the DoG model have a center-surround organization, such that the presence of luminance in the surround inhibits the center response to a target. The ODoG model is similar to the DoG model, except that it substitutes oriented spatial filters for filters with center-surround receptive-field organization. A different neural model of lightness computation, based on the principle of edge integration, was also proposed to account for lightness perceptual contrast. According to this model, edge integration is carried out at the cortical level by spatially integrating the responses of V1 neurons whose receptive fields are tuned to oriented contrast. All the low-level models fail to explain more complex perceptual contrast phenomena.

Perceptual Lightness Contrast: Middle-Level Explanations This level of explanation assumes that the luminance distribution on the retina is organized in frameworks (i.e., a collection of image patches that perceptually group with each other). The preeminent example is the anchoring model, based on the assumption that the highest luminance in a scene is perceived as white (the anchoring rule). According to this model, the SLC display can be seen as a single global framework composed of two local frameworks, one defined by the black background and the other by the white one. The gray target on the black background is the highest luminance in its local framework, and, according to the anchoring rule, it should be perceived as white.

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However, globally it should appear veridical because, in the global framework, there is a real white (the white background of the other local framework). The perceptual outcome is a compromise between these two predictions, and the gray target on the black background is perceived lighter than it is. These explanations introduce grouping principles in their account, but they also fail to explain more complex perceptual contrast phenomena.

Perceptual Lightness Contrast: High-Level Explanations High-level explanations assume that lightness is assigned to surfaces after the visual system has grouped them together according to the principles of perceptual organization and spatial articulation that act on their spatial relationships. Perceptual lightness contrast would then occur among surfaces that perceptually belong to each other. Perceptual spatial articulation has been defined as the result of (a) a perceptual-organization process that selects and highlights specific spatial relationships in a visual pattern and (b) perceptual belongingness as the result of a connection process unifying the ­specific perceptual attributes that arise from spatial articulation. This account assumes that spatial articulation is low when there are few different reflectances and simple spatial relationships and that it becomes greater when there are more areas with different reflectances or their spatial relationships are more complex (or both). Low spatial articulation determines univocal belongingness relationships, and high spatial articulation produces manifold belongingness relationships. Therefore, the lightness contrast induction in a region is the result of a weighted influence of one or more belongingness relationships. These accounts can explain more complex perceptual-contrast phenomena, but because they are founded on complex high-level cognitive processes, they lack a direct reference to anatomical and physiological bases. Tiziano Agostini See also Perceptual Illusions; Visual Perception

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Further Readings Cohen, J. (2015). Perceptual constancy. In M. Mathen (Ed.), Oxford handbook of the philosophy of perception (pp. 621–639). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Cong, Y., Klein, S. A., & Levi, D. M. (2004). Perceptual learning in contrast discrimination and the (minimal) role of context. Journal of Vision, 4, 169–182. Gilchrist, A. (2006). Seeing black and white. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Mallon, B., Redies, C., & Hayn-Leichsenring, G. U. (2014). Beauty in abstract paintings: Perceptual contrast and statistical properties. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 161. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00161 Soranzo, A., & Agostini, T. (2006). Photometric, geometric, and perceptual factors in illuminationindependent lightness constancy. Perception & Psychophysics, 68, 102–113.]

Perceptual Development Perception is an essentially multisensory process that allows an individual to obtain meaningful information about the surrounding environment. Perception operates in combination with an organism’s ongoing actions and, therefore, is an active process by which an individual acquires adaptive behaviors and rich, internal representations. Importantly, at birth, perceptual systems are relatively immature, and individuals are relatively naive about their world. As development proceeds, perceptual systems mature and help shape an individual’s cognitive skills and knowledge. This entry presents two essential facets of perceptual development: First, it reviews basic principles that characterize the changes in perceptual abilities early in life. Second, it discusses the current understanding of how factors both internal and external to the individual (e.g., genes and types of sensory experience) interact during development and how these interactions give rise to new perceptual skills.

Principles of Perceptual Development Researchers have used a variety of ingenious methods and measures to study perceptual development in infancy. These include behavioral measures such

as head turning, sucking, and visual fixation; physiological measures such as heart rate; and neural measures such as event-related brain potentials and functional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS). Overall, the findings indicate that perceptual ­abilities not only grow and improve during early development but are refined through a process of perceptual narrowing whereby some abilities ­paradoxically decline. Perceptual Growth: Increasing Resolution and Specificity

Many perceptual abilities are defined in terms of their precision—that is, the veridicality of the percepts they yield, given the sensory input. For example, visual acuity is 20/640 at birth, which means that an infant must be no more than 20 ft from a stimulus in order to see it as clearly as an adult can see it from as far away as 640 ft! Of course, visual acuity improves rapidly over the first few months of life as do many other basic skills, including the perception of motion, color, frequency, and pitch. Higher-level perceptual abilities also improve. A notable example is object completion. Often, individuals receive incomplete visual input for an object because another object is occluding it. Despite this, most people can “fill in” the missing sensory information and identify the partially occluded object. In contrast, newborn infants do not complete the object (even when it is a simple one), whereas 3- to 4-month-old infants begin to do so. Perceptual Narrowing

Despite the general improvement in perceptual ability in infancy, younger infants exhibit seemingly better perceptual abilities than older infants do. For example, 6-month-old English-learning infants can discriminate phonetic contrasts in their native language as well as they do in a nonnative language (e.g., English and Hindi). By 11 months of age, however, they discriminate only the native-English contrasts. This kind of perceptual narrowing also has been demonstrated in infant perception of other-race faces. At 3 months, infants can discriminate between other-race faces and between same-race faces, but

Perceptual Development

by 9 months they discriminate only between samerace faces. Finally, 6-month-old infants can perceive the intersensory unity of same- and other-species faces and vocalizations, whereas 8-month-old infants perceive only the unity of same-species faces and vocalizations. Overall, narrowing leads to a paradoxical decline in responsiveness to nonnative inputs and a concurrent emergence of perceptual expertise for ecologically relevant inputs, such as native language and same-race faces. It has been theorized that there may be a developmental advantage to beginning life with a relatively coarse and broadly tuned perceptual system. Such a system gives infants access to only a subset of the perceptual information available to adults. For example, poor visual-contrast sensitivity results in infants obtaining information about only the most salient luminance differences, such as the contrast of the white sclera and the dark pupil of the human eye, when observing others. Similarly, young infants respond primarily to low-level but foundational sensory attributes, such as synchrony, intensity, duration, and movement. Although such limitations constrain and limit the information that infants can process and encode, such information is sufficient to specify the basic organizational features of the world. As noted in various forms of the less is more hypothesis proposed by Elissa Newport and by Ronald Oppenheim and Gerald Turkewitz and Patricia Kenny, attention to low-level attributes of objects in the environment can guide processing resources to key aspects of the sensory input, thereby bootstrapping the acquisition of knowledge.

How Does Perceptual Development Occur? Development is a process characterized by complex, dynamic interactions between internal factors (e.g., genes, hormones, nervous system, etc.) and external factors (those in the environment). Therefore, nature and nurture both matter and profoundly interact with each other. Exquisite descriptions of how perceptual development unfolds abound in the field, whether conceived of as stages (e.g., the developmental theories of Jean Piaget) or as interrelated developmental events. A recurrent finding is that different abilities, be they perceptual or cognitive, exhibit distinct developmental trajectories.

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For example, the development of stereoscopic vision does not proceed at the same pace as the development of visual motion perception, and within the latter, the development of global motion perception has a different developmental trajectory and sensitivity to experience than does the perception of local motion. The proposal that development proceeds at a different pace for different perceptual skills has become a general principle that applies not just to perceptual but also to cognitive development. Timing of Experience

The same experiences, when encountered at different points in life, can have dramatically different effects. For example, changes in the tactile and verbal abilities of blind individuals critically depend on whether the individual became blind early or later in life. Early-blind individuals, who are typically defined as losing visual input before 2 years of age, exhibit enhanced tactile and verbal skills resulting from a reorganization of the visual cortex. These effects are not found in later-blind individuals even when they have been deprived of visual input for as long as early-blind individuals have. This suggests that the timing of visual experience during development is critical to the functional reorganization of the primary visual cortex and that maximal effects are delimited by a sensitive period. In other words, a developing system is most responsive to experience at specific time points during the life span of the individual. Perceptual systems can be reshaped beyond the sensitive period, however. A crucial demonstration of this principle comes from the development of ocular-dominance columns in the visual cortex. Classic studies demonstrated that perturbation of visual input early in life, as in the case of amblyopia, has a dramatic effect on the development of the columns, whereas perturbations later in life have a more subtle effect. As a result, treatment, such as forcing the amblyopic eye to respond by patching the nonamblyopic eye, is less effective in adults than in children. Yet research demonstrates substantial plasticity in the adult visual system following altered experiences, such as a prolonged period of total darkness or forcing the amblyopic eye to participate while

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playing video games. It is now clear that developmental changes outside sensitive periods are possible, albeit in a more restricted fashion and often requiring special circumstances or experiences. Altered Experience

Studies of blind and deaf individuals provide striking examples of how altered experience can shape perceptual development. For example, studies of congenitally blind individuals showed that they possess enhanced auditory attention. Conversely, peripheral-visual attention is enhanced in congenitally deaf individuals. As with the diversity seen in developmental trajectories, sensory deprivation can produce complex patterns of behavioral change, with improvements in some skills and deficits in others. Of course, deprivation of a specific type of input rather than of input from an entire sensory modality can also profoundly affect development. For example, studies of neonatal rats raised in zero gravity demonstrated that typical experience with gravity is essential for the development of vestibular and motor functions. Genes

Striking examples of how genes can influence perception can be found in the study of genetically engineered mice or naturally occurring mutations within the genes that code for sensory receptors. For example, there is wide variation in different individuals’ responses to scents and tastes. Natural genetic variations can explain whether one finds a scent pleasant or offensive as a function of which odor receptors are expressed during development. Unfortunately, the role of genes in higher perceptual skills is not as clear because of the levels of complexity that arise between gene expression and human behavior. For example, twin studies have shown that monozygotic twins exhibit more closely correlated face perception and language perception skills than do dizygotic twins. Although interesting, such findings are difficult to interpret because of the complex and fully bidirectional relationship between gene expression and environmental factors. Nonetheless, studies of epigenetics offer hope for elucidating these relations. Overall, it is now clear that the development of perceptual systems and their neural underpinnings

is shaped by the dynamic and complex interactions between the current state of the individual (which includes that individual’s genetic endowment), his or her past history and experience, and the individual’s current environment. Developmentally relevant factors operate simultaneously at many levels of organization, including the genetic, hormonal, neural, behavioral, and environmental. The current challenge for developmentalists is to unpack the mechanisms underlying the coactions of all these factors and determine how they give rise to specific developmental outcomes. Lauren Emberson, David Lewkowicz, and Daphne Bavelier See also Childhood; Nature Versus Nurture; Perception and Cognition; Perception and Language; Perceptual Contrast; Perceptual Illusions

Further Reading Bavelier, D., Dye, M. W. G., & Hauser, P. (2006). Do deaf individuals see better? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10, 512–518. Lewkowicz, D. J. (2011). The biological implausibility of the nature-nurture dichotomy and what it means for the study of infancy. Infancy, 16, 331–367. Lillard, A. S., & Erisir, A. (2011). Old dogs learning new tricks: Neuroplasticity beyond the juvenile period. Developmental Review, 31, 207–239. Scott, L. S., Pascalis, O., & Nelson, C. A. (2007). A domain-general theory of the development of perceptual discrimination. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 16, 197–201. Turkewitz, G., & Kenny, P. A. (1982). Limitations on input as a basis for neural organization and perceptual development: A preliminary theoretical statement. Developmental Psychobiology, 15, 357–368.

Perceptual Disorders Perception provides the means to access and engage with physical and social environments. It comprises all activities involved in the recording, processing, and coding of sensory information, including cognitive (e.g., attention, memory, and executive control) and emotional components (affective evaluation). The neurobiological

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foundation of perception depends on the morphological and functional integrity of the respective sensory systems and their cerebral structures. Information processing and coding occur in peripheral and central sensory systems that are networked components. Sensory cortical areas are specialized in processing and coding of specific elements of sensory information and are segregated into two superordinate pathways, the “where pathway” for the analysis of spatial information and the “what pathway” for object information. Perceptual disorders can arise from peripheral and central sensory dysfunction and include impaired detection, localization, discrimination, and identification or recognition. Alterations of perception, resulting from the dysfunction of the peripheral or central components of sensory systems, may be classified as either negative ­ (impairments or losses) or positive (illusions and hallucinations) symptoms. This entry describes and classifies visual, auditory, somatosensory, olfactory, and gustatory perceptual disorders that result from the dysfunction of peripheral and central sensory systems.

Vision Peripheral (Prechiasmatic) Disorders

This category of disorders reflects the dysfunction of the eyes or the optic nerves or both and can affect visual field, visual acuity, contrast sensitivity, and color vision. Squint, retinitis pigmentosa, and age-related macular degeneration are among the most frequent causes. Amblyopia is a common visual disorder in children, which also interferes with the development of processing properties in the visual cortex. Strabismic amblyopia refers to visual blurring in one eye due to vergence deficiency (i.e., one eye may turn in, out, up or down). Deprivation (occlusion) amblyopia develops when one eye is deprived of visual input because of cataracts. Refractive (anisometropic) amblyopia results from large or unequal degrees of refractive errors in both eyes (e.g., greater farsightedness or astigmatism). Typical consequences of amblyopia include reduced visual acuity, contrast sensitivity, and stereoacuity in the affected eye, as well as impaired binocular vision, stereopsis, and fine form and text processing.

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People with retinitis pigmentosa show progressive visual field constriction in both eyes (“tunnel vision”), leading to difficulties with global vision, visual-spatial orientation, scene perception, and text processing, despite normal visual acuity in many cases. Age-related macular degeneration (AMD) is the most frequent cause of vision loss in those aged 65+ years and primarily affects the central (macular) region of both eyes. During its course, subjects progressively lose visual acuity and contrast sensitivity and experience gray or dark “spots” in the central visual field—that is, in the direction of their sight. Central (Postchiasmatic) Disorders

About 30% of patients with acquired posterior (occipital, occipito-temporal, and ­occipito-parietal) brain injury suffer from visual disorders. The most frequent (~60%) negative symptom is represented by homonymous visual field disorder (hemianopia, upper or lower quadranopia, paracentral ­scotoma), with more than 80% of cases showing unilateral homonymous visual field loss. Patients usually have difficulty in global processing of scenes (overview and scanning) and in text processing ­ (hemianopic dyslexia) when visual-field sparing is less than 5° and 8° to the left and right of the fovea, respectively. After bilateral postchiasmatic injury, visual ­acuity can be normal, partly diminished, or lost (< 0.01) but cannot be improved by optical correction. When spatial contrast sensitivity is impaired, patients usually complain of “blurred” or “foggy” vision despite normal visual acuity, accommodation, and convergence. Color vision may be impaired (cerebral dyschromatopsia) or lost (cerebral achromatopsia). Patients with cerebral dyschromatopsia find it difficult to discriminate fine color hues and may show impaired color constancy. In cerebral achromatopsia, patients cannot see colors and discriminate between hues anymore, although discrimination between grays may be possible. Visual-spatial disorders typically occur after occipito-parietal and posterior parietal injury. Visual-spatial localization may be moderately affected after unilateral posterior brain injury, whereas bilateral posterior brain injury may cause severe difficulties that typically affect all visually

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guided activities, including accurately fixating on objects, oculomotor scanning, reaching for objects, and reading and writing. Defective monocular and binocular depth perception (astereopsis) has been observed in patients with unilateral and bilateral posterior brain injury, with bilateral injury causing more severe deficits. Impaired depth perception may cause difficulties in pictorial depth perception, walking (down stairs), and reaching for objects or handles. Shifts in the vertical and horizontal axes and in the subjective straight-ahead direction (subjective midline) to the contralateral side have been observed, particularly in patients with right occipito-parietal injury, but right-sided posterior parietal injury can cause ipsiand contralateral shifts in the subjective midline. Loss of visual motion perception is known as cerebral akinetopsia. The well-known case of patient L.M. showed persistent selective loss of movement vision in all three dimensions after bilateral temporo-occipital injury. L.M. could not see biological-motion stimuli, including facial movements in speech reading, and her actions requiring movement vision were similarly impaired. Visual agnosia refers to the inability to identify, recognize, interpret, or comprehend the meaning of visual stimuli despite sufficient visual functions, but objects can be recognized in the auditory and tactile modalities, and the disorder cannot be explained by supramodal cognitive or by aphasic deficits. Pure visual agnosia is the exception rather than the rule, and is typically caused by bilateral occipito-temporal injury but may also occur after left- or right-sided posterior brain injury. Martha Farah has proposed a useful classification of visual agnosia according to the type of visual material that is difficult for patients to identify and recognize. Patients with visual-object and visual-form agnosia are unable to visually recognize forms, complex objects or pictures, or living and nonliving objects. In face agnosia (prosopagnosia), recognition of familiar faces, including one’s own face, is impaired or lost. Topographical (topographagnosia) or environmental agnosia refers to defective recognition of familiar environments in reality and on maps and pictures. Agnosia for letters (pure alexia) is a form of acquired dyslexia with defective visual recognition of letters and words, although auditory recognition of letters and words remains intact. Patients

with (bilateral) posterior brain injury may find it difficult to process several stimuli in parallel or many global features of an object and integrate them into a whole percept (integrative or simultaneous agnosia). Positive Symptoms

Visual illusions are characterized by illusory perception of a real visual stimulus and may affect its position and distance, color, size, form, and movement. In contrast, visual hallucinations refer to visual perceptions without a concomitant stimulus—for example, stationary or moving light spots, color surfaces, geometric forms, objects, faces, animals, and scenes. Visual illusions or hallucinations originating from brain injury are usually identified by patients as unreal. Nonorganic Visual Dysfunction

Visual complaints without a pre- or postchiasmatic pathology of the visual system are subsumed under the terms nonorganic, psychogenic, or functional visual loss. Persons with nonorganic visual loss may present with tunnel vision, as well as reduced visual acuity and contrast sensitivity.

Audition Peripheral Disorders

Dysfunction of the peripheral auditory system (ear, acoustic nerve, and brain stem) arising from genetic disorders, premature birth, infection, exposure to loud noises, trauma, or tumor can cause impairment or even loss of hearing (deafness) because of impaired processing of sound frequencies and poor temporal resolution. Age-related hearing loss (presbycusis) is characterized by decreased hearing sensitivity and difficulties in understanding language in a noisy environment and is generally caused by degenerative processes of the peripheral and central auditory systems. Central Disorders

Unilateral and bilateral injury to temporal-lobe structures can impair processing and the perception of auditory stimuli with respect to their spatial and temporal characteristics and their quality

Perceptual Disorders

(environmental sounds, tunes, or prosody) but can also cause “higher-level” auditory disorders—for example, central deafness and auditory agnosia. Auditory agnosia is defined as the impairment or loss of recognition of auditory stimuli in the absence of defective auditory functions, language, and cognitive disorders. Auditory agnosia has been reported for environmental sounds, speech (pure word deafness), and music. Dissociations of auditory perceptual deficits—for example, preservation of speech perception and environmental sounds but impairment of melody perception, impaired speech perception but intact environmental sound perception, or impaired perception of verbal but not nonverbal stimuli—suggest a modular architecture of the auditory brain. Positive Symptoms

These are mainly reported due to abnormal activity in the afferent auditory system or auditory cortex, particularly in elderly people. Examples are tinnitus, which is characterized by “phantom” sounds, musical hallucinations, and hyperacusis, which is a reduced tolerance of ordinary environmental sounds and voices. Both tinnitus and hyperacusis can also coexist with hearing loss.

Somatosensory Perception Peripheral Disorders

Impaired somatosensory perception, including proprioception (position sense), touch (tactile perception), perception of temperature (thermoception), and pain (nociception), is caused by the dysfunction of peripheral somatosensory nerve fibers (peripheral neuropathy). Tactile detection and discrimination thresholds are increased in the fingers at ages above 65 years, thus reducing tactile recognition. Central Disorders

Impairments of somatosensory perception and haptic and body perception have been reported after injury to the postcentral gyrus, including somatosensory areas SI and SII, and the posterior parietal cortex. Perceptual consequences include difficulties with tactile object identification (tactile

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agnosia) and disorders of body perception (asomatognosia), wherein parts of the body are reported as missing or without body awareness. Positive Symptoms

Misperception of the body may be associated with a deranged representation (illusion) of the body concerning its ownership (somatoparaphrenia). Tactile hallucinations may occur after acquired injury to somatosensory brain structures but may also be present in psychotic disorders.

Olfactory and Gustatory Perception Peripheral Disorders

Elevated thresholds for the detection and discrimination of olfactory (hyposmia) and gustatory stimuli (dysgeusia) have been reported in several pathophysiological processes (e.g., chronic rhinosinusitis, traumatic injury, and toxic exposures). In the extreme case, patients may completely lose their olfactory (anosmia) and gustatory (ageusia) senses. Central Disorders

Olfactory perception can be impaired after brain injury by alterations in the detection, discrimination, and identification or recognition of olfactory stimuli. Disorders in olfaction are reported in older age, in neurodegenerative diseases (Alzheimer dementia, Parkinson’s disease), in disorders with dopaminergic pathology (e.g., schizophrenia, autism, and ADHD), depression, and psychotic disorders. Gustatory disorders, involving hypogeusia or dysgeusia, are commonly found after subcortical (left) insular and frontal lobe injury. Gustation decreases with age (above 40 years) and is more pronounced in men. Positive Symptoms

Olfactory distortions refer to the quality of an odorant stimulus (troposmia) or to the perception of an odor when no odor is present (phantosmia or olfactory hallucination). Both symptoms may result from peripheral dysfunction but can occur also in temporal lobe epilepsy and in psychotic disorders. Olfactory perceptual distortions are

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suggested to be an early Parkinsonian symptom. Olfactory distortions can also occur during the course of the menstrual cycle when stimulus intensity is enhanced, and odors may be perceived as novel or more complex. Gustatory hallucinations have been reported in patients with temporal lobe disease, migraine, and psychotic disorders. Josef Zihl See also Auditory Perception; Perceptual Development; Sensory Disorders; Visual Perception

Further Readings Bamiou, D. E., Musiek, F. E., & Luxon, L. M. (2001). Aetiology and clinical presentations of auditory processing disorders: A review. Archives of Disease in Childhood, 85, 361–365. Farah, M. (2000). The cognitive neuroscience of vision. Oxford, England: Blackwell. Farah, M. (2003). Disorders of visual-spatial perception and cognition. In K. M. Heilman & E. Valenstein (Eds.), Clinical neuropsychology (4th ed., pp. 146– 160). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Martin, G. N. (2013). The neuropsychology of smell and taste. London, England: Psychology Press. Yantis, S. (2013). Sensation and perception. New York, NY: Worth. Zihl, J. (2014). Perceptual disorders. In K. Ochsner & S. M. Kosslyn (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of cognitive neuroscience (pp. 193–21). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Perceptual Illusions Perceptual illusions are percepts that depart from veridicality. They are important, ubiquitous, and surprising. With the notable exception of James J. Gibson (1904–1979), who argued that an excessive emphasis on illusions deeply misled a whole scientific tradition toward an indirect representational approach to perception, most theorists hold that illusions play an important role in psychology. Being errors, illusions highlight the limitations of “finite individual minds” to evoke the classic definition of the object of psychological science offered by William James (1842–1910) in the preface to his Principles of Psychology.

Therefore, studying nonveridical as well as veridical instances of perception should enhance understanding of observer–environment interactions. This entry illustrates the different meanings of “perceptual illusions,” their phenomenological variety, and their theoretical relevance. Its content is inspired by Kurt Lewin (1890–1947), who warned his contemporaries about the concept of illusion belonging to an Aristotelian mode of thought. By contrast, a Galilean attitude requires balanced attention to illusory and veridical percepts, distinguishable on epistemological but not psychological grounds, given that processes leading to both types of percept are likely the same. The scientific revolution pivots around the idea that perceptual illusions are ubiquitous and well beyond the beliefs of naive observers, as argued by Galileo Galilei in The Assayer, written in 1623: “To excite in us tastes, odors, and sounds I believe that nothing is required in external bodies except shapes, numbers, and slow or rapid movements. I think that if ears, tongues, and noses were removed, shapes and numbers and motions would remain, but not odors or tastes or sounds.” The more that is known about the physical world, the deeper and wider the gap between appearance and reality becomes. Perceptual illusions are also surprising, as they are “cognitively impenetrable” (an expression coined by the philosopher of mind, Jerry A. Fodor)—that is, not modifiable by knowledge of the actual state of affairs. Expert observers, aware of the fallibility of the senses, experience illusions as effectively as naive observers. Illusory and veridical percepts all belong to what the Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Metzger (1899–1979) called “the encountered” reality, as experienced by an observer. In the words of another Gestalt theorist, Wolfgang Köhler (1887–1967), all percepts are—independent of their veridicality—“phenomenally objective” to observers who also conceive of them as “genetically subjective.”

Three Meanings of Perceptual Illusion Three meanings of the expression “perceptual illusion” should be distinguished: M1: An illusion occurring in perception (during the presentation of external stimuli) rather than in memory (when external stimuli are no longer available)

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M2: A nonveridical effect due to perceptual functioning rather than to the external stimuli M3: A percept characterized by the phenomenal character of nonveridicality, as opposed to percepts that actually are nonveridical but appear to be as objectively true as veridical ones

Regarding M1, illusory conjunctions are a borderline effect at the interface between perception and memory. When a set of colored letters is displayed for a few tenths of a second, “true lies” frequently occur: The color of one letter can migrate to the position occupied by a different letter, and the observer reports having seen a red P when the displayed P was actually green, and redness belonged to C displayed elsewhere. An illusory conjunction may be conceived as a perceptual illusion revealed by a memory task, performed after the disappearance of a briefly displayed complex pattern that overloaded encoding processes. A genuine memory illusion is obtained instead in the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) procedure. The participant is asked to remember a list of spoken words such as the following: bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, wake, snooze, blanket, doze, slumber, snore, nap, peace, yawn, drowsy. Then, when recalling the words, the participant is likely to report also the word sleep, which was absent from the list but strongly associated with all the words it included. False recall and false recognition are incredibly frequent in the DRM procedure and are accompanied by the subjective feeling of remembering specific details of the presentation, such as features of the voice uttering the not-presented word. This is to say that the phenomenology of illusions includes experiences detached from stimulus presentation, like false memories that can share with veridical memories a high degree of phenomenal objectivity. With respect to M2, the broken stick in water is not a perceptual illusion, despite the fact of being appraised through direct perception. The loss of collinearity of the two segments of the stick, below and above water level, is fully explained by optics and simply registered by the visual system. On the contrary, the increased size of the horizon moon is an M2 perceptual illusion, given that the distal (physical) size as well as the proximal (projected)

Figure 1 The Café Wall Illusion. The effect is paradoxical, given that the global perception of converging/ diverging lines coexists with the analytic observation that all squares are equal. The gray lines between squares play an important role in determining the illusion of convergence/ divergence, which is consistent with the combination of local effects related to contrast polarity.

size of the moon are constant, independent of their position in the sky. For M3, the negative afterimage that follows the prolonged fixation of a high-contrast patch is a visual illusion perceived as phenomenally subjective, mainly because its spatial position is locked to gaze (i.e., to sensorimotor exploration). Another effect perceived an anomalous, because of its internal inconsistency, is the café wall illusion (Figure  1), where the mind tolerates the “visual oxymoron” instantiated by the paradoxical coexistence, against naive geometry, of lines that appear to converge or diverge and squares that appear to maintain a constant size. Restricting the domain of perceptual illusions to instances covered by M3 would be too restrictive, but phenomenal veridicality and nonveridicality certainly define a relevant dimension, like actual veridicality and nonveridicality in M2.

General and Specific Illusions Perceptual illusions are found at the level of global perceptual experience and of its specific properties (color, shape, motion). At a general level, the expression illusion of reality refers to a theme central to all representational art and technology but in particular to cinema and virtual reality—that is, to the possibility of reproducing an artificial world in which an observer is captured with a variable

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degree of immersion. Equally general is the notion of a hyperillusion of visual-scene richness associated with the hypothesis that the experienced abundance of details and distinguishable objects of ordinary visual scenes is illusory, not unlike the light inside the refrigerator. With reference to specific properties, perceptual science often uses illusions as compelling phenomena that convey a simple theoretical message and illustrate a particular perceptual mechanism. In the café wall illusion (Figure 1), a fundamental geometric property, parallelism, is lost when black and white square tiles are arranged in an unbalanced fashion. The take-home message is that even the simplest geometric properties can be misrepresented when low-level coding mechanisms distort the content of the input image.

A Classification Approach To cope with the variety of perceptual illusions, one may use a classification system such as the 4 × 4 matrix suggested by Richard L. Gregory (1923– 2010), which is based on two orthogonal factors: “kind of appearance” and “cause.” The four kinds of perceptual appearance—ambiguity, distortion, paradox, fiction—correspond to different ways in which a verbal expression can depart from the ideal of a univocal and veridical sentence (such as the descriptive statement “it is raining,” when water drops are actually falling from clouds to the ground). The structural parallelism between perception and language is built on the assumption that perceiving is representing. In other words, perceptual experience is a description based on sensory labels (visual, acoustic, tactual, olfactory, and so on) that are qualitatively different from the verbal ones but equivalent to them as means for depicting at least some features of real objects, relationships, and actions. Like pictures and sentences, percepts can be veridical (true) or not (false). Ambiguities

The duck–rabbit, extensively discussed by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), is a single graphic image that can be perceived in two mutually exclusive ways. This is just one famous example of a category of perceptual phenomena

structurally similar to syntactically ambiguous sentences such as, “Flying planes can be dangerous,” in which the mind (once both interpretations have been discovered) oscillates between one meaning and the other. Ambiguous figures such as the duck–rabbit or the Necker cube are clearly puzzling. But are they illusions? Despite some controversy on the matter, one should admit that ambiguous figures reveal— to say the least—that all perceptual experience involves a deceptive component, consisting in the illusion of being in direct contact with an external object, whereas the observer is in contact only with signs of the presence of such an object. These signs are univocal most of the time but not so infrequently are plurivocal. In particular, visual ambiguities demonstrate that the optical input is a set of signs, capable of assuming more than one meaning, in contrast with a basic (but fallacious) belief of naive realism: “Given a viewpoint, every object corresponds to a unique image and every image to a unique object,” Whereas the first proposition is true, the second is not. Distortions

Classic geometrical optical illusions belong to the category of distortions. In the Müller-Lyer illusion—a paradigmatic distortion of length— arrowheads decrease, whereas arrow tails increase the perceived extension of a segment. Quantitative distortions resemble what happens in the rhetorical device called hyperbole (exemplified by “He’s miles taller than she”). Any object property can be perceptually distorted with respect to the veridical value measured in a control condition. Take the motion aftereffect known as the waterfall illusion. If one fixates rocks and trees with a nonadapted eye, one will see them as stationary. Instead, if one looks at them after having been staring at a point in the middle of a large waterfall for a minute, one will perceive rocks and trees moving upward. Actual immobility is distorted in a direction opposite to the adapting stimulus. Paradoxes

Both the café wall illusion and the waterfall illusion are paradoxical and can be qualified as M3

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perceptual illusions, being comparable to a linguistic oxymoron such as “hot ice.” In the waterfall illusion, a compelling sense of motion in the adapted region of the visual field coexists with the awareness that rocks and trees inside and outside the adapted region do not change their relative position. Visual phenomenology tolerates such an absurdity, consistent with the idea that motion and position are separately coded in the visual system. An even more striking visual paradox is the socalled devil’s fork, or blivet, which is a 2-D image containing fragments of 3-D information that force the visual system to generate two incompatible objects: a set of three cylinders and a rectangular U-shaped bar. Inspection of Figure 2 makes clear the graphic basis of this visual paradox. Each line is a locally plurivocal sign, corresponding to either the edge of an occluding surface (with the background on its left or right) or the corner of a concave/convex dihedron. The blivet conveys a surprising message: Despite global inconsistency, the visual system does not

reject the 3-D interpretations supported by local cues. The linguistic analogue of the blivet is a sentence such as, “More people have been to Paris than I have,” which is syntactically acceptable but constitutes a semantic dead end.

Figure 2 Blivet (Devil’s Fork). The drawing is incompatible with a single 3-D interpretation. Graphic features (lines and junctions) are compatible with the perception of a U-shaped 3-D bar in the upper part and with three cylinders in the lower part, but the two solid shape interpretations cannot be reconciled. For instance, the second oblique line from left is perceived as an occluding edge belonging to a material cylinder in the lower part of the picture and as a convex corner where two flat faces meet in the upper part.

Figure 3 The Illusory Triangle Designed by Italian Psychologist Gaetano Kanizsa (1913–1993). Line endings and black sectors induce the perceptual presence of an occluding triangle that looks brighter than the background, despite the absence of a local stimulus difference along two thirds of its contour. The anomalous lightness difference can be attributed to the formation of a unitary occluding shape, required by the amodal completion of the three line corners into a single outline triangle and of each black sector into a full disk.

Fictions

Perceptual objects may exist in the absence of local stimulus support. Consider the illusory Kanizsa triangle in Figure 3. The bright, occluding triangle, only partially specified by a local stimulus difference along its contour, is phenomenally clear, almost as a triangle fully bounded by real contours. In this case, the departure from veridicality consists in the production of an object devoid of an obvious stimulus counterpart and in the generation of a color difference not supported by a local intensity step in the distribution of light reaching the eye. Proprioception provides a more dramatic case of fictional perception. Amputees frequently report a phantom limb, where sensations that cannot originate from stimulation of a lost part of the body are nevertheless illusorily localized.

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Causes of Perceptual Illusions The first class of causes of perceptual illusions considered by Gregory and other theorists is physical, such as refraction in mirages and in the brokenstick-in-water phenomenon. Once such possible explanations are ruled out by careful experimentation—as when the moon illusion is ­ reproduced in a lab setting—the best candidate cause (or combination of causes) is selected according to a hierarchical mechanistic model. To explain visual effects, Gregory considered low-, mid-, and high-level vision, corresponding to mechanisms such as bottom-up signal coding, rule application, and top-down object-hypothesis instantiation, respectively, each capable of generating nonveridical as well as veridical effects belonging to each kind of appearance. Physiological low-level mechanisms explain paradoxes like the waterfall illusion and fictions like negative afterimages, both dependent on sensory adaptation and distributed coding of basic stimulus properties like motion and spectral composition. Midlevel rule-based mechanisms are the likely cause of an irresistible demonstration by Edward H. Adelson shown in Figure 4. The picture reproduces everyday situations in which the amount of light coming from a shadowed surface is exactly equal to the amount of light coming from a fully illuminated surface. In reality, this

equality is possible only if the illuminated surface is darker than the shadowed one. Remarkably, perceptual mechanisms perceive surface color as if the illumination falling on it were discounted, as suggested by the German physicist, physiologist, and perception scientist Hermann von Helmholtz (1821–1894). Even more remarkably, the equality of stimulus intensities of A and B regions also is not accessible to the awareness of a fully informed observer. Figure 5 shows the tabletop illusion by Roger N. Shepard, a geometric counterpart of the photometric illusion in Figure 4. Even poor pictorial cues (oblique lines, contour junctions) elicit the perception of a 3-D structure that masks the geometric congruence of the two lower tabletops. Their apparent diversity is an illusion due to perceptual rules applied to construct solid objects out of input images (analogous to rules applied to reconstruct surface color under different illuminations). The similarity between the upper- and lower-right tabletops is also illusory. Perceptual illusions that appear as fictions and are attributable to high-level, top-down processes are typically labeled as cases of pareidolia, as hearing mysterious messages in records played in reverse, seeing ghostly shapes in clouds and flames, or strange facial expressions and various landscapes in walls with a mixture of different stones, as reported by Leonardo da Vinci in his notebooks on painting. Walter Gerbino

Figure 4 Adelson’s Checkershadow Illusion. A appears much darker than B, even though the intensity of light reaching the eye from the two regions is the same.

Figure 5 Shepard’s Tabletop Illusion. The lower right tabletop looks much more similar to the upper than to the lower left one. Geometrically, the two lower gray parallelograms are identical.

Performance Management See also Cognitive Illusions; Embodied Cognition; Perception and Art; Perception and Cognition; Perception and Culture; Perceptual Disorders; Visual Perception

Further Readings Adelson, E. H. (2000). Lightness perception and lightness illusions. In Gazzaniga, M. S. (Ed.), The new cognitive neurosciences (2nd ed., pp. 339–351). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Bronfman, Z. Z., Brezis, N., Jacobson, H., & Usher, M. (2014). We see more than we can report: “Cost free” color phenomenality outside focal attention. Psychological Science, 25(7), 1394–1404. http:// dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797614532656 Calabi, C. (Ed.). (2012). Perceptual illusions: Philosophical and psychological essays. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Lier R. van, & Gerbino, W. (2015). Perceptual completions. In J. Wagemans (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of perceptual organization (pp. 294–320). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Shapiro A., & Todorovic´, D. (Eds.). (in press). The Oxford compendium of visual illusions. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Performance Management Performance management is a continuous process of identifying, measuring, and developing individuals or teams and aligning their performance with the strategic goals of an organization. Like a compass, the purpose of performance management is to provide orientation as well as direction. It shows both one’s actual direction and one’s desired direction. Similarly, the job of the manager is to identify where an employee is at the present as well as to focus effort and attention on the desired direction. This entry discusses necessary elements of effective performance management, including clear communication of expectations, setting goals, performance review, and plans for improving performance. Performance management should be much more than a once-a-year performance review. Rather, it should be an everyday part of a high-performance organizational culture. Organizational culture, in turn, refers to the environment in which employees

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work on a day-to-day basis. It has been described as the DNA of an organization—invisible to the naked eye but critical in shaping the character of the workplace. Culture is the basic pattern of assumptions a given organization has invented, discovered, or developed in learning to adapt to its internal and external environments. That pattern has worked well enough to be considered valid and therefore to be taught to new members of the organization as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel. According to Joanne Martin, it is transmitted through mechanisms such as the following: •• Formal statements of organizational philosophy and the materials used for recruitment, selection, and socialization of new employees •• Promotion criteria •• Stories, legends, and myths about key people and events •• What leaders pay attention to, measure, and control •• Implicit and possibly unconscious criteria that leaders use to determine who fits key slots in the organization

Research has found that the most effective performance goals are those driven by business strategy. This seems logical, because in the absence of a close tie to business strategy (i.e., the means that firms use to compete for business in the marketplace, such as innovation, customer satisfaction, cost leadership, or speed), individuals may develop skills and abilities that are not helpful in achieving high organizational performance. Worse yet, they may not develop their skills at all. At a general level, Pulakos and colleagues identified three regular and ongoing activities that contribute to effective performance management: 1. Communicating expectations on a regular basis 2. Providing feedback in real time whenever exceptional or poor performance is observed 3. Helping employees develop expertise that maximizes their potential (p. 3)

Although the descriptions are slightly different, the same three elements are reflected clearly in the American National Standard from the American

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National Standards Institute on performance management. The standard emphasizes that all three elements can be applied broadly to small as well as large organizations of all varieties and structures and to individual as well as team performance. In the language of business, the standard is therefore “feasible at scale.” The three minimum elements of an effective performance management system are as follows: 1. Goal setting: the process of establishing objectives to be achieved over a period of time 2. Performance review: the process of assessing progress toward goals 3. Performance improvement plans: the process of addressing a specific, individual-performance issue (p. 7)

Goal Setting Goal setting has a proven track record of success in improving performance in a variety of settings and cultures. Studies show that goals direct attention to the specific performance in question (e.g., percentage of satisfied customers), they mobilize efforts to accomplish higher levels of performance, and they foster persistence for higher levels of performance. On average, goal setting improves performance by 10%. The most effective goals are SMART: specific, measurable, achievable (or attainable), relevant (or realistic, reasonable), and time bound. In addition, effective goals are participative (both the individual and his or her manager should be involved in the development of goals to ensure understanding and commitment). Effective goals also are documented, flexible enough to account for changing conditions, monitored (with progress acknowledged), and aligned with an organization’s philosophy, vision, and mission statement. These findings seem to hold across cultures, not just in the United States, and for groups or teams, as well as for individuals. When articulated well, goals communicate clearly what is important in a given job, how that job links to the broader strategy or mission of an organization, and what an employee needs to do to accomplish the goals. Although it might appear that goal setting is appropriate in every employment situation, some thinking questions that

assumption. Specifically, goal setting for knowledge- and service-based jobs, which are fluid and unpredictable, is frequently more challenging. Further, jobs in research and development do not lend themselves to goal setting at all, because it is often impossible to predict what discoveries will occur and when. Under those circumstances, effective performance management behavior requires setting ongoing expectations (in the form of behavioral standards, objective results, or task/project goals) and near-term goals as situations change.

Performance Review As noted earlier, performance review is the process of assessing progress toward goals. Feedback, or information about one’s efforts to improve, is a key feature of this process and serves as a personal development tool. However, the mere presence of performance feedback does not guarantee a positive effect on future performance. In fact, metaanalyses published in the past two decades have shown that, overall, feedback has a positive effect on performance but also a negative effect. Three conclusions from research findings bear notice. One is that more feedback is not always better. A 10-month field study of the behavioralsafety performance of factory employees found that providing feedback once every 2 weeks was about as effective as providing it once a week. Second, immediate feedback may not be appropriate for all learners. Withholding feedback from more experienced learners can help them think more critically about their own performance and, as a result, improve retention and generalization. Third, to be accepted by performers as accurate, feedback should include positive information first, followed by negative information (not vice versa). Several factors drive the need for more frequent and more effective feedback: enhanced technology, the growing numbers of members of the so-called Millennial Generation in the workforce, and high performers in every generation. To be effective, feedback needs to be provided regularly when it makes sense to do so, not only once or twice a year during formal reviews. Informal, continuous feedback is most valuable. Important differences between formal and informal feedback include the following:

Performance Management

•• Formal feedback occurs in sit-down meetings (typically infrequently). It addresses work that is conducted over time: multiple performance events and competencies. •• Informal feedback occurs spontaneously whenever discussion is needed. It focuses on specific incidents—what went right or wrong and what to do differently. It relies on two-way accountability and interaction.

Understanding the value of informal feedback and recognizing opportunities to provide it helps managers and employees take advantage of learning opportunities that occur as part of day-to-day work. Whether feedback is formal or informal, however, the effectiveness of the overall process depends on the quality of the manager–employee relationship. Trust is a prerequisite for effective feedback and coaching. Leaders can build trust by making realistic commitments, following through on promises, keeping others informed, showing support and avoiding blame, sharing information, and protecting those not present. When measurement is part of training, it is critical to provide clear standards for a rating scale and to calibrate raters on a common standard. Regardless of the type of format used to review an employee’s performance, clear definitions of each possible level of performance are essential. Providing raters with examples of behaviors, skills, measures, and other relevant performance factors assists them in assigning the appropriate level of performance of each employee. Moreover, it is critical that the management team be consistent (reliable) in its ratings—across raters, different departments, and jobs. To be effective, rater training for employees as well as managers should include, at a minimum, information about steps in the performance review process, timelines, expected outcomes at each step, and specific allocation of follow-up responsibilities. To ensure that raters have a common frame of reference about the relative effectiveness of different behaviors within performance dimensions, role playing and facilitated discussions are considered best practices.

Performance Improvement Plans Performance improvement plans (PIPs) are appropriate for employees who may be new to a role or

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who are uncertain about performance expectations, as well as for those who regularly are not meeting expectations and who therefore might be starting down the road to discipline. PIPs include three processes: feedback, goal setting, and documentation. It is important to note that the futureoriented emphasis in PIPs seems to have the most beneficial effects on subsequent performance. Feedback alone is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for sustained behavior change. It also is essential to establish mutually agreed-to and formal goals. Goal setting affects performance because it establishes direction, focuses effort in proportion to the difficulty of the goal, and fosters persistence toward difficult goals. It is critical to document the overall PIP process in order to facilitate performance discussions, record concerns and ways to correct them, and ensure a written record for legal or decision-making purposes. The format of a PIP varies across employers, but it should include the following, according to the American National Standards Institute: •• Employee information •• Relevant dates (PIP start date and duration, frequency of progress reviews) •• Description of expected performance •• Description of actual performance (specific and factual, not hearsay or opinions) •• Description of consequences (expectation of sustained performance, extension of time to correct the problem, job reassignment, termination) •• Plan of action (mutually agreed-to, formal goals) •• Signatures of the manager and employee •• Monitoring and evaluation of the plan of action and overall PIP

The Role of the Manager: A Case Study

As reported by Adam Bryant in the New York Times, through its Project Oxygen, which was designed to identify and build better bosses, Google found that effective leadership is synonymous with effective performance management. By analyzing performance reviews, feedback surveys, and nominations for managerial awards, the company identified eight habits of highly effective managers and three pitfalls that hamper success. What employees valued most were even-keeled bosses who made

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time for one-on-one meetings, helped them solve problems by asking questions rather than by dictating answers, and took an interest in their lives and careers. Surprisingly, the manager’s ability to perform technical work ranked last among the top eight behaviors. Conversely, the three pitfalls were managers who had trouble transitioning to the team (i.e., difficulty empowering it rather than micromanaging), lack a consistent approach to performance management and career development, and spend too little time managing and communicating. Managers, as well as employees, need training to understand, practice, and become comfortable with their roles in the feedback and development process. Training for both groups should include topics such as building trust, strategies for communication, ongoing expectations and feedback, and developing through experience. In addition, managers need training in topics such as how to communicate the big picture (whole-organizational and unit-level strategies), diagnosing and addressing performance issues, and skills in communicating constructive feedback and in coaching.

are satisfied with the process, percentage of employees who improve their performance following reviews 3. Risk management—for example, losses from poor customer service and lower productivity, departures of pivotal talent, and increased vulnerability to charges of unfair discrimination

To assess the implementation of performance management systems, experts recommend ongoing monitoring. Regardless of the type or size of an organization, its success depends on the performance of individuals and teams. To maximize that success, performance management must be much more than just performance appraisal. Ideally, it is an ongoing process tightly linked to strategic and operational objectives. Wayne F. Cascio See also Employee Motivation; Employee Satisfaction; Personnel Development; Personnel Evaluation; Personnel Selection; Training and Personnel Development; Workforce Psychology

The Role of the Employee

Further Readings

Employees are not passive players in the performance management process. Rather, their role is to ensure that expectations and performance standards are clear, actively seek feedback, and use feedback to develop their skill sets.

Aguinis, H. (2009). Performance management (2nd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall. American National Standards Institute. (2012). Performance management standard. Alexandria, VA: Society for Human Resource Management. Bryant, A. (2011, March 12). Google’s quest to build a better boss. New York Times. Retrieved from http:// www.nytimes.com/2011/03/13/business/13hire .html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 Cascio, W. F., & Aguinis, H. (2011). Applied psychology in human resource management (7th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Cascio, W. F., & Boudreau, J. W. (2012). Short introduction to human resource strategy. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Kluger, A. N., & DeNisi, A. S. (1996). The effects of feedback interventions on performance: Historical review, a meta-analysis, and a preliminary feedback intervention theory. Psychological Bulletin, 119, 254–284. Locke, E. A., & Latham, G. P. (2013). New developments in goal setting and task performance. New York, NY: Routledge.

Evaluation and Monitoring To assess the overall impact of the performance management process, the American National Standards Institute recommends three broad categories of measurement: 1. Efficiency—for example, the percentage of employees receiving regular performance reviews, percentages of managers completing their reviews properly and in a timely manner, cost and time spent on performance reviews 2. Effectiveness—for example, the percentage of performance reviews with clear goals, percentages of managers and employees (especially, top performers in both groups) who

Personality, Heritability of Martin, J. (2002). Organizational culture: Mapping the terrain. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Pulakos, E. D., Mueller-Hanson, R., O’Leary, R., & Meyrowitz, M. (2012). Building a high-performance culture: A fresh look at performance management. Alexandria, VA: Society for Human Resource Management.

Personality, Heritability

of

Personality is characterized by the typical ways in which people think, feel, and behave. For example, some people are more outgoing than others; some are prone to anxiety and worry, whereas others are fairly emotionally stable; some enjoy taking risks, but others prefer to play it safe. Clearly, personality varies among individuals. But what causes these differences in personality? This question evokes the age-old debate about whether nature (i.e., genes) or nurture (i.e., environments) is more important in shaping personality. In recent decades, behavior-genetic studies have used twin and adoption designs to partition the variation in personality into the relative amounts of genetic and environmental contributions. These studies generally show that variation in personality is influenced about equally by genetic and environmental factors. The first section of this entry introduces the heritability statistic, which quantifies the proportion of variation in a trait that is attributable to genes and explains how the heritability of personality is inferred from twin and adoption studies. The second section shows that even though the heritability of personality has generally been found to be around 50%, heritability estimates may, in fact, change across different environments. This section also discusses the findings of moleculargenetic studies that search for the specific genetic variants underlying personality.

The Heritability Statistic: What It Means and Where It Comes From The proportion of variation in a trait explained by genetic differences among individuals is called the heritability of that trait. Heritability statistics refer to populations, not individuals.

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Thus, when researchers point out that the heritability of personality is 50%, they are saying that in the population from which they sampled, half of the total variation in personality is associated with genetic variation between people. This does not mean that 50% of any given individual’s personality is genetic. Moreover, a heritability statistic refers to a specific population at a particular time, because heritability can vary between populations (e.g., between men and women) and across time. Apart from the heritability statistic, researchers also measure the magnitude of environmental variation in a trait whereby they distinguish between the shared environment and the nonshared environment. The shared environment includes all environmental influences that make members of the same family similar to one another (e.g., household income). Nonshared environmental factors consist of environmental influences that make family members different from one another and could include distinct peer groups, recreational activities, and occupations, as well as measurement error. Estimates of heritability, the shared environment, and the nonshared environment come from adoption and twin studies. For example, shared environmental influences are responsible for resemblances between adopted children and their adoptive parents, whereas behavioral similarities between adopted children and their biological parents are due to genetic effects. Twin studies infer the size of genetic effects from the fact that identical twins share 100% of their genes, but fraternal twins share only 50% of their genes, on average. When twins are reared together in the same household, both identical and fraternal twins share aspects of the family environment that are fixed, by definition, to be equal among family members (e.g., household income) to the same extent. Given this definition of the family environment and known levels of genetic relatedness, genetic effects on personality can be estimated by comparing the amount of resemblance between identical twins versus fraternal twins. For example, if identical twins are found to be more similar to each other than fraternal twins are similar to one another, this would implicate a genetic influence on personality.

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Is the Heritability of Personality Always Fifty Percent? Traditionally, studies of personality had consistently found that normal-range personality has a heritability of around 50%, with the remaining variation largely attributable to nonshared environmental effects (shared environmental influences had been found to be around zero after childhood). Also, these findings seemed to hold across different personality traits. But gene-by-environment interaction studies indicate that the heritability of personality is not static but, in fact, varies across different environments or situations. For example, adolescents’ personalities have been found to reflect their genes more strongly when their relationships with their parents are good. When their relationships with their parents are bad, adolescents’ personalities reflect influences outside the family home. These types of gene-byenvironment interaction studies are gaining appeal among researchers, and future studies of this kind will continue to elucidate how the heritability of personality changes across additional contexts. Another development in personality psychology is that molecular-genetic studies are attempting to locate the specific genes that influence personality. This work is in its infancy, and few well-replicated findings have been reported. Moreover, the genes identified explain a mere fraction of the total variation in personality—much less than the large genetic variation suggested by twin and adoption studies. These findings likely indicate that the total genetic influence on personality reflects the cumulative effects of many genes, each with a tiny individual effect. This recognition means that large sample sizes will be needed to identify the very small effects of the many genes influencing personality. Nayla R. Hamdi, Robert F. Krueger, and Susan C. South See also Behavioral Theories of Personality; Culture and Personality; Factor Analysis and Personality Theory; Personality Development; Personality Traits Versus Situations

Further Readings Bouchard, T. J., Jr., & Loehlin, J. C. (2001). Genes, evolution, and personality. Behavior Genetics, 31, 243–273.

Krueger, R. F., & Johnson, W. (2008). Behavioral genetics and personality: A new look at the integration of nature and nurture. In L. A. Pervin, O. P. John, & R. W. Robins (Eds.), Handbook of personality: Theory and research (3rd ed., pp. 287–310). New York, NY: Guilford Press. Krueger, R. F., South, S., Johnson, W., & Iacono, W. (2008). The heritability of personality is not always 50%: Gene-environment interactions and correlations between personality and parenting. Journal of Personality, 76, 1485–1522.

Personality, Measurement

of

Personality measurement (PM) is a special case of psychological measurement, the primary objects of which are the noncognitive attributes that constitute relevant sources of individual differences between people. In most cases, these attributes are unobservable and convenient abstractions called constructs (e.g., extraversion or conscientiousness) that cannot be measured directly but instead can be inferred from measurable manifestations called construct indicators or measures. Thus, to be talkative or to have many friends are indicators of the extraversion construct. The main goals of PM are (a) to numerically describe what a person is like and (b) to predict how the person would behave in important nontest situations. As well as being of theoretical interest, these goals are highly relevant to applications, such as personnel selection, vocational guidance, counseling, and clinical diagnosis. A theoretical background is required if personality attributes are to be appropriately measured, and this entry describes some of the basic points of that background: in particular, (a) the types and properties of the personality indicators and the strategies used to construct the measurement instruments; (b) the basic assumptions about the relations between the constructs and their indicators, together with the leading psychometric theories that formalize these relations; and (c) the main problems involved in measuring personality constructs and future possibilities for overcoming them.

Historical Notes Woodworth’s Personal Data Sheet, a clinical scale created in 1919, is generally regarded as the

Personality, Measurement of

earliest modern personality measure. It was followed in the 1930s and 1940s by a series of measures that were deemed successful, and the endeavor started to gain in popularity after World War II. This popularity decreased abruptly in the 1960s due to a series of criticisms based on the invalidating effects of response sets (see below) and remained low throughout the 1970s and 1980s, mainly because, at this time, it was widely thought that situational factors were the main determinants of behavior. In the 1990s, PM reemerged as an important topic, mainly in the domain of personnel selection and, despite some criticism, is still ­popular. Some of the features of this “new wave” of PM are an improved theoretical basis and betterconstructed measures.

Measures: Types, Properties, and Construction Strategies Good PM is characterized by a rigorous adherence to psychometric principles in order to attain (a) valid inferences about the indicators–constructs relations, (b) accurate measurement of the constructs, and (c) valid evidence regarding relevant relations with other construct measures, external variables, or criteria. To fulfill these requirements, indicators need to be of the highest quality possible. However, even if it is valid, a single personality indicator has a large amount of measurement error, so personality measures are generally composites consisting of multiple indicators. When all the indicators measure the same single construct, the measure is said to be unidimensional. When the measure contains indicators of more than one construct it is termed multidimensional. The main types of personality indicators are (a) observations, (b) self-reports, (c) informant or peer reports, and (d) objective measurements. They all generally assess what the individual most often does or feels in a given situation or class of situations, and for this reason, they are qualified as typical-response measures. By far the most used personality measure is a questionnaire or inventory made up of multiple self-report indicators. These indicators are called items and are usually short statements (item stems) that are answered on a response scale (item format) that can be binary (e.g., Yes or No), graded (e.g., a 5-point Likert scale), or continuous. For example, consider the item stem “Are you shy?”

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with the binary response format No = 0, Yes = 1, as an indicator that is part of a unidimensional questionnaire measuring Introversion. Because they should be influenced to a substantial degree by the construct they measure, indicators are expected to be adequately correlated (i.e., to display high internal consistency). At the same time, however, they are expected to cover the most important content that defines the construct. It is generally difficult to attain both objectives satisfactorily. This problem is known as the bandwidthfidelity dilemma, and it is resolved by finding a trade-off between the characteristics and purposes of the measure. Thus, a measure of a narrowly defined construct intended to provide accurate predictions in a restricted range (e.g., a measure of test anxiety) emphasizes fidelity (i.e., consistency) at the expense of bandwidth. On the other hand, a measure of a broad construct, such as neuroticism, that is intended to be used mainly for descriptive purposes generally sacrifices internal consistency to gain bandwidth. The strategies used to select the set of indicators that constitute the measure can be grouped into three main classes: (a) deductive (logically or theoretically derived indicators), (b) inductive (indicators that are empirically selected, generally by using statistical techniques), and (c) external (indicators selected to maximize the relation with a relevant external variable). Strategy (c) is appropriate if the measure is to be used for purely predictive purposes. In general terms, however, the best approach is a combination of the deductive and inductive strategies.

Some Theoretical Bases and Measurement Models The most common framework for PM can be summarized in three points. First, personality constructs are conceived as affective-temperamental continua (dimensions or traits). Second, the relations between the constructs and their indicators are probabilistic (i.e., the construct influences the response to the indicator but never totally determines it). Third, the probabilistic relations between the constructs and their indicators are assumed to be governed by a dominance or cumulative process: The higher the level in the construct, the higher the expected score in the indicators.

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For example, consider again the item “Are you shy?” (No = 0, Yes = 1) as an indicator of the construct introversion, defined as a continuous trait. The more introverted the respondent is (i.e., the higher the trait level), the more probable it is that she or he will endorse the “Yes” option (i.e., select 1 instead of 0). Probabilistic cumulative measurement models of personality arise from three main theoretical frameworks: classical test theory (CTT), linear factor analysis (FA), and item response theory (IRT). In CTT and FA, the indicator–construct relations are assumed to be linear, and the precision with which the construct is measured (reliability) is assumed to be the same at all construct levels. These assumptions are convenient simplifications, so CTT- and FA-based models are necessarily approximate. CTT models are purely descriptive; however, FA is a falsifiable model, which means that its appropriateness can be assessed by conducting a model–data fit investigation. In spite of their limitations, the simple linear models have served well (most of the existing, well-designed personality measures have been developed from a CTT or FA framework) and are still useful. Like FA, IRT models are falsifiable—that is, the appropriateness of both the model and the model assumptions can be empirically assessed. Under the IRT framework, however, the indicator–construct cumulative relations are assumed to be nonlinear (usually S-shaped), and the precision with which the construct is measured (test information) is ­generally different at different levels. These assumptions are more plausible than the linear simplifications are, so IRT models are more complex but theoretically more correct. Their main potential advantages are that (a) they provide more accurate estimates of both the position of the individual in the construct (i.e., the individual score) and the corresponding standard error of measurement, and (b) under appropriate restrictions, the indicator indices are independent of the particular sample that is assessed, and the individual estimated score is independent of the particular pool of indicators that is used. The first advantage is particularly important if the individual scores are used for clinical ­assessment or for making impactful decisions (e.g., personnel selection). The second is useful for (a) constructing more efficient tests adapted to individual levels

and administered by a computer, (b) comparing individuals who have taken different measures; and (c) in cross-cultural or multiple-group studies, assessing whether the measurement properties of the indicators are the same in different populations or groups defined—for example, by gender and ethnicity. Overall, their theoretical superiority and potential advantages mean that IRT models are increasingly being used in PM.

Limitations and Advances The theoretical bases discussed in this entry might not be appropriate for certain attributes or individuals. On the one hand, some clinical personality constructs might not function as dimensional traits but as categories (taxons), but others might function as quasi-traits (i.e., they are relevant in only one direction). For these types of attributes, approaches to measurement other than those discussed here should be considered. On the other hand, individuals might vary in the extent to which a construct is relevant to them (a concept called traitedness), and some constructs might be totally irrelevant for certain “untraited” individuals, which would make the measurement process meaningless. In general, however, the dimensional approach in which the construct is generally relevant to all the individuals is considered to be appropriate for most personality constructs, especially broad, universal, normal-range constructs. A second, more specific group of limitations is related to the most widely used indicators in PM: self-reported items. The response to this type of measure can potentially be affected by determinants other than the constructs to be measured. This “contamination” might (a) distort the relations between the constructs and their indicators, (b) reduce the accuracy with which the constructs are measured, and (c) reduce or distort the relations between the measures and other relevant variables (including prediction). Some potential unwanted determinants are (a) idiosyncratic item interpretation; (b) unmotivated or unsympathetic responding; (c) idiosyncratic response scale usage, mainly the tendency to use the middle regions of the scale (middle responding) or the extremes (extreme responding); (d) acquiescence, or the tendency to agree with the item stem regardless of its

Personality Development

content; and (e) faking or socially desirable responding (the distortion of the responses in order to provide a more favorable image). Factors (c), (d), and (e) are generically known as response sets. In contemporary PM, it is assumed that all the factors just listed can potentially be relevant and must be taken into account. However, in a well-designed measure, the primary response determinants are expected to be the constructs that are intended to be measured. Advances in PM aim to overcome the limitations just mentioned, and three particular developments are worthy of mention. First, alternative measurement models are being developed that are intended for constructs that cannot be appropriately characterized as dimensional. Second, improved, more sophisticated IRT models make it possible to (a) obtain better items and (b) reduce the impact of unwanted determinants or obtain additional measures to quantify these determinants (e.g., person-fit indices that quantify inconsistency at the individual level). The third development is the exploration of potential alternatives to or auxiliary indicators other than self-reported items, for example, ­objective measures. Pere J. Ferrando See also Factor Analysis and Personality Theory; Personality Testing; Personality Traits Versus Situations; Personality Traits Versus Personality Types

Further Readings Angleitner, A., & Wiggins, J. S. (1886). Personality assessment via questionnaires. Berlin, Germany Springer-Verlag. Boyle, G. J., Matthews, G., & Saklofske, D. H. (2008). The Sage handbook of personality theory and assessment: Vol. 2. Personality measurement and testing. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Cronbach, L. J. (1990). Essentials of psychological testing. New York, NY: HarperCollins. Ferrando, P. J. (2012). Assessing inconsistent responding in E and N measures: An application of person-fit analysis in personality. Personality and Individual Differences, 52, 718–722. Reise, S. P., & Henson, J. M. (2003). A discussion of modern versus traditional psychometrics as applied to personality assessment scales. Journal of Personality Assessment, 81, 93–103.

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Personality Development The malleability of personality is often debated by philosophers, explored in detail by novelists, used to shape public policy by lawmakers, and served up as discussion points by (mostly) well-meaning relatives. Is character set in stone, unable to be shaped by the slings and arrow of life? Is change possible at any point in the life span, although a relatively rare occurrence unless one desires to change or undergoes a meaningful life experience? If change is possible, can it happen overnight, or is it a slow and gradual process, mostly outside the realm of consciousness? This entry discusses findings from longitudinal studies of personality that have matured to the extent that these questions can be addressed and theories put forth about the factors that influence consistency and change in personality. Sigmund Freud fell on the side of limited change, with the vast majority of one’s character being shaped by age 5 after completing the Oedipal stage of development. Theorists gradually adjusted upward the age that personality change may occur. William James proposed that personality develops throughout young adulthood and then is effectively “set like plaster” by age 30 once a person has experienced the major life events of adulthood, such as starting a family and entering into a career. In contrast, Gordon Allport stated the personality was capable of being shaped throughout the life span, though most of the experience occurs during childhood and young adulthood. Erik Erikson proposed that development continued throughout the life course, with the most tumultuous time occurring in adolescence. More contemporary theorists echo the life span approach where change occurs throughout the life span, though some theorists put more emphasis on childhood and young adulthood as the time periods that are more ripe for change. In contrast to the grand theories of Freud and Erikson, however, contemporary personality development theories rely more on empirical data and thus consist of narrower theories concerning the malleability of personality.

Types of Continuity and Change In the last 20 or so years numerous longitudinal studies have made it possible to empirically address

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consistency and change in personality. Unfortunately, one of the difficulties in addressing the when and why of personality development is that there are many ways to define consistency and change. For example, one of the main ways to estimate consistency is through a rank ordering of individuals in a population over time. In contrast, mean-level change refers to increases or decreases in the absolute levels of personality across time and does not concern the relative ordering of individuals. More conceptualizations of change exist than these two, with each relatively independent from the others. In the past, different conceptualizations have created a misunderstanding about when and how much personality development occurs across the life span, leading some theorists to focus on the consistency of personality and others to focus on its malleability. As with most aspects of life, the truth probably falls in the middle. Personality traits demonstrate moderate levels of rank-order continuity, even from childhood to early adulthood. The magnitude of continuity tends to increase with age, reaching a plateau between ages 50 and 70 and then dropping off in later adulthood. In terms of mean-level changes, modest changes occur throughout the life span, with the majority of these occurring in young adulthood and then again in older adulthood. Mean-level changes during young adulthood have been interpreted as reflecting increases in maturity, when people tend to increase in those characteristics related to agreeableness and conscientiousness while decreasing in neuroticism. Although the year-to-year mean-level changes are modest, compounding across the life span yields changes in the range of 1 standard deviation. Important to note is that not everyone follows the normative trends to increase in maturity and not everyone changes at the same time.

Processes Shaping the Consistency of Personality Research has made it quite clear that personality is open to change at all ages in the life span. Why do change and consistency occur? Consistency of personality reflects both stable and transactional factors in addition to stochastic components, which serve to decrease consistency in personality. Stable

factors mainly reflect the influence of genetics, which contribute to the consistency of personality across time as demonstrated by various longitudinal twin studies. However, the same behaviorgenetic studies also indicate that environment contributes a nonnegligible component to the stability of one’s personality. This idea has been described as an envirotype, where, much like one’s genotype, the environment stays relatively constant across time, resulting in greater consistency in personality. For example, after the demographically dense period of young adulthood, most individuals have a relatively stable life in terms of the city they live in, the friends they interact with, their occupation, and their family. These social roles exist objectively in terms of the physical environment but also subjectively as integral parts of one’s self-concept. By viewing oneself through a particular lens (e.g., devoted husband), the self can ward off possible changes in personality by interpreting objectively different life experiences as constant with its typical experiences. Another component that serves to increase continuity in personality is person–environment transactions. Generally, the environments people enter into and experience during their lives are not due to chance. Rather, different types of person–environment transactions influence the types of experiences people encounter, which may promote both consistency and change in personality. One type of person–environment transaction is niche seeking, where people select experiences consistent with their personality, such as people high in extroversion choosing more social jobs. Along with niche-seeking transactional processes, people can influence how others behave around them by evoking responses that are consistent with their personality. For example, agreeable individuals tend to be warm to others and thus will likely receive warm responses from individuals in return. Other person–environment transactions may also shape one’s lived world, as when people attend only to aspects of the environment consistent with their personality or manipulate their environment to better suit their personality. Together, these person–environment transactions tend to result in greater consistency in personality by entering similar experiences across time.

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Processes Leading to Changes in Personality An important finding that guides the search for processes of personality change is the existence of individual differences in personality trait change. These rule out the possibility that meanlevel changes exist solely because of a genetic predisposition for everyone to change. Instead, individual differences in change imply that personality development results, at least partially, from life experiences. If a large number of people have a particular experience, then mean-level changes are expected to occur, whereas not ­having the experience would lead to individuals countering the normative trend. Although individual differences in personality trait change are not disputed, there are still a number of unanswered questions concerning what experiences are important for personality trait development and how these experiences lead to change. The leading theory is the social investment principle, which states that personality trait change occurs in response to expectations and contingencies embedded in the major age-graded social roles shared across most cultures (e.g., employee, spouse). Personality change is thought to occur investment in and commitments to these roles, where each person comes with certain expectations of how one should behave. As a result of this investment, part of one’s identity consists of membership in the role and commitment to the changes in one’s identity that it entails. Moreover, behavioral changes may be punished if they do not conform to the demands of a particular role. For example, beginning one’s first job entails a number of new behaviors, such as arriving on time and following a boss’s orders. Not following these expectations can lead to lower wages or termination. Consistent with these concepts, entrance into work and relationship roles is associated with changes in personality traits during young adulthood. The sociogenomic model of personality traits expanded on the axioms of the social investment principle in an effort to describe the general processes involved in personality trait development. Together they posit that change results from the prolonged behavioral changes that follow investment in a certain role. The model asserts that

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the environment leads to changes in personality through the influence of state-level manifestations of personality—the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that constitute personality. Over time, state-level behaviors result in broader changes in personality traits through a bottom-up process, including slow changes to neurophysiology as well as one’s identity. Unfortunately, few studies systematically test these processes, and, as a result, it is unknown how long one must engage these state-level experiences or whether engaging them completes the process. It is possible that merely behaving in a trait-consistent manner does not lead to changes in personality unless those behaviors are integrated into one’s identity. Thus, it may not be simple to change someone through the application of extrinsic rewards. What experiences are associated with personality change? As mentioned previously, experiences associated with the roles of social living, such as finding a marital partner, starting a family, and establishing a career are associated with personality change. Other related experiences, such as retiring and getting a divorce, are also related to it. In contrast to role-defined experiences, a host of other types of experiences can result in changes. For example, a lower probability of changes in agreeableness is associated with those who serve in the military than with those who do not enter the military. Health-related experiences have also been associated with personality changes. Joshua J. Jackson See also Behavioral Theories of Personality; Culture and Personality; Existential Theories of Personality; Freud’s Psychosexual Stage Theory of Personality; Humanistic Theories of Personality; Metatheoretical Issues in Personality Psychology; Personality Testing; Personality Traits Versus Situations; Personality, Measurement of; Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Personality

Further Readings Fraley, R. C., & Roberts, B. W. (2005). Patterns of continuity: A dynamic model for conceptualizing the stability of individual differences in psychological constructs across the life course. Psychological Review, 112(1), 60–74.

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Jackson, J. J., Thoemmes, F., Jonkmann, K., Lüdtke, O., & Trautwien, U. (2012). Military training and personality trait development: Does the military make the man, or does the man make the military? Psychological Science, 23, 270–277. Neyer, F. J., & Lehnart, J. (2007). Relationships matter in personality development: Evidence from an 8-year longitudinal study across young adulthood. Journal of Personality, 75, 535–568. Roberts, B. W., & Jackson, J. J. (2008). Sociogenomic personality psychology. Journal of Personality, 76, 1523–1544. Specht, J., Egloff, B., & Schmukle, S. C. (2011). Stability and change of personality across the life course: The impact of age and major life events on mean-level and rank-order stability of the Big Five. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101(4), 862–882.

Personality Disorders The questions of how one’s personality develops, what makes individual personalities different, and how one’s personality becomes disordered has been of great interest since before psychology was formally recognized. Religious leaders, philosophers, and psychological scientists, among others, have developed theories of personality and personality disorders. Although they vary greatly, nearly all theories consider personality to develop over time. When this development is impaired or d ­ isrupted in some way, personality may become disordered. This entry describes the following categories of theories: (a) psychodynamic/object relations, (b) person-centered/humanistic, (c) cognitive, and (d) biopsychosocial.

Psychodynamic/Object Relations Theory Psychodynamic theories of personality disorders come from the work of Sigmund Freud, Alfred Adler, and Carl Jung, among others. The primary assumption of these theories is that individual personality develops out of the dynamic interaction between a person’s underlying core drives, desires, and internal fantasies or mental representations of people and experiences. Object relations is the term used to describe the way in which a person’s relationships are shaped by core drives and

internalized concepts of other people. Individuals are loyal to the internal representations of the world they have developed through interactions with parents and significant others, making them difficult to change. When the core drives are maladaptively managed by the person’s defense style, or when internal fantasies/representations conflict with reality, a personality disorder may develop. For example, the narcissistic personality disorder arises from a conflict between an internal dependency on others (i.e., the desire to be loved) and a fear of inferiority (i.e., others fail to see one as special), together with an external defense style of grandiosity and insensitivity to the needs of others. Based on this theory, treatment for personality disorders attempts to bring unconscious desires and fantasies into consciousness. Once conscious, the focus is on reconciling the conflict between these desires or fantasies and the external reality. This may be a very long process whereby the disordered individual uncovers unconscious desires and reconciles them with reality in the context of a supportive and nondirective relationship with the therapist. The strengths of these theories are that they are intuitive, they acknowledge the influence of unconscious processes, and they are able to explain many personality disorders. However, because they rely so heavily on the unconscious, they are difficult to test empirically. Also, the explanations they provide of different disorders often do not specifically address one disorder or another. Psychodynamic treatment requires frequent therapy visits, is long lasting (sometimes for years), is expensive in comparison to therapies based on other theories, and is difficult to objectively evaluate.

Person-Centered/Humanistic Theory Person-centered/humanistic theories of personality were initially championed by Carl Rogers and have many similarities to religious practices, particularly meditative religions such as Buddhism. Humanistic theories propose that personality develops as a function of the desire to meet essential human needs and create a self-identity. Most of life is spent trying to develop this identity and align it with one’s subjective awareness.

Personality Disorders

However, most people are considered to be only partially aware of their subjective experience. This is because many basic needs must be met before a person can expand conscious awareness of self and others. For example, Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs outlines need levels starting with the most basic physiological needs (e.g., food), then moves through safety, love and belonging, self-esteem, and, finally, self-actualization. The latter occurs when the person is most fully and consciously aware of his or her own needs and capacities. This full consciousness is the recognition of one’s true identity. Personality disorder comes about when a mistaken identity is developed. In this case, substantial parts of the self-image are fabricated and not aligned with actual needs, consciousness, or the awareness of others. A disordered individual may believe that he or she has found true identity, when she or he is, in fact, functioning on the basis of constricted awareness. According to this theory, an individual with obsessive-compulsive personality disorder might constrict the awareness of needs for love and belonging in the context of self-identity because of an extreme focus on safety. As a responsible, scrupulous person, the individual has made it vital to maintain safety through compulsive adherence to rules and standards. Because this adherence to rules never fully satisfies the need for safety, awareness of the need for love is constricted. Treatments based on person-centered/humanistic theory focus on recognizing and validating the individual client’s experience. The therapy is s­ upportive, nonjudgmental, and does not directly challenge the client’s thoughts, feelings, or beliefs. Clients are responsible for discovering their own identity and consciousness. This is similar to i­ndividuals uncovering unconscious desires in ­psychodynamic ­therapy, although person-centered psychotherapies are less intensive, and the therapist acts only as a support and not as an authority. The merits of the person-centered/humanistic theories are similar to those for psychodynamic theory. They are both intuitive, focusing on basic needs and strivings that everyone can understand. They both recognize the role of the unconscious, but person-centered/humanistic theories also place emphasis on consciousness and personal volition as means for achieving growth and personality

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adjustment. These theories also recognize the influence of basic biological and social influences on personality development. The limitations of the person-centered/humanistic theories of personality are that they are difficult to test empirically (the theories tend to be difficult to operationalize) and valid measurement of the mismatch between true identity and mistaken identity is problematic. In addition, these theories imply that all people are “disordered” at some point because they are functioning at a suboptimal level of consciousness.

Cognitive Theory The cognitive theory of personality, and of psychological disorder more broadly, comes from the work of Aaron Beck and others. This theory focuses on cognitive processes, primarily at the level of thoughts, as fundamental to personality development. Thoughts and beliefs form schemas (i.e., ways of interpreting the world) that are the basic units of personality. Schemas bias the information an individual takes in from the environment and how he or she interprets the information, including emotional interpretation. Personality traits, in the form of behavioral strategies, are external manifestations of the schemas. In most cases, schemas are adaptive, allowing one to take in relevant information, ignore distractions, interpret information in an emotionally meaningful way, and take appropriate action. However, if the schemas are extremely rigid or imperative, they make an individual vulnerable to biased interpretations, problematic emotional responses, and the inflexible use of overdeveloped behavioral strategies. For example, a rigid belief that the world is unsafe, unfair, and out of one’s control may lead to an avoidant personality disorder. The overdeveloped and rigid strategy for dealing with chronic and pervasive anxiety around others is to anticipate and avoid any social risks, whether real or perceived. Typical strategies of engaging in casual, expressive communication remain underdeveloped, which further contributes to disordered personality. Cognitive therapy for personality and other disorders focuses on altering maladaptive (i.e., rigid) thoughts, schemas, emotions, and patterns of behavior. This approach first identifies the network

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of thoughts and beliefs that are linked to problematic feelings, behaviors, or other outcomes. Beliefs are explored and challenged, and new thoughts and behaviors are tested. Such efforts might involve examining evidence for or against a belief, identifying alternative explanations for an event, or making predictions and testing them. One strength of the cognitive theory is that it can be empirically tested. Change in observable patterns of behavior can be measured following direct intervention with conscious thoughts and behavioral strategies. Conscious thoughts as a mechanism of the disorder are easier to identify and actively change than unconscious processes, as are observable patterns of behavior. However, with this strong focus on schemas, cognitive theory provides a less explicit consideration of unconscious processes. Biological and social influences are considered as contributing factors, especially in ­ dialectical behavior therapy (DBT), a skills-based cognitive-behavior therapy designed to treat ­borderline personality disorder.

Biopsychosocial Theory A biopsychosocial theory of personality takes into account biological (i.e., genes, hormones, brain structure), psychological (thoughts, beliefs), and social (family environment, interpersonal relationships) influences on the development of personality and personality disorders. The biopsychosocial theory is based on an integration of scientific information across disciplines and is less tied to specific theorists. According to the theory, the unique combination of biological, psychological, and social influences leads to the development of personality over time. Any one of the influences or their combination can constitute a vulnerability to, or protection from, a personality disorder. For example, genetic vulnerability to impulsivity (up to 80% heritable) underlies personality disorders such as antisocial personality disorder (APD) and psychopathy. In addition, a physiological deficit in fear reactivity also underlies the psychopathic personality but not APD. However, not all individuals with a family history of impulsivity develop these disorders, because of protective psychological or social factors. Those who come from environments that teach them to control their impulsivity or to channel fearlessness in adaptive

ways may become very successful in careers ranging from politics to military service or extreme sports. The primary strength of the biopsychosocial theory is that it is the most comprehensive theory of personality. Empirical evidence from genetics, physiology, psychology, and sociology informs the theory. In addition, because there are multiple avenues for the development of disorder, there are also multiple avenues for treatment. Pharmacological treatments can be used to affect physiological processes, cognitive behavioral therapy can be used to address psychological processes, and group therapies or other social ­ interventions can improve an individual’s relationships and environment. Importantly, these interventions can be used in conjunction with each other to treat an individual client. The comprehensiveness of biopsychosocial theories also poses limitations. They are far more complex and more difficult to understand than the other theories discussed previously. This can make it difficult to determine the underlying nature or root cause of the disorder and how to approach treatment. Specifically, biological bases of personality disorders are still not fully understood. For example, a propensity for impulsivity is highly hereditary and underlies many disorders, including attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), substance-use disorders, and APD. However, less is known about the specific genetic differences that separate APD from other externalizing disorders and the environmental differences that may activate a genetic vulnerability to a particular disorder.

Understanding Personality Disorders The development of individual personality, and therefore personality disorders, is a complex process. Although emotional turbulence and social disruption during development can be contributing factors, knowledge is relatively limited about specific environmental conditions that might activate the potential for particular personality ­ disorders. Each of the theories mentioned here contributes in important ways to understanding personality disorders. Beginning in the 1960s, cognitive theories have been largely at the forefront in explaining and

Personality Testing

guiding the treatment of personality and many other psychological disorders. However, the biopsychosocial theory of personality disorders is increasing in influence among researchers and clinicians as the understanding of biological processes and more complex societal influences grows. The therapeutic relationship remains a central element in the treatment of personality disorders across different theoretical perspectives. Allan J. Heritage, Denise D. Davis, and F. Joseph McLaughlin See also Behavioral Theories of Personality; Cognitive Behavioral Therapies; Humanistic Theories of Personality; Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Personality

Further Readings Beck, A. T., Davis, D. D., & Freeman, A. (Eds.). (2015). Cognitive therapy of personality disorders (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Guilford. Millon, T., Millon, C. M., Meagher, S., Grossman, S., & Ramnath, R. (2004). Development of personality disorders. In Personality disorders in modern life (2nd ed.). (pp. 74–116). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley. Paris, J. (1993). Personality disorders: A biopsychosocial model. Journal of Personality Disorders, 7(3), 255–264.

Personality Testing Personality testing refers to a wide array of procedures designed to measure individual differences in the emotions, thinking, interests, motives, values, goals, and behaviors of persons. Personality testing has a long history of use by both academic and professional psychologists. Researchers have used these tests as a means of operationalizing personality constructs in order to test hypotheses related to individual differences. Clinical, counseling, educational, and industrial-organizational psychologists employ personality tests to inform their judgments and decisions about persons. This entry presents a brief review of personality testing procedures, including questionnaires and performance-based tests—inkblot methods, narrative techniques, and sentence completion tests.

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Questionnaires General descriptions of personality testing quickly move to designations of tests as objective versus projective. Among experts in personality assessment, however, this scheme is increasingly viewed as simplistic and misleading, and it has been recommended that it be abandoned. There are many strategies for personality testing, but the so-called objective category refers to just one of them (questionnaires), whereas the so-called projective category refers to everything else. Thus, this simplistic dichotomy offers limited understanding of the wide variety of personality tests and how they operate. Moreover, the terms are misleading in that the very desirable feature of objectivity is granted exclusively to questionnaires, implying that alternative approaches to testing lack objectivity. In fact, all personality tests offer the prospect of objectivity in how they are scored. Questionnaires can be scored by clerical means through the use of established scoring keys, whereas procedures that yield open-ended responses must be classified, coded, or scored by someone trained in the method. Accordingly, the question of objectivity in scoring personality tests is answered empirically by evaluating the reliability of scores produced by independent raters. The adequacy of score interpretations is, likewise, a matter of the size and representativeness of normative samples and the availability of validity evidence. Thus, fundamental psychometric principles can be applied to all personality tests regardless of the strategy used to collect responses. Questionnaires are the most common methods of personality testing in research and practice for several reasons. They are cost-effective and easy to administer to individuals or groups. Responses can be gathered remotely by conventional mail or online systems, and their scoring requires no special training. The efficiency of questionnaires is offset by their susceptibility to distortion by respondents who attempt to create an unrealistically desirable or undesirable impression. Indeed, concern about the accuracy or honesty of responses to questionnaires has stimulated a great deal of research on how to identify and correct for such distortions. Another important advantage of questionnaires is that they are easily

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modified to allow for ratings by informants, such as parents or spouses. The addition of informant ratings to traditional self-report methods in personality testing bestows numerous advantages for research and clinical applications. One of the oldest questionnaires and still the most widely used is the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), a collection of multiple scales designed to inform the diagnosis of mental disorders. The original MMPI scales were constructed in the 1930s by contrasting the responses of various groups of psychiatric patients with presumably normal adults who were not in treatment. For example, an item that was answered “no” more often by the group of 50 patients diagnosed with schizophrenia versus the normal adults was included in the schizophrenia scale and keyed for “false” responses. This purely empirical, criterionkeying method of constructing the MMPI scales has remained one of its distinctive features. The result is a set of items whose content does not always seem obviously linked to the diagnosis of interest. Accordingly, the MMPI held the promise of creating a test more robust to impression management efforts of respondents. New norms and some revisions to the item pool led to the publication of the MMPI-2 in 1989, followed by more extensive reductions of the basic scales to create the MMPI Restructured Form in 2008. The choice of which newer version of this classic test should be employed is currently a matter of contentious debate. Other multiscale ­ inventories designed for the diagnosis of mental disorders have been introduced, most notably the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory in 1977 (revised most recently in 1997) and the Personality Assessment Inventory in 1991. In contrast to the MMPI, the development of these two instruments employed a mixture of rational and empirical strategies, a method of test development referred to as the construct validation approach. Questionnaires with multiple scales have also been developed for the assessment of normal differences in personality. The California Psychological Inventory (CPI) is one of the earliest normal personality inventories, first published commercially in 1957 and revised most recently in 2002. The scales of the CPI were mostly developed using the criterion-keying approach with criterion groups

composed of persons highly representative of the characteristic measured by the scale, such as sociability or responsibility. The Personality Research Form, introduced in 1967 and revised most recently in 1987, assesses 20 basic needs (e.g., autonomy) and was constructed using the construct validation approach. As multivariate statistics and computing software increased in power and sophistication during the second half of the 20th century, personality researchers turned their attention toward discovering a common taxonomy of basic trait dimensions. Raymond Cattell was one of the pioneers in this endeavor, and his work led to the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire in 1949 (most recently revised in 1993). Subsequent researchers achieved consensus on a taxonomy of five basic trait dimensions, which has come to be known as the “Big Five” or five-factor model (FFM) of personality. The most widely used and extensively researched measure of the FFM is the NEO Personality Inventory, which was introduced in 1985 and revised for the second time in 2010.

Performance-Based Tests Performance-based tests of personality provide alternatives to the self-report questionnaire method. Psychologists who are doubtful of the ability of most people to provide accurate information about their personalities are the strongest proponents of this approach. Rather than asking for explicit judgments about personality, performance-based tests present ambiguous or incomplete stimuli and regard the responses to them as implicit demonstrations of important personality differences. Inkblot methods are the most familiar type of performance-based assessment procedure. They were first introduced by Hermann Rorschach, who was a Swiss psychiatrist interested in the study of schizophrenia. Contrary to the common assumption that content of the response (e.g., “a butterfly”) is critical to interpretation, the most important scores relate to the aspects of the inkblot that are most influential in determining what is perceived. Through careful inquiry into the initial responses, the examiner establishes the degree to which shape, color, apparent movement, and shading are influential in the perceptions of the respondent.

Personality Testing

Within a year of the publication of Rorschach’s inkblots and his initial guide to scoring and interpretation in 1921, he died suddenly of peritonitis. This event initiated the strange and controversial history of this test, as further developments were left to others to discover. By the 1960s, there were at least five methods for scoring and interpretation of the Rorschach—a highly unfortunate state of affairs for defending the validity of the test. Exhaustive research comparing the various systems by the psychologist John Exner led to the publication of the Comprehensive System in 1974; the third and final revision was published in 1993. Although the research evidence has been supportive of the Rorschach for one of its primary original purposes—the identification of perceptual aberrations in psychosis—other, less impressive findings and the discovery of duplicate cases in Exner’s normative sample have kept the test firmly mired in controversy. The publication of the Rorschach Performance Assessment System in 2011, with revised scoring and entirely new norms, offers the prospect of resolving the divided viewpoints psychologists hold about the Rorschach. Narrative techniques present the examinee with a picture stimulus or verbal prompt in order to elicit a story. These storytelling techniques are predicated on the theory that narratives, regardless of whether they are entirely imaginary or factual accounts, provide insight into a person’s needs, motives, preoccupations, and personal concerns. The most widely used set of stimuli is the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), a series of black-and-white pictures introduced in 1935. There are 30 TAT cards in the set, but the examiner usually selects six to 10 cards based on considerations of the age and gender of the respondent. The standard TAT instructions call for an imaginative account of the events leading up to the situation depicted in the picture, how the people in the picture are feeling and what they are thinking, and how the story ends. A number of formal scoring approaches can be applied to narratives elicited by picture stimuli; the most extensively researched system is used to score achievement, affiliation, and power motives. The Defense Mechanisms Manual is a formal system for scoring narrative material for the use of denial, projection, and identification; these are psychological defenses that are important for personal

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adjustment but that, in theory, occur outside of awareness. Not all narrative techniques require picture stimuli. The Early Memories protocol asks respondents to recount past memories for eight specific prompts, including earliest memory, earliest memory of mother, and earliest memory of the first day of school. The Social Cognitive and Object Relations Scale can be applied to narrative material elicited by picture stimuli or early memories prompts to yield an assessment of the quality of a person’s concept of self, others, and relationships. Sentence-completion techniques present one or more words that start a sentence, and the respondent is prompted to finish the sentence. The two most extensively studied techniques are the Rotter Incomplete Sentences Blank (RISB) and the Washington University Sentence Completion Test (WUSCT). The RISB calls for scoring 40 individual items for the level of adjustment versus conflict expressed in the response. It has been frequently employed in clinical settings as a screening measure for clinical problems and treatment planning. The WUSCT measures Jane Loevinger’s concept of ego development, a complex of developmental stages of increasing psychological maturity. Learning to score the WUSCT reliably requires considerable training, but the result of these efforts is a personality test with laudable psychometric properties.

Test Selection Given the diversity of methods for personality testing, it is natural to ask which ones should be employed for the assessment of an individual. There are certain occasions or assessment contexts in which some methods are preferred over others. For example, in a forensic scenario, where the examinee is motivated to appear disturbed, selfreport methods are particularly vulnerable to distortion, and performance-based techniques should be considered. Combining explicit (i.e., self-report) and implicit (i.e., performance-based) methods of testing can be particularly informative when the examiner considers the congruence (or disparity) of inferences across methods. Accordingly, the question of incremental validity for each of the different methods is highly important for research in personality testing. To  evaluate incremental validity, multivariate

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statistical techniques are employed that can reveal whether a given test adds significantly to the prediction of relevant criteria, above and beyond some other test. When such analyses reveal that different tests each make a unique contribution to prediction, then the assessor can perform a more informative assessment by using multiple methods of personality testing. John E. Kurtz See also Factor Analysis and Personality Theory; Personality Disorders; Personality Traits Versus Situations; Personality Types Versus Personality Traits; Personality, Measurement of

Further Readings Beutler, L. E., & Groth-Marnat, G. (2003). Integrative assessment of adult personality (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Guilford. Furr, R. M., & Bacharach, V. R. (2014). Psychometrics: An introduction (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Meehl, P. E. (1973). Psychodiagnosis: Selected papers. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Weiner, I. B., & Greene, R. L. (Eds.). (2008). Handbook of personality assessment. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Wiggins, J. S. (2003). Paradigms of personality assessment. New York, NY: Guilford.

Personality Traits Versus Situations Two general influences on human behavior are situations, which operate outside the individual, and traits, operating inside. Historically, scholars have debated whether one influence is more powerful than the other. Hybrid positions, acknowledging joint influences of situations and traits, may resolve the debate. This entry discusses how both situations and personality traits can influence behavior and how situations and traits interact with one another in influencing behavior.

Situations There are many examples of situational and trait variables. Chief among situational variables are

threats (e.g., electric shock) and rewards (e.g., food). Fundamentally, people seek to avoid pain and approach pleasure. Threats and rewards affect behavior by their expected impact on the individual’s pain/pleasure experience. Most people try harder to answer a question correctly if answering incorrectly triggers an electric shock. Offering food is an effective way to get a group of people together. Situations can be classified in many other ways: whether they involve people or things, are brief or ongoing, simple or complex, have direct or indirect effects on behavior, and so on. In all cases, a purely situationist perspective holds that a given situation (e.g., shock vs. no shock) affects behavior about the same way in all people, regardless of their traits. Any differences in how people respond to a given stimulus are treated mostly as statistical noise.

Personality Traits Traits are stable characteristics of people that distinguish between individuals. Height and weight are physical traits, and intelligence is a prominent mental trait. Personality traits, the main focus here, are general tendencies to behave a given way across different situations. Looking deeper, they are behavioral manifestations of neural substrates that have evolved to benefit survival and reproduction and are shaped throughout life by the combined effects of genes and experience. Research over the past 60 years in different cultures has identified several broad personality dimensions. The “five-factor model” (FFM; the “Big Five”) includes extroversion (E), conscientiousness (C), agreeableness (A), neuroticism (N), and openness to experience (O). Each can be broken out into more specific “facet traits.” E includes sociability and dominance; C includes striving for achievement and being methodical; A includes empathy and nurturance; N includes anxiety and depression; and O includes creative thinking and eagerness to learn. The FFM has been criticized for, among other things, being too broad (e.g., the facets can offer better prediction and explanation) and incomplete (e.g., autonomy does not neatly fall within any of the Big Five). An alternative to the FFM is the HEXACO model. The last five letters (EXACO)

Personality Traits Versus Situations

correspond closely to the FFM dimensions (with E = emotionality as similar to N, and X = extroversion). H denotes honesty/humility. It, too, can be considered in terms of more specific facets (e.g., fairness, modesty). The same criticisms of the FFM can apply to the HEXACO model. Notwithstanding their limitations, both models offer a parsimonious organization of diverse facet traits into meaningful clusters, thereby advancing personality research.

Trait–Situation Interaction Behavior is affected by both situations and traits— from the outside and from the inside—and the two sources can combine in different ways. To help understand how, imagine determining how many times people laugh during 1 hour at a party versus a business meeting (the situational variable) and whether they are extroverts or introverts (the personality trait). Looking at just the situation, people in general might be expected to laugh more often at the party than at the meeting. Suppose that, on average, people laugh 10 times at the party and 4 times at the meeting, yielding an overall average of 7 [(10 + 4) / 2]. The “party effect” is 10 – 7 = 3 and the “meeting effect” is 4 – 7 = –3. In terms of personality (and averaging across the two situations), extroverts could be expected to laugh more than introverts. Suppose extroverts average 9 laughs and introverts average 5. Thus, the “extrovert effect” is 9 – 7 = 2 and the “introvert effect” = 5 – 7 = –2. By simply adding effects, extroverts at the party would be expected to laugh 7 (overall average) plus 3 (party effect) plus 2 (extrovert effect) = 12 times. Similarly, introverts at the meeting should laugh 7 (overall average) plus –3 (meeting effect) plus –2 (introvert effect) = 2 times. For the remaining two conditions, introverts at the party should laugh 7 + 3 – 2 = 8 times, and extroverts at the meeting should laugh 7 – 3 + 2 = 6 times. The situation and trait effects in such cases are called main effects. Here, the situation main effect is +3 and –3 and the trait main effect is +2 and –2. Now consider that extroverts may be especially likely to laugh at parties and especially unlikely to laugh at meetings. Assume specifically that extroverts at the party laugh 2 more times beyond the main effects (i.e., 7 + 3 + 2 + 2 = 14), and, perhaps because extroverts tend to dominate parties,

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introverts at the party laugh 2 fewer times (7 + 3 – 2 – 2 = 6). The opposite pattern is one where extroverts at the meeting might laugh 2 fewer times than the main effects would predict (7 – 3 + 2 – 2  =  4), whereas introverts at the meeting might laugh 2 additional times (7 + 3 – 2 + 2 = 4). These opposite effects for extroverts and introverts in the two situations (i.e., +2/–2 vs. –2/+2) are called interaction effects. Two variables interact when the effect of one (on a given behavior) is itself affected by the other. In the example, the effect of extroversion–introversion on laughing is stronger at the party (14 versus 6) than at the meeting (4 each). Correspondingly, laughter is more frequent at the party, especially for extroverts (14 versus 4) compared to introverts (6 versus 4). This example helps clarify how traits and situations combine to affect behavior. First, situations and traits can operate independently: In general, people tend to laugh more at parties than at meetings (situation main effect) and, averaging across situations, extroverts tend to laugh more than introverts (trait main effect). Second, situation and trait effects can vary in strength: A strong situation can overpower trait effects. For example, a blazing inferno (strong situation) could cause everyone caught inside the building, regardless of their level of risk-taking trait, to climb down a drainpipe to escape. An open invitation to go rock climbing (weak situation), on the other hand, allows the risk-taking trait to be expressed in choosing whether or not to go. Third, traits and situations can interact to affect behavior beyond just their main effects: How a given situation affects behavior can depend on the traits of the people in that situation, and how a given trait affects behavior often depends on the situation. This interactionist view is more nuanced than the basic main-effects view, presenting situations and traits as essentially two sides of a single coin.

A Historical Overview In the 1950s and 1960s, psychological science was dominated by a situationist perspective called behaviorism, which emphasized learning by stimulus-response-outcome connections. Personality traits were relegated to the “black box” of

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unobservable mental phenomena not amenable to scientific methods. Then, starting with “drives,” researchers began to view motives, values, intentions, attitudes, and emotions as essential for predicting and understanding behavior. Personality traits survived behaviorism, in part, through their importance in everyday language as means for communicating predictable patterns of behavior. In controlled laboratory studies, situation effects could be made to overpower trait effects. Most ordinary living, however, occurs in situations weaker than those contrived in a lab. Interactionists in the 1970s and 80s stressed that regardless of the relative strength of situational and trait effects, both are jointly critical. At least some of the “noisy” behavioral variance within situations can be explained by traits. Moreover, whether a person displays a given trait (as behavior) depends on the situation. Psychology has moved well beyond purely situationist models, although the idea lives on in experimental research in which situations are manipulated to see how behavior changes. Not all personality research deals with traits, but trait psychologists tend to accept that situations have main effects on behavior and can also interact with traits. A contemporary approach to trait–situation interactions is trait activation theory. Although developed to predict job performance, the theory has broader application, holding that traits lay dormant within the person until a situation triggers trait expression. Such situations are relevant to a given trait if they offer cues for expressing that trait. Thus, a call for help is relevant to the trait of nurturance because individual differences in nurturance become evident when people are faced with a call for help. Those who are high in nurturance offer help, whereas those who are low do not. The theory also says that people tend to feel intrinsic (“from inside”) satisfaction when expressing their traits, and gain extrinsic (“from outside”) satisfaction when their trait expressions, as performance, are valued positively by others. Behavioral consistency across situations, accordingly, can be expected only when the situations are similarly trait–relevant and share similarly valued outcomes. Three important features of trait activation theory are that it (a) incorporates situation main effects (making it receptive to basic behaviorist principles), (b) emphasizes the interactionist notion of

trait–relevant situations, and (c) ties personality traits to motivation via intrinsic and extrinsic satisfaction. Robert Tett See also Behavioral Theories of Personality; Culture and Personality; Factor Analysis and Personality Theory; Metatheoretical Issues in Personality Psychology; Personality Development; Personality Testing; Personality Types Versus Personality Traits; Personality, Measurement of

Further Readings Bowers, K. S. (1973). Situationism in psychology: An analysis and a critique. Psychological Review, 80, 307–336. Endler, N. S., & Magnusson, D. (1976). Toward an interactional psychology of personality. Psychological Bulletin, 83, 956–974. Epstein, S., & O’Brien, E. J. (1985). The person-situation debate in historical and current perspective. Psychological Bulletin, 98, 513–537. Murray, H. (1938). Explorations in personality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Tett, R. P., Simonet, D. V., Walser, B., & Brown, C. (2013). Trait activation theory: Applications, further developments, and implications for person-workplace fit. In N. D. Christiansen & R. P. Tett (Eds.), A handbook of personality at work (pp. 71–100). New York, NY: Taylor-Francis.

Personality Types Versus Personality Traits Personality has been defined both as differences between people in their tendency to feel, think, and behave and as the dynamic organization of these psychosocial systems within a person. The main difference between these two definitions of personality is that the former refers to an interindividual, or between-person, approach, whereas the latter refers to an intraindividual, or withinperson, approach. Historically, this has resulted in two different research traditions within personality psychology: a variable-centered tradition, which examines personality traits, and a personcentered approach, which examines personality

Personality Types Versus Personality Traits

types. In this entry, these two approaches toward studying personality are defined, compared, and discussed, together with implications for research on personality.

Defining Traits and Types The variable-centered approach focuses on comparing people according to characteristics by examining traits or variables that describe differences between people. For example, comparing people on height describes differences between individuals on a continuous dimension from short to tall. The most widely used variable-centered perspective is the five-factor model of personality (FFM). It consists of five broad personality traits derived from a lexical approach—the idea that relevant personality characteristics should be represented in the lexicon of natural language. Reducing all relevant adjectives to a set of trait characteristics by means of factor analysis resulted in the Big Five personality factors consisting of extroversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to experience. In contrast, a person-centered approach does not examine how people differ from each other on specific variables. Rather, it focuses on how personal characteristics relate to each other so as to describe a person in terms of a personality type or profile. Returning to the example of height, a person-centered approach might examine whether tall people are also skinny, thus to describe a “wiry” type of person. The personality types approach advocated by Jack and Jeanne Block is one of the most common person-centered approaches used to study personality. The personality types are based on their theory of ego-resiliency and ego-control. Ego-resiliency is defined as the tendency to respond flexibly to changing situational demands. Ego-control refers to the tendency to inhibit rather than to express emotional and motivational impulses. Ego-resiliency and ego-control have been found to be curvilinearly related, resulting in three personality types: undercontrollers, overcontrollers, and resilients. Undercontrollers are characterized by low levels of ego-resiliency and ego-control, overcontrollers by a low level of ego-resiliency and a high level of ego-control, and resilients by a high level of ego-resiliency and a flexible level of ego-control.

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These personality types are commonly assessed by means of a Q-sort procedure in which people are asked to sort a fixed number of statements or adjectives according to how characteristic they are of them as a person. This results in a personality profile that can then be compared with prototypical profiles for undercontrolled, overcontrolled, and resilient personality types. Personality types can also be derived by mapping the profile of an individual’s scores on trait measures to the three prototypes by means of cluster analysis.

Comparing Trait Versus Type Perspectives What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of using personality traits versus personality types to study personality? The main advantage of using a trait perspective is that the focus on differences between people may reveal associations between specific traits and important outcomes, together with the developmental trajectories of specific personality traits. For example, do people scoring high on extroversion have more friends than those scoring low on extroversion? And do relatively extroverted people stay that way over their life course? However, the disadvantage in this approach is that a trait perspective provides information only about isolated traits, whereas personality traits are not independent from each other within individuals. That is, it might be the case that extroversion on its own does not predict the number of one’s friends, but only the combination of being extroverted, agreeable, and emotionally stable does. The focus on the person as a whole as the unit of analysis is one of the foremost advantages of a personality type approach. In the Blocks’ formulation, for example, this approach examines the development and life outcomes of an undercontrolled, overcontrolled, or resilient person. The constellation of many traits within one individual can be examined using a type perspective rather than examining traits in isolation or interactions among a small number of traits. The focus on single characteristics from a trait perspective and on the organization of traits within individuals from a type perspective has often led researchers to take a trait approach when examining normative development and a type approach when investigating individual differences

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in development. However, it should be noted that a trait perspective can also be used to examine individual differences in the development of specific traits, whereas a type perspective can also be taken to examine the normative development of personality types.

Implications In sum, there is no clear superiority of personality trait or personality type perspectives. Personality can be studied comprehensively only when both differences between people and the organization of characteristics within individuals are considered. Which approach to take when designing a study of personality depends heavily on the research question. Scholars who are interested in the consequences or development of specific personality traits might want to use the trait perspective. On the other hand, researchers who aim to examine the development of a complex constellation of personality dimensions within individuals are advised to use the type perspective. Roos Hutteman and Marcel A. G. van Aken See also Behavioral Theories of Personality; Culture and Personality; Factor Analysis and Personality Theory; Metatheoretical Issues in Personality Psychology; Personality Development; Personality Testing; Personality Traits Versus Situations; Personality, Measurement of

Further Readings Asendorpf, J. B. (2014). Person-centered approaches to personality. In M. L. Cooper & R. Larsen (Eds.), Handbook of personality and social psychology: Vol. 4. Personality processes and individual differences (pp. 403–424). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Block, J. H., & Block, J. (1980). The role of ego-control and ego-resiliency in the organization of behavior. In W. A. Collins (Ed.), Minnesota Symposium on Child Psychology (Vol. 13, pp. 39–101). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. John, O. P., & Srivastava, S. (1999). The Big Five trait taxonomy: History, measurement and theoretical perspectives. In L. A. Pervin & O. P. John (Eds.), Handbook of personality: Theory and research (pp. 102–138). New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Personnel Development Human resources constitute a source of sustainable competitive advantage for organizations, where a competitive advantage is anything that places the organization at an advantage compared with competing organizations. Technological and financial resources can be easily replicated by competitors and do not provide a source of sustainable competitive advantage. Human resources (or human capital), on the other hand, are not easily replicable and thus constitute a source of sustainable competitive advantage. In a rapidly changing world, organizations stress personnel development. From an individual employee’s perspective also, personnel development is a continuous activity, with knowledge learned becoming obsolete in a few years and thus necessitating continuous learning and personnel development. This entry is organized into two sections: The first focuses on organizational efforts to fill positions with highly qualified individuals and to continuously encourage personnel development. The second section focuses on individual efforts by employees to develop workplace skills that result in personnel development.

Human Resource Development in Organizations Organizations hire employees from a pool of applicants. Organizational efforts in human resource development can broadly focus on (a) selecting talented individuals to fill different job positions and (b) providing a climate of continuous learning and development that facilitates personnel development. Staffing Approaches to Building Human Resources in Organizations

The basic logic in staffing is to assess applicants on their knowledge and skills and to select as employees those who have the best fit to job requirements and exhibit superior job performance. To accomplish this, organizations conduct job analyses to identify the knowledge and skills needed by employees to successfully perform their job tasks. This entails collecting data either by observation or through surveys that identify the job tasks.

Personnel Development

Current incumbents in the job or supervisors are common sources of these data. Focus group interviews can also be used. In addition to a list of job duties, information about the relative frequency of each task, the criticality of each task for that job position, and desirable prerequisites are obtained. Finally, the knowledge, skills, abilities, and other characteristics (e.g., personality traits) needed for successfully completing each task are formally identified. The next step is to recruit individual applicants for the job openings. Recruitment entails choosing both a medium of communication (e.g., websites, traditional advertisements) and the content of the recruitment message. Research has shown that several features, such as the ease of navigability of websites, affect recruitment effectiveness. The content of the recruitment message should also be realistic and accurate. Realistic job previews as part of recruitment result in less turnover of employees later. They help screen individuals who may not be interested in the working conditions that attend a specific job. Further, realistic previews generate a feeling of trust in the organization, thus fostering positive job attitudes. The result of recruitment efforts is a qualified pool of job applicants. The selection of applicants for the open positions follows. Organizations may administer predictor measures to applicants—assessments of the knowledge, skills, abilities, and other characteristics identified in the job analysis as needed for successful job performance. Predictor measures can be psychological tests (e.g., cognitive ability tests, integrity tests, personality tests), work simulations, or structured interviews. The predictor measures typically are administered to each applicant, and individual scores are obtained for each. Validation data from prior samples may be used to determine the relation between scores and job performance. Such correlations are referred to as the criterion-related validity and are usually provided by commercial vendors who market the predictor measures. Criterion validities constitute an important piece of information if organizations are challenged in court over their selection procedures. In addition to criterion-related validity, organizations may obtain estimates of content and construct validity for the predictor measures. Content validity refers to the extent to which the tasks in the

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predictor measures are related to the tasks in the job. Construct validity refers to theory-based evidence that the constructs measured by the predictor measures are those intended. Validation data (especially criterion-related validity) are important for personnel selection because they indicate whether those applicants who score higher on the predictor measures are also likely to do better on the job than those scoring lower. However, other issues are also relevant. A predictor measure of cognitive ability may have high criterion-related validity but also result in mean score differences between members of different ethnic groups or between men and women. If so, a larger proportion of applicants in the lower scoring group may be rejected, potentially resulting in an adverse impact on that group. Group differences and adverse impact are different from bias, which refers to systematic overor underprediction of performance from predictor scores. An organization interested in human resource development through selection of qualified individuals should carefully evaluate the technical aspects of the predictor measures it uses. Finally, organizations should also assess whether applicants’ reactions are negative toward the predictor measures. Applicants usually have more positive reactions to the use of work simulations and structured interviews than they have toward psychological tests. Positive applicant reactions have been linked to positive job attitudes and to the decision to accept a job offer when it is made. Often, organizations use a combination of predictor measures. This may raise questions about how best to combine the data from the different predictors. The scores from the different predictors can be combined either in a compensatory or in a noncompensatory manner. In the compensatory approach, high scores on one predictor can mitigate low scores on another. In this approach, there are several different ways to combine the scores from the different predictors. One approach is to combine the scores in a way that gives more weight to predictors with higher score variability. An alternative is to add the standardized z-scores of the different predictors, which gives equal weight to all predictors. In addition, different weights can be assigned to the predictors based on a judgment of their importance for job performance. For example, consider a selection system

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with two predictors, one assessing individual differences in problem solving and another assessing verbal ability. If problem-solving skills are considered more important for job performance than verbal ability, the compensatory system can give higher weight to that predictor. Another option is to assign weights that optimize some criteria using regression approaches. For example, to optimize job performance predictions, job performance measures can be regressed onto the set of predictors assigned their beta weights. The noncompensatory approach typically is used to combine the predictors when a minimum level of each is needed for job performance. If high scores on one predictor do not compensate for low scores on another, minimum cut scores are set for each predictor. All predictors can be administered to all applicants, and those scoring above the cut score in each predictor are considered as successfully passing the selection system. Alternatively, one predictor can be administered at a time, and only those applicants scoring above the cut score for that predictor are administered the next predictor. The former is referred to as the multiple cut score approach and the latter as the ­multiple-hurdle approach. If the cost or time requirements of some predictors are high (e.g., work simulations), a multiple-hurdle approach makes sense so that the costlier predictors are administered to applicants who have passed the earlier predictor(s). However, if the costs of assessment (e.g., paying for them to travel from other locations) are formidable, a multiple cut score approach may be preferred. Training as Part of Personnel Development

Selecting a qualified workforce is the first step in building human resources in an organization. Organizations spend enormous amounts of resources in training and developmental activities. To maximize the return on that, organizations should incorporate psychological principles in the design of their training programs. Successful programs help individuals learn from their mistakes and understand the processes by which problems are solved. Metacognitive strategies enable individuals not only to master specific tasks but also to develop skills that prepare them to perform related tasks and to transfer the training to the workplace.

Successful training programs also emphasize the differences between experts and novices. Effective personnel development through training also depends on appropriate and timely feedback on performance to employees. The utility of feedback depends on the perceived credibility of the source of the feedback by its recipient. Feedback should not be considered as controlling but as informative. In addition to feedback, organizers can enhance the training program. Organizers are cues (e.g., outlines or bulleted lists) that enhance the training program content. Organizers help in focusing the attention of the participants on relevant materials. Several types of individual differences should also be considered in designing effective training programs. Self-esteem plays an important role. Motivation to learn is influenced by variables such as locus of control and commitment to career. If individuals conclude that their performance is beyond their control, personnel development may be stymied. Psychological theories of motivation, such as the expectancy theory, suggest that employee effort is a function of the expectation that effort will result in successful performance. Similarly, goal-setting theory suggests that employees should identify and accept goals for personnel development before such development can take place. Another component of training design is the potential for aptitude-by-treatment interaction (ATI). Basically, ATI posits that certain training programs are more suited to particular individuals in facilitating personnel development. Although empirical evidence for ATI is scarce, there are some generalizable conclusions. For example, individuals high on cognitive ability benefited more from low-structure training programs involving complex tasks compared with individuals low on cognitive ability, who benefited more from highly structured training designs. With available technology, it is possible to tailor training programs for individualized personnel development.

Personnel Development: Individual Efforts Rapid changes in the economy, the pace of technological changes in the workplace, and other factors have placed the need for personnel development squarely on the shoulders of the individual

Personnel Evaluation

employee as well as the organization. Employees are well advised to take more active control in planning their careers and to take steps to acquire the necessary skills for career advancement. Career workbooks have been designed to help individuals assess their strengths and weaknesses. These workbooks consist of questions and exercises that help individuals gain insight into career opportunities. Self-assessment tools are also provided online and can assist self-discovery of learning styles, leadership potential, and preferred contexts for interaction. Personality inventories and workbooks also help individuals assess their skills. Mentoring is another popular approach to personnel development. Mentoring can be formal or informal. In formal mentoring, organizations assign the mentor and mentees, whereas informal mentoring involves individual employees choosing their mentors. Mentoring fosters personnel development for both mentors and their mentees. For the former, it centers on feelings of accomplishment, a sense of regeneration (seeing the mentee develop), and self-reflection. For the mentee, the mentoring relationship provides social support as well as exposure to developmental opportunities the mentor can provide. Successful personnel development also involves the integration of work and family roles for individuals. This becomes more critical with the changing demographic composition of the workforce, where single parents increasingly find themselves balancing work and family issues. The new generation of workforce participants also expects the work to mesh with other social roles. Personnel development should develop skills in telecommuting, job sharing, and teamwork. Finally, personnel development should include a global outlook as national boundaries collapse in a world of global markets. Chockalingam Viswesvaran See also Employee Motivation; Employee Satisfaction; Performance Management; Personnel Evaluation; Personnel Selection; Training and Personnel Development; Workforce Psychology [

Further Readings Goldstein, I. L., & Ford, J. K. (2002). Training in organizations (4th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

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Ones, D. S., Viswesvaran, C., & Schmidt, F. L. (2008). No new terrain: Reliability and construct validity of job performance ratings. Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 1, 174–179. Ployhart, R. E., Schneider, B., & Schmitt, N. (2006). Staffing organizations: Contemporary practice and theory (3rd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Schmidt, N. (Ed.). (2012). The Oxford handbook of personnel assessment and selection. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Personnel Evaluation Personnel evaluation, or performance appraisal, is the process of assessing employees and giving them feedback based on how effectively they are completing the tasks, duties, and responsibilities of their job. The primary goal of personnel evaluation is to align the behaviors of employees with the goals of the organization. This entry discusses best practices for conducting effective employee evaluations. An integral part of the performance appraisal process is sharing the evaluation with the employee, thus allowing the employee to be aware of any gaps between actual and desired performance and, ideally, encouraging changes in employee behavior. Much of performance appraisal is atheoretical, and research in this area typically lags behind practice. As a result, much of the established knowledge about personnel evaluation is descriptive of what has been done. That which is prescriptive—what should be done—draws on a combination of what has been shown to work (best practices) and information culled from psychological theories about how to structure processes for fairness and how to give feedback in a way that is nonthreatening to the employee. In terms of what should be done, research on procedural justice clearly shows the importance of personnel evaluation processes that are perceived as fair. Those viewed as unfair tend to undermine motivation and increase turnover. Organizations should design processes carefully and train managers in how to conduct performance appraisals properly in order to increase positive results. In terms of content, managers can also increase perceptions of fairness by providing a balanced

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review—recognizing both strengths and weaknesses rather than just focusing on the negative. Feedback intervention theory (FIT) provides additional guidance about the content of personnel evaluations. FIT is based on the finding that although giving employees feedback generally improves their subsequent performance, it actually causes decreases in performance about one third of the time. FIT proposes (and finds empirical support for the proposal) that performance decreases when the feedback focuses on the individual (which is ego threatening) rather than on the task. This draws attention away from performance and toward preservation of the ego, which actually leads to more detrimental effects on subsequent performance. Recommendations for best practices, therefore, include a focus on the task rather than the individual when conducting performance appraisals.

Personnel Evaluation Functions Personnel evaluation, like other human resource practices, is most effective when it is aligned with the organization’s strategy. As stated previously, it serves a basic function that is strategic in nature— aligning employees’ actions with the organization’s goals. However, it can also fill two other purposes, and organizations vary in the extent to which they use performance appraisal for these other functions depending on their overall business strategy and their human resource strategy. In addition to the strategic purpose, many organizations use personnel evaluations for developmental or administrative purposes (or both). Organizations that use personnel evaluations for developmental purposes use the performance appraisal as a way to identify areas for growth and to encourage employees to further develop (via training, etc.) their knowledge, skills, and abilities. This provides two benefits: Employees perform better in their current roles, and they are being prepared for future roles in the organization. This use of personnel evaluations is more common in organizations that promote from within. The ongoing development of employees is critical in these organizations in order to have qualified individuals to promote as higher positions become available. Developmental personnel evaluations are also more common for jobs for which it is more costly

to replace employees. Jobs that require substantial training after hiring, for example, are more costly than jobs that don’t require training. Likewise, jobs for which there is a labor shortage are harder to fill, and new employees can often command higher salaries because their skills are in demand. There is, therefore, an advantage to hiring on a long-term basis for jobs for which there is a shortage of qualified potential applicants. In contrast, simple jobs that require few skills and little training incur few replacement costs. Organizations with many jobs of this type tend to put less effort into performance appraisal processes because identifying developmental opportunities for employees does not provide consequential benefit to the organization. Personnel evaluations can also be used for administrative purposes. This means that the results of the evaluation are used to make administrative decisions about rewards (and punishments) for employees. Typical rewards include bonuses, merit-based pay raises, and promotions. Rewards increase motivation and performance when the process is designed and administered effectively. Punishments are generally less common, but if the performance appraisal process reveals problems, there can be negative consequences for the employee, up to and including termination of employment. Although it seems that all organizations would use performance appraisals for administrative purposes, there is considerable variance in the extent to which this process is linked to rewards and punishments. For example, nonprofit organizations tend to have fairly simple pay structures based on the job, not merit. When pay is increased, it tends to be increased for all employees (e.g., a cost-of-living adjustment or COLA). Likewise, the public sector (government) tends to increase pay based on length of service, not performance. In the private (for-profit) sector, organizations that compete on price tend to maintain fairly simple pay structures, given the competition to keep costs low. Spending less on labor costs, by paying everyone about the same amount for the same job, helps these organizations keep their prices competitive. By contrast, organizations that compete based on factors other than price (e.g., innovation) are far

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more likely to provide rewards based on performance, as the performance of key, high-performing employees should contribute more to their success in the external marketplace. Organizations that use personnel evaluations for administrative purposes tend to put greater effort into ensuring the fairness of the process (procedural justice). If higher performance means a larger reward, some effort must go into confirming that managers accurately identify high performers.

Objective Versus Subjective Evaluations Objective Evaluation Methods

Methods for evaluating performance can be objective, though they are more commonly subjective. Objective methods are most often seen in sales (e.g., dollars of product sold) and manufacturing (e.g., the number of products assembled). Although objective methods would seem to be desirable, they are often deficient because they tend to provide information about outcomes, not processes. Supervisors’ evaluations, although subjective, can take into account the process by which the outcome was achieved. For example, a salesperson who was able to sell a great deal by making false promises to customers or by stealing clients from colleagues is probably not the best employee, regardless of dollars of product sold. Unfortunately, subjective evaluations are also flawed, as supervisors bring their own idiosyncratic beliefs, opinions, and biases into the evaluation. They are not able to observe their employees 100% of the time, so their evaluation is based on incomplete information. Research that has examined variation in performance appraisal finds that over 50% of the variance in subjective performance is actually due to the supervisor who provides the evaluation rather than to the employee being evaluated. Although many types of rater errors lead to bias in the evaluation process, the most common is similarity/likeness error. People tend to like other people whom they perceive to be similar to them (because they like themselves). Greater similarity leads to greater liking, and higher ratings of performance. This bias is incredibly difficult to mitigate because it is related to fundamental psychological processes.

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Subjective Evaluation Methods

Subjective evaluations may consist of a narrative review, quantitative assessment, or both. In a narrative review, the supervisor generally provides a letter to the employee that details, in paragraph format, how the employee has performed over the last performance period (typically a year). Narrative reviews generally work well for developmental purposes because they can go into greater detail than a quantitative assessment does. They are not as effective for administrative purposes in that they don’t provide a clear method for comparing performance across employees and identifying who should receive the rewards. Quantitative assessments, usually ratings, are therefore more common when the performance appraisal is used for administrative purposes. A combination of a narrative review and a quantitative assessment tends to work best for organizations that want to use the performance appraisal for both developmental and administrative purposes. Ratings require additional effort at the beginning of the process; the organization must develop an instrument that identifies what should be measured and what allows for quantitative assessment of performance. In terms of what to measure, organizations may decide to focus on attributes, behaviors, goal accomplishment, or some combination of criteria deemed important for the job in question. Personnel evaluations that focus on attributes are quite common; they require the least amount of time and effort to develop and are often applicable to a range of jobs. Attributes are general qualities of the employee that are considered beneficial to job performance, such as “verbal communication skills.” These are typically rated on a Likert-type scale (e.g., 1–5, where 1 = poor and 5 = excellent). In an effort to reduce rater errors, some organizations have abandoned ratings in favor of rankings (though it should be noted that rankings really reduce only errors caused by differences in scale use). Although the rating method compares each individual to a standard, the ranking method compares the employees to one another. Ranking methods can be quite simple; managers can be told that they should rank their employees in order from best to worst. This assessment can be global

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(i.e., based on overall performance), or it can include a variety of attributes or behaviors (or both). Some organizations use a variation of ranking called forced distributions. This method requires the supervisor to group his or her employees into categories, for example, 20% high performers, 70% average performers, and 10% poor performers. The top category usually receives merit-based pay increases and the middle category just a COLA. The bottom category is usually subject to some type of punishment; some organizations go so far as to terminate the bottom 10% every year. Research shows that firing the bottom 10% is not a healthy practice for organizations in the long term; it tends to stifle creativity, risk taking, and cooperative behavior. It is also expensive to replace 10% of the workforce annually, and the practice is worth the expense only if the replacements are actually better than the workers who were terminated. Finally, multisource (or 360-degree) evaluations are growing in popularity. These include evaluations by colleagues, customers, and the employee, in addition to supervisors. Multisource evaluations seem to work well when used for developmental purposes. Although an employee can discount negative feedback from one person, it is harder to ignore that same feedback when it comes from multiple sources. This method should not be used for administrative purposes, however, as it could create an incentive for employees to collude in order to increase their rewards. Laura Parks-Leduc See also Employee Motivation; Human Factors in Organizations; Performance Management; Personnel Development; Workforce Psychology

Further Readings Kluger, A. N., & DeNisi, A. (1996). The effects of feedback interventions on performance: A historical review, a meta-analysis, and a preliminary feedback intervention theory. Psychological Bulletin, 119, 254–284. Rynes, S. L., Gerhart, B., & Parks, L. (2005). Personnel psychology: Performance evaluation and pay for performance. Annual Review of Psychology, 56, 571–600.

Scullen, S. E., Bergey, P. K., & Aiman-Smith, L. (2005). Forced distribution rating systems and the improvement of workforce potential: A baseline simulation. Personnel Psychology, 58, 1–32. Scullen, S. E., Mount, M. K., & Goff, M. (2000). Understanding the latent structure of job performance ratings. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85, 956–970.

Personnel Selection Personnel selection is the scientific process of matching an individual with a job within an organization within a culture within a society. One of the most important tasks for organizational leaders is to select talented, motivated employees who will work to help them meet the goals that have been set for the organization. Likewise, it is in an individual’s best interest to choose a place to work that will correspond to his or her needs, wants, abilities, and attitudes and thus well-being. This important match has been studied for years by industrial and organizational (I/O) psychologists, and much has been learned about how to determine the best match. I/O psychologists first became involved in the process of selecting employees when the U.S. government needed help selecting and placing officers and soldiers in World War I; they continued to help with selection and placement in World War II. They used mental ability tests to select officers and those who would be in the infantry. Much has been learned since the early 1900s, and today, the personnel selection process that many employers use typically consists of five basic components: job analysis, designing the selection process, recruitment, the selection process, and the selection decision, all of which are discussed in this entry.

Job Analysis Job analysis is the identification of the most important elements of a job. I/O psychologists have helped devise effective strategies for determining three basic aspects of any job: (a) What tasks and behaviors are essential to the job? (b) What knowledge, skills, abilities, and other (KSAOs) characteristics are needed to perform the job? (c) What are the conditions (e.g., weather, safety, stress) under which the job is performed?

Personnel Selection

A job analysis can be conducted by interviewing current employees or asking them to complete questionnaires, observing employees at work, or talking to experts about the job. Within the hiring process, information from a job analysis is used to write job descriptions, determine what tests might be used to assess the KSAOs of job applicants, and assist in meeting legal requirements that affect the selection process.

Designing the Selection Process Selection procedures that are properly developed and carefully used are vital to the success of organizations. The goal of employment tests is to help employers choose the person best suited for the job and organization; the tests should predict future job performance. Tests are defined here as the measurement of carefully chosen samples of behavior. This is a broad definition and encompasses most selection devices, including interviews, paper-andpencil tests, personality assessments, and integrity tests. Work samples and situational exercises, in which applicants participate in a simulation of the work they will be asked to do on the job, are also tests. Application blanks, limited Internet searches, reference and criminal background checks, and drug tests are used to help identify the best applicants. Tests should be identified based on their relevance to the information obtained from the job analysis because this ensures that they are related to future job performance. Employers can purchase tests from test publishers or develop their own tests. Before using the tests in the selection process, their reliability and validity should be evaluated. Reliable tests yield similar results over the course of multiple administrations of the test, or the items within a test are internally consistent and measure a similar ability, knowledge, skill, or other characteristic of interest. If a test is reliable, then the next step is to check whether the test measures what it is intended to measure (i.e., its validity). When a test is purchased, the test’s reliability and validity should be provided by the test publisher; the reliability and validity of a test developed for use by an employer must be evaluated similarly. Many employers purchase tests because the research needed to

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determine a test’s reliability and validity can be time-consuming or costly.

Recruitment The process that organizations use to identify qualified applicants for a job defines recruitment. Depending on the job, employers may recruit from inside or outside the organization. They may advertise on their company web page or on an Internet site for specific types of jobs. In addition, websites such as monster.com link potential employees and employers in a variety of jobs and locations. Other recruitment sources include newspapers, radio advertisements, trade magazines, professional publications, and employee referrals. Employee referrals occur when current emp­ loyees recommend others for positions in the organization. The referrals help employers obtain new hires and have been rated highly by them as providing the best return on their investment. Employees recruited through inside sources work for the organization longer and have better job performance than those recruited through outside sources (e.g., advertisements). Those applicants recruited using inside sources have been found to receive more accurate information about the job (known as realistic job previews) than those recruited through external sources. In turn, these realistic job previews have been shown to enhance employee perceptions of organizational honesty, resulting in lower voluntary turnover of employees.

The Selection Process The selection process for many jobs starts with a job candidate completing an application and submitting it with a résumé to the manager or human resources department. Both of these documents provide information about education and work experience to the employer and are used as an initial test to screen candidates. If an applicant meets the basic requirements (e.g., required education level, availability to work specific hours) of the job, the hiring manager may conduct a limited Internet search, including social media sites, for information about the job applicant. These low-cost “reference checks” are often conducted prior to contacting an applicant and

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may be used to eliminate him or her or to provide information that results in further consideration of the applicant. Managers may be able to learn how a job candidate would fit with the organizational culture as well as about his or her professionalism, including communication skills. Managers need to be cautious when perusing social networking sites so that their hiring decisions are not influenced by information such as religion, sex, and national origin; using this type of information would be illegal in the United States. Some managers complete the limited Internet searches toward the end of the testing process in consideration of potential biases that might occur as a result of information obtained from social media sites. Many organizations have developed policies for the use of social networking sites in both recruiting new employees as well as the use of social networking sites by current employees. Legal, privacy, and ethical issues will become more important as the number of people who use social networking sites continues to grow. After passing the application-plus-résumé and the social networking evaluations, applicants may be asked to take online tests (e.g., personality) or to participate in an interview that gauges the applicant’s interest in the job, motivation, and communication skills. Nearly all organizations use some type of interview, whether a phone, online (e.g., Skype), or in-person interview. One type of interview is unstructured and characterized as informal. Different job candidates are asked different questions, there is no scoring key, and it is conducted by an untrained interviewer. Although many employers rely heavily on this type of interview, numerous research studies suggest that it is highly subjective and does not provide reliable or valid information for the selection of employees; it is not a good test to use in the selection process. Another type of interview is structured and is similar to a standardized test. Applicants for the same position would be asked the same questions (which are based on attributes necessary for success, as determined by the job analysis) by a trained interviewer. Guidelines for judging applicants’ answers and a scoring key are provided; these interviews have been found to be reliable and valid. Properly constructed interviews hold the promise of supplying useful information about

attributes, such as oral comprehension, communication and listening skills, and motivation—characteristics not typically evaluated in ability or skills testing. The structured phone or online interview as well as other online tests (e.g., ability) can be used to reduce the list of applicants before meeting them in person; this saves the organization and applicant time and money. Those applicants identified as having the most potential for success would then be invited to visit the organization for more testing. These applicants may be asked to take a physical ability test (e.g., police officers), complete a work sample (e.g., graphic designers), or participate in a leaderless group discussion (e.g., managers). Most likely, they will also participate in another, preferably structured, interview. Another test being used by many managers, either on- or off-site, is the integrity test. Employers use these tests to help them choose applicants who are dependable, honest, and trustworthy. Integrity tests are reliable and predict theft, absenteeism, and performance, as well as a reduction in compensation claims. After completing the relevant tests, a manager may conduct background checks (e.g., reference, criminal, or credit evaluations) and ask the applicant to submit to a drug test. Once the entire testing process is complete, there may multiple applicants who have passed the tests required for the position, and the selection decision must be made.

Strategies for Selection Decisions When selecting employees, employers look for a good match between the employee and the organization. They want to match the requirements for excellent performance in the job with the person’s knowledge, skills, abilities, personality, attitudes, and motivation for the job. They attempt to accomplish this by using the different types of tests administered during the selection process. A manager can use several approaches to making the final selection decision based on testing, including unadjusted top-down, passing scores, banding, multiple cutoff, and multiple hurdle. Unadjusted top-down selection ranks applicants based on their test scores. The top-scoring applicant is selected first, followed by the applicant with the next highest score, and so on until all the

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openings are filled. This type of selection strategy answers the question, “Who will perform best in the future?” Selection using passing scores is determined by the use of a cutoff score that represents the lowest test score associated with acceptable job performance on each of the different tests as decided by management. Individuals who score at or above the passing score on all tests are eligible to be hired. Passing scores answer the question, “Who will perform at an acceptable level in the future?” The banding selection strategy takes into account the degree of error associated with any test score. This strategy seeks to determine whether applicants’ scores are significantly different or whether they are, in fact, equivalent once measurement error is taken into account. The multiple cutoff and multiple hurdle strategies operate in similar ways but make the final decisions differently. In each strategy, applicants need a minimum score on each test to pass it. In the multiple cutoff strategy, applicants complete all tests and then their scores are compared to the passing scores for each test. If an applicant does not have the minimal score required on any one test, he or she is eliminated from further consideration. The multiple-hurdle approach evaluates each test as it is taken, and an applicant is either allowed to continue to take another test or eliminated from further consideration. For example, an applicant would take a knowledge test and, if he or she passed that test with the minimum score, the applicant would be allowed to take the personality test. If applicant did not pass the knowledge test, he or she would be eliminated from further consideration. The different strategies have benefits and drawbacks, so there is not one best strategy. Managers typically use a combination of strategies in order to take into account the requirements of the job as well as organizational and legal issues. Kathy A. Hanisch See also Employee Motivation; Intelligence Testing; Job Analysis; Personality Testing

Further Readings Aamodt, M. G. (2013). Industrial/organizational psychology: An applied approach. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Cengage Learning.

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Earnest, D. R., Allen, D. G., & Landis, R. S. (2011). Mechanisms linking realistic job previews with turnover: A meta-analytic path analysis. Personnel Psychology, 64(4), 865–897. Salgado, J. F., Viswesvaran, C., & Ones, D. (2001). Predictors used for personnel selection: An overview of constructs, methods and techniques. In N. Anderson, D. S. Ones, H. K. Sinangil, & C. Viswesvaran (Eds.), Handbook of industrial, work and organizational psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 166–199). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Zedeck, S. (Ed.). (2010). Selecting and developing members for the organization: Vol. 2. APA handbook of industrial and organizational psychology. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Zottoli, M. A., & Wanous, J. P. (2000). Recruitment source research: Current status and future directions. Human Resource Management Review, 10, 435–451.

Phenomenological, Existential, and Hermeneutical Therapies Phenomenological, existential, and hermeneutical therapies have their own particular definitions, histories, values, and practices but cannot be properly understood except in relation to each other. An integrated phenomenologicalexistential-hermeneutical practice of therapeutic care can be defined as an engaged understanding of lived meaning within the contexts of specific life circumstances and situations and in light of the possibilities and limitations of the shared existential condition. After a description of each approach to therapy, this entry expands on this definition in historical perspective before turning to its implications and future challenges. The nuances within each tradition are a tale to be told. Indeed, existential therapy, for example, includes the following perspectives: existentialphenomenological therapy, integrative humanisticexistential therapy, Daseinsanalysis, existential depth psychotherapy, logotherapy, existential psychoanalysis, existential positive therapy, contemplative existential therapy, and East/West ­existential therapy. Shared values within the existential tradition such as authenticity, meaning, freedom, and responsibility are weighted differently according to different emphases within the various stances.

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Likewise, phenomenological therapy has its nuanced alternatives, depending on the kind of phenomenology one finds oneself committed to: transcendental, hermeneutical, applied, analytic, radical, and even postphenomenological and neurophenomenological options. In turn, hermeneutical therapy may be interpretive, critical, practical, or radical in its orientation. And there are various combinations of the three traditions: existential phenomenology, hermeneutical phenomenology, existential-hermeneutical-phenomenology, phenomenological anthropology, phenomenological psychiatry, and daseinsanalytic phenomenology. In spite of their pronounced diversity, phenomenological, existential, and hermeneutic approaches tri-constitute each other and share an integrated way of being therapeutic for those entrusted to provide care. After all, how could one understand a meaningful experience without hermeneutics? What does hermeneutics attempt to understand if not phenomena as lived in existential situations?

Historical Development The interdependency of phenomenology, existentialism, and hermeneutics is ancient. The early wisdom literature in various spiritual traditions included central existential themes about freedom, meaning, nonnegotiable limitations, leaps into possibilities, and the experience that one is a contributing, but finite, part of something more expansive than oneself. Hermeneutics originated as a way to “divine” or interpret the wisdom and meaning disclosed in sacred texts about these lived experiences of encounters with Otherness. Moreover, the Greek therapeia, from which the word therapy is derived, means “to attend to the divine in another person.” Other phrases, such as the Latin cura animarum, which means “care (not cure) of the soul,” and the Greek Iatros tes psuches, which means “physician of the soul,” highlight the spiritual thread that runs through this integrated tradition up through current discussions about the “theological turn” in Continental thought, particularly about the phenomenology of the gift and the event. This communion of traditions views experience, interpretation, and existence as intertwined, as evidenced by the continuing transdisciplinary dialogues within religion, psychology, and Continental philosophy occurring today.

Medieval use of interpretation in instrumental ways to decode allegory, narrative, and symbols or to discern the spirits gave way to a focus on the limits and possibilities of knowledge and the nature of reality. Therapeutic care focused more on wise counsel about how to live a devout and virtuous life and on the consolatio literature meant to console those who mourned life’s finitude, particularly with the loss of a loved one. Offering empathic solace required attunement with the sufferer’s intentionality, and a shift occurred from the interpretation of texts per se to a focus on the relationship between the text, the author’s intentions, and the interpreter, a shift made by Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), who is known as the father of modern hermeneutics. Given the pace of scientific discovery, along with increased industrialization and challenges to authoritative institutions, the mid-19th century wrought a lineage from Soren Kierkegaard (1813–1855), considered the father of existentialism; to Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), whose work is considered foundational for radical theologians, poststructuralists, critical theorists, ­ and Continental thinkers generally; to Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), considered by many as originally differentiating the human sciences from the natural sciences; to Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), founder of descriptive, transcendental phenomenology; to Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), Husserl’s student, who revised and transformed the entire tradition in ways that “retrieved” an integrated understanding of phenomenology, ­existentialism, and hermeneutics. Phenomenology, existentialism, and hermeneutics led to, and away from, the hub that was Heidegger, who inextricably bound them together as an integrated way of understanding Being itself and its various expressions in specific ways of being-in-the-world. Heidegger’s work was further developed by Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980), Max Scheler (1874–1928), Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961), and the Swiss psychiatrists Ludwig Binswanger (1881–1966) and Medard Boss (1903–1990). Boss conducted seminars in his home between 1959 and 1969, hosting Heidegger and psychiatric residents and translating phenomenological philosophizing to clinical practice. Others advanced this work in Europe, including Gion Condrau (1919–2006) and Alice Holzhey-Kunz

Phenomenological, Existential, and Hermeneutical Therapies

(1943– ), in what came to be known as Daseinsanalysis, or an analysis of existence or Dasein: ways of “being there.” From Daseinsanalysis came existential-­ phenomenological therapy proper, as refined in the works of R. D. Laing (1927–1989), Hans Cohn (1916–2004), and Ernesto Spinelli (1949– ), among others. The phenomenological-existential-hermeneutical tradition of therapeutic care migrated from Europe to the United States, Asia, Africa, Mexico, South America, Russia, Greece, and numerous other countries and has now been incorporated into other theoretical orientations in amalgamated fashion around the world. In spite of the vast possibilities within this praxis of therapeutic care, there is a quiddity, or “thisness,” about the phenomenological-existential-hermeneutical way of caring that is unique and differentiated from other, more common models of care.

Implications for Therapeutic Care In many ways, this human science of therapeutic care was a response to reductionistic scientism, which perpetuated the false presumption that disturbances in human meaning were like physical diseases or pathogens to be cured. Based on this supposition, human beings are viewed as merely biochemical processes or algorithms to be chemically or behaviorally engineered. The human science position, however, maintained its heritage of collaborative, engaged understanding as a model of care for human dignity and soul, resisting the more medically modeled classifications, pathologization, and deficit correction technology that aimed at purifying symptoms, particularly those considered abnormal in relation to norms and the dominant criteria for how one should live one’s life. For the Continental practitioner, symptoms were not “pathogens” to excise but expressions of meaning to be understood and to be understood with an attitude of horizontalization that does not privilege one kind of lived meaning as better or less than another. Because the natural sciences did not address questions of meaning and existential dilemmas in life, other methods were essential that were “experience-near”—that is, familiar with lived experiences as the primary datum of concern so as to illuminate meaning.

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The guiding emphasis in phenomenological, existential, and hermeneutical care is on “meeting” another human being as a human being and journeying together in the project of understanding and clarifying one’s life dilemmas and how one participates in them, all the while suspending determinations of how one should live one’s life and resisting the lure of the cure. Only by depathologizing and de-medicalizing one’s existential condition is it possible to deconstruct stigmatization. The ethics of doing so is predicated of a radical respect for singularity and the uniqueness of persons and situations and of embracing life in its fullness, which also includes its ugliness. This approach has no essentials, foundations, generics, or absolutes. Reality, therefore, is relative to one’s perspective-based situatedness in the concrete world of persons, relationships, things, and events. There is no reality separate from how it matters for me or you or us or them. The therapist—or properly, the therapeut—therefore, brackets what is assumed about what a “self” is from what should be the case regarding life circumstances, relationships, roles, and other common views about life in order to allow new understandings to emerge for exploration. This approach, which is more technically called the epoche, or reduction, involves a movement from a “natural” attitude to a “phenomenological” one. From this stance, and initiated by Heidegger’s thought, truth is aletheia, which is an unfolding, unconcealment, disclosing, or uncovering of Being as lived in ways of be-ing rather than truth as a logical conclusion, deduction, or calculative summation. Opening to such “worlding” experiences occurs through Gelassenheit, or a “letting things be” as they are, in their own way. Hence, there is no essentialist Truth but rather perspectival, multiple, and relative truths. Meaning is inherent to each moment, including moments of meaninglessness, and is a part of a larger story that “intends” a purpose, is “toward something,” or is “about something.” Another way to put it is that there is no unmediated experience or reality; all views are from somewhere. Accordingly, the therapeut is not an expert knower, change agent, or curer, and in fact, is therapeutic precisely in his or her “unknowing”— that is, in his or her ability to inhibit presumptions

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and entitlements and to achieve a validating and flexible, albeit resolute, partiality with any kind of lived meaning encountered. Change is not the primary focus of this way of caring but rather is participating in a human-tohuman, caring relationship that creates an atmosphere for elucidation and invitation to discern one’s existential bearings in one’s life projects. Change, nonetheless, may occur but without insisting on it. This paradox is understood in Eastern traditions as the idea, for instance, of Wu Wei, or change without the intention to force change. Other differences between this way of practicing therapeutic care and other, more familiar ways include the shift from viewing the person in therapy as an object of analysis to a focus on the shared existential condition and a shift from seeking causal explanations to viewing events as convergences of multiple, contextual decisions and meanings: A person is “called toward” something as much as he or she is shaped by something; his or her choices contribute to what occurs, as does much that is beyond his or her control. The therapeut “walks with” another in discerning what is and is not in the other’s hands. From this perspective, depth is not equated with historical antecedence but with the ontological ground (i.e., the inherent and universal givens of the existential condition) from which the ontic expressions (unique and particular) in everyday life emerge. This focus invites the singularity of one’s way of being in the world (i.e., in a web of meaning). Uncovering this lived experience discloses existential significance rather than statistical significance. Most important, though, the therapeutic relationship is the therapeutic intervention rather than a prelude to more engineered forms of intervention. The therapeutic relationship is not an epiphenomenon from past relationships but has its own integrity and creation in the here and now. Intervention, moreover, is not a practice in this tradition of halting, altering, correcting, or eliminating what is unwanted but is about “meeting” another human being as a human being in confirming and challenging ways that do not reduce his or her freedom or uniqueness. Who one is is how one is in relationship with others, things, and life situations.

Meaning, therefore, is disclosed in the relational ways of being with each other. Meaning, though, is not just experiences of joy, warmth, intimacy, inspiration and other positive experiences but may also include despair, horror, and traumatic reexperiences of other, disturbing experiences. Meaning is lived significance that occurs in each moment and is neither good nor bad but simply “is.” It is an attitude in congress with a bracketed and horizontal, albeit resolute, comportment. Understanding, clarification of existence and one’s participation in it, and the power of the engaged relationship to invite current and possible lived meanings is the soul of what can be therapeutic and transformative. Its power to transform, however, is paradoxically predicated on an ability to radically accept another person “as is” without reprimands or agendas to be otherwise and in spite of the possibility to be otherwise, if chosen.

Contemporary Challenges and Future Developments Among the primary, contemporary challenges to this approach of therapeutic care include ongoing dialogue about the nature of reality and meaning between phenomenologists, deconstructionists and speculative realists; explorations of neuroplasticity in neurophenomenology; further development of the therapeutic implications of the “theological turn” in phenomenology; and honoring the ecopsychological challenge to speciesism and exploring how the conditions of human existence may extend to nonhuman existence. If, in the spirit of hospitality, these challenges are welcomed as strangers bringing transformative messages, then they may offer even more power to the therapeutic approach. The relativity of meaningful truths tempers any hegemonic attempt to impose generic essentialism on another person and is the foundation of productive, multicultural dialogue. Phenomenologicalexistential-hermeneutical therapy can be present, researched, and practiced in a wide range of ­cultures. It is accessible precisely because of its flexibility, its bracketing, its horizontalization, and its radical respect for relative singularity. Moreover, because of the focus on everyday existence and the concreteness of events, it offers not only more opportunities for the engaged researcher and public scholar/practitioner in society but also for

Phonology

more interdisciplinary and interprofessional collaboration. An ongoing challenge is the continuing concern about evidence-based best practices in therapeutic care. Retrieval of original meanings of science, evidence, method, empiricism, and measurement will help in the endeavor to resist the hegemony of one dominant view of these matters—namely, a logical positivist, experimental-design perspective—from monopolizing therapeutic care. In fact, meta-­ analyses have shown time and again that the most important therapeutic factor in successful o ­ utcomes is the quality of the therapeutic relationship. “Being-with” is the heart of a phenomenologicalexistential-hermeneutical way of caring and has been so since its inception. Furthermore, much of what matters in therapeutic situations cannot be measured, and respect for these experiences is as merited as respect for those that are measurable. Todd DuBose and Shawn Rubin See also Contemporary Trends in Psychotherapy; Ethics of Therapy; Evidence-Based Therapy; Existential Theories of Personality; Humanistic Theories of Psychopathology; Psychotherapy and Individualism

Further Readings Barnett, L., & Madison, G. (Eds.). (2012). Existential therapy: Legacy, vibrancy and dialogue. London, England: Routledge. Burston, D., & Frie, R. (2006). Psychotherapy as a human science. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press. Caputo, J. (2013). The insistence of God: A theology of perhaps. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Schneider, K., & Krug, O. (2010). Existential-humanistic therapy. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Sparrow, T. (2014). The end of phenomenology: Metaphysics and the new realism. Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press. Spinelli, E. (2014). Practicing existential therapy: The relational world. London, England: Sage.

Phonology Phonology is the system of implicit knowledge that native speakers possess about the sounds of

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their language and how those sounds can be arranged into words and phrases. Phonology is also the branch of linguistics that studies that knowledge by looking at the patterns of vowels, consonants, pitches, and rhythms of each language, making the speakers’ knowledge explicit and discovering generalizations about the organization and arrangement of sounds in a particular language. One goal of phonology is to construct a ­predictive system that captures native speakers’ internalized knowledge. But like other branches of theoretical linguistics, phonology is also comparative, asking what is common to all languages’ phonologies and how widely they can differ. This entry describes phonology and includes examples from different languages.

Examples When hearing a nonnative speaker of English, one can usually guess that speaker’s first language. A French accent in English sounds nothing like a Mandarin accent or a Spanish accent. Nonnative speakers are missing pieces of the implicit knowledge that makes up a phonological system. Instead, they carry over the phonology of their first language into other languages. Similarly, people can often recognize that a computer is “talking” rather than a human. This is because not all the subtleties of the phonology of the language have been made explicit and implemented in the computer’s programming. In fact, this task has turned out to be a very complicated one that is still not completely solved. Consider a specific example of a systematic distribution of sounds that English speakers know unconsciously. Say the words leak and coal aloud, listening to the l in each and paying attention to what the tongue is doing. The ls in leak and coal are different; leak’s is simple: It involves only the tip of the tongue touching behind the teeth. The l in coal is more complex; it has a w-like sound to it, caused by the back of the tongue lifting upward at the same time the tongue tip touches the teeth. The l in leap is clear; the l in coal is called velarized. People are not likely to notice these different ls in English unless someone directs their attention toward them. They seem the same because the phonological system treats them as the same, and

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there is an unconscious rule for distributing them: “Use velarized l at the end of a syllable and clear l at the beginning of a syllable.” Although not aware of this rule, speakers of English may carry it over to other languages. If a person has studied Spanish, Korean, German, or French, the instructor may have corrected the pronunciation of the Spanish word sol (sun), Korean kil (road), German hell (light), or French sel (salt), because the speaker velarized l at the end of the syllable, just as the English rule indicates. When carried over into another language, this makes one sound like a nonnative speaker—in fact, a speaker of English—because Spanish, Korean, French, and German don’t have a rule producing velarized ls. Interestingly, it isn’t that an English speaker can’t pronounce a clear l; they are uttered all the time at the beginning of syllables. Phonology is not mainly a matter of what the vocal apparatus can produce. Rather, it is about the organization of sounds one has internalized as unconscious knowledge. When English speakers learn another language, they must suppress the rule distributing the variants of l. And Spanish or Korean speakers learning English fail to velarize syllable-final ls, at least at first. They must learn to make the velarized l and to put it in the correct position in English. Languages also differ from each other in how many consonants they can fit at the beginning or end of a word. English is quite liberal about clustering consonants together, but Spanish is quite restrictive, and Mandarin and Japanese are even more so. In English, words can end in as many as three consonants—consider words such as horns, carts, or (un)kempt. In Spanish, words can only end in one consonant, and in Mandarin, they can only end in the single consonants n or ng (ng is a single consonant, written [ŋ] in the International Phonetic Alphabet). In Japanese, words end in a vowel or an n-like sound. Thus, a major challenge for Mandarin, Japanese, or Spanish speakers learning English is to produce words that end in consonants or strings of consonants that their native phonological grammars tell them are not pronounceable. The psychological reality of phonological generalizations is often tested by so-called nonce-probe studies. Native speakers are given made-up words they have never heard and thus could not have

memorized. If they apply the hypothesized process to the new (nonce) word, researchers conclude that the process is productive and real. For instance, if the made-up word is lel, and it is presented in written form to English-speaking participants, the prediction is that they will pronounce the first l clear and the second velarized. Similarly, consider how the English plural, spelled s, is pronounced. After so-called voiceless consonants such as p, t, and k, which are made without vibration of the vocal cords, a plural s is pronounced s. (Say caps, cats, and treks, noticing the last sound.) After voiced consonants, such as b, d, and g, where the vocal folds vibrate, the plural suffix is pronounced z. (Say cabs, cads, and dogs. It is possible to feel one’s vocal folds vibrating for the final consonants by putting a hand on the throat.) If the rule about when to use s versus z is psychologically real, speakers should apply it to madeup words. And they do. Studies have shown that a nonce word such as wug will be pluralized with a z by participants (wugs is pronounced wugz), but blick will be pluralized with an s. Ellen M. Kaisse See also Cognition and Language; Language Development, Pinker on Language; Psycholinguistics

Further Readings Berko, J. (1958). The child’s learning of English morphology. Word, 14, 150–177. Hayes, B. (2009). Introductory phonology. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. Odden, D. (2014). Introducing phonology (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. van Oostendorp, M., Ewen, C. J., Hume, E. V., & Rice, K. (Eds.). (2011). The Blackwell companion to phonology. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Piaget’s and the Neo-Piagetian Theories of Cognitive Development Jean Piaget was a biologist with epistemological interests who set himself the task of advancing a theory about the origin, nature, and development

Piaget’s and the Neo-Piagetian Theories of Cognitive Development

of knowledge and intelligence. For Piaget, reality is a constant flux of change that burdens understanding. Objects and persons change continuously (move around; appear and disappear; change in size, color, or form; etc.). Intelligence is a biological system of adaptation that enables individuals to grasp what is stable behind surface variations. As such, intelligence involves operative and figurative aspects. Operative intelligence is active in that it involves all actions, mental or real, undertaken in order to perceive the relations between transformed objects. Figurative intelligence involves the means of representation used to retain in mind the states intervening between transformations, such as perception, mental imagery, drawing, and language. Therefore, the figurative aspects of intelligence derive their meaning from the operative aspects of intelligence. This entry reviews theories of cognitive development, beginning with Piaget’s work in the 1930s and moving to present-day thinkers known as neo-Piagetians. Piaget believed that cognitive development unfolds in stages. Successive stages organize actions into structures that provide the mental frame for the assimilation of current encounters with objects or persons. When assimilation is not possible, the current mental structure changes to provide accommodation to new aspects of objects or persons. The reversibility of structure at each stage is critical in order to identify what is stable behind the transformations that take place, because it connects a present state with an earlier one (e.g., this person is still my mother despite a different dress).

The Stages of Operative Development Sensorimotor intelligence develops through several stages from birth to 2 years of age. At the beginning, infants perceive that objects cease to exist when they are not in view or not acted on. By integrating perceptions (e.g., objects appear, disappear and reappear, change in color or shape) and actions toward objects (e.g., objects are examined from different perspectives, they are thrown away and recovered), infants eventually perceive that objects continue to exist, even if they are not in the field of perception.

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However, up to the age of 8 months, objects are still regarded as projections of the infant’s actions toward them. For instance, infants will try to recover an object from the place where they previously recovered it rather than from the place where it just disappeared. Object permanence is achieved at 15 to 16 months, when objects are recovered from where they were last seen to disappear, indicating the full reversibility of sensorimotor actions. Later, at 18 to 24 months, infants can recover multiple objects even if hidden in a succession of places. This indicates stable object representations embedded in plans for mental actions. Thus, a long journey begins toward the development of representational intelligence. It evolves in three stages, with two substages in each: preoperational intelligence, which involves prelogical (2–5 years) and intuitive intelligence (5–6 years), early (7–8 years) and late concrete operations (9–11 years), and early (11–14) and late formal operations (15–18 years). In the preoperational stage, representations are not interrelated by reversible structures of mental operations. As a result, privileged transformations or appearances may deceive the child because the relations underlying them cannot be mentally reconstructed. Errors of conservation exemplify this failure. For example, preoperational children think that the quantity of water in a glass that is poured in a longer and thinner glass is more than before simply because it is higher (ignoring that it is also thinner). During the stage of concrete thought, from 7 to 11 years of age, these kinds of problems are correctly answered and explained, signifying the construction of the reversible structure of concrete thought. They now realize that what was gained in height was lost in width and it can even be poured back in the original class to check. Piaget devised tasks representing many domains—such as length, area, matter, weight, volume, causality, social relations, and morality—to show that understanding evolves through the same stages and is governed by the same structures. Each stage culminates in the construction of an increasingly abstract conception of stability in the world: object permanence, representation of objects, properties defining various aspects of objects, and ideal possibilities in sensorimotor, preoperational, concrete, and formal thought, respectively.

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Mechanisms of Change in Piaget’s Theory Change follows “reflective abstraction,” which comes in two forms. Reflecting abstraction spots commonalities between actions and their results and projects them into a new concept. For instance, noting that counting a set of objects in different arrangements (in circle, in a row, etc.) always yields the same number, the child may form a new representation of number where only numerosity is relevant and other properties, such as color, length, or density, are irrelevant. Once constructed, the new concept can itself become the object of reflection so that it can be related with other concepts, such as length, weight, and so on. This is reflected abstraction or “thinking about thinking.” Piaget believed that this awareness of mental operations occurs only in formal thought.

Evaluation of the Theory Researchers have replicated Piaget’s original experiments in thousands of studies across numerous domains. The conclusion is that the phenomena he discovered and their approximate age of emergence were valid. But is the theory right? That is, are mental abilities at different ages really the result of the processes proposed by Piaget? Additional hundreds of studies have demonstrated that cognitive development involves many more processes than the structures of reversible mental operations proposed by Piaget. Memory, attention, language, and familiarity are processes that may cause cognitive abilities to appear much later or much earlier than specified by Piaget. Also, individuals usually operate on different levels in different domains at any age. As a result, Piaget’s theory may be considered out of date, although its themes, concepts, and agedependent staging are still under study.

The Neo-Piagetians Neo-Piagetian research and theory have focused on several aspects of cognitive development from an information-processing perspective, most notably working memory and processing speed. Others have focused on core domains of cognitive development.

Information Processing and Cognitive Development

In the 1970s, so-called neo-Piagetian theorists focused on working memory. Early on, a linear relation was assumed between the classical Piagetian stage sequence and working memory development. The working assumption was that increases in working memory are responsible for the transition from stage to stage. Juan PascualLeone claimed that working memory can hold one representation at the age of 3 years, and it increases by one unit every second year until it reaches its maximum of 7 units at the age of 15 years. Thus, each next Piagetian substage is associated with a particular working memory capacity. Later, theorists tried to explain how changes in working memory relate to both across- and within-stage transitions. In the 1980s, Robbie Case proposed a new definition of stages and capacity. He rejected Piaget’s description of mental structures in terms of reversible operations and maintained that each stage is characterized by a particular executive structure for accessing particular kinds of problems. Executive control structures are internal mental blueprints containing (a) a representation of the problem situation (e.g., “This is an interesting object to play with”), (b) a representation of common objectives in the a situation (e.g., grasp the object, bring it closer to view), and (c) a representation of the strategy needed to go efficiently from the problem situation to the objectives (e.g., remove obstacles between the individual and the object). Case described four types of executive control structures: sensorimotor (e.g., seeing or grasping; 1–18 months), interrelational (e.g., words or mental images; 18 months–5 years), dimensional (e.g., numbers; 5–11 years), and vectorial (ratios of numbers; 11–19 years). He maintained that development in each stage evolves through a sequence of four levels of complexity such that the final level of a stage is also the first level of the following stage. Executive control structures depend on total processing space (TPS), which is the sum of operating space (OS) and short-term storage space (STSS). OS is occupied by the executive operations needed to attain a goal. The STSS refers to the maximum number of mental schemes that the thinker can focus on.

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For example, when counting sets of objects, counting occupies OS, and the result of each count occupies STSS. Case maintained that TPS does not change with development. Only the relationships between OS and STSS change. That is, after entering a stage, the execution of operations specific to that stage becomes increasingly efficient and automated, freeing mental resources that can be used to retain more information in STSS. Thus, more complex problems can be solved and concepts grasped with progression within a stage. Case proposed four mechanisms for the construction of new structures involving schemes— namely, search, evaluation, retagging, and consolidation. Schematic search refers to the need to simultaneously activate the requisite mental schemes so that they can be interrelated and combined into something new. Schematic evaluation involves comparing alternative groupings of schemes in order to evaluate their relevance to the present goal. Schematic retagging refers to the process that gives an “identity” to the new structure so that it can be recovered independently of the schemes involved in its construction. Schematic consolidation involves reworking and rehearsing the new structure until it is mastered. Speed of Processing and Inhibition in Cognitive Development

Several theorists attempted to reduce cognitive development to an even more basic function than working memory—namely, processing speed. Robert Kail showed that reaction times in various domains (such as mental addition, mental rotation, and memory search) decrease exponentially with age, leveling off at 17 to 18 years of age. This suggests the operation of a common factor that ­ constrains performance across all types of tasks, a factor possibly related to age-specific changes in the rate of neural communication or other parameters of representation and processing of information in the brain. Kail suggested that increases in processing speed allow more efficient use of working memory, which, in turn, facilitates reasoning and thinking. Other researchers studied the role of inhibition as the gatekeeper of information processing. It protects processing from interference by irrelevant information, removes task-irrelevant information

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from the field or space of processing, and blocks mental or overt actions that may divert processing from the current goal. Research showed that inhibition improves from early childhood to late adolescence, remains stable until middle age, and declines thereafter. This approach evolved into theories of the development of executive control.

Understanding Core Domains and the Mind Another line of research focused on the development of understanding in specific knowledge domains rather than underlying inferential or information-processing mechanisms. The aim was to highlight how crucial aspects of the physical, biological, and psychological worlds are understood by children. This research showed that by the age of 3 years, children discriminate between the physical and the psychological worlds. For example, they realize that one can see, touch, and pet one’s dog but not a dog one only thinks about. However, even 6-year-olds would be afraid to stay alone in a room where they imagined that there is a monster. Therefore, the distinction between reality and imagination apparently develops through the preschool years. Theory of mind (ToM) refers to awareness about the perceptual origins of knowledge and the understanding that each person’s mental states depend on the information each person has access to. Three-year-old children possess the fundamentals of ToM, such as understanding that lying may create representations in another person’s mind that are different from their own representations and they can use the former to satisfy a desired goal. However, they do not solve the classic ToM task. In it, the experimenter places a piece of candy into box A, but not box B, in front of both the child and a research assistant. The assistant leaves the room, and the experimenter moves the candy from box A to box B. The experimenter asks the child to indicate in which of the two boxes the assistant will look for the candy. Box A corresponds to the assistant’s representation of the candy’s location, and box B to the child’s representation of the present location of the candy. This task generally is solved (the child indicates box A) by 4.5 years of age. Later, at about 8 years,

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children grasp a second-order theory of mind. That is, they understand that “John thought that Mary thought that Anna thought . . .” Understanding the organization and functioning of the mind proceeds in a similar fashion. John Flavell and his colleagues showed that preschoolers understand that thinking is some sort of internal mental activity that refers to real or imaginary objects or events. They also realize that thinking is different from perceiving or knowing. One experiment showed that 3-year-olds understand that a person who is blindfolded and has his or her ears covered cannot see or hear an object, but he or she can think about the object. However, there are important aspects of thinking that preschoolers do not understand—for instance, that it goes on continuously in people’s minds or that activities such as looking and listening necessarily entail and shape thinking. During the primary school years, children differentiate between mental processes such as memory and thinking. However, not until middle adolescence do thinkers notice the differences between different types of thinking (e.g., spatial and mathematical thought) and associate them with different processes.

Toward an Overarching Theory Research has confirmed a number of powerful phenomena in intellectual development: 1. Thought develops systematically from birth to adulthood through a series of cycles. Each cycle begins with a new kind of representation at the beginning. There is general agreement that there are four cycles, which start approximately at birth, 2, 6, and 11 years, respectively. 2. Processing speed, working memory, and executive control develop systematically during this age range. Processing becomes increasingly faster, working memory stores increasingly more information, and executive control becomes increasingly more focused, flexible, and efficient. 3. The awareness of mental processes becomes increasingly accurate and refined.

These phenomena may give the impression of direct and linear causal relations between the

cycles of development. Neo-Piagetian theorists generally assumed that this is the case. However, Andreas Demetriou and his colleagues have shown that changes in processing speed and working memory are not directly related to changes in thought. Specifically, they equated a large number of children from 4 to 16 years of age on working-memory performance and compared them in terms of the level of thought development they had reached. Their level of thought was closer to what was expected from their age rather than from their working-memory capacity. Similar results were found for processing speed. They also showed that changes at the beginning of each cycle are more related to changes in speed; changes at the end of cycles are more related to changes in working memory. However, the influence of speed and working memory on thought development was indirect, mediated by awareness. And this mediation of awareness was cycle specific; that is, it was based on awareness of the perceptual origins of knowledge and representations in the 4- to 6-year-old cycle and on the awareness of the inferential origins of knowledge in the 7- to 9-year-old cycle. Thus, mental functioning in each cycle generates insight into the mental constructs and processes that are available during the cycle. By integrating over various lines of research, Demetriou and colleagues have proposed that the mind should be minimally defined in terms of four dimensions: the central core of intellect, development, mastery of different domains of understanding, and individual differences. The central core involves three interdependent processes: (a) abstraction, which induces similarities between patterns of information; (b) representational alignment, which maps representations onto each other, enabling comparisons driven by current goals; and (c) cognizance, which is awareness of the objects of cognition (e.g., “I know that now I am thinking about roses) and of cognitive processes (e.g., “I know that I am looking for similarities between roses and flowers”). This core evolves through four major developmental cycles, with two phases in each. New representations emerge early in each cycle, and their alignment dominates later. Episodic representations flourish in the first year of life, and they are

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aligned with each other in systems of action in the second year. The cycle of representations starts at the age of 2 years, when action-based episodic representations are elevated into symbol-based mental representations. At age 4, representations may be aligned to yield pragmatic inferences, comparisons, and predictions. Children use inference, but they are not aware of it. The cycle of concepts starts at 6 years, when mental representations are integrated into rulebased concepts. At age 8, inferential rules may be aligned to produce systematic logical inferences. Children are aware of inferential processes, but they are not aware of logic. The cycle of principles starts at the age of 11 years, when concepts are integrated into higher order conceptual systems, allowing children to view each concept from the others’ point of view, and inference may be directly evaluated for validity. At this phase, thinkers are aware of logical constraints and principles. At 14 years, principles may be aligned to yield higher order systems containing counterintuitive logical relations, indicating an explicit grasp of metalogic. The central core coexists with several domains of understanding that emerge from interaction with standard relations in the environment. These relations include the following: •• Arrangement in space (e.g., close and far away, left or right, below and above) •• Physical resemblance (e.g., color, shape) •• Aggregation and distribution (e.g., few or many, increase or decrease) •• Effective interactions (e.g., changes in an object or event that are obviously or ostensibly associated with changes in another object or event) •• Species-specific important information (e.g., faces of conspecifics or comforting behaviors, such as feeding and vocalizations)

Domains emerge from the functioning of the core’s processes because the alignment of related items (by nature or the environment) is more likely than alignment of nonelated items. Cognizance enables revisiting and revising alignments, thus strengthening domain specificity and self-directed meaning making. Developmental possibilities may be differentially realized. That is, individuals differ in

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developmental efficiency and stability. Some individuals are developmentally efficient; that is, they develop faster than others, they reach higher levels of performance, and they preserve their developmental gains over time. The combination of higher levels of processing efficiency, working memory, and awareness constitutes an individual advantage for developmental prospects in the long run. Andreas Demetriou See also Adolescent Development, Theories of; Behavioral Development; Childhood; Cognitive Development; Cognition and Language; Culture and Cognition; Culture and Development; Erikson’s Theory of Psychosocial Development; Gender and Cognition; Hermeneutics and Developmental Psychology; Language and Development; Moral Development; Perceptual Development; Reasoning and Decision Making

Further Readings Carey, S. (2009). The origins of concepts. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Case, R. (1992). The mind’s staircase: Exploring the conceptual underpinnings of children’s thought and knowledge. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Demetriou, A. (1998). Cognitive development. In A. Demetriou, W. Doise, & K. F. M. van Lieshout (Eds.), Life-span developmental psychology (pp. 179–269). London, England: Wiley. Demetriou, A., Spanoudis, G., Shayer, M., van der Ven, S., Brydges, C. R., Kroesbergen, E., . . . Kazi, S. (2014). Relations between speed, working memory, and intelligence from preschool to adulthood: Structural equation modeling of 15 studies. Intelligence, 46, 107–121. Piaget, J. (1970). Piaget’s theory. In P. H. Mussen (Ed.), Carmichael’s handbook of child development (pp. 703–732). New York, NY: Wiley.

Pinker

on

Language

Steven Pinker (1954– ) has published widely in linguistics and particularly in the field of cognitive linguistics, which links linguistics and psychology. He is an advocate of the nativist position in the nature–nurture debate as he shows in the

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publications with which this entry is most concerned: The Language Instinct (1994) and Language, Cognition, and Human Nature (2013). Pinker’s approach has been strongly influenced by the work of Noam Chomsky, especially in his claims for universal grammar (UG). Chomsky developed his theory of language in a series of publications beginning with Syntactic Structures (1957) and Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965). As these titles indicate, for Chomsky what characterizes language is grammar: Other features with which all users and many linguists are involved—meaning, communication, identity—are not of interest. Pinker’s research is mainly concerned with first-language (L1) acquisition, whereas what interests Chomsky is grammar. After a historical review of the nature-nurture debate, this entry explains Pinker’s position on this debate with regard to language and provides a critique of his position.

Philosophical Debate The nature–nurture debate has a long philosophical history. The underlying concern—whether the world is accessed by the brain via instinct alone or whether access depends on experience—is constant and perhaps unresolvable. Most scholars take up positions somewhere between the two extremes: only nature and only nurture. Those who have taken the nativism view include Plato, Kant, Pascal, and Descartes. On the empiricism side are Aristotle, John Locke, David Hume, George Berkeley, John Stuart Mill, and Charles Sanders Peirce; linguists such as Geoffrey Pullum and George Sampson; and psychologists such as Michael Tomasello. Nativism is defined as the doctrine of innate ideas, or that the mind possesses forms of thought independent of sensation. This philosophical/psychological theory states that certain abilities (or capacities, mechanisms) are present in the child at birth, This is in contrast to empiricism, the blank slate (or tabula rasa) position of, for example, John Locke, who in 1690 wrote, “How comes the mind to be furnished? . . . Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from experience.” The argument of the nativist is that a child is born with certain psychological capacities that

enable him or her to learn and acquire skills such as language: The canonical example would be a child learning to walk, which, it is accepted, requires no empirical stimuli. For the empiricist, nothing is passed on at birth: All is there in the context to be discovered and passed on, which requires the empiricist to make a complete distinction between physical and mental development. For the nativist, this cannot be since what the young child has to do is to learn a very complicated grammar, so complicated according to Chomsky (1965) that the child must have an innate language learning model, a language acquisition device. For nativists researching language, such as Chomsky and Pinker, language acquisition is not influenced by context any more than learning to walk is: Language is, in their view, instinctive.

Pinker’s Position In his work as a cognitive scientist and linguist, as in his more popular publications, for which he has received much praise for his facility in explaining complex ideas to a nonspecialist audience, Pinker appears to occupy a strong nativist or rationalist position. For him, language is an instinct, an innate behavior shaped by natural selection and adapted to communication needs. Pinker’s early books (e.g., Learnability and Cognition, 1989) were on topics such as the regularization of irregular forms and the massive correlation of frequency and irregularity, with particular reference to the English tense system. But his underlying concern has always been, How did language evolve? For him, there had to be an innate faculty of mind, an instinct similar to adaptive behavior in other species—for example, in a spider’s weaving a web. His 1994 book, The Language Instinct: The New Science of Language and Mind, presents these ideas, which he claims were deeply influenced by Chomsky. Since for Pinker language is an instinct, he proposes that it does not need to be taught, that people’s grammar is not poor, that the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of linguistic relativity (namely, that language inflects perception, that is, one’s language shapes one’s view of the world and her or his interaction with it) cannot be upheld, and that other species—for example, apes—cannot learn languages. Language, he maintains, is unique to

Pinker on Language

humans: It evolved to solve the problem of communication among hunter-gatherers. Pinker seems to wish to demonstrate the idea of a complex and distinctive human nature. He argues that human cognition depends on combining symbols rather than on sensory associations. Ironically, it appears that the more Pinker argues his case for the uniqueness of the human brain, the closer he comes to embracing man as machine. Thus, he maintains in Words and Rules (1999) that both regular and irregular language phenomena are the result of interaction between computation and memory lookup. Attempts to reconcile strict nativism and some version of empiricism can be found in the discussion by Fiona Cowie of enlightened empiricism in What’s Within? Nativism Reconsidered (1999) and Annette Karmiloff-Smith in Beyond Modularity (1996). Karmiloff-Smith has put forward what she labels representational redescription, which moderates strict nativism through the brain’s becoming modular in certain domains rather than the nativist position of modules being innate. For Chomsky, what is most persuasive is that children learn in spite of negative evidence, since by definition speakers do not use expressions that violate restrictions on the language. Here again, the child acquires the language on partial evidence. UG offers a solution by making certain restrictions universal characteristics of human language. These characteristics are accessed by means of an innate language faculty module (the language acquisition device). According to Derek Bickerton, Creole languages are said to support UG, for example, by their common default point of reference to past time, and questions are expressed only by intonation. But Carla Hudson-Kam and Ellisa Newport argue that acquisition can take place by means of children’s facility in systematizing the language they hear, based on probability and frequency of forms.

Critique of Pinker’s Position The reality of Pinker’s proposed language instinct and the related claim that grammar is innate and genetically based has been contested by both psychologists and linguists. Tomasello has been particularly critical. For Tomasello (1995), the basic premise that language is an instinct is flawed:

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Language is not an instinct. In the common understanding of both scientists and lay persons alike an instinct is a behavioral competency, or set of behavioral competencies that: (a) is relatively stereotyped in its behavioral expression, and (b) would appear in ontogeny even if an individual were raised in isolation from its species-typical set of experiences. . . . But language does not remotely fit with either of these two criteria. . . . An individual human being can acquire any one particular language only in the context of several years of particular types of linguistic experiences with other human beings. (pp. 132–133)

Tomasello argues that Pinker, like Chomsky, holds the idiosyncratic view that language is something called UG and that this is not generally accepted among linguists. The model for UG, he points out, is mathematics and propositional logic rather than language as communication. It works only for English, and it has nothing to do with learning. Pinker, writes Tomasello, makes much of two interrelated theoretical arguments—the poverty of the stimulus and the insufficiency of general learning procedures when applied to language. Tomasello dismisses the poverty of the stimulus argument, pointing out that it has to do, quite narrowly, with grammatical mistakes rather than with the conventions of language that people actually learn and control. As for the insufficiency of traditional learning processes, Tomasello comments that Pinker is still appealing to a “worn-out mix of behaviorist learning theory, simple association and blind induction” (p. 146) rather than to a more thoroughly cognitive learning theory. Pinker’s appeals to Creole language formation and to sign languages should also be dismissed if only because “human children acquire basic skills of linguistic repertoire in a wide variety of circumstances” (p. 148). One of Pinker’s more trenchant linguistic critics is Sampson, who makes telling comments on Pinker’s work but who somewhat blunts his effect by turning his critique into an argument ad hominem. In his essay Empiricism v. Nativism, Sampson attacks Chomsky and his followers for politicizing their academic argument and so creating an intellectual foundation for the 21stcentury version of imperialism—an obnoxious

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new political movement whose initial success stemmed from simple ignorance among presentday Westerners about the diversity of human cultures but which can now quote linguistic nativism as allegedly demonstrating that cultures are really not—indeed, cannot be—diverse.

What Pinker and his fellow nativist Ray Jackendoff do, according to Sampson, is base their attack on empiricism as a belief and not as evidence driven. Ironic, surely, since by its nature nativism is not an evidence-collecting theory and, perhaps, cannot be. Sampson, for his part, claims that his large database of recordings of everyday modern spoken English shows “just how unrealistic the nativist’s beliefs about language behaviour are.” Empirical linguistics does, after all, collect evidence and he insists, Anyone who is willing to look at the evidence in good faith must agree that language, and indeed human intellectual achievements more generally, are in all the ways that matter, cultural developments. Only to a trivial extent are they predetermined by our biology.

In The Language Instinct Debate, Sampson takes seven of Chomsky’s arguments for innateness in turn and rejects each one: 1. Speed of acquisition 2. Age-dependence 3. Poverty of the data 4. Convergence among grammars 5. Language universals 6. Nonlinguistic analogies 7. Species-specificity

Sampson attempts to refute these arguments, partly by his use of a language corpus and partly by an appeal to reason. If language is innate how do people really speak? Furthermore, the notion of UG provides a trap: If there is a UG, “One might wonder why separate human communities would have developed separate spoken languages” (p. 131). Alan Davies has suggested that Sampson is too polemical. Sampson is distressed by the smug

assumption of nativists that their mathematical model for grammar is universally the case. And he does in part wonder why it is necessary to take up such an extreme position. Another critique of Pinker is provided by Geoffrey Pullum and Barbara Scholz in their 2005 chapter “Irrational Nativist Exuberance.” They define linguistic nativism: “Most of the acquisition of natural languages by human beings depends on an unacquired (or acquired but unlearned) linguistic knowledge or language-specialized cognitive mechanisms” (p. 60). They claim that (a) research of auxiliary inversion and (b) American Sign Language research provide evidence for a nonnativist view. They point out that there is no clarity as to the meaning of innate and that if UG requires the positioning of parameters for every natural language, all that nativism does is provide a list of ways in which natural languages differ instead of an explanation of how language is acquired. In The Architecture of Language (2000), Chomsky appears to be committed to the extreme nativist view. He writes, To say that language is not innate is to say that there is no difference between my granddaughter, a rock and a rabbit. . . . If [however] they believe that there is a difference between my granddaughter, a rabbit and a rock then they believe that language is innate. (p. 50)

But where does Pinker stand? Does he take up an extreme nativist position like Chomsky does? The answer is surely “no”: Pinker is indeed a nativist but not an extreme one; he is, one might say “nativist-lite.” However, this statement of his view in The Language Instinct does appear unforgiving: Language is not a cultural artifact that we learn the way we learn to tell time or how the federal government works. Instead, it is a distinct piece of the biological make-up of our brains. . . . Some cognitive scientists have described language as a psychological faculty, a mental organ, a neural system, and a computational module. But I prefer the admittedly quaint term instinct. (p. 18)

Placebo Effect

In Language, Cognition, and Human Nature, he still seems unreconstructed: “The doctrine of the blank slate [i.e., the empirical position] [is] untenable” (p. 215). And yet in the very same work, he accepts that “traits that reflect the underlying talents and temperaments—how proficient with language a person is, how religious, how liberal or conservative—are partially heritable” (p. 223). It seems that a strong form of nativism is difficult to uphold; indeed it is both untenable and unnecessary. A coming together of general nativism (rather than nativism specific to language—the language instinct) and an enlightened empiricism is the sensible compromise. Attempts to save a pure nativism through C. H. Waddington’s concept of canalization (i.e., that development proceeds in largely constrained fashion as though it were moving through a canal) or Cowie’s and Samuels’s concept of psychological primitiveness are not helpful: For language acquisition, the first seems to trivialize the debate and the second to give up explanation in despair. Common sense indicates that humans are born with certain capacities, mental as well as physical. These capacities enable them to respond to their environment. Whether those capacities indicate a specifically linguistic device is unclear and probably not important. Pinker’s 2011 book The Better Angels of Our Nature is a long way from nativism. It is as though he has been struggling to find a way out of the UG/ nativist hole that he dug himself into. And so his current view seems to accept that nurture is important: “The way to explain the decline of violence is to identify the changes in our cultural and material milieu that have given our peaceable motives the upper hand [emphasis added]” (p. xxiii). Alan Davies See also The Evolution of Language; Grammar, Psychology of; Language Development; Language, Interaction, and Culture; Perception and Language; Phonology; Verbal Behavior

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Chomsky, N. (2000). New horizons in the study of language and mind. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Chomsky, N. (2000). The architecture of language (N. Mukhergi, B. Patniack, & R. K. Agnihotri, Eds.). New Delhi: Oxford University Press Cowie, F. (1999). What’s within? Nativism reconsidered. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1996). Beyond modularity: A developmental perspective on cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Locke, J. (1690). Essay concerning human understanding Book 2: 1.2. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/ titles/locke-the-works-vol-1-an-essay-concerninghuman-understanding-part-1 Pinker, S. P. (1989). Learnability and cognition: The acquisition of argument structure. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Pinker, S. P. (1994). The language instinct. New York: William Morrow. Pinker, S. P. (1999). Words and rules: The ingredients of language. New York, NY: Harper Collins. Pinker, S. P. (2011). The better angels of our nature. New York, NY: Viking Books. Pinker, S. P. (2013). Language, cognition and human nature: Selected articles. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Pullum, G. K., & Scholz, B. C. (2005). Irrational nativist exuberance: How much knowledge of language is innate? In R. Stainton (Ed.), Contemporary debates in cognitive science (pp. 59–86). Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell. Sampson, G. (2010). Empiricism v. nativism. Retrieved from http://www.grsampson.net/Rempnat.html Sampson, G. (2013). The language instinct debate. London, England: Bloomsbury/Continuum. Samuels, R. (2002). Nativism in cognitive science. Mind and Language, 17(3), 233–265. Tomasello, M. (1995). S. Pinker: The Language instinct. Language is not an Instinct [Book review]. Cognitive Development, 10, 131–156. Waddington, C. H. (1990). Organisms and genes. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Further Readings

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Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic structures. The Hague, The Netherlands: Mouton. Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

The placebo phenomenon is one of the most interesting examples of the close relationship between mental activity and the psychological component

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of well-being expectancy and their impact on the body. The placebo itself (the term placebo is most likely derived from the Latin stem placebit—“it will please”) is a dummy treatment such as sham surgery or a sugar pill. It is interesting to note that the positive effect related to the administration of dummy treatments that are inert may be defined as an “oxymoron.” Indeed, an inert substance cannot have any effect. However, the objective changes in patients’ well-being and relief from symptoms after placebo treatment may be quantified through specific experimental methods. This entry discusses the placebo effect, including its mechanisms and implications.

Alternative Accounts A crucial aspect of studying the placebo effect is what the observed improvements may be due to. There is always the possibility of drawing incorrect conclusions about the effectiveness of a placebo. A spontaneous remission of symptoms should not be considered a placebo effect. If this happens, the observer may have made an erroneous interpretation of the cause–effect relationship. When a placebo preparation is administered in a chronic-pain condition, such as a migraine headache, it is important to bear in mind that the pain is fluctuating. An increase and a decrease of pain may occur in an unpredictable way. Indeed, the natural history of this kind of pain may vary as a function of time. If the placebo is administered when there is a decrease in pain, an incorrect interpretation of the cause– effect relationship may be reached. It can be erroneously concluded that the placebo itself can be effective in reducing pain, but improvement would have occurred anyway as the result of the natural process, even in the absence of a placebo treatment. The only way to control this phenomenon in a clinical trial is to include a natural-history group that receives neither active treatment nor the placebo preparation. However, the vast majority of clinical trials do not include a natural-history group. Another example of the misinterpretation of the cause–effect relationship involves the statistical phenomenon of the regression to the mean. In idiopathic-headache patients, it is often observed that during the examination phase, headache pain may be above the mean value. If the treatment is administered at this time, an apparent improvement in

pain symptoms may be observed due to the statistical artifact of regression to the mean. Patients examined when their pain is greater tend to report less extreme values ​​in repeated measures; that is, the change occurs in the direction of the mean value. Another source of improvement in a clinical trial that is not a placebo effect is the Hawthorne effect. It can be defined as improvement due to a positive psychosocial context intrinsic to the examination, which brings with it an increase in care, medical attention, and clinical assessment. The best method of assessing the placebo effect and to control these statistical artifacts is to follow the time course of pain after the initial examination in a clinical trial that includes the following groups: a. The no-treatment group is needed to study spontaneous improvement due to the natural history of pain and regression to the mean. b. The placebo group is necessary to study the placebo effect, in this case, a decrease in pain greater than that reported by the natural-history group. The difference between the placebo group and the natural history group defines the placebo effect. c. The treatment group should report a decrease in pain greater than that in the placebo group. Indeed, the difference between these latter two groups estimates the effectiveness of the drug versus placebo.

Defining the Placebo Effect The placebo effect may be defined as a context effect. The psychosocial context surrounding the patient it is very important in order to elicit a positive dummy-treatment response. The positive effect is attributable, in part, to the context of healing in terms of stimuli, including social stimuli that signal a medical intervention. These complex stimuli represent the ritual of the therapeutic act. A second view of the placebo phenomenon is the psychobiological approach, which considers the placebo response to be an active neurobiological process that occurs as a result of placebo treatment. The response that has been studied intensively is analgesia, or placebo hypoalgesia, in which the observed effect is not the absence of pain but only a decrease in pain perception.

Placebo Effect

However, it is important to note that the placebo response has also been studied by taking into account other, comorbid symptoms. In this view, there is not a single placebo response but multiple, concurrent placebo responses. For example, in anxiety and depressive disorders, placebo responses are associated with increased activity in neuronal networks related to the regulation of emotions and may be predicted by the presence of genetic polymorphisms that modulate monoaminergic activity. The activation of reward mechanisms related to a placebo treatment has been described in patients with Parkinson’s disease. The therapeutic benefit is represented by an improvement in the symptoms, which was accompanied by differential activity in the nucleus accumbens in the patients. A dopamine release in the striatum, which affects the activity of single neurons in the subthalamic nucleus, was also observed. Another study showed that following placebo administration, there was a cascade of chemical events characterized, for example, by the release of human growth hormone and adrenocorticotropic hormone, well as the endogenous opioids.

Mechanisms One mechanism that plays a role in the placebo response is classical conditioning. If a conditioned stimulus that belongs to the psychosocial context is repeatedly associated with an unconditioned stimulus, such as an active drug that produces an analgesic effect, the stimulus subsequently may elicit the conditioned response of analgesia/ hypoalgesia. This means that the psychosocial context alone may produce its own analgesic effect. A second mechanism is more complex and involves conscious factors, such as an expectation of improvement following the administration of a given treatment. The therapeutic benefit is represented by reward mechanisms of the sort previously described in relation to the placebo response involving the nucleus accumbens. Brainimaging techniques have been fundamental in the understanding expectancy of placebo-related analgesia, and many brain-imaging studies have described the functional neuroanatomy of the placebo analgesic response. Brain-imaging data have been summarized using the activation

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likelihood estimation method (a coordinatebased meta-analytic approach) to search for ­cortical areas involved in placebo analgesia. During the analgesia expectation phase, areas of activation were found in the left anterior cingulate, right precentral and lateral prefrontal cortex, and the left periaqueductal gray. The results suggest that the modulatory cortical networks involved in placebo analgesia largely overlap those involved in the regulation of emotional processes. These findings are consistent with the idea that placebo treatment directly affects the pain experience and suggests that the affective component of pain may be particularly important. Moreover, the placebo effect on reported pain reflects real changes in pain processing rather than simple reporting biases. This approach also allows for examining the temporal pattern of neural activity in the placebo response to pain. Most current knowledge about the neurobiological mechanisms of the placebo effect comes from pain studies that have found different neurotransmitters to be involved, such as endogenous opioids and endocannabinoids. Verbally induced expectations may activate different neurotransmitters. These biochemical events are likely to take place, at least partly, in a pain-modulating network that involves both cortical and subcortical regions— for example, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, and the periaqueductal gray—as well as in the reward circuit, particularly in the nucleus accumbens. In particular, psychological mechanisms, such as expectation of a positive outcome in terms of pain decrease, activate a cascade of endogenous opioids (neuropeptides). During the expectation of a painful symptom decrease, a system is activated that produces morphine-like substances (the endorphins). In certain brain areas, expectations release opioid neuropeptides that bind to the same receptors as the morphine that has been administered to inhibit pain. Given the close link between psychological and neurobiological mechanisms, the result is an alteration of pain perception induced by an inhibition of nociceptive afferents and by a modulation of a specific cortical network, the same network that has been described for opioid analgesia. It is possible to block the effect of placebo analgesia induced by psychological mechanisms of expectation and

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conditioning using a mu receptor antagonist that binds morphine and endorphins. For example, naloxone blocks placebo analgesia through a blockade of the opioid system.

Implications The clinical implications of placebo treatment derive from objective demonstrations of its effects—namely, that stimuli in the psychosocial context formed by patients and the treatment setting activate the same neurotransmitters released by active treatment. On the basis of these insights, it is clear that the placebo response represents an excellent model for understanding mind–body interactions whereby complex mental activity can change body physiology. Psychiatry and psychology, as disciplines investigating mental events, are at the heart of the phenomenon, as the use of words and verbal suggestions influence the course of a disorder and its treatment. Psychiatry has at least two therapeutic tools in its hands: words and drugs that may use the very same mechanisms and biochemical pathways. Morphine binds mu opioid receptors, but verbal suggestions of pain reduction may activate the same receptors. Likewise, cannabis binds cannabinoid receptors, but suggestions of pain decrease may act on the same receptors. Anti-Parkinson agents also bind dopamine receptors, but verbal suggestions of motor improvement activate the same dopamine receptors in the same brain areas. Martina Amanzio See also Behavioral Health; Classical Conditioning; Contemporary Trends in Psychotherapy; Ethics of Therapy; Health Psychology; Hypnosis; Medical Therapies; Measuring Treatment Outcome

Further Readings Amanzio, M., Benedetti, F., Porro, C. A., Palermo, S., & Cauda, F. (2013). Activation likelihood estimation meta-analysis of brain correlates of placebo analgesia in human experimental pain. Human Brain Mapping, 34, 738–752. Benedetti, F. (2008). Placebo effects: Understanding the mechanisms in health and disease. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Play Play is considered important for children’s learning, physical development, and social competence. In play, humans and nonhuman animals explore their environment, examine social roles and relationships, and learn about their world. Despite its seeming simplicity, defining play is challenging because it comes in many forms. However, most researchers agree that play has three defining qualities: First, it is a behavior that does not appear to have a serious, external goal. Those engaging in play are interested in the behaviors themselves (the means) but not the outcomes (the ends). Second, although play can resemble real-life behavior, it lacks real-life consequences. If two children are play-fighting, injuries and legal ramifications usually do not ensue. Third, play occurs after basic needs are met, such as being fed and feeling safe. This entry describes the important components of play, theories of why play occurs, the development of play, and applications.

Components of Play A number of behavioral criteria are often exhibited in play, including flexibility, positive emotions, nonliterality, intrinsic motivation, and a lack of a means–end relationships. Play is flexible in its content and rules, such that external rules are not present or can be renegotiated during play. Play is associated with positive emotions. It can be nonliteral, such that children may “make believe” they are in a particular situation or that an object represents something else. Individuals are intrinsically motivated to engage in play: They participate for pure enjoyment and do not expect an external reward. Finally, a means–end relationship is not present, such that individuals are more interested in the process, not the products, of playing. Playful behaviors often have the qualities of being repeated, fragmented, exaggerated, or reordered. Imagine a child climbing a ladder in order to go down a slide. He or she may repeat this action several times and may also fragment it by going up and down the ladder without going down the slide. Or the child may exaggerate the movements by making unusually slow and large

Play

climbing motions. Finally, he or she may reorder the behavior by climbing up the slide instead of gliding down.

Why Does Play Occur? For centuries, theorists have been interested in the benefits of play and why it occurs. One classic account is recapitulation theory: Play is tied to the human evolutionary past as a means of working through primitive regressions. For example, boys enjoy rough-and-tumble wrestling because it satisfies predatory needs from an earlier point in history. However, this theory has little to no support. Evolutionary theories posit that for a behavior to be prevalent across a species, the benefits must outweigh the costs. Play has the moderate costs of expending calories, time, and exposure to potential injury. Surplus energy theory proposes that evolutionarily advanced creatures have energy beyond what is necessarily to meet basic needs. Such species have an extended juvenile period with adult supervision, enabling juveniles to develop skills needed for surviving in a complex environment. This scenario permits them to play in a safe environment where they can explore their resources, which facilitates learning, exploration, and opportunities for innovation. On the basis of this view, several theorists argue that play during the early juvenile years may serve an important role in development and education. Play affords a low-risk method of learning, practicing, and elaborating on skills in a developmentally appropriate, safe, and enjoyable manner. Through play, children build physical strength and endurance. Cognitively, play can support problem solving, creativity, language, concentration, and planning skills as children learn about real-life situations. Socially, play can facilitate sharing, communicating, conflict resolution skills, and building peer relationships. Emotionally, children can learn about their own and others’ emotions as they play out feelings. Although play may not be necessary for acquiring and practicing such skills and knowledge, it is considered adaptive for the juvenile period because it is a low-cost, enjoyable, intrinsically motivating way for children to do so. In fact, play may serve different purposes for different age groups. For infants, it enables discovery, learning about the physical world, imitation, and basic socializing

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skills. For toddlers, pretend play can help children learn about symbolic representations and perspective taking. In preschool, sociodramatic play can enhance learning scripts, practicing roles, and understanding emotions.

Play Types and Developmental Sequences Theorists classify the types of play children engage in by describing physical, language, cognitive, and social levels of play. Play typically involves the simultaneous inclusion of many or all of these components. For example, physical play includes cognitive and social components. Furthermore, when a new play behavior appears in development, it does not replace the play behaviors that emerged earlier. Instead, it simply adds to the child’s repertoire. Physical Activity Play

Children can play by making physical movements with their bodies, with or without using other objects. During infancy and toddlerhood, physical play contains actions that do not require substantial coordination, such as kicking or arm waving. During the preschool years, physical activity becomes more coordinated as children engage in exercise play, such as running, climbing, jumping, and rough-and-tumble play. Boys’ play tends to be more physically vigorous than girls’ play. Language Play

In language play, children make rhymes, chants, puns, and jokes and otherwise play with words and meanings. Language play can develop children’s knowledge of word meanings and usages (metalinguistic awareness). Language play often begins in toddlerhood, when children practice babbling or repeating various linguistic forms. In preschool, children enjoy playing with rhyme and linguistic jokes, especially conceptual incongruity. By about 6 years of age, children enjoy language play in which words have multiple meanings (e.g., teddy bears are never hungry because they are “stuffed”). Cognitive Levels of Play

Sara Smilansky built on Jean Piaget’s theory of cognitive development to describe a four-step

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developmental sequence of play. First, between approximately 6 months and 3 years of age, children are likely to engage in functional play (also called “practice play”). Children practice motor movements with simple actions, such as hitting a toy hammer on a work bench. Although this play appears repetitive, children gradually elaborate on these actions to increase difficulty or to master new elements. Second, in constructive play, children build or learn to use materials in different ways by physically manipulating objects to construct or create something, such as building a tower out of Legos. Constructive play emerges during toddlerhood, but is most common between 3 and 6 years of age. Constructive play is positively related to intelligence in preschoolers, likely because it encourages problem solving. However, some theorists do not consider this to be “play” because there is often an outcome that children seek to achieve. Third, as preschoolers’ capacities for symbolic thought develop, they begin to engage in pretend play (also called fantasy, dramatic, or make-believe play). Children role-play, enact story scripts, and use objects as symbols. Pretend play first emerges between 12 and 15 months, when actions are usually imitations of adult behaviors, are directed toward the self, and use realistic objects (such as pretending to stir with a spoon and a toy bowl). At about 2 years of age, children begin to use less realistic objects, direct play actions toward other individuals, and incorporate story scripts with more integrated sequences of actions. For example, at first, only one action is involved, such as rocking a baby. Then, different variations on caring for the baby might occur, such as rocking, then feeding, and then wrapping the baby in a blanket. After this is mastered, ministories appear with a focus on common scripts (e.g., going to the store or getting ready for bed). Two subtypes of pretend play appear around 3 years of age: sociodramatic and rough-and-tumble play. In sociodramatic play, children combine multiple schemes to develop plots while playing specific roles (e.g., doctor/patient, teacher/student). Girls tend to be more likely to play out domestic scenes, whereas boys are more likely to act out familiar, male-stereotyped roles. In rough-and-tumble play, children (more often boys) chase and play-fight in a pretend play situation. Rough-and-tumble play is

not actual aggression: Children are having fun and laughing and have no intention of hurting each other. Rough-and-tumble play can help children learn about the limits of acceptable behavior, roletaking skills, interpreting emotional cues, and appropriate responses to others. The last type of play to emerge is games-withrules. These are activities bound by rules, such as tag or dodge ball. Such behavior typically begins with one-rule games during the toddlerhood and preschool years (such as taking turns). As children enter the primary school years, the rules become more complex, and games-with-rules become a dominant mode of play. However, because the rules are preestablished and inflexible, many theorists do not consider games-with-rules to be a form of play. Levels of Social Interaction

Mildred Parten described how children demonstrate varying levels of social interaction during play. Children typically begin with nonsocial play, but levels of social interaction gradually increase with age. Nonsocial play typically involves solitary play (playing alone). Solitary play is normal and comes in many forms, such as drawing, solving a puzzle, building, riding a bike, and more. However, certain forms of nonsocial play, such as aimless wandering, sitting and staring (unoccupied behavior), or hovering over other children’s activities without participating (onlooking) may indicate developmental challenges with social interaction when they occur consistently. Parallel play emerges around 12 months of age and remains common throughout preschool. Children play next to one another, often engaged in the same activity, but with little to no interaction. However, parallel play helps children learn about their peers and serves as a starting point for children to initiate more social, cooperative interactions. Around 15 to 18 months, true social interaction begins with associative play. Children are engaged in similar but separate activities with a small amount of interaction. For example, they may color separate pictures next to each other but share crayons and periodically comment on the other’s drawings. Finally, cooperative play emerges around the second birthday. This occurs when children actively interact and play with others, share toys, and are

Positive Psychology and Human Frailty

oriented toward a common goal or theme. For example, they may play hide-and-seek or pretend to hunt a dragon. In pretend play, they may even enact logical action sequences while alternating roles. By the time children are approximately 3.5 to 4 years old, cooperative play becomes the preferred mode of social interaction.

Applications Several applications have been developed based on theories of play. In play tutoring, parents and caregivers serve as a scaffold for more advanced levels of play by providing verbal guidance, acting as models, making suggestions, or providing explicit training for pretend play. In another application, play therapy, counseling professionals provide a safe environment in which, through play, children can express and overcome aggressive or sexual impulses, learn how to compensate for anxiety or other psychological struggles, and perhaps attain mastery over a traumatic event. Catherine M. Bohn-Gettler See also Childhood; Cognitive Development; Piaget’s and the Neo-Piagetian Theories of Cognitive Development

Further Readings Burghardt, G. M. (2005). The genesis of animal play: Testing the limits. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Pellegrini, A. D., & Smith, P. K. (Eds.). (2005). The nature of play: Great apes and humans. New York, NY: Guilford Press. Power, T. (2000). Play and exploration in children and animals. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Sutton-Smith, B. (1997). The ambiguity of play. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Positive Psychology Human Frailty

and

Positive psychology debuted during 1998, the year that Martin Seligman was president of the American Psychological Association and selected positive psychology as the theme for his presidential year. Positive psychologists provided a rationale

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for their focus on human strengths and well-being that were virtually identical to the justification for humanistic psychology offered by Abraham Maslow during the mid-20th century. Maslow investigated human excellence and “self-actualized” individuals rather than focusing on human deficiencies or psychopathology. In Motivation and Personality, he argued that “the study of crippled, stunted, immature, and unhealthy specimens can yield only a cripple psychology and a cripple philosophy” (p. 234). Positive psychology derives from humanistic psychology in that it is conceived as a kind of counterweight or corrective to the mainstream, and its emphasis is on growth and well-being rather than on pathology and human deficiencies. This entry describes the tenets and criticisms of positive psychology.

Tenets Although initial descriptions of the positive ­psychology research program gave lip service to concepts such as citizenship, love, wisdom, and courage, it seemed to be in essence about the correlates of subjective well-being. Early critiques pointed to the individualism and hedonism that appeared to underlie the initial presentations of the approach, as well as noting the absence of some traditionally valued traits—for example, honesty and critical self-examination. Positive psychologists responded to early criticism by developing complex listings of 24 “personal strengths” categories and three different lifestyles or genres of what was defined as a “positively” lived life. This revised and expanded positive psychology addressed some of the early criticisms and seemed to include among its extensive catalog of strengths some acknowledgment of any conceivable beneficial trait a human being could possess. Seligman specifically distinguished among the “pleasant life,” the “good life,” and the “meaningful life.” The pleasant life is concerned with maximizing pleasure, about creating, maintaining, and intensifying positive feelings—what might be called firstgeneration positive psychology. The good life is a life in which there is a match between signature strengths and roles and activities in which one is engaged. The meaningful life is a life of affiliation in which positive well-being is derived from involvement in something larger than oneself.

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Criticisms There have been numerous criticisms of positive psychology. Many of those have to do with the view that it is underpinned by a disguised ideology that is essentially subjectivist, individualist, and hedonistic. The measure of all things seems to be its impact on individual subjective well-being. Robert Woolfolk and Rachel Wasserman suggested that it is only some “prosocial” practices that positive psychology studies and thereby implicitly endorses: The commitment of oneself to entities that are superordinate to the self may yield pleasure, flow, or a sense of meaning. The ecstasy of the terrorist, the Nazi, or the inquisitor is to the positive psychologist not distinguishable from the joy of the philanthropist or the saint. We can serve god or Satan, but the psychology is the same. (p. 88)

But if positive psychology has no implicit ethic, truly does not contain disguised ethics, why not study the joys of sadism or murder, as some people seem to achieve feelings of ecstasy through these acts? With respect to the meaningful life, the language used is provisional, lacking the concept of unqualified, noninstrumental commitment to anything, and rather appears to be an expedient, instrumental view of loyalty and engagement in community. Another potentially thorny issue that casts some doubt on the degree to which positive psychology coheres with other worldviews is what has been called “the tragic sense of life.” As existential psychotherapist Victor Frankl put it in Man’s Search for Meaning: “If there is a meaning in life at all, then there must be a meaning in suffering. Suffering is an ineradicable part of Life. . . . Without suffering and death, human life cannot be complete” (p. 76). This view is that human beings are frail and that life is filled with pain and suffering, often inevitable in spite of one’s most persistent and dexterous attempts to avoid it. The tragic view of many traditions stands in sharp contrast to the comedic view of positive psychology that happiness is readily achievable and is very much within a person’s control if he or she understands and applies the technology of happiness that is implied and sometimes fleshed out and used by positive psychologists.

Western civilization abounds with recognitions of the benighted nature of human existence: the Greek worldview depicted in the tragic plays of the Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides and in the historical writings of Herodotus, the doctrine of original sin, the contrast between the divine and the worldly, Stoic philosophy, and in the popular culture of the Late Middle Ages. The Renaissance view was that the individuals who possessed cultivation inevitably would also possess a melancholy disposition, a view that prefigures the contemporary evidence that depression and dysphoria, and hyperawareness of the sorrow of the world, are linked to genius. The East likewise offers several examples. Buddhism begins, famously, with the assertion of the First Noble Truth, which is the foundation of the Buddhist view that human consciousness in interaction with a world in which gratification is not inevitable entails dukkha (and its Tibetan counterpart sdük-bsngal), often translated as suffering but also as pain, sorrow, unhappiness, dysfunctionality, dissatisfaction, frustration, angst, and even “stress.” Dukkha is ubiquitous, persistent, and unavoidable. From a Buddhist standpoint, it is not a cognitive distortion to see the world and human existence as dangerous, unsatisfying, painful, and meaningless; rather it is irrational not to see the world this way. Buddhism adopts this pessimistic outlook toward the availability of happiness in the natural course of human existence, because Buddhists believe that the world and human beings are simply not designed such that happiness or even satisfaction will be the normal lot of people but rather that unhappiness and dissatisfaction will be the normal and natural condition. In writing about the Buddhist culture of Sri Lanka, Gananath Obeyesekere suggested that when examining many features of depression, I would say that we are not dealing with a depressive but a good Buddhist. The Buddhist would take one further step in generalization: it is not simply the general hopelessness of one’s own lot; that hopelessness lies in the nature of the world, and salvation lies in understanding and overcoming that hopelessness. . . . If [Buddhists] are afflicted by bereavement and loss . . . they can generalize their despair from the self

Positive Psychology and Human Frailty

to the world at large and give it Buddhist meaning and significance. (pp. 134, 140)

Muslims, in general, see grief, sadness, and other dysphoric emotions as concomitants of religious piety and correlates of the painful consequences of living justly in an unjust world. The ability to experience sorrow is regarded a mark of depth of personality and understanding. In Japan during the Tokugawa period, roughly between the 15th and 19th centuries (1603–1868), one of the principal cultural projects of Japanese historians and literary scholars was that of interpreting ancient Japanese texts with the aim of identifying essential aspects of Japanese national character. Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801) fashioned the concept of mono no aware, sometimes translated as “the persistent sadness that inheres in all things.” This concept was postulated to define an essential ingredient of Japanese culture and meant to characterize both a certain aesthetic and a capacity to understand the world directly, immediately, and sympathetically. Mono no aware was thought to distinguish Japanese culture and mark its superiority to foreign forms of apprehension. The idea here is that of a sensitivity that involves being touched or moved by the world. This kind of sensitivity to the world is thought to be inextricably intertwined with a capacity to experience the sadness and pathos that emanate from the transitory nature of things. The view that the human flourishing can occur through the adoption of positive traits, orchestrated instrumentally in order to achieve psychological well-being, runs afoul of another approach to virtue in human beings—namely, virtue ethics. Alisdair MacIntyre follows Aristotle and virtue ethics in arguing that part of human maturity is to acquire virtues such as courage, temperateness, and truthfulness so that one can function as an “independent practical reasoner in deliberative communities.” But in MacIntyre’s view, Western moral philosophy, including Aristotle, has been colored by a certain “illusion of self-sufficiency.” This misconception, characteristic of individual­ istic approaches like positive psychology, obscures the great amount of frailty, dependence, disability, and limitation in human life, giving rise to ongoing, periodically urgent needs for physical assistance and support, belonging, respect, and guidance from others. To take account of this, there is a need

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to revise the conception of human flourishing or the good life and the skills needed to participate in it to include “virtues of acknowledged dependence” in MacIntyre’s phrase. In an approach very unlike that of positive psychology, MacIntyre (1999) calls for an “education of dispositions,” such as a sense of unalloyed grief or sorrow over someone’s else’s distress—as opposed to looking away from the affliction of others or shame about one’s own—in order to be able to “sustain relationships of uncalculated giving and graceful receiving” (p.  121). MacIntyre makes the compelling case that the capacity to engage in those kinds of relationships and the affirming of them, as well as a cognitive and emotional sensitivity to those in need, should be incorporated into the concept of the good life and the ideals regarding human flourishing. Robert L. Woolfolk and Frank C. Richardson See also Contemporary Trends in Psychotherapy; Grief and Bereavement; Heightened Consciousness; Humanistic Theories of Psychopathology; Mood Disorders; Needs; Objectivity in Diagnosis; Passion; Relational Theory; Stress and Resilience to Life Challenge

Further Readings, Frankl, V. (1959). Man’s search for meaning. Cutchogue, NY: Buccaneer Books. Masahide, B. (1984). Religion and society in the Edo period as revealed in the thought of Motoori Norinaga. Modern Asian Studies, 18, 581–592. MacIntyre, A. (1999). Dependent rational animals: Why human beings need the virtues. Chicago, IL: Open Court. Maslow, A. (1954). Motivation and personality. New York, NY: Harper & Row. Obeyesekere, G. (1988). Depression, Buddhism, and the work of culture in Sri Lanka. In A. Kleinman & B. Good (Eds.), Culture and depression: Studies in the anthropology and cross-cultural psychiatry of affect and disorder (pp. 134–152). Berkeley: University of California Press. Seligman, M. E. P. (2002). Authentic happiness. New York, NY: Free Press. Woolfolk, R. L. (2002).The power of negative thinking: Truth, melancholia, and the tragic sense of life. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 22, 19–27.

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Prenatal Development

Woolfolk, R. L., & Wasserman, R. (2005). Count no one happy: Eudaimonia and positive psychology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 25, 81–90.

Prenatal Development The unparalleled growth and development exhibited by the human fetus as it prepares for life after birth is the most understudied transition in the human life cycle. Because the prenatal period is a time of enormous change, the human fetus is especially vulnerable to organizing and disorganizing influences. These have been described as programming. This entry reviews models for explaining influences on the growth and development of the human fetus. Programming is a process by which a stimulus or “insult” during a critical developmental period has a long-lasting or permanent influence. Because tissues develop in a specific sequence from conception to maturity, different organs are sensitive to environmental influences at different times. Critical periods are defined by epochs of rapid cell division within an organ, and during these periods of rapid cell division, organs are especially vulnerable to perturbations, such as stress. Thus, the timing of the stimulus during development, coupled with the timetable for organogenesis, ­ determines the nature of a programmed effect. A variety of maternal stressors can retard fetal growth and result in damage to vital organs. Regardless of the developmental timetable for organ development, compensations in response to stress are made by the fetus to spare the brain. However, compensation has a price. For instance, stress may decrease the blood supply available to the fetus. To protect the brain, blood is shunted from peripheral organs to nurture the fetal nervous system. This adaptation has an irreversible price that may include damage to relatively expendable peripheral organs but also damage to the “protected” fetal nervous system, because the ­ ­vulnerable fetal brain cannot escape the circulating biochemical fingerprint of maternal stress.

Historical Overview In Britain, at the turn of 19th century, there was a noticeable decline in the population. Birth rates

were low, and infant mortality was high. Moreover, approximately two thirds of the young men who volunteered to fight in the South African war were rejected because of physical frailties. The enlightened governmental response was to recruit and train an “army” of midwives to interview and assist all women during pregnancy and through infancy to 1 year of age. Not only was health restored, but another consequence of this effort was meticulous record keeping of pregnancy history and birth outcomes. These very early life history records, combined with national health records from later life, were perhaps the first data allowing the systematic examination of the influence of factors during the fetal period on adult health and disease. The influential developmental origins of health and disease or fetal programming models initially were developed from the observations in the British health records that a substantial portion of variation in infant, child, and adult health outcomes was attributable to developmental processes during fetal life in response to a variety of environmental, social, psychological, physiological, and genetic influences. The initial studies introducing the programming hypothesis were retrospective and relied on birth phenotype, either birth weight or gestational length, as markers of intrauterine stress exposures. Contemporary studies have included prospective evaluation of prenatal exposures and provided strong confirmation of the programming model.

The Programming Model The basic assumption of tests of the programming model is that developing organisms play a role in their own construction. This occurs because the human fetus has evolved remarkable surveillance and response mechanisms to acquire information about the maternal environment that guide its development. The placenta is a fetal organ that collects information about the maternal environment and responds with a complex series of signals to the host. The fetus incorporates this bidirectional information into its developmental program to adjust its developmental trajectory in preparation for survival after birth. If the prenatal environment is perceived to be stressful or hostile, the fetal-placental complex

Prenatal Development

may promote accelerated developmental trajectories, such as preterm birth (i.e., escape from an inhospitable environment), that ensure short-term survival. Accelerated development has a cost for the surviving infant that can include significant modifications in brain structure, endocrine regulation, and behavioral function. A vivid example of this process is the adjustment made by the tadpole (analogous to a fetus in this example) in response to life-threatening adversity. The desert-dwelling Western spadefoot toad lays its eggs in desert rainwater. If the developing tadpoles detect that the conditions for normal development and survival are unfavorable (e.g., rapid evaporation of the pool), stress hormones are released that influence metabolism and precipitate metamorphic climax so that the tadpole can escape the desiccating environment and avoid impending peril. If the biological stress response is blocked during this life-threatening stress, the rate of development is arrested, and the tadpole is doomed. However, there also are penalties for the surviving tadpole under conditions of accelerated development, because it is smaller at maturity and is at a disadvantage when competing with a normally developing toad when foraging for food or reproducing. The human fetus is exposed to radical physiological changes as gestation progresses. For instance, the maternal endocrine stress or “fight or flight” system is profoundly altered during human pregnancy. The maternal pituitary gland doubles in size, increasing levels of hormones in maternal circulation severalfold as gestation progresses. But it is the growth and development of a new organ, the placenta in primates, that is primarily responsible for the profound changes in the stress circuit. The placenta is not only a sensing and effector organ as described earlier, but it also synthesizes and releases its own pattern of hormones that alters the usual feedback systems in the body. One of the major contributions of the placenta is the synthesis and release of large concentrations of the master stress hormone (corticotropin-releasing hormone or CRH). As pregnancy advances, CRH increases in maternal circulation by as much as 40-fold. Levels beyond this are one signal of adversity to mother and fetus. This information is critical for fetal development (as it is for the tadpole), but

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it also affects the mother. Because of placental activity and its complex interactions with the stress system, women become less responsive to environmental-stress cues as gestation progresses toward term. The human fetus expresses an estimated eightfold increase in cell divisions compared with the remainder of life. The human fetal brain is a primary target for programming influences because it is undergoing rapid growth over a prolonged period of time. Neuron production in humans begins on embryonic Day 42 and is complete by midgestation. Between gestational ages 8 and 16 weeks, migrating neurons form the subplate zone, awaiting connections from afferent neurons originating in the thalamus, basal forebrain, and brain stem. Concurrently, cells accumulating in the outer cerebral wall form the cortical plate, which eventually becomes the cerebral cortex. By gestational Week 20, axons form synapses with the cortical plate, and by gestational Week 24, cortical circuits are organized. By gestational Week 28, the human brain contains billions of neurons, which are 40% greater in number than in the adult. The rate of synaptogensis reaches an astonishing peak so that, at gestational Week 34 through 24 months postpartum, there is an increase of 40,000 synapses per second. Primary support for the developmental origins of the health and disease model has come from studies of exposure to early life stress and adversity. There is strong support from prospective studies that psychosocial or biological markers (or both) of adversity have substantial and largely negative consequences for fetal, infant, and child neurological development. Fetal exposure to biological and psychosocial markers of stress, anxiety, and depression at various times during gestation results in delayed fetal maturation, impaired cognitive performance during infancy and early childhood, greater risk for negative affect in infants and children, and decreased brain volume in areas associated with learning and memory in preadolescent children. Retrospective studies in adults have linked intrauterine adversity to increased risk for cardiac disease, metabolic disorders, emotional impairment, and dementia. The accumulating evidence supports the conclusion that fetal exposure to

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Prenatal Development

psychobiological stress profoundly influences development (and especially the nervous system) with consequences that persist into childhood and perhaps beyond.

Alternative Models The fetal programming “movement” has had a significant influence on medicine and basic science. Despite the fact that this area of research is in its own embryonic stage, the findings have created a paradigm shift. It is now essential to consider fetal experience (or exposure) in order to fully understand human development both in basic science and in clinical practice. Although an impressive body of literature supports this model, there are alternative developmental models. Rather than assuming that disease and pathology constitute the only outcomes of fetal or early exposure to trauma, a second model proposes a provocative and perhaps radical alternative. The predictive-adaptive-response (PAR) model, also known as the weather-forecasting model, predicts that, under certain conditions, organisms that are stressed in utero have an adaptive advantage if they are confronted with stress later in development. The PAR model predicts that optimal outcomes are related to the congruence between the prenatal and postnatal environments. Accordingly, a discordant transition between fetal and infant life places the child at risk for health complications. For instance, infants provided with sufficient nutrition after near-starvation in utero have an increased risk of developing metabolic diseases. In tests of fetal exposure to maternal depression, it was found that infants thrive when their prenatal and postnatal environments are congruent, even if the conditions of those environments are adverse (e.g., depressed pre- and postnatal). The PAR model predicts and finds support for its assertion that under some circumstances, congruence between prenatal and postnatal environments, rather than exposure to adversity alone (as predicted by the programming model), prepares the fetus for postnatal life and confers an adaptive advantage for critical survival functions during early development. The stress-inoculation model predicts that ­exposure to mild adversity during early development promotes resilience in the face of stressful

(i.e., congruent) circumstances later in life. The adaptive calibration model argues that early exposure to adversity increases the liability of responses to subsequent adversity. This results in increased impairment after exposure to stress later in life but also enhanced ability to benefit from supportive and protective features of the environment. There is separate evidence that early exposure to psychosocial adversity accelerates maturation, especially in the area of reproductive development. For example, exposures to psychosocial adversity during early development and again later in life are associated with accelerated sexual maturation in girls. Early maturation in conditions of increased health risk (adversity) may enhance the probability of reproduction and allow females to increase their number of offspring, which ensures that more offspring survive.

Sex Differences Historical records and current studies consistently confirm that more males than females are conceived (the primary sex ratio) and born (the secondary sex ratio). Under certain conditions, the secondary sex ratio is associated with, and perhaps programmed by, maternal and fetal exposures to environmental events. Moreover, studies consistently show that more males than females are born preterm and that males have poorer neonatal and infant health outcomes, have higher risk for motor and cognitive outcomes, and are less likely to survive in intensive care. There is evidence that sexually specific patterns are formed very early in development, as early as meiosis, and are reflected in the function and response to stress of the placenta. Male fetuses are “programmed” to invest their resources in growth and do not alter their patterns of growth in response to adversity. Because the male fetus does not adjust to adversity and has not conserved its resources, it is more susceptible to later stress, with increases in morbidity and mortality. In contrast, the female placenta responds or adjusts to an adverse maternal environment in multiple ways, resulting in reduced growth. If exposed to stress that diminishes nutrients and resources later in gestation, the female fetus, which has conserved its energy needs, has a greater probability of survival. By this mechanism, sexually

Problem Solving

specific patterns of response to stress may be programmed very early in fetal development. Compared with the developmental delays, morbidity, and depressed viability in males, the vulnerability expressed in females is relatively subtle. Females adjust to early adversity with a variety of strategies, but their escape from the risk of early mortality and morbidity has a price of increased vulnerability expressed later in development. The consequences of male fetal exposure to prenatal adversity threaten their viability, culling the weak and the frail and creating a surviving cohort of the fittest. Curt A. Sandman See also Gender Development; Neuroendocrine System; Parent-Offspring Relations; Stress and Gender; Stressors and Stress

Further Readings Bale, T. L. (2009). Neuroendocrine and immune influences on the CNS: It’s a matter of sex. Neuron, 64(1), 13–16. Davis E. P., & Sandman C. A. (2010). The timing of prenatal exposure to maternal cortisol and psychosocial stress is associated with human infant cognitive development. Child Development, 81(1), 131–148. Ellis, B. J., Del Giudice, M., Dishion, T. J., Figueredo, A. J., Gray, P., Griskevicius, V., . . . & Wilson, D. S. (2012). The evolutionary basis of risky adolescent behavior: Implications for science, policy, and practice. Developmental Psychology, 48, 598–623. Sandman, C. A., Glynn, L. M., & Davis E. P. (2013). Is there a viability-vulnerability tradeoff? Sex differences in fetal programming. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 75, 327–335. Sandman, C. A., Davis, E. P., & Glynn, L. M. (2012). Prescient human fetuses thrive. Psychological Science, 23, 93–100.

Problem Solving A person is confronted with a problem when he or she has a goal but does not immediately know the series of actions that can be taken to attain it. The study of problem solving is the study of the

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cognitive process that an organism uses to achieve a goal, particularly when the process requires thought. To be considered as problem solving, an activity generally must involve a series of steps, operations, or intermediate states. Simple retrieval from memory does not qualify as problem solving. Instead, problem solving involves overcoming an obstacle to get from the current state to the goal state. It can involve reformulation of the problem, transformation of the task, or the decomposition of the goal, as well as the recombination of old ideas into new patterns or the transfer and application of an old solution to a new context. Because this goaldirected behavior relies on more basic processes of perception and memory, problem solving is considered a higher order cognitive process. Along with decision making, reasoning, and comprehension, problem solving is often classified under the umbrella term of thinking. As a higher order process, problem solving was one of the areas of cognitive inquiry most affected by the domination of behaviorism, which caused it to be written out of psychology textbooks for most of the 20th century. A resurgence of interest began in the 1950s when the cognitive revolution prompted new attempts to study the complex mental activities that had been ignored by behaviorists. The topic received increasing attention as information-processing approaches gained traction in the 1970s. Thus, this entry will start by describing the early work done in the Gestalt tradition and then will provide an overview of several contemporary thrusts, including the information-processing approach, research on expert problem solving, mathematical problem solving, analogical problem solving, and creative problem solving.

The Gestalt Tradition Behaviorists explored problem solving as either a reproductive process wherein organisms applied a specific response that had been used successfully on a previous occasion or as a process of chance discovery through trial and error. For example, Edward Thorndike observed that cats learn how to escape from cages by engaging in random behaviors that are gradually reinforced by success. By contrast, Gestaltists defined problem solving as a productive process. They attempted to detect

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Problem Solving

processes underlying problem solving by asking human solvers to report their thoughts out loud. Gestaltists attempted to understand how thinking developed over the course of a solution, including transformation of the task by reformulation of the problem and goal statement. They also described problem solving as being a search through a solution space, suggesting that from the start, the solver works within a narrow space of possibilities that can be expanded and redirected as necessary properties of the solution are realized or demanded by failure. Using protocols and experimental methods, the Gestalt tradition documented several theoretical barriers to successful problem solving, including mental set, functional fixedness, and unnecessary assumptions. The Gestalt movement was also frequently characterized by its interest in the roles of insight and incubation in problem solving. Mental Set and Functional Fixedness

Mental set, or Einstellung, is a form of difficulty that occurs when a problem solver becomes fixated on applying a method that has worked previously. The classic demonstration comes from the water jug experiments performed by Abraham Luchins in which participants completed a set of practice problems that could be solved only by using a lengthy formula, followed by a problem that could be solved using a simpler method. Participants who were exposed to the practice problems tended to use the lengthy technique despite the possibility of using the simpler alternative. Even when given an extinction problem where only the simpler solution worked, participants exposed to practice were less successful at finding that solution than naive participants were. Functional fixedness is a specific form of mental set in which individuals fail to recognize that objects can be used in nontraditional ways. The classic examples of this effect come from N. R. F. Maier’s two-string problem and Karl Duncker’s candle problem in which experience with usual uses of objects such as boxes and pliers prevents solvers from finding creative solutions. Both mental set and functional fixedness describe the inclination to rely on previous experience. The two kinds of fixation can also be combined, such as by having individuals use an object for its

usual purpose immediately before attempting a problem where the solution requires it to be used in a nontraditional manner. Priming of misleading responses can exacerbate fixation on ineffective solutions. In the extreme, fixation can blind participants to finding alternative solutions that others may discover easily. Unnecessary Assumptions

Difficulties arise when the solver places unnecessary boundaries, constraints, or assumptions on the task at hand. The most well-known case is the nine-dot problem, where a solver is presented with a 3 × 3 grid of dots with the goal of connecting all nine dots by drawing no more than four lines and without lifting the pen or pencil from the paper. The participant typically makes many attempts by drawing lines that stay within the grid of dots. This self-imposed constraint inhibits the solver from thinking “outside the box” and finding the solution. In response to failures, attempting to reformulate the problem or starting over in a new way may prompt a solver to question her or his assumptions, expand boundaries, and remove constraints. Insight and Incubation

Another emphasis in Gestalt theory was on the characterization of solution as being the result of a reorganization of the elements of the problem into a new whole, which resulted in sudden flash of insight or Aha! moment. Wolfgang Köhler asserted that such flashes of insight were preceded by periods of intense thinking. Alternatively, Graham Wallas suggested that insight might be most likely following a period of incubation, as, according to his theory, thought proceeds through five stages: preparation, incubation, intimation, illumination, and verification.

After the Cognitive Revolution The Information-Processing Approach

In 1972, Allen Newell and Herbert Simon published Human Problem Solving, which detailed the solution processes for relatively simple and welldefined problems, such as DONALD + GERALD = ROBERT, the Hobbits/Orcs problem, and the

Problem Solving

Tower of Hanoi. They provided an informationprocessing account of how people may solve problems by searching in a problem space. The problem space consists of the initial state, the goal state, and all possible intermediate states in between. The actions that people take to move from one state to another are known as operators. A main theoretical contribution was in identifying the principles that govern how people navigate their way through a large number of possibilities, given the limited capacity of working memory. Newell and Simon proposed that navigation is guided by shortcuts, known as heuristics. One heuristic is hill climbing, whereby people take the action that seems to move them forward—that is, toward greater similarity between current state and goal state. Another useful approach is problem decomposition in which the solver considers the subgoals that must be reached, or obstacles that must be overcome, on the way to achieving the main goal. This can be part of a more sophisticated heuristic, means–ends analysis, where the solver looks for the action that lead to the greatest reduction in difference between the current state and goal state but also specifies what to do if that action cannot be taken. A particular strength of the Newell and Simon approach was the development of a computer program, the General Problem Solver (GPS), as a testable model of their theory. When the GPS was programmed to use these heuristics, a close match was found between the steps taken by the program and those observed in the protocols of human solvers. Expert Problem Solving

Spurred by the early success of the informationprocessing approach, researchers began to investigate problem solving in domains such as physics and engineering and in strategic games such as chess. Modern theories of expert problem solving emphasize the important role of an accessible, large, well-organized store of domain-related knowledge that (a) allows experts to circumvent working-memory limitations, construct problem representations that capture key structural features or relationships, and allocate attention to important or relevant information and (b) provides the

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opportunity for strong methods of solution such as forward search. Some negatives of extensive, prior experience have been discovered as well, as experts may also be susceptible to mental set, which may make them less likely to find creative solutions. Mathematical Problem Solving

Theories of mathematical problem solving have generally attempted to explain difficulties that students experience, particularly in the problem representation phase. Students are commonly derailed in their solution attempts by irrelevant information or by ambiguous or confusing language in problem statements. Working-memory limitations also cause difficulties during solution when problems require representing more than one state at a time or the maintenance of intermediate results. Theories about the development of mathematical problem-solving skills have distinguished between teaching students to solve problems procedurally versus conceptually. Instructional approaches that emphasize why particular formulas or methods provide solutions to a class of problems—including explanation, comparison of example problems, or invention tasks—generally lead to greater success in applying these skills in novel contexts. Analogical Problem Solving

Several lines of research on analogical problem solving have explored solvers attempting to use solutions from old problems to solve a new one. Much of the theorizing in this area has focused on explaining why solvers, even when given the solution to an isomorphic (i.e., identical in form) problem minutes before reading the new one, fail to transfer the given solution without a hint. One major obstacle that has been identified is the tendency for solvers to focus on superficial similarities between cases instead of on structural similarities or patterns of relations among problem elements. A popular test that requires the solution of figural analogy problems is Ravens Progressive Matrices. This test was developed as a test of intelligence in the psychometric tradition, but it has become a theoretically important task for understanding how problem solving may depend on working-memory capacity. Success at solving matrices problems tends to correlate highly with

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Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Personality

other forms of analytic problem solving, as well as with measures of executive control, because of the need to inhibit irrelevant information during solution and to deal with the novelty and complexity of the task. Creative Problem Solving

Although success at many problem solving tasks relies largely on making systematic progress through a solution space toward a particular solution and focusing on relevant problem elements, success on other tasks requires the ability to think divergently. Divergent-thinking tasks prompt the generation of novel uses, improvements for everyday objects, or consequences of hypothetical scenarios. These tasks have been used in assessments of individual differences in creative problem-solving skills and also to study the possible benefits of collaboration during group brainstorming. Theoretical approaches have generally focused on explaining why collaborating groups might outperform individuals. Other approaches to creative problem solving have explored contexts that cause fixation or conformity, factors that allow individuals to overcome impasses imposed by misleading problem representations or solutions, and how solvers may achieve insights or highly creative solutions during problem solving. There has been much debate about whether qualitative differences exist between solution processes for analytic and creative problem solving. Ill-Structured Problem Solving and Problem Finding

Problems can be classified along a continuum from well defined to ill defined, depending on whether they have clear goals, solution paths, or predictable solutions. Although most research has focused on well-defined problems, in addition to work on creative problem solving, there has been some headway into less structured domains, such as international relations, art, and writing. Research using computerized microworlds has explored complex problem solving that incorporates difficulties, such as a lack of clarity in starting states or operators, multiple or competing goals, large numbers of interconnected variables, and several kinds of uncertainty or unpredictability.

Finally, although most research on problem solving starts by providing the solver with a statement of the problem to be faced, to fully explain successful problem solving in real-world contexts, one needs to examine the problem-finding stage. The ability to recognize or formulate when there is a problem to be solved may be critical for achieving the moments of greatness that problem-solving theories ultimately seek to explain. Jennifer Wiley See also Creativity; Exceptional Memory and Expertise; Human Information Processing; Intelligence Testing; Reasoning and Decision Making

Further Readings Chi, M. T. H., Glaser, R., & Farr, M. J. (1988). The nature of expertise. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Mayer, R. E. (1992). Thinking, problem solving, cognition (2nd ed.). New York, NY: W. H. Freeman. Rittle-Johnson, B., & Schneider, M. (2015). Developing conceptual and procedural knowledge of mathematics. In R. Kadosh & A. Dowker (Eds.), Oxford handbook of numerical cognition (pp. 1118–1134). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Sternberg, R. J., & Davidson, J. E. (Eds.). (1996). The nature of insight. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Wiley, J., & Jarosz, A. F. (2012). How working memory capacity affects problem solving. Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 56, 185–227.

Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Personality Who is Sigmund Freud, and who does he think humans are? His introductory lectures suggest that the two basic tenets of psychoanalysis— (a) mental processes are essentially unconscious and (b) impulses, especially sexual, play a peculiarly large part in the causation of nervous and mental disorders—met with intellectual and moral prejudice when he first proposed them in the late 1800s. Further, he suggested that psychoanalysis is learned first of all on oneself—a method he applied to himself.

Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Personality

Thus, Professor Freud’s writings focused attention forever after on “the self,” a novel concept at the time but so ordinary now as a cultural meme as to be dismissed as obvious. Human beings house unconscious, often uncontrollable impulses or instincts, which if given full expression, threaten continued existence on planet earth. What follows in this entry are the foundations of psychoanalysis (and psychodynamics—a modified version of psychoanalysis) by considering five famous cases, four famous ideas, three sections of the mind, two failings, and one man considered by many to be a genius who started the field of psychotherapy.

The History and Tenets of Psychoanalysis and Psychodynamics Freud was born in Freiberg, Moravia, in 1856 and trained as a neurologist. He has his share of admirers and detractors and remains an influential figure in the modern world, having been cited more than all sources of history except Lenin, Shakespeare, the Bible, and Plato. He has been heralded as a great intellectual pioneer regarding the role of the unconscious in behavior by the eminent scientist Gerald Edelman, considered the founder of all modern psychotherapy and self-understanding by psychoanalyst Stephen Mitchell, and maligned as one of the three great destroyers by the philosopher Paul Ricoeur (the other two were Marx and Nietzsche). He has been chastised by the psychologist and theologian Margaret Alter for his silver-tongued attack of religious faith, which she believes has never recovered, and touted by the French psychologist Didier Anzieu as the only thinker who understood the crisis in European culture at the end of the 19th century, further suggesting that a review of Freud could cast light on the current cultural distresses worldwide. The history of psychoanalysis and psychodynamics is as interesting as the tenets of psychoanalysis. As Freud drew acolytes to him over the years from mainly America and Europe, legendary if apocryphal stories of intrigue, drug use, dual relationships, and one notable falling-out took place as psychoanalytic training centers were being established. Freud initially developed the ideas of the power of the unconscious and sexual impulses while working with patients who came to his

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consulting office for physical ailments that turned out to have psychological origins; this led him to formulate a depth theory of the mind, a theory based on conflicting impulses of the mind that require resolution. The topographical theory is a theory of place; three places in the mind govern levels of consciousness—those available to everyday alert awareness called the conscious mind; those less available, more shadowy images called the preconscious; and those quite unavailable called the unconscious mind. He proposed that access to unconscious thoughts could be gained through dreams, the famous royal road, as well as through slips of the tongue. Later, he formulated his economic theory based on the structural model of the mind when he realized that the topographical model had less relevance for his work with certain patients, in which he proposed that the id, ego, and superego (the “it,” the “I,” and the “over-I,” according to the Latin terms he used), were separate agents in a closed system that determined behavior. As much as Freud had hoped they would, these two theories never mapped onto each other in a cohesive way, one of his greatest regrets according to his daughter Anna. Freud’s model for mental order and disorder followed from this premise of the conflicts engendered from the id, with the ego and superego; that is, when the ego failed in its coordinating and integrating function, it used defense mechanisms. The patients he worked with demonstrated a variety of ways of denying the conflicts they had and having less than vitalized lives because of it. They found themselves unable to take on life’s challenges such as work, marriage, the raising of children. Freud’s case histories represented patients who were unable to acknowledge their id impulses and manage them in a more useful rerouting of the energy via sublimation (a term he borrowed from chemistry). Freud believed that the technique of free association, which he eventually labeled the fundamental rule, allowed the patient to wander into the conflictual material. The analyst’s job was to correctly interpret these conflicts and their sources, allowing the patient to reverse the process of denial or other defense mechanisms, as expanded by Freud’s daughter Anna, and return to health.

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Freud believed the difference between mental health or mental disorder was a matter of degrees and that warding off self-knowledge through defense mechanisms such as rationalization or denial was merely second best. Within psychoanalysis exists a great rift—the ego psychology school, which continues the main traditions of Freud but attempts a renewed view of the power of the ego, and the object relations school, which proposes that mental disorder is a clash between different self–self, self–other representations, supplanting the drive model with the relational model. That is, humans are drawn to others not for pleasure gratification but for relationship, or attachment, itself an instinct as the British attachment psychologist John Bowlby suggests. Both schools claim basis in Freud’s theory, and both claim to deliver psychotherapy: psychoanalysis (traditional five times a week treatment to a patient who reclines on a coach) and psychodynamic therapy (a treatment modality that requires fewer meetings and that does not require a couch)— although this is an oversimplified distinction. Because space is of the essence in this brief entry, suffice it to say that psychoanalytic psychotherapy is delivered by a trained analyst where the patient works intensively on his or her inner world thus giving rise to transference and countertransference struggles, whereas the psychodynamic psychotherapist may not be classically trained and works less intensively with the inner world of the patient. Both can be useful, and both have their detractors. Freud in the 19th and 21st Centuries

Freud’s theory was embedded within a reassuring scaffolding of the scientific worldview (Weltanschauung) of the late 1800s, which included the hope that humans would continue to make scientific discoveries that would end disease and premature death. Neither world war had taken place; society preferred to believe in its innocence and its omnipotence and that this omnipotence was based on the discoveries of science. Given that Freud’s theories developed within this scientific age, it is ironic that the largest and legitimate criticism of psychoanalysis is this lack of ­ evidence-based research (notwithstanding Wilma Bucci’s multiple code theory, a method that maps referential activity to uncover unconscious

processes, and Lorna Smith Benjamin’s structural analysis of social behavior, a method that maps love vs. hate and autonomy vs. control in relationship to the self and the other). Psychoanalysis and psychodynamics interventions have fallen out of favor because of the ascendancy of cognitive behavioral therapy’s (CBT) evidence-­based research. CBT, which does not rely on childhood origins, lends itself to current research methodologies given its straightforward tenets. In contrast, psychoanalytic and psychodynamic proponents realize the embeddedness of human understanding in the very phenomenon they are attempting to understand. It is no longer the clear and objective scientist observing a particular phenomenon as it was believed to be in Freud’s day. It is probably because of these huge differences in contexts that the German researchers Helmut Thomä and Horst Kächele suggest a review of Freud would be useful rather than a return to Freud as the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan suggests. It is also important to place Freud’s suppositions within the writings of the time. He was not the first to suggest an unconscious, nor was he the first to suggest ideas of infant sexuality as the Greeks beat him to the notion of Oedipus. Nor was it that the polite Viennese culture was incensed by the notion of underlying sexual tensions. Vienna was reputedly a city of some sexual license, although Freud’s theory was never one of sexual license. He always believed in responsible sexual behavior. The point is that given the context of Vienna, it is somewhat surprising that so many of Freud’s contemporaries were upset by his open acknowledgment of sexuality. Also, most of his notions about religion had already been addressed by Ludwig Feuerbach in his book The True or Anthropological Essence of Religion, which predated Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents and The Future of an Illusion. He was also not quite an antireligionist, as portrayed by some. It’s true, he did not himself believe in a supreme being. But he thought that man’s capacity to soberly acknowledge reality was somewhat limited; thus religious consolation was necessary. Freud and Personality: A Summary

Stripped down to its basic components, personality is the combination of emotional, attitudinal, and

Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Psychopathology

behavioral response patterns of individuals. Freud helped a number and variety of patients with their personality struggles, but wrote up only a few actual therapy cases and a consultation with a father about his son: Anna O. (Bertha Pappenheim, analyzed with his friend and collaborator, Dr. Josef Breuer), Dora (Ida Bauer), Rat Man (Ernst Lanzer), Wolf Man (Sergei Pankeieff), and Little Hans (Herbert Graf), although later revisionist interpretations of his case histories bear reading (see Jeffrey Masson). With these key cases in mind, Freud wrote his technique papers between 1912 and 1915 highlighting transference resistance and its interpretation, based on his discoveries about the usefulness of hypnosis first, later substituted with free association and the “talking (cathartic) cure.” Although tremendous controversy exists about his methods as well as the negative influences on his thinking by physicians such as William Fleiss (including the use of cocaine), he is still credited with the development of the examination of the self summarized here: Five famous cases: Anna O, Dora, Rat Man, Wolf Man, and Little Hans Four famous ideas: (a) Not everything is conscious— neuroscientists are inclined to agree. (b) The royal road to that unconscious is through dreams and slips of the tongue. (c) His depth theory of the mind captures a representation of inner conflicts, which must be regulated. (d) The talking cure allows patients to plumb the depths of these conflicts in order to be well. Three sections of the mind (topographical and structural): The id, ego, and superego; the conscious, preconscious, and unconscious. To be responsible citizens, humans must manage their individual and collective instincts by moving material from the unconscious mind to the conscious and by managing the dangerous instincts of the id. That’s essentially the depth theory of the mind. As simple as it seems, it was a new concept in 19th-century Vienna, an “unthought known”—a phrase Freud coined. Two failings: Freud applied his androcentric model to women, whom he likened to the “dark continent,” thereby insulting them and Africans, and he hated to be bested. The former failing he acknowledged, but not the latter, to the dismay of Carl Jung. One man considered by many to be a genius: Freud’s thinking was groundbreaking enough to get him

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listed alongside Einstein, whose general relativity and special relativity theories were never reconciled either, perhaps like Freud’s structural and topographical theories of the mind. Both geniuses had set out at the end of the 19th century to map the inner and outer worlds.

Freud intended to build a respectable theory based on a biological substrate that was to be constantly renewed by clinical observation and rigorously subjected to empirical analysis in an effort to contend with the reigning model of the time: the moral degeneracy theory of mental disorder. In A General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis, Freud insisted that “society pronounces the unacceptable to be untrue” (p.  28). Understanding personality requires that humans become aware of their own inner conflicts, which they must learn to regulate in order to live peaceably in society rather than blaming such conflicts on the devil or any other external idea, person, or object. “The fault . . . is not in our stars, but in ourselves” (Julius Caesar, I.ii.140–141). Sally H. Barlow See also Consciousness and Unconsciousness; Dreams; Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Pathology

Further Readings Dufresne, T. (2003). Killing Freud: Twentieth century culture and the death of psychoanalysis. London, England: Continuum Press. Freud, S. (1924/1953). A general introduction to psychoanalysis (J. Riviere, Trans.). New York, NY: Pocket Books. Schwartz, J. (1999). A history of psychoanalysis: Cassandra’s daughter. New York, NY: Penguin Books.

Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Psychopathology Psychodynamic theorists, be they drive, ego, object relations, or self theorists, view humans as motivated by unconscious forces that they do not

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understand but that often shape their behavior in mysterious and inexplicable ways. Humans are not conscious of their desires, many of their early relationships, or many of their needs for others. Nor are they consciously aware of the ways in which early relationships shape their own development. These theorists argue that humans’ internal psychological worlds are shaped by early development, which can be examined in different ways. This entry briefly describes drive theory, ego psychology, object relations, and self-psychological theories as lenses through which to analyze psychopathologies, including depression, anxiety, borderline and narcissistic conditions, and psychosis.

The Four Psychologies: Drive, Ego, Object, and Self Drive theorists assert that human behavior is based on unconscious, biologically based forces of love and aggression. These drives, located in the id, seek expression but are often in conflict with the conscious mind. They are present from birth, but the other parts of the mind, the ego (the self and reality) and the superego (the conscience), try to keep them in check. They are often considered are bestial and unacceptable. Many people develop harsh consciences or superegos to try to tame the drives. But too harsh a superego or conscience can undermine one’s self and reality. Ego theorists point out that people employ unconscious defenses to cope with the unconscious drives and to adapt to reality in the external world. They may intellectualize, rationalize, or sublimate the drives. These are considered relatively healthy defenses. They may use defenses such as projection, which distorts reality and is not adaptive. Further, too much stimulation or feeling can lead to a breakdown in ego functioning, specifically, in judgment, planning, and reality testing. Object relations theorists suggest that human beings are motivated more by unconscious dramas that are peopled with relationships from the past but acted out again and again unconsciously in the present. Who they are and how they view others is shaped by early development with caretakers who are internalized. If a person has been abused in childhood, that person may view himself or herself as all bad and the abusers as all good. Early ­relational templates are reenacted unconsciously,

distorting relationships and frustrating one’s need for others. Object relations theorists emphasize particular defenses that people use: If deprived, neglected or abused, they often split their views of others and themselves into all good or all bad, unable to experience complexity and imperfections in others or in themselves. Self psychologists are interested in trying to understand functions that others serve in keeping the self whole and psychologically cohesive. Self psychologists view everyone as needing others, whom they call selfobjects, for recognition, for a sense of belonging, and for a sense of feeling strong and vigorous. When people lack selfobject experiences, such as mirroring, merging, and twinship with others, they are more likely to fragment and lose their self-cohesion. They can feel very alone in the world and suffer narcissistic injuries.

Mood Disorders: Depression Depression is a mood disorder that often feels like dejection, sadness, helplessness, lowered selfesteem, loss, regret, boredom, self-hate, or a loss of interest in the world. Sigmund Freud conceptualized depression as stemming from loss—of a ­person, a country, or an ideal. He distinguished normal grief from depression based on the nature of the loss. When one has had a relatively healthy relationship with a person who has died, most people experience ambivalence, and when they mourn, they ultimately can bear they grief because they unconsciously adopt aspects of the person who has died. These identifications enrich them. But the melancholic or depressed person cannot get beyond his or her grief because of the unconscious, problematic nature of the relationship. Freud thought that the melancholic was unaware of his or her anger at the person who had died and turned that anger against the self. Complaints about the self are really unconscious complaints about the other. If a person is unaware of his or her anger and has internalized the hate, self-hate is aroused, even leading to suicidal thoughts and feelings. An Ego Psychological Perspective

Ego psychologists note that when a person does not live up to who he or she wants to be, this leads to lower self-esteem. If one has identified with ­others who are harsh and punitive, one may view

Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Psychopathology

oneself harshly. An important ego function is the capacity to regulate self-esteem. If the ego is impoverished because of defenses that are too rigid, this may lower self-esteem. Poor judgment, poor reality testing, poor regulation of impulses undermines the ego, and ego deficits may lower self-regard. But ego psychologists also point to the capacity to tolerate depression as an important ego strength. An Object Relations Perspective

Early-attachment theorists studied the effects of prolonged separation from attachment figures in young children and noted that absence, abuse, or neglect produced depressive reactions. In the absence of a consistent caregiver, infants become distressed, disorganized, and possibly profoundly depressed and apathetic. Many adults are not able to hold onto the image of others in their absence, and they too, when separated or alone, experience profound depression. Also, a depressed caregiver or an abusive, neglectful, unstable, or emotionally empty caregiver may leave a child—and later, adult—more vulnerable to feeling that he or she is unworthy of love. Depriving or abusive relationships can be generalized so that all relationships may be experienced as dangerous or destructive. Depression may also emerge from destructive feelings toward others who are experienced as too depriving. When envy is too great, it, too, undermines a sense of being good, worthy of love, or whole. A Self Psychological Perspective

Self psychologists view depression as deriving from empathic failures of parents and other selfobjects such as coaches, teachers, or siblings. Most people are vulnerable to slights, hurts, and narcissistic injuries when no one admires them, mirrors them, or recognizes their achievements. When they feel unaccepted, too vulnerable, or too alone or when they feel overburdened or understimulated by others, self-worth is diminished, and they lose a sense of self-cohesion.

Anxiety Disorders From drive and ego psychological perspectives, anxiety serves a natural and important function: It

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signals danger. There may be danger when unconscious hatred or sexual feelings leak from the unconscious mind. There may be danger when repression—a defense mechanism that keeps unacceptable wishes and longings out of consciousness—fails. Signal anxiety can be experienced in combat or in abuse. But some of the unconscious defenses that are mobilized to deal with anxiety may undermine ego functioning. With trauma, for example, dissociation is a defense that is often unconsciously employed to separate feelings from what is actually occurring. But dissociation can then lead to being unable to experience a range of feelings in other experiences. Other anxieties may be expressed through obsessional symptoms, which use the defense of doing and undoing, or in phobias, which use the defense of displacement. All anxieties are not alike. In early years, people may experience annihilation anxiety. If others do not meet their needs, anxiety may be experienced as the fear of disintegrating and ceasing to exist. Later, in toddlerhood, as the child begins to move away from caregivers, he or she may feel separation anxiety—that is, too separate, too alone, or fearing that caregivers might leave and not return. This anxiety is felt again and again when in strange and new situations. At a slightly older stage, individuals may feel anxiety about their fantasies toward others whom they love, including unacceptable aggressive and sexual feelings toward parents or peers. This is called castration anxiety and is the unconscious fear that bodily harm may come as a result of wishes to be better or stronger or to otherwise surpass a parent or a peer. Anxiety can be experienced at different levels. At the psychotic level, people tend to experience annihilation anxiety; at the borderline level, separation anxiety; and at the neurotic level, castration anxiety. From an object relations perspective, anxiety emerges when a person cannot integrate the senses of others and the sense of self. If others are experienced only as need gratifiers rather than as whole people in their own right, then when they fail to gratify, they may be perceived as good or bad, not as both good and bad. Often severe deprivation or loss can precede annihilation anxiety or separation anxiety because a person lacks object constancy (i.e., knowing that another exists even if not

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present). Severe and persistent annihilation or separation anxiety can threaten the self and even reality. From a self psychological point of view, anxiety is a by-product of unmet selfobject needs. When a person achieves something that goes unrecognized, he or she may feel anxious. The same may occur when admirable qualities go unrecognized. Traveling in a foreign land without any connection to others like oneself may produce anxiety and the loss of self-cohesion.

Personality Disorders Personality disorders constitute a major diagnostic group. They are enduring patterns of inner experience and behavior that deviate markedly from the expectations of the individual’s society. These patterns are rigid, pervasive, and inflexible. They tend to begin in adolescence or early adulthood, and, because they are stable over time, they lead to chronic distress or impairment. Two personality disorders, borderline and narcissistic, are the focus here. Drive and Ego Psychology Perspectives

Character or personality is the result of preferred compromise formations that result in an enduring psychological tendencies (traits) and structures (personality). Compromise formations are solutions emerging from internal or intrapsychic conflicts. Each psychosexual stage of development presents a challenge between one’s drives and the social demands of the cultural group. Fixations at the oral, anal, or oedipal period shape who the person is. At the earliest stage of development, the oral stage, a baby is highly dependent, needy, and angry when needs are unmet. Drive theorists account for narcissistic and borderline pathologies as fixation at the oral stage, when character is shaped by demandingness, hunger, neediness, and anger if they go ungratified. Object Relations Perspective

Of all the personality disorders, none has received the more attention than borderline personality disorder. It is characterized by stormy and unstable interpersonal relationships, a substantial

level of emotional dysregulation, and impulsivity. Separation tends to provoke intense and destabilizing anxiety and aggressive gestures (toward self and others). People diagnosed with borderline personalities experience disturbances in a continuous identity. The following vignette illustrates some of these critical features: Laura, a vivacious undergraduate student, came to the college’s counseling center unable to concentrate, crying often throughout the day following an “incident” with her boyfriend the previous weekend. After dating happily for the summer, her boyfriend, Sam, was heading to college in another city. As the day of his departure approached, she became irritable and “moody.” In a fit of anger she asked him to get out of the apartment immediately. Confused and surprised, Sam responded by leaving earlier than planned. As he walked to his car, Laura ran after him, pleading for his return to the apartment because she felt suicidal. As they attempted to discuss what happened, Laura became quite agitated and demanded that he leave immediately. This sequence was repeated for about 2 hours. Laura confessed that she couldn’t bear to be alone. She felt that all through high school, her boyfriends “always ended up leaving” her.

An object relations perspective might explain Laura’s fear of impending separations as stemming from both separation anxiety and a lack of object constancy. That is, when experiencing frustration, Laura could not “hold on to” the good experiences with Sam that would make bearable his physical absence. People or objects—both inside and outside—are experienced as either “all good” or “all bad” as part of the defensive mechanism of splitting. These relational experiences come to the foreground in dramatic and disturbing ways when there are interpersonal tensions and transitions. People with borderline characteristics experience chaotic and unstable interpersonal relationships. Often they employ projective identification, an unconscious defense by which disavowed parts of oneself, such as hatred, are projected onto the other. Sam felt Laura’s rage and her abandonment ambivalence as he was alternately thrown out and beckoned back. It is important to note that many

Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Psychopathology

people who have experienced trauma may present as borderline but suffer from PTSD. Self Psychology Perspective

The current diagnostic criteria for borderline personality disorder include pervasive patterns of grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), the need for constant admiration from others, and a decided lack of empathy for others. From a self psychological view, a lack of affective responsiveness from primary caregivers derails narcissistic development, and this leads to pathological narcissistic disorders. Failures in mirroring, twinship, and idealization undermine personality development and can lead to narcissistic pathology.

The Psychoses Sonny, a young homeless man, was seen at a shelter by a social work student in order to find appropriate services. He had returned to the neighborhood of his youth, and his family was very relieved. “I had to come back,” he clarified. “The devil dressed up as God, but I could tell he wanted to harm my family. I had to come back to protect them.”

The psychoses are a heterogeneous group of mental disorders, with schizophrenia the most studied. Schizophrenic spectrum and other psychotic disorders are characterized by problems in thinking and feeling and result in delusions, hallucinations, disorganized thinking (and speech), and grossly disorganized or abnormal motor behavior. Psychotic symptoms express the confusion of internal with external stimuli, and they demonstrate a lack of reality testing. For people with psychosis, inner fears are experienced as coming from outside. People with psychosis experience major distortions of perception (hallucinations), cognition (delusions), and withdrawal (among other negative symptoms). Drive Theory

A classical psychosexual view of Sonny’s delusion would highlight his forbidden sexual and aggressive impulses, which were unbearable and unsustainable. Sonny’s destructive wishes toward

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his family were expressed and disguised through the urgency to save his family from an extremely all-powerful being. In the classical drive theory, instinctual impulses may generate unbearable conflicts that remain unconscious. In the case of psychotic illnesses, loss of reality becomes a characteristic feature of the solution, or compromise, to these conflicts. Ego Psychology Perspective

Ego psychologists are interested in both the conflicts between the id, ego, and superego and in the role of the ego and how it functions. Sonny’s superego was so harsh and punitive that it undermined his ego’s functions of judgment and reality testing. Sonny’s defenses were also undermined. His most prominent defense was projection. Unacceptable wishes, such as wanting to harm his family, were projected in the figure of the devil, allowing him to continue to think of himself (consciously) as a good member of the family. Object Relations Perspective

Object relations theorists also contend that the mind is intrinsically a battleground for instinctual impulses, specifically, the struggle between love and hate. Other people, in the mind of a very young child, are good when they gratify, bad when they frustrate. Melanie Klein understood babies as living in a passionate, confusing, preverbal, and phantasmagoric world where others may feel persecutory to the baby when the baby’s needs are not gratified. A baby’s early inner world has been called paranoid and schizoid because the baby does not know what is inside and outside. Psychosis may be seen as developing beyond that way of perceiving others or the self. Self Psychology Perspective

Psychosis, like other severe pathologies, results from a loss of self-cohesion, resulting in severely fragmented self-states. Gross failures in empathic attunement to the child’s emerging and unfolding narcissistic selfobject needs for mirroring and twinship can result in pathological states. Psychosis, on this view, is a fragmented sense of self. The importance of a prolonged empathic attunement,

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or optimal responsiveness, is critical for the development and cohesiveness of the self. Without responsiveness and attunement, one could become psychotic. Joan Berzoff and Lourdes Mattei See also Behavioral Perspectives on Psychopathology; Culture and Psychopathology; Historical Roots of Theories of Psychopathology; Humanistic Theories of Psychopathology; Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Psychopathology; Psychopathology and Stress

Further Readings Berzoff, J. (2011). Freud’s psychoanalytic concepts. In J. Berzoff, L. Flanagan, & P. Hertz (Eds.), Inside out and outside in: Psychodynamic theory and practice with multicultural populations (3rd ed., pp. 18–47). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Berzoff, J., Flanagan, L., & Hertz, P. (Eds.). (2011). Inside out and outside in: Psychodynamic theory and practice with multicultural populations (3rd ed.). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Mitchell, S., & Black, M. (1995). Freud and beyond: A history of modern psychoanalytic thought. New York, NY: Basic Books. Schamess, G., & Shilkret, R. (2011). Ego psychology. In J. Berzoff, L. M. Flanagan, & P. Hertz (Eds.), Inside out and outside in: Psychodynamic clinical theory and practice in contemporary multicultural contexts (3rd ed., pp. 62–96). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Therapies Psychoanalytic and psychodynamic therapies are forms of psychotherapy that center on (a) systematic work with and in the relationship between patient and therapist, (b) a conceptualization of dynamically unconscious processes and representations and their links to sexuality and destructiveness, and (c) viewing psychopathology as the result of a dysfunctional handling of unconscious psychic conflicts thought to be linked to experiences and fantasies from early life. Despite this common ground, there is a distinction between psychoanalysis proper and other

forms of psychodynamic therapy. Psychoanalysis proper consists of several years of work with three or more sessions per week. That work is conducted with the patient, or analysand, lying on the couch while the therapist, or analyst, is sitting in a chair behind him or her. The psychoanalytic treatment setting is meant to foster the analysand’s regressive processes—that is, to enable access to fantasies, thoughts, feelings, or images from earlier in life that are being reexperienced within the relationship with the analyst. In contrast to psychoanalysis proper, different forms of psychodynamic therapy tend to last less long, with patient and therapist sitting face-toface and the work centering more on psychic conflicts and problematic interpersonal relationships as they manifest themselves in the patient’s present life situation. Examples of psychodynamic therapy derived from psychoanalysis are transference-focused psychotherapy, mentalization-based treatment, or forms of manualized or disorderspecific psychodynamic treatment. This entry provides an overview of psychoanalytic and psychodynamic treatment techniques. Considerations of the underlying model of psychic change follows, leading to the question of indication for and the limits of psychoanalytic and psychodynamic psychotherapy.

Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Treatment Techniques While working with mostly female, hysterical patients in Vienna toward the end of the 19th century, Sigmund Freud discovered how these patients and their psychopathological symptoms were driven by something he would later call unconscious fantasies and wishes. Anna O.—a patient of Josef Breuer with whom Freud worked together very closely at that time—erroneously stood under the impression of having been impregnated by Breuer and even developed physical expressions of a pseudo-pregnancy. Whereas Breuer appears to have been put off by what he viewed as being unbearably threatening to his self-image as a physician, Freud managed to theoretically conceptualize what had happened. He thought that Anna O. had fallen in love with Breuer and that accompanying sexual wishes, as well as psychic defenses against these wishes, had resulted

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in what he called repression and symptom formation. He also took it that these feelings and fantasies were to be understood as a “new edition” of something stemming from the infantile situation. Later on, he conceptualized this as transference and called it part and parcel of psychoanalytic work. Underlying these transferential processes (and their correspondent in the analyst—namely, countertransference), Freud assumed the existence of (re)actualized infantile psychosexual wishes that were originally directed toward mother or father. Because of their delicate nature of being forbidden, shameful, or anxiety provoking, these wishes would have to be psychically defended against: That is, for the sake of psychic homeostasis, some compromise would have to be brought about. It ought to be a compromise between wishful tendencies and their defense, consequently resulting in both becoming unconscious and—in cases of a psychopathological handling of conflict—a symptom formation. Because repression and other forms of psychic defense do not eliminate images from the mental sphere but only block conscious access, their becoming unconscious is thought of as being dynamically virulent: They seek to become conscious again but have to be altered in order to be allowed to. What Freud then opted for was that the psychoanalytic treatment setting had to foster these infantile constellations reenacting themselves—that is, to be repeated within the psychoanalytic relationship (as was the case with Anna O.). To bring this about, (a) the analyst should have to see the analysand during each day of the week at best; (b) the analysand should lie on the couch, avoiding eye contact with the analyst and discarding motility, thus producing a regressive state in terms of mature or rational ways of thought; and (c) the analyst should adhere to what Freud called the basic rules of psychoanalysis: free association on the side of the analysand and evenly suspended attention on the analyst’s part. To associate freely means saying what comes to one’s mind without selecting in terms of rational discourse or understandability. This is thought of as enabling the analysand to achieve a greater closeness to unconscious aspects of his or her psychic functioning and to infantile states of mind. For the analyst to listen to the analysand, he or she has to try to be evenly suspended in his or her

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attention—that is, to not overvalue something beforehand. Also, he or she should conduct analysis in abstinence, which means to refrain not only from taking up a love or sexual relationship with an analysand but also from actually playing the part that the analysand assigns him or her via transference in general. Thus, it is the analyst’s task to recognize which role he or she is given in the transference and then to analyze it instead of merely, and unreflectingly, acting according to it. From the 1920s on, psychoanalysts Anna Freud (Sigmund Freud’s daughter) and Melanie Klein started to treat children with psychoanalytic play therapy. Instead of focusing on dreams or free association, as both were tied to capacities for verbal expression and to having the analysand lie on the couch, they held for the thought that children expressed their inner conflicts and precarious fantasies in play (and drawings) or, moreover, that they needed to be able to do that in the first place. Playing thus became the major emphasis of ­psychoanalysis with children. Though there have been numerous cases of further elaborating these techniques (mostly about conceptualizations of the nature of the analytic relationship), the technical concepts and corresponding views of the treatment setting still form the general basis for psychoanalytic therapy. Forms of psychodynamic therapy derived from these general principles differ in the overall duration of the treatment, the frequency of sessions per week, the use or nonuse of the couch, and the relation of infantile and present themes and conflicts to one another in terms of interpretation. Also, in some current forms of psychodynamic therapy, work is done more along the lines of mentalizing affects or (re)establishing psychic functions instead of reconstructing early drive development and psychosexual wishes and fantasies.

Psychic Change Through Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Therapy By allowing repetitive actualizations into the analytic relationship and fostering these processes in a corresponding treatment setting, psychoanalysis can provide a frame for, in Freud’s words, a “remembering, repeating, and working through” early experiences and unconscious conflicts. There are two divergent perspectives on the mechanisms of psychic change in psychoanalysis.

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On the one hand, psychoanalysis is conceived of as “insight therapy,” where change comes about via getting a grasp on the memories, fantasies, and feelings of one’s own forgotten and inaccessible past and the impact of these in present life. This is thought to reduce the urge for unconscious symptom formation and to lead an analysand to restore his or her capacity to love, work, and enjoy, as Freud put it. On the other hand, psychoanalytic work is thought of as fostering a “corrective emotional experience,” According to this view, the psychoanalytic process promotes change by pointing out a “new way out” of repetitive relationship patterns once they are brought to consciousness. The two models do not contradict each other, as both circle around the pivotal means of psychoanalytic dialogue: the analyst interpreting that which the analysand talks (and does not talk) about in terms of unconscious meaning. (Otto F. Kernberg has systematically differentiated between different forms of psychoanalytic intervention: clarification, confrontation, and interpretation.) Conceiving of psychoanalysis as insight therapy and conceiving of it as corrective emotional experience are brought together by conceptualizations such as the analyst’s “holding function” (Donald W. Winnicott) and his or her capacity for “containment” (Wilfred R. Bion). These make theoretically plausible how the analyst takes up some aspects of the unconscious material the analysand transmits within the analytic relationship. By doing so, the analyst is able to transform the analysand’s unconscious and unmentalized material to make it more bearable on a mental level. In contemporary psychoanalysis, this is conceptualized prominently in terms of the analytic situation as a bipersonal, dynamic field (e.g., by Willy and Madeleine Baranger or Antonino Ferro). The work done by the analyst is thought of as fostering the analysand’s capacity to experience aspects of his or her inner world that have formerly been inaccessible. Thomas H. Ogden calls this “dreaming the analysand’s undreamt dreams” and Cesar and Sara Botella think of it as a “work of psychic figurability.” Although constantly being subject to research from its beginnings (Freud wrote of an “inseparable bond between cure and research”), in the past few decades psychoanalytic and psychodynamic

therapies have also been studied more extensively in terms of evidence-based practice. These studies show the relevance, effectiveness, and efficacy of long-term psychoanalytic and psychodynamic treatment in a setting where sessions occur frequently.

Indication for and Limits of Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Therapy In its historical beginnings, psychoanalysis was thought of as being suitable exclusively for neurotic patients (hysteria, phobia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, neurotic depression). Only in these patients was there thought to be a psychic conflict symptomatically expressed and, accordingly, only with these patients would transferential processes operate. Soon, the indicational scope widened to working with character neuroses, psychoses, or psychosomatic disorders, along the lines of theoretical and technical differentiation. New conceptualizations of the etiology and psychodynamic functions of these disorders created variations in setting, which resulted in psychoanalysis proper being modified. This also allowed for installing psychodynamic therapy not only in an outpatient setting but also in psychosomatic or psychiatric hospitals. Because in an outpatient setting, psychoanalysis generally aims for structural change (rather than relieving psychopathological symptoms), its major application today is personality disorders. It is hard to say, in general, that certain psychopathological constellations are unsuitable for psychoanalytic or psychodynamic therapies (though in some cases there is an apparent need for neurological, medical, or pharmacological by-treatment). Rather, the limits lie in a need for a realistic view of possible structural changes (the kind of change in mental and social life that can be brought about in the face of a mental structure heavily influenced by traumatic experience and the conflicted processing of the experiences, as well as the analysand’s conscious and unconscious motivation for treatment). Concerning these issues, psychoanalytic and psychodynamic treatments require some sense of suffering from psychic or psychosomatic pain by the analysand. And alongside that, they call for an analysand’s capacity to commit himself or herself

Psycholinguistics

to affective and relational dimensions of his or her inner world that are intense, unknown, and disturbing, as well as a wish to get to know his or her inner world better. Whereas in most psychodynamic therapies there is a focal formulation of therapy goals, in psychoanalysis proper, there is not, apart from the general notion of reaching a more integrated view of oneself. Timo Storck See also Cognitive Behavioral Therapies; Consciousness and the Unconscious; Contemporary Trends in Psychotherapy; Dreams; Freud’s Psychosexual Theory of Personality; Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Personality; Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Psychopathology;

Further Readings Elzer, M., & Gerlach, A. (Eds.). (2014). Psychoanalytic psychotherapy: A handbook. London, England: Karnac. Gabbard, G. O. (2010). Long-term psychodynamic psychotherapy: A basic text (2nd ed.). Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing. Levy, R. A., Ablon, J. S., & Kächele, H. (Eds.). (2012). Psychodynamic psychotherapy research: Evidencebased practice and practice-based evidence. New York, NY: Springer. Roth, A., & Fonagy, P. (2006). What works for whom? A critical review of psychotherapy research (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Guilford Press. Safran, J. D. (2012). Psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic therapies. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

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the mental mechanisms and processes underlying language function also may add to the understanding of a variety of mental disorders. Some of them, such as aphasia and specific language impairment (SLI), stem from problems in language production and comprehension systems. However, problems in language function are highly associated with problems in other areas of function, including social interaction, education, and work. Further, cognitive and neural systems that ­process language information draw from linked cognitive systems, such as working memory, attention, executive control, and perception-action networks. Hence, problems in language function can be secondary to difficulties arising elsewhere in cognition. This entry discusses how psycholinguists attempt to construct theories explaining language-specific processing, how language systems interface with other cognitive systems, how language processing can break down and produce disorder, and ideally, how to intervene to improve language function.

A Foundation in Linguistics Psycholinguistics relies heavily on linguistics for descriptions of fundamental language properties. The organization of language characteristics can be conceptualized in a hierarchical fashion: Phonology/Phonetics → Morphology → Words → Syntax → Discourse → Pragmatics Phonology/Phonetics

Psycholinguistics Psycholinguistics is the study of mental and neural systems involved in the production, comprehension, and acquisition of language. It is a multidisciplinary enterprise with contributions from psychology, linguistics, neurology, computer science, anthropology, sociology, philosophy, and other related fields. Psycholinguistics is an important aspect of psychology because language use is a core characteristic of humans. Understanding human beings requires understanding language function. Understanding

The following briefly introduces each of these aspects of language: Phonology/Phonetics lies at the bottom of the conceptual hierarchy. Phonology/ phonetics reflects basic sound properties of the language. Peer and beer, for example, differ in one phonetic feature (voicing of the initial phoneme, / p / versus / b /). Problems at the level of phonology can produce disorders of speech recognition (this may be part of the problem in SLI) or problems in learning how to read (dyslexia). Psycholinguistic theories, such as the motor theory of speech perception, the fuzzy logical model of speech perception, the WEAVER++ model of speech production, and the Cohort

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model of word recognition place heavy emphasis on the representation and processing of phonetic/ phonological information to explain how people produce and understand speech. It should be noted that signed languages, which are conveyed through visual rather than auditory means, have their own sublexical (“smaller than word”) system of conventional gestures and symbols. These sublexical units are analogous to phonemes/phonetic features in spoken languages, so many theorists describe sublexical units in signed languages as representing sign language phonology (despite the fact that no sounds are involved). Morphology

Morphology is a level of representation in a language that plays a major role in semantics (meaning) and syntax (how different components in sentences, words especially, relate to one another and influence each other’s interpretation). In semantics, a morpheme is an “atomic” unit of meaning. Just as molecules can be built from more basic atoms (water = H2O, two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom), words can be built by combining morphemes (dogs = the root morpheme, dog, plus the inflectional morpheme, s). Agglutinative languages such as Finnish, Turkish, and Aleut, are prolific combiners of morphemes. Morphology also plays an important role in syntax, in that derivational morphemes can be used to shift words from one major category to another and in that morphological marking contributes to syntactic processing by marking words for case and agreement. A verb can be changed to a noun by adding the derivational morpheme er (bake → baker). Case-marking shows the grammatical role that a word is playing in a sentence. I is a nominative case-marked pronoun that must appear as a subject (I like bacon). Me is an accusative casemarked version of the same thing (first person, singular) and cannot appear as a subject (Me like bacon). Languages like Spanish have both gender and number agreement, both of which are marked by morphemes [(La casa (“the house”), Las casas (“the houses”); El toro (“the bull”), Los toros (the bulls)]. Cognitive models describe how free (root) and bound (inflections, derivational) morphemes are

accessed from long-term memory and used during speech production and comprehension. Some cognitive models (e.g., frequency-ordered bin search) propose that long-term memory information for words is organized around root morphemes. These accounts indicate how morphological-processing problems can contribute to language disorder. For example, individuals with SLI appear to have greater problems processing bound morphemes than other kinds of morphemes, and this may contribute to delays in the acquisition of syntactic knowledge. Words

Words are the focus of study in cognitive accounts of lexical representation and processing as well as vocabulary acquisition. Some theories focus on the way information about words is organized in long-term memory. Other theories focus on the way cues from speech or text trigger processes in the memory systems responsible for retrieving and activating word-related information from long-term memory. Still others focus on how information from context combined with stimulus-related information to assign situational meanings to ambiguous words (such as ball that have more than one meaning: a thing that you throw versus a fancy dance party). Many psycholinguistic accounts of word processing distinguish between effects that arise from word form information (what does the word look like or sound like?) and word meaning information to what concept[s] does the word refer?). Many current models of word processing have been developed in the neural network or parallel distributed processing tradition (e.g., David Rumelhart and David McClelland’s TRACE model; Mark Seidenberg and colleagues’ triangle model; Jeff Elman’s simple recurrent network model). These models instantiate word representation and lexical access processes within processing systems built to resemble real networks of neurons. Typically, aspects of words (such as their auditory or phonological features and their meanings) are represented as patterns of activation across a set of processing units. Different populations of processing units are connected to one another such that the activity in one set of units influences the activity in another set of processing units.

Psycholinguistics

The degree to which one processing unit influences another is a function of the kind of connections between the units (excitatory or inhibitory) and the strength of those connections. Many ­models of this type “learn” how to respond via feedback. Stimuli are presented to the input units, activation spreads through the network, and the network’s final pattern of output is compared to the most appropriate or correct pattern of output for that stimulus. When the actual output differs from the correct output, the connections between different processing units are strengthened or weakened. This type of modeling has produced insights into the way language learners acquire knowledge of vocabulary and syntax. It has also produced insights into reading-related disorders, such as dyslexia. A great deal of research has been conducted on the way neural and cognitive systems represent conceptual knowledge and tie that knowledge to words, which addresses how word form is tied to word meaning. Some work uses machine-learning algorithms to determine how patterns of activation in large-scale brain networks map onto conceptual and word knowledge. The input to these algorithms comes from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and other techniques that provide noninvasive means of determining which parts of the brain become active during different wordprocessing tasks. This work points to the contributory role of perception and action systems during word interpretation. These connections are predicted by embodied semantics accounts, which treat word meanings as emerging from cognitive systems used to simulate aspects of the world (e.g., configurations of visual objects), plan and execute motor actions (e.g., how the body interacts with real objects), and retrieve episodic memories (e.g., traces of past experienced events). Additional insights come from studies of brain-damaged patients (e.g., those who have lost brain matter to herpes encephalitis, Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s patients, and stroke victims). These investigations point toward shared neural systems for conceptual knowledge across different categories (e.g., man-made vs. natural kinds; animals vs. nonliving things). Sentence-processing research has made significant contributions to the understanding of human language production and understanding.

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(Wilhelm Wundt, the founder of psychology, invented the tree diagram, a way of representing the syntactic form of a sentence.) Sentence r epresentation and processing research in ­ ­linguistics played a critical role in the cognitive revolution, a period during which the discipline of psychology moved away from radical behaviorism and reintroduced the study of the mind as a central research topic. Syntax

Syntax is a level of mental representation that mediates between individual word meanings and sentence meanings. Sentence processing largely involves the identification and use of syntactic cues to determine how words in sentences relate to one another. Syntactic dependencies, in turn, govern the thematic roles assigned to words (who did what to whom? essentially). In the sentence John chased Mary, John is the thematic agent (the do-er), and Mary is the patient/theme (the recipient of the action). If the words in the sentence are kept largely the same but the syntactic form is changed, the meanings of the individual words change. In the sentence John was chased by Mary, the action is the same (chasing), the players are the same (John, Mary), but their respective thematic roles have switched (John is the patient/theme; Mary is the agent). Identifying the syntactic form of a sentence is therefore a key component of uncovering the speaker’s intended message. Discourse

Discourse-processing research investigates aspects of interpretation that occur when a sequence of sentences forms a story or a conversation. (Dialogue is a separate subfield of research in psycholinguistics, but it shares some features with the study of narrative and expository discourse.) Research on discourse indicates that rather than being passive, discourse comprehension involves active processes of construction on the part of the comprehender. For example, writers and speakers typically leave a range of information implicit (i.e., the story does not explicitly mention all the ideas that a comprehender needs in order to make sense of

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the story). As a result, generating inferences (making assumptions about information that is not explicitly stated) is an important aspect of understanding narratives. Different readers with different backgrounds and different world knowledge may make different inferences and may therefore reach very different understandings of the same story. Discourse-processing research also emphasizes how information from context (information introduced previously into a discourse) can rapidly influence the way a new piece of the discourse is processed and understood. For example, ­listeners make implicit assumptions about what a character is likely to say based on an overall impression of the character. So if a child says I like to drink wine, this produces a different neurophysiological response in the listener within a few hundred milliseconds of the word wine compared with a condition where the same expression is spoken by an adult. Pragmatics

Pragmatics refers to the way listeners use information about speakers, contexts, and the literal meaning of an expression to draw c­onclusions about a speaker’s intentions (why did the speaker produce this expression in this situation?). Pragmatics emphasizes the social communicative goals that language serves. Expressions assigned one meaning in one context may be assigned a very different meaning in another context. For example, if two people are having a casual conversation and one mentions that Dave has nice hair, that expression will be assigned a positive valence (i.e., it is treated as a compliment). If that expression were the sole contents of a letter of recommendation (Dear Sir, Dave has nice hair. Sincerely . . .), it will be assigned a negative valence (i.e., the pragmatic message is that Dave will not be a good employee). Thus, pragmatic aspects of the context influences the way listeners comprehend utterances. Matthew J. Traxler See also Communication and Language; Grammar, Psychology of; Language Disorders; Perception and Language; Phonology; Semantics, Psychology of; Syntax, Psychology of; Verbal Behavior

Further Readings Bloom, P. (2002). How children learn the meanings of words. New York, NY: Bradford Books. Jackendoff, R. (2003). Foundations of language. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Townsend, D., & Bever, T. G. (2001). Sentence comprehension: The integration of habits and rules. New York, NY: Bradford Books. Traxler, M. J. (2012). Introduction to psycholinguistics: Understanding language science. Boston, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. Traxler, M. J., & Gernsbacher, M. A. (2006). The handbook of psycholinguistics (2nd ed.). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier.

Psychological Wellness and Well-Being Although it acknowledges that psychological and physical (biological, medical) health and wellness cannot be clearly demarcated, this entry deals with psychological wellness, leaving discussions of physical wellness to other sources. In addition, the term wellness suggests an objective state that can be objectively measured. Psychological states, however, are highly subjective (although measurable). For that reason, the entry focuses on the concept of subjective well-being or simply well-being, which involves both cognitive (beliefs) and affective (emotions) evaluations of one’s life both currently and over time (past and future). Traditional approaches to promoting psychological well-being have focused primarily on the prevention of mental illness or disorder. This approach is too narrow, however, because it emphasizes only preventing deficient functioning rather than promoting people’s strengths and optimal functioning. In addition, research has shown that measures of positive emotions (well-being) actually add to measures of negative emotions in the prediction of psychological disorders. Thus, this entry is concerned not with preventing mental disorders but with enhancing people’s feelings of well-being and their satisfaction with their lives and themselves—sometimes also referred to using the common lay term happiness.

Psychological Wellness and Well-Being

Controversies The terms well-being and happiness immediately raise philosophical and scientific issues that can be discussed only briefly here. One of the major controversies in the study of well-being is over the distinction between the hedonic approach, which focuses on the attainment of pleasure and positive emotions and the avoidance of pain and negative emotions, and the eudaimonic approach (from “daimon,” meaning “true self”), which focuses on self-understanding and meaning in life. Which approach a researcher uses determines how that researcher measures well-being, which is one reason the research on well-being can appear ­ inconsistent. The distinction between subjective well-being and psychological well-being parallels that between hedonic well-being and eudaimonic well-being. Another major controversy involves the distinction between top-down and bottom-up theories of well-being. The top-down view maintains that psychological well-being results not from life circumstances themselves but from the biological factors that influence thoughts and behaviors, such as the tendency to interpret life events and ­circumstances in positive or negative ways. The bottom-up perspective maintains that psychological well-being is mainly the result of the number of positive and negative life circumstances—day-to-day experiences, as well as socioeconomic status, education, physical health, and other demographic factors. There is strong support for the top-down theory that genetic predispositions influence the way people think about what happens to them and that this matters more than what actually happens. A genetic predisposition may account for as much as 50% of the differences among people in their current well-being and as much as 80% of the differences in long-term (i.e., over a period of 10 years) well-being. Genes seems to influence the establishment of a happiness set point to which people typically return following a rise or fall in happiness or well-being in response to a positive or negative life events. Another way that genes influence well-being is through their influence on three personality traits: extroversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. More extroverted (socially outgoing) people are generally happier than more introverted (solitary)

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people, and highly agreeable (easy to get along with) people are usually happier than less agreeable people. Finally, neuroticism is the general disposition to experience negative emotions such as anxiety and depression, so it is no surprise that people higher in neuroticism generally have a lower sense of well-being than those who are lower in neuroticism. There is less support for the bottom-up theory. Cumulative research suggests that life events and circumstances account for only about 10% of the variability among people in subjective well-being. For example, some research has shown that married people are generally happier than people who have never married or who are divorced, separated, or widowed. Other research, however, has suggested that marriage does not lead to lasting changes in well-being over time. Age is related to well-being in complex ways, depending partly on how well-being is measured. Although people may experience less joy as they age, people also report fewer negative emotional states (such as depression) as they age and greater satisfaction with their lives. The frequency of positive emotions appears to diminish slightly, beginning in the mid-60s, but so do loneliness, depression, and boredom. Physical health is not strongly related to well-being. The relationship is strong when people rate their own health (subjective ratings) but weak or nonexistent when their health is rated more objectively, such as by their physicians. Gender does not seem to be related to well-being. Although women are more likely than men to experience depression, they are also more likely to experience more frequent and stronger positive emotions. Employed people are generally are happier than unemployed people, but this difference does not seem to be related to differences in income. Unemployment can lower an individual’s happiness. Education has a weak association with happiness, although this association is stronger among lower income people and among people in poor countries. Possible explanations for this association may be that people with more education are in more satisfying and higher paying jobs and that education makes it easier for people to pursue their personal goals. Income is consistently related to happiness in both within-nation and betweennation analyses.

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However, in the United States, very rich people are only slightly happier than the nonrich. Increases in income are weakly associated with increases in happiness. Between 1946 and 1990, the average purchasing power of the citizens of France, Japan, and the United States doubled, but average happiness did not increase. Although the association between income and happiness is strongly positive across nations, this may be because wealthier countries are usually more democratic and egalitarian than poorer ones. Nonetheless, the connection between economic affluence and subjective well-being is tenuous at best; international surveys have shown that some of the most satisfied citizens on the planet live in some of the poorest countries, and some of least satisfied live in some of the wealthiest.

Models The construal model views well-being as a combination of both top-down factors and bottom-up factors. It holds that objective life events do indeed influence well-being but that their effect depends largely on how the events are interpreted and how they are compared to the experiences of other people. Cumulative research suggests that construals and interpretations of life events account for perhaps 40% of the variability among people in their subjective well-being. Much of the research on the top-down and bottom-up theories is consistent with the construal model. For example, the research on employment and work shows that people who are more satisfied with their jobs are happier than those who are less satisfied, although happier people may simply be happier wherever they are, including at work, because they construe their life circumstances more positively. Research on education suggests that people’s level of satisfaction with their educational attainment is more important than their actual attainment. Research also suggests that any positive relationship between money and well-being is ­ probably because money increases one’s sense of autonomy, which leads to an increase in well-being. How much one thinks about money also matters. Causing people to think about money motivates them to work more and socialize less, which does not lead to greater well-being. Causing people to

think about time rather than money, however, motivates them to spend more time with friends and family, which leads to greater well-being. In addition, people who are more concerned about social status seem to acquire a greater sense of well-being from money than do people who are less concerned about social status. How one spends money also matters. Spending money on experiences leads to greater well-being than spending money on material things, and spending money on other people leads to greater well-being than spending money on oneself. Also consistent with the construal model of well-being is the research on social comparison theory, which holds that a major influence over well-being is how people believe their lives and experiences “measure up” to the lives and experiences of other people. Habitually comparing one’s lot in life to those whom one views as better off (richer, better looking, more successful)—upward comparison—leads to a diminished sense of wellbeing. In contrast, comparing one’s lot in life to those whom one views as worse off—downward comparison—leads to an enhanced sense of well-being. In a similar matter, feeling and expressing gratitude for what one has and for what is going well is also associated with a greater sense of well-being than focusing on what one does not have and what is not going well. Along the same lines, hope and optimism are also associated with happiness. People who expect favorable outcomes and believe that they can produce them are happier than people who tend to expect otherwise. Theories of wellbeing include two additional types. Need and goal satisfaction theories propose that well-being results from the satisfaction of biological and psychological needs and goals. Activity or process theories propose that well-being is achieved through mindful engagement in interesting and absorbing activities. The two types are not unrelated. For example, people who are working toward the satisfaction of valued needs and goals frequently find themselves mindfully engaged in interesting and absorbing activities. People who believe that they have a purpose in life or who find meaning in life are generally happier than people who do not. Meaning and purpose can be found in religion or spirituality, through work that one finds meaningful, and

Psychoneuroimmunology

through the pursuit of valued goals—all of which can lead to mindful engagement in interesting and absorbing activities. Of course, not all goals are equally conducive to well-being. Goals that are concordant with one’s values appear to be more motivating and lead to greater well-being than nonconcordant goals. In addition, perceived progress toward intrinsic goals (e.g., self-acceptance, affiliation) appears to increase subjective well-being, whereas perceived progress toward extrinsic goals (e.g., financial success, attractive appearance, social recognition) does not. Similarly, people who place greater emphasis on goals of self-acceptance, affiliation, and community improvement than on financial goals are generally happier than people who place a greater emphasis on the latter. These findings are consistent with the construal model because they suggest that it is the meaning of the goals that matters most. Also consistent with the construal model is the broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions. This theory proposes that positive emotions, such as joy, interest, commitment, and love, broaden one’s temporary repertoire of thoughts and actions, which promotes the discovery of new and creative actions, ideas, and social connections. These, in turn, build durable psychological, emotional, and social resources that outlast the positive emotions that initiated the process. One can later draw on these resources to cope successfully with future difficulties, which makes one more resilient in the face of negative life events. Thus, not only is wellbeing enhanced, but threats to well-being become less potent. Research on the broaden-and-build theory is consistent also with theory and research on the role of psychological flexibility in promoting wellbeing. According to this concept, humans recognize and adapt to shifting situational demands, develop and implement situation-specific cognitive and behavioral coping strategies, and maintain balance among important and potentially competing life domains. James E. Maddux See also Behavioral Health; Coping Strategies; Health Psychology; Positive Psychology and Human Frailty; Stress and Resilience to Life Challenge; Stress Syndromes; Stressors and Stress

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Further Readings Cohen, M. A., & Fredrickson, B. A. (2009). Positive emotions. In S. J. Lopez & C. R. Snyder (Eds.), Oxford handbook of positive psychology (2nd ed., pp. 13–24). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Kashdan, T. B., & Rottenberg, J. (2010). Psychological flexibility as a fundamental aspect of health. Clinical Psychology Review, 30, 865–878. Lyubomirsky, S., & Dickerhoof, R. (2010). A construal approach to increasing happiness. In J. E. Maddux & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Social psychological foundations of clinical psychology (pp. 229–244). New York, NY: Guilford. Maddux, J. E., Feldman, D. B., & Snyder, C.R. (2014). Promoting mental health and psychological well-being in adulthood. In T. Gullotta & M. Bloom (Eds.), Encyclopedia of primary prevention and health promotion (2nd ed., pp. 696–704). New York, NY: Kluwer/Plenum. McKnight, P. E., & Kashdan, T. B. (2009). Purpose in life as system that creates and sustains health and wellbeing: An integrative, testable theory. Review of General Psychology, 13, 242–251.

Psychoneuroimmunology Psychoneuroimmunology (PNI) theorizes that mood and behavior can alter immune function and that immune function can modify mood and behavior. Thus, psychoneuroimmunologists examine the interconnections among mood and behavior (psycho-), the nervous (central and peripheral) system (neuro-), and the immune system (-immunology). Since the term PNI was coined in the 1970s, research scientists and medical professionals have used it to connect behavior and mental health to morbidity and mortality in very concrete ways. It merges three disciplines that at times required multiple, reproducible studies in order to convince experts within each discipline that the others were important parts of the puzzle. As PNI continued, bidirectional communication between the nervous and immune systems has been repeatedly shown to affect or be affected by behaviors. This entry reviews major research contributions that marked PNI’s development and that have led to substantial contributions to health psychology, behavioral medicine, neuroimmunology, virology,

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and chronic-disease management, such as psychooncology. The entry concludes with a brief description of brain–immune communication.

The Beginning Physicians since the beginning of recorded time have observed a link between emotions and physical health, including Hippocrates—the father of medicine—who discussed a recurring pattern: Following an emotionally distressing event, his patients became physically ill. Accordingly, PNI is not a new phenomenon, but it did not become an independent science until the late 20th century. In the 1960s, George F. Solomon and Rudolph Moos at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), observed that stressors can modify viral infections in rodents as well as in emotionally distraught patients in a mental health ward. The latter had lower white blood cell counts and responded more poorly to vaccinations compared with noninstitutionalized individuals. This finding led the researchers to propose “psychoimmunology” as a new field of study that challenged the autonomy of the immune system. In the late 1960s, Elena Korneva and colleagues at the Institute of Experimental Medicine, St. Petersburg, Russia, used rodents to demonstrate that lesions in the hypothalamus altered immune activity in the periphery. At the University of Rochester during the 1970s, Robert Ader, a psychologist, was investigating taste aversion by pairing Cytoxan, an immunosuppressant drug, and saccharin-flavored water in rodents. When he continued saccharin administration ­without Cytoxan, his rodents were still exhibiting immunosuppression that resulted in death from consuming only saccharin-flavored water. He consulted with Nicholas Cohen, an immunologist, and they reliably reproduced the classical conditioning of the immune system. This collaboration demonstrated that the immune system did not function in isolation and could be influenced by taste perception via the brain. Psychoneuroimmunology was born.

Brain and Behavior Affect the Immune System Both psychologists and immunologists were skeptical of PNI as a valid approach to addressing physical and mental health issues. Each system—nervous

and immune—was complex and appeared to have unique functions and communication tools. The nervous system’s primary job was to maintain proper bodily function, and the brain perceived, contemplated, and made adjustments in response to the environment. The brain (central nervous system) received information from the body (peripheral nervous system) and controlled the periphery via nerve impulses, neurotransmitters, and hormones. The immune system’s sole purpose was to defend the body from disease. It can be divided into two branches, innate and adaptive. The innate immune system is nonspecific and responsible for detecting foreign antigen and injured self-cells, activating the adaptive immune system and tissue repair, including wound healing. The adaptive immune system produces a tailored response to an antigen and provides “memory” through training B- and T-lymphocytes to manage secondary exposure to foreign antigens. Adaptive immunity can be further broken down into either humoral (B-lymphocytes produce antibodies that mark intercellular antigen for removal) or cell-mediated (T-lymphocytes attack infected cells). Neither system appeared to be related in purpose or function, resulting in strong opposition to the burgeoning field of PNI. Researchers sought to provide underlying mechanisms linking the nervous and immune systems. At Indiana University’s School of Medicine, David Felten and colleagues discovered direct sympathetic innervation of blood vessels and lymphoid tissue, including the thymus and spleen, as well as lymph nodes. Candace Pert, a neuropharmacologist at the National Institutes of Health, identified opioidpeptide receptors first in the brain and nervous system and later found the receptor also present on immune cells and tissues. This suggested that the two systems used common chemical messengers, such as neuropeptides and possibly cytokines. Another priority for PNI was to elucidate how mood and behavior altered the multiple levels of immune function. Seminal work by Janice KiecoltGlaser and Ron Glaser, clinical-health psychologist and virologist, respectively, at the Institute for Behavioral Medicine Research at The Ohio State University, discovered that chronic stress, such as depression, distressed marriages, and familial caregiving for dementia patients, negatively affected immune function, including a reduction in white

Psychoneuroimmunology

blood cells, decreased lymphocyte proliferation, and suppressed cell-mediated immunity, leading to greater susceptibility to disease. At Carnegie Mellon University, Sheldon Cohen and colleagues demonstrated that individuals with high perceived psychological stress were more likely to become sick and display worse symptoms following cold virus inoculation compared to those reporting less perceived stress. Hence, not only major life stressors but more commonly occurring stressors were linked to perception of stress and to reduced immune function. The increased prevalence of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection and the inevitable progression to acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) provided a unique model for the PNI field. Viral replication and immune processes were very predictable, yet in the clinical world, patients infected with HIV developed AIDS at highly variable rates, ranging from months to decades. HIV-infected individuals who reported greater stigma, less social support, and higher levels of depression were more likely to develop AIDS at a faster rate than their less stressed and more optimistic counterparts. The advent of antiviral medication potentiated the psychosocial effects on HIV progression to AIDS. In addition, medication compliance and other healthy behaviors can be affected by psychosocial and mood factors. For example, shameful and pessimistic beliefs may lead HIV-infected individuals to not take medicine or eat healthfully because their state of mind reinforces that they are neither worthy nor able to change their future of developing AIDS, a fatal disease. The HIV/AIDS disease model provided PNI a chronic illness with specific endpoints by which to examine how psychosocial factors and nervous system function changed the course of disease. Today, the PNI lens has been applied to many chronic health conditions, including cardiovascular disease, Type II diabetes, cancer survivorship, autoimmune diseases, and degenerative brain diseases.

Immune System Influences the Brain and Behavior Near the turn of 21st century, Steven Maier and Linda Watkins identified the afferent vagal nerve

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fibers as one mechanism that allows the peripheral immune system to convey messages to the brain. Using rodent models, the researchers discovered that cutting the vagus nerve below the diaphragm inhibited the brain from inducing fever following peripheral cytokine—for example, Interluekin1beta (IL-1β)—injections. William Banks and colleagues at the University of Washington’s School of Medicine observed that the blood–brain barrier played an active role transporting cytokines and immune mediators from the bloodstream into the brain. In addition, circumventricular organs surrounding the third ventricle is another area where the brain “monitors” concentrations of many blood components, including cytokines. Consequently, neuroimmune communication was no longer only a top-down directive but a bidirectional “conversation.” Robert Dantzer and Keith Kelley popularized the notion that systemic inflammation or peripheral cytokine levels can induce sickness behavior, defined as behavioral changes associated with fever, such as decreased energy, decreased appetite, increased desire to be isolated, and changes in sleep. Sickness behavior mimics symptoms of depression. Depression, a long-standing mental health condition, has been associated with the failure to cognitively structure life events less negatively with a neurotransmitter imbalance. ­ Consequently, the linkage of cytokine levels to depressive-like behaviors was radical. Yet Andrew Miller, at Emory University’s School of Medicine, found that combining anti-inflammatory or anticytokine treatment with antidepressants for ­ individuals with major depressive disorder significantly reduced depressive symptoms compared with those taking only antidepressants. Psychoneuroimmunologists also extended the understanding of how psychosocial factors and immune function interplay to affect quality of life. For example, Julienne Bower at UCLA has linked cancer-related fatigue to inflammation. Behavioral interventions show that yoga practice in breast cancer survivors decreased cancer-related fatigue, increased mood, improved sleep, and reduced immune activity. Thus, PNI not only focuses on reductionist molecular and cellular mechanisms but assesses the whole individual as a series of interwoven, complex systems.

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Neuroimmune Bidirectional Communication The two major routes for the central nervous system to communicate with the periphery include direct innervation and neuroendocrine pathways. The peripheral nervous system (NS) “hard-wires” or directly connects the brain to immune tissue and cells via the sympathetic NS’s release of norepinephrine and the parasympathetic NS’s release of acetylcholine. Norepinephrine promotes nuclear factor-kappa B (NF-κB) activation. NF-κB is a transcription factor that regulates gene expression of several proinflammatory mediators, such as Interluekin-6 (IL-6) and Interluekin-8 (IL-8). NF-κB activation increases gene expression of inflammatory mediators, which, in turn, enhances inflammation. Acetylcholine, however, “calms” the immune system via the cholinergic anti-inflammatory pathway. Cholinergic stimulation of immune cells impedes NF-κB’s modulation of inflammatory gene expression. Cortisol, the end product of the hypothalamicpituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis, produces a wide variety of bodily effects. It is one of the most potent anti-inflammatory modulators of the immune system. Cortisol binds to glucocorticoid receptors within immune cells and inhibits activation and release of proinflammatory cytokines. However, chronically elevated cortisol can induce glucocorticoid insensitivity wherein immune cells down-regulate the expression of glucocorticoid receptors. As a result of prolonged high cortisol levels, inflammation can be increased due to unregulated immune cells producing proinflammatory cytokines. The immune system provides information to the brain via cytokines. For example, IL-1 receptors are located throughout the brain, especially in the hypothalamus, and can stimulate corticotropin releasing hormone (CRH) secretion from the hypothalamus, leading to increased HPA axis activity. Peripheral cytokines induce behavioral changes that mirror depression. Proinflammatory cytokines can access the brain through a variety of pathways, including the leaky regions in the bloodbrain barrier, cytokine-specific transport molecules expressed on blood-brain barrier, and the vagus nerve detecting cytokine levels in the periphery and relaying this information to the brain. Psychoneuroimmunology has advanced understanding of the complexity of health and provides a framework for examining biopsychosocial factors

influencing physical and mental health issues. As each discipline—psychology, neuroscience, and immunology—continues to make new discoveries, psychoneuroimmunologists will incorporate the new information and continue to be a progressive field—graying the boundaries between healthrelated disciplines. Jeanette M. Bennett See also Behavioral Health; Chronic Illness, Psychological Aspects of; Coping Strategies; Health Psychology; Neuroendocrine System; Neuroscience as One-Sided Dualism; Stress and Resilience to Life Challenge; Stress Syndromes; Stressors and Stress

Further Readings Bonneau, R. H., Padgett, D. A., & Sheridan, J. F. (2007). Twenty years of psychoneuroimmunology and viral infections in Brain, Behavior, and Immunity. Brain, Behavior, & Immunity, 21, 273–280. Dantzer, R., & Kelley, K. W. (2007). Twenty years of research on cytokine-induced sickness behavior. Brain, Behavior, & Immunity, 21, 153–160. Glaser, R., & Kiecolt-Glaser, J. K. (2005). Stress-induced immune dysfunction: Implications for health. Nature Reviews Immunology, 5, 243–251. Kusnecov, A. W., & Anisman, H. (Eds.). (2014). The Wiley-Blackwell handbook of psychoneuroimmunology. Chichester, England: John Wiley. Vedhara, K., & Irwin, M. R. (2005). Human psychoneuroimmunology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Psychopathology

and

Stress

Feeling anxious, sad, and discouraged are universal experiences that afflict nearly everyone from time to time. Such emotional reactions fall within the normal range of human functioning and are common responses to adverse life circumstances, such as preparing for a difficult job interview, failing an important exam, getting fired, or losing a loved one. Indeed, emotional reactions such as these are adaptive insofar as they help people prioritize goals, communicate feelings, and remember important life events. In some instances, however, emotional reactions to stressful situations can become exaggerated or prolonged, leading to

Psychopathology and Stress

levels of distress that affect social and occupational functioning. Under these circumstances, stress can contribute to the development of different forms of psychopathology. Specific disorders known to be precipitated by stress include social anxiety disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, substance abuse disorder, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major depressive disorder. Stress can also contribute to the development of traitlike personality disorders, such as antisocial personality disorder and borderline personality disorder, especially if the stress exposure is prolonged or severe. This entry reviews different types of stress that cause psychopathology, vulnerability factors that contribute to individual differences in stress reactivity, mechanisms that link stress with psychopathology, and processes that underlie associations between stress, psychopathology, and physical disease.

Types of Stress Three types of stress have been found to increase risk for psychopathology: acute life events, chronic difficulties, and contextual stressors. Acute life events are relatively short-lived stressors that include situations such as acute health problems or illnesses, accidents, marriages, divorces, job losses, births, and deaths. They can occur once or multiple times and can vary in impact from being relatively minor to very severe. Breaking up with a romantic partner after 2 weeks of dating is typically a relatively minor acute life event, whereas being physically or sexually attacked constitutes a severe life event. Chronic difficulties, in contrast, are more prolonged in nature and include circumstances that persist for several months or years, such as ongoing health, relationship, financial, housing, occupational, or educational difficulties. Living in an apartment with limited personal space for 2 months is usually a relatively minor chronic difficulty, whereas taking care of a dying spouse for 5 years constitutes a severe difficulty. Finally, contextual stressors are societal- or macro-level circumstances that form the general physical, social, and psychological environments in which people live. These stressors include experiences such as poverty, war, undereducation, unemployment, discrimination, crime, poor health care

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access, and social isolation. Because of their ubiquitous nature, contextual stressors often give rise to specific acute life events and chronic difficulties. For example, people living in poverty are more likely to experience stressors involving crime and physical danger, and those without access to health care are more likely to experience health- and illness-related stressors.

Stress Exposure and Vulnerability Although stress is ubiquitous, most people who experience stress do not develop psychiatric disorders. This is due, in part, to the severity and duration of the stress exposure, with longer, more severe exposures being more likely to cause psychopathology. Another critical factor that determines whether people develop psychopathology following stress involves level of vulnerability. Theories that account for both the amount or severity of stress exposure and the extent of personal vulnerability present are called diathesisstress theories. These theories posit that the amount of stress required for psychopathology to develop differs depending on the vulnerability of the person. Theories such as cognitive theory of depression focus mainly on cognitive vulnerability to stress that comes in the form of negative views of the self, others, or the future. Vulnerability can be represented at other levels as well. According to stress sensitization and the kindling hypothesis, for example, people become more neurobiologically and behaviorally sensitive to stress over time because of prior psychopathology or experiences with stress. As a result, less stress is required for psychopathology to develop in the future. In addition, neuroticism, or the tendency to remain in a negative emotional state, has also been shown to increase vulnerability to stress. Finally, genetic factors that influence serotonergic and immune system activity also affect stress reactivity, leaving some individuals more likely than others to develop psychopathology following stress. Research on psychopathology and stress has also identified mechanisms by which stress affects mental health. In social signal transduction theory, for example, cognitive, emotional, neural, physiologic, and genetic factors all play a role in linking stress with psychopathology. From this perspective, stress generates specific negative thoughts

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Psychophysics

(e.g., “I’m not good enough,” “I won’t get through this,” “This will never end”) and emotions (e.g., anxiety, sadness, shame, humiliation) that produce distress. Stress also upregulates biological systems, including the sympathetic nervous system and hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis, which regulate components of the immune system involving inflammation that have profound effects on mood, cognition, and behavior. In addition, as revealed by work on human social genomics, some types of stress—such as social conflict, isolation, rejection, and exclusion— can reach deep inside the body to influence the activity of the human genome. These biobehavioral changes can be adaptive and enhance survival when they occur intermittently and in response to actual physical threat. But if activation of these systems is frequent or prolonged, substantial distress can develop, possibly leading to psychiatric illness. Finally, stress can also increase risk for several physical disease conditions that frequently cooccur with psychiatric illness, such as asthma, rheumatoid arthritis, chronic pain, metabolic syndrome, cardiovascular disease, obesity, certain cancers, and neurodegeneration. In fact, one of the discoveries in this area involves the finding that components of the immune system that link stress with anxiety and depression may also give stress the ability to promote the physical diseases just mentioned. The implications of this discovery are profound, as they suggest that stress may be associated with both mental and physical health problems through common, underlying pathways. If this is the case, targeting stress-related biobehavioral processes may reduce risk not just for psychopathology but for physical disease as well. George M. Slavich See also Anxiety Disorders; Behavioral Perspectives on Psychopathology; Grief and Bereavement; Humanistic Theories of Psychopathology; Mood Disorders; Psychoanalytic and Psychodynamic Theories of Psychopathology; Psychoneuroimmunology; Social Factors in Health; Stressors and Stress

Further Readings Boyce, W. T. (2007). A biology of misfortune: Stress reactivity, social context, and the ontogeny of psychopathology in early life. In A. S. Masten (Ed.),

Multilevel dynamics in developmental psychopathology: Pathways to the future (pp. 45–82). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Dohrenwend, B. P. (2000). The role of adversity and stress in psychopathology: Some evidence and its implications for theory and research. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 41, 1–19. Hankin, B. L., & Abela, J. R. (Eds.). (2005). Development of psychopathology: A vulnerability-stress perspective. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Monroe, S. M. (2008). Modern approaches to conceptualizing and measuring human life stress. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 4, 33–52. Slavich, G. M., & Irwin, M. R. (2014). From stress to inflammation and major depressive disorder: A social signal transduction theory of depression. Psychological Bulletin, 140, 774–815.

Psychophysics Psychophysics is characterized by attempts to determine the functional relationship between perceived or subjective magnitudes and physical magnitudes. Much progress has been made in defining and measuring the physical world, yet controversies abound over defining and measuring the perceived world. Over time, standardized scales of measurement have been developed for the physical world. Although there is not unanimous agreement—for instance, a metric mile and international mile are not the same unit of measurement—at least there is agreement that ­ measures on different scales reflect the same quantities—one international mile (i.e., 1,609 ­ meters) is the same in Tucson, Arizona, and in Burnley, Lancashire. Measuring perception, however, is not so straightforward. There are two major problems: (a) intraindividual variation and (b) interindividual variability. The first refers to the fact that measures of any one person will likely vary as a consequence of factors other than the physical magnitude of the stimulus. The second problem refers to the fact that measures of any two different people will likely be different even though the same stimulus is presented to both. This entry discusses the classical view of psychophysics and subsequent views. Consider the physical magnitude of sound intensity and the question of what loud means.

Psychophysics

Measuring sound intensity in terms of decibels (db) is straightforward using a sound meter. However, a person’s answer to the question depends on an indefinite number of factors. One’s estimate of loudness will be very different if it is a car horn that sounds when one steps out of a library or when leaving a Metallica concert. Even when the testing conditions are tightly controlled and the car horn is presented in the context of a sound-attenuated chamber, estimates of loudness will vary from person to person. Given the wellknown hearing deficits in older people, the same car horn will sound less loud to them than it will to a young adult. To address intraindividual variability, the solution is to repeatedly test the same person under the same testing conditions. This method results in a sample of responses that can be aggregated in some way to estimate the person’s typical response to the physical quantity of interest. To address interindividual variability, the solution is to test a representative sample of individuals and aggregate their responses in order to estimate a typical value for the general population. Both solutions provide statistical answers to questions about what the psychological counterparts are to physical quantities.

Classical Psychophysics To try to get a better grip on the underlying psychological mechanisms, a starting point has been to estimate some form of psychophysical ­threshold. One such threshold is known as a just noticeable difference (a JND, or alternatively, a difference limen) and is the amount by which two stimuli must differ for a person to be able to tell them apart—is this same car horn sounding twice or is it two horns? In this scenario, the stimuli vary on the physical dimension of interest—is one car horn louder than another? Alternatively, the limits of perception may be estimated by trying to establish the maximum and minimum values of a physical dimension that can be perceived (a so-called absolute limen). There are now reasonably well-established definitions of the visible spectrum of light and the range of sound frequencies that can be heard. However, these are typically defined relative to statistical rather than absolute threshold values because of the intra- and interindividual differences discussed earlier. They

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are statistical insofar as the values will be couched in terms of things such as the number of times a person saw or heard the stimulus or the number of people who saw or heard a stimulus of some particular value and so on. A key figure was G. T. Fechner, who worked during the middle of the 19th century and is credited with developing various fundamental psychophysical methods for threshold determination. These are known as the method of adjustment, the method of limits, and the method of constants. With the method of adjustment, a person adjusts the physical stimulus along the dimension of interest (e.g., adjusts the volume of sound) to a point where it is just detectable. With the method of limits the experimenter adjusts the volume of the stimuli that are presented. Whenever the stimulus is presented, the person simply indicates whether he or she detected it. The magnitude of the stimulus varies across trials from (a) levels well above detection to levels well below detection—the descending method of limits—or (b) levels well below detection to levels well above detection—the ascending method of limits. With the method of constant stimuli, the magnitude of the stimulus is again experimenter controlled and varies across trials but in an unpredictable manner. Variations on these basic psychophysical methods continue to be used. The general approach is to test a relatively small number of people a very large number of times. The practicalities of extended and demanding testing place real constraints on the use of large samples. Consider the estimation of difference limens. Work by Ernst Weber that predated that of Fechner set the foundations for studying a basic relation between perceived and physical magnitudes— namely, that JNDs scale directly with the physical intensity of a stimulus. Two moderately loud car horns differing by 5 db are much easier to tell apart than are two car horns of 100 and 105 dbs, respectively. The mathematical relation between actual and perceived differences was captured by Weber’s law, which stipulates a direct, proportional relation between the two. Fechner explored this further and came up with Fechner’s law, which stipulates that the actual relationship is best described by a logarithmic function. In the 1960s, S. S. Stevens addressed counterexamples to the Weber-Fechner characterization.

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In providing a more general account of relations between JNDs and actual physical differences, Stevens put forward a power law. By this account, performance can be fitted with a function in which an exponent is applied to the size of the physical quantity. The shape of the eventual function depends on the value of the exponent. Values greater than 1.0 produce an upwardly accelerating curve, a value of 1.0 results in a direct r­ elation (Weber’s law), and values less than 1.0 produce a decelerating function (aligned with Fechner’s law). Now consider estimation of the absolute limen. The corresponding psychophysical function typically has a monotonically increasing S shape (known as an ogive) in which the incidence of a particular discriminatory response is mapped out in terms of increasing physical quantity. Assume, for example, that the function concerns the percent correct in terms of physical quantity from an experiment in which sometimes a stimulus is presented and sometimes not, and the person has to respond Yes (a stimulus was presented) or No (no stimulus was presented) on each trial (this is known as the Yes/No paradigm). A typical function shows that performance varies from always incorrect to always correct, with intervening responses reflecting sometimes correct. Such a function having been obtained, the problem becomes one of deciding where to set the thresholds. A typical solution is to use a value between chance and perfect performance, for instance, 75% correct.

Discrete-Process Theories Despite the simplicity of the methods used for threshold estimation, fundamental interpretative problems exist. For instance, an assumption that underpinned the work by Fechner (and still endures) is that the measured threshold provides a dividing line between consciousness and unconsciousness. That is, the threshold provides an indication as to the point at which a stimulus becomes detectible—either in the absolute sense or the difference sense. This view of a threshold fits well with so-called discrete-process models. These apply in cases such as the all-or-nothing action potential of nerve cells or the ON/OFF logical states of digital computers.

One of the most famous single-threshold accounts of processing is known as the high-threshold model. It posits a single sensory threshold that operates just like an all-or-none filter such that all physical values below a certain value are never detected and those above are. In the Yes/No paradigm, even though there are only two possible responses, there are four possible outcomes. A hit occurs when the person is correct in responding Yes on a stimulus-present trial. A correct rejection occurs when the person is correct in responding No on a stimulus-absent trial. A miss refers to the person being incorrect in responding No on a stimulus-present trial, and a false alarm occurs when the person is incorrect in responding Yes on a stimulus-absent trial. R. D. Luce is credited with modifying the singlethreshold account to produce a two-state, lowthreshold model. A single threshold is assumed, but occasionally, the threshold can be exceeded when no stimulus is present. In this way, the Luce model deals more adequately with the incidence of false alarms. Other theorists began to consider the importance of response thresholds or criteria for responding. Accordingly, any account of perception must address both sensory and decision mechanisms with the implication that both possess thresholds and both are sensitive to different factors. Sensory factors are those that reflect the intensity of the stimulus and the efficacy of the sensory-encoding mechanisms. In contrast, subjective factors reflect the motivational state of the person—how keen the person is to do well—as well as the instructions given to the person, the expectations of the person, and so on.

Signal Detection Theory What emerged during the 1960s was the dominance of two contrasting views. There were those wedded to the importance of the sensory threshold and those less inclined to this view who attempted to do away with the notion altogether while acknowledging the importance of decisional factors. This latter group of theorists (notably, W.  P Tanner, D. M. Green, and J. A. Swets) adopted a more continuous (less discrete) notion of processing and attempted to provide a unifying account of both sensory and decisional processes. The importance of sensory processes was not downgraded,

Psychophysics

but the necessity of sensory thresholds was. The ensuing account came to be known as signal detection theory (SDT). Central to the theory is the notion that over time, evidence accrues on an internal dimension akin to the physical dimension being manipulated either by the person or by the experimenter. So to continue the previous example, car horn sound intensity would be mapped onto an internal, psychological loudness dimension. By this view, the person is continually faced with the problem of attempting to discriminate the presence of a stimulus from the presence of noise, which is interpreted liberally to include all forms of extraneous background noise and all forms of noise present in the central nervous system. Noise also reflects modality-specific noise that could possibly interfere with or mask the presence of the stimulus. The amount of evidence in favor of the stimulus must be weighed relative to the amount of evidence for noise alone. More particularly, it is the amount of evidence combined from the stimulus plus the noise that must be judged relative to the noise alone. The continuous nature of the mechanisms is reflected in the fact that the evidence on the internal dimension falls into overlapping distributions of noise values and signal-plus-noise values, respectively. The extent of overlap is given by how salient the stimulus is relative to the noise. If the stimulus is barely discernible, then the two distributions overlap a great deal. If the stimulus is undiscernible, then the two distributions will be superimposed. The basic view is that stimulus processing takes place under conditions of uncertainty, and because of this uncertainty, the person must make a decision as to the likelihood that a stimulus actually occurred. Hence, decision processes move to the fore. In this regard, SDT invokes the notion of a response criterion. The placement of the criterion reflects the influence of one or more of the subjective factors mentioned previously. A conservative criterion is one wherein a person tends to respond that the stimulus is present when only extreme values of the stimulus are presented, whereas with a liberal criterion, a person tends to report that the stimulus is present most of the time. The flexibility of the placement of the criterion can be examined by keeping the very same

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stimulus presentation conditions but varying the incentives to the person in terms of the consequences of getting the decision correct. This general approach therefore suggests the possibility of studying sensory and response factors independently of one another. Since its inception, SDT has been adopted widely and might be seen as providing a panacea for all problems related to stimulus detection in the presence of uncertainty. However, the debate between discrete-threshold models and continuous-processing accounts remains contentious. Nonetheless, it is hard not to be impressed by the influence that SDT has had. Indeed, further important extensions to the theory began to emerge during the 1980s in terms of something known as general recognition theory (GRT).

General Recognition Theory In GRT more than one dimension of perceptual evidence is considered. For instance, a shape dimension and a color dimension would be posited in pursing explanations of the detection of colored shapes. The aim is to understand better the perception of multidimensional stimuli using, essentially, the same psychophysical methods as those developed by Fechner. The main protagonists of the theory (F. G. Ashby and J. T. Townsend) developed detailed mathematical models intended to deal with perceptional and decisional processes that operate when more than one stimulus dimension is to be assessed. The mathematical proofs are detailed and so have allowed precise empirical predictions to be tested. Indeed, it is through such testing that key predictions have been shown to be false. Such cases do not completely undermine the general theoretical framework but, instead, have produced a much better understanding of the theory and the conditions under which it can be most fruitfully applied. Although the relevant data have predominantly concerned perceptual processing, other studies have looked at the implications for memory. So even though some would question the appropriateness of the term psychophysics to the study of memory, methods that were developed in perceptual settings have much more general application. Philip Quinlan

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See also Auditory Perception; Event Perception; Human Information Processing; Music Perception; Perception and Cognition; Perceptual Contrast; Perceptual Development; Visual Perception

Further Readings Ashby, F. G. (Ed.). (1992). Multidimensional models of perception and cognition. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Macmillan, N. A., & Creelman, C. D. (1991). Detection theory: A user’s guide (2nd ed.). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Quinlan, P. T., & Dyson, B. J. (2008). Cognitive psychology. Harlow, England: Pearson.

Psychosocial Factors and Cancer Psychological and social aspects of life, which have been collectively called psychosocial factors, have long been known to play an influential role in shaping physical health and disease. Included in this relatively broad “umbrella” term are p ­ rocesses that involve a person’s mental state, psychological tendencies, and surrounding social environment. Some examples of psychosocial factors include acute stress, chronic stress, coping, perceived control, neuroticism, hostility, anxiety, rumination, hopelessness, negative affect, depression, social class, social conflict, social isolation, self-efficacy, and self-esteem. This entry provides an overview of research on psychosocial factors and cancer. More specifically, it summarizes different types of cancer, known associations between psychosocial factors and cancer, biological pathways that link psychosocial factors and cancer, and psychosocial interventions that have been shown to alter these biological processes and improve clinical outcomes.

Types of Cancer Cancer is not a singular disease. Rather, cancer is a term that describes a group of diseases that although similar in gross phenotype, are quite heterogeneous in etiology and pathophysiology. Cancers are broadly categorized according to the

type of tissue in the body where they originate. Cancers that originate in epithelial cells—that is, cells that line the outer surface of an organ, such as skin cells—are called carcinomas and are the most prevalent. Sarcomas are cancers that originate in the connective or supportive tissues of the body (e.g., bone, muscle). Lymphomas are cancers that stem from abnormal immune cells in the body’s lymphatic vessels. Finally, leukemias are cancers that stem from malignant immune cells in blood (i.e., white blood cells) or other blood-forming cells that occupy the bone marrow. All told, the National Cancer Institute currently recognizes the existence of more than 100 distinct cancers that can occur in the human body.

The Relation Between Psychosocial Factors and Cancer An association between psychosocial factors and cancer has been pondered at least since the 2nd century CE. At that time, the Greek physician Claudius Galen believed that women with a depressed or “melancholic” disposition were more prone to getting cancer. When examined prospectively over time, most modern studies suggest that no reliable link exists between psychosocial factors and cancer incidence—that is, the onset of cancer. However, a growing body of research shows that stress-related psychosocial factors play a role in cancer progression—that is, the rate at which an existing cancer in the body worsens or causes mortality. In this latter regard, studies of breast cancer are by far the most common. This research has shown that several psychosocial factors—including psychological distress, anxiety, hostility, lack of emotional expression, low overall quality of life, and poor familial- and romantic-relationship quality—are associated with shorter survival time in breast cancer patients. The nature of this relationship is complex, though, as some studies have found that low quality of social support, higher anxiety, and higher hostility are associated with better survival rates. Associations between psychosocial factors and clinical outcomes have been examined in other cancers as well, including lung cancer, colorectal cancer, immune cell cancers, skin cancers, female reproductive cancers (e.g., ovarian cancer, cervical

Psychosocial Factors and Cancer

cancer, uterine cancer), prostate cancer, stomach cancer, liver cancer, head and neck cancer, and brain cancers. In studies that have examined lung cancer progression, personality factors, such as defensiveness and anger suppression or repression, which has been called “anti-emotionality,” and other psychosocial factors such as psychological distress and poorer quality of life, have been shown to predict shorter survival time. In studies of immune cell cancers, depressive mood, depressive coping styles, psychological distress, poor social support, and poor quality of life have been found to predict shorter survival time. Fewer progression studies exist for each of the other cancers listed earlier, and the results of these studies are more mixed. A key question on the topic of psychosocial factors and cancer involves how exactly psychosocial factors affect clinical outcomes in this disease. This is a complicated issue, given that many different psychosocial factors have been implicated in cancer, and in addition, many different types of cancer exist. Nevertheless, some agreement has emerged suggesting that psychosocial factors affect clinical outcomes in cancer, at least in part, by influencing activity of the autonomic nervous, endocrine, and immune systems. More specifically, psychosocial factors that involve negative affectivity and social stress are thought to activate two of the body’s main stress systems—namely, the sympathetic nervous system and the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis— which affect components of the immune system involved in inflammation. Inflammation, in turn, is known to be involved in tumor growth, as well as in promoting several distressing symptoms that at least some cancer survivors experience, such as fatigue, depression, difficulty concentrating, increased pain sensitivity, and social behavioral withdrawal. The exact mechanisms that link psychosocial factors with inflammation and other tumor-promoting physiology are still being elucidated, and this research is being conducted using a combination of methods that include clinical populations, preclinical animal models, and basic in vitro techniques.

Interventions Some of the most potentially important work on psychosocial factors and cancer has focused on

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developing interventions that can affect psychosocial and biological pathways to improve clinical outcomes. A landmark randomized controlled trial (RCT) that began in the late 1970s showed that 12 months of weekly group-based, supportive expression therapy extended the survival of breast cancer patients by twofold after 10 years of follow-up. Since then, two additional RCTs have examined the effect of psychosocial interventions on clinical outcomes in cancer as well as psychological adaptation to having the disease and biological processes that are relevant for its progression. The first of these studies randomly assigned melanoma patients to 6 weeks of group-based therapy that focused on problem-solving skills, stress management, and psychological support versus a standard care control group. During the 10 years of followup, the experimental group showed less negative mood, more immune system processes that inhibit disease progression, and lower rates of cancer recurrence and mortality. A second study randomized breast cancer patients to 4 months of weekly group-based therapy followed by 8 months of monthly group-based therapy that focused on reducing stress, improving mood, altering health behaviors, and maintaining adherence to cancer treatment. During 11 years of follow-up, the experimental group showed less distress, more immune system processes that inhibit disease progression, and less cancer recurrence and mortality. In conclusion, then, there is evidence that psychosocial factors influence biological and clinical outcomes in cancer and that certain psychosocial interventions can affect these processes and yield positive effects. Donald M. Lamkin and George M. Slavich See also Chronic Illness, Psychological Aspects of; Health Psychology; Neuroendocrine System; Psychoneuroimmunology; Social Factors in Health; Stress Syndromes; Stressors and Stress

Further Readings Antoni, M. H. (2013). Psychosocial intervention effects on adaptation, disease course and biobehavioral processes in cancer. Brain, Behavior, and Immunity, 30, S88–S98. Antoni, M. H., Lutgendorf, S. K., Cole, S.W., Dhabhar, F. S., Sephton, S.E., McDonald, P. G., . . . & Sood, A. K.

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(2006). The influence of bio-behavioural factors on tumour biology: Pathways and mechanisms. Nature Reviews Cancer, 6, 240–248. Chida, Y., Hamer, M., Wardle, J., & Steptoe, A. (2008). Do stress-related psychosocial factors contribute to cancer incidence and survival? Nature Reviews Clinical Oncology, 5, 466–475. Hanahan, D., & Weinberg, R. A. (2011). Hallmarks of cancer: The next generation. Cell, 144, 646–674. Nausheen, B., Gidron, Y., Peveler, R., & Moss-Morris, R. (2009). Social support and cancer progression: A systematic review. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 67, 403–415.

Psychotherapy

and Individualism

Most theories of psychotherapy in the 20th and 21st centuries, since Sigmund Freud, their many sharp disagreements notwithstanding, have presented themselves as a kind of “science,” giving a neutral, objective, or value-free account of human dynamics and change. In line with this claim, most of them view themselves in heavily “instrumental” terms. Above all, counseling and therapy should be “effective.” Means and ends are separate and distinct. Ends or goals are either purely natural or inbuilt—health, well-being, or authentic selfhood—or are freely chosen by the client or patient, independent of any substantial influence by the political, moral, cultural, or religious values of the therapist. This leaves therapy theory and practice to concentrate on the means to these outcomes. They will be able to conform to the dictum of the distinguished researcher Paul Meehl, who, at the beginning of the era of psychotherapy’s prominence in American society in 1959, warned that therapists should never behave like “crypto-missionaries,” seeking to convert their clients to their own preferred conception of the good life. This entry discusses the underlying values of psychotherapy in relation to individuals and treatment.

Value Freedom and Value Convergence However, dozens of research studies over the years confirm that counseling and psychotherapy are anything but value neutral. One finding is that

so-called value convergence between therapist and client over time seems to be related more closely to client improvement than many other factors, such as therapist credibility and competence. All sorts of professional, moral, even religious values seem important to perceived improvement. Moreover, overwhelmingly, the findings indicate that only clients, not therapists, change their values during therapy and that value convergence is correlated more strongly with therapists’ than with clients’ rating of the client as normal or improved. This might seem to reflect values “conversion” more than “convergence,” the very thing Meehl feared in the 1950s. In 1996, the psychoanalyst Irwin Hoffman (1996) observed, When we [analysts] interpret the transference, we like to think that we are merely bringing to the surface what is already “there,” rather than that we are cultivating something in the patient and in the relationship that might not have developed in the same way otherwise . . . our hands are not clean. (p. 109)

Individualism and Disguised Ideology How can this anomalous and paradoxical situation be clarified where therapists are morally enjoined to be value-free and clients seeking profound influence and direction are supposed to be protected from their therapist’s best ideals for living? The first step might be to acknowledge that psychotherapy, like other important human activities, such as parenting and politics, is deeply historically and culturally embedded and perpetuates some set of cultural and moral ideals from the surrounding society—one in which, after all, clients hope to function successfully. Health and wellbeing are always defined, in part, by cultural and moral norms. The next step would be to realize that precisely this kind of confusion about influence and freedom lies at the heart of perhaps the dominant ideology in contemporary society—namely “individualism” or “liberal individualism.” In the view of many critics, this kind of individualism reflects precious ideals of human dignity, rights, and equal worth but may also be anti-authoritarian and autonomy centered in a dangerously one-sided way. For example, Phillip Cushman has argued

Psychotherapy and Individualism

that American society defines the mature or ideal individual as a “bounded, masterful self” who is expected to “function in a highly autonomous, isolated way” and “to be self-soothing, self-loving, and self-sufficient” (p. 604). However, he argued, the inflated, would-be autonomous self almost inevitably collapses into an “empty self,” whose characteristics of fragility, sense of emptiness, and proneness to fluctuation between feelings of worthlessness and grandiosity are often said to be the hallmarks of neurotic psychopathology in the present day. His ideas were anticipated by Erich Fromm, who, over a halfcentury ago, contended that modern freedom is “ambiguous.” Americans have, Fromm suggested, a welldeveloped sense of “freedom from” dogmatism, arbitrary authority, and unwarranted impediments to exercising greater control over nature and ourselves. But they sorely lack a corresponding sense of “freedom to” or “freedom for” that would give some context, direction, or deeper purpose to their increased freedom and opportunity. This very situation, he felt, fostered many of their emotional and interpersonal problems of living in today’s world. Individualism’s moral and political outlook stresses the rights and empowerment of individuals but leaves the choice of core values and ends in living strictly to their autonomous choice, so long as they do not interfere with the autonomy or rights of others. Similarly, psychotherapy is thought to heal or empower individuals or bring out their true or authentic selves from within but must remain value-neutral and not impose on clients anyone else’s cultural or moral credo. Both tend to assume a sharp, dichotomous, either–or distinction between autonomy and domination. Both downplay the massive influence of culture, mediated by others, in shaping personality, character, and values, presumably to protect, at all costs, cherished modern values of human dignity and rights. It appears that the modern therapy enterprise is shaped at its core by a “disguised ideology” of liberal individualism, with all its strengths and weaknesses. Liberal individualism represents a sincere effort to affirm freedom without dissolving responsibility or to eliminate dogmatism without abandoning one’s moral duties to others. Nevertheless, this view has some serious philosophical problems that have

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deleterious practical consequences. It is one-sided. It stresses freedom over responsibility and individual rights over commitment to any sort of common good. It is embroiled in the paradox of advocating a thoroughgoing neutrality toward all values as a way of promoting certain basic values of liberty, tolerance, and human rights. In this view, justice is strictly procedural, which means that the focus is on formal rules or codes that people hope will protect their rights and prerogatives while ensuring that no one can define the good life for anyone else. However, if people cannot reason together meaningfully about the worth of ends and the ethical quality of lives and communities, they also cannot defend liberal individualism’s own vision of a way of life characterized by dignity and respect, which is taken to be morally superior or good in itself. This kind of subjectivism or neutrality toward all notions of the good life seems bound to weaken people’s dedication even to individualism’s own best ideals. As Michael Sandel put it, liberal individualism as a public philosophy “cannot secure the liberty it promises, because it cannot inspire the sense of community and civic engagement that liberty requires” (p.  6). As a result, the lives of citizens tend to focus more and more on narrow self-interest in a “culture of narcissism.” Robert Bellah and colleagues identified two main forms of individualism. Despite their differences—they may even clash—both share the same underlying individualistic focus. One is “utilitarian individualism,” a prominent view since the Enlightenment, that “takes as given certain basic human appetites and fears . . . and sees human life as an effort by individuals to maximize their selfinterest relative to these given ends ” (p. 336). The other is “expressive individualism,” arising out of the Romantic movement of the late 18th and 19th centuries, which, as noted by Bellah and colleagues, is guided by the belief that “each person has a unique core of feeling and intuition that should unfold or be expressed if individuality is to be realized” (p. 334). It appears that utilitarian individualism is enshrined at the heart of both classic Freudian theory and the behavioral and cognitive behavioral therapies (their many differences notwithstanding, and that expressive individualism forms the core of humanistic approaches and Heinz Kohut’s self psychology.

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Psychotherapy and Individualism

If this is so, it should come as no surprise that many of the concerns about the modern therapy enterprise expressed over the years echo familiar criticisms of the individualistic way of life. In the 1970s, Jerome Frank thoughtfully summarized many of these issues. He suggested that as “institutions of American society, all psychotherapies . . . share a value system that accords primacy to individual self-fulfillment.” The individual is seen as “the center of his moral universe, and concern for others is believed to follow from his own selfrealization” (p. 6). However, this outlook “can easily become a source of misery in itself” because of its unrealistic expectations for personal happiness. In Frank’s view, the literature of psychotherapy gives little attention to such traditional, possibly worthwhile values or virtues as “the redemptive power of suffering, acceptance of one’s lot in life, adherence to tradition, self-restraint and moderation” (p. 7).

Beyond Individualism What this may amount to is a situation in which counseling and psychotherapy, to some extent, perpetuate the problem in the cure. Their disguised ideology reinforces cultural deficits and the very emotional problems in living that those deficits sometimes engender. However, it is difficult for psychology or the culture at large to move beyond individualism. Amitai Etzioni argued that there can be “excessive liberty” and that without some limits on choice, provided first and foremost by some “shared moral convictions,” neither a coherent sense of personal identity nor social peace is really possible. The difficulty is that people find it hard to conceive of such limits as anything other than a regrettable, if not outright domineering, compromise of their autonomy and integrity. It might help to gain a renewed appreciation of one’s deep belongingness and indebtedness to the cultural and historical context in which one finds oneself, to some tradition or traditions, such that according to Charles Taylor, “We are aware of the world through a ‘we’ before we are through an ‘I.’” Thus, “We always find ourselves as a we-consciousness before we can be an I-consciousness” (p. 40). That is why people are all so much alike in their proud individualism, even as they tend to deny it in the name of individuality, which makes

it very hard to criticize their ideals and practices when needed. In addition, it is important to acknowledge that liberal individualism itself has a dogmatic aspect. It asserts its understanding of procedural justice, which it thinks leaves more substantive ideals of the good life to private determination, as something universal in scope. However, other cultures and strands of American culture may not entirely reject that kind of justice but place a comparable or greater emphasis on character or community. Furthermore, contemporary perspectives on dialogue and relationality clarify how making shared values, and not purely individual choice, one’s starting point might enhance rather than undermine human freedom, responsibility, and well-being. In this view, human life is not basically the interaction of separate individuals but a nexus of relationships, a process of mutual influence and dialogue. Dialogue consists of the interplay of conviction that grows out of shared cultural and moral values and openness to the ever-present challenge of otherness or difference. Participation in this relational or interpersonal process is full of risk and surprise. It may be more demanding, requiring much in the way of critical thinking, courage, and humility than policing one’s borders and protecting one’s autonomy and rights. It does involve learning from others and limits on freedom of choice. But such limits can be a welcome part of deeper and more meaningful human goods, such as friendship, service of others, forgiveness, and the enjoyment of common goods. Though just begun, there may be merit in rethinking individualism and working out the implications of doing so for psychotherapy theory and practice. Frank C. Richardson See also Contemporary Trends in Psychotherapy; Cultural Psychology; Intelligence and Individualism; Positive Psychology and Human Frailty; Self-Determination

Further Readings Bellah, R., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W., Swindler, A., & Tipton, S. (1985). Habits of the heart: Individualism and community in American life. Berkeley: University of California Press. Cushman, P. (1990). Why the self is empty. American Psychologist, 45, 599–611.

Punishment Frank, J. D., & Frank, J. B. (1991). Persuasion and healing. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press. Hoffman, I. Z. (1996). The intimate and ironic authority of the psychoanalyst’s presence. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 65, 102–136. Richardson, F., & Manglos, N. (2012). Rethinking instrumentalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 19, 177–201. Sandel, M. (1996). Democracy’s discontent: America in search of a public philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the self. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Taylor, C. (1995). Philosophical arguments. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Punishment Punishment is a component of operant learning, in which behavior is changed by the consequences that occur contingently upon it. Punishers are consequences that cause behavior to occur less often, unlike reinforcers, which cause behavior to occur more often. Punishment is the reduction in behavior that punishers create and is distinguished from negative reinforcement, in which behavior is strengthened by ending or preventing unpleasant events. This entry discusses punishment as a learning process, therapeutic applications and considerations for punishment-based intervention, and theories about how punishment affects behavior. Although some aspects of the behaviorist tradition from which punishment research first arose remain controversial in psychology, the general notion that consequences guide behavioral adaptation has become widely accepted. Punishment is of interest in psychological research because of its relevance to naturally occurring human interactions, to human institutions such as the legal system, and to therapeutic interventions. More than a century of laboratory and field research verifies that punishment changes behavior reliably when the relevant consequences are contingent on behavior, occur immediately following the behavior, occur after each instance of the behavior, and are of sufficient potency or salience. Punishment as a learning process is distinguished from punishment as a legal tool by which

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the justice system sanctions individuals for undesirable actions. Punishment in this latter sense may violate the conditions of effective behavioral punishment and thus may result in little or no behavior change. Punishment as a learning process was first clearly described by Edward Thorndike, who defined reinforcement as a “satisfying outcome” and punishment as an “unsatisfying outcome.” B. F. Skinner later noted that whether an outcome is satisfying or not is a subjective interpretation. He proposed the terms reinforcement and punishment be applied functionally—that is, to contingent stimuli that cause behavior to occur more and less often, respectively. Skinner’s approach resolves cases that would seem contradictory from Thorndike’s perspective, such as when a teacher’s attempts to publicly praise a student’s efforts cause those efforts to occur less often. Here, praise might be assumed to be a “satisfying outcome” yet it works to suppress behavior. Primary punishers have salience because of species-specific biological influences. Secondary, or conditioned, punishers have salience because of past learning. Classical conditioning is a learning process that creates conditioned punishers. For example, for a young child, certain actions might be followed swiftly by both a scowl from the child’s father (the scowl is not initially a salient consequence) and a spanking (a primary punisher). Eventually just a contingent scowl can reduce the behavior on which it was contingent.

Therapeutic Applications and Considerations In the 1960s and 1970s, as operant psychology moved from the lab to the field, a variety of punishment-based interventions were developed to change socially important behavior. For example, one of the first effective approaches to reducing severe self-injury and other aberrant behaviors in persons with autism employed strong reprimands and mild-to-moderate physical punishment. Token economy systems, in which points or tokens exchangeable for desirable items and privileges and are contingent on behavior, were developed for use in programs addressing behavior problems associated with delinquency. Importantly, effective programs typically included token loss as a

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consequence for misbehavior. Later, reinforcementbased interventions for problems associated with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder were found to work better when punishment (“response cost”) contingencies are incorporated as well. Despite such findings, punishment-based therapeutic interventions have fallen out of favor for three reasons. First, in the case of physical punishment, in several high-profile cases, clients were injured or killed by the use of excessive force, highlighting the risk of harm when physical punishment is employed. In response to such cases, many states in the United States now restrict the use of therapeutic punishment, including that not involving physical contact. Second, although punishment causes behaviors to occur less often, it also may generate a variety of undesirable side effects, most of which are considered problematic in practical settings. The consequences that function as punishers often are, as per Thorndike’s observations, unpleasant. They can elicit emotions such as fear and anger that may interfere with subsequent learning or promote aggression. Through classical conditioning, the negative emotions that punishers elicit may also become elicited by the people who deliver punishment or by the places where punishment occurs. This, in turn, can cause relationship damage (e.g., the avoidance of people who have delivered punishment) and withdrawal (the avoidance of places where punishment was delivered). A third reason for de-emphasizing punishment in therapeutic situations is that it does not teach what to do instead of the undesired behavior. A variety of empirically validated, reinforcementbased tools have been developed to eliminate unwanted behaviors and to replace them with more desirable behaviors. As a result, punishment procedures often are not needed. Overall, the standard recommendation is for punishment to be employed as little as possible in practical settings (therapy, parenting, animal training, etc.) and for reinforcement-based strategies to serve as the main foundation of interpersonal influence. Yet in the everyday world, people tend to rely more heavily on punishment than on reinforcement in their attempts to influence others. This may be true for two reasons. First, threat and punishment appear to be prominent in primate dominance hierarchies, so heavy reliance on

punishment could be a vestige of human evolutionary history. Second, without special training, people may be unaware of or unskilled in using the reinforcement-based tools that are available to them.

Theories Historically, punishment has been explained by two competing theories. One-factor theory maintains that punishment and reinforcement are inverse components of a single learning process. According to one-factor theory, reinforcement directly strengthens behavior, and punishment directly weakens it. Two-factor theory maintains that punishment is an indirect result of two interacting processes, classical conditioning and negative reinforcement. According to two-factor theory, the stimuli that serve as punishers for a given behavior elicit unpleasant emotional states that through classical conditioning (the first process), make engaging in that behavior itself unpleasant. Engaging in other behaviors terminates this unpleasant state, resulting in negative reinforcement of the alternative behaviors (the second process). Two-factor theory, then, holds that punishment weakens a given behavior indirectly by strengthening alternative behaviors that supplant it. Other theories of punishment have served either of two goals. The first goal is to integrate punishment with contemporary mathematical models of reinforcement, which emphasize that the strength of a behavior varies as an inverse function of the strength of competing behaviors. The updated version of one-factor theory has been expressed as follows: log (Behavior 1/Behavior 2) = a(log Reinforcer 1 Punisher 1/Reinforcer 2 – Punisher 2) + log b(1). Here, think of Behavior 1 as a given behavior of interest and Behavior 2 as the aggregate of any competing behaviors. In the equation, these terms refer to the frequency with which the behavior occurs. The reinforcer and punisher terms refer to the frequency with which those consequences are contingent on the various behaviors. The updated version of two-factor theory has been expressed as follows:

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log (Behavior 1/Behavior 2) = a(log Reinforcer 1 + Punisher 2/Reinforcer2 + Punisher 1) + log b(2), with terms defined as shown earlier. The available research evidence is not conclusive but seems to favor the one-factor theory. A second goal of contemporary punishment theories is to expand on Skinner’s functional definition by predicting when a given consequence will serve as an effective punisher. Homoeostatic models approach this problem by suggesting that consequences be thought of not as things or ­ commodities but rather as activities (e.g., in an ­ experiment delivering bits of food contingent on behavior, the reinforcer is eating). According to the Premack principle, punishers are less-preferred activities and can be identified by observing the activities in which an individual engages when not externally restricted. Specifically, punishment should occur when the activity that is contingent on a given behavior is less preferred than that behavior. Many, but not all, predictions of the Premack principle have been confirmed by research. A successor model, called response deprivation theory, improves on its predictions.

Frontiers in Punishment Research and Theory Neural Underpinnings

Reinforcement effects are thought to be mediated by dopaminergic systems in the midbrain. There is debate about whether the same systems underpin punishment effects. This issue is important for its own sake and also potentially bears on the debate about one-factor versus two-factor theories of punishment (i.e., the former seems to be more consistent with the notion of a shared neural architecture for reinforcement and punishment than the latter is). The Role of Punishment in Promoting Cooperation

It has been suggested that punishment helps catalyze cooperation, which involves individuals contributing to endeavors that create common benefits that could not have been engineered by any individual

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alone. However, because these benefits are for the “common good,” it is possible for selected individuals to reap benefits without contributing. Although humans seem unusual among species in terms of how often they engage in cooperative endeavors, this tendency does not usually show up in laboratory experiments, which show that human participants more often act to maximize individual benefits at the expense of the common good. Cooperation arises reliably when individuals experience punishment after acts of noncooperation. Participants in cooperation procedures will sacrifice some of their own benefits in order to punish noncooperation in others, and the tendency to punish noncooperation has been observed in many cultures. In addition, there is evidence that punishing another person’s noncooperation activates brain regions that normally are associated with the experience of receiving reinforcement. This finding raises the possibility that humans are wired to “feel good” when employing punishment to promote cooperation. Expectancy Theory

One approach to understanding when consequences will be punishing emphasizes expectancies, or an individual’s beliefs about which actions cause which consequences to occur. Learned helplessness theory holds that each individual generates beliefs about the efficacy of his or her actions in avoiding unpleasant events (negative reinforcement). An individual who believes he or she is incapable of avoiding unpleasant events is at risk for becoming generally passive and depressive. Although it has been suggested that excessive experience with punishment may create learned helplessness, little is known about how, and whether, expectancies of helplessness influence the punishment process itself. Behavioral Economic Theory

Considerable research shows that the effects of a consequence on behavior are weakened if the consequence is delayed or not certain to occur. In decisions between possible current actions that are guided by knowledge of future consequences, anticipated unpleasant outcomes tend to carry greater weight than pleasant ones (i.e., they are

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more resistant to the weakening effects of delay and uncertainty and thus more likely to influence decisions). The fact that unpleasant outcomes have a strong bearing on decisions, even when uncertain, has led some theorists to characterize humans as “risk averse” with respect to punishment. For example, most people view the toss of a coin as an “unfair” way to settle an argument, showing that the prospect of a loss is more salient than the equally likely prospect of winning. Thomas S. Critchfield See also Behavior Therapies; Behaviorism; Classical Conditioning; Cooperation; Operant Conditioning; Reinforcement

Further Readings Abramson, L. Y., Seligman, M. E. P., & Teasdale, J. D. (2008). Learned helplessness in humans: Critique and reformulation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 87, 49–74. Critchfield, T. S. (2014). Skeptic’s corner: Punishment— Destructive force or valuable social “adhesive”? Behavior Analysis in Practice, 7(1), 36–44. Dinsmoor, J. A. (1998). Punishment. In W. O’Donohue (Ed.). Learning and behavior therapy (pp. 188–204). Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon. Filorillo, C. (2012). Two dimensions of value: Dopamine neurons represent reward but not aversiveness. Nature, 485, 85–88. Kazdin, A. E. (2009). The Kazdin method for parenting the defiant child. Boston, MA: Mariner Books.

Q and experiences and how those meanings shape what they think, say, and do. It seeks to deepen the understanding of people’s behavior by accessing the meaning behind it. Qualitative methods of data collection and analysis are designed to detect meaning from the perspective of the research participants. It does not fit their words and actions into preexisting, theoretically informed categories. Instead, it works from the bottom up so that the themes presented in the analysis are informed by the participants’ own categories of meaning. Qualitative research does not seek to establish cause-and-effect relationships or to identify significant differences between groups or relation between variables. It is not concerned with hypothesis testing or the development of predictive models. Instead, it seeks to capture the quality and texture of research participants’ experiences and to trace the implications and consequences of those experiences in order to better understand the social and psychological processes at work. Accordingly, it adopts an inductive (as opposed to deductive) approach to knowledge generation. The insights generated by qualitative research tend to be localized and context specific and cannot be generalized to the general population. However, qualitative research can give rise to novel theoretical formulations. Qualitative researchers tend to work with relatively small amounts of data that they explore in great depth (e.g., line-by-line analysis of a small number of semistructured interviews). Because qualitative research requires the researcher to extract meaning from participants’ accounts of their experience, it is important that

Qualitative Research Qualitative research is an approach to research that is primarily concerned with studying the nature, quality, and meaning of human experience. It asks questions about how people make sense of their experiences, how people talk about what has happened to them and others, and how people experience, manage, and negotiate situations they find themselves in. Qualitative research is interested both in individual experiences and in the ways in which people experience themselves as part of a group. Qualitative data take the form of accounts or observations, and the findings are presented in the form of a discussion of the themes that emerged from the analysis. Numbers are very rarely used in qualitative research. Qualitative research has become increasingly widely used in psychology over the last 30 years or so. A variety of qualitative research methods differ in their aims, procedures, and the types of insight they can generate. This entry describes the nature and purpose of qualitative research in general, followed by an introduction to different strands within qualitative research, their epistemological bases, and their approach to data analysis. There is also a discussion of methods of data collection and analysis and the types of research questions qualitative research pursues.

Characteristics of Qualitative Research Qualitative research is interested in the meanings people attribute to their own and others’ actions 777

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the researcher pay attention to the way in which his or her own categories of meaning enter the process of interpretation. This is referred to as researcher reflexivity and constitutes an integral part of qualitative studies. Finally, ethical responsibility requires any researcher to consider and reflect on the potential impact of research activities and outcomes on the research participants in particular and the community and wider society in general. Ethical responsibility is also an important feature of qualitative research.

Approaches to Qualitative Research Approaches to qualitative research can be categorized in several ways. One involves the type of knowledge researchers aim to produce and their epistemological orientation. According to such a classification, qualitative research can be realist, phenomenological, or social constructionist. Realist qualitative research seeks to obtain an accurate picture of some aspect of the social world (e.g., an individual’s thought processes, a social group’s practices, a linguistic community’s speech patterns) in order to better understand the social and psychological processes that underpin it. This type of qualitative research shares epistemological assumptions with quantitative research in that it presupposes that psychological structures and processes exist independently of the researcher’s understanding of them and that they can be identified and described. Qualitative researchers who wish to conduct realist qualitative research can use methods such as thematic analysis or (some forms of) grounded theory methodology. Such methods are designed to obtain as accurate and complete a picture as possible of what is going on in a situation in order to develop an explanatory model that will help make sense of it. Phenomenological qualitative research seeks to produce knowledge about the subjective experience of research participants. It seeks to enter their world in order to gain an “insider view” of their experience and to understand what it means to them. This approach to qualitative research requires that the researcher suspend his or her own beliefs about what is true or false or what makes sense or does not make sense and attempt to look at the world through the eyes of the research participants.

Such research is based on the assumption that there is more than one experiential reality and that what is of interest is what the world is like for the participants. A number of phenomenological research methods (some more descriptive and some more interpretative) can be used to generate phenomenological knowledge. Phenomenological research methods include phenomenological-­ psychological reduction and interpretive phenomenology. Social constructionist qualitative research is interested in the social processes through which meaning is constructed. Such research assumes that objects, events, and people can be perceived in many different ways, and it seeks to generate an understanding of the social processes that contribute to constructing particular versions of social reality. Social constructionist researchers take a relativist position in that they assume that versions of reality are constructed for particular purposes in particular contexts. The aim of their research is to identify these processes rather than to find out what is “really going on.” Because language plays an important role in the construction of meaning, social constructionist qualitative researchers often study discourses and their various deployments. Social constructionist research methods include discourse analysis (including Foucauldian discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis, and discursive psychology) as well as narrative analysis and memory work.

Methods of Data Collection Qualitative methods of data collection include semistructured interviews, focus groups, participant observation, diaries, a variety of visual methodologies (such as photo elicitation, video diaries, or paintings), personal journals, existing documents (such as media reports, letters, or transcriptions of radio interviews), and Internet-based materials (such as webpages, blogs, and chat-room conversations). These methods generate different kinds of data that can be analyzed in a number of different ways. Some methods of data collection (e.g., the semistructured interview) can generate data that can be analyzed according to phenomenological analysis, discourse analysis, narrative analysis, and thematic analysis to generate insights that are consistent with the method’s epistemological aspirations.

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Methods of Data Analysis

Qualitative Research Questions

Qualitative methods of data analysis include thematic analysis, phenomenological analysis, discourse analysis, conversation analysis, grounded theory, narrative analysis, ethnography, action research, memory work, and Q-methodology. All require an intensive engagement with the raw data. Qualitative data are not transformed or reduced prior to analysis (except for the process of transcription of the spoken word), and researchers tend to work through the data line-by-line to extract themes. Some research methods (e.g.,  grounded theory and ethnography) require that the researcher move back and forth between data collection and analysis as preliminary analyses inform further, targeted data collection.

Qualitative research does not test hypotheses. Instead, a qualitative research project is driven by a research question that identifies the focus of the research. Qualitative research questions tend to be concerned with processes rather than with causes or effects. The formulation of such questions has implications for the choice of methods used to address the question. For example, a research question that requires a realist approach might ask, “How does a telephone helpline train its volunteers?” A question that takes a phenomenological approach might be, “How do students make sense of failing an important assignment?” An item reflective of the social constructionist approach might be, “How do clinical psychologists construct ‘mental health problems’ in their interactions with patients?” Qualitative research is most widely used in the subdisciplines of social, health, and counseling ­psychology. It is also often linked with applied psychology because its findings can help clarify how people experience and manage challenges, changes, and transitions in their lives. Thus, the results of qualitative research have important implications for how psychologists and other professionals offer support. In addition, qualitative research has links with critical psychology because its methods can be used to critically deconstruct the discourses that underpin the discipline of psychology itself.

Newer Developments Qualitative researchers have also begun to use a pluralistic approach to research whereby a number of different qualitative methods of analysis are used to analyze the same data set. Methodological pluralism acknowledges that one data set can provide the researcher with information about different aspects of a phenomenon, depending on the questions asked of the data. A pluralistic analysis involves several rounds of analysis, building up layers of understanding and interpretation. The result is not necessarily a coherent, integrated account of what is going on (even though it can be that), and methodological pluralism raises questions about how to handle the epistemological tensions that may exist within a pluralistic analysis. Some researchers argue that because human experience itself is complex and multilayered, an analytic strategy that reflects this condition is an appropriate way of capturing human experience. Other researchers prefer to strive for a more integrated understanding. Another development is the reemergence of the case study design. The case study is perhaps the oldest qualitative method of research and was made famous by Sigmund Freud. Case study research did not receive much attention during the early years following the emergence of qualitative research in psychology, and it is only now that qualitative psychologists are embracing the single-case design as a legitimate form of psychological research.

Carla Willig See also Language, Interaction, and Culture; Mixed Methods; Mixed-Method Philosophies; Quantitative Research; Relational Theory; Single-Subject Research Designs; Social Construction

Further Readings Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. E. (Eds.). (2005). The SAGE handbook of qualitative research (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Finlay, L., & Gough, B. (Eds.). (2003). Reflexivity: A practical guide for researchers in health and social sciences. Oxford, England: Blackwell. Reavey, P. (Ed.). (2011). Visual methods in psychology: Using and interpreting image in qualitative research. Hove, England: Psychology Press.

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Willig, C. (2012). Perspectives on the epistemological bases for qualitative research. In H. Cooper (Ed.), APA handbook of research methods in psychology: Vol. 1. Foundations, planning, measures, and psychometrics (pp. 1–17). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Willig, C., & Stainton-Rogers, W. (Eds.). (2008). The SAGE handbook of qualitative research in psychology. London, England: Sage.

Quantitative Research Quantitative research (QR) represents one of the two main empirical approaches in the social and behavioral sciences. At a pragmatic, procedural level—that is, at the level of the research methods—QR is characterized by the fact that researchers try to answer research questions by means of statistical analysis. This is conducted with data drawn from samples that are big and with a research design that ensures the most experimental control possible. QR may be characterized also at the superordinate levels of methodology and of philosophical foundations. The former has to do with the logic of the method. The latter have to do with often hidden assumptions about the nature of reality (ontology) and knowledge (epistemology). This entry discusses philosophical foundations, methodological principles, and research methods in quantitative research.

Philosophical Foundations The philosophical foundations of QR are rooted in positivism and postpositivism, which are at the core of the so-called natural sciences and continue to inform the current commonly accepted and dominant view of science in everyday and academic life. This perspective took shape during the scientific revolution as a reaction to religious authority as the source of all knowledge. It emphasizes formal, logical reasoning (rationalism) applied to perceived events (empiricism). Positivism and postpositivism imply that the world is “real” and exists independently from observers (realist ontology) and that knowledge may be considered to be, at least in principle, objective and true (objectivist epistemology).

Methodological Principles Aims, Perspective, and Logic of Scientific Research

Given the assumptions noted in the previous section, science is considered to aim at identifying universal and immutable laws, which may be expressed in mathematical form and organized in theories. These explain phenomena; that is, they identify the (efficient) causes of the behavior of entities, however large or small. Thus, for example, in psychology, the frustration-aggression theory explains aggressive behavior by means of causally antecedent frustration. QR can be thus considered a science of generality (“what always is,” as stated by Wilhelm Windelband) with a mainly nomothetic perspective. The logic of the investigative process is deductive. In fact, it is necessary to start from a theory, which allows the derivation of a hypothesis (i.e., an expectation), followed by observations that will allow either a refutation of the hypothesis or not. This is called the h ­ ypothetico-deductive method. Criteria

An important criterion in QR is the validity of the results. The degree to which research results can be considered as valid spans two dimensions: internal validity and external validity. Internal validity refers to results (a) that are obtained by following the declared methodology, (b) that are consistent with the hypothesis, and (c) that have ruled out possible alternative explanations. When internally valid research meets standards of rigor, trustworthiness, and applicability by other researchers, it possesses high standards of inference quality. External validity depends on how well the results can be generalized across situations and to the population as a whole. When results are generalizable and also of practical importance, they may be considered also to be ecologically valid.

Research Methods Research Designs

A research design is a plan that defines the conditions in which data are collected. QR in psychology employs a large variety of designs. An important classification distinguishes between experimental

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and nonexperimental designs. In experimental designs, one or more variables are manipulated while other factors are kept as constant as possible. The values of a manipulated variable are established by the experimenter to assess the effect on other variables measured after the manipulation takes place. A manipulation may be achieved by varying the stimuli presented to the research participants, the conditions in which the measures are taken, or the intensity of one or more factors ­present in the experiment. The manipulation can take place across different participants, which defines a between-subject experiment, or across different conditions with the same participants, defining a repeated-measure experiment. In between-subject experiments, other factors are kept constant by randomizing the assignment of  participants to the experi­ mental ­conditions. Randomization is a key factor in the establishment of a causal relationship among experimental variables. When randomization is not feasible, the design is called quasi-experimental. In repeated-measure designs, other factors are kept constant by applying different conditions to the same participant. In nonexperimental designs, all measured variables and design factors vary without ­experimental control. Cross-sectional designs are nonexperimental designs in which all variables are measured at the same time. These designs are common when the aim of the research is to assess the correlation among several variables but with no causal inference required. Longitudinal designs are nonexperimental designs in which variables are measured with the same participants in different conditions or at different times. These designs are useful for studying variation over time. When measures are taken at different times but with different participants each time, a cohort study design is in effect. Sampling

A sample is a portion of a population of cases collected to efficiently represent the population’s characteristics. Sample representativeness is the degree to which a sample represents the population. Sample efficiency is the degree to which a sample achieves representativeness with minimal use of resources.

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Representativeness Representativeness can be achieved by enlarging sample size and by adopting an effective sampling technique. One technique is probability sampling in which a simple random sample is formed by randomly selecting cases such that each case in the population has equal probability of being selected. Moreover, the probability of selection is not affected by the selection of other cases in the population. A random sample is representative because each case is sampled independently of its characteristics, so the population characteristics will be present in the sample proportionally to their incidence in the population, provided the sample is large enough. When the proportion of a population characteristic, such as gender or age, is to be preserved in the sample with certainty, the sample can be formed by selecting an exact proportion of cases for each of the categories defined by the characteristic (called strata) and randomly sampling cases within each category (a stratum). The resulting sample is called a stratified sample. In some circumstances it may be useful to enlarge the proportion in the sample of some category of interest and reduce the proportion for other categories. In these cases, a quota sample is formed. In clinical research, for instance, the sample quota of individuals affected by a psychological condition (clients or patients) may be purposely larger than in its incidence in the whole population. When randomization is not or cannot be employed in the sampling procedure, a nonprobabilistic sample is obtained. A purposive sample is formed by selecting specific cases from the population based on their characteristics. In extremegroups designs, for instance, two groups are formed by selecting cases that score the highest and the lowest on a measured characteristic so that the researcher can study the effects of that difference on other variables. In single-case designs, often used in clinical research, a single case is selected and analyzed in depth because it shows peculiar or rare characteristics that are difficult to find in the population. When the sample is not randomly selected and cases are not chosen for a specific purpose, one obtains a convenience sample. This type of sample is formed only because cases were available for

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selection. Research that involves social media, field surveys, or pilot studies often uses this technique. Convenience samples are generally nonrepresentative of the target population, and the results should be interpreted with care. Efficiency Efficiency may be achieved by adopting the most appropriate sampling technique and by reducing the sample size. However, other things being equal, a larger sample is more representative than a smaller sample. A major challenge in QR is finding a good balance between the efficiency and the representativeness of the sample. Data Collection

In QR, data collection may be defined as the process of systematically gathering information about a phenomenon and coding this information using numerical and/or categorical variables. Data collection is a way to “translate” the properties of phenomena into categorical and/or numerical representation. In QR, different scales of measurement are used for this purpose: nominal (categories and/or numbers represent different qualities), ordinal (numbers represent rankings along some dimension), interval (numbers represent quantities separated by equal distances), and ratio scales (numbers represent quantities separated by equal distances and with a meaningful absolute zero). There are three main ways of collecting data in QR: self-report measurement, indirect measurement, or observational measurement. In selfreports, participants are asked to provide the information required by means of introspection answering closed-ended questions. Typical examples include personality questionnaires, attitude or political surveys, and structured clinical interviews. In indirect measurement, participants are not aware of the measures being taken. For example, with implicit measures, participants perform a task where the scores can be interpreted in terms of seemingly unrelated constructs. Projective tests and implicit-association tests belong to this category. Another important example of indirect measurement is instrumental measures, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and other brain-imaging techniques that are operative during a task.

Using observational measurement, an observer codes the observable feature of study participants—such as a behavior, a personality trait, or a cognitive deficit—into a variable by means of closed-ended descriptors. Observational measures are often made by experts—therapists, teachers, experimenters—who follow different procedures aimed at minimizing coding bias. The use of several independent coders can reduce biased ­ ­measurement. A special case of QR data collection involves the use of data from other previous studies, such as in meta-analytic research. The aim of the metaanalysis is to pool several findings related to the same research question in order to increase confidence in the conclusions. Data Analysis

In QR, the analysis of data is almost always conducted using statistical methods. The aim of the analysis is generally to study variables and to quantitatively assess the relationships among variables. Graphical methods, such as histograms, scatterplots, and diagrams, are common aids in statistical analyses. These analyses employ both descriptive and inferential statistics. Descriptive statistics summarize key features of the variables of interest, such as their central tendencies (means) and dispersion (standard deviations), their relationship with other variables (correlation), and differences between research groups. A major goal of the analyses is to quantify the effects of certain variables (often called independent variables) on other variables (dependent variables). Effect-size indexes and graphical tools are often used to quantify and visualize those effects. Inferential statistics aim at testing hypotheses based on available data. Hypotheses are generally formulated in terms of the presence versus the absence of an effect or, in general, a feature of the data. Null-hypothesis significance testing (NHST) is commonly employed where a sample estimate of a quantity—for example, a correlation coefficient or a difference between two means—is evaluated in terms of the likelihood of obtaining it by sampling from a population where the actual quantity is zero (which is the null hypothesis). Although

Quantitative Research

NHST is useful for assessing the possibility of anomalies in the data, serious criticisms have been raised because of the several assumptions it relies on. In recent years, more focus has been directed to the precision and the accuracy of the statistical estimates, which has meant the increased use of confidence intervals and sensitivity analyses. Several statistical techniques employed in quantitative psychological research are based on the linear model (LM), which provides a tool for studying the effects of one or more independent variables on one or more dependent variables. The LM encompasses techniques that are applicable when the variables are continuous (correlation and regression), when the independent or dependent variable is categorical (generalized linear model), or when the dimensions underlying the observed variables are of interest (factor analysis and structural linear models). Linear models are also used in longitudinal studies and repeated-measure designs (mixed models) and to assess measurement properties (reliability analysis and item response theory). When the data do not meet the assumptions

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of linear models, nonparametric tests are often employed. Omar C. G. Gelo and Marcello Gallucci See also Cross-Cultural Methods of Research; Mixed Methods; Qualitative Research; Research Methods in Health Psychology; Research Methods in Neuroscience; Single-Subject Research Designs

Further Readings Cohen, J., Cohen, P., West, S. G., & Aiken, L. S. (2013). Applied multiple regression/correlation analysis for the behavioral sciences. London, England: Routledge. Cox, D. R., & Reid, N. (2002). The theory of the design of experiments. New York, NY: CRC Press. Howell, D. (2012). Statistical methods for psychology. Boston, MA: Cengage Learning. Kline, P. (2013). Handbook of psychological testing. London, England: Routledge. Reis, H. T., & Judd, C. M. (Eds.). (2000). Handbook of research methods in social and personality psychology. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

R Reading Process, Models

Models of Word Identification

of

Although there are numerous models of word identification, the focus here is on the two models that have received the most attention and motivated the most research: the dual route cascaded (DRC) model and various parallel-distributedprocessing or connectionist versions of what have become known as triangle models. Although sometimes referred to as “models of reading,” these are really models of reading aloud or single-word naming and thus do not actually model the normal reading process. At their core, both the DRC and various triangle models share the basic assumption that bottom-up, orthographic input interacts with lexical knowledge to produce word pronunciations and meanings. However, the DRC and triangle models provide contrasting frameworks for explaining how words are identified and represented in the mental lexicon.

Reading is a highly complex process that is obviously very important for everyday life. There are many questions about the reading process, but the central ones are these: a.  How are written words identified? b.  How does the reader go beyond the meaning of individual words? For example, how are sentences parsed and sentence-level meanings constructed? c. What is the ultimate mental representation of the text after it is read? d. How does the fact that readers move their eyes shape the reading process?

These questions are highly relevant and are the focus of a considerable amount of current empirical research. This entry briefly describes models of various aspects of the reading process. The theoretical value of the models lies in their ability to shape and inform psychological theories of reading that relate to the preceding questions. Note that these models address specific aspects of the reading process but seldom make contact with each other. Thus, for example, models of word identification seldom make contact with models of eye movement control and vice versa. Although this may be unfortunate in some ways, it is quite understandable in other ways because, as already noted, reading itself is a very complex process.

The DRC Model

There are two fundamental assumptions in the DRC model. The first is that there are two routes for generating a word’s pronunciation: (a)  The assembled route, where grapheme-to-phoneme correspondence “rules” are applied that convert a word’s individual graphemes (e.g., letters) into their corresponding phonological representations, and (b) the more direct route from orthography to pronunciation, whereby the whole word’s pronunciation is retrieved directly from the lexicon. The second fundamental assumption of the DRC model is that both the orthographic and 785

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Reading Process, Models of

­ honological forms of words are represented holisp tically in the lexicon, such that known words can be pronounced by mapping a word’s graphemes onto an orthographic unit. It can, in turn, directly activate the phonological unit providing the word’s pronunciation. The assembled and direct routes operate in parallel in the DRC model, such that a given word’s pronunciation is often jointly determined by the products of both routes. Triangle Models

The two fundamental assumptions of the various triangle models are quite different from those of the DRC model. First, according to the triangle model, a word’s pronunciation is generated via propagating activation from processing units representing orthographic input along connections to other units representing phonological output. Thus, in stark contrast to the DRC model, a reader is able to identify printed words using the knowledge contained in a single set of input-to-output connections and in a manner that allows the sum total of all such knowledge to influence the pronunciation of each word that is generated. Second, rather than being represented as holistic units in the lexicon, lexical information in the triangle model is represented by specific patterns of distributed activity across units. Thus, triangle models do not assume that lexical information is represented by discrete holistic units in the lexicon but instead assume that such information is contained in the connections that mediate between the orthographic input and phonological output. Using Both Models

Because both the DRC and triangle models are fully implemented as computer programs, they can be used to simulate tasks often used to study word identification. In so doing, they make predictions about response latencies, error rates, and the types of errors observed in tasks such as naming and lexical decision, as well as accounting for a number of “benchmark” phenomena such as frequency effects (e.g., faster identification of frequent words) and the fact that this frequency effect is typically larger for irregular words (e.g., pint, yacht). Finally, the models provide accounts of the patterns of behavioral deficits that are typically

observed with different types of acquired dyslexia. Since both models can account for such a wide variety of findings, future attempts to understand the word identification process may benefit from considering how this process fits with other components of the reading process.

Models of Syntactic Parsing Many existing models of sentence processing describe how readers take as input the meanings of individual words and construct the representations necessary to understand individual sentences. These models can be classified in three broad categories: garden path models, constraint-based models, and models that have been implemented using connectionist frameworks. Because the connectionist models and constraint-based models share many of their main assumptions, the discussion here is limited to garden path and constraint-based models, where the main theoretical distinction is the level of priority given to syntactic processing during reading. In garden path models, the grammatical structure of a sentence is given precedence over other sources of information, such as contextual constraint or plausibility. A reader initially constructs a single grammatical analysis of the sentence, interprets it, and revises this interpretation when necessary. Although, technically, none of the garden path models have actually been implemented within a formal computational framework, the types of linguistic analyses described are amenable to implementation. In contrast to garden path models, the constraintbased models posit that multiple sources of relevant information (e.g., grammatical structure, plausibility, contextual constraint) interact when a reader initially interprets a sentence. Constraint-based models have been implemented as computational models able to simulate this interactivity in processing. For example, researchers simulated self-paced reading times on reduced relative clause sentences (e.g., “The crook/cop arrested by the detective was guilty of taking bribes”) in which the thematic role of the initial noun phrase (i.e., crook versus cop) had semantic features that were more consistent with the patient versus agent roles, respectively. To predict reading times, the constraint-based model integrated various different types of

Reading Process, Models of

i­ nformation (e.g., the goodness of the thematic role of the initial noun phrase, the bias to interpret the initial phrase as a main clause versus a reduced relative), each of which propagated activation along connections to support one of the two possible interpretations. The model eventually settled into a state consistent with one interpretation after several processing cycles. Though their underlying assumptions are different, both classes of models attempt to explain patterns of observed reading times when readers initially misinterpret a sentence and then attempt to repair their misanalysis. They also attempt to explain why such misanalyses occur initially, as well as the repair mechanisms readers use to ultimately interpret the sentence correctly. Although both models have stimulated considerable research, constraint-based models have gained increasing support because they have actually been computationally implemented and because of the evidence that in some cases, grammatical factors can be completely overridden by meaning and plausibility. As it currently stands, both types of models have empirical support, but there are also studies that are difficult to reconcile with either view. Other proposals have emerged that attempt to situate models of syntactic parsing within the greater cognitive architecture and other task demands of reading. However, despite this progress, all the models of sentence processing generate predictions about reading time by converting arbitrary measures of processing difficulty (e.g., number of processing cycles required) for arbitrary regions of text (e.g., multiword regions) rather than making predictions about the actual time it takes to process meaningful units (e.g., morphemes, words). Perhaps this limitation could be addressed by considering how sentence processing might relate to other components of reading, such as discourse processing—the process of connecting the meanings of multiple sentences to generate the overall meaning of the text.

Models of Discourse Processing Models of discourse processing are difficult to categorize into groups that provide opposing positions. Perhaps this is because these models do not explain the complete process of comprehension

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but rather attempt to explain certain subprocesses—the processes necessary to generate meaningful connections between sentences and to create a coherent event representation. What these models have in common, though, is that they build from the representations created by the word identification and sentence-processing models described earlier. The construction–integration (CI) model can be used to illustrate a few important discourse-level considerations for any complete model of reading. This model assumes two successive stages of processing in which the reader generates a propositional or meaning-based representation of the text. First, during the construction stage, individual word meanings and syntactic operations are used to generate a text base (literal interpretation of the text), which is accompanied by retrieval of related, yet unstated, information from long-term memory. Thus, one sentence at a time, the system forms a loose associative network of propositions (i.e., elementary units of meaning) representing the meaning of the text and inferences generated from it. During the subsequent integration stage, recurring propositions are strengthened and less relevant propositions are weakened, allowing textual inconsistencies and information that is less important to the central meaning of the text to be minimized or eliminated. The CI model aims to predict the information that readers recall (i.e., their summaries of the text), which propositions are more important (i.e., more likely to be remembered), how recall is affected by time (i.e., forgetting), and the “filling in” of unstated text (i.e., inferences made during reading). Like the CI model, other models of discourse processing attempt to describe how literal meanings of the text are interpreted to support comprehension and memory for the text. The models are limited in that they make few predictions about the time course of reading (i.e., eye movement control), focusing rather on the internal mental representations that are generated and maintained. Ultimately, any complete and successful model of reading needs to incorporate predictions about both the time course of eye movements and word recognition and also predictions about the resulting mental representations that those processes generate.

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Reading Process, Models of

Models of Eye Movement Control in Reading There are now numerous models of eye movement control in reading. The first fully implemented model, which has proved to be very effective in simulating most benchmark effects, is the E-Z reader model. Its main competitor, SWIFT (saccade generation with inhibition by foveal targets), has also been quite successful in simulating these effects. Although these models are similar in many respects, there are important dimensions on which they differ. For example, E-Z reader posits that the timing of eye movements is directly determined by the difficulty of lexical processing, whereas SWIFT posits that saccade decisions are primarily triggered by a random timer and are only indirectly influenced by lexical processing. Most important, E-Z reader and SWIFT are considered competing models because they make different predictions about how attention (i.e., lexical processing) is distributed across words in the sentence. Specifically, E-Z reader posits a serial process, but SWIFT posits a parallel process. According to E-Z reader, an early stage of lexical processing, called the familiarity check, corresponds to the point during word identification when it is “safe” to begin programming a saccade to the next word. The subsequent stage of lexical processing, called the completion of lexical access, is the signal to shift attention to the next word. Once initiated, saccadic programming is completed in two stages: an initial labile (i.e., cancellable) stage followed by a nonlabile (i.e., obligatory) stage. It is assumed that saccades are always directed toward the centers of words with some oculomotor error (part random and part systematic) leading to short saccades overshooting their targets and long saccades undershooting their targets. Later instantiations of the model introduced a subsequent stage of integration to account for higher order influences of language processing. E-Z reader has been used to simulate a variety of “benchmark” findings in reading experiments, including landing-site distributions, the effects of lexical variables, and the effects of higher level linguistic variables. The model has also been extended to simulate reading in several languages, different types of tasks, and readers of various ages. Like E-Z reader, SWIFT can account for the full range of benchmark phenomena that have been

used to evaluate models of eye movement control in reading. There have also been several instantiations of SWIFT, and its predictions have been extended to include variations in reader task and age. There are two core assumptions of the SWIFT model. First, attention is allocated as a gradient to support the lexical processing of multiple words. Second, moment-to-moment decisions about when to move the eyes from one viewing location to the next are determined by a random timer; variables such as word frequency influence fixation durations only indirectly, inhibiting the random timer and delaying the initiation of saccadic programming. The remaining assumptions about saccade programming and execution are nearly identical to those of E-Z reader.

Comments About Models of Reading As already mentioned, the reading process is subject to the influences of many cognitive processes. This is undoubtedly the reason that computational models of “reading” have largely focused on simulating only one or two components rather than creating one all-encompassing model. If one accepts the assertion in Edmund Burke Huey’s 1908 book, The Psychology and Pedagogy of Reading, that to understand reading would be to understand “the most intricate workings of the human mind,” then a more integrative approach may be called for in the future. For example, designers of word identification models would have to specify how words are identified across two or more fixations (i.e., from different viewing locations) when an entire sentence or paragraph is being read. Although the task of developing more integrated computational models of reading is undoubtedly a challenging one, it is easy to imagine how one might leverage such models to gain important new insights into the nature of reading and human cognition (e.g., how the time course of syntactic parsing affects the construction of the discourse representation, how topdown constraints of sentence- and discourse-level representations might constrain the identity of an ambiguous word). In the century since Huey wrote his foundational book, reading researchers have made great strides toward understanding some of these

Reasoning and Decision Making

c­ omponent processes. Therefore, it seems promising that in the future researchers may be able to achieve the unified understanding that Huey envisioned. Mallorie Leinenger, Elizabeth R. Schotter, and Keith Rayner See also Attention; Brain and Nervous System: Macroarchitecture; Cognition and Language; Concepts and Language; Human Information Processing; Long-Term Memory: Processes; Perception and Cognition; Perceptual Disorders; Short-term and Working Memory

Further Readings Coltheart, M., Rastle, K., Perry, C., Langdon, R., & Ziegler, J. (2001). DRC: A dual route cascaded model of visual word recognition and reading aloud. Psychological Review, 108, 204–256. Frazier, L., & Rayner, K. (1982). Making and correcting errors during sentence comprehension: Eye movements in the analysis of structurally ambiguous sentences. Cognitive Psychology, 14, 178–210. Huey, E. B. (1908). The psychology and pedagogy of reading. New York, NY: Macmillan. MacDonald, M. C., Pearlmutter, N. J., & Seidenberg, M. S. (1994). Lexical nature of syntactic ambiguity resolution. Psychological Review, 101, 676–703. Reichle, E. D., Rayner, K., & Pollatsek, A. (2003). The EZ Reader model of eye-movement control in reading: Comparisons to other models. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26, 445–476. Seidenberg, M. S., & McClelland, J. L. (1989). A distributed, developmental model of word recognition and naming. Psychological Review, 96, 523–568.

Reasoning

and

Decision Making

Reasoning is the activity of drawing or evaluating conclusions in arguments. Decision making is the deliberate consideration of choices. They have long been considered paradigm cases of higher human thought. At one time, they differed in their historical span, normative bases, methodologies, foundational theories, and best-known authors. No longer. There is now considerable overlap in all these respects, first because of the influence on reasoning of a third area, often bracketed with

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decision making under the term judgment, and second because of the migration of dual-system theory from reasoning to decision making. This entry reviews the basic concepts and research results in both areas and thereby traces their growing synergy.

Classic Approaches to Reasoning Ancient Arguments

The study of reasoning, both logical and psychological, began with Aristotle around 400 BCE. The logical aspect stemmed from a rhetorical motive: the need to be able to decide on the soundness of arguments objectively rather than by mere opinion, assertion, or feeling. Aristotle distilled some forms of argument into a structure that bears his name: the Aristotelian syllogism. Today, quantified syllogism is the more common term, since these arguments consist of sentences containing quantifier expressions: All A are B, some A are B, no A are B, and some A are not B. There are two premises, for instance: (1) All archbishops are believers—the major premise. All believers are Christians—the minor, or categorical, premise.

From these, a conclusion can be derived or ­evaluated; for example, All Archbishops are Christians.

The essential logical and psychological concern with syllogisms is with their validity. An argument is valid if, given true premises, there is no way to derive anything other than a true conclusion; a valid conclusion is thus one that necessarily follows from the premises. In Syllogism (1), this is easy to judge. However, Aristotle also made a psychological observation—namely, that not all syllogistic arguments are as easy as this. Consider these premises: (2) No atheists are believers. All believers are Christians.

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What can be concluded? This argument does have a valid conclusion, although very few people arrive at it: Some Christians are not atheists.

This is almost as hard to appreciate as it is to derive (most participants in experiments judge that no valid conclusion follows). Perhaps this is because it is difficult to assume the truth of the minor premise, perhaps because the conclusion also seems to conflict with world knowledge due to a clash between the everyday and logical scope of some. In logic, this can allow “possibly all,” whereas in conversation, it means “… but not all.” Psychologists have collected data on and theorized about syllogistic-reasoning performance for over a century. The review here is of the major contemporary approaches to explaining syllogistic reasoning after considering the part of human thinking that has most preoccupied reasoning researchers. Reasoning With If

Conditionals are sentences that can be expressed using if and are at the center of the study of human reasoning. They are the gift that keeps on giving: Research continues in a constant stream to the present day. Part of their intrigue lies in the difference between their apparent ease of use in everyday discourse and the difficulties that arise when if is used to think with. This becomes apparent very quickly. Condition­ als can be used in a form of syllogism, as with the Aristotelian kind:

as affirming the p and q parts of the major premise. This produces four basic arguments, of which only two are logically valid: MP (3) and modus tollens, or MT (4): (4) If p then q If Alex is a Christian then he is a believer. not q

Alex is not a believer.

not p

Therefore, Alex is not a Christian.

Significantly fewer people accept MT compared with MP, and they also often accept the two invalid inferences that are derived from stating q or not p as the minor premise. Psychology has to account for this double divergence from logical norms. It also has to deal with the results of Wason’s four-card selection task, which sets conditionals in a hypothesis-testing context. The participant is presented with four cards, all of which have a letter on one side and a number on the other (see Figure 1). A conditional claim is made about these four cards: (5) If there is a D on one side, then there is a 3 on the other side.

D

K

3

7

Figure 1  Selection Task 1

(3) If p then q If Alex is a Christian then he is a believer. The major premise p

Alex is a Christian.

q Therefore, Alex is a believer.

The minor premise The conclusion

Once again, there are differences between the inferences that can be drawn with this argument structure. Argument (3) is called modus ponens, or MP, and it is accepted by almost everyone. Other arguments can be constructed by denying as well

Which of the cards would one need to turn over to tell whether the claim is true or false?

Once again, logic gives a normative answer, and actual performance sharply deviates from it. Conditional logic asserts that an If sentence is false when p is true (there is a D) and q is false (there is not a 3). Otherwise, it is true. So one should search for this possible falsifying case. Two cards could have it: the D card, which might have a number other than 3 on its reverse, and the 7 card, which might have D on it. One should select them and

Reasoning and Decision Making

ignore the other two. But that is not what people do. The critical combination of p with not q is typically selected by fewer than 10% of participants. Psychology needs to explain why so few select the prescribed not q card and so many select the unwarranted q card Two reliable ways of inducing logically normative selections give clues to the psychology of the problem. The first is to negate the major premise so that it reads “If p then not q.” This reverses the logic of the q and not q cards; 3 is now the correct falsifying value—but not the selections: People still select the 3 card. Most likely, they are matching— selecting the items named in the target conditional. The other way is to introduce deontic content, which conveys obligation or permission. A mother says to her child:

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the decision-making constructs of probability and utility explain both the facilitation and perspective effects: People focus on potential losses from either point of view. This was an early example of the fusing of ideas from reasoning and decision making.

Psychological Theories of Reasoning Human reasoning, decision making, and probability judgment systematically deviate from normative prescriptions. In reasoning, the norms are supplied by standard deductive logic. If people did not deviate from it, it could be argued they simply have deductive logic in their minds—a mental logic. Jean Piaget’s theory of intellectual development makes just this proposal, but the accumulation of evidence makes this view untenable today.

(6)

Logic-Based Theories

If you tidy your room then you may go out to play.

Martin Braine and David O’Brien’s theory of If contains inference schemas (i.e., logic-like rules), together with a reasoning program that implements them and pragmatic principles that apply contextual constraints. The schemas can be applied in direct- or indirect-reasoning routines, depending on the complexity of the problem and the rules needed to solve it. The theory successfully predicts phenomena such as intermediate inferences but is restricted in its application. It argues that the standard selection task is beyond untutored human competence—an argument that is open to question. Lance Rips’s psycop (psychology of proof) theory is based on the system of natural deduction in which inference rules contain three basic logical operators: and, not, and If … then. Forward rules generate conclusions, and backward rules evaluate conclusions. People are said to be attempting a mental proof. The theory accounts for both syllogistic and conditional reasoning and predicts both the rate and type of errors. Performance on the selection task is explained as due to the availability of just the forward-inference rule of MP, because there is no conclusion to evaluate. This leads to the selection of just the p card or the p and q cards when the conditional is interpreted as bidirectional. A logic-based theory with its origins in the model-theoretic approach to logic, as opposed to the proof-theoretic approach of the inference rule theories, is Philip Johnson-Laird’s theory of mental

Tidied room

Did not dy room

Went out

Did not go out

Figure 2  Selection Task 2

Four cards show whether the child tidied his room or not and whether he or she went out to play or not, on either side, over four days (see Figure 2). Which cards could show whether the rule has been broken? This formulation strikingly affects performance, but there are equally striking differences between it and the standard selection task. The conditional is now a rule (a regulation), and the task is one of detecting transgression, not truth testing. Further more, the normative answer depends on perspective: Transgression on the part of the mother leads to selecting the tidy/not out (p and not q) cards, but for the child, the other two (not p and q) are warranted. Several explanations for this deontic facilitation effect have been put forward, including evolutionarily acquired algorithms for social exchange and the invocation of learned pragmatic-reasoning schemas, for example. It has also been argued that

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Reasoning and Decision Making

models. It is wide in scope and has given rise to hundreds of studies and research papers. Three stages of thinking are proposed. First, the comprehension stage generates a set of models of what is conveyed by the premises and is represented by an arbitrary number of tokens. In the description stage, the two premises are combined to form a description of the state of affairs they jointly define and, hence, a conclusion if one is available. If it is not, the response is that no conclusion follows; that is, the argument is invalid. In the validation stage, people search for alternative models of the premises in which the putative conclusion is false. A valid conclusion is one for which no such alternative is found. The theory’s account of conditional reasoning shares these features and adds more—principally, the constructs of initial and implicit models. Consider Arguments (3) and (4). Mental models represent true possibilities—in this case, that Alex is a believer, given that he is a Christian. In the theory’s notation, the initial models are as follows: c b …

The three dots are the implicit model—a “mental footnote” that there are other true possibilities that are presently undefined. This demonstrates the theory’s explanation of the difference in difficulty between MP and MT. MP can be drawn immediately by reading off the first (b c) model. MT requires that the implicit model be fleshed out to make explicit its contents:

¬c

b

¬c ¬b,

where ¬ means “not.” Given not c as the minor premise, not b can be read from the second model, but the extra effort involved makes error more likely. People may balk at the fleshing-out step and respond that no conclusion follows. That is just what happens in experiments. The theory accounts for the selection task results and the matching response with negated conditionals in a similar way—namely, that the target sentence produces the same initial model—and people fail to consider anything else.

The Probabilistic “New Paradigm” in Reasoning Research Around the turn of the 21st century, there arose a radically different approach to the psychology of reasoning that stemmed from the insight that in real life, few statements are utterly true or false. But logical thinking requires the assumption that a statement has a probability of just 1 (true) or 0 (false). This is a property of all logicbased theories, including mental models, and the model representations presented earlier reflect this. They consist of tokens that are either present or not. The alternative is to explain reasoning using the calculus of values between 0 and 1—that is, probability. There are two basic objects of probability judgment: plain probability and belief revision. Judging Probability

The dominant form of explanation of probability judgment of both types is the heuristics and biases scheme. Heuristics are “rules of thumb” that lead to biases when they result in deviations from norms. Availability is a heuristic for judging plain probability—that is, how likely something is—by the ease with which instances or associations can be brought to mind. This leads to bias when something other than frequency, such as vividness, enhances availability. In the case of belief revision, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky proposed the representativeness heuristic, where the probability of an event is judged by the degree to which it is similar either to its parent population or reflects the salient features of the process by which it was generated. For instance, people judge how likely a described individual is to be an engineer or a lawyer by the individual’s resemblance to a stereotype, thus ignoring the proportion of each in a sample. This approach has been strongly contested by theorists who argue that such biases disappear when problems are presented using natural frequencies (e.g., “there are 1,000 patients”) rather than percentages or probabilities, because people are evolutionarily prepared to think this way. However, others argue that natural frequencies facilitate judgment because they make relations transparent by focusing on the characteristics of the sample rather than the individual case.

Reasoning and Decision Making

Belief revision was the basis of a reconceptualizing of the selection task as one of information gain rather than logical implication. That is, the selection of the p or p and q cards can be seen as rational if people are asking which cards could best help decide between two hypotheses—namely, that p and q are associated or not associated with each other. A newer probabilistic approach to conditional reasoning is suppositional theory. It is based on the Ramsey test: Given If p then q and p, assess one’s confidence that q follows. This test implies that the degree of belief in the truth of a conditional sentence is equivalent to this conditional probability, P(q|p), computed by pq / pq + p ¬q. Experiments have confirmed this hypothesis rather than the mental models theory, which argues that this judgment would involve all three “true” cases—pq, ¬pq, ¬p ¬q—rather than just the pq and p ¬q cases. The probabilistic view has been allied with another aspect of thinking to promote a new paradigm in reasoning research: dual-system theory. Evidence for dual systems in thinking began in the 1970s, when research found that people produced differing logical explanations for the same matching response to the affirmative and negated selection task. Separable effects of belief and logic in syllogistic reasoning have also been found. The dual systems are therefore concerned with fast, effortless intuitive responses (System 1) versus slower, effortful deliberative thought (System 2). A third reflective system, centered on personality dispositions that govern the application of System 2, has also been proposed in order to account for the apparent paradox of intelligent people doing unintelligent things.

Decision Making Probability and dual systems also figure in contemporary accounts of decision making. The psychology of decision making has always been inherently probabilistic. Its foundational normative theory, subjective expected utility (SEU) theory, explains choices as involving a trade-off between the utility of options (their desirability) and their probability of occurring. Thus, choices are seen essentially as gambles, and the chooser’s task is to maximize expected utility. This expected utility structure was transformed from a normative to a descriptive theory by Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory, which

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aims to account for the numerous observed deviations of human choice from SEU’s prescriptions. In the case of utility, there are two salient deviations: (a)  the diminishing utility of repeated increments of wealth and (b)  the fact that people tend to weight losses more than gains. That is, they feel more pain from a $10 loss than joy from a $10 gain. Prospect theory introduces the idea of a reference point—one’s current state of wealth—with losses and gains calibrated as deviations from it. The loss curve is steeper than the gain curve. People should therefore be risk averse when gains are in prospect and risk seeking with prospective losses. And they are. In the case of probability, people tend to overweight low probabilities and underweight medium probabilities. This finding helps explain why people buy insurance (with its low probability of very undesirable outcomes) and lottery tickets (with their low probability of very desirable outcomes). Choice can be overwhelming when there are too many options, and this can be experienced as aversive. When either six or 24 jams available in a supermarket tasting booth were made available, people preferred the wide choice but actually bought 10 times as many jars of jam when given the narrow choice. Much documented judgment and decision behavior can be attributed to System 1 in the dualsystem framework. System 2 is engaged when System 1 runs into difficulty or needs to be overridden. Recognizing the need to override intuition can depend on personality factors, such as need for cognition. Kahneman has also elaborated on utility, distinguishing between decision and experienced utility—roughly, value versus feeling. Experienced utility can be current or remembered and can result in choices that run counter to apparent decision utility. Thus, patients prefer a longer, painful procedure to a shorter one, as long as the pain is decreasing at the end (the peak-end rule). System 2, the reasoning system, is needed to work out the ethical implications of such preferences. Ken Manktelow See also Behavioral Economics; Consciousness and the Unconscious; Evolutionary Psychology; Intelligence Testing; Personality Testing; Psycholinguistics

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Further Readings Evans, J. StB. T. (2010). Thinking twice: Two minds in one brain. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Gigerenzer, G., & Selten, R. (Eds.). (2001). Bounded rationality: The adaptive toolbox. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2006). How we reason. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin. Manktelow, K. I. (2012). Thinking and reasoning: An introduction to the psychology of reason, judgment and decision making. Hove, England: Psychology Press.

Reinforcement The concept of reinforcement is crucial to understanding the behavior of humans and other animals. It refers to the increases and decreases in behavior that occur as a result of contingencies between different activities and different phylogenetically important events. Historically, it was equated with strength. As a result of increased understanding, reinforcement is now a bit of a misnomer, because changes in behavior do not reflect changes in strength but only changes in frequency or time spent in activities. This entry defines reinforcement and discusses how it affects behavior.

Reinforcers and Punishers Some life events are good: mating and raising offspring; gaining food, water, shelter, and other resources; exercising, sleeping, reading, meditating, and other activities that maintain health; in a social species such as ours, making and maintaining relationships with friends, family, spouse, and others. When possible, humans and other creatures behave in ways that make these events more likely and avoid behaving in ways that make them less likely. They seek mates, work, or resources and write or telephone friends and family. Because the connection between working and gaining resources, for example, supports working, good events, such as gaining resources, are called reinforcers. In general, when an activity occurs frequently because of its ability to make a good life

event more likely, that activity is called an operant activity and is said to be reinforced by the good event it makes more likely. The increment in the activity as a result of its connection to the reinforcer is called reinforcement. Some life events are bad: encountering a predator, fighting with a competitor, falling from a height, and other forms of injury; excessive cold or heat; snakes and plants that may be toxic; bacteria, worms, and other parasites that cause illness; rejection by a mate or friend. When possible, humans and other creatures behave in ways that make these events less likely and avoid behaving in ways that make them more likely. They hide or flee from predators, threaten competitors without actually fighting, build shelters, and choose what to eat. Because the connection between dangerous behavior and injury discourages dangerous behavior, bad events, like injury, are called punishers. In general, when an activity occurs infrequently because of its ability to make a bad life event more likely, that operant activity is said to be punished by the bad event it makes more likely. The decrement in the activity as a result of its connection to the punisher is called punishment.

Contingencies Reinforcers and punishers affect behavior because of their connections to it. They are often referred to collectively as consequences. Gaining resources is a consequence of working, and injury is a consequence of fighting. Such a connection is called a contingency. Gaining resources is contingent on working, and injury is contingent on fighting in the sense that the more one works or fights, the more likely is gaining resources or being injured. A contingency in which more of an activity makes a consequence more likely is a positive contingency. In contrast, a contingency in which more of an activity makes a consequence less likely is a negative contingency. The key point about contingencies is that the likelihood of the consequence, measured as its rate, amount, or intensity, covaries with the time spent in the activity. In a positive contingency, such as foraging to gain food, the more time spent foraging, the more food gained. In a negative contingency, such as digging a burrow to avoid exposure to cold, the more digging, the less exposure.

Reinforcement

When a positive contingency between an activity and a good event causes the activity to increase, the increase is called positive reinforcement. Foraging is positively reinforced by obtaining food. When a negative contingency causes an activity to increase because the activity avoids a bad event, such as in burrowing to avoid the cold, the increase is called negative reinforcement. Lying about how nice a dress looks on a friend is negatively reinforced by avoidance of hurting the friend’s feelings. When a positive contingency between an activity and a bad event causes a decrease in the activity, the decrease is called positive punishment. Lying is positively punished by social rejection. When a negative contingency causes an activity to decrease because it prevents a good event, the decrease is called negative punishment. Breaking curfews is negatively punished by removal of privileges (“grounding”). When an activity increases or decreases in reinforcement or punishment, other activities increase or decrease also. More time spent digging a burrow means less time spent otherwise, perhaps foraging. Since time is limited to 24 hours in a day or 365 days in a year, increases in one activity necessarily require decreases in some other activities. More time spent working usually means less time in leisure activities. Avoidance of fighting means more time spent in alternatives to fighting, such as friendly social behavior. Since trade-offs between activities occur, such that increase in one activity necessarily decreases another activity, reinforcement of one activity means punishment of the other and vice versa. For example, increased pay or prestige might increase (reinforce) time spent working, but if leisure activities decrease, then the increased pay or prestige punishes spending time in leisure activities. If the threat of going to prison punishes stealing cars, then it also negatively reinforces more acceptable activities that remove the threat. Sometimes time spent in an activity determines consequences all by itself, as in gambling, piecework wages, or hunting, but these pure contingencies are rare. Usually, other factors besides behavior limit the possible rate of good or bad events. No matter how many times one checks the mailbox, mail comes only six times per week. When one is in a conversation, one typically limits the time one spends talking in order to let the other person talk.

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In the laboratory, the pure contingency is studied as a ratio schedule, in which a certain amount of an activity is required for a certain amount of a good event, such as access to food. The contingency with an additional factor is studied as an interval schedule, in which a timer has to time out before a certain amount of activity can produce a good event; the timer limits the rate of the good event. Researchers study other complications to contingencies also, with the aim of understanding how consequences determine increases and decreases in activities.

Phylogeny and Phylogenetically Important Events Contingencies with good events and bad events affect behavior as a result of evolutionary history or phylogeny. Good events—such as gaining resources, making friends, and mating—improve Darwinian fitness; that is, they make reproductive success more likely. Bad events—such as injury, illness, and encountering predators—decrease fitness. As a result, natural selection favors those individuals in a population that behave in ways that make good events more likely and bad events less likely, because those individuals are more likely to contribute offspring to subsequent generations than individuals that behave less effectively. Individuals that evade predators well live to reproduce, and so do their offspring. Individuals that forage well are healthy enough to reproduce, and so will their offspring be. Thus, abilities such as running when a predator is near and digging a burrow to run to are selected, as are abilities such as finding and cracking seeds or stalking and chasing animal prey. Good and bad events that affect reproductive success are important to phylogeny. They are phylogenetically important events (PIEs). Any event that affects health, gaining resources, making and maintaining relationships, or mating and rearing offspring is a PIE. Situations in which good events or bad events are likely to occur induce behavior that is selected as appropriate to the good or bad events; that is, when those situations arise, all activities appropriate to the likely PIE increase in frequency. When a predator is present, fleeing or hiding becomes likely; the presence of the predator

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Reinforcement

induces fleeing or hiding. When a plant is shedding seeds, a bird searches beneath the plant; the shedding plant induces searching and pecking. The sight of an antelope induces stalking and chasing in a cheetah. A situation in which a PIE is likely induces activities that because of phylogeny are appropriate to it; that is, they make the good PIE more likely or the bad PIE less likely. Anyone who has fed a pet dog knows that at feeding time, the dog engages in a mix of activities: tail wagging, barking, dancing about, and approaching the person with the food. Ivan Pavlov, famous for his studies of salivation in response to a tone that anticipated food, measured only that specific part of a dog’s induced activities in advance of feeding. Besides activities that are induced by PIE-likely situations as a result of normal development and that are characteristic of most members of a species, additional activities may be induced as a result of an individual’s personal history. These induced activities are idiosyncratic. Historically, the adjective operant has been reserved for these idiosyncratic activities, even though no clear line divides them from the species-characteristic ­ activities. A PIElikely situation induces a mix of  activities, partly species characteristic and partly idiosyncratic. In the laboratory, rats may be trained to press a lever using a positive contingency between lever pressing and food or to press a lever using a negative contingency between lever pressing and electric foot-shock (simulating injury). When the PIE is food, the rats press the lever in a variety of ways— such as pawing, licking, and biting it—as they would food. When the PIE is shock, training lever pressing is more difficult, because the experimental situation induces activities such as freezing that interfere with lever pressing, and the rats do not treat the lever as food. Similarly, pigeons may be trained to peck a key using a positive contingency between key pecking and food or using a negative contingency between key pecking and electric shock. When food is the PIE, the pigeons peck at the key as they would at a seed, with an open beak. Training key pecking to avoid shock is difficult because of interfering activities induced by the shock-likely situation. It is easier when the response is wheel turning instead. Human behavior in the everyday world also includes mixes of induced activities. In the p ­ resence of a potential mate, with sex as the PIE, a hetero-

sexual man behaves in the ways called courtship or “dating”—he lavishes attention on the woman, feeds her in restaurants, gives her gifts, flirts, and is sexually aroused. In a situation where eating is likely, people typically sit and salivate. Humans who are hunter-gatherers hunt and forage when resources are low; all the activities that constitute hunting and foraging are induced by the lowresource situation. When agriculture was invented, the onset of the growing season induced all the activities that constitute cultivation and planting. The presence of a powerful person—someone who controls access to PIEs—induces activities called “subordination,” whereas a friend induces activities called “affection” and “exchange.” Idiosyncratic or operant activities become PIEappropriate as a result of entering into contingencies with PIEs. When a rat’s lever pressing enters into a positive contingency with food or a negative contingency with shock, the contingency occurs in a certain situation—for example, the experimental chamber. Lever pressing is induced in that foodlikely or shock-likely situation. Lever pressing joins those activities that in phylogeny, made feeding more likely or injury less likely. As an everyday example, a dancer’s idiosyncratic style derives from his or her personal history with contingencies between dancing and approval (a PIE for humans), and his or her dance style has become applause appropriate, with the result that applause-likely situations, such as being on stage before an audience, induce the idiosyncratic dance style. Thus, the increases and decreases in activities called reinforcement and punishment arise because every reinforcer and every punisher is either a PIE or a PIE-likely situation and every PIE-likely situation induces activities appropriate to the PIE. Not only may induced behavior be idiosyncratic but the PIE-likely situations that induce activities may also be idiosyncratic. One pigeon may be trained to peck at a green key but not at a red key, whereas another pigeon may be trained to do the opposite. In everyday life, inducing situations also may be idiosyncratic. Mushrooms may induce disgust in one person and delight in another. Men and women differ in the situations that arouse them sexually. A speaker’s casual remark may induce laughing in one listener and aggression in another, depending on the listeners’ personal history.

Reinforcement

Situations become PIE-likely when they are correlated with PIEs or other PIE-related situations. If a person eats lobster and becomes ill, eating lobster becomes a dangerous situation to be avoided. If a person eats strawberries and finds them good, eating strawberries becomes a good situation to be approached. Other foods are not affected, only lobster and strawberries. When one situation induces certain activities and another situation does not, that difference is technically known as discrimination. According to scientific usage, behavior discriminates, not the organism. Additional flexibility in behavior occurs because one temporally extended situation may entail other, more local, situations. In the laboratory, for example, a pigeon may be trained in a contingency in which pecking at a red key sometimes turns the key green, and pecking at the green key enters into a more local contingency with receiving food. In nature, hunting entails searching for prey, but sighting a prey item induces a new mix of activities. For humans, the classic example is the contingency between working and money. Having money is a situation that entails many other situations. It enables, for example, possessing a washing machine, which entails clean clothes, which entails a healthy body, avoidance of illness, and social acceptance. Historically, when a contingency exists between an activity (e.g., working) and an extended situation that is not immediately PIE-likely but entails other situations that are PIE-likely (e.g., having money), the extended situation has been called a secondary reinforcer or punisher, to distinguish it from situations in which PIEs are more immediately likely, which are called primary reinforcers and punishers. The difference is a matter of degree, however, rather than a sharp division.

Mixed Consequences, Impulsivity, and Self-control Typically, behavior has mixed consequences. At the least, when one activity increases, opportunities to engage in some other activities decrease. Enjoying the company of one friend may mean giving up some time spent with another friend. Sometimes the mixed consequences are of more concern. Drugs such as alcohol, nicotine, cocaine, and heroin, which either mimic the effects of good PIEs or ameliorate the effects of bad PIEs, easily become

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addictive because of short-term effects that compete with bad long-term effects. The alcoholic who enjoys drinking excessively also performs poorly at work and in social situations. All addictions have this character of being enjoyable in the short term and disastrous in the long term. In the short term, the inebriating effects of drinking avoid PIEs, such as feeling ill or social timidity, but in the long term, drunkenness is a situation in which much worse PIEs—such as serious illness, loss of resources, and social rejection— are likely. Such conflicts are also common in framing public policy—for example, the difficulty taxpayers and politicians have in paying for infrastructure or disease prevention in the short term rather than have bridge collapses and epidemics in the long term. These short-term versus long-term conflicts are conflicts of contingencies. The same activity— drinking or spending money—enters into contingencies both with short-term inducers and with long-term huge inducers. The problem is that the short-term contingency tends to be highly effective—even more effective than the long-term contingency with PIEs that usually have major effects on reproductive success. When activities are induced by the short-term contingency, the activities are called impulsivity— for example, a person on a diet accepting an offer of ice cream or a person on a budget buying an unneeded dress at the mall. When activities are induced instead by the more extended contingency, the activities are called self-control—for example, a person on a diet declining an offer of ice cream or a person on a budget visiting the mall with limited cash and no credit card. The tendency for long-term situations—such as health, adequate resources, and relationships—to fall short of the inducing power they would have if they were more immediate is called discounting. Researchers study ways to decrease discounting and make long-term contingencies more effective in their competition with short-term contingencies. Two strategies that help are commitment and rules. Commitment strategies limit the ability of a short-term contingency to induce dysfunctional activities by intervening physically—for example, leaving credit cards at home when visiting the mall or placing an alarm clock across the room from one’s bed.

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Relational Theory

A rule is a salient signal correlated with the long-term contingency that tends to induce activities appropriate to the long-term contingency. Rules are usually verbal but may be nonverbal too. For example, a person on a diet may post pictures on her refrigerator of a hippopotamus and a woman in a bikini, or an alcoholic may repeat to himself, “I love my wife and children and must decline all offers of alcohol.” When commitment is impossible, rules may help.

research traditions, provided a source for catalytic dialogue, and given support to critiques of the individualist ideology implicit in much psychological theory. Relational theory and research are resonant with, but largely independent of small-group psychology and the latter’s focus on whole-group structure and function. This entry discusses the history and development of relational theory.

William M. Baum

The earliest contribution to relational theory in psychology was that of George Herbert Mead in 1934. For Mead, the potentials and content of thought emerge from social communication. For him, there is “no mind or thought without language,” and language is quintessentially a byproduct of persons in relationship. This also means that one’s concept of self is socially derived. Appraisals of self emerge when one takes the perspective of the other toward oneself. Although the process of communication begins with primitive gestures, individuals gradually acquire their symbolic significance from observing others. With the enrichment of the individual’s symbolic potentials, human interaction emerges as a relationship of symbolic worlds. These worlds are mutually interdependent, with continuous sharing giving rise to an accretion of symbolic resources. As Charles Horton Cooley reasoned in 1902 by linking mind to relationship, one can challenge the long-standing Cartesian split between individual reason and the social sphere more generally. Descartes championed individual reason over the social order, but Cooley moved in a more sociological direction. Social traditions precede mental process. Cooley’s signature concept, the looking glass self rests on the assumption that the individual imagines how he or she appears and is judged by others and thus comes to experience “some sort of self-feeling such as pride or mortification.”

See also Behaviorism; Biological Constraints on Learning; Classical Conditioning; Law of Effect; Operant Conditioning; Pavlov’s Legacy; Self-Control; Skinner’s Legacy

Further Reading Baum, W. M. (2005). Understanding behaviorism: Behavior, culture, and evolution (2nd ed.). Malden, MA: Blackwell. Baum, W. M. (2012). Rethinking reinforcement: Allocation, induction, and contingency. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 97, 101–124. Rachlin, H. (1994). Behavior and mind: The roots of modern psychology. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Rachlin, H. (2009). The science of self-control. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behavior. New York, NY: Macmillan.

Relational Theory Relational theory in psychology refers to a rich and varied array of accounts that attempt to understand human functioning in terms of social process. For most psychological theories, the primary focus is on psychological processes, mechanisms, or functions within the actors; concern with social process is either derivative or absent. In contrast, relational theory places the primary emphasis on social process, with psychological functioning either derived from or reconstituted in terms of such process. Relational accounts have served, then, as significant alternatives to dominant conceptions and

Early Precursors: Uniting Self and Other

Developments in Self/Other Conceptions Although social psychology might seem to be the obvious home for the subsequent development of relational theory, the increasing dependency on experimentation ultimately led to a dearth of both relational theorizing and small-group psychology.

Relational Theory

Mead’s symbolic interactionism gave rise to a vital movement in sociology, but by the 1950s, such work was virtually absent from psychology. Among the few important exceptions to this tendency were studies in interpersonal bargaining and closely related theoretical developments in social exchange theory. Although firmly lodged in assumptions about the rational basis of action, experiments in interpersonal bargaining focused specifically on the patterns of interrelated choices made by participants in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Meanwhile, resonating with the work of sociologist George Homans, social psychologists began to see that one’s individual attempts to maximize gain and minimize loss could not be separated from the choices of others. Thus, social patterns could be derived from the combination of choices made by individuals. Most salient in this context is John Thibaut and Harold Kelley’s detailed account of the development of reciprocity patterns in social exchange. Even though social psychologists were not centrally involved with the development of relational theory, important developments did take place in other realms of psychology, most notably psychoanalytic, feminist, developmental, and humanistic psychology. In the psychoanalytic domain, theorizing became increasingly social in its focus. The early work of Karen Horney and Erich Fromm attempted to add a social dimension to what otherwise seemed to be hermetic tendencies in Sigmund Freud’s early formulations. With the later development of object relations theory, attention was increasingly paid to the ways in which one mentally represents others and the ways in which these representations play out in both the individual’s psychodynamics and interpersonal relations. As such ideas were extended, the focus of analysis on the individual’s repressed motivation shifted to a concern with his or her relationships—not only to the original family configuration but to important relationships in the present. Sparked by the theorizing of Stephen Mitchell and his colleagues, analysis turned as well to the social character of transference and to processes of countertransference in the analytic session. The journal Psychoanaltyic Dialogues is a central vehicle for discussion of relational theory in psychoanalysis.

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Meanwhile, feminist theorist and psychoanalyst Jean Baker Miller inspired the development of a relational-cultural theory, which became the foundational source for feminist scholars, such as Judith Jordan at the Wellesley Centers for Women. Relational processes of dominance and subordination between women and men, within cultural contexts rather than individual maladies, were regarded as a major source of women’s suffering. This perspective was critical for designing effective therapies and giving power to women’s voices. Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice amplified this tradition, challenging the dominant account of moral decision making—resting as it did on individual psychological development—and replacing it with a social basis. In the developmental sphere, the advent of Lev Vygotsky’s work on the social basis of psychological development represented a landmark contribution to relational theory. For Vygotsky, the higher mental processes are essentially reflections of social experience. Most dramatically, this implied that many processes that traditional psychologists presume to be innately fixed are by-products of culturally based experience. In effect, whatever is in mind is, first of all, within the culture. Moreover, the significant gains in development were traced to the way in which adults and older children help the developing child through available stages of proximal development. Later developmental work, however, moved beyond the impact of the social world on individual psychological functioning to consider relational patterning. The early work of Colwyn Trevarthan, for example, focused on the intricate behavioral dance between mother and infant. Ben Bradley and Jane Selby have demonstrated relational patterns among infants in groups. These latter studies prove resonant with the emergence of poststructural theorizing. Psychologists with more humanistic concerns drew sustenance from the relation-centered phenomenology of Martin Buber and the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. Here, theorists were moved to formulate conceptions of mental process that were inherently constituted with others at the center of concern. Exemplary is the work of Mark Freeman in which he proposes an alternative to the terms of the egocentric account of human experience of traditional psychology. His

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ex-centric perspective gives others a constitutive place in individual experience. It is in the essential otherness of experience that he finds wellsprings for ethical responsivity and responsibility.

Poststructural Relational Theory With the emergence of poststructural literary theory and the “linguistic turn” in philosophy, new developments in relational theory were given birth. Central in the former case is the work of Mikail Bakhtin on dialogue. Here, the focus is on dialogic relations among people and on the patterns of interdependence required to generate meaning. Most important, this account of human interchange proceeds without substantial reference to mental process. In effect, the mental “structures” traditionally credited as the origin of language are abandoned. Language becomes a social process sui generis. The linguistic turn in philosophy largely stemmed from the latter works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and most important, the concept of the “language game.” Resonant with Bakhtin, Wittgenstein located the origins of word meaning in the gamelike patterns of people in relationships. These games typically involve various objects, and the words have referential value (e.g., “the boy hit the ball”). However, as Wittgenstein pointed out, psychological terms have no obvious mental referents and thus may be viewed as purely game dependent in terms of meaning. This latter point proves highly congenial with social constructionist accounts of mental predicates. As constructionist inquiry suggests, the idea of a rich and highly differentiated mental world is a byproduct of the Western cultural tradition. Mental terms, in this sense, are useful because of the way they function in cultural life. Their usefulness does not depend on their reference value but on their pragmatic function. Invited, then, are relational accounts of human action that do not require or depend on mental (or structuralist) explanations. Here one breaks not only with the Cartesian distinction between self and other but with the mind–world dualism that has haunted psychology since its inception. In this context, Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell proposed that the concept of “attitude” does not refer to an internal or ­mental structure but to a position taken in a conversation. Similarly, Michael Billig explained how

the concept of “thinking” is more adequately conceptualized as the use of rhetoric within argumentation. As Derek Edwards and Potter further proposed, most of what constitutes cognitive psychology can more fruitfully be viewed as a discursive psychology. Kenneth Gergen has proposed that coordinated action of two or more people (co-action) gives rise to all human meaning, including the concept of the individual and of mental process, along with the value placed on such discourse, and the patterns of social life in which they function. He has also explored the implications of this form of relational theory to issues of moral pluralism and to practices of therapy, education, organizational change, and daily life more generally. Kenneth J. Gergen See also Close Relationships; Cognition and Language; Cultural Psychology; Culture and Social Relations; Culture and the Dialogical Self; Extended Mind; Language, Interaction, and Culture; Social Cognition; Social Construction; Social Psychology: Is It Truly Social?; Social Role Theory

Further Readings Gergen, K. J. (2009). Relational being: Beyond self and community. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Jordan, J. V. (2009). Relational-cultural therapy. Washington, DC: APA Books. Kirschner, S. R., & Martin, J. (Eds.). (2010). The sociocultural turn in psychology. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Mitchell, S. (1988). Relational concepts in psychoanalysis: An integration. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Sampson, E. E. (2008). Celebrating the other: A dialogic account of human nature. Chagrin Falls, OH: Taos Institute. Wertsch, J. V. (1993). Voices of the mind: A sociocultural approach to mediated action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Rescorla-Wagner Model The study of Pavlovian conditioning is concerned with the processes whereby organisms learn about the statistical relationships among events in their

Rescorla-Wagner Model

environment. By learning to anticipate when a biologically meaningful event (such as food, a predator, or a sexual partner) is likely to occur, the organism would be able to prepare for such an event and behave in an adaptive manner. In Pavlov’s original work, dogs were exposed to pairings of an initially neutral stimulus (e.g., the ticking sound of a metronome) with food powder. After several pairings, the dogs began salivating in response to the sound of the metronome before food was delivered, whereas prior to conditioning, the dog salivated only to the food itself. This entry describes a mathematical model of classical conditioning known at the Rescorla-Wagner model and its application. For several decades following Pavlov’s seminal work, the prevailing view was that Pavlovian conditioning occurred only to the extent that the conditioned and unconditioned stimuli (CS and US, respectively) were temporally contiguous (i.e., occurred closely together in time). However, three independent lines of research in the 1960s questioned that fundamental assumption. Robert Rescorla’s contingency studies, Leon Kamin’s experiments on the blocking effect, and Allan Wagner’s studies on relative cue validity collectively suggested that Pavlovian learning could not so easily be understood in terms of a simple temporal-contiguity mechanism.

The Rescorla-Wagner Model and US Surprise Rescorla and Wagner’s original papers in 1972 revolutionized the study of associative learning because their model (a)  presented a coherent framework for thinking about a wide variety of conditioning phenomena, (b)  stimulated further research that tested a number of novel predictions, (c)  spawned the emergence of a large number of rival theories that make different starting assumptions about basic learning processes, and later (d) directed research at the neurobiological level of analysis. The model assumes that conditioning is a quantifiable construct called associative strength and that changes in associative strength can be calculated on individual conditioning trials. Thus, the model is a trial-by-trial accounting of how changes in associative strength (or “learning”) take place. The formal equations are listed here:

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(1) ΔV = αβ(λ – ΣV), where (2) ΣV = V1 + V2 + … + Vi. Essentially, the model assumes that changes in associative strength, V, will occur as a function of (a) the saliencies of the CS and US, α and β, respectively (this is a measure of how attention-eliciting the stimuli are), and (b) how “surprising” the US is on a given conditioning trial as defined by the discrepancy between the actual US presented on the conditioning trial, λ, and the expectation of the US on that trial, ΣV (or total associative strength). A critical assumption that differentiates this model from earlier models is that all the stimuli present on a given conditioning trial (V1, V2, …, Vi) contribute to the expectation of the US on that conditioning trial by simply summing their individual associative strengths (Equation 2). Prior models assumed that only the associative strength of the stimulus in question mattered. This seemingly innocuous assumption has far-reaching implications.

Application to the Blocking Effect Consider Kamin’s classic “blocking” experiment reported in 1968. One group of rat subjects was trained to associate an auditory CS with an electric foot-shock US in the first part of the study. A second group of rats did not receive this training. In the second part of the study, both groups of rats were given conditioning trials in which an auditory + visual compound CS was presented and paired with the same foot-shock US as before. In the final test phase, Kamin observed that when tested alone, the visual CS failed to evoke conditioned fear reactions in the group given pretraining with the auditory CS. In other words, prior conditioning of the auditory CS “blocked” new learning of the visual CS. A more common example of this phenomenon occurs when one first learns to associate eating strawberries with subsequently developing a skin rash. If, one later consumes strawberries together with kiwi fruit and then breaks out into a skin rash, one would most likely think it was the

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Research Design

s­ trawberries, and not the kiwi fruit, that caused the rash. The blocking phenomenon has been observed to occur in a wide variety of learning settings, including human causal reasoning. The Rescorla-Wagner model explains this phenomenon by assuming that the associative strength of the auditory CS (or the strawberries in the rash example) is quite high as a result of learning during the pretraining phase. In fact, during that phase, the model assumes that V for the auditory CS will continue to grow until its value equals λ. This occurs because Equation 1 states that once (λ – ΣV) = 0, ΔV will also = 0. During the compound-conditioning phase, the total expectation of the US (ΣV) is equal to the combined associative strengths of the auditory and visual CSs (see Equation 2). This value will equal λ in the pretrained group because V for the auditory CS equals λ as a result of the pretraining phase (but V for the visual CS initially equals 0). Thus, in the pretrained group, there will be no surprise when the US occurs [because (λ – ΣV) = 0], and Equation 1 stipulates that there will be no new learning to the visual stimulus as a result. In contrast, subjects in the control group will be surprised once the US occurs because there are no CSs present that predict its occurrence, and thus, learning to the visual CS will take place.

Extensions As noted earlier, the Rescorla-Wagner model has been extremely successful for a number of reasons (although there are a number of shortcomings as well). One discovery has been that the neurobiological mechanisms underlying Pavlovian learning actually seem to instantiate the most basic assumption of the model—namely, that US surprise (or prediction error) drives learning. For instance, individual neurons in various brain regions have been observed to fire in response to a US presentation but only when that US is surprising. Moreover, other researchers have shown how inhibitory feedback processes arise at an entire neural-network level to govern the effectiveness of a US during conditioning. This research points to the critical importance of the notion that US surprise (or prediction error) governs changes in conditioning, the most basic assumption of the Rescorla-Wagner model. Future

research will surely build on these discoveries to reveal a more complete picture of how the brain learns. Andrew R. Delamater See also Applied Behavior Analysis; Behaviorism; Classical Conditioning; Operant Conditioning; Pavlov’s Legacy

Further Readings Kamin, L. J. (1968). Attention-like processes in classical conditioning. In M. R. Jones (Ed.), Miami symposium on the prediction of behavior: Aversive stimuli (pp. 9–2). Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press. Kim, J. J., Krupa, D. J., & Thompson, R. F. (1998). Inhibitory cerebello-olivary projections and blocking effect in classical conditioning. Science, 279, 570–573. Rescorla, R. A., & Wagner, A. R. (1972). A theory of Pavlovian conditioning: Variations in the effectiveness of reinforcement and nonreinforcement. In A. Black & W. F. Prokasy (Eds.), Classical conditioning II (pp. 64–99). New York, NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Siegel, S., & Allan, L. G. (1996). The widespread influence of the Rescorla-Wagner model. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 3, 314–321. Wagner, A. R., & Rescorla, R. A. (1972). Inhibition in Pavlovian conditioning: Application to a theory. In R. A. Boakes & M. S. Halliday (Eds.), Inhibition and learning (pp. 301–336). London, England: Academic Press.

Research Design Research design refers to formal and informal approaches to structuring the manner in which research occurs. A research design is an attempt to answer questions about how research will be carried out before it begins, thus allowing it to be possibly more successful than it would be otherwise. Because of the popularity of quantitative research in psychology, this entry focuses more on experimental research using quantitative research methods. It also provides information about qualitative and mixed-methods research because they are becoming increasingly used in psychology and related disciplines.

Research Design

Design in Quantitative Research The first important issue to consider when looking at quantitative research is that although there are commonalities among quantitative research methods, there is a collection of quantitative methods, and they vary both in terms of what assumptions they make and in the inferences that can be drawn from them. The two broad approaches to quantitative research are experimental and nonexperimental research methods. The former is focused on causation and includes strong/randomized, quasi, and weak designs. Nonexperimental research focuses on description, prediction, and explanation. Only experimental research includes the active manipulation of independent variables to determine their impact on a dependent variable. Independent variables (IV) are presumed to have causal impact on dependent variables (DV) (also called outcome variables). As explained later, randomized experiments are the gold standard for providing evidence of cause and effect between variables. Quasi experiments approximate strong experiments, and other research approaches tend to be significantly weaker. Nonetheless, strong nonexperimental designs (i.e., designs that include matching, statistical controls, theory testing, longitudinal designs) can provide some evidence of cause and effect. Nonexperimental research provides excellent evidence of which variables can predict changes in outcome variables of interests. Nonexperimental research, when based on random sampling, also provides excellent statistical descriptions of populations based on sample data. Variables: The Language of Quantitative Research

Quantitative research uses the language of variables, and the goal is to understand how variables are related based on empirical data. Variables are operationalized at different levels or scales of measurement. At the most basic level (nominal level), numbers or other symbols serve only to distinguish different categories of a variable. Variables can vary in kind or type rather than in amount or quantity. They are also called categorical, or dichotomous, variables when they have only two levels. For example, for a variable such as color preference, numbers can represent the different colors.

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Blue could be labeled 1, red 2, and so on. The numbers simply serve to differentiate the different colors. There is no inherent order or greater value to any of the numbers used here. Names or other symbols also could have been used such as blue, red, and so on. At a slightly higher level are variables with numbers that indicate rank ordering of magnitude (although without specifics about the size of the difference). This level of measurement is the ordinal level. Finally, there are variables for which a meaningful uniform unit is measured. These measures allow researchers to create averages and conduct more sophisticated statistical analyses. These levels of measurement are known as interval and ratio levels. The former has equal distances between adjacent numbers, and the latter is distinguished by the presence of a true zero point. Examples of an interval level variable are IQ and Fahrenheit and Celsius temperature scales, and examples of ratio level variables include response time, height, and the Kelvin temperature scale where 0 is absolute rather than “arbitrary.” Variables also are differentiated by their roles in a study. IVs are manipulated by researchers and are believed to exert a causal influence on other variables, such as dependent or outcome or endogenous variables. For example, a researcher might manipulate the type of instruction strategy students receive (an IV) to see how it affects the students’ recall of the material taught (the DV). In studies where prediction is the research purpose, the IV is sometimes called a predictor variable. In measurement research, the DV is sometimes called the criterion variable. Other important kinds of variables in quantitative research are intervening or mediating variables (i.e., variables that occur between other variables in a causal chain) and moderating variables (i.e.,  variables that delineate how a relationship of interest between variables changes under different conditions or circumstances). As an example of an intervening or mediating variable, perhaps the amount of studying affects cognitive organization of material in long-term memory, which affects test performance; modifications in cognitive organization is the mediating variable because it occurs within the causal chain. As an example of a moderating variable, perhaps the observed relationship between study time and test performance varies according to level of student motivation.

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A worrisome type of variable to be carefully considered in quantitative research is an extraneous or confounding variable—this kind of variable must be controlled for, and if it is not, the ability to draw a clear causal conclusion is compromised because alternative explanations for the relationship exist. The best way to control for extraneous or confounding variables is by using a randomized experimental design. This class of designs includes random assignment to groups to equate the groups at the start of the experiment. Other control techniques include matching (purposively equating groups on one or more variables), adding the variable to the study design, or statistical control (e.g., analysis of covariance [ANCOVA], factorial analysis of variance [ANOVA], partial correlation, and multiple regression). Two key assumptions in quantitative research are that one has controlled for extraneous variables and that all variables are measured and manipulated accurately. When researchers manipulate IVs, they need to be sure that they vary only the IV(s) and that no other variables vary systematically with the IV(s). It also is important that there be no spillage of the manipulation from the experimental treatment group to the control group. For example, if researchers conduct a study where they manipulate instructional strategies, they would need to be sure that they changed only the instructional strategies and not other variables and that only people in the instructional strategies groups receive the respective instructional strategies. If one instructional strategy type involved a longer instructional session than another, it would be plausible that the amount of time on task could account for some of the observed differences; a “confound” would exist, limiting the ability to draw an unambiguous causal conclusion. In this case, amount of instructional time would be a confounding variable. The influence of the confounding variable would present an alternative explanation for a claim that the causal factor was type of instructional strategy. Note that IVs in experiments are usually, but not always, categorical variables. Likewise, DVs typically are quantitative (interval or ratio) variables in experiments. Ordinal-, interval-, and ratio-level variables also must be measured consistently, and accurate and appropriate inferences must be made based on the

data. Consistency is called reliability and is determined by examining consistency of items within a scale (called internal consistency), consistency of performance across time (called test–retest reliability), and consistency of ratings by scorers (called interrater reliability). Accuracy of inferences is referred to as validity and is obtained through multiple means. The concepts or traits or any other characteristic measured in research are labeled constructs. One source of evidence of validity involves expert evaluation of content to be sure that the operationalization adequately represents the construct domain of interest (called content validity). Another source of evidence is how well the measure correlates with other measures of the same construct (called convergent validity evidence) and can be differentiated from measures of different constructs (called discriminant validity evidence). Further, validity can be supported by the ability of the measure to predict group membership or other criterion variables (called known groups evidence). For example, a measure that one claims to be an accurate measure of depression should differentiate depressed from nondepressed individuals. Finally, statistical confirmation of the underlying structure of the construct (using exploratory or confirmatory factor analysis) can also provide additional evidence for the structure of the construct. Any evidence that can add to the inference that the measure works in ways that are consistent with the definition of the construct can be seen as supportive evidence for one’s validity claims. Most quantitative methods, except perhaps for some simple descriptive studies, examine quantitative relationships between variables and group differences to draw inferences about social and psychological phenomena. A simple descriptive study might only involve counting (and percentages) of typical performance or attitudes and beliefs. Most other quantitative studies examine relationships among variables. Nonexperimental quantitative studies look at the relationships among variables with goals varying from description to prediction to explanation. On the simplest level, one could look at how two variables are related (e.g., how does math anxiety relate to mathematics achievement?). On a more complex level, some studies look at patterns of correlations among a set of variables in theoretical models. These studies involve i­ dentifying

Research Design

how hypothesized relations among multiple sets of variables fit with the data collected from a study. These theoretical model studies are aimed at explaining phenomena and are examples of explanatory research. Another popular purpose in nonexperimental quantitative research is to identify variables that predict variation in outcome variables of interest such as dropping out of high school, development of social anxiety, and success in treatment for depression. Constructing an Experimental Research Design

Experimental research is the best approach for gathering evidence about cause and effect. These studies employ experimental manipulation of one or more IVs. Experimental research studies involve finding ways to create contexts that allow the researcher to make reasonable conclusions that the variables play a causal role. This is usually done by creating groups, using random assignment, that are equal on all factors and then manipulating the IV(s) to see if differences among the groups occur concurrent with or after the manipulation. In fact, when constructing an experimental design, one can consider treatment groups; comparison and control groups; none, one, or more pretests; and one or more posttests. Here is a simple but very strong experimental design:

RA O1 XTreatment O2 RA O1 XControl O2

where, RA signifies random assignment of members of a sample (typically a purposive sample) to the treatment and control groups, O1 signifies pretest measurement of the DV, and O2 signifies posttest measurement of the DV.

This strong design is a randomized design because it includes random assignment to the groups. Designs with random assignment also are called RCTs (randomized controlled trials or randomized clinical trials). The logic of this experiment is simple. Random assignment creates groups that are similar on all possible variables (known

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and unknown) at the start of the experiment. After pretest measurement, the researcher varies the levels of the IV for the different groups. Then, after administration of the IV, the researcher measures participants to determine if they have become different. Because the IV is the only variable on which the groups differ, one can make a strong claim that the posttest differences are due to the IV. The ability to draw causal inferences requires that one meet three conditions: (1) Variable A and Variable B must be related, (2) changes in Variable A must occur before changes in Variable B, and (3) the relationship between Variables A and B must not be due to some other, confounding variable. One can see from the example that a randomized experiment is especially strong in establishing causation because all three conditions are fully met: (1) A relationship is observed between the IV and DV, (2) changes in the IV occur before posttest measurement, and (3)  random assignment equates the groups on all extraneous variables at the beginning of the experiment, thus ruling out alternative explanations. Nonexperimental research studies have great difficulty with meeting Conditions 2 and especially 3; hence, if a nonexperimental quantitative study is not especially well conceived and control techniques are not used, then multiple alternative explanations are likely to be present. It is impossible to rule out all alternative explanations in nonexperimental research because there could always be a confounding variable that the researcher overlooked and omitted from the study. When constructing an experiment, one must deal with trade-offs of time, money, availability of participants, and availability of facilities. When making judgments about cause and effect, one must consider the different threats to internal (causal) validity. If one does not use a design with a control group or random assignment of participants to groups, many of the threats apply. Here are the key named threats to internal validity as noted by R. Burke Johnson and Larry Christensen and by Christensen and colleagues: a.  Ambiguous temporal precedence (the inability to specify which variable preceded which other variable) b.  History (specific events, other than the IV, that occur between the first and second measurements of the DV)

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c.  Maturation (the physical or mental changes that may occur in individuals over time such as aging, learning, boredom, hunger, and fatigue) d.  Testing (changes in the score a person makes on the second administration of a test that can be attributed entirely to the effect of having previously taken the test) e.  Instrumentation (any change that occurs in the measuring instrument between the pretesting and posttesting) f.  Regression artifact (the tendency of extreme scores to regress or move toward the mean of the distribution on a second testing) g.  Differential selection (differences that exist in the comparison groups at the outset of the research study and are not due to the IV) h.  Additive or interactive effects (differences that exist in the comparison groups because one of the threats, such as maturation or history, affects the groups differently) i.  Differential attrition (difference that exists in the comparison groups because the participants who drop out of the various comparison groups have different characteristics)

These threats tend to be differentially associated with various experimental designs; however, it is always the researcher’s responsibility to determine if the threat is a plausible threat for each particular instantiation of an experimental design. Even if a threat is associated with a design, it is possible that it still can be ruled out if evidence is obtained and provided. Following is a quick look at how the threats operate in relation to some experimental designs. One might construct an experimental design to include one pretest, administration of a treatment condition, and a posttest: O1 XTreatment O2 Although this design can measure change from pretreatment to posttreatment, several threats might be operative, including history (something other than the treatment might occur between pretest and posttest), as well as maturation, testing, instrumentation, and regression artifacts. This design, therefore, is usually considered a weak

design, although some threats can be ruled out (e.g., regression artifact would not be operating if participants did not have extremely high or low scores, and maturation would not be operating if participants were not changing rapidly on a variable). In this design, the pretest is used as an estimate of the counterfactual (i.e., what the participants would have been like if they had not received the treatment). In experiments, one attempts to compare groups that are treated with their counterfactual. If one were to add a control group to the onegroup pretest–posttest design, the following design would be obtained: O1 XTreatment O2 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

O1 XControl O2 This design looks a little like the strong experiment shown earlier except that this design does not include random assignment to groups. When selecting a control group, one should find a group that is highly similar to the group that will receive the treatment. One can also match the groups on variables that might be related to the DV, and one can include measurement of other variables on which the groups might vary so that statistical adjustments can be used (e.g., ANCOVA and multiple regression). This design is sometimes called the nonequivalent comparison group design. The word nonequivalent is used to remind one that the groups are highly likely to be nonequivalent on one or more variables. The nonequivalent comparison group design is a quasi-experimental design (a design that is moderately good at eliminating threats to internal validity) and is significantly stronger than the one-group pretest–posttest design (a weak design) in several ways. Because of the addition of a comparison or control group, the basic forms of history, maturation, testing, and instrumentation are eliminated as long as they are the same for both groups (which is usually the case). Some new threats emerge however—specifically, differential selection, which means that any preexisting differences between the groups are confounded with the IV—and therefore one does not know if the t­reatment or the confounding variable is the causal factor.

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The basic threats also might operate differentially. For example, differential attrition might occur where the groups become different during the study because of who drops out from one or more groups. Still, the nonequivalent comparison group design is much stronger than a nonequivalent posttest-only comparisons group design where the pretest is excluded. By including a pretest in the design, one can study the pattern of results and often make fairly good causal inferences. How might one construct a design superior to the nonequivalent comparison-group design? Answer: Use random assignment to the groups (i.e., use a randomized design). When this design component is added, all the named threats to internal validity given earlier are eliminated. There is one potential problem, however, that is sometimes overlooked for the RCT shown earlier. If one excludes a variable that has a disordinal interaction with the IV (and the IV includes two treatments), then it will appear that the IV is not effective when actually it is except that one level of the IV works well for one group making up the moderating variable and the other level of the IV works well for the other group making up the moderating variable. When this sort of interaction is present, the effect is masked. If one is worried about this issue, one should add the potentially moderating variable to the design so that one can check for an interaction effect. This design, with two or more IVs is sometimes called the factorial design. Here is a depiction of a factorial design that has two IVs each with two levels, random assignment to conditions, and a posttest:

This design is called the interrupted time-series design, and unlike the one-group pretest–posttest design, its only threat is history (i.e., if something else was changed at the time the treatment was administered). One additional design component a researcher can use is type of IV: between-subjects IV or within-subjects IV. In the preceding examples, the IV was assumed to be a between-subjects variable, meaning that the groups included different people. With a repeated-measures design, all participants receive each level of the IV (usually in different, counterbalanced, orders). Here is one example:



RA A1B1 O2

XLevel 1



RA A1B2 O2

XLevel 2 O



RA A2B1 O2



RA A2B2 O2

where, A = the first IV, with two levels, B = the second IV, with two levels, RA = random assignment to groups, and O2 = posttest measurement of the DV.

This randomized design is very strong because when two or more IVs are included, one can study interaction effects. For example, a two-way interaction would be present if the relationship between the Variable A and the DV varied across the levels of the Variable B. Next is how one can start with the weak onegroup pretest–posttest design (pretest, treatment, and posttest) and produce a quasi-experimental design, which is stronger but not as strong as a randomized design. How might one improve this design without adding a control group or random assignment (which as just shown is an excellent well to strengthen this design)? Answer: Include multiple pretests to obtain a strong baseline measurement and include multiple posttests to get a clear understanding of the DV during and after the onset of the treatment. Specifically, one could construct a design such as this: O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 X O6 O7 O8 O9 O10

O XLevel 2 O XLevel 1 O

This repeated-measures design with counterbalancing has two treatment conditions, with half receiving the order 1-2 and the other order 2-1. It also is a strong experimental design with no major threats to internal validity. Note that quantitative designs that include a mixture of between-subjects and within-subjects IV can be constructed easily and are used in research. One last type of experimental research includes single-case designs. Because of space limitations,

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these designs are not discussed here, but they are covered in standard psychological research methods books such as Research Methods, Design, and Analysis by Christensen and colleagues. In all the experimental designs, the data are analyzed using statistical hypothesis testing to determine if the differences between groups are greater than would be expected by sampling error (i.e., chance). External (Generalizing) Validity

Another important characteristic of quantitative research that needs to be addressed when drawing inferences from a study is the representativeness of the samples of research participants and the situations studied. If one desires to make generalizations from a sample to a population based on a single study, random sampling (using an equal probability of selection method) is required to produce a representative sample. This ensures that within certain limits of sampling error, the sample and group results can be statistically generalized to parameters in the population. Random sampling is especially important in survey research such as in polling where the researcher needs population estimates. This type of external validity is known as population validity. Experiments with random assignment are rarely if ever based on random samples; convenience and purposive samples are typical. In experiments, the limits of generalization are usually determined by conducting the experiment with different people or groups in different contexts (ecological validity). Experimenters also vary treatments and outcomes to determine the degree to which one can generalize across these factors (treatment variation validity and outcome validity). Experimenters also check their findings to see if they hold across time (temporal validity). Data Analysis

Experimental researchers can observe whether groups appear to differ in expected directions. However, sampling error or chance variation is always present in empirical research based on samples. Therefore, the researcher engages in significance testing to determine if the observed differences and relationships are likely to be

greater than would be expected by chance. To do this, the researcher obtains a p value. The p value indicates how often one would observe a relationship as extreme (or more extreme) than was observed in the sample data. It is a conditional probability because it shows the probability of the outcome given the null hypothesis of no relationship is true. If the p value is sufficiently small (e.g., < .05), the researcher rejects the null hypothesis and tentatively accepts the alternative hypothesis that there is a relationship. Measures of effect size also should be used to indicate the magnitude or size of effect (e.g., using eta squared or omega squared, which indicate amount of DV variance accounted for and Cohen’s d, which indicates the magnitude of difference between two means in standardized units). Confidence intervals also should be used when possible to help readers understand that all estimates are subject to sampling error. Overall, the key to understanding quantitative research is to recognize that it is made up of multiple components that vary depending on the research purpose. The design of the study, the sampling of participants and situations, the level of quantification, the reliability and validity of measurement, and the statistical analyses undertaken all need to be taken into consideration. These influence the inferences that can be drawn from the results and the degree to which the results can be generalized outside the specific research context. These, then, are the pieces or components for designing a quantitative study, especially experimental studies.

Design in Qualitative and Mixed-Methods Research Qualitative Research Design

Psychology has traditionally emphasized the use of experimental and other quantitative research methods. However, qualitative and mixed methods research is becoming increasingly popular in some areas of psychology. For example, the British Psychological Society has a qualitative research section, and the American Psychological Association has a qualitative group in Division 5. As noted by Christensen and colleagues, there are five major qualitative research methods (and many additional smaller types):

Research Design

1. Phenomenology (where the purpose is to describe how people experience a particular phenomenon such as the loss of a loved one) 2. Ethnography (where the purpose is to describe the cultural characteristics of a group of people) 3. Narrative inquiry (where the purpose is to document and learn from human’s stories) 4. Case study research (where the goal is to study a single case or group or multiple cases for comparisons to learn about the cases or learn about something that applies beyond just the particular cases) 5. Grounded theory (where the goal is to inductively study a group and its processes to generate an explanatory theory that can be later tested using more traditional methods)

The major qualitative methods vary somewhat from one another, but the key characteristic of design in qualitative research is the idea of emergence. Qualitative researchers determine what methods of data collection they plan to use, but they do not like to construct specific designs that they must adhere to during fieldwork. They prefer  to use emergent designs that allow them to be flexible and go where informative data might be located. Qualitative research starts with general research questions; then the researcher(s) enters the field and explores people and settings for answers. During fieldwork, the research questions are also changed or improved as the researcher determines what is relevant and important in relation to the topic. Qualitative research is against a priori designs because they operate against the emergent, exploratory, and creative nature of qualitative research. Qualitative design involves identifying relevant people and places, collecting open-ended data, analyzing the data, collecting more data and analyzing the data, and continuing this until informative knowledge is obtained or, in the case of grounded theory, until theoretical saturation is reached. Mixed-Methods Research Design

Mixed-methods research (MMR) arose as a solution to the qualitative–quantitative paradigm wars that were especially popular in the 1990s.

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One of the founders of MMR, Jennifer Greene points out that MMR purposively mixes at and across the levels of method, methodology, and paradigm. Method refers to method of data collection (tests, questionnaires, interviews, observation, focus groups, constructed data, and secondary or existing data). At the level of method, one can mix within a method of data collection (e.g., a questionnaire that includes closed-ended items and open-ended items), called intramethod mixing, or mixing across methods of data collection (e.g., standardized test and in-depth interviews) called intermethod mixing. Methodology is a higher and larger level and includes methodologies such as experimental and quasi-experimental research, single-case research, grounded theory, case studies, and qualitative stories. Again, one can mix methodologies within and between. For example, Johnson and colleagues (2010) have articulated a mixed form of grounded theory, and Joanne Mayoh and Anthony Onwuegbuzie (2013) have articulated a mixed form of phenomenology. Finally, one can combine and interactively mix at the level of paradigm by using a multiparadigmatic research team that works toward a superordinate goal and set of interrelated research questions (e.g., a team might include a qualitative constructivist, a quantitative postpositivist, and an MMR pragmatist). When designing a mixed-methods study, therefore, one can mix at and across the levels of method, methodology, paradigm, and discipline (MMR advocates interdisciplinary analysis). Several specific sets of designs also have been provided—for example, by John Creswell [by Johnson and Christensen, and by Charles Teddlie and Abbas Tashakkori—in the mixed-methods research literature. Because of space limitations, only that of Teddlie and Tashakkori is mentioned here. It includes five families of designs: 1. Parallel mixed designs (where one conducts qualitative and quantitative research strands or components concurrently to address different aspects of the same or interrelated research questions) 2. Sequential mixed designs (where the components or strands are done sequentially with the later stages directly building on knowledge gained from prior stages)

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3. Conversion mixed designs (which includes the quantizing of qualitative data or qualitizing of quantitative data) 4. Multilevel mixed designs (where quantitative and qualitative data are collected at smaller and larger units of analysis) 5. Fully integrated mixed designs (which emphasize mixing interactively at all stages of a research study).

For more information about the mixed designs, see the readings at the end of this entry. When designing a mixed methods study, however, it is important to emphasize what Onwuegbuzie and Johnson label multiple validities legitimation. This is defined by Johnson and Christensen as follows: The extent to which the mixed methods researcher successfully addresses and resolves all relevant validity types, including the quantitative and qualitative validity types discussed earlier in this chapter as well as the mixed validity dimensions. In other words, the researcher must identify and address all of the relevant validity issues facing a particular research study [emphasis added]. Successfully addressing the pertinent validity issues will help researchers produce the kinds of inferences and meta-inferences that should be made in mixed research. (p. 311)

Although some might assume that mixing methods relieves the researcher of the requirements that validity otherwise imposes, this is not the case. Mixing adds its own requirements to those already in place. R. Burke Johnson and James Van Haneghan See also Cross-Cultural Methods of Research; Mixed Methods; Mixed-Method Philosophies; Qualitative Research; Quantitative Research; Single-Subject Research Designs

Further Readings American Educational Research Association, American Psychological Association, & National Council on Measurement in Education. (1999). Standards for educational and psychological testing (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Christensen, L. B., Johnson, R. B., & Turner, L. A. (2014). Research methods, design, and analysis (12th ed.). Boston, MA: Pearson. Greene, J. C. (2015). Preserving distinctions within the MMR merger. In S. Hesse-Biber & R. B. Johnson, Oxford handbook of multimethod and mixed research inquiry (pp. 606–615). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Johnson, R. B., & Christensen, L. B. (2014). Educational research methods: Quantitative, qualitative, and mixed approaches (5th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Johnson, R. B., McGowan, M. W., & Turner, L. A. (2010). Grounded theory in practice: Is it inherently a mixed method? Research in the Schools, 17(2), 65–78. Mayoh, J., & Onwuegbuzie, A. J. (2015). Toward a conceptualization of mixed methods phenomenological research. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 9(1), 91–107. doi: 10.1177/1558689813505358 Messick, S. (1989). Validity. In R. L. Linn (Ed.), Educational measurement (3rd ed., pp. 13–103). New York, NY: Macmillan. Onwuegbuzie, A. J., & Johnson, R. B. (2006). The “validity” issue in mixed methods research. Research in the Schools, 13(1), 48–63. Teddlie, C. B., & Tashakkori, A. (2009). Foundations of mixed methods research: Integrating qualitative and quantitative approaches and in the social and behavioral sciences. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Research Methods in Health Psychology Health psychology research is rooted in the biopsychosocial model whereby health is determined by biological (e.g., tissue damage), psychological (e.g., beliefs), and social (e.g., ethnicity) factors. Health psychologists use the biopsychosocial model to understand people’s reactions to illness and to identify ways to promote good health and prevent illness (e.g., evaluating health interventions, making recommendations for policy or practice). For example, a health intervention could be evaluated to see if it affected biological (e.g., biochemical analysis of hair to assess alcohol use) and psychological (e.g., attitudes, intentions) outcome measures and if social factors (e.g., ethnicity, indices of deprivation) influenced its effectiveness.

Research Methods in Health Psychology

Health psychologists conduct research using both qualitative and quantitative methods to collect data and to conduct systematic reviews. This entry reviews different kinds of qualitative and quantitative research methods and the use of reviews and secondary analyses of existing research.

Qualitative Research Methods Interviews can explore an issue in depth and with flexibility. The content of an interview is determined by the research question; for example, interviews may be used to explore the individual’s experience of a chronic disease or to evaluate the acceptability of a health intervention. The first step is to devise an interview schedule composed of questions that can be structured (i.e., closed questions) or semistructured (i.e., open-ended). In semistructured interviews, prompts are used to keep the interview on track and to ensure that all aspects of the question are covered and follow-up questions are used to explore responses in depth. The second step is to conduct the interviews in person or over the telephone; the interviews are typically audio recorded and then transcribed. The analysis and interpretation of the data are the final step. There are many methods of analyzing interview data, but they typically involve identifying themes in the data or categorizing the data into predetermined themes (e.g., using a theoretical framework) and identifying examples of the theme or subthemes. The resulting data can be used to inform interventions and practice. Focus groups allow people to be interviewed in such a way that they can respond to each other’s comments. A facilitator is present to introduce the discussion and to keep the discussion on track. Focus groups are used to explore the experiences and beliefs held by the targeted group (e.g., patients, employees, students) using the same steps as in individual interviews. Focus groups could be used to identify variables that affect medication adherence or factors that influence the consumption of fruits and vegetables in young people. The findings may be used to inform interventions aimed at ­promoting the targeted behaviors. Diary studies are a method of exploring experiences longitudinally. This method allows ­ exploration between people (i.e., differences and similarities between individuals) and within a

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person (i.e., fluctuations and stability over time). For example, a diary study may be used to examine the thoughts, feelings, and experiences of people who were recently diagnosed with a disease. Diaries are analyzed in a way similar to interview data through a process of identifying themes and subthemes. The findings may lead to recommendations for practice if adjustment issues are identified that are not covered in current health care programs. Think-aloud studies are used to gather information about a person’s experience of completing tasks, such as health interventions or questionnaires. Participants are asked to “think aloud” as they complete the task and may be prompted to speak if they have been quiet for several seconds. The sessions can be audiotaped and transcribed. Themes can be identified from the data; for example, in evaluating an online health intervention, the themes may be the content, the language used, and the ease of navigation. Issues that are identified can lead to recommendations for further interventions.

Quantitative Research Methods Experimental studies examine the differences between one or more groups of people who have been randomly assigned to those groups according to an outcome of interest. This allows causation to be inferred, as the participants in the conditions should not differ on factors other than the intervention given. Experiments can be conducted in the laboratory or in the field (i.e., in a real-world setting). Laboratory experiments can control for extraneous variables, whereas field experiments are less controlled but often are more naturalistic. An example of an experiment is a randomizedcontrolled trial. These can be used to evaluate health interventions. In randomized-controlled trials, people are randomly assigned to either (a)  an experimental group that completes the intervention or (b)  a control group (e.g., one that receives an alternative intervention, a distractor task, or standard care). The health behavior that is targeted by the intervention is measured before and after the intervention, and the groups are compared to determine if the intervention was effective (e.g., the intervention group performs more healthy behaviors after the intervention than the control group does). Quasi-experimental studies are a type of experimental study that compares groups but does not

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involve randomization. These are used when randomization would be unethical or unworkable. For example, it would be unfeasible to randomize patients to conditions in order to compare the effects of a chronic disease on quality of life in people from different socioeconomic backgrounds. However, a quasi-experiment could be conducted, as these conditions occur naturally. Note that this quasi-experimental design would not allow one to infer that socioeconomic background caused changes in quality of life. Correlational studies are often used when randomization is not feasible. For example, it would not be ethical to randomly allocate students to a binge-drinking condition in order to determine which beliefs that people hold about binge drinking influence their behavior. However, a correlational study could be used with a preexisting group of binge drinkers. They could be asked to rate their agreement with various beliefs (e.g., “binge drinking is fun”) and to report their alcohol consumption 1 month later to determine which beliefs were correlated with their level of binge drinking. The data could be used to develop a health intervention designed to change the beliefs that underpin binge drinking. Vignette studies involve having people imagine they are in a particular situation. For example, healthy participants could be asked to imagine they had contracted a disease that can be transmitted through various practices in order to study how the method of transmission influences responses to the disease. Case control studies are retrospective studies wherein two groups that differ in an outcome are selected, and the data are analyzed for factors associated with the outcome. For example, people who died by suicide could be compared with people who died by other means. This could involve interviewing family and friends and reviewing clinical records to determine risk factors associated with suicide and not with death by other means. Identification of multiple risk factors could lead to early identification of people at risk of suicide and intervention to prevent suicide. Repertory grids are used to explore how an individual construes a topic. Grids are constructed by (a) presenting people with elements of interest (and similar elements that are not of interest), (b)  eliciting the constructs the person considers

r­ elevant to the elements (e.g., if the elements were diseases, the cause of a disease might be a construct), (c) asking the person to rate each element on each of the constructs, and (d) statistically analyzing each grid. For example, a repertory-grid method could be used to explore how people understand diseases they are at risk of contracting. By asking participants about the similarities and differences between six elements (e.g., three diseases of interest and three other diseases), similarities and differences can be identified and used to form the constructs (e.g., if the disease was curable or not). Participants can then be asked to rate each disease based on the constructs they identified (e.g., “How curable is flu?” on a scale from “curable” to “not curable”). Groups of constructs (i.e., components) can be identified using principal components analysis. The components then can be labeled in terms of predetermined categories or from themes that emerge from the data.

Reviews and Secondary Data Analysis Systematic reviews are reviews of the literature that provide a detailed methodology in order to identify, select, and evaluate previously published work that appears relevant to a research question. A systematic review could explore whether a particular factor, such as social support, influences quality of life after the diagnosis of a particular disease. A systematic review involves a strategic process of searching for, identifying, evaluating, and reviewing published work. The first step is to outline a detailed research question (e.g., type of population, type of intervention or comparison, outcomes of interest). The research question informs the search terms to be used, the relevant databases to be searched, and the inclusion or exclusion criteria. Once the search has been conducted, the titles and abstracts can be examined, and sources that seem to meet the inclusion criteria can be examined in full. Relevant data can be extracted and evaluated (e.g., for quality). The literature about the topic can then be described and the answer to the research question tentatively answered. Meta-synthesis is a type of systematic review that combines the results of similar qualitative studies and reports a secondary analysis of the

Research Methods in Neuroscience

results. For example, a meta-synthesis could explore the experiences of people with a particular disease. Meta-synthesis typically involves a threestep process: (a) comparing and contrasting themes and subthemes from the studies, (b)  reexamining papers to determine if data fit into these themes and subthemes, and (c) refining themes and exploring new concepts to provide an overall interpretation of the data. Meta-analysis is a type of systematic review used to combine the results of similar quantitative studies and reports a secondary analysis. For example, a meta-analysis may be used to determine the effect of a particular type of behavioral-change technique on health behavior. The search and identification of published works is conducted as in a systematic review. The data extracted from each source includes effect size (e.g., a way of standardizing the data) and various factors that might influence effectiveness (e.g., sample type, health behavior). The meta-analysis can determine if the behavioral-change technique is effective and the size of the effect. This type of research can be used to identify particularly effective methods of c­hanging health behavior under a range of ­circumstances. The research methods outlined in this entry can be used singly or in combination. For example, in developing and evaluating a health intervention, different methods can be used at each stage: (a) correlational studies to determine the beliefs to target in a health intervention, (b)  a focus group that explores ideas for the presenting and implementing the intervention, (c)  a think-aloud study for piloting the intervention, (d)  a randomizedcontrolled trial of the intervention, and (e)  interviews about engagement with the intervention. Tracy Epton and Christopher J. Armitage See also Cross-Cultural Methods of Research; Qualitative Research; Quantitative Research; Research Methods in Neuroscience; Single-Subject Research Designs

Further Readings Bolger, N., Davis, A., & Rafaeli, E. (2003). Diary methods: Living life as it is lived. Annual Review of Psychology, 54, 579–616. Breslow, N. (1982). Design and analysis of case-control studies. Annual Review of Public Health, 3, 29–54.

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Robinson, N. (1999). The use of focus group methodology: With selected examples from mental health research. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 29, 905–913. Stanely, K. (2007). Design of randomized controlled trials. Circulation, 115, 1164–1169. Walsh, D., & Downe, S. (2005). Meta-synthesis method for qualitative research: A literature review. Methodological Issues in Nursing Research, 50, 204–211.

Research Methods Neuroscience

in

Neuroscience is an inherently interdisciplinary field, and there are many experimental methods for studying the brain. Although these techniques seem very different at first glance, many of them attempt to study the nervous system in the same way. In general, there are three main categories of research methods in neuroscience: (a)  methods that investigate neural structure and connectivity, (b)  methods that investigate neural activity, and (c)  methods that manipulate neural activity to determine the role of neurons in physiology and behavior. Each category comprises a variety of specific techniques that inform neuroscientists about a specific aspect of the nervous system. This entry reviews these categories of methods in ­neuroscience research.

Methods That Investigate Neural Structure and Connectivity A scientist can learn a lot about the nervous system by examining its structure. Neurons can be classified into different structural and functional groups, with each cell type expressing a unique combination of genes and proteins that specify its role in the brain. Thick, white-matter tracts constitute long-distance pathways of neural communication, and smaller-fiber tracts constitute the local communication networks between populations of neurons. In model organisms, most investigation into neural structure usually involves preparing histological specimens. Neural tissue is soft, delicate, and degradable. Therefore, to accurately study neural structure, a neuroscientist’s first goal is to

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keep the tissue as close to its living state as possible. This is usually achieved by preserving a brain with a fixative, sectioning (cutting) the brain using a microtome or cryostat, and mounting sections on slides for subsequent examination with a microscope. Histological stains such as the Nissl stain (or cresyl violet) can be used to visualize cell bodies, and white-matter stains can be used to visualize fiber tracts. In invertebrate organisms, such as D. melanogaster or C. elegans, the nervous system is so small that no sectioning of neural tissue is necessary. To better characterize individual neurons within the brain, it can be useful to visualize mRNA and protein expression. To analyze patterns of mRNA expression, neuroscientists perform a technique called in situ hybridization. This technique uses single-stranded, nucleic-acid probes to label mRNA that is present in the tissue. The probes bind to complementary mRNA molecules and are labeled with a tag so they can be visualized under a microscope. A corresponding technique to measure protein expression is called immunohistochemistry. Neural tissue is exposed to an antibody that binds to a protein of interest. Usually, the neural tissue is incubated in a secondary antibody that recognizes and amplifies the signal of the first antibody. This secondary antibody is conjugated with a marker, allowing visualization under a microscope. Of course, a neuron never functions in isolation. Its role in the brain is governed by its unique combination of inputs and outputs and the neural circuits to which it belongs. To study these inputs and outputs, neuroscientists use neuronal tracers, chemical probes that label axon paths to illuminate connectivity in the nervous system. Typically, these tracers are viruses or proteins modified with fluorescent or radioactive molecules that allow visualization. They are defined by the direction they travel in a neuron: Anterograde refers to transport from the cell body through the axon to the presynaptic terminal; retrograde refers to tracing in the opposite direction—transport from the synaptic terminal back to the cell body. To use these tracers, a scientist almost always injects the tracer into the brain of a live animal. After a waiting period of about a week, the brain can be removed, processed, and examined for the

presence of the tracer. By studying the locations of anterograde or retrograde signals, neuroscientists can identify new steps in a neural pathway. All the preceding techniques have a crucial limitation; they are extremely invasive and require the sacrifice of the model organism under investigation. To learn about neural structure in human subjects, neuroscientists can apply noninvasive whole-brain imaging techniques. Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) technology produces highly detailed images of the human brain by detecting differences in the way neural tissues respond to a magnetic field. Gray matter (neural cell bodies) and white matter (fiber tracts) exhibit different signal strengths in an MRI scanner, and the contrast between these signals form the basis of an image. To study neural connectivity in humans, neuroscientists can use diffusion tensor imaging, another noninvasive research technique in which an MRI scanner can map the diffusion of water molecules along fiber tracts. Because water molecules diffuse differently through gray and white matter, analysis of the diffusion patterns can reveal the microscopic architecture of neural tissue.

Methods That Investigate Neural Activity It is often important to determine how electrical activity within a neuron or population of neurons relates to environmental stimuli or changes in behavior. A variety of techniques allow neural activity to be monitored in both nonhuman animals and humans. In nonhuman animals, the most common methods include electrophysiology, calcium imaging, and voltage-sensitive dye imaging. In humans, neural activity is typically measured using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) or positron emission tomography (PET). All these techniques are useful in different contexts, and each measures and reports neural activity in different ways. Electrophysiology refers to techniques aimed at directly measuring the electrical activity of local brain regions, single neurons, and even single ion channels. In extracellular physiology experiments, an electrode is placed outside of neurons to measure action potentials. In intracellular physiology experiments, an electrode pierces a neuron to record action potentials and

Research Methods in Neuroscience

also subthreshold events, such as excitatory or inhibitory postsynaptic potentials. In patch clamp electrophysiology, a glass micropipette is positioned on a small surface (“patch”) of a neuron so that current and voltage can be measured, often for a single ion channel. Taken together, these techniques can correlate electrical activity in a brain region or neuron with environmental stimuli or behavioral events, providing a functional link from a neural system to sensation or behavior. Alternatively, they may demonstrate how single ion channels imbue neurons with their electrophysiological properties and cause neurons to respond to various pharmacological compounds and changes in extracellular ionic concentrations. Neural activity can also be measured indirectly using calcium imaging and voltage-sensitive dye imaging. These techniques are beneficial because they can visually report the activity of a population of several neurons rather than single neurons in isolation. Calcium indicators, such as GCaMPs, are genetically encoded and consist of a fluorescent protein fused to a calcium-binding protein. These indicators undergo a conformational change when there is an influx of calcium into the neuron, as occurs during action potentials. This conformational change results in a transient increase in fluorescence that can be examined using a fluorescent microscope. In a similar manner, voltage-sensitive dyes increase fluorescence when the membrane of a neuron becomes depolarized, providing a readout of neural activity that can be visualized with a fluorescent microscope. Both calcium imaging and voltage-sensitive dye imaging can be performed on brain slices in vitro or on the surface of whole brains in head-fixed animals in vivo. Techniques used to study neural activity in humans are less invasive but, unfortunately, also less spatially precise. Due to the obvious limiting factor of not penetrating the skull in a human subject, measuring neural activity must be inherently indirect. For example, fMRI measures changes in blood flow to indicate which locations of the brain are active in response to a stimulus. Neurons consume relatively more oxygen when active, which results in an increase in blood flow. Therefore, blood flow is used as an indirect surrogate for neural activity.

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In a similar manner, PET scans measure metabolic activity in the brain. A radioactive substance that marks metabolic activity (such as fluorodeoxyglucose) is administered to a human ­participant to track increased concentration in brain regions that consume more energy. The positrons emitted are detected by a scanner, which amalgamates these measurements into an image that indicates areas of differential neural activity in the brain. Both fMRI and PET are useful in correlating neural activity in specific brain regions with ­ ­behavioral or cognitive functions.

Methods That Manipulate Neural Activity Once researchers form a hypothesis about the function of a population of neurons, they often find it desirable to manipulate the activity of these neurons to determine whether they are necessary and sufficient for a behavioral or physiological effect. For example, if a scientist hypothesizes that a population of neurons causes aggression, it would be interesting to determine whether stimulating those neurons causes aggression or ­ inhibiting them prevents aggression. In general, a gain of neural activity tests ­sufficiency—that is, the ability of the neurons to cause a behavior or physiological effect on their own. A loss of neural activity tests necessity—that is, the need for activity in those neurons for a behavior or physiological effect to occur. In ­animals, there are multiple ways of stimulating or inhibiting neural activity in vitro or in vivo. Perhaps the least-precise method of manipulating neural activity is to cause a physical lesion in the neural population or brain region of ­interest. There are three ways of lesioning brain tissue—(a) surgically destroying a specific volume of tissue, (b)  electrolytically killing neurons by overstimulating them with electricity, or (c) injecting a toxin into tissue to induce cell death. Although these techniques can be useful for testing the effects of destroying a population of neurons, it is difficult to target specific neurons in a heterogeneous brain region. Furthermore, the effects are irreversible, so the neurons can never regain their function. If a relatively mild amount of current is applied to nervous tissue, electrical stimulation can excite neurons and cause them to fire. Using

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detailed atlases of animal brains, neuroscientists can place electrodes in a specific region of interest and stimulate neurons there to determine whether they are sufficient to cause a behavior or physiological effect. However, like lesion methods, electrical stimulation is not spatially precise and can cause effects in all the neurons within a region of tissue. Therefore, electrical stimulation is often used in vitro under a microscope, or in vivo in large animals, especially rats and ­primates. Pharmacological agents can be used to target more specific regions of interest in neural tissue. Agonists are chemical compounds that increase the activity of endogenous neurotransmitters and neuropeptides. Antagonists are drugs that block the actions of these transmitters, inhibiting their function. For example, a serotonin agonist could work by increasing the release of serotonin from synapses or by preventing the reuptake of serotonin back to the presynaptic cell, therefore extending its effects. A serotonin antagonist could prevent the binding of serotonin to its postsynaptic receptors or by improving the efficiency of the enzymes that degrade serotonin in the synapse. Pharmacological techniques are more spatially precise than lesions or electrical stimulation but can require minutes to hours to produce an effect and to “wash out of” biological tissue. Furthermore, their effects depend on the exact chemical/receptor distribution in the brain region of interest. A relatively new technique, dubbed pharmacogenetics, improves on pharmacology to activate or inhibit specific neurons of interest. By using genetic methods to selectively express recombinant proteins in specific neurons of interest, it is possible to target designer receptors specific to individual categories of neurons in heterogeneous neural tissue. Two common designer receptors include hM3Dq, which causes neurons to increase activity, and hM4Di, which causes them to decrease activity. The ligand for both receptors is a drug called clozapine-n-oxide (CNO), a normally inert substance that has no effect on neurons that have not been transduced with these receptors. Therefore, pharmacogenetics allows enhanced spatial precision in stimulating or inhibiting neural activity. However, the effects of CNO-mediated stimulation or inhibition using pharmacogenetics

can last hours. Depending on the experiment, this temporal resolution may be beneficial, but when the desired lengths of stimulation or inhibition are minutes or even seconds, pharmacogenetic techniques become impractical. Another relatively new technique features both unprecedented spatial and temporal precision. Known as optogenetics, it combines the spatial precision of a genetically encoded neuromodulation tool with the temporal precision of a stimulating electrode. In this approach, receptors are genetically targeted to specific neurons using modern recombinant DNA technology techniques. Instead of responding to ligands, these receptors respond to specific wavelengths of light. For example, channelrhodopsin-2 (ChR2) is a cation channel that opens in response to blue light. Therefore, when genetically expressed in neurons, ChR2 causes neurons to depolarize under blue light illumination. Another protein, halorhodopsin (NpHR), causes neural hyperpolarization when illuminated with yellow light. Therefore, it is possible to selectively stimulate or inhibit specific neurons of interest, even in heterogeneous cell populations, with temporal resolutions of a single action potential. In humans, manipulating neural activity is much more difficult because of obvious ethical issues and safety concerns. It is possible to use electrical-stimulation techniques in patients with severe neurological disorders—for example, stimulation of the subthalamic nucleus in Parkinson’s disease. However, invasive procedures are usually reserved for patients with intractable disease symptoms, and these procedures are rarely used for experimentation. In healthy human subjects, a relatively noninvasive technique called transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) can stimulate or inhibit brain regions without physically penetrating the skull. A magnetic coil is placed adjacent to a subject’s head, and the coil generates a magnetic field that induces a small electric current in a small region of the surface of the brain. These currents can either activate or suppress neural activity depending on the strength of the magnetic field that is applied. This technique has been used extensively in humans to map brain regions important for movement and vision, as well as other sensory f­ unctions.

Research Methods in Neuroscience

It has also shown promise as a therapeutic tool to help patients with disorders such as schizophrenia and depression. Matthew Carter, Nitsan Goldstein, Kelsey Loy, and Alison Smith See also Behavioral Economics; Brain and Intelligence; Brain and Nervous System: Macroarchitecture; Brain and Nervous System: Microarchitecture; Cognitive Neuroscience; Extended Mind; Long-term Memory: Processes; Long-term Memory: Processes; Neuroethics; Neuropsychology; Neuroscience as One-sided Dualism; Neurotransmitters and Neuromodulators; Perceptual Disorders; Psychoneuroimmunology;

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Reading Process, Models of; Sleep Stages and States; Social Neuroscience

Further Readings Carter, M. E., & Shieh, J. C. (2010). Guide to research techniques in neuroscience. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Luo, L., Callaway, E. M., & Svoboda, K. (2008). Genetic dissection of neural circuits. Neuron, 57(5), 634–660. Scanziani, M., & Hausser, M. (2009). Electrophysiology in the age of light. Nature, 461(7266), 930–939. Yizhar, O., Fenno, L. E., Davidson, T. J., Mogri, M., & Deisseroth, K. (2011). Optogenetics in neural systems. Neuron, 71(1), 9–34.

S and microscopic changes in the brain that were not seen typically in schizophrenia. About the same time, Kreapelin further defined the early onset disorders by distinguishing schizophrenia and the associated disturbed thinking from the rapid and dramatic mood shifts seen in what Kreapelin called “manic-depressive insanity” and now commonly referred to as bipolar illness.

Schizophrenia Severe mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia, are the most common causes of human disability worldwide. Ten percent of affected individuals die by suicide. Many affected individuals live lives seriously disrupted by unremitting symptoms. Schizophrenia has been recognized for at least 2,000 years, but modern definitions were first developed in the late 1800s and early 1900s. This entry discusses the symptoms, incidence, etiology, treatment, and prevention of schizophrenia. The term was first used by the German psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler, who believed that one of the key issues was a splitting (schism) of mental functions so that thought, emotion, and behavior were no longer acting together in a coherent fashion. Schizophrenia has nothing to do with “split personality” as commonly used (and confused) in the lay press. As a consequence of fractionation of mental functions, affected individuals behaved in maladaptive and often bizarre ways. Dementia praecox (precocious dementia) was coined by Emil Kraepelin as another term for schizophrenia. Precocious dementia was used to distinguish mental disorders with an onset in the late teenage years or early adulthood from the mental disorders common to later-life memory loss. Alzheimer’s disease is a prototypical form of dementia named for the German neuropathologist Alois Alzheimer who, while working in Kreapelin’s laboratory, clarified the late-onset disorders in terms of course of illness, profound memory loss,

Symptoms Schizophrenia is considered a psychotic disorder. Psychosis refers to a condition of being out of touch with reality while still remaining fully alert and oriented to one’s surroundings. This contrasts with delirium, a condition in which people can be out of touch with reality and experience psychoticlike experiences, such as hallucinations. However, in deliria, people are not fully alert or fully responsive to their surroundings. Importantly, delirious states are often due to a severe medical problem that requires urgent attention. Schizophrenia may involve abnormal perceptions, such as seeing things or hearing things that no one else can perceive. Hallucinations can occur in all sensory modalities. People with schizophrenia may feel their limbs moving when they are not, may feel something touching them when nothing is, and may feel something moving inside their bodies when no movement is occurring. Halluci­ nations of smell or taste can happen but may indicate an organic condition, such as brain tumors. Though hallucinations are common in schizophrenia, they are not diagnostically definitive, because 819

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many other mental disorders can also involve them. Many clinicians view disorders of thought as the most specific symptom of schizophrenia. The process of thinking breaks down so that the affected individual’s thoughts no longer make logical sense. A parody on the rhyme used to remember the number of days in a month may capture what thought disorder is like: “Thirty days has Septober, April, June, and no wonder. All the rest have peanut butter except my grandmother who drives a little red tricycle.” Sometimes the thought process uses the sounds of words rather than the meaning of the words (clang association) such as saying “the fold in the piece of paper was made of many sheep.” Thought processes can become so disorganized that the words resemble an assembly of random words (word salad) that is incomprehensible. Delusions (false beliefs) are common in schizophrenia but occur at about the same rate in other psychotic disorders and thus are not diagnostically specific. The nature of the delusion, however, can be a clue to diagnosis. Depressed people can be delusional, but their delusions are consistent with their low mood (e.g., they may be convinced they are dying of some horrible disease or that they committed some unforgivable sin). Manic individuals may have grandiose beliefs, such as believing they were secretly born to royalty and will soon become fabulously rich and powerful. Delusions also occur in dementia. Many people with memory loss become paranoid. For example, the failure to remember where one put the car keys may become the claim that someone vandalized one’s home and stole one’s keys and credit cards. In schizophrenia, the delusions may be bizarre and fantastic—snakes are growing out of one’s head, one’s skin emitting radiation, one’s thoughts and actions being controlled by alien beings. These thoughts are so real and intense that the affected person can seriously damage self or others in an effort to be rid of the perceived pestilence. True to the early conceptualizations of schizophrenia as a precocious dementia, there is evidence of cognitive decline in some people with schizophrenia. Indeed, the decline may begin quite early in life. One study showed that intelligence quotient (IQ) scores measured in the childhood of people who later developed schizophrenia were, on average,

lower than the childhood IQ’s of their siblings who did not develop schizophrenia. Long-term studies of people with schizophrenia have indicated that some of them experience cognitive decline. The cause of the decline is uncertain and could well be part of the illness, but other factors may be involved, such as difficult socioeconomic conditions, lack of health care, poor nutrition, substance abuse, and medications. Whatever the causes, there are numerous neuroimaging studies, such as MRI, that show evidence of brain shrinkage over time in people with schizophrenia. Clinically, the cognitive decline may present as poverty of thought. The individual may say little or nothing spontaneously and her or his answers to questions may lack detail or elaboration. Although disordered thought is a key feature of schizophrenia, emotions are also disturbed. Mood refers to an individual’s perception of his or her own emotional state, whereas affect refers to what other people infer about a person’s emotional state. For example, a person who feels sad may display a tearful affect. In schizophrenia, affect may be inappropriate (“split off”), such as laughing while talking about a sad topic. Alternatively, affect may be absent—called flat affect. The person with schizophrenia may appear rather robotlike, showing no emotion of any kind. Some of the medications used to treat schizophrenia can also induce a flattening of emotions that confuses the clinical picture. In addition to disturbances of thought, emotion, and perception, a host of other abnormalities have received less attention but may be important clues to the causes of schizophrenia. There is an increase in minor physical anomalies, there are abnormalities of fingerprint patterns, and there are difficulties with coordination and movement. Many of these features suggest that the process that leads to schizophrenia may start during fetal development. Thus, schizophrenia has features of a developmental disorder beginning in the earliest stages of life and also features of a degenerative disorder, with decline in nervous system and behavioral functions progressing well into the adult years.

Incidence and Etiology The clinical features of schizophrenia can be roughly summarized as either positive symptoms (the

Schizophrenia

presence of behaviors that are not normal, such as hallucinations) or negative symptoms (such as flat affect or impoverished thoughts) that exhibit the absence of behaviors that are part of normal functioning. Often, there is a progression from positive symptoms early on before a gradual change to a more impoverished state. During this sequence, it must be kept in mind that people with schizophrenia are, first and foremost, people. Their schizophrenia does not necessarily set them apart from normal responses to unfortunate life circumstances. Thus, the change from functioning normally to the telltale symptoms can bring profound demoralization that is made all the worse by demon voices saying horrible things. As a consequence, about 10% of people with schizophrenia will despair and end their lives by suicide. Schizophrenia affects about 1% of the population. The age of onset is typically late teens or early 20s but can occur in middle childhood and even in old age. Males tend to have an earlier average age of onset than females do, leading to the misperception that men are affected more often than females. However, when populations are studied throughout the life span, men and women are affected with equal frequency. The rate of schizophrenia remains very close to 1% throughout the world regardless of country, geography, climate, or ethnicity. The impact on an affected person can be profound, interfering with education, work, and social relationships, including courtship, marriage, and childbearing. The condition is often lifelong, but symptoms can be minimized by treatment, and occasionally, treated individuals achieve full recovery. In spite of intense study, the cause(s) of schizophrenia remain elusive. The most accepted formulation is that a variety of factors come together to produce schizophrenia. This construct is often referred to as the “diathesis-stress” theory. It asserts that genetic factors create a risk for schizophrenia, but it does not develop without stressors from the environment. These may be psychological, including deprivation and other forms of adversity. Biological factors, such as poor prenatal nutrition, head injuries, lack of oxygen, and infectious agents (prenatal or postnatal) have been implicated. There is strong evidence for genetic factors from family, twin, and adoption studies. Schizophrenia

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is known to run in families. In contrast to the 1% rate of schizophrenia in the general population, first-degree relatives have a 10% to 15% risk of developing schizophrenia. The risk to children of affected mothers is the same as for children of schizophrenic fathers. Risks are greater when relatives are severely ill or there are multiple affected relatives. Studies of children born to people with schizophrenia but raised in adoptive homes where adoptive parents do not have the disorder show the same 10% to 15% risks even if the adoptees are raised totally apart from the affected parents. These kinds of data have dispelled earlier, and cruel, ideas that schizophrenia is somehow caused by the schizophrenogenic behaviors of parents. Studies of identical twins, one of whom has schizophrenia and the other not, show that the children of the nonaffected twin still have a 10% to 15% risk. It is clear that people can have the genetic risk but never show the condition. This generates hope that research will eventually identify the trait-relevant environmental factors in schizophrenia. Geneticists employ the concept of epigenesis to describe this phenomenon. Genetic factors are not immutable. The expression of genes can be turned off or on, depending on environmental factors. Thus, any genetic type (genotype) can have many different developmental outcomes (phenotypes) depending on environmental factors. Phenotypes can be influenced by so many factors that they are difficult to study. Geneticists seek to identify endophenotypes that are traits more closely linked to DNA. Although neuroimaging studies have shown reduced brain volumes in some people with schizophrenia, no clearly defined and common neuroanatomical abnormalities can be observed with the light microscope. However, there is growing evidence of abnormal patterns of interconnections among neurons. These have been postulated to be biochemical more than anatomical. Because many of the medications used to treat schizophrenia block a neurotransmitter (a chemical messenger in the brain) called dopamine, it has been hypothesized that schizophrenia results from a dopamine excess. Indeed, other agents that increase dopamine (e.g., amphetamine) can produce psychosis. However, the dopamine hypothesis, which originated more than 50 years ago, has not unlocked the secrets of schizophrenia. Theorists are shifting

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attention to other neurotransmitters, especially glutamate. Another rapidly developing hypothesis suggests that inflammation in the brain or brain blood vessels alters brain function to produce psychotic symptoms. Inflammatory theories fit with observations that psychosis can develop in a variety of inflammatory diseases and that most of the environmental factors increasing risk for schizophrenia (brain trauma, lack of oxygen, infections, etc.) all induce inflammation. Furthermore, many of the medications used to treat schizophrenia also reduce inflammation.

Treatment and Prevention Prior to the development of medications, half of all hospital beds (including state hospitals) were occupied by people with long-standing mental illness. The medications have been so effective that longterm hospitalization is now rare. Many individuals with schizophrenia are successfully and productively integrated into the community. However, the medications bring their own problems, including the risks for abnormal movement disorders (tardive dyskinesia) or metabolic problems, including weight gain and risk for diabetes, increased blood pressure, and increased cholesterol. Medications are not the whole answer. Because of the early onset of illness for many people, they lose educational, occupational, and social opportunities. These socioeconomic consequences sometimes generate a greater burden than the illness itself. Thus, ideal treatment goes far beyond medication to include a psychosocial rehabilitative approach that provides education, job training, and social skills coaching. Sadly, the resources for these services are rarely available. Treatment is important, but prevention would be better. There are intense efforts to identify genetic and environmental factors that might predict risk, thus allowing for better understanding of causal mechanisms and opportunities for preventative intervention. There are also vigorous clinical and public education efforts to identify individuals who may be showing early signs of schizophrenia—the so-called prodromal phase. Efforts to intervene both pharmacologically and psychosocially have shown considerable promise, but longterm studies of these interventions are needed.

There has been considerable media attention to violent acts committed by mentally ill persons. Considering the vast numbers of people with mental illnesses, these events are rare, but often, they are shocking and generate much notoriety. The rate of violence is only slightly greater among the mentally ill than among the general population. When violence does occur, it almost always motivated by self-defense, but the threat perceived by the mentally ill person is delusional rather than factual. The best predictor of danger is the mentally ill individual’s own level of fear. The best strategy for defusing the threat of violence is help the person find a safe refuge from his or her stressors and fears. The old term asylum was intended to provide such benefits, but there were so many examples of poor, if not inhumane, treatment that “insane asylum” has now acquired negative connotations. However, in the original sense of the word, providing the mentally ill with a sense of safety and protection from threats both real and delusional will enhance their lives and make for safer communities. Daniel R. Hanson See also Behavioral Health; Behavioral Perspectives on Psychopathology; Brain and Nervous System: Microarchitecture; Emotional Disorders; Mood Disorders; Psychoneuroimmunology; Psychopathology and Stress; Stressors and Stress

Further Readings Fornito, A., Zalesky, A., Pantelis, C., & Bullmore, E. T. (2012). Schizophrenia, neuroimaging and connectomics. Neuroimage, 62(4), 2296–2314. Fusar-Poli, P., Bechdolf, A., Taylor, M. J., Bonoldi, I., Carpenter, W. T., Yung, A. R., & McGuire, P. (2013). At risk for schizophrenic or affective psychoses? A meta-analysis of DSM/ICD diagnostic outcomes in individuals at high clinical risk. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 39(4), 923–932. Hanson, D. R., & Gottesman, I. I. (2005). Theories of schizophrenia: A genetic-inflammatory-vascular synthesis. BMC Medical Genetics, 6(1), 7. Miller, B. J., Culpepper, N., Rapaport, M. H., & Buckley, P. (2013). Prenatal inflammation and neurodevelopment in schizophrenia: A review of

Self human studies. Progress in Neuro-Psychopharmacology and Biological Psychiatry, 42, 92–100. Laruelle, M. (2014). Schizophrenia: From dopaminergic to glutamatergic interventions. Current Opinion in Pharmacology, 14, 9–102.

Self Self is an important concept in social psychology and among the most significant discoveries in the social sciences, given its ability to draw patterns of connections between the individual and society. Although there is no universal definition of self, there have been many different social-psychological approaches to its study, ranging across sociology and psychology. Drawing on the influential symbolic interaction theory, identity theory, and selfmotivation theories (such as self-enhancement and self-verification theories), self can be defined as a stable, yet fluid entity containing self-relevant meanings (both emotional and cognitive) that subsumes multiple identities tied to social positions. Self is motivated by both self-enhancement (feeling good about oneself) and self-verification (being known or understood by others according to one’s own self-beliefs) mechanisms, and it motivates behavior through the mediation of identities. This entry describes major theories of self, examines the nature and the components of self, and demonstrates preliminary links between society and self.

Defining Self Symbolic interaction theory was the earliest socialpsychological attempt to define and explain self; it is actually a metatheoretical orientation, developed formally by Herbert Blumer in late 1960s. This theory investigates meaning making and interpretative processes in social interaction, is anchored in the collective and individual use of symbols, and gives a central role to self in human interaction and human nature. Different perspectives on self in the theory can be categorized into two approaches: (a) self as a process (the Chicago School) and (b) self as a stable unit (the Iowa School). The Chicago School (studies originally concentrated at the University of Chicago, pioneered by

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researchers such as George Herbert Mead and Robert Park) views self as reflexive, continuous, and fluid. In this view, self is constructed through a continuous process of evaluation and meaning making through social interaction. This approach provides insight into one of the most important characteristics of human beings, one that differentiates them from most other mammals—namely, self-reflexivity, or the ability to observe and reflect on oneself as an object through the eyes of others, what Charles Horton Cooley classically referred to as the “looking-glass self” at the beginning of the 20th century. The Iowa School (studies originally concentrated at the University of Iowa), in contrast, viewed self as stable, patterned, and organized, thus rendering it empirically measurable and quantifiable. This approach, pioneered by Manford Kuhn and Carl Couch, is also referred to as structuralist symbolic interactionism because of its emphasis on social structure (organized forms of social relationships and institutions). In this empirically systematic approach, self is strongly associated with social hierarchies, social roles, and status differences in society, and people report their subjective experiences of selfhood. Definitions of self further include the motivations underlying selfhood. Traditionally, there are two conflicting views of these motivations: selfverification (confirming consistent information about oneself) versus self-enhancement (the desire for positive evaluations of oneself). Research shows that although self-verification motivates cognitive evaluations (thus involving decision making and memory), self-enhancement motivates affective evaluations (involving feelings and emotions). Therefore, self can be defined as a complex structural core in the person that is both self-reflexive and fluid, motivated to enhance favorable appraisals as well as patterned and stable, motivated to verify consistent images of oneself.

Fluidity and Stability of Self The Chicago and Iowa schools of symbolic interaction theory answered the question about whether the self is stable or fluid differently, with the Chicago School highlighting the fluid process of enacting self within interactions and the Iowa School focusing on the stable, measurable aspects

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of selfhood. Although these different camps proposed seemingly contesting arguments, research since the mid-1960s has demonstrated that these premises, in fact, complement each other: Self is both fluid and stable. One of the early developers of symbolic interactionism and a major influence on the Chicago School was Cooley, who focused extensively on the reflexive character of self. In his view, people construct self in social interactions and principally through other people’s reactions (thus, the looking-glass self, where other people are mirrors for the self). Along with reflexivity, this approach also implies the continuity of the construction of self; that is, self is continuously reproduced as long as one enters social interactions. Another influential theorist of the Chicago School was Mead, who was among the first to systematically link self and society. Mead viewed self as developing throughout childhood, first with “play” (through which the child learns to take roles one at a time) and then with “game” (through which the child learns the rules of the game and takes multiple roles simultaneously). These developmental stages lead to the construction of the “generalized other,” a crucial element in the development of self whereby the child begins to see himself or herself through the eyes of his or her social community and learns the expected roles for specific situations and social positions as well as social norms. The generalized other links self to society and forms the internalization of societal codes and expectations in the child’s notion of self. Building on earlier theorizing by William James, Mead described the self as consisting of two components: “I” and “me.” The I is the active agent, making decisions on the “knife’s edge” of the present moment, and is the active subject during interaction. The me is the object, the sum of the experiences of I drawn from the evaluations that self and others have about self. Accordingly, self is developed through meaning making. It is reflexive (it can be its own object) and is a process (continuously constructed through social interaction). Other work, stemming from the Iowa School, focuses on how self consists of stable, internal representations and is related to the social structural positions one holds. Society is structured and patterned, and self reflects society. Therefore, people

define themselves in large part based on the roles they play within society. This approach also argues that self can be studied with quantitative methods. One of the first attempts to quantitatively measure self, credited to Kuhn, was the Twenty Statements Test. Respondents were asked to complete 20 statements that begin with “I am . . .” The Iowa School’s view was expanded by identity theory, which explicitly affirms patterned links between individual selves and social structure through the vital construct of identities (internalized positions held by the society). First formulated by Sheldon Stryker, identity theory also assumes that self is a stable, patterned unit that reflects social structure and argues that people strive for stable, predictable notions of themselves. Selfverification to reduce uncertainty is among a person’s most important motivations, as self tries to maintain its identities and remain stable, even if that person views himself or herself negatively.

Components of Self The key components of the social self are referred to as identities, defined as bundles of meanings linked to internalized social positions. There are three main types of identities: role, person, and social (or group). Identity theory builds on structural symbolic interactionism and approaches self as an organized structure anchored by a person’s societal roles. Thus, identity theory examines how social structure affects identity and self as well as how identity influences social structure (e.g., through identity verification, self maintains social structure). There are three major research programs within the broad identity theory umbrella. The first approach focuses on hierarchies of role identities. This approach defines identity both in terms of what “it is” and what “it is not.” At this point, these ideas have not fully cohered into a systematic, theoretical research program. The second approach is anchored in social structure and looks at the effects of social structure on identities and the salience of identities. This approach often links social roles to important outcomes such as well-being and stress in relationships. The third approach focuses on the internal dynamics of identities. This approach, called identity control theory (or cybernetic control theory) assumes that people are motivated to verify their identities.

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This happens through a control mechanism (a feedback loop) with four components: (a) perceived input from the environment, (b) the identity standard (self-relevant meanings of identity), (c) the comparator (the process that compares the identity standard with the perceived input), and (d) output (behavior as an end result of this process). Accordingly, people attempt to verify ­ their identities by influencing input through their behavior (output). The nonverification of their identities leads to stress. Thus, broader links to social structure are activated within particular situations as framed by these internalized standards. Social identity theory is the primary theory of self within the psychological tradition. It is a European theory founded by Henri Tajfel that focuses on the place of self in social relationships through the concept of social (or group) identities. According to the theory, identities are largely formed on the basis of social categorization within and across meaningful social groups. Thus, they form an important mechanism underlying intergroup relationships. People automatically categorize themselves and other people into group prototypes—that is, fuzzy sets of attributions that define a certain group or an event and can be considered as an ideal type of a group. This process of depersonalization leads people to see others not as distinct individuals but rather as representatives of social groups. Social categorization of people into prototypes accentuates the differences between groups and minimizes the differences within group, possibly leading to intergroup conflict and prejudice. Social identity theory argues that self-enhancement is at the core of intergroup prejudice and, linked with the ubiquitous process of social categorization, leads to higher self-esteem and motivates intergroup prejudice. The theory focuses on various intergroup phenomena, including altruism, prejudice, conformity, and discrimination, with surveys and experiments as main methods of inquiry. Although both identity theory and social identity theory investigate the identity–social structure relationship, the two theories rarely interact with each other. Identity theory criticizes social identity theory for not giving enough emphasis to cognitive structures and processes. In turn, social identity theory criticizes identity theory for not taking into account the heterogeneity of social identities (i.e.,

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not all social identities are categorical) and that self-esteem does not account for all intergroup conflict.

The Self–Society Link Social scientists have long demonstrated that self is deeply interconnected with society and is anchored in processes of social class, sex role socialization, life transitions (i.e., marriage or employment), modernization, and urbanization. Values form an anchor for personal identity, the most individual level of selfhood. Values can be defined as transsituational, intrinsic end goals that motivate behavior and are the core of self. Empirical studies demonstrate the patterned effects of social structure (such as social class or gender) on values, most famously how parental social class and type of occupation lead to parents valuing self-direction (independent thought and initiative), which, in turn, influences children’s self-direction values. Specifically, being in an advantageous occupation or class that provides flexible and complex work opportunities also facilitates values prioritizing intellectual flexibility and independent judgment in parents and their children, who then seek similar occupations for themselves. Two further concepts are implicated in a discussion of self–society link. The concept of selfesteem, first developed by Morris Rosenberg in 1960s, is an overall global evaluation of one’s own self-worth and has been a major concept in investigations of the effects of society on self (e.g., the role of gender differences in self-esteem). Rosenberg and his colleagues later subdivided self-esteem into specific and global forms. Specific self-esteem derives from specific domains of self, and global self-esteem refers to how a person feels about himself or herself as a whole. Selfefficacy is another important concept defined as one’s self-evaluation of the capacity to exert influence through action. Self-efficacy also ties the self-concept to social structure, especially social class. Rengin B. Firat and Steven Hitlin See also Culture and Social Relations; Human Agency; Personality Development; Self-Esteem; Social Role Theory; Values

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Further Readings Cooley, C. H. (1992). Human nature and the social order. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction. (Original work published 1902) Howard, J. (2000). The social psychology of identities. Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 367–393. Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Owens, T. J., Robinson, D. T., & Smith-Lovin, L. (2010). Three faces of identity. Sociology, 36(1), 477–499. Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33–47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Self-Control Many people feel that they do not have self-control. They do not save enough, do not study hard enough, smoke too much, drink too much, gamble too much, have too much unsafe sex, and so forth. These are important practical problems. The purpose of this entry is to help the reader understand and reformulate such practical problems. It considers two views of what it means to exert self-control: first, an internal view leading to modern neurocognitive psychology and, second, an external view leading to modern behavioral psychology.

The Internal View of Willpower There seems to be a class of objects on earth—animals—that do not behave as machines behave. The very essence of animal movement (human and nonhuman) seems to be beyond prediction. Whereas stones and blocks of wood are moved by outside forces, the movement of animals apparently originates from inside them. Faced with this problem, the Renaissance philosopher and mathematician Rene Descartes reasoned as follows: If he could conceive of animals as machines, what was known about machines could then be applied to animals. The English physician William Harvey had shown that the heart works like a pump, circulating the blood. The science of anatomy had progressed to the point where muscular movement could be seen as

causing limb movement. It seemed to Descartes that the nerves must somehow transfer signals from the brain to the muscles. An outer stimulus enters the body through the sense organs and opens a valve that allows “animal spirits” to flow into the muscles, causing movement (behavior). The behavior of nonhuman animals is entirely determined by this stimulation and response. But according to Descartes, humans have another way to move. Inside each human being is a soul that contains his or her concepts, reason, and will. Nonhuman animals have no willpower, Descartes claimed, but they need none. The mechanical action of their animal spirits serves them in the context of their natural environments. A nonhuman animal can never be “tempted,” according to Descartes, because what it wants to do at the moment is exactly what it should do. Some people feel that such a state would be ideal for human beings too, a return to Eden. But as philosophers have pointed out since ancient times, the first function of the human power to reason, that power valued so highly, is meant to help humans resist temptation. Without that function, reason would never have evolved (or been given by God). Imagine being at a dinner party and already having drunk two glasses of wine. The host insists on a third glass. If left to itself, Descartes would have said, the mechanism inside will move the hand holding the glass out to receive the wine, will lift the glass to the lips, and will move the tongue to swallow the wine, perhaps even without the soul even knowing it. But if the other hand is moved to cover up the glass before the wine enters it, the power of the will is doing the moving, controlling the nerves and muscles. The soul, sitting in the control room of the brain, isolated from the outside world (but helped by a vast store of innate ideas, together with an innate rationality) reads the eddies and swirls of the animal spirits for signs of what is going on in the outside world. Once it has developed a picture of the world, the soul gets the body into motion by reaching down and, for good or evil, countermanding the valve settings caused by bodily stimuli and environmental stimuli acting through the sense organs. When their souls fail to exert control (i.e., when self-control fails) people act impulsively under the

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sway of the immediate stimulus. Willpower thus has a literal interpretation in Descartes’ model— the power of souls to wrest control of behavior away from the outside world. This is how Descartes tried to reconcile the religious view of the soul as an immortal spiritual entity, a repository of good and evil, with a mechanical vision of bodily movement. The way modern neurocognitive psychology views the action of the will is a great improvement over Descartes’ conception, especially in how messages get from brains to muscles and where in brains various messages go to and come from. Information entering the cognitive system, located in the upper brain, combines with “declarative memory” located in the midbrain (perhaps the hippocampus) and forms ideas about the world. These ideas combine, in turn, with messages coming up from the lower brain, where emotions are being processed, and form purposes. The purposes then travel back down, countermanding or augmenting stimuli entering the lower brain, and finally result in behavior.

The External View of Willpower There is a gym with a swimming pool less than a block away from Howard’s house. He has paid for the use of this pool and would like to swim for about 30 minutes per day on days when he is home. Swimming is a good and generally enjoyable exercise for him. Moreover, once he has done it, it improves his mood; he feels better. But he finds it exceedingly difficult to actually do it. It takes him about 10 minutes to collect his gym bag, get over to the pool, get undressed, put on his bathing suit and slippers, collect his towel, goggles, and nose clip, go up one flight of stairs, wave to the lifeguard, get into the shallow end of the pool, put on his goggles and nose clip, and start swimming. Those 10 minutes, involving getting chilly and wet, are rather unpleasant, even painful, Howard would say, especially in the winter. Although, once he starts swimming, he is not even remotely tempted to stop before the 30 minutes are up (and, when he finishes, he always feels good), he often “forgets” to go or puts off going until something comes up to take up his time. Howard’s problem is getting over those first 10 minutes. For one thing, they have to come

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before rather than after the swimming. And just as crucially, during the 30 minutes of the swim, and even afterward, there exists no event that comes close to being enjoyable enough to balance the chill and wetness he has to go through beforehand. In fact, if he adds up the positive values of all the events that compose the swim and its immediate aftereffects, they still do not counterbalance the unpleasantness of getting into the water and starting to swim. Importantly, the thing about swimming that can tip the scales in its favor is not to be found in any brief event but rather in the pattern of the swim as a whole (in its gestalt, or form) and, more globally, in Howard’s habit of swimming. In general, he will be a happier person if he swims two or three times a week. It is important to distinguish two senses in which swimming makes Howard happy. First, it improves his mood. It creates a feeling of well-being. But this is not enough. Of more consequence is that Howard’s swimming is a component of his happiness. The relation between his happiness (such as it is) and swimming is not simply instrumental; it is not like that between salary and work. They are two separate things. But Howard’s swimming is not a separate thing from his happiness. It is a component of his happiness— something that far outweighs a brief, chilly, and wet experience. What holds for swimming holds even more strongly for what Sigmund Freud claimed are the essential components of a happy life—work and love. Work may be said to be “reinforced” by a person’s salary. But work is also reinforced intrinsically by its pattern and its role in the worker’s life. Writer’s block, the apparently insurmountable difficulty many writers have of starting to write, is nothing but Howard’s difficulty in starting to swim writ large. A writer who once begins to write can keep going. But the first hour’s worth of writing is hard work. Something must be created out of nothing. There is no pleasure to be found in any single hour of writing that can compensate for the pain of getting started. So pencils are sharpened, the desk is cleared, and the writing never gets done. The essential rewards of writing (like those of any meaningful work) lie not in the accumulated instants of writing, but in the pattern of writing

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itself and in the role of writing in the pattern of the writer’s life. To say that over a certain period of time or in a certain context, (a) John is behaving rationally (or his mind is in control of his behavior) and (b) John’s pattern of behavior is valuable or desirable, is to say the very same thing in two ways. Just as what seems rational over a short period of time or in one context may seem totally irrational in another, so a relatively valuable pattern of behavior over one time period or in one context may be relatively worthless in another.

Hard Commitment Consider the lament of Archie Goodwin (Nero Wolfe’s sidekick in Rex Stout’s series of detective stories): “The trouble with an alarm clock is that what seems sensible when you set it seems absurd when it goes off” (from The Rodeo Murders). Goodwin’s lament exemplifies simple ambivalence—simple, because there are clearly predictable time periods when he prefers one alternative (waking up early) and when he prefers the other (staying in bed). The alarm clock is a hard-commitment device. At midnight it “seems sensible” to Goodwin to sleep 7 hours, get up at 7 a.m., and put in a full day of legwork for his boss, Nero Wolfe. But when the alarm goes off the next morning, the remainder of the patterns between which he had chosen the night before have suddenly reversed in value. What was chosen before is now rejected, and what was rejected before is now chosen. At this point, when the alarm rings, the choice Goodwin made last night “seems absurd.” Having set the alarm clock the night before (and assuming he put it across the room so he has to get out of bed to turn it off) allows Goodwin to choose again the next morning whether to get up or to go back to sleep. But there are few instances in everyday life where preferences change so quickly and completely. And there are few devices like alarm clocks by which to commit to earlier (and, ultimately, more sensible) preferences. Much more common is the sort of vague situations of the dieter, always wanting to lose weight (with the promise of improved health and social acceptance) and, at the same time, always liking to have something to eat.

Complex Ambivalence and Soft Commitment When Goodwin sets his alarm clock at night for 7 a.m., he is not tempted to sleep until noon. In effect, he stands outside of his next morning’s self. That is, he has a platform from which he can launch his commitment. But the dieter has no platform; he or she is always tempted. The dieter is never free of the desire for food except perhaps for a brief period after a binge. The dieter is continuously beset by ambivalence, eating for a period and abstaining for a period but, even when abstaining, being tempted to eat. This pattern is complex ambivalence. It is unlike simple ambivalence because it is not easily avoided with hard-commitment devices, which are effective only if put in force immediately and maintained indefinitely. The contrast between good health and social acceptance on the one hand and eating a whole pint of ice cream on the other hand is that of a temporally extended event to a temporally discrete event—of an abstract pattern of behavior to a particular act. This sort of conflict, between abstract and particular, may be difficult to grasp. Imagine a snippet of film that shows a man swinging a hammer. But what is he actually doing? Now consider the following alternative descriptions of what the man is doing: a. Swinging a hammer b. Hammering a nail c. Joining one piece of wood to another d. Building a floor e. Building a house f. Providing shelter for his family g. Supporting his family h. Being a good husband and father i. Being a good person

All may be valid descriptions of his behavior. Based on the snippet of film, all one can say is that the man is swinging the hammer. He might have been swinging it at someone’s head. But if one said, “He’s just swinging the hammer,” someone else who saw more of the film might say, “Yes, he’s

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doing that, but what he’s really doing is hammering a nail.” A third person who has seen still more of the film might then correct the second in a similar way: “Yes, he’s hammering a nail, but what he’s really doing is building a floor.” And so forth until there is a Godlike observer who has sat through a film of virtually the man’s entire life and can make the final judgment: “He’s being a good person.” The important point is that all the descriptions, running from top to bottom, are descriptions of the man’s behavior. As one goes down the list, more and more context is incorporated into the description. But that context is always behavioral. The final Godlike observer need not look into the man’s heart as long as he or she has looked at the complete film of the man’s life. Then the observer can say “He is a good man” without fear of contradiction and regardless of the state of the man’s heart. The validity of any description may be settled by moving the camera back or showing more film so as to capture earlier and later events. Some behavioral patterns are difficult to interrupt. Consider the act of listening to a 3-minute song. People typically do not like to be interrupted in that act, and the closer to the end of the song, the more unpleasant interruption becomes. That is, as a person gets absorbed in a TV program, a play, or a concert, interruption becomes more costly. Because long-duration activities attain their value by virtue of their organization (their pattern, their gestalt), interrupting them degrades the value of the whole and not just the value of the part during and after the point of interruption. If the film breaks during the 95th minute of a 100-minute suspense movie, and the rest of the movie is cancelled, it is fair to say the viewer would not be 95% as happy as when the film did not break. When there is a pattern of behavior and its interruption is costly, a person may commit to its completion. This is soft commitment—soft because there is always a way out. That is, the pattern is always interruptible. But it is also commitment, because its interruption is costly. In economics, there is a concept known as sunk costs. They are essentially investments made in a project in the past. When considering whether to make future investments one should, according to economics, ignore sunk costs. For example, it takes about 5 years between the architectural conception

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and the completion of a large commercial building. Suppose that during the fourth year, when the frame of the building is already up, the costs of completion suddenly escalate, and the real-estate market collapses. Should the building be abandoned? Well, yes, if the problem is simply as stated. But there may be other factors to consider. If the uncompleted building will stand out like a sore thumb, and if the builder plans on continuing to do business in that city, then perhaps it is worth completing the building. Otherwise, potential investors in future buildings might worry about their investments being lost and instead put their money with another builder who “foolishly” finishes every project regardless of current conditions. In other words, sunk costs in a narrow context may not be so “sunk” when the context is expanded. Soft commitment adds “weight” to any instance of behavior. It focuses attention on the behavior’s long-term consequences. Consider the person who keeps a supply of chocolate fudge bars in the freezer and is in the habit of eating one or two of them every night. Or consider the person who is in the habit of having two or three glasses of scotch every night before going to sleep. Suppose the person adopts the following rule: However many fudge bars (or scotches) I have tonight, I will have an equal number each night for the rest of the week. Without the rule’s adoption, each fudge bar (or scotch) consumed tonight would entail only its own consequences and could be, in theory, the last one ever consumed. With the rule’s adoption, each fudge bar or scotch is, in effect, 7 of them strung out in time. No longer is it possible to say, “Just this once.” The pleasures of consumption are no longer restricted to the moment but extended in time and, therefore, more easily compared with future disadvantages. In other words, the decision to eat the fudge bar or drink the scotch has been given weight.

Soft Commitment and Happiness Italo Calvino, in his essay titled “Lightness” in Six Memos for The Next Millennium, quotes poet Paul Valéry: “One should be light like a bird, and not like a feather.” In other words, Valéry advocates a directed lightness, a lightness of thought rather than a lightness of whim. In life, Calvino and Valéry imply, one needs to be spontaneous but only

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in the context of some framework that allows one to attain higher levels of spontaneity. A feather is a slave to the wind, but a bird uses the wind. A happy life will strike the right balance between lightness and heaviness. Soft commitment enables reaching that sort of balance. Howard Rachlin See also Addiction; Behavioral Perspectives on Psychopathology; Human Agency; Law of Effect; Operant Conditioning; Reasoning and Decision Making; Reinforcement; Self; Self-Determination; Skinner’s Legacy; Stimulus Control

Further Readings Ainslie, G. (2001). Breakdown of will. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Baumeister, R., & Tierny, J. (2011). Willpower: Rediscovering the greatest human strength. New York, NY: Penguin Books. Rachlin, H. (2000). The science of self-control. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Self-Determination Although the influence of external (extrinsic) factors on behavior is undeniable, in many cases, behavior appears to proceed without external influence or even in spite of it. Psychologists frequently are interested in the influence of internal (intrinsic) factors as well, especially in cases where those factors seem to exert the dominant influence on behavior. Such influence is captured by the concept of self and is related to self as the origin of one’s actions—that is, to the self-determination of action. This entry ­provides an overview of scholarly thinking about self-determination, including descriptions of the self-determination exhibited by well-known historical figures, a brief discussion of three moral theories, and summaries of four empirical ­theories—a biological theory, a psychological theory, a behavior theory, and an ecological theory. The first notable example of self-determination is the legendary Genghis Khan, who rose from poverty to command the largest land empire in history. In 1800s, Thomas Edison quit school at the age of 7, became deaf in his teens, and then persisted with

his electrical interests by testing 10,000 light devices before finding one that ultimately would light up the country. Horatio Alger, a children’s author in the same period, wrote books about poor children succeeding with little more than desire, self-determination, and hard work. In the 1890s, iron-and-steel titan Andrew Carnegie, a rags-to-riches success, commissioned Napoleon Hill, advisor to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, to find out how someone could start out with so little end up with so much wealth. Hill responded by interviewing hundreds of rich and famous individuals in that generation and found that the super successful shared a definite goal, sufficient determination to attain it, practical plans to reach it, the necessary specialized knowledge, and the persistence to carry out the plans. In a word, they were all self-determined.

Forerunner Theories Today, success stories such as the foregoing are central to moral arguments about who deserves what and how much in life. Many believe that people are entitled to keep all that they can earn and accumulate. An outline of Robert Nozick’s entitlement theory follows. Parenthetical phrases have been added to illustrate each point. Entitlement theory asserts the following: a. People are entitled to their natural assets. (I can tap dance, so it is a natural asset, and I am entitled to it.) b. If people are entitled to something, they are entitled to whatever flows from it. (I am entitled to keep what I earn by tap dancing.) c. People’s holdings flow from their natural assets. (My holdings consist of money that I earned by tap dancing.) d. Consequently, people are entitled to their holdings. (I deserve to keep my earnings from tap dancing.)

Among the consequences of this theory is the absence of a social safety net for consistently failing at one’s pursuits. John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness addresses this omission. According to his theory, everyone is entitled to the full battery of basic liberties, and any social and economic

Self-Determination

inequalities that develop are to be rearranged for everyone’s benefit. Justice as fairness argues theory argues the following: a. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive, basic liberty compatible with similar liberty for others. b. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (1) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage and (2) attached to positions and offices open to all.

Group Self-Determination Examples of group self-determination are the women’s rights movement that began in 1848 and includes the Nineteenth Amendment, ratified in 1920, the civil rights movement that began in 1857 and includes with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the disability rights movement that began in 1960 and includes the Americans with Disabilities Act. The first empowered women to vote, and the other two prohibited discrimination based on race or ethnicity and disability, among other achievements. Dennis Mithaug’s equal opportunity theory summarizes the moral claims of these historical movements by asserting that limitations in either the capacity or the opportunities to self-determine justify positive interventions to equalize that capacity or those opportunities for all who may have less than a fair chance to control their own lives. Equal Opportunity Theory a. All individuals have the right to selfdetermination. b. All societies have some individuals who lack the capacity to self-determine. c. All societies generate unequal opportunities to self-determine. d. Consequently, some individuals do not exercise the right to self-determine because they lack the capacity or the opportunity (or both) to do so. e. Therefore, all societies should optimize prospects for self-determination among their less advantaged members by increasing their capacity and improving their opportunities for self-determination.

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Empirical Theories of Self-Determination The theories explaining how self-determination functions in humans generally have identified important biological, psychological, behavioral, and ecological factors. A biologically based theory of self-determination might claim that intrinsic motivation is responsible for the basic level of self-determination. A psychological theory might assert that cognitive factors affect the prospects for self-determination. A behavioral theory might argue that a combination of psychological and self-regulatory factors affects the development and expression of self-determination. An ecological theory might claim that specific combinations of environmental factors support or discourage self-determination. Biological Factors

Researchers Edward Deci and Richard Ryan argue that the biological basis of self-determination is intrinsic motivation, which, in turn, affects a person’s health and well-being. They also argue that environmental circumstances can positively affect expressions of self-determination, particularly when those circumstances include social and cultural settings that support individual autonomy, competence, and relatedness. The following summary of their five theoretical propositions captures the argument: 1. The more the environment supports competence and autonomy, the more likely intrinsic motivation becomes. 2. With more intrinsic motivation, the more autonomous the person will be. 3. There are three types of behavioral orientation: the autonomy orientation in which the person acts out of interest in and valuing what is occurring; the control orientation in which the focus is on rewards, gains, and approval; and the impersonal or motivated orientation characterized by anxiety concerning one’s competence. 4. The more the autonomy, competence, and relatedness, the more likely psychological wellbeing and optimal functioning become. 5. The less extrinsic and more intrinsic one’s goals and goal pursuits become, the more likely one’s wellness and general well-being become.

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Psychological Factors

Michael Wehmeyer has identified four characteristics of individuals that account for various expressions of self-determination: self-regulation, psychological empowerment, confidence, and selfrealization. He also identified factors correlated with those characteristics—namely, choice making, decision making, problem solving, goal setting and attainment, self-monitoring, self-evaluation, self-instruction and self-reinforcement skills, selfadvocacy, leadership skills, an internal locus of control, perceptions of self-efficacy and positive outcome expectations, and self-awareness and self-knowledge. Behavioral Factors

Mithaug and his associates constructed a selfdetermined learning theory to explain how two specific sets of factors interact to affect learning and adjustment over time: the opportunity to produce a favorable outcome and the self-regulation of expectations, choices, actions, and results to produce a desirable end. The theory’s propositions are as follows: a. The closer to optimal that the opportunities for learning become, the more likely the regulation of expectations, choices, and actions are to produce learning gains. b. The more often the regulation of expectations, choices, and actions produce learning gains, the more likely it is that learning will become adaptive, rational, efficient, and successful. c. The closer to optimal that learning opportunities become, engagement in learning becomes more persistent, the feeling of control over one’s learning increases, and the closer adaptation moves to optimal levels.

Ecological Factors

Research by Roger Stancliffe and Brian Abery offers support for an ecological theory that explains why episodes of self-determination occur, are maintained, and disappear across environments and over time. The three-factor theory focuses on skills, attitudes, and knowledge as already identified by previous theories. The critical skills are choice making, goal setting, problem solving,

self-regulation, personal advocacy, sociality, communication, and community living. The critical attitudes are locus of control, self-esteem, selfconfidence, determination, and being valued by others. The critical knowledge is about resources, the political system (laws, rights, and responsibilities), perceived options, and self-awareness. Dennis E. Mithaug See also Achievement Motivation; Human Agency; Humanistic Theories of Psychopathology; Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation; Intelligence and Individualism; Self; Self-Control; Self-Esteem

Further Readings Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. (1985). Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behavior. New York, NY: Plenum Press. Mithaug, D. E. (1996). Equal opportunity theory. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Mithaug, D. E, Mithaug, D. K., Agran, M., Martin, J. E., & Wehmeyer, M. (2003). Self-determined learning theory: Construction, verification, and evaluation. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Stancliffe, R. J., & Abery, B. H. (2003). The ecological model of self-determination: Assessments, curricula, and implications. In M. L. Wehmeyer, B. H. Abery, D. E. Mithaug, & R. J. Stancliffe (Eds.). Theory in selfdetermination foundations for educational practice (pp. 221–248). Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas. Wehmeyer, M. L. (2003). A functional theory of selfdetermination: Model overview. In M. L. Wehmeyer, B. H. Abery, D. E. Mithaug, & R. J. Stancliffe (Eds.), Theory in self-determination: Foundations for educational practice (pp. 182–201). Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas.

Self-Esteem Self-esteem is how much value a person places on himself or herself. Related to self-concept, or what one knows about the self, self-esteem is an emotional evaluation of that knowledge—how one feels about the self. High self-esteem refers to an overall positive self-evaluation, and low self-esteem to an overall negative self-evaluation. Self-esteem does not refer to any objective measurement of

Self-Esteem

worth and need not be related to an accurate sense of one’s worth or the level of worth assigned by others. A person with high self-esteem may have an accurate sense of his or her high level of competence and positive qualities or may have an overinflated sense of his or her mediocre abilities. A person with low self-esteem may rightly perceive his or her lack of abilities or positive qualities or may underappreciate his or her positive qualities. That is, self-esteem is a subjective assessment. It is one of the most researched topics in psychology and an area of inquiry in which nonpsychologists show great interest. This entry includes the ways in which researchers measure self-esteem, the differences between trait and state self-esteem, and the ways in which self-esteem varies across cultures.

Measuring Self-Esteem Self-esteem can be measured explicitly by directly asking an individual about his or her self-worth or implicitly by assessing self-esteem without directly asking the individual to provide the assessment. Explicit self-esteem is typically measured using self-report scales—for example, by asking people how much they agree with statements such as “I take a positive attitude toward myself ” (indicative of high self-esteem) or “All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure” (indicative of low selfesteem). Implicit measures of self-esteem attempt to bypass asking people about their self-evaluations directly. One such measure records how long it takes people to press a key on a computer keyboard when selecting positive words to associate with oneself. Faster responses are assumed to indicate higher self-esteem. Other studies find that people with higher self-esteem express greater preference for the letters in their name or the numbers in their birthday than people with low self-esteem do. Self-esteem exists at both the trait level and the state level. Trait level self-esteem refers to a person’s average or typical level of self-esteem. State self-esteem refers to the fluctuations in self-esteem that a person experiences across time. Though state selfesteem may be higher for one person on some days than on others, the person’s trait self-esteem holds

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steady. Trait and state self-esteem have different effects and implications.

Trait Self-Esteem and the Self-Esteem Movement Many psychologists have long assumed that high self-esteem is critical to proper psychological functioning, even describing it as a fundamental human need. Abraham Maslow included self-esteem in his hierarchy of human needs, theorizing that without it, humans are unable to achieve ­self-actualization— that is, the realization of their full potential. Several psychological theories propose explanations for why self-esteem is essential. Sociometer theory suggests that self-esteem serves as a gauge of acceptance and prestige in one’s social group. Group acceptance is critical for survival, both during humans’ evolutionary past (when surviving harsh conditions of scarcity required banding together with other humans) and in modern times. Self-esteem, according to sociometer theory, evolved to alert people as to whether or not they are fitting in as desirable group members. High self-esteem indicates that one is doing so, and low self-esteem warns that one better change his or her behavior or risk ostracism and rejection. An alternative psychological theory, terror management theory, suggests that self-esteem provides a buffer against the anxieties caused by people’s awareness of their own mortality. It holds that people fear death less if they endorse an organized worldview. People have high self-esteem to the extent that they believe they are living up to the expectations proposed by that worldview but low self-esteem to the extent that they fall short of those expectations. In the 1980s, psychologists, educators, and others voiced concern that Americans (particularly young people) suffered from an epidemic of low self-esteem responsible for many personal and societal woes. Out of this concern emerged what came to be known as the self-esteem movement. Proponents of the movement believed that raising self-esteem would lead to positive outcomes for individuals and society as a whole. These positive outcomes included improved academic and work performance, fewer destructive behaviors (such as drug use, risky sexual behaviors, and eating disorders), and better interpersonal relationships.

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Educational systems and a flourishing self-help industry attempted to raise self-esteem through various interventions that encouraged people to focus on their positive qualities. Tasks such as “I love me” lessons became part of school curriculum as children were encouraged to complete the phrase “I am . . .” with a positive word such as beautiful or smart. The self-esteem movement ran into trouble when scientific evidence failed to support some of its core assumptions. Decades of psychological research indicate that low self-esteem is not rampant and is, in fact, relatively uncommon (i.e., most people have fairly high self-esteem). Furthermore, research shows that self-esteem is either very weakly or not at all associated with positive outcomes. Self-esteem has no bearing on relationship quality or tendency to engage in risky health behaviors and is only weakly associated with good academic and job performance. High trait self-esteem is associated with one major benefit: People with high self-esteem report feeling happier and less depressed than those with low self-esteem. It is important to note, however, that research does not demonstrate that high self-esteem causes greater feelings of happiness or modest benefits to academic and job performance. It is also possible that feeling happy or getting good grades may cause people to have higher self-esteem rather than high self-esteem causing good grades or happiness.

State Self-Esteem and the Pursuit of Self-Esteem Boosts Whereas trait self-esteem assesses how people feel about themselves generally across time, state selfesteem measures how people feel about themselves at a specific point in time. Scales that measures state self-esteem ask people how they feel “right now” or “today,” and responses can fluctuate dramatically. These fluctuations indicate that people’s self-esteem changes depending on the events they experience and the feedback they receive. The fact that self-esteem can change motivates people to boost their self-esteem by demonstrating their value where they feel likely to excel. Because people cannot succeed everywhere, individuals instead derive their self-esteem from one or two endeavors, such as academics, appearance, or

athletics. People feel worthy and valuable if they succeed in these endeavors but feel worthless if they fail. For example, a student whose self-esteem is contingent on academic success experiences a boost in self-esteem when he or she does well on an exam but experiences a drop in self-esteem, with accompanying feelings of anxiety and shame, when he or she does poorly on an exam. These fluctuations are experienced unequally—that is, the lows that people experience following failure or rejection ­ tend to be more extreme than the highs that people experience following success or acceptance. People engage in various behaviors, some of them maladaptive, in an attempt to attain, maintain, or restore high self-esteem, a process called self-enhancement, including avoiding situations where they anticipate failure. When people avoid challenges, they may miss out on opportunities to improve their skills because they are afraid of the consequences for their self-esteem if they fail. The effort to self-enhance leads people to evaluate ­feedback about the self in a biased manner. In addition to avoiding situations that threaten to provide negative feedback, people tend to ­discount negative feedback when they do get it, evaluating such feedback as invalid, irrelevant, or unreliable. Efforts to protect self-esteem from dropping and to pursue self-esteem boosts sometimes have negative consequences for interpersonal relationships. People involved in the pursuit of self-esteem boosts can be so preoccupied with ­questions of their own worth and value that they downplay the needs and desires of those around them, instead viewing friends, family, and romantic partners primarily as potential sources of validation or invalidation. Threats to self-esteem can also lead people to stereotype out-group members because such devaluing can restore damaged self-esteem.

Self-Esteem and Culture Some psychologists suggest that there is a universal desire for high self-esteem, but others argue that this desire is a Western phenomenon. Most of the research on self-esteem has been conducted in Western countries, which are generally more individualistic in that people tend to define the self as distinct and autonomous from others. Culture researchers argue that many self-esteem research findings may not apply to those in collectivistic

Semantics, Psychology of

cultures, which tend to define the self in relation to others. Cross-cultural studies that compare average self-esteem scores in different nations have found that nearly all nations score above the theoretical midpoint of self-esteem scales, indicating that the tendency for high rather than low selfesteem appears to be universal. However, such studies also reveal important differences in self-esteem scores across cultures— specifically, that average scores are higher in individualistic cultures than collectivistic ones. One explanation for this difference is that people from collectivistic cultures value modesty and respond to self-esteem surveys by claiming that their selfesteem is lower than it really is. Studies showing that people from a collectivistic culture (Japan) express self-criticism on explicit measures but high self-esteem on implicit measures provide some support for this explanation. Another potential explanation is that people from collectivistic cultures derive self-worth differently than do those from individualistic cultures do. Although those from individualistic cultures tend to draw self-worth from personal accomplishments, qualities, and capabilities, those from collectivistic cultures are more likely to draw self-worth from harmony in relationships, group belonging, and the fulfillment of roles and duties. Some psychologists suggest that self-esteem is divided into two components, self-competence and self-liking, which capture the bases of self-worth in individualistic and collectivistic cultures respectively. Self-competence involves feeling that one is confident, capable, and efficacious, whereas self-liking involves feeling that one is good, socially relevant, and in harmonious relationships. Some psychologists have proposed a trade-off hypothesis in which individualistic cultures nurture feelings of selfcompetence at the expense of self-liking, but collectivistic cultures nurture self-liking at the expense of self-competence. This hypothesis is supported by studies showing that people report higher selfcompetence in individualistic cultures but higher self-liking in collectivistic cultures. Still others suggest that self-esteem is simply not a relevant concept in many collectivistic cultures. According to this perspective, whereas individualistic cultures endorse a focus on self-enhancement, or the ways in which a person may consider himself or herself “good,” collectivistic cultures endorse

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a focus on self-criticism, or the ways in which one makes himself or herself better by more effectively living up to cultural standards. Jessica J. Carnevale See also Culture and Dialogical Self; Motivation and Personality; Needs; Self; Self-Determination; Social Motives; Terror Management Theory

Further Readings Baumeister, R. F., Campbell, J. D., Krueger, J. I., & Vohs, K. D. (2003). Does high self-esteem cause better performance, interpersonal success, happiness, or healthier lifestyles? Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 4(1), 1–44. Crocker, J., & Park, L. E. (2004). The costly pursuit of self-esteem. Psychological Bulletin, 130, 392–414. Fein, S., & Spencer, S. J. (1997). Prejudice as self-image maintenance: Affirming the self through derogating others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 31–44. Heine, S. J., Lehman, D. R., Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1999). Is there a universal need for positive selfregard? Psychological Review, 106, 766–795. Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Arndt, J., & Schimel, J. (2004). Why do people need self-esteem? A theoretical and empirical review. Psychological Bulletin, 130, 435–468.

Semantics, Psychology

of

Semantics refers to the significance of language, how it communicates information and picks out events in the world. When someone says, “That dog is funny,” the person means to refer to a particular kind of object and to ascribe a particular property to it. Understanding what kind of object and property the speaker referred to is what it means to grasp the semantics of the sentence. Semantics is a large topic in cognitive science. This entry focuses on a single aspect, the psychological representation of the semantics of individual words.

Psychological Theories In philosophy and linguistics, theories of semantics tend to focus on how words relate to the world.

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This is the extensional approach. The word dog is said to have a meaning corresponding to the set of things that could be called dog, which is a very large set, as dogs continue to be born and will probably do so indefinitely. That set of dogs is called the word’s extension. The advantage of this theory is that it is clear what sentences refer to, which makes it easy to see whether they are true or false. If the dog referred to is not in the set of funny things, then the sentence “That dog is funny” is false. This is the kind of issue that is important to philosophers. Psychological theories do not take this approach, because people do not have direct contact with those sets of objects. Although speakers know the meaning of dog, they haven’t seen all the dogs in the world, nor is there a set of dogs in their heads that tells them when to use this word. Instead, psychology takes a descriptive approach to word meaning: The meaning is some kind of mental description of what dogs are like. With this description in one’s head, it is possible to identify dogs when one encounters them or to ask about dogs when they aren’t around. Thus, the word dog is used when it is appropriate to do so. The best evidence suggests that these mental descriptions are based on concepts and general knowledge of the world. That is, people know a lot of things about dogs, and their language gives them access to those things through the word dog. However, there is another constraint that must be kept in mind—namely, the fact that speakers must agree on what words mean. For example, if one person means a four-legged, barking animal but someone else means a small, eight-legged animal that spins webs, then the two people will not successfully communicate. When one says “I stepped on a dog,” the other will not correctly understand. Thus, an important part of semantics is having conventions that establish what words mean. People generally use words the way the broader community uses them, and there are tools, such as dictionaries, to help speakers coordinate their uses. Thus, although psychologists study what is inside people’s heads when they use language, this doesn’t mean that every individual can decide what a word means on his or her own. The language community together decides. The psychological aspect of word meaning focuses on mental description, but there is another approach that focuses on the

conventions that language users agree to follow. The conventional approach and the descriptive approach, therefore, are not competing theories but complementary parts of a complete explanation of word meaning.

Approaches to the Study of Word Meaning Within the descriptive approach, many researchers relate word meanings to concepts, and there are many connections between phenomena in the psychology of concepts and those in the psychology of word meaning. A popular way of representing word meanings is in terms of simpler features. The meaning of dog might be in terms of features such as “has legs, has fur, eats meat, chases cars, barks,” and so on. Similar words have some of the same features. For example, cat and dog share many features (“has legs, eats meat,” etc.). This helps explain why people make errors among similar words. In referring to someone’s dog, it wouldn’t be bizarre if someone called it a cat by mistake, because of the shared features. But it would be bizarre if someone called it a surgery or a truck by mistake. However, features are not sufficient to explain meaning, because many words are relational. Verbs are the most prominent example. The word eat refers to an event in which an agent consumes an object. The event can’t be described without including the agent and object. Typically, this occurs using an argument structure like the following: Eat (agent, object) = the agent takes the object into its body via its mouth.

However, even this is not sufficient, because sometimes the verb eat occurs without an object (as in “I haven’t eaten yet”). Thus, there must be another argument structure: Eat (agent) = the agent takes something into its body via its mouth.

Because of this added complexity, verbs are often more difficult to learn than nouns. A different approach to word meaning attempts to account for it in terms of statistical relations

Sensory Disorders

between words. For example, an analysis of texts might show that the word eat co-occurs with words such as food, napkin, fork, hamburger, hungry, and teeth. These relations between words could represent the word’s meaning. Computer programs that represent meaning this way have been somewhat successful in understanding texts, as measured by their ability to answer multiplechoice questions about them. However, as theories of psychological semantics, the text-based approaches fall short. The problem is that knowing what other words cooccur with a target word doesn’t indicate what the target word means. Does the word eat refer to the action of eating or to the presence of food on a plate or to the sensation one gets from consuming food? The words correlated with eat don’t narrow the meaning enough to explain when and how to use this word and how it differs from other words, such as taste or chew. Furthermore, if eat is defined by its relation to words such as food, napkin, and hungry, and those words are defined by their relation to other words, and those other words are defined by their relations to still other words, the result is a web of words that is no longer connected to the world that contains the original referent. In contrast, the mental description approach indicates what the word refers to by relating it to conceptual knowledge. Finally, the text-based approach has no account of how children learn word meanings. It seems as if they must learn food, napkin, hungry, and so on, in order to learn the meaning of eat. But this is not possible when children learn their first words. Gregory L. Murphy See also Communication and Language; Concepts and Language; Culture and the Dialogical Self; Language Development; Language Disorders; Language, Evolution of; Language, Interaction, and Culture; Perception and Language

Further Readings Bloom, P. (2000). How children learn the meanings of words. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chierchia, G., & McConnell-Ginet, S. (1990). Meaning and grammar: An introduction to semantics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

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Malt, B. C., Sloman, S. A., & Gennari, S. (2003). Universality and language specificity in object naming. Journal of Memory and Language, 49, 20–42. Murphy, G. L. (2004). Word meaning. In The big book of concepts (pp. 385–442). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Sensory Disorders Sensory disorders include a wide range of conditions related to the intake, processing, and use of sensation. Deficits may interfere with sensory reception (cataracts, for instance) or transmission of sensory input from the receptor to central nervous system (CNS) structures. Sensorineural hearing loss can affect the auditory system in either the neural receptors or the transmission of signals from receptor to CNS structures. Cortical blindness and deafness are the result of damage or deficit at the visual or auditory cortex, respectively. This entry discusses kinds of sensory disorders, their effects on learning and behavior, and the theory of sensory integration, including how the theory can be used in the therapeutic process when working with children. Individuals with sensory-integration or sensoryprocessing disorders are assumed to have adequate sensory intake. The challenges lie in the use of sensory input as a foundation for interaction with the environment. Perception, action, and emotional regulation are shaped by the processing and integration of sensation. The ability to receive and integrate stimuli is what allows people to make sense of and engage with others, things, and events in the environment. Individuals with disorders related to the processing and integration of sensation have difficulty with everyday sensory experiences. These difficulties may be expressed in inadequate perception, poorly developed motor skills, over- or underreactivity to everyday sensations, and disruption of regulatory behaviors (e.g., attention or arousal). Although there is controversy over the existence of disorders of sensory processing and integration in the absence of other diagnoses, it is now generally agreed that these disorders exist independently. In addition, they are widely found in conjunction with other disorders, notably autism spectrum

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disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and anxiety disorders.

Historical Context Dr. A. Jean Ayres (1920–1988) first developed the theory of sensory integration. Ayres was an occupational therapist and educational psychologist working with children, who had been diagnosed with neuromotor, sensory perceptual, and learning disorders. In attempting to use the treatment approaches of the day, Ayres determined that the challenges these children faced were not necessarily amenable to a cognitive approach. She believed they were sensory integrative in nature. Ayres observed that sensory-integrative problems interfered with academic learning and behavioral regulation. She reviewed the literature on brain development, neurophysiology, psychology, and education and endeavored to weave those knowledge bases together with her own observations of the children in her clinical practice. The result was the theory of sensory integrative dysfunction. Sensory integration theory continues to evolve as research into its CNS features, characteristic patterns, and behavioral ramifications are better understood. Ayres Sensory Integration® was developed with a focus on children.

Theoretical Underpinnings The theory of sensory integration can be summarized in terms of three broad assumptions: 1. The ability to process and integrate sensation and use it to plan and organize behavior is at the heart of learning. 2. A decreased ability to process and integrate sensation may result in difficulty producing appropriate actions, which, in turn, may interfere with learning and behavior. 3. Meeting the demands of the “just-right challenge” produces sensation that contributes to improved CNS processing, thereby enhancing learning and behavior.

Disorders of sensory integration may result from poor sensory perception or poor sensory modulation. Sensory perceptual disorders reflect

diminished ability to interpret the qualities of sensation. For instance, disorders of visual perception may be reflected in letter and number reversals because the visual system is responsible for orientation in space; inadequate vestibular perception may result in difficulty with balance and uncertainty about “which way is up.” Perceptual disorders are rarely seen in a single sensory system. For instance, visual, vestibular, and proprioceptive systems are intimately linked in understanding position in space, movement through space, and the production of balance and equilibrium. The behavioral consequences of inadequate sensory perception include things such as avoidance of engagement in motor activities; poor gross, fine, and visual motor coordination; and poor behavioral organization. A major element of sensory integrative dysfunction is the inadequate modulation of sensation. This refers, for example, to tolerating loud noises or bright lights as well as to detecting subtleties in the sensory environment and responding appropriately. The modulation of sensation, involves the modality, intensity, duration, and location of the input. Sensory modality refers to the form of sensation. Touch, movement, vision, and audition involve different forms of energy. Children may have preferences for sensory modalities. They may prefer to listen to a book on tape rather than read, for instance. The intensity of sensation can be thought of as a continuum; proprioceptive input resulting from gripping a feather is of minimal intensity and that from gripping a heavy suitcase is considerably more intense. Some children require very intense input in order to attend and orient to stimuli, but others avoid even routine intensity. For instance, some children thrive on loud environments with crowds of people; others find the grocery store lights, temperature, and visual displays to be so intense as to be overwhelming. Stimulus duration plays a role as well. The same child who is overwhelmed in the grocery store may be able to tolerate it while his or her mother selects a single item but an hourlong stay in the store is agonizing. The differential effects of the location of sensory input can be illustrated with reference to touch. Touch that is accompanied by vision—such as touch on the arm or hand, for instance—is often more readily modulated than touch not seen, as a touch on the back might be.

Sensory Disorders

Sensory integration theory acknowledges that responses to sensation are highly individualized. Some people are uncomfortable with and avoid touch but others find hugs, holding hands, or having an arm draped across one’s shoulders calming. Some people love intense movement, such as might be found at an amusement park, but others find it terrifying. Sensory responsiveness also can be influenced by factors such as fatigue and emotional state. The behavioral consequences of poor sensory modulation includes things such as sensory-related challenges with attention, regulation, affect, and activity; withdrawal from or avoidance of sensory experiences; and poor self-esteem.

Praxis and Dyspraxia Praxis involves movement ideation, planning the sequence of movements and its timing, and engaging in the planned movement. Dyspraxia results when one or more of these components are deficient. It is often accompanied by proprioceptive, tactile, and/or vestibular perception deficits resulting in a poor body scheme, inadequate ability to process proprioceptive feedback from movement, difficulty with balance and equilibrium, and poor visual and auditory mapping.

Sensory Modulation Disorders Disorders of sensory modulation have been characterized differently by different investigators. However, agreement exists relative to sensory overreactivity and sensory underreactivity. Children with sensory overreactivity react negatively to sensation that most children do not find troublesome. They may refuse to go to a restaurant because they do not like the way it smells, wear only soft fabrics because anything else feels itchy, or have a tantrum in a grocery store because the visual input is too intense. They may be unable to tolerate movement over which they have no control—for instance, becoming carsick if they are not driving. Sensory overreactivity can be seen in more than a single sensory system, or it may be seen in conjunction with sensory underreactivity in another system. Sensory underreactivity is characterized by a failure to react to sensation that is of typical intensity. Children with underreactivity may not notice

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things such as shoes being on the wrong feet or changes in their visual environment. They may fail to feel food in and on their mouth, leading to eating difficulties. Or they may not respond when their name is called. As with overreactivity, underreactivity may be seen in more than one sensory system, and in conjunction with sensory overreactivity. Unusual sensory interests, repetitions, and seeking behaviors (SIRS) are often observed in conjunction with either over- or underreactivity. Children will seek highly intense or long-duration input in one sensory modality either because they require it in order to process the sensation (underreactive) or because intense input through one modality reduces their overreactivity in another. An example of the latter would be a child seeking “crash and bump” activities (intense touch and proprioception) to reduce overreactivity to sound. Particularly in children with autism, SIRS can reflect an intense interest in or craving for sensory stimulation that may be repetitive in nature. These behaviors may include repeated turning on and off of lights, body rocking, or repetitive movement such as hand flapping or finger flicking. These deficits in sensory processing become problematic only when they interfere with engagement and participation in activities of daily life. Children with dyspraxia may find that their clumsiness significantly interferes with their ability to participate in their sport of choice, to play and interact with peers, or to successfully complete the fine motor tasks required for homework. Children with sensory overreactivity may find that being highly sensitive to touch interferes with their ability to go to the mall or attend concerts for fear of being inadvertently touched or with their ability to work in busy environments.

The Therapeutic Process Being able to determine the child’s strengths and needs requires that the therapist have a strong foundation in the theory of sensory integration, in neuroscience, and in development. Treatment for disorders of sensory integration and processing, using Ayres Sensory Integration® (ASI), involves creating opportunities that provide the modality, intensity, and duration of sensory input needed for successful environmental interaction. In ASI, the

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central tenets begin with the presentation of sensory opportunities (tactile, proprioceptive, and vestibular). The therapist must always attend to the modulation needs of the child and assist the child in attaining and maintaining a regulated state. Postural, ocular, oral, and bilateral motor control, as well as praxis and organization of behavior, are routinely challenged. Importantly, therapist and child collaborate in activity choice and work to establish a therapeutic alliance. It is the therapist’s job to tailor activity in response to the child, ensure success, and support the child’s intrinsic motivation to play. The challenge in using this treatment approach is that if it is done well, it looks like play. Shelly J. Lane and Stacey Reynolds See also Auditory System; Cognitive Neuroscience; Neurodevelopmental Disorders; Perceptual Disorders; Visual System

Further Readings Anzalone, M., & Lane, S. J. (2012). Feels awful and doesn’t sound very good, either: Sensory processing disorders. In S. J. Lane & A. C. Bundy (Eds.), Kids can be kids (pp. 437–459). Philadelphia, PA: F. A. Davis. Ausderau, K. K., Furlong, M., Sideris, J., Bulluck, J., Little, L. M., Watson, L. R., . . . & Baranek, G. T. (2014). Sensory subtypes in children with autism spectrum disorder: Latent profile transition analysis using a national survey of sensory features. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 55, 935–944. Ben-Sasson, A., Carter, A. S., & Briggs-Gowan, M. J. (2010). The development of sensory over-responsivity from infancy to elementary school. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 38(8), 1193–1202. http:// dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10802-010-9435-9 Lane, S. J., Reynolds, S., & Dumenci, L. (2012). Sensory over-responsivity and anxiety in typical children and children with autism and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder: Cause or co-existence? American Journal of Occupational Therapy, 66(5), 595–603. Schaaf, R. C., Schoen, S. A., Smith Roley, S., Lane, S. J., Koomar, J., & May-Benson, T. A. (2010). A frame of reference for sensory integration. In P. Kramer & J. Hinojosa (Eds.), Frame of reference for pediatric occupational therapy (3rd ed., pp. 99–186). Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins.

Sensory Transduction Sensory input is essential for survival. It defines what is human and it is the basis for consciousness and “self.” Sensory transduction is the process that makes the physical signals that reach the sensory organs available to the brain. It includes processes in the sensory organs as well as processes in the central nervous system (brain and spinal cord). This entry describes these processes.

Sensory Parameters Sensory receptors are of two kinds: One consists of the membrane of axons that are specialized for responding to mechanical deformation, various kinds of chemicals, and temperature. The other kind consists of a complete cell with specialized structures, such as cilia, located on the cell membrane. Receptors are located in the ear, eye, skin, joint tendons, nose, and mouth. Internal organs, except the spinal cord and the brain, all have sensory receptors. The receptors in the sense organs convert a physical stimulus into a change in the electrical potentials inside the receptor. This is done with utmost energy efficiency. Sound that reaches the ear causes the membrane potential in the receptors in the cochlea to change, but it is not the energy in the sound that causes this change in membrane potentials. Instead, the change occurs in the electrical resistance of the membrane in the cilia of the cochlear hair cells. A change in the resistance requires far less energy than it would take to generate an electrical potential change in the cell. The weakest sound that humans can hear causes a vibration of the eardrum that is less than 10-9 cm (1/100 of one millimicron, or nanometer [nm], or 10-5 μm, micrometers), which is less than 1% of the diameter of a hydrogen molecule. The smallest amount of light that the human eye can detect is approximately 15 quanta under optimal conditions. Some insects can detect 1 or 2 quanta. (A light quanta, or photon, is the smallest amount of light that can be emitted.) The physical stimuli that reach the ear, the eyes, the skin, the nose, and the mouth are conducted to the sensory cells through specific media that may transform the physical signal before it reaches the

Sensory Transduction

receptors. In the ear, the transformation of the physical stimuli is extensive, less so in the eye and the nose and mouth. In hearing, the transformation involves amplification of the sounds that reach the ear, and sounds are separated according to their frequency in the cochlea before reaching the sensory cells. The parts of the skin that conduct touch of the skin and vibrations transform the stimuli in different ways before reaching the receptors. Ear

There are two kinds of sensory cells in the cochlea—the outer and inner hair cells. They have a similar anatomy and respond to the up-anddown movements of the basilar membrane that divides the fluid-filled cochlea. The functions of the two kinds of hair cells are different. Only the inner hair cells conduct information about sounds to the brain through the 30,000 nerve fibers of the cochlear nerve. When the cilia of the inner hair cells are deflected, the cells contract and elongate with the up-and-down motion of the basilar membrane and thus follow the waveform of the sound waves that reach the ear. The outer hair cells, instead, have a mechanical function that amplifies the motion of the basilar membrane, providing approximately 50 dB in increased sensitivity of the ear, together with the gain in sensitivity provided by the middle ear. The total gain depends on the frequency of the sounds, but it may be as much as 75 dB compared with the situation in which sound were to reach the fluid of the cochlea directly. Eye

The human eye converts light into a change in the discharges of the nerve fibers of the optic nerve. The eye has two kinds of receptors—cones and rods. Rods are more sensitive than cones and allow very faint light to be detected. Light can be described in two different ways: as an electromagnetic radiation and as a series of light quanta (or photons). The wavelength of light determines it color. Rods are most sensitive to light of a wavelength of 500 nm. The light receptors, cones and rods, are located behind a network of nerve cells that connect the receptor cells with the fibers of the optic nerve.

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Light must pass that neural structure to reach the receptors, and the neural structure is therefore transparent. In the human eye, a black pigment is located behind the receptors, preventing light from being reflected. In nocturnal animals, such as the cat, the backside of the eye reflects light so that light can pass the receptors twice, thus providing greater sensitivity. This is why the eyes of many animals seem to glow in the dark when light shines on the animals’ eyes. Cones are less sensitive but allow color vision. The human eye allows detection of light in range of wavelengths between approximately 400 and 700 nm. Cones have their highest sensitivity at 555 nm. The discrimination of color is based on cones that have pigments with different spectral sensitivity. This makes one kind of cones most sensitive to light at a wavelength of 430 nm (blue light), another at 540 nm (green), and the third kind of cones has their best sensitivity at 570 nm (red). These three kinds of receptors make it possible to discriminate thousands of color nuances, because light of any wavelength (color) activates at least two of the three kinds of receptors at the same time. The optic nerve from each eye has two parts, one that crosses the midline and one that continues on the same side to reach the thalamus on either side. This is the common pathway of the optic nervous system in humans and in animals that have forward-pointing eyes. This is typical for animals that hunt, such as the cat, the dog, and humans. Animals that are hunted, such as deer, rabbits, and rats, have their eyes on the side. Animals with forward-pointing eyes can fuse the images produced by the two eyes to get a single picture of the surroundings. Skin

Receptors in the skin that are sensitive to touch and vibrations are part of the somatosensory system. Fine touch, including two-point discrimination, is important for feedback in fine-motor functions. Crude touch has a different pathway in the brain and does not provide information about location. Mouth and Nose

The sense of taste, known as gustation, refers to the ability to detect and discriminate sweet, salt,

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bitter, sour, and umami. The receptors are cells located in the tongue and in the roof and sides of the mouth and project cilia, the membrane of which is sensitive to the basic flavors. Olfaction is the sense of smell and is different from the other four senses in that it uses different structures of the brain. The main projections of the olfactory nerve are to the amygdala and not to the cerebral cortex as with the other four senses. The amygdala is a structure located deep in the brain that is associated with many functions, including emotionally related functions. Humans can discriminate between many different odors, but this ability varies considerably between individuals and between humans and other species. The olfactory organ in the nose also has receptors for pheromones, chemicals important for mating and reproduction. The combination of taste, smell, and tactile sensations form the flavors that are experienced from food. Aage R. Møller See also Auditory Perception; Auditory System; Kinesthetic System; Olfactory System; Vestibular System; Visual Perception; Visual System

Further Readings Kandel, E. R., Schwartz, J. H., Jessell, T. M., Siegelbaum, S. A., & Hudspeth, A. J. (Eds.). (2012). Principles of neural science (5th ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. Møller, A. R. (2012). Sensory systems: Anatomy and physiology (2nd ed.). Dallas, TX: Author. Møller, A. R. (2012). Hearing: Anatomy, physiology, and disorders of the auditory system (3rd ed.). San Diego, CA: Plural. Shepherd, G. M. (1994). Neurobiology (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Sex The study of sexual behavior tends to divide researchers into factions. On the one hand are socalled essentialists, who emphasize universal features of sexual behavior. Essentialists are often associated with biological and evolutionary psychology. On the other hand, there are social

constructionists, who emphasize the importance of culture. Feminist theorists often adopt this perspective, which tends to see culture as assuming the dominant role in the human species (compared to nonhumans). There are also theorists who take a broad and integrative perspective in which they try to assimilate features of the essentialist and social constructionist perspectives. This entry discusses sexual behavior, including causal and functional explanations, sexual development and learning, gender differences, sexual orientation, sexual fantasy, interaction with attachment and psychoactive substances, sexual addiction, and sexual violence. Sexual behavior can be divided into two phases: appetitive behavior and consummatory behavior. Appetitive behavior, a term more often applied to nonhumans, is directed to achieving sexual contact. Something comparable in humans, sometimes termed desire or wanting, describes the numerous ways in which people seek sexual partners and solicit sexual behavior from them. Humans might, of course, feel desire but not wish to link it to any appetitive behavior. In laboratory rats, experiments can be arranged that consist of rats running in a maze or pressing a lever in a Skinner box for the reward of access to another rat. The appetitive phase in particular is used as an index of sexual motivation. The term consummatory behavior refers to the actual act of mating. In rats, this is stereotyped behavior.

Causal Explanations The notion of sexual drive, an intrinsic factor that increases in strength with deprivation, was once popular. For example, Sigmund Freud advanced a hydraulic analogy using a notion of energy and its discharge. However, sex researchers are increasingly coming to adopt incentive-motivation models wherein a motivational state is aroused by attractive incentives and cues associated with them that act on particular brain processes. In addition, in the case of humans, sexual motivation can be aroused by representations of sexually attractive incentives in the conscious mind. Researchers draw a distinction between wanting and liking, and this can be applied to sexual behavior. The wanting part of motivation appears to be based on the neurochemical dopamine,

Sex

though doubtless other substances are also implicated. Liking appears to depend on the opioids, among other substances. Wanting and liking can sometimes become uncoupled, with wanting sex increasing over time, whereas liking sex remains constant or vice versa. People in long-established sexual relationships sometimes experience a considerable decrease in wanting the partner, but it is not accompanied by a corresponding decrease in liking sex with her or him. Brain processes of desire send signals to processes in the autonomic nervous system that are responsible for genital reactions—for example, a swelling of local blood vessels. So-called sex hormones, most obviously testosterone, sensitize incentive motivational processes. They are released from the sex organs and adrenal gland and act on receptors throughout the body, including the brain. In addition to the excitation of sexual desire and behavior, theorists postulate the existence of an active process of sexual inhibition. Inhibition acts at three levels in the brain. First, there is orgasmic inhibition, which is specific to sexual desire and occurs following orgasm. This is generally more evident in males than in females. Second, there is stimulus-based inhibition, which arises from physically present stimuli, such as those triggering fear or disgust. It is probably not peculiar to sexual desire and might be shared with other motivations. Third, there is intentional inhibition, which arises from such intentions as to maintain moral purity or fidelity. This acts at the output side and appears to be a process that is common across activities. It is presumably implicated in resisting temptation. Besides sexual desire or sexual wanting, theorists employ the term sexual arousal. It can be measured objectively by the swelling of the genitals. In males, this shows a positive correlation with their feeling of sexual desire. In females, the correlation is much weaker. There can be signs of sexual arousal at the genitals but no desire. There may even be a subjective sense of sexual aversion. The evidence suggests that in women, for objective sexual arousal to be translated into a subjective feeling of desire, cognitive labeling of the bodily state in terms of meaning is needed. External cues may be recruited in this process. The techniques of functional neuroimaging have been applied extensively to sexual desire.

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Participants are scanned while, for example, they view erotic images, and activity changes in different parts of the brain are noted.

Functional Explanations A functional explanation of behavior occurs in evolutionary terms—that is, how a behavior contributes to the perpetuation of genes. For a sexually reproducing species, sexual motivation is an important factor in increasing the reproductive fitness of an individual. The role of hormones in maximizing desire at times of maximum chances of fertilization can be understood in functional terms, for example.

Sexual Development and Learning Young children show evidence of deriving pleasure from self-stimulation of their genitals. It appears that a process of learning is involved in forming a link between such pleasure and an attractive other individual so that interactions with such individuals becomes attractive. Early sexual experiences either in reality or in the imagination are thought to give direction to the future form and expression of sexual desire.

Gender Differences A highly controversial topic is how to account for gender differences in sexual desire. Across societies, males tend to be more interested than females are in things such as pornography and promiscuous and uncommitted sex. Desires expressed as voyeurism, exhibitionism, or fetishism are mainly, if not exclusively, male phenomena. Although sexual wanting in terms of seeking sex tends to be higher in men than women, there appears to be little to suggest that sexual liking is any different on average. Theorists taking the perspective of evolutionary psychology (and thus a functional explanation) argue that these differences reflect different evolutionary strategies for maximizing reproductive chances. The cost to females of suboptimal mating is greater than it is in the case of males. By contrast, theorists taking a social constructionist or feminist perspective see cultural determinants as being responsible for existing gender

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differences. According to this interpretation, men have always exerted more power than women, and male-dominated societies try to keep women in their subordinate place. From a young age, girls assimilate the cultural norms of restrained female sexuality. Feminist theorists cite various sources of evidence in favor of this argument. In nonhuman primate species close to humans, females commonly take the initiative in instigating sexual encounters. Feminist theorists ask about what happened in the evolutionary line leading to humans. If, for example, women were naturally reserved sexually, procedures such as female genital mutilation would not be necessary. Other theorists support a compromise position: There are genetic differences underlying the difference in behavior, and their effect is reinforced by culture. The recognition of the phenomena of epigenetics only makes distinctions between the effects of genes and environments more blurred. It is sometimes argued that men have a stronger sex drive than women. This is based on such observations as men’s greater use of pornography and prostitution and their higher frequency of masturbation. As noted earlier, drive is a somewhat problematic concept since it tends to divert attention from the role of the external environment and associated cognitive factors.

arise in the imagination. These can be apparently spontaneous or triggered by the perception of an attractive other. Sexual fantasy is not part of a compensation process for lack of sexual outlet, as it can occur at a high frequency at times of high sexual outlet. Sexual fantasy is regarded as healthy, provided the content is not of a distressing, harmful, or illegal nature. An issue that arises is whether sexual fantasy has a causal effect on subsequent sexual behavior. This issue comes into particular focus where sexual crime is concerned, and there has been a prior history of extensive, violent sexual fantasy.

Interactions

The commonly made binary division into heterosexual or homosexual is an oversimplification. For a considerable number of people, their sexual orientation exhibits plasticity, with moves between heterosexual and homosexual orientation happening as a function of their social context. Others identify as “bisexual” for a lifetime. A category that is gaining increasing recognition is that of “asexual.” People with this identity might experience sexual arousal and derive pleasure from masturbation but feel no desire toward another individual. This suggests a developmental explanation by which learned associations between arousal or pleasure and potential incentives were not formed.

Researchers commonly study sexual desire and behavior in isolation. However, this can sometimes prove deceptive, as sex can powerfully interact with other processes. An obvious interaction is with attachment. For some people, sexual desire is expressed only in the context of a monogamous romantic attachment. It appears that sexual desire and romantic attachment are two distinct systems that can strongly interact. However, in some people, these systems remain distinct; there can be a heterosexual sexual attraction to one individual but a homosexual romantic attachment to another or vice versa. Arousal arising from a nonsexual situation can spill over into sexual arousal. The well-known rope bridge experiment, in which fear was triggered in males by crossing an unstable bridge, may exemplify this effect. For some men, negative emotions of anger can interact to increase sexual desire. A number of psychoactive substances powerfully interact with sexual desire. Alcohol increases desire and tends to create what is known as “alcohol myopia” (also termed “motivational myopia”), meaning a tendency to focus on the present and ignore the future. Stimulant drugs, such as cocaine and methamphetamine, primarily target dopamine and tend to increase sexual desire. By contrast, opiate drugs seem to simulate features of sexual pleasure and satiety and are not noted for their aphrodisiac properties in the sense of triggering desire.

Sexual Fantasy

Sexual Addiction

Most humans report the existence of sexual fantasy in which scenarios not actually present can

Controversy attends the phenomenon of sexual addiction, with some denying any usefulness in

Sexual Orientation

Sex Reassignment

the term, whereas for others, issues of free will and determinism come into sharp focus. However, sexual behavior can meet a number of the criteria of addiction, such as excessiveness and destructiveness, as well as a wish to quit but unsuccessful attempts to do so. Sexual addiction can be the cause of much suffering to both addicted people and their families. It appears that sexual addiction is based on a similar set of brain processes as those involved in addictions to drugs. Therefore, neat dichotomies of the physical/physiological versus psychological sort can be seriously misleading.

Sexual Violence Sexual violence is a subject of massive social concern and brings immeasurable human suffering. It is overwhelmingly a problem of uncontrolled male sexuality. Arguments have raged over whether rape is really motivated by sexual desire or a wish to assert control over women. It seems that both factors interact. Controversy rages on the determinants of rape. Some have argued that it is the outcome of a genetically determined process that has proven successful in evolution. Opponents of this position counter that it is the product of male-dominated society in which violence against women is tolerated. The most terrible form of sexual violence is lust killing in which there appears to be a fusion of sexual and aggressive tendencies, often formed in early development. Frederick Toates See also Attraction; Close Relationships; Evolutionary Psychology; Feminist Approaches to Psychology and Gender; Freud’s Psychosexual Theory of Personality; Gender and Sex; Human Nature; Mating Strategy Evolution and Development; Motivation and Personality; Nature Versus Nurture; Sexual Selection

Further Readings Toates, F. (2014). How sexual desire works: The enigmatic urge. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Workman, L., & Reader, W. (2014). Evolutionary psychology (3rd ed.). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

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Sex Reassignment A child’s sex is typically identified at or before birth. In many technologically advanced societies, a person is identified as male or female but not both. This assignment is often based on a quick inspection of the child’s genital appearance. In some cases, as the child grows up, the child or the child’s parents discover some misalignment between the child’s assigned sex and the sex (or gender) with which the child identifies. When this happens, the child’s (or, later, adult’s) sex may be reassigned. In such cases, the child’s (or adult’s) sex identity has probably not changed. Instead the classification of that person’s sex has been corrected. This entry discusses sex reassignment and related personal and social issues.

Sex, Gender, and Sexuality How do social scientists, medical researchers, and reassigned persons account for misidentifications of a person’s sex? Some theorists link a person’s sex identity to that person’s gender and sexual orientation. A person’s gender encompasses the traits and behaviors that the larger culture associates with each sex, whereas sexual orientations are now typically understood in terms of an attraction to sexual partners of a particular sex. Theorists who see these three identities as linked in some natural way often attribute a change in one of these identities to an attempt to align all three identities into some normalized pattern. For example, the psychologists Ray Blanchard and Michael Bailey allege that some persons who are assigned male at birth but who live as women “change their sex” so that it is better aligned with their “homoerotic” attraction to masculine, heterosexual men. The idea that one’s sex, gender, and sexuality are linked in some natural way, so that any misalignment results in a psychological disorder, has been questioned and somewhat discredited by social scientists. If there is no natural alignment of these identities, then therapists and patients will no longer find themselves obliged to reorder these personhood traits into some supposedly normal pattern. Instead, patients may seek treatment to address the anxieties and distress they experience

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when their sex, gender, or sexual identities fail to conform to their society’s norms. The move to “denaturalize” the relationships among sex, gender, and sexual identities comes from two overlapping schools of thought: social constructionism and queer theory.

Social Constructionism and Queer Theory Social constructionists hold that the categories deployed to sort people by sex, gender, and sexuality are the products of cultural and historical forces. Some societies use a binary sex classification system (male/female) that assigns all humans to one of two opposing categories but not to both. Some societies recognize more than two sexes (e.g., a third sex), and some do not treat sex categories as mutually exclusive. The biologist Anne Fausto-Sterling once introduced a five-sex system in order to differentiate bodies with different forms of mixed anatomy (people once called “hermaphrodites”), and others have proposed a scale from female to male, where sex differences are a matter of degree. Similarly, the bodily and behavioral traits regarded as masculine, feminine, or gender neutral are also shaped by one’s cultural and historical context. Last, the categories and criteria used for identifying sexual dispositions, such as heterosexual and homosexual, depend on one’s cultural and historical context. Given that there is no single, rational way to understand differences of sex, gender, and sexuality, how these categories are interrelated depends on one’s cultural and historical context and not on the variety of bodily attributes and dispositions alone. For instance, in societies that recognize a third sex, femininity may be understood as a set of attributes not inherent in or exclusive to females, and sexual orientation categories may be a function of both gender and sex (e.g., some men and women are attracted to women based on the latter’s gender expression rather than physical anatomy). Queer theorists analyze how particular sex, gender, and sexual identities become socially stigmatized. Influenced by Michel Foucault and poststructuralism, queer theorists have focused on how society polices the borders between “normal” and “abject” identity statuses, which can serve as

mechanisms of social control. Whereas Foucault focused on sexual identities, Judith Butler expanded some of Foucault’s ideas and developed an account of gender attributes as performative traits. Butler claims that gender is produced through social interactions in which individuals learn what it means to be feminine or masculine. This involves learning to conform bodily movements, speech, behavior, and all aspects of self-presentations in ways thought appropriate to one’s assigned sex. One’s gender, then, is not a fact one discovers about oneself, but a fact produced by conforming to or defying social conventions about sex-appropriate behavior. In this way, gender terms are performatives (a term derived from speech act theory) because they regulate and define, rather than merely describe, traits deemed appropriate to one’s sex. Eventually, gendered presentations of self become habitual and ingrained so that individuals view them as essential aspects of themselves.

Trans People who resist the dominant gender norms of their society sometimes do not develop a single or unambiguous gender or sex identity. Gender dissidents often describe themselves as transgender or “agender,” and some avoid the term transsexual, which was introduced by sexologists over a century ago to describe persons who wish to transition from one sex identity to another. The terms transgender and transsexual are used in two different ways: to describe subjects who do not fit conventional gender and sex categories as well as those who have crossed from one category to the other. Some now use the term trans to encompass all gender-atypical persons, whether they live seamlessly inside an existing category or resist all sex and gender designations. People who do not conform to their society’s sex, gender, and sexual norms often encounter social prejudice, fear, and hostility and are currently overrepresented among victims of violent crimes. Some queer theorists use the term cisgender for individuals who experience their assigned sex and gender as congruent. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) includes the diagnosis gender dysphoria for those individuals whose assigned sex and gender are regarded by

Sex Reassignment

themselves or others as discordant. This condition replaces the earlier diagnoses of gender identity disorder and transsexualism. The new terminology suggests that individuals who are gender atypical are not mentally ill, but they may need treatment to cope with depression or the negative emotions produced by the incongruity between their assigned sex and their gender expression. Some, but not all, gender-dysphoric patients may seek to modify their body in ways thought congruent with their lived sex and gender status. Others may seek “sex reassignment” surgeries and treatments primarily to meet the legal requirements for altering the sex designation that appears on their official identity documents. Many human rights advocates oppose requiring such surgeries in order to change one’s legal sex status, as this amounts to violating a person’s right to bodily integrity.

Rethinking Nature Versus Nurture Explanations Second-wave feminist theorists promoted the idea that gender traits represent different cultural interpretations of biologically based sex differences. Whereas cultural understandings vary across social groups and can change relatively rapidly, human biology is basically the same across groups and evolves more slowly. With the growing influence of queer theory, transgender studies, and critical race theory, many feminists have rethought the nature-versus-nurture origins of sex and gender distinctions. That is, sex kinds may turn out to be similar to race kinds in terms of providing cultural tools for systematizing the bodily diversity that is observed. Although the bodily differences that people recognize as markers of sex or race identities are a function of different biological or genetic traits that exist across groups, cultures make available different concepts and terms for sorting people into race or sex kinds, as well as for understanding the importance of specific bodily differences. For instance, before geneticists identified the sex chromosomes, scientists generally thought that a person’s gonads decided a person’s sex. When a person’s body has a combination of male and female traits (chromosomes, gonads, genitals, brain development, hormone levels, etc.), the choice to

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prioritize one anatomical feature over another is typically determined by the dominant cultural norms. One percent of humans are born with “mixed” anatomy or an intersex condition, which is currently diagnosed as a disorder of sex development (DSD). For example, a body may be XY and have female genitalia or possess an ovary and a testis. Moreover, although most humans are either XX or XY, other patterns regularly occur, including XYY, XXYY, XXY, and XO. There are about two dozen known intersex conditions, where bodies develop both male and female, or sex-ambiguous, characteristics. In some societies, persons with these intersex conditions are classified as either male or female, and in others they may be classified under a third sex category or assigned to no category (at least initially at birth). So even if sex identities are a function of bodies and biology, there are different—and equally good—cultural schemes for systematizing bodily differences. Some neuroscientists claim that there are structural differences between male and female brains, though there is much disagreement over whether these differences are genetically, hormonally, or environmentally determined. Nevertheless, some scientists and transgender theorists argue that human brains can be differentiated by sex, and a person’s brain sex has a strong influence on his or her sex identity and gender characteristics. On this account, a person could have a brain of one sex but a body that predominantly has the characteristics of the other sex. There is a growing consensus that gender and sex identities develop relatively early and independently of sexual orientations, challenging earlier feminist claims that a woman is something that biological females become by conforming to the norms of heterosexuality (e.g., sexual passivity, social subordination, relative physical weakness, and so on). In societies that recognize only two sexes—male and female—the focus of therapy and treatment for an individual with a DSD is to figure out which of the two sex categories makes the most sense for that individual and whether living successfully in that category will require surgical or hormonal interventions. One of the most difficult issues to address is whether these mostly irreversible therapies should be imposed on young children or whether parents should be instructed to wait until

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their child is old enough to form a stable sex identity and participate meaningfully in decisions about body modification therapies. Patient advocates for intersex and transgender children today often recommend making an initial and tentative sex assignment, then raising a child in ways that are culturally appropriate for that assignment but holding off on irreversible surgeries until at least puberty. At puberty, there are reversible therapies that can be used, such as hormone blockers, so that the child’s body does not develop in ways incongruent with that individual’s sex identity. Irreversible (and potentially sterilizing) surgeries could later be offered at an age closer to adulthood so that they are performed with the informed consent of the patient. There is some controversy over whether a person with both male and female anatomical parts should be diagnosed with a disorder. Although such body types or conditions are relatively rare, they often present no health problems, and they represent a recurring dimension of human diversity. If a society forces intersex children to identify as exclusively male or female, their bodies will be viewed by others as deformed, which then contributes to the notion that their conditions require risky and potentially sterilizing and disfiguring surgeries. People with DSDs, or who do not fit the accepted categories of sex and gender, are thereby rendered socially invisible, thus impeding efforts for social change. Laurie J. Shrage See also Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; Feminist Approaches to Psychology and Gender; Gender and Culture; Gender and Sex; Human Nature; Nature Versus Nurture; Sex; Social Construction; Stress and Gender

Further Readings Butler, J. (2004). Undoing gender. New York, NY: Routledge. Fausto-Sterling, A. (2000). Sexing the body: Gender politics and the construction of sexuality. New York, NY: Basic Books. Halberstam, J. (2005). In a queer time and place: Transgender bodies, subcultural lives. New York: NYU Press.

Karkazis, K. (2008). Fixing sex: Intersex, medical authority, and lived experience. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Kessler, S. (1998). Lessons from the intersexed. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Preves, S. (2003). Intersex and identity: The contested self. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Richardson, S. (2013). Sex itself: The search for male and female in the human genome. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Stryker, S. (2008). Transgender history. Berkeley, CA: Seal Press. Teich, N. (2012). Transgender 101: A simple guide to a complex issue. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Sexual Selection The human brain is an organ that has been shaped by evolutionary processes. One of these is selection, which favors the evolution of a specific type of brain that performs the types of tasks that human ancestors needed to perform in navigating their social and natural environments and ultimately, producing offspring. Importantly, selection is the only known process that can lead to the type of complex biological organization that characterizes the human brain. This entry discusses influences on sexual selection (i.e., choosing a reproductive mate), including effects of ovulation and age, life course effects on men’s testosterone, and situational effects. Whereas natural selection has broadly shaped the brain to cope with a fundamental class of problems that human ancestors regularly encountered (e.g., neutralizing pathogens, predators, and violent conspecifics), a subset of natural selection called sexual selection has shaped how the individual acquires a reproductive mate (or mates) by employing behaviors and attributes that do not otherwise facilitate—or indeed may work in opposition to—the goals of natural selection. Consider the following question: How could the peacock’s large and heavy tail have evolved, given that it compromises its bearer’s escape from predators? Sexual selection provides a logical explanation for how such traits come to be.

Sexual Selection

Sexual selection is typically divided into two related processes: (a) intrasexual selection, whereby traits that facilitate outcompeting same-sex competitors for mates evolve, and (b) intersexual selection, whereby traits that attract members of the opposite sex evolve. In his initial writing on sexual selection, Charles Darwin described instances of both of these processes. For example, he noted that the otherwise cumbersome giant antlers of stags could, in fact, be efficient for fighting off intrasexual rivals for mates. He observed that the elaborate plumage and mating calls of birds seemed to serve only courtship functions. Such weapons and ornaments represent an intraspecific form of precopulatory selection. Modern perspectives also include postcopulatory mechanisms, such as sperm competition between males and cryptic female choice. Darwin adduced considerable evidence for sexual selection in humans. For him, intersexual selection accounted for different standards of beauty in different cultures (exemplified by the wide variety of dangerous and painful body modifications that are endured for aesthetic purposes). Variability in cultural aesthetics is nevertheless compatible with the existence of features that one sex universally esteems in the other. Modern anatomical observations suggest that intersexual selection has shaped aspects of the human body, including women’s relative distribution of gynoid fat and neotenous facial features, as well men’s greater relative size and strength, which also facilitate success in intrasexual conflict. The same (or similar) sexual selection pressures have also shaped aspects of human psychology that function for intersexual courtship and intrasexual competition.

Foundational Findings From Psychology Psychologists have tested sexual selection hypotheses. Among their foundational findings are the following. Ovulatory-Cycle Effects on Mate Choice

Women, like females of other mammalian species, can conceive only within a narrow “fertile window” of the menstrual cycle (i.e., the late follicular phase, or about 15 days before menstruation). This has led researchers to suggest that

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sexual selection has shaped women’s mate preferences to “shift” when conception is more likely— that is, during this fertile phase. Consistent with this prediction, several researchers have reported that when women are closer to the fertile portion of their cycle, they demonstrate increased preferences for traits that are putative indicators of heritable genetic quality in men, including lower voice pitch, higher facial masculinity, and the smell of men with more symmetrical bodies. But how do women do this? How has the brain been shaped to “know” when to find such traits particularly attractive? Given natural hormonal fluctuations across the cycle, selection could have shaped the brain to identify hormones, such as estrogen and progesterone, as “inputs” into the psychological mechanisms that underlie sexual attraction. Some research supports this explanation, with salivary estimates of estrogen (positively) and progesterone (negatively) related to sexual desire across the cycle and estimates of estrogen (positively) and progesterone (negatively) relating to women’s preferences for the scent of symmetrical men. Age Effects on Risk Taking and Creative Displays

The reproductivity of women is constrained by a more limited number of gametes and, given the constraints of gestation and lactation, a longer time period between conceptions. Men—like males of most other species—exhibit greater variance in reproductivity. This means that men have a higher probability of being “shut out” of the “mating market” relative to women, and they also have a higher chance of large numbers of offspring. This, in turn, means that men are likely to invest intensely in behavioral tactics that are beneficial for courtship and for intrasexual competition. Not all men should engage in such tactics, though. Prepubescent boys, elderly men, and investing fathers are unlikely to engage in risks for reproductive opportunities. Instead, it is young adult men who are expected to engage in most intense intrasexual competition and intersexual courtship behaviors. The results from studies of age patterns have indicated, first, that young male adults tend to be the primary perpetrators and victims of

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lethal aggression. Margo Wilson and Martin Daly have coined this phenomenon the “young male syndrome” and explicitly linked it to enhanced mating opportunities. Second, in line with Geoffrey Miller’s suggestion that many seemingly “wasteful” displays function as sexual signals analogous to a peacock’s tail. For example, the peak productivity of male jazz musicians, painters, writers, and scientists is also in early adulthood. Life Course Effects on Men’s Testosterone

Evidence from a wide array of vertebrate species suggests that testosterone functions to regulate trade-offs between the physiological and behavioral traits that are useful in intrasexual competition and courtship rather than those tradeoffs that have other fitness-promoting effects (e.g., immune function, caring for offspring). Men’s testosterone levels are positively correlated with their aggression, and consistent with the young male syndrome, men’s testosterone peaks in young adulthood and steadily declines with age (though the slope of this decline varies across populations). In the United States, men’s testosterone increases after divorce and decreases after marriage, and it appears to decrease further after the birth of a child. Effects of marriage and paternity are not invariant across cultures, though. Indeed, men’s testosterone levels within two groups in a single region—the Lake Eyasi region in northern Tanzania—exhibit different declines after childbirth. Among the Tanzanian Hadza, a foraging group characterized by monogamous marriage and heavy paternal investment in offspring, men with children have lower testosterone than men without children. Among the Tanzanian Datoga, a pastoralist group characterized by polygynous marriage and lower paternal investment in offspring, men with children have testosterone levels equivalent to men without children. Much like estrogen and progesterone (as discussed earlier), selection could have shaped the brain to recognize testosterone, which fluctuates across the life course and contexts of intrasexual competition, as an input to the psychological mechanisms that regulate behaviors useful for acquiring mates or defeating rivals.

Situational Effects on Mating Behavior

Sexual selection has also likely shaped the brain to monitor situational cues as inputs to the psychological mechanisms in mating strategies. For example, researchers have shown that despite generally strong tendencies to conform to decisions that have a high degree of social consensus, men who are primed to think of mating goals (e.g., with a guided visualization about a romantic opportunity on an exotic vacation) conform less. This has been postulated as a strategy for standing out from intrasexual competitors. After similar mating-goal activations, men respond to insults from other men with greater direct aggression (e.g., physical confrontation), but not indirect aggression (e.g., gossiping). And although mating motives provoke men to make conspicuous displays of wealth (e.g., the cars that they drive or the watches they wear), the same men are frugal when it comes to the inconspicuous (e.g., toilet tissue). These effects are not seen to the same degree in women. Postcopulatory Mechanisms in Humans

There is considerable controversy about postcopulatory intrasexual competition in humans. Some theorists have suggested that the size and shape of the human penis were selected to facilitate dislodging the ejaculate of any other men with whom a woman has recently mated. Some have argued for the existence of “kamikaze” sperm in the human male ejaculate that block other men’s sperm from fertilizing the ovum. In contrast, female cryptic choice is a potential form of postcopulatory intersexual selection. Researchers have found different rates of intercourse and different degrees of “flow back” or sperm rejection as a function of women’s interest in their partner and their stage of the menstrual cycle. These effects assume that ancestral humans engaged in extra-pair copulations to an appreciable extent. Joshua M. Tybur and D. Vaughn Becker See also Darwin, Charles; Evolutionary Psychology; Gender, Evolutionary Perspectives on; Gender Roles; Hamilton, W. D.; Human Nature; Mating Strategy Evolution and Development; and Nature Versus Nurture

Short-Term and Working Memory

Further Readings Ellison, P. T. (2001). On fertile ground: A natural history of human reproduction. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Miller, G. (2000). The mating mind: How sexual choice shaped the evolution of human nature. London, England: Heineman. Muller, M. N., Marlowe, F. W., Bugumba, R., & Ellison, P. T. (2009). Testosterone and paternal care in East African foragers and pastoralists. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 276, 347–354. Thornhill, R., & Gangestad, S. W. (2008). The evolutionary biology of human female sexuality. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Wilson, M., & Daly, M. (1985). Competitiveness, risk taking, and violence: The young male syndrome. Ethology and Sociobiology, 6, 59–73.

Short-Term and Working Memory Short-term memory (STM) refers to the temporary retention of information over durations of up to about a minute that requires effort and concentration to retain in memory. STM contrasts with long-term memory (LTM), which can retain information for periods up to several decades and has an almost negligible requirement of active rehearsal. It is hard to identify constraints to the apparently limitless capacity of LTM; in stark contrast, STM processes have severely limited capacity. Also, STM, in contrast to LTM, is effective in retaining meaningless information. A basic characterization, then, is that STM retains very limited amounts of information effortfully over durations of seconds without regard for the meaning of that information. This information can also be processed and manipulated, leading to the use of the term working memory (WM) to refer to systems involved in both temporary storage and manipulation. This entry defines short-term and working memory, discusses characteristics of each, and reviews theories about short-term and working memory. The classic test of STM capacity is the digit span test, a version of which forms part of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-IQ) battery. In it,

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participants are asked to listen to a string of random digits and immediately recall them in order. The length of the string is increased until the participant fails to recall it accurately, and the maximum number of digits successfully recalled is used as a measure of STM capacity. Since the middle of the 20th century, assessments of the capacity of STM have tended to suggest a limit of around seven items—hence the title of George A. Miller’s famous paper “The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two.”

Working Memory The content of STM can be processed or manipulated. Mental arithmetic is an example of this property. Producing a sum, for example, 931 + 724, requires retention of the original two three-digit numbers through one or more stages of mathematical processing to deliver an answer. Another example is imagining unlikely objects, for example, a unicycling horse. Human ability to accomplish such tasks—and to carry them out with random, unpredicted, or novel information—implies that the STM system must be a system not only for retention of information but for the processing of information. WM is a concept that has evolved to describe the systems that underlie temporary storage together with processing. It is similar to STM but reflects processes that not only store information but that also change it. It is now well understood that WM function has implications across the domain of psychology from clinical (e.g., there are associations between poor WM function and schizophrenia) to educational (where WM function is now thought to be highly predictive of educational success).

Characteristics of Working Memory Segregation From Long-Term Memory

STM has a long history in psychology. The pioneering memory researcher Hermann Ebbinghaus described the subjective experience of something like STM, and William James introduced the related concept of “primary memory.” The classic serial position effect in memory was first described by Ebbinghaus and contained a clue that LTM and

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STM may be separate. When participants are asked to retain a sequence of several 10s of items, memory is usually better for the first and last couple of items. Although improved memory for early items in a sequence (primacy) is usually attributed to LTM processes, the improved performance at the end of the sequence (recency) may reflect the operation of STM or WM processes. Research involving the famous amnesiac patient HM demonstrated that despite having severe problems with LTM, the patient’s STM functioned relatively normally. Other patients have a fully functioning LTM but are unable to effectively recall digits presented seconds previously. This double dissociation is evidence of the operation of separate processes. Phonological Encoding

When a participant is asked to remember a verbally presented sequence, such as “2 8 6 3 1,” the digits seem to be encoded and retained as phonological representations, and participants frequently report subvocally repeating the numbers to themselves. The phonological encoding of verbal WM is confirmed by a number of phenomena. The “phonological similarity effect” refers to the pattern whereby phonologically similar sequences such as mad, man, cap, and so on are considerably less well remembered in STM than are phonologically dissimilar sequences. Suppressing the speech production system by requiring the repetition of syllables such as the and also by passively listening to speechlike sounds cause substantial disruption of verbal STM. In the latter case, the similarity of the irrelevant sounds to speech is related to its effectiveness. For example, listening to songs with lyrics is more disruptive than listening to instrumental music. Phonological working memory is now recognized as important in language comprehension and, in particular, language learning. Visuospatial Working Memory

Distinct visual representations can also be retained in WM. “Picture superiority” refers to the observation that adding pictures to a to-be-remembered word list increases participant’s STM recall performance. To account for this, Allan Paivio

developed dual coding theory, which proposed that separate visual and verbal memory systems could operate in parallel. This position is supported by evidence from both experimental psychology and neuroscience of a separation between verbal and visuospatial WM systems. There is now evidence of further divisions within visuospatial WM between processes oriented toward visualappearance information and those specialized for processing spatial location. Chunking

The dichotomy between STM and LTM may not be as strong as implied by the modal model. Contrast the presentation of a string of letters, such as “f-b-i-b-b-c-p-d-q,” with the same letters presented in chunks—namely, “fbi-bbc-pdq.” Participants readily remember far more of the letters in the latter example than in the former, because the latter is composed of chunks that are meaningful. The fact that STM is affected by “chunking” demonstrates that it is not independent from semantic LTM processing. As an example of this, studies of visuospatial bootstrapping have demonstrated that LTM spatial knowledge about the arrangement of numbers on keypads can be used to improve verbal memory for numbers. Capacity Limits

Visual and verbal STM are both limited in capacity. In verbal memory, which is typically limited to around seven items, time constraints dictate capacity, which reflects the amount of material that can be articulated in a few seconds. Thus, STM holds fewer long words than short words. There is also a capacity limit for visuospatial memory items, and, according to Steven Luck and Edward Vogel’s work on feature binding in STM, this is about four items. This difference in capacity between visual and verbal STM is consistent with the claim that visuospatial and phonological STM are separate. Nelson Cowan and his collaborators have called into question the interpretation of digit span as a capacity measure. They identified differences between “storage-specific” and “processingrelated” capacity in verbal STM. The former refers to absolute capacity in terms of the number of independent units or chunks that may be stored in

Short-Term and Working Memory

STM, and the latter to the ability of the WM system to reduce the demands on STM using processes such as chunking. If originally discrete items can be chunked so that they can occupy fewer distinct nodes in STM, then apparent capacity of a WM system may exceed the actual storage-specific capacity of STM. Based on this logic, the researchers argued that the central-capacity limit of storage in WM is actually three to five items, an estimate more in line with estimates of visuospatial memory capacity. Modality Specificity

Some work calls into question the rigidity of the separation between independent visuospatial and verbal STM systems, because several linked crossmodality WM effects have been observed. For example, the binding of information across visual and auditory modalities (wherein one facet, such as color, is presented auditorally and another, such as shape, is presented visually) can be accomplished with ease in WM tasks. Furthermore, visual-similarity effects can have a negative impact on verbal-memory tasks, familiar spatial arrangements can bootstrap performance on verbal-memory tasks, and verbal coding can be used to boost performance on visuospatial-memory tasks.

Theories of Working Memory and Short-Term Memory Early Models of Short-Term Memory

An early theory of STM was the so-called modal model in which STM was the sole route of informational access to LTM. The modal model included control processes that could operate on information within STM processes that would later became known as WM. However, the modal model did not specify how information would be retained or manipulated within STM. By the mid-1970s, much had been learned about the nature of STM storage processes, and the modal model was superseded by theoretical approaches that accounted for storage within WM and STM. The Working Memory Model

The multicomponent working memory model was introduced in the 1970s by Alan Baddeley and

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Graham Hitch and subsequently extended by them and their colleagues. It proposes the existence of a range of modularity-specific memory buffers (“slave systems”) of which two have been fully described—a phonological loop that is responsible for short-term retention of material using a phonological code (and hence preferentially recruited by verbal material) and a visuospatial sketchpad recruited during short-term retention of visual or spatial material. These systems do not manipulate or process their contents. The better understood system is the phonological loop, which is proposed to contain a passive phonological store that is subject to rapid decay and refreshed by articulatory control processes (such as subvocal speech). Although it has been suggested that the visuospatial sketchpad might have a similar design, with a passive visual cache refreshed by spatial rehearsal processes, this proposal is tentative. Other research suggests that the sketchpad itself may be subdivisible into separate visual and spatial components. The WM model also proposes a general-processing component termed the central executive that is responsible for general-processing functions that modify the contents of the slave systems. Originally, Baddeley intended for the central executive to exist as a kind of “black box” into which as-yet-unstudied complex functions could be set aside but not capable of storing information itself. Now, however, the central executive is thought to have a role in complex cognitive tasks (such as problem solving, mathematical calculation, and planning moves in chess), in maintaining divided attention on simultaneous tasks, and in handling novel or unexpected tasks that cannot be handled by autonomous processes. In this respect, it bears a strong resemblance to ideas of higher cognitive and executive functions (sometimes linked to the frontal lobes) that emerge from the neuropsychological literature. Thus the central executive may be implicated in flexible general attention and supervisory attention. Degradation of its abilities may occur during early stages of Alzheimer’s disease, as increasing difficulty of coordinating conflicting tasks is one of the features of these stages of the disease. One addition to the working memory model is a final component termed the “episodic buffer.” It was developed to account for difficulties caused

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Short-Term and Working Memory

by modality-specific systems and their evident interoperability, along with the related issue of how a WM system may interact with LTM. The episodic buffer is a capacity-limited, temporary store that is able to maintain associations between disparate information whether it is held in the phonological loop, the LTM, or elsewhere. Baddeley initially argued that the purpose of the episodic buffer was to create meaningful links between different channels of information held in different systems in order to create unified episodic memories. It has become apparent that a range of phenomena beyond episodic memory also require a multimodal STM store. Although domain general, the episodic buffer is not invoked for the kinds of complex processing performed by the central executive. Moreover, it has become apparent that the types of task that the episodic buffer can accomplish may be carried out without the allocation of general attentional resources. Embedded Processes Model

The embedded processes model has been advanced by Cowan and colleagues. This model downplays the importance of modularity-specific storage within the WM system. Instead, the researchers argue that short-term memories represent activated portions of LTM that may sometimes enter a “focus of attention,” which can be controlled by executive processes. The focus of attention is explained using the metaphor of being able to “zoom” to either focus on the retention of detail or to maximize capacity across a broad attentional range. Under such a schema, WM represents a moment-to-moment aggregation of temporarily active material within the focus of attention. Cowan’s and Baddeley’s approaches are not mutually exclusive and may be seen as a contrast in emphasis, with Baddeley’s approach concentrating on the mechanisms of low-level STM storage and working upward, whereas Cowan’s tends to look at general processing and work downward to try to understand the specific features of STM. In both models, there are multiple points of entry for information—and thus both go well beyond the sequential access through STM to LTM implied by the modal model. Indeed, Cowan’s claim that STM is a subset of LTM is in direct contrast to the modal model.

Working Memory Span There is now a focus on assessing WM using omnibus tests that assess storage and processing in a single measure. “Complex span” or “working-memory span” tasks assess both the storage and the manipulation capacity of WM. A complex-span task requires the combined performance of two components, such as reading a set of sentences aloud and then remembering the last word in each sentence (this is known as “reading span”). An alternative complex-span task is “operation span” in which participants review the correctness of a series of simple sums and then are required to retain the final result of each sum for serial recall. In all cases, the number of statements (and hence to-be-remembered responses) is raised until memory fails, just as in the case of digit span. Complex span is a psychometrically useful tool because it is more reliable than digit span and may therefore be a more valid tool for assessing overall performance of WM as a single, domain-general construct. On the basis of extensive research of this type, Randall Engle has argued that although basic STM tasks may invoke separate processes, complex-span tasks show a high degree of intercorrelation, suggesting that general processes are important in characterizing WM. Because complex-span approaches have tended to converge on single latent variables, which can explain high levels of the variability in data on WM tasks, it has become important to investigate whether WM is a useful psychometric concept in its own right. At this point, it appears that WM is an important individual-difference variable for understanding a range of outcomes in education. Stephen Darling See also Attention; Auditory Perception; Frontal Lobe Functions; Human Information Processing;; LongTerm Memory: Processes; Long-Term Memory: Structures; Nonvisual Memory; Visual Perception; Working Memory, Improvement of

Further Readings Baddeley, A. (2007). Working memory, thought, and action. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Signal Detection Theory Baddeley, A. D., Allen, R. J., & Hitch, G. J. (2011). Binding in visual working memory: The role of the episodic buffer. Neuropsychologia, 49, 1393–1400. Cowan, N. (2008). What are the differences between long-term, short-term, and working memory? Progress in Brain Research, 169, 323–338. Darling, S., Allen, R. J., Havelka, J., Campbell, A., & Rattray, E. (2012). Visuospatial bootstrapping: Longterm memory representations are necessary for implicit binding of verbal and visuospatial working memory. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 19, 258–263. Gathercole, S. E. (1999). Cognitive approaches to the development of short-term memory. Trends in Cognitive Science, 3, 410–418.

Signal Detection Theory All decisions in life involve at least two factors: What one knows and what one wants. When both are clear, decisions almost make themselves; when both are ambiguous, decisions are wisely delayed to allow time for data collection and value clarification. But often, people find themselves in the middle ground of useful, but imperfect, information about the state of the world and a good, if imperfect, understanding of their desires. How, then, do they decide? This is the subject of decision theory, of which signal detection theory (SDT) is a special case. Decision theory is normative: It tells people what to do. SDT is descriptive: It attempts to interpret behavior in terms of the knowledge (signal strength) and values (bias) that most likely motivated it. This entry briefly reviews decision theory and then discusses SDT in more detail.

Decision Theory Decision theory is a fundamentally important approach to the world and to every decision that people make in it. This is true even though people are typically unable to assign the numbers necessary to formally describe the decision. A simplistic illustration is useful: A person believes that he or she sees a 25¢ piece on the ground. Does that person stop for a closer look? The

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outcomes concern money, and people prefer more of it to less. The bottom two rows in Table 1 give the true state of the world and the last two columns the proposed actions—“Stop to Retrieve” the 25¢ coin and an unknown, alternative action (?)—for example, “Move On” or “Slow Down for a Better Look.” If there is a quarter on the ground, and a person stops to retrieve it, the value of the outcome to that person is 25¢. How one frames a problem often foreordains its answer. What goes in the first cell of the last row? 0¢? But this question could not have arisen if there were 0¢—nothing—on the ground. A more likely alternative is “a bottle cap” or “a piece of foil from a cigarette wrapper” or “a nickel.” A quick review of these possibilities is accomplished almost without breaking stride. By providing likely alternative stimuli for which one has idealized visual templates, one effectively improves the signal strength of the stimulus. Perhaps better entries in the two rows would be “Something of value, possibly a coin” versus “Nothing of value.” The decision theory framework provides many lessons. It is a reminder that there are always (at least) four cells in the table: People should always consider just what the alternative states of the world may be and what might happen if they take no action or a different action. It is at home within the framework of Bayesian updating of information, meaning that people should have at least some sense of the base rates of the phenomenon. For example, how likely is it that a 25¢ piece would be on that particular spot of ground? How likely is a cigarette wrapper to be there? Finally, it is utility that really matters—not cost or dollar value but value to oneself. A white elephant may cost thousands to purchase yet have negative utility. People should know what matters. Whenever the decision-theoretic framework brings these considerations to mind, the ensuing decisions will be enlightened. Table 1 The State/Act Matrix Action: World

Stop to Retrieve

25¢ ?

25¢

?

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Signal Detection Theory

Signal Detection Theory SDT operates the decision table in reverse. It applies to situations in which there are existing estimates of the probability of an individual taking Action a or Action b in the context of Stimulus A and Stimulus B. With these estimates, it is possible to fill in the table with the probabilities and infer how clear—how detectable—the target stimulus was and how biased the individual was to act or to withhold action—a bias that reflects the relative utility of the outcomes to the individual. As with many instruments that have evolved over time, the term SDT is a misnomer. It was developed to inform naval sonar and radar operators how to respond if they thought they had detected an enemy ship. When instruments are pushed to their limits, spurious signals—due perhaps to birds or inversion layers or electronic malfunction, for example—could look like the target. Thus, SDT is really signal discrimination theory. In most cases, the receiver is trying to discriminate between two signals, one of the target and an alternative, which might be well-defined (“Look, up in the sky—is that a bird? Is it a plane? Is it Superman?”) or poorly defined. In the latter case, it is simply called noise. When it is supplied by an experimenter, it is called the foil. A pragmatic, modern use of SDT is screening airline passengers for contraband. The inspectors are periodically tested with foils. As with decision theory, the primary strength of SDT is its ability to separate knowledge from value, detectability from bias. Consider the following experiment: One thousand trials were conducted in which Stimulus A was present on 400 trials and absent (~A) on 600. Table 2 gives the table of joint frequencies of object and action (saying a or not a) that were recorded. Accuracy may be computed in terms of relative frequencies. The probability of making a correct response, known as a hit, in the presence of Table 2 The Payoff Matrix Action: World

a

Not a

Total

A

300

100

400

~A

250

350

600

Total:

550

450

1000

A—p(a|A)—was 300/(300+100) = 0.75. When A was absent, the probability of a correct rejection, p(not a|~A), was 350/600 = 0.583. A mistaken a when A was absent—p(a|~A), a false alarm—had a probability of 250/600 = 0.417. Finally, the probability of blinking—of a miss, p(not a|A)—was 100/400 = 0.25. Notice that the miss and correct rejection rates are the complements of the hit and false alarm rates, so if the first two probabilities are known, the second two add no new information and may be ignored. In the medical literature, hit rate and correct-rejection rate are emphasized and are called the sensitivity and the specificity of a test. In the discussion that follows, correct-rejection rates are used where they are more intuitive than false alarm rates, remembering that p(CR) = 1 – p(FA), just as p(H) = 1 – p(M). The four joint frequencies of Table 2 are reduced to two estimates of conditional probabilities but still do not provide the desired information. Figure 1 shows the standard icon of SDT, derived from the work of Leon Thurstone. (A prominent psychologist said of this icon that once learned, it is impossible to think of a signal discrimination problem without seeing it. That is, it is a meme.) Thurstone argued that the same object does not always give rise to the same perception but rather to a spread of stimulation; a coin may lie heads or tails, be clean or dirty, be seen at dawn or dusk. The spread of distributions in Figure 1 reflects this spread of possibilities. Based on the theory of errors, the many, small, independent factors that combine to create an overall perception tend toward a normal distribution. The distribution on the right is that of the signal, A. That on the left is of the foil, ~A. Both distributions are arrayed over what is called the decision axis. On any single occasion, the location of the signal is at one of the points covered by the distribution on the right, and its likelihood of being at a particular location is given by the height of the curve. The same is true for the foil on trials without a signal. On any trial, the location of the signal will probably fall toward the right of the decision axis. A savvy observer will set a mark on that axis, called the criterion (c), and respond a whenever the perception falls to the right of it and respond not a

Signal Detection Theory c

–3

–2

–1

∆

1

2

3

Decision Axis

Figure 1 The Underlying Representation Implicit in SDT, Here Corresponding to the Data in Table 2. The distribution on the right represents signal A, and that on the left signal B, or noise (~A). Instances of the signals from one trial to the next can occur anywhere within the space defined by the distributions.

otherwise. Then the probability of a hit is the area under the A distribution to the right of the criterion, which is 0.75 in Figure 1. But sometimes when the signal is absent, the foil itself exceeds the criterion. The probability of a false alarm is the area under the noise distribution to the right of the criterion, which is 0.417. Readers who have taken a course in statistical inference will recognize that false alarms correspond to Type 1 errors, and misses to Type II errors. Using hit rate (H) and false alarm rate (FA), it is possible to infer how far apart the distributions must be (i.e., what the signal strength or detectability is) and where the criterion is located. Both distributions have means and variances. If both variances are set to 1.0 and the origin of the decision axis is placed halfway between the means of the two distributions, then two unknowns remain: the distance between the signal and noise distributions, d', and the location of the criterion, c. The distance equals the sum of the z scores of the two correct-response (CR) probabilities, H and CR: d' = z(H) + z(CR) = 0.67 + 0.21 = 0.88. Bias indicates how much the observer, on average, favors H over CR and equals half of the difference of their z scores: c = [z(H) – z(CR)]/2 = –0.23. If the observer had set his or her criterion where the distributions cross, the z scores would be equal and c = 0.

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The decision axis represents a balance beam. The farther the distributions are from the fulcrum, the more clearly and forcefully they speak. The farther the criterion is from the two distributions’ center of gravity at 0, the more weight it gives to negative or positive evidence. The observed negative value of c in Figure 1 shows that the observer is not unbiased; he or she is more likely to say a than not a in the presence of an ambiguous signal. This negative criterion is called a “liberal bias.” Bias is not necessarily bad. For example, if the signal were a calcium deposit that might signal cancer, a radiologist should have a liberal criterion for ordering additional tests. But if those additional tests were invasive and not reliable, the radiologist should move the criterion in a more conservative direction. Exactly where the criterion should be placed is a matter of the costs and benefits shown in the four cells of Table 1. Although they are often evaluated intuitively by experts, the values of informed clients should also play a role in criterion setting. Figure 1 implies that when the distributions are close together, small shifts in the criterion can have a large effect on decisions. In the case of contested decisions, it is important to have as great a separation in the distributions—as great a d'—as possible. One of the great advantages of SDT is that it gives an authoritative answer to the question of how best to evaluate the informative value of a test in a way that is independent of the criterion of the expert.! The distance between the signal and noise distributions, or d', gives one good answer, but there is a more general one involving the receiver (or relative) operating characteristic (ROC).

The Receiver Operating Characteristic Reconsider Figure 1 with the criterion all the way to the left—an extremely liberal bias. Such a criterion yields a test that is 100% effective in detecting a target when it is present. Unfortunately, the test is also 100% ineffective in specifying when the target is absent—its false alarm rate is 100%. It is as though the radiologist recommended surgery for everyone who walked in the door. Now consider what happens when the criterion moves all the way to the right. This is the extreme,

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risk-averse position where no chances are taken because of the cost or fear of failure. Figure 2 shows the ROC curve that results from moving the criterion in the ways just mentioned. The area to the right of the criterion for the A distribution in Figure 1 is plotted as a function of the area to the right of the criterion for the ~A distribution. The dashed lines show where the criterion drawn in Figure 1 has left the trade-off between success and failure. It is clear at a glance how changes in the criterion that affect hit rate also affect false alarm rate. Specifically, if d' = 0, the ROC falls along the diagonal. With this the case, one could achieve an H rate of any desired value at the cost of an FA rate of the same value by guessing at chance levels at any point along that line. If d' is large—say, 3 or 4—the ROC rises quickly from 0 toward the top left corner, then smoothly curves to the right. If the observer is perceptive but has confused the response, saying a when b is correct and vice versa, the resulting ROC curves

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Figure 2 The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Based on the Data in Table 2. This figure plots the evolving values of p(H) as a function of the values of p(FA) as the criterion in Figure 1 is swept from the left of its frame to the right. The placement of c in Figure 1 gives the point of intersection of the two dashed lines.

below the diagonal, as though the bow just flipped down. If z(FA) and z(H) are used as the axes, the ROC becomes a straight line. The value of an ROC curve is that it manifests the costs in FA for any desired level of H. This can be done by drawing the horizontal at H until it intersects the ROC curve, then dropping the vertical to predict the FA. However, if the ROC curve is not symmetrical, d' is not as useful an index of test quality.

The Rating Scale ROC A single point based on one pair (H, FA) is a thin reed onto which to place so much of the weight of decision making. Most of the time when an observer responds with “yes” (Y) or “no” (N), he or she could say more. Individuals with a conservative criterion are presumably more confident that when they say Y, the target is really there, as they have chosen to call ambiguous stimuli N rather than risk a false alarm. If the observer is asked about his or her confidence in stating Y or N—say, on a 3-point scale of positive, not sure, just guessing—a 6-point scale emerges: N, and I’m positive, … through Y, and I’m positive. Suppose an alternative: that is, if the experiment were conducted in six separate sessions in which observers were asked to adopt one of the six criteria. In the first session, for instance, they would be asked to say N only if they are positive and Y to all other stimuli. In the second session, they would be asked to say N only if they are not sure and Y otherwise. By accomplishing all the above in a single ­session, the rating scale method offers an almost sixfold savings in labor and produces data similar to those from the more extensive method. Another advantage of rating scales is that the observers are less likely to (a) become bored and thus exhibit declining levels of d' over the sessions or (b) become expert and thus produce increasing levels of d' over the sessions. A Practical Example

Figure 3 shows a rating scale ROC developed for the diagnosis of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Anneke Meyer and Terje Sagvolden collected several measures of fine-motor skills among seven ethnically diverse tribes in South Africa, along with scores on a standardized measure

Single-Subject Research Designs

of ADHD. Peter Killeen added the scores on two of their measures and set a dozen criteria, ranging from the lowest scores to the highest, then calculating p(Hi) and p(FAi) for each criterion. He relied on the division into A (ADHD) and ~A (not ADHD) equivalent to signal present versus signal absent. The ROC in Figure 3 resulted, giving a criterion-free accuracy (the area under the ROC curve) of 75%. By itself, this is not high enough for clinical use (fine-motor disturbances could occur for many reasons), but along with other measures, it could improve categorization accuracy. Or it could be used as a quick prescreening test (using a liberal criterion) to save resources for further detailed analysis or treatment of those affected. Peter R. Killeen 1

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See also Auditory Perception; Event Perception; Heuristics for Memory and Decision Making; Human Information Processing; Perception and Motivation; Reasoning and Decision Making

Further Readings Killeen, P. R. (2003). The yins/yangs of science. Behavior and Philosophy, 31, 251–258. Killeen, P. R., & Taylor, T. J. (2004). Symmetric receiver operating characteristics. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 48, 432–434. Macmillan, N. A., & Creelman, C. D. (2005). Detection theory: A user’s guide (2nd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. McNichol, D. (2005). A primer of signal detection theory. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Meyer, A., & Sagvolden, T. (2006). Fine motor skills in South African children with symptoms of ADHD: Influence of subtype, gender, age, and hand dominance. Behavioral and Brain Functions, 2, 33.

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Figure 3 The Probability of Correctly Diagnosing Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder Where It Exists, as a Function of the Probability of a Misdiagnosis Note: The data are kindly provided by Anneke Meyer, from a study by Meyer and Sagvolden (2006). The test is the sum of two measures of fine motor skills, administered to 264 children from 7 ethnic groups in South Africa, and 264 controls. The ROC used the rating scale technique with 12 equally spaced criteria on motor proficiency. Source: With kind permission from Springer Science+Business Media: Killeen, P. R., Tannock, R., & Sagvolden, T. (2012). The Four Causes of ADHD: A Framework. In S. C. Stanford & R. Tannock (Eds.), Behavioral Neuroscience of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and Its Treatment (Vol. 9, pp. 391–425). Berlin: Springer.

Single-subject research designs (SSDs) are experimental strategies used to evaluate the effects of an intervention on a target behavior in one or more individuals. SSDs typically rely on visual inspection of session-by-session graphs rather than inferential statistics. The effect of the intervention is established by comparison with a baseline condition in which the intervention is absent. In an SSD, the experimenter introduces an intervention (the independent variable) and monitors its effects on a behavior of interest (the dependent variable). This entry discusses the history and characteristics of SSDs and describes ways to maximize the validity and feasibility of this research method. SSDs typically involve (a) repeated measurement of the dependent variable, (b) repeated demonstrations of the effects of the independent variable vis-à-vis the dependent variable within the same individual or across individuals, and (c) evaluation of the effects of the intervention by exposing the same individual to all levels of the independent variable. SSDs are widely used in clinical psychology, education, sports psychology, behavior analysis, and medicine as a means to

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establish evidence-based interventions. In contrast with group-based methodologies, SSDs can produce strong experimental evidence with few individuals.

History Prior to the rise of inferential statistics, all experimental designs could be considered SSDs. For example, Galileo examined the falling rates of individual objects dropped from different heights. With the rise of statistics in the 19th century, many researchers adopted averaging across groups of individuals as a means of drawing conclusions. Not all scientists, however, accepted this approach. For example, Claude Bernard argued strongly for replicating effects in single individuals as the appropriate way to develop medical sciences. In psychology, little emphasis was placed on the use of formal, inferential-statistical methods prior to Ronald A. Fisher’s influential work. In the 1930s, journal editors in psychology began to stress the use of these methods as a requirement for ensuring the reliability of empirical results. B. F. Skinner and other behavioral psychologists challenged this trend. They argued that psychology is a science of the individual and should therefore focus on discovering laws of behavior that apply to individuals rather than finding group averages. Beginning with Murray Sidman’s Tactics of Scientific Research, behavioral psychologists have provided detailed rationales for the use of SSDs.

Characteristics Temporal Recordings

SSDs document changes in the level, trend, and variability of the dependent variable by recording multiple instances of the behavior of interest at each level of the independent variable. These changes help establish the consistency, magnitude, and immediacy of the intervention effects through the visual examination of the sequence of data points. The number of times the target behavior is sampled may vary and is rarely established a priori. For example, low variability, distinct trend change upon implementing the independent variable, and immediate effects may require fewer samples of behavior than a delayed effect with an

unclear trend and moderate variability requires. On occasions when variability is high, it may not be possible to evaluate treatment effects even with large samples of behavior. Excessive variability suggests that an appropriate level of experimental control has not been achieved, and procedural rather than design changes may be necessary. Exposure to All Levels of the Independent Variable

In an SSD, the individual is typically exposed to all levels of the independent variable. The baseline condition should lack the key manipulation to be tested as intervention. For example, to evaluate the effect of the availability of leisure activities on defiant behavior in an individual with intellectual disability, the experimenter would withhold leisure activities during baseline. Repeated Demonstration of the Effects of the Intervention

SSDs should include several demonstrations of an experimental effect. Effects can be demonstrated within the same subject (within-subject demonstration) and across subjects (between-­ subject demonstration). Demonstrations can be grouped in five major categories that define the five major types of SSDs (see Figure 1): 1. Reversal design—repeated within-subject demonstrations over successive, repeated phases. For example, to evaluate the effects of a teacher’s attention on class participation, the experimenter could present and withdraw the teacher’s attention across successive phases. 2. Multi-element design—repeated within-subject demonstration and cyclical alternation of the independent variable. For example, to evaluate the effects of three types of feedback on the performance of an athlete, the experimenter could alternate the type of feedback presented across successive three-session cycles. 3. Parametric or schedule design—within-subject demonstration of a continuous effect in accordance with the gradual increase or decrease of a continuous independent variable.

Single-Subject Research Designs

For example, to evaluate the effect of various medication dosages on alertness, the experimenter could administer increasing or decreasing dosages during successive weeks while monitoring whether alertness varies according to dosage amount.

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4. Changing-criterion design—gradual, withinsubject demonstration of a continuous effect in accordance with the gradual manipulation of a continuous mastery criterion. For example, to establish reading fluency in a 6-year-old, the experimenter might provide positive praise through increasingly more demanding phases. Initially, praise would occur only if 50 words per minute were read. Later, it would occur only if 70 words per minute were read, and so forth. 5. Multiple-baseline design—several time-staggered between- or within-subject demonstrations of intervention effects. Between-subject demonstrations are staggered across participants. For example, to evaluate the effect of engagement in leisure activities on the selfstimulatory behavior of individuals with dementia, the experimenter could stagger the introduction of the intervention across participants and evaluate the relation between self-stimulatory behavior and treatment initiation in all participants. The multiplebaseline design may also produce within-subject demonstrations staggered across behaviors, contexts, therapists, and so on.

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Exposing the same individual to all levels of the independent variable induces potential sources of error: sequential effects in multi-element designs, nonreversibility effects in reversal designs, and cross-baseline interactions in multiple-baseline designs. Sequential effects occur when a preceding intervention affects the dependent variable. For

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example, a child who receives a toy when he or she says “car” in a given setting may do so under a program that prescribes the delivery of toys only during playtimes. Nonreversibility effects occur when the exposure to an intervention produces permanent changes in the dependent variable. For example, the acquisition of certain skills, such as riding a bike, is not reversible. Finally, cross-baseline interactions are undesired influences on a behavior that has not yet been exposed to the intervention. For example, a participant in the baseline condition may be vicariously exposed to the intervention when it is administered to other participants in the study.

examples. SSDs are powerful research designs for systematically exploring and evaluating new and established interventions in clinical and educational settings. Javier Virués-Ortega, Joseph J. Pear, Ashley L. Boris, Alison D. Cox, Lei Hu, Flávia M. Julio, Chelsey A. Michalyshyn, and Jade K. Wightman See also Applied Behavior Analysis; Behaviorism; Law of Effect; Learning Theories; Neurodevelopmental Disorders; Operant Conditioning; Pavlov’s Legacy; Psychophysics; Skinner’s Legacy; Statistics

Further Readings

Maximize Internal Validity

Because organisms differ, an organism is a better control for itself than for another individual. Moreover, demonstrations that require the fewest number of successive phases tend to minimize sequential effects. Further, within-subject demonstrations across phases can reveal gradual effects that develop over successive sessions, which cannot be done as well when the independent variable changes frequently (i.e., in a multi-element design). Thus, when feasible, the reversal design provides the strongest means of experimental demonstration or internal validity. Maximize Feasibility

Not all designs are practical under all circumstances. For example, a reversal design may pose ethical concerns if it involves reinstating an undesirable behavior. It may not be feasible if the intervention needs to be conducted in a setting where time and human resources are limited. And it may not be possible if the effect of the intervention is irreversible.

Implications Many evidence-based interventions have been developed and evaluated using single-subject methodology. Systematic desensitization, functional communication training, functional analysis and treatment of problem behavior, and early, intensive behavioral intervention for autism are just a few

Bernard, C. (1865). Introduction à l’étude de la médecine expérimentale. Paris, France: Flammarion. Sidman, M. (1960). Tactics of scientific research. New York, NY: Macmillan. Thompson, R. H., & Iwata, B. A. (2005). A review of reinforcement control procedures. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 38, 257–278.

Skinner’s Legacy Burris Frederic Skinner (1904–1990), “Fred” to his colleagues, worked in psychology for roughly 60 years, from about 1930 to 1990. Practically all his work was related to behavior, both with respect to its analysis and with the aim of helping bring about better behavior on the part of people. He worked on various levels of analysis with equal facility, including the effect of reinforcing particular forms of behavior (e.g., a pigeon raising its head), how verbal behavior might be accounted for, and the design of culture. This entry summarizes contributions of B. F. Skinner to the field of psychology.

Specific Contributions Operant and Respondent Conditioning

Early in his career, Skinner was partly responsible for the distinction between operant and respondent conditioning. Operant conditioning involves the strengthening of a response (such as a rat’s pressing a bar) by means of its consequences.

Skinner’s Legacy

If a hungry rat is given food when it presses a bar, it will subsequently be found to press at a high rate. Respondent conditioning involves the pairing of two stimuli, one of which elicits a response. If a bell is sounded prior to giving a dog food, the bell alone will subsequently result in the dog’s salivating. The Free Operant

When Skinner began his work, the usual method of studying learning was the maze. In its simplest form, the T-maze involved a runway and a choice point, with turning either left or right resulting in food. Each trial required the experimenter to place the rat at the beginning, measure the time to reach the correct (or incorrect) end, and remove the animal. Skinner developed the free-operant procedure, which involves an animal responding at any time (e.g., a rat pressing a bar), with food being delivered automatically. This removed the experimenter from the situation and opened up an entirely unknown realm—namely, the effect of contingencies of reinforcement on behavior. For example, a maze is basically a fixed-ratio schedule: A fixed number of responses are required in order to receive food. But with the free-operant procedure, schedules were developed that depend on response count, time, or any combination of them. For example, on a variable-interval schedule, following reinforcement, some amount of time must pass (with that time varying from reinforcement to reinforcement), and the next response produces food. This schedule gives rise to a moderate and steady response rate. It would be next to impossible to implement such a schedule by means of a maze. Shaping

Shaping by successive approximation was also developed by Skinner. If an animal does not engage in a desired form of behavior (e.g., if a child does not play Chopin on the piano), one can generate the behavior by reinforcing behaviors that successively approximate the desired behavior (e.g., playing scales would be one of the approximate behaviors). Verbal Behavior

Skinner’s analysis of verbal behavior involved treating it as operant behavior. Writing and

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speaking, for him, were forms of behavior maintained by their consequences (as opposed to their expressing what is on one’s mind, for example). Skinner argued that verbal behavior differed from other forms of behavior because it is reinforced by other people. Other forms of behavior (e.g., riding a bicycle properly) are reinforced directly by the physical environment. Combining shaping and verbal behavior led to his work (following Sidney L. Pressey, 1888– 1979) on teaching machines, which involves the shaping of verbal behavior (e.g., learning the various steps in order to integrate an equation). There are at least two advantages to this approach over traditional teaching. First, a student is given immediate feedback about the accuracy of his or her responses. Second, each student can move at his or her own pace, unlike a traditional classroom in which all proceed at the same rate (which is usually too fast for some and too slow for others). Self-Awareness

René Descartes (1596–1650) based his philosophy on the dictum “I think, therefore I exist.” In other words, he found self-awareness the most undoubtable fact of existence. Skinner turned this on its head, arguing that people can learn to identify objects and properties outside themselves because other people reinforce them under appropriate conditions (e.g., they learn to say “red” in the presence of a particular color because other people can observe the color). But events inside themselves cannot be observed by others, and so they have difficulty learning to identify them. Ethics

David Hume (1711–1776) argued that the philosophy of ethics does not permit an “ought” to be derived from an “is.” In other words, a fact (that which is) does not allow people to say what they or others should or ought to do. Skinner argued that a statement such as “You should not lie” can, in fact, be derived from facts. He expanded such statements to this: “If you are reinforced by the approval of your fellow men, you will be reinforced when you tell the truth.” In other words, he

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viewed “ought” statements as specifying behavior that would give rise to specific consequences. If specific consequences are reinforcing (or punishing), then what a person ought to do follows from that fact. The Law

The legal system also received Skinner’s attention. A law (e.g., a sign reading “Speed Limit 55”) is, for Skinner, a contingency, specifying that if certain behavior is engaged in, certain consequences are apt to follow. He argued that most laws in society specify aversive consequences, making the world more unpleasant than is strictly necessary. How many times are people reinforced for driving at the posted speed? Culture

With respect to culture, Skinner believed that an understanding of behavior would allow contingencies to be implemented that would result in peaceful and productive behavior. He argued that most of the problems humans face are due to human behavior. For Skinner, any catalog of those problems—including an ever-increasing national debt, climate change, overpopulation, depletion of natural resources, extinction of species, and continuous war—was addressable and could be improved by a science of behavior. William Vaughan, Jr. See also Applied Behavior Analysis; Behavior Therapies; Behavioral Development; Behavioral Economics; Behavioral Health; Behavioral Perspectives on Psychopathology; Behavioral Theories of Personality; Behaviorism; Cognitive Behavioral Therapies; Evidence-Based Therapy; Human Nature; Operant Conditioning; Watson, J. B.

Further Readings Bjork, D. W. (1993). B. F. Skinner: A life. New York, NY: Basic Books. Dews, P. B. (1970). Festschrift for B. F. Skinner. New York, NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Skinner, B. F. (1971). Beyond freedom and dignity. New York, NY: Knopf.

Sleep Disorders There are scores of sleep disorders characterized by disruption to the normal sleep/wake cycle and that often cause daytime impairment and distress. These disorders collectively affect the mental, emotional, social, and physical functioning of tens of millions of Americans. Though the effects of sleep disorders can be far-reaching and severe, some of them may be treated by behavioral sleep medicine, a branch of health psychology and clinical sleep medicine that focuses on identifying and changing the cognitive and behavioral factors contributing to the disorder. These interventions are derived from models of behavioral–cognitive science, including classical conditioning, operant conditioning, social cognitive theory, cognitive science, and self-regulation. This entry describes the five primary areas of behavioral sleep psychology intervention and outcome: insomnia, continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) adherence associated with sleep apnea, behavioral insomnia of childhood, circadian disorders, and parasomnias.

Insomnia Insomnia is characterized by difficulty falling or staying asleep, dissatisfaction with sleep quality or quantity, and impairment of daily functioning. It is now well established that psychological, psychiatric, and medical factors combine to precipitate insomnia, but mainly, psychological factors perpetuate it. These factors include attentional bias, which causes preference for sleep-related cues; misguided compensatory behaviors, which include allotting more time for sleep and selfmedicating to induce sleep; and excessive worry about sleep. Edmund Jacobson’s work on conceptualizing and treating insomnia is widely considered the beginning of behavioral sleep medicine. Jacobson developed progressive muscle relaxation (PMR) after theorizing that heightened arousal contributes to many common medical complaints, including insomnia. There are currently over 250 published studies on the psychological treatment of insomnia. The most commonly used interventions are cognitive, behavioral, or both and include

Sleep Disorders

stimulus-control therapy, sleep hygiene, cognitive therapy, relaxation, and sleep-restriction therapy. Stimulus-control therapy, developed using learning theory in the early 1970s by Richard Bootzin, conditions the patient to associate the bedroom and bedtime routine with sleep. In 1977, Peter Hauri published a set of guidelines promoting better sleep called sleep hygiene. The guidelines ­ have since evolved and now include establishing a ­regular bedtime routine, avoiding stimulants and napping near bedtime, and exercising regularly. Sleep restriction therapy, developed by Arthur Spielman and colleagues in the late 1980s, is a behavioral treatment that increases the homeostatic drive for sleep by constraining time in bed to conform to actual time slept. As a result, sleep efficiency (the ratio of total time asleep to total time in bed) is increased, and excess wake time is decreased.

Sleep Apnea and CPAP Adherence Obstructive sleep apnea (OSA) is a debilitating sleep disorder characterized by obstructive apneas, a complete lack of airflow caused by a blockage of the upper airway, and hypopneas, a partial blockage, repeatedly throughout sleep. Early diagnosis and treatment of OSA are critical to patient outcome, as the disorder is associated with hypertension and increased vulnerability to stroke. CPAP therapy, an OSA treatment that keeps the airway open during sleep via continuous air pressure, has been shown to be highly efficacious and can improve psychosocial functioning and associated medical conditions. However, up to half of OSA patients abandon CPAP therapy within 1 year of beginning treatment. Research-supported psychological approaches promoting CPAP adherence in patients with OSA include an educational approach based on social cognitive theory, graded exposure, and applications of motivational interviewing. The primary assumptions of social cognitive theory are that learning occurs through observations of others and that behavior, environment, and personal factors interact to influence behavioral expression. Two components of social cognitive theory have been found to strongly influence CPAP adherence: self-efficacy, or the belief in one’s ability to succeed, and the perceived risks and

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benefits of treatment. Educational approaches to CPAP adherence based on this theory include interventions to increase self-efficacy and education about the actual risks and benefits associated with the therapy. Graded-exposure therapy, a behavior therapy technique, allows patients experiencing phobiclike reactions to the CPAP mask to gradually acclimate to wearing the mask. Finally, motivational interviewing increases CPAP adherence by addressing motivational factors associated with poor treatment compliance and patient ambivalence about treatment.

Behavioral Insomnia of Childhood Insomnia in children is qualitatively different from adult insomnia. Endogenous factors are often contributory, but parent–child interactions are typically the major source of bedtime problems. Commonly used interventions for childhood insomnias are based on three principles. First, children learn to initially fall asleep under certain conditions that must be replicated in order to fall back to sleep after normal nighttime awakenings. To correct sleep maintenance problems, teaching children to initially fall asleep independently is typically sufficient. Second, children who are overtired will likely experience increased difficulty initiating and maintaining sleep. Finally, optimal bedtimes vary, depending on the child and his or her age. Because of the nature of childhood insomnia, interventions apply principles of learning and behavior to the problematic sleep-related behaviors. Reinforcement, extinction, and shaping of the child’s behaviors allow unnecessary behaviors to be reduced or eliminated and replaced with desired behaviors. Another key component of treatment for childhood insomnia is parent education about the best sleep environment for the children, normal sleep patterns, and the importance of developing a bedtime ritual and normal sleep/wake times.

Circadian-Rhythm Disorders Circadian rhythms are biological processes that oscillate every 24 hours and regulate a variety of functions, including temperature, hormone secretion, and appetite. These rhythms also influence

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sleep propensity—that is, the inclination of the body to rest. Other factors influencing sleep propensity include light, noise, stimulants, sedatives, pain, emotional responses, arousal level, and biological factors. Within the range of normal sleep there are people whose advanced circadian clocks cause them to fall asleep and arise earlier than most, commonly called “larks,” and people whose delayed clocks cause them to fall asleep and arise later than most, called “owls.” Such deviations may become extreme and clinically significant. Circadian-rhythm sleep disorders affect the timing of sleep, not the amount or quality of sleep, and can arise from genetic propensity, developmental phases, or environmental intrusion (e.g., shiftwork or jet lag). Developmental phases may affect circadian rhythms during adolescence, when the sleep phase tends to be delayed for some individuals, and during late adulthood, when the sleep phase tends to be advanced for some individuals. Circadian-rhythm sleep–wake disorder can cause the sleep and wake times to be irregular, advanced, or delayed and can be successfully treated with sleep hygiene, education, and light exposure, which consists of slowly shifting bedtime and rising time until the desired sleep schedule is reached.

wets a pad that lies on his or her bed, a bell rings and awakens the child. After this cycle is repeated multiple times, the child comes to associate the sensation of a full bladder with awakening.

Parasomnias

In humans, the conventional characterization of sleep into rapid eye movement (REM) and nonREM (NREM) types, with further division of NREM sleep into grades of depth, is over 50 years old and was developed at a time when understanding of neurobiology was limited, current generation brain imaging did not exist, and lack of computational resources did not allow application of network concepts to biological states. This entry describes the stages of sleep and reviews ­current and alternative models of sleep regulation. The primary features of REM sleep have held up well with modern neurobiological circuit analysis. However, NREM sleep suffers from a major limitation in that deep and restorative “slow wave sleep” (once Stages III and IV but now N3) make up an increasingly minor part of sleep across the life span and may be “normally absent” after the age of 60 years. Sleep seems to have an important role for normal synaptic function and maintenance. In the cerebral cortex, deep NREM sleep manifests with low-frequency variations in surface potentials that

Parasomnias are clinical disorders consisting of undesired phenomena that typically occur during sleep, not of irregularities in the processes regulating sleep, and include nightmare disorder and nocturnal enuresis. Nightmare disorder consists of repeated threatening dreams that cause distress; it is typically treated with cognitive behavioral interventions, including imagery rehearsal therapy and desensitization. Imagery rehearsal therapy consists of remembering and writing down the nightmare scenario, editing it to be more positive, and then rehearsing the new scenario to displace the nightmare. Desensitization, or gradually exposing the person to the feared stimuli, trains the person to cope with and manage the stimuli. Children typically develop the ability to inhibit urination during sleep between the ages of 2 and 6 years. Failing to gain this skill by age 6 is called nocturnal enuresis. In 1938, O. Hobart Mowrer developed the bell-and-pad treatment for enuresis based on classical conditioning. Whenever a child

Caitlin E. Moran, Kenneth L. Lichstein, and Christina S. McCrae See also Consciousness, Disorders of; Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; Dreams; International Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems; Mood Disorders; Reinforcement; Self-Control; Sleep Stages and States; Sleep Functions

Further Readings Carney, P. R., Geyer, J. D., & Berry, R. B. (Eds.). (2012). Clinical sleep disorders (2nd ed.). Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins. Perlis, M. L., & Lichstein, K. L. (2003). Treating sleep disorders: Principles and practice of behavioral sleep medicine. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley.

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characterize slow-wave activity EEG. At the ­neuronal-unit level, these events reflect synchronization (