The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats [1 ed.] 9781614998020, 9781614998013

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THE RISK OF SKILLED SCIENTIST RADICALIZATION AND EMERGING BIOLOGICAL WARFARE THREATS

The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2017. ProQuest

NATO Science for Peace and Security Series This Series presents the results of scientific meetings supported under the NATO Programme: Science for Peace and Security (SPS). The NATO SPS Programme supports meetings in the following Key Priority areas: (1) Defence Against Terrorism; (2) Countering other Threats to Security and (3) NATO, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue Country Priorities. The types of meeting supported are generally “Advanced Study Institutes” and “Advanced Research Workshops”. The NATO SPS Series collects together the results of these meetings. The meetings are co-organized by scientists from NATO countries and scientists from NATO’s “Partner” or “Mediterranean Dialogue” countries. The observations and recommendations made at the meetings, as well as the contents of the volumes in the Series, reflect those of participants and contributors only; they should not necessarily be regarded as reflecting NATO views or policy. Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) are high-level tutorial courses to convey the latest developments in a subject to an advanced-level audience. Advanced Research Workshops (ARW) are expert meetings where an intense but informal exchange of views at the frontiers of a subject aims at identifying directions for future action. Following a transformation of the programme in 2006 the Series has been re-named and reorganised. Recent volumes on topics not related to security, which result from meetings supported under the programme earlier, may be found in the NATO Science Series. The Series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, in cooperation with NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division. Sub-Series

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The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2017. ProQuest

The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats

Edited by

Maurizio Martellini Secretary General, Landau Network Fondazione Volta, Como, Italy

and

Jason Rao

Copyright © 2017. IOS Press, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Advisory Chair, Health Security Partners, Washington DC, US

Amsterdam • Berlin • Washington, DC Published in cooperation with NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division

The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2017. ProQuest

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats Como, Italy 29 November – 2 December 2016

© 2017 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher. ISBN 978-1-61499-801-3 (print) ISBN 978-1-61499-802-0 (online) Library of Congress Control Number: 2017952286 Publisher IOS Press BV Nieuwe Hemweg 6B 1013 BG Amsterdam Netherlands fax: +31 20 687 0019 e-mail: [email protected]

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Preface Maurizio MARTELLINI, Ph.D. a,1 and Jason RAO, Ph.D. b a Landau Network Fondazione Volta (Como, Italy) b Health Security Partners (Washington, DC, USA)

Introduction The main objective of this Advanced Research Workshop titled “The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats” was to assess the risk and ability for radical terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State, to recruit highlyskilled scientists. Indeed, over the past years, it has become increasingly clear that the Islamic State is both willing and capable of online recruitment of Westerners to their cause. Through Facebook, Twitter, and other social media, the Islamic State has been able to attract recruits previously thought unlikely to espouse jihad. This workshop was one-of-a-kind in that it brought together unique perspectives from the social science community and the scientific technical community to discuss the risks of the radicalization of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) skilled scientists.

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Preface Skilled scientists are not immune to the appeal of terrorist groups. Indeed, terrorist groups not only consist of combatants but also consist of leaders, financiers, ideologues, military trainers, and scientists, all of whom are part of a complex eco-system. The split between al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS) can be thought of as an outcome of a community of jihadis made up of bourgeois and thugs. AQ promotes an inclusive ideology among its members, avoiding sectarianism. It values meritocracy and rigorous training (military and education). This translates into large scale sophisticated operations whose main objective is to target political, military, and economic targets. On the other hand, the Islamic State has promoted a sectarian ideology and ‘equal opportunity’ among skilled and unskilled jihadis, which translates into indiscriminate attacks against civilians and non-civilians alike. In assessing the risk of radicalization of highly-skilled scientists, this is a key difference must be taken into account. With respect to the potential radicalization of scientists outside of organized terrorist organizations, of particular concern is the issue of “lone wolves” (i.e. an individual who prepares and commits violence alone, outside of any command structure and without material assistance from any group). In drawing on lessons learned from past cases, A.Q. Khan is an important example of scientist radicalization. His motives were rooted in nationalism. However, he was 1 Corresponding author. Landau Network Fondazione Volta, Como, Italy; E-mail: maurizio.martellini@ fondazionealessandrovolta.it.

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not a frustrated young student, but rather an established scientist with familial, community, and professional ties. Another example is Bruce Ivins, who was the alleged perpetrator of the Amerithrax attack against government and media officials post 9/11. Scientists like A.Q. Khan and Bruce Ivins not only shed light on the challenges posed by “lone wolf actors” but also highlight the potential consequences of a better executed plan by an organized group. If the objective is to undermine the Islamic State, then the physical and digital caliphates must also be considered and combated simultaneously. Digital propaganda facilitates a physical caliphate by attracting fighters to the Islamic State’s territory, and the existence of a physical caliphate facilitates digital propaganda by allowing the Islamic State (IS) to create and disseminate an organized narrative. While it is often mistaken that all IS propaganda is overwhelmingly violent and militaristic, much of their produced visual media focuses on themes like governance, religion, commerce, regulation, policing, and helping the poor. Through this narrative, the Islamic State is attracting people to the caliphate with the promise of a new kind of society.

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Recent studies indicate the over-representation of engineers and medical doctors within terrorist groups. This phenomenon was present also in the first Intifada between the Palestinian authority and Israel. To prevent the radicalization of highlyskilled scientists and engineers, communities and societies must better integrate these individuals into the broader global scientific enterprise and reward and promote science as a peaceful and diplomatic tool to improve the conditions of their countries. Many assessments of IS access to potentially dangerous resources seem often to over-emphasize material resources (i.e. critical materials, infrastructure, and human resources) and underestimate immaterial factors such as knowledge, skills, capital, and time. Although there is basic CBRN knowledge available in the open literature, history has shown that the deployment of an effective CBRN weapon requires more than basic skills and a considerable amount of so-called “tacit knowledge”. The acquisition of tacit knowledge takes time and requires sustained team work. With IS losing its territory and its safe haven, the short-term prospects that IS might resort to a complex CBRN operation is decreasing while the risk of “low-tech” operations with vehicles or knifes is increasing. Of particular concern is the “DoItYourself (DIY) Bio” community, which is a growing global movement thanks to easy access to materials and equipment that can be ordered online. However, despite the de-skilling of biotechnology and the easy acquisition of equipment and raw materials, working with living (micro)organisms requires a certain level of expertise and DNA manipulation aimed to create more virulent pathogens remains a challenge (highlighted by Aum Shinrikyo’s attempt in the 90s). To prevent both unintentional and nefarious events, community self-regulation could help. This includes creating a monitoring mechanism, educating the DIY-bio community, and creating codes of conduct for DIY-bio. External controls such as DNA synthesis and strain repository regulations, custom control, and law enforcement have an important role to play as well. While the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) addresses the risk of biological proliferation by state actors, it is limited. The BWC needs to be strengthened to reduce

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the risk of non-state actors. Non-state actors may develop low level biological weapons (BW) using commercially available and naturally-occurring zoonotic agents targeting animal health and the food supply. Scientists need to be involved in the policy discussion if biotechnology advances will make it easier for non-state actors to develop a BW. The question is if the need for tacit knowledge will start to disappear as biotechnology moves forward. Overall, an intentional biological attack seems to be the most consequential of challenges among the whole spectrum of CBRN events because, even if it might have a low probability of occurring, its consequences could be catastrophic. However, history showed that this risk of intentional misuse is lower than the risk natural and accidental outbreaks. Whether intentional or unintentional, robust public health systems (specifically infectious disease prevention, detection, and response infrastructure) is by far the best preparation for a possible biological event. On the chemical side, the Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is an efficient tool for the detection of alleged use of chemical weapons because it provides time sensitive and actionable information. Evidence suggests that IS has attained crude chemical weapon capability, in the form of sulfur mustard and chlorine, and has developed homemade rockets for delivery. It also suggested that IS has the ability to conduct chemical weapon attacks on a wide geographical area. However, their capability at present is rather limited and the real danger is long term.

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The issue of the WMD delivery systems, meaning not only CBRN materials, but also CBRN devices, IEDs, etc., needs to be taken into account because there is no international mechanism to deal with dual/multi-use items nor any chemical-biological terrorism convention or non-proliferation treaty (the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions are just disarmament treaties). Strategic trade control systems’ main objective is to rule sensitive trade exchanges between states, but not between states and non-state actors. This means that WMD proliferation activities within a state by individuals or organisations not involving crossborder movements are not under the scope of strategic trade control regimes or systems. A way ahead could be developing verifications systems especially for bio, defining guidelines/MoU to counter/reduce the risk of license shopping, raising operators’ awareness, and increasing exchanges of information between state authorities on WMD-related operators and activities. A reference entity in this framework is the UN1540 Committee, which should be strengthened in order to counter IS’s activities. In addition, a robust bio-surveillance system at the border should be set up in critical areas, such as the Hindu Kush, Central Asia, Mesopotamia, etc. As a preventive measure, returning foreign fighters need to be closely monitored, as they are likely to end up in many places, especially in countries with weaker links and law-enforcement systems. Some recommendations include: i. Bolster the role of scientific communities (specifically academic institutions, scientific societies/associations, and other non-governmental scientific entities) in the countries of concern in order to avoid scientists’ potential dissatisfaction and consequent radicalization;

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ii. Strengthen values around culture of responsibility and safe/secure science for peace, starting from the level of lower education institutions (not limited only to the level of the academic and professional associations); iii. Better intelligence sharing, especially between Europe and Arab countries, since the returning fighters may end up as refugees in other counties or in any place where they can seek refuge; iv. Protect high risk bio and chemical facilities as they are easy targets; v. Strengthen potentially vulnerable areas: capacity building in areas potentially under threat, including detection capabilities & border security; and vi. Develop a strategy to monitor disruptive technologies. Countering terrorist organizations requires a comprehensive approach, both inside the area of their operations as well as in the home countries of foreign fighters, with strong cooperation among the members of the international community across the military, intelligence, policy-making, and scientific communities.

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The key to mitigating and combating radicalization is two-fold: governance and youth empowerment. Dissatisfaction with local politics was necessary for groups like IS to take root. Preventing radicalization of scientists requires intervention at an early stage in their education and careers, including providing trans-national and global opportunities for professional development as well as technical training on topics such as culture of responsibility and dual-use reach of concern. An enduring end to political violence and terrorism of the kind represented by IS will require reconciliation, participation, and ultimately representation of the relevant political communities.

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Contents Preface Maurizio Martellini and Jason Rao

v

Iraq Biological Dual-Use Knowledge and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats Mohammed al Sharaa and Sinan Muhi

1

Synthetic Biology, Microbiology, DIY Bio, …: How Easy It Is to Create a Bio Threat Veronica Baldo Strategies for Undermining the Digital and Physical Caliphates Seth Cantey

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Islamic State’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability: An Open Source Intelligence Approach Simeon Dukić

6 19

30

Responsible Science Alastair Hay

42

A.Q. Khan: Self-Radicalization of a Scientist Jonathan Katz

51

The Prospects of Jihadism Amidst a Withering Caliphate Nelly Lahoud

59

Examining the Narratives of Radical Islamists and Other Extremely Violent Groups: The Case of the “Islamic State” Francesco Marone The Shifting Jihadist Galaxy Andrea Plebani

64 74

Designing Systems for Terroristic Indicators Analysis Based on Visible, Social and Dark Web Data Sources John Soldatos

82

Educational Outreach to Combat Radicalisation of Scientists: A Study of the Aum Shinrikyo Cult Michael I. Thornton

94

Subject Index

105

Author Index

107

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The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2017. ProQuest

The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats M. Martellini and J. Rao (Eds.) IOS Press, 2017 © 2017 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-802-0-1

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Iraq Biological Dual-Use Knowledge and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats Mohammed al SHARAA a,1 and Sinan MUHI b a D.G INMA b Biological Expert

Abstract. The efforts of preventing the spread of WMD expertise are often labeled as “scientists’ redirection” are essential to redirect the scientists’ skills and expertise to peaceful civilian activities. Such redirection efforts have historically boosts these activities for securing WMD materials. Human expertise in WMD science and technology poses as high a risk as acquires WMD materials. Thus, states should strengthen their efforts on ensuring personnel reliability to prevent unauthorized access to WMD-related materials. Delays in securing WMD expertise can be more alarming than comparable delays in securing WMD materials. In this paper, the efforts of the Iraqi government to reduce the threat of proliferation of dualuse expertise and materials have presented. Keywords. WMD nonproliferation

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Introduction Redirection and other engagement programs have difficulty without adequate political support. This work does not yield the immediate, tangible “scorecard” accomplishments that come from securing WMD materials. However, the materials for many biological weapons are so prevalent that controlling WMD expertise is the best hope of nonproliferation. Thus, securing WMD materials is a tactical response while securing WMD expertise is more of a strategic activity because it deals with the ability of producing WMD weapons. Iraq starts its biological program at the end of the 1970s. Many scientists and technicians have engaged in this program. In 1991, the program was destroyed according to the Security Council Resolution 687 under the supervision of the UNSCOM [1]. After 2003, the environment was completely different. In addition to the unstable security situation, the chaotic looting, destruction of the physical infrastructure for most of the government institutions, along with much of the rest of the country’s economic infrastructure. Equipment was stolen or vandalized beyond repair. Government research facilities, factories, and even university laboratories all met similar fates. Identifying WMD experts was far more difficult in Iraq. Many of them left Iraq and the others are unemployed.

1 Corresponding author. Iraqi National Monitoring Authority for nonproliferation, P.O. Box 2004, Baghdad-Iraq; E-mail: [email protected].

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M. al Sharaa and S. Muhi / Iraq Biological Dual-Use Knowledge

Legislation and Instructions to Protect Sensitive Biological Materials The Republic of Iraq Constitution, Article 9 (1E) has noted that “The Iraqi Government shall respect and implement Iraq’s international obligations regarding the nonproliferation, non-development, non-production and non-use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and associated equipment, materials, technologies, and delivery” [2]. According to this article many of the related laws, regulations, instructions, policies and strategies have been adopted to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons and their means of delivery: • • • • • • • • • • • •

Environmental Protection and Enhancement Law No. 27 2009. Animal Health Law No. (32) 2013. Quarantine Law No. (76) 2012. Counterterrorism Law No. (13) 2005. National Monitoring Authority for non-proliferation law No. (48) 2012. Instructions for the implementation of the international nonproliferation treaties and conventions 2014. Bio-risk management policy in Iraq. Bio-risk management strategy in Iraq. Bio-risk management law in Iraq. National action plans for Bio-risk management in Iraq. National strategy for countering WMD threats. National Action Plan for countering WMD threats.

A number of subordinate regulations, instructions and guidance have adopted for the relevant ministries and institutions.

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The Role of the Iraqi National Monitoring Authority (INMA) The Iraqi National Monitoring Authority for non-proliferation (INMA) is a governmental agency established as the interface between the Iraqi government and the United Nations Special Commission in 1991. In 2004 its activities have been redirected for implementing Iraq’s obligations under non-proliferation and disarmament international treaties and conventions as well as the Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). In May 2012, the Iraqi parliament approved the Iraqi National Monitoring Authority for non-proliferation (INMA) law No. (48) [3]. The law establishes the National Authority to ensure non-exploitation of Iraqi territories for any prohibited activities. INMA seeks to achieve its goals through the following means: •

Establishing and maintaining a national regime for monitoring and inspection to comply with the obligations under non-proliferation treaties and conventions including nuclear, chemical, biological, means of delivery, and the relevant dual-use items and technologies.

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M. al Sharaa and S. Muhi / Iraq Biological Dual-Use Knowledge

• •

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Developing a comprehensive mechanism to ensure prevention of converting peaceful activities into any prohibited activities, including the production, possession, use, storage, export and import, shipping and transportation. Developing capacity-building programs for the Iraqi agencies to reduce the CBRN threats and prevent non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and related materials.

Measures The Iraqi government has taken a series of measures and practical steps to protect sensitive biological materials, in particular pathogens and biological toxins, and prevent their acquisition by terrorists. In addition, appropriate domestic controls over related materials and effective border controls have been established to prevent their illicit trafficking, which includes the following: • • • • • • •

Establish and upgrade the regulatory framework. Establish and maintain appropriate effective measures to secure biological materials in production, use, storage, and transport. Establish and maintain effective physical protection measures. Establish and maintain effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to prevent the illicit trafficking. Establish and maintain effective national export and import controls regime based on EU regulations. Develop appropriate capacity building programs and the exchange of best practices. Cooperate with the relevant ministries and institutions to raise awareness and strengthen national capacities in security culture.

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National Biological Emergency Plan and CBRN Teams INMA drafted the National Biological Emergency Plan in 2013. The National Security Council approved the plan in 2015. INMA is working with other ministries to review and assess the gaps in the ministries resources. INMA successfully established the national policy CBRN team and the CBRN response teams within the ministry of interior and the ministry of defense. CBRN response teams have responded to all the accidents since 2015 both in the military and civilian attacks.

The National Bio-Risk Management Committee Iraq established the National Bio-risk Management Committee, which aims to enhance biological safety and security measures, raise the level of national capacity for countering and mitigating biological threats, as well as preventing unauthorized persons from accessing valuable biological material. The Committee was also tasked to develop a legal framework that promotes an effective bio-risk management system in Iraq in accordance with international standards.

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M. al Sharaa and S. Muhi / Iraq Biological Dual-Use Knowledge

Scope of the National Programs The proliferation of scientific knowledge has attracted terrorist organizations to acquire sensitive information from scientists with chemical, biological, and nuclear knowledge. The widespread availability of getting such expertise became a pressing threat to global security. National redirection programs have many goals, including: • • • •

To prevent the proliferation of Iraqi WMD expertise. To prevent the exploitation of Iraqi expertise in fields related to weapons of mass destruction or prohibited purposes. To redirect the scientists’ skills and expertise to productive civilian applications. To enable the former expert to serve in the economic and technology rebuilding of Iraq.

Many of the biological scientists with dual-use expertise left Iraq after 2003. The remaining scientists with different backgrounds and from different institutions are engaged in different research activities focusing on various fields, such as industrial, public health, environmental, agricultural, universities, etc. There are some direct programs and other indirect as follows: •

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•

Establishment of Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST), which brought together many experts from the former Iraqi Atomic Energy Organization and research centers from former military industrial commission (MIC). USA launched the Iraqi International Center for Science and Industry (IICSI) program from 2003 to 2005 to support the peaceful, civilian employment of Iraqi scientists, technicians and engineers formerly worked on weapons of mass destruction programs.

The programs worked extensively with the Iraqi Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST), which has absorbed numerous WMD personnel from the former Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission and the Military Industrial Commission, both of which played important roles in Iraq’s WMD programs. After 2012, INMA has worked to implement several programs for health, environment, agriculture, higher education and science and technology ministries with the support of various international programs. These programs concentrated on: • • • • •

Biosecurity and Biosafety. Bio-risk assessment. Dual-use items and technology control. Centers of Excellence programs to mitigate CBRN accidents. Upgrading bio labs and transfer the best practices.

Challenges There are many challenges to be drawn from controlling the biological dual-use expertise and knowledge threats [4]. Biological weapons-related dual-use materials are imported, produced, transported and handled under many different circumstances, posing

The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2017. ProQuest

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a high risk to the community. An effective legislation, instructions, policies, and strategies are essential to mitigate and reduce the possibility of using illegal activities. The biological activity controls over related materials, knowledge, and technologies are a complicated process. It requires long-term monitoring and verification. Attention should be given to identify and understand the extent of the dual-use knowledge and capabilities and their potential links to biological weapons proliferation. The financial allocations are essential for the continuity and sustainability of the programs. New approaches should be developed to ensure nonproliferation of prohibited activities [5]. Securing WMD expertise is a strategic goal since it deals with the expertise with the capability to produce WMD, so it needs to elaborate international strategy to set up proposals and models for short-term and long-term projects [6].

Conclusion The conclusions mentioned in this paragraph are based on the Iraqi experience. It may be utilized to address the long-term challenges that come with controlling the biological dual-use knowledge threats and redirection programs. • • •

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•

•

Sharing of experiences and effective practices are essential instruments to assist promoting the implementation of the biological dual-use expertise and knowledge threats. Providing enough financial allocations to ensure the continuity of monitoring and capacity building programs. Control measures should be selected based on the specific requirements of the legislation and regulations, and risk assessment and properly maintained, examined and tested to ensure their effectiveness Raising awareness, education and training tools providers should be aware of potential proliferation threats, and they should have in place a risk assessment and mitigation framework and may include an array of items including international guidance, manuals, self-assessment tools, and training modules. Specific tools should be established in the industry to allow assessments of technology falling under a control list. The likelihood of sensitive information leaked and whether permissions are required.

References [1] United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, Compendium of Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes in the Chemical, Biological and Missile areas, June 2007. [2] Constitution of Iraq, 2005. [3] Iraqi Official Gazette Al Waqaa Number 4252, 2012. [4] Arturo Casadevall, Susan A. Ehrlich, David R. Franz, Michael J. Imperiale, and Paul S. Keim, Biodefense Research: A Win-Win Challenge, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, Volume 6, Number 4, 2008. [5] Gigi Kwik Gronvall, Preventing the Development and Use of Biological Weapons, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, Volume 7, Number 1, 2009. [6] Meeting Report, Strategies for Managing Dual Use Research of Concern Progress at the National Level, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, Volume 7, Number 1, 2009.

The author(s) of this publication is/are solely responsible for its content. This publication does not reflect the opinion of the publisher. The publisher cannot be held liable for any loss or damage that may occur because of this publication. The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2017. ProQuest

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The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats M. Martellini and J. Rao (Eds.) IOS Press, 2017 © 2017 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-802-0-6

Synthetic Biology, Microbiology, DIY Bio, …: How Easy It Is to Create a Bio Threat Veronica BALDO 1 Insubria Center on International Security

Abstract. Men have always tried to improve their own lifestyle taking advantage of and adapting natural resources to their needs. This happened also with living organisms. Starting from farming and breeding, developments brought about the ability of knowingly modifying the organisms’ DNA that contains the instructions to grow and develop every living organism, arising genetic engineer, biotechnology and synthetic biology. Synthetic biology, in particular, is a multidisciplinary area that allows the creation of artificial living organisms starting from synthetically produced DNA material. This ability could be used for good or malicious purposes, rising dual use issues. This scenario has been complicated by the DoItYourselfbiology (DIY-Bio) movement’s birth, because this is spreading the use of biotechnology beyond the traditional academic and industrial institutions and into the lay public, increasing concerns about biosafety, biosecurity and ethics, even though it has been shown that working with living organisms, especially to create a biothreat, is not that effortless. The continuous improvements of synthetic biology and DIYbio should be strictly monitored and regulated in order to guarantee a safe and secure world.

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Keywords. Genetic engineer, biotechnology, synthetic biology, biothreat, bioweapon and biosecurity

Introduction From the origin of human mankind, men have always tried to adapt and use natural sources to improve and ease their own lives. This happened also with living organisms as plants and animals, starting farming, agriculture, and domestication of livestock animals. From these first steps to improve useful characteristics of living organisms, technological advances have brought about the ability of wittingly modifying the DNA, the molecule coding for all the information needed to growth and develop every living organisms, giving rise to biotechnology, genetic engineering, and more recently, synthetic biology. These strictly related disciplines allow modifying living organisms’ characteristics, making them useful in different fields, such as medicine, agriculture, environment and energy. Since these technologies are dealing with living organisms and pathogens, as well as their uses/applications, it gave rise to some concerns about safety and security, based 1 Veronica Baldo, Insubria Center on International Security, via Natta 14, 22100 Como, Italy; E-mail: [email protected]; [email protected].

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on the perceived risk of harmful organisms being released, either deliberately or accidentally, into the environment. Moreover, the coming of synthetic biology, together with internet dissemination of information on DNA and on how to manage living organisms, makes it possible to create new living organisms, even dangerous ones, or to enhance existing pathogens to create more harmful ones creating a dual-use concern. In the last two decades another actor has been added to this scenario that is Do-ityourself-biology (DIYbio), a global movement spreading the use of biotechnology beyond the traditional academic and industrial institutions and into the lay public.

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The combination of synthetic biology that is de-skilling biotechnology and DNA manipulation with the DIY-bio is making it harder to control the use of these advanced technologies in terms of biosafety, biosecurity, and ethics. Moreover, all the materials and equipment needed to work with living organisms, in particular microorganisms, are available on line and/or can be effortlessly purchased. Manuals to handle and work with living organisms are on line as well, and the DNA can be ordered by mail and delivered wherever you need it. The DIY-bio community could find places to work in community labs, hackerspaces or at home. What cannot be found so easily is the expertise and the know-how to manage organisms for pursuing good or bad purposes. It seems even harder to create a biothtreat, referring specifically to tacit knowledge. In fact, the hardest part of working with living organisms is the acquisitions of tricks and problem solving abilities, something that is usually learned by working side by side with experts. However, even though it will be possible for almost anyone to work with and modify (micro)organisms to create harmful pathogens, the last steps in creating a bioweapon from these pathogens could be very hard to realize. In fact, the scaling up and the creation of a weapon to harm a large number of people has not yet been realized or, at least, a working methodology is not known. Even though the weaponization of living organisms is really hard to obtain and, as known right now, not yet realized, it cannot be ignored that future advances and developments will make it possible. Therefore, it is really important to constantly monitor both research in the bioweaponization direction and in the creation of smaller, but not less frightening and hazardous unintentional or malicious threats. The following summarizes the technological advances and the risks connected with modern biotechnology and synthetic biology especially from a biosecurity point of view.

New Available Bio-Technologies Biotechnology Developments Mankind has been modifying living organisms since around 12,000 B.C., when humans first began to domesticate plants and animals through artificial selection. Selective breeding, hybridization, and grafting have been used to improve and adapt plants and animals to human needs. These processes are now known to change organism DNA that is the molecule that carries the genetic instructions used in the growth, development, functioning, and reproduction of all known living organisms.

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Only since 1973 has genetic engineering and DNA manipulation been applied to modifying living organisms directly using specific biotechnology techniques. In fact, in the latter part of the 20th century, artificial manipulation, modification, and recombination of DNA in order to modify an organism or population of organisms were made through recombinant DNA technology (or gene cloning), in which DNA molecules from two or more sources are combined either within cells or in vitro and are then inserted into host organisms in which they are able to propagate [1]. The use of genetic engineering gave rise to modern biotechnology, which is the use of living systems and organisms to develop or make products, or “any technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or process for specific use” [2]. In particular, these new technologies have been used to synthesize medically useful substances, such as human insulin, human growth hormone, alpha interferon, and a hepatitis B vaccine. Furthermore, genetic engineering has been used in agriculture for food production to increase the shelf life of vegetables, to grow pesticide-producing and herbicide resistant crops and to improve nutritional values of cereals, like rice.

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The birth of this new biotechnology was due to the innovative tools to cut specific DNA sequences (Hamilton Smiths), separate and paste fragments (Berg, Boyer and Cohen). Moreover, in 1977 Frederick Sangers developed a method for sequencing DNA, greatly increasing the genetic information available to researchers. Then, Polymerase Chain Reactions (PCR), developed by Kary Mullis in 1983, allowed small sections of DNA to be amplified and aided identification and isolation of genetic material. In the meanwhile, the techniques to insert the manipulated DNA into organisms and organisms’ genome have also been developed and since the genetic code can be translated and expressed in every existing living organism, it is possible to produce organism proteins in the host that are naturally synthesized in others. In other words, by incorporating foreign DNA from a mammalian gene, for example, into a bacterium, researchers can obtain an almost limitless number of copies of the inserted gene. Furthermore, if the inserted gene is operative/functional (i.e., if it directs protein synthesis), the modified bacterium will produce the protein coded by foreign DNA [1]. For example, the human protein insulin, used by diabetic patients, is produced using the technique of recombinant DNA by bacteria or yeast and easily purified to make it available for medical purposes. Biotechnology is evolving so fast that new techniques are available and DNA manipulation is becoming easier and, thanks to faster, simpler, and cheaper DNA amplifications and synthesis, is improving synthetic biology applications and achievements. In the early 21st century, innovative genetic engineering techniques emerged that centered on gene editing for higher eukaryotes (such as mammals). Gene editing, based on the technology of the so called CRISPR-Cas9, allows researchers to customize a living organism’s genetic sequence by making very specific changes to its DNA [1]. Furthermore, DNA synthesis allows the direct construction of genetic material starting from information and raw chemicals [3], enhancing biotechnological evolution and giving rise to the so-called synthetic biology.

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Synthetic Biology Synthetic biology is, by definition, the design and construction of new biological parts, devices, and systems, and the re-design of existing, natural biological systems for useful purposes [4]. Synthetic biology, combining elements of engineering, chemistry, computer science, and molecular biology, seeks to assemble the biological tools necessary to redesign the living world. This is different from genetic engineering that is the simple addition or modification of a single gene using conventional genetic engineering techniques. On the contrary, adding a whole suite of genes or creating an entirely new genetic code that does not exist in nature is synthetic biology, as well as using synthetically-created nucleic acids, parts, and devices [5–7]. Different approaches, not mutually exclusive, could be used to create new parts or entire living organisms, such as: 1.

2. 3.

Removing cells’ inefficiencies, which are a byproduct of the haphazard nature of evolution, to make the target pathway/process/product the more efficient as possible, without wasting energy and metabolites in unnecessary processes; Combining genetic sequences in useful ways, for example mixing genes from different organisms and/or species to improve the production process; Designing new “living organisms/machines” from scratch, starting from the design and synthesis of new genomes (DNA) to make non-existing organisms with the required characteristics [6].

As per biotechnology applications, synthetic biology is also involved in considerable activity in a number of areas: 1.

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2. 3. 4.

Health and medicines: new drugs synthesis (Artemisinin project to treat malaria), program cells to precisely detect and kill cancer cells, innovative diagnostic kits; Agriculture and food: higher nutritive vegetables, food created in laboratories more efficiently than growing in the land; Energy and environment: biofuels production, creation of new organisms able to digest and decompose pollutants; Other industrial sectors as bioelectronics [6].

In 2002 synthetic biology gained its first considerable achievement. Cello et al. [8] showed that it is possible to obtain a completely functional poliovirus, starting from a chemically synthesized DNA in the absence of a natural template and using a cell-free extract to express the virus genome and develop the virus itself. Eight years later, Craig Venter’s laboratory created a bacteria (Mycoplasma mycoides) from a chemically synthesized genome, capable of continuous self-replication [9], and in 2014 a fully functional eukaryotic chromosome was designed and expressed in yeast [10]. Synthetic biologists are convinced that, with enough knowledge, they will be able to write programs to control the genetic components, programs that would let them not only alter nature but guide evolution as well [7]. Moreover, the tools evolved, thanks to genetic engineering and synthetic biology, are everyday becoming cheaper to get and easier to use. For example, there is a “con-

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tinuously growing collection of genetic parts that can be mixed and matched to build synthetic biology devices and systems” (BioBricks) and the equipment required to work with DNA and living organisms can be easily bought on line, even on common ecommerce platforms (Amazon, eBay…). In addition, with the growth of the internet and the standardization of many biotechnological procedures, the tools for doing synthetic biology are increasingly becoming more accessible. Synthetic Biology Concerns Synthetic biology key concerns are safety and security, based on the perceived risk of harmful organisms being released into the environment. Synthetic biology risk concerns also have ethical and societal implications, pertaining to the creation of novel life forms [11]. Last but not least, synthetic organisms could be specifically created for malevolent purposes, raising concerns about biosecurity. In fact, several pathogenic viruses, including 1918 influenza virus [12] and the infectious poliovirus as previously mentioned, can be synthesized using only published DNA sequence information and mail-ordered raw materials [8]. Such developments have led to the concerns that ‘biohackers’ could create/recreate known pathogens and perhaps make them even more virulent. Faster and cheaper DNA synthesis is one of the key points of synthetic biology. Furthermore, the availability of DNA sequence data and explanations of molecular biology techniques online, combined with the ease of getting a DNA sequence synthesized by a specialized company, means that these technologies are becoming available to an increasingly wide range of people. For example, the iGEM (International Genetic Engineer Machine) competition is dedicated to undergraduate students and brings together students from across a range of disciplines to work collaboratively to design and build biological systems. This kind of experiment is demonstrating the accessibility of the technology to undergraduates and not experienced students across the world [11].

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DIY(DoItYourself)-Bio The easy access to increasingly powerful biotechnological tools promotes the development of the so called DoItYourself-bio that is a global movement spreading the use of biotechnology beyond the traditional academic and industrial institutions and into the lay public. The idea for a popular movement of amateur biotechnologists began around 2000, after a working draft of the human genome was completed by the Human Genome Project [13]. In 2005, Rob Carlson described how he built a molecular biology laboratory in his garage buying all the equipment required easily on-line [14]. At the same time the DIYbio.org was launched on the web, organizing events and performances with simple biological experiments. Carlson and people working at the origin of DIY-bio were experts in the field of synthetic biology, but in just a few years, DIYbio has become a community of hobbyists that has become organized and set up dedicated laboratories in commercial spaces, giving rise to the so called “community labs”. These labs usually sustain themselves on volunteers, membership donations, and paid classes [13]. Most of the DIYers do their work within shared labs, and, even when they work in their home exclusively they share and discuss their work online, keeping other community members informed about their research.

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Lately, DIYers have also attracted private capital and contributed to biotechnology development as technical and scientific achievements, new business achievements, and contribution to public awareness and education, promoting DIYbio from being a spontaneous movement of hobbyists to a movement of valuable stakeholders in biotechnology and synthetic biology. Needs to Manipulate Live Organisms – Equipment and Biological Materials In order to first work with living organisms, bio-laboratory equipment is required, such as machines to amplify the DNA (PCR machine), micro-centrifuge, gel electrophoresis, incubators etc., and they can be easily bought on line or built thanks to manuals made available for free. Also, laboratory reagents can be found on line and manuals to handle them are easily accessible. Regarding the DNA, the required sequence can be ordered on line and delivered where needed. Living (micro)organisms are present in nature or can be obtained from laboratories, and instructions on how to handle them are on line for free, but their use and proper managing necessitate knowledge and practical skills. Moreover, all the equipment and reagents can be readily available in laboratories, such as the ones where the DIY-bio community is working: community labs, hackerspaces, academic lab and corporate/government laboratories. Therefore, all the raw materials and equipment required to handle living organisms for both good and malevolent purposes, and to manipulate, enhance and create new pathogens or toxins, are really simple to source. Know-How Expertise

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Having access to technological devices/equipment and biological material is not enough to manipulate living organisms. In fact, even though synthetic biology is deskilling DNA manipulation, making processes more systematic and more reproducible, it is still hard to reproduce biological experiments and re-create simple living organisms and personal skills do not become irrelevant [15]. In fact, expertise and trainings are also needed. The iGEM (International Genetic Engineer Machine), mentioned before as a competition where even undergraduate students play with biotechnology, tends to demonstrate the challenges of successfully performing synthetic biology experiments and proves the ongoing need for guided instruction and collective experiences [15]. In fact, iGEM teams receive considerable guidance from senior faculty members and, while iGEM is a collaborative exercise, biologically trained students still tend to work beneath ones who have the central roles in daily laboratory activity [15]. Therefore collective and tacit knowledge are pivotal to perform wet-lab experiments. In particular, what is called tacit knowledge is essential and it refers to the typical trial and error problem solving and the master apprentice style relationship. Usually this is a long process that happens working shoulder to shoulder with expert scientists and provides tricks and tools not easily available without expertise. Therefore all these factors influence successes of synthetic biology experiments and notwithstanding it is easy to gather that, it is really hard to obtain the hoped results, especially working with living organisms.

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Living (Micro)Organisms Creation or Modification Starting from scratch, such as DNA/genome sequence, the process to create new (micro)organism or modify existing ones are similar: 1. 2. 3.

4.

Design of the DNA needed to create new functions or enhance processes in a chosen organism; Order the desired DNA sequence from a DNA synthesis company that mails the DNA directly to the lab, where scientists amplify it; Assemble the DNA sequences in a fully functional genome to be expressed in the chosen (micro)organism and to be inserted in the organism for the production of the new organism or the enhanced or modified one; Test new organisms for the appropriate characteristics.

All these passages are tricky and pose really hard challenges and, even though synthetic biology is de-skilling DNA manipulation and biotechnology in general, there are not standardized procedures for every single passage and especially tricky ones require really specific skills and knowledge. Therefore, some biological techniques are not necessarily becoming easier, as demonstrated by the fact that a lot of experiments should be repeated many times before getting a valuable result. These skills and knowledge are usually used for good purposes, as described above (second paragraph), but these technologies are considered dual-use. In fact, if malevolent people manage them, synthetic biology could be used to create new pathogens/toxins or enhance the virulence and toxicity of existing ones. Moreover, new technologies could bring to spread pathogens as a weapon to infect high number of people, or to attack crops or livestock, as will be discussed below.

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Lastly, there could be the risk of nefarious actors seeking to do harm with the tools available in the community labs or in their own home/garage laboratory. Working in a community lab is controlled by strict rules about access, suspicious activities, dangerous pathogens, that can put at risk the entire lab [13].

Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity Issues “Synthetic biology strives to make the engineering of biology easier and more predictable.” [11] One of the main fears about synthetic biology is that this discipline is de-skilling biology, biotechnology and DNA manipulation. These phenomena could give rise to pathogen/toxins enhancement or creation if managed by wrong, malicious hands and used by terrorists to produce biological weapons. Moreover, the continuous growth of DIY-bio offers more and more accessibility to tools, equipment, and dual-use knowledge to bioterrorist seeking to do harm. DNA synthesis is becoming cheaper and can be outsourced, easily ordered by mail and delivered wherever you need it, to make it easier also for biohackers to get it synthesized and used to radically redesign new pathogens/toxins. Terrorists pursuing biological weapons for high consequence, mass casualty attacks able to incapacitate people, livestock and crops, could use these new pathogens/toxins or the enhancement of already existing ones. But, even though it

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looks easy to get raw materials and a bit harder to gain knowledge to modify properly and consciously living organisms, how is it to weaponize biological material? Bio-Weaponization Issues As mentioned before, synthetic biology, as well as other technologies, could be the subject of deliberate misuse. One peculiarity of these biological issues is that dangerous and harmful raw material is already spread all over the world. DNA sequences of mortal viruses or bacteria are already accessible on line. But, highly dangerous pathogens stocks are under strict surveillance in few facilities around the world, where access control is strictly regulated. On the other hand, new technologies as synthetic biology make possible misuses of the DNA-synthesis (synthetic biology) technology as well give rising to both known and unforeseeable threats to our biological safety and security [3]. In particular, DNA synthesis when combined with other advances, such as the development of internet and overnight shipping, challenges the existing recombinant-DNA-era safety front on two aspects: 1.

2.

Physical decoupling of the design of engineered genetic material from the actual construction and resulting use of the material (DNA can be readily designed in one location, constructed in a second place and delivered to a third); and Effective alternative route to those who would seek to obtain specific pathogens for the purpose of doing harm.

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Today, as mentioned before, really dangerous pathogens are available in nature in unknown natural reservoirs and are really hard and dangerous to obtain (Ebola virus). Otherwise, they are locked in a very small number of facilities (smallpox virus) or they no longer exist in nature (1918 influenza virus). As a consequence, the current approach to biological security depends in part on limiting access to such pathogens. Even so, the sequence information that defines the genome encoding pathogens is readily available on line and DNA synthesis, therefore, could be used to obtain the genetic material encoding these pathogens. As previously mentioned, additional expertise is required to obtain pathogens from DNA sequences, but this work might not be subject to any review or oversight through existing safety framework [3]. Once pathogens or toxins are obtained by malevolent hands, the last step to make pathogens or any biological agents dangerous for people, animals or crops, is the weaponization of biological material, in order to spread it and/or harm the largest number of people as possible. This last step involves, first of all, the scale-up and storage of the agent in a stable manner, and developing a suitable mechanism to disperse the product properly [16]. In order to be successful without destroying the pathogens, or person undertaking these activities, each of these individual steps are likely to require specific information, expertise and ‘know-how’ in varying degrees. Historically a number of biological weapons programs are understood to have stymied or failed to create or optimize effective weapons in part because of a deficit of The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2017. ProQuest

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‘know-how’ [17,18]. This limitation is particularly acute in the weaponization step which is notably where a number of authenticated instances of bioterrorism [18,19] have been collapsed of being rendered of limited utility, leading Vogel (2006) [20] to suggest that this step is where “critical tacit knowledge for bioweapons development primary resides.” [21]. In this context, weaponization is referred to the process of optimizing the delivery of a pathogen in a manner that effectively generates significant physiological effect. However, the utility of biological weapons is not limited to mass infectivity per se, and terrorists or state actors could be attracted to biological weapons for their psychological effects in order to attract attention, create fear, and undertake economic or political sabotage [22], objectives that do not require optimized weaponization [21].

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Bioweapon programs in the US and USSR lasted many years and were very well funded; however, they were not successful in achieving their goals of producing a working weapon. The Soviet program was successful in its early stages, where they developed bombs and spray tanks working with classical agents, but their work on developing weapons based on new pathogens that did not exist in nature only reached the research and development stage. Moreover, they failed in producing bioweaponsspecific ballistic or cruise missiles. On the other hand, the US program was also able to weaponize classical agents and produce a few bombs and spray tanks, but none of the weapons developed met military requirements. One explanation for these failures is that unlike nuclear and chemical weapons, which use materials that are quite stable and have predictable behavior, biological weapons rely on microorganisms that are living, can mutate, and are sensitive to their environment and to the way in which they are handled [23]. Another example of biological weapon program was Aum Shinrikyo. Aum Shinrikyo started as a peaceful cult that provided a livelihood to its founder, Chizuo Matsumoto, while purporting to help followers to achieve enlightenment. After years of yoga classes and meditation, this movement, established to save the world, turned into an apocalyptic cult and started both biological and chemical programs to pursue its plans of destruction. Aum strove for both biological and chemical weapon programs and different attacks were performed with both types of newly-created weapons. It found a successful path for developing chemical weapons causing 13 deaths and about 6,000 injuries during a sarin attack at the Tokyo subway in 1995. Aum also tried to induce harm using biological agents, such as the botulinum toxin produced by Clostridium botulinum and anthrax from Bacillus anthracis, but it did not develop effective biological weapons, maybe because chemical weapons capabilities are more accessible than biological capabilities as a means of killing substantial numbers of people. As already mentioned, biological weapons require more tacit knowledge, while chemists may be adequately positioned to develop weapons after consulting relevant documentation [18]. These experiences show how hard the creation of massive weapon using biological material is and, especially, how difficult the weaponization process and the successful spread of pathogens and toxins are to cause massive death are.

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Other Biosecurity Concerns About Biotechnology and Synthetic Biology If the risks linked to the bio-weaponization are restricted, at the moment, by technical limitations, it is not possible to exclude that pathogens and toxins, new or enhanced ones, could be used to scare, create panic or blackmail people, as happened in 2001 with the anthrax letters, sent to American TV, media and senators, when 5 people died out of 23 cases (19 confirmed, 4 suspected). Even though the 2001 anthrax cases have not been ascribed as terrorist attacks, especially linked to the 9/11 ones, the case spread terror and panic all over the country. Furthermore, going forward, these biological agents could be used in a bioterroristic attack since anthrax spores can be easily found in nature, produced in a lab, and last for a long time in the environment. Moreover, anthrax makes a good weapon because it can be released quietly and without anyone knowing. The microscopic spores could be put into powders, sprays, food, and water and because they are so small, you may not be able to see, smell, or taste them [24].

Conclusion Biotechnology, genetic engineering and even more synthetic biology developments give rise to great concerns, as already mentioned, related to ethics, security and safety, because one of its objectives is to produce novel living organisms that can be used for good purposes or misused to frighten or harm people. In response to these concerns, a range of different options for intervention have been suggested to avoid future catastrophic or scaring events, especially from a biosecurity point of view: 1.

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2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Prevention is one of the first steps: trying, for example to identify unauthorized possession, loss, theft, misuse or diversion of biological hazardous agents; Screening of customers by DNA synthesis companies; Oversight of new biotechnologies, DNA synthesis technology and its commercialization; Educating scientists about biosecurity issues and formation of a professional society for synthetic biology; Biosafety, Biosecurity and Biorisk management manual for synthetic biology laboratories; Preparedness in case of natural or deliberate release of hazardous biological material (pathogens or toxins); Regulations generated from dialogue between interested stakeholder, such as policy maker, security managers and scientists themselves.

Among the risks mentioned above, it is crucial to recall that since synthetic organisms could be radically different from those known today when released into the environment (accidentally or on purpose), they could have unintended detrimental effects on the environmental or on human health. Such (micro)organisms might have unpredictable and emergent properties when released in the environment, even though right now it is easier for synthetic organisms to survive in an artificial environment than in a natural environment.

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As mentioned in the Synthetic Biology: Scope, applications and implications [11], regulation will play an important role in the development of synthetic biology and in preventing, foreseeing and responding to biological catastrophic events, particularly in terms of public attitudes toward the emergency applications. It will be really important to maintain an open dialogue between the regulators and researchers (both academic and industrial), ensuring that the regulators are given adequate support to maintain this continued dialogue so that advances and innovations are covered by regulations and the public is kept informed as well. Therefore, law enforcement personnel must work closely with public health agencies to prevent, identify and investigate potential biological threats; ultimately, it is the specific responsibility of law enforcement authorities to protect individuals and communities against threats that may arise through the misuse of this promising technology [3].

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It will be really important, among other things, to monitor developments and advances in detection technologies, because they could contribute to the process of investigating alleged violations, thus reinforcing the norm, or could be used for identifying potential threats in a rapid and effective manner. In support of all these considerations, it highlights the crucial role of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention as reported by Revill and Jefferson (2013) [21], in particular under Article XII of the BWC, as it has become an established practice to conduct a quinquennial review of the Convention which takes “into account any new scientific and technological development relevant to the Convention”. In particular, science and development potential uses contrary to the provisions of the Convention should be surveyed. Moreover, measures for strengthening national biological risk management, voluntary codes of conduct and other measures to encourage responsible conduct by scientists academia and industry should be promoted, as well as education and awareness-raising about risks and benefits of life sciences and biotechnology. Lastly, science and technology-related developments relevant to the activities of multilateral organizations such as the World Health Organization and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) should be put in the scenario as well. In this complicated arena, it is important to consider also DIYers that come from all walks of life, that may lack formal education, and are not overseen by institutional reviewer boards; the policy and science communities fear that they may be more likely to cross ethical boundaries, even though the DIYbio community is trying to spread a culture of responsibility (DIYbio Code of Ethics). Moreover, biosafety and environmental concerns arose about DIYbio, because hazardous living organisms could be accidentally released in the environment and harm DIYers, people or the environment. In contrast to this, it is important to specify that DIY-bio community is not an anonymous threat to public biosafety and biosecurity. Rather the movement provides a new channel for public science engagement and education and a broad opportunity for economic and scientific innovation. The community is already actively engaged in developing codes of conduct, safety protocols, and discussing the various regulations that may affect it. To harness this community’s potential to provide biotech innovation, education, and awareness, policymakers should treat the community as a valued stakeholder within the larger biotech community and include it in the future discussions [13].

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Even if it is really hard to build a bioweapon, but not impossible, and a biological weapon was disseminated successfully, the outcome of an attack would be affected by factors like the health of the people who are exposed and the speed and manner with which public health authorities and medical professionals detect and respond to the resulting outbreak. A prompt response with effective medical countermeasures, such as antibodies and vaccination, can significantly blunt the impact of an attack [25]. (Jefferson. the myth and realities of synthetic bioweapons). Therefore, monitoring to prevent also smaller, but not less frightening and hazardous, unintentional or malicious biological threats and getting prepared in case of biological threat, natural or not, are two of the most important steps to pursue in order to protect men and environment.

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References [1] https://www.britannica.com/science/genetic-engineering. [2] UN Convention on Biological Diversity, Art. 2. [3] Bügl H., Danner J.P., Molinari R.J., Mulligan J.T., Park H.O., Reichert B., Roth D.A., Wagner R., Budowle B., Scripp R.M., Smith J.A., Steele S.J., Church G., Endy D., DNA synthesis and biological security, Nature Biotechnology, 25 (2007), 627–629. [4] http://syntheticbiology.org/. [5] Gillum D., Synthetic Biology: Considerations for Biosafety Professionals, https://absaconference.org/, 2015. [6] Locke S., How scientists are creating synthetic life from scratch, Vox, 2014. [7] Specter M., A Life of Its Own, Annals of Science (The New Yorkers), 2009/02/28. [8] Cello J., Paul A.V., Wimmer E., Chemical synthesis of poliovirus cDNA: generation of infectious virus in the absence of natural template, Science, 297 (2002), 1016–1018. [9] Gibson D.G., Glass J.I., Lartigue C., Noskov V.N., Chuang R.Y., Algire M.A., Benders G.A., Montague M.G., Ma L., Moodie M.M., Merryman C., Vashee S., Krishnakumar R., Assad-Garcia N., Andrews-Pfannkoch C., Denisova E.A., Young L., Qi Z.Q., Segall-Shapiro T.H., Calvey C.H., Parmar P.P., Hutchison C.A. 3rd, Smith H.O., Venter J.C., Creation of a Bacterial Cell Controlled by a Chemically Synthesized Genome, Science, 329 (2010), 52–56. [10] Annaluru N.1, Muller H., Mitchell L.A., Ramalingam S., Stracquadanio G., Richardson S.M., Dymond J.S., Kuang Z., Scheifele L.Z., Cooper E.M., Cai Y., Zeller K., Agmon N., Han J.S., Hadjithomas M., Tullman J., Caravelli K., Cirelli K., Guo Z., London V., Yeluru A., Murugan S., Kandavelou K., Agier N., Fischer G., Yang K., Martin J.A., Bilgel M., Bohutski P., Boulier K.M., Capaldo B.J., Chang J., Charoen K., Choi W.J., Deng P., DiCarlo J.E., Doong J., Dunn J., Feinberg J.I., Fernandez C., Floria C.E., Gladowski D., Hadidi P., Ishizuka I., Jabbari J., Lau C.Y., Lee P.A., Li S., Lin D., Linder M.E., Ling J., Liu J., Liu J., London M., Ma H., Mao J., McDade J.E., McMillan A., Moore A.M., Oh W.C., Ouyang Y., Patel R., Paul M., Paulsen L.C., Qiu J., Rhee A., Rubashkin M.G., Soh I.Y., Sotuyo N.E., Srinivas V., Suarez A., Wong A., Wong R., Xie W.R., Xu Y., Yu A.T., Koszul R., Bader J.S., Boeke J.D., Chandrasegaran S., Total Synthesis of a Functional Designer Eukaryotic Chromosome, Science, 344 (2014), 55–58. [11] The Royal Academy of Engineering, Synthetic Biology: Scope, applications and implications, London, 2009. [12] Tumpey T.M., Basler C.F., Aguilar P.V., Zeng H., Solórzano A., Swayne D.E., Cox N.J., Katz J.M., Taubenberger J.K., Palese P., García-Sastre A., Characterization of the reconstructed 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic virus, Science, 310 (2005), 77–80. [13] Grushkin D., Kuiken T., Millet P., Seven Mith & Realities about Do-It-Yourself Biology, Wilson Center, Washington DC, 2013. [14] Carlson R. Splice it yourself, Wired 05/01/05 (2005). [15] Jefferson C., Lentzos F., Marris C., Synthetic biology and biosecurity: challenging the “myths”, Frontiers in Public Health, 2 (2014), 115. [16] Leitenberg M., The Problem of Biological Weapons, Department of Security and Strategic Studies, Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm, 2004.

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[17] Wheelis M., Sugishima M., Dando M., Wheelis M., Rozsa L., Terrorist use of biological weapons, Deadly Cultures (2006), Cambridge MA Harvard University, 284–304. [18] Danzig R., Sageman M., Leighton T., Hough L., Yuki H. et al., Aum Shinrikyo Insights into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chemical Weapons, Washington, DC, Center for a New American Security, 2011. [19] Tucker J.B., Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Cambridge, MAMIT Press, 2000. [20] Vogel K.M., Bioweapons proliferation: Where science studies and public policy collide, Social Studies of Science, 36 (2006), 659–690. [21] Revill J., Jefferson C., Tacit knowledge and the biological weapons regime, Science and Public Policy, 41 (2014), 597–610. [22] Ilchmann K., Revill J., When push comes to shove, Science and Engineering Ethics, 2013, October 2013. http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11948-013-9479. [23] Jefferson C., Lentzos F., Marris C., WORKSHOP REPORT Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity: How Scared Should We Be? Department of Social Science, Health & Medicine King’s College London, 2014. [24] https://www.cdc.gov/anthrax/bioterrorism/threat.html. [25] Lentzos F., Jefferson C., Marris C., The myths (and realities) of synthetic bioweapons, Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists, 18 September 2014.

The author(s) of this publication is/are solely responsible for its content. This publication does not reflect the opinion of the publisher. The publisher cannot be held liable for any loss or damage that may occur because of this publication. The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2017. ProQuest

The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats M. Martellini and J. Rao (Eds.) IOS Press, 2017 © 2017 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-802-0-19

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Strategies for Undermining the Digital and Physical Caliphates Seth CANTEY, PhD 1 Washington and Lee University

Abstract. This chapter explores mutually reinforcing steps that governments in the United States and Europe have taken to counter the Islamic State (IS) on- and offline. It argues that while operations since 2014 have significantly reduced the group’s attractive power and military capacity, additional measures against the digital and physical caliphates can and should be taken. The chapter outlines strategies that would build on recent successes against IS, recognizing that the group’s ultimate demise will be a long-term project requiring measures beyond what Western states can or should do alone. Keywords. Islamic State, online, digital caliphate, propaganda, strategy, territory

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Introduction The Islamic State (IS) has distinguished itself from otherwise analogous groups by dominating both physical and digital territory.2 Since at least 2014, IS has acted more like a proto-state than a typical terrorist organization, taking territory, establishing a formal army, and governing millions of people.3 Meanwhile, the group has become the undisputed heavyweight champion of online jihad, producing and disseminating professional-grade media products to a global audience at an unprecedented rate. This has led to the emergence of what analysts have variously called the digital or virtual caliphate.4 As scholars and policymakers craft strategies to counter IS, it would be a mistake to consider the digital and physical challenges that the group poses separately. Success and failure on the battlefield and online are intimately connected and mutually reinforcing. Online propaganda, inspiration, and recruitment have facilitated a physical caliphate by attracting supporters to IS-held territory. The physical caliphate, in turn, has enabled IS to present itself as a ‘strong horse’ (to use Usama bin Laden’s term) in digital operations. For much of 2014 and 2015, IS saw this dynamic as a virtuous, even divinely-inspired cycle. 1

Politics Department, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA. USA; E-mail: [email protected]. Cohen, Jared. “Digital Counterinsurgency: How to Marginalize the Islamic State Online.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 6. 2015. 3 Cronin, Audrey Kurth. “ISIS Is Not a Terrorist Group.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 2. 2015. 4 Atwan, Abdel Bari. Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate. University of California Press. 2015; Seamus Hughes, “Countering the Virtual Caliphate.” Written testimony before the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee. 2016; Harleen Gambhir, “The Virtual Caliphate: ISIS’S Information Warfare.” Institute for the Study of War. 2016. 2

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The logic that applies to the virus, however, applies to the remedy. Just as early success online contributed to early success on the battlefield, and vice-versa, more recently policies that have undermined the physical caliphate have undermined the digital one. Consequently, in recent years the stream of foreign fighters and other supporters to Iraq and Syria has receded, diminishing the capacity and morale of IS, as well as the attractiveness of the idea for which it fights. This chapter elaborates upon these observations in two principal ways. First, it explains the importance of physical territory to IS identity and the challenges that losing territory creates for the group on- and offline. This section evaluates policies currently underway to attack the nexus of the digital and physical caliphates. Second, the chapter identifies strategies that would build on recent success. This section engages difficult questions about the ongoing fights in Syria and Iraq, and it proposes further refining existing approaches to counter-narratives. The chapter concludes by putting the measures addressed throughout into broader strategic context, arguing that defeating IS will ultimately depend on more than what Western states can or should do alone.

Current Strategies On- and Off-Line

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IS identity is inherently tied to physical territory. This connection is reflected even in the group’s name. ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah means “The Islamic State,” where the reference to ‘state’ is physical rather than symbolic or aspirational. The group’s previous name, ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fī 'l-ʿIrāq wa-sh-Shām (The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) also referenced physical territory, as did its name before that (ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fī 'l-ʿIrāq, The Islamic State in Iraq) and before that (al-qāʿidah fī 'l-ʿIrāq, al-Qaeda in Iraq). From the declaration of the caliphate in June 2014 until May 2016, IS asserted legitimacy on the basis of its control and governance of physical space.5 In the first issue of the English-language magazine Dabiq, published in July 2014, the group called for Muslims around the world to emigrate to IS-held territory in the Middle East. “Rush O Muslims to your state…The land is for the Muslims… hijrah to the land of Islam is obligatory.”6 This emphasis on physical geography and the auto-translocation of believers has been central to the group’s messaging online. Focus on territorial governance has also been constant. Though violence is perhaps the most recognizable characteristic of IS propaganda, a study of more than 9,000 visual media products from January 2015 to July 2016 found that non-violent images were even more common. 7 A majority of images focused on religious practice, policing, helping the poor, regulating commerce, and other quotidian affairs of state. Because IS believes that governance generates legitimacy, it has sought to attract families, not just fighters. For some the message has been “Come and fight and die for God;” for others it has been “Come and live under the caliphate.” 5 Gambhir, Harleen. “The Virtual Caliphate: ISIS’S Information Warfare.” Institute for the Study of War. 2016. 6 Dabiq, Issue 1, p. 11. 7 Milton, Daniel. “Communication Breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic State’s Media Efforts.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. 2016.

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Physical Caliphate Under Fire Responding to IS advances across northern Syria and Iraq, and recognizing the importance of physical territory to the group’s attractive power, in 2014 the United States launched Operation Inherent Resolve. Over the next three years, coalition partners dropped tens of thousands of bombs on IS-held territory; supplied local partners with intelligence, logistical support, and weaponry; and committed special operations forces and limited ground troops to roll back IS-held physical space. These kinetic measures inflicted heavy losses on the group. By the end of 2016, officials claimed that up to 50,000 IS fighters had been killed in action, numbers that they called conservative.8 According to Defense Department statistics, by the same time IS had lost more than 60% of the territory it once held in Iraq and 28% of the territory it once held in Syria.9 Military pressure has continued into 2017. As this volume goes to press, the Iraqi-led campaign to liberate Mosul has made significant progress, and Iraqi officials claim that IS now controls just 7% of Iraq. Preparations for the campaign to liberate Raqqa are underway. As battlefield losses piled up for IS in late 2015 and 2016, the narrative of success that the group continued to convey online became increasingly disconnected from facts on the ground. Claims of expansion became less credible as both the amount of territory that the group controlled and its ability to broadcast its message receded. IS visual media output peaked in August 2015 with more than 700 products. By August 2016, production had fallen to under 200.10

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The world noticed. What was once a flood of foreign fighters to the caliphate, peaking at some two thousand recruits per month in 2015, has since become a slowmoving stream.11 Recent estimates suggest that IS is attracting as few as 50 recruits per month to Iraq and Syria, far from the number needed to replace battlefield casualties. This reduced inflow of foreign fighters has exacerbated a range of problems – none more important than military capacity – in what has become a dwindling physical caliphate. For certain fighters, none of this will matter. Some fraction of the men and women fighting for IS actively seek martyrdom, where death in the service of God is the primary goal. But this is not the only reason for which people fight. Interviews with former IS members reveal that many were inspired by the group’s early momentum and wanted to play an active role in history. Others sought brotherhood or a sense of community, or they believed that life under sharīʿah would be utopian.12 For these people, military losses can be and often have been demoralizing.

8

Starr, Barbara. “Military: 50,000 ISIS fighters killed.” CNN Politics. December 9, 2016. https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2014/0814_iraq/docs/20161209_ISIL%20Areas%20of%20 Influence_August%202014%20through%20November%202016_Map.pdf?ver=2017-01-06-094734-253. 10 Milton, Daniel. “Communication Breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic State’s Media Efforts.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. 2016. 11 Witte, Griff, Sudarsan Raghavan, and James McAuley. “Flow of Foreign Fighters Plummets as Islamic State Loses Its Edge.” The Washington Post. September 9, 2016. 12 Neumann, Peter. “Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: The Narratives of Islamic State Defectors.” The International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence. 2015. 9

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Beyond attacking military positions and rank-and-file soldiers, the United States and coalition partners have targeted key individuals at the nexus of the digital and physical caliphates. Counterterrorism measures, including but not limited to drone strikes, have eliminated more than a dozen high-ranking IS media specialists from the physical – and therefore also from the digital – battlefield. These include individuals that followers of IS developments will recognize, like IS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani and Abu Muhammad al-Furqan, as well as lesser-known but still influential virtual combatants like Junaid Hussain, Neil Prakash, and Reyaad Khan. 13 Though these individuals have been replaced in the IS hierarchy, their talents have not. Reports suggest that officials “have been surprised that the Islamic State has failed to replace [such individuals] with hackers of comparable ability.” Attacking the Digital Caliphate Beyond the physical world, the United States and coalition partners have targeted IS online. Reductive strategies have sought to reduce the amount of extremist material available to potential sympathizers by removing content from the web. Additive strategies have sought to promote online alternatives to extremist messaging, drawing on a range of voices and techniques.

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Reductive strategies have generally taken two forms: the removal of entire content distribution platforms and the removal of specific content. Analysts familiar with IS websites know that these are as ephemeral as they are prolific, always subject to attack by governments, private-sector actors, and activist hackers. Other content distribution platforms, such as the short-lived IS smartphone app “Dawn of Glad Tidings” (or simply “Dawn”) have also been subject to fast removal from the web. The most successful online campaign against IS has involved Twitter. In 2014 and 2015, the group and its sympathizers used the popular microblog to great effect, hijacking hashtags and posting up to 200,000 tweets per day.14 In response, Twitter partnered with governments and private-sector entities, drawing on dedicated human capital and data analytics to disrupt IS use of the platform. Technology used by companies like Google and Facebook to remove pornography and copyright-protected material was refashioned by Twitter to remove imagery of IS-perpetrated violence. In recent years, the company has suspended hundreds of thousands of IS-directed and inspired accounts, and the IS presence on the platform has declined precipitously. 15 Other companies have learned lessons from the case and applied lessons in their own online battles against IS. Despite much success, reductive strategies will not cripple the digital caliphate: IS is likely to remain strong online for the foreseeable future. Indeed, in recent years the group has adapted, spreading its presence far and wide across social media platforms. IS now has an active online presence on Facebook, Google+, Instagram, justpaste.it, 13 Goldman, Adam and Eric Schmitt. “One by One, ISIS Social Media Experts Are Killed as Result of F.B.I. Program. The New York Times. November 24, 2016. 14 Greenberg, Jon. “Does the Islamic State Post 90,000 social media messages each day?” Politifact.com. February 19, 2015. 15 Woolf, Nicky. “Twitter suspends 235,000 accounts in six months for promoting terrorism.” The Guardian. August 18, 2016.

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Kik, last.fm, Silent Circle, Snapchat, surespot, Telegram, Threema, Tublr, Twitter, WhatsApp, WordPress, Quora, Zello, and other platforms. All of this is in addition to its presence on the dark web. The group’s most prominent social media presence today is on Telegram, an encrypted app that allows for the creation of private message groups of up to 5,000 and broadcasting to unlimited audiences. IS could abandon Telegram in favor of another tomorrow. IS use of multiple social media platforms and increasing reliance on encrypted apps and websites hosted outside of the United States may seem daunting. These innovations do reflect the group’s ability to adapt, and they pose unique challenges for law enforcement and intelligence agencies. At the same time, they reflect an increasingly difficult media landscape for IS. The group is spreading its digital presence across platforms because it understands the risks of disproportionate attention to any single platform. Encrypted messages are more difficult to detect, but they reach far fewer people. Removing websites in other countries can be difficult, but this challenge offers opportunities to partner with foreign states. In short, while reductive strategies are not silver bullets, in at least some cases they are having their intended effects.

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Additive approaches to countering IS online have also involved governments, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. Rather than removing IS-content from the web, the principal goal of additive approaches has been to produce and disseminate narratives that counter those promulgated by IS. As with reductive strategies, additive approaches have improved over time. Early efforts, such as the U.S. State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (2011–2016), often involved direct engagement with extremists through posting English-language counterIS content online. Approaches today are more sophisticated. Increasingly, entities partner with credible local sources to craft and deliver messages in local languages – especially Arabic. In the United States, the recently-formed Global Engagement Center (GEC) is the best example of an entity pursuing an additive approach to counter IS online. Formed in March 2016, the GEC describes itself as “an interagency [organization]…charged with coordinating U.S. counterterrorism messaging to foreign audiences.” 16 For the GEC, this involves work in four core areas: partnerships, data analytics, content, and interagency engagement. Drawing from the GEC website, partnerships seek to empower “positive messengers … to deliver messages that resonate with at-risk populations. [Partners] including NGOs, schools, young people, social and civil society leaders, religious leaders, governments, and others.” Reliance on data analytics seeks to guide and inform messaging efforts, including by measuring their effectiveness. In terms of content, the GEC is pursuing collaborative, thematic campaigns with counterIS coalition nations and others, where “direct engagement with violent extremists has been reduced in favor of partner-driven messaging and enhancing [partner] content capabilities.” Finally, interagency engagement refers to the GEC’s coordination of operations across various United States national security agencies. Non-governmental organizations also hold promise. In Europe, the Vienna Observatory for Applied-Research on Terrorism and Extremism (VORTEX)17 is a cohort of 16 17

https://www.state.gov/r/gec/. http://vortex.univie.ac.at/news/.

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researchers at the University of Vienna who monitor and analyze Arabic-language extremist content online. VORTEX has done important work in a number of areas, including by partnering with organizations and governments abroad. For example, in recent years the group partnered with the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), an Indonesian Muslim organization claiming more than 50 million members, to produce and promote theologically rigorous alternatives to IS narratives across Southeast Asia. More recently, the group has produced professional-grade media products with the look and feel of IS productions, but that convey very different messages. Some of these have drawn on the experiences of former extremists, including those who have traveled to the physical caliphate.

Challenges and Policy Recommendations For all of the recent success in battling IS on- and offline, formidable challenges remain. Recent history has proven that military gains against insurgencies, even dramatic gains, can be fleeting. The existence of IS, which rose from its own ashes in 2011, is testament to this fact. Moreover, regardless of how long dismantling the physical caliphate takes, the digital caliphate appears set to endure. This means that the coalition fighting IS must constantly reevaluate its on- and offline strategies. To that end, this section identifies key questions and tradeoffs that policymakers must consider going forward. In doing so, it proposes policy refinements that would build on recent success.

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Answering the Kurdish Question One of the key obstacles to articulating end-game scenarios for the conflicts in Syria and Iraq has been identifying the role that an important ethnic minority – the Kurds – will play in regional politics when (or even before) violence in the region subsides. This unresolved question is complicated by the fact that Kurdish armed groups have been exceedingly important to the fight. In Iraq, the Peshmerga have been essential to rolling back IS-held territory, especially in and around Mosul. In Syria, the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) are the United States’ preferred force to dislodge IS from Raqqa. Complications abound. Turkey vociferously objects to international support for the YPG based on that group’s ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The latter, which has battled Ankara since 1984, has been designated a terrorist organization by Turkey, the EU, and the United States. Turkey also fears what the Kurds expect – and might get – for their participation in Syria and Iraq: independence. The key consideration here is that Kurdish autonomy could lead to the sacrifice of Turkish geography. Tensions also exist between the Kurds and the governments in Syria and Iraq. In addition to fighting IS, the YPG has battled the Assad government since the war in Syria began in 2011. Though Iraqi Kurdistan and Baghdad recognized each other after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, disagreements over oil rights and revenue sharing flared in 2011 and 2012. The unequal distribution of Iraqi oil, and its disproportionate

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share in Iraqi Kurdistan, mean that Baghdad is unlikely to be receptive to Kurdish independence. In this context, the Western-led anti-IS coalition faces important questions. First, should the YPG lead the fight to dislodge IS from Raqqa? Second, to what extent are YPG operations in Syria and Peshmerga operations in Iraq likely to exacerbate ethnic tensions? Third, should the United States support an independent Kurdish state in return for Kurdish efforts during the war? These questions are interrelated and involve tensions between short- and long-term objectives. Because the United States and its international partners have resisted sending large numbers of ground forces into Syria, and unless that reality changes under President Trump, the Western-led anti-IS coalition will have few options to combat IS on the ground. This contrasts with the situation in Iraq, where the United States has more than a minimal troop presence and coordinates military operations with the Iraqi army. If ever military coordination with the Assad regime were considered, despite its war crimes, those prospects have waned or disappeared entirely since American airstrikes against the Shayrat airbase in April 2017.

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In a military-strategic environment without any good options, the entity best positioned to combat IS in Raqqa is the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a YPG-led coalition that formed in 2015. While this 80,000-plus-member force has shown promise, including through battlefield success, its ethnic composition complicates prospects for clearing – and especially holding – territory. Residents of Raqqa, an overwhelmingly Sunni Arab city, have reason to be skeptical of Kurdish territorial ambitions, as well as the character of YPG, and thus SDF, military operations. They like others in the region recognize that Kurdish military operations are not altruistic. Kurdish generals and political officials have indicated intent to hold territory that they clear in the anti-IS campaign.18 To mitigate this problem, several steps should be taken. First, policymakers and regional partners should push for the continued integration of Arab, especially Sunni Arab, forces into the SDF. Ideally these would be Syrian nationals, but even the temporary integration of conventional forces from regional Sunni Arab armies would be worthwhile. Such continued integration would enhance the ratio of Arabs to non-Arabs in the SDF, reducing the (correct) sense among most Syrians that the SDF is Kurdishled. This could make local populations, especially in Raqqa, more receptive to SDF clear-and-hold operations. Second, the United States and others should provide increasingly lethal weaponry to the SDF, despite objections from Turkey. This is not a policy decision that should be taken lightly, especially given YPG ties to the PKK. The step would undoubtedly complicate diplomatic relations with Turkey, which over the long term are a strategic priority for the United States and other Western powers. Though unlikely, it could lead to the expulsion of United States military personnel and even the closing of United States military bases in the country. That said, unless the United States and others change course and send ground forces to Syria, alternative approaches seem infeasible. Though 18 George, Susannah and Qassim Abdul-Zahra. “Mosul Fight is Already Redrawing the Map of Northern Iraq”. Associated Press. August 27, 2016.

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repairing relations with Turkey would take time, diplomatic, economic, and other tools are available for this purpose. As the symbolic capital of the caliphate, and the principal city from which IS plots attacks against Western cities and interests, Raqqa must be cleared. Ethnic tensions similar to those that complicate politics and military operations in Syria also play in Iraq, though tensions on that side of the border have flared more between Kurds and Shia than between Kurds and Sunnis. The Peshmerga have earned a deserved reputation for being excellent fighters, though often at the expense of Shia militias in addition to IS. What is clear to many analysts of the broader fight in Iraq is not necessarily clear to Kurdish commanders on the ground. The anti-IS coalition will be most effective if the Kurds play a support role to the Iraqi army and Sunni Arab forces. This is especially true in the battle for Mosul, a city estimated to be around 60% Sunni. As in Raqqa, Kurds will play a key role in clearing the city. Attempts to hold non-Kurdish areas would be counterproductive. All of this speaks to a paradox with potentially transformational consequences. The recent upheaval in the region has created a window and justification for Kurdish independence unlike any in the past century. One of the most important steps that policymakers in the United States and others in the anti-IS coalition could take to resolve these conflicts would be to pursue a grand bargain with Kurdish leaders. Such a bargain would need to hold all parties to binding commitments – before, during, and after the violence. Kurds would need to agree to operate in support roles where appropriate, as dictated by the coalition. They would need to play pivotal roles in liberating territory in Syria and Iraq that they would not hold. They would need to moderate territorial ambitions dramatically, recognizing that Western support for formal, legal Kurdish autonomy would come at high diplomatic cost to the United States and other Western powers, and higher cost to regional governments. But the product would be a Kurdish state.

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Refining Counter-Narratives As outlined above, recent years have seen improvements both in the crafting of messages designed to undermine IS narratives and their on- and offline delivery. Increased focus on local languages, especially Arabic, and partnerships with organizations and individuals familiar with relevant populations have been especially important. Nevertheless, policy refinements involving target audiences, messages, and messengers could further improve this aspect of the struggle against IS. Perhaps counterintuitively, the question of how broadly counter-narratives should be disseminated is critical. Some analysts have argued in favor of an expensive net, claiming that these messages need to be spread as far and wide as possible. According to this logic, all counter-IS publicity is good publicity. Others have pushed back, arguing that in some cases counter-narratives may inadvertently spark interest in IS that otherwise would not have emerged. When that happens, the effect of such messaging will not just have been neutral, but counterproductive. Advocates of broad-based counter-narratives have responded to such concerns with the analogy of sex-education, doubling down on the claim that information is power. If students are going to be exposed to sex, the argument goes, they should at

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least be informed. Though some will misuse information, on balance society will benefit. This analogy can be drawn out further to the distribution of birth control. Students may have more sex if schools pass out condoms, but passing out condoms is good policy because it raises awareness of the risks of unsafe sex. Though well-intentioned, this analogy falls apart in the present case. The difference is that while nearly all students will eventually be exposed to sex, only a small minority of people will be exposed to IS narratives. Some will protest that IS has dominated headlines in recent years, but this rebuttal misses the point. Exposure to the news is not exposure to the narrative, which in most cases requires seeking IS content online. The risk of proactively pushing back against IS arguments, then, especially in populations unlikely to be exposed to them in the first place, is that doing so can generate curiosity that may never have been piqued. This can generate a search for explanations that may otherwise never have been sought.

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To be sure, likely exposure to IS narratives will vary by time and place, where proximity to IS-held territory may be the best predictor. Though presenting counternarratives to people living under IS control is next to impossible, focusing efforts on cities and towns recently liberated from IS control is essential. In some ways, it may be useful to think about geographic counter-messaging in terms of concentric circles emanating from IS-held population centers. Physical proximity to the group likely correlates with exposure to its message. After all, IS indoctrination in its most potent form happens offline. IS dominates what people living under its control see, read, watch, and hear. As for counter-narratives themselves, most have focused on undermining IS religious authority. Efforts have varied widely in terms of sophistication, where simpler strategies have pointed to verses from the Qur’an or hadith in hopes that sacred text will be convincing in and of itself. The problem with this approach is that for every peaceful verse a violent verse can also be found. “There can be no compulsion in religion” (Qur’an 2:256) is easily met with “Kill the polytheists wherever you find them” (Qur’an 9:5). More nuanced approaches have sought to contextualize scripture by drawing on religious authorities to respond directly to IS claims (a point revisited below). Pushing back against IS theological claims is right and proper. The group is theologically rigorous in its own publications and media products, and it would be a mistake to cede this territory or let it go unaddressed. At the same time, the content of media products that seek to counter IS narratives can and should be expanded. Content need not focus exclusively or even primarily on theology: a range of alternatives is available. Footage of coalition military advances (especially by Sunni Arab groups), testimonials from people who have escaped the caliphate, and confessions of former IS fighters represent just a few ways that IS can be accurately, if unflatteringly, portrayed. Real-life depictions of life under the caliphate would likely go further to dissuade potential sympathizers than religious counter-narratives would alone. Finally, as alluded to above, the messenger matters. The key here is that assumptions about which messengers matter in which contexts should be revisited. Organizations like VORTEX have acted on observations that by now seem intuitive: engage-

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ment by Western governments and others who are not Muslim and do not speak Arabic will be less effective than local alternatives with local credibility. Consequently, VORTEX and others have partnered with scholars of Islam who are fluent in Arabic, from the Middle East and elsewhere, to directly rebut specific IS claims regarding religious doctrine and the group’s claim to religious authority generally. This has unequivocally been an improvement over past approaches involving direct engagement with extremist claims by Western governments. Still, refinements can and should be made, and those crafting counter-narratives may have something to learn from IS in this regard. A recent study by West Point found that fewer than 1% of IS media products involved leadership-level figures. 19 According to the report, “Islamic state releases contain lots of “average” fighters conveying the group’s message. They may be Iraqi and Syrian locals speaking in Arabic or recently arrived foreigners from abroad… This gives the whole Islamic State enterprise an aura of inclusiveness and breadth.” Expanding the range of counter-narrative messengers to include normal Muslims without special training or unique claims to credibility may also prove fruitful.

Conclusion

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This chapter has addressed strategies for undermining the digital and physical caliphates, arguing that policymakers must be aware of how these are connected to effectively counter IS. The measures addressed throughout have been increasingly effective over time and should be continued in current or refined form, as outlined above. As governments continue to adapt, building on the momentum of recent successes, there is reason to believe that the physical caliphate can be dismantled in the short to medium term. This does not mean that all territory in Iraq or Syria will be cleared of IS members or sympathizers; that will be a long-term objective. It does mean, however, that claims to legitimacy based on territorial governance will not be credible. In that context, attracting individuals to specific territory will be a tough sell. Going forward, policymakers must recognize that gains against IS cannot be enduring in the absence of broader changes unrelated to kinetic or online operations. Dislodging IS from cities, even strategic cities like Mosul and Raqqa, will not be the most difficult part of defeating the group. In this sense, the strategies discussed here have been tactical. While important for reducing IS momentum and liberating millions from the group’s brutal reign, they have not touched on the underlying grievances and conditions that enabled IS to take root and flourish. The related challenges of poor governance, impunity, weak states, corruption, and sectarianism, among others, will require long-term commitments. The United States will have a role to play, as will other states outside the region, but primary responsibility for addressing these problems must lie with the governments and peoples that they most affect. Rolling back IS can create space for the development and implementation of broader solutions. It will not be a panacea.

19 Milton, Daniel. “Communication Breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic State’s Media Efforts.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. 2016.

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References

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A.B. Atwan. Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate. University of California Press. 2015. J. Cohen. Digital Counterinsurgency: How to Marginalize the Islamic State Online. Foreign Affairs 94, 6 (2015). A.K. Cronin. ISIS Is Not a Terrorist Group. Foreign Affairs 94, 2 (2015). H. Gambhir. The Virtual Caliphate: ISIS’s Information Warfare. Institute for the Study of War. 2016. S. Hughes. Countering the Virtual Caliphate. Written testimony before the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee. 2016. D. Milton. Communications Breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic State’s Media Efforts. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. 2016. P. Neumann. Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: The Narratives of Islamic State Defectors. The International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence. 2015. S. George and Q. Abdul-Zahra. Mosul Fight is Already Redrawing the Map of Norther Iraq. Associated Press. August 27, 2016. A. Goldman and E. Schmitt. One by One, ISIS Social Media Experts Are Killed as Result of F.B.I. Program. The New York Times. November 24, 2016. J. Greenberg. Does the Islamic State Post 90,000 Social Media Messages Each Day? Politifact.com. February 19, 2015. G. Witte, S. Raghavan, and J. McAuley. Flow of Foreign Fighters Plummets as Islamic State Loses Its Edge. The Washington Post. September 9, 2016. N. Woolf. Twitter Suspends 235,000 Accounts in Six Months for Promoting Terrorism. The Guardian. August 18, 2016.

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The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats M. Martellini and J. Rao (Eds.) IOS Press, 2017 © 2017 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-802-0-30

Islamic State’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Capability: An Open Source Intelligence Approach Simeon DUKIĆ 1

Abstract. Countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-state groups has been a crucial goal for the international community in preserving global peace and stability. Nevertheless, recent allegations suggest that radical jihadi groups have gained access and used unconventional weapons in the Middle East. Namely, there are statements and reports by intelligence officers, politicians and experts that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant has gained access to internationally prohibited weapons. By systematically using open source intelligence (OSINT) this paper will assess Islamic State’s weapons of mass destruction capability. It will look at allegations in relation to the possession and use of weapons of mass destruction. It will argue that open source information reveals that the group has produced and employed crude forms of sulphur mustard. Moreover, it will show, based on two case studies that OSINT provides valuable information in examining incidents where chemical weapons have likely been used. Before presenting its arguments and findings the paper briefly defines open source intelligence and analyses areas where it provides value. It also examines ISIL’s intentions to develop and utilize weapons of mass destruction. Keywords. Open source intelligence, Islamic State, weapons of mass destruction

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Introduction The threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism originating from non-state groups, particularly extremist jihadi organisations, is a major concern for global peace and security. The international community, and specifically the Security Council of the United Nations, has reacted to this danger by enacting Resolution 1540, which obliges states to draft, implement and enforce legislation to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to terrorist networks. However, the resolution by itself has not been able to prevent the spread of WMD as shown by recent allegations that the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) developed rudimentary chemical weapon capabilities. Namely, John Brennan, the former head of the CIA, has stated that ISIL fighters have developed the capacity to produce small amounts of chlorine and mustard agent [1]. Moreover, the former Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, told the Senate Armed Services in Capitol Hill that extremists have used toxic chemicals as means of warfare on the territory of Syria and Iraq [2]. A November 2016 report by IHS Conflict Monitor, a subsidiary of IHS Markit, an information analytics company, has identified 52 uses of chemical agents since 1

Simoen Dukic, Jane Sandanski 19/1–14, Skopje 1000, Macedonia; E-mail: [email protected].

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2014 [3]. To substantiate its findings IHS Conflict Monitor used open source information from social media, local news reports, and IS propaganda. This paper examines the value of open source intelligence (OSINT) in uncovering and verifying alleged ISIL chemical weapons capability in Iraq and Syria. It argues that OSINT is an important tool for identifying likely uses of chemical weapons. Due to a large amount of chemical weapon incidents in the Middle East the use of open sources can be instrumental for relevant organisations and institutions to discern cases where there is a higher probability that chemical agents were utilized. In order to achieve its goal the paper first defines open source intelligence and briefly introduces its use and (increased) relevance in recent history. Second, the article confirms the intentions of ISIL to obtain WMDs from open sources. Specifically, it presents the so called “Laptop of Doom” and the statements made by a Muslim Dutch fighter on social media. Third, it introduces allegations and facts about extremist group’s WMD capability. Fourth, the paper analyses case studies where open source information has been crucial in presenting a strong probability that chemical weapons have been developed and used by ISIL in Syria and Iraq. Additionally, the paper examines challenges and limitations of open source intelligence when conducting online research on the WMD capabilities of the jihadi organisation.

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Open Source Intelligence Traditionally, intelligence has been viewed as an activity which is derived from confidential sources and through covert methods. However, with the recent technological developments and proliferation of mobile devices there has been an increased debate on the value of open source intelligence. Richard A. Best Jr. and Alfred Cumming argue that the current ability to quickly process vast amounts of data, and the simplicity associated with its sharing have increased the utility of open source information compared to secret data, making it the core component of intelligence analysis [4]. Furthermore, Allen Dulles, a former prominent Director of Central Intelligence, has stated that during peacetime around 80% of the information supplied to intelligence agencies comes from open sources and through overt means [5]. However, what is open source intelligence, and what is its added value in intelligence collection and processing? Definition US Intelligence Community Directive No. 301 defines open source information as any publically available information that anyone can lawfully obtain by request, purchase, or observation. Moreover, it adds that open source intelligence is the insight produced from publically available information that is collected, exploited and disseminated in a timely manner and addressed to a specific audience dealing with a particular intelligence requirement [6]. This information can be found in print and digital form including (social) media, public data (such as official government reports, statements etc.), academic literature, commercial imagery, human experts, grey literature, niche commercial sites and leaked documents [7]. However, there presence of information in the public domain does not mean that this data is readily available to everyone due to legal, monetary and other practical restrictions associated with its collection [8].

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Value The value of open source intelligence has been widely disputed by intelligence officers and experts. The general perception on the value of open source intelligence during the Cold War within the US intelligence community has been marginal. It was regarded that information in the public domain has little use, and that secret and covertly collected data have exclusive benefit to the decision making processes of intelligence agencies. Moreover the term “open source intelligence” was regarded as an oxymoron by practitioners because only confidential information was regarded as real intelligence. To be able to assess the value of open source intelligence, one needs to examine the purpose of intelligence. According to Stevyn Gibson there are generally two agreed functions: (1) providing actionable data to support decision making, and (2) minimizing ambiguity in a timely manner [9]. In order to achieve these goals intelligence officers needs different sources of information and various collection methods to acquire information that answer specific questions. Hence, as long as open source data can provide relevant and actionable data to answer specific intelligence questions in a timely manner, then it should be regarded as an important source of information.

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There are five specific areas where OSINT provides value to the intelligence process. First, open source data is crucial for giving context to (already) acquired information. This is important because looking at pieces of information in isolation could lead to misguided conclusions. Second, OSINT supplies data that could be used for corroborating, verifying and challenging gathered data. Third, open source information could be used to uncover new actionable data that fulfil a particular intelligence requirement. Fourth, collecting OSINT compared to secret information is generally cheaper and faster. Finally, OSINT is constantly available in large volumes [10]. These benefits have not gone unnoticed by policy makers within US institutions. Mainly the utility of OSINT was emphasized in the reports of the 9/11 and WMD Commissions, which were set up to examine the intelligence failures associated with the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programme, respectively. Their work advocated for the development of a system that systematically exploits open source data [11]. Based on their recommendations the Open Source Directorate was opened within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 2005 that would use modern information processing tools to collect open source information [12]. This suggests that OSINT is becoming an integral part of the intelligence cycle which aims to provide insight for decision makers to address specific policy questions.

Intentions Before addressing ISIL’s WMD capability, the paper first briefly examines their intentions to use such weapons by examining open source information. ISIL’s extreme retaliatory violence is a significant characteristic of the jihadi group. It has been constantly expressed with brutal acts such as the beheading of dozens of Syrian and Kurdish soldiers, journalists, and other hostages, the burning of a Jordanian pilot, and massacring various groups on the territory it gained control. In light of this brutalism would the ex-

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tremist group hesitate to develop and use of weapons of mass destruction to further spread its goals? This section examines the findings of the so called “laptop of doom” and the statements made by ISIL fighter Omar Yilmaz to show ISIL’s intent to use unconventional weapons. In August 2014, journalists Harald Doornbos and Jenan Moussa reported on a story about a laptop given to them by a commander of a Syrian rebel group, which they had seized from ISIL militants in the north of Syria. According to the documents on the laptop it belonged to a Tunisian fighter Muhammed S. who studied chemistry and physics in his home country [13]. The laptop contained around 146 gigabytes of documents, pictures and video in French, English and Arabic. Among the files was a 19page guide to safely weaponize bubonic plague from infected animals and a video guide on the steps to obtain and produce ricin, a deadly toxin, from castor beans [14]. In addition to this guide the laptop contained a 26-page fatwa issued by Saudi jihadi cleric Nasir al-Fahr, which approves the use of weapons of mass destructions as a last resort if Muslims cannot defeat the unbelievers. Most of the files found on this computer had been downloaded from open sources on the internet, which emphasizes the easiness with which one could acquire material that contains practical and ideological instructions for conducting unconventional terrorist attacks. The laptop of doom, as the journalists have named it, is an important indication of the radical group’s intent to recruit semi-skilled people to acquire WMDs and wage jihad.

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The intent to acquire and use WMDs can also be inferred from the information presented on the social media accounts of ISIL fighters. One former Dutch soldier turned jihadi militant, Omar Yilmaz, pointed out on his Tumblr profile, a microblogging platform, that the group has come in the possession of chemical weapons agents that were produced by the Assad regime [15]. Moreover, in another post he stated that the militants were prepared to use them because the Syrian government has already conducted chemical weapons attacks [16]. At the time of this writing Yilmaz’s profile has been deactivated from Tumblr, but using archiving websites one could still access the posts mentioned above [17]. The confessions of this infamous militant show that the group does not shy away from using internationally prohibited weapons.

Allegations on Capabilities After confirming ISIL’s intentions to use weapons of mass destruction to terrify, incapacitate, and deter its enemies, it is necessary to analyse their capabilities to do so. Many prominent politicians, policy makers and experts have stated that the group has already acquired and used chemical weapons in the territory they control. Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, a former British Army colonel with expertise in CBRN terrorism, has warned that ISIL has started producing its own mustard gas and has gained access to some of Assad’s undeclared stockpile [18]. Moreover, former French Prime Minister Manuel Valls has warned that the group has plans to smuggle these weapons in Europe and plan an attack [19]. The section analyses some allegations made in relation to the group’s possession and use of unconventional weapons on the territory of Syria and Iraq.

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Possession

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One of the most serious and widely discussed allegations was ISIL’s theft of around 40 kg of lowly enriched uranium compounds from the University of Mosul in Iraq [20]. This was confirmed by the Iraqi UN Ambassador Mohamed Ali Alhakim in a letter addressed to former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon. The Ambassador wrote that the extremists have seized control of nuclear material that could be used in the manufacturing of weapons of mass destruction [21]. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether this amount poses any danger of being converted into a nuclear explosive device. The lowgrade uranium was used for research purposes at the university; hence, ISIL fighters and/or scientists need to have substantial knowledge, raw material, technology and financial resources to enrich the uranium, weaponize it, and attach it to a delivery mechanism for it to be converted into a nuclear bomb [22]. Lacking these qualities, it is highly unlikely that the jihadi group would be able to produce a nuclear explosive that inflicts serious physical harm. However, there are risks associated with this theft; namely, ISIL militants could use it create a simple radiological device called a “dirty bomb” where explosives are combined with the radioactive material. Nevertheless, the radioactivity released in this manner is relatively small and has limited negative health effects [23]. Other allegations suggest that ISIL fighters have captured chemical weapons from the former Iraqi and Syrian programmes. The Islamic State controlled a part of Iraq’s territory where Al-Muthanna, the site where the former Iraqi chemical weapons programme, was located. It has been reported that the bunkers contained nearly 2000 empty shells contaminated with mustard gas and around 600 one-tonne mustard containers [24]. Nonetheless, it is highly unlikely that ISIL was able to get any of this material because the United Nations Special Commission and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission inspectors reported twenty years ago that the material at Al Muthanna had been degraded. Additionally, the bunkers where the UN Special Commission destroyed the agent are sealed, which means that getting access to them would be extremely difficult and dangerous [25]. Thus, it is highly unlikely that ISIL acquired any chemical weapons from this compound. In Syria there are testimonies that Nusra Front fighters, a rebel group with close ties to al-Qaeda, captured a base controlled by Syrian Army named Regiment 111 in December, 2012 [26]. Nevertheless, when the group split, fighters that joined ISIL were in possession of the unconventional weapons. At that time Syria was not a party to Chemical Weapons Convention and it had a significant stockpile of chemical agents. According to a former ISIL fighter the base contained swaths of ammunition and armament including a cache of chemical weapons. Specifically, there were barrels with chlorine, sarin, and mustard gas. Three months later the same operative suspects that ISIL fighters used the agents in the first reported chemical attack during the Syrian war near the town of Aleppo [27]. However, it is difficult to claim with certainty based on these allegations that ISIL has under its possession chemical weapons because even its operative testifying on this matter did not have material evidence that the chemical weapons stolen at Regiment 111 landed in the hands of the jihadi group. Finally, it has been reported that ISIL has developed crude chemical weapons capabilities and home-made delivery systems. This allegation is substantiated by the

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claim that among the thousands of fighters that have been arriving to Syria and Iraq are also skilled scientists with degrees in physics, chemistry and biology that can produce deadly weapons [28]. One of the most infamous scientists that joined ISIL was Abu Malik, who also participated in Saddam Hussein’s chemical weapons programme. CBRN experts believe that these individuals could manufacture chemical weapons because material is relatively easy to acquire, and producing the lethal chemicals is not complicated [29]. The theory that ISIL is producing its own chemical weapons has also been supported by an investigation at the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPWC). After an analysis of a sample of mustard gas taken from the territory of Syria and Iraq the head of the organisation, Ambassador Uzumcu, stated that the results showed that the substance was of a poor quality likely to have been produced by ISIL scientists [30]. The availability of skilled individuals and the relative simplicity to attain and produce chemical material make allegations of ISIL produced chemical capability serious. Additionally, the confirmation of rudimentary capabilities by the head of the OPCW and US intelligence officials has made CBRN terrorism threat a high possibility. Attacks

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Local non-governmental organisations and media outlets have recorded incidents of alleged chemical weapons use. For example, the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), an NGO which documents violations against Syrian civilians, has reported 139 chemical weapon attacks on Syrian territory since UN Security Resolution 2118, which condemned and prohibited the use of chemical warfare in the country, was passed in September 2013 [31]. In its finding it has attributed a minority of attacks, around 3%, to ISIL fighters. Although this is a small percentage, it is still alarming because it points to ISIL’s determination to use chemical agents for warfare. Another NGO called the Syrian Archive has collected 392 verified videos which suggest chemical weapons use [32]. These videos include allegations of both Syrian government and ISIL unconventional weapon incidents. ISIL has allegedly targeted different groups with its chemical arsenal including Peshmega, Syrian and Iraqi government forces, rebel groups, and civilians. Nonetheless, at the time of this writing there has been one official finding by an international body that chemical agents were used by the terrorist group. Namely, the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) set up by the UN and the OPCW with a mandate to identify to the greatest extent possible individuals, entities and groups who organised, sponsored, or were otherwise involved in the use of chemical weapons, concluded in its third report that chemical toxins were used on three occasions on the territory of Syria [33]. The JIM investigated 29 out of 116 incidents where chemical weapons were allegedly employed from which only nine of the most severe events for which forensically verifiable data was available were further examined. Based on the evidence collected and processed the leadership panel of the investigatory body found that ISIL used sulphur mustard on August 21st 2015 in Marea, a city 35 km north-east of Aleppo [34]. The fact-finding mission stated that there had been around 50 artillery projectiles filled with different payloads fired at the city from the east, or north-east, which are areas controlled by ISIL. The Mechanism reported that artillery shells were filled with a dark viscous liquid, which is believed to be sulphur mustard [35]. One should note that although the agent is often referred to as mustard gas, it comes in a liquid form. Moreover,

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the JIM referred to witnesses statements that point out to symptoms and injuries that are consistent with sulphur mustard exposure. Specifically, one individual who attempted to bury one of the artillery shells injured himself when liquid leaked from the projectile causing blisters on his left leg. According to the report the agent used was undistilled and generated through the Levinstein process, which is a relatively simple and quick method to produce sulphur mustard. Although there was no sufficient evidence to conclude the origin of the chemical there is a strong probability that ISIL has developed a capacity to manufacture it by itself. This is due to the fact that OPCW confirmed that Syria’s mustard agent did not contain any impurities which form through the Levinstein process [36]. During its analysis the JIM in addition to its fact-finding mission depended on other outlets of information including open source data. It collected more than 8,500 pages of documents, over 950 photographs and above 450 videos from publically available sources and witnesses [37]. The information presented from open sources and social media was subject to forensic analysis and used to investigate the documented munitions and their remnants, the delivery method and impacts of their use. The next section analyses two case studies where open source intelligence is exclusively used to uncover alleged utilization of chemical weapons by ISIL

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OSINT Analysis The use of chemical weapons by various actors in Syria and Iraq has motivated many NGOs and investigative journalists to monitor violations in the region. The use of open source data has been crucial for these organisations and individuals. For example, the Ghouta chemical attacks in two suburbs of Damascus, of August 21, 2013 were one of the most reported incidents in Syria at the time. After a few weeks after the event Human Rights Watch, a prominent human rights NGO, issued an analysis of the alleged chemical weapons attack, whereby it relied mostly on insight derived from open source data [38]. The assessment found a high likelihood that sarin, a chemical nerve agent, was fired from surface-to-surface rocket systems. Additionally, the report pointed the finger at the Syrian government as the perpetrator of these attacks. More than a week after issuing this article, the UN Mission to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic presented its own findings. Its conclusions were based on on-site visits where the Mission carried out interviews with local witnesses, documented munitions and components, assessed symptoms of witnesses and collected environmental samples [39]. Almost identically as in the Human Rights Watch report the investigation found that surface-to-surface rockets carrying sarin in their payloads struck the Ghouta suburbs [40]. Nevertheless, in contrast to the NGO’s article the UN Mission was not mandated to make remarks on the perpetrators. Bearing in mind the different level of access to resources between the two entities, the similarity in the findings of these investigations show that open source intelligence is valuable in proving evidence that chemical weapons have likely been used in a particular attack. The ability of Human Rights Watch to come to the same conclusions by utilizing open source data as the UN Mission which conducted field investigations is significant. Open source intelligence has been systematically utilized by other entities to monitor chemical weapons use in the Middle East. For instance, Bellingcat, an investigative

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journalist platform, has published stories on the use of sulphur mustard and chlorine by ISIL. One case study involves the August 16, 2016 mustard gas attacks on Marea, the same city targeted by the jihadi group almost a year earlier, which was present in JIM’s report. One could classify the findings of this case study in three categories: (1) payload, (2) delivery method, and (3) victims’ symptoms. In relation to the payload one could observe relevant information from video footage provided to Bellingcat by local journalist Yasser Alhaji that documents two impact sites of projectile shelling [41]. One of the impact sites shows a large splash of dark viscous liquid on a wall right next to a crater where the projectile landed. Other videos of the same impact site from local media, namely RFS Media Office and Qasioun News Agency, corroborate the presence of the dark liquid [42]. Although one cannot confirm with certainty the nature of the payload, it is alleged that the projectile was carrying sulphur mustard. This conclusion is based on the description given by the JIM report which found that a similar liquid was found during the chemical weapon attacks in Marea a year earlier. Moreover, video footage from Shahba Press Agency dated September 2015 shows chemical attacks that occurred in in Marea [43]. The video shows an identical dark liquid next to the impact sites which was also alleged to be mustard gas. In addition, the presence of the dark viscous liquid was accompanied by what the witnesses reported as an “ugly smell” which was similarly described as in the JIM report [44]. This is an important characteristic because, in addition to having a dark colour and being more viscous than water, sulphur mustard has a strong distasteful odour similar to garlic, or horseradish [45].

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Regarding the munitions used to deliver the payload, the information in the videos provided Alhaji and the local news stations show (pieces of) projectiles used by ISIL forces. According to Bellingcat the munitions area mortar bombs produced by ISIL because they do not match any known chemical munitions [46]. In another alleged chemical attack in the Kurdish village Umm Hosh almost a month after the incident in Marea, ISIL used identical projectiles to transfer sulphur mustard [47]. In both incidents the projectiles were completely intact after impact which further supports the claim that they had been filled with a chemical agent. If the payload had been made out of explosives the projectiles would have been destroyed in pieces. In the Marea attacks around 10 people were treated for exposure to chemical weapons. According to one physician, these victims had breathing difficulties, nausea, vomiting, lack of coordination and running noses [48]. Among the victims was a member of the White Helmets, a volunteer civil defence organisation that operates in Syrian territory, and a one month old infant. Even though these symptoms confirm the poisoning from a chemical agent, they do not indicate with a high probability that mustard gas was used. Bellingcat notes that the absence of blistering in these attacks makes it questionable whether sulphur mustard was used. Blistering is a common effect when one is exposed to sulphur mustard that affects the skin by creating yellow blisters filled with clear water. This symptom was present with victims of the Umm Hosh chemical weapons attack mentioned above indicating a strong probability that mustard gas was used [49]. The absence of blistering among the victims in Marea is a raises suspicion to the allegation of sulphur mustard exposure. Nevertheless, it is likely that the victims did not have direct skin contact with the agent, which explains the lack of blistering. The evidence in this regard is dubious, and requires further forensic investigation to determine the type of chemical agent employed. However, based on the data presented

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on the payload, munitions, and symptoms there is a high probability that a chemical agent was used in the attack on Marea.

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Similarly, Human Rights Watch has assessed another case study where there has been an alleged utilization of sulphur mustard in Qayyarah, Iraq, 60 km south of Mosul, in September and October 2016. Their analysis, however, focuses more on the symptoms of the victims, and devotes less attention to the characteristics of the agent and the munitions. Nevertheless, the information provided through video footages and pictures allows one to make partial conclusions on the latter two aspects, as well. In terms of the payload used on the September 21st attack one could see a chemical agent diluted with water at an impact site [50]. It is difficult to uncover the potential toxin used from the evidence, but the yellow-brown colour present might indicate the presence of sulphur mustard. Additionally, the projectiles that landed in the city contained hollow warheads, and the body of the rockets was not destroyed upon impact [51]. As in Marea, this indicates that explosives were not used in the attack. Regarding the symptoms, a victim of the September attacks noticed an odour resembling garlic, or rotten onions, when the projectile landed [52]. Then he complained about a burning feeling in his eyes and reddening of the skin, followed by subsequent blistering after a relatively short time period [53]. According to Keith B. Ward, an expert on chemical warfare agents, the symptoms are consistent with an exposure to blistering agents, most probably sulphur mustard [54]. However, Ward notes that a more detailed analysis of water and soil samples need to be conducted for one to be able to identify the agent with certainty. OSINT can never solely and definitely prove that chemical weapons have been used, but it can discern cases where there is a higher chance they were employed. The two cases studies presented in the section show the utility of open sources providing context, identifying new information and verifying existing pieces of data in uncovering such attacks. For instance, one could use expert guidelines for contextual purposes on the physical characteristics of chemical agents, and relevant symptoms when exposed to them. Bellingcat has published such a guideline that could help one assess whether sulphur mustard was used in different occasions. Moreover, one could find additional sources to corroborate and verify allegations of chemical weapons use. For example, videos and pictures from different local media and independent journalists, which report the same event, as in the first case study, increase the validity of the information. Nevertheless, OSINT analysis is not entirely simple – it carries with it four main challenges; namely, language barriers, validation of acquired data, overload of information and scarcity of useful intelligence. The investigations conducted by Human Rights Watch and Bellingcat in the case studies were based on a significant amount of Arabic sources. Without the appropriate language skills it would be impossible to meaningfully use the collected data. Additionally, one needs to verify whether the information acquired is truthful. Bellingcat has written a concise manual on the methodology for verifying video material. The guideline focuses on four main points: verifying the source of the video, collecting and analysing videos for corroboration, verifying locations, and verifying dates [55]. Nevertheless, it will not be possible to complete these steps on each occasion because of a lack of information, which makes validation a challenging task. The emergence of big data and the overload of information have made manual processing of information almost impossible. Researchers and engineers

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are developing improved algorithms to collect and analyse intelligence with greater precision. However, gaining access to this software incurs significant costs. Finally, in the abundance of information it is difficult to find the golden nuggets that provide valuable insight. Consequently, OSINT analysis requires significant efforts to filter useful information to give policy makers added value in decision-making processes.

Conclusion

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The systematic exploitation of OSINT is valuable in assessing the possession and use of chemical weapons by ISIL. The general utility of open source information is gaining greater recognition and appreciation among the intelligence community, especially after the 9/11 and Iraq WMD intelligence failures. In relation to the jihadi group, one could examine the intentions and capabilities by using publically available information. Regarding intentions, the social media profiles of the militant fighters and reports produced by journalist clearly indicate that ISIL has sought ways to develop, or otherwise acquire WMDs. Allegations about actual capability could also be examined. Allegations that ISIL can build nuclear explosive devices from 40 kg of low enriched uranium are unfounded. Moreover, it is unlikely that ISIL has acquired chemical weapons from the former abandoned Iraqi chemical weapons programme. However, the allegations that ISIL has started producing its own chemical weapons are highly probable. This is based on examinations carried out by the OPCW in relation to the quality of the agent used. Moreover, in the report of the JIM, that confirm ISIL’s use of sulphur mustard, it was clearly stated that the chemical agent was basic and contained many impurities. The OSINT analysis shows with a high probability that ISIL continued to use chemical weapons in the territories of Syria and Iraq. In the Marea case study the payload, munitions, and symptoms of the victims show traces of chemical agents near the impact sites. The undamaged state of the projectiles after reaching their target, the physical characteristics of the chemical agent suggest that a non-explosive substance was used in the payload. In the Qayyarah case study, in addition to the munitions and chemical agent, the symptoms showed a clear exposure to vesicants, due to the blisters that appeared on the skins of the victims after a short period when they contacted the agent. The different forms of information available should be systematically used by investigative bodies to examine cases where there is a greater chance a chemical weapon was employed. Noting that the JIM reported 116 alleged incidents in the territory of Syria, which requires substantial resources for investigation, OSINT can provide relatively inexpensive and easily accessible sources of information to uncover some of the most notorious breaches of international norms.

References [1] K. Howell and J. Brennan, CIA Chief: ISIS Has Used Chemical Weapons, The Washington Times, last modified 2016, accessed November 9, 2016, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/feb/12/johnbrennan-cia-chief-isis-has-used-chemical-weap/. [2] A. Sims, Isis Has Chemical Weapons – And They’Ve Used Them, US Confirms, The Independent, last modified 2016, accessed November 9, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/ isis-has-made-and-deployed-chemical-weapons-says-us-intelligence-official-a6864821.html.

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[3] E. Schmitt, ISIS Used Chemical Arms At Least 52 Times In Syria And Iraq, Report Says, The New York Times, last modified 2016, accessed November 21, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/ world/middleeast/isis-chemical-weapons-syria-iraq-mosul.html?_r=1. [4] R. Best Jr. and A. Cumming, Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): Issues For Congress, in Intelligence Issues And Developments, T. M. Paulson ed., New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2008, 75–77. [5] S.D. Gibson, Exploring The Role And Value Of Open Source Intelligence, in Open Source Intelligence In The Twenty-First Century: New Approaches And Opportunities, Christopher Hobbs, Matthew Moran and Daniel Salisbury ed., New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, 9–10. [6] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence Community Directive No. 301, 2006, accessed October 20, 2016, https://fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-301.pdf. [7] R.D. Steele, Open Source Intelligence, in Handbook Of Intelligence Studies, Loch K. Johnson ed., New York: Routledge, 2007, 138. [8] S. Gibson, OSINF: The Lifeblood Of Decision-Making, RUSI, last modified 2007, accessed November 3, 2016, https://rusi.org/publication/osinf-lifeblood-decision-making. [9] S.D. Gibson (2014), 20. [10] Ibid 9–14. [11] W.Q. Bowen, Open Source Intelligence And Nuclear Safeguards, in Spinning Intelligence: Why Intelligence Needs The Media, Why The Media Needs Intelligence, Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman ed., London: Hurst and Company, 2009, 91–93. [12] CIA, Establishment Of The DNI Open Source Center, last modified 2008, accessed November 16, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-archive-2005/ pr11082005.html. [13] H. Doornbos and J. Moussa, Found: The Islamic State’S Terror Laptop Of Doom, Foreign Policy, last modified 2014, accessed October 20, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/28/found-the-islamicstates-terror-laptop-of-doom/. [14] H. Doornbos and J. Moussa, Recipes From The Islamic State’s Laptop Of Doom, Foreign Policy, last modified 2014, accessed October 20, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/09/recipes-from-theislamic-states-laptop-of-doom/. [15] A. Roul, Apocalyptic Terror: Chemical And Biological Dimensions Of Jihadi Terrorism, SSPC Research Paper, The Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict, 2016, 6. [16] N.A. Youssef, Where Did ISIS Get Its Chemical Weapons?, The Daily Beast, last modified 2015, accessed November 1, 2016, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/09/02/where-did-isis-get-itschemical-weapons.html. [17] His activity can be found using internet archiving sites, such as this one: https://web.archive.org/web/ 20150902094927/http://chechclear.tumblr.com/. [18] P. Wintour, Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga Ask UK For Help Against Isis Chemical Attack, The Guardian, last modified 2016, accessed November 7, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/04/ iraqi-kurdish-peshmerga-fear-isis-chemical-attack-mosul. [19] N. Bar-Yaacov, What If Isis Launches A Chemical Attack In Europe? The Guardian, last modified 2015, accessed October 24, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/global/commentisfree/2015/nov/27/ isis-chemical-attack-europe-public. [20] W. Rudischhauser, Could ISIL Go Nuclear? NATO Review, 2015, accessed October 26, 2016, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/ISIL/ISIL-Nuclear-Chemical-Threat-Iraq-Syria/EN/index.htm. [21] M. Nichols, Exclusive: Iraq Tells U.N. That ‘Terrorist Groups’ Seized Nuclear Materials, Reuters, last modified 2014, accessed October 29, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-nuclearidUSKBN0FE2KT20140709. [22] M. Cottee and D. Esfandiary, The Very Small Islamic State WMD Threat, Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists, last modified 2014, accessed October 1, 2017, http://thebulletin.org/very-small-islamic-statewmd-threat7729. [23] Ibid. [24] W. Rudischhauser (2015). [25] M. Cottee and D. Esfandiary (2014). [26] H. Doornbos and J. Moussa, How The Islamic State Seized A Chemical Weapons Stockpile, Foreign Policy, last modified 2016, accessed November 13, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/17/howthe-islamic-state-seized-a-chemical-weapons-stockpile/. [27] O. Holmes and E. Solomon, Alleged Chemical Attack Kills 25 In Northern Syria, Reuters, last modified 2013, accessed October 24, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-chemicalidUSBRE92I0A220130319. [28] B. Immenkamp, ISIL/Da’esh and ‘non-Conventional’ Weapons of Terror, Briefing (European Parliament Research Service, 2015), 3. [29] Ibid.

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[30] J. Biddle, Watchdog Probing Over 20 Reports Of Alleged Syria Chemical Attacks, Yahoo, last modified 2016, accessed November 23, 2016, https://www.yahoo.com/news/watchdog-probing-over-20-reportsalleged-syria-chemical-152525768.html. [31] 139 Chemical Attacks After Security Council Resolution 2118, Special Reports, Syrian Network for Human Rights, 2016, 1–3. [32] The videos from the database can be found here: https://syrianarchive.org/database/. [33] Third Report Of The Organization For The Prohibition Of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, OPCW-UN JIM, 2016, 4. [34] Ibid 93. [35] Ibid 94–96. [36] Ibid 97. [37] Ibid 6. [38] Attacks On Ghouta: Analysis Of Alleged Chemical Weapons In Syria, Human Rights Watch, 2013, 4. [39] Report On The Alleged Use Of Chemical Weapons In The Ghouta Area Of Damascus On 21 August 2013, United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, 2013, 2–3. [40] Ibid 5. [41] H. Al-Khatib, Evidence From The August 16, 2016 Chemical Attack On Marea By ISIS – Bellingcat, Bellingcat, last modified 2016, accessed October 24, 2016, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/ 2016/08/31/evidence-august-16-2016-chemical-attack-marea-isis/. [42] The videos from the local media outlets can be found here: https://syrianarchive.org/database/?type_of_ violation=3&weapons=1&location=134&startDate=&endDate=. [43] The video of the attack: https://syrianarchive.org/database/2711/. [44] H. Al-Khatib (2016). [45] D. Kaszeta, Is It Mustard Or Not? Guidelines For Assessing Claimed Use Of The Mustard Family Of Blister Agents – Bellingcat, Bellingcat, last modified 2014, accessed October 21, 2016, https://www. bellingcat.com/resources/articles/2014/10/14/is-it-mustard-or-not-guidelines-for-assessing-claimed-useof-the-mustard-family-of-blister-agents/. [46] H. Al-Khatib (2016). [47] E. Higgins, Signs Of Mustard Gas Use In September ISIS Chemical Attacks – Bellingcat, Bellingcat, last modified 2016, accessed October 24, 2016, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2016/09/21/ signs-mustard-gas-use-september-isis-chemical-attacks/. [48] H. Al-Khatib (2016). [49] E. Higgins (2016). [50] Iraq: Fleeing ISIS Forces Fired Toxic Chemicals, Human Rights Watch, last modified 2016, accessed November 17, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/11/iraq-fleeing-isis-forces-fired-toxicchemicals. [51] Ibid. [52] Ibid. [53] Ibid. [54] Ibid. [55] Syrian Archive, Dataset Of Verified Videos About Chemical Weapons Attacks In Syria – Bellingcat, Bellingcat, last modified 2017, accessed March 24, 2017, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/ 2016/09/13/dataset-verified-videos-chemical-weapons-attacks-syria/.

The author(s) of this publication is/are solely responsible for its content. This publication does not reflect the opinion of the publisher. The publisher cannot be held liable for any loss or damage that may occur because of this publication. The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2017. ProQuest

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The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats M. Martellini and J. Rao (Eds.) IOS Press, 2017 © 2017 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-802-0-42

Responsible Science Alastair HAY 1 LICAAM Institute

Abstract. Responsibility in science is not a new requirement. The very practice of science requires a good deal of responsibility to ensure the integrity of research findings and transmission of knowledge. But there are issues where scientific practice may come into conflict with either individual conscience or a more collective view. These conflicts are considered against a backdrop of increasing discussion in both academic and industrial circles about what it means to practice responsible science. Keywords. Chemical weapons, biological weapons, ethical guidelines, pedagogy

Introduction

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Most scientists would claim that they are responsible practitioners of their craft so why the need for a discussion about responsible science? And how might you define “responsible”? For some scientists, responsible might mean avoiding work in certain areas, say weapons research, rocketry, or producing plastics, because they fear it will cause a pollution problem. Counter arguments can be made to all of these positions. Take weapons: if one side is armed, and the other not, then the outcome of any armed conflict is probably a forgone conclusion. To not be armed to defend yourself under these circumstances would probably be judged by most to be quite irresponsible. Events leading up to World War II provide many historical reasons why unilateral disarmament may be risky. But is this a tenable position if the weapons under consideration cause such destruction as to make their use almost impossible to imagine? Nuclear weapons are an obvious case in point. However, the arguments about defence and being held to ransom still apply here, too. For many, an armed stalemate with both sides being well equipped to destroy the other, and both knowing this, and thus being extra cautious about precipitating any conflict, is an uncomfortable position to acknowledge, but one in which none of us have any option but to live with the fact that these weapons exist. Individual scientists may well have a particular view about working on nuclear weapons, but it is harder to persuade the majority about forgoing this work until there is general disarmament, whilst some will certainly adhere to the view that many countries are unfairly affected by the stockpiles of a few. Responsibility about work on nuclear weapons is thus going to be very much a matter of individual conscience. Do the same arguments still apply to complete classes of weapons which are prohibited under international law? Here we can refer to chemical and biological weapons, 1 LICAAM Institute, The Medical School, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, UK; Email: [email protected].

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two weapon classes which are prohibited under international law [1,2]. For many years both weapons classes were not prohibited and an unknown numbers of scientists were actively employed to develop better and more effective munitions. Following the carnage in World War I and the extensive use of chemical weapons, an attempt was made to limit their use with the signing of the 1925 Geneva Protocol [3]. However, the protocol only forbids first use, and many countries entered reservations indicating that, if attacked, they reserved the right to retaliate in kind [4]. This reservation led to many countries maintaining stockpiles of weapons ready for use. It was not until the entry into force of the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention that both types of weapons were outlawed in war. Prior to these conventions, work on these weapons in an offensive capacity was perfectly legitimate, and the arguments outlined above about being suitably armed in case of attack applied. Was there a responsible position and how might it have changed? In 1974 it could have been argued that it was responsible to make biological weapons, but two years later it was quite irresponsible to do so. We are not talking here about a collective change of conscience over the use of these weapons, merely a change in the law. And responsible as far as biological weapons (or chemical weapons) use is concerned simply means just upholding the law.

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Is it sufficient just to uphold the law to be responsible in science? Or should individual conscience be a driver, too, of practice in the field? Long before chemical weapons were outlawed in war many scientists argued that it was wrong to use them, as increasingly, the majority of victims were civilians, people not directly party to the conflict. How could it be responsible, they asked, to develop weapons which were going to target the innocent? These were arguments which were made, not just by scientists, but by increasing numbers of governments, and eventually treaties were agreed. Individual conscience, but also a recognition that the weapons under consideration complicated warfare immensely, all contributed to the eventual bans [4]. But laws differ between countries, and all too often the law is simply playing ‘catchup’ and reacting to events. So whilst abiding by the law would be the responsible position to adopt it may not be the only requirement, or indeed the most responsible, if there is no direct law governing an activity, say, how to conduct research. Research is such a generic description for an activity that is so broad, and each discipline would probably craft a different definition for what it is. Attempting to encourage good practice is often as far as it is possible to go in this situation and guidelines on what to consider help to enable this.

Ethical Guidelines for Chemists In 2015 a group of some 35 scientists met in the Dutch city, The Hague, to draft what has become known as The Hague Ethical Guidelines (see below) [5]. The scientists were primarily concerned about what scientists might do to support the Chemical Weapons Convention but wished to send out a broader, more encouraging, and comprehensive statement about science, and chemistry in particular. Eight topics are covered under a core element which notes that chemistry should benefit humankind and the environment.

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Key elements of The Hague Ethical Guidelines •

Core element. Achievements in the field of chemistry should be used to benefit humankind and protect the environment.

•

Sustainability. Chemistry practitioners have a special responsibility for promoting and achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals of meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.

•

Education. Formal and informal educational providers, enterprise, industry and civil society should cooperate to equip anybody working in chemistry and others with the necessary knowledge and tools to take responsibility for the benefit of humankind, the protection of the environment and to ensure relevant and meaningful engagement with the general public.

•

Awareness and engagement. Teachers, chemistry practitioners, and policymakers should be aware of the multiple uses of chemicals, specifically their use as chemical weapons or their precursors. They should promote the peaceful applications of chemicals and work to prevent any misuse of chemicals, scientific knowledge, tools and technologies, and any harmful or unethical developments in research and innovation. They should disseminate relevant information about national and international laws, regulations, policies and practices.

•

Ethics. To adequately respond to societal challenges, education, research and innovation must respect fundamental rights and apply the highest ethical standards. Ethics should be perceived as a way of ensuring high quality results in science.

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Safety and Security. Chemistry practitioners should promote the beneficial applications, uses, and development of science and technology while encouraging and maintaining a strong culture of safety, health, and security.

•

Accountability. Chemistry practitioners have a responsibility to ensure that chemicals, equipment and facilities are protected against theft and diversion and are not used for illegal, harmful or destructive purposes. These persons should be aware of applicable laws and regulations governing the manufacture and use of chemicals, and they should report any misuse of chemicals, scientific knowledge, equipment and facilities to the relevant authorities.

•

Oversight. Chemistry practitioners who supervise others have the additional responsibility to ensure that chemicals, equipment and facilities are not used by those persons for illegal, harmful or destructive purposes.

•

Exchange of information. Chemistry practitioners should promote the exchange of scientific and technical information relating to the development and application of chemistry for peaceful purposes.

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Most specific fields of science cover a wide range of activities and chemistry is no exception. Thus whilst it might be tempting to prepare a more rigorous code of conduct to encourage good behaviour, or even regulate activity, devising a code that applies to a wide range of disciplines would be difficult as the text would have to be generic and lacking in specificity, when specificity may be exactly what is required. Too general a code would lack teeth and be of little consequence. In addition, for codes to work, they require endorsement by those to whom they refer and active involvement of these individuals [6]. Codes, in other words, need to be living documents, and constantly reviewed to ensure that they are current and applicable. So, devising a code of conduct for chemists globally was seen as something unrealisable and a set of guidelines preferable. Guidelines can then be considered by others devising specific codes for their own distinct discipline. The Hague Ethical Guidelines was the inspiration behind a group under the auspices of The American Chemical Society drafting a global code of ethics for chemists [7] and the text covers similar ground to the ethical guidelines. A more specific Chemical Professionals’ Code of Conduct [8] for members of The American Chemical Society was adopted by the society in December 2016 and builds on earlier, less comprehensive, versions. Here the text applies to those wishing to be members of a specific society where it is possible to enforce requirements. The latest text sets out very clearly how chemists should behave professionally with clients, students and colleagues and requires that members must practice their craft with integrity.

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Chemists Condemn Use of Chemicals as Weapons These moves to encourage good practice in a profession are a clear example of scientists anxious to be seen as responsible members of society. Further examples of chemists acting responsibly are the statements issued in 2016 by numerous chemical councils and societies condemning the use of chlorine as a chemical weapon in Syria [9]. The statements note that chlorine has many legitimate civilian uses and that it must not be used to harm individuals deliberately. The most recent use of a chemical weapon on April 4, 2017 in Syria, possibly a nerve agent, and which resulted in over 70 reported deaths (many of whom were children) and hundreds of injuries [10], has prompted chemists to speak out again. On April 7th a statement was put out by 32 European chemical societies [11], condemning in the strongest terms, the continuing use of chemical weapons, calling for any known stocks to be declared and destroyed, and for those responsible for the attack to be brought to justice (see box below). The European Association for Chemical and Molecular Sciences, EuCheMS, condemns in the strongest possible terms the continuing use of chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict. It calls on the perpetrators to be tried for War Crimes at the earliest possible moment. The use of chemical weapons is a Crime against Humanity of the severest kind and no one who orders attacks using chemical weapons should be allowed to remain free. We further call on all parties in the Syrian conflict immediately to inform the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) of

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all know stockpiles of chemical weapons held by them or their opponents and to allow them to be removed and destroyed at the earliest possible opportunity. The OPCW, based in The Hague, is the international body charged with overseeing the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Signatories to this treaty are required to destroy all their stocks of chemical weapons within 10 years of signing the CWC and agree to inspections of chemical factories and other sites to ensure their compliance with its requirements. Some 192 countries have now signed the CWC with only 4 countries remaining outside the regime. This makes the CWC the most significant and successful disarmament treaty. Destruction of declared chemical weapons is a central requirement of the CWC and to date (April 2017) 94 % of known stockpiles have been destroyed [12]. With a principal goal of the CWC within reach thoughts turn to what route the OPCW now needs to take to uphold the CWC. What must not be allowed to happen is for chemical weapons to re-emerge as part of a state’s armoury, nor for that matter for individuals to feel tempted to develop these weapons to either injure others, or hold them to ransom. So how to reach this other goal? Views have not gelled on what to do, but what is clear is that the CWC needs friends and supporters if it is to remain relevant as a major treaty.

Education and Outreach

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Educating chemists and others about what the OPCW is about, and what the CWC requires, is seen as vital as chemists are those who might make chemical weapons. But the treaty affects everyone and all civilians are vulnerable to the deadly effects of chemicals used as weapons as the recent horrific evidence from Syria demonstrates. It is necessary, therefore, to reach out beyond a narrow professional grouping of chemists to a wider society to encourage them to support the CWC. To this end the OPCW established an Advisory Board on Education and Outreach (ABEO) in 2016 to advise it on how to propagate its messages [13]. Whilst the ABEO debates approaches to take it is important to note that the OPCW and International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) have been active for years in promoting responsibility in science [14]. It is essential that chemists know that it is illegal to make chemical weapons, although one might hope that they would recoil from the idea in the first place, and certainly if any had witnessed the graphic and dreadful scenes from Syria as pictures of nerve gas victims filled our television screens. However, as noted earlier, two decades ago it was still legal for countries to consider using chemical weapons, and certainly if they considered themselves a victim of an attack with these agents. So increasing awareness about the law is undoubtedly a necessary step, but is it the only one that is required? This is where responsibility becomes important. Having any scientist consider the implications of their work is surely a fairly simple ask. But how do you do this? And is it possible to get the majority to cogitate in this way? It is too early to answer the last question. But it is certainly possible to have chemists discuss the consequences of the choices they make. Interactive workshops where active participation around particular issues involving choices with all taking

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part in debate is a successful approach and has been used in various settings [14]. The interactive website ‘Multiple uses of chemicals’ [6] has numerous case studies noting alternative uses for a wide range of chemicals and all of the cases have been used in workshops. It is possible to use the material in an interrogative way too where audiences can be provoked to respond. This approach, not unlike a courtroom, can make for lively debate, and real display of humour, as the presenter is required to deal with all responses from an audience. The key objective is to engage the audience and force it to think about the issues. Many ethical questions can arise in such a forum and this can be challenging for participants, but ultimately rewarding, as the group works towards some consensus about choices made.

The Chemical Industry Another audience, equally vital for the success of the CWC, is the chemical industry. The industry has been key to the success of the CWC and willingly accepts the need for inspections of chemical facilities by OPCW inspectors who both audit company declarations about manufacture and sale of particular chemicals, and who occasionally sample pipework, etc. to obtain final proof. The chemical industry is a vital supporter of the CWC and reemphasised this support by actively condemning the April 4th attack with chemical weapons in Syria. The International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA), a body representing members who account for over 90 % of global sales of chemicals issued the following statement on its website: “ICCA would like to express its disgust about the attack in Syria with chemical weapons. We strongly condemn the use of any chemical as a weapon against people.

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“ICCA strongly supports the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and its members actively support the full implementation of the global ban on any chemical weapons-related activity [15].”

This outspoken condemnation of chemical weapons use by the industry is vital support for the CWC and evidence of the responsibility chemical manufacturers feel about the use of the substances they manufacture. This is an unequivocal demonstration that the chemical industry – or those companies that belong to the ICCA – will not have its members make chemical weapons. The OPCW could not ask for a better endorsement of its activity. Besides supporting the CWC the chemical industry is actively pursuing a model of working that encourages good practice particularly on safety and secure management of chemicals. Known as the Responsible Care initiative, and originally devised by Canadian chemical companies in 1985, this initiative requires companies to follow extremely strict procedures in their manufacturing processes to ensure safety of the workforce, and neighbouring communities and environment, to minimise chemical discharges, and to keep chemicals secure [16]. These are all approaches requiring responsible management of chemicals and, if followed, help to ensure that chemicals are not acquired by unlawful means. These are approaches that the OPCW encourages and which help to support its mandate to prevent use of chemicals as weapons.

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Responsible Science The need to prevent use of chemical weapons applies equally to biological weapons and those countries which have signed the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) reiterate this requirement constantly. The annual meetings which are held by countries party to the BWC refer frequently to the need for scientists to consider the implications of their research and the consequences of publishing information that may be misused by others to make a weapon [18]. It is well recognised that there is a disconnect between what states party to the BWC ask for and expect of scientists, and what the scientific community considers it necessary to undertake. The vast majority of scientists would profess no interest in biological weapons and take affront at the suggestion that their research might contribute in any way to enabling others to make a weapon. There is thus a divide between what policy makers in the defence and security fields wish to see and the relative freedom that science needs to pursue new ideas.

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But scientists do not operate in a vacuum. In each country there are generally laws which require employers of scientists to ensure that workplaces are safe [19], that chemicals or biological materials are handled appropriately and waste disposed of in ways that will neither harm individuals nor the environment [20]. In addition, many grant awarding bodies in countries have rules in place which require scientists to consider if the research they propose doing might have adverse consequences or could be misused by others [21,22]. This ‘dual-use’ question encourages scientists to think beyond what they might have initially considered their research would yield. A possible ‘dual-use’ finding will not necessarily prevent the research being funded, but is likely to lead to some discussion about how findings are disseminated. In addition to the above, some countries have very strict rules in place governing transfer of microorganisms [23]. The transfer might be necessary to enable another laboratory to confirm identification of an organism that may be causing an infection in a patient, for example. Tracking what is shipped, by whom and to whom, is a practical way of ensuring safe custody of biological material that might be misused by those intent on causing harm. The legislation documented in the paragraphs above may not exist in all countries and so a question arises about how to encourage responsible behaviour on the part of scientists, but at the same time recognising their need to have freedom to pursue research interests. This was an issue considered by a meeting organised in Warsaw in November 2009 by the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) [24]. The consensus view of that discussion was that it would be feasible to include discussions about dual use issues during the training of young researchers. So whilst researchers were learning techniques and their trade, so-to-speak, and the importance of record keeping, safety in the laboratory, etc., it would be appropriate to add on topics during this training to increase awareness about dual use and the risk of research being misused. This approach has been tackled in an innovative manner in a series of projects run by a team under the auspices of the NAS. With primary funding from the US State Department (but which did not dictate how work was to be done, nor would the NAS ac-

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cept funding unless it was without conditions) the team has taught academics from universities in the Middle East, North Africa and South East Asia on responsible practices in science [25]. Combining information on how people learn and active learning approaches, the team used innovative pedagogical techniques to engage with the academic scientists to discuss issues ranging from plagiarism, fabrication and falsification of research through to issues around dual use. The approaches used in the numerous workshops together with the resources employed can all be viewed online [25]. In concluding this brief on responsible research it is important to reiterate that the scientific community is very conscious of its need to uphold the law and to continually review the way it practices. New and innovative methods of engaging audiences in discussions about how science should be practiced have been developed and applied with great success, and are continuing. Publications which encourage reflection on what it means to be a scientist [26] and what responsibility in science [27] requires are now available and it is to be hoped that they will have many readers and even more discussants. Real progress has been made to bridge the divide between what defence and security policy makers desire and what scientists feel they can deliver. This is an area where discussion must continue to ensure that no one side is ignorant of the needs of the other. But we should be heartened by what has been done so far.

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References [1] Chemical Weapons Convention. https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/. [2] Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/ 04FBBDD6315AC720C1257180004B1B2F?OpenDocument. [3] Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/bio/1925-geneva-protocol/. [4] S. Murphy, A. Hay A and S. Rose, No Fire, No Thunder: The threat of chemical and biological warfare. Pluto Press 1984. [5] The Hague Ethical Guidelines, available at https://www.opcw.org/special-sections/science.../the-hagueethical-guidelines. [6] Multiple uses of chemicals. http://multiple.kcvs.ca/. [7] Global Chemists’ code of Ethics. https://www.acs.org/content/dam/acsorg/global/international/ scifreedom/global-chemists-code-of-ethics-fi-2016.pdf. [8] The Chemical Professionals’ Code of Conduct, American Chemical Society. https://www.acs.org/ content/acs/en/careers/career-services/ethics/the-chemical-professionals-code-of-conduct.html. [9] Chemical Industry Councils and Scientific Societies condemn use of chlorine as a weapon. https://www. opcw.org/news/article/chemical-industry-councils-and-scientific-societies-condemn-use-of-chlorine-asweapon/. [10] Syria war: US missile strikes brings angry Russian response. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middleeast-39529264. [11] Syrian conflict: EuCheMS condemns use of chemical weapons. http://www.euchems.eu/syrian-conflicteuchems-condemns-use-chemical-weapons/. [12] Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. https://www.opcw.org/. [13] Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons – Advisory Board on Education and Outreach. https://www.opcw.org/documents-reports/subsidiary-bodies/advisory-board-on-education-andoutreach/. [14] P. Mahaffy, J. Zondervan, A. Hay, et al. IUPAC and OPCW Working toward responsible science. Chemistry International, 36 (5): 9–13, 2014. [15] ICCA responds to recent tragic events in Syria involving the use of chemical weapons. https://www. icca-chem.org/blog/ accessed 8 April 2017. [16] ICCA. https://www.icca-chem.org/responsible-care/. [17] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. The Biological Weapons Convention. https://www.un. org/disarmament/wmd/bio/.

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A. Hay / Responsible Science

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[18] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. The Biological Weapons Convention. http://www.unog. ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/92CFF2CB73D4806DC12572BC00319612?OpenDocument. [19] UK Health and Safety Executive. http://www.hse.gov.uk/. [20] Law and your Environment. http://www.environmentlaw.org.uk/rte.asp?id=32. [21] Managing Risks of Research Misuse: A joint Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC), Medical Research Council (MRC) and Wellcome Trust policy statement (UK). July 2015. https://www.mrc.ac.uk/research/policies-and-guidance-for-researchers/managing-risks-of-researchmisuse/. [22] United States. National Institutes of Health. NIH Grants Policy Statement. https://grants.nih.gov/grants/ policy/nihgps/HTML5/section_4/4.1_public_policy_requirements_and_objectives.htm. [23] UK Health and Safety Executive. Biological agents: Managing the risks in laboratories and healthcare premises. http://www.hse.gov.uk/biosafety/biologagents.pdf. [24] US National Academies of Science. Challenges and Opportunities for Education about dual use issues in the Life Sciences. 2009. http://dels.nas.edu/resources/static-assets/materials-based-on-reports/reportsin-brief/Dual-Use-Education-Report-Brief-FINAL.pdf. [25] US NAS. Responsible Science. http://dels.nas.edu/resources/static-assets/materials-based-on-reports/ reports-in-brief/Dual-Use-Education-Report-Brief-FINAL.pdf. [26] On being a scientist: A guide to responsible conduct in Research. 3rd Edition. National Academy of Sciences. 2012. https://www.nap.edu/catalog/12192/on-being-a-scientist-a-guide-to-responsibleconduct-in. [27] Doing Global Science: A guide to responsible conduct in the global Research Enterprise. Interacademy Partnership. Princeton University Press. 2016. http://www.interacademycouncil.net/24026/ GlobalReport.aspx.

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The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats M. Martellini and J. Rao (Eds.) IOS Press, 2017 © 2017 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-802-0-51

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A.Q. Khan: Self-Radicalization of a Scientist Jonathan KATZ 1 Washington University

Abstract. A.Q. Khan was at the center of a multinational nuclear proliferation program, responsible for two successful nuclear weapons programs (those of Pakistan and North Korea), one nascent program (Iran’s) and one dismantled program (Libya’s). In contrast to more recent terrorists, he was intelligent and educated in a serious technical subject (metallurgy). Nor was he radicalized by external agents. His motives appear to have been personal and nationalist rather than religious. Measures designed to detect Islamist radicalization are unlikely to be effective against future A.Q. Khans; traditional counter-espionage vigilance is required. Even more important, we must recognize that technical training is a strategic good, and its export must be controlled; without a corpus of technically trained people, even the fruits of successful espionage are of little effect. Keywords. A.Q. Khan, nuclear proliferation, centrifuges

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Introduction At a time when attention is focused on terrorism by Islamists radicalized by extremist web sites or preachers, we should consider the much greater danger posed by nuclear weapons in the wrong hands. Nuclear weapons are sophisticated technical devices; even more sophisticated are the technologies required to produce their essential fissile materials (highly enriched uranium or plutonium). Their manufacture requires both substantial industrial resources possessed only by nation-states, or perhaps by quasination-states like (prior to 2001) the Taliban in Afghanistan, and specialized knowledge and components obtainable from advanced countries by illicit procurement and espionage. Radicalized lost youths are not capable of organizing such efforts, much less contributing to them at the technical level. The threat consists of sophisticated educated people like A.Q. Khan who stole URENCO’s technology and supplier information, established Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, and proliferated it to Libya, Iran and North Korea. Future A.Q. Khans will not be detected by monitoring extremist preachers or web sites, because they are too sophisticated to succumb to this lure. Conventional counter-espionage vigilance is required; we cannot look into someone’s head, but we can see what his hands, and his fingers on a keyboard, are doing. A.Q. Khan is at the root of most of the nuclear proliferation of the last few decades. His espionage enabled at least three countries (Pakistan, North Korea and Iran) to overcome the highest barrier to developing nuclear weapons: not the design “secrets”, but 1 Corresponding author. Department of Physics and McDonnell Center for the Space Sciences, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo. 63130 USA; E-mail: [email protected].

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the production of fissile material. We must ask how future Khans may be detected before they can do similar harm, and to address that question we must ask about Khan’s motives as well as his modus operandi.

The Pakistani Program The Pakistani nuclear weapons program was conceived at least as far back as 1965, when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, then Foreign Minister, declared “If India makes an atom bomb, then even if we have to feed on grass and leaves – or even if we have to starve – we shall also produce an atom bomb as we would be left with no other alternative.” [1]. It does not appear to have made much progress until A.Q. Khan brought it extensive and detailed technical information he had stolen from the European URENCO uranium enrichment consortium in the mid-1970s. Perhaps his most important contribution was not the technical information itself, but the extensive supplier network that is necessary to the production of any sophisticated technical product. Knowing where and how to obtain components may be more difficult and important than final assembly. This applies to ordinary commercial products such as aircraft and automobiles as well as to centrifuges for uranium enrichment [2,3].

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A.Q. Khan The subject of this meeting is “The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization”. A.Q. Khan is the prime example (index case, to use the terminology of epidemiology) of skilled scientist radicalization. Except that he wasn’t really radicalized, in the current sense of the word. He is not an Islamist, but rather a Pakistani nationalist. Nor, even in that context, is he necessarily radical; there is no public record of his views on Kashmir or other disputes with India being out of the Pakistani mainstream. The summary of his career presented here is abstracted from [4]; inferences about his character and implications for the problems of radicalization, espionage and the prevention of future leaks of WMD technology are my own, based on the facts reported in [1–4]. At the time of his betrayal of the secrets of the URENCO gas centrifuges, A.Q. Khan was working as a metallurgist. He had received a Ph.D. in metallurgy at the Catholic University in Leuven, Belgium and married a woman of Dutch extraction. She converted to Islam, but there is no evidence of religious extremism on either of their parts. They had apparently settled quietly into Dutch life, raising two children. This limitation of family size was apparently a deliberate choice; “Khan said that he did not need a son, and that given the overcrowding of the world, two children were enough.” [4]. This is the attitude of someone fully assimilated to secular European cultural values, who has rejected the expectation of most traditional religions, not only Islam, of a large family; it also indicates the rejection of the value traditional in most cultures that a man is measured by his sons (“father of daughters” is often a somewhat pejorative description). Following the receipt of his Ph.D., he went to work for a URENCO subcontractor, but there is no evidence that he planned either his academic career or his initial employment with the intent of furthering a Pakistani nuclear weapons program. Papers he

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published in 1972 and 1974 (describing work for his Ph.D., received in 1972) concerned martensitic transformations of copper alloys. Martensitic transformations are a major subject in metallurgy, and maraging steel, a very strong alloy that may be used in gas centrifuges for enriching uranium, is the result of such a transformation (maraging = martensite + aging), but Khan’s work was on martensitic transformations in copper-based alloys. No one who was setting out to learn how to build gas centrifuges would have chosen such a topic for his thesis. It is likely accidental that he was hired by a subcontractor to URENCO, whose gas centrifuges could utilize maraging steel, rather than some other metallurgical company.

The Transformation What turned A.Q. Khan from an assimilating resident of Holland into a nuclear spy for Pakistan? Three episodes in his life stand out. The first was in his childhood. At age 16, in 1952, he left his birthplace in Bhopal, India for Pakistan; his group of emigres was attacked and robbed on the way. This journey was a delayed part of the population exchange that had followed Partition in 1947; some of his siblings had emigrated to Pakistan earlier as relations between Moslems and Hindus in India deteriorated and became violent, although his father, a devout Muslim (in the era before Islamic radicalism), remained in India all his life [4].

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This one episode did not turn Khan into a Pakistani nationalist, for he appeared to settle happily in Europe during his education there. But in 1971, when he was in graduate school, Pakistan lost the war with India in which an independent Bangladesh was created from East Pakistan. The defeat and surrender were complete and humiliating, even though the war began as an East Pakistani rebellion and its subsequent repression, rather than as an Indian invasion. This was followed by India’s nuclear explosion (claimed to be “peaceful”, which fooled no one) in 1974. This was a second humiliation; Pakistan had not only been shown to be a quantitatively inferior power (hardly surprising, given India’s several times larger population) but qualitatively inferior: India possessed the defining weapon of the modern age, and Pakistan did not. This last humiliation appears to have turned Khan into a Pakistani nationalist. He became a nuclear “walk-in”, volunteering his knowledge of uranium enrichment technology in a letter to the Pakistani Prime Minister and proceeding to systematically collect centrifuge design information. Loose internal controls permitted him access to much more detailed information than that for which he had any justifiable need to know, and almost non-existent counter-intelligence awareness led a colleague’s warnings to be ignored [4]. Perhaps the most important information he stole was URENCO’s supplier network, companies that were unscrupulous to whom they sold, as long as they were paid. Khan may have had a motive in addition to Pakistani nationalism. Growing up in a family of modest means, earning a Ph.D. in Europe and getting a technical job may have at first seemed success. But nationalism, triggered by India’s bomb, soon was joined by megalomania. A technical, Ph.D. level, job at a metallurgical subcontractor

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sounds prestigious to a schoolteacher’s son, but at URENCO it left him fairly low on the totem pole, translating technical documents from German into Dutch (education in both countries had made him fluent in both languages). Imagining himself as the savior of his country offered the prospect of glory. Megalomania is a frequent motive for espionage; the little man sees himself as a mover of history. This was surely encouraged by the Pakistani Prime Minister’s response to Khan’s letter offering his services: One might expect such a letter to be ignored, assumed to be a provocation, or shunted to a flunkey, but it brought Khan a personal interview with the Prime Minister on his next visit home. Khan’s megalomania in later years became notorious [4]. This soon went to his head. Limited in his own access, he attempted to recruit a Dutch colleague to collect information. Khan overestimated his (significant) charm and powers of persuasion, interpreted the colleague’s innocent friendship as willingness to spy, and attempted to suborn him by paying for a trip to Pakistan. The colleague recognized this for what it was and reported it. After inexcusable delay, management recognized the cuckoo in the nest and cut off Khan’s access to sensitive information. Like many spies before him, recognizing that he was under suspicion and would not be able to gather more information, he soon defected, not returning from a vacation in Pakistan at the end of 1975, carrying much information in his head and presumably much more in his luggage, in addition to whatever he had transmitted earlier.

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More Cuckoos in More Nests? Most of the conventional counter-intelligence warning signs were not present in Khan’s case. He had no known financial or legal problems, no unexplained wealth (Pakistan did not pay him), no conflict with supervisors or colleagues and no evident interest in radical, Islamist, or Pakistani nationalist ideas. He was certainly interested in the last, but kept them in his head. His good relations with colleagues, whether deliberately cultivated or simply part of his personality, served to deflect suspicion; people, unless well (one might say cynically) trained counter-intelligence staff, tend not to suspect those whom they like on a personal level, as every con-man knows, at least instinctively. Educated, sophisticated people usually have the self-discipline to avoid setting off these warnings, simply because such people run their ordinary lives in a selfdisciplined manner. They live within their means, do not abuse alcohol or use illegal drugs and do not brag, or talk unnecessarily about their work. They do not boast of their importance, even if they feel, as they may do, sometimes with justification, that they or their work are important. In the rare cases in which they become spies or terrorists, these cultural or class traits deflect or preclude suspicion.

A Different Expert: Nidal Ayyad Nidal Ayyad was also a trained professional, but his case was very different than Khan’s. He may be considered an example of “trained scientist radicalization”, but rather than engaging in espionage to obtain tightly controlled know-how about weapons of mass destruction, he employed his skills in an “ordinary” terrorist act, the preparation of a conventional bomb.

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Ayyad was the chemist responsible for the somewhat unusual explosive (a mixture of urea nitrate and metals, with additional cylinders of hydrogen) used in the first (1993) World Trade Center attack [5]. He was a 1991 graduate of Rutgers in chemical engineering, and was employed at Allied-Signal, a major chemical company. Like Khan, he had a family (a pregnant wife); ordinarily family ties discourage radicalization, but this does not appear to be the case for those with strong ideological motives. Unlike Khan, Ayyad was part of a conspiracy with about seven members [5]. Again unlike Khan, Ayyad participated in a “conventional” terrorist act, motivated by an anti-Western ideology with radical Islamist roots. Nationalism was not the motive; no nation would have been aided by success (the goal was to destroy the World Trade Center; the September 11, 2001 attack may be considered a more successful second attempt, with similar motives and goals). Rather it was an acting-out of a general animosity to the Western world. Aside from the degree of organization and central direction (by Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, believed to be the planner of the September 11, 2001 attack, and his nephew Ramzi Yousef), Ayyad resembled the teenager radicalized over the internet or by a radical imam and then killing as many as he can, but at random. Ayyad was apparently radicalized by the “blind sheikh” Omar Rahman.

The Origin of Radicalization in Defeat

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Radicalization has its origins in unassimilated defeat. As Bernard Lewis has documented [6], there are two ways to approach defeat: To ask “Who did this to me?” or to ask “What did we do wrong?”. The latter response is constructive, and leads to at least an attempt to remedy the failure and its causes. The former response leads to a festering anger that turns to radicalization and to a destructive search for scapegoats, lashing out at them and at genuine enemies, and often to a mutually destructive cycle of continued and increasing violence as reality is denied. There are many historical examples. The inability of Germans to accept that they had been defeated on the battlefield in 1918 led to the myth of a “stab in the back”, to National Socialism, and to the Second World War. The inability of Arab Palestinians, and of Arabs in general, to accept the fact of their defeat in 1949 led to a series of wars, including an even more calamitous defeat in 1967, and to a political culture whose form of expression is the terrorist act, epitomized by the suicide bomber. The Chechen “black widows” are the same expression in a different context, with a nationalist rather than an Islamist motivation, and so were the Tamil Tigers, who were not Moslem at all. Additional examples include the assassination of Abraham Lincoln by secessionist and racist extremists after the defeat of the South in the American Civil War and the prolonged Troubles decades after the defeat of the extreme Republicans in the Irish Civil War. We have seen that A.Q. Khan, motivated chiefly by nationalism rather than by Islam, was motivated by several Pakistani defeats. Unlike suicide bombers and other small scale terrorists, his rationality suppressed his rage so that he was able to conceal his acts and become a danger much greater than that of any suicide bomber, even an aircraft hijacker.

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The Next Threat As I write, ISIS/ISIL/Daesh (different names for the same organization) is rapidly losing its strongholds in Syria and Iraq. Its imminent defeat will provide a uniquely favorable ground for radicalization, including of trained scientists and technical experts. It is a messianic (to use a likely inappropriate Judeo-Christian term) movement that attempted to revive the traditional Islamic caliphate, formally abolished nearly a century ago but (in the eyes of believers unlikely to accept the validity of the Ottoman caliphate marred by compromises with the modern world) not extant since the distant and idealized past. Daesh did succeed, for a few years and over a significant territory, in establishing a functioning government; its “caliphate” was more than a fantasy. Its adherents are unlikely to accept its demise. A quietist would place his hope in its resurrection in the distant and unknowable future, but Daesh adherents are the opposite of quietists. They form a ready, already radicalized, body.

Harm Reduction

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It is impossible to prevent radicalization, because that takes place inside men’s minds. The measures of ensuring intellectually and materially rewarding but benign careers for scientists and technically-trained people are likely to be counter-productive because no such rewards outweigh, in those culturally and psychologically receptive, the rewards of heaven (including “heaven on Earth”) promised by fundamentalist religion; those offered such careers, if talented enough to be chosen, may turn them to harm. A.Q. Khan is the chief example: if he hadn’t become a trained metallurgist holding a job at a sensitive (and therefore prestigious) URENCO subcontractor, his nationalism would have done no harm. Radicalization only occurs in favorable cultural and intellectual environments, but we do not know how to prevent the development of such environments (nor are extremist recruiters effective at creating such environments where they do not exist; they are as helpless as we, their enemies, in this respect). It is possible to limit the harm done by the radicalized by limiting the resources available to them. The most important resource is technical training; it is easy to control physical objects (pathogen cultures, fissile material), but information is much more mobile, diffusing imperceptibly even when it is not conveyed overtly. The most important technologies are not secret, but implementing them requires hands-on skills and training. The most important technology transferred by A.Q. Khan probably was not the technical details of centrifuges, which underwent extensive further development in the recipient countries, but the supply chain of critical components, even though that may not be classed as a technology at all. To protect against the harm done by radicalized scientists, engineers and technicians it is necessary to control the dissemination of unclassified, nominally harmless, technical training. For example, in the 1970’s the Iraqi government sent many students abroad to learn several engineering disciplines that had no plausible peaceful use in Iraq’s semi-developed and small economy. Petroleum engineering had obvious application to Iraq’s oil industry, but most of these students were not studying petroleum engineering. We now know that Iraq was vigorously developing a nuclear weapons program; taking a longer-term view than we in the West usually do (some cultures think in

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terms of centuries, while we in the West think in terms of years), it was trying to develop a broad base of technical expertise. Thwarted by the destruction of its “Osirak” plutonium-breeding nuclear reactor in 1981, it tried again with an elaborate multi-pronged uranium enrichment effort that was only uncovered in the wake of the 1991 First Gulf War. Temporarily thwarted again, it was likely to have been resumed following the expulsion of the inspectors in 2003, had it not been finally ended by the downfall of Saddam Hussein. Technical training, even in open university programs, is a strategic good whose export must be controlled. How should this be done? The concerns of background checks differ from the traditional “red flags” of security investigations. Here we are not concerned with whether a foreign applicant for technical training is personally reliable (law-abiding, sober, not vulnerable to blackmail). We are concerned with the use likely to be made of his training, so we are more concerned with the intentions of his government and whether he is being sent by his government for its purposes. We are also concerned with his possible internal motives; for example, both World Trade Center attacks were made by people from nations with no animus against the West (the technical training at issue in the second attack was flight training, rather than academic science or engineering training).

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We need to understand an applicant’s character – is he secretly a radical, or is he vulnerable to radicalization? This is difficult or impossible to assess, and historical failures are numerous (many sensitive U.S. and British government agencies were infiltrated by Soviet spies and their accessories in the 1930’s and 1940’s). However, if we are concerned with technical training, as opposed to espionage – with dozens or hundreds of Iraqi engineering students rather that with A.Q. Khan – then we are assisted by the fact that it is not necessary to exclude every future bad actor. A single spy may do enormous harm, but a single engineer cannot. Our task is to cripple major efforts by foreign governments that may pose a threat; A.Q. Khan was damaging because the fruits of his espionage mobilized the substantial resources of the Pakistani, Iranian and North Korean governments.

Conclusion As history has proven too often, it is not possible to see into men’s souls, and every large organization may contain someone who turns its knowledge to evil ends. The motives have varied, from a misled and naive loyalty to the Soviet Union to Pakistani nationalism to Islamic radicalization. We do not know how, with complete assurance, to exclude such persons from positions of trust, or to detect when a formerly trustworthy person undergoes the quasi-religious conversion we term “radicalization”. We will always be finding open barn doors and empty stalls. But we do know how to reduce the harm they may cause The distinction between “Secrets”, stamped in red and with criminal penalties for disclosure, and unclassified technical training should not be sharp. With enough training and other resources technical secrets can be reinvented. Before inviting foreigners to study technical subjects at our universities or acquire products and training from our

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corporations we should ask what their, and their governments’, motives may be, or may become in the future. It is flattering and profitable to do business, academic or commercial, with them, but we should not forget that Lenin said that capitalists would sell the rope with which they would be hanged; this is a danger for free societies and all their institutions.

References

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[1] F.H. Khan, Eating Grass: the Making of the Pakistani Bomb Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2012. [2] G. Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurith, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006. [3] J.H.C. Kelman, Sourcing the Mail Order Bomb: The Evolution of the A.Q. Khan Network and its Implications, Comparative Strategy, 34:1, 44–63, DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2014.962966, 2015. [4] W. Langewiesche, The Wrath of Khan, The Atlantic, November 2005. [5] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_World_Trade_Center_bombing accessed 29/III/17. [6] B. Lewis, What Went Wrong? Western impact and Middle Eastern response, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.

The author(s) of this publication is/are solely responsible for its content. This publication does not reflect the opinion of the publisher. The publisher cannot be held liable for any loss or damage that may occur because of this publication. The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2017. ProQuest

The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats M. Martellini and J. Rao (Eds.) IOS Press, 2017 © 2017 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-802-0-59

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The Prospects of Jihadism Amidst a Withering Caliphate Nelly LAHOUD 1 IISS

Abstract. The split between al-Qa‘ida (AQ) and the Islamic State may partly be attributed to a clash between two worldviews, one developed by AQ’s elites, the other by thugs within jihadism, seeking to oust AQ. The differences testify to the importance of elites in engendering terrorism, but also to the fragile ideological nature of jihadism that prevents unity among those who profess the cause of jihad. Nevertheless, while dissent within jihadism may lead to its self-destruction in the long term, the fractures are likely to generate more violence in the short-term. Keywords. al-Qa‘ida, Islamic State, elites, thugs

Introduction

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This essay explores the prospects of jihadism amidst a withering caliphate. Building on the theme of the workshop ‘The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats’, the essay examines the role of elites in the evolution of alQa‘ida (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS). Starting with stressing the importance of elites in engendering terrorism, the essay then moves to highlight two differing strands within jihadism, the first is a program premised on a vision developed by elites, the second is a program that translates a differing vision developed by thugs.

The Importance of Elites in Engendering Terrorism In her seminal article, ‘The Causes of Terrorism’, Martha Crenshaw remarked that one of the direct causes of terrorism is the existence of ‘concrete political grievances’, but by themselves, they do not produce terrorism. Instead, terrorism comes about through a combination of what she terms ‘preconditions’ that are of a long term nature, and ‘precipitants’ that represent a set of ‘specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism’ [1]. One of the key ingredients in this terrorism recipe, according to Crenshaw, is elite dissatisfaction. In her words: Terrorism is essentially the result of elite disaffection, it represents the strategy of a minority, who may act on behalf of a wider popular constituency who have not been consulted about, and do not necessarily approve of, the terrorists’ aims or method. [2]

1 International Institute for Strategic Studies – Middle East, 14th Floor, GBCorp Tower, Bahrain Financial Harbour, Building 1411, Road 4626, Manama 346, Kingdom of Bahrain, Bahrain; E-mail: [email protected].

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Indeed, if political grievances do not affect the elites, they may simply lead to mass passivity. Crenshaw suggests that when elite dissatisfaction is felt in the midst of mass passivity, the combination provides for a setting that is fertile to terrorism: Perhaps terrorism is most likely to occur precisely where mass passivity and elite dissatisfaction coincide. Discontent is not generalized or severe enough to provoke the majority of the populace to action against the regime, yet a small minority, without access to the bases of power that would permit overthrow of the government through coup d’état or subversion, seeks radical change. Terrorism is the resort of an elite when conditions are not revolutionary.[3]

Accordingly, when the essential role played by elites is analyzed in the context of terrorism, it becomes apparent that terrorist groups could not simply consist of cannon fodders, many of whom may not necessarily qualify as elites. For terrorism to be a viable phenomenon, it needs to count in its midst leaders, financiers, ideologues, military trainers and scientists, all of whom are part of the eco-system that engenders terrorism. An additional element that should be added to this mix is that terrorists are, for the most part, normal people. Studies that sought to identify specific criteria (be they demographic, geographic, religious etc. …) that would paint the ‘terrorist mind’ and those that delved into the psychology of those who engage in violent activities in pursuit of a terrorist profile found that a common feature among terrorists is their normalcy.[4] All this is to say that smart people, including skilled scientists, are not immune to the appeal of terrorist groups; in fact, the elites are essential to the emergence of terrorism. How then has the elite dimension featured in the evolution of jihadism from AQ to IS?

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Assessing Jihadism as a Community of Bourgeois and Thugs Crenshaw observed that ‘the terrorism-prone individual who obtains psychic gratification from the experience is likely to be a follower, not a leader who commands but does not perform the act’ [5]. Although this observation does not neatly capture the differences between AQ and IS, it is nevertheless helpful to consider the split between the two with due attention to Crenshaw’s stress on ‘differentiations between leaders and followers.’[6] Building on this differentiation, it is perhaps helpful to think of the evolution of jihadism and the split that occurred between AQ and IS in terms of clashing cultures, namely, an AQ culture of ‘bourgeois’/elites leaders opposed to an IS culture of ‘thugs’ who were struggling to be recognized as official followers of AQ. In time, the ‘thugs,’ who did not earn the respect of their bourgeois leaders progressively sought to oust their leaders. IS leaders, it should be noted, did not oust the leaders of AQ, but they did eclipse them. Al-Qaeda and Its Bourgeois Jihadism AQ’s internal documents suggest that the group invested not just in military training but in an educational curriculum for its members. For example, senior members of the group are expected to meet a minimum standard of education in classical legal studies pertaining to jihad and that they need to be prudent and disciplined. The documents re-

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veal that in addition to the various requirements expected of AQ’s military leaders, they are expected to have a suitable grounding in classical legal knowledge (qadr munasib min al-`ilm al-shar`i) and to be “rational, measured and disciplined.” The group’s organizational structure suggests that AQ planned that its military leaders and commanders should consist of warriors who have at least attained a tertiary education “not lower than a university degree, preferably graduates of a military academy.” Equally importantly, AQ’s “By-Laws” stress the importance of meritocracy, stipulating that “[assigning] the right man for the right job,” is a fundamental principle, “disregarding considerations pertaining to his regional, organizational or ethnic affiliations.” AQ’s investment in such curricula activities was also meant to translate into elite operational activities. In his lengthy autobiography, the AQ operative Fadil Harun, the lead planner of the 1998 East Africa bombings, uses the description “special operations” (`amaliyyat naw`iyya) to describe AQ’s militant activities. AQ’s operations, he holds, distinguish it from other groups that lack the sophisticated training of AQ’s operatives. More specifically, Harun explains, unlike other groups that are indiscriminate in their attacks, AQ’s operations are planned with the intention of “penetrating the enemy line without causing harm to Muslims.” Although Harun admits that AQ’s attacks result in innocent civilian casualties, but he holds that when such casualties occur, they are not caused by design but by accident. In other words, they are the collateral damage that may result from AQ’s attacks against military, economic and political institutions, which he considers to be the lawful targets of the jihadis. Harun is categorical:

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We do not accept those who are intent on sullying jihad with their unlawful actions, even if they are members of AQ… but what is certain is that the leaders of the original AQ are not responsible for the transgressions that are taking place around the world. There are many who use the name AQ without authorization from the central leadership. There are indeed some stupidities committed in the name of jihad in Iraq today [this was during the days of ISI]; we don’t want to see them repeated in Afghanistan or Palestine.

The reference to “special operations” is not limited to Harun’s writings. Bin Ladin uses the same terminology in one of the Abbottabad documents in his letter to Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr, the leader of al-Shabab in Somalia at the time. In it, Bin Ladin advises Abu al-Zubayr “to review carefully” the attacks against African forces and to avoid “carrying out operations against their compounds unless [you are capable of mounting] major special operations.” In the same spirit explained by Harun above about the need to penetrate enemy line while minimizing civilian casualties, Bin Ladin suggests that such a special operation could take the form of “digging tunnels to reach into their army camp at the same time as mounting an attack from the outside [so that they cannot escape from the camp].” One key point to extrapolate out of AQ’s vision and modus operandi is that it sought to professionalize jihadism. The Af-Pak landscape in which it emerged was littered with ideological disagreements, and it sought to transcend it both through an ideology that focused on militancy but refrained from sectarianism and through military training that focused on few but sophisticated grand scale operations targeting political, economic and military targets.[7]

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The Islamic State and Thuggish Jihadism AQ’s bourgeois jihadism did not satisfy the appetite of all jihadi groups. One such group was that founded by al-Zarqawi, the parent group of what in June 2014 became the Islamic State. Al-Zarqawi wanted to create a political establishment of his own and his criminal background disposed him to vulgar sectarianism and graphic violence. It is with al-Zarqawi that the thuggish jihadism that we’ve been witnessing with IS originates. According to an AQ leader, Bin Ladin met al-Zarqawi in 1999 in Afghanistan and found him to be ‘rigid’ in matters of religious doctrine; but while AQ facilitated his stay in Herat where he set up a training camp, al-Zarqawi and his group were not admitted into AQ. Following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, he and his group fled to Iraq, where he mounted terrorist operations in the wake of the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom. In August 2004, al-Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Bin Ladin, and in December the same year, Bin Ladin accepted his pledge. This acceptance bestowed upon al-Zarqawi the title of the leader of AQ in Mesopotamia, commonly referred to as AQ in Iraq (AQI). Al-Zarqawi’s group was the only group that Bin Ladin himself admitted into the AQ fold, and judging by what followed, Bin Ladin and other AQ leaders lived to regret it.

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Al-Zarqawi was not good at taking orders,[8] and before long, AQ’s leaders were faced with an unruly jihadi whose thuggish jihad alarmed them. In 2005, intercepted AQ letters from ‘Atiyatullah al-Libi and Ayman al-Zawahiri make it clear that alZarqawi’s actions in Iraq were neither authorized by AQ nor did they have its leaders’ approval. Undeterred, al-Zarqawi reminded AQ’s leaders that he is not a blind follower of leaders but he follows what he believes to be the true Islamic creed. If al-Zarqawi’s thuggish jihadism was a problem for AQ’s leaders, his successors were intent on taking his jihadi culture to a new level. They proclaimed a state in 2006, calling the group the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), under the leadership of Abu ‘Umar alBaghdadi. In the mind of its leaders, ISI ousted AQ. The proclamation of a state signaled that the group was no longer prepared to submit to the authority of an organization like AQ, and in Abu ‘Umar’s first public statement in December 2006, he proclaimed that ‘AQ is but one of several platoons that make up the Islamic State.’[9] In public, AQ’s leaders put on a show of unity, in private, they had more to say, and it was not flattering. One letter captured in Abbottabad relates that some jihadis had described Abu Hamza, ISI’s ‘minister of war,’ ‘to be a [real] problem, that al-Zarqawi was heaven compared to him, that he is more extremist when it comes to shedding blood and [quick] to declare fellow Muslims to be unbelievers.’ Some viewed ISI leaders as ‘extremists’, and it seems that they made it known to al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza; one Abbottabad letter reveals that its author had sent them a letter and ‘rebuked them.’ In terrorism parlance, one may contend that the proclamation of a state was about terrorist groups outbidding each other,[10] and it should have been expected and anticipated that ISI would use every opportunity to prove its credentials as the leader of global jihad. Judging by its history, this could only be pursued through mounting more violence than AQ. The war in neighbouring Syria presented that opportunity, and ISI

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seized it. It provided some logistics to Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), the first jihadi group to operate in Syria, and when JN proved its operational credentials, ISI unilaterally declared a merger in April 2013 by adding ‘Levant’ to its name (ISIL). When JN and Ayman alZawahiri rejected the merger and after ISIS/ISIL captured territories linking Syria and Iraq, it proclaimed itself a global Islamic State, dropping all geographical references in its name.[11]

Concluding Remarks What might a withering caliphate mean for the future of the Islamic State and its terrorism prospect? The loss of territories the group holds in Iraq and Syria is likely to have an impact on the standing of the group as a territorial entity. However, the so-called ‘provinces’ (wilayat) that the group proclaimed in over ten countries may continue to breathe life into a fractured entity. Though these provinces are not territorial, some of them, particularly the provinces of Khorasan, West Africa and Sinai have produced sustained attacks. It is possible that when the core is weaker, the provinces may seek to compete or outbid each other. If they do, their outbidding could only be through being even more violent than IS.

References [1] [2] [3] [4]

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[5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]

M. Crenshaw, The Causes of Terrorism, Comparative Politics, 13(4): 381 (379–399), 1981. Ibid, p. 384. Ibid, p. 384. J. Horgan, The Search for the Terrorist Personality in Andrew Silke (Ed.), 2003, Terrorists, Victims and Society. West Sussex, UK: Wiley, chapter 1, pp. 3–28; Victoroff, Jeff. 2005. The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(1). Crenshaw, p. 392. Crenshaw, op. cit., p. 392. The above section is based on my study Nelly Lahoud, Beware of Imitators: al-Qa‘ida through the Lens of its Confidential Secretary, Combating Terrorism Centre (CTC), West Point, June 4, 2012. For an insightful biography of al-Zarqawi, see J. Warrick, Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS, Doubleday, 2015. Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi, ‘Wa-Qul Ja’a al-Haqqu wa-Zahaqa al-Batilu,’ 22 December 2006. On outbidding, see M. Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. This section is based in part on N. Lahoud and L. Collins, How the CT Community Failed to Anticipate the Islamic State, Democracy and Security, July 2016.

The author(s) of this publication is/are solely responsible for its content. This publication does not reflect the opinion of the publisher. The publisher cannot be held liable for any loss or damage that may occur because of this publication. The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2017. ProQuest

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The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats M. Martellini and J. Rao (Eds.) IOS Press, 2017 © 2017 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-802-0-64

Examining the Narratives of Radical Islamists and Other Extremely Violent Groups: The Case of the “Islamic State” Francesco MARONE 1 University of Pavia

Abstract. This chapter examines the narratives of radical Islamists and other extremely violent groups. In particular, the focus is on groups that rely, partially or exclusively, on terrorism to achieve their political ends. Terrorism can be seen as a combination of violence and communication. Narratives are often a crucial part of this communication activity. A useful perspective to approach this question is represented by framing theory. This well-established and sophisticated perspective has been widely used to study, in particular, social movements. However, it can also be fruitfully applied to the analysis of terrorist organizations and militants. A key element in this line of research is the distinction of three “core framing tasks”: “diagnostic” framing (concerning the problem), “prognostic” framing (concerning the solution), and “motivational” framing (concerning the “call to arms”). On the basis of this tripartition, the work explores the narrative of the so-called Islamic State (IS), the more influential and dangerous terrorist organisation of our age. Keywords. Violent extremism, terrorism, narrative, framing, propaganda, “Islamic State”

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Terrorist Organizations, Narratives and Frames This chapter examines the narratives of radical Islamists and other extremely violent groups. In particular, the focus is on groups that rely, partially or exclusively, on terrorism to achieve their political ends [1,2]. Terrorism is, needless to say, a hotly debated concept [3]. Here it is conceived as a strategy of political violence used by non-state actors to overdue the resistance and willingness of a State by exercising psychological pressure [4]. As Alex P. Schmid [5: 1] authoritatively underlined, for a long time terrorism has been understood primarily in terms of violence. However, gradually, it has been realised that it should be understood more in terms of communication and propaganda. Violence and propaganda have salient elements in common. Violence aims at behaviour modification by coercion. Propaganda aims at the same by persuasion and manipulation. Terrorism can be seen as a combination of the two, using demonstrative public violence as an instrument of psychological warfare, displaying an armed group’s capabilities to do harm and to destroy [5]. In turn, violence has to be justified and promoted through communication and propaganda. 1 Francesco Marone, Adjunct Lecturer, Department of Political and Social Sciences, University of Pavia, Corso Strada Nuova 65, 27100 Pavia, Italy; E-mail: [email protected].

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On the one hand, actions, and in particular acts of violence are, of course, crucial for the mission of these organizations. However, on the other hand, words are also very important. Tellingly, in 2005 Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current leader of al-Qaeda (at the time bin Laden’s second-in-command), wrote to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the progenitor of the so-called Islamic State: “I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma [Islamic Community]” [6]. Thus, in terrorism we can find an interesting tension between secrecy and visibility. On the one hand, terrorist organizations have to operate under conditions of secrecy; they have to conceal the identity of their members and hide their plans of action, internal regulations, and a great deal of the activities in which they are engage. On the other hand, unlike most criminal organizations, they have to conduct a systematic activity of political communication and propaganda toward at least three main target audiences: their enemies, their constituency, and third parties. In fact, without visibility and publicity, terrorist organizations could hardly achieve their political goals [7]. For this activity of political communication and propaganda, many terrorist organizations rely on the use of “narratives”. There are several definitions of this popular concept. In general, a narrative can be thought of as a set of consistent story lines, deliberately constructed, which can explain events convincingly and from which inferences can be drawn. A narrative also expresses a sense of identity and belonging and communicates a sense of cause, purpose and mission [5,8].

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A useful perspective to examine the narratives of terrorist organisations is represented by framing theory. In the social sciences, framing generally refers to a set of concepts and theoretical approaches on how individuals, groups, and societies organise, perceive, and communicate about reality. This well-established and sophisticated perspective has been widely used to study, in particular, social movements [9,10]. However, it can also be fruitfully applied to the analysis of terrorist organizations and militants. ‘Framing’ or ‘frame analysis’ is a multidisciplinary research concept, originally attributed to the influential work of sociologist Erving Goffman [11]. This perspective has since been continually developed and expanded upon. Furthermore, it has come to be seen as one of three central dynamics in understanding the nature and process of social movements, together with “resource mobilisation” and “political opportunity processes” [10: 612, 12]. A classical presentation can be found in a contribution by sociologists Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow [10]. In this work they provided an overview of different aspects of the framing concept and found points of coherence and divergence, explaining that framing is the act of producing “collective action frames” or “mobilizing and countermobilizing ideas and meanings”. Following Goffman, frames are conceived as “schemata of interpretation” that enable individuals to “locate, perceive, identify and label’ occurrences within their life space and world at large”. In other terms, frames are sets of ideas and beliefs through which groups interpret the world, legitimate their activities and mobilise potential adherents and supporters [13].

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Framing process involves, among other things [10], the articulation and amplification of elements of existing beliefs and values. A significant part of them is often associated with existing ideologies. However, frames are not the same as ideologies. Rather, ideologies may represent a “cultural resource for framing activity” [14]. Ultimately, framing is about creating resonance (recognition and sympathy) among potential supporters and motivating them to participate. In particular, the concept of “frame alignment” is crucial in this respect. It is described as “the linkage of individual and SMO [social movement organizations] interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary” [9: 464]. Frame alignment processes basically work to find the match between interpretations of reality as performed by organizations, on the one hand, and that of potential adherents on the other, to enlarge the organization’s frames’ resonance, and enlarge its pool of participants. Through framing processes, collective action is usually presented as both possible and necessary. As mentioned earlier, the main tools used to research these frames are provided by the model presented by Benford and Snow [10]. A key element in this model is the distinction of three “core framing tasks”: “diagnostic” framing, “prognostic” framing, and “motivational” framing. They are a necessary ingredient of efforts at successful framing by social groups [15]. The first task, diagnostic framing, is concerned with the identification of the problem and its source. Diagnostic framing therefore addresses fundamental questions in the analysis of a narrative: what is the problem and who or what is to blame?

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The second core task, prognostic framing, covers the proposed solution to the problem: how can the outlined problem be solved (often at the expense of an opponent), and what strategies need to be developed and observed in order to make that solution work? Finally, the task of motivational framing serves as the rationale for action or “call to arms”. This task focuses on convincing potential adherents to join or at least support the organisation. For this purpose, it is necessary to overcome the risks of fear, especially when actions are illegal and violent, and “free-riding” [16] that can inhibit the participation. In short, core framing tasks fulfil two main practical functions: a) mobilising agreement on a problematic issue among the target audience; b) and subsequently motivating them to resort to action in line with the organisation’s goals [12]. A number of scholars have already employed framing tools to analyse the narratives of different terrorist groups or militants [17], including Hezbollah [18], racialnationalist movements in the West [19], Hamas [20], al-Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsula (AQAP) [21], “al-Qaeda Central” [Holbrook 22], Anders B. Breivik [23]. The next will be dedicated to the analysis of one relevant case: the so-called Islamic State (IS; also known as ISIS, ISIL or Da‛esh), the more influential and dangerous terrorist organisation of our age.

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The Case of the “Islamic State” (IS) This section presents a qualitative analysis of the narrative of IS, based on the framing perspective. In particular, it focuses on the three “core framing tasks”. IS has skilfully used different communication channels and tools, including official speeches of leaders, magazines, videos, social media communications, pieces of music and videogames. Many of these products present a high level of technical quality [24,25]. Thus, this jihadist organisation combines traditional doctrine (selectively and creatively reinterpreted) and modern technologies. IS’s propaganda is aimed at multiple audiences at once, including its militants and sympathizers, third parties and its various enemies. This work makes use of open-source material. In addition to the secondary literature, it mainly refers to the online magazine Dabiq in the English language [26]. Dabiq represents an easily accessible resource that allowed IS to explain its ideology, mission, activities and goals in a detailed way. This glossy magazine, published in different languages and characterised by a professional design, made use of photographs, interviews, background stories, religious articles and advertisements for IS’ own video and media outlets. The first issue of Dabiq was published in July 2014, soon after the proclamation of IS’s “Caliphate” (29 June). It explicitly focused on the issues of tawhid (oneness of God), manhaj (search for truth), hijrah (migration), jihad (here understood as “holy war”) and jama’ah (community) (Dabiq, Issue 1).

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The title of the magazine came from a town in northern Syria where, according to Islamic traditions about the end of the world, Muslim believers will triumph over the armies of “Rome” (i.e., Western armies) in a final battle. IS conquered the town of Dabiq in August 2014. However, in September 2016, after the release of 15 issues, Dabiq was apparently replaced by another online magazine, Rumiyah (Arabic for Rome), published in English and other languages. Many experts speculated that this change was due to IS’ imminent loss of the town of Dabiq, which actually occurred in October 2016. The new title refers to an Islamic prophecy about the fall of “Rome”. However, while IS has changed its strategic focus over time in response to its changing fortunes, the organisation’s underlying world view, values and ultimate aims has remained relatively consistent. As confirmed by recent research, Dabiq and Rumiyah are more similar than they are different. In particular, IS’s core values and its antagonistic world view tend to be constant across all issues of the two magazines [27]. Diagnostic Framing What is the problem and who or what is to be blamed? Diagnostic framing is concerned with the identification of the problem and its source, the attribution of blame, and consequently the delineation of boundaries between “good” and “evil” actors.

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According to IS’s propaganda, Islam is in moral crisis internally because it abandoned the right path. Additionally, it is existentially threatened by sworn foes. The problem is presented not as a misfortune or an unpleasant fact, but as an intolerable tragedy. The very survival of the in-group in danger [12]. IS has lashed out against a variety of mortal enemies, including: Shiites; Christian and “polytheist” unbelievers; and Sunni “apostates” [24]. Unlike in al-Qaeda’s strategy, IS has given priority to the fight against the “near” enemy, without forgetting the “far” one. In fact, the first enemy of the so-called Islamic State are the Shiites. The threat is said to be on both a doctrinal level and on a military and political level [15]. Shiites are usually called “Rāfidah”; the term is a derogatory name which means ‘rejecters’ (in Arabic) of Islam. Even more than al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups, IS describes Shiite Muslims as historic existential enemies. A second enemy is represented by “unbelievers” (“kuffār” in Arabic), namely Christians, Jews and “polytheists” (“mushrikīn”). In particular, the struggle against the Christian “Crusaders” is a recurrent key theme in jihadist ideology and propaganda. With this respect, in an interesting book Halverson, Goodall and Corman indentified 13 “master narratives” of Islamist extremism [28].2 A master narrative is described as a powerful form of narrative that transcends particular historical contexts and is embedded in a particular culture. Following this formulation, Mahood and Rane recently analysed the first 10 issues of Dabiq and found that the magazine used seven of these 13 master narratives. Interestingly, the “Crusader” narrative is by far the most common (452 direct references) [29].

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Moreover, IS showed special fury against the Yazidis, a religious minority of Kurdish origin, both in terms of physical violence on the ground and in its communication efforts. They are presented as a “pagan minority”, “deviant from the truth”. IS’s magazine argued that Yazidi women can be legitimately “enslaved” (Dabiq, Issue 4). A third enemy is represented by those who IS, like other jihadist groups, calls “murtaddīn”, apostates who “turn back” from Islam. Based on the controversial practice of “takfīr” (excommunication), the so-called Islamic State accords itself the authority to declare someone a non-believer, even if he/she professes to be a Muslim, and to punish him/her by death. In relation to all these different groups, the process of naming [30] (“Rāfidah”, “Crusaders”, etc.) is salient for IS. In fact, there is real symbolic value in the names given to its enemies, as they have deep negative connotations for Sunni Muslims, based on their shared history. IS has not hesitated to explicitly draw historical parallels: “Just as the Companions [of the Prophet Muhammad] had to face coalitions of various Jewish, pagan, and hypocrite parties in the battle of al-Ahzāb [of the Confederates, in 627 CE], the Muslims of the Islamic State face various coalitions of kuffār having a common interest in seeing the Khilāfah [Caliphate] destroyed” (Dabiq, Issue 11) [13].

2 The 13 “master frames” are the following: 1. the Pharaoh, 2. the Jahiliyyah, 3. the Battle of Badr, 4. the Hypocrites, 5. the Battle of Khaybar, 6. the Battle of Karbala, 7. the Mahdi, the Infidel Invaders (8. Crusaders and 9. Tatars), 10. Shaytan’s Handiwork, 11. 1924, 12. the Nakba, 13. Seventy-Two Virgins.

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This historical comparison illustrates another important aspect of IS’s diagnostic framing: all the different enemies are united in their war on the Sunni believers. However, this war is doomed to failure, according to Dabiq, since it is only “repeating history” (Dabiq, Issue 4). Ultimately, the groups which are not with IS are automatically against them, as unbelievers or apostates, in accordance with an extreme and rigidly Manichean logic of in-group vs. out-group. There is no room for bystanders: (see “The extinction of the grayzone”, Dabiq, Issue 7). One of the main goals of the notorious use of barbaric and gruesome images and messages (for example, videos of beheading) [31] is intended to outrage and terrorise the enemies. Prognostic Framing What is to be done? Prognostic framing stipulates remedies to the identified problem and provides general means or tactics for accomplishing these objectives. Essentially, IS presents the so-called “Caliphate” as the main solution to the failures indicated in the diagnostic frame.

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IS is not only a terrorist group, focused on the use of rebel violence, but also a “proto-state” [32] that controls a territory and governs a population. This fact represents a unique opportunity for a jihadist organisation. In this respect, the establishment of the “Caliphate” in 2014 was a momentous occasion. The “Caliphate” is a state exclusively for Muslims. It represents a sort of utopia, a fully developed state where one can find anything a modern Muslim needs and will remedy the problems of Sunni Muslims in the world, (“you [Muslims] have a state and Khilafah, which will return your dignity, might, rights and leadership”) and offer a way to end oppression (“the Muslim will walk everywhere as a master”) (Dabiq, Issue 1) [13]. The establishment of the ‘caliphate’ gives the so-called Islamic State several propaganda options and allows it to construct a radical narrative of the traditional dichotomy of Dar al-kufr (the abode of unbelief) and Dar al-islam (the abode of Islam). In fact, for IS, “the world has divided into two camps” (Dabiq 1, Issue 1) [13]. The ‘caliphate’ is portrayed as a space where normality and tranquillity reign. “In the midst of a raging war with multiple fronts and numerous enemies, life goes on in the Islamic State” (Dabiq, Issue 4). IS’s propaganda also emphasises healthcare, technological advancement and higher education [13]. The caliphate is described as “the only state ruled by Allah’s Shari’ah today” (Dabiq, Issue 10). Its trajectory is repeatedly compared to the experience of the Prophet Muhammad, tapping into the “myths of origin” and divine ruling. This wealth of religious references, selectively and creatively interpreted, is used to justify the organisation’s objectives and actions but also to emphasise a sense of continuity between past,

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present and future [12]. In this respect, it is important to stress that apocalyptic themes are salient, as suggested by the name of the magazine. Dabiq also compares itself favourably to its enemies, with accusations of social injustice and racism as recurrent subjects. For example, an article that explains the basics of this idea of the Islamic State as a sort of utopia is titled “Walā’ and Barā’ versus American racism” (Dabiq, Issue 11). This expression refers to the undivided loyalty (walā’) Muslims should show to religionists over all other things, on the one hand, and the disavowal (barā’) they must show to anything deemed un-Islamic, on the other. In the discourse of Salafism (the ultra-conservative movement within Sunni Islam) it developed from a call to Muslims to show their shunning Judeo-Christian influences in worship into disavow everything considered even remotely ‘un-Islamic’ [33: 3]. The “caliphate” is the key of a bipolar worldview, based on depersonalisation, from a religious perspective, regardless of nationality, ethnicity or race. The fact that Islam transcends these boundaries is a recurrent theme and a central part to the prognostic frame. It becomes a defining factor in deciding who is the enemy and who is not: “The American Muslim is our beloved brother. And the kāfir Arab is our despised enemy even if we and he were to have shared the same womb” (Dabiq, Issue 8) [13]. What must IS militants and sympathisers to do with enemies? Essentially, the solution is violence. In particular, the Islamic State has undertaken to inspire, support and direct terrorist attacks against civilian populations in the West [34].

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As mentioned earlier, IS does not hesitate to present and publicise the most repulsive and horrific aspects of violence. Moreover, it does not deny the designation of terrorism. In fact, it enthusiastically claims the term: the twelfth issue of Dabiq, published after the attacks of November 2015 in Paris, is titled “Just Terror” [13]. Terrorising the enemy is not the only purpose that this “brutality” theme [35] serves. Revenge is also an important goal. Even barbaric actions such as the beheading of hostages, as repulsive as they seem, fit into IS’ narrative of a just Islamic approach to violence and a way to counter the perceived oppression of Sunni Muslims around the world. Furthermore, in the framing of the Islamic State, violence in the name of the “Caliphate” for the “right” Muslims is not only logical and justified; it is a divinely ordained imperative [13]. Motivational Framing Why must individuals join collective action? IS calls people to engage in “jihad” and “hijrah”. “There is no life without jihād, and there is no jihād without hijrah” (Dabiq, Issue 3); this phrase captures the essence of the Islamic State’s motivational framing [13]. In fact armed “jihād” (in terms of war and terrorism) against the unbelievers and the “hypocrites” is IS’s raison d’être. For this purpose, it needs to recruit muhajidin from amongst the people. The “call to arms” is therefore literal. Individuals must be motivated to “move from the balcony to the barricades” [10], in spite of the risks of

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fear and free-riding. In order to fight in jihad, potential soldiers from abroad need to make hijra3 to the caliphate’s territories. In this respect, an important theme in the motivational framing is the sense of belonging. In Dabiq belonging figures as part of the process of hijra: a Muslim who lives in jahiliyya (“ignorance”, originally the period of time in Arabia before the advent of Islam; a recurrent “master frame” of Islamist extremism [28,29]) in the lands of the West as a stranger and joins his coreligionists in a land ruled by wala’ and bara’. Muslims are enjoined to “abandon the lands of shirk [polytheism or idolatry] and come to the land of Islam” (Dabiq, Issue 8). Following van Gorkom [13], we can say that two main motivations are applied in the frame to get Muslims to emigrate to the “caliphate”. The first is an obligation to God and the Islamic community, since there is a state ruled by shari’a law. In particular, Dabiq warns of the risk run if this individual obligation is not met. This is intended to mitigate the risk of free-riding associated with collective action [16]. For example, a series of articles written for women [36] mostly centre around this obligation to perform hijra, usually comparing their situation to that of men. Women are encouraged to divorce their husbands if they do not agree with their wives’ intention to make hijra. Similarly, children [37] are reminded that they should obey Allah even before their parents [13].

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Behind all this lies the threat that not emigrating to the caliphate is a major sin. Each Muslim “should now make his number one priority to repent and answer the call to hijrah, especially after the establishment of the Khilāfah [Caliphate]” (Dabiq, Issue 3). Continuing to live in the dar al-kufr is a sin in and of itself and if a Muslim is incapable of doing this for “whatever extraordinary reason” then he or she should at least publicise a pledge of allegiance (Dabiq, Issue 2) [13]. The second motivation emphasises not so much the act of hijra itself as it does the reasons for it; readers are warned that “living amongst the sinful kills the heart, never mind living among the kuffār!” (Dabiq, Issue 3) [13]. This ties into the oppression in a “victimhood” theme [35] associated with the diagnostic frame when explaining that “the modern day slavery of employment, work hours, wages, etc., is one that leaves the Muslim in a constant feeling of subjugation to a kāfir master” (Dabiq, Issue 3), but it also emphasises the feeling of cultural isolation a Muslim might feel in a Western country: “Strangeness is a condition that the Muslim living in the West cannot escape as long as he remains amongst the crusaders. He is a stranger amongst Christians and liberals. He is a stranger amongst fornicators and sodomites. He is a stranger amongst drunkards and druggies. He is a stranger in his faith and deeds, as his sincerity and submission is towards Allah” (Dabiq, Issue 12) [13]. Thus, the implication of the prognostic and motivational framing in Dabiq is that the successful muhajir (emigrant) after his/her journey to the caliphate finds a utopian society where he or she will be able to join in IS’ victorious war against the unbelievers. 3 The Hijra is to the migration of the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions from hostile Mecca to Yathrib (Medina) in 622 CE.

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As mentioned earlier, another important theme concerns war and jihad [35]. We can find constant reminders of the organisation’s military victories and continuing territorial expansion in IS’s propaganda, especially in Dabiq. The impression these articles intend to give is that of an unstoppable force, showing that “the mujāhidīn gain further momentum in their war against the armies of kufr” (Dabiq, Issue 7). At the same time IS acknowledges that its rise cannot continue without challenge: “but this momentum is also met with tribulations that test their [the mujahidun’s] firmness, resolve, and sincerity” (Dabiq, Issue 7). Indeed, persevering in the face of opposition and allowing the fight to escalate is part of the narrative. By underlining this theme of invincibility, Dabiq invites readers to be part of this inevitable force, and reap the benefits. Interestingly, despite IS’s injunctions not to “gather the dunyā [temporal possessions] and its treasures”, the organisation still motivates prospective followers by offering them worldly incentives, as mentioned earlier. For example, various articles are devoted to ghanimah, or war booty. Women, too, are presented as part of the reward for a fighter (Dabiq, Issue 12). Interviews with, and personal profiles of, fighters are also common ways of framing a motivational narrative for IS in Dabiq. Profiles of dead fighters especially are often seen in the magazine. The deaths are always celebrated as martyrdoms. These men are tangible examples of people who have done what IS would motivate its readers to do [13]. Finally, fighters and other members of IS are often presented as “brothers”. This sort of family metaphors can increase the sense of solidarity.

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References [1] L. Weinberg, Leonard, Turning to terror: The conditions under which political parties turn to terrorist activities, Comparative Politics 23 (1991), 423–438. [2] B.J. Phillips, What is a terrorist group? Conceptual issues and empirical implications, Terrorism and Political Violence 27 (2015), 225–242. [3] A.P. Schmid, ed., The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research. Abingdon – New York, 2011. [4] F. Marone, La politica del terrorismo suicida, Soveria Mannelli, 2013. [5] A.P. Schmid, Al-Qaeda’s “Single Narrative” and Attempts to Develop Counter-Narratives: The State of Knowledge, ICCT Research Paper, International Centre for Counter Terrorism – The Hague, 2014. [6] Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, 9 July 2005, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/ posts/zawahiris-letter-to-zarqawi-english-translation-2. [7] F. Marone, L’organizzazione del segreto nei gruppi terroristici, Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia 60 (2014), 303–334. [8] A. Beutel et al., Guiding Principles for Countering and Displacing Extremist Narratives, Journal of Terrorism Research 7 (2016), 35–49. [9] D.A. Snow et al. Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation, American Sociological Review 51 (1986), 464–481. [10] R.D. Benford and D.A. Snow. Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment, Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000), 611–639. [11] E. Goffman, Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience, Cambridge, Mass., 1974. [12] H.A.H. Langemeijer, “Don’t Hear about Us, Hear from Us”: The role of ISIS’ online magazine Dabiq in shaping foreign fighter motivations, Thesis, Utrecht University, 2016. [13] T. van Gorkom, Framing the world in Dabiq: The propaganda of the Islamic State, Thesis, Utrecht University, 2016.

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[14] D.A. Snow and R.D. Benford, Clarifying the relationship between framing and ideology in the study of social movements: A comment on Oliver and Johnston, Mobilization: An International Quarterly 5 (2000), 55–60. [15] L.C. Robinson, Just Terror: The Islamic State’s Use of Strategic “Framing” to Recruit and Motivate, Orbis 61 (2017), 172–186. [16] M. Olson, The logic of collective action, Cambridge, Mass., 1965. [17] D.A. Snow and S. Byrd, Ideology, framing processes, and Islamic terrorist movements, Mobilization: An International Quarterly 12 (2007), 119–136. [18] E. Karagiannis, Hizballah as a Social Movement Organization: A Framing Approach, Mediterranean Politics 14 (2009), 365–383. [19] S.A. Wright, Strategic framing of racial-nationalism in North America and Europe: An analysis of a burgeoning transnational network, Terrorism and Political Violence 21 (2009), 189–210. [20] J. Wagemakers, Legitimizing Pragmatism: Hamas’ Framing Efforts From Militancy to Moderation and Back? Terrorism and Political Violence 22 (2010), 357–377. [21] M. Page, L. Challita, and A. Harris, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Framing narratives and prescriptions, Terrorism and Political Violence 23 (2011), 150–172. [22] D. Holbrook, Alienating the Grassroots: Looking Back at Al Qaeda’s Communicative Approach Toward Muslim Audiences, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36 (2013), 883–898. [23] L.E. Berntzen and S. Sandberg. The collective nature of lone wolf terrorism: Anders Behring Breivik and the anti-Islamic social movement, Terrorism and Political Violence 26 (2014), 759–779. [24] M. Maggioni and P. Magri, eds., Twitter and Jihad. The Communication Strategy of ISIS, Milan, 2015. [25] F. Marone, Modernità e tradizione nella propaganda dello “Stato Islamico” (IS), in P. Scotto di Castelbianco (ed.), LeggIntelligence, Preface by Ambassador Giampiero Massolo, Rome, 148–163. [26] H.J. Ingram, An analysis of Islamic State’s Dabiq magazine, Australian Journal of Political Science 51 (2016), 458–477. [27] P. Wignell et al., A Mixed Methods Empirical Examination of Changes in Emphasis and Style in the Extremist Magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah, Perspectives on Terrorism 11 (2017), 2–20. [28] J.R. Halverson, H.L. Goodall, Jr. and S.R. Corman, Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism, New York, 2011. [29] S. Mahood and H. Rane, Islamist narratives in ISIS recruitment propaganda, The Journal of International Communication 23 (2017), 15–35. [30] M.V. Bhatia, Fighting words: naming terrorists, bandits, rebels and other violent actors, Third World Quarterly, 26 (2005), 5–22. [31] S.M. Friis, ‘Beyond anything we have ever seen’: beheading videos and the visibility of violence in the war against ISIS, International Affairs 91 (2015), 725–746. [32] N. Lia, Understanding jihadi proto-states, Perspectives on Terrorism 9 (2015), 31–41. [33] J. Wagemakers, Framing the ‘threat to Islam’: Al-wala’ wa al-bara’ in Salafi discourse, Arab Studies Quarterly 30 (2008), 1–22. [34] L. Vidino, F. Marone and E. Entenmann, Jihadist Attacks against the West since the Declaration of the “Caliphate”, Report, Program on Extremism (PoE) at George Washington University – Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI) – International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT), 2017, forthcoming. [35] C. Winter, Documenting the Virtual ‘Caliphate’, Report, Quilliam Foundation, 2015. [36] H. Khelghat-Doost, Women of the Caliphate: The Mechanism for Women's incorporation into the Islamic State (IS), Perspectives on Terrorism 11 (2017), 17–25. [37] J.G. Horgan et al., From Cubs to Lions: A Six Stage Model of Child Socialization into the Islamic State, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, forthcoming.

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The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats M. Martellini and J. Rao (Eds.) IOS Press, 2017 © 2017 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-802-0-74

The Shifting Jihadist Galaxy Andrea PLEBANI 1 ISPI

Abstract. While maintaining a crucial position within the jihadi discourse, since 9/11 the debate on the creation of a “truly” Islamic State has been partially obscured by the struggle against the far enemy, an objective which was given primary importance by al-Qa‘ida. Especially from 2011 onward, the situation gradually changed and the theme came back to the fore. In a context marked by the stiffening of the authoritarian regimes spared by the Arab Spring, the crisis of the liberal models invoked against them, and the collapse of the Islamist alternatives dominating in the immediate “post-Spring order”, the jihadist galaxy passed through a significant ideological and methodological shift embodied by the proclamation of the “Islamic State” (IS) in 2014. The essay aims to analyze this phenomenon focusing on the different approaches adopted by IS and al-Qa‘ida as well as on the implications this shift may have on the broader jihadi galaxy. Keywords. Jihadism, Islamic State, al-Qa‘ida, weak-failed states

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Introduction The restoration of the caliphate and the foundation of a state able to reflect the model established by the Prophet in Medina have always represented the core aim of the diverse jihadist galaxy. While never reneged, this target appeared to have faded away during the decade of al-Qa‘ida’s supremacy (2001–2011), due to the long-term strategy the group embraced and to the preeminence it bestowed upon the fight against the “far enemy” [1] but, especially since 2011, various jihadist movements returned to focus their efforts on the creation of a “truly” Islamic State. In a context marked by the stiffening of the authoritarian regimes spared by the Arab Spring, by the crisis of the liberal models upheld by the masses gathered in many “Tahrir Squares”, and by the collapse of the Islamist alternatives that dominated the first stage of the “Springs”, the jihadist galaxy shifted its shape once again. By diminishing its anti-system, antagonist role, which made it easy to put it in the “non-state actor” category, it tried to pose as a “credible” – even “successful” – alternative to other state systems, and to become a model to export within and beyond dar al-islam. With the 2014 proclamation of the “Islamic State” (IS), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi gave birth to a model his predecessors tried in vain to establish in 2006 [2], inaugurating a momentous shift in the modus operandi of the entire jihadist galaxy, al-Qa‘ida (AQ) included.

1 Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Largo A. Gemelli 1, 20123, Milano, Italy; E-mail: andrea. [email protected].

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IS: An Answer to the Crisis of the State? The fall of Mosul in June 2014 marked the apex of a process that witnessed IS’ rise from its ashes. In just a few years the group became powerful enough not just to subvert the political balances in the “land of two rivers,” but to shake the very pillars that had kept the whole regional framework together for decades [3]. Under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi the group had managed to re-infiltrate most of the Sunni Arab heartland in Iraq and to push deep into Syrian territory. Far from confining itself to the Mesopotamic and Levantine scenario, the movement aspired to take under its helm the entire dar al-islam, realizing a political organization aimed at being both an “Islamic state” and a “caliphate”:

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O Muslims everywhere, glad tidings to you and expect good. Raise your head high, for today – by Allah’s grace – you have a state and khilāfah, which will return your dignity, might, rights, and leadership. It is a state where the Arab and non-Arab, the white man and black man, the easterner and westerner are all brothers. It is a khilāfah that gathered the Caucasian, Indian, Chinese, Shāmī, Iraqi, Yemeni, Egyptian, Maghribī (North African), American, French, German, and Australian. Allah brought their hearts together, and thus, they became brothers […], standing in a single trench, defending and guarding each other, and sacrificing themselves for one another. Their blood mixed and became one, under a single flag and goal [4].

In al-Baghdadi’s vision, this did not represent a simple accident in history, but the result of a consistent and well-defined path, started in the early 2000s by Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, the forefather of IS, who led the sadly famous al-Qa‘ida in Iraq. According to the group’s propaganda, this path followed six phases (hijra, nikaya, jama’a, taghut, tamkin, and khilafa) with deep analogies with the doctrine expounded by Abu Bakr Naji in Idarat al-Tawahush (Management of Savagery) [5]. After moving to the areas that would become the epicenter of the Iraqi campaign (hijra), the mujahidin enacted a “thousand cuts strategy” (nikaya) that forced authorities to progressively cede territory, enabling the union (jama‘a) of the various factions on the ground, the deep destabilization of the unholy regimes (taghut), the strengthening of jihadist forces (tamkin), and the following proclamation of IS (khilafa). By radically subverting the long-term perspective on which the al-Qa‘ida doctrine was based [6], al-Baghdadi put the creation of an “Islamic state” and the restoration of the caliphate as the first step of a process destined to redefine the whole international system. No more the ultimate goal to be reached after a multigenerational struggle, but a starting point for a new era, the IS strategy aimed at rebuilding from the ground up an international framework that was deemed to be structurally anti-Islamic, by putting the Syraq at the epicenter of change. It is no surprise that every issue of Dabiq magazine opened with a quote by Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi (“Behold, the spark has been lit in Iraq, and its flames will blaze, Allah willing, until they consume the Armies of the Cross in Dabiq”) and wide media coverage was devoted to the destruction of border crossings between Syria and Iraq – demolished in order to stress the link between the ascent of IS and the end of the “Sykes-Picot order”, taken as the umpteenth proof of the state of submission and fragmentation of the whole umma. Such a resolution left no room for compromises or gray areas. The “Islamic state” could not have borders, only frontlines, and it had to reaffirm its superiority to any other temporal authority: “We clarify […] that with this declaration of khilāfah, it is incumbent upon all Muslims to pledge allegiance to the khalīfah Ibrāhīm and support him (may Allah preserve him). The legality of all emirates, groups,

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states, and organizations, becomes null by the expansion of the khilāfah’s authority and the arrival of its troops to their areas” [7]. For this strategy to succeed, however, military skills would not suffice. To sustain its own ambitions, IS had to prove its worth and show that it represented a credible alternative to the autochthonous or Western-originated models that dominated the region. On the other hand, the group’s rapid rise had been hugely facilitated by the deep dissatisfaction of Sunni Arab communities in Syria and Iraq towards their governments, accused of corruption and ineffectiveness, and even of open hostility towards their citizens. This is why IS built a governmental apparatus without comparison within the jihadist galaxy. The organization revolves around al-Baghdadi’s leadership and a consultative council (majlis al-shura), whose task is to flank the “caliph” in managing the lands under his authority, but it also relies upon a multilevel, decentralized administrative model. In this system, the key administrative unity is the province (wilaya), which replicated the central model at a local level, with a governor at its vertex, regional councils with different tasks, a well-defined judicial and bureaucratic apparatus, and police forces [8]. A complex apparatus that, even without granting each wilaya the same degree of control, appears as accountable to a clear political center.

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To al-Baghdadi it was of same, if not more, importance to winning the “hearts and minds” of the local population. While it never relented in rigidly interpreting the shari‘a law and never gave up its reputation of brutality against opponents, the “Islamic state” launched a series of initiatives aimed at underlying its “otherness” as compared to preceding administrations. For this reason, not only did it reward with honors, goods, and benefits its supporters, but it also invested both human and financial resources in fighting crime and corruption, improving existing services, building new infrastructures, and redefining education programs. Thus, the group’s consolidation of power in Raqqa and Mosul also involved the drafting of a “city document” that, taking inspiration from the historical pact signed in Medina by Muhammad upon his arrival at Yathrib, aimed at laying the foundations of a new social pact, called to define relations between IS and the population: “You have tried all kinds of secular regimes, the monarchy, the republican, the Ba’athist and the Rafidhiya (a degrading term for Shi’as), and you were stung by their fire and flames. Now it is the age of the Islamic state and its Khalifa, Abu Bakr Al- Qarashi, and you will see – by God’s help – how hugely different an unjust secular government… and a Qarashi Imama whose approach is the god’s revelation…” [9].

Sure, much of what we know about the real impact of these decisions is mediated by the media of the “caliphate”, the price paid in terms of freedom and infringed rights has been very high, and many observers have argued that the presumed attention IS pays to the population should just be considered regime propaganda. True or false, however, the attention shown on this issue marks a significant change from the modus operandi typical of pre-IS actors, Islamic State in Iraq included. Efforts by al-Baghdadi’s communication channels to present IS as something still imperfect, but certainly different, from the depiction by worldwide media, should be read along the same lines [10]. A sort of new Medina that, in order to restore the golden age of Islam, speaks to all “true” believers, presenting itself as the natural seat for an umma to be “purified” after centuries of corruption and deviance. This is why the call

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to undertake a new hijra represents one of the most important features of IS: just as Muhammad and his companions were forced to leave Mecca and head for Yathrib, “true” Muslims are exhorted to leave the unholy lands and join the “Islamic state.” According to the group’s doctrine, every single believer can make the difference, man or woman, old or young, soldier or not: the ultimate goal is to establish a state able to continue the fight to liberate the dar al-islam and to stand out in any sector. Thus, the appeal towards physicians, teachers, engineers, communication professionals, and experts in any field. In the group’ s weltanschauung, everybody has a role to fulfill. It is also thanks to these features that the message exposed by IS made Syraq the destination for thousands of volunteers from all over the world [11]. Therefore, rush O Muslims to your state. Yes, it is your state. Rush, because Syria is not for the Syrians and Iraq is not for the Iraqis. The Earth is Allah’s. […] The State is a state for all Muslims. The land is for the Muslims, all the Muslims. […] O Muslims everywhere, whoever is capable of performing hijrah (emigration) to the Islamic State, then let him do so, because hijrah to the land of Islam is obligatory. […] We make a special call to the scholars, fuqaha’ (experts in Islamic jurisprudence), and callers, especially the judges, as well as people with military, administrative, and service expertise, and medical doctors and engineers of all different specializations and fields. We call them and remind them to fear Allah, for their emigration is wajib ‘ayni (an individual obligation), so that they can answer the dire need of the Muslims for them [12].

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Al-Qa‘ida: Towards a New Operative Model? The year of 2011 was a crucial one for al-Qa‘ida: in May, Osama Bin Laden was killed in Abbottabad, depriving the group of a leadership that had been crucial both as a symbol and as a way to legitimize its actions; meanwhile ISI, under the leadership of its new amir, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was undergoing a slow rebirth, while the Middle Eastern region was taken by storm by the Arab Springs. While much has been written on the effect on the al-Qa‘ida network by Bin Laden’s death and by the rise of the “Islamic state”, much remain to say on the long-term effects of the 2011 uprisings on the group’s strategic doctrine. After all, albeit through different means than those supported by AQ, the Arab Springs appeared to have been successful in what the group had been unable to do for decades: to overturn the “apostate” regimes that ruled the Islamic world. What at first seemed to be a reason for celebration (something that, at least formally, the upper echelons of the movement did) [13], also represented a threat to the doctrine of the jihadist movement. Indeed, al-Qa‘ida had always campaigned for the “liberation” of the dar al-islam lands from “apostate” tyrants, but it also argued that there was only one way to do so: jihad by the sword.[14] According to the group’s logic, any other way, including political participation, was a one-way road, something made up by different regimes to strengthen their internal and international legitimacy. It was just a tool, to be deprived of any meaning as soon as Islamist formations were to prevail. The success scored by the different souls of “political Islam” at the post-2011 elections was a direct threat to the al-Qa‘ida doctrine: it hit one of the core messages of the group, it came from movements that hailed from a common (albeit different) ideological background, and contrasted with the failures that a number of al-Qa‘ida supported proto-“emirates” had encountered (chiefly, in Iraq, Mali, and Yemen). Failures that of-

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ten could be attributed not so much to the strength of the group’s enemies, rather than to its inability to rally local population support, and to show the presumed superiority of the al-Qa‘ida model [15]. al-Qa‘ida’s leadership succession, from Osama bin Laden to Ayman al-Zawahiri came, therefore, at one of the most difficult times for the movement. After a first period of confusion, characterized by the leadership inability to adequately respond to the Arab Springs’ disruptions and to the ever-tighter competition from the “Islamic state,” the jihadist network was gradually able to redefine its strategy, by pairing the fight on the battlefield with an increasing attention to conquering the “hearts and minds” of the population. Such a turn, while not totally foreign to al-Qa‘ida’s doctrinal corpus, appeared to take in the extent of the threat represented by the IS social organization model, and to counter with an alternative vision, able to pair the movement’s fights with a marked attention to the needs of an audience who did not just ask for a state of permanent revolution, but for a system able to respond to its many necessities.

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A 2013 al-Zawahiri document is, in this sense, paradigmatic. In this document, the Egyptian leader underlines the importance of cultivating popular support and respect a number of lines of conduct that aimed at differentiating the “legitimate” al-Qa‘ida’s armed jihad from the brutal, no-holds-barred conflict that had become the trademark of the “Islamic state” [16] A message aimed at preserving the holiness of the mujahidin and the future of the jihadist community, because “our battle is long and jihad needs safe bases and continuous reinforcement with men, money, and expertise” [17]. This framework seems to have found its most articulated expression in Syria. Since its inception, Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN) aimed at fighting against Bashar al-Assad forces to create a “new Syria” whose groundworks should lay on shari‘a law. A sort of Islamic emirate [18], which would constitute the most evident manifestation of al-Qa‘ida’s new way. The group linked its rise within the Syrian context to the crucial operational skills shown in the fight against loyalist forces, but also to a modus operandi that was particularly sensitive to the delicate balance within the country’s social fabric, to its population’s needs and the heterogeneity of the opposition forces. A strategy that was based on pragmatism and on a gradualist approach, which allowed the movement to gain significant support at the local level and to separate itself from extremism and the penchant for total control shown by IS [19]. The setup of shari‘a courts, the provision of services to the population, and the fight against crime were the main tools to achieve this result. In this sense, the institution of a department charged with tending to the population’s needs by distributing bread at subsidized prices and providing water, natural gas, and health care, proved crucial.[20] Keeping good relations with the different expressions of the Levantine social fabric, based – whenever possible – on a collaborative model light years away from the IS approach, proved equally crucial. In many instances, this system brought to the creation of shared management mechanisms that were active not just in the military field (the so-called operation rooms), but also in the civilian administration of controlled areas.[21] Clearly, this did not imply that JaN cooperated harmoniously with the hundreds of factions active in Syria (nor did this avoid brutal attacks against its local competitors), but it laid the conditions for quite strong ties with similarly-minded groups such as Ahrar al-Sham, Jund al-Aqsa, Ajnad al-Sham, Jaysh al-Muhajirin and

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Ansar al-Din [22]. It was the cooperation with these groups, and with Ahrar al-Sham in particular, that represented the key to the most important success by rebel forces after Raqqa’s fall in 2013: the conquest of the Idlib governorate in late spring 2015. A victory that allowed al-Nusra to turn the northwestern governorate bordering Turkey in the center of a network that can count on important contingents in Aleppo and Damascus, as well as in the center and south of the country [23]. Beyond the important contribution that this strategy brought to JaN at the military level, the links developed with the opposition and the local communities allowed the group to gain in legitimacy and benefit from solidarity in an incomparable way to other’s jihadist movements, as clearly shown already at end 2012, when rallies followed the choice of the US State Department to define the group “a terrorist organization”. The committal showed by JaN men during battles against loyalist forces, and the ties with the country’s social fabric, turned it into a group that is increasingly difficult to put into the “terrorist organization” box alone, and this haziness serves long-term goals that have been well summarized in a 2005 al-Zawahiri writing:

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If we are in agreement that the victory of Islam and the establishment of a caliphate in the manner of the Prophet will not be achieved except through jihad […] then this goal will not be accomplished by the mujahed movement while it is cut off from public support. […] In the absence of this popular support, the Islamic mujahed movement would be crushed in the shadows, far from the masses. […] This is precisely what the secular, apostate forces that are controlling our countries are striving for. These forces don’t desire to wipe out the mujahed Islamic movement, rather they are stealthily striving to separate it from the misguided or frightened Muslim masses. Therefore, our planning must strive to involve the Muslim masses in the battle, and to bring the mujahed movement to the masses and not conduct the struggle far from them [24].

The choice of the group to formally detach from al-Qa‘ida in summer 2016, and to change its name in Jabhat Fatha al-Sham,2 must be interpreted along the same lines. Beyond public declarations, and at least until now, such a choice did not bring to a significant recalibration of the group’s positions or to the parting from al-Qa‘ida’s jihadist framework, but constituted a coup de théâtre, aimed more at shielding the movement from those accusing it of colluding or submitting to al-Zawahiri’s network, than to mark a new course.

Conclusions Although constantly marked by sudden changes, up until now, the evolution of the jihadist galaxy appears to be increasingly moving away from the classical model of a non-state actor. On the opposite, as shown by the “Islamic state” and Jabhat al-Nusra, the trend points towards totally opposite models. Yet, this does not imply that the classical tropes of jihadism a la 9/11 have ended, but that the possible shapes of the global jihad have grown, and that the number of groups that we may put on a continuum (with, at its extremes, the ideal type of the delocalized groups of Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri, and the quasi-state model of Abu Bakr Naji) has increased. 2 At the beginning of 2017, the group renamed itself Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham following a series of clashes erupted with several opposition groups in the region of Idlib.

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While increasingly oriented towards proto-state organizations and concentrated on their long-term sustainability, such groups have not, in any way, relinquished their terror campaign against the far and near enemies, resorting to trained commandos or other actors. The attacks that over the last year have hit Ankara, Baghdad, Berlin, Brussels, Dhaka, Istanbul, Nice, Orlando, Paris, and Rouen – just to name same of the most atrocious – are tragic evidence of all this. Such a trail of death and destruction knows no borders, and it can only be contrasted with a long-term strategy called to contain the jihadi threat on security ground, but most of all to neutralize its ideology, by showing the emptiness of doctrines that are actually betraying the faith that they claim to protect.

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References [1] See G. Kepel (ed.), Al-Qaeda. I testi (al-Qa‘ida’s Texts), Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2006; A. Plebani, Jihadismo globale. Strategie del terrore tra Oriente e Occidente (Global Jihadism, Terror Strategies between East and West), Firenze, Giunti Editore, 2016. [2] N. Kazimi, The Caliphate Attempted: Zarqawi’s Ideological Heirs, their Choice for a Caliph, and the Collapse of their Self-Styled ‘Islamic State of Iraq, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Hudson Institute, Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Modern World, vol. 7, 2008. [3] On IS origins and evolution, see A. Plebani (ed.), Jihad e terrorismo. Da al-Qa‘ida a ISIS. Storia di un nemico che cambia (Jihad and Terrorism. From al-Qa‘ida to ISIS. The History of a Shifting Enemy), Milano, Mondadori, 2016. [4] Al-Hayat Media Center, A Message to the Mujahidin and the Muslim Ummah in the Month of Ramadan, 1 July 2014, p. 5, http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/documents/baghdadi-caliph.pdf. [5] J. Brachman, Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice, Routledge, 2009, p. 95. [6] According to the al-Qa‘ida doctrine, the caliphate restoration would have come only at the end of a long journey. In order to reach this goal, it would have been necessary to put together a vanguard of believer-fighters, whose duty was to awaken the Islamic community and gradually enlarge the ranks of the mujahidin and ultimately defeating the far enemy and bringing the near enemy to its own collapse. Only then would it be possible to reinstate the caliphate, which had been formally abolished in 1924. [7] SITE Intelligence Group, ISIS Spokesman Declares Caliphate, Rebrands Group as “Islamic State”, 29 June 2014, https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/isis-spokesman-declares-caliphate-rebrandsgroup-as-islamic-state.html. [8] Z. Aaron, The Islamic State’s Territorial Methodology, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Research Notes, n. 29, 2016. [9] H.H. al-Qarawee, The Discourse of ISIS: Messages, Propaganda and Indoctrination, in M. Maggioni, P. Magri (eds.), Twitter and Jihad. The Communication Strategy of ISIS, Milan, ISPI-Epokè, 2014. [10] And along the same lines should also be read counter-information videos, often presented by British journalist John Cantlie, as well as short movies showing living conditions in controlled territories, features in the main IS-linked magazines, and social media campaigns run by its militants. On this, see H.H. al-Qarawee, Ibidem; M. Arnaboldi, La rivista Dabiq: essere o apparire? Dentro la propaganda del neo-Califfato (Dabiq Magazine: To Be or to appear. Inside the Neo-Caliphate Propagande, in A. Plebani, M. Diez (eds.), La galassia fondamentalista tra jihad armato e partecipazione politica (The Fundametalist Network between Armed Jihad and Political Participation), Venezia, Marsilio Editori, 2015; M. Arnaboldi, L. Vidino, Califfato, social e sciami in Europa: l’appeal della propaganda dello Stato Islamico tra i nostri aspiranti jihadisti (The Caliphate, Social Media and Swarms in Europe: Islamic State’s Reach to aspiring Jihadists) in M. Maggioni, P. Magri (2015). [11] According to the estimates of various research institutes, over a little more than two years, between 27,000 and 31,000 volunteers have been to Syria and Iraq. Of these, 5,000 came from Europe, although higher numbers of people came from Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Turkey. On this, see Soufan Group, Foreign Fighters. An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq, December 2015; Homeland Security Committee, Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighters Travel, 2015; ICCT, The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union, April 2016. [12] Al-Hayat Media Center (2014), pp. 5–6. [13] N. Lahoud, M. al-῾Ubaydi, Jihadi Discourse in the Wake of the Arab Spring, Combating Terrorism Center, 17 December 2013.

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[14] This term refers to one of the typical forms of jihad, which generally means “effort along Allah’s path.” While the classic doctrine identified various ways in which jihad can be undertaken (by soul, by words, by hand, and by sword, just to mention the most relevant), for jihadist groups the violent interpretation predominates over the others. On this, see D. Cook, Understanding Jihad, University of California Press, 2015. [15] See, N. Kazimi (2008); A. Lebovich, The Local Face of Jihadism in Northern Mali, CTC Sentinel, 25 June 2013. [16] A. Plebani, Emerging trends in the broader jihadi galaxy: between radicalization and new models of jihadism, in P. Maggiolini, M. Demichelis (eds.), The Struggle to Define the Nation. Rethinking Religious Nationalism in the Contemporary Islamic World, Piscataway NJ, Gorgias Press, 2017. [17] A. al-Zawahiri, General Guidelines for Jihad, As-Sahab Media, 2013, pp. 1–4, https://azelin.files. wordpress.com/2013/09/dr-ayman-al-e1ba93awc481hirc4ab-22general-guidelines-for-the-work-of-ajihc481dc4ab22-en.pdf. [18] J. Cafarella, Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria. An Islamic Emirate for al-Qaeda, Middle East Security Report, Institute for the Study of War, 2014, http://www.understandingwar.org/report/jabhat-al-nusra-syria. [19] Y. Abbas, Another ‘State’ of Hate: Al Nusra’s Quest to Establish an Islamic Emirate in the Levant, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, vol. 20, April 2016. [20] C. Lister, Profiling Jabhat al-Nusra, The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Analysis paper, no. 24, July 2016. [21] J. Cafarella (2014). [22] Y. Abbas (2016), pp. 11–14. [23] The clashes erupted between the group and Ahrar al-Sham since the end of 2016 represents a shift of the dynamics described above able to redefine dramatically the relations between two of the most important actors of the anti-Assad camp. [24] Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Combating Terrorism Center, 2005, https:// www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Zawahiris-Letter-to-Zarqawi-Translation.pdf.

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Designing Systems for Terroristic Indicators Analysis Based on Visible, Social and Dark Web Data Sources John SOLDATOS 1 Athens Information Technology

Abstract. This article introduces the main principles and the design of a system for identifying terroristic indicators and predicting terroristic actions based on processing of information from social media and the dask web. The presented system (which is conveniently called VIGILANT) is aimed at responding to recent challenges stemming from the increased exploitation of the internet by terroristic groups, as a means of conducting psychological warfare, gaining publicity, spreading propaganda, mining/collecting information about their targets, raising funds for their activities, recruiting and mobilizing supporters, as well as planning and coordinating their attacks. The article is not confined to the presentation of the technical design of a platform for social media and dark web information processing, but discusses legal and privacy aspects as well.

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Introduction The public internet exposes several properties (e.g., easily and ubiquitously accessible, operates without any essential regulation, global outreach, anonymity of communication, multimedia exchange, opportunities for inexpensive spreading of information, low-cost establishment of web presence, intersection with conventional mass media), which make it an ideal forum for the organization and execution of terroristic-related activities [1]. Terrorists use extensively the internet in a variety of ways [2], including conducting psychological warfare, gaining publicity, spreading propaganda, mining/collecting information about their targets, raising funds for their activities, recruiting and mobilizing supporters, as well as planning and coordinating their attacks [3]. The vast majority of the internet-based terrorist activities take place in the World Wide Web. Indeed, terrorist organizations and their supporters have established and use numerous websites (e.g., alneda.com, jehad.net, alsaha.com, islammemo.com), as a means of organizing attacks and targeting an array of messages towards various audiences. During the last ten years we have also witnessed the proliferation of social networks, which are characterized by a steady increase in the number of their users [4]. Terrorists are increasingly taking advantage of social media (e.g., Isis is fluent in YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, Tumblr, internet memes and other social media, while the Taliban has been active on Twitter since May 2011 with many thousands of followers [5]), which makes the social web a primary medium for web-based terroristic activities. 1

Corresponding author. Kifissias 44 Ave., 15125, Marousi, Greece; E-mail: [email protected].

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In addition to web sites of the visible web, terrorists are increasingly exploiting the dark web (e.g., the Tor (https://www.torproject.org/) and I2P [6] infrastructures), which is a portion of the internet that is intentionally hidden and inaccessible through standard Web browsers [1]. Dark web sites offer anonymity, protect their users from unauthorized use and provide encryption features in order to prevent monitoring. As such they are used for less direct and hardly visible sharing of information among terrorist groups (e.g., Al-Qaeda terrorists use them to distribute material anonymously or ‘meet in dark spaces’) [5]. Nowadays, there is evidence that the internet has been extensively exploited in the course of real-life attacks, such as the recent Paris 9/1 (Charlie Hebdo) case, where terrorists have been using social media and the dark web in order to radicalize and recruit young members [7].

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In response to the wave of internet-based terroristic activities, security agencies and policy makers have invested in infrastructures, technologies, processes and policies which facilitate the monitoring and analysis of on-line terrorism. As a prominent example, Europol’s Check the Web (CTW) project stores and manages information associated with suspicious postings, which are derived following internet searches (e.g., searches on Islamist terrorism-related websites and announcements) [8]. CTW has been a work file for analysis of suspicious or malicious content, while it is currently evolving to an EU wide referral unit for monitoring the internet and storing unpleasant content. Despite, these efforts web intelligence (WEBINT) processes within counterterrorism organizations (including LEAs (Law Enforcement Agencies)), have still many manual elements, which makes them time consuming and inappropriate for detecting, collecting, analysing the ever increasing amounts of on-line content that is generated and published for terroristic purposes. The inefficiency of existing techniques is largely deteriorated as a result of the proliferation of terroristic activities on the social networks and the dark web, which makes it hardly possible to analyse all available content and almost impossible to synthesize insights stemming from multiple sources. LEAs and counter-terrorism agencies could greatly benefit from the emerging wave of BigData and data analytics technologies, which can process terroristic information that flows through web sites (including the dark web and social networks) in an automated way. Indeed, in recent years several social media analytics technologies have been developed, including technologies for tracking topics [9], sentiment analysis [10], detection/identification of communities [11], identification of social incidents [12] and more. Such technologies are already deployed in a variety of application domains (e.g., market research, branding, financial services, political science), but have been only recently considered as a solution for improving the management of security incidents and emergency situations [13]. Overall, while social media processing technologies have reached a mature state, their practical deployment and use towards automatically analysing terroristic information is still in its infancy. Such a deployment could provide millions of insights on the terrorists activities, intentions and plans, thereby boosting LEAs efforts to identify and anticipate terroristic activities, including planning of terroristic incidents. Nevertheless, the deployment of advanced social media processing technologies for anti-terrorism efforts asks for their adaptation to the structure and dynamics of terroristic activities [14], their enhancement with terroristic semantics, as well as their training with appropriate datasets. Additional challenges have to be confronted when it comes to processing information from the dark web, given the need to overcome limitations stemming from the strong authentication and encryption capa-

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bilities of respective infrastructures (such as TOR and I2R). To this end, several measures and techniques could be employed [15], including monitoring and identifying directories of hidden services, tracking requests/connections from unknown or not standard domains, monitoring/tracking sites where information about hidden services might be exchanged (such as pastebin.com), mining and profiling transactions, monitoring hidden services (as they join and leave the dark web infrastructures), as well as building semantic databases from hidden services.

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In addition to deploying social media and dark web processing technologies alone, LEAs and counter-terrorism organizations could also greatly benefit from combination of terroristic information exchanged in social media and the dark web. For example, the correlation of communities and topics detected on the two infrastructures could provide additional insights that would be difficult to obtain from each one of the individual infrastructures or data sources alone. Likewise, the combination of information derived from the dark web with information flowing in social networks could lead to a more accurate understanding and analysis of terroristic incidents, but also to the development of better and more robust databases of terroristic semantics, beyond what is nowadays possible. The development and understanding of these semantics could also enable reasoning about terroristic incidents across various timescales, thereby supporting antiterrorist organizations in the scope of both tactical and strategic tasks. However, despite the proliferation of social web and deep web analytics technologies, their linking and interoperability has not been adequately explored, which is a set-back to the abovelisted opportunities. Overall, recent advances in on-line information processing (including processing of social media) hold the promise to revolutionize the way counter-terrorism agencies work, through automating the tasks of monitoring and processing internet-based terroristic content, while at the same time providing valuable insights on terroristic activities in a way that could essentially facilitating tactical and strategic level tasks. To this end, there is a pressing need for customizing these technologies to the semantics and dynamics of terroristic activities, while at the same time broadening their scope to address not only the visible web, but also the dark web. Furthermore, the combination, unification and linking of information collected and/or derived from different sources could provide significant insights about the dynamics of terroristic activities, thus enabling the implementation of added-value functionalities. Such functionalities could serve as a basis for promptly identifying terroristic activities in the light of the evolving nature and dynamics of contemporary terroristic attacks. In addition to the technical, technological and operational challenges that are associated with the processing of web-based terroristic-related content, there is a need to deal with the ever important ethical and privacy challenges. Internet-scale counterterrorism content processing technologies could become a vehicle for authoritarian governments and agencies to violate citizens’ privacy, restrict freedom of expression and hinder the free flow of legal information. It is therefore essential that tools for processing terroristic content in the internet are built on the basis of privacy-by-design principles, respect privacy regulations and ensure accountability and transparency. Key to the adoption and sustainable use of on-line information processing technologies (including social media and dark web) by LEAs is their adherence to privacy

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principles and regulations with a view to ensuring that they won’t threat to citizens’ privacy and freedom of expression. In this direction, there is also a need for considering existing laws and regulations, with a view to identifying gaps that could permit the abuse or malicious use of the on-line information processing capabilities. In following paragraphs, we present the properties and the design of a system (conveniently called VIGILANT) that could effectively handle and combine information from the visible, social and dark web towards identifying and anticipating terroristic actions and incidents.

Terrorist Prediction System Properties

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The VIGILANT system is a first-of-a-kind platform for analyzing on-line terroristgenerated content, which shall be able to collect, aggregate, link and analyze information stemming from the visible, the dark and the social web. The platform shall ensure the semantic interoperability and semantic unification of diverse content processing technologies, notably technologies which process terrorist-generated information stemming from social media, dark web and visible web. The platform can be integrated based on a range of readily available technologies, such as technologies for topic-based communities detection and tracking, social search, indexing/retrieval over dark/social/ visible web, multimedia analytics (notably visual scene analysis), sentiment analysis, terroristic reasoning and more. These technologies can be configured in order to identify and analyze terroristic activities, based on their customization to terroristic semantics. Overall, the main characteristics of the VIGILANT platform are as follows: •

Multi-Source: The VIGILANT platform shall leverage content and information published in social media/networks, visible web sites and dark web sites (i.e. as part of the TOR and I2R networks). It should be able to exploit each one of these content sources individually, while at the same time linking related information (e.g., events, activities, topics) across the different sources. The linking of related information across different sources will enable the platform to provide insights that can be hardly nowadays identified by web intelligence experts within counter-terrorism organizations.

•

Multi-lingual and Language-Independent: The underlying VIGILANT technologies should employ statistical processing and are largely language independent. This can ensure the multi-lingual nature of the VIGILANT platform, with only minimal effort for the customization of a solution in each different language.

•

Integrated: VIGILANT shall provide integrated functionalities in terms of identification and tracking on on-line communities and terroristic activities, but also in terms of the summarization and classification of terrorist-generated content. All the components technologies to be integrated in the platform will collect and manage information from all the different sources in an integrated way, thus enabling added-value functionalities that are hardly possible nowadays.

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•

User-Centric & User Driven: VIGILANT should be effective blended within the relevant processes and operations of the counter-terrorism organizations, such as WEBINT processes.

•

Semantically Interoperable: Among the key innovative characteristics of the VIGILANT platform should be its ability to enable the semantic unification of information (e.g., events, activities, locations, topics), which originally stem from different information sources. To this end, the platform must ensure that information from the various sources is processed based on common semantic models (notably standards-based models). Furthermore, the semantic unification of data processing functionalities (regardless of the underlying analytics technology employed) must be also pursued.

•

Configurable: The platform should be flexibly configurable in terms of the models driving the analysis of information (e.g., dictionaries and models of events, terroristic indictors and more), the languages supported/used, as well as in terms of the deployment configuration of the platform (e.g., component technologies employed/used). This facilitates the customization and deployment of the platform in different counter-terrorism context and applications.

•

Privacy Friendly/Ethical Friendly: VIGILANT should adhere to privacy and data protection directives, including both EU wide directives/regulations and national laws. At the same time, it should produce guidelines for privacy-bydesign, which shall be taken into account during the design, integration and fine-tuning of the VIGILANT platform.

•

Gender-Aware: Males and females tend to expose different on-line behavior as part of their participation in social networks and other internet-based services, while at the same engaging in terroristic activities based on different roles. VIGILANT shall consider these behavioral differences in an effort to accurately detect activities, communities and information based on the processing of on-line terrorist-generated content.

•

Intelligent and Proactive: VIGILANT shall incorporate powerful terroristic reasoning techniques, which will rely on novel data analytics techniques. The latter will leverage data and metadata from multiple sources, with a view to identifying trends and pattern of terroristic activities that are hardly possible through conventional manual methodologies (notably methodologies exploited nowadays by web intelligence experts). The VIGILANT platform shall also include proactive reasoning functionalities that will enable the prediction/anticipation of terroristic activities and incidents, based on the processing of on-line information.

An overview of the VIGILANT platform is depicted in Fig. 1. At the lowest layers of the platform lie the internet sources that provide the content to be analyzed, which include social media, dark web sites and visible web sites (including Web2.0). The platform should provide the means for interfacing to these sources and collecting content, on the basis of appropriate crawling and indexing components (such as the open source Terrier.org). For the case of dark web sites, the platform shall also implement

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Figure 1. VIGILANT Platform Overview.

and deploy techniques for identifying hidden sites and tracking their contents. Over the various sources, the platform shall integrate readily available internet information processing technologies such as detection of topics, communities and summarization. These components shall process data from the various sources and will accordingly produce meta-data in terms of events, topics, communities, locations etc. Both the data and the metadata that stem from the various sources are transformed to the VIGILNT data models and stored to a (private) cloud infrastructure. The latter cloud infrastructure will provide scalable storage services for data/metadata that will deemed relevant to terroristic activities. This is a prerequisite for executing data mining and data analytics algorithms, while at the same time respective privacy and data protection mandates. A privacy-by-design approach ensuring adherence to regulations, use of anonymization techniques for personal data and restricting the use of the data to authorized end-users shall be employed.

Terroristic Modelling – Modelling for Semantic Interoperability The models of the VIGILANT platform shall provide a standards-based and generic way to model events, activities and other metadata that can be derived based on the online processing of terroristic generated content. In this context, they will boost semantic interoperability across the different sources and analytics components, since they will

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provide common ground for the analysis and interpretation of data and metadata. On top of the common models, the platform shall employ a range of data analytics techniques, which will enable the production of new knowledge (event, incidents etc.) based on terroristic reasoning. A data and metadata processing layer will enable the application of a variety of data analytics components and algorithms, which shall be used as part of the VIGILANT solutions.

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At the heart of the platform will be a range of models and semantic associated with terroristic activities, which will drive the operation of the various social media and deep web analytics technologies. In particular, the platform can use models of terroristic activity, which enable the various technologies to identify topics, events, indicators, weapons, types of terroristic activities and a wide array of other metadata that should be exploited for the identification and analysis of terrorist-generated content and associated terrorist generated activities. VIGILANT can take advantage of the existing works on shared models for representing and understanding terrorist activities [16]. The models to be produced shall serve as a basis for semantic interoperability across the different data processing/analytics technologies to be used, through providing a common representation of terroristic events, indicators and activities regardless of the system used to identify them. Note that most security and defense applications, notably the ones that process large datasets, exploit some short of data models towards representing and sharing information. In this context, the semantic web has been acknowledged as a crucial tool for counter-terrorism researchers [17], given that ontologies provide the means of describing sequences of events, along with the social networks of terrorists and their organization. Moreover, ontologies provide the means for representing relationships within networks of individuals and organizations, which is very handy in the scope of applications that detect and track the evolution of communities. A large number of security applications employ general purpose ontologies for situational awareness [18], which are very common in applications that employ data fusion from multiple sources [19]. However, over the years we have also seen the development of ontologies that are devoted to counter-terrorism applications, through reflecting theoretical concepts of terrorism including the representation of events, assets and terroristic activities. These ontologies can be extended/enhanced on the basis of concepts peculiar to specific terroristic attacks such as those targeting the maritime environment [20]. Beyond ontologies, we have also witnessed the emergence of models that capture actions, events and relationships, which are commonly related to terroristic activities. Indeed, both [21] and [22] provide taxonomies of common terroristic activities and events, which they characterize as terroristic indicators. These taxonomies take into account the semantic of recent terroristic attacks such as 9/11 in New York City. They have a significant amount of overlapping constructs and commonalities, while they seem to capture the activities that occurred during the planning of several terroristic attacks in the period 2000–20120 (such as the bombings in the London and Madrid metros). In the scope of the FP7 PROACTIVE project [16], a system able to collect information about these terroristic indicators (based on sensors) has been developed, including algorithms for reasoning over these indicators with a view to predicting terroristic threats and activities. Nevertheless, contemporary terroristic attacks tend to be less pre-

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dictable, since they have different semantic and dynamics from the ones that have been taken into account in order to build the above-listed taxonomies of terroristic indicators. VIGILANT can use ontologies for modelling terroristic activity, starting from the consolidation and integration of ontologies and data models that have been proposed in the literature. These ontologies could however be enhanced with semantics and concept that relate to on-line activities, given that these semantics are absent from the ontological models and taxonomies outlined above. Furthermore, VIGILANT shall implement mechanisms for dynamically extending the ontology models based on topics, activities and events that will be identified through social network analytics and deep web processing technologies. In this way, VIGILANT will become more dynamic and able to keep up with terroristic activities that have not been identified or employed at large in past terroristic attacks. The VIGILANT semantic models can provide the means for semantic interoperability across the different data sources and data processing algorithms (such as topic based community detection and information summarization) given that all these components will formulate their inputs and outputs according to the common semantics and data models.

VIGILANT Solutions and Tools Based on the capabilities of the VIGILANT platform a wide range of counter-terrorism solutions are envisaged. In this section we provide three indicative solution examples.

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Solution/Tool #1 – Automated Classification and Summarization of Terroristic Activities This solution will access social web, visible web and dark web data sources and will identify information/posts that may relate to terroristic activity. Following this identification it will classify the information according to the type of terroristic activity that they are most likely to relate to (e.g., fund-raising, propaganda spreading, conducting psychological warfare, gaining publicity, mining/collecting information about targets, recruiting and mobilizing supporters, planning and coordinating attacks). Furthermore, it will provide summarized information of the posts that relate to each activity type, including their evolution over time. It will be able to associate/link related pieces of information (e.g., posts or articles) published in different sources, using criteria associated with their topic, publisher, timing and more. The resulting solution will be configurable in terms of the data sources to be used, the dictionary of activities to be used for the classification, the summaries to be provided (length, depth) and more. The solution will greatly aid end-users when identifying terroristic discussions/posts on the Internet, including how they evolve over time, thus improving end-users’ (i.e. web-intelligence experts, counter-terrorism experts, LEA officers, etc.) productivity. The operation of the solution will be either fully or semi-automatic. In the latter case, end-users will be able to intervene in the classification and summarization process (e.g., in order to finetuning the outcomes of the VIGILANT algorithms).

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Solution/Tool #2 – Identification and Tracking of Communities This solution will identify communities of terrorists on the internet, through grouping/linking related posts by different users based on a thematic and temporal classification of their posts, their social graph, their profiles and more. The solution will produce clusters/groups of terroristic-related users/accounts, while at the same providing the means of tracking their activity in terms of volume and content/type of the posts. The solution will correlate groups and/or individuals posting/publishing information across different portions of the internet (e.g., dark web and social web), including individuals that might post/appear on the basis of pseudonyms or other using hidden dark web services. Solution #3: Identification and Anticipation of Terrorist Activity

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This solution will analyze information (data/metadata) collected through the social and deep web, towards identifying and detailing indicators associated with terroristic attacks. Accordingly it will estimate the alert levels associated with terrorist attacks for specific times and locations. The solution will provide estimations of the alert levels across different timescales, thus supporting both tactical and strategic planning operations of LEAs and counter-terrorist organizations. Likewise, the solution will estimate the probability for certain future events, in the form of probabilistic predictions of potential incidents and terroristic attacks. Each of the above listed solutions will be usable and exploitable independently from the others. However, multiplicative benefits and added-value could be derived by the combined use of the solutions. To this end, VIGILANT will integrate the solutions in order to allow for one to use the outputs of the other, while at the same time making them accessible from a single entry point (i.e. the VIGILANT portal). Note also that the solutions listed above will be general purpose, yet customizable to different use cases. In the scope of the pilot operations these solutions will support different use cases in line with the needs of the LEAs. Figure 2 illustrates a list of use cases, along with the way they will be supported by using one or more of the above solutions. Figure 2 lists also the partners’ responsible for the implementation of each of the pilot use cases.

Figure 2. VIGILANT Solutions Overview.

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Indicative Scenarios and Use Cases Using the solutions and tools presented in the previous section, VIGILANT can support several predictive functionalities supporting different use cases, such as the ones presented in following paragraphs. Οn-Line Propaganda Spreading This functionality concerns the identification of individuals and groups that disseminate propaganda messages for the purposes of radicalizing and/or recruiting younger members. Such radicalization and recruitment efforts have been observed prior to the recent Paris 9/1 attack. It can be implemented based on a combination of solution #1 (towards the classification and summarization of propaganda messages) and solution #2 (towards the identification of groups and graphs of terrorists that spread the messages). Οn-Line Propaganda Spreading Concerns the identification of individuals and groups that disseminate propaganda messages for the purposes of radicalizing and/or recruiting younger members. Such radicalization and recruitment efforts have been observed prior to the recent Paris 9/1 attack. The use case will be implemented based on a combination of solution #1 (towards the classification and summarization of propaganda messages) and solution #2 (towards the identification of groups and graphs of terrorists that spread the messages). Terrorist Threat(s) Estimation & Prediction

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It analyzes on-line information and provides LEAs with information, alerts and notifications about potential (future) terroristi activity/events in specific locations. Threat level information is estimated and/or predicted for specific locations and time windows and accordingly presented to officers of the LEA or the counter-terrorism organization. The use case will be based on the customization of the TRK (solution #3) in order to assess treat levels for different locations given a batch of events identified through internet-content processing, but also collected from other intelligence sources maintained by the LEAs. Tracking the Planning of Attacks This use case concerns the identification of a series of related activities that are typically associated with the planning of attacks. In several attacks (such as NY 9/11) terrorists have be engaging on preoperational surveillance of their targets, testing of security measures, dry runs and more. The implementation of the use case entails will be based on solution #1 and solution #3. The former will capture discussions/interactions about each one of the phases of an attack, while the TRK will identify their inter-linking across time.

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Analysis of On-Line Terrorism and Trends This use case will provide LEAs with information about the on-line activities in which terrorists engage (such as propaganda spreading, fund raising, attack planning, recruitment of new members etc.). It will also identify the evolution of these activities in time. The use case will be implemented based on solution #1. The latter will be employed in order to continually classify terroristic-related posts to categories, while monitoring their evolution over time. Accordingly, it will produce aggregate information and statistics, along with summarized information.

Conclusions In this paper we have presented the main principles and a high-level design of an internet information processing platform that could to realize a radical shift in the way counter-terrorism organizations and LEAs analyze web information. The presented platform could substantially increase the automation, the intelligence and the overall efficiency of their WEBINT operations. In particular, such a platform could significantly accelerate the processing of web information, when compared to conventional operations, while at the same time enabling LEAs to process more information in less time and to derive insights beyond what is nowadays possible. The realization of this vision can be based on the integration of a wide range of leading edge technologies for collecting and analyzing information from social media and the dark web, but also on terrorist reasoning technologies. As part of the paper, we have presented some of these leading edge technologies, along with terrorist modelling technologies. We are in the process of implemented selected information processing components of the VIGILANT platform based on open source technologies for social media and dark web information processing.

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References [1] Michael Chertoff and Tobby Simon, “The Impact of the Dark Web on Internet Governance and Cyber Security”, Global Commission on Internet Convergence Paper Series, No. 6, February 2015. [2] Gabriel Weimann, “How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet”, U. Institute of Peace, (www.terror.net), March 2004. [3] Peter W. Singer, “The Cyber Terror Bogeyman.” The Brookings Institution. www.brookings.edu/ research/articles/2012/11/cyber-terror-singer, November 2012. [4] Anwitaman Datta, Marios D. Dikaiakos, Seif Haridi and Liviu Iftode, Infrastructures for Online Social Networking Services [Guest editorial]. IEEE Internet Computing 16(3): 10–12, 2012. [5] Telegraph Reporters, “How terrorists are using social media”, November 4th, 2014 (available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11207681/How-terrorists-are-using-socialmedia.html). [6] Gildas Nya Tchabe and Yinhua Xu, “Anonymous Communications: A Survey on I2P.” www.cdc. informatik.tudarmstadt.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Group_CDC/Documents/Lehre/SS13/Seminar/CPS/ cps2014_submission_4.pdf, 2014. [7] Chris Hughes, “Charlie Hebdo massacre predicted in tweets: Did ISIS plot Paris terror attack?”, mirror.co.uk, January 9th, 2015. [8] “EUROPOL: coordinating the fight against serious and organised crime”, Report with Evidence, European Union Committee, 29th Report of Session 2007–08. [9] L.M. Aiello, G. Petkos, C. Martin, D. Corney, S. Papadopoulos, R. Skraba, A. Goker, Y. Kompatsiaris and A. Jaimes. Sensing trending topics in Twitter. In Transactions on Multimedia 15(6): 1268–1282, October 2013, DOI: 10.1109/TMM.2013.2265080.

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[10] Apoorv Agarwal, Boyi Xie, Ilia Vovsha, Owen Rambowod and Rebecca Passonneau, “Sentiment analysis of Twitter data”, in the Proceedings of the Workshop on Languages in Social Media (LSM ’11), pp. 30–38. [11] D. Cosley, D.P. Huttenlocher, J.M. Kleinberg, X. Lan and S. Suri, Sequential influence models in social networks, in ICWSM, 2010. [12] G. Petkos, S. Papadopoulos and Y. Kompatsiaris. Social Event Detection using Multimodal Clustering and Integrating Supervisory Signals, in ACM International Conference on Multimedia Retrieval (ICMR), Special session on Social Events in Web Multimedia, Hong Kong, 2012. [13] Richard McCreadie, Karolin Kappler, Magdalini Kardara, Andreas Kaltenbrunner, Craig Macdonald, John Soldatos and Iadh Ounis, “SUPER: Towards the use of Social Sensors for Security Assessments and Proactive Management of Emergencies”, in Social Web for Disaster Management (SWDM 15’) workshop of the WWW conference, 2015. [14] L. Palen and S.B. Liu, Citizen communications in crisis: anticipating a future of ICT-supported public participation, in Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on Human factors in computing systems, page 736. ACM, 2007. [15] Ciancaglini, Vincenzo, Marco Balduzzi, Max Goncharov and Robert McArdle. “Deepweb and Cybercrime: It’s Not All About TOR.” Trend Micro Research Paper, October 2013. [16] S. Petris, C. Georgoulis, J. Soldatos, I. Giordani, R. Sormani and D. Djordjevic, “Predicting terroristic attacks in urban environments: An internet-of-things approach”, IJSIA 8(4), 2014. [17] A. Mannes and J. Golbeck, “Building a terrorism ontology”, University of Maryland, College Park, 2005. [18] M. Kokar, C. Matheus, and K. Baclawski, Ontology-based situation awareness. Information Fusion, 10(1): 83–98, 2009. [19] C. Matheus, M. Kokar and K. Baclawski, A core ontology for situation awareness, in Proceedings of FUSION 03, pp. 545–552, 2003. [20] V. Popovich, K. Korolenko, A. Prokaev, N. Hovanov, Y. Gorev, P. Galiano, Y. Ivakin and A. Smirnova, Intelligent Decision-Making Support System with Respect to Anti-Terrorist Activity in Harbor and Coastal Waters, in Proceedings of WSS2008, L. Bjorno (ed), Copenhagen, 2008. [21] RISS/ROCIC Special Research Report, “Indicators of Terrorist Activity: Stopping the Next Attack In the Planning Stages”, 2004. [22] Brian T. Bennett, “Understanding, Assessing and Responding to Terrorism: Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Personnel”, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2007.

The author(s) of this publication is/are solely responsible for its content. This publication does not reflect the opinion of the publisher. The publisher cannot be held liable for any loss or damage that may occur because of this publication. The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2017. ProQuest

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The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats M. Martellini and J. Rao (Eds.) IOS Press, 2017 © 2017 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-802-0-94

Educational Outreach to Combat Radicalisation of Scientists: A Study of the Aum Shinrikyo Cult

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Michael I. THORNTON 1 HESAR

Abstract. Radicalisation of the scientifically well-educated is of concern, as these people may use their knowledge against society by being part of an illegal weapons development programme working on behalf of terrorists or an extreme Cult. A study of the Aum Shinrikyo Cult has been undertaken to understand better how they recruited scientists and to examine what the recruits contributed. Many become radicalised or join cults because they are unemployed, may lack social interaction or a stable family structure, this leading to a sense of frustration, hopelessness and alienation. There is also a similar sense of dissatisfaction and disillusionment amongst some newly graduated scientists, in part due to the falling number of job opportunities for them. The Aum Cult offered a sense of belonging, special privileges and a promise of unlimited research funds in extensive facilities. Although the cult is best known for its chemical weapon attack on the Tokyo underground, they had a nuclear programme and the most extensive non-state biological weapons programme discovered to date. There was a distinct lack of tacit knowledge amongst the recruited scientists and it was in part this ineptitude that contributed to the fact that following an investment of millions of dollars; the cult failed to deliver a true weapon of mass destruction. Although there are programmes of educational outreach related to the dual use aspects of chemistry and biology, they are predominately in English and are to be found in the United States and Europe. More active engagement through outreach needs to be carried out, focusing primarily on the young but also encompassing the educators themselves, with the material translated locally and made available on the Internet. The International Community and, in particular, the educational community has a responsibly to educate and inform scientists as to the dual nature of their work and the consequences to society if they choose to misuse this knowledge. Keywords. Radicalisation, Aum Shinrikyo cult, WMD, chemical weapon, biological weapon, nuclear weapon, education, outreach, dual-use

Introduction It has been said that, for the first time, ordinary people can create extraordinary weapons.[1] With the advent of the information explosion, the existence of a predominately uncensored and largely un-policed internet comes the possibility for virtually anybody to discover the procedure, equipment and material necessary to make some of the world’s most dangerous weapons. This does not mean that everybody can, and will 1 Michael I. Thornton, HESAR – Health Safety Environmental Research Association Rome, Industrial Engineering Department, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Via del Politecnico 1, 00133 Rome, Italy; E-mail: [email protected].

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make those weapons, just that the information necessary to do so, which for many years was held by governments, under a cloak of secrecy is now largely available for anyone who wishes to look for it. If we combine this relative ease of access to such knowledge with well-financed groups of extreme thinking individuals, we could have a recipe for a potential disaster. Nevertheless, downloading a design or a list of instructions from the Internet is not sufficient to manufacture this class of weapon. As can be seen from the examination of the Aum Shinrikyo (Aum) Cult, obtaining the recipe does not necessarily guarantee success. However examining the above cult can give us both an insight into how they recruited scientists and help us to understand better why they and others have not been successful in producing and using weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The Beginning

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Shoko Asahara, the founder of the Aum Shinrikyo Cult in Japan, was born as Chizuo Matsumoto to a poor family in Japan. He experienced a spiritual awakening in 1987, which lead him to form the cult. In the early 1980s, this partially sighted man had a one-roomed yoga school, with some followers and a dream. His dream was not to become rich or famous; he dreamt of world domination.[2] He demonstrated that he was an astute businessman and an expert in marketing and made money both legally, by selling books and computers and illegally by the sale of fake drugs.[3] Within 10 years he had a worldwide network with thousands of followers and had amassed a multimillion-dollar fortune. Many of his followers have attributed their devotion to him to his charismatic personality and ability to persuade people. He took elements of Buddhism and Hinduism, added some yoga, and, from Christianity, the concept of Armageddon. He frequently preached about a coming Armageddon and in this conflagration that he described as a global conflict that would, among other things, see the destruction of Japan by nuclear, biological or chemical weapons with only the followers of Aum Shinrikyo surviving.[4] It was the duty of Aum members to hasten this Armageddon, which would destroy the sinful and place the cult survivors on a higher spiritual plane.[5] To do this Shoko Asahara beloved the cult needed to develop weapons of mass destruction. Over a period of five years from 1992 until 1995 the cult produced and used both biological and chemical weapons that culminated in the attack on the Tokyo subway. These weapons being manufactured in well-equipped facilities, financed by the fortune that the cult had amassed.

The Need to Recruit Scientists The Aum cult may have had sufficient funds to purchase the equipment and create the environment necessary for weapon production; the one element that was missing was the people to do it. It is not sufficient to convince or convert a person who may be qualified in a suitable scientific or engineering discipline; what is required is someone with the tacit knowledge. This skill often acquired through years of practice and experience in the subject. It has been said that it is more likely that a biologist would become a ter-

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rorist than a terrorist become a biologist.[6] The time taken to acquire the necessary level of education, followed by the years of dedication that a person has to undertake before acquiring the tacit knowledge sufficient to develop such weapons can be measured in years, whereas unfortunately the time that is necessary to teach someone to make an improvised explosive device can be measured in days.[7] The key to the production of such weapons is therefore to identify suitably qualified, experienced personnel and persuade them to work for you. Amongst the many “disciples” that Shoko Asahara recruited were scientists and engineers. He effectively recruited people on two levels, the “foot soldiers,” and the more select, who were given an important position within the hierarchy.

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Many, mostly young people, join groups such as the Aum cult for financial reasons, coupled with a feeling of hopelessness in their lives. They often came from areas of the world that have high unemployment and they may lack social interaction or a stable family structure. This leads to a sense of frustration, hopelessness and alienation. Cults such as Aum can give people a sense of well-being, a sense of belonging. This might explain why young, uneducated persons might be drawn into a cult, but does not fully explain why well-educated scientists and engineers might consider this as a life choice. One reason is unfortunately the rising level of unemployment and a certain level of frustration that graduates and doctorates see in today’s world. More people are attending tertiary education than ever before, but the rising number of graduates coupled with the falling number of job opportunities for them, inevitably leads to dissatisfaction and disillusionment. In fact Shoko Asahara took his message to the bright and young in Japan who felt alone or alienated. The need for educational achievement is very strong in Japan with the young not just attending school and doing their homework, but the drive to achieve being so strong meaning that many young students are required by their parents to study for long hours after school as well. This coupled with a society where recent generations have grown up amongst numerous television channels, a plethora of brilliantly animated cartoons and mass computer gaming. This immersion into the artificial world created by computer games giving them both an emotional outlet and a way to spend their small amounts of free time.[7] With this pattern being repeated all the way up the educational system, the students that complete tertiary education are extremely well educated, but many lack social skills, the ability to interact with others and may have an unreal view of the world they live in. These people are prime targets for a cult and added to this, the young that challenge the status quo and wish to reject this type of system will also find a home within the cult, as it offered both a sense of belonging, but also a recognition of achievement by appointing the more intelligent recruits positions and privileges within the organisation. The Aum Shinrikyo cult recruited approximately 300 scientists with degrees in medicine, chemistry biology and genetics engineering, tempting many by the promise of unlimited funds and the opportunity to conduct original research in extensive facilities.[9]

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Aum Shinrikyo’s Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons Programmes Aum Shinrikoyo and Nuclear Weapons

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Few countries in the world have mastered the technique to manufacture nuclear weapons. This is primarily due to the complex nature of such devices, but also due to the difficulty of procuring or producing the fissile material needed for a weapon. Although fissile material is occasional seized during black market sale attempts, both the quantities and quality of such material is grossly insufficient to be able to manufacture a weapon.[10] The presence of successful control regimes that are in place, in combination with the policing by nuclear inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency and the multitude of export license agencies that hamper the acquisition of the needed technologies, material and equipment, mean that any group, deciding to attempt to manufacture a nuclear weapon is going to have a very difficult time. Nevertheless, Shoko Asahara decided that a nuclear weapon was one possible mode to achieve his desire for world domination by launching a nuclear attack and hence triggering a nuclear Armageddon in which the USA and Japan would be destroyed. There have been suggestions that he attempted to acquire a complete nuclear weapon from Russia, although the author has found no evidence to support this. Recognising the difficulty in acquiring sufficient fissile material for a weapon, Shoko Asahara launched a programme of uranium exploration in Australia. In 1993 the cult purchased a 500,000-acre sheep farm in Baniawarn, Western Australia. They imported digging equipment and purchased chemicals in Australia along with mining leases from the Western Australia Department of Minerals and Energy.[11] It appears they wanted to extract uranium, although there is no evidence to indicate how they would have processed it to extract uranium or subsequently enriched it to a level suitable for a nuclear weapon. It was clear that the Shoko Asahara had grossly underestimated the complexity of nuclear weapon production, at its most fundamental stage: the acquisition of a sufficient quantity of uranium. Furthermore, later analysis of ore samples discovered at the Aum premises in Baniawarn, indicated that the uranium quantity in the ore was so low that it would have taken many years to extract a quantity sufficient for the purpose of nuclear weapon manufacture.[12] Aum Shinrikyo and Biological Weapons Even though the Aum cult failed to kill anybody with biological weapons, the Aum cult had the most extensive non-state biological weapons programme discovered to date. Along with the anthrax letters that were delivered to congressmen in 2001 in the United States, the Cult is one of only two known non-state efforts to try to manufacture and use biological weapons. The biological programme started in 1990 when Seiichi Endo, a graduate of Obihiro university of Agricultural and Veterinary Medicine and a student at the Kyoto University Medical School Research Department [13] started work with Clostridium botulinum, having harvested the bacterium he had collected from Japanese soil. The isolated material collected was propagated in 2 or 3 fermenters and although many thousands of litres of material were produced, the broth from the fermenters was neither purified nor concentrated.[14] The resultant material was dispersed widely over Tokyo in multiple

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attacks, but with no casualties or other effects. The failure may have been due to an inability to isolate a virulent strain of the toxin from the soil, or the fact that no attempt was made to purify or concentrate the product or it was damaged during the subsequent dispersion, in any case, it was a failure. In 1992 Shoko Asahara led more than 14 of his followers to Zaire in Africa on a mercy mission to help Ebola patients, although it is believed they were there to try and collect samples of Ebola that they would then use as a weapon. Once more this attempt failed.[15] In 1993 the cult turned to anthrax and having acquired a strain of anthrax from a university, they produced an estimated 1,800 litres of liquid slurry. With no attempt to purify the resulting mixture and because the media dominated the slurry, it had a brown colour and a putrid smell that the cult tried to mask with perfume.[16] On spraying this un-purified mess, the only result was complaints from people living nearby, due to the smell. The lack of injuries or effects from this was attributed later to the fact that they the strain of anthrax that they had acquired was probably a strain used to vaccinate cattle and harmless to humans.[17] It has been said that, “Any quantity of a high-consequence pathogen is strategically significant. One viable micro- organism can be cultured and weaponized with common, commercially available equipment.[18]”

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Although in the case of the cult this was not actually true. Failure to successfully weaponise biological agents may have been due to the time constraints and pressures the scientists were put under to deliver little the weapon, and or the fact that these scientists were not as highly skilled as has been assumed. Demonstrating once more the need for a high level of tacit knowledge, practice and experience in the field. Whilst they were exploring the potential use of a variety of biological agents as weapons, and failing, they also had in parallel, a chemical weapons programme which culminated in the attack on the Tokyo subway. Aum Shinrikyo and Chemical Weapons The chemical weapon programme was headed up by Masami Tsuchiya, born in 1965 he was an introverted child with little social life. He self harmed whilst at university and claimed to have had an “out of body” experience. He held a master’s degree in physical and organic chemistry and soon after joining the cult, was manufacturing hallucinogenic drugs such as lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), phencyclidine (PCP) and methamphetamines. These drugs were often used as part of the conditioning process of members, along with sleep deprivation and yoga.[19] Unfortunately, Tsuchiya did not stop producing illegal drugs and was persuaded by Shoko Asahara to manufacture chemical weapons. His success in producing materials such as GF nerve agent, VX nerve agent and a small quantity of sarin resulted in the construction of a multi-million dollar facility and the mass production of sarin.[20]

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Even though they could produce the chemical agent, the cult experienced difficulties in the dispersion of the material that had been produced. It was not until June 1994 that the cult managed to cause injury and death utilising chemical weapons.[21] The first successful chemical weapons attack was on June 27, 1994 in Matsumoto, 9 months before the attack on the Tokyo subway. In this attack, the cult used sarin gas in an attempt to assassinate judges presiding over criminal charges against the Aum cult. The attack took place in the Kaichi Heights neighbourhood, a quiet residential area in the city of Matsumoto. During the release of the gas from a modified van, the wind direction changed and blew the gas away from the judge’s residence towards another neighbouring block of apartments. As a result, eight people died, 200 were injured but the judge survived. The Matsumoto police found herbicide chemicals at the home of one of the victims and focused its attention on him, ignoring the cult. It was not until after the subway attack months later, that the Matsumoto attack was attributed to the cult.

The Attack on the Tokyo Underground Much has been written about this and so the author will not repeat what has already been published many times before; however, for the purpose of this paper several points of note shall be highlighted.

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Whilst the cult continued its day-to-day work, the police were investigating them and therefore the plan to attack Tokyo with sarin was bought forward and required an accelerated production of sarin. The result was an impure brown coloured liquid with a distinct odour, unlike pure sarin that is colourless and odourless. The impurity of the chemical agent coupled with its odour was one reason why more people were not killed or injured during its use in the underground. The plan was to use the efficiency of the Tokyo subway system and release the material on several trains that would then converge on central Tokyo simultaneously, thus maximising the number of casualties.[22] Masami Tsuchiya, filled eleven thick plastic bags with sarin. They were given to five different cult members who boarded selected trains at predetermined times. At the agreed moment, the 5 dropped the bags to the floor and punctured them with the sharpened tips of umbrellas. The plan being that the liquid would leak from the bags and vaporize. It is clear that Aum had difficulty acquiring an effective dispersal system in preparation for those attacks, thereby resorting to puncturing holes in plastic bags to ensure the delivery of sarin. Of the 11 bags, only 8 were actually ruptured, 3 were subsequently recovered intact. It is estimated that around 4.5 kg of sarin was released. Overall, 12 exposed commuters died, and around 980 were mildly to moderately affected, while about 500 required hospital admission; however, many thousands sought medical assistance swamping the medical system.[23] Most of the sarin was not released into the air in breathable droplets, which would have effectively entered the lungs and landed on the skin of passengers causing mass

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casualties. By merely puncturing the bags, only those in the immediate proximity to the release suffered severe physical injuries or death. Even with impure sarin thousands of passengers were affected, however. Subway stations were forced to evacuate passengers, many in a state of stress, choking, and vomiting from the effect of the chemicals. Some collapsed on the subway platforms and others managed to escape to the street were first responders, mostly unprotected, assisted the victims. Following this attack using a chemical weapon, several other lesser attacks were perpetrated by the cult, none of which were successful. Once more the underground system in Japan was targeted and a binary chemical weapon was chosen. Plastic bags containing sodium cyanide and sulphuric acid were left in the toilets of underground stations but, in all cases, the weapons failed to function and the reaction product, hydrogen cyanide, was not produced or dispersed.

Education and Awareness The response by the Japanese authorities was criticised by some, although we must remember that this occurred at a time some years, before 9/11 and the U.S. anthrax attack.[24] The Tokyo attack with a chemical weapon was a unique event outside of a war zone and the world was not as prepared as it is now to respond to such an event. Even today, many states still do not have laws criminalizing the production of chemical weapons. Japan, for instance, did not have such a law before the terrorist incident in 1995.[25]

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Whilst there has been much investment in the area of response to such events in the light of the attack, more needs to be done at source, to reduce the risk of this happening again. It is the author’s belief that education and outreach is what is needed to discourage young scientists and engineers from joining an extreme cult or terrorist group and using their knowledge to potentially cause death and destruction. Typical non-proliferation programmes currently focus on the more established scientists or engineers. Smith suggested that it might be more advantageous to focus on young scientists before they have had time to become radicalised. In fact, her work determined the average age of a bio scientist joining a terrorist group was about 24 and most likely to be male.[26] It may be easier to stop someone becoming radicalised and joining a terrorist group, than trying to de radicalise someone who is already part of one. Informing young people at the beginning of their career about the possible misuse of their knowledge might prohibit them from taken the radical path. A concept of nuclear security has been in place for many years and a network of Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres exists to contribute to the global efforts to enhance nuclear security capacity.[27] Whilst the term “dual use” applied in the nuclear field has been in use for many years, the same cannot be said for chemistry and biology. It was not until much later did the consideration of dual use concerns in biotechnology and in chemistry appear on the agenda. The International Committee of the Red Cross has recognized the importance of education as part of the “web of prevention” to counter biological threats,[28] and

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whilst programmes exist such as the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) work on the Multiple Uses of Chemicals,[29] they should be part of every undergraduate curriculum and we should make those responsible for teaching these subjects more aware of the possibility of the radicalisation of the students they are teaching. The European Union within the framework of the European Union’s chemical biological radiological and nuclear centres of excellence has funded projects that deal directly with dual use concerns in biotechnology and chemistry.[30] Within the chemical fraternity, Prof Alistair Hay of Leeds University has championed the cause and along with others has used active learning methods to introduce the Multiple Uses of Chemicals, bringing it to a diverse audience. He has carried out workshops in Lebanon with mixed (male/female; Muslim/Christian) student audiences as well as working with teachers, college and university faculty members.[31]

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Discussing the subject of chemical weapons with students is not simple, but using active learning and audience participation, Prof Alistair Hay takes students through the route from the university chemical laboratory to an illegal drugs laboratory, discussing the synthesis of crystal meth from decongestants such as Sudafed, (pseudoephedrine to N- methylamphetamine). We have seen that it can be only one step from the illegal drugs laboratory to the chemical weapons laboratory as this was the route was followed by the chemist in the Aum Cult, Masami Tsuchiya who began his career working in a university chemical laboratory. Once he joined the cult, he moved on to producing hallucinogenic drugs such as LSD and crystal meth, then to using a purpose built multimillion dollar chemical production plant, where he produced the sarin that was used in both the Matsumoto and the Tokyo attacks. Whilst debates continue on the use of chemical weapons, no easy solution to their potential for proliferation has been identified.[32] We depend on the chemical industry in almost every aspect of our daily lives, from energy, to food production, to the manufacture of clothes and health products. The fact that chemicals can be misused does not mean that we should stop using them, but we should educate people into the possible misuse of certain materials. We have to recognise the importance of education and outreach, particularly at the undergraduate level. The Landau Network-Centro Volta has been involved for many years in the effort to establish networks to raise awareness of the dual-use concerns in biotechnology. In particular, in support of the European Biosecurity Awareness Raising Network and through the European Union’s chemical biological radiological and nuclear centres of excellence initiative, where a consortium of 18 universities and institutes, worldwide from 14 different countries have carried out a number of activities to raise awareness on dual-use concerns, particularly among students and young life scientists.[33] In some workshops the students were required to develop designs outlining the duality of biochemistry and to describe the Biological Weapons Convention graphically. This method helps with effective cultural communication, as the participants are from diverse countries and speak different languages.[33] Other outreach programmes exist, within the context of for example biosecurity outreach and dual use, and support and training material exists, but they are often tarThe Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2017. ProQuest

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geted towards the English speaking community and geared more for the researcher.[34] More needs to be done in the non-English speaking countries and in locations outside of Europe and the US where the universities may not have the knowledge or the resources available to teach such issues. We should use the internet more as a targeted information resource, supporting and encouraging local entities to carry out translations themselves of the outreach material, thus ensuring a higher level of sustainability and local interest. It is far easier, cheaper, and more deadly to plan and execute attacks using explosives or firearms than it is to attempt to procure or produce chemical or biological agents. This has been demonstrated by the biological and chemical weapons terrorist attacks conducted by Aum Shinrikyo. All were relative failures compared with bombing operations, such as the Madrid or London train attacks in 2004 and 2005. In the end, the real-world simplicity and effectiveness of simple bombs, armed assaults and the use of vehicles as weapons will prevail over the attraction of unconventional weapons. However, the potential for an extremist group to obtain chemical or biological WMDs is a real threat and by their very nature, their use could give rise to mass destruction. The Aum cult demonstrated that the simple production of chemical or biological agents is not sufficient and that the distribution method is also a key element to its effectiveness. Unfortunately, we have seen that while explosive devices were previously denoted remotely, we now have the human delivery system in the form of suicide bombers. It would certainly be a nightmare scenario if a suicide bomber were to carry out a mission utilising chemical or biological weapons, the detection of which would be very difficult.

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Conclusions In the years that they operated, the Aum Shinrikyo cult convinced many thousands of people to join them. They raised vast sums of money through a variety of both legal and illegal activities and invested much of it in a wide and impressive WMD programme. It would be appear that it is somewhat more difficult for a terrorist group to disperse chemical or biological agents in an actual attack than it would be to acquire the agents themselves. Although it has been claimed that the cult had the Japanese “Elite” as converts, there appears to have been a distinct lack of professionalism in their work, from the unpurified anthrax and botulinum material to the impure brown pungent smelling sarin. This cannot be due to the resources at hand, as they had ample financial resources and may be attributable to a lack of knowledge or experience, (insufficient tacit knowledge) or perhaps the stress of working with these materials under the pressure exerted by the Cult. The recruitment process targeted not only “foot soldiers” but also the well educated but disillusioned youth. The Aum Shinrikyo cult recruited approximately 300 scientists with degrees in medicine, chemistry, biology and genetics engineering tempting many by the promise of unlimited funds and the opportunity to conduct original research. It is not just the young, uneducated, unemployed that feel alienated and disillusioned with life to the point that they consider joining an extreme cult or terrorist or-

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ganisation. We have seen that the educated and, in many cases, fully employed can also feel a sense of alienation or disillusionment with society, to the point that they consider joining such a group. These people are potentially more dangerous, due to the knowledge they carry, but also, in principle, easier to dissuade from doing so, if we can read the signs of their dissatisfaction and make them aware, by education of the issues. As it is almost impossible to stop extremist groups from gaining access to the knowledge of how to produce weapons of mass destruction, we must make those working in scientific fields who have the tacit knowledge for the potential production and dissemination of weapons of mass destruction aware of there responsibilities. Just as the internet today contains the primary source of information that could be used against society, we should use the same tool to ensure that it contains also sufficient information to balance this threat. Furthermore, we should encourage that outreach material should be translated into local languages, by local people, to unsure full understanding and sustainability. The international community and, in particular, the educational community has a responsibly to educate and inform at all levels, from the laboratory technician to the university professor of the dual nature of their work and the consequences to society if they choose to misuse this knowledge.

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References [1] D.E. Kaplan and A. Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, Wired Magazine 4.07 (1996), Wired Digital, Inc. [2] Ibid. [3] N.D. Kristof and S. WuDunn, A Guru’s Journey – A special report.; The Seer Among the Blind: Japanese Sect Leader’s Rise, New York Times online, 26 March 1995. [4] K.B. Olson, Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat? Emerging Infectious Diseases 5(4) (1999): 413– 416. [5] H.W. Kushner, Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Sage Publications, USA, 2003. [6] J.C. Smith, Radicalization of Life Scientists to Terrorism, A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the degree requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Security Studies, Washington, DC, 2011. [7] M. Ranstorp and M. Normark, Understanding Terrorism Innovation and Learning: Al-Qaeda and Beyond, Routledge, New York, 2015. [8] D.E. Kaplan and A. Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, Wired Magazine 4.07 (1996). [9] A. Nehorayoff, et al., “Aum Shinrikyo’s Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Development Efforts.” Journal of Strategic Security 9(1) (2016): 35–48. [10] IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB), Incidents of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control 2016 Fact Sheet. [11] Federation of American Scientist.Org, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo, Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 31 October 1995. [12] H. Mason, The Nuclear Bomb Scenario, Bright Skies, Part 3, (1997). [13] R. Danzig et al., Aum Shinrikyo – Insights Into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chemical Weapons 2nd Ed., Center for a New American Security, Washington DC, 2012, 13. [14] Ibid. P18. [15] T. Ballard et al., Chronology of Aum Shinrikyo’s CBW Activities, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Middlebury Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA, 2005. [16] R. Danzig et al., Aum Shinrikyo – Insights Into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chemical Weapons 2nd Ed., Center for a New American Security, Washington DC, 2012, 27. [17] H. Takahashi et al., Bacillus anthracis Bioterrorism Incident, Kameido, Tokyo, 1993, Emerg Infect Dis. 10(1) (2004 Jan): 117–120. [18] R.M. Salerno and J.G. Koelm, Biological Laboratory and Transportation Security and the Biological Weapons Convention, Sandia National Laboratories, SAND No. 2002-1067P, 2002.

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[19] Egawa Shōko, A Guilty Verdict for the Last Aum Defendant: What We’ve Learned About Mind Control Over the Past 20 Years, Nippon.com, Japan, 22 July 2015. [20] R. Danzig et al., Aum Shinrikyo – Insights Into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chemical Weapons 2nd Ed., Center for a New American Security, Washington DC, 2012, 29. [21] R. Danzig et al., Aum Shinrikyo – Insights Into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chemical Weapons 2nd Ed., Center for a New American Security, Washington DC, 2012, 31. [22] N.A. Clinehens, Aum Shinrikyo and Weapons of Mass Destruction a Case Study, A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 2000. [23] Public Health Response to Biological and Chemical Weapons – WHO Guidance, WHO, 2004. [24] B. Sheppard, The Psychology of Strategic Terrorism: Public and Government Responses to Attack, Routledge, London and New York, 2009. [25] A. Iannotti, Game theory application to chemical maxi-emergency situation: the case study of chemical weapons transloading from Syria to Gioia Tauro, Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the IInd level International Master Course in Protection against CBRNE Events, University of Rome “Tor Vergata,” Department of Industrial Engineering and School of Medicine and Surgery, Academic Year 2015–2016. [26] J.C. Smith, Radicalization of Life Scientists to Terrorism, A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the degree requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Security Studies, Washington, DC, 2011. [27] NSSC Network, IAEA, http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/nssc-network.asp?s=9&l=76. [28] Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity: introduction, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2001-2004, https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5vdj7s.htm. [29] Multiple Uses of Chemicals, IUPAC and OPCW, 2013 http://multiple.kcvs.ca/site/index.html. [30] http://www.cbrn-coe.eu/Projects/TabId/130/PageID/2/PgrID/543/Default.aspx. [31] Education and engagement, Promoting a Culture of Responsible Chemistry, OPCW, Nov 2014, p. 27. [32] United Nations, Chemical Weapon Use Must Not Become ‘New Normal’, First Committee Speakers Warn, Issuing Calls for New Solutions to Combat Bioterrorism Threats, General Assembly First Committee Seventy-First Session, 14th meeting (am) GA/DIS/3556, 18 October 2016. [33] http://landaunetwork.org/index.php/cbrn-security-and-safety/ [34] Bridging Science and Security for Biological Research, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Association of American Universities, Federal Bureau of Investigation, AAAS, Washington DC, 2012.

The author(s) of this publication is/are solely responsible for its content. This publication does not reflect the opinion of the publisher. The publisher cannot be held liable for any loss or damage that may occur because of this publication. The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2017. ProQuest

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Subject Index nuclear proliferation nuclear weapon online open source intelligence outreach pedagogy propaganda radicalisation strategy synthetic biology territory terrorism thugs violent extremism weak-failed states weapons of mass destruction (WMD) WMD nonproliferation

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A.Q. Khan 51 al-Qa‘ida 59, 74 Aum Shinrikyo cult 94 biological weapon(s) 42, 94 biotechnology 6 biothreat 6 bioweapon and biosecurity 6 centrifuges 51 chemical weapon(s) 42, 94 digital caliphate 19 dual-use 94 education 94 elites 59 ethical guidelines 42 framing 64 genetic engineer 6 Islamic State 19, 30, 59, 64, 74 jihadism 74 narrative 64

The Risk of Skilled Scientist Radicalization and Emerging Biological Warfare Threats, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2017. ProQuest

51 94 19 30 94 42 19, 64 94 19 6 19 64 59 64 74 30, 94 1

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Author Index 1 6 19 30 42 51 59

Marone, F. Martellini, M. Muhi, S. Plebani, A. Rao, J. Soldatos, J. Thornton, M.I.

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al Sharaa, M. Baldo, V. Cantey, S. Dukić, S. Hay, A. Katz, J. Lahoud, N.

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64 v 1 74 v 82 94

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