The Routledge Handbook of Sport in Asia [1 ed.] 9780367183776, 9780429061202

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The Routledge Handbook of Sport in Asia

This is the first book to offer a comprehensive overview of the history, development and contemporary significance of sport in Asia. It addresses a wide range of issues central to sport in the context of Asian culture, politics, economy and society. The book explores diverse topics, including the history of traditional Asian sport; the rise of modern sport in Asia; the Olympic Movement in Asia; mega sport events in Asia; sport governance and policy; gender, class and ethnicity in Asian sport, and Asia’s sporting heroes and heroines. With contributions from 74 leading international scholars, it offers a new perspective on understanding Asian sport and society, telling the story of how sport in this mega-region is coming together and reshaping the world in the process. It also provides readers with a wide lens through which to better contextualise the relationships between Asia and the world within the global sport community. The Routledge Handbook of Sport in Asia is a vital resource for students and scholars studying the history, politics, sociology, culture and policy of sport in Asia, as well as sport management, sport history, sport sociology, and sport policy and politics. It is also valuable reading for those working in international sport organisations. Fan Hong is Professor in Asian Studies at Bangor University, UK. She is Visiting and Adjunct Professor at several universities in China, Indonesia and Australia. She is also Editor-in-Chief of the Asian Journal of Sport History and Culture, and an editorial board member of several academic journals. Her research interests are in the areas of sport history, gender, policy and organisations, cross-cultural studies and Asian studies. Lu Zhouxiang is Lecturer in Chinese Studies at Maynooth University, Ireland. He is also Academic Editor of the Asian Journal of Sport History and Culture and Editor of Cogent Social Sciences. His main research interests are Chinese history, national identity, Chinese martial arts and China’s sport policy and practice.

The Routledge Handbook of Sport in Asia

Edited by Fan Hong and Lu Zhouxiang

First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 selection and editorial matter, Fan Hong and Lu Zhouxiang; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Fan Hong and Lu Zhouxiang to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-0-367-18377-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-06120-2 (ebk) Typeset in Bembo by Apex CoVantage, LLC

For scholars, students, editors, publishers, and all the people who are instrumental in moving the study of Asian sport history and culture forward.

Contents

List of figuresxiii List of tablesxiv List of contributors xvi Prefacexxviii Acknowledgementsxxix List of abbreviations xxx

Introduction: the Asian century and Asian sport Fan Hong and Lu Zhouxiang

1

PART I

Asia’s traditional sport

9

  1 In authentic relations: traditional Asian martial arts, East and West Paul Bowman

11

  2 Chinese philosophy and Asian martial arts Barry Allen

20

  3 A brief history of Chinese martial arts Lu Zhouxiang

28

  4 The development and global transmission of Wing Chun Benjamin N. Judkins

36

  5 The transmission modes of taijiquan: traditional martial art, competitive sport and the political reappropriation of culture in modern China Pierrick Porchet   6 The long-term development of Japanese martial arts Raúl Sánchez García

45 54

vii

Contents

 7 Kendō: an indigenous culture embodying national narratives in Japan Yasuhiro Sakaue

64

 8 Judo Mike Callan

75

  9 In search of a tradition for taekwondo Udo Moenig and Minho Kim

83

10 Chinlone: national sport of Myanmar Maitrii Aung-Thwin

96

PART II

The rise of modern sport and the Olympic Movement in Asia

105

11 The foundation and early years of the Olympic Council of Asia: a controversial body making controversial politics Jörg Krieger

107

12 China and the Olympic Games Fan Hong and Zhong Yuting

118

13 The rise of modern sport and the Olympic Movement in India Souvik Naha

126

14 The rise of modern sport and the Olympic Movement in Japan Yasuhiro Sakaue and Lee Thompson

135

15 Beyond the Peninsula: sport and the Olympic Games in colonial Korea (1910–1945) Seok Lee 16 The rise of modern sport and the Olympic Movement in Korea Gwang Ok and Ka-Ram Lee 17 The introduction and institutionalisation of Western sport in colonial and postcolonial Malaya, 1786–1965 Peng Ham Lim 18 Sport, colonisation and modernity in the Philippines Gerald R. Gems

viii

149 159

169 180

Contents

19 The rise of modern sport in colonial Singapore: the Singapore Cricket Club leads the way Nick Aplin

190

PART III

Sport policy and practice: public and private provision

207

20 International sport events and the two Koreas: politics, policies and practice Udo Merkel

209

21 Sport diplomacy at the 2018 Winter Olympics in PyeongChang: the relations between North and South Korea Jung Woo Lee

227

22 Commercialisation of sport in China Ma Yang and Zheng Jinming 23 The reform of China’s elite sport system: case studies on football and table tennis Huang Gangqiang and Lu Zhouxiang 24 The development of sport policy and practice in Taiwan Ko Ling-Mei and Lee Ping-Chao 25 Politics and policy of forging post-handover Hong Kong as sporting mega-event centre Marcus P. Chu 26 An overview of sport in modern India Packianathan Chelladurai and Swarali Patil 27 Indonesia’s sport policy and development in the Old Order Era (1945–1967) and New Order Era (1967–1998) Amung Ma’mun

238

247

256

271

279

289

PART IV

Social stratification and diversity in Asian sport

303

28 Safeguarding children in sport in Asia Daniel J. A. Rhind and Katsumi Mori

305

ix

Contents

29 Sport and ethnicity Bonnie Pang and Rohini Balram

314

30 South Korea: women and sport in a persistent patriarchy Guy Podoler

324

31 Disability sport in Malaysia: challenges and opportunities Selina Khoo

336

32 Sport and gender in contemporary China Xiong Huan

345

33 The changing society, state policies and sport for young children in twenty-first-century China Zhong Yijing and Dong Jinxia

357

34 The development of elite disability sport in China Guan Zhixun

366

35 Sport and social class in Japan: past and present Koji Kobayashi and Hitoshi Ebishima

377

36 Sport and gender in Japan Osamu Takamine

386

37 Sport and ethnicity in Indonesia: developing national character through traditional games Toho Cholik Mutohir and Muchamad Arif Al Ardha 38 Yoga for oppositional defiant disorder and adolescent relationship issues Prasanna Balaji

393 404

PART V

Sport in West Asia and the Middle East

417

39 Sport and diplomacy in the Middle East Andrea L. Stanton

419

40 Sport and international relations in the Arab world Bakeel Al Zandani and Youcef Bouandel

429

41 Arab countries’ strategies to bid and to host major sport events Wadih Ishac

437

x

Contents

42 The emergence and development of the Islamic Solidarity Games Abdul Rahim Al Droushi

447

43 Soccer: moulding the Middle East and North Africa James M. Dorsey

456

44 Playing ball: crowd and ‘contra-crowd’ in the politics of Egyptian and Tunisian football Larbi Sadiki and Layla Saleh

473

PART VI

Asian mega sporting events

491

45 The Asian Games, Asian sport and Asian politics Fan Hong and Gong He

493

46 The Far Eastern Championship Games Wang Yan

505

47 The games of the new emerging forces Friederike Trotier

509

48 Borrowed spectacle: Olympic rhetoric in political battles Jessamyn R. Abel

515

49 The Southeast Asian Games Simon Creak

522

50 The Asian Indoor Games Feng Jing

528

51 The political dimension of the AFC Asian Cup Jörg Krieger

533

52 The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games Min Ge

538

53 The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games and South Korea’s mega-events545 Jihyun Cho 54 Wushu competitions in Asia Shen Liang

551

xi

Contents

PART VII

Asia’s sport heroes and heroines

557

55 Liu Changchun: China’s first Olympic athlete Zhang Ling

559

56 Rudy Hartono: an Indonesian badminton legend Toho Cholik Mutohir and Awang Firmansyah

563

57 Dipa Karmakar: rising star of India Usha S. Nair

572

58 Bruce Lee: his Jeet Kune Do, his movies and his legacy Liu Yinya

575

59 Yao Ming: the basketball giant Huang Fuhua

579

60 Eric Liddell: the flying Scotsman Zhang Huijie

583

61 Seri Pak: Korea’s Golf Empress Gwang Ok and Kyoungho Park

589

62 Dhyan Chand Singh: a legend in hockey Usha S. Nair

593

63 He Zhenliang: China’s Mr Olympics Zhang Jie

596

Index603

xii

Figures

9.1 9.2 1 9.1 19.2 19.3 19.4 1 9.5 19.6 19.7 19.8 23.1 24.1 24.2 34.1 34.2 34.3 35.1

Chinese kwŏnbŏp instructions (page 3) in the Muye Chepo Pŏnyŏk Sokchip 85 (武藝諸譜飜譯續集 Series of Translated Illustrated Martial Arts Records) President Rhee Syngman (right) watches a tangsudo demonstration performed by Choi Hong Hi’s (centre) soldiers, in 1954 87 Articles in the Press including the word ‘Sport’ and/or ‘Recreation’: 1869–1914 191 The Third Pavilion of the Singapore Cricket Club, circa 1895 193 Tennis as the most reported game in the Press (1889–1914) 196 The Ladies Lawn Tennis Club with the original pavilion viewed from Mount Sophia197 The Singapore Golf Club – circa 1893 198 The Singapore Swimming Club 199 The SCC Clubhouse 201 The New Grandstand at the Racecourse in 1910 202 China’s FIFA World Ranking: 1992–2018 250 National sports administrative structure in Taiwan (1997–1999) 262 National sports administrative structure in Taiwan in 2012 263 China Disability Sport Management Centre structure 369 China Disability Sport Management Centre management structure 370 Full-time staff numbers of 12 provincial training centres in 2010 371 Trends in provision of facilities for sport and physical education 380

xiii

Tables

12.1 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 15.1 17.1 17.2 19.1 19.2 19.3 19.4 24.1 26.1 27.1 27.2 27.3 27.4 34.1 34.2 34.3 34.4 34.5 34.6 36.1 38.1 45.1 45.2

xiv

China’s Participation in the Olympic Games 123 Japan’s Participation in the Summer Olympics, 1912–1936 136 Keio University Registered Sports Clubs, by Year 137 The Establishment of Sport Associations in Japan through the 1930s 140 Middle School Sports Clubs in 1932 141 Korean Athletes as Members of the Japanese Olympic Team 153 Total Medal Tally of the First SEAP Games, 12–17 December 1959, Bangkok, Thailand 174 Total Medal Tally of the 3rd SEAP Games, 14–21 December 1965, Kuala Lumpur 175 Census Figures for Singapore as Published by Makepeace et al. (1921) 191 Sport as Elements of the Dominant Culture of Sport in Singapore 194 Association Football–Developmental Stages 196 List of Sport Clubs 200 The Evolution of the Central Sports Administrative Structure in Taiwan, 1949–2018258 India’s Medal Tally in Commonwealth, Asian and Olympic Games 281 Indonesian Badminton Sports Achievement in the Thomas Cup 297 Indonesian Badminton Sports Achievement in the All England Individual and World Championships 297 Indonesian Badminton Sports Achievement in the SEA Games since 1977 298 Indonesia’s Participation in the Olympics 298 National Disabled Games and Athlete Numbers 372 National Level Disability Sport Budget 373 Provincial Level Disability Sport Budget 373 FESPIC Games and Asian Paralympic Games–Results of China 373 Deaflympic Games–Results of China 374 Paralympic Games–Results of China 374 A Timeline of Major Social Events, Gender Equality Policy, and Sport Policy in Japan for the Past Ten Years and into the Future 387 Activities and Their Scientific Relevance Included in This Study 408 FECG (1913–1938) 494 Asian Games (1951–2018) 501

Tables

50.1 Basic Information of AIG & AIMAG 54.1 Wushu Events in the Asian Games (1990–2018) 54.2 Percentage Participation Rate by Region in Wushu Taolu Competitions in the Asian Games 63.1 He Zhenliang’s Visits during Beijing’s Bids to Host the Olympic Games

529 552 554 598

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Contributors

Jessamyn R. Abel is Assistant Professor of Modern Japanese History at Pennsylvania State University, with interests in cultural history, technology, infrastructure, sport and international relations. She is the author of The International Minimum: Creativity and Contradiction in Japan’s Global Engagement, 1933–1964 (University of Hawai‘i Press, 2015) and is currently writing a cultural history of the first bullet train. Barry Allen is Distinguished University Professor of philosophy at McMaster University and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. He has held visiting appointments in Jerusalem, Istanbul, Shanghai and Hong Kong, and he is associate editor at the interdisciplinary journal Common Knowledge. His research concerns aesthetics, technology, the theory of knowledge and Chinese philosophy. He is the author of Truth in Philosophy, Knowledge and Civilization, Artifice and Design: Art and Technology in Human Experience, and Vanishing into Things: Knowledge in Chinese Tradition, and Empiricisms: Experience and Experiment from Antiquity to the Anthropocene. Nick Aplin graduated from Loughborough College of PE in 1976, and obtained an MSc from

Loughborough University in 1985 and a PhD from Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, in 1999. He was a university lecturer until the end of 2019. He then made the transition to focus on Special Projects at Sports Singapore, a statutory board of the Singapore government. His most recent book is Sport in Singapore: The Colonial Legacy (2019). Nick Aplin has been engaged in local television commentary work since 1997, including events such as the SEA Games, the Champions League and the S. League. In 2010, he was a lead commentator for the local cable TV network coverage of the inaugural Youth Olympic Games (YOG) hosted by Singapore. In 2015, he commentated on the ASEAN Paralympic Games hosted by Singapore. Muchamad Arif Al Ardha is Lecturer in the Physical Education Department, Universitas Negeri Surabaya. His research interests include physical education, curriculum development, character building, biomechanics and motor development. Maitrii Aung-Thwin is Associate Professor of Myanmar/Southeast Asian history and Convener

of the Comparative Asian Studies PhD Program at the National University of Singapore. His current research is concerned with nation building, public history, infrastructure and Buddhist networks in South and Southeast Asia. His publications include: A History of Myanmar since Ancient Times:Traditions and Transformations (co-authored with Michael Aung-Thwin, 2013), The Return of the Galon King: History, Law, and Rebellion in Colonial Burma (2011) and A New History of Southeast Asia (co-authored with Merle Ricklefs et al., 2010). Dr. Aung-Thwin served on the Association of Asian Studies Board of Directors (United States) and chaired the AAS Southeast xvi

Contributors

Asian Studies Council. He is currently a trustee of the Burma Studies Foundation (United States), Board Member of SEASREP, Deputy-Director of the Asia Research Institute (Singapore), and editor of the Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. Prasanna Balaji is the Head and Director of postgraduate studies in Physical Education and

Sports Sciences at the renowned National College (Autonomous) in Tiruchirappalli. He obtained his Master’s degree in physical education from the famous Y.M.C.A. College of Physical Education in Chennai and his PhD from the Bharathidasan University. He has been instrumental in developing outstanding athletes, including the fastest woman of India in 2018. He has successfully organised three international conference at his college. Rohini Balram is a PhD candidate at Western Sydney University; her research focuses on understanding the complexities of marginalised groups (Indo-Fijian women) in the diaspora (Fijian) and their relationship with sport, framed by post-structuralism, and southern, gender and sociocultural theories. Her academic and creative writing focuses on central issues of indenture and diasporic experiences, gender, ethnicity, class, power, colonialism and postcolonialism in relation to sport in Fiji employing art based, ethnographic and auto-ethnographic methods. Rohini is a certified gym instructor and runs community-based health and fitness programs to assist marginalised women. Youcef Bouandel is Professor of Politics at the Department of International Affairs, Qatar University. He holds a License in Politics from the University of Algiers, Algeria, (1986) and an MPhil (1988) and a PhD (1994) in Politics from the University of Glasgow, Scotland. He was Lecturer/Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Lincoln, England, and visiting professor in Bulgaria, Sweden, Latvia and the United States. He is the author of Human Rights and Comparative Politics (1997). His most recent publication is Harakat Mujtama’ al-Silm: Democratic Learning in Algeria (2018). Paul Bowman is Professor of Cultural Studies at Cardiff University, UK. He is author of PostMarxism Versus Cultural Studies (Edinburgh University Press, 2007), Deconstructing Popular Culture (Palgrave, 2008) and Theorizing Bruce Lee (Rodopi, 2009), and editor of Interrogating Cultural Studies (Pluto, 2003), The Truth of Žižek (Continuum, 2007), Reading Ranciere (Continuum 2010) and The Rey Chow Reader (Columbia University Press, 2010). His most recent book is Deconstructing Martial Arts, which is available for free download from Cardiff University Press. Mike Callan is Associate Professor in the Department of Psychology and Sports Sciences, and

leader of the i-dojo International Judo Research Unit, at the University of Hertfordshire. He is the editor of the Routledge book The Science of Judo. He is President of the International Association of Judo Researchers, Education Director of the Commonwealth Judo Association and founder of the Richard Bowen History of Judo Archive at the University of Bath, which was nominated for the UNESCO Memory of the World Programme. Director of the consultancy firm Judospace, Dr Callan has advised a wide range of federations and organisations, including the government of Japan and the Tokyo Olympic Organising Committee. Previously he was the International Federation Services Group Leader for Judo for the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games. Mike has been a Board Member of the British Judo Association and holds the grade of 7th dan. Holder of an International Olympic Committee Diploma, and a life member of the British and Maltese Judo Federations, he was awarded the International Judo Federation Special Achievement Award for global contribution to judo education and research as well as xvii

Contributors

the Commonwealth Judo Association Presidents Special Recognition Award for his significant contribution to the development of judo in the Commonwealth. Packianathan Chelladurai, Distinguished Professor, Troy University, is a founding member of the North American Society for Sport Management (NASSM) and the European Association for Sport Management (EASM). He is the recipient of the Earle F. Zeigler Award from the North American Society for Sport Management (NASSM), the Merit Award for Distinguished Service to Sport Management Education from the European Association of Sport Management (EASM) and the Sport Management Scholar Lifetime Achievement Award from Southern Sport Management Association. He is an active member of the prestigious National Academy of Kinesiology. On 18 June 2012, he was awarded the honorary degree of Letters of Law (LL.D.) by The University of Western Ontario, Canada, for his contributions to sport management. In 2015, the European Association of Sport Management named its most prestigious award the EASM Chelladurai Award. Jihyun Cho was awarded a PhD in the Sociology of Sport Science from Loughborough Univer-

sity in 2010. She worked for the 2018 PyeongChang Olympic and Paralympic Games Organising Committee (POCOG) from October 2015 to April 2018 as a senior project manager. She was the 2012 London Olympics Korean Olympic Committee (KOC) Training Camp Manager at Brunel University from July 2012 to August 2012. Jihyun Cho also worked at the University of Leeds as a postdoctoral research assistant, working on a project investigating ‘Cosmetic Surgery Tourism,’ funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). She is currently working for the Korean Olympic Community (KOC) as an editor. Marcus P. Chu is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Lingnan Uni-

versity, Hong Kong. He has published extensively on the history and politics of sporting megaevents in the Greater China region. His most recent book is Politics of Mega-events in China’s Hong Kong and Macao (Palgrave, 2019). Simon Creak is Assistant Professor at the National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technologi-

cal University, Singapore. He is a historian of modern Southeast Asia, particularly Laos and the region as a whole, with research interests in the cultural and political history of sport, nationalism, regionalism and the Cold War. Simon is author of Embodied Nation: Sport, Masculinity, and the Making of Modern Laos (University of Hawai‘i Press) and has published in leading refereed journals, including The Journal of Asian Studies, Journal of Contemporary Asia and Asian Studies Review. Before joining NTU in 2018, he held teaching and research positions at the School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, University of Melbourne (2014–2017) and Kyoto University’s Centre for Southeast Asian Studies (2011–2014). He holds a PhD in history from the Australian National University. James M. Dorsey, PhD, is Senior Fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam

School of International Studies, Adjunct Senior Research Fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute and Co-Director of the University of Würzburg’s Institute of Fan Culture. Abdul Rahim Al Droushi is Assistant Professor in Sport Policy and Management at the Physical

Education and Sports Sciences Department in Sultan Qaboos University, Oman. He completed

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Contributors

his Master of Business in the field of International Sport and Recreation Management from Queensland University in Australia and earned his PhD from Loughborough University in the United Kingdom in 2017. His thesis was titled ‘Discourses on the Modernization Agenda in Sport Policy in Oman: between the Global and Local and Modernity and Authenticity.’ His major research areas have been sport management; sport policy in the Arab world context; sport development and development through sport; the modernisation agenda in sport policy in the Gulf region; sport and globalisation; the governance of sport; sport and politics; the professionalisation of sport; sport mega-events; sport innovation; sport tourism; marketing of sport and football. Hitoshi Ebishima is Professor in the Faculty of Economics at Seijo University, Tokyo, Japan. His research interests include globalisation of sport in Japan and Ireland, the linkage between physical activities and sport, especially in cycling, and the social function of local sport clubs. He co-authored a book chapter, ‘Tradition, Identity Professionalism and Tension in Japanese Rugby,’ in G. Ryan, ed., The Changing Face of Rugby: The Union Game and Professionalism since 1995 (Cambridge Scholar Press, pp. 147–164), with R. Light and H. Hirai. He also co-authored a book chapter, ‘FIFA 2002 World Cup in Japan: The Japanese Football Phenomenon in Cultural Contexts,’ in Maguire, J. et al., ed., Japan, Sport and Society in a Globalizing World (Routledge, pp. 125–139) with Yamashita, R. He edited and published a book about Introductory Irish Studies in Japanese. Its title is Ireland wo Shirutameno 70 shou (70 chapters to comprehend Ireland). In this book he wrote chapters about Irish sport, education and culture. Awang Firmansyah is Lecturer in Universitas Negeri Surabaya, Indonesia. He is active in

Southeast Asia Neighbourhoods Network (SEANNET) in research, teaching and dissemination of knowledge of Asia through the prism of the city and urban communities. Huang Fuhua obtained his PhD in Chinese Studies from University College Cork, Ireland, in

2014. He is Professor at the School of Physical Education and Sports, Jinan University, China. His main research interests are globalisation and sport, the professionalisation and commercialisation of sport, sport history and traditional sport. Huang Gangqiang is Associate Professor within the School of Sport and Physical Education at

South West University of Science and Technology, China. His research interests are China’s sport policy and sport industry. Raúl Sánchez García, PhD, is Lecturer in the Social Sciences department at Universidad Politécnica de Madrid-INEF and is President of the Sociology of Sport working group within the Spanish Federation of Sociology (FES). He has published several papers and chapters on the topic of the civilising process and martial arts/combat sport. In 2018 his book The Historical Sociology of Japanese Martial Arts was published by Routledge. Gerald R. Gems is full Professor Emeritus at North Central College in Naperville, Illinois, in

the United States. He is a past president of the North American Society for Sport History and past vice-president of the International Society for the History of Physical Education and Sport. In 2012 the United States government selected him as a Fulbright Scholar, and in 2016 he was awarded the Routledge Prize for scholarship. He is the author of more than 250 publications, including 20 books. He currently serves as an editor for the Sport, Identity, and Culture series for Lexington Books.

xix

Contributors

Min Ge is Senior Lecturer at the University of Chester in the UK. He is the Programme Leader of Chinese Studies; he is also leading the China Centre in the Faculty of Arts and Humanities at the University. Before joining Chester, Min Ge lived for seven years in Ireland and three years in Australia, working closely with the Chinese Studies Centres and the Confucius Institute in three Irish universities and the University of Western Australia. His research is focused mainly on Chinese sport and economy. He is currently researching LGBT+ sport and athletes in Asia. Gong He is a PhD candidate in the Institute of Media, Culture and Creative Arts, Curtin University, Australia. He received his BA from Chongqing University of Postal and Telecommunications and his MA from University of Southampton. His research interests are Chinese urban middle-class and Chinese leisure sport market. Xiong Huan is Professor in the School of PE and Sports Science at South China Normal University. She obtained her BA degree in Sociology at Fudan University in China and her PhD in Sociology at De Montfort University in the UK. Prior to working at South China Normal University, she was a Lecturer at the School of Asian Studies at University College Cork, Ireland. Her main research interests include gender issues and the sociology of sport, along with urban studies. Her main publications include Urbanisation and Transformation of Chinese Women’s Sport since 1980s (2009), Body, Society and Sport: Sport from the Perspectives of Western Social Theories (2011, in Chinese) and Gender, Body and Society:Theories, Methodology and Practices of Women’s Sports Studies (2016, in Chinese). Zhang Huijie obtained her PhD in Asian Studies from The University of Western Australia in

2016, and is now a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of History, College of Liberal Arts, Jinan University, China. Her main research interests are in the areas of sport history, especially in Christian involvement in sport in modern China and traditional sport. Wadih Ishac is Assistant Professor in Sport Management at Qatar University. His research

focuses on the social and political impacts of mega sport events and foreign investment in the sport industry. Zhang Jie obtained her PhD in Sports Studies from South China Normal University in 2014 and is now a Lecturer at Shenzhen Tourism College, Jinan University, Guangdong, China. She is an editorial team member of the Asian Journal of Sport History & Culture and the Journal of Sports Adult Education as well as a member of China’s Sports Anthropology Committee. Her research interests focus mainly on Chinese traditional sport, the sport industry and sport and the development of cities. Feng Jing obtained her PhD degree in Chinese Studies from University College Cork in 2014. She is Lecturer in the School of Sport at Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang, China. Her main research interests are social evolution, sport governance and sport transformation in China. Zheng Jinming is Lecturer/Assistant Professor in sport management and elite sport policy at

Northumbria University, UK. He has published 14 articles on elite sport policy and Olympic medal distributions in journals such as Sport Management Review, European Sport Management Quarterly, Journal of Sports Sciences and International Review for the Sociology of Sport. He is xx

Contributors

co-author of Sport Policy in China (Routledge, 2018) with Shushu Chen, Tien-Chin Tan and Barrie Houlihan. Dong Jinxia is Professor at Peking University and a prominent scholar in gender and children’s

sport studies. She received her PhD from University of Strathclyde. In the past two decades, she has published several books and dozens of articles in both English and Chinese. She has also organised a number of national and international conferences, including the ISSA 2014 World Congress and the 2018 IASAPYC World Congress. She was a visiting scholar at Yale. She is the co-founder and secretary general of the International Association of Sport and Play for Young Children. Benjamin N. Judkins is co-editor of the journal Martial Arts Studies and a Visiting Scholar at the

Cornell University East Asia Program.With Jon Nielson, he is co-author of The Creation of Wing Chun: A Social History of the Southern Chinese Martial Arts (SUNY, 2015) with Jon Nielson. He is also the author of long-running martial arts studies blog Kung Fu Tea: Martial Arts History, Wing Chun and Chinese Martial Studies. Selina Khoo is Associate Professor at the Centre for Sport and Exercise Sciences, University of

Malaya. Her research interests are related to participation in sport and physical activity by various populations, including older adults and persons with disabilities. She has served on international committees, including the Commonwealth Advisory Body on Sport (CABOS) and the Development Committee of the Far East and South Pacific Games for the Disabled (FESPIC) Federation. She is a current Vice President of the Asian Society for Adapted Physical Education and Exercise (ASAPE) and member of the Women and Sports Committee of the Olympic Council of Malaysia. Selina is also the country contact for Malaysia on the Global Observatory for Physical Activity. Minho Kim is Professor at the Department of Asian Martial Arts,Youngsan University in Yangsan, South Korea. He has a PhD in Cultural Anthropology and teaches and researches in the field of martial arts culture, focusing on martial arts in association with health-related issues. He has published widely in these fields and has translated various books. He has almost 50 years of practical martial arts experience. Jörg Krieger is Assistant Professor for Sport and Social Science in the Sport and Body Culture

research unit of Aarhus University in Denmark. He has a PhD in Sport History from the German Sport University Cologne and two MAs, in International Sport Policy (University of Brighton) and Olympic Studies (German Sport University Cologne). In his research, he explores the historical development of international sport politics with a focus on anti-doping, the International Amateur Athletics Federation (IAAF) and the Youth Olympic Games. His book Dope Hunters: The Influence of Scientists on the Global Fight Against Doping in Sport, 1967–1992 investigates the evolution of scientific knowledge to combat doping in sport. He became Chair of Sport & Society, a Common Ground international Research Network, in 2019. Koji Kobayashi is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Tourism, Sport and Society at Lincoln University, New Zealand. His research interests include globalisation, nationalism, Japan/Asia, media and mega-events as they relate to sport and recreation. His work appeared in journals such as Sociology of Sport Journal, International Review for the Sociology of Sport, Sport in Society, Managing Sport and Leisure, Leisure Studies, Consumption Markets & Culture, and International Journal of xxi

Contributors

Cultural Studies. He also published a book chapter on the cultural economy of globalisation and self-Orientalisation in Global Culture: Consciousness and Connectivity (2016) edited by Roland Robertson and Didem Buhari-Gulmez (2016) and co-edited (with Younghan Cho) the special issue on ‘Asian Sport Celebrity: The Nexus of Race, Ethnicity and Regionality’ in The International Journal of the History of Sport (2019). Jung Woo Lee is Programme Director of MSc Sport Policy, Management and International Development, and Lecturer in Sport and Leisure Policy at the University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom. He received a PhD in the sociology of sport from Loughborough University, United Kingdom. He is a guest editor of annual Asia Pacific Sport and Social Science Special Issue of Sport in Society. Dr Lee is an editorial board member of the Journal of Global Sport Management and the Asian Journal of History and Culture. He is also a special contributor to a British current affair magazine, New Statesman. His research interests include sport mega-event studies, sport diplomacy and international relations as well as globalisation of sport. He is co-editor of The Routledge Handbook of Sport and Politics (2016). Ka-Ram Lee is Assistant Professor at the Department of Physical Education in Gyeongsang National University in Jinju, South Korea. His research focuses mainly on cultural and historical aspects of sport in a Korean context. He is the author of Extraterritorial Outlet of Korean Nationalism in the Far Eastern Championship Games; 1913–1934: A War Without Weapons: Rugby, Korean Resistance, and Japanese Colonialism and 1910–1945:The Influence of Philip L. Gillett on the Development of Korea’s Modern Sports. Seok Lee received his PhD at the University of Pennsylvania. He is currently Associate Director of the James Joo-Jin Kim Program in Korean Studies at the University of Pennsylvania. His publications include ‘Colonial Korea’s First Participation in the Olympic Games (1932),’ Seoul Journal of Korean Studies, 2016, and a chapter in Sport in Korea: History, Development, Management (Routledge, 2018). His research focuses on the intersections between sport and society in modern and contemporary Korea. Shen Liang obtained his PhD from University College Cork, Ireland, and is now Associate Professor in the School of Physical Education in Shanghai University, China. He His main research interests are Chinese sport history, ideology and sport, sport and globalisation, sport policy and transformation of Chinese society. Peng Han Lim has a PhD in library and information science (2012), a MA in mass communications (1994), and a MSc in information studies (1998). He has worked alongside two of the largest sport marketing companies in the world – ISL Marketing AG (with Keith Cooper) and International Management Group (with Richard Avory). He has acquired extensive experience in sport management, sport sponsorship, sport marketing and event management of multisport events (the Southeast Asian Games and the Olympic Games) and single-sport events (the World Badminton Championships and the Thomas and Uber Cup finals). He has also managed a sponsorship portfolio of football, badminton, squash and tennis teams and players. Ko Ling-Mei is Associate Professor in the Department of Leisure, Recreation and Tourism Man-

agement in the College of Business at Southern Taiwan University of Science and Technology. Her current research interests lie in issues relating to sport and leisure policies and sport

xxii

Contributors

management, particularly in the area of human capital. She is co-editor of The Routledge Handbook of Sport Policy (2014). Zhang Ling received her PhD degree in Chinese Studies from University College Cork, Ireland, in 2013, and is now Lecturer in Sports Studies at Guangdong University of Foreign Studies in China. Her research centres on Chinese sport policy and the Chinese sport system, specifically on elite athletes’ education, training and re-employment. Amung Ma’mun has been a Lecturer at the Faculty of Education and Health Education of the Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia (Indonesian Education University/FPOK UPI) since 1986. He has been Leader of the Department of Physical Education (1996–2000), Dean of FPOKUPI (2000–2008), Head of the Sports and Youth Service for the Regional Government of West Java Province (2008–2011) and was seconded to the Ministry of Youth and Sports (2011–2016) – most recently as Expert Staff to the Minister. Since 2017 he has served as Chair of the Masters Programme and Doctor of Physical Education at the UPI Postgraduate School. His research concentrates on the fields of sport policy and sport governance. Udo Merkel is a German social scientist at the University of Brighton’s School of Sport and Service Management in the UK. He holds various degrees in the Social Sciences and Sport Sciences from German and British universities. He has a keen interest in the politics and sociology of mega sport events as a foreign policy and diplomatic tool, globalisation, comparative sport studies and football cultures. The politics of physical culture and sport events in divided Korea have become more prominent on his research agenda since he lived and worked in the South and gained unprecedented access to the North in 2008 and, again, in 2012. Over the last few years he has edited two cutting-edge books (Power, Politics and International Events (Routledge) and Identity Discourses and Communities in International Events, Festivals and Spectacles (Palgrave MacMillan). He is currently working on a book that explores the relationship between hosting mega-events and international relations/foreign policy. Udo Moenig is Associate Professor at the Department of Taekwondo, Youngsan University in Yangsan, South Korea. He has a PhD in Physical Education, and teaches and researches in the areas of martial arts and Asian studies. He was appointed as the first foreigner in Korea to teach taekwondo at a university. He researches, lectures and publishes extensively in the fields of Asian studies, martial arts and sport, and has over 40 years of practical martial arts experience. Katsumi Mori is Professor at the National Institute of Fitness and Sports in Kanoya, which is the only national university in Japan specialising in sport, and a leader of the Faculty of the Sports Humanities and Applied Social Science of NIFS. Professor Katsumi Mori has received the Grants-in-aid for Scientific Research of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science three times since 2010 and pushed forward a study concerning child protection systems in education, sport and sport integrity in the UK. In addition, he has held two funded international symposia in Japan. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Japanese Society of Policy for Physical Education and Sport and an inspector of the Japan Sports Law Association. Toho Cholik Mutohir is Professor in the postgraduate program at Physical Education Department and Sport Science Department. His research interests are physical education, sport development index, sport science, sport history and culture.

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Contributors

Souvik Naha is Marie Sklodowska-Curie Actions postdoctoral fellow at the Department of History, Durham University. He is Associate Editor of Sport in Society, Editor of Sport in History and Book Reviews Editor of Soccer & Society. His current research focuses on the significance of sport to the Indo-British relationship in the twentieth century. He has edited three books and one journal special issue, and he has written 20 journal articles and book chapters on various aspects of sport, politics and popular culture. His monograph on the interplay of cricket, media and public culture in modern India will be published by Cambridge University Press in 2020. Usha Sujit Nair is Associate Professor at Lakshmibai National College of Physical Education, Thiruvananthapuram, India. Her publications include chapters in Routledge’s Elite Youth Sport Policy Management: A Comparative Analysis, edited by Elsa Kristiansen, Milena M. Parent and Barrie Houlihan; Springer’s Comparative Sport Development Systems, Participation and Public Policy, edited by Kirstin Hallmann and Karen Petry; and Greenwood’s National Sports Policies: An International Handbook, edited by Laurence Chalip, Arthur Johnson and Lisa Stachura. Gwang Ok is Professor at Chungbuk National University in South Korea, Regional Board Edi-

tor of the International Journal of the History of Sport, and Editor of the Asia Pacific Journal of Sport and Social Science. He is Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Korean Alliance of Martial Arts and the Korean Journal of Golf Studies. He has published in the International Journal of the History of Sport, the Korean Journal of Physical Education, Recreation and Dance and the Korean Journal of Physical Education. Bonnie Pang directs a research program on Rethinking Health Experiences and Active Lifestyles with Chinese Communities (REHEAL-C), which focuses on the Chinese diaspora in health education and the area of health and physical cultures. This research has examined Chinese youths from Australia, the UK and Hong Kong and is underpinned by a range of (critical) sociocultural theories, ethnographic methods and art-based methods. Dr Pang is a recipient of the prestigious Marie Sklodowska-Curie Individual Fellowship (2019–2020). She has published in key journals, including Sport, Education and Society; Teaching and Teacher Education; and Pedagogy, Culture and Society. She is co-author of Interpreting the Chinese Diaspora: Socialisation, Identity and Resilience According to Pierre Bourdieu (Routledge, 2019) with Guanglun Michael Mu. Swarali Patil is a PhD candidate in the Sport Management and Leadership stream at Western

University’s School of Kinesiology in London, Canada. She holds an MA in Kinesiology (Sport Management and Leadership) from Western University and has a BA (Hons) in Sport Management from Coventry University. Her doctoral research focuses on building capacity for women in sport, in their roles as athletes, coaches, officials and leaders. Her additional research interests include gender equity in sport, organisational capacity and strategy in sport management. Kyoungho Park is Research Professor at Jeju National University. He published his co-authored

article on the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games in The International Journal of the History of Sport in 2011. He has several publications in Korean journals. Lee Ping-Chao is Professor in the Department of Physical Education at National Taichung University of Education in Taiwan. He has published papers in the fields of sport history and sport sociology. His current research interests include sport politics, sport policy and the field of governance of professional baseball in Asia. xxiv

Contributors

Guy Podoler is Senior Lecturer in Korean Studies and Head of the Department of Asian Studies

at the University of Haifa. His research interests include memory and commemoration, sport history, sport nationalism and sport diplomacy. He is author of Monuments, Memory, and Identity: Constructing the Colonial Past in South Korea (Peter Lang AG, 2011), and his articles appeared in journals such as Asian Studies Review, The International Journal of the History of Sport, The International Journal of Cultural Policy, Acta Koreana, Korea Observer, The Review of Korean Studies and others. He has also contributed chapters to edited volumes, and he acts as reviewer for various academic journals. Dr Podoler is on the editorial board of The International Journal of the History of Sport (Asia and the Middle East academic team). Pierrick Porchet is a PhD candidate at the University of Geneva and works as a research and

teaching assistant at the Confucius Institute. He holds a Master degree in Chinese Studies and Contemporary History from the University of Geneva. His current research focuses on the circulation of martial arts’ body technics and representations in contemporary China. Relying on the ethnographic studies of martial arts sites in the People’s Republic of China, his research reflects on how Chinese cultural policy impacts practitioners’ everyday habits and views and how this process can be traced back in the materiality of practitioners’ bodies. Daniel J. A. Rhind is Chartered Psychologist and a Reader in Psychology at Loughborough University. His research focuses on how children’s rights can be protected in, around and through sport. Daniel’s research has been funded by the European Commission, Commonwealth Secretariat, Oak Foundation, the Daiwa Foundation, International Inspiration, the Football Association, the Rugby Football Union, the International Tennis Federation and the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. His most recent research was the foundation of the recently launched International Safeguards for Children in Sport which have been endorsed by over 120 sport organisations around the world. Larbi Sadiki is Professor of Arab Democratization at the Department of International Affairs,

Qatar University and LPI of the QNRF-funded project ‘Transitions of Islam and Democracy.’ He is editor of the Routledge Series on Middle Eastern Democratization and Governance and editor of The Routledge Handbook of Middle East Politics (2019). Yasuhiro Sakaue is Professor in the Graduate School of Social Sciences at Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo. He has published widely on the history and sociology of sport in Japan. His most recent book is Showa Tennō to Supōtsu: Gyokutai no Kindaishi [The Showa Emperor and Sport: A Modern History of the Imperial Presence],Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2016. He has written extensively on the modern history of Japanese martial arts and is editor of the book Umi o Watatta Jūjutsu to Jūdō: Nihon Budō no Dainamizumu [Jūjutsu and Jūdō Overseas:The Dynamism of Japanese Martial arts], Seikyusha, 2010. Layla Saleh is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Qatar University’s Department of International Affairs. She earned her PhD in Political Science from the University of WisconsinMilwaukee and is the author of US Hard Power in the Arab World: Resistance, the Syrian Uprising, and the War on Terror (Routledge, 2017). Andrea L. Stanton is Associate Professor of Islamic Studies and Chair of the Department of

Religious Studies at the University of Denver (Colorado, United States), where she is an affiliate faculty member at the Korbel Center for Middle East Studies. She holds a PhD in Middle xxv

Contributors

Eastern history and has published on sport in Lebanon and Syria, with a focus on the Olympics and Olympic-sanctioned regional games. She has received grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the United States Institute of Peace, and the American Academy of Religion. Osamu Takamine is Professor in the School of Political Science and Economics at Meiji University, Japan, and a board chairperson of the Japan Society for Sport and Gender Studies. He received a PhD in Health and Sport Sciences from Chukyo University, Japan. He has published both qualitative and quantitative articles concerning sexual harassment in sport settings and devoted himself for more than 15 years to solving issues of violence and sexual assault in Japan. He is author of ”Women’s Sports in Japan: Enters a Period of Change,” in G. Molnar, S. Amin, Y. Kanemasu, eds., Women, Sport and Exercise in the Asia-Pacific Region (Routledge, 2019, pp. 173–187). He has recently developed an interest in a gender verification test from a sociological perspective. Lee Thompson is Professor of the Sociology of Sport and Media in the Faculty of Sport Sciences at Waseda University in Tokyo. His research interests focus on the relationship between sport and the media in Japan. He has published in several international journals, including International Review for the Sociology of Sport, Sport in Society and The International Journal of the History of Sport, as well as a range of Japanese publications. He is co-author with Allen Guttmann of Japanese Sports: A History. Friederike Trotier is a research assistant at the Chair of Comparative Development and Cultural

Studies – Southeast Asia at the University of Passau. Until 2017, she worked at the Department of Southeast Asian Studies, Goethe University Frankfurt. She was awarded a PhD in Southeast Asian Studies in 2018. In her thesis she analysed the role of sport events in the changing Indonesian history and scrutinised the new local agency after Indonesia’s decentralisation process with the example of Palembang as Indonesia’s new sport city. She has recently published in the International Journal of the History of Sport on ‘The Legacy of the Games of the New Emerging Forces and Indonesia’s Relationship with the International Olympic Committee,’ and in the Asia Pacific Journal of Sport and Social Science on ‘Changing an image through sports events: Palembang’s success story.’ Wang Yan obtained her PhD in Sports Studies from Soochow University, Suzhou, China, in

2014. She is Associate Professor at the School of Physical Education and Sports, Soochow University, China. Her main research interest is sport history and culture, with particular focus on modern China. Ma Yang is a PhD candidate in the Department of Sport Governance and Event Management at the University of Bayreuth, Germany. His research interests reside in sport governance in China in general and Chinese football governance in particular. He has published articles in International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics, Sport Business and Management: An International Journal and Journal of Global Sport Management. Liu Yinya is Lecturer in Chinese Studies at Maynooth University, Ireland. She received both her

Bachelor and Master degrees in Philosophy from Sun Yat-Sen University in Guangzhou, China, and obtained her PhD in philosophy from Maynooth University in 2011. She has worked in the Department of Philosophy (Maynooth University), Department of Chinese Studies (Dublin xxvi

Contributors

City University) and the International Strategic Collaboration Programme (ISCP-China) before joining the School of Modern Languages, Literatures and Cultures in Maynooth University in 2015. She publishes research articles and book chapters on philosophy, religion, culture and media. Her research interests are Chinese philosophy, comparative philosophy, philosophy of religion, philosophy in literature and Chinese Buddhism. Zhong Yuting is a PhD candidate in the School of Sport, Health & Exercise Sciences, Bangor

University, UK. She received both her BA and MA from Zhejiang Normal University. Her research interests centre around the Olympic Games and China’s sport policy and practice. Zhong Yijing is a PhD candidate in the Institute of Population Research, Peking University.

She received her BA from Peking University and MA from Johns Hopkins University. She has published articles in Chinese and English on New Energy strategies and the educational system of China. She has been involved in a number of research projects on children’s sport and physical education in China. Bakeel Al Zandani is Assistant Professor and Head of the Department of International Affairs, Qatar University. He holds a PhD from the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, in the United States. He was head of the Department of Political Science and Sana’a University,Yemen (2013– 2016). His latest publication, titled ‘Algeria’s National Reconciliation: An Analytical Approach,’ was co-authored with Professor Youcef Bouandel and appeared in the Algerian Review of Human Security, July 2019. Guan Zhixun received his PhD degree from the University of Western Australia in 2016 and is

now Senior Lecturer in Sports Studies and the Head of School of Sports Sociology and Sports Management at the College of Physical Education and Health Sciences, Zhejiang Normal University, China. His research focus is on disability sport.

xxvii

Preface

When Simon Whitmore suggested to us that we produce The Routledge Handbook of Sport in Asia, we were thrilled with the idea. Naturally, as authors whose research areas are closely linked to Asia, we hope to inspire publishers and readers with a slightly different perspective from the familiar European and North American accounts of sport history. We aim to provide our readership a platform for understanding and enjoying the history and culture of sport from the perspective of the East. We thank Simon Whitmore for his vision and trust in providing us with the opportunity to develop this book in a subject area that is very dear to our hearts. This Handbook is the collective work of 74 fine scholars from across the world of academia – both the East and the West. We thank them for their enthusiasm, passion and professionalism. It is a unique moment for us to have had this opportunity to harvest their research fruits in this single book! There is a continuous flow of new discoveries, new evidence, new perspectives and new conceptualisations related to the history and culture of sport in Asia. This Handbook is our first attempt to show not only how much we know but how much more there is yet to know.We are grateful to be taking our readers on this journey towards the future of changes and challenges in Asia and in the sport world. As the famous Chinese poet Wang Zhihuan (688–742) once wrote: ‘Let us ascend another storey to see a thousand miles’ (欲穷千里目，更上一层楼).

Chinese names Chinese family names (‘Deng’) appear before given names (‘Xiaoping’) and are listed in text, notes and bibliographies in that order in this book.

xxviii

Acknowledgements

We are grateful for the contributions of Aelred Doyle, Peter Herrmann, Arbi Sarkissian, Martin Shiels and Zhong Yuting, who helped in proofreading and providing editorial feedback on the manuscript. We thank Rebecca Connor for her generous and efficient administrative assistance. We express our gratitude to all the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions to this project.

xxix

Abbreviations

All Japan Kendō Federation (AJKF) All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF) Asian Badminton Confederation (ABC) Asian Football Confederation (AFC) Asian Games Federation (AGF) Asian Indoor and Martial Arts Games (AIMAG) Asian Indoor Games (AIG) Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP) Batavia Badminton League (BBL) Bataviasche Badminton Bond (BBB) Bataviasche Badminton Unie (BBU) Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee (BOBICO) Berber Cultural Movement (MCB) Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) British American Tobacco (BAT) Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Calcutta Royal Golf Club (CRGC) Cerebral Palsy International Sports and Recreation Association (CPISRA) China Central Television (CCTV) China Disabled Persons’ Federation (CDPF) China General Administration of Sport (CGAS) China National Amateur Athletic Federation (CNAAF) China Youth Anti-Communist National Salvation Corps (CYC) Chinese Basketball Association (CBA) Chinese Basketball Association League (CBAL) Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chinese Football Association (CFA) Chinese Football Association Super League (CSL) Chinese National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) Chinese Olympic Committee (COC) Chinese Swimming Club (CSC) Chinese Table Tennis Association (CTTA) xxx

Abbreviations

Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee (CTOC) Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Department of Physical Education (DPE) East Asian Games Association (EAGA) Emerging Communitarian Caring Bureaucratic System (ECCBS) Entreprise Nationale des Industries de l’Electroménager (ENIEM) Étoile Nord-Africaine (ENA) Eurasian Singapore Recreation Club (SRC) Evergrande Real Estate Group (EREG) Far East and South Pacific Disability Games (FESPIC) Far East and South Pacific Games for the Disabled (FESPIC) Far Eastern Athletic Association (FEAA) Far Eastern Championship Games (FECG) Far Eastern Games Federation (FEGF) Far Eastern Olympiad (FEO) Far Eastern Olympic Association (FEOA) Federation of Malaya Olympic Council (FMOC) Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) Gender and Development (GAD) Gender Gap Index (GGI) Gender Inequality Index (GII) Gender-related Development Index (GDI) Government-General of Korea (GGK) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Guangzhou Evergrande Football Club (GEFC) Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Human Development Index (HDI) Hong Kong Ving Tsun Athletic Association (VTAA) Indian Premier League (IPL) Indonesia Olympic Committee (KORI) Indonesian Badminton Association (PBSI) Indonesian Morning Gymnastics (SPI) Indonesian National Sports Committee (KONI) International Amateur Athletics Federation (IAAF) International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) International Badminton Federation (IBF) International Basketball Federation (FIBA) International Blind Sports Federation (IBSA) International E-Sports Federation (IESF) International Federation of Football Associations (FIFA) International Federation of Wushu (IWUF) International Monetary Fund (IMF) International Olympic Academy (IOA) International Olympic Committee (IOC) International Sport and Leisure (ISL) International Sports Federation for Persons with Intellectual Disability (INAS-FID) xxxi

Abbreviations

International Taekwondo Federation (ITF) International Wheelchair & Amputee Sports (IWAS) Islamic Solidarity Sports Federation (ISSF) Japan Sports Agency (JSA) Jeunesse Sportive de Kabylie (JSK) Joseon Sports Association (JSA) Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) Korea Development Institute (KDI) Korea Taekwondo Association (KTA) Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) Korean Football Association (KFA) Korean Professional E-Sports Association (KESPA) Lakshmibai National Institute of Physical Education (LNIPE) Lawn Tennis Association of Malaya (LTAM) Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Malay Football Association (MFA) Malaya Badminton Association (MBA) Malayan Athletic Association (MAA) Malayan Football Association (MFA) Malayan Rugby Union (MRU) Middle East and North African (MENA) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Ministry of Education (MoE) Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) Mixed Martial Arts (MMA) National Fitness Programme (NFP) National Liberation Front (FLN) National Liberation Front’s (FNL) National Olympic Committees (NOCs) National Skill Development Corporation (NSDC) National Sport Governing Body (NSGB) National Sports Talent Contest (NSTC) National Sports Training Centre (NSTC) National Sports Week (PON) Netaji Subhas National Institute of Sports (NSNIS) New Emerging Forces (NEFOs) Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) Old Established Forces (OLDEFOs) Olympic Broadcasting Services (OBS) Olympic Council of Asia (OCA) Opposition Defiance Disorder (ODD) Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) Parent Sports Organization (IOCO) People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) People’s Republic of China (PRC) People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) Perak Badminton Association (PBA) xxxii

Abbreviations

Physical Education (PE) Physical Fitness Exercise (SKJ) Prime Minister’s Office of Japan (PMOJ) Public Works Department (PWD) Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) Radio Television Malaysia (RTM) Raffles Institution (RI) Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) Republic of China (ROC) Republic of China Sports Federation (ROCSF) Republic of Korea (ROK) Rethinking Health Experiences and Active Lifestyles with Chinese Communities (REHEAL-C) SEAP Games Federation (SGF) Self Defence Forces (SDF) Senior High School of Sports (SMOA) Seoul 1988 Organising Committee (SLOOC) Singapore Cricket Club (SCC) Singapore Football Association (SFA) Singapore Recreation Club (SRC) Southeast Asian (SEA) Southeast Asian Peninsular (SEAP) SEAP Games Federation (SEAPGF) SEA Games Federation (SEAGF) Special Administrative Region (SAR) Special Area Games Scheme (SAG) Sport for All (SFA) Sport, Gender and Development (SGD) Sport-for-Development (SFD) Sports Administration (SA) Sports Affairs Council (SAC) Sports Authority of India (SAI) Sports Development Authority of Tamil Nadu (SDAT) Sports Federation & Olympic Committee of Hong Kong, China (SF&OC) Straits Chinese Football Association (SCFA) Straits Chinese Recreation Club (SCRC) Surat Bukti Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia (SBKRI) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) The International Committee of Special Olympics (IPC) The International Committee of Sports for the Deaf (ICSD) The International Paralympic Committee (IPC) The Ladies Lawn Tennis Club (LLTC) The Olympic Partnership (TOP) The Straits Chinese Recreation Club (SCRC) Three Nations Commission (KTN) Unfederated Malay States (UMS) United Arab Emirates (UAE) United Nations (UN) Women in Development (WID) xxxiii

Abbreviations

World Ranking List (WRL) World Taekwondo (WT) World Taekwondo Federation (WTF) World Trade Organization (WTO) World War II (WWII) Wushu Federation of Asia (WFA) Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA)

xxxiv

Introduction The Asian century and Asian sport Fan Hong and Lu Zhouxiang

As the largest continent in the world, Asia comprises one-fifth of Earth’s total surface area, covering more than 17 million square miles (44.6 million square kilometres) of continental landmasses and outlying archipelagos. At almost five times the size of the United States and more than four times the size of Europe, it stretches from the eastern Mediterranean basin and Red Sea across two-thirds of the Eurasian continent to the Pacific Ocean. Asia’s biophysical and climatic diversity is matched by its cultural and social diversity. It encompasses 48 countries and contains three dominant cultural characteristics: the Islamic, the Hindu-Buddhist and the Sinic. Asia is home to 4.5 billion people, nearly 60 percent of the world’s population.1 For much of its recorded history, Asia has been considered the most important region of the world. As Angus Maddison demonstrated, for most of the past two thousand years up until the mid-1800s, China, India and Japan together generated higher gross GDP than the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy combined.2 But with the Industrial Revolution, Western societies modernised their economies, expanded their empires and subjugated most of Asia. Two centuries of European colonialism and rule around the world were followed by the gradual independence of nations from European hegemony. As a former colony of the British Empire, the United States eventually rose to become a global power after World War II. Western laws, interventions, money and culture set the global agenda, and a Western global order emerged whose dominance prevailed throughout the twentieth century.3 This late development did have its own set of consequences. While the modern Western state is frequently classified as ‘TRUDI’ (Territorial State, the state that secures the Rule of Law, the Democratic State, and the Intervention State),4 a different mode of development took place in Asia, which has been referred to as ‘ECCBS’ (Emerging Communitarian Caring Bureaucratic System).5 This suggests that the adoption of ‘modernity’ is characterised by specific features; in particular, the ongoing meaning of traditional mechanisms of integration. It may be equally seen as successful development of governance mechanisms overcoming the shortcomings of the modern state, which had been often criticised as a ‘havened modernity’ (Beck) or an ‘iron cage of bureaucracy’ (Weber). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the world system changed, and Asia moved from an enforced wallflower existence at the periphery towards a central position in a new global constellation. Its fresh and healthy orchards began to shine over the ruins of the old masters, with some buds still waiting to burst forth. Over recent decades, Asia has gained the greatest share of 1

Fan Hong and Lu Zhouxiang

total global economic growth. Hundreds of millions of Asian people growing up in the past two decades have experienced rapidly expanding prosperity and surging national pride. The world they have come to know is not one of Western dominance but of Asian ascendance. The new world order is no longer one of centre-periphery but rather one of a multifaceted character. Nevertheless, in the framework of such a new world order, the ability to mindfully develop differentiated policies in Asian countries – reaching from authoritarian statehood to welldesigned, non-authoritarian mechanisms of self-determination – require more skilful policy developments than the simple defence of the quasi-hereditary power-positions. Again, the merger of traditional and quasi post-modern policy mechanisms is a characteristic of a reasonably successful strategy. Also, the success cannot be assessed by simply applying the traditional standards, such as GDP growth and employment rate; it must be assessed also through the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI), which includes dimensions such as health, education and standard of living.6 After an initial simple move of catching up, the consolidated development is characterised by an emphasis on qualitative aspects that concern the quality of the techno-economic development, the living standard and the search for new forms of social integration. As ‘late developers,’ many Asian countries have the opportunity to build things up from scratch instead of changing badly run systems. The Asian economic centre, which includes economies from the Arabian Peninsula and Turkey in the west to New Zealand in the east, and from Russia in the North to Australia in the south, now represents 50 per cent of global GDP and two-thirds of global economic growth.7 Of the estimated $30 trillion in middle-class consumption growth calculated for the years between 2015 and 2030, only $1 trillion is expected to come from today’s Western economies; most is projected to be generated from Asian economies. Asia produces and exports, as well as imports, more goods than any other region. Moreover, Asian countries trade and invest more with one another than they do with Europe and North America. Asia has several of the world’s largest economies, much of the world’s foreign exchange reserves, many of the largest banks, and many of the largest industrial and technology companies.8 To see the world from the Asian point of view requires overcoming decades of accumulated and wilfully cultivated ignorance about Asia. To this day, Asian perspectives are often inflected through Western narratives rather than global ones. For instance, the ‘global financial crisis’ was not global; Asian growth rates continued to surge, and almost all the world’s fastest-growing economies were in Asia. In 2018, the world’s highest growth rates were reported in India, China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Uzbekistan.While economic stimulus arrangements and ultra-low interest rates had been discontinued in the United States and Europe, they have continued in Asia.9 Similarly, Western populist politics, from Brexit to Trump, have not infected Asia, where pragmatic governments are focused on inclusive growth and social cohesion. Americans and Europeans see walls going up, but across Asia they are coming down. Rather than being backwards-looking, navel-gazing and pessimistic, billions of Asians are forward looking, outward-oriented and optimistic.10 On the whole, Asia is a nursery from where many civilisations were born. Evidently, there has not been a singular Asian cultural resurgence across such a vast and diverse continent. However, there is a kind of renaissance emerging where the desire for sharing among Asian societies reflects in shopping, eating, arts, entertainment, migration and tourism. Today, greater intermarriage and cultural integration through cross-border education, sporting events and labour opportunities have produced an intra-Asian connectivity and regional understanding.The combination of culture and modern technological advancement is binding Asians together in an era when Western societies no longer serve as role models for the future of Asia. Asian cultures have 2

Introduction

now become a part of the global culture, which is recognised by people from both the West and the East. Martial arts,Yoga, music, dance, performing arts, literature, poetry, film, fashion and languages are not only accelerating Asia’s journey of self-discovery but also bridging it to the rest of the world. Despite diversities in their culture and society, Asian countries have taken similar pathways during the recent historical journey from political independence to social transformation and modernity. In the twentieth century, through a triadic process of cultural continuity, assimilation of contemporary ideas and resistance to imperial powers, individual Asian countries developed a specific political modernity characterised as ECCBS.11 In 1998, Kishore Mahbubani published a provocative collection of essays titled Can Asians Think? It warns the West that the global tide is turning and that Asia has as much to teach the West as the reverse. As Asians come to adopt some semblance of a common world view, it is time to explore not simply if Asians can think but how they think about the world.12 In 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping declared to a gathering of Asian leaders in Shanghai, ‘It is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia.’13 Although there are differences between China and its neighbouring countries, the Asian nations do share the common belief that ‘Asia should come first.’ Asia is confident enough to fulfil an innovative role on the world stage! In May of 2017, a decisive shift could be seen in the characterising of a new global order and defining within this a new role for Asian countries. Sixty-eight countries, representing twothirds of the world population and half of the global GDP, gathered in Beijing for the first Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) summit. This gathering of Asian, European and American leaders symbolised the launch of the largest coordinated infrastructure investment plan in human history. Collectively, the assembled governments pledged to spend trillions of dollars in the coming decades to connect the world’s largest population centres in a constellation of commerce and cultural exchange.14 A new Silk Road era is born, and the Asian Century has begun! Asia’s rise has become an increasingly discussed and debated topic over the past two decades. The region’s fast-growing economy, as well as its cultural and political influence, has made it one of the pillars of the international order in this new era of the Asian Century. In recent years, scholars from both the East and West have been studying the history, culture, politics and economy of Asian countries from diverse disciplinary perspectives.15 As Peter Frankopan stated, The Silk Roads serves as a term that describes the ways in which people, cultures and continents were woven together – and in doing so help[s] us better to understand the way that religions and languages spread in the past, while showing how ideas about food, fashion and art disseminated, competed and borrowed from each other.16 Unfortunately, Frankopan and others missed the opportunity to mention sport as one of the key contributions to the Silk Roads. The development of sport events has allowed us to see the rhythms of history, in which the world has been connected for millennia, as being part of the bigger and inclusive global past. Asian sport has become one of the popular topics among academics, politicians and ordinary people. Modern sport played an important role in stimulating political reassertion, a sense of national identity and the arousal of Orientalism.17 The influence of sport on Asian societies has been widely discussed, and an increasing number of English publications have emerged. They either focus on sport in individual Asian countries, notably China, India, Japan and Korea,18 or they focus on Asia as a whole, offering insights into Asian sport from a macro perspective.19 3

Fan Hong and Lu Zhouxiang

Written by a team of 74 international scholars, The Routledge Handbook of Sport in Asia provides a comprehensive overview of the history and development of sport in countries across East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia and West Asia. It aims to open different perspectives on Asian sport and addresses a wide range of issues central to the development of sport in the context of Asian culture, politics, economy and society. It explores a diverse set of topics: the history of traditional sport; the rise of modern sport in Asia; the Olympic Movement in Asia; mega sport events in Asia; sport governance and policy; gender, class and ethnicity in Asian sport; and Asia’s sporting heroes and heroines. It offers a distinctive contribution to our knowledge and understanding of Asian sport and Asian society. It shows Asia from the inside-out and tells the story of how sport in this mega-region is coming together and reshaping the world in the process. This book is divided into seven parts: Asia’s Traditional Sports; The Rise of Modern Sport and the Olympic Movement in Asia; Sport Policy and Practice: Public and Private Provision; Social Stratification and Diversity in Asian Sport; Sport in West Asia and the Middle East; Asian Mega Sporting Events; and Asia’s Sport Heroes and Heroines. Ultimately, this book is just one example that shows how historians continue to refine and improve their understanding of the history of sport regionally and globally. This is what makes sport history such an exciting subject – there is a thrill in being provoked and encouraged to think about things differently while also discovering connections that link peoples, regions, ideas and themes together. We hope this book will bring some new discoveries, new definitions, new perspectives and new evidence that will inspire our future study of the evolution of sport in Asia and beyond. The Routledge Handbook of Sport in Asia provides a detailed snapshot of historical and contemporary sport affairs in Asia. It offers readers a wide lens through which to better contextualise what has happened and what is still going on between Asia and the world within the global sport community. Asian sport lies at the heart of Asian culture, history, economy and politics. In fact, it is so central to these areas that it is not possible to make sense of what the present and future have in store for Asia without taking Asian sport into account. This handbook is, therefore, intended to bring the history up to date and to interpret what has happened in the sport world, which has experienced profound transformation. It shows that the decisions being made in today’s sport world are not only being made in Lausanne, London, Belgium and Washington but also in Beijing, Tokyo, Doha, New Delhi, Jakarta and Moscow. It tells the story of how sport once shaped the countries along the Silk Roads, and how it is re-emerging in the twenty-first century to reshape the region and the world into the future. Asian sport is not only about the past – it is already in the present, and it will continue to rise with the Asian Century.

Notes 1 Milton W. Meyer, Asia: A Concise History (New York: Portman & Littlefield, 1997), 1–2; Dorling Kindersley, Reference Atlas of the World (London: Dorling Kindersley, 2003); Parag Khanna, The Future Is Asian (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2019). 2 Khanna, The Future Is Asian, 2. 3 Ibid. 4 Michael Zuern and Stephan Leibfried, ‘ “A New Perspective on the State: Reconfiguring the National Constellation,”‘ European Review 13, no. 1 (2005): 1–36. 5 Ibid.‘’ 6 ‘ “Human Development Index,”‘ United Nations Development Programme, http://hdr.undp.org/en/ content/human-development-index-hdi. 7 “ ‘Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific,”‘ Asian Development Bank, 2015, www.adb.org/sites/default/ files/publication/175162/ki2015.pdf. 8 ‘’Ibid. 4

Introduction

9 Ibid.’’, 17 10 Ibid.’’, 18. 11 Jan Romein, The Asian Century: A History of Modern Nationalism in Asia (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1965); Colin Mason, A Short History of Asia (London: Macmillan, 2000); P. W. Preston, Pacific Asia in the Global System (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998); Donald G. McCloud, Southeast Asia: Tradition and Modernity in the Contemporary World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995); Milton Osborne, Southeast Asia: An Introductory History (St Leonards: George Allen & Unwin, 1995); Albert Kolb, East Asian: China, Japan, Korea,Vietnam: Geography of a Cultural Region (London: Methuen, 1971). 12 Kishore Mahbubani, ‘ “Can Asians Think?”‘ Media Asia (1997): 123–27. 13 Xi Jinping, “New Asian Security Concept for New Progress in Security Cooperation,” Remarks at the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China, Beijing, May 21, 2014, 10. 14 Khanna, The Future Is Asian, 1. 15 Daniel Novotny, Torn Between America and China: Elite Perceptions and Indonesian Foreign Policy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010); Ang Cheng Guan, Southeast Asia After the Cold War: A Contemporary History (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2019); Peter Frankopan, The Silk Roads: A New History of the World (London: Bloomsbury, 2016); Fred Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations: Power Politics and Ideology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York: Crown Business, 2012); Osborne, Southeast Asia. 16 Peter Frankopan, The New Silk Roads: The Present and Future of the World (London: Bloomsbury, 2018), 2. 17 Fan Hong, ‘ “Nationalism, Orientalism and Globalization: The Future of the Asian Games,”‘ Sport in Society 8, no. 3 (2005): 515–19. 18 Susan Brownell, Training the Body for China: Sports in the Moral Order of the People’s Republic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Fan Hong, Footbinding, Feminism and Freedom: The Liberation of Women’s Bodies in Modern China (London: Routledge, 1997); Allen Guttmann and Lee Thompson, Japanese Sports: A History (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2001); Andrew Morris, Marrow of the Nation: A History of Sport and Physical Culture in Republican China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004); Joseph Maguire and Masayoshi Nakayama, Japan, Sport and Society: Tradition and Change in a Globalizing World (London: Routledge, 2005); Gwang Ok, Transformation of Modern Korean Sport: Imperialism, Nationalism, Globalization (Seoul: Hollym International Corporation, 2007); Rachael Miyung Joo, Transnational Sport: Gender, Media, and Global Korea (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2012); Gerald R. Gems, Sport and the American Occupation of the Philippines: Bats, Balls, and Bayonets (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016); Denis Gainty, Martial Arts and the Body Politic in Meiji Japan (London: Routledge, 2015); Fan Hong and Lu Zhouxiang, The Politicisation of Sport in Modern China: Communists and Champions (London: Routledge, 2014); Ronojoy Sen, Nation at Play: A History of Sport in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015); Dae Hee Kwak, Yong Jae Ko, Inkyu Kang, and Mark Rosentraub, eds., Sport in Korea: History, Development, Management (London: Routledge, 2017); Hong and Zhouxiang, The Politicisation of Sport in Modern China; Liu Li and Fan Hong, The National Games and National Identity in China: A History (London: Routledge, 2017); Huijie Zhang, Fan Hong, and Fuhua Huang, Christianity and the Transformation of Physical Education and Sport in China (London: Routledge, 2019); Fuhua Huang and Fan Hong, eds., A History of Chinese Martial Arts (London: Routledge, 2018). 19 J. A. Mangan and Fan Hong, eds., Sport in Asian Society: Past and Present (London: Cass, 2002); Joseph A. Reaves, Taking in a Game: A History of Baseball in Asia (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2004); Victor Cha, Beyond the Final Score: The Politics of Sport in Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); Fan Hong, ed., Sport, Nationalism and Orientalism: The Asian Games (London: Routledge, 2013); Younghan Cho, ed., Football in Asia: History, Culture and Business (London: Routledge, 2014); Fan Hong and Lu Zhouxiang, eds., Sport and Nationalism in Asia: Power, Politics and Identity (London: Routledge, 2014); Younghan Cho and Charles Leary, eds., Modern Sports in Asia: Cultural Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2014); William Kelly and J. A. Mangan, The New Geopolitics of Sport in East Asia (London: Routledge, 2014); Katrin Bromber, Birgit Krawietz, and Joseph Maguire, eds., Sport Across Asia: Politics, Cultures, and Identities (London: Routledge, 2015); Stefan Huebner, Pan-Asian Sports and the Emergence of Modern Asia, 1913–1974 (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2016); J. A. Mangan, Sandra Collins, and Gwang Ok, eds., The Triple Asian Olympics–Asia Rising: The Pursuit of National Identity, International Recognition and Global Esteem (London: Routledge, 2017); John Horne and 5

Fan Hong and Lu Zhouxiang

Wolfram Manzenreiter, Football Goes East: Business, Culture and the People’s Game in East Asia (London: Routledge, 2004); Fan Hong, ed., Sport in the Middle East: Power, Politics, Ideology and Religion (London: Routledge, 2015).

Bibliography Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Business, 2012. Bromber, Katrin, Birgit Krawietz, and Joseph Maguire, eds. Sport Across Asia: Politics, Cultures, and Identities. London: Routledge, 2015. Brownell, Susan. Training the Body for China: Sports in the Moral Order of the People’s Republic. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. Cha,Victor. Beyond the Final Score:The Politics of Sport in Asia. Columbia University Press, 2008. Cho,Younghan, ed. Football in Asia: History, Culture and Business. London: Routledge, 2014. Cho, Younghan, and Charles Leary, eds. Modern Sports in Asia: Cultural Perspectives. London: Routledge, 2014. Frankopan, Peter. The New Silk Roads:The Present and Future of the World. London: Bloomsbury, 2018. Frankopan, Peter. The Silk Roads: A New History of the World. London: Bloomsbury, 2016. Gainty, Denis. Martial Arts and the Body Politic in Meiji Japan. London: Routledge, 2015. Gems, Gerald R. Sport and the American Occupation of the Philippines: Bats, Balls, and Bayonets. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016. Guan, Ang Cheng. Southeast Asia After the Cold War: A Contemporary History. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2019. Guttmann, Allen, and Lee Thompson. Japanese Sports: A History. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2001. Halliday, Fred. The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Hong, Fan. Footbinding, Feminism and Freedom: The Liberation of Women’s Bodies in Modern China. London: Routledge, 1997. Hong, Fan. “Nationalism, Orientalism and Globalization: The Future of the Asian Games.” Sport in Society 8, no. 3 (2005): 515–19. Hong, Fan, ed. Sport in the Middle East: Power, Politics, Ideology and Religion. London: Routledge, 2015. Hong, Fan, ed. Sport, Nationalism and Orientalism:The Asian Games. London: Routledge, 2013. Hong, Fan, and Lu Zhouxiang. The Politicisation of Sport in Modern China: Communists and Champions. London: Routledge, 2014. Hong, Fan, and Lu Zhouxiang, eds. Sport and Nationalism in Asia—Power, Politics and Identity. London: Routledge, 2014. Horne, John, and Wolfram Manzenreiter. Football Goes East: Business, Culture and the People’s Game in East Asia. London: Routledge, 2004. Huang, Fuhua, and Fan Hong, eds. A History of Chinese Martial Arts. London: Routledge, 2018. Huebner, Stefan. Pan-Asian Sports and the Emergence of Modern Asia, 1913–1974. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2016. Joo, Rachael Miyung. Transnational Sport: Gender, Media, and Global Korea. Durham: Duke University Press, 2012. Kelly, William, and J. A. Mangan. The New Geopolitics of Sport in East Asia. London: Routledge, 2014. Khanna, Parag. The Future Is Asian: Global Order in the Twenty-First Century. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2019. Kindersley, Dorling. Reference Atlas of the World. London: Dorling Kindersley, 2003. Kolb, Albert. East Asian: China, Japan, Korea, Vietnam: Geography of a Cultural Region. London: Methuen, 1971. Kwak, Dae Hee,Yong Jae Ko, Inkyu Kang, and Mark Rosentraub, eds. Sport in Korea: History, Development, Management. London: Routledge, 2017. 6

Introduction

Li, Liu, and Fan Hong. The National Games and National Identity in China: A History. London: Routledge, 2017. Maguire, Joseph, and Masayoshi Nakayama. Japan, Sport and Society: Tradition and Change in a Globalizing World. London: Routledge, 2005. Mahbubani, Kishore. “Can Asians Think?” Media Asia (1997): 123–27. Mangan, J. A., Sandra Collins, and Gwang Ok, eds. The Triple Asian Olympics—Asia Rising: The Pursuit of National Identity, International Recognition and Global Esteem. London: Routledge, 2017. Mangan, J. A., and Fan Hong, eds. Sport in Asian Society: Past and Present. London: Cass, 2002. Mason, Colin. A Short History of Asia. London: Macmillan, 2000. McCloud, Donald G. Southeast Asia: Tradition and Modernity in the Contemporary World. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995. Meyer, Milton W. Asia: A Concise History. New York: Portman & Littlefield, 1997. Morris, Andrew. Marrow of the Nation: A History of Sport and Physical Culture in Republican China. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004. Novotny, Daniel. Torn Between America and China: Elite Perceptions and Indonesian Foreign Policy. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010. Ok, Gwang. Transformation of Modern Korean Sport: Imperialism, Nationalism, Globalization. Seoul: Hollym International Corporation, 2007. Osborne, Milton. Southeast Asia: An Introductory History. St Leonards: George Allen & Unwin, 1995. Preston, P. W. Pacific Asia in the Global System. Oxford: Blackwell, 1998. Reaves, Joseph A. Taking in a Game: A History of Baseball in Asia. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2004. Romein, Jan. The Asian Century: A History of Modern Nationalism in Asia. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1965. Sen, Ronojoy. Nation at Play: A History of Sport in India. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015. Xi, Jinping. “New Asian Security Concept for New Progress in Security Cooperation.” Remarks at the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China, Beijing, May 21, 2014, 10. Zhang, Huijie, Fan Hong, and Fuhua Huang. Christianity and the Transformation of Physical Education and Sport in China. London: Routledge, 2019. Zuern, Michael, and Stephan Leibfried. “A New Perspective on the State: Reconfiguring the National Constellation.” European Review 13, no. 1 (2005): 1–36.

7

Part I

Asia’s traditional sport

Traditional sport were seen by many Asian countries as symbols of their nation and pride in their history and have long been regarded as important parts of indigenous culture. This part of the book explores the development of traditional sport in Asian countries through identity narratives and explains how these sport have developed into important Asian cultural elements over the course of time. It highlights the special place of traditional sport in Asian society and discusses the close relationships between these sport and Asian history, politics, philosophy and religions.

1 In authentic relations Traditional Asian martial arts, East and West Paul Bowman

How traditional are traditional Asian martial arts? In discourses about East Asian martial arts, the term ‘authentic’ has connotations that can easily be taken to imply a kind of unchanging monocultural purity.The term ‘traditional’ is its partner in crime: in the context of discussions about martial arts, both terms can all too easily imply a long unchanging history and a pure unbroken lineage.1 ‘Authentic’ and ‘traditional’ are very easily read interchangeably as meaning ‘the way things have been, since the origin, unchanging down through the generations.’2 As such, discussions about authenticity and tradition in Asian martial arts often betray deep affections for – even fantasies about – mythical ideas of pure and perfect ancient origins. However, such narratives are often misconstrued. For instance, the most familiar of ‘ancient’ East Asian martial arts emerged in their present form during the twentieth century. Virtually all styles of karate, aikido, taekwondo and Brazilian jiujitsu, for instance, are twentieth-century inventions.3 The avowedly ‘modern’ (late nineteenth to early twentieth century) martial art of judo is actually older than many avowedly ancient martial arts, such as taekwondo (which was devised, named and formalised in the 1950s).4 Similarly, what is now known as either kung fu or wushu should properly be understood as a modern construction.5 Perhaps most surprisingly, even the ‘ancient’ art of taijiquan can actually be understood as a nineteenth-century cultural and ideological response to modernity.6 This short list is merely the tip of the iceberg. What is rarely acknowledged in histories and studies of traditional East Asian martial arts are the complex cultural processes and logics involved in the (modern) invention of (ancient) martial arts. Processes of ‘orientalism’7 and ‘allochronism’8 – both species of mythic romanticizing – are key. Similarly rarely acknowledged is the fact that when they move from one society or cultural context to another, one institution to another, one medium to another, ‘traditional’ martial arts are substantially reinvented each time.9 Narratives of ‘movement’ or ‘discovery’ often work to obscure complex processes of transformation.10 For instance, when Asian martial arts ‘arrived’ in Western contexts, such as Europe or the United States, they were often instituted according to problematic beliefs not only about their countries and cultures of origin but also about the practices themselves.11

11

Paul Bowman

In debates about authenticity and tradition in martial arts, the status of origin stories is immense.12 Fantasies of the origin are combined with a deep investment in the idea of pedagogy as pure transmission – in which the practice of teaching and learning is imagined as nothing other than the smooth transmission of established knowledge from teacher to student, unbroken and unmodified, down through the ages, from era to era and cultural context to cultural context. In such a paradigm, change cannot but be regarded as bad, because (1) if the origin is pure, and (2) if the ancestors are superlative, then therefore (3) any change cannot but be a sign of either arrogance or corruption. Of course, such investments are fantasies. An origin is always a complex process of formation that is always ongoing and that only ever looks like a clean break or a pure moment of emergence in retrospect.13 A tradition is always fractured, multiple, heterogeneous, inventive, transforming, partial, changing and – as scholars since the early 1980s have been increasingly aware – very often invented recently and passed off as ancient for the sake of attempting to gain cultural capital, kudos, mystique, gravitas and/or legitimacy.14 Like tradition, pedagogical processes are far from simply the smooth, unchanged and unchanging transmissions of established knowledge from one body to another. Teaching and learning are partial, plural, variable, often inventive and inevitably differing across time and space in form, content and reception.15 Of course, ‘traditional’ Asian martial arts as encountered around the world often attempt to police any drift or shift in form and content by insisting on the maintenance of strict ritualistic structures and strictures. The ‘traditional’ club, dōjō (道場), dojang (도장 or 道場) or kwoon (館 or 馆) has its familiar rituals, hierarchies and visual insignia. A strong emphasis on ritualistic repetition can work to prevent the drift and transformation of the core content of a syllabus. Supplementing this with clear written codification of content and criteria for progression is equally important in preserving and maintaining ‘standards.’ The value and function of written rules and regulations within an institutional structure can be seen when comparing the similarity of martial sport like kōdōkan (講道館) or Olympic judo (柔道) on the one hand, and the difference between clubs of ‘the same’ style of kung fu, on the other. For while practices like judo and taekwondo (태권도/跆拳道) have all manner of diverse centralised and dispersed institutional factors supervening on their practice, performance and appearance,16 the international dissemination of various styles of kung fu (gongfu, 功夫) has rarely (until recently) been subject to the demands to adhere to the rules, practices and yardsticks set out by any overarching governing body.17 The net result is that judo tends to be more or less the same the world over, while styles of other (unformalised, unregulated) martial arts vary enormously. However, in all cases, traditional East Asian martial arts clubs the world over can be said to self-consciously attempt to institute and inculcate ideas of the ‘traditional East Asian,’18 via the institutions of rituals, repetitions, hierarchies, the way the training space is organised, the terms and language used, the religions and philosophies evoked, and so on. The paradox is that they can all do so differently, meaning that in the final analysis these ‘traditions’ often have the status of simulations19 – manifest in the overarching attempt to construct an imagined ideal Chinese, Japanese, Korean or other national, regional or ethno-linguistic scene. To use Jean Baudrillard’s term, many ‘traditional’ martial arts clubs should properly be regarded as hyperreal.20 Like a traditional Irish pub in Hong Kong or a traditional British pub in Tokyo, traditional martial arts clubs around the world are ontologically akin to theme parks.21 This is not to suggest that this is all about ignorant Westerners being guilty of yet another species of orientalist fantasy. Highly knowledgeable Easterners are often equally guilty of exactly the same thing – especially when it comes to what is sometimes called self-orientalisation.22 12

In authentic relations

Many teachers of ‘regional’ or ‘national’ martial arts have spent time studying in the source or origin cultures of the arts that they teach. So this is not a matter of authenticity versus inauthenticity, or ignorance versus knowledge. It is instead a matter that springs from the irreducibly constructed character of any such practice. The attempt to capture and convey the ‘essence’ or ‘authenticity’ of a traditional martial art involves the deployment of all manner of conventional secondary or supplementary things – from bowing to standing in lines, wearing uniforms and insignia of rank, using Chinese or Japanese terms, and many other matters besides.23 Such contexts, whether in Asia or elsewhere in the world, constitute hyperreal simulations that attempt to create an imagined authentic East Asian origin. It is not merely ‘ignorant Westerners’ who take part in this process. There is much to be gained from the invention of tradition, no matter who or where you are. It is well known that East Asian nation states often actively promote mysterious, timeless and romantic images of themselves and their cultural heritage, precisely in order to attract tourist income.24 By the same token, diasporic communities romanticise and fantasise about their wonderful homeland.25 And there are several other species of invention besides. Such postmodern formulations as these may seem pessimistic to some readers. This is not my intention. The point is not to suggest that some cultures or contexts are ‘false’ while others are somehow ‘true.’ It is precisely this perspective that fuels and fires the martial arts pilgrimage industry, which floods countries such as China, Japan and (more recently) Brazil with tourists looking for true, authentic, traditional (etc.) kung fu, taijiquan, jiujitsu or capoeira. The point is rather to acknowledge the inevitability of inventiveness and the constructed character of entities and identities, even and especially at the very heart of the pedagogical scene – which is the forge and furnace of the ‘reproduction’ of martial arts.

Traditionalizing Taijiquan The discussion so far has sought to problematise any notion of historical ‘tradition’ as being simple continuity and of teaching and learning as being the smooth transmission of established knowledge from one mind or body to another without change. Other scholars have deconstructed the notion of ‘origins’ as they apply in various cultural and martial arts contexts26 and of ‘authenticity’ as a supposedly non-constructed essence.27 In what follows, the questions of continuity and change will be examined in relation to the documented history of the movement of taijiquan – perhaps the ‘ultimate’ traditional Chinese martial art, if not martial sport. It also illustrates in a nutshell many of the features that have occurred in the cross-cultural dissemination of many – perhaps all – traditional East Asian martial arts. Historical study reveals that the practice and performance of all so-called styles can and do change across both time and space.28 As for taijiquan, historians have pointed out that comparing contemporary taijiquan with taijiquan as described in the Taijiquan Classics (Taijiquan Pu 太极拳谱 or Taijiquan Jing 太極拳經) – texts supposedly ‘discovered,’ but more likely composed during the nineteenth century – strongly suggests that the practices described in these texts bear little to no resemblance to contemporary taijiquan.29 Both Douglas Wile and Alexandra Ryan have noted that the nineteenth-century ‘discovery’ of the Taijiquan Classics is perhaps best regarded as ‘part of the conscious promotion of an internal martial arts ideology, developed in the late Qing to express resistance to external threat.’30 The ‘external threat’ in question was, quite simply, all things Western: Western imperialism, Western science, Western ideology, Western cultural power and Western military might. All of these aspects of the West were menacing China in multiple registers at the time of the appearance and popularisation of these quintessentially non-Western martial arts ‘classics.’31 13

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In Wile’s analysis, taijiquan comes to be regarded as having been intellectually ‘invented’ as an ideological response to Western threats of all kinds. As Ryan puts it, numerous events – including the Opium War (1839–1842); the Treaty of Nanking and cession of Hong Kong (1842); the Taiping (1850–1864), Nien (1852–1868) and Boxer (1898–1900) rebellions – all ‘resulted in a shared sense of the loss of Chinese military power and the need to protect and recover indigenous cultural foundations.’32 Accordingly, she argues (like Douglas Wile before her) that ‘the emergence of taijiquan in early twentieth-century China is deeply connected with the attempt to reinvigorate and defend the crumbling “semi-colonialised” empire.’33 This new academic ‘origin story’ of taijiquan, based on historical research and cultural analysis, differs in very many ways from the less well evidenced yet infinitely more well-known and romantic origin stories involving misty mountains and an original genius Daoist monk called Zhang Sanfeng (張三丰) over 700 years ago. In such popular stories of an ancient taijiquan, nothing very much is ever said to have changed. Taijiquan was born, different teachers may have emphasised different things, but almost a thousand mythical years later we still have ‘it,’ and ‘it’ remains the same thing. Conversely, in line with other historically researched studies of taijiquan,34 Ryan is clear that it is ‘not possible to demonstrate technical continuities prior to the nineteenth century.’35 This is because, ‘like other martial arts,’ taijiquan was ‘developed primarily by oral transmission.’ This means that ‘historical reconstruction is thwarted by many problems of evidence and method.’36 Crucially, however, what is known is that, along with other martial arts, taijiquan’s ‘pedagogy and techniques were changed significantly in early twentieth-century China and later during the Cultural Revolution, in line with ideals of physical fitness as a tool for social reform and nation building.’37 Taijiquan survived – indeed, flourished – within the Cultural Revolution because Mao Zedong (毛泽东) approved of its clearly non-Western characteristics and its propensity to be instituted as a uniform, collective, non-competitive, communal practice. However, communist state approval required elements of deracination, distancing taijiquan from both religious practice and many of its former characteristics.This took the form of standardisation. ‘All martial arts were standardised,’ writes Ryan, noting that ‘in 1956, the PRC government tasked a team of experts with the creation of the first “modernised” taijiquan form. This was what is known as the “simplified 24-step taijiquan”, which is based on Yang style taijiquan.’38 These examples of profound changes to taijiquan are often omitted in folkloric lineage histories. Schools and associations tend to prefer histories that focus on stories of successions of individual masters rather than massive institutional, national, ideological and political reconfigurations. Conversely, the best academic studies tend to involve the considerations of as many matters as possible, in order to produce well-rounded accounts of martial arts as practices within social history.39 In this vein, contemporary scholarly understandings have come to regard taijiquan as having regularly been reconstructed and reconstituted during tumultuous moments in Chinese history, in ways that brought it into relations with larger ideological purposes. Key landmarks in its complex history include its emergence as a nineteenth-century cultural, ideological and philosophical response to the multi-pronged threats of Western power and Westernisation,40 followed by subsequent reconfigurations, again as a non-Western, collective activity. Later still, it became (and continues to be) a more complexly articulated part of both Chinese domestic cultural politics and Chinese international relations.41 Certainly, Ryan notes that ‘as Deng Xiaoping’s rectification programme progressed in the late 1970s and 1980s, there was significant uptake of taijiquan in China’:42 A ‘48-step’ routine was developed in 1976, composed of elements from the Yang, Chen,Wu and Sun styles. In 1989, this became the ‘42-step taijiquan competition routine,’ which was 14

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promoted at the 11th Asian Games in 1990 and became the standard global competition style. Sports instructors were trained in a standard wushu syllabus (including standardised taijiquan) and appointed to posts in the provinces to expand the teaching of governmentsanctioned wushu.43 So important does the status and role of taijiquan appear to have become in Chinese cultural politics, that Adam Frank has gone so far as to propose that it is frequently employed by the government of the PRC as the very symbol of ‘Chineseness.’44 The state management of taijiquan is pertinent both culturally and politically. As sociologists from Norbert Elias to Zygmunt Bauman have suggested, ‘culture’ and ‘management’ are essentially two sides of the same coin – so much so that one cannot fully discuss one without discussing the other.45 In Elias’s process sociology, institutions such as sport principally serve as a kind of non-deliberate yet tangibly effective ‘management’ process: sport is ‘cultural management’ in that it brings individuals into alignment or conformity in their behaviours and values, by practically teaching people how to react ‘as one’ – as a community, as a people.46 Against this backdrop, it is possible to see that the sustained interest of successive Chinese governments in standardizing and controlling both the cultural and the sporting dimensions of ‘traditional’ Chinese martial arts amply supports arguments that they have been culturally curated by power for a range of different reasons. Taijiquan has experienced reconfigurations on both a macro and a micro level in China, and it is often closely articulated to or reticulated within complex networks of politics and social power. In his study of its history and status, Douglas Wile proposed that in many respects taijiquan has functioned as one of China’s cultural ambassadors to the world,47 and accordingly as a kind of entry point for Westerners into Chinese culture and philosophy. Against this backdrop, we may want to ask questions of the status and development of taijiquan outside China. Ryan’s discussion focuses on its ‘transmission’ to Britain. She argues that the dissemination of taijiquan to Britain ‘shows the creative interplay and the various tensions between forces of globalisation and tradition and between its martial and therapeutic aspects.’48 As she puts it: In the mid-twentieth century, taijiquan migrated west, becoming aligned in the 1960s and 1970s with Western interest in holistic health, Asian meditative systems and Chinese martial arts, but its martial techniques were little known until the 1980s and 1990s. British taijiquan illustrates the complex outcomes of globalisation processes, resulting in the establishment of different hybrids. There is evidence of the transmission of simplified systems promoted by the Chinese government; of innovative adaptations, developed to suit Western needs; and practices that appear to have survived suppression in mainland China, to be reconfigured in the West.These varied outcomes have been enabled by diverse channels of transmission and by colonial relationships, for example between Britain and Hong Kong, whilst the opening of mainland China in the 1980s has added further exchanges and complexities.49 Her study explores some of the key contours and connections of this emergence and development, and its fascinating interactions and interconnections with multiple practitioners, sets of values and aims – from the interests of countercultural and hippie practitioners to those interested in experimental dance, yogic, spiritual and health practices, and martial artists of all kinds. In each iteration, each incarnation, the name may have stayed the same, but the practice, its pedagogies, aims and outcomes varied enormously. 15

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Interestingly, despite the relative newness of many of its forms, patterns, exercises and principles, like qigong (气功, 氣功),50 taijiquan entered the British cultural scene as (if) a fully established, unchanging, ancient and traditional art. Yet, like karate-do (空手道) in the American context, what was very much lost in translation in the migration from East to West was the wider awareness of how recent, variable and multiple the practice really was.51 In the field of martial arts – whether ‘traditional’ or ‘modern’ – conventions and pedagogical methods are invented, modified and changed (ir)regularly. Many arts that claim to be ancient are actually younger even than such avowedly modern martial arts as judo,52 which is in many ways a synthesis of residual and emergent Japanese cultural values combined with Western approaches to teaching and learning.53 Similarly, kung fu styles and arts that are often regarded as ancient were produced or reconstructed and codified by the Jingwu Athletic Association (精武體育會), founded in Shanghai in 1910.54 Jingwu itself was in part an ideological response to the Western YMCA movement, and absorbed many of its principles or developed related approaches. Many forms of Chinese martial arts have been devised far from China. And, of course, the most stereotypical image – of practitioners of traditional Asian martial arts styles moving synchronously up and down a training hall in straight lines, in response to the barked counting or commands of an instructor – owes more to military training than to misty mountains. The interactions between East and West are infinitely more frequent, ongoing, deep-rooted and complex than easy binaries such as East and West make us inclined or even able to see.Those of us who research and teach either martial arts or academic subjects – or, indeed, both – have an obligation to deconstruct and displace, or even better, simply discard such imprecise, nonreferential and value-laden binaries as East and West. Mystical mythical narratives have no purpose more valuable than allegory, but even when those allegories seem progressive (such as how the weaker may overcome the stronger, as in taijiquan; or how an honourable woman overcame an aggressive man, as in wing chun (詠春), too often and too easily those allegories are actually deployed for nationalist, orientalist, racist or ethnonationalist ends. Whether in the lecture hall, the classroom, the training hall or the gym, our obligation as researchers and educators is to forward and further the best possible knowledge and the best possible practice. I have never known a student of taijiquan to be turned off by or to stop training due to being informed about the actual places and dates of the invention of specific forms or exercises. It is far better to tell a story about cultural responses to imperialism, the effects of the Cultural Revolution, the beliefs and fantasies of the Western counterculture, new age ideologies and the ideological function of wushu and taijiquan in China’s contemporary approach to cultural diplomacy than it is to trade in tales of mystical monks on misty mountains posing zen-like koans or setting challenges in the many chambers of the Shaolin Temple.The truth of the matter is that all classrooms, whether they be for martial arts training or for exploring any other subject, can and should be regarded reverently as the crucibles of variable and ongoing research projects that are able to produce all manner of monster or marvel.

Notes 1 Paul Bowman, Mythologies of Martial Arts (London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2017). 2 Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object (New York and Guildford: Columbia University Press, 1983); Gary J. Krug, “ ‘At the Feet of the Master:Three Stages in the Appropriation of Okinawan Karate into Anglo-American Culture’,” Cultural Studies: Critical Methodologies 1, no. 4 (2001): 395–410. 3 Stephen Chan, “ ‘The Construction and Export of Culture as Artefact: The Case of Japanese Martial Arts’,” Body & Society 6, no. 1 (2000): 69–74; Gichin Funakoshi, Karate-Do: My Way of Life ([S.l.]: Kodansha, 1975); Udo Moenig, Taekwondo: From a Martial Art to a Martial Sport (London: Routledge, 2015). 16

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4 Alex Gillis, A Killing Art: The Untold History of Tae Kwon Do (Ontario: ECW Press, 2008); Moenig, Taekwondo. 5 Benjamin Judkins, “ ‘Inventing Kung Fu’,” JOMEC Journal no. 5 (July 28, 2014), https://publications. cardiffuniversitypress.org/index.php/JOMEC/article/view/328; Brian Kennedy, Jingwu: The School That Saved Kung Fu (Berkeley, CA: Blue Snake Books, 2010). 6 Douglas Wile, Lost T’ai Chi Classics of the Late Ch’ing Dynasty (New York: State University of New York, 1996). 7 Edward W. Said, Orientalism:Western Conceptions of the Orient (London: Penguin, 1978). 8 Fabian, Time and the Other. 9 Krug, “ ‘At the Feet of the Master’.” 10 Paul Bowman, Martial Arts Studies: Disrupting Disciplinary Boundaries (London: Rowman and Littlefield International, 2015). 11 Kevin S.Y.Tan,“ ‘Constructing a Martial Tradition: Rethinking a Popular History of Karate-Dou’,” Journal of Sport & Social Issues 28, no. 2 (January 5, 2004): 169–92, https://doi.org/10.1177/0193723504264772. 12 Benjamin N. Judkins and Jon Nielson, The Creation of Wing Chun: A Social History of the Southern Chinese Martial Arts (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2015); Douglas Wile, “ ‘Book Review of: The Creation of Wing Chun: A Social History of the Southern Chinese Martial Arts. 2015. Benjamin Judkins and Jon Nielson. State University of New York Press’,” Martial Arts Studies 1, no. 1 (November 6, 2015): 83–85, https://doi.org/10.18573/j.2015.10021. 13 Judkins and Nielson, The Creation of Wing Chun. 14 E. J. Hobsbawm and T. O. Ranger, The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 1983). 15 Jacques Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991); Paul Bowman, “ ‘The Intimate Schoolmaster and the Ignorant Sifu: Poststructuralism, Bruce Lee, and the Ignorance of Everyday Radical Pedagogy’,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 49, no. 4 (2016): 549–70, https://doi.org/10.5325/philrhet.49.4.0549. 16 Mark Law, The Pyjama Game: A Journey into Judo (London: Aurum Press, 2008); Kotaro Yabu, “ ‘Diffusion of Judo in the United States During the Russo-Japanese War: Aiming to Overcome the ‘Match-Based Historical View’‘,” Martial Arts Studies 6 (July 23, 2018), https://doi.org/10.18573/mas.67. 17 Esther Berg and Inken Prohl, “ ‘‘Become Your Best’: On the Construction of Martial Arts as Means of Self-Actualization and Self-Improvement’,” JOMEC Journal (2014): 1–19; Alexandra Ryan, “ ‘Globalisation and the ‘Internal Alchemy’ in Chinese Martial Arts: The Transmission of Taijiquan to Britain’,” East Asian Science, Technology and Society: An International Journal 2, no. 4 (2008): 525–43, https://doi. org/10.1215/s12280-009-9073-x. 18 Tan, “ ‘Constructing a Martial Tradition’.” 19 Jean Baudrillard, Simulations (New York City, NY: Semiotext(e), Inc, 1983). 20 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, Body, in Theory (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994). 21 Jean Baudrillard, America (London:Verso, 1989, 1988). 22 Chan, “ ‘The Construction and Export of Culture as Artefact”‘; Adam Frank, Taijiquan and the Search for the Little Old Chinese Man: Understanding Identity Through Martial Arts (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Paul Bowman, “ ‘Making Martial Arts History Matter’,” The International Journal of the History of Sport (2016): 1–19, https://doi.org/10.1080/09523367.2016.1212842. 23 Paul Bowman, Deconstructing Martial Arts (Cardiff: Cardiff University Press, 2019). 24 Frank, Taijiquan and the Search for the Little Old Chinese Man; Bowman, “ ‘Making Martial Arts History Matter’.” 25 Ackbar Abbas, Hong Kong: Culture and the Politics of Disappearance (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Idil Osman, Media, Diaspora and the Somali Conflict (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). 26 Jacques Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other, or, the Prosthesis of Origin (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); Judkins and Nielson, The Creation of Wing Chun. 27 Joseph Heath and Andrew Potter, The Rebel Sell: How the Counterculture Became Consumer Culture (Chichester: Capstone, 2006). 28 Douglas Wile, T’ai-Chi’s Ancestors: The Making of an Internal Martial Art (Sweet Ch’i Press, 1999); Wile, Lost T’ai Chi Classics of the Late Ch’ing Dynasty; Frank, Taijiquan and the Search for the Little Old Chinese Man; Judkins and Nielson, The Creation of Wing Chun; Mark Singleton, Yoga Body:The Origins of Modern Posture Practice (Oxford University Press, 2010). 17

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29 Wile, Lost T’ai Chi Classics of the Late Ch’ing Dynasty; Wile, T’ai-Chi’s Ancestors; Frank, Taijiquan and the Search for the Little Old Chinese Man; Ryan, “ ‘Globalisation and the ‘Internal Alchemy’ in Chinese Martial Arts’.” 30 Ryan, “ ‘Globalisation and the ‘Internal Alchemy’ in Chinese Martial Arts’,” 529. 31 Wile, Lost T’ai Chi Classics of the Late Ch’ing Dynasty. 32 Ryan, “ ‘Globalisation and the ‘Internal Alchemy’ in Chinese Martial Arts’,” 530. 33 Ibid. 34 Wile, Lost T’ai Chi Classics of the Late Ch’ing Dynasty; Frank, Taijiquan and the Search for the Little Old Chinese Man. 35 Ryan, “ ‘Globalisation and the ‘Internal Alchemy’ in Chinese Martial Arts’,” 530. 36 Ibid., 527. 37 Ibid., 525. 38 Ibid., 531. 39 Judkins and Nielson, The Creation of Wing Chun; Wile, “ ‘Book Review Of ’.” 40 Wile, Lost T’ai Chi Classics of the Late Ch’ing Dynasty. 41 Frank, Taijiquan and the Search for the Little Old Chinese Man; John R. Eperjesi, “ ‘Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: Kung Fu Diplomacy and the Dream of Cultural China’,” Asian Studies Review 28 (2004): 25–39. 42 Ryan, “ ‘Globalisation and the ‘Internal Alchemy’ in Chinese Martial Arts’,” 532. 43 Ibid. 44 Frank, Taijiquan and the Search for the Little Old Chinese Man; Bowman, Martial Arts Studies. 45 Zygmunt Bauman, “ ‘Culture and Management’,” Parallax 10 (2004): 63–72. 46 Raúl Sánchez García, “ ‘An Introduction to the Historical Sociology of Japanese Martial Arts’,” Martial Arts Studies 6 (July 23, 2018), https://doi.org/10.18573/mas.64. 47 Wile, Lost T’ai Chi Classics of the Late Ch’ing Dynasty. 48 Ryan, “ ‘Globalisation and the ‘Internal Alchemy’ in Chinese Martial Arts’,” 527. 49 Ibid., 525. 50 David A. Palmer, Qigong Fever: Body, Science and Utopia in China, Kindle ed. (London: Hurst & Co. in association with the Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, Paris, 2007). 51 Tan, “ ‘Constructing a Martial Tradition’.” 52 Chan, “ ‘The Construction and Export of Culture as Artefact”‘; Gillis, A Killing Art: The Untold History of Tae Kwon Do; Moenig, Taekwondo. 53 Law, The Pyjama Game. 54 Brian Kennedy and Elizabeth Guo, Jingwu: The School That Transformed Kung Fu (Blue Snake Books, 2010).

Bibliography Abbas, Ackbar. Hong Kong: Culture and the Politics of Disappearance. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1997. Baudrillard, Jean. America. London:Verso, 1989, 1988. Baudrillard, Jean. Simulacra and Simulation. Body, in Theory Series. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994. Baudrillard, Jean. Simulations. New York City, NY: Semiotext(e), Inc, 1983. Bauman, Zygmunt. “Culture and Management.” Parallax 10 (2004): 63–72. Berg, Esther, and Inken Prohl. “ ‘Become Your Best’: On the Construction of Martial Arts as Means of SelfActualization and Self-Improvement.” JOMEC Journal (2014): 1–19. Bowman, Paul. Deconstructing Martial Arts. Cardiff: Cardiff University Press, 2019. Bowman, Paul. “The Intimate Schoolmaster and the Ignorant Sifu: Poststructuralism, Bruce Lee, and the Ignorance of Everyday Radical Pedagogy.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 49, no. 4 (2016): 549–70. https://doi. org/10.5325/philrhet.49.4.0549. Bowman, Paul. “Making Martial Arts History Matter.” The International Journal of the History of Sport (2016): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/09523367.2016.1212842. Bowman, Paul. Martial Arts Studies: Disrupting Disciplinary Boundaries. London: Rowman and Littlefield International, 2015. 18

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Bowman, Paul. Mythologies of Martial Arts. London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2017. Chan, Stephen. “The Construction and Export of Culture as Artefact: The Case of Japanese Martial Arts.” Body & Society 6, no. 1 (2000): 69–74. Derrida, Jacques. Monolingualism of the Other, or, the Prosthesis of Origin. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998. Eperjesi, John R. “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: Kung Fu Diplomacy and the Dream of Cultural China.” Asian Studies Review 28 (2004): 25–39. Fabian, Johannes. Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object. New York and Guildford: Columbia University Press, 1983. Frank, Adam. Taijiquan and the Search for the Little Old Chinese Man: Understanding Identity Through Martial Arts. Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Funakoshi, Gichin. Karate-Do: My Way of Life. [S.l.]: Kodansha, 1975. García, Raúl Sánchez. “An Introduction to the Historical Sociology of Japanese Martial Arts.” Martial Arts Studies 6 (July 23, 2018). https://doi.org/10.18573/mas.64. Gillis, Alex. A Killing Art:The Untold History of Tae Kwon Do. Toronto, ON: ECW Press, 2008. Heath, Joseph, and Andrew Potter. The Rebel Sell: How the Counterculture Became Consumer Culture. Chichester: Capstone, 2006. Hobsbawm, E. J., and T. O. Ranger. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 1983. Judkins, Benjamin N. “Inventing Kung Fu.” JOMEC Journal no. 5 (July 28, 2014). https://publications. cardiffuniversitypress.org/index.php/JOMEC/article/view/328. Judkins, Benjamin N., and Jon Nielson. The Creation of Wing Chun: A Social History of the Southern Chinese Martial Arts. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2015. Kennedy, Brian. Jingwu:The School That Saved Kung Fu. Berkeley, CA: Blue Snake Books, 2010. Kennedy, Brian, and Elizabeth Guo. Jingwu:The School That Transformed Kung Fu. Blue Snake Books, 2010. Krug, Gary J. “At the Feet of the Master: Three Stages in the Appropriation of Okinawan Karate into Anglo-American Culture.” Cultural Studies: Critical Methodologies 1, no. 4 (2001): 395–410. Law, Mark. The Pyjama Game: A Journey into Judo. London: Aurum Press, 2008. Moenig, Udo. Taekwondo: From a Martial Art to a Martial Sport. London: Routledge, 2015. Osman, Idil. Media, Diaspora and the Somali Conflict. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. Palmer, David A. Qigong Fever: Body, Science and Utopia in China. Kindle ed. London: Hurst & Co. in Association with the Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, Paris, 2007. Rancière, Jacques. The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991. Ryan, Alexandra. “Globalisation and the ‘Internal Alchemy’ in Chinese Martial Arts: The Transmission of Taijiquan to Britain.” East Asian Science, Technology and Society: An International Journal 2, no. 4 (2008): 525–43. https://doi.org/10.1215/s12280-009-9073-x. Said, Edward W. Orientalism:Western Conceptions of the Orient. London: Penguin, 1978. Singleton, Mark. Yoga Body:The Origins of Modern Posture Practice. Oxford University Press, 2010. Tan, Kevin S.Y. “Constructing a Martial Tradition: Rethinking a Popular History of Karate-Dou.” Journal of Sport & Social Issues 28, no. 2 (January 5, 2004): 169–92. https://doi.org/10.1177/0193723504264772. Wile, Douglas. “Book Review of: The Creation of Wing Chun: A Social History of the Southern Chinese Martial Arts. 2015. Benjamin Judkins and Jon Nielson. State University of New York Press.” Martial Arts Studies 1, no. 1 (November 6, 2015): 83–85. https://doi.org/10.18573/j.2015.10021. Wile, Douglas. Lost T’ai Chi Classics of the Late Ch’ing Dynasty. New York: State University of New York, 1996. Wile, Douglas. T’ai-Chi’s Ancestors:The Making of an Internal Martial Art. Sweet Ch’i Press, 1999. Yabu, Kotaro.“Diffusion of Judo in the United States During the Russo-Japanese War:Aiming to Overcome the ‘Match-Based Historical View‘.” Martial Arts Studies 6 (July 23, 2018). https://doi.org/10.18573/ mas.67.

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2 Chinese philosophy and Asian martial arts Barry Allen

What the world knows as the Asian martial arts began in China. China is not the only civilisation to have spiritualised combat arts. There are no less ancient examples in India and Mesopotamia. Yet the Chinese, drawing on the resources of a mature civilisation, merged their arts of armed and unarmed combat with Buddhist meditation and Daoist inner alchemy, two of the most dynamic currents of their post-classical culture. Creatively synthesizing combative arts with these prestigious teachings reinvented their practice as ethical self-cultivation. The idea that Chinese martial arts culture conveyed to practically all the later fighting arts of East Asia (karate, jiujitsu, hapkido, taekwondo and so on) is the dual cultivation of the spiritual and the martial, each through the other, each perfected in the other, with the proof of the perfection consisting in a kind of effortless mastery of violence. The result is very different from Greek or Indian combat sport, and in fact Asian martial arts are not sport at all. The emphasis is not on competition but on self-cultivation. The training is not so acrobatic that it must be reserved to the young; instead it is approached as a lifelong practice that ties self-cultivation to continuous somatic development.1 Ideas from Daoism and Chan/Zen Buddhism are prominent in the literature of the Asian martial arts. Interaction with Confucianism, long China’s orthodox philosophy, is less conspicuous, though probably more decisive.

Daoism (1) Zhuangzi There are two classical works of Daoism. One is the Daodejing, or Classic of the Dao and Its Power, attributed to the legendary sage Laozi.The other, known after its only partly legendary author, is Zhuangzi, or The Book of Master Zhuang. Modern scholars do not agree about which came first. It seems simplest to think of them as approximately contemporary, from around the mid-fourth century BCE, China’s Warring States period.2 A passage in Zhuangzi that speaks to martial arts practitioners relates a conversation between a lord and his cook, who is butchering an ox. The cook has a way of butchering that is beyond technique. He has not had to sharpen his knife in nineteen years. He does not use his eyes, only his spirit. He follows the heavenly patterns and finds the space between bones and ligaments ample and easily negotiated. Meat falls off his knife like clods of earth 20

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from a spade. This cook becomes an image of martial arts mastery. He responds to the ox as the martial master does an opponent. He does not use his eyes, but his qi. What seems quick to others is to him slow and clumsy. There is so much time, and the adversary’s moves are so obvious, that an effortless evasion evolves into a devastating response. A Qing dynasty martial arts author writes: [Zhuangzi] says: ‘Strike in the big hollows, guide the knife through the big openings.’ Why does it say so? Because when Cook Ding cut up oxen ‘he no longer saw the whole ox.’ I say it is the same with hand combat.Why? Because I am looking for my opponent’s soft points, acupuncture points, and those forbidden to strike as I engrave them in my mind’s eye. For this reason, the moment I lift my hand, I am able to target my opponent’s empty points, and strike at his acupuncture points, ‘no longer seeing the whole person.’3 Another martial arts author, in a Preface (1784) to the Hand Combat Classic, looks to Zhuangzi for an image of his art: ‘The subtlety of the method’s application depends entirely on internal strength. It cannot be exhausted by words. Like an old hunchback who catches cicadas . . .When one’s resolution is not distracted, when his spirit is concentrated, he will begin to acquire the agility of ‘mind conceiving, hands responding.’ At this point there is sure to be no straining of muscles nor exposure of bones.’4 The reference to cicadas alludes to a passage of Zhuangzi where the hunchback explains his knack. ‘I settle my body like a rooted tree stump, I hold my arm like the branch of a withered tree; out of all the vastness of heaven and earth, the multitude of the myriad things, it is only of the wings of a cicada that I am aware. I don’t let my gaze wander or waiver, I would not take all the myriad things in exchange for the wings of a cicada. How could I help but succeed?’5 The words are no less a description of the martial practitioner, clearing his spine, emptying his mind, calmly awaiting the other’s departure, intending to leave last but arrive first.

Daoism (2) Daodejing A story by Jigaro Kano, the Japanese founder of judo, conveys the Daodejing’s evocative power for the philosophy of Asian martial arts. He recounts the origin of jiujitsu, the Japanese battlefield martial art from which Kano derived judo. A physician named Akiyama went to China to study medicine. He returned having learned a fighting art that he tried to teach others, but his students were unsatisfied and deserted him. He retreated to a shrine and worshipped for a hundred days, when a new fighting art was revealed to him. During a snowstorm he observed a willow tree whose branches were covered in snow. Unlike the pine tree which stood erect and broke before the storm, the willow yielded to the weight of the snow on its branches, but did not break under it. He realised that martial arts must be practised in the same way. So he named his school Yoshin-riu, the Spirit of Willow school. The principle is not the uniquely Japanese insight Kano makes out. More than a millennium earlier, the Daodejing had already explained that ‘the stiff and strong are the disciples of death, the supple and weak are the disciples of life. That is why a weapon that is too strong will not prove victorious, a tree that is too strong will break.’ (DDJ 76)6 Several themes from the Daodejing have been appropriated in the theory of the practice of Asian martial arts: (1) Many passages seem to refer to meditation practice, breathing, circulating the qi, and arts of the body; for instance, ‘Concentrating your qi and attaining the utmost suppleness, can 21

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you be a child?’ (DDJ 10) A child is this work’s image of unspoiled natural power, a condition of flexibility and uncommitted responsiveness pursued as a goal of practice in Asian martial arts. (2) Concepts of non-action and emptiness are prominent and widely followed in accounts of martial arts. ‘Those of highest virtue practice non-action.’ (DDJ 38) ‘Act, but through non-action.’ (DDJ 63) ‘Non-action’ translates wuwei, which literally means ‘no action’ or ‘not doing.’ In philosophical usage, it describes action that does so little so easily as to seem (for example, to an opponent) to be nothing at all. To have this quality, action must flow spontaneously, without deliberation, calculation or indecision.7 The Daodejing connects wuwei effectiveness with the condition it calls xu, tenuous, empty. This is the emptiness of the unformed and uncommitted, the emptiness of the sky, clouds, steam, a virtual vapour that can coagulate in many forms. It is possible that the Daodejing took this idea from China’s military philosophy. Sunzi’s Art of War extols the virtue of xu emptiness in a dedicated chapter. Emptiness is a formidable strategic power for one with the art to deploy it. ‘If you induce others to adopt a form while you remain formless, then you will be concentrated while the enemy will be divided.’8 This emptiness of form is the emptiness of water. It was the ancient military philosophy that introduced this profound image. ‘Water has no constant shape. One who is able to change and transform in accordance with the enemy and wrest victory is termed spiritual!’9 The Daodejing repeats and canonises the image. ‘In all the world, nothing is more supple or weak than water; yet nothing can surpass it for attacking what is stiff and strong.’ Asian martial arts thought follows this line. The most effective response neutralises violence by harmonizing with its energy. You become ‘empty’ in offering no obstacle to the force launched against you, and your response seems effortless because it requires no energy beyond that supplied by an assailant. In the words of a taijiquan classic: ‘Being able to attract to emptiness, you can use four ounces to deflect a thousand pounds.’10 (3) The Daodejing develops the value of non-contention (bu zheng). ‘The Way of the sage is to act but not contend.’ (DDJ 81) ‘Because they do not contend, no one in the world can contend with them.’ (DDJ 22) This again resonates with the Art of War. The best general wins without combat (bu zhan). In the martial arts, the best fighter never has a fight. He cannot be made to engage.You cannot hit him, cannot hold him, cannot stop him with violence, so it never comes to a fight. How can you fight water? To avoid contention without submitting to another’s violence is a more artful and ethically nuanced accomplishment than either pacifism or aggression. (4) Discerning the minute and subtle. ‘To really see the little things is called enlightenment.’ (DDJ 52) To really see the little things is to see the big things they betoken, and to see them well before they become obvious. In Chinese martial arts tradition, this kind of sagacious penetration is called ‘interpreting energy’ (dong jing). ‘The ability to measure the opponent is impossible without being able to interpret energy. If you are unable to interpret energy, how can you understand the opponent’s incoming energy and thus use your own energy to draw it in?’11 Interpreting energy means being good at perceiving the subtle antecedents of action, so that before your opponent actually acts, he has already revealed his intention.Your response may then seem preemptive, though it is not. Caught in the intentional antecedents of his own action, the 22

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opponent cannot see that for one good at interpreting energy he has already begun to act, and can therefore be attacked in the vulnerability he is creating. (5) Schools of Chinese martial arts teach techniques that are ‘soft’ in the sense that their effectiveness does not require force or strength. That is a difference from European boxing or wrestling, where strength and body mass make a big difference. ‘The supple and weak overcome the hard and the strong.’ (DDJ 36) ‘What is brittle is easy to shatter.’ (DDJ 64) Asian martial arts practitioners (like judo-founder Kano) often like these passages, in which they see a principle of their art. The theme of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ is precursor to the distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ martial arts. Modern martial arts authors usually say that external styles are hard and trained by fighters for fighting, indifferent to self-cultivation, which is what the internal martial arts are all about. The problem with this account is that it is a false dichotomy. ‘Any complete Chinese martial arts system has both internal and external elements.’12 Qing dynasty internal master Chang Naizhou enjoins practitioners to ‘achieve the marvel of the complementary interaction of hardness and softness. . . . Be soft passing energy; hard dropping to a point. Each must mutually complement and thus never lose sequence.’13

Chan/Zen Buddhism According to legend, martial arts were introduced into China at the Shaolin Temple by Bodhidharma, a Buddhist monk who travelled from India to China in the fifth century. The same saint is also founder and first Patriarch of Chan (Zen) Buddhism. Finding the monks at Shaolin unfit for the demanding meditation he wanted to teach, Bodhidharma, born of India’s warrior class, instituted martial arts training to get them in shape. Modern scholars confirm Bodhidharma as an Indian Mahayana Buddhist meditation teacher arriving in China in the fifth century. Everything else, notably Bodhidharma’s dual founding of Chan and Chinese martial arts, is sheer fantasy, some parts of it as recent as the early twentieth century.14 Buddhism and martial arts should be oil and water. Buddhist law forbids weapons and fighting for monks. Ahimsa, non-violence, is among the most important precepts in all Buddhist traditions. Self-defence is expressly forbidden to Theravada clergy, as is association with the military or involvement in combat. Nevertheless, there is a long history in China, at Shaolin and elsewhere, of military monks. This was a chief distinction from Indian Buddhism, and Chan led the way in making Buddhism more ‘Chinese.’15 Chan/Zen’s affinity with Asian martial arts is felt on both sides. Writing to a martial master in the seventeenth century, a Japanese Zen master identifies delusion as the chief obstacle to enlightenment. Delusion does not mean faulty knowledge. To be deluded is to have a mind that stops. Every stopping point is a delusion, a deceptively glittering jewel in the veil cast over emptiness. This idea of stopping and its danger makes brothers of the Buddhist and the martial artist, for whom nothing is as fatal as stopping, or what practitioners know as a freeze. Be like water, even in your mind, especially in your mind. The consummate expression of martial efficacy turns out to be what Buddhism attains by a different path.16

Confucianism An assessment of the Confucian perspective on martial arts has to negotiate the distinction between wen, the civilian administration, and wu, the military. Both Confucius and Mencius 23

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express antipathy to military values, declaiming the superiority of civilian culture.17 There is an effort by literati to isolate the martial from the force of violence and subordinate it to civil wen culture. For instance, archery is reinterpreted as training in Confucian virtue. The Book of Rites says, ‘Archery implies in it the principles of humanity. For to prepare oneself for arrow-shooting, one is required to be quiet in mind and upright in posture before one can let the arrow go.When he fails in hitting the target, he cannot blame or resent those who have succeeded; he has to make introspections.’18 Confucians separate the intelligence that aims the arrow from the force that pierces the target.19 The mind that aims makes the force an asset. Without mind and culture, the military is thuggish. Confucians also reinterpret courage, the battlefield virtue par excellence, which they relocate in righteousness, a field where scholar-officials make a better showing. The paragon of Confucian courage is not a brave warrior; it is a good man trying to do the right thing despite opposition.20 Mencius reiterates the message that the highest courage is not martial. His models are people who are steadfast and undaunted in pursuit of an ethical or political goal.21 The best principles of war are no different from those of Confucian rulership, namely humanity and ritual propriety. Perfect that, and no king needs an army. A virtuous king has no enemies. The army of a true king is not tested.22 These attitudes in the classical sources of Confucian thought may seem to foreclose synergy with Chinese martial arts. However, the rapprochement did eventually come.The Ming dynasty was established by overthrowing China’s first experience of foreign conquest (the Mongolian Yuan dynasty).There was a new frankness about the value of military force. Formerly sharp lines blurred, like that between a general and a scholar, or between preparation for military command and preparation for administrative office. Military men began to participate in scholarship, poetry, painting and calligraphy, and the literati began to collect swords and to notice martial arts. Scholars began to use their erudition to legitimise these arts and a scholar’s attention to them.They made learned appraisals of authenticity and effectiveness, and distinguished different lineages of martial arts practice. Local traditions long left oral became part of a national martial arts history.23 It is a cliché to think there is something ‘Daoist’ about Chinese martial arts. In fact, the connection is surprisingly recent. Even more surprising, it was not made by Daoists or martial artists but by embittered Confucian literati in search of a myth of Chinese nationalism. To mention one example, a foundational text for the philosophy of internal martial arts is the ‘Epitaph for Wang Zhengnan,’ by Huang Zongzi. The work was composed shortly after the fall of the Ming dynasty to Manchu conquerors, initiating a new experience of foreign rule. Huang was a degree-holding scholar and Ming loyalist. His father had been a prominent Ming official and Confucian reformer. The son achieved an examination degree under the Ming and fought against the Manchu until 1649, when, refusing to serve their new dynasty, he retired to study and write. It is this Confucian literatus and disappointed Ming loyalist who invents the myth of the revelation of taijiquan to the Daoist immortal Zhang Sanfeng in a dream on Wudang Mountain. It was a covert political statement against foreign rule, and became part of a nationalist myth of Chinese identity. Playing up the Daoist qualities of something was a way of saying that it was Chinese and did not belong to foreign conquerors.24 Something similar happened a century later in the writings of Chang Naizhou. Chang obtained his examination degree and was known as the scholar boxer (ruquanshi). He innovated the explanation of martial arts in terms of the Neoconfucian concept of the Taiji, or Great Pole, and the natural philosophy of yin and yang. He influentially, though at the time counterintuitively, explained the value of martial arts not in terms of combat, but rather longevity, 24

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health and spiritual realisation. Combative movements are a method for an inner cultivation of qi energy. Chang synthesises Confucian self-cultivation with the Daoist pursuit of the alchemical elixir and the adamantine vajra body of esoteric Buddhism. Martial arts practice is an alchemical synthesis of wen (civilian) and wu (military). ‘Through wen refinement, it contrives the internal elixir. Through wu refinement, it contrives the external elixir. Internal elixir invariably borrows external elixir to be completed.’ This farrago of post-classical sources is garnished with approving citations from Confucius and Mencius.25 Ideas of an internal martial arts practice connected with Daoist Immortals on Mount Wudang, and a longevity-inducing inner alchemy of the qi, emerge not among the Daoists but as the invention of Confucian literati disappointed by what had become of their class and tradition under foreign conquerors. The emergence of Chinese martial arts into cultural prominence in late Qing and early-Republican China is a Confucian, not a Daoist or Buddhist, event. Martial arts practice emerges into Confucian acceptability at the same moment as these arts emerge in the form that we know them, as spiritual practices, methods of self-cultivation and middleclass recreations. All of that happened first in China, then throughout Asia and the world, to the point where probably millions of people, speaking all the languages of the world, have had some training in one or another of the Asian martial arts traditions, and imbibed something of its legendary philosophy.

Notes 1 See Barry Allen, Striking Beauty: A Philosophical Look at the Asian Martial Arts (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). 2 On the Laozi legend, see Angus C. Graham, “ ‘The Origins of the Legend of Lao Tan,’ ” in Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1990). The idea of ‘schools’ of Chinese philosophy is not satisfactory. See Kidder Smith, “Sima Tan and the Invention of Daoism,” Journal of Asian Studies 62, no. 1 (2003): 129–56; Nathan Sivin, “On the Word ‘Taoist’ as a Source of Perplexity,” Religious Studies 17 (1978): 303–30. 3 Huandou Cao,“ ‘Secret Transmission of Acupuncture Point’s Hand Combat Formulas’,” in Shaolin Monastery: History, Religion, and the Chinese Martial Arts, ed. Meir Shahar (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008), 118. 4 Ibid., 126. 5 Angus C. Graham, Chuang-Tzu:The Inner Chapters (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2001), 138. 6 The Daodejing of Laozi. Parenthetically embedded references are chapters, abbreviated DDJ. 7 On wuwei, see Edward Slingerland, Effortless Action: Wu-Wei as Conceptual Metaphor and Spiritual Ideal in Early China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Barry Allen, Vanishing into Things: Knowledge in Chinese Tradition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015). 8 Sunzi, “The Art of War,” in The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, ed. and trans. Ralph D. Sawyer (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 168. 9 Ibid. 10 Benjamin Pang-Jeng Lo, Martin Inn, Robert Amacher, and Susan Foe, ed. and trans., The Essence of T’ai Chi Ch’uan:The Literary Tradition (Berkeley, CA: Blue Snake Books, 1979), 81. 11 Douglas Wile, Lost T’ai-chi Classics from the Late Ch’ing Dynasty (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), 45. 12 Brian Kennedy and Elizabeth Guo, Chinese Martial Arts Training Manuals (Berkeley, CA: Blue Snake Books, 2005). On the usual understanding of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ martial arts, see Thomas A. Green, ‘External vs. Internal Chinese Martial Arts’, in Martial Arts of the World: An Encyclopedia, ed. Thomas A. Green,Vol. 1 (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2001), 119–23. 13 Chang Naizhou, in Douglas Wile, Ta’i Chi’s Ancestors: The Making of an Internal Martial Art (New City, NY: Sweet Ch’i Press, 1999), 95. 14 On Bodhidharma and the origin of Chan, see John R. McRae, The Northern School and the Formation of Early Ch’an Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1986); Mario Poceski, Ordinary Mind As the Way:The Hongzhou School and the Growth of Chan Buddhism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 25

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15 Nikolas Broy, “Martial Monks in Medieval Chinese Buddhism,” Journal of Chinese Religions 40 (2012): 45–89. 16 Takuan Soho, The Unfettered Mind, trans. William Scott Wilson (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1986). 17 See, for example, Analects, 15.1, and Mencius, 4A14, 2B1. 18 Chao Xu, ed., The Book of Rites (Jinan: Shandong Friendship Press, 2000), 411. 19 See Analects, 3.16. 20 Ibid., 2.24. 21 See Mencius, 2A2. 22 Ibid., 7B4; Xunzi, 15.3. 23 See Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 183, 213, 216; Peter A. Lorge, Chinese Martial Arts: From Antiquity to the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 180; Nicola Di Cosmo, ed., Military Culture in Imperial China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). 24 Douglas Wile, “ ‘Taijiquan and ’Daoism,” Journal of Asian Martial Arts 16, no. 4 (2007): 8–21. On the ‘Epitaph for Wang Zhengnan’, see Wile, Ta’i Chi’s Ancestors, 53. 25 Marnix Wells, Scholar Boxer: Chang Naizhou’s Theory of Internal Martial Arts (Berkeley, CA: Blue Snake Books, 2005), 47.

Bibliography Allen, Barry. Striking Beauty. A Philosophical Look at the Asian Martial Arts. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015. Allen, Barry. Vanishing into Things: Knowledge in Chinese Tradition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015. Broy, Nikolas. “Martial Monks in Medieval Chinese Buddhism.” Journal of Chinese Religions 40 (2012): 45–89. Cleary, Thomas, trans. The Art of War. Boston: Shambhala, 2003. Di Cosmo, Nicola, ed. Military Culture in Imperial China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009. Faure, Bernard. The Will to Orthodoxy: A Critical Genealogy of Northern Chan Buddhism. Translated by Phyllis Brooks. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997. Graham, Angus C. Chuang-Tzu:The Inner Chapters. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2001. Graham, Angus C. “The Origins of the Legend of Lao Tan.” In Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1990. Green, Thomas A., ed. Martial Arts of the World: An Encyclopedia. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2001. Ivanhoe, Philip J., trans. The Daodejing of Laozi. Indianapolis, IL: Hackett, 2003. Johnston, Alastair Iain. Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. Kennedy, Brian, and Elizabeth Guo. Chinese Martial Arts Training Manuals. Berkeley, CA: Blue Snake Books, 2005. Lo, Benjamin Pang-Jeng, Martin Inn, Robert Amacher, and Susan Foe, ed. and trans. The Essence of T’ai Chi Ch’uan:The Literary Tradition. Berkeley, CA: Blue Snake Books, 1979. Lorge, Peter A. Chinese Martial Arts: From Antiquity to the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. McRae, John R. The Northern School and the Formation of Early Ch’an Buddhism. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1986. Poceski, Mario. Ordinary Mind as the Way: The Hongzhou School and the Growth of Chan Buddhism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Sawyer, Ralph D., ed. and trans. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China. New York: Basic Books, 1993. Shahar, Meir. Shaolin Monastery: History, Religion, and the Chinese Martial Arts. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008. Sivin, Nathan. “On the Word ‘Taoist’ as a Source of Perplexity.” Religious Studies 17 (1978): 303–30. Slingerland, Edward. Effortless Action:Wu-Wei as Conceptual Metaphor and Spiritual Ideal in Early China. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 26

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Smith, Kidder. “Sima Tan and the Invention of Daoism.” Journal of Asian Studies 62, no. 1 (2003): 129–56. Soho, Takuan. The Unfettered Mind. Translated by William Scott Wilson. Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1986. Wells, Marnix. Scholar Boxer: Chang Naizhou’s Theory of Internal Martial Arts. Berkeley, CA: Blue Snake Books, 2005. Wile, Douglas. Lost T’ai-chi Classics from the Late Ch’ing Dynasty. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996. Wile, Douglas. Ta’i Chi’s Ancestors: The Making of an Internal Martial Art. New City, NY: Sweet Ch’i Press, 1999. Wile, Douglas. “Taijiquan and Daoism.” Journal of Asian Martial Arts 16, no. 4 (2007): 8–21. Xu, Chao, ed. The Book of Rites. Jinan: Shandong Friendship Press, 2000.

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3 A brief history of Chinese martial arts Lu Zhouxiang

Chinese martial arts in the dynastic era Chinese martial arts, also known as guoshu, kung fu, wuyi or wushu,1 are considered by many to symbolise the strength of the Chinese and their pride in their history, and have long been regarded as an important element of Chinese culture.2 The history of Chinese martial arts can be traced back to the Shang dynasty (1600–1046 BC). Together with the invention of bronze weapons, the practice of combat skills using archery, axe, halberd, sword and spear became an important part of military training. Over the course of time, archery demonstrations and martial dances (wu wu), which replicated the bodily movements of real combat, began to appear in rituals, ceremonies and celebrations.3 By the Zhou dynasty (1046–256 BC), archery demonstrations and martial dances had begun to appear in rituals, ceremonies and celebrations used to serve the construction of the feudal pyramid of power.Weapon and combat skills, notably archery, came to be highly regarded by the ruling regime and the feudal lords/kings, and became important parts of rituals, military training and education. Due to their important place in rituals and warfare, archery and charioteering training were incorporated into the education system for the children of the nobility, which was based on the Six Arts (Liu Yi): Rites (Li), Archery (She), Music (Yue), Charioteering (Yu), Calligraphy (Shu) and Mathematics (Shu).The sons of the nobility were also required to learn other weapon and combat skills. The Zhou dynasty saw the development of martial dances. Like the highly ritualised archery demonstrations and contests, these dances were loaded with political significance. The political and cultural values of martial dances were embraced by Zhou society and included in the curriculum for children and young people. In the Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BC) and the Warring States period (476–221 BC), facilitated by warfare, new technologies gave birth to steel and iron weapons such as the crossbow, halberd, sword, sabre and spear, which in turn fostered the further development of weapon skills and military tactics.4 Weapon performances and hand-to-hand combat contests emerged as a form of art and entertainment.5 An embryonic form of martial arts began to take shape. After the Qin reunified China, in order to consolidate the power of the centralised government and prevent rebellion, Emperor Qin Shi Huang banned private ownership of weapons. 28

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The rise of the standing army and the ban on weapons changed the direction of development of martial arts. Jiaodi contests, primarily based on wrestling but also involving striking techniques, and Shoubo (hand-to-hand combat) developed accordingly and became a popular entertainment form.6 After the collapse of the short-lived Qin dynasty (221–206 BC), the Han (206 BC–220 AD) rulers granted civilians the right to own weapons and all males were required to perform military service. This system facilitated the development of military tactics, weapon skills and combat techniques. Manuals on archery and fighting skills began to emerge. In the late Eastern Han period, wars between the three kingdoms resulted in the further development of martial arts. In a context of political chaos and social unrest, people learned weapon and combat skills to respond to unanticipated risks.This period also witnessed the rise of health-oriented physical training. Entering the Northern and Southern dynasties era, individual barehanded martial arts forms, Jiaodi and martial dances flourished. During the Sui (581–618) and Tang (618–907) dynasties, military reforms and the adoption of the Imperial Military Examination system encouraged more middle- and lower-class people to practise martial arts and led to the prevalence of militarism. A culture of gallantry was on the rise. The sword became a symbol of strength, courage, masculinity and righteousness, and carrying short weapons like knives, daggers and swords became fashionable. Social and economic prosperity also boosted the development of martial arts performances. Martial dances and Jiaodi contests were frequently held during courtly banquets, festivals and celebrations. Sword dances, wrestling, combat and other martial arts performances were gathered into the Baixi, a variety show that included acrobatics, animal shows, music, dancing and other art forms. Every year, on the fifteenth day of the first lunar month, Baixi shows were held in major cities to celebrate the Lantern Festival. Historical records reveal that many Tang rulers were fond of swordplay and Jiaodi. Jiaodi was not only performed for entertainment; it also developed into a full-contact combat competition which featured a combination of striking and wrestling skills. Moving on to the Song dynasty (960–1126), the Song rulers imposed civilian control over the military and used a voluntary recruitment system to build up a professional standing army. This led to the further development of weapon skills and training methods. An increasing number of military texts were produced by the Song government. At the same time, with the rise of urban centres and a booming entertainment industry, performing martial arts on the streets became a profession and martial arts emerged as a popular hobby among the urban population. Entering the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), the Mongol rulers promoted archery, horse racing and wrestling among the Mongol population to maintain military power. After Kublai Khan (1215–1294) moved the capital of the Mongol Empire from Shangdu (Šandu) to Yanjing in 1267, Jiaodi flourished in the region. However, the court prohibited Han civilians from owning weapons and practising martial arts. Despite this, martial arts culture continued to develop via the newly emerging poetic dramas which combined various forms of performances including acrobatics, music, martial arts, dancing, pantomime and singing, with plots usually based on popular folk tales, love stories, major historical events and well-known political and religious figures. Some tell the stories of gallant warriors and military leaders and therefore involve martial arts movements and martial dances using bare hands or wooden weapons.7 In sum, by the Song and Yuan dynasties, a modern form of martial arts – a collection of weapon skills, combat techniques, wrestling, martial dances and performances – had taken shape. It was practised for various purposes, including military training, health promotion, self-defence, entertainment and sport-like competition. The Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1911) dynasties marked a golden age of Chinese martial arts. In the 14th and 15th centuries, the Ming government’s supportive stance towards 29

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military education and the restoration of the Imperial Military Examinations facilitated the development of martial arts at all levels. Wrestling, hand-to-hand combat and weapon contests remained popular forms of training and entertainment in the army. The ban on weapons and martial arts was lifted by the Ming court. Martial arts performances began to revive. Street martial arts shows were performed by civilians during market days and festivals.Wrestling and handto-hand combat remained popular forms of entertainment. In the meantime, the newly popular vernacular novels and Kun opera contributed to the building of a martial arts culture. Scenes of martial arts performances and contests were displayed in carved sculptures, murals and paintings, reflecting the popularity of martial arts among the general public and the ruling upper class. In the late 15th and early 16th centuries, facilitated by warfare and benefiting from the voluntary recruitment military system, martial arts reached a new level of development. An increasing number of military texts and manuals were composed by military commanders and experts to standardise martial arts techniques and training. Soldiers were required to learn simple and effective fighting skills and avoid ‘colourful’ martial arts techniques meant for performance. In addition to military texts, descriptions of martial arts can be found in other literary genres such as poems, essays, local gazettes and historical writings. These texts reveal that various schools of martial arts had taken shape by the late Ming era, and they were practised by civilians for selfdefence or as a hobby. Following its Ming golden age, Chinese martial arts continued to flourish in the early Qing period.The Imperial Military Examinations and the relaxed control over weapons facilitated the development of martial arts. From the 17th century, people began to categorise different schools of material arts into two families: external (Waijia) and internal (Neijia). The external family was headed by the Shaolin school. Its defining characteristics included aggressive attacking techniques, fast movements and powerful strikes.Training focused on building up physical strength, agility and speed. It stressed the confrontation of force with force during combat. Most of the external styles centred around punching and kicking. The internal family was headed by the Wudang school, which was believed to have been founded by Daoist priest Zhang Sanfeng from the Wudang Mountains in Hubei Province, central China.8 It emphasised the practise of internal power – qi – and the use of effective defence skills. It upheld the idea that qi could be cultivated and used to energise the physical body and help one to use physical power effectively and efficiently. It focused on throw and joint lock techniques, Movements were mostly soft, gentle and relaxed. During combat, the practitioner avoided direct clashes with the opponent. The strategy was to evade or redirect the opponent’s attack and ‘borrow’ his force to launch an attack.9 In addition to the emergence of the concept of internal family and external family, the Qing dynasty saw the rise of various schools of martial arts, such as Baguazhang, Nanquan, Taijiquan and Xingyiquan. The older schools, such as Shaolin, Wudang and Emei, continued to evolve. However, the rapid development of martial arts attracted the attention of the Qing court. Worrying that the growing population of martial arts practitioners could lead to a rise in gang culture and result in an increase in violence and crime, the Yongzheng Emperor (1678–1735) banned the teaching, studying and performing of martial arts in public places in 1727. Although the ban was not effectively implemented throughout the country, together with the introduction of modern firearms, it more or less discouraged the development of combat techniques and weapon skills. Many martial art practitioners turned their focus to hand-to-hand combat forms and qigong exercises that promoted good health. Entering the nineteenth century, China was dragged into political unrest and economic hardship caused by domestic rebellions and Western incursion. Martial arts came to be associated with politics. Due to its renowned martial arts tradition and well-known loyalty to the Ming 30

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regime, Shaolin was linked to the Heaven and Earth Society, an influential anti-Qing secret society. The Society employed Shaolin to build credibility and influence, turning Shaolin and Shaolin kung fu into a symbol of rebellion and a source of ethno-national identity. Historical evidence shows that members of the Heaven and Earth Society practised martial arts to improve their physical strength and fighting skills. Hongquan (Hong Fist), one of the most popular subbranches of Nanquan, was the prime martial art they developed and practised. In addition to Hongquan, members of the society practised Wuzuquan (Five Ancestors Fist).10 The five boxing forms are: Baihequan (White Crane Fist), Houquan (Monkey Fist), Luohanquan (Arhat Fist), Dazunquan (Bodhidharma Fist) and Taizuquan (Emperor Taizu Fist).11 In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Heaven and Earth Society expanded into the Leizhou peninsula, Hainan Island and the newly rising urban centres in coastal regions, such as Guangdong, Hong Kong, Xiamen and Shanghai.The society was also brought into foreign countries by Chinese migrants from Fujian and Guangdong provinces, and soon became one of the most popular mutual aid organisations among the Chinese diaspora in America, Australia, Europe and Southeast Asia. The martial arts tradition was carried on by its members both in China and abroad, which greatly facilitated the development of Nanquan in general, and Hongquan and Wuzuquan in particular.12 Also in this period, a large number of farmers in northern China began to practise martial arts to defend their villages against bandits.Various schools of martial arts, including Meihuaquan (Plum Blossom Fist), Hongquan (Red Fist), Baguaquan, Erlangquan, Dadaohui (Big Sabre Society) and Shaolin kung fu circulated in rural areas in Shandong, Hebei and Henan provinces.13 By the 1880s, martial arts had become a popular form of physical exercise practised by farmers in northern China for self-defence. In the late 1880s and 1890s, in response to Western incursion and triggered by the expansion of Christian churches, farmers in Shandong Province, bonded together by martial arts societies and folk religion, launched anti-foreign campaigns by attacking churches, foreign missionaries and their Chinese converts. The movement later developed into the Boxer Rebellion of 1898–1901. During the Rebellion, martial arts functioned as a basis for social bonding and played an important role in the formation of a national consciousness among farmers and civilians. After the Boxer Rebellion, a nationalism based on the consciousness of sovereignty prevailed and became a new intellectual source for resisting imperialist expansions. An anti-Manchu movement organised by Han nationalists plotted to overthrow the Qing government and establish a modern nation state. Sport clubs, gymnastics schools and martial arts societies functioned as footholds for nationalists and facilitated the communication, assembly and training of antiManchu revolutionary forces. The nationalists also allied with the Heaven and Earth Society due to its anti-Qing tradition and its influence in Chinese society and among overseas Chinese communities.14 Chinese martial arts were used to build up the strength of revolutionary forces, and directly contributed to the success of the 1911 Revolution.

The twentieth century After the establishment of the ROC, fuelled by a modern Chinese nationalism that focused on anti-imperialism, national unity and national revival, practising Chinese martial arts became widely recognised as a basic approach to build up people’s physiques, strengthen the nation and achieve national salvation. In this context, the government officially promoted Chinese martial arts in the education sector. The 1910s, 1920s and 1930s became the golden age of Chinese martial arts, now called guoshu or wushu. Guoshu societies were set up in major cities across the country. Guoshu manuals, textbooks and monographs were published in great numbers to meet 31

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the increasing demand from martial arts enthusiasts and practitioners. Supported by the government, educationalists and the general public, guoshu served the goals of promoting individual fitness and aiding national defence, and it contributed to the construction of national identity and national spirit among the Chinese people. The revival of Chinese martial arts in the first half of the twentieth century was accompanied by the rise of wuxia novels and movies. Living in an era of rapid social transformation and influenced by the prevailing nationalism generated by revolutions, foreign aggressions, imperialist occupations and wars, Chinese novelists and movie producers consciously or unconsciously used Chinese martial arts to invent a cultural identity and aided the construction of a collective modern national identity among the Chinese during the infancy of the Republic. These wuxia novels and movies in turn helped Chinese martial arts lay a rhetorical claim to national identity. Following the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) initiated socialist reforms and extended state ownership to all sectors. In line with the economic and social policies, China’s sport policy was coloured by nationalism and self-strengthening objectives. The goal was to train strong, healthy bodies for national defence and the construction of the ‘New China.’ As an important cultural legacy and a popular traditional sport, Chinese martial arts received special attention from the government. A nationwide campaign was launched by the Sport Ministry to promote wushu and integrate it into the newly established state-run sport system and education system. Entering the 1960s, fuelled by a defensive nationalism that focused on national sovereignty and national security, sport became closely linked to militarism, and wushu was promoted among the militia in the interests of national defence. Chinese martial arts suffered a major setback during the Cultural Revolution. At the height of the Revolution between 1966 and 1968, wushu competitions ceased to take place and wushu teams at all levels stopped training, as was the case with other sport. At the same time, wushu came to be regarded as representing elitism and feudal culture. Therefore, wushu competitions ceased to take place and members of wushu teams stopped training. Wushu manuals and weapons were confiscated and destroyed by rebels. Wushu societies were closed down and wushu practitioners had to either practise in secret or stop practising. However, not all wushu activities ceased. Various politicised wushu exercises were created to interpret and promote the Maoist road and cultivate revolutionary activism. It was not until the late 1960s that wushu started to recover. By the early 1970s, in a relatively relaxed political environment, wushu development was brought back to normal. The 1950s, 1960s and 1970s also saw the rapid development of wuxia novels and films. In mainland China, due to the introduction of political censorship, wuxia novels and movies fell into the category of feudal superstition and therefore were banned by the government. Hong Kong thus became the place with the appropriate resources, talent and freedom to produce wuxia novels and movies. Theses novels and movies contributed to the construction of a wuxia culture and made wushu a unique representation of Chinese culture. They also unleashed the kung fu fever that later stormed the world. Beginning in the late 1970s, China launched reforms in all areas to achieve the goal of modernisation. In line with this policy, the Sport Ministry launched a campaign to revive Chinese martial arts. The strategy was threefold: to transform wushu into a competitive sport composed of taolu and sanda; to promote wushu as a sport for all; and to develop wushu internationally. Guided by these policies, survey teams were set up to discover and archive traditional wushu forms. Private and public wushu academies, societies and schools were liberated and began to revive at all levels. Primary and secondary schools and universities started to offer wushu classes. Regional and national competitions and exhibitions were organised by the Sport Ministry and the Chinese Wushu Association (CWA) to promote wushu. By the early 1990s, wushu had 32

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experienced pronounced development and become a popular sport and pastime among the general public. The revival of Chinese martial arts occurred together with the reintroduction of wuxia movies in mainland China. Many of the wuxia movies produced in the past three decades are set in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, with plots based around major historical events; they express a strong sense of anti-imperialism, anti-feudalism, nationalism and patriotism. The essential spirit of these films is that the core values of Chinese tradition should be inherited and preserved, and they stress a sense of national identity. Inspired by nationalism, wuxia movies have not only facilitated the revival of Chinese martial arts but also built it into a symbol of indigenous virtue and strength. Together with the revival of wushu in China, and fanned by wuxia movies, the past decades have seen the spread of ‘kung fu fever’ around the world. An increasing number of Chinese martial arts societies and federations have been set up by wushu practitioners from across the five continents. The Sport Ministry and the CWA also launched initiatives to promote wushu internationally. Funded by the state, international conferences and invitation tournaments were held in major cities in China. Wushu coaches and wushu troupes were sent by the CWA to foreign countries to teach and perform wushu. In 1990, wushu was made a competition event at the Asian Games held in Beijing, and the IWUF was launched during the Games. During the past decades, various wushu competitions have been organised by the IWUF and its member federations in Asia, Africa, the Americas, Europe and Oceania, and sanda and taolu have been added to the official schedule of several continental and international sporting events. Today, with millions of people practising wushu and participating in wushu competitions, Chinese martial arts are attracting a worldwide audience. They have made, and will continue to make, important contributions to the promotion of cross-cultural exchanges and understanding between China and the world.

Modern vs. Tradition In recent years, an increasing number of scholars, experts and fans have voiced concerns over the development of Chinese martial arts. Some criticise the Sport Ministry and the CWA’s policy of transforming wushu into a modern competitive sport and believe that the official promotion of the highly standardised taolu and sanda competitions has led to the decline of traditional wushu. Some believe that wushu is totally different from Western sport and therefore should keep its traditional form. Others assert that wushu has blindly followed Western sport and has therefore lost its national character. These criticisms clearly demonstrate the problems caused by the reforms carried out during recent decades and the difficulties and challenges facing the wushu community. However, one has to understand that in this increasingly industrialised, urbanised and globalised world, the dual approach of reform and modernisation is probably the best way forward for Chinese martial arts. During recent decades, the reforms have made possible the rapid development of wushu both in China and internationally. The official promotion of taolu and sanda has resulted in the standardisation, professionalisation and commercialisation of wushu, successfully transforming wushu into a modern competitive sport and giving rise to a wushu education system that nourishes millions of wushu coaches, teachers, athletes, practitioners and movie stars like Jet Li, Donnie Yen and Wu Jing. Also, health-oriented simplified taolu and taijiquan routines have significantly lowered the threshold for wushu practitioners and helped introduce wushu to people from all walks of life and all age groups. There is no doubt that, like Korea’s taekwondo and Japan’s judo and karate, joining the international sport community and seeking to be included in the 33

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Olympics is an effective way for wushu to boost its reputation, attract public interest and achieve sustainable development. As world-renowned wushu coach Wu Bin, the founder of the Beijing Wushu Team and the coach of Jet Li, argued: ‘The karate and taekwondo community were able to make these sports easy to learn, teach, and understand. Students nationwide also have a passion for it. Wushu must learn from these sports.’15 To conclude, Chinese martial arts have always been evolving since their emergence in the Shang and Zhou dynasties. Their form, function, practice and theory have changed dramatically over the course of time. From the early twentieth century on, together with the rapid transformation of Chinese society and influenced by Western sport, wushu began to develop into a new form – a performing art, a competitive sport and a sport for all. It has been widely practiced for health and fitness, self-cultivation, self-defence and entertainment. After a century of development, it has grown into an important part of the international sport world and attracts a global audience.

Acknowledgments Some parts of this chapter are based on Lu Zhouxiang, Politics and Identity in Chinese Martial Arts, London: Routledge, 2018.

Notes 1 Guoshu (国术), literally ‘national skills’, was used in China between the 1920s and 1940s when a nationwide campaign was launched by the nationalist government to promote Chinese martial arts in the education sector and in society. After the nationalist government retreated to Taiwan in 1949, they continued to promote guoshu there.The term was also used by martial arts practitioners in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia; kung fu (功夫), literally ‘effort’, ‘ability’ or ‘skills’, is used in both China and foreign countries, notably the United States; wuyi (武艺), literally ‘martial arts’ or ‘feats’, first appeared in Han dynasty literature; wushu (武术), literally ‘martial skills’, first appeared in an essay collection edited by Prince Xiao Tong (501–31) of the Southern Liang Dynasty (502–57). At first, the term referred to military affairs and operations. Its meaning changed over the course of time and became a collective term for military skills, combat skills, weapon techniques and martial arts performances. The term came into common use in the late nineteenth century. It has been used as the official term for Chinese martial arts in mainland China since the 1950s. 2 Cai Xu, Xucai wushu wenji [Collection of Xu Cai’s Essays on Wushu] (Beijing: Renmin tiyu chuban she, 1995), 3–4. 3 Yuntai Xi, Zhongguo wushu shi [A History of Chinese Wushu] (Beijing: Renmin tiyu chuban she, 1985), 22–23; Dali Cheng, “Xia Shang Xizhou shiqi wushu” [Wushu in the Xia, Shang and Western Zhou dynasties], in Zhognguo wushu baike quanshu [Encyclopaedia of Chinese wushu], ed. Editorial Team of Zhognguo wushu baike quanshu (Beijing: Zhongguo dabaike quanshu chuban she, 1998), 43–44. 4 Xi, Zhongguo wushu shi, 28–31. 5 Ibid., 35–36. 6 Ibid., 60–62. 7 Beng Liao, Song Yuan xiqu wenwu yu minsu [Song and Yuan Drama, Cultural Relics and Folk Customs] (Beijing:Wenhua yishu chuban she, 1989);Tonxu Tian, Yuan zaju tonglun [Study of Yuan Poetic Drama] (Taiyuan: Shanxi jiaoyu chuban she, 2007), 82–83, 188. 8 Guangxi Wang, Chinese Kung Fu (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 17–18. 9 Shengli Lu, Combat Techniques of Taiji, Xingyi, and Bagua: Principles and Practices of Internal Martial Arts, trans. Zhang Yun (Berkeley, CA: Blue Snake Books, 2006), 73. 10 Weiliang Zhou, “Yetan Tiandi hui Shaolin gushi de xingcheng yuanyin ji dui chuantong wushu suo chansheng de yingxiang” [Formation of the Legend of the Heaven and Earth Society and Shaolin Temple and Its Influence on Traditional Wushu], Journal of Beijing Institute of Physical Education no. 4 (1991): 81–84.

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11 Jinhuan Hu and Chongxiong Sun, Nanquan huizong [Southern Boxing] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chuban she, 1985), 24. 12 Xingtan Chen, Wenlong Zhao, Jiyuan Li, and Yongfeng Xu, “Lingnan chuantong Hongquan de wenhua yanjiu” [Study of the Hongquan, a Tradition of Lingnan], Journal of Guangzhou Sport University 36, no. 4 (2016): 53–54. 13 Boyuan Lin, “Lun Yapian zhanzheng zhi Xinhai geming qian Zhongguo chuantong tiyu de fazhan bianhua” [On the Changes of the Development of Chinese Traditional Physical Culture from the Opium War to the Revolution of 1911], Tiyu kexue 12, no. 4 (1992): 12. 14 Zuhui Wu and Xuesong Guo, “Xinhai geming zhong de nan Shaolin wushu yanjiu” [Southern Shaolin Martial Arts in the 1911 Revolution], Journal of Shandong Institute of Physical Education and Sports 27, no. 9 (2011): 41. 15 Melody Chung, “The Father of Modern Wushu–Wu Bin,” Kungfu Tai Chi (March–April 2007): 49.

Bibliography Chen, Xingtan, Wenlong Zhao, Jiyuan Li, and Yongfeng Xu. “Lingnan chuantong Hongquan de wenhua yanjiu” [Study of the Hongquan, a Tradition of Lingnan]. Journal of Guangzhou Sport University 36, no. 4 (2016): 53–54. Cheng, Dali. “Xia Shang Xizhou shiqi wushu” [Wushu in the Xia, Shang and Western Zhou Dynasties]. In Zhognguo wushu baike quanshu [Encyclopaedia of Chinese Wushu], edited by Editorial Team of Zhognguo wushu baike quanshu, 43–44. Beijing: Zhongguo dabaike quanshu chuban she, 1998. Chung, Melody. “The Father of Modern Wushu–Wu Bin.” Kungfu Tai Chi, March–April 2007, p. 49. Hu, Jinhuan, and Chongxiong Sun. Nanquan huizong [Southern Boxing]. Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chuban she, 1985. Liao, Beng. Song Yuan xiqu wenwu yu minsu [Song and Yuan Drama, Cultural Relics and Folk Customs]. Beijing: Wenhua yishu chuban she, 1989. Lin, Boyuan. “Lun Yapian zhanzheng zhi Xinhai geming qian Zhongguo chuantong tiyu de fazhan bianhua” [On the Changes of the Development of Chinese Traditional Physical Culture from the Opium War to the Revolution of 1911]. Tiyu kexue 12, no. 4 (1992): 12. Lu, Shengli. Combat Techniques of Taiji, Xingyi, and Bagua: Principles and Practices of Internal Martial Arts. Translated by Zhang Yun. Berkeley, CA: Blue Snake Books, 2006. Tian, Tonxu. Yuan zaju tonglun [Study of Yuan Poetic Drama]. Taiyuan: Shanxi jiaoyu chuban she, 2007. Wang, Guangxi. Chinese Kung Fu. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Wu, Zuhui, and Xuesong Guo. “Xinhai geming zhong de nan Shaolin wushu yanjiu” [Southern Shaolin Martial Arts in the 1911 Revolution]. Journal of Shandong Institute of Physical Education and Sports 27, no. 9 (2011): 41. Xi,Yuntai. Zhongguo wushu shi [A History of Chinese Wushu]. Beijing: Renmin tiyu chuban she, 1985. Xu, Cai. Xucai wushu wenji [Collection of Xu Cai’s Essays on Wushu]. Beijing: Renmin tiyu chuban she, 1995. Zhou, Weiliang. “Yetan Tiandi hui Shaolin gushi de xingcheng yuanyin ji dui chuantong wushu suo chansheng de yingxiang” [Formation of the Legend of the Heaven and Earth Society and Shaolin Temple and Its Influence on Traditional Wushu]. Journal of Beijing Institute of Physical Education no. 4 (1991): 81–84.

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4 The development and global transmission of Wing Chun Benjamin N. Judkins

Introduction Originally practised by the Cantonese-speaking population of the Pearl River Delta region, Wing Chun is a concept-based fighting system known for its distinct high stances, triangular footwork, short-range boxing and trapping techniques, emphasis on relaxation and preference for low kicks.1 Most branches of the art feature three unarmed forms: Siu Lim Tao (the Little Idea, or Little Thought Form), Chum Kiu (Seeking Bridges) and Biu Ji (Thrusting Fingers).The most commonly encountered weapons are the baat jaam do (eight-directional chopping/slashing knives,Wing Chun’s version of the hudiedao) and a single-tailed fighting pole typically over three metres in length.2 These same weapons are often among the first taught in other regional kung fu styles, and were mainstays of the area’s nineteenth-century militia system.3 Wing Chun is also known for its emphasis on wooden dummy (muk yan jong) training. Distinctions in stance and technique are often noted between this system and the other arts which were popular in its hometown of Foshan, including Choy Li Fut (the most popular art in the region through the late 1920s) and Hung Gar (also an important style in both Foshan and Guangzhou).4 It seems likely that Wing Chun developed in dialogue with these other modes of hand combat. Its characteristic stances and triangular footwork bear a distinct resemblance to certain regional Hakka boxing styles and the arts of Fujian province. This is not surprising, as demographic pressures and market trends led to the emigration of large numbers of people (including many professional martial artists) from coastal Fujian to Guangdong throughout the nineteenth century. The market town of Foshan (a regionally critical trade centre holding the imperial iron monopoly and known for its exports of silk, fine ceramics and a wide variety of handicraft goods)5 was a popular destination for such immigrants. Foshan’s vibrant and quickly growing economy required security guards, civilian martial arts instructors, militia officers and popular entertainers. As such, the market town became a greenhouse nurturing the development of multiple martial arts styles.6 The region’s contentious politics, including the Red Turban Revolt (1854–1856) and the First and Second Opium Wars (1839–1842, 1856–1860), meant that much of the male population was forced into militia service (or swept up in bandit armies) during the middle years of the nineteenth century. In this environment there was a great demand for skilled martial artists 36

The development of global Wing Chun

who could act as military trainers in the gentry-led militia units, or who might be hired as mercenaries to stiffen the ranks of the imperial Green Standard Army, which local officials viewed as understaffed and unreliable.7 Following the end of these hostilities, there was a period of innovation as martial artists sought to digest the lessons of the past and rebuild their lives. Douglas Wile has noted that the setbacks that China suffered at the hand of Western powers unleashed powerful internal discourses within the country as reformers sought for ways to preserve what was important within Chinese culture in an era characterised by rapid reform. Many of the Chinese martial arts most commonly seen today actually emerged, or were fundamentally reformulated, during this period of ‘self-strengthening.’8 This includes Wing Chun. While many modern students attempt to parse its often fantastic folklore in an attempt to rediscover the ancient origins of the art, connecting the practice to migrants from northern China (such as the Shaolin monks) or regionally important cultural heroes (including Cheung Ng),9 all of this ignores a fairly obvious point. The Wing Chun that is widely known and practised today is not a particularly ancient practice. There is no reliable documentation of its existence, or that of any practitioners, prior to the mid-nineteenth century.The art was not practised widely until the Republic of China period (1911–1949), and many of the most popular schools today are reliant on changes made to the style’s pedagogy and presentation by Ip Man in the 1950s and 1960s. Wing Chun, like most Chinese martial arts, is a fundamentally modern practice and its nature can best be understood by examining the social history of southern China between the closing years of the nineteenth century and the present.10 This does not suggest, however, that we can simply ignore the creation myths or oral history of the art. These texts are important, as they provide us with insights into the social position and function of Wing Chun in a rapidly modernising environment. Perhaps the oldest and most complete written version of the Wing Chun mythos was recorded by Ip Man in the 1960s for the creation of a proposed association that never came about. This account was found in his papers following his death and was subsequently disseminated by the Hong Kong Ving Tsun Athletic Association (VTAA).11 Briefly, Wing Chun, which might best be translated as ‘Beautiful Springtime,’ was named not for its creator, the famous Shaolin nun Ng Moy, but rather its first student. After being forced to flee the provincial capital into the far west due to false accusations against her father, the teenaged Yim Wing Chun found herself the victim of unwanted marital advances by a local marketplace bully. Learning of the girl’s plight, the nun Ng Moy (who had previously befriended the refugee family) revealed herself to be one of the five mythical survivors of the destruction of the Shaolin temple by the hated Qing. Taking Wing Chun into the mountains, she trained her student in the Shaolin arts for a year. This allowed her young charge to defend her honour and defeat an individual who had terrorised the community. Leaving to resume her wandering, Ng Moy declared that this new art (which allowed the weak to defeat the strong) should be known by her student’s name.Yim Wing Chun was given the charge of passing on what she had learned, as well as resisting the Qing and working to restore the Ming. Following this, the myth becomes more genealogical in nature. It records that the art was transmitted to, and preserved by, a company of Cantonese opera performers in Foshan. Foshan was the home of the Cantonese Opera Guild prior to the Red Turban Revolt, when the practice was officially suppressed. Eventually two of these individuals, Wong Wah Bo and Leung Yee Tai, passed the art to a pharmacist in Foshan named Leung Jan. He taught it to his children and a single student named Chan Wah Shun. Chan’s final disciple was the son of his landlord, a young Ip Man. 37

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This entire account has a somewhat hybrid nature. Leung Jan, Chan Wah Shun and Ip Man are all known historical figures whose existence can be independently verified.12 However, the story’s opening acts are clearly fictional. All traditional Cantonese arts trace their origins to the survivors of the destruction of the Shaolin temple (a myth complex shared with the region’s Triads). However, historians have known for some time that the Qing never destroyed the Shaolin temple in Henan, and that the Southern Shaolin temple (despite being ‘rediscovered’ by multiple competing local governments) is more the product of literary creation than actual history.13 Both Ng Moy and Yim Wing Chun seem to bear more than a passing resemblance to important female figures in the origin stories of certain branches of Fujianese White Crane. Indeed, it seems that this folklore had an impact on the development of Wing Chun, along with certain footwork patterns and stances.14 Christopher Hamm has published studies of the evolution of southern China’s martial arts fiction during the late Qing and Republic of China period, which can also help to date the Wing Chun myth. The story retold by Ip Man appears to be dependent on an anonymous novel, Shengchao Ding Sheng Wannian Qing (Everlasting), first published in 1893. This was one of the most popular martial arts novels sold in the region, with many reprints and pirate editions. That is particularly important, as in the original version of the story Ng Moy (who makes her first ever named appearance in these books) was not a hero. Rather, she was an antagonist who conspired to bring down the Shaolin monks. She was not reimagined as a hero and friend of Shaolin until a pirate edition with an alternate ending, Shaolin Xiao Yingxiong (Young Heroes from Shaolin), was published in the 1930s.15 The Wing Chun creation myth as related in the Ip Man lineage seems to be dependent on that relatively late edition. Indeed, the openly revolutionary ideology of the story would also have been much more popular with readers in Republican China than with the subjects of the Qing dynasty, who had to be quite careful about how they discussed the government.Yim Wing Chun is also interesting, as she seems to act as a bridge pointing back to the possible influence of Fujianese boxing styles, while also connecting the art to popular trends in Republic-era fiction that focused on stories of the amazing feats of female heroines. In short, while not a historical document, this story likely served an important role in explaining the nature and purpose of the art to Republic-era students. It also supports the view that Wing Chun is a relatively recent art which may have first developed in the middle or later years of the nineteenth century (likely following the opera ban), before being popularised among Foshan’s middle-class and bourgeois martial artists in the Republic of China period.

Wing Chun’s development in the Republican era Setting aside questions of folk history, Wing Chun has passed through three subsequent evolutionary periods. It seems reasonable to assume that the preceding creation myth is correct in asserting that a set of practices and techniques were transmitted to Leung Jan by retired opera performers following the conclusion of the Red Turban Revolt. Being forced to find alternate modes of employment, it is not unlikely that some such individuals would have become private instructors for more wealthy families. Likewise, Chan Wah Shun is a historically attested individual who is known to have taught Wing Chun in the closing years of the Qing dynasty. Still, the community practising the art at this time would have been small. Many accounts suggest that Leung Jan (a successful medical practitioner) had no desire to teach publicly, instead passing his art only to his children and a single close family friend. Chan Wah Shun was active in a period when the martial arts were often viewed as a pathway to employment rather than as a means of recreation. Further, the high cost of his tuition ensured that his teachings were only 38

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available to well-to-do sons of local business owners. Ip Man later stated that his teacher had only 16 students over the course of his career, and many of these were no longer teaching when he returned for college in Hong Kong. Even if we include the possibility of other related Wing Chun lineages during the late Qing, the total number of practitioners in and around Foshan was probably not more than a few dozen people. It was only during the Republic of China Period (1911–1949) that Wing Chun became a fixture in the local martial arts landscape. This is not entirely unexpected, as the waves of nationalist sentiment unleashed by the 1911 revolution helped to popularise practices like traditional boxing and wrestling. Further, educational reforms in the late 1910s and early 1920s led to a renewed emphasis on physical training throughout Chinese society, and a number of groups argued that reformed and modernised martial arts practices should lead the way.16 This social momentum fed the growth of all sorts of fighting arts at both the national and regional level. Wing Chun rode this wave of enthusiasm, really establishing itself in the Pearl River Delta region during the 1920s and 1930s. Much of the folklore of the era focuses on the so called ‘Three Heroes of Wing Chun’: Ip Man, Yuen Kay San and Yiu Choi. However, the ‘Three Heroes’ label is misleading, being the product of later journalists seeking to write sensationalist accounts of local masters. In reality, all three of these individuals did know each other, and they shared relatively privileged backgrounds. Ip Man’s family owned both land and businesses in Hong Kong, and he never needed to work (dedicating his time to martial arts practice) until after the end of World War II. Yuen Kay San (1887–1956) came from a family of industrialists who made their wealth through commercial pigments. His lineage history asserts that his father hired Fok Bo-Chuen and Fung Siu Ching, two students of another retired opera performer, Painted Face Kam, to teach his son.Yuen Kay San was known to associate with Ip Man and other Wing Chun practitioners at the school of Ng Chung So. But like Ip Man, he never felt the necessity of running a school of his own. Finally, Yiu Choi (1890–1956) was another son of a successful local businessman. He began his Wing Chun training under the tutelage of Yuen Kay San’s elder brother, before being recommended to Ng Chung So when the former moved to Vietnam. Like his well-off friends,Yiu also declined the role of teacher. However, he and his elder brother helped to finance the school where Ng Chung So taught and later looked after him in his retirement. Given their wealth, visibility and social status, it is not hard to imagine why writers and journalists would latch onto these individuals. Yet their actual contributions to the development of Wing Chun at this time were quite modest, as they were not directly responsible for the instruction or training of many students. The actual leading figures of the Wing Chun community at this time, and the two individuals responsible for training most of the instructors that one actually encounters in period historical accounts, are Ng Chung So (one of Chan Wah Shun’s top disciples) and Chan Yiu Min (his son). Both ran successful schools that became hubs of the Wing Chun community. Their careers, as well as those of often overlooked individuals such as Jiu Chao, Lai Yip Chi and Cheung Bo, help to illustrate the ways in which the region’s martial arts marketplace evolved in the Republic of China era and became enmeshed in the complex social conflicts that would ultimately bring the period to a close.17

The Hong Kong period The lasting legacy of the Republic of China era was to move Wing Chun beyond being a relatively insular lineage-based project. It was during this period that the art established a public 39

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presence; the first modern commercial schools were opened, and the system’s conceptual identity, outlined in its creation myth, was established. Such a story was likely necessary for marketing, as this was when the art expanded from a handful of practitioners to hundreds of students who found themselves in competition with larger communities such as the Hung Mun Association or the recently imported Jingwu (Pure Martial) Association. Despite this expansion, the art continued to be associated with the area’s upper middle class and skilled workers. There is even evidence that both Wing Chun and Hung Gar instruction were co-opted by the area’s yellow trade unions. This close association with regional elites and reactionary groups ensured that Wing Chun practice did not prosper in the years after 1949. While some lineages (such as Pan Nam’s) continued to survive on the mainland, their growth was limited until well after the conclusion of the Cultural Revolution.18 The situation in Hong Kong was generally more hospitable to martial artists in the 1950s and 1960s. Ip Man fled Guangdong ahead of the Communist advance late in 1949, and with the help of an old friend, Lee Man, found lodging in the communal dormitory of the Hong Kong Restaurant Workers’ Union. In 1950, the now aging Ip Man decided to begin teaching on a professional basis.19 Sadly, the sort of people employed as restaurant workers tended to be highly transient, and this was not good for class retention during the early years of his efforts. Hong Kong was a very different environment from Foshan. While the KMT had attempted to co-opt martial arts practice, the city’s colonial administrators distrusted it for its association with both Chinese nationalism and Triad networks.20 Hong Kong’s urban environment offered a wider variety of distractions and disruptions for Ip Man’s younger students, many of whom were struggling to come to terms with a system of dual colonisation where they were cut off from the Chinese mainland yet also the subject of British imperialism. Western economic sanctions designed to punish the PRC after 1949 also had a devastating impact on Hong Kong’s traditionally trade-based economy, causing massive dislocation as the city struggled to resettle vast numbers of refugees.21 Succeeding in such a marketplace was not easy. Ip Man began to streamline and modernise his presentation of material to meet the expectations of his new students. He created public classes with a progressive curriculum wherein no information was to be held back or kept secret for only select disciples.Within this setting, he limited the amount of time spent on initial stance and form training and instead placed renewed emphasis on a sensitivity drill called chi sao, ‘sticky hands.’22 The ludic qualities of this training exercise certainly helped with student retention. In its more energetic aspects, it also helped to prepare Ip Man’s early students for the rooftop challenge fights that dominated Hong Kong’s martial arts youth subculture at the time.The success of many of Ip Man’s early students in these engagements (including individuals like Leung Sheung and later Wong Shun Leung) attracted more students to his growing classes.23 These were not the only changes. Ip Man’s two sons, Ip Chun and Ip Ching, both managed to flee across the briefly reopened border and rejoin their father in 1962. They immediately noted that while the basic concepts of his Wing Chun remained the same, the art that he was teaching in Hong Kong appeared different from how it had been presented during the Republic of China era. Not only had the curriculum been standardised and rearranged, but it was also being introduced to students in fundamentally different ways. Traditional ideas and concepts such as the ‘five phases’ (sometimes translated as ‘elements’) or the ‘eight directions’ had been eliminated from discussions. Instead, Ip Man drew on his Western education and explained things in simple mechanical terms.24 Describing his thoughts on the art to a young Western visitor in 1960, Ip Man told Rolf Clausnitzer that he ‘regarded Wing Chun as a modern form of kung fu, i.e., as a style of boxing highly relevant and adaptable to modern fighting conditions.’25 This same programme of 40

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pragmatic modernisation and reform, originally intended to make the art more attractive (and effective) within the Hong Kong marketplace, would ultimately lay the groundwork for its global expansion. While a previous generation of teachers in Foshan had struggled to establish Wing Chun as a publicly taught system in a crowded marketplace, Ip Man’s career inadvertently set the stage for the practice’s global expansion.

Wing Chun as a global art It is interesting to note that as early as 1969 Clausnitzer had predicted that Wing Chun would become a global art, even though most Western martial artists were more interested in the Japanese fighting arts than their Chinese cousins. The key to this future expansion lay, in his estimation, in the education and relatively liberal attitudes of most of the system’s younger students, at least when it came to teaching the art to foreigners.26 Still, it is easy to overstate the supposed secrecy of Chinese instructors in the West during the twentieth century. More significant was the fact that Ip Man’s students began with some advantages when it came to spreading their art. Hong Kong itself has always served as a meeting point between Chinese and Western culture. During the 1960s and 1970s it was involved in the global exchange of goods, capital, people and ideas in ways that other areas of China were not. Growing up in a British territory, many of Ip Man’s students had worked diligently to learn English during their school years. They also enjoyed opportunities to seek schooling or employment in the West, which other Chinese youth lacked at the time. Ip Ching has noted that during this period many of his father’s students felt compelled to go overseas to advance their careers. The issue was the state of higher education in Hong Kong. Simply put, educational reforms had been successful enough that the city’s schools were producing more graduates than their small university system could absorb. Travelling overseas to finish one’s education or find professional employment thus became a necessity for many of Ip Man’s better-off young students.27 In comparison to other traditional Chinese martial arts,Wing Chun had been exporting potential instructors for years. The final ingredient which propelled Wing Chun from a regional fighting system to one of the most popular arts in the global marketplace was the fortuitous return of Bruce Lee, Ip Man’s most famous student, to the United States in 1959. Lee, born in California, became well known in Hong Kong as a child actor, having starred in a number of popular films. However, he was a hyperactive child who had problems in school. After becoming a Wing Chun student, he followed individuals like Wong Shun Leung and William Cheung into the violent world of rooftop fighting. Eventually his parents sent him to America to make a fresh start.28 Bruce Lee promoted the Chinese martial arts along the West Coast and began to make appearances in Black Belt, the most important English-language martial arts magazine of the period. Images of Ip Man even appeared in some of these articles, giving both his teacher and original style an unprecedent amount of exposure in a period when most American martial artists knew little about the Chinese martial arts.29 Eventually Lee would go on to create his own system (Jeet Kune Do), which subsequently had a somewhat complex relationship with the traditional Wing Chun community. Nevertheless, it was Lee’s return to acting that did more to advance the global popularity of Wing Chun than any other single factor. Martial arts fans were energised by his performance as Kato in The Green Hornet. But it was the release of the blockbuster Enter the Dragon in 1973, shortly after Lee’s own untimely death, that would make him a global phenomenon. This was the first kung fu-style action film shot in English and supported by a Hollywood studio. It created a level of cultural interest in, and desire for, the Chinese martial arts that had 41

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never before been seen in North America or Europe. Audiences were mesmerised by Lee’s martial performance and the alternate vision of masculinity that was read onto his highly developed physical form. Likewise, minority audiences were drawn to the anti-imperialist messages in this and his prior films.30 Suddenly, people around the world wanted to understand how Lee had trained and developed his unique capabilities. Overnight, martial arts classes across the Western world were inundated with students. Students of Ip Man who had already immigrated to pursue school or career goals were ideally positioned to rapidly expand Wing Chun’s presence in North America, Australia and Europe. Further, the modernised system of hand combat that Ip Man had developed for Hong Kong was relatively easily adapted to the needs and cultural background of these students. Wing Chun remains one of the most commonly encountered traditional Chinese arts in the world today. Bruce Lee’s continual cultural relevance has helped to sustain popular interest in the art, as have endorsements from celebrity students such as Robert Downey, Jr. The release of Wilson Ip’s 2008 fictionalised biopic of Ip Man also led to renewed interest in the art in the West, but also within the PRC. While Ip Man often spoke out against fantastic kung fu legends, his posthumous transformation into a legendary fighter and nationalist hero has helped to spread the popularity of his art far beyond its native Guangdong.

Notes 1 Benjamin N. Judkins and Jon Nielson, The Creation of Wing Chun: A Social History of the Southern Chinese Martial Arts (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2015). 2 Robert Chu, Rene Ritchie, and Y. Wu, Complete Wing Chun: The Definitive Guide to Wing Chun’s History and Traditions (North Clarendon, VT: Tuttle Publishing, 1998). For a detailed comparison of the unarmed and weapons sets taught in the most commonly encountered Wing Chun lineages, see the reference work provided by Chu, Ritchie and Wu. 3 J. Elliott Bingham, Narratives of the Expedition to China, from the Commencement of the Present Period,Vol. 1 (London: Henry Colburn Publishers, 1842), 177–78. Bingham provides a historically important firsthand account of militia troops in southern China training with the hudiedao during the period of the Opium Wars. Also see Judkins and Nielson, The Creation of Wing Chun, 70, 94. 4 Judkins and Nielson, The Creation of Wing Chun, 92–99, 117–18. 5 Yimin He, ‘ “Prosperity and Decline: A Comparison of the Fate of Jingdezhen, Zhuxianzhen, Foshan and Hankou in Modern Times’,” Frontiers of History in China 5, no. 1 (2010): 52–85. Translated by Weiwei Zhou from Xueshu Yuekan (Academic Monthly) 12 (2008): 122–33. 6 Researchers should note, for instance, that Foshan is also remembered for the important contributions which it made to the development of styles such as Choy Li Fut and Hung Gar, and its thriving Jingwu Hall prior to the Japanese invasion in 1938. All of these styles were better known than Wing Chun during the Republic of China period. 7 Frederick Wakeman Jr., Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China, 1839–1861 (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1997), chapters 13–15. 8 Douglas Wile, Lost T’ai-Chi Classics from the Late Ch’ing Dynasty (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), 5, 20–26. 9 Ip Chun and Michael Tse, Wing Chun Kung Fu: Traditional Chinese Kung Fu for Self-Defense and Health (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1998), 20–21. 10 Douglas Wile, in his 1996 introduction to the Lost T’ai-Chi Classics, systematically laid out the reasons why many of the most ancient-seeming Chinese martial arts are fundamentally products of the modern era. Everything that he argued in that work applies equally as well to the hand combat systems of southern China, including Wing Chun. 11 Ip Man, ‘ “The Origins of Ving Tsun: Written by the Late Grand Master Ip Man’,” www.vingtsun.org. hk/; Ip Ching, ‘ “History of Wing Chun”‘ (Ip Ching Ving Tsun Association, 1998), DVD; Chun and Tse, Wing Chun Kung Fu’, 17–20. 12 Judkins and Nielson have provided a review of the known biographical details of all three of these individuals, which goes beyond the confines of the current discussion. 42

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1 3 Meir Shahar, The Shaolin Monastery (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008), especially chapter 6. 14 Stanley Henning, ‘ “Thoughts on the Origins and Transmission to Okinawa of Yongchun Boxing’,” Classical Fighting Arts 2, no. 15 (2009): 42–47. 15 John Christopher Hamm, Paper Swordsman: Jin Yong and the Modern Chinese Martial Arts Novel (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2006), 34–36. 16 Andrew D. Morris, Marrow of the Nation: A History of Sport and Physical Culture in Republican China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), chapter 7. 17 Judkins and Nielson, The Creation of Wing Chun, 169–211. 18 Ibid. 19 Ip Ching and Ron Heimberger, Ip Man: Portrait of a Kung Fu Master (Springville, UT: King Dragon Press, 2003), 25, 33. 20 Daniel M. Amos, ‘ “Spirit Boxing in Hong Kong: Two Observers, Native and Foreign’,” Journal of Asian Martial Arts 8, no. 4 (1999): 10. 21 Judkins and Nielson, The Creation of Wing Chun, 214–15. 22 Chun and Tse, Wing Chun Kung Fu, 40–42; Yip Chun and Danny Connor, Wing Chun Martial Arts: Principles  & Techniques (San Francisco, CA: Weiser Books, 1992), 26. 23 Judkins and Nielson, The Creation of Wing Chun, 228. 24 Michael Tse, ‘ “Master Ip Ching’,” Qi Magazine 24 (1996): 16–20; Chun and Tse, Wing Chun Kung Fu, 40–42. 25 R. Clausnitzer and Greco Wong, Wing Chun Kung Fu: Chinese Self-Defence Methods (London: Paul H. Crompton Ltd, 1969), 10. 26 Ibid., 12. 27 Ching, ‘ “History of Wing Chun’,” 1998. 28 Matthew Polly, Bruce Lee: A Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018). 29 Anthony DeLeonardis, ‘ “Martial Arts in Red China Today’,” Black Belt (February 1968): 22. The inclusion of a photograph of Ip Man and text block highlighting Wing Chun in one of Black Belt’s earlier features on the Chinese martial arts is typical of Lee’s success in promoting his teacher’s reputation abroad. 30 Paul Bowman, Beyond Bruce Lee: Chasing the Dragon Through Film, Philosophy and Popular Culture (New York: Wallflower, 2013).

Bibliography Amos, Daniel M. “Spirit Boxing in Hong Kong: Two Observers, Native and Foreign.” Journal of Asian Martial Arts 8, no. 4 (1999): 8–27. Bingham, J. Elliott. Narratives of the Expedition to China, from the Commencement of the Present Period. Vol. 1. London: Henry Colburn Publishers, 1842. Bowman, Paul. Beyond Bruce Lee: Chasing the Dragon Through Film, Philosophy and Popular Culture. New York: Wallflower, 2013. Chu, Robert, Rene Ritchie, and Y.Wu. Complete Wing Chun:The Definitive Guide to Wing Chun’s History and Traditions. North Clarendon,VT: Tuttle Publishing, 1998. Clausnitzer, R., and Greco Wong. Wing Chun Kung Fu: Chinese Self-Defence Methods. London: Paul H. Crompton Ltd, 1969. DeLeonardis, Anthony. “Martial Arts in Red China Today.” Black Belt 6, no. 2 (1968): 18–29. Hamm, John Christopher. Paper Swordsman: Jin Yong and the Modern Chinese Martial Arts Novel. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2006. He, Yimin. “Prosperity and Decline: A Comparison of the Fate of Jingdezhen, Zhuxianzhen, Foshan and Hankou in Modern Times.” Frontiers of History in China 5, no. 1 (2010): 52–85. Translated by Weiwei Zhou from Xueshu Yuekan [Academic Monthly] 12 (2008): 122–33. Henning, Stanley. “Thoughts on the Origins and Transmission to Okinawa of Yongchun Boxing.” Classical Fighting Arts 2, no. 15 (2009): 42–47. Ip, Ching. “History of Wing Chun.” Ip Ching Ving Tsun Association, 1998. DVD. Ip, Ching, and Ron Heimberger. Ip Man: Portrait of a Kung Fu Master. Springville, UT: King Dragon Press, 2003. 43

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Ip, Chun, and Michael Tse. Wing Chun Kung Fu:Traditional Chinese Kung Fu for Self-Defense and Health. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1998. Ip, Man. “The Origins of Ving Tsun: Written by the Late Grand Master Ip Man.” www.vingtsun.org.hk/ Judkins, Benjamin N., and Jon Nielson. The Creation of Wing Chun: A Social History of the Southern Chinese Martial Arts. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2015. Polly, Matthew. Bruce Lee: A Life. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018. Shahar, Meir. The Shaolin Monastery. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008. Tse, Michael. “Master Ip Ching.” Qi Magazine 24 (1996): 16–20. Wakeman, Frederick, Jr. Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China, 1839–1861. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1997. Wile, Douglas. Lost T’ai-Chi Classics from the Late Ch’ing Dynasty. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996.

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5 The transmission modes of taijiquan Traditional martial art, competitive sport and the political reappropriation of culture in modern China Pierrick Porchet

Introduction On a warm Saturday during the summer of 2019, Master Sun Jianguo’s disciples gathered from across China in their master’s hometown, Guangfu Township. In the morning, six individuals including me, will undertake the ritual by which Master Sun will recognise them as his disciples. Although some of us already started to train the Wu lineage of taijiquan – which Master Sun belongs to – this ritual marks the beginning of the initiation process to this art by the master. After the ritual, we will not only have entered the community bound by symbolic family ties – thus becoming the little brothers of the other disciples – but we will also have access to the teaching of the master (who will act as a symbolic father) and will be burdened with the moral obligation to transmit and further this knowledge. The ritual was held in the historical household of Wu Yuxiang (1812–1880), responsible for the Wu lineage of taijiquan. Master Sun is acting as a curator for this historical site that has become a museum under the supervision of the Cultural Bureau of the Yongnian district where Guangfu is located.The ritual itself was hosted by a government representative of Guangfu who managed the different steps of the ritual and thus oversaw the use of the public space that is this important historical site. On the symbolic level, the ritual included two specific elements. Firstly, individuals who belong to (or will enter) the lineage, including the master and his disciples, have to commemorate the ancestors of the lineage (i.e. the four generations of masters who preceded Master Sun). Secondly, each new disciple has to individually ‘pray to the master’ (拜师baishi) to accept them as his disciple. In order to ensure the symbolic efficiency of the ritual, Master Sun also invited a specialist in rituals to help oversee the rehearsal and proceedings of the ritual. After the end of the ritual, all the participants headed to the recently opened Taiji Hotel, which is the latest instalment in Guangfu of the governmental program for tourism development.There, Master Sun held a banquet reception during which old and new disciples – but also the master’s family members and acquaintances – can socialise in an informal manner. Master Sun also booked a dozen rooms for the participants who had to travel from other provinces in 45

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order to attend the ceremony. In the evening, he came to my room and invited me to follow him to another disciple’s room. When we arrived, the disciple – who entered the lineage the previous year – was revising a basic technique. Master Sun sat down in the armchair and poured a cup of tea whilst watching his disciple for a few moments: ‘You’re not right!,’ he exclaimed standing up sharply. Turning to look at me, he asked me what I saw. I answered that during the weight transfer forward, the movement was not entirely fluid. ‘Exactly,’ shouted Master Sun, now standing beside his disciple. As the disciple prepared to execute the technique once again, Master Sun corrected his upper body position: ‘If you want to produce power, your body must be upright and move forward in one smooth motion.’ Upon the disciple finishing his movement, Master Sun performed the same technique as the example, this time with an emphasis on the small vertical rotation of the forearms: ‘You see, only this way can I have power. Try to push me.’ Upon hearing these words, the disciple stood in front of his master with both hands pushing forward towards the master’s chest. As soon as the disciple’s forearms entered in contact with the incoming master’s forearms, the latter used the previously mentioned technique, projecting the student backwards who then fell to the ground. I purposefully start this chapter on taijiquan in recent China with this short recount of a personal experience to provide the reader with the type of observations I had the opportunity to record from the inside, as both an ethnographer and an initiate of the ritual. Firstly, these observations – and the way I interpret them – concern what Gary Fine defines as the dynamics of ‘group life.’1 On the one hand, the observations concern social interactions and ‘shared narratives’ (Fine and Corte 2017) occurring in a relatively small group of practitioners; in the case of this ritual, the observations concern the interaction between the master and his disciples, and the symbolic family ties created and reaffirmed through the ritual. On the other hand, my observations also concern interactions with external agents – such as the government representative or the ritual specialist – and the significance of these interactions for either the practitioners or the larger social context in which they operate. Secondly, these observations concern a type of interaction that involves bodily movements. Taijiquan, as a practice, requires the body to perform actions. The knowledge that circulates from the master to the disciples is ‘embodied’ in the sense that it is not only theoretical but also requires the body to achieve specific technical requirements.That is to say, the practitioner is not only required to know the techniques but must also have the ‘know-how’ in order to perform these bodily techniques.2 These bodily movements – acting as interactions between individuals – are mobilizing a specific ‘kinesic intelligence [which is] our human capacity to discern and interpret body movements, body postures, gestures, and facial expressions.’3 In this case, the student had to use his kinesic intelligence to cognitively grasp the technical instructions of the master and then apply these instructions on his own body. Moreover, as an ethnographer, I also had to use my own kinesic intelligence in order to make sense of these interactions as a process of knowledge transfer. This chapter will discuss the transmission frameworks of taijiquan techniques and their representations by focusing on the observation and description of social interactions happening in taijiquan communities. I will rely on two case studies which each function as an example of two different types of framework that can be observed today in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). First of all, the case of Master Sun and his disciples – introduced above – will serve as an example of what Jean-Marc De Grave describes as a ‘traditional transmission framework’; that is, a practice rooted in a local community with strong interpersonal relationships between a master and his disciples.4 In addition, the second case study will focus on professional athletes of taijiquan within the wushu elite sport team of the Beijing Municipality. This example will illustrate how the practice of taijiquan has been reappropriated by state institutions and reshaped into a 46

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competitive sport, and how this process of reappropriation impacts grassroots practitioners and the practice at large. This chapter will address the broad question of the production of taijiquan culture through the perspective of everyday life of a taijiquan practitioner. It will reflect how traditional Chinese culture in the modern day is shaped by a complex negotiation between the state – which keeps close control over the meaning of practices – and grassroots practitioners who actively articulate this ideological framework in their everyday practice. I argue that the observation of small group dynamics can offer a renewed understanding on the production of taijiquan culture in recent Chinese history. Therefore, one portion of the description will be devoted to the interactions between the individuals within these groups. However, these groups are operating in the larger context of the political hold over culture undertaken by Chinese authorities since the foundation of the PRC. In the next section, I will describe how the Chinese authorities have reclaimed meaning over the practice of martial arts since the 1950s.

The political leadership over martial arts in modern China The cultural policy of the PRC was first formulated by Mao Zedong et the Yan’an Conference on Literature and Art in 1942. Art was conceived as a tool to educate the masses and to achieve a socialist revolution. Artistic creations must therefore serve the ideological purpose of the Communist Party, which keeps close control over their content and dissemination.5 As many observers have noticed, the authorities of the PRC within their political project have elaborated a discourse on ‘popular culture’ (民间风俗 minjian fengsu) that has led to their standardisation into nationally shared and politically acceptable forms.6 Elements labeled as ‘feudal’ (封建 fengjian) or ‘sectarian’ (宗派 zongpai) have been proscribed by state institutions, such as national sport associations.7 These institutions are thus shaping the framework of ‘orthodox’ practice showing ‘their will to keep control over the meaning’ of these practices.8 Since the introduction of Western gymnastics to China in the late nineteenth century, modern sport has been viewed through a nationalist lens. Sport aims to strengthen the bodies and minds of the population, and in turn strengthen the nation, so that China will be able to compete with foreign powers, ridding the nation of imperialist influences. In that sense, communist authorities followed the main line of the nationalist regime (1912–1949) within their sport policy.9 At the foundation of the PRC in 1949, martial arts had been spread within the population for at least a century.10 Moreover, they had already been reframed as institutionalised and national practices during the nationalist period.11 Therefore, Chinese authorities reclaimed martial arts in their political project as a tool for the construction of what Anne-Marie Thiesse refers to as a ‘patriotic body’ embodying the nation.12 However, the traditional transmission framework represented a threat for the authorities, as some groups could effectively ‘resist the government at the local level.’13 The ritual modes of initiation by a master – who then has the authority on the techniques and their associated meanings – was labelled feudal and were replaced with the rational and institutional elements of modern sport. In 1958, the Chinese Wushu Association (CWA) was created under the supervision of the National Sport Bureau. Its mission is to ‘federate all the professionals and amateurs of the country’ and ‘put in order’ (整理 zhengli) the numerous systems of techniques that are then sorted together under the generic term of wushu (武术).14 The CWA starts to commission masters with the task of synthesising the variations within a particular lineage into ‘simplified’ (简化 jianhua) sets of techniques becoming ‘standardized’ (标准 biaozhun) on a national level.15 Authorities are thus reshaping wushu through a ‘modern’ perspective, formalizing the basis of a physical education by setting competition regulations and physical preparation (warm-ups, gymnastic 47

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conceptions of movements, rationalised teaching methods/pedagogy, etc.).16 This political leadership over martial arts has led to the creation of a ‘wushu sport’ (武术运动 wushu yundong) – intermingled with the Olympic ideology – which has been the main discipline supported and promoted by state institutions until today.17 Since the beginning of the 1980s, Chinese authorities implemented the ‘elite sport first’ policy in order to train athletes able to compete and win against their international peers, especially American and Russian athletes. By competing equally during international competitions, China reaffirms its place as a powerful nation.18 Through the same dynamics, Chinese authorities also developed competitive disciplines for its traditional martial arts and promoted an international framework with the objective of their inclusion within the Olympic Games, thus attempting to affirm the universality of Chinese culture.19

Wu lineage taijiquan of Guangfu township As I described above with the example of the ritual, individuals are bound by symbolic family ties within the lineage of one’s own master and the master who preceded him back to the founder of the style. As Lü and Zhang point out: The construction of the master-disciple relationship – that simulate bloodline – links the community together and thus produces a network of relationship (social interactions). This network is understood as a genealogical order of transmission between masters and disciples – the master being in all the cases the center of these networks.20 In the case of Chinese martial arts in general and of taijiquan in particular, recent research in the field of social history highlights how these communities were formed throughout the nineteenth century in a context of a moral, military and economic crisis where China was defeated by Western colonial empires. Martial arts thus represented values and a way of socialisation conceived as authentically Chinese in this context of rapid evolution and external intrusion.21 Master Sun is a fifth-generation master in the Wu lineage. He learned taijiquan in his childhood from Master Li Jinfan (1920–1991), who was a descendant of the founder of the lineage Wu Yuxiang. As Master Sun stresses in his discourse, he is a direct transmitter. Just like his predecessor, he is a native of Guangfu. He relates that as a young disciple he would go to his master’s house bringing him water or wood as gifts to receive the master’s teaching. The first technique he learned was one of the basic stances that he had to train for over the course of six months before the master taught him the next basic technique. Master Sun reproduces this mode of transmission when he is in Guangfu, as the example of the hotel room shows. Moreover, during my stay in Guangfu, I observed that Master Sun received regular visits by local disciples during which he shared his knowledge through an informal process, mixing discussion of taijiquan’s principles with technical application for the student. These examples highlight how the transmission of knowledge is both rooted in the local community of Guangfu and is dependent on a close relationship between the master and his disciple. I have also observed that Master Sun is engaged in a more institutionalised and structured mode of transmission. Master Sun will regularly travel around China or sometimes even abroad to participate in workshops where he will teach groups of practitioners. For example, a group of disciples in the district of Xianju, Zhejiang Province, invited Master Sun to spend a few weeks in this district in order to teach them. The group held collective training exercises which were more formally organised and structured than those that I observed in Guangfu.The interactions

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between the master and his disciples were different, as the master would structure the training techniques by often performing an example in front of the students. Master Sun would also participate in institutional activities such as a forum and public performances. As examples, a few years back, he acted as an expert consultant in the conception of the Wu lineage ranking system for the Chinese Wushu Federation. He is also actively engaged in the Guangfu Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH) program. As mentioned earlier, the ritual element of taijiquan traditional transmission framework – as well as the strong authority figure assumed by the master – has been labeled feudal and sectarian by the communist authorities. However, in the past years, this traditional framework has recovered a new symbolic meaning in the shaping of Chinese identity, as it became a part of its National Intangible Cultural Heritage.Thus, martial arts techniques – within traditional lineages registered as ICH on national lists – become cultural goods ‘reflecting the values and spirit of the Chinese nation.’22 However, the process of heritage making raises new issues within practitioners’ communities. Indeed, the inclusion of an item and its transmitter on the heritage list leads necessarily to the exclusion of other elements from the heritage field. Actors engage in the process are thus competing for the recognition of either their practice or their belonging to a registered practice as a transmitter.23 The engagement of Master Sun in institutional activities can be interpreted as a strategy for his recognition as a transmitter. The Wu lineage taijiquan has been registered on the national list of 2008.24 Master Sun has already been recognised as transmitter on the district level. In order to progress to the provincial level and hopefully the national level, he musy reach the official criterion which are measured quantitatively on the basis of the scope of his transmission: the number of disciples, publications, contributions to the promotion of taijiquan culture, etc. Moreover, the practitioner’s personal network also plays a role in this system, which encourages the practitioner to participate actively in the institutional activities. The stakes are high, since the transmitter will receive institutional and financial backup according to the level of his recognition (district, province and nation).

Taijiquan and competitive sport In his research on heritage Sport, Joel Pinson distinguishes the specificities of competitive sport in regard to other kinds of sporting activity. He identifies the core element of a competition as ‘one of their aims is to designate a winner.’25 The core element in the competitive sport is to classify the performance of athletes according to the event regulation. As one athlete, now retired, reflects: ‘[O]ur main goal for training was to win [the] medal, we trained all . . . year just for the few minutes we will spend on the carpet.’ The competition is at the core of the athlete’s experience. If the moment he actually competes represents the peak of the experience, his preparation during the year represents his mundane experience of being an athlete. In the next section, I will describe how the athletes of Beijing Municipality were training in their everyday life. The Taijiquan athletes’ group is a branch in the elite wushu team of Beijing Municipality. Athletes train at the Beijing Shichahai Sport School located in the old Beijing historical area north of the Beihai park. The center was created in 1958 under the supervision of the Sport Bureau in order to train Beijing municipality and national elite athletes as well as prepare future talent. Nowadays, the center hosts eight different elite sport teams (including wushu, sanda, boxing, taekwondo, fencing, badminton, golf and karate) as well as programs for semi-professional and junior athletes, for a total of 800 individuals between 6 and 30 years of age.26

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When visiting the campus, one cannot miss the high level of professionalisation and rationalisation of the training facilities. From training halls to dorms, cantina, classrooms, recovery center and clinic, everything is organised to provide and guarantee the athlete will have an all-inclusive experience, thus giving him or her the opportunity to focus solely on his or her training. It seems that the athlete’s well-being is at the heart of many aspects of the training center. On the nutrition level, athletes will be advised on specific diet and he or she will find balanced and healthy food in the cantina. In the middle of the school, athletes can enjoy a stress-free stroll within the inner courtyard garden, from which he or she can then access the recovery center through a lounge area. All around the campus, many trees and flowers cover the empty spaces near sidewalks and buildings, creating an overall peaceful and perfumed atmosphere. The school facilities ensure the athletes optimal training conditions. I had the opportunity to observe the preparation of 10 athletes (four seniors and six juniors) who represented the Beijing team during the taijiquan round of the 2019 Wushu Taolu National Championship held in Qian’an (Hebei) between November 9 and 12. They were supervised by two coaches specialised in competitive taijiquan (one of whom was also acting as an athlete), two physical trainers and a team supervisor.The team was training from Monday to Friday both in the morning and in the afternoon as well as on Saturday morning. Most of the training was dedicated to taijiquan techniques and was conducted in a dedicated training hall equipped with competition carpets. Three afternoons a week, the team would undertake a physical training that took place in a fully equipped fitness hall shared by all the teams. All the athletes had to be engaged in an educational program, whether at the middle-school, high school or university levels. Since all the infrastructures were located on campus, the athletes rarely have the need to go out. Moreover, the school regulation requires the athletes to formally apply for permission to leave the campus. Within the school, the group of athletes was thus bound by the rigorous schedule of their training and the proximity experienced in their everyday life. The interactions between team members were significantly different during the two types of training (technical and physical). On the one hand, during technical training, the technical coach – who is specialised in competitive taijiquan – is in charge of the overview of the athletes’ training (including the physical part). As one of the coaches told me, he will observe the athletes, identify the specific need of each one and adapt the training accordingly.The athletes I observed were already experienced and were very familiar with the training proceedings. Coaches will thus concentrate on very specific technical feedback, either personalised or collective. Athletes will also share advice among themselves. On the other hand, during physical training, the physical coach would engage with athletes throughout the training session. During the training session, the coach will give detailed instructions on the way to execute the drills as well as the quantity of movements he expects. During the drills, the coach will engage with the athletes and push them to go forward. Athletes will also cheer up one another, mutually encouraging one another to go through the physically demanding exercises. The physical trainer conceives drill series according to the athlete’s individual condition. The conception of the program requires a continuous collaboration between the two types of coaches. The relationship between the two coaches requires a mutual commitment and trust. I think that these interactions highlight that the relationships between team members go beyond the simple training proceedings. As Harrington and Fine suggest: ‘[G]roups exist not only to get things done, but also to maintain themselves as social units.’27 The cohesion among the group of athletes was not only created by the instrumental purpose of their training but also by an affective culture where they will share a genuine sense of fraternity and mutual assistance. By developing a friendship beyond the sole sport training, individuals ‘see their group as a desirable arena of action.’28

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Conclusion How can we interpret these two distinctive frameworks – traditional and sportive – as described side by side from the perspective of practitioners and in the light of the national context of the PRC? At first sight, the two frameworks exist in two separate social spheres with very distinct group cultures. In the traditional framework, the group of practitioners evolves in a variety of social spaces. From the local network of Guangfu Township to the national branches of disciples and the various institutional activities, Master Sun has to navigate within various social configurations. As the epicenter of the community formed by his disciple around him, he has to negotiate between the social meanings of taijiquan within the lineage and the government representative, whose role is both to ensure that the practitioners keep aligned with the government orthodoxy and to provide the community with the opportunity to be recognised within the institutional program of ICH. In the competitive sport, the athletes seem to be isolated from the outside world. Their training center functions as an ivory tower where their sole purpose is to prepare rationally and professionally to win medals during competitions. But as we saw, athletes and coaches are not only bound by this instrumental purpose because they develop an affective culture which allows the group to function properly. However, if we pay attention to the discourse of actors, the barriers between the two frameworks begin to thicken. As one of the coaches puts it: ‘[A]ll the movements that the athletes perform originate from traditional taijiquan.The difference is that they are professionally trained athletes so they are able to perform the movement at the highest level of performance.’ The two frameworks share a common representation of body movements and the narrative of their origins. Both frameworks identify themselves as representing an authentic Chinese traditional culture.The focus of the practice may change between the two. As Master Sun points out: ‘[W]e concentrate on the inner aspect as the athletes concentrate on the external.’ However, the practice itself is still recognise as a form of taiji whether it is called taijiquan (taiij boxing) or taijicao (taiji gymnastic). This process is a complex negotiation of continuity and rupture between the two frameworks. As we say with the engagement of Master Sun in the ICH program, this master is actively articulating the new elements introduced by the authorities in his everyday practice. However, this process is not a simple acceptance of what has been introduced from above by the state institution. Master Sun accepts some elements (the ICH system and its requirements) but refuse others (the gymnastic conception of movement). This logic is very similar with how John Fiske describe the culture of everyday life: ‘The everyday life of the people is where the contradictory interests of capitalist societies are continually negotiated and contested.’29 For him, subordinated people would use everyday life strategies and tactics to reclaim as their own the elements that have been imposed by a dominant group. As Master Sun engages with institutional activities, he reclaims his right over these meanings and representations.

Notes 1 Gary Alan Fine, ‘ “Towards a Peopled Ethnography: Developing Theory from Group Life’,” Ethnography 4, no. 1 (2003): 41–60. 2 Hervé Munz and Philippe Gesin, ‘ “Le patrimoine culturel immatériel à l’épreuve des savoir-faire horlogers dans l’Arc jurassien’,” Museum.ch 5 (2010): 29. 3 Guillemette Bolens, The Style of Gesture: Embodiment and Cognition in Literary Narrative (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), 1.

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4 Jean-Marc De Grave, ‘ “L’initiation rituelle javanaise et ses modes de transmission. Opposition entre javanisme et islam’,” Techniques & Culture [En Ligne] 48–49 (2007): 17, http://tc.revues.org/3032. 5 Bonnie McDougall, Mao Zedong’s ‘‘Talks at the Yan’an Conference on Literature and Art’: A Translation of the 1943 Text with Commentary (The University of Michigan Center for Chinese Studies, 1980), 5. 6 On this issue, see Pascale Bugnon, ‘ “L’art d’accomoder les ancêtres de la nation: Analyse du patrimoine culturel musulman en Chine’,” Tsantsa 23 (2018); Vincent Durand-Dastes, ‘ “La Grande muraille des contes’,” Carreau de la BULAC (2014); Florence Graezer, ‘ “Le Festival de Miaofeng shan: culture populaire et politique culturelle’,” Etudes chinoises 22 (2003); Florence Graezer Bideau,‘ “L’instrumentalisation de la culture populaire. Le cas de la danse du yangge en Chine’,” Tsantsa 13 (2008); Evelyne Micollier, ‘ “Qigong et ‹nouvelles religions› en Chine et à Taiwan: instrumentalisation politique et processus de légitimation des pratiques’,” Autrepart 2, no. 42 (2007). 7 ‘ “The Rules of Martial Ethics,’ ” Chinese Wushu Association, accessed November 20, 2017, http:// zgwx.wushu.com.cn/w_wdsz.asp. 8 Graezer, ‘ “Le Festival de Miaofeng shan’,” 294. 9 Zhouxiang Lu and Hong Fan, Sport and Nationalism in China (New York: Routledge, 2014). 10 Benjamin Judkins and Jon Nielson, The Creation of Wing Chun: A Social History of the Southern Chinese Martial Arts (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2015). 11 Peter A. Lorge, Chinese Martial Arts: From Antiquity to the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 223–25. 12 Anne-Marie Thiesse, La Création Des Identités Nationales: Europe XVIIIe-XXe Siècle (Editions du Seuil, 1999), 242. 13 Lorge, Chinese Martial Arts, 226. 14 ‘ “Constitution,’ ” Chinese Wushu Association, accessed November 20, 2017, http://zgwx.wushu.com. cn/xhzc.asp. 15 Lorge, Chinese Martial Arts, 234–35. 16 Bailong Jiang, Basic Théories of Wushu (Beijing: Renmin tiyu chubanshe, 1995). 17 Jie Song and Hongli Yue, ‘ “Considerations on Wushu’s National Culture Characteristics,’ ” Asia Pacific Journal of Sport and Social Sciences 5, no. 1 (2016): 28–34. 18 Lu and Fan, Sport and Nationalism in China, 103–5. 19 Marc Theeboom, Dong Zhu, and Jikkemien Vertonghen, ‘‘ “ ‘Wushu Belongs to the World’’. But the Gold Goes to China. . .: The International Development of the Chinese Martial Arts,’ ” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 52, no. 1 (2017): 5. 20 Shaojun Lu and Weikai Zhang, ‘ “The Social and Cultural Grounds of Martial Arts Communities’,” Journal of Beijing Sport University 36, no. 9 (2013): 8 (translation by the author). 21 On this subject, see Paul Bowman, ‘ “Making Martial Arts History Matter,’ ” The International Journal of the History of Sport 33, no. 9 (2016); Judkins and Nielson, The Creation of Wing Chun; Douglas Wile, Lost T’ai-Chi Classics from the Late Ch’ing Dynasty (Albany, NY: University of New York Press, 1996). 22 Caroline Bodelec, ‘ “Etre Une Grande Nation Culturelle. Les Enjeux Du Patrimoine Culturel Immatériel Pour La Chine,’ ” Tsanta 19 (2014): 19. 23 Christina Maags and Marina Svensson, eds., Chinese Cultural Heritage in the Making: Experiences, Negotiations and Contestations (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018), 121–45. 24 ‘ “National List’,” Chinese ICH Website, accessed August 15, 2018, www.ihchina.cn/5/5_1.html. 25 Joël Pinson, ‘ “Heritage Sporting Events: Theoretical Development and Configurations,’ ” Journal of Sport  & Tourism 21, no. 2 (2017): 134. 26 ‘ “Beijing Shichahai Sport School,’ ” China Sport School Federation Website, Accessed November 25, 2019, www.cssf.net.cn/news/26.html. 27 Brooke Harrington and Gary Alan Fine, ‘ “Opening the ‘Black Box’: Small Groups and 21st Century Sociology,’ ” Social Psychology Quarterly 63, no. 4 (2000): 312–23, 321. 28 Gary Alan Fine and Ugo Corte, ‘ “Group Pleasures: Collaborative Commitments, Shared Narrative, and the Sociology of Fun,’ ” Sociological Theory 35, no. 1 (2017): 64–86, 65. 29 John Fiske, Understanding Popular Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994), 32.

Bibliography Atkinson, Michael. “Entering Scapeland: Yoga, Fell and Post-Sport Physical Cultures.” Sport in Society 13, no. 7–8 (2010): 1249–67. 52

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Becker, Howard S. “Art as Collective Action.” American Sociological Review 39, no. 6 (1974): 767–76. Bodelec, Caroline. “Etre Une Grande Nation Culturelle. Les Enjeux Du Patrimoine Culturel Immatériel Pour La Chine.” Tsanta 19 (2014): 19–30. Bolens, Guillemette. The Style of Gesture: Embodiment and Cognition in Literary Narrative. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012. Bowman, Paul. “Making Martial Arts History Matter.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 33, no. 9 (2016): 915–33. Bugnon, Pascale. “L’art d’accomoder Les Ancêtres de La Nation: Analyse Du Patrimoine Culturel Musulman En Chine.” Tsanta 23 (2018): 99–103. De Grave, Jean-Marc. “L’initiation Rituelle Javanaise et Ses Modes de Transmission: Opposition Entre Javanisme et Islam.” Techniques & Culture [En Ligne] 48–49 (2007): 1–28. Durand-Dastes, Vincent. “La Grande Muraille Des Contes.” Carreau de La BULAC (2014): 1–57. http:// bulac.hypotheses.org/1676. Fine, Gary Alan. “Towards a Peopled Ethnography: Developing Theory from Group Life.” Ethnography 4, no. 1 (2003): 41–60. Fine, Gary Alan, and Ugo Corte. “Group Pleasures: Collaborative Commitments, Shared Narrative, and the Sociology of Fun.” Sociological Theory 35, no. 1 (2017): 64–86. Fiske, John. Understanding Popular Culture. New York: Routledge, 1994. Graezer, Florence. “Le Festival de Miaofeng Shan: Culture Populaire et Politique Culturelle.” Etudes Chinoises 22 (2003): 283–95. Graezer, Florence. “L’instrumentalisation de La Culture Populaire. Le Cas de La Danse Du Yangge En Chine.” TSANTSA 13 (2008): 52–60. Harrington, Brooke, and Gary Alan Fine. “Opening the ‘Black Box’: Small Groups and 21st Century Sociology.” Social Psychology Quarterly 63, no. 4 (2000): 312–23, 321. Lorge, Peter A. Chinese Martial Arts: From Antiquity to the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Lu, Shaojun, and Weikai Zhang. “The Social and Cultural Grounds of Martial Arts Communities.” Journal of Beijing Sport University 36, no. 9 (2013): 8. Lu, Zhouxiang, and Hong Fan. Sport and Nationalism in China. London: Routledge, 2014. Maags, Christina, and Marina Svensson, eds. Chinese Cultural Heritage in the Making: Experiences, Negotiations and Contestations. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018. McDougall, Bonnie S. Mao Zedong’s ‘Talks at the Yan’an Conference on Literature and Art’: A Translation of the 1943 Text with Commentary. Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1980. Micollier, Evelyne. “Qigong et ‘nouvelles Religions’ En Chine et à Taiwan: Instrumentalisation Politique et Processus de Légitimation Des Pratiques.” Autrepart 2 (2007): 129–46. Munz, Hervé, and Philippe Gesin. “Le patrimoine culturel immatériel à l’épreuve des savoir-faire horlogers dans l’Arc jurassien.” Museum.ch 5 (2010): 28–31. Pinson, Joël. “Heritage Sporting Events: Theoretical Development and Configurations.” Journal of Sport & Tourism 21, no. 2 (2017). Song, Jie, and Hongli Yue. “Considerations on Wushu’s National Culture Characteristics.” Asia Pacific Journal of Sport and Social Sciences 5, no. 1 (2016): 28–34. Theeboom, Marc, Dong Zhu, and Jikkemien Vertonghen. “ ‘Wushu Belongs to the World’. But the Gold Goes to China. . .: The International Development of the Chinese Martial Arts.” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 52, no. 1 (2017): 3–23. Wile, Douglas. “Fighting Words: Four New Document Finds Reignite Old Debates in Taijiquan Historiography.” Martial Arts Studies 4 (2016): 17–35. Wile, Douglas. Lost T’ai-Chi Classics from the Late Ch’ing Dynasty. Albany State: University of New York Press, 1996.

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6 The long-term development of Japanese martial arts1 Raúl Sánchez García

Introduction Despite the existence of martial traditions from other Asian countries such as China, Korea and Thailand, Japan was instrumental in giving martial arts a recognisable form, evolving from a local to a global asset of physical culture. Japanese martial arts – expressed in Japanese by the terms bujutsu, bugei and budō – produced the blueprint for the organisation and systematisation of martial arts in global governing bodies and international competitions. For instance, judo was the first martial art to be widely acknowledged on an international basis, featuring as an official Olympic event in Tokyo in 1964. The aim of this chapter is to show the long-term development of Japanese martial arts. The long-term process led to the shift from classical to modern martial arts, including the sedimentation and re-elaboration of different practices and values from different social groups bound together within shifting interdependencies and power balances. The understanding of such a complex dynamic relationship among different groups helps us to make sense of what martial arts represent nowadays: a set of practices featuring martial efficacy, etiquette, aesthetics, selfperfection and even sporting competition.

The early development of martial traditions connected to warfare In the transition from the Heian (794–1185) to the Kamakura (1185–1333) period, the power balance tilted towards the warrior class. Between the eighth and tenth centuries, the centralised imperial army was broken down into small movable units of mounted warriors wielding bow and arrow. These warriors, sons and brothers of district magistrates, were known as ‘strong fellows’ (kondei) and could be considered the direct predecessors of the samurai.2 Military skills increasingly became a path of upward mobility for provincial elites and lower-rank central nobility. During the period between 950 and 1050, increasing competition for control over the land tenure system known as shōen among the imperial court, provincial elites, powerful central nobles and religious institutions led to a generalised use of private small military forces. Nonetheless, the central court still maintained control over warriors of the military houses, who fought each other to become the ‘chief of all warriors’ on the court’s behalf. The Taira and Minamoto military 54

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families became the two dominant contenders, leading to the famous Genpei war of 1180–85. Yoritomo Minamoto won and was appointed shogun (‘barbarian-subduing generalissimo’) on behalf of the imperial court, even though he proclaimed his authority and the autonomy of warriors by establishing a military government (the Kamakura Shogunate) in the Kanto region. During the Kamakura period, the first examples of martial arts as identifiable traditions featured archery proto-ryū3 in the family traditions of the Takeda and Ogasawara, linked to ceremonial functions. The category of martial arts held also for the kind of sumo that developed from ceremonial contests in court during the Heian period to martial preparation for warriors in the Kamakura period. Sumo connected with the martial traditions of warriors, influencing the kind of grappling in full armour (kumi-uchi) performed by warriors in the battlefield. Nonetheless, a clearer and more formalised martial tradition emerged throughout the Muromachi (1336–1573) and Azuchi Momoyama (1574–1600) periods, during which the power balance shifted definitively towards the warriors.Warrior power became evident in the figure of shugo daimyō (military governors), acting as aggressive local powers. They progressively became the predominant rulers across the country, acting as the political, economic and military authority in their lands, enforcing law by sheer force. Two consecutive cycles of violence, consisting of wide-scale conflicts across Japan, unfolded in the Two Courts period (Nanbokuchō, 1336–1392) and a subsequent, more pervasive and intense second cycle of violence known as the Warring States (Sengoku, 1467–1600). Elimination contests between warriors, court, temples and peasants led to unification campaigns of the country, led first by Oda Nobunaga (1534–1582) and later by Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537–1598). During these two consecutive cycles of violence and their aftermaths, composite (sogō) martial ryū appeared. Examples from the first cycle include Nen ryū and its later development through Chujo ryū. It is feasible that some other ryū appeared at that time but could not survive due to a lack of stability in the transmission, as a tradition survived in the same family only for a few generations.4 Examples from the second cycle include Tenshin Shōden Katori Shintō ryū, Kashima Shintō ryū, Shinkage ryū, Itto ryū, Tendō ryū and Hōzōin ryū. All of the ryū from these two cycles counted on sword and/or spear techniques, even though some of them also included other weapons, such as the naginata (glaive). Besides, some ryū, such as Takenouchi or Araki, placed special importance on the development of grappling while in armour, using small weapons such as the short sword or dagger. Specialised (not composite) archery ryū such as the Heki ryū also appeared at that time.5 Even though sumo did not develop as a ryū per se, it belonged to the broad category of martial arts during the Muromachi period. The grappling skills provided by sumo were still considered a useful training activity for warriors by military leaders, and it also progressively became a form of spectator entertainment. Martial ryū that originated in both cycles of violence and their aftermaths presented common characteristics: (1) Their founders came predominantly from the middle and lower ranks of warriors (bushi) and fought on foot, wielding swords and spears in the battlefield. During the Two Courts Period, warfare was conducted through skirmishes and scattered melées of mounted/foot soldiers wielding bow and arrow. Nonetheless, the use of large swords (ōdachi) and smaller swords (katana) by foot warriors in hand-to-hand combat increased. During the Warring States period, the bulk of the armies were based on pikemen.The pike or the spear became more relevant as the main weapon of the warrior,6 while the sword continued to play a role as a back-up secondary option. (2) Martial ryū were linked to the esoteric traditions influenced mainly by Marishiten, a female war deity. The presence of Marishiten and tengu (her messengers) in many documents of 55

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koryū (ancient ryū) indicates that her influence was very strong in these incipient times. For instance, the Nen ryū text Marishiten setsu shogun kyō states that the founder of the ryū, Nen Ami Jion (1351-c.1427), received inspiration from Marishiten through the mediation of a tengu.7 (3) Esoteric and martial practices were blended in religious institutions such as shrines and temples.These institutions not only transmitted a set of religious beliefs but also represented a reservoir of martial knowledge in the hands of monks or shrine attendants (hafuribe). Most ryū founders of the Warring States era were either related to shrine attendants or were attendants themselves. Iizasa Chōisai Ienao, founder of Tenshin Shōden Katori Shintō ryū, was heavily influenced by shrine attendants from Kashima and Katori shrines, and Tsukahara Bokuden, founder of Kashima Shinto ryū, was from the Urabe clan, shrine attendants at Kashima Grand Shrine. (4) Most martial ryū originators were seasoned battlefield veterans who later honed their skills through musha shugyō (a wandering ascetic journey for warriors) as a path for selfperfection. The main purpose of martial ryū was not to train large sums of warriors for the battlefield but to aim for self-perfection.8 Musha shugyō helped one to hone martial skills by wandering through different daimyō domains, confronting well-reputed warriors. It was a kind of duel – in the sense that it implied a one-on-one encounter – but the main aim was to test and improve martial technique and advance in the path of self-perfection. The sword (which could be wooden) was the most commonly used weapon, but the yari (spear), naginata (glaive), kusarigama (a sickle with a chain) or even bow and arrow were options.

The stabilisation and transformation of martial traditions during the Tokugawa shogunate In 1600, Tokugawa forces won the definitive battle of Sekigahara for the unification of the country and Ieyasu was proclaimed shogun in 1603, destroying the remaining opposition in the Osaka campaigns of 1615. The central military court (bakufu) of the shogun in Edo connected a web of smaller military courts located in different domains (han) ruled by the different daimyō. The functioning of the whole baku-han system strictly segregated the population in a fourestate system (samurai-farmer-craftsman-merchant), maintaining the social privilege of a huge number of samurai. During early Tokugawa (1603–1645), seasoned warriors were still encouraged to develop self-perfection through martial arts and had the chance to experience upward social mobility under the patronage of certain daimyō or even the shogun. For example, Ono Jiroemon Tadaaki (1565–1628),Yagyu Munemori (1571–1647) and Musashi Miyamoto (1584– 1645) went through the turmoil of war during the unification period and helped to organise and systematise previous fighting stock during the early Tokugawa era, influencing martial ryū. In general, martial arts featured a progressive predominance of sword-centred ryū. Nevertheless, they maintained a composite character and some ryū promoted other weapons. For example, Shintō Muso ryū featured the jō (short staff) as the core weapon of the composite system. The development of bow and arrow ryū with battlefield applications was hindered during Tokugawa – archery practice remained limited to target shooting as a pastime or a way of self-development. Some composite ryū placing special importance on grappling (Kito ryū, Seigō ryū, Sekiguchi ryū)9 emerged during early Tokugawa and would later have a tremendous impact on the development of jūjutsu ryū. Kata (pre-arranged forms practised in pairs) training gained predominance in the transmission of martial arts, due to different factors: the shogunate restricted samurai movement across domains, teaching of martial traditions became a profession for some instructors who opened up training halls and charged fees, and competition between different ryū (taryū jiai) was discouraged. 56

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During mid and late Tokugawa periods, the figure of the samurai shifted from a warrior type to a retainer/bureaucrat type. A neo-Confucian approach became the official doctrine of the shogunate, and the samurai code stressed a moralised sense of honour in which military efficiency was undermined. Self-control to display proper moral example was the key sign of samurai status as a group. Besides, many samurai went into debt with merchants, becoming more dependent on them. The loss of power of the samurai became symbolically visible in the idealisation of and longing for warriors past, especially of those samurai of peripheral domains detached from the dynamics of big cities such as Edo, Kyoto and Osaka. A 1716 text from the Saga domain called Hagakure is the clearest example of such a tendency. Connected to these general trends, several specific changes took place within the martial traditions: (1) Use of restraining weapons (full of hooks and stoppers) and ropes for arresting criminals without shedding blood increased considerably, attached to police functions. (2) The end of composite styles due to specialisation in martial ryū had started to unfold by the 1670s.10 The sword definitively came to take up a central position, as it was a much more suitable weapon in a civil context than bow and arrow, spear or naginata. Changes in swordsmanship went from battlefield kenjutsu performed by warriors clad in armour to civil kenjutsu performed in everyday clothes without protection. (3) Controversy about the most suitable method for training (kata versus sparring) unfolded during the early 1700s. Some sword – but also naginata and spear – ryū introduced protective gear, and a further development of a sword made of split bamboo called shinai appeared. These innovations allowed sparring to be done using full power, in order to overcome the limitations imposed by kata training. (4) The professionalisation of instruction gained momentum during the eighteenth century. By the end of the seventeenth century, private martial arts academies had opened the doors to any samurai or even commoners. Professional instruction became a solution to cope with the need to make ends meet for many of the jobless retainers in a market already saturated for customers of samurai stock. Some famous instructors such as Saitō Yakurō – whose Renpeikan was one of the most prominent dojō in Edo in the nineteenth century – came from common stock. Musha shugyō (warrior’s pilgrimage) underwent a revived interest at that time, and dōjō yaburi (challenging the head of a school and keeping his students if victorious) appeared as a way to test skills and make a living. The opening of martial arts to commoners was especially notable in the case of bare-handed methods that would lead to the emergence of commoners’ jūjutsu, often featuring small concealed weapons for self-defence.11 (5) Samurai in need of job opportunities and well-to-do commoners, eager to take part in the samurai culture, represented the perfect match for the development of modern sport-like competitions in swordsmanship (gekken or gekiken) and sumo bouts. Whereas samurai often played the exclusive role of patrons, organisers and referees, commoners (but also samurai) acted as paid professionals and paying spectators.

The development of modern martial arts The forced opening of the country by the Western powers in 1854 caused a lot of resentment in many samurai circles, which directed their grudge against the shogunate. Musha shugyō became popular again. For instance, Takechi Zuizan (1829–65) and his followers Kakaoka Shintarō (1838–67) and Sakamoto Ryōma (1836–67) travelled through the country, stopping at several 57

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dōjō to participate in fencing bouts and expand the network of anti-shogunate swordsmen.12 Most of the men that helped to overthrow the Tokugawa shogunate came from dōjō promoting free practice with safety equipment, in which low-rank samurai and commoners took part. In 1868, a combined force of Satsuma, Chōsū and Tosa samurai fought shogunate forces in different battles collectively known as the Boshin War, ending with the abolition of the shogunate and the restoration of imperial rule by Emperor Meiji. The new government made some of the traditionalist samurai uneasy, and several samurai rebellions ensued during the 1870s; the most famous and important one was the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877, led by Saigō Takamori. Saigō was defeated by the Imperial Army, which proved that samurai forces were outdated for the requirements of modern warfare. It was during Meiji that martial arts went from being an exclusive part of the samurai identity to becoming an element of the nation’s identity, even spreading abroad. At the same time that Western sport started to be appropriated by the Japanese during Meiji, martial arts started travelling abroad, coming into contact with local combat sport wherever Japanese experts went. Also, Westerners residing in Japan became increasingly exposed to Japanese disciplines such as judo and kendo.13 At the beginning, the Meiji government considered martial arts inferior to military gymnastics and not suitable from an educational point of view. In fact, martial arts did not expand to the population through the school system, but mainly through two organisations of civil society: Kanō’s Kōdōkan and Dai Nippon Butokukai. They both collaborated in the spread of martial arts but at the same time competed against each other on issues such as the legitimacy of terminology, the right to grant official titles, the systematisation of kenjutsu and jūjutsu in specific sets of kata, and influence over the national school curriculum. The founder of the Kōdōkan, Kanō Jigoro (1860–1938), was a member of the Diet and head of the Tokyo Teacher Training School. His main aim was to foster a relevant role for Japan at the international scale through the expansion of judo. He harshly disapproved of the frivolous spectacle of martial arts shows of the 1870s as a way to make ends meet for poor or unemployed martial experts. In fact, the change in terminology from jujūtsu to judo was precisely due to the vulgar consideration attached to the former discipline during those times.14 In the same vein as the Olympic Movement, Kanō considered judo a tool for establishing good international relations. Nonetheless, as in the case of the initial Olympic promoters such as Baron de Coubertin, Kanō’s internationalist message often exuded nationalistic undertones. The creation of the Dai Nippon Butokukai in 1895 helped to install the era’s militaristic, nationalistic notion of bushidō (the warrior’s moral code) through martial arts.15 The Dai Nippon Butokukai soon gathered within a single organisation much of the classical martial traditions and further systematised their organisation, methods and rankings. Kanō was instrumental in devising the Dai Nippon Butokukai kata for jūjutsu (1906), intervening also in the reformulation of the Dai Nippon Butokukai kenjutsu kata (1912). Some classical ryū (kōryū) joined the Dai Nippon Butokukai and helped to systematise not only jūjutsu and kenjutsu, but also kyūjutsu (archery), sōjutsu (spear) and naginata (halberd). Nonetheless, other koryū maintained a more autonomous existence, transmitted as small family traditions or related to the police/military and ultra-nationalistic societies. Police forces and other parts of the Meiji establishment, such as the military, maintained a strong bond with the Dai Nippon Butokukai from the very beginning. During Meiji, women’s relevance in the martial arts world notably increased.16 For instance, Murakami Hideo (1863–1949) was an accomplished martial artist of the era who honed her skills in musha shugyō and became the seventeenth-generation headmistress of Toda-ha Bukoryu. She also took part in professional demonstration matches, wielding naginata or kusarigama, without losing a bout.17 As martial arts started to be included in the school system, female 58

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martial artists became key agents for the instruction of girl students.The early Shōwa period (see below) would later reinforce this trend, as budō in PE classes for girls became progressively more and more promoted for the sake of building a strong nation prepared for war. During the Taishō democracy era (1912–1926), Japanese society experienced more openness, especially in urban areas. Nonetheless, this also brought conflict, leading to the use of institutional violence by political parties. In the Taishō period and the first years of Shōwa, the competitive aspects of martial arts, and the excitement and thrill of the bouts, became crucial for young participants engaging in these activities.18 Sumo provided a format of professional competition, becoming a ‘national sport’ strongly connected to Japanese identity. National judo and kendo tournaments were held. Nonetheless, the Dai Nippon Butokukai clearly opposed this and in 1919, it instigated changes in the official denomination from bujūtsu to budō, emphasising the character-building aspects connected to patriotism. During the Taishō period, budō was also considered a method for self-perfection, imbued with the mystical experience that characterised the life-centrism of the period.19 Ueshiba Morihei’s (1883–1969) aikido and Awa Kenzō’s (1880–1939) shadō were the greatest examples of this phenomenon. Kanō Jigoro’s judo expanded greatly during the 1920s and 1930s. Judo also spread towards female participation, becoming in 1916 one of the main subjects for girls’ PE in the school system. In 1923 and 1926, the Kōdōkan women’s section and the feminine judo section were created.The expansion of judo abroad was especially successful in Europe at that time, even though the activity was indistinctively known as judo and jūjutsu. Kanō’s judo as an amateur sport and a method for self-defence gained grip with the help of Kōdōkan experts such as Koizumi Gunji (1885–1965) in Britain and Aida Hikoichi in France, as well as in England and Germany. Nonetheless, jūjutsu/judo also spread abroad through the professional model, linked to shows and bouts against Western boxers and wrestlers. Kanō’s organisation was also instrumental in helping other disciplines to grow, such as kendo through the connection of Kanō with the famous expert of the era, Sasaburo Takanō (1862–1950), crucial to the development of kendo university clubs. Kanō also helped Okinawan karate masters such as Funakoshi Gichin (1868–1957), Mabuni Kenwa (1889–1952) and Miyagi Chōjun (1888–1953) to start spreading their art in mainland Japan during the 1920s. Other karate experts such as Motobu Chōki (1870–1944) started showing and teaching their art in mainland Japan as well. Nevertheless, Funakoshi maintained close relationships with Kanō and other well-known martial artists such as kendo and iaidō expert Nakayama Hakudō, and remained the most influential figure in karate officialdom in mainland Japan. Apart from the Kōdōkan and the Dai Nippon Butokukai, the police and the military also played an important role in the further organisation of martial arts. In 1924, the Tokyo police Bureau organised a committee of kenjutsu/kendo and jūjutsu/judo experts to develop a system of hand-to-hand combat to meet the needs of police duties. The school system also helped to spread the discourse on bushidō connected to military virtues through martial arts. In 1925, the Imperial Diet proposed to elevate gekken and jūjutsu to compulsory status.20 During the early Shōwa period (1926–45), Japanese society underwent progressive militarisation and witnessed the rise of violent ultra-nationalistic organisations (bōryokudan) composed of party politicians, military men, leaders of big business and yakuza. They were a constituent part of what could be considered Japanese fascism,21 emerging as a reaction against the advance of the workers’ movement at that time. The role of martial arts was instrumental in the spread of a nationalist militarised message: budō (martial arts) was connected to shinto (functioning as a state religion) and embodied the imperial bushidō message. Martial virtue-nation-emperor became the core of the national Japanese citizen/soldier. This understanding of martial arts was transmitted mainly through different governmental (e.g. the school system) and civic (e.g. 59

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Dai Nippon Butokukai) organisations. The term kōbudō (classical or ancient budō) was coined, in order to get some distance and criticise gendai budō (modern budō) for lacking the samurai pedigree of the classical disciplines. The conservative mood of the era also pervaded Kanō’s organisations. His connection with classical martial arts strengthened when he created the Kōdōkan Kōbudo Kenkyukai in 1928. A common instructor of all of the Kōdōkan selected research groups was Ueshiba Morihei (1883–1969), a martial genius connected to ultra-nationalist societies22 who at that time was altering Takeda Sōkaku’s (1860–1943) Daito ryū towards his own understanding of what would eventually be known as aikido. During the early Shōwa period, karate continued spreading in mainland Japan. The pattern of expansion featured a tension between those Okinawan masters who decided to integrate – with consequent modifications – karate into Japanese budō, and those masters who decided to maintain the art in the Okinawan format. Overall, during the 1920s and 1930s, Okinawan karate became part of the Japanese budō establishment. A process of ‘Japanisation’ of karate ensued: karate practitioners started to wear training uniforms and coloured belts in the Japanese fashion; teaching methodology changed; ranking titles were introduced. Konishi Yasuhiro (1893– 1983) was crucial to the acceptance of karate as a sanctioned discipline within the Dai Nippon Butokukai during the 1930s. After WWII, the SCAP (Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces) issued an initial ban on martial arts. Sumo had already resumed in 1945, as the Allied occupation forces considered it more a sport than a martial art. Judo resumed public activity in 1950; kyudō followed suit in 1951; kendo first as an altered form called shinai kyōgi in 1952, and then as kendo in 1953; and naginata in 1959 as an extra-curricular club activity and in 1966 as part of PE in secondary schools. Overall, Japanese martial arts projected a public distance from military views. The Dai Nippon Butokukai adopted a renovation of the organisation, avoiding the excessive connection to imperial militarism; Japanese martial arts teachers connected the dō suffix of martial arts to ways of spiritual development such as Zen, instead of a training of combat spirit; bushidō progressively moved towards the transmission of a sense of tradition, detached from any militaristic connection. Martial arts took part within the global sport circuits, in both amateur (judo and karate) and professional (MMA) versions (see below). Nonetheless, traditional disciplines such as koryū and aikido avoided the blend with sport. In the case of sumo, it grew as an autochthonous national sport, constituted as a reservoir of Japanese traditions and identity, despite the progressive modernisation of its format. Sumo was able to maintain both modern and traditional images at the same time through different strategies, for instance by introducing the championship system on the one hand – a typical format of modern sport – but maintaining the yokozuna rank on the other, as a way to keep sumo traditionally oriented.23 The development of disciplines such as kendo, naginata, kyudō and jūkendo remained limited mainly to Japanese soil. They did not spread overseas to the same extent and at the same rate as other disciplines such as judo and karate, even though kendo enjoyed considerable success in countries such as South Korea and Taiwan. The main channel of integration of Japanese martial arts within the global sport movement was international competition.The Tokyo Olympic Games of 1964 helped to project a Japanese image of ‘peaceful internationalist,’24 improving Japan’s international relations through martial arts as a kind of soft power.25 Judo, acknowledged as a regular Olympic sport (kendo featured as an exhibition sport), was key to conveying elements of Japan’s traditional culture without militaristic undertones. Nonetheless, the Kōdōkan organisation lost influence in the way judo was to be conducted.26 The shifting relationship in the power balance between Japanese Kōdōkan 60

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and foreign international players implied a shift towards the achievement-oriented ethos of elite sport, at the expense of tradition. The same happened with kendo. Karate expanded very successfully on a global scale, with the greater influence of Japanese masters over their Okinawan counterparts in the establishment of strong karate organisations both within Japan and abroad. Overall, the general trend in the development of post-war karate as a sport unfolded through the amateur circuit. Nonetheless, some of the so-called hard styles (such as Kyokushin and its offspring) would become key actors in the development of hybrid disciplines of professional combat sport such as kick-boxing and K-1. The hybridisation of Japanese and Western disciplines started to gain real momentum during the 1970s (e.g. kickboxing and pro wrestling) and exploded during the 1990s, associated with Mixed Martial Arts (MMA), with K-1 the stand-up version and Pride27 a more all-inclusive format. MMA came to embody and portray the ‘Cool Japan’ imagery,28 replacing the old and serious image of Japan based on strict work practices with a more playful and cheerful portrayal of Japan, exemplified in youth culture such as fashion, manga, software technology, visual arts and music.

Notes 1 The analyses presented in this chapter result from the figurational/process-sociology approach of Norbert Elias. In fact, the long-term development of Japanese martial arts can be fruitfully studied through the civilising process theory. For a fully developed figurational argumentation of the long-term development of Japanese martial arts, see Sánchez García Raúl, The Historical Sociology of Japanese Martial Arts (London: Routledge, 2019). 2 W. William Farris, Heavenly Warriors:The Evolution of Japan’’s Military, 500–1300 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 111–12; Karl F. Friday, Hired Swords: The Rise of Private Warrior Power in Early Japan (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1996), 120. 3 The term ryū is commonly translated as ‘school’, but a more precise translation would be ‘current’ or ‘flow’. 4 William De Lange, Famous Japanese Swordsmen of the Period of Unification (Warren: Floating World Editions, 2008), 128. 5 Yokose Tomoyuki, ‘ “What Is Kobudō?’ ” in Budo: The Martial Ways of Japan, ed. Alexander Bennett, 87–101 (Tokyo: Nippon Budokan Foundation, 2009), 94. 6 Karl F. Friday, Samurai,Warfare and the State in Early Medieval Japan (London: Routledge 2004). 7 David A. Hall, Encyclopedia of Japanese Martial Arts (Tokyo: Kodansha USA, 2012), 350. 8 Karl F. Friday, ‘ “Off the Warpath: Military Science & Budō in the Evolution of Ryūha Bugei’,” in Budo Perspectives, ed. Alexander Bennett,Vol. 1, 249–68 (Auckland: Kendo World Publications, 2005). 9 Takenouchi ryū joined the other three in a group known as the ‘big four schools of grappling’ of the Tokugawa period. 10 G. Cameron Hurst III, Armed Martial Arts of Japan: Swordsmanship and Archery (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1998), 78. 11 Serge Mol, Classical Fighting Arts of Japan: A Complete Guide to Koryū Jūjutsu (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 2001), 41. 12 Alexander C. Bennett, Kendo: Culture of the Sword (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2015), 90. 13 Matt Hlinak, ‘ “Jūdō Comes to California: Jūdō vs Wrestling in the American West, 1900–1920,”‘ Journal of Asian Martial Arts 18, no. 2 (2009): 8–19; Joseph R. Svinth, ‘ “The Spirit of Manliness: Boxing in Imperial Japan, 1868–1945’,” in Martial Arts in the Modern World, ed. Thomas A. Green and Joseph R. Svinth (London: Praeger, 2003), 37–46. 14 Tetsuya Nakajima and Lee Thompson,‘ “Jūdō and the Process of Nation-Building in Japan: Kanō Jigorō and the Formation of Kōdōkan Jūdō’,” Asia Pacific Journal of Sport and Social Science 1, no. 2–3 (2012): 97–110, 9. 15 In Meiji, no monolithic discourse on bushidō was in place. During the 1890s, the term spread, linking budō and shidō, its meaning becoming something like ‘samurai ethics’. See: Oleg Benesch, Inventing the Way of the Samurai (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 73. 61

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16 The participation of women in warfare and martial arts prior to Meiji existed, though on a smaller scale compared to men. For instance, armour tailored for women’s bodies has been found, and historical documents such as the diary of Chancellor Tōin Kinkata register the participation of female cavalry in battles fought in western Japan in 1351. See: Thomas Conlan, State of War: The Violent Order of Fourteenth-Century Japan (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 2003), 128. During the late Tokugawa period, Ōtagaki Rengetsu (1791–1875), a Buddhist monk and acclaimed poet known as Lotus Moon, was also keen in martial arts. She received a samurai education from an early age, training in martial arts on a regular basis. 17 Ellis Amdur, ‘ “The Role of Arms Bearing Women in Japanese History’,” Journal of Asian Martial Arts 5, no. 2 (1996): 10–35, 24. 18 Bennett, Kendo, 123. 19 Sasaki Sadami, ‘ “Twentieth Century Budō and Mystic Experience’,” in Budo Perspectives, ed. Alexander Bennett,Vol. 1, 15–44 (Auckland: Kendo World Publications, 2005). 20 Kiyoto Motomura, ‘ “The History of Budō in Schools’,” in Nippon Budokan: The Martial Ways of Japan (Tokyo: Nippon Budokan Foundation, 2009), 61–65, 61. 21 Eiko Maruko Siniawer, Ruffians, Yakuza, Nationalists: The Violent Politics of Modern Japan, 1860–1960 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 109. 22 Ellis Amdur, Dueling with O-Sensei (Wheaton: Freelance Academy Press, 2015), 148–49. 23 Allen Guttmann and Lee Thompson, Japanese Sports: A History (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2001), 181. 24 Paul Droubie, ‘ “Phoenix Arisen: Japan as Peaceful Internationalist at the 1964 Tokyo Summer Olympics’,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 28, no. 16 (2011): 2309–22. 25 Jessamyn R. Abel, ‘ “Japan’s Sporting Diplomacy: The 1964 Tokyo Olympiad’,” The International History Review 34, no. 2 (2012): 203–20. 26 Yoshinobu Hamaguchi, ‘ “Innovation in Martial Arts’,” in Japan, Sport and Society: Tradition and Change in a Globalizing World, ed. Joseph Maguire and Masayoshi Nakayama (London: Routledge, 2006), 7–18, 16. 27 The birth of Pride in 1997 was influenced not only by the autochthonous Japanese development of pro wrestling but also by the global impact of the Ultimate Fight Championship (UFC), an American promotion.The original idea and organisation in 1993 came from Rorion Gracie (1952–), an expert in Gracie jiu-jitsu, a Brazilian discipline based on ground work that was highly influenced by the Japanese judo/jūjutsu pioneers who toured the world during the first half of the twentieth century. 28 Yoshio Sugimoto, ‘ “Japanese Society: Inside Out and Outside in’,” International Sociology 29, no. 3 (2014): 191–208.

Bibliography Abel, Jessamyn R. “Japan’s Sporting Diplomacy: The 1964 Tokyo Olympiad.” The International History Review 34, no. 2 (2012): 203–20. Amdur, Ellis. Dueling with O-Sensei. Wheaton: Freelance Academy Press, 2015. Amdur, Ellis. “The Role of Arms Bearing Women in Japanese History.” Journal of Asian Martial Arts 5, no. 2 (1996): 10–35. Benesch, Oleg. Inventing the Way of the Samurai. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Bennett, Alexander C. Kendo: Culture of the Sword. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2015. Conlan, Thomas. State of War:The Violent Order of Fourteenth-Century Japan. University of Michigan, 2003. De Lange, William. Famous Japanese Swordsmen of the Period of Unification. Floating World Editions, 2008. Droubie, Paul. “Phoenix Arisen: Japan as Peaceful Internationalist at the 1964 Tokyo Summer Olympics.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 28, no. 16 (2011): 2309–22. Farris, William W.  Heavenly Warriors: The Evolution of Japan’s Military, 500–1300. Harvard University Press, 1995. Friday, Karl F. Hired Swords:The Rise of Private Warrior Power in Early Japan. Stanford University Press, 1996. Friday, Karl F. “Off the Warpath: Military Science & Budō in the Evolution of Ryūha Bugei.” In Budo Perspectives, edited by Alexander Bennett,Vol. 1, 249–68. Auckland: Kendo World Publications, 2005. Friday, Karl F. Samurai,Warfare and the State in Early Medieval Japan. London: Routledge, 2004. Guttmann, Allen, and Lee A. Thompson. Japanese Sports: A History. University of Hawai‘i Press, 2001.

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Hall, David A. Encyclopedia of Japanese Martial Arts. Kodansha USA, 2012. Hamaguchi, Yoshinobu. “Innovation in Martial Arts.” In Japan, Sport and Society: Tradition and Change in a Globalizing World, edited by Joseph Maguire and Masayoshi Nakayama, 7–18. London: Routledge, 2006. Hlinak, Matt. “Jūdō Comes to California: Jūdō vs Wrestling in the American West, 1900–1920.” Journal of Asian Martial Arts 18, no. 2 (2009): 8–19. Hurst, G. Cameron, III. Armed Martial Arts of Japan: Swordsmanship and Archery.Yale University Press, 1998. Mol, Serge. Classical Fighting Arts of Japan: A Complete Guide to Koryū Jūjutsu. Kodansha International, 2001. Motomura, Kiyoto. “The History of Budō in Schools.” In Nippon Budokan:The Martial Ways of Japan, 61–65. Tokyo: Nippon Budokan Foundation, 2009. Nakajima, Tetsuya, and Lee Thompson. “Jūdō and the Process of Nation-Building in Japan: Kanō Jigorō and the Formation of Kōdōkan Jūdō.” Asia Pacific Journal of Sport and Social Science 1, no. 2–3 (2012): 97–110. Sadami, Sasaki. “Twentieth Century Budō and Mystic Experience.” In Budo Perspectives, edited by Alexander Bennett,Vol. 1, 15–44. Auckland: Kendo World Publications, 2005. Sánchez García, Raúl. The Historical Sociology of Japanese Martial Arts. London: Routledge, 2019. Siniawer, Eiko Maruko. Ruffians,Yakuza, Nationalists: The Violent Politics of Modern Japan, 1860–1960. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008. Sugimoto, Yoshio. “Japanese Society: Inside Out and Outside in.” International Sociology 29, no. 3 (2014): 191–208. Svinth, Joseph R. “The Spirit of Manliness: Boxing in Imperial Japan, 1868–1945.” In Martial Arts in the Modern World, edited by Thomas A. Green and Joseph R. Svinth, 37–46. London: Praeger, 2003. Tomoyuki, Yokose. “What Is Kobudō?” In Budo: The Martial Ways of Japan, edited by Alexander Bennett, 87–101. Tokyo: Nippon Budokan Foundation, 2009.

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7 Kendō An indigenous culture embodying national narratives in Japan Yasuhiro Sakaue

Introduction There are a few sport that are traditional to Asian countries and are seen as symbols of history and national pride and as parts of indigenous culture embodying national narratives. In Japan, certain martial arts, particularly kendō, fall within this narrative.This chapter discusses the special position held by the Japanese national sport kendō, changes in that position and the relationship of kendō with the wars. Kendō literally means the way of the sword, but in feudal times Japanese swordsmanship was known as kenjutsu, kenpō, tōjutsu and so on. Practicing swordsmanship was a necessity for the samurai class. Training methods in swordsmanship included two elements: kata (predetermined patterns of movement) using wooden swords and practice/matches with shinai (bamboo swords) and other equipment. Modern kendō has its roots in the latter. It was invented in the mid-eighteenth century and gradually spread nationwide throughout the nineteenth century. It came to be known by the new name of gekiken.1 The name was later changed to kendō by a national governing body in about 1914,2 as recounted later in this chapter, and this name has been used in school curricula since 1926.

Duality of Samurai swordsmanship: prior to 1868 The martial arts lost much of their military value with the appearance of modern weapons in Japan, beginning with the matchlock gun in 1543. Even before this, swords were used in battles only to a certain extent, and the main weapons used by the samurai were bows and spears in close combat.3 However, even during the Tokugawa period (1603–1867), the approximately 250 clans nationwide practiced various schools of swordsmanship and established teachers to provide instruction as part of the Tokugawa shogunate’s policies for encouraging the literary and military arts. The number of swordsmanship schools grew to more than 600 by 1867.4 As the Japanese sword was symbolic of the samurai status, its importance was never lost. The samurai, in both public and private, always wore a pair of swords around their waists – a large one and a small one. While the governmental power in China and Korea was in the hands of the literati, in Japan a powerful military class was ruling in Japan still during the Tokugawa period.5 64

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The Tokugawa Shogunate government lifted the ban on exchange with foreign countries except Korea, China, and the Netherlands in 1854. Following these policies and the achievement of domestic peace, somewhere around the mid-seventeenth century there was a shift to government by law and reason. As a result, the samurai increasingly became government officials and bureaucrats and in a sense became objects of a spectacle, and archery and horsemanship ‘became sports to train for the military arts rather than for killing people,’6 and a similar development can be observed in swordsmanship as well. Further, the mid-eighteenth century saw the broad dissemination of the ideas of NeoConfucianism, a thought process that was traditionally in conflict with the military. Japanese Confucianism differed from the Confucianism of other Asian countries in that it focused on developing a system of refinement that promoted the self-awareness of the samurai as rulers.7 Also swordsmanship was accompanied by training in (Neo)-Confucianism and Buddhism (particularly, Zen Buddhism, which had incorporated Neo-Confucian elements).The philosophy of swordsmanship came to be described in the language of Buddhism and Zen, featuring ideas such as mu (nothingness). Nevertheless, swordsmanship did not lose sight of its main purpose – effectively killing an opponent.8 In swordsmanship, loyalty became a major ideological element and even actions, which would considered to be cowardly or malicious according to contemporary moral standards, were praised if they were done out of loyalty for one’s lord.9 Swordschools taught practical combat techniques as well as aspects of aesthetic beauty, the pursuit of higher mystical ideas and self-cultivation. The warrior ideal also encouraged the samurai to cultivate their humanity (jin) and be paragons of moral perfection as they fulfilled their duty.10 Although samurai were under certain circumstances allowed to kill in the execution of their duties, they were expected to develop the (literary) cultivation required in a ruler. This dual character of war and literary studies (bunbu) was stamped onto swordsmanship of the Tokugawa period. The Tokugawa Shogunate came in contact with more Western nations when the United States forced open Japan’s ports in 1853.The Shogunate then sincerely began westernizing their weaponry, including adopting Western rifles. However, at the same time, the Shogunate and fiefdom throughout the country encouraged practice and competition, or gekiken, using the shinai, or bamboo practice sword, to preserve fighting readiness.11 Thus, swordsmanship remained a common practice until the end of the Tokugawa period.

Merging with a New Bushidō: 1868–1918 The collapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate and the abolition of the samurai class in 1868 did not alter the duality of swordsmanship. Although this revolution was aristocratic and was led by the samurai,12 Japanese swords – the symbols of samurai status – began to be considered oldfashioned, and in 1876, it became forbidden to wear a sword by anyone outside the military, police and the people in full-dress uniform. The emperor replaced the Tokugawa Shogunate and the shogun as the pinnacle of power, and the government was transformed into a bureaucracy with a standing army, following the Western model of the modern nation state. Accompanying this transformation in the nineteenth-century was the need for a national identity, built on old traditions in accordance with the themes of the nation state. In Japan, the most congruent ‘invented tradition’13 was that of the emperor as the embodiment of the unbroken imperial line. The emperor was defined as the descendent of the mystical sun goddess Amaterasu Ōmikami, the ancient creator of Japan. State ideology stressed that the ancient divine bloodline was passed down, uninterrupted, to the ruler of the modern 65

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nation. Thus, Japan resurrected its monarchical government, with the emperor holding ruling power and operating as a constitutional monarch in command of the military and as a modernday deity to be worshiped. Patriotism became crucial in the creation of the nation state and the citizen’s willing sacrifice of life out of loyalty and grateful piety towards the emperor came to be seen as the highest form of patriotism. The creation of a conscript military made military service compulsory to all male Japanese; ascribing a role to the entire male population that had previously been assigned only to the samurai. The training of soldiers was done using military drills based on Western style military training. Physical education in schools was inseparable from the conscript system and focused on gymnastics and military drills. Traditional martial arts, including swordsmanship, were excluded from the military training, and swordsmanship only appeared as an extracurricular activity in, for example, junior high schools and police officer training. These conditions changed after Japan’s victories in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), which was fought to establish dominance in Korea, and the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05), which increased Japanese power and influence in northeast China and Korea. The first new bushidō, or samurai code, quickly came to be well known against the backdrop of these two wars.14 The Japanese soldiers who defeated China and Russia were likened to the samurai of an older period and idolised. They came to be considered as the embodiment of the traditional national character of Japan. Chamberlain (1912) accurately noted that bushidō was a recently created religion that did not appear in any dictionary before 1900 and provided a description of the concept of morality of the nation in which the people were the emperor’s children who sacrificed their lives willingly to repay an obligation with loyalty and piety15 (the idea of bushidō also included social and moral norms, but this chapter focuses on its nationalistic and ideological aspects). Secondly, swordsmanship and jujutsu came to be seen as a ‘precious technique for conveying the glory of bushidō,’16 thus connecting bushidō and martial arts.The symbol of this was the Dai Nippon Butokukai (Great Japan Martial Virtue Society), established in Kyoto in April 1895, just after the Japanese victory in the Sino-Japanese War. The establishment of the Butokukai was an attempt to revive and memorialise the national narrative in which Emperor Kanmu encouraged the martial arts 1,100 years ago.17 The name ‘Butokukai’ derives from the Butokuden (Martial Arts Hall), a sacred symbol that was established in Heiankyō (ancient Kyoto). The goal of the Butokukai was to foster warrior virtues through martial arts, although the warrior virtues here mean the militaristic spirit, or bushidō. The Butokukai proclaimed that bushidō itself was the foundation for Japan’s independence of 1,000 years or more – free from invasions by foreign powers – and encouraged this ideology as an urgent and necessary tool within the contemporary environment of international politics, which was based on the survival of the fittest.18 The national significance of the Butokukai only grew with victory in the Russo-Japanese War because of the assumption that the victory in the 1904/1905 war was also achieved because of the soldier’s bushidō spirit and also because the defeat of Russia presented to the world a martial nation, which was the official view of not only the Butokukai but also the army. Following the experience with hand-to-hand combat in the Russo-Japanese War, the army recognised the military value of swordsmanship and began emphasizing this in training. The army had made single-handed swordsmanship fundamental in its implementation of French-style fencing, although in 1915 this was changed to a ‘pure Japanese style,’ which used both hands.19 Further, the army pressured the Ministry of Education to incorporate swordsmanship into the school curricula. Following this and the lobbying of martial arts enthusiasts within the House of Representatives, in 1911–1912 swordsmanship (or gekiken) became an elective subject for physical education in middle and normal schools for boys.20 Swordsmanship and jūjitsu were 66

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incorporated into the state educational system, and the Butokukai changed the names of the two martial arts to kendō and jūdō in about 1914.21

Change to a means for cultivating the spirit: 1919–1930 Following a system of titles and ranks, the Butokukai succeeded in organizing groups of exemplary swordsmen from across the country, and the hanshi and kyōshi who were at the top of the swordsmen pyramid were able to define the further development.22 Unlike the world of jūjutsu, wherein the Kōdōkan (founded by Jigorō Kanō in 1882) had a great deal of power over the martial arts, swordsmanship practices were centralised in and controlled by the Butokukai. In August 1919, the Butokukai changed the name of archery from kyūjutsu to kyūdō, and moved kendō, judō, and kyūdō from bujutsu to budō (i.e., from ‘martial arts’ to ‘martial ways,’ although the English phrase ‘martial arts’ is used for both here). Hiromichi Nishikubo had been appointed Vice President of the Butokukai and Principal of the Martial Arts Vocational College (Budō Senmon Gakkō) in January 1919, and it was he who had led the name-change initiative. The primary reason for the change was to clarify that the objective of kendo and other martial arts was not just to learn technical skills but to train one’s mind and body and to focus significantly on cultivating one’s spirit.23 Nishikubo’s claim was thus part of a strategy to introduce kendō and jūdō as separate subjects in their own right in secondary school. The proposition for this was submitted to the House of Lords by Nishikubo, Jigorō Kanō and other members of the House and was passed in March 1925.24 However, kendō and jūdō did not yet become separate subjects in secondary school, but by 1926 the subject names used in physical education in secondary school were changed to kendō and jūdō. By January 1931, both became compulsory components of physical education in secondary school. The following three points are characteristics of the new approach of the Butokukai. The first was a clear refutation of the perception of the practicality of martial arts in battle.25 This definition occurred against the backdrop of major domestic and international changes.The League of Nations was formed after World War I, and the Washington Naval Disarmament Treaty was concluded in 1922. Arms reductions took place in Japan, and there was an increasing demand to remove political privileges from the military. These shifts in public opinion extended to the Butokukai, and some criticised its ideal of militarism and the spirit of imperialism.26 This was a ideological change from the bushidō boom era in the previous decades, and there was a call to develop martial arts for times of peace rather than for war. The redefinition of martial arts as a means to cultivate the spirit was a response to this criticism.27 The second feature was the reassessment of Tokugawa period swordsmanship. Swordsmanship was linked to bushidō and established as a means to cultivate a samurai spirit. It has already been noted that this has to be seen as an invented tradition and a biased view on swordsmanship.28 The third characteristic was the fact that kendō was not positioned as a sport but rather as something sacred which carried values, in contrast to Western sport.29 This characteristic showed that swordsmanship was defined in contrast to increasingly popular Western sport and appealed to a discourse that proclaimed the unique nature of Japanese martial arts within Japanese culture. Thus, right around the same time that the foreign word ‘sport’ came to be used in Japan, the new tradition of ‘martial arts’ was created and planted in Japanese society. The value and influence of kendō were thereby enhanced as traditional culture and considered to be ‘sacred.’ However, at the same time, its potential development as a competitive sport was constrained.The Butokukai itself had never held a championship competition to determine a nationwide champion. Championship tournaments at the national level were held three times prior to World War II, though these were all in the context of national celebrations related to the 67

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imperial household and were held in the presence of Emperor Hirohito. The fact that tournaments were not held without the authority of the emperor shows that the discourse of kendō as not being a sport was quite powerful. The Butokukai continued to hold on to a negative view of competition-based kendō, though at the same time the swordsmen in universities and colleges were the ones who took the lead role in sponsoring competitive tournaments.30 For them, kendō involved not just moralistic didacticism but competitive athleticism as well. It was after World War II that they gained hegemony over the world of kendō.31 Before that, kendō returned to being treated as a technique for killing on the battlefield again.

State encouragement and the return to battle techniques: 1931–1945 In 1931, Japan invaded Northeast China and established the puppet state of Manchukuo. It came in conflict with China and with international opinion concerning recognition of the puppet state, and in 1933 it withdrew from the League of Nations. In 1934, Japan repeatedly struck out against the international order, leaving the Washington Naval Disarmament Treaty and taking other actions, and thus becoming increasingly isolated internationally. During this external crisis, kendō and other martial arts came into the spotlight. Muneo Shiotani contemplated about the relationship between this external crisis and martial arts in his essay of 1935. He asserted the existence of ‘a set of laws’ which prompt the self-awareness of the people when a national crisis affecting the state arises and create a need for stressing the Japanese spirit and bushidō, which in turn results in an increased attention towards martial arts.32 In 1937, two years after Shiotani’s essay was published, a second Sino-Japanese War erupted, and in 1941 Japan entered World War II. At that time, Shiotani’s laws came to the fore to a greater extent, and in 1941 martial arts became part of compulsory education in elementary schools, and other state-implemented policies were aimed at encouraging martial arts as well. The objectives of the Martial Arts Promotion Committee in 1940, as listed here, indicate the fundamental direction of the state policy to promote martial arts: the discarding of ‘selfinterest,’ ‘dying bravely in a spirit of loyalty and heroism,’ following ‘the principles of fidelity and honor,’ and honoring ‘the national spirit’ which remained unchanged since ancient times, constitute ‘the essence of the martial art.’ In other words, it was considered to be ‘fundamental to eternally defend and support the emperor.’ With the contemporary army comprising the people as a whole, every male citizen became a “samurai” and martial arts came to operate as ‘a natural obligation of a Japanese citizen.’33 The purpose of the martial arts classes was now defined as to ‘train to attack as a main focus’ and to cultivate ‘practical skills of serviced devotion.’ Secondary schools emphasised martial arts along with ‘the belief of certain victory,’ ‘the mind of selfless dedication,’ and ‘combative spirit’; in a combination of extreme nationalism and militaristic demand.34 Intense nationalism and militaristic imperatives were therefore combined, and martial arts were converted into practical techniques for killing on the battlefield. Competition in kendō is based on two opponents facing each other with a bamboo sword and striking at one of the four regulated areas – men (head), dō (trunk), kote (forearm), and tsuki (throat) – to win. The principal rule of kendō had been a three-point system (the winner is the first to score two out of three available points) since about the 1890s.35 This changed to a one-point system in 1939, and the length of the bamboo sword and its handle were shortened to make it similar to katana (real swords). In martial arts classes, hand-to-hand combat group competitions were held. I would particularly like to stress that the changes in the technical repertoire of kendō emerged from using Japanese swords in combat situations in the battlefields 68

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in China.36 The most well-known and documented example of Japanese swords used at the Chinese battlefront happened in 1937. During the invasion of Nanking, two Japanese commissioned officers held a contest to see who could kill 100 people the fastest with a sword. The Tokyo Nichinichi Newspaper also published a photo of the two officers proudly holding their swords on December 13, 1937. The story has also been included in Chinese middle school history textbooks showcasing the brutality of the Japanese army during the Nanking Incident. In the minds of the Chinese, this ‘contest’ entered cultural memory and is remembered as if it happened yesterday.37 Meanwhile, in 1937 in Korea, which was then a colony of Japan, Japanese national physical exercises were established. It was made compulsory in every school to practise the basic kendō movements with wooden swords by the Government-General of Korea.38

Rebirth as a sport, and a return to Japanese traditional martial arts: 1945 to the present After the defeat in World War II, for the first time in its history, Japan was under foreign rule, that is, under the rule of the United States, from August 1945 until April 1952. Japan’s political structure was rebuilt under the demilitarisation and democratisation policies of the occupation, and the country abandoned its military power.The emperor was preserved as a symbol, although the state myth of the emperor as a national identity was clearly rejected. Kendō and other martial arts were removed not only from the school curriculum and extracurricular activities but also from society: 1,927 martial arts teachers were removed from their roles in secondary schools, 887 of whom had been kendō teachers, and 1,219 executives of the Butokukai were removed from office because they were considered as having been ‘tools of militarism’ during the War. Even the use of the term budō was banned.39 In 1946, the Japanese Ministry of Education gave kendō the most severe evaluation, specifically, ‘the fact that kendō was used as a means to train [young men] to use swords in war.’ According to the Far Eastern Commission in 1947, ‘[C]lassical sports, such as kendō, which encourage the martial spirit, should be totally abandoned. Physical training should no longer [be] associate[d] with Seishin Kyōiku (ideological education).’40 The ban on kendō was not lifted until the end of the Occupation. It is important to note that such criticism of the nationalistic and militaristic nature of martial arts practice came not only from the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers but also from the Japanese themselves.41 The prohibition periods of kendō, jūdō, and kyūdō differed. However, the commonly imposed condition of reintegration into society was to eventually transform these martial arts into ‘sport.’ For kendō to become a sport, in 1953, the Committee reported the following specific requirements: (1) Play for the purpose of kendō itself, not as a means to an end, was specifically imposed. The focus was directed towards enjoying the process of the activity itself instead of towards the result; (2) The purpose of kendō practice had to be the pursuit of better techniques and purposeful activities without any restrictions being imposed by external objectives; (3) Mutual affirmative cooperative relations, and not mutual negative human relations, were formulated as goals. (4) Finally, the sport was to be governed by the presence of reasonable and well-defined rules of competition.42 As it developed into a sport that completely rejected being a means to an end, kendō was freed from the political ideology and killing techniques for the first time in history.This brought about a revolution in the rules and instructional methods and opened the door for women’s participation. After being reborn as a sport, martial arts gained popularity. The number of new kendō rank holders annually was more than 30,000 from 1965 onward, 40,000 from 1971 69

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onward, and 50,000 in the 1980s.43 The membership of the high school kendo club reached its peak in 1984.44 However, the popularity of kendō did not give the officials of the All Japan Kendō Federation (AJKF) total satisfaction. Many remained hostile to the notion that ‘kendō is a sport.’ In 1975, the AJKF stated that ‘kendō is to discipline the human character through the application of the principles of the katana.’ This was a conservative change in the ideology of kendō. Kendō was declared a form of traditional Japanese culture and was resurrected as a martial art owing to the sense of crisis stemming from the intensified competition accompanying its transformation into a sport.45 The popularity of kendō, however, declined as soon as the ideological change began.The number of kendō players especially among the young, fell remarkably from the 1980s onward. Nine organisations, including the AJKF, along with the Nippon Budokan, partnered with conservative politicians to apply pressure on the Ministry of Education. This resulted in restoring the term budō, or martial arts, in the physical education curriculum in 1989. Thus, in martial arts classes, students were obliged to receive unique instruction in martial arts as part of traditional Japanese culture that is not found in Western sport, and such courses were made compulsory in junior high schools beginning in 2008.46

Conclusion The explicit discussion of loyalty and patriotism diminished after World War II, despite the fact that most pre-war martial arts ideologies, including the tradition of emperor worship, the idea of the foundation of the Japanese nation by the ancestors of the imperial family and military spirit, were resurrected.47 Kendō now had returned to its 1920s state. Kendō, which had been reborn as a sport in the post-war era, is now nothing more than an image reconstructed in the context of increased national pride and redefined within the search of a cultural identity by conservatives.48 However, the search for kendō’s cultural identity is still under way, and it will certainly undergo significant changes due to the transformative influence of globalisation and diversification.49

Notes 1 Shoji Enomoto, ‘ “Edojidai Zenki niokeru Shigei toshiteno Kenjutsu no Seiritsu to Gekiken no Shutsugen nitsuite” [A Historical Approach to ‘Kenjutsu’ and ‘Gekiken’ in the Early Edo Period: About the Rise of ‘Heiho Dojo’ and the Differentiation of ‘Heiho’ in the 17th Century]’,” Tokai Journal of Budo 12 (2017): 1–15. 2 Yasuhiro Sakaue,‘ “Nichiro Senchū Sengo niokeru Dai Nippon Butokukai” [The Dai Nippon Butokukai Under/After the Russo-Japanese War: Its Political and Military Function, the Change of Plan to Promote Martial Arts, and Name-Change to Kendō and Judō]’, Hitotsubashi Annual of Sport Studies 37 (2018): 29–30. 3 Masaaki Takahashi, Bushi no Seiritsu Bushi-zō no Sōshutsu [The Making of the Samurai, Inventing the Image of Samurai] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1999), 233–50. 4 Yoshio Imamura, 19seiki ni okeru Nihon Taiiku no Kenkyū [A Study on Physical Education in the Nineteenth Century] (Tokyo: Fumaidō, 1967), 342. 5 Masaaki Takahashi, Higashi Ajia Bujin Seiken no Hikakushi Kenkyū [A Comparative History of Military Government in East Asia] (Tokyo: Azekura Shobō, 2016), 85–153. 6 Matsunosuke Nishiyama, ‘ “Kinsei Geidou Shisō no Tokushitsu to sono Tenkai” [The Characteristic of the Performing Arts and Its Development in Tokugawa Period],’ in Kinsei Geido-ron [The Thought on the Performing Arts in Tokugawa Period], ed. Matsunosuke Nishiyama et al. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shotten, 1972), 599–601.

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7 Takahashi, Higashi Ajia Bujin Seiken no Hikakushi Kenkyū, 148–49. 8 Tsuneo Sogawa, Nihon Budō to Toyō Shisō [Japanese Martial Arts and Oriental Thought] (Tokyo: Heibonsya, 2015), 54–58. 9 Kenji Tomiki, Taiiku to Budō [Physical Education and Japanese Martial Arts] (Tokyo: Waseda Daigaku Shuppanbu, 1970), 216–17. 10 Alexander C. Bennet, Kendo: Culture of the Sword (Oakland: University of California Press, 2015), 66–68. 11 See, for example, Takahide Koyama, ‘ “Shintai Gijittsu Densho no Kindaika: Kyu Hirosaki-han niokeru Kinsei Ryūha Kenjutsu kara Kin-gendai Kendō eno Henyō nitsuite” [A Modernization of the Transmission of Physical Technique: The Transformation of Kenjutsu in the Hirosaki Domain, from Tokugawa Period to Modern Time]’ ” Aomori-ken Minzoku no Kai 3 (2003): 57–59. 12 Thomas C. Smith, Native Sources of Japanese Industrialization, 1750–1920 (Berkley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1988), 133–47. 13 Eric Hobsbawm and Terrance Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 14 Takahashi, Higashi Ajia Bujin Seiken no Hikakushi Kenkyū, 179–84; Oleg Benesch, Inventing the Way of the Samurai: Nationalism, Internationalism, and Bushidō in Modern Japan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 77–149; Yoshikazu Nakada, ‘ “Kindai Bushidō ga Umareru Toki” [The Birth of Modern Bushidō],’ in Nihon Kindai niokeru Kokkaishiki Keisei no Syomondai to Ajia: Seiji Shiso to Taishu Bunka [The Problems of the Making of National Consciousness and Asia in Modern Japan: Political Thought and Popular Culture], ed. Kaoru Endo (Tokyo: Keiso Shobō, 2019), 41–62. 15 Basil H. Chamberlain, The Invention of a New Religion (London: Rationalist Press, 1912). 16 Jigorō Kanō, ‘ “Kōdōkan Judō Gaisetu” [An Outline of the Kōdōkan Judō],’ Judō 2 (1915): 25–26. 17 For further details of its founding and growth in Maji era, see Yasuhiro Sakaue, ‘ “Dai Nippon Butokukai no Seiritsukatei to Kōzō, 1895–1904” [The Organizing Process and Structure of the Dai Nippon Butokukai, from 1895 to 1904]’, The Journal of Administrative and Social Sciences 1, no. 3–4, Fukushima University (1989): 59–112; Denis Gainty, Martial Arts and the Body Politic in Meiji Japan (London: Routledge, 2013), 35–72. 18 Sakaue, ‘ “Dai Nippon Butokukai no Seiritsukatei to Kōzō’,” 86–87. 19 Sakaue, ‘ “Nichiro Senchū Sengo niokeru Dai Nippon Butokukai,’ ” 22–28. 20 Yasuhiro Sakaue, ‘ “Teikoku Gikai Shūgiin niokeru Taiiku nikansuru Kengian no Shingi Katei [The Deliberations of the 1905 Proposal to Include Kendō and Judō in the School Regular Curriculum in the Imperial Diet]’,” Hitotsbashi Annual of Sport Studies 32 (2013): 26–43. 21 Sakaue, ‘ “Nichiro Sentyū Sengo niokeru Dai Nippon Butokukai,’ ” 29–30. 22 Yasuhiro Sakaue, ‘ “The Historical Creation of Kendo’s Self-Image from 1895 to 1942: A Critical Analysis of an Invented Tradition’,” Martial Arts Studies 6 (2018): 13–14. 23 Ibid., 15–16. 24 Yasuhiro Sakaue, ‘ “Taishō-ki niokeru Dai Nippon-Butokukai” [Dai Nippon Butokukai in the Taisho Era (1912–26): An Analysis of its Political and Military Function]’, Japanese Journal of the History of Physical Education 7 (1990): 44–45. 25 Sogawa, Nihon budō to Toyō shisō, 224–27. 26 Sakaue, ‘ “Taishō-ki niokeru Dai Nippon-Butokukai’,” 41. 27 Another example is the concept of Jita Kyōei (the idea of cooperation and of the development of mankind or of a global society/community) advocated by Jigorō Kanō in 1922. For the concept see Yasuhiro Sakaue,‘ “Judo Shisō to Orinpizumu no Kōsaku: Kanō Jigorō no Jita Kyōei Shisō” [The Idea of Judo and Olympism: Jigorō Kanō’s concept of Jita Kōei]’, in Nippon no Orinpikku: Nihon ha Orinpizumu to ikani Mukiatte kitaka [Japan and Olympic: How Did Japan See Olympism], ed. Yasunao Kojita et al. (Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2018), 131–62; Andreas Niehaus, ‘ “ ‘Attaining Useful Abilities Is by Nature the Highest Goal of Education’: Kanō Jigorō’s Concept of Seiryoku Zen’yō Jita Kyōei as Applied Moral ’Principles,” in Knowledge and Arts on the Move:Transformation of the Self-Aware Image Through East-West Encounters, ed. Craig Christopher, Enrico Fongaro, and Akihiro Ozaki, Vol. 2 (Milan: Mimesis, 2018), 59–76. 28 Sakaue, ‘ “The Historical Creation of Kendo’s Self-Image from 1895 to 1942’,” 16. 29 Ibid., 17. 30 Tadayoshi Ōtsuka, Nihon Kendō no Rekishi [The History of Japanese Kendō] (Tokyo: Madosha, 1995), 60–64. 31 Ysuhiro Sakaue, ‘ “Kendō no Kinshi to Saishuppatsu” [The Kendō Ban and Its Restart]’, Kendo Nippon 511 (2019): 72.

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32 Yasuhiro Sakaue, ‘ “Budōkai no Senji-taiseika: Budo Sōgō Dantai Dai Nippon Butokukai no Seiritsu” [The Reorganization of the World of Martial Arts for the War: The Establishment of the Dai Nippon Butokukai in 1942]’, in Maboroshi no Tōkyō Orinpikku to Sono Jidai: Supōtsu, Toshi, Shintai [The Tokyo Olympics of 1940 and Its period: Sport, Body and Urban Areas in the Wartime], ed. Yasuhiro Sakaue and Hiroyuki Takaoka (Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2009), 248–49. 33 Ibid., 255. 34 Masaru Kōzu, ‘ “Budō,”‘ in Gendai Kyōikushi Jiten [Dictionary of the History of Japanese Education], ed. Yoshizo Kubo et al. (Tokyo: Tokyo Shoseki, 2001), 245. See also Bennett, Kendo, 147–54. 35 Sakaue, “The Historical Creation of Kendō’s Self-Image from 1895 to 1942,” 18–20. 36 Sakaue, ‘ “Budōkai no Senji-taiseika’,” 249–50; Ōtsuka, Nihon Kendō no Rekishi, 129–53. 37 Yasuhiro Sakaue, Supōtsu to Seiji [Sport and Politics] (Tokyo:Yamakawa Shuppan, 2001), 82–87. 38 Tatsuo Nishio, Nihon Shokuminchika Chōsen ni okeru Gakkō Taiiku Seisaku [The Policy of School Physical Education in Korea Under Japanese Occupation] (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2003), 408–15. 39 Yasuhiro Sakaue, ‘ “GHQ Senryōka niokeru Kendō” [Kendō Under the GHQ Occupation in Japan: Ban, Surviving, Transforming into Sport and Entertainment]’, Hitotsubashi Annual of Sport Studies 35 (2016): 3–17. 40 Ibid. 41 Sakaue, ‘ “Kendō no Kinshi to Saishuppatsu’,” 71–72; Zennihon Kendō Renmei (AJKF), ed., Zennihon Kendō Renmei Gojūnenshi [50 Years History of the AJKF] (Tokyo: Zennihon Kendō Renmei, 2003), 11. 42 Yasuhiro Sakaue, ‘ “The Nationalization of the Body in Martial Arts: A Case of Postwar Japan’,” Journal of Martial Arts Research 2, no. 2 (2019): 4. 43 Ibid., 5. 44 Ibid.,‘’ 7. 45 Zennihon Kendo Renmei, Zennihon Kendō Renmei Gojūnenshi, 27. 46 Ibid. 47 Sogawa, Nihon Budō to Toyō Shisō, 270. 48 Sakaue, ‘ “The Nationalization of the Body in Martial Arts’,” 6–7. 49 On the global diffusion of kendō, see Bennett, Kendo, 200–30.

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Yoshio Imamura. 19 seiki ni okeru Nihon Taiiku no Kenkyu [A Study of Physical Education in the Nineteenth Century]. Tokyo: Fumaido, 1967. Ysuhiro Sakaue. “Kendō no Kinshi to Saishuppatsu” [The Knedō Ban and Its Restart]. Kendō Nippon 511 (2019): 72. Zennihon Kendō Renmei (AJKF), ed. Zennihon Kendō Renmei Gojunenshi [50 Years History of the AJKF]. Tokyo: Zennihon Kendō Renmei, 2003.

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Judo was the first sport of Asian origin to be accepted into the Olympic Games.1 Founded by the first Asian member of the International Olympic Committee, Professor Jigorō Kanō,2 it is an activity that effectively juxtaposes its roots in oriental culture with its global brand as a modern combat sport. Judo is an education for life, developed as a physical, intellectual and moral education by the Japanese polymath Kanō, who described judo as ‘a study and training in mind and body as well as in the regulation of one’s life and affairs.’3 Kanō specifically used the term jūdō (anglicised to judo), rather than the more commonly accepted term of Kanō ryū jūjutsu, seeing his creation as a way through life rather than simply a technical skill. The Kōdōkan defines judo as the way of softness and flexibility.4 International judo is governed by the International Judo Federation, founded in 1951 in London and led since 2007 by President Marius Vizer. The IJF defines judo as an educational method derived from the martial arts, ‘a highly codified sport in which the mind controls the expression of the body and a sport which contributes to educating individuals.’5 The 1860s were a time of great change in Japan, with the abolition of the Tokugawa shogunate and the return of Imperial rule under the new emperor Meiji.6 Shinnosuke was born in 1860, the fifth child of Jirōsaku Kanō and his wife Sadako. Later he was given the name Jigorō.7 He was sent to boarding school at the age of 12 following the death of his mother. A slight and studious boy, he was bullied in the dormitory and vowed to develop himself physically and learn the traditional samurai martial art of hand-to-hand combat known as jūjutsu.8 By the age of 17 he had found Hachinosuke Fukuda, a teacher in the Tenjin Shin’yō-ryū jūjutsu tradition. Kanō studied hard with Fukuda, and in 1879 they were invited to give a display for Ulysses S. Grant, who was visiting Japan from America. Fukuda died shortly afterwards, and Kanō continued to train under Masamoto Iso for two years. Following the death of Masamoto, Kanō sought out Tsunetoshi Iikubo, a teacher in the Kito ryū style, which had a greater emphasis on the importance of timing. By this time he was a student at Kaiseki Academy (later Tokyo Imperial University), where he was heavily influenced by an American, Ernest Fenollosa,9 who taught him about the English Victorian philosopher Herbert Spencer. Spencer’s 1861 treatise Education: Intellectual, Moral and

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Physical10 was to have a great influence on the ideas of Kanō,11,12 which can still be seen in the modern judo we know today. As a 22-year-old graduate from the Department of Political Science and Economics of Tokyo Imperial University,13 in 1882 Kanō founded a small private school, the Kanō juku, in the grounds of Eisho-ji Temple in Inari-cho. Alongside his school he founded an institution to teach his way of judo, calling it the Kōdōkan, or place to study the way. Kanō’s first student was Tsunejiro Tomita, whose name appears in the first line of the enrolment book of the Kōdōkan. Tomita started judo as the first live-in student aged just 17, five years younger than Kanō, and was his main training partner. He was also the first student to be awarded the shōdan (1st dan) in 1883. Kanō adopted the dan-kyu system of ranks for judo students, similar to the board game Go, as opposed to the menkyo system common in other jūjutsu ryū. Saigō Shirō was the second student to join, and achieved shōdan alongside Tomita. Saigō was very skilful and could avoid the favoured uki-goshi of Kanō; this led to Kanō developing haraigoshi. Saigō left the Kōdōkan in 1890. The book Sanshiro Sugata is based on him. Written by the son of Tomita, it was dramatised as the first movie by the director Akiro Kurosawa. Tomita and Saigō were two of the Kōdōkan Shiten’nō (four heavenly kings); the others were Sakujiro Yokoyama and Yoshiaki Yamashita. Yamashita was the nineteenth member of the Kōdōkan; he made rapid progress and achieved shōdan in just three months. He went on to be the first person to achieve judan (10th dan). ‘Demon’Yokoyama was considered the most formidable of all judo experts of his time. He was 22 when he joined the Kōdōkan and by the age of 40 had achieved 7th dan, the highest grade at that time. The reputation of the Kōdōkan rested in part on the promotion of victorious matches against other schools. Most famously, there was a match at the Keishicho, the Tokyo Police dojo, in 1886 when the Kōdōkan was challenged by the Totsuya Yoshin ryū. This was one of the first times that the Kōdōkan team wore black belts with white judogi.The final deciding match pitted Saigō against the heavier opposition captain. Saigō was overpowered and thrown up in the air, but always landed on his feet in a controlled manner. His movements were likened to that of an agile cat. After 15 minutes Saigō perfectly executed his trademark yama-arashi, which ended the match with such force that his opponent retired with a concussion. This match helped firmly establish judo as superior to other jūjutsu, and judo was subsequently adopted as the official training style for the Tokyo police academy. In 1926, the Kōdōkan women’s division Joshibu was established in the Kaiun-zaka dojo, and by January 1933 Katsuko Kosaki became the first woman dan-holder in the Kōdōkan. A year later, in January 1934, Ayako Akutagawa and Yasuko Morioka were promoted to 1st dan, and Masako Noritomi was promoted to 2nd dan with her 1st dan skipped. Also a member of the Joshibu around that time was a young Keiko Fukuda, granddaughter of Hachinosuke Fukuda, Kanō’s first teacher. Fukuda would go on to achieve Kōdōkan 9th dan, the highest grade awarded to a woman.14 In 1899, Kanō was asked by the Imperial Household Agency to travel to Europe to study education systems overseas.15 Whilst travelling Kanō took every opportunity to teach and promote judo.16 Meanwhile the Kōdōkan attracted more and more members, moving venues frequently in search of additional space. By March 1907 the Kōdōkan had moved to the Shita-tomizaka dojo, containing 300 mats. By that time the Kōdōkan had enrolled around 10,000 members in the Tokyo area, and 70,000 elsewhere.17 The end of the Russo-Japanese war in 1905 led to a surge of interest in the art of jūjutsu, particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom,18,19 and Kanō sent instructors overseas. 76

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One of the first was Yoshitsugu (Yoshiaki) Yamashita, who travelled to the United States in 1903 with Saburo Kawaguchi at the invitation of Samuel Hill, and attracted the attention of President Theodore Roosevelt, who requested lessons. While Mr Yamashita taught the President, his wife Fude taught judo to the First Lady.2021 Other famous travellers included Mitsuyo Maeda, who taught in London in 1906 before moving to Europe and then travelling to Brazil, where his skills were greatly admired.22 In 1909, at the invitation of Baron Pierre de Coubertin through an introduction by the French Ambassador to Japan Auguste Gerard, Kanō became the first Asian member of the International Olympic Committee. Just two years later he founded the Japan Amateur Athletic Association (which became the Japan Sport Association and the Japanese Olympic Committee).23 During a visit to the Olympic Games in Antwerp in 1920, Kanō visited London, where the Budokwai (Way of Knighthood Society) had been formed at the invitation of William Steers, an Englishman who had achieved shōdan at the Kōdōkan during his time in Japan. Kanō graded the two teachers, Gunji Koizumi and Yukio Tani, to 2nd dan, and the Budokwai adopted Kōdōkan judo as its primary activity.2425 The Budokwai was very influential in the development of judo in the first part of the twentieth century. Influential judoka who practised there included Mikinosuke Kawaishi26 and Moshe Feldenkrais,27 who would both have a significant influence on the development of judo in France;28 Christmas Humpreys, the founder of the Buddhist Society in Great Britain; Trevor Leggett, an acclaimed judoka and teacher who studied extensively in Japan and authored many books on judo, yoga and Zen Buddhism;29 and the actress Sarah Mayer, famously the first Western woman to achieve shōdan in Japan.303132 In 1936 Kanō attended the Olympic Games in Berlin in his role as an IOC member. He had been instructed by the Japanese government to try to secure the 1940 Olympic Games. He was an effective lobbyist and at the Congress the IOC did award the Games to Tokyo, where judo was intended to be a demonstration sport. Those Games never took place, following the outbreak of World War II. There were early efforts to establish a European League of Judo in 1932, which did not survive World War II. Following the war, Budokwai members established the British Judo Association in July 1948 and four days later the European Judo Union at Imperial College Union, London. In 1951 the EJU received an application to join by Argentina. To accommodate them, the EJU was dissolved and the International Judo Federation was founded, under the chairmanship of Dr Torti from Italy. Japan was unable to attend the meeting that established the IJF, and Kanō, President of the Kōdōkan, sent a letter to Gunji Koizumi containing a proposal that a permanent home for the IJF be established at the Kōdōkan. At the second meeting of the IJF in Zurich in 1952, the EJU was resurrected and the presidency was offered to Risei Kanō.3334 The first World Judo Championships was held in Tokyo in 1956 with one open weight category attracting 31 competitors from 21 nations. Victory went to Shokichi Natsui of Japan. The fourth World Championships in 1961 saw a turning point in the internationalisation of the sport. It was held in Paris, outside Japan for the first time. The victor was a young Dutchman, Anton Geesink, who had forged his judo skills in the Tenri University dojo in Nara Prefecture.35 This created concern in Japan, as there was a real risk that at the upcoming 1964 Olympic Games, the showpiece judo event, would be won by a foreigner. The solution was to have four weight categories at the Olympics, thus increasing the likelihood of Japanese victory.36 The strategy worked. Nakitani at 68kg, Okano at 80kg and Inokuma at over 80kg were the first Olympic judo champions, but as many expected, the Open category was won by Geesink, beating the host nation favourite Akio Kaminaga in the final match. Immediately following the victory, Geesink’s supporters sought to rush onto the mat, and his demeanour in ushering them 77

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away in recognition of Japanese traditions enamoured him to the host audience and helped seal the future of judo as a global sport.37 A World Championships for women was introduced in 1980, thanks to the tireless efforts of American organiser Rena ‘Rusty’ Kanōkogi and the support of IJF President Dr Shigeyoshi Matsumae. It took place at the famous Madison Square Garden in New York City.3839 Women’s judo joined the Olympic programme as a demonstration sport in 1988 and as a full sport in 1992. In 1988, the use of blue and white judogi was brought in to help the television audience distinguish the competitors. The change was initially controversial, with some research suggesting that the use of coloured judogi might influence the competition outcome.404142 This is just one of a number of changes to the rules that have been made in an attempt to make the sport attractive to the viewer. Throughout this process, the sport has retained much of the original ethos of fair play and respect for the opponent.43 Many great champions have emerged since the 1950s. Among the men, these include Yasuhiro Yamashita (Japan), a nine-time All-Japan and three-time World and Olympic Champion who went undefeated for 203 matches over an eight-year period. Teddy Riner (France) continues his career at the time of writing and has amassed 10 World Championships and two Olympic golds. Tadahiro Nomura (Japan) is the only person to have won three Olympic golds. Ryoko Tani (Japan) has the most Olympic medals with five; she also has seven World Championships golds. In the twenty-first century, judo on a global stage has been transformed under the leadership of IJF President Marius Vizer. The introduction of the World Ranking List (WRL), alongside a series of events at Grand Slam and Grand Prix level, has led to a situation whereby the world’s top athletes compete on the World Judo Tour, as the final two years of the WRL contribute towards points for Olympic qualification. Seeding for the Olympic Games is based on the top eight judoka on the Olympic Qualification List, meaning that judoka chase those positions during the qualification period, aware that a seeding at the Olympic Games means the draw will keep them separate from the other topranked judoka until the quarter-final stage. Considerable research continues into the WRL and the effect of the seeding system on the results of the competitions.44 The role of media in the presentation of judo has also been transformed. The IJF World Tour is live-streamed with entertaining and informed commentary so that judo fans around the world can follow their favourite judoka most weekends. The media packages available for the Olympic judo event were increased to allow broadcasters to purchase the rights to a wider variety of options, such as the option to broadcast only the medal fights. This had a significant impact on the number of countries where Olympic judo could be viewed, leading to an increase in the worldwide viewing figures and a consequent increase in the IJF’s share of the Olympic broadcast revenues. Kanō Jigorō explained that the ultimate aim of judo was to benefit society and outlined the three levels of judo.Training for defence against attack is the lower level. Cultivation of the mind and body and putting one’s energy to use is the middle level. The upper level of judo is to put one’s energy to use in society. Throughout the world there are many examples of judo initiatives to benefit society. One of the most obvious examples is the Judo for Peace project. Founded in Norway as Judo for Fred, it created judo clubs in war-torn Afghanistan. Judo for Peace supports judo clubs in Syria and elsewhere, and has a special focus on displaced persons. At the Rio Olympic Games, there were two judoka in the Olympic Refugee Team.

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The Solidarity of International Judo Education is a Non-Profit Organisation established by Yasuhiro Yamashita. It has organised a number of initiatives to use judo as a tool for peace in the communities of Israel and Palestine, such as inviting Israeli and Palestinian children to Japan to practise judo together. On the IJF World Tour, the Arab nations refused to allow the Israeli athletes to parade under their own flag, and so the IJF threatened to withdraw the Abu Dhabi Grand Prix from the United Arab Emirates Judo Federation unless there were assurances that Israeli athletes would be treated equitably. History was made in October 2018 when Sagi Muki won the gold medal in the Abu Dhabi Grand Prix and the Israeli national anthem rang out around the stadium. Judo has evolved technically, though many of the more traditional techniques can be found in the kata or forms. Throwing techniques are categorised into five sections in the Kōdōkan Gokyo (te waza, ashi waza, koshi waza, ma sutemi waza, yoko sutemi waza); grappling techniques are categorised into katame waza, kansetsu waza and shime waza. More techniques have been added to the Gokyo over time, and the Kōdōkan now recognises a total of 100 techniques. There are eight kata recognised by the Kōdōkan; Nage no Kata and Katame no Kata (collectively known as Randori no Kata), Kime no Kata, Ju no Kata, Kōdōkan Goshin jutsu, Koshiki no Kata, Itsutsu no kata, and Seiryoku Zenyo Kokumin Taiku no Kata.45 The value of practising kata should not be underestimated, and it is often a focus of study for high-grade judoka. Sometimes kata is referred to as the alphabet of judo. There are four ways to study judo: through free practice (randori), forms (kata), lectures (kogi) and question and answer (mondo). The skills of the judoka are tested in contest, known as shiai.46

Notes 1 Nicolas Soames and Roy Inman, Olympic Judo: History and Techniques (Swindon: Ippon/Crowood, 1990); Sandra Wilson, ‘ “Exhibiting a New Japan: The Tokyo Olympics of 1964 and Expo ‘‘70 in Osaka’,” Historical Research 85, no. 227 (2012): 159–78. 2 Syd Hoare, A History of Judo (London:Yamagi, 2009); John Stevens, The Way of Judo: A Portrait of Jigoro Kano and His Students (Boulder, CO: Shambhala Publications Inc, 2013). 3 Jigoro Kanō, ‘ “The Contribution of Judo to Education,”‘ Journal of Health and Physical Education 3, no. 9 (1932): 37–58. 4 Mike Callan and Slaviša Bradić, ‘ “Historical Development of Judo’,” in The Science of Judo, ed. M. Callan (London: Routledge, 2018), 25–31. 5 IJF Statutes, Swiss Association, Translated from the French Original (2017). 6 Inazo Nitobe, Bushido: The Soul of Japan. An Exposition of Japanese Thought (Eastford: Martino Fine Books, 2013). 7 Stevens. The Way of Judo. 8 Callan and Bradić, ‘ “Historical Development of Judo’.” 9 Van Wyck Brooks, ‘ “Ernest Fenollosa and Japan’,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 106, no. 2 (1962): 106–10. 10 Herbert Spencer, Education: Intellectual, Moral and Physical ([S.l.]: Williams and Norgate, 1861). 11 Mike Callan, Elite Sport and Education Support Systems: A Case Study of the Team Bath Judo Programme at the University of Bath (Bath: University of Bath, 2008). 12 Mike Callan, ‘ “Judo as a Physical, Intellectual and Moral Education’,” in The Science of Judo, ed. M. Callan (London: Routledge, 2018), 32–36. 13 David Waterhouse, “Kano Jigoro and the Beginnings of the Judo Movement” (Paper presented at the 5th Canadian Symposium on the History of Sport and Physical Education, Toronto School of Physical and Health Education, 1982). 14 Joseph R. Svinth, ‘ “The Evolution of Women’’s Judo 1900–1945’,” Yo: Journal of Alternative Perspectives no. 2 (2001). 15 Hoare, A History of Judo.

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16 Alex Bennett, Jigoro Kano and the Kodokan: An Innovative Response to Modernisation, 1st ed. (Tokyo: Kōdōkan Judo Institute, 2009). 17 Hoare, A History of Judo. 18 Mike Callan, Conor Heffernan, and Amanda Spenn,‘ “Women’s Jūjutsu and Judo in the Early TwentiethCentury: The Cases of Phoebe Roberts, Edith Garrud, and Sarah Mayer’,” International Journal of the History of Sport (2019): 1–24. 19 Charles à Court Repington, The War in the Far East, 1904–1905 (London: J. Murray, 1905). 20 Michel Brousse and David Matsumoto, Judo in the U.S.: A Century of Dedication (Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic, 2005). 21 Joseph R. Svinth, ‘ “Yamashita Goes to Washington’,” Journal of Combative Sport (October 2000). 22 Richard Bowen, 100 Years of Judo in Great Britain (Brighton: IndePenPress, 2011). 23 Japan Olympic Committee, Chronology, Jigoro Kano Memorial International Sport Institute, 2019, www.100yearlegacy.org/english/Kano_Jigoro/Chronology/. 24 Bowen, 100 Years of Judo in Great Britain. 25 Mike Callan, “History of the Budokwai, London: The Adoption of Kōdōkan Judo in the Early Years,” (Paper presented at the 4th European Science of Judo Research Symposium & 3rd Scientific and Professional Conference on Judo: ‘Applicable Research in Judo’, Porec, Croatia, 2017). 26 Mikonosuke Kawaishi, My Method of Judo (London: W Foulsham & Co. Ltd., 1955). 27 Moshé Feldenkrais, ‘ “Research Work at the Budokwai’,” Judo Quarterly 5, no. 4 (1950). 28 Michel Brousse, Judo for the World (Paris: International Judo Federation, 2015). 29 Trevor Leggett, The Spirit of Budo: Old Traditions for Present-Day Life (London: Kegan Paul International, 1998). 30 Callan, Heffernan, and Spenn, ‘ “Women’s Jūjutsu and Judo in the Early Twentieth-Century.’ ” 31 Sarah Mayer, “Seven Letters from Sarah Mayer Addressed to G. Koizumi re Her Training Visit to Japan, February 1934–January 1935,” The Richard Bowen Collection Database (C64), University of Bath, 1934. 32 A. Spenn, “Having a Bath in Japan” (PhD thesis, University of Wolverhampton, Wolverhampton, 2019). 33 Richard Bowen, ‘ “Origins of the British Judo Association, the European Judo Union, and the International Judo Federation’,” in Martial Arts in the Modern World, ed.Thomas Green and Joseph Svinth (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2003), 173. 34 Bowen, 100 Years of Judo in Great Britain. 35 P. Nichols, “Anton Geesink Obituary,” The Guardian, September 6, 2010. 36 S. Kido, ‘ “New Look at Judo’,” Black Belt Magazine 1, no. 4 (1962). 37 Brousse, Judo for the World. 38 Barbara Barnett and Marie C. Hardin, ‘ “Advocacy from the Liberal Feminist Playbook: The Framing of Title IX and Women’s Sports in News Releases from the Women’s Sports Foundation’,” International Journal of Sport Communication 4, no. 2 (2011): 178–97. 39 Hoare, A History of Judo. 40 Peter D. Dijkstra and Paul T.Y. Preenen, ‘ “No Effect of Blue on Winning Contests in Judo’,” Proceedings: Biological Sciences 275, no. 1639 (2008): 1157–62. 41 Ursula F. Julio, Bianca Miarka, João P. P. Rosa, Giscard H. O. Lima, Monica Y.Takito, and Emerson Franchini, ‘ “Blue Judogi May Bias Competitive Performance When Seeding System Is Not Used: Sex, Age, and Level of Competition Effects’,” Perceptual and Motor Skills 120, no. 1 (2015): 28–37. 42 David Matsumoto, Jun Konno, Stephanie Hata, and Masayuki Takeuchi, ‘ “Blue Judogis May Bias Competition Outcomes’,” Research Journal of Budo 39, no. 3 (2007): 1–7. 43 Sanja Smojver-Ažić, Matija Jug-Dujaković, Slaviša Bradić,Vladimir Takšić, and Veno Đonlić, ‘ “Relation Between Motoric and Psychological Characteristics of Young Judokas’,” Applicable Research in Judo no. 59 (2016): 59–64. 44 Geert Claes, ‘ “Analysis of Winning and Losing the Bronze Medal in International Women’s Judo Competitions 2012–2016 and the Consistency with the IJF Ranking List’,” Research Journal of Budo 50 (2017): S_125; Emerson Franchini and Ursula Ferreira Julio, ‘ “The Judo World Ranking List and the Performances in the 2012 London Olympics’,” Asian Journal of Sports Medicine 6, no. 3 (2015): e24045; F. D. Lascau and D. Rosu, ‘ “Study Regarding the Prediction of Medal Winning in Olympic Games Judo Competitions’,” Journal of Physical Education and Sport 13, no. 3 (2013): 386–90. 45 Slaviša Bradić and Mike Callan, ‘ “Kata Training for Judo: Value and Application of Judo Kata to Judo Training’,” in The Science of Judo, ed. Mike Callan (London: Routledge, 2018), 37–46; Slavisa Bradic, Mike Callan, and Isamu Nakamura, ‘ “Value of Nage-No-Kata: Analysis of Motoric Movement and 80

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Principles with the Goal of Teaching Applicability of Throwing Techniques in Simulated Combat Situations’,” in Proceedings of the 4th European Science of Judo Research Symposium & 3rd Scientific and Professional Conference on Judo: ‘Applicable Research in Judo’, ed. H. Sertić, S. Čorak, and I. Segedi (Porec: Croatian Judo Federation, 2017); Sumuyuki Kotani, Kata of Kodokan Judo Revised (Kobe: Koyano Bussan Kaisha Ltd., 1970). 46 Syd Hoare, Judo (Sevenoaks: Teach Yourself Books, 1980).

Bibliography Barnett, Barbara, and Marie C. Hardin. “Advocacy from the Liberal Feminist Playbook: The Framing of Title IX and Women’s Sports in News Releases from the Women’s Sports Foundation.” International Journal of Sport Communication 4, no. 2 (2011): 178–97. Bennett, Alex. Jigoro Kano and the Kodokan: An Innovative Response to Modernisation. 1st ed. Tokyo: Kōdōkan Judo Institute, 2009. Bowen, Richard. 100 Years of Judo in Great Britain. Brighton: IndePenPress, 2011. Bowen, Richard. “Origins of the British Judo Association, the European Judo Union, and the International Judo Federation.” In Martial Arts in the Modern World, edited by Joseph Svinth, 173–83. Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2003. Bradić, Slaviša, and Mike Callan. “Kata Training for Judo:Value and Application of Judo Kata to Judo Training.” In The Science of Judo, edited by Mike Callan, 37–46. London: Routledge, 2018. Bradic, Slaviša, Mike Callan, and Isamu Nakamura. “Value of Nage-No-Kata: Analysis of Motoric Movement and Principles with the Goal of Teaching Applicability of Throwing Techniques in Simulated Combat Situations.” In Proceedings of the 4th European Science of Judo Research Symposium & 3rd Scientific and Professional Conference on Judo:‘Applicable Research in Judo’, edited by H. Sertić, S. Čorak, and I. Segedi. Porec: Croatian Judo Federation, 2017. Brooks, Van Wyck. “Ernest Fenollosa and Japan.” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 106, no. 2 (1962): 106–10. Brousse, Michel. Judo for the World. Paris: International Judo Federation. 2015. Brousse, Michel, and David Matsumoto. Judo in the U.S.: A Century of Dedication. Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic, 2005. Callan, Mike. Elite Sport and Education Support Systems: A Case Study of the Team Bath Judo Programme at the University of Bath. Bath: University of Bath, 2008. Callan, Mike. “History of the Budokwai, London:The Adoption of Kōdōkan judo in the Early Years.” Paper presented at the 4th European Science of Judo Research Symposium & 3rd Scientific and Professional Conference on Judo: ‘Applicable Research in Judo’, Porec, Croatia, 2017. Callan, Mike. “Judo as a Physical, Intellectual and Moral Education.” In The Science of Judo, edited by M. Callan, 32–36. London: Routledge, 2018. Callan, Mike, and Slaviša Bradić. “Historical Development of Judo.” In The Science of Judo, edited by M. Callan, 25–31. London: Routledge, 2018. Callan, Mike, Conor Heffernan, and Amanda Spenn. “Women’s Jūjutsu and Judo in the Early Twentieth Century: The Cases of Phoebe Roberts, Edith Garrud, and Sarah Mayer.” The International Journal of the History of Sport (2019): 1–24. Claes, Geert. “Analysis of Winning and Losing the Bronze Medal in International Women’s Judo Competitions 2012–2016 and the Consistency with the IJF Ranking List.” Research Journal of Budo 50 (2017): S_125. Dijkstra, Peter D., and Paul T. Y. Preenen. “No Effect of Blue on Winning Contests in Judo.” Proceedings: Biological Sciences 275, no. 1639 (2008): 1157–62. Feldenkrais, Moshé. “Research Work at the Budokwai.” Judo Quarterly Bulletin 5, no. 4 (1950). Franchini, Emerson, and Ursula Ferreira Julio. “The Judo World Ranking List and the Performances in the 2012 London Olympics.” Asian Journal of Sports Medicine 6, no. 3 (2015). Hoare, Syd. A History of Judo. London:Yamagi, 2009. Hoare, Syd. Judo. Sevenoaks: Teach Yourself Books, 1980. 81

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IJF Statutes, Swiss Association. Translated from the French Original, 2017. Julio, Ursula F., Bianca Miarka, João P. P. Rosa, Giscard H. O. Lima, Monica Y. Takito, and Emerson Franchini. “Blue Judogi May Bias Competitive Performance When Seeding System Is Not Used: Sex, Age, and Level of Competition Effects.” Perceptual and Motor Skills 120, no. 1 (2015): 28–37. doi:10.2466/30. PMS.120v15x2. Kanō Jigoro. “The Contribution of Judo to Education.” Journal of Health and Physical Education 3, no. 9 (1932): 37–58. Kawaishi, Mikonosuke. My Method of Judo. London: W. Foulsham & Co. Ltd, 1955. Kido, S. “New Look at Judo.” Black Belt Magazine 1, no. 4 (1962). Kotani, Sumuyuki. Kata of Kodokan Judo Revised. Kobe, Japan: Koyano Bussan Kaisha Ltd, 1970. Lascau, F. D., and Rosu, D. “Study Regarding the Prediction of Medal Winning in Olympic Games Judo Competitions.” Journal of Physical Education and Sport 13, no. 3 (2013): 386–90. Leggett, Trevor. The Spirit of Budo: Old Traditions for Present-Day Life. London: Kegan Paul International, 1998. Matsumoto, David, Jun Konno, Stephanie Hata, and Masayuki Takeuchi. “Blue Judogis May Bias Competition Outcomes.” Research Journal of Budo 39, no. 3 (2007): 1–7. Mayer, Sarah. “Seven Letters from Sarah Mayer Addressed to G. Koizumi re Her Training Visit to Japan, February 1934–January 1935.” The Richard Bowen Collection Database (C64), University of Bath, 1934. Nitobe, Inazo. Bushido: The Soul of Japan. An Exposition of Japanese Thought. Eastford: Martino Fine Books, 2013. Smojver-Ažić, Sanja, Matija Jug-Dujaković, Slaviša Bradić, Vladimir Takšić, and Veno Đonlić. “Relation Between Motoric and Psychological Characteristics of Young Judokas.” Applicable Research in Judo no. 59 (2016): 59–64. Soames, Nicolas, and Roy Inman. Olympic Judo: History and Techniques. Swindon: Ippon/Crowood, 1990. Spencer, Herbert. Education: Intellectual, Moral and Physical. [S.l.]: Williams and Norgate, 1861. Stevens, John. The Way of Judo: A Portrait of Jigoro Kano and His Students. Boulder, CO: Shambhala Publications Inc., 2013. Svinth, Joseph R. “The Evolution of Women’s Judo 1900–1945.” Yo: Journal of Alternative Perspectives no. 2 (2001). Svinth, Joseph R. “Professor Yamashita Goes to Washington.” Journal of Combative Sport (October 2000). https://ejmas.com/jcs/jcsart_svinth1_1000.htm. Waterhouse, David. “Kano Jigoro and the Beginnings of the Judo Movement.” Paper presented at the 5th Canadian Symposium on the History of Sport and Physical Education, Toronto School of Physical and Health Education, 1982. Wilson, Sandra. “Exhibiting a New Japan: The Tokyo Olympics of 1964 and Expo ‘70 in Osaka.” Historical Research 85, no. 227 (2012): 159–78.

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9 In search of a tradition for taekwondo Udo Moenig and Minho Kim

Introduction The Asian martial arts differ from traditional Asian games or sport-like activities in one important aspect: they have often been associated with historical narratives of ancient, grand military conquests by certain tribes, people and nations. As a result, modern Asian martial arts are often portrayed as surviving symbols and testimonies of a nation’s proud martial heritage and heroic military tradition. Well-known narratives, promoted in popular literature and movies, are tales about the famed Chinese Shaolin fighting monks, romantic anecdotes about the loyalty and devotion of Japanese samurai warriors and heroic battles of Muay Thai fighters repelling invaders of Siam with their bare hands. However, the historical accuracy of these narratives, presented and promoted by various interest groups, is a complicated topic in which history and fiction, factual records and crude nationalism, and tradition and invented tradition are often blended and confused.1 Furthermore, the relationship between martial arts and sport is a complicated issue as well. In many parts of the world, traditional wrestling and boxing contests historically evolved to appear at various events, which were usually religious and festive in nature, such as the ancient Olympic Games. While many of these wrestling and boxing activities could be categorised as traditional sport-like activities, great segments of followers of Asian martial arts reject outright any association with sport.There exists a great divide between followers of so-called ‘traditional martial arts’ and followers of ‘modern combat sport.’ In the Asian martial arts discussion, followers of traditional martial arts often claim that the ‘real’ purpose of martial arts is battle – a matter of life and death; on the other hand, the purpose of combat sport appears rather trivial to them – leisure, health and sport, contested and distorted through rules and protective gear. Besides, traditional Asian martial arts are also often associated with various ‘Oriental’ teachings and philosophies, blended with medicine and diverse mystic and cult-like practices. Accordingly, followers of traditional Asian martial arts often belittle or outright dismiss the sport aspect.2 The general process of ‘sportification’ in Asian martial arts started mostly during the early twentieth century, when many Asian martial arts transformed gradually into modern sport with the introduction of free sparring methods and competition events. The Japanese martial arts were the leaders in this respect, primarily through the evolution of modern kendo and judo into 83

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primarily competition sport.3 In comparison, taekwondo’s sportification process has been more recent, starting in the 1960s. By and large, taekwondo has always been a very fragmented enterprise in terms of training activities and corporate organisations. There are in fact a variety of activities associated with the name ‘taekwondo,’ and the sparring competition sport represented at the Olympic Games is just one of them. With regard to different taekwondo organisations, the dominance of the World Taekwondo Federation (WTF), recently renamed World Taekwondo (WT), has been achieved only recently with taekwondo’s recognition in 2000 as an official Olympic sport. Moreover, during taekwondo’s formative years the followers of the traditional training elements, which consists mostly of forms rehearsal for the purpose of self-defence, outright rejected and opposed the sportification process.4 So the relationship between martial arts and sport is a complex issue, complicated by different layers of perception, definitions and varying philosophies. Consequently, the term ‘sport’ in connection with the topic of this Handbook, ‘sport in Asia,’ has very complex nuances and meanings in the realm of martial arts. With this background in mind, this chapter will concentrate on the historical narrative of taekwondo and its invented and actual traditions. Taekwondo’s invented historical narrative is largely a product of Korea’s complicated colonial past and South Korea’s desire for nationbuilding after liberation in 1945. Moreover, since taekwondo was only introduced to North Korea in 1980, this study will solely concentrate on South Korea, where the entire formation of taekwondo took place. It will first focus on the relationship, or lack thereof, between ancient or earlier Korean martial arts and present-day taekwondo. Then it will explain the formation of taekwondo from Japanese karate, followed by a discussion about the motivation behind taekwondo’s ‘Koreanisation’ process. Lastly, the chapter will briefly focus on taekwondo’s ascent to the Olympics.

Traditional Korean martial arts and their lack of relationship to taekwondo Although the exact narrative of the origins of taekwondo has changed slightly over time, the taekwondo establishment and organisations related to the South Korean government, such as the Kukkiwon (the so-called World Taekwondo Headquarters), have principally been promoting taekwondo as a 2,000-year-old indigenous Korean martial art. Despite a variety of studies and publications during the past two decades disputing the official account, the ancient indigenous Korean martial arts narrative persists in popular literature and historical portrayals of the various taekwondo organisations.5 Before its early modernisation drive during the late nineteenth century and subsequent annexation by Japan in 1910, Korea relied heavily on China for military technology, tactics and training. Traditional weapon-based martial arts seem to have been strongly influenced or directly derived from Chinese methods.With regard to weaponless martial arts activities, such as wrestling and striking games, the existence of any records in the form of manuals, illustrations or references is very scarce in Korea.6 The existing sources pale in comparison to available artefacts and references of traditional Western combat activities, such as wrestling and the boxing methodologies of ancient Greece and Rome, or martial arts traditions in medieval Europe. Apart from a couple of ancient murals from the Koguryŏ Dynasty (37 BCE–668 CE), depicting possibly some wrestling and striking activities, not many other artefacts exist that would point to a splendid unarmed martial arts tradition of that period in Korean history. Moreover, the murals mimic earlier Chinese murals, pointing to Chinese origins. Regarding written references, the first mention of unarmed martial arts activity in Korea is in the Koryŏsa (高麗史 84

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History of Koryŏ), composed during the reign of King Sejong (r 1418–1450). The text mentions a martial art called subak, which was, according to the text, already practised during the early twelfth century. However, subak is the Korean transliteration of the archaic Chinese martial arts term shoubo (手搏), referring to unarmed ‘hand fighting’ or Chinese boxing. Equally, Korean wrestling activities point, at least in name, to Chinese roots. During the following centuries, insufficient references to unarmed martial arts activities exist, and the first Korean martial arts manual was only composed in 1598, the Muye Chepo (武藝諸譜 Illustrated Martial Arts Records), which represents a replica of an earlier Chinese manual, the Jixiaoxinshu (紀效新書 New Book Recording Effective Techniques).7

Figure 9.1 Chinese kwŏnbŏp instructions (page 3) in the Muye Chepo Pŏnyŏk Sokchip (武藝諸 譜飜譯續集 Series of Translated Illustrated Martial Arts Records)8 Source: Courtesy of Keimyung University Dongsan Library.

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More well known is an expanded manual of the Muye Tobo T’ongji (武藝圖譜通志 Comprehensive Illustrated Manual of Martial Arts) of 1790, which features many modifications and additions. The Muye Tobo T’ongji is often associated with taekwondo history, even though the only unarmed martial arts activity described in the manual consists of Chinese kwŏnbŏp (拳法 ‘fist method’ or Chinese boxing; Chinese: quanfa). In fact, unarmed martial arts activities for ancient and medieval militaries never played any role in real battle and were solely a tool for the physical training of soldiers. Moreover, in general, the traditional Asian martial arts had been progressively declining over centuries with the invention of gunpowder and the subsequent increasing use of firearms. In reality, the depiction in popular literature and movies of the use of fanciful unarmed Asian fighting methods in battle is nothing more than a modern, romantic fairytale, fathered mainly by Hollywood and the Hong Kong film industry.9 Moreover, during the Chosŏn Dynasty (1392–1897), which emphasised Neo-Confucianism and scholarly activity, the martial arts in Korea were for the greatest part disregarded and in decline. Subsequently, the only unarmed, fight-like activities mentioned in any records are ssirŭm, a Korean wrestling game, and t’aekkyŏn, a vanishing folk game using mostly legs to push or knock down the opponent. In fact, t’aekkyŏn almost disappeared at the start of the twentieth century and was only revived during the 1960s. Both activities, ssirŭm and t’aekkyŏn, represented folk games, performed together with a variety of other games during cultural and religious festivities and celebrations, such as Ch’usŏk (the Korean harvest festival). The so-called ‘last t’aekkyŏn player of the Chosŏn period,’ Song Tŏk-ki, was the only person during the 1950s still able to perform t’aekkyŏn. He frankly stated that he never regarded t’aekkyŏn as a martial art but considered it simply a game.10 Nevertheless, the taekwondo community created the fictional narrative that t’aekkyŏn, suppressed by Japanese colonial authorities, was the link between ancient Korean martial arts and modern taekwondo. Ironically, the Korean t’aekkyŏn community itself, does not even support this claim and denies any links between t’aekkyŏn and taekwondo.The first reference to t’aekkyŏn survives only from the early eighteenth century, and there exists no evidence of t’aekkyŏn’s origins or possible relationship to earlier Korean martial arts or games. Moreover, t’aekkyŏn had been suppressed by Korean authorities during the late nineteenth century because of its association with lower-class disorderly conduct, and its demise had nothing to do with any Japanese suppression. In reality, traditional Korean martial arts – with the exception of archery, which was very popular among the Confucian elites as a sort of gentleman’s activity – had vanished for the greatest part by the late nineteenth century. In contrast, during the same period, traditional martial arts were reintroduced to Korea from Japan with the opening of the first kendo and judo schools, and the use in police training of martial arts. Despite the claims, none of the founders of taekwondo had any credible relationship to or knowledge of t’aekkyŏn or any other ancient Korean combat activity, since they had all long vanished. It is in fact well documented that all the founders of taekwondo studied Japanese karate, all but one of them in Japan.11

The formational process of taekwondo The origins of taekwondo can be traced to the period of Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule, at the end of World War II in 1945.The forerunners of today’s taekwondo were a variety of martial arts styles and fighting methods, called by several different names and taught in a handful of street corner gyms, or established within existing judo schools, all in the Seoul area. These martial arts schools or gymnasiums, called kwan, were all established between 1944 and 1946, and later designated as the so-called ‘five founding kwan of taekwondo.’ Kwan (館 Japanese: kan) 86

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means literally ‘hall’ or ‘house’ but refers in this context to a martial arts school, style or organisation. The kwan were disunited, had different teaching methods and their founders had learned from a variety of different karate instructors in Japan, though Funakoshi Gichin’s Shōtō-kan karate style featured most prominently, likely due to Funakoshi’s authority on the Japanese karate scene. Moreover, a couple of kwan founders also had some Chinese kwŏnbŏp experience, acquired during their stay in Japanese-occupied Manchuria, though this had very little influence on the overall development of taekwondo.The disunity between the different kwan was actually a problem inherited from karate, which lacked uniform teaching methods and a unified organisation and leadership, since karate had only recently been introduced from Okinawa to Japan by Funakoshi, the so-called father of Japanese karate-dō, during the early 1920s.12 A few years on, during the Korean War (1950–1953), several of the kwan founders went missing and consequently some of their students established their own gyms; disputes among members were another reason for branching out.The first attempt to establish an umbrella martial arts organisation for the different schools took place during this period. In the course of the Communist North Korean onslaught against South Korea, the defenders had to retreat to the Pusan Perimeter in the far south. As a result, Pusan hosted many refugees from all over the country, including leaders of the martial arts community. Some of them established branches of their kwan during their stay in Pusan and in 1950 tentatively launched an umbrella organisation, the Korea Kongsudo [Karate] Association, which soon dissolved due to leadership disagreements. Subsequently, after the most pressing hardships of the Korean War ended and life tentatively returned to normal, the leadership of the martial arts community returned to Seoul and the idea of a unified association was revived, despite lingering tensions and rivalries among leaders.13 During this period, the different kwan used various terminology for their martial arts styles, such as tangsudo (唐手道 ‘way of the Tang [China] hand’), kongsudo (空手道 ‘way of the empty hand’) and kwŏnbŏp.14 The first two terms, both pronounced karate-dō in Japanese,15 point to Japanese origins, and the latter is a Chinese martial arts term (拳法) that was also popularly used in Okinawa and Japan in association with karate. As a result, some of the leaders wanted to distance themselves from their karate past through a name change. Consequently, in 1955,

Figure 9.2 President Rhee Syngman (right) watches a tangsudo demonstration performed by Choi Hong Hi’s (centre) soldiers, in 1954 Source: Courtesy of Jeong Soon Cheon, student of Choi Hong Hi and taekwondo pioneer.

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Choi Hong Hi, a powerful general, created the new name taekwondo,16 replacing tangsudo in his military-based Odo Kwan.The choice of the new name was influenced by a strong similarity in pronunciation to the term t’aekkyŏn,17 which was publicised by some in the Korean martial arts community as a ‘genuine’ though largely forgotten Korean martial art, untainted by foreign influences. Subsequently, Choi started claiming that taekwondo’s origins had been in t’aekkyŏn, which he had supposedly studied in his youth.18 However, the name taekwondo initially proved unpopular in the martial arts community and was only used by Choi’s affiliated schools. In 1959, due to his power as a military general and his good relationship with the Rhee Syngman administration (the first South Korean president, in office 1948 to 1960), Choi was able to secure the support of the Ministry of Education and the Korea Amateur Sports Association; with their help, Choi forced several of the important kwan to join an umbrella organisation under his leadership, the Korea Taekwondo Association.19 However, this was short-lived because of President Rhee’s forced resignation the following year, due to his authoritarian rule and the massive political corruption within the ruling party. Subsequently, against a general backdrop of social and political instability and unrest, Park Chung Hee, a major general in the South Korean military, seized the opportunity and removed the short-lived government of the Second Republic through a military coup d’état in 1961. By means of martial law, amid a purification campaign that purged political opposition and rival generals, social unrest and political chaos began to subside and order gradually returned.20 Accordingly, the new military government forced changes in all walks of life, and the martial arts community was no exception. The different kwan were urged to unite under a single umbrella organisation. This period marked the beginning of the government’s heavy-handed involvement in the taekwondo community. After much wrangling for positions and agreeing once again on a new official name for the martial art, the kwan leaders settled on the name taesudo (跆手道), as a compromise between the names formerly used, including taekwondo.21 Choi Hong Hi tentatively supported the military coup but held conflicting positions in addition to a personal animosity towards Park Chung Hee. Consequently, the Park regime removed Choi from his military role by appointing him as Ambassador to Malaysia in 1962. Correspondingly, deprived of military position and physically absent from Korea, Choi’s power and influence in the martial arts community diminished rapidly. However, after his tenure in Malaysia was suddenly terminated, possibly due to an audit, he was recalled to Korea in 1964.22 Subsequently, he lobbied to become the president of the newly established Korea Taesudo Association (KTA). After skilful political maneouvring, Choi became president of KTA and in 1965 unilaterally changed the names back to taekwondo and the Korea Taekwondo Association. At once, the unpopular Choi and his actions were perceived as authoritarian and arrogant by large segments of the martial arts community. Within a year, he lost his short-lived tenure and was once and for all expelled from the Korea Taekwondo Association.23 As a result of his expulsion, Choi founded the International Taekwondo Federation (ITF) as a rival taekwondo organisation. Subsequently, Choi’s taekwondo and the taekwondo of the KTA parted ways, in both technical and organisational terms. Despite his removal, this time the unifying name of the martial art was retained, and remains taekwondo to this day.

Sport and Korean nationalism: taekwondo becomes the nominal national sport of South Korea in 1971 The Vietnam War provided a great boost for the international proliferation of taekwondo, since many South Korean instructors were sent during the early 1960s to train South Vietnamese soldiers in hand-to-hand combat. Subsequently, taekwondo training also became very popular 88

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among American servicemen.24 However, the foremost image and purpose of taekwondo also began to change during that period, with the principal function of taekwondo as a means for self-defence gradually substituted by the goal of training for sporting contests.25 In 1963, taesudo was recognised as an official sport in the annual National Sports Festival (Chŏn’guk Ch’eyuktaehoe). This represented the beginning of taekwondo as a sparring, competition sport. The Park Chung Hee regime regarded the establishment of a Korean cultural identity as a primary policy objective. Consequently, the Park junta introduced a policy of cultural revival under the catch-phrase ‘Cultural Korea (Munhwa Han’guk).’26 Due to the general perception and often repeated narrative (then, and now) of national victimisation, humiliation and loss of identity at the hands of the Japanese, the regime’s goal was to instil in Koreans a sense of identification with their nation and a belief in their ‘unique’ culture, ‘distinctive’ history and ethnic superiority; ultimately, Koreans should feel proud of being Koreans. However, contrary to popular anti-Japanese sentiments running deep in the general Korean population, Park, ideologically shaped by his time in the Japanese military, admired the Japanese and followed the model for social and political reengineering provided by the Japanese Meiji Restoration of 1868.27 In the economic sphere, Park chose the chaebol system, consisting of large family-controlled corporate groups, as the base for South Korea’s economic advance, which was modelled after the Japanese zaibatsu system. In the political area, Park’s Yusin Constitution, inaugurated in 1972, was named and modelled after the Japanese Meiji Restoration, with similar goals such as catching up economically with the West and building a strong, self-reliant military. The constitution also granted Park life-long presidency, elevating him to quasi-emperor status. By and large, there existed a general desire for Koreans to emulate Japan in the sphere of economic success and as a strong nation with a powerful military, which was (and is) contradicted by their nationalistic and emotional rejection of Japan.This paradox also extended into the realm of martial arts, when karate was transplanted into Korea during the end of the colonial period and reincarnated as a supposedly 2,000-year-old indigenous Korean martial art named taekwondo. The Park regime started to indoctrinate the population through a variety of mass movements and mobilisation campaigns, as a means of social, cultural and ideological reengineering, mostly based on pre- or post-war Japanese prototypes. Sport fitted particularly well into this scheme of patriotic indoctrination through mass events and large-scale spectacles featuring ‘nationalistic symbols, images [and] rhetoric.’28 In addition, watching these events was a form of entertainment and distraction from the regime’s suppressive politics, social hardship and the harsh realities of life. Another aspect of sport, and in particular martial arts, was that it reinforced authority and provided a practical tool of physical exercise to increase the discipline and health of the nation’s youth. The Japanese-based martial arts favour military-style synchronised ceremonies, formations and training methods, and a military-like hierarchy among students and instructors. Moreover, taekwondo lessons and events also came to incorporate ‘rituals of nationalism,’29 such as saluting the Korean national flag or pledging verbal alliance to the nation. The peculiar ritual of bowing or saluting the Korean national flag before and after workouts is also expected from non-Korean taekwondo students around the world. So, in a sense, taekwondo exported Korean nationalism and, according to Kim Yong-ok, a well-known Korean philosopher, succeeded in drawing respect from Westerners where general politics had failed.30 During the early twentieth century, the Japanese incorporated judo and kendo (and to a lesser extent karate) into the general public education system, and as a physical training exercise in the Imperial Japanese Army. Martial arts served as a means of increasing the physical strength and discipline of students and conscripts, in addition to being a tool for nationalistic indoctrination. Simultaneously, the bushidō (武士道 ‘the way of the warrior’) doctrine, originally a vaguely defined behavioural and moral code of conduct of the samurai, was introduced as an 89

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ideological foundation and elevated to a cult of ethnic and cultural superiority, self-sacrifice and loyalty to the Japanese emperor and nation.31 During Korea’s colonial period (1910–1945), the Japanese promoted kendo and judo, together with the bushidō doctrine, in a similar fashion in Korea. Park Chung Hee had similar ideas about taekwondo when it was introduced as a mandatory training exercise in the military during the 1960s (after being pioneered by Choi Hong Hi in the mid-1950s) and subsequently brought into the public education system during the 1970s. On an ideological level, the Japanese bushidō doctrine was reincarnated in Korea as the hwarang spirit (花郞 hwarang or ‘flower boys’)32 of the Silla (57 BCE–935 CE) knights, which featured strongly in South Korean military symbolism and subsequently in taekwondo philosophy. However, there exists no convincing evidence that the hwarang were in any way a military or warrior group or organisation. The hwarang narrative appears to have been entirely invented after Korea’s liberation and introduced as a means to promote the ideals of loyalty and sacrifice to the nation. Moreover, the tale served as an example of unification and glory by means of military conquest, a hint of the South Korean regime’s preferred resolution in its dealings with the Communist North.33 This was a period when ‘mythological narratives [underwent] a slow process of historicisation,’34 and taekwondo’s nationalistic historical narrative matured during this period as well. In addition to exploiting sport as a tool for nationalistic ends, Park Chung Hee also used it to market Korea internationally through achievements and greatness in sporting events.35 Sport functioned as a means of displaying Korean cultural and racial superiority in international competition events, bearing similarities to many modern authoritarian regimes of the twentieth century. In this context, taekwondo, as an increasingly internationally recognised sport, had great potential in showcasing Korea. In this political environment, President Park advocated taekwondo under the slogan ‘Physical strength is national power,’36 and often referred to the role of sport and martial arts in building a strong nation.37 Therefore, similar to the budō (武道 ‘martial ways’) sport in Japan during the Japanese Empire,38 in 1971 Park designated the art with the title kukki t’aekwŏndo (國技跆拳道 literally: ‘national skill taekwondo’), making taekwondo the national sport of South Korea.39

Taekwondo becomes an Olympic sport Following its designation as a national sport, the Park Chung Hee regime could not leave taekwondo in the hands of some individuals who quarrelled most of the time for leadership and personal gain.They needed a trustworthy and reliable leader who would work primarily for the interests of the Park regime. As a result, the regime gave its blessing to Kim Un Yong as the new president of the KTA in 1971. In a 1978 report to the United States House of Representatives, which investigated the lobbying efforts and illegal activities of the South Korean Unification Church (nicknamed the Moonies), ‘diplomat’ Kim Un Yong and taekwondo were implicated together with the religious cult and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). According to the report, the Moon foundation gave money to various taekwondo instructors in the United States and also to Kim Un Yong to promote taekwondo in the United States for the purpose of South Korea’s general recognition and interest. Moreover, some taekwondo instructors allegedly also received financial support and help from the KCIA. Overall, the report investigated the concerted effort to “influence more than a hundred U.S. Congress,” “American academics and the press,” and the “Joint Chiefs of Staff ” in order to mitigate plans to greatly reduce American troops and aid to South Korea (Gillis, 2011, 103–4). Moreover, the report 90

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stated that Kim was a ‘KCIA officer’ and appointed ‘counselor’ at the Korean Embassy in Washington during the 1960s. Kim, as a former officer of the fierce KCIA, thus had the blessing of the most authoritative people in the country. Besides, taekwondo’s international proliferation process was financed and supported by dubious backers and parties. From the onset, Kim Un Yong had great, forward-looking plans for taekwondo’s development. After assuming office, his most immediate task was establishing an authoritative taekwondo headquarters, the World Taekwondo Headquarters or Kukkiwon (國技院 Kukkiwŏn or ‘Gymnasium of the National Sport’),40 which was completed in 1973. However, the main task given to Kim by the Korean government was to streamline and control the unruly taekwondo community. Initially, when Kim came to power, he forced the different kwan through the Ministry of Education, to have them register and comply with a wide variety of regulations. The goal was for non-affiliated gymnasiums to fall in line or be forced out of business. Not all taekwondo instructors collaborated with the KTA under Kim, and several objected to government-enforced centralisation of power. As a result, many of these deviant and troublesome leaders were forced out of the country and emigrated.41 Foremost among them, Choi Hong Hi felt threatened by the Park regime because of his refusal to subordinate his ITF to the newly established taekwondo hierarchy; subsequently, he fled to Canada in 1972.42 Moreover, as a result of Choi’s break with the Park regime and the KTA, Choi sided with North Korea and introduced taekwondo there in 1980. Parallel to the construction of a taekwondo headquarters, Kim Un Yong strongly focused on the globalisation of taekwondo. In contrast to Choi Hong Hi’s already internationally established ITF, the KTA lacked a global organisation. Therefore, under Kim’s direction, an official international body, the World Taekwondo Federation (WTF), was inaugurated during the first World Taekwondo Championships in 1973. By this time, the South Korean government had realised the immense potential of taekwondo in advertising and promoting Korea internationally. Consequentially, taekwondo was exported globally through a state-sponsored promotion campaign with an eye on the Olympics. And as with so many modernisation projects and movements under the Park regime, taekwondo’s quest for the Olympics was directly inspired by a Japanese model, the successful inclusion of judo in the Olympics in 1964. As a result, South Korean officials lobbied for the 1988 Olympics to be held in Seoul, serving as a springboard for taekwondo’s introduction to the Olympics. In the following decades, Kim Un Yong would rise to be perhaps the most powerful individual in the Asian Olympic Movement. Meanwhile, amidst obscure circumstances and dubious dealings, and despite objections from North Korea and a similar bid by Japanese karate, Kim finally secured taekwondo’s admission as an official sport to the Olympics in Sydney in 2000. However, Kim was a deeply flawed and unethical individual, and his career ended when he was convicted and incarcerated for bribery and corruption in 2004.43 In spite of its successful launch on the international stage, taekwondo has been mired in numerous scandals and cases of corruption. Moreover, nowadays taekwondo’s status is challenged by Chinese wushu and Japanese karate, which are comparable combat sport; both nations have introduced or are going to introduce (Bejing 2008; Tokyo 2020) these arts as demonstration events while hosting the Olympics.

Conclusion Despite the claims, there exists no historical connection between taekwondo and any martial art that existed in Korea in the past. The so-called founders of taekwondo all (but one) learned 91

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karate in Japan, during their studies at Japanese universities. In addition, two of them also had a Chinese martial arts background, though this had little influence on the overall development of taekwondo. The name ‘taekwondo’ was only invented in 1955, and only over time became accepted as a generic unifying term for the different karate styles and schools that existed in Korea. Taekwondo’s real origins have been obscured for the past 50 to 60 years, mainly due to Korea’s colonial history and resentment towards Japan, and the ethno-nationalistic and militaristic policies of the evolving authoritarian regimes. Until recently (and even perhaps nowadays), Koreans looked to Japan as a model for modernisation and progress to emulate, but at the same time they resented their colonial masters. Koreans perceive their colonial history as humiliating, especially since large parts of the Korean population collaborated with the Japanese. After Korea’s liberation, the Japanese budō sport, especially kendo and judo, were often perceived by Koreans as symbols of Japanese imperialism, aggression and suppression. Karate, as another budō art, carried a similar image. Moreover, all of the founders of taekwondo had a Japanese-friendly past and had cooperated with the Japanese to various degrees. The Japanese colonial past was considered by nationalists to be a stain on Korea’s proud traditions, hence the desire to whitewash history. After liberation in 1945, nation-building and new-found national pride in South Korea required a heroic and nationalistic history, unstained by foreign (especially Japanese) elements. Moreover, in the Korean psyche, Japan became a lasting adversary and nemesis of the Korean nation and people; historical, territorial, racial and political disputes between both nations have kept this perception alive. In this context, taekwondo’s karate past increasingly became a liability, especially when taekwondo was elevated to the nominal national sport of Korea in 1971. As a result, taekwondo leaders have been promoting a nationalistic but entirely invented taekwondo narrative which claims it to be a 2,000-year-old indigenous Korean tradition. Sport in general, and taekwondo in particular, became a tool for the authoritarian military regime under Park Chung Hee in controlling the nation domestically and promoting South Korea internationally. However, even now that South Korea has become increasingly economically developed and democratic, the principal purpose of taekwondo – to showcase the Korean nation and serve as a tool for sport politics – has not changed.

Acknowledgments This chapter is partly based on the article by Udo Moenig and Minho Kim, ‘A Critical Review of the Historical Formation of Olympic-Style Taekwondo’s Institutions and the Resulting Present-Day Inconsistencies,’ The International Journal of the History of Sport 34, no. 12 (2017): 1323–42. We would also like to thank Dr Gregory S. Kailian for his helpful advice, comments and corrections.

Note on romanisation and names The Romanisation of words was conducted according to the McCune-Reischauer system for Korean, Hepburn for Japanese and Pinyin for Chinese. However, the spelling of names of well-known individuals, such as Park Chung Hee, has been left according to their popular use. Korean and Japanese names in the main text are left according to tradition, family names first. 92

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Notes 1 For the concept of ‘invention of tradition’, see Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 2 Karl E. Friday and Seki Humitake, Legacies of the Sword:The Kashima-Shinryū and Samurai Martial Culture (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1997), 119; Udo Moenig, Taekwondo: From a Martial Art to a Martial Sport (London: Routledge, 2015), 1–2; Paul Bowman, ‘ “Making Martial Arts History Matter’,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 33, no. 9 (2016): 915–33. 3 Denis Gainty, Martial Arts and the Body Politic of Meiji Japan (London: Routledge, 2013); Alexander C. Bennett, Kendo: Culture of the Sword (Oakland: University of California Press, 2015); G. Cameron Hurst III, Armed Martial Arts of Japan (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1998). 4 Moenig, Taekwondo, 84–94. 5 Compare the ‘official’ historical narrative of the Korea Taekwondo Association (KTA) (accessed May 25, 2019, www.koreataekwondo.co.kr/d002; meanwhile, the World Taekwondo [WT] deleted all history references on its homepage recently) to leading alternative narratives: Steven D. Capener, ‘ “Problems in the Identity and Philosophy of T’aegwŏndo and Their Historical Causes’,” Korea Journal 35, no. 4 (1995): 80–94; Won Shik Kang and Kyong Myong Lee, A Modern History of Taekwondo (Seoul: Pokyŏng Munhwasa, 1999), 2–29 [parts available in English online]; Eric Madis, ‘ “The Evolution of Taekwondo from Japanese Karate’,” in Martial Arts in the Modern World, ed. Thomas A. Green and Joseph R. Svinth (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 185–209; In-uk Hŏ, Taekwondo’s Formation History (Kyŏngki-Do: Han’guk Haksul Ch’ŏngbo, 2008), 39–108 [in Korean]; Moenig, Taekwondo. 6 Stanley E. Henning, ‘ “Traditional Korean Martial Arts’,” Journal of Asian Martial Arts 9, no. 1 (2000): 8–15; Sungkyun Cho, Udo Moenig, and Dohee Nam,‘ “The Available Evidence Regarding T’aekkyŏn and Its Portrayal as a ‘Traditional Korean Martial Art’‘,” Acta Koreana 15, no. 2 (2012): 341–68; Moenig, Taekwondo, 13–33. 7 Moenig, Taekwondo, 13–33; Udo Moenig and Minho Kim, ‘ “The Invention of Taekwondo Tradition, 1945–1972: When Mythology Becomes History’,” Acta Koreana 19, no. 2 (2016): 131–64. 8 Approximately 1610, a replica of the Muye Chepo, and the last surviving original text in Korea. 9 Ibid. 10 Tŏk-ki Song and Chong-gwan Pak, T’aekkyŏn (Seoul: Sŏrim Munhwasa, 1983), 8 [in Korean]; Moenig, Taekwondo, 13–33. However, the modern t’aekkyŏn community also promotes the fictional, invented narrative of t’aekkyŏn being a traditional Korean martial art. 11 Moenig, Taekwondo, 13–33; Moenig and Kim, ‘ “The Invention’.” 12 Capener, ‘ “Problems in the ’Identity”; Kang and Lee, A Modern History, 2–29; Madis, “ ‘The ’Evolution”; Hŏ, Taekwondo’s Formation, 39–108; Udo Moenig, Sungkyun Cho, and Taek Yong Kwak, ‘ “Evidence of Taekwondo’s Roots in Karate: An Analysis of the Technical Content of Early ‘Taekwondo’ Literature’,” Korea Journal 54, no. 2 (2014): 150–78; Moenig, Taekwondo, 34–79. 13 Kang and Lee, A Modern History, 22–29; Hŏ, Taekwondo’s Formation, 110–14. 14 In addition, during the late 1950s, the Chinese-based term subak was adopted by Hwang Kee. For more information regarding subak, see Moenig and Kim, ‘ “The Invention’,” 147–51. 15 The first character in both sets of characters has the same kun reading in Japanese, hence the common pronunciation karate-dō. Funakoshi Gichin made the modification to ‘way of the empty hand’ during the 1930s, which soon gave karate recognition as an ‘official’ Japanese martial art. 16 Due to the phonetic choice of the term tae-kwon-do (跆拳道), Choi Hong Hi also misrepresented its meaning. According to Choi (Taekwondo: The Art of Self-Defence [Seoul: Daeha Publication Company, 1965], 14), ‘Tae [跆] literally means to jump or kick or smash with the foot’, and very similar definitions remained in all later taekwondo literature. In fact, the character tae has the meaning of ‘to step on’ or ‘to trample down’. Kwon (拳): ‘fist’; do (道): ‘way’. T’aekkyŏn represents a purely Korean term and therefore is not written with Chinese characters. Regarding the choice of the name, see Moenig, Taekwondo, 48–49. 17 Alex Gillis, A Killing Art:The Untold History of Tae Kwon Do (Toronto: ECW Press, 2008), 49. 18 Choi, Taekwondo, cover note: 22. Shortly before Choi’s death (2002), he admitted in an interview that there was actually no connection between taekwondo and t’aekkyŏn, and that he had never learned any t’aekkyŏn in his youth. As cited in Pyŏng-ch’ŏl Han, Kosu [In Search for the Master] (Seoul:Yŏngwŏn Munhwasa, 2003), 193 [in Korean]. 19 Kang and Lee, A Modern History, 29–31; Gillis, A Killing Art, 54. 20 Yong-Sup Han, ‘ “The May Sixteenth Military ’Coup,” in The Park Chung Hee Era:The Transformation of South Korea, ed. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F.Vogel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 35–57, 43, 51–57.

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2 1 Kang and Lee, A Modern History, 55–57; Hŏ, Taekwondo’s Formation, 123–43; Moenig, Taekwondo, 93. 22 Chong Woo Lee, as cited in Sung-chul Yook [Interview with Chong Woo Lee], ‘ “Kukkiwon Vice President Chong Woo Lee’s Shocking Confession of Olympic Competition Result Manipulation!’ ” Shin Dong-A, trans. Soo Han Lee, April 2002, p. 303, http://tkdreform.com/yook_article.pdf. 23 Kang and Lee, A Modern History, 49; Gillis, A Killing Art, 76–78. 24 Gillis, A Killing Art, 64–69. 25 Moenig, Taekwondo, 92. 26 Sang Mi Park, ‘ “The Paradox of Postcolonial Korean Nationalism: State-Sponsored Cultural Policy in South Korea, 1965-Present’,” The Journal of Korean Studies 15, no. 1 (2010): 67–94, 74–78. 27 Hyug Baeg Im, ‘ “The Origins of the Yushin Regime: Machiavelli Unveiled’,” in The Park Chung Hee Era:The Transformation of South Korea, ed. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F.Vogel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 233–64, 234. 28 Steven D. Capener, ‘ “The Making of a Modern Myth: Inventing a Tradition for Taekwondo’,” Korea Journal 56, no. 1 (2016): 61–92, 71. 29 Park, ‘ “The Paradox’,” 80. 30 Yong-ok Kim, Principles Governing the Construction of the Philosophy of Taekwondo (Seoul: T’ongnamu, 1990), 130–32 [in Korean]. 31 Heiko Bittmann, Karatedô: Der Weg der leeren Hand [Karatedô: The Way of the Empty Hand] (Ludwigsburg:Verlag Heiko Bittmann, 1999), 36 [in German, but available in English]; see a detailed discussion about bushidō in Oleg Benesch, Inventing the Way of the Samuari (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 32 There are other possible translations for the term, based solely upon language. 33 Richard Rutt, ‘ “The Flower Boys of Silla (Hwarang)’,” Royal Asiatic Society 38 (October 1961): 1–66, 30; see a detailed discussion in Moenig and Kim, ‘ “The Invention’,” 136–41. Silla conquered the Paekche and Koguryŏ kingdoms during the seventh century, which is often considered the first unified Korean kingdom. 34 Codruta Sintionean, ‘ “Heritage Practices During the Park Chung Hee Era’,” in Key Papers on Korea, ed. Andrew David Jackson (Kent: Global Oriental, 2013), 253–74, 268. 35 Capener, ‘ “The Making’,” 73. 36 Park, ‘ “The Paradox’,” 79–80. 37 Capener, ‘ “The Making’,” 73. 38 The Japanese budō sport include judō, kendō, karate-dō and several others. 39 The South Korean National Assembly designated taekwondo as the official national sport by legislation in 2018. 40 The name Kukkiwon was likely borrowed from the Japanese national sport sumō (Japanese wrestling) and its headquarters. 41 Kang and Lee, A Modern History, 73–74, 97–99. 42 Gillis, A Killing Art, 110–11. 43 Ibid., 147–66; Andrew Jennings and Vyv Simson, The Lord of the Rings (London: Simon & Schuster Ltd, 1992); Andrew Jennings, The New Lords of the Rings (London: Simon & Schuster, 1996.

Bibliography Benesch, Oleg. Inventing the Way of the Samurai. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Bennett, Alexander C. Kend: Culture of the Sword. Oakland: University of California Press, 2015. Bittmann, Heiko. Karatedô: Der Weg der leeren Hand [Karatedô: The Way of the Empty Hand]. Ludwigsburg: Verlag Heiko Bittmann, 1999. [In German, but available in English.] Bowman, Paul. “Making Martial Arts History Matter.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 33, no. 9 (2016): 915–33. Capener, Steven D. “The Making of a Modern Myth: Inventing a Tradition for Taekwondo.” Korea Journal 56, no. 1 (2016): 61–92. Capener, Steven D. “Problems in the Identity and Philosophy of t’aegwŏndo and Their Historical Causes.” Korea Journal 35, no. 4 (1995): 80–94. Cho, Sungkyun, Udo Moenig, and Dohee Nam. “The Available Evidence Regarding t’aekkyŏn and Its Portrayal as a ‘Traditional Korean Martial Art‘.” Acta Koreana 15, no. 2 (2012): 341–68. Choi, Hong Hi. Taekwondo:The Art of Self-Defence. Seoul: Daeha Publication Company, 1965. 94

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Friday, Karl E., and Seki Humitake. Legacies of the Sword: The Kashima-Shinryū and Samurai Martial Culture. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1997. Gainty, Denis. Martial Arts and the Body Politic of Meiji Japan. London: Routledge, 2013. Gillis, Alex. A Killing Art:The Utold History of Tae Kwon Do. Toronto: ECW Press, 2008. Han, Pyŏng-ch’ŏl. Kosu [In Search for the Master]. Seoul:Yŏngwŏn Munhwasa, 2003. [In Korean.] Han,Yong-Sup. “The May Sixteenth Military Coup.” In The Park Chung Hee Era:The Transformation of South Korea, edited by Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F.Vogel, 35–57. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011. Henning, Stanley E. “Traditional Korean Martial Arts.” Journal of Asian Martial Arts 9, no. 1 (2000): 8–15. Hŏ, In-uk. Taekwondo’s Formation History. Kyŏngki-Do: Han’guk Haksul Ch’ŏngbo, 2008. [In Korean.] Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence Ranger, eds. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Hurst, G. Cameron, III. Armed Martial Arts of Japan. New Haven:Yale University Press, 1998. Im, Hyug Baeg. “The Origins of the Yushin Regime: Machiavelli Unveiled.” In The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea, edited by Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel, 233–64. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011. Jennings, Andrew. The New Lords of the Rings. London: Simon & Schuster, 1996. Jennings, Andrew, and Vyv Simson. The Lord of the Rings. London: Simon & Schuster, 1992. Kang, Won Shik, and Kyong Myong Lee. A Modern History of Taekwondo. Seoul: Pokyŏng Munhwasa, 1999. [In Korean, but parts available in English online.] Kim, Yong-ok. Principles Governing the Construction of the Philosophy of Taekwondo. Seoul: T’ongnamu, 1990. [In Korean.] Madis, Eric.“The Evolution of Taekwondo from Japanese Karate.” In Martial Arts in the Modern World, edited by Thomas A. Green and Joseph R. Svinth, 185–209. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003. Moenig, Udo. Taekwondo: From a Martial Art to a Martial Sport. London: Routledge, 2015. Moenig, Udo, and Minho Kim. “The Invention of Taekwondo Tradition, 1945–1972: When Mythology Becomes History.” Acta Koreana 19, no. 2 (2016): 131–64. Moenig, Udo, Sungkyun Cho, and Taek Yong Kwak. “Evidence of Taekwondo’s Roots in Karate: An Analysis of the Technical Content of Early ‘Taekwondo’ Literature.” Korea Journal 54, no. 2 (2014): 150–78. Park, Sang Mi. “The Paradox of Postcolonial Korean Nationalism: State-Sponsored Cultural Policy in South Korea, 1965-Present.” The Journal of Korean Studies 15, no. 1 (2010): 67–94. Report of the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations U.S. House of Representatives. Investigation of Korean-American Relations.Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 31, 1978. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pur1.3275407706461 0;view=1up;seq=9. Rutt, Richard. “The Flower Boys of Silla (Hwarang).” Royal Asiatic Society 38 (October 1961): 1–66. Sintionean, Codruta. “Heritage Practices During the Park Chung Hee era.” In Key Papers on Korea, edited by Andrew David Jackson, 253–74. Kent: Global Oriental, 2013. Song, Tŏk-ki, and Chong-gwan Pak, T’aekkyŏn. Seoul: Sŏrim Munhwasa, 1983. [In Korean.] Yook, Sung-Chul. [Interview with Chong Woo Lee]. “Kukkiwon Vice President Chong Woo Lee’s Shocking Confession of Olympic Competition Result Manipulation!” Shin Dong-A, April 2002.Translated by Soo Han Lee. http://tkdreform.com/yook_article.pdf.

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10 Chinlone National sport of Myanmar Maitrii Aung-Thwin

Chinlone is the name of the traditional caneball game that evolved to become the national sport of Myanmar. The light ball (also referred to as a chinlone) is woven out of long strips of rattan from the palm tree into a 50-cm sphere with, typically, 12 five-sided holes in it. The traditional format of playing chinlone is a variant of the various ‘kick basket’ games of Southeast Asia (and parts of South Asia) that challenge players to keep the ball in the air with only their feet and legs. Called sepak raga in the Malay world (literally ‘kick woven ball’), sipa in the Philippine islands, and sepak takraw in Thailand, the game is known throughout Southeast Asia, with some Burmese records tracing chinlone as far back as the thirteenth century. While the contemporary Thai version incorporates a net and a competitive scoring system similar to volleyball, the classic form of chinlone is played alone or by a group of players in a circle who try to keep the ball from touching the ground through an elaborate collection of stylised movements or strokes called kat. Essentially non-competitive, group play involves forming a circle and controlling the movement of the chinlone in the air using stylised foot and leg strokes to pass the ball between teammates. Like in a freestyle performance of juggling a football (soccer ball), the game is paused momentarily when the ball touches the ground.Today, chinlone is recognised as a competitive sport by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Games and was recently featured as an exhibition event at the Asian Games. The story behind chinlone’s transformation from a game into a recognised sport is connected to what scholars in Sport Studies conventionally call ‘sportification’ – the process through which a game is defined, standardised, quantified, measured and infused with a competitive element. In broad terms, the history of chinlone fits this formula: chinlone began as a street game but was transformed into an official ‘sport’ in the twentieth century via the codification of rules, the regularising of playing courts, the standardising of the chinlone’s dimensions and the establishment of a points system to award the successful execution of each stylised movement in competition. In this regard, chinlone’s transformation into a competitive sport via quantification might be compared to the way one scores points in gymnastics, ice skating, diving or snowboarding. This process of chinlone’s sportification in the 1950s is connected to the broader history of British colonialism in Burma, anti-colonial campaigns, nation-building and the construction of national identity in Myanmar. Pushing deeper, the story of chinlone’s transformation in Myanmar was also part of a broader attempt to modernise, a project that Thonghchai Winichakul has 96

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referred to as siliwai or qualities of civilisation, arguing that through ‘the transcultural process in which ideas and practices from Europe, via colonialism, had been transferred, localised, and hybridised,’ Thai notions of civilisation were derived from colonial cultural norms and values.1 As in the case of Thailand’s quest to become ‘civilised,’ Myanmar’s attempt to demonstrate its ability to modernise depended on how effectively colonial standards of etiquette, material culture, legal authority, social order, infrastructure, technology and public health were localised and adopted.2 Under the British, sport in Myanmar became a condition of modernity, while chinlone’s transformation into a sport became a symbol of that modernity by postcolonial nation builders in Myanmar. Chinlone’s transformation into a sport was not so much a resurrection of the past but an attempt to localise colonial notions of health, gender, education and modernity to produce a cultural product that could be associated with the independent nation state. While the history of chinlone may extend back into the precolonial past, the game that emerged in the twentieth century was very much a product of the colonial encounter. With that said, the roots of the game extend back in time and far beyond the contemporary boundaries of nation states. In fact, sixteenth century sources suggest that versions of the game were played in Siam, Cambodia, Southern Vietnam and Indonesia,3 and like Myanmar they all claim the game as their own. European travellers to the region often commented in considerable detail on the unique qualities of the ball and the attractive nature of the game, allowing scholars to confirm that chinlone was a cultural activity that existed well before the concept of sport arrived with colonialism. Texts such as the Malay Sejarah Melayu of the early seventeenth century describe a Malay chief who was so good at keeping the ball in the air that he could keep it there for as long as it took to ‘cook a pot of rice.’4 Myanmar’s claims to chinlone as its national sport are based on references from the archaeological record of the country’s earliest urban sites, which existed roughly between the second century (BCE) and the eleventh century (CE). Collectively known as the Pyu civilisation, the group of city states consists of five sites that were located along the Irrawaddy River valley system. In 1927, the French archaeologist Charles Duroiselle discovered an old Pyu town and unearthed, among several items of significant historical value, a 1¾-inch solid silver ball that he considered to be a chinlone. Further claims of the game’s deep historicity by domestic writers in Myanmar cite chinlone’s existence during the Bagan era (tenth to fourteenth centuries CE), the period known for the rise of Myanmar’s classical kingdom that succeeded politically to, and borrowed culturally from, the Pyu city states. In this popular account, an ivory chinlone was presented to a thirteenth century Burmese king of Bagan upon his ascension to the throne. As the story goes, the king was so pleased with the gift that he had ordered that multiple chinlone be made in rattan cane so the young men of the royal court could play it. In later accounts in precolonial Myanmar, there is a reference to a king sponsoring the playing of chinlone in addition to the convening of a celebratory funeral procession and feasts in honour of the king’s monk who had died.5 This is an important reference because it demonstrates how merit-making, an important aspect of Buddhism, could be expressed through the sponsoring of physical activities by a patron, similar to the way patrons might host gladiator matches and other activities in connection with funerals in ancient Greece. Additionally, the connection to religious activities provides some context to more recent connections between the playing of chinlone in connection with religious festivals and spaces. Although these references are not easily verifiable, the tracing of chinlone into Myanmar’s past reflects how important the game is as a signifier of the country’s antiquity and what domestic writers view as part of their enduring national culture. 97

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By the eighteenth century, when European interaction with Myanmar became more regular, the historical records of mercenaries, merchants and other educated men provide a clearer view of chinlone’s place in Myanmar’s physical culture. Father Sangermano, a Roman-Catholic priest working in the kingdoms of Ava and Pegu between 1783 and 1806, wrote an account of the country in a book entitled A Description of the Burmese Empire, published posthumously in 1833. He describes chinlone being played in the court and in the villages, reflecting that it was one of the kingdom’s ‘more athletic games.’ He writes: Besides playing tiddlywinks, card games with playing cards made from elephant tusks, cock fighting and various games of health and fun, the Myanmar play a ball game, where the ball, made of woven bamboo, is tossed by foot by a team of six members.6 The Anglo-Burmese Wars of 1824, 1852 and 1885 brought Myanmar’s Konbaung dynasty in Mandalay under the authority of British India. The conquest of the Burmese kingdom and the dismantling of the monarchy brought an army of administrators, merchants, cartographers and ethnographers into the country. Their task was to map both the physical terrain and the sociocultural landscape of the newly acquired territory. James G. Scott, one of several key scholarofficials, wrote an account of Burmese society entitled The Burman: His Life and Notions.7 His account described chinlone in considerable detail, perhaps due to his passion for and experience with football (soccer), which he is credited with introducing to British Burma. Far from providing just a description of the game, Scott delved into the material aspects of the chinlone (rattan ball) and the intricacies of playing the game. One might surmise that Scott was one of the first colonial observers to consider whether chinlone should be classified as a game or as a sport. He went on to describe that chinlone was not a game, insofar as there was competition, but was primarily designed ‘to exercise the body, to restore elasticity to the back and limbs cramped by sitting, reading or writing.’8 The element of competition was thus a key aspect for designating a physical activity as a sport. Chinlone did not seem to fit the prescribed criteria. For a start, chinlone left the impression that it was more of an exercise than a sport. Players could work out by themselves or in a group, with the object of the game being primarily concerned with keeping the ball off the ground rather than competing with another player or group of players. Group play did not seem to reflect coordinated strategy, either; it seemed to Scott that players were more concerned about individual performance, passing the ball more by accident than by intention. Thus a single individual may play it all by himself, or there may be [a] circle of players who catch the ball as it comes round their way, keep it up as long as they can, until an ill-judged stroke sends it away from them to somebody else, who proceeds in a similar manner.9 Where participating in organised team sport in the English/Scottish tradition was regarded as a reflection of shared values, corporate identity and stratified organisation, chinlone, in contrast, was seen to be spontaneous, individual and lacking in organisation. If physical culture can be read as mirroring the social body, Scott’s description of chinlone reveals a reading of Burmese society as inherently divided, spontaneous and lacking integration. Chinlone players did not seem to pass the ball to other players strategically; they did so only due to having made an error or from a lack of control. Echoing other colonial writers of the time, the ‘Burman’ (here used as a term to reflect the majority of locals) was in it more for himself, motivated by self-interest and individual priorities. At the same time, Scott recounted in great detail the types of skills and 98

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techniques that Burmese players exhibited while playing chinlone. He noticed, for example, how ‘a good player’ would propel the ball from one leg to the other, sending it high into the air and catching it with the other leg. He caught how players shifted their weight and adjusted their body in order to execute the most subtle touches to keep the chinlone airborne at the exact height and pace needed to continue its flight. Clearly, he was impressed.10 Scott’s referencing of sport as a benchmark for understanding and classifying chinlone was part of a broader ethnographic project connected to British colonialism.The presence or absence of sport and sporting institutions was one way to gauge the cultural sophistication, civilisational development and physical potential of the colonised. The presence of physical activities with standardised rules, measurable outcomes and genuine competition were indicators of a broader colonial modernity that was associated with organised sport. The existence of games such as chinlone reflected colonial ideas about the developmental progress of Myanmar. The ability to adopt, take part in and excel in physical activities considered to be sport would become a benchmark for assessing the progress of colonial societies. Similar to notions of public health, law or material infrastructure, sport itself became a category of, and an instrument towards, the implementation of colonial power. With that said, Scott’s appraisal of chinlone was, clearly, appreciative. As a sportsman who would eventually introduce football to British Burma, his close eye for movement and technique is found in his close attention to describing the skills displayed by those he was observing. At the same time, his description and categorisation of chinlone as a game reflects how sport itself became a metric for defining and identifying the modern in British Burma. This subtle frame of reference to notions of colonial modernity would enter discussions amongst the western-educated Burmese elite. Attempts to bridge this game-sport binary would soon be taken up by reformist Burmese in the early 1900s who sought to raise the stature and place of Burmese cultural activities within this colonial hierarchy. While Scott was no doubt referring to rural examples of chinlone, recent research by Myanmar scholars refers to the development of chinlone in more urban areas. Pekin Pyan Win Ko, the son of one of these early players, conducted extensive oral and archival research in his study of chinlone. He points to chinlone developing at both schools and at Buddhist religious sites, usually at a particular neighbourhood pagoda ground or a monastery, and the emergence of regular amateur games of chinlone being played at fixed venues in the early decades of the twentieth century, often near pagodas and other religious edifices. No doubt this distinction is connected to the later professionalisation of the game in the 1950s. In his recent book, Pekin Pyan Win Ko writes that only expert players were allowed to participate in these pagoda-based chinlone sessions. He refers to specific corners of monasteries or temple grounds as preferred sites of play. The northwest corner of Aindawya Pagoda in Mandalay was one such site, as was the Thayettaw monastery courtyard in Yangon, where celebrated players were known to gather. Some appear to have formed groups that played on a daily basis.11 The transformation of chinlone’s meaning and its place in Burmese society was also the product of missionaries, student reformers and other urban groups in the first quarter of the twentieth century. The Young Men’s Christian Association and other missionary organisations introduced new ideas about physical culture through their education programmes. The YMCA began to organise football matches in 1899. Transforming the man spiritually and physically was very much aligned with ideas about being modern. In many ways, the YMCA was itself a model of a modern social organisation, providing young Burmese reformers with a reference to form their own groups.The Young Men’s Buddhist Association marked the emergence of a new political elite that also regarded sport as an important platform for building connections amongst members and creating a sense of attachment to the organisation. Like the YMCA, the YMBA 99

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organised football competitions and regular leagues that contributed to the public profile of the organisation but also elevated sport’s status as an expression of modernity. Sport itself became part of the discourse of modernity, and while exposure to colonial varieties of sport (e.g. rowing, football, cricket and tennis) became activities associated with being modern, young educated Burmese began looking at their own physical activities for evidence of comparable expressions of modernity. Sport and education became closely intertwined in British Burma. Physical education became part of the standard curricula in missionary schools, and government schools soon followed with programmes of their own. Manuals such as the 140 page Physical Training for Schools in Burma outlined teaching approaches and provided sample pictures of how to correctly teach physical exercises and activities to children. Each photo was accompanied by a descriptive and explanatory passage on how each stretch or exercise should be attempted, providing a standard example for repetition in any setting. Illustrations and diagrams provided guidance on how to position one’s feet, shift one’s weight, move into a new position when a command was given and how one should look when in the correct posture. The book provided a template for how future manuals would present chinlone’s official rules, movements and recognised techniques. By the 1910s, and well into the next decade, the principles of early physical education in British Burma were established through these manuals and distributed throughout schools across the country. This form of presenting physical activities in this structured format inspired how chinlone would be reordered and repackaged in the decades to come. The advent of physical education in Burmese schools, and its connection to effective learning, was deeply connected with how sport would become associated with modernity in British Burma. By the 1910s and 1920s, students in Rangoon were forming social organisations associated with university and intellectual life. Reading groups, book clubs and debate teams were the preferred form of organisation, as they enabled young participants to gather and discuss the weakened status of Burmese culture under colonial rule. Unable to express political opinions for fear of arrest by the colonial authorities, some of these students directed their attention to the recovery and elevation of what was deemed ‘Burmese culture’ as a means to cope with the sense of loss, anxiety and displacement that coincided with the dismantling of the monarchy, the former cultural patron of the kingdom. Just as the absence of the monarchy required everyday folk to contribute to the upkeep of the religion, so too did young students see themselves as protectors and promoters of modern Burmese cultural practices. In 1913, the Rangoon College Literary and Debating Society considered whether chinlone was in fact a Burmese sport. Reacting to the claim that Myanmar society lacked sport, members suggested that Burmese sport should be given more recognition. Others were unsure of this strategy, stressing that Burmese sport seemed effeminate and that chinlone was probably the only example of local sport that might be comparable to colonial sport. Supporters of chinlone sought to elevate the status of chinlone as a way of highlighting the richness of indigenous Burmese culture in reference to colonial examples. Yet in doing so they faced the uncomfortable dilemma that they were judging their own culture based on criteria and particular definitions of physical culture that had been established by the British. Around the same time, local players were also contributing to the development of chinlone as a formal organised sport. By the 1920s, teams of regularly playing chinlone players started to form around religious sites. The connection to religious spaces (temple or monastery grounds) and times (holy days) indicates a parallel to the way urban Buddhist groups connected sport with spirituality. At the same time, these chinlone teams became a way of expressing belonging and identity. In 1921, a Myanmar Honourable Naypyidaw Chinlone Team in Mandalay was 100

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established by private individuals, along with another team calling themselves the Buddhist Chinlone Team. Games were played at various monasteries, and the teams would come in uniform, sponsored by a local patron. On 28 December 1925, an organisation was established to draw up rules and regulations with Ba Gyi Hla as the first chairman.12 British Burma’s socio-economic challenges in the 1930s – race riots, economic depression and the radicalisation of the political landscape – were exacerbated by the dislocation of World War II, the withdrawal of the British and the eruption of civil war following independence in 1948. Understanding what constituted Burmeseness in a civic sense compelled the need to bridge deep rifts among stakeholders and communities who had very different ideas about what it meant to belong to the new Union of Burma. The establishment of the Ministry of Culture in 1952 ushered in an ambitious project that sought to establish ‘emblems of the nation’ that were meant to provide a means for groups to emotionally (and politically) connect, despite differences in class, locale, ethnicity, religion and politics. UNESCO supported the development of a Cultural Institute, which would be home to the new national library, national art gallery, national theatre, national archive and national school of arts, and which was the institutional component of this grand plan. It was within this context that a new national stadium was built and the transformation of chinlone into the national sport took place. In 1953, the National Fitness Council appointed two retired civil servants, U Win Phay and Sithu U Paing, to convene an All Myanmar Chinlone Conference. The conference began with a preliminary All-District Chinlone conference, convened from 29 June to 8 July, 1953, in Rangoon at the newly built hall in Aung San Stadium. Representatives from 33 districts attended, in addition to members of the Games Rule Drafting Board. Rules were drafted by U Ah Yein and submitted before the delegates, who unanimously voted to ratify the charter. Following the ratification of the competition rules, the Union of Burma Amateur Chinlone Federation was formed with 12 members. The Federation consisted of a network of chinlone associations, organised along the same administrative structures as the government, with district, township, and village branches. Chinlone courts were created, standardised and even drawn into the outer rings of the national stadium. Competition guidelines were established for contests between teams, with points being assigned for individual strokes (kat), and for successful team combinations of strokes. The number of players, the playing court, length of time and rules for referees were standardised during the conference.13 The 1953 conference completely transformed the game of chinlone that James G. Scott had described in his book The Burman. Whereas earlier forms of the chinlone were spontaneous and self-regulated, by the mid-1950s chinlone bore all the credentials of having been through the modernisation process. Matches were now to be played in fixed circles of standardised dimensions, with regularised time limitations and carefully delineated rules that signalled the beginning and ending of play. Crucial to this reformulation of chinlone was the element of competition, which was established by assigning value to the difficulty level of each stroke and ascribing points each time a particular manoeuvre or series of manoeuvres was successfully executed. Finally, one rule stating the purpose of the game – preventing the chinlone from falling to the ground – insulated the newly designated sport from being changed or reinterpreted. The story of chinlone’s transformation from a street game to a national sport highlights a few key themes in the history of physical culture in Southeast Asia. First, it treats sport as a historically constructed understanding of physical activity that accompanied industrialised European companies and governments in their search for resources, labour and commodities in Asia. Sport was as much a discourse of colonial modernity as it was a means to attain it. Demonstrating a proper sporting culture and supporting infrastructure was as much a metric of development as having (or lacking) laws, roads, sewage systems and other emblems of modernity. Sport and the 101

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process of sportification was deeply embedded in the colonial project and continued to serve as a criterion for progress in the postcolonial era as well. The case of chinlone also highlights an important exception to the history of sport and its connection to colonialism. Unlike the histories of cricket, football and baseball, the Burmese did not adopt the favourite pastimes of the British for their own national sport. Unlike India’s obsession with cricket, Cuba’s passion for baseball or the Philippine’s devotion to basketball, the Burmese did not adopt cricket, rugby or football as other former British colonies did. This development is most likely the result of the particular history of colonialism in Burma, how sport was understood by different stakeholders and how that period in the history of the country is remembered. While the process of sportification was adopted from the British by the Burmese, those activities most associated with British sport – cricket, football and rugby – were not. Nation-building in Burma was deeply entangled with anti-colonialism, civil war and the memory of cultural loss. Thus the construction of chinlone as the national sport can be understood in terms of those sentiments. Perhaps a third way of thinking about the transformation of chinlone into a sport is to return to Thongchai Winichakul’s ideas about colonial modernity and the broader localisation process that is a key theme in modern Southeast Asian history. Approaching sport as a category of colonial modernity enables us to focus on how the Burmese understood this condition and the processes through which it could be achieved. Choosing to modernise chinlone was clearly not a step backwards, an attempt to reclaim what was lost or under threat as a result of colonialism. Rather, the adoption of chinlone and its transformation via the establishment of rules and guidelines was an attempt to embrace the modernity of the British but through an activity that was familiar, recognisable and deemed (somewhat) autonomous to the Union of Burma. The transformation of chinlone into a sport is an example of how the concept of sport was internalised, measured and then applied to fit the priorities of Burmese nation-builders. Either out of necessity or choice, other institutions from the British were adopted and transformed to fit local needs and priorities in the 1950s. Laws, architecture, procedures, protocols and rituals were refashioned to fit Burmese senses of modernity and nationhood. Chinlone was part of that broader modernisation program, an emblem of Burmese culture but also a symbol of its aspiration to join the community of nation states.

Notes 1 Thongchai Winichakul, ‘ “The Quest for ‘Siwilai’: A Geographical Discourse of Civilizational Thinking in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth-Century Siam,’ ” The Journal of Asian Studies 59, no. 3 (2000): 528–49. 2 Ibid.‘‘ 3 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450‑1680: The Lands Below the Winds (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1988). 4 Ibid. 5 Pekin Pyan Win Ko, Facts About Myanmar Traditional Chinlone Game and Correct Methods of Chinlone Playing (Yangon: DuWun Publishing, 2013). 6 Vincenzo Sangermano, A Description of the Burmese Empire (Rome: Joseph Salviucci and Son, 1833). 7 James George Scott, The Burman, His Life and Notions (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1910, 1896). 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ko, Facts About Myanmar Traditional Chinlone Game. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid.

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Bibliography Guttmann, Allen. Games & Empires: Modern Sports and Cultural Imperialism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. Guttmann, Allen. Sports:The First Five Millennia. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2004. Ko, Pekin Pyan Win. Facts About Myanmar Traditional Chinlone Game and Correct Methods of Chinlone Playing. Yangon: DuWun Publishing, 2013. Reid, Anthony. Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450‑1680: The Lands Below the Winds. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988. Sangermano,Vincenzo. A Description of the Burmese Empire. Rome: Joseph Salviucci and Son, 1833. Scott, James George. The Burman, His Life and Notions. London: Macmillan, 1910, 1896. Winichakul, Thongchai. “The Quest for ‘Siwilai’: A Geographical Discourse of Civilizational Thinking in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth-Century Siam.” The Journal of Asian Studies 59, no. 3 (2000): 528–49.

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Part II

The rise of modern sport and the Olympic Movement in Asia

With the efforts of the YMCA and YWCA, the late nineteenth century saw the rise of modern sport in Asia at both the elite and grassroots levels. By the early twentieth century,Western sport, such as athletics, swimming, basketball and soccer, had grown into popular leisure activities and pastimes in many Asian countries. The Olympic Movement was also introduced to Asia and soon gained mainstream popularity. It would be naïve to assume that the ‘Olympic Movement and Ideal’ are perceived similarly in the East to how they are in the West. When we talk about the Olympics, we must accept that the Olympic Movement is a reflection of Western civilisation that has been transplanted into many other cultural contexts, at the same time retaining ties to its original roots in Western civilisation and sport. Two of the most important periods in the history of Western civilisation were also the two most important periods in the history of sport: the age of classical Greece and the Industrial Revolution in Europe (especially Britain).The former resulted in the first ancient Olympic Games in 776 BC. The latter resulted in the first modern Olympic Games in 1896. It is no coincidence that the most closely defended symbolic act of the Games is the relay of the Olympic flame from its Greek sanctuary, which may be interpreted as symbolising the light of Western civilisation spreading out from its Greek origins, bringing enlightenment to the rest of the world. Nevertheless, beneath the unified surface of the Olympic Movement there is cultural diversity. As more and more non-Western nations join the IOC, and as they become more and more influential, the Olympic Movement as envisioned by Coubertin will inevitably be transformed. This eventuality is, no doubt, ominous to those who regard themselves as the keepers of the flame, but it is necessary if the Olympic Movement is to be a truly non-imperialist, international movement that allows cultural diversity and does not enforce conformity to Western standards. The Olympic Movement varies immensely from one nation to another in its practice, social consequences and cultural interpretation. The Olympic Movement and the interpretations of the Olympic Ideal in Asian countries described in this section are examples of great significance. This distinction is not only because Asia is a large and diverse region but also because its tradition, the core Asian civilisation, is distinct from the Western tradition that conceived the Olympic Games.

Modern sport and Asian Olympic Movement

In the modern period, in the context of imperialist expansion and colonisation in Asia, and against the background of the two world wars, modern sport and physical education came to be associated with militarism, nationalism, national identity and politics. This section focuses on the development of Western sport and the Olympic Movement in Asia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It points out that, on the one hand, Western sport functioned as an instrument for colonisation. On the other hand, modern sporting events, which pit nation against nation, cultivated a sense of competition and helped the construction of nationhood and national identity in Asian countries. In addition, Western sport and physical education and the Olympic Games contributed to the modernisation of Asia in many ways.

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11 The foundation and early years of the Olympic Council of Asia A controversial body making controversial politics Jörg Krieger

Introduction According to American academic and policy advisor Victor D. Cha, sport in Asia is not only political but is arguably more political than elsewhere in the world.1 Vastly diverging interests heavily influenced by economic, cultural and religious differences have led to countless political disputes during the turbulent history of the world´s largest continent.The rapid development in Asia has reinforced such tensions and has also affected international sport in recent years. The unification of those diverse interests within the Asian Olympic Movement is the responsibility of the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA), the umbrella governing body of sport in Asia. The OCA emerged in 1981 from its forerunner, the Asian Games Federation (AGF), when the National Olympic Committees (NOCs) of Asia deemed it necessary to have an organisation with permanent offices to represent its interests. However, as a result of complex political relations, the OCA is far from free in its decision-making processes and is heavily entrenched in geopolitical debates. In fact, the NOCs within the OCA have a high percentage of their leadership linked to government institutions.2 This chapter provides an overview of the OCA’s early history and identifies central political power plays that have shaped the organisation’s policies, and still do. The chapter is based on sources from the archives of the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) Olympic Studies Centre and argues that the OCA’s political tensions are deeply rooted in its foundation.

The Asian Games Federation – forerunner in the midst of regional politics Until the 1960s, international sport politics in Asia was dominated by states with a tradition in Western sport and close ties to Europe, a result of former colonial rule. Sporting officials of those nations came together in 1949 for the foundation of the AGF, as the sporting body to oversee the organisation of the Asian Games to be held every four years from 1951 onwards.3 In contrast to the majority of international sporting bodies, the AGF was set up without permanent offices. 107

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Instead, it would be headquartered with the organising committee of the host nation of each upcoming Asian Games. This highlighted the AGF’s focus on the event itself, rather than on intercontinental representation in the Olympic Movement. However, until the beginning of the 1980s, host nations struggled to stage the event and therefore to fulfil the rationale of the AGF. For example, South Korea handed back the Games in 1970 due to a financial crisis, forcing the AGF to move them to Bangkok just months before the start.4 Other countries were able to stage the Games but required vast external organisational and financial support to handle the ever-increasing size of the event. But the Asian Games survived and developed into the world’s largest continental sporting mega-event during the 1970s and 1980s. At the 1978 Asian Games in Bangkok, 2,863 athletes participated in 199 events.5 Israel’s inclusion in – and exclusion from – the AGF best encapsulates the political challenges of sport on the Asian continent and eventually led to the foundation of the OCA. Israel participated in the Asian Games from 1954 onwards, following its official recognition through the IOC in 1952.6 However, in 1962 Muslim-majority Indonesia rejected Israel’s participation (and separately that of Taiwan) in the Asian Games in Jakarta, despite protests from the IOC and the international sporting community.7 Indonesia was backed by Arab states and China, and the Games were ultimately held without the two banned nations. Israel returned to the Asian Games in 1966 and 1970, but the political struggles continued. At the 1974 Asian Games in Tehran, many Arab nations, China, Pakistan and North Korea refused to compete against Israeli athletes. On the back of these disputes, the AGF officially excluded Israel from participation at the 1978 Asian Games – originally scheduled to take place in Singapore – for ‘security reasons.’8 Even after the event was moved to Bangkok, and under threat from the IOC of having official recognition for the Games removed, Israel remained excluded.9 This led the International Amateur Athletics Federation (IAAF) to withdraw its sanctioning of the athletic events,10 but the Games took place – without Israel.

Foundation of the Olympic Council for Asia Two separate developments initiated the processes to establish a new strong body to represent the NOCs in Asia. First, and more often publicly communicated, the number of Asian countries participating in the Summer Olympic Games increased dramatically throughout the 1970s. However, the Asian athletes lacked competitiveness, just as Asian sport officials continued to lack international influence. The representatives of the Asian NOCs thus developed a desire to unite efforts under a new sport organisation that would put itself in a more powerful position in respect to the IOC – particularly in negotiations for Olympic Solidarity funds – and push forward sporting development in Asia.11 The missing knowledge transfer between Asian Games hosts was named as another reason for the need to have a permanent body with fixed offices.12 Second, strong political interest in sport from Gulf Arab states with access to large financial resources emerged in the 1970s. Under the leadership of Sheikh Fahd Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber AlSabah from Kuwait, those nations strove for increasing influence in sporting political processes. They were united in their anti-Semitic belief that Israel should not participate in Asian sporting events and that it should be permanently excluded from an Asian governing body of sport. AlSabah himself had fought with the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) against Israel and vigorously continued sporting boycotts against the country.13 This attitude would influence the OCA’s policy towards Israel in the following decades. Besides such common political beliefs, the Gulf states’ influence was further strengthened by their financially strong backbone. They could provide the necessary financial backing for the staging of the Asian Games, which host nations had struggled so severely with in the past. Those resources also proved attractive for the IOC. 108

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While the original decision to install a new permanent sporting body reached back to an AGF Council meeting ahead of the 1978 Asian Games, the final decision on the OCA’s foundation was made in 1981.14 Al-Sabah was able to gain from the momentum caused by the desire of the most powerful Asian nations (China, South Korea, Japan) to be better represented in the Olympic Movement, and provided them with the necessary funds to inaugurate permanent headquarters. Al-Sabah further had the backing of the other Gulf Arab states and India.15 China, arguably the most powerful sporting Asian nation, did not have the confidence to challenge Al-Sabah for the presidency, and India had profited from a $15 million Al-Sabah donation to finance the stadium for the 1982 Asian Games in New Delhi.16 Eventually, Al-Sabah was elected the first OCA President during the formal establishment of the OCA in November 1982.The OCA’s permanent headquarters were installed in Kuwait following diplomatic manoeuvring amongst the Gulf states, and so the Arab NOCs had established a base from which to exert their influence on the Olympic Movement.This was despite the fact that there had been opposition from various countries against the establishment of permanent offices in the President’s country, in an attempt to avoid a monopolistic structure.17 For Asian Olympic sport, the foundation of the OCA thus marked the beginning of that ‘inextricable, incestuous relationship between sport and politics that is nowhere more pronounced than in the Middle East and North Africa.’18 Unsurprisingly, Al-Sabah’s first action was the permanent exclusion of the Israeli Olympic Committee from the OCA.19 Al-Sabah was not reduced to support from within the Asian region only. In 1981 he was elected to the IOC (as was the General Secretary of the Chinese National Olympic Committee, He Zhenliang), the first IOC member from a Gulf state. The IOC’s support was upheld shortly after his election when Al-Sabah caused controversy at the 1982 World Cup. In protest against a refereeing decision in Kuwait’s first-round match against France, Al-Sabah pulled the Kuwaiti players from the pitch and remonstrated with the referee.20 Some IOC members perceived this intervention as an infringement of the Olympic Charter,21 but IOC President Samaranch and the IOC administration supported Al-Sabah against such criticism.

Early politics: empty promises The OCA’s early years were shaped by attempts to consolidate power and practices. Such inactivity was reflected in Al-Sabah not appointing a Secretary General, much to the discontent of many OCA members. Until 1986, the OCA’s administration was run by his personal assistants, centralising power in his Kuwait offices. This gave further rise to the arguments of some sporting officials that the OCA was initiated mainly to keep Israel out of the Asian sport movement, and to do little else.22 That said, the Olympic Movement in Asia did progress rapidly in the first half of the 1980s, leading to the emergence of two powerful new stakeholders. First, in 1981 the IOC named South Korean capital Seoul the host for the 1988 Summer Olympic Games, seeing off competition from the Japanese city of Nagoya. Only two months later, the OCA awarded Seoul the 1986 Asian Games, the first Games under OCA auspices. The successful staging of both events led South Korea to become a major player in global sport, while stimulating economic growth and sociocultural development in South Korean society.23 South Korea used both events to further its political strategy and improve its relationships with the Soviet Union and China. However, the dominant challenge for South Korea, the IOC and indeed the OCA was a potential disruption of the Asian and Olympic Games through North Korea.24 The OCA would have had to deal with this security threat more intensively had it not been for the 1988 Olympic Games. This meant the IOC had a high interest in peace talks and encouraged the two nations to come 109

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together for joint meetings. OCA President Al-Sabah also participated, but his role did not go beyond that of advisor to IOC President Samaranch. The talks could not avoid political disruption.Ten NOCs – instructed by their governments – boycotted the 1986 Asian Games, the most ever. Days before the opening ceremony of the 1986 Asian Games, North Korean agents triggered a bomb explosion at Gimpo International Airport in Seoul.25 Joint action by the OCA against North Korea was not taken. Second, China topped the medal table at the 1982 and 1986 Asian Games, emphasising its sporting ambitions, which increased rapidly during the 1980s. The 1984 Los Angeles Olympics also saw the first participation of China, with the new member of the Olympic family gathering 15 gold medals.26 Against the background of such sporting success and further sporting political ambitions, the Chinese government and the Chinese Olympic Committee (COC) increasingly saw hosting sporting events as a valuable tool for national identity building and showcasing the nation’s political and economic significance. This policy was reflected in the COC’s direct approach to Al-Sabah to select Beijing as the host city for the 11th Asian Games in 1990.27 China held talks with various OCA member federations to convince them about the Chinese application, aware that Japan had also tabled a bid. Eventually, the Chinese efforts were rewarded when the OCA overwhelmingly voted for Beijing.28 China’s attempts to increase its influence in Asian sport did not stop there. Leading COC individuals voiced dissatisfaction with Al-Sabah’s OCA leadership, and the COC nominated its Vice-President He Zhengliang to run against him for the OCA presidency in 1986.29 Knowing that He, with support from South Korea and Japan, had a very good chance of outmanoeuvring him, Al-Sabah struck a deal with the COC. He asked for re-election but promised increased action to position the OCA in the Olympic Movement, and to introduce a rule allowing a maximum of two terms in office. He, after reporting to the Chinese government, accepted this in the hope of contributing to unity among the OCA member federations.30 Moreover, the Chinese government urged him to pull out of the leadership contest to avoid political disputes with the rich Arab nations. The re-election clause was indeed added to the OCA Constitution in 1986, but did not reappear after 1988 and later allowed an Al-Sabah dynasty in the OCA.31 In 1986, the OCA accepted the NOC of Palestine as an affiliated member, continuing its Middle East policy. A written letter by Al-Sabah to the Seoul 1988 Organising Committee (SLOOC) shows that he continued to be much concerned with Israel, even though he had forced its expulsion from the OCA. While praising the organisation of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, Al-Sabah – in his function as OCA President – complained strongly against the SLOOC’s usage of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in official publications and during the opening ceremony of the Games.32 He accused the SLOOC of an ‘aggression on a whole people,’ demanding a public apology from the SLOOC to Palestine. Despite Al-Sabah’s complaint, the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games proved to be wide-ranging successes for Asian sport and were perceived very positively among OCA members.33 Both events were widely televised and introduced millions of viewers to Asian culture. The same applies to the 1990 Asian Games in Beijing, which gained attention and significance following the political uproar after Tiananmen Square in 1989. The Games provided the Chinese regime with the opportunity to demonstrate its political stability.34 The fact that Taiwan participated for the first time after 20 years, though forced to compete under the IOC-approved name of Chinese Taipei, added to the symbolic and peaceful image of the event. That said, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait caused the OCA – under threat of a boycott from Arabic states – to expel Iraq from the Games.35 Despite the success of the 1986 and 1990 Asian Games and the emergence of South Korea and China as global sporting powers, the events also showed that national interest and politics 110

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remained of far greater significance than the development of continental unity in the OCA. Following the 1990 Beijing Asian Games, China put its focus on the global stage with a bid for the 2000 Olympic Games. Japan, with the city of Nagano, successfully applied for the 1998 Winter Olympic Games. The OCA continued to lack strategic leadership. Having originally set out to secure increased Olympic Solidarity funding as its major goal, financial support from the IOC did rise, but this was a result of growing IOC resources rather than the OCA’s efforts.36 This was communicated clearly to Al-Sabah by the IOC administration at various times.37

‘Change’ in leadership Against a background of failing leadership and a lack of progress within the OCA, the smouldering discontent among member federations became evident at the 1990 OCA General Assembly when the presidential election was due to take place. Months prior to the meeting, Al-Sabah had already made clear that he wanted to stand for another election, travelling to the powerful NOCs of South Korea and China to gain support. However, dissatisfaction with his leadership remained strong, and China, again with He Zhengliang as presidential candidate, intended to challenge Al-Sabah. However, Al-Sabah died in August 1990 during Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and the Arab nations put forward his son Sheikh Ahmad Al-Fahd Al-Sabah Jr to replace him. Insisting that the OCA was not an Arab monarchy, the Southeast Asian and East Asian nations opposed this political move and supported He’s candidacy. He was the clear favourite to become the OCA president leading into the election in 1991 – until China handed the IOC its bid for the 2000 Olympic Games. The COC then decided that its Olympic bid was more important than the OCA presidency, and in hope of getting the votes of the Arab IOC members China withdrew He from the election.38 This opened up the OCA presidency for Al-Sabah Jr, who saw off a challenge from OCA Vice President Roy de Silva from Sri Lanka to become the second OCA President in 1991. The COC’s strategy did not pay off, as Beijing lost the contest for the 2000 Olympic Games to Sydney. Al-Sabah Jr’s election and the perceived control over the OCA of Arab nations angered the Pacific Asian nations. Thus, in September and November 1991, the NOCs of China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, Taiwan and Hong Kong joined forces to found the East Asian Games Association (EAGA). The EAGA was installed as a body independent from the OCA, with separate leadership. It was to oversee the organisation of the East Asian Games, held every four years, and initiate sport exchange among East Asian nations. China was the main driving force behind this initiative and secured the location of permanent offices in Beijing, as well as Shanghai as the first East Asian Games host in 1993.39 The institutionalisation of the East Asian sport movement in the form of EAGA highlights the complexity of the OCA’s task to unify Asian sport.This was further complicated through the addition for the 1994 Asian Games of five countries that had recently gained independence from the former Soviet Union: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.40 Moreover, the centralisation of power in the Arabic states and the Al-Sabah family did not contribute to unification either. This did not change in the early years of Al-Sabah Jr’s presidency. In 1992, the IOC accepted him as an IOC member to replace his father, despite his lack of experience in sporting administration.41 The appointment helped him to continue his father’s main policy and push for the inclusion of the Palestinian NOC in the IOC. In 1993, the IOC officially accepted this request.42 Al-Sabah Jr became a strong supporter of IOC projects and initiated a donation of $250,000 from the Emir of Kuwait for the building of the IOC Museum in Lausanne.43 111

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Al-Sabah Jr used his power as OCA president to maintain the organisation’s ban on Iraq. Originally, the OCA had decided to expel the Iraqi NOC until the Olympic Movement in Kuwait was restored. This appears to have been the case already by 1992, as Kuwait participated in the 1992 Olympic Games and with Al-Sabah Jr’s support was able to found an Olympic Museum in the country. However, as the OCA was in the strong hands of Kuwait and its allies, Iraqi efforts for readmission were rejected. Iraq appealed to the IOC, which had not expelled the NOC from the IOC.44 Nations close to Iraq, such as Jordan, made similar claims to the IOC.45 Despite various written requests by the IOC to put the matter on the agenda of OCA General Assemblies between 1995 and 1997 and lift the suspension on Iraq,46 Al-Sabah Jr and his allies prevented such discussions. Iraq only returned to the Asian Games in 2006. The handling of doping cases shows that the OCA under Al-Sabah Jr’s leadership continued to lack a clear approach to sporting policy.While the OCA officially recognised the significance of the global anti-doping campaign, led until the end of the 1990s by the IOC’s Medical Commission, it did not develop its own anti-doping efforts. On the contrary, the OCA did little to investigate potentially widespread drug usage by its member NOCs. The 1994 Asian Games in Hiroshima received unwanted global media attention when 11 Chinese swimmers tested positive for anabolic steroids.47 Like the IOC, the OCA did not follow up on suspicion on wide-ranging doping in China, discounting the scandal as an ‘accident.’ Carefully attempting not to discredit the Asian Games, it called the positive tests uncovered by world-leading doping scientist Manfred Donike into question for several months before confirming them.48 A clear anti-doping strategy remains absent today. Despite the foundation of the East Asian Games, the influence of China, South Korea and Japan in the OCA did not diminish. At the 1995 General Assembly, the OCA voted for the South Korean city of Busan as host for the 2002 Asian Games, surprisingly seeing off competition from Kaohsiung in Taiwan.49 The Taiwanese sport officials accused China of pushing OCA officials to support the Korean bid, in an attempt to prevent the staging of the event in Taiwan.50 The 2002 Busan Asian Games, the second in South Korea, were once again influenced by North-South Korean politics. This time, however, it was not political disruption but rather symbolic unity, marked by a joint Asian Games flame lighting in North and South Korea, as well as a joint entrance of united Korea at the Opening Ceremony with a flag of the Korean peninsula.51 Politics dominated yet again. Finally, despite the continuing influence of East Asian nations, it was evident that by the end of the 1990s, the (sporting) political leaders of the Arab region who had influence in the OCA were increasingly pushing to host the Asian Games in the Arab world.The nations of the Arabian Peninsula also had the economic goal of marketing their main destinations to tourists and the business world.52 Qatar’s capital Doha emerged as the main contender for an Arab bid for the 2006 Asian Games, supported by Al-Sabah Jr on the back of the excellent relationship between Qatar and Kuwait.53 As had been the case with previous host city elections, the 2000 OCA General Assembly did not elect the hotly tipped favourite – Kuala Lumpur – after a successful staging of the 1998 Commonwealth Games but instead chose Doha. In 2002, Al-Sabah Jr further supported Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani, Chairman of the Qatar National Olympic Committee, as he became an IOC member.

Concluding remarks International sport has never been and will never be apolitical, neither in Asia nor anywhere else. This is despite the fact that the IOC has attempted to tackle the inseparable relationship between sport and politics in the Middle East, not by targeting the OCA directly but by 112

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suspending the Kuwait Olympic Committee due to alleged state interference.54 Returning to Victor D. Cha, who argues that the ‘cocktail of history, sport and politics is very potent in Asia,’55 this chapter outlines that the foundation and early history of the OCA is an excellent example of such a strong mixture. The OCA has not only become heavily involved in political matters over the years but its entire existence has been built upon political quarrels on the Asian continent. While unification of the diverse political, economic and cultural interests in Asian sport must be considered an impossible task, the monopolistic treatment of the OCA by the Arab nations in general, and the Al-Sabahs in particular, has not and does not serve the original OCA mission well. Instead, individual agendas are constantly pursued.

Notes 1 Victor D. Cha, Beyond the Final Score:The Politics of Sport in Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 2 Mads A. Wickstrøm and Stine Alvad, Autonomy in National Olympic Committees 2017, Report June 2017 (Copenhagen: Playthegame, 2017), www.playthegame.org/knowledge-bank/downloads/ autonomy-in-national-olympic-committees-2017-/e3cb0290-dadf-4ed0-940b-a78b00b46398. 3 Mithlesh K. Singh Sisodia, ‘ “India and the Asian Games: From Infancy to ’Maturity,” Sport in Society 8, no. 3 (2005): 404–13. 4 Sombat Karnjanakit and Supitr Samahito, ‘ “Thailand and the Asian Games: Coping with ’Crisis,” Sport in Society 8, no. 3 (2005): 440–48. 5 Ibid. 6 Yair Galily, ‘ “Sport, Politics and Society in Israel: The First Fifty-Five ’Years,” Israel Affairs 13, no. 3 (2007): 515–28. 7 Rusli Lutan and Fan Hong, ‘ “The Politicization of Sport: GANEFO—A Case ’Study,” Sport in Society 8, no. 3 (2005): 425–39. 8 “Correspondence from IOC Technical Director to IOC President,” File H-FC02-ASIAN/001, ‘Asian Games and Asian Games Federation: Correspondence,’ Files on the Asian Games Federation, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, May 25, 1977. 9 Fan Hong, ed., Sport, Nationalism and Orientalism:The Asian Games (London: Routledge, 2013). 10 “Letter from IAAF President Adriaan Paulen to IAAF Members in Asia,” File H-FC02-ASIAN/001, ‘‘Asian Games and Asian Games Federation: ’Correspondence,’ Files on the Asian Games Federation, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, November 22, 1978. 11 Fan Hong and Lu Zhouxiang, ‘ “China, the Asian Games and Asian ’Politics,” The International Journal for the History of Sport 29, no. 12 (2012): 74–97. 12 “Report: Basic Information on the Olympic Council of Asia,” File D-RM01-AAOCA/007, ‘OCA Publications,’ Files on the Olympic Council of Asia, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland. 13 Vyv Simons and Andrew Jennings, Dishonored Games: Corruption, Money & Creed at the Olympics (Toronto: Stoddard, 1992). 14 Hong and Zhouliang, ‘ “China, the Asian Games’.” 15 “Report: Sport Inside,” File D-RM01-AAOCA/002, ‘OCA: Correspondence,’ Files on the Olympic Council of Asia, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, March 31, 1982. 16 Hong and Zhouliang, ‘ “China, the Asian Games’.” 17 “Letter: Datuk Seri Haji Hamzah Bin Haji Abu Samah to IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch,” File D-RM01-AAOCA/002, ‘OCA: Correspondence,’ Files on the Olympic Council of Asia, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, December 10, 1982. 18 James M. Dorsey, ‘ “Gulf Autocrats and Sports Corruption: A Marriage Made in Heaven’,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 33, no. 18 (2016): 2226–37. 19 “Fax: Israel Olympic Committee to IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch,” File D-RM01AAOCA/002, ‘OCA: Correspondence,’ Files on the Olympic Council of Asia, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, November 18, 1982. 20 Simons and Jennings, Dishonored Games. 21 “Letter: Richard Pound to IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch,” File CIO MBR-ALSAB-CORR, ‘Biography, Cuttings and Correspondence of Cheik Fahad Al-Ahmad AL-SABAH,’ Files on Al-Sabah Sr and Al-Sabah Jr., IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, June 25, 1982. 113

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22 Simons and Jennings, Dishonored Games. Also see: Fan Hong, ‘ “Sport, Social Transformation and Political Independence:The Asian ’Games,” (Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions Intercollege, Nicosia, Cyprus, April 25–30, 2006). 23 Eunha Koh, ‘ “South Korea and the Asian Games: The First Step to the World,”‘ Sport in Society 8, no. 3 (2005): 468–78. 24 William W. Kelly and Susan Brownell, The Olympics in East Asia: Nationalism, Regionalism, and Globalism on the Center Stage of World Sports, CEAS Occasional Publication Series. Book 3, http://elischolar. library.yale.edu/ceas_publication_series/3. 25 Jung Woo Lee, ‘ “The Olympics and Post Soviet Era: The Case of Two Koreas’,” in The Politics of the Olympics, ed. Alan Bairner and Gyozo Molnar (London: Routledge, 2010), 117–28. 26 Fan Hong and Lu Zhouxiang, The Politicisation of Sport in Modern China: Communists and Champions (London: Routledge, 2014). 27 Fan Hong, ‘ “Communist China and the Asian Games 1951–1990: The Thirty-Nine Year Struggle to Victory,”‘ Sport in Society 8, no. 3 (2005): 479–92. 28 Hong and Zhouliang, ‘ “China, the Asian Games’.” 29 Hong, ‘ “Sport, Social Transformation and Political Independence’.” 30 Liang Lijuan, He Zhengliang and China’s Olympic Dream (London: Foreign Language Press, 2007). 31 Hong, ‘ “Sport, Social Transformation and Political Independence’.” 32 “Letter: Sheikh Fahad Al-Sabah to SLOOC President Park She Jik,” File D-RM01-AAOCA/004, ‘OCA: Correspondence,’ Files on the Olympic Council of Asia, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, September 19, 1988. 33 Koh, ‘ “South Korea and the Asian Games’.” Also see: Kelly and Brownell, ‘ “The Olympics in East Asia’.” 34 Hong, ‘ “Communist China’.” 35 Jeffrey K. Parker, ‘ “Iraq Booted from Asian Games’,” UPI, September 20, 1990, www.upi.com/ Archives/1990/09/20/Iraq-booted-from-Asian-Games/8488653803200/. 36 Marie Therese Zammit and Ian Henry, ‘ “Evaluating Olympic Solidarity 1982–2012’,” in Routledge Handbook of Sport Policy, ed. Ian Henry and Ling-Mei Ko (London: Routledge, 2014), 93–105. 37 “Various Letters,” ‘OCA: Correspondence,’ Files on the Olympic Council of Asia, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland. 38 Hong, ‘ “Sport, Social Transformation and Political Independence’.” 39 Friederike Trotier and Alan Barnier, eds., Sport and Body Cultures in East and Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2018). 40 “Welcome Address: Sheikh Fahad Al-Sabah to 13th Olympic Council of Asia General Assembly,” File D-RM01-AAOCA/018, ‘OCA: 15th General Assembly in Bangkok from 7 to 9 December 1996: Programme and Report,’ Files on the Olympic Council of Asia, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, October 5–6, 1995. 41 “Minutes: 99th IOC Session in Barcelona,” IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, July 21–23, 1992. 42 “Minutes: 101st IOC Session in Monaco,” IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, September 21–24, 1993. 43 “Fax: IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch to Sheikh Fahad Al-Sabah,” File D-RM01-AAOCA/013, ‘OCA: Correspondence,’ Files on the Olympic Council of Asia, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, November 1, 1993. 44 “Letter: Uday Saddam Hussein to IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch,” File D-RM01AAOCA/013, ‘OCA: Correspondence,’ Files on the Olympic Council of Asia, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, August 22, 1994. Also see: “Letter: Iraqi National Olympic Committee to Centennial Olympic Congress,” File D-RM01-AAOCA/013, ‘OCA: Correspondence,’ Files on the Olympic Council of Asia, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, August 23, 1994. 45 “Letter: Awad Khleifat to IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch,” File D-RM01-AAOCA/013, ‘OCA: Correspondence,’ Files on the Olympic Council of Asia, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, June 29, 1995. 46 “Letter: Francois Carrad to Sheikh Fahad Al-Sabah,” File D-RM01-AAOCA/013, ‘OCA: Correspondence,’ Files on the Olympic Council of Asia, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, June 28, 1995. Also see: “Letter: Francois Carrad to Sheikh Fahad Al-Sabah,” File D-RM01-AAOCA/014, ‘OCA: Correspondence,’ Files on the Olympic Council of Asia, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, November 17, 1997.

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47 Thomas M. Hunt, Drug Games:The International Olympic Committee and the Politics of Doping, 1960–2008 (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2010), 101. 48 Steven Mufson, ‘  “China’s Leap Backward’,” Washington Post, December 6, 1994, www.washing tonpost.com/archive/sports/1994/12/06/chinas-leap-backward/13f2284e-f30b-4225-ab915a784d5deb9f/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.833c00059673. 49 ‘  “Busan Hosts the 2002 Asian Games,” Donga-A Ilbo, May 24, 1995, https://newslibrary.naver. com/viewer/index.nhn?articleId=1995052400209101004&editNo=45&printCount=1&publishD ate=1995-05-24&officeId=00020&pageNo=1&printNo=22862&publishType=00010#. 50 Ibid. 51 Cheongrak Choi, Myungsoo Shin, and Chang-Gyun Kim, ‘ “Globalization, Regionalism and Reconciliation in South Korea’’s Asian Games,”‘ The International Journal of the History of Sport 32, no. 10 (2015): 1308–20. 52 Mahfoud Amara, ‘ “Qatar Asian Games: A ‘Modernization’ Project from Above?’ ” Sport in Society 8, no. 3 (2005): 493–514. 53 Edmund Jan Osmanczyk, Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements, 3rd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 1877. 54 Dorsey, ‘ “Gulf Autocrats and Sports Corruption’.” 55 Cha, Beyond the Final Score, 25.

Bibliography Amara, Mahfoud. “Qatar Asian Games: A ‘Modernization’ Project from Above?” Sport in Society 8, no. 3 (2005): 493–514. Cha, Victor D. Beyond the Final Score: The Politics of Sport in Asia. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. Choi, Cheongrak, Myungsoo Shin, and Chang-Gyun Kim. “Globalization, Regionalism and Reconciliation in South Korea’s Asian Games.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 32, no. 10 (2015): 1308–20. Dorsey, James M. “Gulf Autocrats and Sports Corruption: A Marriage Made in Heaven.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 33, no. 18 (2016): 2226–37. Galily, Yair. “Sport, Politics and Society in Israel: The First Fifty-Five Years.” Israel Affairs 13, no. 3 (2007): 515–28. Hong, Fan. “Communist China and the Asian Games 1951–1990: The Thirty-Nine Year Struggle to Victory.” Sport in Society 8, no. 3 (2005): 479–92. Hong, Fan, ed. Sport, Nationalism and Orientalism:The Asian Games. London: Routledge, 2013. Hong, Fan, and Lu Zhouxiang. “China, the Asian Games and Asian Politics.” The International Journal for the History of Sport 29, no. 12 (2012): 74–97. Hong, Fan, and Lu Zhouxiang. The Politicisation of Sport in Modern China: Communists and Champions. London: Routledge, 2014. Hunt, Thomas M. Drug Games: The International Olympic Committee and the Politics of Doping, 1960–2008. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2010. Karnjanakit, Sombat, and Supitr Samahito. “Thailand and the Asian Games: Coping with Crisis.” Sport in Society 8, no. 3 (2005): 440–48. Kelly, William W., and Susan Brownell. The Olympics in East Asia: Nationalism, Regionalism, and Globalism on the Center Stage of World Sports. CEAS Occasional Publication Series. Book 3. http://elischolar.library. yale.edu/ceas_publication_series/3. Koh, Eunha. “South Korea and the Asian Games: The First Step to the World.” Sport in Society 8, no. 3 (2005): 468–78. Lee, Jung Woo. “The Olympics and Post Soviet Era:The Case of Two Koreas.” In The Politics of the Olympics, edited by Alan Bairner and Gyozo Molnar, 117–28. London: Routledge, 2010. Lijuan, Liang. He Zhengliang and China’s Olympic Dream. London: Foreign Language Press, 2007.

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Lutan, Rusli, and Fan Hong. “The Politicization of Sport: GANEFO: A Case Study.” Sport in Society 8, no. 3 (2005): 425–39. Osmanczyk, Edmund Jan. Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements. 3rd ed. London: Routledge, 2003. Simons, Vyv, and Andrew Jennings. Dishonored Games: Corruption, Money & Creed at the Olympics. Toronto: Stoddard, 1992. Sisodia, Mithlesh K. Singh. “India and the Asian Games: From Infancy to Maturity.” Sport in Society 8, no. 3 (2005): 404–13. Trotier, Friederike, and Alan Barnier, eds. Sport and Body Cultures in East and Southeast Asia. London: Routledge, 2018. “Correspondence from IOC Technical Director to IOC President.” File H-FC02-ASIAN/001, ‘Asian Games and Asian Games Federation: Correspondence,’ Files on the Asian Games Federation, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, May 25, 1977. “Fax: IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch to Sheikh Fahad Al-Sabah.” File D-RM01-AAOCA/013, ‘OCA: Correspondence,’ Files on the Olympic Council of Asia, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, November 1, 1993. “Fax: Israel Olympic Committee to IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch.” File D-RM01-AAOCA/002, ‘OCA: Correspondence,’ Files on the Olympic Council of Asia, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, November 18, 1982. “Letter: Awad Khleifat to IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch.” File D-RM01-AAOCA/013, ‘OCA: Correspondence,’ Files on the Olympic Council of Asia, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, June 29, 1995. “Letter: Datuk Seri Haji Hamzah Bin Haji Abu Samah to IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch.” File D-RM01-AAOCA/002, ‘OCA: Correspondence,’ Files on the Olympic Council of Asia, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, December 10, 1982. “Letter: Francois Carrad to Sheikh Fahad Al-Sabah.” File D-RM01-AAOCA/013, ‘OCA: Correspondence,’ Files on the Olympic Council of Asia, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, June 28, 1995. “Letter: Francois Carrad to Sheikh Fahad Al-Sabah.” File D-RM01-AAOCA/014, ‘OCA: Correspondence,’ Files on the Olympic Council of Asia, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, November 17, 1997. “Letter from IAAF President Adriaan Paulen to IAAF Members in Asia.” File H-FC02-ASIAN/001, ‘Asian Games and Asian Games Federation: Correspondence,’ Files on the Asian Games Federation, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, November 22, 1978. “Letter: Iraqi National Olympic Committee to Centennial Olympic Congress.” File D-RM01AAOCA/013, ‘OCA: Correspondence,’ Files on the Olympic Council of Asia, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, August 23, 1994. “Letter: Richard Pound to IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch.” File CIO MBR-ALSAB-CORR, ‘Biography, Cuttings and Correspondence of Cheik Fahad Al-Ahmad AL-SABAH,’ Files on Al-Sabah Sr and Al-Sabah Jr., IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, June 25, 1982. “Letter: Sheikh Fahad Al-Sabah to SLOOC President Park She Jik.” File D-RM01-AAOCA/004, ‘OCA: Correspondence,’ Files on the Olympic Council of Asia, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, September 19, 1988. “Letter: Uday Saddam Hussein to IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch.” File D-RM01-AAOCA/013, ‘OCA: Correspondence,’ Files on the Olympic Council of Asia, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, August 22, 1994. “Minutes, 99th IOC Session in Barcelona.” IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, July 21–23, 1992. “Minutes, 101st IOC Session in Monaco.” IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, September 21–24, 1993. “Report: Basic Information on the Olympic Council of Asia.” File D-RM01-AAOCA/007, ‘OCA Publications,’ Files on the Olympic Council of Asia, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland. “Report: Sport Inside.” File D-RM01-AAOCA/002, ‘OCA: Correspondence,’ Files on the Olympic Council of Asia, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, March 31, 1982.

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“Various Letters.” ‘OCA: Correspondence,’ Files on the Olympic Council of Asia, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland. “Welcome Address: Sheikh Fahad Al-Sabah to 13th Olympic Council of Asia General Assembly.” File D-RM01-AAOCA/018, ‘OCA: 15th General Assembly in Bangkok from 7 to 9 December 1996: Programme and Report,’ Files on the Olympic Council of Asia, IOC Archive, Lausanne, Switzerland, October 5–6, 1995. Zammit, Marie Therese, and Ian Henry. “Evaluating Olympic Solidarity 1982–2012.” In Routledge Handbook of Sport Policy, edited by Ian Henry and Ling-Mei Ko, 93–105. London: Routledge, 2014.

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12 China and the Olympic Games Fan Hong and Zhong Yuting

Introduction The Olympic Movement is ‘the world organisation for the promotion of Olympism in all aspects’.1 Olympism, or the Olympic Ideal, is the spirit and purpose of the Olympic Games. ‘It is a state of mind, a philosophy even, encompassing a particular conception of modern sport, according to which sport can, through an extension of its practice, play a part in the development of the individual, and of human kind in general.’2 Nevertheless, the Olympic Movement varies immensely from one nation to another in its practices, social consequences and cultural interpretations. The Chinese Olympic Movement and the Chinese interpretation of the Olympic Ideal described in this chapter are examples of great significance, not only because China is a large and powerful nation but also because its tradition, the core of Far Eastern civilisation, is quite distinct from the Western tradition that conceived the Olympic Games. The globalisation of the Olympic Movement has experienced three distinguished periods, each accompanied by different ideology and political actions.

Nationalism and the establishment of the Chinese Olympic Committee (1924–1949) Long before the Olympic Movement spread to China, there already existed some Western sport in the form of military exercises imported from Europe and America (1840–1911) which had developed rapidly and widely, for they accorded with the Chinese martial spirit and the traditional Chinese ideal of a unified regime known as the ‘Central Kingdom.’This kingdom, though deteriorating gradually in authority from the end of the eighteenth century, still dominated the whole nation culturally as well as militarily. Other Western sport events, which were not of direct use and did not reinforce Chinese values, were not encouraged. Competitive sport in educational institutions came from the West in the nineteenth century, initially with missionaries, especially the YMCA, and subsequently by way of Chinese students returning from Europe and the United States. For the missionaries, the aim of the Games, according to the YMCAs, was to train outstanding oriental athletes to participate in the Olympic Games and to spread Western morality and masculinity among those weaker oriental people. 118

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The Games were a product of Western cultural imperialism. It was meant to replace traditional Eastern cultures with Western culture. Chinese radicals wanted to see China revive and become strong and powerful again. They saw the weakness of traditional Chinese culture and wanted it reformed through Westernisation. By studying Western philosophical works and observing European and American societies, they came to the conclusion that the vigour which had accounted for the advance of the Western powers resided in the strong individual. The first three National Athletic Meetings between 1911 and 1924, and the first six Far Eastern Championship Games between 1913 and 1923, for example, were organised or supervised in China by the YMCA. They encouraged physical activities, including competitive sport for boys and girls, and men and women in schools, universities and society. Competitive sport, with its stress on instrumentality, power, product, rationality and control, portrayed an essentially masculine image. It offered the opportunity for the Chinese to enter and merge with their Western counterparts in an aggressive and competitive world. In 1904, when the Third Olympics took place in St. Louis, the media reported on it. Many Chinese began to know of the new ‘Olympic Games.’ In 1907, before the Fourth Olympics took place in London, Chinese educationists suggested that China should participate in it. In 1913, the YMCAs in the Philippines, China and Japan reached an agreement to organise an Asian Olympic Games among Asian countries every two years. The first Far Eastern Olympiad took place in Manila, the Philippines, in 1913. It was an imitation of the Olympic Games, including all the regulations, rules and ceremonies. The IOC welcomed the Games but suggested that the Games should not use the name ‘Olympiad.’ Therefore, in 1915, when the Games took place in Shanghai, it was changed to the Far Eastern Championship Games (FECG). The IOC sent a telegram of congratulations to the FECG. In 1922,Wang Zhenting (1882–1961), the Foreign Minister of the Republic of China in the 1910s, and architect of the FECG, became the first member of the IOC from China. In 1928, when the Ninth Olympic Games took place in Amsterdam, China sent one observer, Mr Song Ruhai, to the Games. In 1932, China participated in the 10th Olympics in Los Angeles. China sent Liu Changchun, a sprinter, and his coach to the Games. After 25 days at sea, Liu finally arrived in Los Angeles. But he was too exhausted to perform well. In 1936, China sent 141 athletes to Berlin to attend the Eleventh Olympic Games. The athletes came back empty-handed. In 1939, Kung Xiang-xi (Kong Xiangxi, 1880–1967), the Minister of Finance of the Republic China, became a member of the IOC. In 1947, Dong Shouyi (1895–1978), General Secretary of the China Athletic Association, became a member of the IOC. In 1948, China sent 40 athletes to London to participate in the Fourteenth Olympics Games. In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party defeated the Nationalists, taking control of China and establishing the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Nationalists fled to Taiwan. Both claimed that they were the representatives of China. It began the era of the famous ‘Two China Issue’ in political and sport history. Immediately after the founding of the People’s Republic, the Chinese government lost no time in recognising the importance of the Olympic Games as an international stage where its identity could be asserted internationally. In 1952, when the Fifteenth Olympic Games took place in Helsinki, the IOC invited both Beijing and Taiwan to participate in the Games. Taiwan claimed that it ‘cannot compete with Communist bandits on the same sports field,’ and it immediately withdrew from the Games in protest. Beijing received the invitation from the IOC just one day before the opening ceremony. However, it managed to send a delegation consisting of 40 members, which arrived in Helsinki 119

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one week later, just to raise the national flag at the Olympic village and catch the last couple of events at the Games. After the Helsinki Olympics, both Beijing and Taiwan were preparing to participate in the Melbourne Olympic Games in 1956. However, due to the unsolved ‘Two China Issue,’ Beijing withdrew from participation in the Games on November 6, just before the Games started, despite the fact that the qualifying events for it had taken place and more than 1,400 athletes from 27 provinces, cities and autonomous regions had attended the preparatory competitions, with 92 athletes selected for the PRC Sports Delegation and waiting to go to the Olympics. Instead, Taiwan participated. In August 1958, disappointed with the IOC’s ambiguous attitude on the ‘Two China Issue,’ the PRC withdrew from its membership of the IOC. Between 1958 and 1980, Taiwan represented China and participated in six Olympic Games. In 1972, the new President of the IOC, Lord Killanin (1972–1980), began a dialogue with China. In 1977, he visited Beijing, and, in 1979, China renewed its seat at the IOC. In accordance with the ‘Olympic Formula,’Taiwan changed its name from Chinese Olympic Committee to Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee, and from Chinese Olympic Team to China Taipei. In this way, both the PRC and Taiwan were able to participate in the Olympic Games. At the Los Angeles Games in 1984, the PRC re-emerged on the stage of the Olympic Games after an absence of 32 years. It won 15 gold medals and came in fourth for total gold medals received. Although the victory in Los Angeles was partly attributed to the absence of the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Germany, it nevertheless excited virtually every Chinese, from government officials to ordinary citizens. ‘Develop elite sport and make China a superpower in the world’ became both a slogan and dream for the Chinese. However, for the Chinese, the 1988 Seoul Olympics was a nightmare. When the two sporting superpowers, the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Germany, returned to the Olympics, China’s gold medal tally shrank to five. China had slipped painfully from fourth to eleventh in the gold medal table. In 1992, China fought back at the Barcelona Olympics. Although the Soviet Union had split into several countries, it still took part in the Games as a single unit under the name of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Germany had reunited and was even more powerful than before. However, China won 16 gold medals and regained fourth place in the gold medal count. The Atlanta Olympics in 1996 did not please the Chinese, for they again won 16 gold medals and remained fourth on the gold medal table. This lack of progress was unacceptable to China. In Sydney in 2000, China achieved a historic breakthrough at the Twenty-seventh Olympics. It increased its gold medal tally to 28 and came in third. However, some sport officials argued that this result was not a reliable measure of improvement in Chinese sport’ strength, since five of the gold medals came from newly added events: synchronised diving and women’s weightlifting. In 2004 in Athens, the Chinese competed in 203 events and won 32 gold, 17 silver and 14 bronze medals. Among 36 gold medals, four of them came from traditional Western ‘fortress’ areas: track and field, swimming, rowing and canoeing. With 63 medals in total, China came third in the medal rankings, after the United States and Russia. With 32 gold medals, China beat Russia and came second to the United States. Furthermore, six new world records were established by Chinese athletes, and they also broke 21 Olympic records. After their triumph in Athens, senior Chinese sport officials claimed triumphantly that China, together with the United States and Russia, had become one of the three superpowers in the Summer Olympics. CNN commented, ‘In the six Olympic Games they have competed in, China has moved up the medal tally in world record time’ (see Table 12.1).3

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The moment the Athens Olympics ended, the world media turned its attention to Beijing, where the next Olympics would take place, and where the whole world would eagerly watch the next gold medal confrontation between China and the United States.

Gold medal fever Why are the Chinese so obsessed by Olympic gold medals? Why do the Chinese have so much ambitio to be a sport superpower? To understand the obsession and ambition, we have to put the Olympic gold medal fever in the context of Chinese politics, history and economics. First, the government’s valuation of Olympic gold medals is based on political objectives. Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, sport has always been one of the most powerful weapons in the Chinese Communists’ arsenal, and it has never escaped from the shadow of politics. In the Maoist era, between 1949 and 1978, sport was right at the centre of politics and diplomacy, as in other communist states at that time. China’s sport success was used to demonstrate that socialism was superior to capitalism. Deng Xiaoping’s era followed and was characterised by reform and the famous ‘openness.’ Since the 1980s, China’s sport success has been regarded not only as evidence of ideological superiority and economic prosperity but also as a totem of national revival. At the end of the Athens Olympics, an editorial on the front page of the People’s Daily claimed, When a country is powerful, its sport will flourish. Chinese athletes’ excellent performance on the Olympic stage is inevitably proof of our great achievements in economic reform and modernisation. . . . The achievements at the Games have shown China’s ability to stand proudly and independently among the other nations of the world. . . . Chinese athletes will make more contributions to realise our nation’s great revival. During the Cold War, the government’s politicisation of sport reflected the confrontation between communism and capitalism. After the Cold War, the government’s politicisation of sport reflected the confrontation between nation states. In addition, the Chinese government uses sport as a window to show the world the new image of communism in the new era; as an ideology to unite Chinese people in a sporting patriotism as Marxist-Leninist and Maoist ideological beliefs begin to decay, and as an opiate to distract attention from severe social problems such as corruption and unemployment. Second, the Olympic gold medal fever among ordinary Chinese people is derived from a mixture of extreme pride and extreme inferiority. China, the so-called ‘sleeping giant,’ with the largest population in the world, nostalgically cherishes the memory of its supremacy at the centre of the world and its glorious prosperity during the Tang Dynasty a millennium ago. It feels pain for the past 160 years’ history of humiliation and inferiority at the hands of the West and Japan. Modern Chinese history is a history of humiliation, struggle and striving to restore national pride and international recognition. Between the 1950s and the 1970s, Mao Zedong did instil a sense of self-worth and made the Chinese mistakenly believe that they were the ‘most progressive and advanced force’ on earth, and that they were responsible for the liberation of all the human beings in the world – especially those living in the capitalist societies! In the 1980s, Deng’s open-door policy forced open Chinese eyes and they saw clearly that their standard of living – as well as their science, technology, military, education and health – was substantially lower than those of the Western powers. Facing up to this reality was a devastating agony for the Chinese. At this point, they shared desperation but also hope with the government.

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The hope lay in drawing on the spiritual, intellectual and physical powers of the Chinese to create the strength necessary to be a powerful country. In this climate, it is no exaggeration to state that the desire to host the Olympic Games and to win its medals was driven by the powerful requirements of national survival in the face of major internal and external threats to political and economic existence. The Games are, at the same time, a ritual of cohesion, a battlefield on which to beat the economically advanced nations, and a means to restore the confidence of the nation. Competitive sport is war without gunfire. The Chinese, who had lost most of the wars of the recent past, were now longing to become winners of any kind of war, including the Olympics. ‘A winner is a king, a loser is nothing but a bandit’ (chengzhe wanghou baizhekou), this ancient Chinese saying is still believed by most Chinese people. The dominant concept for the Chinese is not ‘fair play,’ but winning no matter at what cost! China has a tradition of enduring hardship and of sacrificing individuals’ interests for the sake of the nation. Therefore, it is only natural that hundreds and thousands of unsung athletes and coaches have been ‘built’ into a ‘human ladder’ in the past 55 years to help some 100 Olympic medallists to climb to the top. This brutal system has the enthusiastic support not only of the government but also of most of the people.4 Third, the Olympic Games and gold medals bring economic benefits to Beijing and China. Dick Pound has pointed out that since the Americans made the Los Angeles Games the first ever money-making Olympics three decades ago, hosting the Olympic Games has become a very profitable business. During the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, the IOC provided a billion dollars from television rights and sponsorship to the Beijing organising committee.Top sponsors such as Coca-Cola, Kodak, Schlumberger-Sema and Swatch quickly renewed their contracts. At the same time, the Beijing Municipal Government was very confident that hosting the Games would bring immense business opportunities to the city. The world’s top 500 enterprises and the domestic industrial and commercial tycoons are ambitious to use this opportunity to grab as much profit as possible in this, the largest consumer market on earth. It is estimated that the total expenditure in Beijing hit US$1.6 billion during the 2008 Olympics. Unsurprisingly, He Zhenliang, IOC Executive Board Member and former Vice President of the China Olympic Committee, claimed, Indeed, the 2008 Olympic Games will serve as a catalyst for furthering reform and the liberalisation process in China. Coupled with far-reaching impact of China’s access to the World trade Organization, China’s economy will become more closely linked internationally; . . . [I]t will be a milestone in world development.’5 Indeed, the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games achieved great success. It is precisely because of the economic benefits of the 2008 Olympic Games that Beijing will host the 2022 Winter Olympic Games. Beijing has become the first city to hold both the summer Olympic Games and the Winter Olympic Games.

Conclusion China, which Mao once taught to despise bourgeois values, now has its own enterprise zones and millionaires, and in her cities there are fashion shows, stock exchanges and soccer hooligans. A huge proportion of the world’s population is waking up to the entrepreneurial twenty-first century. The country has passed from rags to what millions of Chinese see as riches in just one generation. Not only is it trying to modernise with 40 times the number of the people Europe 122

China and the Olympic Games Table 12.1 China’s Participation in the Olympic Games Olympic Games

Date

Country

Los Angeles 1932

30 July – 14 August 1932 1 August – 16 August 1936 29 July – 14 August 1948 19 July – 3 August 1952

Los Angeles, United States Berlin, Germany

3 February – 24 February 1980 8 February – 19 February 1984 28 July – 12 August 1984

Lake Placid, United States Sarajevo, Yugoslavia Los Angeles, United States

13 February – 28 February 1988 17 September – 2 October 1988

Calgary, Canada

20

Seoul, Republic Of Korea

293

Albertville 1992

8 February – 23 February 1992

Albertville, France

Barcelona 1992

25 July – 9 August 1992

Barcelona, Spain

Lillehammer 1994

12 February – 27 February 1994

Lillehammer, Norway

Atlanta 1996

19 July –4 August 1996

Atlanta, United States

309

Nagano 1998

7 February – 22 February 1998

Nagano, Japan

57

Berlin 1936 London 1948 Helsinki 1952

Lake Placid 1980 Sarajevo 1984 Los Angeles 1984

Calgary 1988 Seoul 1988

London, Great Britain Helsinki, Finland

Chinese Athletes 1

Facts

69

First time to attend the Olympic Games. –

33

–

40

The People’s Republic of China’s first appearance at an Olympic Games. First time to attend the Winter Olympic Games. –

28 37 225

35

251

27

China back on the Olympic stage. Xu Haifeng won the first gold medal. 4th place in the gold medal table. (15 gold medals, 8 silver medals, and 9 bronze medals.) – 11th place in the medal table. (5 gold medals, 11 silver medals, and 12 bronze medals) First time to win a medal in the Winter Olympic Games. 16th in the medal table (3 silver medals.) 4th place in the medal table. (16 gold medals, 22 silver medals, and 16 bronze medals.) 18th place in the medal table (1 silver medal and 2 bronze medals.) 4th place in both the gold medal table and the overall medal table. (16 gold medals, 22 silver medals, and 12 bronze medals.) 16th place in the medal table. (6 silver medals and 2 bronze medals.) (Continued)

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Fan Hong and Zhong Yuting Table 12.1 (Continued) Olympic Games

Date

Country

Chinese Athletes

Facts

Sydney 2000

15 September – 1 October 2000

Sydney, Australia

311

Salt Lake City 2002

8 February – 24 February 2002

Salt Lake City, United States

66

Athens 2004

13 August – 29 August 2004

Athens, Greece

407

Turin 2006

10 February – 26 February 2006

Turin, Italy

Beijing 2008

8 August – 24 August 2008

Beijing, People’s Republic Of China

Vancouver 2010

12 February – 28 February 2010

Vancouver, Canada

London 2012

27 July – 12 August 2012

London, Great Britain

396

Sochi 2014

7 February – 23 February 2014

Sochi, Russian Federation

66

Rio 2016

5 August – 21 August 2016

Rio, Brazil

PyeongChang 2018

9 February – 25 February2018

PyeongChang, Republic of Korea

3rd place in both the gold medal table and the overall medal table. (28 gold medals, 16 silver medals, and 16 bronze medals.) Wins the first gold medal in the Winter Olympic Games. 13th place in the medal table (2 gold medals, 2 silver medals, and 4 bronze medals.) 2nd place in the gold medal table and the overall medal table. (32 gold medals, 17 silver medals, and 14 bronze medals.) 14th place in the medal table. (2 gold medals, 4 silver medals, and 5 bronze medals.) 1st in both the gold medal table and the overall medal table. (51 gold medals, 21 silver medals, and 28 bronze medals.) 7th place in the medal table. (5 gold medals, 2 silver medals, and 4 bronze medals) 2nd place in both the gold medal table and the overall medal table. (38 gold medals, 31 silver medals, and 22 bronze medals.) 12th place in the medal table. (3 gold medals, 4 silver medals, and 2 bronze medals.) 3rd place in the gold medal table and the 2nd place in the overall medal table. (26 gold medals, 18 silver medals, and 26 bronze medals.) 14th place in the medal table. (1 gold medal, 6 silver medals, and 2 bronze medals.)

124

76

639

94

416

82

China and the Olympic Games

had when it industrialised but it is trying to do so in less than a fifth of the time.6 Almost everywhere one looks there are the symptoms and symbols of a country in transition. The Olympic Movement certainly plays an important part in this transition. It is a beneficial force in the development of the Chinese politico-economic system. It is a force for social change and cultural inspiration. The Olympic Games (the Olympic Movement) in China is not a simply a foreign import. It has grown, and continues to grow, in a hot-house of patriotism and communism. It is a movement with a Chinese character. It is not a Western interpretation of the movement; it is the Chinese interpretation. Arguably its interpretation of the Olympic Ideal sheds some light on the future development of Olympism in Eastern countries.

Notes 1 International Olympic Committee, The Olympic Movement (Lausanne, Switzerland: International Olympic Committee, 1984), 12. 2 Ibid., 9. 3 Tracy Holmes, “China Takes the Olympic Limelight’,” CNN, September 14, 2004, http://edition.cnn. com/2004/SPORT/08/30/athens.games/. 4 Fan Hong, Ping Wu, and Huan Xiong, “Beijing Ambitions: An Analysis of the Chinese Elite Sports System and Its Olympic Strategy for the 2008 Olympic Games,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 22, no. 4 (2005): 510–29. 5 David Miller, From Athens to Athens: The Official History of the Olympic Games and the IOC, 1894–2004 (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing Company, 2004). 6 Lynn Pan, New Chinese Revolution (London: Sphere Books, 1988).

Bibliography Barmé, G. R. “To Screw Foreigners Is Patriotic: China’s Avant-Garde Nationalist.” In Chinese Nationalism, edited by Jonathan Unger. New York and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996. Chinese Society for History of Physical Education and Sport (CSHPES), ed. Modern Chinese Sports History. Beijing: Beijing Sport University Press, 1990. Hong, Fan, Ping Wu, and Huan Xiong. “Beijing Ambitions: An Analysis of the Chinese Elite Sports System and Its Olympic Strategy for the 2008 Olympic Games.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 22, no. 4 (2005): 510–29. International Olympic Committee. The Olympic Movement. Lausanne, Switzerland: International Olympic Committee, 1984. Miller, David. From Athens to Athens: The Official History of the Olympic Games and the IOC, 1894–2004. Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing Company, 2004. Pan, Lynn. New Chinese Revolution. London: Sphere Books, 1988. Pound, Richard. Inside the Olympics. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2004. Segrave, Jeffrey O., and Donald Chu, eds. The Olympic Games in Transition. Champaign: Human Kinetics, 1988.

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13 The rise of modern sport and the Olympic Movement in India Souvik Naha

Colonial origins of modern sport The British introduced a number of modern sport to India during their nearly two centuries of colonial rule. A crew of seamen were documented as playing cricket in western India in 1721. Other British sport like football, tennis, hockey and various athletic events followed in the nineteenth century, almost as soon as their rules had been standardised in Britain. In fact, some British sport were invented in India. The British initially showed little inclination to teach Indians to play. Sport was not part of colonial governance, and as such its promotion depended on individual government officials, Christian missionaries and civilians. Some of them subscribed to the idea that team sport, cricket in particular, would teach Indians fair play, discipline, fortitude and moral masculinity as a good training for citizenship.1 Sport thus unofficially became part of the colonial ‘civilising mission,’ a paternalistic enterprise for bringing colonial people up to speed with the altruism of British imperialism and Britain’s contribution to human civilisation.2 This is nowhere more apparent than in the words of Cecil Headlam, who toured India in 1903–04 as part of the Oxford Authentics: Cricket unites, as in India, the rulers and the ruled. It also provides a moral training, an education in pluck, and nerve, and self-restraint, far more valuable to the character of the ordinary native than the mere learning by heart of a play of Shakespeare.3 A number of scholars claim that British governors such as Lord Harris, Lord Brabourne and Lord Willingdon patronised cricket with the hope that the sport might ‘bond together India’s religiously, linguistically and ethnically diverse population.’4 They also highlight the immense contribution of British-led schools and colleges across India in helping their students learn modern sport, and more importantly the ‘games ethic.’5 The role of enthusiastic principals and headmasters, many of whom were also Christian missionaries, such as Chester Macnaghten and Cecil Earle Tyndale-Biscoe, is commonly cited as evidence of well-meaning British benevolence. Some historians even attribute Indian sporting success against British or European teams in the early twentieth century to the triumph of British cultural imperialism.6 In reality, the 126

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pedagogic measure could not have reached the masses, since very few, essentially privileged Indians went to these institutions. Similarly, administrators like Lord Harris were not convinced sport would benefit Indians. They constantly reminded themselves that the locals would never be as good as the British, as they did not possess the Anglo-Saxon character and temperament. At the same time, most of them expressed high hopes for the future of sport in India. Two England visits by Parsee cricket teams in 1886 and 1888, and a slew of India visits by teams of English cricketers, buttressed this division while also elevating the sporting profile of Indians. The first ‘All-India’ cricket team toured England in 1911. These sporting exchanges were an important part of imperial cultural diplomacy.7 Most Europeans in India preferred to have separate clubs and competitions until the end of the nineteenth century.They would routinely mock the appearance and sporting skill of Indians, rather than play them. An army regiment, when compelled to play against a Parsee club, agreed on the condition that the match would be played as ‘officers with umbrellas versus natives with bats.’8 The Royal Calcutta Golf Club, founded in 1829, was constructed as a sanctum for British people away from home. It was not until 1946 that an Indian was allowed membership. In a way, the denial of golf to Indians served as a method of racial segregation.9 The Royal Calcutta Turf Club, established in 1847, got its first Indian member in 1908. Even when the British played with Indians, their attitude did not bespeak the ideals of sportsmanship circulating in Britain.They disputed the umpire’s call and got into altercations with officials and other players.10 When Ranjitsinhji and later his nephew Duleepsinhji played cricket for England with distinction, journalists employed Orientalist tropes to describe them. Neville Cardus considered Ranji a miracle and freak of nature, very un-English and un-Christian, yet highly effective. Essentially, despite all his brilliance, Ranji was considered subversive, and not a player of English cricket.11 The early sporting associations were run by British colonial officials, and Indians often accused them of looking after the interests of the European community, penalising Indian clubs and athletes for minor offences while turning a blind eye to those of Europeans. The spread of modern sport in India is a narrative of cultural assimilation rather than diffusion. British garrisons played an important role in bringing modern sport to the country, and British army personnel have been credited with developing badminton and polo. They are known to have played badminton with a woollen ball instead of a shuttlecock in Thanjavur, southern India, in the 1850s. The play with shuttlecock was initially known as Poona, after a town in western India. The rules of the sport may have been drawn up in Poona in 1873 or in Karachi (in present-day Pakistan) in 1877, and were followed internationally until the Badminton Association of England codified its own rules in the 1890s. Similarly, soldiers discovered a horseback sport called Sagol Kangjei which had been very popular since at least the fifteenth century in Manipur, and transformed it into polo. Through the efforts of a number of lieutenants and captains, polo came to Calcutta in 1863. The game had spread all over India by 1870, mainly due to the interest taken by the 10th Hussars cavalry regiment. The princely states in western India also actively promoted polo, especially the states of Jaipur and Jodhpur, which set various tournament records and are credited with various innovations. The Indian Polo Association, established in 1892, was one of the first sport governing bodies in the country, followed by the Indian Football Association (1893), the All India Tennis Association (1920), the Indian Hockey Federation (1925), the Indian Olympic Association (1927), the Board of Control for Cricket in India (1928), the Badminton Association of India (1934) and the Athletics Federation of India (1946). The seeds of modern sport in India were thus planted in colonial times. 127

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Among the most important tournaments in colonial India were the Durand Cup, the IFA Shield, the Beighton Cup and the Bombay Pentangular. The Durand Cup, started in 1888, is the joint-second oldest existing football tournament in the world, after the FA Cup. The IFA Shield began in 1893 as Bengal’s and later India’s premier football competition. Success for Indian teams in these tournaments was elusive, as competition from British regimental teams was tough. The few Indian teams to have won the tournament were hailed as legends. The Beighton Cup, instituted in 1895, was initially organised by the IFA until the Bengal Hockey Association took over in 1908. The Bombay Pentangular cricket tournament was variously called the Presidency Match (1877–1906),Triangular (1907–1911) and Quadrangular (1912–1936), until a fifth team was added in 1837. It started as an annual fixture between the British-led Bombay Gymkhana and the Zoroastrian Cricket Club. The 1892 match was the first cricket match in India to be given first-class status. Gradually, teams of Hindus, Muslims and a squad comprising Buddhists, Jews and AngloIndians joined the fray.The tournament was easily the most followed sport, even in colonial India.

Sport, nationalism and nationhood Indians started playing Western sport in an organised manner in the mid-nineteenth century, setting up clubs and competitions. Historians have explained in various ways why many Indians took to Western sport in the colonial period. Ashis Nandy, somewhat sweepingly, remarks that Victorian discourses of cricket were coextensive with the conventional temperament and philosophy of Indians. The idea of moral masculinity embedded in modern sport dovetailed particularly well with the ‘rather classical Brahminic concept’ which stressed ‘control over [one’s] impulsive self,’ ‘superiority of form over substance, mind over body, culture over nature’ and ‘serenity in the face of the vagaries of fate.’12 Certain communities such as the Parsees and classes such as the Indian royalty were the first to take Western sport seriously. Some of them might have visualised playing these sport as a means to emulate the British coloniser, become closer to them in political and cultural terms, and differentiate themselves from other Indians. The Parsees in Bombay established several sporting associations, beginning with the Oriental Cricket Club in 1848. Most of their clubs were named after Greco-Roman deities. In Calcutta, upper- and middle-class Bengalis founded a number of football clubs, with Mohun Bagan (1889), Mohammedan Sporting (1891) and East Bengal (1920) remaining very popular. Several princely states patronised team sport and sponsored tournaments. Ranjitsinhji apparently used his fame as a cricketer to obtain the colonial state’s support in eliminating his rivals to the throne of Nawanagar.13 This was by no means a class identity, as princes such as the ruler of Natore revelled in defeating British teams such as the Calcutta Cricket Club. The public also used sport as an instrument for challenging imperial hegemony rather than mimicking Englishness. In colonial India, modern sport served three distinctive functions: as a powerful mechanism for questioning the dominant types of imperial organisation, as an instrument for ensuring a broadening of social access to modern sport, and as a creative means of renegotiating gender politics.14 The claim of earlier historians that nationalist opposition to Anglo-Saxon sport was ineffective, as Indians mainly imitated rather than resisted sport, has been criticised on the grounds that resistance was implicit in Indian ways of appropriating foreign sporting codes.15 Aside from enabling Indians to negotiate colonial modernity, the ‘moral posture’ of sport, especially cricket, empowered them to question post-utilitarian colonial governance for not living up to its own standards of morality. Such imperatives of colonial politics resulted in appropriation of sport as a vehicle of articulating an indigenous brand of nationalism. When Calcutta’s 128

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Mohun Bagan football club defeated the East Yorkshire Regiment to lift the IFA Shield in 1911, the victory assumed political significance as an inspirational triumph of the colonised.16 Colonial sport was a sphere of simultaneously collaborating with and resisting the British. Symbolic resistance against colonial ideology became a dominant feature of colonial sport, especially cricket, football and hockey, from the early twentieth century. This is why the news of a team of Hindus defeating a European representative team in cricket in 1906 quickly spread across the country and was celebrated as a feat comparable to the military victory of Japan over Russia in 1905.17 C.K. Nayudu became India’s first ‘national’ sporting icon, not only through cricketing exploits that tapped all sources of nationalist pride, but also through imaginative journalism that represented him as the apogee of anti-colonial masculinity.18 When India went to play a cricket series in England in 1946, a cricket administrator wrote: The goal is to play the game in the same spirit as it is played in England and also if possible to beat the Englishmen at their own game and on their own soil – at the game of cricket, England’s sunny gift to India! . . . Whatever the results, this great sub-continent will be happy as long as her chosen representatives ‘play cricket’ in every sense of the phrase.19 Cricket thus served as a nonviolent means of upending the empire. It provided a level playing field where Indians could take on the empire without much fear, protected by the sport’s rules. Sport in general enabled Indians to contest the refrain of physical and intellectual decadence that ran through much of the colonial discourses of Indian history. In the colonial vision, Indians were physically weak and incapable of keeping up with the strides of modernity. India already had a vibrant wrestling and martial arts culture, but numerous akharas (gymnasiums) and physical exercise clubs began to appear in response to this humiliating myth of effeminacy, in areas not formerly known for a strong emphasis on body culture. A number of political leaders and associations espoused the cause of cultivating a strong physique.20 The political connotation of a strong body started waning in places like Bengal in the twentieth century but grew stronger in northern India. As Joseph Alter argues, wrestling was antithetical to the European notion of modernity in the sense that it was conceptualised as a method of disciplining the body.21 Competition was secondary and victory in bouts inconsequential, as long as the desired reformation of the body was achieved. Political leaders like Gandhi supported individual physical exercise, as opposed to team sport, arguing that slavish adherence to Western sport would not bode well for Indians who were spiritually and physically ill-prepared for these alien cultural forms.22 In sum, the projection of identity and nationhood through sport had begun in earnest in the colonial period. However, it was not cricket, football or wrestling, but rather hockey that gave colonial India its first taste of international glory. Following the IOA’s establishment in 1927, a hockey team was sent to the 1928 Olympics. When it returned with a gold medal, the nation woke to the possibility of projecting its pride and identity on the world stage through sport. The Olympic Movement gathered momentum in India following the hockey win, and more so after India was not invited to participate in the inaugural Empire Games (later renamed the Commonwealth Games) in 1930, making the Olympics India’s only shot at making a statement. Unlike other sporting associations, the IOA was headed by an Indian, famous industrialist Sir Dorabji Tata, who had earlier established school cricket and athletic competitions in Bombay. Exposed to the ‘games ethic’ during his education in England, Tata realised the importance of sport in the making of a strong nation. He sought out the sport-loving Indian princes, the colonial government and the YMCA to support his endeavour to prepare Indian athletes for the Olympics.23 129

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The YMCA contributed a great deal in the early years of Indian Olympism. It organised training for athletes through its extensive nationwide network, and appraised the International Olympic Committee of the progress made by India. Having found that American ideals of sport were not tenable in the Indian context, it creatively fused global and local elements of fitness regimes in its activities. Colonial discourses of race and imperial tropes of physical difference were nonetheless influential in its physical education routines.24 As India shone in Olympic hockey, several princes turned their attention to the IOA. The Maharaja of Patiala, already well known for his patronage of cricket, replaced Tata as President. Guided by his enthusiasm, Indian athletes participated in a number of tournaments such as the 1929 Far Eastern Games, the 1932 Olympics and the 1934 Western Asiatic Games. He even succeeded in securing a permanent representation of India at the IOC’s annual meeting. The YMCA, increasingly alienated from Olympic affairs, resented Patiala’s strong grip over the IOA. A clash of personalities and regionalism raged throughout the 1930s over the thorny issues of managing resources, building stadiums and drawing up the parameters of competitions. India’s sterling performance in hockey, where the country swept every other nation aside, hid some of this acrimony, but the politicisation of these rivalries put the fissures in Indian society in sharp relief; these continue to be the bane of sporting development in the country.

Sport and social divisions Sport articulated and sometimes intensified political, racial and communal tension in colonial India. Certain members of the untouchable castes found in cricket a tool of social mobility. Hindu cricket teams not only accepted the Palwankar brothers–Baloo,Vithal, Shivram and Ganpat – as formidable cricketers, they relaxed some of their prejudices in order to appoint them captains.25 The cricket teams maintained by princes were exemplary in their inclusive nature. Often coached by former English cricketers, these teams comprised people from every possible religion and caste in India, selected on merit. The allegation of communalism was raised against the Bombay Pentangular tournament, owing to the composition of teams along religious lines. The Congress party campaigned for the tournament’s abolition, arguing that it divided rather than united Indians in the freedom struggle. Nearly every cricketer to have taken part in the tournament, irrespective of religion, vouched that the matches never generated communal violence.26 The tournament was nonetheless dissolved in 1945; the intention to eliminate competition for the BCCI-sponsored Ranji trophy may have played a part.27 A concrete example of communal tension brewing in the sporting area was the public response to Mohammedan Sporting’s stellar record of five consecutive IFA Shield wins in the 1930s. Apparently, every victory drove a communal wedge deeper into Calcutta football by giving the city’s Muslims a solid marker of identity. Measures such as allotting land for new Muslim clubs in violation of existing laws, not to mention aggressive and often violent victory celebrations by Muslim football fans, antagonised Hindus.28 Thus, instead of fostering peace, football polarised communities. Wrestling evinced a similar unintended politicisation of sport. In colonial northern India, the body of a wrestler signified a certain way of life built through observing a regime of mind-body discipline. This was not an essentially Hindu conception of physical and intellectual harmony, as wrestling was widely practised among Muslims as well. Karim Bux, the Great Gama (Ghulam Mohammad Baksh), Raheem Bakhsh Sultani Wala and the Bholu Brothers (Bholu, Azam, Aslam, Akram, Goga) were legendary wrestlers from the United Provinces. But the ideology of

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inculcating discipline through drills and coordinated physical movement, and development of physique in general, followed by the proponents of Hindu mobilisation in late colonial India, has informed a religion-centric image of the sport in modern times. Although availing of the services of wrestlers as strongmen in collective violence and riots is well documented, very few wrestling associations in reality subscribe to or are associated with militant Hinduism. However, many of them uphold forging one’s body as a patriotic or nationalist responsibility that could counter challenges to the nation. Somehow such notions have never been associated with wrestling in southern India, nor did the sport catch the public imagination there to the extent it did in the rest of the country.29 The contribution of Anglo-Indians to Indian sport is often underplayed. The first Indian Olympian was Norman Pritchard, who won two silver medals in the 1900 Olympics. A look at the world-beating hockey teams from the 1930s and 1940s reveals a strong concentration of players drawn from the Anglo-Indian community, often as many as seven or eight in the playing eleven.The other major group was Sikhs from the Punjab region and Hindus and Muslims from the United and Central Provinces, nearly all employed by the Indian army. The migration of Anglo-Indians to countries such as Australia and Canada in the wake of India’s independence reduced the competitive quality of Indian hockey in the 1960s, while ameliorating the sporting standard of their adoptive countries. The preeminence of northern Indian players in hockey translated into their recruitment for corporate teams in office leagues and major clubs in local hockey leagues in Calcutta and Bombay. This resulted in migration of skilled players to other states, where they settled. The gender divide in society was evident in matters of women’s participation in sport. Women rarely played competitive sport before the late nineteenth century. Many girls’ schools then started physical education classes aimed at empowering women and invigorating their health. The YWCA played an important role in teaching exercise to students of missionary schools. Women took part in a variety of sport, including athletics, swimming, cycling, badminton, football, basketball, table tennis, volleyball and cricket. Inter-school and inter-college athletic championships started in the 1930s. Most toplevel female athletes in colonial times were Anglo-Indian Christians whose participation was facilitated by their self-disposition towards European culture. Female spectators of men’s sport were always chaperoned by male relatives and often sat in special tents hidden from public gaze.30 The conservative attitude towards women’s domesticity, safety and modesty was a hindrance to women’s sport, with Indian women’s traditional attire often held responsible as an obstacle to free movement and proper training. Women’s participation numbers in sport remained much lower than men’s in urban areas, while rural women hardly ever played sport.

The consolidation of modern sport The government of independent India acknowledged the importance of sport, evidenced by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s enthusiasm for organising the first Asian Games in New Delhi in 1951 as a means to foster Asian solidarity and project a positive image for India. A number of councils were set up and a committee was appointed to survey the state of sport and recommend plans to implement proper physical education programmes. Following the Central Advisory Board of Physical Education (1951) and the All-India Council of Sports (1954), a Sport and Welfare Department made up of former princes, top politicians and industrialists became part of the Ministry of Education in 1958. Acting upon its

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recommendations, the government established the National Institute of Sports in Patiala and started the Arjuna Award for outstanding athletes in 1961.31 The activities of these institutions suggest that the government deeply cared for sport, especially in rural and suburban areas, and promoted sport as a means of national integration. The outcome has been highly disappointing, in the absence of well-rounded planning and financing. Corruption and politicking in sport administration have further contributed to the decline of Indian sport. Specific government sectors such as the Services and the Railways have patronised and trained most of the athletes to have represented the country in international events, hockey players and athletes in particular. School and college sport have badly suffered from government inaction and a culture of parents forcing their children to study rather than play, since sport have never really been seen as bringing financial benefits. Cricket and football were the two sport to receive more attention, first from wealthy princes and then from corporate sponsors. Cricket flourished in late colonial India as princes maintained cricket teams, and some of the richer ones continued to do so after independence. Government concerns such as Customs, Railways, State Bank of India and Port Trust, or corporate houses such as Tata and Mahindra, recruited sportspersons to play for their teams in office leagues and otherwise represent professional sport of their choice. Cricketers got most of these jobs, since as a class they were found to be better educated than football or hockey players. The companies could have them continue as white-collar employees after their retirement from sport, while less educated athletes would be liabilities after their playing days.32 The lack of attention from the private sector, coupled with the government’s inefficacy, set Indian sport back decades while the likes of China and Japan improved their sporting performance by leaps and bounds. India qualified for the 1950 football World Cup in Brazil, but could not participate due to its inability to finance the journey. (The story that India pulled out because FIFA was unwilling to let its footballers play barefoot is a myth.) India narrowly lost 2–1 to France in the 1948 Olympics, finished fourth in the 1956 Olympics, and won gold at the Asian Games in 1951 and 1962. The game declined in performance and popularity thereafter, with only Bengal living up to its former glory until the 1990s. Goa, Kerala and Manipur have since emerged as domestic football powerhouses, but the country has not been able to replicate the international glory of the 1950s. The Calcutta derby between East Bengal and Mohun Bagan is considered one of the fiercest rivalries in world football. Attended by no less than a hundred thousand spectators and followed by a larger multitude outside the stadium, these matches provide the Bengalis who have lived in Calcutta since the nineteenth century and those who migrated in the twentieth century a platform to act out their grievances against one another. The intensity of the rivalry has frequently led to violence and even deaths among supporters. The dynamic of Western sport in colonial India shows that sport was looked upon as a resource for both recreation and struggle. Sport enabled the British to understand the locals through the forms of knowledge and appropriation methods the latter brought to bear on sport. Their initial observations of Indian athletes were definitely underpinned by colonial ideologies of race and culture. Sport later helped refine some of these assumptions, but also sometimes further entrenched the discourse of difference as inexorable. Indians were able to familiarise themselves with European culture through sport, and creatively reinvented sporting codes in their everyday lives. They did not change the form, as that would have disallowed them from competing with the coloniser. Rather, they introduced their own class, caste, ethnic and religious signifiers, which doubly served to consolidate social stratification in sport and to empower athletes to break down social barriers. This function was not uniquely attributable to Western sport but was articulated most visibly and elaborately through spectator team sport like cricket and football. 132

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Notes 1 J. A. Mangan, The Games Ethic and Imperialism: Aspects of the Diffusion of an Ideal (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985); Allen Guttmann, Games and Empires: Modern Sports and Cultural Imperialism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). 2 Paul Dimeo,‘ “Sporting and the ‘Civilising Mission’ in India,”‘ in Colonialism and Civilising Mission: Cultural Ideology in British India, ed. Harald Fischer-Tiné and Michael Mann (London: Anthem, 2004), 165–78. 3 Cecil Headlam, Ten Thousand Miles Through India and Burma: An Account of the Oxford University Authentics Cricket Tour with Mr KJ Key in the Year of the Coronation Durbar (London: J. M. Dent, 1903), 169. 4 Guttmann, Games and Empires, 33. 5 Mangan, The Games Ethic and Imperialism. 6 Tony Mason, ‘ “Football on the ’Maidan,” International Journal of the History of Sport 7, no. 1 (1990): 85–96. 7 Prashant Kidambi, Cricket Country: An Indian Odyssey in the Age of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). 8 Ramachandra Guha, A Corner of a Foreign Field: The Indian History of a British Sport (London: Picador, 2002), 17. 9 Paul Dimeo, ‘ “The Social History of the Royal Calcutta Golf Club, 1829–2003,”‘ in Subaltern Sports: Politics and Sport in South Asia, ed. James Mills (London: Anthem, 2005), 123–38. 10 Guha, A Corner of a Foreign Field. 11 Satadru Sen, Migrant Races: Empire, Identity and K.S. Ranjitsinhji (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004). 12 Ashis Nandy, The Tao of Cricket: On Games of Destiny and the Destiny of Games (New Delhi: Viking, 1989). 13 Boria Majumdar, Twenty-Two Yards to Freedom: A Social History of Indian Cricket (New Delhi: Penguin, 2004). 14 Projit B. Mukharji, ‘ “The Early Cricketing Tours: Imperial Provenance and Radical ’Potential,” International Journal of the History of Sport 21, no. 3–4 (2012): 351–62. 15 James Mills, ‘ “A Historiography of South Asian ’Sport,” Contemporary South Asia 10, no. 2 (2001): 207–21. 16 Kausik Bandyopadhyay, Scoring Off the Field: Football Culture in Bengal, 1911–1980 (New Delhi: Routledge, 2011). 17 Guha, A Corner of a Foreign Field. 18 Souvik Naha, ‘ “Producing the First Indian Cricketing Superhero: Nationalism, Body Culture, Consumption and the C.K. Nayudu Phenomenon,”‘ International Journal of the History of Sport 29, no. 4 (2012): 562–82. 19 Berry Sarbadhikary, Presenting Indian Cricket (Calcutta: A. Mukherjee & Co., 1946). 20 John Rosselli, ‘ “The Self-Image of Effeteness: Physical Education and Nationalism in NineteenthCentury Bengal,”‘ Past & Present 86 (1980): 121–48. 21 Joseph S. Alter, The Wrestler’s Body: Identity and Ideology in North India (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992). 22 Boria Majumdar, ‘ “Forward and Backward: Women’s Soccer in Twentieth-Century India,”‘ Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 25, no. 1 (2005): 204–13; Kausik Bandyopadhyay, Mahatma on the Pitch: Gandhi & Cricket in India (New Delhi: Rupa, 2017). 23 Boria Majumdar and Nalin Mehta, Olympics:The India Story (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2008). 24 Harald Fischer-Tiné, ‘ “Fitness for Modernity? The YMCA and Physical-education Schemes in Latecolonial South Asia (circa 1900–40),”‘ Modern Asian Studies 53, no. 2 (2019): 512–59. 25 Guha, A Corner of a Foreign Field. 26 Ibid. 27 Majumdar, Twenty-Two Yards to Freedom. 28 Bandyopadhyay, Scoring Off the Field. 29 Alter, The Wrestler’s Body. 30 Souvik Naha,‘ “Adams and Eves at the Eden Gardens:Women Cricket Spectators and the Conflict of Feminine Subjectivity in Calcutta, 1920–70,”‘ International Journal of the History of Sport 29, no. 5 (2012): 711–29. 31 Ronojoy Sen, Nation at Play: A History of Sport in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). 32 Richard Cashman, Patrons, Players and the Crowd: The Phenomenon of Indian Cricket (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 1979). 133

Souvik Naha

Bibliography Alter, Joseph S. The Wrestler’s Body: Identity and Ideology in North India. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992. Bandyopadhyay, Kausik. Mahatma on the Pitch: Gandhi & Cricket in India. New Delhi: Rupa, 2017. Bandyopadhyay, Kausik. Scoring Off the Field: Football Culture in Bengal, 1911–1980. New Delhi: Routledge, 2011. Cashman, Richard. Patrons, Players and the Crowd: The Phenomenon of Indian Cricket. Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 1979. Dimeo, Paul. “The Social History of the Royal Calcutta Golf Club, 1829–2003.” In Subaltern Sports: Politics and Sport in South Asia, edited by James Mills, 123–38. London: Anthem, 2005. Dimeo, Paul. “Sporting and the ‘Civilising Mission’ in India.” In Colonialism and Civilising Mission: Cultural Ideology in British India, edited by Harald Fischer-Tiné and Michael Mann, 165–78. London: Anthem, 2004. Fischer-Tiné, Harald. “Fitness for Modernity? The YMCA and Physical-Education Schemes in LateColonial South Asia (circa 1900–40).” Modern Asian Studies 53, no. 2 (2019): 512–59. Guha, Ramachandra. A Corner of a Foreign Field:The Indian History of a British Sport. London: Picador, 2002. Guttmann, Allen. Games and Empires: Modern Sports and Cultural Imperialism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. Headlam, Cecil. Ten Thousand Miles Through India and Burma: An Account of the Oxford University Authentics Cricket Tour with Mr KJ Key in the Year of the Coronation Durbar. London: J. M. Dent, 1903. Kidambi, Prashant. Cricket Country: An Indian Odyssey in the Age of Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Majumdar, Boria. “Forward and Backward: Women’s Soccer in Twentieth-Century India.” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 25, no. 1 (2005): 204–13. Majumdar, Boria. Twenty-Two Yards to Freedom: A Social History of Indian Cricket. New Delhi: Penguin, 2004. Majumdar, Boria, and Nalin Mehta. Olympics:The India Story. New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2008. Mangan, J. A. The Games Ethic and Imperialism: Aspects of the Diffusion of an Ideal. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985. Mason, Tony. “Football on the Maidan.” International Journal of the History of Sport 7, no. 1 (1990): 85–96. Mills, James. “A Historiography of South Asian Sport.” Contemporary South Asia 10, no. 2 (2001): 207–21. Mukharji, Projit B. “The Early Cricketing Tours: Imperial Provenance and Radical Potential.” International Journal of the History of Sport 21, no. 3–4 (2012): 351–62. Naha, Souvik. “Adams and Eves at the Eden Gardens: Women Cricket Spectators and the Conflict of Feminine Subjectivity in Calcutta, 1920–70.” International Journal of the History of Sport 29, no. 5 (2012): 711–29. Naha, Souvik. “Producing the First Indian Cricketing Superhero: Nationalism, Body Culture, Consumption and the C.K. Nayudu Phenomenon.” International Journal of the History of Sport 29, no. 4 (2012): 562–82. Nandy, Ashis. The Tao of Cricket: On Games of Destiny and the Destiny of Games. New Delhi:Viking, 1989. Rosselli, John. “The Self-Image of Effeteness: Physical Education and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Bengal.” Past & Present 86 (1980): 121–48. Sarbadhikary, Berry. Presenting Indian Cricket. Calcutta: A. Mukherjee & Co., 1946. Sen, Ronojoy. Nation at Play: A History of Sport in India. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015. Sen, Satadru. Migrant Races: Empire, Identity and K.S. Ranjitsinhji. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004.

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14 The rise of modern sport and the Olympic Movement in Japan Yasuhiro Sakaue and Lee Thompson

A wide variety of traditional games and competitions could be found in Japan even before modern sport were introduced from Europe and America. During the 2002 World Cup, kemari (蹴鞠) enjoyed some unwarranted fame as the ancestor of football (soccer) in Japan. In this obsolete game, eight players kicked a deerskin ball among themselves, counting the number of kicks before it landed on the ground. Kemari was played at the imperial court from around the twelfth century, and was popular among the samurai class and townspeople from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. Other once-popular premodern sport include dakyū (打毬), an equestrian game resembling polo that was also played at court, and gitchō (毬杖) and injiuchi (印地 打), hockey-like games played by children of the commoner class. A wide variety of folk games, including boat races and tug-of-war, were held throughout the country as well in association with festivals and other traditional events.1 Various armed and unarmed martial arts have also been practised in Japan for centuries. Many of these, including judo, kendo and kyudō, successfully made the transition to the modern age and are now widely practised all over the world. In contrast, modern sport imported from Europe and America have almost completely superseded traditional games and competitions. (A notable exception is sumo.) The Olympics Games serve both as a store window displaying these modern Western sport to the world and a site for competition between nations: a mega-event that incites the national pride of the participating states. Japan quickly fell under that spell; as the newly established government vied for a place among the nations of Europe and America in incorporating the entire globe into an imperialistic world order, participation in the Olympics seemed mandatory. For this reason, modern sport and the Olympic Games have had an inordinate significance to and influence on Japan.

The introduction of modern sport to Japan In 1639, fearing the influx of Christianity and the influence of foreign powers, the Tokugawa shogunate prohibited all trade and commerce between Japan and all foreign nations (except for Korea, China and the Netherlands). This isolationist policy lasted until 1854, and the adoption

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of Western culture only began in earnest after 1868, when a modern nation state based on the Western model was first established. Modern sport were adopted in the subsequent assimilation of Western culture. The educational system served as the main conduit for this assimilation, but initially through extracurricular activities rather than the physical education curriculum itself. Educators hired from abroad to teach Western knowledge and skills in the many newly established modern schools introduced Western sport and games to their students outside the classroom and encouraged them to play. The students soon formed clubs and teams and began to participate proactively in extracurricular sport activities. As participation grew, competitions became regular events on the school calendar. By the beginning of the twentieth century, schools all over the country were holding interscholastic competitions, especially in baseball and rowing. Sport was introduced into the curriculum at a much slower pace. The first physical education curriculum was based mainly on the system of ‘normal gymnastics’ introduced by American educator George A. Leland at the National Institute of Gymnastics, established by the Ministry of Education in 1878 to train physical educators. (The comprehensive term for physical education was ‘gymnastics’ [taisō 体操].) From 1885, however, the focus gradually shifted to preparing young men for conscription into the armed forces.2 From 1913 the physical education curriculum was divided into three areas: gymnastics, military drills and games, with the emphasis on the first two. Sport were subsumed as a category of games. In 1926 the curriculum for secondary schools was divided into four areas: gymnastics, military drills, games and contests, and (for boys only) kendo and judo. In this curriculum, sport were given a recognised place as ‘contests,’ which raised their profile somewhat, and the number of sport included also increased; in general, however, sport in prewar physical education remained a minor presence.3 In contrast, students in secondary school and above devoted much of their time and energy to sport in their extracurricular activities. From 1880, these became more and more organised.4 The school authorities looked to extracurricular activities to maintain and improve students’ health and develop their morals. The first university association of sport clubs was the Athletic Foundation of the University of Tokyo, formed in July 1887, a mere four months after the university itself, which consisted of seven clubs: kendo, judo, kyudō, rowing, ball games, athletics (track and field) and swimming. University sport clubs produced most of the athletes that went on to compete in the Olympics and other international competitions. Japan participated in six Olympic Games between 1912 and 1936, dispatching 389 athletes; 258 of those, or 66 percent, were college students (Table 14.1).

Table 14.1 Japan’s Participation in the Summer Olympics, 1912–19365 Year

City

1912 1920 1924 1928 1932 1936

Stockholm Antwerp Paris Amsterdam Los Angeles Berlin

*Ranking based on number of gold medals

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Delegation Students (%)

Medals G S B Tot Ranking*

15 10 (67%) 19 12 (63%) 43 29 (67%) 131 92 (70%) 179 113 (63%)

0000 0 2 0 2 17 0 0 1 1 23 2 2 1 5 15 7 7 4 18 5 6 4 8 18 8

Modern sport and Olympic Movement in Japan

Over half of the students that participated in the Olympic Games during this period were from three universities: Waseda, Keio and Meiji. Table 14.2 shows the year in which each club joined the Keio University association of sport clubs, and thus is an indicator of the order in which different sport were established in Japan. Note that along with the various martial arts of Japan, the baseball and rowing clubs had already been established by 1892. The number of clubs increased in the following years, but only two of them – sumo and karate – were for sport originating in Japan.The majority of the club sport were imported from Europe and America. Other clubs did not belong to the association and therefore are not on this list, including wrestling, American football, fencing and badminton.6 A baseball team and a rowing club were also part of the student association of the First Higher School from its establishment in 1890.8 The school’s baseball team in particular was dominant in interscholastic competitions. From 1896 it regularly competed against American teams from the foreign settlement in Yokohama, and won 11 of the 13 games played up to 1904. These victories, widely reported in the press, were a boost to national pride and helped counter a popular stereotype of the Japanese people as ‘essentially feeble,’ effeminate and unmanly.9 Why did the American sport of baseball take such firm root in Japan? Roden suggests that it was because the sport ‘seemed to emphasise precisely those values that were celebrated in the civic rituals of state: order, harmony, perseverance and self-restraint.’10 In contrast, Guttmann proposes that the appeal of baseball was ‘not tradition but modernity’; it was associated with ‘the telegraph, telephone and many other technological marvels of the era.’11 Settling this question would require detailed research into the perceptions of the students who played the sport during this era. However, most of the research into the adoption of baseball in Japan focuses on the cultural foundations for its acceptance and/or the issue of acculturation, and thus does not address the reasons behind its popularity. Many readers may wonder why soccer, or other sport for that matter, was slower to establish itself in Japan. The question of why certain sport cultures develop in different countries or regions is a fascinating one; out of the constellation of conditions that have influenced the adoption of Western sport in Japan, here we would like to indicate three factors that are significant from a global and comparative-historical perspective. First is the temporal gap that resulted from over two centuries of isolationism. If Japan had not been closed to the outside world, British sport probably would have been introduced before American sport. However, when the country opened itself to the world in 1868, British and American sport were introduced effectively at the same time. This is an anomaly in the global history of sport. The second factor is the influence of the Olympics. Established global sport such as tennis, swimming, cycling, gymnastics, athletics (track and field), hockey and equestrianism were already part of the Olympics, and one can easily imagine how these activities captured the

Table 14.2 Keio University Registered Sports Clubs, by Year7 1892 kenjutsu [kendo], jujutsu [judo], kyūjutsu [kyudō], baseball, rowing, (military drill), (walking) * 1901 tennis, 1902 swimming, 1903 rugby, gymnastics, (cycling) 1917 running, 1919 sumo, mountaineering, hockey 1922 equestrianism, 1927 soccer, ice skating 1931 basketball, 1932 karate, 1934 skiing, 1937 table tennis, 1938 yacht 1941 volleyball, shooting The clubs in parentheses were eventually disbanded

*

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interest of spirited students, triggering dreams of bringing glory to home and country. Kanō Jigorō – principal of Tokyo Higher Normal School, founder of Kodokan judo and (from 1909) the first International Olympic Committee member from Asia – believed that the fate of the nation depended on the physical and spiritual strength of its people, developed through physical education, and that participation in the Olympics was a prerequisite for joining the ranks of the advanced nations. Asia as a whole was being incorporated into an imperialistic world order with the West at the apex. Japan became an imperialistic power through its victory in the RussoJapanese War of 1904–1905, and the nationalistic goal of joining the ranks of the Western powers gave added justification to participation in sport and the Olympics. In 1911 Kanō established the Greater Japan Physical Education Association, which served as the Japanese Olympic Committee, and the next year he sent two athletes (including one from his own school) to the Games in Stockholm. Japan sent athletes to every Olympics for the next three decades, and won its first medal at the 1920 Antwerp Games. This close connection between college sport clubs and the Olympics had a significant influence on the subsequent development of sport clubs at the university level. The third factor is the influence of the Far Eastern Championship Games (FECG). The Philippines, China and Japan participated in these games a total of ten times between 1913 and 1934, and the IOC formally recognised them in 1920.12 The FECG were the brainchild of the Physical Director of the Manila YMCA, Elwood S. Brown. Kanō was initially not enthusiastic about participating; he dismissed the FECG as ‘insignificant,’13 likely referring to the limited scale of the event and to the fact that, unlike the Olympics in which Western powers took the lead, the competition in the FECG was an American colony, the Philippines, and China, which itself had been bullied into a semi-colonial status—not the sort of company for an aspiring world power to keep. Kanō and his colleagues began to participate more actively from the 3rd FECG, held in Tokyo in 1917.14 This was the first international sport competition held in Japan, and as such had a big impact on raising the interest of the Japanese people in sport. Events were held in seven sport: athletics (track and field), aquatics, tennis, basketball, volleyball, soccer and baseball. Note that the American sport of basketball, volleyball and baseball were included, though they were not yet Olympic sport. The FECG and the YMCA of Japan played a big role in the popularisation of volleyball and basketball in Japan.15 These games also kick-started the relevance of soccer in Japan, a latecomer to the sport in Asia.

State support, participation in international competitions, and expansion: 1921–1936 As we have already seen, Kanō Jigorō emphasised the national significance of physical education and the Olympics. The national government appeared to concur in 1921 when it began to subsidise delegations of athletes from the national treasury. In that year the Ministry of Education provided financial support for the delegation to the 5th FECG, held in Shanghai.The Ministries of Education and the Interior provided financial support to the delegation to the 1924 Paris Olympic Games, and in subsequent years the government continued to provide support for delegates to these two events.16 In 1924 the Ministry of the Interior established the first comprehensive national sport competition in Japan: the Meiji Shrine Games, held to commemorate the completion of the Meiji Shrine Stadium in Tokyo and to celebrate the ‘virtue’ of the late Emperor Meiji, to whom the shrine is dedicated. These games were held about every other year until 1943, a total of 14 times. Initially they included 14 events: the seven events held at the FECG, plus 138

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sumo, kendo, judo, kyudō, equestrianism, hockey and rowing. Rugby, shooting, boxing, table tennis, gymnastics, skiing, skating, yachting and other sport were added later. The Ministry of the Interior withdrew from the event after the third Games, but the government continued its subsidies.17 The Ministry of Education also established a National Sports Day in 1924, and pressured schools and governmental bodies to participate in sport and physical education events held simultaneously around the country on that day. This was part of a policy of ‘social physical education’ conceived by the Ministries of Education and the Interior in response to the deteriorating health of the nation’s citizens, as reflected in an increase in the rate of infant mortality and tuberculosis.18 It is perhaps no mere coincidence that the government’s new policy to promote sport took place during a period of reign change. Emperor Taisho was an invalid and Crown Prince Hirohito was appointed Regent in November 1921, shortly after he returned from a six-month tour of Europe. Hirohito was touted in the media as an avid sport fan and a sportsman himself. He played golf with British Crown Prince Edward during the latter’s visit to Japan in April 1922; he tried his hand at skiing, and film footage of him displaying his swimming skills was shown to the public. He attended a variety of sporting events as a spectator, often donating a trophy for the victor. Many of these trophies have subsequently become standard issue and are now known as Emperor’s Cups. Probably the best known of these is the one presented to the champion of each of the six annual professional sumo tournaments and the one presented to the champion of the Tokyo Six Universities Baseball League. Emperor Taisho donated an Emperor’s Cup for the Sixth FECG, hosted by Japan in 1923, and Hirohito’s younger brother Prince Chichibu served as Director of the Games. It goes without saying that it became the paramount mission of every subsequent Japanese delegation to bring home the Emperor’s Cup. Prince Chichibu was even more actively involved with sport than his older brother; in addition to being a frequent spectator at sporting events, he also presented the Japanese delegation to the 1924 Paris Olympics with a Rising Sun flag to be carried at the head of the delegation during the opening ceremony. Prince Chichibu was known as the ‘prince of sport.’ When British Crown Prince Edward was in Japan in 1922, he commented that Crown Prince Hirohito was the driving force behind the growth of sport in Japan. It is true that during this time the imperial family took a leading role in promoting sport. That is probably because the Japanese imperial family took its cue from the British royal family, which, in response to the collapse of hereditary monarchies throughout Europe, had successfully created a new image of the royal family. The patronage of sport by the Japanese imperial family was its response to a similar sense of crisis. Sport focused attention on the body of the monarch, and in that way symbolised a transformation in the main function of the royal family. The promotion of sport by the imperial family carried huge weight in Japanese society and was effective in countering the jingoistic opponents of (Western) sport. One example of this is the embrace of sport by the military, which reached its peak in the early 1920s.19 In this way, by the 1920s the English word ‘sport (スポーツ)’ became part of the Japanese language. As the government and the imperial family encouraged the development of sport, alumni of college sport clubs began to form national sporting bodies. The first was the Japan Rowing Association, established in 1920. By 1938 national bodies had been established for football (soccer), tennis and equestrianism, among other sport (see Table 14.3). Most of these bodies joined Kanō’s Greater Japan Physical Education Association, as well as the appropriate international federations. In this way Japan began to participate in the international sport network comprising the IOC and the international federations. 139

Yasuhiro Sakaue and Lee Thompson Table 14.3 The Establishment of Sport Associations in Japan through the 1930s20 Rowing Football (soccer) Tennis Riding Hockey ‘Soft’ tennis Golf Aquatic sport Skiing Track and field Amateur boxing Rugby Volleyball International equestrianism Skating Gymnastics Basketball Table tennis Amateur wrestling Yachting Cycling Weightlifting Amateur fencing Shooting Handball Canoeing

1920 1921 1922 1922 1923 1924 1924 1924 1925 1925 1926 1926 1927 1929 1929 1930 1930 1931 1932 1932 1934 1936 1936 1937 1938 1938

The number of middle and higher schools for girls increased in the 1920s, and their students also began to hold Sports Days. Although limited in scope, as the opportunities for women to participate in sport increased, so did the level of the competition. However, a strong gender bias restricted the opportunities for women in sport, as reflected in the stark difference in the sport teams available for boys and girls in middle schools (Table 14.4). This gap subsequently narrowed, but the proportion of girls’ middle schools with clubs for such sport as judo, kendo, sumo and rowing remained below one percent, as these sport were thought to be unsuitable for women.21 The country also became increasingly urbanised from the 1920s on, and by 1935, a quarter of the population lived in the 34 cities with populations over 100,000. Students who played extracurricular sport in school went on to become civil servants, white-collar workers, factory workers and merchants, and continued to play sport such as baseball, tennis and table tennis in their leisure time. Sport, along with cinema and radio, flourished as a paradigmatic leisure activity in the emerging urban popular culture, part of a developing urban lifestyle based on new modes of communication and transportation.22 A large gap existed between the cities and the countryside, however. The majority of young men did not attend middle school and remained in the countryside; for them, youth associations (seinendan, 青年団) provided an opportunity to participate in sport. According to a 1930 survey, the main sporting activity for rural youth associations was track and field, followed by the martial arts at 40 percent, and sumo and mountain climbing at around 10 percent each. Urban youth 140

Modern sport and Olympic Movement in Japan Table 14.4 Middle School Sports Clubs in 1932*23

Kendo Judo Kyudo Sumo Track and field Swimming Tennis Volleyball Basketball Baseball Table tennis Football Rugby Rowing Skiing Skating Others Total

Boys’ Middle Schools

Girls’ Middle Schools

Vocational Schools

Totals

569 476 119 155 550 377 546 175 213 450 47 210 24 73 72 10 210 4,276

1 0 132 0 517 199 600 563 451 2 424 0 0 3 56 8 403 3,359

508 311 98 166 453 197 481 81 127 260 114 52 5 25 48 8 220 3,154

1,078 787 349 321 1,520 773 1,627 819 791 712 585 262 29 101 176 26 833 10,789

Survey among 2,153 schools: 594 boys’ schools, 949 girls’ schools and 610 vocational schools

*

associations, in contrast, provided a wider variety of sporting opportunities: participation in track and field, mountain climbing, martial arts and baseball surpassed 20 percent each, and swimming and table tennis surpassed 10 percent.24 A 1940 survey revealed that little had changed. Baseball, tennis and table tennis had not spread beyond the urban areas.25 Talented rural youth did have the opportunity to prove themselves in regional and national events. At the first Meiji Shrine Games, for example, 546 of the 3,144 participants were from rural youth associations, and they represented their prefectures in track and field and other events.26 There is a widely accepted view, both within Japan and without, that there were unique cultural foundations for the adoption of modern sport in Japan which resulted in sport being culturally transformed into something uniquely Japanese. Specifically, it is claimed that as Western sport gained popularity in Japan, it was infused with what was assumed to be the dominant ethos of its practitioners: the spirit of budō (the Japanese martial arts) and/or bushidō (the way of the warrior).27 This prevailing conception is based on what Donnelly and Young identify as the overly simple notion that ‘sports represent a direct reflection of the dominant culture.’28 In contrast, they suggest that we should ‘consider sport less as a totally incorporated aspect of culture and more as an area in which values, ideologies and meanings are contested.’29 Sport is ‘a cultural form that is constantly being produced and reproduced.’30 In this vein, recent research on sport in Japan has revealed a more varied and dynamic picture, through careful analysis of contemporary accounts of active and former student athletes and media discourses over time. In contrast to the prevailing conception, these studies show that sport in Japan has at times opposed the dominant culture.31 Recent careful analyses of the sporting activities of the larger populace, rather than just students, also challenge this prevailing assumption. Based on studies of the life history of the 141

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common people, some scholars assert that folk games (such as sumo), festivals, and traditional forms of tourism and travel are more plausible foundations on which the cultural assimilation of Western sport was based.32

Sport and the Olympics during the war years, 1937–1945 At the fourth Summer Olympics in which Japan participated, the Amsterdam Games of 1928, the country won its first gold medals, in the triple jump and the men’s 200-metre breaststroke. For each of the next 10 years, until 1937, Japan participated in one of three sporting megaevents: the Olympic games, the Far Eastern Championship Games or the Meiji Shrine Games. Other sporting events of varying sizes were also held throughout the country. In the process, sport became prime fodder for the media. Newspapers, magazines and radio all covered sport, stirring up enthusiasm among their readers and listeners. The impact of radio in particular was enormous. Early sport broadcasts consisted mainly of baseball and sumo. Live broadcasts of baseball began in 1927, and by the 1933 more than 100 games were broadcast per year.33 The popularity of interscholastic baseball led to the birth of professional baseball in 1936. For their part, newspapers not only increased their coverage of sport, they also began to stage and sponsor sporting events themselves. In 1915 the Asahi newspaper inaugurated an annual national high school baseball tournament, and has continued to sponsor the event for over 100 years. From the 1920s on, newspaper companies vied to establish competitions in a variety of sport including baseball, tennis, track and field and swimming. Japan sent a contingent of 190 athletes to the Los Angeles Olympic Games in 1932, the second-largest delegation after the host country. The contingent was supported not only by a subsidy from the national government and a donation from the Emperor, but also by a fundraising campaign headed by the mayor of Tokyo. These efforts were rewarded with a haul of 18 medals, including seven gold, which vaulted Japan to the status of a rising sport power and garnered the attention of the world. Since Tokyo had already announced its desire to host the next Olympic Games, the substantial contingent and the performance of Japan’s athletes made a strong case for a successful bid. Japan’s presence and performance at Los Angeles also had a foreign policy dimension. The Japanese army had invaded China the year before, occupying its three northeastern provinces and establishing the puppet state of Manchuria. The international community had objected to these developments, however, and the Japanese government hoped that the Los Angeles Games would provide the opportunity to rehabilitate Japan’s image in the eyes of America and the rest of the international community. But the generally favourable impression generated by the performance of Japan’s athletes and their adherence to the principles of fair play was not transferable to the political realm.34 The General Assembly of the League of Nations voted 42–1 not to recognise Manchuria as an independent state, and in 1933 Japan withdrew from the League. Japan then tried to have Manchuria included in the 10th Far Eastern Championship Games to be held in the Philippines in 1934 but was stymied by fierce opposition from China. Japan responded by withdrawing from the FECG and establishing a separate body, the Amateur Athletic Association of the Orient, but this body never actually organised any events.35 The Manchurian dispute thus brought an end to the 21-year history of the Far Eastern Championship Games. Japan’s military adventurism from the 1930s had chilling consequences for sport in the region. Japan went on to win a total of 18 medals, including six gold, at the 1936 Berlin Games. These were broadcast live in Japan and the exploits of the athletes were transmitted in real time, creating a sensation. No other sporting event had ever garnered so much attention and created 142

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such a stir.36 The Los Angeles Olympics were the first Games during which representations and discourses of nationalism, such as national symbols and war metaphors, were replete in the newspaper coverage, and this tendency increased during the Berlin Games.37 However, Japan had not yet formed a military alliance with Germany and Italy, and World War II had not yet broken out, so newspaper coverage did not stress solidarity with Germany or Italy and did not encourage hostility towards Britain and America. Tokyo was selected as the host city for the 1940 Olympics on the day before the opening of the Berlin Games. This big news accentuated interest in the Games in Japan, stimulating an almost feverish excitement. At the time Japan was repeatedly engaging in reckless challenges to the international order over recognition of Manchuria, and had seemed to paint itself into a corner. However, several factors contributed to the success of Tokyo’s bid. Japan had campaigned intensively for five years, and eventually convinced Italian Prime Minister Mussolini to withdraw Rome’s bid.38 The large delegations and the performance of Japan’s athletes (see Table 14.2) at previous Games had helped to establish Japan’s international sporting reputation. The significance of having the first Games in Asia, and the conceit of the international sporting community that ‘sports and politics are separate,’ also contributed. A mere two years after successfully bidding for the 1940 Games, however, Japan went ‘missing.’39 The direct reason was the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. An increasing number of countries began to express reservations about holding the Olympics in one of the belligerent countries in that conflict, and it became apparent that if the war were still being fought by the time the official letters of invitation were issued in January 1939, many countries would decline to participate.40 One aim of the Olympic Movement is to promote peace, and thus the 1940 Tokyo Games were an opportunity for the international community to convey its desire for Japan to end the war on the continent. Japan was not listening. Turning its back on international public opinion, Japan renounced the 1940 Games in order to focus its energies on the war. Helsinki was chosen to be the replacement site, but those Games, and the Games scheduled for London in 1944, were both cancelled due to World War II. The wartime regime intensified after Tokyo gave up the 1940 Olympics and Japan entered WWII in 1941. Until recently the accepted view has been that, reflecting the nationalist and militarist mood of the times, the government suppressed sport and promoted the martial arts (budō) and mass gymnastics. However, that only applies to young men, and students in particular, as revealed by more recent research that takes a look at women and working men, and is revising the above scenario.41 The government and military mainly focused on young men of enlistment age, and the Ministry of Education prioritised preparing them for the battlefield by developing basic physical fitness and combat skills through military drills and by restricting the practice of ball games and other sport. These restrictions applied to extracurricular activities as well. The martial arts and activities associated with combat skills (bayonet [銃剣道], shooting, marching) were encouraged. The only ball games considered appropriate were rugby, soccer, handball and basketball.42 Baseball and other clubs were abolished, and these sport were excluded from the various tournaments. The Tokyo Six University Baseball League was disbanded in 1943, symbolizing the decline of inter-scholastic sport for men.43 In contrast, women students were encouraged to participate in ball games as part of their extracurricular activities.44 The Ministry of Welfare also encouraged working men and women to play baseball, tennis and other sport as leisure activities. As the war drew on, and people’s lives in general became more circumscribed by numerous restrictions, the government recognised the importance of sport and other physical activities to revive their flagging spirits (in order to maintain their productivity).45 143

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Conclusion: post-war recovery The London Olympics were held in July 1948. They were the first Olympics in 12 years, the Games having been suspended twice because of WWII. Japan, however, did not participate – neither Japan nor Germany were invited. Japan had joined forces with Germany and Italy during the war but kept fighting even after the other two countries had surrendered. The result of this intransigence was the atomic bomb, occupation by Allied troops led by the United States, a ban on the martial arts (budō) and expulsion from the IOC and other international sporting bodies. Japan began the long process of rehabilitation by rejoining the various international sport federations. In 1951 it participated in the first Asian Games, held in New Delhi, representing its return to international sport competition, and it returned to the Olympic stage at the 1952 Helsinki Olympics after a 16-year hiatus. Japan went on to participate in the Melbourne and Rome Games, but what really enhanced its presence in the Olympic Movement was the 1964 Tokyo Olympics. Ever since Japan relinquished the 1940 Tokyo Games, hosting the Olympic Games had been the Holy Grail of the sport community in Japan, and after a seven-year campaign they finally succeeded in winning the bid in May 1959. The Tokyo Games, with 5,137 athletes from 33 countries, were broadcast around the world via satellite. Domestically these games were seen as a celebration of Japan’s recovery from the devastations of war and its development into a peaceful, democratic country; they also helped restore a sense of pride. The performance of Japan’s athletes symbolised the country’s vigorous push towards rapid economic growth. Not all of the country’s citizens welcomed the 1964 Tokyo Games, however. In a survey taken four months before the opening ceremony, over half of the respondents agreed with the statement, ‘There are better things for the country to spend its money on than holding the Olympics.’46 After the Games were over, novelist Kikumura Itaru summed up his feelings: ‘I guess it was a good thing after all to have held the Olympics. It’s like climbing Mount Fuji: everybody should do it once. But only a fool would do it twice.’47 Many of his compatriots probably agreed. However, by now these doubts and criticisms appear to have been forgotten, and amidst a loud chorus promoting visions of success and prosperity,Tokyo is preparing to hold the Olympic Games for the second time in 2020.

Notes 1 Allen Guttmann and Lee Thompson, Japanese Sports: A History (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2001), 13–41. 2 Hideaki Kinoshita, Heishiki taisō kara mita gun to kyōiku [Military Drills in the Military and in Education] (Tokyo: Kyōrin Shoin, 1982). 3 Yūzō Kishino and Kyūzō Takenoshita, Kindai nihon gakkō taiikushi [The History of School Physical Education in Modern Japan] (Tokyo: Tōyōkan Shuppan, 1959). 4 Tōru Watanabe, “ ‘Meijiki chūgakkō ni okeru supōtsu katsudō” [Sport Activities in Middle School in the Meiji Era],‘ The Proceedings of the Department of Sports Sciences College of Arts and Sciences, the University of Tokyo 12 (1978): 1–22. 5 Nobumasa Kawamoto, ed., Orimpikku no jiten [Dictionary of the Olympics] (Tokyo: Sanseidō, 1984); Fumio Tsukahara, ‘ “1912 nen – 2008 nen kaki Orimpikku Nihon daihyō senshudan ni kansuru shiryō: shozoku soshiki to saishū gakureki wo chūshin ni” [The Japanese National Team at the Summer Olympic Games, 1912–2008: Affiliation and Educational Background]’, Supōtsu kagaku kenkyū [Sport Science Research, Waseda University] 10 (2013): 241–316. 6 Ibid. 7 Keiō Gijuku Taiikukai, Keiō gijuku taiikukai nempyō (Tokyo: Keiō gijuku taiikukai, 1977). 8 Yasuhiro Sakaue, Nippon yakyū no keifugaku [A Genealogy of Japanese Baseball] (Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2001). 144

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9 Donald Roden, ‘ “Baseball and the Quest for National Dignity in Meiji Japan’,” American Historical Review 85 (1980): 513. 10 Ibid., 519. 11 Allen Guttmann, Games and Empires: Modern Sports and Cultural Imperialism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 79. 12 Ikuo Abe, ‘ “Historical Significance of the Far Eastern Championship Games: An International Political Arena’,” in Olympic Japan: Ideals and Realities of (Inter)Nationalism, ed. Andreas Niehaus and Max Seinsch (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2007), 67–87. 13 Kō Takashima, ‘ “Kyokutō senshuken kyōgi taikai to YMCA” [Far Eastern Championship Games and YMCA]’, in Chūgoku Higashi-Ajia gaikō kōryū shi no kenkyū [The History of Diplomacy in China and East Asia], ed. Susumu Fuma (Kyoto: Kyōto Daigaku gakujutsu shuppankai, 2007), 479. 14 Stefan Huebner, Pan-Asian Sports and the Emergence of Modern Asia, 1913–1974 (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2016). 15 Takashima, ‘ “Kyokutō senshuken kyōgi taikai to YMCA’,” 487. 16 Yūji Ishizaka, ‘ “Senzen no supōtsukai no sokuseki: Orimpikku hatsusanka kara maboroshi ni itaru made” [Sport in Prewar Japan: From First Olympic Participation to the Cancellation of the 1940 Games]’, in Nippon no Orimpikku: Nihon wa Orimpizumu to ikani mukiatte kitaka, ed.Yasunao Kojita et al. [Japan and the Olympics: How Japan Has Viewed Olympism] (Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2018), 86–112. 17 For further details of the games, see Katsumi Irie, Meijijingū kyōgitaikai to kokumin seishin sōdōin undō [The Meiji Shrine Games and Full Mobilisation] (Tokyo: Fumaidō Shuppan, 1991); K. Takashima, Teikoku Nihon to Supōtsu [The Japanese Empire and Sport] (Hanawa Shobō, 2012). 18 This and the following three paragraphs reference Yasuhiro Sakaue, Kenryoku sochi toshite no supōtsu: Teikoku Nihon no kokka senryaku [State and Sport in Inter-War Japan] (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1998), 56–77; Yasuhiro Sakaue, Shōwa Tennō to supōtsu: Gyokutai no kindaishi [The Showa Emperor and Sport: A Modern History of the Imperial Presence] (Tokyo:Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2016), 110–32, 173–76. 19 Kō Takashima, Guntai to supōtsu [The Military and Sport in Modern Japan] (Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2015). 20 Nihon Taiiku Kyōkai, Nihon Taiiku Kyōkai 75 nenshi [75-Year History of Japan Amateur Sports Association] (Tokyo: Nippon taiiku kyokai, 1986). 21 Fūta Suzuki, ‘ “Senjiki no supōtsu to jendā: Monbushō no ‘jūten seisaku’ wo chūshin ni” [Sport and Gender in Japan During the Asia-Pacific War: Focusing on the ‘Priority System’ Policy of the Ministry of Education]’, Hitotsubashi Annual of Sport Studies 31 (2012): 48. 22 Masaru Kōzu, Nihon kindai supōtsu shi no teiryū [Undercurrents of Sport History in Modern Japan] (Tokyo: Sōbun Kikaku, 1994), 238–55. . 23 Monbu Daijin Kanbō Taiiku-ka 1933, quoted in Sakaue, Kenryoku sochi toshite no supōtsu, 32 24 Sakaue, Kenryoku sochi toshite no supōtsu, 44–45. 25 Nobuyoshi Tasaki, ‘ “Senkanki to atarashii seikatsu bunka” [The New Life Culture in the Inter-War Period],’ in Kindai Nihon no toshi to nōson: Gekido no 1920–50 nendai [Cities and Villages in Modern Japan: The Turbulent 1920s–50s], ed. Nobuyoshi Tasaki (Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2012), 25. 26 Sakaue, Kenryoku sochi toshite no supōtsu, 61. 27 Kōzu, Nihon kindai supōtsu shi no teiryū, 14–22. 28 Peter Donnelly and Kevin M.Young, ‘ “Reproduction and Transformation of Cultural Forms in Sport: A Contextual Analysis of Rugby,”‘ International Review for the Sociology of Sport 20, no. 1–2 (1985): 19. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid., 20. 31 For example, Sakaue, Nippon yakyū no keifugaku; Thomas Blackwood, ‘ “Bushidō Baseball? Three ‘Fathers’ and the Invention of a Tradition’,” Social Science Japan Journal 11, no. 2 (2008): 223–40. 32 Kōzu, Nihon kindai supōtsu shi no teiryū, 79–177. 33 Ibid., 250. 34 Sakaue, Kenryoku sochi toshite no supōtsu, 188–92. 35 Kō Takashima, ‘‘ “Manshūkoku no tanjō to Kyokutō supōtsukai no saihen” [The Birth of Manchuria and Its Impact on Sports in the Far East], Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University 47 (2008): 131–81; Huebner, Pan-Asian Sports and the Emergence of Modern Asia, 70–73. 36 Sakaue, Kenryoku sochi toshite no supōtsu, 210–19. 37 Sachie Hamada, Nihon ni okeru media Orimpikku no tanjō: Los Angeles, Berlin, Tokyo [The Birth of the Mediated Olympics in Japan: Los Angeles, Berlin and Tokyo] (Kyoto: Mineruva shobō, 2016), 139–204. 38 Tetsuo Nakamura, ‘ “IOC Kaichō Baillet-Latour karamita Tokyo Orimpikku” [How IOC President Baillet-Latour perceived the 1940 Tokyo Olympic Games]’, in Maboroshi no Tōkyō Orimpikku to sono 145

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jidai: Supōtsu, toshi, shintai [The 1940 Tokyo Olympics and Its Period: Sport, Body and Urban Areas in Wartime], ed.Yasuhiro Sakaue and Hiroyuki Takaoka (Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2009), 26–28. 39 Sandra Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games: The Missing Olympics: Japan, the Asian Olympics and the Olympic Movement (London: Routledge, 2007). 40 Junko Tahara, ‘ “Dai 12 kai Orimpikku Tōkyō taikai no kaisai chūshi wo meguru shogaikoku no hannō ni tuite: Gaimushō gaikō shiryōkan bunsho no bunseki wo toshite” [A Study of the Responses of Foreign Countries to the Cancellation of the Games of the 12th Olympiad, Tokyo: Through an Analysis of the Documents in the Possession of the Diplomatic Record Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan]’, Japanese Journal of Physical Education 38, no. 2 (1993): 87–98; Nakamura, ‘ “IOC Kaichō BailletLatour karamita Tokyo Orimpikku’,” 48–49. 41 Fūta Suzuki, ‘ “Taiiku supōtsu no senji hensei to jendā” [Sport and Gender in Japan During Wartime]’ (PhD diss., Hitotsubashi University, 2014). 42 Suzuki, ‘ “Senjiki no supōtsu to jendā’,” 51. 43 Tetsuya Nakamura and Toshio Kunugi, ‘ “Gakusei yakyū no kokkatōsei to jichi: Senjika no Tobita Suishū” [The Autonomy of Interscholastic Baseball and State Control: Suishū Tobita During the War]’, in Maboroshi no Tōkyō Orimpikku to sono jidai: Supōtsu, toshi, shintai [The 1940 Tokyo Olympics and Its Period: Sport, Body and Urban Areas in Wartime], ed.Yasuhiro Sakaue and Hiroyuki Takaoka (Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2009), 354–78. 44 Suzuki, ‘ “Senjiki no supōtsu to jendā’,” 51–53. 45 Yasuhiro Sakaue, ‘ “Hyōteki toshiteno toshi: Kōseishō ni yoru undōshisetsu kakujū seisaku no tenkai” [Targeting the Cities: The Policy of the Ministry of Health and Welfare During the War]’, in Maboroshi no Tokyo Orimpikku to sono jidai: Supōtsu, toshi, shintai [The 1940 Tokyo Olympics and Its Period: Sport, Body and Urban Areas in Wartime], ed. Yasuhiro Sakaue and Hiroyuki Takaoka (Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2009), 279–319; Yasuhiro Sakaue, ‘ “Taiheiyō sensō ka no supōtsu shōrei: 1943 nen no Kōseishō no seisaku hōshin, undōyōgu oyobi kyōgitaikai no tōsei” [Sport Promotion During the Pacific War: The Policy and Control Over the Production of Sporting Goods and the Holding of Athletic Meetings by the Welfare Ministry in 1943]’, Hitotsubashi Annual of Sport Studies 29 (2010): 11–18; Suzuki, ‘ “Taiiku supōtsu no senji hensei to jendā’.” 46 Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai Hōsō Yoron Chōsasho, Tōkyō Orimpikku [Tokyo Olympics] (Tokyo: Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai Hōsō Yoron Chōsasho, 1967), 141. 47 Itaru Kikumura, ‘ “Yattemite yokatta” [It Was a Good Experience]’, Yomiuri shimbun, October 24, 1964.

Bibliography Abe, Ikuo. “Historical Significance of the Far Eastern Championship Games: An International Political Arena.” In Olympic Japan: Ideals and Realities of (Inter) Nationalism, edited by Andreas Niehaus and Max Seinsch, 67–87. Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2007. Blackwood, Thomas. “Bushidō Baseball? Three ‘Fathers’ and the Invention of a Tradition.” Social Science Japan Journal 11, no. 2 (2008): 223–40. Collins, Sandra. The 1940 Tokyo Games: The Missing Olympics: Japan, the Asian Olympics and the Olympic Movement. London: Routledge, 2007. Donnelly, Peter, and Kevin M. Young. “Reproduction and Transformation of Cultural Forms in Sport: A Contextual Analysis of Rugby.” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 20, no. 1–2 (1985): 19. Guttmann, Allen. Games and Empires: Modern Sports and Cultural Imperialism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. Guttmann, Allen, and Lee Thompson. Japanese Sports: A History. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2001. Hamada, Sachie. Nihon ni okeru media Orimpikku no tanjō: Los Angeles, Berlin,Tokyo [The Birth of the Mediated Olympics in Japan: Los Angeles, Berlin and Tokyo]. Kyoto: Mineruva shobō, 2016. Huebner, Stefan. Pan-Asian Sports and the Emergence of Modern Asia, 1913–1974. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2016. Irie, Katsumi. Meijijingū kyōgitaikai to kokumin seishin sōdōin undō [The Meiji Shrine Games and Full Mobilisation]. Tokyo: Fumaidō Shuppan, 1991.

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Ishizaka, Yūji. “Senzen no supōtsukai no sokuseki: Orimpikku hatsusanka kara maboroshi ni itaru made” [Sport in Prewar Japan: From First Olympic Participation to the Cancellation of the 1940 Games]. In Nippon no Orimpikku: Nihon wa Orimpizumu to ikani mukiatte kitaka [Japan and the Olympics: How Japan Has Viewed Olympism], edited by Yasunao Kojita et al. Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2018. Kawamoto, Nobumasa, ed. Orimpikku no jiten [Dictionary of the Olympics]. Tokyo: Sanseidō, 1984. Keiō Gijuku Taiikukai. Keiō gijuku taiikukai nempyō. Tokyo: Keiō gijuku taiikukai, 1977. Kinoshita, Hideaki. Heishiki taisō kara mita gun to kyōiku [Military Drills in the Military and in Education]. Tokyo: Kyōrin Shoin, 1982. Kishino,Yūzō, and Kyūzō Takenoshita. Kindai nihon gakkō taiikushi [The History of School Physical Education in Modern Japan]. Tokyo: Tōyōkan Shuppan, 1959. Kōzu, Masaru. Nihon kindai supōtsu shi no teiryū [Undercurrents of Sport History in Modern Japan]. Tokyo: Sōbun Kikaku, 1994. Kyōkai, Nihon Taiiku. Nihon Taiiku Kyōkai 75 nenshi [75-Year History of Japan Amateur Sports Association]. Tokyo: Nippon taiiku kyokai, 1986. Nakamura,Tetsuo. “IOC Kaichō Baillet-Latour karamita Tokyo Orimpikku” [How IOC President BailletLatour Perceived the 1940 Tokyo Olympic Games]. In Maboroshi no Tokyo Orimpikku to sono jidai: Supōtsu, toshi, shintai [The 1940 Tokyo Olympics and Its Period: Sport, Body and Urban Areas in Wartime], edited by Yasuhiro Sakaue and Hiroyuki Takaoka, 26–28. Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2009. Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai Hōsō Yoron Chōsasho. Tokyo Orimpikku [Tokyo Olympics]. Tokyo: Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai Hōsō Yoron Chōsasho, 1967. Roden, Donald. “Baseball and the Quest for National Dignity in Meiji Japan.” American Historical Review 85 (1980): 513. Sakaue,Yasuhiro. Kenryoku sochi toshite no supōtsu:Teikoku Nihon no kokka senryaku [State and Sport in InterWar Japan]. Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1998. Sakaue,Yasuhiro. Nippon yakyū no keifugaku [A Genealogy of Japanese Baseball]. Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2001. Sakaue,Yasuhiro. Shōwa Tennō to supōtsu: Gyokutai no kindaishi [The Showa Emperor and Sport: A Modern History of the Imperial Presence]. Tokyo:Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2016. Sakaue,Yasuhiro. “Taiheiyō sensō ka no supōtsu shōrei: 1943 nen no Kōseishō no seisaku hōshin, undōyōgu oyobi kyōgitaikai no tōsei” [Sport Promotion During the Pacific War:The Policy and Control Over the Production of Sporting Goods and the Holding of Athletic Meetings by the Welfare Ministry in 1943]. Hitotsubashi Annual of Sport Studies 29 (2010): 11–18. Suzuki, Fūta. “Senjiki no supōtsu to jendā: Monbushō no ‘jūten seisaku’ wo chūshin ni” [Sport and Gender in Japan During the Asia-Pacific War: Focusing on the ‘Priority System’ Policy of the Ministry of Education]. Hitotsubashi Annual of Sport Studies 31 (2012): 48. Suzuki, Fūta. “Taiiku supōtsu no senji hensei to jendā” [Sport and Gender in Japan During Wartime]. PhD diss., Hitotsubashi University, 2014. Tahara, Junko. “Dai 12 kai Orimpikku Tokyo taikai no kaisai chūshi wo meguru shogaikoku no hannō ni tuite: Gaimushō gaikō shiryōkan bunsho no bunseki wo toshite” [A Study of the Responses of Foreign Countries to the Cancellation of the Games of the 12th Olympiad, Tokyo: Through an Analysis of the Documents in the Possession of the Diplomatic Record Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan]. Japanese Journal of Physical Education 38, no. 2 (1993): 87–98. Takashima, Kō. Guntai to supōtsu [The Military and Sport in Modern Japan]. Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2015. Takashima, Kō. “Kyokutō senshuken kyōgi taikai to YMCA” [Far Eastern Championship Games and YMCA]. In Chūgoku Higashi-Ajia gaikō kōryū shi no kenkyū [The History of Diplomacy in China and East Asia], edited by Susumu Fuma. Kyoto: Kyōto Daigaku gakujutsu shuppankai, 2007. Takashima, Kō. “Manshukoku no tanjō to Kyokutō supōtsukai no saihen” [The Birth of Manchuria and Its Impact on Sports in the Far East]. Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University 47 (2008): 131–81. Takashima, Kō. Teikoku Nihon to Supōtsu [The Japanese Empire and Sport]. Hanawa Shobō, 2012. Tasaki, Nobuyoshi. “Senkanki to atarashii seikatsu bunka” [The New Life Culture in the Inter-War Period]. In Kindai Nihon no toshi to nōson: Gekido no 1920–50 nendai [Cities and Villages in Modern Japan: The Turbulent 1920s–50s], edited by Nobuyoshi Tasaki. Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2012.

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Tsukahara, Fumio. “1912 nen – 2008 nen kaki Orimpikku Nihon daihyō senshudan ni kansuru shiryō: shozoku soshiki to saishū gakureki wo chūshin ni” [The Japanese National Team at the Summer Olympic Games, 1912–2008: Affiliation and Educational Background]. Supōtsu kagaku kenkyū [Sport Science Research, Waseda University] 10 (2013): 241–316. Watanabe, Tōru. “Meijiki chūgakkō ni okeru supōtsu katsudō” [Sport Activities in Middle School in the Meiji Era]. The Proceedings of the Department of Sports Sciences College of Arts and Sciences, the University of Tokyo 12 (1978): 1–22.

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15 Beyond the Peninsula Sport and the Olympic Games in colonial Korea (1910–1945) Seok Lee

Introduction and diffusion of Western sport The years from 1870 to 1914 are known as the Age of Imperialism, during which European domination of the world reached its peak. During that half-century, the nations of Western Europe, later including the United States and Japan, expanded their imperial holdings around the globe. It was against this background that the Western challenge came to East Asia. In China, the easy British victory in the First Opium War (1839–1842) paved the way for brutal invasions by the era’s great powers, the collapse of the Qing dynasty and a bloody civil war until the rise of Mao and the Communists. Japan’s encounter with the ‘black ships’ and the Treaty of Kanagawa in 1854 caused the progressive samurai leaders’ reform programme, the Meiji Reform. Korea was not exempted; beginning in the 1840s,Western warships began to arrive in Korean ports. However, it was not Western powers but rather Japan that forced Korea to sign the Treaty of Kanghwa in 1876 to open up to Japanese trade. Consequently, Korea became a battlefield for pugnacious imperial powers. Two wars, the first Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) and the RussoJapanese War (1904–5), determined its fate. Japan won both and annexed Korea as a colony in 1910, ending the Chosŏn dynasty (1392–1910) after more than 500 years of independent rule. In this tumultuous period, Korea experienced dramatic modern transformation. Seoul had electricity, trolley cars, telephones, telegraph lines and a water system before any other major Asian city.1 With material cultures reshaping vistas in the ancient city, new types of Western-style popular culture were introduced to Korea. One of them was sport. Diverse agents from the West, including diplomats, merchants, journalists, teachers and soldiers, played an important role in popularising sport in Korea. In particular, the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) should be credited for the introduction of modern physical activity to Korea. Enjoying the protection afforded by a series of treaties that the Western powers signed with Korea in the 1880s, Christian missionaries played an increasingly pivotal role in the introduction of Western civilisation. Sport constituted an important part of the missionaries’ attempts to inculcate the notion of ‘muscular Christianity’ based around a ‘holistic’ trinity of mind, body and spirit.2 Starting from Paejae Academy, the first mission school established in 1885, the implementation of Western-style sport became a crucial part of the curriculum of these mission schools. The Hwangsŏng (Seoul) YMCA, established in 1903, enabled physical 149

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education to become not only a key component but a hallmark of American YMCA activities in Korea, as part of the ongoing sport classes and training sessions. Military rule (1910–1919) highlighted the extension of Japanese military and police control into all areas of civilian life on the peninsula. The YMCA became a centre of sporting activity for Koreans, who became familiar with a secularised version of Protestant subjectivity connected with strength, industry and self-management, known as ‘the whole man.’3 However, focusing only on the YMCA as a key player in sport diffusion downplays Korean agency. At the end of the nineteenth century, Korea was burdened with two tasks: reforming its traditional Confucian society and fending off imperialist forces. Herbert Spencer’s idea of the survival of the fittest provided the intellectual framework for a somatic view of Korean society in which the valorisation of physical strength and competitiveness was directly linked to state power and imperial rule. One of the many reformative actions undertaken to build the physical strength of Koreans was launched by King Kojong (r. 1864–1907, Kwangmu emperor from 1897), who played a critical role in transforming Korea into a modern nation state. The Rescript on National Education (kyoyuk ipkuk chosŏ), announced in 1895, recognised physical, intellectual and moral education as the three principles of education intended to integrate national subjects into the modern state system. A plethora of Korean intellectuals took up the slogan of ‘Enrich the country, strengthen the military’ (puguk kangbyŏng, Ja. fukoku kyōhei). Influenced by Chinese and Japanese social Darwinist reformism, they began to argue for the importance of physical education, suggesting various plans: establishing physical education schools, building public stadiums, forming sport research institutes, training physical education teachers and dispatching students to research foreign physical education programmes and public stadiums. An implicitly militarised subjectivity linked to notions of a vigorous, adventurous soul became essential to Korean ‘independence/modernisation.’4 A concept of the nation as ‘imagined community’ began to emerge at the end of the nineteenth century through print capitalism among Korean intellectuals.5 Korea’s indigenous newspapers began to serve as the primary medium for the reimagining of the nation through sport. Further influence in the expansion of Korean sport came from Japan. Much of what Koreans came to consider modern originated from the West, filtered through a Japanese prism. It should be noted that while modern sport was first introduced to Korea by British and American missionaries in the late nineteenth century, this new physical culture effloresced into organised and systematic forms during the colonial period. As in China,6 the very terms of Korean physical culture – physical education (ch’eyuk), calisthenics (ch’ejo) and exercise (undong) – were direct translations of Japanese terms (taiiku, taisō, undō) first used in the Meiji era.7 In Korea, the modern education system and sport organisations which disseminated sport information arose under Japanese influence. Korean students studying in Japan played a vital role in promoting the importance of sport in the interest of their homeland, through exhibition matches and lectures held around the country. Japan was the natural training ground for the new generation of Koreans who began their careers as athletes in the 1920s and 1930s. Japanese settlers in Korea, ‘brokers of empire’ as Jun Uchida calls them,8 played an important role in Korean sport by organising sport institutions, teaching and competing against Korean athletes. After World War I (1914–1919), the global Roaring Twenties, a decade of economic prosperity and a distinctive cultural edge, arrived on Korean soil. World War I had brought about a new multilateralism, increased interest in democracy and a trend towards disarmament. Japanese political leaders began to express a more lenient attitude towards the colonies in a bid to promote Japan’s new status as a world power.9 After massive uprisings in the spring of 1919, the Government-General of Korea (GGK) shifted from the previous policy of coercive military rule 150

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to ‘cultural rule,’ meant to lessen Korean resistance and co-opt Korean elites by encouraging active participation in the cultural and political affairs of the colony.10 A vibrant print industry that included a burgeoning number of newspapers, magazines and literary works offered forums for nationwide debates about sport and served as a catalyst for the diffusion of knowledge about sport into every corner of Korea. Major newspapers such as Tonga ilbo and Chosŏn ilbo became important agents in hosting and supporting sport competitions nationwide. GGK permission for the formation of civil organisations made possible the establishment of Korean-led sport clubs throughout the peninsula. Within the guidelines of the new cultural policy, the vast majority of the groups were centred on depoliticised social or cultural activities.11 Against this backdrop, the Korean Sports Association (Chosŏn ch’eyukhoe) was established in July 1920 to promote and coordinate sport among Koreans by means of research, publishing and organisation of sporting events. Beginning with the first All-Korea Baseball Game in 1920, nationwide contests in soccer, lawn tennis, track and field, and speed skating began in the first half of the 1920s. Prior to the Korean Sports Association, the Korean Sports Confederation (Chosŏn ch’eyuk hyŏphoe) had been formed by mainly Japanese settlers in colonial Korea in 1919 and worked to improve sport infrastructure and hosting national games. Most importantly for Korean athletes, local tryouts hosted by the Korean Sports Confederation provided a gateway to the higher levels of sport events held in the metropole. In particular, the Meiji Shrine Games, held 14 times between 1924 and 1943, was the main annual national sport competition in the Japanese empire. The locality (the Meiji Shrine) and date (the Meiji emperor’s birthday, November 3) epitomised the exploitation of sport in the interest of mobilising youth and nurturing loyalty to the state and emperor.12 On the other hand, it was also one of the most valuable opportunities for Korean athletes to compete with their colonisers on equal terms. Sport have long been the site wherein the colonised make culturally manifest their resistance to imperial rule. For instance, cricket was the primary vehicle for black Caribbean resistance to white colonial rule.13 Without a doubt, sport was the major arena where the most intense antiJapanese sentiment was aroused. Ethnic Korean schools put an emphasis on physical education as an element of the core curriculum in order to foster physically and mentally strong Korean young people. In their view, developing a modernised, rational body was essential in order for Koreans to overcome Japanese imperialism. Korean national identity was strengthened through sporting competitions organised by nationalist groups.14 One notable example was the defeat of Waseda University of Japan by Yŏnhŭi College (present-day Yonsei University) of Korea in a friendly soccer match in 1927. Furthermore, the Pʻyŏngyang Sungsil High school soccer team, made up of Korean nationals, won the Japanese Student Soccer Championship in 1928. Yangchŏng High School began to regularly win the Ekiden, a famous long-distance relay race in Japan, from the late 1920s on. These teams represented not just their schools but the whole Korean nation in an early emblematic national clash with the Japanese.15 The Japanese empire carried out an assimilation policy emulating German and French practices, one predestined to fail; in contrast to the rhetoric of assimilation and integration of Koreans into Japanese culture and society, the reality of assimilation policy detached the two peoples and pigeonholed Koreans as a distinctive, inferior race of imperial subjects.16 On the other hand, sport within the mass culture realm illustrates the varied dimension and contradictory character of ‘colonial modernity.’17 Sporting events, combined with mass media, helped shape a new kind of commercialised body culture through capitalist consumption. The strength of the market forces dominated the Korean sport world to the point where Korean 151

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national intellectuals were thwarted in their attempt to educate the masses though dignified popular culture as opposed to vulgar commercialism.18 In the 1920s, major domestic Korean newspapers began to sponsor popular Korean sporting tournaments, such as the Kyŏngsŏng (present-day Seoul)-Pʻyŏngyang Annual Soccer Match, reflecting regional rivalry between the two cities, and Yŏnhŭi (present-day Yonsei University)Posŏng (present-day Korea University) intercollegiate events. Beginning in 1928 and continuing into the 1930s, radio broadcasts of sport such as baseball, boxing and basketball were among the most popular programmes carried by the colonial Kyŏngsŏng Broadcast Corporation.19 In combination with commercial interests, the number of media-sponsored sport events increased rapidly. The position of modern spectator sport was established and consolidated due to the emergence of modern mass media at this time. By the 1920s, the transnational development of new media was bringing the exploits of sporting heroes to the audience in an unprecedentedly direct manner. As part of the Japanese empire, colonial Korea also embraced the phenomenon. Colonial subjects’ interest in the metropolitan centre often results in both resistance and mimicry; Korean mass media not only reported on foreign sport stars such as Jack Dempsey, Fred Perry, Jesse Owens, Don Bradman and Babe Ruth, based on mostly Japanese sources, but also commonly ran feature articles for the Korean public about Korean athletes competing against foreigners. In the 1910s, Ŏm Poktong (1892–1951), a cyclist who out-performed his Japanese counterparts, emerged as the first Korean sporting hero. Yi Yŏngmin (1905–1954), a renowned baseball player, achieved great fame, particularly when he hit a home run at Kyŏngsŏng Stadium in 1928 and joined an all-Japanese team playing against an American team that included Major League stars such as Babe Ruth, Lou Gehrig, Jimmie Foxx and Connie Mack, during their historic tour of Japan in 1934.20 Sŏ Chŏnggwŏn, a bantamweight professional boxer ranked sixth in the world, was pulverising foreign opponents in California, and his tremendous prize money made him a star. At the same time, the adaptation of traditional games to modern tastes and mass-mediated modes of delivery exemplified the resilience of Korean culture against the rule of imperial masters. Korean traditional physical activities were (re)invented as modern sport in new media in order to demonstrate Korean cultural distinctiveness. For instance, one of the most popular sport in colonial Korea was ssirŭm (Korean traditional wrestling). A nationwide competition was supported by mass media, standardised rules such as the size of the ring and a dress code similar to that of modern Western sport.21 As an amalgamation of tradition and modernity, ssirŭm symbolised a Korean tradition transformed into a modern sport up until the post-liberation period.

From bottom to top tier: the Olympics and colonial Korea An article entitled ‘If You are a Man of Chosŏn, Kick a Soccer Ball’ in the magazine Kaebyŏk (Creation) in November 1920 recommended soccer in order for Koreans to have long and strong legs like Westerners. Global recognition as a civilised race with able bodies was a national wish in order to overcome an inferiority complex towards Westerners in colonial Korea.22 International sporting events were a touchstone for Koreans to prove their ability to compete with imperial masters on equal terms. Before the Olympic Games, the Far Eastern Championship Games (FECG) served as an international arena in which Korean athletes could compete with their Asian counterparts. Four ethnic Korean students studying in China participated in the 1925 Manila FECG as members of the Chinese team, gratifying their home country’s desire to join the international community. Asia had been gradually incorporated into the Olympic Movement at the turn of the twentieth century. As sport gained prominence on an increasingly global scale, Pierre de Coubertin 152

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(1863–1937), founder of the modern Olympic Movement, sought to broaden the reach and elevate the influence of the Olympic Games around the world, including in Asia.The first Asian territories to compete in the Olympics were Japan in 1912, India in 1920 and the Philippines in 1924. Kanō Jigorō of Japan was elected to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1909, and delegates from India (Dorabji Tata) and China (Wang Zhengting) entered the Olympic fold in 1920 and 1922, respectively. China’s first Olympic delegation – a lone athlete accompanied by a coach and four bureaucrats – showed up in Los Angeles in 1932 to join the Olympic family. The overall competitiveness of Korean athletes increased significantly throughout the colonial period. Until the early 1920s, Korean athletes were far behind even the small number of Japanese residents in Korea in most sporting contests. Due to the expanding popularity of sport, Korean athletes soon caught up with their Japanese counterparts not only in colonial Korea, but in the metropole. In the early 1930s, the colonised surpassed the coloniser in soccer and reached a world-class level in the marathon. Finally, the 1932 Olympics saw three ethnic Korean Olympians represent Japan: Kim Ŭnbae and Kwŏn T’aeha (marathoners), and Hwang Ŭlsu (boxer). Thirteen Korean athletes went on to take part in global sporting events during the interwar period, as shown in Table 15.1. Among colonial Korea’s sport stars, Son Kijŏng (1912–2002), the winner of the 1936 Berlin Olympic marathon, stands out. As is well known, Son was coerced into running as a member of the Japanese national team. When he became the first ethnic Korean to win Olympic gold, national sentiment in his homeland had never been more unbridled. The ‘Japanese Flag Erasure Incident’ (Ilchang’gi malso sakŏn) – in which the Tonga ilbo and the Chosŏn chungang ilbo, the representative Korean vernacular newspapers of the time, doctored photographs to edit out the Japanese flag on Son’s sweatshirt on the podium – reflected Korean national sentiment.The incident provoked brutal punishment of the reporters by the Japanese colonial government. Many of them were tortured, jailed and laid off. This story resonated with heroic Korean nationalism Table 15.1 Korean Athletes as Members of the Japanese Olympic Team Olympics

Name

Event

Result

1932 Los Angeles Summer Games

Kim Ŭnbae Kwŏn T’aeha Hwang Ŭlsu Kim Chŏngyŏn

Marathon Marathon Boxing (lightweight) Speed skating

Yi Sŏngdŏk

Speed skating

Chang Usik

Speed skating

Son Kijŏng Nam Sŭngnyong Kim Yongsik Yi Kyuhwan Yi Sŏnggu, Chang Ijin, Yŏm Ŭnhyŏn

Marathon Marathon Soccer Boxing (welterweight) Basketball

6th 9th Eliminated in 1st round 1,500m: 15th 5,000m: 21st 10,000m: 13th 500m: 16th 1,500m: 23rd 5,000m: 27th 10,000m: 25th 5,000m: 27th 10,000m: 26th 1st 3rd Eliminated in 2nd round Eliminated in 1st round Eliminated in 3rd round

1936 GarmischPartenkirchen Winter Games

1936 Berlin Summer Games

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and became a part of Korean (sporting) history. Indeed, it is still engraved in Korean memory today as the culmination of Korean resistance against Japanese colonialism through sport.23 On the other hand, it is too simplistic to understand Son’s victory in terms of Korean nationalism. Through the ‘capital/ethnicity (nationality)/media’ triangular system, sport nationalism was maintained, reproduced and cast in a new, Korean-style mould. As new mass symbols, the Olympics and Son were attractive in terms of advertising for the business world. A number of both Korean and Japanese companies used Son as a means of profit.24 Media companies tried to attract the attention of Korean subscribers through news articles on his victory and even his privacy. Radios, telegrams and international calls enabled Korean journalists to report on Korean Olympians in the 1936 Nazi Games in real time. Ironically, infrastructure built by the Japanese empire, commercial business and mass media intersected with unyielding anti-colonial resistance. Colonial cultural policy shifted significantly from 1937 to 1945, during the Second SinoJapanese War and the Pacific War. Japanese colonial authorities began a programme of forced assimilation, including mandatory worship at Shinto shrines, the compulsory adoption of Japanese names, the exclusive use of the Japanese language, and conscription. The GGK used sport to advocate state ideologies and boost Korean loyalty to Japan. The Korean Sports Association was disbanded and integrated into the Korean Sports Confederation, supported by the GGK. The colonial policy was designed to make all of Korea into a military base, and Korean sport swiftly fell within the Japanese orbit. Military drills, including mass gymnastics, were enforced as part of the curriculum to achieve Japanese imperial war aims.25 All these activities were aimed at training Korea to be a ‘docile body,’ loyal to the Japanese empire without the need for routine violent punishment, in Foucault’s terms.26 Nevertheless, Korea’s reaction to the 1940 Tokyo Olympics shows a more nuanced picture of this period of heavy-handed Japanese wartime mobilisation. The Games were awarded to Tokyo by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1936, and subsequently given up by the Japanese in 1938. The Japanese empire hoped to host the games to deflect international criticism of its bellicosity caused by the Second Sino-Japanese War and to celebrate the 2,600th anniversary of the legendary founding of the Japanese empire by Emperor Jimmu (kigen) in 660 BCE, thereby enhancing nationalism.27 As part of the Japanese Empire, colonial Korea closely monitored the Japanese Olympic bidding.Tokyo’s Olympic bid began as early as 1930, when the city held a Reconstruction Festival to celebrate its recovery from the Kantō Earthquake of 1923. As soon as Tokyo won the bid, colonial Korea was quick to make the best use of the Olympics for its own sake. The Olympics were not only about sport, but also about a variety of social concerns in colonial Korea: transportation, national security, tourism and sporting facilities, among others. The colonial government and Japanese leadership took the initiative in designing a master plan for welcoming international visitors in order to propagate a positive image of the colony. At the same time, Koreans were not just passive spectators but also aggressive supporters of the Games for many reasons, including expectations of income, development of social infrastructure and participation in the Games as athletes and tourists. Japanese preparation for the 1940 Games is a case in point which shows the interaction of the colonial relationship, highlighting that the transnational relationship is shaped as much by the colonised as by the colonisers, as Schmid mentions.28 Modern sport in colonial Korea reached its apogee in the late 1930s. Korean athletes participating in the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games learned the scientific strategies and skills of advanced sport powerhouses, and their experience became a valuable asset for the Korean sport community. More Korean athletes from a variety of sport emerged as competitive candidates

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for the 1940 Japanese Olympic squad. Korean athletes defeated world-class Japanese athletes in the 100-metre sprint, the long jump, the triple jump and the shot put. They were also surpassing their Japanese counterparts in new sport such as cycling, weightlifting, handball, wrestling and dressage, and they were poised to win a significant number of medals in the 1940 Tokyo Games.

Conclusion Nation building occurs not only through political and economic processes, but also in cultural and symbolic contexts. In this regard, sport are crucial sites for ‘imagining and re-imagining the nation.’29 Stadiums remain battlegrounds between Korea and Japan, and titillate national sentiment in a post-liberation era where colonial memories remain deeply entrenched. Korean athletes competing against Japan at any level must compete with clenched teeth and win without exception. To Koreans, a victory over Japan is about national pride – compensation for 35 years of colonial rule.30 Sport in East Asia tends to be more nationalistic than in Europe because of the turbulent histories caused by controversies and conflicts surrounding territorial or textbook issues. The relationship between Korea and Japan is a case in point.31 In the face of Japanese teams, even the fierce post-liberation division between North and South Korea evaporates, and they are united by their collective memories and pan-Korean identity.32 As argued in this chapter, the booming popular culture of the Japanese empire presents a more complex relationship between the coloniser and the colonised. Colonial Korean sport reflected the maturity of a mass culture deeply imbricated with globalisation in relation to the metropole. Most Korean Olympians were by-products of colonial modernity. Education, sport facilities, a sizable fan base and the mass media constructed by colonialism played a major role in producing world-class Korean athletes. Being enmeshed with the Japanese empire gave Korean athletes many opportunities to compete with their Japanese counterparts and enter universities where their athletic careers could continue in one of the best sport environments. Japan’s wellfunded Olympic delegation provided favourable conditions for Korean Olympians, as members of the Japanese Olympic team, to train in Olympic sites. We must view sport as a colonial hegemony in which colonialism, nationalism and modernity are negotiated, contested and recreated across and beyond the one-dimensional dichotomy of colonial repression/exploitation versus Korean resistance. The athletes and sport personalities of colonial Korea played a major role in the emerging Korean sporting community after liberation. With their nationality restored, they entered the 1948 London Olympic Games under the flag of the Republic of Korea, led by flag-bearer Son Kijŏng. At the 1936 Olympics, Koreans running as conscripts for Japan had won gold and bronze medals in the marathon, sparking Korean nationalism and creating a global image of the marathon as Korea’s national sport. This colonial legacy continued as Korean runners won the 1947 and 1950 Boston Marathons. Kim Sŏngjip (1919–2016), once a promising weightlifter for the Japanese team for the aborted 1940 Tokyo Olympics, won the first medal (bronze) for South Korea in the 1948 and 1952 Games, and later ran the T’aerŭng National Training Centre, founded in 1966 to produce elite national athletes. Yi Sangbaek (1904–1966), a former JOC official, became the second Korean IOC member (1964–1966). Most athletes, coaches, administrators and reporters in the post-liberation Korean sporting community had been engaged in colonial Korea. A better understanding of sport in the colonial period can shed more light on the saga of sport in Korea, with the former colony outdoing its coloniser in the Games since the 1988 Seoul Olympics.

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Acknowledgement Part of this chapter appeared in Seok Lee, ‘Colonial Korea and the Olympic Games, 1910–1945.’ PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2016; Seok Lee, ‘Colonial Korea’s First Participation in the Olympic Games (1932).’ Seoul Journal of Korean Studies 29, no. 2 (December 2016): 267–303.

Notes 1 T’aejin Yi, Kojong sidae ŭi chaejomyŏng [Refocusing on the Kojong Period] (Seoul: T’aehaksa, 2000), 26–73. 2 J. A. Mangan and Nam-gil Ha, ‘ “Confucianism, Imperialism, Nationalism: Modern Sport, Ideology and Korean Culture,’ ” in Europe, Sport,World: Shaping Global Societies, ed. J. A. Mangan (Portland: Frank Cass, 2001), 49–76. 3 Koen De Ceuster, ‘ “Wholesome Education and Sound Leisure: The YMCA Sports Programme in Colonial ’Korea,” European Journal of East Asian Studies 2, no. 1 (2003): 39–62. 4 Pak Noja, Ssissikhan namja mandŭlgi: Han’guk ŭi isangjŏk namsŏngsŏng ŭi yŏksa rŭl p’ahech’ida (Seoul: P’urŭn yŏksa, 2009), 156–57. 5 Andre Schmid, Korea Between Empires, 1895–1919 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). 6 Andrew D. Morris, Marrow of the Nation: A History of Sport and Physical Culture in Republican China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), 6. 7 Han-sŏp Yi, Ilbonŏ esŏ on uri mal sajŏn (Seoul: Koryŏ Taehakkyo Ch’ulp’anbu, 2014), 804–6. 8 Jun Uchida, Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876–1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014). 9 Frederick R. Dickinson, World War I and the Triumph of a New Japan, 1919–1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 132–34. 10 Michael E. Robinson, Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920–1925 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2015). 11 Ibid., 49–50. 12 Katsumi Irie, Shōwa supōtsu shiron: Meiji Jingū Kyōgi Taikai to kokumin seishin sōdōin undō (Tokyo: Fumaidō shuppan, 1991), 3–5. 13 C. L. R. James, Beyond a Boundary (New York: Pantheon, 1983), 112. 14 Jung Woo Lee, ‘ “Examining Korean Nationalisms, Identities, and Politics through ’Sport,” Asia Pacific Journal of Sport and Social Science 4, no. 3 (2015): 179–85, 180. 15 J. A. Mangan, Kyongho Park, and Gwang Ok, “ ‘Japanese Imperial Sport as Failed Cultural Conditioning: Korean ‘Recalcitrance‘,” in Japanese Imperialism: Politics and Sport in East Asia: Rejection, Resentment, Revanchism, ed. J. A. Mangan, Peter Horton, Tianwei Ren, and Gwang Ok (Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018), 43–70, 54–55. 16 Mark E. Caprio, ‘ “Janus-Faced Colonial Policy: Making Sense of the Contradictions in Japanese Administrative Rhetoric and Practice in Korea,”‘ Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies 17, no. 2 (2017): 125–47. 17 Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, eds., Colonial Modernity in Korea (Cambridge: East Asia Council Publications, 1999). 18 Ceuster, ‘ “Wholesome Education and Sound Leisure’.” 19 Deug Heon Yun, Sŭp’och’ŭ wa midio (Seoul: Reinbou Puksu, 2008). 20 Joseph A. Reaves, Taking in a Game: A History of Baseball in Asia (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 123. 21 Sung-yeon Yoo, “ ‘Ilche kangjŏmgi kyŏnggi ssirŭm e taehan yŏn’gu,”‘ Taehan mudo hakhoe chi 19, no. 1 (2017): 67–79. 22 Jung Hwan Cheon, ‘ “Bend It Like a Man of Chosun: Sports Nationalism and Colonial Modernity of 1936’,” in The Korean Popular Culture Reader, ed. Kyung Hyun Kim and Youngmin Choe, 199–227 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 205–6. 23 Ceuster, ‘ “Wholesome Education and Sound Leisure’,” 53–54; Brian Bridges, The Two Koreas and the Politics of Global Sport (Leiden: Global Oriental, 2012), 27–28. 24 Cheon, ‘ “Bend It Like a Man of Chosun’,” 222–24. 25 Gwang Ok, The Transformation of Modern Korean Sport: Imperialism, Nationalism, Globalization (Elizabeth: Hollym, 2007), 257–96. 156

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26 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1975). 27 Sandra S. Collins, The Missing Olympics: The 1940 Tokyo Games, Japan, Asia and the Olympic Movement (London: Routledge, 2007). 28 Andre Schmid, ‘ “Colonialism and the ‘Korea Problem’ in the Historiography of Modern Japan: A Review Article,”‘ Journal of Asian Studies 59, no. 4 (2000): 951–76. 29 Karen Farquharson and Timothy Marjoribanks, ‘ “Transforming the Springboks: Re-Imagining the South African Nation Through Sport’,” Social Dynamics 29, no. 1 (2003): 27–48. 30 Hangnae Yi, Han’’guk ch’’eyuksa yŏn’’gu (Seoul: Kukhak Charyowŏn, 2003). 31 Victor D. Cha, Beyond the Final Score (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 23–24. 32 Oh Miyoung, ‘ “ ‘Eternal Other’ Japan: South Koreans’ Postcolonial Identity’,” International Journal of the History of Sport 26, no. 3 (2009): 371–89.

Bibliography Bridges, Brian. The Two Koreas and the Politics of Global Sport. Leiden: Global Oriental, 2012. Caprio, Mark E. “Janus-Faced Colonial Policy: Making Sense of the Contradictions in Japanese Administrative Rhetoric and Practice in Korea.” Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies 17, no. 2 (2017): 125–47. Cha,Victor D. Beyond the Final Score. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. Cheon, Jung Hwan.“Bend It Like a Man of Chosun: Sports Nationalism and Colonial Modernity of 1936.” In The Korean Popular Culture Reader, edited by Kyung Hyun Kim and Youngmin Choe, 199–227. Durham: Duke University Press, 2014. Collins, Sandra S. The Missing Olympics: The 1940 Tokyo Games, Japan, Asia and the Olympic Movement. London: Routledge, 2007. De Ceuster, Koen. “Wholesome Education and Sound Leisure:The YMCA Sports Programme in Colonial Korea.” European Journal of East Asian Studies 2, no. 1 (2003): 39–62. Dickinson, Frederick R. World War I and the Triumph of a New Japan, 1919–1930. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Farquharson, Karen, and Timothy Marjoribanks. “Transforming the Springboks: Re-Imagining the South African Nation Through Sport.” Social Dynamics 29, no. 1 (2003): 27–48. Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish:The Birth of the Prison. Translated by Alan Sheridan. New York:Vintage Books, 1975. Hangnae,Yi. Han’guk ch’eyuksa yŏn’gu. Seoul: Kukhak Charyowŏn, 2003. Irie, Katsumi. Shōwa supōtsu shiron: Meiji Jingū Kyōgi Taikai to kokumin seishin sōdōin undō. Tokyo: Fumaidō shuppan, 1991. James, C. L. R. Beyond a Boundary. New York: Pantheon, 1983. Lee, Jung Woo. “Examining Korean Nationalisms, Identities, and Politics Through Sport.” Asia Pacific Journal of Sport and Social Science 4, no. 3 (2015): 179–85. Lee, Seok. “Colonial Korea and the Olympic Games, 1910–1945.” PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2016. Lee, Seok. “Colonial Korea’s First Participation in the Olympic Games (1932).” Seoul Journal of Korean Studies 29, no. 2 (December 2016): 267–303. Mangan, J. A., and Nam-gil Ha. “Confucianism, Imperialism, Nationalism: Modern Sport, Ideology and Korean Culture.” In Europe, Sport,World: Shaping Global Societies, edited by J. A. Mangan, 49–76. Portland: Frank Cass, 2001. Mangan, J. A., Kyongho Park, and Gwang Ok. “Japanese Imperial Sport as Failed Cultural Conditioning: Korean ‘Recalcitrance’.” In Japanese Imperialism: Politics and Sport in East Asia: Rejection, Resentment, Revanchism, edited by J. A. Mangan, Peter Horton, Tianwei Ren, and Gwang Ok, 43–70. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. Miyoung, Oh. “ ‘Eternal Other’ Japan: South Koreans’ Postcolonial Identity.” International Journal of the History of Sport 26, no. 3 (2009): 371–89. Morris, Andrew D. Marrow of the Nation: A History of Sport and Physical Culture in Republican China. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004. 157

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Noja, Pak. Ssissikhan namja mandŭlgi: Han’guk ŭi isangjŏk namsŏngsŏng ŭi yŏksa rŭl p’ahech’ida. Seoul: P’urŭn yŏksa, 2009. Ok, Gwang. The Transformation of Modern Korean Sport: Imperialism, Nationalism, Globalization. Elizabeth: Hollym, 2007. Reaves, Joseph A. Taking in a Game: A History of Baseball in Asia. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002. Robinson, Michael E. Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920–1925. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2015. Schmid, Andre. “Colonialism and the ‘Korea Problem’ in the Historiography of Modern Japan: A Review Article.” Journal of Asian Studies 59, no. 4 (2000): 951–76. Schmid, Andre. Korea Between Empires, 1895–1919. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002. Shin, Gi-Wook, and Michael Robinson, eds. Colonial Modernity in Korea. Cambridge: East Asia Council Publications, 1999. Uchida, Jun. Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876–1945. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014. Yi, Han-Sŏp. Ilbonŏ esŏ on uri mal sajŏn. Seoul: Koryŏ Taehakkyo Ch’ulp’anbu, 2014. Yi, T’aejin. Kojong sidae ŭi chaejomyŏng [Refocusing on the Kojong Period]. Seoul: T’aehaksa, 2000. Yoo, Sung-Yeon. “Ilche kangjŏmgi kyŏnggi ssirŭm e taehan yŏn’gu.” Taehan mudo hakhoe chi 19, no. 1 (2017): 67–79. Yun, Deug Heon. Sŭp’och’ŭ wa midio. Seoul: Reinbou Puksu, 2008.

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16 The rise of modern sport and the Olympic Movement in Korea Gwang Ok and Ka-Ram Lee

From Confucianism to evangelism: germination of modern Korean sport culture Edward Said stated that the history of all cultures is one of cultural borrowing.1 Most sport enjoyed by Koreans today were not created on Korean soil. For example, the four most popular sport in Korea now are baseball, soccer, basketball and volleyball, all of which originated in the West and have grown to be forms of popular leisure culture in Korea. Amid the global historical currents of imperialism in the nineteenth century, modern cultures from the West were diffused into Asia. Through this process, sport culture, a modern physical culture organised in the West, also spread to Korean society and is the origin of the sport culture enjoyed in Korean society today. The initial period (starting in 1876) when Western sport began to flow into Korea was the most turbulent period in Korean history. During this time, Koreans were forced to open their doors to a political environment that was undeniably one of imperial aggression. Korean society faced heterogeneous others and practised various views and responses to this. They reacted differently in their encounters with a modern new culture; this reaction largely manifested as a critical view of modern Western civilisation and a positive view of their own advanced civilisation.2 In this context, the conflict and controversy within Korean society over the acceptance of Western modern sport culture was a natural consequence.Those who adhered to Confucianism, which dominated Korean society at the time, rejected physical sport culture due to its conflict with the tradition of disdaining martial arts and exalting scholarship. For example, a yangban (aristocrat) watching a tennis tournament hosted by a foreign missionary is said to have asked, ‘Why do you have to do such hard work as a servant? Why do you suffer from sweat?’3 Sport was a physical culture unfamiliar to Confucian thinkers, who placed great emphasis on study, and was therefore denigrated. However, in the late nineteenth century, modern Western sport culture was also positively perceived by some. Members of the Gaehwa party were the primary source of this positive recognition and confirmed the weakness of the Joseon dynasty through the tangible contrast with the imperial powers during their invasion. They regarded health and physical strength as 159

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important mechanisms for renewing the country during this period, during which ‘the strong prey upon the weak,’ and played a significant role in stressing the importance of health and physical strength in Korean society.4 They criticised an education system for the most part centred on scholarship and instead emphasised physical activity. In particular, Park Eun-sik, a leading intellectual and authority on this matter, claimed that the study-oriented education produced by Confucianism served as the driver for the invaders, because it produced physically weak youth.5 Lee Gi, another intellectual, also lamented the fragility of young people who only studied; he insisted that they strengthen their muscles and bones by applying force to their hands and feet for about an hour a day.6 The intellectuals who had experienced modern Western civilisation introduced modern sport culture to Korea more actively. Enlightenment thinker Seo Jae-pil was the main writer for the Independent (7 April 1896–29 December 1898), Korea’s first modern newspaper (founded in 1896), and played a role in spreading the aspects of Western culture he had experienced in the United States to Korea. He introduced baseball, tennis, cycling, boxing, soccer, fencing, cricket, wrestling and gymnastics through the Independent and asserted that sporting activity was essential to becoming a strong nation. His media activity served as an important facilitator for the promotion of Korea’s modern sport culture as well as a bridge to introduce a modern new sport culture into Korean society.7 For thinkers who had lived outside Korea and had absorbed evolutionary thinking, sport was the basic foundation for autonomy and independence. In the late nineteenth century, the spread of Christianity was the most decisive impetus to the introduction of modern Western sport culture, along with the Joseon perception of the importance of physical activity. British sport historian J.A. Mangan determined that Christianity’s growth as a worldwide religion was the result of its combination with various conditions in the nineteenth century;8 the religious enthusiasm of imperialist countries under Christian influence functioned as the driving force for imperial expansion.9 South Korea also faced such an impact. Early Christianity was a symbol of imperialism and became a suppressed subject among Korean scholars. However, at the beginning of the twentieth century it gained ground in Korean society, becoming an important lever supporting the Europe-centred universal civilisation discourse. This occurred because the educational and medical services in Korean society nurtured the open acceptance of Western civilisation. For example, in the late nineteenth century mission schools such as BaeJae School (1885), Ewha School (1886) and Kyungshin School (1886) were established by Protestant missionaries. It is noteworthy that they introduced various types of modern sport culture, along with modern educational activities. Through this process, the mission school was able to serve as the main channel for introducing sport to the Joseon Dynasty.10 Sport were also introduced during the evangelical propagation process carried out by local missionaries at the time. Henry M. Bruen (1874–1959), who founded the Namsan Church in Daegu in 1899 and was actively engaged in missionary work, introduced and taught aspects of modern sport culture, such as baseball and tennis, to break down the existing linguistic barriers with local youth and dispel disapproval of him as a foreigner. A modern sport culture was able to take root in Korea during the late nineteenth century, clearly due to the use of sport as a major medium for Christian expansion.11 In the early twentieth century, Christian missionary work served as a bridge for the introduction of modern sport culture in Korea, which was introduced into Korean society in earnest primarily through the YMCA. In 1903, the Korean YMCA was established in Seoul as the Hwangseong YMCA. It introduced modern sport such as baseball, basketball, soccer, judo, fencing and gymnastics to members. It also accommodated their spread through friendly competitions with other organisations, including the country’s first baseball and basketball games, and held classes on basketball and volleyball to promote sport in Korean society.12 160

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The Korean YMCA was able to lay the groundwork for the distribution of modern sport in Korea, based on the sport project promoted by Philip L. Gillett, the first Secretary of the Department of Physical Education, also established in 1903. Gillett taught various Western sport to members as the focal point of YMCA sport activities, and he laid the foundation for the spread of baseball and basketball by teaching the sport to members in 1904 and 1907.13 As such, the Korean YMCA, a Christian evangelical organisation, served as a cradle of modern sport in Korea during the early twentieth century by actively engaging in activities that disseminated sport culture, despite its status as a religious organisation rather than a modern sport club.

From evangelism to nationalism: evolution of Korean modern sport culture Colonialism, the inevitable product of imperial expansion, was the main driver of the worldwide spread of sport. However, the evolution of each sport depended on how the people of the country embraced each individual sport when it was introduced into Korea. Paradoxically, there were also cases in which the sport that were transferred inspired the desire of colonial states for national identity and independence.14 In Korea, which became a Japanese colonial state in 1910, sport developed with a nationalistic character, which allowed them to grow in popularity while also serving as a medium for the resistance movement. According to the treaty on the annexation of Korea, signed on 22 August, 1910, Korea became a colony of Japan; in the early days, Japan implemented military rule there. This essentially blocked Koreans from enjoying freedom of speech, publication, assembly and association. The Korean sporting organisations that existed at the time were also disbanded by Japan. As a result, the sporting activities of Koreans declined rapidly, while those of the Japanese actively developed. However, despite the situation, sporting activities were still actively conducted in one space: the YMCA.15 The Korean YMCA, as a religious organisation founded by the American YMCA, was able to remain somewhat free of Japanese oppression, based on its status as part of an international network comprising other similar organisations. Therefore, the Korean YMCA continued to introduce and disseminate various sport cultures to Korean youth. Volleyball was introduced in 1915, and sport were promoted with a focus on baseball and soccer competitions between Japanese sport clubs and Korean schools. In addition, in 1911 the YMCA baseball team and basketball team hosted games in Pyongyang and Seoncheon; in November 1912, the baseball team had its first overseas away game.16 The YMCA built Korea’s first indoor gymnasium in 1916 and invited B.P. Barnhart, a skilled physical director, to conduct full-fledged sport guidance and dissemination activities.17 The Korean YMCA, an international religious organisation, became a catalyst for the popularity of sport in Korean society by establishing the space and human resources to facilitate them while also organising matches against Japan and hosting other sporting events. Second only to the YMCA’s role as a key channel for the spread of sport in Korea during the period of military rule was that of Korean self-awareness as it related to sport. Korean independence activists had faith that the spread of sport could augment the strength of Korean youth in a bid for independence. Also, young people who had experienced sport directly came to express a more masculine temperament, latent up to that point, while exerting themselves physically through sport. For example, young people in Joseon society were able to express the potential masculinity they experienced internally through baseball, which was the main medium of Christian evangelism.18 Through this process, sporting events stimulated a collective nationalist sentiment. 161

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This was evident through baseball games with the Japanese. Founded in 1914 by players who had learned baseball at the YMCA, the Oh-Seong Gurakbu team attracted national attention in Korea by competing against a Japanese team. In 1914 Oh-Seong-Gurakbu defeated the Yongsan Railway Bureau, a Japanese baseball team, and the Korean crowd was unable to contain its excitement. Japanese spectators angry at defeat jumped onto the field and assaulted the Korean players; this quickly developed into a group brawl between the Koreans and the Japanese.19 This confrontation at a sporting event, between the controlling country and the subjugated country, was seen as a symbol of the confrontation between the two nations and became a catalyst for the spread of sport in Korea. Beginning in the 1920s, sport became an expressive space for the nationalist movement during the Japanese occupation. In 1919, after the March 1 Independence Movement, Japan shifted its colonial rule policy on Korea from one of military rule to one focused on culture (1919–1931). As a result, freedom of speech, assembly and association were partially permitted, enabling the formation of sporting bodies. At this time, the Joseon Sports Association (JSA), the predecessor of the Korea Sports and Olympic Committee, was born. On 13 July 1920, the JSA was established with the active support of Korean athletes, students studying in Japan and the Dong-A Ilbo newspaper, with the aim of strengthening Koreans’ physical strength, fostering national spirit and encouraging unity. It organised various competitions in baseball, soccer and tennis, as well as the Korean National Baseball Championship, its first project and the first national sporting competition. In addition, the JSA established a sporting goods store to address the lack of sporting equipment at various competitions and published a handbook on track and field rules to encourage events.20 The formation of sporting organisations centred on the JSA and formal athletic competition was a driving force in the evolution and development of sport in Korean society; in the process, various sport became the object of public interest, because Korean athletes demonstrated a willingness to inspire the national spirit, develop the national culture and even build a foundation for independence through participation in sporting activities.21 The baseball stadium was the context in which the nationalist consciousness of cultural domination was the most united. Baseball grew to become the most popular sport in Korea, influenced by the United States and Japan during the Enlightenment, as well as the Japanese occupation. During Japan’s cultural rule, baseball became a tool for expressing nationalism through competition with Japanese teams. One heavily symbolic contest was a regular baseball game in Seoul between the Koreans of Yeonhui College and the Japanese of Gyeonsong Medical School. It inspired significant public attention due to the tension between Korea and its colonial ruler. The spectators divided themselves into Japanese and Korean sides and engaged in a fiery cheering match. Whenever Yeonhui won, Seoul’s downtown was the site of nightlong celebrations; if they lost, the streets were dark. Spectators often fought during the game, and some Koreans danced victory dances.22 The baseball field became a temporary battlefield without gunfire, due to the ongoing national confrontation. Sport was one way for Koreans to display resistance.23 During Japanese cultural rule, Korea achieved the spread and popularisation of modern sport culture through nationalistic sport activities. As the establishment of social organisations became somewhat freer, various sporting bodies were formed and competitions held. For example, the JSA (1920) and the Gwanseo Sports Association (1925) held nationwide competitions in Seoul and Pyeongyang, including baseball, tennis, basketball, athletics and soccer. In provincial areas, numerous youth organisations formed sport clubs, which became the core of the anti-Japanese national movement and expressed their anti-Japanese resistance through games with Japanese teams.24 162

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In addition, the YMCA, key to nationalist activities during this period, argued that for Joseon to survive in a world where the law of the jungle prevailed, it had to be physically strong and that this would be facilitated by sporting activity.25 In this context, the YMCA hosted a nationwide indoor sport day, judo competitions, sport training, the Korean National Secondary School Basketball Tournament, the Korean National Table Tennis Tournament, the Korean National Weight Lifting Championship, the Korean National Wrestling Competition, and the Korean National Gymnastics Competition.26 During the Japanese colonial period, sport was a source of collective nationalist activity and a legitimate and temporary space for anti-Japanese activities. In the process, a variety of modern sport such as boxing, table tennis, volleyball, tennis, skiing, rugby and weightlifting continued to spread. During the Japanese colonial period, the acceptance and dissemination of sport served a purpose greater than that of mere athletic activity. It functioned as a core means of strengthening the Korean nation and its independence. Modern Western sport spread and were popularised in Korean society as the most effective mechanism for gathering and expressing national consciousness, in addition to serving as a means of spreading the Christian gospel.

The cultural bridge of national unity and anti-colonialism: the rise of the Korean Olympic Movement Asian nations were not included in the first modern Olympic Games, a sport festival for people around the world. Amid the tide of imperialism in the late nineteenth century, it was impossible for Asian countries which had only barely experienced Western-style modern sport culture to participate in an international competition focused on modern sport. Korea was no exception. When the modern Olympics began, sport competitions were first introduced to Korea as ‘sport days.’27 Since these were organised not only for schools but also for community festivals, such as student and village competitions, they had a role in strengthening solidarity and a sense of community. In addition, in terms of strengthening collective awareness, sport was also a vehicle for augmenting the will to win independence and the formation of a national consciousness.28 In the early twentieth century, national interest in sport increased due to the nationwide spread of this sport day concept. In Korea in the 1920s, the modern Olympics were recognised as a stage upon which Koreans, who lived quietly in their corner of the world, could bring the world to its knees.29 Along with the sport days, the activities of the JSA also laid the foundation for the spread of sporting competitions in Korean society, and facilitated the growth of national hope for participation in the modern Olympics. The JSA was established, in part, to enable participation in the Olympics with a truly Olympic spirit. This fact is reflected in the purpose of the competition organised by the JSA: Participate in track and field competitions if you want to be globally competitive. The sports day, which will hearten the youth of the Joseon Dynasty, should be attended by athletes who will participate in the world Olympics. . . . In the face of the great harmony that is the World Olympics, the exemplary athlete who wants to win a laurel of glory by participating in a global athletic competition in the future will participate in this competition and hone his skills! Be brave!30 In 1924, JSA wanted to position the first Korean athletics competition as a bridge to the Olympics, in which Joseon’s athletic community had a great desire to participate. One of the founders of the JSA lamented the inability of the Korean people to participate in the Olympics, due to the fact that colonial people recognised the modern Olympics as a medium for national unity and 163

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a source of national independence, beyond the goal of pure sport competition.31 In this respect, the national sport competition organised by the JSA provided decisive momentum for the qualitative growth of Korean modern sport and served as a space for improving the performance of professional elite sport athletes, thereby leading to the emergence of international-level athletes in some sport. Sport days and the nationwide sport competitions that developed in Korean society during the early twentieth century served as stages for outstanding athletes and as outlets for antiJapanese sentiment; naturally, the aspirations of both athletes and the nation were heightened when it came to the Olympics. However, for Korea, deprived of its sovereignty as a colonial country, the only way for athletes to participate in international athletics was to be part of the Japanese team. Japan first appeared on the Olympic stage at the 1912 Stockholm Olympics. The absence of Asian athletes until the 1908 Olympics had not satisfied Pierre de Coubertin’s ideal of the Olympics as a worldwide competition. Against this backdrop, the Japanese founder of judo, Kanō Jigorō, was elected to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1909. His efforts brought Japan to the 1912 Olympics, with two Japanese athletes competing in track and field events.32 Subsequently, Japan dispatched 15 athletes for the 1920 Antwerp Olympics and won two silver medals. At the 1924 Paris Olympics, 28 athletes participated in four events, winning only one bronze medal in wrestling. However, at the 1928 Amsterdam Games, Japan won two golds, two silvers and two bronzes.33 At the 1932 Los Angeles Olympics, Japan allowed athletes from colonial Korea to participate. Japan had to make every possible effort to perform well at the 1936 Berlin Olympics, as Tokyo was to be the host of the 1940 Olympics.34 Korea was a region ruled by Japan, and from the Korean point of view, there was no reason to give up a chance for its best athletes to perform in the Games. As a result, the Korean athletes selected through regional qualifiers were given the right to participate in the Olympics through the final Olympic qualifiers held in Tokyo. Marathoners Kwon Tae-ha and Kim Eun-bae and boxer Hwang Eul-su became the first Koreans to appear in the Olympics.35 Kim Eun-bae and Kwon Tae-ha placed sixth and ninth, respectively, and Hwang Eul-su lost in the first round. Although no medals were won, the Korean athletes’ participation was sufficient to trigger national pride in the hearts of Koreans.36 Korean athletes participated in the 1936 Berlin Olympics. Seven Korean athletes were included on the Japanese national team and were especially well represented in the marathon. Sohn Kee-chung won the gold medal by setting a new Olympic record of 2:29:19 seconds, and Nam Sung-yong came third with a time of 2:31:32.37 Sohn’s victory was recognised throughout the world as that of Korea, creating a sense of temporary independence for colonial Koreans and prompting celebration.38 The Berlin Olympics became a source of national triumph for Korea, a cultural medium through which the pride of the lost nation could be restored. The Olympics signified more than just participation for the colonial Koreans. This was also revealed by the athletes. Gold medal-winner Sohn participated in the competition out of love for his country. This is confirmed by a letter sent by Olympic marathoner Kwon Tae-ha to encourage him to participate in the Olympics. Before competing in the Olympics, Kwon trained with me in Kyungsung and sent me a letter. ‘Mr Sohn, I competed in the Olympics but failed. I think it’s too late to start over now. I observed your outstanding marathon talent while training with you. I’m sure you could win the world marathon. Why don’t you compete in the official marathon from now on? I want you to win the world marathon and knock the wind out of the sails of the Japanese.’39 164

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This letter from Kwon played a decisive role in Sohn’s decision to target the Berlin Olympics as the greatest battlefield of his life. He participated in the Olympics not only as an individual but also as a Korean national who carried the sorrow of his lost country, and that sense of national identity was one source of his victory.40 For colonised Korean athletes, the Olympics were perceived as a battlefield without gunfire. Sohn’s Olympic gold was a victory for all Koreans, and an opportunity for the country to display its national strength and create excitement throughout the Korean peninsula. During a time when political and military confrontation with Japan was impossible, sport were the best means of cultivating national competence, and Sohn Kee-chung represented the essence of cultural nationalism mediated by sport, the spearhead for restoring the national pride of colonial Korea.41 Korea’s Olympic Movement continued even after it gained its independence. South Korea participated in the 1948 London Olympics, the first after it won its independence, which served to promote the country to the international community; it was also the country’s first experience participating in a sporting event on a world stage. However, participation in the Olympics evolved into a difficult situation to navigate. Given the tenuous nature of the nation’s reconstruction following its independence, participating in international competition was the beginning of an arduous journey. Nevertheless, Korea set the stage for its participation in the Olympics through the establishment of the Korea Olympic Committee in 1946, in order to take part in the London Olympics with the partial purpose of informing the international community about Korea, a newly independent nation, just before the establishment of the Korean government. In June 1947, Korea was officially approved as a member of the IOC. In 1948, it became responsible for promoting sport activities by hosting and participating in international competitions.42 Korea also launched the London Olympic Support Lottery in 1947 to raise money for a national team to compete at the Olympics.43 At the London Olympics, a large team of 67 Korean athletes participated under the Taegeukgi flag for the first time; Kim Seong-jip won bronze in weightlifting and Han Soo-ann did the same in boxing.44 Since then, South Korea has consistently participated in the Olympics and has won medals at every Games except for the 1960 Rome Olympics, thereby cementing its position as a sport powerhouse. In particular, the sport science and systematic training put into place beginning with the 1964 Tokyo Olympics led to the country’s first gold medal, at the 1976 Montreal Olympics.45 South Korea hosted the 1988 Seoul Olympics; this marked a historic turning point following the Moscow (1980) and Los Angeles (1984) Games, both overshadowed by boycotts.46 Korea’s Olympic Movement, which began in the early twentieth century, was launched to restore national pride and overcome the weakness of colonial Korea through participation in sport.The development of modern Korean sport competition, which began as a sport day during the Enlightenment period, was fuelled by Korean athletes’ first participation in the Olympics in 1932, amid the development of nationwide sport competitions. Although Koreans participated as representatives of Japan during Japanese rule, their excellent performance in the Olympics was seen as a symbolic victory for the Korean people and became a source of national pride. In this regard, the Korean Olympic Movement during the Japanese colonial period was an imagined collective celebration, and the shared memory became the primary source of the Olympic Movement, beginning with independence and continuing until the 1988 Seoul Olympics.

Notes 1 Seong-Gon Kim and Jeong Hyeong-Ho, trans., Culture and Imperialism (Seoul: Chang, 1997), 381. 2 Jung-Sim Park, The History of Korean Modern Thought (Seoul: Cheonnyeon-ui Sangsang, 2016), 77, 148. 165

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3 ‘ “The Pride of Nation, the Cradle of Strengthened Fighting Spirit’,” Donga-Ilbo, April 1, 1975. 4 Hak-Rae Lee, A Study on the History of Modern Sports (Seoul: Jishik Sanupsa, 1990), 20–21; U-Young Back and Ka-Ram Lee, ‘ “Seo Jae-Pil’s Contribution to the Evolution of Korea’s Modern Physical Education and Sports Culture’,” Asian Journal of Physical Education and Sport Science 7, no. 2 (2019): 51–64. 5 Lee, A Study on the History of Modern Sports, 30. 6 Ibid. 7 Ka-Ram Lee, ‘ “A Study on Sports Articles Published in the Independent’,” Korean Journal of Physical Education 55, no. 3 (2016): 1–14. 8 James A. Mangan, The Games Ethic and Imperialism (London:Viking Penguin, 1986), 168. 9 Yeong-Seok Lee, Modern Scenery (Seoul: Pureun-yeogsa, 2003), 208. 10 Lak-Geoon G. Paik, The History of Protestant Missions in Korea 1832–1910 (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1970), 308–19. 11 ‘ “American Missionary Bruen First Spread Baseball in 1899’,” Sindong-a, January 21, 2014. 12 Kim Jae-Woo, ‘ “A Study on the Physical Education of the Korean YMCA in the Period of Gu-HanMal’,” Journal of Sport Information & Technology 1 (2006): 75–86. 13 Ka-Ram Lee, ‘ “The Influence of Philip L. Gillett on the Development of Korea’s Modern Sports,”‘ Korean Journal of History for Physical Education, Sport, and Dance 19, no. 2 (2014): 101–14. 14 Lee Jong-Seong, Sports Culture History (Seoul: Keomyunikeisyeonbugseu, 2014), 113. 15 Lee, A Study on the History of Modern Sports, 111. 16 Kim Jae-Woo, The 100-Year Sports History of the Seoul YMCA (Seoul: Sangrok Munwha, 2009), 95. 17 Ka-Ram Lee and Jae-Pil Ha, “ ‘A Study on the Introduction Process of Korean Volleyball,”‘ Korean Journal of History for Physical Education, Sport, and Dance 21, no. 1 (2016): 10. 18 Philip Loring Gillett, Annual Report of the Foreign Secretaries of the International Committee September 30, 1910. Reports of Foreign Secretaries 1910, 1. Kautz Family YMCA Archives, University of Minneapolis, USA. 19 ‘ “10th Anniversary of Joseon Baseball History (9) Mr Tiger’s Visit and Mr Ohseong’s Remarkable ’Performance,” Donga-Ilbo, April 11, 1930. 20 Hwan Son, ‘ “A Study on Establishment and Activity of Joseon Sports Associations,”‘ Korean Journal of Physical Education 47, no. 3 (2008): 1–13. 21 Nam-Gil Ha, New Theory on Sports History (Jinju: Gyeongsang University, 2010), 662. 22 Kyunghyang Daily News, July 12, 1962; Kyunghyang Daily News, January 12, 1974. 23 Gwang Ok, ‘ “Coercion for Asian Conquest: Japanese Militarism and Korean Sport, 1938–45,”‘ International Journal of the History of Sport 24, no. 3 (2007): 338–56, 340. 24 Ha, New Theory on Sports History, 657–58. 25 Seong Heo, ‘ “Need for Healthy Life,”‘ Cheongnyeon, November 20, 1922. 26 Taek-Bu Cheon, The History of Korean YMCA Sports (Seoul: Beomwosa, 1994), 195–209. 27 The Independent, May 5, 1896. 28 Korean Society for History of Physical Education, Sport and Dance, Korea Sports History (Seoul: Daehanmidieo, 2015), 86. 29 Jung-Hwan Cheon, Never-Ending Syndrome (Seoul: Pureun Yeoksa, 2005), 145. 30 ‘ “To Be World-Class, Take Part in the Track and Field Competition,”‘ Donga Ilbo, June 3, 1924. 31 Hui-Jun Jeong, Sports Korea Fantasy (Seoul: Gaemagowon, 2009), 41–42. 32 Allen Guttman and Lee Thompson, Japanese Sports: A History (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2001), 117–18. 33 Ibid., 119–21. 34 ‘ “Poor Nationalism Obsessed with the Olympics,”‘ Sindonga, August 27, 2004. 35 ‘ “Kwon Tae-ha, Kim Eun-bae, Both on Away Game Overseas,”‘ Donga-Ilbo, May 31, 1932; ‘ “Kim Eunbae, Kwon Tae-ha, Hwang Eul-su,”‘ Kyunghyang Daily News, July 6, 1979. 36 ‘ “Olympics and Our Nation,”‘ Donga Ilbo, August 20, 1960. 37 ‘ “Thunderous Shouts of Hurrah Everywhere’,” Donga Ilbo, August 10, 1936. 38 Cheon, Never-Ending Syndrome, 54. 39 Kee-Chung Sohn, My Homeland, My Marathon (Seoul: Hankook Ilbo Press Publishing Department, 1983), 89. 40 Jung-Hee Ha, ‘ “Historical Review of Sports Hero Shon Kee Chung’s Sport Activities”‘ (PhD diss., Chung-Ang University, 2012), 15.

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41 Cheon, Never-Ending Syndrome, 68–69; Gwang Ok, The Transformation of Modern Korean Sport: Imperialism, Nationalism, Globalization (Elizabeth: Hollym, 2007), 235. 42 Hwan Son, ‘ “A Study on Olympic Movement in Korea After Independence,”‘ Korean Journal of History for Physical Education, Sport, and Dance 15, no. 2 (2010): 17–26. 43 ‘ “The Olympic Support Lotto Collected 140 Million Won’,” Donga-Ilbo, December 11, 1947. 44 ‘ “A Star Player of a Half-Century of Physical Education’,” Kyunghyang Daily News, July 11, 1970. 45 ‘ “Korean Marathon Falls Behind Japan for More than 10 Years’,” Donga-Ilbo, December 9, 1987. 46 ‘ “The Seoul Olympics: A Great Opportunity for East-West Unity’,” Hankyoreh, October 4, 1988; ‘ “The Seoul Olympics: A Catalyst for East-West ’Harmony,” Kyunghyang Daily News, September 12, 1989; Sandra Collins, ‘ “Asian Soft-Power: Globalization and Regionalism in the East Asia Olympic Games’,” in Rethinking Matters Olympic: Investigation into the Socio-Cultural Study of the Modern Olympic Movement, ed. R. Barney, Tenth International Symposium for Olympic Research (London: The University of Western Ontario, 2010), 169–70.

Bibliography Back, U-Young, and Ka-Ram Lee. “Seo Jae-Pil’s Contribution to the Evolution of Korea’s Modern Physical Education and Sports Culture.” Asian Journal of Physical Education and Sport Science 7, no. 2 (2019): 51–64. Cheon, Jung-Hwan. Never-Ending Syndrome. Seoul: Pureun Yeoksa, 2005. Cheon, Taek-Bu. The History of Korean YMCA Sports. Seoul: Beomwosa, 1994. Collins, Sandra. “Asian Soft-Power: Globalization and Regionalism in the East Asia Olympic Games.” In Rethinking Matters Olympic: Investigation into the Socio-Cultural Study of the Modern Olympic Movement, edited by R. Barney. Tenth International Symposium for Olympic Research. London: The University of Western Ontario, 2010. Guttman, Allen, and Lee Thompson. Japanese Sports: A History. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2001. Ha, Jung-Hee. “Historical Review of Sports Hero Shon Kee Chung’s Sport Activities.” PhD diss., ChungAng University, 2012. Ha, Nam-Gil. New Theory on Sports History. Jinju: Gyeongsang University, 2010. Jeong, Hui-Jun. Sports Korea Fantasy. Seoul: Gaemagowon, 2009. Kim Jae-Woo. “A Study on the Physical Education of the Korean YMCA in the Period of Gu-Han-Mal.” Journal of Sport Information & Technology 1 (2006): 75–86. Kim Jae-Woo. The 100-Year Sports History of the Seoul YMCA. Seoul: Sangrok Munwha, 2009. Kim, Seong-Gon, and Jeong Hyeong-Ho, trans. Culture and Imperialism. Seoul: Chang, 1997. Korean Society for History of Physical Education, Sport and Dance. Korea Sports History. Seoul: Daehanmidieo, 2015. Lee, Hak-Rae. A Study on the History of Modern Sports. Seoul: Jishik Sanupsa, 1990. Lee, Jong-Seong. Sports Culture History. Seoul: Keomyunikeisyeonbugseu, 2014. Lee, Ka-Ram. “The Influence of Philip L. Gillett on the Development of Korea’s Modern Sports.” Korean Journal of History for Physical Education, Sport, and Dance 19, no. 2 (2014): 101–14. Lee, Ka-Ram. “A Study on Sports Articles Published in the Independent.” Korean Journal of Physical Education 55, no. 3 (2016): 1–14. Lee, Ka-Ram, and Jae-Pil Ha. “A Study on the Introduction Process of Korean Volleyball.” Korean Journal of History for Physical Education, Sport, and Dance 21, no. 1 (2016): 10. Lee,Yeong-Seok. Modern Scenery. Seoul: Pureun-yeogsa, 2003. Mangan, James A. The Games Ethic and Imperialism. London:Viking Penguin, 1986. Ok, Gwang. “Coercion for Asian Conquest: Japanese Militarism and Korean Sport, 1938–45.” International Journal of the History of Sport 24, no. 3 (2007): 338–56. Ok, Gwang. The Transformation of Modern Korean Sport: Imperialism, Nationalism, Globalization. Elizabeth: Hollym, 2007. Paik, Lak-Geoon G. The History of Protestant Missions in Korea 1832–1910. Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1970.

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Park, Jung-Sim. The History of Korean Modern Thought. Seoul: Cheonnyeon-ui Sangsang, 2016. Sohn, Kee-Chung. My Homeland, My Marathon. Seoul: Hankook Ilbo Press Publishing Department, 1983. Son, Hwan. “A Study on Establishment and Activity of Joseon Sports Associations.” Korean Journal of Physical Education 47, no. 3 (2008): 1–13. Son, Hwan. “A Study on Olympic Movement in Korea After Independence.” Korean Journal of History for Physical Education, Sport, and Dance 15, no. 2 (2010): 17–26.

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17 The introduction and institutionalisation of Western sport in colonial and postcolonial Malaya, 1786–1965 Peng Ham Lim

The geographical boundary of the Malay archipelago stretches from Aceh in the west, moving eastwards to Patani in Thailand and ending in Irian in the east. Prior to the arrival of the Europeans in the sixteenth century, the people were known to be excellent sailors and played indigenous sport like sepak raga and pencak silat, a local martial art.

British straits settlements The British occupied Penang in 1876 and Malacca in 1895, and they established a trading settlement in Singapore in 1819.The three settlements were amalgamated into the Straits Settlements in 1826, with Singapore becoming the headquarters in 1832.1 After the founding of Singapore and its status as a free port, with its more advantageous position at the foot of the Peninsula, the island rapidly overtook Penang and Malacca in trade. Between 1840 and 1870 the Straits Settlements ports consolidated their position in the global trading network. Britain was the principal customer of Straits produce such as pepper, gambier, gutta percha and sugar.2 There were 1,712 Europeans in the Straits, about 0.55 percent of the total population of 308,097. Singapore held 1,329 of them, 77 percent.3

Early European and Eurasian sport and recreation clubs Small communities of European military, merchants and administrators established their own clubs – the Singapore Cricket Club (1852), Penang Cricket Club (1866),4 Malacca Cricket Club (1886), Perak Club (1881) and Selangor Club (1884) – to exclusively play cricket and other sport like football among themselves.5 The Eurasians were a minority racial grouping consisting of 5,772 people, 1.87 percent of the total population. They founded the Singapore Recreation Club (1883), Penang Recreation Club (PRC) (1880s) and Malacca Recreation Club (1893).6 In 1894, the PRC sailed to Singapore to play cricket and tennis with the SRC.7

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Early straits Chinese sport and recreation clubs In the Straits, Chinese immigrants were categorised under five headings: Macaos, natives of Canton; Kehs, from the towns and villages of the province of Quantung; Tay Chews, from Swatow; Hylams, natives of Hainan Island; and Hokiens, from Amoy and the province of Fukien. A sixth category was the Chinese born in the Straits, called Babas to distinguish them from those born in China. In Malacca, there were Babas who could claim no connection with China for centuries – their forebears had been in Malacca already when the Portuguese occupied the sultanate. Although they loyally adhered to the customs of their ancestors, they despised the real Chinese and identified as British subjects.8 There were 174,327 Chinese residents in the Straits in 1881, 41.1 percent of the total population. There were 9,527 Straits Chinese in Singapore, 9,202 in Penang and 5,264 in Malacca.The total of 23,993 was 13.8 percent of the total Chinese population, or 5.6 percent of the total Straits population.9 In 1885, Straits Chinese founded the Straits Chinese Recreation Club (SCRC) for ‘the purpose of playing lawn tennis, cricket and practising English athletic sport.’10 Six years later, the Straits Chinese National Football Association was established to organise the annual Chinese New Year sport meeting.11 The Penang Chinese Recreation Club was formed in 1893 for the encouragement of all kinds of sport and recreation among the Chinese. The 3.5-acre Victoria Green ground was lent to it for cricket, football and tennis. The Club had 250 members in 1908. Its football team finished third in the Penang Football League in 1906 and 1907; the cricket team also had a good record, and tennis was exceedingly popular among the members.12 A Chinese Lawn Tennis Club was founded in Malacca in 1893, largely owing to the efforts of Tan Chay Yan, Chan Koon Chiang, Chi Kan Cheng and Chan Cheng Siew.The object of the institution was to encourage the practice of both outdoor and indoor games – notably tennis, croquet, billiards and chess – among the English-speaking Straits Chinese of Malacca.13

Indirect rule in the Malay States During the mid-nineteenth century, the alluvial tin deposits along the interior foothills of the main range of the Malay Peninsula attracted Chinese immigrants. Conflict between various factions in the mining areas and political difficulties among the ruling Malay aristocracies resulted in British intervention in the western state of Perak in 1874.14 With the Treaty of Pangkor, Perak accepted a British Resident whose advice was to be followed in all matters of general administration.15 In August 1874, Frank Swettenham resided at Kuala Kangsar as British representation. A few weeks later, the Sultan of Selangor signed a letter declaring that he would be very glad if his ‘friend would set up my country to right and collect all its taxes.’16 Together with Negri Sembilan and Pahang, the Federated Malay States were established on 1 July 1896, with Kuala Lumpur becoming the capital.17 The British takeover of the northern states of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu was completed in 1909 with the signing of the Anglo-Siamese Treaty. These four northern states and Johore (which did not receive a British Advisor until 1914) were collectively known as the Unfederated Malay States (UMS).18 British Malaya thus consisted of three parts, the Straits Settlements, FMS and UFS, all effectively under British control.19

Early European sport and recreation clubs The Europeans established the Perak Club, Selangor Club (1884), Lake Club (1890) and Ipoh Club (1892). The Perak Club was the premier social institution of Taiping and the senior club 170

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in the native states, with a Colonel Walker in large measure responsible for its progress since its formation in 1881. The capacious clubhouse was erected by the government and kept in repair by the Public Works Department (PWD). In front of the building was an admirable playing field used for cricket, football, hockey and tennis.20 In 1891 there were 366 Europeans in Perak – 260 males and 106 females, only 0.17 percent of the total population of Perak.21 The Ipoh Club was founded with 19 members in 1892 at a meeting in the first dispensary in Ipoh, owned by a Mr Oldfield.22 The recreation ground was used for football, cricket, tennis and croquet. There were about 500 members in 1908, as well as many visiting members. It was one of the best clubs in the peninsula.23 The Selangor Club was ‘formally opened on a small scale’ in 1884, in the hope that ‘the attractions of reading, writing and billiard rooms, cricket and tennis, will be the means of inducing many visitors to avail themselves of the privileges of the club.’24 In 1891 there was 190 Europeans – 145 males and 45 females – in Selangor, 0.23 percent of the total population of 81,592.25 The Lake Club was formally inaugurated on 16 August 1890 by a group of 28 people, the crème de la crème of local expatriate society, making it the most exclusive club in town.26 It was perched on one of the top eminences in Kuala Lumpur, with its base nestling in the dip of a valley, a more or less winding sheet of water – the ‘lake’ from which the club derived its name. It was a distinctly social club, ‘making not provisions for violent exercise further than the possession of two cramped tennis courts.’27

Inter-settlement and interstate games among Europeans The building of the first eight-mile railway line from Port Weld to Taiping in 1885, and another from Port Klang to Kuala Lumpur a year later, enabled the cricket team to travel to Port Klang, Singapore and Penang to play Inter-Settlement cricket matches.28 Between 1889 and 1899, Perak hosted the SCC and the Selangor Club four times each. During the same period, the Perak team also travelled to Penang three times and visited Kuala Lumpur and Singapore once.29 The Perak Club never lost a match against Singapore, Penang or Selangor.30

Selangor Chinese recreation club In 1891, Selangor, with 62.3 percent of the total population Chinese (50,844), 32 percent Malaysian (26,546) and 4.5 percent Indian (3,698), was the only Protected Malay State in which the population was Chinese-majority. The Chinese constituted 44.3 percent of the population of Perak, 23.6 percent of that of Negri Sembilan (including Sungei Ujong), and 5.6 percent of Pahang. The Chinese population was divided into seven groupings in the 1891 census: Kheh or Hakka (63.7 percent of the total Chinese population), Cantonese (15.4 percent), Hokkien (8.8 percent), ‘Straits Born’ (4.7 percent), Tiechiu (3.7 percent), Hylam or Hainanese (3.3 percent).31 The Selangor Chinese Recreation Club was founded in 1917, as a result of a meeting held in August by public-spirited Chinese at the Chinese Chamber of Commerce who proposed the formation of a club for the pursuit of sport and other activities. The Kuala Lumpur Minstrels then amalgamated with the Selangor Chinese Recreation Club, and their 150 members joined en bloc. Premises were at 52 Pudu Road. Not until April 1930 did the two-storey clubhouse building with a spacious lounge and modern conveniences come into existence. The lounge overlooked the tennis courts and the football field. The club had subcommittees for football, hockey, cricket, lawn tennis, volleyball and basketball32 as well as 650 members in 1933.33 171

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Establishment of sport associations, and inter-settlement and interstate competitions The first athletic meeting was held in Ipoh, Perak, in 1906. It was ‘open to all Clubs in the FMS’ and was meant for athletes from different states to meet and compete.34 Thirty-nine entries came from Ipoh, Taiping, Batu Gajah, Tapah, Kuala Lumpur and Penang (which had only one participant).35 Nine events were held: the 100-yard handicap, 220-yard handicap, quarter mile, one mile, hurdle race, long jump, throwing the cricket ball, consolation race and veteran’s race.36 The Batu Gajah division succeeded in carrying off seven of the Challenge Cups, Kuala Lumpur two, while Ipoh took the other.37 The annual meeting continued until it was cancelled in 1914 due to the beginning of the World War I.38 The Malayan Athletic Association (MAA) was formed in 1920 with a permanent committee of two delegates from each settlement or state. Delegates were from Singapore (SCC), Penang (PCC), Malacca (Malacca Club), Perak (Ipoh Club), Selangor (SC) and Negri Sembilan (Sungei Ujong Club).39 The committee broke the colour bar by allowing ‘all amateur residents’ to compete in the MAA championships as long as they entered through their clubs.40 In 1922, Singapore hosted ‘the first open Malayan championships’ for members of all recognised clubs.41 Singapore won the 1922 championship with an aggregate 38 points, Negri Sembilan was second with 20 points, and Selangor was third with 11 points.42 H.C. Mills, a Eurasian from the Singapore Recreation Club, won the individual championships with 11 points. Joint second were Ashworth (Negri Sembilan) and Morley (Pahang), each with 10 points.43

HMS Malaya cups league competition for football and rugby HMS Malaya Cups for football and rugby were held separately in 1921. Singapore won the inaugural football cup by beating Selangor 2–1.44 In 1926 representatives of the Malaya Cup football competition met to form a Malayan Football Association (MFA).45 From 1921 to 1941, Singapore won 15 times, Selangor 4 times, Perak twice, and Singapore and Selangor drew twice.46 The Malayan Rugby Union (MRU) was formed in 1928 to organise the annual Malaya Cup rugby competition.47

Lawn Tennis Association of Malaya (LTAM) In 1920, L.E. Gaunt, a prominent tennis player in SCC tournaments, on his retirement from Malaya generously donated a handsome silver cup for the men’s open singles championships for the Peninsula.48 S. Kakamura, champion of Singapore, conquered Khoo Hooi Hye of Penang 6–4, 6–3 and became the first winner of the Gaunt Cup competition between representatives of the different states and settlements in 1921.49 The Malayan Lawn Tennis Association was formed in 1924 as the controlling body in the Peninsula.50 From the years 1921 to 1936 Singapore won the Cup 5 times, Perak 4 times and Selangor and United Services, each three times.51

Malaya Badminton Association (MBA) On November 1934, delegates from Perak, Selangor, Singapore and Penang met at the Perak Turf Club to form the Malaya Badminton Association (MBA).52 J.L. Woods, President of the Perak Badminton Association (PBA), was unanimously elected first President of the Association.53 The first interstate triangular badminton tournament was played by Perak, Penang and Selangor in 1935. The Leong Sin Man Cup was for the men’s team event and the Permaisuri 172

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Cup for the women’s team event.54 The interstate Foong Seong Cup tournament began in the mid-1930s. Initially, Penang, Perak and Selangor took part.55 By 1937, three more badminton association associations from Negri Sembilan, Malacca and Kedah were affiliated.56 Kelantan was the eighth association to be affiliated to the MBA in 1938.57 The formation of the MBA was an extremely important development in the progress of the game in the country. It put badminton at the pinnacle of Malay sport, along with football.Wood felt the game had shown astounding development and popularity, as it was ‘in many ways an ideal game in the Tropics’ that appealed to Asians. It meant all states and settlements were able to take part in a recognised All-Malaya team and individual tournaments.58 The first Malayan Badminton Championships was held in 1937 at the Happy World covered stadium in Singapore.59 The first winner of the men’s singles title was Selangor’s A.S. Samuel, who beat Seah Eng Hee of Singapore in three sets.60 In 1954, the first Malayan Open Championship open to overseas players was held in Penang. Ferry Sonneville, the 1953 Indonesian champion, and Eddy Yusuf took part in the men’s singles.61 Twenty-four-year-old Sonneville was a judo instructor with the Indonesian police, and 22-year-old Yusuf was a high school student.62

Japanese occupation of British Malaya, 1942–45 The Japanese occupied Malaya from 1942 to 1945. The liberation of Singapore on 5 September 1945 marked the resumption of authority by the British Crown.63 In 1946, the nine states in the Malay Peninsula and the two British settlements of Penang and Malacca formed the Malayan Union, excluding Singapore. The settlement of Singapore was constituted as a separate colony in view of its economic interests.64

Federation of Malaya Olympic Council In August 1953, delegates from the Federation of Malaya Athletic Union and the Federation Hockey Union, both affiliated with their respective international controlling bodies, met to form the Federation of Malaya Olympic Council (FMOC). E.M. McDonald was elected ProTerm President. The FMOC sent a team of athletes to the 1954 Asian Games in Manila for the first time.65 The FMOC began its ‘Malayanisation’ policy in June 1957 by adding a new by-law whereby only citizens of the Federation of Malaya could hold office.The new president was the Federation’s Finance Minister, Colonel H.S. Lee, who replaced McDonald.66

The federation of Malaya Two months later, the nine Malay states, along with the Settlements of Penang and Malacca, became the independent Federation of Malaya. The Federation remained within the Commonwealth and an agreement with Great Britain provided for the external defence of Malaya.67 Tengku Abdual Rahman was elected as the first Prime Minister of Malaya.68 The 1957 Malaya Cup final was played at the newly built Merdeka Stadium for the first time. The president of FAM, Tengku Abdul Rahman, was mainly responsible for this ‘first-class stadium’ which sat 20,000 people. It had a 400m running track built round a full grass games pitch (about 200 yards by 150 yards) for football, hockey or rugby, with provision for floodlighting. The building had the most up-to-date administration offices, a restaurant and dressing rooms.69 Tengku Abdul Rahman was unanimously re-elected president of FAM for the eighth successive year in February 1958.70 In 1962, The Tengku was unanimously elected President of the Asian Football Confederation (AFC), founded in 1954.71 173

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In 1959, six delegates from Malaya, India, Formosa (now Taiwan), Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Nepal and Indonesia met in Kuala Lumpur to form the Asian Badminton Confederation (ABC). The Tengku was elected as the first President of the Confederation.72 The first Asian Badminton Championships was held at Stadium Negara, Kuala Lumpur, in 1962.73

Third Asian Games, Bangkok, 1958 In 1958, the FMOC sent a contingent of 92 athletes and officials for the first time to the Asian Games in Bangkok. The athletes participated in track and field, basketball, football, hockey, shooting, swimming, tennis and wrestling.74 Malaya won a gold medal in the 4x400m men’s relay and bronze medals in the 4x100m men’s relay, 400m sprint (A.R. Ahmak) and ladies’ doubles tennis (Gladys Loke Chia and Katherine Leong Kam Wah).75

SEAP Games, 1959 In 1959, six Southeast Asian peninsular nations – Burma, Laos, Malaya, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam – gathered together in Bangkok to participate in the inaugural biannual Southeast Asian Peninsular (SEAP) Games.76 FMOC sent a team of 57 men and nine women to compete in 12 events: athletics, badminton, basketball, boxing, cycling, football, lawn tennis, swimming, shooting, table tennis, volleyball and weightlifting.77 Malaya was placed third in the medal tally with eight gold medals, 15 silver medals and 11 bronze medals, as shown in Table 17.1.

Participation in multisport events The Federation of Malaya sent three men for track and field, two swimmers, two weightlifters and two marksmen to the Rome Olympics in 1960.78 When the Malayan contingent took part in the 2nd SEAP Games held in Rangoon, the medal tally remained third with 12 gold medals, 15 silver medals and 16 bronze medals.79 In August 1962, FMOC sent a team of women and men athletes to participate in the Asian Games in Jakarta.80

Malaysia, host and organiser of SEAP Games, Kuala Lumpur, 1965 The new Federation of Malaysia, consisting of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and North Borneo (renamed Sabah), came into being in September 1963.81 On 7 August 1965, Singapore agreed to separate from Malaysia, and on 9 August it became an independent, sovereign nation.82 The separation of Singapore from Malaysia caused a minor problem in organisation and representation, Table 17.1 Total Medal Tally of the First SEAP Games, 12–17 December 1959, Bangkok, Thailand83 Country

Gold

Silver

Bronze

Total

Thailand Burma Malaya Singapore South Vietnam Laos

35 11 8 8 5 0 67

26 15 15 7 5 0 68

16 14 11 18 5 0 64

77 40 34 33 15 0 199

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which was amicably settled. Singapore was offered participation in the Malaysian team, but decided to enter the Games as a separate nation.84 In the same year, the SEAP Games Federation (SGF) amended Rule 10 of its constitution, with the approval of all seven SEAP nations, to enable Singapore to become a full member.85 In May 1963, it was unofficially discovered that Cambodia intended to cancel the 3rd SEAP Games owing to a disagreement over a ruling of the International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) and that Laos, next in line, would not be able to organise the Games. In anticipation of being asked to play host, the FMOC in October 1963 appointed a Special Committee under the Chairmanship of Oh Boon Tat, with one representative from each sport, to investigate the requirements for holding the Games in Malaysia. In November, the Committee reported that Malaysia had enough facilities, venues and experienced officials to organise and run the various events.86 In spite of the ongoing second Indochina war, the 3rd SEAP Games were held in Kuala Lumpur from 14–21 December 1965, instead of in 1963. A total of 737 men and 216 women from all seven SEAP nations took part. However, Cambodia, South Vietnam and Laos were represented by small contingents of 83, 93 and 43 athletes, respectively, due to the ongoing war spreading over each country’s territory. The Yang di-Pertuan Agong of Malaysia officially declared open the 3rd eight-day SEAP Games.87 This was the first time that the opening ceremony was televised live by Radio Television Malaysia (RTM).There was also daily live coverage of various events from 2:15 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., and a half-hour daily report at 9:30 p.m. featuring highlights of the daily events.88 This was the first time that Malaysia hosted the SEAP Games. Sepak raga, a traditional game widely played in Malaysia and Thailand, was included for the first time. Malaysia won gold and Thailand won silver.89 The host country managed to improve, placing second overall below Thailand with a total of 98 medals, as shown in Table 17.2. The then-Federation of Malaya had ranked third in the overall medal standings at the first and second SEAP Games. Thailand had a major share of its gold medals in tennis, cycling, shooting, boxing and judo.90

Conclusion The institutionalisation of sport in British Malaya began when the Europeans began to set up recreation and sport clubs and play Western games like cricket, football and tennis. Later, the Eurasian, Chinese, Malay and Tamil communities began to establish their own clubs to play the various sport. By the twentieth century, football, athletics and tennis associations had been founded to organise domestic and interstate competitions. The associations were dormant during the Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945.

Table 17.2 Total Medal Tally of the 3rd SEAP Games, 14–21 December 1965, Kuala Lumpur91 Country

Gold

Silver

Bronze

Total

Thailand Malaysia Singapore Burma Cambodia South Vietnam Laos

38 33 26 18 15 5 0 135

33 36 23 14 19 7 0 132

35 29 27 16 17 7 2 133

106 98 76 48 51 19 2 400

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The FMOC was established in 1953 to enable Malaya to participate in the 1954 Asian Games. Malaya continued to participate in the Asian Games, SEAP Games and Olympic Games after achieving independence in 1957. A ‘world-class stadium’ was build in the same year to host organised football, hockey and rugby competitions. Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman provided the leadership to lead the ABC in 1959 and AFC in 1962. The headquarters of the ABC, now known as Badminton Asia, and the AFC still remain in Malaysia. The Federation of Malaysia was established in 1965, the same year the country hosted the 3rd SEAP Games for the first time, signalling that the various sport associations have the ability to organise the various sporting events in accordance to the required technical standards. This was the beginning of many bigger and sophisticated multisport events that Malaysia would host in many of the years to come. The various Western sport and sport associations have permanently become part of Malaysia’s social, political and cultural system. Western sport have become part of Malaysia’s value system and are shaped to support the country’s nation building processes.

Notes 1 Roland St. J. Braddell, ‘ “A Short History of the Colony’,” in One Hundred Years of Singapore, ed. Walter Makepeace, G. E. Brooke, and Ronald St. John Braddell,Vol. 1 (London: John Murray, 1921), 17–22. 2 John H. Drabble, An Economic History of Malaysia, c. 1800–1990: The Transition to Modern Economic Growth (London: Macmillan, 2000). 3 John F. A. MacNair, C. B.Walker, and A. Knight, Report of the Census Officers, for the Settlement of Singapore, 1871 (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1871), 6. 4 ‘ “’Penang,” Singapore Free Press Mercantile Advertiser, May 31, 1866, 3. 5 Peng Han Lim, ‘ “The Diffusion and Transmission of Cricket Among European, Indigenous and Migrant Communities in the British Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States During the Late Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century, 1786–1899,” International Journal of the History of Sport 30, no. 3 (2013): 214–20, https://dx.doi/org/10.1080/09523367.2012.755346. 6 Ibid.,‘’ 215–18. 7 ‘ “The Penang Recreation Club Visitors’,” Straits Times, February 2, 1894, 3. 8 J. D. Vaughan, The Manners and Customs of the Chinese of the Straits Settlements (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974), 2–6. 9 S. Dunlop, Report on the Census of Singapore, 1881 (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1881), 3, 6, 21, 43. 10 Theodore R. Hubback, ‘ “Sport’,” in Twentieth Century Impression of British Malaya, ed. Arnold Wright and H. A. Cartwright (London: Lloyd’s Greater Britain Publishing Company, 1908), 584; ‘ “’Untitled,” Straits Times, January 14, 1885, 2. 11 ‘ “Chinese New Year’s ’Sports,” Straits Times, February 8, 1894, 3. 12 Hubback, ‘ “’Sport,” 584. 13 Ibid. 14 J. C. Jackson, ‘ “Population Changes in Selangor, 1850–’1891,” Journal of Tropical Geography 19, no. 19 (1964): 42. 15 Brian Harrison, Southeast Asia: A Short History (London: Macmillan, 1966), 204. 16 J. M. Gullick, Glimpses of Selangor 1860–1898 (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1993), 8. 17 Kay Kim Khoo, ‘ “The Formation of the Federated Malay ’States,” in Encyclopaedia of Malaysia: Early Modern History, 1800–1940, ed. Boon Kheng Cheah (Singapore: Archipelago Press, 2001), 80–81. 18 Boon Kheng Cheah, ‘ “The Unfederated Malay ’States,” in Encyclopaedia of Malaysia: Early Modern History, 1800–1940, ed. Boon Kheng Cheah (Singapore: Archipelago Press, 2001), 92–93. 19 C. E. Carrington, Singapore and Malaya (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956), 3. 20 Ibid., 584–85. 21 E. M. Merewether, Report of the Census of the Straits Settlements Taken on 5th April 1891 (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1892), 156. 22 Mark Foenander, ‘ “J. R. Crawford: A Veteran of ’Perak,” British Malaya 10, no. 9 (1936): 226.

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23 Arnold Wright and H. A. Cartwright, Twentieth Century Impressions of British Malaya: Its History, People, Commerce, Industries and Resources (London: Lloyd’s Greater Britain Publishing, 1908), 875. 24 ‘ “The Opening of the ‘Selangor Club’,”‘ Straits Times, October 18, 1884, 6. 25 Merewether, Report of the Census, 156. 26 D. J. M. Tate, The Lake Club 1890–1990 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990), 2–3. 27 Correspondent, ‘ “The Lake ’Club,” Straits Times, February 27, 1896, 2. 28 ‘ “Malayan Golden ’Jubilee,” Straits Times, November 24, 1935, 14. 29 Lim, ‘ “The Diffusion and Transmission’,” 221. 30 Wright and Cartwright, Twentieth Century Impressions, 589. 31 James C. Jackson, ‘ “Population Changes in Selangor State, 1850–1891’,” The Journal of Tropical Geography 17 (1964): 50–51. 32 ‘ “Advance of Chinese Sport in Selangor’,” Straits Times, May 19, 1935, 14. 33 ‘ “The Club That Beat the Slump’,” Straits Times, January 8, 1933, 13. 34 ‘ “Ipoh Athletic Sports’,” SFPMA, September 27, 1906, 199. 35 “The Ipoh Athletic Meeting,” SFPMA, September 13, 1906, 8. 36 “The Athletic Meeting at Ipoh’,” SFPMA, September 24, 1906, 5. 37 ‘ “Ipoh Athletic Sports’,” Eastern Daily Mail and Straits Morning Advertiser, September 29, 1906, 5. 38 ‘ “Malayan Athletic Sports’,” Straits Times, July 21, 1920, 10. 39 Allan E. Moreira, The Malaya Sports Record (Kuala Lumpur: Huxley, Palmer & Co., 1923), 101–3. 40 ‘ “Malayan Athletics: Colour-Bar Broken’,” SFPMA, August 30, 1921, 12. 41 ‘ “Malayan Sports’,” Straits Times, September 13, 1922, 10. 42 ‘ “Malayan Sports’,” Straits Times, September 18, 1922, 10. 43 ‘ “Singapore Wins the Championship’,” SFPMA, September 21, 1922, 185. 44 ‘ “Malaya Cup Final’,” Straits Times, October 3, 1921, 10. 45 ‘ “Malayan Football’,” Straits Times, September 13, 1926, 10. 46 Peng Han Lim and Mohd Salleh Aman, ‘ “The HMS Malaya Cup Football League, 1921–1941:Towards the Institutionalization of Football in British Malaya’,” International Journal of the History of Sport 34, no. 17/18 (2017): 1981–2007, https://doi.org/10.1080/09523367.2018.1495194. 47 ‘ “Malayan R. U. Affairs’,” Straits Times, September 14, 1928, 10. 48 Moreira, The Malaya Sports Record, 82. 49 ‘ “Lawn Tennis’,” Malaya Tribune, September 10, 1921, 5. 50 ‘ “Tennis Association Formed’,” SFPMA, August 6, 1924, 16. 51 “ ‘The History of Rugby in Malaya’,” Sunday Tribune, August 30, 1936, 20. 52 ‘ “Malaya Badminton Association Formed’,” Straits Times, November 13, 1934, 14. 53 ‘ “Malaya Badminton Association’,” SFPMA, November 14, 1934, 16. 54 ‘ “Triangular Badminton Tournament’,” Straits Times, June 2, 1935, 16. 55 ‘ “Foong Seong Cup’,” SFPMA, July 30, 1936, 15. 56 ‘ “Malayan Badminton Survey’,” Sunday Tribune, April 25, 1937, 19. 57 ‘ “Where Shuttles Are Scarce Players Progress!’ ” Sunday Tribune, July 10, 1938, 19. 58 ‘ “All About Badminton in Malaya’,” Malaya Tribune, December 2, 1934, 18. 59 ‘ “Singapore Stars Defeated in Badminton Championships’,” Straits Times, December 6, 1937, 16. 60 ‘ “First Malayan Badminton Champion to Retire’,” Sunday Tribune, January 30, 1938. 61 ‘ “Indonesian May Be B.A.M. Singles Champion’,” Straits Times, July 31, 1954, 14. 62 Sports Editor, ‘ “Sonneville,Yusuf Here for Experience’,” Straits Times, August 10, 1954, 14. 63 H. R. Hone, British Military Administration, Malaya: Advisory Council, Singapore: Report of Proceedings (Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Union Government Press, 1946), 2. 64 ‘ “Singapore to Remain a Separate Colony’,” Straits Times, October 1, 1945, 1. 65 ‘ “Federation Olympic Council Formed’,” Straits Times, August 16, 1953, 20. 66 ‘ “Malayanisation It’s Making Its Debut in Sport’,” Straits Times, June 2, 1957, 18. 67 Richard Winstedt, Malaya and Its History, 7th ed. (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1966), 148. 68 Andrew Barber, The Making of a Nation 1510–1957 (Malaysia: AB &A, 2008), 126. 69 ‘ “K.L. Stadium to Be ‘Best in East’’,” Straits Times, June 11, 1958, 26. 70 ‘ “Tengku Is Re-Elected’,” Straits Times, February 17, 1958, 14. 71 Norman Siebel, “ ‘FAM’s Rise to Leading Role in Asia’,” Straits Times, December 7, 1961, 18. 72 V. Nayagam, ‘ “Tengku Agrees to Lead ABC’,” Straits Times, July 30, 1959, 14. 73 Norman Siebel, ‘ “The Is 1st Asian Champion’,” Straits Times, May 6, 1962, 20.

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74 Charles Bryce, ‘ “One Thing Malay Has Plenty of Games Officials’,” Singapore Free Press, April 10, 1958, 14. 75 Organising Committee, Official Report of III Asian Games, Tokyo 1958 (Tokyo: Organising Committee, 1958), 116–17, 122. 76 Peng Han Lim and Mohd Salleh Aman, ‘ “The History of the South East Asian Peninsular Games’,” International Journal of the History of Sport 33, no. 5 (2016): 545–68, https://doi.org/10.1080/09523367. 2015.1062371. 77 Organising Committee, The Official Report of the 1st SEA Peninsular Games, Bangkok 1959 (Bangkok: Organising Committee, 1959), 35–36. 78 ‘ “Our Team’,” Straits Times, August 18, 1960, 6. 79 Organizing Committee, The Second South East Asia Peninsular Games Rangoon 1961 (Rangoon: The Organizing Committee, 1962), 119. 80 ‘ “Malayans Look Smart in the Opening Ceremony’,” Straits Times, August 25, 1962, 19. 81 Harrison, Southeast Asia, 256. 82 Ministry of Culture, Singapore Year Book 1964 (Singapore: Ministry of Culture, 1965), 10–11. 83 Aba Mardjadi, Dari SEAP Games Ke SEA Games [From SEAP Games to SEA Games] (Jakarta: Media Gema Olahraga, 1997), ix. 84 Organising Committee, III SEAP Games: Kuala Lumpur 1965 (Kuala Lumpur: South East Asia Peninsular Games Federation, 1966), 36. 85 Ernest Frida, ‘ “Games in Phnom Penh’,” Straits Times, December 22, 1965, 22. 86 Organising Committee, III SEAP Games, 36. 87 Mansoor Rahman, ‘ “King to Open the Capital’s First SEAP Games at Impressive Ceremony’,” Straits Times, December 12, 1965, 16. 88 ‘ “TV Live and Well’,” Straits Times, December 17, 1965, 12. 89 Organising Committee, III SEAP Games, 130. 90 Lim Kee Chan, ‘ “World Record’,” Straits Times, December 16, 1965, 22. 91 Organising Committee, III SEAP Games, 156.

Bibliography Barber, Andrew. The Making of a Nation 1510–1957. Kuala Lumpur: AB&A, 2008. Braddell, Roland St. J. “A Short History of the Colony.” In One Hundred Years of Singapore, edited by Walter Makepeace, G. E. Brooke, and Ronald St. John Braddell, 17–22. London: John Murray, 1921. Carrington, C. E. Singapore and Malaya. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956. Cheah, Boon Kheng. “The Unfederated Malay States.” In Encyclopaedia of Malaysia: Early Modern History, 1800–1940, edited by Boon Kheng Cheah, 92–93. Singapore: Archipelago Press, 2001. Drabble, John H. An Economic History of Malaysia, c. 1800–1990: The Transition to Modern Economic Growth. London: Macmillan, 2000. Dunlop, S. Report on the Census of Singapore, 1881. Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1881. Foenander, Mark. “J. R. Crawford: A Veteran of Perak.” British Malaya 10, no. 9 (1936): 226. Gullick, J. M. Glimpses of Selangor 1860–1898. Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1993. Harrison, Brian. Southeast Asia: A Short History. London: Macmillan, 1966. Hone, H. R. British Military Administration, Malaya: Advisory Council, Singapore: Report of Proceedings. Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Union Government Press, 1946. Hubback, Theodore R. “Sport.” In Twentieth Century Impression of British Malaya, edited by Arnold Wright and H. A. Cartwright, 559–86. London: Lloyd’s Greater Britain Publishing Company, 1908. Jackson, J. C. “Population Changes in Selangor, 1850–1891.” Journal of Tropical Geography 19 (1964): 42–57. Khoo, Kay Kim. “The Formation of the Federated Malay States.” In Encyclopaedia of Malaysia: Early Modern History, 1800–1940, edited by Boon Kheng Cheah, 80–81. Singapore: Archipelago Press, 2001. Lim, Peng Han. “The Diffusion and Transmission of Cricket Among European, Indigenous and Migrant Communities in the British Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States During the Late Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century, 1786–1899.” International Journal of the History of Sport 30, no. 3 (2013): 210–31. https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09523367.2012.755346. 178

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Lim, Peng Han, and Mohd Salleh Aman. “The History of the South East Asian Peninsular Games.” International Journal of the History of Sport 33, no. 5 (2016): 545–68. https://doi.org/10.1080/09523367.201 5.1062371. Lim, Peng Han, and Mohd Salleh Aman. “The HMS Malaya Cup Football League, 1921–1941:Towards the Institutionalization of Football in British Malaya.” International Journal of the History of Sport 34, no. 17/18 (2017): 1981–2007. https://doi.org/10.1080/09523367.2018.1495194. MacNair, John F. A., C. B. Walker, and A. Knight. Report of the Census Officers, for the Settlement of Singapore, 1871. Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1871. Mardjadi, Aba. Dari SEAP Games Ke SEA Games [From SEAP Games to SEA Games]. Jakarta: Media Gema Olahraga, 1997. Merewether, E. M. Report of the Census of the Straits Settlements Taken on 5th April 1891. Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1892. Ministry of Culture. Singapore Year Book 1964. Singapore: Ministry of Culture, 1965. Moreira, Allan E. The Malaya Sports Record. Kuala Lumpur: Huxley, Palmer & Co., 1923. Organising Committee. III SEAP Games: Kuala Lumpur 1965. Kuala Lumpur: South East Asia Peninsular Games Federation, 1966. Organising Committee. The Official Report of the 1st SEA Peninsular Games, Bangkok 1959. Bangkok: Organising Committee, 1959. Organising Committee. Official Report of III Asian Games,Tokyo 1958. Tokyo: Organising Committee, 1958. Organising Committee. The Second South East Asia Peninsular Games Rangoon 1961. Rangoon: Organizing Committee, 1962, 119. Tate, D. J. M. The Lake Club 1890–1990. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990. Vaughan, J. D. The Manners and Customs of the Chinese of the Straits Settlements. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974. Winstedt, Richard. Malaya and Its History. 7th ed. London: Hutchinson University Library, 1966. Wright, Arnold, and H. A. Cartwright. Twentieth Century Impressions of British Malaya: Its History, People, Commerce, Industries and Resources. London: Lloyd’s Greater Britain Publishing, 1908.

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18 Sport, colonisation and modernity in the Philippines Gerald R. Gems

By the last decade of the nineteenth century, the United States had consolidated its territorial hold on the North American continent. Its industrial output and economy had surpassed that of Great Britain, and it began to challenge the European powers for world leadership. Great Britain, France and Germany had already established colonial empires to extend their economic and cultural influence. The United States government also felt the need to fulfil its ‘manifest destiny,’ a concept professed by the earliest Puritan colonists, and become a beacon for the rest of the world. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge proclaimed: Our history has been one of expansion [which] is not a matter of regret, but of pride. . . .We were right in wresting from barbarism and adding to civilisation the territory out of which we have made these beautiful states. Barbarism . . . has no place in a civilised world. It is our duty toward the people living in barbarism to see that they are freed from their chains, and we can free them only by destroying barbarism itself.’1 His senatorial colleague Albert Beveridge further rationalised the spread of democracy and capitalism as a moral imperative. And of all our race He has marked the American people as His chosen nation to finally lead in the regeneration of the world. This is the divine mission of America. . . . We are trustees of the world’s progress, guardians of its righteous peace.’2 The Americans found a ready excuse to enact their martial plan on 15 February 1898, when an American battleship mysteriously exploded in the harbour of Havana, Cuba, a colony within the Spanish empire. The Americans soon declared war on Spain. Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, directed American ships to Manila in the Philippines, part of the far-flung Spanish dominions. The Americans quickly defeated the Spanish navy and Admiral George Dewey stalled revolutionary leader Emilio Aguinaldo and his insurgent forces, which had already surrounded the Spanish army in Manila. Aguinaldo declared Filipino independence on 18 June 1898 and proclaimed himself the first president of an independent Philippines. The American army arrived on 30 June and engaged in subterfuge which resulted in the Spanish 180

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surrendering to the Americans rather than the Filipino rebels. As increasing American forces occupied the islands, consequently governed and administered by American officials, Aguinaldo’s army engaged in a guerrilla war that lasted until 1902 in the northern islands and continued until 1913 in the southern islands inhabited by Muslims, as the Americans endeavoured to convert even the Catholic Filipinos to their version of Protestant Christianity.3 Religion assumed a prominent place in the American colonising efforts. Protestant church officials met in a conference to divide the Philippines into denominational territories after chaplains and the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), a Protestant evangelical group, accompanied the American troops to the islands. The first missionaries travelled to the archipelago in March 1899, and sport proved to be an influential means of conversion. The YMCA had used sport and gymnasiums to attract young men to its proselytising messages in the United States, and it soon allied with American government officials in Manila. Even before the arrival of the missionaries, American soldiers had already introduced the native population to boxing and the American national game of baseball. The missionaries established religious schools throughout the islands, and sport and physical education became a primary means of inculcating the American value system. Initially lacking the ability to communicate in English, students might still learn that sport involved competition, the basis of a capitalist economy. Team games were especially important because they required leadership, cooperation and self-sacrifice, the components of democracy. Competitive sport also required referees or umpires, which taught respect for authority. Success in athletics also required self-discipline and a strong work ethic, all of which the Americans intended to instil in their new charges. Such cultural values sometimes conflicted with the Filipino lifestyle, where wealthy families hired servants to do their manual labour.The Spanish concept of time also differed with American punctuality, and American individualism was at odds with the communalism of Filipino society. Although more than a thousand American teachers had travelled to the islands by 1903, they were assisted by 3,500 local Filipinos, some of whom came late to classes or took days off to attend fiestas. The American teachers were appalled by the communal practice of students copying one another’s work, but indigenous children perceived such help as a communal norm.4 In the public schools established by the American government, the YMCA enjoyed inordinate influence despite the separation of church and state as a fundamental principle of the American Constitution. Elwood Brown, director of the YMCA, prepared the official recreation manual, and another YMCA staff member served as the director of public education. In the schools the language of instruction was English, considered to be a modern, unifying influence by the American administrators, as the numerous tribes throughout the islands spoke a variety of tongues.The ilustrados, wealthy Filipinos who had been educated in Spain or under the direction of Spanish priests, spoke Spanish and objected to the American imposition. In 1903 the American government began recruiting the children of the ilustrados for education in the United States with the intention of instilling allegiance to the Americans and producing future leaders, thereby stunting the growing nationalist sentiments among the Filipino upper class.5 Sport and physical education permeated the school curriculum and the American acculturation efforts. Secretary of the Interior Dean Worcester claimed: ‘Quite as important as the development of the minds of the young is the development of their bodies through the introduction of athletic games and sport, which have incidentally promoted intercommunication and mutual understanding between the several Filipino peoples. In many regions baseball is emptying the cockpits, and thus aiding the cause of good order and morality.’6 As early as 1905, physical education became a required subject for both boys and girls, and schools fielded teams for interscholastic competition in baseball, indoor baseball (softball), 181

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basketball and volleyball. By 1910, running tracks and tennis courts had been added to school premises. A grade of 75 percent in physical education classes was required for promotion to the next level. By 1915 more than 90 percent of the 450,000 registered students participated in some form of athletics, and students earned bonus academic points by qualifying for championships in the various sport competitions.7 In addition to sport and physical education, schools began instruction in industrial education and the production of handicrafts, starting in 1909. Boys learned carpentry and gardening, while girls engaged in cooking, childcare, housekeeping, weaving and sewing. Students made baskets, mats, hats, lace, slippers, embroidery, pottery and other handicrafts, which the Bureau of Education sold for additional revenue. By 1924 nearly 900,000 students were engaged in such work. Industrial education was hardly suitable for leadership roles in society, and such programmes lost favour as Filipinos assumed greater leverage during the interwar years. One historian asserted that ‘the US government’s ultimate objective in promoting public education in the Philippines had more to do with developing commerce than with the benevolent goals of freedom and cultural unity.’8 The infusion of sporting practices, however, continued well beyond the schoolyards and playgrounds. Elwood Brown established the Philippines Amateur Athletic Federation in 1910 with Governor General W. Cameron Forbes, a former football coach at Harvard University, as the president. Brown also promoted the games of basketball and volleyball, sport which had been invented by YMCA instructors in the United States. By 1913 Brown had begun serving on the Playground Committee and training its instructors.9 In addition to Elwood Brown and the YMCA, Episcopalian bishop Charles Brent wielded considerable power among the American administrators. Brent arrived in the Philippines in 1903 and remained until 1917. Like Elwood Brown, Brent subscribed to the concept of ‘muscular Christianity,’ using sport as a means to develop discipline, self-control and a rugged but moral masculinity. Brent’s own athletic and social pursuits enabled him to befriend a number of governors general as well as the most prominent military officers in the region. In 1904 he founded the Columbia Club, which offered bowling, billiards, an indoor swimming pool and a library for its Anglo patrons in Manila. A gym was added in 1914. Both Brent’s club and the YMCA were granted tax exemptions for their religious work.10 In 1907 the YMCA constructed two buildings on its Manila property, which segregated white and Filipino patrons accordingly. A year later the compound included a 75-room dormitory, a swimming pool, a gym, tennis courts, a social hall, a library and a dining room. Brent built a private school for American offspring in Baguio, the summer retreat for Americans in the central mountains of the island of Luzon, where they were shielded from relationships with the native Filipinos. The indigenous population was not allowed into the distinguished Army and Navy Club or into other elite social institutions established by the Americans, as they reinforced the racially segregated practices of the American culture in the United States. Such policies generated antagonism and hostility towards the white occupiers, who deemed the Filipinos incapable of governing themselves.11 Despite the American efforts to distance themselves from the local natives, sport offered opportunities for interracial competition and nationalistic confrontation. American teachers replaced soldiers in the schools, and by 1903 baseball teams of boys and girls were waging battles for local prestige. Manila featured its own ballpark by 1902, with interscholastic tournaments and leagues by 1905. One school principal sent his players to Fort McKinley to learn from the military teams, and they apparently learned their lessons well – in 1911 the team defeated the American soldiers in three of their five games. Such victories challenged the Americans’ ethnocentric notions of racial and physical superiority.12 182

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The Americans channelled the growing nationalistic fervor of the Filipinos into other athletic contests. After defeating China in a war in 1895 and then subduing the Russians in a 1905 conflict, the Japanese deemed themselves the rightful overlords of the Pacific region. The American occupation of the Philippines proved an obstacle to the fulfilment of such desires. In 1912 the Waseda University baseball team travelled to the Philippines to engage in a surrogate form of athletic warfare. At Cebu in the central Philippines, an American reported: ‘The rivalry was spirited. Once or twice, it bordered on bitterness. In short, the game was for blood. Having defeated a white foe in war, no doubt the Japs could not brook defeat by their neighbouring islanders.’ When the Cebu team triumphed, ‘Bedlam broke loose, Japan was whipped, and the Cebu men became heroes.’ More than five thousand fans attended the game in Manila as the Filipinos won a narrow victory and the series, much to the chagrin of the Japanese.The international contests continued over three decades, pitting American military, college and professional teams against their non-white Asian subjects and Japanese aspirants, until the onset of actual combat in World War II.13 More widespread competition ensued with the YMCA’s reorganisation of the Manila Carnival. Initially established as a business and economic exposition in 1908, under the direction of Elwood Brown the event was transformed into an international athletic festival in 1913. The carnival hosted the national championships in track and field, baseball, basketball for males and females, tennis, swimming and diving, rowing, golf, polo, soccer, American football and bowling. Brown invited both China and Japan to the 1913 festival, which he dubbed the Far Eastern Olympics, as the Americans claimed credit for bringing the Asian nations into the modern world of athletics. Eighteen thousand spectators attended the baseball game with Japan and rejoiced at the overall victory of the Filipinos at the games. An American journalist claimed: [Up] to the time of American occupation the Filipino had done absolutely nothing in athletics. The race, in an athletic standpoint, was in very poor condition. They were, perhaps, the weakest of all Orientals. Today, they are at the head.14 In the 1915 volleyball championship semifinal contest, Filipino workers defeated their American employers by allegedly playfully hitting the ball 52 times among themselves before returning it across the net. The dejected Americans declared the strategy to be deceptive and unsportsmanlike, and they soon changed the rules to allow only three hits for the Filipinos, but unlimited hits by their white bosses. Other Filipinos also outwitted their American overlords by simply entering the tennis tournament, thereby gaining free admission to the festival, for which they had no intention of paying the admission fee.15 While sport and games attracted Filipino youth, the athletes did not always adhere to American notions of propriety and deliberation. When Bishop Brent established a school for Muslim Moro boys in Jolo, baseball and boxing were introduced to ‘civilise’ its students. In a 1908 baseball game with the provincial school team, W. Cameron Forbes offered a prize of ten pesos to the winners. The game, however, was officiated by a teacher from the provincial school. When the Moro boys disagreed with his decisions, they repeatedly quit the game rather than accept dishonour by his rulings.16 Boxing proved to be the most telling of Filipinos’ athletic successes, as interracial contests offered direct challenges to the whites’ belief in racial supremacy. Although such affairs were barred by the American magistrates, clandestine bouts persisted. By 1909 American promoters ran the Olympic Stadium and Athletic Club, which accommodated 8,500 fans with integrated seating. Another 3,000 were denied entry for a bout between the British featherweight champion and a local fighter. American promoters Frank Churchill and Joe Waterman imported 183

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American and Australian boxers; Filipinos favoured African Americans, with whom they had developed a kindred spirit during the ongoing guerrilla warfare. (Some black American soldiers had defected to the Filipino insurgent army due to shared feelings of racist, bigoted and unequal treatment.) Waterman believed in the character-building qualities of sport, particularly boxing. He claimed that ‘the Filipino as a boxer has done more in two years for Philippine independence and to eradicate the cock fighting evil, than insurrectos and politicians have done in 12 times the length of time.’ Despite Waterman’s perceptions, Filipinos simply transferred their wagers from the roosters to the boxers.17 Boxers greatly contributed to the destruction of whites’ ethnocentric perceptions of racial superiority. Just as the African American Jack Johnson had wrested the heavyweight championship of the world from white domination during the Filipinos’ nationalistic awareness, local fighters challenged whites in and out of the ring. In a demonstration of masculine virility they refused to wear the athletic cups that protected the male genitalia, considering the equipment an effeminate accessory of the Americans. Francisco Guilledo, the best of Frank Churchill’s stable of fighters, assumed the ring alias of Pancho Villa, the Mexican bandit who terrorised the American Southwest during World War I. He fought Mike Ballerino, the American Army champion, thirteen times and never lost (11 wins and two draws). Churchill took Villa and other top Filipino boxers to the United States to demonstrate their talents with a larger purpose in mind.18 Churchill stated: [B]efore I am through here I mean to prove that whatever the Filipinos can do in a prize ring they can do in politics, in commerce and in finance. I know the Filipino people about as well as anybody knows them. And I know those Filipinos as hard-working, courageous and intelligent people who not merely are worthy and competent of independence and control of their affairs, but a nation of people which, if given a chance, will rise up within a generation to ranking as one of the most important in any part of the world.19 Churchill’s pronouncement and his fighters’ success served as a rebuttal to the governing whites’ perceptions of Filipino debility, incompetence and barbarity. The Americans had long characterised the Filipinos as primitive, uncivilised savages. In 1904 the US government paid $1.5 million to bring a contingent of tribesmen and Moros to the St. Louis World’s Fair, and put them on exhibit in tree houses and other primitive dwellings. They performed a daily tribal dance in loincloths, and such eroticism became the highlight of the fair. The Igorotte tribesmen were characterised as head-hunting cannibals. James Sullivan, head of the Amateur Athletic Union and WJ McGee, the first president of the American Anthropological Association, recruited the Filipinos and other racial and ethnic groups to compete in athletic contests known as the Anthropology Days, in an attempt to compare the participants’ ‘natural abilities’ to those of trained white athletes competing in the concurrent Olympic Games in the city, with predictable results that buttressed whites’ claims to racial superiority. White American entrepreneurs continued to recruit troupes of Filipinos to tour the United States and Europe through 1913, portraying and reinforcing primitive stereotypes.20 Dean Worcester, too, earned large sums and the vilification of Filipinos for his lecture tours and articles in the National Geographic magazine that continually portrayed the Filipinos as primitive savages, incapable of self-government. Such publicity spawned a tourist economy in the islands as Americans became enraptured with the islands and its multitude of peoples that the US government was attempting to usher into the modern world.21 Although American college and professional baseball teams made repeated trips to the islands, Worcester’s depictions catered to more daring adventurers who sought exotic and erotic 184

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pleasures unavailable to them at home. American photographers captured photos of wily Filipino tricksters who dressed in tribal garb and loincloths to meet the tourists’ desires, in exchange for cash.22 Such caricatures agitated the Filipino ilustrados, who clamoured for national independence. Provincial Governor Vicente Nepomuceno complained: In furtherance of this determination to hold our reins of government they have gone into the remotest corners of the islands, gathered together the lowest types of the inhabitants and brought them to this country (United States) to exhibit them in an attempt to justify their paternal grip on the islands. American Clarence Edwards of the Bureau of Insular Affairs even admitted that ‘the Igorrotes were no more representative of the Philippines than the most savage Indians are representative of Americans.’23 Filipino boxers stood in very visible public and undeniable displays that confronted such social Darwinian precepts. In 1922, Pancho Villa (Francisco Guilledo) travelled with Frank Churchill to the United States. He captured the flyweight championship a year later, the first Asian to hold a world title. During his two-year sojourn in the United States,Villa’s fights drew record crowds and garnered nearly $300,000. Countering the negative stereotypes of Filipinos, he displayed the utmost grace and undeniable sportsmanship in the ring. Whenever Villa knocked down an opponent, he retreated to his corner to allow the downed fighter to recover, though it was customary at the time to stand over him and commence the onslaught as he stood up. Still, American sportswriters offered racialised and primitive excuses for his success, such as ‘his brown sweating body flashing back and forth like a caged monkey . . . it was impossible for anything human to get around so fast.’24 Journalists also castigated Villa for his emulation of the defiant Jack Johnson, who spent his money on sartorial splendor and cavorted with white women, an affront to racial norms of the era. Villa’s success in the ring and his challenges to the hegemonic norms and standards of the white authorities made him a hero in the Philippines. When he died from treatment for an infected tooth in 1925 at the young age of 23, his nation fell into a collective gloom. Stores closed and streets were draped in black as more than 100,000 mourners lined the streets for his funeral. Nearly a century later a Filipino scholar lamented his loss: Into his person he collected all the swank and swagger of the period and the whole country felt a vicarious pride in his rise from rags to riches – and in his magnificent wardrobe, his collection of silk shirts and natty hats, his pearl buttons and gold cufflinks, and his princely retinue. He had a valet to massage him, another valet to towel him, another valet to put on his shoes, another valet to help him in his trousers, and still other valets to comb his hair, powder his cheeks and spray him with perfume. He was, perhaps, more idolised as a magnifico than as a boxer; and when he died the nation’s heart broke.25 In 1999 the Associated Press belatedly recognised his greatness by naming him the ‘flyweight of the century.’ Villa’s success led the American authorities in the Philippines to initiate boxing programmes in the local colleges, determined to produce model American subjects. Governor General Leonard Wood asserted that ‘boxing develops every muscle in the human body, quickens the brain, sharpens the wits, imparts force, and above all it teaches self-control.’26 In 1921 Wood and former Governor General W. Cameron Forbes had co-authored a highly critical report to the US 185

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government, stating that despite more than two decades of American occupation, the Filipinos were still incapable of self-rule. It did, however, praise the role of sport in the inculcation of desired values.27 Filipino boxers continued to migrate to the United States during the interwar years. By the 1930s at least a dozen had made their mark in America, where they found ardent support from the large number of migrant Filipino workers in California. Speedy Dado (Diosdado Posadas), Small Montana (Benjamin Gan) and Ceferino Garcia all appeared in world championship bouts, further adding to the martial prestige of the Philippines. One historian noted that ‘a Garcia fight anywhere on the Pacific Coast is a signal for a cavalcade of motor cars of various vintages to converge on the scene of action.’28 The US government took notice of Filipino progress, granting the Philippines commonwealth status in 1935 with the election of its own president, Manuel Quezon. However, the United States retained overall supervision of the islands and maintained a strong influence on the economy with its large military bases situated in the country. That arrangement resulted in the utter destruction of Manila by Japanese forces during World War II. In the aftermath of the war, the Philippines finally gained full independence in 1946. The legacy of the long American occupation still lingers in the country.The American cultivation of ilustrado families resulted in an oligarchy which continues to control the economy and has political influence to the extent of dictatorial power. The American Protestants’ attempt to convert the Filipinos largely failed, with the continued patronage of Catholicism in the northern and central islands and an adherence to Islam in the south. American forms of sport, however, continue to permeate Filipino culture. Basketball, introduced by the YMCA, has become the national sport, spawning rabid interest in the American National Basketball Association and the professional league within the Philippines. Baseball still lingers, as the Little League team from Zamboanga on the southern island of Mindanao reached the international championship game in 1992. Filipino boxers continue to challenge for world championships, most notably Manny Pacquiao, who has become an international celebrity. Pacquiao accumulated world championships in eight different weight classes and was considered to be the best pound-for-pound boxer in the world. He parlayed his fame into a singing and acting career, as well as election to the national legislature and the establishment of a charitable foundation to eliminate poverty in the nation. The initial American administrators of the colonial Philippines had an idealistic dream of producing productive and successful people, but such well-rounded athletic and civic talent came to fruition only under an independent Philippines.29

Notes 1 James Bradley, The Imperial Crusade: Secret History of Empire and War (New York: Little, Brown & Co., 2009), 203. 2 Warren Zimmerman, The First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made Their Country a World Power (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2002), 348. 3 Gerald R. Gems, Sport and the American Occupation of the Philippines: Bats, Balls, and Bayonets (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016), 41–62. 4 Ibid., 130–31. 5 Ibid., 131–32; Peter W. Stanley, A Nation in the Making:The Philippines and the United States, 1899–1921 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), 315; Glenn May, Social Engineering in the Philippine: The Aims, Execution, and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900–1913 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1980), 83; Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines (New York: Random House, 1989), 206–7. 6 Dean C. Worcester, The Philippines Past and Present (New York: Macmillan, 1914), 928.

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7 Celia Bocobo-Olivar, History of Physical Education in the Philippines (Quezon City, Philippines: University of the Philippines Press, 1972), 40–50; Frederic S. Marquardt Papers, University of Michigan, Bentley Library; Elwood S. Brown, Annual Report, October 1, 1914–October 1, 1915, n.p.; Lou Antolihao, Playing with the Big Boys: Basketball, American Imperialism, and Subaltern Discourse in the Philippines (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015), 38, cites that 95 percent of the 700,000 students participated in physical education classes in 1911. 8 Gems, Sport and the American Occupation of the Philippines, 136–37; Julie A. Tuason, ‘ “The Ideology of Empire in National Geographic Magazine’s Coverage of the Philippines, 1898–1908’,” Geographical Review 89, no. 1 (1999): 34–53 (quote, 43). 9 Gems, Sport and the American Occupation of the Philippines, 95. 10 Ibid., 92. 11 Ibid., 57, 66, 93, 136. 12 Gerald R. Gems, The Athletic Crusade: Sport and American Cultural Imperialism (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 50, 55, 59. 13 Ibid., 59; Gems, Sport and the American Occupation of the Philippines, 147–53. 14 Gems, Sport and the American Occupation of the Philippines, 34–35, 96–97 (quote), 154–55; Elwood S. Brown, Annual Reports, 1911–1914, YMCA Archives, Box Philippines, NP, Correspondence Reports, 1911–1968, administrative reports file. The reporter conveniently forgot that the Japanese had already participated in the 1912 Olympics in Stockholm, Sweden. Brown drew the ire of Pierre de Coubertin for invoking the word Olympics in his title and duly changed the name to the Far East Games. 15 Brown, Annual Report. 16 Bishop Charles H. Brent Papers, Library of Congress, Box 47, Philippine Islands folder; Alexander C. Zabriskie, Bishop Brent: Crusader for Christian Unity (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1948), 56, 70–72; Gems, Sport and the American Occupation of the Philippines, 136. 17 Gems, The Athletic Crusade, 58; Gems, Sport and the American Occupation of the Philippines, 118–19 (quote, 118). 18 Gems, Sport and the American Occupation of the Philippines, 118–19, 158–61; Gerald R. Gems, Boxing: A Concise History of the Sweet Science (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 38–39, 99–100. 19 Theresa Runstedtler, ‘ “The New Negro’s Brown Brother: Black American and Filipino Boxers and the ‘Rising Tide of Color‘,” in Escape from New York:The New Negro Renaissance Beyond Harlem, ed. Davarian L. Baldwin and Minkah Makalani (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 2013), 105–26, 117 (quote). 20 Robert A. Reid, The Greatest of Exhibitions: Completely Illustrated, official publication (St. Louis: Samuel F. Myerson, 1904); Susan Brownell, ed., The 1904 Anthropology Days and Olympic Games: Sport, Race, and American Imperialism (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008); Claire Prentice, The Lost Tribe of Coney Island: Headhunters, Luna Park, and the Man Who Pulled Off the Spectacle of the Century (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2014). 21 Dean C. Worcester, ‘ “Field Sports Among the Wild Men of Luzon’,” National Geographic 22, no. 3 (1911): 215–67; Dean C.Worcester,‘ “Head-Hunters of Northern Luzon’,” Dean C.Worcester, National Geographic 23, no. 9 (1912): 833–930; Dean C. Worcester, ‘ “The Non-Christian Peoples of the Philippine Islands: With an Account of What Has Been Done for Them Under American Rule’,” National Geographic 24, no. 11 (1913): 1157–256; Dean C. Worcester, The Philippines: Past and Present (New York: Macmillan, 1913). 22 Gems, Sport and the American Occupation of the Philippines, 152–53; Carlos Bulosan America Is in the Heart: A Personal History (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1946), 66–67; Amos Alonzo Stagg Papers, University of Chicago, Special Collections, Box 27, folder 2. 23 Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States & the Philippines (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 229, 264–65 (quotes, respectively). 24 Gems, Boxing, 100; “Pancho Villa,” accessed February 2, 2019, boxrec.com/media/index.php/Pancho_ Villa; Stanley Weston, ‘ “Pancho Villa: The Gigantic Runt’,” Clipping in the Villa File, International Boxing Hall of Fame. 25 Christina Evangelista Torres, The Americanization of Manila, 1898–1921 (Quezon City, Philippines: Diliman, 2010), 176. His wife later charged that he was murdered with an overdose of anaesthetic at the behest of gamblers who had lost a large sum on his last fight. 26 Gems, Boxing, 39; Joseph R. Svinth,‘ “The Origins of Filipino Boxing, 1899–1926’,” Journal of Combative Sport (2001): 6 (quote), accessed July 8, 2011, http://ejmas.com/jcs/jcsart_svinth_0701.htm. 27 Kramer, The Blood of Government, 401–24.

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28 Gems, Boxing, 132–33; Gems, Sport and the American Occupation of the Philippines, 160–61; Linda EspanaMaram, Creating Masculinity in Los Angeles in Little Manila: Working-Class Filipinos and Popular Culture, 1920s–1950s (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 79 (quote). 29 Gems, Boxing, 187–88; Gems, Sport and the American Occupation of the Philippines, 167–82; Antolihao, Playing with the Big Boys.

Bibliography Amos Alonzo Stagg Papers, University of Chicago, Special Collections, Box 27, folder 2. Antolihao, Lou. Playing with the Big Boys: Basketball, American Imperialism, and Subaltern Discourse in the Philippines. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015. Bishop Charles H. Brent Papers, Library of Congress, Box 47, Philippine Islands folder. Bocobo-Olivar, Celia. History of Physical Education in the Philippines. Quezon City, Philippines: University of the Philippines Press, 1972. Bradley, James. The Imperial Crusade: Secret History of Empire and War. New York: Little, Brown & Co., 2009. Brown, Elwood S. Annual Report, October 1, 1914–October 1, 1915, n.p. Brown, Elwood S. Annual Reports, 1911–1914, in YMCA Archives, Box Philippines. Brownell, Susan, ed. The 1904 Anthropology Days and Olympic Games: Sport, Race, and American Imperialism. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008. Bulosan, Carlos. America Is in the Heart: A Personal History. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1946. Espana-Maram, Linda. Creating Masculinity in Los Angeles in Little Manila:Working-Class Filipinos and Popular Culture, 1920s–1950s. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. Frederic, S. Marquardt Papers, University of Michigan, Bentley Library. Gems, Gerald R. The Athletic Crusade: Sport and American Cultural Imperialism. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006. Gems, Gerald R. Boxing: A Concise History of the Sweet Science. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014. Gems, Gerald R. Sport and the American Occupation of the Philippines: Bats, Balls, and Bayonets. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016. Karnow, Stanley. In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines. New York: Random House, 1989. Kramer, Paul A. The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States & the Philippines. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006. May, Glenn. Social Engineering in the Philippine: The Aims, Execution, and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900–1913. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980. NP, Correspondence Reports, 1911–1968, administrative reports file. Prentice, Claire. The Lost Tribe of Coney Island: Headhunters, Luna Park, and the Man Who Pulled Off the Spectacle of the Century. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2014. Reid, Robert A. The Greatest of Exhibitions: Completely Illustrated, Official Publication. St. Louis: Samuel F. Myerson, 1904. Runstedtler, Theresa. “The New Negro’s Brown Brother: Black American and Filipino Boxers and the ‘Rising Tide of Color’.” In Escape from New York: The New Negro Renaissance Beyond Harlem, edited by Davarian L. Baldwin and Minkah Makalani, 105–26. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 2013. Stanley, Peter W. A Nation in the Making:The Philippines and the United States, 1899–1921. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974. Torres, Christina Evangelista. The Americanization of Manila, 1898–1921. Quezon City, Philippines: Diliman, 2010. Tuason, Julie A. “The Ideology of Empire in National Geographic Magazine’s Coverage of the Philippines, 1898–1908.” Geographical Review 89, no. 1 (1999): 34–53. Weston, Stanley. “Pancho Villa: The Gigantic Runt.” Clipping in the Villa File, International Boxing Hall of Fame. Worcester, Dean C. “Field Sports Among the Wild Men of Luzon.” National Geographic 22, no. 3 (1911): 215–67. 188

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Worcester, Dean C. “Head-Hunters of Northern Luzon.” National Geographic 23, no. 9 (1912): 833–930. Worcester, Dean C. “The Non-Christian Peoples of the Philippine Islands: With an Account of What Has Been Done for Them Under American Rule.” National Geographic 24, no. 11 (1913): 1157–256. Worcester, Dean C. The Philippines: Past and Present. New York: Macmillan, 1913. Worcester, Dean C. The Philippines Past and Present. New York: Macmillan, 1914. Zabriskie, Alexander C. Bishop Brent: Crusader for Christian Unity. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1948. Zimmerman, Warren. The First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made Their Country a World Power. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2002.

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19 The rise of modern sport in colonial Singapore The Singapore Cricket Club leads the way Nick Aplin

Introduction Imperial expansion and its relevance to the introduction of sport in specific locations did not occur at an even pace. In the context of the evolution of sporting practices in Singapore, the equatorial island often lagged behind similar settlements and colonies. First established in 1819, Singapore was a relatively late arrival on the imperial scene in Southeast Asia. Together with Penang and Malacca, the city became the main location for a trading hub known as the Straits Settlements, achieving colony status in 1867. The focus here is on the elevation of sporting practices by the British during the later decades of the nineteenth century and the period before World War I. One indication of the varying speed with which various sporting activities came to prominence in Singapore is provided by the contents of the daily and weekly newspapers. The inclusion of advertisements for sporting equipment, regular programmes of future events, instructional books and reports of ongoing or completed events reflects an awareness and interest in an increasingly important social institution.The period from 1867 to 1914 was not a smooth phase of development; it was instead an erratic journey of discovery, evaluation, rejection, appraisal and acceptance. Figure 19.1 illustrates how interest in sport, as reflected in the frequency of references to sport and recreation, increased after 1882. Early development of sport in Singapore was slow because of the lack of a critical mass of participants and of adequate facilities that could stage regular events. In addition, the transition from temperate to equatorial environments favoured some activities more than others, particularly when it came to the introduction of more serious forms of competition. The colonial sporting legacy evolved in fits and starts well into the twentieth century.1 The rate of growth in sport was slower than that in its sister colony Hong Kong, which was colonised later, in 1841. Cricket, fives and basic athletic sport were diffused from Britain before the demise of the British East India Company in 1858, and during the late Victorian period modern team games started to appear. These activities were largely the preserve of the elite classes, predominantly European but including a few representatives of the Malay and Chinese communities. Tennis and golf eventually became the pastimes of the elite or ‘Upper Ten,’ referring to their percentage of the population. Both men and women could participate. Association football (soccer) became 190

Rise of modern sport in colonial Singapore 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914

0

Sport

Recreation

Figure 19.1 Articles in the Press including the word ‘Sport’ and/or ‘Recreation’: 1869–1914 Note: No data available for 1882.

Table 19.1 Census Figures for Singapore as Published by Makepeace et al. (1921)2 Census year

Total population

Resident European & American population

European & American % of total population

British military population

Resident plus military population

Resident plus military % of population

1871 1881 1891 1901 1911

97,111 139,208 181,602 228,555 303,321

922 1283 2302 2861 5711

0.96 0.92 1.27 1.25 1.88

596 783 1,160 495 NA

1518 2066 3462 3356 NA

1.56 1.48 1.91 1.47 NA

the people’s game after 1890, when military groups and the Chinese and Malay communities began their own rivalries and challenges to the Europeans at the Cricket Club.

The local context – demographics The population census figures provide a framework for examining the development of Western sport in Singapore. Increasing numbers of military personnel, traders, clerical workers, civil service administrators, merchants, engineers and technicians from Europe brought sport with them as significant cultural baggage. And yet in terms of pure numbers, these adventurers represented a small percentage of the growing population. At no time did the European (plus American) residents and the military account for more than two percent of the population.3 Table 19.1 below refers to data published in 1921.4 As representatives of the imperial colonial power, the British were the main decision-makers in all aspects of social, political and economic life – and even more so in the sporting environment, which was largely private and separatist. As the governing ‘insiders,’ the British shaped the sporting scene in Singapore to mirror the evolving culture back home. After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, trade and migration to Singapore became more pronounced. The 1870s marked the emergence of a period of transition from traditional games and sporting activities to more modern pastimes and competitive challenges.5 Many sport were 191

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loosely defined. Rules and regulations were still somewhat vague and designed to fit the prevailing climatic conditions. The word ‘football’ was seldom heard, and when it was there was an associated sense of ambiguity – association or rugby?

Overcoming inertia The rise of modern sport in Singapore is closely associated with the expansion of the British Empire during the second half of the Victorian era. This period was more vibrant, as the influence of the ‘games cult’ spread to Singapore. Rapid colonisation, after the opening of the Suez Canal and the introduction of steamships, brought a wave of athleticism to the clubs and schools in Singapore. As more and more Europeans sought their fortunes in settlements in Asia, so the pursuit of sporting challenges increased. Athleticism and the games ethic, both products of the British public school system, spread to Asia. Athleticism, of any degree of intensity, was almost a prerequisite for the successful inclusion of new arrivals into the growing social scene. The influence of the American perspective on sport was yet to be felt. The three decades after 1867 were a crucial phase of hesitant yet willing resourcefulness, as the ‘games cult’ not only triggered the introduction of a number of desirable pastimes but also captured the imagination of the indigenous Malays, Eurasians, Straits Chinese and the Indian migrant population. Between 1872 and 1894, many of the sport that would form the core of the sporting culture in Singapore were introduced. Simultaneously, new clubs associated with communities other than the colonial British were created. Once established on a more permanent basis, sport was also seen as a bond between colonies. Inter-settlement games involving teams from Singapore, Shanghai, Colombo and Hong Kong figured prominently, if not regularly, on the calendar of the late 1880s and 1890s. The players were predominantly members of British clubs or regiments.

The foundations are established Mangan has been quick to point out that sport does not evolve in a smooth and predictable way. Everything can change, but nothing disappears completely.6 Within the context of the British Empire and the diffusion of sport and recreation, there were multiple continuities and discontinuities. This is true of the experience in Singapore. Sport such as fives emerged as popular activities during the early Victorian period, but subsequently disappeared. The dominant activities, such as cricket, did not always enjoy a permanent place on the sporting calendar. Horse racing became, and remains, one of the most firmly established sport. The oldest sporting institution in Singapore is the Sporting Club, founded in 1842 with a view to organising race meetings and other outdoor activities. The hegemony of the British revealed itself most clearly when it came to the occupation of the choicest tracts of land. Ironically, the Singapore Cricket Club (SCC), with its imperious strategic location on the Esplanade, was once considered an intruder into the quiet social circles of mid-Victorian Singapore. The land it occupied was officially the domain of the people, as decreed by Stamford Raffles, the founder of the island settlement. The Esplanade was a place for gossip, for entertainment by a regimental band, and for exercising horses. Gradually the members of the club encroached on the playing space and staked a more permanent claim by constructing a series of three pavilions between 1863 and 1884, each one larger than its predecessor. Distancing themselves from the local migrant population, the members of the SCC secured a private space for play, drink and social intercourse that would be preserved until the Japanese Occupation in 1942. The bar, verandah, locker room and bathroom facilities were the 192

Rise of modern sport in colonial Singapore

Figure 19.2 The Third Pavilion of the Singapore Cricket Club, circa 1895. New Rendering Based on Architects’ Plans (Swan and Maclaren) Source: Diagram created by the author.

essential amenities at the SCC after 1884. Ladies were granted accommodation on the firstfloor balcony only.

Shaping the dominant culture The momentum created by interest in racing, cricket and sailing was boosted by the introduction of individual and team games during the latter stages of the Victorian period. Of the activities listed in Table 19.2, the early arrival of racquet games (badminton and lawn tennis) and the late arrival of association football and golf reflect the influence of significant individuals or groups of like-minded individuals – those with the initiative to create or recreate an image of home. The arrival of tennis was notable in that it enabled the colonial women of the Empire to participate more actively.

The years of expansion begin The 1880s were pivotal years in the development of sport in Singapore. As the population increased and the diffusion of sport from Britain gathered momentum, recreational activities and competitive sport grew in significance. New sporting clubs were formed, and schools also became involved in the ‘games cult’ that was starting to blossom. Newspaper editors began to take greater notice of sporting events that might attract a wider readership. Newspaper reporting 193

Nick Aplin Table 19.2 Sport as Elements of the Dominant Culture of Sport in Singapore Sport: including a competitive component

Year of first press report

Athletic sport Badminton Lawn tennis Rugby football Rowing Polo Cycling Association football Golf Hockey Aquatics – swimming and water polo

18727 18748 18759 187810 187911 188612 188913 188914 189115 189216 189417

of sport proved to be an important catalyst for promoting the activities of an increasing number of clubs and association. Coverage of sport in the English-language newspapers was heavily tilted towards European tastes. The organisation of regular competitive events, with codified rules and regulations, became a more prominent feature of the local press. In the 1890s, the most active sport were led by the European community, and by the SCC in particular. Representatives from the Straits Chinese Recreation Club (SCRC) and the Eurasian Singapore Recreation Club (SRC) were initiating their own programmes. In 1890, a watershed event occurred. A large party of SCC members visited Hong Kong during Chinese New Year to play an inter-port or inter-colonial cricket match. Extensive reports indicate that other sport (tennis, rowing, sculling and billiards) were contested on a friendly basis as well.18 Leading articles in papers such as the Singapore Free Press and the Mercantile Advertiser featured the activities of the SCC in cricket challenges involving clubs from other colonial ports (for example, Penang, Hong Kong and Shanghai).19 These games were popular attractions for the SCC players. In early 1891, teams arrived in Singapore from Colombo, Hong Kong and the Native States of Malaya to participate in a Cricket Fortnight. Thirty-five years later, Birch, captain of the victorious hosts at the SCC, spoke of this quadrangular contest as being the ‘culminating point of interest’ in cricket.20 Local and general articles relating to sport focused on the New Year Sea and Land Sports (the annual New Year holiday festivities), and an SCC lawn tennis match against its counterpart in Colombo, Ceylon, was played.21 The Ladies Lawn Tennis Club received attention, along with the Singapore Cycling Club, the Singapore Rifle Association and the Singapore Rowing Club. The two most publicised sport were the Spring Races at the Singapore Sporting Club and association football. In the case of football, the rapid increase in interest was fired by growing enthusiasm among the Straits Chinese.22 For many years they had remained on the margins of sport as passive observers, and had only established their own club in 1885.23 The reluctance of the Europeans in the SCC to entertain their Chinese counterparts for recreational pursuits undoubtedly constrained and limited Chinese advancement. The alternative for the community was to engage with the military units on the soccer field. The practice of exclusivity among SCC members was balanced by their welcoming gestures towards the military community.Various branches of the artillery and military engineers figured

194

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regularly on the sporting calendar of the SCC. Maritime visitors invariably received a warm welcome too. Royal Navy officers and men provided a welcome change in the type of challenge desired by the SCC. Instead of playing the repetitive cycle of ‘England versus Scotland,’ ‘Marrieds versus Singles’ or ‘Public School Educated versus Non-Public School Educated’ games, it was possible to bring in fresh blood.

Organisation and the societies ordinance The year 1889 was pivotal in the evolution of sport in Singapore. First, a recognisable form of association football was introduced. It would become the national game. In 1892, the Singapore Football Association was founded, the first such body to be formed in Asia. Second, the introduction of the Societies Ordinance was unintentionally helpful in creating a structured but flexible system for sporting activities. The Ordinance was designed to reduce the threats created by Chinese secret societies by requiring the registration of all participants and the establishment of a system of regular oversight. Under the provisions of the Ordinance, societies with a membership of more than 10 individuals were considered illegal unless they were registered and had obtained official approval from the government. The Ordinance did not apply only to the Chinese secret societies but to all clubs and associations, including sport clubs. In January 1890, the regulations were published.24

The dominant games: tennis, cricket and football Initially team games were not the most popular activities. Heat and humidity had to be endured. The gentler tempo of lawn tennis was better suited to the European temperament. Tennis provided late afternoon recreation from the mid-1870s, while cricket could be tolerated at the weekends. Tennis proved to be the first popular social event that could attract women from the colonial section of the population. Both sport were symbols of imperial dominance. Tennis became the most reported sport during the years immediately before World War I.This superior status would remain until the 1930s. Ultimately, the most successful import from Britain was association football.25 Tennis and cricket could not sustain their image of exclusivity. Unlike cricket, football seems to have appeared during a 12-year period of increasing imperial activity throughout the main colonies in Asia in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The SCC and the regimental teams were the dominant soccer forces during this period. The Marine Engineers won the first formal competition in 1892, but thereafter the soldiers, from different units, became regular title holders. As members of the Chinese and Malay communities became involved in their own challenges, the game was considered to be an important means of consolidating the image of benevolent hegemony in the region. The first ‘soccer missionaries’ were members of the SCC who travelled across the Straits of Johore to play against a team of Malay plantation workers in 1894. The quality of the match encouraged the SCC members to organise a return match in Singapore.26 Two years later, a team from the SCRC would also engage the top team from Johore in a challenge match.27 During the next twenty years, football would become firmly established as a means of including all communities in a shared set of sporting experiences. However, the separation of sporting clubs on racial lines reinforced the imperial policy concerning control and perceived respect for colonial authority. Table 19.3 illustrates the timeline of the development of football as a communal game.

195

Nick Aplin 3500

2958

3000 2500 2000

1277

1500

1221

1000

500

Cricket

Tennis

.

.

1914

1913

1912

1910

1911

1909

1908

1907

1906

1905

1904

1903

1902

1901

1900

1899

1898

1897

1896

1895

1894

1893

1892

1891

1890

1889

0

Football

Figure 19.3 Tennis as the most reported game in the Press (1889–1914) Table 19.3  Association Football–Developmental Stages Initiatives

Year

Football introduced by members of the SCC and the Marine Engineers Singapore Football Association (SFA) Cup introduced–European teams only Warren Shield introduced – military teams Darul Adab Cup contested by ten Malay teams Football League Shield, open to all except the SCC and top military teams Malay Football Association (MFA) – the Colman Cup with 27 teams introduced Tramway Cup introduced for ‘native teams’ only Straits Chinese Football Association (SCFA) registered

1889 1892 1894 1898 1904 1908 1909 1911

The main European clubs in the 1880s and 1890s Becoming a member of a European club such as the SCC was a sign of status and privilege. By implication, sport helped to forge a particular imperial identity that excluded other communities. The British became the sporting ‘insiders’ with access to recreational space. The ‘outsiders’ remained literally outside the boundaries of the playing area. Cricket and lawn tennis represented the epitome of high sporting status during the last decade of the nineteenth century. As the number of active European clubs increased, there were calls to centralise a form of organisational control through a process of amalgamation. However, the SCC, the Swimming Club, the Cycling Club and the Rowing Club chose to retain a sense of autonomy.28 Older and more senior government administrative officials had control over proceedings in the SCC, and promoted these quintessential colonial games. The younger and more athletic members chose the two football codes. There was a class divide within the SCC, best illustrated by the sentiments expressed around the demise in 1896 of a popular member of the club, John Lawson, a committed soccer player. A Scot, Lawson was the captain of the Marine Engineers side that won the first SFA Challenge Shield in 1892. As a footballer and an engineer, his lower status within colonial society was fixed. Class divisions within the SCC emerged on the day of his funeral, when senior members (government officials and military officers) refused to show their respect and continued to play tennis.29

Singapore recreation club Originally known as the Straits Recreation Club when it was founded in 1881, the Singapore Recreation Club (SRC) organised its first athletic sport in July 1886 and completed construction 196

Rise of modern sport in colonial Singapore

of its first pavilion later that year.30 The Clubhouse opened on November 5, 1892.31 Located immediately opposite the SCC on the Esplanade, it was to become a vibrant sporting institution and a rival of the SCC, notably in hockey, football and cricket.

The Ladies Lawn Tennis Club The Ladies Lawn Tennis Club (LLTC) was created in 1884 as a response to increasing demand for playing space at the Singapore Cricket Club. The wives and female relatives of the male members of the SCC would have dearly liked to occupy the space on the Esplanade that had been assigned to the SRC in 1883. The cooling sea breezes would have been much more desirable than the stench that invaded their low-lying courts a kilometre inland. In 1884, the ladies complained but were ultimately obliged to follow the guidance of their husbands and accept a less salubrious venue. A new pavilion, closer to the road and further away from the drainage channel, was opened in 1905 when club membership had reached 270.32 Men were permitted to become ‘subscribers’ but not members of the LLTC. It was thought to be an elevation of male status to be invited to become a subscriber. European women now had a focal point of control that existed outside the domestic domain.

The Singapore Golf Club It was only in 1891 that a golf course was mapped out in the centre of the oval-shaped racecourse. Even then, there was competition for access to a low-lying stretch of grazing turf. The

Figure 19.4 The Ladies Lawn Tennis Club with the original pavilion viewed from Mount Sophia Source: Collection of the author.

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game of polo was also vying for regular access to ground that could satisfy the need to display equine prowess. As there were relatively few polo exponents and the game of golf had broader appeal, the location soon became the preserve of the golfers.The ladies were quick to seize space for themselves in the pavilion.There would be no repeat of their removal from the tennis courts on the Esplanade. New rendering based on architects’ plans (Swan and Maclaren). Diagram created by the author.

Singapore Swimming Club (SSC) There were frequent requests to build swimming bathhouses during the 1880s,33 but it was not until 1893 that a swimming club was conceptualised. The SSC had a distant coastal location. A prolonged journey by launch from Johnson’s Pier near the Singapore River was required.

View from Racecourse

Entrance from Buffalo Road

Ladies’ Room

Dressing Room

Verandah

Figure 19.5 The Singapore Golf club – circa 1893 198

Rise of modern sport in colonial Singapore

Figure 19.6 The Singapore Swimming Club

The initial steps to form the Singapore Swimming club took place in late 1893,34 and in 1903 a spacious clubhouse was designed for a thriving membership of 441, many of whom were also members of the SCC. By 1901, competitive swimming in the sea at the club had become a feature in the press. The Jackson Miller Cup, named after the first elected President of the SSC, attracted European swimming enthusiasts, notably German and Swiss members.35 New rendering based on architects’ plans. Diagram created by the author.

The Straits Chinese Recreation Club (SCRC) The SCRC was established in 1885 to cater to the needs of local-born Chinese who wished to emulate the activities of the British at the SCC. Located in the heart of Chinatown, the club was allocated limited space to conduct its activities. There were tennis courts and a small cricket field that could double as a football pitch.

Chinese Swimming Club (CSC) The stretch of coastline running east from the SSC proved the most hospitable for sea swimming and bathing. In 1905, the Tanjong Katong Swimming Party was created.The name was changed in 1909 to the Chinese Swimming Club, which was registered in 1912 and thereafter became the main rival to the SCC in terms of social prestige. The design of the club facilities included a pagar (fence) that extended into the shallow coastal waters.

Sport in schools The first school to adopt sporting practices in its curriculum was Raffles Institution (RI). It was founded in 1823, but athleticism and the ‘games cult’ did not reach the RI playing field until the 1880s. Richmond William Hullett, the principal from 1871 to 1906, was acknowledged as a pioneer in encouraging school sport. The Raffles Cricket Club at RI was formed in 1886. Under the direction of the senior boys, and as such very much in the same pattern as British public schools, a variety of pastimes were introduced, including athletic sport, association football, gymnastics, rugby football and tennis. There were no school rivals, so it was necessary to challenge adult members of clubs such as SCC and SRC. As early as 1891, a team comprising present and former pupils of the school challenged the SCC to a rugby match.36 199

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Expansion and renovation Other initiatives supported the growth of sport.The SCC was at the forefront of plans to expand the potential of its own private pastimes. There were significant plans to pursue extensive land reclamation both north and south of the Singapore River. Trade and business would benefit from an enlargement of coastal and docking facilities in Telok Ayer, adjacent to Chinatown. The SCC was able to increase its playing space on the Esplanade. Initially 270 yards wide, the eastwest dimension was doubled by 1890. By 1889, just as football was starting to become an obsession with ‘young Singapore,’ members could enjoy spectatorship of a variety of amusements simultaneously.37 Between 1880 and 1890, membership of the SCC grew from 12538 to 351.39 The first decade of the twentieth century was a period of renewal. Existing clubhouses, pavilions and associated facilities were seen as inadequate for the purpose of catering to an increasing sporting population. Just as the SRC was celebrating the completion of a new pavilion, the SCC was revealing its own plans for a new palatial clubhouse. It was to be the third construction, designed to cater for 620 resident members.40 New rendering based on architects’ plans. Diagram created by the author. New rendering based on architects’ plans. Diagram created by the author.

Issuing a club challenge Light-hearted, free and easy forms of recreation were gradually transformed into more serious, technical and scientific domains. Sport came to be associated with both recreation and more serious competition, with the competitive aspect becoming a ready source of news for the press. Regular tennis competitions were organised at the SCC, with an Open Championship played in 1884. In 1889, a rifle match involving representatives from Singapore (the Chief Settlement of a Crown Colony), Hong Kong (a Crown Colony) and Shanghai (a Municipal Commune) took place.41 First called intercolonial challenges and later inter-port matches, these became traditional fixtures until 1935.42 Initially the teams fired at their home ranges and reported their scores over different distances to their counterparts. Judges were allocated to verify the performances. These contests were often disrupted by prevailing weather conditions. At the turn of the century, SCC members were competing regularly with their counterparts at the Selangor Club in Kuala Lumpur. Cricket led the way in 1900, followed by football and rugby in 1901 and hockey in 1904.43 Cricket matches also featured opponents from Perak and Penang. An interstate competition for the Swettenham Cricket Trophy was played in 1902. In 1906, the first of the interstate challenges in athletics took place in Ipoh.44 Table 19.4 List of Sport Clubs

Club

Facility

Year

Ladies Lawn Tennis Club

New clubhouse constructed adjacent to the road New clubhouse constructed opposite SCC Enlarged clubhouse with additional social rooms Pavilion – extension New clubhouse New grandstand

1904

Singapore Recreation Club Singapore Cricket Club Singapore Golf Club Chinese Swimming Club Turf Club 200

1905 1906 1907 1909 1910

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Figure 19.7 The SCC Clubhouse

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Figure 19.8 The New Grandstand at the Racecourse in 1910

The growing social significance of sport: a source of discrimination As team games such as football were introduced, it became clear that the Chinese and the Malay communities were so captivated by the spectacle that they created their own opportunities to play. This may have been viewed as an intrusion by the privileged Europeans, who initially refused to accept challenges from the outsiders. It was the military teams that welcomed invitations to ‘try conclusions’ on the pitch.

The YMCA in Singapore The experiences of the YMCA in China during the early twentieth century were not replicated in Singapore. As a small equatorial settlement, Singapore tended to develop its institutions and associations later than the longer established centres. The introduction of the YMCA is a case in point. Ceylon (1882),45 China (1888),46 India (1891)47 and Burma (1897)48 all had branches of the YMCA before the turn of the century. Although proposed in 1892, the full inauguration 202

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of the Singapore YMCA did not take place until 1903.49 The Singapore version of the YMCA was based on the colonial British approach and as such was different from the China version, which was American in essence.50 This meant that games such as basketball and volleyball were late arrivals in Singapore. Football and cricket teams representing the YMCA were created. In addition, the YMCA was a contributing partner in the formation of a local football league for second-tier or junior teams in 1904.51 There were twelve teams in the inaugural competition.52 The YMCA was one of the best-known sporting institutions, and was at the forefront of attempts to provide moral and spiritual guidance – often through the medium of sport – to the younger sections of the population. Established in 1903, the YMCA moved to grander amenities on Orchard Road in 1911. The three-storey building boasted function rooms that could host competitions in chess, draughts, billiards (three tables) and table tennis (five tables). Outdoor activities included tennis, basketball and volleyball. A salt-water pool was also created on Fort Canning Hill behind the Association.

Conclusion Sport during the pre-World War I period in Singapore was generally parochial in nature, with the SCC leading the way. As the prosperity of the island increased, sport became a significant social pastime. Tennis was the preferred game, as it permitted greater social interaction without undue physical exertion. For the younger men, football and rugby provided a more energetic form of release from the drudgery of work. The number of European participants was relatively small, and over-familiarity eventually encouraged sporting tours to other colonial outposts. The inclusion of other communities with an equal interest in games such as football provided an important catalyst for the future development of modern sport after the war.

Acknowledgements Articles cited from the Straits Times and the Singapore Free Press were accessed through https:// eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers.

Notes 1 Nick Aplin, ‘ “Sports and Games in Colonial Singapore: 1819–1867’,” Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics 15, no. 10 (2012): 1329–40. 2 Ibid. 3 K. G. Tregonning, “Tan Cheng Lock: A Malayan Nationalist,” Journal of Southeast Asian History 10, no. 1 (1979): 25–76. 4 Walter Makepeace, Gilbert E. Brooke, and Roland St. J. Braddell, eds., One Hundred Years of Singapore (London: John Murray, 1921), 355–60. 5 Nick Aplin, ‘ “British Imperialism and Sport in Asia’,” in Sports Around the World: History, Culture and Practice, ed. John Nauright and Charles Parrish (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2012), 206–7. 6 J. A. Mangan, ‘ “Imperial Singapore–Culture Imperialism and Imperial Control: Athleticism as Ideological Intent’,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 30, no. 11 (2013): 1193–220. 7 Straits Times Overland Journal, January 4, 1872, 2. 8 Straits Times, June 27, 1874, 2. 9 Makepeace, One Hundred Years of Singapore, 331. 10 Straits Times Overland Journal, October 31, 1878, 6. 11 Straits Times Overland Journal, November 8, 1879, 3; Singapore Monitor, December 3, 1983, 31. 12 Makepeace, One Hundred Years of Singapore, 335. 13 Singapore Free Press, July 19, 1889, 61. 14 Makepeace, One Hundred Years of Singapore, 333. 203

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1 5 Ibid., 338. 16 Ibid., 334. 17 Straits Times, February 3, 1894, 2. 18 Straits Times Weekly Issue, February 4, 1890, 12. 19 Singapore Free Press, July 7, 1891, 1. 20 E. W. Birch, ‘ “British Malaya’,” Malayan Sport in the Earlier Days 1, no. 1 (1926): 23–26. 21 Singapore Free Press, January 7, 1891, 9. 22 Nick Aplin, ‘ “The Slow Contagion of Scottish Example: Association Football in Nineteenth-Century Colonial Singapore’,” Soccer & Society 14, no. 5 (2014): 588–602. 23 Nick Aplin and Quek Jin Jong, ‘ “Celestials in Touch: Sport and the Chinese in Colonial Singapore’,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 19, no. 2–3 (2002): 67–98. 24 Straits Times Weekly Issue, January 28, 1890, 12. 25 Straits Times Weekly Issue, May 29, 1889, 1. 26 Singapore Free Press, November 19, 1894, 2. 27 Straits Times, October 9, 1896, 2. 28 Straits Times, July 6, 1894, 3. 29 Straits Times, September 8, 1896, 3. 30 Straits Times, September 4, 1905, 5. 31 Makepeace, One Hundred Years of Singapore, 601. 32 Straits Times, May 20, 1905, 5. 33 Straits Times Weekly Issue, October 31, 1887, 5. 34 Straits Times Weekly Issue, November 14, 1893, 2. 35 Singapore Free Press, June 5, 1894, 339. 36 Singapore Free Press, May 26, 1891, 9. 37 Singapore Free Press, September 17, 1889, 347. 38 The Motor Car and Athletic Journal, 1908, 11. 39 Singapore Free Press, August 27, 1890, 233. 40 Singapore Free Press, August 24, 1905, 116. 41 Singapore Free Press, November 26, 1889, 654. 42 Straits Times, October 30, 1938, 31. 43 Alan E. Moreira, The Malaya Sports Record (Kuala Lumpur: Huxley, Palmer and Co., 1923). 44 Ibid. 45 World YMCA, ‘Brief YMCA History’, https://www.ymca.int/member/ymca-in-asia-and-pacific/ ymca-sri-lanka/. 46 Weekly Sun, March 22, 1913, 5. 47 YMCA India, ‘History and Growth’, http://www.ymcaindia.org/index.php/about-us/history-andgrowth. 48 Emily Fishbein, ‘It’s fun to stay at the Myitkyina YMCA’, www.ymca.int/member/ymca-in-asia-andpacifi c/ymca-sri-lanka/. 49 Straits Times, June 15, 1903, 5. 50 Jonathan Kolatch, Sports Politics and Ideology in China (Middle Village, NY: Jonathan David, 1972). 51 Singapore Free Press, January 13, 1904, 22. The League for junior clubs included the Prison Warders; the Police; Raffles Cricket Club;YMCA; 62 Co Royal Garrison Artillery; 64 Co Royal Garrison Artillery; Tanjong Pagar Recreation Club; Army Temperance Association; Howarth Erskine, Manchester Regiment, Singapore Volunteer Artillery; and Singapore Volunteer Infantry. 52 Singapore Free Press, January 13, 1904, 22.

Bibliography Aplin, Nick. “British Imperialism and Sport in Asia.” In Sports Around the World: History, Culture and Practice, edited by John Nauright and Charles Parrish, 206–7. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2012. Aplin, Nick. “The Slow Contagion of Scottish Example: Association Football in Nineteenth-Century Colonial Singapore.” Soccer & Society 14, no. 5 (2014): 588–602. Aplin, Nick. “Sports and Games in Colonial Singapore: 1819–1867.” Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics 15, no. 10 (2012): 1329–40.

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Aplin, Nick, and Quek Jin Jong. “Celestials in Touch: Sport and the Chinese in Colonial Singapore.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 19, no. 2–3 (2002): 67–98. Birch, E. W. “British Malaya.” Malayan Sport in the Earlier Days 1, no. 1 (1926): 23–26. Kolatch, Jonathan. Sports Politics and Ideology in China. Middle Village, NY: Jonathan David, 1972. Makepeace, Walter, Gilbert E. Brooke, and Roland St. J. Braddell, eds. One Hundred Years of Singapore. London: John Murray, 1921. Mangan, J. A. “Imperial Singapore–Culture Imperialism and Imperial Control: Athleticism as Ideological Intent.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 30, no. 11 (2013): 1193–220. Moreira, Alan E. The Malaya Sports Record. Kuala Lumpur: Huxley, Palmer and Co., 1923. Tregonning, K. G. “Tan Cheng Lock: A Malayan Nationalist.” Journal of Southeast Asian History 10, no. 1 (1979): 25–76.

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Part III

Sport policy and practice Public and private provision

This part of the book examines the development of sport and physical education in modern Asia in the context of globalisation and commercialisation. It focuses on Asian countries’ sport policy and practice, and explains how sport was promoted to meet diplomatic, economic, social and political demands during the past decades. In general, elite sport has been developed in many Asian countries to promote the ideas of fair play and competition, inspire the people and consolidate national unity. They also contributed to cultural exchanges and communications between Asian countries and beyond Asia. Simultaneously, commercialised and professionalised sporting events have been promoted across Asia to facilitate economic development. In addition, many Asian countries have made great efforts to promote school physical education and encouraged their citizens to participate in mass sporting activities, hoping to produce a strong and healthy labour force, and to serve the purpose of modernisation and development. Commercialisation of sport in Asia and the commercialisation in sport are two of the themes in this section, not least as today’s economy is located between the private and public sectors. In many contexts, sport is not just concerned with games but with big business. A look at recent developments, such as the opening of the Apple store in Dubai or the Ikea centre in Changsha, shows that shopping has gained a new dimension. Shopping is not simply about selling and buying goods but is an entirely new experience in quasi-public spaces offered by private companies and working according to rules that ‘everybody knows.’ This is especially obvious if one enters a new shopping mall with the firm and sole intention of buying a specific product or strolling around in search of a restaurant. If nothing else is clear, at least the location of the restaurants is – nearly all on one floor, gathered together as a food court. In much same way, we find commercialisation of sport there by way of especially relevant shops (the wellknown brand names like Nike, Adidas and Le Coq Sportif, to name a few), thus integrating sport firmly into the world of commerce. What we find, of course, are those brands reaching out to the consumer: advertisements can be found in nearly every stadium and on every t-shirt, even in small clubs.The broadcasting rights for major sport events are big business, and evidently something that is part and parcel of the process of social stratification. This section demonstrates how the world of sport and commerce interpenetrate each other in Asia.

20 International sport events and the two Koreas Politics, policies and practice Udo Merkel

Introduction At the beginning of the twenty-first century, participating in and hosting international events, festivals, expositions, spectacles and fairs, particularly mega-events such as the Olympic Games, the Football World Cup, EXPOs and others, is a highly sought after, multifaceted opportunity for many nation states. Their governments and politicians (on both the right and the left) see these events as a welcome occasion to pursue a large number of socio-economic, cultural and political objectives. Nauright suggests that [I]n this increasingly unified yet still divided world, sports mega events, particularly the Olympic Games and the FIFA (Féderation Internationale de Football Association) World Cup, have become high-demand focal points that have symbolic value well beyond the results of sporting competition.1 There is little doubt that the enthusiasm to be represented internationally or to act as the hosts of large-scale events is hardly ever motivated by a genuine interest in the event, the performance, the exhibition or the competition, or driven by a hedonistic rationale. Instead, the involvement of national governments in and support for such events is linked to a long list of politically desirable outcomes, which can be organised in two broad categories: a domestic and an international agenda. The domestic political agenda contains the following objectives: to contribute to nationbuilding processes; offer a sense of national pride; maintain the existing socio-economic and political systems and structures; promote social cohesion; generate income; initiate and/or accelerate urban and economic development projects; establish and implement social, educational and cultural policies and opportunities; and offer short-lived diversion and distraction. ‘While the extent of long-term change attributed to mega-events remains open to debate, it is widely acknowledged that events on the scale of the Summer Olympic Games can transform entire nations and act as a catalyst for change.’2 With reference to the international agenda, there are four recurring themes. These are the desire to gain international recognition, fostering of a positive image, the creation of propaganda and public relations opportunities, and engagement in foreign policy and diplomatic activities.3 Although almost all of these objectives, to differing extents, are relevant for this chapter, 209

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two have to be considered in more detail, as they appear to be the most important in North and South Korea’s events policy and practice: nation-branding and soft power. Nation-branding, in general, refers to the process of utilising publicity and marketing to promote selected positive images of, and convey important messages and ideas about, a geographical location.4 It is about projecting a desirable narrative, which usually focuses on a country’s historical development and its (past and contemporary) culture, often singling out far-reaching and influential material and non-material achievements. It is a strategic charm offensive that aims to create attraction and favourable views by foreign audiences. Although the focus usually tends to be on the efforts of nations and nation states, towns, cities5 and regions6 are also involved in such branding activities. Fan argues that nation-branding is primarily ‘concerned with a country’s whole image on the international stage, covering political, economic and cultural dimensions.’7 Anholt has convincingly explained the need for nation-branding in the twenty-first century.8 He argues that both the concept and phenomenon of nation-branding are closely linked to the growing competition between various geographical locations and the ongoing globalisation process. Places seek to be viewed favourably by others in terms of desirable economic cooperation, political values, national heritage, culture, tourism, sport and other things. Initial discussions about nation-branding were often underpinned by an explicit economic imperative with a strong emphasis on market positioning, economic competitiveness and foreign investments framed by neo-liberal principles. However, over the last decade, more attention has been paid to nation-branding for political purposes, particularly for small, peripheral states that wish to boost their image and increase their influence in the context of global political matters.9 This chapter’s analysis pays attention to both socio-economic and political concerns of nation-branding. Nation branding is, of course, closely related to Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power.10 He suggests that soft power includes three vital resources: culture, political values and foreign policy.11 While the production and enhancement of soft power involve both state- and non-state actors, the display of soft power must be credible and legitimate. Sport events, athletes and teams play an important role in this context due to their global reach. However, in the context of this chapter, soft power is not only understood as a country’s appeal and attraction, but also as a defensive mechanism, that is ‘soft power as image-shifting and soft power as niche diplomacy.’12 This nuance is particularly helpful when dealing with a disreputable state such a North Korea that former US president George W. Bush, in 2002, included in his geopolitical ‘axis of evil’ (next to Iran and Iraq).With reference to South Korea, the notion of smart power needs to be mentioned. Smart power strategically combines the resources of soft power and traditional forms of hard power. In South Korea’s case, this is not the country’s military capabilities but the economic dimension of hard power, that is the country’s wealth, largely accumulated through its ICT (Information and Communication Technology) industries. Although the above-mentioned two agendas are fairly comprehensive in terms of policy objectives, there is an additional layer that only applies to divided societies such as the previously divided Germany and the Korean people.13 For divided societies, international sport events are a particularly powerful forum to seek international recognition and also for their ‘highly charged competition for legitimacy with their other ‘part-nation.’14 This was particularly obvious during the first four decades after the foundation of the two Koreas in 1948.

North Korea: participating in international sport events and hosting a unique spectacle of physical culture North Korea is one of the most enigmatic and least understood countries on this planet. The little we know about North Korean society, politics and culture has led to a reputation that is overwhelmingly characterised by suspicion, distrust and wariness. This is largely the result of 210

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the unpredictability and ruthlessness of its authoritarian rulers, Kim Il-Sung (1948–1994), Kim Jong-il (1994–2011) and Kim Jong-un (since 2011);15 the absence of democratic structures and processes; a lack of legitimacy and transparency; a disregard of human rights; and the selfimposed isolation from the rest of the world.16 The country is also one of the poorest and least developed states in the world.17 According to E.J.R. Cho: From the very early stage of the nation-building process, the North Korean regime introduced the idea of the entire nation state as an extended family, and, as a result, relations between the supreme leader and the North Korean people have developed into something akin to father – children-like relations.18 Parallel to this strategy, the country’s political elite have, over the last seven decades, been most concerned with the development of hard power, in particular military prowess. This is clearly reflected in one of the key political principles, the Songun or ‘military first’ policy, which guides socio-economic and political life in North Korea. It is also very conspicuous and visible in the annual military parades that are an essential element of the country’s annual events calendar. In recent years, the development of nuclear weapons and frequent testing of missiles has provoked angry reactions from the outside world, led to several UN resolutions, and far-reaching economic sanctions. Although only in power since 2011, Kim Jong-un’s actions have reduced the global political discourse about North Korea to the strategic threat to use nuclear weapons as a deterrent against a US-led hostile military intervention. Therefore, it is no surprise that North Korea’s ruling elite has always been and is keen to promote alternative and more positive narratives about the country, which is widely known as a ‘shifting images strategy.’ Grzelczyk explains: Soft power has also been used in the context of changing one’s image from one that might have been problematic in the past to a new one that is deemed more seductive, more attractive, and in some cases less threatening.19 By the late 1950s, and for foreign policy reasons, North Korea was already frequently engaged in football matches against teams from the former Soviet Union and several Eastern European countries. At the top of the country’s agenda was the pursuit of international recognition and legitimacy. In 1966, North Korea participated in the Soccer World Cup on British soil, although the UK government was initially inclined not to issue visas to the team.20 Due to FIFA’s pressure on the UK’s foreign office, the obscure North Korean team were eventually allowed to enter the country and chose Middlesbrough, in the North-East of England, as their base. Although the team, in North Korea referred to as Chollima,21 was widely regarded to be complete underdogs, surprisingly they progressed to the quarter-finals. Their underdog status appeared to work in their favour as the positive reception by local people clearly showed. Large crowds turned up to their matches and plenty of anecdotal evidence suggests that players and locals bonded quickly.22 Seven remaining players of the 1966 squad even returned to Middlesbrough in 2002 for an emotional visit. The overwhelming public (and media) interest in their short stay confirmed the enduring affection in which the North Korean team are still regarded, and the value of people-to-people contacts as part of a country’s public diplomacy.23 Twenty years later, Kim Jong-il reminded a select audience of the success of the 1966 team and identified international soccer as a key sport to develop for nation-branding purposes in a speech given on 19 May 1986: Football is the most popular of all sports. Football is extremely popular, both in our country and in the rest of the world. It draws the greatest public interest. A highly 211

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skillful football team can bring honour to its country and its people in the eyes of the world.24 Kim Jong-il also suggested a vague strategy, which involved channelling concerted efforts into improving skill levels and developing better tactics ‘so that our players win the Asian Games first and then the World Cup.’25 This speech also outlines succinctly his intention to use athletes, teams and international sport events strategically as diplomatic tools. He explicitly states that ‘sportsmen [sic] should participate in many domestic and international events . . . with loyalty to the Party and leader, a firm resolve to bring honour to their motherland.’26 The latter is a recurring theme in his speech. He argues that the display of ‘the flag of our Republic’ at international sport competitions enhances ‘the honour of the country’ and demonstrates ‘our nation’s resourcefulness . . . to the world.’27 This document also mentions that ‘developing sporting skills and organising sporting exchange on a wide scale will contribute to promoting friendly relations with many countries.’28 Furthermore, Kim Jong-il sets out a large number of principles, identifies relevant organisations and institutions responsible for the implementation of his vision and even encourages the production and distribution of ‘newspapers and magazines [that] carry the photographs of famous sportsmen [sic] so that they become known to the public, [and] scientific films, documentaries and feature films.’29 The latter is rather unusual and contradicts the underlying ideological principles of North Korea, which explicitly reject the concept of individualism and wholeheartedly favour collective achievements that constitute the most important pillars of Korean society.30 Considering the powerful position of North Korea’s leader, it is no surprise that his subjects did their best to realise his plan. Despite the extremely limited resources North Korea possesses, the country has frequently participated in the Summer Olympics and Asian Games, has occasionally sent small delegations to the Winter Olympics and, whenever qualified, has dispatched their women’s and men’s soccer teams to the respective FIFA World Cups. In addition to attending these high-profile, mediated mega sport events, North Korean athletes also compete in smaller, less popular and visible international competitions, such as the World Weightlifting Championships. In 2014, when the world’s best weightlifters met in Kazakhstan, the North Korean athletes topped the medal table with 12 gold and an overall tally of 21 medals. This was the first time ever that a North Korean team headed a medal table at an international competition. The six men and six women received an enthusiastic welcome on their return to Pyongyang and subsequently attended a banquet with Kim Jong-un. Most importantly for the North Korean regime, the team’s outstanding record also made it into the sport pages of many international newspapers.31 At the Rio de Janeiro Olympics in 2016, North Korea’s weightlifters continued to impress the sporting world by winning one gold and two silver medals. In 2017, they held three World and two Olympic records. More used to victorious and jubilant returns and frequently mentioned in the international sport news are North Korea’s women soccer teams. Eunah Hong argues that ‘North Korea has been one of the most successful nations in women’s football in Asia during the past two decades,’ and the country has even sacrificed its commitment to ‘the philosophy of Confucianism by utilizing female football players as role models.’32 In 1999, North Korea’s senior women’s side surprisingly qualified for the Women’s Soccer World Cup in the United States. The even bigger surprise was that the team accepted the invitation to play in the United States, although the two countries do not even have formal diplomatic relations. After winning the Under-20 (years of age) Women’s World Cup in 2006 and the Asian Cup in 2001, 2003 and 2008, the members of the women’s soccer team are usually among the best 212

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known athletes in North Korea and have often acted as ‘track suit ambassadors.’ In 2011, however, at the Women’s World Cup in Germany, five North Korean players were found guilty of using performance-enhancing drugs and immediately suspended. Subsequently, the whole team was banned from the 2015 Soccer World Cup in Canada. However, there does not appear to be any shortage of gifted young female soccer players in North Korea. In 2016, the country’s Under-17 and Under-20 squads won their respective World Cups in Jordan and Papua New Guinea. At the 2018 Asian Games in the Indonesian cities of Jakarta and Palembang, North Korea’s senior women’s team beat Tajikistan convincingly 16–0, which is a new official record in the context of the Asian Olympics. As of August 2019, North Korea’s women’s football team is ranked ninth in the world according to FIFA.This team won the East Asia Football Federation Championship in December 2017 but surprisingly did not qualify for the 2019 World Cup in France. Their male counterparts are ranked a lowly 118th by FIFA, although they offered decent-quality football at the 2010 Soccer World Cup. However, they were narrowly beaten by Brazil (2–1) and subsequently thrashed by Portugal (7–0).Various unconfirmed news reports at the time suggested players, coach and support staff were publicly shamed on their early return home. What the North Korean rulers did not realise was that the sheer presence of this team attracted a considerable amount of media interest. Journalistic accounts in various international newspapers and websites dealt with a variety of issues, including the team’s performances, the players’ individual strengths and weaknesses, their manager, the training schedule, their accommodation, travelling arrangements, contacts with locals, the press conferences and, of course, their noisy and conspicuous 300 supporters whose identity remained a mystery.33 One of North Korea’s players, Jong Tae-se,34 unintentionally became an international symbol of the fluidity of contemporary nationalisms after a television camera caught him overcome with emotion. Tears were streaming down his cheeks when North Korea’s anthem was played before the team’s opening game against Brazil. Although that is not unusual, his relationship with the country is. He has never lived in North Korea and only visited it on a relatively small number of occasions. He was actually born and raised in Japan and is a member of the large local North Korean community there. Despite the severe economic problems and growing poverty in North Korea, recent reports suggest that Kim Jong-un has reinvigorated elite and recreational sport development with a strong focus on the provision of modern facilities and venues. A new elite football academy for young girls and boys was opened in Pyongyang in 2013 and many other facilities have been refurbished since he came to power in 2011. Furthermore, a large number of recreational sport facilities have been built since then, including popular water parks, skating rinks as well as basketball and volleyball courts. In addition to promoting and funding top-level sport and providing the necessary resources for athletes and teams to travel to international competitions, North Korea’s political elite has been quite innovative in their strategic attempts to change and improve the country’s image and reputation. For that purpose, they have promoted a remarkably different model of physical culture. It manifests itself in the Mass Games, officially known as The Grand Mass Gymnastics and Artistic Performance Arirang. The Mass Games can best be described as a spectacular dance, gymnastic and acrobatic show involving up to 100,000 young people in Pyongyang’s 150,000-capacity May Day Stadium.35 The 90-minute show consists of three distinct components: First, a floor show of complex, highly choreographed and flawless group routines performed by tens of thousands of gymnasts (with large artificial flowers, flags, hoops, balls, ropes and clubs), acrobats (with poles, ladders, springboards, trampolines and large metal wheels) and dancers.The event also includes a military 213

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tattoo, hordes of waving, smiling children, an aerial ballet by dancers on bungee ropes and military personnel performing taekwondo routines in the centre of the stadium. Second, the backdrop, which comprises a giant human mosaic forming colourful, elaborate and detailed images of historical and contemporary scenes, landscapes, architecture, objects, slogans, cartoons, and, of course, portraits of Kim Jong-il and the late Kim Il-sung. This part of the spectacle includes more than 20,000 schoolchildren holding up coloured cards, which are part of a large book, and turning them so quickly and in complete unison, that these images appear to be animated – all synchronised to a low-key video and laser light show. Portal suggests that the ‘use of a backdrop of rows and rows of participants, each turning the pages of a book of interlocking images, which only becomes apparent when viewed from a distance, is something borrowed from China.’36 Third, the music that provides an acoustic connection between the backdrop and the floor show.37 Since 1946, the country has more or less regularly staged Mass Games. ‘From 2007 to 2013 the festival was an annual summer ritual, popular with tourists who were transfixed by the mesmerising grandeur of thousands of performers dancing and marching with military precision on the world’s largest stadium stage.’38 After a five-year break, this extravaganza was relaunched in August 2018. The performance’s sheer magnitude and exuberance is breathtaking, and the design and choreography are impressive visual pleasures. However, it is the political content that is most significant.The Mass Games are, of course, a celebration of North Korea’s leaders and the country’s achievements. Furthermore, the show reinforces a sense of North Korean identity and the fundamental ideological principles of North Korean society and culture. But it also addresses key foreign policy issues such as inter-Korean relations, the Korean division, and reunification. The celebration of pan-Korean identity is based on ‘an extreme form of ethnocentric Korean nationalism . . . that expresses pride and self-esteem based on the greatness of the Korean nation.’39 One of the sets depicted a dramatic theatrical representation of the division of the Korean nation. Several hundred young people magically assembled into the perfect shape of the entire Korean peninsula. Subsequently, the southern and northern halves of the peninsula inexorably drifted asunder; aching arms were outstretched in futility as unseen forces pulled the two halves apart. At the same time, the backdrop created a colourful panorama of Korean children repeatedly uttering, ‘How much longer do we have to be divided due to foreign forces?’ These kinds of highly emotive features are, of course, designed to appeal to both North Korean spectators and visitors. The Mass Games make full use of the poverty-stricken nation’s most valuable natural resource: the inexpensive skills of highly educated and utterly obedient young people. In addition to entertainment and propaganda for local people, the Mass Games provide the North Korean rulers with a rare and unrivalled opportunity to present the usually isolated state to the rest of the world and to exhibit the strength and vigour of its political system. Allowing thousands of tourists to see the Mass Games is also meant to generate income for the impoverished state and demonstrate more openness and transparency to the rest of the world.40 Cho comes to the conclusion that the Mass Games clearly reveal ‘how North Korea wants to be seen by the others, as well as delivering what it wants to both domestic and international audiences. In this respect, the Arirang festival seems to contribute to producing some sort of positive images for North Korea, just as conventional nation-branding strategies do for liberal capitalist countries.’41 While staging the Mass Games has a long history in North Korea, the country has little experience hosting sport tourism events that involve the active participation of amateur and recreational athletes. And yet, since 2014, international runners have been invited to participate in the Pyongyang Marathon, which has always been held in April as it is part of the annual celebrations 214

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marking the birthday of Kim Il-sung (15 April 1912), the country’s founder. In 2019, almost 1,000 international runners took part in this race that constitutes a tour of Pyongyang’s most important tourist sites and landmarks. It blends vigorous physical activity with teaching the political history of North Korea. This event is most likely intended to generate income for the impoverished state and to convey a message of normality to the steadily growing number of visitors. North Korea appears to have copied and adjusted the successful template of the Havana Marathon. Its route through the Cuban capital is designed for the runners to engage with the socio-economic and political culture of the Caribbean island, in particular its highly treasured revolutionary past, places and icons. According to Sugden, the Havana Marathon offers ‘sun, sea, sand, salsa, heritage and revolutionary politics, . . . is unashamedly created for and aimed at the international sport tourism market . . . to bring in tourist income.’42 Podoler suggests that ‘by putting more emphasis on the participation of amateur and recreational foreign runners, North Korea has expanded the scope of its event tourism, which had previously relied primarily on the Mass Games. With the inclusion of the marathon into its tourism industry, the country thus anchored its place in the worldwide trend of sport event tourism.’43

South Korea: hosting mega sport events As South Korea’s development into an athletic powerhouse in Asia has been extensively documented,44 this section focuses on the hosting of sport mega events only. In order to make sense of South Korea’s keen interest in hosting mega sport events, the country’s socio-economic and political development and, in the absence of an explicit broader events strategy, selected cultural and sport policies need to be considered. South Korea’s political trajectory since its foundation in 1948 was dominated by four decades of US-backed military dictatorships. Shortly before his assassination, Park Chung-hee, who ruled South Korea from 1961 to 1979, had expressed a keen interest in bidding for the Summer Olympics in 1988. After seizing power through a military coup, Chun Doo-hwan (1980–1988) pursued his predecessor’s ambition and proceeded with the bid. Although he dissolved the national parliament in 1980, and despite the subsequent declaration of martial law and the brutal persecution of the pro-democracy forces, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) did not hesitate to accept Chun Doo-hwan’s proposal in 1981. Hyung-joong Won and Eunah Hong suggest that ‘Chun Doo Hwan . . . viewed sport as an efficient instrument for nation-building.’45 Others have argued that, for the South Korean ruler, hosting the Olympics was part of a wider strategy, aimed at distracting people from the economic problems and political tensions the country was facing. In the lead-up to the Olympics, the torture and imprisonment of prodemocracy activists continued and led to unprecedented mass demonstrations and widespread protests. This severe domestic unrest and international pressure led, eventually, to the first free democratic elections in 1987. General Park Chung-hee’s dictatorial rule during the 1960s and 1970s needs to be credited with creating the modern foundations of South Korea’s cultural policy, such as the establishment of legal frameworks and the funding and creation of key organisations. Eunah Hong also recognises that General Park Chung-hee drove forward the modernisation of Korean sport, as he valued physical activity for its contributions to ‘his regime’s priorities . . . political security, social order, material prosperity and mass patriotism.’46 The modernisation of cultural and sport policies happened during the eight-year authoritarian rule of Chun Doo-hwan in the 1980s. In addition to continuing the promotion of traditional Korean arts and heritage, contemporary art and the lived cultural experiences in various South Korean regions were included. International sport was intended to provide a platform to increase the country’s recognition and prestige. 215

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Equally important for this chapter is, of course, the increased appreciation and explicit recognition of the importance of international cultural (and much later sport) exchanges.These became a key feature of South Korea’s foreign policies for the following decades, either in connection with unification policies or as a response to the accelerating globalisation process.47 The 1988 Summer Olympics in South Korea’s capital, Seoul, was the first mega-event that the country hosted. It is widely considered a ‘major factor in South Korea’s emergence on to the world stage.’48 However, the political agenda attached to this event, as well as the intended and unintended impacts, is much more complex. In addition to establishing itself as an advanced nation that had rapidly changed from a war-torn, unstable and poor country to a prosperous, developed nation, South Korea was equally keen to draw level with Japan’s capital,Tokyo, which had hosted the 1964 Olympics and to generate similar socio-economic and political benefits. The rivalry between South Korea and Japan has a long history, although the Japanese annexation of the Korean peninsula from 1910 to 1945 exacerbated their tense relationship. Furthermore, the South Korean government saw the hosting of the 1988 Games as an opportunity to establish diplomatic ties with China, the Soviet Union and its socialist allies. Despite the ‘Towards One World–Beyond Barriers’ motto, the 1988 Olympics certainly did not achieve an easing of tensions between the two Koreas, as ‘North Korea boycotted the Games and blew up a South Korean airliner in November 1987 with the intent to destabilize the South Korean government and scare away participants from the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games.’49 It is noteworthy that one of the reasons the IOC awarded the right to host this event to South Korea was an expectation that it would promote reconciliation between the two Koreas.Victor Cha suggests that the 1988 Seoul Olympics sealed the end of the inter-Korean battle over legitimacy.50 Cho and Bairner confirm that assessment: ‘The start of the Seoul Games, in this regard, truly marked the end of inter-Korean competition for legitimacy.’51 South Korea’s capital put on a show that celebrated the country’s socio-economic development and technological advances that the North was unable to match. ‘Finally, the 1988 Summer Olympics became a huge success because it was staged during a revolutionary time for the global communications industry. This in turn set the stage for South Korea’s information society.’52 In order to leave no doubt about the host nation’s rapid industrialisation, economic boom and growing prosperity, a large number of urban regeneration and infrastructure projects were undertaken. Almost 50,000 buildings were destroyed and over 700,000 people were forcibly evicted in order to modernise and beautify Seoul as part of the Olympic project.This established an unfortunate precedent that many other Olympic hosts went on to follow. There is little doubt that staging the Olympic Games in 1988 and the inevitable international media interest in the country also contributed, to some extent, to South Korea’s democratisation process. This event represented a turning point in a country that still had rigid limitations on international travel, where sport and leisure activities were relatively new cultural phenomena and books and movies still heavily censored. The Olympics marked, and to some extent celebrated, an abrupt break from the country’s authoritarian past, instead of bestowing legitimacy on it. Vandenberghe concludes that the Seoul Olympics ‘served as a medium through which South Korea could place itself on the international scene by projecting an image of itself as [a] positive, industrialized, and peace-minded country.’53 It goes without saying that South Korea’s fourth position in the final Olympic medal table (behind the Soviet Union, East Germany and the United States), after winning a total of 33 medals, was a source of national pride and impressed sport fans all over the world. The complex significance of the 2002 FIFA World Cup, which South Korea hosted together with Japan, can only be understood against the context of the Asian financial crisis that commenced in 1997. South Korea and several other Asian countries experienced a 216

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dramatic devaluation of their currencies and massive capital outflows after the confidence of major investors turned from over-exuberance to contagious pessimism. While unemployment rose quickly, the stock market crashed and lost nearly half of its value, and South Korea’s currency, the won, depreciated by over 60 percent. The economic crisis unfolded only a few months after South Korea had reached the $10,000 per capita income level and was a severe blow to the country’s economic aspirations and national pride. It was widely perceived as a national embarrassment and a traumatic experience. With hindsight, experts established that South Korea’s large industrial conglomerates, the chaebols, were one of the key causes of this sudden crisis. This was due to their wasteful spending, reckless investments and massive debt, combined with corruption and cronyism between chaebols and high-ranking, influential politicians. The 2002 FIFA World Cup was the first one on Asian soil since its inauguration in 1930 in Uruguay. FIFA had awarded the tournament to South Korea and Japan in the hope that the joint hosting would promote football in Asia, reconciliation between the two hosts54 and also contribute to an improvement of inter-Korean relations.The South Korean hosts were particularly keen on generating economic benefits, which involved urban regeneration, the creation of new jobs, increased production of consumer goods and an expansion of the tourism industry. That is not surprising, considering the impact of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, particularly the conditions attached to the bailout by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These led to a number of austerity measures and a considerable reduction in funding for governmental organisations and national projects such as the 2002 World Cup. In order to maintain public support, governmental reports repeatedly forecasted positive economic impacts and stressed the importance of this event for nation (re)branding purposes. The 1998 report by the Korea Development Institute (KDI), a government-funded research centre, claimed that the 2002 World Cup would provide a ‘critical momentum for overcoming the economic crisis and restoring South Korea’s credibility and could rebrand South Korea’s image in the international political-economic marketplace.’55 Furthermore, Hyun-jung Lee and Young-han Cho argue that the Asian financial crisis had massive repercussions for South Koreans’ sense of national pride and that ‘the 2002 World Cup posited itself as the perfect occasion for the country to rebound from a national depression and re-enter the global arena with a renewed image.’56 As in 1988, the host cities of the 2002 World Cup completed their improvement of the existing infrastructure and building of new venues in time. South Korea put on a colourful and memorable World Cup that was significantly enriched by the Red Devils, South Korean football fans, who caught the world’s attention. With the help of the Internet, they mobilised over 20 million people to watch the matches of their team on large screens in the streets of Seoul and other major cities. Never before had South Koreans displayed their sense of nation in such a public, playful and outgoing manner. Football fans and media all over the world were taken by surprise by the passion of street cheering in South Korea. The Red Devils sparked a re-examining of South Koreans’ deep-rooted ethnic nationalism. Their more contemporary outlook on the nation offered an inclusive approach, disregarded people’s background such as ethnicity, age, gender or religion and was more forward looking. The Red Devils became an iconic cultural symbol of modern South Korea at the 2002 World Cup. There is a widespread consensus that South Korea achieved most of its political goals through hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup. ‘The World Cup enhanced awareness of South Korea as an international travel destination and as a potential market for new investments.’57 The event also helped to rebrand South Korea’s chaebols by promoting them as global high-tech companies and enhanced the country’s soft power. However, relations between Japan and South Korea did not improve. Surprisingly, the North Korean media frequently reported on the very successful 217

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run of the South Korean soccer team in this competition – a rare display of pan-Korean unity overcoming deep political differences. Sixteen years later, South Korea completed its Grand Slam of hosting mega sport events as the country organised the 2018 Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang, a small town with a population of almost 44,000 people in the Kangwon Province in the North-East of South Korea. In order to avoid any confusion with North Korea’s capital, Pyongyang, the town changed the spelling of its name to PyeongChang. After more than ten years of lobbying and two unsuccessful applications, the IOC rewarded the small town for its patience and endurance with a firstround victory and a total of 63 votes. The third and final successful application was primarily driven by the central government in conjunction with the province and national sport organisations and was widely supported by the Korean people. There was little doubt that South Korea had the financial resources, political will, organisational and other skills to turn this occasion into an impressive event. And it did so in style. The Games certainly put Pyeongchang on the global map, improved the infrastructure of the Kangwon province and increased sport tourism, for at least a short period of time. At the time of writing, that is 18 months after the 2018 Winter Olympics, it is too early to say whether all the promised longterm impacts, such as boosting the popularity of winter sport, tourism development, economic gains, increase in regional employment, the status of the country in the world and increased brand awareness of South Korean companies and sponsors, will materialise. However, there is no question that South Korea’s new president, Moon Jae-in, is one of the big winners of these Olympics. When preparing this mega event, the biggest risk the local organising committee faced came from north of the adjacent border, North Korea. In the decade before the Pyeonchang Olympics, the political climate on the divided Korean peninsula was rather tense. This was largely the outcome of the hard-line approach of previous South Korean governments and the repeated testing of missiles by North Korea. However, there was also some modest optimism, as many South Koreans hoped that this event would provide an opportunity for closer cooperation, reduce the tensions between the two Koreas and promote peace and reconciliation on the divided peninsula. A systematic analysis of the use of sport and sport events as a foreign policy and diplomatic tool came to a similar optimistic conclusion in 2011 and recommended: In order to avoid a repeat of the North’s boycott of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, the organizers of the 2018 Winter Games must carefully consider (at least) three options: first, offering the North the opportunity to host a small number of events; second, fielding a joint team for these Winter Games; and, third, arranging a number of high-profile publicity activities that focus on reconciliation and reunification, such as entering the Olympic stadium together at the opening ceremony. A combination of all three would be a political coup and guarantee the 2018 Winter Olympics a long-lasting and impressive legacy. . . . However, even if only one of these three options became reality, it would help to defuse the explosive political climate on the divided Korean peninsula. None of these three options are unrealistic.58 When the newly elected (10 May 2017) South Korean president, Moon Jae-in, unveiled his North Korea strategy in a speech in Berlin in July 2017, it became clear that, after ten years of conservative and hard-line rule, he was planning to continue the more liberal path of his predecessors, Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008). Their North Korea strategy, the ‘Sunshine Policy,’ was guided by the principles of engagement and reconciliation rather than ostracising and marginalising North Korea. It involved political dialogue, cultural exchanges, people-to-people contacts and economic cooperation. Two weeks before his speech in Berlin, Moon Jae-in had invited North Korea to participate in the 2018 Winter Olympics. 218

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At the opening ceremony of the World Taekwondo Championships in the southern county of Muju in South Korea, Moon Jae-in stressed sport’s role as a peace-maker and explicitly suggested the formation of joint teams for the 2018 Pyeongchang Games. What in fact happened eight months later will be explored in the next section, which discusses the development of inter-Korean relations in the context of international sport events. The Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang were, as expected, flawless and left no doubt that South Korea took their task of organising this mega event very seriously. Particularly impressive and symbolically very meaningful was the entertaining and thoughtful Olympic opening ceremony, entitled Peace in Motion.The overarching themes were harmony, unity and peace.The latter was rather simplistically explained as the inevitable outcome of connection and communication. It was frequently performed and visualised through the presence of five children ‘on a quest for peace,’ John Lennon’s Imagine (performed by four South Korean singers), doves and the combination of candlelight and water that marks peace in Korean mythology. The opening ceremony, which was simultaneously inward and outward looking, consolidated South Koreans’ sense of national identity, promoted the nation as a brand, reminded the rest of the world of past and present achievements and addressed several specific political issues. Most prominent among the latter was, of course, the relationship between the two Koreas. Furthermore, several symbols communicated a small number of fundamental political principles and policies of the new South Korean government. The ceremony followed an established pattern and came across as a fairly low-key, more modern, less rigid and more vibrant performance than, for example, the 2008 spectacle in Beijing. The Pyeongchang show did not hesitate to add an element of K-Pop, repeatedly praised South Korea’s massive and continuous contributions to the digital revolution and revealed an unprecedented degree of self-confidence.

Inter-Korean relations: building bridges through and at sport events During the Cold War (1947–1990), the two Korean states used international sport events as a political battleground, both insisting to be the true, legitimate representative of the Korean people.They either boycotted the event as a protest to the other’s presence or, when they competed against each other, the rivalry was fierce. As mentioned above, this antagonism reached a climax when North Korea boycotted the 1998 Summer Olympics in Seoul. However, the 1990s experienced some considerable changes as national and international sporting encounters started to build bridges, celebrate pan-Korean unity and were marked by a more reconciliatory spirit. In October 1990, a set of ‘Unification Football Matches’ took place in both Seoul and Pyongyang. Ten years later, the first ‘Unification Basketball Tournament’ was held in the capitals of the two Koreas. Following the first couple of games, where the men’s and women’s All-Star teams played their Northern counterparts in Pyongyang in September, the next games took place in Seoul three months later. The Pyongyang games were the first sport events in North Korea to be televised in South Korea. The historic summit of Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang in June 2000 accelerated inter-Korean cooperation, exchanges and collaboration in the world of sport. Article IV of the joint declaration (15 June 2000), states ‘that the two Koreas will work on follow-up measures for the revitalization of social, cultural, athletic and environmental areas.’ Shortly after the summit, at the 2000 Sydney Summer Olympics, the two Korean teams marched together at the opening ceremony, displaying a white flag with the shape of the Korean peninsula embroidered in a deep blue colour’59 and wearing identical uniforms. Despite this public celebration of Korean unity, the athletes subsequently competed as two separate teams.60 This high-profile symbolic practice of 219

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marching together in the opening ceremonies of international events turned quickly into a tradition and continued at the 2003 Asian Winter Games in Aomori, the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens, the 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin and the Doha Asian Games in the same year. Although only united for a day, it is the symbolic potency of such a practice in the context of a popular international sport event with global media coverage that turns these gestures into powerful foreignpolicy signals. Most notable in this context are the 2002 Asian Games in South Korea’s second-largest city, Busan, as a group of 300 North Korean athletes and officials attended this event. It is widely considered to be a fundamental turning point, as never before had North Korea sent a team to an international sport event in the South. The hosts made a number of far-reaching concessions in order to accommodate the North Korean guests. They even allowed the North Korean flag and other state insignia to be used in public. Even North Korea’s anthem was played on several occasions, although South Korean military bands refused to play this tune. A special permission was also granted to the Mangyongbong-92, a North Korean passenger and cargo ship, to enter South Korean waters. The vessel anchored in Busan’s port for the duration of the Asian Games and served as lodging for the North Korean athletes, coaches, party officials and sport administrators. At the opening ceremony of the 14th Asian Games, athletes from the North and the South, as before, walked together hand in hand, wearing the same outfit. They followed the reunification flag that depicts the shape of the Korean peninsula in blue against a white backdrop. At the same time the Arirang song was played in the stadium. Two athletes, one from the North and one from the South, carried out the lighting of the Asian Games’ flame. Although symbolic and carefully choreographed, these encounters demonstrate that both Koreas have taken public diplomacy seriously and wish to improve inter-Korean relations. On other occasions, unusual and innovative measures were taken to avoid any uncertainties or ambiguities and reinforce the key message. In March 2006, when a North Korean ice hockey team was invited to play a friendly match in the South, the organisers decided to form two mixed teams, each comprising athletes from both countries. Even the teams’ names, URI (meaning ‘we’) and HANA (meaning ‘one’), reflected the reconciliatory spirit of this event. This incomplete list of examples of the various forms of sporting dialogue, cooperation and exchanges between the North and the South clearly demonstrates that, prior to 2008, both countries were keen to promote, grow and intensify dialogue, celebrate commonalities and unity as well as display to their respective populations their commitment to reunification without the need to engage in complicated political negotiations. Ten years later, these efforts were reinvigorated and turned the 2018 Winter Olympics in South Korea into a political spectacle with, probably, far-reaching consequences. In December 2017, in his New Year’s speech, Kim Jong-un surprisingly confirmed the attendance of a North Korean delegation at the forthcoming Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. Six weeks later, a large North Korean contingent arrived in South Korea. It consisted of 22 athletes, coaches, sport administrators and government officials, media representatives, a taekwondo performance group, an arts troupe comprising an orchestra, dancers and singers as well as almost 200 female cheerleaders. The latter caught global media attention due to their impeccable routines and energetic performances, such as when they supported the joint (North and South) Korean ice hockey team. This team, albeit not very successful, became the symbolically most powerful expression of pan-Korean unity. For most spectators, the arrival of South and North Korean athletes in the Olympic Stadium in Pyeongyang became a highly emotional experience. For the first time in over a decade, they entered the arena together as a unified team, wore the same outfit and marched behind the unification flag that was carried by a North and South Korean athlete. Later on, two Korean hockey 220

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players (one from each country) carried the torch together on its final leg, a set of steep stairs, before it reached the Olympic cauldron. In his short speech,Thomas Bach, president of the IOC, captured the atmosphere very succinctly: ‘We are all touched by this wonderful gesture.’ Moon Jae-in could not have hoped for more powerful images and supportive responses to his courageous approach to dealing with North Korea. After all, he got the ball rolling when he invited North Korea in July 2017 to attend these Olympic Games. All these activities fully exploit sport’s potential to facilitate international cooperation, increase understanding and bridge profound differences.They involve creating opportunities for contacts between divided, and even hostile, nations to be initiated or renewed, on an apparently informal basis.There was no doubt that the sport diplomacy of the two Koreas at the 2018 Winter Games was serious and not just a meaningless PR stunt. North Korea’s high-ranking political delegation was led by Kim Jong-un’s sister, Kim Yo-jong. She personally delivered an invitation to the South Korean president for an inter-Korean summit with her brother. Only a day after the opening ceremony, she met Moon Jae-in in Seoul’s Blue House, the official residence of the president, where they discussed inter-Korean relations. Politically, the Pyeongchang Winter Games were like a starting gun as they triggered a series of high-profile meetings between Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong-un. South Korea’s president described this development with a suitable metaphor: ‘The little snowball which we set in motion together has grown into a snowman of peace.’ Five months after their historic April 2018 summit, Moon Jae-in even addressed an audience of around 150,000 North Koreans at the Mass Games in Pyongyang’s May Day stadium as part of his three-day visit. Amongst several other political agreements, the two leaders also expressed their intention to apply to the IOC for the right to co-host the 2032 Summer Olympic Games.

Conclusion: commonalities and differences While critically evaluating the success of the above-mentioned political strategies could be an interesting research project, the final section of this chapter focuses on drawing out commonalities and differences between the two Koreas with particular reference to nation-branding and soft power. There is little doubt that South Korea was and continues to be keen on hosting mega sport events. Eunah Hong claims, that ‘the hosting of major international sporting events in contemporary South Korea can be explained from the perspective of nation-building and national identity.’61 That is certainly true and a recurring rationale, but it neglects the international dimension and does not capture the political complexity that underpins South Korea’s keenness to stage mega sport events. While the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul succeeded in displaying South Korea’s technological advancements, industrial growth and economic achievements to a world audience, the 2002 Soccer World Cup, co-hosted with Japan, was intended to be a ‘catalyst to create popular harmony, system stability and to promote a neo-liberal hegemony in Korea.’62 The latter also helped to consolidate a distinctive South Korean identity, contributed to rebranding the nation in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis and improved South Korea’s and its chaebols’ global reputation. More recently, the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics offered South Korea another high-profile opportunity to promote national pride, pan-Korean identity, the nation as a brand, its ITC industries and other chaebols as well as key foreign policies of the new president, Moon Jae-in. North Korea has no track record of hosting mega sport events but offers its own population and international audiences the Mass Games, a unique gymnastic and artistic extravaganza. The perfect choreography of this physical and, more importantly, political spectacle, the active involvement of tens of thousands of children and young people and its non-competitive spirit celebrate the Kim 221

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dynasty, selected political principles and achievements. The Mass Games provide an alternative to the concept of competitive modern sport and fall outside its dominant ‘higher, faster, stronger’ philosophy. Nation-building and nation-branding, which is best described as a ‘shifting images strategy,’ are important underlying motives for staging this event. So are income generation and the celebration of pan-Korean unity. While the means in both Koreas are, of course, very different and clearly reflect different socio-economic and political environments and access (or lack of such) to all kinds of resources, the ends show a high degree of similarity with only a few notable exceptions. Despite its limited resources, North Korea frequently participates in international sporting competitions and is doing rather well. So does South Korea, which is one of Asia’s greatest sport powers frequently appearing in the top ten of, for example, the Olympic medal tables. For both nations, these sport mega events provide multilayered opportunities for nation-branding and for displaying and enhancing their soft power. While the latter is, of course, much more difficult for North Korea due to its widespread reputation as a ‘rogue state,’ South Korea has skilfully used these events to pursue a number of policy objectives, including nation (re)branding and soft power. The details of these strategies such as the soft power sources are usually shaped by the concurrent socio-economic and political contexts. At the same time, both countries have repeatedly utilized international sports events to remind the rest of the world that the Korean nation continues to be divided, keep the reunification issue in the public discourse in both countries, promote mutual understanding, facilitate dialogue and cooperation, symbolically celebrate pan-Korean unity and pursue new and/or reinvigorated foreign policy objectives. However, the lack of any cooperation between the 2008 Beijing and 2018 Pyeongchang Olympics clearly shows that the efficacy of sport as a diplomatic tool depends on the overarching foreign policy framework, direction and rationale. During this decade, inter-Korean relations had seriously deteriorated, which was largely caused by the hard-line South Korean governments who favored a more confrontational foreign policy approach. In February 2008, Lee Myung-bak, the newly elected South Korean president, outlined his policy framework towards North Korea. This document, entitled “Vision 3000”, linked humanitarian aid to political concessions and reforms, in particular the denuclearisation of the DPRK. It also stipulated a discontinuation of his predecessors’ ‘Sunshine Policy’. North Korea almost immediately stopped all official contact with Seoul and reconciliation talks went into a deep freeze. Only a few months later, at the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing, both teams did not even march together at the opening ceremony.The 2010 Asian Games in Guangzhou, China, saw a further deterioration.There were no reconciliatory gestures, signs of good will and symbolic cooperation. South Korean basketball players even turned their backs when the DPRK’s anthem was played, while North Korean fans did not rise from their seats and ignored South Korea’s anthem. Although Korean fans from both countries were seated only a railing apart in neighbouring sections, there was no interaction between them. The 2018 Winter Games in Pyeongchang have triggered a new wave of foreign policy efforts and rekindled the hope of many Koreans that reunification of the divided peninsula may still be on the cards. Even if that takes a long time, South Korea has increased its Soft Power as Moon Jae-in will certainly be remembered for his initiative and as a peace-loving president. After all, one of his predecessors, Kim Dae-jung, received the Peace Nobel Prize for his ‘Sunshine Policy’ towards North Korea.

Notes 1 John Nauright, ‘ “Selling Nations to the World Through Sports: Mega Events and Nation Branding as Global Diplomacy’,” PD Magazine, Winter 2013, p. 23.

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2 Malcolm Foley, David McGillivray, and Gayle McPherson, Event Policy: From Theory to Strategy (London: Routledge, 2012), 3. 3 Udo Merkel, ‘ “The Critical Social-Scientific Study of International Events: Power, Politics and Conflicts’,” in Power, Politics and International Events: Socio-cultural Analyses of Festivals and Spectacles, ed. Udo Merkel (London: Routledge, 2014), 3–30. 4 John R. Gold and Steven Ward, eds., Place Promotion:The Use of Publicity and Marketing to Sell Towns and Regions (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 1994). 5 Adam Jones, ‘ “London 2012: Urban Imagery and City Branding’,” in Identity Discourses and Communities in International Events, Festivals and Events, ed. Udo Merkel (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 96–115. 6 Louisa Devismes, ‘ “Regional Events and Festivals in Europe: Revitalizing Traditions and Modernizing Identities’,” in Identity Discourses and Communities in International Events, Festivals and Events, ed. Udo Merkel (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 33–52. 7 Ying Fan, ‘ “Branding the Nation: Towards a Better Understanding,” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 6, no. 2 (2010): 98. 8 Simon Anholt, ‘Competitive Identity: The New Brand Management for Nations, Cities and Regions (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Simon Anholt, ‘ “Place Branding: Is It Marketing or Isn’t It?’ ” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 4, no. 1 (2008): 1–6. 9 Zala Volcic and Mark Andrejevic, ‘ “Nation Branding in the Era of Commercial Nationalism’,” International Journal of Communication 5 (2011): 598–618. 10 Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990); Joseph Nye, Soft Power:The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 11 Joseph Nye, ‘ “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 97. 12 Virginie Grzelczyk, ‘ “Hard, Soft, Smart? North Korea and Power: It’s All Relative’,” Asian International Studies Review 18, no. 1 (2017): 137. 13 This is also essential for a driving force for military governments that came to power through a coup d’état and/or dictatorships. 14 Brian Bridges, ‘ “Playing Games: The Two Koreas and the Beijing Olympics’,” Japan Focus (March 17, 2008): 1. 15 Bradley K. Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2006). 16 Bruce Cumings, North Korea (New York:The New Press, 2004); Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2005); Brian Reynolds Myers, The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves: And Why It Matters (Brooklyn, NY: Melville House Publishing, 2010). 17 Bruce Cumings, North Korea: Another Country (New York and London: The New Press, 2004). 18 E. J. R. Cho, ‘ “North Korea’s ‘Grand Theatre’ for Survival: Nation Branding or Nation Bulding?’ ” Geopolitics 22, no. 3 (2017): 603. 19 Grzelczyk, ‘ “Hard, Soft, Smart?’ ” 138. 20 For a full account, see Martin Polley, ‘ “The Diplomatic Background to the 1966 Football World Cup’,” The Sports Historian 18, no. 2 (2009): 1–18. 21 Chollima is the nickname of North Korea’s national football team. A Chollima is a mythical horse with wings that has its roots in Chinese classics and frequently features in East Asian mythology.This winged horse is said to be too swift and elegant to be mounted. 22 Louise Taylor, ‘ “How Little Stars from North Korea Were Taken to Middlesbrough’s Heart: Memories of North Korea, the Adopted Boys of 1966, Have Lingered on Teesside as the 2010 World Cup Beckons’,” The Guardian, June 8, 2010, 14. 23 The Game of their Lives’ is a feature-length documentary by Nick Bonner and Daniel Gordon. It comes highly recommended as it empathetically tells the story of how North Korea’s team arrived in England in 1966, at the height of the Cold War, and how the players won the sympathy and support of the local people of Middlesbrough (UK). 24 Jong-il Kim, On Popularizing Physical Training and Sport and Developing Sporting Skills Rapidly (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1989), 11. 25 Ibid., 12. 26 Ibid., 14–15. 27 Ibid., 5.

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2 8 Ibid., 3–4. 29 Ibid., 22. 30 Jung-woo Lee and Alan Bairner, ‘ “The Difficult Dialogue: Communism, Nationalism and Political Propaganda in North Korean Sport’,” Journal of Sport and Social Issues 33, no. 4 (2009): 390–410. 31 For example: Brian Oliver, ‘ “North Korea Creates History with Weightlifting Success,’ ” The Guardian, November 15, 2014, 26; Smiriti Sinha, ‘ “North Korea Just Dominated the World Weightlifting Championship and No One Knows How,” Vice Sports, November 17, 2014, 28; Brian Oliver, ‘ “Weight Lifting Pries Open Doors to a Hermit Kingdom’,” New York Times, November 17, 2014, 28. 32 Eunah Hong, ‘ “Women’s Football in the Two Koreas: A Comparative Sociological Analysis’,” Journal of Sport and Social Issues 36, no. 2 (2012): 115–34. 33 Some observers speculated that they were volunteers who had been recruited in China; others suggested they were ethnic North Koreans living in Japan. One rumor claimed they were members of the DPRK’s armed forces, whose mission was to offer a colourful, noisy and fun-loving face of North Korean socialism. 34 John Duerden, ‘ “Jong Tae-se Is North Korea’s Answer to Wayne Rooney’,” Observer, May 30, 2010, 35. 35 Udo Merkel,‘ “Pyongyang Proudly Presents: Mass Displays and Displays of the Masses in North Korea’,” in Leisure Identities and Authenticity, ed. Louise Mansfield and Dikaia Chatziefstathiou (Eastbourne: Leisure Studies Association, 2010), 1–28. 36 Jane Portal, Art Under Control in North Korea (London: Reaktion Books, 2005), 135. 37 Udo Merkel, “ ‘The Grand Mass Gymnastics and Artistic Performance Arirang’ (2002–2012): North Korea’s Socialist-Realist Response to Global Sports Spectacles’,” in The New Geopolitics of Sport in East Asia, ed. William Kelly and Tony Mangan, Special Issue, The International Journal of the History of Sport 30, no. 11 (2013): 1247–59. 38 Nicola Smith and Julian Ryall, ‘ “Kim Jong-un to Re-launch Mass Games in Bid to Lure Tourism Dollars’,” Telegraph, March 19, 2018, 22. 39 Lee and Bairner, ‘ “The Difficult Dialogue’,” 394. 40 Udo Merkel, ‘ “Sport and Physical Culture in North Korea: Resisting, Recognizing and Relishing Globalization’,” in Glocalization of Sports in Asia, ed.Young-han Cho, Charles Leary, and Steve Jackson, Special Issue, Sociology of Sport Journal 29, no. 4 (2012): 506–25. 41 Cho, ‘ “North Korea’s ‘Grand Theatre’ for Survival’,” 606. 42 John Sugden, ‘ “Running Havana: Observations on the Political Economy of Sport Tourism in Cuba’,” Leisure Studies 26, no. 2 (2007): 248–49. 43 Guy Podoler, ‘ “Running in the Sun: The Pyongyang Marathon and Is Evolution into Sports Tourism Event’,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 33, no. 18 (2017): 2207–25. 44 See for example Eunah Hong, ‘ “Elite Sport and Nation-building in South Korea: South Korea as the Dark Horse in Global Elite Sport’,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 28, no. 7 (2011): 977–89. 45 Hyung-jong Won and Eunah Hong, ‘ “The Development of Sport Policy and Management in South Korea’,” International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 7, no. 1 (2015): 142. 46 Hong, ‘ “Elite Sport and Nation-building in South Korea’,” 982. 47 Hak-soon Yim, ‘ “Cultural Identity and Cultural Policy in South Korea’,” The International Journal of Cultural Policy 8, no. 1 (2002): 37–48. 48 Victor Cha, Beyond the Final Score: The Politics of Sport in Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009) 59. 49 Doosik Min and Yujeong Choi, ‘ “Sport Cooperation in Divided Korea: An Overstated Role of Sport Diplomacy in South Korea’,” Sport in Society 22, no. 8 (2018): 1383. 50 Cha, Beyond the Final Score, 59. 51 Ji-hyun Cho and Alan Bairner, ‘ “The Socio-Cultural Legacy of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games’,” Leisure Studies 31, no. 3 (2012): 285. 52 Penelope Vandenberghe, ‘ “PyeongChang 2018 and South Korea’s Strategic Use of Soft Power’,” in Korea’s Soft Power and Public Diplomacy, ed. Kadir Ayhan (Seoul: Hangang Network, 2017), 130. 53 Ibid.,‘’ 131. 54 Oliver Butler, ‘ “Getting the Games: Japan, Korea and the Co-hosted World Cup’,” in Japan, Korea and the 2002 World Cup, ed. John Horne and Wolfram Manzenreiter (London: Routledge, 2002), 43–55. 55 Yu-min Joo,Yooil Bae, and Eva Kassens-Noor, Mega-Events and Mega-Ambitions: South Korea’s Rise and the Strategic Use of the Big Four Events (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2016), 75. 56 Hyun-jung Lee and Cho Young-han, ‘ “Performing Nation-ness in South Korea During the 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup’,” Korea Journal 49, no. 3 (2009): 93–120. 224

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5 7 Joo, Bae, and Kassens-Noor, Mega-Events and Mega-Ambitions, 85. 58 Udo Merkel and Kim Misuk, ‘ “Third Time Lucky!? PyeongChang’s Bid to Host the 2018 Winter Olympics: Politics, Policy and Practice’,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 28, no. 16 (2011): 2365–83. 59 This symbol was first used at the 1991 World Table Tennis Championships in Japan, where athletes from the North and the South did not only march together but competed as one team. 60 Competing together as one team happened on two previous occasions: in 1991 athletes from the North and South participated as one team in the World Table Tennis Championships in Japan and eventually won the women’s team event, beating the invincible powerhouse of this sport, China. In the same year, a joint soccer team went to Portugal where they made a big impression by reaching the quarter-finals of the FIFA World Youth Championships after beating Argentina 1–0 in group qualification 61 Hong, ‘ “Elite Sport and Nation-building in South Korea’,” 985. 62 Wolfram Manzenreiter and John Horne, ‘ “Global Governance in World Sport and the 2002 World Cup Korea/Japan’,” in Japan, Korea and the 2002 World Cup, ed. John Horne and Wolfram Manzenreiter (London: Routledge, 2002), 1–26.

Bibliography Anholt, Simon. Competitive Identity: The New Brand Management for Nations, Cities and Regions. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Anholt, Simon. “Place Branding: Is It Marketing or Isn’t It?” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 4, no. 1 (2008): 1–6. Butler, Oliver. “Getting the Games: Japan, Korea and the Co-hosted World Cup.” In Japan, Korea and the 2002 World Cup, edited by John Horne and Wolfram Manzenreiter, 43–55. London: Routledge, 2002. Cha, Victor. Beyond the Final Score: The Politics of Sport in Asia. 59. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. Cho, E. J. R. “North Korea’s ‘Grand Theatre’ for Survival: Nation Branding or Nation Building?” Geopolitics 22, no. 3 (2017): 603, 606. Cho, Ji-hyun, and Alan Bairner. “The Socio-Cultural Legacy of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games.” Leisure Studies 31, no. 3 (2012): 285. Cumings, Bruce. Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2005 Cumings, Bruce. North Korea. New York: The New Press, 2004 Cumings, Bruce. North Korea: Another Country. New York and London: The New Press, 2004. Devismes, Louisa. “Regional Events and Festivals in Europe: Revitalizing Traditions and Modernizing Identities.” In Identity Discourses and Communities in International Events, Festivals and Events, edited by Udo Merkel, 33–52. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Eunah Hong. “Elite Sport and Nation-building in South Korea: South Korea as the Dark Horse in Global Elite Sport.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 28, no. 7 (2011): 977–89. Eunah Hong. “Women’s Football in the Two Koreas: A Comparative Sociological Analysis.” Journal of Sport and Social Issues 36, no. 2 (2012): 115–34. Fan, Ying. “Branding the Nation: Towards a Better Understanding.” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 6, no. 2 (2010): 98. Foley, Malcolm, David McGillivray, and Gayle McPherson. Event Policy: From Theory to Strategy. London: Routledge, 2012. Gold, John R., and Steven Ward, eds. Place Promotion: The Use of Publicity and Marketing to Sell Towns and Regions. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 1994. Grzelczyk,Virginie. “Hard, Soft, Smart? North Korea and Power: It’s All Relative.” Asian International Studies Review 18, no. 1 (2017): 137. Jones, Adam. “London 2012: Urban Imagery and City Branding.” In Identity Discourses and Communities in International Events, Festivals and Events, edited by Udo Merkel, 96–115. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Joo,Yu-min,Yooil Bae, and Eva Kassens-Noor. Mega-Events and Mega-Ambitions: South Korea’s Rise and the Strategic Use of the Big Four Events. Houndsmill: Palgrave, 2016, 75. 225

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Kim, Jong-il. On Popularizing Physical Training and Sport and Developing Sporting Skills Rapidly. Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1989. Lee, Hyun-jung, and Cho Young-han. “Performing Nation-Ness in South Korea During the 2002 KoreaJapan World Cup.” Korea Journal 49, no. 3 (2009): 93–120. Lee, Jung-woo, and Alan Bairner. “The Difficult Dialogue: Communism, Nationalism and Political Propaganda in North Korean Sport.” Journal of Sport and Social Issues 33, no. 4 (2009): 390–410. Manzenreiter, Wolfram, and John Horne. “Global Governance in World Sport and the 2002 World Cup Korea/Japan.” In Japan, Korea and the 2002 World Cup, edited by John Horne and Wolfram Manzenreiter. London: Routledge, 2002. Martin, Bradley K. Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2006. Merkel, Udo. “The Critical Social-Scientific Study of International Events: Power, Politics and Conflicts.” In Power, Politics and International Events: Socio-cultural Analyses of Festivals and Spectacles, edited by Udo Merkel, 3–30. London: Routledge, 2014. Merkel, Udo. “ ‘The Grand Mass Gymnastics and Artistic Performance Arirang’ (2002–2012): North Korea’s Socialist-Realist Response to Global Sports Spectacles.” In The New Geopolitics of Sport in East Asia, edited by William Kelly and Tony Mangan. Special Issue. The International Journal of the History of Sport 30, no. 11 (2013): 1247–59. Merkel, Udo. “Pyongyang Proudly Presents: Mass Displays and Displays of the Masses in North Korea.” In Leisure Identities and Authenticity, edited by Louise Mansfield and Dikaia Chatziefstathiou. Eastbourne: Leisure Studies Association, 2010, 1–28. Merkel, Udo. “Sport and Physical Culture in North Korea: Resisting, Recognizing and Relishing Globalization.” In Glocalization of Sports in Asia, edited by Young-han Cho, Charles Leary, and Steve Jackson. Special Issue. Sociology of Sport Journal 29, no. 4 (2012): 506–25. Merkel, Udo. “Sports Events as a Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Tool.” In Routledge Handbook of Sport and Politics, edited by John Kelly, Alan Bairner, and Lee Jong-woo, 28–38. London: Routledge, 2016. Merkel, Udo, and Kim Misuk. “Third Time Lucky!? PyeongChang’s Bid to Host the 2018 Winter Olympics: Politics, Policy and Practice.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 28, no. 16 (2011): 2365–83. Min, Doosik, and Yujeong Choi. “Sport Cooperation in Divided Korea: An Overstated Role of Sport Diplomacy in South Korea.” Sport in Society 22, no. 8 (2018): 1383. Myers, Brian Reynolds. The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves—And Why It Matters. Brooklyn, NY: Melville House Publishing, 2010. Nye, Joseph. Bound to Lead:The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books, 1990. Nye, Joseph. “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 97. Nye, Joseph. Soft Power:The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs, 2004. Podoler, Guy. “Running in the Sun: The Pyongyang Marathon and Is Evolution into Sports Tourism Event.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 33, no. 18 (2017): 2207–25. Polley, Martin. “The Diplomatic Background to the 1966 Football World Cup.” The Sports Historian 18, no. 2. (2009): 1–18. Portal, Jane. Art Under Control in North Korea. London: Reaktion Books, 2005, 135. Sugden, John. “Running Havana: Observations on the Political Economy of Sport Tourism in Cuba.” Leisure Studies 26, no. 2 (2007): 248–49. Vandenberghe, Penelope. “PyeongChang 2018 and South Korea’s Strategic Use of Soft Power.” In Korea’s Soft Power and Public Diplomacy, edited by Kadir Ayhan. Seoul: Hangang Network, 2017, 130. Volcic, Zala, and Mark Andrejevic. “Nation Branding in the Era of Commercial Nationalism.” International Journal of Communication 5 (2011): 598–618. Won, Hyung-jong, and Eunah Hong. “The Development of Sport Policy and Management in South Korea.” International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 7, no. 1 (2015): 142. Yim, Hak-soon. “Cultural Identity and Cultural Policy in South Korea.” The International Journal of Cultural Policy 8, no. 1 (2002): 37–48. 226

21 Sport diplomacy at the 2018 Winter Olympics in PyeongChang The relations between North and South Korea Jung Woo Lee

Introduction The 2018 Winter Olympics in PyeongChang was arguably one of the most politicised sport mega-events ever. After almost two years of escalating political tensions, North and South Korea finally displayed a wish to improve their thorny relations, and this sporting competition offered a negotiation table at which inter-Korean dialogue could take place. After a series of meetings, the two sides agreed to form a sporting union at the Winter Olympics to demonstrate, to a domestic and international audience, their desire to reunify the nation.1 As a consequence, the peace and unity of the two Koreas became a major theme of this winter sport festival.2 A number of academics have discussed the diplomatic implications of international sport,3 and the PyeongChang Winter Olympics presents a classic example of the intersection between world politics and a global sporting event. Hence, this chapter considers relations between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) in three different stages of the Winter Olympics: (1) the bid for the event; (2) the preparation for the Olympics; and (3) the Games themselves. Before undertaking this analysis, I review inter-Korean relations at the major sporting events that took place in the Korean peninsula before PyeongChang 2018, as this review offers a useful contextual background to this study.

Sport and Inter-Korean Relations It should be noted that Korea, both historically and culturally, is home to a single ethnic community but is ideologically divided into two states. While the two Koreas have persistently displayed their willingness to build a unified nation state since partition in 1948, they have also shown antipathy towards each other over the last seven decades due to ideological differences.4 The coexistence of the two sentiments has meant that inter-Korean relations are in a constant state of uncertainty. This volatility and instability are reflected in sport. 227

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The South Korean government has frequently utilised sport mega-events as foreign policy tools.5 Until the 1960s, South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world. However, the South Korean economy developed rapidly from the 1970s to the 1980s, and it subsequently emerged as one of the most advanced economies of the 1990s. During the course of this growth, the nation hosted two major sporting events: the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games. Staging these international competitions in Seoul had two major diplomatic consequences. First, South Korea wanted to raise its international image and reputation by hosting the two sporting occasions.6 Because these events received intense international media attention, the host could showcase its remarkable modernisation and industrialisation, namely, the Miracle on the Han River,7 to the world. Second, capitalist South Korea was able to build a diplomatic channel with communist countries through the Asiad and the Olympiad. It should be noted that many socialist states, including the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union, sent their delegations to Seoul, despite a hardening ideological conflict in the Korean peninsula. Their participation eventually led to the establishment of diplomatic and economic ties between the communist states and capitalist Korea.8 In fact, in the late 1980s the South Korean government implemented the ‘Northern Policy,’ the aim of which was to normalise political and economic relations with the Eastern Bloc countries. The two sporting events just mentioned encouraged this normalisation process.9 The opening of the diplomatic connection with China and the Soviet Union empowered the position of South Korea in Northeast Asian geopolitics. Given the zero-sum-game nature of the East Asian Cold War, this empowerment of the ROK significantly undermined the diplomatic leverage of the DPRK in the region. Understandably, communist Korea conspired against the international sporting occasions awarded to its southern sibling. First, the North Korean government filed a petition to the International Olympic Committee (IOC).10 In this anti-Seoul Olympic campaign, the North contended that the decision to give the rights to host the event to the South Korean capital should be reconsidered. They argued that the current political situation in the South was unstable due to the large-scale student protest against the then military regime in the country.11 Second, the North contended that if the Olympics were to be held in the Korean peninsula, then the two Koreas should co-host the event because a jointly hosted Olympics would promote peace in the region.12 The sport governing body and the South Korean government rejected these arguments. In the end, North Korea called for an Olympic boycott amongst its communist allies, but only Cuba stayed on the side of the DPRK. In the 2000s, the icy relations between the two Koreas began to thaw and a a period of exchanges and collaboration developed.13 Sport also mirrored this shifting political climate. The joint march of North and South Korea at the opening ceremony of the 2000 Sydney Olympics clearly demonstrated this mood. While the two Korean teams participated in the competition separately, they displayed a unified identity. They emphasised to the international community their desire to reunify the nation by walking into the stadium as one.14 This practice of the joint parade continued until the 2006 Torino Winter Olympics. In 2002, the Asian Games were held in the South Korean city of Busan. For the first time in its history, North Korea dispatched its large delegations, including athletes and cheerleaders, to this intra-continental competition.15 The appearance of the North Korean team at this event gave rise to the situation in which the North Korean flag and anthem were officially displayed on South Korean soil for the first time since the Korean War.16 The 2002 Busan Asiad was indeed the place for mutual recognition and reconciliation between the ROK and the DPRK. In 2002, the FIFA World Cup Finals were held in South Korea (co-hosted with Japan). The staging of this event was less about the host nation’s rivalry against its northern neighbour than about revamping its international image, especially after the East Asian financial crisis of the late 228

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1990s.17 Additionally, the outstanding performance of the South Korean squad, which advanced to the semi-finals at the championship, further helped the host nation’s global publicity.18 However, this event was not free from controversy. During the global football tournament, a North Korean navy vessel crossed the sea border and attacked a South Korean navy patrol boat. This naval confrontation killed 19 seamen and wounded 33 sailors. This was an unexpected military provocation given the amicable relations that the two Koreas had maintained in the early 2000s. It was largely considered an attempt by North Korea to sabotage South Korea’s endeavour to impress the world by hosting the premier football championship. In the same period, North Korea also staged a large-scale mass gymnastic performance, namely the Arirang festival, in the May Day Stadium in its capital, Pyongyang. Essentially, this was a cultural spectacle embellished with Korean communist political propaganda.19 However, it was also North Korea’s cultural relations programme at its best, which consisted of artistic, gymnastic and flip-card mosaic parades, and many foreign visitors, tourists, journalists and diplomats were invited to attend.20 When this show was first enacted in April 2002, North Korea actively promoted it via various diplomatic channels so as to attract more foreign tourists to Pyongyang.21 While it was part of a DPRK cultural diplomacy campaign, the Arirang performance in the North Korean capital coincided with the FIFA World Cup being held in the South Korean cities. By presenting this cultural spectacle, especially in the presence of international media, the North Korean regime was trying to divert global attention to the North while the football matches were ongoing in the South.22 In so doing, the communist regime strived to compete on equal terms with the South Korean government in the game of cultural diplomacy.

The 2018 Winter Olympics and the two Koreas The bid for the Olympics23 The diplomatic implications of the 2018 Winter Olympics cannot be evaluated properly without considering North and South Korean relations. PyeongChang is located a mere 50 miles away from North Korea. More importantly, the province of Gangwon, where the host town is located, is the only divided administrative region governed by the two Koreas in the peninsula. In effect, these geographical features symbolise the partition of the nation. Understandably, the South Korean campaign to host the sport mega-event highlighted that the Winter Olympics would promote peace in the region and would help build a bridge between North and South Korea.24 With reference to the notion of the Olympic Truce, the South Korean delegation presented the improvement of its relationship with the North as one of the major legacies of the Winter Olympic Games. In particular, a South Korean old lady whose son still lives in North Korea appeared in their promotional video. In this short film, the frail elderly woman made an emotional appeal to the IOC members to acknowledge the importance of reunifying divided families in the Korean peninsula, expressing her desperate desire to meet her son again before she dies.25 The South Korean representatives at the IOC session in Guatemala asserted that hosting the winter sport mega-event in Gangwon Province would be an ideal social environment for a family reunion. They further stressed how such a humanitarian effort closely relates to the fundamental principles of the Olympic Games.26 The then South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun also attended the IOC session. In an interview with an international journalist, he stated, If the Olympic Games is to be held in PyeongChang, North and South Korea can collaborate during the preparation stage. During this process, the two Koreas will be able to realise 229

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the Olympic principle concerning international cooperation and peace promotion. Such collaboration certainly promotes peace in the Korean peninsula.’27 Moreover, President Roh suggested the probable formation of a unified Korean team at the Winter Olympics and the delivery of a few Olympic events on the North Korean side of Gangwon Province. The Roh Moo-hyun administration maintained the momentum of reconciliation during the five years of its governance, and the president’s view of potential inter-Korean alliance at the Olympic Winter Games clearly mirrored the less hostile political climate surrounding the Korean peninsula.The fact that the North Korean member of the IOC, Mr Chang Ung, also supported the South Korean campaign further evidenced relatively amicable relations between the two Koreas at that time. Nevertheless, the IOC awarded the rights to host the 2014 Winter Olympics to the Russian city of Sochi. In 2009, the PyeongChang government again announced a candidacy as the 2018 Olympic host. By this time, however, inter-Korean relations had deteriorated because of a series of political incidents which took place in the late 2000s. First, unlike his predecessor, the newly elected South Korean president, Lee Myung-Bak, declared that he would adopt a tough approach to the communist government in the North. Second, North Korea resumed its nuclear programme and undertook a long-range missile test, which resulted in the escalation of military tensions in Northeast Asia.Third, a North Korean torpedo destroyed a South Korean navy ship, resulting in the deaths of 46 ROK sailors. Fourth, North Korea fired shells at the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong: the first military attack on South Korean territory since the Korean War. Not unrelated to these crises, the element of North and South Korean collaboration at the Olympics was less visible in PyeongChang’s new campaign. In fact, there was a concern that any type of alliance with North Korea would weaken PyeongChang’s effort, given that communist Korea’s nuclear programme posed a serious threat to the international community. Nonetheless, in his interview with international media at the IOC session in Durban, South Africa, the South Korean President Lee Myung-bak28 anticipated that hosting the Winter Olympics would ease the current tensions between the two sides and would facilitate peace promotion in the Korean peninsula. This implied that improving its relationships with the North was not completely excluded from South Korea’s Olympic diplomacy. In their third attempt, PyeongChang finally won the rights to stage the 2018 Winter Olympic Games in 2011.

The preparation for the Olympics In the year when PyeongChang was selected as a Winter Olympic host, yet another significant political change occurred in North Korea. Kim Jong-il, the Dear Leader of the secretive state, suddenly died in December 2011, and his son, Kim Jong-un, became supreme leader of the DPRK. As the new leader was only in his thirties and his character was largely unknown in the South, the establishment of the third communist regime in the North rendered relations between the two Koreas uncertain. That said, what seems apparent was that Kim Jung-un, as an avid sport enthusiast, was willing to use sport as propaganda and diplomatic tools.29 Not only did the supreme leader set sport development as one of the main policy objectives of his new regime, but he also invited foreign athletes and sport administrators to Pyongyang. For example, the communist regime was strategically fostering the women’s football team in order to win an international championship because such a triumph would boost the morale of the North Korean people.30 Additionally, former NBA star Dennis Rodman visited North Korea several times with his basketball team to participate in friendly matches with the communist side.31 In relation to the Winter Olympic Games awarded to PyeongChang, the most noticeable aspect of sport development in North Korea was arguably the construction of the Masikryong 230

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ski resort in 2013. Officially, the main rationale for building this winter sport resort was to increase the welfare of North Korean people and to attract foreign tourists to the country.32 In reality, it was unlikely that ordinary citizens of the communist state would use the ski facilities frequently due to the limited economic and social resources available to them.33 Also, while the DPRK government was keen to develop its tourism industry, the unpredictable political situation in the secretive state of North Korea, paired with an oppressive and aggressive regime, made it an unlikely destination for international tourists.34 A more realistic view is that the opening of the Masikryong ski resort was intended to place North Korea on an equal footing with South Korea, where the Winter Olympics was to be staged in 2018.35 Given that the ski slopes are located on the North Korean side of Gangwon Province, the communist state had planned to host a few Winter Olympic events jointly with its southern siblings when it first opened in 2013. However, the then conservative South Korean government ruled out this possibility in December 2014.36 In May 2017, a more reformative politician, Moon Jae-in, won the South Korean presidential election, and his administration resolved to improve relations with North Korea. At least in the South, the Winter Olympic Games re-emerged as a potential means to reopen a dialogue with the North.The South Korean government suggested that some ski events could be hosted in the North and that a unified Korean team could be formed for the Olympic women’s ice hockey event, expecting the collaboration at this winter sport mega-event would reconnect the broken ties between the two Koreas.37 The Organising Committee of the PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games also stated that if the North Korean regime decided to send its athletes to the competition, they would be allowed to cross the border through the demilitarised zone.38 The South Korean government presented this sporting exchange proposal in the hope that this would lead to the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue amid rapidly worsening tensions in the Korean peninsula. When a high-profile North Korean sport administrator, Mr Chang Ung, confirmed that he would travel to South Korea in June in order to attend an international taekwondo festival, PyeongChang perceived this as a positive signal from the North in response to the South Korean offer. Nevertheless, when he arrived in South Korea, Mr Chang Ung dismissed any possibility of a sporting exchange materialising before the commencement of the Winter Olympics without the resolution of the inter-Korean political stalemate.39 In November 2017, the UN General Assembly adopted the Olympic Truce for the upcoming Winter Olympic Games.40 This international resolution asked every member state to observe the principle of the Olympic Truce in order to foster a peaceful world through sport. It is questionable whether such an idealistic view of the the influence of the Olympic Games is achievable in a twenty-first century political setting. However, the current UN resolution relating to PyeongChang 2018 was a symbolically significant gesture, given that the host country was geopolitically located in the middle of heightened tensions and conflict. In relation to this, the Ministry of Unification in the South stated, ‘We hope that the North will decide to take part in the Winter Olympics as soon as possible so that the two Koreas can have frank discussions about ways to make the Games the Peace Olympics.’41 This statement implies that the South was willing to collaborate with the North at the Winter Olympics in spite of the political impasse. However, North Korea did not respond to a series of friendly signals from the South until the end of 2017.

The games: Pyeongchang 2018 On New Year’s Day 2018, less than two months before the start of the Winter Olympics, North Korea made a surprise declaration of its intention to participate in the Winter Olympics and its 231

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willingness to hold a dialogue with the South to discuss potential collaboration in PyeongChang. Both South Korea and the IOC welcomed this message, and this diplomatic gesture led to the re-establishment of the inter-Korean hotline.42 North and South Korea convened an initial meeting on 7 January 2018 in the border town of Panmunjom, and they issued a joint press release after the bilateral talks. Here, the two Koreas agreed in principle that both parties would work together on the successful delivery of the Winter Olympics. North Korea also confirmed that it would send their cultural ambassadors and cheerleaders along with their Olympic athletes. In return, South Korea assured the North Korean visitors’ safety and welfare. The DPRK and the ROC met again at the IOC headquarters in Lausanne on 20 January. Thomas Bach, the president of the IOC, chaired the meeting. In the three-party talks, representatives from the two Koreas and the IOC president jointly released the Olympic Korean Peninsula Declaration. The key terms of this consensus included: (1) IOC approval of the North and South Korean athletes’ joint march under the Korean Unification flag at the opening ceremony; and (2) permission to form a unified women’s ice hockey team.43 This declaration allowed 22 North Korean athletes to take part in the Winter Olympics. Given the hostile climate surrounding the Korean peninsula until December 2017, this rapid shift from animosity to amicability may reflect the volatile nature of inter-Korean relations. That said, the Olympic Games clearly worked as a catalyst for this political and diplomatic breakthrough. The day before the the event was due to start, high-level representatives from North Korean arrived in PyeongChang. The DPRK’s delegations included Kim Yo-jung, the younger sister of the North Korean leader Kim Jung-un. This visit made her the very first family member of Kim’s dynasty in the North to set foot on South Korean soil since partition.44 Dispatching such a high-profile political elite to the Olympics implied communist Korea’s willingness to improve its relationship with capitalist Korea. Kim Yo-jung met the South Korean president, Moon Jaein, at the opening ceremony, and the pair displayed friendly and welcoming gestures throughout the celebrational occasion.45 Additionally, Mr Moon invited Ms Kim to a luncheon at his presidential place, and Kim Yo-jung delivered a letter from her brother to Mr Moon at this special reception.This letter also included Chairman Kim’s invitation to President Moon to Pyongyang, the North Korean capital.46 This interaction between the DPRK’s representative and the ROK’s statesman exemplifies a scenario where a sport mega-event can facilitate diplomatic communications between nations. The Opening Ceremony of PyeongChang 2018 abounded with symbols signifying the unity of the two Koreas, the joint march being the most noticeable one of these. In fact, it was not the first time that Korean athletes had paraded as one at an Olympic ceremony. As mentioned earlier, this type of a sporting union had been made in several Olympics in the early 2000s,47 but the practice had ended when inter-Korean relations soured and subsequently froze. Therefore, the revival of the joint march after more than a decade of tensions signified a dramatic transition in the political climate of Northeast Asia. The final leg of the Olympic torch relay also displayed a unified Korean identity.48 When the Olympic torch arrived in the stadium, it was passed on to South Korean Park Jong-ah and North Korean Jong Su-hyon from the unified women’s ice hockey team. Holding the torch together, the pair then climbed up the steps leading to the Olympic cauldron.The two athletes handed the torch to 2010 Olympic gold-medallist for figure skating Yuna Kim, who finally lit the Olympic flame. Although the duo from the unified team did not actually light the flame of the competition, the moment they ran up to the cauldron together was a clear statement of the unity of North and South Korea.49 Indeed, in his opening address Thomas Bach declared, ‘In PyeongChang, the athletes from the ROK and the DPRK, by marching together, send a powerful message of peace to the world.’50 232

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The unified women’s ice hockey team of Korea also strongly represented unity and reconciliation at the sporting event. It should be noted that it was the first time in the history of the Olympics that the two sides successfully organised a joint team.51 North and South Korea had discussed the possibility of organising a unified Korean Olympic team several times previously, but it had never come to fruition. In PyeongChang, they finally agreed to field a unified team, albeit in the women’s ice hockey event only. While their sporting performance on the ice was not victorious, the first appearance of the unified team at the Olympics attracted huge media and public attention internationally.52 The fact that the South Korean president Moon Jae-in and the North Korean representative Kim Yo-jung watched one of the ice hockey matches sitting next to each other also demonstrated a symbolic union between the high-level representatives. This political shift from a sense of resentment to one of reconciliation between North and South Korea is, therefore, the most notable diplomatic implication of the 2018 Winter Olympic Games in PyeongChang.While it is unclear how long this tentative friendship of the two Koreas will last, it is certain that this winter sporting competition propelled the transformation of the political climate surrounding the Korean peninsula from hostility to amicability.

Final remark So far, I have looked at inter-Korean relations at three different phases of the PyeongChang Winter Olympics. Relations between the two Koreas were a major consideration from the time of the bid to the delivery of the event. The case of PyeongChang 2018 showcases the intersection between world politics and the Olympics.53 This winter sport festival created a diplomatic opportunity for the two Koreas to convene and discuss their future relationship in a less risky but highly visible setting. The Winter Olympics mediated the transition of inter-Korean relations from a mood of resentment to one of reconciliation. This political shift formed an environment in which the two sides held additional meetings and dialogues in the post-event period.54 Subsequently, the heads of the two Korean states have met twice in the border area of Panmunjom in April and May respectively. Moreover, the first US-DPRK summit took place in June. It is difficult to deny that improving relations between the two Koreas facilitated this historic encounter between US president Donald Trump and Kim Jung-un. It is usually a more global political circumstance that determines the nature of international sport.55 In PyeongChang, however, a sporting event managed to facilitate a political breakthrough. The diplomatic significance of the 2018 Olympic Winter Games lies in this distinctive character of politics in North and South Korea. The year of 2018 was arguably one of the most peaceful periods in the Korean peninsula since its division, and it was the Winter Olympics that brought this warm air to the region.

Notes 1 Jung Woo Lee, ‘ “A Tale of Two Summits: Why North Korea Is Finally Speaking to Its Enemies’,” New Statesman, March 12, 2018, www.newstatesman.com/world/asia/2018/03/tale-two-summitswhy-north-korea-finally-speaking-its-enemies. 2 David Rowe and Jung Woo Lee, ‘ “The Winter Olympics and the Two Koreas: How Sport Diplomacy Could Save the World’,” The Conversation, January 10, 2018, http://theconversation.com/ the-winter-olympics-and-the-two-koreas-how-sport-diplomacy-could-save-the-world-89769. 3 Stuart Murray, Sports Diplomacy: Origins, Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2018); Geoffrey A. Pigman, ‘ “International Sport and Diplomacy’’s Public Dimension: Governments, Sporting Federations and the Global Audience’,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 25, no. 1 (2014): 94–114; Simon J. Rofe, ‘ “Sport and Diplomacy: A Global Diplomacy Framework,”‘ Diplomacy & Statecraft 27, no. 2 (2016): 212–30. 4 Yangmo Ku, In yeop Lee, and Jongseok Woo, Politics in North and South Korea: Political Development, Economy, and Foreign Relations (London: Routledge, 2018). 233

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5 Jung Woo Lee, ‘ “The Politics of Sports Mega Events in South Korea: A Diachronic Approach’,” in Routledge Handbook of Sport and Politics, ed. Alan Bairner, John Kelly, and Jung Woo Lee (London: Routledge, 2017), 471–82; Udo Merkel, ‘ “The Politics of Sport Diplomacy and Reunification in Divided Korea: One Nation, Two Countries and Three Flags’,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 43, no. 3 (2008): 289–311. 6 Jung Woo Lee, ‘ “The Olympics in the Post-Soviet Era: The Case of the Two Koreas’,” in The Politics of the Olympics: A Survey, ed. Alan Bairner and Gyozo Molnar (London: Routledge, 2010), 117–28. 7 Brian Bridges, ‘ “The Seoul Olympics: Economic Miracle Meet the World’,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 25, no. 14 (2008): 1939–52. 8 Lee, ‘ “The Olympics in the Post-Soviet Era’,” 117–28. 9 Charles Armstrong, ‘ “South Korea’’s ‘Northern Policy’‘,” Pacific Review 3, no. 1 (1990): 35–45; Jung Woo Lee, ‘ “Do the Scale and Scope of the Event Matter? The Asian Games and the Relations Between North and South Korea’,” Sport in Society 20, no. 3 (2007): 369–83. 10 James F. Larson and Heung S. Park, Global Television and the Politics of the Seoul Olympic Games (Oxford: Westview Press, 1993). 11 Brian Bridges, The Two Koreas and the Politics of Global Sport (Boston: Global Oriental, 2012). 12 Richard W. Pound, Five Rings Over Korea:The Secret Negotiations Behind the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul (New York: Little, Brown & Company, 1994). 13 Ku, Lee and Woo, Politics in North and South Korea. 14 Bridges, The Two Koreas and the Politics of Global Sport. 15 Jung Woo Lee, ‘ “North and South Korean Relations and Sport: Displaying Unified Korean Nationalism at the 2002 Busan Asian Games’,” in Sport in Korea: History, Development and Management, ed. Dae Hee Kwak,Yong Jae Ko, Inkyu Kang, and Mark Rosentraub (London: Routledge, 2018), 105–18. 16 Lee, ‘ “Do the Scale and Scope of the Event Matter?’ ” 369–83. 17 Jung Woo Lee, ‘ “A Game for the Global North: The 2018 Winter Olympic Games in Pyeongchang and South Korean Cultural Politics’,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 33, no. 12 (2016): 1411–26. 18 Rachael Miyung Joo, Transnational Sport: Gender, Media, and Global Korea (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012). 19 Jung Woo Lee and Alan Bairner, ‘ “The Difficult Dialogue: Communism, Nationalism, and Political Propaganda in North Korean sport’,” Journal of Sport and Social Issues 33, no. 4 (2009): 390–410. 20 Udo Merkel, ‘ “The Grand Mass Gymnastics and Artistic Performance Arirang (2002–2012): North Korea’’s Socialist–Realist Response to Global Sports Spectacles’,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 30, no. 11 (2013): 1247–58. 21 Kim Soyoung, ‘ “Bukhan, 150yeo Dongpo Danche ae Arirang Chukjeon Chochungjang Balsong” [North Korea Sent an Invitation to the Arirang Festival to More than 150 Korean Diaspora Groups]’, LA Joongang, June 6, 2002, 27. 22 Youngsun Im, ‘ “2002 World Cup gwa Pyeongyang Arirang Chkjeon” [The 2002 World Cup and the Arirang Festival in Pyeongyang]’, Future Korea, July 9, 2002, www.futurekorea.co.kr/news/articleView. html?idxno=465. 23 PyeongChang was a candidate city for the 2010, 2014 and 2018 Winter Olympics. As the first two unsuccessful campaigns similarly highlighted the improvement of the relations between the two Koreas as a potential legacy of hosting the event, this chapter omits the case of PyeongChang’s 2010 candidacy in order to avoid repetition. 24 Udo Merkel and Misuk Kim, ‘ “Third Time Lucky!? PyeongChang’’s Bid to Host the 2018 Winter Olympics: Politics, Policy and Practice’,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 28, no. 16 (2011): 2365–83. 25 Byung H. Chun, ‘ “4 nyun-jeon Prague sim-gum ul-ryut-dun hal-mer-nee sae-sang ddeu-go-seo-do” [The Old Lady Who Emotionally Appealed in Prague Four Years Ago Has Passed Away]’, The Hankyoreh, July 5, 2007, www.hani.co.kr/arti/PRINT/220426.html. 26 Mansik Choi, ‘ “4 nyun-jeon choi-jong presentation u-tuk-kae e-roo-uh jut-na?” [How Did We Deliver the Final Presentation Four Years Ago]’, Chosun Ilbo, February 20, 2011, http://news.chosun. com/site/data/html_dir/2011/02/20/2011022000375.html. 27 KTV, ‘ “Nambuk Danil Team Chuljeon” [A North and South Korean Unified Olympic Team Would Take Part]’, KTV, July 2, 2007, www.ktv.go.kr/content/view?content_id=66025. 28 The Blue House, ‘ “Lee Daetongryung ‘Gongjung Pyoungga Hamyun PyeongChang ee Yoochihal Gut’ ” [President Lee, ‘PyeongChang Would Win the Olympic Rights If the Evaluation Is Done 234

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Objectively’]’, The Republic of Korea Policy Briefing, July 5, 2011, www.korea.kr/news/policyNewsView. do?newsId=148714650. 29 Jung Woo Lee and Alan Bairner, ‘ “Sport and Communism: The Examples of North Korea and Cuba’,” in Routledge Handbook of Sport and Politics, ed. Alan Bairner, John Kelly, and Jung Woo Lee (London: Routledge, 2017), 66–78. 30 Jung Woo Lee, ‘ “The Politics of Female Football in North Korea: Socialism, Nationalism, and Propaganda’,” in Women and Sport in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed. Gyozo Molnar,Yoko Kanemasy, and Sara Amin (London: Routledge, 2019), 37–48. 31 Hunter Felt, ‘  “How NBA Star Dennis Rodman Came to Stand Between the World and Nuclear War,” The Guardian, September 14, 2017, www.theguardian.com/sport/2017/sep/14/ dennis-rodman-north-korea-kim-jong-un-basketball. 32 DPRK Ministry of Sport, Masik-ryong Ski Resort (Pyongyang: DPRK Ministry of Sport, 2013). 33 Chris Summers, ‘ “Snow Business: Kim Jong-un’’s Ski Resort Is Empty Because Impoverished Nation Can’’t Afford Food, Never Mind a Night in a Chalet’,” The Daily Mail, April 25, 2017, www.dailymail. co.uk/news/article-4442334/Snow-business-slopes-N-Koreas-ski-resort.html. 34 Dean J. Ouellette, ‘ “The Tourism of North Korea in the Kim Jong-un Era: Propaganda, Profitmaking, and Possibilities for Engagement’,” Pacific Focus 31, no. 3 (2017): 421–51. 35 Lucy Aspden, ‘ “North Korea ‘‘Using Child Labour’’ to Keep Luxury Ski Resort Open for Country’’s Elite’,” The Daily Telegraph, January 30, 2017, www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/ski/news/north-koreaski-resort-kept-open-by-child-labour/. 36 Ki-hyun Park, ‘ “Park Geun-hye daetongryung ‘PyeongChang donggye Olympic boonsan gaechoi umi upseo’ ” [The President Park Geun-hye Said ‘It Is Meaningless to Host the PyeongChang Winter Olympics Jointly’]‘, YTN, December 15, 2014, http://ytn.co.kr/_ln/0101_201412151502381305. 37 Justin McCurry, ‘ “North Korea Could Co-Host 2018 Winter Olympics, Seoul Suggests’,” The Guardian, June 21, 2017, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/21/seoul-proposes-north-korea-hostsome-winter-olympics-skiing-events. 38 Reuters, ‘ “Pyeongchang 2018: North Korean Athletes to Travel Through Demilitarised Zone,” The Daily Telegraph, May 18, 2017, www.telegraph.co.uk/olympics/2017/05/18/pyeongchang-2018north-korean-athletes-travel-demilitarised/. 39 Byung S. Jung, ‘ “Chang Ung, sport ae jung-chi yeon-gyul-si-ki-myun gon-ran” [Chang Ung Said Sport and Politics Should Not Be Mixed]’, Chosun Ilbo, June 26, 2017, http://news.chosun.com/site/ data/html_dir/2017/06/26/2017062600151.html. 40 Yonhap,‘ “UN Adopts Olympic Truce for PyeongChang Winter Olympics,” The Korean Herald, November 14, 2017, www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20171114000199. 41 Ibid. 42 Rowe and Lee, “ ‘The Winter Olympics and the Two Koreas.’ ” 43 IOC, ‘ “Olympic Korean Peninsula Declaration’,” International Olympic Committee, January 20, 2018, https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/News/2018/201801-20-Declaration.pdf. 44 Jung Woo Lee, ‘ “North Korea Got What It Wanted from the Winter Olympics’,” BBC, February 9, 2018, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-42983425. 45 Nicola Smith, ‘ “Koreas Unite . . . as Pence Carefully Keeps His Distance’,” The Daily Telegraph, February 10, 2018, 15. 46 Benjamin Hass, ‘ “Kim Jong-un’’s Sister Invites South Korean President to Pyongyang’,” The Guardian, February 10, 2018, www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/10/kim-yo-jong-meets-south-koreanpresident-in-seoul-as-thaw-continues. 47 Lee, ‘ “The Politics of Sports Mega Events in South Korea’,” 471–82. 48 Oliver Brown,“Nakedly Brazen Show Gets Message Across in Blitz of Symbolism’,” The Daily Telegraph, February 10, 2018, 10–12. 49 Ibid. 50 Sean Ingle,‘ “Winter Olympics Begin with Powerful Message of Peace’,” The Guardian, February 9, 2018, www.theguardian.com/sport/2018/feb/09/winter-olympics-begin-with-powerful-message-of-peace. 51 Ivan Watson, Stella Ko, and Sheena McKenzie, ‘ “Joint Korean Ice Hockey Team Plays for First Time Ahead of Olympics,” CNN, February 5, 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2018/02/04/sport/northsouth-korea-ice-hockey-intl/index.html. 52 David Rowe, “The Worlds That Are Watching: Media, Politics, Diplomacy, and the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics,” Communication & Sport 7, no. 1 (2019): 3–22. 235

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5 3 Rowe and Lee, ‘ “The Winter Olympics and the Two Koreas.’ ” 54 Lee, ‘ “A Tale of Two Summits.’ ” 55 Jonathan Grix, Sport Politics: An Introduction (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

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22 Commercialisation of sport in China Ma Yang and Zheng Jinming

Introduction Propelled by rapid economic development, sport in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) experienced a notable shift in the 2010s as a reaction against sluggish growth in both business and sport.1 As Ma and Kurscheidt argued in this context, two observations mentioned here are worth noting: a socio-economic approach that should be adopted for a richer understanding of underlying processes; and an adequate evaluation of the outcomes of sport businesses. First, negatively influenced by rising wages and exchange rates, China was plagued by great economic uncertainty,2 which was mainly reflected in the slowdown of economic growth. More importantly, this slowdown was accurately diagnosed by the central government as structural in nature, and an agenda to reconstruct the Chinese economic landscape was demanded.3 Over the past three decades, drawing upon the competitive advantages of the manufacturing industry and massive exports, the Chinese Communist Party legitimised its continuation in economic terms and thereby strengthened its political capacity.4 The old economic policy, featuring the manufacturing industry and massive exports, seemed to be on the brink of exhaustion, so there was a shift in policy towards investment in technology and innovation. Support for national service industries, previously identified as nonproductive capitalist sectors, also became a central focus.5 Second, this service-oriented growth policy exerts a twofold impact on sport policy in Mainland China. On one hand, mass sport participation could be classified as one of the successful areas of the service-oriented policy for nurturing private health-club businesses. On the other hand, it is perhaps hardly surprising that professional sport, with its large market potential, is perceived as indispensable.6 In October 2014, targeting sport participation and professional team sport, the ‘Guidelines on the Promotion of the Sport Industry and Sport Consumption by State Council’ was issued.7 It is noteworthy that, for the Olympic elite sport, the service-oriented growth policy did not denounce the long-standing goal of ‘winning glory for the nation’: to achieve Olympic (gold) medal success is a consistent objective. The number of Chinese football fans is equivalent to the entire population of the United States.8 To date, professional football has been at the forefront of the new Chinese sport policy, which is manifested by The Overall Plan for Chinese Football Reform and Development, enacted by the central government in March 2015.9 Previously, football had been excluded from high-level policy. In stark contrast 238

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to this,10 according to Peng et al.,11 ‘For the first time in Chinese history, football development is prioritized as part of national strategy.’ Football is even deemed the front runner in Chinese sport industry.12 Private actors started to embrace this new sport policy, as shown by their eagerness to invest in Chinese professional football.The considerable penetration of commercialisation is substantiated by the following observations. The Chinese Football Association Super League (CSL), the top-tier professional football division in China, sold its 2016–2020 TV broadcasting rights for a record RMB 8 bn (more than US$ 1 bn), 26 times higher than the previous amount paid.13 In the winter transfer window of 2016, CSL clubs combined spent almost 334 million euro signing high-profile players from Europe and South America.14 The purchase of internationally high-ranking footballers for extremely large sums attracted considerable worldwide interest.The CSL has entered an era of lavish spending in the sport labour market, and financial support from parent corporations has risen aggressively, accelerating an irreversible trend in the commercialisation of Chinese professional football. Hence, the primary focus of this chapter is the commercialisation of professional football in Mainland China. In line with the name of this part of the Routledge Handbook of Sport in Asia, ‘Part III: Sport Policy and Practice: Public and Private Provision,’ this chapter is structured in the following four sections. Two high-level sport policies orchestrated by the central government are outlined in the first section of this chapter; in particular, the underlying characteristics of the sport policy are identified, paving the way for the in-depth analysis that follows. In the second section of the chapter, attention is directed to sport practice. The corresponding reasoning starts from the argument that the aforementioned policy mix of economic and sport policy follows the trend and model of the Western approach to sport governance.15 However, this model revolves around the intensified marketisation of football, which requires greater autonomy for football organisations and less government control or intervention, permitting the market to play the predominant role in determining resource allocation. Hence, the governance structure of the CSL will be subject to careful scrutiny in the third section in an attempt to determine the structural barriers that lie ahead in the commercialisation process. It centres on what Chinese scholars have named the ‘Evergrande phenomenon.’ This involves an analysis of the unique ‘friendly relationship’ between the Evergrande Club and the Chinese football authorities. The fourth section discusses the controversial topic of overcommercialisation. Although Chinese sport commercialisation development is still relatively nascent, several indicators of overcommercialisation have already surfaced that deserve greater academic attention.

Two high-level sport policies orchestrated by the central government Guidelines on the promotion of sport industry and sport consumption In October 2014, the State Council issued the ‘Guidelines on Promotion of Sport Industry and Sport Consumption’ (hereafter called the ‘Guidelines’). This high-level sport policy is widely considered a general blueprint for the development of the Chinese sporting goods manufacturing and sport service sector.16 Notably, one of the development objectives of the ‘Guidelines’ is to generate an overall sport industry output exceeding RMB 5,000 bn by 2025,17 which indicates that sport has evolved into an economic development generator. Additionally, one of the development objectives highlights the necessity of addressing the problem of uneven 239

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development between sporting goods manufacturing and sport service. The ‘Guidelines’ also specify, but are not limited to, the following aims: (a) to advance the reform of professional sport; (b) to elevate the percentage of sport service in the total sport economy; (c) to promote team sport that possess substantial public popularity, taking football, basketball and volleyball as a point of departure; and (d) to develop medium- and long-term plans for the relatively underdeveloped football sector.18 Overall, two notable implications are derived from the ‘Guidelines.’ First, to date, the Chinese sport economy is dominated by sporting goods manufacturing, with sport service constituting only approximately 23 percent of this economic sector.19 The ‘Guidelines’ reveal that this asymmetric development has drawn great attention from policy-makers. Defined as a successful area of sport service policy, Chinese professional football will undoubtedly benefit from the ‘Guidelines.’ Second, the ‘Guidelines’ emphasise the importance of medium- and long-term plans for football development. It could be argued that the policy regarding sport system reform is similar to that of economic system reform. In contrast to other, highly ambitious short-term planning goals, reform policies for the Chinese economic and sport systems embrace medium- and long-term visions. Indeed, Chinese economic reform is a gradual progress with a relatively high degree of tolerance of trial and error.

The overall plan for Chinese football reform and development In March 2015, the ‘Guidelines’ were supplemented by another fundamental sport policy that specifically targeted the development of Chinese football: ‘The Overall Plan for Chinese Football Reform and Development’20 (hereafter the Plan). It would be beyond the scope of this chapter to analyse this plan in full. However, several highlights of the Plan are presented here: (a) to detach the Chinese Football Association (CFA) from the General Administration of Sport of China (GAS); (b) to change the role of the CFA towards the professional football leagues from micro(management) to macro(management); (c) to create national football teams that could shoulder the responsibility of ‘winning glory for the nation’; (d) to prioritise the promotion of the national team, in particular over the promotion of league clubs; and (e) to bid for the FIFA World Cup.21 In summary, it is clear that, to a great extent, the intent of the Plan is to resolve the following two fundamental problems that underlie Chinese football development: (a) the struggle between governmental control and market orientation in term of governance structure; and (b) the mismatch between football underperformance and economic superpower. Regarding the latter, Manzenreiter and Horne22 characterised the development of Chinese football as the ‘footballization of China,’ indicating that modern China is attempting to employ football as a vehicle to achieve international respect and affirmation as a world powerhouse. Similarly, Leite Junior and Rodrigues23 pointed out that China is endeavoring to challenge Eurocentrism in the world of football by aiming to exploit the enormous potential of football as a soft power source. Returning to the analysis of the Plan, although it is an ideologically correct sport policy, whether the policy is technically feasible remains to be seen. Specifically, there is a question mark over whether the two aforementioned requirements will contradict each other in the Chinese context. Political economy theory assumes that administrations are incentivised by individual selfinterest rather than social welfare.24 In specific terms, self-interest includes pay, power and prestige. In the Chinese context, the football officials of the CFA are responsible for the political tasks pertaining to the promotion of national football teams. In pursuit of pay, power and prestige, they are often motivated to complete the political tasks by any means. However, currently, 240

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the CSL is the highest-level source for providing and selecting football talent. It is impossible for the football officials, who are pressured by the heavy political tasks, to loosen their grip on the CSL; on the contrary, they possess much stronger personal incentives to keep the governance structure as it is or even to tighten their control over the CSL. Hence, it is safe to argue that in the Chinese context, the Plan proposes two apparently contradictory requirements. It is an ideologically correct policy that lacks technical feasibility.

The governance structure of the CSL Contrasting with sport governance in the Western world, Chinese sport governance has opted to follow a top-down rather than bottom-up logic, with power flowing downward from the top.25 The GAS is positioned at the top of the vertical agency chain, administratively parallel to ministries such as the Ministry of Education. Sport management centres affiliated with the GAS are in charge of specific Olympic and non-Olympic sport in China. It is noteworthy that football is the only exception,26 because the football management centre was abolished by the GAS in 2015. However, this drastic reform is synonymous with the total immunity of Chinese professional football from government control or influence. Currently, the CSL is governed by the CFA and run by the CSL Company.27 Although modelled on the system of Western countries, the CFA is in nature a ‘quasi-association’ affiliated with the GAS.28 All CFA presidents are appointed directly by the GAS, as are the CEOs of the CSL Company.29 Furthermore, it is worth noting that the current governance structure of the CSL is consistent with that of the Jia-A League, the predecessor of the CSL. Amara et al.30 proposed the term ‘restricted capitalism’ to capture the dominant characteristics of the governance structure of substantial power and authority residing centrally in the CFA. However, it could be argued that only at the clubs’ governance level has the ‘capitalism’ element been reinforced by the engagement and expansion of private actors such as the Evergrande Real Estate Group (EREG).31 This insight is elaborated in the next section of this chapter. Unsurprisingly, the CSL found itself confronted with diverse governance challenges, for instance, divergent goals and problems of compliance.32 More specifically, as a government agency, the CFA was under great pressure to promote the underperforming Chinese national team.Thus, at the end of each financial year, the majority of the funds sourced from the CSL, for instance, from the sales of sponsorship, broadcasting, advertising and jersey rights, were reallocated for the objective of national football team development. The default strategy for promoting the performance of the nation football team is to strengthen the ‘inviting in’ and ‘sending out’ policies (i.e. inviting internationally renowned coaches and sending promising players or the entire team to take part in lower-tier Western football leagues). As a result, only partial revenues are allocated to the sustainable development of the CSL. Regarding the compliance issue, there is substantial evidence that the Jia-A League was puzzled by an outbreak of corruption and match-fixing,33 for which more than 100 people were arrested.34

The advent of the ‘Evergrande phenomenon’ In March 2010, EREG took over the Guangzhou Football Club from the Guangzhou Municipal Football Association for a fee of RMB 100 million, changing the club’s name to Guangzhou Evergrande Football Club (GEFC).35 Backed by soft loans of EREG, the GEFC spent an additional RMB 170 million for high-profile talent imports domestically and abroad, including national team players Gao Lin and Sun Xiang, national team captain Zheng Zhi, and Luiz Muriqui from Brazil. It has been recorded that the GEFC was promoted to the CSL in only 241

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243 days.36 In the following seasons, the GEFC further strengthened its squad with players and coaches of great reputation. The club went on to win the top-tier league title each year from 2011 to 2017. Notably, at the higher level, the GEFC is the only Chinese professional football club that has ever won the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) Champions League (twice, in 2013 and 2015, respectively). Moreover, in 2014, China’s largest e-commerce firm, Alibaba, bought a 50 percent stake in the GEFC, leading to the change of the club name to Guangzhou Evergrande Taobao FC.37 Before 2009, EREG, the main investor, had been located in only 25 cities in Mainland China. By 2013, this number had risen to more than 140 cities, achieving a transformation from a local brand to a national brand and rendering EREG the leading corporation in the nation in terms of presence in most cities.38 In addition, the brand value of EREG increased from RMB 8.16bn at the time that EREG took control of the club, to RMB 21.18bn in 2011, representing a staggering increase within just two years. In 2013, EREG ranked first among all domestic real estate corporations, with a value of RMB 26.78bn.39 It is no exaggeration that Mainland Chinese football scholars have labelled the success of EREG the ‘Evergrande phenomenon.’ However, despite this remarkable success, the ‘friendly relationship’ between the GEFC and CFA has prompted considerable debate over the issue of conflict of interest, partially evidenced in the simple observation that Marcello Lippi, the coach of the Chinese men’s national team, earns three-quarters of his salary from the GEFC rather than the CFA.40 More importantly, as Delgado and Villar41 noted, three fundamental motifs have reinforced the promotion of Chinese football: reputation, pride and image. In this regard, the authorities seek to elevate reputation by employing the CSL as a mirror of the promised society; they seek to enhance national pride and to present a positive and respected image of the national football team. In practice, first, the spectacular prosperity of the Evergrande phenomenon is closely connected to the reputation; second, given the preeminence of the AFC Champions League, the GEFC has achieved remarkable success in competition against other Asian professional football clubs, particularly their Japanese and Korean counterparts. Victory has inspired intense nationalism among the Chinese people, to a great extent compensating for the consistent underperformance of the men’s national team. Finally, and most importantly, there is a clear trend that the GEFC is evolving into the ‘national team plus three foreign players’42 since talent from the GEFC is increasingly selected by the national team. Therefore, the ‘friendly relationship’ between the GEFC and the CFA can be confirmed. To put it more clearly, the ‘friendly relationship’ has huge potential to evolve into ‘suspicious dependency,’ which will always be deemed a compliance problem against the Western background. At least one serious consequence is reflected in the conflict between two leading Guangzhou-based businesses (i.e., Dongfeng Nissan Passenger Vehicle Company and EREG). Dongfeng concluded a jersey sponsorship deal with the GEFC, and the agreement was worth RMB110 million. However, in the final match of the 2015 AFC Champions League, the GEFC players appeared in jerseys with the logo of Evergrande Life, an insurance company affiliated with EREG. Dongfeng said it was ‘shocked by the club’s unilateral decision to cancel its rights as a sponsor for the team.’43 The recklessness of the GEFC could be interpreted as the direct consequence of the aforementioned ‘friendly relationship’ or even ‘suspicious dependency.’

The issue of overcommercialisation It must be admitted that ‘overcommercialisation’ is more frequently discussed within Western discourse. Given increasing commercial penetration into the football industry and ever-rising ticket prices, many supporters have stopped attending matches or purchasing football-related products. Martin44 noted that the commercialisation of football has driven it to sell its historic 242

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soul as the ‘people’s game.’ Commercialisation is diminishing supporters’ love for football, and their passion is fading.45 In the discourse of Germany, the German Bundesliga is famed for a relatively better-regulated league than others across Europe. However, this league is currently also threatened by increasing ticket prices. The traditional working-class loyal supporters will be unable to attend matches because of the ‘gentrification’ of German football.46 Zhang et al.47 empirically confirmed that negative attitudes towards commercialisation led to less purchasing intention in the American intercollegiate athletics context. Returning to the Chinese context, scholars tend to give primacy to the negative influence of commercialisation on Chinese elite sport development. For instance, as Tan and Houlihan48 pointed out, countermeasures were implemented to prevent the negative influence of commercialisation on the Chinese elite system, such as controlling the access of athletes to commercial activities and preventing athletes from indulging in the pursuit of wealth. However, in terms of current Chinese professional football development, academics should take note of a peaceful protest by fans that occurred on 8 June 2014, when more than 1,000 loyal fans from six official fan clubs of the GEFC published an open letter online. The letter targeted EREG and the Alibaba Group and asked them to change the club name either to Guangzhou FC or Guangzhou SC Tigers to show respect to the tradition.49 Although the commercialisation of Chinese professional football is still in its infancy, there is evidence of overcommercialisation that should not be neglected by scholars.

Conclusion In the Chinese context, the latest policy mix of economic and sport policy mimics the trend and model of the Western approach to sport governance.50 However, this model revolves around an intensified marketisation of football and requires greater autonomy for sport organisations and less governmental control, permitting the market to play the predominant role in determining resource allocation. Labelled the barometer of the Chinese sport industry, professional football, which is personally advocated by the most powerful individual, Xi Jin-Ping, is at the forefront of the new Chinese sport policy. However, in league-level governance, there is substantial evidence that the long-standing governance structure featuring governmental control continues to act as an impediment to the commercialisation of Chinese professional football. Notably, the ideologically correct Plan proposes two apparently contradictory requirements, demonstrating the absence of technical feasibility. In club-level governance, on one hand, the ‘capitalism’ elements have been reinforced, compared with the Jia-A League, with the advent of the ‘Evergrande phenomenon.’ On the other hand, propelled by the three motifs (reputation, pride and image), a ‘friendly relationship’ between the football authorities and the GEFC has emerged, with the potential of evolving into a ‘suspicious dependency.’ Imitating the relatively successful Chinese economic system reform, the short-term ambitious plan of Chinese football reform has been abandoned, replaced by the medium- and longterm plan for a gradual reform process. However, decision-makers should bear in mind the unique economic aspects of sport. For instance, it is essential for the professional football clubs to establish a league for jointly producing related services. With regard to the economic system, this kind of league should not possess the same level of importance as professional football in China. Hence, it is impossible for decision-makers to learn from the economic reform in terms of sustainable league-level governance. Most importantly, more autonomy for football organisations and less governmental control will result in layoffs among the football authorities and will break the rice bowls of powerful stakeholders who possess extraordinary motivation to retain the system just as it is. 243

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Overall, there is still a long way to go towards the greater commercialisation of Chinese professional football.To date, the relevant stakeholders of great salience are still locked in the pursuit of the promotion of the national football team rather than the reform of professional football per se. Another barrier is overcommercialisation, which has emerged within the Chinese professional football landscape and deserves further academic attention.

Notes 1 Dongfeng Liu, James J. Zhang, and Michel Desbordes, ‘ “Sport Business in China: Current State and Prospect’,” International Journal of Sports Marketing and Sponsorship 18, no. 1 (2017): 2–10; Yang Ma and Markus Kurscheidt, ‘ “Governance of the Chinese Super League: A Struggle Between Governmental Control and Market Orientation’,” in Football and Its Shifting Global Powerbase, ed. Paul Widdop, Simon Chadwick, and Dan Parnell, Special Issue, Sport, Business and Management: An International Journal 9, no. 1 (2019): 4–25. 2 Bates Gill, ‘ “China’s Future Under Xi Jinping: Challenges Ahead’,” Political Science 69, no. 1 (2017): 1–15. 3 Ma and Kurscheidt, ‘ “Governance of the Chinese Super League’,” 5. 4 Fulong Wu, ‘ “China’s Great Transformation: Neoliberalization as Establishing a Market Society’,” Geoforum 39, no. 3 (2008): 1093–96. 5 Ma and Kurscheidt, ‘ “Governance of the Chinese Super League’,” 5; Emanuel Leite, Jr. and Carlos Rodrigues, ‘ “The Chinese Plan for Football Development: A Perspective from Innovation Theory’,” in Football and Its Shifting Global Powerbase, ed. Paul Widdop, Simon Chadwick, and Dan Parnell, Special Issue, Sport, Business and Management: An International Journal 9, no. 1 (2019): 63–77. 6 Ma and Kurscheidt, ‘ “Governance of the Chinese Super League’,” 5. 7 Liu, Zhang, and Desbordes, ‘ “Sport Business in China’,” 6. 8 Lin Yu et al., ‘ “The Transition Game: Toward a Cultural Economy of Football in Post-Socialist China’,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 54, no. 6 (2019): 711–37. 9 Qi Peng, James Skinner, and Barrie Houlihan, ‘ “An Analysis of the Chinese Football Reform of 2015: Why then and Not Earlier?’ ” International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 11, no. 1 (2019): 1–18. 10 Hong Fan and Zhouxiang Lu, ‘ “The Professionalisation and Commercialisation of Football in China (1993–2013)’,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 30, no. 14 (2013): 1637–54. 11 Qi, Skinner, and Houlihan, ‘ “An Analysis of the Chinese Football Reform of 2015’,” 2. 12 Tien-Chin Tan et al., ‘ “Xi Jin-Ping’s World Cup Dreams: From a Major Sports Country to a World Sports Power’,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 33, no. 12 (2016): 1449–65. 13 Ma and Kurscheidt, ‘ “Governance of the Chinese Super League’,” 16. 14 Liu, Zhang, and Desbordes, ‘ “Sport Business in China’,” 8. 15 Markus Kurscheidt and Angela Deitersen-Wieber, ‘ “Sport Governance in Germany’,” in Sports Governance in the World: A Socio-Historic Approach, ed. Claude Sobry (Paris: Editions Le Manuscrit, 2011), 259–306. 16 Leite and Rodrigues, ‘ “The Chinese Plan for Football Development’,” 67. 17 Jinming Zheng et al., Sport Policy in China (London: Routledge, 2019). 18 State Council, ‘ “Guidelines on Promotion of Sport Industry and Sport Consumption’,” State Council, accessed August 13, 2019, www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-10/20/content_9152.htm. 19 Liu, Zhang, and Desbordes, ‘ “Sport Business in China’,” 6. 20 Qi, Skinner, and Houlihan, ‘ “An Analysis of the Chinese Football Reform of 2015’,” 2. 21 State Council, ‘ “The Overall Plan for Chinese Football Reform and Development’,” State Council, accessed August 13, 2019, www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-03/16/content_9537.htm. 22 Wolfram Manzenreiter and John Horne, ‘ “Playing the Post-Fordist Game in/to the Far East:The Footballisation of China, Japan and South Korea’,” Soccer & Society 8, no. 4 (2007): 561–77. 23 Leite and Rodrigues, ‘ “The Chinese Plan for Football Development’,” 63. 24 Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 25 Yang Ma and Markus Kurscheidt, ‘ “The National Games of China as a Governance Instrument in Chinese Elite Sport: An Institutional and Agency Analysis’,” International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics (2019): 1–21, doi:10.1080/19406940.2019.1633383. 26 Zheng et al., Sport Policy in China, 48.

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2 7 Ibid., 102. 28 Fan and Lu, ‘ “The Professionalisation and Commercialisation of Football in China (1993–2013)’,” 1642. 29 Ma and Kurscheidt, ‘ “Governance of the Chinese Super League’,” 30. 30 Mahfoud Amara et al., ‘ “The Governance of Professional Soccer: Five Case Studies–Algeria, China, England, France and Japan’,” European Journal of Sport Science 5, no. 4 (2005): 189–206. 31 Ma and Kurscheidt, ‘ “Governance of the Chinese Super League’,” 14. 32 Ibid. 33 Benjamin Ostrov, ‘ “Corruption in Chinese Sport Culture’,” in Corruption in International Business: The Challenge of Cultural and Legal Diversity, ed. Sharon Eicher (New York: Routledge, 2009), 91–98. 34 Fan and Lu, ‘ “The Professionalisation and Commercialisation of Football in China (1993–2013)’.” 35 iFeng, ‘ “The Dynamics of Value Change of Guangzhou Evergrande FC: Spent RMB 1bn on Purchasing Guangyao and Increased 23 Times in 4 Years’,” iFeng Sport, June 5, 2014, accessed August 16, 2019, http://sports.ifeng.com/gnzq/special/maxu/content-3/detail_2014_06/05/36671926_0.shtml. 36 Sohu,‘ “Guangzhou Evergrande FC Get Promoted to the Top-Tiered League as a Champion of LowerTiered League: Spent RMB 1.7bn One Season’,” Sohu Sport, November 3, 2010, accessed August 16, 2019, http://sports.sohu.com/20101103/n277088213.shtml. 37 Ma and Kurscheidt, ‘ “Governance of the Chinese Super League’,” 16. 38 Ibid., 17. 39 Jianxin Li and Hansheng Liu, ‘ “An Interpretation and Reflection on the Characteristics of Chinese Professional Football-Based on the Case Study of Chinese Soccer Super League’,” Journal of Sports and Science 37, no. 2 (2016): 30–36. 40 Xinhuanet, ‘ “10m Euro! Splendid Salary of Marcello Lippi, Partly Paid by Guangzhou Evergrande’,” Xinhuanet Sport, October 21, 2016, accessed July 27, 2018, www.xinhuanet.com/sports/201610/21/c_1119759463.htm. 41 Daniel Lemus Delgado and Francisco Javier Valderrey Villar, ‘ “It Is Not a Game: Soccer and China’s Search for World Hegemony’,” Soccer & Society (2018): 1–14, doi:10.1080/14660970.2018.1561441. 42 Sohu, ‘ “Schmidt: National Team Plus Three Foreign Players Equals Evergrande’,” Sohu Sport, July 7, 2017, accessed August 19, 2019, http://sports.sohu.com/20170707/n500324901.shtml. 43 Ecns, ‘ “Dongfeng Nissan Disappointed by Evergrande Move’,” Ecns Business, November 23, 2015, accessed August 16, 2019, www.ecns.cn/business/2015/11-23/189686.shtml. 44 Paul Martin, ‘ “Football, Community and Cooperation: A Critical Analysis of Supporter Trusts in England’,” Soccer & Society 8, no. 4 (2007): 636–53. 45 Jinming Zheng and Borja García, ‘ “Conclusions: The Rising Importance of Supporter Activism in European Football’,” in Football and Supporter Activism in Europe:Whose Game Is It? ed. Borja García and Jinming Zheng (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 277–85. 46 Udo Merkel, ‘ “Milestones in the Development of Football Fandom in Germany: Global Impacts on Local Contests’,” Soccer & Society 8, no. 2–3 (2007): 221–39. 47 Zhu Zhang, Doyeon Won, and Donna L. Pastore, ‘ “The Effects of Attitudes Toward Commercialization on College Students: Purchasing Intentions of Sponsors’ Products’,” Sport Marketing Quarterly 14, no. 3 (2005): 177–87. 48 Tien-Chin Tan and Barrie Houlihan, ‘ “Chinese Olympic Sport Policy: Managing the Impact of Globalisation’,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 48, no. 2 (2012): 131–52. 49 Sohu, ‘ “6 Fan Clubs of Guangzhou Published an Open Letter, Evergrande Promised to Take Care of Fans’,” Sohu Sport, June 9, 2014, accessed August 16, 2019, http://sports.sohu.com/20140609/ n400584402.shtml. 50 Kurscheidt and Deitersen-Wieber, ‘ “Sport Governance in Germany’,” 285.

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Kurscheidt, Markus, and Angela Deitersen-Wieber. “Sport Governance in Germany.” In Sports Governance in the World: A Socio-Historic Approach, edited by Claude Sobry, 259–306. Paris: Editions Le Manuscrit, 2011. Leite, Emanuel Jr., and Carlos Rodrigues. “The Chinese Plan for Football Development: A Perspective from Innovation Theory.” In Football and Its Shifting Global Powerbase, edited by Paul Widdop, Simon Chadwick, and Dan Parnell. Special Issue. Sport, Business and Management: An International Journal 9, no. 1 (2019): 63–77. Li, Jianxin, and Hansheng Liu. “An Interpretation and Reflection on the Characteristics of Chinese Professional Football-Based on the Case Study of Chinese Soccer Super League.” Journal of Sports and Science 37, no. 2 (2016): 30–36. Liu, Dongfeng, James J. Zhang, and Michel Desbordes. “Sport Business in China: Current State and Prospect.” International Journal of Sports Marketing and Sponsorship 18, no. 1 (2017): 2–10. Ma,Yang, and Markus Kurscheidt. “Governance of the Chinese Super League: A Struggle Between Governmental Control and Market Orientation.” In Football and Its Shifting Global Powerbase, edited by Paul Widdop, Simon Chadwick, and Dan Parnell. Special Issue. Sport, Business and Management: An International Journal 9, no. 1 (2019): 4–25. Ma,Yang, and Markus Kurscheidt. “The National Games of China as a Governance Instrument in Chinese Elite Sport: An Institutional and Agency Analysis.” International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics (2019): 1–21. Manzenreiter, Wolfram, and John Horne. “Playing the Post-Fordist Game in/to the Far East: The Footballisation of China, Japan and South Korea.” Soccer & Society 8, no. 4 (2007): 561–77. Martin, Paul. “Football, Community and Cooperation: A Critical Analysis of Supporter Trusts in England.” Soccer & Society 8, no. 4 (2007): 636–53. Merkel, Udo. “Milestones in the Development of Football Fandom in Germany: Global Impacts on Local Contests.” Soccer & Society 8, no. 2–3 (2007): 221–39. Mueller, Dennis C. Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Ostrov, Benjamin. “Corruption in Chinese Sport Culture.” In Corruption in International Business:The Challenge of Cultural and Legal Diversity, edited by Sharon Eicher, 91–98. New York: Routledge, 2009. Peng, Qi, James Skinner, and Barrie Houlihan. “An Analysis of the Chinese Football Reform of 2015:Why then and Not Earlier?” International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 11, no. 1 (2019): 1–18. Tan,Tien-Chin, and Barrie Houlihan. “Chinese Olympic Sport Policy: Managing the Impact of Globalisation.” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 48, no. 2 (2012): 131–52. Tan, Tien-Chin et al. “Xi Jin-Ping’s World Cup Dreams: From a Major Sports Country to a World Sports Power.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 33, no. 12 (2016): 1449–65. Wu, Fulong. “China’s Great Transformation: Neoliberalization as Establishing a Market Society.” Geoforum 39, no. 3 (2008): 1093–96. Yu, Lin et al. “The Transition Game: Toward a Cultural Economy of Football in Post-Socialist China.” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 54, no. 6 (2019): 711–37. Zhang, Zhu, Doyeon Won, and Donna L. Pastore. “The Effects of Attitudes Toward Commercialization on College Students: Purchasing Intentions of Sponsors’ Products.” Sport Marketing Quarterly 14, no. 3 (2005): 177–87. Zheng, Jinming, and Borja García. “Conclusions: The Rising Importance of Supporter Activism in European Football.” In Football and Supporter Activism in Europe:Whose Game Is It? edited by Borja García and Jinming Zheng, 277–85. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. Zheng, Jinming et al. Sport Policy in China. London: Routledge, 2019.

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23 The reform of China’s elite sport system Case studies on football and table tennis Huang Gangqiang and Lu Zhouxiang

Introduction From the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 to the end of the Mao Era in 1976, China’s socialist economic system went through three phases: the establishment of a planned economic system; adjustment and improvement; and the emergence of problems. After the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the high-ranking decision-makers realised that economic development was the most urgent issue facing China at the time. So through a process of ‘bringing order out of chaos,’ state leaders developed an awareness and ideology with which to restructure the economic system.The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1978 marked the start of China’s socialist market economic system.This reform has led to historic breakthroughs since 1992, and after 20 years of development, a market economic system has, essentially, taken shape.1 Through this tide of economic reform, the spirit of reformation permeates all areas of life. One good example is land reform. Influenced by a relatively liberal political background and loosened rural economic policies, reform broke through in the countryside. A household responsibility system was implemented and was met with great enthusiasm by farmers.2 In addition, non-governmental enterprises grew rapidly: the number of private sector companies grew from 98,100 in 1990 to 4.98 million in 2006.3 Today, having experienced the contract-based and shareholding systems through reform, state-owned enterprises aim to change their approach in order to build up an effective enterprise system.4 In the context of China’s reform and opening up, how have the country’s elite sport, whose main goals are to achieve excellent results at the international level, undergone reform? Looking back at the progress of market-oriented reform in sport over the last few decades, this chapter takes football and table tennis as its subjects of study in order to discuss and analyse the reform process. The chapter looks at the development principles of a market-oriented economy and of pragmatism in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the reform in Chinese elite sport. Inspired by the achievements of the Soviet team at the 1952 Helsinki Olympics, the Central People’s Government Committee of Sport was established on 15 November 1952 – signifying the formation of China’s state-run sport system. Through a series of developments and 247

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reforms, by the 1980s China had established a relatively complete sport development model – the nationwide system (Juguo Tizhi 举国体制). This is a special national administrative system and operating mechanism relying on government administration to supervise sport, and on planned administration to provide the necessary financial support.5 Provincial and municipal professional teams are state institutions, managed by sport commissions, which are responsible for funding coaches, training and competition, as well as for athletes’ life, study and their employment after their retirement from elite sport. Athletes are assigned to years-long intensive training programmes.They participate in competitions at all levels to represent the country, their provinces and cities, and they share the spiritual and material rewards of their achievements. Since the early 1990s, all of China has seen unprecedented change. The economic system is being transformed from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy, while in the meantime society is gradually modernising. In 1993, the sport ministry studied and published a series of proposals on further sporting reform, and these have determined the goal of sport reform since the 1990s: to convert the country’s sport management system from that of a planned economy to that of a market-oriented economic system.

Case study on football In the second half of 1992, a national football conference was held in Hongshankou, Beijing. Li Tieying (Politburo member, State Counsellor, Minister and Party Secretary of the National Education Commission) attended the conference and instructed representatives that Chinese football should have a one-off reform. Professional clubs shall be established. And they shall be able to support themselves by incomes from allowing broadcasting, advertisements, tickets, lotteries and transfer fees. And both the Football Association and each Provincial Football Association should be agencies of service for the development of the sport rather than bodies of power and authority.6 This meeting marked the beginning of market-oriented reform in Chinese elite sport.7 As required by the national football conference’s decisions, the experimental units and provincial and professional associations meeting the required conditions formed football associations and set up professional clubs. By the end of 1993, Dalian, Guangzhou, Tianjin and eight other pilot football cities had set up their football associations. The core idea of the reform was that the sport should be able to support itself in terms of finance and funding, and should break away from its total financial dependence on the Sports Ministry.8 Football associations in Chengdu, Shanghai, Dalian, Chongqing, Liaoning Province, Jiangsu Province and Sichuan Province became financially independent and were able to fund themselves. Beijing, Shenyang and Nanjing remained partially self-financing.9 After the reform, financial investment in football from the government decreased from the previous RMB 12 million to RMB 6.3 million in 1997.10 On 3 July 1992, approved by the Dalian municipal government, China’s first professional club – the Dalian Football Club – was established. It was set up jointly with the cooperation of the Provincial Sports Commission, the Municipal Physical Culture and Sports Commission and private enterprises. On the basis of forming a professional football team, these bodies provided training and competition venues and other infrastructures, while the private enterprises bore the expenditure for competitions, training and wages for coaches and athletes. The professional football clubs had essential differences to the sport teams set up by the Sports Commissions and private enterprises in the 1980s, when private enterprises were only title sponsors, without participation in the management of the teams.11 In these new professional football clubs, however, the private enterprises had the right to full participation and control 248

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of the management. For example, Wang Jianlin, Chairman of Dalian Wanda Football Club, told coach Chi Shangbin, who took the job in 1995, ‘The goal of being the champion or at least finishing in the top three will not change. I pay more attention to management than performance, because management is what affects the team in the future.’12 With the development of the professional league, private enterprises are gradually taking full control. For instance, Sichuan Quanxing Group, which set up a professional football club together with the Sichuan Institute of Sport, has been fully involved in the management of the club.13 Beijing Guoan, Shanghai Shenhua and other professional football clubs were also managed by private enterprises. To improve the professional club system, the Chinese Football Association (CFA) organised the first China Football Club Championship from the end of 1992 to the beginning of 1993. With the cooperation of private enterprises, the clubs were constituted from the provincial and municipal professional football teams which had participated in the Chinese Football League. The competition had a professional approach for the first time: all participating clubs would bear their own expenses but would share ticket revenue. The China Football Club Championship was held again in 1993, with eight teams selecting a city as their home and a home-and-away system adopted. After two years of experimentation, the Chinese Football Class A League officially began on 17 April 1994. China Central Television (CCTV) paid RMB 10 million for the broadcast rights, signalling the beginning of the professionalisation and marketisation of Chinese football. The eight teams which had taken part in the Chinese Football Class A League in 1992, along with the top four teams in the Chinese Football Class B League, made up the league. It demonstrated strong vitality from the beginning; the reforms had an immediate and obvious effect, and crowds showed great enthusiasm. The 1995 League drew 3.14 million spectators, an average of over 20,000 per match. With market reform, players’ pay greatly increased. At the beginning of the season, Shanghai Shenhua players’ annual income (wages, bonuses and match fees) was RMB 200,000–300,000, and for some players it reached RMB 700,000–800,000. The average monthly salary of players and coaches at the time was about RMB 1,000.14 The CFA received ten times as much funding from the League as from the government. Private enterprises invested a huge amount of money in their clubs. According to a survey, Dalian Wanda Group invested RMB 0.2–0.25 billion from 2002 to 2008, and Sichuan Quanxing Company invested RMB 0.15 billion from 2004 to 2008.15 Direct investment in football from private enterprises amounted to RMB 10 billion from 1994 to 2004.16 However, in 2002 international football referee Gong Jianping was detained on suspicion of taking bribes, and Nan Yong (former Director of the Chinese Football Management Centre), Yang Yimin (former Vice-Chairman of the CFA) and Zhang Jianqiang (former Director of the Referee Committee) were arrested on charges of manipulating football games and accepting bribes. This demonstrated that, after a temporary boom, the League was plagued by a series of problems, including match-fixing, corrupt refereeing and gambling. In response to the scandals, the Chinese Football Class A League changed its name to the China Football Super League in 2004, and in 2005 the CFA revised the Football Association Charter. In 2015, the State Sports General Administration made the CFA fully independent, bringing reform in football to a new level. With the establishment of professional football clubs and the determination to reform the league to make it more market-oriented, the original ‘three-tier talent training’ network and system – with players cultivated in sport schools, brought up to provincial and municipal professional teams and then to the national team – collapsed. Provinces and cities with no professional football clubs abolished their provincial and municipal teams. For instance, the Zhejiang 249

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0 20 40 60 80

100 120 Figure 23.1 China’s FIFA World Ranking: 1992–201818

Province Sports Committee eliminated the provincial male and female professional teams, and the ‘three-tier talent training’ network and system in Zhejiang Province collapsed shortly afterwards.17 In the provinces and cities with professional teams, some converted class B and class C professional teams into professional clubs, and some sold them altogether. In 1994, the CFA adopted a regulation that all class A clubs must have a class B team and a class C team before the 1995 registration deadline, indirectly indicating the abolishment of the original national system – the football talent cultivation model. The reform failed to improve Chinese football’s level of performance. The FIFA World Ranking shows that the Chinese men’s football team’s ranking slowly declined during the previous decades (see Figure 23.1).

Case study on table tennis China dominates Olympic table tennis. In order to provide a better environment for the sport, the Chinese Table Tennis Association (CTTA) has always been prudent in its approach to market-oriented reform. In 1995, it decided to carry out systemic and structural reform centred on a ‘dual track approach’ – meaning the coexistence of state administration and the club system. From 10 – 13 December 1995, the CTTA held the first nationwide table tennis club event in Shunde, Guangdong Province, using a ‘game-meeting’ system. Each club consisted of professional table tennis teams representing provinces or cities, with companies or private enterprises as sponsors. In 1996, the CTTA issued the ‘Rules of Chinese Table Tennis Association Clubs.’ In the same year, by cooperating with sponsors, 12 clubs were set up by various Provincial Sports Commissions, and Municipal Physical Culture and Sports Commissions. In 1998, the CTTA changed the club system into a home-and-away system, a national table tennis league. At this point, the prototype of a market-oriented professional table tennis league had been established. In 1999, the CTTA upgraded the A-League to the Super League and implemented the ‘Detailed Rules and Regulations for Sportsmen of CTTA Clubs.’ In 2000, Shandong Luneng, the first professional table tennis club in China run according to a modern entrepreneurial system, was established. In the 2012 season, the Table Tennis & Badminton Centre introduced a landmark ‘New Deal’ policy which provided clubs with ownership as well as the right to exchange and own their players. This further pushed forward the professional process of the league. While the league was in this marketisation development stage, club organisational structures were also quietly changing. Of the eight men’s table tennis teams in the Super League in 2012, 250

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four of them were run by private companies and local sport commissions, three by private companies, and one in cooperation with a shell company. Of the eight women’s clubs, four were run by private companies and sport commissions, one by a private company, one in cooperation with a shell company, one by a local sport commission, and one by the East China University of Science and Technology and a private company.19 In a jointly organised club, the sport commission still allocated funds as they had to provincial and municipal table tennis teams, so as to pay basic wages and training expenses; it organised and managed daily training competitions, basically maintaining the management style of the original provinces and cities. Every year, entrepreneurs invested a certain amount of money in athletes’ and coaches’ wages, benefits and so on.20 Sponsors did not really participate in management or training related to the club. The leader of Beijing’s table tennis team put it this way: ‘The “club” is the name used when taking part in the Beijing Super League, while the “team” is the professional team belonging to the Beijing Xiannongtan Sports School.’21 A manager at Shanghai Dongchang Club said: ‘Sponsoring units just send money to the accounting office of a sport team, without direct management of the team. Hence, market operation does not actually exist.’22 With the market development of the Table Tennis Super League, sponsors strengthened their investment. For instance, in 2012 Shandong Electric Power Group invested RMB 20 million in Shandong Luneng Club; Rongsheng Heavy Industries Group invested RMB 8 million in Ba Yi Club and CNE invested RMB 3 million in Shanghai Jinmaichi Club. At the same time, the players’ income greatly increased. In the preliminary stage of the development of the club league, the annual income of some national team players in registered clubs could reach RMB 100,000, while the income of the average provincial player was about RMB 10,000.23 By 2004 the annual income of top athletes had reached RMB 600,000, and by 2005 RMB 1 million.24 With almost 20 years of development, the Chinese Table Tennis Club Competition now has more than 300 clubs, divided into six classes: Super Class, A+, B+, C+, A−, and B−. Marketoriented reform in table tennis has continued through a relatively conservative dual-track approach. High-level competitions feature many different clubs; in cases such as that of the Luneng club in Shandong, private companies obtain naming rights as sponsors through financial investment. The original national ‘three-tier training’ system has been retained, while the system of national, provincial and municipal clubs still exists in the form of first-tier, second-tier and third-tier teams. At the same time, professional clubs such as Shandong Luneng are entirely market-oriented and have developed significantly.

Pragmatism and China’s market reform in elite sport With the transformation of China from a planned economy to a market economy, Chinese athletic administration has been transforming from a state-run system to a market-based system. During the transformation process, there has been a remarkable discrepancy between the market-based reforms of football and table tennis. Football adopted a radical strategy: to eliminate the original system and structures and then to establish a completely new system. In the cities at the centre of the experiment, spending by football associations has been cut or greatly eliminated. Marketisation and professionalisation reforms have taken place in the professional football teams of various provinces and cities. The wages of coaches and athletes are based on the market rather than set by the state. Private enterprises, rather than sport commissions, are the entities involved in the daily management of teams. The former model for cultivating footballing talent, the ‘three-tier talent training’ nationwide network, barely survives, and professional football teams have disappeared in many provinces and cities. 251

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In the early stage of marketisation, the professional football tournament showed great vitality. In a prosperous market, private enterprises showed unprecedented enthusiasm and made huge investments. The CFA received more capital with which to promote the development of football, and the salaries of coaches and athletes increased faster than ever. However, after ephemeral prosperity, the national league has been mired in scandals of fraud, corrupt refereeing and gambling for a long time. Also, due to the lack of young talent, the performance of the national football team is worse than ever. Compared with the radical reforms of football, table tennis adopted a comparatively conservative approach, a dual-track reform based on not demolishing the old system until the new system matures. The original professional table tennis teams still exist. The coaches and players remain inside the public system and can play for clubs and get bonus payments. Private enterprises are title sponsors rather than direct participants in management.The original development model for talented players, the nationwide three-tier training network, remains in place. After years of market-based development, the club league has an integrated system with more than 300 clubs ranked in six tiers. The league system includes various types of club, and investment from sponsors has sharply increased, as has player recompense. The league is steadily developing, and China is the perennial world number-one power in table tennis. Based on this analysis, it can be concluded that after a 20-year exploration of market-oriented reform and development, reform in both football and table tennis has led to some outstanding achievements. However, during the process of marketisation, the performance of football and table tennis has been very different. After brief prosperity, football has reached a nadir, with many scandals and difficulties; in contrast, market reform in table tennis has been relatively smooth and steady. Pragmatism is a school of philosophy introduced and developed by Charles Sanders Peirce, William James and John Dewey in the late nineteenth century. The influence of pragmatism peaked in the 1930s and it has had a great impact on legal, political, educational, social, religious and arts studies.The central focus of pragmatism is the pragmatic maxim which examines a truth or idea by evaluating their actual effect and practical results. Chinese football and table tennis have taken two different paths, and this has led to two different results. Applying the pragmatic maxim, the path taken by table tennis has been more suitable for China’s market-oriented reform in elite sport development. Why is this so? Because Chinese elite sport already had a relatively mature and effective national system before market-oriented reform began. In the history of Western philosophy, the correspondence theory of truth has had an important role. It posits that ‘truth is a property of certain of our ideas; it means their “agreement” as falsity means their disagreement with “reality”.’25 James turned the focus from discussing the nature of truth to acceptance of the criteria of truth. He discussed the sense of correspondence in detail, namely, its practical results in human life. In our daily lives, most truth is indirectly confirmed. Indirect confirmation is when a concept leads us to deal with real things or things attached to the real intellectually or actually, and if the concept is adaptable to the entire environment, then it has been confirmed indirectly to be consistent with reality. Indirect confirmation of truth includes two external features: convenience and coordination with existing truth. James held that remaining faithful to the old truth is the primary principle and the only principle in most cases. He also thought most truth was the product of previous truth; truth must pass through the test of experience and be approved by old beliefs; old beliefs or truths constitute the theoretical framework and starting point for dealing with new things and the new concept actually neutralises old truth and new experiences and maximises their convergence both subtly and conveniently. Based on James’s pragmatic theory of truth, China’s nationwide elite sport system can be seen as the old concept of elite sport management with marketisation as a new concept. For 252

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marketisation to be truly achieved, it must go through the test of practical experience and must be integrated with the ideas of the nationwide system. The old concept – the nationwide system – should be the foundation of marketisation. However, the reform in football did not take this into account, instead adopting a ‘demolish, then build’ principle, a more radical method of reform which unavoidably caused conflicts between marketisation and the nationwide system – between the new and the old. That is why there have been more negative outcomes. In contrast, the table tennis reform approach adopted a ‘build, then demolish’ principle. Based on the structure of the original nationwide system, step-by-step reform came gradually so as to better combine marketisation and the existing system. That is why table tennis has developed in a more stable and orderly way.John Dewey inherited and developed James’s theory of truth. He believed that truth is a concept, and that a concept is a tool for people to connect with the environment around them; people take the initiative to transform their environment though concepts. The effectiveness and value of a concept depends on the success of its work – that is to say, truth is not something out there for people but a guide to action and a tool leading us from uncertain experience to more definite experience. According to Dewey’s view of pragmatism,26 ‘market-oriented’ is not only a guiding idea but also a tool to guide reform in Chinese elite sport. However, the reform in football was based on a ‘one step to the designated position’ approach, going directly to the system used in developed Western countries – but this system did not work in China as planned.

Conclusion Against the background of China transforming from a socialist planned economy to a market economy, elite sport moved from a stated-funded system to market-oriented reform. Chinese football adopted a ‘demolish, then build’ model; the original nationwide model was abolished, and marketisation was directly and radically carried out. In contrast, Chinese table tennis employed a conservative ‘build, then demolish’ model – a gradualist approach to reform. The practical and operational effects show that table tennis reform has proceeded more steadily than football reform and has not stirred up conflict in the way that the latter has. Analysis from the perspective of pragmatic truth theory shows that because football’s market-oriented reform did not take the original system as a starting point, the reform met with resistance. In contrast, reform in table tennis retained maximum continuity with the original nationwide system. In the process of the reform and development of elite sport in China, marketisation is a tool which can guide development – it is not the ultimate goal. With reference to the different outcomes in football and table tennis, reform should be incremental and based on the original state-funded national system, without abandoning the existing talent cultivation model. In other words, continuing to identify and train young talent through the state-funded nationwide system while making the highest adult level fully market-based is better than blindly and completely copying the marketisation and professional operation model of elite sport in Western countries. In this way, Chinese elite sport could develop its own characteristics and achieve steady and sustainable development.

Notes 1 Juming Hao, “Economic System: Evolution Track and Basic Experience,” Modern Economic Research no. 8 (2009): 29–34. 2 Donglian Xiao, “Evolution of the Thinking on China: Economic Restructuring from 1978 to 1984,” Contemporary China History Studies 11, no. 5 (2004): 59–70. 253

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3 Chusheng Ye and Lianfa Luo, “Private Enterprise and the Dual Structure,” Liangshan Tribune no. 9 (2008): 9–13. 4 Fengyi Liu, “Sixty Years of China’s State-owned Enterprise: Theoretical Exploration and Policy Evolution,” Economist no. 1 (2010): 21–28. 5 Qin Hao, “A Discussion of the Concept, Characteristics and Function of the Juguo Tizhi in Chinese Sports,” Journal of Chengdu Sport University 30, no. 1 (2004): 51–59. 6 Fan Hong and Lu Zhouxiang, “The Professionalisation and Commercialisation of Football in China (1993–2013),” International Journal of the History of Sport 30, no. 14 (2013): 1637–54. 7 Shaozhu Wu, China Sport History (Beijing: China Book Press, 1999), 7. 8 Hong and Zhouxiang, ‘ “The Professionalisation and Commercialisation of Football in China (1993– 2013)’,” 1638. 9 Chi Liu, “Reform in Member Associations of Chinese Soccer Association,” Journal of Shandong Sport University 21, no. 5 (2005): 30–35. 10 Shouxun Song et al., “Feasibility of the Implementation of Professional Soccer Club System in China,” China Sport Science and Technology 28, no. 9 (1992): 1–10. 11 Qi Chen,“Research on the Status and Counter-measures of China’s Professional Soccer Club Management,” Sport Science 17, no. 3 (1997): 23–27. 12 Ibid., 27. 13 Chunfei Xiao,Yongjun Cai, and Renwei Zhao, “State-owned Enterprise Soccer, Lost Money and Lost Face,” Outlook Weekly no. 10 (2006): 12–13. 14 Shanghai Sports Commission, “Moral Education of Professional Sports Clubs,” Journal of Shanghai Sport University 21, no. 4 (2017): 1–7. 15 Shaoxia Liang, “Review of Soccer Occupation in China,” Journal of Guangzhou Sport University 28, no. 2 (2008): 55–59. 16 Jinsheng Liu and Yan Wang, “Policy Barriers of the Professionalisation of Soccer in China,” Journal of Chengdu Sport University 36, no. 10 (2010): 9–12. 17 Ping Ling et al., “Problems of Soccer in Zhejiang,” Zhejiang Sport Science 18, no. 6 (1996): 21–28. 18 ‘ “Men’’s Ranking’,” FIFA, www.fifa.com/fifa-world-ranking/ranking-table/men/rank/id12679/#all. 19 Bowen Yang, “Research on the Development of Chinese Table Tennis Super League” (Master’s thesis, Beijing Sport University, 2014). 20 Lin Zhang et al., “Research on the Development of China’s Elite Table Tennis Clubs,” Sport Science 18, no. 5 (2005): 31–34. 21 Tong Lan, “Exploration into the Chinese Table Tennis Management System” (PhD diss., Beijing Sport University, 2007). 22 Ibid. 23 Zhang, ‘ “Research on the Development of China’s Elite Table Tennis Clubs’.” 24 Ibid.‘’’ 25 William James, “Pragmatism’’s Conception of Truth,” Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 4, no. 6 (1907): 141–55, 141. 26 See:Yajun Chen, Philosophy Reform: From Pragmatism to New Pragmatism (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1982).

Bibliography Chen, Qi. “Research on the Status and Counter-Measures of China’s Professional Soccer Club Management.” Sport Science 17, no. 3 (1997): 23–27. Chen, Yajun. Philosophy Reform: From Pragmatism to New Pragmatism. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1982. Hao, Juming. “Economic System: Evolution Track and Basic Experience.” Modern Economic Research no. 8 (2009): 29–34. Hao, Qin. “A Discussion of the Concept, Characteristics and Function of the Juguo Tizhi in Chinese Sports.” Journal of Chengdu Sport University 30, no. 1 (2004): 51–59. Hong, Fan, and Lu Zhouxiang. “The Professionalisation and Commercialisation of Football in China (1993–2013).” International Journal of the History of Sport 30, no. 14 (2013): 1637–54. James, William. “Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth.” Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 4, no. 6 (1907): 141–55, 141. 254

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Lan, Tong. “Exploration into the Chinese Table Tennis Management System.” PhD diss., Beijing Sport University, 2007. Liang, Shaoxia. “Review of Soccer Occupation in China.” Journal of Guangzhou Sport University 28, no. 2 (2008): 55–59. Ling, Ping, Hongling Ma, Bo Jiang, and Hong Zhang. “Problems of Soccer in Zhejiang.” Zhejiang Sport Science 18, no. 6 (1996): 21–28. Liu, Chi. “Reform in Member Associations of Chinese Soccer Association.” Journal of Shandong Sport University 21, no. 5 (2005): 30–35. Liu, Fengyi. “Sixty Years of China’s State-Owned Enterprise: Theoretical Exploration and Policy Evolution.” Economist no. 1 (2010): 21–28. Liu, Jinsheng, and Yan Wang. “Policy Barriers of the Professionalisation of Soccer in China.” Journal of Chengdu Sport University 36, no. 10 (2010): 9–12. Shanghai Sports Commission. “Moral Education of Professional Sports Clubs.” Journal of Shanghai Sport University 21, no. 4 (2017): 1–7. Song, Shouxun, Renmin Zhang, Xieseng Wei, Guoying Ni, and Guozhi Ye. “Feasibility of the Implementation of Professional Soccer Club System in China.” China Sport Science and Technology 28, no. 9 (1992): 1–10. Wu, Shaozhu. China Sport History. Beijing: China Book Press, 1999. Xiao, Chunfei, Yongjun Cai, and Renwei Zhao. “State-Owned Enterprise Soccer, Lost Money and Lost Face.” Outlook Weekly no. 10 (2006): 12–13. Xiao, Donglian. “Evolution of the Thinking on China: Economic Restructuring from 1978 to 1984.” Contemporary China History Studies 11, no. 5 (2004): 59–70. Yang, Bowen. “Research on the Development of Chinese Table Tennis Super League.” Master’s thesis, Beijing Sport University, 2014. Ye, Chusheng, and Lianfa Luo. “Private Enterprise and the Dual Structure.” Liangshan Tribune no. 9 (2008): 9–13. Zhang, Lin, Zhi Ma, Xiang Duan, Zengqi Xu, and Yaling Liu. “Research on the Development of China’s Elite Table Tennis Clubs.” Sport Science 18, no. 5 (2005): 31–34.

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24 The development of sport policy and practice in Taiwan Ko Ling-Mei and Lee Ping-Chao

Introduction Over the last seven decades, sport development in Taiwan can be attributed to two significant factors, namely, diplomacy and modernisation, with the former being directly linked to Cross-Strait relations and the latter to the development of party politics in Taiwan.1 The aim of this chapter is thus to elucidate how government involvement in sport has developed and the resulting consequences. Starting with a brief history of the political context of Taiwan from the Japanese colonial period, the chapter continues with a description of the historical development of Taiwan’s sport policy and administrative structure at the government level, and ends with an analysis of the current sport policy priorities, challenges, trends and power struggles.

A brief history of the political context of Taiwan Taiwan has a long and complex history, as the island and its people have been influenced by many different forces and cultures. In the late nineteenth century, specifically in 1885, Taiwan was declared a province controlled by the Chinese Qing dynasty; however, at the conclusion of the first Sino-Japanese war in 1895, Taiwan was ceded to Japan by Imperial China under the Treaty of Shimonoseki. For the next 50 years, until 1945, Japan governed Taiwan as a colony.2 During the period of Japanese colonial rule over Taiwan, the colonisers sent many Taiwanese people to fight for them on the battlefield; as a result, physical education (i.e. sport) was primarily used as a form of military training to complement political goals.3 Although the Japanese colonial government left Taiwan, the sport culture, physical education and sport system it left behind continued to influence Taiwan. For example, baseball has developed into Taiwan’s national sport.4 In 1945, the Republic of China (ROC) declared victory in the second Sino-Japanese War, and the government of the ROC under the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT), which was led by Chiang Kai-Shek, took control of Taiwan from Japan; thus, Taiwan became a province of the ROC. After four years, in 1949, the ROC’s central government retreated from mainland China to Taiwan because the KMT had lost the mainland civil war to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which was led by Mao Ze-Dong.5 While the KMT government 256

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insisted that it continued to represent all Chinese people on both the island and the mainland, the CCP declared the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing and began preparations to liberate Taiwan by military force, a situation which continues to the present day. Since then, each government has claimed to be the only legitimate representative of China, and the tension between both sides of the Taiwan Strait has never diminished.6 After the Korean War broke out in 1950, the United States was convinced that Taiwan was too strategically valuable to hand over to the CCP; thus, the United States maintained its defensive commitment to Taiwan.7 The ROC government was recognised as the only legitimate Chinese government until it lost its seat representing China in the United Nations to the authorities in Beijing in 1971.8 Since then, the Communist regime has increasingly been recognised as the Chinese government by the rest of the world. In 1979, the United States switched their diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC and ended their military alliance with the ROC in Taiwan.9 Following the death of President Chiang Kai-shek in 1975, Chiang Ching-kuo (the son of Chiang Kai-Shek) became the president of the ROC in 1978. The KMT governed Taiwan under martial law from 1949 to 1987. With martial law still in effect after 38 years, the first political opposition party (the Democratic Progressive Party, DPP) was established in 1986. The next year, Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law in Taiwan, thereby ending the 40-year suspension of the ROC constitution and bringing Taiwan forward into democracy and modernisation.10 During the 1980s, the rapid post-war economic growth of Taiwan improved for most social groups, and leisure time expanded due to later changes in labour market legislation.11 In 1996, the ROC’s first direct presidential election was held in Taiwan and was won by the incumbent president of the KMT, Lee Teng-hui. During his terms in office (1988–2000), Lee steadily pushed the creation of Taiwan nationalism.12 In 2000, Chen Shui-bian, the DPP candidate, won the presidential election, meaning that Taiwan experienced its first change of governing political party. Following eight years of tension across the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan voters elected Ma Ying-jeou, the KMT candidate, in the 2008 presidential election.13 During his presidency (2008–2016), Ma faced tremendous challenges when he deepened Taiwan’s social and economic engagement with mainland China.14 In 2016, the DPP was once again elected by the people, and the DPP leader, Tsai Ing-wen, became the island’s first female president. Although Tsai claims to maintain the status quo and build consistent and sustainable Cross-Strait relations with China, she does not accept the so-called ‘1992 Consensus,’ which is a strategic political formula that implies that Taiwan is part of China. Beijing has since suspended all official contact with the DPP administration because Beijing considers the Consensus crucial to its ‘One China’ principle.15 In 2020, Han Kuo-yu, the mayor of Kaohsiung, will represent the KMT in challenging the incumbent Tsai Ing-wen in the next Taiwanese presidential election. During the current tense period of Cross-Strait relations, whoever wins the 2020 Taiwan presidential election will be crucial, due to the strategic geopolitical significance of Taiwan, as far as Asia is concerned. Indeed, although Taiwan has transformed itself from an authoritarian regime to a democratic polity over the past few decades, the Cross-Strait relations continue to influence policy in Taiwan, including sport policy.

The development of sport policy and practice in Taiwan Since the Republic of China’s government retreated to Taiwan in 1949, government involvement in sport has moved through four distinct periods (Table 24.1). In this section, each period 257

Ko Ling-Mei and Lee Ping-Chao Table 24.1 The Evolution of the Central Sports Administrative Structure in Taiwan, 1949–2018 Year

Name of administration

1949–1972 1973–1997 1997–2012

Council of Physical Education, Ministry of Education Department of Physical Education, Ministry of Education Sports Affairs Council, Executive Yuan Department of Physical Education, Ministry of Education Sports Administration, Ministry of Education

2013 – present

is described through its contemporary political context, its sport administrative structure and its relationship to sport policy and practice in Taiwan.

Council of Physical Education, Ministry of Education (1949–1972) In this period, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, the KMT government became an authoritarian one-party state regime, and the military dominated the state. In 1950, the immediate threat of ‘militarily liberating Taiwan’ from mainland China eased temporarily after the outbreak of the Korean War, and the first priority of the KMT regime was to prepare to ‘return to the mainland and rebuild the country.’16 Between 1949 and 1971, Taiwan was able to gain strong external supporters and independence as an autonomous state because the ROC government was recognised by the international community as being the legitimate government of China. Therefore, the government was mainly concerned with the development of the national defence force, and the primary focus of sport policy involved promoting physical training to achieve military preparedness.17 Indeed, the relationship between sport and militarism and the resulting utilisation of sport as preparation for war is well known.18 At that time, the development of sport was focused on schools’ physical education and sport activities to meet the government’s political aims; thus, in general, sport in society was ignored and little was undertaken.19 In the period from 1949 to 1972, there were two major national bodies in charge of the development of physical education and sport under the supervision of the Ministry of Education (MoE), both of which were transplanted from mainland China and imposed on the island. One body was the China National Amateur Athletic Federation (renamed the Republic of China Sports Federation in 1989), which was a quasi-governmental sporting organisation directly controlled by the central government, that assumed major responsibility for sport development until 2000.The other body was the Council of Physical Education (1949–1972), which was in charge of sport promotion, with the primary focus being on physical training and health.20 The purpose of physical education was to not only increase physical strength but also cultivate obedience to rules, a fighting spirit and a national consciousness. As understood by the authoritarian regime, the best way to promote its authoritarianism and to foster and cultivate the loyalty of young people to the KMT government was through education.21 Within education, physical education was then utilised in an attempt to enhance the national spirit and to promote a sense of national identity. Moreover, since sport are recognised as major tools used to deliver government values and policies,22 the earlier Taiwan Provincial Sports Games continued; however, the opening ceremonies were presided over by the KMT party chairman, and the requisite singing of the national anthem, the president’s keynote speech, the reciting of slogans, and the singing of patriotic songs, dances and drills were implemented. It is through participation in and support of the rituals and competitions of sporting events that 258

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people develop a sense of belonging to a community. These events directly serve the interests of the state and promote the government’s political intentions.23 During the period of martial law (1949–1987), the KMT government dominated virtually every aspect of Taiwanese society, and people had no freedom of speech, assembly or association.24 It is clear that under the authoritarian party-state regime, the development of sport policy was closely related to the leadership of the KMT and its party-state policy. Consequently, there were only two important organisations that were allowed to promote sport and physical education outside the educational system. The first organisation was the General Association of the Scouts of China, which was founded in 1934 by Chiang Kai-shek, and has long played an important informal educational role by providing youths with outdoor sport activities. Although the Scout movement was interrupted in 1949 when the Chinese communists took over mainland China, it re-emerged after the Nationalist government moved to Taiwan. The second organisation was the China Youth Corps (China Youth Anti-Communist National Salvation Corps, often known simply as CYC), which was formed in 1952 by Chiang Chingkuo and known as the youth arm of the KMT. The CYC offered recreational activities such as hiking and mountain climbing together with the arrangement of summer and winter break recreational activities, with the aims of attracting youths for party education and the promotion of a specific Chinese national identity.25 In 1968, within a relatively stable domestic environment built on the basis of tight political control, a nine-year compulsory education policy was enacted in Taiwan. The government shifted its sport policy to pay more attention to the health of students, who were suffering from the huge pressure of preparing for their entrance exams to junior and senior high schools and universities without having enough time to participate in physical activities to maintain their health.26 To address this problem, the MoE issued regulations regarding physical education that set required hours to ensure that all school students had the same opportunity to take physical education classes and join extracurricular physical activities.27 In this period, strong public confidence in, and enthusiasm towards, both the nation and baseball were boosted due to the Hong Yeh junior baseball team defeating Japan in 1968; also, the Jin Long junior baseball team and the Giants team won the World Junior Baseball Championship in 1969 and 1971, respectively.28 Aware of the phenomenon, the government subsequently made use of this atmosphere by initiating the first central sport programme since its retreat to Taiwan, namely, a programme entitled ‘Developing Sport for All and Cultivating Elite Sports Programmes.’29 During this period of sport history, the authoritarian regime emphasised not only physical training for military preparation but also domestic and international sport events to enhance the national spirit. Interestingly and significantly, although sport development was not the first priority of the KMT government in this period, sport policy in Taiwan still retains the perspectives from this period, including physical education in school, sport for all and competitive sport.

Department of Physical Education, Ministry of Education (1973–1997) The later period of martial law (1973–1986) In the period of the 1970s–1980s, Taiwan’s politics underwent significant changes. After the ROC government withdrew from its seat representing China in the United Nations in 1971, global support for Taiwan declined.30 Therefore, the KMT regime suffered diplomatic difficulties, and the regime was thus dedicated to developing elite sport in an attempt to promote informal international relations and visibility.31 However, it became difficult for Taiwan to engage 259

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in international sport organisations due to resistance from China on the world’s political stage. Thus, participation in competitive sport at the international level was a major concern of the KMT government. Consequently, the government’s orientation towards sport policy moved from that of an initial general fitness or military fitness to an emphasis on the cultivation of talented athletes across the whole range of international contracts, competitions and diplomatic activities that had implications for the overall relations between the nations concerned.32 Physical education programmes in schools thus became a useful tool for the government to promote the development of competitive sport, for example, through programmes such as the ‘Long-term Training of Primary and Secondary Schools’ Elite Sports Scheme,’ the ‘Improving the Implementation of Sport for All in Society Scheme’ and the ‘Revising the National Physical Education Act’ that promoted the development of competitive sport.33 After Chiang’s death in 1975, Chiang Ching-kuo became the president of the ROC in 1978. In the late 1980s, domestic politics moved towards a more democratic system, and the KMT government launched many administrative reform programmes to improve administrative efficiency and capability.34 Changes to the political, economic and social contexts were believed to have profound effects on the development of sport. In an attempt to promote ‘Sport for All’ and leisure activities, the government established the Department of Physical Education (DPE) under the MoE in 1973, which was involved in the managerial administration of physical education programmes as well as in overseeing sport development. Meanwhile, the DPE was also encouraging the Department of Education to set up physical education divisions to promote sport in different cities.35 The DPE followed the guidelines of ‘Developing Sport for All and Cultivating Elites Sports Programmes,’ which were published in 1968, to introduce a programme called ‘The Active Implementation of Sport for All Scheme,’ which sought to achieve a mental and physical balance through healthy exercise for the population and to develop elite sport to achieve medals on the international stage.The implementation of this programme was subsequently expanded to place emphasis on two additional specific dimensions, which were sport for all as a leisure activity and elite sport.36 This was the first time that the concept of sport as a leisure activity had been promoted, as Taiwan had been effectively improving its economy since the late 1970s.

Post martial law/the beginnings of liberal democracy (1987–1997) In the late 1980s through the 1990s, the economy turned from protectionism towards the modern open environment, while economic and social developments also experienced major changes. These changes improved the local quality of life and drove the advent of consumer society in Taiwan.37 The KMT government made efforts to promote sport development as well as to create a more liberal democratic society. It was the establishment of the first political opposition party (the Democratic Progressive Party, DPP) in 1986 and the lifting of martial law in 1987 that brought Taiwan forward into democracy and modernisation.38 Since then, Taiwan’s politics have transformed from an authoritarian regime to multiparty politics. The government called the move ‘a new milestone’ for democracy on the island.39 In this political and economic context, the KMT government was aware of the demand for opportunities for participation in leisure and sport activities. Therefore, in 1987, the DPE drafted the ‘National Four-Year Sports Programme,’ not only to achieve excellence in sport but also to encourage citizens to take part in sport activities.40 The 1987 draft plan was not published until 1989, following Taiwan’s frustration at their failure to win any medals in the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games; the DPE sought to improve sport performance at all levels and thus introduced a new version of the ‘National Four Year Sports 260

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Programme.’41 The programme, which was the biggest sport programme of the central government after 1968, aimed to encourage sport participation at all levels, to promote participation in international competitions, to upgrade academic sport research and to improve sport facilities.42 In the same year, the MoE drafted the ‘Leisure Education Implementation Scheme,’ which acknowledged that leisure plays an important part in modern life, and leisure education was thus introduced into schools for the first time.43 In 1989, the China National Amateur Athletic Federation was restructured into two different organisations. The Republic of China Sports Federation (ROCSF) was established as a quasi-governmental organisation that was responsible for domestic sport development and managing the Tsoying Training Centre (renamed in 2000 as the National Sports Training Centre–NSTC), and the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee (CTOC) was given responsibility for Olympic and international sport affairs.44 Moreover, the 1980s was a turning point for the development of sport in Taiwan due to the issue of the ‘Two Chinas’ in the sport domain. In 1981, the KMT government rejected competing in the Olympics under the name of Taiwan, insisting on a name with a connection to China. Taiwan was ultimately forced to change its name to the CTOC and to adopt a new flag and emblem.45 In the early 1990s, ROC President Lee Teng-hui, oversaw a foreign policy of pragmatic diplomacy, stating the need for Taiwan to be seen as a state separate and distinct from the control of China. In 1990, Taiwan accepted the ‘Olympic Formula’ proposed by the International Olympic Committee by adopting the name ‘Chinese Taipei’ to return to the Asian Games; since then, Taiwan has moved from passive to active participation in international sporting events.46 In 1994, the seventh ‘National Education Congress’ was conducted and articulated seven important goals in relation to developing sport, including in the areas of sport administration, sport facilities, sport for all, elite sport, international sport affairs and physical education,47 which guided the implementation of the main sport policies of the DPE until 1997 (i.e. until the establishment of the Sports Affairs Council in 1997). In short, in the 1970s – 1980s, the government began to develop a sport administration after the establishment of the DPE and the clarification of the relationship between the ROCSF and the CTOC. The development of sport policies paralleled the shift in Taiwan’s political and economic structures, and shifted from militaristic considerations to the promotion of sport for all and elite sport. The implementation of physical education policies in schools had been seen as a way to achieve better performance at the elite level to meet the government’s political interest. In the late 1980s–1990s, because of Taiwan’s rapid democratic and economic development, which improved the local quality of life, the government began to promote sport development as well as an initial emphasis on leisure issues, such as the establishment of the Chinese Professional Baseball League in 1990. Thus, the 1990s was a period of comprehensive development for the sport industry.48

Sport Affairs Council, executive yuan Department of Physical Education, Ministry of Education (1997–2012) In the 1990s, the sport administrative structure faced major changes. In 1997, the government established the National Council on Physical Fitness and Sport, which was renamed the Sports Affairs Council (SAC) in 2007. The SAC officially became the nation’s central authority governing sport affairs and declared that its sport policy direction was that of ‘Two Axes’ (i.e. the development of sport for all and elite sport).49 To carry out its sport policy, the SAC relied heavily on the CTOC and the ROCSF. The national sport administrative structure of the late 1990s is shown in Figure 24.1. 261

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Executive Yuan

Ministry of Education

Department of Physical Education

Education Bureau at local level

Sports Affairs Council

Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee

ROC Sports Federation Tzuo Ying Training Centre

National Sports Organizations

Figure 24.1 National sports administrative structure in Taiwan (1997–1999)

This was a tremendous transition for sport in Taiwan; the SAC was independent from the education system, and its budget and the sport budget were upgraded to a new level, which represented a sixfold increase over the previous budget of the DPE.50 The power of the DPE was substantially reduced, as it was limited to promoting physical education within the education system. However, the DPE had more direct control over and impact on school sport through the education system at the local level.51 After the establishment of the SAC, the DPE returned to its emphasis on school sport.The policy of the DPE was oriented towards training and to attract more people to participate in sport. For example, to intensify student physical fitness, the DPE introduced the ‘Physical Fitness 333 Plan (1999–2003)’ (i.e. doing aerobic exercise three days a week, thirty minutes per day, with at least 130 heartbeats per minute during each aerobic exercise session). The project ‘One Pupil, One Sport; One School, One Team Plan’ was an attempt to let students develop an interest in certain sport and to encourage them to participate in those particular sport for the rest of their lives.52 In the DPP government era (2000–2008), the SAC’s dual objectives were continually pursued. The liberalisation and encouragement of private firms to invest in sporting facilities constituted a significant step forward. In 2000, the authority was issued by the government for a statute promoting private participation in public construction, which was known as BOT (Build, Operate and Transfer).53 In 2010, the SAC provisioned the largest amount ever (US$42 million) for a single sport for all project, called the ‘Moulding Taiwan into a Sports Island Plan (2010–2015).’54 To achieve this policy goal, the SAC combined five sub-projects, which were: establishing physical ability testing centres, building a website on which local sport organisations could share sporting information, subsidising local sport clubs, holding sporting events and constructing 50 city sport centres and 20 county sport parks.55 In this period, the DPP authorities sought not only to join international organisations but also to host international sporting events to enhance Taiwan’s diplomatic relations and recognition within the world community. Thus, there was an emphasis on Taiwan bidding to stage a world sporting event before 2010.56 Although China continually used its political influence to prevent Taiwan from bidding to host international sport events,Taiwan still made every effort to 262

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win the right to host international events. In 2005 alone, there were more than 60 international sporting events hosted in Taiwan.57 In 2009, Taiwan successfully hosted the 8th World Games in Kaohsiung and the 21st Summer Deaflympics in Taipei. Later, in 2011, Taipei won its bid against Brazil to host the 2017 Summer Universiade, which was the largest-scale and highestlevel international mega sporting event in Taiwan’s history. To some extent, it was particularly significant for the Taiwanese government to declare Taiwan an independent, sovereign authority through their hosting of international sporting events. The 2012 national sport administrative structure is shown in Figure 24.2, which clearly demonstrates that the SAC, as the nation’s central authority governing sport affairs, could directly control and influence the decision-making of the CTOC, ROCSF, NSTC and national sport organisations.58 However, when the SAC was the central authority governing sport affairs, there were disputes and tensions between government agencies (e.g. the DPE and the SAC) and among the sport organisations. Although it was agreed that the SAC was responsible for both elite sport and sport for all, and that the DPE was in charge of school sport, it was difficult to have a clear-cut boundary between the two government agencies.59 In addition, the CTOC and the ROCSF were disappointed that the SAC took away their resources and power, and were not satisfied with its bureaucracy and capability. For example, the SAC assumed the ROCSF’s power to dominate the selection, training, competition and counselling of elite athletes and the operation of the NSTC, which caused serious conflict (including a lawsuit). However, given the serious nature of the complex power relationships between the SAC, the DPE of the MoE, the CTOC and the ROCSF, as well as the disappointing outcome at the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing (four bronze medals), calls for the dismissal of the SAC were prompted because it had failed to fulfil its policy objective of winning seven gold medals. In response to the public debate on the role of the SAC and the subsequent disputes over the relationship between the national governing bodies of sport, as part of the government structural reform, the SAC officially merged with the MoE and was renamed the Sports Administration (SA) in 2013. To summarise, the sport administrative structure underwent a tremendous transformation within this period. The SAC was established in 1997 and officially became the central authority

Executive Yuan

Sports Affairs Council

Ministry of Education

Department of Physical Education

Education Bureau at local level

Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee

ROC Sports Federation

National Sports Training Centre

National Sports Organizations

Figure 24.2 National sports administrative structure in Taiwan in 2012 263

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governing sport affairs, while the DPE was then limited to promoting physical education in schools. The priorities of the SAC’s sport policy continued to be the development of sport for all and elite sport. In this period, the liberalisation and encouragement of private firms to invest in sporting facilities was seen as a significant step forward. Moreover, another emphasis of sport policy was that of hosting international sporting events in an attempt to enhance Taiwan’s international visibility and diplomatic relations.

Sport Administration, Ministry of Education (2013 to present) A new stage began in 2013, when the SAC was renamed the Sports Administration (SA), which is under the MoE in conjunction with the government’s structural reform.The central authority governing sport affairs is once again an administration housed under the education system. The delivery of policy change is overseen by the sport administrative structure reform at the government level. There are six operating units of the SA, including the Planning Division, the School Physical Education Division, the Sport for All Division, the Competitive Athletics Division, the International and Cross-Strait Sports Division and the Sports Facilities Division.60 In 2015, the National Sports Training Centre was separated from the government sector and became a legal entity (i.e. an administrative institution).61 Later, in 2016, the Executive Yuan established the ‘Physical Education and Sports Development Council’ with the aim of facilitating cross-sector collaboration for the development of physical education and sport in Taiwan.62 In 2013, the SA integrated sport resources and affairs in schools and society and issued the ‘Sport Policy White Paper’ governing the next decade. The priorities of sport policy shifted from that of ‘Two Axes’ (i.e. sport for all and elite sport) into the new era of the ‘Golden Triangle’ (sport for all, elite sport and the sport industry).63 The action plan for the white paper was completed in September and published in December. The white paper set out the vision of ‘Healthy Citizens, Outstanding Competitive Skills and Vibrant Taiwan’ with the core philosophy of a quality sport culture, outstanding athletic performance and prosperous sport industries as guidelines for sport development in Taiwan.64 Since the ‘Sports Industry Development Act’ was issued in 2012, sport industry development has emerged as one of the central policy themes within the sport policy agenda. In 2017, the Legislative Yuan successively passed the amendment of the ‘Sports Industry Development Act,’ which provides a legal basis for public-sector participation in the sport industry. Its aim is to grant subsidies and tax deductions, such as allowing tax deductions to be filed for expenditures associated with donating sport or exercise equipment to government agencies or schools as well as to people who help further advance the sport industry.65 This kind of policy is similar to the concept of the new public service emerging for the policy planning and implementation of sport for all.66 The new public service emphasises the roles of the government and civil society on sharing resources and responsibilities in the pursuit of a mutually desired benefit.The SA has been encouraging the private sector and corporations to actively participate in public affairs. For example, the ‘Corporate Sponsorship Plan for Sport’ provides incentives for industries to sponsor sport, including tax waivers for private enterprises’ income taxes and simplifying sponsorship procedures. In addition, the purpose of the ‘Enterprise League Matches,’ the linking of sporting events and corporate brands is to enhance the enterprises’ image, promote sales and improve visibility.67 Furthermore, in 2015, the NSTC was separated from the government sector and became a legal entity with the right to operate flexibly concerning the investment of resources from the private sector and corporations. In recent years, the Taiwanese government and politicians have used sport as a means of achieving greater social integration through promoting aboriginal physical activities and female 264

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participation in sport. In line with the international trend of raising the attention paid to women’s participation in sport and gender equality, the SA announced the ‘Women’s Sports Participation Advocacy White Paper’ and launched the action plan ‘Women Get Moving, Exercise Easy Go!’ in 2017. The white paper proposes a ten-year programme to boost women’s participation and to achieve gender equality in sport by advocating positive attitudes in the mass media.68 In 2017, the SA amended the ‘Sport Policy White Paper’ and the ‘National Sports Act.’ In particular, the amendments to the ‘National Sports Act’ have been seen as a giant step forward for the development of athletes and the enforcement of financial accountability, the administrative transparency of the sport-governing bodies and the promotion of public participation. Regarding the institutionalisation of sport, the administration has been dominated by bureaucrats and politicians, with restricted participation in decision-making for the other stakeholders. For decades, key national sport organisations, such as those for athletics, swimming, badminton and cycling, have been dominated by incumbent or former civil servants and political leaders who have the power to monopolise all kinds of resources.69 However, according to President Tsai: [T]he purpose of the governing bodies is to help athletes, not to monopolise financial and material resources. We must reform organisations that do not take good care of athletes. These bodies will become more equitable for everyone and will have more openness and accessibility to the public.70 Although there are still disputes over the new rules, such as membership of a sport organisation, the amendments to the ‘National Sports Act’ are seen as a significant move essential for successful sport reform. In recent years, it is unsurprising that Taiwan’s relationship with international sport continues to be influenced by Chinese interference. As China continues to rise and carry a greater weight in global politics, challenges to Taiwanese sport development have become more evident. The most significant example is the Chinese interference that resulted in the revocation of Taiwan’s right to host the first East Asian Youth Games, scheduled for 2019. Although the success of the 29th Summer Universiade in Taipei demonstrated Taiwan’s ability to host mega sport events, China has continued to block Taiwanese bids to host international sport events as a sovereign state at all costs. In 2014, Taichung won the bid to host the East Asian Youth Games; however, in 2018, the East Asian Olympic Committee announced that it had revoked Taichung’s right to host the Games scheduled for 2019 due to pressure from China, after the city had already spent nearly US$22.04 million on preparations for the event. This action was taken because China was unhappy about a referendum proposal to rename Taiwan’s national sport team from ‘Chinese Taipei’ to ‘Taiwan’ for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics.71 This behaviour demonstrates that China will use political interference to impede Taiwan’s participation in international sporting arenas.72 The Taiwanese government understands that it is almost impossible for them to participate in international sport affairs unless Taiwan can become involved in the leadership of international sport organisations and soften the attitude of the Chinese government towards the Taiwanese sport community.Thus, the SA makes efforts to strengthen the links between international sport organisations and the hosting of international sport events and conferences by assisting in the campaign for leadership positions in international sport organisations and training personnel for international sport affairs. As of 2016, there were 166 Taiwanese serving in international sport organisations and 10 secretaries of international sport organisations located in Taiwan.73 265

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Conclusion President Tsai Ing-wen, during her 2016 electoral campaign, made a promise to double the government’s budget for sport development within eight years. The government now promises to allocate US$331.1 million to the development of sport from 2018 to 2021 as part of the ‘Forward-looking Infrastructure Development Programme.’ From the angle of sport as a policy concern of the government, this chapter has reviewed the historical developments of sport policy in Taiwan and the related issue of how sport has been structured and managed since the start of the Taiwanese government’s settlement in Taiwan in 1949. This review has also served to show how Taiwanese sport has always been marked by political patronage, where sport has been used as a resource for promoting the interests of certain political parties.The trend over the past 20 years has clearly been for the Taiwanese government to become more closely involved in sport and to seek to exploit sport in pursuit of domestic and international policy objectives. However, the challenge is that China’s rise to superpower status will continue to play a significant role in Taiwan’s attempts to engage in international sport affairs and will thus influence the development of Taiwan’s sport policy. In conclusion, since the launch of the ‘Sport Policy White Paper,’ the administration has developed a range of programmes that, to a greater or lesser extent, have addressed the areas of physical education, sport for all, elite sport, international and Cross-Strait sport, sport facilities and the sport industry. In this regard, the real challenge for future administrators is to comply not only with the requirements of the laws but also with the evaluation of the effectiveness and the impact of sport policies in Taiwan. Considering the trend of public-private partnerships applied in the policy domain, there is a need to find mechanisms to involve the private sector in providing additional financial support for the development of sport in the future. Policy analysis and evaluation will be essential to attracting and establishing more strategic partnerships to achieve these goals.

Notes 1 Alan Bairner, Tien-chin Tan, and Jung Woo Lee, “Sport in the Asia-Pacific Region,” in Sport in Society: A Student Introduction, ed. Barrie Houlihan and Dominic Malcolm (London: Sage, 2016), 490–513. 2 A-chin Hsiau, “Narrating Taiwan Out of the Chinese Empire: Rewriting Taiwan’s History from a Taiwanese Perspective in the 1970s,” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 18, no. 2 (2018): 93–126. 3 Ping-chao Lee, Ling-mei Ko, and Tien-chin Tan, “The Changes in Post-War Taiwanese State and Political Structures with Legislative and Administrative Policy toward Sport and Physical Education,” Journal of Sport and Recreation Management no. 7 (2010): 1–18. 4 Ping-chao Lee, “Understanding the Match-fixing Scandals of Professional Baseball in Taiwan: An Exploratory Study of a Confucianism-oriented Society,” European Sport Management Quarterly no. 17 (2017): 45–66. 5 Ling-mei Ko, Meng-chi Ting, and Ping-chao Lee, “The Development of Chinese Martial Arts in Taiwan since 1949,” The International Journal of the History of Sport no. 34 (2017): 1603–16. 6 Tien-chin Tan et al., “Sport Policy in Taiwan, 1949–2008: A Brief History of Government Involvement in Sport,” International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics no. 1 (2009): 99–111. 7 Kuisong Yang and Sheng Mao, “Unafraid of the Ghost: The Victim Mentality of Mao Zedong and the Two Taiwan Strait Crises in the 1950s,” China Review no. 16 (2016): 1–34. 8 Ping-chao Lee and Bai-sheng Li, “Does China Matter? Taiwan’s Successful Bid to Host the 2017 Summer Universiade,” The International Journal of the History of Sport no. 32 (2015): 1044–56. 9 Richard C. Bush and Ryan Hass, Taiwan’s Democracy and the China Challenge (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2019). 10 Bairner, Tan, and Lee, “Sport in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 490–513. 11 Heather Smith, “Taiwan’s Industrial Policy in the 1980s: An Appraisal,” Asian Economic Journal no. 11 (1997): 1–33. 266

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12 Bruce J. Jacobs and I-hao Ben Liu, “Lee Teng-hui and the Idea of ‘Taiwan’,” The China Quarterly no. 190 (2007): 375–93. 13 Bush and Hass, Taiwan’s Democracy and the China Challenge. 14 David J. Sarquis and Wei-chiao Ying, “Cross-Strait Relations: From the Sole China,Two Chinas and the Greater China,” International Relations no. 7 (2019): 258–78. 15 Yu-jie Chen and Jerome A. Cohen, “China–Taiwan Relations Re-examined: The ‘1992 Consensus’ and Cross-Strait Agreements,” University of Pennsylvania Asian Law Review no. 1 (2019): 2–40. 16 Wei-qian Dai, “National Ideology and Sports Policy,” in Sports Education and Humane Concerns: Policy and Ideology, ed.Yi-hsiung Hsu (Taipei: Shta Book, 1998), 159–86. 17 Chien-yu Lin and Ping-chao Lee, “Sport as a Medium of National Resistance: Politics and Baseball in Taiwan During Japanese Colonialism, 1895–1945,” The International Journal of the History of Sport no. 24 (2007): 319–37. 18 Vassil Girginov, “Sport, Society and Militarism—In pursuit of the Democratic Soldier: J.A. Mangan’’s Exploration of Militarism,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 20, no. 4 (2003): 90–117. 19 Tan et al., “Sport Policy in Taiwan, 1949–2008,” 99–111. 20 Ya-wen Huang and Tien-chin Tan, “Sport-for-All Policy in Taiwan: A Case of Ongoing Change?” Asia Pacific Journal of Sport and Social Science no. 2 (2015): 85–98. 21 Yun-han Chu and Jih-wen Lin, “Political Development in 20th Century Taiwan: State-building, Regime Transformation and the Construction of National Identity,” The China Quarterly no. 165 (2001): 102–29. 22 David Shilbury, Kalliopi Sotiriadou, and Christine B. Green, “Sport Development. Systems, Policies and Pathways: An Introduction to the Special Issue,” Sport Management Review no. 11 (2008): 217–23. 23 Dong-jhy Hwang et al., “Sport, National Identity, and Taiwan’s Olympic History,” in The Olympics in East Asia: Nationalism, Regionalism, and Globalism on the Center Stage of World Sports, ed. William W. Kelly and Susan Brownell, CEAS Occasional Publications Series Book 3 (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2011), 119–46. 24 Liqun Cao, Lanying Huang, and Ivan Sun, “From Authoritarian Policing to Democratic Policing: A Case Study of Taiwan,” Policing and Society 26, no. 6 (2016): 642–58. 25 Melissa J. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities (London: University of California Press, 2004); Qingxin Ken Wang, “Taiwanese NGOs and the Prospect of National Reunification in the Taiwan Strait,” Australian Journal of International Affairs no. 54 (2000): 111–24. 26 Tan et al., “Sport Policy in Taiwan, 1949–2008,” 99–111. 27 Tien-chin Tan and Chih-fu Cheng, “Sports Development and Young People in Taiwan,” in Routledge Handbook of Sports Development, ed. Barrie Houlihan and Mick Green (London: Routledge, 2010), 184–97. 28 Junwei Yu, Playing in Isolation: A History of Baseball in Taiwan (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007). 29 Ministry of Education, Taiwan, Developing Sports for All and Excellent Sportsmen Training Programs, Education Act (Taipei: Cheng-chung Publisher, 1968). 30 Lee and Li, “Does China Matter?” 1044–56. 31 Ko, Ting, and Lee, “The Development of Chinese Martial Arts in Taiwan,” 1603–16. 32 Yi-hsiung Hsu and Yuan-ming Hsu, Chinese Physical Education in Modern Times: The Development of Ideology (Taipei: Shta Book, 1999); Chien-yu Lin, “Seeking a Separate National Identity: The Taiwanese State, Politics and the 2007 Baseball World Cup,” The International Journal of the History of Sport no. 29 (2012): 2435–49. 33 Lee, Ko, and Tan, “The Changes in Post-War Taiwanese State,” 1–18. 34 Ibid. 35 Hung-yu Liu, “A Study of The Political Intervention in Sports: The Case of the 2001 Taipei World Baseball Cup,” Journal of Physical Education in Higher Education no. 8 (2006): 13–32. 36 Department of Physical Education, Physical Education Regulation (Taipei: Ministry of Education, 1984). 37 R. S. Jiang, “The Development of Basketball in Taiwan: From the Perspectives of Theories of Governance and Strategic Relations” (PhD diss., Institute of Sport and Leisure Policy, Loughborough University, 2013). 38 Bairner, Tan, and Lee, “Sport in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 490–513. 39 Mei-chiang Shih, Milan Tung-wen Sun, and Guang-xu Wang, “The Historical Institutionalism Analysis of Taiwan’s Administrative Reform,” International Review of Administrative Sciences no. 78 (2012): 305–27. 267

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4 0 Lee, Ko, and Tan, “The Changes in Post-War Taiwanese State,” 1–18. 41 Ibid. 42 Department of Physical Education, Physical Education Regulation (Taipei: Ministry of Education, 1990). 43 Ministry of Education, Ministry Education Bulletin (Taipei: Ministry of Education, 1989). 44 Jiang, “The Development of Basketball in Taiwan.” 45 Alan Bairner, “Sport and the Politics of National Identity in the Two Chinas,” in Sport and National Identities: Globalization and Conflict, ed. Paddy Dolan and John Connolly (New York: Routledge, 2017), 37–54. 46 Lee and Li, “Does China Matter?” 1044–56. 47 Ministry of Education, Taiwan, The 7th National Education Conference (Taipei: Ministry of Education, 1994). 48 Jiang, “The Development of Basketball in Taiwan.” 49 Sports Affairs Council, Taiwan, National Physical Education Law (Taipei: Executive Yuan, 1998). 50 Hsing-nuan Yu and Chia-wen Hong, “A Discussion on Central Physical Education Budget Allocation and Implementation,” Physical Education Journal no. 39 (2006): 121–34. 51 Tan et al., “Sport Policy in Taiwan, 1949–2008,” 99–111. 52 Jiang, ‘ “The Development of Basketball in Taiwan.” 53 Ibid. 54 Yu-liang Lin and Chin-hsung Kao, “A Study on the Policy of Sport for All in Taiwan from the Perspective of the New Public Service,” Asian Sports Management Review no. 10 (2016): 2–10. 55 Huang and Tan, “Sport-for-All Policy in Taiwan: A Case of Ongoing Change?” 85–98. 56 Sports Affairs Council,Taiwan, The Active Scheme of Sport Development in the 21st Century (Taipei: Executive Yuan, 2000). 57 Lee, Ko, and Tan, “The Changes in Post-War Taiwanese State,” 1–18. 58 Huang and Tan, “Sport-for-All Policy in Taiwan: A Case of Ongoing Change?” 85–98. 59 Tan et al., “Sport Policy in Taiwan, 1949–2008,” 99–111. 60 Sports Administration, Taiwan, 2013 Sports Policy White Paper (Taipei: Ministry of Education, 2013). 61 National Sports Training Center, “History,” accessed July 17, 2019, www.nstc.org.tw/English/#about. 62 ExecutiveYuan,“The Establishment of the Physical Education and Sport Development Council,” accessed July 17, 2019, www.ey.gov.tw/Page/9277F759E41CCD91/db395958-4455-4ce7-a4a7-b0134f442a03. 63 Ministry of Education, “Main Education Policies: Sports and Physical Education,” accessed July 17, 2019, http://history.moe.gov.tw/policy.asp?id=23. 64 Sports Administration, Taiwan, 2013 Annual Report (Taipei: Ministry of Education, 2014). 65 Sports Administration, Taiwan, 2017 Sports Policy White Paper (Taipei: Ministry of Education, 2017). 66 Lin and Kao, “A Study on the Policy of Sport for All in Taiwan from the Perspective of the New Public Service.” 67 Sports Administration, Taiwan, 2016 Annual Report (Taipei: Ministry of Education, 2017). 68 Sports Administration, Taiwan, Women’’s Sport Participation Advocacy White Paper (Taipei: Ministry of Education, 2017). 69 Tan et al., “Sport Policy in Taiwan, 1949–2008,” 99–111. 70 Executive Yuan, “President Tsai Promises to Increase Budget for Sports Development,” press release, accessed July 17, 2019, https://english.ey.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=3FA02B129BCA256C&sms =925E4E62B451AB83&s=1331ADA5056EB048. 71 Executive Yuan, “Taiwan Condemns Chinese Interference in 2019 East Asian Youth Games Hosting Rights,” press release, accessed July 17, 2019, https://english.ey.gov.tw/News_Content2.aspx?n=8262 ED7A25916ABF&sms=DD07AA2ECD4290A6&s=9F128A13A441BA3C. 72 Ko, Ting, and Lee, “The Development of Chinese Martial Arts in Taiwan,” 1603–16. 73 Sports Administration, 2016 Annual Report.

Bibliography Bairner, Alan. “Sport and the Politics of National Identity in the Two Chinas.” In Sport and National Identities: Globalization and Conflict, edited by Paddy Dolan and John Connolly, 37–54. New York: Routledge, 2017. Bairner, Alan, Tien-Chin Tan, and Jung Woo Lee. “Sport in the Asia-Pacific Region.” In Sport in Society: A Student Introduction, edited by Barrie Houlihan and Dominic Malcolm, 490–513. London: Sage, 2016. 268

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Brown, Melissa J. Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities. London: University of California Press, 2004. Bush, Richard C., and Ryan Hass. Taiwan’s Democracy and the China Challenge. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2019. Cao, Liqun, Lanying Huang, and Ivan Sun. “From Authoritarian Policing to Democratic Policing: A Case Study of Taiwan.”  Policing and Society 26, no. 6 (2016): 642–58. Chen, Yu-jie, and Jerome A. Cohen. “China–Taiwan Relations Re-examined: The ‘1992 Consensus’ and Cross-Strait Agreements.” University of Pennsylvania Asian Law Review no. 1 (2019): 2–40. Chu,Yun-han, and Jih-wen Lin. “Political Development in 20th Century Taiwan: State-Building, Regime Transformation and the Construction of National Identity.” The China Quarterly no. 165 (2001): 102–29. Dai, Wei-qian. “National Ideology and Sports Policy.” In Sports Education and Humane Concerns: Policy and Ideology, edited by Yi-hsiung Hsu, 159–86. Taipei: Shta Book, 1998. Department of Physical Education, Taiwan. Physical Education Regulation. Taipei: Ministry of Education, 1984. Department of Physical Education, Taiwan. Physical Education Regulation. Taipei: Ministry of Education, 1990. Girginov,Vassil. “Sport, Society and Militarism: In Pursuit of the Democratic Soldier: J.A. Mangan’s Exploration of Militarism.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 20, no. 4 (2003): 90–117. Hsiau, A-chin. “Narrating Taiwan Out of the Chinese Empire: Rewriting Taiwan’s History from a Taiwanese Perspective in the 1970s.” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 18, no. 2 (2018): 93–126. Hsu,Yi-hsiung, and Yuan-ming Hsu. Chinese Physical Education in Modern Times:The Development of Ideology. Taipei: Shta Book, 1999. Huang, Ya-wen, and Tien-chin Tan. “Sport-for-All Policy in Taiwan: A Case of Ongoing Change?” Asia Pacific Journal of Sport and Social Science no. 2 (2015): 85–98. Hwang, Dong-jhy, Alan Bairner, Kathleen Heitzman, and Wei-cheng Chiu. “Sport, National Identity, and Taiwan’s Olympic History.” In The Olympics in East Asia: Nationalism, Regionalism, and Globalism on the Center Stage of World Sports, edited by William W. Kelly and Susan Brownell, 119–46. CEAS Occasional Publications Series Book 3. New Haven, CT:Yale University, 2011. Jacobs, Bruce J., and I-hao Ben Liu. “Lee Teng-hui and the Idea of ‘Taiwan’.” The China Quarterly no. 190 (2007): 375–93. Jiang, R. S. “The Development of Basketball in Taiwan: From the Perspectives of Theories of Governance and Strategic Relations.” PhD diss., Institute of Sport and Leisure Policy, Loughborough University, 2013. Ko, Ling-mei, Meng-chi Ting, and Ping-chao Lee. “The Development of Chinese Martial Arts in Taiwan Since 1949.” The International Journal of the History of Sport no. 34 (2017): 1603–16. Lee, Ping-chao. “Understanding the Match-Fixing Scandals of Professional Baseball in Taiwan: An Exploratory Study of a Confucianism-Oriented Society.” European Sport Management Quarterly no. 17 (2017): 45–66. Lee, Ping-chao, Ling-mei Ko, and Tien-chin Tan. “The Changes in Post-War Taiwanese State and Political Structures with Legislative and Administrative Policy Toward Sport and Physical Education.” Journal of Sport and Recreation Management no. 7 (2010): 1–18. Lee, Ping-chao, and Bai-sheng Li. “Does China Matter? Taiwan’s Successful Bid to Host the 2017 Summer Universiade.” The International Journal of the History of Sport no. 32 (2015): 1044–56. Lin, Chien-yu. “Seeking a Separate National Identity: The Taiwanese State, Politics and the 2007 Baseball World Cup.” The International Journal of the History of Sport no. 29 (2012): 2435–49. Lin, Chien-yu, and Ping-chao Lee. “Sport as a Medium of National Resistance: Politics and Baseball in Taiwan During Japanese Colonialism, 1895–1945.” The International Journal of the History of Sport no. 24 (2007): 319–37. Lin,Yu-liang, and Chin-hsung Kao. “A Study on the Policy of Sport for All in Taiwan from the Perspective of the New Public Service.” Asian Sports Management Review no. 10 (2016): 2–10. Liu, Hung-yu. “A Study of the Political Intervention in Sports:The Case of the 2001 Taipei World Baseball Cup.” Journal of Physical Education in Higher Education no. 8 (2006): 13–32. 269

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Ministry of Education, Taiwan. The 7th National Education Conference. Taipei: Ministry of Education, 1994. Ministry of Education, Taiwan. Developing Sports for All and Excellent Sportsmen Training Programs, Education Act. Taipei: Cheng-chung Publisher, 1968. Ministry of Education, Taiwan. Ministry of Education Bulletin. Taipei: Ministry of Education, 1989. Sarquis, David J., and Wei-chiao Ying. “Cross-Strait Relations: From the Sole China, Two Chinas and the Greater China.” International Relations no. 7 (2019): 258–78. Shih, Mei-chiang, Milan Tung-wen Sun, and Guang-xu Wang. “The Historical Institutionalism Analysis of Taiwan’s Administrative Reform.” International Review of Administrative Sciences no. 78 (2012): 305–27. Shilbury, David, Kalliopi Sotiriadou, and Christine B. Green. “Sport Development. Systems, Policies and Pathways: An Introduction to the Special Issue.” Sport Management Review no. 11 (2008): 217–23. Smith, Heather.“Taiwan’s Industrial Policy in the 1980s: An Appraisal.” Asian Economic Journal no. 11 (1997): 1–33. Sports Administration, Taiwan. 2013 Annual Report. Taipei: Ministry of Education, 2014. Sports Administration, Taiwan. 2013 Sports Policy White Paper. Taipei: Ministry of Education, 2013. Sports Administration, Taiwan. 2016 Annual Report. Taipei: Ministry of Education, 2017. Sports Administration, Taiwan. 2017 Sports Policy White Paper. Taipei: Ministry of Education, 2017. Sports Administration, Taiwan. Women’s Sport Participation Advocacy White Paper. Taipei: Ministry of Education, 2017. Sports Affairs Council, Taiwan. The Active Scheme of Sport Development in the 21st Century. Taipei: Executive Yuan, 2000. Sports Affairs Council, Taiwan. National Physical Education Law. Taipei: Executive Yuan, 1998. Tan, Tien-chin, and Chih-fu Cheng. “Sports Development and Young People in Taiwan.” In Routledge Handbook of Sports Development, edited by Barrie Houlihan and Mick Green, 184–97. London: Routledge, 2010. Tan, Tien-chin, Chih-fu Cheng, Ping-chao Lee, and Ling-mei Ko. “Sport Policy in Taiwan, 1949–2008: A Brief History of Government Involvement in Sport.” International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics no. 1 (2009): 99–111. Wang, Qingxin Ken. “Taiwanese NGOs and the Prospect of National Reunification in the Taiwan Strait.” Australian Journal of International Affairs no. 54 (2000): 111–24. Yang, Kuisong, and Sheng Mao. “Unafraid of the Ghost:The Victim Mentality of Mao Zedong and the Two Taiwan Strait Crises in the 1950s.” China Review no. 16 (2016): 1–34. Yu, Hsing-nuan, and Chia-wen Hong. “A Discussion on Central Physical Education Budget Allocation and Implementation.” Physical Education Journal no. 39 (2006): 121–34. Yu, Junwei. Playing in Isolation: A History of Baseball in Taiwan. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007.

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25 Politics and policy of forging post-handover Hong Kong as sporting mega-event centre Marcus P. Chu

Introduction After the Qing Empire’s failure in the Opium War in the 1840s, Hong Kong, then a small fishing village in the south coast of China, was ceded to Britain. In the following 150 years of colonial rule, the British successfully transformed this fishing village into one of the most prominent commercial and financial centres in the world.To further boost the reputation of Hong Kong in the international arena, since the 1980s the colonial government and business corporations have been instrumental in providing financial support to local sport organisations to hold international tournaments of badminton, tennis, squash, golf, rugby and football.1 The city was also an enthusiastic host of mega-events overseen by renowned international sport organisations.2 The people of Hong Kong enjoyed the brilliant performances of world-class athletes in these sport galas. However, in 1997 the British government agreed to return the city to Beijing. Although the paramount leader Deng Xiaoping and his followers insisted that Hong Kong would enjoy a high degree of autonomy under the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ principle after the transfer of sovereignty, Hong Kong citizens were anxious about the future. Reports from the international media predicted the failure of this unprecedented principle.3 It is in this context that the colonial authorities and business corporations saw how sport could be used to restore the confidence of the Hong Kong people. Accordingly, a number of new sporting mega-events were held in the city in the 1990s.4 On the eve of 30 June 1997, the lowering of the Union Jack in the handover ceremony indicated that the over 150-year colonial rule by Britain was over. As a result, Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region (SAR) under the sovereignty of China. Since then, the four Chief Executives, namely Tung Chee-hwa, Donald Tsang, Leung Chun-ying and Carrie Lam, along with their respective administrations, promised to promote Hong Kong as a sporting mega-event centre (shengshihua). Yet while Tung, Tsang and Lam keenly formulated policies to realise their promises, Leung was reluctant to do so.This chapter aims to understand the political factors behind the difference and to assess the potential future development of the city in hosting sporting mega-events.

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Hong Kong under Tung Chee-hwa 1997–2005 In the first two years after the political takeover, the GDP of Hong Kong slumped dramatically because of international speculative attacks and the subsequent Asian financial crisis. As a result of this, Hong Kong citizens and overseas investors were less optimistic about the investment environment of the city. Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa and his administration used tens of billions of dollars from the public reserve to defend against overseas financial attacks at this time. They also put the promotion of Hong Kong as the Asian World City in their working agenda with the intention of creating job opportunities, boosting the recovery of the local economy, enhancing the overall competitiveness of the city, restoring the confidence of investors and displaying the success of the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ principle. Accordingly, the SAR government continued to back international tournaments organised by local sport organisations. The government also accepted the proposal of the Sports Federation and Olympic Committee of Hong Kong, China (SF&OC), regarding the hosting of the 2006 Asian Games. Against challenges from the cities of Doha, Kuala Lumpur and New Delhi in the 2006 Asian Games bid, the SAR government remained confident about Hong Kong’s chances for success. However, the government’s senior executives were unwilling to lavishly stage the event and were unenthusiastic about lobbying voters to promote the city at home and abroad. In line with the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ principle, the Chinese authorities decided to let Hong Kong handle the bidding project on its own, although the Chief Executive requested Beijing’s assistance. The other bidders, particularly the capital cities of Qatar and Malaysia, had their national governments’ backing. These cities promised to present the 2006 Asian Games in an extravagant manner and also proactively lobbied support from the Asian sport community. Not surprisingly, Hong Kong suffered a crushing defeat in this competition.5 The general public of Hong Kong did not blame the government for the loss, although the bidding project cost over HKD 15 million of the public reserve,6 as the economic recovery emerged and the unemployment rate decreased. While the citizens of Hong Kong were looking forward to a faster pace of GDP growth, the 9/11 incident resulted in another slump in the local economy of the SAR. Together with a series of controversial policies formulated by Tung Chee-hwa and his cabinet, this triggered the Hong Kong people to ask for Tung-Chee-haw’s resignation. Nevertheless, President Jiang Zemin’s all-out support led to Tung’s Chief Executive contract being renewed for a further five years. In a report on the city’s future development of sport, the SAR government put particular stress on the necessity of making Hong Kong a centre of international sporting events.7 This report also indicated that in the second term of his office, Tung would bring more internationally renowned sporting galas to the city. In June 2003, the SAR government and the SF&OC activated the bid for the 2009 East Asian Games. Tung’s popularity declined further during this time because of the government’s failure to prevent the spread of SARS and its decision to legislate the national security bill, which led to accusations from citizens that the government was intent on destroying the city’s political freedom. More than 500 thousand people took part in a protest on 1 July 2003 – the sixth anniversary of the SAR – expressing their dissatisfaction at the performance of the government and demanding the removal of Tung and his colleagues from office. In this context, some lawmakers who had once supported the legislation of the national security bill changed their minds. This unexpected political turn meant that the government’s plan could not be passed by the SAR legislature. Tung shelved the legislation indefinitely. In view of the SARS outbreak and the subsequent massive political protest, the Chinese authorities realised that it was essential to (1) help Hong Kong enhance its international reputation, and (2) restore the confidence of citizens and overseas investors in the ‘One Country, Two 272

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Systems’ principle. Accordingly, the Chinese authorities decisively supported the city in the bid for the 2009 East Asian Games.8 After winning the hosting rights, the central leaders accepted the request of the SAR government and the SF&OC to allow Hong Kong host the 2008 Summer Olympics equestrian events.9 While Jacque Rogge and other senior executives of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) were reviewing this Beijing-backed proposal, Tung Chee-hwa resigned from office because of health issues. His deputy, Donald Tsang, subsequently took up the duty of chairing the local administration. In September 2005, the IOC agreed that Hong Kong would host the 2008 Summer Olympics equestrian competitions. Subsequently, the SAR government managed to secure a guarantee the Hong Kong Jockey Club, a nongovernment organisation with the duty of managing horse racing and lottery affairs, to cover the cost of building the venues for the 2008 Summer Olympics equestrian competitions.10 During the bid for the 2009 East Asian Games, the SAR government formed the Mega Sports Events Committee.11 This was a unit under the direct charge of the Home Affairs Secretary with the aim of ‘advising the administration on: (1) the strategies and initiatives for the promotion and hosting of major sport events in Hong Kong; (2) the strategies to foster partnership with the sport, tourism and private sectors for major sport events; (3) the principles, procedures and the control mechanism for the allocation of funds for major sport events; and (4) the funding priorities for major sport events.12 Later, the ‘M Mark’ system was introduced to identify prestigious sporting mega-events that were to be sponsored by the local executive.13 These arrangements, together with the success in the pursuit of the 2008 Olympics equestrian competitions and the 2009 East Asian Games, showed Hong Kong’s ambition to stage more international sporting galas in the Donald Tsang era.

Hong Kong under Donald Tsang 2005–2012 To raise his popularity and avoid repeating the mistakes of his predecessor, Donald Tsang, promised to establish social cohesion, boost the morale of the public, restore the legendary reputation of Hong Kong and showcase the success of the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ principle. Accordingly, he and his administration decided to increase the budget for the 2009 East Asian Games.14 While the lawmakers of Hong Kong welcomed this arrangement, the Beijing side decided to change the policy towards the SAR. Hong Kong’s citizens’ anxiety over the legislation of the national security law in 2003 led the Chinese authorities to deem that it was necessary to tighten Hong Kong’s ties with China. Thus, the central government of China, since 2005, actively approved Chinese corporations to raise funds in, and encouraged their citizens to visit, Hong Kong. They also demanded the SAR government to imbue the general public with patriotic sentiment.15 In view of this, Tsang and his administration started to draft the national education curriculum for local primary and secondary schools, called on the Hong Kong people to give donations once the magnitude 8 earthquake occurred in Wenchuan county of Sichuan province and highlighted the promotion of the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics and its equestrian competitions.This promotional measure was confirmed later as a successful strategy, because patriotic sentiment of the local citizens reached a historic high while watching the extravagant opening ceremony of the event in Beijing, the gold medal haul of the Chinese delegation and Hong Kong’s astonishing celebration of the equestrian competitions.16 With the arrival of Chinese investors and tourists, the economy of Hong Kong recovered. In this climate, Tsang and his administration made repeated commitments to the forging of Hong Kong as an international sporting event centre.17 The government also proposed to build a mega-sport complex in the site of the former Kai Tak Airport.18 However, the GDP of the city 273

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slumped in 2008 due to the global financial tsunami. To boost the morale of the Hong Kong people, the SAR government decided to flawlessly celebrate the 2009 East Asian Games. This nine-day sporting mega-event eventually won critical acclaim of the Chief Executive and the public, as the creative opening ceremony and the Hong Kong men’s football team’s victory in the final match were a display of the host city’s ability to rejuvenate itself.19 In view of the government’s determination to forge the sporting event centre and its plan to build the sport complex, the SF&OC, shortly after the 2009 East Asian Games were over, expressed the intention to host the 2019 Asian Games in Hong Kong. However, Tsang and his colleagues deemed that the SAR had a greater chance of gaining the hosting rights to the 2023 Asian Games. After the proposed budget of HKD 13.7–14.5 billion to forge the event was unveiled by the government, the majority of local citizens voiced their opposition.20 To avoid their members being eliminated in the 2011 District Board and 2012 Legislative Council elections, the pro-establishment lawmakers decided to stand with the public rather than the executive. In this situation, Tsang and his administration had no choice but to withdraw the plan to stage the 2023 Asian Games. During this time, the Hong Kong citizens’ enthusiasm to embrace China declined significantly. This was because: (1) the Beijing side intensified involvement in the political affairs of the SAR; (2) the Chinese local authorities were found to have been reckless in managing the donations of Hong Kong to the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake; and (3) giving birth, hoarding properties and snapping up daily necessities became the prime objective of the Chinese people who came to Hong Kong. More than a hundred million people took part in protests throughout the summer of 2012, demanding the government cancel the launch of the national education subject in primary and secondary schools. Surprisingly, Leung Chun-ying, a diehard pro-Beijing surveyor who succeeded Donald Tsang as the Chief Executive on 1 July, suspended this policy.

Hong Kong under Leung Chun-ying 2012–2017 Aside from the suspension of the launch of the national education subject, Leung adopted measures to limit the Chinese in giving birth, hoarding properties and snapping up daily necessities in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, the occupy movement boosted the citizens’ antipathy against China and the SAR government. On 31 August 2014, the National People’s Congress unveiled its proposed framework for how to elect the Chief Executive in 2017. Since this decision was viewed as obstructing Hong Kong’s genuine democracy, tens of thousands of people – mostly young students – demonstrated their anger by illegally occupying the downtown streets. However, both the central and SAR authorities refused to compromise with the participants, and this 79-day civil disobedience movement failed. Because of this situation, some of the young people, in 2015 and 2016, frequently booed the national anthem of China in the international sporting competitions hosted in the SAR as an expression of their deep dissatisfaction with the political reality.21 Both the Chinese and Hong Kong authorities were infuriated. However, the SAR government was unable to penalise those who were involved in the booing, as there was no law against insults to the national anthem in the SAR. To avoid a recurrence of this, however, the government cut the budget for hosting sporting mega-events.22 Also, the commitment to making Hong Kong a sporting mega-event centre was excluded from the 2015 and 2016 Chief Executive’s work agenda.23 Even though the local civil organisations, during this period, still put forward applications to stage international sporting galas, Leung and his administration chose not to give words of support.24 Meanwhile, the Beijing side formed a committee to oversee the implementation of President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative, a Beijing-led programme with the participation of 274

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Asia, Africa, Europe and Oceania for infrastructure construction, investments, trade and cultural exchange. Leung and his administration keenly supported this ambitious cross-continent project as a way to further tighten Hong Kong’s dependence upon China.25 While the relevant measures were being carried out consecutively, Leung declared that he would not seek the renewal of his Chief Executive contract. Thus, his deputy Carrie Lam became the new leader of the SAR executive in July 2017.

Hong Kong under Carrie Lam since 2017 Closely following the trend of China and further tightening Hong Kong’s ties with Beijing became the top priority of Lam’s work agenda.The SAR administration thus continued to back the implementation of the Belt-and-Road initiative, took part in the making of the Greater Bay Area26 and intended to legislate a law to ban insults to the national anthem of China at public occasions.27 In addition, to display the government’s interest in sport in general and the creation of the sporting mega-event centre in particular, Lam promised to offer over HKD 20 billion for local athletic development from 2017 to 2022.28 The government also activated the building of the sport complex in the site of the former Kai Tak Airport with a budget of over HKD 30 billion.29 In view of this, the SF&OC expressed interest in bring sporting mega-events to the SAR.30 While the local sport community was discussing hosting plans with the government, Lam and her colleagues put forward the extradition bill to the legislature and pushed its members to give approval by June 2019. Given their fear of being extradited to China, more than one million people joined the protests against the bill, urging the executive to withdraw it at once. Although Lam eventually suspended the legislation, the police force was condemned to use of excessive violence against the protestors.31 Thus, over two million people marched in the rallies on 16 June and 1 July, voicing their demands for: (1) Lam’s resignation; (2) formally withdrawing the bill; (3) forming an independent enquiry commission to investigate the police’s use of excessive violence; (4) releasing the protestors; and (5) the implementation of genuine universal suffrage to elect the Chief Executive. In light of this ongoing political crisis, Lam repeatedly delivered apologies.32 The pro-Beijing figures, however, admitted that the execution of the SAR government’s policies in future would be extremely difficult if the people’s political demands failed to be satisfied.33

Conclusion This chapter reviewed the political factors determined by the chief executives and administrations of Hong Kong to pursue sporting mega-events. The findings showed that both the first and second Chief Executives–Tung Chee-hwa and Donald Tsang – keenly favoured the holding of sporting mega-events. Meanwhile their administrations formulated policies to facilitate the local sport community’s quest for the hosting rights and subsequent organisation tasks. They instituted these policies because the targeted events – particularly the 2006 Asian Games, the 2008 Summer Olympics equestrian competitions, the 2009 East Asian Games and the 2023 Asian Games – were believed to have the potential to boost the international profile of the SAR, display the success of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ principle, restore citizens’ morale and confidence as well as intensify the patriotic sentiment of the public. However, to express their anger about the Chinese authorities’ interventions in the political affairs of Hong Kong, some local residents, in 2005 and 2006, frequently booed the national anthem of China in the international sporting competitions. Due to the absence of laws against 275

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insulting the national anthem, the third Chief Executive, Leung Chun-ying, decided to reduce the government’s financial support to the local sport organisations for pursuing sporting megaevents. His administrative team was also indifferent towards the local community’s applications for the athletic gatherings. Leung’s successor, Carrie Lam, adopted a number of ambitious measures to resume the city’s passion of holding sporting galas, as she and her cabinet were confident that to complete the making of the national anthem law during their term of office would be plain sailing. This chapter also revealed that Carrie Lam’s words and deeds showed she had determined to let Hong Kong closely follow the Chinese authorities’ footsteps. Thus, any future sporting mega-events sponsored by the SAR government would be likely to carry the mission of promoting Hong Kong’s role in the implementation of Beijing’s ambitious projects, like the Beltand-Road initiative and the Greater Bay Area. Nevertheless, the failure to enact the extradition law resulted in the collapse of Lam and her cabinet’s governance legitimacy. The government’s enthusiasm to make sporting mega-events bloom in the city may decline.

Acknowledgement The author pays tribute to Professors Fan Hong and Lu Zhouxiang for editing this Handbook. He also thanks Lingnan University Office of Research Support for offering direct grant (No. DR19B6) to fund the data collection of this chapter.

Notes 1 They included the Hong Kong Open Badminton Championships, the Hong Kong Squash Open, the Hong Kong Open (golf), the Hong Kong Sevens (rugby), the Hong Kong Tennis Open and the Chinese New Year Cup (football). 2 Hong Kong’s holding of the four Asian Football Confederation (AFC) Women’s Asian Cup events from 1975 to 1989 was one of these instances. 3 Louis Kraar and Joe McGowan, ‘ “The Death of HK’,” Fortune, June 26, 1995, accessed July 8, 2019, http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1995/06/26/203948/index.htm. 4 The Hong Kong International Cricket Sixes and the Hong Kong Marathon are two instances. 5 Marcus P. Chu, ‘ “Post-handover Hong Kong’s International Sporting Bids: A Win-less-lose-more Journey’,” International Journal of the History of Sport 30, no. 10 (2016): 1194–97; Marcus P. Chu, Politics of Mega-events in China’s Hong Kong (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 62–67. 6 ‘ “Gang Shenban Yayun Gonghuafei Yiqian Wubai ’Wanyuan” [Hong Kong’s Asian Games Bid Cost HKD 15 Million], Wen Wei Po, November 17, 2000, p. A14. 7 ‘ “Sports Development in Hong Kong’,” Hong Kong SAR Legislative Council, June 12, 2015, p. CB2/PL/ HA, accessed July 8, 2019, www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-15/english/panels/ha/papers/ha20150612cb21637-4-e.pdf. 8 Chu, ‘ “Post-handover Hong Kong’s International Sporting Bids 2016’,” 1197–200. 9 Chu, Politics of Mega-events in China’s Hong Kong, 71–72. 10 ‘ “Buhua Gongtang Mahui 8 Yi Jianchangdi” [Hong Kong Jockey Club Spends HKD 800 Million to Build Stadium So Hong Kong Government Would Not Use Public Money for Holding Equestrian Events], Hong Kong Economic Times, July 9, 2005, p. A18. 11 ‘  “Zhengfu Chengli Liangweiyuanhui Tuiguang ’Tiyu” [Government Forms Two Committees to Promote Sports], Hong Kong SAR Government, accessed July 8, 2019, www.info.gov.hk/gia/ general/200310/05/1004183.htm. 12 ‘ “Major Sports Events Committee Terms of References’,” Hong Kong SAR Government Homes Affairs Bureau, accessed July 8, 2019, www.hab.gov.hk/file_manager/en/documents/policy_responsibilities/ msec_tor-e.pdf. 13 ‘ “M Pinpai Jihuan Zhichi Daxing Tiyu ’Huodong” [M Mark System Supports Sporting Megaevents], Hong Kong SAR Government, November 12, 2004, accessed July 8, 2019, www.info.gov.hk/gia/ general/200411/12/1112224.htm. 276

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14 ‘ “Delegates See Local Support for 2009 East Asian Games’,” Hong Kong SAR Government, June 17, 2006, accessed July 8, 2019, www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200606/17/P200606160277.htm. 15 One of the instances was that President Hu Jintao, in the ceremonies of the tenth anniversary of the Hong Kong handover, emphasised the importance of letting local young people accept national education. 16 Chu, Politics of Mega-events in China’s Hong Kong, 74–75. 17 Donald Tsang, ‘ “The 2006–07 Policy Address: Proactive Pragmatic Always People First’,” Hong Kong SAR Government, accessed July 8, 2019, www.policyaddress.gov.hk/06-07/eng/pdf/speech.pdf; Donald Tsang, ‘ “The 2007–08 Policy Address: A New Direction for Hong Kong’,” Hong Kong SAR Government, accessed July 8, 2019, www.policyaddress.gov.hk/07-08/eng/docs/policy.pdf; Donald Tsang, ‘ “The 2008–09 Policy Address: Embracing New Challenges’,” Hong Kong SAR Government, accessed July 8, 2019, www.policyaddress.gov.hk/08-09/eng/docs/policy.pdf. 18 ‘ “Xingzheng Zhangguan Lifahui Dawen Dahui Tanhua Quanwen (Si)’ ” [Full Script of Chief Executive’s Reply to Legislative Council Members’ Questions (Part Four)], Hong Kong SAR Government, January 15, 2009, accessed July 8, 2019, www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200901/15/P200901150307. htm. 19 Chu, Politics of Mega-events in China’s Hong Kong, 75–76. 20 The people did not believe the Asian Games would bring financial benefits to the city. They also deemed that the money budgeted for the event should be used to fill the gap between the rich and the poor, as the ongoing economic growth caused severe wealth disparity in society. 21 Brian Bridges, ‘ “Booing the National Anthem: Hong Kong’s Identities Through the Mirror of Sport’,” Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations 2, no. 2 (2016): 819–43. 22 Chan Kin-wa, ‘ “Hong Kong’s Major Sports Events Under Threat with Government Set to Scrap Mega Events Fund’,” South China Morning Post, October 18, 2016, accessed July 8, 2019, www. scmp.com/sport/hong-kong/article/2029128/marquee-golf-tennis-and-dragon-boat-events-maylose-millions-funding. 23 Leung Chun-ying, ‘ “The 2015 Policy Address: Uphold the Rule of Law Seize the Opportunities Make the Right Choices Pursue Democracy Boost the Economy Improve People’s ’Livelihood,” Hong Kong SAR Government, accessed July 8, 2019, www.policyaddress.gov.hk/2015/eng/pdf/PA2015.pdf; Leung Chun-ying, ‘ “The 2016 Policy Address: Innovate for the Economy Improve Livelihood Foster Harmony Share Prosperity’,” Hong Kong SAR Government, accessed July 8, 2019, www.policyaddress.gov. hk/2016/eng/pdf/PA2016.pdf. 24 One of the instances was the Hong Kong LGBT community’s quest for the 2022 Gay Games. The government did not deliver words of support, although the business sectors believed the event had potential to boost local tourism, and the organiser promised to invite the people of mainland China to take part. For details see Chu, Politics of Mega-events in China’s Hong Kong, 81–84. 25 Chun-ying, ‘ “The 2016 Policy Address’.” 26 The Greater Bay Area is a President Xi Jinping-endorsed project with the aim of forming an 11-city single market in the Pearl River Delta. These cities include Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Foshan, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Jiangmen, Huizhou, Zhaoqing, Hong Kong and Macao. 27 ‘ “National Anthem Bill Gazetted Today’,” Hong Kong SAR Government, January 11, 2019, accessed July 8, 2019, www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201901/11/P2019011100265.htm?fontSize=1. 28 ‘ “CE Presents Flag to Hong Kong Delegation to 13th National Games’,” Hong Kong SAR Government, August 10, 2017, accessed July 8, 2019, www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201708/10/P2017081000582. htm?fontSize=1. 29 Chan Kin-wa, ‘ “Kai Tak Sports Park Operator to Be Hit with Huge Fines for Failing to Fill Facilities; HK$4.3m Per Day for Construction Delay’,” South China Morning Post, April 24, 2019, accessed July 8, 2019, www.scmp.com/sport/hong-kong/article/3007347/kai-tak-sports-park-operator-behit-huge-fines-failing-fill. 30 Karen Zhang and Peace Chiu, ‘ “Hong Kong Olympic Committee Plans Bid to Host 2021 World Beach Games’,” South China Morning Post, November 7, 2018, accessed July 8, 2019, www.scmp.com/ news/hong-kong/society/article/2172014/hong-kong-plans-bid-host-2021-world-beach-games. 31 ‘ “Statement by Non-official ExCo Members on Amendments to Fugitive Offenders Ordinance’,” Hong Kong SAR Government, June 15, 2019, accessed July 8, 2019, www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201906/15/ P2019061500713.htm?fontSize=1. 32 ‘ “Government Response to Public Procession’,” Hong Kong SAR Government, June 16, 2019, accessed July 8, 2019, www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201906/16/P2019061600803.htm; ‘ “Opening Remarks 277

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by CE at Media Session’,” Hong Kong SAR Government, June 18, 2019, accessed July 8, 2019, www.info. gov.hk/gia/general/201906/18/P2019061800812.htm. 33 Yu Kam-yin, ‘ “Prospects for Fresh Constitutional Reforms Dialogue Get Dimmer’,” Hong Kong Economic Journal Insight, July 8, 2019, accessed July 8, 2019, www.ejinsight.com/20190708-prospects-forfresh-constitutional-reforms-dialogue-get-dimmer/.

Bibliography Bridges, Brian. “Booing the National Anthem: Hong Kong’s Identities Through the Mirror of Sport.” Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations 2, no. 2 (2016): 819–43. Chu, Marcus P. Politics of Mega-events in China’s Hong Kong. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. Chu, Marcus P. “Post-handover Hong Kong’s International Sporting Bids: A Win-less-lose-more Journey.” International Journal of the History of Sport 30, no. 10 (2016): 1193–208.

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26 An overview of sport in modern India Packianathan Chelladurai and Swarali Patil

Introduction India is a constitutional republic comprised of 29 states and seven union territories. With a population of 1.3 billion, India is the second most populous democracy in the world.1 With approximately one-sixth of the world’s total population (17.50 percent), it is characterised by its diversity in terms of religion, culture, language and ethnicity. There are 22 major languages in India, written in 13 different scripts, with over 720 dialects.2 The Indian population is made up of numerous regional ethnolinguistic groups, the majority of whom are Indo-Aryans (72 percent) and Dravidians (25 percent). India is a religious nation, with 79.8 percent of the population practicing Hinduism, followed by Islam (14.2 percent), Christianity (2.3 percent) and Sikhism (1.7 percent).3 Though conflicts arise among different groups defined by religion, ethnicity, language and caste, India thrives as a democracy where all segments of the society are respected. The current value of the Indian economy is USD 2.30 trillion, the seventh largest in the world. In terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) the Indian economy ranks third in the world and is pegged at USD 8.52 trillion.4 In contrast, India ranks 122nd in PPP per person at a measly USD 7,783, as a result of its vast population.5 Currently, 50 percent of India’s population is below the age of 25 years and 65 percent of its population is below the age of 35 years. In 2020, the Indian population is expected to have an average age of 29 years, compared to 37 for China and 48 for Japan.6 Economically, India’s middle class is expected to comprise 40 percent of its population, accounting for more than 60 percent of its annual consumption.7 With a growing middle class and a young population, there is no dearth of human capital to help India pursue sporting excellence.

India’s traditional sport Like other ancient civilisations of the world, India has its own tradition of sport and physical fitness. Hinduism, the religion of the majority of the population in the country, promotes the virtues of physical perfection based on a clear understanding of the body and its functions. One manifestation of this tradition is the practice of yoga,‘an ancient discipline designed to bring balance and health to the physical, mental, emotional and spiritual dimensions of the individual.’8 279

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Yoga originated in India in approximately 2700 BCE, and is now practised worldwide because of its focus on harmonising the mind and body.9 Sport indigenous to India include kabaddi and kho kho, which are mostly played in community settings at the grassroots level. Kabaddi has gained tremendous popularity in India, particularly with the success of the Pro Kabaddi League.10

Sport in modern India The Indian sporting landscape is dominated by cricket, but it has other major sport, such as field hockey, football, badminton and tennis.Traditional sport such as kabaddi and kho kho are primarily played at the grassroots level. A brief description of the major sport in India is provided here. Cricket: Cricket, the most popular and profitable sport in India, was introduced to India by the British in the early 1700s. India has won three World Cup trophies and is currently the number one team in all three formats of the game (i.e. one-day test, five-day test, and T20 – a version where the competition is restricted to 20 overs by each team. An over consists of six consecutive balls bowled by a single player from one end of the pitch).The Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) organises popular national tournaments featuring athletes from different regions of India.The BCCI introduced the Indian Premier League (IPL) in 2008 – an eightteam professional league featuring Indian and international cricketers.11 The IPL has achieved tremendous commercial success and is valued at USD 6.3 billion.12 Badminton: Badminton was introduced to India by the British late in the first decade of the twentieth century. The sport has gained popularity in recent years due to the success of young Indian players, such as Saina Nehwal, P.V. Sindhu and K. Srikanth, on the international stage. The Badminton Association of India has initiated a professional league comprised of six teams located in six of the largest cities in India, with prize money of USD 1 million. The association has also launched the Shuttle Time–India programme, encouraging youth from the six franchise cities to compete in professional competitions.13 Field Hockey: Commonly known as hockey, it is India’s national game. Hockey was introduced to India in the middle of the first decade of the twentieth century by the British. Hockey is India’s most successful sport on the international stage. The Indian men’s Olympic hockey team has won eight gold medals and the 1975 Men’s Hockey World Cup. Football: Football was introduced to India by the British in the same time period as field hockey was introduced. The Indian football team was the first Asian team to qualify for the semi-finals at the 1956 Olympic Games.14 Tennis: Introduced by the British late in the first decade of the twentieth century, tennis is governed by the All India Tennis Association and is a sport popular in the urban areas of India. Popular and successful Indian tennis players include Leander Paes, Mahesh Bhupati, Sania Mirza and Vijay Amritraj. Gymnastics: Gymnastics is a relatively new sport in India. Ashish Kumar won the Bronze medal in the 2010 Commonwealth Games held in India, which was India’s first medal in gymnastics in an international event.15 Similarly, Dipa Karamarkar won a bronze medal in the 2014 Commonwealth Games held in Scotland, becoming India’s first female gymnast to do so, and she won a bronze medal in the 2015 Artistic Gymnastics Asian Championships.16 Given the lack of popularity of gymnastics in India and the fact that the Gymnastics Federation of India has been characterised as inefficient, the achievements of Kumar and Karamakar are praiseworthy.17 Other Sport: Sport such as basketball, chess, billiards, snooker and golf have a long history in India, but they do not enjoy commercial success and popularity. Lack of success on the international stage in recent years has likely resulted in public indifference towards these sport. 280

An overview of sport in modern India Table 26.1 India’s Medal Tally in Commonwealth, Asian and Olympic Games Commonwealth Games Year

Organising Country

Gold

Silver

Bronze

Total

2010 2014 2018

India Scotland Australia

38 15 26

27 30 20

36 19 20

101 64 66

Asian Games 2010 2014 2018

China South Korea Indonesia

14 11 15

17 10 24

34 36 30

65 57 69

1 0 0

0 2 1

2 4 1

3 6 2

Olympic Games 2008 China 2012 United Kingdom 2016 Brazil

However, attention from popular international sport leagues interested in gaining viewership and following in Asian nations has the potential to attract sport fans in India. For example, The NBA Academy in India provides elite-level training to aspiring athletes and this may result in the development of talented basketball players and help popularise the sport in the country.18 India’s Performance in International Competitions: As demonstrated in Table 26.1, the success of Indian athletes at securing medals in the Olympic, Asian and Commonwealth Games has been rather mediocre over the last three iterations of the events.

Sport policy and practice Sport in India is delivered through government and non-government agencies that are interconnected and serve allied mandates. Policy of Sports Authority of India: The Sports Authority of India (SAI), a unit of the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, was established in 1984 with the aim of promoting sport and games in the country. The SAI also maintains various stadia in New Delhi, such as the Jawaharlal Nehru Sports Complex, the Indira Gandhi Sports Complex and the Dr Karni Singh Shooting Ranges.19 The objectives of the SAI include: • • • • • •

identifying talent at the grassroots level and nurturing it towards excellence, providing aspiring athletes with training and opportunities to compete in international events, supporting athlete training with appropriate equipment and licensed practitioners, assisting in the training and preparation of national teams, developing and maintaining sport infrastructure, and developing coaches and physical education professionals of the highest calibre in different sport.20

To achieve these objectives, the SAI has established 12 SAI Regional Centres and Educational Institutes, 56 SAI Training Centres, 19 Special Area Games Centres and 11 Centres of 281

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Excellence.21 The SAI has differentiated the processes of training coaches for the pursuit of excellence in sport and training physical educators for the promotion of participation in sport. The Netaji Subhas National Institute of Sports (NSNIS) focuses largely on training coaches, sport psychologists and experts in sport medicine. The NSNIS is affiliated with recognised universities to offer graduate degrees, post graduate diplomas and certificates in sport coaching, sport medicine, sport massage and grounds management. The SAI’s larger Lakshmibai College of Physical Education in Gwalior was renamed as the Lakshmibai National Institute of Physical Education (LNIPE) and is now deemed a university. It operates independently of the SAI but under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports. The LNIPE is affiliated with the University of Kerala and offers a master’s degree in physical education (MPE), a postgraduate diploma in health and fitness management (PGDHFM) and a master of philosophy degree (MPhil).

Programmes of the Ministry for the Development of Sport and Promotion of Physical Activity The programmes (or schemes) initiated by the Ministry for the Development of Sport and Promotion of Physical Activity are set out in detail here. National Sports Development Fund: The National Sports Development Fund was established in 1998 to (a) support specific sport and athletes, (b) provide training and coaching to sport persons, (c) construct and maintain sport infrastructure, (d) identify research-based solutions to barriers, (e) promote international cooperation and exchange programmes, and (f) provide interest-free or low-interest loans for sport-related projects.22 Human Resources Development in Sports: In 2013, the Department of Sports established a programme named the Scheme of Human Resources Development in Sports, which offers funds for advanced graduate sport studies; organisation of seminars, workshops and conferences; inviting qualified experts from other nations; training of referees and umpires, coaches and other support personnel; providing grants for research projects and publication of sport-related research; and developing an online platform for dissemination of knowledge in different languages.23 Khelo India Scheme: The Khelo India (Let’s play, India) programme was established in 2017 with the vision of encouraging youth in the country to participate in sport indigenous to the nation, to popularise them and bring them into the mainstream.24 This programme aims to (a) develop playing fields, community coaches and state-level Khelo India centres, (b) identify and develop aspiring athletes, (c) organise sport competitions, (d) maintain and upgrade sport infrastructure, (e) provide support to national, regional and state academies, (f) encourage sport and physical fitness in schools, and (g) promote sport as a medium of peace and development. Ek Bharat Shreshtha Bharat: The Ek Bharat Shreshtha Bharat (One India, Great India) programme was established in October 2015 to bring together the Indian states to carry out joint ventures in sport, language, literature, cuisine and festivals.25 Each state is paired with another state for the duration of a year to (a) celebrate the diversity of the nation, (b) promote the spirit of national integration, (c) illustrate the rich culture and heritage of the nation, (d) establish long-term engagements, and (e) share best-practices and experiences.Teams in competitions are composed of players from both states to promote cultural understanding and harmony. Programmes for International Competitions: In addition to the programmes just discussed, the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, from time-to-time, establishes specific programmes to enhance the performance of Indian athletes in international competitions. Some examples of these programmes are the Scheme for Preparation of Indian Athletes for Commonwealth Games – 2010 and Operation Excellence for London Olympics – 2012. The amount spent in supporting teams and 282

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athletes for these games ranged from INR 678 crore (approximately USD 96 million) and INR 135 crore (approximately USD 21 million).26 These efforts yielded remarkable results for the country, as India won six medals (2 silver and 4 bronze) at the London 2012 Olympic Games and 64 medals (15 gold, 30 silver, and 19 bronze) at the Commonwealth Games.27 Come and Play Scheme: Instituted in 2011 as part of the legacy plan, the scheme specifies that the sport stadia and other facilities are to be used not only for the pursuit of excellence but also for recreational purposes by the masses.28 This scheme provides youth and sport enthusiasts with an opportunity to train with qualified coaches in well-maintained facilities and with the correct equipment. Competitions are organised among teams within each age group, and athletes who display talent during these events are encouraged to train and compete for higher-level training schemes. Community Connect: Established in 2014, the Community Connect Scheme encourages citizens to participate in activities held in the infrastructure under the jurisdiction of the SAI.29 This ensures the existing infrastructure is utilised in the promotion of a healthy lifestyle among the population. The scheme has also created academies for football, cycling, swimming and shooting to develop talent. There is also a proposal to establish a national sport museum under this scheme. National Sports Talent Contest (NSTC) Scheme: Instituted in 1985, the National Sports Talent Contest scheme is aimed at identifying talented sport persons in the age range of 8–14 years and to develop them into medal prospects.30 Students who perform well in district, state and national level competitions are accepted into the scheme. Selected students are paid an annual stipend of INR 4,150 (approximately USD 59) to support the costs of their sport equipment, insurance and competition-related expenses, as well as an additional annual stipend of INR 3,000 (approximately USD 42). The educational institution is also provided an annual grant of INR 20,000 (approximately USD 282) to assist with the purchase of sport equipment. Coaches trained at the SAI’s National Institute of Sports are assigned to academic institutions that have performed well in sport events and have the use of good infrastructure.These coaches, in turn, are expected to enable promising youth sportspersons to pursue excellence in sport.The distinct feature of this programme is that talented youth are trained at their home institutions. Currently, the scheme includes 14 schools for international sport and 10 schools for indigenous sport and wrestling, which train 805 boys and 255 girls for a total of 1060 athletes. SAI Training Centres: Established in 1995, the SAI Training Centres programme is a collaboration between the SAI and state governments, where the state government provides the infrastructure for the training of athletes between the ages of 12 and 18 years and the SAI provides board and lodging, scientific training and equipment to the trainees.31 The trainees are chosen from their performance in the NSTC Scheme discussed earlier. Currently, there are 56 such centres across the country where 5,394 trainees (3,807 boys and 1,587 girls) are being trained. Army Boys Sports Company Scheme: Established in collaboration with the Indian Army, the scheme aims to utilise the army’s extensive sport infrastructure and ‘disciplined environment’ to train young male athletes between the ages of 8 and 16 years.32 These young athletes are identified through their performances in state and national level competitions in archery, athletics, basketball, boxing, diving, fencing, football, gymnastics, hockey, rowing, shooting, weightlifting and wrestling. The programme provides for the board, lodging, equipment, competition, insurance and medical expenses of over 1,000 youth who are training at 18 different army centres. An additional benefit for the trainees is the opportunity to join the Indian Army around age 18. Special Area Games Scheme:The Special Area Games Scheme (SAG) was established with the aim of identifying talented sportspersons from inaccessible tribal, rural and coastal areas of the country.33 The programme aims to identify talented youth in the age range 12–18 years and provide 283

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them with training and support. The SAI supports the budding athletes with their expenses for board, lodgings, competition, education, insurance and equipment. Currently, there are 1,676 trainees (961 boys, 715 girls) at 19 SAG Centres. Centre of Excellence Scheme: Athletes who have excelled in the aforementioned programmes are recruited into the SAI’s Centres of Excellence, where they are provided with advanced technical training with all expenses borne by the SAI.34 Selection criteria include athletes between the ages of 12 and 25 years who have won or placed second at national championship events. Currently, there are 15 Centres of Excellence training 556 athletes (288 boys and 268 girls). Vision 2020:The SAI’s ambitious plan labelled Vision 2020 has set the goal of winning 25–30 medals in the 2020 Olympic Games, and this plan is expected to cost INR 984 crore (approximately USD 139 million).35 The process involves identifying approximately 2,500 talented athletes in various sport recognised by the IOC, grooming that talent in national coaching camps and exposing them to international competitions. The cost includes a stipend of INR 3,000 (approximately USD 42) per month per individual and an incentive of INR 300,000 (approximately USD 4,234) for individuals who qualify for the 2020 Olympic Games or INR 150,000 (approximately USD 2,117) for members of sport teams that qualify for the same event. Development of Coaches: Following the National Skill Development Corporation’s (NSDC) forecast that the demand for sport coaches, nutritionists and physiotherapists would increase to approximately 49 billion hours or 0.8 million persons by the year 2022, the Ministry instituted programmes for training coaches. The Rajiv Gandhi Khel Abhiyan (Rajiv Gandhi sport campaign) aims to train community kridashrees (coaches) to serve as trainers in rural regions,36 and the National Coaching Scheme deploys SAI trained coaches to serve in the SAI programmes previously discussed.37

The role of non-governmental organisations and the private sector The non-governmental sport associations in India include national sport governing bodies (NSGBs), including the Indian Olympic Association, and their respective members at the state, regional and panchayat (town) levels. An NSGB is responsible for the governance and promotion of its sport within the country, and its state associations are charged with the administration of its sport within their respective jurisdictions. A rather unique feature of sport in India is the participation and influence of the armed forces and the Indian Railways in sport. The Railway Sports Promotion Board of the Indian Railways and the Services Sports Control Board of the armed forces of India are also members of most of the national sport governing bodies. The regional units of Indian Railways (e.g. Southern Railways) and the Services Board field their own teams in various tournaments. Private Academies: A growing trend in India is the entrepreneurial role of former athletes in establishing sport academies in various sport such as cricket (e.g. Sehwag Cricket Academy), tennis (e.g. Britannia Amritraj Academy, Bhupati Tennis Academy), badminton (e.g. Gopichand Badminton Academy, Prakash Pudukone Academy) and football (Baichung Bhutia Football School). The efforts of these academies have produced outstanding athletes and medal winners, such as Tintu Luka (gold medal in the women’s 800 metres race at the 2015 Asian Athletics Championships), tennis star Leander Paes and badminton star Saina Nehwal (ranked second in the world in badminton). Corporate Social Initiatives: Another emerging and encouraging feature of the Indian sport scene is the involvement of industrial and business enterprises (e.g.Tata Steel,Vijaya Bank) in the promotion of sport as one of their corporate social responsibility initiatives. For example, TATA 284

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organises nationwide talent searches to identify talents and train them in its own sport academies, such as the TATA Archery Academy, TATA Athletics Academy and TATA Football Academy.38 TATA also sponsors other sport academies, such as the Prakash Pudukone Badminton Academy.These efforts have produced several players who have represented India on its national teams and earned medals in archery and badminton at the Commonwealth and Asian Games.

State sport authorities The policies and programmes of the central government are replicated in the 29 states of the Indian Union. For example, the state of Tamil Nadu, situated in the southernmost part of India and one of the largest and most populous states, has its own Sports Development Authority of Tamil Nadu (SDAT), which aims to promote sport and physical fitness throughout the state with a special emphasis on talent identification and development, competition culture, sport infrastructure and appropriate coaching methods.39 SDAT provides monetary support to the state level sport organisations, organises and/or supports residential and non-residential coaching camps in various sport, has established a talent identification scheme, offers cash incentives to high level performers in sport and runs its own centres of excellence and sport hostels. SDAT has established specialised academies for several sport, such as cricket, volleyball, diving, field hockey, table tennis, swimming and squash. SDAT organises and/or supports competitions in various sport at the district and state levels. Finally, the state body implements the programmes assigned to it by the SAI. A unique way several states support sportspersons is through guarantees of admission into highly coveted educational programmes, such as engineering, agriculture and medicine. Government, non-government and private organisations also adopt this practice of promising employment to promising athletes. This is commonly referred to as the ‘sport quota’ in India, and has proved to be an incentive for youngsters to pursue excellence in sport.

Conclusions The considerable involvement of the Indian government in promoting sport and physical activity is laudable. However, youth athletics and sport in general are under the purview of state governments in their respective states. To maximise a return on investment, coaching and technical education programmes may be delivered through the state level educational ministries and/or through the state level sport authorities. An additional benefit of the involvement of the state governments in promoting and channelling excellence in sport may lead to the growth of interstate rivalries, which may kindle the enthusiastic support of the citizens of a state. Rivalries between proximate and similar teams may contribute to higher levels of motivation, effort and performance of team members.40 These rivalries may also have an impact on the involvement of coaches, managers, sponsors and fans. SAI may consider providing financial assistance to privately owned sport academies that have been successful in producing champions. SAI may also pursue partnerships with private academies and educational institutions to leverage the diverse expertise among government, academic and private enterprises to address the coaching and training needs of the nation. The emerging public-private sport partnerships in Western nations may serve as a model for such a move in India. SAI may also focus on encouraging women coaches to pursue training and education to be eligible for high level coaching positions in Indian sport. Sport consumption in India is expected to grow at a rate of 8.9 percent per annum to USD 6 billion in 2025 as a result of the increase in disposable income among households.41 With the increased levels of education, travel and exposure through digital means, Indian consumers are 285

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becoming aware of their physical health.42 The authors also note that the culture of the workplace in India is evolving, and employee fitness is being promoted and facilitated. Another encouraging feature is the growth of the middle class in India. Currently, 250 million individuals are estimated to be middle class, and this figure is expected to climb to 600 million individuals by 2030.43 With the abundance of discretionary income in the hands of the middle class, the demand for excellence in sport is bound to rise. Taken together, these variables should see games and physical activities prospering at the grassroots level, genuine and honest efforts to hone greatness and the rise of world-class competitors in India.

Notes 1 “World Population Prospects:The 2017 Revision, Population Division,” United Nations, accessed February 19, 2019, https://population.un.org/wpp/DataQuery/. 2 “India: A Microcosm of Linguistic Unity in Diversity,” Mayflower Language Services, accessed February 19, 2019, www.mayflowerlanguages.com/india-microcosm-linguistic-unity-diversity/. 3 “CIA World Factbook,” CIA, accessed February 13, 2019, www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/fields/print_2122.html. 4 Ibid., 1. 5 Ibid. 6 Kaushik Basu, “India’s Demographic Dividend,” BBC News: South Asia, accessed July 25, 2007, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6911544.stm. 7 Abheek Singhi and Nimisha Jain, “The Rise of India’s Neo Middle Class,” Live Mint, accessed October 4, 2016, www.livemint.com/Politics/HY9TzjQzljCZNRHb2ejC2H/The-rise-of-Indias-neomiddle-class.html. 8 Alyson Ross and Sue Thomas, “The Health Benefits of Yoga and Exercise: A Review of Comparison Studies,” The Journal of Alternative and Complementary Medicine 16, no. 1 (2010): 3–12. 9 Ishwar V. Basavaraddi, “Yoga: Its Origin, History and Development,” Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India, accessed April 23, 2015, www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?25096/Yoga+Its+Or igin+History+and+Development. 10 “About Pro Kabaddi,” Vivo Pro Kabaddi League, accessed February 13, 2019, www.prokabaddi.com/ about-prokabaddi. 11 “About the Indian Premier League,” VIVO IPL, accessed February 13, 2019, www.iplt20.com/. 12 Gaurav Gupta, “Brand IPL Now Soars to $6.3 Billion,” Times of India, accessed August 8, 2018, https:// timesofindia.indiatimes.com/sports/cricket/ipl/top-stories/brand-ipl-now-soars-to-6-3-billion/arti cleshow/65321837.cms. 13 “Shuttle Time: India,” Badminton Association of India, accessed February 19, 2019, www.badmin tonindia.org/shuttle-time/. 14 “India’s Olympic Heroes: Babu Narayan Takes Us Through His 1956 and 1960 Experience,” Goal.com, July 25, 2012, www.goal.com%2Fen-india%2Fnews%2F136%2Findia%2F2012%2F07%2F25%2F326 3069%2Findias-olympic-heroes-babu-narayan-takes-us-through-his-1956-and-&usg=AOvVaw1tpzIM77MY2MjlE9QwDHjR. 15 Press Trust of India, “I Could Have Won Gold Had Equipment Arrived Earlier: CWG Medalist Ashish,” Hindustan Times, October 9, 2010, https://web.archive.org/web/20101218050807/www. hindustantimes.com/I-could-have-got-gold-had-equipment-arrived-earlier-CWG-medallist-Ashish/ Article1-610455.aspx. 16 Shivani Naik,“After a Flight,a Landing:Why Dipa Karmakar’s Medal in Commonwealth Games Is Its Bravest Bronze,” Indian Express, accessed April 18, 2016, https://indianexpress.com/article/sports/sport-others/ after-a-flight-a-landing-why-dipa-karmakars-medal-in-commonwealth-games-is-its-bravest-bronze/. 17 Chander Shekar Luthra, “Indian Gymnasts’ CWG Participation in Doubt Over Selection Issues,” DNA, accessed July 10, 2014, www.dnaindia.com/sport/report-indian-gymnasts-cwg-participationin-doubt-over-selection-issues-2000982. 18 “About the NBA Academy India,” NBA Academy India, accessed February 11, 2019, https://nba academy.nba.com/location/india/. 19 “About SAI: Introduction,” Sports Authority of India, September 8, 2014, http://sportsauthorityof india.nic.in/index1.asp?ls_id=54. 286

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20 “Aims and Objectives,” Sports Authority of India, October 29, 2013, www.sportsauthorityofindia.nic. in/index1.asp?ls_id=91. 21 “SAI Training Centres–STC,” Sports Authority of India, November 10, 2014, http://sportsauthority ofindia.nic.in/index1.asp?ls_id=629. 22 “National Sports Development Fund,” Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, June 11, 2018, https://yas. nic.in/sports/national-sports-development-fund-0. 23 “Department of Sports: Scheme of Human Resources Development in Sports,” Ministry ofYouth Affairs and Sports, May 22, 2019, https://yas.nic.in/sports/scheme-human-resources-development-sports-0. 24 “Department of Sports: National Sports Development Fund,” Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, November 13, 2018, https://yas.nic.in/sites/default/files/Operational%20Guidelines%20-%20Promotion%20of%20rural%20and%20indigenoustribal%20games.pdf. 25 “Department of Sports: Ek Bharat Shreshtha Bharat Programme,” Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, January 24, 2019, https://yas.nic.in/sports/ek-bharat-shreshtha-bharat-programme. 26 Nikhilesh Bhattacharya, “India’s Olympic Program Under Spotlight Again,” New York Times, accessed August 13, 2012, https://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/13/indias-olympic-programunder-spotlight-again/. 27 “Year End Review: OPEX 2012,” Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, December 14, 2012, http://pib. nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=90676. 28 “Come and Play Scheme,” Sports Authority of India, June 12, 2019, www.sportsauthorityofindia.nic. in/index1.asp?ls_id=5708. 29 “Sports Minister Jitendra Singh launches the Community Connect Scheme to Include Sports and Recreational Facilities in Stadia,” Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, March 5, 2014, http://pib.nic. in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=104492. 30 “National Sports Talent Contest Scheme–NSTC,” Sports Authority of India, accessed February 24, 2019, http://sportsauthorityofindia.nic.in/index1.asp?ls_id=628. 31 Ibid., 21. 32 “Army Boys Sports Company Scheme–ABSC,” Sports Authority of India, November 10, 2014, http:// sportsauthorityofindia.nic.in/index1.asp?ls_id=626. 33 “Special Areas Games Scheme–SAG,” Sports Authority of India, November 10, 2014, http://sports authorityofindia.nic.in/index1.asp?ls_id=630. 34 “Centre of Excellence Scheme–COE,” Sports Authority of India, November 10, 2014, http://sports authorityofindia.nic.in/index1.asp?ls_id=627. 35 Press Trust of India, “SAI Expedites Efforts to Make ‘Vision 2020’ a Reality,” Times of India, May 19, 2013, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/sports/more-sports/others/SAI-expedites-efforts-to-makeVision-2020-a-reality/articleshow/20134525.cms. 36 “Rajiv Gandhi Khel Abhiyan,” Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, May 26, 2015, http://pib.nic.in/ newsite/mbErel.aspx?relid=122013. 37 “Impact of National Coaching Scheme of Sports Authority of India,” Planning Commission, New Delhi, December 1, 2002, http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/sereport/ser/stdy_ncsprts.pdf. 38 Amit Kumar Srivastava et al., “Corporate Social Responsibility: A Case Study of TATA Group,” IOSR Journal of Business and Management 3, no. 5 (2012): 17–27. 39 “Youth Welfare and Sports Development Department: About Us,” Sports Development Authority of Tamil Nadu, accessed February 16, 2019, www.sdat.tn.gov.in/about_us.php?token=about. 40 Gavin J. Kilduff, Hillary Anger Elfenbein, and Barry M. Staw, “The Psychology of Rivalry: A Relationally Dependent Analysis of Competition,” Academy of Management Journal 53, no. 5 (2010): 943–69. 41 Arpita Mukherjee, “Sports Retailing in India: Opportunities, Constraints and Way Forward” (Working Paper No. 250, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), 2010). 42 Ibid., 41. 43 Homi Kharas, “The Emerging Middle Class in Developing Countries” (OECD Development Centre Working Papers No. 285, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2010), https://doi.org/10.1787/18151949.

Bibliography Kharas, Homi. “The Emerging Middle Class in Developing Countries.” OECD Development Centre Working Papers No. 285, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1787/18151949. 287

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Kilduff, Gavin J., Hillary Anger Elfenbein, and Barry M. Staw. “The Psychology of Rivalry: A Relationally Dependent Analysis of Competition.” Academy of Management Journal 53, no. 5 (2010): 943–69. Mukherjee, Arpita. “Sports Retailing in India: Opportunities, Constraints and Way Forward.” Working Paper No. 250, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), 2010. Ross, Alyson, and Sue Thomas. “The Health Benefits of Yoga and Exercise: A Review of Comparison Studies.” The Journal of Alternative and Complementary Medicine 16, no. 1 (2010): 3–12. Srivastava, Amit Kumar, Gayatri Negi,Vipul Mishra, and Shraddha Pandey. “Corporate Social Responsibility: A Case Study of TATA Group.” IOSR Journal of Business and Management 3, no. 5 (2012): 17–27.

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27 Indonesia’s sport policy and development in the Old Order Era (1945–1967) and New Order Era (1967–1998) Amung Ma’mun

Introduction The Indonesian nation was established on 17 August 1945 after liberation from more than 350 years of Dutch colonisation and the Japanese occupation during World War II.The independence of the Indonesian people was the result of centuries of struggle. In the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, five fundamental principles were set out as the spirit of the establishment of the Indonesian nation. First, that freedom is the right of all nations and, therefore, colonisation must be abolished because it is not in accordance with humanity and justice. This idea became part of the world’s wealth because the enthusiasm, which was the basic foundation of an independent Indonesian nation state, inspired other countries that were not independent at that time. Second, that the struggle of the Indonesian independence movement arrived at a happy moment to deliver the people of Indonesia to an independent Indonesia that is free, united, sovereign, just and prosperous. It implies that the Indonesian nation is the result of the Indonesian people’s struggle and not given by outside forces.Third, that the blessing of Almighty God encouraged a noble desire to have a free national life and the Indonesian people thereby declared their independence; this sentence implies that the Indonesian people who fought for independence and established a nation state at that time were religious people, and that independence was obtained not solely as a result of human struggle but because of the power of God Almighty. Fourth, that the intent of the Indonesian people was to form an Indonesian state government that protects the entire Indonesian nation, promotes public welfare, educates the nation’s life and participates in the world order based on the values of freedom, eternal peace and social justice. This idea confirmed the four national ideals of independent Indonesia. Fifth, that the independence of the Indonesian nation was arranged in the Indonesian State Constitution, which was formed in the state structure of the Republic of Indonesia based on the people’s sovereignty, God Almighty, justice, civilised humanity, Indonesian unity, nationality led by wisdom in deliberation/representation and by realising social justice for all the people of Indonesia. These principles, confirming the basis of the Indonesian state, are better known as pancasila, which is the philosophy underpinning the formation of the Indonesian nation state. In line with the above principles, all national development processes, including policies and practices for the development of sport, must be based on and refer to the Preamble of the 1945 289

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Constitution, which contains the national ideals of an independent Indonesian nation; then on the body of the 1945 Constitution dated 18 August 1945; and on other laws and regulations. A realistic view of Bung Karno’s speech in June 1945 – on independent Indonesia, and about pancasila – is that he acknowledged the plurality of proposed new citizens and asked for consensus to unite ethnic groups, religions and languages. Pancasila was proposed as a life system for the state and society, adopted as the ideological and philosophical basis of the new republic and reinforced by the adoption of ‘Unity in Diversity’ as the national motto. This is a phrase created by poet Mpu Tantular in the fourteenth century, and today appears on national symbols.1 This chapter discusses the policies and practices of sport development in Indonesia. The policy and practice of developing sport in Indonesia can be traced through the historical role played by its leaders (Presidents) since Indonesia’s independence on 17 August 1945 and can be divided into three eras of national leadership: first, sport development policies and practices in the leadership era of the Old Order (1945–1967) led by President Soekarno; second, the policies and practices of sport development in the era of the New Order national leadership (1967–1998) led by President Soeharto; and third, the policy and practice of sport development in the era of the national leadership of the Reform Order (1998 – present), which has been led by five presidents.2 This chapter will discuss policies and practices for sport development in the Old Order era (1945–1967) and the New Order era (1967–1998) only, beginning with a brief look at the policies and practices of sport development in the two eras. In the Old Order era, sport was deeply involved in the role of diplomacy and international politics as well as with the challenges faced by the newly independent Indonesian nation after 1945.The rejection of Indonesian participation in the 1948 Olympic Games in London became an important influence on how Bung Karno implemented more politically nuanced policies and practices for the development of sport in Indonesia.The failure to participate in the 1948 Olympic Games inspired the founding of the 1948 National Sports Week (Pekan Olahraga Nasional, or PON), which took place in Solo, Central Java Province. Later, the hosting of the 1962 Asian Games and the 1963 Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) became important examples of how Bung Karno developed and promoted sport in Indonesia in line with his vision of nation and character building. Political motives underlined the development of sport policies and practices in the Old Order era. The fourth Asian Games, held in Jakarta in 1962, involved a lot of national resources and were coloured by an intensification of national sentiments.3 In contrast, during the New Order era, Pak Harto, in strengthening his leadership, made more efforts to expand sport activities in the community under the slogan of socialising sport and cultivating the community. The concept developed by Pak Harto is a further interpretation of the idea of the importance of physical education and sport and is part of the same movement developing across the world under the motto of ‘sport for all.’4 Furthermore, Pak Harto, in his sport development policies and practices, focused on the political diplomacy of the ASEAN region and the restoration of international relations with the IOC with a vision of improving the quality of the Indonesian people as a whole.5

Policy and practice for developing sport in the Old Order era (1945–1967) 1948  London Olympics, National Sport Week and national politics During the Old Order era, President Soekarno regarded the development of sport as an arena for international diplomacy and an opportunity to demonstrate that the Indonesian state stood proud and independent within the international community. Issues and visions of nation and 290

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character building were used as the basis for directing all sectors in the national development process. The effort to instil the spirit of nationalism and national character in all the people was an anchor to encourage the people’s awareness of the establishment of the Indonesian nation, and to give the people a feeling of possession and participation in raising and advancing their nation. This spirit provided a strong foundation for national unity, and was also applied by other Southeast Asian countries, such as Singapore, the Philippines and Burma, who also used their experiences of struggle and sacrifice during World War II in their nation-building efforts.6 The participation of the Indonesian contingent at the XIV Summer Olympics in 1948 in London was rejected, which laid the groundwork for how sport was used politically on the stage of international diplomacy by Bung Karno. Based on the records of the 1948 Olympics committee, there were three reasons why the participation of the Indonesian contingent was rejected. They were, first, that Indonesia as an independent country had not been recognised by other countries around the world (countries that had not recognised many new states – the Netherlands had refused first, and Britain followed its partner); secondly, that Indonesian sportsmen were considered inadequate to participate at the Olympic level; and third, that the Indonesian Sports Union (PORI), founded in 1946, and the Republic of Indonesia Olympic Committee (KORI) founded in 1948 to coordinate Indonesian sport activities and prepare the Indonesian contingent for the 1948 Olympiad, had not yet been recognised as a member of the IOC, nor had the country of Indonesia been registered as a member of the United Nations.The IOC then provided an opportunity for Indonesia to become an observer at the 1948 Olympics but on one condition, namely that the Indonesian delegation had to travel on Dutch passports and under the Dutch flag. The offer was rejected by the Indonesian delegates, Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, Azis Saleh, and Maladi.7 The three reasons for rejection gave the Indonesian sport people enthusiasm to fight for the existence and recognition of the Indonesian nation through sport. They rejected the refusal to recognise Indonesia as an independent country since independence had been proclaimed on 17 August 1945 – independence that accommodated differences in ethnicity within the framework of a new united Indonesian state.8 They rejected the claim of an inadequate quality of sport performance (this element has been understated) as not in accordance with the principle of participation and involvement of the Olympic Movement.9 And they rejected that the membership of PORI/KORI, as the official institution for managing national sport in Indonesia, had not been recognised as a member of the IOC. These claims encouraged Bung Karno’s enthusiasm to always fight for the legitimacy of the existence of the newly independent Indonesian nation through sport. After the return of the Indonesian contingent who had not been allowed take part in the 1948 London Olympics, the national sport officials negotiated and consulted with the national leadership, who directly reported to Bung Karno, finally reaching a conclusion that Indonesia needed a national sporting event similar to the Olympic Games, and including participants from various countries, national Olympiads, and government regions. Indonesia National Sports Week (PON) was the result and it was decided to hold it for the first time on 9–12 September 1948, that is, within one month of the 1948 London Olympics (29 July – 14 August 1948). The event was inspired by the implementation of a sport week in 1938 when Indonesia was still under Dutch occupation. Bung Karno, along with the state officials at that time, reacted quickly to show how the offense of the Olympics was felt in Indonesia. The city of Solo in Central Java was chosen because it was considered to have adequate facilities, one of which was the Sriwedari Stadium, and there was a swimming pool. There were participants from all around Java, with 600 athletes competing in nine sport. This was a concrete solution intended to show the world that the independent Indonesian nation existed and had recovered from Japanese occupation. 291

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On the occasion of the first PON, there were members present from the Three Nations Commission (KTN) – a formation of the UN Security Council set up to mediate in the Indonesia-Dutch conflict, namely, Merle Cochran (representing the United States), Thomas Critchley (Australia) and Paul van Zeeland (Belgium) – as well as British Consul General Shepherd, Indian Consul General Raghavan and the diplomat Mohammad Yunus.10 In his opening speech, President Soekarno thanked Allah the Almighty that the PON took place in the free world, and stated his pride in the participating heroes from the occupied territories and in the presence of so many young people and young women having come not just for exercise but to show the burning spirit of independence.11 The holding of the PON was a political message to show the Netherlands that Indonesia was a sovereign country. The continuation of the PON today shows the spirit of unity and unity of the nation’s society through the presence of sport ambassadors representing various regions in Indonesia, even though at the time of the first edition there were only participants from various regions on the island of Java.What was clear was that Bung Karno had succeeded in showing to the world the existence of the sovereign Indonesian nation, and the PON continued in 1951, 1953, 1957 and 1961. In 1965 it was interrupted by an unsuccessful coup d’état. In national competitions, there is an interaction between the many forces that shape Indonesian society in the postcolonial period, including ethnicity, gender, regionalism, and tension between local traditions and global modernity. PON became a forum where the imaginary Indonesian community could be realised, at least in part, and demonstrates the contribution made by sport to building modern Indonesian society and forming the nation’s social history.12 The organisation of PON continues to decorate the history of the Indonesian nation, especially through and in sport. In the New Order era it was held eight times: in 1969, 1973, 1977, 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993 and 1996.

Physical education and school sport in the politics of the Old Order era The practices and policies for the development of physical education and sport in schools during the Old Order era saw an education system that was coloured by political nuances. The education system adopted was strongly influenced by the thinking of the Taman Siswa (‘Garden of Students’) movement, based on the principles of ing ngarso sung tulodho (those in front should give an example), ing madyo mangun karso (those in the middle should give encouragement) and tut wuri handayani (those behind should give support). The legal basis for the implementation of education is stated in Law Number 12 of 1954 concerning the Basics of Education and Teaching in Schools; Law Number 22 of 1961 concerning Higher Education; Law Number 14 of 1965 concerning the National Education Council; and Law Number 19 of 1965 concerning the Principles of the National Education System, in which it affirms pancasila as the basis of education. The purpose of national education was to give birth to citizens of the Indonesian socialist community who were responsible, just and prosperous, both spiritually and materially. This goal became a reference in the implementation of education and was used as a foundation by all educational institutions, both public and private, from preschool to higher education. Policy practices relating to the development of sport in schools, in addition to physical education and sport as subjects, saw sport included as one of the daily agenda items, in addition to field activities for culture, arts and games that were held every Saturday. The curriculum, born from independence and set out in 1947, did not emphasise academic education but instead focused on character education and awareness of society and the state. While the emotional and psychomotor domains were more emphasised in art lessons and physical education, the implementation of education in Indonesia focused on efforts to foster awareness of defending the country. Curriculum changes occurred in 1964, which included the development of creativity, 292

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taste, intention, work and morals, known as panca wardhana. Subject areas of study were classified into five groups: moral, intelligence, emotional/artistic, skills and physical development. This development included placing physical health as one of the key targets, in addition to promoting the culture and development of the community so that it would be orderly and peaceful, and forming students to become independent human beings with noble minds, who would become useful human beings and citizens responsible for the life of the nation and the homeland. These ideas were in harmony with the goals of the Taman Siswa College founded by Ki Hajar Dewantoro. Thus, physical education and school sport subjects in the Old Order era were directed towards improving physical health and character formation.

1962  Asian games, GANEFO 1963 and politicisation in the historical trajectory of Indonesian sport development policies and practices Political upheaval continued to colour the practice and policy of sport development in Indonesia towards the end of Bung Karno’s leadership. The hosting of the fourth Asian Games (AGIV) in 1962 and GANEFO in 1963 in Jakarta became major events and adorned the journey of the history of Indonesian sport. A monument to this period was the Jakarta Gelora Senayan Stadium, with the capacity for more than 120 thousand spectators, built with the support of the then Soviet (now Russian) government. The achievements and involvement of Indonesia as the host of AG-IV in Jakarta were not only a big leap forward for Indonesia in adopting the knowledge and management skills of modern sport and achieving international sport standards but also a victory for building nationalism and national identity through sport. Led by Bung Karno, the arena was used as a symbol of the breaking of Western hegemony and the building of a ‘new order’ in the world.13 Furthermore, Bung Karno reaffirmed the potential of sport development in the international political arena by organising GANEFO as a form of state resistance to international discrimination against Indonesia in the aftermath of IOC sanctions on Indonesia for not granting visas to Taiwanese or Israeli athletes during the implementation of the 1962 Asian Games Indonesia, even though the two countries were still recognised as members of the Asian Sports Federation.14 GANEFO, which was initiated by Indonesia and driven by political motives to revive the spirit of the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung, was successfully held in Jakarta in 1963, with 2,700 athletes from 51 countries participating. GANEFO was born from a desire to destroy the hegemony of Western countries in the established old order of power and to create a new order in a world where every country would be free from exploitation by other countries. Due to political problems in Indonesia and the People’s Republic of China (as well as problems with supporters among the emerging nations of Latin America, Asia and Africa) the 1963 edition of GANEFO was both the first and last edition of the event.15 Although the first and last, GANEFO proved to be a smart move by Indonesia at the international political level; the results were amazing and encouraging for Indonesia, not least because of its athletes’ performance – with 17 gold, 24 silver and 30 bronze medals – ranked third after China and the Soviet Union. The participation in GANEFO was low, but political dividends were high for Indonesia and for socialist countries that were relatively underdeveloped at the time. Indonesia showed leadership by successfully opposing the old and established Western traditions of the Olympics.The implementation of GANEFO was very profitable, because this was a period when Indonesia’s foreign policy was to project a completely different image from that of a potentially aggressive and not too friendly country.16 GANEFO is a single moment that explains politics and sport in the 1960s. China used the event to navigate international and regional geopolitical issues through the diplomatic and sport corridors where GANEFO resonated, so that GANEFO became 293

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a platform where geopolitical tensions were revealed. China was involved in a propaganda campaign that was directed against the West to win new allies among the decolonised countries of Asia and Africa, beyond the artificial boundaries that separated the Second and Third Worlds. China’s interest in GANEFO and Western responses to it, reflect the ways in which anti-communist Cold War politics were united with the postcolonialist discourses and tensions that were radicalising tensions between the Second World powers.17 However, this event is also proof that while politics can be a source of construction, it can also be a source of destruction, as it was for GANEFO.18 In its development to date, the intersection of sport with politics is difficult to avoid and continues to influence the development of sport in the spectrum of state policy. A nation’s selfidentity related to sport has been widely researched and discussed by experts. After the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics, the symbolic potential of sport surfaced in the context of identity narratives on the divided Korean peninsula, between North and South Korea;19 the impact of sport continues to develop in relation to identity, culture and power;20 and the interconnectedness of sport, national identity, politics, historical processes and globalisation has been well established.21 Likewise, Chinese participation in the Asian Games has shown that as long as conflict and confrontation are present in society, sport and politics cannot be separated.22 Thus, the issue of sport development in the Old Order era, which was used by Bung Karno, was thick with politics, primarily for the advancement of the existence and national identity of Indonesia, which had not long been independent. History may be a starting point, but returning to the concept of thinking about future sport development as in the past, where political practices were so deep, is certainly not something to be recommended, because the paradigm of sport development has shifted, the conditions and environment surrounding it are different and the challenges he faced then were far more severe. We must shift the development of sport from a political approach towards a sport development that has a political impact as an implementation of shifting global issues; that is, from development of sport to development through sport.

Sport development policies and practices in the New Order era (1967–1998) The transition of national leadership from the Old Order era to the New Order era was not smooth. This was largely due to the relatively serious threat to the Indonesian nation posed by the emergence of the 30 September 1965 Communist Party of Indonesia attempted coup d’état (known in Indonesia as G30S/PKI ‘65). The violence resulted in many civilian casualties and the deaths of several high-ranking army officers. General Soeharto, who at that time was one of the top military officers and who held the position of Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Pangkostrad), managed to coordinate military institutions, as well as being mandated to banish and quell the G30S/PKI uprising. Within two years, General Soeharto was named Indonesia’s president to replace Bung Karno, through the MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly)’s special session in 1967, a position he held until 1998. Under Pak Harto’s leadership, sport development policies and practices began to shift orientation as he did. Soeharto reversed many of the positions of his predecessor, including the historical traces of Soekarno’s presidential leadership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), part of his grand design to make Indonesia the dominant force of Southeast Asia; cooperation with Communist China as another major power; and the reduction of Western military and economic influence at that time.23 In addition, he further revealed that Bung Karno’s policies had achieved little while increasing tension with the West, and that Indonesia’s conflict 294

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with the new pro-Western nation of Malaysia isolated Indonesia, as it was considered unreasonable and part of the design to destroy all remaining Western influences, first in Indonesia and then throughout Southeast Asia. The concept of sport development during the era of President Soeharto placed ASEAN at the centre of the political stage, both in terms of rebuilding friendships among ASEAN countries and making achievements in sport itself. Specific sport development policies and practices focused on popularising sport and physical education.

Socialising sport and cultivating the community Community-based sport development with the aim of increasing community participation in sport activities to the widest extent possible so that they become part of everyday life continues to be government policy. This strategy was inspired by a vision of the world of sport (physical activity and recreation) as a medium for community development, with the aim of building the quality of the Indonesian people as a whole; that is, achieving knowledge, physical, mental and social goals in an integrated unit. The 1978 UNESCO International Charter of Physical Education and Sport inspired the sport for all movement in many countries around the world,24 including the concept of sport development developed during President Soeharto’s leadership, when sport activities were expanded into the community. Socialising sport and cultivating the community are the watchwords of sport developments that the government initiated and are positively perceived by the wider community. In consideration of the expansion of sport activities, and in order to socialise sport, exercise the community, and improve physical, spiritual and work productivity for civil servants, members of the armed forces, employees of business entities and state-owned banks, company employees and students, it was deemed necessary to establish a sport hour that takes place every Friday morning for 30 minutes before work begins by way of the Presidential Decree of the Republic of Indonesia Number 17 of 1984. The expansion of sporting activities during the New Order era through the movement to popularise sport and exercise for the people was seen as successfully realised and had a widespread impact not only on employees but also on students in school through Senam Pagi Indonesia (SPI), implemented for students at Higher Education through the Student Sports Activity Unit, and for the wider community, including the elderly, to exercise while filling in leisure time. Studies have shown that these government policies of providing facilities for leisure activities have a positive impact on the economic and social growth of the community, and that the public are motivated by quality of life available for physical activities.25 Thus the policies and practices of developing sport in Indonesia during the New Order era were expanded and integrated into people’s lives. The policy and practice of developing sport is carried out based on expert recommendations, so that the community takes time to exercise and fill leisure time with sport activities. This is recommended so that people benefit directly in terms of health and a better quality of life. This is also in line with the experience of the world community; sport is aimed at overcoming the general deterioration in public health from changes in daily life as a result of the impact of scientific and technological developments, such as modern transportation systems that reduce physical activity. The foundation for the development of sport in the widest possible community is the sport for all movement, which is promoted in Indonesia under the slogan of socialising sport and cultivating the community. The Charter of Physical Education and Sport continues to inspire countries around the world, including Indonesia, and contains 11 articles. They are: (1) The practice of physical education and sport is a fundamental right for everyone; (2) physical education and exercise are important elements of lifelong education in the education system as a whole; (3) physical 295

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education and sport programmes must meet individual and social needs; (4) teaching, fostering and administering physical education and sport must be carried out by qualified personnel; (5) adequate facilities and equipment are very important for physical education and sport; (6) research and evaluation are very necessary components in the development of physical education and sport; (7) protection of ethical and moral values ​​of physical education and sport must always be of concern to everyone; (8) information and documentation helps promote physical education and sport; (9) mass media must have a positive influence on physical education and sport; (10) national institutions play a major role in physical education and sport; and (11) international cooperation is a prerequisite for the promotion of universal and balanced physical and sport education.26 The introduction of the international International Charter of Physical Education and Sport also helped establish physical education and sport as subjects in schools in the areas of physical education, sport and health. Health is inherent in the subject matter and emphasises the importance of children’s health, which can be improved through guided physical activity in the form of physical education and sport. In addition, physical education, sport and health subjects are intra-curricular and must be provided by all schools in accordance with their type, level and pathway. Extracurricular activities are also provided in accordance with the ability of the school and the distribution of student interests and talents through sport carried out outside of school hours. In a similar way to the implementation of sport development policies and practices under the slogan of socialising sport and exercising the community, all schools hold morning exercise on certain days, usually two or three times a week in the morning before starting lessons, and there are even schools that carry out exercises every morning. Therefore, various types of gymnastics have been developed, such as Indonesian Morning Gymnastics (SPI) and Physical Fitness Exercise (SKJ). In order to fill the new need for physical and sport education teachers in the 1970s, the state set up a Senior High School of Sports (SMOA). The alumni were mostly appointed as teachers of physical education, sport and health, at both primary and secondary education levels. However, in the 1980s it was transformed into a Sports Teacher School, and ten years later it merged into institutions of higher education providing teacher education along with efforts to increase the stratification of teacher positions for all subjects.

Elite sport development: SEA Games and badminton The elite sport coaching system is coordinated by the Indonesian National Sports Committee (KONI) and carried out by the Parent Sports Organisation (IOCO). KONI and IOCO are organised at the provincial and district levels throughout Indonesia. The National Sports Week (PON), whose history began in 1948 in Solo, Central Java, with the aim of showing the identity of an independent, united and sovereign Indonesian nation, was targeted by each region’s sport coaches. In the New Order era, PON was held eight times between 1969 and 1996; seven times in Jakarta, and once, in 1969, in Surabaya. The policy of hosting PON in Jakarta was as a result of the availability of sport infrastructure, including that built for the 1962 Asian Games and GANEFO. However, since 2000, at the beginning of the Reform era, the hosting of PON was spread to various regions with the aim of accelerating the development of regional sport infrastructure. In coordinating national sport coaching, KONI is more focused on preparing for international multisport events, such as the SEA Games, Asian Games and Olympic Games. It often provides a guidance system, carried out using the national training centre model based in Jakarta, in advance of these events. 296

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The Indonesian Badminton Association (PBSI) provides a continuous coaching system for that sport throughout the year. Badminton sport coaching systems in Indonesia adhere to the FTEM model (Foundation, Talent, Elite and Mastery)27 and ADT (the Athlete Development Triangle, as developed in Australia).28 As a result, in the New Order era the achievements in badminton were relatively prominent and became the pride of the community, as well as making Indonesia one of the world badminton powers, in addition to China, Denmark, Malaysia, Japan and Korea. An overview of Indonesia’s badminton performance record, especially at the Thomas Cup (men’s team event), All England Championships and World Championships (individual events) is shown in Tables 27.1 and 27.2. During the New Order era, sport coaching activities in preparation for the SEA Games, the Asian Games and the Olympic Games coordinated by KONI were very effective, although their achievements were not as prominent in the Asian Games and Olympic Games. However, throughout the course of its history (1977–1997), at the ASEAN level Indonesia was still the best: nine times champion and twice runner-up. This was helped by the fact that other competing countries at that time had not developed a system of sport coaching such as those used in developed countries. Thus, in the New Order era the position of sport achievements in the ASEAN region was still the pride of the community. A glimpse of Indonesian sport achievements since joining ASEAN and participating for the first time in the 1977 SEA Games is set out in Table 27.3. Sport policy from the perspective of international diplomacy during the New Order era prioritised developing relations with regional countries in Southeast Asia and improving relations with the IOC. The results described in Table 27.3 demonstrate that international diplomacy

Table 27.1 Indonesian Badminton Sports Achievement in the Thomas Cup Event Year

Result

Total

1958, 1961, 1964, 1970, 1973, 1976, 1979, 1984, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002 1967, 1982, 1986, 1992, 2010, 2016 and 2018 1988 1990

Champions

13 times

Runners-up Third position Fourth position

7 times 1 time 1 time

Source: Developed from the Ministry of Youth and Sports of the Republic of Indonesia, 2011, Indonesian Sports Achievement Track.

Table 27.2 Indonesian Badminton Sports Achievement in the All England Individual and World Championships All England Championship 1967–1998

Total Wins

World Championship 1977–1997

Total Wins

Men’s Singles Women’s Singles Men’s Doubles Women’s Doubles Mixed Doubles

15 4 20 2 5

Men’s Singles Women’s Singles Men’s Doubles Women’s Doubles Mixed Doubles

6 3 9 4

Source: Developed from the Ministry of Youth and Sports of the Republic of Indonesia, 2011, Indonesian Sports Achievement Track.

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through sport in the ASEAN achieved success, in addition to Indonesia hosting the ASEAN secretariat headquarters in Jakarta. The central figure in this change was Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX. He lobbied ASEAN countries and the IOC, including Malaysia, as a new country supported by the Western bloc at that time, and in 1977 Indonesia participated on the stage of the SEA multisport event for the first time and succeeded in becoming the overall champion that year.29 The most impressive historical event since Indonesia first took part in the Olympics, in 1952 in Helsinki, in terms of sport performance was the 1988 Seoul Olympics; Indonesia won a silver medal in archery with the women’s team of Nurfitriana Saiman, Lilies Handayani and Kusuma Wardani. Subsequently, at the 1992 Barcelona Olympics, Indonesia won two gold medals in badminton with Alan Budi Kusumah and Susi Susanti, for the men’s and women’s singles, respectively; two silver medals with Ardy B. Wiranata in the men’s singles, and men’s doubles partners Edy Hartono and Rudy Gunawan; and one bronze medal with Hermawan Susanto in the women’s singles.This was the first time that badminton was included in the Olympics. Since badminton has been included in the Olympics, Indonesia has been one of the countries that regularly win medals. The complete participation of the Indonesian team at the Olympics can be seen in Table 27.4 below. Table 27.3 Indonesian Badminton Sports Achievement in the SEA Games since 1977 Year

Host City

Rank

Number of Gold Medals

1977–1983 1985 1987–1993 1995 1997 1999–2003 2005–2007 2009 2011 2013–2017

Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Manila, Singapore Bangkok Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Singapore Bangkok Jakarta Brunei, Kuala Lumpur, Hanoi Manila dan Nakhorn Ratchasima Vientiene Jakarta Palembang Naypyidaw, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur

I II I II I III – III I –

62; 92; 85; 64 62 183; 102; 92; 88 77 194 44; 72; 55 – 43 182 –

Source: Developed from the Ministry of Youth and Sports of the Republic of Indonesia, 2011, Indonesian Sports Achievement Track.

Table 27.4 Indonesia’s Participation in the Olympics Olympics

Achievements/Medals

Remarks

1952–1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016

– 1 gold 2 gold, 2 silver and 1 bronze 1 gold, 1 silver and 2 bronze 1 gold, 3 silver and 5 bronze 1 gold, 1 silver, and 2 bronze 1 gold and 2 bronze 1 silver and 1 bronze 1 gold, 2 silver and 3 bronze

9 editions Archery Badminton Badminton Badminton and weightlifting Badminton and weightlifting Badminton and weightlifting Weightlifting Badminton and weightlifting

Source: Developed from the Ministry of Youth and Sports of the Republic of Indonesia, 2011, Indonesian Sports Achievement Track.

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From a leadership perspective, in the New Order era, President Soeharto inherited the principle of leadership towards a desired outcome from President Soekarno in the Old Order era. However, when compared to the Soekarno era, the development of sport in the Soeharto era can be seen as relatively more advanced, because sport became non-elitist through the encouragement of sport for all and were positioned as instruments of development aimed at building a large community in which sport must be integrated with daily living activities.30 In conclusion, it seems that the development of sport in Indonesia in the Old Order and New Order eras was very dependent on the views and political vision of the leader of the time, and that each leader had certain views on how the development of sport should be implemented.

Notes 1 Iain Christopher Adams, “Pancasila: Sport and the Building of Indonesia–Ambitions and Obstacles,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 19, no. 2–3 (2002): 295–318. 2 Amung Ma’mun, “Governmental Roles in Indonesian Sport Policy: From Past to Present,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 36, no. 4–5 (2019): 1–19. 3 Rusli Lutan, Olahraga, Kebijakan dan Politik [Sport, Policy and Politics] (Jakarta: Directorate General of Sport, Ministry of National Education, 2004), 20. 4 UNESCO, “International Charter of Physical Education and Sport,” November 1978, www.unesco. org/education/pdf/SPORT_E.PDF. 5 M. A. Harsuki, “Sport for All Movement in Indonesia,” Asian Journal of Physical Education 8, no. 3–4 (1986): 32–48. 6 Kevin Blackburn, “War Memory and Nation-Building in South East Asia,” South East Asia Research 18, no. 1 (2010): 5–31. 7 Harsuki, “Sport for All Movement in Indonesia.” 8 R. E. Elson, “Constructing the Nation: Ethnicity, Race, Modernity and Citizenship in Early Indonesian Thought,” Asian Ethnicity 6, no. 3 (2005): 145–60. 9 Peter J. Beck, “The British Government and the Olympic Movement: The 1948 London Olympics,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 25, no. 5 (2008): 615–47. 10 Harsuki, “Sport for All Movement in Indonesia.” 11 Reported in Merdeka Daily, September 10, 1948. 12 Colin Brown, “Sport, Modernity and Nation Building: The Indonesian National Games of 1951 and 1953,” Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia 164, no. 4 (2008): 431–49. 13 Rusli Lutan, “Indonesia and the Asian Games: Sport, Nationalism and the ‘New Order’,” Sport in Society 8, no. 3 (2005): 414–24. 14 Stefan Hübner, “The Fourth Asian Games (Jakarta 1962) in a Transnational Perspective: Japanese and Indian Reactions to Indonesia’s Political Instrumentalisation of the Games,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 29, no. 9 (2012): 1295–310. 15 Rusli Lutan and Fan Hong, “The Politicisation of Sport : GANEFO – A Case Study,” Sport in Society 8, no. 3 (2005): 425–39. 16 Ewa T. Pauker, “Ganefo I: Sports and Politics in Djakarta,” Asian Survey 5, no. 4 (1965): 171–85. 17 Russell Field, “Re-entering the Sporting World: China’s Sponsorship of the 1963 Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO),” International Journal of the History of Sport 31, no. 15 (2014): 1852–67. 18 Chris A. Connolly, “The Politics of the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO),” International Journal of the History of Sport 29, no. 9 (2012): 1311–24. 19 Udo Merkel, “The Politics of Sport and Identity in North Korea,” International Journal of the History of Sport 31, no. 3 (2014): 376–90. 20 John Hunter, “Flying the Flag: Identities, the Nation, and Sport,” Identities 10, no. 4 (2003): 409–25. 21 John Bale, “Sport and National Identity: A Geographical View,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 3, no. 1 (1986): 18–41; Joseph A. Maguire, “Globalisation, Sport and National Identities,” Sport in Society 14, no. 7–8 (2011): 978–93; Li Liu and Fan Hong, “The National Games and National Identity in the Republic of China, 1910–1948,” International Journal of the History of Sport 32, no. 3 (2015): 440–54. 22 Fan Hong, “Communist China and the Asian Games 1951–1990: The Thirty-Nine Year Struggle to Victory,” Sport in Society 8, no. 3 (2005): 479–92. 299

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2 3 Denis Warner, “Sukarno’s Grand Design,” Challenge 12, no. 2 (1963): 23–26. 24 Simon McNeely,“Unesco Places Physical Education and Sport in Global Perspective,” Journal of Physical Education and Recreation 51, no. 7 (1980): 21–25. 25 Kathleen Lloyd and Christopher Auld, “Leisure, Public Space and Quality of Life in the Urban Environment,” Urban Policy and Research 21, no. 4 (2003): 339–56. 26 UNESCO, “International Charter of Physical Education and Sport.” 27 Jason Gulbin et al., “An Integrated Framework for the Optimisation of Sport and Athlete Development: A Practitioner Approach,” Journal of Sports Sciences 31, no. 12 (2013): 1319–31. 28 Jason Gulbin, et al., “Patterns of Performance Development in Elite Athletes,” European Journal of Sport Science 13, no. 6 (2013): 605–14. 29 Greg Poulgrain, The Incubus of Intervention: Conflicting Indonesia Strategies of John F. Kennedy and Allen Dulles (Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: SIRD, 2015). 30 Ma’mun, “Governmental Roles in Indonesian Sport Policy.”

Bibliography Adams, Iain Christopher. “Pancasila: Sport and the Building of Indonesia: Ambitions and Obstacles.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 19, no. 2–3 (2002): 295–318. Bale, John. “Sport and National Identity: A Geographical View.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 3, no. 1 (1986): 18–41. Beck, Peter J. “The British Government and the Olympic Movement: The 1948 London Olympics.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 25, no. 5 (2008): 615–47. Blackburn, Kevin. “War Memory and Nation-Building in South East Asia.” South East Asia Research 18, no. 1 (2010): 5–31. Brown, Colin. “Sport, Modernity and Nation Building: The Indonesian National Games of 1951 and 1953.” Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia 164, no. 4 (2008): 431–49. Connolly, Chris A. “The Politics of the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO).” International Journal of the History of Sport 29, no. 9 (2012): 1311–24. Elson, R. E. “Constructing the Nation: Ethnicity, Race, Modernity and Citizenship in Early Indonesian Thought.” Asian Ethnicity 6, no. 3 (2005): 145–60. Field, Russell. “Re-entering the Sporting World: China’s Sponsorship of the 1963 Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO).” International Journal of the History of Sport 31, no. 15 (2014): 1852–67. Gulbin, Jason, Morag J. Croser, Elissa J. Morley, and Juanita R. Weissensteiner. “An Integrated Framework for the Optimisation of Sport and Athlete Development: A Practitioner Approach.” Journal of Sports Sciences 31, no. 12 (2013): 1319–31. Gulbin, Jason, Juanita R. Weissensteiner, Karen Oldenziel, and Françoys Gagné. “Patterns of Performance Development in Elite Athletes.” European Journal of Sport Science 13, no. 6 (2013): 605–14. Harsuki, M. A. “Sport for All Movement in Indonesia.” Asian Journal of Physical Education 8, no. 3–4 (1986): 32–48. Hong, Fan. “Communist China and the Asian Games 1951–1990: The Thirty-Nine Year Struggle to Victory.” Sport in Society 8, no. 3 (2005): 479–92. Hübner, Stefan. “The Fourth Asian Games (Jakarta 1962) in a Transnational Perspective: Japanese and Indian Reactions to Indonesia’s Political Instrumentalisation of the Games.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 29, no. 9 (2012): 1295–310. Hunter, John. “Flying the Flag: Identities, the Nation, and Sport.” Identities 10, no. 4 (2003): 409–25. Liu, Li, and Fan Hong. “The National Games and National Identity in the Republic of China, 1910–1948.” International Journal of the History of Sport 32, no. 3 (2015): 440–54. Lloyd, Kathleen, and Christopher Auld. “Leisure, Public Space and Quality of Life in the Urban Environment.” Urban Policy and Research 21, no. 4 (2003): 339–56. Lutan, Rusli. “Indonesia and the Asian Games: Sport, Nationalism and the ‘New Order’.” Sport in Society 8, no. 3 (2005): 414–24. Lutan, Rusli. Olahraga, Kebijakan dan Politik [Sport, Policy and Politics]. Jakarta: Directorate General of Sport, Ministry of National Education, 2004. 300

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Lutan, Rusli, and Fan Hong. “The Politicisation of Sport: GANEFO: A Case Study.” Sport in Society 8, no. 3 (2005): 425–39. Maguire, Joseph A.“Globalisation, Sport and National Identities.” Sport in Society 14, no. 7–8 (2011): 978–93. Ma’mun, Amung.“Governmental Roles in Indonesian Sport Policy: From Past to Present.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 36, no. 4–5 (2019): 1–19. McNeely, Simon. “Unesco Places Physical Education and Sport in Global Perspective.” Journal of Physical Education and Recreation 51, no. 7 (1980): 21–25. Merkel, Udo. “The Politics of Sport and Identity in North Korea.” International Journal of the History of Sport 31, no. 3 (2014): 376–90. Pauker, EWA T. “Ganefo I: Sports and Politics in Djakarta.” Asian Survey 5, no. 4 (1965): 171–85. Poulgrain, Greg. The Incubus of Intervention: Conflicting Indonesia Strategies of John F. Kennedy and Allen Dulles. Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: SIRD, 2015. UNESCO. “International Charter of Physical Education and Sport.” November 1978. www.unesco.org/ education/pdf/SPORT_E.PDF. Warner, Denis. “Sukarno’s Grand Design.” Challenge 12, no. 2 (1963): 23–26.

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Part IV

Social stratification and diversity in Asian sport

Scholars in this part of the book extend the analysis of sport to gender, race, class, ethnicity, disabilities, children and the elderly, which remains a rich and untilled soil needing to be ploughed. The authors explain how sport has played its role in supporting the disabled community, contributing to gender equality movements and improving ethnic relations. They also explore the relationships between sport and issues of social class, aiming to achieve a better understanding of the role of sport in facilitating social integration, inclusion, diversity and pluralism in Asian society.

28 Safeguarding children in sport in Asia Daniel J. A. Rhind and Katsumi Mori

Introduction Article 19 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) asserts that all children have the right to be protected from violence and calls on state parties to take all appropriate measures for the protection of children, including while in the care of others.1 However, child maltreatment remains a significant global issue. Stoltenborgh et al. reviewed 244 studies and summarised the global prevalence of the different forms of child maltreatment as: sexual abuse (127/1000), physical abuse (226/1000), emotional abuse (363/1000), physical neglect (163/1000) and emotional neglect (184/1000).2 Though it is not always acknowledged as such, sport across the globe is a context within which children can experience maltreatment and have their rights violated.3 Rights advocates argue that every child has the right to play safely, in an enabling and protective environment. The context of sport across Asia is not immune from this global threat. It is thus important to identify the specific threats to children in Asia and how these can be mitigated by effective safeguarding measures.

Defining key terms • •

• •

Child – The United Nations defines a child as a human below the age of 18 years old.4 Child maltreatment – The World Health Organisation defines this as ‘All forms of physical and/or emotional ill-treatment, sexual abuse, neglect or negligent treatment or commercial or other exploitation, resulting in actual or potential harm to the child’s health, survival, development or dignity in the context of a relationship of responsibility, trust or power.’5 Safeguarding – This is the reasonable ‘actions taken to ensure all children and young people are safe from harm.’6 Safe sport – ‘An athletic environment that is respectful, equitable and free from all forms of non-accidental violence to athletes.’7

Safeguarding Issues in Sport in Asia The range of potential threats that a child can be exposed to in sport are now recognised at three levels: the individual (e.g. depression, self-harm, substance abuse and disordered eating); 305

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the relational level (e.g. sexual, physical and emotional abuse); and at an organisational level (e.g. systems which promote overtraining or competing with an injury, institutional doping or an unhealthy organisational culture). It is now acknowledged that anyone can be involved in such issues as a perpetrator, victim or bystander. This includes all stakeholders, from athletes, peers and coaches through to parents, members of the support team and managers. Abuse can occur in all sport settings related to training or competition as well as online via social media. A limited body of research has specifically investigated safeguarding issues in sport within Asia. Existing studies have primarily focused on the appropriateness of training programmes and the use of physical violence. For example, in a study of 231 young athletes, including some from Japan, 35 percent of participants reported experiencing symptoms of significant overtraining.8 Evidence from Taiwan, based on the analysis of 119 youth athletes, suggests that such training regimes can cause serious muscle injury in children (e.g. rhabdomyolysis), and in some instances, may even require hospitalisation.9 Concerns have also been raised over the severity and potential harm of elite youth training programmes in China.10 The next section considers the situation in Japan.

Safeguarding Issues in Sport in Japan Most youth sport in Japan occur during after-school club activities in junior and senior high school and not in community sport clubs, even though primary school children practice some sport in the community, such as kendo, judo or swimming at the local dojo or swimming schools. Rules that prohibit corporal punishment can be traced back to 1879, to article 46 of the Elementary School Order: ‘[S]tudents should not be punished by corporal punishments (punching or arresting) at every school.’ Article 47, enforced in 1890, said school principals and teachers could give disciplinary measures to a child if necessary for education, but did not mention corporal punishment.11 Corporal punishment was regulated when article 11 of the School Education Act was established in 1947. However, there is an interpretation that the minimum infringement of a body is not corporal punishment and this continues up to the present day without clarification. In addition, such an interpretation can contribute to a culture which accepts corporal punishment.12 In the first study to empirically explore this issue in Japan, Mori, Rhind and Gervis administered a survey to elite young athletes regarding their experiences of sport as a child.13 Of this sample, 20 percent had experienced corporal punishment, with 18 percent witnessing the use of corporal punishment on another child. Corporal punishment was reported across both team and individual sport. Athletes were most likely to report experiencing corporal punishment just before they achieved the elite level. When considering the sample as a whole, 46 percent perceived that corporal punishment was necessary in youth sport. Interestingly, this figure rose to 62 percent for those who had actually experienced corporal punishment in sport as a child. The significance of these empirical findings has been tragically illustrated by recent high profile cases. For example, on 24 February 2016, Tokyo District Court passed judgement on a case at Sakuranomiya Senior High School in Osaka. The captain of the school’s basketball team committed suicide in December 2012, after having been assaulted many times by his coach. His father, mother and elder brother brought an action against the coach for compensation for damages based on article 11 of the State Tort Liability Act, saying that his assaults corresponded to wrongful conduct.

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The coach struck the player with the palm of his hand approximately 8 to 10 times and forcefully struck the player’s face approximately 16 to 20 times. The sounds of the strikes were said to have echoed throughout the gymnasium.The player suffered serious injuries and his face bled profusely. He required medical treatment. The coach had directed abusive language towards the student, such as saying, ‘Doing by hitting is the same way done by animals at a zoo or circus; [player’s name] is an animal?’ The coach also told the student that it was his fault that the team lost the game; therefore, he should resign as team captain.14 When the player told the coach he felt too distressed to continue being captain, the coach told him that if he did resign, he would be prohibited from playing. When the student told the coach that he would continue as captain, the teacher said ‘You’ll continue as captain if you’re battered?’ The court judged that the acts of physical force constituted wrongful conduct, and that there was sufficient cause to link the suicide of the student to the coach’s actions. The court found 70 percent to be the degree of contribution, and authorised 70 percent of the amount of damages sought by the plaintiffs. In September 2013, the case was tried as a criminal case, and the court gave the coach a conviction of three years’ imprisonment with one year’s suspension. Instruction by corporal punishment and abusive language by coaches during club activities has not been eliminated. The idea that ‘the slight infringement of a body does not correspond to corporal punishment’ exists in educational administration; the precedent has been the judgment by Tokyo High Court on 1 April 1984 in the case of Mito 5th Junior High School, which said that it was permitted to use physical force in the school as a disciplinary measure. This precedent is shown ‘as a way of thinking about a disciplinary measure, the corporal punishment to the child prescribed in the article 11 of the School Education Act’ attached to a notice given in February 2007 by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT). The contents have an allowance for ‘a permissible physical punishment theory’ in the educational area.15 In January 2013, after the Sakuranomiya Senior High School case, MEXT issued the notice: ‘Concerning thoroughgoing corporal punishment prohibition and understanding of actual situation of corporal punishment,’ which said corporal punishment should not be permitted and it is a mistake to justify corporal punishment as instruction under any circumstance. In May 2014, MEXT issued the notice ‘Investigation Report Concerning Athletic Club Activity,’ noting that corporal punishment should be distinguished from strict instruction. ‘Guidelines on Instruction by the Athletic Club Activity’ was attached to the report. The report included the provision that a single person (i.e., coach) should not be the only one entrusted with governance of instruction, the whole school should be involved. However, these guidelines are not viewed as legal obligations. Instruction by violence and abusive language by coaches is still found in youth sport in Japan. It is necessary to construct a new system in order to protect the human rights and welfare of every child. The child protection system in the United Kingdom should be used as a model, as it is the most advanced in the world.

Safeguarding issues around Sport in Asia Sport can impact the rights of children in Asia beyond those who are participating as athletes. This has particularly been demonstrated in relation to major sport events. Brackenridge, Rhind and Palmer-Felgate conducted a systematic review and interviews with 70 experts that identified key risks related to child labour, displacement, child sexual exploitation and human trafficking.16 The positive social legacy of sport events was found to frequently mask more problematic

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issues, taking attention away from the safeguarding vulnerabilities. The following illustrative examples were identified which relate to the context of Asia, and had an impact, either directly or indirectly, on children: •

720,000 people were forcibly displaced before the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games for infrastructure development, which increased poverty, divided families and forced children to witness their parents being beaten and their houses being destroyed. For the Japan and Korea 2002 FIFA World Cup, 300 homeless were ‘cleaned up’ from Osaka, and in Seoul city officials set up ‘off-limits’ areas for homeless people. The Beijing 2008 Olympic Games reportedly displaced 1.25 million residents, with an additional 400,000 migrants from rural areas living temporarily in extreme insecurity. The Delhi 2010 Commonwealth Games led to the eviction of 300,000 people from city slums. Some of these evictions were violent and unplanned with no entitlements for the evictees who now live in resettlement camps far from schools and economic opportunities in Delhi. Child labour that may involve the manufacturing of goods to be sold during events, the construction of stadia or street selling (Gustafson, 2011; Morrow, 2008; Play Fair, 2008), which could be a particular challenge in a country such as India where 12 percent of the work force are estimated to be children.

• • •

•

There is therefore a need to not only safeguard the children who are directly participating in sport at all levels in Asia but also to adopt a broader perspective to consider how sport may indirectly promote or violate the rights of children.

International Safeguards for Children in Sport To address the need to safeguard children in sport, the International Safeguards were launched in 2014. These Safeguards were developed, implemented and evaluated based on a two-year pilot process with 32 organisations.17 Of this sample, four organisations specifically worked in Asia and a further 11 organisations worked internationally, including in Asia. The International Safeguards outline the guidance and processes that should be put in place by any organisation providing sport activities to children and young people. The Safeguards should be viewed as guides, which facilitate an organisation’s journey towards safeguarding individuals, rather than as an end in themselves. The Safeguards reflect International declarations, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, relevant legislation, government guidance, existing child protection/safeguarding standards and good practice. The International Safeguards are: Safeguard 1: Developing your policy – Any organisation providing or with responsibility for sport activities should have a safeguarding policy. This is a statement of intent that demonstrates a commitment to safeguard everyone involved in sport from harm and provides the framework within which procedures are developed. A safeguarding policy makes clear to all what is required. It also helps to create a safe and positive environment and to show that the organisation is taking its duty of care seriously. Safeguard 2: Procedures for responding to safeguarding concerns – Procedures describe the operational processes required to implement organisational policy and provide clear step-by-step guidance on what to do in different circumstances. They clarify roles and

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responsibilities as well as lines of communication. Procedures help to ensure a prompt response to concerns about a person’s safety or well-being. Safeguard 3: Advice and support – Arrangements made to provide essential information and support to those responsible for safeguarding. People should be advised on where to access help and support. An organisation has a duty to ensure advice and support is in place to help people to play their part in safeguarding such that they know who they can turn to for help. Safeguard 4: Minimising risks – The measures which are taken to assess and minimise the risks to children in the organisation. Some people, who work or seek to work in sport in a paid or voluntary capacity, pose a risk. People can also be at risk when placed in unsuitable places or asked to participate in unsuitable activities. It is possible to minimise these risks by putting safeguards in place. Safeguard 5: Guidelines for behaviour – An organisation should have codes of conduct to describe what an acceptable standard of behaviour is and promote current best practice. Standards of behaviour set a benchmark of what is acceptable for all, and codes of conduct can help to remove ambiguity and clarify the grey areas around what is viewed as acceptable behaviour. Safeguard 6: Recruiting, training and communicating – Recruiting appropriate members of staff, creating opportunities to develop and maintain the necessary skills, and communicating regarding safeguarding. Everyone within an organisation has a role to play in safeguarding. Organisations providing sporting activities have a responsibility to provide training and development opportunities for staff and volunteers. Safeguard 7: Working with partners – The actions taken by the organisation to influence and promote the adoption and implementation of measures to safeguard people by partner organisations. Sport organisations have both a strategic and a delivery role. Where organisational partnership, membership, funding or commissioning relationships exist or develop with other organisations, the organisation should use its influence to promote the implementation of safeguarding measures. Safeguard 8: Monitoring and evaluating – It is essential that there is ongoing monitoring of compliance and effectiveness, involving all key stakeholders. This is necessary because organisations need to know whether safeguarding is effective and where improvements and adaptations are needed or where patterns of risk exist. (Rhind and Owusu-Sekyere, 2018) The International Safeguards aim to: help create a safe sporting environment for children wherever they participate and at whatever level; provide a benchmark to assist sport providers and funders to make informed decisions; promote good practice and challenge practice that is harmful; and provide clarity on safeguarding to all involved in sport. The safeguarding journey is broken down into five steps: • • • • •

Step1: Foundation level (e.g. understanding the need for safeguarding). Step 2: The Self-Audit Tool (e.g. understanding the current status of safeguarding). Step 3: Developing your Safeguard (e.g. creating an action plan). Step 4: Implementing your Safeguard (e.g. promoting awareness and engagement with the policy or procedure). Step 5: Embedding your Safeguard (e.g. monitoring and reviewing practice).

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A clear need for the implementation guides was emphasised to help people understand how their organisation can work towards the International Safeguards, irrespective of their current situation in relation to safeguarding.

The CHILDREN Pillars Eight key factors have been identified which influence effective implementation of the International Safeguards.18 These are called the CHILDREN pillars: Cultural sensitivity, Holistic, Incentives, Leadership, Dynamic, Resources, Engagement and Networks. The acronym of these pillars spells CHILDREN to emphasise the fundamental point that they should be viewed and treated as children first and that their rights should be protected and promoted through sport. Cultural sensitivity – The Safeguards need to be tailored to the cultural, political and social norms of the context. I think that the main thing is the way in which we understand issues of child protection in the country. So, while everybody seems to agree in principle that children are vulnerable and should not be abused in any kind of drastic way, no sexual abuse or anything like that. Here, for example, scolding children is not necessarily seen as abuse. Or, having a child run around a field 5 times is not seen as a problem, you know, or stand in the sun. I mean, these are all things that have been done to us while we were in school. Holistic – Safeguarding should be viewed as integrated into all aspects of an organisation as opposed to being an additional element. What has been interesting is that when we have worked with organisations to develop their codes of conduct, they have themselves identified a need for clear policies regarding issues such as hiring and the specific action which will take place if the codes are not followed. When they see the initial success they can see the benefits of this kind of work in other areas. In truth, many of these areas are integrated with each other. Incentives – There needs to be a clear reason for individuals and an organisation to work towards the Safeguards. I think that the core thing is that everyone we talk to is passionate about their sport. So the way we presented it was doing what was right for our sport so that people have a positive experience and want to keep coming back again and again. It is not just about the children, it is everyone. It is about the whole sport and not just the children. Leadership – The Safeguards need to have strong support from those working in key leadership roles both at the top and throughout an organisation. Another success is that each of our regions in the last year have identified a Safe Sport contact. Our ultimate goal would be for each of our clubs to have a Safe Sport person. Just having a person at the regional level, building your army, has been really exciting and is a big win in general, just showing how our membership has embraced something that at first they were not that psyched about. Also just having these people thinking about the issues and coming up with new ideas, extending the reach, has been a good win.

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Dynamic – The safeguarding systems within an organisation need to continually be reviewed and adapted to maintain their relevance and effectiveness. I think the main challenge is the rollout process. With anything you do it takes time. Particularly when working in global contexts. We have 20 countries around the world with staff and volunteer teachers and children and community members and how that gets effectively integrated into the work that you do and how it’s transferred into being meaningful for that specific context. Resources – The implementation of the Safeguards needs to be supported by appropriate resources (e.g. human, time and financial). The approach that I have adopted is around frameworks. To say these are the core competencies, these are the things that you are trying to get to. How you get there may differ because the circumstances that they are working in and the resources that they have will vary significantly. Engaging stakeholders – A democratic approach should be adopted which invites and listens to the voices of those in and around the sport (e.g. children, parents, coaches and community leaders). Those who make the policy are not the ones implementing the policy, that’s why I think the most important thing is that those who are using it should be part of the drafting, so it becomes realistic. Networks – An organisation’s progress towards the Safeguards will be strengthened by developing networks with other related organisations. This is a good thing about the networking. I think the sport for development network is probably one of the most generous networks with the sharing of knowledge and resources. So we used that to develop our own policy, and then identified issues and areas for development. Important impacts for children were reported by people in the International Safeguards project working in Asia. In one sport for a development agency, a significant reduction in incidents of corporal punishment was observed. This was perceived to be associated with an increase in the use of questioning techniques by teachers during interactions with children. One member of staff at the agency explained: [I]f there’s a naughty child, they are not so quick to punish, they try to understand their behaviour and cover all angles. Another participant was involved in a programme that used sport within a youth detention centre. Changes were reported with respect to how people interacted with children: The interaction when we first saw them, it was so negative. But then when we worked with them with the coaching practices we see that has changed. There’s an emotional safety for youth and now they feel they are someone they feel like they are something and they can be someone after they get out of this.

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An employee within a Sport for Development organisation described how the training of coaches had helped to safeguard children both within and outside of the organisation: One way in which our involvement with the Safeguards has impacted children is through our provision of first aid. As part of the self-audit, we reviewed our injury log.We identified that the kinds of injuries being suffered were not really being addressed by our training for coaches. We adapted the curriculum to include foot and spinal injuries, which are both prevalent in our society. The coaches really liked this as they could transfer these skills back into the community, such as dealing with road traffic accident injuries. This may appear tangential to the Safeguards but it came about as a result of our involvement in this project and has helped to better safeguard the children in our organisation.

Conclusion Despite the significant body of work which has been conducted over the past 20 years related to safeguarding children in sport, there remains a wide range of avenues for possible research. The vast majority of the research has been conducted in European contexts, and there is only a limited body of research in Asia. Funding is required for future investigations which address the following key questions with respect to sport in Asia: 1 2 3 4 5

What is the nature and prevalence of the different forms of child maltreatment? What are the individual, relational and organisational risk factors for child maltreatment? How can cultures be developed and maintained which help to safeguard children in sport? How can the International Safeguards for Children in Sport be effectively embedded? How do the International Safeguards impact the experiences of children?

Notes 1 United Nations, Convention on the Rights of the Child (United Nations, 1989), www.unicef.org.uk/ UNICEFs-Work/Our-mission/UN-Convention//. 2 Marije Stoltenborgh et al., “The Prevalence of Child Maltreatment Across the Globe,” Child Abuse Review 24 (2014): 37–50. 3 Celia H. Brackenridge, Tess Kay, and Daniel J. A. Rhind, Sport, Children’s Rights and Violence Prevention: A Source Book on Global Issues and Local Programmes (London: Brunel University Press, 2012). 4 UN, Convention on the Rights of the Child. 5 World Health Organisation, Preventing Child Maltreatment: A Guide to Taking Action and Generating Evidence (Geneva: World Health Organisation, 2006). 6 Daniel J. A. Rhind and Frank Owusu-Sekyere, International Safeguards for Children in Sport (London: Routledge, 2018). 7 Margo Mountjoy et al., “Safeguarding the Child Athlete in Sport: A Review, a Framework and Recommendations for the IOC Youth Athlete Development Model,” British Journal of Sports Medicine 49 (2016): 883–86. 8 John S. Raglin et al., “Training Practices and Staleness in 13–18 Year-Old Swimmers: A Cross Cultural Study,” Paediatric Exercise Science 12 (2000): 61–70. 9 Albert C. Lin et al., “Rhabdomyolysis in 119 Students After Repetitive Exercise,” British Journal of Sports Medicine 39 (2005): 3–4. 10 Fan Hong, “Innocence Lost: Child Athletes in China,” Sport in Society 7, no. 3 (2004): 338–54. 11 Keiji Kawai, The Issue of Corporal Punishment and Abuse Concerning School Sports: From the Comparison Between Japan and the United States (Tokyo: Tetsuro Sugawara & Koichiro Mochizuki, 2014), 71–72. 12 Shoko Kawauchi, “Corporal Punishment as a Disciplinary Punishment: Present Situations and Issue from History of Institutionalisation and Judicial Precedents,” Study of School Compliance 3 (2015): 30.

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13 Katsumi Mori, Daniel Rhind, and Misia Gervis, “The Present State of Abuse or Corporal Punishment Involving Children and Sports Authority Figures and the Necessity for a Child Protection System in Sports in Japan,” Annals of Fitness and Sports Science 50 (2015): 1–8. 14 Precedent by Tokyo District Court Judgement, February 24, 2016. Refer to Precedent Times, 1432, 204–46. 15 Aogu Sakata, “Vestiges of ‘Theory of Forgiven Corporal Punishment’: The Case of Suicide of Osaka City Provided Sakuranomiya Senior High School,” Study of School Compliance 7 (2019). 16 Celia H. Brackenridge, Daniel J. A. Rhind, and Sarah Palmer-Felgate, “Locating and Mitigating Risks to Children Associated with Major Sporting Events,” Journal of Policy Research in Tourism, Leisure and Events 7 (2015): 1–14. 17 Rhind and Owusu-Sekyere, International Safeguards for Children. 18 Daniel J. A. Rhind, Tess Kay, Laura Hills, and Frank Owusu-Sekyere, “Building a System to Safeguard Children in Sport: The 8 Children Pillars,” Journal of Sport and Social Issues 41 (2017): 151–71.

Bibliography Brackenridge, Celia H., Tess Kay, and Daniel J. A. Rhind. Sport, Children’s Rights and Violence Prevention: A Source Book on Global Issues and Local Programmes. London: Brunel University Press, 2012. Brackenridge, Celia H., Daniel J. A. Rhind, and Sarah Palmer-Felgate. “Locating and Mitigating Risks to Children Associated with Major Sporting Events.” Journal of Policy Research in Tourism, Leisure and Events 7, no. 3 (2015): 1–14. Hong, Fan. “Innocence Lost: Child Athletes in China.” Sport in Society 7, no. 3 (2004): 338–54. Kawai, Keiji. The Issue of Corporal Punishment and Abuse Concerning School Sports: From the Comparison Between Japan and the United States. Tokyo: Tetsuro Sugawara & Koichiro Mochizuki, 2014. Kawauchi, Shoko. “Corporal Punishment as a Disciplinary Punishment: Present Situations and Issue from History of Institutionalisation and Judicial Precedents.” Study of School Compliance 3 (2015): 30. Lin, Albert C., C.-M. Lin, T.-L. Wang, and J.-G. Leu. “Rhabdomyolysis in 119 Students After Repetitive Exercise.” British Journal of Sports Medicine 39 (2005): 3–4. Mori, Katsumi, Daniel Rhind, and Misia Gervis. “The Present State of Abuse or Corporal Punishment Involving Children and Sports Authority Figures and the Necessity for a Child Protection System in Sports in Japan.” Annals of Fitness and Sports Science 50 (2015): 1–8. Mountjoy, Margo, Daniel J. A. Rhind, Anne Tiivas, and Michel Leglise. “Safeguarding the Child Athlete in Sport: A Review, a Framework and Recommendations for the IOC Youth Athlete Development Model.” British Journal of Sports Medicine 49 (2016): 883–86. Raglin, John S., Sachi Sawamura, Serafin Alexiou, and Peter Hassmên. “Training Practices and Staleness in 13–18 Year-Old Swimmers: A Cross Cultural Study.” Paediatric Exercise Science 12 (2000): 61–70. Rhind, Daniel J. A., and Frank Owusu-Sekyere. “Evaluating the Impacts of Working Towards the International Safeguards for Children in Sport.” Sport Management Review (2019). Rhind, Daniel J. A., and Frank Owusu-Sekyere. International Safeguards for Children in Sport: Developing and Embedding a Safeguarding Culture. London: Routledge, 2018. Rhind, Daniel J. A.,Tess Kay, Laura Hills, and Frank Owusu-Sekyere. “Building a System to Safeguard Children in Sport: The 8 Children Pillars.” Journal of Sport and Social Issues 41 (2017): 151–71. Sakata, Aogu. “Vestiges of ‘Theory of Forgiven Corporal Punishment’: The Case of Suicide of Osaka City Provided Sakuranomiya Senior High School.” Study of School Compliance 7 (2019). Stoltenborgh, Marije, Marian J. Bakermans-Kranenberg, Lenneke R. A. Alink, and Marinus van Ijzenboorn. “The Prevalence of Child Maltreatment Across the Globe.” Child Abuse Review 24 (2014): 37–50. World Health Organisation. Preventing Child Maltreatment: A Guide to Taking Action and Generating Evidence. Geneva: World Health Organisation, 2006.

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29 Sport and ethnicity Bonnie Pang and Rohini Balram

Introduction Ethnicity in sport has an important impact on sport behaviours and patterns. Ethnicity as a social construct provides the basis for the understanding of the dynamics in the microcosm of individual dispositions, practices and challenges within sporting structures and how they further translate into the complexity of the macrocosm of power, economy and politics. This chapter defines ‘Asia’ as a social construct which is ever-changing geographically, politically and culturally. Historically, Europeans have used terms such as ‘the Orient’ to describe those who inhabit Asia, North Africa and the Middle East.1 As Said2 noted, Orientalism is the basis for the inaccurate cultural representations that form Western thoughts and perceptions of the Eastern world, specifically in relation to the Middle East region. Therefore, the term ‘Asia’ may denote otherness and binary opposition to the West. Similarly, the conceptualisation of ethnic identity is a dynamic construct expressed as a function of relational context. The point here is not to posit an essentialist difference between Asia and the West. Nor do we intend to use ‘Asia’ as a static geographical category but rather as a conceptual tool to discuss and outline the relevant studies within this socially constructed region. This chapter includes literatures about ethnicity in relation to sporting cultures, bodies and sport events that represent those from East Asia (e.g. China, including Hong Kong and Taiwan, Japan and South Korea), Southeast Asia (e.g. Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand), South Asia (e.g. India, Pakistan), and West Asia (e.g. Iran, Turkey). Asia has almost every racial type that can be found globally. Within South, South East, East and West Asia, there are ethnic minorities that are marginalised in their cultures.3 South Asia accounts for almost a quarter of the world’s population and is the most densely populated area in the world.4 Dravidian and Indo-Aryan cultures are prominently shared by the major states in South Asia, whereas the inhabitants of Bangladesh and West Bengal are mostly Bengalis.5 East Asia represents 38 percent of Asia’s total population.6 Of China’s 56 ethnic minority groups, Han is the biggest while Hezhen is the smallest, with fewer than 2,000 people.7 Southeast Asia has a population size of more than 641 million,8 and the region has been greatly influenced by the cultures and religions of India and China.9 The Chinese make up the majority of the ethnicities in Singapore, with Indians being the minority group.10 Cambodia has about 36 ethnic groups; the Khmer are the main ethnic group. The major ethnic group in Indonesia is Javanese, and 314

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the minority groups are the East Timorese and South Moluccans. Christian Filipinos are the main ethnic group in the Philippines, while the Palawan and Mangyans are among the minority groups.11 West Asia has a population size of approximately 310 million, with the majority of the population being Arab, Turkic and Persian, and with smaller populations of Greek, Kurdish, Jewish, Assyrian, Armenian and Cypriot peoples.12

Sporting bodies, ethnic relations and national identity The body has been a central research topic in Western social sciences since the start of the twentyfirst century, and yet it is still under-examined in an Asian context. The Body in Asia13 is a collection of papers on the body in relation to religion, culture and the state in Asia. A monograph by Man14 focuses on the body discourses in Chinese philosophy, body aesthetics and art, and the body and gender in China and Chinese culture. Rowe and Gilmour15 discuss the consumption of sport in Asia, highlighting Western-dominated sport media and the lack of interest in domestic Asian professional sport. This is partly the result of the influence of transnational broadcasters in Asia and the marketing efforts of Western sport interests, which tend to privilege European- and American-based sport leagues. The sport fan in Asia also tends to engage in a form of consumption that favours globally marketed Western sport competitions and their celebrities. In contemporary society, sport is an effective means for revealing a country’s political preoccupations and geopolitical concerns. In East Asia, Horne16 writes about body culture in Japanese sport. He draws on Kirk’s17 notion of physical culture to discuss the evolution from baseball and sumo, as Japan’s twentieth-century sport, to soccer in the twenty-first century. Horne proposes that the Japanese sport culture has moved through three eras of ‘sport citizenship’ over the last century. The first four decades of the twentieth century were an era of ‘imperial athletes’ and ‘athletes of Greater Japan.’The post-World War II decades saw the construction of an essentialist cultural opposition between ‘Japanese athletes’ and ‘foreign athletes.’ In the twenty-first century, soccer is creating more flexible ethnic identities and senses of belonging, and the mobility of athletes has an impact on those athletes’ national identities.18 Merkel19 highlights the complex and multidimensional relationship between sport and national identity in divided societies, and focuses on the politics of identity in North Korea. He focuses on the context of both international and inter-Korean sport events and concludes that, despite the fact that reunification of the two nations is unlikely to occur in the near future, both tend to stress harmony and unity, and celebrate historical and cultural commonalities in sporting events. Instead, the rivalry of both North and South Korea is with Japan, due to their country’s colonial history. International sporting events have been seen as building grounds for promoting nationalism and national identity. China and India are becoming more prominent in the organisation of major sport events, and are also seen as potentially lucrative sport media markets. These two powers are building on and extending the global sporting role of Japan and South Korea in earlier decades. Bairner and Hwang20 note that one of the main political aims of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games was to promote Chinese nationalism and strengthen cohesion within multinational and ethnically diverse China. Mangan, Kwon and Kim21 discuss the relations between South Korea, Japan and China, from developing friendship to growing friction in economics, politics and sport in relation to the Guangzhou Asian Games. There is a history of bitter rivalry between these countries, as manifested in Japan’s occupation of Korea and the Second SinoJapanese War, for example. The Asian Games were seen as a manifestation of resentment and revenge arising out of historic conflicts among these countries. In South Asia, cricket is particularly important to collective identity. In India, it is the richest and most popular of all sport played in the country.22 India’s cricketing relations with Pakistan 315

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signify a complex array of meanings to people in India. Bandyopadhyay23 discusses how Indian people relate cricket to nationalism, communalism, war, infiltration, insurgency, terrorism, diplomacy, peace, election, cultural exchange and commercial booms. Dimeo and Kay24 state that cricket has become a tool for diplomacy and peace for Indians and Pakistanis, who have shared a long history of distrust. Not only have India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka faced internal conflict due to such historical tensions; they have also dealt with the underlying prejudice within the media when South Asia won the right to host the Cricket World Cup in 1996.25 In relation to gender relations, girls and women have much less access to sport than boys and men, but male control over their movements is organised very differently in comparison to many Islamic countries.26 Since the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Hindu fundamentalists in India, young Indian Muslims, have been emphasising their national identity over their Muslim identity. Thus, women of this minority community end up at risk of being victimised by forces both within and outside Islam.27 In West Asia, the relationship between nationalism and sport is perhaps even more evident in the development of national sporting associations and national teams. In 2008, Turkey’s strong showing in the European Soccer Cup led the Turkish masses to flood the streets in celebration. Sport plays a major role in public life – Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan and Lebanon all possess vibrant sporting cultures.28 Not only has the Pan-Arab Games been a competitive environment in which Arab youth can enhance their sporting skills but it has also been a vehicle to express cultural unity, raise interest in sport and aid in building strong youth who believe in their Arab identity.29 Reiche30 states that by hosting prestigious sporting events, promoting elite sport success and by investing in famous sport clubs, Qatar too has used sport as a domestic and foreign policy tool to develop a healthy society and improve relations between nations in order to gain soft power and strengthen national security. Hargreaves31 discusses the situation in Iran, where, under the leadership of Islamist feminist Faezeh Hashemi, Muslim women have been increasingly drawn towards sport and physical activity. The way this change is being brought about is not radical. Iran has succeeded in providing women with considerable opportunities for engaging in sport and physical activity by being able to offer segregated spaces (indoor facilities to which men have no access) in which women are free to wear shorts and T-shirts. Schoolgirls play soccer in Iran, but under female coaches, and tournaments are conducted by female officials and referees.

Ethnic minorities in sport Ethnic minorities exist within Asian countries, and some continue to experience marginalisation in sporting culture. Taking the case of Thailand, Jonsson32 explores Mien (Yao), an ethnic minority, in sport. He discusses the restructuring of social life that emerges with ethnic mobilisation in sport and culture. The Mien, ‘an ethnic minority people in the northern highlands, are known to anthropology as one of Thailand’s “hill tribes”, migratory shifting cultivators of rice, maize and poppy, and Mien religious life has been characterised as ancestor worship, Daoism or a combination of the two.’33 He draws on the sport that Mien play during their ethnic festival, which includes a cultural contact zone that enables Mien practices of song, music and dance as features of a common cultural heritage, as well as non-local sport such as soccer, basketball and handball that were promoted through the national schooling system. This ethnic festival has therefore provided a space for playing with both modernity and tradition in national terms. Gilmour and Rowe34 focus on Malaysia, which utilises sport as a vehicle for the promotion of a more heterogeneous version of Malaysian national identity. Malaysia’s population is primarily composed of three major ethnic groups: the Malay majority (just over half of the population), and the Chinese (one-third) and Indian (one-tenth) minorities.35 Traditional Malaysian sport 316

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were in the form of elite male hunting, elephant taming and the training of champion cocks for cock-fighting. Other popular sport focussing on craft skills included: kite flying (wau), top spinning, sepak bola tangkis (badminton), finger and arm-wrestling, silat (a form of self-defence) and races on bamboo stilts.36 As a result of the Kuala Lumpur riots, sport has been one of the most efficacious means of bringing Malaysia’s various ethnic groups (Malay, Chinese and Indian) together; for men, cricket (out of all sport) has assisted most in forging better ethnic relations.37 Post-independence Malaysia is characterised by ‘ethnic segregation,’ and sport are influenced by a combination of the Malay hegemony and the ethnic tensions that characterise so much of Malaysian life. Tibet is an autonomous region within the People’s Republic of China.38 Historically, the two states of the high Himalayas, Tibet and Bhutan, resisted the progress of football, seeing it as an effective instrument of colonisation.39 The formation of the Tibetan National Football Association and the Bhutanese experience of the history of football are associated with this strong desire to assert national identity through a global cultural form, like football, as the political options for these nations are very limited. Football gained popularity among the stateless Tibetan exiles living in India, through which they justified their identity as a modern autonomous nation. In Bhutan’s case, public demand in the 1990s compelled the government to grant access to world football on satellite television channels, giving rise to the popularity of that sport.40 However, participation in sport with colonial legacies, such as hockey and cricket, takes on different personal and political connotations than those of sport like golf and basketball that individuals are acculturated into within the diaspora.

Postcolonialism and ethnic identities in sport Sport has been profoundly affected by colonial legacies. While some postcolonial countries struggle with race/ethnicity and identity, others have used sport as a major tool to manifest these things (i.e. in contemporary sporting events). For example, modern sport came to Tibet as part of the British imperial model of development. But it faced stiff resistance and consequent banning by the Buddhist authorities, who regarded it as ‘an effective tool of western cultural imperialism.’41 Under Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan, the sport curriculum played an important part in promoting Japanese identity. Baseball was particularly well received by Taiwanese people, leading to the establishment of junior, youth and adult leagues.42 Initially, ‘baseball remained the prerogative of the Japanese during the early years of occupancy.’43 However, the sport retained its influence in terms of identity formation even after the Japanese left the island at the end of World War II. Parkes44 draws an analogy between buzkashi, an equestrian game in Afghanistan, and polo in India/Pakistan. While the traditional game, at one level, was expressive of regal authority and patronage, the polo tournaments were intended to crystallise regional alliances, kinship ties and allegiances to kingship. Once the game was reprioritised with Hurlingham rules, the colonial elite began to play it both as a mark of distinction and exclusivity, and the Pakistani elite who replaced their colonial counterparts after 1947 sailed in the same boat.45 Postcolonialism and race/ethnicity go hand in hand with class segregation in sport. Less powerful groups, such as ethnic minorities, may occupy a lower social-class position in sport in society because of postcolonial power struggles. Dimeo46 discusses the history of The Calcutta Royal Golf Club (CRGC), reflecting on its social function, which was to answer the desire of members for physical and social distance from the locals (it excluded Indians from its membership until 1946) and other minorities, thus making golf a class-biased and racially exclusive 317

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sport during colonial times in India. The new middle class that took control of the club after independence retained the elitist and exclusive values of colonialism. The Anglo-Indian community has always suffered from a sense of ‘otherness’ that kept it at an uneasy distance from both the British and the Indians during colonial rule and still haunts it in the midst of its constant urge for assimilation into the host society in postcolonial India.47 Anglo-Indians representing India in other sport on the world stage, including boxing, cricket, athletics or billiards, posit their right to be considered as an inseparable part of an Indian national community. Yet the transition from colonial to postcolonial India implies that, despite their active participation in and contribution to nation-building process through sport, the AngloIndians use sport as ‘a means of perpetuating and consolidating the community.’48

Negotiating racial/ethnic identity in sport as Asians With globalisation and migration, the diasporic world is filled with ethnic diversity and differences, which further raises the question of the ongoing negotiations of people’s race/ethnicity in sport. Sport plays a significant role for diasporic Asian communities, enabling them to identify with, and celebrate, spaces nominally representing ‘nation,’‘home’ and ‘homeland.’49 Rowe, Parry and Pang50 explore the geopolitics of football in Asia and Australia. They highlight the ambivalence towards China; the country’s economic investment in football in Australia is welcomed but not its culture or ethnic practices. As Rowe et al.51 suggest, the emphasis on transnational flows of football capital, knowledge and labour is not always accompanied by an equivalent concern with cultural flows or the cultural dynamics of the lives of Chinese-Australians. An increasing number of studies conducted with Chinese diaspora youths in Australia reveal their ongoing negotiations of Chineseness and their perceptions of and experiences in school sport and in physical activity more broadly. These studies also address the influence of the youths’ families and living environments on their experiences in physical activity; their definitions of health and healthy bodies; health and physical education teachers’ experiences with these Chinese Australian students; and self-reflexive narratives about the authors as Hong Kong Chinese-Australians conducting critical sociocultural research with Chinese diaspora youth in sport.52 In the digital age, social media are increasingly central as systems of representation of ethnic identity, culture and community. Pang and Hill53 conducted a critical discourse analysis on social media representations of Chinese communities’ health and physicality and their relation to the intersections of race, gender and power.The study indicates there is a dearth of knowledge about how the ‘other’ constructs meanings of health and physicality and in relation to Chinese ethnic identities. For example, only four of the articles from social media sites discussed in the study were written by a Chinese author, with many others focusing on the experiences of Westerners visiting China. In diasporic communities, ‘South Asian’ is often used as a collective identity to describe different experiences of Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi peoples.54 Young South Asian British Muslim women adhering to more traditional interpretations of Islam prioritise the importance of concealing the body from male view. Thus, their participation in sport is considered inappropriate, especially if there is no gender segregation.55 Stride56 discusses the importance of considering the multiplicity of South Asian Muslim girls ‘gendered and ethnic identities in order to meet their multiple and diverse needs in physical education (PE).’ She challenges stereotypes of these girls as passive, frail and oppressed, and discovers them (through the findings of her qualitative research) to be active agents in negotiating PE and resisting dominant discourses. Stride57 acknowledges these girls’ heterogeneity and agency in the way they negotiate multiple hurdles (including religion) to engage in physical activity on their own terms. Long, Hylton, and Spracklen58 discuss the underrepresentation of Asians among British minority 318

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ethnic groups in sport participation, spectating, volunteering, administration and coaching. Football in England has provided an avenue to discuss various aspects of racism, not only in sport but in pluralistic cultures and work spaces.59 British football has low rates of participation of South Asian players, and the enduring scarcity of South Asian players within men’s professional football denotes adamant patterns of racial stereotyping of South Asians.60 However, this does not necessarily reflect the actual participation rates of different ethnic groups, nor their interest or desire to participate. Many South Asian male footballers have been forced to create their own football teams in order to protect themselves from personal racial abuse and institutional racism in the game.61 Therefore, the British Asian footballers who have achieved the most success have either been classified as Anglo-Asians or have underemphasised their South Asian heritage to possess the necessary cultural capital for breaking into professional football and for gaining acceptance within player subcultures.62 Increasing numbers of young British Asians are expressing their support for the England football team. This is in direct contrast to cricket, where large numbers choose to follow a team from the Indian subcontinent. For many young British Asians, cricket invokes images of their own or their ancestors’ homes and lives before migration.Thus, supporting a subcontinental nation in the global sport arena facilitates an imagined connection with ‘the old country.’63 The (overlooked) concept of the Asian diaspora spawns more expressive accounts of how sport reconnects geographically disseminated peoples, influencing their identities and subjectivities in hostile circumstances.64

Setting the research agenda on sport and ethnicity in Asia This chapter provides a by no means a comprehensive understanding of all Asian societies that construct ethnicity through sport, as it is limited to those studies published in English which focus on rising superpowers, notably China, India, Japan and Korea. In other words, we have left out a massive amount of significant research published in the countries’ native languages. This points to the need to move towards post-monolingual research methodologies that complicate the privileged and taken-for-granted scholastic view of English-medium knowledge in this intellectual field.65 Alongside the lack of discussion of literatures from the native languages, this chapter also does not offer concentrated attention to the emerging themes in ethnicity in sport. Notably, the discussion points out that the intra-ethnic relations and ways in which ethnic minorities within Asian countries play out in sport are often undermined. Likewise, the inter-ethnic relations with other parts of Asia (including geographically located Australia, New Zealand and Asia Pacific islands) in a range of sport are worth further examination. The current intra-and inter-ethnic relations in sport in Asia, when considered in conjunction with gender, power and politics, reveal the necessity of promoting diversity, equity and social justice through international and mega sporting events in Asia.

Notes 1 Edward W. Said, Orientalism:Western Conceptions of the Orient (1978) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995). 2 Ibid. 3 Vahid Rashidvash and Fatemeh Moosavi Mirak, “Ethnic Groups in Aisa,” International Journal of Humanities & Social Science Studies 3, no. 3 (2015): 181–86, 181. 4 The Five Regions of Asia–Asia Countries and Regions, www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-fourregions-of-asia.html. 5 Rashidvash and Mirak, “Ethnic Groups,” 181. 6 The Five Regions of Asia–Asia Countries and Regions. 319

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7 “Ethnic Minorities in China,” Asia Society, accessed June 6, 2019, https://asiasociety.org/ ethnic-minorities-china. 8 The Five Regions of Asia–Asia Countries and Regions. 9 Rashidvash and Mirak, “Ethnic Groups” 181. 10 Gerald Clarke, “From Ethnocide to Ethnodevelopment? Ethnic Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in Southeast Asia,” Third World Quarterly 22, no. 3 (2001): 413–36. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid., 181. 13 Bryan S. Turner and Yangwen Zheng, eds., The Body in Asia,Vol. 3 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009). 14 Eva Kit Wah Man, “Bodies in China: Philosophy, Aesthetics, Gender and Politics,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 76, no. 2 (2018): 240–43. 15 David Rowe and Callum Gilmour, “Sport, Media, and Consumption in Asia: A Merchandised Milieu,” American Behavioral Scientist 53, no. 10 (2010): 1530–48, 1530. 16 John Horne, “Understanding Sport and Body Culture in Japan,” Body & Society 62, no. 2 (2000): 73–86. 17 David Kirk, “Physical Culture, Physical Education and Relational Analysis,” Sport, Education and Society 4, no. 1 (1999): 63–73. 18 William W. Kelly, “Japan’’s Embrace of Soccer: Mutable Ethnic Players and Flexible Soccer Citizenship in the New East Asian Sports Order,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 30, no. 11 (2013): 1235–46. 19 Udo Merkel, “The Politics of Sport and Identity in North Korea,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 31, no. 3 (2014): 376–90. 20 Alan Bairner and Dong-Jhy Hwang, “Representing Taiwan: International Sport, Ethnicity and National Identity in the Republic of China,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 46, no. 3 (2011): 231–48, 231. 21 J. A. Mangan et al., “From Honeymoon to Divorce: Fragmenting Relations Between China and South Korea in Politics, Economics – and Sport,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 30, no. 10 (2013): 1113–29, 1113. 22 Payoshni Mitra, “Challenging Stereotypes: The Case of Muslim Female Boxers in Bengal,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 26, no. 12 (2009): 1840–51. 23 Kausik Bandyopadhyay, “Feel Good, Goodwill and India’s Friendship Tour of Pakistan, 2004: Cricket, Politics and Diplomacy in Twenty-First-Century India,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 25, no. 12 (2008): 1654–70. 24 Paul Dimeo and Joyce Kay, “Major Sports Events, Image Projection and the Problems of ‘SemiPeriphery’: A Case Study of the 1996 South Asia Cricket World Cup,” Third World Quarterly 25, no. 7 (2004): 1263–76. 25 Ibid., 1263. 26 Ibid., 1840. 27 Ibid. 28 Shaun Lopez, “Sport and Society in the Middle East: An Alternate Narrative of Middle Eastern History for the American College Classroom,” Middle East Critique 18, no. 3 (2009): 251–60. 29 Ian P. Henry et al., “Sport, Arab Nationalism and the Pan-Arab Games,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 38, no. 3 (2003): 295–310, 295. 30 Danyel Reiche, “Investing in Sporting Success as a Domestic and Foreign Policy Tool: The Case of Qatar,” International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 7, no. 4 (2015): 489–504. 31 Jennifer Hargreaves, Heroines of Sport:The Politics of Difference and Identity (London: Routledge, 2000). 32 Hjorleifur Jonsson, “Mien Through Sports And Culture: Mobilizing Minority Identity in Thailand,” Journal of Anthropology Museum of Ethnography 68, no. 3 (2003): 317–40. 33 Ibid. 34 Callum Gilmour and David Rowe, “Sport in Malaysia: National Imperatives and Western Seductions,” Sociology of Sport Journal 29, no. 4 (2012): 485–505, 485. 35 Amira Firdaus, “Ethnic Identity and News Media Preferences in Malaysia” (Paper delivered at ARC APFRN Signature Event, Curtin University, Perth), March 26–29, 2006, accessed June 10, 2019, http:// citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.452.9920&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 36 Janice N. Brownfoot, “Healthy Bodies, Healthy Minds: Sport and Society in Colonial Malaya,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 19, no. 2–3 (2002): 129–56. 37 Ibid. 38 Elliot Sperling, The Tibet-China Conflict: History and Polemics, Policy Studies (Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington, 2004). 320

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3 9 Ibid., 1654. 40 Ibid. 41 Alex McKay, “Playing for the Tibetan People: Football and History in the High Himalayas,” in Sabaltern Sports: Politics and Sport in South Asia, ed. James Mills (London: Anthem Press, 2005), 191–204. 42 E. Patricia Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895–1945 (Cambridge: MA Harvard University Press, 1977). 43 Junwei Yu, Playing in Isolation: A History of Baseball in Taiwan (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), 14. 44 Peter Parkes, “Indigenous Polo in Northern Pakistan: Game and Power on the Periphery,” in Sabaltern Sports: Politics and Sport in South Asia, ed. James Mills (London: Anthem Press, 2005), 123–38. 45 Ibid. 46 Paul Dimeo, “The Social History of the Royal Calcutta Golf Club, 1829–2003,” in Sabaltern Sports: Politics and Sport in South Asia, ed. James Mills (London: Anthem Press, 2005), 123–38. 47 Megan M. Mills, “Community, Identity and Sport: Anglo-Indians in Colonial and Postcolonial India,” in Sabaltern Sports: Politics and Sport in South Asia, ed. James Mills (London: Anthem Press, 2005), 205–16. 48 Ibid. 49 Daniel Burdsey et al., eds., Playing Through Time and Space: Sport and South Asian Diasporas (London: Routledge, 2013), 212. 50 David Rowe et al., “The China Question in Football in Australia,” in Softpower, Soccer, Supremacy: The Chinese Dream, ed. J. A. Mangan et al. (Switzerland: Peter Lang, in press). 51 Ibid. 52 Bonnie Pang et al., “ ‘Do I Have a Choice?’ The Influences of Family Values and Investments on Chinese Migrant Young People’’s Lifestyles and Physical Activity Participation in Australia,” Sport, Education and Society 20, no. 8 (2015): 1048–64, 1048; Bonnie Pang and Joanne Hill, “Representations of Chinese Gendered and Racialised Bodies in Contemporary Media Sites,” Sport, Education and Society 23, no. 8 (2018): 773–85, 773; Sheila Scraton et al., “Bend It Like Patel: Centring ‘Race’, Ethnicity and Gender in Feminist Analysis of Women’s Football in England,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 40, no. 1 (2005): 71–88, 71. 53 Pang and Hill, “Representations of Chinese,” 773–85, 773. 54 Scraton et al., “Bend It Like Patel,” 71–88, 71; Scott Fleming, “Sport and South Asian Youth: the Perils of ‘False Universalism’ and Stereotyping,” Leisure Studies 13, no. 3 (1994): 159–77. 55 Tess Kay, “Daughters of Islam: Family Influences on Muslim Young Women’’s Participation in Sport,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 41, no. 3–4 (2006): 357–73. 56 Annette Stride, “Let US Tell YOU! South Asian, Muslim Girls Tell Tales About Physical Education,” Physical Education and Sport Pedagogy 19, no. 4 (2014): 398–417. 57 Annette Stride, “Centralising Space: The Physical Education and Physical Activity Experiences of South Asian, Muslim Girl,” Sport, Education and Society 21, no. 5 (2016): 677–97. 58 Jonathan Long, Kevin Hylton, and Karl Spracklen,“Whiteness, Blackness and Settlement: Leisure and the Integration of New Migrants,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 40, no. 11 (2014): 1779–97, 1779. 59 Ben Carrington, “Introduction: Sport Matters,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 35, no. 6 (2012): 961–70. 60 Ibid. 61 Sanjeiv Johal, “Playing Their Own Game: A South Asian Football Experience,” in Race, Sport and British Society, ed. Ben Carrington and Ian McDonald (London: Routledge, 2001), 153–69. 62 Daniel Burdsey, “ ‘One of the Lads’? Dual Ethnicity and Assimilated Ethnicities in the Careers of British Asian Professional Footballers,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 27, no. 5 (2004): 757–79. 63 Daniel Burdsey, “ ‘If I Ever Play Football, Dad, Can I Play for England or India?’ British Asians, Sport and Diasporic National Identities,” Sage Journals 40, no. 1 (2006): 11–28, 23. 64 Ben Carrington, “Assessing the Sociology of Sport: On Race and Diaspora,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 50, no. 4–5 (2015): 391–96. 65 Guanglun Michael Mu and Bonnie Pang, Interpreting the Chinese Diaspora: Identity, Socialisation, and Resilience According to Pierre Bourdieu (London: Routledge, 2019).

Bibliography Bairner, Alan, and Dong-Jhy Hwang. “Representing Taiwan: International Sport, Ethnicity and National Identity in the Republic of China.” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 46, no. 3 (2011): 231–48. 321

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Bandyopadhyay, Kausik. “Feel Good, Goodwill and India’s Friendship Tour of Pakistan, 2004: Cricket, Politics and Diplomacy in Twenty-First-Century India.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 25, no. 12 (2008): 1654–70. Brownfoot, Janice N. “Healthy Bodies, Healthy Minds: Sport and Society in Colonial Malaya.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 19, no. 2–3 (2002): 129–56. Burdsey, Daniel, Stanley Thangaraj, and Rajinder Dudrah, eds. Playing Through Time and Space: Sport and South Asian Diasporas. London: Routledge, 2013. Burdsey, Daniel. “ ‘If I Ever Play Football, Dad, Can I Play for England or India?’ British Asians, Sport and Diasporic National Identities.” Sage Journals 40, no. 1 (2006): 11–28. Burdsey, Daniel. “ ‘One of the Lads’? Dual Ethnicity and Assimilated Ethnicities in the Careers of British Asian Professional Footballers.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 27, no. 5 (2004): 757–79. Carrington, Ben. “Assessing the Sociology of Sport: On Race and Diaspora.” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 50, no. 4–5 (2015): 391–96. Carrington, Ben. “Introduction: Sport Matters.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 35, no. 6 (2012): 961–70. Clarke, Gerald. “From Ethnocide to Ethnodevelopment? Ethnic Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in Southeast Asia.” Third World Quarterly 22, no. 3 (2001): 413–36. Dimeo, Paul, and Joyce Kay. “Major Sports Events, Image Projection and the Problems of ‘Semi-Periphery’: A Case Study of the 1996 South Asia Cricket World Cup.” Third World Quarterly 25, no. 7 (2004): 1263–76. Dimeo, Paul. “The Social History of the Royal Calcutta Golf Club, 1829–2003.” In Subaltern Sports: Politics and Sport in South Asia, edited by James Mills, 123–38. London: Anthem Press, 2005. Fleming, Scott. “Sport and South Asian Youth: The Perils of ‘False Universalism’ and Stereotyping.” Leisure Studies 13, no. 3 (1994): 159–77. Gilmour, Callum, and David Rowe. “Sport in Malaysia: National Imperatives and Western Seductions.” Sociology of Sport Journal 29, no. 4 (2012): 485–505. Hargreaves, Jennifer. Heroines of Sport:The Politics of Difference and Identity. London: Routledge, 2000. Henry, Ian P., Mahfoud Amara, and Mansour Al-Tauqi.“Sport, Arab Nationalism and the Pan-Arab Games.” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 38, no. 3 (2003): 295–310. Horne, John. “Understanding Sport and Body Culture in Japan.” Body & Society 62, no. 2 (2000): 73–86. Johal, Sanjeiv. “Playing Their Own Game: A South Asian Football Experience.” In Race, Sport and British Society, edited by Ben Carrington and Ian McDonald, 153–69. London: Routledge, 2001. Jonsson, Hjorleifur. “Mien Through Sports and Culture: Mobilizing Minority Identity in Thailand.” Journal of Anthropology Museum of Ethnography 68, no. 3 (2003): 317–40. Kay, Tess. “Daughters of Islam: Family Influences on Muslim Young Women’s Participation in Sport.” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 41, no. 3–4 (2006): 357–73. Kelly, William W. “Japan’s Embrace of Soccer: Mutable Ethnic Players and Flexible Soccer Citizenship in the New East Asian Sports Order.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 30, no. 11 (2013): 1235–46. Kirk, David. “Physical Culture, Physical Education and Relational Analysis.” Sport, Education and Society 4, no. 1 (1999): 63–73. Long, Jonathan, Kevin Hylton, and Karl Spracklen. “Whiteness, Blackness and Settlement: Leisure and the Integration of New Migrants.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 40, no. 11 (2014): 1779–97. Lopez, Shaun. “Sport and Society in the Middle East: An Alternate Narrative of Middle Eastern History for the American College Classroom.” Middle East Critique 18, no. 3 (2009): 251–60. Man, Eva Kit Wah. “Bodies in China: Philosophy, Aesthetics, Gender and Politics.” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 76, no. 2 (2018): 240–43. Mangan, J. A., Sun-Yong Kwon, and Bang-Chool Kim.“From Honeymoon to Divorce: Fragmenting Relations Between China and South Korea in Politics, Economics: And Sport.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 30, no. 10 (2013): 1113–29. McKay, Alex. “Playing for the Tibetan People: Football and History in the High Himalayas.” In Sabaltern Sports: Politics and Sport in South Asia, edited by James Mills, 191–204. London: Anthem Press, 2005.

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Merkel, Udo. “The Politics of Sport and Identity in North Korea.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 31, no. 3 (2014): 376–90. Mills, James, ed. Subaltern Sports: Politics and Sports in South Asia. London: Anthem Press, 2005. Mills, Megan M. “Community, Identity and Sport: Anglo-Indians in Colonial and Postcolonial India.” In Sabaltern Sports: Politics and Sport in South Asia, edited by James Mills, 205–16. London: Anthem Press, 2005. Mitra, Payoshni. “Challenging Stereotypes:The Case of Muslim Female Boxers in Bengal.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 26, no. 12 (2009): 1840–51. Mu, Guanglun Michael, and Bonnie Pang. Interpreting the Chinese Diaspora: Identity, Socialisation, and Resilience According to Pierre Bourdieu. London: Routledge, 2019. Nanayakkara, Samantha. “Crossing Boundaries and Changing Identities: Empowering South Asian Women Through Sport and Physical Activities.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 29, no. 13 (2012): 1885–906. Pang, Bonnie, and Hannah Soong. “ ‘Teachers’ Experiences in Teaching Chinese Australian Students in Health and Physical Education.” Teaching and Teacher Education 56 (2016): 84–93. Pang, Bonnie, and Joanne Hill. “Representations of Chinese Gendered and Racialised Bodies in Contemporary Media Sites.” Sport, Education and Society 23, no. 8 (2018): 773–85. Pang, Bonnie, Doune Macdonald, and Peter Hay. “ ‘Do I Have a Choice?’ The Influences of Family Values and Investments on Chinese Migrant Young People’s Lifestyles and Physical Activity Participation in Australia.” Sport, Education and Society 20, no. 8 (2015): 1048–64. Pang, Bonnie. “Conducting Research with Young Chinese-Australian Students in Health and Physical Education and Physical Activity: Epistemology, Positionality and Methodologies.” Sport, Education and Society 23, no. 6 (2018): 607–18. Parkes, Peter. “Indigenous Polo in Northern Pakistan: Game and Power on the Periphery.” In Subaltern Sports: Politics and Sport in South Asia, edited by James Mills, 123–38. London: Anthem Press, 2005. Rashidvash, Vahid, and Fatemeh Moosavi Mirak. “Ethnic Groups in Aisa.” International Journal of Humanities & Social Science Studies 3, no. 3 (2015): 181–86. Reiche, Danyel. “Investing in Sporting Success as a Domestic and Foreign Policy Tool: The Case of Qatar.” International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 7, no. 4 (2015): 489–504. Rowe, David, and Callum Gilmour. “Sport, Media, and Consumption in Asia: A Merchandised Milieu.” American Behavioral Scientist 53, no. 10 (2010): 1530–48. Rowe, David, Parry Keith, and Bonnie Pang. “The China Question in Football in Australia.” In Softpower, Soccer, Supremacy: The Chinese Dream, edited by J. A. Mangan, P. Horton, and T. Ren. Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang, in press. Said, Edward W. Orientalism:Western Conceptions of the Orient. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995, 1978. Scraton, Sheila, Jayne Caudwell, and Samantha Holland. “Bend It Like Patel: Centring ‘Race’, Ethnicity and Gender in Feminist Analysis of Women’s Football in England.” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 40, no. 1 (2005): 71–88. Sperling, Elliot. The Tibet-China Conflict: History and Polemics’, Policy Studies. Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington, 2004. Stride, Annette. “Centralising Space: The Physical Education and Physical Activity Experiences of South Asian, Muslim Girl.” Sport, Education and Society 21, no. 5 (2016): 677–97. Stride, Annette. “Let Us Tell You! South Asian, Muslim Girls Tell Tales About Physical Education.” Physical Education and Sport Pedagogy 19, no. 4 (2014): 398–417. Thangaraj, Stanley. “Playing Through Differences: Black–White Racial Logic and Interrogating South Asian American Identity.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 35, no. 6 (2012): 988–1006. Tsurumi, E. Patricia. Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895–1945. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977. Turner, Bryan S., and Yangwen Zheng, eds. The Body in Asia.Vol. 3. New York: Berghahn, 2009. Yu, Junwei. Playing in Isolation: A History of Baseball in Taiwan. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2007.

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30 South Korea Women and sport in a persistent patriarchy Guy Podoler

Introduction During 2017, and after a period of heightened tension on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea’s new president Moon Jae-in was making substantial efforts to create an atmosphere of reconciliation with North Korea. Among other things, Moon extended an invitation to the neighbouring country to participate in the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics hosted in South Korea.When North Korean leader Kim Jong-un responded positively in his New Year’s speech, hopes were raised of reducing the tensions and making progress in inter-Korean relations.Talks between the two sides were indeed advancing, and President Moon framed the Games as the ‘Peace Olympics.’ Against this background, one of the biggest stories of the mega-event unfolded: the joint Korean women’s hockey team which was assembled just a few weeks prior to the opening of the Games following an official South Korean proposal. To its initiators and supporters, the collaboration on the ice between North and South Korean players, who were competing together under the Korean Unification Flag, was a symbol of hope and peace as well as a facilitator of rapprochement. Also, besides being a potentially valuable tool in international and sport diplomacy, the inter-Korean team, as one of the players later recollected, was notably effective in raising interest in ice hockey in South Korea.1 But there was also vocal opposition in South Korea to the initiative. Many argued that it was simply unfair to sacrifice the South Korean players who had been preparing and practising together as a cohesive team, a team which was also ranked much higher than the North Korean team. Others claimed that is was a sexist decision that showed disrespect, and that ‘the men’s team was never considered for integration.’2 Furthermore, and in a broader sense, the designation of such meaningful roles to South Korean women athletes should be viewed in light of women’s status in the country. The 2018 Global Gender Gap Report presented, again, a gloomy picture in this regard, as previous annual reports did too.The country’s overall world ranking in gender equality was 115 out of 140, placing it second to last in the East Asia and the Pacific region and 18th among the G20 countries. The report also ranked South Korea 124th in Economic Participation and Opportunity, 100th in Educational Attainment and 92nd in Political Empowerment, and, compared with other countries, South Korean women spent significantly more time than men on unpaid tasks such 324

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as household care.3 In this context, the creation of a unified Korean women’s hockey team highlights tensions related to women’s place in contemporary South Korean society, and it brings to mind the possibilities contained in utilising sport as a vehicle for greater gender equality. This chapter examines the historical relationships between women, sport and gender equality in South Korea’s patriarchic society. First, it presents a historical overview of concepts pertaining to the advancement of gender equality through sport. It continues with a brief analysis of South Korea’s gender equality situation, followed by sections that explore, first, the history of women’s sport participation in South Korea, and second, the place of female sporting role models in the country.

Women, sport and gender equality4 A paradigm of women in development (WID) emerged in the early 1970s. As international women’s movements were making achievements, the United Nations acknowledged that a focus on women and development was needed due to the ‘significant structural inequities’ which continued to exist worldwide.5 The WID movement centred on improving women’s educational and employment opportunities, achieving equality in political and social participation and increasing women’s health and welfare services.6 To promote this agenda, the United Nations has taken various initiatives.7 Yet, particularly since the early 1980s, a critique of the WID concept has emerged.8 Rather than treating women in isolation and viewing the lack of access to resources as the source of their subordination, a shift occurred towards a Gender and Development (GAD) approach, which turned attention to existing social structures. This framework includes a look at both males and females, and it investigates gender order, roles and relations.9 In this context, a sport-for-development (SFD) movement evolved too. According to an oft-cited definition, SFD is ‘the use of sport to exert a positive influence on public health, the socialisation of children, youths and adults, the social inclusion of the disadvantaged, the economic development of regions and states, and on fostering intercultural exchange and conflict resolution.’10 A significant expansion of the SFD movement occurred in the 1990s, and the end of that decade witnessed ‘an increasingly vociferous loose coalition of sport-for-development organisations.’11 While sport was promoted as a human right under the broad ‘evolutionary international framework of declarations of human rights,’ it was the argument about the utilitarian contributions that sport can make to the aid agenda of agencies such as the United Nations which constituted the main impetus behind the leap forward of the SFD movement.12 Thus, at this stage, the United Nations became heavily involved, giving a further boost to the movement. In 2000 it published eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which ‘aim to eradicate or reduce poverty, hunger, child mortality and disease, and to promote education, material health, gender equality, environmental sustainability and global partnerships.’13 From the start, sport was perceived as a useful tool in this context, and further initiatives took place during the following decade.14 Considering, then, that one of the eight MDGs was ‘to promote gender equality and empower women,’15 ‘one particular human right – sport,’ as Hancock, Lyras and Ha aptly emphasise, was advocated ‘to achieve another – gender equity.’16 Initially, sport was not a main focus of the WID movement.17 However, ‘the World Conferences on Women and Sport,’ starting from the one held in Brighton in 1994, ‘led to major progress in the field of feminine sport around the world.’18 In general, they sought to overcome two interrelated conceptual and structural challenges in this regard: first, the notion of sport as primarily ‘a hegemonic masculine enterprise,’19 and second, gender-role expectations which restrict women’s participation in sport due to ‘the demands of domestic and reproductive labour.’20 Moreover, the difference between ‘equality’ and ‘equity’ was noticed. While equality is 325

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about ‘similar treatment and outcomes without consideration for the diverse needs and “starting points” of different groups,’ equity employs ‘differential treatment’ so that ‘different groups gain access to the same conditions.’21 The initiative of developing women’s sport thus soon expanded, particularly with more awareness to, and involvement of, developing countries, and attention shifted towards development. As Hargreaves argued, the conferences served as ‘channels for the empowerment of women in sport across the world.’22 Empowerment is ‘both a process and an outcome,’ ‘a strategy for both individual and structural change.’23 According to the Committee on Gender and Population of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, ‘women’s empowerment involves the transformation of power relations at four different levels – the household/family, the community, the market and the state.’24 ‘Since sport is directly dealing with the body and its functions,’ SFD programmes, Meier contends, can promote ‘gender-based knowledge,’ including on violence and sexual harassment, ‘which enables especially girls and women to better control their own lives.’25 Moreover, there are numerous health, social and psychological benefits gained from participation in sport – learning discipline, self-confidence and leadership skills; experiencing teamwork; and broadening horizons and social networks, to name a few – thus ‘positive and successful experiences in sport may encourage girls and women in other areas of society.’26 In short, sport ‘may liberate girls and women from constraining hegemonic feminine ideals’ and ‘empower them within their communities.’27 It must be emphasised, though, that, as the approach towards ‘empowerment’ mentioned above suggests, empowerment goes beyond focusing on the individual – that is, beyond women empowering themselves; it is also about taking into account, and changing, the structures which impose the various forms of oppression. In this sense, it is about promoting gender equality.28 The WID, GAD and SFD approaches brought change, opened up opportunities and made advancements in the conditions of girls and women.29 And a new conceptual framework emerged, named Sport, Gender and Development (SGD).Yet these paradigms and policies were also closely scrutinised as scholars have addressed related problems, limitations and challenges from conceptual, theoretical and practical perspectives.30 Moreover, a comprehensive research of SFD literature showed that among the various related themes, that of gender was the least explored.31 This brief historical and conceptual overview of challenges and achievements pertaining to the relationship between sport, women’s empowerment and gender equality frames the following discussion on the South Korean case.

Gender equality in South Korea – advancements and stumbling blocks Back in the early 1990s, Soh characterised South Korea as a ‘patriarchal democracy’ in which tensions and conflicts existed as a result of the clash between the (Western) democratic concept of sexual equality and ‘the traditional Confucian ideology of male superiority.’32 Indeed, with the transition to democracy in the late 1980s, women’s movements became, in Moon’s words, ‘nationally visible within androcentric civil society,’ ‘a definite social force with which the state has to reckon.’33 A diversified women’s movement dealt with a wide variety of issues, including sexual and domestic violence, employment conditions, consumer issues, childcare, lesbian rights and more.34 Throughout the 1990s and 2000s new laws were passed related to such concerns – including, most importantly, sexual harassment legislation – and even the long-standing male-oriented family registry (hojuje) was abolished in 2005. More women have also entered college, participated in the labour force and assumed professional positions as doctors, lawyers, professors and 326

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government employees.35 Finally, a growing number of women have asserted their rights by filing for divorce – often on grounds of domestic abuse or simply because they were unhappy in their relationship36 – and many others have joined the ‘Sampo (‘three abandonments’) generation’ – a term coined in 2011 to indicate a phenomenon of young people who, reacting to the economic and social pressures, decided to give up courtship, marriage and childbirth.37 For women, this has been a way to remain independent and realise self-fulfilment, on the one hand, yet, on the other hand, to a large extent they opted for this choice to resolve the familyworkplace dilemma which, as explained later, the persistent patriarchy imposes on them. As mentioned, South Korea still ranks extremely poorly on gender equality. There are two main reasons behind this. The first is traditional views on gender roles,38 which, to avoid the frequently played culture card, should be construed, following Swidler,39 as values and strategies selected from a broader, more diverse, ‘tool kit,’ rather than explanatory factors on their own.40 The second reason is insufficient governmental policies. A significant majority of men prefer that women stay home and focus on childbearing and housework, and only very few are willing to share these tasks with their wives. Also, working women suffer various forms of gender discrimination, such as earning lower salaries than men, being denied promotion and being subjected to sexual harassment.41 Finally, since the government has not developed sufficient institutional support – for example, there is a lack of childcare facilities in the country – and since working long hours is a social norm, married working women are in a constant struggle to balance home/family and workplace responsibilities.42 It is within this persistent sociopolitical setting of patriarchy that women’s involvement in sport in South Korea should be examined.

Women in South Korean sport: history and policies The difficult position of Korean women in modern sport goes back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Modern sport was then introduced into Korea and became, first, a means to strengthen the country in the face of foreign powers; second, a modern subject taught in schools; and third, a moral tool in the hands of Christian missionaries.43 Women’s participation in sport, however, was frowned upon under the strict Confucian system that controlled their bodies as a vessel that primarily served the interests of the family through the tasks of reproduction and housework.The woman was expected to conceal her body by staying indoors and by wearing layers of clothing which both covered her skin and blurred the contours of her figure.44 Accordingly, women’s participation in the new sport that made their way to the country, such as tennis, basketball and especially ‘masculine’ soccer, were harshly criticised. Angry reactions and acts of protest took place, for example, at Ewha School girls when students participating in gymnastics classes, raised their arms and legs in the air in a way considered inappropriate and immoral.45 Under Japanese colonial rule (1910–1945) sport, for Koreans, became mainly instrumental to promote patriotism and to express resistance to the oppression through competitions between Korean and Japanese athletes.46 At the same time, the Japanese used sport as a tool of control and mobilised women, too, to participate in a variety of sport and physical activities.47 In the broader context, the ‘enforced modernisation’ of the period brought Korean women into the public sphere for the first time – namely, they went to school and joined the workforce48 – and women’s movements were advancing their agendas. However, as Wells argued, the women’s movements were primarily mobilised to serve the cause of the independence movements: women activists gave up ‘their original goal of a new gender arrangement’ in favour of ‘core nationalist and socialist priorities,’49 and men activists preferred ‘cultural continuity, not real 327

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independence for women.’50 Accordingly, despite the new opportunities that opened up, women mainly remained subjected to colonial and male-dominated agendas in sport as in other areas. Following the division of the Korean Peninsula and the establishment of the two separate states in 1948, the South Korean government of the 1950s could not afford to invest in sport due to the dire contemporaneous economic, political and social conditions.51 Modern sport began to develop only under the authoritarian regime of President Park Chung-hee (1961–1979), who promoted sport by providing significant financial support for related organisations, training centres and programmes.52 Sport under Park was used as a political-nationalist tool to spread the regime’s ideology, to foster its legitimacy and to enhance the nation’s international prestige.53 The focus was on elite sport, and as women were encouraged and mobilised to contribute to the country’s economic development, women’s sport also received attention on the elite level as a means to gain international acknowledgment and respect. In this context, women started to participate in taekwondo, the martial art which, under Park, was first established as a sport and later designated the nation’s ‘national sport.’ Yet this did not signal nor propel significant breakthroughs in women’s status. First, the number of women practitioners remained significantly low as compared to men,54 and second, they were mainly playing a part in the project of solidifying taekwondo’s place under the said political and nationalist agenda. Regarding team sport, while women’s soccer was ridiculed and did not experience the ‘gender transformation’ that took place in European soccer after the 1970s, women’s basketball and volleyball were embraced by the public because, as Koh argued, they displayed the women’s body in a ‘relatively acceptable’ way.55 Focus on elite sport continued during the authoritarian regime of Chun Doo-hwan (1980– 1987) and the government of Roh Tae-woo (1988–1993), the first under the new democratic constitution. Although ‘Sport for All’ (SFA) organisations were already set up in the 1980s, the government showed no particular interest in them,56 and only since 1993, against the background of further developments pertaining to the democratisation process, has attention also shifted to this concept of mass sport participation.57 Indeed, as data suggest,58 the participation in sport of both men and women sharply increased into the early twenty-first century. It is safe to assume that increased disposable income and availability of more leisure time have encouraged this trend. At the same time, women’s participation in ‘female appropriate’ sport, such as calisthenics, swimming and aerobics, was much higher than in soccer and weightlifting. Regarding their motives to participate in sport, many more women than men stated ‘weight loss,’ and far fewer in this comparison mentioned ‘social relationship’59 – an indication of body-image related pressures which affected mostly women. Parallel to the advancement mentioned earlier of the SFD concept worldwide, and particularly since the early 2000s, South Korea too has committed itself to more related domestic and international initiatives. At home, government sport programmes targeted underprivileged populations such as women, ethnic minorities, youth at risk and so on; yet, as Ha et al. argued, there were two main problems: first, those were mostly one-off initiatives lacking long-term planning; and second, the programmes failed to foster social inclusion, as they did not include nor encourage participation of the general public.60 Regarding women in this context, sport has not been systematically or usefully employed to promote gender equality,61 and, in general, South Korean scholars have shown little interest in women’s sport history.62 Women have also been discriminated against in sport management,63 and women’s soccer, which at a certain point gained some respect, lost its prestige, as Koh argued, once it ‘failed to function as a symbol of national identity.’64 The challenges South Korean female soccer officials have been facing epitomise the general attitude towards women athletes. Women referees, first, experience sexist-based hostility and abuse; second, face the family-workplace dilemma; and third, lack a 328

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peer community and mentoring system, as well as administrative support.65 Throughout South Korea’s history, then, women’s participation in sport and the concept of sport as a means to advance gender equality have been heavily influenced by a persistent patriarchy, which determined the norms of sport appropriateness. On the governmental level, the lack of a significantly meaningful long-term institutional vision to implement change, together with the mobilisation of women’s sport – whenever deemed necessary – to serve the national cause, further supported the said male-dominated structure.

Female athletes as role models: an answer to the persistent patriarchy? Female sporting role models can function as part of sport-related discourses or sport development programmes which target greater gender equality. A role model’s function is to inspire others by attaining presumably desired success.66 Role models ‘indicate a distinct destination and a clear route to that destination,’67 often encouraging outsiders to enter ‘a presumed desirable position that has been previously off-limits.’68 Most importantly, female sporting role models may encourage girls and women to participate not only in the sport in which they achieved success but also ‘in another sport or physical activity or in any activity that is currently dominated by men or by people from a more advantaged socio-economic status.’69 Through her international success in 1998, Pak Se Ri created a wave of interest in golf in South Korea and inspired female golfers to compete at the highest levels and others to pursue golf as a career.70 Figure skater Kim Yuna is also regarded as a role model. Already a 2009 World champion and a household name in her home country on the eve of the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver,71 her gold medal at the Games and further international success sparked national interest in a sport that had been marginal until she appeared on the stage.72 A third noted South Korean female sport-related role model is Lee Si-young. In 2010 the famous actress started boxing training in preparation for a part as a female boxer in a TV drama. The show eventually did not air, yet Lee continued practising, becoming a successful amateur competitor and even making it to the national team in 2013. Dubbed ‘the Si-young Lee effect,’ public attention was drawn to women’s boxing and more women began taking up this sport.73 Thus, through their respective sporting successes, as well as by setting up foundations and doing charity work, such role models raised awareness of different sport and provided inspiration for girls and women in particular to explore the various benefits and possibilities pertaining to the pursuit of sport. Even a heavily male-oriented sport such as boxing has shown positive signs of accepting women.74 Still, a closer look at these promising achievements provides a more complex picture. In South Korea the image of successful female athletes has usually been built around nationalism and through assessments of their physical features. Kim Yuna and Pak Se Ri, for example, were made national heroes by the media, advertising and state leaders, becoming a source of nationalist and patriotic pride and embodiments of the ‘Korean dream’ – success as the result of individual effort and the sacrifice of the families.75 The bodies of both athletes were appropriated for the cause: ‘Kim’s balletic body becomes a perfect symbol of ideal Korean womanhood – a chaste young lady who diligently works to serve her nation, hiding her labor and sexuality,’76 and Pak going through ‘a national makeover’ which transformed ‘a tomboyish national icon’ to a ‘womanly figure.’77 In other cases, too, the bodies of successful female athletes received considerable attention. During the 2010 Asian Games, for example, South Korean newspapers focused heavily on the physical features of the country’s sportswomen.78 A representative piece titled ‘The 5 Korean Beauties of the Asian Games’ was carried by the Chosun ilbo, the biggest newspaper in the country. In the English-language report, five top South Korean female athletes were 329

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subjected to the gaze of the reporter. Among other details provided, references were made to the ‘intense eyes’ that ‘resemble those of a sexy movie star’ of one athlete, to the ‘long and slender’ body of another and to the ‘supermodel’-like body of a third. Even a plastic surgeon and a dermatologist were asked for their insights.79 This way of imagining the female body should be seen in the context of the phenomenon of sexual harassment in South Korean sport. Public discussion on this acute problem began in 2007 when sexual assault by a women’s professional basketball team coach made headlines.80 A decade later, a survey held by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism showed that, still, almost 38 percent of South Korean professional female athletes in soccer, baseball, basketball, volleyball and golf experienced sexual harassment.81 And in early 2019 a wave of female athletes in skating, judo, taekwondo and wrestling came forward, accusing their male coaches of abusing them sexually.82 Thus, framing the significance of successful female athletes mainly in terms of heroes who serve the nation, and focusing on their bodies against the background of a sporting culture where sexual abuse is prominent, restrains the potential contribution to gender equality that female sporting role models can make in South Korea.

Conclusion Through both the activity of women’s movements and the assertive choices of individuals, South Korean women have been gaining more rights, new opportunities have kept opening up for them and their voices cannot be ignored. More women have also been made aware of the benefits of physical activity and sport participation – among others, thanks to the success of female sporting role models – and have pursued a wide variety of sport. However, two decades into the twenty-first century, the concept of promoting gender equality through sport remains significantly limited. Indeed, practitioners and scholars worldwide have been critically exploring theoretical and practical issues pertaining to SFD initiatives, while the topic of gender equality in this regard remained marginal. In this context, the South Korea case is an example of how, despite the advancements made in gender equality, a persistent patriarchal structure and insufficient governmental and institutional effort to make a change in general, and through sport in particular, have determined the relationship between sport and gender equality. The joint hockey team mentioned in the chapter’s opening demonstrates the historical pattern of harnessing women for the bigger cause of serving the overall good, namely, the nation and the state.The appropriation of female sporting role models in this way, together with references to their bodies under both the nationalist and the sexist gazes – with a serious problem in the background of sexual harassment in society at large and in sport in particular – has derived from the androcentric sociopolitical arrangement, and at the same time has helped maintain it.

Acknowledgements I thank Olga Fedorenko for commenting on an earlier draft of this chapter.

Notes 1 Aimee Lewis,“When Sports and Politics Collide–What Happened When North and South Korea Unified on the Ice,” CNN, February 7, 2019, accessed July 5, 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/02/07/ sport/south-korea-north-korea-unified-ice-hockey-team-winter-olympics-2018-spt-intl/index.html. 2 Motoko Rich and Seth Berkman, “For South Korea’s Hockey Women, Unity with North Is a Bitter Burden,” New York Times, January 22, 2018, accessed July 6, 2019, www.nytimes.com/2018/01/22/ sports/olympics/south-korea-hockey-north-olympics.html. 330

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3 World Economic Forum, The Global Gender Gap Report 2018 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2018). 4 Socio-economic gaps among women should be considered too in order to gain a fuller understanding of issues related to both gender equality and women in sport.Yet since this chapter is too short to delve into this discussion, it relates to women in general. 5 June Larkin, with the assistance of Sabrina Razack and Fiona Moola, “Gender, Sport and Development,” in Literature Reviews on Sport for Development and Peace (Toronto: Sport for Development and Peace International Working Group, 2007), 96. 6 Shahrashoub Razavi and Carol Miller, From WID to GAD: Conceptual Shift in the Women and Development Discourse, Occasional Paper 1 (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1995), 2. 7 Marianne Meier, Gender Equity, Sport and Development, Working Paper (Biel/Bienne: Swiss Academy for Development, 2005), 6; Martha Saavedra, “Women, Sport and Development,” Sport and Development International Platform (2005), accessed July 22, 2019, www.sportanddev.org/sites/default/files/down loads/56__women__sport_and_development.pdf. 8 Razavi and Miller, From WID to GAD, 1. 9 Ibid., 12; Larkin, “Gender, Sport and Development,” 96; Meier, Gender Equity, 6. 10 Alexis Lyras and Jon Welty Peachey, “Integrating Sport-for-Development Theory and Praxis,” Sport Management Review 14 (2011): 311. It is worth noting that policy makers, scholars, and activists sometimes prefer to use Sport for Development and Peace (SDP) rather than SFD. 11 Fred Coalter, “The Politics of Sport-for-Development: Limited Focus Programmes and Broad Gauge Problems,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 45, no. 3 (2010): 301. 12 Ibid. 13 United Nations Office on Sport for Development and Peace, “Contribution of Sport to the Millennium Development Goals,” February (2010), 1, www.un.org/sport/sites/www.un.org.sport/files/ ckfiles/files/Sport%20and%20the%20MDGs_FACTSHEET_February%202010.pdf. 14 Coalter, “The Politics of Sport-for-Development,” 301–3. 15 World Health Organization, “Millennium Development Goals (MDGS),” accessed July 30, 2019, www. who.int/topics/millennium_development_goals/about/en/. 16 M. Hancock, A. Lyras, and J. P. Ha, “Sport for Development Programme for Girls and Women: A Global Assessment,” Journal of Sport for Development 1, no. 1 (2013), https://jsfd.org/2013/04/11/ sport-for-development-programmes-for-girls-and-women-a-global-assessment/#ref1. 17 Saavedra, “Women, Sport and Development.” 18 Meier, Gender Equity, 7. 19 Saavedra, “Women, Sport and Development.” 20 Larkin, “Gender, Sport and Development,” 98. 21 Ibid., 99. 22 Jennifer Hargreaves, “The ‘Women’s International Sports Movement’: Local-Global Strategies and Empowerment,” Women’s Studies International Forum 22, no. 5 (1999): 470. It should be noted that critics have argued that SFD initiatives have been dominated by Western perspectives, namely, by ‘forces’ from the Global North, thus voices from the Global South are yet to be more involved and better heard. Hargreaves analysed this phenomenon in this paper (461–71).Writing a decade and a half later, Sumaya F. Samie et al., argued that the topic of women’s empowerment in the Global South is at the centre of the discourse, yet Global North perspectives still dominated it (see “Voices of Empowerment:Women from the Global South Re/Negotiating Empowerment and the Global Sports Mentoring Programme,” Sport in Society 18, no. 8 (2015): 923–37). 23 Tess Kay, “Development through Sport? Sport in Support of Female Empowerment in Delhi, India,” in Routledge Handbook of Sports Development, ed. Barrie Houlihan and Mick Green (London: Routledge, 2011), 312. 24 Cited in Ibid. 25 Marianne Meier, “The Value of Female Sporting Role Models,” Sport in Society 18, no. 8 (2015): 968. 26 Saavedra, “Women, Sport and Development.” 27 Ibid. 28 This very brief discussion on the concept of ‘empowerment’ serves the purpose of the analysis. A vast body of critical literature exists on ‘empowerment,’ yet it is beyond the scope of this chapter to engage with it. 29 See, e.g., Larkin’s assessment in “Gender, Sport and Development,” 100–7. 331

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30 A good starting point on the state of the field is Nico Schulenkorf, Emma Sherry, and Katie Rowe, “Sport for Development: An Integrated Literature Review,” Journal of Sport Management 30 (2016): 22–39. 31 Ibid., 29. 32 Chung-hee Sarah Soh, “Sexual Equality, Male Superiority, and Korean Women in Politics: Changing Gender Relations in a ‘Patriarchal Democracy’,” Sex Roles 28, no. 1–2 (1993): 73–74. 33 Seungsook Moon, “Carving Out Space: Civil Society and the Women’s Movement in South Korea,” The Journal of Asian Studies 61, no. 2 (2002): 492. 34 Ibid., 490. 35 Eunha Kim and Hansol Park, “Perceived Gender Discrimination, a Belief in a Just World, Self-Esteem, and Depression in Korean Working Women: A Moderated Mediation Model,” Women’s Studies International Forum 69 (2018): 143. 36 Claire Lee, “Reasons for Divorce Have Changed Since the ‘50s in South Korea: Study,” Korea Herald, June 18, 2016, accessed August 5, 2019, www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160617000753. 37 Hyun-ju Ock, “Koreans’ Changing Perceptions on Marriage,” Korea Herald, March 27, 2015, accessed August 5, 2019, www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20150327001036%20; Simon Maybin,“Why I Never Want Babies,” BBC, August 16, 2018, accessed August 5, 2019, www.bbc.com/news/stories-45201725. 38 Kim and Park, “Perceived Gender Discrimination,” 143;Yonjoo Cho et al., “Asian Women in Top Management: Eight Country Cases,” Human Resource Development International 18, no. 4 (2015): 414. 39 Ann Swidler, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies,” American Sociological Review 51, no. 2 (1986): 273–86. 40 A good analysis of how gender politics by the South Korean state has actively marginalised women during the nation-building process and beyond is Seungsook Moon, Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005). 41 Kim and Park, “Perceived Gender Discrimination,” 143. 42 Ibid.; Cho et al., “Asian Women in top Management,” 414; Yoon Soo-Yeon, “Is Gender Inequality a Barrier to Realizing Fertility Intentions? Fertility Aspirations and Realizations in South Korea,” Asian Population Studies 12, no. 2 (2016): 206. 43 Eunha Koh, “Chains, Challenges and Changes: The Making of Women’s Football in Korea,” Soccer and Society 4, no. 2–3 (2004): 69–70. 44 Taeyon Kim, “Neo-Confucian Body Techniques:Women’s Bodies in Korea’s Consumer Culture,” Body and Society 9, no. 2 (2003): 99–102. 45 Koh, “Chains, Challenges and Changes,” 69. 46 Ibid., 70; Gwang Ok, “The Political Significance of Sport: An Asian Case Study–Sport, Japanese Colonial Policy and Korean National Resistance,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 22, no. 4 (2005): 649–70. 47 Gwang Ok, “Coercion for Asian Conquest: Japanese Militarism and Korean Sport, 1938–45,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 24, no. 3 (2007): 344, 348. 48 Kim, “Neo-Confucian Body Techniques,” 102; Kenneth M. Wells, “The Price of Legitimacy: Women and the Kŭnuhoe Movement, 1927–1931,” in Colonial Modernity in Korea, ed. Gi-Wook Shin and Michael E. Robinson (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1999), 197. 49 Wells, “The Price of Legitimacy,” 219. 50 Ibid., 220. 51 Jae-Pil Ha et al., “From Development of Sport to Development Through Sport: A Paradigm Shift for Sport Development in South Korea,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 32, no. 10 (2015): 1267. 52 Jae-Pil Ha et al., “From Development of Sport,” 1267–68. 53 Ibid., 1267; Koh, “Chains, Challenges and Changes,” 70. 54 See the data at Cheong Rak Choi et al., “A Modern History of Women Taekwondo in Korea Since the Second World War,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 30, no. 3 (2013): 320. 55 Koh, “Chains, Challenges and Changes,” 72–73. 56 Hyung-Joong Won and Eunah Hong, “The Development of Sport Policy and Management in South Korea,” International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 7, no. 1 (2015): 146. 57 Ha et al., “From Development of Sport,” 1269. 58 See Yang-Rea Kim, “The Study on the Trend and Discourse of Women’s Sports Participation in Korea,” The Journal of Korean Society of Aerobic Exercise 11, no. 1 (2007): 133. 59 Ibid., 34–35. 332

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6 0 Ha et al., “From Development of Sport,” 1270. 61 Dean J. Myers and Sung-Joo Park, “Sport as a Means of Empowerment for Korean Women,” Philosophy of Movement: Journal of Korean Philosophic Society for Sport and Dance 24, no. 2 (2016): 1–22. 62 Yeomi Choi, “ ‘Seupocheu heoseutory’: Hanguk yeoseong cheyuksa yeongu donghyang gwa gwaje, 2007–2016,” Cheyukgwahakyeongu 29, no. 1 (2018): 179–85. 63 Kyung Hwa Yoo, “Discrimination and Women in Sport Management in Pusan, Republic of Korea” (PhD diss., United States Sports Academy, 1997). 64 Koh, “Chains, Challenges and Changes,” 77. 65 Min-Chul Kim and Eunah Hong, “A Red Card for Women: Female Officials Ostracized in South Korean Football,” Asian Journal of Women’s Studies 22, no. 2 (2106): 114–30. 66 Marianne Meier and Martha Saavedra, “Esther Phiri and the Moutawakel Effect in Zambia: An Analysis of the Use of Female Role Models in Sport-for-Development,” Sport in Society 12, no. 9 (2009): 1168. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid., 1169. 69 Ibid., 1168. 70 Kyoung-yim Kim, “Producing Korean Women Golfers on the LPGA Tour: Representing Gender, Race, Nation and Sport in Transnational Context” (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2012), 2, 59, 101, 244–45. 71 Philip Hersh, “Kim Yuna Has South Korea’s Full Attention,” Los Angeles Times, February 11, 2010, accessed August 6, 2019, www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-feb-11-la-sp-olympics-kim112010feb11-story.html. 72 Chuyun Oh, “Nationalizing the Balletic Body in Olympic Figure Skating,” in Sport in Korea: History, Development, Management, ed. Dae Hee Kwak et al. (London: Routledge, 2018), 119, 122; Dong-hwan Ko, “Teenage Skaters Extend Kim Yuna’s Legacy,” The Korea Times, January 14, 2019, accessed August 7, 2019, https://m.koreatimes.co.kr/pages/article.asp?newsIdx=262008. 73 Yun Jung Kim, “Restructuring the Male Dominant Sport: The Case of Korean Women Boxers” (Master’s thesis, Seoul National University, 2014), ii, 3, 20, 92. 74 Kim, ‘ “Restructuring the Male Dominant Sport.” 75 On Kim Yuna see Oh, “Nationalizing the Balletic Body,” 119–32; and on Pak Se Ri refer to Rachael Miyung Joo, Transnational Sport: Gender, Media, and Global Korea (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2012), passim. 76 Oh, “Nationalizing the Balletic Body,” 128. 77 Joo, Transnational Sport, 156. 78 Eoin J. Trolan, “The Impact of the Media on Gender Inequality Within Sport,” Procedia–Social and Behavioral Sciences 91 (2013): 222–23. 79 “The 5 Korean Beauties of the Asian Games,” Chosun ilbo, November 17, 2010, http://english.chosun. com/site/data/html_dir/2010/11/17/2010111700281.html.The Korean-language version is at http:// sports.chosun.com/news/news.htm?id=201011120100119100006872&ServiceDate=20101111. 80 Sangmin Yoon, “Seupocheu seongpongnyeok ui siltae, gyuje wa daechaek,” Seupocheu wa beop 14, no. 1 (2011): 60. 81 Yonhap, “Nearly 4 in 10 South Korean Pro Female Athletes Have Experienced Sexual Harassment: Survey,” Korea Times, February 26, 2019, accessed August 8, 2019, www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/ sports/2019/02/663_264419.html. 82 AP, “#MeToo in South Korea: Olympic Skater Among Women Accusing Coaches of Sexual Abuse,” ABC, January 21, 2019, accessed August 8, 2019, www.abc.net.au/news/2019-01-21/ south-korean-woman-skaters-accuse-sport-of-sexual-abuse/10733126.

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Choi, Yeomi. “Seupocheu heoseutory: Hanguk yeoseong cheyuksa yeongu donghyang gwa gwaje, 2007– 2016.” Cheyukgwahakyeongu 29, no. 1 (2018): 179–85. Coalter, Fred. “The Politics of Sport-for-Development: Limited Focus Programmes and Broad Gauge Problems.” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 45, no. 3 (2010): 301. Ha, Jae-Pil, Ka-Ram Lee, and Gwang Ok. “From Development of Sport to Development Through Sport: A Paradigm Shift for Sport Development in South Korea.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 32, no. 10 (2015): 1267. Hancock, M., A. Lyras, and JP Ha. “Sport for Development Programme for Girls and Women: A Global Assessment.” Journal of Sport for Development 1, no. 1 (2013). Hargreaves, Jennifer.“The ‘Women’s International Sports Movement’: Local-Global Strategies and Empowerment.” Women’s Studies International Forum 22, no. 5 (1999): 470. Joo, Rachael Miyung. Transnational Sport: Gender, Media, and Global Korea. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2012. Kay, Tess. “Development Through Sport? Sport in Support of Female Empowerment in Delhi, India.” In Routledge Handbook of Sports Development, edited by Barrie Houlihan and Mick Green. London: Routledge, 2011. Kim, Eunha, and Hansol Park. “Perceived Gender Discrimination, a Belief in a Just World, Self-Esteem, and Depression in Korean Working Women: A Moderated Mediation Model.” Women’s Studies International Forum 69 (2018): 143. Kim, Kyoung-yim. “Producing Korean Women Golfers on the LPGA Tour: Representing Gender, Race, Nation and Sport in Transnational Context.” PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2012. Kim, Min-Chul, and Eunah Hong. “A Red Card for Women: Female Officials Ostracized in South Korean Football.” Asian Journal of Women’s Studies 22, no. 2 (2106): 114–30. Kim,Taeyon. “Neo-Confucian Body Techniques:Women’s Bodies in Korea’s Consumer Culture.” Body and Society 9, no. 2 (2003): 99–102. Kim, Yang-Rea. “The Study on the Trend and Discourse of Women’s Sports Participation in Korea.” The Journal of Korean Society of Aerobic Exercise 11, no. 1 (2007): 133. Kim, Yun Jung. “Restructuring the Male Dominant Sport: The Case of Korean Women Boxers.” Master’s thesis, Seoul National University, 2014. Koh, Eunha. “Chains, Challenges and Changes: The Making of Women’s Football in Korea.” Soccer and Society 4, no. 2–3 (2004): 69–70. Larkin, June, Sabrina Razack, and Fiona Moola. “Gender, Sport and Development.” In Literature Reviews on Sport for Development and Peace. Toronto: Sport for Development and Peace International Working Group, 2007. Lyras, Alexis, and Jon Welty Peachey. “Integrating Sport-for-Development Theory and Praxis.” Sport Management Review 14 (2011): 311. Meier, Marianne, and Martha Saavedra. “Esther Phiri and the Moutawakel Effect in Zambia: An Analysis of the Use of Female Role Models in Sport-for-Development.” Sport in Society 12, no. 9 (2009): 1168. Meier, Marianne. “The Value of Female Sporting Role Models.” Sport in Society 18, no. 8 (2015): 968. Meier, Marianne. Gender Equity, Sport and Development. Working Paper. Biel/Bienne: Swiss Academy for Development, 2005. Moon, Seungsook. “Carving Out Space: Civil Society and the Women’s Movement in South Korea.” The Journal of Asian Studies 61, no. 2 (2002): 492. Moon, Seungsook. Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship in South Korea. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005. Myers, Dean J., and Sung-Joo Park. “Sport as a Means of Empowerment for Korean Women.” Philosophy of Movement: Journal of Korean Philosophic Society for Sport and Dance 24, no. 2 (2016): 1–22. Oh, Chuyun. “Nationalizing the Balletic Body in Olympic Figure Skating.” In Sport in Korea: History, Development, Management, edited by Dae Hee Kwak, Yong Jae Ko, Inkyu Kang, and Mark Rosentraub. London: Routledge, 2018. Ok, Gwang. “Coercion for Asian Conquest: Japanese Militarism and Korean Sport, 1938–45.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 24, no. 3 (2007): 338–56. 334

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Ok, Gwang. “The Political Significance of Sport: An Asian Case Study—Sport, Japanese Colonial Policy and Korean National Resistance.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 22, no. 4 (2005): 649–70. Razavi, Shahrashoub, and Carol Miller. From WID to GAD: Conceptual Shift in the Women and Development Discourse. Occasional Paper 1. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1995. Samie, Sumaya F., Alicia J. Johnson, Ashleigh M. Huffman, and H. Sarah. “Voices of Empowerment: Women from the Global South Re/Negotiating Empowerment and the Global Sports Mentoring Programme.” Sport in Society 18, no. 8 (2015): 923–37. Schulenkorf, Nico, Emma Sherry, and Katie Rowe. “Sport for Development: An Integrated Literature Review.” Journal of Sport Management 30 (2016): 22–39. Soh, Chung-hee Sarah. “Sexual Equality, Male Superiority, and Korean Women in Politics: Changing Gender Relations in a ‘Patriarchal Democracy’.” Sex Roles 28, no. 1–2 (1993): 73–74. Swidler, Ann. “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies.” American Sociological Review 51, no. 2 (1986): 273–86. Trolan, Eoin J. “The Impact of the Media on Gender Inequality Within Sport.” Procedia–Social and Behavioral Sciences 91 (2013): 222–23. Wells, Kenneth M. “The Price of Legitimacy: Women and the Kŭnuhoe Movement, 1927–1931.” In Colonial Modernity in Korea, edited by Gi-Wook Shin and Michael E. Robinson. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1999. Won, Hyung-Joong, and Eunah Hong. “The Development of Sport Policy and Management in South Korea.” International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 7, no. 1 (2015): 146. World Economic Forum. The Global Gender Gap Report 2018. Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2018. Yoo, Kyung Hwa. “Discrimination and Women in Sport Management in Pusan, Republic of Korea.” PhD diss., United States Sports Academy, 1997. Yoon, Sangmin. “Seupocheu seongpongnyeok ui siltae, gyuje wa daechaek.” Seupocheu wa beop 14, no. 1 (2011): 60. Yoon. Soo-Yeon. “Is Gender Inequality a Barrier to Realizing Fertility Intentions? Fertility Aspirations and Realizations in South Korea.” Asian Population Studies 12, no. 2 (2016): 206.

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31 Disability sport in Malaysia Challenges and opportunities Selina Khoo

Disability in Malaysia Approximately 15 percent of the world’s population, or over a billion people, live with some form of disability.1 Given that the population of Malaysia in 2016 was estimated at 32.4 million,2 it is expected that there would be 4.86 million Malaysians with a disability. However, only 486,878 persons with disabilities were registered with the Department of Social Welfare that year.3 This is only 1.5 percent of the Malaysian population or approximately 10 percent of the World Health Organization and World Bank estimate. Because registration is not mandatory, we do not know the exact number of persons with disabilities in the country.4 There is government support for persons with disabilities. The Persons with Disabilities Act 20085 acknowledges the rights of persons with disabilities and adopts the social model of disability, which says that disability is caused by barriers in society or the environment. The Act aims ‘to provide for the registration, protection, rehabilitation, development and well-being of persons with disabilities’ through ‘the establishment of the National Council for Persons with Disabilities.’6 In the Act, the rights of persons with disabilities are recognised, and persons with disabilities are no longer regarded as objects of social welfare or charity. Unfortunately, there is a gap between government policies and the reality for persons with disabilities in Malaysia.7 According to the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia, persons with disabilities in Malaysia are marginalised and face inequalities in employment, education and health, and the majority face social exclusion and live in poverty.8 The employment rate of persons with disabilities in the country is low, and there are insufficient job opportunities for them.9 This is despite government efforts, including setting a one percent quota for persons with disabilities to be employed in the public sector and tax deductions for employers.10 In 2018, there were 3,691 persons with disabilities employed in the public sector, which only accounts for 0.03 percent of government employees. Of the total number of persons with disabilities who applied for jobs, only 20.5 percent were offered jobs. Among the reasons for the low employment rate were inaccessible transportation and buildings. Some organisations did not have an accessible built environment or enough resources to provide facilities required by employees with disabilities.11 Employers’ negative perceptions, their lack of understanding about disabilities, the needs of employees with disabilities and shortcomings of 336

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persons with disabilities themselves, as well as negative parental attitudes, were other problems faced in terms of employment.12 Malaysians with disabilities also face challenges in terms of healthcare. Tan (2015) highlighted the unmet needs of children with disabilities in terms of dental services, dietary advice, speech therapy, psychology services and communication aids.13 Schoolchildren with disabilities face challenges in terms of inadequate resources, facilities, teaching materials and early intervention programmes.14 There are also few students with disabilities in Malaysian higher education institutions, making up only 0.34 percent (1,874 out of 552,702 students) of total enrolment in the 20 public universities and one percent (268 out of 26,069 students) of 94 community colleges in 2018.15 The Persons with Disabilities Act 2018 also mentions access to recreation, leisure and sport. Section 32 of the Act states that ‘Persons with disabilities shall have the right to participate in recreational, leisure and sporting activities on an equal basis with persons without disabilities,’ including access to instruction, training, resources, services and venues.16 The right to access and participate in sport is also recognised in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which was adopted by United Nations General Assembly on 13 December 2006 and came into force on 3 May 2008.17 The Convention recognises disability as a human rights issue, and aims to ‘promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity.’18 The Convention outlines the civil, cultural, political, social and economic rights of persons with disabilities. Article 30.5 of the Convention, which deals with participation in cultural life, recreation, leisure and sport, states that persons with disabilities should be given opportunities to participate in both mainstream and disability-specific activities, as well as have access to related services and venues. Malaysia ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2010.

Disability sport in Malaysia Disability sport in Malaysia has a short history, with sport being organised on an ad hoc basis starting from the 1970s.19 Most sport were introduced within each disability group. It was also in the 1970s when Malaysia first took part in international competitions. Disability sport in Malaysia has become more structured and organised over the past few decades, with both government and non-governmental organisations playing a role. Government support is given in the form of funding, sport science support and facilities. The government also promotes equal opportunities for athletes with a disability in terms of training and allowance during training. Sport science support for elite athletes with a disability is provided by the National Sports Institute, which also supports elite athletes without disability. The National Sports Institute also conducts talent identification programmes and has discovered athletes for sport such as athletics, boccia, goalball and wheelchair tennis.The Paralympic Sports Excellence Centre, opened in 2014, was purposebuilt for disability sport and includes various accessible sport facilities (such as swimming pools, badminton, basketball and goalball), lecture hall, cafeteria and hostel.20 Athletes with a disability also receive cash incentives from the government for winning medals at international competitions. The first time they received incentives was for the 1992 Paralympic Games. However, the incentives for the Paralympic Games were only 30 percent of the incentives for the Olympic Games. Since 2016, the same incentives were given for a Paralympic and Olympic medals (RM 1 million or USD 241,844 for gold, RM 300,000 or USD 72,552 for silver and RM 100,000 or USD 24,184 for bronze). Paralympic medallists also receive a lifetime monthly pension (RM 5,000 or USD 1,210 for gold medallists, RM 3,000 or USD 730 for silver medallists and RM 2,000 or USD 485 for bronze medallists), which they did not receive 337

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before 2016.21 Medallists from previous Paralympic Games were also eligible for the pensions. This was a positive step in terms of equality, as few countries have equal rewards for athletes with and without disabilities. The National Sports Council organises the annual National Sports Awards, which also acknowledges the accomplishments of athletes with a disability with the National Paralympian Sportsman and National Paralympian Sportswoman awards. Although the National Paralympian awards started only in 2005 (the National Sportsman and Sportswoman awards started in 1966), it is encouraging that both athletes with and without disability are celebrated on the same platform. For the 2018 Awards, recognition was also given to an administrator in disability sport. Malaysian Blind Sports Association President, S. Radha Krishnan, was a joint recipient of the Sports Leadership Award, together with the former Secretary General of the Olympic Council of Malaysia, Sieh Kok Chi. It was the first time that such recognition was given to a leader of a disability sport organisation. Incidentally, the Sportswriters Association of Malaysia also has an annual award to recognise the best athletes and the Best Paralympian award was introduced in 2016. The umbrella body for disability sport organisations is the Paralympic Council of Malaysia. Established in 1989, the Council is affiliated to the International Paralympic Committee, the Asian Paralympic Committee and the ASEAN Para Sports Federation. Members of the Paralympic Council of Malaysia include disability sport organisations (e.g. Boccia Association of Malaysia,Wheelchair Tennis Association of Malaysia) as well as non-disability sport organisations which take charge of disability sport (e.g. Amateur Swimming Union of Malaysia, Badminton Association of Malaysia). In addition to working together with the National Sports Institute to prepare athletes for international competitions, the Council also trains officials and promotes disability sport throughout the country. The Council has been instrumental in hosting international multisport and multi-disability competitions such as the 2001, 2009 and 2017 ASEAN Para Games (competition for South East Asian nations), 2006 Far East and South Pacific Games for the Disabled (FESPIC) Games (competition for Asia and the South Pacific that was replaced by the Asian Para Games in 2010), 2013 Asian Youth Para Games and single-sport world competitions such as the 2016 IPC Powerlifting World Cup. Malaysian athletes have been participating in and winning international competitions. The country first took part in the Paralympic Games in 1972 (it did not take part again till 1988) and has won a total of 11 medals. The best performance by the Malaysian contingent was at the 2016 Paralympic Games in Rio where Malaysian athletes won three gold (men’s 100m T36, men’s long jump T20 and men’s shot put F20) and one bronze medal (women’s long jump T20). It was the first time that the country had won gold medals at the Games and this inspired the nation and increased the profile of disability sport in the country. This incredible performance generated much interest in the public and media. There was much more media coverage of the Paralympic Games than before, and the Paralympians became role models. A special stamp series was issued depicting the three gold medallists (Mohamad Ridzuan Mohamad Puzi, Abdul Latif Romly and Muhammad Ziyad Zolkefli). After the 2016 Paralympic Games, the Paralympic Council of Malaysia22 received enquiries from parents who wanted to know how their children with disabilities could participate in disability sport. According to Siti Zaharah, Secretary General of Paralympic Council of Malaysia, parents saw the potential of sport and wanted their children involved.23

Media coverage of disability sport There had been limited coverage of disability sport in the Malaysian media. However, media coverage has increased as a result of the country’s commendable performance in international 338

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competitions. Analysis of the 2012 and 2016 Paralympic Games in Malaysian newspapers has shown increased coverage. Malaysia won one silver and one bronze medal at the 2012 Games compared to the three gold and one bronze medals won in 2016. For the 2012 Paralympic Games, the average number of articles per day in the eight Malaysian newspapers surveyed ranged from 0.07 to 2.07.24 The average number of newspaper articles for 2016 Paralympic Games increased to 3.08 articles per day in the two highest circulation newspapers in the country.25 The increased newspaper coverage of the 2016 Paralympic Games could be because of the gold medals won by Malaysian athletes. Incidentally, the country has not won any gold medals at the Olympic Games. There were also articles about the Paralympic Games on the front pages of the newspapers. In terms of content, reporting of the 2012 Paralympic Games was positive, and positive comparisons were made between disability sport and non-disability sport, with emphasis on the achievements of athletes with a disability matching their able-bodied counterparts.26 For both the 2012 and 2016 Paralympic Games, there was more coverage of Malaysians compared to non-Malaysians. There was also more coverage of male athletes compared to female athletes in those years. Athletes with disabilities are getting more media coverage and publicity. For example, when Mohamad Ridzuan Mohamad Puzi, gold medallist (100m T36) at the Rio Paralympic Games, won the 2018 Best Asian Male Para Athlete, the news was covered in the media and even the Malaysian Prime Minister congratulated him on Twitter.27 It was big news because he was the first Malaysian athlete to win the award.There is now more media coverage whenever Malaysian athletes with a disability do well in international competitions, such as when S. Suresh won the World Para Archery Championships, and Malaysia won the badminton mixed doubles at the Deaflympics.28 Personal stories about athletes with disabilities have also been featured, including news of national athletes who received Special Needs Bursary scholarships from the Sime Darby Foundation for their university education, and the marriage of Paralympic gold medallist Muhammad Ziyad Zolkefli.29 Athletes with disabilities have recently been featured in advertisements. Ahmad Solihim Mohd Nor, who won the silver medal (men’s 100m T46) at the Eleventh Fazza World Para Athletics Grand Prix in Dubai, was featured in an advertisement for a local mobile network operator. The online video entitled ‘Constraints are not a Burden’ for the VIP Plan was released in November 2018.30 The national blind football team was also featured in a 2019 Independence Day advertisement by another mobile network operator.31 The blind football team is also featured in a documentary ‘Eye on the Ball’ which documents the team’s remarkable journey to qualify for the 2018 IBSA Blind Football World Championships. Although they failed to qualify for the world championships, it is still a compelling story of their lives on and off the pitch. The documentary will be screened in local cinemas in December 2019.

Opportunities and challenges Media coverage of disability sport in Malaysian media has led to increased awareness. This increased public awareness of disability sport provides opportunities to further promote sport for persons with disabilities. Although there is now more equality in terms of elite sport, participation in sport and physical activity for persons with disabilities is low.32 The benefits of sport and physical activity for persons with disabilities include physiological, psychological, cognitive and social benefits.33 It has been argued that physical activity is even more important for persons with disabilities compared to persons without disabilities because persons with disabilities tend to have poorer health and increased prevalence of secondary conditions.34 Various barriers have been cited for the low physical activity levels in persons with disabilities. Among them are personal and environmental barriers.35 Personal barriers include health, low 339

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energy levels and self-consciousness. Environmental barriers include lack of facilities, transport and accessibility.36 Section 26 of the Persons with Disabilities Act 2008 states that necessary measures should be taken to ensure that public facilities, amenities, services and buildings should be accessible.37 However, despite codes of practices on access to the built environment for persons with disabilities, there are limitations in enforcing this legislation.38 There is no code of practice on accessible design of transportation and most public transportation is not accessible. When discussing accessibility, access for people with various disabilities and severity of disabilities should be considered. It is also important to have sport in schools because that is where the majority of athletes, including the Paralympic gold medallists, were introduced to sport. There should be qualified Adapted Physical Education teachers in order to provide a positive experience for students. Currently, there is no degree in Adapted Physical Education being offered in Malaysian universities. However, Adapted Physical Education or Adapted Sports Education courses are taught within Physical Education degree programmes. There are also opportunities to promote disability rights through sport. In his speech at the United Nations Human Rights Council Social Forum, International Paralympic Committee President Andrew Parsons highlighted that sport is one of the best vehicles to promote human rights.39 The Paralympic Games provides a platform to discuss disability issues and can promote inclusion and change popular perceptions of disability.40 This is certainly true for Malaysia, where perceptions of disability have changed following the 2016 Paralympic Games. With growing interest in disability sport in Malaysia, there is an opportunity to raise awareness about disability and contribute to equality. Some of the challenges faced by persons with disabilities are related to perception and attitudes. Negative perception and attitudes towards persons with disabilities in Malaysia have caused barriers for persons with disabilities to be included in society, including in the workforce.41 There is lack of understanding and awareness about disability in Malaysia. This had led to stigma against persons with disabilities. Families of children with disabilities still face stigma and discrimination because of their relatives’ disability.42 Disability sport also has an opportunity to contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which are a collection of 17 global goals, covering a range of social and economic development issues, set by the United Nations.43 The SDGs were implemented in 2016, and each goal has targets that need to be achieved by 2030. Disability is incorporated in SDGs related to education, growth and empowerment, inequality and accessibility of human settlements.44 The SDGs which are especially relevant to disability sport are SDG 3 (ensure healthy lives and promote well-being), SDG 5 (gender equality) and SDG 10 (reduce inequalities). Persons with disabilities experience good health and well-being benefits when they participate in sport and physical activity. It can also contribute to social integration and inclusion. Gender equality can also be promoted through disability sport. This is because women with disabilities face the double discrimination of having a disability and being female.45 Sport can be used as a tool to empower women and girls with disabilities. More consideration should be given to females with a disability when planning sport and physical activity programmes. Only 25 percent of Malaysian Paralympians are female, and only two have won Paralympic medals (Siow Lee Chan for powerlifting -56 kg in 2008 and Siti Noor Radiah Ismail for long jump T20 in 2016). It is important to have inclusive access to sport for persons with disabilities.

Conclusion Malaysia’s achievement in disability sport is commendable. In its relatively short history, the country has won Paralympic gold medals, and Malaysians have been world champions. Media coverage and public support has also increased as a result of this. Although elite athletes with 340

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disabilities should be supported in their quest for glory, that should not be the only focus. It is important for all persons with disabilities to gain the benefits of sport and physical activity. Although there are policies in place to encourage participation in sport for persons with disabilities, there should be better implementation of the policies.

Notes 1 World Health Organization and World Bank, World Report on Disability (Geneva:World Health Organization, 2011), 29. 2 Ministry of Human Resources Malaysia, Statistik Pekerjaan Dan Perburuhan [Employment and Labour Statistics] (Putrajaya: Ministry of Human Resources Malaysia, 2019), 3. 3 Ibid., 110. 4 Selina Khoo, “New Direction: Disability Sport in Malaysia,” Sport in Society 14, no. 9 (2011): 1285. 5 Government of Malaysia, Act 685 Persons with Disabilities Act, 2008. 6 Ibid., 7. 7 Lynne K. Norazit, “How Much Difference Can One ‘‘Word’ Make? Changing Perceptions of Disability in Malaysia,” International Journal of Arts and Sciences 3, no. 15 (2010): 268. 8 Harlida Abdul Wahab and Zainal Amin Ayub, “Employment Right of Persons with Disabilities in Malaysia,” in Social Interactions and Networking in Cyber Society, ed. Ford Lumban Gaol and Fonny Dameaty Hutagalung (Singapore: Springer, 2017), 217; Veena Babulal, “Malaysia’’s Disabled Still Marginalised, Says Suhakam,” New Straits Times, December 6, 2017, accessed July 9, 2019, www.nst.com. my/news/nation/2017/12/311353/malaysias-disabled-still-marginalised-says-suhakam. 9 Furuoka Fumitaka et al., “Employment Situation of Person with Disabilities: Case Studies of US, Japan and Malaysia,” Researchers World 2, no. 4 (2011): 1. 10 Esther Landau, “Employ More Disabled People, Public Sector Urged,” New Straits Times, November 17, 2018, accessed July 8, 2019, www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2018/11/432156/employ-moredisabled-people-public-sector-urged. 11 Ling Ta Tiun, Lay Wah Lee, and Suet Leng Khoo, “Employability of People with Disabilities in the Northern States of Peninsular Malaysia: Employers’ Perspective,” Disability, CBR & Inclusive Development 22, no. 2 (2011): 82, 92. 12 Melissa Ng Lee,Yen Abdullah, and Ching Mey See, “Employment of People with Disabilities in Malaysia: Drivers and Inhibitors,” International Journal of Special Education 26, no. 1 (2011): 118; Selvi Narayanan, “A Study on Challenges Faced by Disabled People at Workplace in Malaysia,” International Journal for Studies on Children,Women, Elderly and Disabled 5 (2018): 90. 13 Seok Hong Tan,“Unmet Health Care Service Needs of Children with Disabilities in Penang, Malaysia,” Asia Pacific Journal of Public Health 27, 8 Suppl. (2015): 44S–46S. 14 Muhamad Nadhir Abdul Nasir and Alfa Nur Aini Erman Efendi, “Special Education for Children with Disabilities in Malaysia: Progress and Obstacles,” Geografia-Malaysian Journal of Society and Space 12, no. 10 (2017): 84. 15 Ministry of Education Malaysia, Higher Education Statistics 2018 (Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Education, 2019), 9–10, 28, 100–5, 135. 16 Government of Malaysia, Act 685, 26. 17 United Nations, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (New York: United Nations, 2006). 18 Ibid., 4. 19 Selina Khoo, “Disability Sport in Malaysia,” Journal of Paralympic Research Group 6 (2016): 19. 20 Eric Samuel, “Newly Opened Sports Centre Aims to Spur Paralympic Champions,” The Star, March 6, 2014, accessed July 6, 2019, www.thestar.com.my/sport/other-sport/2014/03/06/ rm49mil-sporting-facility-to-spur-paraathletes. 21 Tee Ching Ooi, “RM1 Million for Malaysian Para-Athletes Who Win Gold at Rio Paralympics,” New Straits Times, August 28, 2016, accessed July 6, 2019, www.nst.com.my/news/2016/08/168849/ rm1-million-malaysian-para-athletes-who-win-gold-rio-paralympics. 22 Paralympic Council of Malaysia, http://paralympic.org.my/. 23 Siti Zaharah Abdul Khalid (Secretary General, Malaysian Paralympic Council), in discussion with the author, March 14, 2018. 24 Jadeera Phaik Geok Cheong, Selina Khoo, and Rizal Razman, “Spotlight on Athletes with a Disability: Malaysian Newspaper Coverage of the 2012 London Paralympic Games,” Adapted Physical Activity Quarterly 33, no. 1 (2016): 21. 341

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25 Jadeera Cheong, Selina Khoo, and Rizal Razman, “A Quantitative Analysis of Malaysian Newspaper Coverage of the 2016 Rio Paralympic Games” (Paper presented at the 15th Asian Society for Adapted Physical Education and Exercise Symposium, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, July 11–13, 2018). 26 Cheong, Khoo, and Razman, “Spotlight on Athletes with a Disability,” 27. 27 “PM Ucap Tahniah Kepada Atlet Paralimpik Mohamad Ridzuan Puzi” [PM Congratulates Paralympic Athletes Mohamad Ridzuan Puzi], Utusan, January 4, 2019, accessed July 6, 2019, www.utusan.com. my/berita/nasional/pm-ucap-tahniah-kepada-atlet-paralimpik-mohamad-ridzuan-puzi-1.816213. 28 Sufian Hadi Sojak, “Deaflympics: Malaysia Menang Perak” [Deaflympics: Malaysia Wins Silver], Utusan, July 28, 2017, accessed July 6, 2019, www.utusan.com.my/sukan/badminton/deaflympicsmalaysia-menang-perak-1.508467; Aftar Singh, “World Champion Suresh a Beacon of Hope for the Disabled,” Star, June 13, 2019, accessed July 6, 2019, www.thestar.com.my/sport/archery/2019/06/13/ world-champion-suresh-a-beacon-of-hope-for-the-disabled#4E43jptM4MylHFtz.99. 29 Nur Aqidah Azizi, “Paralympics Gold Medallist Muhammad Ziyad Marries College Sweetheart,” New Straits Times, November 11, 2016, accessed July 7, 2019, www.nst.com.my/news/2016/11/187892/ paralympics-gold-medallist-muhammad-ziyad-marries-college-sweetheart.Fazurawati; Che Lah, “Atlet Paralimpik Terima Biasiswa” [Paralympic Athletes Receive Scholarship], Harian Metro, March 25, 2019, accessed July 7,2019,www.hmetro.com.my/bestari/2019/03/437419/atlet-paralimpik-terima-biasiswa. 30 Ahmad Solihim Mohd Nor (national athlete with a physical disability), in discussion with the author, July 9, 2019. 31 Mohd Amirul Arif (captain of the national blind football team), in discussion with the author, July 9, 2019. 32 Noela C. Wilson and Selina Khoo, “Benefits and Barriers to Sports Participation for Athletes with Disabilities: The Case of Malaysia,” Disability & Society 28, no. 8 (2013): 1133–34. 33 Jeffrey J. Martin, “Benefits and Barriers to Physical Activity for Individuals with Disabilities: A SocialRelational Model of Disability Perspective,” Disability and Rehabilitation 35, no. 24 (2013): 2031–32. 34 Oscar Castro et al., “Scoping Review on Interventions to Promote Physical Activity Among Adults with Disabilities,” Disability and Health Journal 11, no. 2 (April 2018): 175. 35 James H. Rimmer and Alexandre C. Marque, “Physical Activity for People with Disabilities,” Lancet 380, no. 9838 (July 2012): 193. 36 Eva A. Jaarsma, Pieter U. Dijkstra, Jan H. Geertzen, and Rienk Dekker, “Barriers to and Facilitators of Sports Participation for People with Physical Disabilities: A Systematic Review,” Scandinavian Journal of Medicine & Science in Sports 24, no. 6 (December 2014): 871. 37 Government of Malaysia, Act 685. 38 Hazreena Hussein and Naziaty Mohd Yaacob, “Malaysian Perspective on the Development of Accessible Design,” Asian Journal of Environment-Behaviour Studies 3, no. 8 (2018): 155. 39 International Paralympic Committee, “IPC President Speaks at Human Rights Council Event,” accessed June 30, 2019, www.paralympic.org/news/ipc-president-speaks-human-rights-council-event. 40 Ian Brittain and Aaron Beacom, “Leveraging the London 2012 Paralympic Games: What Legacy for Disabled People?” Journal of Sport & Social Issues 40, no. 6 (December 2016): 515; Jason Bantjes and Leslie Swartz, “Social Inclusion Through Para Sport a Critical Reflection on the Current State of Play,” Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Clinics of North America 29, no. 2 (May 2018): 414. 41 Azmah Othman and Rohana Jani, “Employment Prospect of Persons with Disability: The Myth and Reality” (Paper presented at Scholar Summit 2017: Scholar Summit on Shaping a Better World, Depok, Indonesia, October 10–11, 2017). 42 United Nations Children’’s Fund (UNICEF) Malaysia, Childhood Disability in Malaysia: A Study of Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (Kuala Lumpur: UNICEF Malaysia, 2017), 6. 43 United Nations General Assembly, “Transforming Our World:The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” 2015, www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E. 44 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs,“#Envision2030: 17 Goals to Transform the World for Persons with Disabilities,” www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/envision2030.html. 45 Sherry R. Fairchild, “Women with Disabilities: The Long Road to Equality,” Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment 6, no. 2 (2002): 14.

Bibliography Abdul Wahab, Harlida, and Zainal Amin Ayub. “Employment Right of Persons with Disabilities in Malaysia.” In Social Interactions and Networking in Cyber Society, edited by Ford Lumban Gaol and Fonny Dameaty Hutagalung, 217–32. Singapore: Springer, 2017. 342

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Bantjes, Jason, and Leslie Swartz. “Social Inclusion Through Para Sport: A Critical Reflection on the Current State of Play.” Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Clinics of North America 29, no. 2 (2018): 409–16. Brittain, Ian, and Aaron Beacom. “Leveraging the London 2012 Paralympic Games: What Legacy for Disabled People?” Journal of Sport & Social Issues 40, no. 6 (2016): 499–521. Castro, Oscar, Kwok Ng, Elizaveta Novoradovskaya, Gregoire Bosselut, and Mary Hassandra. “A Scoping Review on Interventions to Promote Physical Activity Among Adults with Disabilities.” Disability and Health Journal 11, no. 2 (2018): 174–83. Cheong, Jadeera Phaik Geok, Selina Khoo, and Rizal Razman. “Spotlight on Athletes with a Disability: Malaysian Newspaper Coverage of the 2012 London Paralympic Games.” Adapted Physical Activity Quarterly 33, no. 1 (2018): 15–32. Cheong, Jadeera, Selina Khoo, and Rizal Razman. “A Quantitative Analysis of Malaysian Newspaper Coverage of the 2016 Rio Paralympic Games.” Paper presented at the15th Asian Society for Adapted Physical Education and Exercise Symposium Kuala Lumpur, July 11–13, 2018. Fairchild, Sherry R. “Women with Disabilities: The Long Road to Equality.” Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment 6, no. 2 (2002): 13–28. Fumitaka, Furuoka, Khairul Hanim Pazim, Beatrice Lim, and Roslinah Mahmud. “Employment Situation of Person with Disabilities: Case Studies of US, Japan and Malaysia.” Researchers World 2, no. 4 (2011): 1–10. Government of Malaysia. Act 685 Persons with Disabilities Act, Kuala Lumpur, 2008. Hussein, Hazreena, and Naziaty Mohd Yaacob. “Malaysian Perspective on the Development of Accessible Design.” Asian Journal of Environment-Behaviour Studies 3, no. 8 (2018): 147–56. Jaarsma, Eva A., Pieter U. Dijkstra, Jan H. Geertzen, and Rienk Dekker. “Barriers to and Facilitators of Sports Participation for People with Physical Disabilities: A Systematic Review.” Scandinavian Journal of Medicine & Science in Sports 24, no. 6 (2014): 871–81. Khoo, Selina. “New Direction: Disability Sport in Malaysia.” Sport in Society 14, no. 9 (2011): 1285–90. Khoo, Selina. “Disability Sport in Malaysia.” Journal of Paralympic Research Group 6 (2016): 17–29. Martin, Jeffrey J. “Benefits and Barriers to Physical Activity for Individuals with Disabilities: A Social-Relational Model of Disability Perspective.” Disability and Rehabilitation 35, no. 24 (2013): 2030–37. Ministry of Education Malaysia. Higher Education Statistics 2018. Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Education, 2018. Ministry of Human Resources Malaysia. Statistik Pekerjaan dan Perburuhan [Employment and Labour Statistics]. Putrajaya: Ministry of Human Resources Malaysia, 2019. Narayanan, Selvi. “A Study on Challenges Faced by Disabled People at Workplace in Malaysia.” International Journal for Studies on Children,Women, Elderly and Disabled 5 (2018): 85–92. Nasir, Muhamad Nadhir Abdul, and Alfa Nur Aini Erman Efendi. “Special Education for Children with Disabilities in Malaysia: Progress and Obstacles.” Geografia-Malaysian Journal of Society and Space 12, no. 10 (2017): 78–87. Norazit, Lynne K. “How Much Difference Can One ‘Word’ Make? Changing Perseptions of Disability in Malaysia.” International Journal of Arts and Sciences 3, no. 15 (2010): 266–84. Othman, Azmah, and Rohana Jani. “Employment Prospect of Persons with Disability:The Myth and Reality.” Paper presented at Scholar Summit 2017: Scholar Summit on Shaping a Better World, Depok, Indonesia, October 10–11, 2017. Rimmer, James H., and Alexandre C. Marques. “Physical Activity for People with Disabilities.” Lancet 380, no. 9838 (2012): 193–95. Tan, Seok Hong. “Unmet Health Care Service Needs of Children with Disabilities in Penang, Malaysia.” Asia Pacific Journal of Public Health 27, 8 Suppl. (2015): 41S–51S. Tiun, Ling Ta, Lay Wah Lee, and Suet Leng Khoo. “Employability of People with Disabilities in the Northern States of Peninsular Malaysia: Employers’ Perspective.” Disability, CBR & Inclusive Development 22, no. 2 (2011): 79–94. United Nations. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. New York: United Nations, 2006. 343

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United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Malaysia. Childhood Disability in Malaysia: A Study of Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices. Kuala Lumpur: UNICEF Malaysia, 2017. Wilson, Noela C., and Selina Khoo. “Benefits and Barriers to Sports Participation for Athletes with Disabilities: The Case of Malaysia.” Disability & Society 28, no. 8 (2013): 1132–45. World Health Organization and World Bank. World Report on Disability. Geneva: World Health Organization, 2011.

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32 Sport and gender in contemporary China Xiong Huan

Introduction Since the economic reform of the 1980s, Chinese society has undergone a dramatic transformation not only in the economic, technological and political fields but also in the ways of people’s daily life, including leisure activities and sport participation. Like their international sisters, there are increasing numbers of Chinese women engaged in and admitted to more and more types of sport and physical activities that were previously designated ‘male.’ In particular, the extraordinary performance of Chinese female athletes in the international sport arena ‘thrust Chinese sportswomen into the global limelight and sparked considerable interest around world.’1 It is not only in the field of elite sport that the participation of Chinese women in sport has grown; also at the grassroots level, women’s participation has grown quickly. In the morning or evening, city parks, streets and neighbourhood playgrounds fill up with women of different ages performing various physical activities: aerobics, jogging, Taichi, broadcast gymnastics,Western ballroom dancing, and other types of activity. Women doing exercise has become a part of the scenery of the Chinese cities. Previous studies have already proved that, whether in theory or in practice, sport and exercise played a very important role in the sudden rise to prominence of Chinese women in the contemporary era.2 How women’s sport and physical exercise has been reshaped by social relations, institutions and cultural productions during the social transformation process since the economic reform – and how sport has become a new arena for women to express themselves and to achieve real gender equality in the sport world – raises questions that will be discussed in this chapter. Considering the dual-structure of sport systems in contemporary China,3 this chapter focuses on women’s mass sport (qunzhongtiyu) only, which is defined as various physical activities, including sport, taking place among social groups in their leisure time. Unlike elite sport, which has always been a state-sponsored activity,4 women’s mass sport is a product of the interaction of socio-economic and cultural contexts being widely and deeply determined by the new social forces and the social situation of women in the process of social transformation. The exploration of integrated forces through the rise of women’s sport participation may provide a new point of access and specific perspectives to reveal women’s status and the way in which gender power is represented in an Asian society.

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Historical background: female body and sport in the Pre-Reform Era To review Chinese modern history, sport and exercise have contributed to women’s liberation movements and their social status profoundly and universally. In feudal societies, Chinese women suffered a long history of oppression. It was originally reflected in the restrictions on the female body – specifically foot-binding. As Hong5 argues, foot-binding was a physical tyranny and social constraint on Chinese women from ancient to modern times. It represented male domination and power by controlling the female body physically and mentally. The emancipation of Chinese women’s bodies between 1840 and 1949 involved years of gradual liberation from the harsh oppression of foot-binding, and indicates that physical emancipation has been the prerequisite for wider liberation of women because ‘without normal limbs, unmutilated extremities and unrestricted movement there was little possibility of physical and psychological health, educational access, occupational opportunity and political assertion.’6 Since 1949, when Communist China was founded, Chinese women were completely emancipated from the physical tyranny of foot-binding and encouraged to build masculine bodies, which were considered more egalitarian and homogeneous. The female sporting body was a very special location for creating women’s ‘iron bodies’ and ‘masculine images.’ It served to transform the image of Chinese women from physical weakness to a powerful body, eventually achieving the aim of breaking the gender boundary.7 It was also treated as an effective instrument to build an independent image of the new socialist country around the world.8 For these reasons women’s participation in sport was highly promoted, and Chinese women’s sport achieved much in a very short time. Chinese women’s elite sport gained a great reputation, and endowed China with political and diplomatic capital to convey a new image to the world.9 In this period, national development, to a certain extent, was accelerated, but individuals lost the freedom to fulfil themselves through choosing their own lifestyle, attitudes and values. As a result, Chinese women’s sport participation, on the one hand, gave its political meanings to the state, bringing the country benefits and glory and creating a symbolic image of women’s emancipation; on the other hand, the government did not provide women with choices in their sport activities to fulfil their own needs, desire and rights as independent individuals.The female sporting body was suppressed by enforcing masculinity and the concept of gender became an unmarked and neutralised category, its role as a vessel for self-identity was greatly diminished.10 This situation did not change for woman’s sport until the emergence of the new process of urbanisation under the Chinese economic reforms of the 1980s.

Reconstruction: the social forces in the rise of women’s sport participation since the eform era Since the 1980s, Chinese sport has undergone an extraordinary transformation from a planned system into a market-oriented system.The most distinguishing phenomenon is the rapid growth of mass sport at the grassroots, with increasing demands for sport activities in women’s daily lives. Chinese sport, since then, has been split into two systems: an elite sport system and a mass sport system. The elite sport system functions to select potential athletes, train them and finally to achieve medals for the country on the international stage. The mass sport system, on the other hand, aims to promote sport participation at the grassroots and improve the fitness and health of the general public.11 We cannot deny that the elite sport system is still firmly controlled by the central government and used as an instrument to achieve its diplomatic and political goals. However, driven by the market economy, the mass sport system has, to a certain extent, been 346

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released from the political control of the central government. As a result, sport participation at the grassroots has developed faster than ever before, along with the increase of social demands for health, fitness, entertainment, leisure and self-fulfilment of the Chinese people.12 The rise of women’s sport participation was the result of integral forces in the changing sport policy, sport values and institutional transformation of urban life.

Sport policy and the promotion of women’s sport participation As economic reform has launched a revolution in people’s lives since the 1980s, it has triggered a sociopolitical debate on how to redefine the relationship between sport, the state and the individual. The changes in the roles of the state and the market and their impact upon individuals constitute new concerns of how to promote a better life for individuals. The key objective of Chinese sport reform strategy was to encourage the Chinese sport system to become involved in the market-oriented transformation and to improve the quality of people’s lives.13 It required sport to function to improve the relationships of members of society and to construct a healthy way of life and create a harmonious environment in society.14 This strategy reflects the increased attention that the Chinese central government has been paying to the social and economic functions of sport apart from its political function. Consequently, mass sport has been strongly promoted. In June 1995, the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese Olympic Committee (COC) established the ‘National Fitness Programme’ (NFP). The NFP aimed to ‘promote mass sport activities on an extensive scale, improve people’s physique, and spur the socialist modernisation of China.’15 The goal of the NFP – ‘sport for all’ – implied non-discrimination, no elitism and providing popular alternatives to mainstream sport. It was ideal for introducing the idea of equality in opportunity for women. The NFP identified women as a category of special need. It noted that attention must be paid to women’s health, fitness and well-being. It created a new commission for women’s sport and played a leading role in the development of policies and practices. In general, NFP had three types of influence upon women’s sport. First, the formulation and implementation of the NFP embodied the efforts of the Chinese government to safeguard women’s equal rights to participate in sport. Its objective was closely associated with the expansion of the concept of health and the idea of enriching women’s cultural lives. The government pointed out that ‘for women, physical activity makes an important contribution to physical and mental well-being. Chinese women, as important social contributors, should be widely encouraged to participate in sport, which is also a symbol of social progress.’16 Second, the government also designed a network of opportunities to guarantee women access to sport participation. According to the NFP, women’s sport activities should be promoted by central government and operated by local sport authorities, enterprises, voluntary and commercial agencies. It required local authorities to develop sport stadiums, fields and other sport facilities accessible to women. It required enterprises, communities and sport associations to organise women’s fitness training and sport events. Sport agencies were required to carry out fitness testing and surveys among women. The sport instruction system was directed to supervise women’s sport participation.17 The China General Administration of Sport (CGAS) also claimed that for provision to be appropriate for women there should be ease of accessibility to public transport, proximity to residential areas should be a guiding principle and there should be good safety measures, a pleasant social space and a friendly atmosphere.18 Third, in practice, various sport programmes and fitness activities suitable for women were carried out, such as organising family sport events, including recreational sport activities and fitness exercises, and 347

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building women’s sport centres. Most importantly, women’s leadership in sport at the grassroots level was emphasised so that women’s sport could develop continuously and comprehensively for women’s own benefit. The Chinese sport policy rhetorically highlighted the importance of women’s physical activities, safeguarded the rights of women to participate in sport and explicitly formulated approaches for developing women’s sport in cities. It put an emphasis on social and cultural functions and also on the importance of women’s self-development and enjoyment.

Sport values and women’s internal motivations for sport activity The growth of women’s sport at the grassroots level was not only the consequence of the sport policy but also the direct result of the changes in women’s lives, along with their changing attitudes towards sport and physical exercises. Before the economic reform, the internal motivation of women to take part in sport was very weak. On the one hand, peoples’ lives were considerably poorer – being well-fed was the priority for their health; on the other hand, people had very little leisure time. Since the 1980s, economic achievements have increased Chinese people’s standard of living and changed individual lifestyles from a generalised, static and monotonous pattern into dynamic, various and diversified opportunities. This resulted in a significant change in Chinese women’s attitudes and demands for health, leisure and consumption that related to the sporting life. The health issue is an important concern among women, and it has become the main force motivating them to participate in sport activities. According to a survey in 2014, almost 70 percent of women participated in sport for health-related reasons.19 Women’s health concerns in China are not dissimilar from the rest of the world’s female population. However, over the centuries, the Chinese, in general, have developed unique understandings of well-being and ways to be healthy. Traditional Chinese Medicine, based on the theory of yin and yang, have had a profound impact on the way Chinese women think about health and the methods or products that can help to keep them in tip-top shape. Among the most popular health concern categories for women in China are anti-aging, skincare, weight loss, detox, prenatal care and enriching the blood. These concerns motivated most Chinese women to choose health exercises rather than sport games. In addition to physical health, many women have suffered from depression, anxiety and mental disorders caused by heavy pressures from work, study and family in the fast-paced urban life. Participating in physical exercise is considered by Chinese women as a good way to relieve social pressure and to maintain a peaceful mind. To reduce the pressures of urban life, Chinese women were more concerned with taking part in recreational and therapeutic exercises rather than fierce and aggressive physical activities. Walking, jogging, badminton, yoga, Taichi and dance were the most popular activities among women according to their needs for mental health.20 Mass media also play an important role in delivering the idea, as well as the value, of health and sport to women. It is reflected in the mushrooming columns concerning health issues in women’s magazines, on TV programmes and on the Internet. The media cover a wide range of issues concerning women’s health and fitness – from how to keep healthy teeth to how to get a slim, fit and sexy figure. Underlying these topics is a general concern about the need to take part in sport and exercise. The proliferation of writings and media images on sport has also had a significant impact on women’s knowledge and interest. Sport, therefore, is conceptualised as an important element for creating a healthy lifestyle and has become absorbed into Chinese women’s own experiences. Leisure is an important part of urban life and it is closely related to the changing value of Chinese sport from a political tool into a social medium of entertainment.Traditionally, Chinese 348

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women’s leisure activities such as reading, sewing, playing music or games took place at home. In modern times, sport activities have become part of the mass entertainment industry and an integral part of the commercialisation of popular culture.This social change encouraged women to step out of the home to take part in leisure activities. Apart from health and fitness purposes, women tended to participate in sport with friends or family, which could provide them with a good atmosphere for social communication, networking and sociability. More importantly, sport was fun – it could release women from the pressure of their work and family. It is in leisure, rather than work, that individuals see themselves as free to act and develop as they please, to the degree that they argued, Women’s life is always controlled by the others – employers, husbands and children. It is only when we leave home and participate in sport and exercises with other women that we can fully control our time and enjoy our lives.21 The growth of income and enhanced commercial exchange have nurtured individual desires for consumption. Sport and fitness exercise, which was treated as a public product provided by government, has now become commercialised. Along with soaring gross consumption, women’s desire for sport commodities and services were stimulated. Chinese women – especially the young generation – have become more sport-conscious than before, and are often willing to spend more money on sporting pursuits, including sportswear and equipment, venues, services and sport training.22 Apart from economic conditions, the change in the concept of the young consumer has been another vital factor stimulating women’s sport consumption behaviour. China Daily reported: An annual membership card, priced at 5,500 yuan (US$ 687), is definitely not small spending for the 26-year-old woman who earns 2,500 yuan (US$ 312) a month. But Miss Wang says it is worth it. ‘I cannot save much money as the salary is so low. If I didn’t spend the money in fitness club, I would probably have spent it all on shopping,’ says Wang, ‘I come here to be healthy,’ said Wang, proudly showing off her svelte body. ‘You only have one life, one body.’23 Participation in sport as a consumer activity is a sign of an increased desire for material life and women’s desire for enrichment. Buying sport-related goods has become a new concept internalised by some Chinese women. It symbolises the rise in consumer power of Chinese women. The greater demand for health and fitness, recreation and consumption reflect women’s physical, psychological, economic, social and cultural ambitions in contemporary China. The pursuit of a happy life, as the internal driving force, has spurred the transformation of women’s sport.

Sport institutional changes and diversified approaches for women’s sport participation Women’s individual pursuits, as already discussed, have become the driving force in the increase of women’s sport. However, without a rational institutional structure, women’s personal pursuits could not have been fully achieved and the transformation could not have happened. The decline in the power of the state and the proliferation of new economic and social organisations unquestionably enlivened city life. It opened up new venues for both public and private 349

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interaction, and under these circumstances, sport – as a personal affair as well as a social activity – has gained more room to develop, which provides women with multiple choices for engagement in sporting pursuits. Before the reform, Chinese women were forced into taking part in state-organised physical exercises and sport events, such as broadcasting exercises and workers’ sport games in the autumn and spring. Many women looked on this kind of physical exercise or sport event as a difficult task to complete, but not as a way to develop themselves, because it was associated with their bonus and political credit (zhengzhi bian xian) in work units (places),24 not with their own needs and interests. And the only way women could participate in sport was through their schools or work units.25 The voluntary sport organisations that emerged in the 1980s provided women with a new approach. Unlike the work-unit management system, these voluntary sport organisations tended to put women’s preferences and interests first and give women expanded choices concerning how to participate. These organisations (or so-called exercise groups) are organised and run by the exercising women themselves under the supervision of residents’ committees or local associations for sport and culture. Women normally gather in parks, squares or neighbourhoods. They bring their own tape-recorder and buy their own sport suits and equipment. They pay coaches of their own accord and collect money for team activities.26 There are no particular regulations or rules in these voluntary sport groups. The residents’ committee or local sport associations do not interfere with the activities, organisation and management unless the group practises or organises activities that are forbidden by the government. The scale of the voluntary group can be very large, often with over 100 members, or very small, having less than ten members.27 A friendly environment, flexibility and low cost are the main reasons that explain why women join these voluntary sport and exercise groups. In addition, they can offer a good atmosphere and a free space for women to choose when, where and how to take part in sport activities according to their own preferences. More importantly, women can seek an alternative to the mainstream and male-dominated sport. In pursuit of alternatives, they have established their own programmes and organisations. In separating from the mainstream, they have gained autonomy and helped develop women-centred activities. This is the most remarkable difference from work-unit and government-organised sport. More interestingly, besides doing the exercises together, the group members also meet outside their regular practice site, going for picnics, organising group trips or travel, or having family parties. They make a network in the community and become associated through sport activities. Women’s sport at the grassroots level, accordingly, has shifted from organised and controlled activities to self-initiated and voluntarily organised activities. Furthermore, through sport and exercise, Chinese women are building their own communities around shared interests and collective goals. This involves deliberate efforts to move away from mainstream sport towards a more cooperative and inclusive one.

Limitations: gender inequality, stratification and unfinished process The reform period has represented a remarkable period in the rise of women’s sport and exercise. Chinese women have benefited from increased opportunities and made considerable progress in sport participation. However, not all changes are for the better. Women’s supposed inferiority and class inequality remain in this transformation and may affect the sustainable development of women’s sport.

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Inadequate provision for women’s sport participation In theory, the NFP promoted women’s sport widely and intensively; in practice, inadequate provision from the Chinese central government, local authorities and commercial sectors has restricted this aim. Although an amount of money is available to the CGAS each year for mass sport, there are no specific targets or regulations on how much should be spent on women. At present, the CGAS concentrates more on building sport infrastructures and organising big sport events and meetings. They assign women’s sport programmes to the local authorities, the education authorities, enterprises, commercial firms and public organisations. However, within this partnership, the question of who should take the major responsibility for supporting women’s sport remains unresolved. In the commercial sector, funds and sponsorship for women’s sport are still lacking. Private providers have indeed invested in high-standard women’s fitness clubs, but they are not willing to fund public activities and provide women with cheap sport goods. To make profits, most commercial funds are spent on building luxury sport centres, leisure complexes and establishing sport clubs. Nevertheless, most women cannot take advantage of these ‘modern’ sport.The public sport centres have the same problem. This implies that although the government lays down that sport should be open to all people, the fact is, those who control financial resources can use their economic power to organise and sponsor sport for their own interests.28 Meanwhile, the government has made insufficient efforts to intervene to alter institutional discrimination against women.

Ideological obstructions to women’s sport participation Although women’s demands for health, fitness, leisure and consumption have stimulated their desire to participate in sport, they have also met with some obstacles that have been caused by the gender ideology of being a ‘healthy’ and ‘appropriate’ woman. First, scientific and medical discourses have put too much emphasis on female-appropriate fitness and nutrition.They encourage women to participate in some appropriate sport and consistently warn women that excessive sport activities will jeopardise their health. Modern scientists and nutritionists have sent a message that a reserve of energy is essential for women’s bodies. Chinese traditional medicine’s concept of yin-yang theory regulated women’s position as yin, which should remain passive, restrained and inwardly focused. If women are engaged in too many vigorous activities, the inner balance of women’s body may be damaged. Therefore, they urge women to take part in gentle, less strenuous physical exercise. This idea has locked women into a fixed concept of female-appropriate sport and restricted women’s various choices and experiences in sport. Second, the traditional ideology concerning gendered leisure is another essential factor. As is the case in most countries of the world, men’s leisure is highly valued, while women’s is valued less. Some women put their husband’s leisure needs before theirs and are willing to sacrifice their own desires. Most Chinese women who are married would feel guilty when going out alone, while their husbands would not have the same feeling, as people regard men’s going out as their duty to sociability.29 As a result, many women tend to choose leisure activities within the domestic sphere or semi-domestic sphere;30 whereas men spend more leisure time on social activities and sport activities out of the home.

The stratification of women’s sport participation The reformation of sport has provided women with opportunities to pursue their own benefits and fulfilment. However, not all of them can equally or fully benefit. The rise of women’s sport

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has also gone side by side with the stratification of women’s status in cities.31 Some women with good education have grasped the opportunities of market-oriented urbanisation to develop their economic competence and promote their social status; some with low education have remained working in manual occupations; and others are unemployed. Women’s economic capacity, educational background, domestic status and cultural values fundamentally affect their sport participation. Sport serves women at different levels according to their class. Chinese women’s sport has therefore emerged with diversity but with a strongly stratified character.32 With high income, good education and open minds, middle-class women are willing to spend money on enjoying sport using high-quality facilities and services. They look at sport as a mode of self-development and self-expression. Economic independence is the precondition for their consumption of sport. High education is essential for them in shaping their sport attitudes and habits. Their improving status in the domestic sphere has partially released them from patriarchal restrictions. Influences from Western culture have stimulated their enthusiasm for pursuing fitness and sexiness, and establishing self-realisation through body movement.Through participation, middle-class women have recognised that sport can be used as an instrument to resist imposed gender-related constraints and can give them a certain power to achieve their goals.33 Like middle-class women, working-class women also demand involvement in sport, but their sport participation is more informal and casual. They do not often go to fitness clubs and do not like to spend money on sport activities. They adopt traditional ways of exercising in neighbourhoods, streets, squares and parks after work and housework. They look at sport as a way of leisure and keeping healthy, but do not recognise its functions for self-expression and self-emancipation.34 Low income, low level of education and double roles as workers and wives are the main categories of constraint that limit working-class women’s sport, which are linked closely to their significant economic disadvantages and their lower ability to resist patriarchal arrangements and gender ideology. An increasing number of unemployed and elderly women are also showing an enthusiasm for participating in sport and physical exercises. It is the unexpected situation of unemployed/retired women being marginalised from the mainstream of society that has caused their movement to rediscover the sporting arena as a site for sociability and self-expression. They perceive sport participation more as a way of socialisation, at the same time seeking self-expression through body movement.35 However, for most unemployed/retired women, their sport participation is curtailed by their financial constraints and increasing housework and domestic commitments. Women’s different economic, social, domestic and cultural status has framed different contents, forms and meanings of their sport experiences. Under these controls, Chinese women cannot equally utilise sport opportunities created by the economic reform; some of them still live within patriarchal arrangements and do not completely succeed in pursuing a good quality of life.

The unfinished process of women’s sport and exercises Women’s sport is spreading in the voluntary sector, and it has become a mainly self-organised activity. However, as women’s demands for sport participation increase, the self-organised sport groups will not be able to meet their further needs.36 At present, several problems are emerging. The first problem is that there is no formal and fixed place for these sport groups. Women often exercise in parks, local neighbourhoods and streets. But sometimes they must move their locations. In addition, there are many conflicts and arguments between different exercise groups that are fighting for space. There was also a debate as to whether or not to allow women to 352

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exercise in residential areas. Some residents complained about the loud music of the exercise groups, while others complained that these groups destroyed the natural and public surroundings.The second problem is that self-organised activities are very simple and unchangeable.They are linked to stereotypical ideas concerning what women want; Taichi, various aerobic dances and self-designed keep-fit exercises are highly favoured. The members have no opportunity to be offered new sport, so the interests of women in a variety of sport have probably been underestimated.The third problem is that women’s sport groups seem too discursive, flexible and lacking certain regulations, which has resulted in women’s participation being casual and informal without sustainability.37 Some sport experts recommend that the self-organised sport activities should be led by sport associations and clubs, and the government and local authorities should give them more financial and institutional support.38

Looking to the future: development, equality and emancipation The economic reform and the social transformation that has happened in China will continue to drive Chinese sport forward in the twenty-first century. Women’s sport and exercises as an institutional and cultural phenomenon will be further developed. Nevertheless, the future development of women’s sport will not be automatic; it needs institutional support to change the power relations of gender in the wider society and in sport in particular.39 First, the Chinese government must have considerable involvement in women’s sport in a variety of ways. With regard to sport policy, a combination of strategies is clearly needed to, for example, channel resources to fund women’s sport, establish women’s sport organisations within central and local authorities and, more importantly, promote women’s leadership in sport at different levels. Also, the official women’s organisation, the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF), while carrying out its mission to improve women’s social status, should also pay particular attention to women’s sport and exercise, including the dissemination of women’s rights in sport and supporting their sport participation. Second, since the development of women’s sport participation depends on continual changes in how sport are organised, promoted, played and portrayed, Chinese sport reform needs to take the characteristics of women’s sport into account. New forms of sport for women at the grassroots therefore need to be created. Examples include using multiple ways of promoting women’s sport, providing programmes that bring women and men together to share sport experiences and creating new orientations based on the pleasure and participation approach rather than competition and performance. Third, the commercialisation of sport will dominate Chinese sport under neoliberalism in the twenty-first century. For women, as discussed earlier, it has positive and negative influences. On the one hand, the commercialisation of sport will continue to present strong messages that appeal to women’s enthusiasm for sport for reasons of both fitness and recreation. It will also produce more opportunities for women to gain access to modern sport activities. On the other hand, the commercialisation of sport will accelerate the stratification of participation. Those women who have lower salaries and less discretionary income may suffer participation setbacks. To embrace all women into sport and offer them equal opportunities, a network for women’s sport, linking the governmental, voluntary and commercial sectors, needs to be established. This means an effort to create a better sporting environment for women is required. Fourth, the further development of women’s sport also needs a large-scale feminist movement to strive for greater wealth, more meaningful lives and freedom from patriarchal controls at the grassroots. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to build fair economic institutions and a more democratic climate for both genders to achieve their potential in market competition. 353

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Moreover, Chinese women’s collective consciousness of being engaged in struggling against social bias, injustice and the patriarchal order needs to be awakened. This call will require the development of new feminist perspectives and multidimensional women’s studies to remove patriarchal obstacles and position women more favourably in the field of sport.

Notes 1 Jingxia Dong, Women, Sport and Society in Modern China: Holding Up More Than Half the Sky (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 1. 2 Fan Hong, Footbinding, Feminism and Freedom:The Liberation of Women’s Bodies in Modern China (London: Frank Cass, 1997); Huan Xiong, Urbanisation and Transformation of Chinese Women’s Sport Since 1980s: Reconstruction, Stratification and Emancipation (London: VDM Verlag, 2009); Jianming You, Beyond Gendered Body:Women’’s Sports in Modern East China (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2012). 3 Xiaozheng Xiong and Binshu Zhong, 60 Years of Sport in New China (Beijing: Beijing Sports University Press, 2010), 294. 4 Dong, Women, Sport and Society in Modern China, 14. 5 Hong, Footbinding, Feminism and Freedom. 6 Ibid., xiv. 7 Huan Xiong, “Urbanisation, Women’s Body Image, and Women’s Sport Under Chinese Socialism 1949–1979: A Historical Review,” Sport History Review 39, no. 2 (2008): 127–51. 8 Fan Hong and Xiaozheng Xiong, “Communist China: Sport, Politics and Diplomacy,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 2, no. 3 (2002): 319–42. 9 Fan Hong, “Women’s Sport in the People’s Republic of China: Body, Politics and Unfinished Revolution,” in Sport and Women: Social Issues in International Perspective, ed. IIse Hartmann-Tews and Gertrud Pfister (London: Routledge, 2003), 224–37. 10 Xiong, “Urbanisation, Women’s Body Image, and Women’s Sport Under Chinese Socialism 1949– 1979,” 127–51. 11 Xiong and Zhong, 60 Years of Sport in New China, 265–71. 12 Huan Xiong, “The Evolution of Urban Society and Social Changes in Sports Participation at the Grassroots in China,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 42, no. 4 (2007): 441–71. 13 Xiong and Zhong, 60 Years of Sport in New China, 260–62. 14 China State Council, “The No. 8 Document of the State Council – The Suggestion of Central Committee of the CCP and the Government on How to Strengthen and Improve Sport in the New Era,” internal document, July 22, 2002. Accessed in CGAS, 2003. 15 State Council and Chinese Olympic Committee, “National Fitness Programme (NFP)” (Collection of Documents of NFP), 1995, 1–6. 16 State Council and COC, “National Fitness Programme (NFP),” 1–6. 17 Ibid., 5. 18 All-China Women’s Federation and CGAS, “A Notice of Conducting Programme of ‘A Hundred Million Women Participating in Fitness Activities’,” in Collection of Documents and Articles of NFP, ed. Mass Sport Department of CGAS (Beijing: Beijing Sports Press, 2000), 20–25. 19 Huan Xiong, “Female Mass Sport Development Path in China in New Era,” Journal of Sports Adult Education 33, no. 1 (2017): 66–71. 20 Ibid. 21 Huan Xiong, “Free of Choices and Empowered Body–Resolution of Sport to the Dilemma of Women’s Leisure,” China Sport Science 34, no. 4 (2014): 47–53. 22 Huan Xiong, “A Study on Sports Participation of Middle-Class Women in Urban China,” Journal of Beijing Sport University 31, no. 8 (2008): 1042–44. 23 “Fitness Fetish,” China Daily, July 18, 2005, C3. 24 Kaizhen Wang and Hai Ren, “Social Transformation in China and Reform of Urban Social Sports Management System,” Journal of Beijing University of Physical Education 27, no. 4 (2004): 433–39. 25 Ibid. 26 Huan Xiong,“Transformation of Women’s Mass Sport in the Process of Urbanisation in Contemporary China,” International Journal of the History of Sport 31, no. 13 (2014):1617–38. 27 Liu Wang and Jie Li, “Community Grassroots Sports Organization: Living Conditions and Future Development,” Journal of Wuhan Institute of Physical Education 45, no. 2 (2011): 17–21. 354

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2 8 Jay Coakley, Sport in Society: Issues & Controversies (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001), 281. 29 Xiong, “Free of Choices and Empowered Body,” 47–53. 30 Huan Xiong, “The Construction of Women’s Social Spaces Through Physical Exercise in Urban China,” Sport in Society 22, no. 8 (2019): 1415–32. http://10.1080/17430437.2019.16149192019. 31 Huan Xiong, “Stratification of Women’s Sport in Contemporary China,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 28, no. 7 (2011): 990–1015. 32 Xiong, “Stratification of Women’s Sport.” 33 Xiong, “A Study on Sports Participation of Middle-Class Women,” 1042–44. 34 Xiong, “Stratification of Women’s Sport,” 990–1015. 35 ’Ibid. 36 Yalin Huang, Chinese Sports Associations (Beijing: Beijing Sports University Press, 2004), 88. 37 Huan Xiong, “Consideration on the Developing Goals of Chinese Women’s Mass Sport,” Journal of Physical Education 23, no. 4 (2016): 68–72. 38 Ibid. 39 Jennifer Hargreaves, Sporting Females: Critical Issues in the History and Sociology of Women’s Sports (London: Routledge, 1994).

Bibliography All-China Women’s Federation and China General Administration of Sport. “A Notice of Conducting Programme of ‘A Hundred Million Women Participating in Fitness Activities’.” In Collection of Documents and Articles of NFP, edited by Mass Sport Department of CGAS, 20–25. Beijing: Beijing Sports Press, 2000. China State Council. “The No. 8 Document of the State Council – The Suggestion of Central Committee of the CCP and the Government on How to Strengthen and Improve Sport in the New Era.” Internal document, July 22, 2002. Accessed in CGAS, 2003. Coakley, Jay. Sport in Society: Issues & Controversies. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001. Dong, Jinxia. Women, Sport and Society in Modern China: Holding Up More Than Half the Sky. London: Frank Cass, 2003. Hargreaves, Jennifer. Sporting Females: Critical Issues in the History and Sociology of Women’s Sports. London: Routledge, 1994. Hong, Fan. Footbinding, Feminism and Freedom: The Liberation of Women’s Bodies in Modern China. London: Frank Cass, 1997. Hong, Fan. “Women’s Sport in the People’s Republic of China: Body, Politics and Unfinished Revolution.” In Sport and Women: Social Issues in International Perspective, edited by IIse Hartmann-Tews and Gertrud Pfister, 224–37. London: Routledge, 2003. Hong, Fan, and Xiaozheng Xiong. “Communist China: Sport, Politics and Diplomacy.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 2, no. 3 (2002): 319–42. Huang,Yalin. Chinese Sports Associations. Beijing: Beijing Sports University Press, 2004. Wang, Kaizhen, and Hai Ren. “Social Transformation in China and Reform of Urban Social Sports Management System.” Journal of Beijing University of Physical Education 27, no. 4 (2004): 433–39. Wang, Liu, and Jie Li. “Community Grassroots Sports Organization: Living Conditions and Future Development.” Journal of Wuhan Institute of Physical Education 45, no. 2 (2011): 17–21. Xiong, Huan. “The Evolution of Urban Society and Social Changes in Sports Participation at the Grassroots in China.” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 42, no. 4 (2007): 441–71. Xiong, Huan. “A Study on Sports Participation of Middle-Class Women in Urban China.” Journal of Beijing Sport University 31, no. 8 (2008): 1042–44. Xiong, Huan. “Urbanisation, Women’s Body Image, and Women’s Sport Under Chinese Socialism 1949– 1979: A Historical Review.” Sport History Review 39, no. 2 (2008): 127–51. Xiong, Huan. Urbanisation and Transformation of Chinese Women’s Sport Since 1980s: Reconstruction, Stratification and Emancipation. London:VDM Verlag, 2009. Xiong, Huan. “Stratification of Women’s Sport in Contemporary China.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 28, no. 7 (2011): 990–1015. 355

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Xiong, Huan. “Free of Choices and Empowered Body–Resolution of Sport to the Dilemma of Women’s Leisure.” China Sport Science 34, no. 4 (2014): 47–53. Xiong, Huan. “Transformation of Women’s Mass Sport in the Process of Urbanisation in Contemporary China.” International Journal of the History of Sport 31, no. 13 (2014): 1617–38. Xiong, Huan. “Consideration on the Developing Goals of Chinese Women’s Mass Sport.” Journal of Physical Education 23, no. 4 (2016): 68–72. Xiong, Huan. “The Construction of Women’s Social Spaces Through Physical Exercise in Urban China.” Sport in Society 22, no. 8 (2019): 1415–32. Xiong, Xiaozheng, and Binshu Zhong. 60 Years of Sport in New China. Beijing: Beijing Sports University Press, 2010. You, Jianming. Beyond Gendered Body: Women’s Sports in Modern East China. Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2012.

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33 The changing society, state policies and sport for young children in twentyfirst-century China Zhong Yijing and Dong Jinxia

Introduction Sport for young children has been of increasing concern in China since the beginning of the twenty-first century. Various reforms and innovations have been introduced to physical activities and sport in China’s kindergartens. It is self-evident that children’s sport is often a product of the interaction of many macro and micro factors, such as economic strength, international and national politics, traditional culture, sport and educational policies, investment and family support. However, so far, there is a paucity of quality studies on the latest developments in physical activity in kindergartens and children’s sport in China. Many questions need to be answered: What innovations and reforms have been introduced to Chinese kindergartens in terms of physical activity and sport in this century? What social and cultural forces are behind these developments? How did the social and policy changes, in association with family, early education and sport, affect the development of children’s sport in the country? What are the future prospects? So far these issues have been rarely addressed by either Chinese or Western academia.Therefore, it is necessary to seriously examine the relevant issues in children’s play and sport in China.This paper will focus mainly on continuity and changes in children’s sport and the forces behind them in the most populated country in the world. Based on a massive literature review (both Chinese and English), questionnaires and interviews with kindergarten principals, teachers and parents across the country, this chapter will review the development of children’s sport in China in the new century; analyse the major social forces behind the changes – such as market-oriented economic reforms, Western influence, parents anxiety for safety, state birth-control policy and educational reforms; and look at future trends and challenges in children’s sport. Sport, in this chapter, is defined as all forms of physical activity that include play, recreation, casual or organised/competitive sport.Young children mean those aged under six years.

Historic review of physical activities and sport at kindergartens in China prior to 2000 Children’s sport existed in ancient China. But organised children’s sport activities only emerged in the country after Western Christians came to China to run kindergartens in the 1870s. Prior 357

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to 1920, Chinese kindergartens were modelled either on the Japanese approach that emphasised a structured and teacher-directed curriculum, or Western modes that encouraged children’s initiatives and natural development. In the years from 1920 to 1936, some Chinese specialists, such as Chen Heqin, Taoxingzhi and Zhang Xuemen, made efforts to explore early education in the context of Chinese social and economic development.They all advocated sport games for kindergarten children. Due to the wars between China and Japan (1937–1945) and between the Communist Party and the Nationalist Party (1945–1949), early education, including children’s sport, did not advance significantly during this period. After the People’s Republic of China was established in October 1949, fundamental changes took place in the country. Based on Soviet experience, China adopted a centrally planned economy and learnt from the socialist Soviet ‘big brother’ in virtually every respect, including education. Thus, Chinese kindergartens borrowed the discipline-oriented teaching model from the Soviet Union and replaced the unit-based model that was popular in the 1930s and 1940s. Soon the ‘temporary code for kindergartens,’ which governed the objectives of early education, and the ‘kindergarten temporary teaching programme’ for the six subjects of maths, music, fine arts, physical education, common sense and language were endorsed in 1952. By the mid-1950s the rules and regulations had been basically established. Under the Kindergarten Education Work Guide and Provisions, children were required to do 20 minutes of morning exercise and one and a half to two hours play and walking in the morning, and one hour in the afternoon each day. It can be said that physical education and sport were recognised as a discipline in the same way as language or music, and enjoyed relatively high attention from the government and public in the 1950s. To catch up with the Western nations quickly, the Great Leap Forward – a massive political and economic campaign – was launched nationwide between 1958 and 1960. Motivated by the movement, women were encouraged to participate fully in social production, which was considered a precondition of women’s liberation, and to be free from domestic chores.The latter element resulted in the rapid expansion of kindergartens.The number of kindergartens increased over 26-fold in the year from 1957 to 1958.1 This happened even faster in rural areas than in cities. About 70 percent of children enrolled in kindergartens were located in the countryside.2 During the Great Leap Forward the state advocated that kindergarten children should take more outdoor sport and participate in work suitable for their age. Therefore, games, walks and labour were all very important elements in the daily activities of rural children.3 Unfortunately, this was a short-lived social experiment. Starting in 1960, China experienced three-years of economic difficulty, which led to the closure of many kindergartens. By 1963 the number of kindergartens had declined to the 1957 level. A few years later, the political movement of the Cultural Revolution erupted across the country and lasted for a decade. It is widely accepted that this movement had huge impacts on Chinese society and people’s lives. Early education was no exception. In spite of a general claim that the Cultural Revolution hindered the development of early education, as in the other fields, including sport for young children, my interviews with some women, who either worked in kindergartens or had children in kindergartens, revealed that the effects on early education, including sport for young children, during the Cultural Revolution were not all negative. Various kinds of kindergartens, from state-run to community-run, provided boarding and daily care for children between one and a half and six years of age, to help women focus more on their paid jobs, which was considered necessary for women’s liberation. At the time, many activities were organised in most kindergartens. Accordingly, evidence-based studies on sport for young children during the period from the mid-1960s to the late-1970s are needed. After economic reform was introduced in the late 1970s, early education entered a period of fast-track development and reform. Various regulations were endorsed by the State Education 358

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Commission, including the ‘Opinions on Strengthening Early Childhood Education’ (1988), the ‘Procedural Work Rules for Kindergartens’ (for trial implementation) and the ‘Regulations on Kindergarten Management’ (1989). Guided by the above policies, kindergarten curriculum reform was carried out across the country. Consequently, multiple curriculum modes, namely, discipline-oriented, activity-centred and core curriculum modes, came into being.4 Generally speaking, many kinds of sport activities – for example, gymnastics, table tennis, swimming and many games – were provided in kindergartens in the 1980s. When the market-oriented economic reform was initiated in 1992, more fundamental changes took place in Chinese society. In the same year the ‘Outline for the Development of Chinese Children in the 1990s’ was issued by the State Council. Benefiting from the improved economic and political environment of the 1990s, play and sport facilities and equipment for children in most Chinese kindergartens improved significantly. However, the market-oriented era posed challenges to the existing management system and regulations of early education. First, a number of enterprise-run kindergartens were either closed or merged with others. Second, preschool classes expanded vastly in the countryside. Third, unsatisfactory teachers’ professional training negatively affected the quality of early education.These problems forced government to endorse a number of regulations accordingly, for example, the ‘Several Opinions on Enterpriserun Kindergartens.’ It should be pointed out that by the mid-1990s, physical education and sport were listed in the first educational objectives for early education, but it had become obvious that kindergarten teachers were mostly unable to teach and manage effectively the physical education and sport activities.5 It is clear from the description just presented that sport for young children in China has historically been intertwined closely with national identity, state policy, economics and educational development.

Beijing Olympics, globalisation and children’s sport The first years of the twenty-first century were a turning point for China in terms of its international influence and status as manifested by two events: Beijing’s successful bid to host the 2008 Summer Olympic Games and China’s acceptance into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Due to the contemporary global significance of the Olympic Games, to become an Olympic power had been the persistent and ultimate dream of China since the mid-1980s when the ‘Olympic Strategy’ was introduced in the country. The successful Olympic bid of Beijing in 2001, and the hosting of the Games in 2008, provided a golden opportunity for China to fulfil the dream of being an Olympic power. China ranked first in the gold medal tally, a truly historic achievement. No doubt, staging the Games helped raise the generally low level of popular participation in sport, especially among the young, most of whom have since become parents. This was strengthened by the government decision that 8 August, the day of the Opening Ceremony of the 2008 Olympic Games, be declared ‘National Olympic Day’ in 2009. Immediately, soccer was promoted at schools and universities across the country with the aim of developing 20,000 soccer-specialising schools and 200 universities with elite soccer teams by 2017. This so called Campus Soccer campaign sped up after the Ministry of Education took charge in 2014. This campaign has extended to kindergartens in the last two years. In 2019, the Ministry of Education announced that there would be 10,000 soccer-specialising kindergartens by 2020. In August 2019, some 3,570 kindergartens across the country were awarded the title of soccerspecialising kindergarten for the first time.6 China has integrated with the world more closely since it was admitted into the World Trade Organization in 2001. While China made every effort to continue its educational traditions, 359

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the Chinese were also eager to learn from others about contemporary ideas, curriculums and management in order to become part of the global community. The popular Western educational, sport and other activities were watched on TV and the Internet and then adopted. Those who could afford to would invest in their child’s education, including sport, from an early age. Interestingly, the Montessori Method, based on the theories of a famous Italian educator and first introduced to China a century ago, have now became popular in the country. Maria Montessori’s works were translated into Chinese, and kindergartens named after her appeared in Qingdao and Beijing. The China Montessori Association was registered in 2014. It is widely believed that Montessori’s ideas are very compatible with the spirit of the National Mediumand Long-Term Education Reform and Development Plan (2010–2020). To resume its historic role as ‘the pre-eminent power in East Asia’ and ‘to bring to an end the overlong century of humiliation and subordination to the West and Japan’7 has been a Chinese dream since 1840, when China first started to suffer humiliation by the West and Japan. Entering the twenty-first century, China was determined to further its modernisation and have a greater voice in world affairs. Thus, it was necessary to build up a strong nation of human resources – physical, intellectual and social. A powerful nation needs a strong and capable young generation. Thus, more attention and investment were given to preschool education, including children’s sport. China issued the ‘Chinese Children’s Development Program (2001–2010)’ in 2001. Children’s development was put on the government agenda. Nevertheless, with improved living standards, Chinese dietary preferences and lifestyle have changed significantly over the past decades. As a result, the number of overweight or obese children has risen over time, which caused great concern about their health and body image in Chinese society. Furthermore, Chinese children’s fitness has declined over time since the mid-1980s. The sharp contrast of the obese and fragile image of young Chinese and the rising economic power of China in the world sounded a warning note for the Chinese government and public.

Market forces and children’s sport After 30 years of economic reforms, China had become the world’s third-largest economy by 2010.With the increased economic power, China invested more in early education over time. In 2016 the total investment in early education reached 280.2 billion yuan, a 15.48 percent increase over the previous year. The admission rate of children to kindergartens rose from 35 percent in 2000, to 56.5 percent in 2010 and to 77.4 percent in 2016. In 2018 there were 265,000 kindergartens and over 44 million children between the ages of three and six in the country. Nevertheless, given that early education is non-compulsory, China’s early education has long suffered from serious underinvestment, accounting for just 1.3 percent of the total education budget in the years before 2010. Since then it has risen gradually, from 1.5 percent in 2010 to 7.2 percent in 2016, when the budget for early education was 280.2 billion yuan, a 15.48 percent increase over the previous year and much a faster increase than in other education sectors. The proportion of early education budget to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) also jumped from about 0.05 percent in 2009 to 0.38 percent in 2016.8 Consequently, the number of kindergarten teachers increased by 200,000 per year between 2010 and 2017. In spite of this, there is still a shortage of kindergarten teachers, especially those who are professionally trained. After China shifted its financial management of education from exclusive state investment to joint sponsorship by government and society in the mid-1980s, and especially after 1992, private early education institutions had surpassed the public ones by 2010. For example, in 1989, stateowned and collectively-run public care institutions accounted for more than 90 percent, but by 2010, state-owned and collective nurseries had basically disappeared. Private kindergartens 360

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numbered about 124,600, or about 68.54 percent of the total, by 2012.9 In addition, the ‘lust for money’ mentality arising from the market-oriented reform made the quality private kindergartens extremely expensive in China. As a result, it is difficult for a child to find a placement in either a public kindergarten or a private one at affordable prices. Obviously, this ‘marketisation’ and privatisation substantially reduced governmental ability to exercise autocratic authority over child-care agencies and kindergartens. In 2014 the promulgation of ‘Several Opinions on Accelerating the Development of Sport Industry to Promote Sports Consumption’ by the State Council generated great interest from people in all walks of life. Influenced by mega sport events and Western sport values, parents sent their children to sport clubs to play tennis, ice hockey, baseball and figure skating, all of which are popular in the West. Small straws in the wind perhaps, but blowing in the right direction. Sport is increasingly valued by modern well-educated young couples. However, due to the widening income differences between urban and rural areas (three times), between different industries (up to ten times), and between east and west (over two times), many children from less developed areas and low-income families may be blocked out of the ‘upper-middle class’ sport such as tennis, golf, skiing and ice hockey. As a consequence of these concerted efforts, sport participation at the grassroots level rose significantly after 2010. Take running as an example. It was unusual to see people running in the street or in the park in the past, let alone running a marathon. However, marathon running became increasing popular across the country from 2012, which was further accelerated by the decision of the China Athletics Association in early 2015 that the organising of a marathon race no longer needed its approval. Such decentralisation gave momentum to the rapid expansion of the marathon across the country. In 2018, the number of marathons registered with the State Sports Administration reached 1,581, attracting 5.83 million runners.10 The enthusiasm for the marathon extended from adults to children. A number of cities, such as Beijing, Xi An and Chengdu, organised either parent-children or children-only mini marathon races of various distances between 2 km and 5 km in recent years. Though there has been controversy over whether it is appropriate for children to run such races, it has helped raise the awareness of children’s participation in sport. After the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress passed the ‘Private Education Promotion Law’ in 2017, more entrepreneurs joined the early education sector, including children’s sport. From July 2016 to July 2018, there appeared more than 730 new children’s sport business organisations in China. Thus, it is not surprising that sport for young children has become very popular since 2017. When ‘children’s sport’ for the period 2001–2018 was used as a search term in the Chinese National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) database, there were 1,167 articles. Of those, only five were from 2001, 55 were from 2011 and 207 were from 2018. Since 2012, the number of articles on children’s sport has increased significantly. Additionally, various sport organisations were established in recent years, such as the Sub-committee on Physical Education and Sport for Young Children of the China Sports School Society. During 2017 some 11 research centres that are targeted at children and sport were set up. Moreover, workshops and forums on sport for young children have been organised for kindergarten principals and teachers, which attracted governmental officials, Olympic champions and scholars across the country. The 2018 International Forum on Children and Sport held in Peking University attracted over 300 participants from the United States, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Macao and Mainland China. A series of books on children’s physical education and sport will be published soon by Beijing Sports University Press. Some normal universities, such as Changsha Teachers College, set up major’s programmes in children’s physical education and sport, and provide students with curriculums for children’s physical education and sport. 361

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By 2018, getting a placement in a kindergarten had become a social problem. A number of proposals were submitted to the National People’s Congress by different representatives referring to the issue in the last two years. This attracted central government attention. In 2018 the Preschool Education Act, as the first category of projects, was included in the Five-Year Legislative Plan of the 13th Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. At present, the Ministry of Education is making efforts to revise and improve the draft of the Act, which will be included in the legislative plan of the State Council in 2020.11

State policy and children’s sport Economic, social, political and cultural changes now underway in the fast-forward transition to a market economy have affected education policies, strategies and plans. This is reflected in the system of college entrance examination which has had an impact on virtually every Chinese family. The system is not just limited to colleges and universities but is also related to primary and middle schools, and even kindergartens. In order to get admitted into a prestigious university, students need to excel academically as early as in primary school, and even in kindergarten.Thus, parents and teachers make concerted efforts to achieve good results in exams from an early age. ‘Do not lose at the start line’ is the most vivid example of this mindset. In the face of the negative impacts of the college entrance exam on youths and their families, the Ministry of Education has tried hard to improve the system.Various innovations were introduced to reform the system, for example, emphasising individualised and all-around development, and comprehensive qualities, including self-management and learning abilities. The changes to the college entrance examination sent signals to parents and kindergarten teachers that comprehensive qualities should be cultivated from an early age, and sport is an effective means to nurture these qualities. State policy plays an important role in directing the development of children’s sport because centralised government of education has been in place in China for 70 years. According to the Instructional Outlines of Kindergarten Education, which was issued in 2001, the educational content for kindergartens was classified into five major areas: health, language, society, science, and art. Physical education and sport are included in the health area. This categorisation has had a great impact on kindergarten physical education and sport. Physical education classes no longer exist in most kindergartens. In the early years of the twenty-first century, children were encouraged to explore freely and not to engage in competitive activities and gymnastics, which disappeared from kindergarten activities due to the high risk of injury. After kindergartens were encouraged to build up curriculums with their own special characteristics in 2006, many kindergartens started to experiment with courses in martial arts, roller skating, outdoor activities, sport games and other activities. In addition, to solve the shortage of qualified teachers, some new programmes, such as the cognition-oriented ‘Sound World,’ were introduced to kindergartens, and sport instructors, especially males, were invited to kindergartens to teach children sport skills and fitness approaches. This created employment opportunities for male university graduates who had specialised in physical education and sport. Since 2010, a number of regulations about children and kindergartens were promulgated, for example, the Outline of National Medium- and Long-Term Education Reform and Development Plan (2010–2020), and the Chinese Children’s Development Programme (2010–2020). Two years later, a Learning and Development Guide for 3–6 year old Children was endorsed by the Ministry of Education. It stated that ‘early education is of great significance to children’s habit formation, intellectual development and physical and mental health.’ Physical education and sport play an important role in facilitating children’s lifelong and coordinated development of their physical, intellectual, moral and aesthetic character. 362

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In addition to educational policy, other policies, such as population, also had an impact on children’s sport. The ‘one child’ policy initiated in 1980 had an alarming and unforeseen social consequence: spoiled children unwilling to face up to harsh training regimes. These children today have become mostly self-centred parents who have posed some challenges to kindergarten management. One of the challenges is parents with overt concerns about their children’s safety, which makes sport activities with even the slightest possibility for injury difficult, if not impossible, for kindergartens to provide, because of the fear of lawsuits from parents if their children are injured. Fortunately, in line with the arrival of an ageing society, the ‘one child’ policy was first relaxed in 2013 and then completely dropped in 2016. This policy change has, and will further have, great impact on Chinese families and society. As the number of children increases, the demand for kindergarten admission and spaces will rise. This may worsen the problem of insufficient kindergarten places. Besides, raising a child is very expensive in contemporary China. To have a second baby will certainly place a greater financial burden, as well as caring and educational responsibilities, on parents. In consequence, the available time and energy of parents to accompany their children to participate in leisure and sport activities will be reduced. However, the ‘second baby’ has positive impacts on children. They are encouraged to be independent, and to learn to get along with their younger brothers or sisters, which may provide a beneficial social environment for the development of children’s sport. However, we should not be too optimistic. Due to the historically lingering stereotype against sport, book knowledge is still valued more than sport participation in Chinese society. ‘Chinese children play too little, let them play more,’ said President Xi Jinping at the opening ceremony of the Confucius Institute in London and the Confucius Classroom Annual Meeting in 2015. Besides, migrant or left-behind children are other groups that deserve special attention. After China started economic reform in the late 1970s, rural populations migrated to cities to earn their living. Domestic migration reached approximately 252.78 million by 2011. The children of domestic migrants and children who were left behind with relatives when their parents moved to the cities did not obtain sufficient attention in terms of their education, social and psychological development, as well as in sport and games.

Future prospects ‘By 2049, Chinese education will steadily stand at the centre of the world and lead the trend of world education development,’ proclaimed Chen Baosheng, the minister of education, in 2019. Education here certainly includes early education, as it is an integral part of basic education. In moving towards this target, China is faced with a number of problems and challenges where children’s sport is concerned. For example, the dilemma of ‘high demand’ for and ‘actual marginalisation’ of sport in kindergartens; the lack of systematic physical education and sport programmes; the epidemic of safety anxiety among parents; the low physical literacy of kindergarten teachers; the limited space for physical activities; the air pollution that will restrain children from outdoor activities; and the unbalanced development between urban and rural areas are just a few of the known problems. Nonetheless, it is not all doom and gloom; opportunities may be reasonably juxtaposed with these challenges. First, the strong economy makes it possible for children’s sport to develop at a fast pace; and the coexistence of government funding and corporate sponsorship, if run properly, could channel the flow of investment to early education, including children’s sport. Second, with the growing emphasis on teacher training, more capable and committed teachers will be available. They will ensure that quality and systematic sport programmes are completed in practice. 363

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Third, the hosting of the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics and Winter Paralympics will encourage 300 million people to participate in winter sport.Young children will be part of the participating population. The Olympic Education Program for schools in association with the staging of the Winter Olympics will be extended to kindergartens. Some kindergartens in Beijing have already introduced winter sport to young children. Therefore, the hosting of the winter Olympics will add momentum to the development of children’s sport in China. Fourth, increased exchange between China and the rest of the world in the era of globalisation and the Internet will help deepen people’s understanding of physical activity and sport as well as encourage them to be more actively involved. Last but not least, new technologies, such as artificial intelligence and wearable devices, may facilitate the development of children’s sport. In summary, children’s sport in China has evolved in the last 70 years from embryo to maturity, and from relative invisibility to full visibility. This process has been replete with challenges, complexities and complications and has been deeply enmeshed also with communist practices, state policy, economic development, traditional forces and international trends. Chinese determination to reform their early education, including physical education and sport, in the twentyfirst century is largely motivated by the worrisome physical and psychological state of students and the challenges in building a new, vigorous, modern and strong nation in the world. The unprecedented support level for physical education and sport in early years of a child’s education from the government and public reflects Chinese awareness of the relationship between children’s health and well-being and national identity in the world. If everything goes well, the reforms and innovations introduced in the past 18 years will result in the flourishing of children’s sport across China.

Notes 1 ‘ “Jin yi bu tuidong funv jiji touru dao zengchang jieneng de yundong de gaochao – quangguo sheng shi zizhiqu fulan zhuren kuoda huiyi tongbao”‘ [Further Mobilise Women of the Country to Enthusiastically Participate in the Surging Campaign of Increasing Production and Saving Energy – Bulletin of the Enlarged Meeting of the Directors of the Women’’s Federations at Provincial, Municipal and Autonomous Levels], China’s Women no. 17 (1959). 2 ‘ “Gaojun Mao Ze Dong sixiang de qizhi, jin yi bu fadong funv wei shixian 1960 nian jixu yuejin er fendou – cai chang zhuxi zai quanguo fulian di san jie di er ci zhixing weiyuan hui de baogao”‘ [Raising the Banner of Mao Zedong Thought and Further Mobilising Women to Continue to Struggle to Realise the Continuing Great Leap Forward in 1960 – Chairman Cai Chang’s Report on the Second Executive Committee of the Third Women’s Federation], Women’s Work no. 5 (1960). 3 Qing Zai,‘ “Jiti hua xia de tong nian:‘da yue jin’ shiqi nongcun you er yuan yanjiu”‘ [Childhood Under Collectivisation: Research on Rural Kindergarten in the Period of the ‘Great Leap Forward’], Journal of Chinese Women’s Studies 140, no. 2 (2017): 36–49. 4 Hongmei Cai, ‘ “20 shiji woguo you er yuan kecheng gaige de lishi huigu”‘ [The Historic Retrospect of Kindergarten Curriculum Reform in the 20th Century in China], Journal of Nanjing Xiaozhuang College 21, no. 2 (2005): 71–74. 5 Leng Xiao Gang, “1994 nian shanghai shi qu you er yuan tiyu huodong xianzhuang diaocha baogao” [Investigation Report on the Current Situation of Kindergarten Sports Activities in Shanghai in 1994], Early Childhood Education no. 1 (1996): 47–48. 6 Li Runfa, ‘ “Nian quanguo zuqiu tese you er yuan mingdan 2019”‘ [National Football Specialised Kindergarten List 2019], PRC Central Government, August 17, 2019, www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-08/17/ content_5421854.htm. 7 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 229.

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8 Zhiyan zhixun jituan, ‘ “2017 nian zhongguo jiaoyu jingfei ji xue qian jiaoyu jingfei zhichu qingkuang tongji fenxi”‘ [Statistical Analysis of China’’s Education Funds and Pre-School Education Expenditure in 2017], China Industry Information, August 23, 2017, www.chyxx.com/industry/201708/553387.html. 9 Zhiyan zhixun jituan, ‘ “2018–2024 nian zhongguo zao jiao shichang shendu fenxi ji touzi zhanlve yanjiu baogao” [In-Depth Analysis and Investment Strategy Research Report of China’’s Early Education Market in 2018–2024], www.chyxx.com/research/201805/639443.html. 10 Han Tian, ‘ “2018 zhongguo ma la song 1581 chang chanye zong chan chu da 746 yi” [China Marathon Reached 1581 in Number in 2018 with Consumption of 74.6 Billion Yuan], China Sport, March 12, 2019, www.sports.cn/cydt/jsby/2019/0312/214722.html. 11 ‘ “Chen Baosheng xiang quanguo renda chang wei hui zuo guanyu xue qian jiaoyu shiye gaige he fazhan qingkuang baogao”‘ [Chen Baosheng Made a Report to the Standing Committee of the National People’’s Congress on the Reform and Development of Preschool Education Under the State Council], China Education Daily, August 23, 2019.

Bibliography “2017 zhongguo ma la song da shuju fenxi baogao” [2017 China Marathon Big Data Analysis Report]. “2018–2024 nian zhongguo zao jiao shichang shendu fenxi ji touzi zhanlve yanjiu baogao” [In-Depth Analysis and Investment Strategy Research Report of China’s Early Education Market in 2018–2024]. Cai, Hongmei. “20 shiji woguo you er yuan kecheng gaige de lishi huigu” [The Historic Retrospect of Kindergarten Curriculum Reform in the 20th Century in China]. Journal of Nanjing Xiaozhuang College 21, no. 2 (2005): 71–74. “Chen Baosheng xiang quanguo renda chang wei hui zuo guo weu yuan guanyu xue qian jiaoyu shiye gaige he fazhan qingkuang baogao” [Chen Baosheng Made a Report to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on the Reform and Development of Preschool Education Under the State Council]. China Education Daily, August 26, 2019. Gang, Leng Xiao. “1994 nian shanghai shi qu you er yuan tiyu huodong xianzhuang diaocha baogao” [Investigation Report on the Current Situation of Kindergarten Sports Activities in Shanghai in 1994]. Early Childhood Education no. 1 (1996): 47–48. Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. “Gaojun Mao Ze Dong sixiang de qizhi, jin yi bu fadong funv wei shixian 1960 nian jixu yuejin er fendou – cai chang zhuxi zai quanguo fulian di san jie di er ci zhixing weiyuan hui de baogao” [Raising the Banner of Mao Zedong Thought and Further Mobilising Women to Continue to Struggle to Realise the Continuing Great Leap Forward in 1960 – Chairman Cai Chang’s Report on the Second Executive Committee of the Third Women’s Federation]. Women’s Work no. 5 (1960). “Jin yi bu tuidong funv jiji touru dao zengchang jieneng de yundong de gaochao – quangguo sheng shi zizhiqu fulan zhuren kuoda huiyi tongbao” [Further Mobilise Women of the Country to Enthusiastically Participate in the Surging Campaign of Increasing Production and Saving Energy – Bulletin of the Enlarged Meeting of the Directors of the Women’s Federations at Provincial, Municipal and Autonomous Levels]. China’s Women no. 17 (1959). Zai, Qing. “Jiti hua xia de tong nian: ‘da yue jin’ shiqi nongcun you er yuan yanjiu” [Childhood Under Collectivisation: Research on Rural Kindergarten in the Period of the ‘Great Leap Forward’]. Journal of Chinese Women’s Studies 140, no. 2 (2017): 36–49.

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34 The development of elite disability sport in China Guan Zhixun

Introduction At the Thirteenth Summer Paralympics Games in Beijing in 2008, the Chinese Paralympics delegation took the limelight. A team of 332 Chinese athletes competed in 284 events and put China in first position in both the gold medal and total medal rankings. They won 89 gold, 70 silver and 52 bronze medals, for a total of 211 medals. The medal total was 10 medals more than the combined totals of the United Kingdom and the United States, which were second and third, respectively.The world was shocked, and the question on everyone’s mind was ‘how could China have become the only superpower in the Paralympics Games in such a short time?’

Deng Pufang and the China Disabled Persons’ Federation In order to understand Chinese disabled sport we must begin by introducing Deng Pufang, who devoted his life to disabled people’s welfare in China. Deng was the eldest son of China’s former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. During the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping was labelled as a capitalist roader. His family suffered as well. The Red Guards jailed his son Deng Pufang. In 1968, Deng Pufang was tortured and thrown out of the window of a three-storey building at Peking University. But some sources tell another version of the story.1 Either way, he injured his back and was paralysed, as the injury was too serious to cure. He remained a paraplegic, using a wheelchair for life.2 In 1984, after the Cultural Revolution, with the help of his father’s political power and influence, Deng Pufang determined to look after the disabled people of China. He established the China Welfare Fund for the Disabled and founded the China Disabled Persons’ Federation (CDPF) in 1988. The CDPF has three basic functions: to represent the interests of people with disabilities in China and protect their legitimate rights; to provide them with effective and comprehensive services; and to advise the government on issues relating to people with disabilities. From the beginning, Deng Pufang channelled his father’s political power and influence to promote the CDPF. The Chinese government supports it with a substantial degree of resources and material (e.g. office buildings and financial outlays), human resources (e.g. social workers, administrators and clinicians), and intellectual capital (e.g. media coverage, research institutes and publishing house). 366

Elite disability sport in China

Elite disability sport policy development Disability sport is part of the disability movement in China and is promoted by both the CDPF and the Chinese Sport Ministry.The development of disabled sport in China can be divided into three periods: the beginning period (1980s–1992); the development period (1993–2004); and the Superpower of the Paralympic Games period (2005 – present).

The beginning period (1980s–1992) Disability sport is part of the disability movement in China and has been promoted by both the CDPF and the Chinese Sport Ministry since the 1980s. In 1983, China joined the International Paralympic Committee and promised to send a delegation to the 1984 New York Summer Paralympic Games. From this point on, Chinese disability sport slowly moved forward in three ways. First, when joining the International Paralympic committee, The Chinese Sport Ministry set up the Injured and Disabled Sport Association for Paralympics, although there was still was no officer who worked practically for disability sport and it was only another name of the mass sport office. Second, the Injured and Disabled Sport Association ran the first national disability sport competition in Tianjin in 1983 to select the 1984 New York Summer Paralympic Games delegation. That event was reported in The People’s Daily,3 which was the first time Chinese media paid attention to disability sport at a national level. Third, the Injured and Disabled Sport Association and the Sport Ministry jointly issued the Notice for Developing Injured and Disabled Sports to provincial Sport Commissions in 1984, 1987 and 1990,4 which was a turning point for disability sport policy development. It was the first recorded policy from the central sport administration to promote disability sport nationwide. Educational institutions played a major role in the development of disability sport during this period.5 In part, this was due to education legislation such as the Compulsory Education Law of the People’s Republic of China (1986), in which Article 9 provided that ‘local governments at all levels should organise special education schools for blind, deaf, dumb, and intellectually disabled children and teenagers.’ Another legislative push came from the Regulations on the Work of College Sports which came into law in 1990. This addressed the regulations for physical education and health programmes at colleges and universities.6 It provided that colleges should make available appropriate sport health, therapeutic exercise, medical treatment and sport activities for students who had physiological challenges or certain medical conditions (such as traumatic brain injury and dwarfism), so that they could improve their physical condition and health.6 In this period, disability sport was not promoted at a national level under any specific policy, as the policy makers were concentrating on Olympic success, in line with the central government’s priority. However, the rapid development of disability social policies started to bring disability groups into the public eye and laid the foundation of a social environment for boosting disability sport.The Development Period (1993–2004)In 1993, the central government moved responsibility for disability sport management from the Ministry of Sport to the CDPF. The CDPF hosted the Far Eastern and South Pacific Disabled Games (the FESPIC Games) in Beijing in 1994, a regional version of the Paralympics for the countries of South and East Asia.7 In 1996, 37 Chinese athletes participated in Atlanta at the 10th International Paralympic Games, winning a total of 16 gold medals, 13 silver medals, and 10 bronze medals, and with 10 athletes breaking 16 world records. China was ninth in the gold-medal ranking. In 2000, China sent 87 athletes to participate in the 11th Paralympic Games, winning a total of 34 gold medals, 22 silvers medals and 16 bronze medals. Twenty-five athletes also broke 15 world records, which helped China to move up to sixth in the gold-medal ranking. 367

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In 2002, the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and State Council issued the Guidelines on Further Strengthening and Improving the Work of Sports in the New Era. This was introduced to prepare China to host the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games.8 Article 13 stated, ‘[P]ay more attention to and support the selection, training, team organisation and competition of athletes with a disability.’ As a result, at the 12th Paralympic Games in Athens, Greece, in 2004, the Chinese delegation won 63 gold medals, topping the gold-medal ranking and the total medal ranking.

The superpower of the Paralympic games period (2005 – present) During this period, China became the only superpower in the Paralympic Summer Games. To better host the 2008 Beijing Paralympic Games, the Chinese government provided more support policies and a clear goal for developing its elite disability sport, which guaranteed longterm success. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council of China jointly issued the Guidelines on Accelerating Disability Initiatives on 28 March 2008. This required that ‘every local government should pay close attention to sport activities for the disabled, develop athletes with a disability and support them by specific state policies.’ This further reinforced the message of the Guidelines of the General Office of the State Council on Further Strengthening the Disabled Sport Work: Make disability culture and sport prosper. Organise the disabled to take part in mass culture, arts and entertainments, enrich their spiritual and cultural life, and encourage them to actively participate in the advanced cultural construction of socialism. Fulfil the National Fitness Project and initiate mass sport and fitness activities for the disabled. Do scientific research and physical education on disability sport.The public facilities for culture and sport have to be open to the disabled at preferential prices. Organise Paralympic competitions, the Special Olympics and the Deaflympics. Hold and participate in major competitive games at home and abroad. Try to have the best events and to successfully host the Beijing 2008 Paralympic Games and the Guangzhou 2010 Asian Disabled Games.9 The policies and guidelines issued by the government and the party had a great impact on the development of disability sport in terms of the administrative system, competition system, funding and resources.

The elite disability sport administrative system The China Injured and Disabled Sport Association was renamed the China Disabled Sport Association in 1991. Its membership includes the physically disabled, the intellectually disabled, those with spinal cord injuries and the blind. In 1993, CPDF set up a Sport Department as the administrative body for managing disability sport. It provided support and management assistance to the three Associations: China Disabled Sport Association, China Intellectually Disabled Sports Association and the China Deaf Sport Association. It also provided support to disability sport through policy, planning and institutional development to specific sport events.10 The Sport Department of the CPDF also assisted international disability associations in China, including: The International Paralympic Committee (IPC), The International Committee of Sports for the Deaf (ICSD), 368

Elite disability sport in China

The International Committee of Special Olympics (IPC), International Blind Sports Federation (IBSA), Cerebral Palsy International Sports and Recreation Association (CPISRA), International Wheelchair & Amputee Sports (IWAS), and International Sports Federation for Persons with Intellectual Disability (INAS-FID). The three Chinese disabled sport associations have a significant presence across China. They have branches in all provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities, cities and districts within the CPDF structure. There are initiatives for local collaboration in disability sport. In 2003, in order to better prepare the 2008 Paralympic Games, the China Disability Sport Management Centre was established.11 It was a milestone in the development of disability sport in China. It brought disability sport to a new era. It employed specialised professional full-time staff and set up the world biggest disability sport training campus. Its organisational structure is shown in Figure 34.1. The Centre extended the size and responsibility of the previous Sport Department of the CPDF. It is the highest administrative body for managing national disability sport. Its responsibility includes overall management, selecting and training for competition in both domestic and foreign disability sport competitions, organising national and international disability sport competitions, managing the China Disability Sport Training Campus, and guiding and coordinating provincial and local disability sport organisations.

China Disability Sport Management Center

Center Director

Vice Center Director

Vice Center Director

Human Resources Department

Competitions Department

Campus Office

Training Department

Research Office

Sport Manager

Liaison Department

National Teams Office

Sport Manager

Marketing Department

Propaganda Department

National Youth Team Office

Sport Manager

Center Office

Finance Department

Special Olympic Department

Figure 34.1 China Disability Sport Management Centre structure12 369

Guan Zhixun

Sport Department of China Disabled Persons’ Federations China Disability Sport Mangement Center Mass Sport Department of General Administration of Sport of China

National Teams

Sport and Culture Department of Province, City, District Disabled Persons’ Federations

Sport Management and Training Center

Figure 34.2 China Disability Sport Management Centre management structure13

Its management structure also channels resources from the Chinese Sports Ministry and CDPF into elite disability sport (see Figure 34.2). The Centre remains largely dependent on money from the central government for survival. During the preparation for the Beijing Paralympic Games, the central government increased its financial support to the Centre in order to achieve success at the Games. Like the Chinese elite sport system, the elite disability sport training centre has reached out to all provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities since 2003. Elite disability sport training centres steadily increased all over China. It could maximise resources as the successful local elite sport experience and culture, facilities and geographical conditions already existed. To date, 17 training centres have been established. All provincial training centres have full-time staff. But staff numbers vary due to differing economic development, and disability sport developments are very different in different areas of China. The staff numbers of 12 provincial training centres, according to a 2010 CPDF report, are shown in Figure 34.3. Some provincial level Disabled People’s Federations also developed their own training centres, such as Sichuan province.14

The elite disability sport competition system In 1983, the Tianjin Sports Ministry, Civil Affairs Bureau, Labour Bureau and Red Cross Society co-sponsored and organised the first national level disabled sport tournament; 200 blind and amputee athletes came from 13 provinces, cities and autonomous regions to compete in track and field, swimming, table tennis and other sport. In 1984, the 1st National Disabled Games of China were held in Hefei, and more than 1,500 disabled athletes, coaches and referees from 29 provinces, cities, autonomous regions and Hong Kong took part in the Games.15 It marked the establishment of the internal competitive system for disabled sport in China. In 1985, the National Blind Youth Athletics Competition and the National Disabled Table Tennis Championships were held in Hangzhou. In 1986, the Taishan Cup National Deaf Basketball Tournament took place in Jinan. From 1987–1993 China held about 60 national championships, the number of disabled sport increased from 4 to 14, and more than 10,000 participants were involved. 370

Elite disability sport in China 60 Liaoning 50

Beijing Hebei Tianjing

40

Neimenggu Shanghai

30

Yunan Zhejiang

20

Jiangsu Hubei

10

Jiangxi Henan

0 Full Time Staff Number

Figure 34.3 Full-time staff numbers of 12 provincial training centres in 2010

The highest level of elite disability sport competition in China is the National Disabled Games of the People’s Republic of China, and it has played an important role in Chinese elite disability sport development. In 1992, the State Council officially approved including the 3rd National Disabled Games of the People’s Republic of China held in Guangzhou into a major national games’ series to be held every four years. After that, China held the National Disabled Games of the People’s Republic of China in 1996, 2000, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 and 2019 (see Table 34.1). In 1992, the CPDF and the Sports Ministry reformed some relevant issues in relation to the National Games. First, it adjusted the timetable of the National Disabled Games to the same year as the Paralympic Games rather than one year before it. This was in order to ensure that the elite athletes concentrated their mental and physical training on the upcoming Paralympic Games in an attempt to gain the best results. However, it did not work very well. In 2003, the CPDF changed the National Disabled Games back to one year before the Paralympic Games for better performance. Second, all the sport included in the National Disabled Games Qualification system were the same as for the Paralympics. Despite the importance of the National Disabled Games, the priority was the Paralympic Games. Third, the point recording system of the National Disabled Games was subsequently changed to reflect the success of those who had competed in the Paralympic Games. China placed more emphasis on the Paralympic Games than on any other competition. It attempted to connect internal sport competitions with international games, especially the Paralympic Games. According to the CPDF, by 1993, China had run almost 300 disability sport training clinics for developing disability sport competition related professions.16 There were more than 10,000 people trained through these clinics, which meant that China had 10,000 people qualified to work in disability sport competitions at different levels and in different areas.17 After 10 years of development of the disability sport competition system, China already had the capacity to host international disability sport competitions. After the National Games, a series of provincial and city games were gradually introduced. At district and township level, various games for people with disabilities were run frequently by the 371

Guan Zhixun Table 34.1 National Disabled Games and Athlete Numbers Name

Date

Host City

Number of Athletes

Number of Delegations

Sports

1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th

1984 1987 1992 1996 2000 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019

Anhui, Hefei Provence Tangshan, Hebei Provence Guangzhou, Guangdong Provence Dalian, Liaoning Provence Shanghai Nanjing, Jiangsu Provence Kunming, Yunnan Provence Hangzhou, Zhejiang Provence Chengdu, Sichuan Provence Tianjing

500 900 1153 1200 1800 2229 4614 5000 2382 3481

30 30 33 34 34 33 35 36 35 35

4 5 6 8 11 14 20 17 12 34

local CPDF. At this level, total athlete participation numbers have reached more than 20 million in various competitions from 1987–1993.18 Apart from the rapid social development of the disability movement in China during this period, the main motivation for running disability sport competitions at district and township level was to select athletes to compete at a higher level. In the 1990s, disability sport competition increased in China and the system gradually moved towards development and diversification.19 Competition in China was then divided into different forms according to their level, such as, the Paralympic Games, Special Olympic Games and Deaflympic Games; national and local competitions; comprehensive and single competitions; professional and selection competitions; adult and youth competitions, and so on. At the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, the tournament system and the methods of awarding had also been changed in the National Disabled Games system. In this period, all of the national disability sport competitions complied with the strategy of Olympic and Paralympic success.

Funding resources for elite disability sport Financial support for the Chinese elite disability sport mainly consists of funds from the government. The central financial department is responsible to the national sport teams, and local governments are responsible for their local teams.20 There are also three other ways money is raised for disability sport.The first is from the sport lottery fund and welfare lottery fund. According to the rules of the Ministry of Central Finance of China, finance departments arrange special funds from the sport lottery and welfare lottery to support disability sport. However, the proportions are not laid out clearly and the funds are inadequate.21 The second way is through sponsorship. In the past, sponsorship has come from individuals, companies, government bodies and agencies, social associations and so on. However, this funding has been greatly reduced. The problem has been compounded by the fact that there is no tradition of charitable donations in this area. As a result, money from charity and sponsorship is very limited. The third way is through selfsupport, where athletes spend their own money to support themselves for competitions. But this way is extremely rare in elite disability sport in China and can only be found in certain Paralympic sport, such as badminton, and in athletes at lower levels in provincial and local teams. State financial investment in elite disability sport is the main source of funds. Most of the funds are spent on elite disability sport as the system was designed for. Table 34.2 shows the 372

Elite disability sport in China Table 34.2 National Level Disability Sport Budget Year

1983

1993

2002

2003

Budget

160,000RMB

4,000,000RMB

20,000,000RMB

100,000,000RMB

Table 34.3 Provincial Level Disability Sport Budget Province Hunan

Sichuan

Yunnan

Hebei

Jiangsu

Guangdong

Budget 220,000 RMB 500,000 RMB 500,000 RMB 550,000 RMB 6,000,000 RMB 20, 000,000 RMB

Table 34.4 FESPIC Games and Asian Paralympic Games–Results of China Year

3rd FESPIC 4th FESPIC 5th FESPIC 6th FESPIC 7th FESPIC 8th FESPIC 9th FESPIC 1st APG 2nd APG 3rd APG

1982 1986 1989 1994 1999 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018

Host City

Hongkong Surakarta, Indonesia Kobe, Japan Beijing, China Bangkok, Thailand Busan, Korea Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Guangzhou, China Incheon, South Korea Jakarta, Indonesia

Participants

15 23 57 422 195 206 190 448 228 232

Medals Gold

Silver

Bronze

6 64 99 298 205 191 199 185 174 172

12 21 32 28 90 90 76 118 95 88

7 3 8 138 45 50 32 88 48 59

increasing level of financial support from government financial departments between 1983 and 2003.22 At the provincial level, the provincial government financial departments also have budgets for supporting elite disability sport. Due to differing economic development, there is a huge variation between provinces. Table 34.3 shows this variation between several provinces in 2009.

The achievements of elite disability sport Since the 1980s, during which tremendous changes took place in Chinese society, China has become the only superpower in the Paralympic Summer Games.The following outlines China’s impressive achievement.

FESPIC games The Asian Paralympic Games, formerly known as the Far East and South Pacific Disability Games (FESPIC), was the first international disability sport games in which China participated. In 1982, 15 Chinese athletes with disabilities competed in an international disability sport competition for the first time at the 3rd FESPIC Games in Hong Kong. After that, China competed in all subsequent Games.Table 34.4 gives an overview of the FESPIC Games in which China has competed.23 373

Guan Zhixun

Deaflympic games In 1989, when the 16th World Deaflympic Games were held in New Zealand, China sent its first delegation, which only had eight athletes, to take part in the table tennis event. Table 34.5 gives an overview of Deaflympic Games in which China has competed.24

Paralympic games In 1984, China sent its first Paralympics delegation, consisting of 24 athletes with disabilities, to participate in the 7th International Paralympic Games. Two blind Chinese female athletes, Ping Yali and Zhao Jihong, won the women’s B2 and B3 long jump gold medals, respectively. Table 34.6 gives an overview of the Paralympic Games in which China has competed.

Conclusion In summary, Chinese elite disability sport has had an impressive development nationally and internationally from the 1980s to the present. The CDPF and the Ministry of Sport of China have provided strong support in all aspects. However, unlike the elite disability sport success, the Table 34.5 Deaflympic Games–Results of China Year

16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21st 22th

1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013

Host City

Participants

Christchurch, New Zealand Sofia, Bulgaria Copenhagen, Denmark Rome, Italy Melbourne, Australia Taipei, Taiwan Sofia, Bulgaria

8 0 13 15 69 78 96

Medals Gold

Silver

Bronze

0 0 1 2 5 12 12

0 0 0 3 8 9 5

0 0 0 2 4 17 8

Table 34.6 Paralympic Games–Results of China Year

Host City

Participants

Medals Gold

7th

1984

8th

1988

9th 10th

1992 1996

11th 12th 13th 14th 15th

2000 2004 2008 2012 2016

374

New York, United States Seoul, South Korea Barcelona, Spain Atlanta, United States Sydney, Australia Athens, Greece Beijing, China London, UK Rio, Brazil

Listed Silver

Bronze

24

2

13

9

23th

43

17

17

10

14th

24 37

11 16

7 13

7 10

12th 9th

87 200 332 282 308

34 63 89 95 107

22 46 70 71 81

14 32 52 65 51

6th 1st 1st 1st 1st

Elite disability sport in China

grassroots disability sport developed fairly slowly in term of the activity participation rate and professional services infrastructure. Therefore, how to use the success of elite disability sport to inspire the development of grassroots disability sport in China remains a challenge.

Acknowledgements This chapter is funded by the Youth Foundation of Social Science and Humanity Research Project of the Ministry of Education of China. Project No. 19YJC890011.

Notes 1 It was claimed that Deng Pufang may have jumped or fallen out of the window in an attempt to commit suicide as he could not bear the Red Guards’ torture and humiliation any longer. 2 Yan Qin, Deng Pufang de lu [The Deng Pufang Road] (Taiyuan: Shuhai Chubanshe, 1992). 3 Luyao Liang, “The Study on Paralympic Games Report on People’s Daily, 1880–1900: A Study in Social Mobility” (Master’s thesis, Soochow University), 41–43. 4 Xiaocen Hao, “The Vicissitudes of the Research into the Sports Policy for Disabled People in China: From Right Protection to Right Remedy,” Chinese Journal of Special Education 9, no. 9 (2010): 45–51. 5 Sun Shuhan et al., “China and the Development of Sport for Persons with a Disability, 1978–2008: A Review,” Sport in Society 14, no. 9 (2011): 1192–210. 6 Minxue He, “Characteristics of Scholastic Physical Education in Special Education,” Journal of Physical Education 14, no. 5 (2007): 96–99. 7 Peiping Sun, “FESPIC Introduction,” China Disabled 5, no. 5 (1994): 10–15. 8 Fan Hong, Ping Wu, and Huan Xiong, “Beijing Ambitions: An Analysis of the Chinese Elite Sports System and Its Olympic Strategy for the 2008 Olympic Games,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 22, no. 4 (2005): 510–29. 9 Shuhan et al., “Development of Sport,” 1200. 10 Long Zhang, “Comparison Between the Disabled Sports Organization and Management System,” Journal of Physical Education 16, no. 4 (2009): 34–36. 11 Shuhan et al., “Development of Sport,” 1200. 12 Guan Zhixun and Fan Hong, ‘ “The Development of Elite Disability Sport in China: A Critical ’Review,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 33, no. 5 (2016): 485–510, 494. 13 Zhixun and Hong, ‘ “The Development of Elite Disability Sport in China: A Critical Review’,” 494. 14 Guan Zhixun and Fan Hong, Body and Politics: Elite Disability Sport in China (New York: Nova, 2018). 15 Chuanyin Cheng and Wenhui Li, “Successful Experience and Enlightenment of Jiangsu Province Disabled Competitive Sports Development,” Journal of Beijing Sports University 7, no. 7 (2004): 34–37. 16 CPDF, Working Report 1987–1993 (Beijing: CPDF, 1994). 17 Ming Zhang, “Optimization of Management Mode of Competitive Sports for Disabled in China,” Journal of Wuhan Institute of Physical Education 46, no. 5 (2012): 19–23. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Zhang, “Comparison Between,” 34–36. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 CPDF, Results of 3rd Far East and South Pacific Games for the Disabled (Beijing: CPDF, 1982); CPDF, Results of 4th Far East and South Pacific Games for the Disabled (Beijing: CPDF, 1986); CPDF, Results of 5th Far East and South Pacific Games for the Disabled (Beijing: CPDF, 1989); CPDF, Results of 6th Far East and South Pacific Games for the Disabled (Beijing: CPDF, 1994); CPDF, Results of 7th Far East and South Pacific Games for the Disabled (Beijing: CPDF, 1998); CPDF, Results of 8th Far East and South Pacific Games for the Disabled (Beijing: CPDF, 2002); CPDF, Result of 9th Far East and South Pacific Games for the Disabled (Beijing: CPDF, 2006); CPDF, Results of 1st Asian Paralympic Games (Beijing: CPDF, 2010); CPDF, Results of 2nd Asian Paralympic Games (Beijing: CPDF, 2014); CPDF, Results of 3rd Asian Paralympic Games (Beijing: CPDF, 2018). 24 CPDF, “Sport,”, Deaflympics, 2003, accessed July 18, 2015, www.caspd.org.cn/web/viewpage. aspx?subid=361&infoid=939. 375

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Bibliography Cheng, Chuanyin, and Wenhui Li. “Successful Experience and Enlightenment of Jiangsu Province Disabled Competitive Sports Development.” Journal of Beijing Sports University 7, no. 7 (2004): 34–37. CPDF. Results of 3rd Far East and South Pacific Games for the Disabled. Beijing: CPDF, 1982. CPDF. Results of 4th Far East and South Pacific Games for the Disabled. Beijing: CPDF, 1986. CPDF. Results of 5th Far East and South Pacific Games for the Disabled. Beijing: CPDF, 1989. CPDF. Results of 6th Far East and South Pacific Games for the Disabled. Beijing: CPDF, 1994. CPDF. Working Report 1987–1993. Beijing: CPDF, 1994. CPDF. Results of 7th Far East and South Pacific Games for the Disabled. Beijing: CPDF, 1998. CPDF. Results of 8th Far East and South Pacific Games for the Disabled. Beijing: CPDF, 2002. CPDF. Result of 9th Far East and South Pacific Games for the Disabled. Beijing: CPDF. 2006. CPDF. Results of 1st Asian Paralympic Games. Beijing: CPDF, 2010. CPDF. Results of 2nd Asian Paralympic Games. Beijing: CPDF, 2014. CPDF. Results of 3rd Asian Paralympic Games. Beijing: CPDF, 2018. Hao, Xiaocen. “The Vicissitudes of the Research into the Sports Policy for Disabled People in China: From Right Protection to Right Remedy.” Chinese Journal of Special Education 9, no. 9 (2010): 45–51. He, Minxue. “Characteristics of Scholastic Physical Education in Special Education.” Journal of Physical Education 14, no. 5 (2007): 96–99. Hong, Fan, Ping Wu, and Huan Xiong. “Beijing Ambitions: An Analysis of the Chinese Elite Sports System and Its Olympic Strategy for the 2008 Olympic Games.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 22, no. 4 (2005): 510–29. Liang, Luyao. “The Study on Paralympic Games Report on People’s Daily, 1880–1900: A Study in Social Mobility.” Master’s thesis, Soochow University. Qin,Yan. Deng Pufang de lu [The Deng Pufang Road]. Taiyuan: Shuhai Chubanshe, 1992. Shuhan, Sun,Yan Rui, Mao Ailin, Chao Liu, and Jing Tang. “China and the Development of Sport for Persons with a Disability, 1978–2008: A Review.” Sport in Society 14, no. 9 (2011): 1192–210. Sun, Peiping. “FESPIC Introduction.” China Disabled 5, no. 5 (1994): 10–15. Zhang, Long. “Comparison Between the Disabled Sports Organization and Management System.” Journal of Physical Education 16, no. 4 (2009): 34–36. Zhang, Ming. “Optimization of Management Mode of Competitive Sports for Disabled in China.” Journal of Wuhan Institute of Physical Education 46, no. 5 (2012): 19–23. Zhixun, Guan, and Fan Hong. “The Development of Elite Disability Sport in China: A Critical Review.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 33, no. 5 (2016): 485–510. Zhixun, Guan, and Fan Hong. Body and Politics: Elite Disability Sport in China. New York: Nova, 2018.

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35 Sport and social class in Japan Past and present Koji Kobayashi and Hitoshi Ebishima

Introduction Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s and the associated decline of Marxism, the topic of sport and social class has become less popular than other areas of identification, exploitation and oppression (e.g. gender, sexuality and race/ethnicity). Yet several scholars insist the importance of the Marxist tradition in the works of Antonio Gramsci and Pierre Bourdieu, who have been more frequently cited and refereed in recent years.1 Even so, these studies on sport and social class were predominantly conducted on Western societies, whereas the formation of, and changes in, social class in Eastern societies remain to be much less known. Against this backdrop, this chapter aims to identify and outline the dominant themes and forces that shaped social class from the nineteenth to the twenty-first centuries in Japan. Perhaps to the surprise of many, there is a scarcity of previous literature in the English language on sport and social class in Japan, while those in the Japanese language are also somewhat limited.Therefore, this chapter offers one of the first attempts to provide a general overview of the historical shifts that impacted on the relationship between sport and social class in Japan. For the rest of the chapter, the three major shifts are identified and examined: (1) from feudal to modern Japan; (2) to post-war Japan; and (3) to neoliberal Japan.

Modern Japan (1868–1930s): from the feudal system to the modern stratification shaped by schools and corporations In 1868, Japanese society experienced a remarkable shift in the sociopolitical regime with the abolishment of the feudal system under the Tokugawa shogunate and the establishment of the modern governance under the newly formed Meiji government. The modernisation demolished the rigid social stratification of feudalism with warriors (bushi) at the top, followed by peasants, merchants and the untouchables. Within this context, sport as a modern Western invention was also imported and introduced to the Japanese populace. Furthermore, sport was strategically used by the government as key part of its slogan ‘the wealth and military strength of a nation’2 as it symbolised the civilised activities and physical superiority of Westerners. Thus, as Kusaka noted, ‘Many foreign teachers and technicians were invited by the Meiji government to assist 377

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at Japanese higher educational establishments in order to catch up with Western civilization.’3 More specifically, Westerners, most notably the American G.E. Leland and the Englishman F.W. Strange, played a key role in the development of physical education as a central domain for sport to be engaged and practiced in Japan. Hence, during this period of rapid modernisation, sport was largely incorporated into school education, especially ‘for the elite to train as competent leaders of Japanese society.’4 According to Kusaka, those students who had access to sport in school ‘were descendants of the Bushi (Samurai) class (Shizoku) who had the traditional attitude of Bushido (Samurai spirit),’ which ‘was characterized by an emphasis on the moral excellence of Confucianism, a fighting spirit which was influenced partly by Zen-Buddhism, and a consciousness of shame.’5 As a result, while sport was imported from the West, it was eventually mobilised as an educational instrument and infused with the traditional values and practices of the premodern elites. During the 1880s, fraternity sport clubs emerged in association with school organisations and gave birth to what are now commonly known as undōbu (sport clubs) and bukatsudō (extracurricular school activities). Earlier fraternity sport clubs included athletic and swimming clubs at Tokyo Imperial University (established in 1886); rowing, judō and kyūdō clubs at Tokyo Higher Commercial School (established in 1889); and baseball and swimming clubs at Gakushūin (established in 1889). These developments were followed by an increase in inter-school competitions locally at first, then regionally and nationally. Therefore, during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, despite the existence of a national policy to promote equality in (physical) educational opportunities, sport continued to serve as a demarcation for the privileged because ‘only a few young persons who grew up in affluent educational circumstances, that is, whose parents had higher social and economic status, could enter these higher schools.’6 The number of schools rapidly rose over the first thirty years of the twentieth century, and so did sport clubs. At the same time, ‘the formal acceptance of sport ideology, which mainly emphasized the moral and spiritual cultivation of players, all contributed to the institutionalisation of Japanese (school) sport.’7 For example, baseball was a case in point of this development led by the premodern elites.8 While this was most apparent in the history of baseball, the principles of bushidō and pedagogical culture were nonetheless spread across a variety of sporting codes and across different levels of schools from junior high schools and high schools to universities. Consequently, this came to characterise the disciplinary attitudes and values of bukatsudō, making it possible to shape the mass mobilisation of the salaryman workforce as the emerging middle class in post-war Japan. Another domain where sport was predominantly engaged and incorporated into during the beginning of the twentieth century was what we may term ‘corporate sport,’ which has been uniquely developed in Japan. Corporate sport is generally considered to have two functions, often accompanied by two units within the corporate organisational structure.9 The first function is to provide sport and recreational opportunities as a means of social welfare to employees, whereas the second function is to manage a corporate sport club to participate in and win elite competitions. Initially, corporate sport was formed in response to the labour movement, including a series of strikes in the textile and chemical industrial sectors. Within this context, access to engage in sport was offered by corporations to their workers in order to relieve the labour tensions and develop productive labour relationships.10 In addition to schools as the primary provider of sport facilities and programmes, corporations became a major owner and provider of sport facilities, including tennis courts, athletic grounds, volleyball courts and swimming pools, which were nonetheless only accessible to their employees.11 By offering leisure activities under the control of corporations and thereby confining employees to the workplace without setting clear boundaries between work and leisure, employers were able to generate a 378

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company-as-a-family culture. The loyalty to one’s corporation was further amplified by developing corporate sport clubs. In short, corporate sport served as a space for general mass leisure and sport to be enjoyed, as well as for elite sport competitions to be developed.Yet it is important to note that the opportunities to engage in sport were restricted to those of the privileged classes in comparison to later periods, to which we now turn.

Post-war Japan (1945–1970s): the making of the middle class through ‘sport for all’ policies The end of World War II marked the start of regeneration of sport, yet it took years for the normal systems and functions to be restored in the Japanese economy and society. In the 1950s, the national sport policy was realigned to centre on the development of systems to prepare for the 1964 Tokyo Olympics.12 School sport was rearticulated with ‘militaristic’ physical education through such traditional notions as budō (Japanese martial arts) and shūdan kōdō (collective behaviour).13 Corporate sport was revitalised as ‘workplace sport’ as a means to respond to another wave of the labour movement in the 1940s and the 1950s.14 As a result, over 70 percent of the large corporations established an internal unit for the promotion of ‘workplace sport,’ which functioned to form and strengthen enterprise unions.15 Like corporate sport in pre-war Japan, the ‘workplace sport’ unit served the dual function of providing sport-related events for all the employees to participate in and managing corporate sport clubs that focused more on winning national competitions and promoting the corporate brand through sport. Moreover, corporate sport clubs were major drivers for the success of several Olympic sport, including the gold medal won by the women’s volleyball team consisting of employees from those clubs at Unitika (then Japan Textile),Tōyōbō and Kurabō.16 Thus,Yamashita argued that the emphasis on corporate sport and elite sport success in post-war Japan led to the concentration of resources and opportunities for those who worked for large, often national, corporations, thereby leaving others with much fewer resources and opportunities outside of school.17 According to reports by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sport, Science and Technology (MEXT, then the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture) in 1969, workplace sport facilities accounted for 16.1 percent of all sport facilities in Japan, whereas only 6.9 percent of sport facilities were publicly owned and run, and this trend did not substantially changed until the 1980s (see Figure 35.1).18 This meant that neither the national government nor local authorities were yet to recognise sport and recreation as part of their services, whereas national corporations took a social welfare role in providing sport facilities and opportunities, though restricted to their employees. However, the rapid economic growth of the 1960s was accompanied by the adverse effects of overindustrialisation, including overwhelming stress and associated labour tensions from intensive working environments and long hours, and health consequences from industrial pollution. This resulted in a shift in people’s needs from watching ‘sport for elite athletes’ to participating in ‘sport for all’ in the 1970s.19 The sudden craze of popularity in ten-pin bowling at the beginning of the 1970s symbolised the rise in the public consciousness of engaging in sport for a leisure pursuit rather than for competition and winning. The 1970s was an important turning point, when the idea of ‘sport for all’ was widely accepted and adopted by the public sector and schools, and by society more generally. This was also reflected in the increasing demands of the general public for the right to access sport and recreation opportunities.21 For instance, school sport was restructured through the introduction of intra-curricular sport clubs (in addition to bukatsudō) and the formalisation of measurements for achievements in physical education in order for youth to develop fundamental physical abilities and skills.22 In 1971, MEXT released a report identifying the need for more 379

Koji Kobayashi and Hitoshi Ebishima 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 1969

1975 School

1980 Public

1985

1997

Workplace

2003 Private

Figure 35.1 Trends in provision of facilities for sport and physical education20

physical education and sport facilities (such as athletic grounds, tennis courts, swimming pools and indoor spaces) based on a comparative analysis of those in the UK, Germany, France and the United States.23 It is also noteworthy that MEXT produced a report in 1976 on the promotion of sport in everyday life and noted for the first time the need for community sport clubs (as opposed to school sport clubs) and the importance of local authorities and communities to provide and support them.24 This was then followed by the government’s policy to increase public provision of sport and leisure facilities as well as to open up school facilities more for public use. For instance, the Japan Masters Athletics Championships was organised for the first time in 1977, and gateball quickly became a popular and accessible sport for the elderly.25 While the 1973 oil crisis slowed down such developments, they nonetheless picked up again and were eventually implemented at the end of the 1970s. Consequently, the idea of ‘sport for all’ guided the formulation of the policies which promoted more equitable provision of sport and recreation, most of which were more fully realised in the 1980s.

Neoliberal Japan (1980s–present): an increased emphasis on the local public-private partnership in response to the increasing gap between rich and poor In the 1980s, the role of the public sector in providing sport facilities and services expanded in order to generate local-authority based community sport rather than corporate-based sport clubs. At the same time, the neoliberal policies brought in by Prime Minister Nakasone promoted the vision and initiatives for local business in providing community sport, art and other cultural activities, which eventually cultivated a new market for alternative modes of sport consumption, including a rapidly growing fitness club business.26 With the adaption of the neoliberal policies, sport was politically mobilised to promote individual freedom and responsibility and much greater involvement by the private sector.27 Against the backdrop of the rising alternative modes of sport consumption, corporate sport or ‘workplace sport’ was substantially diminished through rationalisation and restructuring as well as outsourcing of sport welfare services for employees to private fitness clubs. Corporate sport clubs were positioned more as professional 380

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teams, with professional contracts becoming more common, in isolation from core corporate functions.28 One of the notable developments in relation to sport and social class during this period was the establishment of the so-called ‘resort law’ in 1987, which resulted in an increasing number of golf courses and skiing fields for the upper class and upper middle class to meet the needs of their luxurious leisure.29 The law was created partially in response to the increasing rural-urban disparity in the economy through which rural areas of Japan experienced a sharp decline in population and productivity due to the migration of people, especially younger generations, to the growing urban cities like Tokyo. The resort law provided these rural areas with government subsidies to construct resort facilities and infrastructure and to generate alternative incomes from tourism. However, given that the neoliberal idea was still in its infancy and somewhat resisted in various corners of political opinion, it did not dramatically alter social systems and provisions during the 1980s. For example, the role of the public sector in providing sport and recreation was expanding (see Figure 35.1). In particular, the Ministry of Construction and the local authorities played a central role in the provision of urban sport and recreation parks, especially tennis courts and athletic grounds. The fact that the neoliberal policy did not necessarily transform the provision of sport facilities to the private sector mode is also seen in other countries.30 In addition, the number of community sport clubs increased from 300,000 in 1985 to 350,000 in 1989.31 Moreover, the number of local authorities that established an internal unit for sport promotion increased from 270 in the 1970s to 315 in the 1980s, which accounted for 48.4 percent of local authorities in total.32 The provision of sport and recreation facilities is an important indicative factor to understand social class, as access to facilities is considered one of major barriers for working class participation in sport and recreation.33 The 1990s was often described as ‘the lost decade’ when the Japanese economy collapsed, resulting in many job losses and bankruptcies, and entered a long-term recession. Subsequently, as Uchiumi detailed in his analysis, the rates for sport participation and the level of sport goods and service consumption sharply declined during the 1990s.34 The mega leisure resort facilities for golf and others were forced out of business or had further development halted, with the shift of consumption from expensive leisure tourism to more affordable and individualised leisure in close proximity to everyday life. Similarly, the private sector’s sport facilities, especially for fitness gyms, swimming and tennis, were significantly reduced, or forced to close down, by a decline in customers.35 Corporate sport clubs, which supported the elite level of success from pre-war Japan, were also severely affected by the recession, with many of them, including the renowned volleyball clubs of Unitika and Hitachi, being suspended or terminated. In 1996, Prime Minister Hashimoto took the neoliberal policies to another level by introducing radical changes, known as the ‘six reforms’ (roku dai kaikaku), across the areas of governmental administration, fiscal structure, financial system, economy, social security and education.36 In the face of the severe economic recession, radical ‘neoliberalisation’37 was seen by politicians as the only way to respond. In contrast, despite such an emphasis on neoliberalisation at the central government level, the public sector and community groups continued to play a crucial role in the provision of sport facilities and services, thereby offsetting the reduced provision through corporate sport and private sector during the recession. For instance, the contributions from the Ministry of Construction and local authorities to the construction and renovation of sport and recreation facilities increased to 107 billion yen in 1988 and peaked at 161 billion yen in 1997.38 These facilities ranged from sport mega-stadia, like the International Stadium Yokohama, to local urban parks, walking trails and cycling roads. Another factor in the shift from corporate sport to community sport was reinforced by the success of the J.League, established in 1993, and its community-based model of sport provision through which the involvement of communities and local authorities in sport provision was promoted.39 However, towards the end of the 381

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decade, an increase in the consumption tax, from 3 percent to 5 percent in 1997, discouraged sport participation and consumption, and led to a decline in usage and income for sport and recreation services and facilities. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, neoliberal policies were further pursued by Prime Minister Koizumi. The radical neoliberalisation ignited by Hashimoto and carried on by Koizumi polarised Japanese society and increased the proportion of the poor in what was labelled the ‘kakusa shakai’ (gap society).40 This was evidenced by the rising unemployment rate, 5.6 percent in 2002, which was the highest since the end of World War II.41 The role of the local authorities continued to be central in catering for the needs of sport and recreation outside of school sport and was further strengthened by MEXT’s policy of funding and supporting the creation and development of community sport hubs (sōgōgata chiiki supōtsu kurabu) and local public-private partnerships.42 Furthermore, there was a notable increase in the number of officially registered not-for-profit community sport clubs, with Hokkaido Barbarians Rugby Club becoming the first of its kind in 1999, and over 1,500 such clubs registered by 2005.43 Although school sport continued to serve its role in the equitable provision of physical education and bukatsudō for youth and the alternative modes of sport participation were cultivated over the decades in place of declining corporate sport, this does not mean there was no hardship for those in an increasing proportion of the working class, as well as those falling out of the middle class. For instance, as Takahashi reported, the results of one survey, conducted by a corporation in 2009 of 15,450 mothers who had children in the age group of 3 to 17 years, found that 75 percent of those with an annual salary below 4 million yen agreed with a statement that ‘costs for sport activities are heavy,’ in comparison to 49 percent of those in the range of an annual salary from 4 million yen to 8 million yen.44 The same survey also revealed that sport participation by children were 47 percent for those families with an annual salary below 4 million yen; 58 percent for those with an annual salary between 4 million and 8 million yen; and 65 percent for those with an annual salary above 8 million yen.45 At the upper end, there were specialised elite sport academies, like the Miyazaki Golf Academy, where children were required to stay at boarding facilities with an enrolment fee of 300,000 yen, a monthly accommodation fee of 70,000 yen, and an annual lesson fee of 1,500,000 yen.46 This may indicate that there is an increasing gap in access to sport and recreation among different social classes, especially outside of school sport and community sport where a certain level of equitability is supported. Under Prime Minister Abe’s government, the consumption tax was raised from 5 percent to 8 percent in 2014 and was increased to 10 percent in October 2019. The increase of the consumption tax has contributed, and is likely to further contribute, to the widening gap in household disposable income and, therefore, to a further decline in opportunities for the working class to engage in sport and recreation. However, given the dearth of research into the recent forms and conditions of social class in Japan, there is a pressing need for further investigations by future research.

Conclusion The chapter traced the shift in the political regimes and ideological backgrounds that impacted on the (re-)formation of social class with a focus on its links with sport in Japan. Sport as a modern invention and Western import was adopted early by the shizoku, an elite class under the Tokygawa shogunate, in the 1890s. Schools and corporations then undertook a major role in developing a primary platform for sport engagement and competition from the 1890s to the 1930s. After World War II, a wider expansion of sport participation was supported by schools and corporations in the 1950s and the 1960s. The 1970s and 1980s saw an increasing role for the public sector, especially local authorities, as well as the private sector in the provision of 382

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sport and recreation facilities and services. With the economic recession in the 1990s and the government’s subsequent response of neoliberalisation, the role of corporations and the private sector was substantially diminished, resulting in fewer opportunities for those in the working class or falling out of the middle class to engage in sport and recreation. The increase in the consumption tax from 3 percent to 5 percent in 1997, to 8 percent in 2014, and prospectively to 10 percent in 2019, has put pressure on the disposable income of those families and individuals in the lower classes, with an implication of a widening gap in sport participation and consumption, especially outside of school sport and community sport. It is important to note that while the participation rate and competitive level in sport were developed and supported by large corporations earlier in history, school sport and community sport, particularly since the 1970s, have played a crucial role in providing a certain level of equitability in access to sport and recreation from the Meiji era to the present. A few avenues for future research are suggested based on this general overview of sport and social class in Japan. First, the relationships between corporate sport, school sport and community sport could be further examined for their commonalities and differences in shaping social stratification at different periods. In particular, the evolving roles of bukatsudō, community sport hubs (sōgōgata chiiki supōtsu kurabu) and private fitness business in response to the widening gap between rich and poor in more recent years deserve more attention. Second, a Bourdieusian analysis of tastes, capital and habitus of particular sport could be conducted to provide more nuanced insight into the link between sport and a particular section of social class.47 Third, the relationship between neoliberalism and sport could be further investigated in relation to rising poverty and lack of opportunities for the working class and the working poor to engage in sport and recreation.

Notes 1 Alan Bairner, “Back to Basics: Class, Social Theory, and Sport,” Sociology of Sport Journal 24, no. 1 (2007): 20–36; Ben Carrington and Ian McDonald, eds., Marxism, Cultural Studies and Sport (London: Routledge, 2009); Richard Giulianotti, Sport: A Critical Sociology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005). 2 Yuko Kusaka, “The Emergence and Development of Japanese School Sport,” in Japan, Sport and Society: Tradition and Change in a Globalizing World, ed. Joseph Maguire and Masayoshi Nakayama (London: Routledge, 2006), 19–34. 3 Ibid., 21. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid., 26. 7 Ibid., 30. 8 Koichi Kiku, “The Japanese Baseball Spirit and Professional Ideology,” in Japan, Sport and Society:Tradition and Change in a Globalizing World, ed. Joseph Maguire and Masayoshi Nakayama (London: Routledge, 2006), 35–54. 9 Takayuki Yamashita, “Kigyōsupōtsu to Nihon No Supōtsu Rejiimu: Sono Tokusei Wo Ukibori Ni Suru” [Company-Organized Sport and Japanese Sport Regime], Japan Journal of Sport Sociology 17, no. 2 (2009): 17–31. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Kazuo Uchiumi, “Supōtsu No Kenri Kōkyōsei to Shinjiyūshugi Kojinteki Shōhishugi Tono Taikō (1): 70nendai No Supōtsu Dōkō to Seisaku,” Hitotsubashi Daigaku Kenkyū Nenpō: Jinbun Kagaku Kenkyū 38 (2001): 3–90. 13 Uchiumi, “Supōtsu No Kenri Kōkyōsei to Shinjiyūshugi Kojinteki Shōhishugi Tono Taikō (1),” 64. 14 Yamashita, “Kigyōsupōtsu,” 25. 15 Ibid. 16 Toshio Saeki, Gendai Kigyō Supōtsuron (Tokyo: Fumaidō Shuppan, 2004). 17 Yamashita, “Kigyōsupōtsu,” 26. 383

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1 8 Ibid. 19 Uchiumi, “Supōtsu No Kenri Kōkyōsei to Shinjiyūshugi Kojinteki Shōhishugi Tono Taikō (1),” 6. 20 Reproduced Based on Yamashita, “Kigyōsupōtsu,” 20. The original graph was produced by Yamashita with the data from MEXT’s Taiiku supōtsu shisetsu genjō chōsa hōkoku (Research report on the current provision of facilities for sport and physical education). 21 Yamashita, “Kigyōsupōtsu,” 28. 22 Uchiumi, “Supōtsu No Kenri Kōkyōsei to Shinjiyūshugi Kojinteki Shōhishugi Tono Taikō (1),” 20. 23 Ibid., 35. 24 Ibid., 45. 25 Ibid. 26 Yamashita, “Kigyōsupōtsu,” 28. 27 Kazuo Uchiumi, “Supōtsu No Kenri Kōkyōsei to Shinjiyūshugi Kojinteki Shōhishugi Tono Taikō (2): 80nendai No Supōtsu Dōkō to Seisaku,” Hitotsubashi Daigaku Kenkyū Nenpō: Jinbun Kagaku Kenkyū 39 (2002): 3–97. 28 Yamashita, “Kigyōsupōtsu,” 28. 29 Uchiumi, “Supōtsu No Kenri Kōkyōsei to Shinjiyūshugi Kojinteki Shōhishugi Tono Taikō (2),” 13. 30 James Tapper and Koji Kobayashi, “ ‘It’s a Harsh Fact of Life with the RMA’: Neo-Liberalism and the Realities of Community Sports Facility Development by the Private Sector in New Zealand,” Leisure Studies 37, no. 3 (2018): 282–94. 31 Ibid., 50. 32 Ibid., 61. 33 Michał Lenartowicz, “Family Leisure Consumption and Youth Sport Socialization in Post-Communist Poland: A Perspective Based on Bourdieu’s Class Theory,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 51, no. 2 (2016): 219–37. 34 Kazuo Uchiumi, “Supōtsu No Kenri Kōkyōsei to Shinjiyūshugi Kojinteki Shōhishugi Tono Taikō (3): 90nendai No Supōtsu Dōkō to Seisaku,” Hitotsubashi Daigaku Kenkyū Nenpō: Jinbun Kagaku Kenkyū 40 (2003): 3–102, 48. 35 Ibid. 36 M. Osawa, “Government Approaches to Gender Equality in the Mid-1990s,” Social Science Japan Journal 3, no. 1 (April 1, 2000): 3–19. 37 Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, “Neoliberalizing Space,” Antipode 34, no. 3 (2002): 380–404. 38 Uchiumi, “Supōtsu No Kenri Kōkyōsei to Shinjiyūshugi Kojinteki Shōhishugi Tono Taikō (3),” 15. 39 John Horne and Wolfram Manzenreiter, “Football, Komyuniti and the Japanese Ideological Soccer Apparatus,” Soccer & Society 9, no. 3 (2008): 359–76. 40 Anne Allison, Precarious Japan (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013). 41 Uchiumi, “Supōtsu No Kenri Kōkyōsei to Shinjiyūshugi Kojinteki Shōhishugi Tono Taikō (3),” 18. 42 Hitoshi Ebishima, “Supōtsu Ni Yoru Chiiki No ‘Sairyōikika’ No Kanōsei: Genjō to Sono Kadai” [Can Communities Be Revitalized by the Re-Territorialization Through Sport?], Biwako Seikei Sport University Kenkyū Kiyō 4 (2007): 39–50. 43 Ibid., 44. 44 Hidesato Takahashi, “Supōtsu Yokkyū Kara Kōkyōsei e” [Establishing ‘Publicness’ and the Self-Interest of Sport], Japan Journal of Sport Sociology 19, no. 2 (2011): 33–48. 45 Ibid., 35. 46 Ibid., 36. 47 E.g. Lenartowicz, “Family Leisure Consumption.”

Bibliography Allison, Anne. Precarious Japan. Durham: Duke University Press, 2013. Bairner, Alan. “Back to Basics: Class, Social Theory, and Sport.” Sociology of Sport Journal 24, no. 1 (2007): 20–36. Carrington, Ben, and Ian McDonald, eds. Marxism, Cultural Studies and Sport. London: Routledge, 2009. Ebishima, Hitoshi. “Supōtsu Ni Yoru Chiiki No ‘Sairyōikika’ No Kanōsei: Genjō to Sono Kadai” [Can Communities Be Revitalized by the Re-Territorialization Through Sport?]. Biwako Seikei Sport University Kenkyū Kiyō 4 (2007): 39–50. Giulianotti, Richard. Sport: A Critical Sociology. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005. 384

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Horne, John, and Wolfram Manzenreiter. “Football, Komyuniti and the Japanese Ideological Soccer Apparatus.” Soccer & Society 9, no. 3 (2008): 359–76. Kiku, Koichi. “The Japanese Baseball Spirit and Professional Ideology.” In Japan, Sport and Society: Tradition and Change in a Globalizing World, edited by Joseph Maguire and Masayoshi Nakayama, 35–54. London: Routledge, 2006. Kusaka, Yuko. “The Emergence and Development of Japanese School Sport.” In Japan, Sport and Society: Tradition and Change in a Globalizing World, edited by Joseph Maguire and Masayoshi Nakayama, 19–34. London: Routledge, 2006. Lenartowicz, Michał. “Family Leisure Consumption and Youth Sport Socialization in Post-Communist Poland: A Perspective Based on Bourdieu’s Class Theory.” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 51, no. 2 (2016): 219–37. Osawa, M. “Government Approaches to Gender Equality in the Mid-1990s.” Social Science Japan Journal 3, no. 1 (April 1, 2000): 3–19. Peck, Jamie, and Adam Tickell. “Neoliberalizing Space.” Antipode 34, no. 3 (2002): 380–404. Saeki, Toshio. Gendai Kigyō Supōtsuron. Tokyo: Fumaidō Shuppan, 2004. Takahashi, Hidesato. “Supōtsu Yokkyū Kara Kōkyōsei e” [Establishing ‘Publicness’ and the Self-Interest of Sport]. Japan Journal of Sport Sociology 19, no. 2 (2011): 33–48, 35. Tapper, James, and Koji Kobayashi. “ ‘It’s a Harsh Fact of Life with the RMA’: Neo-Liberalism and the Realities of Community Sports Facility Development by the Private Sector in New Zealand.” Leisure Studies 37, no. 3 (2018): 282–94. Uchiumi, Kazuo. “Supōtsu No Kenri Kōkyōsei to Shinjiyūshugi Kojinteki Shōhishugi Tono Taikō (1): 70nendai No Supōtsu Dōkō to Seisaku.” Hitotsubashi Daigaku Kenkyū Nenpō: Jinbun Kagaku Kenkyū 38 (2001): 3–90. Uchiumi, Kazuo. “Supōtsu No Kenri Kōkyōsei to Shinjiyūshugi Kojinteki Shōhishugi Tono Taikō (2): 80nendai No Supōtsu Dōkō to Seisaku.” Hitotsubashi Daigaku Kenkyū Nenpō: Jinbun Kagaku Kenkyū 39 (2002): 3–97. Uchiumi, Kazuo. “Supōtsu No Kenri Kōkyōsei to Shinjiyūshugi Kojinteki Shōhishugi Tono Taikō (3): 90nendai No Supōtsu Dōkō to Seisaku.” Hitotsubashi Daigaku Kenkyū Nenpō: Jinbun Kagaku Kenkyū 40 (2003): 3–102, 48. Yamashita, Takayuki. “Kigyōsupōtsu to Nihon No Supōtsu Rejiimu: Sono Tokusei Wo Ukibori Ni Suru” [Company-Organized Sport and Japanese Sport Regime]. Japan Journal of Sport Sociology 17, no. 2 (2009): 17–31.

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36 Sport and gender in Japan Osamu Takamine

Introduction Sport policy in Japan has developed rapidly in the past ten years. This trend started when the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology announced the Strategy for Sports Nation in 2010.1 The following year, in 2011, the Basic Act on Sport was adopted,2 and the First Sport Basic Plan was launched in 2012.3 The supplementary provisions of the Basic Act on Sport provide for the establishment of the Japan Sports Agency, which was established as an extra-ministerial agency of MEXT in October 2015. Two years later, in 2017, the Second Sport Basic Plan was launched as a statement of the Sports Agency’s initiatives.4 This chapter focuses on measures that target women within trends relating to these sport policies. It also assesses gender equality measures within sport policy from the perspective of the relationship between the current status of gender equality within Japanese society and gender equality policies, and it also identifies issues concerning the measures.

The Tohoku earthquake and tsunami disaster, international sport events and nationalism We start by examining sport policy against the backdrop of major social events that have occurred in Japan in recent years. The Tohoku Earthquake, the epicentre of which was located off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture, occurred in March 2011. The tsunami caused by this earthquake resulted in massive damage to the coastal regions of three prefectures (Fukushima, Miyagi and Iwate) in the Tohoku region, caused an explosion at a Tokyo Electric Power nuclear power plant in Fukushima, and gave rise to a national crisis in Japan.That year, the FIFA Women’s World Cup was held in Germany, and the Japanese national team, commonly known as Nadeshiko Japan, won its first-ever World Cup. Many people in Japan had not yet recovered materially or spiritually from the earthquake. There was a dramatic element to the match with Nadeshiko Japan tying the score in the closing minutes and winning in a penalty shootout. As a result, Nadeshiko Japan’s World Cup victory was a source of tremendous pride for the Japanese people, particularly those affected by the disaster, and it provided motivation for recovery from the earthquake disaster. This is a representative example of nationalism overcoming gender, that 386

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is, a case where achieving exceptional competitive results on the international stage as a national team led to feelings of nationalism even though it was in a women’s sport. Recovery from the Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami also became a justification for hosting the 2020 Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games. Specific preparations to host the 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games in Tokyo began after the earthquake occurred. The Application File (February 2012) and Candidature File (January 2013) stated that one of the reasons for hosting the Olympic and Paralympic Games in Tokyo was recovery from the Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami. In September 2013, the IOC General Assembly decided to award the 2020 games to Tokyo. Japan will also host the Rugby World Cup in 2019 and the World Masters Games 2021 in Kansai (see Table 36.1).

Table 36.1 A Timeline of Major Social Events, Gender Equality Policy, and Sport Policy in Japan for the Past Ten Years and into the Future Year

Major Social Events

2010 2011

Gender Equality Policy

Sport Policy

The Third Basic Plan for Gender Equality (Cabinet Office)

Strategy for Sports Nation (MEXT) The Basic Act on Sport

The Tohoku Earthquake. Winning by Nadeshiko Japan of the FIFA Women’s World Cup.

2012 2013

The First Sport Basic Plan (MEXT) Decision on Hosting the 2020 Olympic/Paralympic Games in Tokyo

2014

2015

Establishment of the Japan Sports Agency

The Headquarters for Creating a Society Where All Women Shine (PMOJ) The Fourth Basic Plan for Gender Equality (Cabinet Office)

2017

2018

2019

Hosting the Rugby World Cup

2020

Hosting the Tokyo 2020 Summer Olympics Hosting the World Masters Games 2021 Kansai

2021

Special Feature for Sport in White Papers on Gender Equality in 2018 (The Gender Equality Bureau) Intensive Policy to Accelerate the Empowerment of Women 2019 (PMOJ)

The Second Sport Basic Plan (MEXT) The Council on Women’s Empowerment through Sport (JSA) Policy on the Promotion of Women’s Sports (JSA)

JSA: Japan Sports Agency MEXT: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology PMOJ: Prime Minister’s Office of Japan

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The developments just presented can be summarised as follows: in the past ten years, sport policy has been developed under the leadership of the government, and one of the results has been the hosting of many international sport events.The occurrence of the Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami, however, has given performance in international competition a nationalist significance, symbolic of recovery from the disaster, and the resulting nationalism has led to increased motivation for recovery.

Current status of gender equality in Japanese society Before examining the status of gender in Japan’s sporting world, we evaluate the status of gender equality in Japanese society as a whole, while making reference to a number of international indicators. According to recent data, in international rankings, Japan ranked 22 out of 160 countries on the Gender Inequality Index (GII),5 55 out of 164 countries on the Gender-related Development Index (GDI),6 and 110 out of 149 countries on the Gender Gap Index (GGI) (World Economic Forum, 2018).7 Japan’s rankings on the GII and GGI are quite different, and its ranking on the GGI is conspicuously low. The GII and GGI are based on evaluations in health, politics, education and labour/economy, and there is a tendency for Japan’s evaluations to be particularly low in the politics and labour/economy areas. Compared to the GII, the GGI has more detailed evaluation indicators in each area and, as a result, Japan’s low evaluations in the politics and labour/economy areas become conspicuous. Specifically, in Japan, the ratios of women compared to men in the following areas are low, resulting in evaluations that women’s activity is not equal to that of men: women in parliament (0.11: ratio of women to men), women in ministerial positions (0.19), years with a female head of state (last 50) (0.00); ratio of women to men), estimated earned income (0.53), legislators, senior officials and managers (0.15), and professional and technical workers (0.67).8 In contrast to these indicators, Japan’s evaluations are good in education and health. Japan is ranked first for literacy rate, enrolment in primary education, enrolment secondary education and sex ratio at birth.

Sport in gender equality policy In part to improve Japan’s positions in the international rankings just mentioned, the Japanese government has implemented a number of gender equality policies. Those relating to sport fields are introduced here. First, the Fourth Basic Plan for Gender Equality was established by the Cabinet in December 2015.9 The Basic Plans for Gender Equality are formulated by the Gender Equality Bureau of the Cabinet Office. The first was adopted in 2000, and the plans have been updated every five years since then. The second and third plans referred to supporting the health of women and promoting lifetime sport activities.The fourth plan had a new section on promoting gender equality in the sport field, and this section focused on issues relating to joint participation by men and women in the sport field. In other words, the positioning of sport within the Basic Plan for gender equality was emphasised and given greater clarity than in the past. The Abe government has established policies with an emphasis on the empowerment of women in society,10 and in 2014 it established the Headquarters for Creating a Society Where All Women Shine within the Cabinet to promote coordination among governmental agencies in relation to implementation of those policies. The Headquarters has announced intensive policies each year since 2016, and the most recent version, entitled Priority Policy to Accelerate Women’s Empowerment 2019, placed priority on promoting the health of women through sport and expanding women’s participation and human resource development in the sport field.11 388

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The Gender Equality Bureau, mentioned earlier, has issued White Papers on Gender Equality since 2001, and the 2018 version took up sport as a special topic for the first time.12 These developments confirm that the positioning of sport within Japan’s gender equality policy has become stronger in recent years.

Gender equality in sport policy At the same time, gender equality has been addressed as an issue in sport policy.The Second Sport Basic Plan, which started in 2017, positions support for the lifelong health of women as a specific measure for achieving a tolerant society through sport. This title may give the impression that the purpose of this policy is to promote the empowerment of women in Japanese society through sport, but in fact the specific measures are as follows: to provide opportunities to participate in sport and sport environments tailored to the needs and desires of women from early childhood to old age; to encourage the acquisition of coaching qualifications by women and increase the number of female coaches; to encourage the hiring of women by sport organisations; and to support enhancement of the competitiveness of top female athletes. Unfortunately, it is difficult to say whether the policy is intended to promote the empowerment of women in Japanese society through sport or if it is limited to promoting the empowerment of women within sport. Apart from this evaluation, the Japan Sports Agency created the Council on Women’s Empowerment through Sport in 2017 to discuss specific policies on promoting the empowerment of women through sport under the Second Sport Basic Plan. This body, made up of 18 members, including researchers on women’s sport, obstetricians, representatives from several competitive bodies, private companies, television stations, the Japan Sport Association, the Japanese Olympic Committee, the Japanese Para-Sports Association and the Japan Sports Council, met six times from August 2017 to March 2019. The result was the announcement of a policy on the promotion of women’s sport by the Japan Sports Agency in November 2018. The pillars of the policy are: the raising of sport participation rates by all generations, increasing the number of female officers in sport organisations and developing female coaches. The current status of each of these pillars is as follows.

Sport activities by each generation Boys begin participating in competitive sport earlier than girls, and this trend continues from the age of ten years.13 The gender gap between inactive boys and girls increases to more than 10 percent in high school and college. The percentage of inactive teenagers begins to increase sharply during the high school years.14 Participation rates for both men and women have generally increased for 40 years and men’s participation rates have always been higher than women’s.The gender gap in sport participation was less than 10 percent in 2013.The percentage of inactive adults is higher for women than for men in all age groups.15 Looking at weekly participation, the participation rates of women in their twenties and thirties are conspicuously low.16

Female officers of organisations The Fourth Basic Plan for Gender Equality sets a target of at least 30 percent for the percentage of women in leadership roles in various areas throughout society. The percentages of female officers in representative Japanese sport governing bodies are as follows: Japan Sport Association: 389

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19.4 percent; Japanese Olympic Committee: 18.2 percent; average rate of the 177 affiliated organisations of the Japan Sport Association: 11.2 percent.17

Female leaders In October 2015, the percentage of women in 16 categories of sport coach sanctioned by the Japan Sport Association was 27.5 percent. The percentages of women with qualifications in fitness and management fields are relatively high, and the percentages are high among women in their twenties.18 To carry out these policies, in its budget for the 2019 fiscal year, the Japan Sports Agency allocated 19.8 million yen to raising sport participation rates in all generations and 12 million yen to increasing female officers of sport organisations.19 The total budget of the agency for the fiscal year 2019 is 35.033 billion yen,20 and the amounts budgeted for these issues are a mere 0.03 percent of that total. In contrast, the amount allocated for reinforcing competitiveness in competitive organisations is 10.047 billion yen (28.7 percent), leaving considerable room for debate concerning the allocation of resources. In addition to administrative agencies such as the Japan Sports Agency, organisations that govern sport competitions in Japan include the Japan Sport Association, the Japanese Olympic Committee, the Japanese Para-Sports Association and the Japanese Paralympic Committee. Of these, the Japan Sport Association, the Japanese Olympic Committee and the Japanese ParaSports Association have established bodies that focus on women’s sport.

Summary Japan’s sport policy has developed over the past decade, as discussed in this chapter, and it can be said that policies addressing women’s issues have expanded. Moreover, against this backdrop, the Abe government has implemented measures to promote the advancement of women in society. At the same time, however, it is difficult to conclude that gender-specific perspectives throughout society and the allocation of labour by gender have disappeared. As a result, women in Japan currently perform traditionally female roles such as housework, childcare and family care while employed outside the home and must also engage in sport and more actively manage their own health than in the past. Participation in sport to enjoy a more enriching life must not be allowed to become a burden on individual lifestyles. Concurrent with the empowerment of women, attempts to change social gender structures are needed. In this sense, the influence of current women’s sport policy on social reform is limited. This is because women’s sport policy until now has been intended to eliminate the various gender disparities seen in the sport environment and has not sought to promote gender equality throughout Japanese society through women’s sport policy. Nevertheless, attempts to reform society through sport have been started in Japan. For example, to mark the 25th anniversary of the establishment of the J. League,21 efforts were put into a social collaborative initiative referred to as the ‘Use J. League!’ Working in collaboration with local residents, businesses, organisations, local governments, schools and other stakeholders, the J. League and its teams implemented a variety of programs to address social issues, including education, health, community development, interaction among generations and diversity. This project is an attempt to focus on social issues going beyond soccer and has the potential for sport to be incorporated as an essential element in society and local communities. As already indicated, women’s sport is currently not a policy that has the influence to reform society. Raising sport participation rates by women and increasing the percentages of female 390

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coaches and organisational officers are important policy goals, but will it be possible to focus on promoting gender equality in Japanese society after achieving those targets? This issue is related to achieving gender equality, the fifth of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) through sport. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced an action plan for Japan relating to the SDGs in 2019,22 but sport is not positioned anywhere in that plan. In order to make sport an essential presence within Japanese society, which is facing a low birth-rate, aging population and declining population, it will be necessary, in addition to hosting international sport events, to search for policies that can link sport to society. The issue of women’s sport is an issue of sustainability for sport in Japan.

Notes 1 “Strategy for Sports Nation 2010,” MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology), accessed July 15, 2019, www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/sports/rikkoku/1297182.htm. 2 “The Basic Act on Sport,” MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology), accessed July 15, 2019, www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/sports/kihonhou/attach/1336024.htm. 3 “The First Sport Basic Plan 2012,” MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology), accessed July 15, 2019, www.mext.go.jp/sports/b_menu/sports/mcatetop01/list/ detail/1383695.htm. 4 “The Second Sport Basic Plan 2017,” MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology), accessed July 15, 2019, www.mext.go.jp/sports/b_menu/sports/mcatetop01/list/1372413. htm. 5 “Gender Inequality Index 2017,” United Nations Development Programme, accessed July 15, 2019, hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii. 6 “Gender-Related Development Index 2017,” United Nations Development Programme, accessed July 15, 2019, hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-development-index-gdi. 7 “Global Gender Gap Report 2018,” World Economic Forum, accessed July 15, 2019, http://reports. weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2018/data-explorer/#economy=JPN. 8 All figures are based on information concerning Japan from the World Economic Forum website, accessed July 15, 2019, http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2018/data-explorer/ #economy=JPN. 9 “Fourth Basic Plan for Gender Equality 2015,” Cabinet Office, accessed July 15, 2019, www.gender. go.jp/about_danjo/basic_plans/4th/index.html (in Japanese). 10 This does not necessarily mean that the Abe government is sensitive to or has a deep understanding of the issue of gender equality. 11 “Intensive Policy to Accelerate the Empowerment of Women 2019,” Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, accessed July 15, 2019, www.kantei.go.jp/jp/headline/brilliant_women/. 12 “White Paper on Gender Equality 2018,” Cabinet Office, accessed July 15, 2019, www.gender.go.jp/ english_contents/about_danjo/whitepaper/index.html. 13 Yasuko Kudo, “Doing Sports and Women,” in De-ta de miru supo-tu to jenda- [Understanding Sport and Gender with Data], Japan Society for Sport and Gender Studies (Tokyo: Yachiyo Shuppan K. K., 2016), 42–43. 14 Osamu Takamine, “Women’s Sports in Japan: Enters a Period of Change,” in Women, Sport and Exercise in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed. Gyozo Molnar et al. (Oxford: Routledge, 2018), 176–81. 15 Ibid., 175–76. 16 “7th IWG World Conference Women and Sports, Sports and Women–Efforts by the Japan Sports Agency,” Japan Sports Agency, accessed July 15, 2019, www.mext.go.jp/sports/b_menu/shingi/014_ index/shiryo/1407076.htm. 17 All figures are as of October 2018, “Fiscal Year 2018: Survey on Participation in Determination of Measures and Policies Concerning Women,” Cabinet Office, accessed July 15, 2019, www.gender. go.jp/research/kenkyu/sankakujokyo/2018/index.html#senmon. 18 Shizuho Okatsu, De-ta de miru supo-tu to jenda- [Understanding Sport and Gender with Data], Japan Society for Sport and Gender Studies (Tokyo:Yachiyo Shuppan K. K., 2016), 59–60. 19 “Policy on the Promotion of Women’s Sports 2018,” Japan Sports Agency, accessed July 15, 2019. www. mext.go.jp/sports/b_menu/sports/mcatetop11/list/1410705.htm. 391

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20 “Main Items in the Fiscal Year 2019 Budget (Proposed),” Japan Sports Agency, accessed July 15, 2019, www.mext.go.jp/sports/a_menu/kaikei/detail/1412467.htm. 21 The J. League is Japan’s men’s professional soccer league, established in 1993. Since its launch, the league has promoted collaboration with local communities. 22 “Concerning the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed July 15, 2019, www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/sdgs/pdf/about_sdgs_summary.pdf.

Bibliography Kudo,Yasuko. “Doing Sports and Women.” In De-ta de miru supo-tu to jenda- [Understanding Sport and Gender with Data], Japan Society for Sport and Gender Studies, 42–43. Tokyo:Yachiyo Shuppan K. K., 2016. Okatsu, Shizuho. “Supporting Sports and Women.” In De-ta de miru supo-tu to jenda- [Understanding Sport and Gender with Data], Japan Society for Sport and Gender Studies, 59–60. Tokyo: Yachiyo Shuppan K. K., 2016. Takamine, Osamu. “Women’s Sports in Japan: Enters a Period of Change.” In Women, Sport and Exercise in the Asia-Pacific Region, edited by Gyozo Molnar, Sara N. Amin, and Yoko Kanemasu, 173–87. Oxford: Routledge, 2018.

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37 Sport and ethnicity in Indonesia Developing national character through traditional games Toho Cholik Mutohir and Muchamad Arif Al Ardha

Introduction Indonesia consists of more than 17,000 islands stretching across 3,977 miles, which makes it the longest archipelago country in the world.1 Indonesia is also a diverse country; it has more than 300 local ethnic groups2 and some foreign races or ethnicities that have lived in Indonesia since the colonial era.3 Javanese are the largest Indonesian ethnic group, and make up 41 percent of the Indonesian population.4 Javanese originate from Central Java, East Java, and the Special Region of Yogyakarta, but they have also spread to almost every large island in Indonesia.5 On the other hand, Chinese are the largest foreign group in Indonesia.6 Most of them work as entrepreneurs and businessmen. Even though Indonesia has a diverse society,7 Indonesia aims to unite them all by adopting Pancasila (the official ideology of the state) as a system of living, and a foundation for the nation.8 Furthermore, it is reinforced by the national motto Bhineka Tunggal Ika (unity in diversity).9 As a result, there are no longer local or foreign ethnicities in Indonesia, only Indonesian identities with various kinds of traditional cultures.10 Indonesia has a rich traditional culture.11 It includes languages, songs, dances, food, clothes, housing and traditional ceremonies.12 Indonesia also has six national religions, with Islam being the largest, and the largest Muslim population in the world.13 Furthermore, traditional games can be categorised as a local culture, because they are played and developed in certain areas.14 Traditional games are found in many varieties and types,15 but all of them have wisdom and value, reflecting the inheritance from each tribe’s ancestors.16 Additionally, the practise of traditional games in early childhood benefits students’ physical, motor, cognitive, social, emotional and language development.17 As a result, games have been shown to develop positive personality traits, such as responsibility, discipline and honesty.18 These positive values were also recognised as a character which was developed in each tribe.19 In other words, preserving local genius and norms will be beneficial for character development.20 Character development is not limited only to the transfer of knowledge about good values; it reaches out to ensure that these values​​ remain embedded and united in thought and action.21 Character development can be interpreted as an effort to encourage students to grow and develop holistically, with moral principles in their lives and to have the courage to do what is right, even though they are faced with various challenges.22 393

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School is a part of the national education system, and has a very important role in educating human resources. Every component of education in schools – that is, curriculum content, learning and assessment processes, school management, implementation of co-curricular activities, empowering infrastructure, financing and work ethic – must be involved to support character development.23 K13 is the current Indonesia education curriculum, which integrates character development in every subject and at every level of education.24 Character development becomes more contextual and applicative by encompassing local wisdom within every subject.25 In addition, schools need to collaborate and communicate with the parents intensively to maximise character development in the family environment.26 It is expected that Indonesia will have a golden generation who will have a positive attitude, essential mindset, normative commitment and indispensable competence by 2045.27 This article aims to investigate the potential values of traditional games in Indonesia and how they contribute to character development in Indonesia.

Traditional games Indonesia has many kinds of traditional games.28 However, all of them include a fun element.29 Accordingly, they are played by children as a recreational activity.30 They can also be adopted as an activity in physical education class.31 Utilising traditional games can enrich the learning materials in physical education.32 Moreover, involving traditional games in the education system will benefit the children’s development by introducing cultural values and national values.33 Furthermore, traditional games have been proven to engage students’ ability to improve problem solving, verbal and nonverbal strengths, social skills and emotional expression.34 In this chapter, the traditional games will be presented based on their origin. There are thousands of traditional games which have been identified in Indonesia. However, this chapter focuses on ten traditional games which have been selected from the five big islands of Indonesia.

Jawa Island Cublak-Cublak Suweng Cublak-cublak suweng is a traditional game from East Java. It requires at least three players to play this game. There is a player, called Mr Empo, who will be selected before the game and needs to find an object called a suweng. Mr Empo has to close his eyes while the suweng is moved by the other players who sit and sing the cublak-cublak suweng song around him. The suweng will be stopped and held in a player’s hand right after the song has ended. However, every player needs to close their hands. Mr Empo then tries to guess who is holding the suweng. If Mr Empo guesses the hand which grasps the suweng correctly, then the player who grasps the suweng becomes Mr Empo. But, if Mr Empo guesses incorrectly, then the game will be repeated again with the same player as Mr Empo. The game is complete when all players agree to finish.

Gobak Sodor Gobak sodor is a traditional Javanese game which is played by two groups. Each group contains a minimum of five players. The groups are divided into an offensive and a defensive group. The defensive group needs to block the offensive players, who will run across their line by moving left and right or back and forth. On the other hand, the offensive group has to try to run across the line guarded by the defensive players. If an offensive player is touched by a defensive player, then he is out of the game. The game will end and the groups will be swapped after all of the 394

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offensive players are out. The game can be limited by time, and the score is based on the total number of members of the group who can successfully cross the line.

Sumatra Island Pecah Piring Pecah piring is a traditional game of the Batak Tribe in North Sumatra province. This game is usually played by children with simple tools, such as a ball made from paper filled with small stones and flat surface stones to be arranged neatly. The participants must be divided equally into two groups. Both of the groups arrange all the stones in a square, which is drawn by chalk. Then the groups decide to play as njahat (attackers) or burju (defenders). The burju group throws the ball until the stones that were arranged at the start are falling apart again. Their job is to rearrange the stones as before, while avoiding being hit by a throw from the attacking group. The njahat group is tasked with keeping the stones from being rearranged by the burju group. The njahat group also has the task of attacking the burju group by throwing balls so that they hit burju group. If the entire burju group are hit by a ball before all the stones are rearranged, then the game is finished and the attacking group is the winner. Conversely, if all the stones are rearranged by the burju group, then they will be the winners.

Kutau Kutau is a type of folk game in Musi Rawas, South Sumatra. This game is one type of martial art which is played by two or more people at traditional celebrations by teenage boys.The game is performed without equipment, but is usually accompanied by a gamelan, drum, kentongan (traditional drum) or other music. Before the performance, seats are prepared for honoured guests and the public audience. After everything is ready, two players are called to the performance arena and introduced to the audience by both name and origin. After being introduced, both players shake hands and immediately go into action. Each of them seeks the weakness of his opponent and tries to hit the other with a false punch that does not hurt. What is particularly preferred in performances is the element of style.The determination of losing and winning is not important.The duration of the game depends on the referee who will referee and separate when needed. This game is very important as a martial arts exercise for defence from both criminal attacks and wild animal attacks.

Kalimantan Island Telur Penyok Telok Penyok means turtle’s eggs. The concept of the game comes from the story of a mother turtle who struggled desperately to defend her eggs from evil thieves who liked to eat her eggs. This game can be played by more than three children.The equipment is: a rope of two metres in length; any objects that can be used as eggs, such as plastic balls; and a piece of square or round wood with a length of half a metre and diameter of two and a half centimetres, which is used as a base to hold the rope. One player becomes the turtle mother and the other players become the egg thieves. The turtle mother holds the rope that has been tied to the handle and guards the eggs, so their motion is limited by the length of the rope. The thieves get ready to steal the eggs by distracting the mother turtle’s attention. The game will be ended and restarted when all the eggs have been taken. 395

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Tempong Tempong is a type of traditional game from West Kalimantan Province. The equipment is: a fruit made from coconut shell; five pieces of shield, used for hiding tools from tempong players; a whistle, which is used by a referee to manage the game; a set of traditional musical instruments to accompany the game; a scorebook; and a santutut (a tool to cover the face of the pangate – see below). The number of participants who are involved in the original game of tempong is unlimited. Five people act as panempong who have to find a hiding place and prepare to duel if their hiding place and name are known. One other person acts as a tempong guard, called a pangate. The pangate has to guess where the panempongs are hidden by mentioning their name. There is also a referee who regulates the game and records the scores. The game is started by covering the pangate’s eyes with the santutut, and the panempong immediately look for a hiding place. While the panempong are looking for a hiding place, music from traditional musical instruments is sounded. After all the panempong are hidden, the pangate tries to find them. The pangate must mention the name of the panempong and then run to kick the named player. During the fight, the panempong gets a score of 10 if he can kick the pangate. Conversely, if the pangate successfully kicks the panempong, then the panempong is declared dead and cannot continue the game. The game will be ended when there are no more panempong or a time limit is reached. The panempong who achieved the highest score is declared the winner of the match.

Sulawesi Island Maggasing Maggasing is a traditional spinning top game from the Bugis Tribe in Makassar. It can be played anywhere by two or more players of any age or gender. The equipment is a piece of wood with a diameter between two and half and four centimetres. The bottom is pointed, then the tip is shaped like a nail, or iron nails are used, with a protrusion of approximately two millimetres. This nail will later touch the ground when the wood is spinning. Other equipment is a thread of one millimetre in diameter and three metres in length, which is braced tight at one end of the thread and a small piece of wood (approximately 3 centimetres in length) is tied at the other end of the thread. There are two types of game based on the rules which were developed by the Bugis community: the contest and competition game. In the contest game, the winner will be decided on the shape, beauty, size, height, smoothness of sharpening, length of rotation, and balance in spinning. On other hand, the competition game prioritises expertise in playing. In both cases, the player who can defeat their opponents is the winners.

Marraga Marraga is also often called akraga or sport, because it combines sport and art.This game requires dexterity, strength and agility. Marrraga is played by five to fifteen men, both teenagers and adults. The game is performed in a circular arena of at least 6 metres diameter. The equipment in this game is a rattan ball of fifteen centimetres diameter. The rules are simple, the player only needs to perform, juggling with legs, hands, shoulders, chest or other body parts in the middle of the circle after he has received the ball, but the ball cannot be held. Other players wait their turn to perform with the ball. 396

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Irian Island Inkaropianik Inkaropianik is a famous traditional game in Sorong, Irian Jaya. In the local language of the Raja Ampat Islands, Inkar means a type of fish that has very rough skin. Furthermore, Inkaropianik describes the effort of the fish to escape from a net by using its strength.The game can be played by at least six people. A larger number of participants ensures the game is more exciting. This game can be played in the ocean, rivers or swimming pools. The rules are: there are two groups of players, one group will be fish and one will be the net.The group playing the net form a circle and hold each other’s hands. Every fish must be outside the net and enter the net through the gaps between the other participants’ feet. After the fish are in the net, then the fish try to escape from the net by pushing their body/chest towards the other participants. Fish can come out of the net if the chain of hands is released due to pushing by a fish. The fish are only allowed to go out through the upper net – the chain of hands. Fish may not escape by diving between the legs of the other participants. The game is finished and the groups are swapped after all the fish have escaped from the net.

Nsya Asya/Tok Asya Nsya Asya/Tok Asya is a famous traditional game in Papua. However, due to safety issues, this game is only played by boys. Nsya means to roll and Asya means rattan circles or wheels. Tok Asya means to throw a spear into a rattan circle. So, Nsya Asya/Tok Asya means to roll or run the rattan circle from one place to another while throwing a spear at it. This game can be played by two or more people. The winner of this game is the player who can throw the spear into the rattan circles while it is being rolled.

Character analysis The term character comes from Greek language charassein (to carve). Building good character is not easy, because it takes needs time and skill.35 Character is a representation of a person’s identity that shows their submission to rules or moral standards and which is applied and reflected through the thoughts, feelings and inner attitudes manifested in their manner of talking, behaving and acting.36 There are many values involved in good character, such as caring, empathy, cooperation, courage, determination, commitment, fairness, helpfulness, honesty, integrity, humour, independence, confidence, loyalty, patience and respect. The Indonesian government has chosen eighteen characteristics, which are mentioned in the Indonesian curriculum K13.37 The eighteen characteristics are: religiosity, honesty, tolerance, discipline, hard work, creativity, independence, democracy, curiosity, nationalism, love of Indonesia, appreciation of achievements, friendliness and communication, peacefulness, love of learning, care for the environment, social care and responsibility.38 This chapter focuses on seven of these core values.

Honesty Honesty is behaviour which means a person can always be trusted in words, actions and work.39 It is critical that this value be implemented in daily activity. On the other hand, failure to inculcate honesty will cause much negative behaviour, such as cheating, corruption and even criminality.40 All of the traditional games described in this chapter require honesty and obeying 397

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of the game rules. For example, all players of cublak cublak suweng, pecah piring, telur penyok, inkaropianik, tempong and gobak sodor need to be honest if they are caught. Also, the Mr Empo player in cublak cublak suweng, mother turtle in telur penyok and the pangate in tempong should not cheat while they are playing. Even though it is possible to do so, if the players do cheat, then the game will not be interesting. In some traditional contact games, such as kutau, marraga and nsya asya, honesty values are important in order to keep every player safe.

Responsibility Responsibility is the attitude and behaviour needed to carry out the duties and obligations towards oneself, society and the environment.41 Responsibility needs to be taught and evaluated by process, product and outcome.42 All of the traditional games which are described in this chapter give responsibility to each player. The responsibility is not only for individuals but also for the group. Individual responsibility can be taught in traditional games like gobak sodor, maggasing, kutau, marraga and nsya asya. Group responsibility can be applied in cublak cublak suweng, pecah piring, telur penyok, inkaropianik, tempong and gobak sodor.

Tolerance Tolerance is attitudes and actions which respect differences in religion, ethnicity, opinions, attitudes and actions.43 Tolerance will develop a peaceful society and prevent violence.44 In traditional games, the main purpose of each player is to participate for fun and recreation.45 So the interaction among players in these traditional games will make society be a better one. Understanding individual characteristics and capabilities will make each player know how to deal with another player. In cublak cublak suweng, for example, each player sings happily without considering the other player’s background. Furthermore, in other traditional games such as pecah piring, telur penyok, inkaropianik, tempong and gobak sodor, the players are interacting positively by helping their team and having fun with all players.

Independence Independence is attitudes and behaviours that are not dependent on others in completing tasks.46 It can be taught through habituation.47 The role of environment may support its development.48 In traditional games, there are certain skills that need to be mastered by each player independently. For instance, in gobak sodor, each player needs to have good speed and agility in order to make a score. Furthermore, each player has to swim and dive independently to swim out from the net in the inkaropianik game. Also, there are strength, power and speed in the traditional martial arts games, such as kutau, marraga and nsya asya. In addition, maggasing players also need to train their individual skill to make certain the harmony, beauty, precision and agility in their maggasing.

Cooperation Cooperation is the ability to understand, feel and act in collaborative activities to achieve common goals.49 It is also commonly recognised as teamwork. Most of the traditional games mentioned in this chapter require cooperation or teamwork. For example, in pecah piring, telur penyok, inkaropianik, tempong and gobak sodor, each player needs to be cooperative to achieve the goal. Especially in pecah piring and gobak sodor, the teams are divided into two equal groups, so each team member has to help the others to achieve the goal of the team. In the individual traditional 398

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games presented here, the cooperation may not be applied to the team member but to the traditional game organiser and also to the opponent.

Creativity Creativity is the ability to think and to do something differently to produce new ways or results.50 In the traditional games such as pecah piring, telur penyok, inkaropianik, tempong and gobak sodor, it is also important to be creative in playing the games by using certain strategies and tactics. Furthermore, innovation is needed to make the best performance. In maggasing, for example, it requires some experiments to test the top which was created by the player in order to create precision, harmony and beauty. Moreover, traditional martial art games, such as kutau, marraga and nsya asya also need innovation in order to create efficient motion and movement as well as the fighting strategies and tactics.

Discipline Discipline is the action of showing behaviour that conforms to various provisions and regulations.51 It is also defined by a willingness to follow procedures.52 All traditional games which were mentioned here have rules which regulate the player and the game. So each player needs to be disciplined and obey all rules. For example, in pecah piring, players could throw the ball only at the lower part of the opponent’s body. Also, in the nsya asya/tok asya game, the players can throw the spear only at the circle. In addition, there are some training procedures which can be performed by the players to improve their skill in every traditional game. The values just described are inherent in traditional games. Teachers needs to define the values which will be taught and inform the student about these values. Then, the implementation process should be started by giving more opportunity to the student to participate and experience the values through traditional games. In addition, reward and reinforcement should be given to the student to emphasise the values which have been learnt.

Conclusion Traditional games in every ethnic group have different forms and styles.These games also require different physical skills and movement patterns.There is evidence that each ethnic group has their own customs and expressions of their culture and heritage. However, every traditional game has a similar purpose: it is a heritage which allows the society to perform physical activity for fun and to learn to be capable in some certain skills. Moreover, traditional games also have values, which were described in the value assessment in this chapter. These values have much potential for developing national character. The traditional game values are honesty, responsibility, tolerance, independence, cooperation, creativity and discipline. These seven values are core characteristics which can support all the national characters declared by the Indonesian Ministry of Education in 2017; religiosity, honesty, tolerance, discipline, hard work, creativity, independence, democracy, curiosity, nationalism, love of Indonesia, appreciation of achievements, friendliness and communication, peacefulness, love of learning, care for the environment, social care and responsibility.

Notes 1 H. Dick and P. J. Rimmer, Cities, Transport and Communications (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 81–116. 399

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2 G. Hugo, Demography of Race and Ethnicity in Indonesia (Berlin: Springer, 2015), 259–80. 3 A. Kaur, Demography of Race and Ethnicity in Southeast Asia (Berlin: Springer, 2015), 171–87. 4 A. Widyanti et al., “Ethnic Differences in Indonesian Anthropometry Data: Evidence from Three Different Largest Ethnics,” International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics 47 (2015): 72–78. 5 Z. Hidayah, Ensiklopedi Suku Bangsa di Indonesia (Jakarta:Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia, 2015). 6 “Profil Pengidentifikasian Diri Suku Tionghoa Indonesia (Yinhua = yinni huaren) Sebagai Bangsa Indonesia dalam era Globalisasi Studi kasus.” 7 C. Casram, “Membangun Sikap Toleransi Beragama dalam Masyarakat Plural,” Wawasan J. Ilm. Agama dan Sos. Budaya 1, no. 2 (2016): 187–98. 8 I. Adams, Sport in Asian Society: Past and Present (London: Frank Cass, 2005). 9 G. Lertari, “Bhineka Tunggal Ika: Khasanah Multikultural Indonesia di Tengah Kehidupan SARA,” J. Pendidik. Pancasila dan Kewarganegaraan 28, no. 1 (2016). 10 H. Poerwanto, “Suku Bangsa dan Ekspres Kesukubangsaan,” J. Hum no. 9 (2013): 112–22. 11 K. R. Adhe, “Penanaman Karakter Anak Usia 4–5 Tahun pada Masyarakat Samin,” J. Pendidik. Usia Dini 8, no. 2 (2014): 275–90. 12 D. Hanan, “Regions and Regional Societies and Cultures in the Indonesian Cinema,” in Cultural Specificity in Indonesian Film (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 91–157. 13 A. Rianti et al., “Ketupat as Traditional Food of Indonesian Culture,” Journal of Ethnic Foods 5, no. 1 (2018): 4–9. 14 A. Sutini, “Meningkatkan Keterampilan Motorik Anak Usia Dini Melalui Permainan Tradisional,” Cakrawala Dini J. Pendidik. Anak Usia Dini 4, no. 2 (2018). 15 J. C. Ranciu, H. D. Waluyanto, and A. Zacky, “Perancangan Buku Ilustrasi Permainan Tradisional dan Penanaman Nilai Etika Dasar,” J. DKV Adiwarna 1, no. 2 (2013): 11. 16 T. Andriani, “Permainan Tradisional Dalam Membentuk Karakter Anak Usia Dini,” Sos. Budaya 9, no. 1 (2012): 121–36. 17 I. Khasanah, A. Prasetyo, and E. Rakhmawati, ‘ “Permainan Tradisional Sebagai Media Stimulasi Aspek Perkembangan Anak Usia Dini,’ ” Paudia J. Penelit. Dalam Bid. Pendidik. Anak Usia Dini 1, no. 1 (2011); D. Hidayat, “Permainan Tradisional dan Kearifan Lokal Kampung Dukuh Garut Selatan Jawa Barat,” Acad. Maj. Ilmu Sos. dan Ilmu Polit 5, no. 2 (2013). 18 H. Nur, “Membangun Karakter Anak Melalui Permainan Anak Tradisional,” J. Pendidik. Karakter no. 1 (2013). 19 Adhe, “Penanaman Karakter Anak Usia 4–5 Tahun pada Masyarakat Samin.” 20 U. Fajarini, “Peranan Kearifan Lokal dalam Pendidikan Karakter,” Sosio-Didaktika Soc. Sci. Educ. J. 1, no. 2 (2014): 123–30. 21 A. Sudrajat, “Mengapa Pendidikan Karakter?” J. Pendidik. Karakter 1, no. 1 (2011). 22 B. Maunah, “Implementasi Pendidikan Karakter dalam Pembentukan Kepribadian Holistik Siswa,” J. Pendidik. Karakter no. 1 (2016). 23 M. A. Ramdhani,“Lingkungan Pendidikan dalam Implementasi Pendidikan Karakter,” J. Pendidik. Uniga 8, no. 1 (2017): 11. 24 S. Judiani, “Implementasi Pendidikan Karakter di Sekolah Dasar Melalui Penguatan Pelaksanaan Kurikulum,” J. Pendidik. dan Kebud 16, no. 9 (2010): 280. 25 N. Asriati, “Mengembangkan Karakter Peserta Didik Berbasis Kearifan Lokal Melalui Pembelajaran di Sekolah,” J. Pendidik. Sosiol. dan Hum 3, no. 2 (2013). 26 Y. Wulandari and M. Kristiawan, “Strategi Sekolah dalam Penguatan Pendidikan Karakter Bagi Siswa dengan Memaksimalkan Peran Orang Tua,” JMKSP (Jurnal Manajemen, Kepemimpinan, dan Supervisi Pendidikan) 2, no. 2 (2017). 27 B. Manullang, “Grand Desain Pendidikan Karakter Generasi Emas 2045,” J. Pendidik. Karakter no. 1 (2013). 28 A. Fad, Kumpulan Permainan Anak Tradisional Indonesia (Jakarta: Cerdas Interaktif, 2014). 29 E. Purwaningsih, “Permainan Tradisional Anak: Salah Satu Khasanah Budaya yang Perlu Dilestarikan,” Sej. dan Budaya Jawa 1, no. 1 (2006): 40. 30 S. Y. Saputra, “Permainan Tradisional VS Permainan Modern Dalam Penanaman Nilai Karakter di Sekolah Dasar | Saputra | ELSE (Elementary School Education Journal): Jurnal Pendidikan dan Pembelajaran Sekolah Dasar,” J. Pendidik. dan Pembelajaran di Sekol. Dasar 1, no. 1 (2017). 31 P. Widodo and R. Lumintuarso, “Pengembangan model permainan tradisional untuk membangun karakter pada siswa SD kelas atas,” J. Keolahragaan 5, no. 2 (2017): 183.

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32 M. A. Al Ardha et al., “Multiple Intelligences and Physical Education Curriculum: Application and Reflection of Every Education Level in Indonesia” (Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Education Innovation, 2018). 33 H. P. Yudiwinata, “Permainan Tradisional Dalam Budaya dan Perkembangan Anak,” Paradigma 2, no. 3 (2014). 34 A. Amirudin and Z. Mukarom, “Pendidikan Karakter dalam Kaulinan Budak Baheula: Studi Nilai Pendidikan Karakter Melalui Permainan Anak Tradisional Sorodot Gaplok Dari Jawa Barat,” Al-Bidayah J. Pendidik. Dasar Islam 10, no. 2 (2018). 35 M. Kosim, “Urgensi Pendidikan Karakter,” KARSA J. Soc. Islam. Cult 19, no. 1 (2012): 84–92. 36 A. N. Aeni, “Pendidikan Karakter untuk Siswa SD dalam Perspektif Islam,” Mimb. Sekol. Dasar 1, no. 1 (2014): 50–58. 37 S. Islam, “Karakteristik Pendidikan Karakter; Menjawab Tantangan Multidimensional Melalui Implementasi Kurikulum 2013,” J. Edureligia 1, no. 2 (2017): 89–100. 38 A. Syarbini, Model Pendidikan Karakter Dalam Keluarga (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2014). 39 K. D. Putri and A. Dewantara, “Mulai Punahnya Nilai Kejujuran Dikaji Dengan Buku Diskursus Pancasila Dewasa Ini.,” https://osf.io/waz2q/. 40 Ramdhani, “Lingkungan Pendidikan dalam Implementasi Pendidikan Karakter,” 11. 41 R. M. Ardila, N. Nurhasanah, and M. Salimi, “Pendidikan Karakter Tanggung Jawab Dan Pembelajarannya di Sekolah,” Pros. Semin. Nas. Inov. Pendidik (2017): 79–85. 42 N. Ernawati, “Pembentukan Karakter Tanggung Jawab dan Kreativitas Melalui Ekstrakurikuler Marching Band (Studi Kasus di MIN Bawu Jepara) Tahun 2017,” Universitas Islam Negeri Walisongo, 2018. 43 Khasanah and Rakhmawati, “Permainan Tradisional Sebagai Media Stimulasi Aspek Perkembangan Anak Usia Dini.”; Hidayat,“Permainan Tradisional dan Kearifan Lokal Kampung Dukuh Garut Selatan Jawa Barat.” 44 Y. Babuta, Y. Y. I. Babuta, and O. D. Wahyurini, “Perancangan Buku Pendidikan Karakter Toleransi dan Cinta Damai untuk Anak Usia 3–5 Tahun,” J. Sains dan Seni ITS 3, no. 1 (2014): F28–F32. 45 Purwaningsih, “Permainan Tradisional Anak: Salah Satu Khasanah Budaya yang Perlu Dilestarikan.” 46 W. Wuryandani, F. Fathurrohman, and U. Ambarwati, “Implementasi Pendidikan Karakter Kemandirian di Muhammadiyah Boarding School,” J. Cakrawala Pendidik 15, no. 2 (2016). 47 S. W. Tanshzil, “Model Pembinaan Pendidikan Karakter Pada Lingkungan Pondok Pesantren Dalam Membangun Kemandirian Dan Disiplin Santri (Sebuah kajian pengembangan Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan),” Penelit. Pendidik 12, no. 2 (2012). 48 A. Riyanti and P. Rini, “Kemandirian Remaja Berdasarkan Urutan Kelahiran,” J. Pelopor Pendidik 3, no. 1 (2012). 49 S. D.Yulianti, E. T. Djatmika, and A. Santoso, “Pendidikan karakter kerja sama dalam pembelajaran siswa Sekolah Dasar pada kurikulum 2013,” J.Teor. dan Praksis Pembelajaran IPS 1, no. 1 (2017): 33–38. 50 D. Campbell, Mengembangkan Kreativitas (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 1986). 51 A. F. Helmi, ‘ “Disiplin Kerja,’ ” Bul. Psikol 4, no. 2 (2016): 32–41. 52 Ibid.

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Ardila, R. M., N. Nurhasanah, and M. Salimi. “Pendidikan Karakter Tanggung Jawab Dan Pembelajarannya di Sekolah.” Pros. Semin. Nas. Inov. Pendidik (2017): 79–85. Asriati, N. “Mengembangkan Karakter Peserta Didik Berbasis Kearifan Lokal Melalui Pembelajaran di Sekolah.” J. Pendidik. Sosiol. dan Hum 3, no. 2 (2013). Babuta,Y.,Y.Y. I. Babuta, and O. D.Wahyurini. “Perancangan Buku Pendidikan Karakter Toleransi dan Cinta Damai untuk Anak Usia 3–5 Tahun.” J. Sains dan Seni ITS 3, no. 1 (2014): F28–F32. Campbell, D. Mengembangkan Kreativitas.Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 1986. Casram, C. “Membangun Sikap Toleransi Beragama dalam Masyarakat Plural.” Wawasan J. Ilm. Agama dan Sos. Budaya 1, no. 2 (2016): 187–98. Dick, H., and P. J. Rimmer. Cities,Transport and Communications. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Ernawati, N. “Pembentukan Karakter Tanggung Jawab dan Kreativitas Melalui Ekstrakurikuler Marching Band (Studi Kasus di MIN Bawu Jepara) Tahun 2017.” Universitas Islam Negeri Walisongo, 2018. Fad, A. Kumpulan Permainan Anak Tradisional Indonesia–Aisyah Fad. Jakarta: Cerdas Interaktif, 2014. Fajarini, U. “Peranan Kearifan Lokal dalam Pendidikan Karakter.” Sosio-Didaktika Soc. Sci. Educ. J 1, no. 2 (2014): 123–30. Hanan, D. “Regions and Regional Societies and Cultures in the Indonesian Cinema.” In Cultural Specificity in Indonesian Film, edited by David Hanan, 91–157. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. Helmi, A. F. “Disiplin Kerja.” Bul. Psikol 4, no. 2 (2016): 32–41. Hidayah, Z. Ensiklopedi Suku Bangsa di Indonesia. Jakarta:Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia, 2015. Hidayat, D. “Permainan Tradisional dan Kearifan Lokal Kampung Dukuh Garut Selatan Jawa Barat.” Acad. Maj. Ilmu Sos. dan Ilmu Polit 5, no. 2 (2013). Hugo, G. Demography of Race and Ethnicity in Indonesia. Berlin: Springer, 2015. Islam, S. “Karakteristik Pendidikan Karakter; Menjawab Tantangan Multidimensional Melalui Implementasi Kurikulum 2013.” J. Edureligia 1, no. 2 (2017): 89–100. Judiani, S. “Implementasi Pendidikan Karakter di Sekolah Dasar Melalui Penguatan Pelaksanaan Kurikulum.” J. Pendidik. dan Kebud 16, no. 9 (2010): 280. Kaur, A. Demography of Race and Ethnicity in Southeast Asia. Berlin: Springer, 2015. Khasanah, I., A. Prasetyo, and E. Rakhmawati. “Permainan Tradisional Sebagai Media Stimulasi Aspek Perkembangan Anak Usia Dini.” Paudia J. Penelit. Dalam Bid. Pendidik. Anak Usia Dini 1, no. 1 (2011). Kosim, M. “Urgensi Pendidikan Karakter.” Karsa J. Soc. Islam. Cult 19, no. 1 (2012): 84–92. Lertari, G. “Bhineka Tunggal Ika: Khasanah Multikultural Indonesia di Tengah Kehidupan SARA.” J. Pendidik. Pancasila dan Kewarganegaraan 28, no. 1 (2016). Manullang, B. “Grand Desain Pendidikan Karakter Generasi Emas 2045.” J. Pendidik. Karakter no. 1 (2013). Maunah, B. “Implementasi Pendidikan Karakter dalam Pembentukan Kepribadian Holistik Siswa.” J. Pendidik. Karakter no. 1 (2016). Nur, H. “Membangun Karakter Anak Melalui Permainan Anak Tradisional.” J. Pendidik. Karakter no. 1 (2013). Poerwanto, H. “Suku Bangsa dan Ekspres Kesukubangsaan.” J. Hum no. 9 (2013): 112–22. Purwaningsih, E. “Permainan Tradisional Anak: Salah Satu Khasanah Budaya yang Perlu Dilestarikan.” Sej. dan Budaya Jawa 1, no. 1 (2006): 40. Ramdhani, M. A. “Lingkungan Pendidikan dalam Implementasi Pendidikan Karakter.” J. Pendidik. Uniga 8, no. 1 (2017): 11. Ranciu, J. C., H. D.Waluyanto, and A. Zacky. “Perancangan Buku Ilustrasi Permainan Tradisional dan Penanaman Nilai Etika Dasar.” J. DKV Adiwarna 1, no. 2 (2013): 11. Rianti, A., A. E. Novenia, A. Christopher, D. Lestari, and E. K. Parassih. “Ketupat as Traditional Food of Indonesian Culture.” Journal of Ethnic Foods 5, no. 1 (2018): 4–9. Riyanti, A., and P. Rini. “Kemandirian Remaja Berdasarkan Urutan Kelahiran.” J. Pelopor Pendidik 3, no. 1 (2012). Saputra, S.Y. “Permainan Tradisional VS Permainan Modern Dalam Penanaman Nilai Karakter di Sekolah Dasar | Saputra | ELSE (Elementary School Education Journal): Jurnal Pendidikan dan Pembelajaran Sekolah Dasar.” J. Pendidik. dan Pembelajaran di Sekol. Dasar 1, no. 1 (2017). Sudrajat, A. “Mengapa Pendidikan Karakter?” J. Pendidik. Karakter 1, no. 1 (2011). 402

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38 Yoga for oppositional defiant disorder and adolescent relationship issues Prasanna Balaji

Introduction One of the priceless gifts of India’s tradition is yoga, and its value has been acknowledged worldwide since 2015 with the annual celebration of Yoga Day on June 21. Though yoga has unequivocally sprung into the arena of healthcare, bringing it into the system and making it a part of one’s routine by understanding the significance of it, needs a showcase example of the benefits to a community at a regional level. Since the onset of the colonial regime and its aftermath, it is obvious that Indians have experienced a great shift with regard to their life style. This shift or change can be seen in their food habits and day-to-day activities. This chapter gives the outline of an approach that could be of great support in handling Opposition Defiance Disorder (ODD) in adolescents. ODD leads to much wider issues that often go unattended or ignored over time. Inappropriate handling of these issues may lead to unexpected results and, sometimes, even physical or psychological harm to those affected. Failing to intervene early may result in the development of personalities that struggle to live in society and, as a result, become a threat to the society and the nation. ODD is a behavioural and social disorder in youngsters which is seen in negative, insubordinate, rebellious and confrontational conduct towards authority figures. It can have a significant effect on the youngsters’ development. ODD affects between two percent and 16 percent of children and adolescents in the world population and is nearly equally common in boys and girls.1 There is no known or clear cause of ODD; whether it is caused by genetics or environment, it results in poor relationships with family members, neighbours, peers and teachers. ODD may lead to problems such as poor school and work performance, antisocial behaviour, impulse control problems, substance abuse and suicide.2 Noticeably in India, the differences between the modern way of life and traditional understandings and expectations have a great influence on, and contribute to, adolescent development. In the modern world, boys and girls in India have let the patterns of relationships in movies and media influence them. The fashion that attracts and the tradition that forbids have resulted in constant cultural clashes. Today, dating is seen as a normal process of development for most adolescents when they begin their quest for self-identity, an identity that is actually formed by their efforts and experiences in developing a variety of relationships with their peers. This is 404

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a crucial time in the teenage years which can provide pivotal experiences, positive and negative, on the adolescents developing ability to interact socially, plan for the future and indulge in intimate partnerships.3 Almost every boy or girl has to come through this phase positively, but more often than not they suffer damage to their normal life. They need to be aware of themselves and the society. A behavioural intervention plan that is suitable for teaching, encouraging and rewarding appropriate behaviour has always been needed throughout the various stages of children’s development in school and college. For the best results, it is important to have a system that is close to the culture and traditions of the nation rather than a formal method that treats all individuals the same way.

Managing the issue Managing adolescents is a difficult issue, and colleges and universities find this an ongoing problem to resolve successfully. In 2016, University Grants Commission (UGC) Secretary Jaspal Singh Sandhu issued directives regarding a proposed student counselling system to all the then university vice-chancellors. He asked for the setting up of a ‘students counselling system’ in all institutions of higher education. As per the directive, the system would tackle all common worries of students – such as anxiety, stress, fear, homesickness and academic troubles – through the involvement of the students, their teachers and parents. Along with this, there was a call for the deployment of trained psychologists and, when required, one teacher counsellor for every 25 students. The concern of the UGC to set up a body for the coordination, determination and maintenance of standards reflects the complex nature of managing adolescents in higher education. Use of yoga, which offers awareness and the ability to counter one’s negative thoughts and feelings, is a well-known and widely accepted intervention. This chapter aims at developing a systematic training module using yoga as an effective behavioural health intervention system for the wellbeing of all the students in the universities and colleges of India.

Overall objective The overall objective of the current chapter is to examine the benefits of a systematic behavioural health intervention through yoga for students with ODD and adolescent relationship issues, and to help them to develop an attitude of humility, confidence and compassion, thereby overcoming their adolescent crises. Intermediate objectives 1

To supplement counselling through Kundalini Yoga so as to provide students with knowledge and support to prepare them to deal with issues that they are likely to face, and to invite them to participate and cooperate better in the process of counselling. 2 To develop self awareness and social awareness through healthy interactions, field visits, the practice of yoga, meditation and physical exercise on a regular basis. 3 To offer breathing and physical exercises to improve the coordination of body and mind, and to study the progress of the selected students. 4 To establish whether yoga, meditation and physical exercise bring any psychological improvement by studying psychological parameters, such as level of aspiration, temperament and focus of control. 5 To evaluate how effectively yoga, meditation and physical exercise works on an individual’s physiology through physiological variables, such as resting heart rate, anaerobic power, 405

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forced vital capacity and breath holding ability. (These analyses will be done before and after practicing yoga, meditation and physical exercise). 6 To confirm the development of calmness and confidence among the students within defined parameters.

Review and status of research and development in the subject A. International status ODD is one of the most important, if not the most important, childhood behavioural disorders. About 10.2 percent of children will develop ODD, with the condition occurring somewhat more often in boys (11 percent) than girls (9 percent). The true rate of ODD is yet to be found and resolved. Generally, ODD is seen to affect 2–16 percent of all children. What was once thought to be a condition that affects mainly boys is now being recorded among girls as well. While girls also develop ODD, they exhibit different patterns of behaviour to boys. Research is gradually moving to a position where girls and boys are seen to be equally affected. The National Comorbidity Survey in the United States gathers lifetime occurrence estimates among adults, while many other surveys focus on point-in-time estimates with the help of parent surveys, with or without teachers’ support, and interviews with children.4 The lifespan existence of ODD was 10.2 percent in an adult group sample, with men at 11.2 percent and women at 9.2 percent.5 Mostly, the differences in estimate of prevalence were due to practical and methodical differences in assessment or calculation.6 Maughan says that the existence of conduct disorder varies in the survey depending on responses from parents, children, teachers or combinations of them.7 Teachers and parents often provide diverse ratings of ODD symptoms in children.8 Similarly, the predilection of males to ODD may signify that samples have had larger participation by boys. According to a test conducted by the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health in the United States which included thousands of school children in Grades 7 to 12, more than 80 percent of those over 14 years of age were, or had been, in a romantic relationship, including a modest number (2–3 percent) in same-sex relationships.9 A considerable number of these relationships were of a very short duration, particularly among younger people, yet a considerable number were also in a relationship for a year or more. With regard to whether these are socially normative, the finding shows that, in most cases, parents were aware of their child’s romantic partner and the couples had no hesitation in publicly declaring their relationship.There is no clear data on romantic relationships in other developed or developing countries, but research suggests parallel percentages to the US data, even though conducted with somewhat older age groups.10 In this way, it can be understood that this is a universal issue to be handled by every nation in the context of local cultures and laws. Experts have found that the peaceful nations of the world also enjoy lower interest rates, a stronger currency and higher foreign investment, not to mention better political stability and a stronger correlation with individual levels of perceived happiness.11 The question is whether the character of the individuals reflects on the growth of the nation more than that of mental and business capabilities. It is important to note that India is expected to have a youth population of 34.33 percent of its total population by 2020. This proportion reached its maximum of 35.11 percent in the year 2010. China, in contrast, reached its highest proportion of youth to population in the year l990 at 38.28 percent and is projected to see the proportion shrinking to 27.62 percent by the year 2020, a situation which Japan experienced in around 2000.12 It is 406

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essential to have in place an effective programme to build and mould the character of Indian youth, which will in turn reflect on the growth of the nation. The UN Political Declaration on Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) acknowledges that the global burden and threat of NCDs constitutes one of the major challenges for development in the twenty-first century and that they undermine social and economic development throughout the world, which threaten the achievement of internationally agreed development goals. The emergence of strong psychology was paralleled historically by the spreading of the texts of yoga.13 In the past, as well as at present, people prefer yoga to psychotherapists, and a great deal had already been written comparing Eastern and Western thought. Wilhelm Hauer, born in Württemberg in 1881, was sent in 1906 by the Basel Mission to India. He recorded his views on Indian tradition and yoga saying: My five years’ experience in India has widened and deepened my religious views in a way I had never expected. I went to India as a missionary in the ordinary sense, but I came back from India a missionary in a different sense. I learned that we have only the right to state, to testify to what is in us, and not expect others to be converted to our point of view, much less to try to convert them.14 Yoga stands for the belief that unless one realises one’s self, one’s purpose in this world has been missed.15 It is important to bring the youth together in a structure that allows them to appreciate their lives’ purpose and realise it.

Importance of the intervention Yoga and meditation are often seen as two different activities; but they are really one. Meditation is performed when the body is static, and yoga is performed during the meditation, keeping the body moving. In other words, yoga is meditation in motion. Every scientist is a yogi, for he or she concentrates on the object of investigation. In every skill, there is yoga (union) of mind and body. Human beings have not yet identified the inbuilt power of mind. But the practice of yoga and meditation, on prescribed lines with a trainer, can bring about dramatic changes in lifestyle. Research signifying the usefulness of yoga interventions on countless aspects of psychological health has multiplied recently. Much research has established the fact that yoga can improve symptoms of fear, depression, anxiety, stress, post-traumatic stress disorder as well as many other psychological problems. When one can go little further than holding one’s breath, there will be no sense of energy rising and no crystallisation of the ‘self ’ shall happen. But should one proceed with holding one’s breath notwithstanding the difficulty, there shall emerge an extraordinary sense, in both the physical and mental (emotional/astral) bodies, resembling an explosion that releases the inner tension. And this will be the very process of liberation of ‘self ’ from one’s ‘kunda,’ that is, the Kundalini.16 Only a small amount of research exists that suggests that yoga can help in behavioural regulation. It has shown that doing yoga for a period can do wonders for the subject: ‘a 10-week, twice-weekly yoga intervention with previously inactive participants increased their longer-term adherence to a physical activity regimen, indicating that yoga can boost one’s ability to regulate a fairly difficult behaviour.’17 A recent study of medical students who took an elective yoga and mindfulness course exhibited that ‘goal-directed regulation of behaviour improved pre-to post, according to self-report.’18 Studies have also suggested that those who had practised yoga showed a general decline in nicotine cravings.19 407

Table 38.1 Activities and Their Scientific Relevance Included in This study No. 1.

2.

3.

4.

Activity/Type / Preparation

Execution/Outcome

Counselling/Messages/ Motivation

MangalaCharn/Mantra Sitting in easy pose, palms together at the heart centre, thumbs crossed. (Spirit Rising Yoga) 20 Minutes

Execution Chant Aad Guray Nameh – extend the arms up to 60°. Inhale powerfully as arms return to heart centre Chant–Jugad Gurey Nameh – extend the arms up to 60°. Inhale, returning arms to the heart centre. Outcome Protection.

Counselling • Individual power. • Universal pattern. • Divine system.

Adi Shakti Mantra/Mantra Sit in easy pose with a straight spine The wrists are at the level of the shoulders, with the hands in line with the ears. Make sure the spine is kept very straight and is neck locked. Engaged with Ravi Mudra. 30 minutes

Ong So Hung Mantra Sit in easy pose or on a chair with a straight spine. Bring the left hand to the heart centre but not touching. The right hand in Gyan mudra resting on the knee. Eyes 1/10 open focus on tip of the nose. 20 minutes PanjShabad Mantra Panj means five, and this mantra expresses the five primal sounds of the Universe (SSS, TTT, NNN, AAA and MMM.) It is the mantra Sat Naam from the Japji of Guru Nanak, in its sound-current form or naad. 20 minutes

Execution Inhale very deeply. Hold 15–20 seconds. Exhale through the mouth in a whistle. Inhale a second time, very deeply, hold 15–20 seconds. Whistle out every bit of breath. Inhale a third time and squeeze the entire being. Hold and squeeze 10–15 seconds. Strong exhale through the mouth. Relax. Outcome Suspending the mind in bliss. Execution Chant the mantra ongsohung. Theong is chanted from the back of the throat, nose. Outcome Heart-opening and empowering.

Procedure Inhale 16 times on Panj Shabad of Sa Ta Na Ma and as many rhythms one inhales on, that many rhythm one holds the breath, and that many rhythms one exhales the breath. And then hold the exhale in that rhythm – that completes it. Outcome Feeling of rebirth

Messages • Peace and love. • Videos of care. • Inspirational videos. • Loving one’s self. Motivation • Lecture on the benefits of protection through Yoga. Counselling • Importance of spirit. • Joy of detachment. • Calmness. Messages • Music. • Mind and life. • Inspirational videos. Motivation • Lecture on the power of the spirit. Counselling • Importance of spirit. • Joy of detachment. • Calmness. Messages • Music. • Mind and life. • Inspirational videos. Motivation • Lecture on the power of the spirit. Counselling • Beauty of Life. • Value of life. • Need for change. Messages • Melody. • Value of self talk. • Words of Gita – discussion. Motivation • Lecture on the power of the beauty of life.

No. 5.

6.

7.

8.

Activity/Type / Preparation

Execution/Outcome

Counselling/Messages/ Motivation

Long Deep Breathing/Pranayama Sit easy. Start by filling the abdomen, then expanding the chest and finally lifting the upper ribs and clavicle. The exhale is the reverse: first the upper deflates, then the middle and finally the abdomen pulls in and up, as the navel point pulls back towards the spine 26 breaths, or 3–31 minutes. Breath of Fire (Agni-Prasana) Sit in Vajrasana – the breath rate should be 120 to 180 times per minute

Procedure Start the exhale by relaxing the clavicle, then slowly emptying the chest. Finally, pull in the abdomen to force out any remaining air. Breathe through the nose. Outcome A great way to relax and also very good for any lung-related problems.

Counselling • Beauty of life. • Value of life. • Need for change.

Procedure Breathe in and out through the nose (or mouth). Pull the abdomen in towards the diaphragm during the exhalation and push out during inhalation. This is very fast, as fast as 2 or 3 times per second, and also very loud. The breathing should be audible. Outcome A cleansing and energising breath, powered by abdominal contractions. Procedure Close eyes and mentally draw a circle of light around oneself. Outcome The circle separates one from the world of daily life – both the outer world of perceptions and activities and the world of familiar preoccupations and thinking patterns.

Counselling • Love one’s body. • Understanding one’s body. • Need to protect it.

Procedure Inhale and hold the breath. Quickly begin to make fists of the hands, first with the thumbs inside the fists, then outside. Alternate rapidly while holding the breath for 15 seconds. Then, with the hands in the original position, slowly bring the thumbs together overhead. Slowly lower the arms in an arc while exhaling deeply.

Counselling • Beauty of the individual self. • Uniqueness of creation. • Everything has a purpose.

Soham Mantra Breathing Be still and comfortable in a sitting posture with spine erect and with the pelvis, chest and head vertically aligned. Sit on a chair, or cross-legged on the floor with a cushion or a folded blanket under the hips. Use enough support to lift the hip joints slightly higher than the knees. 20 minutes Energise/Kriya Sit in easy pose. Bring the arms out to the sides and raise them until they form a ‘V’ shape. The fingers are pressing against the mounds of the palms with the thumbs pointing up. Begin Breath of Fire for 3 minutes. This exercise is revitalising. It enhances charisma and makes one radiant

Messages • Melody. • Value of self. • Words of Gita – discussion. Motivation • Lecture on the power of the beauty of life.

Messages • Power of self. • Value of organs. • Dangers of an unhealthy body. Motivation • Lecture on the value of organs.

Counselling • Value of the self. • Need for detachment. Messages • Reading Swami Vivekanand. • Knowing the self – discussion. • Being proud of the self. Motivation • Thoughts of Swami Vivekanand.

Messages • Love among living things. • Poor human beings. • Nature and greatness. Motivation • Visiting the places of the poor. (Continued)

Table 38.1 (Continued) No. 9.

10.

11.

Activity/Type / Preparation Creativity/Kriya Procedure Still sitting in easy pose, form hands into fists and bring them to the sides of the body at chest level with the elbows pressed back. Outcome This exercise activates the internal fire to spark creativity.

Execution/Outcome

Procedure Extend chest out. Take 5 deep breaths, then inhale deeply and hold the breath. With the breath held, begin punching the arms alternately. When one cannot hold the breath any longer, exhale. Inhale and repeat the powerful punching motion with the held breath. Repeat 1 more time for a total of 3 times. Then sit, eyes closed and breathe as slowly as possible for 2 minutes. Stretch and relax. Prosperity/Kriya Procedure Sit in easy pose. Keep the Inhale deeply and hold, spine straight. Look at the suspending the breath while centre of the chin through mentally reciting, ‘I am closed eyes or look at the bountiful, I am blissful, I am tip of the nose through beautiful.’ partially closed eyes. Exhale all the breath out, then Practice this for 3 minutes at suspend the breath out while a time. Feel free to practice mentally saying, ‘Excel, excel, 3, 4, or more times a day fearless.’ for 3 minutes each time. Outcome Mental and vibrational doors to prosperity Guyan Mudra Preparation Procedure The tip of the thumb touches Relax the hands on the knees the tip of the index finger, with palms opposite and stimulating knowledge upwards. and ability. The index Tap the tip of the index finger to finger symbolises Jupiter, the tip of the thumb. and the thumb represents Relax the fingers straight and the ego. parallel to each other. This Sit down in a meditative Mudra is executed by both pose, for example the hands. Sukhasana (Easy Pose), Close the eyes and centre on the Padmasana (Lotus breath. Pose) or Vajrasana (Diamond To further improve the efficiency Pose). of the Gyan Mudra or Dhyan Or carry out the Gyan Mudra, chant the word Om Mudra while standing (Aum) in conjunction with in the Tadasana yoga every exhale. (Mountain Pose) or sitting contentedly on a chair. Outcome Guyan Mudra imparts receptivity & calm 15 minutes.

Counselling/Messages/ Motivation Counselling • Individual talent. • The human being as a design of God. Messages • Everyone has a talent. • One should appreciate one’s gifts. • Try to know one’s self. Motivation • Movies of great achievers. • Meeting with achievers.

Counselling • Need for charity. • Contentedness. Messages • One should be satisfied. • One should contribute. Motivation • Meeting people who live a life of offering.

Counselling • Calmness activates thinking. • Composed life and needs. Messages • Everyone has troubles – discussion. • Life is all about getting up – discussion. Motivation • Meeting people with many issues in life. • Related videos.

No.

Activity/Type / Preparation

Execution/Outcome

Counselling/Messages/ Motivation

12.

Active Guyan Mudra Pose The fingernail of the index finger is pressed into the first thumb joint Outcome Seeking knowledge 15 minutes

Procedure The first joint of the index finger is bent under the first joint of the thumb, imparting active knowledge.

Counselling • Calm and active. • Awareness.

Surya Mudra Pose Tip of the ring finger (symbolising Uranus or the Sun) touches the tip of the thumb, giving energy, health and intuition Outcome Energy, health and intuition 15 minutes

Procedure Regular practice of 30 minutes in the early hours of the morning is enough to get the maximum benefits of Surya Mudra; but it may be done at any time or in any position.

Buddha Mudra Pose Right hand rests on left for men, left on right for women. Outcome Releases tension, stress and confusion 15 minutes

Procedure Place the right hand palm-up on the lap, then rest the fingers and back of the left hand on top of the right hand. Now let the thumbs connect in a vertical circle. Hands should rest against the lower abdomen.

First Chakra, Muladhara: Mula (root) adhara (support) Time: As per development

Asanas Mountain Pose, Warrior Pose, Standing Forward Bend Crow Pose Outcome Overcoming fear and surviving.

13.

14.

15.

16.

Second Chakra the Sacral Chakra Svadhisthana: Seat of Vital Force Time: As per development

Asanas Hip openers, Wide-stance Forward Bend, Wide-stance Seated Position, Seated Bound Angle Pose Outcome Creation, desire and relationships

Messages • Role of the individual. • Path of life. Motivation • Life of Adishankara – video. Counselling • Health of the body. • Cleanliness. Messages • The body can be purified. • The body is powerful. Motivation • Interactions with people who are fit due to yoga/ aged but active. Counselling • Taking future. • Need to be strong. Messages • Patience is powerful. • Patience involves thinking. Motivation • Movie about warriors who are at peace with their heart. Counselling • Fear changes ones attitude. • Man can survive. Messages • Everyone can survive. • Life is a pursuit. Motivation • Movie about the life of Buddha. Counselling • One can control desire. • Maintaining Relationships. Messages • Human Nature. • Uncertainty of Relationships. Motivation • Movie about the life of Buddha. (Continued)

Table 38.1 (Continued) No.

Activity/Type / Preparation

Execution/Outcome

Counselling/Messages/ Motivation

17.

Third Chakra the Solar Plexus (Manipura) Time: As per development

Asanas Half-twist, Boat Pose, Backbends Outcome Vital, sexually uninhibited, prosperous and satisfied

Counselling • Nature of sexual urges. • Nature of wealth.

18.

19.

20.

21.

Fourth Chakra (he Heart Chakra) Anahata–Anahata literally means ‘unbeaten.’

Fifth Chakra (The Throat Chakra) Visuddha: Purification

Sixth Chakra, the Third Eye (Ajna)

Sahasrara: One-ThousandPetalled Lotus Transcendence, The Seat of the Soul

Asanas Eagle Pose, Cow Pose, Backbends, Chest-opening poses Outcome To transcend pain and suffering

Reading of poems and prayers and chanting Asanas: Fish Pose, Lion Pose, Supported Shoulder Stand Outcome Purification

Asanas Breath work, meditation, Child’s Pose, Yoga Nidra Outcome Intuition and wisdom

Asanas Tree Pose, Eagle Pose, Seated Meditation Outcome Transcendence and feeling one with universe

Messages • Life is about self control. • Need for satisfaction. Motivation • Meeting people with physical ailments and mental health issues. Counselling • Life is a combination of pleasure and pain. • One should endure suffering. Messages • With one’s mind one can control everything. • Pain is what one chooses to feel. Motivation • Meeting with people suffering from cancer. Counselling • Be pure of heart and mind. • Cleanse one’s self. Messages • The body is pure and must be kept that way. Motivation • Meeting with yogis who lead an enlightened life. Counselling • Wisdom gives bliss. • Learn from the world. Messages • Wisdom releases one from bondage. Motivation • Stories from the Upanishads by a guru. Counselling • The individual is a force of nature. • Understanding the universe. Messages • Love leads to learning. • Learning leads to wisdom. Motivation • Words of a yogi about the path of a yogi.

Yoga for ODD and child relationship issues

Mastering Kundalini Yoga is something that is considered to be a lifelong task, but this chapter aims at demonstrating the primary benefits that beginners can achieve. Kundalini Yoga is a combination of physical postures, breathing, physical movement, stretching, meditation, chanting and relaxation.This chapter aims at exploring a systematic counselling method supported by yoga especially for behavioural intervention. Swami Satyananda Saraswati believes that Kundalini Yoga is a part of the tantric tradition. Even though you may have already been introduced to yoga, it is necessary to know something about tantra also. Since ancient times, wise men have realised that the mind can be expanded and that experiences do not necessarily depend on an object.20 He adds that to awaken kundalini one must prepare oneself through yogic techniques. One must practice asanas, pranayama, kriya yoga and meditation.Then one will be able to force prana into the seat of kundalini. As per his version, in Sanskrit, kundal means a coil, and so kundalini has been described as ‘that which is coiled.’ The word kundalini actually comes from the word kunda, meaning ‘a deeper place, pit or cavity. Kunda refers to the concave cavity in which the brain, resembling a coiled and sleeping serpent, nestles.’ Swami Satyananda Saraswati says that the practices of Kundalini Yoga are intended to create awareness, not necessarily to awaken kundalini, and adds that, in a yogic lifestyle, one begins to have experiences and one realises something is happening to one. When a student begins to analyse his experience and understands his energy, he is on the path to peace and happiness.

Notes 1 Morley D. Glicken, Evidence-Based Practice with Emotionally Troubled Children and Adolescents (Burlington: Elsevier, 2009), accessed on November 13, 2018, www.sciencedirect.com/book/9780123745231/ evidence-based-practice-with-emotionally-troubled-children-and-adolescents. 2 Leo Kanner, “Do Behavior Symptoms Always Indicate Psychopathology,” Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 1, no. 1 (2006):17–25. 3 Keith Davis and James M. Benshoff, “A Proactive Approach to Couples Counseling with Adolescents,” Professional School Counseling 2 (1999): 391–94. 4 Ronald C. Kessler, National Comorbidity Survey: Adolescent Supplement (NCS-A), 2001–2004. Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research July 13, 2015, www.icpsr.umich.edu/ icpsrweb/HMCA/studies/28581/version/4. 5 Matthew K. Nock et al., “Lifetime Prevalence, Correlates, and Persistence of Oppositional Defiant Disorder: Results from the National Comorbidity Survey Replication,” Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 48, no. 7 (2007): 703–13. 6 Glorisa Canino et al., “Does the Prevalence of CD and ODD Vary Across Cultures?” Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology 45, no. 7 (2010): 695–704. 7 Barbara Maughan et al., “Conduct Disorder and Oppositional Defiant Disorder in a National Sample: Developmental Epidemiology,” Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 45, no. 3 (2004): 609–21. 8 Elizabeth M. O’Laughlin, Jessica L. Hackenberg, and Maria M. Riccardi, “Clinical Usefulness of the Oppositional Defiant Disorder Rating Scale (ODDRS),” Journal of Emotional and Behavioral Disorders 18, no. 4 (2010): 247–55. 9 Karen Carver, Kara Joyner, and Richard J. Udry, “National Estimates of Adolescent Romantic Relationships,” in Adolescent Romantic Relationships and Sexual Behavior:Theory, Research, and Practical Implications, ed. Paul Florsheim (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum and Associates, 2003), 20–60; Lloyd Grieger,Yasamin Kusunoki, and David J. Harding, “The Social Contexts of Adolescent Romantic Relationships,” Focus 31, no. 1 (2014): 15–17. 10 Susan Moore et al., “Characteristics and Predictors of Romantic Relationships in Late Adolescence and Young Adulthood in Hong Kong and Australia,” Australian Psychologist 47 (2012): 108–17.

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11 Luca Ventura, “The Most Peaceful Countries in the World 2018,” Global Finance, June 21, 2019, www. gfmag.com/global-data/non-economic-data/most-peaceful-countries. 12 “Youth in India,” Statistics Office, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India (Social Statistics Division), 2017: 3. 13 Georg Feuerstein, “East Comes West: An Historical Perspective,” in Feuerstein, Sacred Paths (Burdett, NY: Larson Publications, 1991). 14 C. G. Jung, The Psychology of Kundalini Yoga (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012). 15 Ibid., xxxii. 16 Dmitry Danilov, “What Is Kundalini? Theorizing on the Question,” accessed November 16, 2018, www.academia.edu/4579028/What_is_Kundalini_Theorizing_on_the_question. 17 Stephanie Bryan, Genevieve Pinto Zipp, and Raju Parasher, “The Effects of Yoga on Psychosocial Variables and Exercise Adherence: A Randomized, Controlled Pilot Study,” Alternative Therapies in Health and Medicine 18, no. 5 (2012): 50–59. 18 Alison R. Bond et al., “Embodied Health: The Effects of a Mind–Body Course for Medical Students,” Medical Education Online 18, no. 1 (2013): 1–8. 19 Andrea Elibero, Kate Janse Van Rensburg, and David J. Drobes, “Acute Effects of Aerobic Exercise and Hatha Yoga on Craving to Smoke,” Nicotine and Tobacco Research 13, no. 11 (2011): 1140–48. 2 0 Swami Satyananda Saraswati, Kundalini Tantra, accessed November 18, 2018, http://thek ingdomwithin.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Swami-Satyananda-Saraswati-KundaliniTantra.pdf.

Bibliography Banerjee, Anirban. “Youth Participation in Indian Elections.” Society Today 2, no. 2 (2013): 58–67. Bond, Alison R., Heather F. Mason, Chelsey M. Lemaster, Stephanie E. Shaw, Caroline S. Mullin, Emily A. Holick, and Robert B. Saper. “Embodied Health: The Effects of a Mind–Body Course for Medical Students.” Medical Education Online 18, no. 1 (2013): 1–8. Bryan, Stephanie, Genevieve Pinto Zipp, and Raju Parasher. “The Effects of Yoga on Psychosocial Variables and Exercise Adherence: A Randomized, Controlled Pilot Study.” Alternative Therapies in Health and Medicine 18, no. 5 (2012): 50–59. Canino, Glorisa, Guilherme Polanczyk, J. J. Bauermeister, Luis A. Rohde, and Paul J. Frick. “Does the Prevalence of CD and ODD Vary Across Cultures?” Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology 45, no. 7 (2010): 695–704. Carver Karen, Kara Joyner, and Richard J. Udry. “National Estimates of Adolescent Romantic Relationships.” In Adolescent Romantic Relationships and Sexual Behavior: Theory, Research, and Practical Implications, edited by Paul Florsheim, 20–60. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum and Associates, 2003. Davis, Keith M., and James M. Benshoff. “A Proactive Approach to Couples Counseling with Adolescents.” Professional School Counseling 2 (1999): 391–94. Elibero, Andrea, Kate Janse Van Rensburg, and David J. Drobes. “Acute Effects of Aerobic Exercise and Hatha Yoga on Craving to Smoke.” Nicotine and Tobacco Research 13, no. 11 (2011): 1140–48. Feuerstein, Georg. “East Comes West: An Historical Perspective.” In Feuerstein, Sacred Paths. Burdett, NY: Larson Publications, 1991. Glicken, Morley D. Evidence-Based Practice with Emotionally Troubled Children and Adolescents, Burlington: Elsevier, 2009. www.sciencedirect.com/book/9780123745231/evidence-based-practice-with-emo tionally-troubled-children-and-adolescents, accessed November 13, 2018. Grieger, Lloyd, Yasamin Kusunoki, and David J. Harding. “The Social Contexts of Adolescent Romantic Relationships.” Focus 31, no. 1 (2014): 15–17. Jung, C. G. The Psychology of Kundalini Yoga. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012. Kanner, Leo. “Do Behavior Symptoms Always Indicate Psychopathology?” Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 1, no. 1 (2006): 17–25. Kuntsevich, Viktoria, William C. Bushell, and Neil D. Theise. “Mechanisms of Yogic Practices in Health, Aging, and Disease.” Mount Sinai Journal of Medicine 77 (2010): 559–69.

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Maughan, Barbara, Richard Rowe, Julie Messer, Robert Goodman, and Howard Meltzer. “Conduct Disorder and Oppositional Defiant Disorder in a National Sample: Developmental Epidemiology.” Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 45, no. 3 (2004): 609–21. Moore, Susan, Cynthia Leung, Wally Karnilowicz, and Ching-Leung Lung. “Characteristics and Predictors of Romantic Relationships in Late Adolescence and Young Adulthood in Hong Kong and Australia.” Australian Psychologist 47, no. 22 (2012): 108–17. Nock, Matthew K., Alan E. Kazdin, Eva Hiripi, and Ronald C. Kessler. “Lifetime Prevalence, Correlates, and Persistence of Oppositional Defiant Disorder: Results from the National Comorbidity Survey Replication.” Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 48, no. 7 (2007): 703–13. O’Laughlin, Elizabeth M., Jessica L. Hackenberg, and Maria M. Riccardi. “Clinical Usefulness of the Oppositional Defiant Disorder Rating Scale (ODDRS).” Journal of Emotional and Behavioral Disorders 18, no. 4 (2010): 247–55. “Youth in India.” Statistics Office, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India (Social Statistics Division), 2017.

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Part V

Sport in West Asia and the Middle East

Sport in West Asia and the Middle East is a topic that requires particular attention from academia.To date, research and publications have scraped only the surface of this area, mainly focusing on political and gender issues. This part of the book tries to offer a picture of the overall development of sport in this region, including traditional sport that were popular among Arabic nations and the rise of modern sport and the Olympic Games. It also discusses the role of the Pan Arab Games and Islamic Solidarity Games in the construction of a collective cultural identity among Arabic countries.

39 Sport and diplomacy in the Middle East Andrea L. Stanton

Introduction The December 2010 announcement that Qatar would host the 2022 FIFA World Cup sent ripples of change – and waves of pushback – around the sporting world. Despite soccer’s popularity in the Middle East, no World Cup had been held there before, and Qatar seemed a particularly improbable host as a small country with a tiny population and summer temperatures of 50C or above. But news accounts noted how Qatar had focused on sport investment for over a decade in order to attract international attention, successfully getting the Qatar Masters listed as part of the PGA European Tour and the Qatar Open as a major world tennis event. It built its hosting abilities with the 2006 Asian Games and bid to host the 2016 Summer Olympics. Putting Qatar on the global sport map represented a major, sustained commitment to global nation-branding and diplomatic equity. As Sheikha Moza bint Nasser, consort of then-emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, said, ‘It sends out a message that after 92 years of waiting [since the first World Cup in 1930] we are fully part of the global football family,’ bringing teams from over 40 countries, and their attendant media coverage, to Qatar.1 Qatar’s efforts to make itself known on the international sport scene – in golf, tennis, and now soccer – offer a powerful case study for the use of sport to advance diplomatic or other foreign policy aims. While some organisations, like the United Nations, have focused on international sport engagement as a ‘powerful tool to promote peace, tolerance, and understanding by bringing people together across boundaries, cultures and religions,’2 some scholars have considered these efforts as inherently connected to politics and an important, if complex, part of international diplomacy.3 However, some other scholars argue, sport engagements do not achieve diplomatic success naturally: they must be systematic and be supported by foreign policy objectives in order to be successful. ‘[O]nly the systematic and lasting use of sport, both at grassroots and top levels, can make it a powerful diplomatic tool.’ Sport engagements must be ‘embedded in and supported by a wider strategy that pursues the same political goals,’ as Qatar’s have been.4 Yet Qatar’s FIFA win has met with pushback due to its hot desert climate and FIFA’s attendant decision to move the World Cup from summer to winter, its treatment of the foreign workers building World Cup stadiums5 and potential involvement in FIFA corruption scandals. Also in play are hostile UAE efforts to sabotage Qatar’s hosting.6 419

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Recognising the challenges that can attend efforts like Qatar’s, this chapter surveys various areas in which sport and diplomacy have intersected, focusing on diplomatic relationships between states within the Middle East as well as between Middle Eastern states and states around the world. It looks at regional or lower-level sport events and their connections to the global ‘mega-events’ – the World Cup and the Olympic Games. It highlights successful sport engagements as well as the challenges that states and non-state actors face when engaging in sport as public diplomacy and suggests that states outside the European and American power centres face the possibility that sport engagement may not lead to diplomatic achievements or successful nation-branding.

Historical overview: the emergence of modern sport in the Middle East Indigenous sport have a long history in the region, with sport like running, archery, and wrestling dating to ancient times. As with indigenous sport in other world regions, these sport activities were also useful in wartime or as preparation for raids and community defence, and consequently seem to have been more likely to involve younger people as participants. Women seem also to have participated in sport activities at various points in ancient history, and in various Middle Eastern societies. Sport are mentioned in the Qur’an, along with the merit of maintaining one’s physical health.The hadith, which record the sayings of Muhammad and key anecdotes about his life, suggest his support for sport activities, especially those that strengthened the body and could support the community in military conflict. He is depicted as having participated in running contests with his wife Aisha, and encouraged his companions to engage in horse races. He also appears to have enjoyed wrestling and archery, as well as swimming. Building on this early legacy, the medieval Sunni theologian al-Ghazali, a major architect of normative belief and practice in Sunni Islam, encouraged children in playing games and physical activities.7 Soccer came to the region with colonisation in the late nineteenth century, as did other European sport like tennis and basketball.8 This period also brought a new, self-consciously modern concept of sport and male physical culture to the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere – linked to other efforts at defensive modernisation and self-strengthening. Sport appeared as an important means for men to engage in an activity open to all, regardless of religion or ethnicity – although sport clubs tended to be aligned with ethno-religious identities. Participating in sport was seen as a moral and a national act: building strong, disciplined, morally oriented bodies that would support the community and the nation.9 As states in the Middle East achieved independence starting in the mid-twentieth century, some emphasised the role of sport in building a strong national community – including in their national constitutions. Kuwait, with one of the earliest postindependence constitutions in 1962, notes that ‘The state devotes particular care to the physical, moral and mental development of the youth.’10 ‘Physical education is a foundation for the building of society,’ the 1973 Syrian Constitution says; ‘The state encourages physical education to form a physically, mentally, and morally strong generation.’11 The Turkish Constitution of 1982 included a section on ‘Development of Sport,’ stating: ‘The State shall take measures to develop the physical and mental health of Turkish citizens of all ages, and encourage the spread of sport among the masses,’ adding: ‘The State shall protect successful athletes.’12 These constitutional statements reflect a focus on domestic sport development, echoed as well in the many countries – in the Middle East and elsewhere – with ministries of youth and sport, including Lebanon and Egypt. However, they also reflect a foundational state understanding of sport as integrally connected to youth development, with physical and moral benefits for the individual and for the nation. At the levels of participation and of spectatorship, soccer has been the most popular sport in the region, facilitating its interconnection with state and popular politics as well as religious activism.13 Sport 420

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as national development and self-strengthening might be understood as an underlying element of sport engagement internationally: governments that envision sport as integral to the national project may be able and willing to leverage citizens’ participation and interest in sport when engaging in international sport events. As Silverstein has argued, sporting practices – domestic, regional, and international – are central ‘to the very making and unmaking of communities, nations, and states,’ and play a foundational role in political engagements at all levels.14

Sport and diplomacy and the World Cup Soccer is generally acknowledged to be the most popular sport in the Middle East, as it is in many other parts of the world.While Qatar seems on track to be the first Middle Eastern country to host the World Cup in 2022, Egypt was the first African and Arab country to participate in a World Cup, in 1934.15 While hosting the World Cup represents a new global moment in terms of expanding the hosting regions of the world beyond Europe and the Americas, its high-profile status has also led to intense scrutiny of Qatar, its government, its labour practices, its climate, its sporting achievements and its preparations for 2022. Reiche describes ‘sporting success’ for a state as including hosting sport mega-events, winning medals at international sporting events and making global sport investments in major world teams or clubs.16 Very few countries have the opportunity to host a sport mega-event, and winning more medals at those events may be difficult, but wealthy countries (or countries with wealthy, sport-minded individuals) can invest in global sport teams or clubs – as Qatar has.While Reiche argues that none of these approaches seem to have had much domestic impact in Qatar, they may be more useful in the international arena.The third approach may prove more feasible, and have a greater pay-off in terms of public diplomacy, than hosting. Similarly, sponsorship – of teams or events – may also be an effective means of projecting soft power, as the United Arab Emirates’ Emirates Airlines has shown with its soccer sponsorships. (Al Jazeera’s sport channel, which has become the leading sport network in the MENA (the Middle East and North Africa) region and has made inroads in Europe, North America and Asia, may end up in a similar role.)17 The 2014 removal of FIFA’s ban on the hijab or other head coverings for women has facilitated women’s participation in soccer (and other sport) by expanding narrow understandings of sport garb.18 While framed more as ‘body politics’ or as part of the broader issue of contemporary Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hostilities, removing the ban might also be productively understood as a diplomatic achievement for what Fahy has described as the faith-based diplomacy of Qatar (and other states).19 More broadly, the promotion of women’s sport in the conservative Gulf states – at all levels, including international sport events – reflects the important role that ‘the image of the pious and modern woman’ plays in ‘contemporary Gulf nationalisms’ and their projections domestically, regionally and internationally.20

Sport and diplomacy and the Olympics The modern Olympic Games began in 1896 and by the outbreak of World War I had become a major institution, whose participation signalled a key level of recognition by the Europeandominated international community. A few countries began participating in the Olympics with recognised national committees before World War I. Egypt’s Olympic Committee was recognised in 1910, for example, and the Ottoman (later Turkish) Olympic Committee was recognised in 1911. Others joined after obtaining their independence from colonial powers: Morocco in 1959, Algeria in 1964. Other countries’ Olympic engagement started at later moments in their national histories, like Jordan in 1963 (17 years after independence) or Bahrain in 1979 421

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(eight years after independence).21 As is well known, no Middle Eastern city has been chosen to host the Olympics. However, the history of Middle Eastern cities putting in bids to host the Summer Olympics stretches back to 1916, when Alexandria, Egypt – then under British colonial governance – was an official candidate city. Egypt has had candidate cities three times: Alexandria again in 1936 and Cairo in 2008. Turkey’s Istanbul has placed bids five times, from 2000 to 2020 – when it was a final-round candidate along with Madrid and winning city Tokyo. Doha has placed bids for 2016 and 2020. Dubai expressed interest in placing a bid for 2016, but did not submit one; its National Olympic Committee announced that it would bid for the 2024 Summer Olympics, but ultimately did not.22 Middle Eastern royal family members and other elites have played a prominent role in national Olympic committees. The brother of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi led Iran’s NOC from its founding in 1947 until his death in 1954; another half-brother led the NOC from 1954 until the Iranian revolution in 1979. Uday Hussein, oldest child of former President Saddam Hussein, led the Iraq NOC and its soccer association from 1984 until the US-led overthrow of the Baathist government; he was known for brutalising athletes who failed to perform well in competitions.23 Middle Eastern elites’ participation in the International Olympic Committee dates back to the early days as well. Gabriel Gemayel, brother of major Lebanese political figure Pierre Gemayel and uncle to Presidents Bashir and Amin Gemayel, was elected to lifetime membership of the IOC in 1952, five years after he founded Lebanon’s NOC.24 While the IOC’s member size has expanded since the 1950s, membership is still a signal of national stature and influence. A few Middle Easterners, again mostly elites, are current IOC members: Prince Feisal Al Hussein of Jordan, brother of the current king, has been head of the Jordanian NOC since 2004 and an IOC member since 2010. (Other IOC members seem to have been appointed for bureaucratic or athletic achievements. Nawal El Moutawakel, Morocco’s sole IOC member, served in its Ministry of Youth and Sport and won gold in the 1984 Summer Olympics; she also won medals in numerous other regional competitions. She was the first Muslim woman to win a gold medal at the Olympics as well as the first Muslim woman appointed to the IOC.)25 Middle Eastern elites have also been appointed to serve on various IOC commissions, though such membership is less significant than IOC membership. For example, in 2018, three Saudis were appointed to IOC commissions – all members of the royal family, including Princess Reema bint Bandar Al Saud, whose appointment to the IOC Women and Sport Commission follows her earlier work to advance Saudi women’s career opportunities and professional development.26 Kuwait’s NOC has consistently been headed by a member of the royal family; in June 2019, the 32-year-old grandson of the emir began his presidency with ten other newly elected board members, starting its operations afresh after the IOC lifted the suspension on Kuwaiti participation in Olympic events.27 In addition to serving on NOCs and IOCs, a smaller number of Middle Eastern royal family members and other elites have competed in the Olympic Games, almost all since 2000. Princess Haya bint Al Hussein of Jordan, for example, competed for Jordan in equestrian sport at the Summer Olympics in 2000, although she did not medal. Three members of Dubai’s royal family have competed in men’s shooting events, with Sheikh Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Hasher Al Maktoum taking gold in 2004. Two female members of Dubai’s royal family have competed as well, one in equestrian events and one in Taekwondo. Two Saudi royals have competed in equestrian events.The net impact of such high-level participation in the NOCs, IOC and in the Games themselves may be to suggest to citizens, particularly those of more conservative Gulf states, the acceptability and importance of sport participation; it also suggests the prevalence of royal family members in the political sphere, especially in smaller Middle Eastern states. As Amara notes, sport serves as a political domain at the national and international levels, in the Middle East and elsewhere.28 422

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While the Olympics is generally presented as a gathering of nation states in a global, international sport engagement, it has also served as an opportunity for Middle Eastern states to engage regional political issues. Middle Eastern states have participated in the 1956, 1976, 1980, and 1984 Olympic boycotts. The 1956 boycott was sparked by the Suez Crisis, the 1980 boycott by the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, the 1976 boycott related to apartheid, and the 1984 boycott to US relations with Iran and Libya. Boycotts seem to have been the least effective political action relating to the Olympics. As Rosner and Low argue, ‘[B]oycotts have accomplished only the limited goals of making a fleeting political or ideological statement,’ without achieving substantive political change.29 Yet boycotts at a state-to-state level have been important for signal-sending, as with ‘one of the last sporting boycotts in the global world of sports.’ The boycott has limited Lebanon’s ability to host international sport events, and thus its ability to capitalise on the soft power accrued from doing so.30 The case of Lebanon suggests the symbolic importance of the Olympics for participating states, even when their athletes are unlikely to win any medals. As of the 2016 Olympics, Lebanon has won four medals since 1948 – two silver and two bronze.Yet it has continued to field athletes continuously, even through times of major turmoil – like the country’s civil war, which lasted from 1975 to 1990 – and minor ones – like its moments of instability since 2005.31 In general, Arab and other Middle Eastern states are considered to have consistently under-performed in terms of Olympic medal counts, due to ‘variables such as finance, demography, sporting culture, policy and governance, and athlete migration’ rather than any simplistic assumptions about religion or ethnicity.32 Yet these states continue to send Olympic delegations to every Summer Games, suggesting that Olympic participation conveys diplomatic benefits that go beyond medal counts, providing opportunities to participate with more powerful states as a relative equal and to participate in regional sport events in leadership roles – as Lebanon did in the 1960s and 1970s and as Syria did in the 1980s and 1990s.33 Finally, Middle Eastern states have participated in the Special Olympics, which are run as IOC-recognised competitions for athletes with intellectual disabilities.While the Special Olympics are less often recognised as having political elements, regionally they seem to have supported small-scale moments in conflict reduction – as with ‘safe zones’ or similar areas established to enable athletes from Iraq to travel safely to compete in regional Special Olympics in 2004, 2006, and 2008. Here also, elites have been involved in some key leadership roles: Special Olympics in Egypt, which was established in 1982, operated from 1994 until the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak under the patronage of his wife, then-First Lady Suzanne Mubarak.34 Regional Special Olympics games have been held regularly since Egypt hosted the first one in 1999, and in March 2019 the United Arab Emirates hosted the first World Games held in the Middle East.

Sport and diplomacy in regional sporting events The iconic sport ‘mega-events,’ like the Olympic Games, tend to draw the greatest attention in terms of global media coverage and analyst interest. However, as Grix and others emphasise, regional sport events can also support states’ efforts to use sport for public diplomacy.35 Like the Olympic Games, these efforts can include hosting regional events or competing in them – and while they draw less attention globally, they can serve as an important space for public diplomacy, whether in terms of building ally relationships, shunning enemy states or projecting soft power. Within the Middle East, the primary regional sport events have been those connected to the Olympics, like the Asian and Mediterranean Games and the regional qualifiers for the World Cup. To some extent, Middle Eastern states have used hosting opportunities to highlight their self-positioning. Gabriel Gemayel, founding head of Lebanon’s NOC and IOC member, played 423

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an instrumental role in the country’s hosting of the third Mediterranean Games in Beirut in 1959, which served to showcase the country as modern, forward-looking, and a regional leader – despite controversies over Israel’s participation and ongoing fallout from Lebanon’s 1958 domestic unrest. While the country also hosted the second Arab Games, it was the Mediterranean Games which offered Lebanon greater regional rewards.36 As an IOC-sponsored event, it attracted European attention and European participation, while fitting Lebanon’s selfproclaimed identity as a Mediterranean country with an ‘Arab face’ rather than as an Arab country. Since the Lebanese civil war, the Lebanese Olympic Committee has been granted authority to recognise the sport engagements of non-IOC regional games, including the Arab and Islamic Solidarity Games – and to operate autonomously from Lebanon’s Ministry of Youth and Sports.37 Other countries have also leveraged the Mediterranean Games’ geographically and culturally hybrid identity: Turkey, which hosted the Games in 1971 (Izmir) and 2013 (Mersin), anticipates long-term economic and public perception gains from future tourist and sport events coming to Mersin.38

Sport and diplomacy in other international sporting events Middle Eastern states have been active participants in ethnic sport events – notably, the Pan Arab (later Arab) Games – as well as some religiously organised games. Established under the auspices of the newly formed Arab League as countries across the Middle East and North Africa were gaining their independence from European colonial regimes, the first Pan Arab Games were held in Egypt in 1953. Participant countries included those still under colonial rule, non-Arab League members, non-Arab states like Turkey, and non-Middle Eastern (but Muslim-majority) states like Pakistan and Indonesia. Because the IOC does not recognise ethnic sport events, participation in these Games would not count towards Olympic qualification for any athletes, nor could they be presented as taking place with IOC patronage. This may have contributed to the Pan Arab Games’ somewhat irregular schedule but did not curtail its regional political value. Particularly in its first 15 years, the Pan Arab Games ‘played an important role as a vehicle of communication regarding the goals and aspirations of a Pan-Arab movement.’39 The Organisation of the Islamic Conference established the Sports Federation of Islamic Solidarity Games in the early 2000s, with the first Games held in 2005 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.40 As with the Arab Games, the Islamic Solidarity Games have been held somewhat irregularly, although Azerbaijan hosted them in 2017 and Turkey is expected to host the next Games in 2021.41 In some cases, hostile governments have effectively used sport events to ease tensions, as with the US wrestling team that visited Iran in 1998 to compete in the Takhti Cup, establishing a tradition of wrestling exchanges between the two countries that continued through the late 2010s.42 While these kinds of exchanges can provide opportunities for a bilateral easing of tensions, they have been unable to resolve larger, long-standing conflicts – even with the bestknown efforts, like the Seeds of Peace initiative, which was established in 1993 to bring together young Israelis and Palestinians.43 In others, hostilities have led to limits on a state’s ability to host sport events. Israel was prevented from hosting soccer events by the Union of European Football Associations in the early 2000s due to security concerns, along with volleyball and other sport associations (although basketball and tennis competitions continued to be held there).44

Conclusion The question of sport and diplomacy in the Middle East comes in the wake of what Sorek has termed a ‘power shift in international sports . . . with the awarding of mega sporting events to 424

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countries such as Bahrain, Qatar, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates’ – leading to scholarship focused on the business, management and policies of sport in the region, rather than politics.45 The arc of Middle Eastern states’ engagement with international sport and diplomacy has grown from participation to signal membership in the community of sovereign states in the 1950s and 1960s, to the strategic use of boycotts through the 1980s, to the rise of the Gulf states as would-be power players in the 2000s – with engagement in regional or ethnic sport events as a consistent counterpoint. However, the more recent trend raises the question of whether sport and diplomacy has begun giving way to sport engagement as diplomacy, with states little known for their sport activity now hosting or investing in sport events and teams, primarily for little other than nation-branding and public diplomacy purposes. James Dorsey, long-time observer of soccer and politics in the Middle East, has argued that international sport engagement offers small states like Qatar the opportunity to engage in public diplomacy through the projection of soft power.46 But projecting soft power through sport is not simple, and the response to it is not guaranteed, whether the projection is aimed at regional states, civil society or international audiences. While recognising that ‘dynamics in the sports sphere are an integral part of political processes and sometimes they take part in generating them,’47 it is also important to acknowledge that the unfolding and impact of sport engagements go beyond the control of the states that participate in them – especially for those outside the historical power centres of Western Europe and North America.

Notes 1 James Montague, “Qatar: From Obscure Desert Kingdom to World Cup Host,” CNN, December 3, 2010, http://edition.cnn.com/2010/SPORT/football/12/02/world.cup.qatar.opinion/index.html. 2 “International Day of Sport for Development and Peace 6 April,” United Nations, undated, www. un.org/en/events/sportday/index.shtml. 3 Stuart Murray and Geoffrey Allen Pigman, “Mapping the Relationship Between International Sport and Diplomacy,” Sport in Society 17, no. 9 (2014): 1098–118. 4 Udo Merkel, “Sport as a Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Tool,” in Routledge Handbook of Sport and Politics, ed. Alan Bairner, John Kelly, and Jung Woo Lee (New York: Routledge, 2017), 28–38. 5 Azadeh Erfani, “Kicking Away Responsibility: FIFA’s Role in Response to Migrant Worker Abuses in Qatar’s 2022 World Cup,” Jeffrey S Moorad Sports Law Journal 22, no. 2 (2015): 623–62. 6 James Montague and Tariq Panja, “Ahead of Qatar World Cup, a Gulf Feud Plays Out in the Shadows,” New York Times, January 2, 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/02/01/sports/world-cup-2022-qatar. html?module=inline. 7 Mahfoud Amara, “Sport and Political Leaders in the Arab World,” Histoire Politique 2, no. 23 (2014): 142–53. 8 Alon Raab, “Sport in the Middle East,” in The Oxford Handbook of Sports History, ed. Robert Edelman and Wayne Wilson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 287–300. 9 Murat Yildiz, “Strengthening Male Bodies and Building Robust Communities: Physical Culture in the Late Ottoman Empire” (Diss., University of California, Los Angeles, CA, 2015). 10 “Kuwait Constitution of 1962,” English translation by the International Constitutional Law (ICL) Project, www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ku00000_.html. 11 “Syrian Constitution of 1973,” English translation by the International Constitutional Law (ICL) Project, www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/sy00000_.html. 12 “Constitution of the Republic of Turkey,” November 7, 1982, www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5be0. html. 13 Raab, “Sport in the Middle East.” 14 Paul A. Silverstein, “Sports, Bodily Habitus, and the Subject(s) of the Middle East,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 51, no. 3 (August 2019): 482–85. 15 Amara, “Sport and Political Leaders in the Arab World.” 16 Danyel Reiche, “Investing in Sporting Success as a Domestic and Foreign Policy Tool: The Case of Qatar,” International Journal of Sports Policy and Politics 7, no. 4 (2015): 489–504. 425

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17 Mahfoud Amara, “Sport and Politics in the Arab World,” in Routledge Handbook of Sport and Politics, ed. Alan Bairner, John Kelly, and Jung Woo Lee (New York: Routledge, 2017), 129–36. 18 Ibid., 134. 19 John Fahy, “International Relations and Faith-based Diplomacy: The Case of Qatar,” The Review of Faith and International Affairs 16, no. 3 (2018): 76–88. 20 Charlotte Lysa, “Football Femininities: Lessons from the Gulf,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 51, no. 3 (August 2019): 479–81. 21 “National Olympic Committees,” International Olympic Committee website, www.olympic.org/ national-olympic-committees?q=AlphabeticalOrderFilter. 22 Ola Salem, “Dubai’s Olympic Wait Will Be Worth It, Officials Say,” The National, August 1, 2011, www. thenational.ae/uae/dubai-s-olympic-wait-will-be-worth-it-officials-say-1.463994. 23 Don Yaeger, “Son of Saddam as Iraq’s Top Olympic Official, Uday Hussein Is Accused of the Torture and Murder of Athletes Who Fail to Win,” Sports Illustrated March 24, 2003, 110–12, archived online, www.si.com/vault/2003/03/24/340225/son-of-saddam-as-iraqs-top-olympic-official-uday-husseinis-accused-of-the-torture-and-murder-of-athletes-who-fail-to-win. 24 Andrea L. Stanton, “ ‘Pioneer of Olympism in the Middle East’: Gabriel Gemayel and Lebanese Sport,” International Journal of the History of Sport 15, Special Issue on Middle East Sport (Fall 2013): 2115–30. 25 “Academy Members”, Laureus World Sports Awards, www.laureus.com/world-sports-academy/ members/nawal-el-moutawakel. 26 “Saudi Royals Appointed to International Olympic Committee,” Arab News, August 29, 2019, www. arabnews.com/node/1363626/saudi-arabia. 27 “Kuwait Olympic Committee Elects New President and Board of Directors,” Association of National Olympic Committees website, March 7, 2019, www.anocolympic.org/nocs-highlights/ kuwait-olympic-committee-elects-new-president-and-board-of-directors/. 28 Amara, “Sport and Political Leaders in the Arab World,” (2014). 29 Scott Rosner and Deborah Low, “The Efficacy of Olympic Bans and Boycotts on Effectuating International Political and Economic Change,” Texas Review of Entertainment and Sports Law 11, no. 1 (Fall 2009): 27–80. 30 Danyel Reiche, “Not Allowed to Win: Lebanon’s Sporting Boycott of Israel,” Middle East Journal 71, no. 1 (Winter 2018): 28–47. 31 Stanton, “Pioneer of Olympism.” 32 Mahfoud Amara, “The Olympic Movement and the Middle East and North African Region: History, Culture, and Geopolitics–An Introduction,” International Journal of the History of Sport 34, no. 13 (2017): 1343–46. 33 Andrea L. Stanton, “Syria and the Olympics: National Identity on an International Stage,” International Journal of the History of Sport 31, no. 3 (2014): 290–305. 34 Lesley Kitchen Lababidi and Nadia El-Arabi, Silent No More: Special Needs People in Egypt (Cairo and New York: American University in Cairo Press, 2002). 35 Jonathan Grix, “The Mixed Record of Sports Diplomacy,” interview by Eleanor Albert, Council on Foreign Relations, February 6, 2018, www.cfr.org/interview/mixed-record-sports-diplomacy. 36 Stanton, “Pioneer of Olympism.” 37 Nadim Nassif and Mahfoud Amara,“Sport, Policy, and Politics in Lebanon,” International Journal of Sports Policy and Politics 7, no. 3 (2015): 443–55. 38 Zafer Yildiz and Sinem Cekic, “Sport Tourism and Its History and Contribution of Olympic Games to Touristic Promotion,” International Journal of Science Culture and Sport, Special Issue on the Proceedings of the 4th ISCS Conference (August 2015): 326–37. 39 Luis Henrique Rolim Silva and Hans-Dieter Gerber, “Our Games! The Pan-Arab Games (1953– 1965),” International Journal of the History of Sport 29, no. 15 (2012): 2099–114. 40 Mohd Ma’Sum Billah, “Role of the OIC and Other International Organizations in the Sustainable Development of Islamic Finance,” in Islamic Financial Products: Principles, Instruments, and Structures (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 13–31. 41 Murad Ismayilov, Post-Soviet Modernity and the Changing Contours of Islamic Azerbaijan (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018). 42 Frank Pingue, “Wrestling: Putting Politics Aside, Iran Beats US in World Cup Final,” Reuters, February 17, 2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-wrestling-worldcup-idUSKBN15W1T1. 43 Gerald M. Steinberg, “The Limits of Peacebuilding Theory,” in The Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding, ed. Roger MacGinty (New York: Routledge, 2013), 36–53. 426

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44 Yair Galily, Ilan Tamir, and Moshe Levy, “The Games Must Go on? The Influence of Terror Attacks on Hosting Sporting Events in Israel,” Israel Affairs 8, no. 4 (October 2012): 629–44. 45 Tamir Sorek, “Introduction: Is There a Middle Eastern Sport?” International Journal of Middle East Studies 51, no. 3 (August 2019), 465–67. 46 James Dorsey, “Qatar’s Sports-Focused Public Diplomacy Backfires,” The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer (Blog), February 3, 2014, http://mideastsoccer.blogspot.com/2014/02/qatars-sports-focusedpublic-diplomacy.html. 47 Sorek, “Is There a Middle Eastern Sport?” 465.

Bibliography Amara, Mahfoud.“Sport and Political Leaders in the Arab World.” Histoire Politique 2, no. 23 (2014): 142–53. Amara, Mahfoud. “The Olympic Movement and the Middle East and North African Region: History, Culture, and Geopolitics–An Introduction.” International Journal of the History of Sport 34, no. 13 (2017): 1343–46. Amara, Mahfoud. “Sport and Politics in the Arab World.” In Routledge Handbook of Sport and Politics, edited by Alan Bairner, John Kelly, and Jung Woo Lee, 129–36. New York: Routledge, 2017. Billah, Mohd Ma’Sum. “Role of the OIC and Other International Organizations in the Sustainable Development of Islamic Finance.” In Islamic Financial Products: Principles, Instruments, and Structures, 13–31. Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. “Constitution of the Republic of Turkey,” November 7, 1982. www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5be0.html. Erfani, Azadeh. “Kicking Away Responsibility: FIFA’s Role in Response to Migrant Worker Abuses in Qatar’s 2022 World Cup.” Jeffrey S Moorad Sports Law Journal 22, no. 2 (2015): 623–62. Fahy, John. “International Relations and Faith-based Diplomacy: The Case of Qatar.” The Review of Faith and International Affairs 16, no. 3 (2018): 76–88. Galily, Yair, Ilan Tamir, and Moshe Levy. “The Games Must Go on? The Influence of Terror Attacks on Hosting Sporting Events in Israel.” Israel Affairs 8, no. 4 (October 2012): 629–44. Grix, Jonathan. “The Mixed Record of Sports Diplomacy.” Interview by Eleanor Albert, Council on Foreign Relations, February 6, 2018. www.cfr.org/interview/mixed-record-sports-diplomacy. Ismayilov, Murad Ismayilov. Post-Soviet Modernity and the Changing Contours of Islamic Azerbaijan. London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018. “Kuwait Constitution of 1962.” English translation by the International Constitutional Law (ICL) Project. www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ku00000_.html. Lababidi, Lesley Kitchen, and Nadia El-Arabi. Silent No More: Special Needs People in Egypt. Cairo and New York: American University in Cairo Press, 2002. Lysa, Charlotte. “Football Femininities: Lessons from the Gulf.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 51, no. 3 (August 2019): 479–81. Merkel, Udo. “Sport as a Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Tool.” In Routledge Handbook of Sport and Politics, edited by Alan Bairner, John Kelly, and Jung Woo Lee, 28–38. New York: Routledge, 2017. Murray, Stuart, and Geoffrey Allen Pigman. “Mapping the Relationship Between International Sport and Diplomacy.” Sport in Society 17, no. 9 (2014): 1098–118. Nassif, Nadim, and Mahfoud Amara. “Sport, Policy, and Politics in Lebanon.” International Journal of Sports Policy and Politics 7, no. 3 (2015): 443–55. Raab, Alon. “Sport in the Middle East.” In The Oxford Handbook of Sports History, edited by Robert Edelman and Wayne Wilson, 287–300. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. Reiche, Danyel. “Investing in Sporting Success as a Domestic and Foreign Policy Tool: The Case of Qatar.” International Journal of Sports Policy and Politics 7, no. 4 (2015): 489–504. Reiche, Danyel. “Not Allowed to Win: Lebanon’s Sporting Boycott of Israel.” Middle East Journal 71, no. 1 (Winter 2018): 28–47. Rosner, Scott, and Deborah Low. “The Efficacy of Olympic Bans and Boycotts on Effectuating International Political and Economic Change.” Texas Review of Entertainment and Sports Law 11, no. 1 (Fall 2009): 27–80. 427

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Silva, Luis Henrique Rolim, and Hans-Dieter Gerber. “Our Games! The Pan-Arab Games (1953–1965).” International Journal of the History of Sport 29, no. 15 (2012): 2099–114. Silverstein, Paul A. “Sports, Bodily Habitus, and the Subject(s) of the Middle East.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 51, no. 3 (August 2019): 482–85. Smith, Ginger, Andrea Cahn, and Sybil Ford. “Sports Commerce and Peace:The Special Case of the Special Olympics.” Journal of Business Ethics 89 (2010): 587–602. Sorek,Tamir. “Introduction: Is There a Middle Eastern Sport?” International Journal of Middle East Studies 51, no. 3 (August 2019): 465–67. Stanton, Andrea L. “ ‘Pioneer of Olympism in the Middle East’: Gabriel Gemayel and Lebanese Sport.” International Journal of the History of Sport 15, Special Issue on Middle East Sport (Fall 2013): 2115–30. Stanton, Andrea L. “Syria and the Olympics: National Identity on an International Stage.” International Journal of the History of Sport 31, no. 3 (2014): 290–305. Steinberg, Gerald M. “The Limits of Peacebuilding Theory.” In The Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding, edited by Roger MacGinty, 36–53. New York: Routledge, 2013. “Syrian Constitution of 1973.” English translation by the International Constitutional Law (ICL) Project. www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/sy00000_.html. Yildiz, Murat. “Strengthening Male Bodies and Building Robust Communities: Physical Culture in the Late Ottoman Empire.” Diss., University of California, Los Angeles, CA, 2015. Yildiz, Zafer, and Sinem Cekic. “Sport Tourism and Its History and Contribution of Olympic Games to Touristic Promotion.” International Journal of Science Culture and Sport, Special Issue on the Proceedings of the 4th ISCS Conference (August 2015): 326–37.

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40 Sport and international relations in the Arab world Bakeel Al Zandani and Youcef Bouandel

Introduction Nation-state building and strengthening political legitimacy, security and attempts at constructing a collective identity and the Arab ummah have been at the forefront of international relations in the Middle East.The creation of Israel on Arab land in 1948 strengthened the idea of this collective identity, which manifested itself, among other things, in sport. This chapter looks at the role of sport in international relations in the Middle East and assesses the development of sport in the region. It also looks at popular traditional sport and the rise of modern sport. Particular attention is paid to the use of sport as a branding and to what extent sport has been successful in constructing a collective identity among Arab countries. In order to address these points, the first section outlines the theoretical perspectives in a discussion of sport and international relations.The second section examines the role of sport as a tool for collective identity. The third section analyses the role of sport as soft power, focusing on countries in the Arab Peninsula. The concluding section summarises the findings and, crucially, answers the question of whether sport and sporting events have been successful in the construction of a collective cultural identity among Arabic countries.

Sport and international relations To the layperson, sport and politics are not related. Whenever sport is mentioned, the first thing that springs to mind is individuals, groups and states competing for glory. When politics and international relations are mentioned, it is individuals, groups and states competing for positions of influence. Thus, apart from competition, the two issues are separate. The reality, however, is that the two are intertwined. Membership of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the International Federation of Football Associations (FIFA) is almost as important as membership of the United Nations (UN). Palestine, for instance, sees its membership of the IOC since 1995 and of FIFA since 1998 as a stepping stone towards recognition as a full member by the United Nations. Indeed, membership of the IOC outnumbers that of the UN. Furthermore, there is a close connection between sport and the prevailing political ideology in a country. Houlihan argues, ‘[S]port is a mirror of society and consequently it is a reasonably accurate 429

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reflection of the prevailing ideology found within a particular state at a particular time.’1 In this sense, the prevailing ideology dominates the behaviour of the political elite, and sport is used as a vehicle for spreading this ideology. Sport competitions are invariably used to achieve the elites’ interests and display the superiority of their ideology. A survey of sporting events since the end of World War I in 1918 shows that all governments, irrespective of their political ideology, have used international sporting competitions ‘as a testing ground for the nation or the political system. German Nazis, Italian Fascists, Soviet and Cuban Communists, Chinese Maoists, Western capitalists, Latin American juntas – all have played the game and believed in it.’2 Indeed, Mussolini used the 1934 FIFA World Cup, held in Italy, to display Fascist Italy. Similarly, Adolf Hitler used the Olympic Games in 1936 to promote the Nazi ideology of the superiority of the Aryan race. As such, sport is used as an important tool to promote national unity and stress collective identity. This is particularly significant in countries that have, for a long time, been under colonial occupation and embarked on a process of state building, or countries that are characterised by deep divisions along ethnic, linguistic and religious lines. Perhaps the most significant example of this is the South African Rugby team, dubbed the ‘rainbow,’ which won the World Cup in 1995 after the end of apartheid. In functionalist terms, sport is a vehicle for the socialisation of citizens through which messages and images are diffused to strengthen the belief in the values that the country wishes to send. Jackson and Haigh correctly argue that ‘sport has long served as an important source of collective identification and is perhaps one of the most powerful and visible sources of national identity and nationalism.’3 In addition to this, sport plays a significant role in how a particular state is perceived, both internally and, most importantly, externally. International sporting events, such as the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup tournaments, for instance, given the enormous public attention and media coverage they receive, represent a very good opportunity for sport as a propaganda tool. Governments, regardless of the type of political system or prevailing ideology, use these events to serve their particular interests. Former communist countries, for instance, used successful performance in international sport events as a legitimising tool. In this sense, sport serves, Riordan and Kruger argue, ‘to mobilize resources to use sport to perform what is believed to be salient political functions in their foreign policy.’4 Sport is also used as a diplomatic tool between states. Countries that do not have friendly relations may use sport as the first port of call. For instance, taking part in games organised by or involving country A by country B suggests that relations between the two countries, despite the hostile environment that exists, have not reached a point of no return. This participation might present the two countries with an opportunity to work on improving their relations. Perhaps the most cited example is US President Richard Nixon’s use of ‘ping-pong diplomacy’ (table tennis) to start diplomatic relations with China in the early 1970s. In this sense, sport can be a uniting force and help in building bridges between countries. Similarly, boycotting sport tournaments or not facing athletes from particular countries, can, at least, be seen as showing disapproval of a country’s policies or suggest that relations between the two countries are either broken or have reached a breaking point. During the Cold War (1945–1990), several countries boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games, allegedly because of the former Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. Four years later, several countries from the former communist bloc returned the ‘favour’ by boycotting the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games. Over the last century, a number of international sporting events have been targeted by political agendas and conflicts. This is particularly true of the FIFA World Cups and the Olympic Games, the latter of which is the most watched of any sport gathering. More recently, ‘in the lead-up to the Euro12 football championships, the British government announced it would send no Ministers to attend matches in the Ukraine because of ongoing concerns about that 430

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country’s human rights record.’5 Furthermore, arguably, the most uncontested example when it comes to the significance of politics and international relations is the boycott movement against the former apartheid regime in South Africa. Beginning in the 1960s, activists and NGOs campaigning against the regime in South Africa saw in sport organisations a potential powerful ally to raise people’s awareness of the racist practices of the South African regime in an attempt to isolate it. Cricket and Rugby Union, arguably the most popular sport in South Africa, were targeted in New Zealand, Australia and England. Demonstrators exerted pressure on their countries’ respective teams not to participate in contests against South Africa as a sign of protest. This protest soon took on an international dimension and in 1970 the IOC simply banned South Africa from competing in its games. This represented an official declaration against apartheid and South Africa found itself isolated. These actions were significant in putting an end to apartheid in the country in 1991. Sport, on the other hand, is used as a sign of the rehabilitation of a state. Four years after the end of apartheid, South Africa hosted and won the 1995 Rugby World Cup. South Africa’s hosting of the FIFA World Cup in 2010 cemented this process. When it comes to the discipline of international relations, three approaches have dominated the field: Realism, Pluralism and Marxism.6 Each perspective, Keohane argues, ‘incorporates a set of distinctive questions and assumptions about the basic units and forces in world politics.’7 Hence, from the outside, it seems that these perspectives do not cover sport: they are essentially concerned with issues of security, trade, power, foreign policy and so on. Indeed, realism focuses exclusively on the role of the state as the basic unit of analysis and uses power as the driving force in international relations. It does not explore the actions of other actors, such as nongovernmental organisations (NGOs)or associations of sport.Therefore, it does not offer much in terms of analysing the role of sport in international relations. Pluralist and Marxist approaches, on the other hand, do offer a better structure for analysis of sport and international relations. Like the realist paradigm, they both acknowledge the important place the state occupies in international relations, but they stress the role of non-governmental actors. Marxists stress the importance of economic relations, including equalities. Whilst it is a fact that sport has become very big business driven by a multibillion dollar industry, the scope of this paradigm, however, remains limited in answering all the questions that sport and international relations ask. Pluralism, by comparison, offers a better tool for understanding this relationship. It not only takes into account the role different groups perform but sees foreign policy agendas as multidimensional. This includes pressure, negotiation and compromise on issues ranging from socio-economic and legal to environmental and so on. More recently, ‘soft power’ has been used as a paradigm for analysing international relations.8 Sport exchange is a tool of public diplomacy, the aim of which is the nurturing of mutual understanding. Having said that, sport in general does not receive the attention it deserves in the study of international relations. According to Black, this is the result of bias as the field continues to be dominated by American and . . . European . . . preoccupations.The result is a widespread neglect of the concerns of the newer and smaller jurisdictions [which] . . . include . . . international sport and sporting events. . . . Closely related to this is a bias towards the material and empirical, or measurable, and against the cultural, symbolic or intangible.9 Sport has presented a fertile terrain for the study of issues pertaining to international relations both from theoretical and applied perspectives. Perhaps the most uncontested issue that sport contributes to is globalisation. The role and activities of NGOs cannot be underestimated. Organisations pertaining to human rights have exerted pressure and sought the support of highprofile athletes to publicise human rights abuses in specific countries. Furthermore, the IOC, for 431

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instance, has been interested in issues beyond sport, such as the environment. In 1992, it attended ‘the Rio Earth Summit, and from there worked towards achieving observer status in the General Assembly.’10 The involvement of the IOC in political issues not only raises peoples’ awareness of them but also draws media attention. Nevertheless, this made the organisation much more open to scrutiny when it was perceived to turn a blind eye to issues elsewhere. To be sure, the IOC was criticised for not taking a position on Saudi Arabia and the debate on whether or not the country ‘should be barred from London [Olympics 2012] because of its treatment of female athletes.’11 The Saudis stated that their women athletes would compete only if ‘they dressed moderately [and] were accompanied by a male guardian, and did not mix with other men.’12

Sport as a tool for collective identity Sport, as anywhere else, plays a significant role in the political affairs of the Arab world. It has been used, to varying degrees, as a tool to resist colonial power and raise national and collective identity. It was also used to legitimise the ruling elite and strengthen the notion of national identity as defined by the power holders. More recently, particularly in the Arabian Peninsula, sport is used as ‘soft power’ and/or ‘public diplomacy’ to give these countries more exposure on the world stage. Thus, any discussion of sport in the Arab world must outline its history and development from traditional sport that are specific to the region to the rise of modern sport. We can also analyses the extent to which sport has been successful in the construction of a collective identity throughout the Arab world. Physical endurance and competition have been at the heart of Arab traditions for centuries. Throughout history, Arab rulers, even before the formation of the modern nation state, have paid particular attention to physical power. The teachings of Islam, a religion that was launched over 14 centuries ago in the Arabian Peninsula, stressed the importance of sport. The Prophet Mohamed urged Muslims to teach their children swimming, archery and horse riding. Given the harsh geography of the Arabian Peninsula, it comes as no surprise that horses, falcons and archery were, and still are to a large extent, an integral part of the people’s daily life. Hunting, sailing (trade and fishing) as well as diving were means of subsistence. Until the 1940s, for instance, pearl diving was one the main sources of revenues for many families in the Arabian Gulf.The sport practised reflected this environment and culture. Hence, camel and horse racing, and falcon hunting were, and still are, common practises in many Arab countries.They combine competition and physical strength when celebrating religious or cultural events. A small survey of the history of the twentieth century in relation to sport in the Arab world reveals that Egypt was the first Arab country to take part in international sport competitions. It participated in the FIFA World Cup tournament held in Italy in 1934. Furthermore, the most prominent football clubs in Egypt: Al-Ahly and Zamalek, were closely linked with the Egyptian political establishment. Zamalek, which is also the name of one of the most exclusive neighbourhoods in Cairo, was close to the then Egyptian King Farouk. Al Ahly, on the other hand, is more representative of the ordinary Egyptian people. Saad Zaghloul, the leader of the Wafd Party, who led the struggle against British occupation and espoused nationalist and anti-monarchical sentiments, founded this football team in 1907.13 Football clubs, throughout the Arab world, were bastions for nationalism. The names given to clubs reflected anti-colonial sentiments and raised awareness about a collective identity that was distinct from that of the colonial power. Several of these names reflected the Arab-Muslim dominant culture in the region. Mouloudia in Algeria was established in 1921. Its name derives from the Arabic term mawlid: the birth of the Prophet of Islam. Al Karama (dignity) in Syria in 1928 and Al Hilal (the crescent) in Sudan in 1930 are clear symbols of the Islamic faith. Perhaps one of the most pertinent examples of the use of 432

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sport to resist occupation is the Algerian FLN’s (Front de Libération National/National Liberation Front) team. In 1957, Algerian professional players in the French League, some of whom, such as Rachid Mekhloufi, could have played for France in the 1958 FIFA World Cup in Sweden, formed it. The team went on to play over 50 games, mainly in the Arab world and the former communist countries.To be sure, the fact that these players gave up fame and money to publicise the Algerian struggle for independence, in a rare marriage between sport and politics, gave the Algerian cause more exposure.14 The development of this collective identity at the regional level (Arab community – ummah) cannot be understood without reference to two particular important events that took place in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The first is the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, and the second is the Egyptian revolution (read coup d’état) in 1952.The creation of Israel on Palestinian/ Arab land was perceived as a failure of the political systems that existed at the time. Nationalist feelings rose and coups against the existing regimes began, especially after the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967, in which the Arabs were heavily defeated. From Egypt in 1952 to Iraq in 1958, Algeria in 1965, Libya in1969, and Syria in 1970, the new military leaders espoused a discourse of Arab unity. This political discourse of collective identity was more visible in Egypt. Its new leader, Gamal Abdul Nasser, who led the Free Officers to topple the monarchy in 1952, saw himself as the champion of the Arab cause and saw Arab unity as a salvation. He provided military and financial support to Algerians who started their war for independence from France in 1954. His decision to nationalise the Suez Canal in 1956 resulted in the tripartite (France, Great Britain and Israel) aggression against his country. As a result, Egypt, Iraq and Lebanon boycotted the 1956 Olympic Games in Melbourne, Australia, in protest against this aggression. Whilst several Arab countries were still under occupation at the time, this was the first instance of a collective sport-based united Arab action against military intervention in the region. However, the united Arab front seemed to be more of a mirage than a reality. Despite Egypt’s support for the Algerian struggle for independence, the Egyptian national team, for whatever reasons and against the official rhetoric coming out of Cairo, refused to play against the FLN’s team.15 After independence, sport was used to bring people together, reduce tension and strengthen the existing ties between the countries involved. North African countries (Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia) established la Coupe du Maghreb (competition for winners of national championships in the Maghreb region) in 1968. In the mid-1970s, a conflict arose between the two biggest countries in the region, Algeria and Morocco, over the Western Sahara territory. Politics interfered once more with sport and the tournament was abolished in 1976.16 The Gulf countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Oman and Qatar) established the Gulf Cup: a football tournament involving the national teams of the six countries. A number of other sport that reflect the cultural peculiarities of the region, such as camel racing competitions, take place on a regular basis. However, political reasons, as we have seen in the case of the North African countries, and as we shall see later in relation to Gulf countries, such as the blockade of Qatar in June 2017, significantly affected the collective identity sport tends to create. The importance of sport in strengthening this collective identity can be further seen in the position of Israel. Despite being in Asia in general and the Middle East in particular, it has been excluded from many of the sporting events that take place in the region. Indeed, for sporting reasons, Israel is considered European. Because it is surrounded by Arab and Muslim countries, the majority of which not only do not recognise it but also see it as a colonial entity, its national team is seeded with European countries and teams in the Israeli football league play in European competitions, such as the Europa League and the preliminary rounds of the Champions League. The killing of Israeli athletes in the 1972 Munich Olympic Games is the extreme example of 433

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the collision between sport and politics in the Middle East. Furthermore, despite the improvement in relations between a number of Arab countries, such as Jordan and Egypt with the restoration of diplomatic relations, some athletes from the Arab and the Muslim world simply refuse to face their Israeli counterparts in official competitions, forfeiting medals on a number of occasions and risking fines from sport associations.17

Sport as soft power Towards the end of the twentieth century, and especially in the beginning of the twenty-first century, particularly in a number of Arab Gulf states, sport has been used as soft power.A close examination of the Arabian Peninsula reveals that Qatar has been the most visible country in the region because of its investment in sport and international exposure. Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani, who assumed his country’s throne in 1995, has transformed the country beyond recognition. He embarked on a process of reforms and modernisation. He established Al Jazeera Satellite Channel that put the country firmly on the international stage, made conflict resolution (Article 7 of the 2004 Qatari Constitution) a pillar of his country’s foreign policy, and used ‘soft power’ as a means towards achieving his country’s objectives. In terms of sport, Qatar embarked on a relentless and consistent marketing policy to secure international exposure.The organisation of the Asian Games in 2006 is arguably the major turning point in this process. Since then, Qatar has been organising sport events on a yearly basis and has developed sport facilities, such as Aspire Zone, that have become the envy of the developed world. Indeed, Aspitar, a medical facility in Doha, is one of the most important destinations for sportsmen and women from around the world who are seeking cures for their sport-related injuries. Furthermore, taking advantage of the technological advancements and the worldwide appeal of sport, Qatar created Al Jazeera Sport (now BeIn Sport). It has become the most important player in sport broadcasting, covering all sorts of sport from the different parts of the world. Neighbouring countries, particularly Bahrain and the UAE have not only followed the Qatari model of branding but also tried to compete with it. Bahrain and Abu Dhabi in the UAE holding their own international Formula One Grand Prix are good examples. It also seems that the Qataris and the Emiratis, in particular, have taken their competition for international exposure to Europe.They have been associated with some of the biggest names in European and world football through either acquiring these clubs or being one of their sponsors.The Emiratis are the owners of the English football club, Manchester City while the Qataris own the French club Paris St Germain. Qatar and the UAE were the sponsors of Spain’s top two clubs, Barcelona and Real Madrid, to name just a few. The relentless drive for branding and international exposure led Qatar to bid for and win the right to host the FIFA World Cup in 2022. This decision was celebrated not only in Qatar but also throughout the Arab world. This will be the first event of its kind to be held in the region and a real test of the Qatari’s abilities to organise and navigate the troubled waters that resulted from FIFA’s decision to award Qatar the hosting rights. This decision, in December 2010, coincided with the launch of the Arab Spring in Tunisia in the same month. The two unrelated events, sporting and political, brought Qatar firmly under the spotlight and had a significant impact on its international relations, particularly with its neighbours. In January 2011, Tunisia’s President Ben Ali was ousted as demonstrations spread throughout the Arab world and claimed the position of a number of long-standing despots.18 Qatar, the only Arab country that did not see any demonstrations against its regime, played a pivotal role in the Arab League and the United Nations when it came to dealings with regimes such as Qaddafi’s.19 The hosting of the World Cup put Qatar under scrutiny. Accusations of corruption notwithstanding, nongovernment organisations and Western media accused Qatar of gross violations of human rights. 434

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In an attempt to discredit the country in the hope of taking away the right to host the tournament, the rights of migrant workers, who are building the infrastructure for the World Cup, were highlighted.The government of Qatar on the other hand, whilst acknowledging that there were shortcomings, insisted that the necessary measures had been taken to address these shortcomings. Whilst the hosting of the World Cup in an Arab country brought euphoria throughout the region, political events that followed the launch of the Arab Spring had disastrous effects. Qatar’s support for Islamists, the strongest political force in the Arab world, put it at loggerheads with anti-revolutionary forces in the KSA and the UAE. Therefore, on 6 June 2017, Qatar woke up to the news that Bahrain, Egypt, the KSA and the UAE had cut off diplomatic ties with it and closed their air space to Qatari aircraft. The KSA had closed its borders – the only land borders Qatar has. Despite the move being politically motivated, sport were affected. Dorsey argues that the World Cup increased tensions between Gulf countries rather than de-escalating the crisis. He goes on to state that the blockading countries have been eager and fully prepared to take away the benefits that Qatar may derive from the World Cup.20 Indeed, FIFA put a plan forward to increase the competitions from 32 to 48 teams starting in 2022, in an effort to use football to build bridges between countries. The suggestion, however, was not approved.21 Infantino, FIFA’s president, admitted that the blockade ‘is complicating the situation,’ but was hopeful that when ‘it comes to football people talk to each other.’22 Indeed, despite this blockade, Qatari teams have been taking part in the Asian Football Confederation competitions and playing against teams from the blockading countries. In the last Asian Cup, in 2019, hosted by the UAE, Qatar emerged as winners. However, the abuse Qatari players received when they played the host country suggests that the chasm between the rhetoric of Khalidji (Arab goodwill and unity) versus reality is as great as it has ever been.

Conclusions Making sense of relations between states and developing a collective identity through sport is not a straightforward exercise. The general assumption that sport and politics do not mix is too simplistic – the two are closely related. Sport was a significant factor in the development of a collective identity in the Arab world, distinct from that of colonial powers. Arab states, whilst preserving traditional sport, have embraced modern sport wholeheartedly. Through branding, countries in the Arabian Peninsula, in particular, project the region as stable and able to play a significant part in world sport. However, sport has not been a decisive instrument in international relations for the Arab world. Furthermore, sport has not been able to create the much sought after Arab collective identity. On the contrary, sport has been a victim of politics, since political considerations are the driving force behind any sporting decision.

Notes 1 Barrie Houlihan, Sport and International Politics (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), 15. 2 Allison Lincoln,‘ “The Changing Context of Sporting Life,’ ” in The Changing Politics of Sport, ed. Allison Lincoln (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 17. 3 Steven J. Jackson and Steven Haigh, “Introduction: Between and Beyond Politics: Sport and Foreign Policy in a Globalizing World,” in Sport and Foreign Policy in a Globalizing World, ed. Steven J. Jackson and Steven Haigh (London: Routledge, 2009), 3. 4 Jim Riordan and Arnd Kruger, The International Politics of Sport in the 20th Century (New York: E & FN Spon, 1999), 62. 5 Brian Stoddard, “Changing Perspectives on Global Sport, International Relations and World Politics,” Global Policy (Blog), July 16, 2012, accessed June 16, 2019, www.globalpolicyjournal.com/ blog/16/07/2012/changing-perspectives-global-sport-international-relations-and-world-politics-0. 435

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6 Karen A. Mingst, Essentials of International Relations (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1999). 7 Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 2. 8 Joseph Nye, Soft Power:The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 9 David Black, “Dreaming Big: The Pursuit of ‘Second Order’ Games as a Strategic Response to Globalization,” in Sport and Foreign Policy in a Globalizing World, ed. Steven Jackson and Stephen Haigh (London: Routledge, 2009), 121. 10 Stoddard, “Changing Perspectives on Global Sport.” 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Michel Raspaud, “Cairo Football Derby: Al-Ahly-Zamalek,” in Sport Around the World: History, Culture and Practice, ed. John Nauright and Charles Parrish (ABC-CLIO, 2012), 283–84. 14 Mahfoud Amara and Youcef Bouandel, “Algeria,” in The Palgrave International Handbook of Football and Politics, ed. Jean-Michel De Waele et al. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 329–45. 15 Ibid. 16 Interview with a former member of the Algerian national team that played in the 1982 and 1986 world cups. Algiers, August 2016. 17 “Jordanian Judo Athlete Refuses to Fight Israeli at Major Tournament,” Al Araby, August 15, 2018, accessed June 1, 2019, www.alaraby.co.uk/english/blog/2018/8/15/jordanian-judo-athlete-refuses-tofight-israeli-competitor. 18 Larbi Sadiki and Youcef Bouandel, “The Post-Arab Spring Reform: The Maghreb at a Cross Roads,” DOMES -Digest of Middle East Studies 25, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 109–31. 19 Press Association, “UN Security Council Resolution on Libya: Key Points,” The Guardian, March 18, 2011, accessed May 5,2019,www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/18/un-security-council-resolution-key-points. 20 Brookings,“Lessons from the 2019Asian Cup:Sport,Globalization,and Politics in theArabWorld,”accessed June 14, 2019, www.brookings.edu/events/lessons-from-the-2019-asian-cup-sport-globalization-andpolitics-in-the-arab-world/. 21 Al Jazeera, “FIFA Shelves Plan to Expand 2022 World Cup to 48 Teams,” Al Jazeera, May 23, 2019, accessed May 28, 2019, www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/fifa-qatar-2022-world-cup-32-teams-19 0522195332047.html. 22 David Conn, “Qatar Would Help Middle East Peace by Sharing 2022 World Cup,” The Guardian, November 21, 2018, accessed June 2, 2019, www.theguardian.com/football/2018/nov/21/ qatar-2022-world-cup-48-teams-gianni-infantino-fifa.

Bibliography Allison, Lincoln. “The Changing Context of Sporting Life.” In The Changing Politics of Sport, edited by Lincoln Allison, 1–23. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993. Amara, Mahfoud, and Youcef Bouandel. “Algeria.” In The Palgrave International Handbook of Football and Politics, edited by Jean-Michel De Waele et al., 329–45. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. Black, David. “Dreaming Big: The Pursuit of ‘Second Order’ Games as a Strategic Response to Globalization.” In Sport and Foreign Policy in a Globalizing World, edited by Steven Jackson and Stephen Haigh, 119–32. London: Routledge, 2009. Houlihan, Barrie. Sport and International Politics. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994. Jackson, Steven, and Stephen Haigh. “Introduction: Between and Beyond Politics: Sport and Foreign Policy in a Globalizing World.” In Sport and Foreign Policy in a Globalizing World, edited by Steven J. Jackson and Steven Haigh, 1–10. London: Routledge, 2009. Keohane, Robert. International Institutions and State Power. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989. Mingst, Karen A. Essentials of International Relations. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1999. Nye, Joseph. Soft Power:The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs, 2004. Raspaud, Michael. “Cairo Football Derby: Al-Ahly-Zamalek.” In Sport Around the World: History, Culture and Practice, edited by John Nauright and Charles Parrish, 283–84. ABC-Clio, 2012. Riordan, James, and Arnd Krüger. The International Politics of Sport in the 20th Century. New York: E & FN Spon, 1999. Sadiki, Larbi, and Youcef Bouandel. “The Post-Arab Spring Reform: The Maghreb at a Cross Roads.” DOMES – Digest of Middle East Studies 25, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 109–31. 436

41 Arab countries’ strategies to bid and to host major sport events Wadih Ishac

Introduction The past few years have witnessed an increase in the number of countries investing in hosting sport events. These investments target different factors that help in developing and improving the host countries’ territories. Such investments include investing in recreational sport, elite sport development, bidding to host international and mega sport events or investing in foreign sport clubs. The increased focus on hosting sport events is due to the fact that sport events are used as an arena for countries to compete against each other while providing them with a global sporting arms race to improve their international prestige. Furthermore, when a team participates in these events and wins, they are viewed as a part of their country’s soft power, which is evaluated on its victories and the level of performance delivered. For instance, a country can show its strength and capability through the number of Olympic medals won, reflecting its global image.1 Therefore, the success gained in sport events is a reflection of the strength and the prestige of a nation, which is why sport competitions have become a field where ideologies are spread and for reflecting the political situation between countries.2 Additionally, a country winning international or mega sport events increases its residents’ pride, joy, and happiness.3 Many researchers have agreed that the main benefits generated from hosting international sport events are focused on domestic social and economic change.4 Another benefit includes the increase of power and influence for the hosting country in its international relations. Along with this approach, the economic growth of the hosting country reflects its power, which provides the country with an advantage in being chosen to host a sport event.5 The countries bidding to host major sport events are playing an active and influential role on the global scene through their economic capabilities, where some become game-changers in the governance of the global economy through their involvement on the international scene via international economic organisations.6 As a result, bidding to host major sport events or investing abroad in sport gives these countries the economic ability and the political need to boost their authority in global affairs.7

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Strategy for globalisation It is important to understand why globalisation is encouraging these countries to implement strategies to bid for and host these sport events. The meaning of globalisation can be explained by the consolidation of the world into one space, in other words, a ‘global community.’ Additionally, it is the ‘compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole.’8 Therefore, this multifaceted phenomenon called globalisation helps in improving connections between nations and regions. Most countries’ strategies have become more focused on attracting international events while linking them to their image and ideologies. As a result, countries have started bidding to host international sport events more and more, providing them with the opportunity to showcase their capabilities and abilities to perform at a high level and to win. Hosting sport events is the opportunity to spread national cultural practices on a global level9 while creating an impact on reception, interpretation, organisation and practice. There is no doubt that sport events have profited from globalisation, and this is seen through the increased number of countries participating at different levels in sport events. Globalisation has helped in reducing barriers between countries and nationalities; therefore, the host countries have also indirectly profited from this globalisation. For instance, football became ‘unique in its ability to bridge differences and overturn national prejudices.’ This is seen when two nations come together and join forces to host a mega sport event. One such event was the case of the 2002 FIFA World Cup, where South Korea and Japan, despite all the political problems between both countries, combined in a joint venture.10 Governments are implementing strategies to host international and mega sport events in order to generate positive impacts. Researchers have agreed that different types of impacts are generated by the community from hosting international sport events;11 these impacts are categorised as physical, cultural, social, political and economic, which can be studied before, during or after the events takes place.12 Furthermore, hosting sport events has become one of the best tools for branding. In fact, it is used in a way that allows countries to brand themselves on the international scene in order to attract more tourists. Bidding to host mega sport events helps the bidding countries to spread their national cultural practices on the global scene. Furthermore, sport events and sport competitions give rise to common bonds where people strengthen their national identity.13

Hosting sport events in the MENA region Countries from the MENA (the Middle East and North Africa) region are focusing on strategies for improvement in tourism and other sectors. Bidding to host sport events (international or mega) can help in achieving their objectives for their improvement purposes. For instance, hosting international or mega sport events allows these countries to attract more tourists who will be coming to attend these events. While there, tourists will have the opportunity to travel and mingle while they are introduced to the hosting country’s culture and traditions, along with the ambiance provided by attending the sport event itself. As a result, hosting sport events can improve tourism if it is used in a well-planned strategy and is well communicated to reach all audiences. Hosting international or mega sport events, such as the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup, has been shown to increase and attract a more global audience and to shape tourism patterns.14 For example, the Middle East has seen an increase in the number of international tourist arrivals, approximately 10 percent on an annual average.15 In general, all these countries located in the MENA region are hosting or bidding to host international or mega sport events despite their economic situation. For instance, the economies 438

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of the Gulf countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE are built mainly on the oil and natural gas industries. Although these countries were never a destination for tourists, today these countries are applying different strategies to develop tourism, especially since developing the tourism sector is being used as a new source of revenue to boost their economy for the future.16 Therefore, hosting or bidding to host international or mega sport events gives Arab countries an opportunity for repositioning and global configuration of production, in terms of finance and commerce, where tourism is an important aspect.17

North African countries Egypt Egypt is one of the oldest countries to host sport events and has been hosting them since ancient times. Egypt has hosted the African games in 1991, the Pan Arab Games in 1953 and 1965, and the football African Cup of Nations in 1959, 1986 and 2006.18 Furthermore, in 2000, the country launched a website to promote its bid to host the FIFA 2010 World Cup. The purpose of this bid was to boost the economic situation and improve the country’s international reputation while developing a sense of national pride;19 it was also an opportunity to improve Egypt’s interaction with countries from Asia and Africa.20 According to Lopez, Egypt’s attempt, during Mubarak’s regime, to bid against two other African countries for the hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup failed. South Africa won the bid to host the event, with 14 votes, while Morocco’s bid got 10, and Egypt’s got zero.21 There is no doubt that this bid under Mubarak’s regime was related to strengthening his position within the country itself and to showcase Egypt as an African country welcoming everyone. Nonetheless, FIFA officials saw Egypt as a country promoting itself as a superior country to the rest of Africa. The bid focused on Egypt’s singular cultural heritage instead of promoting the country as an African ambassador and representative, along with the lack of political freedom.22 Recently, the Minister of Youth and Sport stated that Egypt plans to bid for the 2030 FIFA World Cup and the 2032 Olympic games.23 This statement came after a meeting with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Since his arrival, President Sisi has set up a new strategy in his foreign policy where Egypt is playing the role of a mediator between Palestine and Israel. Furthermore, the ‘Sisi doctrine’ defines the president’s foreign policy by looking more towards Africa, which is seen in the president attending the African Summits.24 Hence, the country should focus on stabilising and improving its internal situation, such as its economy, transportation facilities and public facilities, before projecting externally and bidding on hosting mega sport events.

Tunisia Tunisia hosted the Mediterranean Games in 1967 and 2001 as well as the football African Cup of Nations in 1965, 1994 and 2004.25 According to Amara, both heads of state, Habib Bourguiba (1959–1987) and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (1987–2011) targeted the hosting of international sport events as one of their strategies for improvement.26 Tunisian presidents, among others, understood the supportive value of football to improve national identity. As stated by Abbassi, the purpose of hosting the Mediterranean Games and the football African Cup of Nations was not only to improve foreign policy but also to provide an expression of the new symbolic identity that he (the president) wanted to embody.27 Since the change of regime, different factors affected the position of Tunisia to bid to host international or mega sport events, so Tunisia has taken more of a passive position. The instability of its economy and security are the main 439

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concerns affecting the decision to host sport events. Today, Tunisia is in a transitional situation, taking its time to come up with a strategy for the coming years.

Morocco Morocco is one of the main North African countries active in bidding to host international or mega sport events. The country invested massively in hosting tennis tournaments, which may have been due to the fact that King Hassan II was a fan of tennis. They have also invested in golf for tourism purposes. Investing in hosting golf events increases the opportunity to compete with other Mediterranean countries located nearby, like Spain and Portugal. This strategy opens the country to a new market and new types of tourists influenced by participating in this type of sport events. Morocco hosted the Mediterranean Games in 1983, the Pan Arab Games in 1961 and 1985, the Jeux de la Francophonie (Francophone Games) in 1989, and the football African Cup of Nations in 1988. Furthermore, Morocco made unsuccessful bids in 1994, 1998, 2006 and 2010.28 Despite these disappointments, the country bid to host the 2026 FIFA World Cup while competing against the United States, Canada and Mexico. Their bid focused on their passion for football, their geolocation as a potential match venue and their European time zones.29 Once again Morocco was unable to secure the votes needed; however, the country is now seeking to host the 2030 FIFA World Cup, supported by King Mohammed VI, and a plan was established to seek joint ventures with neighbouring countries. Joining forces with other countries in North Africa will be difficult – especially with Algeria, due to the current political situation and the tension between these countries over their border which has been closed for more than 20 years. The only option that would likely be successful would be to join forces with Portugal and Spain. A joint bid with the European countries would improve Morocco’s diplomatic relations with the European countries while improving its image in and ties to Europe.

Algeria The country has been active in bidding for and hosting events in the past decade: it hosted the African Games in 1978 and 2007, the Mediterranean Games in 1975, the Pan Arab games in 2004 and the football African Cup of Nations in 1990.30 Amara argued that Algeria under the leadership of President Boumedienne was able to spread its socialist program by showing the world the results achieved through organising the Mediterranean Games in 1975 and the African Games in 1978.31 From 1990 to 2005, Algeria was not active in bidding to host sport events due to its domestic political situation. In late 2006, they started to bid to host continental sport events such as the African Games. After regaining their political stability, Algeria was able to win the bid to host the 2021 Mediterranean Games in Oran, the second-largest city in Algeria.32 This city was destroyed in the civil war and hosting such events will help to improve infrastructure development and attract more tourists. Furthermore, Algeria recently opened a new airport with a capacity for 10 million travellers as part of its strategy to attract more tourists and to improve this sector. With the new political situation in place it is difficult to foresee the approach that will be taken by the government. What we can understand from the strategies implemented in hosting sport events is that Algeria has focused on hosting small-scale sport events and, when they aim to host international or mega sport events, they focus on events related to youth development, which can be understood as an intention to provide youth with opportunities. 440

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Middle-East countries Lebanon The 1990s saw the end of the Lebanese civil war. Until then, the country was inactive in bidding to host international sport events. After this period, and with the new settlement between the different parties in the country, a new phase started where different parties agreed to develop the country. This agreement was followed by hosting several sport events, notably the Pan Arab Games in 1997, the football Asian Cup of Nations in 2000 and the Jeux de la Francophonie in 2009. The Pan Arab Games took place during the period of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, who was able to secure external funds provided by Saudi Arabia to build a sport complex to host the event. By hosting this event, the Prime Minister saw an opportunity to re-establish Lebanon’s credibility and to reinforce unity with other Arab countries.33 Despite the economic and political instability, Lebanon kept participating in international and mega-events, reflecting its strategy in youth and grassroots development. It is important to mention that between the 1996 and the beginning of the twenty-first century, Lebanon witnessed an era of sport development; for example, the country improved its positive recognition on the international scene by participating in and hosting basketball tournaments.The Lebanese basketball team became among the best in Asia. In 1999 and 2000, the country hosted the Asian championship for clubs where the Lebanese Sagesse team won both tournaments. Every person in the region associated the country’s name with its basketball team. Huge private investments were implemented to develop youth through basketball. Although Lebanon achieved this huge recognition in sport, Lebanese politicians were not able to profit from this opportunity to reposition and reshape their country’s image, and the only positivity generated from these participations and wins was in the pride of the Lebanese population. In recent years, Lebanon hosted the Beirut marathon, an annual event taking place in Beirut. Its first edition took place in 2003 with 6,000 runners participating.The 2018 edition witnessed almost 10 percent of the total participants being foreigners; this increased number shows the wider recognition of the event on the international sport scene. Hosting such an event exposes Lebanon and the entire region to a new approach to the use of sport events, an approach where the participants are contributing to a cause and the rewards are going directly to society or to NGOs related to that specific cause. Such an approach has given inspiration, support and motivation for self-development for many Lebanese and foreign activists campaigning for a specific cause. The 2017 edition of this event witnessed instability on the political level. A few days before the event took place, the Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri resigned during a visit to Saudi Arabia.34 This resignation put Lebanon in an unstable situation and the country had no choice but to use this event, recognised internationally, to call for diplomatic and international support for the return of their Prime Minister. Adopting the Lebanese unity and patriotism reflected in event participation, President Michel Aoun asked the Beirut Marathon to use the event as a demonstration asking the Prime Minister to return. May the Beirut marathon tomorrow be a national, athletic demonstration of solidarity with PM Hariri and with his return to his country.35 Accordingly, while the marathon took place, the Lebanese people united, holding signs reading ‘Running for you’ and ‘Waiting for you.’ The whole media sector – advertisers, broadcasters, 441

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influencers – was engaged to promote the country’s demand, which resulted in the return of the prime minister to Lebanon a few days later. In a country built on religious diversity, the Lebanese showed unity in their political parties support for the return of their prime minister, in the same way that they support their basketball team each time it represents the country. Thus, it shows the importance of politicians uniting in order to develop the country despite the differences in their politics. Furthermore, due to its geographic size and its political and economic instability, Lebanon is not yet ready to host international or mega sport events; thus, their best strategy may be co-hosting them with other countries in the region. This approach would strengthen the country’s position within the Arab world while limiting risks.

The Gulf region The First Gulf War played a major role in forming new policies by decision-makers in the whole region. In order to improve recognition, if for different reasons, the ruling elites in the Arabian Peninsula developed a new strategy of improving attractions.These improvements were focused on developing businesses operating across many sectors. These long-term investments were implemented in preparation for the time when oil will no longer be the main resource generating economic revenues. The region focuses on hosting international and mega sport events as an opportunity to develop international recognition, as well as to attract foreign companies to invest. As a result, many urban projects like Zayed Sports City in Abu Dhabi, Dubai Sports City and Aspire Zone in Doha, to name a few, were developed and managed by international companies in order to host these events. Similarly, regularly hosting events is used for political and business reasons, such as the case of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi hosting the Formula One Grand Prix annually.36 Another example would be United Arab Emirates (UAE) investing in sport for the same reasons; the country is hosting sport events or investing and buying in the international sport sector – teams, companies and stadiums – with the purpose of marketing and sponsoring itself as a tourist destination.

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia In 2018, a new era in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) began, where the country applied a new strategy of increasing the number of sport events it hosts. As well as allowing females to drive cars for the first time, they were allowed to participate for the first time in sport events. This new approach shows the willingness of leaders in reshaping their country’s image, a fact which the Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is financing all these events to take place in the country, has understood.37 As well as hosting the King Abdulaziz Horse Championship, the PSA Women’s Squash Masters took place at Princess Nora bint Abdul Rahman University, being the first international sport event for women hosted in the Kingdom.38 The Kingdom also hosts the Formula E electric car race at Ad-Diriyah and won the bid to host the final of the World Boxing Super Series Mohammed Ali Trophy, bringing together British boxers George Groves and Callum Smith for the medium-weight category title. Further to hosting tournaments, the country hosted a friendly game between South American soccer rivals Brazil and Argentina in Jeddah. In December 2018, Saudi citizens had the opportunity to attend a top tennis game between two of the best tennis players in the world, Rafael Nadal and Novak Djokovic, facing off at Jeddah’s King Abdullah Sports City.39 442

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In a unique move, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammad bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, closed a deal with the European PGA Tour in 2019 to bring the golfing event to Saudi Arabia for the first time. Hosting sport events is part of the Kingdom’s Vision 2030 plan, designed to attract more tourists to visit the country. The Saudi Golf Federation chairman, H.E. Yasir Al-Rumayyan, stated that hosting golf tournaments will help to showcase Saudi Arabia’s assets to the world, from golf courses and facilities to cultural heritage and business credentials.40 The Kingdom opened its doors to a variety of cultural activities (e.g. public concerts, international conferences, cinema and other entertainment) with an objective to improve the tourism sector, among other sectors mentioned under its Vision 2030. We can argue that the new approach implemented by the Kingdom has to do with improving the country’s attractiveness on the international scene while reshaping its image as a destination for praying as well as for entertainment.

Qatar In other countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) also, such as Qatar, the use of sport for development while increasing international recognition is one of the strategies implemented. These development strategies were expressed in Qatar National Vision 2030, which shows how the country is determined to achieve its objectives of improving its relations with other countries. Furthermore, attracting this large number of sport events has much to do with improving the country’s international prestige. In fact, this was seen in 2015 when the host country was able to achieve second place in the Handball World Championship that they hosted, the first time it was hosted in the Gulf region. Moreover, hosting and bidding to host these international and mega sport events, through the tourism sector, helps improve diplomacy with the country’s allies due to the region’s political history and economy. In fact, while geographically small, the State of Qatar has one of the fastest-growing economies in the world.41 Qatar is now progressing steadily towards its goal of becoming a major player in the Middle East’s tourism sector.42 Additionally, after the invasion of Kuwait in the 1990s, and due to the size of the neighbouring countries, the KSA and Iran, Qatar implemented several strategies to maintain good relations with foreign countries. That was reflected by the political situation in 2017 when the majority of the GCC countries executed a blockade of Qatar. However, Qatar’s strong international relations kept the country moving forward in pursuit of its objectives without being affected by the blockade. As mentioned, the State of Qatar aims to become a high-quality tourist destination, and one of its strategies to achieve its objectives is to host international and mega sport events. The approach of hosting sport events reflects the country’s strategy to generate a positive impact in the long run while avoiding any over-rapid tourism development.43 Other than developing the tourism sector, Qatar’s approach to developing its territory was seen during HE Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa’s era, which was a stage focusing on modernising the country that started by hosting several international sport events (e.g. the 2006 Asian Games, the Handball World Championship 2015, the annual ATP tennis tournament and the 2019 IAAF World Athletics Championships). Moreover, Qatar marked itself as the first country in the region to win the hosting of one of the biggest mega sport events, the 2022 FIFA World Cup.44 Further to hosting international sport events, Qatar keeps investing in European countries (e.g. owning the French football team Paris Saint Germain), a strategy that has also been implemented by neighbouring countries, in order to benefit politically and economically. It is worth mentioning that the year 2019 witnessed the country’s ability to achieve development through sport. Despite the GCC blockade, Qatar was able to showcase itself as a country 443

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seeking development through its national football team. The political and economic blockade launched by the UAE, KSA, Bahrain and Egypt worked in favour of the country when the national football team was able to win the Asian Cup hosted by the UAE. The Qatari team’s win, despite all the pressures they faced during the tournament, reflected Qatar’s situation as a country getting through the blockade the GCC countries executed with minimal damage. There is no doubt that sport is one of the vehicles the country relies on to promote and develop the country under the Khalifa family’s leadership.This can be seen through the number of sport events hosted every year in the country, making Qatar an important destination for the sport industry.45

Conclusion As with the majority of countries employing strategies to host international and mega sport events, countries from the Arab world are also implementing them to improve their image while attracting more visitors. Even though the events vary in size between the Arab countries due to their political stability and economic ability, we can still observe that hosting these sport events has become an arena to spread their political authority while modernising and developing the country. In fact, these strategies implemented by the Arab countries were exploited in the past where countries from different ideologies and political systems hosted sport events for the same reasons. For instance, the Berlin Olympics 1936 was used as an opportunity for promoting and spreading the Nazi regime’s ideology. Due to developed countries’ preconceptions of war and instability in the region, the Arab world hopes that by hosting international and mega sport events they can reshape their image and reposition themselves as countries under development, while also spreading their values and cultures.

Notes 1 Ernst & Young, “Rapid-Growth Markets Soft Power Index,” Ey.com, accessed April 4, 2019, www. ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Rapid-growth_markets:_Soft_power_index/$FILE/Rapidgrowth_markets-Soft_Power_Index-Spring_2012.pdf. 2 James Riordan, “Soviet Sport and Soviet Foreign Policy,” Soviet Studies 26, no. 3 (1974): 322–43. 3 Veerle De Bosscher, The Global Sporting Arms Race: An International Comparative Study on Sports Policy Factors Leading to International Sporting Success (Meyer & Meyer Verlag, 2008). 4 Janis Van Der Westhuizen and Kamilla Swart, “Bread or Circuses? The 2010 World Cup and South Africa’’s Quest for Marketing Power,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 28, no. 1 (2011): 168–80. 5 Doug Guthrie, China and Globalization:The Social, Economic and Political Transformation of Chinese Society (New York: Routledge, 2012). 6 Stefan A. Schirm, “Leaders in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance,” European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 2 (2010): 197–221. 7 Ian Taylor, China’’s New Role in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009). 8 Roland Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture,Vol. 16 (London: Sage, 1992). 9 Lawrence A. Wenner, ed., MediaSport (Psychology Press, 1998). 10 Sean Wilsey, “This Month 32 Nations Will Compete for the World Cup of Soccer, the ‘Beautiful Game’ That Unites and Divides Countries Around the Globe,” National Geographic 209, no. 6 (2006): 42. 11 L. Fredline, “Host Community Reactions to Motorsport Events: The Perception of Impact on Quality of Life,” Sport Tourism: Interrelationships, Impacts and Issues (2004): 155–73. 12 Robert Gramling and William R. Freudenburg, “Opportunity-Threat, Development, and Adaptation: Toward a Comprehensive Framework for Social Impact Assessment 1,” Rural Sociology 57, no. 2 (1992): 216–34. 13 John Crompton, “Beyond Economic Impact: An Alternative Rationale for the Public Subsidy of Major League Sports Facilities,” Journal of Sport Management 18, no. 1 (2004): 40–58.

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14 John D. Horne and Wolfram Manzenreiter, “Accounting for Mega-Events: Forecast and Actual Impacts of the 2002 Football World Cup Finals on the Host Countries Japan/Korea,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 39, no. 2 (2004): 187–203. 15 Richard Sharpley, “Planning for Tourism:The Case of Dubai,” Tourism and Hospitality Planning & Development 5, no. 1 (2008): 13–30. 16 J. C. Henderson, “Tourism in Dubai: Overcoming Barriers to Destination Development,” International Journal of Tourism Research 8, no. 2 (2006): 87–99, https://doi.org/10.1002/jtr.557. 17 Scarlett Cornelissen, “Sport Mega-Events in Africa: Processes, Impacts and Prospects,” Tourism and Hospitality Planning & Development 1, no. 1 (2004): 39–55. 18 Barrie Houlihan and Dominic Malcolm, eds., Sport and Society: A Student Introduction (London: Sage, 2015). 19 Shaun Lopez, “Football as National Allegory: Al-Ahram and the Olympics in 1920s Egypt,” History Compass 7, no. 1 (2009): 282–305. 20 Ibid. 21 Shaun Lopez, “Race, Place and Soccer: Egypt, Morocco and ‘African’ Identity in the Competition to Host the 2010 FIFA World Cup,” Soccer & Society 13, no. 5–6 (2012): 639–52. 22 Ibid. 23 Rayana Khalaf, “Egypt Wants to Host the World Cup and People Are Cracking Jokes,” Stepfeed. com, July 13, 2018, accessed April 17, 2019, https://stepfeed.com/egypt-wants-to-host-the-worldcup-and-people-are-cracking-jokes-3115. 24 P. Ignatiev and P. Bovsunivskyi, “Egypt’s Foreign Policy Under Abdel Fattah El-Sisi,” Actual Problems of International Relations 134 (2018): 4–15. 25 Houlihan and Malcolm, Sport and Society. 26 Mahfoud Amara, “Sport and Political Leaders in the Arab World,” Histoire Politique 2 (2014): 142–53. 27 Driss Abbassi, “ Sport et usages politiques du passé dans la Tunisie des débuts du XXIe siècle,” Politique et Sociétés 26, no. 2–3 (2007): 125–42. 28 Houlihan, Barrie, and Dominic Malcolm, Sport and Society. 29 Ewan Morgan, “Why Does Morocco Keep Bidding, and Failing, to Host the World Cup?” Thesefootballtimes.co, accessed May 17, 2019, https://thesefootballtimes.co/2019/04/02/why-does-moroccokeep-bidding-and-failing-to-host-the-world-cup/. 30 Houlihan and Malcolm, Sport and Society. 31 Amara, “Sport and Political Leaders,” 142–53. 32 Daniel Etchells,“Algerian Olympic CommitteeAnnounces Country to Host 2021 Mediterranean Games,” Insidethegames.biz,September 18,2015,accessed May 17,2019,www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1030320/ algerian-olympic-committee-announces-country-to-host-2021-mediterranean-games. 33 Amara, “Sport and Political Leaders,” 142–53. 34 Associated Press,“At Beirut Marathon, Lebanese Call for PM to Return,” En.annahar.com, November 12, 2017, accessed May 17, 2019, https://en.annahar.com/article/699955-at-beirut-marathon-lebanesecall-for-pm-to-return. 35 Agence France-Presse “I’’m Free to Return to Lebanon from Saudi Arabia, Says Saad Hariri,” Theguardian.com, November 12, 2017, accessed May 19, 2019, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/12/ beirut-marathon-runners-missing-lebanon-prime-minister-saad-hariri. 36 Amara, “Sport and Political Leaders,”142–53. 37 Adam Reed,“Khashoggi Disappearance Puts Saudi Arabia’sVision of Hosting Major Sports Events Under the Microscope,” cnbc.com, October 17, 2018, accessed May 19, 2019, www.cnbc.com/2018/10/17/ khashoggi-disappearance-puts-saudi-arabias-vision-of-hosting-major-sports-events-under-the-micro scope.html. 38 Arab News, “Saudi Arabia Has ‘Ambitious’ Plans to Land ‘Big Sporting Events,” Arab News, February 7, 2018, accessed June 8, 2019, www.arabnews.com/node/1242116/sports. 39 Ibid. 40 Tom Kershaw, “European Tour Confirm First Golf Event in Saudi Arabia Despite Scrutiny Following Jamal Khashoggi Murder,” Independent, October 29, 2018, accessed June 8, 2019, www.independent. co.uk/sport/golf/european-tour-saudi-arabia-golf-event-crown-prince-mohammad-bin-salman-pat rick-reed-dustin-johnson-a8607276.html. 41 Andy Sambidge, “Qatar Set to Launch New Tourism Ad Campaign,” Arabian Business, November 6, 2008, www.arabianbusiness.com/qatar-set-launch-new-tourism-ad-campaign-83434.html.

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42 Andy Sambidge, “Tourism Set to Double Qatar GDP Contribution – Report,” Arabian Business, March 19, 2009, www.arabianbusiness.com/tourism-set-double-qatar-gdp-contribution-report-64 917.html. 43 Henderson, “Tourism in Dubai.” 44 Wadih Ishac, “Furthering National Development Through Sport, the Case of Qatar” (PhD diss., Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté, 2018). 45 Ibid.

Bibliography Abbassi, Driss. “Sport et usages politiques du passé dans la Tunisie des débuts du XXIe siècle.” Politique et sociétés 26, no. 2–3 (2007): 125–42. Amara, Mahfoud.“Sport and Political Leaders in the Arab World.” Histoire Politique 2, no. 23 (2014): 142–53. Cornelissen, Scarlett. “Sport Mega-Events in Africa: Processes, Impacts and Prospects.” Tourism and Hospitality Planning & Development 1, no. 1 (2004): 39–55. Crompton, John. “Beyond Economic Impact: An Alternative Rationale for the Public Subsidy of Major League Sports Facilities.” Journal of Sport Management 18, no. 1 (2004): 40–58. De Bosscher,Veerle. The Global Sporting Arms Race: An International Comparative Study on Sports Policy Factors Leading to International Sporting Success. Meyer & Meyer Verlag, 2008. Fredline, L. “Host Community Reactions to Motorsport Events: The Perception of Impact on Quality of Life.” In Sport Tourism: Interrelationships, Impacts and Issues, edited by Brent W. Ritchie and Daryl Adair, 155–73. Clevedon: Channel View Publications, 2004. Gramling, Robert, and William R. Freudenburg.“Opportunity–Threat, Development, and Adaptation:Toward a Comprehensive Framework for Social Impact Assessment.” Rural Sociology 57, no. 2 (1992): 216–34. Guthrie, Doug. China and Globalization: The Social, Economic and Political Transformation of Chinese Society. New York: Routledge, 2012. Henderson, J. C. “Tourism in Dubai: Overcoming Barriers to Destination Development.” International Journal of Tourism Research 8, no. 2 (2006): 87–99. https://doi.org/10.1002/jtr.557. Horne, John D., and Wolfram Manzenreiter. “Accounting for Mega-Events: Forecast and Actual Impacts of the 2002 Football World Cup Finals on the Host Countries Japan/Korea.” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 39, no. 2 (2004): 187–203. Houlihan, Barrie, and Dominic Malcolm, eds. Sport and Society: A Student Introduction. London: Sage, 2015. Ignatiev, P., and P. Bovsunivskyi. “Egypt’s Foreign Policy Under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.” Actual Problems of International Relations 134 (2018): 4–15. Ishac, Wadih. “Furthering National Development Through Sport, the Case of Qatar.” PhD diss., Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté, 2018. Lopez, Shaun T. “Football as National Allegory: Al-Ahram and the Olympics in 1920s Egypt.” History Compass 7, no. 1 (2009): 282–305. Lopez, Shaun T. “Race, Place and Soccer: Egypt, Morocco and ‘African’ Identity in the Competition to Host the 2010 FIFA World Cup.” Soccer & Society 13, no. 5–6 (2012): 639–52. Riordan, James. “Soviet Sport and Soviet Foreign Policy.” Soviet Studies 26, no. 3 (1974): 322–43. Robertson, Roland. Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture.Vol. 16. London: Sage, 1992. Schirm, Stefan A. “Leaders in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance.” European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 2 (2010): 197–221. Sharpley, Richard. “Planning for Tourism: The Case of Dubai.” Tourism and Hospitality Planning & Development 5, no. 1 (2008): 13–30. Taylor, Ian. China’s New Role in Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009. Van Der Westhuizen, Janis, and Kamilla Swart. “Bread or Circuses? The 2010 World Cup and South Africa’s Quest for Marketing Power.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 28, no. 1 (2011): 168–80. Wenner, Lawrence A., ed. MediaSport. Psychology Press, 1998. Wilsey, Sean. “This Month 32 Nations Will Compete for the World Cup of Soccer, the ‘Beautiful Game’ That Unites and Divides Countries Around the Globe.” National Geographic 209, no. 6 (2006): 42. 446

42 The emergence and development of the Islamic Solidarity Games Abdul Rahim Al Droushi

Introduction The emergence of modern sport in the Arab world and Muslim countries occurred via two main routes. In most Arab countries, it is the legacy of colonialism, which took several different forms: direct military colonialism, annexation and protectorates.1 Modern sport was also introduced, particularly in the Arabian Peninsula, through petroleum companies’ migrant workers from Africa and Asia.2 According to Pfister, non-Western societies are based on different paradigms that do not focus on competition and achievement, and modern sport may not be in accordance with their values, beliefs and mentalities. The relationship between Islam and modern sport is thus problematic.3 The Islamic Solidarity Games have been an arena for clashes between modern sport as a Western product (with its ideas concerning the body and physical exercise) and Islamic teachings and values. Amara clarifies that the Muslim world has accepted modern sport as a symbol of modernisation as well as a privileged tool for nation-state building.4 On the other hand, many Muslims, in particular those who represent Islamic movements, view modern sport with suspicion, seeing it as a symbol of secularism and deviation from the authentic societal concerns of the ummah.5 In 1985, the Constituent Assembly for the foundation of the Islamic Sports Solidarity Federation (ISSF) was organised in Saudi Arabia with representatives from 34 countries, who attended in order to ratify the ISSF statutes.6 The ISSF’s main aims were to help all members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) with every aspect of sport and to strengthen unity and solidarity among Muslim youth in the Muslim world. One of the first objectives of the federation was to supervise the organisation of a multinational, multisport event to be called the Islamic Solidarity Games.7 The Islamic Solidarity Games is considered the biggest multinational sporting event outside the Olympics, as it includes around 55 countries. This chapter aims, first, to trace the emergence and development of the Islamic Solidarity Games; second, to discuss the controversies surrounding the Games in its four editions; and third, to address and discuss the challenges that the OIC and the ISSF should address in order to sustain the Games.

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The establishment and objectives of the games The idea of the Games was first suggested by the late Prince Faisal bin Fahd bin Abdulaziz in 1981, when the leaders of the Islamic world discussed the importance of establishing the Islamic Solidarity Sports Federation at the Third Islamic Summit of the OIC, held in Mecca and in Al Taif in Saudi Arabia.8 Four years later, the OIC invited the National Olympic Committees (NOCs) and sport governmental organisations of all Muslim countries to attend the Constituent Assembly of the ISSF in Saudi Arabia at the initiative of Prince Faisal, General President of Youth Welfare in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia announced an annual subsidy for the administration of the ISSF and declared that its headquarters would be in the Olympic Complex in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia.9 At its meeting in Bali in June 2001, the OIC decided to organise the first Islamic Solidarity Games in Saudi Arabia in that year.10 It is worth mentioning that officials and journalists from Iran believe that the idea of the Islamic Solidarity Games is Iranian, an extended version of the Muslim Women’s Games.11 The Muslim Women’s Games is a multisport event that was initiated by Iran. It was held in 1993, 1997, 2001 and 2005 in Tehran.12 The Iranian officials considered the Games as a great opportunity for the development of sport among Muslim women. Furthermore, it was seen as an alternative for Muslim women to the Olympic Games. The ISSF states on its website six objectives that the Federation works to achieve: first, to supervise the organisation of a multisport event to be held once every four years for member countries, to be called the Islamic Solidarity Games; second, to supervise the organisation of tournaments and championships in all sport; third, to encourage the exchange of bilateral visits between sport teams of member countries; fourth, to enter into cooperation agreements with sport organisations at international, continental and regional levels; fifth, to train and develop sport cadres in member states through the exchange of technical expertise and the organisation of training courses in various sport; and sixth, to hold conferences and symposia, to create exhibitions and museums, to supervise studies and research as well as to disseminate publications serving the ISSF’s goals.13

The emergence and development of the Games The first Islamic Solidarity Games were organised in four cities in Saudi Arabia: Mecca, Al Taif, Al Madinah and Jeddah. Like the headquarters of the ISSF, the choice of Mecca to be the leading host city had a high symbolic value for all participating countries since Mecca embodies the centre of Islam.14 Under the patronage of the OIC and the ISSF, Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, announced the beginning of the first Islamic Solidarity Games from Mecca in 2005. The Games were seen as an opportunity for the al-Saud family in the aftermath of 9/11 to brand Saudi Arabia as moderate Muslim country open to change, progress and modern technology.15 Despite the political atmosphere in the Gulf during this period, Iraq and Iran were among the countries participating in the Games.16 Only male athletes could participate in this edition, and they had to follow the rules adopted in Saudi Arabia in regard to sportwear. For example, athletes were forbidden to wear ‘too-short clothes.’ This rule also applied to athletes competing in sport such as swimming and athletics. The Games witnessed the participation of 7,000 athletes, including Christians, from 54 Islamic member countries of the OIC. Entrance was free for spectators. Saudi Arabia topped the medals table, winning 60 medals, followed by Egypt, Kazakhstan, Iran and Iraq.17 448

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The Second Islamic Solidarity Games were scheduled for September 2009; however, it was postponed due to health concerns related to swine flu.18 Hence the ISSF changed the date of the event to April 2010. During this period, other issues emerged that threatened the organisation of the event. In particular, a dispute arose when the Iranian organising committee used the term ‘Persian Gulf ’ instead of ‘Arabian Gulf ’ on logos, medals and event materials. The term ‘Persian Gulf ’ reflects the body of water that lies between the countries of the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. It is also known as the ‘Arabian Gulf ’ or ‘The Gulf.’ The term ‘Persian Gulf ’ is used in Iran exclusively and Iran does not recognise alternative forms.19 Furthermore, any foreign airlines that do not use the phrase on their in-flight monitors are not allowed to fly in Iran’s airspace. On the other hand, Arabs in the Gulf Cooperation Council point out that the use of ‘Persian Gulf ’ is linked to the Persian Empire, which no longer exists. In addition, the people who live around the Gulf are mostly Arabs residing in the six Arabian countries that account for 70 percent of the coastline.20 The ISSF attempted to reach a compromise by demanding three major requirements from the Iranian organisers in order for Iran to become host for the event. First, Iran would need to provide the organisation with a report from the Ministry of Health on the state of health and control of the spread of swine flu; second, Iran would need to use the designs proposed by the Secretariat in all logos, Games, and publications; and third, Iran would need to recognise that the rights to the Games belong to the ISSF, and therefore the organising committee must preserve the Federation’s rights in terms of marketing, sponsorship and TV broadcasts in accordance with the Federation’s rules and regulations.21 The organisers, however, refused to modify the term ‘Persian Gulf.’ As a result, the Games were cancelled by the ISSF, and the following statement was sent to media: The board of directors has unanimously decided to cancel the second Islamic Solidarity Games which were to be held in the Islamic Republic of Iran due to noncompliance of the organizing committee with the rules and regulations of the Federation as well as with the decision of the General Assembly of the Union.22 In response to the ISSF decision, the Iranian organising committee of the Games stated on its website ‘Regrettably and without presenting any logical reasons, the [Islamic Solidarity Games Federation] committee decided not to hold the Games with Iran as the host.’23 Therefore, athletes from OIC countries had to wait another four years to participate in the next Islamic Solidarity Games. It is worth mentioning that the OIC and the ISSF had approved the host countries of the first three Games, which were announced at the same time: Saudi Arabia, Iran and Syria. Due to the political atmosphere and the war in Syria, the third Islamic Solidarity Games were rescheduled to be held in Pekanbaru, Indonesia in 2013. However, some issues arose concerning unpaid labourers and corruption scandals linked to the provincial governor. Changing the host city became imperative; Jakarta was the organisers’ best choice and thus was approved by the ISSF. Nevertheless, other problems arose, and the organisers proposed moving the Games from Jakarta to Palembang in Southern Sumatra. This decision was taken less than two months prior to the event.24 Finally, eight years after the first Games, the opening ceremony of the Third Islamic Solidarity Games took place in Palembang in September 2013 under the patronage of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the former President of Indonesia. An estimated 2,575 people, representing 39 OIC member countries, participated in the event. Among the participants, 1,647 athletes competed in 13 different sport. Except for Saudi Arabia, all OIC member countries included women 449

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athletes in their teams. This edition witnessed good media coverage through 2,200 media personnel and great efforts by 2,400 volunteers from Jakarta and Palembang. The host country was at the top of the medals table, winning 104 medals, followed in descending order by Iran, Egypt, Malaysia and Turkey.25 In 2017, the 4th Islamic Solidarity Games took place in Azerbaijan, the first time in Europe after three editions in Asia. The President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, was at the top of the attendance list for the opening ceremony, together with the Chairman of the Organising Committee of the fourth Islamic Solidarity Games, and His Excellency Dr. Yousef bin Ahmed AlOthman, Secretary General of OIC. Unlike the previous two editions, Baku 2017 was a success story, thanks to the substantial investment that the Azeri government put into the Games. It is important to note that the timing of this edition of the Games was during a very tense period for the Islamic world. That said, the Azeri Muslim population consists of 65 percent Shiite and 35 percent Sunni living peacefully together. Thus, the Games were an amazing opportunity to call on Muslims to show solidarity. Such value was evident when 2017 was declared a year of Islamic Solidarity in Azerbaijan. In addition, after two previous failed bids to host the Olympics, organising a successful Islamic Solidarity Games represented a possible path for the Azeris to staging the Olympics.26 The First Vice President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Mehriban Aliyeva, Chair of the Baku 2017 Islamic Solidarity Games, stressed in her speech at the opening ceremony, ‘Our Games will send an inspirational message out far beyond the borders of Azerbaijan: solidarity is our strength.’27 The fourth Islamic Solidarity Games demonstrated a unique example of 54 Muslim nations bringing the Islamic world together in a friendly atmosphere, although there were tensions between some Muslim countries.28 The Games witnessed the participation of 2,800 athletes from four continents competing in 21 sport. Furthermore, about 12,000 volunteers helped to make the Games a reality. These levels of participation helped the OIC recover from the fall in number of participating members in the previous edition of the Games, making it the second largest in the history of the Games. This edition played an important role in changing the image of the Games. Azerbaijan was at the top of the medals table with 75 gold medals, just four more than Turkey.29 At the end of the closing ceremony of the Games, the flag of the Games was submitted to the organisers of the fifth Islamic Solidarity Games, which is scheduled to take place in Turkey in 2021. Turkey has been a very active and strong contender in the previous editions of the Games.

Controversies surrounding the Games It is important at this point to discuss some controversies that have appeared since the first Islamic Solidarity Games. Many OIC member countries have achieved progress in women’s participation in sport, especially in the last two decades; this has been linked to modernisation and to reforms in these countries’ education systems.30 However, the first three editions of the Islamic Solidarity Games witnessed debates concerning women’s participation. The issues included the acceptance of women’s sport as such, the extent to which women can participate in the same venues as men and the appropriate dress code for women athletes. Also important to mention is the fact that male athletes were not considered in these debates, except for the Saudi Arabian edition, when their sportswear was required to conform to sharia rules.This was due to the fact that the Games were held in the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Madinah. Participants were asked to wear modified sportswear, including those participating in sport such as athletics and swimming competitions. The ‘bikini issue’ emerged in the 3rd Islamic Solidarity Games when some of the participating countries did not accept women’s sportswear in sport such as volleyball and swimming. 450

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Thus, a question raised about ‘appropriate’ dress code created a controversy. The organisers in Indonesia had considered the Games to be not exclusively for Muslim athletes. Djoko Pramano, chairman of the central organisers of the Games, said, ‘The Islamic Solidarity Games is not a sport event exclusively for Muslim athletes. This is an event for nations not bogged down by religious faiths. Several participating countries have included in their contingent a number of non-Muslim athletes.’31 The organisers were clear that the choice must be left to the athlete and the participating country whether to follow religious values and beliefs or to wear sportswear according to the international regulations and rules of the respective sport. As Muddai Madang, the chairman of the local organisers, put it, ‘We cannot ban the rules applied by the international body. But if Muslim athletes want to wear a head scarf, they may do so.’32 The organising committee in the 3rd Islamic Solidarity Games appeared to be arguing for a tolerant standpoint, particularly in negotiating demands from groups willing to follow their religious faith.33 In the same vein, the Indonesian organisers attempted to maintain a low Islamic faith profile for the Games by implementing the international profiles of the sport. In Baku’s edition of the Games, the situation was different. On the one hand, there was less conflict in regard to women’s sportswear. On the other, the officials in the European edition were straightforward in applying international sport rules in the competition. Another issue that emerged in the Games was also related to the competitive environment for women’s sport. Some participating countries in the 3rd Islamic Solidarity Games made requests for the organising committee to arrange separate days for men’s and women’s events. It is essential to note that the proposed competitive environment for the Second Islamic Solidarity Games, the Games that were cancelled in Iran, included gender-segregated venues; the organising committee offered six sport venues made especially for women’s competitions. However, this was not done by the organisers in Indonesia.34 The Games were also an arena for another set of conflicting values. The Games promote unity and solidarity among Muslim youths, one of the most important aims of the founders. However, as a sport event, it also promotes national pride and nationalism. Despite slogans about unity and solidarity, these nationalist values are considered to go against the value of Muslim unity perceived by the Quran.35 Jamal Abu Shamallah, one of the non-Muslim athletes in the Palestinian basketball team, points out, ‘We are in the same team and always together fight for our country . . . it’s no different whether we are Muslim or not because we are the same and because these are not religions’ Games but nations’ Games.’36

Challenges facing the Games A crucial point to start with when discussing challenges facing the Games is to consider to what extent the Islamic Solidarity Games can bring the ummah together. Although the Games could create a feeling of community for families and friends in the host country in each edition, the same could not be said for the Muslim community in the Islamic world. There were concerns that even in editions such as the 3rd Islamic Solidarity Games, feelings of solidarity between Muslims were weak among the Muslim community in Indonesia during the Games. Since the Games could not attract the ummah as a whole, the question should be directed to the organisers of the Games and ISSF. Another challenge is the international reach and exposure of the Games. Despite the fact that the Games were seen by the ISSF as successful and achieved significant goals especially for the host country, they did not attain a significant international, regional or even local engagement. The ISSF concentrates on promoting the Games in the Muslim world; but it is also important 451

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to move the Games to a global level and to promote Games as the second-largest sporting event after the Olympics. The sustainability of the Games is another serious challenge that faces the OIC and the ISSF. Today, this challenge has increased for two main reasons. On the one hand, the political fragmentation of the Islamic world puts any Games in a fragile position, especially in western Asia. Even though the second and third editions of the Games were supposed to be held in Iran and Syria, neither country could make them a reality owing to political issues. On the other hand, the economic status of most OIC countries and the financial cost of hosting the Games are ongoing fundamental barriers for many countries in the Islamic world. The case of the Palembang Games is a clear example of how hard it can be to host the Games for members outside the Gulf and Europe.37 Funding for the Games is an obstacle faced by the hosting organisers of successive editions of the Games.With the exception of Saudi Arabia, which had a huge budget for the first Games, for most hosting countries it is enormously difficult to prepare and implement strong marketing campaigns, win great sponsorship deals and make the Games self-sustaining. Saudi Arabia is one of the strongest financial supporters of the Games. The ISSF uses this support to help some Muslim countries to participate in the event by providing accommodation and travel for participating delegations that need it, as well as supporting the host country’s organisation of the event. However, this support has not been consistent. For example, officials in Indonesia struggled to reach the budget target for the event. Some also claimed that not all the funds reached their destination; this was reflected in the modest opening and closing ceremonies of the third Games.38 In the fourth Islamic Solidarity Games, there was lack of support for some of the delegations; in particular, Azerbaijan did not pay expenses for any delegation. This meant that some countries such as Libya and Sudan could not send delegations to participate in the event. Another challenge that has affected the Games is spectator interest in attending sport competitions. For instance, although the organisers of the Islamic Solidarity Games in Baku decided to make the entrance tickets to the stadiums very cheap, between $1 and $3, there were few spectators attending the Games to watch most of the competitions. Worse, even when spectator entrance to the Games was free, as in some editions such as the first, few attended the events. These trends prove that self-financing of the Games is difficult to achieve.

Conclusion This chapter aimed to discuss the emergence, development and current status of the Islamic Solidarity Games. Most attention was paid to the Games’ development, to controversies surrounding it, and to challenges that faced its progress in the previous four editions. In conclusion, there are some points that should be addressed and clarified. Since the first edition of the Islamic Solidarity Games in 2005, more than 12,000 athletes have participated from across the Muslim world. Notably, in all the completed editions, the host countries celebrated their preparation and effort in hosting the event by winning the most medals. Moreover, the Games created an amazing opportunity to celebrate unity and solidarity among Muslim youth and to show the progress and modernisation that OIC countries have achieved in the sport sector. At the same time, however, the Games have been an arena for clashes between Western values, represented by the international rules and regulations associated with modern sport, and Islamic values and sharia law. The controversies discussed in this chapter suggest that the developments that occurred from the first to the most recent edition can provide insights into the relationship between sport and its secular elements and conservative/traditional values represented by Islamic teachings 452

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and sharia rules. This is evident in two actions. First, the successive organising committees’ movement towards following the international rules of the Games; and, second, the organisers’ tendency to view the Games as an event organised for both Muslim and non-Muslim athletes, which should therefore not be attached to the Muslim identity. These facts manifest a progressive agenda that the ISSF has favoured by allowing the changes, especially since the Islamic Solidarity Games in Indonesia. The literature covering Islam and modern sport has always been primarily focused on women’s participation in sport at a competitive level and the limitations placed on them with respect to exposure of the body and the appropriate dress code. What this chapter adds is an examination of the progressive tendency developing in the Islamic Solidarity Games, an event organised by a federation that belongs to the OIC.While the first edition of the Games in Saudi Arabia was men-only, the second in Iran was planned to include women but in gender-segregated venues with private media coverage and female officials. Four years later, when some countries opposed the idea of allowing women athletes to wear Western sportswear, the organising committee in Indonesia was clear on following the international rules of sport and permitting the participating countries to decide what dress code their sporting federations wished to follow. For Baku’s 2017 edition, there were media discussions about the sportswear but no clear opposition to women’s sportswear. The position of the organising committee is summarised in Teimar Ataev’s clarification: At the Olympic Games in Rio, last year, in volleyball, athletes from Muslim countries of North Africa took part. They performed in normal sportswear. A girl in a hijab performed as a member of the US fencing team, and her mother said that they chose fencing because the girl will wear a helmet that will cover her head. In principle, there are no particular differences between the Islamic Games and the Olympic Games.39 The challenges discussed in the chapter also can be a threat to the future of the Games. Despite the main aims of the Games, the chance of hosting any Islamic Solidarity Games is always menaced by the political tensions in the region. This is also true of the approved next edition of the Games to be held in Turkey in 2021. On the positive side, the organisational level of the Games has shown strong improvements, especially in the Baku edition. However, essential elements are still missing, especially in marketing, sponsorship, spectator management and handling political tensions.

Notes 1 Mahfoud Amara, Sport, Politics, and Society in the Arab World (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 2 A. R. Al Droushi, “Discourses on the Modernization Agenda in Sport Policy in Oman; Between the Global and Local and Modernity and Authenticity” (PhD diss., School of Sport, Exercise and Health Sciences, Loughborough University, 2017). 3 Gertrud Pfister, “Outsiders: Muslim Women and Olympic Games-Barriers and Opportunities,” International Journal of the History of Sport 27, no. 16–18 (2010): 2925–57. 4 Amara, Sport, 8. 5 Ummah can be translated as the nation of Muslim believers or the Muslim nation. 6 For more details on the foundation of the Islamic Solidarity Sports Federation (ISSF), see the official ISSF website, accessed May 10, 2019, http://issf.sa/en/. 7 Ibid. 8 “The Idea of Establishing the Union,”The Islamic Solidarity Sports Federation, accessed May 10, 2019, http://issf.sa/en/?page_id=3479. 9 Ibid. 453

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10 Mahfoud Amara, “The Muslim World in the Global Sporting Arena,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 14, no. 2 (2008): 67–75. 11 Kourosh Ziabari, “Boycotting the Islamic Solidarity Games Over the Words ‘Persian Gulf ’,” Foreign Policy Journal, accessed June 14, 2019, www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2009/05/13/ boycotting-the-islamic-solidarity-games-over-the-words-persian-gulf/. 12 The Women’s Islamic Games took place four times in Iran: in 1993, 1997, 2001 and 2005. The event was organised in gender-segregated venues and all the officials and referees were women. 13 “The Objectives and Tasks of the Union,” The Islamic Solidarity Sports Federation, accessed May 10, 2019, http://issf.sa/en/?page_id=3479. 14 Friederike Trotier, “Changing an Image Through Sports Events: Palembang’s Success Story,” Asia Pacific Journal of Sport and Social Science 6, no. 1 (2017): 3–18. 15 Amara, “The Muslim World,” 67–75. 16 In this chapter, it will be called the Gulf; assuming that the reader will know that the current work is discussing issues related to the Arabian/Persian Gulf, rather than, for example, the Gulf of Mexico. 17 Amara, “The Muslim World,” 67–75. 18 This was the first issue to be announced. 19 Martin Levinson, “Mapping the Persian Gulf Naming Dispute,” A Review of General Semantics 68, no. 3 (2011): 279–87. 20 Ibid. 21 “The Islamic Solidarity Games in Iran is Cancelled,” Al-Madina News, accessed May 17, 2019, www. al-madina.com/article/10475. 22 Ibid. 23 Meris Lutz, “Iran, Saudi Arabia: Islamic Solidarity Games in Tehran Canceled Over ‘Persian Gulf ’ Spat,” Los Angeles Times, accessed June 12, 2019, https://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2010/01/ iran-tehran-loses-islamic-solidarity-games-over-persian-gulf-spat.html. 24 “Tensions Mar Islamic Solidarity Games,” Aljazeera Media Network, accessed June 14, 2019, www.alja zeera.com/sport/2013/2013/09/201392081139796687.html. 25 “The Third Islamic Solidarity Games Report, 2019,” The Islamic Solidarity Sports Federation, accessed May 24, 2019, http://issf.sa/ar/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/140136541229.pdf. 26 “Baku Brings Down Solidarity Games Curtain in Style,” Baku 2017, accessed July 7, 2019, www. baku2017.com/baku-brings-down-solidarity-games-curtain-in-style.html. 27 “Baku 2017 Islamic Solidarity Games: Opening Ceremony Speech,” Baku 2017, accessed June 10, 2019, www.baku2017.com/images/m.a.eng_oc_speech_mehribanaliyeva_%20eng.pdf. 28 Gurbanov Rafi, “Azerbaijan Celebrates Religious Solidarity: Not Just Islamic,” The Jerusalem Post, accessed June 22, 2019, www.jpost.com/Blogs/Gurbanov-Rafi/Azerbaijan-celebrates-religious-soli darity-Not-just-Islamic-532690. 29 Baku 2017, “Baku Brings Down.” 30 Mahfoud Amara and Ian Henry, “Deconstructing the Debate Around Sport and the ‘Question’ of ‘Muslim Minorities’ in the West,” in Islam in the West, ed. Max Farrar, Simon Robinson,Yasmin Valli, and Paul Wetherly (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 138–53. 31 Ansyor Idrus and Mustofid,“Athletes Not Bound to Muslim Dress Code,” Jakarta Post, accessed May 24, 2019, www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/09/18/athletes-not-bound-muslim-dress-code.html. 32 Ibid. 33 Trotier, “Changing,” 3–18. 34 Note: The organising committee also was not clear on the number of the countries that were concerned about organising events on the same days for male and female athletes during the Games. 35 Alberto Testa, “Engaging in Sport:The Islamic Framework,” In Sport in Islam and in Muslim Communities, ed. Alberto Testa and Mahfoud Amara (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), 13–29. 36 Idrus and Mustofid,“Athletes Not Bound.”That the Gulf that is referenced in the discussion is the same Gulf that caused the dispute. 37 “The Problem Islamic Solidarity Games Begin in Baku,” Turan News Agency, accessed June 14, 2019, http://turan.az/ext/news/2017/5/free/analytics/en/117859.htm. 38 The ISSF appeared to have clear and strong positions in situations such as changing the logos and printing materials of the Second Islamic Solidarity Games. However, it was not evident in setting the limits in dress code, separating female and male venues and dates, etc. 39 Teimar Ataev is a political scientist and author of three books on Islam.

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Bibliography Al Droushi,Abdul Rahim.“Discourses on the Modernization Agenda in Sport Policy in Oman; Between the Global and Local and Modernity and Authenticity.” PhD diss., Loughborough University, 2017. Amara, Mahfoud. “The Muslim World in the Global Sporting Arena.” Brown Journal of World Affairs 14, no. 2 (2008): 67–75. Amara, Mahfoud. Sport, Politics, and Society in the Arab World. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. Amara, Mahfoud, and Ian Henry, eds. Deconstructing the Debate Around Sport and the ‘Question’ of ‘Muslim Minorities’ in the West. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. Henry, Ian, Mahfoud Amara, and Mansoor Al-Tauqi. “Sport, Arab Nationalism and the Pan-Arab Games.” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 38, no. 3 (2003): 295–310. Levinson, Martin. “Mapping the Persian Gulf Naming Dispute.” ETC: A Review of General Semantics 68, no. 3, (2011): 279–87. Pfister, Gertrud. “Outsiders: Muslim Women and Olympic Games-Barriers and Opportunities.” International Journal of the History of Sport 27, no. 16–18 (2010): 2925–57. Testa, Alberto, eds. Engaging in Sport:The Islamic Framework. London: Routledge, 2016. Trotier, Friederike. “Changing an Image Through Sports Events: Palembang’s Success Story.” Asia Pacific Journal of Sport and Social Science 6, no. 1 (2017): 3–18.

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43 Soccer Moulding the Middle East and North Africa James M. Dorsey

Occupation and conquest Soccer is about occupation and conquest, the occupation of an opponent’s territory and the conquest of his goal.1 The sense of confrontation is heightened with fans often segregated from one another in different sections of the stadium. ‘The playing field thus becomes a metaphor for the competition between communities, cities and nations: football focuses group identities,’ said Iranian soccer scholar Houchang E. Chehabi.2 French scholar of Iran and soccer, Christian Bromberger, noted that every match between rival towns, regions and countries takes the form of a ritualised war, complete with anthems, military fanfares and banners wielded by fans who make up the support divisions and who even call themselves ‘brigades,’ ‘commandos,’ ‘legions’ and ‘assault troops.’3 Social scientist Janet Lever argued that in sport ‘nationalism is aroused by individual contestants but peaks over team sports. . . (It) peaks because many consider collective action a truer test of a country’s spirit than individual talent.’4 Little wonder that communities with contested identities and national leaders saw soccer, since its introduction to the Middle East and North Africa by colonial powers, as a key tool to shape their nations and promote modernity in a world in which, according to political scientist Benedict Anderson, ‘nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time.’5 The sport was initially employed as what sport scholar Mahfoud Amara described as the postcolonial tool par excellence ‘for party-state regimes in their projects of mobilising populations around nation state building and integration into the international bi-polar world system.’ It has, since then, helped autocratic leaders maintain power while managing the transitions of their economies from state-run to market. It did so in part by exploiting the fact that nations emerge, in the words of Turkish sociologist Dogu Ergil, out of the tireless global competition that determines dominance, submission and the hierarchy of nations. Success in sport increases the confidence of nations. Failure does the opposite, Ergil argued.6 Amara and Ergil’s insights are relevant in the context of ethnographer Anthony D. Smith’s emphasis on ‘common myths and memories’ and ‘mass, public culture’ as crucial elements of national consciousness7 and the realisation that the relationship between nationalism and sport is

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to a large degree determined by political context. That context is in turn defined by the multifaceted nature of nationalism. According to noted sport scholar Alan Bairner: There is a very real difference between the nationalism of a well-established world power and that of a submerged people. . . . Inevitably there will also be a marked variation in the manner in which sport is used in such different contexts to promotes the nationalist cause.8 The bottom line is that sport, and particularly soccer, enabled postcolonial societies in the Middle East and North Africa to generate meaning and symbolism that gave imagined substance to an identity that differentiated the conceived nation from others and helped neutralise the threat posed by racial, ethnic, social, religious and regional identities they incorporated. At the same time, it allowed such subgroups to differentiate themselves even though those subidentities potentially would eventually compete with the larger national identity. As a result, sport in general, and soccer in particular, served historically in the Middle East and North Africa as a platform of opposition and resistance to colonial rulers and their local allies, as well as a means to assert identity in contested lands and as a tool to project on the international stage a nation or ethnic group struggling to achieve independence. Given its strength in producing various forms of distinction,9 sport frequently helped postcolonial Middle Eastern and North African societies to initially mould multiple, often rival identities into one that encompassed the nation as a nation. It was repeatedly used to simultaneously help construct national myths and advance postcolonial modernisation and foreign policy goals across the region in countries and territories such as Israel, Palestine, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Morocco and Algeria.

Constructing national identity For the Palestinians, in contrast to other national groupings in the Middle East and North Africa, forming a national identity initially constituted nation formation. Political scientist Paul James defined nation formation as occurring ‘within a social formation constituted in the emerging dominance of relations of disembodied integration’ in which there is no face-to-face encounter or agency extension.10 The differentiation of Palestinian identity in the absence of agency extension – the existence of a nation state – was defined by asserting its distinctiveness from a Syrian Arab identity that, at the time, was prevalent in Syria, Palestine, Lebanon and Jordan and opposing Zionist settlement. Moreover, both in nation formation and nation building, imagined national communities need to give substance to their constructs by creating a consciousness of what it means to be a nation. For Israeli Jews and Palestinians, sport served that purpose.11 Nonetheless, inevitably, the effort in multi-ethnic, multi-confessional Middle Eastern and North African societies to employ soccer in the shaping of an overriding national identity was complicated by the communal aspirations of minority communities such as Kurds, Berbers and Israeli Palestinians, as well as conflict that resulted from their assertion of those aspirations.These communities felt discriminated against because the newly established states were preoccupied with creating one imaginary overall national identity that superseded society’s diverse fabric12 rather than one that sought multicultural accommodation of the identities of its various constituent communities. Those communities often saw soccer as much as a way of expressing an identity of their own as they viewed it as tool to shape the new state’s national distinctiveness. Bairner and historian John Sugden noted that ‘wherever there are national or regional conflicts between societies which share a passion for sport, those conflicts will be in and carried on through respecting sport cultures.’13

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Construction of a deeply rooted national identity was often hampered by the fact that a significant number of nations in the region lacked the perception of a long-standing common history, on which countries like Egypt, Turkey and Iran prided themselves, or the wrenching, unifying experience of a vicious struggle for independence as in the case of Algeria. This deficit was reinforced by the emergence across the region of neo-patriarchic autocracies that viewed the population as immature subjects rather than full-fledged citizens. As a result, sport, with soccer in the lead, underperformed as a tool in moulding nations and promoting a truly felt national solidarity in line with historian Eric Hobsbawm’s definition of nations as imagined or constructed entities with invented traditions.14 Nevertheless, Middle Eastern and North African examples of the political employment of sport to create national myths abound. Egypt, a regional sport powerhouse, claimed, for example, to have fathered soccer long before the British who are largely credited with the emergence of the sport. Ousted President Hosni Mubarak’s State Information Service asserted that ancient Egyptians had recorded their knowledge of the game with inscriptions on the walls of temples that were discovered by fifth century Greek historian Herodotus.15 In his memoir of a visit to Egypt entitled ‘An Account of Egypt,’16 Herodotus made no mention of the inscriptions or of ancient Egyptians playing something akin to soccer. He also failed to refer to assertions that he saw young men kicking around a ball made of goatskin and straw.17 Zionists, much like the Shah of Iran and the Ottoman Empire’s reformist Young Turks, saw sport as the way to mould their citizenry in their nationalist image. For the Zionists, the goal was the new, muscular Jew. Reza Shah Pahlavi, who captained his team in his Swiss boarding school and played for the squad of the Iranian military’s Officer School, saw soccer as a way ‘to create a modern Iranian man who understood the values of hygiene, manly competition and cooperation.’18 To the Young Turks, soccer was a means of garnering support as they sought to convert the remnants of the Ottoman Empire into a modern state. Both recognised what French scholar of Iran and soccer, Christian Bromberger, identified as the Westernising virtues of the sport: ‘football values team work, solidarity, division of labour and collective planning – very much in the image of the industrial world that produced it.’19 German and Swedish athletics was to the Turks, as in the case of the Zionists, the flip side of Cooper’s Commonwealth competition. It furthered what social anthropologist Paul Connerton described as the creation of collective memory and shared identity through ritualised physical activity.20 Soccer was uniquely designed for that purpose in the mind of historian Eric Hobsbawm, who noted that ‘the imagined community of millions seems more real as a team of eleven named people.’21

Moulding modern citizens For Israel, Palestine, Iran and Turkey, sport was key to the moulding of a new ‘modern’ citizen as well as the forging of relations with a colonial or Western power that could assist them in their endeavour irrespective of the fact that Jews and Palestinians were forming nations while Turkey and Iran were building nations as illustrated in this section. In doing so, they built on the experience of the first modern-day international sport encounter, a cricket match in 1860 between the United States, a former British colony, and Canadian colonies that had yet to achieve independence.22 They also relied on the notion, first put forward in 1891 by Reverend J. Astley Cooper, of a British Commonwealth sporting competition that would also involve literary and military events as a way of strengthening ties between Britain and its colonial world.23 Zionism’s view of sport, much like that of the shah of Iran as well as the Young Turks and their Kemalist successors, was partly anchored in the need to prepare young men for military 458

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service and the defence of the nation. It was similarly rooted, although not acknowledged, in nineteenth-century German approaches to athletics articulated by Theodore Herzl, the father of political Zionism and physician, and social critic Max Nordau’s concept of muscular Judaism. It also harked back to the principle in Deuteronomy 4:9 of shimrat ha-guf, guard the body. ‘I must train the boys to become soldiers. . . . I shall educate one and all to be free, strong men, ready to serve as volunteers in the case of need,’ Herzl wrote in his diaries.24 Speaking to the Second Zionist Congress in Basel, Nordau urged his audience: ‘let us continue our ancient tradition of being heroes with deep chests, nimble limbs and fearless looks.’ Russian physician Max (Emmanuel) Mandelstamm made a similar appeal at the congress which he ended by repeating a line from Roman poet Juvenal’s Satire X:25 ‘Mens sana in corpore sano (A sound mind in a sound body).’26 Zionism’s embrace of the importance of sport was also rooted in moves by significant segments of nineteenth-century Diaspora Jewry to accommodate societal change, counter antiSemitism and, by implication, reject Orthodox Jewish repudiation of sport as a form of secularism. From the mid-nineteenth century, many Jews viewed joining the main gymnastic movements and, more importantly, sport and country clubs and the Olympic Movement as part of their ‘emancipation’ from the old legal and social exclusions and from a ‘Jewish pathology.’ Jews were described as intellectuals, cosmopolitans and therefore artificially removed from nature. Responding to the charge of physical inadequacy, participating in gymnastic and sport movements was just another facet of claiming equality and, simultaneously, manifesting patriotism.

Following the Zionist example Palestinians, notwithstanding their hostility to Zionism and its leader, effectively adopted their approach. The sport column of Filastin, an initially twice-weekly Christian-owned newspaper published in the first 67 years of the twentieth century that pioneered Palestinian sport reporting, supported the Young Turks during Ottoman rule, opposed pre-Israel’s traditional Palestinian leadership and was influential in promoting Palestinian nationalism, said this: Obedience is one of the most important qualities a soldier on the battlefield must equip himself with.The war will not be fought without obedience. I urge everyone to obey whoever they are subordinate to, irrespective of whether you are players, spectators or referees, and to heed his every command, decision and restriction,’ In a separate column, Mohammed Tahre Pasha, an Egyptian doctor, who went on to found the Mediterranean Games and head the Egyptian Olympic Committee, argued that sport was crucial for the East and the Arab’s regaining of past glory. ‘The East neglected sports for a long time. It is a main reason, if not the main reason, for its loss of superiority,’ Pasha argued.27 The Zionist employment of sport in their struggle for Jewish statehood nonetheless sparked a Palestinian national response that sought to counter the challenge in the realm of sport. Palestinian national sentiment expressed itself after World War I in the emergence of charitable societies, women’s groups, youth organisations and sport clubs – even though Palestinian media lamented that they lacked the resources, particularly in sport, available to their Zionist counterparts. British mandate officials nonetheless recognised early on that the development of separate Jewish and Palestinian sport clubs was likely to fuel nationalist friction. Jerusalem Military Governor Ronald Stores called, at the 1921 inauguration of the Jerusalem Sports Club, for clubs to be inclusive and admit members irrespective of their religion or beliefs.28 459

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Palestinian sport Historian Issam Khalidi documented the battle over rival Jewish and Palestinian claims to land and identity waged on the soccer pitch in the decades leading up to the founding of Israel. Muslim, Christian Orthodox and secular Palestinian sport clubs reinforced national identity and constituted a vehicle to strengthen ties among different Palestinian communities. Orthodox Christians, opposed to foreign domination of their parishes, took a lead in promoting sport with the first conference of Orthodox Christian clubs in 1923, which called for the establishment of clubs across Palestine. Its call was heeded with the emergence of Orthodox clubs established in Jaffa, Jerusalem, Lod and Akko.29 The clubs, similar to the role of the Algerian national team as a promoter of the Algerian liberation struggle during that country’s war of independence, allowed Palestinians to forge relations with other Middle Eastern and North African nations. Filastin praised in nationalistic terms the performance of the Orthodox Club of Jaffa in its 1931 encounter with a visiting Egyptian team: The team of the Egyptian University came to Palestine and played with the Jewish teams, no Arab team applied to compete with them, except the Orthodox Club. The result was better than the game with “Maccabi.” So it made us proud and made everyone understand that there are Arabic teams in Palestine who are skilful in this game and have the same level as the British and Jewish teams.30 Sport clubs further created an institutional base for political organisation and served to prepare predominantly young men for social and political engagement. In an effort to forge useful relationships through soccer, Palestinians first created their own informal national team in 1910 that played primarily against missionary clubs. Encouraged by local media, the Arab Palestinian Sports Federation and a national team that played its first match against a squad from the American University of Beirut were born 21 years later as Palestinian counterparts of their Zionist opponents. The team ‘will refute Jewish claims and Zionist propaganda that Palestinians are ignorant and have nothing to do with sports,’ Filastin quipped.31 The Palestinian struggle to gain the right to represent themselves in soccer gave birth to a strategy Palestinian soccer upholds to this day: the projection of Palestinian nationhood through football. Filastin commented a day before the 1947 United Nations vote in favour of partitioning Palestine that Palestinians: cannot avoid devising a way to publicise their ideas . . . and propagate their principles and views without being afraid of opposition or oppression. They can achieve their goal through sports as did Sweden, Czechoslovakia . . . and Hungary.32 Nevertheless, it would take the Palestinians 52 years to be recognised by FIFA and defeat Zionist insistence that the Palestinians did not constitute a people or a state. In achieving their goal, the Palestinians made history by becoming the first territory without a state to have a seat at the soccer world table.

Islam and soccer Similarly soccer, the mechanism for the introduction in Algeria and elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa of modern sport, offered Algerians as early as the 1910s a seemingly nonpolitical way of challenging French colonialism and venting pent-up anger and frustration. It

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brought Algerians into physical contact with the colons, the French settlers, which often ended in brawls. It also enabled fans to forge an increasingly nationalist collective identity at a time that a national Algerian identity was just emerging. World Bank sustainable development expert Andrea Liverani in a seminal study of Algerian civil society, said: ‘Although at the time of its appearance in Algerian cities the nadi (club) was limited to Muslim cultural, intellectual and commercial elites, its combination with proto-associative spaces (the café) and with colonial associative experiences (the sport club, the union, etc.) contributed to mobilise the people fighting for the liberation war.33 Liverani added that the nadi provided the main intellectual hub for the development of Algerian nationalism. The revolutionary ideas of the intelligentsia combined with the mobilisation potential of the less elitist trade unions and sport clubs to produce the intellectual and human capital which eventually brought colonial rule down.34 The first sport club to explicitly identify itself as Muslim was FC Musulman de Mascara, established in 1913, two decades after the French introduced soccer to Algeria. Ten years later, 20 percent of all Algerian clubs had adopted an indigenous identity.They wore the green, white and red colours associated with the Algerian flag. One team, Espérance Sportive de Guelma, opted for black in permanent protest against the victims of French colonial rule.35 The clubs openly challenged France’s laicist version of secularism by wearing their religion on their sleeves. In projecting their identity on the pitch, they were engaging in what Swedish social anthropologist Ulf Hannerz called ‘peripheral corruption,’ the adaptation and corruption of values and ideals put forward by a colonial power to meet the needs and requirements of the colonised.36 French hopes that soccer would serve to distract and pacify Algerians were dashed. Instead, clubs and pitches became vehicles for anti-colonial agitation. Founded in 1921 on the birthday of the Prophet Mohammed as the most prominent Muslim club in French-administered Algeria, Mouloudia Club d’Alger, straddled the nation’s two most important arenas for resistance against the French: Islam and soccer. It kick-started the creation of numerous other Muslim football clubs in the 1920s and early 1930s in advance of a North African championship established in 1927. The clubs expressed their nationalist sentiment in their names, symbols and jerseys. The emergence of anti-colonial soccer clubs mirrored developments elsewhere in the Arab world with the founding of Al Ahli (The National) in Cairo and Forty Team in Atbara, a Sudanese railroad and trade union town where Lord Kitchener’s Anglo-Egyptian army defeated the Mahdist forces in 1898. Founded by railway workers, the number 40 expressed a rejection of the European rule that a soccer team should be made up of 11 players. The workers viewed the rule as a British colonial effort to discipline workers in an effort to counter labour activism.37 These clubs constituted counterpoles to associations formed by French and British colonialists and their local associates like Al Zamalek in Cairo in 2011; Club des Joyeusetés d’Oran, the first sport club to be founded in Algeria in 1894;38 and the Football Club de Tunis in 1904 that was quickly renamed Racing Club de Tunis. Soccer, moreover, constituted a release valve for pent-up anger against discrimination by French colonialists. Ahmed Ben Bella, a leader of the anti-French resistance and Algeria’s first

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post-independence president, recalled being punished in school for standing up to a French teacher who insisted in class that the Prophet Mohammed was an imposter. Ben Bella said: I believe what saved my morale at this time was sport. I threw myself into it with extra keenness, especially into football, which was my passion and in which I had made very rapid progress. Of course, I realise today that at that time football became a kind of compensation. The world of sport was one in which there were no restrictions and where my own ability set the only limitations. When I manoeuvred the ball at high speed against the enemy, nobody asked me whether I was European or Algerian.39 The celebration in 1930 of France’s alleged 100 years of success in bringing civilisation to Algeria fuelled the positioning of Algerian Muslim clubs as catalysts of anger and rejection of French triumphalism.Young Algerians dismissed French President Gaston Doumergue’s notion, articulated in a speech in the east Algerian city of Constantine to celebrate the anniversary of colonial rule, that ‘the celebration of the centenary will show in a decisive fashion the human, peaceful, just and beneficial character of French colonisation methods and of the work of civilisation that France is pursuing.’40 Clubs further served as vehicles for supporters to stake a claim to public space and an arena where Muslim Algerians could assert themselves physically. They constituted the breeding ground for leaders of the anti-French resistance like Ben Bella,41 a mid-fielder who played in the 1940s for French team Olympique de Marseille and for IRB Maghnia. Rather than pursuing a soccer career, Ben Bella eventually joined General Charles de Gaulle’s Free French forces against the Axis powers. ‘Ben Bella, like other African nationalists, believed that football – originally a European colonial game – could be appropriated and made to express African people’s desire for equality and freedom,’ noted African sport scholar Peter Alegi.42 Mouloudia’s name was derived from Mouloud, the Prophet Mohammed’s birthday, and like similar clubs, its colours were the red and green of Islam.43 Its century long popularity as Algeria’s foremost club is rooted not only in its representation of the two drivers that evoke the country’s most deep-seated passions – religion and soccer – but also in its symbolisation of the struggle for freedom and its roots in the Casbah, the medieval old part of Algiers that has been a focal point of Algeria’s multiple battles ranging from its war of independence in the 1950s, memorialised in Gillo Pontecorvo’s 1966 cinematic classic, The Battle for Algiers, to its civil war in the 1990s. ‘Mouloudia is revolution,’ Hakim Boukadoum, a former head of the club’s fan group told the New York Times in 2013.44 The founding of Mouloudia and other Muslim clubs that were often linked to clergymen sparked French fears that ethnically or religiously based clubs could fuel resistance to colonial rule and provoke racial or sectarian clashes.To counter the perceived threat, the French administration’s Native Affairs Bureau monitored the clubs and reported to prefects in Algiers, Oran and Constantine on their funding, links to political groups and players. French Governor-General Jules-Gaston Henri Carde initially obliged clubs to have at least three European players and later raised the number to five in a bid to enforce a 1901 French law that mandated that all clubs should be open to all segments of the population irrespective of origin.45 ‘Sport should be the link that allows Frenchmen and Muslims to unite in a common desire to perform and (in support of) noble aspirations, the elimination of all rivalry between religions and races,’ the French commander of the Algerian province of Oran told a local newspaper in 1936.46 The commander’s remarks followed efforts by the colonial administration to suppress what it viewed as sectarianism by forcing clubs to include the word ‘française (French)’ or at least the letter F in their names. The commander’s instruction was based on a 1930 directive that 462

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set quotas for mandatory European membership in clubs. The administration threatened clubs six years later with closure if they did not include Frenchmen in their management. At times, matches were cancelled if a club did not comply with the directives.47 These impositions, as well as Carde’s rule, were denounced by fans in chants during matches. Some clubs abided by the name rule. At the same time, many clubs sought to circumvent the hiring rule by taking on Muslim players who had obtained French citizenship or asserting that they were not able to recruit Europeans. The French measures were relaxed during World War II, but authorities simultaneously limited licensing of newly established Muslim clubs. The circumvention effort laid bare differences among the anti-colonial clergy. Hiring of Algerians who had acquired French nationality amounted, in the interpretation of religious edicts by some clergymen such as Sheikh Abdelhamid Ben Badis, to employing apostates liable for punishment by death because their naturalisation amounted to disavowing Islamic law. Ben Badis, a major religious influence in the first half of the twentieth century, decreed in 1937 that ‘the acquisition of non-Muslim nationality implies abandoning Islamic law. Renunciation of even one precept of the Quran according to doctrine by all clergymen of Islam amounts to apostasy. The naturalised is a renegade.’48 The clergyman who clad his nationalism and anticolonialism in religious terms offered relief, however, to those who opted for a return to adherence to Islamic law. Nonetheless, Carde’s order, rather than pre-empting clashes between Algerians and French settlers, set the stage for frequent violent confrontations when teams representing the two groups played. The mayor of the eastern Algerian town of Djidjelli warned in a May 15, 1936, letter to the region’s prefect that if a team essentially composed of natives should meet with one made up in large part of Europeans, it is beyond doubt that sporting antagonism, pushed to fever pitch, will add to the racial antagonism and at this moment the repercussions would be especially dangerous.49

New heights Ben Bella took the harnessing of soccer to the national struggle to new heights by forging links to popular clubs and fans and by forming a National Liberation Front’s (FNL) soccer team during Algeria’s war of independence. Alegi noted: Stadiums and clubhouses became arenas in which intellectuals, business owners and the unemployed challenged colonial power and expressed a shared commitment to racial equality and self-determination. Football constructed a fragile sense of nationhood in political entities arbitrarily created by colonial powers and fuelled Africa’s broader quest for political liberation.50 In doing so, he recognised French sociologist Jean Meynaud’s definition of athletes as soldiers of sport in a world in which ‘nationalism determines sports relations between nations. . . . Successes in sports are viewed as signs of excellence and power; they become the standard for judging different socio-economic systems.’51 A powerful symbol of Algeria’s struggle for independence, the National Liberation Front (FLN) capitalised on soccer’s mass appeal in its bid to rally Algerians to the liberation movement’s cause, forge a distinct national identity, and impress upon world opinion the patriotism, skill, discipline and tenacity of Algerians in their struggle for independence. 463

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Of the ten Algerian players who clandestinely left their French clubs in April 1958 via Switzerland and Italy, nine made it to Tunis, the seat of Ben Bella’s exiled Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria, where they formed the FLN squad that, post-independence, became the Algerian national team. Tunisian President Habib Bourgiba greeted the players with the words: ‘I wish you much success and Algeria liberty as soon as possible.’52 The tenth player, Mohamed Maouche, who as part of Stade de Riems was widely viewed at the time as one of France’s foremost upcoming stars, was detained on the French-Swiss border. After several months in prison, a return to Stade de Riems and a stint with Red Star Paris, Maouche finally joined the FLN team in 1960. Ultimately, the total number of players that left France to play for the FLN climbed to 30. French teams at the time estimated the value of their loss at US$250,000. Their defections constituted a powerful political statement. By abandoning France, they were demonstrating that Algeria was not French and the failure of French colonial efforts to promote equality and racial integration. The idea of creating an FLN soccer team, a notion that was unique to Algerians among national liberation movements of the time, first occurred to Mohamed Boumezrag, an FLN operative, grandchild of an imam who was imprisoned by the French for more than 30 years, and an Algerian player in France who retired in 1945. He was inspired by the presence of an Algerian team at the 1957 World Youth Festival in Moscow that marched in front of Soviet President Nikita Khrushchev at the opening of the festival and by an earlier charity match between France and a North African squad.53 The FLN had by that time demonstrated its grasp of soccer as a propaganda tool by using the 1954 World Cup to bring together in Switzerland, the tournament’s host, dispersed FLN leaders, including Cairo-based Ben Bella and Mohamed Boudiaf, Mostefa Ben-Boulaid from Algeria and Paris-based Mourad Didouche. In Switzerland, they announced the launch of the FLN’s armed struggle.54 ‘As patriots seeking the liberation of their country above all else, our footballers have given the youth of Algeria an example of courage, rectitude, and selflessness,’ the FLN said in a communiqué. It asserted that Algerian players had suffered from anti-North African and anti-Muslim sentiment in France that was increasingly making itself felt in French stadia.55 Two years later, the FLN ordered sport clubs to freeze their activities and instructed members to join the rebels. The FLN’s notion of soccer as an important vehicle in the liberation struggle against colonial rule harked back to the establishment in 1926 of a centre for sport and politics in Algeria,56 Étoile Nord-Africaine (ENA), a nationalist group widely viewed as the FLN’s predecessor.57 ENA leader Messali Hadji frequently staged his rallies in stadia. ‘The Algerian people were to develop a new public form of political expression in a domain that was considered coarse and commonplace, thus putting an end to the pseudo-neutrality of sport,’ wrote FrenchAlgerian sport scholar Youcef Fates.58 In doing so, they were perfecting a model created by Al Ahli in Egypt that positioned itself as a nationalist, republican, anti-monarchical club which served as a platform for growing opposition to British colonial rule and a meeting ground for students and fans who staged the 1919 Egyptian revolution. The liberation movement’s team, dubbed the Desert Foxes, served, according to an FLN statement, to deprive France of some of its best players, raise international awareness about the Algerian struggle, and highlight popular support of the quest for independence.59 Players declared themselves football revolutionaries. TIME Magazine reported that [W]hen newsmen tracked down the Algerians in Switzerland and Tunisia, they found them hobnobbing with F.L.N. agents, were handed an F.L.N. communiqué stating that the players refused any longer to help French sport “at the moment when France makes merciless war

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on their country. They have placed the independence of Algeria above all, giving Algerian youth proof of their courage and disinterestedness.60 TIME quoted Zitouni as saying: ‘I have many friends in France, but the problem is bigger than us. What do you do if your country is at war and you get called up?’61 The sacrifice made by the players was not insignificant. Sport was one of the few platforms on which Algerians could succeed and be recognised in France. As a result, Algerian contributions to French sport went far beyond soccer. Marathon runner Boughera El-Ouafi secured France’s only gold medal in the 1928 Olympic Games in Amsterdam, while Alain Minoumi won a marathon gold medal for France in the 1956 Melbourne Olympics. The FLN fulfilled some of its goals even before its team played its first international match with the mere departure of the Algerians from France. French sport newspaper L’Equipe reported that ‘the word France takes a more narrow meaning’62 with the departure of the Algerians who included four internationals. The New York Times headlined a report: ‘French Athletes Defect to Rebels; 5 Star Soccer Players Quit Teams and Go to Tunisia in Algerians’ Cause.’63 TIME quipped that the departure of the Algerians ‘was as if, overnight, the best Latin American baseball players in the major leagues – men like Chico Carrasquel, Bobby Avila, Minnie Minoso, Ruben Gomez – had fled the United States and challenged the Yankees and Braves for the world championship.’64 The FLN team won the vast majority of its matches played in Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Iraq, Jordan, the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria,Yugoslavia, China and North Vietnam. It garnered international support for their country’s struggle for independence. Of the 91 games it played, it won 65, lost 13 and drew in 13. It scored 385 goals as opposed to 127 against it.65 Ferhat Abbas, president of Algeria’s provisional government in exile and a player in his youth who headed Union Sportive Musulman de Setif, declared that the Desert Foxes had ‘advanced the Algerian revolution by 10 years.’66 Abbas saw soccer as an arena in which Algeria could defy the French notion of superiority.The French ‘rule us because they have guns. Without guns and machines, on a man to man basis, on the field of soccer, we can show them who is really superior,’ Abbas said.67 In response to the FLN’s employment of soccer, FIFA, in what would become a pattern of support for colonial and postcolonial regimes in the Middle East and North Africa, banned at the request of the French national soccer association the team’s players and excluded squads that agreed to meet it on the pitch.68 The ban constituted a rejection of a bid by the FLN and the players to persuade FIFA to take a stance similar to the one it adopted in 1919 when England sought to persuade the soccer body to expel teams, including Hungary, that represented Germany and its allies in World War I.69 The FIFA refusal prompted England, Scotland and Wales to leave the group. The FLN team nonetheless set an example for other nations like Palestine and Kurdistan, whose use of soccer to project nationhood and achieve statehood is modelled on Algeria’s success. Underlying the model is the premise that ‘football is the continuation of war by other means’ in the words of Le Figaro journalist Thierry Oberle who paraphrased nineteenth century Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz’s maxim that war is the continuation of politics by other means.70 While in Tunisia, the FLN team inspired the creation of a Palestinian team that unsuccessfully sought to project Palestinian nationhood.71 The FLN’s focus, once in government at the end of the war, was the employment of soccer to mobilise various social groups, including youth, students and workers; the projection of Algeria on the global stage; and the construction of infrastructure to achieve these goals.72 Soccer

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served to emphasise the state’s recognition of the importance of youth and as a tool to bolster the government’s legitimacy. The FLN squad-turned-national-team’s performance failed, however, in the first two decades of independence to match the government’s ambitions. That changed when, coached by former FLN players Mekloufi and Abdelhamid Zouba, it overpowered Germany in 1982 in Algeria’s first World Cup appearance and Africa’s first defeat of a European team. In a statement, the youth and sport ministry declared that the victory had done more for the nation than the work of any Algerian ambassador.73 Algeria’s memory of victory is, however, a bittersweet one mired in allegations that it was prevented from advancing to the next stage of the tournament by the alleged fixing of Germany’s subsequent match against Austria. Germany beat Austria 1:0, a result that allowed both teams to advance to the next round at Algeria’s expense.

The politics of survival Politicisation ultimately derailed the post-independence government’s effort to pacify and demobilise youth and prevent stadia from becoming platforms of protest. The failure became increasingly evident when, in the spring of 1980, the notion, implicit in the Qassaman (We Pledge), the FLN soccer team’s hymn that became Algeria’s national anthem, of one Algerian nation was shattered. This occurred as Berbers, who account for a quarter of the population, rallied behind Jeunesse Sportive de Kabylie (JSK), one of Algeria’s foremost soccer clubs and widely seen as an expression of Berber nationalism. They rejected the government’s Arabisation policy that was directed more at reducing the use of French than it was at suppression of Berber languages. The Berbers nonetheless demanded recognition of their language as well as release of political prisoners and political and civil rights. Kabylie in JSK’s name refers to the mountainous, predominantly Berber, provinces of Algeria along the Mediterranean Sea. At a time when all political and cultural expressions of Berber identity were banned, JSK and its stadium became the sole venues in which Berberism could assert itself. President Houari Boumediene, visibly uncomfortable, sat stony-faced in the stadium as JSK supporters celebrated their team’s winning of the 1977 Algerian Cup with the chant, ‘Pouvoir Assassin!’ (the government is an assassin).The chant became the rallying cry for Berber rights. As a result, JSK’s 1 November Stadium was closed to prevent the club’s nationalist fan base from gathering. The closure did not prevent thousands of fans of JSK, which at the time was named Jeunesse Electronique de Tizi Ouzou because it was owned by stateowned Entreprise Nationale des Industries de l’Electroménager (ENIEM), to show up for a semi-finals league match in Algiers in the Berber red and yellow colours with the words Jeunesse Sportive de Kabylie rather than Jeunesse Electronique Tizi Ouzou emblazoned in Latin rather than Arabic script on their shirts and headbands. Fans demanded the release of hundreds of activists, intellectuals, lawyers and students, many of whom went on to become founders of Berber parties and organisations like the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) and the Berber Cultural Movement (MCB) once Algeria’s one party system was abolished in 1989. In Algiers’ 5 July 1962 Stadium, named for the day Algeria declared its independence from France, the fans, waving olive branches, a symbol of Kabylie, chanted ‘Imzaighen,’ the term by which Berbers refer to themselves, which means free men.74 In what was to become a repeat performance in 2011, the year that mass anti-government protests swept the Arab world including Algeria, fans were allowed to chant political slogans in stadia as long as they did not take their protests into the streets. ‘The slogans were traps. They allowed the fans to engage in a tactical 466

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dialogue to persuade authorities of their good faith and by the same token enable authorities to manipulate them,’ Fates wrote.75 The government’s tolerance of stadia as release valves recognised that they have been arenas of political agitation for a century as repression in popular urban areas increased. ‘The sport stadia were next to register the heat of social discontent. At every football match, there were riots and youth demonstrations,’ wrote scholar Said Chikhi in his description of a wave of protests that swept Algeria in the late 1980s.76 Chickhi warned as follows when civil war began to tear Algeria apart in the 1990s: The stadiums have become a rallying-point, where the young can show their explosive strength.They have practically nowhere else to gather for collective manifestations, so thousands of them go to these places to express their protests. This can appear as real subversive actions: the young develop a biting irony, express their mockery in practical jokes and make fun of absurdities and political personalities in satires. The official symbols are thus cut into pieces and a kind of cynicism mixes with dissidence and mockery, all the more piercing as it compensates for the rage from being unable to act. But as the situation gradually deteriorates and people lack even essentials – consumption goods, water, housing – the young will increasingly become carriers of radicalism: the stadiums will, just as the mosques, open up to the streets and simultaneously to the city.77 Algerian stadia like those in numerous autocratic Arab states were, in effect, platforms where anti-systemic groups challenged institutions that constituted the backbone of the state. Noted international relations scholar Barry Buzan said: When institutions are threatened by force, the danger is that they will be overpowered, and the remedy is defence. When they are threatened by opposing ideas, the danger is that their legitimacy will be eroded and that they will collapse for lack of support. Armed force might sustain them . . . but institutions without popular support are much more precariously positioned than those with it.78 Algerian leaders, like their Arab counterparts, confronted repeatedly with popular demands, nevertheless engaged in what another international relations scholar, Joel S. Migdal, termed ‘the politics of survival’ by resorting to violence to control society and pre-empt the reshaping of social relationships.79 The soccer protests, like the broader violence in Algeria that exploded into civil war in 1992, were rooted in a significant segment of society’s loss of confidence in the state and its institutions.80 Algerian stadia reflected that loss of confidence. They summed up, in the words of Algeria scholars Martin Evans and John Phillips, ‘the huge chasm of unforgiving contempt between the rulers and the ruled.’81 The profile of rebellious fans in Algeria at the time of the 2011 popular Arab revolts, in the 2019 toppling of president Abdelaziz Bouteflika and in sustained subsequent protests to force true systemic change, was not unlike that in other parts of the Middle East and North Africa and nowhere more so than Egypt. They were, almost exclusively, often under-educated and un- or under-employed young men between the ages of 12 and 30.82 They hailed from popular neighbourhoods in major cities to which they had a strong sense of belonging. That sense of belonging coupled with loyalty to a soccer club emerged during the civil war that undermined concepts of patriotism and saw Algerians retreat to their harra or neighbourhood and club. The harra and the stadium constituted for many the two venues in which they could express identity. Their sense of alienation, hopelessness and anger at the failure of the country’s gerontocracy, in 467

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control since independence, to share power with a younger generation, create jobs and address housing problems was reinforced by media that depicted them as unpatriotic delinquents and drug addicts who were deranged, disruptive and sinister troublemakers – and by often brutal security forces whose violence produced a vicious circle.

Conclusion Nowhere in the world has sport in general and soccer in particular played such a key role in the development of a region than in the Middle East and North Africa.Yet the nexus of sport, politics and society is one area that Middle East studies with few exceptions have, for the longest period of time, ignored. Similarly, sport studies have focused on all parts of the world with one exception: the Middle East and North Africa. Nonetheless, sport, particularly soccer, has been in various parts of the Middle East key to nation formation, nation building, regime formation, regime survival and the struggles for human, gender and labour rights. Research into the role of soccer in the development of the Middle East and North Africa since the late nineteenth century has only started to gather momentum in the early twentyfirst century with the popular Arab uprisings, Qatar’s winning of hosting rights for the 2022 World Cup and the adoption by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco and Turkey of sport as a pillar of their soft power, public diplomacy and economic diversification strategies.83 As the case studies of Israel, Palestine and Algeria, as well as the histories of Turkey, Iran, Kurds and Berber demonstrate, soccer has played a key role in the formation of nations, the survival of regimes and the venting of pent-up frustration and anger that ultimately contributed to the downfall of autocrats. As a result, soccer pitches have emerged as frequent barometers of the public mood and indicators of political and social trends – so much so that the US Central Intelligence Agency routinely attends Middle Eastern and North African matches to glean clues as to where a country is headed.84

Notes 1 Tom Clark, “Aspects of the Psychology of Games and Sports,” British Journal of Psychology 31, no. 4 (1941): 279–93. 2 Houchang E. Chehabi, “The Politics of Football in Iran,” in Fringe Nations in World Soccer, ed. Kausik Bandyopadhyay and Sabyasachi Mallick (London: Routledge, 2008), 77. 3 Christian Bromberger, “Football as World-View and as Ritual,” French Cultural Studies 6 (1995): 293–311. 4 Janet Lever, Soccer Madness: Brazil’s Passion for the World’s Most Popular Sport (Long Grove:Waveland Press, 1983), 29. 5 Benedict Anderson, Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Kindle ed. (London:Verso, 1983). 6 Dogu Ergil, “On Football,” Today’s Zaman, July 19, 2014, www.todayszaman.com/columnist/doguergil/on-football_353397.html. 7 Anthony D. Smith, The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates About Ethnicity and Nationalism (London: Polity Press. 2000), 3. 8 Alan Bairner, Sport, Nationalism and Globalization; European and North American Perspectives (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001), 164. 9 Pierre Bordieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (London: Routledge, 1984). 10 Paul James, Nation Formation:Toward a Theory of Abstract Community (London: Sage, 1996), 45. 11 Ibid. 12 Anderson, Reflections. 13 John Sugden and Alan Bairner, Sport, Sectarianism and Society (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993), 129. 468

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14 Eric Hobsbawm, “Introduction / Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe 1870–1940,” in The Invention of Tradition, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1–4, 263–307. 15 State Information Service, “History of the Egyptian Football Game,” 2009, www.sis.gov.eg/En/ Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?ArtID=1746. 16 Herodotus, “An Account of Egypt, trans. G. C. Macaulay,” Project Guttenberg, 2006, www.gutenberg.org/ files/2131/2131-h/2131-h.htm. 17 Alaa Al Aswany, “Egypt’s Enduring Passion for Soccer,” New York Times, April 16, 2014, www.nytimes. com/2014/04/17/opinion/egypts-enduring-passion-for-soccer.html?_r=0. 18 Franklin Foer, How Soccer Explains the World (New York: HarperCollins, 2006), 217. 19 Bromberger, “Football as World-View,” 293–311. 20 Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 4. 21 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 143. 22 “International Cricket Match; United States vs. Canada,” New York Times, September 1, 1860, www. nytimes.com/1860/09/01/news/international-cricket-match-united-states-vs-canada.html. 23 J. Astley Cooper, “1908 Olympic Games, What Has Been Done and What Remains to Be Done,” in The History of Sport in Britain 1880–1914, ed. Martin Poley (London: Routledge, 2004), 147–57. 24 Theodore Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, Vol. 1 (New York: Herzl Press and Thomas Yoseloff, 1990), 51. 25 R. D. Hick, ed., Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925). 26 Georg Eisen, “Jewish History and the Ideology of Modern Sport: Approaches and Interpretations,” Journal of Sport History 25, no. 3 (1998): 531. 27 Mohammed Taher Basha, Filastin, March 11, 1945. 28 “Jerusalem Sporting Club,” Palestine Weekly, April 12, 1921. 29 Issam Khalidi, “The Coverage of Sports News in Filastin 1911–1948,” Jerusalem Quarterly 44 (2010): 45–69. 30 Issam Khalidi, “Coverage of Sports News in Filastin, 1911–1948,” Soccer and Society 13, no. 5–6 (2012): 764–77; Filastin, January 18, 1933. 31 Filastin, March 28, 1931. 32 Filastin, November 28, 1947. 33 Andrea Liverani, Civil Society in Algeria: The Political Functions of Associational Life (London: Routledge, 2008), 16. 34 Ibid., 21. 35 Youssef Fates, Sport et Tiers Monde (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1994), 32. 36 Ulf Hannerz, “Scenarios for Peripheral Cultures,” in Culture, Globalization and the World-System: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity, ed. Anthony D. King (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 107–28. 37 Ahmed Alawad Sikainga, City of Steel and Fire: A Social History of Atbara, Sudan’s Railway Town 1906– 1984 (Portsmouth, NH: Heineman, 2002), 82–84. 38 Paul Dietschy and David Claude Kemo-Keimbou, Le football et l’Afrique (Paris: EPA, 2008), 57. 39 Robert Merle, Ben Bella (London: Michael Joseph, 1967), 43–44. 40 Martin Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 49–50. 41 Ibid., 63–64. 42 Peter Alegi, “Death of a Striker, Fighter, and Socialist,” Football Is Coming Home, April 12, 2012, www. footballiscominghome.info/tag/ben-bella. 43 “Le MC Alger: un club, une histoire, un palmarès,” DjaZairess, August 29, 2012, www.djazairess.com/ fr/lnr/217061. 44 Carlotta Gall, “Born in Protest, a Soccer Team Hailed by the People and the Government,” New York Times, November 12, 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/11/13/world/africa/born-in-protest-a-soccerteam-hailed-by-the-people-and-the-government.html. 45 Légifrance, official website of the French government for the publication of legislation, regulations, and legal information, www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006069570. 46 Lahcène Belahoucine, La Saga du football algérien (Algiers: Éditions HIBR, 2010), 49. 47 Ibid. 48 Youcef Fates, Sport et politique en Algérie (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2009), 185. 469

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4 9 Evans, Algeria, 63–64. 50 Peter Alegi, African Soccerscapes, How a Continent Changed the World’s Game (London: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., 2010), 36. 51 Jean Meynaud, Sport et politique (Paris: Payot, 1966), 135. 52 “M. Bourgibba reçoit les footballeurs algérien qui ont quitte la France,” Le Monde, April 22, 1958. 53 Françoise Escarpit, “1958, les ambassadeurs de la révolution algérienne,” L’Humanité, October 6, 2001, www.humanite.fr/node/253384. 54 Charles-Henri Favrod, “La Suisse des négociations secretes,” in La guerre d’Algérie et les Francais, ed. JeanPierre Rioux (Paris: Fuyard, 1990), 397. 55 “Le F.L.N. salue dans les footballeurs qui ont abandonne la metropole des ‘patriotes conséquents’,” Le Monde, April 17, 1958. 56 Allen Guttman, Games and Empires: Modern Sports and Cultural Imperialism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 69. 57 Alegi, African Soccerscapes, 36. 58 Yousef Fates, “Football in Algeria: Between Violence and Politics,” in Football in Africa, Conflict, Conciliation and Community, ed. Gary Armstrong and Richard Giulianotti (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 48. 59 Rabah Saadallah and Djamel Benfares, La glorieuse equpe de FLN (Algiers: ENAL, Brussels GAM, 1980), 136. 60 Time Magazine, The Disappearing Act, April 28, 1958. 61 Ibid. 62 “Neuf footballeurs algériens ont disparu,” L’Equipe, April 15, 1958. 63 Thomas F. Brady, “French Athletes Defect to Rebels; 5 Star Soccer Players Quit Teams and Go to Tunisia in ’Algerians’ Cause,” New York Times, April 15, 1958. 64 Ibid.; Time Magazine. 65 Escarpit, “1958, les ambassadeurs.” 66 T. Abdelkrim, “Le légendaire équipe de football du FLN: Une fabuleuse épopée,” El Moudjahid, October 31, 2011, www.elmoudjahid.com/fr/mobile/detail-article/id/19048. 67 Anver Versi, “Striking Power: Arab Football Kicks Off,” Middle East, March 1998, 10. 68 James M. Dorsey, “Asian Football: A Cesspool of Government Interference, Struggles for Power, Corruption and Greed,” International Journal of the History of Sport 32, no. 8 (2014): 1001–15. 69 Le Monde, “Le F.L.N. salue dans les footballeurs.” 70 Thierry Oberlé, “Vingt-neuf ans âpres l’indépendance: Une rencontre charge de symbols,” Le Figaro, October 6, 2001. 71 Markus Asam, “Ningun Partido,” El Pais Magazine, February 2, 1992, 38–43. 72 Mahfoud Amara, “Football Sub-Culture and Youth Politics in Algeria,” Mediterranean Politics 17, no. 1 (2012): 41–58. 73 Mahfoud Amara, “Global Sport and Local Identity in Algeria: The Changing Roles of Football as a Cultural, Political and Economic Vehicle,” in Transition and Development in Algeria: Economic, Social and Cultural Challenges, ed. Margaret A. Majumdar and Mohammed Saad (London: Intellect Books, 2005), 152. 74 Fates, Sport et politique en Algérie, 221. 75 Ibid., 220. 76 Said Chikhi, “The Worker, the Prince and the Fact of Life: The Mirage of Modernity in Algeria,” in Algeria, the Challenge of Modernity, ed. Ali El-Kenz (London: Codesria, 1991), 220. 77 Said Chikhi, Algeria, From Mass Rebellion in October 1988 to ’Workers’ Social Protest (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1991). 78 Barry Buzan, People, State and Fear, the National Security Problem in International Relations (Brighton: Wheatsleaf Books, 1983), 57. 79 Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 206–37. 80 Azzedine Layachi, “Reinstating the State or Instating Civil Society: The Dilemma of ’Algeria’s Transition,” in Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, ed. I. W. Zartman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 171–89; George Joffee, “The Role of Violence in the Algerian Economy,” The Journal of North African Studies 7, no. 1 (2002): 29–52. 81 Mark Evans and John Phillips, Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed (London: Yale University Press, 2007), 114. 470

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82 The World Bank put youth unemployment in 2018 at 29.9%, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=DZ. 83 James M. Dorsey, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 84 Josh Meyer, “To Locate the Next Arab Spring Revolution, Look to the Soccer Stands,” Quartz, May 22, 2013, http://qz.com/87105/to-locate-the-next-arab-spring-revolution-look-to-the-soccer-stands/.

Bibliography Anderson, Benedict. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Kindle ed. London:Verso, 2012. Armstrong, Gary, and Malcolm Young. “Fanatical Football Chants: Creating and Controlling the Carnival.” Culture, Sport, Society 2, no. 3 (1999):173–211. https://doi.org/10.1080/14610989908721852. Bairner, Alan. Sport, Nationalism and Globalization; European and North American Perspectives. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001. Belahoucine, Lahcène. La Saga du football algérien. Algiers: Éditions HIBR, 2010. Bordieu, Pierre. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. London: Routledge, 1984. Bromberger, Christian. “Football as World-View and as Ritual.” French Cultural Studies 6, (1995): 293–311. https://doi.org/10.1177/095715589500601803. Buytendijk, Frederick Jakobus Johannes. Le football: une étude psychologique. Paris: Brouwer, 1952. Chehabi, Houchang E. “The Politics of Football in Iran.” In Fringe Nations in World Soccer, edited by Kausik Bandyopadhyay and Sabyasachi Mallick, 77–105. London: Routledge, 2008. Clark, Tom. “ ‘I’m Scunthorpe ‘til I die’: Constructing and (Re) Negotiating Identity Through the Terrace Chant.” Soccer and Society 7, no. 4 (2006): 494–507. https://doi.org/10.1080/14660970600905786. Connerton, Paul. How Societies Remember. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Dietschy, Paul, and David Claude Kemo-Keimbou. Le football et l’Afrique. Paris: EPA, 2008. Eisen, Georg. “Jewish History and the Ideology of Modern Sport: Approaches and Interpretations.” Journal of Sport History 25, no. 3 (1998): 482–531. Evans, Martin. Algeria: France’s Undeclared War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Fates,Youssef. Sport et Tiers Monde. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1994. Fates,Youcef. Sport et politique en Algérie. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2009. Foer, Franklin. How Soccer Explains the World. New York: HarperCollins, 2006. Hannerz, Ulf. “Scenarios for Peripheral Cultures.” In Culture, Globalization and the World-System: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity, edited by Anthony D. King, 107–28. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997. Herodotus. “An Account of Egypt, Translated by G. C. Macaulay.” Project Guttenberg, 2006. www.guten berg.org/files/2131/2131-h/2131-h.htm. Herzl, Theodore. The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl.Vol. 1. New York: Herzl Press and Thomas Yoseloff, 1990. Hick, R. D., ed. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925. Hobsbawm, Eric. “Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe 1870–1940.” In The Invention of Tradition, edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Hobsbawm, Eric. Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence Ranger, eds. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. James, Paul. Nation Formation:Toward a Theory of Abstract Community. London: Sage Publications, 1996. Khalidi, Issam. “The Coverage of Sports News in Filastin 1911–1948.” Jerusalem Quarterly 44 (2010): 45–69. Khalidi, Issam. “Coverage of Sports News in Filastin, 1911–1948.” Soccer and Society 13, no. 5–6 (2012): 764–77. Lever, Janet. Soccer Madness: Brazil’s Passion for the World’s Most Popular Sport. Long Grove: Waveland Press, 1983. Liverani, Andrea. Civil Society in Algeria:The Political Functions of Associational Life. London: Routledge, 2008. 471

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Merle, Robert. Ben Bella. London: Michael Joseph, 1967. Mylonas, Harry. The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Patrick, G.T.W. “The Psychology of Football.” The American Journal of Psychology 14, no. 3–4 (1903): 104–17. Saadallah, Rabah, and Djamel Benfares. La glorieuse equpe de FLN. Algiers: ENAL, Brussels GAM, 1980. Sikainga, Ahmed Alawad. City of Steel and Fire: A Social History of Atbara, Sudan’s Railway Town 1906–1984. Portsmouth, NH: Heineman, 2002. Smith, Anthony D. The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates About Ethnicity and Nationalism. London: Polity Press, 2000. Sugden, John, and Alan Bairner. Sport, Sectarianism and Society. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993. Time Magazine, The Disappearing Act, April 28, 1958.

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44 Playing ball Crowd and ‘contra-crowd’ in the politics of Egyptian and Tunisian football Larbi Sadiki and Layla Saleh

Background: the interconnections of football and politics This section provides a brief comparative and thematic overview of the areas in which football encroaches into the political, and vice versa: namely, with respect to authoritarian legitimation, national and subnational identities, ‘development’ and progress, interstate rivalries and potential resistance to authoritarian rule. In exploring the many interactions between Arab politics and football, Latin American cases are instructive. Many parallels can be drawn between the region’s historical and sociopolitical circumstances and those of the Arab world: Western colonialism, independence/post-coloniality, underdevelopment, military rule, and so on. Football was centre stage in what Tony Mason has called the ‘well-tried mixture of repression, bread and circuses in order to control their peoples’1 by military governments in Latin America.2 Dictators manipulated the sport as a means of propping up their rule. Through its stadium-building frenzy in the 1970s, for example, Brazil’s military junta ruling the country after the 1964 coup attempted to ‘associate itself with popular interests,’3 even distributing the chance to play in national championships as a way to earn votes for the governing party.4 Governments used football victories to mobilise public support and distract from human rights abuse, as in the case of the Argentinian government opposed by the Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo (mothers of the disappeared of the Plaza de Mayo) in 1978 and investigated by the Organization of American States.5 National victories in the sport were wielded as a mark of civilisation and regional leadership, as when the Peronist government organised the 1951 inaugural Pan-American games.6 Competitiveness in the international sport arena, namely, the FIFA World Cup, has also been emblematic of modernity, progress and even long-elusive ‘development.’ Football has long spilled over into national political rivalries (e.g. the Uruguay-Brazil match of 1950),7 inseparable from questions of national identity.8 The sport has both reflected and shaped sociocultural debates and transformations.9 Since its ‘ideological’ adoption by Latin American leaders in the neocolonial era of the nineteenth century who attempted to ‘emulate the social and cultural practices of England, France and Germany,’ football has permeated national ‘narratives’ throughout the region.10 Questions over racial identities (e.g. Brazil and Honduras),11 the emergence of a local criollo (read: not British) style of play,12 and the phenomenon of football as a ladder to social mobility for working class and immigrant youth, all confirm its entwinement 473

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with broader cultural and political concerns. More recently, the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil brought to the fore issues of domestic and international socio-economic and racial inequality (e.g. which Brazilians could afford to attend the games) as well as social capital in a context of the global commercialisation and neo-liberalisation of the sport, (e.g. corporate sponsors).13 The nexus of politics and football is similarly evident in formations and projections of nationalist (and pan-nationalist) identity in the Arab world. Attempts to cultivate Arab ‘unity’ through the Pan-Arab Games set up by the Arab League in 1951, for instance, have not been immune to intra-regional and international political disputes, from the first Gulf War to the overarching Arab-Israeli conflict, as indicated by delegates attending, excluded from or boycotting the games.14 An analysis of football as ‘secular ritual’ significant to state-building during Yemeni unification in 1990 points to the consolidated Northern and Southern ministry overseeing them, the selection of the players and the social capital discourse surrounding the tournaments as symbolic of political unity and equality, perhaps resonating with the public more than with the political elites orchestrating the political process.15 The limitations and contradictions of Palestinian-Israeli ‘minority’ citizenship comes to the fore in diverging sport media accounts (Hebrew vs. Arab) and audience reception of Arab football clubs participating in the Israeli Football Association.16 In Gulf states such as Qatar, investment in international tournaments, including FIFA 2022, is central to both internal socio-economic development strategies and a projection of ‘soft power,’ raising the tiny country’s profile in the international political (and commercial) arena – while also drawing controversy over labour rights, for example.17 James Dorsey thus fittingly underscores the political nature of football, in its fomenting of intense emotions, in its spatial congregation of large crowds and in its attraction of large numbers of youths in the Middle East.18 Football was a ‘symbol of modernisation’ for the Arab postcolonial elites,19 as for their Latin American counterparts. It has been at once a ‘pillar of support for the regime’ and ‘a platform for anti-government protest,’ one of the ‘few contested public spaces’ in the Middle East.20 Football as a site of political resistance has been most explicit among the ultras, extreme football fans in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia.21 Tustad suggests that as a ‘negative class consciousness’ emerged among Arab ultras, youth renegades, many unemployed, used football to ‘express political sentiments and identities,’ some rebelling against the patriarchal authority (and politico-economic injustices) epitomised by the state.22 For years these youth honed street-fighting skills that came in handy in the 2011 uprisings (as in Egypt). Alternatively, young football fans collaborated with security forces to ‘bloc[k] attempts at democratic transition’ in Jordan where the sport has become a platform for ‘killing political taboos,’ as through vocalised challenges to tribal loyalties, including of the royal family.23 These attempts to situate football within the Arab uprisings aptly highlight its significance as an arena of ‘bottom-up politics.’ Yet the transformation from football as a means of taming the masses – through putative depoliticisation of the sport – to football as a site of resistance against the authoritarian state remains under-theorised. If, as Dorsey suggests, following Sharabi, football is one link in the chain of ‘franchised repression,’ with the participation of society in systems of Arab neopatriarchy,24 when and how are the state’s tentacles of control challenged or resisted? Questions about the interplays between identity formation, emotions, solidarity, marginalisation and deprivation, trust, and collective action command further analytical attention. It is not enough to posit that football is political or politicised, by either elites or publics. Indeed, studies addressing both Latin American and Arab (and doubtless other) contexts suggest that football has always been political. The pressing analytical concern here, then, is how football is politicised by long-marginalised publics. That is, publics resisting the authoritarian state – flinging its clubs and stadiums, an important cog in the machinery of faux legitimacy, in its face, as it were. All the while, these ultras proclaim that they are apolitical! Accordingly, this exploratory 474

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chapter tentatively proposes that football is awash with politics, a line of argument explored in the ensuing analysis.

Crowds and mass mobilisation The Euro-American ‘crowd’ Crowd theory offers some important conceptual tools for this exploration of football, authoritarianism and popular resistance in Egypt and Tunisia. Importantly, concepts and theories of ‘the crowd’ were developed in the context of Western liberal democratic states. Some social capital scholars have explored precisely this context. Stefan Jonsson traces the emergence of the concept of ‘the mass’ (and/or its synonym, ‘the crowd’) in Weimar Germany and Austria’s first republic. He notes that these new terms, and the debates surrounding them, grew out of the massification of politics.25 Politicians, artists and academics of the day – from conservatives wary of the crowd such as Gustave LeBon to their critics such as Georg Simmel – recognised that ‘power was from now on linked to mass mobilisation.’26 Subsequently, in both discourse and practice, ‘the masses also reveal the eternal problem of democracy’27 (i.e. the political, cultural and aesthetic representation of popular interests and attitudes).28 For Jonsson, diverging characterisations of the mass and the crowd – irrationality (negative), the unjustly excluded (sympathetic), fluidity (dynamic)29 – can be understood within ‘the gap between the existing parliamentary system and the vast horizon of expectations’ of fuller, fairer popular representation, in politics and art in interwar Germany and Austria.30 In this way, ‘the mass’ or ‘the crowd’ as a social or political phenomenon as such is imbricated in the very proliferation of ‘democratic ideas’ in Europe after 1789.31 In other words, political, artistic and academic attention to ‘the crowd’ took shape in a starkly different cultural-political-social background from colonial Egypt and Tunisia.

Irrationality, collective action and norms Beginning with ‘anxi[ous], associations of the crowd with ‘irrationality, violence, and de-individuation,’32 what Neville and Reicher have termed ‘pathological accounts,’33 characterisations and theorising of crowds, even by sociologists, has belied political concerns.This view held considerable sway until the rise of social movement theory, with its rationalist emphasis on collective organisation and action that refuted long-held views of crowd irrationality, gradually overtaking crowd theory.34 Postmodernists such as Baudrillard revitalised interests in crowds and masses, albeit while positing what some interpret as a ‘post-political . . . situation in which traditional understandings of politics are annulled, suspended or transcended.’35 Yet the wariness of ‘crowds’ as a term has often lingered: even Hardt and Negri use a different term, ‘multitude,’36 to conceptualise their politicised interest and advocacy of bottom-up, non-institutionalised antistate popular resistance to empire. Where much of disciplinary sociology and perhaps political science have dragged their feet in theorising crowd behaviour, social psychology-inspired ‘emergent norm theory’37 has stepped in. According to this view, crises prompt people not to act irrationally and exhibit LeBonian ‘mass panic’38 but to ‘come together,’ leaving behind their conceptions of ‘appropriate behaviour’ to develop new norms and ‘ways of acting’ dictated by the situation at hand.39 The extended social identity model of crowds additionally turns to social identity (i.e. how people ‘position’ themselves ‘within a set of social relations’ and the ‘possible and desirable’ actions within that identity).40 Thus, participation in crowds (e.g. in a protest) not only ‘consolidate[es]’ social identities even after the event, but can also activate changes in those very social identities, particularly 475

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in situations marked by asymmetrical power relations, as between protestors and police.41 Members of crowds, for instance, may consider ‘imposition[s]’ such as police repression as ‘illegitimate,’ thus desiring to and accumulating ‘sufficient power to challenge the way they are treated.’42 In this way, crowds involve both formations of and contests over identities, power and the characterisations thereof, often precipitating self/other or us/them narratives, for both participants (e.g. protestors) and observers (e.g. media personalities or elites, as well as audiences).43 Symbolic interactionism that posits the formation and expression of group identity vis-à-vis other groups via symbols (language, body language, etc.)44 is illuminating in this regard. It is used in this analysis to test the formation and belonging to football team groups, namely, ultras in Egypt and Tunisia. Crowds may also possess ‘collective intelligence’ as they deal with the cognition, coordination and cooperation problems of common or public life, so long as they preserve ‘diversity and independence’ of membership and opinion – disagreement breeds higher quality decisions than does consensus.45 Hence, crowds embody decentralisation in both organisation and decision-making; groups will devise ‘collective solution[s. . .] likely to be better than any other solution’ by an individual, even an expert.46 Democracy itself is built on an inherent assumption upholding the normative superiority of collective deliberation over individual decision-making.47 ‘Baiting crowds’ (e.g. rioting, violent mob), while rare, do exist, always sparked by ‘instigators’ whom most people will not follow; the mob is an example of ‘extreme,’ not wise, ‘judgement.’48 Some see latent violence in sport crowds in particular. Allen Guttman underscores the psychological dimensions of sport spectatorship: ‘identification’ with one’s team and thus ‘partisanship,’ in addition to ‘representation,’ or fans’ sentiments that athletes represent them.49 This emotionally heady mix, amplified by the suspenseful nature of sport, always has the capacity to stoke aggressive behaviour by fans who revel in its competitive, ‘agonistic character,.’50 The Internet itself has a collective ‘ethos’; crowd sourcing information confirms the wisdom of crowds.51 The Internet has transformed crowd behaviour, rendering collective formation and action ‘socio-technological.’52 Online ‘social formations’ – virtual crowds that may also go offline – in turn develop their own norms, group identities, structures and organising relationships and even ‘power asymmetries.’53 Collective action, in other words, remains rooted in ‘social processes’ that are facilitated and shaped by but cannot be reduced to technological infrastructures.54

Crowd theory and the Arab Spring In the many domains of Arab politics, the 2011 popular uprisings may have rejuvenated interest in crowds.55 For some, new social movement studies is just the ‘eclectic’ analytical umbrella to explore the corporealities and geographies of street and public square protests, the utilisation of ICT and social media, as well as the range of emotions from rage to humiliation, the latter proving even more consequential than sociologists had predicted.56 Others explicitly call for a resuscitation of crowd theory to explore ‘postmodern crowdings’ protests, sport, leisure and consumer behaviour, all with their high levels of mobilisation.57 A more interdisciplinary crowd theory can be well suited to examine the physical and spatio-temporal dimensions of crowd experiences that seem to recur in contemporary sociopolitical occurrences.58 The suggestion here is that responding to these welcome invitations will require a reconfiguration of crowd theory, away from the political and institutional apparatuses of the Western liberal-democratic state – and their attendant conceptual toolkits. For instance, the boundaries between sociology’s ‘conventional crowds’ (congregating for a specific event – including sport tournaments), ‘expressive crowds’ (emotionally-motivated gatherings such as funerals) and ‘acting crowds’ (convening for a particular action including protesting or rioting),59 developed in 476

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liberal democratic Western settings, warrant rethinking in Arab postcolonial contexts. While crowd theory can become an analytical window into investigations of Arab protest politics – their repertoires of contention,60 crowds do not merit attention only in the 2011 uprisings. In fact, as will be argued here, the mobilisation of crowds has long been part of an almost ‘repertoire of control’ of Arab postcolonial dictators and their regimes. Ayubi describes regimes in states from Egypt to Tunisia as ruling through ‘populist corporatism,’ a combination of welfarism and statism seeking to control not only society’s various classes but also other interests (e.g. the ‘religious establishment’).61 This form of authoritarianism is therefore ‘distinctly mobilizational, unleashing social forces through various policies of economic development and modernization’ in a constant struggle for the ‘appropriate institutional arrangements’ that strike the right balance between popular support and state control.62

Social capital, solidarity and ‘contra-crowds’ Is there an explanatory power for social capital in our understanding of football-based, stated and driven norms of solidarity (norm convergence)? How can this be empirically explored with special reference to the implications of football sociability in the Middle East (Egypt and Tunisia)? In particular, how is football deployed as a mobilisational medium of state crowd recruitment, penetration and control? Equally, how does a football crowd morph into what is called here a state ‘contra-crowd’? Social capital stock values are theorised as coterminous with national unity, citizenship, civic development and socio-economic progress and democracy.63 Following the tradition of emphasising the self-organising collective role of citizens in a society expounded by Alexis de Tocqueville, for Putnam social capital rests on ‘features of social organisation, such as networks, norms, and trusts that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.’64 The triad of networks, norms and trust bring together essential aspects without which the contribution of citizens to public life would be markedly low. The payoffs of social capital can manifest not just in the political but in the economic sphere. Anthony Giddens, for instance, argues that the government’s role in sustaining social and civic frameworks is pivotal for markets.65 Robert Hefner’s study of Muslim politics in Indonesia revises Putnam’s theory, positing a synergy among civic organisations, public culture and the state – the latter required for civic organisations to further augment their democratic role.66 Nonetheless, social capital is not without problems. It does not answer the questions related to the ‘capital’ in social capital: when is it capital? It is assumed to be thus when it coheres with nation and state-building. Rarely, if at all, is it assumed to have potentiality for, as an example, anti-systemic-type anomie. It is invariably correlated with a kind of positive progenitor of civic and democratic development – for some a cultural co-actor precipitated by economic growth.67 That is, it is hardly considered in negative terms: a counter-actor, with anti-state subversive potentiality. Capital is assumed as inherently aligned with statism, a wherewithal of civility. Does that undermine the ‘social’ in social capital when its returns do not add up as systemic construction? Quite to the contrary; the question, then, becomes ‘What remains of the “social” in social capital when norm-making assumes subversive and corrosive properties – i.e. antisystemic”? Scholarship seems to be largely focused on values (trust, compromise, inclusiveness, solidarity, etc.), agents, processes and resources that individually and collectively condition civic and democratic sociability and unity. Charles Tilly conceptualises trust as a ‘relationship’ (rather than an ‘attitude’) ‘consist[ing] of placing valued outcomes at risk to others’ malfeasance.’68 By extension, trust networks are ‘ramified interpersonal connections within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance of others.’69 477

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This conceptualisation may be malleable enough to apply to social bonds that may or may not reinforce the ‘system,’ (i.e. the state and its institutions). Importantly, Tilly notes that sometimes trust networks arise out of discontent with ‘governmental performance.’70 Yet he is wary of new media, partly because it can ‘dissolve connections between’ on the one hand ‘public politics at the national scale’ and people’s existing trust networks on the other – a distance contributing to what he calls ‘de-democratization.’71 Relations of trust, it seems, are normatively valued only insofar as they work in tandem with the state and its (democratic) institutions.The hidden angle of social capital is what if solidarity or trust, for example, taken to be social capital, values work to undermine the system, not to uphold it? The approach in this chapter explores this angle, be it in a parsimonious and tentative fashion, by predicating it on narrow social-identity (football-club type belonging that happens to be geographically focused). By exploring this angle, the aim is not so much to highlight the limitations of social capital in relation to soccer activism within authoritarian contexts as it is to seek a linkage between crowd theory, social capital and football politics. By refocusing the analysis via this linkage, the aim is to represent the problematics of football politics, both relationally and situationally (spatially and temporally). Just as in the case of other concepts and theories of political science, neither crowd theory nor social capital can be assumed to be generalisable when explaining problems and phenomena such as the politics of football. The case studies presented here of crowd conformity and then crowd rebellion are both embedded in social capital values of solidarity and group membership founded on trust. Accordingly, one contribution being made here is that Euro-American theories are delimited by their spatial and temporal exclusivity.

The politics of football through the lens of symbolic interactionism Egyptian football Football, brought to Egypt by the English in the early twentieth century, increased in popularity with the establishment of several football clubs.The sport’s popularity can be tracked in some of the sport magazines and newspapers that emerged at this time, in the lead-up to and aftermath of the Egyptian team’s participation in the 1934 Olympics, the most prominent of which was Al-Risalah al-Riyadiyyah, published by Fouad University (later Cairo University).72 Football was at first a site of British cultural (and political) tutelage. Egyptians played against British teams or members of the British army, always with British referees, making football part of ‘a disciplinary regime; a chance to teach obedience and order to their colonial subjects.’73 With their enduring rivalry, the two clubs Al-Ahli and Al-Zamalek (first named Qasr-El Nil) had diverging histories inseparable from Egypt’s colonial experience and the various political (and class) positions therein. The Student Club founded by Mustafa Kamil in 1905 for the Egyptian non-elites during British rule was the precursor to Al-Ahly, later headed honorarily by the 1919 revolution’s leader, Saad Zaghloul.74 Al-Ahly victories would spur anti-British protests, and by 1925 non-Egyptians were barred from membership.75 By contrast, the more elitist and foreignerfriendly club renamed Al-Zamalek in 1952 (after a series of name changes, from Qasr el-Nil to El-Mokhtalat to El-Farouk), was founded by Belgian George Marzbach in 1911.76 The politicisation of football did not wane in Abdel Nasser’s Egypt. Abdel Nasser was instrumental in founding the Africa Cup of Nations in 1957, which Egypt won that year. In 1959, Abdel Nasser not only symbolically but literally inserted the army into football, naming a former Free Officer to head Al-Ahly in the 1960s. Training camps for football players were held adjacent to military bases, with army leaders exhorting the public to support the army and its war effort through attending football matches.77 The nationalist president was declared 478

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honorary head of Al-Ahly club, often attending games, in a tradition that would continue to Hosni Mubarak.78 A video broadcast of the opening of the Cairo Stadium in 1960, on the 8th anniversary of the Free Officer’s Revolution,79 exemplifies this ‘mobilisational’ aspect of statesponsored football, central to the personalistic rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser. The zaim (leader) of Egypt stands on a stage above the roaring crowd. He is surrounded by public officials and foreign dignitaries to whom he awards tokens of the country’s friendship. Rows of identically dressed women and youth march in step to the swell of drumbeat music. The extravaganza is rounded off with a parade of Ramses cars made in the United Arab Republic by ‘Arab labourers,’ followed by a display of youth riding Egyptian-made bicycles adorned with the UAR flag. All this showcases a pan-Arab industrial capacity before a thunderous audience, itself a projection of national unity. This is no routine gathering of football fans. It is a choreographed political spectacle of the highest order, a well-designed utilisation of public space (the stadium), corporeal presence (the cheering crowd) and ‘politico-mechanics’ (the cars), in a scene decorated by other nationalist symbols (the United Arab Republic flag, etc.). On this anniversary of the ‘revolution,’ Nasser addresses his ‘brethren citizens,’ invoking ‘independence, freedom, and building the nation’ paved by the sacrifices of ‘martyrs.’80 Having completed the hardest ‘takeoff stage’ of economic development and nation building, ‘your unity,’ he commends the crowd, makes it possible to move onto the next stage of ‘building our republic.’ The country moves forward to create a ‘democratic’ society made harmonious through ‘just distribution,’ continues Nasser, as we ‘depend on God and ourselves while maintaining our independence.’ The crowd is almost a prop in this theatrical stadium opening, a power ‘play’ feeding into Nasser’s personalist rule. Yet the same state that could bestow sport as pastimes and tournaments as spectacle upon the populace could just as easily withdraw it. After the 1967 Arab defeat (naksah) in the Six-Day War with Israel, Abdel Nasser banned football, which he now deemed a ‘distraction.’ The sport was only reinstated under Sadat’s rule in 1971.81 Whether through carrots or through sticks, football has been one site through which the state sought to penetrate – and control – society. Engineered, energetic crowds could infuse regimes, from Abdel Nasser to Mubarak, with a semblance of popular legitimation.Yet the affective and psychological solidarity of sport spectatorship, Guttman’s ‘identification’ and ‘partisanship,’ could always pose a latent threat to authoritarian rule. Importantly, the military has long been a cornerstone of Egypt’s ‘populist-corporatist’ regime, deployed in the various ‘repertoires of control’ of society, football crowds included. In fact, teams sponsored by the Ministries of the Defence and Interior, funded by the national defence budget itself, cropped up among the premier leagues in Egypt in the Mubarak era.82 President Mubarak (ousted in 2011 through a popular uprising) and his sons Alaa and Gamal famously attended matches and other sporting events, including training sessions of the national team preparing for the FIFA qualifying match against Algeria in 2009. Anti-Algerian hostility building up to an Egyptian loss may have marked a turning point in football crowd manipulation by the state. For some, 2009 marked the end of an era of state-led nationalist football obsessions, with a number of Egyptian intellectuals recognising the excessive political-media hype in the prelude to the game as an ‘ “empty replacement” for a “real nationalist cause”.’83

Tunisian football As in Egypt, the emergence of football clubs in Tunisia pre-dates its modern statehood, going back to the French colonial period. Indeed, the long-standing rivalry between the country’s two oldest and largest clubs, Esperance and Club Africain – akin to that between Al-Ahly and Zamalek – may belie their shared history of resistance against the French, as bulwarks of AraboIslamic Tunisian identity.84 Founded in 1919, Esperance characterises itself as an embodiment 479

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of an anti-colonial struggle ‘against tyranny and injustice,’ reflected in the name of the Club itself, al-tarajji in Arabic, denoting hope and aspiration.85 This was the first entirely local, Tunisified football club in the country, soon followed in 1920 by Club Africain (al-nady al-ifriqi), the latter banned by the French from adopting its preferred name, the ‘African Islamic Club.’86 Bourguiba, as national independence leader, was heavily involved in Esperance from 1931 – a proclivity and patronage that would extend into his presidency as first postcolonial leader of independent Tunisia. Other prominent figures of the nationalist movement such as Albashir Sifr and Abdulaziz Tha’albi (founder of the Destour Party) played a similar role in Club Africain, recognising the mobilisational potential – at this point, against the French – of football’s expansive popularity and broad social base.87 Football retained its political significance after official Tunisian independence from the French in 1956. The political dominance of Habib Bourguiba, the country’s first president in the nascent populist corporatist state, is noteworthy. His ‘omnipresen[ce]’88 was the backdrop against which the top-down reorientation of football towards constructing a ‘Tunisian nation,’ even refashioning its citizenry, took place. His neo-Destour, ‘the highly centralized, oligarchic party’ monopolising a one-party political system was ‘not necessarily the best vehicle for development.’89 Bourguiba demonstrated remarkable staying power via the party, eliminating rivals (e.g. exiling and assassinating Salih bin Youssif),90 skilfully reassigning potential challengers (Bin Salah) and unleashing a formidable ensemble of ‘militants’ and ‘paramilitants’ on Tunisians.91 The neo-Destour continually reorganised itself to control various classes (e.g. labour and youth) and suppress potential ideological challengers and blocs (e.g. pan-Arabists or ‘fundamentalists,’ that is, Islamists).92 In this way, Bourguiba ensured that criticism and disloyalty to him – also al-zaim – was equivalent to disloyalty to the party and nation itself.93 It is no surprise, then, that this impulse and practice of control extended to sport, from Bourguiba and then later Ben Ali. Bourguiba turned to sport, administered by the Ministry of Education, the Ministry for Youth and Sport, and Tunisian Scouts as a means to ‘shape the nation’s youth and instill a love of country,’94 to ‘try and transform mentalities.’95 Sport, football included, was thus part of a civic regimen to refashion the new progressive citizen, shaping a forward-looking ‘Tunisian nation.’ Spurred by pressure from the IMF and World Bank, economic liberalisation under Ben Ali, who came to power in a bloodless, so-called ‘medical coup’ in 1987, meant budget cuts to sport. A shift to more ‘clientilism’ (exemplified by Slim Chiboub and others)96 took place in the increasingly ‘police state which tried to control every aspect of Tunisian life, including sport.’97 This state of affairs continued until the revolution in 2011, which promulgated legal measures to elect new boards of sport federations throughout the country.98 Bourguiba was not just a supreme fighter (al-mujahid al-akbar) but also a supreme patron of sport and football. Far from shy about his bias towards Esperance, he became its honorary head in 1957. Like Abdel Nasser, he tapped into the mobilisational and control benefits of crowds. From 1959 to 1980, Bourguiba made a habit of attending football matches to bestow his ‘blessing,’ asserting his (omni)presence before thousands of Tunisians. In his gleaming black Rolls Royce, sunroof open, he stood up in his long black coat to exuberantly wave with his arms and hat at the excited masses.99 His official car was accompanied by a motorcade donning red and yellow, the ‘blood and gold’ colours of al-tarajji. Crowds must be kept in check, however: the zaim who gave the nation sport and football could just as easily deprive errant citizens of his largesse, as when he briefly disbanded the Najm Sahel team in 1961 after audience ‘mischief.’100 Alternatively, the state, via Bourguiba, brandished football to quell unrest. As if to blot out or whitewash the UGTT strikes and riots of 1978, khubz-iste101 crowds in which 51 people were killed, a different state-sanctioned crowd celebrated Tunisia’s qualification for the World Cup finals in Argentina, ‘help[ing] calm people’s anger.’102 The permanent crowd of football fans 480

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played almost a double game, prostrate and contra-state. It is therefore significant that Bourguiba’s (and later Ben Ali’s, through his son-in-law Slim Chiboub’s) patronage of Esperance has earned the club the popular name al-dawlah (the state). The moniker connotes an association with the state, but also the state-ification of the club: dawlat-al-tarajji, Esperance as state. Not to be outdone, Africain is often unofficially labelled al-sha’b (the people), a tongue-in-cheek designation of the ongoing rivalry between the residents of Bab Al-Jdid and Bab al-Soueika, two neighbourhoods in Tunis.103 This dawlah-sha’b duo suggests a public awareness of both the entanglement of elites in football and the popular base that ensures its very power, a back-andforth exchange characterising the sport since the earliest days of the republic. Bourguiba’s imposition of national unity was not simply about formal political control (e.g. dominance of the neo-Destour party). It also carried substantial identitarian dimensions in a postcolonial Tunisia where ‘national unity is spelt singularity’: absolute deference to the state and its elites.104 He sought to fashion the new muwatinoon (citizens) in a baldi-Saheli (coastal) and Franco-bourgeois model.105 Bourguiba used both repression and ‘equalization through welfarist redistribution of goods’ such as education to crush alternative forms of identity, including the very tribes that had mobilised in the anti-French resistance.106 They were now a threat. In this new Tunisian ethno-nationalism, ethnos and demos were ‘blurred’ to do away with ‘viable identities: religious, tribal, and democratic’ that might, if left unchecked, coalesce into rival centres of power challenging the state.107 Ben Ali, despite grand proclamations of democratisation, continued in this same vein, pre-empting potential democratising self-identifications and collectivities, from trades unionists to Islamists.Yet attempts by both Bourguiba and Ben Ali to ‘hegemonise’ national identity were never complete. Football matches such as those between Esperance and Africain (‘no other event[s] in Tunis consume[d] a public of this size’), reflect some of the contradictions between nationalist (Tunisia) and more place-based identifications (Bab Jdid and Bab Souika’) that could be ‘competing or reinforcing.’108 State efforts at ‘taming’ both the behaviour and identification of society (here, embodied in football crowds) were always only partially successful. The state has never been able to summon complete and ultimate solidarity at the expense of other solidarities. Governorates were the postcolonial state’s geographicadministrative attempt to snuff out tribal identities and loyalties; still, residual tensions between regions (e.g. the South and the Sahel) underpin ‘racist’ chants and even violence at some football games in Tunisia.109 A banner taunting a northern Bizerte club for being the ‘(remnants) of colonialism’ held up by the crowd at a Tataouine football club,110 for instance, demonstrates on some level a refusal of sociopolitical engineering by the state: contra-crowds in action.

Contra-crowd: ultras’ symbols and images Parallel to the contraction of state-controlled football mania was the phenomenon of ultras, part of a phenomenon referred to here as the ‘contra-crowd.’ Fashioning themselves after counterparts in Eastern Europe and Latin America, minus the overt politico-ideological positions, these extreme fans emerged in Egypt and Tunisia in the years leading up to the 2011 Arab uprisings. Feelings of ‘alienation’ by youth (and citizens generally) had spread across countries in which the state sought to control every aspect of public life, particularly large gatherings (crowds) in football stadiums. Here the ultras, super-enthusiastic fans, formed a sort of solidarity, identification and trust not with the state (as citizens) but with the club itself: al-watan al-nadi (the club as nation).111 Their anti-systemic stances and behaviour were directed at the state apparatus directly tasked with (coercively, physically) crowd control: the security forces, in a brazen ‘all cops are bastards’ (kul rijaal al-amn awghaad) attitude.112 For these superfans, the security forces as representatives and soldiers of the state threatened a basic level of freedom sought by the ultras, 481

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namely, attending matches and supporting their clubs’ teams. Rivalries between Zamalek and Ahly in Egypt could be surpassed, bringing together sport foes to defy police and security forces. It was similar in Tunisia, where competing African-Esperance ultras would ‘confron[t] the police and liberat[e] public space’ together, inflicting a ‘constant headache’ upon the authorities.113 These ultras showed a remarkable knack for leading protests up to and after the 2011 revolution as well as boycotting stadiums (e.g. the Black Korfas) in objection to police violence.114 More recently, ultras mobilised support across the country’s many clubs when Omar al-Ubaidi drowned after a police chase during an Africain-Olympique Medenin game.115 Smaller ‘us vs. them’ oppositions between clubs and their superfans are transcended in solidarity against state repression: the larger ‘us vs. them.’ While ultras’ physical confrontations over the years with security forces are legendary in both Egypt and Tunisia, they also utilised a number of other symbolic forms of resistance. These ranged from graffiti and songs taunting security forces (for their lack of education, for instance), to negotiations with the security forces flexing their muscle not just against the ultras but the larger football audience. In so doing, ultras developed their own set of norms – attending all club matches, standing up for the entire 90 minutes, nonstop cheering and refusing any outside funding.116 From a symbolic interaction perspective, ultras’ graffiti, chants, songs, banners, the extravagant displays upon stadium entry known as al-dakhlah, T-shirts and hoodies are markers and expressions of a group identity. Occasionally, these symbolic expressions address explicitly political issues, as in al-Tarajji’s song O Palestine ask them: where have the [Arab] nation’s men gone?117 The ultras’ sense of solidarity, belonging and group norms, all fomenting bonds of trust between members, were formed vis-à-vis the state, contra the centre and vice versa. Security forces targeted ultras (with tear gas, arrests and violence), depicted as agents of chaos subverting state authority and control. In other words, the ultras’ pursuit of the ‘freedom’ to attend matches and support their team played out antagonistically – by necessity in corporatist-populist regimes such as Egypt’s and Tunisia’s. This identity, an us-vs.-them (ultras or ‘the people’ vs. the state) is further guided by a code of silence, almost. Ultras avoid traditional media, seen as an arm of the state, under most circumstances. Instead, they emphasise anonymity, not just for survival purposes (avoiding security forces) but also as an ethos. They refuse partisan identification and funding. What matters is the game – unfettered access, enjoyment and celebration of that game.Tunisian ultras thus use terms like gharaam (passion) for football, incubated among ashaab (friends) and ikhwah (brothers) forming an ‘aa’ilah (family) held together by both emotion, mahabbah (love), a reigning ethic, nush (counsel), but also more formal organising principles, qanun dakhili (by-laws).118 Ultras as contracrowds are thus corrosive, anti-systemic and anti-centre, restricting state control over the group. They are also collectivities held together by bonds of trust, emotion and formal and informal ‘norms’ to offer an alternative form of flexible belonging. Club (or regional) identification, Guttmann’s ‘partisanship,’ is made subservient to a larger membership, of the people against a state deemed repressive.The suggestion here, then, is that ultras’ sociopolitical significance lies not just in their street-fighting readiness for mass confrontation with the state in the 2011 uprisings in both countries nor in discussions of when ultras who claim they are apolitical become overtly political actors (e.g. protesting and defending protestors in the 2011 revolution in an individual, not group, capacity). Additionally, ultras are politically noteworthy in their identitarian, group membership and trust dynamics through which a crowd as expression of state control transforms into a contra-crowd. This abrasive crowd/contra-crowd encounter, as identity and resistance against the authoritarian state ‘centre,’ continues to play out, from the Port Said massacre of 2012 to Sisi’s Egypt, where they are currently banned.119 Even after the revolution in Tunisia, football 482

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remains a fulcrum of formal party politics. The sport is exploited for political recruitment (of footballers-turned-politicians) and mobilisation (of football’s fan base), seen in the Troika coalition government (2011–2014) where athlete Tarak Dhiab served as Minister of Sport, and in the 2014 elections.120 This trend continued in the 2019 presidential elections in the candidacy of Slim Riahi, head of Club Africain. At the same time, persistent strains between Tunisian ultras and security officials have resulted in repeated incidents of violence and wide-scale banning of public attendance at football matches.While officers insist they are ‘targeted’ by fans armed with sticks and knives, ultras complain of being prohibited from bringing in their signature regalia to games, noting ‘aggressive and provocative behaviour by certain officers’ who prohibit the signature regalia and banners121 so central to their identity and practice.

Conclusion: football’s ‘habitus’ – field and practice This preliminary comparative analysis of football and politics in Tunisia and Egypt points to the continual political salience of the sport in both countries. From its heyday during the anticolonial resistance period, through the formation of the postcolonial state, into the 2011 revolutions and since, football has been pivotal to state-led discourses and practices of nationhood, political loyalties and allegiances, and mobilisation and recruitment.The interplay of football and politics through ‘crowd and contra-crowd’ is amenable to further empirical verification.Yet the suggestion here is that this is one area to explore in the key state-society dyad in the context of the Arab world. State-society relations, that is, cannot be seen exclusively through the lens of authoritarianism. Instead, state and society seem to be locked into a game of exchange: of benefits, recruitment and recognition.This power dynamic is not a stable one but vacillates along a pendulum. Within football, the state is not always calling the shots (e.g. ultras’ protests in the 2011 uprisings, or even the Port Said massacre of 2012). More broadly, football and its crowds tell us something about how to study power. Here Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, and his use of the metaphor of football (game, field, practice) is apt. He defines habitus as a system ‘that organizes perception of the world and action in the world in accordance with the objective structures of a given state of the social world,’ in ‘schemes of perception, appreciation and action . . . acquired through practice and implemented in the practical state.’122 Thus habitus is the intersubjective connections between social beings and agents who share representations, engaging in the production, construction and perception of symbols and meanings. Future research can probe the explanatory power of the habitus in settings of polarity between sport and polity. How might we further explore the habits and habitus within this football-politics terrain, with its political, psychological, biological and affective dimensions? Habitus can go both ways: there is an elite habitus, populist-corporatist, that sees only hierarchical organisation and wielding of power. But games, including football, are not always predicated on win-win outcomes. Some situations feature an almost counter-habitus (within a club following, a counter-base, almost) that may not always obey the rules of engagement of the elite habitus. What, then, are the social, biological and political drives that make a habitus conducive to co-option, or to cooperation? When and how can the football-politics ‘field’ become grounded in an understanding of exchange (of recognition, benefits, recruitment) or counter-power? When does the crowd of the state become the ‘state of the crowd – a question hinted at by the phrase dawlat-al-tarajji, discussed earlier? Clubs themselves have their own potentiality, capacity and agency, which can make them co-operative or coercive, pliant or subversive. They are held together by their own practices and bonds of trust: as an internal ‘glue’ that, to modify Tilly’s concept, may be both a relation and an attitude. Unlike control over society which may stabilise, control over crowds is not guaranteed to be permanent. Historically, 483

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it fluctuates, even under corporatist-authoritarian regimes, from the unruly crowd of Al-najm al-Saheli during Bourguiba’s rule, to the Ahly-Zamalek or Esperance-Africain solidarity against Mubarak or Ben Ali’s security forces. The Egypt-Tunisia comparison has helped illuminate these shifting state/society, crowd/ contra-crowd dynamics, reaching their peak in 2011 but now back almost to square one. Ultras are banned as such in Sisi’s Egypt, or from attendance of games in Tunisia. Football crowds are subject to control and taming by the state. Yet their latent threat remains. Here it is important not to overstate the political capacities of football crowds or informal political actors, identities, collectivities and mobilisation. The ‘low politics’ of football and its cat-and-mouse interactions with the state are one thing. Cascading into the larger rebellion against the entire political apparatus – al-mandhooma – is a different ‘game’ altogether.Yet the crowds-in-waiting, where repression is high (Egypt) or deprivation is widespread (Tunisia), are still there. The comparative value of this ‘crowd’ is promising. Expanding the sample lends itself to the identification of similar or diverging patterns across the region. The crowd is thus a repository of social beings, their agential potentialities and ascriptive and symbolic capacities. Ascriptive politics of football crowds is important here. Enthusiasm for the sport or the team does not rule out revolutionary fervour, concern for the public interest and discontent with the state or the formal political system. We are tempted to speculate, then: what is the threshold these (contra)crowds must transcend for us to approach the crowd-in-waiting as actually a new social movement?

Notes 1 Tony Mason, Passion of the People? Football in South America (London:Verso, 1995), 61. 2 Joseph L. Arbena, “Generals and Goles: Assessing the Connection Between the Military and Soccer in Argentina,” International Journal of the History of Sport 7 (1990): 120–30. 3 Mason, “Passion,” 64. 4 Ibid., 65. 5 Ibid., 73. 6 Ibid., 67. 7 Joshua Nadel, Futbol! Why Soccer Matters in Latin America (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2014), 32. 8 Simoni Lahud Guedes, “On Criollos and Capoeiras: Notes on Soccer and National Identity in Argentina and in Brazil,” Soccer and Society 15, no. 1 (2014): 147–61. 9 Kirk Bowman, “Futebol/Futbol, Identity, and Politics in Latin America,” Latin American Research Review 50, no. 3 (2015): 254–64. 10 Nadel, Futbol!, 13. 11 Ibid., 154–56. 12 Ibid., 46. 13 Joshua Nadel,interview with Kojo Nmandi,Kojo Nmandi Show,WAMU,May 28,214,accessed July 15,2019, https://thekojonnamdishow.org/shows/2014-05-28/futbol-soccer-history-and-politics-latin-america. 14 Ian P. Henry, Mahfoud Amara, and Mansour Al-Tauqi, “Sport, Arab Nationalism and the Pan-Arab Games,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 38, no. 3 (2003): 295–310. 15 Thomas B. Stevenson and Abdul Karim Alaug, “Football in Newly United Yemen: Rituals of Equity, Identity, and State Formation,” Journal of Anthropological Research 56, no. 4 (2000): 453–75. 16 Tamir Sorek, “Arab Football in Israel as an ‘Integrative Enclave’,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 26, no. 3 (2003): 422–50. 17 Danyel Reiche, “Investing in Sporting Success as a Domestic and Foreign Policy Tool: The Case of Qatar,” International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 7, no. 4 (2015): 489–504. 18 James M. Dorsey, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 19 Ibid., 32. 20 Ibid., 283. 21 Ibid., 69, 78–85. 484

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22 Dag Tuastad, “From Football Riot to Revolution: The Political Role of Football in the Arab World,” Soccer and Society 15, no. 3 (2014): 383. 23 Ibid. 24 Dorsey, Turbulent World, 35. 25 Stefan Jonsson, Crowds and Democracy: The Idea and Image of the Masses from Revolution to Facism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013). 26 Ibid., 9. 27 Ibid., 15. 28 Ibid., 14. 29 Ibid., 248. 30 Ibid., 250. 31 Stefan Jonsson, A Brief History of the Masses: Three Revolutions (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 13. 32 Christian Borch, The Politics of Crowds: An Alternative History of Sociology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 16. 33 Fergus G. Neville and Stephen Reicher, “Crowds, Social Identities, and the Shaping of Everyday Social Relations,” in Political Psychology: A Social Psychological Approach, ed. Christopher J. Hewer and Evanthia Lyons (London: John Wiley & Sons, 2018), 233. 34 Borch, Politics of Crowds, 253–54, 261. 35 Ibid., 269. 36 Ibid., 270. 37 Ralph H. Turner and Lewis M. Killian, Collective Behavior, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987). 38 John Drury, Chris Cocking, and Steve Reicher, “Everyone for Themselves? A Comparative Study of Crowd Solidarity Among Emergency Survivors,” British Journal of Social Psychology 48 (2009): 488. 39 Mikaila M. L. Arthur, “Emergent Norm Theory,” in Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements, ed. David A. Snow, Donatella della Porta, Bert Klandermans, and Doug McAdam (London: Blackwell, 2013), 1. 40 Neville and Reicher, “Crowds, Social Identities,” 243. 41 Ibid., 245. 42 Ibid., 246. 43 Ibid., 249. 44 Norman K. Denizen, Symbolic Interactionism and Cultural Studies: The Politics of Interpretation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). 45 James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds (New York: Anchor Books, 2005), xviii–xx. 46 Ibid., 70. 47 Ibid., 271. 48 Ibid., 256. 49 Allen Guttmann, “Sports Crowds,” in Crowds, ed. Jeffrey T. Schnapp and Matthew Tiews (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 111–32. 50 Ibid. 51 Surowiecki, Wisdom, 272–78. 52 Ulrich Dolata and Jan-Felix Shrape, “Masses, Crowds, Communities, Movements: Collective Action in the Internet Age,” Social Movement Studies 15, no. 1 (2016): 1–18. 53 Ibid., 13–14. 54 Ibid. 55 For instance, Andrea Khalil, Crowds and Politics in North Africa:Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya (London: Routledge, 2014). 56 Tova Benski, Lauren Langman, Ignacia Perrugoría, and Benjamín Tejerina, “From the Streets and Squares to Social Movement Studies: What Have We Learned?” Current Sociology 61, no. 4 (2013): 541–61. 57 Christian Borch and Britta Timm, “Postmodern Crowds: Re-Inventing Crowd Thinking,” Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory 14, no. 2 (2013): 109–13. 58 Reza M. Nejad, “Crowds, Protests and Processions: Revisiting Urban Experiences,” Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory 17, no. 3 (2016): 251–53. 59 William Little, Introduction to Sociology: 2nd Canadian Edition (2016), accessed August 12, 2019, https:// opentextbc.ca/introductionto. 485

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6 0 Charles Tilly, “Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain,” Social Science History 17, no. 2 (1993): 253–80. 61 Nazih A. Ayubi, “Withered Socialism or Whether Socialism? The Radical Arab States as PopulistCorporatist Regimes,” Third World Quarterly 13, no. 1 (1992): 89–105. 62 Ibid., 98–99. 63 Alejandro Portes and Margarita Mooney, “Social Capital and Community Development,” in The New Economic Sociology: Developments in an Emerging Field, ed. M. F. Guillen, R. Collins, P. England, and M. Meyer (New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 2002), 303–29; Robert Putnam, “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital,” Journal of Democracy 6, no. 1 (1995): 65–76. 64 Robert N. Putnam, “Social Capital and Public Affairs,” Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 47, no. 8 (May 1998): 6–7. 65 Anthony Giddens, The Third Way and Its Critics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 57–58. 66 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 25. 67 Robert Inglehart, “Trust, Well-Being and Democracy,” in Democracy and Trust, ed. Mark E. Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 88–120. 68 Charles Tilly, “Trust and Rule,” Theory and Society 33 (2004): 4. 69 Ibid., 5. 70 Ibid., 8. 71 Ibid., 25. 72 Mahmood Al-Dawsaqi, “Safahaat min Tarikh Kurat al-Qadam fi Misr ‘‘Umruha 100’ Aam” [100 YearOld Pages from Egypt’’s Football History], Al-Ahram, June 21, 2018, accessed September 21, 2019, http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/1970990.aspx. 73 Shaun Lopez, “Football as National Allegory: Al-Ahram and the Olympics in 1920s Egypt,” History Compass 7, no. 1 (2009): 286. 74 Ann Zacharias, “Only a Game? Not in Egypt,” The National, June 24, 2014, accessed September 21, 2019, www.thenational.ae/world/only-a-game-not-in-egypt-1.310197. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid. 77 Islam Abdultawwab,“Fi Dhikra Miladi: Gamal AbdelNasser al-’Ra’is al-Ahlawi” [On His Birthday: Gamal Abdelnasser theAhlawi President],Elmwatin,January 15,2019,accessed September 21,2019,www.elmwatin. com/583340/%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%8A%D9% 84%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%A F%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6% D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%87%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%8A%D8% A3%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B0-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B 9-%D9%88%D8%BA%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AE%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85-%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%B5. Such celebratory accounts have mushroomed under the rule of Abdel Fattah el-Sissi, seeking to revive Nasser’s legacy – opening, for instance, the Gamal Abdel Nasser Museum in 2016 – and perhaps fashioning himself after the late leader. See, for instance, Martin Chulov, “Egypt Wonders if Army Chief Is Another Nasser,” The Guardian, August 7, 2013, accessed September 21, 2019, www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/07/egypt-morsi-nationalist-general-sisi. 78 Alaa Al Aswany, “Egypt’’s Enduring Passion for Soccer,” New York Times, April 16, 2014, accessed September 21, 2019, www.nytimes.com/2014/04/17/opinion/egypts-enduring-passion-for-soccer.html. 79 “Gamal Abdel Nasser Opens Cairo Stadium 1960,” March 29, 2014, accessed September 21, 2019, www.youtube.com/watch?v=UUHhGvbU9gQ. 80 “President Gamal Abdel ’Nasser’s Speech on the Occasion of the Opening of the New Cairo Stadium on the Anniversary of the Revolution,” accessed September 21, 2019, www.youtube.com/ watch?v=HhWdDqM4s40&t=3s. 81 Steve Bloomfield, Africa United: How Football Explains Africa (Edinburgh: Canongate Books, 2010), 22. 82 Islam A. Ahmad, “Jama’at al-Altras wa Ishkaliyyat al-’Alaqah bain al-dawlah wal mujtama’ ” [Ultras and the Problematic of State-Society Relations, Part Three], Egyptian Institute for Political and Strategic Studies, November 13, 2016, accessed July 20, 2019, https://eipss-eg.org/%d8%ac%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%b9%d 8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a3%d9%84%d8%aa%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%b3-%d9%88%d8%a5 %d8%b4%d9%83%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d9%84%d8%a7%d9% 82%d8%a9-%d8%a8%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d9%88%d9%84%d8%a9-%d9%88%d 486

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8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d8%ac%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%b9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ac%d8%b2%d8%a1%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ab%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ab/. 83 Carl Rommel, “A Veritable Game of the Nation: On the Changing Status of Football Within the Egyptian National Formation in the Wake of the 2009 World Cup Qualifiers Against Algeria,” Critical African Studies 2, no. 2–3 (2014): 164. 84 Mohammed al-Juoueli, “Tarikh al-Firaq al-Riyadhiyah fi Tunis ’Juz’ min Tarikh al-Nidaal Did al-Isti’maar,” Al Arab, May 2, 2016, accessed September 23, 2019, https://alarab.co.uk/%D8% AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AE-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B6%D9%8A%D 8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3-%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A1%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B6%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B6%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1. 85 Esperance de Tunis, “Histoire,” accessed September 21, 2019, www.esperance-de-tunis.net/club/ histoire/. 86 Abou Cisse, “Club Africain, exister dans l’ombre de l’Esperance Tunis,” Afrik Foot, September 26, 2012, accessed September 20, 2019, www.afrik-foot.com/club-africain-exister-dans-l-ombre-de-lesperance-tunis. 87 Mohammad Bel Tayyeb, “An Al-dawr al-kabir allathi tal’abuhu kurat al-qadam fi al-siyasah altunisiyyah” [On Football’s Big Role in Tunisian Politics], Raseef 22, April 4, 2016, accessed September 23, 2019, https://raseef22.net/article/53584-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8% AF%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B0%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%87%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85-%D9%81%D9%8A. 88 Olfa Belhassine, “Rewriting Tunisia’s History to Preserve Dissident Memories,” JusticeInfo, January 10, 2017, accessed September 20, 2019, www.justiceinfo.net/en/truth-commissions/31647-rewritingtunisia-s-history-to-preserve-dissident-memories.html. 89 Douglas E. Ashford, “Neo-Destour Leadership and the ‘Confiscated Revolution’,” World Politics 17, no. 2 (1965): 230. 90 Derek Hopwood and Sue Mi Terry, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia: The Tragedy of Longevity (New York: Martin’’s Press, 1992), 87. 91 Ashford, “Neo-Destour.” 92 Ibid., 227–30. 93 Ibid., 222–25. 94 Maha Zaoui and Emmanuel Bayle, “The Central Role of the State in the Governance of Sport and the Olympic Movement in Tunisia, from 1956 to the Present Day,” International Journal of the History of Sport 34, no. 13 (2018): 1389. 95 Ibid., 1340. 96 Ibid., 1343. 97 Ibid., 1344. 98 Ibid., 1347. 99 “Al-Zaim Bourguiba wa ka’s Tunis 1980,” accessed September 20, 2019, www.youtube.com/watch?v =F4Oz8PHCRaY&feature=youtu.be. 100 Bel Tayyeb, “Al-dawr al-kabir.” 101 Larbi Sadiki, “Popular Uprisings and Arab Democratization,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 32, no. 1 (2000): 80–83. 102 Zaoui and Bayle, “Central Role,” 1342. 103 Tariq el-Essadi, “Siraa’ ‘Dawlat’ al-Tarajji wa ‘Sha’b’ al-Ifriqi munthu Zaman Bourgiba,” Jomhouria, September 23, 2014, accessed September 23, 2019, www.jomhouria.com/art22057_%D8%B5% D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B9%20%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8 %AA%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%8A%20%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%20%D8%A7%D9%8 4%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A%20%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B0%20 %D8%B2%D9%85%D9%86%20%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A 8%D8%A9%20:%20%D9%85%D9%86%20%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%85 %20%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A A%D9%8A%D8%AC%20%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9% 20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%A9%D8%9F. 487

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104 Larbi Sadiki, “The Search for Citizenship in Bin Ali’s Tunisia: Democracy Versus Unity,” Political Studies 50, no. 3 (2002): 498. 105 Ibid., 499. 106 Ibid., 503. 107 Ibid., 504. 108 Laryssa Chomiak and John P. Entelis, “Contesting Order in Tunisia: Crafting Political Identity,” in Civil Society Activism Under Authoritarian Rule: A Comparative Perspective, ed. Francesco Cavatorta (London: Routledge, 2013), 83–84. 109 Haitham Slimani, “Akthar min Mujarrad ‘Mustatil Akhdar’,” SasaPost, December 4, 2018, accessed September 20, 2019, www.sasapost.com/the-roots-of-the-racism-of-football-in-tunisia/. 110 Ibid. 111 Ahmad, “Jama’at al-Altras,” 8. 112 Ibid., 7. 113 Haikel Hazgui, “Kurat al-Qadam al-Tunisiyyah: Al-Shuhnah al-Siyasiyyah wanhiyaar ‘al-shaqaf ’,” Nawaat, June 29, 2018, accessed September 23, 2019, https://nawaat.org/portail/2018/06/29/%D 9%83%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8 %AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9%D8%8C-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%AD%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D 8%A9-%D9%88/. 114 Ibid. 115 Ibid. 116 BBC News Arabic, “How Did Ultras Emerge in Egypt and Where Are They Going?” May 5, 2017, accessed July 30, 2019, www.youtube.com/watch?v=0CzMw8pLN-8. 117 Abdelslam Hirshi, “Al-Ultras fi Tunis: ‘Unf wa thawrah wa difaa’ ‘an Qadaya’ aadilah,” Vice, September 4, 2019, accessed September 26, 2019, www.vice.com/ar/article/43kxv9/%D8%A7%D 9%84%D8%A3%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D 8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3-%D8%B9%D9%86%D9%81-%D9%88%D8% AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D 8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9 %84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%84%D8%A9. 118 “A’daa’ ultras min Tunis fi Hiwar Talfasi, Part 1,” Face to Face, December 15, 2017, accessed July 19, 2019, www.youtube.com/watch?v=vmwA8QatY_4. 119 Middle East Eye, “Egypt Allows Football Fans – But Not Ultras–Back into Stadiums,” Middle East Eye, September 2, 2018, accessed September 22, 2019, www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-allowsfootball-fans-not-ultras-back-stadiums. 120 Majdi Al-Saidi, “Ma Bain al-Riyadah walsiyasah: Nujoom Tunisiyoon fi Mu’’tarak al-Ahzaab,” Aljazeera, May 9, 2019, accessed September 23, 2019, www.aljazeera.net/news/politics/2019/5/9/%D8 %B1%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B6%D9%8A%D9%88-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3-%D8% B7%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9% 8A%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%B4%D8%A E%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%A9. 121 Souhail Khmira and Mark Lomas, “Tunisia: A Seasoned Marred by Violence,” BBC Sport, April 19, 2018, accessed September 26, 2019, www.bbc.com/sport/football/43795136. 122 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 94–95.

Bibliography Arbena, Joseph L. “Generals and Goles: Assessing the Connection Between the Military and Soccer in Argentina.” International Journal of the History of Sport 7 (1990): 120–30. Arthur, Mikaila M. “Emergent Norm Theory.” In Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements, edited by David A. Snow, Donatella della Porta, Bert Klandermans, and Doug McAdam. London: Blackwell, 2013. Ashford, Douglas E. “Neo-Destour Leadership and the ‘Confiscated Revolution’.” World Politics 17, no. 2 (1965): 215–31. 488

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Ayubi, Nazih A. “Withered Socialism or Whether Socialism? The Radical Arab States as PopulistCorporatist Regimes.” Third World Quarterly 13, no. 1 (1992): 89–105. Benski, Tova, Lauren Langman, Ignacia Perrugorría, and Benjamín Tejerina. “From the Streets and Squares to Social Movement Studies: What Have We Learned?” Current Sociology 61, no. 4 (2013): 541–61. Bloomfield, Steve. Africa United: How Football Explains Africa. Edinburgh: Canongate Books, 2010. Borch, Christian. The Politics of Crowds: An Alternative History of Sociology. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Borch, Christian, and Britta Timm. “Postmodern Crowds: Re-Inventing Crowd Thinking.” Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory 14, no. 2 (2013): 109–13. Bourdieu, Pierre. The Logic of Practice.Translated by Richard Nice. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990. Bowman, Kirk. “Futebol/Futbol, Identity, and Politics in Latin America.” Latin American Research Review 50, no. 3 (2015): 254–64. Chomiak, Laryssa, and John P. Entelis. “Contesting Order in Tunisia: Crafting Political Identity.” In Civil Society Activism Under Authoritarian Rule: A Comparative Perspective, edited by Francesco Cavatorta, 73–93. London: Routledge, 2013. Denizen, Norman K. Symbolic Interactionism and Cultural Studies:The Politics of Interpretation. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. Dolata, Ulrich, and Jan-Felix Schrape. “Masses, Crowds, Communities, Movements: Collective Action in the Internet Age.” Social Movement Studies 15, no. 1 (2016): 1–18. Dorsey, James M. The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Drury, John, Chris Cocking, and Steve Reicher. “Everyone for Themselves? A Comparative Study of Crowd Solidarity Among Emergency Survivors.” British Journal of Social Psychology 48 (2009): 487–506. Giddens, Anthony. The Third Way and Its Critics. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000. Guedes, Simoni L. “On Criollos and Capoeiras: Notes on Soccer and National Identity in Argentina and in Brazil.” Soccer and Society 15, no. 1 (2014): 147–61. Guttmann, Allen. “Sports Crowds.” In Crowds, edited by Jeffrey T. Schnapp and Matthew Tiews, 111–32. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006. Hefner, Robert W. Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000. Henry, Ian P., Mahfoud Amara, and Mansour Al-Tauqi.“Sport, Arab Nationalism and the Pan-Arab Games.” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 38, no. 3 (2003): 295–310. Hopwood, Derek, and Sue Mi Terry. Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia: The Tragedy of Longevity. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. Inglehart, Robert. “Trust, Well-Being and Democracy.” In Democracy and Trust, edited by Mark E. Warren, 88–120. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Jonsson, Stefan. A Brief History of the Masses:Three Revolutions. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. Jonsson, Stefan. Crowds and Democracy:The Idea and Image of the Masses from Revolution to Fascism. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013. Khalil, Andrea. Crowds and Politics in North Africa:Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya. London: Routledge, 2014. Little, William. Introduction to Sociology: 2nd Canadian Edition, 2016. https://opentextbc.ca/introductionto. Lopez, Shaun. “Football as National Allegory: Al-Ahram and the Olympics in 1920s Egypt.” History Compass 7, no. 1 (2009): 282–305. Mason, Tony. Passion of the People? Football in South America. London:Verso, 1995. Nadel, Joshua. Futbol! Why Soccer Matters in Latin America. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2014. Nadel, Joshua. Interview with Kojo Nmandi. Kojo Nmandi Show,WAMU, May 28, 2014. https://thekojonnamdishow.org/shows/2014-05-28/futbol-soccer-history-and-politics-latin-america. Nejad, Reza M. “Crowds, Protests and Processions: Revisiting Urban Experiences.” Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory 17, no. 3(2016): 251–53. Neville, Fergus G., and Stephen Reicher. “Crowds, Social Identities, and the Shaping of Everyday Social Relations.” In Political Psychology: A Social Psychological Approach, edited by Christopher J. Hewer and Evanthia Lyons. London: John Wiley & Sons, 2018. 489

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Part VI

Asian mega sporting events

With the arrival of Western sport and the Olympics, mega sporting events, such as the Far East Championship Games, began to be held in Asian countries from the early twentieth century onwards. This part of the book provides an overview of the history and development of major continental and regional sporting events held in Asia in the past century. It tries to highlight the role of these events in Asian politics, diplomacy, power struggles, economic competition and cross-cultural communications, revealing the important role that sport has played in the socioeconomic development of Asian countries.

45 The Asian Games, Asian sport and Asian politics Fan Hong and Gong He

Introduction Asia is the largest continent in the world. It comprises one-fifth of the world’s total land area. It is almost five times the size of the United States and is more than four times the size of Europe. It embraces some 17 million square miles of continental landmasses, mainlands, and outlying archipelagos. Asia’s physical diversity is matched by an even greater cultural and social diversity. It comprises 49 separate countries and contains three main cultural areas: the Islamic, the Hindu-Buddhist and the Sinic. It is home to almost 60 percent of the world’s population.1 Although there are diversities in culture and society, Asian countries have taken a similar recent historical journey, from political independence to social transformation and modernity. In the twentieth century, Asian countries, through a triadic process of cultural continuity, assimilation of contemporary ideas and resistance to imperial power, have developed political modernity.2 Modern sport has played an important role in stimulating political reassertion, a sense of national identity and the arousal of Orientalism.3 The Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) founded the Asian Games in 1913 in the image of the Olympic Games, and they were held until 1934, before World War II. In 1951, the revived Asian Games took place in New Delhi. The ostensible purpose of the Games was to promote sport in Asia and to unite Asian countries through sport. Over the years, the Games developed into a distinguished international sporting event. It takes place in every four years, and the number of participating countries increased from 11 in 1951 to 45 in 2018. The number of participants increased from 489 in 19514 to 11,300 in 2018.5 The Asian Games is now regarded as the second-biggest sport meeting in the world.6 This chapter explores the relationship between the Asian Games, Asian sport and Asian states, and focuses on the following issues: (1) the origin of the Asian Games; (2) the Asian Games and regional cooperation; (3) the Asian Games and regional bilateral relations; and (4) the Asian Games, Asian sport and regional and global politics.

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The origin of the Asian games: from cultural imperialism to national and regional identity Modern sport is not a native Asian phenomenon. It was introduced in the nineteenth century from the West, initially by missionaries, and subsequently by way of Asian students returning from Europe and the United States. Of these missionary groups, the YMCA played the most crucial role in organising sport meetings and initiating the Asian Games. In 1913 the YMCAs of three countries – the Philippines, China and Japan – agreed to hold a sport meeting similar to the modern Olympic Games. Therefore, the Games were called the Far Eastern Olympiad (FEO). The organising body was called the Far Eastern Olympic Association (FEOA). Elwood S. Brown, the general secretary of the Philippines’YMCA and the founder of the Far Eastern Games, reported the establishment of the first Asian sport organisation, the FEOA, and the success of the first Asian Games, to Pierre de Coubertin, the President of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), in 1913. Coubertin replied that he would like to cooperate with the FEOA, but the FEOA should not use the term Olympiad for its Games since it was for use only by the Olympic Games.7 Accordingly, in 1915, the name of the Far Eastern Olympic Association (FEOA) was changed to the Far Eastern Games Federation (FEGF); and the Far Eastern Olympiad was changed to the Far Eastern Championship Games (FECG) (see Table 45.1). The aims of the Games, according to the YMCAs, were to train outstanding Oriental athletes to participate in the Olympic Games and to spread Western morality and masculinity among the ‘weaker’ Oriental people. The Games were a product of Western cultural imperialism. It was meant to replace traditional Eastern cultures with Western culture. However, for the Asian countries, it was the first regional sport event which united Asian athletes together under the banner of the Asian games. As the Philippine Free Press stated in 1913, ‘The Far Eastern Olympiad is quite the most significant event that has touched Oriental peoples in united action.They have never met before for united action on any basis other than athletics.’9 For China, Japan and the Philippines, the Asian Games provided an opportunity to train people for real competition between nations. For the athletes, it was pride and national identity, which could be displayed at the Games, that attracted most of their attention. Athletes, for the first time, experienced the pride of representing their nation under their national flag before thousands of spectators. These young men, no matter how much they had been taught by their

Table 45.1 FECG (1913–1938) Year

Games

Dates

Host City

Host Nation

1913 1915 1917 1919 1921 1923 1925 1927 1930 1934 1938

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

3–7 February 15–21 May 8–12 May 12–16 May 30 May – 3 June 21–25 May 17–22 May 28–31 August 24–27 May 16–20 May Cancelled

Manila Shanghai Tokyo Manila Shanghai Osaka Manila Shanghai Tokyo Manila Osaka

Philippines Republic of China Japan Philippines Republic of China Japan Philippines Republic of China Japan Philippines Japan

Based on the work of Hübner Stefan8

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Asian games, Asian sport, Asian politics

YMCA directors and instructors about Western values and morals within the imperialist framework, were still inspired by patriotism. The Asian Games, from the very beginning, was closely linked to nationalism and national identity. When the Chinese athletes won at the second FECG in 1915, Wang Zhengting, the Chairman of the Organising Committee, pointed out that the Games took place at the time when the country was in the Sino-Japanese crisis, and people were worried about the future of the nation. China’s victories at the Games gave hope to the nation. People realised the strength of the nation came from a united China. They also realised the importance of training strong bodies through sport for the future of China. His message was clear: competitive sport could create a strong and powerful masculine China.10 Wong-Quincey said of the symbolic nationalist sentiment of the Games, Its true significance lay in the fact that the Games furnished a convenient occasion for a wild expression of pent-up patriotism, of a bruised and wounded nationalism which had no time to recover from the shock and humiliation arising from the Sino-Japanese crisis.11 Following the 1841 Sino-Japanese War, the 1915 Twenty-One Demands and Japan’s 1931 conquest of Manchuria, politics carried both China and Japan close to a broader conflict. This conflict was also reflected in the Games. Athletes fought with their athletic bodies and skills to advance the political power of their own countries. The Games provided the Chinese sport community with an international perspective to form ideas of a sporting Chinese nation. It also provided real opportunities for Chinese athletes to triumph over the reviled Japanese imperialists on the sport field. At the same time, the Games provided Japan with a platform to show its political, military and sporting superiority over its Eastern neighbours. Sport is politics, and politics is a sport. What happens on the sport field reflects what happens on the political stage. In September 1931, Japanese troops invaded Manchuria.The puppet regime, Manchukuo, was established in 1932. The Japanese made the last Qing emperor Pu Yi ‘chief executive’ of the government and retained control of the area until the end of World War II.12 The FECG took place every other year from 1913 to 1934 and lasted for ten editions. The Japanese wanted the international community to acknowledge the status of its creation, Manchukuo.The international sport stage was an ideal place to start.Therefore, in January 1934, Japan insisted that Manchukuo should participate in the 10th FECG as an independent nation state.When China, together with the Philippines, rejected the request from Japan, the FECG was dissolved on 20 May 1934, and a new Amateur Athletic Association of the Orient was founded, of which Manchukuo became a member.13 Therefore, the FECG ended in Manila in 1934. The Chinese called 20 May the ‘humiliation day in sport history.’14 The history of the FECG will always be remembered as a history of political conflict between China and Japan. While the FECG ended in Manila in 1934, the first Western Asiatic Games took place in India that year. Four countries from West Asia participated: Afghanistan, Ceylon, India and Palestine.The founder of the Games was G.D. Sondhi, who was inspired by the FECG and decided to hold a similar sport meeting to unite the countries in the region of West Asia. The Games were successful, and Palestine proposed to hold the second edition in 1938. However, the second Games never took place due to the approach of World War II.15 The revival of the Asian Games came after World War II, when there was a process of decolonisation, and the emerging postcolonial countries took different routes to independence and modernity.The Asians saw independence and modernity as involving many kinds of transformation – political, economic and social – in Asian society. 495

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However, those Asian states found little to bind them together.The traditional regional political system offered few models for interstate cooperation. A key element for such cooperation – acceptance of the concept of sovereign and equal states – had no political basis in the concepts of the traditional system. Suzerain-vassal relations and subjugation by force had been the primary means for dealing with neighbours and were also the standards for conducting interstate relations. Nevertheless, their links to Europe, which were based on the residual economic and social linkages of the colonial era and the allure of global politics, which was based on the ideologically charged Cold War, were stronger than their links to each other. Therefore, their traditional and colonial experiences left Asian states in a position of non-cooperation.16 The establishment of a supranational forum to unite all states in Asia against the global powers became an important goal. In March 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, held the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi. The Non-Aligned Movement, a defensive response to the Soviet and US superpowers began. It advocated establishing a ‘New Order’ based on mutual respect and peaceful coexistence. Combined with the Non-Aligned Movement was Sondhi’s vision of an ‘All Asian Games to unite the newly independent Asian countries through sport meetings.’ The vision impressed the representatives of various countries at the conference. Indian Prime Minister Nehru immediately offered his support. Encouraged by the success at home, the following year, Sondhi presented the proposal to some Asian countries during the London Olympic Games in 1948. He again received a positive response from the Asian countries, which had emerged from the collapse of the British and other colonial empires, including Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and Israel. On 13 February 1949, the Asian Games Federation (AGF) was born at Patiala House in New Delhi. Maharaja Yadvendra Singh (India) become the First President; George B. Vargas (Philippines), the Vice-President; and G.D. Sondhi (India) the Secretary-cum-Treasurer. The AGF decided to follow the Olympics’ pattern and hold the games every four years between the Olympic Games. Athletics, swimming and diving were compulsory events at the Games. The optional sport would be decided by the host nation, provided that at least four countries were willing to participate. The first Asian Games took place in New Delhi in March 1951.17

The Asian Games and regional cooperation The historical experience of Asian states may explain much of the initial lack, and subsequent slow evolution, of regional cooperation. In the 1950s regional cooperation was limited due to the result of the lack of regional solidarity, common culture and common communications.18 The Asian Games provided an opportunity for the Asian states to confront the traditional system and the intraregional isolationism maintained by the colonial powers. When the first Asian Games took place in New Delhi, Rajendra Prasad, India’s first President, called on Asians to forge links of friendship and understanding with all nations in order to further the cause of peace. He said, I am sure that the first Asian Games will promote the realisation of understanding and friendship among all nations and will start a process which as time passes, will go on cementing the friendly ties between the peoples of Asia.19 Prime Minister Nehru also stated: Delhi and India are fortunate in holding the first Asian Games. . . . There is, however, another aspect of these international gatherings of athletes. They bring together the youth 496

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of many countries and thus help, to some extent, in promoting international friendship and cooperation. In these days when dark clouds of conflicts hover over us, we must seize every opportunity to promote understanding and cooperation between nations. It must be remembered always that these games and contests should be carried out in an atmosphere of utmost friendliness. Each one must try his best and winner or loser must play his part gracefully and must enter into the spirit of the games.20 There was a permanent struggle by the AGF to fund and organise the Games between the 1950s and 1970s. For financial reasons, South Korea and Singapore withdrew from hosting the 6th Games in 1970 and the 8th Games in 1978, respectively. In order to maintain the symbolism of the Asian Games, Thailand, with the help of the other Asian countries, hosted the Asian Games three times, in 1966, 1970 and 1978. As General Kriangsak Chomanan, the president of the organising committee for the 1978 Games, said: The responsibility of organising the eighth Asian Games within the short space of time is a challenge worthy of Thailand and one which we accept with pride. We will not let down the trust that our friends have placed in us and will do our utmost to make the Games no less successful than the previous ones so that the athletes and sports lovers in Asia will have the opportunity to meet each other on common grounds to promote further friendship and goodwill.21 Sombat Karnjanakit and Suptir Samahito stated: The three Games during 1966 and 1978 had a great impact on the Asian sports world and Thailand. . . . [D]uring this period, the Asian countries were independent of colonialism and built their nations. Sport was used as a vehicle for building national pride, mutual understanding, cooperation, and competition among the Asian countries. It also helped to strengthen the relationship between Thailand and other Asian countries. The three Games, to a large extent, showed the solidarity and unity of the Asian sports family.22 Thus, the Asian Games not only brought regional cooperation but also brought a sense of regional identity. Since independence, Asian states have developed a creditable record in the area of regional cooperation, including the formation of ASEAN, SEATO and APEC.23 The Asian Games provided a cultural base that developed understanding and cooperation between the contemporary Asian regions. Political leaders and sport leaders throughout Asia between the 1950s and 1970s used the Games to defend the social, political and cultural features of the region in both national and regional contexts.

Asian Games and regional bilateral relations International and domestic politics overshadowed regional cooperation in Asia. This can be clearly seen in the bilateral relations of Asian countries. Since the end of World War II, some Asian states have maintained bilateral relations.They have frequently been influenced by domestic political climates, which in turn were influenced by the rhetoric of the Cold War. Reactions to foreign policy initiatives among regional states were often polemical or ideological, for example, in Vietnam, Korea and China. The ‘Two Chinas’ issue is an example of how the Asian states dealt with bilateral relations and politics in Asian sport. In 1949 China divided into two states: the People’s Republic of China in 497

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Beijing (PRC) and the Republic of China in Taiwan (ROC). Not all regional states recognised both or either. When the first Asian Games took place in New Delhi, the PRC was invited to serve the political purpose of building a bridge between India and China. However, when the second Asian Games took place in Manila in 1954, and the third in Tokyo in 1958, the ROC was invited as the representative of China. The situation began to change at the fourth Asian Games in Jakarta, Indonesia, in August 1962, when President Sukarno of Indonesia looked on the Games as a means to strengthen his own position among the newly emerging forces of Asia, Africa and Latin America that were ‘struggling against capitalism and trying to create a new world order.’24 Communist China was a useful ally in this endeavour. The PRC also used this opportunity to attempt to establish its position as a leader of the ‘Newly Emerging Forces’ of the world through the Asian Games. The Minister of Sport of the PRC stated, The Chinese government cannot ignore those Imperialists and their followers who wanted to use the Asian Games to create “two Chinas.” These activities will not only harm the friendship between the PRC and Indonesia, but also harm the stand of Indonesia’s fight with Imperialism.25 In the light of the reaction of the PRC and some Arab countries, Indonesia decided not to allow Taiwan or Israel to attend the Games and refused to issue visas to the athletes of these two countries.The IOC and the international federations for weightlifting and athletics regarded this as a political action. They claimed that the Games would face the sanction of not being recognised. The Indonesian government discussed this with Beijing and formally announced on 24 August 1962, that it would reject Taiwan and Israel from the fourth Asian Games. The IOC and the international federations immediately stated that they would not recognise the fourth Asian Games, as they could not tolerate a sport movement whose aim was strictly political. Nevertheless, the Games went ahead and achieved reasonable success. The fifth and sixth Games took place in Bangkok in 1966 and 1970, respectively, and Taiwan represented China at the games. However, when world politics started to change in the early 1970s, sport provided the opportunity for Communist China’s global realignment.The moment when the Chinese and American table tennis players started to talk to each other marked a turning point in relations between the PRC and the United States.26 Following the fine example of the ‘Ping-Pong diplomacy,’ the PRC would re-establish its identity and status in the Asian world through sport at the seventh Asian Games in 1974, when Iran was the host country. From the early 1970s, China and Iran had developed a close relationship. In September 1972, the Iranian monarchy and government were invited to visit Beijing, and they received a warm welcome from Chairman Mao. Subsequently, at the AGF board meeting in September 1973 in Bangkok, Iran proposed to accept PRC as a member and to revoke Taiwan’s membership. The proposal was supported by Japan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, but opposed by Thailand and Malaysia. After some intense debate, the AGF officially admitted the PRC as a member of the AGF, and Taiwan was withdrawn.The IOC was particularly cautious about this change. At its 74th session in September 1971, the IOC stated that politics should not mix with sport. It claimed that if the AGF did not invite all the countries which were IOC members to attend the Asian Games, the IOC would not acknowledge the seventh Asian Games. Other international federations warned that their member countries would be forbidden to compete with non-member countries’ athletes at the Asian Games. However, 269 Chinese athletes participated in all the sport events after some negotiation with the international federations, Asian sport federations and the AGF.

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The 8th Asian Games took place in December 1978 in Bangkok. China began to challenge Japan’s dominant position, winning 51 gold medals and placing second in the medal table. In November 1979, the IOC voted overwhelmingly to admit Communist China as the Chinese Olympic representative.Taiwan, at the same time, accepted the IOC’s conditions for its continuing recognition by changing its name from the National Olympic Committee to the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee. It also had to change its flag and anthem. The change in international politics and the increasing influence of Communist China on the sport world had given Beijing what it wanted. The AGF and the Asian Games soon adopted the same model. Communist China’s return to the Asian Games changed the power structure of the Asian Games. It challenged Japan and South Korea’s dominance in the Games and established its position as the sport superpower in the Asian world. This can be clearly seen in the Asian Games between 1990 and 2002. Sport has great importance, not only for the establishment of Communist China’s identity but for the prospects of eventual reunification with Taiwan. It has played, and still plays, an important part in the Communist strategy to bring Taiwan back to where Beijing conceives Taiwan’s proper place to be – that is, a part of the Chinese motherland to be governed from one centre for the benefit of all Chinese.27 A unified team from South and North Korea at the Asian Games in Qatar in 2006 has provided another model of how the Asian Games solve the problems of regional bilateral relations in the Asian world.

Asian games, Asian sport and regional and global politics Between 1951 and 1981, the Asian Games were organised and governed by the AGF. It was a sport organisation without a fixed headquarters or a steady income. The president and general secretary of the AGF were provided by the host country of the Games. The headquarters was changed according to the changing of the host cities. Nevertheless, the AGF was a semiindependent and democratic sport body that actively promoted unity and cooperation in the region, and tried to stick to its principles and rules under pressure from the superpowers – the United States, the Soviet Union and China – along with pressure from the IOC and international sport federations. In the late 1970s, when many Asian countries established national Olympic Committees (NOCs) and participated in the Olympic Games, the desire grew for a strong body to supervise and develop Asian sport and to have access to a world stage, like the International Olympic Movement. Simultaneously Gulf Arab states emerged with rich financial resources and were ready to play an important role in Asian sport. Their representative was Sheik Fahad Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti sport leader, with his strong political ambition and anti-Semitic feeling, which would influence the policy and practice of the Asian Games for the next two decades. In 1978, before the 8th Asian Games in Bangkok, members of the AGF met and decided to establish a new Asian sport association. A committee was set up to prepare the new organisation. In November 1981, 34 Asian NOCs met in New Delhi and named the new organisation the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA). The 34 Asian NOCs became the founding members. When other NOCs wanted to join the OCA, they had to have the support of two-thirds of the existing members. In this way, the AGF was abolished, and Israel was excluded from the new OCA.28 In November 1982, during the 9th Asian Games in New Delhi, the OCA was formally established. The election of the president and setting up a permanent headquarters became the focus. Sheik Fahad, a son of Kuwait’s billionaire ruling family and president of the Kuwait

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National Olympic Committee, showed his strong interest in the position. Sheik Fahad promised on his election that he would work hard to promote Asian sport in the Asian world. Sheik Fahad died in August 1990. His son, Sheikh Ahmad Al-Fahd Al-Sabah, inherited his father’s position as the president of the Kuwait Olympic Committee, and became the President of OCA in September 1991. Almost at the same time, the Olympic Committees of East Asian countries and regions, including China, Japan, Korea, South Korea, Mongolia,Taiwan and Hong Kong, met in November 1991 in Beijing to decide to more actively promote cooperation within the East Asian region through sport. It proposed that the East Asian countries and region would hold an East Asian Games every four years. The Games would be organised and managed by the new East Asian Games Association (EAGA). This association and its games did not belong to, nor were they affiliated with, the OCA. It was an independent sport organisation. Its decision-making forum was the General Assembly, in which each member country had one vote. The Executive Committee consisted of vice presidents and officers of the East Asian sport federations. The president was provided by the host city of the Games, and the two vice presidents were provided by the previous and next host cities/countries. A strong secretariat was set up in Beijing. The main source of income for the EAGA came from the country hosting the next Games.29 The 1st East Asian Games were held in Shanghai in May 1993. The Shanghai Sports Council claimed that the Games took place without State financial support. Three hundred million RMB spent on the Games came from sponsorship, endorsement, lotteries and advertising. It became a successful model for Chinese sport reform. Juan Antonio Samaranch, then President of the IOC, was invited to be present at the Games. He commented, The establishment of the EAGA and the holding of the East Asian Games has met the need for the development of sport in Asia. You East Asian countries are sports superpowers in Asia, and you should unite and play a major role in Asian sport.30 When the 2nd East Asian Games took place in Busan in 1997, some countries from the former Soviet Union became members of the EAGA. After the Busan Games, Australia was attracted by the high level of competition and applied for membership of the EAGA. After debate within the EAGA, Australia was accepted as a guest member and participated in the third EAG in 2001 in Japan. The formation of the EAGA and EAG is a symbol of the solidarity of East Asia. It served the interests of regional states. It was an attempt to save the principle and spirit of the Asian Games and Asian sport. Its leadership, with experience, confidence and shared knowledge and ethics, has led the new organisation and the games in successfully developing a regional infrastructure for regional cooperation. In summary, the establishment of the OCA was, to some extent, a consequence of the spread of the international Olympic Movement across the continent. The OCA has made some progress on the development of sport in Asian history. Apart from the organisation and supervision of the Asian Games, it also initiated the Asian Indoor Games in 2005, a competition that takes place every two years, including six to eight sport that are not included in the Olympic Games or the Asian Games. However, the OCA has become an organisation infected by racism, which uses sport as a political weapon against other countries. The exclusion of Israel from the Asian Games since the 1980s directly failed to abide by the International Olympic principle of fair play and nondiscrimination on the basis of race and religion, and the principle of the Asian Games, of

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developing the moral and physical qualities of the youth of Asia by fair competition, friendship, respect and goodwill.

Conclusion The Asian Games were originally a product of cultural imperialism. It was an attempt by the YMCA to reconstruct Asia through the transmission of Western ideas and values to the people of Asian through sport. However, its historical function turned out to be providing a platform for athletes and Asian countries to establish their national and regional identities. The revival of the Asian Games in the 1950s was the product of independence and decolonisation. The Asian Games enhanced the image of the Orient in the international sport arena. It provided an opportunity for advancing the development of the Asian states in the global political system. It helped to break the hegemony that the Occident exercised over the Orient (see Table 45.2). The creation of the OCA in the 1980s provided a means for Asian states to make their views known in the International Olympic Movement. It has co-opted itself into the body of

Table 45.2 Asian Games (1951–2018) Games Year

Host City

Host Nation Dates

Nations Compe- Sports Events Top Placed titors Team 11 18 16 12

489 6 970 8 1,820 13 1,460 13

16 16 19 19 23

1,945 2,400 3,010 3,842 3,411

1 2 3 4

1951 1954 1958 1962

New Delhi Manila Tokyo Jakarta

India Philippines Japan Indonesia

5 6 7 8 9

1966 1970 1974 1978 1982

Bangkok Bangkok Tehran Bangkok New Delhi

Thailand Thailand Iran Thailand India

10

1986 Seoul

11

1990 Beijing

12 13 14

1994 Hiroshima 1998 Bangkok 2002 Busan

15 16 17

2006 Doha 2010 Guangzhou 2014 Incheon

18

2018 JakartaPalembang

South Korea China Japan Thailand South Korea Qatar China South Korea Indonesia

4–11 March 1–9 May 24 May – 1 June 24 August – 4 September 9–20 December 9–20 December 1–16 December 9–20 December 19 November – 4 December 20 September – 5 October 22 September – 7 October 2–16 October 6–20 December 29 September – 14 October 1–15 December 12–27 November 19 September – 4 October 18 August – 2 September

57 76 97 88

Japan Japan Japan Japan

14 13 16 19 21

143 135 202 201 147

Japan Japan Japan Japan China

22

4,839 25

270

China

36

6,122 27

310

China

42 41 44

6,828 34 6,554 36 7,711 38

338 337 419

China China China

45 45 45

9,520 39 9,704 42 9,501 36

424 476 439

China China China

45

11,300 40

465

China

Based on data from India Today31

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the Olympic family. However, it has lost its original function as an autonomous sport body to supervise and promote sport in the Asian world. It has lost its former unique position to coordinate and unite all the Asian sport bodies (47 of them) and to use its strategic location to play its part in the major forums of world politics. It should implement the principles of the Asian Games and the Olympic Games – equality, fair play and non-discrimination on the grounds of race, sex, colour, religion and politics – to make the Asian Games a true and distinctive Games for the whole of Asian society and take it ‘Ever Forward.’32

Notes 1 Milton W. Meyer, Asia: A Concise History (New York: Portman & Littlefield, 1997), 1–2; Times Atlases, Reference Atlas of the World (London: Dorling Kindersley, 2003). 2 Jan Romein, The Asian Century: A History of Modern Nationalism in Asia (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1965); Colin Mason, A Short History of Asia (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); P. W. Preston, Pacific Asia in the Global System (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998); Donald G. McCloud, Southeast Asia:Tradition and Modernity in the Contemporary World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995); Milton Osborne, Southeast Asia: An Introductory History (St. Leonards: George Allen & Unwin, 1995); Albert Kolb, East Asia: China, Japan, Korea,Vietnam: Geography of a Cultural Region (London: Methuen, 1971). 3 See the special issue of Hong Fan, “Sport, Nationalism, and Orientalism: The Asian Games,” Sport in Society 8, no. 3 (2005). 4 Anonymous, “New Delhi 1951, 1st Asian Games,” The Olympic Council of Asia, September 11, 2018, www.ocasia.org/Game/GameDetailsByGameID?q=BrMykyrnI530p/vsnX+Z8vJNguoh97VGtnRA BxESGMU=. 5 Anonymous, “18th AG Jakarta-Palembang 2018,” The Olympic Council of Asia, www.ocasia.org/Game/ GameDetailsByGameID?q=BrMykyrnI530p/vsnX+Z8vJNguoh97VGtnRABxESGMU=. 6 Anonymous, “Asian Games: Thousands Pour in the World’s Second-Biggest Multi-Sports Event,” The New Indian Express, August 14, 2018, www.newindianexpress.com/sport/asian-games/news/2018/ aug/14/asian-games-thousands-pour-in-for-worlds-second-biggest-multi-sports-event-1857657.html. 7 Mingxin Tang, Woguo caojia Aoyun changshangshi [The History of China’s Participation in the Olympic Games] (Taipei: Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee, 1999), 113; see also Wu Chih-kang, “The Influence of YMCA on the Development of Physical Education in China” (Unpublished PhD diss., University of Michigan, 1956); Chinese Society for History of Sport, ed., Zhongguo jindai tiyushi [Modern Chinese Sports History] (Beijing: Beijing tiyu xueyuan chubanshe, 1990). 8 Stefan Hübner, “Images of the Sporting ‘Civilizing Mission’: The Far Eastern Championship Game (1913–1934) and Visions of Modernization in English-Language Philippine Newspaper,” Journal of World History 27, no. 3 (September 2016): 497–533. 9 Anonymous, “The New Olympian,” Philippines Free Press 7, no. 5 (February 1, 1913), cited in Andrew D. Morris, Marrow of the Nation: A History of Sport and Physical Culture in Republican China (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 2004), 22. 10 Zhengting Wang, “Guan dierci yuandong yundonghui zhi ganyan” [My Views on the Second Far Easter Championship Games], Jinbu 8, no. 3 (July 1915), 13–14. 11 J. Wong-Quincey, “The Far Eastern Championship Games,” China’s Young Men 15, no. 10 (1915): 427; cited in Morris, Marrow of the Nation, 28. 12 Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (London: Hutchinson, 1990), 391–92; Richard T. Phillips, China Since 1911 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 119–20. 13 The Association would have its first sport meeting in Japan in 1938 and the second sport meeting in the Philippines in 1940. Due to the approach of World War II, the meetings never took place. 14 Zhengting Wang, “Yuandong tiyu xuehui feifa jieshan zi jinguo” [The Facts of How the Far Eastern Games Federation was Dissolved], Qinfeng 1, no. 9 (1935): 71–75; Yu Ri, “Zhong Ri Yuanyun jiaozu shi” [The Conflicts Between China and Japan at the Far Eastern Championship Games], Tiyu wenshi no. 2 (1990): 48–49;Tang, Woguo caojia Aoyun changshangshi [The History of China’s Participation in the Olympic Games], 263–69; Morris, Marrow of the Nation, 164–66. 15 Mithlesh K. Singh Sisodia, “India and the Asian Games: From Infancy to Maturity,” Sport in Society 8, no. 3 (2005): 405.

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16 Richard Robison, Kevin Hewison, and Garry Rodan, “Political Power in Industrialising Capitalist Societies:Theoretical Approaches,” in Southeast Asia in the 1990s, ed. Richard Robison, Kevin Hewison, and Garry Rodan (St. Leonards: George Allen & Unwin, 1993), 9–15; McCloud, Southeast Asia; Passin. H. Wriggins, “The Asian State System in the 1970s,” in Asia and the International System, ed. Wayne Wilcox, Leo E. Rose, and Gavin Boyd (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop Publishers, 1972), 367–69. 17 Mithlesh K. Singh Sisodia, “India and the Asian Games,”; Chinese Society for the History of Sport, ed., Zhongguo jindai tiyushi [Modern Chinese Sports History] (Beijing: Beijing tiyu xueyuan chubanshe, 1990), 23–24; Xueqian Wu, “jiyi youxing de wangshi” [My Memory of the Asian Games], in Bumie de Yayun zhihuo [The Flame of the Asian Games], ed. China Central TV Station (Bejing: Chinese Broadcast and TV Press, 1990), 4;Tang, Woguo canjia Aoyun changshangshi [The History of China’s Participation in the Olympics], 56. 18 Derek Davies, “Traveller’s Tales,” Far Eastern Economic Review (December 18, 1969): 593–94; George Modelski, “Indonesia and the Malaysia Issue,” The Yearbook of World Affairs, 1964 (London: Sweet and Maxwell Steven Journals, for the London Institute of World Affairs, 1965), 130. 19 Ajmer Singh et al., Essentials of Physical Education (Ludhiana: Kalyani Publishers, 2003), 593. 20 Cited in Mellow de Melville, ed., The IX Asian Games Delhi 1982, Official Report, Vol. 1 (New Delhi: Thomson Press, 1982), 202. 21 Cited in Sombat Karnjanakit and Supitr Samahit, “Thailand and the Asian Games: Coping with Crisis,” Sport in Society 8, no. 3 (2005): 447. 22 Ibid. 23 ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations; SEATO: Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation; APEC: Asia and South Pacific Area Council. 24 Cited in Hong Fan and Xiaozheng Xiong, “Communist China: Sport, Politics and Diplomacy,” in Sport in Asian Society: Past and Present, ed. J. A. Mangan and Fan Hong (London: Cass, 2003), 327. 25 “Diyijie xinxing liliang yundonghui gexiang gongzuo zhongjie baogao” [The Working Report of the 1st GANEFO], Guojia tiyu zhongju danganguan [National Sports Bureau Archives], 135 (1963). 26 Spence, The Search for Modern China, 633. 27 Phillips, China Since 1911, 289. 28 Interview with an OCA official in Beijing in April 2006. 29 Interview with an official of the EAGA in Shanghai in March 2006. 30 Liang Lijuan, He Zhengliang and Olympics (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2005), 193. 31 Anonymous, “Asian Games: A Brief History,” India Today, August 14, 2018, www.indiatoday.in/sports/ asian-games-2018/story/asian-games-a-brief-history-1314241-2018-08-14. 32 “Constitutions and Rules of the OCA,” http:www.ocasia.org/constitution/CHAPTER%20II.asp.

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Morris, Andrew D. Marrow of the Nation: A History of Sport and Physical Culture in Republican China. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004. Osborne, Milton. Southeast Asia: An Introductory History. St. Leonards, NSW: George Allen & Unwin, 2010. Phillips, Richard T. China Since 1911. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996. Preston, Peter. Pacific Asia in the Global System: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell, 1998. Robison, Richard, Kevin Hewison, and Garry Rodan. Political Power in Industrialising Capitalist Societies: Theoretical Perspectives. St Leonards, NSW: George Allen & Unwin, 1993. Romein, Jan Marius. The Asian Century: A History of Modern Nationalism in Asia. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1965. Simon, Sheldon W. “Review of Wayne Wilcox, Leo E. Rose, and Gavin Boyd, eds., Asia and the International System. Cambridge, MA:Winthrop Publishers, 1972.” in Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne De Science Politique 6, no. 2 (1973): 334–35. Sisodia, Mithlesh K. Singh. “India and the Asian Games: From Infancy to Maturity.” Sport in Society 8, no. 3 (2005): 404–13. Spence, Jonathan D. The Search for Modern China. London: Hutchinson, 1990. Wong-Quincey, J. “The Far Eastern Championship Games.” China’s Young Men 15, no. 10 (1915): 429.

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46 The Far Eastern Championship Games Wang Yan

Establishment of the Far Eastern Championship Games In 1913, the Philippines, China and Japan jointly set up a regional sport organisation named the Far Eastern Olympic Association, later changed to the Far Eastern Athletic Association (FEAA). From the start, it began to regularly organise international sport events among East Asian countries, following the model of the Olympic Games, called the Far Eastern Championship Games (FECG).1 In 1920, the FEAA was recognised by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) as the first regional international sport organisation. Starting with the first FECG in 1913, a total of ten FECG were held successively in the Philippines, China and Japan in rotation before the termination of the games in 1934. In general, the history of the FECG can be divided into four phases. These are the early stages, during the first to third events; the growth period, during the fourth to sixth events; the flourishing period, during the seven to ninth events; and the collapse of the events. The FECG provided a pivotal paradigm for the introduction and development of modern Western sport across East Asian countries. Therefore, the FECG is often called the ‘Oriental Olympic Games’ or ‘Asian Games’ of modern times. As a typical and characteristic symbol of Western culture, the impact of the FECG goes far beyond the field of sport. They became a significant witness to and participant in the historical transformation of modern East Asia, penetrating deeply into political, economic, cultural and educational domains during the rapid modernisation of East Asian countries.

Promoting International Relations in East Asia International political relations are a game of negotiation in which the philosophy of advance and retreat is similar to that of sport competitions. Competition in political relations in modern East Asia occurred in two ways: first, between East Asia and the West, in different political ideas and different hierarchical roles within the world order, and second, among East Asian countries, the weakening China and the rising Japan, and the changing political strategies of other East Asian countries in dealing with both their neighbouring countries and the powerful Western

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countries. In this context, the foreign strategies of East Asian countries were complicated, and the FECG played an important diplomatic role in bridging divides between them. The Philippines, China and Japan were in different stages of social development and diverse in polity at the time, but their relationships were interconnected. In particular, the negative influence of the Twenty-One Demands and the Mukden Incident between Japan and China were brought to the FECG.The entry of the Manchukuo puppet regime into the FECG association eventually resulted in its disbandment. In spite of this, sport diplomacy through the FECG did promote mutual relationships among East Asian countries.The Philippines, China and Japan joined the IOC one after another. They not only actively participated in Olympic affairs but also moderated the political conflicts and cultural estrangement between the East and the West. Meanwhile, the FECG widely promoted the ideas of the Olympic Truce, which helped delay war among the three countries and brought some peace to Asia and the world. Pierre De Coubertin addressed the FECG’s significant contribution to world peace when he said that, as the outburst of the World War I forced the termination of the sixth Olympics, if the youth of Europe failed to raise the torch, the youth of East Asia would not fail to do so.2

Triggering the rise of Asian sport industries and markets The economic development of East Asia was slow in the modern period, even in Japan, the most developed Asian country at that time. For instance, by 1988 the gross national income of the United States was $370 billion and the average per capita income was $3373 compared to $20 billion and $36 in Japan.4 The organisation of the FECG was beneficial to East Asian economies during the uneven economic development of the modern period. On the one hand, the FECG gave impetus to the rise of early forms of sport industry in Asia in a variety of ways. First, through the acquisition of social capital; in order to raise sufficient funds for the games, the governments of the Philippines, China and Japan had tried to combine multiple sources, including governmental allocation, donations, commercial investment, tickets and self-raised funding. The 2nd FECG, as the first-ever international competitive sport event in China, was supported by the Beiyang government.5 A few officers made donations of their own, such as Yuan Shi-kai’s 2,000 yuan.6 Other government sectors introduced preferential policies for the event, such as a transport discount for student athletes.7 Second, through the adoption of the sport club system, there emerged some clubs running a membership system, in particular in Japan and China. These clubs were responsible for the organisation of domestic and overseas sport competitions, including the FECG, such as the Youyou Sports Association in China. The Japanese sport club attracted 240 members when it was set up in 1908, and this had increased to more than 370 by 1926. In addition to sport activities, the club also provided leisure services as in Western countries, such as snooker and a bar.8 Third, through cooperation in large-scale exhibitions; the FECG learnt from the Olympic Games, which sought cooperation with World Fairs and Exhibitions as well as achieving a win-win with some large-scale exhibitions. On the other hand, the FECG facilitated the development of a regional sport economy in East Asia. Examples include the construction of multipurpose sport stadiums for the FECG, such as the Meiji Jingu Gaien Stadium in Tokyo and the Central Stadium in Nanjing. These stadiums had stimulated the hospitality and tourism industries during and after the games. Moreover, the FECG had driven the sport goods manufacture and trading markets; the Lisheng Sports Goods Factory of China, for example, produced various sport goods, including for basketball, football, volleyball, badminton, and exported to more than 70 countries across Asia, Europe and Africa. 506

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Bridging the Eastern and Western cultural divide The formation of international systems at the advent of the twentieth century paved the way for the further interconnectedness of Eastern and Western cultures. In this process, the FECG helped promote cultural communication between the East and the West through sport. Western sport accounted for the major sport competitions during the FECG, such as gymnastics, swimming, football, basketball and boxing, which demonstrated the vast presence of Western sport in modern East Asia. Since then, leisure sport and team ball games have been particularly welcomed and have taken root in East Asian countries – for example, golf and American football in the Philippines. While Western physical education and sport dominated in modern East Asia, indigenous Asian sporting forms struggled to survive at the time of the FECG. For example, during the FECG, the host countries often held festivals exhibiting local sport to sustain the tradition and promotion of East Asian sporting cultures, such as the Philippine Cultural Festival and the Traditional Sports Festival in China. The Commercial Press also issued the Attractions of China: Album of the Second Far Eastern Championship Games, showcasing the long history and rich culture of China. As consequence, a growing number of traditional Asian sport spread to the Western world, such as Japanese judo9 and Philippine’s Yoyo10 into America. Notably, these sport festivals also motivated sport exchanges within East Asia, driving some indigenous traditional games and major sport of the region, such as spia, piko, luksong-tinik, luksong-lurid, holen, goma, trumpo and tex of the Philippines.

FECG and the prospering of physical education in East Asia In the early twentieth century, the Philippines, China and Japan introduced modern education systems based on Western models. The FECG’s promotion of modern physical education and sport greatly contributed to the transformation of education systems in the East Asian countries. First, these modern education systems and physical education theories transformed traditional military gymnastics into modern Western-style physical education and sport, which gave rise to the emphasis on socialisation and personal development in sport education. For instance, the early women’s physical education special school in Japan also offered course in physiology, hygiene, Japanese, English, music, psychology and ethics, so as to cultivate modern women. Second, led by the missionary schools, many interscholastic sport organisations were founded, such as the Eight Universities’ Intercollegiate Athletic Association of Eastern China and the Six Universities’ Intercollegiate Baseball Association of Tokyo. Third, sport participation played a role in female liberation. Women in East Asian gradually enrolled in schools and education, transforming the traditional mode of female education. Fourth, the FECG advocated the Olympic ideals, stemming from ancient Greece, which played a major role in pushing forward the transformation of education in East Asia. It advanced the idea that the major objective of modern education was to cultivate the young in social responsibility and national prestige.

Conclusion Generally speaking, the FECG was a positive development for modern East Asia. However, it is also notable that the FECG was initiated by the YMCA, whose primary purpose was to disseminate Christian doctrines and the masculine ideals embedded in Western values and norms. In association with the growing impact of the FECG, the United States revealed its ambitions to increase its power in East Asia through the expanding YMCA network and the sporting arena. 507

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The combination of religious beliefs and political hegemony underpinned Western colonialism in East Asia and had a profound effect on the process of modernisation in physical education and sport across East Asian countries, which can still be seen today.

Notes 1 Andrew D. Morris, Marrow of the Nation: A History of Sport and Physical Culture in Republican China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), 97; G. Hoh, Physical Education in China (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan [Commercial Press], 1926), 97; Mark Dyreson, Making the American Team: Sport, Culture, and the Olympic Experience (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 176; Huijie Zhang, Fan Hong, and Fuhua Huang, Christianity and the Transformation of Physical Education and Sport in Modern China (1840–1937) (London: Routledge, 2016), 53–55. 2 Pierre de Coubertin, Olympic Memoirs: Pierre de Coubertin (Chinese Version) (Beijing: Beijing Sport University Press, 2016), 152. 3 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (Beijing: Qiushi Publishing House, 1988), 245. 4 Jianlang Wang and Jinghe Luan, Modern China, East Asia and the World, Vol. 1 (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2008), 192. 5 Jonathan Kolatch, Sports, Politics and Ideology in China (New York: Jonathan David Publishers, 1972), 55; Ligang Peng, “Far Eastern Championship Games and the Early Olympic Movements in China–A History Being Forgotten,” Journal of Shandong Physical Education Institute no. 6 (2005): 62. 6 Gengsheng Hao, The Far Eastern Championship Games. Archives of the YMCA, 1914. 7 Qi Li, “Far Eastern Championship Games and Modern China” (PhD diss., Central China Normal University, 2008), 19–20. 8 Zuen Chen, Japanese:The Japanese Residents in Modern Shanghai (1868–1945) (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press, 2007), 113–14. 9 Franklin H. Brown, “Growth of Athletics in Japan,” Official Bulletin of the International Olympic Committee (Olympic Review), no. 3 (July 1926): 19. 10 Interview with Amante Del Mundo, Assistant Professor of Philippine Arts and Popular Culture, University of the Philippines Manila, February 20, 2009.

Bibliography Brown, Franklin H. “Growth of Athletics in Japan.” Official Bulletin of the International Olympic Committee (Olympic Review) no. 3 (July 1926): 19. Chen, Zuen. Japanese:The Japanese Residents in Modern Shanghai (1868–1945). Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press, 2007. de Coubertin, Baron Pierre. Olympic Memoirs: Pierre de Coubertin (Chinese version). Beijing: Beijing Sport University Press, 2016. Dyreson, Mark. Making the American Team: Sport, Culture, and the Olympic Experience. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1998. Hao, Gengsheng. The Far Eastern Championship Games. Archives of the YMCA, 1914. Hoh, G. Physical Education in China. Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan [Commercial Press], 1926. Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Beijing: Qiushi Publishing House, 1988. Kolatch, Jonathan. Sports, Politics and Ideology in China. New York: Jonathan David Publishers, 1972. Li, Qi. “Far Eastern Championship Games and Modern China.” PhD diss., Central China Normal University, 2008. Morris, Andrew D. Marrow of the Nation: A History of Sport and Physical Culture in Republican China. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004. Peng, Ligang. “Far Eastern Championship Games and the Early Olympic Movements in China–A History Being Forgotten.” Journal of Shandong Physical Education Institute no. 6 (2005): 61–63. Wang, Jianlang, and Jinghe Luan. Modern China, East Asia and the World. Vol. 1. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2008. Zhang, Huijie, Fan Hong, and Fuhua Huang. Christianity and the Transformation of Physical Education and Sport in Modern China (1840–1937). London and New York: Routledge, 2016. 508

47 The games of the new emerging forces Friederike Trotier

We Peoples of the New Emerging Forces conscious that sport mean to serve as an instrument to build Man and Nations, to create international understanding and goodwill, desirous to build this world anew, free from colonialism and imperialism in all their forms and manifestations, aspiring to develop a community of nations imbued with the spirit of the AsianAfrican Conference held in Bandung 1955 which ensures respect for each other’s national identity and national souvereignty [sic], strengthens friendship, fosters cooperation towards lasting peace among nations, and towards Brotherhood of Man, have agreed to develop a new international sport movement, to secure the achievement of these ideals, (. . .) and to proclaim an international sport movement: THE GAMES OF THE NEW EMERGING FORCES, To be known as the GANEFO1

Introduction The preamble of the Charter of the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) reflects how the establishing of the sport event was a political manifestation of anti-imperialism and anticolonialism, initiated and implemented in Indonesia with consequences reaching far beyond the Southeast Asian country. After hosting the Asian-African Conference in Bandung in 1955, Indonesia – under the charismatic leadership of President Sukarno – once more took centre stage to advance the Non-Aligned Movement and to challenge the West, especially as embodied in the International Olympic Committee (IOC).Thus, GANEFO played a part in geopolitics in the context of the Cold War and the formation and leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement. In spite of being short-lived, GANEFO and its political framework had an impact on decision-makers in diplomacy and sport in the 1960s, and the event functioned as a ‘sporting outcome of the non-aligned movement.’2 The focus on this movement was repeatedly foregrounded when referring to GANEFO as being in line with the Bandung Conference and thus living the ‘spirit of Bandung.’ This spirit put forward the emergence of the formerly colonised world as a new agent in world politics.3 509

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Genesis and implementation of the event GANEFO was born out of controversies about the role and nature of the Asian Games in general, and Indonesia’s implementation of the 1962 event in particular. The debate is still ongoing whether the dispute around the fourth Asian Games and Indonesia’s exclusion from the IOC directly initiated GANEFO or whether the idea of such an event had already preceded the conflict between Indonesia and the IOC.4 Certainly, the expulsion of Indonesia from the IOC accelerated the foundation process of GANEFO,5 and undoubtedly the initiation of the new sport events was linked Sukarno’s political agenda.Yet it seems likely that Sukarno’s initial target was to implement his ideas relating to the non-aligned world within the Asian Games. Only when this attempt failed did he voice the need for new and different games. Already in the run-up to the 1962 event, the intention of the Indonesian organisers to turn the Asian Games into the sport event of the Non-Aligned Movement became clear when they advocated inviting Arab countries, which were not part of the Asian Games at that time, and even Egypt, an important African ally.6 Hence, Indonesian non-aligned foreign policy dominated the perception of the Asian Games with the prospect of changing the event’s regional shape.7 This policy led to Indonesia’s rejection of Israel and Taiwan’s participation in Jakarta. Another aspect supports the argument that Sukarno’s first intention was to act within the system of the IOC and AGF (Asian Games Federation). Considering his ambition to establish Indonesia as the sport centre of Asia, it appears likely that he was already speculating about a bid for the Olympic Games.8 This was in line with one of the long-term targets of the Jakarta Asian Games, which was to put forward Indonesia as a candidate for the 1970 FIFA World Cup.9 Thus, it was attractive for Indonesia to stay within the system in order to bring the requests of the NonAligned Movement to an international audience and to become the first decolonised country to host these prestigious events. Yet most of these ambitions collapsed during and after the 1962 Jakarta Asian Games and were then taken up by the newly established GANEFO.The AGF, for instance, refused to include Egypt,10 and prevented the implementation of Indonesia’s ideas for reforming the Asian Games. The battle between Indonesia and the IOC over mixing sport and politics was already situated in the tensions of Cold War antagonism and decolonisation processes;11 the way was already paved for the ensuing ideological struggle between the IOC and GANEFO. Furthermore, as the Olympic Games were out of reach after Indonesia’s exclusion from the IOC, Sukarno hastened to establish the counter-movement of GANEFO in order to host another event that had a similar global outreach. In 1963, it was of utmost importance for the Indonesian organisers to stage GANEFO before the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games so as to be able to claim superiority to the Olympic Games, to write different rules for international sport games12 and to become the first Asian country to stage a major sport event of international significance.13 GANEFO was first conceived during a conference in Jakarta in April 1963,14 and the opening ceremony of the first GANEFO took place on 10 November followed by 12 days of various competitions15 and cultural events.16 Around 100,000 people attended the opening ceremony. Of the 48 countries17 that participated, 36 signed up as members of the GANEFO Federation in the aftermath of the event.18 One-third of the participating nations, however, were represented by unofficial and local teams19 due to the IOC’s threat of punishment. The slogan ‘Onward. No retreat!’ underlined the ambitions of the non-aligned ideas but also GANEFO’s evolution out of the Asian Games, whose slogan was coined in 1951 as ‘Ever Onward.’20 The main difference to the Asian Games, however, was GANEFO’s confrontational and global nature, whereas the Asian Games focused on intra-Asian relations.21

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Old vs. new emerging forces GANEFO must be seen as the brainchild of Indonesia’s President Sukarno22 and, consequently, the sport event was shaped by his political concepts. Sukarno saw two forces struggling against each other: the Old Established Forces (OLDEFOs) and the New Emerging Forces (NEFOs). In defining them as forces, Sukarno created an additional dimension beyond the nation state, which helped him to address a larger part of the world. Any kind of organisation could be called a NEFO, even if its geographical location was outside the developing world.23 In accordance with his worldview, Sukarno contentiously named the new sport event the Games of the New Emerging Forces, demonstrating his view that sport and politics could not be separated. GANEFO was the sporting manifestation of a political struggle against imperialism and colonialism as well as a challenge to the IOC and even to ‘the entire basis of international politics under the Cold War.’24 This threat was taken seriously on the sporting and political stages in the developed world, as can been seen from the desperate attempts to downgrade the event as ‘communist propaganda’ and to describe it through a racist and colonial discourse.25 The IOC feared GANEFO’s explosive force. IOC President Avery Brundage understood Indonesia’s ‘machinations’ outside the IOC as directed against the influence of the United States and Europe in world sport.26 In order to spread negative commentary about GANEFO to the IOC’s member states and their National Olympic Committees (NOCs), Brundage discouraged participation and even threatened the NOCs with severe consequences should they send their official delegates to Jakarta. Hence, the IOC followed a policy of distancing itself from the new sport event and of putting severe pressure on the NOCs, especially in GANEFO’s target continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America.27

Indonesia’s Hosting and China’s sponsorship GANEFO as a political idea was inseparably connected with two Asian countries: Indonesia and China. Both linked the sport event to their own ambitions for foreign and domestic policies. President Sukarno emphasised the outstanding importance of GANEFO to the entire Indonesian nation. In order to create a homogenous Indonesian identity after the violent struggle against the Dutch colonisers, Sukarno had to work around the great ethnic and cultural diversity in the archipelago. The manifestation of GANEFO as an Indonesian idea, linking it to the specifically ‘revolutionary’ character of the Indonesian people, had the purpose of asserting a unifying Indonesian identity.28 GANEFO took place during the hot phase of konfrontasi, a policy of undeclared war with Indonesia’s newly independent neighbour Malaysia, which was perceived as a puppet of British imperialism. The international sport event provided an expedient opportunity for Indonesia to propagate its anti-Malaysia rhetoric. A prominent slogan was ‘Success to GANEFO, Crush Malaysia,’29 which suggested that participation in the sport event implied support of Indonesia’s confrontation with its neighbour country.30 In addition, even in the aftermath of the event, the slogan ‘Onward. No Retreat!’ remained as confrontational mode of discourse against Malaysia. This confrontation with Malaysia went hand in hand with Sukarno’s most prominent move in Indonesia’s foreign policy – the rapprochement with communist China. Indonesia’s hosting and China’s sponsorship of GANEFO were a manifestation of the strategy to combine Chinese and Indonesian power to become joint leaders of Asia31 and to win the ‘scramble for Africa’32 against the developed world.

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China’s involvement in GANEFO mirrored the country’s navigation of international and regional geopolitics and between the developed and developing worlds.33 The appeal of GANEFO was manifold for the PRC. First, China had withdrawn from the IOC during the Great Leap Forward34 and had a strong interest in establishing a counter-movement to the Olympic Games. Second, it was a crucial period in China’s foreign policy with new attempts to establish the country’s place in world politics.35 Consequently, China was the first country to announce its support for GANEFO and immediately started to demonstrate its (financial) support for developing countries to join the event, which was crucial in the competition between the West and the Soviet Union for these countries.36

Conclusion Indonesia’s and China’s leaders had envisioned a long-lasting legacy for the first GANEFO by establishing a permanent GANEFO Federation and staging regular events,37 as well as by building political alliances among non-aligned countries under their leadership.Yet the continuation of GANEFO was contested, especially by the Soviet Union which promoted a struggle against the IOC from within the organisation and the turning of GANEFO into a festival.38 Several flaws and developments brought an end to the sport event. The key problems within the structure were the different interests and divisions among the participants and the unwillingness of many countries to leave the Olympic Movement.39 Moreover, the political nature of the event gave it an unstable foundation. Consequently, it was mainly the political changes in Indonesia and China which prevented GANEFO’s continuation and long-lasting impact. In Indonesia, Sukarno was overthrown and the Sino-Indonesian rapprochement came to an end. The new President Suharto ensured that Sukarno’s policy of the New Emerging Forces was stopped and almost forgotten. The Cultural Revolution in China had a similar effect and by 1967 GANEFO had all but disappeared from public records.40 In spite of GANEFO’s discontinuation and failure, the effects of the event on the world and the IOC were not completely lost. Facing the threat of an alternative sport event, the IOC had to reconsider its policy especially towards the newly decolonised nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Furthermore, GANEFO changed the mindset of developing nations’ governments and their actions on the global stage, for instance, by using sport to reach their political goals.41 GANEFO did not necessarily meet its targets, but it did contribute to giving a voice to Asia and thus laid the ground for later mega sport events on the Asian continent.

Notes 1 Permanent Secretariat of the GANEFO Federation, GANEFO (Games of the New Emerging Forces): Its Principles, Purposes, and Organization (Jakarta: Permanent Secretariat of the GANEFO Federation, 1965), 31. Original formatting. 2 Russell Field, “Splitting the World of International Sport: The 1963 Games of the New Emerging Forces and the Politics of Challenging the Global Sport Order,” in Sport, Protest and Globalisation: Stopping Play, ed. Jon Dart and Stephen Wagg (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 79. 3 Naoko Shimazu, “Diplomacy as Theatre: Staging the Bandung Conference of 1955,” Modern Asian Studies 48, no. 1 (2013): 230. 4 Michal Marcin Kobierecki, “Sport as a Tool of Building Political Alliances: The Case of the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO),” The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 25, no. 4 (2016): 108. 5 Rusli Lutan and Fan Hong, “The Politicization of Sport: GANEFO – A Case Study,” in Sport, Nationalism and Orientalism:The Asian Games, ed. Fan Hong (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 27. 6 Stefan Hübner, Pan-Asian Sports and the Emergence of Modern Asia, 1913–74 (Singapore: NUS Press, 2016), 182–83. 512

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7 Ibid., 185. 8 Ibid., 193. 9 Amin Rahayu, Asian Games IV 1962: Motivasi, Capaian, serta Revolusi Mental, dan Keolahragaan di Indonesia (Jakarta: Nuril Hapress, 2015), 327. 10 Hübner, Pan-Asian Sports, 183. 11 Stefan Hübner, “The Fourth Asian Games (Jakarta 1962) in a Transnational Perspective: Japanese and Indian Reactions to Indonesia’s Political Instrumentalisation of the Games,” International Journal of the History of Sport 29, no. 9 (2012): 1305. 12 David Webster, “Sports as Third World Nationalism:The Games of the New Emerging Forces and Indonesia’s Systemic Challenge Under Sukarno,” Journal of American-East Asian Relations 23, no. 4 (2016): 3. 13 Hübner, Pan-Asian Sports, 193. 14 Ewa T. Pauker, “Ganefo I: Sports and Politics in Djakarta,” Asian Survey 5, no. 4 (1965): 173. 15 Ibid., 171–72. 16 Field, “Splitting the World of International Sport,” 77. 17 Pauker speaks of 51 countries. Pauker, ‘Ganefo I,’ 171. 18 Chris A. Connolly, “The Politics of the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO),” International Journal of the History of Sport 29, no. 9 (2012): 1317. 19 Pauker, ‘Ganefo I,’ 175. 20 Hübner, Pan-Asian Sports, 117–18. 21 Simon Creak, “Representing True Laos in Post-Colonial Southeast Asia: Regional Dynamics in the Globalization of Sport,” in Sport Across Asia: Politics, Cultures, and Identities, ed. Katrin Bromber, Birgit Krawietz, and Joseph Maguire (New York: Routledge, 2013), 97. 22 Lutan and Hong, “The Politicization of Sport,” 29. 23 Terry Vaios Gitersos, “The Sporting Scramble for Africa: GANEFO, the IOC and the 1965 African Games,” Sport in Society 14, no. 5 (2011): 648. 24 Webster, ‘Sports as Third World Nationalism,’ 2. 25 Field, ‘Splitting the World of International Sport,’ 82–83. 26 Russell Field, The Olympic Movement’s Response to the Challenge of Emerging Nationalism in Sport:An Historical Reconsideration of GANEFO (Lausanne: IOC Library, 2011), 10, http://doc.rero.ch/record/24926/ files/Russell_Field_-_report.pdf. 27 Ibid., 13–15. 28 Adrian Vickers, A History of Modern Indonesia (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 115. 29 Pauker, ‘Ganefo I,’ 179. 30 Ibid. 31 Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945–1965 (1973; repr., Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter Mouton, 2018), 409. 32 Gitersos, “The Sporting Scramble for Africa,” 645. 33 Russell Field, “Re-Entering the Sporting World: China’s Sponsorship of the 1963 Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO),” International Journal of the History of Sport 31, no. 15 (2014): 1853. 34 Amanda Shuman, “Elite Competitive Sport in the People’s Republic of China 1958–1966: The Games of the New Emerging Forces,” Journal of Sport History 40, no. 2 (2013): 263. 35 Ibid., 260. 36 Fan Hong and Lu Zhouxiang, The Politicisation of Sport in Modern China: Communists and Champions (London: Routledge, 2013), 43–44. 37 The Second GANEFO was first scheduled for Cairo in 1967, later re-scheduled for Beijing and finally cancelled. An Asian GANEFO took place in Cambodia in 1966. 38 Connolly, “The Politics of the Games,” 1316. 39 Ibid., 1321. 40 Shuman, “Elite Competitive Sport,” 260. 41 Webster, “Sports as Third World Nationalism,” 12.

Bibliography Agung, Ide Anak Agung Gde. Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945–1965. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter Mouton, 2018. 513

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Connolly, Chris A. “The Politics of the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO).” International Journal of the History of Sport 29, no. 9 (2012): 1317. Creak, Simon. “Representing True Laos in Post-Colonial Southeast Asia: Regional Dynamics in the Globalization of Sport.” In Sport Across Asia: Politics, Cultures, and Identities, edited by Katrin Bromber, Birgit Krawietz, and Joseph Maguire, 95–120. New York: Routledge, 2013. Field, Russell. “Re-Entering the Sporting World: China’s Sponsorship of the 1963 Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO).” International Journal of the History of Sport 31, no. 15 (2014): 1853. Field, Russell. “Splitting the World of International Sport: The 1963 Games of the New Emerging Forces and the Politics of Challenging the Global Sport Order.” In Sport, Protest and Globalisation: Stopping Play, edited by Jon Dart and Stephen Wagg, 79. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Gitersos,Terry Vaios. “The Sporting Scramble for Africa: GANEFO, the IOC and the 1965 African Games.” Sport in Society 14, no. 5 (2011): 648. Hong, Fan, and Lu Zhouxiang. The Politicisation of Sport in Modern China: Communists and Champions. London: Routledge, 2013. Hübner, Stefan. “The Fourth Asian Games (Jakarta 1962) in a Transnational Perspective: Japanese and Indian Reactions to Indonesia’s Political Instrumentalisation of the Games.” International Journal of the History of Sport 29, no. 9 (2012): 1305. Hübner, Stefan. Pan-Asian Sports and the Emergence of Modern Asia, 1913–74. Singapore: NUS Press, 2016. Kobierecki, Michal Marcin. “Sport as a Tool of Building Political Alliances: The Case of the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO).” The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 25, no. 4 (2016): 108. Lutan, Rusli, and Fan Hong. “The Politicization of Sport: GANEFO – A Case Study.” In Sport, Nationalism and Orientalism:The Asian Games, edited by Fan Hong, 22–36. London and New York: Routledge, 2007. Pauker, Ewa T. “Ganefo I: Sports and Politics in Djakarta.” Asian Survey 5, no. 4 (1965): 173. Permanent Secretariat of the GANEFO Federation. GANEFO (Games of the New Emerging Forces): Its Principles, Purposes, and Organization. Jakarta: Permanent Secretariat of the GANEFO Federation, 1965. Rahayu, Amin. Asian Games IV 1962: Motivasi, Capaian, serta Revolusi Mental, dan Keolahragaan di Indonesia. Jakarta: Nuril Hapress, 2015. Shimazu, Naoko. “Diplomacy as Theatre: Staging the Bandung Conference of 1955.” Modern Asian Studies 48, no. 1 (2013): 230. Shuman, Amanda. “Elite Competitive Sport in the People’s Republic of China 1958–1966: The Games of the New Emerging Forces.” Journal of Sport History 40, no. 2 (2013): 263. Vickers, Adrian. A History of Modern Indonesia. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Webster, David. “Sports as Third World Nationalism: The Games of the New Emerging Forces and Indonesia’s Systemic Challenge Under Sukarno.” Journal of American-East Asian Relations 23, no. 4 (2016): 3.

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48 Borrowed spectacle Olympic rhetoric in political battles Jessamyn R. Abel

Introduction The Olympic Games are a series of battles: the competition among cities for the honour of hosting the Games, the struggles of athletes to earn positions on their national teams, and the most visible contests – the ones among athletes vying for a medal. In the nation of the host city, this international event gets drawn into another kind of battle. During the bidding and preparation for all three Tokyo Olympiads – the cancelled 1940 Games, the successful 1964 Games and the upcoming 2020 Games – political actors mobilised the symbolism and rhetoric of the Olympics for goals that had little to do with the Games themselves, from criticising policies of the ruling party to scoring points against a rival in the arena of public opinion. Juxtaposing three examples of Olympic planning for a single city in disparate historical contexts – times of imperialist war, high-speed economic growth and what bid materials called the ‘mature’ society of contemporary Japan – shows the flexibility and persistence of the particular opportunities and pressures created by the Olympics’ enduring symbolism and their impact on domestic political contests. Fundamental aspects of the modern Olympic Games enable such wide-ranging political appropriation. First, the Olympic Movement claims to be apolitical, even as it promotes the vague political ideal of internationalism. This inherently ambiguous politics creates an empty space that can be filled with almost any political content. Olympic symbolism can be taken up by all sides in a political struggle, each making its own claims about what actions truly reflect and concretise the rhetoric of international amity and peace. Second, since the 1930s, the Olympics have become a mass media spectacle, drawing worldwide attention and often particular excitement in the nation of the host city. And third, the nested spatiality of the Games, overseen by an international organisation for a global audience but organised along national lines and hosted by a single city, makes these mega-events useful as ammunition in political battles from the global to the local level.1 The spectacle of the events is invariably mobilised for a role in public diplomacy, while the momentum of Olympic construction is harnessed to promote transnational social movements, such as human rights and environmental protection, or particular local infrastructural projects only tangentially connected to the competitions or the housing of athletes and other visitors.2 Improving Japan’s international relations has been a primary goal in the promotion of all three 515

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Olympiads in Tokyo.3 And the combination of unassailable rhetoric and the layered spatial scope that allows a single city to represent the nation as a whole to the entire world brought questions of national pride and international reputation into debates over local infrastructure, such as sewers and electric wires. In fact, all three of Tokyo’s Olympic moments inspired calls to improve the sewer system, as planners anticipated not only intensified usage, but also international scrutiny.4 In between these dynamics of global positioning and local development, the spectacle and symbolism of the Games are also used in domestic political contests, as is clear in each of Tokyo’s Olympic moments. In the late 1930s, a time when the Japanese government heavily suppressed political opposition, a critique of policies surrounding the Games, however mild, could stand in for the much more dangerous step of criticising the government. In the 1960s, leftist parties and activists were free to voice opposition but were becoming marginalised in the political structure; the Games provided an opportunity to use the rhetoric of a globally popular movement against the ruling party’s foreign and domestic policies. In the current climate, political rivals of local and national leaders have seized upon missteps in the planning process to make broader critiques of governing style and priorities.

Olympics for the people in imperialist Japan Though the Olympic Games are hosted by a single city, Japanese government leaders and Olympic organisers predicted that holding the 1940 Games in Tokyo would yield national benefits. They anticipated that a successful Olympiad would raise Japan’s international status, strengthen the ‘national body’ by promoting sport and spur the infrastructural development of Japan’s capital city, which would be the focus of international attention during the event. But the ambiguous political agenda of the Olympic Movement meant that the government’s opponents, increasingly silenced under intensifying censorship, could harness the same rhetoric and concerns to critiques not only of the government’s approach to hosting the Games but also of policies regarding basic political rights. When Tokyo won the right to host the 1940 Olympic Games, support for the event was almost universal. However, a few voices of dissent could be heard coming from the political far left, a point of view that had been all but completely suppressed. Expectations that hosting the Olympics would bring lasting improvements to the city and its residents created a dilemma for leftist activists and thinkers. While urban improvements made for the Olympics might benefit the masses, the accompanying inculcation of ultranationalism into the popular mind and the potential solidification of Japan’s international position as an imperialist power was contrary to their goals. Leftist intellectuals grappled publicly with the ambiguous impact and significance of hosting the Olympics. But even as they joined ongoing discussions about the event’s impact on Japan’s national prestige or Tokyo’s urban infrastructure, their writings reveal a concern with issues more fundamental to the future of Japanese society. One well-known intellectual who borrowed excitement about the Olympics to make broader political arguments was Nakano Shigeharu. A leader of the proletarian literature movement in the late 1920s, Nakano joined the underground Japan Communist Party in 1931 but was soon arrested and held in prison for nearly two years, finally gaining release only by announcing his ideological conversion (tenkō). By the mid-1930s, he was, ostensibly, no longer a member of the proletarian movement, but his subsequent writings and his immediate return to the Communist Party after the war suggest that his sympathies remained in that direction, in spite of the promises that released him from prison. In October 1936, Nakano wrote a series of articles for the major daily Yomiuri newspaper, each criticising policies implemented in the name of the Olympics for their failure to benefit the Japanese masses. 516

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In the first article, Nakano derided a campaign to raise public morality for the Olympics. He conceded, ‘Tokyo’s streets are strewn with garbage, the parks and playgrounds are full of trash, . . . and we spit wantonly all over the place.’5 But he doubted that Olympic-oriented campaigns to raise public morality would change this kind of behaviour because they focused on superficial appearances rather than the fundamental circumstances that produced undesirable behaviour. Criticising leaders who sought solutions at the level of symptom rather than cause, he wrote, If we have a people (kokumin) who are completely indifferent about national politics, but incredibly fastidious about spit and trash on the roadside, that kind of people, as a people and as human beings, are crippled. Indeed, to spit phlegm on the floor of the train and mash it with the heel of a geta sandal is the Japanese sense of public morality that matches the political silence forced upon the Japanese people. Nakano, too, desired a stronger public morality, but he insisted that it should emerge ‘as the natural expression of the people’s political life.’6 In other words, instead of enjoining the people to change their behaviour, he argued, the government should grant them political freedoms, and their behaviour would change as a matter of course. Nakano took advantage of the soapbox afforded by the Olympics to voice a fundamental critique of the censorship system, under which leftist views like his own were heavily suppressed. In subsequent articles, Nakano similarly used consideration of Olympic-related public campaigns to criticise policies on public health, infrastructural development and the uneven distribution of the economic benefits and burdens of hosting the Games.7 These constituted a rare critical note, highlighting the negative impact on Japan of hosting the Games. But even for Nakano, whose perspective was from the side of the people, the real concern was not that the Olympics were being used for nationalistic purposes but rather that they would not benefit the nation in the correct way. As the outlying oppositional voice, Nakano demonstrated that every way of considering the Olympics traversed a path that went not above or beyond, but directly through national politics. In his use of the Games to call attention to the ills of Japanese government and society and to promote the welfare of the Japanese masses, Nakano’s approach to the Olympics was not that different from that of the government he criticised. Each sought to borrow the symbol of the Olympics to further a particular political position.The government, however, ultimately decided that the costs of the Olympics outweighed their potential benefits in the context of an expanding war, and the Cabinet decided in 1938 to relinquish the right to host.

A ‘Festival of Peace and Amity’ in 1964 The idea that sport was apolitical, and the popularity of the Olympics in particular, again contributed to widespread support for hosting the Games in 1964. As in the 1930s, however, popular attention, the supposed absence of politics and the event’s layered spatiality made Olympic rhetoric useful in domestic political contestation. The 1962 revision of the Olympic Charter listed as an original goal of the movement to ‘create international amity and good will, thus leading to a happier and more peaceful world.’8 The administration of Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato, borrowing that rhetoric to hail the event as a ‘festival of peace and amity,’ took advantage of hosting to present a certain image of Japan. For instance, the four-branched path of the torch relay through every prefecture of Japan nurtured a feeling of national unity and made a highly visible statement about the status of American-occupied Okinawa at a time when Japanese leaders were pressing for a return of sovereignty. The relay also helped symbolise Japan’s recovery from wartime destruction, passing through the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park and ending with the 517

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lighting of the cauldron by Sakai Yoshinori, born in Hiroshima Prefecture on 6 August 1945, the day Hiroshima city was hit with an atomic bomb. The role of the emperor in the opening ceremonies, the use of the rising sun flag and unofficial national anthem as well as participation by the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) helped rehabilitate national symbols tarnished by the war.9 Of course, Olympic symbolism was available not only to the ruling party but also to antiestablishment activists. The popular influence and electoral fortunes of the political left was in decline in the early 1960s, and in the context of the emerging dominance of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Olympics provided an opportunity for opponents to present alternative visions of post-war Japan and criticise the direction of the country. The most vehement criticism came from Communists and others on the political left. But rather than simply criticising the political use (or abuse) of the Olympics by the LDP, some critics themselves borrowed the rhetoric of Olympic internationalism to attack the ruling party. For instance, in anticipation of the Olympics, communist journalist Kitani Yatsushi compared contemporary political circumstances to the militarism that derailed the 1940 Games. He asked:‘Can the Tokyo Olympics be a festival of peace and amity in the context of the active promotion of policies of the strengthening of American military bases, the nuclear armament of Japan, and the revival of militarism?’10 Two of the main elements of Olympic rhetoric – the idea that the Games encourage peace and the myth that they are apolitical – were central to Kitani’s arguments against specific policies. He expressed his opposition to the security alliance with the United States by asserting that it contradicted Olympic ideals: In order for the Tokyo Olympics to be a real festival of peace and amity, they must be tied to our country’s fight to be an independent, peaceful democracy. They cannot be a festival of peace and amity if they are cut off from our fight against Japan’s current existence as a base for American imperialism . . . and against the active support by Japan’s reactionary powers for aggression in Asia by American imperialists.11 Kitani used the claim that the Olympics should be separate from politics to decry the role of the SDF in the Games as militarist propaganda and criticised connections to Ikeda’s ‘peoplebuilding’ policies, asserting that the administration was using sport in order to strengthen American and Japanese monopoly capitalism by creating citizens who would work as directed by their rulers and complacently go to war. And he accused the LDP of contravening the Olympic spirit of fair play by using athletic events in election campaigns. Kitani promoted his own view of post-war Japan’s international role by emphasising responsibility to ensure that newly independent nations of Asia and Africa were able to participate in the Olympics, thereby bolstering their autonomy. In a later article, written after the Olympics had ended, he concluded that the Games had failed in their goal of developing international amity, and argued more broadly that the Olympics and other international sports meets cannot truly deepen friendship and amity among the people of all nations because they are not devoted to protecting the people’s basic rights and interests . . . and are not tied to a real policy of protecting popular sovereignty in every country and international amity and ties.12 As in the 1930s, Olympic ideals were directed towards support for opposing visions of Japan’s future.

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‘In Time for the Olympics’ in 2020 In the run-up to the XXXII Summer Olympiad, politicians and their critics are again using preparations for hosting the Olympics to impart a sense of urgency to policies unrelated to the event itself, such as constitutional revision and reconstruction of the areas affected by the March 2011 earthquake, tsunami and nuclear meltdown. The phrase ‘in time for the Olympics’ is ubiquitous in political discourse, as the year 2020 is pinpointed as the goal for any number of changes, not only for Tokyo, but for the nation as a whole. For instance, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō announced in May 2017 that he hoped to have a revised constitution take effect in 2020. The Asahi newspaper vehemently opposed this plan, insisting that the nation must not allow the prime minister to change Japan’s identity as a ‘peace nation’ through revision of the war-renouncing constitution. An editorial criticised the prime minister for having ‘connected constitutional revision to the Tokyo Olympics by setting 2020 as the deadline.’13 Though the revision has no direct connection to the Olympics, the spectacle of the event is such that timing creates a link. The ongoing recovery from the 2011 triple disaster in Fukushima is a particularly poignant issue that both Olympic planners and opponents use to bolster their arguments. Olympic bid organisers quickly turned the triple disaster to their advantage, dubbing the Tokyo Games the ‘reconstruction Olympics,’ and the term continues to pervade discussions of planning and preparations.14 But critics argue that the focus on construction and development for the Games is actually impeding the progress of rebuilding in disaster-stricken areas.15 In addition, the contrast between two kinds of spectacle – the festival atmosphere of the Olympics and heartbreaking images of disaster – can themselves serve as a critique of political leaders. For instance, immediately after Tokyo won its bid for the Games in September 2013, opposition politician Kaieda Banri (then head of the Democratic Party of Japan) began to talk about the importance of the event as a ‘festival of peace and amity’ in his critiques of Abe administration policies. In an October 2013 Diet (parliament) session, Kaieda responded to Abe’s speech with references to the Olympics, pointing out that his party had strongly supported Tokyo’s bid and promising to ‘put all of our cooperation into making the Olympics and Paralympics a big event that will provide the people of the world with dreams, hopes, and excitement as a festival of peace and amity.’ But what, he asked, should Japan communicate to the world with this sport festival? His answer was that Japan should showcase its recovery and gratitude for the help and encouragement from all around the world. But in addition, he said, ‘because the Olympics are a festival of peace and amity, aren’t they a heartfelt promise among all the world’s countries and people, including neighbouring countries, to promote peace and amity?’ To live up to that promise, Kaieda insisted, Japan could not wait until 2020 but rather must begin immediately by tackling the combined problems of nuclear safety and the recovery of the people and towns affected by the March 2011 triple disaster. Kaieda contrasted the image of Abe and Tokyo governor Koike Yuriko celebrating the vote for Tokyo at the 2013 IOC session in Buenos Aires with a story of his own visit to the afflicted town of Kesennuma to underline the dissonance between the fun and extravagance of the Olympic Games and the struggles of people still suffering from the after-effects of the disaster.16 It remains to be seen how else the 2020 Tokyo Olympics will be used as a political football. But with history as a guide, we can predict that politicians will seek to borrow the aura of the event, planners will make claims about the international gaze turning towards the capital and critics will blame them for sullying the purity of sport with the smear of politics.

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Notes 1 John Horne and Garry Whannel, Understanding the Olympics (New York: Routledge, 2012), 126–45; John J. MacAloon, “The Theory of Spectacle: Reviewing Olympic Ethnography,” in National Identity and Global Sports Events (SUNY Series on Sport, Culture, and Social Relations), ed. Alan Tominson (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006), 31; Barbara Keys, Globalizing Sport: National Rivalry and International Community in the 1930s (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 92. 2 Pierre Arnaud and James Riordan, eds., Sport and International Politics (New York: E & FN Spon, 1998); Fan Hong and Lu Zhouxiang, “The Politicisation of the Beijing Olympics,” International Journal of the History of Sport 29, no. 1 (January 2012): 157–83; Barrie Houlihan, Sport and International Politics (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994); Keys, Globalizing Sport; Alfred Erich Senn, Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games: A History of the Power Brokers, Events, and Controversies That Shaped the Games (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 1999). 3 Jessamyn R. Abel, The International Minimum: Creativity and Contradiction in Japan’s Global Engagement, 1933–1964 (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2015), 108–71, 254–59; Sandra S. Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games:The Missing Olympics: Japan, the Asian Olympics and the Olympic Movement (New York: Routledge, 2007). 4 “Dai jūni kai Orimupikku Tokyo kaisai ni kan suru kansō oyobi kakuhōmen e no kibō to chūmon,” Kaizō 18, no. 9 (September 1936): 297, 299; Suzuki Bunshirō, “Orinpikku to Bankokuhaku: Senden to kokuminteki kanshin,” Kaizō 20, no. 6 (June 1938): 183–84; Tōru Jin, “Orinpikku to Tokyo no gesuidō,” Shin toshi 15, no. 2 (February 1961): 39–40; Shintani Yasuyuki, “ ‘2020-nen Tokyo Orinpikku/ Pararinpikku’ kaisai ni mukete,” Gekkan gesuidō 37, no. 1 (January 2014): 20–23. 5 Nakano Shigeharu, “Orinpikku to Nihon,” Nakano Shigeharu zenshū,Vol. 10 (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1979), 554. 6 Ibid., 555. 7 Ibid., 556–59. 8 International Olympic Committee, The Olympic Games: Fundamental Principles, Rules and Regulations, General Information (Lausanne, 1962), 47, www.olympic.org/olympic-studies-centre/collections/ official-publications/olympic-charters. 9 Aaron Skabelund, “Public Service/Public Relations: The Mobilization of the Self-Defense Force for the Tokyo Olympic Games,” in The East Asian Olympiads, 1934–2008: Building Bodies and Nations in Japan, Korea, and China, ed. William Tsutsui and Michael Baskett (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2011), 63–76; Christian Tagsold, “The Tōkyō Olympics as a Token of Renationalization,” in Olympic Japan: Ideals and Realities of (Inter)Nationalism, ed. Andreas Niehaus and Max Seinsch (Würzburg, Germany: Ergon Verlag, 2007), 111–29. 10 Kitani Yatsushi, “Tokyo Orinpikku o heiwa to yūkō no saiten ni,” Zen’ei 213 (August 1963): 139. 11 Ibid. 12 Kitani Yatsushi, “Oten o nokoshita Tokyo Orinpikku,” Zen’ei 229 (December 1964): 150. 13 “Kenpō 70-nen: 9-jō kaikenron no ayausa,” Asahi shinbun, May 9, 2017, morning ed., 14. 14 “Gorin shōchi, hatajirushi wa ‘fukkō’ 2020-nen,Tokyo-to ga ikō hyōmei,” Asahi shinbun, June 28, 2011, 23. 15 See, for instance, Koide Hiroaki, “Fukushima jiko to Tokyo Orinpikku,” introduced and translated by Norma Field as “The Fukushima Disaster and the Tokyo Olympics,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 17, no. 3 (March 1, 2019), issue 5, available at https://apjjf.org/2019/05/Koide-Field-Translation.html. 16 Shūgiin Honkaigi, “Kokkai kaigiroku kensaku shisutemu,” October 16, 2013, http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp.

Bibliography Abel, Jessamyn R. The International Minimum: Creativity and Contradiction in Japan’s Global Engagement, 1933– 1964. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2015. Arnaud, Pierre, and James Riordan, eds. Sport and International Politics. New York: E & FN Spon, 1998. Bunshirō, Suzuki. “Orinpikku to Bankokuhaku: Senden to kokuminteki kanshin.” Kaizō 20, no. 6 (June 1938): 183–84. Collins, Sandra S. The 1940 Tokyo Games: The Missing Olympics: Japan, the Asian Olympics and the Olympic Movement. New York: Routledge, 2007.

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Narusawa Reisen, in “Dai jūni kai Orimupikku Tokyo kaisai ni kan suru kansō oyobi kakuhōmen e no kibō to chūmon.” Kaizō 18, no. 9 (September 1936): 297, 299. Hong, Fan, and Lu Zhouxiang. “The Politicisation of the Beijing Olympics.” International Journal of the History of Sport 29, no. 1 (January 2012): 157–83. Horne, John, and Garry Whannel. Understanding the Olympics. New York: Routledge, 2012. Houlihan, Barrie. Sport and International Politics. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994. Jin, Tōru. “Orinpikku to Tokyo no gesuidō.” Shin toshi 15, no. 2 (February 1961): 39–40. Keys, Barbara. Globalizing Sport: National Rivalry and International Community in the 1930s. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006. MacAloon, John J. “The Theory of Spectacle: Reviewing Olympic Ethnography.” In National Identity and Global Sports Events (SUNY Series on Sport, Culture, and Social Relations), edited by Alan Tominson, 15–39. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006. Senn, Alfred Erich. Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games: A History of the Power Brokers, Events, and Controversies That Shaped the Games. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 1999. Shigeharu, Nakano. “Orinpikku to Nihon.” In Nakano Shigeharu zenshū. Vol. 10. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1979. Skabelund, Aaron. “Public Service/Public Relations: The Mobilization of the Self-Defense Force for the Tokyo Olympic Games.” In The East Asian Olympiads, 1934–2008: Building Bodies and Nations in Japan, Korea, and China, edited by William Tsutsui and Michael Baskett, 63–76. Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2011. Tagsold, Christian. “The Tōkyō Olympics as a Token of Renationalization.” In Olympic Japan: Ideals and Realities of (Inter)Nationalism, edited by Andreas Niehaus and Max Seinsch, 111–29. Würzburg, Germany: Ergon Verlag, 2007. Yasuyuki, Shintani. “’2020-nen Tokyo Orinpikku/Pararinpikku’ kaisai ni mukete.” Gekkan gesuidō 37, no. 1 (January 2014): 20–23.

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49 The Southeast Asian Games Simon Creak

Introduction In purely sporting terms, the biennial Southeast Asian or ‘SEA Games’ – as the event is universally known – is a third-tier mega event positioned beneath both the Olympics and the Asian Games. This formal status has done nothing, however, to limit the growth and consolidation of the event on the regional sporting calendar over the past 60 years. Nor has it diminished the seriousness and enthusiasm with which the 11 Southeast Asian nations approach the event. The most recent edition, the 30th SEA Games in the Philippines in 2019, broke all records, with more than 8,500 athletes competing in 56 sport, far more sport and almost as many athletes as the more prestigious Asian Games and the Olympic Games. All but ignored outside the region itself, the SEA Games came to dominate regional sporting culture in Southeast Asia through distinctive norms of regional cooperation in sport that are embedded in regional history and international relations.

Historical foundations The forerunner of today’s SEA Games, the South East Asia Peninsular (SEAP) Games, were established in 1959 by Thailand and several of its neighbours: Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Malaya and the Republic of (South) Vietnam. Singapore was added before the first games in Bangkok. The impetus for the games came from the vice president of the Olympic Council of Thailand, Luang Sukhum Naiyapradith, who proposed a ‘little Asian Games’ during meetings with his counterparts at the third Asian Games in Tokyo in 1958. Having agreed with the idea in principle, the men convened again in Bangkok the following June and formed the SEAP Games Federation (SEAPGF). With the OCT president Lieutenant-General Praphat Charusatien also being deputy prime minister of the Thai junta, the Thai government readily agreed to host and fund the first SEAP Games in Bangkok. According to Sukhum, the SEAP Games formally had two objectives: to promote friendship among Thailand and its newly independent neighbours and to improve sporting standards among competing nations in the Olympics and the recently formed Asian Games. Both stemmed from the context of decolonisation and the Cold War in Southeast Asia. Although Thailand had not 522

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been colonised, its neighbours had recently gained independence or, in Singapore’s case, internal self-government from colonial rulers. In this context, national leaders embraced international sport to promote nation building and foster relations in the postcolonial region of nascent nation states. But sport officials found their standards lagged far behind regional competitors. Regular competition against opponents of similar sporting standards and physicality, argued Luang Sukhum, would improve performances at the larger events. Meanwhile, Thailand’s status as a bastion of anti-communism determined that the games’ vision of regional friendship would be anti-communist, as evidenced by the absence of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and a number of disputes between the Thai founders and neutralist Cambodia.1 The SEAP and later the SEA Games remained limited to non-communist nations until the 1980s. The SEAPGF meetings in 1959 adopted a number of distinctive rules. First, the founders decided to conduct the games biennially between each Olympic and Asian Games, twice as frequently as the larger events, so the SEAP Games could be used to prepare for these. Second, the SEAPGF determined that after the first games in Bangkok, hosting of future editions should rotate according to alphabetical order of participating countries. According to this principle, the games would pass automatically to Burma (1961), Cambodia (1963), Laos (1965), and so on. Finally, the rules gave the host country the power to select the sport program. Besides the inclusion of aquatics and athletics, both of which were compulsory, hosts initially stuck with familiar Olympic sport, in keeping with the objective of training for larger meets.2 Over time, these distinctive characteristics would profoundly shape the evolution of the SEA Games. In the short term, however, the SEAP Games were plagued by the confluence of postcolonial nationalism, the Cold War and military conflict in Indochina. For a range of political reasons, Cambodia withdrew from the inaugural games in 1959, cancelled its own games in 1963 and again declined its turn to host and even to attend Thailand’s second games in 1967. With Laos also declining to host due to conflict in the country, the 1965 games passed to Malaysia (as Malaya had been renamed). As it transpired, none of the three Indochinese countries were able to host the SEAP Games between 1959 and 1973, leaving the other four countries to do so. Malaysia and Singapore urged the SEAPGF to admit new member countries, but Thailand resisted these efforts. With the communist revolutions of 1975, the three Indochinese countries withdrew completely, leaving the event to an uncertain future.3 The SEAP Games became the SEA Games (with no ‘Peninsular’) in 1977 when the remaining four members finally agreed to admit Brunei, Indonesia and the Philippines – all located in archipelagic Southeast Asia. Despite the changed name and expanded membership, the numbering of the games was retained so that the 1977 event was called the ninth SEA Games. As sporting powerhouses in Southeast Asia, Indonesia and the Philippines would host as soon as 1979 and 1981, respectively, and Indonesia took over from Thailand as the dominant country. Cambodia returned to the SEA Games under Pol Pot’s Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) in 1983–1987, but Laos and Vietnam agreed to rejoin only after the CGDK withdrew in 1989 – an important early indication of the wider regional détente that would follow in the early 1990s. All ten countries of Southeast Asia competed for the first time in 1995 when the newly reconstituted Kingdom of Cambodia again rejoined the games. Timor Leste became the most recent member of the SEA Games Federation (SEAGF) in 2003 after gaining independence from Indonesia.

Core principles Like other sport mega events, the SEA Games is a large, expensive and complex event, and it can be studied from many perspectives.4 One of the most important is its role and interaction 523

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with the emergence of regionalism in Southeast Asia. Although the original SEAP Games were envisaged as a ‘little Asian Games’ and today’s SEA Games look similar in many ways to that event and the Olympics, the SEA Games developed a distinct culture of its own, especially after its expansion in the late 1970s. This was due largely to the distinctive rules adopted by the founders and the institutional norms that developed around them. Shaping the SEA Games in unexpected ways, these norms fostered the emergence of a distinctive regional sporting community. For this reason, it would be mistaken to consider the SEA Games merely as an imitative or localised derivative of the larger mega events on which it was originally based. Embedded in regional cultures of sport and regional cooperation, the SEA Games came to represent a unique mode of cooperation in sport as well as in Southeast Asian regional affairs. To an unfamiliar eye, one of the most distinctive features of the SEA Games is the inclusion of many ‘local’ or ‘traditional’ sport, defined as non-Asian Games or Olympic sport. This trend began in 1965 with the inclusion of sepak takraw, a spectacular game resembling volleyball played with the feet and a rattan ball. Standardised from indigenous games played throughout the region – and named by combining Malay and Thai words for the game – sepak takraw had a genuine regional heritage and was thus a quintessential regional sport. From the 1980s, however, host countries took turns strategically choosing the program with not just local but national and ‘new’ sport to derive advantage. While the number of sport climbed gradually from 12 in 1959 to 18 in 1985, it leapt to 29 in Indonesia’s second SEA Games as host in 1987. Since then, the number reached 43 in 2007 (Thailand) and an astonishing 56 in 2019 (Philippines). Although SEAGF rules were modified to cap the number of non-Asian Games/Olympic sport, this was ineffective in reorienting the focus towards Asian Games and Olympic events. Since this practice emerged in the 1980s, officials and media have ritually condemned the steady increase in local and new sport. Some go as far as calling it corruption, but most question the practice for undermining the goal of building performance in Asian Games and Olympic disciplines. Nevertheless, this novel feature of the games has stuck for two main reasons. First, national and regional sport federations in Southeast Asia see the SEA Games as a means of promoting their sport, first in Southeast Asian countries and ultimately beyond. Many national sport, including pencak silat (Indonesia), muay thai (Thailand), arnis (Philipines) and vovinam (Vietnam) have been included in the SEA Games for this reason. Second, and most substantively, the inclusion of local and new sport served as a key factor in emergence of distinctive norms of reciprocity and exchange. In essence, the practice allows host countries to dominate the medal tally (in the case of larger nations) or to dramatically increase the number of medals won (for smaller nations). In recent editions, for example, strategic sport selection helped Indonesia (2013) and the Philippines (2019) top the medal tally with 180 and 149 gold medals, respectively, the only times they had done so since they previously hosted (in 1997 and 2005).Though much smaller, Laos won a remarkable 33 gold medals when it hosted for the first time in 2009, more than six times more than its next best performance two years earlier. Sport selection is not the only factor that contributes to inflated medal tallies, but SEAGF officials agree it is the most consequential factor in boosting host country performances.5 While this may seem contrary to the spirit of sport, officials accept the practice to ensure the host governments that fund the SEA Games can gain a patriotic dividend on their investment – thus ensuring governments remain willing to host the SEA Games. Most crucially, with biennial frequency and under the rotational hosting system, all countries are ensured the opportunity to host and benefit from these norms.With Brunei (1999),Vietnam (2003) and Laos (2009) having hosted for the first time in the past two decades, and Myanmar having done so in 2013 for the first time in 44 years, only Cambodia (hosting in 2023) and tiny Timor Leste (which joined only in 2003) await their turn for national glory.6 524

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Despite being contrary to fundamental sporting principles (notably, the equality of opportunity to compete and win), this system of reciprocity and exchange underpins the regional sporting community of the SEA Games.7 Perhaps because they recognise this, athletes and officials often stress that the SEA Games are ‘the friendly games.’ In part, this common belief reflects the pervasive rhetoric of ‘friendship’ in the SEA Games, stretching back to the original SEAP Games’ objectives.8 As in other sport mega events, regional ideas are reinforced by symbolic and semiotic devices as well as by rhetoric of ‘friendship’ and ‘family’ that slips unconsciously between individual and national registers.9 In the case of the SEA Games, it is further underpinned by popular understandings of geographical proximity, comparable physicality, and putative cultural similarities among participants, even if such ideas are questionable given the region’s great cultural diversity. In addition, the notion of the SEA Games as the ‘friendly games’ appears also to stand as tacit recognition that the SEA Games are not governed solely or even primarily by the pursuit of sporting excellence. On the flip side of friendship rhetoric, the SEA Games provide pervasive opportunities for overt performances of nationalism. Of course, this also is a feature of all international sport events, with the pride of representing ones nation, the raising and waving of flags, singing of chants and anthems, cheering of athletes and teams and reading about national accomplishments (largely to the exclusion those of others) in the national press and online. The popular pride that typically comes with hosting the SEA Games is another case in point, notwithstanding the controversies that occur in host nations over the cost and desirability of hosting.10 Yet beyond these common features of nationalism in sport, the nationalism of the SEA Games is inflamed by intense rivalries among neighbouring traditional rivals. Although the proximity of these nations promotes familiarity, desire and emulation, sporting passions combine with historical acrimony to breed intense rivalries, including racism and violence among fans.11 While such incidents contradict discourses of friendship, they build the region in another more subtle way. The combination of familiarity and contempt breeds a love-hate paradox in which the SEA Games provide a potent means of constructing national selves in contradistinction to ones nearest neighbours – the same countries that figure as friends and villains in national historiography and myth.12 Most importantly, these rivalries exist within a sealed system of regional competition based on the imagined reality of ‘Southeast Asia’ as a historical and geographical construct – a construct that emerged from the post-war period parallel and dialogically related to the SEA/SEAP Games.13 In this way, proximity and rivalry combine to reinforce a collective sense of mutual national construction and interdependence.14

Conclusion The SEAP Games were originally established as a means of promoting friendship among the young nations of the region and preparing teams for competition in larger international events. As a result of changes in the sport program and the rotation of hosting rights, they have come to focus more on the first of these two objectives than the second. Although the SEAP/SEA Games still resemble the Olympic model on which they were originally based, they have thus moved away from their original conception as a ‘little Asian Games,’ developing according to a distinct system of reciprocity and exchange and in the process becoming deeply embedded in regional history and international relations. The regional philosophy is most evident in the system of rotating hosts and is enhanced by the biennial frequency of the games, host selection of sport, the relatively small size of the region (11 countries), its geographically stable nature and the proximity and shared histories of participating nations. The idea of ‘Southeast Asia’ constructed and celebrated in the SEA Games appears stronger than the equivalent idea of ‘Asia’ in the Asian Games. Not only is Southeast Asia far less vast and 525

Simon Creak

diverse than Asia; the remit of the Southeast Asian Games has tended to move away from that of the Olympic Games, allowing greater adaptation to local cultural peculiarities.The regional idea of Southeast Asia has not emerged solely from the sporting community of the SEA Games, but sport and the SEA Games have been important factors in creating it. Above all, the SEA Games defy the notion that a single Olympic ‘template’ is simply reproduced and adapted at different scale throughout the region and the world.

Notes 1 Simon Creak, “New Regional Order: Sport, Cold War Culture and the Making of Southeast Asia,” in Spanning and Spinning the Globe: History of Sport in the Cold War, ed. Robert Edelman and Christopher Young (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2020). The Asian Games were also limited to noncommunist countries around this time. See Stefan Huebner, Pan-Asian Sports and the Emergence of Modern Asia, 1913–1974 (Singapore: NUS Press, 2016). 2 Simon Creak, “Eternal Friends and Erstwhile Enemies: The Sporting Community of the Southeast Asian Games, 1959–Present,” TRaNS:Trans-Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia 5 (1): 147–72. 3 Simon Creak, “Friendship and Mutual Understanding: Sport and Regional Relations in Southeast Asia,” in The Ideals of Global Sport: From Peace to Human Rights, ed. Barbara Keys (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019), 21–46. 4 Though I do not consider it here, one of the most important aspects of the games are the politicaleconomic dimensions of organizing such vast events in countries as poor as Laos and Myanmar. 5 Besides sport selection, countries invest more in coaching and preparation when hosting, home crowds inspire local athletes and rumours abound of biased judging in subjective sport (especially combat sport) favouring the home athletes. 6 Creak, “Eternal Friends and Erstwhile Enemies.” 7 For the structural characteristics of modern sport, see Allen Guttmann, From Ritual to Record:The Nature of Modern Sports, Updated ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). 8 Creak, “Friendship and Mutual Understanding.” 9 Ibid. 10 Simon Creak, “Sport as Politics and History:The 25th SEA Games in Laos,” Anthropology Today 27, no. 1 (2011): 14–19; Simon Creak, Embodied Nation: Sport, Masculinity, and the Making of Modern Laos (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2015), chapter 8; Simon Creak, “National Restoration, Regional Prestige: Myanmar’s Southeast Asian Games of 2013,” Journal of Asian Studies 73, no. 4 (2014): 1–21. 11 For examples from the 29th SEA Games in Malaysia, see AFP,“Malaysia Fined $30,000 Over ‘Dog’ Chants During SEA Games,” Jakarta Post, October 31, 2017, accessed December 10, 2019, www.thejakartapost. com/news/2017/10/31/malaysia-fined-30000-over-dog-chants-during-sea-games.html; AFP, “SEA Games:Myanmar Fans Beaten Up at Football Stadium,”August 22,2017,accessed December 10,2019,www. channelnewsasia.com/news/sport/sea-games-myanmar-fans-beaten-up-at-football-stadium-9147524. 12 As Frederick Barthes wrote, identity is strongest near the boundary. Fredrik Barth, “Introduction,” Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference (Bergen-Oslo and London: Universitets Forlaget and George Allen & Unwin, 1969). For elaboration with respect to the SEA Games, see Creak, “Sport as Politics and History.” 13 Creak,“National Restoration”; For the emergence of “Southeast Asia”, see Donald Emmerson,“Southeast Asia: What’s in a Name?” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 15, no. 1 (1984): 10. 14 Cf. Huebner, Pan Asian Sports, who suggests state nationalism and nation branding took precedence over Pan-Asian sentiments in the early Asian Games.

Bibliography Barth, Fredrik. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference. Bergen-Oslo and London: Universitets Forlaget and George Allen & Unwin, 1969. Creak, Simon. “Sport as Politics and History: The 25th SEA Games in Laos.” Anthropology Today 27, no. 1 (2011): 14–19.

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Creak, Simon. “National Restoration, Regional Prestige: Myanmar’s Southeast Asian Games of 2013.” Journal of Asian Studies 73, no. 4 (2014): 1–21. Creak, Simon. Embodied Nation: Sport, Masculinity, and the Making of Modern Laos. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2015. Creak, Simon. “Eternal Friends and Erstwhile Enemies: The Sporting Community of the Southeast Asian Games, 1959–Present.” TRaNS: Trans-Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia 5, no. 1 (2017): 147–72. Creak, Simon. “Friendship and Mutual Understanding: Sport and Regional Relations in Southeast Asia.” In The Ideals of Global Sport: From Peace to Human Rights, edited by Barbara Keys, 21–46. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019. Creak, Simon. “New Regional Order: Sport, Cold War Culture and the Making of Southeast Asia.” In Spanning and Spinning the Globe: History of Sport in the Cold War, edited by Robert Edelman and Christopher Young. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2020. Emmerson, Donald. “Southeast Asia: What’s in a Name?” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 15, no. 1 (1984): 10. Guttmann, Allen. From Ritual to Record: The Nature of Modern Sports. Updated ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004. Huebner, Stefan. Pan-Asian Sports and the Emergence of Modern Asia, 1913–1974. Singapore: NUS Press, 2016.

527

50 The Asian Indoor Games Feng Jing

A brief history of the Asian Indoor Games The Asian Indoor Games (AIG) was an important multisport event of Asia. The Games were proposed by the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA) in 2001 and aimed to further promote the Olympic spirit and to strengthen friendship and communication between Asian countries. The Asian Indoor Games were held once every two years. The first edition of the games was held in Bangkok, Thailand, in 2005, and was followed by editions in Macao, China, in 2007, and Hanoi, Vietnam, in 2009. On 30 June 2008, Doha withdrew from hosting the 4th Asian Indoor Games. In a letter from the Qatar Olympic Committee to the OCA, they said, ‘Qatar Olympic Committee is not in a position to continue with its plan to host the 4th Asian Indoor Games in 2011 due to unforeseen circumstances and thereby formally withdrawing its interest in organising these Games.’1 Afterwards, the OCA announced that the last edition of the games would be the 2009 Asian Indoor Games. In 2011, the Asian Indoor Games and Asian Martial Arts Games were combined and became the quadrennial Asian Indoor and Martial Arts Games (AIMAG). These games are described as the second-largest Asian multisport event after the Asian Games.The first AIMAG was held in Incheon, South Korea, in 2013. Ashgabat in Turkmenistan held the second AIMAG (which was also counted as the fifth AIG) in 2017. In 2015 Thailand launched a bid to host the 2021 AIMAG, as they believed ‘the event will promote the nation as a regional sports hub.’2 However, at the time of writing, the OCA has not announced the host city for the 2021 AIMAG, which in all probability will not be held at the predetermined time. In the first three editions of the games, 30 sport were represented. These events were neither Asian Games programmes nor Olympic Games programmes. However, these programmes were all participated in by large numbers of amateur sport enthusiasts, and were played indoors.3 In 2017, nineteen countries from Oceania and one African refugee team appeared on the AIMAGs stage for the first time.4

Martial arts on the stage of the AIG and AIMAG Martial arts are a major element of Asian culture. Wushu of China, Muay Thai of Thailand, kurash of Central Asia, jujitsu of Japan, and taekwondo of Korea are all popular in their own 528

The Asian indoor games Table 50.1 Basic Information of AIG & AIMAG Year

Game

Host City

Nations Competing

Number of Events in Each Sport

Athletes Participating

2005 2007 2009

Bangkok, Thailand Macao, China Hanoi, Vietnam Bangkok, Thailand

37 44 42 37

120 in 9 sport 151 in 17 sport 215 in 24 sport 108 in 9 sport

2343 1792 2456 892

2011

AIG AIG AIG Asian Martial Arts Games AIG

N/A

N/A

N/A

2013

AIMAG

43

100 in 12 sport

1652

2017

AIMAG

65

339 in 21 sport

4012

2021

AIMAG

Doha, Qatar: withdrawn in 2008 Incheon, South Korea Ashgabat, Turkmenistan To Be Announced

N/A

N/A

N/A

Source: All data in Table 50.1 were collected from the official website of the Olympic Council of Asia.

countries, throughout Asia and worldwide. Sport like kurash and Muay Thai are not yet major spectator sport. Sambo and kickboxing are not traditional Asian sport. Sambo is a mix of judo, jujitsu and wrestling. It has also merged into many different fighting styles in Europe and Asia. Kickboxing combines karate and Muay Thai, both types of martial arts. At the 2017 Ashgabat AIMAG, kurash, Muay Thai, jujitsu, kickboxing and sambo were official events.The stage of the AIG and AIMAG gave these sport exposure to the world.The AIG and AIMAG put martial arts centre stage and helped spread them to the world.

E-sport at the AIG and AIMAG Besides the common indoor sport, electronic sport – still a controversial sport, debated by researchers and in the media – was included in the 2007 Macao AIG as an official event. This was the very first time that e-sport were incorporated into an international multi-event games.5 In order to cater to the theme of ‘sporting meeting,’ the organisers chose to feature three games. NBA Live 07, FIFA 07 and Need for Speed: Most Wanted6 were included, rather than the popular mainstream e-sport games such as Counter Strike or War 3. At the 2009 AIG, e-sport were again included, and six video games were selected for the competition. Of these six games, FIFA 09, NBA Live 08, and Need for Speed: Most Wanted were included as in the 2007 AIG. However, another three popular e-sport were included, which were Star Craft: Brood War, Counter-Strike 1.6 and Dota Allstars. At the 2013 AIMAGs, six video games were selected as part of the events: FIFA 13, Need for Speed: Shift 2 Unleashed, Star Craft II: Heart of the Swarm,Tekken Tag Tournament 2, League of Legends, and Special Force. At the 2017 AIMAG, e-sport were held as a demonstration sport and medals won in this sport were not included in the official overall medal tally. The popular e-sport games of Hearthstone, Star Craft II, Dota 2 and KOF XIV were included in this edition of the games. Although it was only a demonstration sport in the 2017 AIMAG, it still attracted 50 players from 12 countries to compete. Based on the performance of e-sport at the AIG and AIMAG, the OCA has changed its opinion on them and accepted e-sport as an official sport for the 2022 Asian Games. 529

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Positive impacts of the AIG and AIMAG The impact of hosting large-scale sport events has been discussed by many researchers. However, there is very little research focusing on the AIG and AIMAG. Lai discussed the impact of largescale sporting events on Macao and concluded that hosting the 2nd AIG and two other largescale sporting events in Macao improved stadiums and sporting facilities in Macao; strengthened cooperation and communication between Macao and other countries, both worldwide and regionally as well as promoted commercial cooperation; showed the ability of Macao to host international sporting events; helped to consolidate the special role of Macao in the regional economy; acted as a balance to the over-influence of gambling on the local economy; provided examples for Macao’s youth in knowledge, culture and values; cultivated local sport talents, such as local judges, stadium managers, coaches, volunteers, journalists, etc.; and generally raised the quality of life for the whole population.7 Similarly, Huang also believes that hosting the AIG in Macao improved the use of sport venues and generated both sport and social benefits.8

Challenges for the AIG and AIMAG While hosting mega sport events does have a positive impact on the hosting cities, there are also issues that cannot be ignored. Some criticisms have already been raised regarding the AIMAG, mainly by other organisations and in media coverage. First, with the development of e-sport, it has been argued that the organising of e-sport competitions at the AIMAG is not normative. For example, Korea officially considered quitting the 2017 AIMAG on the grounds of the non-standard operation of e-sport events.The Korean Professional E-Sports Association (KESPA) believed that in order to ensure the smooth progress of the competition, the competition events needed several Asian countries to participate and choose possible events for continuous development and competition in future editions of the games. KESPA insisted that the final choice of the events should also be approved by the International E-Sports Federation (IESF), a body which was established by nine national and regional e-sport associations from Europe and Asia in Seoul in 2008. The purpose of the IESF is to ‘promote e-sport as a true sport beyond language, race and cultural barriers’ and to ‘see a world where e-sports is accepted as a real sport and that e-sport athletes can compete on the same level and with the same support as athletes from traditional sports.’9 However, the e-sport events of the 2017 AIMAG were decided without using this procedure, and the popular e-sport League of Legends was not included. KESPA also objected to the e-sport in the 2017 AIMAG being run by Ali Sports – a Chinese private e-sport organisation that was not accredited by the Chinese Sports Association – rather than an international ‘accredited’ organisation such as the IESF. Additionally, KESPA regarded the incomplete domestic network infrastructure of the host country, and the insufficient organising budget, as insufficient for operating a large-scale e-sport competition. However, the IESF is accredited by neither the OCA nor the International Sport Federation, with the OCA viewing it not as an official e-sport organisation but rather as a non-governmental voluntary organisation. Therefore, in response to the criticisms, the OCA argued that it had the right to decide what events would be included in the 2017 AIMAG e-sport competition. Second, another query arose over the number of major regional sport events organised by the OCA at this time. The 2013 AIMAG was held just one year before 2014 Asian Games, and both games were hosted in the same city – Incheon, Korea. Some voices argued that by organising too many games, the OCA would reduce the passion and attention of the spectators. The OCA organises five major multisport events to ‘reflect the diverse 530

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sporting culture and climate throughout the continent.’10 These events are: the Asian Summer Games, Asian Winter Games, AIMAG, Asian Youth Games and Asian Beach Games. In addition, they OCA also organises the Asian Regional Games. The Asian Regional Games include the East Asian Games, Central Asian Games, South Asian Games, West Asian Games, South East Asian Games and South Asian Beach Games. The fear is that so many games will cause a large economic burden on organising countries and cities as well as cause fatigue in the bidding process. For example, the 18th Asian Games should have been held in Vietnam but were changed to Indonesia, because Vietnam announced that they could not afford to build stadiums for the games due to fiscal difficulties. Hangzhou in China was the only candidate city for the 2022 Asian Games. Besides, there are also Asian Championships for many individual sporting events, such as basketball, badminton, beach volleyball, wrestling, chess and so on. In contrast, the European Olympic Committee only delivers three worldclass sport events, which are the European Games, European Youth Olympic Festival and the Games of the Small States of Europe. European Games are held once every four years, the year before the Olympic Games. The European Youth Olympic Games and the Games of the Small States of Europe are held biennially. Therefore, can it be argued that there are too many games in Asia? Do they put a burden on the hosting countries? Is this arrangement reasonable?

Suggestions for future research The previous sections discussed the impact of the AIG and AIMAG on the host cities and on certain sport events. Obviously, hosting a mega sport event will have many positive impacts on the hosting cities. However, there are also a few issues which should be noted, such as the use of stadiums after the games, the organising norms and the arrangement of games that are organised within a continent. For future research, both micro and macro aspects of hosting the AIMAG should be noted. From the micro aspect, future research could focus on the rules of the AIMAG and the development of certain sport events through the AIMAG, such as jujitsu and sambo. From the macro aspect, future research could focus on the effects of hosting the AIMAG on hosting cities and certain sport events; the relationship between the OCA and the AIMAG in terms of politics and diplomacy; the regional economic development and geopolitics of the AIMAG and the cultural impact of the AIMAG both in Asia and worldwide. More importantly, the OCA needs to communicate with each country’s Olympic Committee to make sure the AIMAG are held regularly. The OCA needs to fight against its own corruption issues, decrease the impact of geopolitics and make reforms. It also needs to encourage different countries or cities to jointly hold the AIMAG to reduce the financial pressure on them and to further promote the AIMAG worldwide. Future research could also look at how regional sporting events promote youth participation.

Notes 1 “4th Asian Indoor Games, Doha Withdrawn,” Olympic Council of Asia, June 30, 2008, accessed July 20, 2019, www.ocasia.org/News/GetNewsbyNewsID?q=b3jYDnEtuw7x/GwZGnrF/XR2PF55l+aCL gRsXW964p0=. 2 Michael Pavitt, “Thailand to Launch Bid for 2021 Asian Indoor and Martial Arts Games,” Insidethegames.biz, October 26, 2015, accessed July 23, 2019, www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1031168/ thailand-to-launch-bid-for-2021-asian-indoor-and-marital-arts-games. 3 Siyu Cao et al., “Research on Asian Indoor Games,” Sport Culture Guide 10 (2013): 67–70. 531

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4 “OCA President Hails ‘Best Ever’ AIMAG at Ashgabat 2017 Closing Ceremony,” Olympic Council of Asia, September 27, 2017, accessed July 23, 2019, www.ocasia.org/News/GetNewsbyNewsID?q=TV Qj6i+m8PkKsB9I05HSZsT2fOIYLBsIbIJOQS8WrQc=. 5 “E-Sports Will Be a Sport Event at 2007 Asian Indoor Games,” Sina.com, accessed July 23, 2019, http:// games.sina.com.cn/e/n/2006-06-08/1702154457.shtml. 6 “Results of Macau, 2nd Asian Indoor Games,” Sina.com, accessed July 23, 2019, http://maigoc2007. sports.sina.com.cn/php/item_result.php?lan=en&s=20. 7 Yawei Lai, “Study on Function and Impact on the Development of Macau Society by Holding LargeScale Sport Events” (PhD diss., Beijing Sport University, 2013). 8 Youli Huang, “A Study of the Development Strategy of Macau Sports in the Framework of One Country Two Systems” (PhD diss., Beijing Sports University, 2009). 9 “About IESF,” IESF, accessed July 20, 2019, www.ie-sf.org/iesf/. 10 “OCA Games,” Olympic Council of Asia, accessed July 20, 2019, www.ocasia.org/Game/Games.

Bibliography Cao, Siyu, Tingting Li, Qingjun Cao, and Zhang Maomao. “Research on Asian Indoor Games.” Sport Culture Guide 10 (2013): 67–70. Huang,Youli. “A Study of the Development Strategy of Macau Sports in the Framework of One Country Two Systems.” PhD diss., Beijing Sports University, 2009. Lai,Yawei. “Study on Function and Impact on the Development of Macau Society by Holding Large-Scale Sport Events.” PhD diss., Beijing Sport University, 2013.

532

51 The political dimension of the AFC Asian Cup Jörg Krieger

Introduction In 2019, Qatar won the AFC Asian Cup, organised by the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) and hosted that year in the United Arab Emirates for the first time. In doing so, Qatar became the smallest nation to ever win the continent’s most prestigious football tournament. Qatar’s success comes on the back of a focus on football as part of the nation’s soft power strategy that includes hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup, lifting football success onto a highly politicised level.1 However, politics and football have always gone hand in hand, particularly in the context of the AFC Asian Cup. By drawing on the competition’s history and current status, this chapter provides an introduction to some of the key sport political challenges that the AFC has faced over time with regards to its showcase event.The question of Israel, the struggle around the ‘two Chinas,’ and disrupting incidents surrounding the 2019 edition of the Cup serve as examples here. It is argued that the challenging sport political environment in which Asian football finds itself situated mirrors the complex geopolitical affairs on the continent and thereby significantly influences the execution of the continent’s prime football event.

Beginnings and foreshadowing The AFC was founded in 1954 in Manila, following informal discussions at the 1952 Helsinki Olympic Games.2 The new federation set its sights immediately on the staging of a continental tournament, which was held for the first time in Hong Kong in 1956 and staged every four years since then.3 The qualification process of the inaugural edition had already been overshadowed by the withdrawals of various nations for political reasons. Israel qualified for the finals without competing, as all its potential opponents had refused to play the Israeli team due to Arab nation’s rejection of Israel. Similarly, South Vietnam did not have to play its final qualification round as Malaysia withdrew its team. Whilst the finals of the 1956 tournament itself were held without major incidents – with South Korea winning the title by coming out on top of a round-robin group stage – the complexities of staging an international football tournament on the world’s most diverse continent became instantly obvious. A look at the participants of the 1960 Asian Cup, which featured South Korea (hosts and eventual winners), South Vietnam, Republic of 533

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China and Israel, further highlights this as only South Korea is still competing in the Asian Cup under its original name.

The impact of the Israel question Israel’s bizarre route to qualifying for the inaugural Asian Cup did not remain the only challenge surrounding the country’s participation in international football. Israel ‘won’ the African/Asian qualification for the 1958 FIFA World Cup entirely unchallenged as national teams from Muslim countries withdrew from matches against Israel due to the Arab League’s continued boycott of the newly founded state.4 Thus, FIFA arranged a playoff game between Wales, who had not qualified from the European qualifiers, and Israel, which the Welsh side won.5 Whilst this specifically organised contest saved FIFA from the embarrassment of a team at the World Cup finals that had not competed in any qualifier, the AFC did not have a solution for the issue in the 1960s and early 1970s. In fact, Israel even hosted and won the 1964 AFC Asian Cup. However, 11 of the 16 national teams that had originally entered the competition withdrew in protest against the final tournament being held in Israel that year.6 In 1968, Israel again qualified, losing the final against the hosts, the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2–1.Yet, this result had more than sporting implications as Iran’s victory symbolised an emerging power shift in the AFC and the Asian Cup to West Asia, both on and off the pitch. Moreover, the spectators of the final voiced strong anti-Semitic sentiments.7 With Arab and Muslim countries gaining significant strength in the AFC and other continental sporting bodies,8 the AFC eventually expelled Israel in 1974, preventing one of the competition’s initially strongest and most successful teams from competing in future tournaments. The 1976 Asian Cup, held again in Iran and highly instrumentalised by the Iranian regime,9 became the first tournament for which Israel did not qualify.10 FIFA, concerned by the political significance of the AFC’s decisions, threatened to suspend the continental governing body, but the AFC held firm to its stance.11 Israel remained expelled and in 1994, after appearances in the European (1982) and Oceanian (1986 and 1990) World Cup qualifiers, became a full UEFA member in 1994.The episode symbolises the tournament’s difficult beginnings, with national politics interfering with the execution of the competition. Moreover, Israeli scholars argue that the AFC’s expulsion of Israel has ‘backfired’ as the country is now able to compete in a much more prestigious competition.12

The Two Chinas The period between the 1950s and 1960s saw a further dispute in the AFC that was fuelled by geopolitical tensions and prevented the participation of national teams in the AFC Asia Cup and the execution of the competition. The Chinese Football Association (CFA) had been affiliated with FIFA since 1931. After the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the PRC’s national team first played a friendly match in Finland in August 1952.13 However, the international appearances of the PRC’s team were short-lived because FIFA and the AFC began to recognise the Republic of China’s football federation as the official body representing a different ‘Chinese’ country. As a consequence, Asia’s most populated nation remained absent from the Asian Cup until 1976. Instead, the Republic of China, which had been a founding member of the AFC, participated in the qualification rounds for the Asian Cup from 1956 onwards (qualifying for the final tournaments in 1960 and 1968). However, with the increasing membership in the AFC and the hope for increasing financial benefits, the AFC decided in 1974 to adhere to the PRC’s demands and expel the Republic of China, and to admit the

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PRC’s national federation as representative body for China instead. As in the case of Israel, FIFA considered the AFC’s decision a breach of its statutes. It was only in 1978, that FIFA accepted the PRC as member, simultaneously demanding that the Republic of China change its name to Chinese Taipei. Yet it took another 11 years before the Chinese Taipei Football Association re-entered the AFC and participated in an Asian Cup, in Japan in 1992.14

Continuing political controversies before and during the 2019 Asian Cup The cases just outlined indicate that the AFC Asian Cup has always been strongly embedded in the geopolitical tensions of the Asian continent. However, political interference in the Asian Cup is not just a historical phenomenon. A brief look at the recent qualifiers for the 2019 AFC Asian Cup is enough to illustrate that political interests are as present as ever and continue to disturb the event. The qualification for the 2019 AFC Cup proved to be a specific challenge for the AFC due to various political interferences. In 2015, FIFA suspended the football associations of Indonesia and Kuwait indefinitely due to governmental interference in their respective governing bodies of the sport. Hence, the AFC cancelled all matches of the AFC Asian Cup qualifiers involving the two nations and awarded Kuwait’s already played matches as 3–0 wins for Kuwait’s opponents. In other cases, the tournament was interrupted due to postponements and relocations. In March 2017, the Malaysian government prevented its national football team from playing its qualifier for the 2019 AFC Asian Cup in North Korea due to escalating political tensions between the two nations. Following months of negotiations and postponements, the games between the two countries were held on neutral ground in Thailand.15 Similarly, the government of Kyrgyzstan advised the AFC to postpone a match between Kyrgyzstan and Myanmar due to security concerns.This match was eventually played in Incheon, South Korea. However, the incidents that received most global attention in the 2019 AFC Asian Cup involved the eventual winner, Qatar.The final tournament of the competition, held in the UAE, took place in the midst of a diplomatic crisis between Qatar and nations allied with Saudi Arabia, including the UAE. The political conflict between the UAE and Qatar had an effect on the logistics of the Qatari team, with team officials, including the Qatari AFC Vice President and member of the Asian Cup Competition Committee with overall responsibility for the event, Saoud al-Mohannadi, struggling to obtain visas to enter the UAE.16 The tensions between the two nations were also visible inside the stadium when Qatar and the UAE faced each other in the semi-final of the tournament. The match was continuously disrupted by shoes thrown on to the pitch by UAE spectators, a symbolic insult in the Arab world.17 Finally, spectators showing obvious sympathy for the Qatari team had to bear the consequences of the diplomatic crisis. A British spectator, who wore a Qatar shirt inside the stadium, was detained by the UAE authorities as it was a punishable offence.18

Conclusion The growing economic significance of the AFC Asian Cup and the increasing global attention for the event are undeniable. The last editions of the event have been watched by a television audience of more than a billion viewers.19 The global impact of the event has been further strengthened through the inclusion of Australia in the AFC in 2005 and the participation of the Oceanian nations in the AFC Asian Cup from 2007 onwards.20 In fact, Australia hosted and won

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the 2015 event, the first Asian Cup held outside the Asian continent. Ever-increasing attention from European football followers has also been noted and is a result of the expansion of the football market to Asia, as well as the growing number of Asian footballers playing for Europe’s top teams.21 However, this short introduction has also highlighted that Asian football in general, and the AFC Asian Cup in particular, has always been and remains heavily entrenched in the highly politicised environment of the Asian continent.

Notes 1 Paul B. Brannagan and Robert Giulianotti, “Soft Power and Soft Disempowerment: Qatar, Global Sport and Football’s 2022 World Cup Finals,” Leisure Studies 34, no. 6 (2015): 703–19. 2 Ben Weinberg, “The Future Is Asia? The Role of the Asian Football Confederation in the Governance and Development of Football in Asia,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 29, no. 4 (2012): 535–52. 3 Following the 2004 Asian Cup in China, the AFC decided to move the competition to a year without Summer Olympic Games and European Football Championships. It was next held in 2007, co-hosted by Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. 4 Torbjörn Andersson, “The 1958 World Cup in Sweden. Between Modernity and Idyll,” in The FIFA World Cup 1930–2010, ed. Stefan Rinke and Kay Schiller (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2012), 142–61. 5 Kevin Moore, “A Second ‘Maracanazo’? The 2014 FIFA World Cup in Historical Perspective,” Sport in Society 20, no. 5–6 (2017): 555–71. 6 An official video history of the competition released by the AFC in January 2015 omitted any mention of the 1964 tournament. Michael Safi, “Israel Omission from Asian Cup Video Embarrasses Asian Football Confederation,” The Guardian, January 22, 2015, www.theguardian.com/football/2015/jan/22/ israel-omission-from-asian-cup-video-embarrasses-asian-football-confederation. 7 Ben Weinberg, Asia and the Future of Football:The Role of the Asian Football Confederation (London: Routledge, 2015), 63. 8 See the chapter on the Olympic Council of Asia in this Handbook. 9 Huochang E. Chehabi, “The Politics of Football in Iran,” Soccer & Society 7, no. 2 (2006): 233–61. 10 Israel qualified for the 1972 Asian Cup in Thailand but later withdrew. 11 Weinberg, “The Future Is Asia?” 12 Yair Galily and Tal Samuel-Azran, “Israel,” in The Palgrave International Handbook of Football and Politics, ed. Jean-Michel De Waele, Suzan Gibril, Ekaterina Gloriozova, and Ramon Spaaij (Champaign: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 269–84. 13 China had actually been invited to participate at the 1952 Helsinki Olympic Games. However, the Chinese football team only arrived after the competition had already been held. Taiwan was disappointed by the IOC resolution and withdrew from the 1952 Helsinki Olympics in protest. Alan Bairner and Dong-Jhy Hwang, “Representing Taiwan: International Sport, Ethnicity and National Identity in the Republic of China,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 46, no. 3 (2010): 231–48. 14 Weinberg, Asia and the Future of Football, 87. 15 “Political Tensions Lead to Cancellation of Football Matches,” Insidethegames, September 29, 2017, www.insidethegames.biz/articles/search?q=%22Asian+Cup%22&sort=date. 16 Tariq Panja, “Top Qatari Soccer Official Barred From Tournament in U.A.E.,” New York Times, January 3, 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/01/03/sports/qatar-soccer-asian-cup.html. 17 AP, “With Shoes and Insults Flying, Qatar Beats U.A.E. and Advances to Asian Cup Final,” New York Times, January 29, 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/01/29/sports/qatar-uae-boycott-asian-cup.html. 18 Diane Taylor, “British Man Detained in UAE After Wearing Qatar Football Shirt to Match,” The Guardian, February 5, 2019, www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/05/british-man-detained-inuae-after-wearing-qatar-football-t-shirt-to-match. 19 David Rowe, “The AFC Asian Cup: Continental Competition, Global Disposition,” in Sport, Media and Mega-Events, ed. Lawrence A. Wenner and Andrew C. Billings (London: Routledge, 2017), 185–98. 20 Anthony Bubalo, “Football diplomacy” (Paper of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2005). 21 N. David Pifer, “Asian Football Confederation,” in Routledge Handbook of Football Business and Management, ed. Simon Chadwick, Daniel Parnell, Paul Widdop, and Christos Anagnostopoulos (London: Routledge, 2018), 473–84.

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Bibliography Andersson,Torbjörn. “The 1958 World Cup in Sweden. Between Modernity and Idyll.” In The FIFA World Cup 1930–2010, edited by Stefan Rinke and Kay Schiller. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2012. Bairner, Alan, and Dong-Jhy Hwang. “Representing Taiwan: International Sport, Ethnicity and National Identity in the Republic of China.” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 46, no. 3 (2010): 231–48. Brannagan, Paul B., and Robert Giulianotti. “Soft Power and Soft Disempowerment: Qatar, Global Sport and Football’s 2022 World Cup Finals.” Leisure Studies 34, no. 6 (2015): 703–19. Bubalo, Anthony. “Football Diplomacy.” Paper of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2005. https:// archive.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/pubfiles/Bubalo%2C_Football_diplomacy_stripe_1.pdf. Chehabi, Huochang E. “The Politics of Football in Iran.” Soccer & Society 7, no. 2 (2006): 233–61. Galily, Yair, and Tal Samuel-Azran. “Israel.” In The Palgrave International Handbook of Football and Politics, edited by Jean-Michel De Waele, Suzan Gibril, Ekaterina Gloriozova, and Ramon Spaaij. Champaign: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. Moore, Kevin. “A Second ‘Maracanazo’? The 2014 FIFA World Cup in Historical Perspective.” Sport in Society 20, no. 5–6 (2017): 555–71. Pifer, N. David. “Asian Football Confederation.” In Routledge Handbook of Football Business and Management, edited by Simon Chadwick, Daniel Parnell, Paul Widdop, and Christos Anagnostopoulos. London: Routledge, 2018. Rowe, David. “The AFC Asian Cup: Continental Competition, Global Disposition.” In Sport, Media and Mega-Events, edited by Lawrence A. Wenner and Andrew C. Billings. London: Routledge, 2017. Weinberg, Ben. “The Future Is Asia? The Role of the Asian Football Confederation in the Governance and Development of Football in Asia.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 29, no. 4 (2012): 535–52. Weinberg, Ben. Asia and the Future of Football: The Role of the Asian Football Confederation. London: Routledge, 2015.

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52 The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games Min Ge

In 2001, after winning its second attempt at bidding, Beijing was chosen as host of the XXIX Olympic Games. The opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games took place in Beijing, the capital of the People’s Republic of China, on 8 August 2008.The Games lasted 16 days, with the closing ceremony held on 24 August in Beijing. The Beijing Olympic Games were the first summer Olympic Games held in China. It is also the third time an Asian country hosted them, after the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul.1 In terms of scale and participation, the Beijing Olympic Games were the largest at the time. In Beijing, a total of 10,942 athletes, including 6,305 men and 4,637 women, from the 204 member associations of the International Olympic Committee participated in the Games.2 They competed in 28 sport and 302 events in this edition of the Games. The Beijing Games were the last Olympics for baseball and softball before 2020.3 Baseball and softball were not included in the London Olympic Games in 2012 and the Rio Games in 2016. During this edition of the Games in 2008, the athletes broke a total of 43 world records and 132 Olympic records.4 This Olympic Games produced two superstars. In the water, the American swimmer Michael Phelps won eight gold medals in the ‘Water Cube,’ making him the athlete to have won the most gold medals in a single Olympic Games, as well as the athlete with the most gold medals in the Summer Olympics in general.5 Meanwhile, on land, the Jamaican sprinter Usain Bolt won three gold medals in the men’s 100 metres, 200 metres and 4 x 100 metre relay in the ‘Bird’s Nest’ in eight days, making him the fastest person in the world.6 As part of the Games, the torch relay of the Beijing Olympics was the longest, most extensive and most attended torch relay in Olympic history.The programme was themed as the ‘Harmony Journey’ with the slogan ‘Light the Passion, Share the Dream.’7 The whole journey lasted 130 days and the total distance covered was about 137,000 kilometres, including 20 cities on five continents.8 In 2008, the Olympic Flame reached the summit of Mount Everest for the very first time. The torchbearers numbered 21,800 in total.9 In addition, the biggest difference between the torch relay of the Beijing Games and the previous editions was that the cities the Olympic flame passed through were rarely Olympic cities, and for many of them it was their first time to be part of the torch relay of an Olympic Games.10 In the medal table, 87 countries won medals in the competition, also setting a record for the Olympic Games in general.11 China, the host nation, won 51 gold medals in total and 538

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historically surpassed the sport superpower, the United States, for the first time and placed first in the medal table.12 This was the first time in the history of Chinese sport, and in Olympic history, that an Asian country topped the gold medal table.13 Along with 21 silver medals and 28 bronze medals, China won 100 medals overall for the first time.14 As a sporting event, Beijing presented the best Olympic Games at the time. As the former International Olympic Committee President Jacques Rogge said at the Games’ closing ceremony, the Beijing Olympics were a ‘truly exceptional Games.’15 The Beijing Games were also a success in terms of the economy and marketing of the Games. Since the commercialisation of the Olympic Games in 1984, the Olympic marketing programme has played an important role in providing financial security for the Games, as well as promoting and stabilising the Olympic Movement.16 The Beijing Olympic Games were the first-ever Olympic Games to have full digital coverage freely available around the world.17 The Olympic Broadcasting Services (OBS) delivered more than 5,000 hours of high-definition sport programming to the rights-holding partners.18 In total, there were more than 61,700 hours of television coverage aired globally to 220 territories, the most in Olympic history in terms of broadcasting hours.19 There were three different ways the Games were broadcast: in total 44,454 hours, which is 72 percent of coverage, were aired on free-to-air terrestrial channels; while the rest of the coverage was aired on either pay TV/cable/ satellite platforms or on free-to-air digital channels.20 For the first time in Olympic history, a large amount of online video content was available on the Internet and mobile platforms. In the end, the Beijing Olympic Games broadcast to 4.3 billion people with access to the coverage. There were 3.6 billion people who watched at least one minute of the Games.21 The Beijing TOP (The Olympic Partner) programme, with 11 companies selected as partners, generated US$866 million in cash, goods and services for the Games as a whole, contributing around 40 percent of total IOC revenues and making it the second-largest source of income after media rights.22 Lenovo, as the first Chinese sponsor in the TOP partners, joined the list for the first time in Olympic history. Besides the TOP programme, the Beijing Olympic sponsorship programme also involved Beijing 2008 Partners, Beijing 2008 Sponsors, Beijing 2008 Exclusive Suppliers and Beijing 2008 Suppliers.23 There were 10 companies chosen to be the sponsors of the Beijing Games. There was a special situation in the Beijing Games sponsor programme with both Tsingtao Beer Corporation Ltd. and Beijing Yanjing Beer Company Ltd. chosen for the list, which broke with the IOC’s usual convention of one sponsor for a specific type of product or service.24 Meanwhile, a Chinese website–SOHU.com – became the first Internet sponsor in Olympic history.25 Additionally, for other selected exclusive suppliers and suppliers for the Games, there were 51 enterprises in total in the sponsorship programme of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, and the Beijing Organising Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG) received US$1,218 million revenue in total, the highest in Olympic history.26 There were 6.8 million tickets available for the Beijing Olympic Games, and more than 6.5 million tickets were sold.27 Around 70 percent of all tickets were sold in China, while 16.5 percent of tickets went to international sales. There were around 10 percent of tickets for sponsors and broadcasters, and the rest of the tickets were for the IOC and other international federations.28 The total of 95.6 percent of tickets sold made Beijing the only Olympic Games (at that time) since 1984 to have sold more than 90 percent of the tickets and generated US$185 million for the BOCOG.29 The Beijing licensing programme proved to be a remarkable success, as well as the largest licensing programme in Olympic history in terms of product range.30 It generated in total US$163 million as the contribution to the revenue of the BOCOG. There were, in total, 68 539

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licensed manufacturers and 81 licensed retailers who signed agreements with the BOCOG.31 The programme developed over 8,000 different kinds of licensed products for the Beijing Olympic Games, in 13 categories. Meanwhile, there were 3,000 licensed shops, counters and agencies established across the 31 venues in China. Two iconic video game characters were brought together for the first time ever in Olympic history.32 It has been shown that the game ‘Sonic and Mario at the Olympic Games’ was a bestseller in many markets around the world and brought Olympic values to the living rooms of millions of Olympic fans.33 There is no doubt that the Beijing Olympic marketing programme was the most successful one at the time, with the sponsors and rights holders making a huge contribution in terms of revenue. On the other hand, the new record costs set by Beijing demonstrated that it is very expensive to host the Olympic Games nowadays. The budget of the Beijing Olympic Games was RMB280 billion, or US$40 billion.34 This budget made Beijing the most expensive Games in Olympic history, amounting to more than the sum of the budgets of all the Olympic Games of the previous 108 years.35 In 2003, due to an increased budget for security and some additional projects, there was a further RMB10 billion or US$2 billion added to the budget, which made the cost total RMB290 billion or US$42 billion. Despite the high budget, in June 2009 China’s National Audit Office reported that the Beijing Olympic Games had made a profit of more than RMB1 billion, or US$146.4 million. The high revenue and low profit of the Beijing Games demonstrated that the Olympic Games were becoming a rich man’s game. The Beijing Olympic Games were also a showcase of the Chinese economy and modern China. China’s goal was to ensure that the best side of Beijing and China would be shown in front of the world, no matter what. The benefit of hosting the Olympic Games is not only in the economic figures; the Games also had a number of lasting impacts and legacies for the city and country. During the pre-Games period, Beijing’s annual GDP nearly tripled from 2002 to 2007, growing from RMB313 billion to RMB900.62 billion, or US$44.71 billion to US$128.66 billion.The Olympic investment projects added an additional RMB2.75 billion, or US$392.8 million to Beijing’s GDP in 2003; this figure reached RMB32.78 billion, or US$4.68 billion at its peak in 2007.36 In terms of the contribution to GDP growth, the Olympic investment ranged from 0.76 percent in 2003 to 3.64 percent in 2007.37 The Beijing construction industry increased its gross production by RMB135.115 billion, or US$19 billion, from 2004 to 2008. This increase also created an extra 795,900 jobs in Beijing.38 In addition, there were 1.92 million new jobs created in the hospitality industry in the Beijing area.39 This significantly improved Beijing’s economy at its tertiary level. By hosting the Olympic Games, the industrial configuration of tertiary industry, secondary industry and primary industry was upgraded, and the Beijing economy was developed further into a service-oriented economy. The majority of the Beijing Olympic Games events were held in Beijing city. Meanwhile, some of the events were held in the other six co-host cities: Qingdao, Hong Kong, Tianjin, Shanghai, Shenyang and Qinhuangdao.40 With the economic impact of hosting the Olympic events, these cities have turned into local regional centres for economic development and growth. The Beijing Games created seven such centres in China in order to lead Chinese economic reform and opening-up to the next level. The Olympic economic zone is similar to the special economic zones from the economic reform period. In this context, it has been seen as a reflection of Chinese economic reform, as well as its continuance.41 The Olympic Games successfully promoted Beijing and boosted its tourism industry. China was ranked sixth in the world for inbound tourist revenue with the Olympics’ impact on tourism.42 It has also been forecast by the Travel and Tourism Council that, with this trend, 540

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China will become the world’s fourth-largest outbound tourist country by 2020.43 International tourism income from 2001 to 2011 grew from US$2.95 to US$5.42 billion, while domestic tourism revenues increased from RMB88.77 to RMB286.4 billion, or US$12.68 to US$40.9 billion.44 The Beijing Olympic Games left massive infrastructure projects to the city, including rail transportation, highways, urban roads and a new airport terminal.45 There was RMB63 billion, or US$9 billion invested in rail transportation in order to achieve the goal of 300km of municipal railway in Beijing.46 According to Brunet and Zuo,47 the cost of infrastructure projects from 2002 to 2006 was RMB283.89 billion, or US$40.56 billion. Meanwhile, for communication and transportation, the investment between 2002 and 2006 was four times as much as it was between 1997 and 2001, with a total sum of up to RMB110 billion, or US$15.71 billion.48 A new terminal was built as part of Beijing Capital International Airport for the use of the Olympic Games, at a cost of US$3.5 billion. The government was the major source of funds for all projects, and Beijing has taken this opportunity to upgrade its infrastructure.49 The Beijing Olympic Games had a total 37 venues; 31 were located in Beijing, and the other six were located in co-host cities. Twelve of them are new permanent venues, and there were four venues located on university campuses.50 Among all the venues, there are two famous ones. The first one is the 91,000-seat Beijing National Stadium, affectionately known as the ‘Bird’s Nest,’ where the opening and closing ceremonies, most of the track and field events and football matches took place.51 The total cost of the ‘Bird’s Nest’ was US$480 million. The second one is the new Beijing National Aquatics Centre, known as the ‘Water Cube,’ which was mainly used for water sport events. They have become symbols of the Beijing Olympic Games, as well as of Beijing city, continuing to attract tourists even after the Games. In addition, the ‘Bird’s Nest’ has hosted several concerts and exhibitions, and the ‘Water Cube’ was renovated into a multi-purpose leisure and swimming centre, with part of the venue turned into China’s first full-themed international indoor water park.52 It is believed that many legacy venues from the Beijing 2008 Games will be transformed for the Winter Olympics in 2022. Hosting the Olympic Games improved grassroots sport in Beijing, as well as in China. A national fitness programme was formed, and a campaign named ‘National Fitness and Move with the Olympics’ was launched in 2006, which attracted 100 million people who joined different sport programmes.53 In addition, in 2009 the Chinese central government also declared that 8 August was ‘National Fitness Day’ for China.The Beijing Olympic Education Programme was officially launched in 2005.54 There were, in total, 400 million students from 500,000 schools throughout the whole country who benefited from the programme.55 In addition, the ‘Heart to Heart Partnership Programme’ was launched in September 2006. The programme linked 210 schools in the Beijing area with 205 NOC delegations, and the exchanges between Chinese and international students from 161 different countries and regions have continued after the Games.56 According to the BOCOG,57 the Beijing Olympic Games volunteer recruitment programme operated from August 2006 to March 2008 and there were 1,125,799 applications in total, including 22,000 international applicants. In the end, the BOCOG selected 100,000 applicants as the Games-time volunteers to support the Beijing Olympic Games. It also involved 400,000 city volunteers, who provided Olympic participants, journalists and domestic and international tourists with information, translation and emergency services.58 There were also one million social volunteers and 200,000 cheerleading volunteers, which made the volunteer programme of the Beijing Games not only the biggest in Olympic history, but also in Chinese history, for a single event.59 Through these programmes, the Beijing Olympic Games has created legacies of human capital for Beijing, as well as China, in health, education and training, which will benefit the city and the country for their further development.60 541

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The ‘Green Olympics’ was one of the concepts of the Beijing Olympic Games.61 Between 2002 and 2005, there were 200 factories, which potentially could cause harsh environmental conditions, moved out of Beijing city.62 Overall, China invested US$17 billion in environmentalrelated projects. However, there was no significant effect in the long term.63 The Beijing local government also implemented relevant policies to continue the legacy left by the Olympic Games, but due to the increasing population and further development, environmental issues are still one of the problems that Beijing is facing.64 The 2008 Games raised the awareness of environmental issues for both the Chinese people and the Chinese government. By preparing for the Winter Olympic Games, Beijing started another round of the battle to improve its environmental conditions. It will be interesting to find out in the future whether the Olympic Games could help Beijing transform a ‘Green Games’ into a ‘Green City.’65

Notes 1 Official Website of BOC, accessed June 12, 2019, www.olympic.cn/games/summer/summer/2010/ 0210/24918.html. 2 Official Website of the Olympic Games, accessed July 4, 2019, www.olympic.org/beijing-2008. 3 Official Website of BOC. 4 Beijing Organising Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG), Preparation for the Games: New Beijing Great Olympics -Official Report of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games,Volume 3 (Beijing: Beijing Sport University Press, 2010). 5 Official Website of BOC. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Official Website of the Olympic Games. 9 Official Website of BOC. 10 Ibid. 11 BOCOG, Beijing Olympics Report. 12 Official Website of BOC. 13 Official Website of the Olympic Games. 14 BOCOG, Beijing Olympics Report, vol. 3. 15 Ibid. 16 International Olympic Committee (IOC), The International Olympic Committee Marketing Report: Beijing 2008 (Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 2009). 17 Ge Min, “The Olympic Economy in China: A Study of the Beijing Olympic Games” (PhD diss., University of Western Australia, 2016). 18 Harald Dolles and Sten Soderman, “Sponsoring as a Strategy to Enter, Develop, and Defend Markets: Advertising Patterns of the Beijing Olympic Games’ Sponsoring Partners,” in Asian Inward and Outward FDI: New Challenges in Global Economy, ed. Claes Alvstan, Harald Dolles, and Patrik Strom (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 36. 19 Min, “The Olympic Economy in China.” 20 John Davis, The Olympic Games Effect: How Sports Marketing Builds Strong Brands (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 2012). 21 Ibid. 22 BOCOG, Beijing Olympics Report, vol. 3. 23 Ibid. 24 Min, “The Olympic economy in China.” 25 Ibid. 26 International Olympic Committee (IOC). The Olympic Marketing Fact File: 2012 Edition (Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 2012). 27 International Olympic Committee (IOC). The International Olympic Committee Marketing Report: Beijing 2008 (Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 2009). 28 Min, “The Olympic Economy in China.” 29 IOC, Marketing Fact File: 2012.

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30 International Olympic Committee (IOC). The Olympic Marketing Fact File: 2014 Edition (Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 2014). 31 Min, “The Olympic Economy in China.” 32 Curt Hamakawa and Elizabeth Elam, “Beijing Olympics: Games of Epic Proportion,” Journal of Business Cases and Applications no. 3 (2011): 1–11. 33 IOC, Marketing Report. 34 BOCOG, Beijing Olympics Report, vol. 3. 35 Jinxia Dong and J. A. Mangan, “Beijing Olympic Legacies: Certain Intentions and Certain and Uncertain Outcomes,” in Olympic Legacies: Intended and Unintended, ed. J. A. Mangan and Mark Dyreson (London: Routledge, 2013), 136–57. 36 BOCOG, Beijing Olympics Report, vol. 3. 37 Min, “The Olympic Economy in China.” 38 Dong and Mangan, “Beijing Olympic Legacies,” 136–57. 39 Xin Tieliang, New Beijing, Great Olympics (Beijing: Beijing Publishing Press, 2006). 40 Beijing Organising Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG), Ceremonies and Competitions: Celebration of the Games-Official Report of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games,Volume 2 (Beijing: Beijing Sport University Press, 2010). 41 Min, “The Olympic Economy in China.” 42 Dong and Mangan, “Beijing Olympic Legacies,” 136–57. 43 Ibid. 44 Min, “The Olympic Economy in China.” 45 Hengming Qiu, “The Bill of the Olympic Games,” China Investment no. 8 (2008): 40–59. 46 National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Year Book 2007 (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2007). 47 Ferran Brunet and Zuo Xinwen, The Economy of the Beijing Olympic Games: An Analysis of First Impacts and Prospects (Barcelona: Centre d’Estudis Olímpics, UAB, 2009). 48 Qiu, “The Bill of the Olympics,” 40–59. 49 Ibid. 50 Davis, The Olympic Games Effect. 51 BOCOG, Beijing Olympics Report, vol. 2. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Wang and Masumoto, Olympic Education, 31–41. 55 Richard Holt and Dino Ruta, eds., Routledge Handbook of Sport and Legacy: Meeting the Challenge of Major Sport Events (London: Routledge, 2015). 56 Beijing Organising Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG), Preparation for the Games: New Beijing Great Olympics -Official Report of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games,Volume 3 (Beijing: Beijing Sport University Press, 2010). 57 BOCOG, Beijing Olympics Report, vol. 2. 58 International Olympic Committee (IOC). Final Report of The IOC Coordination Commission: Games of the XXIX Olympiad, Beijing 2008 (Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 2010). 59 Holt and Ruta, Challenge of Major Sport Events. 60 Min, “The Olympic Economy in China.” 61 BOCOG, Beijing Olympics Report, vol. 1. 62 Ibid. 63 Huijuan Cao, Hidemichi Fujii, and Shunsuke Managi, “Environmental Impact of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games,” Economics Discussion Papers no. 30 (2013). 64 Min, “The Olympic Economy in China.” 65 Ibid.

Bibliography Beijing Organising Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG). Bid Documents and Analysis: Passion Behind the Bid-Official Report of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games.Vol. 1. Beijing: Beijing Sport University Press, 2010.

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Beijing Organising Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG). Ceremonies and Competitions: Celebration of the Games-Official Report of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games.Vol. 2. Beijing: Beijing Sport University Press, 2010. Beijing Organising Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG). Preparation for the Games: New Beijing Great Olympics -Official Report of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games. Vol. 3. Beijing: Beijing Sport University Press, 2010. Brunet, Ferran, and Zuo Xinwen. The Economy of the Beijing Olympic Games: An Analysis of First Impacts and Prospects. Barcelona: Centre d’Estudis Olímpics, UAB, 2009. Cao, Huijuan, Hidemichi Fujii, and Shunsuke Managi. “Environmental Impact of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.” Economics Discussion Papers no. 30 (2013). www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/ discussionpapers/2013-30. Davis, John. The Olympic Games Effect: How Sports Marketing Builds Strong Brands. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 2012. Dolles, Harald, and Sten Soderman. “Sponsoring as a Strategy to Enter, Develop, and Defend Markets: Advertising Patterns of the Beijing Olympic Games’ Sponsoring Partners.” In Asian Inward and Outward FDI: New Challenges in Global Economy, edited by Claes Alvstan, Harald Dolles, and Patrik Strom, 36–64. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Dong, Jinxia, and J. A. Mangan. “Beijing Olympic Legacies: Certain Intentions and Certain and Uncertain Outcomes.” In Olympic Legacies: Intended and Unintended, edited by J. A. Mangan and Mark Dyreson, 136–57. London: Routledge, 2013. Hamakawa, Curt, and Elizabeth Elam. “Beijing Olympics: Games of Epic Proportion.” Journal of Business Cases and Applications no. 3 (2011): 1–11. Holt, Richard, and Dino Ruta, eds. Routledge Handbook of Sport and Legacy: Meeting the Challenge of Major Sport Events. London: Routledge, 2015. International Olympic Committee (IOC). The International Olympic Committee Marketing Report: Beijing 2008. Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 2009. International Olympic Committee (IOC). Final Report of The IOC Coordination Commission: Games of the XXIX Olympiad, Beijing 2008. Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 2010. International Olympic Committee (IOC). The Olympic Marketing Fact File: 2012 Edition. Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 2012. International Olympic Committee (IOC). The Olympic Marketing Fact File: 2014 Edition. Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 2014. Min, Ge. “The Olympic Economy in China: A Study of the Beijing Olympic Games.” PhD diss., School of Social Sciences, the University of Western Australia, 2016. National Bureau of Statistics of China. China Statistical Year Book 2007. Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2007. Qiu, Hengming. “The Bill of the Olympic Games.” China Investment no. 8 (2008): 40–59. Tieliang, Xin. New Beijing, Great Olympics. Beijing: Beijing Publishing Press, 2006. Wang,Yimin, and Naofumi Masumoto.“Olympic Education at Model Schools for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.” International Journal of Sport and Health Science 7 (2009): 31–41.

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53 The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games and South Korea’s mega-events Jihyun Cho

Introduction Over the past few decades, numerous social scientists have assessed the nature of the impact of hosting mega-events on a city or country.1 Between the pre- and post-Seoul Olympic periods, it is evident that there have been various transformations in South Korean society. A number of scholars have argued that the Seoul Olympic Games were one of the most successful examples of a country hosting a global mega-event.2 The decision to host the 1988 Seoul Olympics was supported by the then-South Korean President Chun Doo-Hwan and his government, and South Korea’s key actors cooperated with international organisations. The Samsung Economic Research Institute reported that the 1988 Seoul Olympics provided dramatic economic benefits to South Korea. However, they ‘would not generate the (same) economic benefits’ from the 2002 FIFA World Cup.3 Perhaps the Seoul Olympics had promoted Korea’s brand name and the image of its largest companies better, to the benefit of South Korea’s economic development over the next two decades. They had also been the starting point for hosting more mega sport events in the country. Sport mega-events are clearly linked to business objectives. Since the 1980s, the IOC has encouraged the investment of millions of dollars through the establishment of The Olympic Partnership (TOP). TOP encouraged business partnerships with the IOC and many organisations paid for the privilege of obtaining ‘partner status.’4 The TOP programme idea was formed by Horst Dassler, son of the founder of Adidas and, at the time, chief executive of the company. With the blessing of the then-FIFA President Joao Havelange, Dassler established International Sport and Leisure (ISL), which set up the TOP programme.5 Since the 1980s, the IOC and FIFA have both embarked on strategies for the success of their global enterprises. But what have been the actual positive and negative outcomes of hosting mega-events?6 Hosting sport mega-events impacts in different ways on host cities and nations. There is much evidence of the influence of these events on domestic political, economic and social developments as well as on international relations. The main aim of this study is to investigate the impact of the Seoul Olympic Games on developments within South Korean society.

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Mega-events and South Korea South Korea is not an exceptional country in its ambition to host mega sport events. Based on the framework of ‘mega sport events,’ the Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism, Kim MyungGon, highlighted the importance of hosting such events: I think that Korea’s high recognition has been earned through the success of hosting various mega-events. Hosting mega-events has had an impact on our politics, economics and general society. Therefore, we can say that hosting mega-events has many beneficial outcomes and consequences, such that if it is possible, we need to continue to host various mega-events in Korea, and not only sport events; we should host various other events so that we can have various, similarly beneficial effects in Korean society. If we host various other events in different regions, we could have development in other cities and their residents could learn useful specialist knowledge and skills, which could also have an effect on the development of infrastructure.7 The globalisation process and hosting sport mega-events, especially the Olympic Games and FIFA World Cup, can be seen as multidimensional elements in South Korea’s ongoing politicoeconomic development. According to Horne and Manzenreiter, ‘[T]he 1988 Seoul Olympics already showcased South Korea’s newly industrialised economy and the end of military dictatorship’ and also its ‘having Asia’s third-largest economy and one of the world’s best educated and most technology-savvy populations.’8 Over the following 30 years, South Korea has undergone rapid development in various ways. It is important to remember that in the period directly before the Seoul Olympics, South Korea was considered a developing country. Indeed, one of the aims of hosting the Olympics was to obtain the economic benefits necessary to ‘catch up’ with the developed world. By contrast, in 2002, South Korean Deputy Prime Minister Jin Nyum said to journalists before the FIFA World Cup that there was more consideration being put to ‘the brand-making of Korea, rather than making money directly.’9 Thus, during the 2002 FIFA World Cup, co-hosted with Japan, South Korean people wore their now famous ‘Red T-shirts,’ expressing Korean identity in loud, colourful and memorable displays,10 while the South Korean company Samsung reportedly spent around US$100 million on a global advertising campaign, which made much of its Korean identity.

Globalisation and the Seoul Olympic Games South Korea’s economic development, political transformation and sociocultural formations are closely linked to broader global flows. In particular, the close relationship between the United States and South Korea resulted in increasing economic, cultural and political interdependence. Donnelly’s argument is that Americanisation has privileged dominant cultures (that is, particularly American culture) throughout the world.11 However, Maguire points out that the ‘global process is itself a parody of a set of complex arguments . . . it is more difficult to understand local or national experiences without reference to these global flows.’12 Maguire argues that ‘there is no single global flow . . . globalization processes involve multidirectional movement of people, practices, customs, and ideas.’13 Through the Seoul Olympics, South Korean people came faceto-face with global society, through those ‘cross-cultural processes’ which the hosting of sport mega-events brings. The following interview extracts provide insights into the South Korean peoples’ perspective on globalisation processes, including Westernisation, Americanisation and Olympism. 546

1988 Seoul Olympics and SK’s mega-events

Journalist Park Gun-Man highlighted the various positive impacts on Korean society resulting specifically from the Seoul Olympics: The Seoul Olympics impacted on Korea’s development in many ways toward westernisation. First of all, politically, there was the opportunity that the Olympics provided for ending the period of military dictatorship in favour of democracy. Also, the Seoul Games contributed to cleaning up Korean society. In particular, through hosting the Olympics, Koreans obtained a mindset of ‘we can do it’ which helped the progress of westernisation in Korean society.14 Moreover, Professor Roh Mung-Woo drew attention to the psychological legacy of the Seoul Olympics: I think, the biggest legacy is a memorable Olympics for the people. For example, for those Olympics which were memorable Olympics, people will talk about them again and again about the Olympics having a positive impact. . . . [T]hat kind of thing is the legacy of Olympism. One aspect of the mental part was that the Seoul Olympics were unfortunate in Korean history. That is because the Seoul Olympics had an undemocratic preparation compared to the PyeongChang preparation. However, at least, we now live with the world’s attention, and Korean people have self-satisfaction; also, they want to receive consolation from others.15 However, the manager of the International Relations Bureau of the Korean Football Association (KFA), Park Yong-Soo, was critical of the general Westernisation of Korea which has led to a number of problems: It is extreme to talk about the westernisation of Korea. However, when we hosted the Seoul Games, we had a chance to meet foreign people and through the experience of hosting them we enhanced our own national pride. So I think there were certain indirect advantages from the Seoul Olympics. I think westernisation is like this; democracy and a correct concept of capitalism, and during this period Korea began to take those steps. Yet, I think Korea is still at an early stage of this process even now.16 Miller et al. emphasise that global sport took shape following the development of new international divisions of cultural labour and through complicated interactions between ‘Americanisation’ and ‘governmentalisation,’ as well as through ‘commoditisation’ and ‘televisualisation.’17 Those processes have impacted strongly on South Korea’s sociocultural forms from the 1980s to the present, with the 1988 Olympics being particularly influential. South Korean people acquired ‘self-satisfaction’ – ‘we put in hard work and effort to prepare for the Seoul Games, then the world awards respect to Korea.’18 Three decades after the Seoul Olympics, following the process of globalisation in Korean society, and through the hosting of other mega sport events, it is not only necessary but also possible to evaluate the actual consequences of the Games for South Korean society. The following interview data provide some concluding insights into the consequences of the Seoul Games, specifically in relation to mega-events. The then-Minister of Culture, Sport and Tourism, Kim Myung-Gon, described the lasting effects of the Seoul Olympics on Korean society: Through the hosting of mega-events, Korean people have developed a more mature society and have learnt cooperation skills that have made us confident about hosting mega-events 547

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in Korea. This means that if we have to do something, Korean people do their best to do very well. So at the time of the Seoul Games, the world was surprised with Korea, but Koreans were also surprised at themselves for their energy and commitment in preparation. As a result, Koreans considered their own national identity to be tied to the hard work and high-spiritedness shown during the preparation for the Games. These impacts contributed to the maturation of Korean society and played a huge role in changing the oppressive politics of President Chun to democratic politics in Korea.19 Thus, through hosting sport mega-events, South Korea has witnessed multidimensional developmental legacies. For that reason, Professor Lim Burn-Jang placed emphasis on the importance of hosting mega sport events: We have hosted mega sports events many times, and the knowledge from these experiences needs to be used for the development of the sports tourism industry and the national infrastructure for enhancing the economic benefits of sport. We should host a number of mega sports events in Korea.20 Thanks to mega-events, South Korean people have had the chance to improve their country’s image, have shown greater enthusiasm for annual national games and have also been proud to become global citizens.

Conclusion As shown earlier, hosting the Seoul Olympic Games delivered various benefits to South Korea. In the 1980s, South Korea had limited communication with global society, lacking opportunities for expressing its identity on the global stage. Roche explains that ‘mega-events promote the localization of international global event movement history in relation to host sites and cities,’ and that ‘sport culture provides opportunities for people to reanimate a sense of effective agency in a number of ways.’21 The 1988 Olympics was the first time that a sport mega-event was hosted in Korea, and the experience and knowledge gained from the event led the South Korean people to acquire a substantial capacity to host further events in their more modernised society. According to the Minister of Cultural Tourism and Sport, Kim Myung-Gon, hosting the Seoul Olympics impacted on the hosting of subsequent mega-events, which in turn influenced the emergence of the Hallyu (the Korean Wave involving cultural exports around Asia).22 This meant that South Korea’s globalisation experience was not only about the acceptance of Western cultural forms, but also allowed Korea to advertise its own sociocultural achievements. In addition, there is no doubt that from the 1980s to the present, South Korea has undergone rapid development in politics and economics, thereby endorsing the claim that sport mega-events can have a ‘social order-creating or cultural order-creating character and potential.’23 Importantly, South Korea changed its political system in 1987, becoming a democratic country, and the government became more open, allowing the country to engage in greater economic cooperation and to continue to develop in the global context. In sum, by hosting the Seoul Olympics 30 years ago, South Korea was affected by what can be called the mega-events phenomenon, which involves massive developments in politics, economics and sociocultural performance on the global stage. Arguably, the South Korean government still has the ambition to host more sport mega-events on the Korean peninsula. However, before this policy is pursued, it will be important to consider problems associated with domestic sport 548

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policy, such as those affecting athletes’ lives (education system, future employment plans), coaches’ behaviour (violence, assaults), and, most significantly, concerns for the quality of human life.24

Notes 1 Maurice Roche, Mega-Events Modernity: Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture (London and New York: Routledge, 2000); Alan Bairner, Sport, Nationalism and Globalization (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001); Toby Miller et al., Globalization and Sport: Playing the World (London: Sage, 2001); John Horne and Wolfram Manzenreiter, eds., Japan, Korea and the 2002 World Cup (London: Routledge, 2002); Brian Bridges,“The Seoul Olympics: Economic Miracle Meets the World,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 25, no. 14 (2008): 1939–52; Jung Woo Lee and Joseph Maguire, “Global Festivals Through a National Prism: The Global-National Nexus in South Korean Media Coverage of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 44, no. 1 (2009): 5–24; J. A. Mangan, Gwang Ok, and Kyoungho Park, “From the Destruction of Image to the Reconstruction of Image: A Sports Mega-Event and the Resurgence of a Nation – the Politics of Sport Exemplified,” International Journal of the History of Sport 28, no. 16 (2011): 2339–64; Jonathan Grix and Barrie Houlihan, “Sports Mega-Events as Part of a Nation’s Soft Power Strategy: The Cases of Germany (2006) and the UK (2012),” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 16, no. 4 (2014): 572–96. 2 James F. Larson and Heung-Soo Park, Global Television and the Politics of the Seoul Olympics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993); H.Y. Kim and T. S. Lim, “The Influences of Seoul Olympics on the Political and Diplomatic Changes in Korea,” Journal of the Korean Alliance for Health, Physical Education, Recreation and Dance 33, no. 2 (1994): 200–13; W.Y. Ha, “Korean Sports in the 1980s and the Seoul Olympic Games of 1988” (PhD diss., Pennsylvania State University, 1997); Seon-Jong Kim, “Sport and Politics in the Republic of Korea” (PhD diss., University of Surrey, 2000); Bridges, “The Seoul Olympics: Economic Miracle,” 1939–52; Jihyun Cho and Alan Bairner, “The sociocultural legacy of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games,” Leisure Studies 31, no. 3 (2012): 271–89. 3 Korea Times, October 5, 2001, cited in John Horne and Wolfram Manzenreiter, “Accounting for Mega- Events: Forecast and Actual Impacts of the 2002 Football World Cup Finals on the Host Counties Japan/Korea,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 39, no. 2 (2004): 191. 4 John Horne and Wolfram Manzenreiter, “An Introduction to the Sociology of Sports Mega-Events,” Sociological Review 54, no. 2 (2006): 1–24. 5 Horne and Manzenreiter, “Introduction to the Sociology of Sports Mega-Events.” 6 M. Malfas, B. Houlihan, and T. Eleni, “Impacts of the Olympic Games as Mega-Events,” Municipal Engineer 157, no. 3 (2004): 209–220. 7 Myung Gon Kim, interviewed by Jihyun Cho, June 30 2008. 8 Horne and Manzenreiter, “Accounting for Mega- Events,” 193. 9 Newsweek, June 17, 2002, cited in Horne and Manzenreiter, “Accounting for Mega- Events,” 193. 10 Horne and Manzenreiter, “Accounting for Mega- Events.” 11 Peter Donnelly, “The Local and the Global: Globalization in the Sociology of Sport,” Journal of Sport and Social Issues 20, no. 3 (1996): 239–57. 12 Joseph Maguire, “Sport Identity Politics, and Globalization: Diminishing Contrasts and Increasing Varieties,” Sociology of Sport Journal 11, no. 4 (1994): 400. 13 Ibid., 401–2. 14 Gun-Man Park Interviewed by Jihyun Cho, July 17, 2008. 15 Myung-Woo Roh Interviewed by Jihyun Cho, July 24, 2007. 16 Yong-Soo Park Interviewed by Jihyun Cho, July 22, 2008. 17 Miller et al., Globalization and Sport. 18 Professor Roh Mung-Woo, interviewed by Jihyun Cho, July 24, 2007. 19 Myung-Gon Kim Interviewed by Jihyun Cho, June 30, 2008. 20 Burn-Jang Lim Interviewed by Jihyun Cho, July 9, 2008. 21 Roche, Mega-Events Modernity, 224. 22 Myung-Gon Kim Interviewed by Jihyun Cho, June 30, 2008. 23 Roche, Mega-Events Modernity, 225. 24 Jihyun Cho, “Life After Judo: An Examination of the Life Experience and Post-Retirement Career Choices of South Korean Judo Olympic Medallists,” Asia Pacific Journal of Sport and Social Science 1, no. 2–3 (2012): 156–65. 549

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Bibliography Bairner, Alan. Sport, Nationalism and Globalization. New York: State University of New York Press, 2001. Bridges, Brian. “The Seoul Olympics: Economic Miracle Meets the World.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 25, no. 14 (2008): 1939–52. Cho, Jihyun. “Elite Sport in South Korean Society: Consequences of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games.” The Korean Society for The Study of Physical Education 18, no. 2 (2013): 1–14. Cho, Jihyun. “Life After Judo: An Examination of the Life Experience and Post-Retirement Career Choices of South Korean Judo Olympic Medallists.” Asia Pacific Journal of Sport and Social Science 1, no. 2–3 (2012): 156–65. Cho, Jihyun, and Alan Bairner. “The Sociocultural Legacy of the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games.” Leisure Studies 31, no. 3 (2012): 271–89. Donnelly, Peter. “The Local and the Global: Globalization in the Sociology of Sport.” Journal of Sport and Social Issues 20, no. 3 (1996): 239–57. Grix, Jonathan, and Barrie Houlihan. “Sports Mega-Events as Part of a Nation’s Soft Power Strategy: The Cases of Germany (2006) and the UK (2012).” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 16, no. 4 (2014): 572–96. Ha, W. Y. “Korean Sports in the 1980s and the Seoul Olympic Games of 1988.” PhD diss., Pennsylvania State University, 1997. Horne, John, and Wolfram Manzenreiter, eds. Japan, Korea and the 2002 World Cup. London: Routledge, 2002. Horne, John, and Wolfram Manzenreiter. “Accounting for Mega- Events: Forecast and Actual Impacts of the 2002 Football World Cup Finals on the Host Counties Japan/Korea.” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 39, no. 2 (2004): 187–203. Horne, John, and Wolfram Manzenreiter. “An Introduction to the Sociology of Sports Mega-Events.” Sociological Review 54, no. 2 (2006): 1–24. Kim, H.Y., and T. S. Lim. “The Influences of Seoul Olympics on the Political and Diplomatic Changes in Korea.” Journal of the Korean Alliance for Health, Physical Education, Recreation and Dance 33, no. 2 (1994): 200–13. Kim, Seon-Jong. “Sport and Politics in the Republic of Korea.” PhD diss., School of Linguistic and International Studies, University of Surrey, 2000. Larson, James F., and Heung-Soo Park. Global Television and the Politics of the Seoul Olympics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993. Lee, Jung Woo, and Joseph Maguire. “Global Festivals Through a National Prism: The Global-National Nexus in South Korean Media Coverage of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games.” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 44, no. 1 (2009): 5–24. Maguire, Joseph. “Sport Identity Politics, and Globalization: Diminishing Contrasts and Increasing Varieties.” Sociology of Sport Journal 11, no. 4 (1994): 398–427. Mangan, J. A., Gwang Ok, and Kyoungho Park. “From the Destruction of Image to the Reconstruction of Image: A Sports Mega-Event and the Resurgence of a Nation – the Politics of Sport Exemplified.” International Journal of the History of Sport 28, no. 16 (2011): 2339–64. Miller, Toby, Geoffrey Lawrence, Jim McKay, and David Rowe. Globalization and Sport: Playing the World. London: Sage, 2001. Roche, Maurice. Mega-Events Modernity: Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture. London and New York: Routledge, 2000.

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54 Wushu competitions in Asia Shen Liang

China is the birthplace of wushu, but wushu has spread and extends across Asia.The development of wushu and wushu competitions in Asia is inseparable from the establishment and expansion of the wushu governing body in Asia. In November 1986, eight countries and regions, including Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong and China, jointly established the Preparatory Committee of the Wushu Federation of Asia (WFA) in Tianjin, China. One year later, the WFA was formally established on 25 September 1987 in Yokohama, Japan. The WFA is the international federation that governs wushu in all its forms in Asia, with the aims of enhancing the cooperation and friendship of Asian wushu, improving wushu techniques, and promoting the development of wushu in Asia. Initially, there were 11 countries and regions that joined as members of the WFA; they were China, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand, the Philippines, Nepal, Malaysia, Macau, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia. As of August 2018, the WFA has reached 37 members. The WFA has actively promoted the development of wushu competitions in Asia. Asian wushu competitions, including the Asian Wushu Championships and wushu competitions in the Asian Games, provide an important platform for the internationalisation and intracontinental development of wushu. Mega sport events are stages that not only feature professional athletes representing their country in competing for excellence but also provide the host nation with a universally legitimate way to present and promote their national identity and culture on a global scale. On the eve of the eighteenth Asian Games in Jakarta-Palembang in 2018, the Indonesian president said, ‘Indonesia must use the Asian Games and Asian Para Games to show to the world the Indonesian nation is a good host, a nation of excellence, and a nation of champions that upholds fair play.’1 The Asian Games also provide an opportunity to showcase martial arts in Asia. Taekwondo, a Korean martial art that emphasises skill, strength and speed of kicking, was first introduced at the 10th Asian Games in Seoul in 1986. For China, the successful hosting of the 11th Asian Games in 1990 not only offered Asia a chance to understand China’s economic and social development after implementing the reform and opening-up policy from 1978 but also provided China with a stage to display the charms of their most representative national sport – wushu. Through the efforts of the WFA, wushu was officially incorporated into the Asian Games in 1990 and then later become a competition event at the Southeast Asian Games (in 1991), the East Asian Games (in 1993) and the South Asian Games (in 2009). Furthermore, a number of wushu 551

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regional federations have been established since the 1990s. For example, the Southeast Asian Wushu Federation was established in Jakarta on 14 June 1994, and the Central and West Asian Wushu Federation in Zahedan, Iran, on 8 February 2015. In general, wushu in Asian sporting competitions comprises two main categories: taolu and sanda. Taolu refers to the set routine (or form) practice component of wushu. Sanda is a modern unarmed combat sport that developed from traditional wushu techniques and primarily makes use of punching, kicking, throwing, wrestling and defensive techniques.2 Compared with taolu, sanda did not become an official event of the Asian Games until the fourteenth Games in Busan in 2002. Since the 1990 Beijing Asian Games, the number of participants and the scale of participation in wushu events in the Asian Games have been gradually increasing. As shown in Table 54.1, from the eleventh Asian Games in 1990 to the eighteenth in 2018, the number of participating countries and regions in wushu taolu at the Asian Games increased from 11 to 27, and the number of participants increased from 99 to 201. In addition to the Asian Games, the largest wushu competition in Asia is the Asian Wushu Championships. The WFA held the first Asian Wushu Championship in Yokohama, Japan, in September 1987. Since then, the competition has been held every two years. The most recent Asian Wushu Championship (the ninth) was held in Chinese Taipei in 2016. Furthermore, the WFA also actively promotes and hosts the Asian Youth Wushu Championships. Up until 2019, a total of nine championships have been held. This event is also the highest level of Wushu competition for Asian teenagers. The Asian Traditional Wushu Championships is another major wushu sporting event hosted by the WFA. Traditional wushu’s values align with those of promoting social cohesion, cultural and educational values, and the development of healthy lifestyles and habits. At the same time as promoting the development of competitive wushu, WFA is also actively committed to the development of traditional wushu. On 28 November 2018, the first Asian Traditional Wushu Championships were held in Nanjing, China. This event attracted more than 500 athletes from 13 countries and regions, including China, Brunei, India, Japan and Kazakhstan. It is a high-profile and large-scale international A-class sporting event.This tournament includes three major categories, including traditional wushu, sparring and collective joint taolu. In addition to wushu taolu, the WFA promotes and holds sanda competitions. In 2017, the first Asian Cup Wushu Sanda Competition was held in Foshan, China. A total of 45 athletes from nine countries and regions, including China, Hong Kong; China, Macau; India; Kyrgyzstan; South Korea; the Philippines; Sri Lanka and Vietnam participated in this competition. This competition adopted the latest wushu competition and refereeing rules authorised by the International Federation of Wushu (IWUF).

Table 54.1 Wushu Events in the Asian Games (1990–2018) Games

Year

Host city

Participant nations

Participants

Events number

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018

Beijing, China Hiroshima, Japan Bangkok, Thailand Busan, South Korea Doha, Qatar Guangzhou, China Incheon, South Korea Jakarta–Palembang, Indonesia

11 15 14 19 21 26 29 27

99 75 71 85 106 117 190 201

6 6 11 11 11 15 15 14

Source: Based on data from www.wfa-asia.org/

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The sustained development and growth of wushu events in Asia is related to the unique and common cultural environment of Asia. Asia has 47 countries and more than 1,000 ethnic groups, and it has two-thirds of the world’s population on one-third of the world’s land, providing a good foundation for the spread of wushu. Furthermore, the development of wushu competitions benefited from the similar and common cultural background shared by the countries of Asia. Many Asian countries share similar traditional cultures and geopolitical culture, which provides convenience for people of all countries in Asia in understanding, accepting and developing wushu culture. Moreover, China has played an active role in promoting the development of wushu competitions in Asia. The establishment of the Asian wushu organisations and regional wushu competitions began in the 1980s, when China experienced its initial stage of reform and opening-up. From the 1990s until now, wushu in Asia has ushered in a period of prosperity of 30 years, during which China has been continuously integrating into Asia and the world. To build a peaceful and stable external environment, China has been making various efforts – political, economic and in the security field – to maintain and upgrade a harmonious and constructive relationship with its neighbouring Asian countries. Accordingly, wushu is an important medium and platform for cultural exchanges and regional dialogues between China and other Asian countries. China plays a leadership role in promoting communication and cooperation in wushu far beyond East Asia. Wushu became a part of the South Asian Games for the first time in 2006 in the 10th games held in Sri Lanka. For example, wushu started in Bangladesh in late 1970s. China has offered Bangladesh technical and equipment assistance regarding the development of wushu. The Bangladesh Wushu Association President F.R. Siddiqui, in an exclusive interview, claimed that with the support of China, wushu is becoming more and more popular in the country, with more than 5,000 players, 25 judges and 40 coaches.3 However, there is a certain imbalance in the development of Asian wushu sporting competitions. As far as wushu taolu is concerned, it comprises two major categories: unarmed (chuan) or armed (qi xie).Taolu routine includes a variety of events, such as chang quan, nanquan, taijiquan, gunshu, qiangshu, jianshu and nandao. The specific taolu events vary in every competition. In recent years, athletes from South Asian countries have made great achivements in taijiquan and nanquan. For example, Indonesia’s popular wushu athlete Lindswell Kwok won nine medals at the world championships between 2008 and 2018, and she won a gold and a silver medal in taijichuan at the 2014 and 2018 Asian Games. East Asian countries, especially China, still maintain an overall superiority in taolu events. In addition, the uneven development of wushu in Asia can also be seen from the participation rates of various countries and regions in Asian wushu competitions (the regional participation rate is the number of countries in the region participating divided by the total number of countries in the region). In general, the participation rate of specific regions reflects the overall development level of wushu in the region. According to geographical distribution, Asia can be divided into five major regions: East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, West Asia and Central Asia. Table 54.2 shows that East Asian countries and regions have a highest participation rate, and the average participation rate is over 80 percent. The participation rate of Southeast Asian countries and regions follows closely, and the average participation rate is over 45 percent. The participation rates of South Asian, West Asian and Central Asian countries and regions are relatively low compared to those of East Asia and Southeast Asia, but the entry rate of the three regions is on the rise, especially in the Central Asian countries and region. The changing participation rate is obvious from Table 54.2. In the sixteenth Asian Games, participaton had reached 80 percent, and only one country, Turkmenistan, has not entered the competition. It can be seen that in recent years the development of martial arts in various regions has obviously improved. As a whole, the 553

Shen Liang Table 54.2 Percentage Participation Rate by Region in Wushu Taolu Competitions in the Asian Games Games Regions

11th

12th

13th

14th

15th

16th

17th

18th

East Asia Southeast Asia South Asia West Asia Central Asia

75.0 36.4 12.5 0 0

87.5 45.5 12.5 0 40.0

75.0 45.5 12.5 5.0 20.0

87.5 63.6 25.0 10.0 20.0

75.0 45.5 37.5 15.0 60.0

87.5 45.5 37.5 25.0 80.0

30.1 26.5 15.4 16.8 11.2

23.5 34.4 20.8 13.2 8.1

Source: Based on data from www.wfa-asia.org/

participation rate of the various regions has been rising. Relatively speaking, the change in the participation rate between regions is not so obvious. The participation rate in other regions has been slow to increase. The distribution of participating countries still has regional imbalances. Therefore, it is necessary to increase the development of various regions, especially in countries with relatively low participation rates, such as those in South Asia and West Asia. The WFA has been making active efforts to promote the sustainable development of Asian wushu competitions and to alleviate the increasingly significant imbalance in wushu competitions among countries and regions in Asia. First, in terms of wushu events, the Asian Games and Asian Wushu Championships highlight the most popular events in wushu competition. For example, chang quan, taijiquan and nanquan were selected as the most stable three events in Asian Wushu competitions. The purpose is to attract more Asian countries and regions to participate in wushu competitions and make achievements in them. Second, the new scoring system reduces wushu movement difficulty and closes the gap between the athletes in the completion of the difficult movements. In 2005, the International Wushu Federation (IWUF) implemented a small graded rating standard for individual competitions. This is a major reform in the internationalisation of the wushu taolu competition. The new technical evaluation system combines the traditions of wushu taolu with the sporting characteristics of modern athletics. More importantly, the new grading standard controls the movement difficulty coefficient so as to allow more athletes to be able to complete basic difficult movements and expand the participation in wushu competitions. Third, the Chinese-led WFA promoted the wushu assistance program and helped the development of wushu in many Asian countries and regions. The unbalanced development of wushu in various countries has attracted the attention of the WFA and the IWUF. In recent years, the Chinese government has actively promoted the internationalisation of wushu by sending coaches to other countries in assisting and guiding wushu training. Mu Ning, a Chinese foreign aid coach and the Iranian national wushu team coach said, ‘If wushu wants to go to the world, China has to send high-level coaches to help other countries develop. In addition, sending coaches to give lectures abroad and inviting foreigners to train and study in China are also good ways.’4 The improvement in performance of national wushu teams has also promoted the popularisation and development of martial arts at the grassroots level. In Iran, the number of wushu practitioners in 2007 was about 5,000–8,000, but it had reached more than 20,000 by 2010. Moreover, in recent years, the strategic concepts of ‘one belt and one road’ and ‘building a community of Asian and human destiny’ proposed by the Chinese government to promote regional common development have been echoed by many Asian countries, and also creates a favourable external environment for the development of wushu in Asia. 554

Wushu competitions in Asia

Notes 1 Max Walden, “Indonesia Pins Great Economic Hopes on Asian Games,” Voice of America, updated August 17, 2018, accessed October 8, 2019, www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/indonesia-pins-greateconomic-hopes-asian-games. 2 Liang Shen, Traditional Wushu and Health Self-Defense (Shanghai: Shanghai University Press, 2018), 20–21. 3 “Wushu Can’t Be Developed Without Chinese Support,” China Daily, updated February 8, 2010, accessed November 1, 2019, www.chinadaily.com.cn/2010-02/08/content_9444802.htm. 4 “China’s Foreign Aid Coach Promote Wushu,” People Network, accessed December 12, 2019, http:// sports.sina.com.cn.

Bibliography Cheng, Dali. Chinese Wushu: History and Culture. Chengdu: Sichuan University Press, 1995. Guo,Yucheng. Chinese Wushu and National Image. Beijing: Higher Education Press, 2014. Hong, Fan. “Communist China and the Asian Games 1951–1990: Thirty-Nine Year Struggle to Victory.” Sport in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics 8, no. 3 (2005): 479–92. Kuang, Wennan. Introduction to Chinese Wushu Culture. Chengdu: Sichuan Education Press, 1990. Shen, Liang. Traditional Wushu and Health Self-Defense. Shanghai: Shanghai University Press, 2018. Tan, Huang. History of Sport. Beijing: Higher Education Press, 2009. Tang,Yong. “Influence of Evolution in Wushu Rules on the Development of Asian Wushu Taolu Routines.” Chinese Wushu Research 1, no. 2 (2012): 65–67. Wushu Research Institute of State Physical Culture and Sports Committee. History of Chinese Wushu. Beijing: Peoples Sports Publishing House, 1997.

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Part VII

Asia’s sport heroes and heroines

This part of the book provides a comprehensive introduction to Asia’s famous sportsmen and sportswomen who have made great contributions to the development of both traditional and modern sport in Asia in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. It offers interesting and informative accounts of the history of Asian sport through the life stories of these sport stars and celebrities.Their experience in sport has demonstrated an increasing interest in the role of sport as a means of maintaining, shaping and transmitting body image and moral values. The body in sport is a location for debate about the changing nature of ideology, power, social structures and cultural systems. There remains an opportunity to plough this rich and untilled soil – the historical investigation of sport heroes and heroines in Asia. We need more detailed stories of individuals, and it is important that their passion and contribution to the evolution of Asian sport is recognised, researched and recorded. This book is intended as a plea: a plea for a collective history of Asian sport and a plea for individual stories of sport personalities, because both have been, and continue to be, in short supply.

55 Liu Changchun China’s first Olympic athlete Zhang Ling

Early life Liu Changchun was born in November 1909 to a poor peasant family in Dalian, Liaoning Province. His mother died when he was nine years old and the whole family moved to another village the following year. The new school was very far from home and Liu had to run about 10km between school and home every day.1 This experience enhanced Liu’s running ability. In 1923, 14-year-old Liu participated in the Guangdongzhou Track Meeting. He won the 100 metres and 400 metres in 11.8 and 59 seconds, respectively, which created a new record for Dalian primary students.2 In 1927, Liu’s 100 metres sprint time had reached 11 seconds. In the same year Liu’s sport talent was discovered and initially he was enrolled in the Northeastern University Preparatory School before being transferred to the Sport Department that had just been established. In Northeastern University, Liu got up at 5 a.m. and trained for one-and-a-half hours every day. After finishing the initial training, and in addition to his training plan, Liu also received one-on-one training.3 Liu flourished at Northeastern University. In May 1929, at the 14th North China Games held in Shenyang, Liu Changchun broke the national record in the three categories of 100 metres, 200 metres and 400 metres.4 On 20 October 1929, Liu won two silver medals at a Chinese-Japanese-German meeting in Shenyang. After these games, Zhang Xueliang, the president of the Northeastern University sponsored and hired a German ex-world champion to coach Liu, which allowed him to progress even further.5 In 1930, Liu won three gold medals in his historic performance at the National Games in Hangzhou.

Entering the Olympics On 18 September 1931, the Japanese army bombarded the Northeast China military station and attacked the Shenyang North Camp, subsequently occupying Shenyang itself. The other three north-eastern provinces, Liaoning, Jilin and Helongjiang, were soon quickly captured. A few months later, Japanese armies, with the support of Manchu independence forces and former officials of the Qing Dynasty, had established a new regime called Manchukuo, in what 559

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had been the Republic of China’s three north-eastern provinces. In order to allow the puppet regime under its control to be recognised internationally, the Japanese wanted to take advantage of the opportunity to participate in sport competitions and therefore sent a delegation in the name of Manchukuo to participate in the 10th Olympic Games held in Los Angeles in July 1932.6 China’s official sport body in late May of 1932 had initially decided not to participate in the Games due to a lack of funding. However, on 21 May 1932, shocking news was seen in the local Taidong Daily in Dalian: ‘The World Games, newly formed state has sent players to participate.’7 Liu Changchun and another athlete Yu Xiwei appeared on the athletes list.8 The ‘World Games’ mentioned in the paper was the Olympic Games to be held in Los Angeles that year; the so-called ‘newly formed state’ referred to the puppet state Manchukuo. The same news also appeared in the Japanese newspapers.9 After that, the Japanese harassed Liu Changchun and his family to force him to participate in the Olympic Games on behalf of the Manchukuo regime. Liu Changchun had to move to Tianjin to escape. Liu made a statement through Tianjin Daily: ‘I am of the Chinese race, a descendant of the Yellow Emperor. I am Chinese, and will not represent the Puppet Manchukuo at the Games of the 10th Olympics.’10 He also assured readers that he had never made any agreement with the sporting personnel from the puppet regime – ‘my conscience is still with me, and my hot blood still flows – how could I betray my nation and serve another puppet regime as a slave?’11 Liu Changchun’s statement had great repercussions, and Chinese patriots believed that China should send a team to participate in the Olympics in order to smash Japan’s attempt to use the games to defraud the international community. After the efforts of Hao Gengsheng, director of the Sport Department of Northeastern University; Zhang Boling, president of Nankai University; and Wang Zhengting, Chinese Foreign Minister and President of the China National Amateur Athletic Federation (CNAAF), Liu Changchun eventually received the consent of the National Government to be part of China’s participation in the Olympic Games. However, the government refused to provide any financial support for his trip. On 1 July 1932, Zhang Xueliang, the president of Northeastern University, declared that he would be donating ¥8,000 (US$1,600) for Liu Changchun and Yu Xiwei to run for China in the Olympics.12 On 2 July, Liu Changchun and accompanying coach Song Junfu departed for Shanghai. The news that Liu Changchun had arrived in Shanghai caused a strong reaction in the local area, and he was treated as a hero. A few days prior to leaving for the United States, and having boarded the ship, Liu Changchun was constantly in demand for interviews by the media. At the same time, whilst Japanese authorities had hoped to persuade Yu to represent Manchukuo, he was nowhere to be found. A policy of informal house arrest and subtle threats was applied to Yu and other Northeastern stars, as it was feared they would join the Chinese team, which in turn convinced Yu to stay in Dalian to ensure the safety of his family and to ignore the Chinese Olympic call.13 On 8 July, the CNAAF President Wang Zhengting presented Liu with the Chinese national flag,14 and then Liu, who was dressed in a costume embroidered with the national emblem, boarded the President Wilson. The ship sailed for 21 days and arrived at the Los Angeles terminal at 4:00 p.m. on 29 July, just one day before the Olympic Games were scheduled to begin. The arrival of the first Chinese Olympic athlete was cause for a big celebration, and the two-man delegation was greeted by dozens of local Chinese. At 2:30 p.m. on 30 July, the 10th Olympic Games were officially opened. China, with a population of 400 million, had only sent one athlete to participate, and he was enrolled in the men’s 100 metres, 200 metres and 400 metres races. At 3:00 p.m. on 31 July, Liu stood on the 560

Liu Changchun, China’s 1st Olympic athlete

race track of the Olympics. Liu Changchun had not been training as planned for more than a month. In addition to the lack of familiarisation, his physical strength had also not been restored. Other athletes had arrived in the United States as early as a few weeks before the event and begun training for the games. At the beginning of the race, Liu Changchun led the race. He had been leading for the first 60 meters. The finish line was getting closer and closer. However, his pace began to slow in the second half of the race, and his physical strength waned. The runners behind him were catching up quickly. At 80 metres, his opponents finally caught up with him and, at this stage, some overtook him. At the end of the race, he only placed fifth in the heat.The 200 metres heats were held on 2 August and the 100 metres heat was re-enacted with Liu Changchun eliminated again.15 Due to his lack of physical strength, he finally chose to give up the 400 metres race. On 21 August 1932, Liu Changchun boarded the ship President Coolidge to return to China. He had ended his first Olympic tour for China. Four years later, Liu Changchun represented China at the Berlin Olympics but failed to qualify for the semi-finals. After the competitions, Liu was forced to stay in Berlin due to a lack of funding. He eventually relied on the support of local Chinese to get back to China.16

Post Olympics Liu finished his competitive career in 1937 because of a leg injury. He disappeared from the public’s attention for more than ten years, living in poverty and at the bottom of the social ladder. Liu had to work in a restaurant to support his family until the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949. He then enrolled in the Sport Department in Northeastern Normal University as a PE teacher and track coach before transferring to Dalian University of Technology until he retired. In 1959, China’s first National Games were held in Beijing, and Liu Changchun was a referee. Liu’s 25-year-old Chinese record for the 100 metres sprint was broken during the games. In November 1979, China officially resumed its seat on the International Olympic Committee. Liu Changchun served as the vice chairman of the Chinese Olympic Committee and on the Standing Committee of the All-China Sports Federation. On 25 March 1983, at the age of 73, Liu Changchun fell ill and died.

Notes 1 Yu Chen, “Liu Changchun, China’s First Olympic Man,” Lantai Shijie 7 (2010): 57–58. 2 Zou Jihao, “The History of China’s First Olympic Athlete,” Sina.com, April 29, 2008, accessed July 23, 2019, http://ent.sina.com.cn/m/2008-04-29/09502008028.shtml. 3 Guanghong Zhang, “Liu Changchun’s Olympic Life,” China Science Daily, July 3, 2019, 6. 4 Sheng Li, “Liu Changchun, the first to represent China in Olympic competition,” Sport History 5, no. 1 (1984): 34–35. 5 Andrew Morris, “I Can Compete! China in the Olympic Games, 1932 and 1936,” Journal of Sport History 26, no. 3 (1999): 545–66, 547. 6 Shuzhen Fang, “Review of the Olympic Memory in Modern China,” Journal of Physical Education 18, no. 1 (2011): 71–74, 72. 7 “The New Country Will Send Players to Participate in the World Games,” Taidong Daily, May 25, 1932. 8 “Manchukuo Will Send Liu Changchun to Participate in the World Games,” Taidong Daily, May 30, 1932. 9 Chen, “Liu Changchun, China’s First Olympic Man,” 57. 10 Xuehai Zhang, “A Study of Liu Changchun’s Sports Thought,” Guizhou Sports Science and Technology 130, no. 1 (2018): 11–14, 12. 561

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11 Liu Changchun, “The Whole Story of My Representing China at the Tenth Olympic Games,” in The Olympics and China, ed. Ji Hongmin and Yu Xingmao (Beijing: Literature and History Publishing House, 1985), 64. 12 Zhang, “Liu Changchun’s Olympic Life.” 13 Morris, “I Can Compete!” 548. 14 Yin Wu, “Liu Changchun – the First Chinese to Participate in the Olympics,” Yanhuan Chunqiu no. 7 (2001): 58–61. 15 Min Pan, “The Report of China’s First Participate in the Olympics,” Journal of News Research 5, no. 5 (2014): 67. 16 Bo Zhang, The Olympic Memory of Modern China (Tianjing: Tianjing Ancient Books Press, 2008), 117–206.

Bibliography Changchun, Liu. “The Whole Story of My Representing China at the Tenth Olympic Games.” In The Olympics and China, edited by Ji Hongmin and Yu Xingmao. Beijing: Literature and History Publishing House, 1985. Chen,Yu. “Liu Changchun, China’s First Olympic Man.” Lantai Shijie 7 (2010): 57–58. Fang, Shuzhen. “Review of the Olympic Memory in Modern China.” Journal of Physical Education 18, no. 1 (2011): 71–74. Li, Sheng. “Liu Changchun, the First to Represent China in Olympic Competition.” Sport History 5, no. 1 (1984): 34–35. Morris, Andrew. “I Can Compete! China in the Olympic Games, 1932 and 1936.” Journal of Sport History 26, no. 3 (1999): 545–66. Pan, Min. “The Report of China’s First Participate in the Olympics.” Journal of News Research 5, no. 5 (2014): 67. Wu,Yin. “Liu Changchun-the First Chinese to Participate in the Olympics.” Yanhuan Chunqiu no. 7 (2001): 58–61. Zhang, Bo. The Olympic Memory of Modern China. Tianjing: Tianjing Ancient Books Press, 2008. Zhang, Xuehai. “A Study of Liu Changchun’s Sports Thought.” Guizhou Sports Science and Technology130, no. 1 (2018): 11–14.

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56 Rudy Hartono An Indonesian badminton legend Toho Cholik Mutohir and Awang Firmansyah

Introduction Badminton has been known for a long time in Indonesia. In 1930 there were two big clubs in Jakarta. Badminton was introduced to Jakarta via the southern states of Malaya and Singapore.1 The first club was named Bataviasche Badminton Bond (BBB) and the second was named Batavia Badminton League (BBL).2 The two clubs were dominated by ethnic Chinese, who served either as chairmen or club members.These two clubs were apparently in competition with each other, but were brought together around 1940 by Tjoa Seng Tiang to form the Bataviasche Badminton Unie (BBU), with headquarters at Molenvliet West 175 (now Jl. Gadjah Mada).3 The existence of badminton clubs in the period before independence spread from Jakarta to Surabaya. By the mid-1930s, the game had spread to other major cities in Java, including Surabaya and Bandung.4 One of the clubs in Surabaya was Soerabaiasche Badminton Bond, which was founded in 1936.5 Few facts and data are available on the history of the establishment of this club but, as with the clubs in Jakarta, it was dominated by ethnic Chinese. At that time there were not many courts that could be used to play badminton. Badminton was a sport played for social or entertainment reasons during the period of Dutch colonisation. Badminton matches were held regularly but ended in 1942 when Japan occupied Indonesia.6 In 1951, the Indonesian Badminton Association (PBSI) was officially established in Indonesia, chaired by H.R. Rochdi Prataatmadja.7 One of the founders of this organisation was Dick Sudirman, who later became chairman in the period 1952–1963.8 The name of Sudirman was immortalised in the tournament called the Sudirman Cup, a prestigious match that has been held every two years since 1989. Under Sudirman’s leadership, PBSI was registered as a member of the International Badminton Federation (IBF) and became a full member of the IBF in 1953.9 During the 1948 PON Games (Pekan Olahraga Nasional – National Sport Week, an annual multisport event held every four years in Indonesia), badminton was included in the competition. The 1948 PON winners were teams from Solo, Kediri and Bandung.10 The inclusion of badminton in PON was not without reason. At that time, badminton was a popular sport with teams competing from nine clubs. At that time the game of badminton was already very familiar

563

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to the people of Indonesia and had been strengthened by the formation of the PBSI. In 1992, badminton was included in the Barcelona edition of the Olympic Games. Rudy Hartono Kurniawan (or Nio Hap Liang), often referred to as RH, was born in Surabaya on 18 August 1946. He was the third of eight siblings. RH’s parents were tailors who lived in Jalan Kaliasin 49 (Jl. Basuki Rahmat), Surabaya, East Java. They also owned a milk processing business in Jalan Wonokromo, Surabaya, East Java.Young RH’s father was also a badminton player and had played for the OKE Badminton Club, which he founded in 1951 in Surabaya.11 In his childhood, RH was involved in various sport, including athletics, swimming, volleyball, soccer, roller skating and badminton. However, badminton was the sport that led RH to become an outstanding professional athlete. At the age of nine, RH had already shown his badminton talent. RH always demonstrated excellent skill during his training activities on the street in front of the PLN Surabaya Office (Jl. Gemblongan). Moreover, he trained every Sunday, from morning until 10:00 o’clock at night. From these beginnings, RH ventured into small competitions around Surabaya, which at that time were only lit by paraffin lamps.12 At the age of 11, his father realised that RH had a talent for badminton and enrolled him in a badminton club. At the badminton club, RH received professional training that concentrated on four main training programmes: speed, good breath control, game consistency and aggressiveness in picking out targets. Unsurprisingly, a lot of the training programmes also emphasised the athletics side, including short- and long-distance running and jump training.13 After a while, RH finally chose to move to the larger badminton club called Rajawali. This club is one of the clubs noted for producing international badminton players. However, RH was not satisfied with his career at the Rajawali club.14 The achievements of RH attracted much praise, including from the President of the Dutch Badminton Association, Stuart Wyatt. RH also received the IBF distinguished service award in 1985 and received the first ever IBF Herbert Scheele Trophy in 1986.15 There has been much written concerning the life of RH and his performances in badminton, but relatively few studies have been carried out specifically on RH’s roles beyond his achievement as an inspiring athlete, badminton hero and national figure. This chapter aims to enquire into the wonder boy’s legacies. Accordingly, it is not only about badminton but also about Indonesian society and culture. This is a qualitative study which was conducted by document analysis and interview. The documents were taken from newspapers, magazines and books about RH. The interviews were conducted using a semi-structured method. There are several key persons who were interviewed, including RH, representatives of the badminton association and badminton scholars.

RH as an inspiring athlete In 1965 RH was called up for national training to take part in the Thomas Cup championship. At the time he was very young, 16 years old, and the youngest athlete in competition. In 1966, while participating in the Thomas Cup against Tan Aik Huang, he lost two matches to Tan Aik Huang, who was the All England champion at the time. The defeat experienced by RH had its own meaning for him. Even though he lost a match against the world champion, he was determined in himself to defeat him someday. Oei Wijanarko commented that ‘in my opinion, RH is a hard-working person, no matter how great the coach gives a program, if the athlete doesn’t want to try hard, it will be difficult to progress, number one is the will of the athlete.’16 In 1967 when the Thomas Cup was held in Jakarta, RH defeated Tan Aik Huang with a score of 15–8 and 15–6.17 As if he had answered his own anxiety, this victory meant a lot to RH because he had been previously defeated by Tan Aik Huang three times. RH’s victory at that 564

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time became a sign that he was a ‘saviour of Indonesia.’ Herbert Scheele, in a book published by the International Badminton Federation (IBF) in 1968, said: In the Thomas Cup match in Jakarta a seventeen-year-old boy emerged as the strongest single player. He is RH, a player who is not very well known outside of Asia, but gives influence to the world in a short time.18 In September 1967, he attended the national championships. He failed to win and was defeated by Mulyadi, an opponent he considered strong during national training. The failure made him move from Jakarta to Surabaya on his father’s advice. His father advised him that ‘you can’t continue in Jakarta, you must return to Surabaya. In Jakarta, your condition is even worse.’19 The Surya Naga and Rajawali clubs in Surabaya are the training ground for drilling in smash blows. Without help from anyone, RH tried to make his own exercise programme and run it very tightly. The period between October and December 1967 became another turning point for RH.20 Beside that, his determination to avenge the defeat by Mulyadi made him promise himself to win the All England Championships in 1968. In 1968 at the All England Championships, RH reunited with Tan Aik Huang in the final. Even though RH had defeated him in the Thomas Cup, he could not stem his anxiety. Feeling nervous, tense and anxious was torture for RH.21 He tried to overcome it with his imagery training. Ferry Sonneville had taught him about the use of imagination, analysis, tactics and strategies. Additionally, the climate differences between tropical Indonesia and cold England were a challenge for RH. Despite these problems, he reached the final and defeated Tan Aik Huang in two games with a score of 15–12 and 15–9.This victory opened a new chapter in the history of Indonesia at the All England championships after the Tan Joe Hok era; according to a report by Reuters, the victory of Indonesian players in the All England arena opened a bright path in the upcoming Thomas Cup race.22 In 1968 RH won the All England Championship. This was a golden moment for Indonesia and the world of badminton. It had been nine years since Indonesia won the All England. Previously, Tan Joe Hok had won the All England in 1959. RH’s struggle had been answered, and he had made Indonesia famous on the international scene. The following year he returned to the All England and won the championships again. RH went on to win the All England Championship seven times in succession, from 1968–1974. Previously the record had been held by Erland Kops of Denmark who had won the championship seven times, but only four successive times. In 1975 RH was expected to become the All England champion for the eighth time in a row. This would have meant he had broken his previous record. Nobody doubted RH would win in the 1975 All England final game against Svend Pri. Pri was a player from Denmark who had participated in the All England ten times and never won. In that game Svend Pri beat RH. Suara Merdeka covered the news: RH Hartono of Indonesia failed to make a new history of the All England badminton tournament, to be the 8th champion in a row, when in the men’s singles finals he was beaten by old rival, Danish badminton star Svend Pri, in straight sets 15–11, 17–14 in Wembley stadium on Saturday afternoon.23 From the beginning of the game RH was optimistic and kept trying to be the best, but in the final game against Svend Pri, RH suddenly felt tense, doubtful, anxious, nervous and less focused, resulting in his playing performances being unsatisfactory. He tried to take the initiative 565

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repeatedly but succeeded only in the initial stages, the rest of the game was dominated by Pri. RH was trying to recover after he made many unforced errors and failed in the first match, but in the second match Pri still dominated and RH’s best defence could not help him. Feelings of insecurity were one of the causes of his defeat by Pri. The defeat was indeed bitter for RH. He promised to take revenge. He thought that winning and losing were common in sport, but that next time he would be more careful.24 Even though he failed to win the title, he still wanted to compete again on the next occasion. The attitude shown by RH exemplifies the sportsmanship in sport. RH’s presence in the 1976 All England was awaited by the public. He admitted that he had doubts himself. But his defeat against Pri did not encourage him to hang up his racket, even though he was already 27 years old at that time. In the All England final two great players from Indonesia met, RH and Liem Swie King. The match was won by RH; he had just broken the record by winning the All England for the eighth time.This was recorded by BBC London with comments covered in the Suara Merdeka newspaper: The BBC London sportcaster, Radle, commented on RH’s victory in the championship, which also broke the world record for world badminton championship holders, saying that RH had fascinated the world. There were, he said, only two sportsmen in the world who fascinate: RH in badminton and Muhammad Ali in boxing. Like Mohammad Ali, Radle said that if RH swung his racket the world was fascinated; if RH loses, the world is disappointed, and if RH wins, the world is proud and laughs.25 Although competing against teammates, for Indonesia this victory became a showpiece that increased the country’s international reputation through sport.

RH as an Indonesian badminton hero RH is one of Indonesia’s greatest badminton players, and he has inspired many young players due to his superior physical conditioning, skills, mental stability and spiritual power. He has a very strong commitment to success in every competition, besides his basic humbleness. He believes that ‘man proposes, God disposes.’ Every time he scores against an opponent he says ‘Thank you God for this point.’ Others have described RH as: a ‘wonder boy’ (Herbert A Scheele, IBF); ‘the best badminton player in the world and a distinguished ambassador of Indonesia’ (Stuart Wyatt); one of the best singles players ever (C.C. Reedie); a friendly, polite and humble person (Johan Wahyudi); having mental toughness (Padmo Sumasto); having high discipline and responsibility (Sukamto Sayidiman); a maestro badminton player (Sudirman, PBSI); the best player ever with the best personality (Ali Sadikin, Governor of Jakarta); an exemplary player that can be a role model for young players and winners in Indonesia (Eddy Yusuf, badminton player); having tolerance, self confidence, and high fighting spirit (Tahir Jide); having an open mind and honest as well as strong will (Indra Gunawan, badminton player);26 and talented and having strong persistence and determination as a legend (Wijanarko, Head of PBSI East Java).’27 No doubt, RH is the one of the greatest singles players. ‘He is reliable in all aspects of the game, his abilities, tactics and enthusiasm,’ said Stuart Wyatt, a European badminton figure.28 He has successfully saved the ranking of Indonesian Badminton at international level after the Thomas Cup was won by other nations. With his strong discipline and responsibility, RH had great success in the struggle to bring the Thomas Cup back to Indonesia. Additionally, Rudy has participated in the All England Championship ten times, winning eight times and being runner up twice (in 1975 and 1977). After retiring as a badminton player, RH felt obliged to ‘give it back’ in the development of badminton in Indonesia by becoming a member of the PBSI. He was the Head Indonesian Badminton Achievement Coach in 1981. The transition from professional athlete to management 566

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was an important experience for RH.29 From 1981 to 1985 the chairman of PBSI was Ferry Sonneville. Ferry was a Thomas Cup trophy winner in 1958. For his victory, the government awarded him the Satya Lencana Kebudayaan. This is a government award to national heroes who have triumphed in their fields with a passion that exemplifies Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Out of many, One), the Indonesian national motto.30 As the head of achievement training in PBSI, RH focused his efforts on talent scouting and coaching, because it is important for developing new generations. The best and most talented young badminton players needed to be identified and developed in a systematic and continuous way. Holding national championships in different places every year was not sufficient.Therefore, the talent scouting and coaching programs for developing young badminton players, as well as the national championships, were deemed important for the future development of badminton in Indonesia. In addition, he also held training camps for talent development in six regions – Jakarta,West Java (Bandung and Semarang), East Java (Surabaya), South Sulawesi (Ujungpandang) and North Sumatra (Medan) – and also through camps established by PBSI with help from several corporations.31 In Central Java he looked for superior seeds managed by the Djarum Kudus corporation; likewise in East Java and West Java, where they were managed by British American Tobacco (BAT). In the general forum or MUKER PBSI, held in Ujungpandang in 1983, it was identified that there were 2,444 clubs and 26,412 players in 27 provinces.32 Without good guidance for long-term athletic development, potential athletes would not appear. Various breakthroughs were made by RH so that Indonesia’s badminton climate would be much better. The efforts of both coaches and players were not in vain, Indonesia won the Thomas Cup trophy in 1984, which had previously been held by China.33 This victory signalled to the world of badminton that Indonesia still had players who were of good quality, tough and respectful. Since 1984, there have been upgrading programmes for coaches that were carried out systematically and continuously. It is expected that in training camps in the regions, professional trainers may number 3,414 spread throughout Indonesia.34 Efforts are being made by the PBSI management to increase badminton penetration in Indonesia. PBSI administrators strive for badminton to be included in the curriculum as an additional subject in the elementary, middle and high schools, as well as in colleges.35 The role and participation of parents also needs to be nurtured and improved in an effort to develop adolescent badminton. The key to promoting badminton starts in homes, schools and clubs.

Nationalism When the Indonesian team won the Thomas Cup in 1976, RH was also invited to the Presidential Palace by Suharto to receive Bintang Jasa Kelas 1 (Star of Service civil award). The award was a mark of pride and gratitude because Indonesia had won back the Thomas Cup title which Malaysia had held for three years. He did not expect that this Thomas Cup victory would be a national victory, but all Indonesian people had followed the news through television and radio from cities to remote villages, and thousands of people’s shouts cheered this victory. Badminton is not just a sport; it can be the glue of the nation and a trigger for the spirit of nationalism. Something similar happened in 1973 after RH won the All England title for the sixth time. After returning from London in 1973, RH was welcomed as a hero in Jakarta.36 In addition to being accepted into the Faculty of Medicine, Universitas Airlangga, RH was also accepted as a Garuda (Indonesian Airlines) pilot. He faced a very difficult choice between playing badminton and pursuing a career as a pilot. Not only was his future bright but, more 567

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importantly, RH was indeed happy with the job of being an airplane crew member and still being able to play badminton.37 However, he did not take the option of becoming a pilot and continued his career as a badminton athlete. He was willing to give up his personal ambitions for the sake of the country. In 1978, when the All England final was over, RH did not look sad even though he lost to King. At that time, many reporters were curious about why the defeat did not make RH sad. He asked why he should be sad if the title of All England champion had returned to Indonesia. Badminton is an individual sport, but more than that he thought of how he could best serve his country in the international arena.

RH as a national figure Cultural diversity means having lots of differences between one culture and another. The population census of Indonesia carried out by the Central Statistics Agency in 2011 stated that there were around 1,128 ethnic groups living in Indonesia.38 These ethnic groups include Javanese, Madurese, Sundanese, Bataknese, Bugis and Chinese. The Chinese were considered to be a minority and, during the immediate post-independence era (1950s), there was a government regulation stipulating that Chinese ethnic groups in Indonesia should replace their Chinese names with Indonesian names.When viewed through the lens of history, ethnic Chinese have long struggled for the cause of Indonesian independence. At the time of the formation of the BPPKI (Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia – Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence) chaired by Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, Liem Koen Hian was appointed as one of its members.39 Its very nationalist actions can be seen as a reflection of the seriousness of the ethnic Chinese in fighting for Indonesia. In addition, he also contributed greatly to the delegation appointed to represent Indonesia at the Renville Convention in 1947.40 Through sport, people of Chinese descent with tenacious traits of entrepreneurship were able to show themselves in badminton.41 For them sport was a channel or ladder for a rise in social status and to gain recognition in society.42 RH Hartono was born into a Chinese family. In 1967 there was a massive assimilation of ethnic Chinese Indonesian citizens. A simple example that can be observed is in the name changing of Chinese citizens, as happened with Nio Hap Liang becoming Rudy Hartono Kurniawan. The incident left its own sadness and memories for the ethnic Chinese.Yet the rules did not become a barrier for someone to be able to make his people proud. The extraordinary struggle of RH Hartono, showed that Indonesia could be noticed throughout the world through the All England Championship. As a leader of the MPRS (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara – People’s Consultave Assembly, the Indonesian parliament), Mashudi, said: ‘Hopefully, RH’s victory can provide encouragement to MPRS members in continuing the struggle of the nation and state.’43 RH inspired not only Indonesia but also the world. He became like a breath of fresh air that could be enjoyed by Indonesians, especially the ethnic Chinese who had experienced hardship during the assimilation efforts. Badminton is not just a sport, a hobby or a business; it is also full of political meaning.44

Asian hero RH was named as an Asian Hero by TIME magazine in 2006, at the same time as other Asian heroes, including the Dalai Lama, Gandhi and Aung San Suu Kyi.45 Rudy himself did not expect to be named an Asian hero in the sport category. RH’s name was nominated and carried because he was the only Asian who had been able to win the All England title eight times. When he played, all eyes were on RH – as if the game was able to anesthetise the hearts of the audience. 568

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The British public itself named RH in their English style ‘a wonderful boy.’46 To this day, no one has been able beat RH’s achievements in the All England event.47 That achievement, added to RH’s success and dedication as a sportsman, made him an inspiration not only to the Indonesian people but also to all Asian nations. However, there is still conflict about the citizenship question of ethnic Chinese and whether they belong to Indonesia or not. The conflict can arise because of the large number of Chinese people who have immigrated to Indonesia and the growing number of ethnic Chinese descendants in Indonesia with such a long history behind them. The only way to distinguish between immigrants and peranakan (ethnic Chinese people in Indonesia) is to talk to them using Indonesian. The government implemented SBKRI (Surat Bukti Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia – Proof of Citizenship of Indonesia, an identity card system) for ethnic Tionghoa (an ethnic Chinese people in Indonesia). This proof of citizenship was an obstacle to many activities such as going abroad, sending children to school or dealing with civil records if they wanted to get married.48 James A. Sterba stated in his writing that as a national hero, RH was something of an anomaly because he was not really an Indonesian. He was mostly ethnic Chinese, and his Chinese name was Nio Hap Liang.49 In the sense of recontextualising Indonesian identity, the argument of James A. Sterba should be discussed more, because RH is fully recognised as Indonesian, since he was born in Indonesia when it was the colonial Dutch East Indies. The role of the Chinese in Indonesia is known since the era of Majapahit (Javanese empire between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries) and is to this day. The idea and struggle for independence from the colonial period showed how different ethnicities each play their own role, bringing together all ethnicities to be part of Indonesia and proud of their Indonesianess. The modern form of official Indonesia arose in 1949 after the DutchIndonesian Round Table Conference in The Hague. Since that time, many ethnic Chinese people have counted their identity as Chinese Indonesian and stood for Indonesia – as was clearly reflected by RH. RH is indeed not an ordinary person; he is an ambassador for the nation. Moreover, his main role is unquestionable, to make his beloved country proud of his achievements. Furthermore, for a country now divided by religious strife, separatism and economic woes, he was, for eight glorious years, a symbol of unity and pride – badminton’s boy king, through whom Indonesia ruled the world.50 Identity is needed, but where it comes from is less important than a real contribution to the country. Whatever it is to be Indonesian, RH Hartono has shown that Indonesia can be great through badminton. ‘The Asian Hero Award from TIME magazine is unexpected and my personal pride as well as Indonesia’s,’ he said.51 He has great hopes for badminton, especially in Indonesia. The achievement of badminton in Indonesia in the world today is unstable and is continuing to struggle. Breakthroughs in finding superior seeds have not been obtained regularly because the priority of the government for badminton in elementary schools has no curriculum. If you already have it in elementary school, you will get back the achievements of the world regularly.52 As an Indonesian nation, whatever their origins, the people feel amazed at the echoes of the Raya (national anthem) in their hearts.53 All have strong hopes of giving birth to the next champion so that Indonesian achievements can again be recognised worldwide. RH is still active in badminton today as a coach and executive committee member, and he is also a preacher.To date, there have been no studies carried out concerning RH as a preacher. Further study is needed in this area to illuminate the influence of RH in and by religious affairs. 569

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Conclusion This present chapter is an attempt to understand RH and his role as an Indonesian badminton legend who left legacies to Indonesia. RH has been recognised by many people of Indonesia, Asia, and the world as a badminton player and hero due not only to his great achievements as a phenomenal athlete (eight times the All England winner) but his excellent personality, his spirit and his dedication of his life to the development of Indonesia through badminton. Furthermore, the role of RH in serving people by dedicating his life as a preacher is particularly respected, although this is still an unexplored area that needs further scrutiny.

Notes 1 Max Karundeng, Pasang Surut Supremasi Bulu Tangkis Indonesia (Jakarta: Penerbit Sinar Harapan, 1980), 3. 2 C. Brown, “Playing the Game: Ethnicity and Politics in Indonesia Badminton,” Indonesia 81 (2006): 71–94. 3 Sabaruddin Sa, “Tjoa Seng Tiang,” in Sabaruddin Sa, Apa & Siapa: Sejumlah Orang Bulutangkis Indonesia (Jakarta: Jurnalindo Aksara Grafika, 1994), 343–44. 4 Peng Han Lim and Mohd Salleh Aman, “The History of Modern Organized Badminton and the Men’s Team Thomas Cup Tournaments,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 34, no. 7–8 (2017): 678–96. 5 Brown, “Playing the Game.” 6 Sejarah Olahraga Indonesia (Jakarta: Direktorat Jendral Olahraga, 2003), 231. 7 “Sejarah di Balik Nama Piala Sudirman,” CNN Indonesia, May 18, 2019, accessed July, 2, 2019, www. cnnindonesia.com/olahraga/20190518144911-170-395995/sejarah-di-balik-nama-piala-sudirman. 8 Ibid. 9 Malcolm Ganner, World Badminton Almanac,Vol. 1 (Hants: M. G. Books, 1985), 241. 10 Sejarah Olahraga Indonesia, 234. 11 Alois A. Nugroho, Rajawali dengan Jurus Padi (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1986), 7. 12 Ibid., 22. 13 Ibid., 10. 14 Ibid., 23. 15 Antara Pustaka Utama, 99 Tokoh Olahraga Indonesia Catatan Satu Abad (1908–2008) (Jakarta: Antara Pustaka Utama, 2009), 83. 16 Interview with Oei Wijanarko Adi Mulya (Head of PBSI in East Java Province), May 9, 2019. 17 Nugroho, Rajawali dengan Jurus Padi, 62. 18 Ibid., 25. 19 Ibid., 63. 20 Ibid., 64. 21 Ibid., 68. 22 Editor, “Rudy Hartono Cs Hari ini Tiba Di Indonesia,” Suara Merdeka, March 28, 1968, 2. 23 Editor, “Rudy Gagal; Pri Juara,” Suara Merdeka, March 24, 1975, 4. 24 Editor, “Rudy Janji Ambil Revanche Tahun Depan,” Suara Merdeka, March 26, 1975, 4. 25 Editor, “Rekor, All England Pecah; Rudy Hartono 8 Kali Juara,” Suara Merdeka, March 29, 1976, 1. 26 Nugroho, Rajawali dengan Jurus Padi, 215–30. 27 Interview with Oei Wijanarko Adi Mulya (Head of PBSI in East Java Province), May, 9, 2019. 28 Nugroho, Rajawali dengan Jurus Padi, 227. 29 Wisnu Subagyo, Ferry Sonneville Karya dan Pengabdian (Jakarta: Direktorat Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional. 1984), 57. 30 Buku Pedoman PBSI, Pengurus Besar PBSI Pusat, 1978, pp. 10–24. 31 Subagyo, Ferry Sonneville Karya dan Pengabdian, 64. 32 Ibid., 115. 33 Ibid., 59. 34 Ibid., 65. 35 Ibid.

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3 6 Editor, “Rudy Enam Kali Juara Berturut-turut,” Suara Karya, March 26, 1973. 37 Nugroho, Rajawali dengan Jurus Padi, 49. 38 “Indonesia Miliki 1128 Suku Bangsa,” JPNN.com, February 3, 2010, accessed June 29, 2019, www.jpnn. com/news/indonesia-miliki-1128-suku-bangsa. 39 Yerry Wiryawan, Basis (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2019), 19. 40 Ibid. 41 Rusli Lutan, Tahir Djide Hidup dan Karyanya dalam Bulutangkis (Bandung: Remaja Rosdakarya, 2013), 20. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid., 156. 44 Agus Muttaqin, “Visualisasi Perjuangan Ivana Lie Meraih Kewarganegaraan (1),” Jawa Pos, February 7, 2002. 45 Jason Tedjasukmana, “60 Years of Asian Heroes,” Time Magazine, November 13, 2006, accessed May 2, 2019, www.time.com/time/asia/2006/heroes/ae_hartono.html. 46 Editor, “Rudy A Wonderful Boy,” Suara Merdeka, March 25, 1969, 1. 47 Antara Pustaka Utama, 99 Tokoh Olahraga Indonesia Catatan Satu Abad (1908–2008), 82. 48 Lutan, Tahir Djide Hidup dan Karyanya dalam Bulutangkis, 21. 49 James A. Sterba, “Badminton Champion Is Indonesia’s Hero,” New York Times, March 29, 1972, 50. 50 Tedjasukmana, “60 Years of Asian Heroes.” 51 Interview with Rudy Hartono by telephone, June 19, 2019. 52 Ibid. 53 Subagyo, Ferry Sonneville Karya dan Pengabdian, 52.

Bibliography Antara Pustaka Utama. 99 Tokoh Olahraga Indonesia Catatan Satu Abad (1908–2008). Jakarta: Antara Pustaka Utama, 2009. Brown, C. “Playing the Game: Ethnicity and Politics in Indonesia Badminton.” Indonesia, 81 (2006): 71–94. Ganner, Malcolm. World Badminton Almanac.Vol. 1. Hants: M. G. Books, 1985. Karundeng, Max. Pasang Surut Supremasi Bulu Tangkis Indonesia. Jakarta: Penerbit Sinar Harapan, 1980. Lim, Peng Han, and Mohd Salleh Aman. “The History of Modern Organized Badminton and the Men’s Team Thomas Cup Tournaments.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 34, no. 7–8 (2017): 678–96. Lutan, Rusli. Tahir Djide Hidup dan Karyanya dalam Bulutangkis. Bandung: Remaja Rosdakarya, 2013. Nugroho, Alois A. Rajawali dengan Jurus Padi. Jakarta: Gramedia, 1986. Sejarah Olahraga Indonesia. Jakarta: Direktorat Jendral Olahraga, 2003. Subagyo, Wisnu. Ferry Sonneville Karya dan Pengabdian. Jakarta: Direktorat Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional, 1984. “Tjoa Seng Tiang.” In Sabaruddin Sa, Apa & Siapa: Sejumlah Orang Bulutangkis Indonesia. Jakarta: Jurnalindo Aksara Grafika, 1994. Wiryawan,Yerry. Basis.Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2019.

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57 Dipa Karmakar Rising star of India Usha S. Nair

For a country that knew of gymnastics predominantly from watching foreign gymnasts on the Olympic stage, the arrival of Dipa Karmakar on the scene resembled the rising of the sun in the east. Being India’s first female gymnast to participate in the Olympics, she heralded a new brighter time for the artistic sport in India – a time that is resplendent with accolades and records and that paves the way for new talent like hers to be recognised and celebrated. The hilly north-eastern state of Tripura is home to some of the country’s finest sporting icons. From tennis star Somdev Devvaram and national women’s football team goalkeeper Laxmita Reang to one of the country’s earliest gymnasts, Bisweswar Nandi, Tripura seems to be weaving a sporting narrative of its own. It is in this illustrious company that Dipa Karmakar stands tall. Born and raised on the plains of Agartala, Tripura, Karmakar’s humble beginnings were interwoven with unique opportunities. Her family was inclined towards sport and they nudged Dipa in the direction of artistic gymnastics at the tender age of six, even before she had begun her schooling. She refused an English medium school because it did not devote enough time to sport and began her education in Abhoynagar Nazrul Smrithi Vidyalaya. With the tremendous support of her parents, coupled with the inherent talent that she possessed, there was no telling what Dipa might accomplish in the future. Fortunately, Dipa had access to incredibly experienced coaches. Initially trained by Soma Nandi and her husband, the famed gymnast Bishweshwar Nandi, young Dipa left an indelible mark on them. At one time, Bishweshwar Nandi noted that when he first took Dipa under his wing she was flat-footed.1 This is a physical condition considered to be a tremendous obstacle to succeeding as a gymnast. Flat-footedness greatly affects the spring in one’s jump and hence could have proven a rude shock to any aspiring gymnast.Yet this did not deter her efforts. Bishweshwar and Karmakar could not proceed with actual training until they were able to correct her feet. They worked tirelessly and only when her feet developed a gymnast-like arch did they proceed with her formal training. In the process, she developed an ability to sift out the positives and work with what she possessed. Her passion for the sport was not truly ignited until she won the national championship in Jalpaiguri in 2007. She began to see a future in the sport, one that only few others could envision. However, the road was not always easy. In a cricket-mad country, the aid and attention given to sport like gymnastics is minimal at best. Dipa was often faced with the more menacing 572

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hurdles of the game, like inadequate infrastructure and lack of funds. She often had to make do with second-hand equipment and irregular-sized landing mats in her rigorous training sessions. But Karmakar made the best of them. Since her first victory in 2007, she has 77 medals to her credit, including 67 gold medals in state, national and international championships. In early 2011, Dipa Karmakar was exposed to a wider audience on a national level. At the 2011 National Games in Delhi she represented her home state Tripura and instantly shot to fame when she claimed gold in all four events of artistic gymnastics – floor, vault, uneven bars and the balance beam. She appeared to strike the perfect balance, in more ways than one, by delivering incredibly artistic movement with athletic agility. There was no turning back from that point on. Dipa remembers that the turning point in her life came when she watched history being made by fellow Indian Ashish Kumar as he won India’s first-ever gymnastics medal at the 2010 Commonwealth Games in New Delhi. It stirred a hunger within her to bring laurels to her country on an international platform, and that was exactly what she was going to do. The country began to wake up to the enormous talent of this young achiever when she represented India at the 2014 Commonwealth Games in Glasgow, UK. At the end of all four gymnastics events, Dipa Karmakar won a bronze medal and created history by becoming India’s first female athlete to win a medal in gymnastics. Undoubtedly, it was a moment of exceeding pride as the entire country cheered her on. Overnight she became a household name, and a fresh interest in gymnastics blossomed across India. At the 2014 Asian Games she finished fourth in the vault finals. At the Asian Championships in Hiroshima she secured the bronze medal in the vault finals again. Her next big event was set to be at the greatest sporting platform in the world, the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro. She made history once again by being the first Indian woman to participate in the gymnastics event at the Olympics. At the final event, Karmakar was to undertake one of the most challenging routines in the history of the sport. With a high-difficulty level of seven, the Produnova vault had previously been performed by only four other gymnasts since Elena Produnova, the Russian gymnast who first accomplished it. It seemed too great a risk for even multiple medal-winning American gymnast Simone Biles to try. But these words of caution did not affect the focused determination of Dipa to attempt the truly incredible.2 Running at top speed towards what some had called the vault of death, Dipa sprung off her arms and completed two and a half somersaults before landing on her haunches. The ending was not perfect and she narrowly missed securing a medal in that event.3 But Karmakar had set a precedent. She had attempted the herculean manoeuvre with unbelievable agility and speed, all the while making it look easy. In 2016, Dipa Karmakar was awarded the Rajiv Gandhi Khel Ratna award.The following year she was awarded the Padma Shri, the fourth-highest Indian national honour, for her contribution to sport. In 2017 she was also on the Forbes List of super achievers from Asia under the age of 30.4 Karmakar also went on to win a gold medal in the vault event of the FIG Artistic Gymnastics World Challenge Cup at Mersin, Turkey. In the process, she became the first Indian gymnast to win a gold medal at a global event. She suffered minor setbacks with injuries during practice sessions, but she always came back stronger. The Dipa Karmakar story is far from over.5 Dipa is now looking to the 2020 Tokyo Olympics. She might not attempt the Produnova again but is more inclined to perform a new routine that she has been rehearsing. The usual questions around her age as compared to other competing athletes have never bothered her. She firmly believes that her best days are yet to come. Even cricketing legend Sachin Tendulkar remarked that Dipa Karmakar is nothing short of an inspiration to all women athletes in the country. In more recent news, a Barbie Doll has been named after her and she has postal stamps in her honour, too.6 573

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Her record-setting achievements are worth being memorialised as an example for young girls across the country. In many ways, that is the true highlight of the Dipa Karmakar story. The young star not only made a name for herself and brought laurels to her country but stands as an inspiration to the next generation. She never shied away from trying again. Whether it was standing against potentially career-ruining physical difficulties or standing against worldrenowned stars on an international stage, Dipa always chose to stand tall. Karmakar has also helped to redefine the way India looks at artistic gymnastics. It is no longer perceived dubiously as a sport only fit for the foreigner. She garnered attention for the sport with her excellence and generated an interest in it that will not die down anytime soon. A pathbreaker, she paves the way for many young gymnasts in the country who share a similar golden dream of Olympic success. There is no telling what victories this young star has in her future. One thing is for sure, as far as artistic gymnastics in India is concerned, the best is still ahead.

Notes 1 Jasvinder Sidhu, “Rio Olympics: Dipa Karmakar, Flat Feet to Top Flip of the World,” Hindustan Times, August 8, 2016, accessed June 7, 2019, www.hindustantimes.com/other-sports/rio-olympics-dipakarmakar-flat-feet-to-top-flip-of-the-world/story-5uMQEapMbRUWxuCcUGiCbO.html. 2 Avantan Chowdary, “Dipa Karmakar and the Vault of Life,” New Indian Express, July 30, 2018, accessed June 7, 2019, www.newindianexpress.com/sport/asian-games/news/2018/jul/30/dipa-karmakar-andthe-vault-of-life-1850509.html. 3 PTI, “Rio Games: Dipa Karmakar Misses the Bronze by a Whisker,” Times of India, August 15, 2016, accessed June 7, 2019, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/sports/rio-2016-olympics/indiain-olympics-2016/gymnastics/Rio-Games-Dipa-Karmakar-misses-bronze-by-a-whisker/article show/53702292.cms. 4 Nidhi Sethi, “Dipa Karmakar, Sakshi Malik Among 53 Indians on Forbes’ ‘Under 30’ Achievers List,” NDTV, April 17, 2017, accessed June 6, 2019, www.ndtv.com/india-news/dipa-karmakarsakshi-malik-among-53-indians-on-forbes-under-30-achievers-list-1682275. 5 Nandi Bishweshwar, Deo Digvijay Singh, and Mohan Vimal, Dipa Karmakar: The Small Wonder (New Delhi: Finger Print, 2018). 6 Rebello Maleeva, “Apart from Bringing Accolades to the Nation, Pv Sindhu,Tendulkar Dipa Karmakar Have Postal Stamps to Their Credit Too,” Economic Times, May 11, 2018, accessed June 6, 2019, https:// economictimes.indiatimes.com/magazines/panache/apart-from-bringing-accolades-to-the-nation-pvsindhu-tendulkar-dipa-karmakar-have-postal-stamps-to-their-credit- too/articleshow/64123339.cms.

Bibliography Nandi Bishweshwar, Deo Digvijay Singh, and Mohan Vimal. Dipa Karmakar:The Small Wonder. New Delhi: Finger Print, 2018.

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58 Bruce Lee His Jeet Kune Do, his movies and his legacy Liu Yinya

Bruce Lee’s life and movies Bruce Lee was born in San Francisco on 27 November 1940, the year of the dragon. At the time, Lee’s father, a performer of Cantonese Opera, was touring in America. In 1941, his parents returned with Bruce to Hong Kong where, at the age of six, he had his first screen debut, eventually acting in more than 20 films in Southeast Asia during his childhood.1 In his early teens, Bruce Lee had already shown his physical talent by winning various championships, for example, in boxing and dancing.2 He had also become involved in street fights and began training with Ip Man, the master of Wing Chun, beginning in 1954.3 Concerned about his behaviour in street fighting, Lee’s parents moved and brought their son to Seattle,Washington, in 1959. By this stage, Bruce Lee had been practising Wing Chun for five years. He had different jobs, including restaurant waiter and dance teacher, but his interest and skill in gong-fu was deepening. After he enrolled at Edison Technical High School and earned his high school diploma, Lee started to teach martial arts informally in late 1959.4 He started studying philosophy as a major at the University of Washington in the spring of 1961.5 During this time, he began to teach gong-fu to students at school, and also had an idea to open his own martial arts school.6 In 1963, Bruce Lee published his first book, Chinese Gung Fu: The Philosophical Art of SelfDefense. The content of this book is mainly based on Lee’s reflections on traditional martial arts, like Wing Chun, and their contrast to the modern and real world of street-fighting that he had experienced in San Francisco. Lee returned to Hong Kong in the summer of 1963. This was his first time there since 1959. By this time, however, he had accomplished many things and considered himself to have made a mental and financial transformation to a more mature stage.7 He returned to Seattle at the end of the summer. In 1964, Lee moved to Oakland and started a martial arts school, but he encountered several challenges. He was supported by his students, while some of the local martial arts practitioners considered him as a provocateur who showed little respect to his seniors.8 He had received several challenges and competitions from gong-fu practitioners, and most of the time he defeated his opponents in just a few minutes. From these experiences, he began to reflect on his fighting style.9 The early concept of Jeet Kune Do (截拳道) was then born. 575

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In 1966, Lee and his family moved to Los Angeles because he was now acting in a new TV series called The Green Hornet.10 Until 1971, the family of Bruce Lee stayed in Hollywood while filming other movies. In 1970, Lee had a serious back injury and had to rest in bed. Though he was unable to practise gong-fu physically, he drew on his teaching and acting experience in the subject to reflect on his philosophy of Jeet Kune Do and set about systematising his training methods for movements and gestures. The resulting book was not completed when Lee passed away in 1973, but it was later published as The Tao of Jeet Kune Do by his wife Linda Lee in 1975. When he travelled back to Hong Kong again in 1971, Lee had become famous in Hong Kong as a result of the popularity of The Green Hornet. He was, undoubtedly, transformed into a superstar through this TV series. Later on, he was invited to act in a leading role in the film The Big Boss (Fists of Fury in the United States, 唐山大兄), which was directed by Lo Wei and achieved great popularity and attention.This was also Bruce’s first major movie. In the following year, 1972, Lee’s second important film, Fist of Fury (The Chinese Connection in the United States, 精武门), was released after he returned to Hong Kong and also achieved a great box office return. His third influential movie, Way of the Dragon (Return of the Dragon in the United States, 猛龙过江), was written, produced, directed by and starred Bruce Lee. The box office returns of this movie beat all previous records for Lee’s movies. In the spring of 1973, the filming of Enter the Dragon (龙争虎斗) was completed in two months. It was the first movie co-produced by the United States and Hong Kong film industries.11 On 10 May 1973 Lee lost consciousness at the filming venue for a few hours, which foreshadowed his health concerns. Lee also began another movie, Game of Death (死亡游戏), in late 1972, but it was never completed because Lee died suddenly in Hong Kong on 20 July 1973 and was buried in Seattle on 30 July 1973.

Jeet Kune Do and Bruce Lee’s philosophical reflections From a young age, Bruce Lee, before he concentrated on gong-fu, had shown great interest in reading, especially books on philosophy and psychology. According to Linda Lee, Bruce Lee had collected more than 2,000 books in his personal library.12 Through this reading, Lee examined his experience of fencing, boxing, physical exercise, self-defence and ideas about martial arts from the perspectives of multiple disciplines. Based on this research, he further developed his own philosophical analyses of the spirit of martial arts. Though Lee achieved great popularity as a martial arts actor, he considered himself a martial artist.13 In his book Tao of Jeet Kune Do, published posthumously, the essence of Lee’s thinking about Jeet Kune Do has been explained, both theoretically and practically. For Bruce Lee, martial arts are not only about movement and gestures but are, more importantly, about ‘true knowledge’ and the ‘true life.’14 From this perspective, martial arts are a process for breaking boundaries and exploring boundless possibilities. In other words, gong-fu as a skill is easy to teach and learn through limited patterns or ideas, but the attitude of martial arts is more difficult to obtain, as it requires unlimited searching and researching. In order to achieve this boundlessness, for Lee, the secret is simply to simplify.15 The one-inch punch (一寸拳) is an important example. The one-inch punch was demonstrated by Lee in 1964.16 This essential skill demonstrates the spirit of Jeet Kune Do as the epitome of simplicity: ‘Simplicity is the shortest distance between two points.’17 This idea was developed by Bruce Lee, based on the principles of boxing techniques, which emphasise their application across short distances. This is easier for practitioners to learn, and the power of the one-inch punch is stronger. In practice, nonetheless, the punch is not limited to one inch, or three inches, but to whatever distance is applicable in close combat. In addition to the idea of simplicity, Lee also emphasised the significance of freedom in practising gong-fu, 576

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especially when it is applied to the understanding of the boundlessness or formlessness of martial arts.18 Only in this formlessness can, and does, Jeet Kune Do embrace all different forms and styles. In this regard, Lee argues that ‘a method of fighting’ is set in the limit of ‘that method,’ and so, not ‘actually fighting.’ Understanding martial arts, in particular Jeet Kune Do, in Lee’s mind, therefore, is more about understanding oneself, one’s relationship to one’s opponents and one’s relationship to gong-fu itself. The words on Bruce Lee’s gravestone capture precisely and intensively his ideas on martial arts:‘Using no way as way, having no limitation as limitation.’ (以无法为有法，以无限为有限). Lee often used water as a symbol to illustrate this idea because water is flexible – it can be formless to fit into various forms, but it also can be powerful when it comes together like a tsunami to crush everything before it.This idea resonates with the interpretation of Laozi’s Daoist thinking on the characteristics of water in Chapter Eight of the Dao De Jing, as well as in Buddhist thought.

The legacy of Bruce Lee: when East meets West Bruce Lee was not only a follower of traditional martial arts but also an innovator, who both raised and extended interest in interdisciplinary reflection on the roots of martial arts.19 This reflection was integrated into Lee’s movies and his timely encounter with the blooming Hong Kong film industry of the 1960s and 1970s. Cinema, as a wide-ranging platform, has delivered Lee’s innovative ideas on martial arts and fight choreography cross-culturally from the East to the West. Lee’s legacy has since been inherited and adopted through various perspectives and in different contexts. In the first place, Bruce Lee’s Asian-American identity is typical but unique. Lee performed in many films as an Asian leading actor in the United States, though this was resisted by the Hollywood film industry in the 1960s, yet he was born in America.20 Lee had to convince both industry practitioners and cinema audiences by means of his exceptional gong-fu and heroic persona in the movies. His exclusive style of gong-fu and his intercultural personal background helped make the martial arts films produced in Hong Kong popular in the United States. This phenomenon impelled people to re-evaluate the concepts of Asian and Chinese cultures, not only in the area of the film industry but also in popular culture, both from Western and Eastern perspectives. The theme of masculinity is another important aspect of Bruce Lee’s legacy. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, China was facing both internal divisions and external invasion by Japan. The phrase ‘the Sick Man of Asia’ (东亚病夫) was used to mock the Chinese government and the Chinese people as being too weak and not strong enough to revolt. In the movie Fist of Fury (1972), there is a scene where Bruce Lee kicks and breaks a board with that phrase inscribed on it. Lee, playing Chen Zhen in the movie, defeats all the Japanese in the Japanese martial hall and declares that China is no longer ‘the Sick Man of Asia.’ This scene has become a symbol of Chinese patriotism, and Lee has become an iconic Chinese masculine hero who shaped the hope of being strong and powerful again, both in an individual sense as well as a national sense. Bruce Lee’s legacy has been revisited in many movies, especially movies produced in Hong Kong. The influence of Bruce Lee can be seen in such recent movies as Ip Man trilogy (2008– 2010) and The Legend of the Fist:The Return of Chen Zhen (2010). Many books and magazines on various aspects of Bruce Lee are still published every year. Bruce Lee’s pursuit of the spirit of martial arts has been transmitted to people from both the West and the East by means of the ongoing production of martial arts movies and other 577

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methods. This, however, is simply because, as Bruce Lee consistently repeated, ‘After all, knowledge in the martial arts ultimately means self-knowledge.’21 Thus people who are interested in Bruce Lee, his movies or other related images may have received this legacy by constantly reflecting on the knowledge of one’s self, one’s identity and one’s culture, based on the inheritance of his spirit of the martial arts.

Notes 1 Charles Russo, Striking Distance: Bruce Lee and the Dawn of Martial Arts in America (Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2016), 29. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid., 32, 53–55. 4 Bruce Thomas, Bruce Lee: Fighting Spirit (North Atlantic Books, 1994), 33. 5 Russo, Striking Distance, 67. 6 Ibid., 78. 7 Ibid., 104. 8 Ibid., 129. 9 Ibid., 145. 10 Thomas, Bruce Lee, 75, 77. 11 Pierre-François Peirano, “The Multiple Facets of Enter the Dragon (Robert Clouse, 1973),” InMedia, the French Journal of Media Studies 3 (2013), https://journals.openedition.org/inmedia/613. 12 Bruce Lee, Tao of Jeet Kune Do (Ohara Publications, Black Belt Communications LLC, 1975), 5; “The Libraries of Famous Men: Bruce Lee,” Art of Manliness (Blog), October 7, 2018, accessed September 14, 2019, www.artofmanliness.com/articles/the-libraries-of-famous-men-bruce-lee/. 13 Ibid 14 Ibid., 7. 15 Ibid., 12. 16 Russo, Striking Distance, 112. 17 Lee, Tao of Jeet Kune Do, 12, his emphasis. 18 Ibid., 24–25. 19 Russo, Striking Distance, 9. 20 Paul Bowman, Beyond Bruce Lee: Chasing the Dragon Through Film, Philosophy, and Popular Culture (New York: Columbia University Press), 3. 21 Russo, Striking Distance, 145.

Bibliography Bowman, Paul. Beyond Bruce Lee: Chasing the Dragon Through Film, Philosophy, and Popular Culture. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013. Lee, Bruce. Tao of Jeet Kune Do. Ohara Publications, Black Belt Communications LLC, 1975. Russo, Charles. Striking Distance: Bruce Lee and the Dawn of Martial Arts in America. University of Nebraska Press, 2016. Thomas, Bruce. Bruce Lee: Fighting Spirit. North Atlantic Books, 1994.

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59 Yao Ming The basketball giant Huang Fuhua

The basketball giant, masculinity and the postcolonial Asian body image Basketball was invented in America in 1891 and was brought to China through the YMCA movement in 1895. In spite of intense ideological battles between the ambitions of both the Western imperialists and Chinese nationalists in the sporting realm, basketball was one of the few sport transplanted into China that flourished. Since then, the proliferation of basketball has embraced a solid popularity to become the second major sport – if not the first, ahead of football – and generations of pre-eminent basketball players have propelled Chinese basketball to become a ‘national pastime’ of the country and an active participant in global basketball. Yao Ming was definitely carrying the muscular imagination and national aspiration of the Chinese nation and the 1.3 billion hoops fans when he headed for the NBA.1 Born in Shanghai in 1980 into a basketball family, his parents were both retired basketball players,Yao Ming, with his 7-foot 6-inch stature and extraordinary flexibility, won the most individual statistics in the Chinese Jiaji League and led the Shanghai Sharks to overthrow the Bayi Rockets dynasty before he joined the Houston Rockets. Nevertheless, the NBA career of this Chinese giant started with criticism when he was the first overall pick in the 2002 NBA Draft, the first ever Asian to be picked in the NBA’s history. The debut of Yao Ming in the NBA followed other Asian precursors who had eventually faded out of the league, namely, Wataru Misaka and Wang Zhizhi. In spite of explosive reports of his potential in the paint zone,Yao Ming still received many insults from other top NBA players, since basketball is a game dominated by African-American players. Charles Barkley, former power forward of the Houston Rockets and Hall of Famer, who joined the TNT television network as a commentator after retirement, said he would kiss Kenny Smith’s butt if Yao Ming scored over 19 points in one game in his rookie season. Shaquille O’Neal repeatedly expressed in public his racist views on Yao Ming with foul language and body moves.The young rookie responded mildly in interviews but acted manly on the court. Barkley kept his promise on a nationally broadcast TV program, after Yao Ming scored 20 points in his eighth game in the league, when he kissed a donkey (ass) produced by Kenny Smith. The first match-up between Yao Ming and O’Neal began with Yao Ming’s three straight blocks on the Shark.Yao Ming’s masculinity as an Asian player can also be demonstrated through his successful 579

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NBA career, averaging 32.5 minutes, 19 points, 9.2 rebounds and 1.9 blocks per game in all of his nine seasons; eight times an NBA All Star; two times on Second All-NBA Teams; and three times on Third All-NBA Teams. Yao Ming’s muscular performance in the NBA was epochal in reshaping Westerners’ body image of the Asian; it not only showcased to the world his outstanding basketball techniques but also reconstructed the postcolonial cultural discourse around Chinese basketball when contextualising the introduction of basketball during the semi-colonial and semi-feudal period in China. As Polumbaum argues, the early diffusion of basketball in China was a logical extension of new conceptions of the relationship of body and soul emerging in Protestantism in the mid-1800s and subsequently enshrined in the YMCA’s philosophy.2 The colonists proselytised Chinese people with their muscular Christian doctrines and implanted various sporting norms embedded with Western values and ideologies, on the grounds of strengthening the bodies of Chinese people who were then humiliated as the ‘Sick man of East Asia.’ The rhetorical construction and representations of Yao Ming, however, have functioned to illustrate a clash of cultures and serve as a statement on notions of masculinity in basketball,3 as Lavelle also observes that the depictions of Yao Ming in the American media do not evoke the earlier negative stereotypes of Asians but reinforce his position as a model minority, someone who embodies traditional Chinese cultural values and has not assimilated into American culture.4

Marketing the NBA superstar in the global sport mediascape The globalisation of basketball at the advent of the new millennium, started by the NBA aggressively seeking profits in overseas territories, was heralded by the rapidly expanding global industries of advertisement and endorsement by transnational media and sporting goods companies along with the indispensable product of the excellence of the NBA stars. The NBA’s strategy of tapping into Asian markets had been implemented as early as the early 1990s, when a major overseas office was set up in Hong Kong. But it was not until Yao Ming’s arrival in the league that the Chinese market grew to be the NBA’s largest one outside of North America. The NBA’s strategy of cultivating the overseas markets generally included establishing a strong network of television and digital media outlets with local partners, and Yao Ming was at the centre of the NBA’s media network for its Chinese market, as demonstrated in the following statistics: a combination of nationwide, provincial and municipal broadcasters increased the total of NBA television partners in China to 54 for the 2010–2011 season; among the top 15 most popular sport stars in China, basketball has the most, with five, with Yao Ming on top and Michael Jordan as runner-up; and among the retrieved 51,474 questionnaire samples, 37.8 percent of basketball fans said they started watching NBA games because of Yao Ming, only 9.5 percent of them said they would give up watching NBA games if Yao Ming retired and one-third of the interviewees showed an interest in the products endorsed by Yao Ming.5 The influence of Yao Ming’s media appeal in the Chinese basketball market is multifold. Besides the NBA’s own big business, it has also activated a sponsorship market that attracts a combination of world-class Chinese corporations and multinationals incorporating China’s sporting resources into the ongoing global economic market. The Chinese professional basketball league, moreover, has expanded its market share.

Sport celebrity and the Sino-American cultural ambassador Following the Ping Pong Diplomacy in the 1970s that encouraged political dialogue between China and the United States, the engagement of Yao Ming by the NBA was another landmark 580

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historical event in respect of cultural communication between two countries with entirely different social ideologies and political regimes.When Yao Ming first landed in Houston, a new era for the NBA and Chinese basketball began, as the welcoming slogan of Houston said: ‘Be Part of Something Big!’ There is no one who is as big an ambassador as Yao Ming to Houston and the United States, who is a basketball player and also a representative of Shanghai City and China or even Asia. The highest honours have been given to Yao Ming for his contribution to the development of basketball as well as to bilateral Sino-American cultural relations through basketball. Yao Ming entered the Naismith Memorial Basketball Hall of Fame in 2016, the first ever Asian Hall of Famer. On 3 February 2017, Houston Mayor Sylvester Turner declared 2 February ‘Yao Ming Day’ and welcomed Yao Ming as the city’s goodwill ambassador, an appointment he first received from former Mayor Annise Parker in 2013.6 The franchise retired Yao Ming’s No. 11 jersey two days later, only the sixth number of the Rockets to hang on the stadium. Off the court, Yao Ming has become a role model and icon through the education, environmental protection, poverty relief and other charitable activities undertaken by his Yao Ming Fund. The University of Hong Kong for this reason conferred Yao Ming with an honorary PhD degree as an outstanding individual in 2012. For Chinese society, however, the celebrity of Yao Ming can also be implicitly represented as a cultural symbol in maintaining local strength in coping with the encroaching power of the NBA’s cultural globalisation. Over the past two decades, the NBA’s cultural diffusion in China has broken down the geopolitical constraints of the traditional Chinese sport complex with a despatialised transnational sport culture, and has, to some extent, cosmopolitanised and consumerised Chinese basketball culture in an American manner. The metaphor and celebrity of Yao Ming as idol, the cognate collective memories as a form of nostalgia for the local society and the dynamics of cultural nationalism, have consolidated the foundation of a Chinese basketball system and enhanced the national character of Chinese basketball culture, so as to resist the NBA’s cultural homogenisation. Bill Clinton, former President of the United States, addressed Yao Ming as China’s single largest export to the United States,7 which also reveals the formidable soft power of Yao Ming within the cultural politics of globalisation.

Chairman Yao Era: reformation and the governance of Chinese basketball Having endeavoured to achieve international prestige through elite sport for decades, the Chinese government determined to switch its role from one of steering to leveraging Chinese sport from the 1980s. Following football, basketball was the second sport to be professionalised and put into the market in the early 1990s. Building on the Jiaji League (1994–2003), which followed the European model with an open-membership promotion/relegation system, Chinese basketball governors restructured the league to become the Chinese Basketball Association League (CBAL) that aimed to facilitate the adoption of the NBA’s governance model with a closed-membership franchise system. But it was found that the governing powers still prioritised national interest, and the vertical-centralised power allocation in Chinese basketball has meant that the NBA’s governance model could not be fully adopted in the Chinese context, since doing so would necessarily imply an erosion of the dominant power of Chinese government, as pointed out in previous work of mine in 2015.8 It was Yao Ming who accomplished the crucial reform in terms of governance authority in Chinese basketball. Previously, the Sports Ministry had attempted to set up a market-oriented governing body to detach Chinese basketball from government involvement, which proposed the establishment of the Chinese Basketball Association (CBA) Company that would adopt an 581

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NBA-style board composition of a board of governors and a commissioner. But this plan was ultimately rejected in favour of the stereotypical nationalised governance model, which became part of the government’s dual portfolio in 2009. To achieve this reformation, Yao Ming allied with 18 club owners to set up an independent entity, the Chinese Professional Basketball League Company, in early 2016, compelling the government to agree to establish the CBA Company in response. With Yao Ming’s appointment as chairman of the CBA and CEO of the CBA Company in 2017, reformation of Chinese basketball had taken a solid step. For his contribution,Yao Ming was selected as one of the 100 Pioneers of China’s Reform and Opening-Up by the central government of China in December 2018. In the past few years, a variety of strategies have been initiated by Yao Ming to further promote the professionalisation and marketisation of Chinese basketball, covering the player reserve, draft and mobility rules of the labour market, the capital market, the product market, as well as grassroots proliferation, etc. Certainly, advocating marketisation has not resulted in a decline in athletic performance of the national teams. In fact, the national teams won all the basketball gold medals during the 2018 Jakarta Asian Games, including the men’s and women’s 5 vs. 5 and 3 vs. 3 competitions, breaking the record for Chinese basketball history. In June 2019,Yao Ming was elected chairman of the International Basketball Federation (FIBA) Asia, where he continues to assist the development of basketball across Asian countries.

Notes 1 Brook Larmer, “The Center of the World,” Foreign Policy no. 150 (2005): 66–74. 2 Judy Polumbaum, “From Evangelism to Entertainment: The YMCA, the NBA, and the Evolution of Chinese Basketball,” Modern Chinese Literature and Culture 14, no. 1(2002): 178–230. 3 Katherine L. Lavelle, “Yao Ming and Masculinity in Middle America: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Racial Representations in NBA Game Commentary” (PhD diss., Wayne State University, 2006). 4 Ibid. 5 Lin Luo,Yongguan Dai, and Fuhua Huang, “Glocalization and the Rise of the Chinese Basketball Market,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 32, no. 10 (2015): 1321–35. 6 Associated Press, “Rockets Retiring Yao Ming’s No. 11 Jersey,” USA Today, February 3, 2017, accessed June 20, 2018, www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nba/2017/02/03/rockets-retiring-yao-mings-no-11jersey/97466476/. 7 Michael Wan, “Chinese Basketball Fans Will Always Thank Yao Ming,” ESPN, September 9, 2016, accessed June 20, 2018, www.espn.com/nba/story//id/17503441/what-yao-ming-means-basketballfans-china-2016-nba-hall-fame. 8 Fuhua Huang and Fan Hong, “Globalization and the Governance of Chinese Sports: The Case of Professional Basketball,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 32, no. 8 (2015): 1030–43.

Bibliography Huang, Fuhua, and Fan Hong. “Globalization and the Governance of Chinese Sports: The Case of Professional Basketball.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 32, no. 8 (2015): 1030–43. Larmer, Brook. “The Center of the World.” Foreign Policy no. 150 (2005): 66–74. Lavelle, Katherine L. “Yao Ming and Masculinity in Middle America: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Racial Representations in NBA Game Commentary.” PhD diss., Wayne State University, 2006. Luo, Lin,Yongguan Dai, and Fuhua Huang. “Glocalization and the Rise of the Chinese Basketball Market.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 32, no. 10 (2015): 1321–35. Polumbaum, Judy. “From Evangelism to Entertainment: The YMCA, the NBA, and the Evolution of Chinese Basketball.” Modern Chinese Literature and Culture 14, no. 1 (2002): 178–230.

582

60 Eric Liddell The flying Scotsman Zhang Huijie

Introduction China is undoubtedly rising as a global sporting superpower. It has made great achievements in the international arena and is now generally in the top three in terms of gold medals at the Olympic Games. Superb Chinese athletes, such as Yao Ming, have emerged as sporting heroes known globally. Chinese athletes’ compelling Olympic performances have thoroughly changed the stereotypical Western image of Chinese people: the view that they are unhealthy and weak – the ‘Sick man of Asia’– and the Chinese have expediently used martial arts and indigenous sport to showcase athletic capability and masculinity.1 Indeed, it is difficult to articulate the indigenous physical education or ‘sporting’ culture of China since ‘Wen (literacy) outweighing Wu (physicality)’ was long a mainstream educational concept in the age of the dominant role of Confucianism in ancient China. But it is clear that modern physical education and sport were introduced by Westerners during the late Qing dynasty, when the door of China was forced open by Western military power. The inflow of Christianity, namely, YMCAs and missionary schools, significantly changed the traditional trajectory of Chinese culture. China began to engage with the globalising ‘sportisation’ process, and the ideology of Chinese sport utterly changed, from the emancipation of humanity and the body to the infusion and shaping of a modernised sporting culture.2 The missionaries played a pivotal role in this modernisation process, with Eric Liddell an outstanding hero remembered by Chinese society.This chapter sets out to explore the contribution of Liddell in promoting modern physical education in China and how this sporting hero and missionary became a celebrity in modern Chinese history.

The rise of an athletic hero and Olympic champion Eric Henry Liddell was born on 16 January 1902 in Tientsin (now Tianjin), China. Both of his parents were missionaries with the London Mission Society who had been sent to China in the late nineteenth century. Liddell returned to Scotland with his parents when he was five years old, where he attended a Christian boarding school in Blackheath established by the London Missionary Society (it later moved to Kent and changed its name to Eltham College).3 In 1920, 583

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Liddell began a BSc in Pure Science at the University of Edinburgh.4 Along with his academic excellence, he demonstrated tremendous ability as an athlete and pious faith as a Christian. Both would radically shape his destiny. At the University of Edinburgh, Liddell demonstrated his intense talent for rugby, cricket and athletics. In 1922, he made his debut for the Scottish national rugby union team against France at Stade du Colombes, Paris.5 Soon after that, renowned coach Tom McKerchar started bringing Liddell to nationwide athletic events.6 He became one of the country’s top runners. He was also successful at a national level, winning the shorter sprint distances at the Triangular International Contests (for athletes from Scotland, England and Ireland) in 1921, 1922 and 1923.7 Liddell’s success guaranteed him inclusion in the British Olympic squad which set sail for Paris in 1924. Liddell was strongly fancied as a contender in the 100-metre race, but he refused to run in the preliminary heats due to his religious principles as they were held on a Sunday.This put him under great pressure – the British Olympic Committee tried to persuade him to participate in the national interest – but Liddell felt that to race in this contest would be to go against his god’s wishes.8 Although he was criticised in some sections of the British media as a ‘traitor’ and for a ‘lack of sportsmanship and patriotism,’ he spent that particular Sunday preaching at the Scots Presbyterian Church in Paris.9 Liddell was selected to run in the 400 metres, a distance at which he was a good performer, but which was certainly not his forte. Magically, he won the gold medal and broke both the Olympic and world record on 11 July, after winning a bronze in the 200 metres on 9 July.10 He described his race plan, highlighting the power of God: ‘The secret of my success over the 400 metres is that I run the first 200 metres as fast as I can. Then, for the second 200 metres, with God’s help, I run faster.’11

Running in another race: Christianity and Liddell’s introduction of physical education to China In the summer of 1925, already an Olympic champion and household name at 23 years old, Liddell made a sudden decision which changed his life. He decided to return to China and carry out missionary work there, leaving the better living conditions in his homeland.12 Liddell returned to Tianjin, his birthplace, and began a teaching career of almost 20 years in chemistry and physical education at Tientsin Anglo-Chinese College, a school set up by the London Mission Society in 1864. Liddell was determined to deliver Christian doctrine to China, on account of his deep interest in the Chinese people, an interest which came from his parents and his intense religious faith. Liddell definitely knew life would be difficult in China, saying to a friend before he left that he forsook all possibility of fame and fortune in the UK and had decided to serve Jesus, his saviour, by preaching the gospel to the Chinese. He had made up his mind that he was willing to give up any chance of a materially rich life in order to help the poor Chinese.13 Liddell passed an entrance exam, completed a one-year internship in a poor village and studied Chinese for a year at Yenching University before taking up his position at Tientsin Anglo-Chinese College. He was popular on campus and was devoted to cultivating young men for China.14 When, after some years, the clouds of war gathered, Liddell refused to leave. He continued to preach and showed compassion for the local Chinese people, helping many escapes from the invading Japanese. His faith remained firm under fire as he relocated to Xiaozhang County in 1935. In 1937, Liddell finally left Tientsin Anglo-Chinese College, leaving his family and preaching alone in Xiaozhang. In December 1941, he was rounded up and interned, along with

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other foreign nationals, by the Japanese in the Weihsien internment camp in March 1943.15 This did not dampen his faith. Despite camp life being tough and cramped, he kept on preaching about Jesus, organising sport to encourage morale and taking Christian services. It was later revealed that he refused an opportunity to leave the camp in a prisoner exchange negotiated by Winston Churchill, instead giving his place to a pregnant woman. Sadly, Liddell did not live to see the end of the war, dying of a brain tumour in the camp on 21 February 1945, aged 43.16

Physical education as body building Athleticism and masculinity were important educational philosophies for Liddell. As he put it: Athletics is part of educating the whole person. A man is composed of three parts: mind, body, and soul and only when we instruct each part in such a way that one is not overestimated, but each receives proper emphasis, we will get the finest and truest graduates.17 At Tientsin Anglo-Chinese College, Liddell devoted himself to changing the physical values of the Chinese students so as to foster full-grown men. One of his students, Yu Wenji, recalled: ‘Physical education was our favourite course in school; we knew Liddell was an Olympic champion and liked to learn sporting skills from him.’18 Liddell also inspired students to participate in physical exercise, both at school and afterwards. The sporting culture on campus changed significantly thanks to Liddell’s efforts. The 1929 Annual of Tianjin Anglo-Chinese College says: ‘Between 1921 and 1929, the college witnessed the prosperity of physical education and sport due to the contribution of Liddell. We won a wide range of sport championships in Tianjin.’19 At the First Primary and Secondary School Sports Meeting of Tianjin in 1936, the Anglo-Chinese College won first place among middle schools in Tianjin.20 Moreover, Liddell was very responsible for students’ health. He required that all students have a medical check-up every year and asked ill students to take a break from school no matter how good their academic record was. Only when the illness was cured could the student return.21

Social services for sport In addition to physical education classes and training, Liddell was also active in providing social services for sport in Tianjin. The 40,000-square-metre Minyuan Stadium, built in 1920 in the British concession area of Tianjin, was renovated in 1926, and Liddell consulted the blueprint for the Stamford Bridge stadium in London to provide many useful suggestions, including on the structure of the track, lighting equipment and grandstands.22 The improved stadium became one of the best in China, with 500-metre and 200-metre tracks and two football pitches. It attracted many international sport events, including international athletics meets, international football matches and Boy Scout athletics meets.23 Liddell also helped to identify and train Chinese sporting talent. For instance, he formed a football team by selecting gifted college players and led training personally. The team soon became one of the earliest and strongest teams in Tianjin.24 Liddell fostered a great number of talented sportsmen for Tientsin Anglo-Chinese College and the city of Tianjin. Some even had great achievements on the international stage, such as Wu Bixian, the first Chinese Olympic high jumper, and goalkeeper Chunxu Ding who played for China at the Far Eastern Championship Games.25

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Propagating Olympism in China In order to further propagate modern physical education and Olympism, Liddell often made speeches at other schools and institutions. He was invited by Zhang Boling, President of Nankai University, to give a series of lectures on the scientific physical training of various sport. Chronicle of Sport in Modern Tianjin (1840–1949) notes that Physical Education Director Zhang Jiwu invited Liddell to Nankai University in November 1929 to lecture on training methods for sprinters.26 Liddell’s student Huang Jingming recalled that Liddell often wore his traditional tracksuit or Scottish dress on formal events, with his Olympic gold medal around his neck.27 In this way, Liddell delivered to the Chinese people the pride of Olympism, so as to inspire them to participate in modern physical education and sport. The 1936 Berlin Games witnessed China’s Olympic debut. Liddell was hired as a coach for the team.28 Before the delegation set off for Berlin, Zhang Boling organised a warm-up match in Minyuan Stadium, with Liddell in charge.29 His contribution to propagating Olympism in China is remembered by the Chinese. Before the start of the Beijing Olympics, President of Tianjin No. 17 Middle School Zu Jianwang said: ‘Our international friend Eric Liddell helped China develop physical education and sport, delivering Olympism to China. . . . Eric Liddell is together with our modern-day peaceful China, the charming Tianjin City, and the prosperous No. 17 Middle School.’30

Collective memory as Olympic legacy As China entered the modern age, a large number of missionaries came to China to proselytise. Physical education was generally embedded in their Christian doctrine, particularly in the missionary schools and YMCAs. However, many of these missionaries are lost to the ages or have faded from the memory of Chinese society. But Liddell is definitely not forgotten by the Chinese people. Soon after the end of World War II, he was buried in the Mausoleum of the Martyrs in Shijiazhuang, alongside other prestigious international friends of China like Norman Bethune and Dwarkanath Kotnis. As a Christian, an Olympic champion, an educationist and a benefactor, Liddell is no longer with us, but his benevolence, selflessness and upright character still inspire the Chinese people and are precious legacies for China and the world.31 In the 8 January 2008 edition of AsiaNews, a piece begins: ‘Not everyone may know that the first “Chinese” athlete to win an Olympic medal was a Scotsman born in China. He was Eric Liddell, the son of Presbyterian missionaries, born in Tianjin in 1902.’32 Vice President of Edinburgh University Steve Hill adds that although Liddell was not Chinese by nationality, he was born in China, married in China and buried in China. He was an Olympic champion of China.33 Commemorative activities for Liddell have never stopped in China, particularly in Tianjin and Weifang. A great number of international friends from Canada, the United States, New Zealand, the UK and Singapore have visited Tianjin to follow his trail. Graduates from the Anglo-Chinese College, in particular students of Liddell, organise commemorative activities for Liddell every year. Since 1985, a large-scale commemoration of victory in the Anti-Japanese War has been organised every decade in Weifang, during which the career of Liddell is highlighted. Liddell’s fellow camp internees were represented in the 1985 commemoration and visited his resting place. Patriotic education is the theme of these anniversaries, attended by students and local government officials. Moreover, the British people also have sincere memories of Liddell. In 1990, Charles Walker, a Scottish engineer working in Hong Kong, established the Eric Liddell Foundation in order to 586

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memorialise the ideas and contribution of Liddell in spreading physical education and sport in China.34 This organisation brought together potential athletes under the age of 20 from London, Hong Kong and Tianjin for training camps every year. Although the foundation lasted only a decade, it provided an opportunity for talented young sportspeople and added to the contribution of Liddell. More importantly, Liddell’s fame has now become a bridge of friendship between China and the UK. In November 2011 a photographic exhibition themed ‘Eric Liddell and Tianjin’ was held in London, organised by the Tianjin Municipal People’s Government.35 On 3 November the Tianjin delegation visited the University of Edinburgh, presenting the university with a photo album of Liddell as a gift.36 A year later, the Scottish government invited the Tianjin Municipal People’s Government to jointly present the photographic exhibition on ‘Eric Liddell and Tianjin’ in Edinburgh during the 2012 London Olympics. These activities evoked people’s memories of Liddell, and showed that he has become an important cultural legacy of China and the UK.

Notes 1 Fan Hong and Tan Hua, “Sport in China: Conflict Between Tradition and Modernity, 1840s to 1930s,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 19, no. 2–3 (2002): 189–212. 2 Shiming Luo, Olympics Came to China (Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 2005), 1–10. 3 Ellen Caughey, Run to Glory:The Story of Eric Liddell (Uhrichsville: Barbour Books, 2017). 4 “Eric Liddell Departs for China,” Dundee Evening Telegraph, June 29, 1925, 1. 5 “Rugby Career,” Eric Liddell Centre, accessed September 9, 2018, www.ericliddell.org/about-us/ eric-liddell/rugby-career/. 6 Caughey, Run to Glory, 52. 7 “The Man Who Wouldn’t Run on a Sunday: Eric Liddell in the SOAS Archives,” SOAS University of London, August 1, 2014, accessed September 10, 2018, https://blogs.soas.ac.uk/archives/2014/08/01/ the-man-who-wouldn%E2%80%99t-run-on-a-sunday-eric-liddell-in-the-soas-archives/. 8 “Eric Liddell, First ‘Chinese’ Olympic Champion,” AsiaNews, August 1, 2008, accessed September 10, 2018, www.asianews.it/news-en/Eric-Liddell,-first-Chinese-Olympic-champion-12909.html. 9 John W. Keddie, Running the Race: Eric Liddell–Olympic Champion and Missionary (Faverdale North: Evangelical Press, 2007), 110–32. 10 Ibid., 112–13. 11 D. P. Thomson, Eric H. Liddell: Athlete and Missionary (Grieff: Research Unit, 1971), 55. 12 David McCasland, Pure Gold: The Olympic Champion Who Inspired Chariots of Fire (Grand Rapids, MI: Discovery House, 2001), Foreword. 13 Tianjin Municipal Television, “Eric Liddell, Olympic Champion Born in Tianjin,” 2012, www.you tube.com/watch?v=OvzFxqpTxMI. 14 Licheng Zhou, Foreigners in Old Tianjin (Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Press, 2007), 180. 15 Culture and History Committee of Weifang People’s Political Consultative Conference, The Weihsien Internment Camp (Beijing: China Culture and History Press, 2015), 321–23, 364. 16 Xinping Wan, Historical Figures in Modern Tianjin (Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Press, 2016), 118. 17 James H. Taylor, “Pure Gold–Foreword,” Weihsien-paintings.org (Blog), accessed August 28, 2018, www. weihsien-paintings.org/NormanCliff/people/individuals/Eric01/PureGold/txt_foreword.htm. 18 Tianjin Municipal Television, “Eric Liddell.” 19 “Physical Education in Anglo-Chinese College,” 1929 Annual of Tianjin Anglo-Chinese College, Tianjin Municipal Archives, archive no. 252-1-2-2550. 20 “Physical Education in Anglo-Chinese College,” 1937 Annual of Tianjin Anglo-Chinese College, Tianjin Municipal Archives, archive no. 252-1-2-2554. 21 Wenji Yu, A Biography of Eric Liddell: The Olympic Champion and Educationist Born in China (Tianjin: China Social Sciences Press, 2009), 57. 22 Kun Geng, “What Will the New Minyuan Stadium Look Like?” Tianjin Daily, July 5, 2012, 8. 23 Ibid. 24 Tianjin Municipal Television, “Eric Liddell.” 587

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25 Huijie Zhang, Fan Hong, and Fuhua Huang, Christianity and the Transformation of Physical Education and Sport in China (London: Routledge, 2017), 53–58. 26 The Culture and History Office of the Sport Committee of Tianjin, Chronicle of Sport in Modern Tianjin (1840–1949) (Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Press, 1990), 61. 27 Tianjin Municipal Television, “Eric Liddell.” 28 Tieying Gong, “Eric Liddell: The China-UK Ambassador,” China Daily, January 6, 2012, 23; The Press Office of Tianjin, “ ‘Seize the Moment to Get Close to the People: A Case Study of Li Airui and Tianjin,” Foreign Communication no. 2 (2013): 50–51. 29 Yu, A Biography of Eric Liddell, 158. 30 President of Tianjin No. 17 Middle School Zu Jianwang’s speech before the start of the Beijing Olympics, quoted in Yu, A Biography of Eric Liddell, 160. 31 Gong, “Eric Liddell: The China-UK Ambassador,” 23. 32 AsiaNews, “Eric Liddell, First ‘Chinese’ Olympic Champion.” 33 Press Office of Tianjin, “Seize the Moment,” 50–51. 34 “The Memorial to Eric Liddell,” The Old Elthamians’ Magazine 2, no. 12 (1991): 13–14. 35 Chinese Embassy UK, “Eric Liddell and Tianjin Photo Exhibition Held in London,” November 5, 2011, accessed February 24, 2019, www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/EmbassyNews/2011/t876930. htm. 36 “Eric Liddell and Tianjin,” China Daily, accessed November 4, 2018, www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/ static/2011tianjin/tianjin_ericliddell.pdf.

Bibliography Caughey, Ellen. Run to Glory:The Story of Eric Liddell. Uhrichsville: Barbour Books, 2017. Culture and History Committee of Weifang People’s Political Consultative Conference. The Weihsien Internment Camp. Beijing: China Culture and History Press, 2015. The Culture and History Office of Sport Committee of Tianjin. Chronicle of Sport in Modern Tianjin (1840– 1949). Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Press, 1990. Hong, Fan, and Tan Hua.“Sport in China: Conflict Between Tradition and Modernity, 1840s to 1930s.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 19, no. 2–3 (2002): 189–212. Keddie, John W. Running the Race: Eric Liddell–Olympic Champion and Missionary. Faverdale North: Evangelical Press, 2007. Luo, Shiming. Olympics Came to China. Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 2005. “The Memorial to Eric Liddell.” The Old Elthamians’ Magazine 2, no. 12 (1991): 13–14. McCasland, David. Pure Gold: The Olympic Champion Who Inspired Chariots of Fire. Grand Rapids, MI: Discovery House, 2001. “Physical Education in Anglo-Chinese College.” In 1929 Annual of Tianjin Anglo-Chinese College, Tianjin Municipal Archives, Archive no. 252-1-2-2550. “Physical Education in Anglo-Chinese College.” In 1937 Annual of Tianjin Anglo-Chinese College, Tianjin Municipal Archives, Archive no. 252-1-2-2554. The Press Office of Tianjin. “Seize the Moment to Get Close to the People: A Case Study of Li Airui and Tianjin.” Foreign Communication no. 2 (2013): 50–51. Thomson, D. P. Eric H. Liddell: Athlete and Missionary. Grieff: Research Unit, 1971. Tianjin Municipal Television. “Eric Liddell, Olympic Champion Born in Tianjin.” 2012. Wan, Xinping. Historical Figures in Modern Tianjin. Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Press, 2016. Yu, Wenji. A Biography of Eric Liddell: The Olympic Champion and Educationist Born in China. Tianjin: China Social Sciences Press, 2009. Zhang, Huijie, Fan Hong, and Fuhua Huang. Christianity and the Transformation of Physical Education and Sport in China. London: Routledge, 2017. Zhou, Licheng. Foreigners in Old Tianjin. Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Press, 2007.

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61 Seri Pak Korea’s Golf Empress Gwang Ok and Kyoungho Park

Introduction Korean female golfers began to occupy the global golf arena around the year 2000. As of October 2019, Korean golfer Jin-young Ko is ranked at the top of women’s golf worldwide.1 The top rankings also include many other Korean female golfers, including In-bee Park, Sung-hyun Park and Jeong-eun Lee. In addition to their Korean heritage, they share another common characteristic: they are all ‘Seri Pak kids.’2 Seri Pak is a celebrated figure who has had a tremendous impact on the world of professional golf, both in Korea and around the world.This study highlights the achievements of Seri Pak as an amateur and professional golf player and defines the footprint she has left on the history of Korean golf. By recording the professional narrative of Seri Pak, this study will convey the story of a sport heroine for future generations.

Seri Pak’s amateur days Seri Pak was born in the inland city of Dae-jeon in South Korea in 1977. Pak joined an athletic club in Yuseong Elementary School because she wanted to become a track and field athlete. As she entered middle school, she began playing golf based on a recommendation from her father, Joon-cheol Pak.3 This was her first step to becoming a golf empress. She did not immediately take great interest in golf, but after becoming aware of the unfavourable financial status of her household, she immersed herself in golf for the purpose of achieving financial success. Pak practiced hard as a grinder from the very beginning. One day, her father dropped Pak off at the driving range in the morning and forgot to pick her up. It was almost midnight when, realising she was still at the range, he hurriedly returned to get her. Upon arriving, he found Pak still practicing.4 Seri Pak was turning into a very self-disciplined player. After only about three years of playing golf, Pak won a championship in the professional KLPGA Lyle & Scott Golf Open in 1992. In her freshman year of high school in 1993, she scored a victory in the KLPGA Tomboy Women’s Open.These victories marked her spectacular debut in the Korean golf world.5 Samsung recognised Pak’s potential, which led to her endorsement of Samsung products. Then, in 1997, she attended the Leadbetter Golf Academy in Orlando, Florida, in the United 589

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States. Thanks to the vigorous training she received from David Leadbetter, in October 1997 Pak was accepted by the qualifying school with the highest score, which marked her debut into the LPGA in the United States.6

Seri Pak’s achievement as a professional player As a professional golf player, Seri Pak won a total of 25 LPGA championships. The McDonald’s LPGA Championship, which she won the first year after debuting in the American LPGA in 1998, was the first championship she won as a professional player.7 Pak was the first Asian player to win the LPGA championship. She also recorded the fewest strokes in the history of major female golf tournaments.8 The U.S. Women’s Open Golf Championship in 1998 was the game that stamped the name of Seri Pak in the minds of global golf fans. This game was played at the Blackwolf Run Golf Course located in Kohler, Wisconsin, United States, on 7 July 1998. In this game, Pak defeated Jenny Chuasiriporn in extra time to score her victory. Pak faced a big challenge on the 18th hole as her tee shot landed in a sloped rough alongside a water hazard. Executing her unique adventurer’s temperament, Seri Pak successfully carried out her famous ‘barefoot swing,’ taking off her shoes to stand in the water to take her shot, a moment that will be forever remembered in golf history.Thanks to this dramatic shot, the game entered extra time. With a successful birdie putt in the second hole of a suddendeath playoff, Seri Pak finally scored victory after the five-hour-long battle.With this championship, Seri Pak became the youngest winner and the first Asian champion of the U.S. Women’s Open Golf Championship in history.9 In 1998 alone, Seri Pak won four championships. As a result, she was named the LPGA Rookie of the Year in 1998, the first Korean player to win the award. In 1999, the second year after her professional debut, Pak won four championships. Six years after her debut in the American LPGA, she achieved over a dozen championship trophies, including five championships in 2001, five in 2002 and three in 2003. Restricting the victories to major tournaments, Seri Pak won two championships in 1998, one in 2001, one in 2002 and another in 2006, for a total of five major tournament championships. As she reached a total of 22 victories following her win in the 2004 Michelob Ultra Open, Pak satisfied all ranking points to qualify as a candidate for both of golf ’s Halls of Fame. In 2007, she was finally inducted into the LPGA Tour Hall of Fame and the World Golf Hall of Fame, becoming the youngest golfer and first Asian to be inducted into both Halls of Fame.1011 Despite satisfying all requirements to qualify for induction into both Halls of Fame in 2004, she had to wait until 2007 because she had not yet completed the required ten tour seasons. This demonstrates how quickly Seri Pak conquered the golf world after she debuted on the global stage.

Seri Pak’s legacy Seri Pak, who experienced significant fame and fortune as a professional golfer, retired in 2016. She then won a gold medal at the 2016 Rio Olympics in Brazil, which marked the first time in 112 years that golf had been included in the Olympic Games. This time, however, she was recognised not as a player but as a coach. In-bee Park, who won the female golf championship in the Rio Olympics, was one of the Seri Pak kids. Following Pak’s tradition, Park won an LPGA championship and was inducted into the LPGA Tour Hall of Fame and World Golf Hall of Fame in 2016.The gold medal in the Rio Olympics was an achievement that the golf legend Seri Pak and the Seri Pak kids attained together.

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Seri Pak, who appeared on the LPGA scene in 1997, demonstrated the competence of Korean golfers to the world with her remarkable play in the United States, which was new ground for Korean golfers. At the same time, she stirred national pride for Koreans, who were in a state of dejection due to the financial crisis of 1997. Pak will be remembered in the history of Korean golf forever for her many achievements, but mostly because she planted a cultural seed on the ground of the LPGA and gave birth to the future generations of Seri Pak kids by showcasing pioneering achievement on the LPGA stage. Twenty years have passed since Seri Pak took her famous barefoot shot in the U.S.Women’s Open Golf Championship. The Korean female golfers who are ranked in the world’s top ten in 2019 can be seen as a cultural legacy of Seri Pak; they grew up watching Pak achieve success and dreamed of becoming like her. The second and third generations of Seri Pak kids will be similarly influenced by the historical successes that the current Seri Pak kids are achieving. This cultural circle of victory can become an invisible impetus for the continuous development of women’s golf in Korea, and it can all be traced back to the path forged by the remarkable Seri Pak.

Conclusion At her retirement ceremony in 2016, Seri Pak said, ‘I want to enjoy golf from now on.’12 Her words can serve as advice to the younger generations who follow her. The comment was not surprising coming from Seri Pak, a pioneer of the LPGA who inspired the new generation of female golfers called Seri Pak kids. Seri Pak is a legend who achieved great success as a pioneer of women’s golf in Korea. In her amateur days, Seri Pak excited golf fans with her skills that surpassed those of professionals. On the LPGA stage on which she debuted at a young age, Pak triumphed beyond anyone’s expectations and became a legend not only in Korean history but also in international golf history. After retirement, as coach of the national Olympic golf team in Korea, she won a gold medal in the 2016 Rio Olympics. Seri Pak is still a legend as both a player and a coach. Seri Pak acted as a role model for Korean female golfers entering the global stage. The generation of Seri Pak kids who grew up watching Seri Pak’s remarkable accomplishments became a cultural legacy that gives Koreans hope for another heyday for Korean female golfers. After a long time, someone will ask, ‘Why do Korean female golfers play so well?’The answer will go like this: ‘It is because there was a legendary golfer named Seri Pak.’ Seri Pak can be celebrated as a Korean golfer who left record-breaking achievements in the world of golf and as a pioneer who brought on the renaissance of golf in Korea.

Notes 1 “Segye 1wi Ko jin-young, Lee jung-eun 6, BMW Ladies Championship” [Ko Jin-young and Lee Jungeun, World No. 1 & 6, Participated in BMW Ladies Championship], Mail Daily, October 14, 2019. 2 They are the generation of female golfers who became golf players under the influence of Seri Pak. 3 “Golfga insaengui jeonbuyeotdeon Park Se-ri, geuleona geolgijlmothaetda” [Pak Se-ri,Whose Life Was All About Golf: But I Didn’t Enjoy It], Hankuk Daily, August 9, 2019. 4 Ibid. 5 “Golf 93 Tomboy open daehoe yeogo1nyeonsaeng Park, Se-ri useung yeonjangjeon kkeut Kim, Sunmi mullichyeo” [Pak Se-ri, a High School Freshman, Beat Kim Sun-mi in Extra Time and Won the Tomboy Open in 1993], Donga Daily, May 2, 1993. 6 Park Ho-yun, “Golf seonsu Park Se-ri” [Golfer Park Se-ri], Navercast, 2019, https://terms.naver.com/ entry.nhn?docId=3567468&cid=59118&categoryId=59118.

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7 Kim Ok Hyun, “A Study on Globalization Process of Korean Women’s Golf: Focusing on Appadurai’s Theory” (Unpublished PhD diss., Konkuk University, Seoul, 2017). 8 “Park Se-ri greenyeowang deunggeuk” [Pak Se-ri Becomes Queen of Green], Hangyeole Daily, May 19, 1998. 9 “Park Se-ri greenui sinhwaleul mandeulda” [Pak Se-ri to Make a Legend of Green], Donga Daily, July 8, 1998. 10 Park Ho-yun, “Golf seonsu Park Se-ri” [Golfer Park Se-ri], Navercast, 2009, https://terms.naver.com/ entry.nhn?docId=3567468&cid=59118&categoryId=59118. 11 “Yeoja golf renaissance gaecheokja Park Se-ri” [Pak Se-ri, the Pioneer of Women’s Golf Renaissance], Ilgan-Sports Daily, October 2, 2019. 12 “Maeumdo seongjanghan seri kids geuligo hansuiseontae” [The Mature Pak Se-ri Kids, and the Choice of Jang Ha-na], Ajukyeongje Daily, May 30, 2017.

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62 Dhyan Chand Singh A legend in hockey Usha S. Nair

At a time when India was still finding its feet in international sport, there arose an unlikely hero with a prodigious skill set and an uncommon passion for his game. He would eventually go on to leave an indelible mark on the country’s sporting history, sparking a golden beginning to India’s love affair with its national sport. In the domain of Indian field hockey, the name Major Dhyan Chand Singh remains synonymous with magical ball control and phenomenal athletic ability. Born in 1905 to a Rajput family in Allahabad, Dhyan Singh was not immediately drawn to the sport that would make him a household name.1 His father served as a subedar (a rank below commissioned officer) in the British Indian Army. Dhyan Singh recalled that his initial sporting inclination was not towards hockey but towards wrestling. He did indulge in casual hockey games with his friends but did not seriously take up the sport until much later. His father, Sameshwar Dutt, had a position in the Army that resulted in the family having to travel according to his postings. The numerous travels and dislocations were not conducive to young Dhyan’s education, which he ultimately had to terminate after six years of schooling.Yet this was no barrier to the fulfilment of his sporting potential. Instead, it formed an unlikely start to the prodigy’s prowess in the game. The family finally settled in Jhansi, Uttar Pradesh. On the small plot of land awarded to his father for his army service, Dhyan Singh began to make use of the basic facilities around him. His first hockey stick was nothing more than a branch of a tree with which he used to strike balls made of ragged cloth. One can only imagine what skill he developed during those humble beginnings. On his seventeenth birthday in 1922, he enlisted in the Punjab regiment as a sepoy (the lowest rank in the Indian army). During the initial four years of his enlistment, he played only army hockey and regimental matches. It was under his coach Pankaj Gupta that his passion and talent for the sport began to materialise into something truly incredible. He spent long hours practicing, most often by the light of the moon.This is how he came to be called Chand, which literally means ‘the Moon,’ and it is most likely that the moon was his only companion during those long hours of practice in the army. That was not the only name impressed spectators gave him. In one particular match, he helped his team make up a two-goal deficit by scoring three goals, all in the last four minutes of the game. After this, they could not help but call him ‘the Wizard.’2 593

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From the army hockey team, Dhyan Chand was soon selected to be a part of the national hockey team. During an initial tour of New Zealand, the team won an incredible total of 18 matches, drawing two and losing only one. Stories of Chand’s superb ball control, tactical stick work and defensive prowess spread quickly. On returning home, he was promoted to the position of lance naik in 1927 (a rank in the Indian army equivalent to lance corporal).3 The rest, as they say, is history. Chand went from victory to victory, always improving his game and stupefying the swarming masses who had heard of his fame and came eagerly to watch this young Indian work his magic on the field.With his selection for the Indian team that participated in the 1928 Olympic Games in Amsterdam, Chand’s talent and skill were set to be displayed before a global audience. He played centre forward and in just five matches he scored a staggering 14 goals. His hockey prowess was largely responsible for India winning the gold medal in the 1928 Olympics. In 1932 India struck gold again at the Los Angeles Olympics with the team being referred to as ‘a typhoon from the east’ in local papers. Chand’s value to the team was recognised and he was made the captain of the Indian team for the Western Asiatic Games at Delhi in the year 1934. In his biography Goal, he remembered his highest honour as being called upon to captain the Indian team, which continued its winning streak at the 1936 Berlin Olympics.4 Chand rose to his name and shone in every match that the team played. In the rousing finale, attended by Adolf Hitler, Chand and his team clinched yet another Olympic gold medal for India.5 It is even believed that Hitler offered Chand the position of colonel in his army and German citizenship, which he politely turned down because he preferred to play for his own nation. Chand’s story is one of persistence, passion and defiance. What is striking is that he achieved his remarkable feats and created history at a time when few other Indians were venturing into the world of sport. He derived an innate joy from playing the game, which could be seen in the fluidity with which he moved and the sheer energy he possessed throughout every match. His performances set the records for his day. In three Olympic tournaments, he scored a whopping 33 goals in just 12 matches. He possessed an unparalleled ability to dribble the ball, working his way through a field at lightning speed as centre forward. This mystical skill confused his opponents so much that they would often break open his hockey sticks to see if they contained magnets to make the ball follow his stick so perfectly. He could also strike goals unlike any of his contemporaries. Don Bradman, the cricketing legend, said that Chand scored goals like runs in cricket. He had taken the sporting world by storm, and they were not going to forget his legend any time soon. Dhyan Chand continued his service in the army, which was unusual for a sport hero who had attained that level of stardom. He also continued playing hockey with the same fervour that he began with, only retiring from serious hockey in the late 1940s. He retired from the army in 1956 as a major. For years after his retirement he worked as a coach. Family was also an indispensable part of his life. In his autobiography, Goal, he remarked that not even hockey, which had always been his first love, could lure him away from his wife and their seven sons. His contribution to the country’s early repertoire of sport was awe-inspiring and pathbreaking. Dhyan Chand remained a bright star in the glorious early history of Indian field hockey. He helped India win three Olympic gold medals. In his career from 1926–1948 he scored over 400 goals. Undoubtedly, the country was proud to honour him in 1956 with its third highest civilian honour, the Padma Bhushan, for his contribution to the field of sport. In 2012, the Twentieth National Award – the Gem of India – was awarded to Chand, who died 3 December 1979, and accepted by his son, also an Olympic hockey player in his own right. Dhyan Chand’s birthday, 29 August, is celebrated every year as National Sports Day in India, a day on which the President of India gives out the Arjuna Award, the Rajiv Gandhi Khel Ratna 594

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Award and the Dronacharya award (the Government of India’s annual awards for sport persons). India’s highest award for lifetime achievement in sport is named The Dhyan Chand Award. Furthermore, the All India Major Dhyan Chand Hockey Tournament and the national stadium in Delhi are named in his honour. It would not be far-fetched to remember this sporting legend as the Father of Indian Sports. Even on a global platform, Dhyan Chand is often hailed as a hockey legend. A statue of the icon was erected in Vienna, displaying four hands and four sticks, a depiction of his seemingly unbelievable ball control. In many ways, Major Dhyan Chand challenged the way people perceived the game of hockey and, more importantly, challenged the world’s idea of what a country steeped in battles for its independence had to offer the sporting arena. He gave Indians something to be proud of and something to aspire to, showing all along that the Indian spirit truly was unbreakable. Dhyan Chand demonstrated that serving the nation did not only mean doing so at the forefront of politics or with military action; it could also mean utilising the opportunities at hand to bring laurels to your country. This he did with exemplary fortitude, sealing his place in the hall of fame as an Asian sporting hero. Major Dhyan Chand’s legacy lives on. For years, millions have remembered him for his excellence in sport and his spirit of defiance. Unperturbed by what could have held him back, he took India to new heights and gave the country a taste for victory. He had all the makings of a true Indian hero – a passion for his vocation, a love for his family and an unshakeable commitment to his country. This sets Major Dhyan Chand Singh apart as one of the greatest to ever grace the game of hockey.

Notes 1 Nagaraddi B. Mallanna and Dr Shivasharanappa Prasannakumar, “Dhyan Chand: Field Hockey Player,” International Journal of Physical Education, Sports and Health 3, no. 6 (2016): 327–31. 2 Seline Augustine, “Dhyan Chand: Wizard of Hockey,” The Hindu, January 5, 2019, www.thehindu.com/ children/wizard-of-hockey/article25919555.ece. 3 Bhushan Niket, Dhyan Chand:The Legend Lives On (New Delhi: Wiley Eastern, 1992). 4 Dhyan Chand, Goal: An Autobiography with Hockey Hints (Chennai: Sports Star THG, 2018). 5 Indranil Basu, “Dhyan Chand’s 1936 Berlin Olympics Magic Caught on Nazi Filmmaker’s Camera,” Times of India, August 29, 2013, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/sports/hockey/top-stories/DhyanChands-1936-Berlin-Olympics-magic-caught-on-Nazi-filmmakers-camera/articleshow/22127611. cms.

Bibliography Chand, Dhyan. Goal: An Autobiography with Hockey Hints. Chennai: Sports Star THG, 2018. Mallanna, Nagaraddi B., and Dr. Shivasharanappa Prasannakumar. “Dhyan Chand: Field Hockey Player.” International Journal of Physical Education, Sports and Health 3, no. 6 (2016): 327–31. Niket, Bhushan. Dhyan Chand:The Legend Lives on. New Delhi: Wiley Eastern, 1992.

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63 He Zhenliang China’s Mr Olympics Zhang Jie

Introduction He Zhenliang (29 December 1929 – 4 January 2015) was a Chinese sport diplomat. Born in Wuxi in Jiangsu Province of China, He and his family moved in 1938 to the Shanghai French Concession, where he attended a school run by French Jesuits and began to learn French. In 1954, after graduating from the Department of Electrical Engineering at Aurora University (now Fudan University) in Shanghai, He joined the Chinese Communist Party. One year later, he was assigned a role in the State Sports Committee of the PRC (now known as the General Administration of Sport of China) to engage in foreign affairs, which gave a start to his sport career. He served as a French interpreter for China’s Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai. In 1981, He was co-opted as an IOC member. Later, He served many sport organisations in different capacities, including as president of the Chinese Olympic Committee (1989–1994), executive board member of the IOC for three terms (1985–1989, 1994–1998 and 1999–2003), and vice-president of the IOC (1989–1993). Being the vice president of the IOC was the highest position a Chinese has occupied in the world’s premier international sport organisation. For serving the IOC, from being a common IOC member to executive board member and vicepresident consecutively, He was hailed by the Chinese local media for his ‘Triple Jump.’

He Zhenliang and his Olympic dream It was not until November 1979 that the IOC passed the Nagoya Resolution to restore the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to its rightful place.1 It took the State Sports Committee and He Zhenliang a number of years to uphold China’s national sovereignty and gain a more significant say in international sport organisations. At the time, He worked to resolve the external affairs and matters related to Taiwan as the head of the international department of the State Sports Committee.2 He negotiated with Taiwan to promote cross-straits sport exchanges and signed the first cross-straits agreement with it. Two years later, with China’s backing, He was co-opted as a member of the IOC. For He, it was a turning point, as, prior to this, he was engaged mainly in sport diplomacy opposing some of the IOC’s misguided policies that were not in favour of China. It was the turning point not only for him but also for China’s Olympic dream. 596

He Zhenliang, China’s Mr Olympics

The Chinese longed to host the Olympic Games. To value the Olympic spirit, to participate in Olympic affairs, and to hold the Olympic Games had become China’s 100-year dream and unremitting pursuit.3 China’s Olympic dream was also He’s Olympic dream. After a lifetime of involvement in the Olympic cause, everything related to the Olympic Movement aroused exceptionally strong emotions in him.4 Moreover, He spared no efforts during China’s ten-year Olympic bidding process.

The first bid to host the 2000 Olympics (13 May 1991 – 23 September 1993) On 13 May 1991, the 2000 Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee (BOBICO) was launched. From that day on, He, as an executive member of BOBICO, set out on the long journey of China’s Olympic Games bidding process. He was an essential person for China’s bid campaigns. As an IOC member, since the establishment of the PRC, He had witnessed many competitions fought for the rights to host the summer and winter Olympic Games. Having acquired an insight into the Olympic bidding process, He continuously built up his friendships with colleagues and continued to accumulate further knowledge of the Games’ bidding process. During the first bidding, He tried hard to win every possible vote for Beijing. He believed that the success of an Olympic Games bid depended, first, on the quality of the bidding programme and, second, on the ability of the programme to win the understanding and confidence of IOC members.5 After years of development, China was finally ready to host the Olympic Games; however, persuading the IOC members to believe in China’s capacity to host the Games was a problem. Article 37 of the Olympic Charter clearly stipulates that ‘the election of any host city is the prerogative of IOC alone.’6 Therefore, the most important thing in He’s mind was to win the friendship and confidence of IOC members. These members had diverse political views, cultural backgrounds, hobbies and religious beliefs, and many were also influenced by their wives, children and professional relationships.7 Hence, during the bidding years, He was constantly visiting or receiving IOC members to exchange views and win their trust. He flew approximately 640,000 kilometres, which meant that in less than three years, he had circled the globe 16 times.8 He also asked his wife, Liang Lijuan, a senior journalist at the People’s Daily, to take part in the bidding work by becoming a consultant to the public relations department of BOBICO. Both of them frequently travelled together, working for success of the bid. He brought Liang on the scene not for her company but because he believed in a tip that a Japanese IOC member had once given him: ‘Never ignore the work of the members’ wives. A member would definitely not vote for a city that his wife doesn’t want to go to.’9 Actually, taking his wife with him was not only to weave friendly relations with the members’ spouses but also to show China’s openingup; in those days, wives seldom accompanied their husbands to official occasions in China. He and Liang even left a will (He preferred to call it ‘a short letter’) to their children because the couple travelled abroad quite often, advising them to open it in case their parents did not return.10 Fortunately, this letter never needed to be opened. Not only did He deal with the foreign affairs for the bid but he also had to adapt some of the ‘local’ bidding methods to have an ‘international flavour’ that suited the reality of the IOC.11 He also tried hard to change certain bureaucratic practices existing in BOBICO. Unfortunately, Beijing lost the bid to host the 2000 Olympics, for various reasons, by a narrow margin of two votes to Sydney at the 101st session of the IOC in Monte Carlo in September 1993. 597

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The second bid to host the 2008 Olympics (7 April 1999 – 13 July 2001) Far from making He give up, the frustration of the first failure spurred him to work harder to fulfil his and China’s Olympic dream. On 7 April 1999, Beijing submitted its second application to bid, for the 2008 Olympics. Having retired from his administrative posts in 1994, He volunteered to join BOBICO as the oldest volunteer on the bidding committee and was appointed as an adviser and member of the organisation’s executive committee. During the bidding process, He frequently travelled to visit IOC members to introduce the bidding plan and the progress Beijing had made to win possible votes (see Table 63.1). At that time, He was in his seventies and had been suffering from a kidney illness for many years. Therefore, he always travelled with a medicine chest full of Chinese medicines.12 He realised that the main difficulty in Beijing’s winning the bid was that the outside world did not understand how fast China was making progress on both the economic and social fronts. Hence, he proposed that BOBICO members prepare specific videos and magazines to make the Western press aware of the progress China had made, and they also invited them to come to China. This strategy proved very effective. In addition, He did not neglect even minor things like sending New Year’s greetings cards. He believed it was through such small details that IOC members would see the quality of Beijing’s work and the cultural accomplishments of its bidding team.13

Persistent efforts and sincere words win trust He not only campaigned for China to host the Olympic Games for many years but also gave the bidding presentations as a Beijing representative twice. He carefully chose every word of his speeches and spoke alternatively in French and English while stringing Beijing’s several presentations together into one. During the bidding process for the 2000 Olympics, to highlight the significance of the Olympic Games to China, He declared, ‘We are deeply convinced that the Olympic Games belong to all nations, both the developed nations and the developing nations.’15 For the 2008 bid, He concluded his speech with the following words, ‘If you honour Beijing with the right to host the 2008 Olympic Games, I can assure you, my dear colleagues, that, in seven years from now, Beijing will make you proud of the decision you make here today.’16 His sincere words moved many people and were widely read around China. He’s persistent efforts were finally rewarded. At 6:00 p.m. Moscow time on 13 July 2001, the IOC president, Juan Antonio Samaranch, solemnly announced, ‘The Games of the 29th

Table 63.1 He Zhenliang’s Visits during Beijing’s Bids to Host the Olympic Games14

Bid to host the 2000 Olympics

Bid to host the 2008 Olympics

598

Time period

Type of visit

Countries or regions visited

20 Dec. 1990 – 23 Sep. 1993 16 Jan. 1991 – 9 Sep. 1993 9 Nov. 1998 – 17 Jul. 2001 17 Feb. 2000 – 26 Jun. 2001

Visits made.

42

Visits received

51

Visits made

38

Visits received.

45

He Zhenliang, China’s Mr Olympics

Olympiad in 2008 are awarded to the city of Beijing!’ Interestingly, it was He who told Samaranch to pronounce ‘Beijing’ as ‘Beidjing’ in a Spanish accent so that Samaranch could announce the name ‘Beijing’ correctly to the world.17 With this, China’s 100-year Olympic dream finally came true. Beijing’s success in its bid to host the 2008 Olympic Games was regarded as a milestone on the road of national revival.The victory held special significance for He. After ten years of bidding, bringing the Olympiad to China finally turned his life into ‘a life without regrets.’18

Promoting the Olympic spirit Since his joining the IOC, He had set a task for himself of helping sport act as a bridge for strengthening friendship and mutual understanding between peoples – and for carrying forward the Olympic spirit.19 In 1995, He was appointed the chairman of the Cultural Commission (1995–1999) and later the chairman of the Commission for Culture of Olympic Education (2000–2009). He also served as an honorary member of the Commission for Culture and Olympic Education (2009–2015). He made considerable efforts in promoting the Olympic spirit, culture and education. He also advised on the introduction of proper Olympic education to explore and celebrate cultural diversity in the Olympic Movement.20 After Beijing’s success in bidding for the Olympic Games, He transferred his focus to work educating young generations through the Olympic culture to improve their self-improvement spirit and national self-confidence.21 He held that the Olympic Movement belonged to the entire world.Therefore, in the IOC he strived to treat everything from a global point of view and emphasised equal respect for different cultures.22 Until 2004, under He’s leadership, the IOC had organised two contests in sport and art, two contests in sport and literature, and one contest in sport and photography, besides holding many world forums to promote the spread of the Olympic spirit and culture. Samaranch said that He helped the IOC regain its youth. Indeed, some IOC members called He ‘Mr Culture.’23 He was presented with the ‘Golden Flame Award’ by Panathlon International for his efforts in promoting the Olympic concept of combining sport and culture.

Widespread acclaim and opposing voices He devoted his whole life to the development of sport, especially the development of China and the Olympic Movement. He’s lifetime achievements won him a large number of awards and honours, such as the Spanish Grand Cross of the Order of Civil Merit (twice), and the honorary ‘Delphi’ award of the International Olympic Academy (IOA) for his contribution to sport and for his glorious life. Lauded for his work during his lifetime and even after his death, He is addressed as the ‘Father of China’s Olympics’ and ‘Mr Olympics’ by the domestic media. He was also praised as ‘China’s Olympic Crusader’ by the New York Times in a commemorative article, and was twice voted the world’s most influential leader by Germany’s International Sports Newsletter. The honorary president of the IOC, Jacques Rogge, praised He as a remarkable man who served the Olympics all his life – ‘The Olympic Movement would not be in its current position of strength without men like He Zhenliang.’24 Hearing of the death of He in 2015, IOC president Thomas Bach asked for the Olympic flag to be flown at half-mast for three days in tribute to a great Olympic personality. Although He’s lifetime work won him widespread acclaim, he also attracted some controversial accusations at the domestic level. A former top Chinese sport official, minister for sport in China and director of the State Sports Committee,Yuan Weimin, accused He of not following orders and acting on his own in many cases. Yuan, in his book, has claimed that the Chinese 599

Zhang Jie

government had agreed to support Jacques Rogge’s bid for the IOC presidency in exchange for support from European IOC members for Beijing’s bid, the so-called ‘tactic of strategic alliance-making,’ but ‘a senior Chinese member in the IOC purposely defied our strategies and nominated IOC member Kim Un-Yong, causing awkwardness for the Beijing Olympic Committee.’25 The unnamed IOC member is believed to be He Zhenliang. There were also some other opposing voices against him from the State Sports Committee. The accusations caused some debates at home and abroad. Some netizens even denounced He as a ‘traitor,’ while many others strongly supported him. Some foreign media, including the Times of London, reported that China’s former sport minister had written a book revealing that they had made a ‘secret deal’ with the current IOC president Rogge at that time to win the bid for Beijing, and some foreign media even began to slander the IOC. Against the accusations, He kept silent most of the time and only gave a few responses in an interview. He insisted the IOC vote was a secret ballot and Yuan could not know how he voted – ‘The only person who can prove that I voted for Rogge is me myself.’26 He also stated that he would make the right choice in the interest of his country and the Olympic spirit. No one can please everyone, and the same happened in case of He Zhenliang. His dual identity as Chinese administrative official (deputy director of the State Sports Committee) and executive member of IOC, made things hard for him to balance, both in technical and emotional aspects. The special status determined that he should not only fulfil his duties as a government sport official to strive for national interests as much as possible but also consider the development of the international Olympic Movement. He’s work was two-fold: to facilitate communications between Eastern and Western cultures and to guide Chinese organisations to familiarise, understand and adapt to IOC rules, especially during Beijing’s bidding process. It is hard to satisfy all stakeholders; misunderstandings and conflicts are inevitable. This explains why the opposing voices were mainly from He’s colleagues in the State Sports Committee.The limelight given to He by worldwide media also worsened the situation. However, the complicated situation that he found himself in further enhanced He’s heroism.

He Zhenliang: China’s Olympic hero China’ sport diplomat He Zhenliang devoted his entire life to the development of the Olympic Movement in China and around the world. He played a pivotal role in returning China to the Olympics and for over ten years spared no pains to fulfil the country’s hundred-year Olympic dream. Working untiringly, He turned Beijing’s failure in the first bid to historical success in the second bid to host the 2008 Olympics. He was a man of great talent, persistence, patriotism and culture, and he promoted the Olympic spirit and culture in China and around the world. He acted as a bridge connecting Chinese sport with the rest of the world during the historical bidding period and upgraded the cooperation between Chinese sport and the IOC. No one can replace him; He was China’s Olympic hero for who he was and what he did.

Notes 1 Lijuan Liang, He Zhenliang and China’s Olympic Dream, trans. Susan Brownell (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2007), 292. 2 Ibid., 297. 3 Fan Hong and Lu Zhouxiang, “Beijing’s Two Bids for the Olympics:The Political Games,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 29 (2012): 145–56.

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4 Liang, He Zhenliang, 402. 5 Ibid., 407. 6 International Olympic Committee (IOC), 2001 Olympic Charter (Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 2001), 56, www.olympic.org/search?q=Charter. 7 Liang, He Zhenliang, 421. 8 Ibid., 409. 9 Ibid., 427. 10 Ibid., 411. 11 Ibid., 407. 12 Ibid., 337. 13 Ibid., 408–9. 14 Yao Song, “The Research on He Zhenliang’s Contribution to the Olympic Movement Development” (Master’s thesis, Capital Institute of Physical Education, 2017), 25; see also He Zhenliang, He Zhenliang Olympic Bidding Diary [in Chinese] (Beijing: China People’s Publishing House, 2008). 15 Liang, He Zhenliang, 435. 16 Ibid., 492–93. 17 Ibid., 407. 18 Song, “The Research,” 2. 19 Liang, He Zhenliang, 368. 20 Ibid., 384. 21 Keke Hou, “To Educate the Youth Through Olympic Culture [in Chinese],” Guang Ming Daily, April 30, 2008; see also Haihong Jia, “He Zhenliang, Sports. Culture. Education [in Chinese],” People’s Education 20 (2005): 40–41; Zhihua Wang and Yong Xiang, “The Origin of Ancient Olympic Games from the Perspective of Competitive Culture [in Chinese],” Journal of Sports Adult Education 3 (2018): 55–58. 22 Liang, He Zhenliang, 382. 23 Ibid., 389. 24 Li Xiao, “Mr. Olympics Honored at Book Launch,” china.org.cn, April 28, 2007, accessed October 10, 2019. 25 Yuan Shan, Yuan Weimin and China’s Sports (Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 2009), 85–87. 26 Yantao Chen, Pan E, and He Zhenliang, “Who Am I, What I Do and How I Live [in Chinese],” Xiaokang 12 (2009): 40–41; see also Xiang Shen, “The Study on the Social Responsibility of the Olympic Movement,” Journal of Sports Adult Education 1 (2018): 82.

Bibliography Chen,Yantao, Pan E., and He Zhenliang. “Who Am I, What I Do and How I Live [In Chinese].” Xiaokang 12 (2009): 40–41. He, Zhenliang. He Zhenliang Olympic Bidding Diary [In Chinese]. Beijing: China People’s Publishing House, 2008. Hong, Fan, and Lu Zhouxiang. “Beijing’s Two Bids for the Olympics: The Political Games.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 29 (2012): 145–56. Jia, Haihong. “He Zhenliang, Sports. Culture. Education [In Chinese].” People’s Education 20 (2005): 40–41. Liang, Lijuan. He Zhenliang and China’s Olympic Dream. Translated by Susan Brownell. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2007. Luo, Gang, and He Zheng. “China’s Olympic Monument [In Chinese].” Times Figure 2 (2015): 80–81. Shan,Yuan. Yuan Weimin and China’s Sports. Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 2009. Shen, Xiang. “The Study on the Social Responsibility of the Olympic Movement.” Journal of Sports Adult Education 1 (2018): 82. Song, Yao. “The Research on He Zhenliang Contribution to the Olympic Movement Development.” Master’s thesis, Capital Institute of Physical Education, 2017. Wang, Zhihua, and Yong Xiang. “The Origin of Ancient Olympic Games from the Perspective of Competitive Culture [In Chinese].” Journal of Sports Adult Education 3 (2018): 55–58.

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Zhang, Jie. “Reality and Dilemma:The Development of China’s Sports Industry Since the Implementation of the Reform and Opening-Up Policy.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 32, no. 8 (2015): 1085–97. Zhang, Yongheng. China’s Olympics: The Interpretation of Beijing Olympics from of Celebrities from Home and Abroad [In Chinese]. Beijing: China People’s Publishing House, 2008. Zhang, Tingquan. “He Zhenliang: An Outstanding Sport Diplomat [In Chinese].” Outlook Weekly 51 (1995): 32–34.

602

Index

Note: Italicized page numbers indicate a figure on the corresponding page. Page numbers in bold indicate a table on the corresponding page. Abdulaziz, Abdullah Bin 448 acting crowds 476 aikido 11, 59 – 60 Akutagawa, Ayako 76 Al-Ahly football club 432, 478 – 479 Algerian major sport events 440 Algerian nadi (club) 461 Algerian politics of survival 466 – 468 Al Karama (dignity) 432 – 433 All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF) 353 All-India Council of Sports 131 All Japan Kendō Federation (AJKF) 70 All-Korea Baseball Game (1920) 151 All Myanmar Chinlone Conference 101 allochronism 11 Al-Othman, Al-Othman 450 Al-Sabah, Fahd Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber, Jr, 110 – 111 Al-Sabah, Fahd Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber, Sheik 108 – 110, 500 Alter, Joseph 129 Al-Zamalek football club 432, 478 – 479 Anglo-Burmese Wars (1824, 1852, 1885) 98 Anglo-Indian Christians 131 anti-Qing tradition 31 anti-systemic-type anomie 477 Aoun, Michel 441 Arab countries see international sport relations in Arab world; major sport events in Arab countries; individual Arab countries Arab-Israeli conflict 433, 474 Arab politics of football: Arab Spring uprisings 474, 476 – 477; background on 473 – 475; contra-crowds and 477 – 478, 481 – 483; crowd theory 475 – 477; Egyptian football 478 – 479; Euro-American crowd 475; habitus concept 483 – 484; social capital and 477 – 478; symbolic interactionism 478 – 483; symbols and images 481 – 483; Tunisian football 479 – 481

Arab Spring uprisings (2011) 474, 476 – 477 archery 24, 28, 285 Army Boys Sports Company Scheme 283 Art of War (Sunzi) 22 Asahi newspaper 142 ASEAN Para Sports Federation 338 Asian Economic Crisis (2017) 217, 221, 228 – 229, 271 Asian Football Confederation (AFC) Asian Cup: beginnings and foreshadowing 533 – 534; China and 534 – 535; introduction to 533; Israel and 534; political controversies 535; summary of 535 – 536 Asian Football Confederation (AFC) Champions League 242 Asian Games: Asian sport and politics 499 – 501; introduction to 493; origin of 494, 494 – 496; regional bilateral relations 497 – 499; regional cooperation 496 – 497; summary of 501, 501 – 502 Asian Games (1951) 132 Asian Games (1958) 174 Asian Games (1962) 132, 510 Asian Games (1963) 290 Asian Games (1978) 499 Asian Games (1986) 228 Asian Games (1988) 228 Asian Games (1990) 15, 111 Asian Games (2002) 220, 228 Asian Games (2003) 220 Asian Games (2006) 272 Asian Games (2010) 329 – 330 Asian Games (2019) 274 Asian Games (2023) 274 Asian Games Federation (AGF) 107 – 108, 496, 510 Asian Indoor and Martial Arts Games (AIMAG): brief history 528; challenges of 530 – 531;

603

Index

e-sport and 529; future research 531; martial arts and 528 – 529, 529; positive impacts of 530 Asian Indoor Games (AIG): brief history 528; challenges of 530 – 531; e-sport and 529; future research 531; martial arts and 528 – 529, 529; positive impacts of 530 Asian martial arts see martial arts Asian Olympic Movement 58, 91, 105 – 106, 515 – 516 see also Chinese Olympic Movement; Indian Olympic Movement; Japanese Olympic Movement; Korean (colonial) Olympic Movement; Korean (modern) Olympic Movement Asian Relations Conference 496 Asian sport: Asian Games and 493, 499 – 501; heroes and heroines 557; introduction to 1 – 4; mega sporting events 491; rise in industries/ markets 506; safeguarding issues in 305 – 307 Asian Traditional Wushu Championships 552 Asian Wushu Championships 554 Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo (mothers of the disappeared of the Plaza de Mayo) 473 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 96 Athletic Foundation of the University of Tokyo 136 Athletics Federation of India 127 Attractions of China: Album of the Second Far Eastern Championship Games (Commercial Press) 507 Azuchi Momoyama period (1574–1600) 55 baat jaam do in Wing Chun 36 Bach, Thomas 221 badminton 280, 297, 297, 298, 317, 563 – 570 Badminton Association of India 127 Baihequan (White Crane Fist) 31 baku-han system 56 Ballerino, Mike 184 Bangladesh Wushu Association 553 Banri, Kaieda 519 Barkley, Charles 579 basketball in China 579 – 582 Batavia Badminton League (BBL) 563 Bataviasche Badminton Bond (BBB) 563 Baudrillard, Jean 12 Bauman, Zygmunt 15 Beighton Cup 128 Beijing Olympic Games see Olympic Games (2008) Beijing Olympic Games Bid Committee (BOBICO) 597 – 598 Beijing Organising Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG) 539 – 540 Beijing Paralympic Games (2008) 368, 370 Beijing Shichahai Sport School 49 Beijing Sports University Press 361 Beijing TOP (The Olympic Partner) programme 539, 545 Beijing Xiannongtan Sports School 251 604

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 3, 274 – 275 Ben Badis, Abdelhamid 463 Ben Bella, Ahmed 461 – 464 Berber Cultural Movement (MCB) 466 Beveridge, Albert 180 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 316 Bhineka Tunggal Ika (unity in diversity) 393 Big Boss,The film 576 Biu Ji 36 Black Belt magazine 41 Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) 127, 280 Bodhidharma 23 Body in Asia,The collection 315 Bombay Pentangular 128 Book of Master Zhuang,The (Zhuangzi) 20 – 21 Boumezrag, Mohamed 464 Bourdieu, Pierre 377 Bourguiba, Habib 480 Boxer Rebellion 31 Brazilian jiujitsu 11 Brent, Charles 182, 183 British colonialism 96, 99, 102, 127 – 128, 422, 458, 461, 464 British East India Company 190 British imperialism 40, 126, 317, 511 British Judo Association 77 British Olympic Committee 584 British straights settlements in Malaya 169 Bromberger, Christian 457 – 458 Brown, Elwood 182 Bruen, Henry M. 160 Buddhism 25, 97 see also Zen Buddhism Buddhist Chinlone Team 101 Buddhist Society in Great Britain 77 budō (Japanese martial arts) 141, 144, 379 bukatsudō (extracurricular school activities) 378 Bung Karno 290, 291, 293 – 294 Burman: His Life and Notions,The (Scott) 98, 101 Busan Asian Games (2002) 112 bushidō doctrine 90, 141 Butokukai 66 – 68 Buzan, Barry 467 buzkashi 317 Calcutta Cricket Club 128 – 129 Calcutta Royal Golf Club (CRGC) 317 – 318 Central Advisory Board of Physical Education 131 Centre of Excellence Scheme 284 Chang Naizhou 23, 24 Chang Ung 231 Chan Wah Shun 38 Chan (Zen) Buddhism see Zen Buddhism character development in Indonesia 393 – 394 Chehabi, Houchang E. 456 Chen Baosheng 363 Chen Shui-bian 257

Index

Cheung, William 41 Chiang Ching-kuo 257, 260 Chiang Kai-Shek 256 – 259 Chikhi, Said 467 children and sport in China see young children’s sport in China child safety in sport: CHILDREN pillars safeguard 310 – 312; international safeguards 308 – 310; introduction to 305; key definitions in 305; safeguarding issues in Asia 305 – 307; safeguarding issues in Japan 305 – 307; summary of 312 China see People’s Republic of China (PRC); women and sport in China; young children’s sport in China China Athletic Association 119, 361 China Central Television (CCTV) 249 China Daily 349 China Disabled Persons’ Federation (CDPF) 366 China Disabled Sport Association (CPDF) 368 – 370, 369, 370 China Football Super League 249 China General Administration of Sport (CGAS) 347, 351 China National Amateur Athletic Federation (CNAAF) 258 – 259, 560 China’s elite sport system: Chinese Football Association 248 – 250, 250; Chinese Table Tennis Association 250 – 251; introduction to 247 – 248; pragmatism and 251 – 253; summary of 253 China Sports School Society 361 China Welfare Fund for the Disabled 366 Chinese Basketball Association League (CBAL) 581 Chinese Children’s Development Programme 362 Chinese commercialisation of sport see commercialisation of sport in China Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 32, 238, 247, 256 – 257 Chinese Football Association (CFA) 240 – 241, 248 – 250, 250, 534 Chinese Football Association Super League (CSL) 239, 241 Chinese Gung Fu:The Philosophical Art of SelfDefense (Lee) 575 Chinese Lawn Tennis Club 170 Chinese martial arts: in dynastic era 28 – 31; introduction to 24; in twentieth century 31 – 33 Chinese nationalism 24, 34n1, 40, 83, 118 – 121 Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) 40, 256 – 259 Chinese National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) database 361 Chinese Olympic Committee (COC) 109, 110, 118 – 121, 347 Chinese Olympic Movement: Chinese Olympic Committee 109, 110, 118 – 121; gold metal fever

121 – 122; He Zhenliang and 110, 122, 596 – 600; introduction to 118; summary of 122 – 125, 123 – 124 Chinese Sport Ministry 367 Chinese Swimming Club (CSC) 199 Chinese Table Tennis Association (CTTA) 250 – 251 Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee (CTOC) 120, 261 Chinese Wushu Association (CWA) 32, 47 – 48 Chinese Wushu Federation 49 chinlone in Myanmar 96 – 102 chi sao drill 40 Cho, E.J.R. 211 Choi Hong Hi 88 Chōki, Motobu 59 Chomanan, Kriangsak 497 Chosŏn Dynasty (1392–1897) 149 Choy Li Fut 36 Christianity and sport 584 – 585 see also Young Men’s Christian Association Chum Kiu 36 Chun Doo-Hwan 215, 328, 545 Churchill, Frank 183 – 184 Classic of the Dao and Its Power (Laozi) 20 Clausnitzer, Rolf 40 – 41 Club Africain (al-nady al-ifriqi) 480 Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) 523 Cochran, Merle 292 Cold War 430, 497 collective intelligence of crowds 476 collective memory and Olympic legacy 586 – 587 colonial Korean Olympic Movement see Korean (colonial) Olympic Movement colonisation of the Philippines 180 – 186 combative movements 25 Come and Play Scheme 283 commercialisation of sport in China: Chinese Football Association Super League 239, 241; Evergrande Real Estate Group 241 – 242; Guidelines on Promotion of Sport Industry and Sport Consumption 238, 239 – 240; introduction to 238 – 239; Overall Plan for Chinese Football Reform and Development,The 238 – 239, 240 – 241; overcommercialisation issue 242 – 243; summary of 243 – 244 Committee on Gender and Population of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population 326 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 120 communalism 130, 181, 316 Communist Party of China (CPC) 368 Community Connect 283 Compulsory Education Law of the People’s Republic of China 367 Confucianism 23 – 25, 159 – 160, 326 605

Index

Confucius Classroom Annual Meeting (2015) 363 Connerton, Paul 457 – 458 contra-crowds and Arab politics of football 477 – 478, 481 – 483 conventional crowds 476 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 337 Cooper, J. Astley 458 cooperation in Indonesian sport 398 – 399 corporate sport in Japan 378 – 381 Coubertin, Pierre de 494 Council of Physical Education 258 – 259 Council on Women’s Empowerment 389 creativity in Indonesian sport 399 cricket 128 – 129, 169, 192 – 200, 193, 201, 280, 316 Cricket World Cup (1996) 316 Critchley, Thomas 292 crowd theory 475 – 477 cublak-cublak suweng game 394 Cultural Revolution, China 14, 16, 32, 247, 358, 366 cultural sensitivity in CHILDREN pillars 310 Dai Nippon Butokukai 58 – 60, 66 Dalian Football Club 248 – 249 dan-kyu system 76 Daodejing 21 – 23 Daoism 20 – 23, 25 dawlat-al-tarajji football club 481 Dazunquan (Bodhidharma Fist) 31 de Coubertin, Pierre 152 – 153 De Grave, Jeam-Marc 46 delusion as obstacle to enlightenment 23 democracy and collective deliberation 476 Deng Pufang 366 Deng Xiaoping 14 – 15, 121, 271, 366 Department of Physical Education (DPE) 260, 262 – 263 de Silva, Roy 111 Devvaram, Somdev 572 Dewey, George 180 Dewey, John 252, 253 Dhyan Chand Singh 593 – 595 diplomacy and sport see sport diplomacy in Middle East disability sport in China: achievements of 373 – 375, 374; administrative system 368 – 370, 369, 370; beginning of 367 – 368; China Disabled Persons’ Federation 366; competition system 370 – 372, 371, 372; funding sources 372 – 373, 373; introduction to 366; paralympic games period 368; sport policy 367 disability sport in Malaysia: introduction to 336; media coverage of 338 – 339; opportunities and challenges 339 – 340; overview of 337 – 338; summary of 340 – 341 discipline in Indonesian sport 399 606

diversity concerns 303 dojang 12 dōjō 12, 57 – 58, 76 – 77, 306 Dong Shouyi 119 Donike, Manfred 112 Doumergue, Gaston 462 dual colonisation 40 Durand Cup 128 Duroiselle, Charles 97 dynamic views in CHILDREN pillars 311 East Asian Cold War 228 East Asian Games Association (EAGA) 111, 500 ECCBS (Emerging Communitarian Caring Bureaucratic System) 1, 3 Education: Intellectual, Moral and Physical (Spencer) 75 – 76 Edward, Prince 139 Edwards, Clarence 185 Egyptian football 478 – 479 see also Arab politics of football Egyptian major sport events 439 Egyptian Olympic Committee 421, 459 Ek Bharat Shreshtha Bharat (One India, Great India) programme 282 Elias, Norbert 15 elite disability sport in China see disability sport in China elitism 32, 347 emergent norm theory 475 emotional abuse of children 305 emptiness concept 22 enlightenment 22, 23, 105, 160, 162, 165 Enter the Dragon film 41, 576 Entreprise Nationale des Industries de l’Electromenager (ENIEM) 466 esoteric Buddhism 25 e-sport 529 – 530 ethnicity and sport: introduction to 314 – 315; minority concerns 316 – 317; negotiations of 318 – 319; postcolonialism 317 – 318; research agenda 319; sporting bodies 315 – 316 ethnicity and sport in Indonesia: character analysis 397 – 399; cublak-cublak suweng game 394; gobak sodor game 394 – 395; ikaropianik game 397; introduction to 393 – 394; kutau game 395; maggasing game 396; marrraga game 396; Nsya Asya/Tok Asya game 397; pecah piring game 395; summary of 399; Telok Penyok game 395; tempong game 396; traditional games 394 – 396 ethno-linguistic scene 12 Eunah Hong 215 Euro-American crowd 475 European hegemony 1 Evergrande Club 239 Evergrande Real Estate Group (EREG) 241 – 242

Index

expressive crowds 476 external martial arts 23 Far Eastern and South Pacific Disabled Games (FESPIC) 367 Far Eastern Athletic Association (FEAA) 505 Far Eastern Championship Games (FECG): bridging East/West cultural divide 507; establishment of 119, 505; influence of 138 – 139; international relations in East Asia 505 – 506; Manchuria and 142; origin of Asian Games and 494 – 495; prospering physical education in Asia 507; rise in Asian sport industries/markets 506; summary of 507 – 508 Far Eastern Commission 69 Far Eastern Games Federation (FEGF) 494 Far Eastern Olympiad (FEO) 494 Far Eastern Olympic Association (FEOA) 494 Federation Hockey Union 173 Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) 209, 211, 212 – 213, 240, 249 – 250, 250, 421, 429, 465 see also World Cup Federation of Malaya Athletic Union 173 Federation of Malaya Olympic Council (FMOC) 173 Feldenkrais, Moshe 77 female athletes as role models 329 – 330 feminine judo section 59 Fenollosa, Ernest 75 – 76 festival of peace and amity 517 – 518 feudalism 32, 47 field hockey 280, 593, 594 Filastin 459, 460 Filipino colonisation and sports 180 – 186 Fine, Gary 46 First Opium War (1839–1842) 36, 149 Fist of Fury film 576, 577 football: China 238 – 239, 241 – 242, 248 – 250, 250; India 280; Malaya 170, 172 see also Arab politics of football foot-binding in China 346 Forbes, W. Cameron 182, 183, 185 – 186 Fourth Basic Plan for Gender Equality 388 Frankopan, Peter 3 Free Officer’s Revolution 478 – 479 Fujianese White Crane 38 Fukuda, Hachinosuke 75, 76 Fukuda, Keiko 76 Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO): genesis and implementation 510; Indonesia and China 511 – 512; Indonesian sport development and 293 – 294; introduction to 290, 509; political shaping of 511; summary of 512 gekiken see kendō martial arts Gemayel, Gabriel 422, 423 – 424 gender equality 325 – 327

Gender Equality Bureau 388, 389 Gender Gap Index (GGI) 388 Gender Inequality Index (GII) 388 Gender-related Development Index (GDI) 388 General Administration of Sport of China (GAS) 240, 241 German Bundesliga 243 Germany 120, 142 – 143 Giddens, Anthony 477 Gimpo International Airport bombing 110 Global Gender Gap Report (2018) 324 gobak sodor game 394 – 395 gold metal fever, China 121 – 122 golf 329, 382, 589 – 591 gong-fu 575 – 576 Gong Jianping 249 Government-General of Korea (GGK) 150 – 151, 154 Gramsci, Antonio 377 Grand Mass Gymnastics and Artistic Performance Arirang 213 – 214, 222 Grant, Ulysses S. 75 Greater Japan Physical Education Association 139 Great Leap Forward 358 Green Hornet,The TV show 41, 576 Green Standard Army 37 Guangfu Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH) 49 Guangzhou Evergrande Football Club (GEFC) 241 – 242 Guidelines on Promotion of Sport Industry and Sport Consumption 238, 239 – 240 Guilledo, Francisco 184, 185 Gulf Region major sport events 442 Guttman, Allen 476 Gwanseo Sports Association 162 gymnastics 280, 572 – 574 habitus concept in Arab politics of football 483 – 484 Hakudō, Nakayama 59 Han Kuo-yu 257 Hannerz, Ulf 461 Han period 29 Han Soo-ann 165 Hariri, Rafic 441 Hariri, Saad 441 Hartono, Rudy: as Asian hero 568 – 569; as badminton hero 566 – 567; as inspiring athlete 564 – 566; introduction to 563 – 564; nationalism and 567 – 568; summary of 570 Hayato, Ikeda 517 Headlam, Cecil 126 Hefner, Robert 477 Heian period (794–1185) 54 He Zhenliang: Beijing Olympics 598, 598 – 599; BOBICO and 597 – 598; introduction to 596; Olympic dreams 122, 596 – 597; promotion of 607

Index

Olympic spirit 599; support and opposition 110, 599 – 600 Hideo, Murakami 58 – 59 hijab ban by FIFA 421 Hirohito, Prince 139 Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park 517 – 518 Hobsbawm, Eric 457 – 458 hockey 593 – 595 see also field hockey Hokkaido Barbarians Rugby Club 382 holistic views in CHILDREN pillars 310 honesty in Indonesian sport 397 – 398 Hong Kong period (1950s/1960s) 39 – 41 Hongquan (Hong Fist) 31 Houquan (Monkey Fist) 31 Human Development Index (HDI) 2 Human Resources Development in Sports 282 Human Rights Commission of Malaysia 336 Humpreys, Christmas 77 Hung Gar 36, 40 Hung Mun Association 40 Hussein, Uday 422 Hwang Ŭlsu 153, 164 hwarang spirit 90 Hyung-joong Won 215 Hyun-jung Lee 217 Ienao, Iizasa Chōisai 56 ikaropianik game 397 ilustrados in Philippines 181, 186 Imperial Household Agency 76 Imperial Japanese Army 89 Imperial Military Examinations 29, 30 incentives in CHILDREN pillars 310 independence in Indonesian sport 398 Independent newspaper 160 Indian Hockey Federation 127 Indian modern sport: Asian Games and 109; ethnicity and sport 316; introduction to 279; non-governmental sport associations and 284 – 285; overview of 280 – 281, 281; programs of 282 – 284; sport policy and practice 281 – 282; state sport authorities 285; summary of 285 – 286; traditional sport vs. 279 – 280 see also Opposition Defiance Disorder (ODD) in Indian adolescents Indian Olympic Association (IOA) 127, 129 Indian Olympic Movement: colonial origins of 126 – 128; consolidation of modern sport 131 – 132; nationalism and 128 – 130; sport and social divisions 130 – 131 Indian Polo Association 127 Indian Premier League (IPL) 280 Indonesia and GANEFO 511 – 512 Indonesia National Sports Week (PON) 291 – 292 Indonesian Badminton Association (PBSI) 2 97, 563

608

Indonesian National Sports Committee (KONI) 296 – 297 Indonesian Sports Union (PORI) 291 Industrial Revolution 1, 105 Injured and Disabled Sport Association 367 institutionalisation of East Asian sport movement 111 institutionalisation of Western sport in Malay: British straights settlements 169; early Chinese clubs 170; early European/Eurasian clubs 169, 170 – 171; federation of of Malaya 173 – 174; HMS Malaya Cups 172; indirect rule in Malay States 170; inter-settlement and interstate games 171 – 172; introduction to 169; Japanese occupation of Malaya 173; multisporting events 174, 174 – 175; summary of 175, 175 – 176 Instructional Outlines of Kindergarten Education 362 inter-Korean relations 219 – 221, 227 – 229 internal martial arts 23 International Amateur Athletics Federation (IAAF) 108 International Badminton Federation (IBF) 563, 565 International Charter of Physical Education and Sport (UNESCO) 295 – 296 International Federation of Wushu (IWUF) 33, 552, 554 International Judo Federation 75, 78 – 79 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 217, 480 International Olympic Academy (IOA) 599 International Olympic Committee (IOC): Arab sport and 429, 432; Asian Games and 498 – 499; early members of 75, 77, 138, 153; FEAA recognition by 505; GANEFO and 509 – 511; Hong Kong proposal to 273; Indonesian relations with 290; Middle Eastern elites’ participation in 422, 424; Olympic Formula 261; Olympic Korean Peninsula Declaration 232; Pyeongchang Winter Games 221; South Korean proposal to 215 International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) Olympic Studies Centre 107 international sporting events in Koreas: interKorean relations 219 – 221, 227 – 229; introduction to 209 – 210; North Korea 210 – 216; South Korea 215 – 219; summary of 221 – 222, 233 international sport relations in Arab world: collective identity and 432 – 434; introduction to 429; overview of 429 – 432; sport as soft power 434 – 435; summary of 435 International Taekwondo Federation (ITF) 88 interpreting energy (dong jing) 22 Ip Ching 40, 41 Ip Chun 40 Ip Man 37, 39 – 42, 575

Index

Ipoh Club 171 Islam and soccer 460 – 466 Islamic Solidarity Games: challenges to 451 – 452; controversies surrounding 450 – 451; emergence and development of 448 – 450; establishment and objectives 448; introduction to 447; summary of 452 – 453 Islamic Sports Solidarity Federation (ISSF) 447, 448 – 449 Iso, Masamoto 75 Israel 108, 534 J. League 381, 390 James, William 252 Japan 173, 305 – 307, 317, 327 see also sport and social class in Japan; women and sport in Japan Japan Communist Party 516 Japanese Flag Erasure Incident (Ilchang’gi malso sakŏn) 153 Japanese martial arts: early connection to warfare 54 – 56; introduction to 54; jiujitsu 11, 13, 20, 21; judo 58, 59, 75 – 79; jujūtsu 58, 76; karate 11, 16, 34, 59 – 61, 86 – 89, 91 – 92; modern martial arts and 57 – 61; Tokugawa shogunate and 56 – 57 see also kendō martial arts; taekwondo Japanese Ministry of Education 69 Japanese Olympic Movement: introduction to 135; modern sport and 135 – 138, 136, 137; post-war recovery 144; state support and expansion of 138 – 142, 140, 141; war years and 142 – 143 Japanese Student Soccer Championship (1928) 151 Japan Masters Athletics Championships 380 Japan Sports Agency 389 Jeet Kune Do 575 – 577 Jerusalem Sports Club 459 Jet Li 33 – 34 Jeunesse Sportive de Kabylie (JSK) 466 Jiaji League (1994–2003) 581 Jiang Zemin 272 Jigorō, Kanō 21, 58, 59 – 60, 75 – 79, 78, 138, 153, 164 Jingwu Athletic Association 16 Jingwu (Pure Martial) Association 40 Jita Kyōei 71n27 jiujitsu 11, 13, 20, 21 Jixiaoxinshu (New Book Recording Effective Techniques) 85 Johnson, Jack 184, 185 Jong Su-hyon 232 Jordan’s Olympic Committee 421 Joseon Dynasty 160, 163 Joseon Sports Association (JSA) 162, 163 – 164 judo 58, 59, 75 – 79 jujūtsu 58, 76

Kaiseki Academy 75 kakusa shaka (gap society) 382 Kamakura period (1185–1333) 54 – 55 Kamil, Mustafa 478 Kanōkogi, Rena ‘Rusty’ 78 karate 11, 16, 34, 59 – 61, 86 – 89, 91 – 92 Karmakar, Dipa 572 – 574 Karnjanakit, Sombat 497 Kawaguchi, Saburo 77 Kawaishi, Mikinosuke 77 kendō martial arts: Butokukai and 66 – 68; cultivation of the spirit 67 – 68; introduction to 64; new bushidō code 65 – 67; rebirth as sport 69 – 70; return to battle techniques 68 – 69; summary of 70; swordsmanship and 64 – 67 Kenzō, Awa 59 Khalidi, Issam 460 Khelo India Scheme 282 Khrushchev, Nikita 464 Kim Dae-jung 218, 219, 222 Kim Eun-bae 164 Kim Il-Sung 211, 214, 215 Kim Jong-il 211 – 212, 214, 219, 230 Kim Jong-un 211, 212, 220, 230, 232 Kim Seong-jip 165 Kim Sŏngjip 155 Kim Ŭnbae 153 Kim Un Yong 90 – 91 Kim Yo-jung 232 – 233 Kim Yong-ok 89 Kim Yuna 329 Kindergarten Education Work Guide and Provisions 358 Kōdōkan 12, 76 Kōdōkan Kōbudo Kenkyukai 60 – 61 Koguryŏ Dynasty (37 BCE–668 CE) 84 kongsudo martial arts 87 Korea Amateur Sports Association 88 Korea Development Institute (KDI) 217 Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) 90 Korean (colonial) Olympic Movement: establishment of 152 – 155, 153; introduction to 149 – 152; summary of 155 Korean Football Association (KFA) 547 Korean martial arts 84 – 86, 85 Korean (modern) Olympic Movement: evolution of 161 – 163; germination of 159 – 161; rise of 163 – 165 Korean National Baseball Championship 162 Korean National Gymnastics Competition 163 Korean nationalism 88 – 80 Korean National Secondary School Basketball Tournament 163 Korean National Table Tennis Tournament 163 Korean National Weight Lifting Championship 163 Korean National Wrestling Competition 163

609

Index

Korean Professional E-Sports Association (KESPA) 530 Korean Sports Association (Chosŏn ch’eyukhoe) 151, 154 Korean Sports Confederation (Chosŏn ch’eyuk hyŏphoe) 151 Korean War (1950–1953) 87 Korea Olympic Committee 165 Korea Taekwondo Association 88 Korea Taesudo Association (KTA) 88, 91 Kosaki, Katsuko 76 Krishnan, S. Radha 338 Kublai Khan 29 Kumar, Ashish 573 Kundalini Yoga 407, 413 Kung Xiang-xi 119 kutau game 395 Kuwait 108 – 109, 112 kwŏnbŏp martial arts 87 Kwon Tae-ha 153, 164 – 165 kwoon 12 Kyŏngsŏng-Pʻyŏngyang Annual Soccer Match 152 Ladies Lawn Tennis Club (LLTC) 197, 197 Lake Club 170 – 171 Lakshmibai National Institute of Physical Education (LNIPE) 282 Lam, Carrie 275 Lantern Festival 29 Lawn Tennis Association of Malaya (LTAM) 172 leadership in CHILDREN pillars 310 League of Nations 67, 68 Lebanese major sport events 441 – 442 Lebanese Olympic Committee 424 Lee, Bruce: Jeet Kune Do and 575 – 577; legacy of 577 – 578; life and movies 41, 575 – 576; Wing Chun and 41 Lee Myung-bak 230 Lee Si-young 329 Lee Teng-hui 257, 261 Leland, George A. 136, 378 Leong Sin Man Cup 172 – 173 Leung Chun-ying 271, 274 – 276 Leung Jan 38 Lever, Janet 456 Liang Lijuan 597 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 518 Liddell, Eric: collective memory and Olympic legacy 586 – 587; introduction to 583; modern physical education in China 583 – 587; Olympism and 586; physical education as body building 585; social services for sport 585 Li Gi 160 Li Jinfan 48 Lippi, Marcello 242 Liu Changchun: early life 559; Olympics and 559 – 561; post-Olympics 561 610

Liverani, Andrea 461 Lodge, Henry Cabot 180 Luang Sukhum 523 Luohanquan (Arhat Fist) 31 Macnaghten, Chester 126 Maddison, Angus 1 maggasing game 396 major sport events in Arab countries: globalisation strategy 438; introduction to 437; in MENA region 438 – 439; Middle Eastern countries 441 – 444; North African countries 439 – 440; summary of 444 Malacca Cricket Club 169 Malacca Recreation Club 169 Malaya Badminton Association (MBA) 172 – 173 Malayan Football Association (MFA) 172 Malayan sport see institutionalisation of Western sport in Malay Malaysian Blind Sports Association 338 Malaysian ethnicity and sport 316 – 317 male gaze 329 – 330 Mangan, J.A. 160 Maouche, Mohamed 464 Mao Zedong 47 – 48, 256 – 257, 498 market-oriented economic reform 359 marrraga game 396 martial arts: AIG and AIMAG 528 – 529, 529; Asian Indoor Games and 528 – 529, 529; budō 141, 144, 379; Chinese martial arts 24; Daoism and 20 – 23; external/internal martial arts 23; introduction to 20; kongsudo 87; Korean martial arts 84 – 86, 85; kwŏnbŏp 87; political leadership over martial arts 47 – 48; sportification of 83; traditional Asian martial arts 11 – 13 see also Asian Indoor and Martial Arts Games; Chinese martial arts; Japanese martial arts; kendō martial arts; taekwondo Martial Arts Promotion Committee 68 Martial Arts Vocational College (Budō Senmon Gakkō) 67 martial dances 29 martial law (1949–1987) in Taiwan 259 – 260 martial ryū 55 – 57 Marzbach, George 478 Mason, Tony 473 Mayer, Sarah 77 Ma Ying-jeou 257 McGee, WJ 184 McKerchar, Tom 584 mega sporting events in Hong Kong: under Carrie Lam 275; under Donald Tsang 271, 273 – 274; introduction to 271; under Leung Chun-ying 271, 274 – 275; under Tung Chee-hwa 271, 272 – 273 mega sporting events in South Korea 215 – 219 Meiji Restoration 89

Index

Meiji Shrine Games (1924) 138 – 139, 141, 142, 151 Mencius 23 – 24 menkyo system 76 merit-making in Buddhism 97 Meynaud, Jean 463 Middle East and North Africa (MENA): Islam and soccer 460 – 466; major sport events 438 – 439, 441 – 444; modern citizens and 458 – 459; national identity of 457 – 458; occupation and conquest 456 – 457; politics of survival 466 – 468; summary of 468; Zionism and 457 – 460 Middle East sport diplomacy see sport diplomacy in Middle East Mien Yao 316 military governments in Latin America 473 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 325 Minamoto,Yoritomo 54 – 55 Ming dynasty (1368–1644) 24, 29 – 31 Ministry of Education, Culture, Sport, Science and Technology (MEXT) 307, 379 – 380, 382, 386 minority concerns in sport see ethnicity and sport Mixed Martial Arts (MMA) 61 Miyamoto, Musashi 56 Miyazaki Golf Academy 382 ‘M Mark’ system 273 modern physical education in China 583 – 587 Mohamad Puzi, Mohamad Ridzuan 339 Mohammedan Sporting 130 Mongol Empire 29 Montessori Method 360 Moon Jae-in 218 – 219, 231 Morihei, Ueshiba 59 Morioka,Yasuko 76 Moroccan major sport events 440 Mpu Tantular 290 Muay Thai fighters 83 Mukden Incident between Japan and China 506 Munemori,Yagyu 56 Muromachi period (1336–1573) 55 muscular Christianity concept 182 musha shugyō 56 Muslim Women’s Games 448 Muye Chepo (Illustrated Martial Arts Records) 85, 85 Muye Tobo T’ongji (Comprehensive Illustrated Manual of Martial Arts) 86 Myanmar, chinlone in 96 – 102 Myanmar Honourable Naypyidaw Chinlone Team 100 – 101 mystic practices 83 nadi (club), Algeria 461 Nagoya Resolution 596 Nam Sung-yong 164 Nandi, Bisweswar 572 Nandy, Ashis 128 Nanking Incident (1937) 69

Nasser, Gamal Abdel 478 – 479 Nasser, Sheikha Moza bint 420 National Comorbidity Survey 406 National Council on Physical Fitness and Sport 261 National Disabled Games of China (1984) 370 – 371 National Fitness Council 101 National Fitness Programme (NFP) 347 National Four-Year Sports Programme 260 – 261 National Geographic magazine 184 National Institute of Gymnastics 136 National Institute of Sports in Patiala 132 National Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH) 49 National Liberation Front’s (FLN) 463 – 466 National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health 406 National Medium and Long-Term Education Reform and Development Plan (2010–2020) 360, 362 National Olympic Committee (NOC) 422, 448, 499, 511 National Paralympian awards 338 National People’s Congress 274 National Skill Development Corporation (NSDC) 284 National Sport Bureau 47 – 48 National Sports Council 338 National Sports Development Fund 282 National Sports Festival 89 National Sports Institute 337 National Sports Talent Contest (NSTC) 283 National Sports Training Centre (NSTC) 261, 263 nation branding 210, 211, 214, 221 – 222, 419 – 420, 425 Native Affairs Bureau 462 Nayudu, C.K. 129 Nazi Games (1936) see Olympic Games (1936) neglect of children 305 Nehru, Jawaharlal 131, 496 – 497 neoconfucianism 24 – 25, 57, 65, 86 Nepomuceno,Vincente 185 Netaji Subhas National Institute of Sports (NSNIS) 282 networks in CHILDREN pillars 311 new bushidō code 65 – 67 New Emerging Forces (NEFOs) 511 New Order (1967–1998), Indonesia 290, 294 – 299 New York Summer Paralympic Games (1984) 367 Ng Moy 37 – 38 Nippon Budokan 70 Nishikubo, Hiromichi 67 Nixon, Richard 430 Nomura, Tadahiro 78 non-action concept 22 Non-Aligned Movement 509 – 510 non-contention (bu zheng) 22 611

Index

non-governmental sport associations 284 – 285, 431 non-violence (ahimsa) 23 Nordau, Max 459 Noritomi, Masako 76 North African major sport events 439 – 440 North Korea: boycott of 1988 Olympics 218; inter-Korean relations 219 – 221; pan-Korean unity 217 – 218; sporting events in 210 – 216; summary of 221 – 222 see also international sporting events in Koreas; Olympic Games (1988) North-South Korean politics 109 – 110, 112 Nsya Asya/Tok Asya game 397 Oberle, Thierry 465 Oda Nobunaga period (1534–1582) 55 Oh-Seong Gurakbu team 162 Okinawan karate 60 Old Established Forces (OLDEFOs) 511 Old Order (1945–1967), Indonesia 290 – 294 Olympic Broadcasting Services (OBS) 539 Olympic Council of Asia (OCA): Asian Games Federation 107 – 108; Asian Indoor Games and 528, 530 – 531; early politics of 109 – 111; foundation of 108 – 109; introduction to 107; leadership change 111 – 112; regional and global politics 499 – 501; summary of 112 – 113 Olympic Council of Thailand (OCT) 522 Olympic Game politics: festival of peace and amity 517 – 518; in imperialist Japan 516 – 517; introduction to 515 – 516; XXXII Summer Olympiad and 519 Olympic Games (1928) 465 Olympic Games (1932) 142 Olympic Games (1934) 478 Olympic Games (1936) 142 – 143, 154, 164, 444 Olympic Games (1940) 143, 144, 154 – 155 Olympic Games (1944) 143 Olympic Games (1948) 132, 290 – 292, 496 Olympic Games (1952) 119 – 120, 247 Olympic Games (1956) 120, 132, 465 Olympic Games (1960) 165 Olympic Games (1976) 165 Olympic Games (1980) 165 Olympic Games (1984) 120, 165, 430 Olympic Games (1988): bid for 229 – 230; globalisation and 546 – 548; inter-Korean relations 216, 219 – 221, 227 – 229; introduction to 227, 545; IOC and 120; mega sporting events and 215 – 219, 546; OCA and 109, 110; overview of 231 – 233; preparation for 230 – 231; summary of 233, 548 – 549; Taiwan and 260 Olympic Games (1992) 298 Olympic Games (1996) 120 Olympic Games (2000) 111, 120 Olympic Games (2004) 120 – 121, 220 Olympic Games (2006) 220, 228 612

Olympic Games (2008) 122, 272, 273, 294, 308, 359 – 360, 538 – 542 Olympic Games (2010) 329 Olympic Games (2016) 212, 419 Olympic Games (2018) 218 – 219 Olympic Games (2020) 144, 519 Olympic Games (2022) 364 Olympic Korean Peninsula Declaration 232 Olympic Movement see Asian Olympic Movement Olympic Solidarity funds 108 Ōmikami, Amaterasu 65 – 66 Ŏm Poktong 152 O’Neal, Shaquille 579 ‘One Country, Two Systems’ principle 271, 272 – 273, 275 Opium War (1840s) 271 Opposition Defiance Disorder (ODD) in Indian adolescents: importance of yoga 407 – 413, 408 – 412; introduction to 404 – 405; management of 405; objective of study on 405 – 406; research and development on 406 – 407 Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 447 – 453 Organization of American States (OAS) 473 Oriental Cricket Club 128 orientalism 11, 314, 493 Orthodox Christian clubs 460 Overall Plan for Chinese Football Reform and Development,The 238 – 239, 240 – 241 Oxford Authentics 126 Pak Harto 290, 294 Pakistan ethnicity and sport 317 Pak Se Ri 329 Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) 108 Pan-American games (1951) 473 Pan-Arab Games (1951) 439, 474 Pancasila (official ideology of the state) 393 Paralympic Council of Malaysia 338 Paralympic Sports Excellence Centre 337 Parent Sports Organisation (IOCO) 296 Park Chung-Hee 88 – 90, 215, 328 Park Eun-sik 160 Park Gun-Man 547 Park Jong-ah 232 Park Yong-Soo 547 Pasha, Mohammed Tahre 459 patriotism 59, 66, 121, 125, 215, 327, 441, 463, 467, 495, 577 pecah piring game 395 Peirce, Charles Sanders 252 Pekin Pyan Win Ko 99 Penang Chinese Recreation Club 170 Penang Cricket Club 169 Penang Football League 170

Index

Penang Recreation Club (PRC) 169 pencak silat 169, 524 People’s Daily 121, 367, 597 People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) see North Korea People’s Republic of China (PRC): Asian Football Confederation (AFC) Asian Cup 534 – 535; Asian Games and 497 – 498; basketball and 579 – 582; commercialisation of sport in 238; establishment of 119, 121; ethnicity and sport 317, 318; GANEFO and 511 – 512; modern physical education in 583 – 587; political leadership over martial arts 47 – 48; promotion of women in sport 347 – 348; social interactions in taijiquan communities 46; sport policy and practice in Taiwan 256 – 257 see also China’s elite sport system; Chinese martial arts; Chinese Olympic Movement; commercialisation of sport in China; disability sport in China; women and sport in China; young children’s sport in China Perak Club 169, 170 – 171 Persons with Disabilities Act (2018) 337 Philippine Cultural Festival 507 Philippine Free Press 494 Philippines Amateur Athletic Federation 182 physical abuse of children 305 Physical Education and Sport for Young Children 361 physical education in Asia 66, 507 Physical Training for Schools in Burma 100 Pinson, Joel 49 political censorship 32 political leadership over martial arts 47 – 48 Pol Pot 523 PON Games 563 – 564 postcolonialism and ethnicity in sport 317 – 318 pragmatism and China’s elite sport system 251 – 253 Praphat Charusatien 522 Prasad, Rajendra 496 Prataatmadja, H.R. Rochdi 563 Priority Policy to Accelerate Women’s Empowerment (2019) 388 Pritchard, Norman 131 purchasing power parity (PPP) 279 Pyeongchang Winter Games see Olympic Games (1988) Qatar Olympic Committee 528 Qatar’s major sport events 443 – 444 qi 21 – 22 qigong 16 Qing dynasty (1644–1911) 21, 23, 29 – 31, 149, 271, 559 Qin Shi Huang, Emperor 28 – 29 Quezon, Manuel 186

Raffles Cricket Club 199 Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) 466 Rangoon College Literary and Debating Society 100 rectification programme 14 – 15 Red Turban Revolt (1854–1856) 36, 37, 38 Reform Order (1998-present), Indonesia 290 Regulations on the Work of College Sports 367 Republic of China in Taiwan (ROC) 256 – 257, 498 Republic of China period (1911–1949) 37, 38 – 39 Republic of China Sports Federation (ROCSF) 261, 263 Republic of Indonesia Olympic Committee (KORI) 291 Republic of Korea (ROK) see South Korea resources in CHILDREN pillars 311 responsibility in Indonesian sport 398 Riner, Teddy 78 Rodman, Dennis 230 Rogge, Jack 273 Rogge, Jacques 539, 600 Roh Moo-hyun 218 Roh Mung-Woo 547 Roosevelt, Theodore 77, 180 Royal Calcutta Golf Club 127 Royal Calcutta Turf Club 127 Rugby World Cup (1995) 431 Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) 66, 76, 138, 149 Ryan, Alexandra 13 – 14, 15 Ryōma, Sakamoto 57 – 58 ryū development 55 – 57 Samahito, Suptir 497 Samaranch, Juan Antonio 500 Samsung Economic Research Institute 545 samurai culture 57, 64 – 67 Sangermano, Father 98 Satsuma Rebellion (1877) 58 Saudi Arabian major sport events 442 – 443 Scott, James G. 98, 101 SEAP Games Federation (SEAPGF) 522 – 523 Second Opium Wars (1856–1860) 36 Second Sport Basic Plan for Gender Equality 389 sectarianism 47, 462 Sejarah Melayu text 97 Selangor Chinese Recreation Club 171 Selangor Club 169, 170 – 171 self-cultivation 20, 23, 25, 34, 65 Self-Defence Forces (SDF) 518 self-orientalisation 12 Senam Pagi Indonesia (SPI) 295 Seo Jae-pil 160 Seoul 1988 Organising Committee (SLOOC) 110 sepak raga 96 – 102, 169 sepak takraw 96 – 102, 524 613

Index

Seri Pak: amateur days 589 – 590; introduction to 589; legacy of 590 – 591; professional achievements 590; summary of 591 sexual abuse of children 305 Shang dynasty (1600–1046 BC) 28 Shaolin fighting monks 83 Shaolin Temple 23 Shengchao Ding Sheng Wannian Qing (Everlasting) 38 Shigeharu, Nakano 516 – 517 Shintarō, Kakaoka 57 – 58 Shintō Muso ryū 56 Shirō, Saigō 76 shōen tenure system 54 Shōwa period (1926–1945) 59 shūdan kōdō (collective behaviour) 379 Siddiqui, F.R. 553 Sieh Kok Chi 338 Silk Road era 3 Singaporean modern sport: demographics of 191 – 192; dominant games 195, 196, 196; expansion of 193 – 195, 195; foundation of 192 – 193, 193; growth of 200, 202; introduction to 190 – 191, 191, 191; main clubs 195 – 199, 200; in schools 199; serious competition 200; shaping dominant culture 193; slow rise of 192; Societies Ordinance and 195; summary of 203; YMCA in 202 – 203 Singapore Cricket Club (SCC) 169, 192 – 200, 193, 201 Singapore Golf Club 197 – 198, 198 Singapore Recreation Club (SRC) 169, 194, 196 – 197 Singapore Sporting Club 202 Singapore Swimming Club (SSC) 198 – 199, 199 Singh, Maharaja Yadvendra 496 Sino-Japanese War (1894–1995) 66, 143, 149, 495 sipa 96 – 102 Siu Lim Tao 36 six reforms (roku dai kaikaku) 381 Smith, Anthony D. 456 Smith, Kenny 579 soccer and Islam 460 – 466 Sŏ Chŏnggwŏn 152 social capital 477 – 478 social services for sport 585 social stratification 4, 132, 207, 303, 377, 383 social transformations online 476 soft power and sport 434 – 435 Sohn Kee-chung 164 – 165 Solidarity of International Judo Education 79 Sondhi, G.D. 496 Song dynasty (960–1126) 29 Song Ruhai 119 Son Kijŏng 153 Southeast Asian Games (SEA Games): core principles 523 – 525; historical foundations 614

522 – 523; introduction to 522; summary of 525 – 526 Southeast Asian Peninsular (SEAP) Games 174, 174 – 175, 522 – 523 South Korea: globalisation and 546 – 548; interKorean relations 219 – 221; mega sporting events in 215 – 219, 546; North-South Korean politics 109 – 110, 112; pan-Korean unity 217 – 218; Seoul Olympics 545; summary of 221 – 222; taekwondo as nominal sport of 88 – 90 see also international sporting events in Koreas; Olympic Games (1988); women and sport in South Korea South Korean Unification Church 90 Soviet Union 109, 120, 211, 216, 228, 377, 423, 500, 512 Special Administrative Region (SAR) government 271 – 273 Special Area Games Scheme (SAG) 283 – 284 Special Needs Bursary scholarships 339 Spencer, Herbert 75 – 76 Sport, Gender and Development (SGD) framework 326 sport and social class in Japan: introduction to 377; in modern Japan 377 – 379; in neoliberal Japan 380 – 382; in post-war Japan 379 – 380, 380; summary of 382 – 383 sport as soft power 434 – 435 sport diplomacy in Middle East: historical overview 420 – 421; international sporting events 424; introduction to 419 – 420; Olympic Games and 421 – 423; regional sporting events 423 – 424; summary of 424 – 425; World Cup and 421 Sport for All (SFA) organisations 328 sport for children in China see young children’s sport in China sport-for-development (SFD) movement 325 – 326 sportification of martial arts 83 sport in West Asia and the Middle East 417 Sport Ministry 32 – 33, 248, 367 sport policy and practice: China 239, 367; India 281 – 282; Korea 210; overview of 203, 207 sport policy and practice in Indonesia: community-based sport development 295 – 296; elite sport development 296 – 299, 297, 298; GANEFO and 290, 293 – 294; introduction to 289 – 290; in New Order 290, 294 – 299; in Old Order 290 – 294; physical education and school sport 292 – 293 sport policy and practice in Taiwan: development of 257 – 258, 258; introduction to 256; liberal democracy 260 – 261; martial law period 259 – 260; political context of 256 – 257; Sports Administration 264 – 265; Sports Affairs Council 261 – 264, 262, 263; summary of 266 Sports Administration (SA) 264 – 265

Index

Sports Affairs Council (SAC) 261 – 264, 262, 263 Sports Authority of India (SAI) 281 – 282, 283, 285 Sports Development Authority of Tamil Nadu (SDAT) 285 Sports Federation and Olympic Committee of Hong Kong, China (SF&OC) 272, 274 sports in the Philippines 180 – 186 Spring and Autumn period 28 sprit and kendō martial arts 67 – 68 ssirŭm (Korean traditional wrestling) 152 stakeholder engagement in CHILDREN pillars 311 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 361 State Sports General Administration 249 Straits Chinese National Football Association 170 Straits Chinese Recreation Club (SCRC) 170, 194, 195, 199 Strange, F.W. 378 Suez Canal 191 Sun Jianguo 45 – 46, 48 Sunni Islam 420 supreme fighter (al-mujahid al-akbar) 480 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 340, 391 sword dances 29 swords/swordsmanship 57, 64 – 67 symbolic interactionism 478 – 483 Syngman, Rhee 87, 88 Syrian Constitution (1973) 420 Table Tennis Super League 251 Tadaaki, Jiroemon 56 taekwondo: formal process of 86 – 88, 87; introduction to 11, 12, 83 – 84; Korean martial arts and 84 – 86, 85; as nominal sport of South Korea 88 – 90; as Olympic sport 90 – 91; summary of 91 – 92 taijiquan: as competitive sport 49 – 50; introduction to 11, 13 – 16, 45 – 47; political leadership over martial arts 47 – 48; summary of 51; Wu lineage of 48 – 49 Taishō democracy era (1912–1926) 59, 139 Taiwan 112, 119 – 120 Taizuquan (Emperor Taizu Fist) 31 Takamori, Saigō 58 Tang Dynasty (618–907) 29, 121 tangsudo martial arts 87 Tani, Ryoko 78 Tao of Jeet Kune Do,The (Lee) 576 Telok Penyok game 395 tempong game 396 tennis 172, 250 – 251, 280 Tenshin Shōden Katori Shintō ryū 56 Thirteenth Summer Paralympics Games in Beijing (2008) 366 Thongchai Winichakul 96 – 97, 102 Three Nations Commission (KTN) 292 Tiananmen Square uproar 110

Tianjin Daily 560 Tilly, Charles 477 – 478 TIME Magazine 464 – 465 Tjoa Seng Tiang 563 Tohoku Earthquake 386 – 388, 387 Tokugawa period (1603–1867) 64 – 67 Tokugawa shogunate 56 – 57, 64 – 65, 75, 382 Tokyo Olympiads 515 Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games (2020) 387 Tokyo Olympic Games (1964) 60 Tokyo Six University Baseball League 143 tolerance in Indonesian sport 398 Tomita, Tsunejiro 76 Totsuya Yoshin ryū 76 Toyotomi Hideyoshi period (1537–1598) 55 traditional Asian martial arts 11 – 13 Traditional Chinese Medicine 348 Traditional Sports Festival in China 507 ‘TRUDI’ (Territorial State, the state that secures the Rule of Law, the Democratic State, and the Intervention State) 1 Tsai Ing-wen 257 Tsang, Donald 271, 273 – 274 Tsoying Training Centre 261 Tung Chee-hwa 271, 272 – 273 Tunisian football 479 – 481 see also Arab politics of football Tunisian major sport events 439 – 440 Turkey’s Olympic Committee 421 Turkish Constitution (1982) 420 Twenty-One Demands 495, 506 Two Courts period 55 Tyndale-Biscoe, Cecil Earle 126 ultra-nationalistic organisations 59 – 60 ultras phenomenon 481 – 483 undōbu (sport clubs) 378 UN General Assembly 231 United Arab Emirates (UAE) 533 United Arab Republic (UAR) 479 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 305, 308 United States House of Representatives 90 ‘Unity in Diversity’ as Indonesian motto 290 university sport clubs 136 – 138, 137 UN Political Declaration on Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) 407 U.S. Women’s Open Golf Championship 590 van Zeeland, Paul 292 Vargas, George B. 496 Ving Tsun Athletic Association (VTAA) 37 violent ultra-nationalistic organisations 59 – 60 Vision 2020 284 Wang Jianlin 249 Wang Zhengnan 24 615

Index

Wang Zhengting 119, 495, 560 Warring States period 20, 28 Washington Naval Disarmament Treaty 67, 68 Waterman, Joe 183 – 184 Way of the Dragon film 576 Westernisation in China 119 Western sport in Malay see institutionalisation of Western sport in Malay Wile, Douglas 13 – 14, 15 Wing Chun: as global art 41 – 42; Hong Kong period 39 – 41; introduction to 16, 36 – 38; Republic era 38 – 39 without combat (bu zhan) 22 women and sport in China: future of 353 – 354; historical background 346; ideological obstructions 351; inadequate provisions for 351; institutional changes 349 – 350; internal motivations for 348 – 349; introduction to 345; limitations to 350 – 353; promotion of 347 – 348; social forces in rise of 346 – 350; stratification of women’s status 351 – 352; unfinished process of 352 – 353 women and sport in Japan: activities by generation 389; current status of 388; female officers/leaders of organisations 389 – 390; gender equality policy 388 – 389; introduction to 386; Japanese Olympic Movement 140; summary of 390 – 391; Tohoku Earthquake and 386 – 388, 387 women and sport in South Korea: gender equality and 325 – 327; history and policies 327 – 329; introduction to 324 – 325; role models 329 – 330; summary of 330 women in development (WID) 325 – 326 women’s mass sport (qunzhongtiyu) 345 Women’s Soccer World Cup 212 – 213 Wong Shun Leung 41 Wood, Leonard 185 – 186 Worcester, Dean 181, 184 World Bank 461, 480 World Cup (1934) 430, 432 World Cup (1950) 132 World Cup (1970) 510 World Cup (2002) 135, 216 – 217, 228 – 229, 308, 545 World Cup (2011) 386 World Cup (2014) 474 World Cup (2022) 421, 434, 474, 533 World Health Organisation (WHO) 305 World Judo Championships 77 World Ranking List (WRL) 78 World Taekwondo Championships 91, 219 World Taekwondo Federation (WTF) 84, 91 World Taekwondo Headquarters 90 – 91 World Taekwondo (WT) 84 World Trade Organization (WTO) 359 Wudang school 30 Wu lineage of taijiquan 48 – 49 616

wushu elite sport: creation of 46, 48; introduction to 11, 16; overview of 551 – 554, 552, 554; training of 49 Wushu Federation of Asia (WFA) 551 Wushu Taolu National Championship (2019) 50 Wu Yuxiang 45, 48 Wuzuquan (Five Ancestors Fist) 31 Xi Jinping 3, 274 – 275, 363 Yamashita,Yoshitsugu (Yoshiaki) 76, 77 Yan’an Conference on Literature and Art (1942) 47 Yao Ming: basketball and masculinity 579 – 580; global marketing of 580; reformation and governance of Chinese basketball 581 – 582; as sport celebrity 580 – 581 Yatsushi, Kitani 518 Yim Wing Chun 37 – 38 Yi Sangbaek 155 Yiu Choi 39 Yi Yŏngmin 152 yoga for ODD adolescents in India 407 – 413, 408 – 412 Yokoyama, Sakujiro 76 young children’s sport in China: future prospects 363 – 364; global significance of 359 – 360; historic review 357 – 359; introduction to 357; market forces 360 – 362; state policy and 362 – 363 Young-han Cho 217 Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA) 99 – 100 Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) 16, 99 – 100, 105, 118 – 119; basketball in China 579 – 580; FECG and 507 – 508; founding of Asian Games 493 – 495, 501; Indian Olympic Movement 129 – 130; Japanese Olympic Movement 138; Korean (colonial) Olympic Movement 149 – 150; Korean (modern) Olympic Movement 160 – 163; in Singapore 202 – 203; sports in the Philippines 181 – 183, 186 Yuan dynasty (1271–1368) 29 Yuen Kay San 39 Yuna Kim 232 Yunus, Mohammad 292 Yuriko, Koike 519 Zaghloul, Saad 478 Zamalek football club 432 Zen Buddhism 23, 65, 77, 378 Zhang Jianqiang 249 Zhang Sanfeng 24, 30 Zhou dynasty (1046–256 BC) 28 Zionist/Zionism 457 – 460 Zuizan, Takecki 57 – 58