The Rise and Fall of the Ancient Israelite States 9780313051890, 9780275980122

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The Rise and Fall of the Ancient Israelite States

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The Rise and Fall of the Ancient Israelite States MARTIN SICKER

PRAEGER PRAE

Westport, Connecticut London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sicker, Martin. The rise and fall of the ancient Israelite states / Martin Sicker. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-275-98012-X (alk. paper) 1. Jews—History—To 586 B.C. 2. Bible. O.T.—History of Biblical events. Kings and rulers. I. Title. DS121.55.S53 2003 933—dc21 2003045791 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2003 by Martin Sicker All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2003045791 ISBN: 0-275-98012-X First published in 2003 Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984). 10 987654321

3. J e w s -

Contents

Introduction

1

1

Israelite History in Theopolitical Perspective

7

2

The Geopolitical Setting

27

3

The Israelite Conquest

41

4

The Era of Tribal Confederacies

65

5

From Confederacy to National State

93

6

The Dual Monarchy: The Reign of David

125

7

The Dual Monarchy: The Reign of Solomon

149

8

The Rise and Fall of the Kingdom of Israel

179

9

Decline and Fall of the Kingdom of Judah

219

10 The Aftermath

247

Selected Bibliography

253

Index

259

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Introduction

This book is the product of many years of intellectual gestation. Over the past decades, I have given numerous lectures and courses, in different venues and to a variety of audiences, dealing with the history of ancient Israel. Each of these has been different in content and emphasis, at least to some extent, from the preceding one. The primary reason for this is that each such excursion into Israel's ancient history has raised new questions that caused me to put aside my lecture notes and to review the subject once again as though I were considering it for the first time, but approaching it more critically each iteration. Because of this, it is still with considerable trepidation that I undertake to set down in this work my current understanding of the early political history of ancient Israel. Although archaeology has yielded a good deal of information about the early social and economic history of Palestine and the surrounding region, our knowledge of the early political history of ancient Israel is almost exclusively dependent on the information or indications that may be gleaned from the biblical writings. Except for an occasional brief reference in some other ancient source, virtually nothing is known of the origins of the Israelites other than through the biblical account, particularly that contained in the Pentateuch. And that account tends to be dismissed by critical scholars as essentially mythological in character, a characterization that, as will be discussed further in the first chapter of this book, does not entirely invalidate the extractable nuggets of information contained therein. There is a fundamental on-going dispute between traditionalists and historical-critical scholars over the historicity, and therefore the utility, of

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the biblical accounts of the origin and course of Israel's history in early ancient times. For more than a century, critical scholarship has generally accepted the so-called "documentary hypothesis/' which purports to demonstrate that the biblical accounts, especially but by no means exclusively those found in the Pentateuch, are actually syntheses of a number of diverse literary streams (the exact number being itself a matter of continuing controversy) that were finally put in writing long after the events described. Furthermore, it is argued, much of that writing is apologetic in character, and apology, as someone once said, is history with a purpose and without a conscience. That is, elements of the biblical narrative are assumed to have been reconstructed to suit contemporary ideological needs and therefore may bear little relation to actual events. This assumption, of course, is difficult to refute because it probably holds true for a good deal of historical writing, both past and present, that is completely unrelated to the work of the biblical historiographers. There is more than a grain of truth in the witticism that history is a joke the living play on the dead. On the other hand, an increasing number of recent scholars have rejected many of the critical hypotheses that have dominated the field of biblical scholarship for the last hundred years and have increasingly leaned toward a more traditionalist view of the essential unity and integrity of the biblical texts. The problem has been compounded by the ruminations of some archaeologists whose conclusions regarding Israel's history far exceed the supporting evidence they purport to present. This is particularly the case with regard to Israel's early history in general and the historicity of the Exodus and the Israelite penetration and conquest of the land of Canaan in particular. It would seem that some of these archaeologists have concluded that the canons of scientific research as well as simple logic do not necessarily apply to their field. Accordingly, some biblical archaeologists appear to believe that they may legitimately infer conclusions from the absence of data, a rather dubious assumption. Their argument, in essence, is that since they have not uncovered any compelling information supporting the biblical saga of the Exodus it did not happen. Such contentious conclusions, which may make exciting reading for some, will be ignored entirely in this study. It is not my intention in this work to attempt to contribute to this debate or to adopt the standpoint of one school of thought or another. However, it is necessary to bear these diverse scholarly views in mind in drawing upon the biblical account, particularly where there appears to be a conflict with information derived from other presumably reliable sources. Nonetheless, one can hardly undertake to write a history of ancient Israel without treading upon someone's cherished convictions, and I fear that I shall be doing so as well. Since I cannot resolve the fundamental division of

Introduction

3

scholarly opinion on the historicity of the events described in the biblical narrative, I can only apply my own best judgment in making use of them. Despite all the problems with the source texts, the picture of the history of the ancient Israelite states that can be derived from them has always held a certain fascination for me as a student of politics. Nowhere else in world literature, to the best of my knowledge, can we find a basis for constructing a continuous and plausible narrative history of the origins of a nation, its early stages, and the progressive development of its political institutions until they culminate in a state, which proceeds to reach a pinnacle of success in terms of economic well-being, territorial enhancement, and geopolitical stature, and then enters what appears to be an irreversible process of decline until it is destroyed by external forces with which it is unable to cope successfully. The ancient Israelite states were confronted by virtually every political dilemma, domestic and international, encountered by states and governments throughout the subsequent history of the world, and the way they dealt with the issues, successfully or otherwise, is highly instructive and relevant to the complex issues faced by states and governments today. My principal concern in this book is to attempt to construct such a plausible political history of the ancient Israelite states, one that takes into consideration the geopolitical realities that directly conditioned much of that history, both internally and externally, as well as the religious dimensions of Israelite political culture that played a critical role in it. Although I do have some deeply held views regarding many of the issues that have preoccupied modern biblical scholars, I have tried very hard not to incorporate them into this work, which is not intended to be a critical study of the biblical texts, or even a contribution to the seemingly endless debate over them. Because so much of the information for this work is derived directly from the biblical texts, it is essential to explore, albeit briefly, the theopolitical perspective that pervades the work of the biblical historiographers. The first chapter of the book is devoted to a consideration of that perspective, without which the unique and politically significant role assigned to the prophets in Israel's political history would be largely incomprehensible, the critical question being whether the prophets actually played such a role or whether this was just the wishful thinking of later scribes. It is suggested in the first chapter that Israelite political culture did in fact assign an independent political role to such charismatic individuals, outside the framework of the organized state, and that they were able by force of their personalities and rhetoric to have an impact on policies and events. That this could be the case should cause no surprise. After all, one can easily invoke innumerable examples of present-day individuals not directly affiliated with any government organization who have exerted significant influence on government policies. Indeed, there is a small army

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of such individuals, known as lobbyists, at work in Washington, D.C. seeking to do exactly that on a daily basis, a not insignificant number of whom attempt to influence governmental decision-makers to further or desist from policies that affect particular religious interests or moral concerns. The chapter that follows presents a brief discussion of the regional geopolitical background and the prevailing political situation in the land west of the Jordan River, which came to be called Palestine by the Romans, at the time that the Israelites first began to give up their semi-nomadic existence for permanent settlement in the land they considered theirs, but which they first had to conquer. The story of the conquest that follows in chapter three deals with what must be, by any account, perhaps the most obscure period in Israel's long history. The biblical account of the conquest and settlement of the land appears incomplete and unsystematic, encouraging a wide range of speculation that seems to shed more smoke than light on the subject. In this chapter, I attempt to sort out the most likely of the possible scenarios that have been proposed, discussing them in light of what seems to make the most sense from a political perspective; that is, from the standpoint of what competent political leaders would likely have done under similar circumstances. A similar problem is addressed in chapter four, which examines the perhaps equally obscure period of the so-called Judges, which is presented in the biblical account as a series of not necessarily sequentially connected episodes involving a number of independent and presumably charismatic individuals who took on the role of political leader at critical moments in the history of the tribes of Israel over the course of some two centuries. In chapter five, we turn to a consideration of the events that led the nation of Israel from its longstanding organization as a tribal confederacy to the first steps towards the establishment of a tribal federation with a relatively strong central government, and the ultimate transformation of that federation into a rudimentary centralized state under a constitutional monarchy. It also considers the resulting bifurcation of political and religious authority and power and the political consequences of that development, including the emergence of the virtually perennial conflict between kings and prophets, an early form of the conflict between church and state that plagued ancient Israel throughout its history. This is followed by two chapters that deal with the transition from a kingdom of the tribes of Israel, in which the constituency consists of ethnic Israelites and those tribes and clans long affiliated with them, all adherents of the Mosaic faith, to a territorial state in which many non-Israelite cities, town, and peoples were reluctantly incorporated, creating the unanticipated problem of dealing with substantial minorities practicing alien religions. The territorial state that was created differed dramatically in a number of important ways from the previous unified tribal monarchy, most notably in that it emerged as two separate kingdoms organized along tribal lines,

Introduction

5

united only in the person of the king who was monarch of both. This period of the dual monarchy, which lasted approximately eighty years, represents the zenith of Israel's political existence after which the seeds of dissolution brought it quickly to an end, splitting the state into the two separate and independent kingdoms of Israel and Judah. The next two chapters discuss the decline and fall of the two Israelite states, two and three and a half centuries later respectively, in the context of the renewed struggle of the major Near Eastern powers of the period, Egypt and Assyria and later Egypt and Babylonia, for domination of the region generally, and of the economically important trade routes that traversed the land-bridge states in particular. I then conclude with a brief consideration of the aftermath of the destruction of what is sometimes referred to as the First Hebrew Commonwealth, a phrase that clearly recognizes that the story has not really come to a definitive end. The fall of the ancient Israelite states did not result in the dissolution of the Israelite nation, which quickly began to recover from the disaster and within a half century after the destruction of Jerusalem initiated the process of reconstitution that resulted in the emergence of the Second Hebrew Commonwealth, which survived in one form or another for more than half a millennium. In preparing this book, I have drawn many insights from a variety of sources, as reflected in the notes and bibliography, and have cited a number of these authors when their words resonated with my own thoughts on the subject, sometimes preferring to quote them directly rather than appear to be merely paraphrasing their ideas. However, my citing any particular writer should not be construed as indicating agreement with the views such authors may entertain beyond the narrowest context of the quote. In fact, I strongly disagree with the arguments presented by some of the historians and biblical scholars I have elected to cite in this work. One of the more frustrating information gaps that one must deal with in constructing a narrative history of the ancient Israelite states is precisely when the events described took place. This is especially problematic with regard to the discussion of the periods of the initial Israelite conquest and settlement of the land of Canaan and the events that occurred during the period of the Judges, which may have lasted for some two hundred years. Moreover, the exact chronology of the reigns of the Israelite kings and many other significant dates in the history of the Near East are uncertain and remain an ongoing controversy among scholars, with a number of schemes being used by various authors. In this book, I have chosen, admittedly somewhat arbitrarily, to employ the widely adopted chronology developed by William F. Albright.1 As indicated at the outset, I undertook to write this book about ancient Israel because I felt that the enormous volume of existing work on the subject, for one reason or another, did not do it justice, at least from the

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standpoint of this lifelong student of politics. It is my hope that this work will offer its readers a perspective on the history of the ancient Israelite states that will help them to find a way through the literary fog that has long enveloped the subject, which, I would suggest, is of more than merely antiquarian interest; it is also a story of continuing relevance to a realistic understanding and appreciation of contemporary political history and the problems faced by nations, states, and governments in the twenty-first century. NOTE 1. William F. Albright, From the Stone Age to Christianity (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1957), pp. 404-9.

CHAPTER 1

Israelite History in Theopolitical Perspective

Because the primary source for the history of ancient Israel is the biblical writings, it is important for anyone attempting to construct a political history based on them to indicate his or her appreciation of the mindset with which the biblical historiographers approached their tasks. Moreover, it will prove helpful to the nonspecialist reader to gain some insight into the theopolitical perspective in accordance with which these writers recorded and related the events that unfolded during their lifetimes, as well as their reading of the historical materials, both oral and written, to which they had access. The writing of history, we have been taught, began with Herodotus, for whom it "was first and foremost a bulwark against the inexorable erosion of memory engendered by the passage of time." In addition to chronicling the past, Greek historiography reflected an intense curiosity about world and exhibited a desire to draw moral and political insights from the past. "Beyond that, history had no truths to offer, and thus it had no place in Greek religion or philosophy. If Herodotus was the father of history, the fathers of meaning in history were the Jews. It was ancient Israel that first assigned a decisive significance to history and thus forged a new world-view." In this radically different perception of the position of humanity, "the crucial encounter between humans and the divine shifted away from the realm of nature and the cosmos to the plane of history, conceived now in terms of divine challenge and human response." 1 For the biblical historiographers, it was how the latter challenge and response were played out on the stage of history that concerned them, and their description of that drama inevitably produced a very different sort of historical writing than the typically self-glorifying chronicles of

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other ancient peoples. Events, for t h e m , w e r e considerably less interesting t h a n the motivations b e h i n d a n d the consequences that flowed from their responses to the divine challenges w i t h w h i c h they w e r e presented. Accordingly, even a cursory glance at the historical portions of the H e b r e w Scriptures will reveal that they w e r e not written as narrative history in the familiar form that w e k n o w it. A l t h o u g h the biblical narratives p u r p o r t to tell the story of the origins a n d s u b s e q u e n t events that befell the p e o p l e of Israel, at least u p to the destruction of the Temple of Jerusalem a n d its aftermath, that h a r d l y seems to be their p r i m a r y p u r p o s e . The fact is that the biblical writer was not interested simply in preserving for posterity a record of the past, nor with an objective, dispassionate, comprehensive, and integrated delineation of human affairs. He was in fact not detached from but completely involved in the events he described. He had little use for the pursuit of objectivity because he was committed to a particular point of view. He had no claim to comprehensiveness, but was thoroughly and consciously selective. He was dedicated to the proposition of using historic events to demonstrate, objectify, and transmit truths to which he was passionately committed. 2 As a result, the historical narratives p r e s e n t e d in the biblical writings are too sketchy to p e r m i t the reconstruction of the early political history of Israel in a m a n n e r that w o u l d p e r m i t its r e a d y correlation w i t h other historical sources, literary or archaeological. Moreover, it w o u l d a p p e a r that the biblical account of Israel's origins a n d its emergence as a nation on the stage of history is i n t e n d e d to present not so m u c h its actual social a n d political history, w h i c h w a s probably as u n k n o w n to the biblical writers as it is to us today, b u t its foundation m y t h , w h i c h p u r p o r t s to explain Israel's existence in m y t h o p o e i c terms. I hasten to a d d that I d o not u s e the t e r m " m y t h " in the e v e r y d a y sense of a fable or i m a g i n a r y story, a p r o d u c t of p u r e fantasy. M a n y m y t h s , particularly political foundation m y t h s , deal w i t h real historical events a n d people. As one s t u d e n t of the subject observed: We may disagree with the account they give of these people and events, but they are not fiction. For the most part, the myth-maker does not invent his facts; he interprets facts that are already given in the culture to which he belongs. What marks his account as being a myth is, not its content, but its dramatic form and the fact that it serves as a practical argument. Its success as a practical argument depends on its being accepted as true, and it is generally accepted as true if it explains the experience of those to whom it is addressed and justifies the practical purposes they have in mind. . . . It renders their experience more coherent; it helps them understand the world in which they live. And it does so by enabling them to see their present condition as an episode in an ongoing drama . . . It offers, in short, an account of the past and future in the light of which the present can be understood. And as we would expect, this account is, not only an explanation, but also a practical argument. 3

Israelite History in Theopolitical Perspective

9

The biblical writers and editors of the accounts of ancient Israel clearly made use of existing historical records that were available to them, but only to the extent that the documentation provided was germane to their literary purpose. In other words, such historical records were employed in biblical historiography exclusively to illustrate the dynamic process at work in the divine-human encounter in history. Whatever did not serve this purpose was ignored. However, for the benefit of those readers who were particularly interested in the detailed events of an era rather than their sweeping religious and moral implications, the biblical writers simply referred them directly to the literary sources from which they drew, evidently confident that their own purposive recapitulation of the meaning of those events reflected what was truly significant about them. Thus, for one of a number of similar examples, after concluding his discussion of the reign of Jeroboam, the biblical writer advises the reader, "And the rest of the acts of Jereboam, how he warred, and how he reigned, behold, they are written in the book of the chronicles of the kings of Israel" (1 Kings 14:19). That is, there were standard detailed histories that were written, presumably to glorify the reigns of the various kings, something that was of little interest to the biblical historiographers. Unfortunately, the "book of the chronicles" referred to in this passage, not to be confused with the biblical Book of Chronicles, is no longer extant but was presumably available to the ancient researcher just as rare archives are available to his modern counterpart. The work of the biblical historiographers reflects a keen awareness of the uniqueness of Israel's political experience, which they attributed to the divine role in history. In a remarkable capsulization of the early history of Israel in only a few sentences, one biblical historiographer makes clear the divine role in history and its manifestation in the destiny of the people of Israel: A wandering Aramaean was my father, and he went down into Egypt, and sojourned there, few in number; and he became there a nation, great, mighty, and populous. And the Egyptians dealt ill with us, and afflicted us, and laid upon us hard bondage. And we cried unto the Lord, the God of our fathers, and the Lord heard our voice, and saw our affliction, and our toil, and our oppression. And the Lord brought us forth out of Egypt with a mighty hand, and with an outstretched arm, and with great terribleness, and with signs, and with wonders. And He has brought us into this place, and has given us this land, a land flowing with milk and honey. (Deut. 26:5-9) In this passage, the biblical writer makes the counterintuitive assertion that Israel's national origins derive from a dramatic reversal of the usual course of historical development, where the bonds between people living in a given territory naturally evolve into one of nationhood. Israel, he

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claims, first came into being as a nation in alien territory. Only after it was constituted as a nation was it led to settle in the land that was to serve as its national patrimony and in which it was to develop what may have become the first true nation-state known to humanity. This divinely managed and unique historical process is described as having taken place under the inspiration and direction of a prophet-leader, Moses. The subsequent biblical recounting of Israel's history details the relationship between Israel and God and the consequences of its achievements and failures in response to the responsibilities imposed on it by its divine benefactor. As the biblical history of Israel unfolds, it quickly becomes evident that, beginning with Moses, prophets and prophecy play a unique and inestimable role in its society. Moses, as the national traditions recorded in the Pentateuch make abundantly clear, consistently insisted that the salvation of the Israelites from oppression in Egypt had taken place in order that they might constitute a unique nation committed to the service of the God recognized by the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, which Scripture characterizes as the one and only true deity. This idea of divine exclusivity, reflected in the biblical concept of monotheism, was embodied in the covenant between God and the children of Israel that was concluded in the wilderness of Sinai prior to Israel's entry into the land of Canaan. The covenant clearly set forth the idea of divine kingship of the universe, an idea the true implications of which were probably not immediately self-evident even to those who willingly entered into the covenant. In the concept of kingship it reflected, God alone possesses the attribute of sovereignty; He alone is the ultimate source and repository of political and moral authority and as such can tolerate no competing claims to such authority from other gods or humans. Over time, this unique theopolitical concept developed into a deeply-rooted antagonism to any human claims of or pretensions to sovereignty, pitting upholders of the Mosaic concept against the latter throughout the course of Israel's history. It has been suggested by some scholars that this theopolitical concept should be assessed as the religious version of one of the most common treaty stipulations found in ancient Near Eastern documents, which forbids the vassal any allegiance apart from that which he owed to his suzerain. Seen from this perspective, the commonly accepted argument that monotheism is a late development in Israel's religious history would appear to be on very shaky ground. "It should be kept in mind that monotheism was not born as a speculative belief or as an abstract philosophical system, but as the theological-political response to human tyranny, aiming at the creation of a unique interhuman framework, where every sphere of Israel's life was to be shaped by the exclusive will of the Divine King." 4 To be obedient to the latter meant a complete rejection of the culture and mores, and especially the religious practices, of the peoples the children

Israelite History in Theopolitical Perspective

11

of Israel were to encounter in the process of fulfilling their national destiny in the land promised to their ancestors, the land of Canaan. When thou art come into the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee, thou shalt not learn to do after the abominations of those nations. There shall not be found among you any one that maketh his son or his daughter to pass through the fire, one that useth divination, a soothsayer, or an enchanter, or a sorcerer, or a charmer, or one that consulteth a ghost or a familiar spirit, or a necromancer. For whosoever doeth these things is an abomination to the Lord; and because of these abominations the Lord thy God is driving them out from before thee. Thou shalt be wholehearted with the Lord thy God. For these nations, that thou art to dispossess, hearken unto soothsayers, and unto diviners; but as for thee, the Lord thy God hath not suffered thee so to do. (Deut. 18:9-14) Moses' primary concern was to instill a new ethos in the people he was leading to constitute a unique nation, and the best way to do this in face of the competing faiths of the peoples they would encounter as they settled the land assigned to them was through retention of the existing familial and clan structure of the children of Israel for as long as possible. This concern becomes evident, albeit implicitly, when the biblical writer reports the words of Moses, acting in his capacity as interlocutor between God and the people of Israel. As Moses concludes a covenant between the two parties just prior to his demise, he is careful to assert that, "Neither with you only do I make this covenant and this oath; but . . . also with him that is not here with us this day" (Deut. 29:13-14). That is, all of Israel, whether present at the moment or not, are encompassed by the pact. But, one may ask, how can Moses unilaterally enter into a covenant with and impose obligations on persons who are not explicit parties to the agreement? How can the covenant encompass and obligate all future generations of the children of Israel? What is the theory of politics, presumably accepted and advocated by Moses, which would permit him to conclude such a covenant and would accord ongoing legitimacy to the imposition of such open-ended obligations on the unborn? I would suggest that the underlying Mosaic political theory is that of patriarchalism, although not in the special sense in which the term is used to describe seventeenth-century attempts to justify the idea of the divine right of kings. The biblical notion of patriarchalism is predicated on a presumed natural reciprocity that exists between parents and children, leading to the principle that one is generally obligated to fulfill the demands imposed by one's parents or their surrogates. That is, just as one receives life and nurture from one's parents, one thereby also incurs certain reciprocal obligations, one of which is to fulfill the agreements to which one's parents and their ancestors subscribed. This approach is reflected in the seemingly peculiar rationale that is provided by the biblical

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text for the fifth commandment, which reads: "Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee" (Ex. 20:12). Although the idea of honoring one's parents can hardly be gainsaid as a common-sense expectation, the biblical rationale for the commandment is not filial but political. Honoring one's parents is considered a prerequisite to perseverance on the land, to sustaining a viable society in the face of external pressures. Based on this rationale, the commandment should be understood as though it stated, "Honor the obligations undertaken by your father and mother." In this way the covenant between God and the children of Israel will be perpetuated. Similarly, the law that "whatsoever man there be that curseth his father or his mother shall surely be put to death" (Lev. 20:9) seems to address the same issue. How else explain the severity of the punishment? Surely Moses is not suggesting that such a curse is so harmful that its very utterance is to be considered equivalent to a capital crime, which would be the same as asserting that the person guilty of issuing such a curse has the capability of invoking divine powers to bring it to fruition. However, if it is understood to mean that by cursing one's parents one effectively repudiates the covenantal obligations that are being transferred to the succeeding generation, the severity of the penalty becomes comprehensible in light of the political consequences of the act, which equates to sedition. From the patriarchalist perspective, one can legitimately obligate future generations to a covenant to which the unborn have not assented, and it is this theory of political obligation that provides the substructure for the entire political edifice of Mosaic legislation. In other words, in the Mosaic worldview, it is the family rather than the individual that constitutes the basic building block of society and civilization. The covenant between Moses and the elders is not binding on future generations in and of itself. It must be effectively renewed in each generation through the immediate patriarchal relationship between parent and child, which represents a continuous link throughout the generations back to the original covenant between Moses and the tribal patriarchs of Israel. The concern about assuring continuity of the covenantal obligation is clearly reflected in Moses's insistence upon the retention of a tribal structure within Israel's politically organized society. It would seem reasonable to assume that, once the tribes of Israel abandoned their nomadic life, the nation would be reconstituted along lines more compatible with an essentially sedentary mode of existence. Moreover, Moses's own political experience as a scion of the royal house of Egypt assuredly gave him a good sense of how best to organize a well-ordered state. According to the biblical writer, Moses implicitly acknowledged that at some time in the future it would probably be necessary for the Israelites to establish a centralized state in the land they planned to conquer and occupy. He nonetheless prescribed that, at least initially, both political authority and

Israelite History in Theopolitical Perspective

13

territory were to be distributed along essentially decentralized tribal lines. The fact that maintaining the tribal structure in an increasingly urban environment would ultimately prove impracticable and communally divisive seems to have been a secondary consideration at best. The great challenge was to use the intervening period to strengthen the covenant as the motivating force behind the Israelite social and political order to the extent that it became recognized as indispensable to Israel's national existence. The biblical text tells us that Jethro, Moses's non-Israelite father in-law and counselor, evidently appalled by the drain on Moses's energies resulting from his dealing directly with the claims and concerns of a plethora of tribal elders and leaders, advised him to adopt a centralized management based on an overall organizational restructuring of the masses of individuals, families, clans, and tribes over which he exercised leadership. This clearly included large numbers of non-Israelites, the "mixed multitude" (Ex. 12:38) that accompanied the Israelites when they left Egypt or that adhered to them during their sojourn in the wildernesses of Sinai and the Negev. In effect, Jethro was urging that the entire population be treated as a single homogeneous constituency, effectively eliminating the tribal structure of Israelite society, which was to be reorganized on a hierarchical basis, with only a handful of officials at the top of the organizational pyramid reporting directly to Moses. "Moreover, thou shalt provide out of all the people able men . . . and place such over them, to be rulers of thousands, rulers of hundreds, rulers of fifties, and rulers of tens" (Ex. 18:21). The biblical writer then assures us that Moses acknowledged the wisdom of Jethro's recommendation, and "did all that he had said" (Ex. 18:24). One wonders, however, if there is not something more to this episode than meets the eye. After all, Moses was raised in the palace of a powerful king, who had a massive civil and military bureaucracy at his disposal, and it seems odd to suggest that he required the advice of a desert chieftain on how to reallocate the leadership and management burden to make it more bearable for him. Upon further examination of the biblical texts, it soon becomes clear that Moses adopted Jethro's recommendation only within a much narrower context than originally proposed. Moses did not choose able men out of all the people, but only "out of all Israel" (Ex. 18:25). In other words, Moses was well aware of how to go about setting up an efficient governmental organization and needed no coaching in that regard. The problem he was grappling with was how to deal simultaneously and equitably with the multiple tribal constituencies that made up the nation of Israel, given that he had no desire to upset the basic tribal structure of the nation, which he considered essential to assuring covenantal continuity. Nonetheless, his conversation with Jethro did result in Moses coming up with a compromise solution to his organizational dilemma.

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We know from what takes place later in the biblical narrative that Moses adapted and applied the proposed hierarchical structure to the tribes of Israel, but not to all the people as a collective non-tribal constituency, thus retaining the tribal structure of Israel intact. "So I took the heads of your tribes . . . and made them heads over you, captains of thousands, and captains of hundreds, and captains of fifty, and captains of ten, and officers, tribe by tribe" (Deut. 1:15). Moses evidently rejected his father-in-law's broader political advice, presumably because it would have undermined the cohesiveness provided by the tribal structure, and with it the patriarchal principle that he was committed to retaining. His mission was to preserve the children of Israel so that they could serve God's purpose, and not to create an artificial nation out of a mixed population united only by a common disaffection for Egyptian rule. It is quite possible if not probable that it was Moses's refusal to adopt Jethro's recommendation as he framed it, which would effectively have provided equal opportunity for non-Israelites to achieve significant status within the national hierarchy, that caused the ultimate split between the two (Ex. 18:27). As will be seen later in this book, Israel's tribal constituencies continued to play a significant role in its complex political history, at least through the reign of Solomon and possibly longer, even though non-Israelites also began to play a progressively larger role in the state. Although Moses surely was concerned about the treatment of the nonIsraelites that had become associated with the nation, as his admonitions and injunctions regarding treatment of strangers make abundantly clear, his overriding immediate political objective was to retain the Israelite family as the basic social unit of the nation for as long as it was possible, and this could be done most effectively through retention of a tribal structure. The obvious reason for this is that the tribe is essentially an extension of family and clan, in which the sense of personal obligation to the collectivity is much stronger than in societies organized on the basis of unassociated individuals. The ties of blood that bind the individual to the larger familial unit and ultimately to the tribe represent personal linkages that facilitate the cross-generational transfer of commitments and responsibilities. In preparing the essentially patriarchal and politically unsophisticated tribal society of Israel for its future challenges, and perhaps reflecting his personal experience with the court magicians and diviners of Egypt, Moses indicated his well-founded concern about the common practice of political leaders to surround themselves with a variety of sycophantic advisers whose sole real function is tell them what they wish to hear. Moses thus took steps to prevent practitioners of the occult from assuming any positions of public prominence in the society of Israel. Israel was to be governed by reason guided by the requirements of the higher law set forth in the elaboration of the covenant, the Torah. The needs that would

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arise for extraordinary insight into the course of events and the policies that must be adopted to meet both the immanent and the transcendent goals of the nation were no longer to be supplied by a variety of spiritualists and charlatans. As an indispensable element paralleling the governmental structure he set forth for the nation as an organized political society, Moses introduced a new and unique institutional element into the framework of Israel's society, that of the prophet. Prophets were to be acknowledged within the nation as independent spokesmen for God, whose function was to inspire public conformity with the divine will through constant reaffirmation of the goals and requirements of the Mosaic legacy to the leaders of the people and to the public at large. A prophet will the Lord thy God raise up unto thee, from the midst of thee, of thy brethren, like unto me; unto him shall ye hearken; according to all that thou didst desire of the Lord thy God in Horeb in the day of the assembly, saying: "Let me not hear again the voice of the Lord my God, neither let me see this great fire any more, that I die not." And the Lord said unto me: 'They have well said that which they have spoken. I will raise them up a prophet from among their brethren, like unto thee; and I will put My words in his mouth, and he shall speak unto them all that I shall command him/' (Deut. 18:15-18) The prophet thus becomes a necessary intermediary between God and humans because of the inability of the people to cope directly with the divine-human interaction. His vocation is distinguished from all others in the society not only by his unique role but also by his method of appointment. Whereas other acknowledged authority figures, who function within the framework of government, are to be appointed by the people according to a set of biblically stipulated criteria, the prophet alone is divinely chosen and appointed and is therefore responsible only to God. The independent institution of prophecy was thus founded on the basic premise that God makes his will known to chosen individuals in successive generations, which gave them an unprecedented degree of extra-governmental authority and influence. Individuals who were acknowledged as prophets therefore had a special status within ancient Israelite society, which generally accorded them a degree of freedom of expression and a concomitant expectation of personal immunity from retaliation (not always respected by the kings) that was unavailable to other members of the community, especially with regard to the critique of governmental policies and practices. It is well known that many ancient societies had religious figures who are generally described as prophets, individuals who are perceived as possessing an element of divine grace, as possessing charisma. The basic distinguishing characteristic of the true Hebrew prophet, however, is his unwavering self-awareness of having been sent by God to carry His message. The true prophets are, in this regard, spontaneous and highly artic-

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ulate messengers of the divine, a type rarely if ever encountered in the ancient cultures of the Middle East, including that of ancient Greece, from which the term "prophet" derives. Ancient Greek writing distinguished between the manteis and the prophetai.5 Manteis are diviners, raving adepts enraptured by a god and transmitting what they have received from the god in undecipherable sounds. Because the product of mantic divination is not a clear, polished, or even comprehensible utterance, the manteis require the assistance of the prophetai, "proclaimers," who are capable of interpreting the mysterious sounds emitted by the former and of translating them into comprehensible human speech. The prophet, accordingly, is one who proclaims the divine message received by another who is incapable of articulating it. Although we translate the Hebrew term navi as "prophet," the meaning of the term, especially in the Hebraic thought of the monarchic period, is more often than not quite different from its indicated meaning in Greek thought when used with regard to those individuals identified in Scripture as prophets. In Hebraic thought, as suggested, the navi is in essence an intermediary in the relationship between God and humanity; he is a proclaimer of the divine word and not merely an interpreter of the divine word received by an intermediary. Moreover, the Bible also indicates that there are different degrees of divine revelation, with only Moses deemed sufficiently competent to receive the highest level of such communication. And He said: "Hear now My words: if there be a prophet among you, I the Lord do make Myself known unto him in a vision, I do speak with him in a dream. My servant Moses is not so; he is trusted in all My house; with him do I speak mouth to mouth, even manifestly, and not in dark speeches" (Num. 12:6-8). To sum up. Divination nowhere developed into prophecy, no more than polytheism developed into monotheism, or, to give a more recent analogue, no more than the guild system developed into trade unions. Divination was a common ancient Near Eastern phenomenon; prophecy is a uniquely Israelite phenomenon.6 Nonetheless, the precise meaning attributed to the Hebrew term navi or prophet appears to have undergone some changes over the course of the early biblical period. Originally, the title navi is first applied by the biblical author to Abraham, because of his role as intercessor for humans before the divine. "But you [Abimelekh] must restore the man's wife [Sarah]— since he [Abraham] is a prophet, he will intercede for you to save your life" (Gen. 20:7). And, in at least one passage, the term navi was also used in a sense comparable to the Greek prophet who translated the mantic murmurings of the ecstatic diviner. Thus, when Moses attempts to get out of the mission assigned to him on the basis of his speech difficulty, whether the result of a physical impairment or the likelihood that he spoke

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Hebrew with a heavy Egyptian accent, he is told that Aaron will serve as his mouthpiece, articulating clearly his unclear speech. "And the Lord said unto Moses: See, I have set thee in God's stead to Pharaoh; and Aaron thy brother shall be thy prophet" (Ex. 7:1). Note, however, that in this case Aaron is to be considered a navi by analogy only. Similarly, in later times a prophet was viewed on occasion as a divine "spokesman" or "proclaimer," one who essentially transmitted to others a message he did not originate; that is, his prophetic orations are direct quotations rather than his own formulation of the essence of the divine message. Thus Ezekiel reports about his election to prophecy: "Moreover He said unto me: 'Son of man, all My words that I shall speak unto thee receive in thy heart, and hear with thine ears. And go, get thee to them of the captivity, unto the children of thy people, and speak to them, and tell them: thus saith the Lord God; whether they will hear, or whether they will forbear" (Ezek. 8:10-11). Early Israelite prophecy was also associated with ecstatic outburst but nonetheless bore no relation to the enigmatic utterances of the Greek manteis. The Israelite ecstatic prophet did not require a translator but was able to deliver inspired messages in a clearly articulated voice. The prevalence of ecstatic prophecy in ancient Israel is reflected in the biblical story about the prophetic process by which Saul, newly anointed king by the prophet Samuel, was to determine his initial course of action. "And it shall come to pass, when thou art come thither to the city, that thou shalt meet a band of prophets coming down from a high place with a psaltery, and a timbrel, and a pipe, and a harp, before them; and they will be prophesying. And the spirit of the Lord will come mightily upon thee, and thou shalt prophesy with them, and shalt be turned into another man. And let it be, when these signs are come unto thee, that thou do as thy hand shall find; for God is with thee" (1 Sam. 10:5-7). That is, Saul would become entranced by the music and, in the resulting ecstatic state, he would receive signs suggesting the appropriate course of action that reason alone would not reveal to him. Similarly, in one of the later stories about Saul's attempts to capture David, we are told of an incident that exemplifies the emanative if not contagious effects of ecstatic prophecy on those who came in contact with it. And Saul sent messengers to take David; and when they saw the company of the prophets prophesying, and Samuel standing over them, the spirit of God came upon the messengers of Saul, and they also prophesied. And when it was told Saul, he sent other messengers, and they also prophesied. And Saul sent messengers again the third time, and they also prophesied . . . And he [Saul] went thither to Naioth in Ramah; and the spirit of God came upon him also, and he went on, and prophesied . . . And he also stripped off his clothes, and he also prophesied

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before Samuel, and lay down naked all that day and all that night. Wherefore they say: "Is Saul also among the prophets?" (1 Sam. 19:18-24) That the prophetic spirit could be evoked in adepts through music is also clearly reflected in the story of the prophet Elisha, when he is asked by the king to prophesy regarding the outcome of a pending action. After agreeing to do so, the prophet first asks for a minstrel. "And it came to pass, when the minstrel played, that the hand of the Lord came upon him" (2 Kings 3:15). The idea of prophecy was so potent and the demand for it so great that it soon became a profession practiced by some well-meaning individuals, but more often by charlatans and sycophants who simply told people what they hoped to hear. Professional prophets were paid for their services in predicting the future, something for which they prepared themselves by self-inducing a state of trance or, alternatively, a state of ecstasy, or pretending to do so. Moreover, it appears that the professional prophets were organized in guilds and for the most part left no literary legacy. Professional prophets also appear in the courts of the kings, where they serve as a chorus of ostensibly prophetic voices giving religious sanction to virtually whatever the king proposed to do. Thus, when the prophet Elisha was asked for a second opinion by Jehoram, the king of Israel, in order to convince Jehoshaphat, king of Judah, of the wisdom of a joint military campaign against Moab, discussed in a later chapter of this book, "Elisha said unto the king of Israel: 'What have I to do with thee? Get thee to the prophets of thy father, and to the prophets of thy mother" (2 Kings 3:13). That is, since the king was unfaithful to his religious heritage and the prophet was a servant of the true God, Elisha dismissed his request and referred him to the "court prophets" of his parents, who would tell him what he wanted to hear. Nonetheless, out of respect for the king of Judah who was faithful to Mosaic teaching, Elisha consented to prophesy. "And Elisha said: As the Lord of hosts liveth, before whom I stand, surely, were it not that I regard the presence of Jehoshaphat the king of Judah, I would not look toward thee, nor see thee. But now bring me a minstrel" (2 Kings 3:14-15). As indicated earlier, Elisha put himself into an ecstatic state and prophesied what the king of Israel did not want to hear. An important transition in the concept of prophecy took place after Samuel, who is also identified as a ro'eh or "seer," one who can foretell the future. The biblical writer thus notes parenthetically, "Beforetime in Israel, when a man went to inquire of God, thus he said: 'Come and let us go to the seer'; for he that is now called a prophet was beforetime called a seer" (I Sam. 9:9). A seer is thus one who sees or knows what is hidden from the eyes of ordinary people. Starting with Samuel, the prophet also assumed a new role, that of advocate for justice, truth, and righteousness.

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After the eighth century, the words and teachings of the so-called "literary" or "classical" prophets are recorded in the biblical books bearing their names. These prophets did not undertake their vocations out of conscious and deliberate choice; they were chosen, sometimes against their will. Moreover, they were not professionals who were paid for their prophetic services. Thus, when the prophet Amos predicted calamity and was told to go elsewhere to prophesy for "his bread," he retorted: "I am not a prophet, nor the son of a prophet" (Amos 7:14). That is, he asserted that he was not a professional prophet and had nothing to gain personally from his predictions. The professional prophet was employed by humans to get what they wanted from heaven. By contrast, the "amateur" prophet was employed by God to tell people what He wanted from them. The true prophet thus became a teacher of religion and morality. Since prophecy, by definition, is not dependent on any external human agency, and the prophet's strictures are supposed to be taken as authoritative, the problem of authenticity arises. How is one to know that what the prophet says is indeed the word of God, if that word is not independently verifiable? Authenticating the true prophet is a problem that Moses was acutely aware of and attempted to deal with as best he could, setting forth the following general criterion for ascertaining the validity of a prophecy. "When a prophet speaketh in the name of the Lord, if the thing follow not, nor come to pass, that is the thing which the Lord hath not spoken; the prophet hath spoken it presumptuously, thou shalt not be afraid of him" (Deut. 18:21-22). In other words, the validity of a prophecy can be verified only by an empirical test, which may not always be practicable. Accordingly, if a particular prophecy is to be fulfilled over a relatively protracted period, the true prophet has no viable course of action other than to bear the burden of public doubt if a false prophet should prophesy to the contrary. Indeed, in some instances, prophets ended their days without having received vindication of the truth of their prophecies. Addressing the issue of prophetic authentication, Maimonides, the medieval philosopher and codifier of Rabbinic Law, drew a distinction between prophecies concerning positive or negative developments. If one prophesies a disaster and none occurs, that does not necessarily disqualify him as a prophet, because God is forgiving. However, if one prophesies that something good will happen and it does not, he is to be considered a false prophet, "for all good is an edict of God and, even if there is a stipulation, He does not go back on that." 7 But, how does one know if he is dealing with a true or false prophet in the short term? According to the sages of the Talmud, there appear to be overt signs that are based on the behavior of the true prophets as recorded in Scripture. A true prophet exhibits religious and moral integrity in his behavior; he remonstrates with those who would transgress and overturn the Mosaic teachings contained in the Torah. And, in their view, it is the purpose of the historical

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and prophetic books of Scripture to demonstrate the consequences of the failures to heed the warnings of the prophets. The sages thus asserted, "If Israel had not sinned, they would have received only the Five Books of the Torah and the Book of Joshua." 8 That is, the books of the Early Prophets, which include the historical books of Joshua, Judges, Samuel and Kings, and books of the Writings (Hagiographa), which includes the books of Chronicles, would have never been written because they would have served no didactic purpose. Another sign of authenticity is that the true prophet does not seek to be in conformity with the spirit of the times nor do his pronouncements smack of expediency He functions solely in accordance with the dictates of his conscience and, if necessary, will challenge anyone and everyone. His concern and efforts to educate the public and to elevate its moral standing for its own general benefit are clear evidence this. Moreover, in his efforts to inform the public, he is prepared to undertake hardships that symbolize his divinely imposed mission; he is ready to endure pain and humiliation, to which only a true prophet would willingly subject himself. Scripture provides numerous examples of the readiness of the true prophet to undergo harsh trials as part of his mission. Isaiah is told by God to go barefoot and without an upper garment (Isa. 20:2). Jeremiah is told to wear a wooden yoke around his neck (Jer. 27:2). Ezekiel is told to wear fetters (Ezek. 3:25). He is also directed to eat only bread of a mixture of grains that will symbolize the prevailing scarcity of food, to drink only a minimum of water, and to bake his bread over a fire fueled with human dung (Ezek. 4:9-12). To add to his public humiliation, he is instructed to shave his head and beard (Ezek. 5:1) and to carry all his belongings on his shoulder like a wanderer (Ezek. 12:3-6), all to emphasize and attest to the seriousness of his message. What induces one to take on the burden of serving as a true prophet, given the lack of any expectation of tangible rewards for his efforts? The simple answer appears to be that he has no real choice in the matter. The prophet is consumed by the consciousness of being dominated by God, and of the need to speak out even if he risks abuse for his words. Jeremiah thus bemoans his being called to prophecy against his will. O Lord, Thou hast enticed me, and I was enticed, Thou hast overcome me, and hast prevailed; I am become a laughing-stock all the day, everyone mocketh me. For as often as I speak, I cry out, I cry: 'Violence and spoil'; Because the word of the Lord is made a reproach unto me, and a derision, all the day. And if I say: T will not make mention of Him, nor speak any more in His name/ then there is in my heart as it were a burning fire shut up in my bones, and I weary myself to hold it in, but cannot. (Jer. 20:7-9) According to Maimonides, prophecy is a reflection of the existence of a certain degree of latent perfection in the nature of humanity. However,

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such prophetic potential can only be realized through the rigorous development and training of the individual's moral and rational faculties. The sages of the Talmud earlier sought to establish a set of fundamental criteria for eligibility to serve as a prophet, one of which demanded that the prophet be capable of asserting his physical and economic independence. He cannot be dependent on others for his personal security and welfare, a dependence that could jeopardize his prophetic integrity. Accordingly, they declared, "Prophecy only rests upon a wise, strong, and rich man." 9 With regard to the first of these criteria, Maimonides argued that, "it is not possible that an ignoramus should turn into a prophet; nor can a man not be a prophet on a certain evening and be a prophet on the following morning, as though he had made some find." When a "superior individual" reaches that state of moral and intellectual perfection, he will be prepared to become a prophet if he can also achieve perfection of his "imaginative faculty" unless God prevents him from attaining it for some unknown reason.10 Scripture accords extraordinary authority to the prophet by asserting that the prophets must be comparable to Moses (Deut. 18:15). However, this seems to conflict with the explicit statement that "there has not arisen a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses" (Deut. 34:10). Assuming that the personal criteria for suitability for prophecy apply equally to Moses and his successors, the distinction between them must lie in the character of their respective missions. Thus, Scripture declares: "These are the commandments which the Lord commanded Moses for the children of Israel on Mount Sinai" (Lev. 27:34), which the rabbinic interpretive tradition understands as affirming that only the commandments that were given to Moses are to be considered obligatory, precluding any later prophet from legislating additional mandatory requirements. In other words, only the word received by Moses had legislative authority; subsequent prophets would have moral but no comparable legal authority. In this regard, Scripture announces an unequivocal obligation on the part of society to pay heed to the teachings of the true prophet—"unto him ye shall hearken" (Deut. 18:15). Thus, while tradition denies the prophet who comes after Moses the authority to enact new permanent legislation, he is understood as having been granted the authority to abrogate the law temporarily in order to satisfy a dire societal need. This unique ad hoc authority of the prophet is circumscribed by the requirement that any deviation from the Mosaic Law be for the exclusive purpose of strengthening it in the long run. From its very inception in Israel's history the prophetic vocation has had a significant political dimension. Moses, the prophet par excellence, assigns an explicit national mission to Israel. It is to become a "kingdom of priests and a holy nation" (Ex. 19:6). One of Moses's important political tasks is to prescribe the set of institutions that will facilitate the transfer-

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mation of Israel into that idealized state. First, the cohesion of the nation must be strengthened from within. Justice becomes the raison d'etre of the state. This fundamental responsibility is assigned to the judiciary, which is to dispense justice within the society, and to an executive arm that is to assure that the requirements of justice are given practical satisfaction. "You shall appoint magistrates and officials for your tribes, in all the settlements that the Lord your God is giving you, and they shall govern the people with due justice" (Deut. 16:18). Second, at an appropriate time after the nation has been settled in its territory, it is to adopt a form of government that will enable it to deal successfully with the volatile international environment in which it must persevere. That form may be a monarchy, or a system under which there is a single focal point for the concentration of political and military power. "If after you have entered the land that the Lord your God has assigned to you, and taken possession of it and settled in it, you decide, T will set a king over me, as do the nations about me'; you shall be free to set a king over yourself, one chosen by the Lord your God" (Deut. 17:14-15). It is not clear that the biblical author is advocating monarchy as the preferred form of government. However, given the prevailing international environment within which the new state must be formed, a monarchy seems to be the logical choice. However, if the nation chooses to adopt this form of government, the person chosen is to be one chosen by the Lord your God. The question, of course, is how the tribal elders are to know who is the divine choice. Thus, it seems that the person chosen to become king would need to have the approval of someone acknowledged to possess insight into the divine will, the latter presumably being the authentic prophet. However, if the prophet is instrumental in putting someone on the throne because he presumably has divine favor, the prophet is necessarily also in a position to indicate that a sitting monarch has lost divine favor and should be replaced by someone else. And, as will be seen repeatedly throughout the history of the monarchy in Israel, the prophets, capitalizing on their unique positions within the cultural-religious framework of the nation, sometimes played a dramatic role in making and unmaking kings and dynasties through a process that I will refer to as "righteous sedition." The role of the prophets in the history of Israel will be seen to correspond to the state of affairs that they had to contend with, namely, governments that appeared to have lost their bearings, tolerating if not actively encouraging corruption throughout the society Moreover, governmental facilitation of the intrusion of alien beliefs and practices into Israelite society contributed to the loss of cultural and religious pride, which further exacerbated the general conditions that led to national decline. It was these conditions that the prophets arose to do battle with. As will be seen, many of the seeds for the flowering of these conditions were planted during the reign of David, were nurtured during the reign of

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Solomon, and came to fruition after the dual monarchy created by the former came apart at its seam following the death of the latter. With regard to establishing a kingdom, Israel is presented by the prophet-legislator with the critical elements of a concept of a constitutional monarchy that would acceptable to God. When the time actually came for the establishment of a monarchy, it was presumably these constitutional provisions that were set forth before the people by the prophet Samuel as "the manner of the kingdom" (1 Sam. 10:25). The first of these provisions is clearly related to the achievement of the national purpose. "Be sure to set as king over yourself one of your own people; you must not set a foreigner over you, one who is not your kinsman" (Deut. 17:15). Only one of the children of Israel may assume supreme leadership of the nation. It would seem that this constraint is intended to assure that the king of Israel, who is essentially charged with carrying out Israel's divinely mandated mission, must of necessity have an intimate personal stake in the achievement of the national mission. Furthermore, perhaps anticipating the tendency of monarchies to become dynastic, in the event of the failure of the king to produce a male heir, this provision would preclude a non-Israelite consort of a royal princess from succeeding to the throne. The biblical historiographer makes clear that the principal reason for instituting monarchical government in ancient Israel was to enhance the physical security of the nation in the face of emerging and intensifying existential threats. This demanded the establishment of a hierarchical structure of decision-making that would facilitate decisive and prompt responses to any serious challenges to the well-being of the nation. In this regard, Israel's tribal leaders chose to emulate the national leadership structures of the neighboring states with which they had to contend. However, despite the superficial similarities between the monarchies of Israel and those of the neighboring states, there were also to be some highly significant differences in both personal status and legitimate authority. In effect, the concept of monarchy as it was to be applied to Israel deviated in important ways from that which prevailed among the states of the region. In most if not all of the ancient Near East the religious character of kingship was taken for granted, but in Egypt and areas within its sphere of influence kingship was considered as actually sharing in divinity. However, the notion of humanity partaking in divinity was clearly incompatible with the fundamental Mosaic teaching regarding God's "otherness," necessitating a significantly different approach to the concept of monarchy, albeit not one that could be considered secular. The notion of a clear distinction between the religious and the secular was alien to all ancient thought. Israel shared, "in an intensified form, her neighbors' convictions concerning the totality of divine providence. This conviction precluded

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the possibility of attributing a purely secular character to any event or institution; kingship could not exist in Israel without being theologized." 11 Accordingly, the king of Israel was not to be considered as endowed with sovereignty, which was attributed to God alone as ruler of the universe. The king was therefore as fully subject to the law as were all other members of the society, notwithstanding his exalted position in the state. Nonetheless, the prophet-legislator was keenly aware that the exercise of political power could be intoxicating as well as morally corrupting, and he sought some means of helping the monarch to retain a sense of moral balance and to prevent his ego from overwhelming his better judgment. In this view, the only way this could be achieved, acknowledging the foibles of men, was through being constantly reminded that the king is not above the law and that there was every expectation that he would act accordingly, if he wished to retain the favor of heaven. "And it shall be, when he sitteth upon the throne of his kingdom, that he shall write him a copy of this law in a book . . . And it shall be with him, and he shall read therein all the days of his life; that he may learn to fear the Lord his God, to keep all the words of this law and these statutes, to do them; that his heart be not lifted up above his brethren, and that he turn not aside from the commandment, to the right hand, or to the left; to the end that he may prolong his days in his kingdom, he and his children, in the midst of Israel" (Deut. 17:18-20). This requirement denies the king the authority to supersede or even suspend any of the Mosaic laws, even on the basis of temporary expediency, an injunction that is clearly intended to preclude any assertion of monarchic sovereignty or even privilege with regard to those divinely originated laws. In addition, as a constitutional monarch, the king was to be subject to a number of specific constraints designed to limit any tendencies on his part toward megalomania and despotism. One such stipulation is that the king "shall not keep many horses or send people back to Egypt to add to his horses" (Deut. 17:16). Presumably, the intention of this stricture, considered in the context of antiquity, was to preclude the unnecessary militarization of the state through the buildup and deployment of costly mobile forces (cavalry and chariots), in excess of the numbers needed to cope with actual military requirements based on realistic assessments of the threat to the nation's security and its defense needs. It also reflects a concern that the possession of such excess military capabilities might tempt a king to make use of them for purposes of unwarranted aggression. Moreover, given that Egypt was the most accessible exporter of horses at the time, the king was not to pay for such extra-budgetary military aggrandizement by contributing contingents of troops to the Egyptian army in lieu of cash payments, evidently a not uncommon method of settling international trade accounts in antiquity. In other words, the public should not be burdened with the costs of a monarch's desire for military osten-

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tation, which is not considered a valid national security expense. For the same basic reason, the king is not to "amass silver and gold to excess" (Deut 17:17). That is, he is not to use his position of authority and power to enrich himself at the expense of the public he is in office to serve. In other words, he is not to view his realm as his personal patrimony, as is often the case with other monarchs, the people becoming the king's servants rather than he theirs. In the last analysis, it is not parades, displays of military might, or prestige deriving from conspicuous royal consumption that will tip the military balance in Israel's favor when confronted by extraordinary threats from its enemies; it is acting in conformity with divine guidance that will assure victory. Accordingly, "When you take the field against your enemies, and see horses and chariots—forces larger than yours—have no fear of them, for the Lord your God, who brought you from the land of Egypt, is with you" (Deut. 20:1). Another stipulation is that the king "shall not have many wives, lest his heart go astray" (Deut. 17:17). It is noteworthy that this specific injunction applies only to the king and not to the male population at large. This constraint would seem to be predicated on the common historical experience of the debilitating effects of maintaining a harem on the moral stature of the ruler. However, in the context of the work of the biblical author, the injunction reflects a deeper concern as well. In the very first part of the narrative of Genesis it is repeatedly noted that Adam and his descendants each had a single wife until the sixth generation, when the Cainite Lamech broke this tradition by taking two wives (Gen. 4:19). The import of that information is that by so doing he violated the established norm that the woman was intended to be the counterpart to man. A wife could be a man's counterpart and therefore his equal. But two wives cannot each individually be an equal counterpart to their common husband. Each, of necessity, becomes something less than an equivalent person unless the husband comes to be considered as more than a person. Lamech is thus clearly identified by the biblical author as the first to violate the fundamental moral principle of human equality, always to treat persons as ends in themselves and not as a means to one's own ends. 12 The biblical account of this episode may be understood as suggesting that the degradation of humankind resulting from this fundamental violation of the principle of human equality contributed significantly to the alienation of humanity from its moral moorings. And, if this was true with regard to the effects of a man having taken two wives, how much more so with regard to a ruler who maintains a harem. In other words, the constraint placed on the king is to help assure that his heart not go astray. That is, the king must recognize always that he is a man not unlike other men, but with greater public responsibility placed upon his shoulders, a role that does not entitle him to self-exaltation and a sense of inherent superiority to others. And for this reason, he must function under

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greater personal constraints than others with less responsibility for the well-being of the society. It is abundantly clear that, seen from the perspective of the biblical writers, the kings of Israel generally failed to carry out their prophetically assigned roles in an appropriate manner, ultimately failing themselves and the people they were charged with leading. However, demonstrating this was not the primary purpose of the prophetic historiographers. The central message of their work, one that is expressed repeatedly in one way or another throughout the biblical writings, is that Israel's destiny is entirely bound up with its relation to God. When that relationship is wholesome and true, Israel will prosper even against otherwise insurmountable odds. When the converse situation obtains, Israel is left on its own and entirely at the mercy of geopolitical forces beyond its control, regardless of who wears the crown or wields the sword on its behalf. This, then, is the theopolitical perspective reflected in the work of the biblical historiographers. Their writings are intended to demonstrate the consequences for Israel of failure to uphold the covenant, for the society as a whole as well as for its individual members, rather than to glorify the successes of Israel's rulers, which in the final analysis all proved ephemeral. Nonetheless, there is a great deal of political, geopolitical, strategic, and economic information to be gleaned from the biblical texts, from which one may begin to construct historically plausible political scenarios that are consistent with what we generally believe to be reliably known from other sources about the history of the ancient Near East. NOTES 1. Yosef H. Yerushalmi, Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1982), p. 8. 2. Nahum M. Sarna, Studies in Biblical Interpretation (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2000), p. 37. 3. Henry Tudor, Political Myth (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 138-139. 4. Benjamin Uffenheimer, HaNevuah haKedumah beYisrael (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1973), English Summary, p. x. 5. Plato, Timaeus (trans, by Donald J. Zeyl. Indianapolis: Hoc Kett, 2000), p. 66, par. 72b. 6. Harry M. Orlinsky, 'The Seer-Priest," in The World History of the Jewish People, vol. 3: Judges, ed. Benjamin Mazar (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971), p. 279. 7. Maimonides, The Book of Knowledge (New York: KTAV Publishing, 1983), Treatise 1: The Foundation of the Torah 10:4. 8. Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Nedarim (London: Soncino Press, 1978), 22b. 9. Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Shabbat (London: Soncino Press, 1978), 92a. 10. Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), Part 2, ch. 32-36. 11. Eugene H. Maly, The World of David and Solomon (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 29. 12. For a fuller discussion of this point, see my Reading Genesis Politically: An Introduction to Mosaic Political Philosophy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), pp. 63-65.

CHAPTER 2

The Geopolitical Setting

A central premise of this study of the ancient Israelite states is that there are a number of relatively constant factors that have had great significance in shaping the course of the political history of the region in which those states emerged and then declined and ultimately vanished, as did so many other then contemporary political entities. These factors, which are primarily but not exclusively geographic and geostrategic, have contributed heavily to establishing patterns of state development and interstate relations in the region variably known as the Middle East, the Near East, and even the Hither East, that have remained remarkably consistent throughout its troubled history. There is little consensus among writers on history and foreign affairs regarding just what is included in these various designations. The American naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan coined the term Middle East at the beginning of the twentieth century to designate the region centered on the Persian Gulf that stretched from Arabia to India, a reflection of his particular strategic interest at the time but not one shared by other writers for whom the center of geographic interest was located farther to the west, in an area which they designated as the Near East. Although both designations reflect a Eurocentric orientation that is of dubious relevance at the beginning of the twenty-first century, their use has become so commonplace as to be virtually indispensable, even though it is not always clear as to what territories are included in each. In this work, I consider the Middle East to consist of a core area, which is of primary interest here, and a surrounding peripheral region of intrinsic geopolitical and historical importance to the core. The core area, or

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what I will refer to as the Near East, consists of Egypt and the Red Sea region, Iran and the Persian Gulf littoral, and the Fertile Crescent. The historian James Breasted coined the latter term early in the twentieth century to describe the arc of territory stretching from the Persian Gulf to Egypt. The crescent arches northward encompassing Mesopotamia, the territory between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, and circumscribes the perimeter of the Arabian desert along the eastern Mediterranean littoral south to Egypt. The Fertile Crescent thus includes the modern states of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel. It is noteworthy that Egypt, an African state, played a critical role in the history of the Near East primarily as a result of geopolitical factors that apply with the same force today as they did in remote antiquity. Although a political map of the country will indicate that Egypt encompasses a substantial swath of territory, its sheer physical size has never constituted a significant component of its national power. This is because the commercial, political, and population centers of the country have always been concentrated in the relatively small Nile delta region. As a consequence, Egypt's leaders have perennially been challenged by the fact that, notwithstanding its apparent size, the country actually possesses little strategic depth in which to repel a land invasion from the northeast before the heart of the country is overrun. Egypt has thus always been highly vulnerable to attack from Asia and has therefore consistently linked its security to its ability to dominate or at least control the territories of Palestine and Syria, which serve in effect as the land bridge between Africa and Asia. Because of this perceived geostrategic need, Egypt has been compelled to play a major geopolitical role in Near Eastern affairs throughout its long history. When viewed from a geopolitical perspective, it becomes readily evident that many of the contemporary political boundaries separating the states of the Near East often bear little relation to the geographical and topographical realities that have traditionally conditioned interstate relations in the region. For example, the drawing of Arabia's northern border across the peninsula from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Persian Gulf has little real geopolitical relevance, because it is but an artificial line that was drawn by modern Western cartographers for particular extra-regional political purposes. The geopolitical reality is that the Arabian desert extends northward into Syria almost as far as Aleppo, giving a geographical coherence to the desert region that is belied by the map lines drawn through it, setting the essentially artificial boundaries between Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. It is this fact that has made the Fertile Crescent, the arc of settlement that skirts the desert between Egypt and Mesopotamia, the primary stage on which the history of the Near East has unfolded. Another geopolitical factor of great importance in conditioning the political history of the region in antiquity has been the small number of major

The Geopolitical Setting

29

international communications routes that traversed it, serving as arteries of trade as well as of military conquest. Because much of the wider region of the Middle East is composed of either mountains or inhospitable desert, the number of such overland routes linking the Mediterranean and Black seas to the interior of Asia was quite limited. Accordingly, much of the history of the Middle East generally, and the Near East in particular, concerns the struggle for control over those routes or the critical topographic bottlenecks through which they passed. Indeed, many of today's military and commercial highways as well as pipelines follow these same routes. The turbulent history of ancient Israel, as known to us from the biblical writings and other ancient sources, is to a significant extent a direct consequence of its unfortunate geostrategic position, which straddled or abutted the two major land routes linking Egypt and South Arabia to the Fertile Crescent and the rest of the Middle East. The political history of the Near East in ancient times is thus in large measure the story of the continuing struggle for control of the economic and military arteries that were crucial to the viability of the states of the region. One of the main prizes for which the major powers of antiquity contended was domination of the trade routes that passed through the relatively narrow strip of territory stretching from the Egyptian frontier in the Sinai to the Euphrates River in Asia Minor, the land bridge between Africa and Asia. As a consequence of its geopolitical role as a buffer zone between the major powers of antiquity, the peoples of the land bridge were never permitted to evolve into a major political power in their own right. It was always in the interest of Egypt and the power that dominated Mesopotamia at any particular point in time to assure that the territory that constituted the land bridge remained divided into numerous small states that would have to depend on one or the other of the major powers for their political survival. As a result, it was only during periods of effective stalemate between the competing ambitions of the major powers, or of significant internal political disarray in Egypt and Mesopotamia, that any formidable states arose in the land-bridge region, only to be suppressed or destroyed once the struggle between the major powers for regional dominance resumed. Because of this, the political history of ancient Israel can best be understood when viewed in the context of the geopolitics of Egypt and Mesopotamia, their relations with the peoples, nations, and states on their peripheries, and the competition between them for regional supremacy that went on intermittently for more than a millennium. The narrow and relatively small strip of territory at the southern end of the African-Asian land bridge, bounded by the Mediterranean to the west, the Arabian Desert to the east, the mountains of Lebanon to the north, and the Sinai desert to the south, was known to the biblical historiographers as Canaan and is recorded in Akkadian inscriptions as Kinahna. 1 Since remote antiquity, Canaan played an important role in the

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The Rise and Fall of the Ancient Israelite States

international political dynamics of the wider region. Because of its immediate geographic proximity to Egypt's northern frontier, it served both as a buffer zone as well as the primary point of entry from Egypt into the land bridge and, as such, became a corridor of conquest in the struggles for empire between the powerful states that arose in Egypt to the south and in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia to the north and east, respectively. Moreover, in addition to the land communications routes that passed through it, its position along the eastern littoral of the Mediterranean gave Canaan strategic importance relative to the coastal maritime trade route between Egypt and the ports of Phoenicia, Syria, and Anatolia. Oblong in shape along a north-south axis, the small country is divided lengthwise into three parallel strips, the coastal plain, the Judean-Samarian mountain chain, and the Jordan rift valley, the latter being bounded on the east by the mountains of Transjordan. Corresponding to these topographic features, a number of natural north-south land routes traverse the country, two of which became important international lines of communication for trade and military purposes. 2 Running along the coastal plain was the international coastal highway or Sea Road, known in Roman times as the Via Maris, which was the main land artery connecting Egypt with Phoenicia, Syria, Mesopotamia, and the land of the Hittites in Anatolia. After traversing about 150 miles from the Nile Delta across the northern coast of Sinai, the road passed through Gaza, about four miles inland from the Mediterranean, and then through the towns of Ashdod and Jabneh, after which it moved farther inland to circumvent the Yarkon River at the ancient city of Aphek, which was strategically located to guard the two-mile corridor between the river and the edge of the mountains of Ephraim (Samaria). From there the route proceeded northeast through the Wadi Ara pass that traversed the Carmel mountain ridge via the fortified town of Megiddo, which controlled the entrance into the Jezreel valley, and then continued to the plain of Acre and Phoenicia, at which point it split into two major branches, one heading toward the Bekaa valley and Syria through the fortified city of Hazor, the other proceeding eastward through the Jezreel valley to northern Transjordan. It was primarily the fact of the passage of this important international trade and military route through its territory that made Israel a critical pawn in the power struggle between the major powers of the ancient Near East. Farther inland, the Watershed Route ran along and interconnected the crests and slopes of the mountains of Judah and Samaria, linking the historically important cities of Hebron, Jerusalem, Gibeah, Ramah, Bethel, Shechem, Ibleam, and Jezreel, with connecting roads to Beersheba and other cities and locales. The Watershed Route was not an international trade route but was critically important for ancient Canaan's and later Israel's internal communications. East of the Jordan River, the King's

The Geopolitical Setting

31

Highway, which later would be known as Trajan's Road (Via Traianus) after its reconstruction by the Romans, linked the Gulf of Aqaba to Damascus and beyond. The centuries-long struggle over control of this important international trade route was a principal factor in the history of the Israelite settlement in Transjordan and its troubled relations with the Aramaean state centered in Damascus, as well as with the minor kingdoms of Ammon, Moab, and Edom. Because of Canaan's pivotal location in the region, with two internationally important communications routes passing through it and its immediate periphery in Transjordan, no single local power was permitted to extend its control over the entire area—a prerogative that was reserved for the major regional powers alone. Consequently, the country witnessed the emergence of dozens of petty city-states and principalities, which served as vassals to one or another of the dominant regional powers. The first glimpses of political life in the territory known as Canaan date to the fourth millennium B.C.E. Indications are that the country had at one time been brought within the political orbit of the ancient Mesopotamians who held sway over the arc of territory stretching from Mesopotamia to the Mediterranean coast and the frontiers of Egypt. The Mesopotamian kings had a clear interest in the copper mines that were to be found in the Sinai Peninsula and in the biblical land of Midian, known to them as Magan. Although this early period is shrouded in uncertainty, there seems to be some reasonably reliable evidence that in the early third millennium Canaan was considered as part of the domain of King Lugalzagissi, who broke the power of the prosperous Mesopotamian city-state of Lagash about 2897 B.C.E. Lugalzagissi, who styled himself as "King of the World," ruled an empire that stretched from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean and included both Syria and Canaan. There is also some evidence that Sargon of Akkad, who conquered Babylonia and Elam some two hundred years later and extended his rule over Amurru, or the lands of the Amorites, also maintained control over Syria and Canaan, as did his grandson and successor, Naram-Sin. The Akkadian empire of Sargon and his successors dominated Mesopotamia for several centuries until, plagued by succession crises, it became fused with a resurgent Sumer about 2300 B.C.E. to form the new and powerful kingdom of Sumer and Akkad, which was centered in the city of Ur. The civilization of Ur was renowned in the ancient world, so much so that the Israelites were later careful to trace the origin of the patriarch Abraham to it. The empire of Sumer and Akkad went into political decline at the end of the twenty-third century as a result of a simultaneous, though uncoordinated, assault on Ur by the Elamites in the east and the Amorites in the west. By the end of the twenty-first century, the Amorites, a Semitic people, were able to establish a new kingdom at Babylon, a politically

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The Rise and Fall of the Ancient Israelite States

unimportant town at the time, and began to build it into a major power center in the region. Under the leadership of Hammurabi (c. 19th/18th centuries), the sixth in the line of Amorite kings at Babylon, Amorite power was finally extended throughout Mesopotamia, making the Amorite period the most dynamic in the country's long history. At the same time, however, the migration of Indo-European tribes from Anatolia along with Indo-Aryans from Iran into the Fertile Crescent placed heavy pressures on those Amorites who had settled in northern Mesopotamia. Sometime during the eighteenth century B.C.E., these population pressures precipitated an Amorite migratory movement from northern Mesopotamia westward along the Fertile Crescent into the mountains and coastal regions of Syria and Canaan. The lands into which the Amorites migrated, for the most part, came under the dominion of three new and relatively powerful Amorite citystates. The most prominent of these was Yamhad, whose center was in the ancient city of Aleppo, which dominated northern Syria and was apparently treated with some respect by Hammurabi as well as by Zimrilim, the king of Mari. Sitting astride some of the major regional trade routes, Yamhad served as a gateway for commerce transiting the region from as far to the east as Iran and as far to the west as Cyprus and the Aegean. One of the kings of Yamhad, Yarim-lim, is reported to have had a fleet of 500 ships that plied the Euphrates, enabling him to intervene directly in Mesopotamian politics. South of Yamhad, there came into being the Amorite city-state of Qatanum, which was centered on the upper Orontes River in central Syria and had direct access to the Mediterranean coast through the Eleutheros valley (Nahr al-Kebir). Qatanum maintained generally good relations with nearby Mari on the Middle Euphrates River, and the two states occasionally undertook joint military ventures. Further south, the Amorites established yet another city-state at Hazor, which was strategically located in the upper Jordan valley and dominated both southern Syria and northern Canaan, maintaining trade relations with virtually all of the major cities in the Fertile Crescent. In essence, Amorite power had become supreme in southwestern Asia from the Zagros Mountains to the frontiers of Egypt. However, the Amorites did not attempt to actually occupy the large amount of territory that came under their control. Given their numbers, it would not have been a practical option for them. Instead, and especially in Canaan, they were content to dominate the major trade routes passing through it from a number of strategically located fortresses. Thus, from their strongholds at Tell al-Ajul (the predecessor to Gaza) and Joppa (Jaffa), they were able to control much of the Mediterranean littoral, which provided the principal land route between Africa and Asia. Given their record of success, it was only a matter of time before the Amorites and the melange of peoples under their domination and influ-

The Geopolitical Setting

33

ence began to consider Egypt a tempting target for further expansion. Marching southward along the land bridge, the Amorites, presumably led by a warrior aristocracy known to the Egyptians as the Hyksos, invaded the country around 1720. The Hyksos took control of and then fortified the ancient eastern delta town of Avaris, situated on the Pelusiac arm of the Nile. This became the principal power base from which they gradually extended their control over all of northern or Lower Egypt, which they ruled for more than a century. It was probably during the very latter part of this period that the Hebrew clans that would later constitute the people of Israel first entered and settled in Egypt. Closely related to the Amorites, culturally and perhaps ethnically as well, they settled in the eastern delta region, in the vicinity of the Hyksos capital and, according to biblical tradition, prospered and underwent a population explosion. However, their status changed dramatically after the indigenous Egyptians under Amosis I (c. 1570-1545), the founder of the Eighteenth Dynasty, ultimately succeeded in driving the alien Hyksos out of the country. The Hebrews, who remained in Egypt after the Amorites left, were viewed with suspicion by the authorities and soon lost their relatively privileged position in the country. They became subject to an official policy of discrimination and suffered substantial social and economic disabilities. These appear to have been intended principally to reduce the military significance of a sizeable Hebrew population in the event of a renewed Amorite invasion from Asia. Since the Hebrews were considered aliens, and were domiciled close to Egypt's Asian frontier, it was reasonable to expect that they would render assistance to the Amorites under whose rule they had prospered in the past. This practical Egyptian political concern may be seen clearly reflected in the biblical account of the dynastic change that took place, presumably at the time of the expulsion of the Hyksos. "Now there arose a new king over Egypt, who knew not Joseph. And he said unto his people: Behold, the people of the children of Israel are too many and too mighty for us; come, let us deal wisely with them, lest they multiply, and it come to pass, that, when there befalleth us any war, they also join themselves unto our enemies, and fight us" (Ex. 1:8-9). The Amorites, having been driven out of the Nile Delta, were forced to withdraw into Canaan, where they were pursued by Amosis as far as Sharuhen (Tell al-Farah) in the western Negev, a site that controlled the route to Egypt. This site, later included in the tribal territory of Simeon (Josh. 19:6), fell after a three-year siege. To counter any future attempt to invade Egypt from the north, Amosis sought to establish firm control over the land approaches to the country by subjugating any populations in the frontier region that might be inclined, for whatever reason, to assist the invaders. Amosis was tempted to take advantage of the general collapse of Amorite power in the region at the time and continue to extend Egyp-

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The Rise and Fall of the Ancient Israelite States

tian power northward into Asia. However, he elected to consolidate his gains rather than risk a major confrontation with a new aggressive power that had recently penetrated the region from the east. As Amorite power receded throughout the ancient Middle East, others struggled to fill the political vacuum that was created thereby. One of the more successful of these aspirants was the Hurrian kingdom of Mitanni, which expanded from its center in the Khabur valley in northwestern Mesopotamia and soon established its sway over most of southwest Asia from the Zagros Mountains in the east to the Mediterranean in the west. It was not until several decades later, when Mitanni was faced by a serious challenge from Asia Minor at the same time that Thutmosis I (c. 15251508) succeeded to the throne of the pharaohs, that Egypt seemed strong enough to make a bid to extend its control to the territories beyond its northern frontier. Although Thutmosis easily swept through the region as far as the Euphrates in northern Syria, he was unable to defeat Mitanni decisively and soon found it necessary to withdraw his forces back to Egypt. Although he claimed hegemony over Syria and Canaan, Thutmosis was unable to enforce his will there. In the absence of an Egyptian army of occupation, those territories soon reverted to the control of numerous i etty princes whose fealty to the pharaoh was nominal at best. As a conequence, it was not long before Mitanni was able to reestablish its own position of power in Syria. This tenuous situation in Syria and Canaan continued for several decades until the death of Hatshepsut (c. 1502-1483), who initially ruled Egypt as regent for her infant stepson Thutmosis III (c. 1504-1451) but ultimately usurped the crown for herself. With her demise the throne of Egypt finally passed to the young Thutmosis III, setting off a revolt of the indigenous Canaanite and Syrian princes, under the leadership of the king of Kadesh (on the Orontes River) and with the support of Mitanni, against Egyptian authority. It seems that a critical factor that helped trigger the revolt was the evidently low regard in which Thutmosis was held because of his long period of subservience to his stepmother. His ascension to the throne may therefore have been perceived as an opportunity for the rulers of the minor states of the region to rid themselves of their Egyptian overlords. However, it quickly became clear that they had seriously underestimated the young king. Contrary to their expectations, Thutmosis moved against them aggressively. He not only reasserted Egyptian authority in Canaan and Syria but also made it clear that he intended to incorporate the territories in an expanded Egyptian empire. Thutmosis marched up the ancient military road from Qantara along the coast of Canaan and, in 1483, engaged and defeated the rebel forces in the Jezreel valley near the fortified and strategically important town of Megiddo, or Armageddon as it was later called in Greek.3 The Carmel ridge in the north central part of the country is the only natural transverse

The Geopolitical Setting

35

barrier that the intercontinental road had to traverse, and the fortress city of Megiddo straddled Wadi Ara, the main pass through this ridge. Megiddo thus constituted a strategic stronghold that dominated the overland route from Egypt to the Euphrates and, as such, had been a critical military prize since communications and trade between Africa and Asia began in remote antiquity The surrender of Megiddo, after a seven-month siege, opened the road for an Egyptian advance into Mesopotamia. However, Thutmosis was not prepared to pursue such an adventurous course and evidently preferred to focus on consolidating Egyptian control of the southern land-bridge region. As a result of the battle at Megiddo and more than a dozen other campaigns that he conducted in the region, Thutmosis succeeded in wresting virtually undisputed control over the entire SyrianCanaanite coastal strip from Mitanni, making Egypt the preeminent power in the eastern Mediterranean region. It was, however, a short-lived preeminence. The Fertile Crescent was inherently politically unstable and highly volatile, plagued by seemingly incessant changes in the dominating power and rebellions by the repeatedly conquered peoples it contained. Without actually occupying and directly controlling the region, something it was not prepared to attempt, Egypt was unable to prevent the resurgence of Hurrian power. In fact, by the end of the reign of Amenhotep II (c. 1451-1426), Egypt was compelled to come to terms with Mitanni, ceding to it undisputed control of Syria north of a line drawn due eastward from the Mediterranean coast at Tripoli, effectively partitioning the country between them. The peace treaty with Mitanni eventually evolved into a surprisingly long-term security alliance that effectively stabilized Egypt's northern frontier in Asia and placed Canaan under Egyptian domination for another two centuries. Regional stability was shattered once more during the fourteenth century B.C.E. as Hatti, the kingdom of the Hittites, expanded from its center in Anatolia to challenge Mitanni's position as the dominant power in the region north of Canaan. Under Suppiluliumas (c. 1380-1346), the Hittites soon reached the zenith of their power. They consolidated their grip on Anatolia and northern Syria from the Halys to the Euphrates rivers. To neutralize Egypt, while conducting his campaign against Mitanni, Suppiluliumas contrived to reach a non-belligerency accord with its pharaoh Amenhotep IV (or Akhenaton, c. 1377-1360), who had little interest in foreign affairs and therefore little appreciation of the long-term implications of giving the Hittites what amounted to a free hand in the region. The treaty with Suppiluliumas effectively dissolved the alliance between Egypt and Mitanni, leaving the latter without a major ally and therefore vulnerable to a Hittite attack. To ensure that Egypt would have no excuse for intervening in Mitanni's behalf, Suppiluliumas initially avoided any overt interference in Egypt's dependencies in southern Syria, or in the

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The Rise and Fall of the Ancient Israelite States

trading ports along the Mediterranean coast, a strategic approach that well served Hittite interests. Confident that Akhenaton, who was fully absorbed in trying to impose a religious revolution from above on his people, would not react forcefully to Hittite incursions into northern Syria, Suppiluliumas began the incremental conquest of the nominal Egyptian dependencies there. As evidenced by the archaeological finds at Tell-el-Amarna, the Egyptian-appointed governors of these territories appealed for help from the pharaoh. However, Akhenaton apparently hesitated to send Egyptian soldiers to die in distant places for the sake of preserving the conquests of his predecessors, a legacy in which he had little interest. His failure to send the requested aid left these dependencies exposed to the Hittite onslaught. Some of these small states, such as that of the Amurru, situated in the buffer zone between the Egyptian and Hittite frontiers, soon discovered that they had no practical alternative but to overthrow their Egyptian governors and switch allegiances to become Hittite vassals. The sudden cessation of the payment of tribute from its Asian dependencies soon threatened to bankrupt the Egyptian treasury, which had long depended on the receipt of revenues from its nominal African and Asian holdings. Although Akhenaton remained effectively immobilized, this was not a situation that his successors were prepared to live with. As a result, the stage was set for a major conflict between Egypt and Hatti over the domination of Canaan and Syria and the major trade routes that passed through these territories. In effect, it was to be a struggle between the two major powers for regional supremacy. The war between Egypt and Hatti over control of the land-bridge region broke out during the reign of Suppiluliumas's successor, Mursilis II (c. 1345-1315). The contest for dominance over this strategically important piece of territory was long and bitter and dragged on inconclusively for more than a generation. By the beginning of the thirteenth century, the regional military balance seemed to be shifting in favor of Egypt, which underwent a significant economic and military resurgence under the able leadership of the last of the great pharaohs, Rameses II (c. 1304-1234). Rameses succeeded in replenishing Egypt's virtually empty treasury with large amounts of gold extracted from conquered mines in Nubia and began investing heavily in the rebuilding and re-equipping of the Egyptian army. With a new and powerful military capability at his disposal, Rameses soon undertook the reconquest of the principalities along the Mediterranean littoral, a move that threatened to reverse the gains achieved by the Hittites over the preceding century. However, Rameses was evidently unable to muster the overwhelming force needed to decisively defeat the Hittites, and the renewed struggle between Egypt and Hatti for dominance of the Mediterranean coastal region raged on incon-

The Geopolitical Setting

37

clusively for several years, culminating in a major but indecisive battle fought around 1285 at Kadesh, in northwestern Syria. The two powers were so evenly matched that it soon became apparent that the conflict over control of Syria, Canaan, and the coastal trade routes had resulted in a virtual stalemate, while sapping the strength of both states. As a result, the Egyptian-Hittite conflict was formally settled around the year 1269 by a pact between Rameses II and Hattusilis III (c. 12891265). Although no demarcation of their respective spheres of interest was contained in the treaty, it is assumed that as a practical matter the line separating Egypt from the Hittites was drawn at a point above Byblos, on the Mediterranean coast north of Sidon. A decade later, Egyptian-Hittite ties were strengthened further by the marriage of Rameses II to the daughter of the Hittite king. These moves established a short-lived balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean and another brief period of stability along its littoral. It was in this period of relative calm, at least from the perspective of the great power politics of the day, that significant developments began to take place within the unstable frontier region separating the Egyptians from the Hittites. Egypt's effective discomfiture at Kadesh had resulted in a loosening of its control over Canaan that produced a series of local uprisings by the city-states of Acre, Merom, Beth-shean, Tyre, and Byblos, as well as others that had to be suppressed. It appears that Rameses was compelled to mount a significant military campaign to reassert Egyptian dominance over the coastal region of Canaan from Rafia in the south to Dor in the north, destroying and then rebuilding Jaffa in the process. Rameses also apparently mounted a campaign in southern Transjordan to bring the territory of Moab under his control. Shortly thereafter, sometime in the latter half of the thirteenth century B.C.E., perhaps during the reign of the pharaoh Merneptah (c. 1224-1211), several developments took place that set the stage for a dramatic political restructuring of the land-bridge region. For one thing, the Hebrews, who had lived as an ethnic community in eastern Egypt in a state of subjection for many generations, mounted a successful insurrection under the leadership of Moses and broke loose from Egyptian control. Having inspired them with the hope of freedom and a settled existence in a land they believed had been divinely promised to their forefathers, the originally small Hebrew clans that had now grown into the substantial tribes of Israel began moving toward Canaan, and the adjacent region east of the Jordan River, from the eastern Nile Delta region. At about the same time, momentous developments that would also dramatically affect the history of the southern land-bridge region were taking place outside the immediate area. Despite the apparent ability of the Hittites to maintain a generally favorable power position in the Mediterranean littoral, their empire barely

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lasted until the end of the thirteenth century, although small neo-Hittite states persisted in the region until the eighth century B.C.E. It is still unclear as to what constituted the specific causes of the apparently precipitous Hittite decline. The general presumption is that it came about primarily as a consequence of the intrusion of a new power into the region, the socalled "Sea People." The Sea People are generally thought to have originated in Greece and the Aegean islands and to have taken ship from there to conquer new lands for settlement. This movement is assumed to have taken place principally in reaction to the mounting population pressures on their small native enclaves. During the reign of Merneptah, an alliance of five confederated groups of the Sea People and Libyan tribes attempted an invasion of Egypt from the west that reached as far as the Nile Delta before it was stopped. The main challenge to Egypt from the Sea People, however, took place during the reign of Rameses III (c. 1185-1152) when they mounted a major onslaught against the shores of the eastern Mediterranean. The Hittite empire had collapsed under their unrelenting pressure and they soon turned southward, approaching Egypt along the traditional invasion route through Syria and Canaan. The Sea People sacked the coastal region of Syria, Phoenicia, and Cisjordan (Palestine), destroying a number of city-states such as Alalakh and Ugarit in the process. They also attacked Cyprus and then moved on to Egypt by land and sea simultaneously. The maritime assault, led by the Philistines, a component of the Sea People that originated from Caphtor or Crete according to biblical tradition (Amos 9:7), turned into a debacle for them when their ships were trapped and decimated by the Egyptian fleet in the inlets of the Nile Delta near Pelusium. At the same time, the armies of Rameses succeeded in repelling the land attack before the invaders were able to cross Egypt's Sinai frontier. Although Egypt was clearly still capable of protecting its frontiers, its power was nonetheless in a state of steady decline and the presence of the Philistines in southern Canaan posed a continuing threat to Egypt's security. To deal with this problem, Rameses soon sought an accommodation with the Philistines, whose own security concerns were satisfied at Canaanite expense. Under their arrangement, the Egyptians evidently agreed not to interfere with the emergence of a network of Philistine citystates that would be superimposed on the existing Canaanite-ruled territories along the coast of the southernmost section of the African-Asian land bridge, on Egypt's Sinai doorstep, an area roughly corresponding to the present day Gaza strip. In return, the Philistine-dominated territory would effectively serve as a heavily armed and fortified buffer zone that protected the land approaches to Egypt from Asia. While the Egyptians appear to have upheld their part of the bargain, the degree to which the

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Philistines a t t e m p t e d or w e r e able to secure the invasion route to Egypt is less clear. Once established in s o u t h w e s t e r n C a n a a n , the Philistines soon s o u g h t to e x p a n d the area u n d e r their control to all of the coastal plain a n d adjacent areas of Cisjordan, p r e s u m a b l y to achieve greater d o m i n a n c e of the international t r a d e r o u t e traversing the territory. This b r o u g h t t h e m into direct conflict w i t h the Israelites w h o w e r e at the time in the process of establishing their o w n state in the area, triggering a protracted struggle b e t w e e n t h e m over d o m i n a n c e of the s o u t h e r n l a n d - b r i d g e region. At the s a m e time, other elements of the Sea People settled farther n o r t h along the M e d i t e r r a n e a n coast. There they assimilated to the i n d i g e n o u s p o p u lation a n d thereby g a v e birth to a previously u n k n o w n Phoenician nation that e m e r g e d as a thassalocracy that d o m i n a t e d m a r i t i m e traffic a n d commerce in the eastern M e d i t e r r a n e a n a n d A e g e a n seas for centuries to come. NOTES 1. The term "Canaan" has also been used both biblically as well as in nonbiblical sources such as the stele of Idrimi, king of Alalakh (fifteenth century B.C.E.) and the Amarna letters (fourteenth century B.C.E.) to refer to the entire area later known as Syria-Palestine. In the Bible, it is evidently used in this sense in its definition of the bounds of the land as extending from the river of Egypt unto the great river, the river Euphrates (Gen. 15:18). The sense in which the term is used in later portions of the Bible more certainly refers to the area of southern Canaan, the sense in which it is used here. 2. The ancient road systems of Cisjordan are discussed in great detail in David A. Dorsey, The Roads and Highways of Ancient Israel (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991). However, the work does not cover the King's Highway in Transjordan, which was only second in importance to the international coastal highway that connected Egypt to the rest of the Middle East. 3. Armageddon derives from the Hebrew Har Megiddo, or "mountain of Megiddo."

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CHAPTER 3

The Israelite Conquest

The exact nature and timing of the initial Israelite appearance in Canaan is highly uncertain and remains a matter of considerable contention among modern biblical scholars and historians of antiquity, whose theories range from discounting in its entirety the biblical account of an Israelite conquest to accepting it based on the implausibility of the notion that the already heavily populated country simply opened its welcoming arms to a migratory wave of Israelites sufficiently large to dominate it within several generations, the latter being a view with which I am inclined to agree. In any case, because of certain apparent incompatibilities between the available documentary sources, which are almost exclusively biblical, and some of the archaeological evidence uncovered to date, I would argue that it is impossible at this time to credibly assert with any high degree of confidence the precise manner by which the Israelites first took possession of the land of Canaan. 1 Nonetheless, I would also argue that even in a number of instances where most scholarly opinion discounts significant aspects of the biblical account on the basis of archaeological evidence or the lack thereof, geopolitical considerations alone tend to lend a reasonable degree of credibility to that account. Accordingly, the description and analysis of the Israelite penetration and conquest that follow are based on assumptions and explanations that seem the most plausible, given what is more or less reliably known about the contemporary history of the region and the geopolitical forces acting on it. At the same time, it should be recognized that modifications to this reconstruction of what took place will undoubtedly be necessary as new information and insights into this obscure period of

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history emerge. In other words, as the author of a major study of the Israelite conquest wrote regarding his work, "This is not to say, that the hypothesis unrolled in the following pages may be presented as the absolute historical truth, the one and only interpretation of the evidence.. . . It merely means that in the present writer's opinion, his reconstruction of events agrees best with the evidence available at present, supplemented by reasonable assumptions, which do not require too wide a stretch of imagination and facts."2 It appears that following the mass exodus of the Israelites from Egypt, in accordance with the biblical account, their subsequent penetration of Canaan took place in at least two successive tribal movements, although there is considerable uncertainty as to exactly which tribes took part in which, and as to when these movements took place. Despite these unresolved ambiguities, this approach to understanding the process of penetration and conquest greatly facilitates the reconciliation of the conflicting testimony of diverse biblical texts. The overall timing for such an Israelite invasion of Canaan appears to have been optimal for several objective reasons. For one thing, the country had been systematically impoverished as a result of Egyptian economic exploitation, a factor that surely had a significant effect on the morale of the indigenous population. But perhaps more important, the country was also politically fragmented by the incessant struggle for local supremacy among the numerous Canaanite citystates, the term Canaanite referring to a variety of ethnically unrelated peoples such as Amorites, Hittites, Hivites, and others that had established a presence in Cisjordan in the course of wars and invasions over an extended period of time. The resulting endemic lack of cohesion of this melange of peoples in a relatively small geographic area was further exacerbated by the persistent meddling in Canaanite politics of the Egyptians who pursued a deliberate policy of divide and rule in the country. The constant squabbling among the Canaanite chiefs not only made it easier for Egypt to maintain its hegemony over the turbulent country without a major investment of its own resources; it also made Canaan vulnerable to Israelite penetration and occupation. As observed by one writer, 'The Israelites, kindled by religious and national zeal, confronted a Canaanite population devoid of any over-all national consciousness, a land unable to present a unified front against an invader." 3 Nonetheless, the Israelites were not able to simply march in and take over the country. For one thing, they were precluded by Egypt from invading Canaan at any point along its readily accessible and vulnerable Mediterranean flank. The Egyptians remained in full command of the approaches to the coastal region and would not permit any activity that might endanger their control of the important international trade route that passed through it. This compelled the Israelites to seek to gain entry to the country at a point farther east. This geopolitical reality is reflected

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in the biblical notice that "when Pharaoh had let the people go, that God led them not by the way of the land of the Philistines, although that was near; for God said: Lest perad venture the people repent when they see war, and return to Egypt" (Ex. 13:1). As one historian of the period points out, "the anachronistic reference, 'by way of the land of the Philistines/ no doubt refers to the southern end of the Via Maris, which was the main road leading to Canaan, and along which there rose at the time of Seti I and Ramses II a long line of fortresses."4 To avoid another major direct confrontation with the Egyptians along the Mediterranean coast before even reaching Canaan, the Israelites moved farther inland into the sparsely populated Sinai region, establishing their base at the oasis of Kadesh-barnea (Ain el-Qudeyrat), which was the principal gateway to Canaan from the southern desert. About fifty miles southwest of Beersheba, Kadesh-barnea was the largest oasis in the Sinai, and in fact, "is the only district in the whole Sinaitic region in which a nomad group could have existed for any length of time." 5 It is not known how long the Israelites remained at Kadesh-barnea before moving on to Canaan, some suggesting it may have been for several decades. In any case, it appears to have served for a time as the nationalreligious center of the Israelites, and it was there that the Israelite tribes were united under the leadership of Moses into a tribal confederacy that would undertake the conquest and settlement of Canaan, and it was there, according to biblical tradition, that Moses' sister Miriam was buried (Num. 20:1). It also was from Kadesh-barnea that Moses dispatched reconnaissance parties to assess the terrain and the probable extent of opposition to a peaceful Israelite penetration or, if necessary, a military invasion. "And Moses sent them to spy out the land of Canaan, and said unto them: 'Get you up here into the south, and go up into the mountains; and see the land, what it is; and the people that dwelleth therein, whether they are strong or weak, whether they are few or many; and what the land is that they dwell in, whether it is good or bad; and what cities they are that they dwell in, whether in camps, or in strongholds'" (Num. 13:17-19). The mission statement set forth by Moses clearly indicates that he was a man with some experience in military affairs, a notion consistent with the biblical story of his having spent a third of his life as a royal prince of Egypt. After the surveillance mission was completed, it appears that the scouting parties were unable to arrive at a unanimous assessment of the situation, which resulted in the presentation of both a majority and minority report. The majority report asserted that, although the land itself was clearly desirable as a place of settlement, occupying it at that point in time was likely to be very costly because "the people that dwell in the land are fierce, and the cities are fortified, and very great" (Num. 13:28), and therefore capable of repulsing any Israelite attempt at a penetration from the south. The majority report went farther and asserted that even an indirect

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approach was clearly impracticable because of the disposition of the various peoples that lived in the land. "Amalek dwelleth in the land of the South; and the Hittite, and the Jebusite, and the Amorite dwell in the mountains; and the Canaanite dwelleth by the sea, and along by the side of the Jordan" (Num. 13:29). In other words, there was no way of entering the land en masse without a major armed struggle, in which they saw little prospect of Israelite success. Based on what the biblical account tells us happened next, it seems quite clear from a geopolitical perspective that the majority report was entirely rational and well conceived, although not what Moses and his colleagues had hoped to learn about the land and prospects for its penetration. The assessment of the situation reflected in the majority report cast doubt on the viability of the proposed enterprise of establishing a permanent Israelite presence in the country. It asserted, in effect, that the ragtag, illequipped, and untrained forces of the Israelite tribes were no match for the fortified towns and experienced armies of the Canaanite and other peoples in control of the country from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River and the Dead Sea. As indicated, there was also a minority report that offered a rather different assessment of the situation and the prospects for a successful penetration of the country. The spokesman for the minority view was Caleb, a leader of the tribe of Judah, who recommended, "We should go up at once, and possess it; for we are well able to overcome it" (Num. 13:30). What was the reasoning behind Caleb's optimism, which was later seconded by Joshua of the tribe of Ephraim, the leader of the expedition? In effect, Caleb did not dispute the objective information contained in the majority report. He did, however, dispute the conclusions drawn from it and the recommendation for inaction based on those conclusions. But on what basis did the minority reach an opposite conclusion from that of the majority? It would seem that, at least from the perspective of the biblical historiographer, Caleb was asserting that the majority report's assessment failed to take into account the divine role in history and the divine promise to Israel's patriarchs. With God on Israel's side, the balance of power on the battlefield would shift in Israel's favor. Does this mean that Caleb was anticipating a miracle that would enable Israel to prevail against the perceived odds? There is no indication in Caleb's words that he believed this to be the case. He argued quite explicitly that with regard to the opposition that would be mounted by the Canaanites and others, "we are well able to overcome it." In other words, the conviction that God stood behind them would give the Israelites a superiority of morale that would compensate for the inferiority of their arms and battle experience. The biblical writer then implicitly suggests that Caleb's argument began to influence significant numbers of the leadership to the extent that his opponents, the authors of the majority report, attempted to undercut and

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discredit Caleb's position by taking steps that were clearly politically irresponsible. Fearful that the opinion set forth in the minority report would ultimately prevail, the majority group effectively betrayed their responsibilities to the authorities to whom they were responsible and resorted to propaganda and disinformation directed at the public. "And they spread an evil report of the land which they had spied out unto the children of Israel, saying: The land, through which we have passed to spy it out, is a land that eateth up the inhabitants thereof" (Num. 13:32). This description of a barren and unproductive land clearly and obviously contradicted their own earlier official report in which they described it as one that surely "floweth with milk and honey" (Num. 13:27).6 And, to undermine Caleb's argument regarding superior morale as the balancing factor, they reverted to invoking ancient images of men of superhuman stature, the Nephilim, who lived in the land, "and we were in our own sight as grasshoppers, and so we were in their sight" (Num. 13:33)7 In other words, they insisted that Caleb's argument that superior morale would tip the military balance in favor of Israel was illusory, because their high morale would quickly dissipate once the Israelites were faced by the reality of contending with an invincible foe. The disinformation campaign took its toll and Moses was soon faced by the threat of a popular revolt against his leadership, charging him in effect with creating a situation in which the people now found themselves stranded in the desert between the Egyptians to the south and the Canaanites to the north. Caleb, supported by Joshua, attempted to reason with the people, assuring them that "the land, which we passed through to spy it out, is an exceedingly good land. If the Lord delight in us, then He will bring us into this land, and give it to us . .. Only rebel not against the Lord, neither fear ye the people of the land . . . their defense is removed from over them, and the Lord is with us; fear them not" (Num. 14:7-9). However, Caleb and Joshua's arguments could not undo the damage done to the morale of the people by their opponents. It was only after many if not all of those who strenuously opposed Caleb and Joshua apparently succumbed to a mysterious illness that was interpreted as a sign of divine disfavor that popular sentiment started to shift, expressing a readiness to fight their way into Canaan. But at that point, Moses took the position that their newfound enthusiasm for the struggle was too late in coming. In effect, he suggested implicitly that their wavering had undermined their morale and that their professed readiness for war was more rhetorical than real. He now warned them that, because they had lost their qualitative edge, disaster awaited them if they now engaged the Canaanites and Amalekites who blocked their way. "Go not up, for the Lord is not among you; that ye be not smitten down before your enemies .. . forasmuch as ye are turned back from following the Lord, and the Lord will not be with you" (Num. 14:42-43). The biblical writer then informs

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us that, notwithstanding Moses's opposition, an unauthorized attempt was made by the Israelites to penetrate Canaan from the south, following the route taken earlier by the Israelite scouting party. As anticipated by Moses, the incursion into the southern hill country dominated by the relatively powerful Canaanite state of Arad was repulsed with heavy Israelite casualties (Num. 14:45, 21:1) at Hormah, assumed by some to have been the royal capital of the Arad district. Ironically, the intelligence report submitted by the majority of the scouting party, which argued strongly against such an attack, proved to be prescient once Israel's earlier qualitative edge was no longer a factor. Following this military debacle, the tribal leaders concluded that the southern approaches to central Canaan were too well defended to attempt another invasion from that direction. In addition to Arad, which effectively dominated one of the key routes from Kadesh-barnea through the northern Negev into the Canaanite heartland, the Canaanite city-states also controlled a number of fortified outposts in the vicinity of Beersheba, southwest of Arad, that added significantly to their capability of thwarting any Israelite attempt at a frontal assault from the south. Nonetheless, it does appear that some possibly non-Israelite clans closely associated with and subsequently incorporated into the tribe of Judah, the Kenites, Kenizzites, and Jerahmeelites, ultimately did manage to bypass the Canaanite southern defenses and to work their way into the southern foothills, where they were later able to join up with the main body of the tribe coming from a northerly direction. The Israelite defeat by Arad also led to a reappraisal of their strategy and tactics. The attempt at a conventional campaign against a militarily superior enemy had proven ineffective and costly. The lesson was learned. Henceforth, wherever possible, enemy superiority would be counterbalanced by unconventional approaches, capitalizing on strategic and tactical indirect methods. "This indirect approach sought to avoid frontal assault and siege warfare, as well as straightforward encounters with enemy forces, especially chariotry, in the open field. To achieve this the Israelites resorted to tactics based on deception—feints, decoys, ambushes and diversionary maneuvers—any guile to attain surprise in overcoming the enemy."8 An objective assessment of the situation led the Israelites to conclude that the most promising direction of approach would be from the east, which was the least defended. Presumably, this was because beyond the Jordan River valley and the adjacent sparsely populated region, which constituted its eastern frontier, Canaan faced the vast and essentially empty Arabian desert, and there was little expectation that an invading army of any size would approach it from that direction. To take advantage of this weakness in the Canaanite defenses, it became necessary for the Israelites to make a wide flanking movement eastward into Transjordan

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and then, arching westward, to enter Canaan across its vulnerable eastern side. As suggested above, the Israelite penetration of Canaan was probably undertaken in two waves, most likely separated by some years, although the tribal composition of the two waves of Israelites is not known with any certainty. Given the lack of hard intelligence about what lay ahead in the indirect approach they had elected to pursue, proceeding in stages seemed a prudent course of action. Presumably, reports sent back by the first group would enable the second to avoid some of the problems they had encountered. Carrying out the flanking movement into Transjordan was by no means risk-free. According to the biblical account, the first wave of Israelite tribes had to fight its way eastward across the southern Negev desert, principally against the Amalekites, a people about whom nonbiblical sources provide no information whatever, but whose eponymous ancestor Amalek is identified by the biblical historian as a grand nephew of the Israelite patriarch Jacob (Gen. 36:2). Perhaps out of fear that the Israelites might be tempted to try to overrun their territory, or simply a wish to harass and plunder the long Israelite caravan train that was moving eastward along the Amalekite frontier as it transited from Kadesh-barnea across the Negev into Transjordan, the Amalekites mounted what must have been a major attack on the rear guard and baggage train of the exhausted Israelites as they paused at a still unidentified desert site, probably a small oasis, named Rephidim. "And all the congregation of the children of Israel journeyed from the wilderness of Sin . . . and encamped in Rephidim .. . Then came Amalek, and fought with Israel in Rephidim" (Ex. 17:1, 8).9 The Amalekite attack, which the Israelites viewed as an unprovoked, unwarranted, and even cowardly aggression, given that the Israelites were moving eastward rather than northward specifically for the purpose of avoiding any confrontation with them, evidently struck a raw nerve that made it unforgivable as well as unforgettable. "Remember what Amalek did unto thee by the way as ye came forth out of Egypt; how he met thee by the way, and smote the hindmost of thee, all that were enfeebled in thy rear, when thou wast faint and weary" (Deut. 25:17-18). The Israelite forces under the command of Joshua succeeded in repelling the attack and routing the Amalekite force (Ex. 17:13), but they did not press their advantage to attempt to defeat the Amalekites definitively, something that might have served Israel's long term interests but not its more immediate concerns. The timing of the first wave of the Israelite migration, perhaps taking place in the early part of the thirteenth century, was highly propitious. It evidently was calculated to take advantage of the fact that the region the Israelites were entering in Transjordan had been destabilized by both the military campaigns of Ramses II to ensure Egyptian control of the trade

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routes, as well as by a regional Amorite-Moabite war. The newly emerging kingdoms of Edom and Moab, through which the Israelites had to pass, had not yet consolidated control over their territories and therefore were not in a position to seal their frontiers. As a result, once the Israelites dealt with the Amalekites, they were able to cross into Transjordan and then proceed northward without encountering any effective opposition. It is not at all clear whether they actually went on to cross into Canaan at once, or whether they waited in the plains of Moab for the second wave of Israelites to join them. However, by the time that the second wave of Israelite tribespeople was ready to make a similar flanking movement into Transjordan from the southern Negev, possibly some years later, the states of Ammon, Edom, and Moab had already consolidated their realms. They now were in a position to control their frontiers, a capacity that they lacked during the earlier Israelite movement through their lands. The Israelites appealed to Edom for transit rights through its territory, promising to stick to the King's Highway en route, but their request was rebuffed. "And Edom said unto him: Thou shalt not pass through me, lest I come out with the sword against thee" (Num. 20:18). It seems that a similar overture was made to Moab and it too was rejected (Jud. 11:17). This presented the Israelites with the prospect of having to dissipate their strength in what they viewed as unnecessary wars with Edom and Moab, just in order to be in a position to reach their goal on the western side of the Jordan. They decided against this course of action, preferring to husband their strength for the struggle that awaited them in Canaan. It therefore became necessary for them to first turn southward and then to swing wide around both Edom and Moab in order to avoid violating their frontiers. They would then turn westward toward Canaan at a point farther north than that taken by their predecessors. It seems likely that it was at this point in time that, given the expectation that the Edomites would once again pose no obstacle to Israelite passage through their territory, some of the clans associated with the tribe of Judah had already moved into Edomite territory south of the Dead Sea, precipitating the very conflict with the Edomites that the tribal leaders wanted to avoid. The net result of what probably turned out to be a limited confrontation was that the clans managed to force their way north directly into Canaan, where they eventually succeeded in defeating an evidently weakened Arad, enabling them to join up later with the main body of Judah following the Israelite invasion of Cisjordan from the east. In pursuing its circuitous course through Transjordan, the main Israelite body managed to avoid direct contact with Edom and Moab and proceeded northward uneventfully until it crossed the Arnon River, after which it turned west. There the Israelites encountered the forces of the Amorite city-state of Heshbon, a buffer state between Moab and Ammon

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that probably came into being following the battle at Kadesh on the Orontes River in northern Syria between the Egyptians and the Hittites a century earlier. At about that time, the Hittites, and presumably their Amorite allies as well, had penetrated Syria as far south as the Damascus region. From there, the Amorites continued to strike southward into Moabite territory under their king Sihon, "who had fought against the former king of Moab, and had taken all his land out of his hand, even unto the Arnon" (Num. 21:26). Once again wishing to avoid what they saw as an unnecessary military confrontation, the Israelites sought transit rights through the Amorite kingdom but their request was refused. "And Sihon would not suffer Israel to pass through his border; but Sihon gathered all his people together, and went out against Israel into the wilderness" (Num. 21:23). This time, the Israelites had little choice but to fight. There was no acceptable alternate route to the Jordan. After defeating the forces of Sihon that stood in their way, the Israelites moved northward into the heart of Amorite territory, occupied the capital at Heshbon, and seized control of the plains along the Jordan between the Arnon and Jabbok rivers (Num. 21:21-25). Subsequent to the defeat of the Amorites, the Arnon became the boundary between Transjordanian Israel and Moab. It should be noted, however, that the Moabites never became fully reconciled to the loss of what had been their territory prior to its conquest by the Amorites. As will be seen in the next chapter, they made repeated attempts, with the aid of the seminomadic Midianites who were their allies and dependents, to retake it from the Israelites who had settled in those lands. These struggles continued intermittently for more than two centuries. Following the defeat of Sihon, the Israelites advanced farther north along the Jordan and also occupied the Amorite territory between the Jabbok and the Yarmuk rivers, the entire region between the Yarmuk and the Dead Sea later being designated by them as the territory of Gilead. Building on their successes, the Israelites subsequently crossed the Yarmuk and encountered and defeated Og, king of Bashan, in a decisive battle that took place at Edrei, east of the source of the Yarmuk. The conquest of Og's territories (Num. 21:33-35) not only rewarded the Israelites with its rich pastureland; it also gave them effective control of Transjordan from the Arnon north to Mount Hermon. The main body of the Israelites then crossed the Jordan at Gilgal, probably a point about three kilometers southeast of Jericho and, after entering Canaan, evidently split into two principal groupings. 10 Upon reflection, it seems almost self-evident that the next steps to be taken by the Israelites were in basic accord with a grand strategy conceived by Joshua for the conquest and settlement of the land. Based on the information previously gathered by the scouts dispatched by Moses from Kadesh-barnea, which presumably gave Joshua and his advisers a

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good sense of the strategic situation in the country, they seem to have formulated a plan of action along the following lines. The key to a successful penetration and conquest of Cisjordan was the principle of divide and conquer. Although the Israelites had the initial advantage of a strong central leadership under Joshua, something that the Canaanites and others in the land that lay before them did not have, the latter nonetheless had numerous fortified cities and strong points controlling the various lines of communication through the territory. In the aggregate, these fortified positions gave the Canaanites the potential ability to block an Israelite advance into the interior should they prove able to organize a consolidated front. The Israelite conquests in Transjordan had already effectively cut off any links between it and Cisjordan. The challenge now was to prevent the numerous city-states of the latter from joining forces to oppose the Israelites, and this meant gaining control of the principal communications arteries in the country. Accordingly, the Israelite forces split into two wings for the strategic purpose of physically preventing the city-states of the south from joining forces in common cause with those of the north. 11 Several of the tribes, the most powerful of which was Judah, headed toward what became known as the Judean hill country and its adjacent lowlands, eventually meeting up with the Kenites and the Kenizzites, who had cast their lots with the Israelites into whom they were assimilated, who had managed to approach the foothills from the south. Most of the remaining tribes, the dominant one being Joshua's tribe of Ephraim, moved westward into the Samarian hills. It soon became apparent, however, that some of the Israelite tribes, most notably Reuben, Gad, and some elements of Manasseh, were quite prepared to abandon the idea of settling in the land of Canaan. They were content to remain in the lands they now occupied in Transjordan. The territory between the Arnon and the Jabbok had been divided between Reuben and Gad, the former being assigned the southern part of the strip, while the territory between the Jabbok and the Yarmuk was assigned to half of the tribe of Manasseh. It is suggested by some that two of the clans of Manasseh, Machir and Gilead, which originally settled in Cisjordan, soon relocated back across the Jordan because of the lack of adequate arable land in the hill country assigned to the tribe and settled in the region north of the territory occupied by Gad and Reuben. The Israelite leaders understood that any such tribal defections before the crossing into Cisjordan would seriously weaken the tribal alliance and jeopardize the success of the ongoing penetration and conquest of Canaan. The biblical writer suggests that Moses had to use all of his considerable influence to retain the loyalty of the tribes of Reuben and Gad to the Israelite alliance. He did this by making the legitimacy of their holdings in Transjordan contingent upon their continued participation in the conquest of Canaan, a ploy that apparently succeeded in holding the alliance

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together at a critical point in time (Num. 32: 1-42). The need to take such a step made it clear that the Israelite tribal alliance was inherently unstable. In the absence of a more deeply ingrained sense of common purpose, it could only be held together by the charismatic personality of a Moses or a Joshua, who assumed the mantle of leadership after the death of the prophet-legislator. When such men were no longer available to lead the people, the cohesiveness of the alliance began to crumble, seriously complicating and prolonging the final conquest and effective occupation of Cisjordan. The comparable inability of the Canaanite city-states, because of their basic political and military disunity, to act in concert for any length of time was perhaps their greatest weakness, as demonstrated by the lack of any notable attempt on their part to prevent the Israelites from crossing the Jordan. To do the latter would have required a coordinated defense system along the Jordan frontier, which simply never came into being. Nonetheless, the considerable military capabilities of the Canaanites, represented by well-armed and highly mobile cavalry and chariot forces, operating in a defensive mode that gave them certain tactical advantages, still presented a most formidable challenge to the invading Israelites. The military capabilities of the latter were based almost entirely on popular tribal levies of lightly armed spear and sword-bearing infantry, and it would require a maximum unified effort on their part to compensate for their inherent military deficiencies against a well-entrenched enemy. Moreover, the elders of the several tribes realized that success in this endeavor required that they voluntarily set aside some of the tribal rights and prerogatives they so cherished in order to enable their acknowledged leader Joshua to lead them to victory Toward this end, they consciously invested Joshua with plenipotentiary powers that possibly even exceeded those attributed to Moses. "Whosoever he be that does rebel against thy commandment, and will not hearken unto thy words in all that thou commandest him, he shall be put to death" (Josh. 1:18). Joshua, endowed with supreme powers by the general assembly of the tribes, took a number of dramatic steps to keep his tribal confederacy intact until the conquest of Canaan was successfully completed. Perhaps first and foremost, as reflected in the problem of premature Israelite settlement in Transjordan, he had to prevent the tribes from actually occupying and settling the land as they conquered it. This was necessary to forestall the defections from the Israelite armies that would ultimately cripple their ability to defeat the Canaanites decisively. Toward this end, Joshua drew a sharp distinction between the prosecution of the war as such, and the subsequent occupation of the land, which he designated as two distinct phases of the forthcoming campaign for the conquest of the country. As suggested by one student of the period, "This is why Joshua separates the war entirely from the occupation of

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territory. He keeps the people in camp for the whole duration of the war. No matter where the army fights, it always returns to the camp. Throughout the whole war Joshua does not occupy a single city, nor does he rebuild a single city. He only destroys the Canaanite defenses and moves on. He is compelled to prevent the people from occupying its portions until the end of the war, because he cannot be sure that he will be able to muster them for the general war if they are engaged in claiming land." 12 Once having crossed into Canaan, the Israelites quickly established a secure bridgehead at Gilgal to ensure the safety of their communications to their principal supply bases in Transjordan, which were in the lands occupied by the tribes of Reuben and Gad. Gilgal was also a convenient center for trading the booty taken from the Canaanites for supplies from the Moabites and Ammonites. This was essential since the drive into Canaanite territory effectively destroyed the agricultural economy of the land and, in accordance with Joshua's plan, there was to be no Israelite agricultural activity in Canaan until the conquest was completed. Gilgal also served as a defensive position against a possible surprise attack on the Israelite rear from across the Jordan, as well as a forward base for forays deep into the Canaanite interior. In effect, Gilgal became the temporary capital of the tribal confederacy. It is noteworthy that we hear of no Egyptian intervention in defense of its vassals in Canaan, although a hint in such regard is found in the socalled "Israel Stela" of Merneptah, which celebrated the pharaoh's victory over the Libyans about 1230 B.C.E., and which also mentioned several other military achievements, including one over Israel. "Plundered is the Canaan with every evil; Carried off is Ashkelon; seized upon is Gezer; Yanoam is made as that which does not exist; Israel is laid waste, his seed is not."13 Although this inscription is deemed highly important because it contains the earliest mention of Israel in any known Egyptian record, it would seem to have little relevance to the events surrounding the Israelite conquest of Canaan, since the victory referred to had to take place at about the time when the Israelites were in the Sinai desert on their way to Canaan after having left Egypt. "It is quite likely that this boast refers to a victory over Israel at the time of the Exodus, when the 'seed of Israel' no longer remained in Egypt."14 Moreover, an Egyptian attack on the Israelites in Canaan at that time would hardly have escaped mention in the biblical writings, making it reasonable to assume that the reference is to an earlier period. Israel's first campaign in Cisjordan was directed at the capture of nearby Jericho, an ancient fortified oasis city with fertile orchards and critical water sources that commanded the road from the Jordan ford to the interior of the country. Jericho appears to have been destroyed in an earlier period but may have been at least partially rebuilt and reoccupied by the time of Joshua's appearance on the scene, making it an appropriate stra-

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tegic military target. The successful conquest of the city exemplifies the manner in which the Israelite military leaders learned to compensate for their inherent weaknesses as a popular army with little experience in the field and no capability for an effective siege of a fortified and walled city. The biblical writers attributed the conquest to a "miraculous" collapse of the city's walls, following seven days of repeated circling of the city by seven priests blowing horns, "so that the people went up into the city, every man straight before him, and they took the city" (Josh. 6:3-20). However, there are sufficient internal clues earlier in the biblical account to paint a more mundane picture of what probably took place. It appears that prior to the assault on the fortified city, Joshua dispatched a reconnaissance team to determine whether there were any weaknesses in Jericho's defenses that could be exploited by the Israelites. One of the things they discovered was that the city was in a panic in anticipation of an Israelite assault, which was further exacerbated by the rumor that Israelite spies had already entered the city and had effectively placed it in a state of siege. "Jericho was straitly shut up because of the children of Israel: none went out and none came in" (Josh. 6:1). The reconnaissance team had found its way to a potential but presumably disreputable female collaborator whose residence was actually located in the city wall. After receiving assurance of her trustworthiness, the team convinced her to aid them by dangling a scarlet cord outside her window, providing a marker for a surreptitious entry by a raiding force into Jericho through her home (Josh. 2:1-20). With a penetration by stealth as the tactical plan, the repetitive marching around the city for seven days, making nerve-wracking noise but without taking any military action, falls into place as a means of lulling the enemy into a state of stultifying anticipation, lowering both their guard and morale and leaving them susceptible to a surprise attack from within the walls.15 Presumably, once the raiding party was assembled in the city, their primary initial objective would be to open the gates to allow the main Israelite force to attack. Accordingly, the biblical note concerning the collapse of the city walls might be understood figuratively rather than literally. As one analysis put it, "Without diminishing the miraculous aspects of the scriptural account, the psychological walls of Jericho's defenders surely came tumbling down after the seventh nerve-wracking day of encircling the fortress-city with coordinated horn blasts and shouts." 16 Alternatively, the scriptural note may be understood as suggesting that as a result of the surreptitious insertion of Israelite forces into the city, its walls no longer could serve to keep out the main body of the attacking Israelites. The taking of Jericho provided the Israelites with a significant base of supply in Cisjordan and reduced their dependence on critical supplies reaching them from Transjordan. However, it is noteworthy that Joshua did not make Jericho his primary base of operations, which remained at

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Gilgal. From a security perspective, Gilgal afforded a better and more accessible crossing point for the Jordan, and from a morale perspective, Joshua evidently did not want his rear headquarters to be located in a relatively large city with its demoralizing distractions. Accordingly, Joshua razed the city, preventing its immediate use as a residence, and placed a ban on its immediate reconstruction (Josh. 6:26), although it was later incorporated as a populated settlement in the area allocated to the tribe of Benjamin (Josh. 18:21). After securing Jericho, the Israelites moved farther west to seize the central mountain massif in order to establish a commanding position over the populated plains below. The natural fortifications of the mountains would provide the lightly armed Israelites with secure positions from which to pounce on the Canaanite settlements in the lowlands and valleys at will. At the same time, "these territories, as yet ill-organized politically, and probably still thinly populated, were least capable of resisting the advance of the Israelites, and offered them the best opportunity of settling down and gradually turning from their semi-nomadic way of life to an agricultural economy."17 The military threat posed by the advancing Israelites became fully apparent when, according to the biblical account, they next attempted to seize the strategically important fortified site at Ai, which guarded access to the city of Bethel and the nearby watershed. Some archaeologists suggest that Ai was in fact destroyed a thousand years before the Israelite tribes took the site, and that the name itself means "ruin." However, this does not conclusively prove that the site was unoccupied at the time of the Israelite conquest.18 One plausible theory suggests that, in anticipation of an Israelite assault, the city of Bethel decided to make a stand against the invaders at the previously abandoned ruins of the strategically located site.19 A military analysis of the situation suggests that "to forestall the threat of an Israelite attempt upon their town, which must have seemed imminent after the fall of Jericho, the people of Bethel did prepare Ai as a fortified outpost because of its commanding position above the ascent" at the edge of the watershed. 20 As in the case of Jericho, the Israelites were again confronted by the need to take a heavily fortified position for which they were ill equipped, but unlike the much larger city of Jericho, Ai was evidently too small a fortress-town in which to mount a successful surreptitious insertion of troops. A reconnaissance team was dispatched to assess the vulnerability of Ai to a frontal assault, and it reported that the site had but few defenders and could be taken with a relatively small force. However, an attempt to do so was easily repulsed (Josh. 7:2-5). This failure threatened to explode the emerging myth of Israelite invincibility, which Joshua had been able to exploit to his advantage; "For the Canaanites and all the inhabitants of the land shall hear about it" (Josh. 7:9). It was essential to turn

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this setback into a ruse that would take advantage of the self-assurance that the defenders of Ai would be expected to feel, making it a tactical move that would lead to an Israelite victory once again. Accordingly, the Israelite commanders were compelled to resort to a high-risk diversionary maneuver that required a relatively high degree of sophistication and coordination. So Joshua arose, and all the people of war, to go up to Ai; and Joshua chose out thirty thousand men, the mighty men of valor, and sent them forth by night. And he commanded them saying: Behold, ye shall lie in ambush against the city, behind the city; go not very far from the city, but be ye all ready. And I, and all the people that are with me, will approach unto the city; and it shall come to pass, when they come out against us . . . that we will flee before them. And they will come out after us, till we have drawn them away from the city . . . And ye shall rise up from the ambush, and take possession of the city (Josh. 8:3-7). The main Israelite force was deployed to attack the walls of the fortress while a secondary force waited out of sight, but in a position to attack on a prearranged signal. The main force launched an initial unsuccessful frontal attack on the walls and then quickly retreated, drawing the defending force out of Ai in hot pursuit of the retreating Israelites, as had happened after the previous frontal attack. This time, however, after luring the defending force a preset distance from the fortress, the secondary Israelite force assaulted the lightly defended site and put it to the torch, compelling the defending force to abandon its pursuit of the main Israelite force and to hasten back to Ai. At that point, the main Israelite force turned and attacked them, as the secondary Israelite force struck from behind, effectively trapping the enemy between the two Israelite contingents, with the expected result of a decisive Israelite victory (Josh. 8:20-22).21 Joshua subsequently made an example of Ai, totally destroying the site and executing its commander, acts calculated to enhance Israel's reputation as a conquering power and thereby instilling fear of it among the numerous city-states in Canaan that formed loose military alliances to confront the Israelites. From Ai, Joshua's forces moved on to Bethel, virtually on the central range watershed, which was overrun when secret access to the town was obtained from a captured resident (Jud. 1:24-25). With both Ai and Bethel in Israelite hands, the stage was set for the conquest of the surrounding countryside as Joshua's forces fanned out to the west and south. From Bethel, the next logical move was toward Gibeon, which would position the Israelites to threaten Jerusalem to the south while interdicting one of the main roads from the foothills region, the Shephelah, into the hill country. Viewed from a broader strategic perspective, Joshua's approach to se-

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curing control of the highlands, placing the Israelites in a position to threaten the lowlands but not actually attacking them at this stage, was surely conceived with a wary eye on what Egypt might do in response to such an Israelite initiative. The land-bridge area was still nominally a part of the Egyptian empire, and Joshua was taking a calculated risk in upsetting the local balance of power there. However, it would seem that he concluded that the risk of Egyptian interference was minimal as long as there was no perceived threat to Egypt's primary interest in the land bridge, which was control of the Via Maris, the strategically important military and trade route along the Mediterranean coast that linked Egypt by land with western Asia. An unintended consequence of the destruction of Ai and the seizure of Bethel, which clearly signaled Israelite intentions in the region, was the formation of a temporary alliance of the chiefs of the diverse peoples of the Shephelah and the area around Hebron, consisting of Amorites, Canaanites, Hittites, Hivites, Perizzites, and Jebusites, that "gathered themselves together, to fight with Joshua and with Israel, with one accord" (Josh. 9:2). However, several towns of the Hivite confederacy, Gibeon, Chephirah, Beeroth, and Kiriath-jearim, all of which were probably under the regional jurisdiction of the king of Jerusalem, and which because of their relative proximity to Ai and Bethel would be among the first to have to confront the growing Israelite threat, quickly defected from the antiIsraelite alliance and sought to reach a separate accommodation with the Israelites. From the biblical account it would appear that the Hivites had some knowledge of the rules of engagement that governed Israelite military activity in Canaan. These rules, set out in no uncertain terms by Moses, were evidently designed to prevent the assimilation of the Israelites, who had long practiced an austere nomadic way of life, to the more opulent and sensual cultures of the pagan societies they would encounter in Canaan, cultures that were considered to be morally corrupt from the Mosaic perspective. Accordingly, on the one hand, the Israelites were instructed to wipe out the cities of Canaan and to annihilate "the Hittite, and the Amorite, the Canaanite, and the Perizzite, the Hivite, and the Jebusite; as the Lord thy God hath commanded thee; that they teach you not to do after all their abominations, which they have done unto their gods" (Deut. 20:17-18). On the other hand, the rules of engagement were quite different for wars against cities that were not in Canaan. In this case, the city about to come under attack was to be given the opportunity to save itself and its people by capitulating and accepting Israelite suzerainty (Deut. 20:10-11). The dilemma for the four Hivite towns in Canaan that wanted to escape destruction in the impending war was how to avoid being subject to the standing rules of engagement that Joshua was clearly applying quite lit-

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erally, given what had happened at Ai. Their solution of the problem, based on the premise, which ostensibly proved prescient, that the invading Israelites did not yet have a detailed knowledge of the country and especially of the ethnic composition of its smaller towns, was to perpetrate a gross deception. They dispatched envoys, attired in worn clothing and covered with dust as though they had traveled from a great distance, to Joshua's headquarters at Gilgal, where they sought to negotiate a treaty that would in effect make their confederacy a protectorate of Israel. Although Joshua and his advisers were skeptical about who these envoys were and where they came from, they appear to have been hampered by the lack of sufficient detailed information to effectively challenge them, and ultimately, "Joshua made peace with them, and made a covenant with them, to let them live; and the princes of the congregation swore unto them" (Josh. 9:15). The biblical account may strike one as somewhat disingenuous, it being quite unlikely that Joshua's agents did not know where Gibeon, a stone's throw from Bethel, was located. It seems far more likely that the deception had little if anything to do with the location of Gibeon, but with where the travelers claimed they came from. Assuming that the primary center of Hivite settlement was farther to the north in the vicinity of Shechem, as indicated by the biblical author (Gen. 34:2), or even as far north as Mount Lebanon (Jud. 3:3), Joshua and his staff may have been led to believe that the Gibeonites came to him representing the entire Hivite settlement in Cisjordan. A peace agreement with the Hivites would thus serve Israel's purpose by effectively removing them from the Canaanite alliance and denying it their support. 22 Alternatively, it may be that Joshua had already reached the conclusion that strictly carrying out the rules of engagement that were held to apply in the land of Canaan was impractical and perhaps even counterproductive, as it would tend to increase the desperation and thus harden the resistance of the people of the land, leaving them no viable option other than to fight to the end. Accordingly, the pretense of having been deceived by a duplicitous enemy, but nonetheless feeling obligated to honor the solemn accord made with the Gibeonites, provided a plausible rationale for circumventing the rules of engagement. According to the biblical account, it was not until three days later that the Israelites discovered that the Hivites had not come from afar but from the four nearby Hivite towns, and that their leaders had therefore been deceived. The people were outraged and wanted to destroy the towns but were held back by their leaders who insisted on the necessity of keeping their sworn word, once given. Joshua, a master of military deception, surely appreciated the irony of the perception that he had been deceived by so blatant a ruse, but he presumably considered it a price in prestige worth paying given the benefits it provided. By the agreement with Gibeon and the other members of the local Hivite confederacy, Joshua gained

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an important strategic position without having to fight for it. However, he could not let the Hivites get away entirely without paying for the alleged deception. The price extracted from them was their becoming a permanent albeit protected laboring underclass within Israelite society, a status in which they remained until the days of the monarchy under David. Accordingly, although Joshua presumably had legitimate grounds for repudiating the agreement, he chose not to do so because by employing the Hivites to carry out the many labor-intensive chores required to sustain the Israelite community, more Israelite manpower would be made available for military service at a time when Israel was engaged in conquering the land of Canaan. The treaty with Gibeon and the other Hivite towns effectively gave the Israelites virtually complete freedom of military action in the immediate region as well as significant geostrategic advantages. The Hivite defection not only exposed the northern flank of the Jebusite kingdom of Jerusalem but also endangered the security of the Canaanite towns west of the hill country by giving the Israelites a commanding position on the strategically important east-west route between Jericho and the Mediterranean coast. The king of Jerusalem, Adoni-zedek (Adoni-bezek), reacted sharply both to the deepening Israelite penetration and the voluntary Hivite surrender to the enemy. He quickly put together an alliance linking Jerusalem and its allies in the hill country with those in the Shephelah, the four citystates of Hebron, Jarmuth (Khirbet el-Yarmuk), Lachish, and Eglon, for the purpose of punishing the Hivite confederacy for defecting from common cause with the other Canaanite city-states, and most especially Gibeon, which had helped place the Israelites in position for a direct assault on Jerusalem. Accordingly, Adoni-zedek and his allies attacked and laid siege to Gibeon, which promptly invoked the treaty with the Israelites and appealed directly to Joshua for assistance in countering the assault on the city. Joshua responded immediately and positively to the Gibeonite request. He not only intended to observe the obligations he undertook with regard to assuring the security of the Gibeonites, he also was unwilling to cede the key strategic position of Gibeon, which he had obtained without loss of life. The Israelite forces made an all-night uphill march of some fifteen miles, climbing over three thousand feet from their base at Gilgal to Gibeon, and launched a devastating surprise assault on the exposed rear of the besieging army at dawn. Joshua completely routed Adoni-zedek's forces and pursued them down the defile of Beth-Horon as far as the valley of Aijalon (Josh. 10:9-10). This audacious tactical move is captured in the famous biblical verse: "'Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon; and thou, Moon, in the valley of Aijalon.' And the sun stood still, and the moon stayed, until the nation had avenged themselves of their enemies" (Josh.

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10:12-13). The imagery of this passage seems to reflect a particular time at dawn, prior to the setting of the moon in the west over the Aijalon valley but after the appearance of the sun over Gibeon in the east, when the battle took place. Following the decisive victory at Gibeon, the Israelites were able to establish their virtually unchallenged hegemony over the western slopes of the hill country between the Aijalon and the Jezreel valleys. The ultimate historical significance of the battle at Gibeon is well captured in the following commentary: "Here was fought perhaps the most important battle in all human history .. . since the religious destiny of all the world was at stake in the r e s u l t . . . In this one battle the conquest of Canaan was made certain, though it was not fully accomplished until long afterward." 23 Continued Canaanite control of the Jezreel valley made expansion northward from the hill country of Ephraim into the Galilee region difficult and in some instances impracticable. However, it appears probable that another wing of Israelites crossed the Jordan north of the Sea of Galilee and fought their way into the Galilee, where they were challenged by another alliance of Canaanite city-states that stretched from Mount Hermon in eastern Lebanon to Mount Carmel on the Mediterranean coast, under the leadership of Jabin, king of Hazor. The latter ancient fortress was evidently the center of Canaanite power in the northern part of Cisjordan, as the biblical writer notes, "for Hazor beforetime was the head of all those kingdoms" (Josh. 11:10). Once again, superior tactics carried the day. The Canaanite alliance selected the location of the "waters of Merom," often identified as Lake Huleh, as the staging area for their planned offensive to drive the Israelites out of the Galilee, if not out of all Cisjordan. The choice of location was designed to take advantage of the fact that all the major lines of communication in the Upper Galilee converged at Merom, placing the Canaanites in a position to strike out at the Israelites in virtually every direction. The effective response of Joshua to the threat was to seize the initiative before the enemy could deploy its forces to more advantageous ground. In a preemptive strike, Joshua surprised the Canaanites while they were still encamped in the relatively narrow gorge, where their chariots were effectively immobilized. Joshua's forces came charging down the adjacent slopes causing pandemonium in the enemy camp, which was now transformed into the principal battlefield, where the idle Canaanite chariots and horses were more of a hindrance than a help to the defenders. It is noteworthy that Joshua was unable to make effective use of the captured horses and chariots, incapacitating the former for warfare by cutting their sinews and destroying the chariots, an indication of the relative lack of sophistication of Israel's tribal army at the time. The defeat of Jabin and his allies on the shore of Lake Huleh gave the Israelites control of much but not all of the northern Galilee (Josh. 11:7-9).

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Although the Israelites were now able to move westward toward the Mediterranean, the tribe of Asher proved unable to dominate some of the coastal cities assigned to it, most notably Tyre and Achzib, and thus failed to secure complete Israelite control of the adjacent coastal region. At about the same time, the Canaanite defeat at Gibeon appears to have opened the way for some elements of the tribes in the south to approach the Judaean hill country directly from the Negev and the Arava region, as already noted. Thus, toward the end of the thirteenth century, it appears that the clans of the Kenites and Kenizzites, long associated with the tribe of Judah, succeeded in overrunning some the towns of the northern Negev and the southern Judean hills, including Arad, Hebron, Hormah, and Debir, the latter conquered by Othniel the Kenizzite, the nephew of Caleb who later emerged as the first "Judge" of Israel. Moreover, Joshua's forces appear to have overrun the entire area between Kadesh-barnea and Gaza, a reflection of the erosion of the Egyptian position in the country (Josh. 10:41). Such a military campaign would have been precluded in an earlier period, given that the road to Gaza was probably the most direct route from Egypt to Canaan, the one that Moses did not even attempt to take advantage of. However, the Israelite hold on this area would soon be successfully contested by the Philistines, who established one of their principal centers in Gaza. The Israelites had successfully demonstrated a remarkable ability to compensate for their military deficiencies by exceptional generalship and a capacity to outmaneuver the Canaanites, registering some notable victories over superior forces. Nonetheless, and notwithstanding their military prowess and efficiency, the Israelites were generally constrained to confine themselves to the mountainous regions of the country. The principal reason for this, as already noted, was because Canaanite military power was based on technology and tactics unavailable to the Israelites at the time, namely, chariot-warfare and the effective use of cavalry. This is reflected in the biblical account of the military progress of the tribe of Judah, which "drove out the inhabitants of the hill-country; for he could not drive out the inhabitants of the valley, because they had chariots of iron" (Jud. 1:19). Accordingly, the Israelites had to counter the numerical and technological superiority of the Canaanite armies by engaging them where the latter's primary offensive capabilities were effectively neutralized by the nature of the terrain, and this meant setting the battlefield in the hill country Where this was not an option, they had to make effective use of stratagems such as surprise and indirection, as illustrated in the biblical account of the conquest of Ai, in which the lightly armed Israelites were able to defeat the garrison of a fortified town that they would not otherwise have been able to take without massive casualties. Similarly, as discussed above, in the struggle for control of the Upper Galilee, the Canaanite alliance concentrated its forces at Merom (Lake

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Huleh), the point of convergence of all the major axes of communication in the region. However, the Israelites were able to launch a surprise attack on the enemy encampment in the narrow gorge of the Brook of Merom, where there was not enough room for the Canaanites to deploy their chariots effectively. As noted by the biblical writer, "So Joshua came, and all the people of war with him, against them by the waters of Merom suddenly, and fell upon them" (Josh. 11:7). With the powerful mobile forces of the Canaanites suddenly immobilized, the tactical advantage shifted to the Israelites who emerged victorious from the battle. However, the victory over the northern Canaanite coalition was not decisive. And, as a consequence of the Israelite inability to establish definitive control of the coastal plain and the Jezreel valley, numerous Canaanite enclaves continued to exist in the midst of nominally Israelite territory, especially that assigned to the tribe of Manasseh. These enclaves were to be found in a chain of fortresses guarding the mountain passes, once in Egyptian hands, that stretched from Beth-shean in the east, which was on the main road to Damascus, to Megiddo in the west, and extending from there to Dor on the Mediterranean coast, which had long been occupied by the Tjeker, one of the Sea Peoples that, along with the Philistines, struck roots in Canaan. Indeed, Dor and Beth-shean, at both ends of the chain of fortresses across Cisjordan, had once been Egyptian administrative centers for control of the region. To deal with the emerging threat from the central mountain massif of Ephraim, the Canaanites in the northern part of the country subsequently formed a new anti-Israelite coalition, the principal members of which were the kings of Taanach, Megiddo, and Jokneam in the Jezreel valley, Dor on the Mediterranean coast, and Kadesh further north. As before, the coalition was headed by Jabin of Hazor and remained a troublesome thorn in Israel's side for some time. A similar situation prevailed on the southern slopes of the mountains of Ephraim, where a similar group of Canaanite fortified towns effectively formed a chain across the country that impeded communication with the Israelite settlements in the mountains of Judah. The practical problems of topography and military technology that the Israelites encountered militated against a rapid completion of the conquest of the country. Nonetheless, the Israelites succeeded in achieving sufficient territorial cohesiveness of their holdings in Canaan for Joshua to establish a new headquarters of the tribal confederacy at Shiloh, in the hill country assigned to Ephraim, which was the natural center of Israelite settlement in Cisjordan. With the subsequent relocation of the portable tabernacle there, and the construction of a modest temple to house the Ark of the Covenant, Shiloh effectively became the capital of the Israelite nation. "The temple of Shiloh, where the ark was kept, brought Israelite pilgrims from various provinces, and in this way the primogeniture of the Ephraimites acquired a religious sanction. However, this embryo of a .

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spiritual center was still too frail to consolidate the tribes into a lasting national union that could serve as the groundwork of a political state organization." 24 Before his death, Joshua confirmed the provisional arrangements for the partition of Canaan among the several tribes, even though a significant amount of the land in question still remained in Canaanite hands. This was particularly the case in the territories north of the Jezreel valley and along the maritime plain. The incompleteness of the conquest at this time is attested to in the biblical text, which relates that Joshua was "old and well stricken in years, and there remaineth yet very much land to be possessed" (Josh. 13:1). Nonetheless, the process of conquest would continue inexorably, in fits and starts, until it was completed many years later. As one writer observed: "The conquest of Palestine was really the clash of two cultural worlds. At the moment of impact they represented two ways of life: on the one side, the autocratic feudal system of a decadent noble class, based on slavery and on taxation imposed upon the agricultural population and supported by the imperial army of Egypt; on the other, the tribal democratic system of the nomads, to whom the oppressed class of slaves and servants, the landless mercenaries, and probably also parts of the vassal agricultural population adhered. The two ways of life could no longer continue to exist side by side." 25 The departure of Joshua from the scene had significant and immediate desultory effects on the Israelite confederacy. Joshua had no successor in terms of his ability to command the respect of the various tribal leaders and to direct them in a manner that served the broader interest of the nation. Moreover, once the tribes began to settle in their designated areas, local rivalries emerged to the fore as they competed over access to water sources and fertile fields, rivalries that sometimes turned into armed conflicts. As a consequence, it not only became increasingly difficult to coordinate the activities of some of the tribes, the difficulty increasing with distance from the center at Shiloh, it also became difficult to prevent them from taking unilateral actions that worked to the detriment of other tribes and the nation as a whole. As a practical matter, the geopolitical setting in Cisjordan also militated against national coherence. Because completing the conquest of Canaan took many years and proceeded at a different pace in each tribal area, depending on the local situation and the opportunities available at a particular point in time, a unified effort in this regard was effectively precluded in the absence of a central government that could allocate manpower and resources throughout the region in a programmatic fashion. To do this, a significant modification to the existing tribal structure would be necessary, one involving at a minimum the superimposition of a pantribal central authority to direct and coordinate matters that crossed tribal lines, and at that point in time no one including Joshua even contemplated

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such a radical d e v e l o p m e n t . It w o u l d take m a n y d e c a d e s before such a notion w a s o p e n l y considered, a n d a b o u t t w o centuries before steps w e r e taken to m a k e it a n effective reality. NOTES 1. A useful review and summary of the variety of scholarly views on the subject is presented in George W. Ramsey, The Quest for the Historical Israel (Atlanta: John Knox, 1981), pp. 65-98. 2. Shemuel Yeivin, The Israelite Conquest of Canaan (Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archeologischlnstitut, 1971), p. 71. 3. Abraham Malamat, "Origins and the Formative Period," in H. H. BenSasson (ed.), A History of the Jewish People (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 57. 4. Benjamin Mazar, "The Exodus and the Conquest," in Benjamin Mozar (ed.), The World History of the Jewish People, vol. 3: Judges (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971), p. 74. 5. Emil G. Kraeling, Rand McNally Bible Atlas (New York: Rand McNally, 1956), p. 117. 6. This characterization of the land seems far-fetched. However, the terms "milk and honey" referred to the abundance of milk-producing flocks of sheep and goats, and to the large quantity of date palms found in Cisjordan, the "honey" being the sweet extract from the dates rather than that produced by bees. It is pointed out by Cyrus H. Gordon and Gary A. Rendsburg that "The Hebrew word is debash, whose Arabic cognate dibs refers only to the sweet extracts (saps, molasses, syrups, etc.) of fruit (dates especially)," The Bible and the Ancient Near East (New York: Norton, 1997), p. 168, n. 2. Although the land was neither lush nor one of great agricultural wealth, it was a welcome sight to people coming into it from the desert. 7. See Gen. 6:4 for the ancient reference to the Nephilim, the progenitors of a mythical race of powerful men who populated the antediluvian world. 8. Malamat, "Conquest of Canaan: Israelite Conduct of War According to Biblical Tradition," Encyclopaedia Judaica Year Book, 1975/6 (Jerusalem: Keter, 1976), p. 173. 9. The exact location of Rephidim is uncertain. Most scholars believe the site to be in Wadi Firan near Jebel Musa or at Wadi Rafayd, about 22 miles southeast of el-Arish in the Sinai. 10. The location of Gilgal is uncertain, some locating it northeast of Jericho. 11. Yehuda Elitzur, "Tokhnit Kibbush haAretz beSefer Yehoshua," in Chaim Rabin et al. (eds.), Iyyunim beSefer Yehoshua (Jerusalem: Kiryat Sepher, 1960), pp. 6-7. 12. Yehezkel Kaufmann, The Biblical Account of the Conquest of Palestine (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1953), p. 92. 13. James B. Pritchard (ed.), The Ancient Near East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 231. 14. Simon Dubnow, History of the Jews, vol. 1, (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1967), p. 79. 15. Yigal Yadin points out that the ancient Romans employed the identical tactic over a seven-day period. See his "Aspektim Tzvayim veArchiologiyim beTiur Kib-

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bush haAretz beSefer Yehoshua," in Rabin, p. 73. Chaim Herzog and Mordechai Gichon, Battles of the Bible: A Modern Military Evaluation of the Old Testament (New York: Random House, 1978), p. 29, point out several historical tactical parallels. 16. Monroe Rosenthal and Isaac Mozeson, Wars of the Jews: A Military History from Biblical to Modern Times (New York: Hippocrene, 1990), p. 33. 17. Albrecht Alt, Essays on Old Testament History and Religion (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 219-20. 18. It is also impossible to assert with certainty, in the absence of digging up numerous other possible sites in the same area, that the ruin identified by archaeologists is in fact the biblical Ai. See comments of Elitzur, "Tokhnit Kibbush haAretz beSefer Yehoshua," pp. 4-5. 19. Luc. H. Grollenberg, Shorter Atlas of the Bible (New York: Thomas Nelson, 1959), p. 85. 20. Herzog and Gichon, Battles of the Bible, p. 31. 21. It is noteworthy that even if this account is legendary, as some scholars maintain, it nonetheless reflects what might be termed a sense of the tactically elegant on the part of the biblical author. 22. Yehuda Elitzur and Yehuda Kiel, Atlas Daat Mikra: A Compendium of Geographical-Historical Terms in the Scriptures (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1993), p. 136. 23. Jesse L. Hurlbut, A Bible Atlas: A Manual of Biblical Geography and History (New York: Rand McNally, 1948), p. 39. 24. Dubnow, History of the Jews, vol. 1, p. 83. 25. Emmanuel Anati, Palestine Before the Hebrews: A History, from the Earliest Arrival of Man to the Conquest of Canaan (New York: Knopf, 1963), pp. 433-34.

CHAPTER 4

The Era of Tribal Confederacies

As discussed in the preceding chapter, the patchwork pattern of Israelite settlement in Cisjordan, most of which was distributed throughout the northern and southern hill country and separated by valleys occupied by the Canaanites, made it difficult to bring about a coherent central leadership of the nation, notwithstanding the nominal capital and religious center that had been established at Shiloh. Moreover, the traditional disunity among the Canaanite city-states, which made it difficult for them to cooperate when they were not under an immediate common threat, also reduced their own capacity for challenging the piecemeal Israelite expansion that took place in the decades following the wars of Joshua, which in turn militated against any incentive for intertribal unity among the Israelites. Thus, as one historian put it, 'The hilly terrain, netted by a maze of valleys and wadies, made for political disjunction. Since no enemy was powerful enough to threaten more than a small part of Israel at any one time, the pressure from without was not great enough to produce any effective integration." l This "political disjunction'' was particularly acute among the numerous tribes in the northern hill country, which constituted the bulk of the Israelite population, and notably less so in the south where a far smaller number of the tribes had settled. According to the biblical writer, it would appear that of the several Israelite tribes, only Judah managed to completely dominate the area of its settlement in the southern hill country, giving it what was for all practical purposes a country of its own. "And the Lord was with Judah; and he drove out the inhabitants of the hill country" (Jud. 1:19). The tribe of Judah proper, whose center of settlement

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in this period was located in Bethlehem, was actually the principal member of a coalition bearing its name that included the tribe of Simeon, which occupied the region farther south near Beersheba, and the associated clans of the Kenites, Kenizzites, and Jerahmeelites. Because the primary focus of the Judahite coalition was on maintaining the security of its southern and western frontiers, it had little to do with the concerns of the northern and eastern tribes until the overarching Philistine threat to all the tribes that arose about a century later, discussed below, effectively forced Judah to reorient itself toward closer collaboration with the other tribes of Israel. As for the northern tribes, at best some were able only partially to dominate their areas of settlement, necessitating a variety of hegemonic arrangements with the Canaanite enclaves that continued to thrive in their midst in a suzerain-vassal relationship. In the cases of the tribes of Asher and Naphtali, the reverse situation prevailed, in which the Israelites "dwelt among the Canaanites" (Jud. 1:31-33), that is, they remained effectively subordinate to the indigenous rulers of the areas in which they settled. With regard to the tribe of Isaachar, about which very little is known, it appears that it was not only unsuccessful in conquering its assigned area of settlement, but it is intimated that the tribe was actually forced into a form of Canaanite serfdom (Gen. 49:15). And, in the case of the tribe of Dan, which was unable to obtain a permanent foothold in its assigned area in the foothill region that separates the Judean hills from the coast, it was ultimately forced to relocate far to the north. Despite this melange of territorial and political arrangements, some historians of the period have suggested, using a notion drawn by analogy from the confederations found to have existed in ancient Greece, that the Israelite tribes were organized as an amphictyony, that is, as a confederation of tribes organized around a central religious site and sanctuary, in this case with the Ark of the Covenant at Shiloh serving as its epicenter.2 A variant on this approach, based on suppositions regarding the almost simultaneous emergence of the Philistine pentapolis, suggests that the leadership of the amphictyony effectively rotated from one tribe to another, thereby accounting for the changing locus of the main events of the period discussed below.3 There is, however, very little direct or compelling support to be found in the biblical writings for these assertions. If an amphictyony including all the Israelite tribes ever existed at all, it did so only during the period of Moses and Joshua, and even then the authority of these leaders over the tribes that the amphictyony would have encompassed was subject to substantial internal challenge. After the death of Joshua, there is no indication whatever of an Israelite league that encompassed all the tribes until the emergence of the monarchy and a centralized state, although, as will be seen, a substantial case can be made for more limited tribal alliances that came into being episodically to deal with an immediate crisis that affected two or more tribes. In any case, it seems

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clear that any action to be taken by the tribes in common would have had to be initiated through ad hoc consultations among their tribal elders, and even then their decisions might or might not be accepted by the often jealously independent clans and tribal families. During the period following the initial conquest and settlement that is under consideration here, for the most part, the tribes continued to function as virtually completely autonomous units, generally governed by councils of elders, although it appears that there was also a public assembly of all the free adult males in the tribal community, whose relation to the tribal elders is obscure. In any case, it was a period during which there is no evidence or even suggestion of an overall common tribal government. As described most succinctly by the biblical historiographer, "In those days there was no king in Israel; every man did that which was right in his own eyes" (Jud. 17:6, 21:25). The latter statement should not be construed as suggesting that the Israelite society of the time was characterized by anarchy and lawlessness. On the contrary, it is suggested that it was during this formative period that the Mosaic Law began to take definitive shape in the codes of apodictic religious laws and casuistic civil laws that are strewn throughout the Mosaic canon, the Torah. The casuistic type of laws, that is, the primarily civil laws that are characterized by a conditional clause such as "if" or "provided that," appear to have been borrowed by the Israelites to some extent from the legal codes of the Babylonians, Hurrians, and Canaanites and were then adapted to their own particular needs. The apodictic group of laws, those primarily religious laws that are stated dogmatically, would seem to be the product of the experiences of the Israelites in their formative stages as a people in the wilderness of Sinai and later in Canaan. 4 Moreover, it would be a mistake to conclude that a strong sense of kinship among the tribes did not exist at the time. There surely was a certain sense of commonality among the tribes, based primarily on the Mosaic covenant to which they were all parties, which provided the foundation for some intertribal unity in times of crisis. At such critical moments, tribal leadership might be transferred temporarily to individuals believed to be capable of delivering the tribe or tribes affected from danger, or to persons who achieved distinction as intertribal arbitrators and thereby earned the confidence of the tribal leaders. These ad hoc charismatic political-military leaders and adjudicators of customary tribal law, who were not necessarily tribal elders, are those identified by the biblical historiographers as shofetim or judges. Accordingly, as one commentator put it, "The office of the shofetim on that account is understood not as a form of government . .. but as a mandatory vocation conditioned and limited by the situation—an exclusively charismatic office whose interruptions of tenure thus ultimately belong to its essence." 5 The commonly accepted translation of shofet as a judge is more often than not misleading,

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if we think of the term in its conventional modern juridical connotation. Considering the shofetim as magistrates, combining limited judicial and executive powers, comes closer to the mark, although there are instances where they appeared to be nothing more than mercenary chiefs or warlords. 6 Scholars have noted that the ancient Carthaginians also had suffetes who served as the supreme magistrates of Carthage and that the term shafat in ancient Semitic usage referred to "a judging by him who settles an argument according to justice, and hence also a judging by him who is the head of a people and saves it from danger according to justice." 7 It is not clear what happened to the shofet once the crisis that brought him to his position of leadership passed or subsided. It seems safe to assume that in many instances the shofet continued in his role for as long as he had the support of the tribal elders, given that the latent antagonisms between the Israelites and the indigenous Canaanite populations persisted even after the moments of acute crisis passed, ever ready to erupt once again. 8 What we know of the history of the period of the shofetim, which lasted some two centuries, is reflected in the biblical book of Judges, which was evidently written and compiled in such a way as to present a fragmentary historiosophical account of the period, which raises certain problems in understanding the events that actually transpired. The compiler and editor of the stories of the individual shofetim, stories derived in some instances from tribal traditions, reflected a unique perspective in his work that discerned a recurrent theme. The events recounted seemed to have occurred in a series of recurring cycles of Israel's reversion to idolatry, subsequent punishment at the hands of foreign enemies, repentance and deliverance, and then a period of peace and quiet until the cycle was repeated. It becomes readily apparent that the biblical historiographer's concern is far less with history in the modern sense of the term than with the use of history to illustrate a moral point, an approach that makes it difficult to reconstruct events in their contemporary geopolitical context. Accordingly, as one writer put it, the history of this period "is like a mountain range seen upon a distant horizon: the peaks glow in the sun, but darkness fills the valleys and the perspective is extremely obscure." 9 Compounding the difficulty are the sketchy and incomplete historical materials presented to the reader of the biblical texts. This is, of course, quite understandable given that during the period of the tribal confederacies it was extremely unlikely that many contemporary records of events would have been preserved in writing. What we have before us then is essentially an anthology of those primarily oral tribal sagas and traditions that survived until the biblical compiler put them into writing centuries later, without any clue as to the number of other such oral histories that simply faded from memory over time. Nonetheless, the biblical compilations we do have often reflect a sober historical assessment of the

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international and intertribal relations of the period, matters that are frequently presented in an offhand manner that requires a careful reading of the texts to glean the nuggets of information contained therein. Because of the historiosophical approach of the biblical writers, it would seem that the sequence of some of the events described in the books of Judges and Samuel, at least in some instances, most probably cannot actually be as set forth therein, primarily because they raise some political issues that seem insoluble if the order of events is not adjusted. It appears that Josephus, the ancient Jewish historian, who had also served as a major military commander in the war against Rome in the first century C.E., was well aware of this problem and reordered at least one of the events in the biblical narrative to place it in a more realistic political context. Most notably, as discussed further below, Josephus treated the very last incident recorded in the biblical book of Judges, concerning the tribe of Benjamin, as having occurred very early in the period, seeing it as key to understanding, at least in part, why certain events and developments in the era of the tribal confederacies followed the course described. It appears that following the departure of Joshua from the scene, and despite his efforts to forge them into a coherent tribally-based entity capable of pursuing the national mission set forth by Moses, there emerged a general tendency among the Israelites to integrate with the indigenous populations of the area and to assimilate to the popular culture. The dispersal of the tribes and clans over often noncontiguous areas, and the transition from the marginal survival economy of seminomads to the more advanced and more stable economies of the settled agricultural societies they encountered, tended to weaken the grip of the traditions they brought with them. "Once settled in Canaan, the Israelites could not resist the temptation to adopt the worship of the native deities, on whom the prosperity of flocks and fields was supposed to depend." 10 The social cohesion of the Israelites thus began to unravel as they became increasingly conscious of the gap between the relatively primitive ways of life they had led and those of the far more sophisticated lifestyles and religious practices they observed among their non-Israelite neighbors. They experienced the need to adapt to the changed circumstances, and in so doing began to undermine the relatively pristine Mosaic social and religious culture that gave them their distinctiveness as a people. Thus we are told, "And the children of Israel dwelt among the Canaanites, the Hittites, and the Amorites, and the Perizzites, and the Hivites, and the Jebusites; and they took their daughters to be their wives, and gave their own daughters to their sons, and served their gods" (Jud. 3:5-6). Josephus, reflecting the prophetic historiosophical perspective, expands on this by pointing out that "the Israelites grew so indolent, and unready of taking pains, that misfortunes came heavier upon them, which also proceeded in part from their contempt of the divine worship." 11 In other words, Israelite assimilation

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to the alien cultures of their neighbors caused them to lose the sense of mission and the resulting qualitative edge that facilitated the conquest and settlement of the lands they occupied. As the biblical writer put it, retrospectively: And the children of Israel did that which was evil in the sight of the Lord, and served the Baalim. And they forsook the Lord, the God of their fathers, who brought them out of the land of Egypt, and followed other gods, of the gods of the peoples that were round about them, and worshipped them; and they provoked the Lord. And they forsook the Lord, and served Baal and the Ashtaroth. And the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel, and He delivered them into the hands of spoilers that spoiled them, and He gave them over into the hands of their enemies round about, so that they could not any longer stand before their enemies. (Jud. 2:11-14) Translated into secular terms, what the biblical writer is asserting is that, in the absence of the supreme leadership of a Moses or a Joshua, Israel soon lost its collective sense of purpose and mission, which had given it a motivating power that enabled it to establish itself in the land. It reverted to a hodgepodge of tribes and clans that proved unequal to the task of nation building in a politically hostile environment. They came to see themselves as essentially no different from the Canaanites among whom they lived and succumbed to the raw appeal of the sexually oriented fertility rites that constituted Canaanite religious practice. "In contrast to the richness of the Canaanite culture, closely connected with the earth and its vegetation, a richness which was still attractive, especially for women, in much later times, there stood the faith in the one God of Israel, the God to be worshipped without any visual representation. Here there was neither developed mythology nor dramatic ritual, neither orgiastic usages nor aesthetic pleasure, but only moral demand." 12 This does not mean that they abandoned entirely the far less attractive austerity of Mosaic religious legislation, but rather that they mixed the two, producing a syncretism that traditionalists found completely unacceptable. Israel, although not all of its people to be sure, thus appeared to have lost its very reason for becoming a distinctive nation, with the result that it now became increasingly demoralized and susceptible to national disintegration, a tendency that has resulted in the disappearance of many other ancient peoples and nations from the stage of history. Before long, the resulting Israelite weakness of spirit and military vulnerability became patent when an invasion force descended on Canaan from the north, from Aram-Naharaim. Some scholars consider AramNaharaim, that is, Aram of the Two Rivers, to be generally understood as referring to the region between the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, and therefore tend to discount the likelihood of an attack originating from Meso-

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potamia during this period. Accordingly, through a liberal reconstruction of the biblical text, rendering Aram into Edom, they suggest that that the attack actually came from Edom in the near south, making it an Edomite rather than Aramaean conquest.13 Others, however, suggest that the designation of Aram-Naharaim in biblical times originally referred to the region between the Euphrates and the Balikh Rivers, near Aleppo in northern Syria, making the possibility of such an assault far more probable.14 Moreover, the latter region is on the northern fringe of the desert that defines the arc of the Fertile Crescent, from which the Aramaeans, originally semi-nomads, emerged during this period to begin establishing their presence in southern Syria. A related plausible explanation suggests that the Aramaean invasion was the result of their displacement from the north of Syria by the onslaught of the Sea People, which brought the Philistines to the frontier of Egypt.15 In the absence of any hard information to the contrary, I am inclined to accept the view that it was an Aramaean invasion, which is consistent with the biblical text as it stands. According to the biblical writer, the Aramaean invasion, under the leadership of their king Cushan-Rishathaim, apparently overran much of the region including the various Israelite-held territories, over which he exercised suzerainty for eight years. Although the biblical writer speaks only of the effects on Israel, even a cursory consideration of the topography and geography of Cisjordan makes it clear that it is unlikely that Israel was the primary target of the invasion. One view suggests that the events reported in the biblical account should be seen in the broader context of then contemporary events in the region, especially with regard to the internal political problems that surfaced in Egypt toward the end of the thirteenth century. Following the death of Merneptah, which brought the Nineteenth Dynasty to a close, there was a period of interregnum in Egypt during which a "Horite" or possibly an Aramaean seized the Egyptian throne for a time until Rameses III (c. 1200-1170), founder of the Twentieth Dynasty, restored order in the country. When one takes this development into consideration, it seems most likely that an Aramaean invasion from the north would have the riches of Egypt rather than the relatively meager pickings in Canaan or Israel as its primary objective.16 As a practical matter, the invasion routes from the north would have brought the Aramaeans first and foremost into the areas under control of the numerous autonomous Canaanite city-states and principalities, because it was they who controlled the valleys and lowlands through which the invaders would pass en route to Egypt. The Israelites, who for the most part had their settlements in the hill country straddling the invasion routes, would surely have been subject to forays to prevent them from interfering with the main activity of the Aramaeans, particularly in strategically sensitive areas, but it is most unlikely that they were the primary targets at this stage of their history.

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Ultimately, the biblical writer informs us that Othniel ben Kenaz of Judah, nephew and son-in-law of Caleb and a hero of the wars of conquest under Joshua, filled the leadership vacuum that prevailed after the death of Joshua and took matters into his own hands. One might assume that his military reputation from an earlier period enabled him to muster sufficient support to mount a successful rebellion against Aramaean suzerainty, which was probably carried out in conjunction with the Canaanites, who presumably found it in their interest to forge a temporary alliance with their Israelite enemies for the purpose of dealing with the immediate foreign threat to their interests, a pattern of behavior repeated throughout the history of the Middle East. Moreover, it also seems likely that the Israelite rebellion took place at a time when the Egyptians had resolved their domestic crisis and were in a position to force an Aramaean retreat not only from Egypt but also from the Egyptian sphere of influence in southern Canaan. The time was propitious for an Israelite insurrection to assure that the Aramaeans did not remain in the area and, under the circumstances of a withdrawal from Egypt proper, it makes sense that an Israelite rising would take place in the southern tribal area of Judah first to help spur the complete withdrawal of the Aramaeans from Cisjordan. In any case, under the leadership of Othniel, Israel managed to bring about the expulsion of the Aramaean forces from its territories. It is noteworthy that Othniel is the only shofet specifically identified by the biblical writer as originating from a clan affiliated with Judah, the dominant tribal power in the southern part of the country, although two of the "minor" shofetim, Shamgar and Izban, are also assumed to have served in Judah. Inspired by his success, Othniel evidently decided to assume the role of successor to Joshua, or as the biblical writer put it, "And the spirit of the Lord came upon him, and he judged Israel" (Jud. 3:10), apparently managing to maintain the peace both with regard to foreign affairs and intertribal relations until his death decades later. It is not clear whether Othniel was able to enlist all or any of the other tribes in his campaigns, although he presumably did so to some extent since fully expelling the Aramaeans from the country would have required military activity in the northern tribal areas as well. It may be that the emerging north-south struggle for dominance in Israel between the tribes of Ephraim and Judah was already in evidence and Judah's assumption of the leadership role in the struggle for liberation from the Aramaeans may have exacerbated the internecine rivalry. It may also be that Judah's relative isolation in the southern hill country, far from the trade and communications routes that traversed the northern and Transjordanian tribal areas, gave it a respite from the contentious international relations that primarily plagued the north until the emergence of the Philistine threat to Judah's security. In any case, there is no evidence, biblical or other, of a tribal confederacy during the era that at any time encom-

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passed all or even most of the tribes, perhaps because until confronted with Philistine expansionism across the length of the country most of the external threats to the Israelites tended to be localized. With Israelite settlement concentrated primarily in the hill country, population surpluses from tribes such as Benjamin, which was wedged into a small territory between the major tribes of Ephraim and Judah, tended to move back across the Jordan into the fertile lands of Gilead. Similarly, additional contingents from the tribe of Manasseh settled in the sparsely populated areas north of the Jabbok. While the consolidation of Israelite settlement and control'in the region north of the Jabbok went largely uncontested, the situation was very different in the affluent region of Transjordan between the Jabbok and the Arnon, the area occupied by the tribes of Reuben and Gad. Here a complex power struggle developed between the Israelites and the neighboring states of Edom, Moab, and Ammon, a struggle that lasted for some two centuries. Although the Israelites found themselves in conflict primarily with the Moabites and Ammonites, Edom being too far south to be of immediate concern, the state of Edom's relations with Moab had a significant effect on the latter's ability to withstand pressure from both the Ammonites and the Israelites. Edom thus served as a lever for altering the regional balance of power among these small states. The first of the localized threats materialized with the northward expansion of the Moabites, who had only recently consolidated their position in Transjordan. The first priority of the Moabite king Eglon was to recover the lands occupied by the Israelite tribe of Reuben, lands that had once been Moabite. To accomplish this goal, Eglon entered into an antiIsraelite alliance with his northeastern neighbors, the Ammonites, whose access to the Jordan valley was blocked by the Israelite tribes who occupied the tableland on the river's eastern bank. Eglon also enlisted the aid of the Amalekites, Bedouins who roamed the Sinai desert and had a history of conflict with the Israelites, whom they challenged unsuccessfully when the latter crossed the Negev to reach Transjordan in the days of Moses. It would appear that at this point, Moab was the dominant power among the peoples east of the Jordan and the Dead Sea. The Moabites and Amalekites crossed the Arnon and overran the area occupied by the tribe of Reuben, which was unable to mobilize the support necessary to stymie the Moabite advance. They then joined forces with their Ammonite allies, defeating whatever forces the Gileadites were able to muster, effectively taking control of much of the Israelite-held territory in Transjordan. It is noteworthy that the biblical writers record nothing of any attempts by the western Israelite tribes to come to the assistance of their Transjordanian brethren in their hour of need, again reflecting the tenuous nature of any effective Israelite tribal confederacy. Following the conquest of the territory associated with Reuben, and

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having secured most of the region between the Arnon and the Jabbok, the Moabites, for the first time since the arrival of the Israelites in the region, were in a position to expand westward into Cisjordan as the Israelites had done earlier. And, sensing Israelite weakness "on account of the disorders of their political government," as Josephus put it, the time seemed opportune for a Moabite thrust across the Jordan and the extension of Moabite control to some of the Israelite-held territory in Cisjordan.17 The Moabite-Ammonite-Amalekite alliance then forced its way into Cisjordan, where they seized control of the site of the ruins of the ancient city and, more important, the lush oasis of Jericho, which they occupied and used as a forward base from which to dominate the area. This placed them on a collision course with the tribe of Benjamin, which had nominal control of the territory under attack. We may assume that the tribal elders called for help from the neighboring Israelite tribes of Judah and Ephraim, but once again no aid was forthcoming. As a result, Benjamin was overrun and subjugated for a period of some eighteen years, during which it was compelled to pay onerous tribute to Eglon. The intriguing question is why none of the other tribes came to the assistance of Benjamin, given that the Moabite-Ammonite-Amalekite invasion of Cisjordan posed a direct potential security threat to them as well. One possible answer is that the Moabite alliance may have elected not to attempt to penetrate the principal areas of Israelite settlement in the hill country. Another, perhaps more geopolitically realistic, is that Moab was too small a nation to be able to dominate the much larger and more populous Israelite areas of settlement, and was therefore not considered a serious military threat by the other tribes. Finally, there is a third possibility, which helps explain why, in his history, Josephus chose to rearrange the sequence of events recorded in the biblical book of Judges. According to the biblical account (Jud. 19:1-30), an incident took place earlier in the town of Gibeah in Benjamin that earned the tribe the status of a pariah that no one was willing to assist. This incident had significant parallels with the story of the depravity displayed by the men of Sodom and Gomorrah (Gen. 19:1-9) and culminated in the perpetration of an atrocity that brought the indignation of the several Israelite tribes, led by Ephraim, to a boiling point. When the Benjamites refused to turn over the perpetrators to the representatives of the ad hoc Israelite tribal alliance, a bloody civil war broke out, which took a heavy toll on both sides but resulted in the destruction of much of Benjamin and its cities and towns, and its complete ostracism from the rest of Israel.18 This bitter internecine conflict and its outcome would explain why no one in Israel would lift a finger to help the outcast tribe when it came under attack by the Moabite alliance. Moreover, as one historian of the period observed: "But time and again in biblical historiography such seemingly private, individual family incidents actually reflect historio-political events. The actual background

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to this story was undoubtedly provided by inter-tribal rivalry for hegemony in Israel, especially that between Ephraim and Benjamin."19 Toward the end of the period of alien occupation, the biblical writer tells us, the Benjamites finally came to the general public realization of the fact that they had themselves been the primary cause of their problems. They acknowledged that their oppression by the Moabite-led alliance, and the failure of their fellow Israelites to come to their aid, was a consequence of their faithlessness to their cultural heritage and took steps to redeem and reestablish themselves within the faith community of Israel. However, this would happen only after Benjamin itself took dramatic steps toward its own self-liberation. Thus, "when the children of Israel cried unto the Lord, the Lord raised them up a savior, Ehud the son of Gera, the Benjamite" (Jud. 3:15). According to the biblical chronicler, Ehud's father Gera was the grandson of the tribal ancestor's first-born (1 Chron. 8:3), making Ehud the scion of one of Benjamin's most prominent families and therefore a likely candidate for tribal leadership. It appears that Ehud, in an act of great daring and personal danger, contrived to assassinate the Moabite king Eglon in the course of delivering the tribal tribute payment to him in Moab. The biblical writer recounts the slaying of Eglon with great relish and with historically relevant detail. "Ehud made him a sword which had two edges, of a cubit length; and he girded it under his raiment upon his right thigh . . . And Ehud put forth his left hand, and took the sword from his right thigh, and thrust it into his belly .. . and it came out behind" (Jud. 3:16-23). Many questions have been raised by scholars about how Ehud was able to pull off this off without being disarmed before entering the king's chamber. However, as one archaeologist points out, the answer is provided in part by the history of armament. In the period under consideration, throughout the Middle East, the sword in common use was the scimitar, a curved single-edged blade used for hacking, which because of its shape would be difficult to conceal under one's clothes. Accordingly, Ehud had a special short doubleedged straight sword, designed for thrusting, made for him, a sword that he could wear under his clothes without incurring any suspicion.20 This coupled with his either being left-handed or ambidextrous, and therefore wearing the blade on his right side instead of the usual left was sufficient to deceive the guards into believing he was unarmed. Scholars have also noted that there is a biblical reference to 700 left-handed slingers from the tribe of Benjamin (Jud. 20:16), raising the possibility that many Benjamite men were specially trained to be left-handed fighters to afford a tactical advantage over an enemy in combat.21 In any case, Ehud then made good his escape back across the Jordan to the highlands of Ephraim, out of Moabite reach.22 From there, Ehud called upon the Ephraimites to follow his lead and pounce on the disoriented Moabites while they were preoccupied with the problems of the succes-

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sion to Eglon. "And he said unto them: "Follow after me; for the Lord hath delivered your enemies the Moabites into your hand" (Jud. 3:28). Presumably because of his personal charisma as a bona fide hero, and perhaps because of the disarray among the Moabite leadership and its effects on the Moabite-Ammonite-Amalekite alliance, coupled with Benjamin's earnest desire to reassociate with the other Israelite tribes after a sufficient period of penance, the Ephraimites decided not only to join Ehud's campaign against foreign occupation and rule but probably to take charge of it. "And they went down after him, and took the fords of the Jordan against the Moabites, and suffered not a man to pass over" (Jud. 3:28). Instead of immediately attacking the Moabites ensconced in Jericho, Ehud and the Ephraimites first took steps to cut off a Moabite retreat across the Jordan. Had they done otherwise, allowing the Moabite army to withdraw intact, it might only be a matter of a short time before they returned in even greater force. The Israelite intent, therefore, was to preclude this from happening by seizing the main fording points along the river in the vicinity of Jericho, thereby trapping the Moabite forces on the west bank of the Jordan. By so doing they also precluded the Moabites on the east bank from coming to the relief of their trapped compatriots. The Israelites were going to send a clear message to Moab to cease and desist all future efforts to establish a Moabite foothold in Cisjordan. That message would be inferred from the virtual annihilation of the Moabite army of occupation (Jud. 3:29), and it appears to have had the desired effect. We may also presume that, with the Moabite alliance in disarray, the Israelite tribes in Transjordan were able to reassert their independence, pushing both the Moabites and Ammonites back to their own territories. However, it also seems likely that Reuben never fully recovered from the mauling it received and therefore was no longer in any position to play a significant role in the political affairs of the nation. In any case, at least for the next several decades, both the Moabite and Ammonite threats to Israel remained inconsequential. Sometime during the latter part of the twelfth century, the prevailing untenable and highly volatile situation in Cisjordan, in which the Israelites controlled the northern hill country and the Canaanite city-states dominated the lowlands, reached the point of explosion. It seems likely that the growth of Israelite power in this region brought about a temporary alliance of the remaining Canaanite city-states in the Jezreel valley, the most important of which were Taanach, Megiddo, and Jokneam, Dor on the Mediterranean coast, Kedesh in the northern part of the tribal area of Naphtali, and Hazor, whose king Jabin was acknowledged as leader of the northern Canaanite alliance. It also seems likely that the alliance had the support of the Philistines, who were moving northward along the coast from their southern bases. Although the Philistines were also a threat

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to the Canaanites, they may have found common cause in preventing Israelite expansion, operating on the basis of the adage that the enemy of my enemy is my friend, albeit even if only temporarily. As will be seen later in this chapter, this joint effort was the converse of what happened in the south where there appeared to be a temporary alliance of the Israelites and Canaanites against the Philistines, the latter being seen by both as the greater threat.23 The die was cast for war when Sisera, who was probably a Philistine serving as temporary field commander of the Canaanite alliance, the headquarters of which was located in Hazor, took control of the forest area skirting the northern fringe of the Jezreel valley known to the biblical writer as Haroshet-Goiim, or Haroshet of the Gentiles. The latter was a strategically important position that dominated the narrow pass connecting the Jezreel valley to the northern coastal plain, in addition to the roads linking the Galilee region to the Sea of Galilee and the Jordan valley. Its occupation by the Canaanites threatened to upset the prevailing balance of power by isolating the centers of Israelite settlement from one another. It thus served as the tripwire for a major Canaanite-Israelite confrontation. The first to feel the Canaanite threat were the small northern borderland tribes of Issachar, Naphtali, and Zebulun, which were unable to cope with the threat without, at a minimum, the support of the larger and more powerful tribes of the interior, Manasseh and Ephraim. The latter were induced to join with the weaker borderland tribes by Deborah, a highly respected forensic judge as well as a prophetess whose tribal affiliation is uncertain but assumed by some to be that of Ephraim, who clearly perceived the need to rekindle the sense of mutual welfare and the fighting spirit that had enabled the conquest and settlement to take place under Joshua. As a result of her efforts, half of the Israelite tribes, ranging from Benjamin in the south to Naphtali in the north, united temporarily under her banner and that of her military commander Barak ben Avinoam of Naphtali. Barak was a seasoned soldier who only reluctantly accepted the burden of actual command of the Israelite forces against an evidently superior foe under Deborah's inspired strategic guidance. The brunt of the struggle was borne by the tribes of Naphtali and Zebulun, a secondary role being played by the other tribal participants, which included Isaachar, Machir (Manasseh), Ephraim, and Benjamin. Despite Deborah's call to all the northern tribes for assistance, Reuben and Gad in Transjordan, and Asher and Dan, the latter most probably already located far to the north at the time, whose interests were not directly threatened, declined or were unable to participate. Judah and Simeon, preoccupied with their own enemies far to the south, were never even considered as potential allies in the conflict. The campaign against the Canaanites culminated in a decisive battle that took place near the foot of Mount Tabor, probably in the latter part

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of the twelfth century. The Israelite coalition fielded a combined force of a size that proved capable of overcoming the technological and tactical advantages possessed by the Canaanites. In her wisdom, Deborah, whose primary concern had to be with finding a means by which to neutralize the enemy's chariot forces, provided Barak with the basic strategy and concept of a battle plan for defeating the powerful Canaanite alliance. "Hath not the Lord God of Israel commanded, saying, Go and draw toward Mount Tabor, and take with thee ten thousand men of the children of Naphtali and the children of Zebulun? And I will draw unto thee, to the river Kishon, Sisera the captain of Jabin's army, with his chariots and his multitude; and I will deliver him into thine hand" (Jud. 4:6-7). The battle was evidently timed to coincide with the onset of the rainy season, enabling the Israelite alliance to take special advantage of the terrain in their strategy. As suggested in the analysis of the conflict by two military historians, Deborah conceived of a three-phase campaign to defeat the Canaanite forces.24 The first phase involved the mobilization of a substantial Israelite force on Mount Tabor, an easily defensible position that could serve as a staging area for attacks against an enemy in the valley below. Deborah correctly anticipated that, when Sisera learned of the Israelite deployment at Mount Tabor, he would move all of his available forces to contain Barak on the mountain, hoping to draw him down into a battle on the open plains where the Canaanite chariots would decimate the Israelite infantry. Accordingly, in the second phase, Deborah proposed to employ the forces she gathered in Ephraim to draw Sisera away from Mount Tabor towards the swampy region of the Kishon River in the western Jezreel valley, where the maneuverability of the Canaanite forces would be severely hampered by the terrain. Once the Canaanites were bogged down there, the third and final phase of the campaign would be launched. Barak and his troops would swoop down from the mountain to attack Sisera's rear, as the other Israelites mounted a counterattack. The Canaanites would thus be caught in a vise from which there was no effective escape. As it turned out, according to the biblical account, Deborah's strategy proved successful and the Canaanite coalition was dealt a staggering, even if not completely decisive, defeat. From a military perspective, "Its historical importance arises from the fact that, for the first time, the Hebrew mountaineers were victorious on the open plain over the war-chariots of the city-dwellers." 25 From a geopolitical perspective, it was important because for the first time since the Israelite invasion there was now some territorial contiguity between the tribes of the Galilee and those of the central part of the country, enabling the tribe of Zebulun to move west to the sea, even though the Canaanites continued to remain a force to be reckoned with in the Jezreel valley. It should also be noted that the alliance forged by

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Deborah appears to have fallen apart as soon as the immediate crisis was over. One unanticipated consequence of the weakening of Canaanite power in the north was the upsurge of repeated and increasingly damaging incursions into the area by camel-riding raiders from the eastern desert, Midianites, Amalekites, and Ishmaelites. These depredations represented a significant threat to the security of the Israelite settlements for more than a century. Facing a passive and lackluster defense by the Transjordanian tribes of Reuben and Gad, the raiders felt encouraged to probe farther and farther inland from the desert. Eventually, they developed sufficient selfconfidence to cross the Jordan and mount a massive invasion of the country, devastating its economy as they advanced. And the hand of Midian prevailed against Israel .. . And so it was, when Israel had sown, that the Midianites came up, and the Amalekites and the children of the east . . . and they encamped against them, and destroyed the increase of the earth, till thou come unto Gaza, and left no sustenance for Israel, neither sheep, nor ox, nor ass. For they came up with their cattle and their tents, and they came as grasshoppers for multitude; for both they and their camels were without number; and they entered the land to destroy it. (Jud. 6:1-5) These raids were not for the purpose of territorial expansion, but for plunder, a tribal practice among non-sedentary groups that was common practice in the general region until very modern times. As one scholar points out, "Among the non-sedentary groups in the Near East in both ancient and modern times the sense of property has always been different from that prevailing among sedentary peoples; among the former, plundering has never been considered a crime provided that it happens in connection with groups which are not bound either by ties of affinity or by alliances."26 For a period of seven years, much of the territory of the northern tribes came under virtual control of the semi-nomadic Midianites, who were operating far from their traditional grounds far to the south in the Arabian Desert. To a large extent, such raiding was a natural consequence of life in semi-arid areas, where at least eight inches of annual rainfall is essential for settled agricultural existence unless supplemented by ground water irrigation. However, in the land-bridge region, the six-inch isohyet (the line connecting points of equal rainfall) passes south of Beersheba and east of Amman, making settled agricultural life beyond that line highly tenuous and subject to major disruption by even a minor fluctuation in the annual amount of precipitation. When the latter occurred, the tribesmen of the desert regions had little choice but to seek short-term access to more fertile areas. However, during periods of extended drought, a not uncommon phenomenon in the region, desperation drove the nomads to

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seek to occupy fertile areas for as long as possible. The only way to prevent such long-term incursions from the desert was to organize substantial border defenses, something that required a degree of central coordination that was still absent among the autonomous Israelite tribes. Especially hard hit by the Midianite depredations was the tribe of Manasseh, whose settlements bordered on the Jezreel valley, which served as the gateway to the interior of the areas of Israelite settlement and control as well as to the Mediterranean coast. However, it must also be recognized that the Jezreel valley was also peppered with Canaanite settlements that were subject to the same depredations as their Israelite neighbors. The Midianites gained the initial advantage by exhibiting great maneuverability in the deployment of their forces, having "learned how to use the recently domesticated camel with terrifying effectiveness in longrange raids." 27 In the absence of any significant organized opposition to the raiders, reflecting the traditional lack of unity among the tribes and sometimes even among the clans of a single tribe, Gideon the son of Joash, a member of the clan of the Abiezerites, whose brothers apparently had earlier been the victims of a Midianite raid, took it upon himself to reverse the deteriorating security situation. Although from a presumably undistinguished family, Gideon was possessed of a charisma that inspired those who came in contact with him, and he soon rallied the Abiezerites to his banner. His success in doing so subsequently brought the rest of the clans of Manasseh to him as well. Before long he was able to mobilize a sizeable force drawn from the tribes of Asher, Zebulun, and Naphtali, and later augmented by additional troops from Ephraim. The tribal leaders of Ephraim, which considered itself the preeminent tribe in the northern region and therefore its natural leader, were quite peeved at not being consulted beforehand but nonetheless saw it as in their interest to join in the campaign against the invaders. It also seems probable that the nature of the Midianite threat was such that an uneasy alliance was probably concluded with some of the Canaanites of the region who were confronted by the same danger. As one writer put it, "No longer were the opposing sides Israelites and Canaanites; the whole settled population, however varied their ancestry, were forced to unite against the nomadic raiders." 28 Gideon's test as a leader came soon, when the forces under his command engaged the Midianites in what was to prove to be a decisive battle that took place in the valley between Mount Tabor and the Hill of Moreh, where the main Midianite body was encamped. Gideon's tactical problem was that his infantry force could not effectively defeat mounted cavalry— he had to catch them off guard when they were dismounted. Mobilizing an elite strike force of some 300 specially selected men that he divided into three contingents, each small enough to move about without risking early detection, Gideon mounted an audacious night raid on the Midianite camp that caught them completely unprepared. The three groups of raid-

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ers struck the Midianite camp at night from different directions causing chaos and disorientation in the dark, with the result that the Midianites ended by killing and wounding a substantial number of their own men. As the remaining Midianites sought to escape what they took to be a massive assault on their position, Gideon used his large reserve forces, some 32,000 men according to the biblical account, to block their movement westward. He thereby maneuvered them into a killing field between Mount Gilboa, the eastern slopes of the Samarian ridge, and the Jordan River, as men from Ephraim seized the Jordan fords south of the Sea of Galilee, effectively preventing most of the Midianites from withdrawing across the river. By the use of guerrilla tactics and superior generalship, Gideon succeeded in inflicting a decisive defeat on the Midianites and their allies, annihilating most of their forces as they attempted to flee to safety across the Jordan. The victory might have been even more complete had Gideon given the Ephraimites adequate advance notice of his battle plan. However, it seems that intertribal rivalry prevented this from happening until the last minute, resulting in some of the crossing points remaining open. As a result, the principal Midianite chieftains managed to make their way across the Jordan, with Gideon and his raiders in hot pursuit. Moving quickly, without a supply train to slow him down, Gideon sought to obtain provisions for his exhausted men from two cities along his route, (scholars are divided over whether these were Israelite cities), but the elders of these cities refused to help him out of fear of reprisals should the Israelites fail to annihilate the Midianites. They evidently had not considered the reprisals Gideon might inflict if he was successful and had a score to settle with them, which is precisely what happened. Gideon pressed on, decimating the fleeing Midianites and driving the survivors deep into the desert, effectively eliminating them as a significant future security threat. "Thus was Midian subdued before the children of Israel, so that they lifted up their heads no more. And the country was in quietness forty years in the days of Gideon" (Jud. 8:11). As a result of the decisive defeat of the Midianites, which was entirely predicated on the unified efforts of the limited tribal alliance, some of the Israelite tribal elders evidently began to display an interest in developing a new political structure that would change the traditional relationship between the tribes. Thus, the tribes of Asher and Zebulun apparently sought to reach some sort of political union with Manasseh under Gideon's leadership. According to the biblical account, some of their leaders were prepared to offer Gideon a hereditary monarchy, but nothing came of the effort, probably because others fiercely opposed the idea. Gideon is reported to have declined the offer (Jud. 8:23), although he does appear to have exercised virtual monarchic authority over the limited tribal confederacy. This would seem to be evidenced by the royal style in which he

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appears to have lived, given that he is reported to have had a harem of numerous wives who bore him some seventy sons, according to the biblical writer (Jud. 8:30). It is therefore reasonable to conclude that Gideon had become a monarch de facto albeit not de jure. As a practical matter, it probably would have been premature at the time to attempt to establish a formal monarchy with tight central control over the fiercely independent Israelite tribes. Nonetheless, the idea of becoming a king, with all the attendant royal prerogatives, had great appeal for Abimelech, one of Gideon's sons. Following his father's death, Abimelech approached the notables of Shechem with the proposal that they back him in seizing power and establishing a monarchy that would incorporate those tribal areas that Gideon ruled as a shofet. Since Shechem was at this time a non-Israelite city in the tribal area of Manasseh, his actions require some explanation. Presumably, the rationale for his proceeding in this manner was his expectation of Canaanite support for his assumption of the crown, based on the fact that he himself was the son of Gideon by a Canaanite woman from Shechem, allowing the Canaanites to view him at least in part as one of their own (Jud. 9:1-6). As such, he may also have anticipated the support of the general Canaanite population in the region, which presumably could be induced to see Abimelech's focus on Shechem as suggesting that it was his intent to resurrect the previous Canaanite city-state that was centered there. With Shechemite financial support, Abimelech carried out a coup d'etat and, following common practice in dynastic struggles in the ancient Middle East, murdered all of his siblings, except for the youngest, Jotham, who managed to escape and who later attempted unsuccessfully to provoke an insurrection against his half-brother. Abimelech then proclaimed an Israelite kingdom in the area that had been under Gideon's control, with himself as monarch and Shechem as his capital, although he soon moved his actual seat of government to a more defensible location outside the city. This brief experiment in monarchy lasted but three years before Abimelech met his end while attempting to suppress an insurrection mounted by his erstwhile Canaanite supporters. We have no specific information about what triggered the revolt, other than a growing dissatisfaction with being ruled by an Israelite, a grievance that was promoted by some Canaanite elements that would today be labeled as nationalists. However, a significant clue to what precipitated the insurrection is provided in the biblical passage that observes that, as a result of the growing rift between Abimelech and the people of Shechem, the latter "set liers-in-wait for him on the tops of the mountains, and they robbed all that came along that way by them" (Jud. 9:25). The question to be answered is why the people of Shechem turned to highway robbery as an expression of their opposition to Abimelech's rule.

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The probable answer to this question emerges from a consideration of the geographical location of Shechem, which is positioned at the mouth of the gap between Mount Ebal and Mount Gerizim, through which the main road that traverses the central mountain range passes. As a result, all caravan traffic passing through the area had to go through Shechem, which not only made it a major market center but also a point for collection of the tolls that were routinely imposed on caravans passing through such market centers, providing lucrative income for the city, which was managed and distributed by the city elders. However, it would seem that Abimelech, in need of revenue to support his establishment, might have converted the collection of tolls into a royal monopoly, in disregard of the common practice, thereby alienating the city leaders who now saw the monarchy under Abimelech as a liability rather than an asset. Presumably, some of the more volatile Shechemites resorted to highway robbery as a way of denying the king income from his misappropriation of the traffic tolls, their assumption being that caravans that were robbed would claim that it was Abimelech's responsibility to provide security for traffic passing through his kingdom in exchange for the tolls he collected from them, and that he therefore was obligated to make good their losses. Whether Abimelech ever did so can only be a matter of conjecture, the more important point being that the robberies clearly represented a direct challenge to his ability to maintain order in his kingdom. Israelite hopes for an extended period of relative peace after their recent victories were soon dispelled by the geopolitical realities of the region. The decline of Moabite power following its defeat by Ehud, and Gideon's defeat of the Midianites, actually facilitated the unanticipated emergence of the Ammonite attempt to fill the power vacuum in Transjordan that the Israelite victories created. Ammon, which straddled the King's Highway, was able to control the caravan trade along the strategic route to Damascus. However, its location on the fringe of the desert provided it virtually no strategic depth, making its security highly dependent on heavy fortifications to protect its centers, and it now sought to break out of its marginal position and expand westward, at least to the banks of the Jordan. Ammonite expansion westward would come, of course, at the expense of the Israelite-held region along the east bank of the Jordan. The Ammonites undertook a long series of incursions in the region north of Moab between the Arnon and the Jabbok, and began occupying some of the pasture used by the Israelite tribes domiciled in Transjordan, a process that continued for nearly two decades, according to the biblical account. Emboldened by the lack of a serious response from the complacent Israelites, the Ammonites even mounted incursions across the Jordan, making pinprick strikes in Benjamin, Judah, and Ephraim. Finally, the situation reached the point where the Ammonite freedom of action in Gilead was correctly seen as a significant threat to their collective security,

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and the tribal elders of Reuben, Gad, and Manasseh convened at Mizpah, north of the Jabbok, to consider how to respond to the Ammonite aggression. It was decided to appoint a general who would undertake leadership of the campaign to repel the Ammonites, and that whoever was chosen would become "head over all the inhabitants of Gilead" (Jud. 10:18). In effect, the elders had reached the point where they were prepared to surrender their traditional political authority to a tyrant, if only he would stop the Ammonite expansion into their territories. As it turned out, they were unable to concur on a candidate from among their own ranks and reluctantly agreed to approach Jephthah son of Gilead, an expatriate Gileadite, with regard to taking the position. Their willingness to offer the post to Jephthah may be taken as an indication of their degree of exasperation and concern for their futures. Jephthah was an illegitimate child who had been driven away from his home by his legitimate siblings to prevent him from sharing in the family inheritance. An outcast in Gileadite society, he relocated to a region farther to the north, where he gathered about him a band of freebooters and lived as a Bedouin chief, raiding throughout the area. However, over the years he developed a widely acknowledged reputation as an audacious and highly competent leader, which is what the tribal elders now desperately needed. Even so, in their initial approach to Jephthah, the tribal leaders backtracked from their agreement at Mizpah regarding the scope of the position to be offered. The thought of making an outcast head over all the inhabitants of Gilead evidently rankled too much and, instead, they proposed to Jephthah, "come and be our chief, that we may fight with the children of Ammon" (Jud. 11:6), that is, they invited him to take up leadership of the struggle and nothing more. In other words, they were offering him a temporary appointment as commander of the forces they would mobilize for the coming conflict. Because of his prior personal history as an outcast from respectable Israelite society, Jephthah refused to accept their offer, taunting them for having first made him an outcast and then turning to him in their hour of need. Evidently desperate to obtain his agreement to lead the struggle, the elders raised the stakes for him by offering what they had originally agreed to before they decided to approach Jephthah, namely, that if he undertook leadership of the campaign against the Ammonites, "thou shalt be our head over all the inhabitants of Gilead" (Jud. 11:8). This was an offer the former outcast and bandit chief could hardly refuse. He surely took pleasure in having the tribal elders escort him back to Gilead, where his appointment as general was given popular approval (Jud. 11:11). Jephthah's first surprising move as political-military leader of Gilead was an apparent attempt to negotiate a settlement with the Ammonites rather than to immediately take to the battlefield. It may be that he was stalling for time until he could properly assess the military situation, or

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that he was delaying action until he had a better idea of what kind of support he might obtain from the other tribes. He dispatched an embassy to the king of the Ammonites to determine the reasons behind their aggressive behavior and their attempt to take over large sections of Israelite territory. The response he received was that the Ammonites had a claim to the territory between the Arnon and the Jabbok that anteceded the Israelite occupation, and that they were now taking the necessary steps to give effect to their claim. Jephthah responded in turn that the Ammonite claim was not historically well grounded since the Amorites had already conquered the territory in question, and that it was from them that Israel took the territory as a prize of war. Moreover, much of the region north of the Arnon was originally Moabite and not Ammonite (Jud. 11:12-28). It is of interest to note that in the course of Jephthah's response to the Ammonites, as recounted by the biblical writer, he made the assertion, "Wilt not thou possess that which Chemosh thy god giveth thee to possess? So whomsoever the Lord our God hath dispossessed from before us, them will we possess." The clear implication of this argument is that "There are two peoples at war, rivaling one another in expanding their respective territories, each under his own god. But only the peoples, not their gods, are at war with one another. At least, there is no hint of one's god expanding at the expense of the other one. If a people is defeated, it is not because the enemy's god was stronger, but because its own god was angry."29 By acknowledging that the Ammonites had their national god, just as Israel had its, Jephthah reflected a still primitive concept of monolatry rather than the more abstract monotheism taught by Moses, which was more clearly articulated later by the prophets under the pressure of objective circumstances unfavorable to the Israelites. It also exemplifies the challenge experienced throughout the ancient period of restraining the drift of the Israelites toward the less abstruse belief systems held by their neighbors and their more tangible pagan expressions in worship practices. Jephthah soon concluded that the dubious Ammonite territorial claim was merely an excuse and that the true reason for the aggression was Israel's display of weakness, something he would have to rectify. The other tribes largely ignored his call to arms and he therefore mobilized an army composed primarily of Gileadites that soon took to the field against the Ammonites and inflicted a major defeat on them. No details of the campaign are preserved in the texts, other than that a large number of Ammonite towns were attacked and that they suffered very heavy casualties (Jud. 11:33). Sensitive to the realities of intertribal politics, and remembering the reaction in Ephraim when Gideon had failed to consult them before undertaking the Midianite war, Jephthah also invited Ephraim to participate in the struggle against Ammon. In the former instance, Ephraim did ul-

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timately participate in the conflict, primarily because its own real interests were at stake. In the present case, however, the Ammonite threat to Ephraim was remote and the tribal elders were preoccupied with a concern about the continuing incremental expansion of the Philistines from their coastal enclaves in the direction of the northern foothills. As a result, and evidently peeved that Jephthah had not consulted with them prior to his initiating an effort to mobilize a pan-tribal army, they chose not to respond to Jephthah's call to arms, notwithstanding the reasonable expectation that, without their help, the Gileadites would fail in their efforts to dislodge the Ammonites. However, once Jephthah was seen as prosecuting a successful war against a longstanding enemy without Ephraimite assistance, the tribal elders viewed this as a threat to their aspirations to primacy among the Israelite tribes and felt compelled to confront Jephthah over his failure to await their response, which they considered as a deliberate slight. It is important to note the progressive development of Ephraim's sense of self-importance over the period from Deborah, when Ephraim was simply a minor participant in the conflict, to the time of Gideon, when it was a grudging participant, and then to the time of Jephthah, when it refused to participate because it had not been consulted beforehand and was occupied with other matters it considered as being of a higher priority. Possibly because the Tabernacle was located at Shiloh in Ephraim, the Ephraimites reached the point where they considered themselves as the natural leader of the loose Israelite confederation and demanded respect for their presumed authority from the other tribes. By contrast with Gideon, who sought to appease the Ephraimites and thereby maintain neighborly relations between them and his own tribe of Manasseh, Jephthah, who had a very different sort of personality, flatly rejected their presumption of tribal primacy as well as their criticism of his peremptory actions. This set the stage for a test of wills that soon erupted into an intertribal conflict that had disastrous short-term consequences for Ephraim, which had dispatched a punitive expeditionary force to Gilead that was soundly defeated by Jephthah's army (Jud. 12:1-6). At about the same time that an era of relative stability appeared to taking hold on Israel's eastern frontiers, as a consequence of the successive and successful struggles discussed above, a much greater challenge was emerging from the Mediterranean coastal region, already alluded to, which would have enormous impact on the subsequent history of the nation as a whole. Once having come to terms with Egypt during the twelfth century, the Philistines turned their attention to consolidating their presence along much of the Mediterranean coast between Sinai to the south and Phoenicia to the north, a process that took place over an extended period of time. The Philistines represented an alien force that the decadent Canaanite city-states of the coastal plain were unable to cope with effectively,

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and to which they soon succumbed. The Philistines "were a hardy race of fighting men, well equipped with the resources of an advanced and ancient civilization. They were survivors of heroic wars and of desperate hardships in which the weaker elements must have perished, leaving only the sturdier and more durable stock. They found themselves in a land which had no organized or settled government, where, apparently, there could be no concerted effort to oppose them." 30 Initially, they founded five autonomous city-states along the southern maritime plain, centered in Gaza, Gath, Ashkelon, Ashdod, and Ekron. However, these autonomous city-states were organized for security purposes as a powerful pentapolis, a viable military confederation that was able to act in concert, when they so chose, to an extent unknown among the jealously independent Israelite tribes. The Philistines also managed to obtain and maintain a virtual monopoly on the import and forging of iron, a metal newly introduced to the region, which they employed effectively for military use, thereby providing their own relatively small army with a qualitative advantage that they were able to exploit as a force multiplier. Moreover, operating from their fortified and heavily garrisoned cities, the Philistines were able to dominate the major international coastal trade and communications route that traversed the region. It was not to be long before the ambitions of the Philistines and the Israelites collided and a centuries-long struggle erupted between them over dominance of the western lowlands and the coastal plain. Anxious to descend from the hill country to the coastal plain, the Israelites led by Ephraim posed a growing threat to Philistine control of the lucrative trade route linking Egypt and Arabia with Syria and Mesopotamia. At the same time, the Philistines sought to extend their defensive perimeter by building inland frontier posts, which the Israelites saw as preliminary to an invasion of their heartland in the hill country. The biblical writer records, in a very brief notice, an early conflict between the Philistines and the Israelites that evidently took place at an unidentified location at a time when both were in process of establishing control over their respective areas of settlement in the country. In this initial confrontation, the Israelite forces were led by a certain Shamgar ben Anath, about whom we know nothing other than that his name is not Hebrew and the name given as his parent, Anath, is that of a Canaanite war goddess, leading to the likelihood that Shamgar may have been a professional Canaanite warrior, rather than an Israelite. If this is correct, the implication may be that although both the Israelites and the Philistines were encroaching on Canaanite territory, the Canaanites themselves may have seen the better-armed Philistines as the greater immediate danger. Following the popular adage that the enemy of my enemy is my friend, it would appear that the Canaanites and Israelites, primarily those from the southern tribes, entered into a temporary alliance under Shamgar's leadership and

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inflicted heavy casualties on the Philistines that temporarily blocked their advance. Thus, in addition he helping his own people, according to the biblical account, "he also saved Israel" (Jud. 3:31). Decades later, the Danite hero Samson is reported in the biblical account as similarly having been able to hold the Philistines in check for a brief period, through his highly destructive personal exploits in the area between the coast and the hills of Judah. However, in general, the loosely structured and relatively undisciplined local Israelite confederacy could neither repel nor even defend itself successfully against the well-orchestrated Philistine expansionist movement. Indeed, it appears that the tribe of Judah was compelled to acknowledge Philistine suzerainty, their leaders telling Samson, when he sought refuge with them, "Knowest thou not that the Philistines are rulers over us?" (Jud. 15:11). Once having consolidated their control of the southern coastal region and having extended their hegemony farther inland into the territory of Judah, toward the middle of the eleventh century the Philistine leaders became determined to bring an end to the seemingly interminable skirmishes along their frontiers with the Israelites by moving deeper into the foothills in the northern half of the country as well. To facilitate their northward expansion, the Philistines decided to establish their own controlling position on the heights overlooking the Jezreel valley. This represented a direct challenge to the Israelite position in the region that could not be ignored, and soon precipitated a major military confrontation between the two foes. It should be noted, however, that the Philistine advance northward could only have come as a result of the conquest and subjugation of the Canaanites whose settlements in the lowlands lay in the Philistines' path. The forces of the Israelites mobilized to confront the Philistine challenge were primarily from Ephraim, operating under the civil and clerical but not the direct military leadership of the aging Eli, who held court as both high priest and shofet at Shiloh, the only Israelite leader to serve in such a dual capacity. A decisive battle took place around 1050 B.C.E. at Aphek, a strategically important frontier post on the northern edge of the Sharon plain and a gateway to Shechem, along the Via Maris. Aphek lay about twenty-five miles north of Ekron, the northernmost of the main Philistine strongholds, near the Yarkon River, which flows into the Mediterranean at the northern edge of modern Tel Aviv. Abandoning the guerrilla warfare tactics at which they excelled, and meeting the Philistines head on in a pitched battle on ground that favored the enemy, the Israelite forces were badly mauled, losing some 4,000 men according to the biblical account. The Israelites mobilized their forces once more and made another bold attempt to drive the Philistines back. This time, they sought to invoke heaven directly in support of their efforts by bringing the hallowed Ark of the Covenant from the sanctuary at Shiloh

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to the battlefield. The ensuing struggle resulted in a total debacle for the Israelites. The biblical writer asserts that some 30,000 of their troops were slain in the battle, and that the Ark of the Covenant was captured and placed as a trophy in the temple of the Philistine god Dagon at Ashdod (1 Sam. 4:1-22, 5:1-2). Although the Ark was subsequently returned to the Israelites several months later, the Philistines attributing an epidemic that broke out to its presence in their territory, the fact of its initial loss was an unmitigated disaster that brought the morale of the people to the lowest point in generations. With the destruction of the sanctuary at Shiloh, the portable tabernacle originally constructed by Moses was apparently relocated to Nob, in the territory of Benjamin, along with the priests that survived the destruction of the sanctuary, and the Ark of the Covenant itself, which was not brought to the tabernacle at Nob, possibly because of the prevailing instability in the region, was ultimately warehoused in Kiriath-jearim, one of the Hivite cities near Jerusalem that had aligned itself by treaty with the Israelites in the days of Joshua, but now probably found itself within the Philistine sphere of control. The Ark of the Covenant evidently remained there in the care of some Levites for decades before any effort was made to reintroduce it as a national focus of religious attachment. With the loss of Shiloh, Ephraim also gradually lost its tribal preeminence, and the political center of gravity soon shifted farther south to Benjamin. As a consequence of the decisive defeat of the Israelites, the Philistines gained access to the Jezreel valley and the northern highlands and were able to overrun a good part of the territory of Ephraim, apparently destroying Shiloh in the process. The tribes of Ephraim and Benjamin were forced into tributary status. Farther south, the territory allotted to the tribe of Dan under the original Israelite partition scheme for the country was completely annexed by the Philistines, leaving those Danites who were not prepared live under Philistine domination with little choice other than to relocate elsewhere. Those who did not choose to surrender their tribal identity and to integrate into nearby Judah were compelled to relocate en masse to the most northern part of Cisjordan, to the district around the city of Laish in the valleys between the Lebanon and the Anti-Lebanon. They attacked and destroyed Laish, which was then rebuilt and given the name of Dan. En route to the north, according to the biblical account, the Danites passed by the home of a religious renegade in Ephraim who had set up a pagan house of worship, presided over by a Levite who served as its priest. They confiscated the idol and other paraphernalia found there and took them to the north where they established a sanctuary at Dan, presided over by a priesthood alleged to have descended from Moses (Jud. 18:30-31). This bizarre development not only points out the extent of the insinuation of pagan culture and religion into Israel at the time but also

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takes on political significance a b o u t a century a n d a half later in connection with w h a t h a p p e n e d following the collapse of the d u a l m o n a r c h y after the d e a t h of Solomon. In the face of the e x p a n d i n g Philistine p o w e r in Cisjordan, a n d its inability to challenge the Philistines successfully, the prospect for Israel's viability as an i n d e p e n d e n t nation in the land a p p e a r e d rather d i m at this point in its history As one nineteenth-century writer aptly p u t it, it a p p e a r e d that "their G o d h a d a b a n d o n e d t h e m — p e r h a p s m i g h t a p p e a r on the side of their enemies. N o t merely the glory a n d the i n d e p e n d e n c e , even the political existence of Israel s e e m e d d e p a r t e d w i t h the ark, d e p a r t e d for ever." 31 Nonetheless, h a v i n g reached their nadir, the fortunes of Israel w e r e about to take a d r a m a t i c t u r n for the better that w o u l d in the course of a few d e c a d e s b r i n g it to the pinnacle of its political ascend a n c y in ancient times. NOTES 1. Harry M. Orlinsky, Ancient Israel (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 50. 2. Martin Noth, The History of Israel (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), p. 85-97. 3. Aryeh Bartal, Malkhut Shaul (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuhad, 1982), p. 22. 4. Orlinsky, Ancient Israel, pp. 53-53. 5. Martin Buber, Kingship of God (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 76-77. 6. Tomoo Ishida, History and Historical Writing in Ancient Israel: Studies in Biblical Historiography (Leiden: Brill, 1999), pp. 41-42. 7. Giuseppe Ricciotti, The History of Israel, vol. 1 (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1958), p. 240. 8. Hanoch Reviv, MiBeit Av leMamlakhah: Yisrael biTekufat haMikra (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1981), p. 83. 9. Ricciotti, The History of Israel, vol. 1, p. 230. 10. G.A. Cooke, The Book of Judges (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1918), p. 28. 11. Josephus, Antiquities of the lews, 5:3:2. In Complete Works (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel, 1977). 12. Ernst L. Ehrlich, A Concise History of Israel (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 23. 13. John L. McKenzie, The World of the Judges (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1966), p. 122. 14. Joshua Steinberg, Millon haTanakh (Tel Aviv: Izreel, 1960), p. 73. See also Luc. H. Grollenberg, Shorter Atlas of the Bible (New York: Thomas Nelson, 1959), p. 84. Map 2, 'The Wanderings of the Patriarchs/' 15. Henri Daniel-Rops, Israel and the Ancient World: A History of the Israelites from the Time of Abraham to the Birth of Christ (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1949), p. 122. 16. Abraham Malamat, 'The Egyptian Decline in Canaan and the Sea-Peoples," in Benjamin Mazar (ed.), The World History of the Jewish People, vol. 3: Judges (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971), pp. 25-27.

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17. Josephus, Antiquities, 5:4:1. 18. Ben-Tsiyon Luria sets forth the interesting argument that this entire incident actually took place much later during the period between when David became king of Judah and then king of Israel, although he does not really explain why the episode is recounted in the book of Judges. See his Sha'ul uVinyamin: Mehkarim beToldot Shevet Binyamin (Jerusalem: Kiryat Sefer, 1970), pp. 162-82. 19. Malamat, 'The Period of the Judges/' in Mazar, The World History of the Jewish People, p. 162. 20. Yigal Yadin, "Aspektim Tzvayim veArchiologiyim beTiur Kibbush haAretz beSefer Yehoshua," in Chaim Rabin (ed.), lyyunim beSefer Yehoshua (Jerusalem: Kiryat Sepher, 1960), p. 74. 21. James D. Martin, The Book of Judges (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 46. 22. This incident has aroused the interest of many commentators from Josephus to the present, who have parsed every aspect of the story, reinterpreting it in a variety of ways to answer the many questions it raises. These questions and Josephus' s attempt to deal with them, which provides the basis for most subsequent commentary, are discussed at length in Louis H. Feldman, "Josephus's Portrait of Ehud," in John C. Reeves and John Kampen (eds.), Pursuing the Text: Studies in Honor of Ben Zion Wacholder on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994), pp. 177-201. It is noteworthy that many commentators have argued that the assassination must have taken place in Jericho, where Eglon established his headquarters, and not in Moab. However, this view is problematic from both a geographical and political standpoint. The biblical account has Ehud passing by Gilgal during his escape, but Gilgal, according to many scholars, lies to southeast of Jericho and not on the route from Jericho to the hills of Ephraim. Politically, it is unlikely that Eglon would relocate permanently to Jericho; his prolonged absence from his kingdom in Transjordan would have quickly bred instability in what was always a volatile region where not only his allies but Edom and the Midianites also vied for power. 23. J. Alberto Soggin, Judges: A Commentary (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1981), pp. 68, 98. 24. Chaim Herzog and Mordechai Gichon, Battles of the Bible: A Modern Military Evaluation of the Old Testament (New York: Random House, 1978), pp. 48-54. 25. Adolphe Lods, Israel from Its Beginnings to the Middle of the Eighth Century (New York: Knopf, 1962), p. 341. 26. Soggin, Judges, pp. 111-12. 27. William F. Albright, From the Stone Age to Christianity (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1957), p. 287. 28. David F. Payne, Kingdoms of the Lord: A History of the Hebrew Kingdoms from Saul to the Fall of Jerusalem (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1981), p. 17. 29. Voegelin, Eric, Israel and Revelation (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1956), p. 220. 30. Theodore H. Robinson, A History of Israel: From the Exodus to the Fall of Jerusalem, 586 B.C. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 142. 31. Henry Hart Milman, The History of the Jews (London: Routledge, 1878), p. 116.

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CHAPTER 5

From Confederacy to National State

The Philistine victories had traumatic effects on Israel. The loss of Shiloh eliminated the nominal center of the loose tribal confederation, increasing the difficulty of getting the dispersed tribes to act in unison in the face of this unusually powerful enemy that had decimated the Israelite armies as no other had been able to do. Moreover, the Philistines, who also imposed a strict ban on the Israelite manufacture of armaments, consistent with their monopolies on the import and forging of iron, had effectively disarmed the Israelites, or so it was assumed. According to the biblical account, "there was no smith found throughout all the land of Israel, for the Philistines said: Lest the Hebrews make them swords or spears" (1 Sam. 13:19). Indeed, the text goes on to note that the restrictions were so severe that it became necessary for the Israelite farmers to have their iron plows sharpened by Philistine smiths, who charged exorbitant if not prohibitive fees for their services. By placing all such iron-working capability in their own hands, the Philistines hoped to keep the volatile Israelite tribes effectively disarmed and under their control. Needless to point out, such efforts at arms control have never been foolproof, and it would be unrealistic to assume that the Israelites had not successfully obtained and hidden arms or that they did not "illegally" manufacture some, albeit perhaps not enough to equip the number of troops required for a successful insurrection against Philistine suzerainty. Moreover, it seems quite likely that the Philistines also permitted a certain amount of arms to be retained by their Israelite vassals for purposes of internal security, and to assist their Philistine suzerains when called upon, particularly with regard to dealing with raiders coming in from the desert regions.

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It was at this critical time that there arose among the Israelites a powerful and charismatic personality who was able to begin the reconstitution of the people along lines more appropriate to the realities of the changed political environment introduced by the Philistines. Samuel ben Elkanah, portrayed in the biblical sources as a figure of legendary proportions, reintroduced a theopolitical dimension to Israel's political life that had effectively disappeared from view during the period following the death of Joshua. Samuel, who was a disciple of Eli the venerable seer-priest and who came to be revered as a prophet as well as a shofet, was broadly considered by the biblical writers as the true successor of Moses, a view reflected in the work of the psalmist who wrote, "Moses and Aaron among His priests, and Samuel among them that call upon His name, did call upon the Lord, and He answered them" (Ps. 99:6). Engaged in his prophetic vocation from his early youth, Samuel came to exercise a widely acknowledged authority that had eluded the intervening leaders of the nation. Samuel also became the preeminent clerical figure among the Israelites, eclipsing in importance the successor to Eli as chief priest. Ahitub, the grandson of Eli, had survived the destruction of Shiloh and established a new sacral center at Nob, near Jerusalem, where the remaining members of the priesthood gathered and reassembled the tabernacle, albeit without the Ark of the Covenant as its centerpiece. However, the center at Nob did house the ancient oracular device employed by the high priests to determine the divine will with regard to whether certain specific actions were to be undertaken, and Nob thus became a site of religious pilgrimage. Nonetheless, the high priesthood soon slid into virtual political as well as religious irrelevance in the face of Samuel's towering personality and his broad public acceptance as Israel's principal spiritual leader. As a result, from this point on, it was prophecy and the schools of prophets initiated by Samuel that dominated the religious and moral aspects of Israel's existence for the next several centuries. With the nominal capital established by Joshua at Shiloh gone, Samuel was nonetheless able to function effectively out of his home in Ramah, managing to maintain intact the political-military coalition of the regional tribes directly affected by the Philistines, most especially Ephraim and Benjamin, that was originally cobbled together by his mentor Eli. At the same time, Samuel established an ad hoc religious center in the Benjamite city of Mizpah, where periodic public assemblies took place to hear words of encouragement and exhortation from the prophets who came there to disseminate their message. During the period of Samuel's religious and political leadership, it began to be recognized, albeit reluctantly and slowly, that the Israelite tribes would have to be able to present a more coherent defense of their common interests if they were to survive as viable entities. And for those who had

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a grasp of the developments taking place along the Philistine frontiers, this meant that even the relatively remote northern tribes would have to reassess their ability to continue to function as they did in earlier and simpler times. Security concerns alone might make it necessary for them to subordinate their precious autonomy to a stronger, more comprehensive, collective security arrangement that would in itself demand the prior formation of a more effective tribal confederation. Samuel eventually succeeded in getting the Israelites to overcome their despair at the loss of the Ark of the Covenant and the temple at Shiloh, and to begin to focus on how to marshal their energies in common cause. A key factor in accomplishing this was the effective use of religious fervor to uphold and raise the morale of the people. Accordingly, it is at this time that, according to the biblical writer, we first hear of "bands of prophets" roaming the countryside, whipping up religious fervor through music and dance, apparently inducing states of ecstatic elation among those who joined them (1 Sam. 10:5). There is a suggestion by some scholars that these bands may have been formed under the leadership and inspiration of Samuel as a vehicle for encouraging the people to rebel against their Philistine overlords. Others suggest that the bands were comprised of educated but unemployed Levites, who had formerly served at the tabernacle in Shiloh and who now joined in Samuel's revivalist movement. The prophetic message they proclaimed was straightforward; if you redirect your hearts to the God of Israel, "He will deliver you out of the hand of the Philistines" (1 Sam. 7:3). It appears that Saul ben Kish, the future king of Israel, may well have spent some time in one of these prophetic bands, where he first came to the attention of Samuel. In any case, the time was not long in coming before the Israelites, reinvigorated under Samuel's leadership, were prepared to challenge the Philistine hegemony imposed on them. When the moment arrived that he felt the time was ripe for reconstituting the tribal confederation, Samuel called for the convening of a national assembly that met at Mizpah, north of Jerusalem, which was attended by delegations from many if not all the tribes of Israel. The deliberations at the convention went on for some time. "And Samuel judged the children of Israel in Mizpah" (1 Sam. 7:6), that is, Samuel proceeded to adjudicate the variety of intertribal disputes that had previously impeded their unity in face of common danger, an effort that was critical to strengthening the cohesiveness and commitment to collective security of the members of the confederacy. The Philistines understood that the convening of such a national assembly of tribal leaders, even if done for nominally religious purposes, was a political act that posed a threat to the continuation of their dominant position in the areas of Israelite settlement, and they took steps to quash what they correctly perceived as the beginning of a revolt against their authority. A Philistine force was sent to disrupt the assembly and

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probably to arrest the organizers, but to their surprise and dismay, the Israelites, under the overall leadership of Samuel, who was not himself a military man, not only resisted but also attacked the Philistines, driving them back. The initial setback that the Philistines received at Mizpah gave the Israelites the confidence to mount a broad offensive against their common enemy that not only temporarily drove the Philistines out of the hill country in the vicinity of Mizpah, but also enabled the Israelites to retake some of the perhaps originally Danite towns and villages that earlier were placed under direct Philistine rule in the area between Gath and Ekron (1 Sam. 7:10-14). However, the Philistines had hardly been defeated, and their presence still hovered over the region adjacent to the Mediterranean coastal strip, where they continued to maintain a de facto hegemony over most of the Israelite tribal areas along their frontiers. Nonetheless, the initial albeit limited resurgence of Israelite power under Samuel not only stiffened Israelite resolve to ultimately free itself from the Philistine menace, it also had the unanticipated consequence of promoting a period of relative peace between the Israelites and their Canaanite and Amorite neighbors (1 Sam. 7:14). The latter appeared to accept the notion that, at least for the time being, they would have to be satisfied with maintaining the territorial status quo with the Israelites, since there was no realistic possibility of driving them out of the hill country, and the Philistines, as a practical matter, were not in a position to actually occupy the territory even if they wished to do so. Samuel, and surely others of whom he was the most publicly visible and vocal representative, recognized that one of the principal factors contributing to the prevailing state of affairs was the traditional pattern of Israelite political-military decision making and leadership. The episodic reliance on the emergence of a charismatic military leader to rally some of the tribes in a temporary unity to meet an immediate crisis could not provide the stability in the tribal confederation needed to meet a threat as awesome as that presented by the Philistines. He therefore deemed it essential to establish a more permanent centralized political leadership structure for the confederation that incorporated the capacity to mobilize the requisite military force necessary to deal with contingencies as they arose. That central leadership would remain operative and in place on a continuing basis, commanding the ongoing allegiance of the otherwise completely independent-minded tribes, each governed by its own council of elders. He was aware, of course, that there was a school of thought among the tribal leaders that inclined toward the idea of establishing a central government under a monarchy. Indeed, the nation had never been as unified as it was under Joshua, who was in effect a king in all but name, and more recently Gideon had been offered a crown, which he wisely refused, but

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nonetheless ruled his tribe as though he were its monarch. Samuel, however, was not prepared to go that far, primarily, I would suggest, because as a religious traditionalist, he saw great benefit in retaining the familybased tribal system, notwithstanding the problems it faced in adequately dealing with the contemporary national security challenges facing Israel. He evidently considered it his personal responsibility to assure the continuity of the collective and individual obligations under the covenant received as a legacy from Moses, which defined the purpose and mission of the nation and which, as discussed earlier in this work, would be best preserved in a patriarchal tribal society that would facilitate the transmission of Israel's heritage from one generation to the next. Accordingly, for as long as he was able, and following in the footsteps of Moses, Samuel strenuously opposed those who sought to restructure Israelite society along centralized but non-tribal lines, which he saw as detrimental to the long-term interests of the nation. Capitalizing on his prestige, he thus continued to function as the widely acknowledged religious leader of the tribes of Israel, using the authority of his position to maintain the internal political status quo, although it is not clear to what extent his writ was followed in the outlying tribal regions. It is worth noting in this regard that the tribes whose area of settlement lay north of the Jezreel valley, which was not under undisputed Israelite control at the time, were often effectively isolated from the rest of the nation as a result of the prevailing security situation in the valley. In an effort to lend even greater authority to the position of shofet, Samuel sought to transform his headquarters at Ramah into a national religious center, establishing an altar there (1 Sam. 7:17) to attract worshippers, an effort that appears to have been without any notable success. Moreover, he considered it important for the shofet to reach out to the public and he traveled an annual circuit that included stops at Bethel, Gilgal, and Mizpah, that is, throughout the center of the country, where he convened public assemblies during which he dealt with inter-tribal issues, among others, in an effort to maintain the cohesion of the nation as best he could. This approach was something new and constituted a significant change from earlier practice, in which the people came to the shofet at their discretion rather than the shofet to them at his (Jud. 4:5); it was an innovation that reflected Samuel's determination to struggle against Philistine domination the best way he could under the prevailing circumstances. 1 In effect, Samuel had instituted, albeit informally, a new leadership structure in which he played the dominant political role, presumably calling upon appropriate military commanders to respond to security threats as they arose. What was particularly significant in the arrangement was the fact that Samuel demonstrated that Israel could meet the challenges facing it and continue to thrive without resort to a warriorshofet, let alone a king.

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One of Samuel's signal political achievements up to this point was the reintegration of Judah, along with its dependency Simeon, into active membership and participation in the tribal confederation. As one historian observed: "During the entire period of the Judges' rule [presumably with the possible exception of the campaigns of Othniel], the men of Judah had not taken the slightest share in public events. Dwelling far away in their pasture-fields and deserts, they seemed to have no part in the life of the other tribes . . . Utterly secluded, they led a separate existence, untouched by the sorrows and joys, the battles and conquests, of the tribes living on both sides of the Jordan." 2 This situation was changed dramatically by Philistine expansionism, which now threatened Judah along with the rest of the nation, compelling it to join with the tribes of the north in common cause, notwithstanding the effective physical barrier between them formed by the Jebusites who occupied the district separating the hills of Ephraim and Judah. When Samuel reached the point where he personally could no longer physically meet all the demands of his self-defined office, he concluded that the time had come to take the next step and begin to formalize the new leadership structure that he had already informally instituted, one that would preserve the patriarchal tribal system for cultural and religious purposes but provide for stronger ongoing centralized leadership to deal with the political issues facing the nation. He took the audacious step of appointing his own two sons to assist him by serving as regional shofetim, that is, as his lieutenants, whom he dispatched far to the south at Beersheba, reflecting the reintegration of Judah and Simeon with the tribes of the north, which Samuel continued to service directly. It also appeared to confirm that Samuel intended to make the position of shofet dynastic and was preparing his sons to succeed him. This step was unprecedented and represented a radical departure from how things had been done in the past, not so much because it appeared that Samuel intended to establish a political dynasty, but principally because the tribal elders had always appointed the shofetim. The process introduced by Samuel effectively took this privilege out of their hands, making the central leadership of the confederation both permanent and dynastic. Theoretically, the tribal elders could always refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of a shofet they would not accept, but as a practical matter it was exceedingly difficult for them to challenge the decision of Samuel, who was popularly revered as a veritable second Moses. Samuel's action had profound effects on the tribal confederation, effectively forcing the elders to acknowledge that the existing pattern of tribal leadership and decision-making had become anachronistic. It was more suited to an earlier semi-nomadic existence than to the circumstances of a continuing struggle for permanent settlement in a land overcast by the threatening shadow of a Philistine alliance that was able to act in unprec-

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edented unity in projecting its power throughout much of the country. Samuel brought the Israelite leaders to a keener awareness of the need to think and act beyond their immediate and parochial tribal interests. He took a calculated risk in this approach because, once having broken with the traditions of tribal leadership, the elders might become disposed to consider an even more radical restructuring of Israelite political life than that contemplated by the prophet. It soon became clear to many of the elders that the transformation of the shofet into a permanent national executive by Samuel, while representing a significant advance over what had prevailed earlier, still did not fully meet the needs of the tribes in the face of the Philistine and other external threats, especially that from the Ammonites, who sensed Israel's growing military vulnerability and under their king Nahash began depredations against Gilead once again. Moreover, Samuel's sons apparently had neither the virtues nor the charisma of their father, and without any compensating military competence, they were assessed as being incapable of welding the tribes into a closer political and military alliance. The tribal leaders thus grudgingly came to the conclusion that the time had arrived to set aside their traditional tribal loyalties and to begin to think more in national, or at least in federal, terms, which was now held to be essential to assure continued Israelite viability in the land. In effect, they had come to believe that the existing tribal confederation had to be transformed into a federation of tribes, dominated in times of crisis by the strong central government that was already established and in place. As described in Scripture, the elders came to Samuel, and said to him: "Behold thou art old, and thy sons walk not in thy ways; now make us a king to judge us like all the nations" (1 Sam. 8:5). There is no suggestion here that the elders intended to abolish the tribal structure or wished to diminish their own authority. What they wanted was a more stable and stronger central political authority that could cope with emerging crises more efficiently and more effectively than the rather flimsy traditional arrangement. And they expected to find this in a federated monarchy, in which the king would have greater authority to mobilize the resources of all the tribes in time of war, and the power to assure their compliance, a system of governance and leadership that they perceived to exist among their neighbors and enemies. "These are no longer times in which a tribal structure (classless, we would say) allowed 'Judges' to assume command (for limited periods), Judges who were simultaneously possessed seers, administrators of the law, ritual experts, and leaders in war. Such an aggregate of functions, as the book of Judges shows, gave rise to errors and abuses in its day, but, in that different context, was considered altogether normal. Now this aggregate of functions was no longer adapted to the needs of a people who were calling loudly for a king." 3

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Samuel surely appreciated the benefits to be derived from having such a strengthened central government in times of crisis, but at the same time he feared that the long-term implications of such a step were not fully appreciated even by the elders. His evident concern was that an Israelite monarchy, created in a period of persistent national crisis, would inevitably be modeled after the monarchies of the surrounding states. There were, in fact, two models of kingship among the states of the Near East, that of Egypt and that which prevailed in Mesopotamia, the small states between the two probably tending toward one or the other depending on which sphere of influence they came under. The Egyptian model "featured a deified ruler, and hence an absolute form of government which made the king's authority supreme both in theory and practice." Under the concept of the state that prevailed in Mesopotamia, "the king was distinctly a mortal ruler whose authority was subject to two ever-present checks: one by the assembly of his elders, the other by the gods to whom the king was ultimately responsible for his acts." 4 Although both models offered the benefits of central command, they also tended to be universally despotic in character, a trait that was incompatible with fundamental Mosaic teaching. In any case, the model most familiar to the tribal elders, and the concept of the state of greatest concern to Samuel, was that of Egypt, whose influence was still pervasive in the immediate region, and which was inimical to the divine covenant that governed Israel's life as a distinct nation. Moreover, the introduction of such a politically autonomous central authority into the tribal system would have a major impact on the functioning of the traditional religious authority vested in priest and prophet, which was a critical factor in keeping even the loose confederation intact until this point. The fulfillment of this function required committed clerical-religious leadership, not just political-military leadership. Although there were strong ethnic ties among some of the tribes, the primary factor that had held them together in the past and that might continue to do so in the future was the set of traditional religious beliefs they maintained in common. In establishing a secular political authority, it would be necessary to find a means of assuring continued clerical oversight of the religious heritage of the nation. This would necessitate that there be two separate authorities that, if they did not work together harmoniously, might be forced to compete against each other for the allegiance of the people, producing internal instability. In addition to the implication that Samuel's tenure as religious-political leader was inadequate under the prevailing circumstances, which he evidently considered a personal affront, he therefore also had good reason to be concerned about the changes he was being pressured to agree to. It has been suggested that, "it would be odd if the fateful transition

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from the theopolitical constitution of Israel to a national monarchy should have aroused nothing but unthinking enthusiasm." At issue for Samuel was the "tension between divine and human constitution of society." As long as Israel remained a tribal confederacy, resting on the traditional social structure of the Hebrew clans, the inherent tension between religion and politics would rise to the surface only in instances of emergency, when a charismatic political leader was needed to deal with the immediate crisis. However, whenever attempts were made in the past to perpetuate what amounted to an essentially secular arrangement, the results had proved counterproductive in religious and cultural terms. Now, it was being proposed that the Israelite confederacy be transformed into a permanent national federation headed by a king and a central government. This raised the critical question of whether Israel, by acquiring a king like all the nations, would not itself become a nation like all the others? And, if Israel was to remain the chosen people of the Lord, "how could kingship be brought into accord with the exigencies of a theopolity?" 5 The tribal elders, having made up their minds, were not disposed to grapple with this complex issue, and Samuel therefore attempted to circumvent the demand of the tribal elders by making a last desperate appeal directly to the people, warning them of the practical implications for them of the impending change in the structure of their political leadership. A monarchy, he declared, would inevitably subject them by family and household to confiscatory taxes as well as compulsory military and other service to the regime. He predicted "that ye shall cry out in that day because of your king whom ye shall have chosen" (1 Sam. 8:18). It was of no avail. At this point in time, the position of the tribal elders truly reflected the popular sentiment. "But the people refused to hearken unto the voice of Samuel; and they said: Nay, but there shall be a king over us; that we also may be like all the nations; and that our king may judge us, and go out before us, and fight our battles" (1 Sam. 8:19-20). The reasons for the popular clamor for a king, instead of the institutionalized office of shofet that Samuel had hoped to establish, are puzzling to some extent and merit further consideration. And, in fact, the text of the biblical narrative provides some significant clues as to why the people were so determined to have a king, despite Samuel's pointed caveats. It becomes clear that their decision was not motivated only by security concerns, but also by a desire to overcome the prevailing situation of virtual anarchy and corruption in the country, perpetuated in some cases by those whose primary obligation was to see to the proper ordering of the society. In his farewell address to the nation upon stepping down as their shofet, Samuel, reflecting a sense of betrayal after a lifetime of selfless service, declares himself innocent of any wrongdoing. "Here I am; witness against me before the Lord .. . whose ox have I taken? Or whose ass have I taken? Or whom have I defrauded? Or whom have I oppressed? Or of whose

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hand have I taken a ransom to blind mine eyes therewith? And I will restore it you" (1 Sam. 12:3). The people agree that he has not done anything of the sort, that he was a true and honest arbiter of their affairs. However, they had already informed Samuel that his sons did not follow in his path. That is, his sons were corrupt and took advantage of their positions as judges to confiscate, defraud, oppress, and even accepted bribes to pervert justice. In other words, the only way a full-time judge could acquire any wealth was by being corrupt, and this was because there was no ongoing institutional mechanism for compensating a judge for his juridical-military services. That is, the notion of paying a judge a decent wage in compensation for his time and effort, which he could have devoted to some other remunerative activity, had no way of being translated into reality in a primitive multi-tribal structure that had no permanent central institutions. Samuel, who oversaw the needs of the tribal confederation for more than a generation, was unique in that his personal integrity was unimpeachable. Although he may have earned a meager sustenance from serving as a folk diviner who, for a fee, helped peasants recover their lost livestock (1 Sam. 9:6-8), he never abused the authority he was entrusted with as a shofet and therefore was able to serve as the principal leader of the people without violating their trust or enriching himself at their expense. The behavior of Samuel's sons, who were judges like him but who evidently accepted bribes and allowed themselves to become corrupted, made the fallibility of the existing system clear to all. Paradoxically, it has been argued that it is the fact that the king is maintained at the expense of the entire community that becomes the best possible assurance of his incorruptibility and therefore of his justice.6 Of course, this is no guarantee that a king will not seek greater wealth than the people are prepared to grant, but it does suggest that such abuse of the public trust is less likely than would be the case with individuals who accept uncompensated leadership positions and are not independently wealthy. Notwithstanding his personal opposition to the establishment of a monarchy, Samuel evidently concluded that the prudent approach would be to go along with the popular sentiment while at the same time seeking to place constraints on the freedom of action of the soon-to-be-enthroned king. He did this, in effect, by setting forth what amounted to a constitution to which the monarch would be required and expected to conform. "Then Samuel told the people the manner of the kingdom, and wrote it in a book, and laid it up before the Lord" (1 Sam. 10:25)7 Although we know nothing about the actual contents and details of this document, it seems reasonable to assume that, at a minimum, it contained the substance of the provisions set forth in the section of the Deuteronomic code concerning the king, discussed in chapter one, and most especially that which stated:

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And it shall be, when he sitteth upon the throne of his kingdom, that he shall write him a copy of this law in a book . . . And it shall be with him, and he shall read therein all the days of his life; that he may learn to fear the Lord his God, to keep all the words of this law, and these statutes, to do them; that his heart be not lifted up above his brethren, and that he turn not aside from the commandment, to the right hand, or to the left; to the end that he may prolong his days in his kingdom, he and his children, in the midst of Israel. (Deut. 17:18-20) On another level, the idea of establishing a monarchy had other farreaching implications as well, which its advocates failed to appreciate fully at the time. It was, in effect, a call for the transformation of the loose alliance of independent tribes into a national state, to which the tribes would necessarily have to cede much if not all of their traditional autonomy. In other words, they would have to resolve the fundamental political question of "the relationship between tribal and the newly emerging political government. This is an issue which always confronts a society in the transition stages between kinship-organization and a scheme which endeavors to transcend clan and tribal loyalties. How much authority will be retained by the traditional family and tribal elders in the face of pressures making for centralized controls?" 8 As the tribal leaders began to grapple with this issue in Israel, where tribal traditions were still very strong and would remain so for generations to come, the popular enthusiasm for establishing a monarchy diminished considerably. However, it was already too late for Samuel to stop the general movement in that direction. It is interesting to note that, according to the biblical depiction of these events, the tribal leaders themselves made no attempt to enthrone a monarch, but sought prophetic sanction for such an act, which Samuel reluctantly granted. While some may view this as an attempt by the biblical author to enhance the role of Samuel in the affair, it is nonetheless grounded in a highly probable political reality. It would simply be more palatable to have a monarch selected by an acknowledged prophet rather than through a process of horse trading and bickering among the tribal leaderships over whom to accept as a permanent paramount leader, such as took place earlier in Gilead with regard to the appointment of Jephthah. Nonetheless, it would take some time before even the prophet's choice of monarch achieved national recognition and acceptance. Indeed, as the biblical recounting of Samuel's designation of Saul, of the tribe of Benjamin, to the post makes clear, the new political-military leader did not meet with universal approval (1 Sam. 10:27). The choice, however, was an astute one. By choosing a personally imposing and perhaps even charismatic candidate from Benjamin, the smallest of the tribes, Samuel hoped to avoid a major split in the confederation that might well have occurred had he chosen someone from one of the major tribes, who were jealous of

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their relative standing. Moreover, Benjamin was one of the tribes that had suffered most from the Philistines, who maintained a permanent military presence in its territory. If nothing else, Saul surely would be highly motivated in leading the struggle against the Philistines, something that might not have been the case had the choice fallen on a candidate from one of the distant northern tribes. It is also possible that Samuel's decision to so honor Benjamin, the smallest and weakest of the tribes, was taken deliberately in the expectation that the proposed monarch would prove incapable of imposing his will on the more powerful tribes and tribal alliances. Were this to happen, the monarchy would collapse and the tribes would necessarily revert to an arrangement of the sort Samuel has tried to promote earlier. Alternatively, it is possible that by selecting a monarch from a weak tribe, Samuel may have wanted to turn Saul into a puppet-ruler, holding on to real political power himself. It is noteworthy, in this regard, that according to the biblical writer Samuel never told Saul that he was anointing him as melekh (king) but rather as nagid (prince) (ISam. 10:1).9 It would seem that the distinction, at least in Samuel's mind, was that although the nagid had all the legitimate authority and power of the melekh, he did not possess those attributes that would much later be defined as sovereignty, attributes that would place him above the Mosaic Law. And, since Samuel was the acknowledged authority on that law, he would therefore necessarily serve as Saul's religious mentor, a situation that Saul evidently fully accepted. Nonetheless, "we may be sure that in practice the term melekh began to be applied to the new leader as soon as he was installed—for was not every Canaanite princeling a 'king'?" 10 It is curious that the Philistines, who we must assume were aware of what was taking place among the Israelites, did not attempt to prevent the national assembly that Samuel once again convened at Mizpah from meeting, this time for the purpose of establishing the monarchy and then obtaining approval from the assembly of elders for the selection of Saul as Israel's first king. It seems most likely that the Philistines were still engaged at the time in reestablishing their control over those positions from which they were ejected earlier by the popular uprising against them led by Samuel, and that they were not yet in a position to prevent the assembly from taking place, something they surely would have done if they were able to. It clearly was not in the Philistine interest to see the Israelite tribes united under a central government. In any case, their concerns may have been quickly assuaged by the fact that nothing perceptible had changed on the ground following the establishment of the new Israelite federation and monarchy, which seemed to be more ephemeral than real. Following the convocation at Mizpah, everything seemed to return to the status quo ante. In fact, however, Israel was not yet ready to take on the Philistines, and nothing was done to provoke their concerns. Ac-

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cordingly, the first significant act of the new central leadership of Israel was directed eastward rather than westward toward the Philistines. The new federated Israelite monarchy was soon to meet its first major test when the Ammonites invaded the territory of Manasseh in Transjordan and laid siege to the town of Jabesh-gilead, which was located in the hills overlooking the Jordan valley. Presumably based on a consideration that the leaders of the Israelite federation were totally preoccupied with the Philistine threat and would therefore not be in a position to provide aid of any consequence to the Gileadites, and discounting the significance of the new Israelite king, or perhaps unaware that the monarchy had come into being, the Ammonite king Nahash presented the city with barbaric terms of surrender. He was so confident that no help would be forthcoming from the other Israelite tribes that he arrogantly even offered safe conduct through the siege lines for Gileadite emissaries to seek such assistance, an offer that was accepted. However, the elders of Jabesh-gilead sent their emissaries not to the elders of the other tribes but to Saul, who was still attending to his herds at Gibeath-shaul in Benjamin. Why did they turn to Saul, who had no armed forces of any consequence at his disposal, rather than to the various tribal leaders, who would still be in a better position to render assistance at this moment of crisis? It would seem that the answer to this question finds its roots in events that probably took place more than a century earlier, but which were still very much alive in Manasseh's tribal consciousness. It will be recalled that in the early days of Israelite settlement, as discussed in the preceding chapter with regard to Ehud's revolt against Moabite occupation, there was a civil war in which Benjamin came under attack from the rest of the tribes. The tribes had met at Mizpah and solemnly decided to act in unison against Benjamin, which was subsequently decimated in a fierce battle at Gibeah. Following the conflict it was discovered that the men of Machir, the dominant clan of the half-tribe of Manasseh that was settled in Gilead, did not participate in the war against Benjamin, and they thus earned the hatred of the tribal alliance for breaking tribal unity (Judg. 21:5). As a result, the tribal alliance launched a punitive raid on the Machirite center at Jabesh-gilead, wiping out most of the population. Of those left alive, according to the biblical account, some 400 young women were taken captive and brought to Benjamin to marry some of those who survived the civil war, so that the tribe would not disappear entirely. "And the people repented them for Benjamin, because that the Lord had made a breach in the tribes of Israel" (Judg. 21:15). Because of these intertribal marriages, an intimate and virtually familial relationship developed between the people of Jabesh-gilead and Benjamin that persisted through the generations. Given this consideration, it should come as no surprise that the elders of Jabesh-gilead would turn first and foremost to Benjamin

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for help. The fact that the new king, although still untried in war, was also a Benjamite heightened expectations of relief from that quarter.11 Saul clearly recognized the political significance of the opportunity with which he had been presented. If he were to fail to mobilize a major federal force in support of Jabesh-gilead, his credibility and that of the federation itself would suffer irreparable damage at its very outset. Moreover, were the Ammonites to be allowed to take control of Jabesh-gilead, it would drive a wedge through the Israelite territories in Transjordan, further compounding the problem of making the federation more cohesive. Saul acted with an audacity that either fully justified Samuel's confidence in his leadership qualities or confounded the prophet-judge. He asserted his new national authority in an unprecedented manner, not by requesting but demanding support from the tribes, and threatening severe penalties for any failure to comply. According to the biblical writer, Saul "took a yoke of oxen, and cut them in pieces, and sent them throughout all the borders of Israel by the hand of messengers, saying: Whosoever cometh not forth after Saul and after Samuel, so shall it be done unto his oxen" (1 Sam. 11:7). The unprecedented threat of this kind of sanction had the desired effect, and a formidable force was soon mobilized under Saul's command, although the biblical source is silent with regard to which tribes actually responded to Saul's mobilization order. Saul also had to make an assessment of the probable reaction of the Philistines, who were in effective control of the fortress city of Beth-shean at the eastern end of the Jezreel valley, not far from Jabesh-gilead across the Jordan, and were therefore in a position to intervene at will on behalf of the Ammonites. Should they elect to do so, Saul could find his forces trapped between the Philistines and Ammonites and cut off from his home base. He evidently made the sober judgment that the Philistines, aware of what had happened earlier to the forces of Moabites and then the Midianites when they sent troops across the Jordan while the river fords were held by the Israelites, would not be prepared to risk sending a significant force across the Jordan without first making sure they were in full control of the crossing points, and this clearly was not the case. He thus concluded that the Philistine commanders would not countenance such a high-risk operation to save the Ammonites, with whom they had little if any relations or contacts, merely because they would be inflicting damage on the Israelites in the process. Leading a comparatively powerful army against the Ammonites, and demonstrating little concern about a possible Philistine attack on his rear, Saul crossed into Transjordan and made short work of the Ammonites besieging Jabesh-gilead. The success of his first campaign earned Saul the unqualified respect of the tribal leaders for his leadership, which gave the new Israelite federation its first significant military achievement against a longstanding foe. It also secured for Saul "the permanent gratitude of the

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men of Jabesh-gilead, and, indeed, of a large district to the east of the Jordan. In after days this was the real stronghold of his house, and in the coming struggle with the Philistines he had secured a base on which he could fall back, outside the territory which they controlled." 12 The benefits of federation were now apparent to all. After the battle at Jabesh-gilead, Saul was no longer merely the choice of the prophet, imposed by the latter on the tribes. He was now the people's choice as well. "Then said Samuel to the people: Come and let us go to Gilgal, and renew the kingdom there." Sensing the opportunity at hand to further unify the people, Samuel urged them to give their own public stamp of approval on the new political configuration by popularly proclaiming Saul as their king, an event that took place around the year 1020. "And all the people went to Gilgal; and there they made Saul king before the Lord in Gilgal" (1 Sam. 12:14-15). Samuel's choice of Gilgal as the site for a national convocation of all the tribes was full of symbolic significance, perhaps not fully appreciated by the tribal leaders at the time. It need only be recalled that it was at Gilgal that Joshua established his headquarters at the outset of the invasion and conquest of Canaan. By having the federation affirmed there through the popular election of Saul as undisputed monarch of the tribes of Israel, it suggested that a new beginning had taken place and that the conquest of the land promised to the fathers of the nation, begun centuries earlier, would now be pursued to completion with renewed vigor. Saul recognized that being crowned by acclamation, in the wake of a heady military victory, offered little assurance that the fledgling federation would be able to overcome the inertia of centuries of tribal rule and intertribal rivalries. Accordingly, he moved quickly and methodically to establish the central institutions of both the federation and the monarchy. His first step was to begin the process of acquiring a force monopoly. That is, he needed to assert his command authority over the tribal militias. Saul did this by first establishing a small standing military force and demobilizing the tribal levies. This in itself was a radical departure from Israelite practice under the earlier tribal confederacy. Traditionally, the army was made up exclusively of tribal militias fighting under their own commanders, in accordance with the Mosaic prescription, and only occasionally with the shared command of an acknowledged intertribal leader. Under the new concept implemented by Saul, a standing force of 3,000 troops, under Saul's immediate and undisputed command, would constitute the nucleus of the new army of Israel, which would consist of tribal levies that would be mobilized around it as circumstances dictated. The Israelite tribal leaders soon learned that by empowering Saul to maintain an independent armed force, they had effectively surrendered their own tribal autonomy as well. Whereas they were driven to seek federation and a monarchy as defensive measures, recognizing the bene-

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fits of such concentration of power and authority in times of crisis, they now discovered that they had also empowered the monarch to involve the tribes in offensive activities that few had ever imagined. Prior to this restructuring of the confederacy into a federated state, the Philistines would likely consider an insurrectionary activity undertaken on the part of any tribal leader, or in any tribal area, as a local affair. Now, however, given that the Philistines surely knew that the tribes had reconstituted themselves into a federation under a common head, any local insurrectionary act took on far greater significance. An attack on a Philistine garrison that took place in the territory of a particular tribe would no longer be considered as a merely local affair. It would henceforth be seen as a renewal of open warfare between the Israelite state and the Philistine pentapolis, and the latter could be expected to react with great force to any such overt action. Accordingly, Saul now had the capacity to involve the tribes in a renewed attempt to complete the conquest begun centuries earlier by Joshua, without even consulting the tribal leaders. In other words, although they had agreed only to a federation and a king to meet their defensive needs, they now were confronted with a king who was in a position to force tribal unification far beyond anything they might have anticipated. From Saul's perspective, the alleviation of the constant pressure being applied by the Philistines on the areas of Israelite settlement, and the simultaneous achievement of greater political cohesion among the Israelite tribes, required an offensive campaign, the primary objective of which would be to force the Philistines out of the Aijalon valley, which separated the tribes of the north and south for all practical purposes and presently denied ready access for them to the Jordan fords and the Israelite tribes domiciled in Transjordan. It was crucial that the Aijalon be under Israelite control to facilitate ease of movement between the tribal regions, without which an effective tribal federation could not be maintained. The question was whether the Israelite tribes were prepared to take the offensive against the militarily superior Philistines in a struggle for control of an area that was strategically important to both, albeit for diametrically opposite reasons. It was not long before Saul took a decisive step to dramatically alter the existing political situation. If Israel was to free itself of Philistine control of sections of its territory and people, it was necessary that the required military campaign be undertaken at a time when morale was high, as it was in the period following the victory in the Ammonite war. Some time had elapsed since then and the question was whether it was still sufficient to compensate for Israel's military deficiencies when compared to the Philistine military machine. Saul could not answer this question other than by putting it to the test on the battlefield. Once again the key to success would be audacity more than just military power, which would have

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given the advantage to the enemy. It was a high-risk approach, and Saul evidently elected to take it on his own initiative and without prior consultation with the leaders of his tribal constituencies. Saul's eldest son Jonathan, who was appointed commander of a third of the standing army, undertook the initial gambit in the campaign. Presumably acting on Saul's instructions, Jonathan mounted a raid on Geba, in the tribal area of Benjamin, and wiped out the permanent garrison stationed in the town in addition to killing the resident Philistine agent responsible for the collection of taxes. Geba was located a few miles north of Jerusalem and was a key position for Philistine control of the region, situated as it was astride the Wadi Suweinit, a deep ravine that runs from the hills of Benjamin to Jericho. As Saul surely anticipated, assuming that he had in fact authorized Jonathan to launch such an attack, the Philistines immediately and correctly understood this provocative action as the opening blow in what would be a major challenge to their dominion. Anticipating an immediate and sharp Philistine response, Saul quickly relocated his headquarters from Michmas, a high point across the ravine from Geba, southeast to Gilgal, which was relatively safe from any immediate Philistine attack, and from which he could easily retreat to friendly territory across the Jordan if necessary. He then proceeded to order the mobilization of the Israelite army in preparation for the coming Philistine retaliatory strike. As the biblical chronicle records: "And all Israel heard say that Saul had smitten the garrison of the Philistines, and that Israel also had made himself odious with the Philistines" (1 Sam. 13:4). In other words, the tribal leaders now learned to their dismay that the attack on Geba was seen by the Philistines as an act committed by the nation as a whole, rather than merely by the tribe of Benjamin. Thus, without consulting the tribal elders, Saul cast the die and committed them to a war for which, by all reasonable military standards, they were grossly ill prepared, psychologically as well as materially. The Philistine response was to attempt to crush the rebellion with overwhelming force. According to the traditional account, "the Philistines assembled themselves together to fight with Israel, thirty thousand chariots, and six thousand horsemen, and people as the sand which is on the seashore in multitude" (1 Sam. 13:5). As evidenced by the last clause of this citation, the figures need not necessarily be taken literally; they do, however, reflect the suggestion that this was an army that was clearly capable of wreaking great havoc and destruction on the Israelites. Indeed, the sight of this major deployment near the strategically important junction at Michmas, which controlled the road between Benjamin and Ephraim, was enough to create panic among the nearby Israelite tribes. The fact that Michmas had heretofore been Saul's headquarters made it clear that the Philistines intended to crush the new kingdom in its infancy.

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To his consternation, Saul evidently overestimated the state of Israelite morale and the readiness of its tribal levies to take on the highly intimidating Philistine military machine. The anticipation of a massive Philistine attack created widespread panic among the Israelites, especially in the region of the expected assault. Many of those who could do so fled across the Jordan, hoping to find safety there. Others hid in caves and in the woods, wherever they could find cover, hoping to avoid detection by the enemy. As a practical matter, the army of Israel not only failed to mobilize, it completely disintegrated. The tribes of both the north and the south made no attempt to rally behind Saul and waited to see what would happen. In effect, all that remained to face the Philistines was the small standing force that had followed Saul to Gilgal, where they awaited in vain the arrival of the tribal reinforcements. Apparently abandoned to their fate, before long, even that core contingent of troops dwindled through desertions to only some 600 men. In the meantime, Saul was desperately trying to keep his shrinking army intact, awaiting the arrival of Samuel in Gilgal. The prophet had instructed Saul to take no action for a week, until he arrived to sanctify the army and invoke the favor of heaven in support of Israel in the lopsided struggle that was about to ensue. As the week drew to a close, and Samuel had not yet arrived, Saul came under enormous pressure to act. From a military perspective, time was not on his side. The longer he hesitated to move, the stronger and more entrenched the Philistines became at Michmas, and the greater his concern that his shrinking military force might dissolve entirely in face of the overwhelming power of the enemy. Although Samuel ultimately arrived in Gilgal before the period of delay had expired, Saul had already undertaken to perform the sanctification ritual himself, effectively usurping Samuel's clerical authority. Saul's act was hardly unprecedented. "The idea of a king offering sacrifice was perfectly in harmony with ancient Near Eastern practice; and even within Israel, where a priesthood in which sacrifice was an exclusive privilege was not yet established, it could easily be accepted." 13 However, it was not acceptable to Samuel, who viewed it as an indication that his fears about a monarchy were about to be realized. As a result, at a critical moment when a unified leadership was essential, king and religious leader found themselves in a struggle for primacy with each other. While it is tempting to downplay the significance of the incident and to sympathize with Saul's plight as a military leader, the implications of this squabble between Saul and Samuel were really quite far-reaching. Indeed, it went to the heart of Israel's self-understanding as a nation. Samuel and his prophetic predecessors had struggled to convince the people that their greatest strength lay in their faith in the divine covenant, which assured them tenure in the land irrespective of the alien power that might be raised against them. It was the national ideology, inculcated by

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the prophets and teachers since Moses, which assured them that they would ultimately prevail against their enemies. As long as they maintained their faith, it asserted, they would have the qualitative edge of superior morale, which would prove decisive in the end. Saul, however, effectively undermined this self-understanding by introducing practical expediency as a consideration of comparable importance. There was also another issue in contention, one that had arisen in the past and would do so again later in Israel's history, that of the separation of political and religious or clerical authority and power. Thus, while Moses was Israel's political leader and legislator, it was his brother Aaron who was responsible for its religious affairs. Presumably, the reason for this separation of authority was to assure that the religious interests of the nation not be subordinated to political expediency, something that was likely to occur when both responsibilities were vested in a single person. In the present context, Saul had done just that, setting a precedent that Samuel considered both counterproductive and dangerous to the spiritual well-being of the nation. As one nineteenth-century writer put it: "Saul, in direct violation of the Hebrew constitution, and against the express command of Samuel, took upon himself the priestly function, and offered sacrifice. The union of these two offices in one person would either have given an overweening weight to the kingly authority, or the religious primacy, instead of maintaining its independent dignity, would have sunk into a subordinate branch of the royal office."14 Samuel prudently condemned the king for his highly inappropriate act in private, and peremptorily decided to withdraw his long-term support from Saul because, once having breached the wall separating the political and religious functions, he presumably could not trust that Saul would not to do so again when expediency seemed to demand it. This meant, in effect, that while Samuel would do nothing to further exacerbate the situation at the moment, when Israel was about to confront the powerful enemy waiting for it at Michmas, he would oppose according any legitimacy to Saul's future dynastic ambitions. Putting their conflict aside, at least for the moment, Samuel assumed his traditional role as the national patriarch and led the way to Gibeath-benjamin, near Michmas, followed by Saul and what was left of the army. The Philistines, reluctant to engage the Israelites in a drawn-out guerrilla war in the hill country, which would have worked to the enemy's advantage, sought to provoke Saul into a pitched battle by sending out raiding parties to harass and pillage the countryside, imposing new hardships on the populace that would in turn put pressure on Saul to take decisive action to relieve their plight. While Saul deliberated about how to deal with the threat awaiting him from the Philistine forces at Michmas, Jonathan took the initiative and, according to the biblical account, accompanied only by his sword-bearer, scaled the height and attacked the Phil-

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istine outpost there, wiping out the contingent manning the observation point, which seemed completely inaccessible from the ravine that separated the opposing forces. This outpost, as was the case with others that were set up throughout the area of Philistine control, was of more than a little military significance because of its position above the pass through the hills that enabled it to spot and report, and thereby effectively hinder, any large-scale Israelite troop movements in the direction of the lowland and Philistine-held territory. The suddenness and audacity of the attack, which left the Philistines dumbfounded, triggered a panic that spread rapidly through the ranks of the main body of the army that was bivouacked in the open field below. With their officers unable to control the troops, the small Israelite commando raid quickly cascaded into a major panic-driven disorderly retreat that even affected the seasoned Philistine raiding parties. "And there was trembling in the camp in the field, and among the people; the garrison, and the spoilers, they also trembled . .. And the watchmen of Saul in Gibeath-benjamin looked; and, behold, the multitude melted away, and they went hither and thither" (1 Sam. 14:1516). Once Saul realized what had happened, he immediately sought to capitalize on the situation and quickly mounted an assault on the retreating Philistines, who in their confusion were attacking each other, inflicting many casualties that only exacerbated the panic, as they withdrew westward toward Philistia. Notwithstanding that the victory was not decisive and the Philistines would continue to be a thorn in Israel's side for many years to come, for the time being the hill country was free of their presence. One of the unintended consequences of Saul's victory over the Philistines may well have been the psychological impact it had on the latter. For the second time in a relatively short period of time, the first coming in the minor victory at Mizpah under Samuel's inspiration, the Philistines suffered notable setbacks as Israel's leadership became increasingly centralized. It has therefore been suggested that the emergence of a monarchy in Israel may have triggered a similar development among the Philistines, who were becoming equally concerned about their ability to effectively repel a new and more organized and aggressive Israelite attempt to break out from the hill country into the plains. Put another way, the initial advantage that the Philistines enjoyed against both Canaanites and Israelites was their ability to coalesce as a confederation in times of strife and act as one. The emergence of a permanent centralized leadership in Israel, with the ability to mobilize and concentrate forces as required, tended to nullify that advantage, causing the Philistines to reconsider the viability of their existing collective security infrastructure. As a result, "it is precisely during Saul's reign that a Philistine king, Achish King of Gath, is mentioned for the first time (1 Sam. 21:11, 27:2)."15 In the course of his deliberations about how to deal with the Philistine threat confronting him, while Jonathan was conducting his own private

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campaign against the enemy, Saul, perhaps reflecting on the displeasure he had evoked in Samuel at Gilgal, evidently concluded that he no longer could view the aging prophet as an ally and now sought to marginalize him as much as possible. In need of religious sanction for his proposed actions, instead of appealing to the prophet, he chose to revert to an older tradition to ascertain how best to proceed, employing a procedure that had fallen into disuse since the destruction of the sanctuary at Shiloh and the capture of the Ark of the Covenant decades earlier. Thus, instead of consulting the prophet Samuel, he turned to the high priest Ahijah (or according to some, Ahimelekh) the son of Ahitub, who had reestablished the high priesthood at Nob, for an oracle. However, instead of going to the high priest as required by tradition, he ordered the high priest to come to him and, while the latter was preparing to inquire of God regarding the matter, Saul interrupted him when he became aware of what was taking place in the Philistine camp and took immediate action without waiting for the priest's inquiry. As Samuel had feared, Saul had now reached the point where divine guidance was a convenience that he would readily dispense with whenever he considered it inexpedient. Moreover, once the battle was over, it was Saul who ordered the construction of an altar for use by the high priest and the priests that accompanied him (1 Sam. 14:35), by implication making the priesthood a branch of his government, something that surely only reaffirmed Samuel's concerns about the arbitrary use of the royal prerogative. In fact, Saul increasingly took it upon himself to act as the nation's spiritual leader and on his own initiative banished all sorcerers and soothsayers in an effort to purge Israel of all pagan influences, a move that Samuel surely would have applauded had he been consulted about it. It is also possible, as suggested by one writer, that Samuel was also angry at Saul for not taking any steps to build a suitable sanctuary to house the Ark of the Covenant, which still lay neglected in storage at Kiriath-jearim, that could have provided a much needed focus for Israelite religious consciousness. 16 However, it could also be argued that Saul hesitated to do this because of the still unstable national security environment; he may not have wished to risk establishing such a sanctuary and then facing the possibility of it being destroyed in battle, as had occurred with the sanctuary at Shiloh, incurring serious consequences for the public morale. In any case, it seems clear that Saul's arrogation of religious authority continued to exacerbate the tension between prophet and king, which would soon lead to a complete breach. As already indicated, the defeat of the Philistines at Michmas was by no means decisive, and Saul spent the rest of his reign in campaigns against them as well as against numerous other regional foes. In Transjordan, where the Ammonites were still licking their wounds from the defeat at Jabesh-gilead, there were incursions by the Moabites, who were

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encroaching on the territory of Reuben from the south. In the north, Manasseh was similarly experiencing encroachment on its territory by the Aramaeans, who had been moving southward from the northern desert. In Cisjordan, the Edomites and Amalekites continued to harass Judah and Simeon. The resurgence of the Amalekites was a particularly sore point in Israel because of the bitter animosity against them that dated back to the days of Moses. Although it is questionable whether the Amalekites posed a sufficiently significant threat to Israel to justify a major campaign against them at a time when the Philistines still posed a far greater threat to the nation as a whole, Samuel nonetheless demanded that Saul undertake a holy war against them, notwithstanding the absence of any compelling political or economic justifications for such a war. Because it was to be a holy war, Samuel insisted that it was not only incumbent on Saul to eliminate the Amalekites as a threat to Israel's security but to annihilate them entirely, including all their material possessions. Samuel made it clear that the differences between Israel and Amalek were not negotiable; this was to be viewed as an existential total war, from which Israel was not to gain any material advantage, and that unless this was done Israel would never have peace. Seeing this as an opportunity to reconcile his differences with Samuel, Saul vigorously prosecuted the war against the Amalekites. However, Saul was only prepared to follow the script laid out by Samuel up to a point. He did indeed annihilate all the Amalekites who readily came into his hands but did not take any steps to follow those who fled into the desert, from where they subsequently continued to mount harassing attacks against Israel. Moreover, he spared the life of the Amalekite king Agag whom he took prisoner, possibly as a hostage against any further Amalekite attacks, and confiscated all Amalekite property of any value. When confronted by Samuel over his failure to carry the prophet's guidance with respect to the aims and conduct of the campaign, Saul sought to shift the blame to the tribal levies for the seizure of the Amalekite property, lamely suggesting that their purpose in preserving the best of the herds was to sacrifice them to the God of Israel, which would in the end be the same as simply destroying them as Samuel had directed. It seems clear, however, that the seizure of the Amalekite property took place because the people who were risking their lives and livelihoods in the campaign expected to derive some compensation for it—the idea that they were fighting a holy war evidently was not sufficient to sustain the commitment of the tribal levies to the campaign. Samuel would have none of Saul's apologetics and accused him of failing in his responsibilities as the king whom he as a prophet had chosen for the people. In effect, Samuel told Saul that he had made him and that he could break him. Samuel remained an overpowering figure in Israelite

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society and Saul, as recent events had shown, still had not welded the tribes into a cohesive whole that he could command at will. Moreover, despite Saul's efforts to cast himself in such a role, it was Samuel who continued to be popularly perceived as the spiritual leader of the nation, and Saul needed his continuing support. It was clear that Saul and Samuel were coming to a final parting. The prophet saw the king as being an instrument for carrying out the divine will as he represented it to him, and not as a sovereign making autonomous decisions in the best interests of the nation as he understood them. The king, however, viewed the prophet as a nemesis that strove to be the power behind the throne, perhaps even claiming divine sanction for policies that were of his own design. The dispute between them may have been inevitable. In the complex constitutional structure created by Samuel, "the division between the King's position and rights and those of the Prophet, as representative of God the Sovereign, could not but cause tension and q u a r r e l . . . It is quite natural that Saul tried to inherit all the functions and jurisdictions the Judges before him had exercised. However, Samuel intended to keep some of them for himself in order to deny Saul the position of Sovereign, which belonged to God, and to Him only" 17 Needless to say, Saul found himself unable to reconcile to the notion that, as the nation's first constitutional monarch, he actually had less authority than the shofetim that preceded him. Nonetheless, the biblical writer tells us, Saul pleaded with Samuel not to make their dispute public and thereby undermine whatever authority he had managed to garner over the fledgling federation. "I have sinned; yet honor me now, I pray thee, before the elders of my people, and before Israel, and return with me, that I may worship the Lord thy God" (1 Sam. 15:30). The monarchy was a new institution that initially had broad popular support following Saul's early victories, but, as might be expected, that support began to wane because of the constant demand for resources, both human and material, needed to sustain the continuing struggles that went on throughout Saul's reign. Moreover, the tribal leaders surely had not yet been fully reconciled to their loss of independence, and any perception of a split between the political and spiritual leadership, between Saul and Samuel, could prove counterproductive to the interests of both. Samuel agreed that an open conflict between them would serve no constructive purpose and, after personally dispatching the Amalekite king, he parted from Saul without fanfare and returned to his home in Ramah, while the king went to his residence in Gibeath-shaul. Despite the effort to gloss over their differences, the split between Saul and Samuel proved irreparable. "And Samuel never beheld Saul again until the day of his death; for Samuel mourned for Saul" (1 Sam. 15:35). Saul's victory over the troublesome Amalekites, whom he drove far into the southern wilderness, made him highly popular among the elders of

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Judah and enabled him to finally bring all the tribes of Israel into a united Israelite commonwealth under his rule. Notwithstanding the perseverance of centrifugal tribal tendencies, Saul had managed to become the king of all the Israelites. It is noteworthy, however, that Saul made no effort to bring the foreign population of the Israelite territories in Cisjordan or Transjordan, including the Canaanites and Philistines, under his rule. As long as they did not trouble the Israelites, he more or less left them alone, essentially granting them an early form of extraterritoriality. Even the Philistines appeared to have reconciled themselves to maintaining the status quo, that is, "until the balance of power in the Jezreel Valley was broken. When Saul gained control over the central part of the Jezreel Valley, it was tantamount to closing off the Via Maris against the Philistines in that area."18 It would not be long before another war with the Philistines erupted. In the meantime, Saul evidently also took a number of steps to usurp some of the religious authority claimed by Samuel as a means of strengthening his position against the latter. Noting that no effort had been made by Samuel to restore the sanctuary at Shiloh, Saul assigned new importance to the surviving priests of the house of Eli, who were attached to the altar in Nob that he now treated as a royal sanctuary. His evident purpose in doing this was to both identify him with and give him control of the still revered high-priestly family, which had strong traditional and symbolic significance for the people of Israel. Nonetheless, the psychological effect on Saul of the split with Samuel was traumatic. "To be repudiated by the very man from whose hands he had received his throne was a terrible blow for Saul, and he did his best to propitiate Samuel, endeavoring to clear himself of the charge of disloyalty to his God by engaging in a number of minor campaigns against the neighboring peoples and those Canaanites who were still to be found among the Israelitish settlers. He put them all to the sword and destroyed their shrines, thus hoping to prove the genuineness of his faith. He became a religious fanatic out of sheer uneasiness of mind." 19 He remained haunted by the prophet's prediction that his children would never succeed him as king and demonstrated increasing and visibly perceptible paranoid tendencies. He also became erratic and indecisive, no longer exhibiting the sense of command and audacity that won him acclaim at the outset of his royal career. Samuel, by his very presence in Israel, remained a greater threat to him than his external enemies, yet he dared not move against the prophet as long as Samuel was not seen publicly committing sedition, something Saul surely believed he was doing discreetly After all, if there was to be no dynastic succession, and the longevity of a warrior-king was uncertain at best, Samuel must already be secretly grooming Saul's replacement, waiting in the shadows to seize the throne once Saul came to his end.

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Saul's fears, of course, were fully justified. Samuel, in fact, had searched out a candidate to succeed Saul but kept the matter secret. His choice fell on a young man, David ben Jesse, who seemed to have the requisite spiritual and martial capabilities to be the kind of king that Samuel envisioned for the people of Israel. Both a formidable soldier and a poet-singer, David endeared himself to the king, whom he served as both military assistant and music therapist, and became a close personal friend of the crown prince, Jonathan. Fearless in combat, David soon won promotion and a reputation for heroism that made him the darling of the king and the people. Ultimately, David's popularity unnerved Saul, who began to consider him as a possible competitor against his son Jonathan for the crown. It would also appear that, at one point, Saul suspected that David was colluding with Jonathan to depose the king in favor of the popular prince, whose reputation as a warrior probably equaled that of David.20 In either case, the king started to distrust him, and the biblical writer recounts attempts by Saul himself to actually kill David during some of his paranoid episodes. In a more lucid moment, he made David a commander of a troop, probably in the expectation, or at least the hope, that the Philistines might achieve the desired result on the battlefield and David might meet his end in the service of the kingdom. Contrary to his hope, David not only survived but also significantly enhanced his reputation as a military leader, gaining increased popularity that further fed Saul's concerns about his ambitions. The biblical account relates a strange episode in this regard that would have important political ramifications later. Saul was apparently made aware that one of his daughters, Michal, was enamored of David, and he sought to exploit this to help bring about David's downfall. He offered his daughter in marriage to David as a reward for his exploits on behalf of the state but asked that the young warrior undertake a particularly dangerous mission, the accomplishment of which would serve as a dowry for the hand of the princess. This proposal was a highly risky gamble for Saul; if David succeeded, the marriage would make him a member of the royal family and give him a degree of legitimacy that he did not now have, which he could exploit later to claim the throne. It was also very risky for David, because the likelihood of surviving the mission was low. Nonetheless, David was willing to take the risk because it would clearly advance his regal ambitions. In other words, this marriage was not about love, but about politics. Although the biblical account tells us that Michal loved David, there is no indication that the feeling was mutual, or that she was even consulted about the proposed marriage. The negotiations over the marriage dealt exclusively with the political status that David would achieve by becoming the king's son-in-law.21 For David, it was a gamble worth taking, and he did so successfully; for Saul, the gamble

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backfired, resulting in a significant increase in his level of anxiety about David. Still loyal to Saul, but fearing for his life at the hands of the increasingly erratic king, now his father-in-law, David went into voluntary exile along with a small band of loyal followers, which grew to several hundred as a growing number of those disenchanted with Saul's regime, or disgruntled with their personal circumstances under the prevailing social order, chose to join David, living as freebooters and mercenaries while attempting to avoid confrontations with the detachments that Saul periodically dispatched to hunt David down. At one point, David went to Ramah to seek out Samuel, with whom he took refuge for a while as Saul scoured the countryside searching for him. When the king became aware of this, it only further fueled Saul's not altogether paranoid suspicion of a conspiracy between pretender and prophet to take the throne away from his house. David then moved on to the sanctuary at Nob where he sought aid from Ahimelech the high priest, who was unaware that David was wanted by the king. When Saul later discovered that the high priest, who he believed owed him fealty, had given David some food for his men, the king ordered the slaughter of the priests for treason, an act that his Israelite officers refused to carry out. Not to be put off, Saul invited Doeg the Edomite, who had informed against the priests, to carry out the deed. As a result, the entire house of Ahimelech, the high priest, was annihilated that day along with all the priests of Nob, with the exception of Ahimelech's son Abiathar who escaped and joined up with David and his band, later to become the high priest in Jerusalem. In the meantime, Saul slid into an ever-deepening depression, and David and his band continued to roam the countryside in search of safety and a livelihood. The biblical account records another incident that took place during this period that would shortly have significant political implications. In the course of roaming through Judah, David and his men ran short of supplies and he turned for help to Nabal, a wealthy member of the Calebite clan that dominated the Hebron area, who refused the requested assistance. Under the circumstances of the time, David's request would have been considered legitimate; since he was in effect protecting Nabal's herds from roving bandits, he and his men deserved some compensation for their efforts. Offended by the refusal, David was about to attack him when Nabal's wife Abigail intervened to prevent it. David was taken with her and, following Nabal's subsequent and ostensibly natural death shortly thereafter, David married his widow, not only obtaining Nabal's wealth thereby, but also inheriting his social and political position among the Calebites, which would well serve him later when he made a bid for power in Judah. 22 Under continual pressure from Saul, whose determination to kill David had turned into an obsession, David reached the point where he saw no

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viable alternative to leaving Saul's domains entirely. He sought refuge in the territory of Achish, the Philistine king of Gath, to whom he hired out his troop as a mercenary force. His assumption, which proved prescient, was that even Saul would not invade Philistine territory just to get at him. This was a particularly bold step on the part of David, who had a wellknown reputation as a ferocious warrior who had become a famed commander in Saul's army, with much Philistine blood on his hands. Achish appreciated David's audacity and, well aware of Saul's desire to rid himself of the young charismatic officer, sought to turn the situation to his advantage. It was in the Philistine interest to prolong the strife between Saul and David, because as long as Saul was so occupied, it distracted him from attempting to interfere with the preparations the Philistine chiefs were making for a new and major assault on Israel, the primary purpose of which would be to restore a favorable balance of power in the Jezreel valley, which was essential if the Philistines were to have effective control of the CisJordanian portion of the Via Maris. David negotiated an agreement with Achish to the effect that David would undertake to assure the security of the Philistine southern frontier against Saul's forces, as well as against Bedouin raiders from the desert, in exchange for which David and his men would be permitted to settle in the town of Ziklag, on the southern fringe of Judah and about eleven miles southeast of Gaza. Presumably, Achish's calculation was that when Saul learned of this he would send an army far to the south to confront David, (something that he in fact did not do), which would have effectively weakened his defenses in the central part of the country. This arrangement also well served David's interests because his presence in Gath raised eyebrows among Achish's officers, who understandably did not trust him, even though their ruler evidently did. Accordingly, it was desirable for all concerned that David and his men keep out of sight as they carried out their agreed-upon responsibilities. David, however, had little interest or inclination to actually bolster the Philistine position in the country. He therefore deceived Achish into believing that he was carrying on a series of border raids against Judah and its affiliated clans in the south of the country, when in reality he was systematically attacking other non-Israelite tribes, including the Amalekites, who returned to their ancestral lands in the Negev and were continually skirmishing with the Judahites. In order to maintain this deception, David proved himself capable of ruthlessness—he left no survivors of his raids to tell tales. David's actions against Judah's enemies were clearly calculated to win favor with the Judahites, upon whom he would have to rely as a power base for his political ambitions. Thus, after his raids, David would dutifully bring Achish his share of the spoils, the latter believing that they had been obtained from the Israelites, at the same time that he secretly sent a good deal of the spoil to the various centers of settlement

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in Judah, where his popularity continued to rise as it became clear that not only had he not really joined the Philistine enemy, but that he was actually serving Judah's interests. David continued to play this dangerous duplicitous game for some sixteen months in order to avoid a head-on conflict with Saul. Although he had several opportunities to dispose of Saul, because of tactical mistakes committed by the king, it appears that David abhorred the idea of regicide and would have none of it, an attitude that he maintained throughout his life. Hunted as he was, David always remained loyal to Saul and went to great lengths to avoid any situation that might compel him to act directly against the king. The state of affairs between Israel and the Philistine alliance of citystates changed dramatically following Samuel's death, and the consequent removal of the major moral force that he represented. This, coupled with the perception of a decline in Israel's military capability resulting from Saul's apparent growing lack of self-confidence, led the Philistines to consider the moment ripe to initiate a new campaign of conquest. This time, after repeated failures to penetrate the central mountain massif from the west, they chose to employ a different approach. The Philistine forces mobilized at Aphek, at the northern edge of the coastal plain where they had registered a signal victory against Israel several decades earlier, and marched northward skirting the hill country of Ephraim into the Jezreel valley through one of the passes traversing the Carmel range. From there they evidently planned to enter the central massif from the north at Irganim (Jenin) and march southward. Uncertain of what the Philistines were planning, and their convergence on Aphek raising the possibility of an attack designed to sever the lines of communication between Judah and the northern part of the country, Saul took no action to block the Philistine passage through the Carmel defiles. He may also have been misled by reports of Philistine troop movements from Aphek toward the south, which raised the possibility of having to engage in a two-front war. Concern about such a possibility evidently prevented Saul from concentrating his strength in the north and blocking the Philistine forces from exiting the pass through the Carmel range, a maneuver that might have turned the tide of battle in his favor. As it turned out, the troop movement to the south was not a Philistine diversionary tactic or the opening of a second front, but the return of David's forces from Aphek to their base at Ziklag far to the south. The Philistine mobilization had placed David in an extremely awkward position, raising the probability of it becoming necessary for him to go to war against his countrymen, as Achish expected him to do. However, the distrust of the other Philistine commanders solved his problem for him, since they refused to allow him to serve along with them. They simply would not trust someone, ostensibly a traitor to his own people, not to

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similarly betray them at a critical point in the battle that might turn the tide against them, an act that might serve David's interests if he wanted to become reconciled with Saul. As a result, David and his men returned to the south as the Philistine army marched toward the decisive battle that would take place near Mt. Gilboa, overlooking the Jezreel valley.23 By the time Saul recognized what the Philistines were up to it was too late to prevent the concentration of their forces in the vicinity of Mt. Gilboa, and he proceeded to move his own troops to a position blocking the ascent from the Jezreel valley to Ir-ganim and the heartland of Ephraim. It is ironic that Saul, who had an unblemished record of past military victories, was placed in a militarily untenable position, albeit unintentionally, by David, who was happily marching away from the impending battle that would prove to be the only one that Saul lost. The ultimate issue for the contending forces was control of the Jezreel valley, which was critical to the territorial integrity of Saul's realm because it separated the tribes of the Galilean highlands from those of the central hill country, and which was also of great economic significance because the trade route from Egypt to Mesopotamia crossed it. Moreover, if the Philistines were able to break through from the strategic stronghold of Beth-shean, which was still a semi-autonomous Canaanite site, to the Jordan, only about five miles distance, they could then march up the Jordan valley to the Sea of Galilee or move southward from the valley directly through the hill country of Ephraim, which was more vulnerable from this direction than from the west and whose passes were more difficult to defend, and thereby essentially carve up Saul's kingdom. Ideally, Saul's initial battle plan would have been to draw the Philistines out of the valley into the hills, where their chariots would be ineffective, giving the advantage to Israel's lightly armed but highly mobile infantry forces. The Philistines, however, were not going to be diverted from their strategic aims and attempt to storm up the slopes of Mt. Gilboa to engage the Israelite army at Jezreel, across the valley, where it had concentrated its forces. This time, the battle would have to be fought below on ground chosen by the Philistines, where they had the advantage, if Saul was going to prevent them from breaking through to the Jordan valley or through the hill country. Left with no viable alternative, Saul's forces descended from the heights and engaged the Philistines on lower ground to block their advance. To Saul's dismay, the enemy broke through his lines in the fierce battle that ensued, with the chariot-mounted Philistine archers making their way up the readily traversable western slope of the mountain to the plateau, where the Israelite forces were subjected to withering attack. Demoralized and disheartened by the initial Philistine success, the Israelite front collapsed, and the army effectively dissolved in disorderly retreat, with the Philistines in hot pursuit of the Israelite king and his retinue. Saul was severely wounded from an enemy arrow, and rather

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than face the humiliation of capture, he literally fell on his own sword. The Philistines decapitated him and hung his mutilated body on the wall of Beth-shean, which they occupied, where he remained until secreted away and buried along with his sons by some hardy men of Jabesh-gilead, who never forgot that Saul had come to their aid in an hour of critical need at the outset of his reign. Thus, about the year 1000 B.C.E., ended Israel's first attempt to create an independent sovereign state. Although Saul seemed to be the ideal choice for the leader of such a state, events proved otherwise. As one writer put it: "Saul is one of the most tragic figures in history. A great and nobly endowed nature, heroic and chivalrous, inspired with fiery zeal, he finally accomplished nothing . . . At his death the situation was again just what it had been at his coronation: Israel was prostrate, the power of the Philistines greater and firmer than ever before. He had not shown himself equal to the task which destiny and circumstances had set for him." 24 With the death of Saul, Jonathan, and his other sons except for Ishbaal (Ishbosheth), the war was over, at least for the time being. The one surviving prince, Ishbaal, fled across the Jordan, where Saul's commanding general and kinsman Abner ben Ner gathered the remnants of Israel's army and reestablished the monarchy at Mahanaim in Gilead with Ishbaal as king, as the Philistines took control of numerous strategic positions in the center of the country that had been abandoned in the wake of the military debacle. However, as events were soon to prove, Israel was sorely wounded but not beyond the possibility of dramatic recovery. NOTES l.Aryeh Bartal, Malkhut Shaul (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuhad, 1982), pp. 31-32. 2. Heinrich Graetz, History of the Jews, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1956), pp. 76-77. 3. Cristiano Grottanelli, Kings and Prophets: Monarchic Power, Inspired Leaderships, and Sacred Text in Biblical Narrative (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 100. 4. E. A. Speiser, "The Manner of the King," in Benjamin Mazar (ed.), The World History of the Jewish People, vol. 3: Judges (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971), p. 283. 5. Eric Voegelin, Israel and Revelation (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956), pp. 246-47. 6. Grottanelli, Kings and Prophets: Monarchic Power, Inspired Leadership, and Sacred Text in Biblical Narrative (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 90. 7. For a discussion of the various theories regarding what may have been meant by the phrase "manner of the kingdom," see Tomoo Ishida, The Royal Dynasties in Ancient Israel: A Study on the Formation and Development of Royal-Dynastic Ideology (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1977), pp. 40-41.

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8. Mulford Q. Sibley, Political Ideas and Ideologies: A History of Political Thought (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 13. 9. For a review and analysis of the various meanings attached to the title nagid, see Tomoo Ishida, History and Historical Writing in Ancient Israel: Studies in Biblical Historiography (Leiden: Brill, 1999), pp. 57-67. See also William F. Albright, The Biblical Period from Abraham to Ezra (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 48. An alternate approach to the relation between nagid and melekh will be found in Shraga Abramson, "Mah Haya Sha'ul, Melekh o Nagid/ 7 in David Shemesh (ed.), Shmuel veSha'ul—HaNavi veHaMelekh (Jerusalem: Kiryet Serer, 1986), pp. 30-36. 10. Albright, The Biblical Period, p. 48. 11. This analysis is based in part on comments by Ben-Tsiyon Luria, Sha'ul uVinyamin: Mehkarim beToldot Shevet Binyamin (Jerusalem: Kiryat Sefer, 1970), pp. 150-51. 12. Theodore H. Robinson, A History of Israel: From the Exodus to the Fall of Jerusalem, 586 B.C. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 182. 13. Eugene H. Maly, The World of David and Solomon (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 32. 14. Henry H. Milman, The History of the Jews (London: Routledge, 1878), pp. 120-21. 15. Benjamin Mazar, 'The Philistines and Their Wars with Israel/' in Benjamin Mazar (ed.), The World History of the Jewish People, p. 178. 16. Simon Dubnow, History of the Jews, vol. 1 (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1967), p. 116. 17. Bartal, Malkhut Sha'ul, English Summary, p. xiii. Full discussion of the conflict between Saul and Samuel is presented in pp. 130-35. 18. Yohanan Aharoni, The Land of the Bible: A Historical Geography (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1967), p. 258. 19. Josef Kastein, History and Destiny of the Jews (New York: Viking, 1935), p. 29. 20. Carl H. Cornill, History of the Peoples of Israel: From the Earliest Times to the Destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans (Chicago: Open Court, 1899), p. 67. 21. Steven L. McKenzie, King David: A Biography (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 87. 22. Ibid., p. 108. 23. Although Ben-Tsiyon Luria, "Malkhut Sha'ul/' Beit Mikra, 128 (1992), pp. 25-27, makes a strong argument that the battle did not take place at Gilboa but in the Aijalon valley, I do not find it sufficiently compelling to discount the traditional view. 24. Cornill, History of the Peoples of Israel, p. 70.

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CHAPTER 6

The Dual Monarchy: The Reign of David

The untimely death of Saul at about the beginning of the first millennium B.C.E., in which David fortuitously played no identifiably direct part, cleared the way for the latter's aspirations to the Israelite throne. Until this point he had scrupulously avoided any act that would bear the taint of disloyalty to his monarch, or of his taking advantage of Saul's mistakes for personal gain. Now the situation was quite different. "His people had been miserably defeated and subjected by the Philistines, and David was now the only man in Israel who was both connected with the royal household and endowed with the political experience, the military genius, the personal brilliance and the public esteem to undertake with success the slow and arduous task of rebuilding Israel's political fortunes/' 1 The Philistine victory over Israel should not be understood as implying that the territories of Israel underwent Philistine occupation. It would have been both impractical and impracticable for the Philistines to do anything of the sort, given their relatively small population. What the Philistines wanted was to maintain direct and unquestioned control over the Mediterranean coast, which was for them the most valuable part of the country, and unfettered access to the trade artery that passed from the coast through the Jezreel valley and beyond. Their interest in Israel was primarily a matter of national security—they needed to assure that the Israelites would not have the ability to descend from the hill country to the coastal plain. Accordingly, what they were after was hegemony and suzerainty, and not direct rule. It was sufficient for their geopolitical purposes to dominate the area, prevent the emergence of any significant military threat to their interests, and glean whatever tribute they might from

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the Israelites, as much to keep them under control as to actually realize any significant amount of income from such payments. The sort of wealth that interested the Philistines came from their control of the trade routes, and not from taxing Israel's internal agricultural production. For the latter purpose, the maintenance of a few outposts was sufficient, as long as any potential security threat could be quickly contained or suppressed. As a result of its decisive defeat in the war, Saul's kingdom was clearly in almost total disarray, its institutions shattered, and it would take some time for a central government to reconstitute itself even to a limited extent. It was therefore not long before the Philistine occupation of the Israelite heartland was reduced to the point where an Israelite government could begin to function as the vassal state that the Philistine overlords desired. And in fact, the commander of Saul's army, Abner, who survived the disastrous campaign, had already begun taking steps to restore a semblance of government in the northern hill-country. Saul's throne had passed to his surviving son Ishbaal, who reigned from the new capital that Abner established for him at Mahanaim in Transjordan, out of Philistine reach. It is noteworthy that Abner apparently had little interest in trying to seize the throne for himself, possibly out of continued loyalty to Saul, although he clearly intended to be the power behind the throne. At the same time, in the southern part of the country, David, now free of his constraint of loyalty to Saul, began to fill the power vacuum that had been created in Judah, whose ties to the northern tribes had weakened considerably in the wake of the military disaster and the ensuing political crisis. Building on the support he had developed during the time he was operating from Ziklag, from where he effectively secured Judah's desert frontiers from the raiding Amalekites and others, David decided to take the political initiative and moved his headquarters to Hebron, the most prominent city in Judah, and assumed power there. It will be recalled that David had previously married Abigail, the widow of the Calebite chieftain Nabal, inheriting both his wealth and status in the clan that was in effective control of Hebron. Presumably, as a result of his already having the support of the Calebites, the elders of the other clans of Judah, faced by what amounted to a fait accompli, quickly came to terms with David, probably because he and his small but highly effective army was the only force capable of standing between Judah and its enemies. It seems likely that, at least initially, David continued to honor his vassal relationship with Achish, the king of Gath, to assure noninterference from the Philistines in his efforts to establish a power base in Judah. Indeed, "he may, particularly in the eyes of Achish, have been regarded as a loyal vassal whose resettlement in Judah could be explained as an extension of the Philistine sphere of influence into a distant and hitherto inaccessible area." 2 Alternatively, David's move to assume power in Judah may have

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been welcomed by the Philistines, who would have viewed David as a counterpoise to a re-emergent state in the north, presumably hoping thereby to be in a position to play off one vassal ruler against the other, thus facilitating their retention of control with a minimum investment of resources. In any case, it seems clear that the Philistines interposed no obstacles to David's assumption of power in Judah. Nonetheless, it was a risky and uncertain course he chose to follow to power in Israel, both with regard to the Philistines looking over his shoulder and the Israelite tribes arrayed before him. With regard to the latter, the situation stood as follows. The traditional tribal subdivision of the country had always been ill defined as a practical matter and was now largely irrelevant. The tribes had in fact merged into three large regional groupings in the north, in the south, and in the east. In the north, Ephraim had long been the dominant factor, although more recently Benjamin had played a more significant role because Saul had established his capital there. In the south, Judah had effectively absorbed Simeon, which henceforth virtually disappears from the pages of the biblical histories, and the various quasi-Israelite clans that had long been affiliated with Judah, as well as the remnants of Dan that failed to move to the far north with the main body of the tribe after its displacement by the Philistines. In the east, in Transjordan, the tribes of Gad, Reuben, and part of Manasseh had for all practical purposes merged into Gilead. Now, in the wake of the effective destruction of the kingdom that Saul built, Abner was busy trying to reconstitute these disparate components of the previous tribal federation into a new kingdom of all Israel under Ishbaal. The dilemma David faced, if he was going to fulfill the destiny Samuel had committed him to, was how to prevent Abner from succeeding in rallying all of Israel to the banner of the house of Saul once again. The decision David reached, presumably in consultation with his advisers and supporters, was far-reaching and fraught with unintended but not wholly unanticipated consequences. It was a decision he could not have taken lightly. He would in effect politically isolate Judah and its constituent clans from the remainder of the Israelite tribes by transforming it into an independent country and kingdom. Presumably, he did this on the assumption that over time the other tribes or tribal conglomerates would weigh the benefit of his leadership against that of the ineffectual Ishbaal, and eventually accede to the kingdom of Judah, which would in effect replace the earlier united kingdom of Israel. Accordingly, around 1000 B.C.E., David figuratively threw down the gauntlet to Abner and Ishbaal by having himself crowned king of Judah. "This action to some extent restored the situation to what it had been in the days of the Judges, when Judah had been separate from the other tribes." 3 David's initial attempt to attract other Israelites to his banner as king of Judah concentrated on Gilead. Presumably, if David were able to bring

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over Gilead, which would have been a prize of enormous symbolic value for David's purposes, the entire attempt by Abner to reconstitute the kingdom of Israel under the house of Saul might be brought to collapse. Historically, Gilead generally had had little to do with the Cisjordanian tribes other than Benjamin until the Ammonite war that forced the Gileadites to turn to Saul for relief. The latter's prompt and saving response made them indebted to Saul, and it was surely for this reason, above all, that Abner sought to reestablish the kingdom of the house of Saul under Ishbaal at Mahanaim in Gilead. Moreover, the Gileadites had already demonstrated their indebtedness and fealty to Saul and his house by taking the dangerous step of crossing the Jordan and rescuing the mutilated bodies of the king and his sons that the Philistines had placed on public display, and then burying them with the deference owed to fallen leaders. However, the Gileadite action, understood by Abner and Ishbaal as a confirmation of loyalty to the house of Saul, was evidently interpreted by David as bringing closure to their debt of honor to Saul, a debt that did not necessarily extend to Saul's remaining and not highly-thought-of son. Accordingly, David made an overture to the Gileadites, commending them on their actions but at the same time reminding them that the era of Saul was over, and urging them to hold out against any Philistine attempt to extend its hegemony across the Jordan until he could come to their aid. The message brought by his emissaries, according to the biblical author, was "Now therefore let your hands be strong, and be ye valiant; for Saul your lord is dead, and also the house of Judah have anointed me king over them" (2 Sam. 2:7). Take note that David makes no reference whatever to Ishbaal, as though his presence in Gilead was entirely irrelevant to their situation. Although David's bid for Gilead's allegiance, which was effectively preempted by Abner's reconstitution of Israel's monarchy there, did not produce any immediate results, quite understandable under the circumstances, he laid the groundwork for such in the not-too-distant future. In the meantime, Ishbaal's reconstituted kingdom held sway over Gilead and incrementally expanded its rule to the northernmost tribal areas, which were out of the reach of the Philistines, and then to the Jezreel valley region and the central highlands of Ephraim, as the Philistines reduced their direct presence there. Although Saul's writ previously obtained in Judah as well, David had successfully preempted Abner's ability to reincorporate it into Ishbaal's realm. As a result, relations between Judah and Israel remained contentious and frequently volatile as they both pursued the process of state-building independently. It would also appear that David adopted a policy of applying increasing pressure on Ishbaal through a variety of means, all calculated to destabilize his situation and to keep him preoccupied as David consolidated his own position in Judah. He had evidently already developed good

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personal relations with the Moabite court, possibly based in part on the consideration that David's great-grandmother Ruth was a Moabite (Ruth 4:10). He also had sent his parents there for safety when Saul was actively seeking his life (1 Sam. 22:3-4). David thus had a putative ally on Ishbaal's southern flank in Transjordan. It also appears that he had come to some agreement with Nahash, king of the Ammonites, whom Saul had defeated when he went to the defense of Jabesh-gilead. When Nahash subsequently died, David sent a message to his successor Hanun commenting on the kindnesses the Ammonite king had shown him in the past and, by implication suggesting a continuation of good relations between Judah and Ammon. Hanun summarily rejected this overture and, as an indication of his contempt for David, he mistreated David's emissaries in a manner that soon provoked a war between them (2 Sam. 10:1-4). Nonetheless, while Nahash lived, he continued to pose a threat to Ishbaal's eastern flank that served David's interests. David also evidently entered into an agreement with the king of Geshur, a small city-state north of Gilead, which was sealed by David's marriage to the king's daughter Maacah, the mother of his favorite son Absalom (2 Sam. 3:3), an alliance that remained in effect even after David conquered all the other small states of Transjordan. In other words, with the Philistines on Ishbaal's western flank, he was virtually completely ringed with enemies, all of whom had good relations with David. One of the areas in contention between the two budding kingdoms was the borderland region of much-plagued Benjamin. Being the homeland of Saul and Ishbaal, Benjamin was therefore considered by the latter as naturally affiliated with his new kingdom of Israel. However, David, who also sought to lay claim to the territory, challenged this assumption. The territory of Benjamin was of great strategic value to Judah because it contained one of the few east-west routes through the southern hill country from the Mediterranean to the Jordan, a route that had been exploited in the past by Israel and subsequently by its enemies as well. Moreover, parts of the area were still under non-Israelite domination, including continued Jebusite control of Jerusalem, an anomaly that David intended to correct. The immediate attention of both contenders for Benjamin focused on the large reservoir at Gibeon, about five miles northwest of Jerusalem, a significant groundwater source in a land otherwise heavily dependent on rain. Armed contingents from both sides, Ishbaal's led by Abner and David's by his nephew Joab, field commander of his forces, converged at Gibeon to assert their respective claims to the area. As negotiations between the two generals failed to resolve the issue, fighting between them soon broke out, with Abner's contingent of relatively inexperienced troops, most of his seasoned men having fallen in the Philistine war, faring very poorly against Joab's forces, which had recently gained significant experience in the campaigns that David mounted against the Amalekites. As

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Abner retreated with his remaining forces, one of Joab's younger brothers Asahel attempted to overtake and personally kill Abner, presumably assuming that without the strong hand of Abner, Ishbaal's regime would quickly collapse and thereby facilitate a takeover by Judah. In the event, Abner killed Asahel inadvertently, albeit in self-defense, generating a blood feud that he had hoped to prevent by unsuccessfully warning off the young man, a feud that would have dramatic political consequences several years later. In the meantime, a protracted low-level military conflict ensued between the houses of David and Saul, in which the latter grew progressively weaker and the former stronger. Political developments took a dramatic turn with the emergence of a split between Ishbaal and the real power behind the throne, Abner, over a private matter that the king saw as politically portentous. Abner apparently had established a romantic relationship with Rizpah, one of Saul's former concubines, and this set off alarms in the palace. Ancient custom dictated that a king's harem passed to his successor along with the crown. By consorting with Rizpah, Abner not only trespassed on Ishbaal's customary rights in this regard, but also was perceived as asserting his preeminence over that of the king, possibly indicating his intention to make a bid for the throne, something that Ishbaal could not allow to pass unchallenged. Contrary to what Ishbaal may have imagined was happening, it is extremely unlikely that Abner was using his connection to a member of Saul's harem as a step toward seizing power—if he had wanted to do that he could have ignored Ishbaal entirely and have assumed the throne immediately after the death of Saul and Jonathan, since the dynasty had not yet been established. If anything, it is more likely that Abner saw little future for the state under Ishbaal and sought some means of provoking discord between them to justify his abandonment of the house of Saul, which he had served devotedly for so long. When Ishbaal challenged Abner about his impolitic act, the latter became outraged over what he ostensibly saw as something that was entirely personal and none of the king's business. Indeed, according to the biblical writer, Abner remonstrated and charged the king with ingratitude, going so far as to threaten, not to overthrow him and seize the throne himself, but "to transfer the kingdom from the house of Saul, and set up the throne of David over Israel and over Judah, from Dan even to Beersheba" (2 Sam. 3:10). It seems clear that the squabble between king and army chief unleashed Abner's frustration with Ishbaal as an uninspiring leader, one incapable of rebuilding Saul's state to the degree necessary to ensure its future. Once having given voice to the thought of bringing Israel under the wing of David, who was widely perceived as an inspired and inspiring leader, it was not long before Abner took steps to bring that about, secretly sending emissaries to David with an offer to turn the kingdom over to him in

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exchange for an alliance between them, under which, presumably, Abner would become commanding general of David's army. This was an offer that David could hardly ignore, if for no other reason than that Abner was himself an extended family member of the house of Saul, and his defection from Ishbaal to David could have significant political implications. At the same time, David was conflicted by a dilemma of a more personal nature. Abner clearly expected to receive, as the price of his transfer of allegiance, the post in David's regime that was currently filled by his volatile nephew Joab, who surely would not graciously accept demotion, and especially not subordination to the man who had killed his brother. Putting state interests first, David apparently was prepared to accept Abner's terms, which were presumably distasteful to him, and to worry about Joab's reaction later. Because the agreement clearly implied that Ishbaal would have to be deposed and probably done away with, David was concerned about how he, as a person always loyal to Saul, would be perceived if he now entered into a conspiracy to overthrow Saul's legitimate successor. He required a plausible rationale for taking such an egregious action and found one in his own connection to the house of Saul. At one point in his ambivalent relationship with Saul, the king had given his daughter Michal in marriage to David (1 Sam. 18:17-29). However, after Michal later helped David escape Saul's wrath, the king annulled the marriage and gave her to another. The reestablishment of that connection to the house of Saul might make David's assumption of the crown of Israel more palatable to those concerned about the dynastic issues involved in such a takeover. It was evidently with this in mind that David stipulated that he would enter into an agreement with Abner only on the condition that Abner take the necessary steps to deliver David's former wife to him, irrespective of the fact that she was married to another, thereby creating a facade of legitimacy for his claim to the throne of Israel.4 Following appropriate protocol, and probably to help conceal the secret negotiations with Abner, David then made a formal demand of Ishbaal that he return to him Michal, his wife who had forcibly been taken from him by Saul. Implicit in the demand was the notion that Saul's intervention in that regard was a matter of personal animus and not a matter of state that obligated Ishbaal to continue to uphold his father's action. Undoubtedly, the king consulted with Abner, who surely advised him that a failure to restore Michal to David might well transform the political conflict between Israel and Judah into a vindictive personal one between David and Ishbaal, and the latter must have been sufficiently intimidated by that prospect to agree to comply with David's demand. Accordingly, by royal command, Michal's husband divorced her and she was sent to David's court, presumably accompanied by Abner as her escort, thereby facilitating direct negotiations between him and David. It is noteworthy

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that the biblical account does not suggest that Michal was even consulted about her being sent to David's harem, nor does it indicate that she actually went to Hebron, or that David had much to do with her afterward— she was merely a pawn in the larger political game being played by David. In anticipation of the condition stipulated by David being fulfilled, Abner surreptitiously set about preparing the leaders of Israel for a prospective change in regime, capitalizing on the fact that there had been a number of elders who were originally in favor of inviting David to assume the crown following the death of Saul. Ironically, it was probably Abner who earlier dissuaded them from doing so in order to preserve the house of Saul, of which he too was a member, in power. He also assiduously courted the elders of Benjamin, who were expected to be the most opposed to the change because of the prestige they attained as the home tribe of the house of Saul. The direct negotiations between Abner and David regarding the transition of power and the disposition of Ishbaal, which ultimately took place when Michal was delivered to David, were concluded at a celebratory feast in David's capital, with Abner reportedly stating, "I will arise and go, and will gather all Israel unto my lord the king, that they may make a covenant with thee, and that thou mayest reign over all that thy soul desireth" (2 Sam. 3:21). However, before Abner was able to make his way safely back to Israel, he was arrested by order of Joab, without David's knowledge or approval, and was murdered, ostensibly in retaliation for his earlier slaying of Joab's brother. However, it is likely that Joab simply did not trust someone who would betray his king—if Abner was prepared to betray Ishbaal, he would probably also betray David if it served his purpose—and was convinced that David had made a mistake that he had to correct. In addition, Joab may have feared that David might reward the experienced general with the position of commander-in-chief of the joint forces of Israel and Judah, once the union between the two kingdoms was consummated. That would have compounded the problem of trust and would also have been counter to Joab's own ambitions in the same regard. The fact that Abner was murdered in Judah, while presumably traveling under a safe conduct arrangement ordered by the king, was particularly egregious and odious, and his murder evidently haunted David for the rest of his life. David was outraged and furious at Joab for what had happened but realized that there was little he could do that would not be counterproductive, his hands effectively being tied. Joab and his brother Abishai, who was implicated in the deed as well, were the chief commanders of the army in addition to being the king's nephews and confidantes. Given that Israel and Judah had been at war for years, David was justifiably concerned about the effect on the morale of the army of any punishment he might seek to impose on Joab for killing the enemy commander. Moreover, even if David did not know about or condone Joab's act, it

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nonetheless nullified some of his serious concerns about the devil's bargain he had struck with Abner. For one thing, he surely would have agreed with Joab that if Abner betrayed his king, what assurance could David have that Abner would not plot against him as well? For another, David's obvious rewarding of Abner's treason, if it were to be revealed, might not sit well with some of the elders of Israel who remained loyal to the house of Saul and might lead to speculation that David was behind it from the outset. Finally, eliminating Abner avoided the problems that surely would have arisen if, as agreed, he had been given a post that effectively displaced Joab, who was loyal to David to a fault, and who was held in high esteem by the army. As a practical matter, Abner would very quickly have outlived his usefulness to David and would have become a troublesome liability. What David had to do now was to put aside recriminations about what happened and look for ways to mitigate whatever political damage to him that the act wrought among the elders and people of Israel, where Abner was widely popular. In fact, all David could and did do was to bury Abner in Hebron with honors, and to declare a public fast and mourning for the slain leader, in which David visibly participated by personally eulogizing him. These steps had the desired result of dissociating and absolving him from any blame in the affair; "So all the people and all Israel understood that day that it was not of the king to slay Abner the son of Ner" (2 Sam. 3:37). The loss of Abner was traumatic for Israel, where the great fear was that the war with Judah would continue unabated, only that now the army would be under the direct command of Ishbaal, who evidently was not held in high regard as a political leader, let alone as a military one. This led some Benjamites to conclude that the only way to solve the immediate dilemma was by assassinating the king. Since Ishbaal apparently had no male heirs and the male member of the house of Saul next in the line of succession was Jonathan's twelve-year old son Meribaal (Mephibosheth), who was physically handicapped as the result of a childhood accident and was therefore unable to assume the role of a warrior-king, the death of Ishbaal would open the way for David's assumption of the throne, something that the latter would not have done as long as Ishbaal was alive, out of his longstanding loyalty to the house of Saul. In other words, only the death of Ishbaal would bring a prompt end to the protracted and debilitating war with Judah. And, according to the biblical account, Ishbaal was soon assassinated by two of his military officers, who brought his decapitated head to David as proof of his death. But David, notwithstanding that the murder cleared the way for him to the throne of Israel, could not abide the notion of regicide and had the murderers executed. He subsequently buried Ishbaal's head in the grave of Abner in Hebron. It is noteworthy that the biblical text names the two assassins and em-

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phasizes that they were Beerothites, "of the children of Benjamin; for Beeroth also is reckoned to Benjamin; and the Beerothites fled to Gittaim, and have been sojourners there until this day" (2 Sam. 4:2-3). This parenthetical note in the biblical text is of historical interest and possibly explains the motive for this horrendous act of treason. It should be recalled that Beeroth is one of the four Hivite cities, along with Gibeon, Chephirah, and Kiriath-jearim, which became Israelite protectorates through a treaty with Joshua (Josh. 9:17-18). The text under consideration is generally understood as suggesting that the original Hivite residents of Beeroth were driven out of the city and forced to permanently settle elsewhere. Presumably, this occurred during Saul's efforts to reduce the non-Israelite presence in the area of the strategically important Aijalon valley, discussed below in connection with David's negotiations with the Gibeonites. But what is the significance of the parenthetical note in the context of the assassination of Ishbaal? An alternate understanding of the note provides a plausible explanation.5 It is suggested that because Beeroth was one of the cities that was never conquered by Israel, but which entered into a permanent treaty relationship with it, it became a non-Israelite enclave within Benjamin with special treaty rights. Over time, and especially during Saul's rule, many Benjamites may have been encouraged to relocate there for security reasons, thus impinging on the autonomous control of the city by the Hivite population. Following Saul's death, as already indicated, the frontier war between Israel and Judah focused on the domination of Benjamin. It would seem to have been in David's interest at that point to weaken Ishbaal's control over the strategically situated Hivite enclaves, and he may have both encouraged and supported the efforts of the indigenous population of Beeroth to effectively pressure their Benjamite residents to leave the area, making the Hivite city a de facto ally of Judah. From this perspective, the Beerothites that fled to and resettled at Gittaim, another town in Benjamin, were the Benjamite residents and not the Hivites. Acknowledging that Beeroth was in Judah's sphere of influence, the two Benjamite assassins may have hoped that, by getting rid of Ishbaal and opening the way for David to become king of Israel, he might reward the displaced Benjamite Beerothites by restoring them to their previous homes and landholdings in Beeroth. The biblical account further indicates that David reigned over Judah alone for seven and a half years and then reigned over both kingdoms for thirty-three years (2 Sam. 5:5). It also informs us that Ishbaal reigned for only two years before he was assassinated. The question that has troubled scholars is what took place in the five-and-a-half-year period after the death of Ishbaal and before the enthronement of David as king of Israel. Although the biblical account indicates that there "was long war between the house of Saul and the house of David" (2 Sam. 3:1), much of which

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probably took place during the five-and-a-half-year period, it provides no specifics about the course of that struggle other than that "David waxed stronger and stronger, but the house of Saul waxed weaker and weaker" (2 Sam. 2:10). It would seem, however, that the long struggle alluded to in the biblical text probably took place over control of the borderlands between the two kingdoms, most especially the tribal area of Benjamin, the contest for which began immediately after David became king of Judah. Benjamin was critically important to David for at least two reasons, one strategic and one political. The strategic importance of Benjamin has already been discussed above in connection with the battle between Joab and Abner. The political importance lay in it being the homeland of the house of Saul, and therefore a potential source of opposition to David's ambitions. As the biblical writer noted, the house of Saul, although weakened by the struggle, still existed; it did not disappear with the death of Ishbaal. It is therefore reasonable to assume that, notwithstanding the dearth of information about what transpired, the house of Saul continued to lead the northern kingdom in the ongoing struggle for control of Benjamin during that five-and-a-half-year period. It is also clear that until David dealt with the remnants of the house of Saul, his goal of uniting all of the Israelite tribes under his banner would be thwarted. Redeeming a promise earlier made to his dear friend Jonathan, David now effectively adopted the latter's son Meribaal, who posed no threat to him, and raised him along with his own children. There were, however, seven other potential claimants to the throne of Israel: the two sons of Saul's concubine Rizpah, whom Abner had wanted to marry, and the five sons of Saul's eldest daughter Merab, who remained to be dealt with. The biblical historiographer simply records without comment that all of these potential challengers to David's legitimacy were subsequently eliminated for reasons that had nothing whatever to do with anything they are reported to have said or done to merit their fates. According to the biblical account, early in David's reign, the country underwent a three-year drought that wreaked havoc with its agricultural economy, and it somehow became the popular belief that the drought was divine retribution for Saul's earlier violation of an ancient treaty with the people of Gibeon. Moreover, it was believed that relief would only come with public atonement for that breach of trust. It was recalled, as noted above, that some two centuries earlier, during the early stage of the Israelite conquest, Joshua had made a solemn treaty with Gibeon and several other Hivite enclaves in what later became Benjamite territory, in which he had guaranteed their security. The Gibeonites now alleged that in his campaign to rid the hill-country of non-Israelites, Saul, perhaps intentionally or perhaps inadvertently, killed a number of Gibeonites in violation of that treaty (2 Sam. 21:1-2). It seems far more likely, however, that Saul's action against the Gibeonites was undertaken for geostrategic reasons

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rather than for the alleged purpose of ethnic cleansing. Gibeon, along with the other members of the Hivite coalition, including Chephirah, Beeroth, and Kiriath-jearim, city-states that entered into a treaty with Joshua, formed a wedge of non-Israelite towns along the Aijalon valley that extended into the central hill country, which, in conjunction with Jebusiteheld Jerusalem, constituted a barrier to the security of the lines of communication between the northern Israelite tribes and those of the south. It would appear that Saul may have decided that it was necessary to rectify this situation, regardless of Gibeon's status as a protectorate, and took steps to assure direct Israelite control over the Aijalon, steps that evidently resulted in some Gibeonite loss of life, losses that would in modern terms be characterized as unintentional "collateral damage." Ostensibly under pressure to assuage public concern over the alleged cause of the drought, David acknowledged Saul's violation of the treaty and offered to pay compensation for the lives that had been taken. According to the biblical account, the Gibeonites refused the offer, insisting that the account could only be settled on the basis of an eye for an eye, and demanded the lives of Saul's surviving heirs, a demand to which David ultimately yielded. David's agreement to hand over all of Saul's surviving sons and grandsons, with the exception of Meribaal, to the Gibeonites, who executed them all, was an act that must have raised some cynical eyebrows in Israel, notwithstanding the claim that it was done to assuage divine anger over violation of a treaty oath. After all, punishing sons for the sins of their fathers violated a basic tenet of the Mosaic value system. It is possible that David also had another, more political objective in mind; namely, to find a way of beginning to integrate the non-Israelite populations into the territorial state he intended to build. The Gibeonites were an important first test case, primarily because of the strategic position of Gibeon relative to the Aijalon. Although they were a protected minority under the ancient treaty, they were nonetheless an alien presence in the Israelite body politic, and David may have wished to create an environment for them to gradually assimilate into the Israelite majority. By conceding the legitimacy of their claims, he set the stage for them to begin to feel like an integral part of the nation, thus effectively repudiating their traditional status as an underclass. Moreover, their obvious antagonism to the house of Saul made them natural allies of David, particularly in assuring the security of the Aijalon. Although it would take some time before David felt he could rely on their loyalty, as discussed further below, the ultimate success of his approach is evidenced by the fact that from David's time on, the Gibeonites were considered Israelites rather than Hivites. 6 In any case, when the drought subsequently broke, ostensibly as a result of this strange manner of rectifying a past wrong, David evidently sought

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to put an end to any recriminations over the episode by bringing the bodies of Saul, Jonathan, and the other sons who died with him at Gilboa, from Jabesh-gilead and burying them together with the other seven sons and grandsons in the tomb of Saul's father Kish. The net political outcome of this bizarre episode was that there were now no other extant members of the house of Saul in a position to raise a serious claim of dynastic succession to the throne of Israel. With the house of Saul now effectively eliminated, except for Meribaal whom David adopted, the leaders of the northern and Transjordanian tribes eventually became reconciled to the reality of the situation, namely that there was no viable alternative to acceptance of David as their ruler. Expediency dictated that it would be best if they took the first step rather than wait for David to impose his rule over them, and they therefore came to Hebron, where a covenant was concluded between the parties that made David king of Israel in addition his being king of Judah. The idea of there being a covenant between David and the leaders of the tribes of Israel merits special emphasis. "The people were not ready to submit to an ancient Near Eastern dictatorship. The Israelites always maintained a sense of tribal and individual dignity and privilege, and so the king had to abide by a covenant that was sort of constitution he had to grant if they were to accept him." 7 The language employed by the delegation from Israel in offering to transfer their allegiance to David, as cited in the biblical account, is especially noteworthy. Behold, we are thy bone and thy flesh, they asserted, affirming the close ethnic bond between the northern and eastern tribes and that of Judah. They then went on, "In times past, when Saul was king over us, it was thou that didst lead out and bring in Israel; and the Lord said to thee: Thou shalt shepherd My people Israel, and thou shalt be nagid (prince) over Israel" (2 Sam. 5:1-2). This, as has been pointed out, "is the terminology of the old theocratic ideal. The king is thus like a Sumerian ensi, claiming only to be the shepherd who pastures God's human flock. God is the official ruler; the human head of state is only His agent." 8 Moreover, it also makes clear that their intent was not that David should have the sovereign prerogatives of an absolute king, regardless of his bearing that title, but that he was intended to be a nagid, exercising his rule in accordance with the tribal traditions of the people. In an evident overture to northern sensibilities, David was henceforth generally designated as king of Israel, as though he had now reconstituted the earlier united kingdom of Saul. However, in fact, the covenant with the representatives of the northern tribes did not merge the two states of Israel and Judah. In effect, what was created was not an integrated kingdom, as existed under Saul, but a dual monarchy that consisted of a personal union of two separate kingdoms that simply had the same ruler and central government, not at all unlike some of the personal unions found

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in European history. While David might have striven to bring about the political integration of Israel and Judah, neither he nor his immediate successor ever truly succeeded in so doing. His earlier decision to establish an independent kingdom of Judah now prevented its unification with Israel. Feelings in both kingdoms against such integration were too strong to make it politically practicable. Too much blood had been spilled between them during more than seven years of virtually continuous strife, without a decisive victory for either side, to suddenly come together. The most David could achieve was a personal union of the two through him and his house. Israel needed a strong king to deal with its complex strategic and military problems, and David of Judah was clearly the man for the job. However, Judah and Israel would remain essentially separate kingdoms for the remainder of their histories, both institutionally and in the perceptions of their peoples. The establishment of the dual monarchy shocked the Philistines into the realization that they had completely miscalculated both David's ambitions and capabilities. They now saw him as a dangerous enemy who had to be dealt with quickly, before he was able to consolidate his power, and a new Philistine invasion was promptly organized and initiated. The Philistine strategy appears to have been to attack David's capital at Hebron from the north, approaching it from the valley of Rephaim, a plain that extended some three miles southwest of Jerusalem, and then proceeding southward through Bethlehem to Hebron. However, instead of mounting a defense of Hebron, David anticipated the Philistine advance and moved northward to cut off the Philistine army before it penetrated too deeply into Judahite territory. He then launched a preemptive strike that caught the Philistines off guard and routed them. The Philistines regrouped and once again deployed in the valley of Rephaim, where they awaited an Israelite attack from the south. David, however, altered his offensive strategy and circled the Philistines, attacking them from behind, once again inflicting a significant defeat on them. The Philistines were now forced to rethink their entire approach to the emerging powerful Israelite state under David and resolved to reach a modus vivendi that conceded all of the hill country to David at the same time that they retained control of three of their original five enclaves along the coast, the other two, Gath and Ekron, now being compelled to acknowledge David's suzerainty. Although the Israelites had long desired to descend from the hill country to take advantage of the coastal plain, David wisely decided to forego acting on that desire and desisted from any attempt to overrun the territory held by the Philistines. Had he chosen otherwise at the time, the state of virtually continual war between the two nations would have persisted. Having reached an accommodation with the Philistines, David was now free to attempt to further consolidate the two kingdoms under his rule. Taking into consideration the sensitivities that existed between Israel in

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the north and Judah in the south, it was evident that it would be a mistake to continue to use Hebron as the nation's capital, which was a constant reminder to both and a special irritant to the elders of the northern tribes that the king and his government were based in Judah. The more politically prudent and astute choice was to establish the capital at Jerusalem, situated in the center of the country in the frontier zone between Israel and Judah, a non-Israelite city that had been bypassed during the original conquest of the land, and which was still occupied by the Jebusites, a people of Hurrian origin who came under the general rubric of Canaanites. Since no Israelite tribe, clan, or faction had any prior history with the city, it was an ideal choice for a capital because it gave no special prestige to anyone and would arouse no intertribal jealousies. Moreover, control of Jerusalem, which was virtually impregnable by frontal assault, would also eliminate the threat of any further Philistine attempts to attack Hebron, which was vulnerable to assault from the north through the valley of Rephaim that lay just southwest of the ancient Jebusite city Having set his sights on Jerusalem, David soon managed to take the city through a surreptitious penetration of its defenses by Joab and his men rather than through a protracted siege, for which he was not prepared. The precise means by which his troops accomplished this, mentioned but not elaborated in a brief and obscure biblical passage (2 Sam. 5:8-9), remains a matter of scholarly contention. It is important to note, however, that the biblical account informs us that it was "the king and his men" (2 Sam. 5:6) that took Jerusalem; that is, it was David and the troops directly under his personal command that conquered it, and not the tribal levies of the army of Israel-Judah. Accordingly, the city became David's personal property by right of conquest. Situated between Judah and Israel, but belonging to neither, Jerusalem and its people thus owed allegiance to David and his house rather than to the kingdoms he ruled, a fact that became especially important when the dual monarchy dissolved following the reign of David's successor. Once Jerusalem was secured, David made it the headquarters of his regime and immediately took steps to make it the political and cultural capital of the nation as a whole. His first step was to enhance the city's physical security. He expanded its fortifications, particularly on its northern side, the only side that was not protected by deep ravines, and began construction of a suitable palace to serve as the center of government. Moreover, he went to much bother to assure that every institution in or associated with the capital appeared neutral in composition so that there should be no allegations of preference for Judah. He went so far as to employ Phoenicians to help build his palace and Philistines and other nonIsraelites to serve as his bodyguards. David's practice in this regard has raised eyebrows, and why he chose to employ non-Israelite mercenaries in such a critical role seems puzzling. However, there is indeed a com-

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pelling logic behind his decision. "Natives tend to have family or local loyalties. Foreign mercenaries have no such ties and tend to be well disciplined, loyal to their commander, and interested in his personal welfare, for on him depends their professional welfare. Thus these mercenaries were eventually instrumental in preserving David's life and throne when his own flesh and blood betrayed him." 9 Later kings of Israel and Judah who did not follow David's example did not live to regret it. David's next priority was to transform Jerusalem into the religious and cultural center of the nation, hoping thereby to bring about greater unity between its disparate elements. Toward this end, he now retrieved the Ark of the Covenant, which had effectively been warehoused for more than two decades at Kiriath-jearim, and brought it to Jerusalem with much pomp and circumstance, placing it in a special tent, which became the national sanctuary, until a suitable temple could be built to house it. David's transfer of the ark to Jerusalem was a political stroke of genius. "Jerusalem was a city without traditions, historical associations, or imaginative appeal to the Hebrews hitherto. Now at one stroke, by becoming the home of the ark, Israel's most precious possession, Jerusalem became the holiest city in the land and one to which were attached the memories, traditions and associations which were inherent in the ark."10 It is difficult to understand why Saul and Samuel did not bring the ark out of storage in Kiriath-jearim decades earlier, unless the town continued to remain within the Philistine sphere of control even though it was not in Philistine territory as such. "We know that Kiriath-jearim was a member of the Gibeonite league (Josh. 9:17) and therefore a predominantly Amorite or Canaanite city; and it is probable therefore that it remained under Philistine suzerainty, although not situated in Philistine territory, even when Saul had succeeded in a large measure in throwing off the Philistine yoke."11 This situation changed dramatically following David's repeated defeat of the Philistines, which eliminated their sphere of control outside their coastal enclaves. Having established Jerusalem as the religious center of the dual monarchy, David also appointed two chief or high priests, Abiathar and Zadok, to oversee the religious life of the nation.12 The reason for having two high priests remains a mystery, although it may be that David, in the process of consolidating his rule, did not want to be faced by the possible conflict of religious and secular interests that afflicted the reign of his predecessor Saul, whose differences with Samuel led to sedition and David's own selection as future king by the prophet. Perhaps to avoid this, he chose to split the religious leadership by appointing two chief priests and thereby personally becoming the arbiter between them and thus retaining final authority over all state decisions that might involve religious issues. As for David's choices for the high priesthood, it is likely that Abiathar was appointed to the office because he was one of the sole sur-

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vivors of the massacre of the priests of Nob carried out by Saul and had served David loyally ever since. As for Zadok, it has been suggested that he had previously served Saul, and this was a way of demonstrating David's evenhandedness with regard to appointing the nation's religious leadership. Another and probably more likely reason for splitting the high priesthood is that David considered it essential at the time, given the current state of religious affairs and his ambitions for Jerusalem. It has been suggested in this regard that "Zadok's appointment as High Priest beside Abiathar must have been a concession to the priests outside Jerusalem and thus a recognition of the sanctuaries outside the capital."13 That is, David must have realized that the acceptance of Jerusalem as the principal cultic site of Israel-Judah would not occur overnight simply because he brought the Ark there. Many people evidently still worshipped at other sacral sites around the country, especially at Gibeon, to which the tabernacle had been relocated after the slaughter of the priests of Nob, and where Zadok had been officiating (2 Chron. 1:3). Accordingly, until Jerusalem became the religious and cultic center of the state in fact as well in theory, Abiathar would serve as high priest in Jerusalem while Zadok would continue to serve as high priest at the sanctuary on the heights of Gibeon (1 Chron. 16:39, 21:29). It would appear that David might also have had a political motive for sending Zadok to Gibeon and therefore according high stature to the royal sanctuary he established on the heights there. The neighboring city of Gibeon still had a large Hivite population, supplemented by a good number of Benjamites who settled there as well. It is suggested that, by making Gibeon a major cultic center, David caused a large number of priests and Levites to relocate there, increasing the Israelite component of the population of the strategically important location. This, in addition to the large number of pilgrims that would constantly be going there, would assure that the relatively large but basically non-Israelite city, strategically located with regard to the Aijalon, would remain loyal to him as he set about consolidating his territorial control over the non-Israelite enclaves in his realm.14 These considerations, as well as the problem created by having two high priests and the potential for conflict between them that was thereby created, may well be what caused the prophet Nathan, after his initial assent, to advise David that it was premature to build an imposing central sanctuary for the Ark of the Covenant in Jerusalem, which was not yet widely acknowledged as an Israelite city. Presumably, he was concerned that it might serve to exacerbate the internal divisions rather than the religious unity of the nation. The building of the temple would have to wait until the centrality of Jerusalem would be more accepted, and this would happen only once the Davidic dynasty was fully established under David's

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successor. At that time, it would be necessary to eliminate one of the high priests. An alternate explanation of why Nathan changed his mind and why David heeded Nathan's revised advice is predicated on the notion that David's intrinsic loyalty to Mosaic teaching, notwithstanding the political logic of making Jerusalem the religious focus of the nation, led him to the view "that to associate divine worship permanently with a particular place was to abandon Mosaic tradition." 15 This idea is clearly reflected in the prophecy that Nathan is reported as having revealed to the king. "Thus saith the Lord: Shalt thou build Me a house for Me to dwell in? for I have not dwelt in a house since the day that I brought up the children of Israel out of Egypt, even to this day, but have walked in a tent and in a tabernacle. In all places wherein I have walked among all the children of Israel, spoke I a word with any of the tribes of Israel, whom I commanded to feed My people Israel, saying: Why have ye not built Me a house of cedar?" (2 Sam. 7:5-7). Implicit in this is the concern that the transformation of the central sanctuary of Israel from a portable tabernacle to a fixed temple would tend to associate God with a particular territorial location as opposed to association with the Mosaic faith community, wherever it might be found. Presumably, this argument was sufficient to dissuade David to desist from building a temple, but at the same time raised his concern about the ultimate consequences it might have for the future of Jerusalem as the political and religious center for the nation. It seems that it was to deal with this concern that Nathan sought to assure David that idea of building a central national sanctuary in Jerusalem had not been categorically rejected, only that it was premature to build a permanent temple there now—it would have to wait until the time was ripe and this would occur during the reign of his successor. The prophecy thus continued, "He shall build a house for My name, and I will establish the throne of his kingdom for ever" (2 Sam. 7:13). David accepted the logic of the argument, resting content with the assurance that there was an irrevocable covenant between God and the house of David, an idea that subsequently served as a basis for the dynastic stability of the kingdom of Judah for more than three centuries. David subsequently launched a series of campaigns of strategic conquest to consolidate his kingdom by eliminating alien pockets, as well as to better provide for its security. The remaining Canaanite enclaves in the valleys and the maritime plain soon capitulated and were absorbed into the general Israelite population, their lands becoming royal estates administered on the king's behalf by his stewards. Non-Israelite cities like Megiddo that refused to surrender were destroyed. Having no naval experience or maritime capabilities, David elected to run the risks of leaving the coast from Egypt to Tyre and Sidon in the hands of the Philistines and the Phoenicians, the former as vassals and the latter as autonomous neigh-

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bors whose territory was nonetheless included within an Israelite sphere of influence, letting them defend the coastal areas while he commanded the heights, from which he could descend at will. Having pacified and brought the coastal region under Israel's control and influence, David soon became engaged in a series of campaigns along his northern and eastern frontiers in Syria and Transjordan that quickly transformed the dual monarchy into a mini-empire. The resulting territorial expansion would enable it to dominate the economy of the region, especially through domination of the major trade routes—the Via Maris and the King's Highway—that would pass through territory under David's control. Relations with Israel's eastern neighbors had frequently been testy at best, and, as already indicated, soon came to a boiling point with the accession of Hanun to the Ammonite throne and his deliberate humiliation of the emissaries sent by David to extend his felicitations on the occasion. This was clearly the equivalent of a declaration of war and David did not hesitate to send an expeditionary force under Joab to attack the Ammonite capital at Rabbath-ammon (contemporary Amman). In anticipation of an Israelite attack, Hanun recruited a mercenary army from the Aramaean states of Beth-rehob, Zobah, Maacah, and Tob, in southern Syria, to march south and attack the Israelite rear as Joab led his forces against the Ammonites. The supposition was that by forcing the Israelites to fight a two-front war, they would be caught in a pincer that would result in their defeat. Hanun, however, underestimated Israel's military capabilities. While Abishai, commanding one part of the army, held the Ammonites at bay, Joab mounted a counterattack against the Aramaeans that turned into a rout. The Ammonites were forced to withdraw into their heavily fortified capital, while the Israelites, not being prepared for what would necessarily be a protracted siege of the city, had no alternative but to disengage and retire. The humiliation of the Aramaean forces did not sit well with Hadadezer, the king of Aram-Zobah, who gathered a new army to join with the Ammonites in an attack on Israel. This time, David personally took the field at the head of his forces and intercepted the Aramaeans at Helam in northern Transjordan, where they were decisively defeated. The result of the Aramaean foray was the subjugation of the members of Hadadezer's Aramaean coalition to the status of tribute-paying vassals, and the establishment of an Israelite garrison in Damascus. In addition, David seized control of the Bekaa valley (Aram-Zobah), along which he built a series of fortresses, the northernmost of which was Ijon (present day Marjayoun) at the bend of the Litani River, which also effectively gave him direct control of the military and trade route to Mesopotamia. With the Aramaeans no longer a factor in Israel's conflict with the Ammonites, Joab laid siege to Rabbath-ammon and managed to gain control of its water

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supply, soon making surrender of the city its only option. At that point, the ever-loyal Joab sent a message to David inviting him to come and take credit for the victory. With the surrender, David took the crown of the deposed Ammonite king Hanun and placed it on his own head, thus declaring himself king of Ammon in addition to Israel and Judah. In two additional campaigns against Moab and Edom, the former was reduced to the status of a vassal and the latter to direct Israelite administration, with the appointment of an Israelite governor. It is not clear as to what precipitated the campaign against Moab, with whom David appeared to have good relations. The most likely scenario was a Moabite attack across the Arnon to regain part of their ancient homeland in southern Gilead at a time when David was preoccupied with the Aramaeans in the northern part of Transjordan. In any case, David appears to have taken full advantage of the window of opportunity presented by the preoccupation of both Egypt and Mesopotamia with other matters, and exploited it to vastly expand his reach, his sphere of control and influence extending from the Red Sea in the south to the Euphrates in the north, making Israel-Judah the preeminent force in the land-bridge region separating the two major powers. His victories in Transjordan also gave David effective control of the King's Highway from Edom to Damascus, enabling him to derive some financial benefits from the international trade it carried. Nonetheless, as one writer put it most emphatically, "it cannot be proved or even claimed with plausibility that David began a single one of these wars: only to ward off unwarranted attacks and for the defense of the most vital interests of his people did David draw the sword, but when he did, it was with might and as a war of God."16 In other words, David might properly be viewed as the world's first and probably only accidental imperialist. It is important to note that notwithstanding his conquests, David never laid claim to the territories of the peoples of Transjordan that came under Israel's control and that they were not conquered for such purpose. Quite to the contrary, those lands were considered as the legitimate property of the nations defeated in battle, and not as the spoils of war that were to be annexed to an expanding state. "This explains why when David began to swallow up this whole series of mountain states from Edom in the south to the Arameans in the north, he did not join them politically to the kingdoms of Israel and Judah, but made each according to its circumstances either a vassal-state ruled by its previous king, and responsible only to himself, or removed the king and placed it directly under his own administration, as a subject-state, in his royal domain." 17 Although David's royal authority extended far beyond the Israelite heartland, Israel and Judah remained the nucleus of the empire he created; David's battles were and continued to be fought by Israelite troops, augmented by his mercenary force, and not by soldiers conscripted from the conquered territories.

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It has been argued that David's approach in this regard was a significant contributory factor to the domestic instability that began to plague the dual monarchy in the latter part of his reign and that of his successor. By contrast with his predecessor Saul, whose military policy was essentially defensive in character, David continually employed the army of IsraelJudah for offensive purposes, operating in a preemptive mode that was difficult to explain to the public, which saw little tangible benefit from the wars they were called upon to fight far from home. It might have been different had the conquered or policed territories been annexed to Israel or Judah, as was the case with the Canaanite and Philistine enclaves in Cisjordan, rather than merely being added to the list of those paying tribute to the monarchy. David, however, was evidently concerned about what effect the addition of large alien populations through annexations to Israel and Judah might have on the national religious and cultural integrity of the Israelite kingdoms, and he resolutely resisted any inclinations to proceed in that direction, leaving a void in state policy that became a festering sore. As matters stood, the chronic instability of the territories over which David claimed suzerainty required repeated interventions that were a drain on the resources of Israel and Judah, which were obligated to raise and support troop levies for the purpose. "To send conscripted armies into the field time after time, perhaps year after year, for such a purpose made demands on the kingdoms which as time went by became increasingly difficult to fulfill. In short, the bow had bent too far; however well it suited David personally to strive after a complete and perfect control over the whole of Palestine, it did not suit the individual interests of Israel and Judah." 18 As a result, there was a growing disenchantment in the kingdoms that David did little to counter. It seems quite likely that it was David's imperial policy that seriously exacerbated the domestic problems with which his regime was plagued. The troubling and destabilizing complex of internal political issues that began to rise to the surface in the later years of David's reign was largely the consequence of the still essentially tribal structure of Israelite society in both Israel and Judah. There was a good deal of muted resistance to the increasing centralization of power in David's regime, which left the traditional tribal elders and leaders with not much beyond their titles. As the biblical writer observed, "David reigned over all Israel; and David executed justice and righteousness unto all his people" (2 Sam. 8:15). The key word in this statement is "all." That is, all executive functions were carried out through a governmental hierarchy that increasingly sidelined the traditional tribal authorities. The powers formerly assumed by the tribal councils of elders were taken over by a cabinet of officials who served at the king's pleasure. Put another way, in stark contrast to the modus operandi of Saul, who personally attempted to undertake critical

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leadership roles such as military commander, priest, and prophet, David established a bureaucracy under his direction to perform those roles and others, enabling him to function far more effectively. "The division of functions and their organization under the direction of a centralized power; the complex articulation of society into classes and functional sectors; the creation of a team of specialists centered on the palace, the seat of royal power: this is the new state framework that issues, as a superior synthesis, from the struggle between the 'old' and the 'new' models of kingship, between David and Saul."19 The biblical writings give some indication, albeit incomplete, of the membership in David's cabinet. Joab served as the person with overall responsibility for the armed forces; Jehoshaphat served as both cabinet secretary and official chronicler; Seruiah served as procurator-general, with responsibility for drafting and enforcing the royal decrees; Benaiah was responsible for the foreign mercenaries, including the Pelethites (Philistines) and Cherethites (Cretans) who served as David's bodyguards; Adoniram was in charge of the corvee, the compulsory labor required for David's construction projects; and Ahitophel served as royal counselor. It is noteworthy that several of these and other key appointments were given to non-Israelites, such as Ahitophel and probably also Adoniram, a reflection of David's readiness to open the highest positions in his government to persons of merit regardless of their ethnic origin, as long as they were committed to serve the kingdom loyally. In addition to these essentially secular offices, David also concentrated religious power in the central government. The principle religious leaders were appointed by and were responsible to David. These included the high priests Abiathar and Zadok, as well as the prophets Nathan and Gad, who were attached to the royal court as advisers. David's singular achievement may be seen in his having transformed the rudimentary national state forged out the tribal alliance by Saul into a territorial state, albeit in the form of a dual monarchy, with more or less clearly defined boundaries. In the process, however, the territorial bounds necessarily incorporated a variety of ethnic groups with different religious beliefs and practices than the Israelites. As a result, the indigenous Canaanites as well as parts of the Philistine population all became more or less equal members of the Davidic state, which now lost some of its Mosaic religious and cultural distinctiveness, even as Jerusalem increasingly became the central focus of Israelite religion. The net result of this was the emergence, for the first time, of what might be called the "Canaanite problem," which rapidly became an acute domestic political issue, one that would have been seriously exacerbated if the vassal territories in Transjordan had been annexed as well. It was one thing to destroy alien religious shrines in the process of conquest of territory; it was another to impose Israelite beliefs on others. While it was possible for the Israelite tribes to be religiously exclusive, it was not practicable for an Israelite

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state that incorporated alien groups to be so unless it was prepared to discriminate against certain segments of its population, with all that that implied for domestic stability. As will be seen, Israelite rulers were only rather infrequently prepared to do this, and in the few cases where they did so it was for the purpose of restoring a sense of national purpose among the majority of the population in times of recurring political crises. In general, although the religious establishment often played a significant role in influencing the domestic policy of the state, and the monarchy itself was the official sponsor of the state religion, the practice of other religions among the nonIsraelite segment of the population appears to have been tolerated. Moreover, there appears to have been an active process of mutual assimilation taking place that involved the mixing of religion and culture, which was a direct result of fraternization between the Israelites and Canaanites, to the chagrin of the prophets who perceived this process as a serious danger to the theopolitical underpinnings of the state. The emergence of this dilemma was an unanticipated consequence of David's accomplishments, and was one that would increase significantly over time. One feature of the organization of the new and increasingly centralized state created by David was probably especially irritating to the tribal elders. While the state maintained a small permanent army, it remained a tribal responsibility to raise annual levies of some 24,000 men per tribe, which were organized as a part-time militia, regularly serving one month a year per tribe, but which were commanded by senior career officers. Moreover, in case of emergency, the entire militia reserve could be mobilized at one time if necessary. Organizing the military in this manner required that there be a census to determine the available manpower, which was undertaken by Joab, and this in itself flouted a traditional aversion to enumerating the tribes. This was in addition to the growing resentment against the continuing mobilizations and the increasing taxes that were levied to support the seemingly unending wars, as well as the extension of Israelite control to areas beyond those originally envisioned by Moses and Joshua in their allocation of the tribal territories. Further compounding the problem, there were also longstanding intertribal animosities that continued to fester, particularly between the northern and southern tribes, providing a level of residual dissatisfaction that could be exploited by demagogues. This was soon to be demonstrated in a domestic crisis that threatened to tear the state apart, a crisis whose roots were to be found in the royal family itself. NOTES 1. S. Goldman, Samuel (London: Soncino, 1977), p. 192. 2. Hans W. Hertzberg, I & II Samuel: A Commentary (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1964), pp. 247-48.

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3. Hayim Tadmor, 'The Period of the First Temple, the Babylonian Exile and the Restoration," in H. H. Ben-Sasson (ed.), A History of the Jewish People (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 96. 4. Biblical exegetes and commentators have labored hard over the millennia in trying to rationalize how Saul could annul a marriage that had already been consummated or how David could remarry a woman who was married to another in the interim, something that is in direct violation of biblical law (Deut. 24:3). 5. The following analysis is based in part on the interpretation of the biblical passage by Ben-Tsiyon Luria, Sha'ul uVinyamin: Mehkarim beToldot Shevet Binyamin (Jerusalem: Kiryat Sefer, 1970), pp. 123-24. 6. Luria, Sha'ul uVinyamin, p. 140. 7. Cyrus H. Gordon and Gary A. Rendsburg, The Bible and the Ancient Near East (New York: Norton, 1997), pp. 194-95. 8. Ibid., p. 194. 9. Gordon and Rendsburg, The Bible and the Ancient Near East, p. 197. 10. Goldman, Samuel, p. 219. 11. Ibid, p. 220. Goldman bases this suggestion on the commentary of A.R.S. Kennedy in the Century Bible edition of Samuel. 12. The exact title of these priests is a matter of controversy, some scholars insisting that the designation "high priest" was applied only during the Second Temple period, and that the appropriate title for the period under consideration here is that of "chief priest." As a practical matter, the different titles reflect a distinction without a difference and have no particular political or religious significance. 13. Frederic Thieberger, King Solomon (London: East & West Library, 1947), p. 112. 14. Luria, Sha'ul uVinyamin, p. 134. 15. Salo W. Baron, A Social and Religious History of the Jews, vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), p. 65. 16. Carl H. Cornill, History of the Peoples of Israel: From the Earliest Times to the Destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans (Chicago: Open Court, 1899), pp. 77-78. 17. Albrecht Alt, Essays on Old Testament History and Religion (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), p. 294. 18. Ibid., p. 296. 19. Cristiano Grottanelli, Kings and Prophets: Monarchic Power, Inspired Leadership, and Sacred Text in Biblical Narrative (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 102.

CHAPTER 7

The Dual Monarchy: The Reign of Solomon

Although a highly successful political leader by any measure, David, like many a ruler before and after him, had a serious problem keeping his own house in order, a problem exacerbated by his having a harem of some dozen wives and numerous children. This was a prescription for generating palace intrigues, especially since the dynastic idea had not yet taken root among the Israelites, and while the eldest son might have reasonably expected to succeed to the throne, there was as yet no accepted tradition of primogeniture that prescribed that such had to be the case. The crisis emerged when David's firstborn son Amnon became infatuated with and raped his half-sister Tamar, the full sister of Absalom, who was next in line after Amnon in the presumed order of succession to the throne, even though he was the third eldest son. Chileab, David's second eldest son appears not to have been involved in the question of the succession, possibly because of an early death or disability. An alternate and more intriguing suggestion is that David essentially disqualified Chileab because his mother was an Israelite. There is a certain political logic behind such a seemingly strange decision. In a still strongly tribal-oriented society, David may have been concerned about undue influence being exerted by the mother's family on the prince and the popular perception that one tribe was being given preference over others. Accordingly, just as David had elected to establish Jerusalem as his capital because it was essentially neutral, not having an association with any of the tribes, he similarly preferred that his heir and successor not be associated with any particular tribe through his mother, an approach to selecting successors

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to the throne that appears to have been followed in numerous instances in the history of the house of David.1 When the outrage against Tamar was revealed, David was apparently unwilling to take any serious steps against his eldest son and heir presumptive and did nothing, despite the fact that the victim was his own daughter. David's passivity with regard to the scandalous affair is puzzling, leading some to suggest that his surprising reticence to punish Amnon was a reflection of his own sense of guilt at having committed adultery with Bathsheba, and then having her husband killed so that he could marry her. There can be little doubt that his failure to take any punitive action against Amnon was deeply resented by Absalom and planted a seed of disaffection in the latter that grew over time until it blossomed into a major crisis that threatened to tear the kingdom apart. Absalom held his peace for two years before he exacted revenge, ordering his retainers to kill Amnon at a time when the latter believed that his assault on Tamar had already been forgiven and forgotten. Because of the two-year delay, it seems safe to conjecture that, given Absalom's later behavior, the murder of Amnon was probably more of a calculated political act than the delayed reaction of an outraged brother over what had happened to his sister. By eliminating Amnon, Absalom advanced to first position in the line of succession to David's throne. It was clearly a very high-risk gambit, and it seems reasonable to assume that he would not have done it unless he felt assured by the deep affection that David displayed toward him that his direct complicity in the murder would not derail his ambition. He evidently believed that David would ultimately, albeit not immediately, forgive him for what might at that time have been considered a justifiable homicide. However, Absalom, presumably concluding that it was unwise as well as unsafe for him to remain in the country while the king was contending with his grief and anger over the murder of his son and heir, fled for safety to his maternal grandfather Talmai, the king of Geshur, a small Aramaean vassal state in the Golan, east of the Sea of Galilee, where he remained for three years. His choice of refuge was rather typical of a polygamous society, where there may be numerous siblings from different mothers. In the event of conflict among half-brothers, it was quite natural to seek sanctuary with the family of one's mother. The alternate notion, suggested by some, that Absalom sought refuge in Geshur because he would be safe there from David's retribution, because his maternal grandfather would never surrender him, seems rather implausible. It is hard to envision a small vassal state like Geshur refusing the demand of David, the most powerful king in the land-bridge region, to turn over to him his own son, and thereby risking a war that would inevitably result in the destruction of the tiny kingdom. Even more curious is the fact that there is no indication whatever that David even sought

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to extradite Absalom back to Jerusalem to face the king's justice. I would therefore suggest that David never had any intention of punishing Absalom for his fratricide, primarily because he himself was guilty of not punishing Amnon for his rape and mistreatment of Tamar; it would have constituted gross hypocrisy on the king's part to take action against Absalom for avenging his sister, and not against the one who assaulted David's own daughter. It therefore seems to me that the purpose behind Absalom's temporary exile from Jerusalem was to avoid exacerbating David's discomfit by his continued presence, thus allowing time for the scandal to die down and for David to regain both his royal and paternal composure. Moreover, it seems likely that Absalom's temporary banishment was probably arranged by David's closest advisers, given that the prince still remained David's favorite and the most likely to succeed to the throne. During Absalom's long absence from the court, it became clear that David sorely missed his favorite son. After a period of three years, perhaps because of his concern about David's psychological well-being, perhaps because he thought the reinstatement of Absalom to be desirable as the question of who should be groomed to succeed David was under consideration in the palace, Joab contrived to get the king to permit the return of Absalom from his banishment. Nonetheless, despite his great affection for Absalom, David was still sufficiently distraught by the affair to deny him a place at the court, a slight that only served to exacerbate the relationship between father and son. It would take another two years before Joab interceded once again on behalf of Absalom and arranged for reconciliation between the king and his son and potential successor. As a practical matter, however, Absalom's resentment at his treatment by David had reached a point where true reconciliation was no longer possible. Although Absalom was widely perceived as the heir apparent to the throne, there was as yet no fixed dynastic tradition regarding the succession, and Absalom had reason to be concerned that David might ultimately choose to pass over him and select another son to be his successor. It has been suggested that Absalom may have learned about a secret promise made by David to Bathsheba that her son Solomon would succeed him on the throne, and that it was this that spurred him to take steps to thwart such an eventuality 2 To assure his succession, Absalom began a campaign of self-promotion and a systematic attempt to undermine David's public standing. There can be no doubt that the seeds of discontent were taking root among many in the population over the increasing centralization of power in Jerusalem, which was almost completely overshadowing longstanding tribal traditions and arrangements, and it was this growing sentiment that Absalom sought to exploit in garnering support for his ambition. The biblical account relates that every morning Absalom would go to

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the city gates, where he would speak to the people from different tribes coming to Jerusalem to seek the king's justice and caution them that they would not receive such until he himself ascended the throne, and presumably would be more attentive to tribal norms and customs. Moreover, he shrewdly sought to evoke memories of earlier times when the tribes were essentially autonomous except for their voluntary submission to a shofet in times of need. In public, Absalom refrained from speaking directly of his monarchic ambitions. Instead, he would typically exclaim, "Oh that I were made judge (shofet) in the land" (2 Sam. 15:4). He would also be highly responsive to all who approached him, such that it was not long before "Absalom stole the hearts of the men of Israel" (2 Sam. 15:6). Moreover, he would routinely travel through the city in a chariot with a contingent of fifty men who cleared the path before him as though he were already in fact a potentate. Unaccountably, David appears to have made no effort to constrain this sort of behavior, which went on for several years, fostering the popular perception that Absalom would in fact succeed the king, who was growing old and weary. Absalom, however, was still concerned about whether David had a surprise in store for him and eventually came to the conclusion that the only way he could assure his succession to the throne was to seize it by force. Absalom shrewdly played on the residual disaffection of the tribal leaders, whose status had steadily declined during David's reign, especially in Judah, which was David's power base, where they expected special consideration after David also assumed the throne of Israel. At the same time, the northern tribes that constituted Israel were never fully reconciled to rule by a southerner, and therefore in their mind by Judah with which there was a long history of disaffection. It would seem, however, that in order to overcome the latter problem, Absalom, who was himself a southerner, must have convinced the elders of the northern tribes that, if he wore the crown, he would move to restore power to the tribes by reconstituting David's centralized state into a tribal federation. As a result, "the conspiracy was strong; for the people increased continually with Absalom" (2 Sam. 15:12). Absalom even recruited David's trusted counselor Ahitophel to his cause. It is noteworthy that, of David's inner circle, only Ahitophel was prepared to betray him. Scholars have speculated that his motive may have been personal, rather than political. There is some literary evidence to the effect that Ahitophel was the grandfather of Bathsheba, whom David famously seduced, or was seduced by, into an adulterous relationship and contrived to have her husband killed; it is therefore suggested by some that Ahitophel may have harbored a festering grudge against the king for having so debased her and therefore her family.3 It is also noteworthy that one ancient commentator suggested a more political motive, namely that Ahitophel's ambition was to seize the throne for himself, and

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presumably, if this were not possible, to be the power behind the throne if Absalom's plot succeeded. 4 It was not long before Absalom was able to bring the mounting resentment of David and his regime to a boiling point and succeeded in fomenting a revolt against the central government that first broke out in Hebron. The fact that the insurrection erupted out in David's former capital in the kingdom of Judah suggests that his core support there had waned considerably since he moved his court to Jerusalem. As king of Israel as well as Judah, David was no longer in a position to show any favoritism to his home tribe, a circumstance that we may assume Absalom suggested he would deal with differently than the king. Unprepared for an insurrection, especially one originating in his own power base, and uncertain about the extent to which it might spread in the rest of the country, David concluded that it would be best if he abandoned the capital, for reasons that are not entirely certain. Perhaps he simply wanted to avoid having Jerusalem come under siege, with him and his government trapped and immobilized within the city. It is also possible that he was unsure about the loyalties of the Canaanites who remained there after its capture and probably still constituted the majority of its residents, a concern that would have been exacerbated by the defection of Ahitophel. In any case, David quickly left Jerusalem with his retinue, including his foreign guards and most of his household, except for his concubines whom he left behind in the palace. It has been suggested that a major factor in the revolt that worked against David was his failure to reorganize the basic structure of the army, which was still predicated on "the continued existence of the elefi'a. thousand' or 'extended family'), the basic military unit of the pre-monarchal army. When the people were recruited to the army on the basis of family and tribe, they were assembled 'by their thousands'. In spite of all his military innovations, David had continued this system of recruitment, thereby retaining the influence of the elders over the army and the people." As a result, once the elders decided to throw their support to Absalom, they were easily able to persuade their tribesmen, "the men of Israel," to do likewise. Thus, when David heard that "the hearts of the men of Israel are after Absalom" (2 Sam. 15:13), he reasonably concluded that most of the tribal leaders had turned against him and that the most prudent course of immediate action was to flee to Transjordan, where he would reconstitute whatever forces he could muster. And, when David ultimately succeeded in mobilizing a force with which to confront the rebels, the biblical historiographer pointedly notes that it was "the servants of David who defeated the people of Israel" (2 Sam. 18:7).5 That is, there were no tribal levies mobilized in defense of the realm; it was primarily the small full-time permanent core of the army, David's personal militia, and his force of foreign mercenaries that carried the day.

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Having made it safely to Transjordan, David established his headquarters at Mahanaim, following in Ishbaal's footsteps after the defeat of Saul. One may assume that David probably chose Mahanaim as his headquarters because it provided adequate facilities for his household and government, as it did for its previous occupant. In Gilead he expected to find loyal garrisons and vassals who were indebted to him and hoped to mobilize those remaining faithful to him to help deal with the revolt. His expectations of support were prescient. The rich landowners, and others who benefited from the security David had imposed on the region, were prepared to pay heavily to keep David in power (2 Sam. 17:27-28). Notable among these was Shobi, a son of Nahash, the late king of Ammon, whom David probably appointed governor of the Ammonite capital after Joab's defeat of his brother Hanun. As it turned out, few if any of David's allies changed allegiances and went along with Absalom, further evidence of the success of David's policies with regard to those foreign lands and peoples that were brought under his suzerainty or direct rule. Once he accepted the reality of what had happened, including the betrayal by his trusted adviser Ahitophel, David reacted with the shrewdness and daring that were his hallmarks. When the high priests Abiathar and Zadok, the latter having come from Gibeon to show his support for the king, appeared before him with the Ark of the Covenant, thus symbolically invoking the support of heaven for his cause, David instructed them to return to Jerusalem with the ark, and to take up their regular priestly duties. "David leaves himself with splendid resignation in the hand of God. He feels that the presence of the ark will not affect the fate which He had determined for him." 6 At the same time, however, he asks the high priests to serve as his eyes and ears and to employ their sons as runners to keep him abreast of developments in the capital. He also asked his close confidante Hushai the Archite, a member of an assimilated Canaanite clan, to return to Jerusalem and get close to Absalom, and above all to attempt to contravene the influence of Ahitophel, who was evidently stage-managing the insurrection. And, according to the biblical account, Hushai made sure he was the first official to greet Absalom upon his entry into Jerusalem, who was shocked at seeing that his father's close friend and advisor had deserted him. Hushai disingenuously convinced Absalom that his primary loyalty was not to any individual but to the throne and whoever sat on it. Following Ahitophel's advice, Absalom took a dramatic step to indicate publicly that the course he had set out upon was irreversible, a step that presumably was necessary to assure his followers that they would not be left in the lurch should he become reconciled to his father once again. He did this by consorting with the concubines that David left behind in his harem in Jerusalem, an irreversible act that constituted a public affirmation of his assumption of the royal rights and privileges as successor to

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the throne. 7 Once having crossed this bridge, there was no longer any possibility of turning back. In addition, Ahitophel urged Absalom to launch an immediate night attack on David's camp before he had a chance to mobilize, thereby acknowledging that, even on the run, David remained a most formidable enemy. Indeed, Ahitophel was so convinced that such an attack was urgent if the insurrection were to succeed that he offered to lead the assault himself, specifically targeting David, without whom all resistance to the new regime would collapse (2 Sam. 17:1-3). Although inclined to follow Ahitophel's advice in this regard as well, Absalom was anxious to hear what Hushai, who evidently was also seen as a former close confidante of the king, thought about it. Hushai recognized that an immediate major attack on David, before he was able to reconstitute his forces, could in fact be decisive. Accordingly, he sought to dissuade Absalom from agreeing to it. His argument was that the success of Ahitophel's plan was dependent on an invalid assumption. To kill David, without engaging in a protracted struggle with his loyal followers, required that the king be found and dispatched in the initial attack. But, Hushai argued, David was too shrewd not to anticipate such a move and together with his most seasoned troops he would probably lie in wait hoping for just such an attack. By inflicting heavy casualties on Absalom's spearhead forces, the king would be sending a signal that he was in full control of the situation, with the result that many of Absalom's followers would quickly desert in anticipation of David's return to Jerusalem. If he wanted to defeat David, Hushai advised, Absalom would have to mobilize an army of tribal levies large enough to overwhelm David's loyal followers as well as those vassals that would continue to support him. Absalom's own knowledge and fear of his father, who was perhaps both incautious and indecisive as a parent but quite the opposite as a general, led him to prefer Hushai's advice over that of Ahitophel, whose recommendation was probably more sound at that moment. Hushai thus managed to give David the respite he needed to reconstitute his regime in exile and to mobilize an army for the struggle ahead. Ahitophel quickly grasped the implications of Absalom's decision—the insurrection would fail and he would be dealt with by David as the traitor he was. Rather than wait for the inevitable, he quietly returned to his home, set his affairs in order, and committed suicide. Making good use of the time it took for Absalom to mobilize the overwhelming force that Hushai recommended, David deployed his forces in Gilead in a manner that would cause the coming battle to take place on ground of his choice, the "forest of Ephraim," probably so named because it lay in a district populated by immigrants from that tribe. David's forces were divided into three contingents under his nephews Joab and Abishai, and Ittai of Gath, the loyal non-Israelite commander of David's Philistine and Cretan guards. At their insistence, David agreed not to participate

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directly in the battle, but to remain at his headquarters at Mahanaim, most probably with a reserve force ready to march at a moment's notice, if required. It has been suggested that the rationale behind the decision was that if Absalom's forces succeeded in forcing any or all of the three contingents to retreat, Absalom would be less likely to pursue the retreating forces vigorously if the king was elsewhere. Uncertain of the outcome of the coming battle, David nonetheless urgently requested of his commanders that they should "deal gently for my sake with the young man, even with Absalom" (2 Sam. 18:5). In effect, he was telling them that, once the rebellion was crushed, reconciliation with Absalom was still possible as far as he was concerned. This request must have struck his commanders, especially Joab, as rather bizarre given that Absalom's intention clearly was to do away with David. Absalom and his army, under the command of his cousin Amasa ben Jether, another of David's nephews by his sister Abigail, duly crossed the Jordan and engaged David's forces on the battlefield chosen by the latter. The battle was fierce and turned into a rout of Absalom's army, composed primarily of troops from the north, which suffered very heavy casualties. In his flight from the battlefield, Absalom was pursued and dispatched by Joab, in violation of David's explicit instructions not to harm his beloved son. David was overcome by grief at the news—his love for Absalom was such that he was fully prepared to forgive him for his treachery. Joab, however, who was evidently well aware of David's weakness in this regard, had acted out of loyalty to David even though the latter refused to acknowledge it. There is every reason to believe that Joab was personally fond of Absalom, in whose behalf he had intervened twice with the king. However, Joab was clearly convinced that had Absalom survived, David would probably have reconciled with him once again, and Absalom surely would have attempted to overthrow David again whenever the opportunity presented itself. In effect, Joab was saving David from himself. Nonetheless, David remained furious at Joab for again disobeying him. With the insurrection at an end, David undertook a series of internal political moves calculated to ease some of the tensions that had helped Absalom develop an alliance against David's rule. He was particularly concerned about restoring his credibility in Judah. As a gesture that David surely understood would be taken as a sign of favoritism toward the south that would be resented in the north, but one that he felt was necessary to restore the loyalty of his now fractured power base in Judah, David took the unusual step of making Absalom's commanding general Amasa commander-in-chief of his army, effectively demoting Joab. It need hardly be pointed out that Joab must have been furious at this slight, which may have been, at least in part, a demonstration of David's anger at him for killing Absalom in violation of the king's specific instructions. Nonethe-

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less, his loyalty to David was such that he accepted the demotion and continued to serve his king. Most important from David's perspective, the essentially political gambit was successful; the appointment of Amasa helped restore the loyalty of Judah to David's banner. How this was perceived in Israel was an entirely different matter. There, the failed insurrection was now viewed by many as essentially an internal conflict between various factions in Judah, into which Israel was unwittingly drawn at high cost to it. Indeed, the whole affair could be seen as a struggle for power between David and his commanding general Joab and Absalom and his commanding general Amasa, all of whom were from the same extended Judahite family, and the way the conflict was resolved was to effectively eliminate one contestant from each side, Absalom and Joab, in favor of a new power structure based on David and Amasa. Another step that David took to assuage Judah also had immediate and negative repercussions in Israel. As an unmistakable indication of his solidarity with his home tribe, and his abandonment of any pretensions to the principle of maintaining intertribal equality, David persuaded the tribal leaders of Judah to come to Mahanaim and for them alone to accompany him across the Jordan to Gilgal, and then back to Jerusalem. This act, which left the delegations of tribal leaders from Israel, who also came to escort the king, following behind the delegation from Judah, triggered a heated exchange between the representatives of the two kingdoms. David's obvious display of partiality to his tribal kinsmen was deeply resented by other tribal leaders and soon became a cause for another revolt against David, this time originating in Benjamin, probably at the time the king's train was passing through its territory en route to the capital. As the biblical writer recounts what happened, a Benjamite leader, Sheba ben Bichri, became so incensed at the slight that he publicly proclaimed: "'We have no portion in David, neither have we inheritance in the son of Jesse; every man to his tents, O Israel.' So all the men of Israel went up from following David, and followed Sheba the son of Bichri; but the men of Judah did cleave unto their king, from the Jordan even to Jerusalem" (2 Sam. 20:1-2). What is so remarkable about this incident is the relative ease with which the northern tribal leaders were prepared to withdraw from their covenant with David, evidently being already predisposed to believe that the king had defaulted on his obligations to them, thereby justifying their repudiation of his being their legitimate monarch. Moreover, it has been suggested that a careful reading of the biblical genealogies indicates a likely family connection between Sheba and the house of Saul. This would have the effect of transforming a prospective revolt into an attempt to restore Saulide rule over the northern tribes. The seriousness with which David viewed this new challenge is clearly reflected in his reported remark to Abishai, "Now shall Sheba the son of Bichri do us more harm than did Absalom" (2 Sam. 20:6).

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Accordingly, Amasa's first important assignment as new commander of David's army was to suppress the revolt by malcontents under the leadership of Sheba ben Bichri, which threatened to spread from Benjamin throughout the north. He instructed Amasa to mobilize the necessary forces from Judah within three days. This was a tight schedule; it would take a day for Amasa to pass through Judah, meet with tribal elders, and issue a call for conscription, a day to mobilize the recruited troops, and a day's forced march back to Jerusalem. When Amasa did not return on time, David, anxious to nip the problem in the bud, called upon Abishai to lead his standing force of professional troops in an assault that would catch the Benjamite rebels off guard before they could take control of any of the fortified cities in their region. Abishai and Joab, who was accompanying him in a subordinate capacity, subsequently arrived at the sanctuary at Gibeon, where Amasa came to greet them. Why was Amasa at Gibeon without an army rather than in Judah mobilizing one? It would seem that when Amasa met with the tribal elders of Judah, there was little enthusiasm or incentive for going to war to uphold the rule of David when they had just finished supporting Absalom's revolt against that rule. The people were tired and probably indifferent to secessionist movement in the north. In other words Amasa's mobilization mission to Judah was an utter failure, and he dared not return to David empty-handed, which would seal his fate as far as the king's previous undertakings to him were concerned. Accordingly he went to Gibeon to seek volunteers to fight against the forces of Sheba ben Bichri. Why Gibeon? Because at the beginning of his reign, as discussed above, David restored dignity to the Gibeonites, who felt that Saul and the Benjamites had mistreated them and made their lives as non-Israelites difficult. The Gibeonites thus owed a debt of loyalty to David, and Amasa evidently hoped to capitalize on this and their longstanding antipathy to the Benjamites, whose leader Sheba ben Bichri had become. 8 Presumably, it was while Amasa was engaged in negotiations with the elders of Gibeon that Abishai and Joab arrived there with their small army. After dispatching their cousin Amasa on the spot, Joab reassumed command of David's forces and led a successful campaign against the rebels, driving them out of Benjamin and pursuing them far to the north where their leader Sheba had sought refuge in Abel-beth-maacah, a fortified town in Upper Galilee about five miles west of Dan, which was placed under siege. To forestall an assault that would effectively destroy the town, the townspeople turned on Sheba, and assassinated and then decapitated him, throwing his head over the wall to Joab as evidence of their loyalty to David. When Joab returned victorious to Jerusalem, David had little practical choice but to reappoint him as commander-in-chief of the army. There are two aspects of this episode that are especially interesting

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when viewed from a political perspective. First, it appears that Sheba ben Bichri found no support whatever for his revolt from any of the other tribes of Israel; Joab and his men encountered no opposition as they pursued him virtually through the entire length of the kingdom of Israel. Second, one wonders where Sheba was heading when Joab effectively cut him off at Abel-beth-maacah, near the northernmost frontier of Israel proper. It has been suggested by at least one historian that it is likely that Sheba was attempting to reach Aram-Zobah, one of the conquered territories to which David did not accord vassal status but placed under the direct rule of an Israelite governor, where Sheba hoped to make contact with elements who aspired to break free from David's grip and restore their independence. 9 Presumably, had he succeeded in doing this, he might have been able to destabilize David's control of the entire northern frontier region. The rebellions and the seething discontent in the country had been held in check by David, but he was very much concerned about what they portended for the future of the dual monarchy, which would require that his successor rule with wisdom and an iron hand if it was to survive him. The death of his much beloved Absalom evidently devastated David, who increasingly withdrew from direct management of the affairs of state, and who had simply refused to address the question of the succession that became urgent as the king was perceived as approaching his natural end. The matter of the succession was a complicated business. The notion of dynastic rule itself was by no means taken for granted, although there were several factors favoring it. For one thing, the capital and its environs belonged neither to Israel or Judah; Jerusalem was the personal domain of David by traditional right of conquest and would go to his chosen heir regardless of whether or not that heir followed him as head of the dual monarchy. Given that Jerusalem was now in the process of becoming the religious center of the nation, it would be awkward in the extreme for it to be ruled by someone other than the king of Israel and Judah. And, if David were not to name a successor, how would one be selected? There could be no turning back to the days when Saul was selected for his regal role by a third party, a charismatic prophet such as Samuel, and then confirmed by popular acclaim. David had originally been accepted as king of Judah, his own tribe, before there was any prospect of a union between it and Israel in the person of the king. It is extremely unlikely that Judah would now accept a king from any of the tribes of the northern kingdom. Conversely, it is doubtful that Israel would accept anyone else from Judah in such a role, given the level of existing discontent with David. That is, it was uncertain that Israel would even accept a successor from the house of David. Finally, the array of David's vassals both in Transjordan as well as Cisjordan owed fealty to David and not necessarily to either the kingdom of Israel or that

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of Judah. That obligation might reasonably be expected to extend to an heir from the house of David, but most assuredly not to any one else. This raised the specter of a new series of wars on Israel and Judah's periphery just to maintain the status quo, if in fact the dual monarchy even survived David's departure from the scene. Accordingly, as a practical matter, prudent political leaders in both kingdoms concluded that continuation of the dual monarchy with as little change and disruption as possible was the most desirable course to pursue, and this required a dynastic succession coupled with the hope that it would suffice to maintain the political status quo for the foreseeable future. As it turned out, that hope was realized for most of the reign of David's successor. However, at the time that David's health began to fail, there was little certainty about who that successor would be. Within David's own circle of ministers and advisers, there emerged two schools of thought on the matter of the succession. "It was natural for those who were interested in stabilizing the institution of kingship and assuring the permanency of the dynasty to have favored a procedure which would establish the succession on an automatic basis and therefore to have supported the claim of the oldest living son. It was equally natural, in the absence of precedent or fixed tradition, for David's loyal personal followers to have attributed to him the prerogative of choosing his successor."10 Moreover, although primogeniture seemed the more natural approach to succession and was a principle well established in the wider region, Israelite tradition was less clear about it, in a number of significant instances favoring ultimogeniture, giving priority to a younger over an older son, as was the case in the choice of Isaac over Ishmael, Jacob over Esau, and Judah over Reuben during the period of the patriarchs. It is noteworthy, in this same regard, that both Moses and David were themselves younger sons. Given that there was no established precedent of succession through primogeniture in Israelite society, there was little basis for an automatic assumption that David's eldest surviving son Adonijah would in fact succeed to the throne. Nonetheless, by virtue of the fact that, as in the case of Absalom, David permitted Adonijah to go about with a substantial retinue, it appeared that David expected the latter to succeed him. This perception, however, failed to distinguish between the king having made an implicit political decision with regard to the succession, and David as a doting or perhaps inept parent indulging the follies of another of his children. With regard to Adonijah, the biblical writer explicitly acknowledges that David "had not grieved him all his life in saying: 'Why hast thou done so?'" (1 Kings T.6). That is, David had never rebuked or corrected Adonijah and simply allowed him to do whatever he wished. It is therefore understandable that Adonijah would consider himself his father's favorite, as would all observers of the contemporary scene who

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were not privy to what was taking place behind the doors of the palace. In fact, however, the question of the succession was actually far from settled. One of David's younger sons, Solomon, was also a prospective candidate for the throne, although he was by no means next in the line of succession after Adonijah. His candidacy was predicated on a secret promise, probably known only to a few in the palace, that was given by David to Solomon's mother Bathsheba, presumably as compensation for the sorrows she endured as a result of their adulterous affair and the loss of the child that it produced. Reflecting the first of the two perspectives regarding the matter of the succession discussed earlier, Adonijah had the support of Joab and the high priest Abiathar, two of the most powerful and influential men in the kingdom, as well as most of the royal household and the tribal leaders of Judah. Solomon's candidacy, which was supported by those who maintained the second perspective, had the support of the high priest Zadok and Benaiah, commander of the palace guard as well as the still formidable group of distinguished heroes, the gibborim, comrades in arms long associated with David. In addition, Solomon also had the formidable support of the prophet Nathan. Faced by this division in the kingdom's ruling circle, David procrastinated in reaching a decision regarding the succession, even as his health continued to fail. It thus remained unclear whether David would honor the commitment to Bathsheba and designate Solomon or follow the general principle of primogeniture and elevate Adonijah. Nonetheless, it might reasonably have been construed that David had already given some public indication of his support for Solomon's candidacy. The biblical account seems to suggest that, as late as a year before his death, David had arranged for a political marriage between Solomon and Naamah, an Ammonite princess, presumably for the purpose of strengthening relations between Israel-Judah and Ammon, or as some suggest, as a reward for Ammon's support of David during the rebellion of Absalom. According to the biblical chronology, Solomon subsequently reigned for forty years (1 Kings 11:42), and Rehoboam, his first-born son by Naamah, was forty-one when he succeeded Solomon (2 Chron. 12:13), indicating that the royal marriage was contracted a year before Solomon ascended the throne. 11 The fact that it was Solomon and not Adonijah who was chosen to participate in the political arrangement might readily be interpreted as a clear sign that David was evidently grooming Solomon for the throne, and a cause for alarm among the party supporting Adonijah that may have helped propel the succession crisis that was now taking shape. 12 The question must be asked whether or not it was really a difference of opinion over the principle by which the succession should be governed that caused such a split among David's principal military and religious officials, placing Joab and Abiathar in opposition to Benaiah and Zadok.

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It has been suggested that with regard to the military leaders, Joab saw in Adonijah an opportunity to bring about the reorganization of the kingdom's armed forces along lines that he preferred, whereas Benaiah expected Solomon to retain the existing structure established by David. Joab, the ever-faithful right hand of David, had always considered the latter to be too trusting and had therefore repeatedly intervened against David's wishes whenever he believed the king had made an error of judgment in that regard. Thus, Joab killed Abner, the traitor to Ishbaal and potential traitor to David, in whom the king had placed too much trust. He also killed Amasa, the commander of David's rebel son Absalom's army, whom David made commander of his own army and entrusted with suppression of a rebellion in Israel that Amasa did not carry out with sufficient alacrity. Finally, he also killed Absalom, whom David wanted taken alive and whom he probably would have pardoned, only to have his ambitious son attempt to overthrow the king again whenever the opportunity presented itself. Having spent his entire career in total commitment to the king, "Joab demanded the concentration of military power in the hands of reliable men, a stern subordination of the individual to the will of the king, who for him embodied the state, and to whom he himself bowed." 13 However, Joab's desires in this regard were never fully realized during David's reign. He was, it is true, commander-in-chief of the army, but there were other military forces such as the foreign mercenaries and the fiercely loyal warriors who served as David's personal comrades in arms, who were commanded by others such as Benaiah, who came from their ranks. It has therefore been suggested that Joab's principal motive in supporting Adonijah was that under the latter he would be able to get rid of the Cherethites and Pelethites, as well as David's gibborim, whom he evidently did not completely trust to be as loyal to his successor as they had been to David, and thus bring all of the armed forces in the country under his own single overall command. In the case of Abiathar, there appears to have been at least one issue with which he was concerned that caused him to favor Adonijah's succession, probably because the latter was favorably disposed to a resolution along the lines he desired. Presumably, Abiathar wished to see Jerusalem become the preeminent cultic site of Israel, with him as its sole high priest. This would in effect restore the house of Eli to its rightful place at the head of the priestly hierarchy, thereby eliminating the present co-high priestly status of Zadok. It is similarly likely that Zadok expected Solomon to maintain the current arrangements, which accorded equal status to the cultic centers at Jerusalem and Gibeon. In fact, according to the biblical account, Solomon's first ceremonial religious act after his succession to the throne was to go and offer "a thousand burnt-offerings on the great altar at Gibeon" (1 Kings 3:4), following which he returned to Jerusalem "and stood before the ark of the covenant of the Lord, and offered up

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burnt-offerings, and offered peace-offerings, and made a feast to all his servants" (1 Kings 3:15). Solomon's surprising order of priority may have been a deliberate gesture to Zadok, a reward for his support. It is also noteworthy, in this regard, that Solomon basically agreed with Abiathar that Jerusalem should be the principle cultic center; however, Solomon soon demoted Abiathar and brought Zadok from the sanctuary at Gibeon to Jerusalem to become the sole high priest. Anticipating David's demise, Adonijah made the fatal mistake of publicly asserting his claim to the throne before David had actually announced his choice. He had proceeded to hold court at a large public feast in his honor at the spring of En-rogel in the Kidron valley southeast of Jerusalem, an affair that presumably was cast as a prelude to his imminent coronation. It would seem that Adonijah's plan was not to mount a coup, but rather to convene a public assembly that would pass a resolution supporting his succession to the throne, following which David's consent to the popular choice would be solicited. If a coup had been intended, it is extremely unlikely that it would have been supported by either Joab or Abiathar, whose loyalty to David was beyond question. As things stood, their intent surely was to bring the issue to a head before their opponents in the palace might succeed in swaying the king toward an alternate candidate. The assembly may have been held outside Jerusalem for at least two possible reasons. First, there simply wasn't a large enough open space in the crammed city to accommodate the expected crowd, which also made providing adequate security for such an event a problem. Second, and more important, the choice of a spring as the site may have had significant political implications. An ancient tradition recorded in the Talmud asserts that, "kings are anointed only at a fountain that their sovereignty may endure." 14 That is, the flow of living waters was taken as a sign of continuity. The choice of site for the public assembly and celebratory feast thus suggests that an anointing, which was more important than the actual coronation itself because it conveyed the idea of legitimacy in the eyes of God, was to take place there. (As will be seen below, Solomon was also anointed at a site of running waters.) The guests invited to this feast included all the notables in Jerusalem and the surrounding region supportive of Adonijah's elevation to the throne. "The pointed exclusion of Nathan, Benaiah and his officers (ha-gibborim), and Solomon from the meal at Ain Rogel indicates that Adonijah was not prepared for 'peaceful coexistence', to which, by ancient Semitic convention, he would have been committed by such a meal. He obviously trusted in the strength of his party to liquidate the opposition, the strength of which, to say nothing of the weakness of the king, he much underrated." 15 Spurred to action by Adonijah's precipitous move, the arrangements and purpose of which he evidently was informed about, Nathan prevailed

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upon Bathsheba, whom David continued to hold in high regard, to approach the king and implore him to make good on his earlier promise concerning her son. It is noteworthy that Nathan did not act here in a prophetic capacity but rather as a royal adviser taking sides in a dispute over the succession. Why did Nathan prefer Solomon to Adonijah? It has been suggested by some that Nathan's preference for Solomon resulted from his acquaintance with the prince as a student and his appreciation of the young man's intelligence and wisdom. An alternate opinion contends that Nathan's preference actually had little or nothing to do with the comparative qualities of either candidate, but that his choice was predicated solely on the basis of David's having made a commitment to Bathsheba, which necessarily took precedence over the tenuous claims of primogeniture. The king's word is law, and its abrogation affects the integrity of his regime. In Nathan's view, then, it was morally imperative that David should be reminded of his promise and that he be pressed to keep it.16 Accordingly, having been reminded of his earlier undertaking to Bathsheba with regard to the succession, and after being advised by Nathan of Adonijah's impolitic actions that might precipitate a struggle over the succession unless the king took immediate steps to clarify his wishes in that regard, David agreed to take a definitive stand on the matter of the succession. He instructed Zadok and Benaiah to escort Solomon to the Spring of Gihon and there anoint him as king, and to then place him on the throne while David still lived (1 Kings 1:32-35). When this was done, Solomon effectively became co-regent with David, an arrangement that lasted for the remainder of David's days, at the very moment that Adonijah was celebrating his own forthcoming ascension to the throne. Because this biblical account of the succession crisis tends to portray the aging David as susceptible to manipulation by others, some scholars have speculated that there may have been more to the designation of Solomon as his heir than meets the eye. It is suggested that David actually preferred Solomon as his successor for practical reasons, notwithstanding the more popular perception that he would naturally favor Adonijah because it would be advantageous to adhere to the principle of primogeniture as a means of limiting the potential for internecine conflicts over the succession in succeeding generations. The suggested reason for his preferring Solomon was the consideration that Bathsheba, whose family connections are not made clear in the biblical account, most probably was a Canaanite or Jebusite from pre-Davidic Jerusalem, and quite possibly a granddaughter of his former counselor Ahitophel. In this case, Solomon would have been part Canaanite, and connected through his mother to a prominent Jebusite family, a circumstance that David may have seen as favorable for ensuring the continuing support of the Jebusite aristocracy in Jerusalem, which remained in place and which he co-opted to his re-

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gime when he took over the city-state.17 Seen from this perspective, David's choice of Solomon was made in part to ensure that his succession as king of Jerusalem went smoothly and that once this was accomplished, it was hoped that acceptance by both Judah and Israel would readily follow. Moreover, with regard to David's concern about ensuring the stability of the dual monarchy after his death, it is noteworthy that the biblical writer records that not only did David have Solomon anointed and proclaimed as his successor as king, he also specifically designated him to be nagid or prince over both Israel and Judah (1 Kings 1:34-35). It has been suggested that this was also a reflection of David's concern that Solomon be able to maintain the dual monarchy intact, recalling that David himself had first become king of Judah, and only later king of Israel as well, but was unable to integrate the two kingdom's into a unitary state, the one political goal he failed to achieve. This ambition was foiled by the lingering discontent among important members of the northern tribes about being ruled by a southerner, a discontent that had helped fuel the rebellions by his son Absalom as well as the Benjamite leader Sheba. Accordingly, he may have sought to assuage such sentiment by also designating Solomon as nagid, a title that had deeper roots in Israelite tradition than that of king, which was essentially alien to the tribal outlook that still dominated the north. The term nagid "described that particular kind of military and personal leadership which had brought David himself to the throne. David may have meant that he was designating a leader to continue and uphold the old tribal traditions, even though that leader must now be a king." 18 When Adonijah learned about what had happened, he had good reason to fear for his life because, although Joab was in command of the army, his rival Benaiah was in command of the palace guard, which was already in position to carry out the new king's commands. However, Solomon had no intention of beginning his reign with a bloodbath and therefore assured Adonijah that no harm would come to him as long as he behaved as a loyal prince of the realm, presumably one retired from public life. In his final charge to his heir, David is reported as having urged Solomon to beware of Joab, who was uncontrollable when he thought he was in the right, reminding him of how he had murdered Abner and Amasa, thereby acting in ways that undermined David's policies. It is noteworthy that David did not mention the act for which he most resented Joab, namely, his killing of Absalom. That would have been impolitic, for had Joab not killed him, Absalom and not Solomon might still have become king. Ironically, according to the biblical writer, he asked Solomon to do what he himself never had the heart for, namely, to "do therefore according to thy wisdom, and not let his hoar head go down to the grave in peace" (1 Kings 2:6). It would probably be an error to misconstrue David's charge as intended to wreak revenge on Joab for past transgressions com-

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mitted against him. It is far more likely that David's primary concern here was for the stability of the kingdom and Solomon's reign, and that his specific instructions were intended to remove the onus from Solomon of ridding the state of those elements that posed the greatest threat to that stability As a dutiful son, Solomon would be simply carrying out the last wishes of his revered father. Nonetheless, Solomon wisely waited for an appropriate provocation before doing so, a provocation that was not long in coming after David's death. The passing of David also reflected a significant transition in the kingdoms he left to his heir. David was a charismatic warrior who forged a territorial state out of the still essentially tribally based nation ruled by Saul. By contrast, his heir Solomon was more of the brilliant and shrewd technocrat, whose greatest challenge was to preserve and enhance the legacy bequeathed to him. "When David became king, the whole life and prosperity of the kingdom depended on the personality of the monarch. David's greatness lay in the fact that he so developed the kingdom that it became independent of the personality of the king." Of course, personality continued to matter, but it was no longer the critical factor. "The institution of kingship had become more important than the personality of particular kings. So David did create a dynasty. Solomon became king because he was one of David's sons; not the son most successful in battle, but the son most successful in palace intrigue." 19 There was perhaps no one who appreciated the orderly succession more than David himself, given what had happened earlier with regard to the heir of his predecessor Saul. Accordingly, he is reported as having declared: "Blessed be the Lord, the God of Israel, who hath given one [the Septuagint adds 'of my seed'l to sit on my throne this day, mine eyes even seeing it" (1 Kings 1:48). "The point of David's thanksgiving is not just that a successor had been found, but that the dynastic principle had been accepted." 20 Solomon (c. 961-922) benefited enormously from the politically secure kingdom left to him by David. There were no serious threats, either external or internal, confronting Israel-Judah at the time of his succession to the throne. There was, however, a subsequent abortive attempt by Adonijah to set the stage for a seizure of the throne, but it was quickly quashed and the prince executed. Ignoring the lesson he should have learned from the past political implications of Abner's request to marry one of Saul's concubines, and his brother Absalom's treatment of the concubines in David's harem, Adonijah committed the cardinal mistakes of requesting permission, and attempting to use the presumably unwitting queen mother Bathsheba as his advocate, to marry Abishag, who served as David's concubine toward the end of his life, a step that could reasonably be construed as equivalent to making another bid for the throne. However, given Bathsheba's experience with palace intrigue, she evidently presented Adonijah's case in a manner that made the political motive behind it patent,

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effectively forcing Solomon to eliminate the latent threat posed by his older brother, who was still closely connected to Joab and Abiathar and presumably was acting in concert with them now that David was gone and their personal loyalty to him moot. Accordingly, after disposing of Adonijah, Solomon turned to deal with Abiathar and Joab, Adonijah's principal supporters in the plot. The former, one of the two high priests, was spared because of his many years of faithful service to David but was dismissed from his high office and banished from the capital to his home village outside the city. There was to be no such leniency for Joab, whom David had urged Solomon to dispose of. Aware of what awaited him, Joab sought sanctuary at the altar in the temporary temple. However, Solomon, who charged him with the murder of the generals Abner and Amasa, outwitted him. The ancient law of sanctuary applied only to manslaughter but not to murder. Accordingly, at Solomon's instruction, Benaiah, commander of the palace guard, who subsequently assumed Joab's position as commander-in-chief of the army, cut him down in the sanctuary. Following these events, the biblical account notes, "And the kingdom was established in the hand of Solomon" (1 Kings 2:46), the clear implication being that prior to the elimination of Adonijah, Abiathar, and Joab, the threat of a coup to replace him on the throne hovered over Solomon's head, and that the residual threat was now completely eliminated. At the time that Solomon ascended the throne in Jerusalem, the immediate region was relatively stable, although there appear to have been latent security problems far to the north in Syria. A revolt led by Rezon ben Eliadeh, an Aramaean officer originally under command of the king of Aram-Zobah, against Israelite rule in Syria resulted in the secession of some territory from Solomon's empire and the establishment of a new Aramaean kingdom on Israel's northern border that was centered in Damascus. Aram-Damascus soon replaced Aram-Zobah as the leading Aramaean state in Syria and ultimately emerged as Israel's most powerful adversary in the land-bridge region. There is a brief note in this regard in the biblical account of Solomon's reign that indicates that he mounted a successful military campaign against the kingdom of Hamath, in the region of Aram-Zobah, where he built store-cities. Solomon is also recorded as having built a fortress at Tadmor (Palmyra) on the Euphrates about 150 miles northeast of Damascus, presumably to secure the buffer zone between it and Israel proper (2 Chron. 8:3-4), in effect compensating for the strategic and commercial loss of Damascus since the trade route from Damascus to Mesopotamia passed through Tadmor. As a practical matter, during Solomon's reign Rezon and his new kingdom of Aram-Damascus was seen as just a troublesome neighbor that continued to harass Israel's northern interests, but evidently not to the extent that a pacification campaign against it was considered necessary. For the most part, the era of Israelite conquest and expansion had come

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to an end, and Solomon's foreign policy was focused primarily on detente, international trade, and the promotion of friendly relations with the states of the region. The latter was pursued through a program of nuptial diplomacy resulting in numerous morganatic marriages that connected Solomon with the royal families of the various neighboring and nearby nations, including the Ammonites, Moabites, Edomites, Sidonians (Phoenicians), and Hittites, intercourse with whom had been proscribed by tradition as a means of precluding Israelite assimilation to their cultures (1 Kings ll:l-2). 2 1 Of particular note was Solomon's marriage to the daughter of Siamun, penultimate pharaoh of Egypt's relatively weak Twenty-First Dynasty who ruled from about 987-952.22 It seems likely that the marriage came about primarily as the result of a confluence of mutual interests for both rulers. The fact that it came about at all is an indication of the extent to which Israel-Judah had become the dominant power in the land bridge, as well as to the extent to which Egypt's power had declined because of its internal problems, such that an alliance with Israel, something unthinkable in the past, was now deemed not only acceptable but desirable. A major consideration for the pharaoh was that the principal internal threat to the survival of the Twenty-First Dynasty came from Libyan elements in the country who had risen to prominence in the Egyptian military, including the future pharaoh Shishak, who ultimately succeeded in overthrowing it. The latter, his father, and his grandfather were all identified as leaders of a major Libyan people, the Meshwesh, who along with the Philistines were original components of the Sea People who had invaded the region centuries earlier. It may well be that one of Siamun's concerns was to use an alliance with Israel-Judah to offset any possibility of the Philistines and the Libyan opponents of his dynasty joining forces against him. It is also suggested that Siamun may have hoped, a hope that went unfulfilled, to obtain a share in Solomon's Red Sea trade, since he was denied direct access to the wealth of Nubia, which was controlled by opponents of Siamun's regime.23 For Israel-Judah, a treaty with Egypt offered the possibility of assuring the security of its southern frontiers, something that was essential if Solomon were to be left free to pursue his program of internal development in the country. This meant not only securing a stable relationship with Egypt but also containing the ability of the Edomites to destabilize the Negev region and thereby impair the mining operations Solomon undertook in Edom, as well as his plans for the opening of a new Red Sea trade route to South Arabia and beyond. That maritime route could also interconnect with the Via Maris and thus open vast new opportunities for international commerce from which Israel-Judah would derive lucrative revenues. Solomon's immediate concern was the fact that Hadad, an Edomite prince who had escaped from Joab's grasp during his last cam-

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paign to suppress the Edomites, had earlier found political asylum in Egypt, Siamun's predecessor Amenemopet seeing him as a potentially useful tool in any designs he might have on David's realm once his internal situation was sufficiently stabilized. Accordingly, the pharaoh nurtured the Edomite prince, who soon became a favorite at court and to whom Siamun subsequently gave the sister of his chief wife in marriage. Solomon's diplomatic overture put Siamun in the position of having to decide whether an alliance with Israel-Judah was of greater political value than the nuisance potential that Hadad offered in a prospective attempt by Egypt to regain its long-lost position in the land bridge. Siamun evidently concluded that an alliance with Israel-Judah would better serve his interests, and the bargain was sealed by the royal marriage of his daughter to the Israelite king. At the same time, he was obligated to continue to provide for Hadad, who had become a member of the Egyptian extended royal family but who also was anxious to return to Edom to lead a revolt against Solomon. Presumably, Hadad believed that since both David and Joab were dead, the time during which Solomon was preoccupied with consolidating his rule was opportune for an Edomite rebellion. Siamun tried to dissuade him from returning to Edom, so as not to complicate Egypt's regional diplomacy or to introduce any new instability in the border region, but Hadad insisted on doing so (1 Kings 11:21-22). Although the Edomite insurrection led by Hadad was quickly suppressed, he managed to retain control of the hills of Edom, primarily because Solomon's interest in Edom was focused on control of the commercial route through the Arabah to the Red Sea ports, which was no longer seriously threatened, rather than on total control of contiguous non-Israelite territories that were of little strategic significance to him. The marriage inaugurated a new and unprecedented political alliance between Egypt and Israel-Judah, one that may have been frowned upon by many of Solomon's constituents. After all, Israelite tradition had never had much good to say about Egypt, which it always characterized as a house of bondage for the children of Israel, the best recollection of Egypt in Israelite memory being the exodus from the country that took place some three hundred years earlier. Solomon's becoming related through marriage to the Egyptian royal family bore echoes of Moses's role as a prince of just such a family and surely signaled the onset of a new stage in Israel's history, one in which Egypt would once again play a significant role, for good or bad, over the next several centuries. An immediate benefit of the alliance with Egypt netted Israel-Judah the heavily fortified and primarily Canaanite town of Gezer, some nineteen miles northwest of Jerusalem at the foot of the mountains of Ephraim, which David had not brought within territorial bounds of his kingdom, but which Siamun now wrested from Canaanite control and gave to Solomon's bride as her dowry (1 Kings 9:16). It appears that although David

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had attacked Gezer, he did not have the siege equipment necessary to break through its powerful fortifications and was unwilling to expend the resources necessary for an extended siege to force its submission. Nonetheless, the continued existence of the Canaanite stronghold in a position to interrupt internal communications in the country as well as the trade routes was an irritant that Solomon was determined to eliminate. Solomon's dilemma was that he still did not have the equipment to successfully take such a fortress, but the Egyptians did. Accordingly, it would seem that in the course of the negotiations over the marriage to the pharaoh's daughter, Solomon probably proposed that Siamun's conquest of Gezer and subsequent gift of the city to his daughter as a dowry would well serve the interests of both parties. Solomon would have a thorn removed from his side, and Egypt would have the benefit of a fully secure trade route between Egypt and Phoenicia. Only this or a similar reconstruction of the event would explain why Solomon would permit an Egyptian military force to penetrate to the center of his realm unopposed for the purpose of taking a city within Israel-Judah that it would then turn over to the latter as a marriage dowry 24 Solomon's new and intimate relations with Egypt soon led to his seemingly conscious and deliberate embrace of the Egyptian concept of the state and the monarchy, which Samuel had struggled so hard to exclude from Israel. "Through his marriage with Pharaoh's daughter, who ranked as the true queen above all the other concubines, he came into direct contact with the Egyptian preceptors. Above all he came to know the splendor of court life, with its ceremonial and gorgeous display, that in those times flourished in Egypt. The Nile-state was embodied in the person of the king, who was the son incarnate of the Sun-god himself. The entire country belonged to the king, who leased it out to his subjects."25 This was a concept of state and kingship that had great appeal to the royal ego, but which was diametrically opposed by Mosaic teaching and tradition and would prove to be a source of internal instability over the course of the subsequent history of the Israelite kingdoms. The numerous marriages Solomon entered into with foreign princesses, who were permitted to continue the practice of their pagan religions, ultimately became a matter of domestic public concern because of the equal status it was perceived as conferring on religions that Mosaic monotheism considered abominations. The more cosmopolitan Israel-Judah's capital became, the more it aroused the ire of religious conservatives, whose prophetic spokesmen appear to have held their peace in public until the latter part of Solomon's reign, possibly out of deference to David and the fear of causing divisiveness or because of Solomon's lavish support of Israelite religious institutions. Eventually, the prophets did begin to give public expression to their concerns about what they saw as royal perfidy at the end of Solomon's reign and during those of his successors.

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David's vast expansion and consolidation of Israel-Judah's territory and regional sphere of interest also provided a significant geopolitical bonus in that it gave the small country maritime outlets to both the Mediterranean and the Red Seas. Israel-Judah also straddled the main caravan routes linking the Nile valley and the Arabian peninsula with Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, enabling it to serve as a transit point for some of the triangular trade between Africa, Asia, and Europe. Indeed, this overland trade was possible only with Solomon's good will. The transit fees and caravan tolls that were thus produced constituted a significant share of the state's revenue. Most beneficial of its various alliances for Israel-Judah was its bilateral trade relationship with Phoenicia, a maritime state along the Mediterranean coastal strip north of Israel, centered in Tyre. Israel-Judah produced an agricultural surplus, principally wheat and olive oil, that it exchanged for the large quantities of timber from the mountains of Lebanon and the work of skilled architects that were needed for Solomon's vast construction program, all of which Phoenicia had in abundant supply. It is worth noting that Solomon's hunger for construction materials and technical assistance soon produced a sizeable trade imbalance in favor of Phoenicia that Israel was forced to rectify by the temporary cession of a strip of territory, containing some twenty villages, inland from Acre. Israel-Judah also developed a security alliance with Phoenicia, whereby the latter took responsibility for the security of Israel-Judah's coastal area while the former assured the security of Phoenicia's hinterland. Solomon nurtured and broadened the already existing good relations that his father had developed with the Phoenician king Hiram, and the two formed a maritime trade partnership, opening a trade route from Ezion-geber on the Gulf of Aqaba to the various ports in the Red Sea, and possibly even beyond. Joint Israelite and Phoenician crews manned the vessels used in this trade, built with the assistance of Hiram's shipwrights. It was probably in connection with this trade that the fabled queen of Sheba, a small country assumed to have been located in the southern Red Sea region, visited Solomon, presumably to discuss a variety of possible trade issues that affected her interests. This was especially the case with regard to the spice trade in the Red Sea region, from which it was in their common interest to try to exclude Egyptian participation and which Egypt's new and aggressive pharaoh Shishak was attempting to restore. In addition, the opening of the seaport at Ezion-geber may have threatened the lucrative overland trade from South Arabia, and the queen may have been seeking a modus vivendi with Solomon in this regard as well.26 Domestically, Solomon took a number of steps to continue and expand David's interest in making Jerusalem a truly royal city and the cultic center of his realm. The scale of the temple he constructed was enormous by Israelite standards and was clearly intended to overshadow all other sane-

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tuaries and cultic sites in the country. "However, the establishment of a temple to the God of Israel in a formerly alien city that had no place in tribal traditions undoubtedly led to opposition on the part of the old religious centers, which still played a decisive role in the life of the people. The fact that the Ark of the Covenant had been transferred to the Jerusalem Temple was apparently insufficient to gain it acceptance. The religious dissatisfaction with Jerusalem may have been one of the main factors behind the revolt that broke out after the death of Solomon."27 Solomon has often been contrasted unfavorably with David, who lived quite modestly and without much ostentation. Solomon seems to have been possessed by an "edifice complex," an insatiable desire to build elaborate structures—construction of the temple took seven years and his palace in Jerusalem thirteen—which was seen as an exercise in selfglorification. It is especially noteworthy that his palace greatly outshone the temple architecturally. However, viewed from another perspective, his construction program was intended to serve as an exterior sign of the monarch's power inherited from his father, which up to that time had not the external magnificence so indispensable according to oriental standards. Who would have suitably appraised the power of the Egyptian dynasties without the sumptuous temples of their gods and the superb palaces of their Pharaohs? . . . The nation, in the Orient, was one unit with its national god, and the theocratic king was his national representative; hence the grandeur of the whole nation was measured by that of the temple and the royal palace together. In an oriental monarchy which had progressed beyond its beginnings and was well developed . . . no matter how powerful, such a monarchy would not engender belief in its strength at home and abroad when those things which passed for proofs of power were lacking.28 In other words, Solomon's building program may also be seen as a means of establishing Israel-Judah's prestige, a vital component of national power or the perception of such. The perception of power may often be sufficiently intimidating to obviate the need for its exercise, and Solomon may have considered the fostering of such a perception of his kingdom as much an element of his security policy as improving the military capabilities of its armed forces. With regard to the latter, in addition to his monumental civil construction program in the capital, including the temple and palaces of Jerusalem, Solomon also mounted a substantial military construction program to assure the security of the country from both external and internal threats. To deal with external threats, as revealed by archaeological findings, Solomon concentrated on bolstering the fortifications of at least three strategically located cities, which were garrisoned with chariot forces and other troops that were Israel's first line of defense. Substantial fortifica-

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tions were constructed at Hazor in northeastern Galilee, which commanded the road to Damascus, at Megiddo, which dominated the pass through the Carmel range into the Jezreel valley, and at Gezer, which provided access to the central coastal plain. In addition, construction also took place at a number of other strategic points throughout the country that formed a defense network designed to control the major roads and passes through the hill country, as well as to be able to subdue any insurrections by local vassals. His defense construction program clearly indicates that, as one writer put it: "Although Solomon was not a warrior king like his father David, he had an excellent grasp of security needs, and maintained a high level of military force skillfully dispersed at all strategic points. As a shrewd and realistic ruler, he did not believe that foreign alliances were a substitute for self-defense, or that peace could rest on weakness." 29 Solomon also developed a substantial standing army built around a large chariot corps, something that was conspicuously absent in Israel's previous military history. In this regard the biblical author gives special notice of his importation of large numbers of horses from Egypt and chariots from Cilicia and Cappadocia in Asia Minor (1 Kings 10:28-29), making him a regional power to be reckoned with. He may also have engaged in triangular trade in both horses and chariots, importing and exporting them to customers in neighboring states.30 This transformation of the traditional makeup of the Israelite army is particularly noteworthy because it seems most likely that the members of the chariot corps were drawn from the Philistine and Canaanite segments of the population, rather than from the Israelites who had little experience in mobile warfare. This development gave these non-Israelites an elite status in Israel's standing army and undoubtedly contributed to the growing assimilation of nonMosaic culture and religious practice into Israelite society, a process, as discussed above, that had already unintentionally been set in motion by David's establishment of a territorial state. Solomon's extensive public works program, in addition to the costly defense program, bled the national treasury, forcing him to impose a very heavy tax burden on the country. Moreover, the manpower needed for the combined construction programs was also enormous and necessitated the imposition of compulsory labor on the working population, both Israelite and non-Israelite, the latter employed as bondservants to carry out the most menial tasks. According to the biblical writer, it took seven years of sustained muscular effort just to construct the temple complex, which entailed sending legions of men to Lebanon to fell trees, hew logs, and transport the lumber to Jerusalem. And king Solomon raised a levy out of all Israel; and the levy was thirty thousand men. And he sent them to Lebanon, ten thousand a month by courses: a month they were in Lebanon, and two months at home . . . And Solomon had threescore

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and ten thousand that bore burdens, and fourscore thousand that were hewers in the mountains; besides Solomon's chief officers that were over the work, three thousand and three hundred, who bore rule over the people that wrought the work. (I Kings 5:27-30) Solomon's financial and compulsory labor impositions created a good deal of discontent, which, when coupled with the resentment caused by the central government's increasing disruption of traditional tribal arrangements, would soon break through the surface calm into a major domestic crisis. In addition to his public works program, Solomon had also undertaken a series of administrative reforms to streamline government at all levels throughout the country, primarily, it may be assumed, in order to improve his tax-gathering apparatus. He reorganized the country into twelve administrative districts, which cut across tribal lines, the commissioners of which reported directly to the king. Moreover, the non-Israelite enclaves that dotted the country were incorporated within this new administrative structure, which may have been one of the considerations that made such arrangements both desirable and necessary. For all practical purposes, this eliminated whatever residual authority the traditional tribal leaders had retained. To make matters worse, each of the twelve administrative districts was required to raise sufficient foodstuffs to support the palace, that is, the central government, as well as to provide fodder for all of the king's horses for an entire month. However, this administrative arrangement appears to have applied only to Israel. Judah came directly under a senior administrative official at the royal court, perhaps even the king himself, and may possibly have been exempted from the food taxes, given that there is no mention in the biblical writings of any complaints from Judah about them. It is not clear why Solomon came up with such an inequitable arrangement, although it seems likely that he had residual concerns about the pervasiveness of old animosities in Israel and was wisely concerned to retain the absolute loyalty of Judah as his ultimate base of power, as did his father before him. It may also be that the area occupied by Judah did not contain sufficient numbers of people generally and non-Israelites in particular to necessitate an administrative arrangement such as that established in the north. What seems evident, however, is that it would have been perceived as discriminating against the northern tribes and that it further nurtured a growing resentment in Israel against Solomon, whose essential power base remained rooted in Judah. In any case, and whatever the reasons for the nonsymmetrical treatment of the two kingdoms from an administrative standpoint, it surely proved counterproductive to the goal of transforming the kingdoms of the dual monarchy into a single coherent national entity. Finally, Solomon publicly displayed a remarkably pluralistic approach

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to religion, given his investment in establishing the great temple of Jerusalem. He permitted the public worship of pagan gods by members of his large harem as well as other non-Israelites and went so far as to build altars for them. Moreover, the biblical writer observes, he personally participated in such religiously deviant practices. It has been suggested that Solomon's acts in this regard were politically motivated; "the installation of this 'pantheon' was an expression of the loyalty of Solomon's state; by accepting foreign gods it also sought to offer a guarantee of peace to the countries around. A state government acts in terms of power politics, and has a right to do so. But no one should be surprised that in view of such models there was also encouragement in Judah and Israel to take note of the wives and gods of their neighbors . .. Here were the seeds of the practices which later aroused the prophet's anger."31 Indeed, according to the biblical account, prophetic anger at Solomon soon resulted in righteous sedition that urged and supported the break-up of the dual monarchy. As a result of such policies, toward the end of his reign Solomon was confronted by a growing internal opposition that threatened to erupt into rebellion. The primary opponent of Solomon's burdensome and discriminatory taxation program was Jereboam, an officer the king had made responsible for management of the labor levies from the northern tribal areas. The primary opponent of Solomon's religious policies was the prophet Ahijah of Shiloh, who may have been motivated in part by David and Solomon's failure to restore the ancient sanctuary at Shiloh as the national religious center and their determination to concentrate both political and religious authority in recently acquired Jerusalem. Ahijah, following the precedent of righteous sedition set earlier by Samuel, aligned himself with Jereboam in an effort to end the dual monarchy, and he urged the latter to lead a rebellion that would detach Israel from both Solomon and the kingdom of Judah. And it came to pass at that time, when Jereboam went out of Jerusalem, that the prophet Ahijah the Shilonite found him in the way; now Ahijah had clad himself with a new garment; and they two were alone in the field. And Ahijah laid hold of the new garment that was on him, and rent it in twelve pieces. And he said to Jeroboam: Take thee ten pieces; for thus saith the Lord, the God of Israel: Behold, I will rend the kingdom out of the hand of Solomon, and will give ten tribes to thee...." (I Kings 11:29-31) Once Solomon was made aware of the conspiracy he took immediate steps to deal with it. Jereboam was forced to flee for his life to Egypt, where he was granted asylum by its new pharaoh Shishak or Sheshonq (935-914), who displayed little interest in maintaining the good relations that had been established between Egypt and Israel-Judah under the previous regime. Shishak's attitude in this regard was made clear by his ap-

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p r o v i n g the m a r r i a g e of Jereboam to the k i n g ' s sister-in-law. 32 A l t h o u g h Solomon w a s able to k e e p the d u a l m o n a r c h y intact for the r e m a i n d e r of his reign, it b e c a m e increasingly a p p a r e n t that it probably could not survive very long once he p a s s e d from the scene. NOTES 1. Shemuel Yeivin, "Baiyot haYerushah shel Rishonai Malkhut Beit David," in Ben-Tsiyon Luria (ed.), Iyyunim beSefer Shmuel (Jerusalem: Ha Mercaz haOlami leTanakh biYerushalayim, 1992), p. 455. 2. Yehezkel Kaufmann, MiKivshonah shel haYetzirah haMikra'it: Koretz Maamarim (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1966), p. 183. 3. The assumption is that Ahitophel's son Eliam (2 Sam. 23:34) is the same Eliam that the biblical text identifies as Bathsheba's father (2 Sam. 11:3). 4. Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Sanhedrin 101a. 5. Hayim Tadmor, "The Period of the First Temple, the Babylonian Exile and the Restoration," in H. H. Ben-Sasson (ed.), A History of the Jewish People (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 100. 6. S. Goldman, Samuel (London: Sonsino, 1977), p. 280. 7. Herodotus notes that the custom of taking over the previous king's harem was followed by the Persians of antiquity, The Persian Wars 3:67-68 (New York: Random House, 1947), p. 245. 8. Ben Tsiyon Luria, Sha'ul uVinyamin: Mehkarim beToldot Shevet Binyamin (Jerusalem: Kiryat Sefer, 1970), pp. 143-46. 9. Yeivin, "Mered Avshalom," in Luria, lyynim beSefer Shmuel, p. 289. 10. Leo L. Honor, Book of Kings 1: A Commentary (New York: Union of American Hebrew Congregations, 1955), pp. 34-35. 11. However, it is suggested by some scholars that David lived for two to three years after having settled the matter of the succession, and that Solomon's reign included such a longer period of co-regency with his father. If this suggestion is valid, the marriage to the Ammonite princess may, although not necessarily, have taken place after Solomon's elevation to the co-regency. 12. Frederic Thieberger, King Solomon (London: East & West Library, 1947), p. 113. 13. Ibid., p. 110. 14. Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Horayot 12a (London: Soncino, 1935). 15. John Gray, I & II Kings (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963), p. 83. 16. Kaufmann, MiKivshonah shel haYetzirah haMikra'it, pp. 183-84. 17. Hanoch Reviv, MiBeit Av leMamlakhah: Yisrael biTekufat haMikra (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1981), pp. 134-35. 18. J. Robinson, The First Book of Kings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 32. 19. Ibid., p. 20. 20. Ibid., p. 34. 21. For further reference to this point see Deut. 7:1-4 and Josh. 23:12-13. 22. Some scholars suggest that the pharaoh that became Solomon's father-in law was Psusennes II, the last king of the Twenty-First Dynasty.

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23. Abraham Malamat, History of Biblical Israel: Major Problems and Minor Issues (Leiden: Brill, 2001), p. 203. 24. Thieberger, King Solomon, pp. 139-41. 25. Ibid., p. 27. 26. Jacob M. Myers, II Chronicles (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), p. 57. 27. Tadmor, "The Period of the First Temple, the Babylonian Exile and the Restoration," pp. 104-5. 28. Giuseppe Ricciotti, The History of Israel, vol. 1 (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1958), p. 296. 29. Joan Comay The Hebrew Kings (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976), p. 68. 30. The meaning of the biblical verses referred to here has been subject to various interpretations with regard to exactly what was imported from where. I have chosen that which seems to me the most probable. 31. Siegfried Herrmann, A History of Israel in Old Testament Times (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981), p. 182. 32. The Septuagint Version of the Old Testament and Apocrypha (Grand Rapids, MI: Zandervan, 1972). 3 Kings 12:24 (Supplement).

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CHAPTER 8

The Rise and Fall of the Kingdom of Israel

Following Solomon's death, his eldest son and designated heir Rehoboam (922-915) ascended the throne of Judah in an orderly dynastic succession. In the northern kingdom, however, the dynastic principle had still not been fully accepted and it was necessary to obtain the renewed allegiance of the tribal elders to the scion of the house of David. To facilitate their acceptance of his succession to the throne of Israel, Rehoboam, who was keenly aware of the growing disaffection with the dual monarchy in the north, sought to downplay his own connection to Judah in the south. As a conciliatory gesture, he agreed to have his coronation take place in Shechem, the principal city and de facto capital of Israel, instead of in Jerusalem, which was the capital of the dual monarchy. This gesture was probably intended to offset the historical fact that David had been crowned king of Israel in Hebron, which he had made the capital of Judah. By being crowned in Shechem, Rehoboam would symbolically be giving both kingdoms equal status. It seems likely that the elders of the northern kingdom were determined to extract a price for their support of Rehoboam's succession, which they made contingent on his commitment to rectify certain aspects of what they deemed inappropriate treatment by Solomon. Their choice of a public personality to act as their spokesman and interlocutor with the king, one who would meet with the approval of all the northern tribal elders, fell on Jereboam, who had earlier taken up just such a cause and had been forced into exile in Egypt by Solomon for his pains. Jereboam, who was now closely connected to the Egyptian pharaoh Shishak through marriage to the latter's sister-in-law, seemed like the ideal candidate for the posi-

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tion, both because of his concern about the well-being of Israel and the public stature that he had attained as a result of his relationship to the Egyptian royal family. Word was sent to him in Egypt informing him of the initiative the elders wished to undertake and inviting him to return home to take up leadership of their cause. Given Solomon's death and the conciliatory approach being taken by Rehoboam in the matter of the coronation, Jereboam evidently concluded that it was safe for him to return to his homeland, where he was welcomed by the tribal leaders and made their spokesman and advocate. It also seems quite likely that his return may actually have been encouraged by Shishak, who probably anticipated that it would serve to destabilize the cohesion of Israel-Judah at a time of regime change, making it easier for Egypt to pursue its own interests in the land-bridge area. Shishak (935-914), who established the Twenty-Second Dynasty, was a powerful Libyan notable who had dethroned Psusennes II, the last pharaoh of the preceding dynasty whose predecessor Siamun had given his daughter in marriage to Solomon. By contrast with Psusennes, Shishak harbored expansionist ambitions, which accounted for his readiness to provide a safe haven for renegades from the kingdoms of the land-bridge region. Leading a delegation of northern notables to Rehoboam's coronation, Jereboam approached the king with an urgent request for some fundamental changes in state policy that would result in easing the onerous tax and compulsory labor burdens that had been imposed on Israel by Solomon. Rehoboam agreed to consider the matter and held consultations with his counselors, who were split over the issue. One group of advisers, holdovers from the previous regime, urged that he continue on the course of conciliation that he had already initiated. Sensitive to the increasing volatility of northern resentment of Solomon's domestic policies, they concluded that those policies could no longer be sustained by his successor without dangerously alienating the leaders of the northern tribes, who were already at the boiling point over their being virtually completely sidelined through Solomon's administrative reforms. The second group of advisers, made up of young friends and colleagues that Rehoboam brought into his inner circle, men without significant political experience, took the opposite position. They saw the request made by Jereboam and the northern tribal leaders as the opening gambit in a power struggle that would determine the future of the dual monarchy They argued, in effect, that the conciliatory gesture to the north that he had already made was being interpreted as a sign of weakness that they intended to exploit. Any new concessions would only further undermine the king's authority. Accordingly, they recommended that Rehoboam demonstrate unequivocally that not only was he not weak but that he was even more determined than his father to carry out the policies that he alone deemed to be in the

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interest of the state. Unwisely, Rehoboam ultimately decided to follow the latter advice, not only rejecting Jereboam's petition, but also warning him that the tax burdens he was complaining about would in fact be increased rather than lessened under the new regime. As the king's more seasoned advisors anticipated, Rehoboam's stated position was the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back. In retrospect it seems clear that Rehoboam seriously misread what the central issue was in his confrontation with the northern tribal elders. As one commentator points out: "The issue between the king and the people was the question of sovereignty. The request that the tax rate be lowered was undoubtedly a sincere expression of popular desire; but it was put to Rehoboam as a test case. The real issue was whether Rehoboam, as Solomon's heir, had automatically become king and the coronation a mere ceremony or whether the right of election rested with the people/' 1 Although the breakup of the dual monarchy was by no means inevitable, Rehoboam's impolitic approach to dealing with the challenge posed by the elders of Israel effectively made it so. From that point on, the movement toward secession of the northern and eastern tribes from the dual monarchy en bloc proceeded very rapidly. There was, however, no movement among the tribal elders of Israel to restore the loose confederacy that prevailed prior to Saul, in which the tribes were virtually completely autonomous. The northern and eastern tribes all recognized the necessity for a central government and its institutions, especially that of an army that could deal with the growing threats to their well-being on all their frontiers. They simply could no longer abide the notion of being ruled by the essentially Judahite house of David, the tribe of Judah having followed a course of history and political development different from that of the other tribes of Israel for centuries. The dissolution of the dual monarchy began in earnest when the official that Rehoboam appointed to the position of manager of the labor levy, originally held by Jereboam under Solomon, was stoned to death, signaling the outbreak of the revolt. As it grew in scope and intensity, the king was forced to flee for his life back to Jerusalem. As a practical matter, not only had the dual monarchy come to an end, Rehoboam was also effectively deposed as king of Israel, remaining king of Judah alone. Jereboam was summoned to the assembly of the elders of the northern and eastern tribes where he was proclaimed king of Israel. Although Rehoboam was reluctant to give up the throne of Israel and mobilized a substantial army to retake control of the north, he was dissuaded from the attempt by a trusted adviser, the prophet Shemaiah, who evidently convinced him that he had erred in listening to his inexperienced advisers and that it was too late to undo the politically calamitous blunder that had cost him the throne of Israel. The die had been cast. A major civil war would only weaken both kingdoms at a time when their

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external enemies were gaining strength. As the prophet put it, according to the biblical record, "Thus saith the Lord: ye shall not go up, nor fight against your brethren the children of Israel; return every man to his house; for this thing is of Me" (I Kings 12:24). As a practical matter, the prophet's advice was well founded. For one thing, it seemed likely that, since Jereboam was a protege of Shishak, an attack on him by Rehoboam might trigger an Egyptian intervention to prevent the reconstitution of the dual monarchy, which was not in Egypt's interest. For another, to defeat the northern kingdom, Rehoboam would have had to rely almost entirely on the tribal militia of Judah, which would have a difficult time of overcoming the larger northern forces, which would have inherited the major chariot bases at Hazor and Megiddo and would be garrisoned in the numerous fortresses built and enhanced by Solomon at strategic points throughout Israel. In addition, the split definitively shifted the economic balance of power to Israel, which still had control of the trade routes in addition to the tax revenues from the far larger number of Israelite tribes that it encompassed. It should be noted, however, that the dissolution of the dual monarchy along tribal lines created a special problem for Benjamin, which was traditionally a northern tribe but was now inextricably bound to Judah because of the retention of Jerusalem as the capital of the kingdom of Judah, the city being located in the territory of Benjamin rather than that of Judah. Benjamin, which constituted the frontier zone separating the two kingdoms, remained a flashpoint that periodically erupted into skirmishes and occasionally more intense conflict over the succeeding centuries. This situation was primarily the result of the fact that Jerusalem, once considered an ideal location as the center of the dual monarchy, was now uncomfortably close to the frontier that separated the two states and could readily be subject to attack from the north. Accordingly and more often than not, at least during the early years of the separated kingdoms, these skirmishes reflected the desire on the part of the kings of Judah to establish a buffer zone between it and Israel as far to the north as possible from Jerusalem. For his part, Jereboam (922-901) indicated no interest in nor did he make any attempt to reestablish the dual monarchy under his rule; he definitively put aside any notion of even an eventual union with Judah. He was determined that the northern kingdom should henceforth pursue its own independent course, without any special regard for past historical linkages with Judah. As a practical matter, from an economic perspective, Judah would be more of a burden than an asset. The majority of the Israelite population was in the north and east, and it was Israel that had the stronger agricultural base as well as effective control of the trade routes passing through the country. Judah, whose economy was based primarily on animal husbandry, had added little to the economic mix.

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Moreover, even from a political and geostrategic standpoint, it added little to the security of the state other than its ability to guard the southern approaches to the country, and this was of limited concern in an era of relative peace. What Jereboam evidently did not foresee was that the separation of Israel from Judah would effectively help destabilize the region, because without a strong central government in Jerusalem, capable of allocating military resources as necessary to meet any potential threat, there was nothing to prevent or offset a wholesale reconfiguration of the external political forces operating in the immediate region. Ammon, Moab, and Edom, all of which had acknowledged the suzerainty of the dual monarchy, now cast aside their vassal status, creating a hostile security environment on the eastern and southern frontiers once again. Similarly, the Philistine cities along the Mediterranean coast began to reassert themselves militarily and before long began raiding Israelite settlements in the Aijalon valley As a result, although the secession of the northern kingdom from the dual monarchy under Jereboam proved irreversible, the destinies of the two kingdoms remained intertwined in a variety of ways for the next two centuries. Given the size and proximity of the territories involved, it could hardly have been otherwise. The newly independent northern kingdom of Israel started out on a note of domestic instability because most of its leaders, who were former officials of Solomon's government, were now considered unacceptable and were replaced with less experienced men. The situation in Judah, where there was continuity of government, was quite different. Moreover, the public ideology of a permanent covenant between God and the house of David lent it a degree of internal political stability that was completely unknown in Israel, which had a far more heterogeneous population as well as a far wider range of regional interests and concerns. Compounding the problem, the northern kingdom continued to be plagued by tribal rivalries. Indeed, it has been suggested that the northern tribes had little in common other than their hatred of the house of David. 2 By contrast, in the south Judah had completely absorbed and integrated the territories and populace of Simeon and those parts of Benjamin that had come under its sway, effectively creating a new tribe of Judah in which its original disparate tribal elements and associated clans were all blended together, giving it a degree of internal unity that was completely absent in the north. As a result, although the principle of primogeniture was not always followed in the kingdom of Judah, with one brief exception the monarchy always remained within the Judahite house of David. In Israel, by contrast, the throne became a political prize for whoever had the ability to seize and hold it. A few kings managed to establish dynasties that lasted for several generations; others held the throne for as little as a week. The key to royal legitimacy in the northern kingdom, as will be seen

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below, frequently rested on prophetic designation. That is, in the absence of the concept of a covenant such as that between God and the house of David to give it its veneer of legitimacy, as was the case in Judah, the next best thing was an indication of divine approval through designation by a prophet, a time-tested approach first taken by Samuel with regard to both Saul and David, and now by the prophet Ahijah the Shilonite with respect to Jereboam. However, as the cases of Samuel and the first two kings Saul and David clearly demonstrate, prophetic appointment "introduced an unstable and fluid element into the Israelite monarchy which was not present in Judah. Every ruler had to fear the possibility that without his knowledge a new man had already been designated who might seek to kill him the very next day."3 Moreover, when viewed from a secular political perspective, it would seem that the prophets occasionally made some rather problematic choices regarding whom they supported for the throne. In his zeal to punish Solomon for his religious indiscretions, the prophet Ahijah, who had helped inspire Jereboam to bring down the dual monarchy, had failed to take into account the possibility that Jereboam was in fact more interested in political power than in the moral welfare of the state. He also failed to consider the implications of a northern secession when the population of Israel had its religious center in Jerusalem, which remained the capital of the kingdom of Judah. This created the anomalous situation in which the people of Israel continued to cross the frontier into Judah for the purpose of religious pilgrimages to the temple in Jerusalem, in effect helping to finance the southern kingdom at the expense of the north. Moreover, there was a concern that the attachment of the people of Israel to the temple could undermine the success of the secession from the dual monarchy. As the biblical writer observed: "And Jereboam said in his heart: 'Now will the kingdom return to the house of David. If this people go up to offer sacrifices in the house of the Lord at Jerusalem, then will the heart of this people turn back unto their lord, even unto Rehoboam king of Judah" (I Kings 12:26). To deal with this concern, Jereboam concluded that it was essential to prevent members of the northern tribes from making such religious pilgrimages to Jerusalem. And, to do this, it would be necessary to reverse the centrality of the sacrificial rite in the temple in Jerusalem. After all, the centralization of the sacrificial rite in Jerusalem dated from David, only about seventy years earlier, and the temple itself was only built about three decades earlier. His assumption was that the religious significance attached to Jerusalem had not been in effect long enough to be irreversible. However, and probably to Ahijah's dismay, Jereboam did not attempt to restore Shiloh as the primary sanctuary of Israel, which he could claim took historical precedence over Jerusalem. Instead, he took the radical step

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of formally establishing alternate royal shrines at Dan and Bethel, at the northern and southern ends of Israel. The two sites were carefully chosen because of a complex of reasons. Dan, originally Laish, a Canaanite city captured by the displaced tribe of Dan, possessed an ancient sanctuary that dated back to the period of the judges, another reminder of the unimportance of Jerusalem in Israel's prior history. Moreover, Dan was more easily accessible than Jerusalem to those living in the northern part of the country and for that reason alone would likely be a more attractive site for pilgrimages for several of the northernmost tribes. The sanctuary at Bethel, relatively close to Jerusalem, was presumably built at the traditional site of Jacob's dream of the ladder ascending to heaven, which gave the place an ancient sanctity that Jerusalem could scarcely equal. Although Jereboam had good reasons to establish the sanctuaries at Dan and Bethel, it was a strategically risky move because of the proximity of those sites to enemy territory, AramDamascus in the north and Judah in the south; the devastation or capture of either of these shrines during the frequent conflicts that afflicted the region could and probably did have serious consequences for the preservation of public morale. Jereboam also took steps to provide a credible alternative to the unique sacrificial rite in the temple of Jerusalem. He established a rite based on the centrality of a pair of golden calves that were intended to substitute for the cherubim that were placed atop the Ark of the Covenant, as the symbolic resting place for the invisible God of Israel. The choice of the golden calves as the appropriate symbol of the divine presence was surely intended to be reminiscent of the similar development that tradition held to have taken place in the desert following the exodus from Egypt in the days of Moses and Aaron. Moreover, the use of the golden calves probably was also predicated on the consideration that the bullock or ox is described as the traditional symbol of the preeminent northern tribe of Ephraim (Deut 33:17), of which Jereboam was now the leading member. The biblical writer presents Jereboam as proclaiming to his people, "Ye have gone up long enough to Jerusalem; behold thy gods, O Israel, which brought thee up out of the land of Egypt" (1 Kings 12:28). However, as suggested, it seems quite unlikely that the employment of the golden calves was intended to be a reversion to paganism, but rather a cultic reform based on old traditions that preceded the public ideologies surrounding David and the temple built by Solomon. "The golden calves set up by Jereboam probably were not intended as idol-gods any more than were the cherubim and the Ark in Solomon's Temple. They, like the cherubim and the Ark, would have served as symbols of the divine presence or pedestals on which the deity stood or sat invisibly. The difference between the Ark-cherubim and the bull images was primarily one of religious iconography rather than theology." 4 Seen from a political per-

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spective, employment of the bull images may have been intended as a religious overture to help bind the otherwise indifferent Canaanite population, to which the bull images were acceptable as cult objects, to his rule. In effect, Jereboam set about creating a new state religion that might unify the disparate peoples of the northern kingdom, such cohesion lending strength to the newly independent state. Once again, political expediency was given priority over religious integrity All this, understandably, caused an irreparable breach between the king and Ahijah and the other prophets, who now began to work toward the overthrow of his house under the permissive principle of righteous sedition. Following his program of establishing a distinctive state cult in Israel, one that was clearly distinguished from that which was practiced in Judah, Jereboam also relieved the Levites, who were too closely associated with the temple in Jerusalem, from all sacral duties and appointed his own priests, ostensibly from the descendants of Moses instead of Aaron, as had earlier been the case with the old sanctuary at Dan. Moreover, it would appear that by establishing two cultic centers, at Dan and Bethel, it was no longer possible to have a single high priest such as existed in Jerusalem. Presumably, this was also part of Jeroboam's calculated move; he himself would serve as the nation's high priest, combining secular and religious power in the person of the king. In this regard, he evidently sought to model himself after the original high priest Aaron, who also served as interim political leader of Israel during the absence of Moses. Accordingly, Jeroboam not only reintroduced the adoration of the golden calf, as Aaron had done in the desert, he went so far as to name two of his sons Nadab and Abijah after the two sons of Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, who had died after offering "strange fire before the Lord" (Lev. 10:1-2). To interrupt the flow of pilgrims to Jerusalem, he also changed the date on which Israel would observe the Festival of Booths (Sukkot), which was also the main harvest festival during which pilgrim traffic to Jerusalem was particularly heavy, moving it from the seventh to the eighth lunar month. It has been suggested that, as a practical matter, the harvest in the north took place later than in the south because of climatic differences, and that Jereboam simply took advantage of this to change the festival date to a time that made more sense to the farmers of Israel.5 Jereboam's approach to consolidating his political power had turned into a kulturkampf that aroused the passions of many religious and spiritual leaders who saw his reforms as a reversion to paganism, and who would continue to challenge them and their proponents for as long as the kingdom of Israel survived. For these traditionalists the kingdom had lost its raison d'etre, and they led a continuing internal struggle against the moral and religious lapses of the state leadership. Foremost among the earliest of these spiritual leaders was the prophet Ahijah, who now real-

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ized the folly of what he had helped precipitate and, according to the biblical writer, turned his full wrath toward his own protege. Go, tell Jereboam: Thus saith the Lord, the God of Israel: Forasmuch as I exalted thee from among the people, and made thee prince over My people Israel, and rent the kingdom away from the house of David, and gave it thee; and yet thou hast not been as My servant David, who kept My commandments, and who followed Me with all his heart, to do that only which was right in Mine eyes; but hast done evil above all that were before thee, and hast gone and made thee other gods, and molten images, to provoke Me, and hast cast Me behind thy back; therefore, behold, I will bring evil upon the house of Jeroboam, and will. . . utterly sweep away the house of Jeroboam, as a man sweepeth away dung, till it be all gone. (I Kings 14:7-10) Jereboam met with an unnatural death in 901 (2 Chron. 13:20), some suggesting that it may have been at the hands of elements disgruntled over his policies and failures. His son and successor, Nadab (901-900), sought to reverse the fortunes of the kingdom and engaged in a conflict with the increasingly aggressive Philistines over control of Gibbethon, a strategic position controlling access to the hills of Judah, thereby driving a wedge between Judah and its Philistine allies, who now found common cause with regard to Israel. It was then that Ahijah's prophecy came true. Nadab and the entire house of Jereboam were wiped out in a military coup led by one of his generals, Baasa (900-877) of the tribe of Isaachar. The coup, which was probably inspired and supported by the prophet Jehu ben Hanani (I Kings 16:2), put an end to rule by the house of Jereboam after a reign of more than two decades. Perhaps more importantly, Baasa's coup also effectively put an end to the predominance of the tribe of Ephraim in the northern kingdom's politics and also set the precedent for the intervention of Israel's military in politics, a factor that contributed greatly to the chronic instability of the country It is noteworthy that during the 200 years of its existence, Israel's throne changed hands through revolt and assassination nine times, each of the seven assassinations (eight if the pretender Zimri is included) leading to a change of dynasties, while in the case of Judah, excepting for one brief period of seven years, there was no change in dynasty during the entire 350 years of its existence. Earlier, in about 924, Shishak invaded the land-bridge area, posing a major threat to Judah and probably destroying Solomon's fortress at Ezion-geber to eliminate Judah's Red Sea trade in the process; he also laid waste to a good part of Israel. According to Egyptian sources, their invasion force bypassed Gaza and took Gezer, from where it moved east, cutting across the hill country and taking the towns of Aijalon, Beth-horon, and Gibeon along Judah's frontier. After having received a large amount of tribute to avoid an invasion of Judah and a siege of Jerusalem, Shishak

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marched into Israel and then immediately crossed the Jordan south of the Jabbok, capturing the important towns of Succoth, Mahanaim, and Penuel, which Jereboam had fortified. From there, the Egyptians swung back across the river to take Beth-shean, and then moved into the Jezreel valley, seizing Shunem, at the base of Mt. Tabor, and the fortresses at Taanach and Megiddo, before returning to the coast and then marching southward along the coastal road back to Egypt. Scholars have long pondered the reason why Shishak would attack the land of his own protege Jereboam, whom he had earlier granted refuge in Egypt. One plausible explanation is that Jereboam had failed to keep certain unknown commitments made to Shishak in the event of his assumption of power in Israel, some suggesting that it was the nonpayment of expected tribute that precipitated the punitive expedition. This would account for the greater amount of destruction wrought by the Egyptians in Israel than in Judah. 6 It is also suggested that one of the main purposes of the campaign was to devastate the coastal trade route to Tyre, which was siphoning off the transit trade in luxury goods from the sea route from Egypt to Byblos, long an Egyptian monopoly that Shishak wished to restore. 7 An alternate explanation is that, in the aftermath of the dissolution of the dual monarchy, Judah was in a much stronger military position than Israel, which had to deal with a host of internal problems. Moreover, while Rehoboam fortified the strategically important sites that controlled the approaches to Judah from the east, west, and south, reflecting his concern about an unprovoked attack from Egypt, he did not do so along his northern frontier, suggesting that he may have considered that frontier fluid and temporary. It is also postulated that, taking advantage of the disarray in Israel, Rehoboam was able to march through the country virtually unopposed and seize control of much of the Jezreel valley, including the strategically important towns of Megiddo, Taanach, and Beth-shean, although mention of such a development is entirely absent from the biblical account. According to this theory, with Jereboam in desperate straits, the Egyptian invasion may actually have served to save his kingdom by capturing the towns taken by Judah and thereby breaking the stranglehold they were imposing on Israel.8 However, it seems even more likely that Shishak's primary motive was to reassert Egyptian hegemony in the land bridge, and to place the segment of the important international trade route passing from Egypt along the Philistine coast and then turning inland through the Wadi Ara pass to Megiddo and the Jezreel valley under his control. Under pressure of the appearance of an Egyptian force that penetrated as far as Edom, Rehoboam was able to forestall an attack on Judah and Jerusalem, which were secondary targets of the Egyptians at best, by payment of a ransom

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from the temple treasury. As the biblical writer relates this event, the prophet Shemaiah tells Rehoboam: Thus saith the Lord: 'Ye have forsaken Me, therefore have I also left you in the hand of Shishak/ Then the princes of Israel and the king humbled themselves; and they said: 'The Lord is righteous.' And when the Lord saw that they humbled themselves, the word of the Lord came to Shemaiah, saying: They have humbled themselves; I will not destroy them; but I will grant them some deliverance, and My wrath shall not be poured out upon Jerusalem by the hand of Shishak. Nevertheless they shall be his servants; that they may know My service, and the service of the kingdoms of the countries. (2 Chron. 12:5-8) As suggested, one of Shishak's principal aims, in what seems to have been a punitive but in all likelihood was actually a strategic expedition, was to prevent any attempt at a reconstitution of the empire of David and Solomon, and at the same time to reestablish Egyptian dominance over the key communications routes through the region. It appears that the destruction of Shechem in the process forced the relocation of Israel's capital to Tirzah. The perhaps unintended further weakening of Israel by the Egyptian attack also led to a successful attempt by Rehoboam's successor Abijah or Abijam (915-913) to add some of Israel's territory, including Bethel, to Judah, pointing out the folly on the part of Jeroboam in placing one of his new cultic centers so close to Judah's frontier. This territorial encroachment may also have been aided by an alliance that was struck between Abijah and Tabrimmon (1 Kings 15:18-19), king of AramDamascus, who had successfully broken away from Israelite control during the latter part of Solomon's reign. The alliance between Jerusalem and Damascus made it necessary for Jereboam to split his forces in anticipation of a two-front war, thus tilting the military balance on his southern frontier in favor of Judah. This pattern repeated itself several years later when frontier tensions between Israel under the rule of Baasa and Judah under the rule of Asa (912-873), Abijah's successor as the king of Judah, erupted into a frontier war that continued throughout Asa's reign, with Baasa managing to regain most of the territory, including the Bethel area, earlier lost to Abijah. In this instance, it was Judah that was caught in a pincer, because whether acting in collusion with Baasa or independently, there was an attack on Judah from the south led by Zerah the Cushite. There is substantial scholarly disagreement over the identity of Zerah, one school of thought identifying him with the son of Shishak, Osorkon I, the future king of Egypt, another school of thought identifying him as the governor of a Cushite (Nubian) colony established in southern Canaan by Shishak in his earlier campaign against Israel. It has been suggested that this was part of Shishak's effort, discussed earlier, to break the Tyre-Judah land trade connec-

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tion in favor of the Egypt-Byblos sea trade for luxury goods. 9 In any case, the attack, which originated in the Sinai desert and proceeded through Philistia as far as Mareshah in the Judean foothills, about twenty-five miles southwest of Jerusalem, was repulsed successfully. Judahite archers and slingers were positioned in the adjacent hills and caught Zerah's forces in a narrow pass, where he could not deploy his chariots, inflicting a decisive defeat on the invading force. In the process of repelling the attack, Judah was able to take control of a number of the more important wells and pastures in the Negev region, further extending its physical presence there. Prior to the accession of Asa to the throne of Judah, the frontier between Israel and Judah had not been fortified, facilitating the easy passage between the kingdoms not only of pilgrims but troops as well. Now Baasa proceeded to fortify Ramah, only several miles north of and commanding the road to Jerusalem, interdicting the roads leading north from the Judahite capital and cutting off a principal route of trade and communications between the two states. Fortifying Ramah was effectively a means of keeping Judah in check by way of the persistent military threat the fortification posed to Jerusalem. Lacking the forces to turn back Israel's advance southward, Asa turned to Ben-hadad I, king of Aram-Damascus, and invoked the earlier treaty concluded between their respective fathers Abijah and Tabrimmon. The idea was that if Aram-Damascus attacked Israel along its northern frontier, the latter would have to divert some of its forces from the south thereby enabling Judah to mitigate the threat to Jerusalem. To secure the needed Aramaean assistance, Asa essentially raided the temple treasury (1 Kings 15:18-19). Aram-Damascus found itself in the unique position where both Israel and Judah sought special relationships with it. Israel wanted AramDamascus to help secure its northern frontier, thereby leaving it free to pursue its expansionist policies in the south, while Judah wanted AramDamascus to keep Israel's northern frontier in turmoil so as to preclude any adventurism in the south. Aram-Damascus was thus in a position to play off each of the Israelite states against each other as it suited its own interests. In this instance, Ben-hadad was only too happy to oblige Judah; he abrogated his treaty with Israel and invaded the tribal area of Naphtali in the northern Galilee. Ben-hadad's actions were by no means motivated exclusively by the payment received from Judah, which at most reaffirmed his decision to act for other reasons. Aram-Damascus, as a landlocked state, had a strategic interest in obtaining control of the northern part of Israel's territory in order to secure the flank of its trade route to the Mediterranean coast, and the alliance with Judah facilitated its achieving that objective. This time Israel did have to fight a two-front war and fared badly. It lost parts of the northern Galilee to Ben-hadad, including the important

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cities of Dan and Hazor as well as the fortress of Ijon at the Litani River, thereby severing the northern defense network built by David and Solomon that ran south from there to Dan and on to the western shore of the Sea of Galilee. On Israel's southern flank, Baasa was compelled to abandon Ramah, its recently installed fortifications being dismantled by Asa and their materials used to strengthen the defenses of Gibeah and Mizpah, thereby eliminating the immediate threat to Jerusalem and improving its defense posture against attack from the north. Asa's fortification of Judah's northern frontier was equivalent to a public acknowledgment that the prospect of any reunification of Israel and Judah under a dual monarchy, a dream still cherished by some in Jerusalem, was no longer a realistic possibility. Although Asa's strategy of forcing Israel to fight a two-front war evidently succeeded, it set a dangerous precedent of deliberately involving alien forces in Israel-Judah's internecine conflicts, a move that was condemned by the seer Hanani as counterproductive to Judah's longer-term interests. "Because thou hast relied on the king of Aram . .. therefore is the host of the king of Aram escaped out of thy hand" (2 Chron. 16:7). That is, Hanani, who evidently represented the views of those who opposed Asa's alliance with Aram-Damascus against Israel, did so on the grounds that Ben-hadad was a greater long-term threat to Judah than Baasa. Accordingly, in the opinion of those who held this view, weakening Israel's northern frontier ultimately served to strengthen Aram, which was not in Judah's long-term interest. It would seem that they held it to be more advantageous for Judah to reach some accommodation with Israel, with whom it shared a common ancestry and history until relatively recently, and then to jointly deal with the emerging Aramaean threat to both. Asa became outraged at this challenge to his judgment, threw Hanani into prison, and took harsh measures against his supporters (2 Chron. 16:10). It is noteworthy that, while being excoriated by Hanani for his foreign policy, Asa had the full support of the prophet Azariah ben Oded for his domestic policy. It appears that Asa's grandmother, Maacah, who had been a power to be reckoned with in the palace during the brief reign of his father and during the first years of his own reign, helped promote pagan worship in the capital. Under pressure from Azariah and presumably other religious leaders as well, Asa eventually gathered the selfconfidence to depose Maacah from her official position as queen mother and undertook a major albeit not total religious reform in Jerusalem and throughout the country (2 Chron. 15). In the north, Baasa's adventurism had turned into a geopolitical debacle for Israel, which was now compelled to concede the permanent loss of the tribal territory of Benjamin to Judah. Domestically, Baasa continued Jereboam' s policies, for which he was roundly condemned by the prophet

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Jehu ben Hanani, who predicted that Baasa's house would meet the same fate as that of the house of Jereboam, which he had displaced (1 Kings 16:1-4). Although Jehu originally supported Baasa's coup, he turned against him when it became clear that the man he had given legitimacy to as king was motivated solely by political ambition and had no intention of instituting the religious reforms needed to restore Israel to divine favor. Jehu declaimed against Baasa "both because of all the evil that he did in the sight of the Lord, to provoke Him with the work of his hands, in being like the house of Jereboam, and because he smote him" (1 Kings 16:7). That is, "Had Baasa been righteous, his destruction of the house of Jeroboam would have been regarded as a Divine mission; but since he was as impious as Jeroboam, his act was only motivated by personal ambition and judged as such."10 It is interesting to note that the biblical historiographers, although writing from a prophetic perspective, do not hesitate to point out, albeit indirectly, the evidently poor judgment exercised by the prophets in their choices of whom to back as political saviors. Baasa reigned for twenty-four years, during which period Jehu not only continued to declaim against him, pursuing the traditional prophetic policy of righteous sedition, but also went so far as to advocate regicide, something he managed to get away with, as did his predecessor Ahijah of Shiloh, but to little effect, Baasa eventually dying of natural causes. Baasa's son and successor Elah (877-876) managed to retain the crown for only two years before Jehu's prediction came true. The only thing known about Elah is that, according to the biblical account, he followed in the footsteps of his father and that he did not comport himself responsibly as a monarch; at the time that his army was engaging the Philistines at Gibbethon in the foothills in the southwestern part of the country in an effort to prevent them from moving beyond their traditional coastal enclaves, Elah remained at home in Tirzah, "drinking himself drunk" (1 Kings 16:9). He was assassinated and replaced by Zimri, one of Elah's generals, who may have surmised that the people did not regard the king very highly and would therefore not be particularly upset by his overthrow. There is also reason to believe that Zimri may have been encouraged by the prophet Jehu to take action against Elah. Zimri managed to survive in office for only a week, but that gave him enough time to wipe out all the male members of the royal family and their close associates, bringing an end to the house of Baasa. Zimri barely had enough time to dispose of the latter before Omri, a rival field commander of the forces at Gibbethon, was proclaimed king by his troops and marched on the capital at Tirzah. Able to muster only a token resistance and finding himself in a hopeless situation, Zimri elected to commit suicide, leaving the capital and throne to his rival. This, however, was not the end of the story; it appears that the civil sector of Israel's population rejected the military dictatorship imposed by the army,

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and instead gave its support to a candidate of its own choice, Tibni ben Ginath, to succeed to the throne. In this instance there does not appear to have been any prophetic intervention to provide even a fig leaf of legitimacy to either aspirant, in which case it would simply be the more powerful of the two that would win the throne. The failure to provide for an orderly succession effectively split the nation in two, triggering a civil war that lasted for as long as five years before Omri gained the upper hand and Tibni was defeated and slain (1 Kings 16:21-22). Once establishing his authority as king of Israel, Omri (876-869) quickly brought an end to the prevailing anarchy and imposed an impressive order on the country that bore his stamp for decades to come. He was not only a capable general but also a resourceful manager and administrator. The impression he made outside the borders of Israel was such that long after his dynasty disappeared Israel was still known by the Assyrians as "the Land of Omri." In one of his early acts that was probably done in emulation of David and intended to demonstrate that a new era was at hand, Omri built a new and impressive capital at Samaria, a hilltop site that was a natural fortress that he further fortified, which was located at a strategic crossroads in the tribal area of Isaachar in the hills of Ephraim, about seven miles northwest of Shechem. Henceforth, just as all the kings of Judah were buried in Jerusalem, all subsequent kings of Israel would be buried in Samaria, which remained the capital of Israel for the next century and a half, until it fell to the Assyrians in 722/721, which marked the end of the kingdom of Israel. Before long, the name of the capital became synonymous with the name of the kingdom, which subsequently was frequently referred to as the kingdom of Samaria. It has also been suggested that Omri's decision to relocate the capital from Tirzah to Samaria may have been prompted by geopolitical considerations. Tirzah was located on the eastern side of the hill country of Ephraim, at the head of a valley that leads down to the Jordan. Samaria, by contrast, was on the west side of the hill country overlooking the coastal plain and provided ready access to the Phoenician cities with which Omri reestablished close relations. "Omri would have been concerned to control as far as possible the great international trade route which passed through the Esdraelon [Jezreel] valley, through the pass behind Megiddo and then along the coastal plain to Egypt. His choice of Samaria as his capital city may well have been his open declaration that his policy was expansionist and that he intended to control the trade route." 11 Omri was a strongman whose most immediate domestic challenge was to impose a firm regime on the melange of peoples encompassed by Israel, and to inaugurate a long awaited period of stability in the country. This required that cultural and religious accommodations be made; the pagan

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religions of the non-Israelite population were not to be suppressed but tolerated. "After the time of David and Solomon he was the first to make the state of Israel into a more complex ethnic structure by incorporating other elements of the population. He saw the problems which were crucial for governing Israel and for securing its existence . .. For the state could not be stabilized by permanent conflict; it was necessary to gain control of the powers at work within it, in the best fashion possible." 12 This approach, of course, put Omri on a collision course with the traditionalists and the prophets who were their spokesmen, creating an internal Israelite opposition that ultimately contributed substantially to the downfall of the Omride dynasty. With regard to Israel's external affairs, the half-century of intermittent conflict with Judah had come to an end and cordial relations were established between Omri and Asa that subsequently developed into an alliance between their respective heirs, Ahab (869-850) of Israel and Jehoshaphat (873-849) of Judah. It remains a matter of contention whether or not the latter had entered into an arrangement in which Judah was essentially a vassal to its more powerful northern neighbor. What is clear is that as a result of the new relationship, Judah, which had been relatively isolated from much of the international politics that was reshaping the region, was now drawn into it more and more, ultimately to its own detriment. Omri renewed the ties that David and Solomon had established with Phoenicia, forging an alliance with Ethbaal, king of Tyre, which was sealed by the marriage of Israel's crown prince Ahab to the Phoenician princess Jezebel. As in earlier times, the two countries nicely complemented each other; Phoenician traders supplied Israel with a variety of imports, minerals as well as manufactured goods, while Israel's agriculturalists provided olive oil and foodstuffs from its fertile fields. They also shared a common interest in the two major overland trade routes, the Via Maris and the King's Highway, which passed through or abutted their territories, and the treaty with Phoenicia gave Omri access to many of the economic resources he needed to wrest control of them. Omri extended his domination over the King's Highway by reasserting Israelite hegemony over the kingdom of Moab, a situation that continued in effect through the reign of his successor. As recorded on the Moabite Stone: "As for Omri, king of Israel, he humbled Moab many years . .. Omri had occupied the land of Medeba, and (Israel) had dwelt there in his time and half the time of his son (Ahab), forty years." 13 Eventually, Judah joined the alliance as well, providing additional control of the southern part of trade route through its hegemony over Edom, which straddled the King's Highway in the region south of Moab. There was also an important strategic dimension to the Israel-Phoenicia alliance. As the struggle with Aram-Damascus continued, the alliance effectively closed its route to the sea, which also

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benefited the Phoenician traders, who thereby limited competition from the landlocked state to the east. Control of the lucrative traffic along the King's Highway, as well as the denial to Aram-Damascus of access to the sea, provided the casus belli for a protracted struggle with Aram-Damascus that plagued the house of Omri throughout its relatively long rule. The wars were bitterer than any the people of Israel had experienced before, as Aram-Damascus' s power grew over time with its incorporation of additional Aramaean-held territories and peoples under its sway. As a result of these struggles, Omri lost some of Israel's territory and was forced to accord certain special privileges to Aramaean merchants in the bazaars of Samaria (1 Kings 20:34). The biblical sources record at least three major Aramaean campaigns against Israel during the reign of Ahab, the precise timing of which remains a matter of scholarly controversy. In the first, Ben-hadad, at the head of an alliance of vassals, is reported as laying siege to Samaria and threatening to raze it to the ground unless Ahab capitulated to a series of clearly unacceptable demands. When Ahab refused, Ben-hadad, whose forces were mobilized at Succoth in Transjordan, due south of Damascus, crossed the Jordan at Adam (the site of the modern Damiya bridge) and proceeded up the Wadi Fara, which contracts into a narrow defile near its apex that his chariots had to squeeze through. It was at this point of vulnerability that Ahab mounted a successful counterattack that turned Benhadad's campaign into a debacle from which he barely managed to escape. (It is noteworthy that during the First World War, in September 1918, British aircraft decimated a Turkish army winding its way down from Nablus through the same narrow defile of Wadi Fara.) His defeat was not decisive, however, and Ben-hadad began to prepare for a second campaign. The biblical writer suggests that, in assessing what went wrong, Ben-hadad's military advisers concluded that they had committed two fundamental errors that had cost them the campaign. For one thing they had attempted to attack Israel in the hills, on ground where the defending force had the clear advantage. This had proved to be a mistake and something that could have been avoided had they taken their cue from the long struggle of the Israelites, based in the hill country, and the Canaanites, based in the lowlands where their chariot forces were most effective. Secondly, his advisers pointed out that Ahab was too powerful an enemy to conquer with amateur military leadership. Accordingly, they advised that the next campaign be fought in the plain, where the tactical advantage would be theirs, and that the various vassal chiefs be sent home and professional military officers be put in command of their troops (1 Kings 20:23-25). The following spring, Ben-hadad mobilized a fresh army and took a different route, evidently planning to cross into Cisjordan at the lower end

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of the Sea of Galilee and to attack via the Jezreel valley, where his chariots could be used to good effect. However, it appears that Ahab anticipated this and intercepted the Aramaean force in the hills east of the Sea of Galilee, between the gorge of the Yarmuk river and the town of Aphek, where Ben-hadad's forces were defeated once again, and he was taken prisoner.14 However, Ahab elected not to press his advantage and march north into Aram-Damascus, which would have drained his resources; he remained content with bolstering the security of his existing frontiers. It seems likely that the reason Ahab did not do away with the troublesome Ben-hadad was the expectation, given the growing Assyrian presence in the region, that at some point in the not-too-distant future it might become necessary for the small states of the land-bridge area to enter into a collective security arrangement. Allowing Ben-hadad to live might be helpful in mitigating the longstanding enmity between Israel and AramDamascus, which was essential if such a collective security arrangement were to become a realistic possibility. Moreover, the imminent threat from Assyria made it evident that it was in Israel's interest for Aram-Damascus to serve as its northern buffer. Any Assyrian attack would strike AramDamascus first, and it would be counterproductive to weaken it to the point where it could not put up a credible defense against the invader. Accordingly, Ahab released Ben-hadad from captivity but also extracted a price from him, namely the latter's commitment to return the land earlier taken from Omri, as well as to accord Israelite traders the same privileges in the bazaars of Damascus that the Aramaeans had enjoyed in Samaria. A truce agreement was concluded between Israel and Aram-Damascus that held for the next several years, as both states considered how to deal with the new threat that loomed on the horizon, which made the Aramaean threat to Israel shrink in significance. The centuries-long period in history during which the peoples of the African-Asian land bridge: Ammonites, Aramaeans, Canaanites, Edomites, Israelites, Moabites, Philistines, Phoenicians, and others were essentially left free to pursue their own interests as they saw fit was rapidly coming to an end. Now, in the ninth century, Assyria became the dominant power in Mesopotamia and, having created the most powerful military machine ever known to man up to that point, began expanding along the Fertile Crescent in the direction of the Mediterranean and the great geopolitical prize, Egypt. Of course, the road to Egypt passed through the land bridge, and all the nations, mini-states, and sheikdoms in that region therefore became caught up in events over which they had very little control. Assyria soon became a mortal threat to all of the kingdoms west of the Euphrates. In an early westward probe under Asshurnasirpal II (884-859), which took place while Omri still ruled in Israel, Assyrian forces reached northern Syria and the Phoenician coast as early as 875, exacting heavy tribute from the coastal cities before they withdrew. This was but a preview of

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what was to come a few years later. In the meantime Assyria assumed virtually complete control of all the major trade routes traversing the broader region. Nonetheless, at this point the Assyrians still skirted around the kingdoms of Aram-Damascus and Israel where they expected to encounter strong opposition to their imperial aims. Their preferred strategy was to establish a cordon around the two kingdoms that could be tightened whenever circumstances favored it. Then, in 853, under Shalmaneser III (859-824), Assyria, a state so large and powerful that its defeat at the hand of Israel or of Aram-Damascus alone was quite out of the question, was on the march again, crushing everyone in its path. This, as he had anticipated, forced Ahab to enter into an uneasy military alliance with Ben-hadad of Aram-Damascus and with Irhuleni, king of the more northerly neo-Hittite kingdom of Hamath, as well as some other regional principalities. It is noteworthy that neither the Phoenician cities nor Judah participated in the anti-Assyrian alliance, possibly because they doubted the alliance could prevail over the Assyrians even with their help. A major battle took place at Qarqar on the Orontes River in northern Syria, where the Assyrian advance was stymied by the regional alliance in which Israel played a major role. According to Assyrian records, Ahab had contributed some 10,000 infantry and 2000 chariots to the joint war effort, more of the latter than all the other allies combined. It has been suggested that the Assyrian figures for the number of Israel's chariots committed to the struggle may have been exaggerated to bloat the significance of the battle, of which the Assyrians claimed victory. It is significant, however, that even if the numbers are inflated, Israel was perceived by the Assyrians as the more powerful of the states arrayed against them. The actual outcome of the battle at Qarqar was in fact indecisive, as evidenced by the fact that the Assyrians withdrew once again without having made any clear political gains. However, it would only be a matter of a few years before they returned. And, in anticipation of just such a development, Ahab undertook a major military construction program. He rebuilt and re-fortified the strategic fortresses at Hazor and Megiddo, as well as Samaria, strengthening their walls to resist Assyrian battering rams, and constructed sophisticated water supply systems to enable the fortresses to withstand lengthy sieges. The Assyrian threat also created significant theological issues for the religious leaders of Israel, issues that became increasingly problematic over time. It raised in a most serious way the question as to whether the God of Israel was capable of defeating the god of the Assyrians and its vassals and allies, even on Israel's own territory. This evidently became a critical morale issue for the Israelites. Logically, one should worship the stronger god. However, for the traditional religious leaders and prophets this was an impossible option. As a consequence, it became necessary for

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the prophets to begin to think and preach about a new although latent conception of God that would take into consideration the political realities of the time. They were forced to abandon the popular nation-specific conception of the God of Israel for the more universal monotheistic view inherent in Mosaic teaching. The God of Israel, they now began to assert, was also the God of the Assyrians. If the latter worshiped pagan deities, it was because they were perverse in their understanding of the nature of deity. If these nations that failed to perceive the true God were able to defeat Israel, it was only because the God of all used them as a means with which to punish Israel for its perfidy. Assyria thus became viewed as a divine instrument for chastising Israel and as such was seen as ultimately less significant than Israel in the divine scheme. If Israel were defeated, it would not be because it was more evil than other nations, but rather because it must conform to a higher standard since it was chosen to serve as an example of public morality to the rest. This reformulation of their belief system enabled the Israelites to survive defeat and also provided a basis for believing that the favor of heaven had not departed from them permanently and that Israel could once again recover. However, for this to happen the society of Israel would have to be decontaminated from its alien influences, and this ran afoul of Ahab's domestic policy, which was highly permissive in this regard, primarily as an obligation of international etiquette to his Phoenician queen Jezebel. He evidently would do nothing to jeopardize his alliance with Ethbaal, which was essential to his plans for the restoration of Israel's power as it was in the days of David and Solomon. In this regard, he permitted the construction of a Baalist temple (most likely one devoted to the Tyrian god of the netherworld Melqart) in Samaria, an act that was evidently intended to demonstrate his respect for his Phoenician allies but which also went beyond the general religious permissiveness of his predecessor. By effectively according a Canaanite cult official status in the nation's capital, Ahab entered onto an irreversible collision course with the current leader of the religious reform movement, Elijah the Tishbite, a prophet from Gilead, in a classic example of the struggle between religion and politics for dominance in the state. "The prophetic party could not brook this procedure for the Lord is a jealous God before whom there can be no other gods. The kings, on the other hand, could not accept the prophetic obduracy because, in the light of the accepted international etiquette, the prophetic demand implied a policy of isolationism which was counter to the political interests of their country."15 As a practical matter, even without his perceived need to accommodate his Phoenician ally, Ahab was faced by an internal religious policy dilemma that defied simple resolution. He ruled an area in which much of its economic and military strength was centered in the old Canaanite cities, and it is most unlikely that their residents ever completely abandoned

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their religion when they were incorporated into the Israelite state. Given the non-homogeneous character of the population, domestic stability demanded that Ahab make certain cultural concessions to the non-Israelites under his rule, particularly with regard to their religious beliefs and practices. It seems clear that there was little popular opposition to this. The prevailing perception in Samarian society was that the existence of the Baal cult in their midst did not basically affect or conflict with the belief in the supreme national God of Israel. Thus, Ahab himself, despite his public support of pagan worship, gave his own children names that included either a prefix or suffix denoting the God of Israel. In other words, the concept of absolute monotheism was still so little developed among the Israelites, except in the schools of the prophets, that many sincere adherents of the Mosaic faith simply did not comprehend the confusion of the diametrically opposed conceptions of divinity that were reflected in the syncretism resulting from the commingling of religious cults. "The believer of that time regarded religion as a ritual, not as a doctrine, and in combining rituals he failed to see that he was throwing together two completely heterogeneous concepts." This approach, as already suggested, ran afoul of Israel's prophetic religious leaders, "who in thundering tirades denounced the worship of two gods and foreign culture in general."16 To them, any vestige of paganism in their society was unacceptable, especially in the capital, which set the tone for the rest of the country and which was a predominantly Israelite city. Further compounding the problem was the infusion of wealth into the capital, which resulted in an increasing economic gap between it and the countryside and a concomitant increase in social injustice, the roots of which were considered by the prophets to be connected with the regime's religious perfidy. A century later the prophet Micah would still recall the moral failures of Omri and Ahab as afflicting his own generation: "For the statutes of Omri are kept, and all the works of the house of Ahab, and ye walk in their counsels" (Mic. 6:16). The religious struggle was thus merely one aspect of a broader emerging rift between the ruling and the wealthy classes of the important cities such as Samaria and Shechem, which were most prone to foreign influences, and the general population of the smaller towns and villages as well as the countryside, where traditional Israelite religion found its more faithful adherents. On the one hand, Ahab evidently took the position that assurance of Israel's future prosperity required abandonment of old traditions that stood in the way of progress and modernity, and that to achieve that goal it was necessary for Israel to seek to approximate the advanced civilization of its Phoenician ally. Elijah, on the other hand, equally concerned about the future of Israel, took the position that what was required was not the abandonment of tradition but its adaptation to the prevailing circumstances, taking into account the conditions of life and community, thereby permitting Israel

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to change and prosper without sacrificing its distinctive character as a Mosaic civilization, without which it would lose its reason for being. The internal struggle between Ahab and Elijah was therefore essentially one over the character of the state and the monarchy. Israel, notwithstanding the political upheavals and Jeroboam's religious innovations, remained a generally traditional society whose ethos was framed within the context of the covenantal Mosaic Law. Within that context, the ruler, be he shofet, nagid, or melekh, was considered subordinate to that law and was expected to act within its constraints. In other words, from the outset of central rule in the time of Samuel, the Israelite kings were constitutional monarchs and were expected to behave as such, coming under the harsh criticism of prophets who served as watchdogs to protect the public interest if they deviated from accepted norms. Nonetheless, the allure of monarchic absolutism was irrepressible and many of Israel's kings chafed at the constraints they were under as nominally constitutional monarchs. Ahab, perhaps more than any of his predecessors, and probably spurred on by his influential if not domineering wife Jezebel, became determined to change the fundamental relationship between the king and the higher law to which he was considered bound. Ahab chose to act in the belief that his will was the divine will, and that he was therefore above the traditional constitutional restrictions on his behavior. His position in this regard is exemplified in the biblical account of the means by which he took possession of a vineyard close to his palace that he wanted for a garden. The owner, Naboth, would not sell the plot because it was ancestral land and the king had no legitimate authority to force him to surrender it, especially since Ahab wanted it for his own personal use rather than for the public welfare. According to the biblical account, Ahab was extremely frustrated by his inability under the law to do as he wished. Not previously known for passivity, in this instance he behaved like a spoiled child, pouting and refusing to eat (1 Kings 21:4). It has been suggested that, "his behavior is designed to attract the attention of his activist wife, to manipulate her to carry out a plan he does not want to carry out himself."17 Taking charge and acting in Ahab's name, Jezebel contrived to have the owner charged and convicted of the capital offense of blasphemy, thus subverting the legal process and effectively committing judicial murder. It also appears that Naboth's sons were executed along with the father, the legal basis for which is unclear, to eliminate all other claimants to the family's property (2 Kings 9:26). Following the executions, the king confiscated the vineyard in question, presumably because in the absence of any direct heirs the property reverted to the state. Elijah reacted to this affront to public morals by condemning Ahab and his house to die by violence just as he had conspired to murder an innocent man (1 Kings 21). It is noteworthy that the confiscation of the private property at issue in the biblical account was accomplished not through ignoring the traditional

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law and simply compelling the owner to sell it, but through perversion of the law, indicating that Ahab and even Jezebel still felt constrained by it. The implication of this is that Ahab, as well as Jezebel, understood that as far as the public was concerned he was still a constitutional monarch and that he would have to proceed cautiously to successfully transform his country into the absolute monarchy to which he aspired. In the interim, he would still have to tread with care with prophets like Elijah looking over his shoulder. Elijah was unconditionally opposed to the religious policies of Ahab, and with the support of those prophets who shared his opinions, which excluded the cadre of sycophantic prophets that adorned the court, and probably with the tacit support of the majority of the population outside the capital, he led an attempt to rid the land of paganism, which Ahab occasionally publicly espoused and practiced for political reasons, both internal and external. Concerned about how Ahab's approach to religion might negatively impact the society, Elijah evidently felt compelled to adopt the extreme position that, simply stated, Israel's God was not prepared to tolerate the worship of alien deities in Israel, even if such worship were done by non-Israelites. As a practical matter this meant that Elijah had made himself the nemesis of the queen, Jezebel, who was the prime patroness of Baalism in the country. With Ahab's passive complicity, she ordered the slaughter of the schools of the prophets, only a small number of their disciples surviving the onslaught as a result of the quiet intervention of one of Ahab's officers. As Elijah went into hiding, there was a backlash against Ahab and Jezebel that threatened the internal stability of the kingdom and resulted in the retaliatory slaughter of hundreds of the pagan priests brought into the country by Jezebel. Although Ahab was not overly upset by the event, it having provided an outlet for the pressure that was building in the country, Jezebel wanted Elijah's head and he was forced into exile. Essentially confronted by the same dilemma as Samuel with Saul and Ahijah with Jereboam before him, Elijah too saw the solution of the problem as resting with a change of dynasty, placing no hope in the house of Omri. However, in this instance, prophetic sedition was to extend beyond the bounds of Israel and include invoking foreign assistance to bring about what would amount to the destruction of the country, which would then be rebuilt from the ruins by a religiously faithful remnant. His plan, apparently, was to forge a de facto alliance between Hazael, who probably was commander of the army of Aram-Damascus, and Jehu ben Nimshi, one of Ahab's generals, who would lay claim to the throne of Israel against the house of Omri. 18 It was evidently already clear to Elijah and his circle that Jehu held some extreme views regarding the appropriateness of the policies, both foreign and domestic, of the house of Omri, views that were entirely compatible with those of Elijah, making Jehu the ideal candidate

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to replace the Omrides. The anticipated alliance between Hazael and Jehu would be facilitated by the prophet taking part in the anointment of both and would be supported by a coup d'etat carried out under the spiritual leadership of Elisha, one of Elijah's prophetic disciples. The biblical writer recounts the tradition that attributes this extraordinary plot to a divine revelation. And the Lord said unto him: 'Go, return on thy way to the wilderness of Damascus; and when thou comest, thou shalt anoint Hazael to be king over Aram; and Jehu the son of Nimshi shalt thou anoint to be king over Israel; and Elisha the son of Shephat . . . shalt thou anoint to be prophet in thy room. And it shall come to pass, that him that escapeth from the sword of Hazael shall Jehu slay; and him that escapeth from the sword of Jehu shall Elisha slay. Yet will I leave seven thousand in Israel, all the knees which have not bowed unto Baal, and every mouth which hath not kissed him. (I Kings 19:15-18) It would take several years before the basic elements of the plot fell into place, Elijah succeeding only in appointing Elisha to follow him as chief domestic thorn in the side of the house of Omri. In the meantime, the recession of the imminent Assyrian threat after the battle of Qarqar evoked an unwarranted complacency among the key members of the anti-Assyrian alliance, which soon fell apart as Ahab and Ben-hadad reverted to pursuing their individual interests. A new IsraeliteAramaean war erupted as a result of Ben-hadad reneging on his agreement to return to Ahab the territory in the northern part of Gilead, including Ramoth-gilead, which had been seized by Aram-Damascus during Omri's reign. Ramoth-gilead was of great strategic importance because of its position on the heights commanding a major approach to Judah and Israel from the east. Moreover, it also was in such proximity to the King's Highway that, in hostile hands, it could interrupt Israel's undisputed control of that important trade route. To take on Ben-hadad and his vassals, Ahab was sorely in need of allies, and the only such potential ally lay to his south in Judah. Presumably as a result of diplomatic overtures, about which the biblical account reveals little, there was for the first time since the dissolution of the dual monarchy a significant improvement in relations between the two neighbors. Jehoshaphat, king of Judah, soon joined forces with Ahab in a military alliance against Aram-Damascus. However, in the ensuing battle to retake Ramoth-gilead, the Israelite coalition was defeated, Ahab was slain on the battlefield, and Jehoshaphat abandoned the enterprise and returned to Jerusalem. It is unclear what Ben-hadad did after the withdrawal of the Israelite forces, whether he sought to press his advantage by making further inroads into Israel's territory or whether he came to terms with Ahab's successor, forcing the latter to accept the status quo in Transjordan,

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at least for the time being. The absence of any reports in the biblical accounts in such regard suggests that the latter was the most likely outcome of the campaign. Ahab's eldest son Ahaziah (850-849), who was also the son of Jezebel and a target of Elijah's unrelenting harassment, succeeded him on the throne. Ahaziah's undistinguished reign actually lasted for less than a year before he died as the result of an accident. However, during his brief tenure he presided over the beginning of a period of decline that lasted more than a half-century, beginning with the secession of Moab. His only recorded act of significance was entering into an agreement with Jehoshaphat in what proved to be an unsuccessful attempt to revive the Red Sea maritime trade from Ezion-geber, originally developed by Solomon, which had gone into decline following the dissolution of the dual monarchy (2 Chron. 20:35-36). Without a male heir, Ahaziah left the throne of Israel to his younger brother Jehoram (849-842). Aside from the throne, Jehoram also inherited the problem of Moab. During the reign of his grandfather Omri, Moab had been subdued and made a tribute-paying vassal of Israel. According to the biblical account, the annual levy amounted to the wool of 100,000 lambs and of 100,000 rams (2 Kings 3:4). Although these amounts need not necessarily be taken at face value, they do suggest that the burden imposed on Moab was onerous and that the Moabites would seize the first opportunity that presented itself to rebel against Israelite domination. It thus appears that either very late in the reign of Ahab, or more probably during the brief tenure of Ahaziah, the Moabite king Mesha took advantage of Israel's preoccupation with Aram-Damascus and succeeded in restoring Moab's independence. It seems likely that Aram-Damascus encouraged the Moabite revolt as a means of weakening Israel's grip in Transjordan. And, with the subsequent failure of the Israel-Judah coalition to dislodge the forces of Aram-Damascus at Ramoth-gilead, the death of Ahab, and the ineffectiveness of his successor Ahaziah, Mesha concluded that the time was ripe for Moab to expand northward and regain some of the territories that had once belonged to it but were now under Israelite rule. Mesha struck northward and captured a number of Israelite towns, claiming to have killed 7,000 people in just one of them. Upon assuming the throne, Jehoram decided to undertake a retaliatory campaign against Moab. Mesha had anticipated such a possibility and had fortified his northern frontiers to make an attack from Israel difficult and very costly. Similarly, an attack on Moab from the immediate south was deemed impracticable because of the need to cross the Zared River, which emptied into the Dead Sea and which formed the frontier between Moab and Edom. The need to move an army up the steep and highly defensible northern bank of the river would eliminate any element of surprise and could also prove very costly. Given these considerations,

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Mesha evidently believed he had effectively mitigated the threat from Israel. However, Jehoram was also well aware of these problems and planned to attack Moab from the east instead of the north or south, a highly risky maneuver through the desert that Mesha did not consider a realistic option and did not take steps to prevent. To do this, however, Jehoram needed the cooperation of both Judah and Edom, through which his army would have to pass in order to approach Moab through the "wilderness of Edom" south and east of the Dead Sea. Jehoshaphat agreed to join in the campaign because, as the biblical writer suggests, he considered the people of Israel and Judah as one (2 Kings 3:7). And, because Edom was a vassal of Judah, it too participated in the joint campaign. The forces of the Israelite alliance proceeded across the parched desert according to plan, skirting the Zared River and invading Moab across its essentially undefended eastern frontier. It then proceeded northward with devastating effect. Mesha was compelled to withdraw his main forces from the north and redeploy them to face the Israelite onslaught, which was clearly intended as a punitive expedition rather than one of conquest. The Israelites forces evidently followed a scorched earth policy and laid waste to the country until they reached its capital of Kir-hareshet (modern Kerak). As the biblical writer records: "They smote the land, even Moab, mightily And they beat down the cities; and on every good piece of land they cast every man his stone, and filled it; and they stopped all the fountains of water, and felled all the good trees; until there was left only Kirhareshet with the stones of the wall thereof" (2 Kings 3:24-25). Mesha attempted to disrupt the coalition forces by counterattacking at their weakest link, namely the Edomite contingent, which had the least stake in the outcome of the campaign. Had Mesha succeeded in this ploy he might have been able to cut the line of retreat of the Israel-Judah forces, disrupting their order of battle, and might have left the enemy with no practical alternative but to come to terms with him. However, his attempt to break through the lines failed. As a last desperate measure Mesha may have sought to invoke the assistance of the Moabite god Chemosh, publicly offering his son, the crown prince, as a sacrifice on the city wall of his besieged capital in full sight of the enemy. It also has been conjectured that the sacrifice was not intended to invoke the assistance of the Moabite god but rather that it was an act of black magic intended to frighten the still largely superstitious enemy 19 Mesha's desperate move apparently had the desired effect, and the Israel-Judah alliance called off its attack and withdrew. Although the biblical writer does not give any clear explanation of why this horrific act had such an effect, it seems reasonable to assume that when Mesha reached such a point of desperation as to kill his own son and heir, the punitive purpose of the campaign had been more than adequately satisfied, since there was evidently no intention on the part of any of the allies to actually occupy Moab. The primary aim

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had always been to restore Moab's vassal status and its annual payment of tribute. An alternate albeit less plausible theory regarding the Moabite war suggests that Mesha's sacrifice so heartened the demoralized Moabite troops that they fought on bravely until the forces of the Israelite-led alliance simply gave up and dispersed, allowing the Moabites to retain their independence.20 In any case, in a declaration typical of the self-congratulatory encomiums that Middle Eastern rulers give themselves to this very day, that are often at odds with historical realities or even probabilities, Mesha claimed that the outcome of the struggle was a decisive Moabite victory. "I have triumphed over him [Ahab] and over his house, while Israel hath perished for ever!"21 It appears that several years later war with Aram-Damascus broke out once again, resulting in an Aramaean invasion of Israel and the mounting of a protracted siege of Samaria that inflicted severe hardship on the population. The Aramaeans ultimately raised the siege only after they became convinced that their path of retreat was about to be cut off by a mercenary force of Hittites from the north, trapping them in the Israelite hill country (2 Kings 8:6-7). Another contributing factor may have been Ben-hadad's increasingly critical illness, which soon led to his assassination and the succession to the Aramaean throne of Hazael, who probably was the commanding general of Aramaean army. In any case, apparently encouraged by the Aramaean withdrawal, Jehoram followed the retreating Aramaeans into Transjordan, hoping to retake the regions of the Golan and the Bashan that had previously been conquered from Israel by Ben-hadad. Jehoram was joined in this campaign by the ill-fated Ahaziah (842), the twentytwo year old grandson of Jehoshaphat, who had just succeeded his father Jehoram (849-842) as king of Judah, but did not live out a year on the throne. Presumably, what caused Ahaziah to join in the anti-Aramaean alliance with Jehoram, notwithstanding the failure of the similar alliance that Jehoshaphat had joined for the same purpose earlier, was his direct connection to the house of Omri, his mother being Athaliah, the daughter of Ahab and Jezebel. The immediate target of the campaign, as before, was the strategic prize of Ramoth-gilead. Jehoram was wounded in the ensuing battle and fortuitously turned over the leadership of the army to one of his able generals, Jehu ben Nimshi, as he retired to recuperate at his winter palace in Jezreel. It was there that his young ally Ahaziah went to visit the ailing Israelite king. And it was there that the scene was set for Elijah's disciple Elisha to set in motion the plot the former had conceived to eliminate the house of Omri and to reinstate Israel's proper Mosaic cultural tradition as the moral compass of the state. According to the biblical account of the matter, Elisha, exercising the presumed prophetic privilege of righteous sedition and professing to

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speak as the voice of the people, instructed one of his aides to go to Jehu and secretly advise him that he was chosen to assume the crown of Israel in place of the existing house of Omri. Jehu was then called out of a general staff meeting by the strange-looking emissary and given the news. He was also urged not to wait until it was determined whether or not Jehoram would survive his wounds, but immediately to mount a coup that would result in the total obliteration of the house of Omri, including the hated queen mother Jezebel. When Jehu was asked by his fellow commanders why he had been asked to interrupt their meeting by someone who was evidently a madman, he informed them of Elisha's message, whereupon the generals proclaimed him king of Israel (2 Kings 9:11-13). It seems clear that there must have been a good deal of dissatisfaction among the military leaders with Jehoram, thus accounting for their readiness to support a military coup to overthrow his regime. This story of how a plot to change the course of a nation's history was hatched exemplifies the ambivalence with which prophets were treated in ancient Israel by common folk as well as by their leaders. Although the prophets had moralized and sermonized incessantly for centuries, they do not appear to have achieved any significant effects on religious or moral behavior. Nonetheless, as one writer points out, the prophets were viewed as objects of awe, at least to some extent. Although they were regarded as perhaps a little mad and few took their message seriously, they were still seen as messengers of God, possessing supernatural and magical powers. "When a prophet preached repentance in the abstract, nobody paid much attention; but when he came with specific tidings, a call to war or to desist from war, to dethrone a king or raise a usurper to the throne, the power of prophecy became very real. In this context, it is possible to understand the sudden switch from ridicule to deadly earnestness on the part of Jehu's officers when they heard the words of the prophet." 22 Jehu (842-815) was only too pleased to accept the chore nominally assigned to him by Elisha and hastened to Jezreel, where he soon confronted and killed Jehoram, and while he was at it, critically wounded Ahaziah as well, the latter managing to make it as far as Megiddo before succumbing. Presumably to limit the political fallout from this unprovoked attack on the king of Judah, Jehu had his body returned to Jerusalem for burial. His rationale for killing Ahaziah is not clear, although it may be simply that he was considered a member of the house of Omri because of his mother Athaliah's direct connection to it, and therefore he might have been considered a legitimate claimant for succession to the throne of Israel. Jehu's coup had significant ramifications for both Israel and Judah. In a single blow he brought the house of Omri to an end, immediately in Israel and subsequently in Judah as well after the death of the queen mother Athaliah. The Omrides, for clearly political reasons, had devel-

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oped intimate relationships with the Phoenicians that ultimately led to the pursuit of domestic policies that were reflected in their sympathy for the spread of Canaanite religious practices. Religious traditionalists in both Israel and Judah saw this as inimical to the long-term interests of the Israelite states and registered their fierce opposition to such policies, their spokesmen Elijah and Elisha being perceived in official circles as enemies of the state. "It was concern for the religious future of the people of Israel and Judah as the covenant people of God which led Elisha to encourage Jehu's ambitions. Jehu acted as a traitor against his king, but the support which he received from Elisha enabled him to present his action as being inspired by patriotism rather than personal ambition." 23 As a result of Jehu's coup, both Israel and Judah, at least in the short run, took political and religious directions that amounted to a reversion to the traditional ideas and ideals that were championed by Elijah and Elisha, but were ignored by the Omrides. As will be seen below, it also precipitated a recasting of the geopolitics of the region. Killing Jehoram and taking control of Jezreel, which was merely a secondary royal residence, did not in itself secure the throne for Jehu. He still was faced with the reality that the power center of Israel was in Samaria, which was home not only to the rest of the royal family but also to the aristocratic class long associated with the house of Omri. There was evidently a serious concern that they might raise significant resistance to his usurpation of the throne, throwing the entire country into a civil war at a time when it was still at war with external enemies. As a practical matter, Jehu had only brought a small contingent of troops with him to Jezreel, which was clearly inadequate for forcibly taking over the capital, and the main body of the army could hardly be precipitously withdrawn from the battlefield at Ramoth-gilead for such purpose. Accordingly, Jehu proceeded with due caution coupled with remarkable audacity. Instead of personally going to Samaria to seize the throne, and possibly triggering the very internal conflict he hoped to avoid, he sent messages to the elders and public authorities in the capital advising them to select the ablest member of the royal family to be Jehoram's successor and to mobilize behind him to challenge Jehu and his forces for control of the state. This was both risky as well as shrewd. On the one hand, Samaria was a heavily fortified city with abundant military resources that would be difficult for him to conquer if its leadership took his suggestion seriously. On the other hand, the fact that Jehu had in a single blow eliminated the kings of both Israel and Judah gave him an aura of invincibility that cowed the Samarian leaders, who were taken aback by his unnerving confidence in offering to allow them the time to pick a new king and to mobilize for war. Jehu's ploy evidently worked, and the elders and public authorities decided that capitulation to Jehu was the wiser course of action. Their response to his challenge, according to the biblical writer, was,

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"We are thy servants, and will do all that thou shalt bid us; we will not make any man king; do thou that which is good in thine eyes" (2 Kings 10:5). Jehu then took the shrewd step of making the entire leadership complicit in the coup by advising them that if they were to prove their loyalty to him they had to exterminate all of Ahab's descendants and bring their heads to him in Jezreel, a task they promptly carried out, thereby eliminating all possible legitimate challengers for the crown. The display of the decapitated heads of the princes of Israel revolted the population but also provided the occasion for Jehu to vindicate himself before his people. "Behold, I conspired against my master, and slew him; but who smote all these?" (2 Kings 10:9) As one commentator explained: "Jehu justifies his action on the ground that the destruction of Ahab's house was ordained by God and that he was the destined instrument for the execution of the Divine decree. It is true, he argues, that I slew the late king, but that does not make me a common murderer. See who slew all these—the most eminent men in Samaria! Are they, too, just murderers? Of course not; they and I are only God's agents for the fulfillment of what Elijah had foretold in His name." 24 Jehu followed up by ordering the execution of all with close connection to the royal house. The bloodbath effectively wiped the slate clean of everything closely associated with the house of Omri and instilled a fear of Jehu that he exploited to carry out some highly significant domestic reforms. The ascendancy of Jehu marked a critical turning point in the course of Israel's history. Although he personally was not notably religious in any sense and was roundly criticized by the prophets for his heterodox behavior, he was nonetheless sensitive to the cohesive power of Israel's traditional religion and the coherence it could bring to the melange of tribes, clans, and factions that made up his kingdom. He evidently concluded that the instability that had plagued Israel since the days of Jereboam was largely if not primarily the consequence of the intrusion of alien cultures and religions that served to dissolve the sense of national cohesion that David and Solomon had brought about with their blending of nationalist politics and religion in Jerusalem. Jehu became determined to follow a similar path and undertook major religious and cultural reforms, uprooting the paganism his predecessors not only tolerated but also fostered, particularly the worship of Baal, a principal cult of Israel's Phoenician neighbors and allies. Moreover, by killing the leaders of the cult of Baal, Jehu also rid the kingdom of those most disposed to support the house of Omri, upon whose patronage they relied. He did not, however, eliminate the cultic practices introduced by Jereboam at the sanctuaries of Dan and Bethel, which evidently were still considered acceptable modes of Israelite religious worship at the time. The excesses he indulged in to recast the national character of Israel,

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some of which revealed " a taste for the grisly in excess of the realpolitik requirements of the day," had serious external consequences that were either unanticipated or simply discounted by Jehu.25 Thus, the murder of Jezebel, whom he had thrown out of a window, contributed directly to a breakdown of the alliance with the king of Tyre, and the killing of Ahaziah, as well as a number of his brothers who had come to Israel to visit the former king, effectively scuttled the alliance with Judah. As a result, these acts, which were both unnecessary in order to accomplish Jehu's purposes, left Israel politically and militarily isolated in the face of a persistent threat from Aram-Damascus, and economically bereft of the financial benefits that accrued from the trade relations with Phoenicia. In 841, shortly after Jehu mounted the throne of Israel, the Assyrians under Shalmaneser III returned to the region. They defeated the Aramaean alliance led by Hazael but bypassed Damascus and struck westward toward Phoenicia, marching across Israel through the Jezreel valley until they reached the Mediterranean coast. After accepting tribute from Israel and Tyre, both of which were probably happy to acknowledge Assyrian suzerainty as a buffer against Aramaean encroachment, the Assyrians withdrew back to their own country and were subsequently preoccupied with other parts of the wider region for the next four decades before returning to the Mediterranean littoral. The Assyrian withdrawal provided a window of opportunity for AramDamascus to mount another campaign of conquest against a weakened and politically isolated Israel. Moreover, Hazael was anxious to secure his rear in the event of an Assyrian return to the region and, ignoring any nominal vassal relationship with Assyria, the Aramaeans threw all their weight against Israel. Overwhelming Jehu's opposition, Hazael took control of all Israelite territory in Transjordan, from Bashan in the north to the Arnon in the south, as well as a good part of the Galilee (2 Kings 10:32-33) in Cisjordan. Israel was reduced in size to little more than the hill country surrounding Samaria, and became in effect a vassal of AramDamascus. Indeed, it was only Hazael's reluctance to commit his forces to a guerrilla war in the hills that saved Israel from total conquest. Hazael also exacted tribute from Judah, having marched southward through Israel as far as Gath before withdrawing. Israel remained in a state of virtual servility to Aram-Damascus throughout most of the reign of Jehu's son Jehoahaz (815-801). To keep Israel in a state of subservience, Hazael effectively demanded Israel's disarmament and elimination of its offensive capabilities. Jehoahaz was forced to demobilize the sizeable military force that Israel had built up over the preceding half century and was permitted to retain but ten chariots and fifty horsemen, presumably for ceremonial purposes, and a small infantry force for defensive purposes and the maintenance of internal security (2 Kings 13:7).

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The desperate situation that Israel found itself in changed dramatically in 806, when the Assyrians under Adad-nariri III returned to the region and decisively defeated the Aramaeans. This time, Aram-Damascus surrendered and Hazael's successor Ben-hadad III, who mounted the throne that very year, was forced to accept Assyrian suzerainty and the payment of a heavy annual tribute. Israel renewed its acknowledgement of Assyrian suzerainty, paid its tribute, and during the rein of Jehoahaz's son and successor Joash (801-786) became a de facto Assyrian protectorate. However, the Assyrians were soon compelled to withdraw from the region once again, this time to confront a new rising power in the mountains to the north, the kingdom of Urartu (Armenia), and would not return in force for another half century. Taking advantage of the regional power vacuum and the reduced state to which Aram-Damascus had been brought in the war with Assyria, Joash took to the field about the year 790 and, in three campaigns, managed to recover some of the territory and towns previously taken by the Aramaeans. He also engaged in a war with Judah that was provoked by the latter's king Amaziah, in which he defeated the southern kingdom in a major battle at Beth-shemesh and then struck into Judah, destroying part of the northern wall of Jerusalem. He subsequently compelled Judah to pay a substantial war indemnity for having precipitated the conflict. It appeared that Israel was on the road to recovery as a significant force in the land-bridge region. Under Joash's son and successor, Jereboam II (786-746), and with the encouragement of the prophet Jonah ben Amittai, Israel undertook a campaign of imperial restoration and soon recovered direct control of Transjordan from the frontier of Aram-Damascus to as far south as the Dead Sea. It also imposed its suzerainty on Aram-Damascus, thus effectively extending its perimeter of control as far north as the kingdom of Hamath. Although Assyria was well aware of what was happening in the region that was under its nominal hegemony, it was not in a position to do anything about it. Faced by the challenge of Urartu in the far north and Israel's expansion in the south, and unwilling or unable to fight a war on two fronts simultaneously, Assyria gave priority to holding northern Syria, assuming that the lesser threat to its interests posed by a resurgent Israel could be dealt with later. The resurgence of Israel under Jereboam II turned out to be a final burst of energy before the state went into a steep and irreversible decline. The death of Jereboam led to domestic chaos in Israel and a rapid series of successors as the state began to disintegrate, a process that would conclude within a matter of several decades, as the course of events in the larger region made virtually inevitable. Indeed, Jereboam's successor, his son Zechariah (746-745), the last of the dynasty of Jehu, was assassinated at Ibleam, not far from Jezreel where Jehu murdered Jehoram and brought

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an end to the dynasty of the Omrides. Zechariah was eliminated by Shallum ben Jabesh, one of his generals, in the course of a military coup that took place six months after he mounted the throne. Shallum was in turn deposed and eliminated a month later by Menahem ben Gadi (745-738), another military commander. It is noteworthy that both Shallum and Menahem were from Gilead in Transjordan and were probably supported by the wealthy landowners there, men who rose to prominence during the reign of Jereboam II and now aspired to more influence on the political and economic decisions that were being made in Samaria.26 It has been suggested that both Shallum and Menahem were originally acting as the agents of Pekah ben Remaliah, a general who was preoccupied with consolidating his control over Israel's remaining territories in Transjordan. The idea was for them to overthrow the Omrides and secure the throne for Pekah, but they betrayed him and instead seized the throne themselves.27 Pekah subsequently took the throne from Menahem's son, as discussed below. Almost simultaneously, a dramatic change had taken place in Assyria that would have enormous impact on Israel and its neighbors. In contrast to his predecessors, Tiglath-pileser III (745-727) was not satisfied with the traditional Assyrian pattern of plundering a country of its wealth and then withdrawing, only to repeat the process again some years later. He wanted to conquer and colonize the countries of the Fertile Crescent and its periphery from Babylonia to Egypt. His ambition was to transform Assyria into the greatest empire the world had ever known. His immediate concern was to establish firm Assyrian control of the trade routes passing through northern Syria to the Mediterranean coast, and to do this he had to deal with Urartu, which had extended its reach into that region and had caused significant shortages of needed materials, such as metals, timber, and horses, which had helped precipitate widespread insurrections in the Assyrian homeland in the period following 760. Accordingly, Tiglath-pileser's first priority was to seize permanent control of the eastwest trade routes. This led to a three-year war with Urartu that was fought in northern Syria from about 740 to 737. Following this, his next priority was to establish Assyrian control of the south-north trades routes traversing the region, and this meant the Via Maris and the King's Highway, which passed through the land bridge. Accordingly, it was not long before the various kingdoms in Anatolia, Syria, and Palestine were paying regular tribute to Tiglath-pileser, perhaps still unaware of the Assyrian king's ultimate intentions. In Israel, Menahem was forced to impose a heavy head tax on every male able to bear arms to meet the Assyrian demands, a tax burden that continued to bleed the already weakened country, which soon found itself at war with Aram-Damascus once again, and once again losing control of most of Transjordan to it. The situation remained unchanged throughout

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the reign of Menahem's successor, his son Pekahiah (738-737), who was killed in a military coup after reigning for only two years. It seems that the burden of the annual tribute paid to Assyria was such that an antiAssyrian faction, probably encouraged by Rezin of Aram-Damascus, threw its support to Pekah ben Remaliah (737-732), the army commander in control of what remained of Israel-controlled Transjordan, who seized the throne with the help of a relative handful of soldiers from Gilead. That very fact suggests that Rezin intended to resist the Assyrians and was anxious to have Israel join it in an anti-Assyrian coalition at the appropriate time. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that Rezin agreed, probably covertly, not to attempt to upset the status quo in Transjordan, thereby freeing Pekah to leave the region for the purpose of overthrowing Pekahiah in Samaria. It also seems likely that as the price for allowing Pekah to seize the throne of Israel, Rezin demanded that Pekah become his vassal, a status in which he evidently remained for some years. Then, in 734, Tiglath-pileser marched down the Mediterranean coastal plain through Phoenicia and Philistia as far as Gaza and the Egyptian frontier. There he installed a permanent garrison to block any Egyptian assistance to the land-bridge states, before withdrawing the bulk of his forces. Bypassing Aram-Damascus and Israel, he was now positioned to outflank both whenever he decided the time had come to deal with them. The local monarchs, not yet completely discerning Tiglath-pileser's strategic concept, nonetheless saw this as an ominous sign that he intended to maintain an Assyrian presence in their area, something his predecessors had never done. They correctly saw this as a threat to their freedom of action and possibly their independence. Erstwhile enemies now sought to cobble together an anti-Assyrian alliance to resist such colonialist expansion. Pekah thus joined in a military alliance with Rezin, king of AramDamascus, and received promises of support from the kingdoms of Ammon, Edom, and Moab, as well as from the rulers of Gaza and Ashkelon in Philistia. Judah was also invited to join the alliance but declined to do so. This decision was both prudent and prescient. The likelihood that a coalition of even all the states of the land-bridge region could effectively stop Tiglath-pileser's determined onslaught was miniscule. It seemed that the wiser course was one of accommodation with the overwhelmingly superior power. Accordingly, when Ahaz (743-727) ascended the throne of Judah, he adopted a pro-Assyrian policy, which generated a significant domestic opposition led by Isaiah, an influential prophet of the time. Although the view reflected by Isaiah fully supported Ahaz's position on refusing to join with Israel and Aram in an anti-Assyrian alliance, it was also adamantly opposed to Ahaz's pro-Assyrian policy. Isaiah's position was that the appropriate policy for Judah was to adopt a posture of unquestioned neutrality, without attempting any devious strategic or dip-

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lomatic initiatives. The fundamental reason behind Isaiah's position was the judgment that what Israel needed most was to institute cultural reforms that would bring the country into line with its true raison d'etre, and that for this to happen, it was essential that Israel not be too closely tied to any foreign power. Moreover, the kingdom of Judah of the day was a small inland state through which no major trade routes passed, and it was possible that Assyria would not bother conquering it, being satisfied with receiving tribute instead. Ahaz, however, while sympathetic to this argument, felt compelled to reject it as a practical guide to policy. His view was that he could not simply sit with folded hands secure in faith that God will intervene to force Assyria to respect his neutrality. He persisted in pursuing a proAssyrian policy. He was convinced that only by appeasing the Assyrians would he avert the disaster that was engulfing his northern neighbors, and therefore he would not abandon this policy in favor of the proposed tripartite alliance. This created a strategic dilemma for the new alliance because this left open the possibility of Judah actually aligning with Assyria militarily, something that would leave both Israel and Aram-Damascus exposed to a possible attack from the south and hence a two-front war in the event of a conflict with Assyria. As a result, the allies concluded that Judah either had to be coerced into joining them or, at the least, be militarily incapacitated. Accordingly, they jointly invaded Judah and laid siege to Jerusalem, attempting to force Ahaz into accepting their terms. There is also some evidence that they had already selected a certain Ben-Tabeel, whose identity is a matter of contention, to replace Ahaz on the throne if he refused to comply with the demands of the northern alliance (Isa. 7:6). Some scholars suggest that this reference is to an anonymous member of the royal house of Tyre, possibly a son or relative of its king Tubail.28 The presumption was that such a new ruler would bring Judah into line, given that Tyre was a strong supporter of the anti-Assyrian alliance. An alternate theory suggests that Ben-Tabeel was actually a Judahite commander, probably a member of the Davidic family, who was responsible for Judah's holdings in Transjordan and was offered independence as well as the throne in Jerusalem if he would help overthrow Ahaz. From this perspective, it was seen as in the interest of both Israel and Aram, at a minimum, to eliminate Ahaz's control over the southern portions of the King's Highway and other trade routes to the Arabian peninsula.29 Still another view suggests that Ben Tabeel is a reference to none other than Rezin himself, the founder of his dynasty being Tabel or Tabrimmon. 30 In this case, Rezin's plan would have been to overthrow completely the house of David and install an Aramaean king over Judah. Jerusalem, however, was not easily taken, and Ahaz was able to hold on for the time being, hoping that the Assyrians would invade AramDamascus from the north, hopefully sooner rather than later. But attempt-

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ing to sit out the siege of Jerusalem did not deal with other serious problems affecting Judah with which Ahaz was confronted. One immediate consequence of the Israelite-Aramaean attack was the defection of Judah's vassals. The Edomites took advantage of the situation to seize territory in the Negev, including Elath, Judah's Red Sea port, and the Philistines took advantage of Judah's distraction with the attack from the north, which essentially left its western flank unguarded, to advance into the hill country, seizing Beth-shemesh and other frontier towns in both the Shephelah and the Negev (2 Chron. 28:18). Unless Ahaz did something soon, Judah would be reduced to Jerusalem alone. Under attack on all sides, Ahaz saw no alternative but to appeal directly to Tiglath-pileser for relief, sweetening the request with a voluntary tribute of much of the silver and gold from the Temple treasury. The practical problem, however, was that he had no way of sending a substantial embassy through enemy lines to reach Tiglath-pileser. It would seem that he could do nothing until Assyria mounted its campaign of conquest, which demolished the armies of the kingdom of Aram-Damascus and actually took Damascus for the first time in 732. At that point, the lines of communication through Transjordan became open. "So Ahaz sent messengers to Tiglath-pileser king of Assyria, saying: I am thy servant and thy son; come up, and save me out of the hand of the king of Aram, and out of the hand of the king of Israel, who rise up against me" (2 Kings 16:7). Tiglath-pileser was probably both delighted and amused at being invited by the king of Judah to intervene directly in the tangled affairs of the landbridge region since it was something that he was in the process of doing in any case. Adjusting the schedule of his campaign to do so immediately, with Judah still tying up a joint army of Israel and Aram-Damascus, seemed most appropriate, and he responded to Ahaz's plea with immediate action. With the fall of Damascus, the Aramaean state ceased to exist as an independent entity and was incorporated as an Assyrian province. Shortly thereafter, Tiglath-pileser's forces broke through Israel's northern fortified defenses at Hazor and Megiddo and fanned out from there in three wings, one marching through the Galilee to the Mediterranean coast, another through the Jezreel valley, and the third moving directly south from Aram through Transjordan as far as the Dead Sea. The biblical historiographer summarizes the Assyrian conquests in northern Israel as follows: "In the days of Pekah king of Israel came Tiglath-pileser king of Assyria, and took Ijon, and Abel-beth-maacah, and Janoah, and Kedesh, and Hazor, and Gilead, and Galilee, all the land of Naphtali" (2 Kings 15:29).31 The territories that were seized were organized as three Assyrian provinces, Dor, covering the coastal area, Megiddo, which included the Galilee, and Gilead, which incorporated all of Transjordan. It is noteworthy that Tiglathpileser did not similarly transform Ashkelon and the other port city-states

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along the Philistine coast into Assyrian provinces under direct Assyrian rule. It seems that he preferred to allow them to retain their relative autonomy under his suzerainty in order to reap the maximum benefit from their vibrant international commerce, even though Ashkelon, for example, was part of the Israel-Aram alliance. Consistent with a new policy that called for the displacement of the elite members of conquered nations in order to prevent the emergence of movements for national resurgence, Tiglath-pileser ordered the transfer of large numbers of Israelites to Assyria, including virtually the entire Israelite population of Transjordan. What remained of Israel was only a small vassal state that consisted of the immediate region around Samaria. To save Samaria itself from a similar fate, and leading a pro-Assyrian faction, "Hoshea the son of Elah made a conspiracy against Pekah the son of Remaliah, and smote him, and slew him, and reigned in his stead" (2 Kings 15:30). The coup, most likely undertaken with Tiglath-pileser's approval and assistance, saved Samaria from destruction and Hoshea (732-724) was permitted to rule what remained of Israel as an Assyrian puppet state. The death of Tiglath-pileser III in 727, as frequently occurred in the history of the nations of the Middle East, was an occasion for conspiracies designed to take advantage of the period of uncertainty and consolidation that accompanied transitions of personal power. Egypt saw the time as ripe to attempt to destabilize the Assyrian hold on the region and encouraged the small kingdoms of the land-bridge region to form an antiAssyrian alliance. Although Hoshea initially remained a loyal vassal of the new Assyrian king Shalmaneser V (727-722), by 725 he succumbed to the blandishments of the king of Egypt and signaled his rejection of Assyrian suzerainty by withholding his annual payment of tribute. This act of defiance soon triggered an Assyrian invasion of Israel. When Hoshea discovered that, despite its incitement, Egypt was unprepared to come to his assistance, he had little choice but to capitulate, even though Samaria itself refused to do so, and he was exiled to Assyria. Samaria was placed under siege and held out for about three years, falling to the Assyrians in 722-721. The Assyrians withdrew from Israel in 721 because of a pressing need to deal with internal revolts that had erupted in their eastern domains. Most notably, Babylon temporarily broke away from Assyrian control under the rule of the Chaldaean king Merodach-baladan (721-709), who held on to the throne there for a dozen years. That same year Sargon II seized power in Assyria, and in 720 he returned to quell the widespread revolts that broke out west of the Euphrates with the withdrawal of the Assyrian armies. Hanunu, the Philistine king of Gaza who had fled to safety in Egypt in 734 when Tiglath-pileser's forces invaded Philistia, now returned with an Egyptian army to join with Yaibidi, the king of Hamath, and other

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local states in an attempt to block the Assyrian advance. Sargon swept down the Mediterranean coast as far as Rafia on the Egyptian frontier, where he defeated an Egyptian army, following which he turned north once more and effectively did away with the kingdom of Israel, exiling a large segment of the Israelite population, and incorporating some of the surviving military into the Assyrian army. Sargon's own account describes the event as follows. "I besieged and conquered Samaria, led away as booty 27,290 inhabitants of it. I formed from among them a contingent of 50 chariots and made the remaining (inhabitants) assume their (social) positions. I installed over them an officer of mine and imposed upon them the tribute of the former king."32 The biblical account states blandly, "In the ninth year of Hoshea, the king of Assyria took Samaria, and carried Israel away unto Assyria" (II Kings 17:4-6). That is, the elite of Israel were exiled to Mesopotamia and were replaced by similar exiles from among the other rebellious populations within the Assyrian empire. What remained of the territory of Israel became the Assyrian province of Samerina, reflecting the name of Israel's former capital, Samaria, or Shomron in Hebrew. NOTES 1. Leo L. Honor, Book of Kings I: A Commentary (New York: Union of American Hebrew Congregations, 1955), p. 170. 2. Ibid., p. 182. 3. Siegfried Herrmann, A History of Israel in Old Testament Times (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981), p. 192. 4. J. Maxwell Miller and John H. Hayes, A History of Ancient Israel and Judah (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), p. 242. 5. Hanoch Reviv, MiBeit Av leMamlakhah: Yisrael biTekufat haMikra (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1981), p. 164. 6. Reviv, "The Canaanite and Israelite Periods (3200-332 BC)," in Michael AviYonah (ed.), A History of Israel and the Holy Land (New York: Continuum, 2001), pp. 82-83. 7. Shemuel Yeivin, "The Divided Kingdom," in Abraham Malamot (ed.), The World History of the Jewish People, vol. 4-1: The Age of the Monarchies: Political History (Jerusalem: Massada, 1979), p. 134. 8. Theodore H. Robinson, A History of Israel: From the Exodus to the Fall of Jerusalem, 586 B.C. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 275. 9. Yeivin, "The Divided Kingdom," p. 135. 10. Israel W. Slotki, Kings (London: Soncino, 1971), p. 117. 11. J. Robinson, The First Book of Kings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 186. 12. Herrmann, A History of Israel in Old Testament Times, p. 208. 13. James B. Pritchard, ed., The Ancient Near East (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958), pp. 209-10. 14. This Aphek should not be confused with the city of the same name in western Cisjordan.

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15. Honor, Book of Kings I, pp. 241-42. 16. Simon Dubnow, History of the Jews, vol. 1 (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1967), p. 174. 17. David N. Freedman, The Nine Commandments (New York: Doubleday, 2000), p. 143. 18. Jehu was actually the son of Jehoshaphat ben Nimshi (2 Kings 9:2) but is generally referred to as Jehu ben Nimshi to avoid any confusion about his relation to Jehoshaphat, king of Judah. 19. Yehezkel Kaufmann, MiKivshonah shel haYetzirah haMikra'it: Kovetz Maamarim (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1966), p. 207. 20. Dubnow, History of the Jews, vol. 1, p. 185. 21. Pritchard, The Ancient Near East, p. 209. 22. Adin Steinsaltz, Biblical Images: Men and Women of the Book (New York: Basic Books, 1984), p. 172. 23. J. Robinson, The Second Book of Kings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 78. 24. Slotki, Kings, pp. 222-23. 25. Steinsaltz, Biblical Images, p. 173. 26. Reviv, MiBeit Av leMamlakhah, p. 210. 27. Yeivin, "The Divided Kingdom," p. 171. 28. Miller and Hayes, A History of Ancient Israel and Judah, p. 343. 29. Reviv, MiBeit Av leMamlakhah, p. 214. 30. Emil G. Kraeling, Rand McNally Bible Atlas (New York: Rand McNally, 1956), p. 295. 31. The Gilead mentioned in this passage must refer to a town with that name in northern Israel rather than the region on the east bank of the Jordan. 32. Pritchard, The Ancient Near East, p. 195.

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CHAPTER 9

Decline and Fall of the Kingdom of Judah

A good deal of Judah's early political history was closely intertwined with that of its northern neighbor, much of which was discussed in the preceding chapter and will not be repeated here, except to the extent that certain aspects of those events and developments require further consideration and explication. In addition, there were a number of other events that took place in Judah during the ninth and eighth centuries, not mentioned earlier, that are important for understanding the history of the kingdom during that period. Accordingly, we begin by returning to a further examination of the period of cordial relations between Israel and Judah that were initiated by Omri and Asa and carried on by their successors, Ahab (869-850) and Jehoshaphat (873-849), a period that lasted for about a halfcentury The longstanding hostility between Israel and Judah, which seems to have been perpetuated primarily by the refusal of the kings of Judah to acknowledge the right of the northern tribes to secede from the kingdom of the house of David, had come to an end. Both Asa and Jehoshaphat had come to the realization that it was in Judah's greater interest to face the reality of the existing situation and acknowledge that cooperation with Israel would have substantial benefits for both. Following the established practice of contracting royal marriages as a means of assuring good faith among allies, Jehoshaphat arranged for his son and heir Jehoram (not to be confused with his contemporary Jehoram, son and heir of Ahab), to marry Athaliah, daughter of Ahab and Jezebel and sister of the Jehoram who would succeed Ahab as king of Israel.1 There seems to be sufficient literary evidence to conclude that Jehoshaphat's cordial relationship with the house of Omri and his policy of ac-

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commodation with it, exemplified by the family connection established through the Jehoram-Athaliah marriage, did not meet with universal approval in Judah and that there was in fact substantial opposition to his policy in this regard. 2 Not only was Jehoshaphat excoriated by the prophet Jehu ben Hanani for his warm relations with the house of Omri: "Shouldest thou help the wicked, and love them that hate the Lord? For this thing wrath is upon thee from before the Lord" (2 Chron. 19:2), he was also attacked by the prophet Eliezer ben Dodavahu for entering into a joint venture with Ahaziah of Israel to revive the Red Sea trade: "Because thou hast joined thyself with Ahaziah, the Lord hath made a breach in thy works" (2 Chron. 20:37). According to the latter version of the episode, the joint venture ultimately failed when the ships they had constructed were wrecked at Ezion-geber. An alternate version of the story, different from that presented in the preceding chapter, which is in accord with that given above, suggests that there had been a longstanding tripartite arrangement during the reign of Ahab in Israel between Judah, Israel, and Phoenicia for pursuing the Red Sea trade. However, with the death of Ahab, Jehoshaphat sought to terminate the existing arrangement with Israel, determining that Judah would benefit more if it pursued the Red Sea trade independently, given that it was Judah's suzerainty over Edom that made it possible at all. Jehoshaphat therefore refused to reconfirm the trade treaty with Ahaziah (1 Kings 22:50), causing a souring of relations between the two kingdoms for a brief period. In either case, it turned out that Judah derived little benefit from its decision to act unilaterally, because the Red Sea trade venture, which was predicated on the use of a Judahite merchant fleet, failed. Nonetheless, Judah also had other important and more remunerative external trade relationships, most notably with the Philistines, who may have served as exporters of Judah's goods, as well as with the Arabs of the Arabian peninsula, whose caravans passed through the trade routes in southern Transjordan that were under Jehoshaphat's control. Judah evidently derived significant revenue from these relationships, with which the king undertook a massive military construction program (2 Chron. 17:11-13) to enhance the country's security posture. In this regard, he also appears to have reorganized Judah's army. He garrisoned the relatively small standing army in Jerusalem and in various fortified outposts throughout the country and organized large trained and combat-ready reserve forces that were to be mobilized and activated at his call (2 Chron. 17:19). Jehoshaphat also undertook a massive effort to strengthen and prepare the nation for the troubled times ahead through a large-scale civics education program and a thorough revision of the judicial system, previously held primarily in the hands of the tribal elders. The evident purpose of these reforms, in addition to revitalizing the sense of national purpose through a better understanding of Mosaic teaching, was to create a stronger

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sense of national unity among the people as well as to build greater loyalty to the state and its institutions. To carry out the public education program, he constituted a commission that included five princes and a group of priests and Levites as instructors. "And they taught in Judah, having the book of the Law of the Lord with them; and they went about throughout all the cities of Judah, and taught among the people" (2 Chron. 17:9). With regard to judicial reforms, he established a two-tiered judicial system. "And he set judges in the land throughout all the fortified cities of Judah, city by city," who were cautioned with regard to their obligations for maintaining impartiality and personal integrity in meting out justice (2 Chron. 19:5-7). He also established a dual higher court in Jerusalem, one religious and the other civil, to hear appeals from the lower courts and to decide cases that the lower courts were unable to deal with. "And, behold, Amariah the chief priest is over you in all matters of the Lord; and Zebediah the son of Ishmael, the ruler of the house of Judah, in all the king's matters" (2 Chron. 19:11). The latter appointment would appear to be intended to assuage the concerns of the tribal elders over their effective loss of judicial prerogatives. What is remarkable about this arrangement is that it would appear that Jehoshaphat reduced or entirely eliminated his own role as chief justice, effectively devolving some of his own traditional powers to others. Nonetheless, the opposition to Jehoshaphat's policy of maintaining close relations with the house of Omri, which was viewed by traditionalist circles as the very antithesis of what the king had set out to accomplish in Judah, was unrelenting. It also seems clear that for this same reason, namely the marriage of his son to Athaliah of the house of Omri, there was substantial opposition to Jehoram as heir presumptive to the throne. Nonetheless, according to the biblical account, although there were other more popularly acceptable candidates among Jehoram's brethren, who were awarded fiefdoms throughout the country, Jehoshaphat gave the throne to Jehoram only because he was the first-born (2 Chron. 21:2-3), the principle of primogeniture evidently having been well established by then. It is assumed by many that Jehoshaphat shared his rule with his son for the last three years of his life. Accordingly, with the death of Jehoshaphat in 849, Jehoram (849-842) became sole ruler of Judah and, as soon as he consolidated his position, in one of his first acts "he slew all of his brethren with the sword, and divers also of the princes of Israel" (2 Chron. 21:4), the latter phrase probably referring to some of the tribal leaders. 3 That is, he eliminated all six of his brothers to whom Jehoshaphat had assigned fortresses throughout the country, as well as other political leaders opposed to his policies. He ordered this purge, presumably, to eliminate all those opposed to close relations with the religiously deviant regime in Israel, who might be in a position to threaten his hold on the throne, as well as to ensure his own full control of the defenses of the country.

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It was not long before Jehoram proved to be a mediocre leader both with regard to foreign as well as domestic affairs. He was soon confronted by a revolt of the vassal kingdom of Edom, which he failed to suppress successfully. This resulted in Judah's loss of access through the Negev to the port of Ezion-geber and therefore to the Red Sea, as well as the loss of a southern buffer zone and the strategic depth that it provided. Jehoram was also challenged by a resurgence of hostile activity emanating from Philistia, which resulted in the loss of the formerly Canaanite city of Libnah in the Judean foothills. Internally, he followed the pattern of his inlaws, Ahab and Jezebel, and permitted his wife Athaliah free reign in terms of her religious proclivities, which resulted in a flowering of paganism in Jerusalem that aroused a good deal of anger and resentment in traditional circles and earned Jehoram the stern condemnation of the foremost social and religious critic of the period, Elijah the Tishbite. As a result, Jehoram lived and died of illness unloved and unmourned by his people. As the biblical writer put it, "he departed joyless" (2 Chron. 21:20), leaving the throne to his twenty-two-year-old son Ahaziah (842), whose succession was evidently also contested, and who was placed on the throne by "the inhabitants of Jerusalem" (2 Chron. 22:1). That is, there was little support for his enthronement by any other than the denizens of the capital, an awkward situation to say the least for an ostensibly constitutional monarchy. It appears that Jehoram sought to bolster the prospects for his son by marrying him to Zibiah of Beersheba (2 Kings 12:2; 2 Chron. 24:1), an apparent bid for the loyalty of the southern clans, which constituted Judah's first line of defense against the Edomites. In any case, his reign lasted less than a year. As discussed in the preceding chapter, Ahaziah joined forces with his maternal uncle Jehoram, king of Israel, in the renewed war with AramDamascus. In his absence from Jerusalem, he turned control of the affairs of the state over to his mother Athaliah, who was exceptionally strongwilled and ambitious. When word came that Ahaziah had been killed in the coup that overthrew the house of Omri and brought Jehu to power in Israel, Athaliah immediately had all potential claimants to the throne of Judah murdered. Considering the forceful reformation that was taking place under Jehu's direction in Israel, Athaliah was surely afraid that her opponents would take heart and seek to do the same in Jerusalem and wished to make certain that there were no survivors of the house of David around whom they could rally. According to the biblical account, only Ahaziah's infant son Joash escaped the slaughter when he was hidden in the temple by an aunt who was married to the high priest Jehoiada. Having ostensibly wiped out all living remnants of the house of David, and thereby having intimidated all vocal opposition into silence, there was no public outcry when the pagan queen mother seized the throne for herself. Athaliah (842-837), the only woman to have ruled the kingdom of Judah

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and the only monarch that was not a descendant of David to do so, reigned for six years, during which time she gave formal status to the pagan religious cult that her mother Jezebel had made fashionable in Israel, and against which Elijah fought so hard. She went so far as to build a temple for Baal worship on the grounds of the royal palace in Jerusalem. Surprisingly, she was able to rule for such a long time without any real support from the people or even the army, and there were no attempts to overthrow her. This suggests, according to one view, that she "wielded unusual power in the state during the reign of both her husband and her son and did so not merely as the result of her formal position. Even in the days when there was formally some kind of king, it became clear that everyone involved knew who the actual ruler, the real 'boss,' of the country was . .. Thus, even when the legitimate holder of the government disappeared, his ministers and clerks continued to accept this woman's authority." 4 There is, however, an alternate theory regarding the reign of Athaliah that superficially seems to contradict the biblical account, but on close analysis may actually be implied by it. This theory attempts to deal with some of the inherent problems with the biblical account, most notably that Athaliah remained unaware for six years of the presence of her grandson Joash in the temple, something that seems highly improbable in what was essentially a police state. It seems far more likely that it was Athaliah herself who gave the child over to Jehoiada for his care and education. In this view, Athaliah did not wish to wipe out the house of David in its entirety, but only insofar as it posed an immediate threat to her rule. She surely wanted to pass the throne on to one of her own descendants at an appropriate time, and she chose that to be her youngest grandson Joash. Since Joash was an infant when she took the throne, he clearly was no threat to her and she could have ruled as regent at least until he reached the age of majority, legitimately and with public support, thus accounting for the lack of any public opposition to her reign. Accordingly it is suggested that the biblical account is so constructed as to portray Athaliah in as negative a way as possible for didactic purposes, but at the same time to permit the careful reader to discern a somewhat different account of her rise to power and her downfall. The key to the enigma is in the story of her downfall. In 837, when the sole surviving member of the house of David, Joash, was seven years old, according to the biblical account, the high priest Jehoiada decided that the time was ripe to rid the country of Athaliah and he conspired to depose the queen and place the child on the throne. The coup was unique in that it was carried out primarily by Levites drawn from throughout the country who assembled at the temple in Jerusalem. What was it that, for the first time, brought the priesthood and the Levitical establishment to assume the primary role in determining the nature

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of the regime? It is argued that the cause of the revolt was not Athaliah's tyrannical rule but the change in status she conferred on the temple of Baal that she established in Jerusalem. During the days of Jehoram and Ahaziah, the temple of Baal was considered the private chapel of the alien queen. However, once she sat securely on the throne as regent, she accorded her pagan temple the status of a royal sanctuary, a status heretofore reserved exclusively for the temple of the God of Israel. It was this that aroused the ire if not the fury of Jehoiada, the priesthood, and the Levites, who could not accept the relative denigration of the Holy Temple, and perhaps also the economic implications of state financial resources being redirected to the pagan temple. Accordingly, Jehoiada began to plot Athaliah's overthrow and the placement of the child Joash on the throne in her place, presumably under his continued tutelage. In other words, Athaliah was overthrown primarily because she directly attacked the interests of the religious establishment or, as some would put it, because of the conflict of religions that she provoked. 5 In any case, Jehoiada publicly crowned Joash (837-800) in front of the temple, amid the blare of trumpets and under the protection of a group of armed Levites, including those who had just come off duty from service in the temple, and their relief. Athaliah tried in vain to quash the coup engineered by Jehoiada that was taking place but was soon dispatched by the Carian royal guards, foreign mercenaries from Asia Minor who were convinced by Jehoiada to transfer their allegiance to the new legitimate king, thus bringing an end to the brief and anomalous period of nonDavidic rule in Judah. The constitutional monarchy was reestablished through two covenants initiated by Jehoiada (2 Kings. 12:17), the first reaffirming the sovereignty of God over both king and people. This covenant effectively signaled the utter rejection of the approach to kingship pursued by Ahab and the Omrides that sought to assign the attribute of sovereignty to the throne. The second covenant affirmed the constitutional relationship between the king and the people, predicated on the constraints imposed on the monarch by the first covenant; it was in effect a social contract. Supporters of the new regime destroyed the pagan temple that Athaliah had constructed, as well as its cultic paraphernalia, in effect triggering a housecleaning of pagan influences throughout the kingdom. Joash remained under the dominating influence of Jehoiada, who served as regent throughout Joash's youth and then as the king's chief counselor throughout the remainder of the high priest's life. Accordingly, as the most memorable act of his reign, Joash undertook the financing of the renovation of the temple, now some 145 years old, in which he had spent much of his childhood and which had fallen into disrepair, through a national fund drive carried out by the priests and Levites throughout the country. This became necessary because the royal treasury could no longer sustain the

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costs of its upkeep and the priests could not or would not pay for it out of the income that accrued to them from the tithes and other revenues they received from the worshipping public (2 Kings 12:5-6). This fundraising campaign had the positive effect of giving the people the sense that the temple was theirs rather than the personal property of the house of David, which helped strengthen popular attachment to it. Nonetheless, with the death of Jehoiada, the king soon came under the influence of the more cosmopolitan and nonreligious elements in the capital and was condemned by Jehoiada's son Zechariah for allowing the revival of pagan practices. Joash, displaying a surprising degree of ingratitude to Jehoiada for serving him faithfully over a long period of time, had no qualms about having the latter's son stoned to death. More or less at the same time that this took place, Hazael, king of AramDamascus, was rampaging through Israel and imposed an extraordinary demand for tribute on the kingdom of Judah as the price for not being invaded. The fact that Joash had to raid the temple treasury as well as his own to meet this demand serves a glaring example of the state of military and economic impotence the kingdom had come to under his reign. This, possibly together with the slaying of Zechariah, triggered the king's assassination by some of his own disgruntled palace officials. Some suggest that the assassination plot may have been planned and carried out by two of his own sons by Ammonite and Moabite mothers, possibly indicating some foreign intrigue in the event. According to this theory, when Joash fell ill towards the end of his reign, the question of the succession gained some urgency and the sons of the foreign princesses he had married for political reasons sought to press their claims to the throne, primarily on the basis that they were descended from royalty on both sides. However, when Joash named his eldest son Amaziah by a wife from a Jerusalemite family to succeed him they tried to mount a coup, which resulted in the death of Joash but ultimately failed to achieve its purpose because of the popular support that Amaziah enjoyed in the capital.6 Accordingly, Amaziah (800-783) ascended the throne without further incident and promptly executed the assassins. In the meanwhile, Judah's situation with regard to Aram-Damascus had changed significantly in 806, when the Assyrians under Adad-nariri III returned to the region and decisively defeated the Aramaeans, transforming Aram-Damascus into an Assyrian vassal state. With the threat AramDamascus had earlier represented to his father now no longer a deterrent, Amaziah considered the moment ripe to reimpose Judah's suzerainty over Edom and thereby help secure the southern approaches to the country, as well as to reimpose some control by Judah over the trade routes with Arabia. Marching southward through Hebron and Arad, he defeated the Edomites in the desert region south of the Dead Sea and then marched eastward into Transjordan where he seized the Edomite city carved out

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of the red sandstone cliffs, later to be named Petra by the Greeks, which served as a point of convergence for caravans coming from the Syrian desert, Elath, Gaza, and the Mediterranean. In mobilizing his forces for the campaign against Edom, Amaziah planned to include a band of mercenaries from Israel to augment his own troops. However, he was dissuaded by his counselors from using them in the campaign, for reasons that are not entirely clear, even though they had already received an advance payment for their services. One theory is that when Amaziah's intelligence service informed him of the true size of the Edomite forces, he determined that he had more than enough men to deal with them without the mercenaries and decided not to make use of them. 7 Sent back to Israel with only the advance payment in their pockets, the mercenaries evidently decided to make up for the lost income that would have accrued to them had they gone into battle by looting it from the towns and villages through which they passed, wreaking havoc all along the way home. When Amaziah learned of what happened upon his return from Edom, he was understandably furious and rashly challenged Joash, the king of Israel, to a test of strength in battle over the matter. Joash was disinclined to accept the challenge, perhaps out of understanding of or even sympathy with Amaziah's rage over the event, for which Joash bore no responsibility. After all, Joash could not reasonably be held accountable for the behavior of Israelite mercenaries hired by Judah. Accordingly, he sought to dissuade Amaziah from what was an unwarranted and unprovoked war, assuring him that he would only experience defeat rather than satisfaction from such a conflict. According to the biblical writer, Joash responded to the challenge, "Thou hast indeed smitten Edom, and will thy heart lift thee up? glory therein, and remain at home; for why shouldest thou meddle with evil, that thou shouldest fall, even thou, and Judah with thee?" (2 Kings 14:10). Amaziah could not be dissuaded, and Joash duly marched into Judah. The principal engagement took place at Beth-shemesh, one of the chief points of entry into the territory of Judah, where Amaziah's forces were soundly beaten in a decisive battle in which he was taken captive and subsequently brought by Joash to Jerusalem, which was occupied by Israelite troops. Joash then destroyed part of the city's northern fortifications, leaving it susceptible to attack from that direction, and helped himself to the treasury of the temple as well as the palace before withdrawing and returning to Samaria. Having caused the humiliation of Judah in an unnecessary and very costly war, a plot against the king began to unfold and Amaziah was ultimately forced to flee for his life to Lachish, where he was subsequently murdered. In his place, with popular approval, the kingdom passed to his sixteen-year-old son Azariah or Uzziah (783-742). Some scholars suggest that Uzziah mounted the throne not

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after Amaziah was assassinated but after Joash had taken him captive some years earlier; that is, Uzziah ruled as co-regent while Amaziah was in captivity According to this view, the eventual plot against and assassination of Amaziah was a result of a falling out between father and son.8 The reign of Uzziah in Judah closely paralleled that of Jeroboam II in Israel; they were not only contemporaries but also set about reconstituting their respective kingdoms as they had been in earlier times. Indeed, taken together Israel and Judah under these two rulers roughly approximated the territories of the dual monarchy under David. Uzziah completed the subjugation of Edom, begun by his father, rebuilt the port of Elath near Ezion-geber, opening it up to the Red Sea trade once again, and pacified the Bedouin tribes of the southern desert, which were becoming increasingly troublesome. He was also anxious to restore the luxury goods trade connection with Tyre that was disrupted because of the recent conflict between his father and Joash of Israel, which made use of the land route through Israel unavailable to Judah. Accordingly, he needed an alternate means of access to Tyre and that meant use of the sea route from the Philistine coast. However, that too was closed to him because worsening relations with the Philistines since the days of Jehoshaphat made it impracticable for him to make use of the Philistine ports. Uzziah decided that the least costly way to deal with the problem was to open a corridor to the coast by force. He therefore also undertook a successful campaign against the Philistines, dismantling the defenses of Ashdod, Gath, and Jabneh (2 Chron. 26:6), and presumably establishing some settlements in the coastal plain to assure secure access from Judah to the Mediterranean and the sea route to Tyre. Although the major port of Ashkelon logically should have been his primary target, without being able to blockade it from the sea, and Judah had no such naval capability, a land siege would prove pointless. As a result, Uzziah had to be satisfied with the use of smaller ports along the coast for his purpose. The revived trade with Tyre helped stimulate an economic upturn in Judah that provided the king with the ability to undertake a number of initiatives, especially in the area of national security. The improving economy permitted Uzziah to take steps necessary to assure the security of his expanded kingdom, and especially its control of the trade routes that now passed through it once more. Accordingly, he not only significantly bolstered the defenses of Jerusalem but also built forts and settlements in the southern Negev, as far south as Kadeshbarnea, to help protect the caravan routes from Bedouin raiders; as the biblical writer notes, "he built towers in the wilderness." The army was enlarged as well as modernized, transforming the traditionally lightly armed infantry into a more heavily armed force "that made war with mighty power." Uzziah was also a farmer-king, a man devoted to agriculture who "hewed out many cisterns, for he had much cattle; in the

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Lowland also, and in the table-land; and he had husbandmen and vinedressers in the mountains and in fruitful fields; for he loved husbandry" (2 Chron. 26:10-13). Implicit in these statements is the notion that Uzziah also took steps to bolster the agricultural economy, probably by promoting agricultural settlements to support the military installations he established in the Negev and elsewhere in the country. Domestically, it would appear that Uzziah sought to contain the influence of the priesthood that had continued to persevere in Jerusalem since the days of Jehoiada, the high priest who dominated the country during the early years of the reign of Joash. Uzziah did this by arrogating to himself some of the ritual prerogatives of the priesthood with regard to the sacrificial rite in the temple. "But when he was strong, his heart was lifted up so that he did corruptly, and he trespassed against the Lord his God; for he went into the temple of the Lord to burn incense upon the altar of incense" (2 Chron. 26:16), an act that aroused the ire of the priests, who did not hesitate to challenge him and demand that he leave the sanctuary. Although Uzziah is credited with having reigned in Jerusalem for some forty years, he did not actually rule during that entire period. He became seriously and chronically ill, probably with leprosy, which the biblical historiographer characterized as his punishment for attempting to usurp the functions of the priests. Uzziah eventually moved out of the palace to a more isolated residence, probably a fortress outside Jerusalem, and withdrew from the conduct of public affairs, although not necessarily from overseeing the affairs of state and actual decision-making on important questions. His son and heir Jotham, who was "over the king's house" (2 Chron. 26:21), took over the king's public functions, effectively serving as his stand-in and ruling the country in his father's name from about 750 until Uzziah's death in 742, at which point Jotham (742-735) continued to both reign and rule in his own name. It was during his time that the Ammonites were forced to acknowledge Judah's suzerainty and compelled to pay it tribute. Jotham represented the rare case of an Israelite monarch whose performance was treated by the biblical writers as almost wholly meritorious, noting "he did that which was right in the eyes of the Lord, but the people did yet corruptly" (2 Chron. 27:2), that is, his principal fault lay in his failure to use his authority and power to improve the ethical and religious behavior of the general public. It was during the reign of Jotham's son and successor Ahaz (735-715) that Judah was faced once again by the looming threat of Assyria, which clearly was the primary danger to the state. Israel had earlier made the mistake of not accurately assessing Assyria's intentions when the latter began to press Aram, and the kingdom failed to make the most of the temporary reprieve it enjoyed during the reign of Jereboam II to improve its defense posture; Judah did likewise under Ahaz. Now Assyria was on

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the march again, and Judah's two neighbors, Israel and Aram, began to perceive that an irrepressible force was closing in on them and saw their only hope of survival in a military alliance between them and Judah that might be able to hold off the Assyrians. However, as discussed in the preceding chapter, when Ahaz ascended the throne, he adopted a proAssyrian policy. He believed that by appeasing the Assyrians he would avert the disaster that was engulfing his northern neighbors, and he therefore rejected the idea of entering into a tripartite alliance. The kings of Israel and Aram then decided to attack and conquer Judah, eliminate Ahaz, and replace him with a more accommodating ruler before the Assyrian threat became a battlefield reality. Ahaz's pro-Assyrian policy became a matter of significant public concern, and Isaiah, an influential spokesman and prophet, fully backed Ahaz's refusal to join with Israel and Aram in an anti-Assyrian alliance, notwithstanding a significant degree of public support for just such an anti-Assyrian policy. Isaiah roundly condemned those of Judah who "rejoiceth with Rezin and Remaliah's son [Pekah] and argued that the policy they advocated would lead the nation to disaster" (Isa. 8:6). However, he was also adamantly opposed to Ahaz's pro-Assyrian policy. Both from a religious and practical political point of view, he argued for a policy of strict neutrality in the conflict that was about to ensue. On the one hand, he feared that an alignment with Assyria would ultimately cause an upsurge of pagan practices in the cities of Judah, which would undermine the nation's reason for being and thereby significantly weaken it. On the other hand, he suggested, albeit implicitly, that there was little prospect of Judah coming out of its predicament unscathed, and that an alliance with Assyria might prove as detrimental to Judah's long-term interests as joining the anti-Assyrian alliance would be in the short term. Accordingly, the most promising policy would be that of maintaining strict neutrality coupled with a healthy dose of prayer and repentance to regain divine favor in this troubled time. Ahaz clearly appreciated Isaiah's argument but as a political leader felt compelled to reject his advice. He did not believe that, as a practical matter, he could simply sit on the sidelines in the coming conflict secure in belief that there would be a divine intervention to compel Assyria to respect his neutrality. Accordingly, he insisted on pursuing a pro-Assyrian policy, even though this would lead to a joint attack from Aram and Israel. Once the war with the northern alliance actually broke out and Judah was clearly getting the worst of it, at the first opportunity that presented itself, which was probably after the fall of Damascus, Ahaz urgently invited Assyrian intervention on Judah's behalf. This was a request that the Assyrian king Tiglath-pileser III was only too pleased to grant; attacking both Aram-Damascus and Israel was something he was already planning to do in any case. Ahaz probably hoped to expedite the timing of the Assyrian

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decision to attack Israel by his contribution of a substantial amount of gold and silver to Tiglath-pileser's coffers. There is no real reason, however, to assume that the Assyrian decision to attack Israel was in any way related to Ahaz's effort to bribe the Assyrian king. It is difficult to imagine the king of a major power like Assyria going out of his way to save a miniscule state like Judah because he was being paid to do so as though he were a mercenary for hire. It is far more likely that Tiglath-pileser took advantage of the fact that an immediate attack on Israel, while its army was engaged in a siege of Jerusalem, would force it into a two-front war it would not be able to sustain for long. As discussed earlier, the Assyrians did proceed to attack and defeat Aram, conquer Damascus, and then move on to Israel, which was soon conquered and then obliterated as a state, while Judah continued to thrive. Buoyed by the obvious success of his policy, Ahaz was able to gain popular support of the people for establishing closer ties to the giant from Mesopotamia. However, part of the price he had to pay for Assyrian intervention was public acceptance of the introduction of elements of Assyrian culture and religion. Accordingly, it was not long before Ahaz pushed aside the traditional bronze altar in the temple of Jerusalem in favor of a copy of one he saw in conquered Damascus, which presumably was intended to serve as a sign of his loyalty and deference to Assyria. The failure of Isaiah's efforts to temper the laissez-faire if not cynical religious policy of Ahaz convinced him that the latter was hopeless, and that nothing further could be done to save Judah during his reign. The prophet placed all his hopes for Judah on Ahaz's successor, Hezekiah (715-687). Notwithstanding Judah's survival amid the chaos that had struck the region, the destruction of Israel had a major psychological impact on the country. The people were frightened and Isaiah undertook to calm their fears. In addition to consistently pointing out the errors of Ahaz's policies, Isaiah now posited in full form the prophetic conception of history. All peoples, states and rulers, all actors on the stage of history are nothing but instruments in the hands of God to realize His purposes. Even the king of Assyria, unwittingly to be sure, serves this purpose. He is the instrument by which God is punishing those peoples whose hour for retribution has come, namely, Aram and Israel now, and Judah in the nottoo-distant future. Fully aware that the continued existence of Judah as a political entity was contingent on Assyrian sufferance, Hezekiah was very careful not to antagonize Assyria and assiduously avoided giving the Assyrian authorities in the region any reason to intervene in Judah's internal affairs. In the meantime, he took a number of steps to strengthen the kingdom as much as possible within that constraint. He strengthened the defenses of Jerusalem and undertook a major engineering project to assure an ade-

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quate water supply for the capital that would enable it to withstand a prolonged siege. Hezekiah's first priority, however, was the rehabilitation of the moral and religious status of the people and society. He was intolerant of the pagan religion and practices tolerated by his father and sought to eliminate all vestiges of it throughout the kingdom, destroying all pagan shrines and images. The temple was refurbished and purified and the priesthood and Levites were reorganized. A system of assured compensation from tithes was instituted, facilitating their full rededication to their primary vocations. The biblical writers roundly lauded Hezekiah's efforts in unusually effusive terms. "And thus did Hezekiah throughout all Judah; and he wrought that which was good and right and faithful before the Lord his God. And in every work that he began in the service of the house of God, and in the law, and in the commandments, to seek his God, he did it with all his heart, and prospered" (2 Chron. 31:20-21). With the destruction of Israel as a state, Hezekiah and the kings of Judah that followed once again viewed themselves as kings of all Israelites and as legitimate heirs to the territories of the former northern kingdom. Accordingly, Hezekiah invited the Israelites of the now Assyrian province of Samaria to participate in the religious festivals once again, as they had in the days of Solomon. His efforts in this regard proved to be in vain, since most of the Samarian Israelites ignored his invitation. Their sense of oneness with the Israelites of the south had long since dissipated. Moreover, the Assyrians had no interest in seeing such connections reestablished and moved to thwart such a possibility by allowing the restoration of the sanctuary at Bethel, first established by Jereboam I for the expressed purpose of preventing the Israelites of the north from going to Jerusalem for fulfillment of their religious needs. The relationship between Judah and Assyria was tenuous at best. As early as 716 the Assyrians reappeared in Philistia near the Egyptian border, with the port city-state of Ashdod becoming an Assyrian vassal. The Assyrians were there ostensibly to help open trade with Egypt, something the Egyptians were understandably wary about. Egypt was weak at the time but a new Nubian dynasty was emerging that would soon challenge Assyria for control of the land-bridge region. In 712, as early as three years into Hezekiah's reign, a direct confrontation between Judah and Assyria was only narrowly avoided when Judah, along with Edom and Moab, was implicated in a revolt against Assyrian suzerainty undertaken by Yamani, the king of Ashdod. The uprising was one of several that were being stimulated by Babylonia and Egypt to destabilize Assyrian control of the broader region. The leaders of the revolt are alleged to have received promises of support from the Egyptian king Shabaku, founder of the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty, help that was not forthcoming. Indeed, Egypt betrayed the Philistines and cooperated with Assyria, turning over the leader

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of the revolt who had sought asylum there. Ashdod was captured and transformed into an Assyrian province. The general political situation became notably more volatile with the death of Sargon in 705 and the succession of Sennacherib (705-681) to the Assyrian throne. Revolts erupted throughout the empire, and Sennacherib spent the first three years of his reign engaged in restoring Assyrian dominance in Mesopotamia. An insurrection broke out in Babylon, once again under the leadership of Merodach-baladan, who sent an embassy to Hezekiah, ostensibly to inquire after the king's health following a serious illness, but more likely to explore the possibility of Judah joining an antiAssyrian alliance. The critical question in Judah was how it should respond to the evolving situation. The growing danger from Assyria had caused a major split in the country with regard to its foreign policy. It was generally recognized that the ultimate enemy of Assyria was Egypt, with whom Assyria maintained a regional balance-of-power relationship. It was thus in Egypt's interest to promote a military alliance with Judah to tip the scales of the balance in its favor. Many in Judah saw this as a way that Judah might survive the Assyrian onslaught, as the only viable alternative to outright surrender. Others continued to believe that the alliance with Assyria remained the only guarantee of national survival. This time, Isaiah was adamantly opposed to both positions. He prophesied long and hard against putting Judah's fate in the hands of Assyria. He also argued strenuously against placing any reliance on Egypt as a counterweight to Assyria, referring to Egypt as "Arrogancy that sitteth still" (Isa. 30:7). Egyptian ability and readiness to aid Judah were mere pretense; it would do nothing to help as those who relied on it were destroyed one by one, as had been the case with Ashdod. In the last analysis, Judah could only rely on itself. Hezekiah earlier accepted Isaiah's advice regarding alien influences within Judah itself, and undertook a major religious reform in the country. However, with regard to the question of foreign alliances, Hezekiah seemed to have no fixed viewpoint and continued to waver between Egypt and Assyria, as he played the part of a loyal vassal to the latter. Ultimately, under pressure from an increasingly aggressive Egypt, Hezekiah became more inclined to cooperate with it. Then, when widespread revolts against Assyria broke out upon Sargon's death in 705, the proEgyptian party gained the upper hand in the court and a mission was dispatched to explore a defense alliance. Hezekiah soon entered into an alliance with Sidon, Ashkelon, and Ekron, backed by Egypt, against the Assyrians. Although Ekron joined the coalition, it did so over the objections of its king Padi, who was seized by Hezekiah and imprisoned in Jerusalem, where he remained until freed by the Assyrians. It appears that Hezekiah also invaded the territory of Gaza, whose king also remained loyal to Assyria, making Judah the preeminent power in the southern

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land-bridge region. Even the Babylonians sent gifts to Hezekiah to encourage him to persist in the anti-Assyrian course he was taking. Isaiah predicted that the results of Hezekiah's alignment with Egypt would be disastrous (Isa. 31:1-3). He was right! Sennacherib regained control of Babylon in 702 and then turned to deal with the uprisings in the west, at about the same time that Shebitku (702690) the new activist pharaoh of the Twenty-Fifth (Nubian) Dynasty took the throne of Egypt. Tyre, Ammon, Moab, and Edom submitted immediately, followed by Ashkelon once Sennacherib reached Philistia. In 701, the Egyptians fought Sennacherib's army to a standstill at Eltekeh, in the hill country between the coast and the hills of Judah due west of Jerusalem, but then withdrew, essentially abandoning their local allies to the fury of Sennacherib over their malfeasance as Assyrian vassals. Without a significant threat of an attack on his flank from the south, Sennacherib turned eastward and invaded Judah, quickly conquering most of the country. A major battle took place at the strongly fortified town of Lachish, about midway between Ashkelon and Hebron, which was besieged and then taken by the Assyrians and made their base of operations. Hezekiah, now trapped in Jerusalem, which was all that remained of his kingdom for all practical purposes, asked for terms of surrender. The Assyrian demand for tribute required him to strip the treasury as well as the temple of all its gold and silver. As Sennacherib himself records: "As for Hezekiah, the Jew, who did not bow in submission to my yoke, forty-six of his strong walled towns and innumerable smaller villages in their neighborhood I besieged and conquered . . . I made to come out from them 200,100 people, young and old, male and female, innumerable horses, mules, donkeys, camels, large and small cattle, and counted them as spoils of war. He himself I shut up like a caged bird within Jerusalem, his royal city." Sennacherib then goes on to boast of the extraordinary tribute that Hezekiah obligated himself to pay annually, which included "30 talents of gold, 300 talents of silver, precious stones . . . all kinds of valuable treasures, as well as his daughters, concubines, male and female musicians he sent me later to Nineveh, my lordly city" 9 But even that was not enough for Sennacherib. He also demanded the complete surrender of the capital, a demand that Isaiah urged Hezekiah to refuse. Isaiah is reported as having advised Hezekiah to hold out, because Sennacherib "shall hear a rumor, and shall return to his own land" (2 Kings 19:7). It would appear that Isaiah was well informed about regional developments and was convinced that Sennacherib would be unable to remain in the region for very long because of developments in Mesopotamia of a higher priority that would necessitate his return. Moreover, there was intelligence that Tirhakah (2 Kings 19:9), presumed to be Tarakos (690-664), who subsequently became the last king of the TwentyFifth Dynasty, had mobilized a large army and was on the march and, if

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able to overrun the Assyrian positions in Philistia, might be in a position to trap Sennacherib outside of Jerusalem. Finally, according to the biblical writer, an epidemic broke out among the Assyrian forces that quickly decimated their ranks, making continuation of the siege (2 Kings 19:3536), as well as Sennacherib's plan to invade Egypt, impractical.10 With regard to the latter, the ancient Greek historian Herodotus, on the basis of historical information he obtained in Egypt, wrote that the Egyptians were prepared to make a determined stand against the Assyrians at Pelusium, the gateway to Egypt. Then, "as the two armies lay here opposite one another, there came in the night a multitude of field-mice, which devoured all the quivers and bow-strings of the enemy, and ate the thongs by which they managed their shields. Next morning they commenced their flight, and great multitudes fell."11 And, echoing the biblical account, Josephus cites an earlier Babylonian writer Berossus, who asserted that "when Sennacherib was returning from his Egyptian war to Jerusalem, he found his army . . . in danger for God had sent a pestilential distemper upon his army; and on the very first night of the siege, a hundred fourscore and five thousand, with their captains and generals, were destroyed." 12 In any case, Sennacherib was forced to abandon the siege and return to the east where he promptly undertook the suppression of another major revolt in Chaldea. In Judah, the fact that Jerusalem had survived, when confronted by the virtually identical circumstances that brought about the destruction of Samaria, spurred a spontaneous resurgence of national and religious pride, and it set about the process of recovery and reconstruction of the cities and facilities devastated during the war. Nonetheless, clearer heads were surely aware that the danger to the nation's autonomy if not its true independence was still hovering over it, even though there were no immediate signs of renewed Assyrian aggression. The historical reality is that Sennacherib was distracted from returning to his unfinished business with Hezekiah because of a need to deal with a new threat to Assyrian interests that was emerging to the north in Anatolia. It was at about this time that the coasts of Anatolia became the subject of intense colonization and settlement by Ionian Greeks, who began to expand eastward along the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean littorals. About 698, the governor of Cilicia revolted against Assyria and aligned himself with the Ionians who had landed on the Cilician coast and established bases at Tarsus and Ingira. They then seized the strategically important mountain passes known as the Cilician Gates, thereby interrupting the great trade route through the Taurus Mountains from Syria to Anatolia and the Black Sea coast. Sennacherib's armies engaged and defeated the Greeks in a major battle, blocking their attempts to gain control of the important Syrian-Palestinian coastal trade routes, as well as any further eastward expansion of their

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colonies. Nonetheless, by the end of the seventh century, Ionian expansion into the Middle East had become a significant factor that would greatly affect its future history. Not only had the lonians driven the Phoenician traders out of Greek waters, they severed the Phoenician trade routes that linked the motherland with its major trade centers and colonies in Carthage, Sicily, and Spain, thereby permanently reducing the previously preeminent role of the Phoenicians in international maritime commerce. In the meantime, although Jerusalem was saved, the country was devastated and large segments of the population had been transferred to Assyria—Assyrian records claiming as many as 200,150 people. Judah reverted to being a docile if not loyal tribute-paying Assyrian vassal, and Hezekiah's son and successor Manasseh (687-642), for the most part, did little to upset his Assyrian suzerain. This is hardly surprising since Manasseh was put on the throne when he was only twelve years old (2 Kings 21:1). It seems clear that his elevation must have involved bypassing older siblings or relatives, and that the government was actually being run for a number of years by members of the pro-Assyrian party in the capital, perhaps under direct Assyrian oversight, who served as regents. It would also seem that, as he matured, Manasseh turned out to be the polar opposite of his father with regard to internal religious and cultural affairs, adopting the permissive approach of earlier kings to pagan cults, which reappeared throughout the country, including the capital. In effect, he instituted a counter-reformation that essentially undid most of the reforms Hezekiah had initiated. Moreover, although details are not provided, the biblical writers clearly indicate that Manasseh's regime was highly tyrannical in character, any opposition to his policies being met with swift reprisal. "Manasseh shed innocent blood very much, till he had filled Jerusalem from one end to another" (2 Kings 21:16). Manasseh's reign coincided with the zenith of Assyrian expansionism under Esarhaddon (680-669), who succeeded to the Assyrian throne following the assassination of his father Sennacherib. Esarhaddon was first drawn into the land-bridge region because of a revolt in Sidon that took place in 677. He subsequently returned to Phoenicia in force in 671, following up with an invasion of Egypt and conquest of its ancient capital at Memphis that same year, a campaign in which Manasseh, as an Assyrian vassal, was required to participate. Tirhakah, who still ruled Egypt at the time, had been persistent in his efforts to fuel anti-Assyrian sentiment in the land-bridge area and the situation had reached the point where Esarhaddon decided to put an end to the problem by taking over the country. The Assyrians occupied Lower Egypt for fifteen years, during which there was at least one uprising fomented by Tirhakah and his nephew Tantamani (664-656), who apparently retained control of Upper Egypt. That revolt against Assyrian rule was ultimately suppressed by Esarhaddon's son and successor, Asshurbanipal (668-627), who further

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consolidated the Assyrian grip on the country by putting Necho I on the throne briefly as an Assyrian puppet, primarily for the purpose of keeping the several kinglets in the Nile Delta region under control. Necho was subsequently killed in battle opposing Tantamani's attempt to take control of Memphis from the Assyrians and was replaced by his son Psammeticus I. Following Asshurbanipal's successful suppression of a revolt in Babylonia in 652, after several years of struggle, Assyria under became undisputed master of the entire Near East, at least for a few years before its power started to wane and the region became engulfed in rebellion and war. It appears that in the latter part of his reign Manasseh aroused the ire of the Assyrian king, probably because of an upsurge in anti-Assyrian sentiment in Judah that paralleled the unsuccessful revolt in Babylonia in 652. Manasseh was dragged off to Babylon in chains, where he was imprisoned for a time and then released, presumably after once again swearing fealty to his Assyrian suzerain, which he maintained throughout the remainder of his reign. When he was allowed to return to Jerusalem, he began to invest heavily in strengthening the defenses of the capital and bolstering the army garrisons throughout Judah. It seems reasonable to conclude that this was done with the approval of the Assyrians, probably out of their concern about the growing power of Egypt relative to its own decline, and the possible role that Judah might play in securing Assyrian interests along the Egyptian frontier. Indeed, it seems likely that it was Manasseh's agreement to play such a role that secured his release from captivity. However, it also appears that following his harrowing experience of imprisonment, Manasseh reportedly underwent a religious reawakening. Thus, at the same time that he was strengthening the defense posture of Judah, and evidently on his own initiative, he also undertook a major purge of paganism in the country, something that could not have pleased the Assyrians but which they tolerated under the prevailing circumstances. Out of gratitude for his safe return from captivity Manasseh ordered the removal of all pagan paraphernalia, idols, and altars, from the temple and from Jerusalem generally, that he had previously promoted or permitted (2 Chron. 33:11-17). Notwithstanding its nominal subordination to Assyria, Egypt's power had begun to increase under Psammetichus I (656-610), an early activist pharaoh of the Twenty-Sixth Dynasty, toward the end of Asshurbanipal's reign when Assyrian power began to wane. By then, the Egyptian king who had been placed on the throne by Asshurbanipal had no qualms about entering into an alliance with the kingdom of Lydia on the Anatolian coast, presumably for the purpose of gaining a degree of control of the waters and shipping lanes along the eastern Mediterranean littoral, or with marching into Assyrian-dominated Philistia and conquering Ash-

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dod. Preoccupied with other concerns, its primary interest in Egypt and its periphery being about control of the eastern Mediterranean seaboard trade, Assyria arrived at a modus vivendi with Egypt that effectively gave Psammeticus a free hand in Egypt under the same terms as his father Necho I. However, with the resurgence of Egyptian power, the question arose of whether Judah should deviate from the official pro-Assyrian line it had pursued for decades, a change in position advocated by an emerging proEgyptian faction. The issue became more pressing following the death of Manasseh in 642 and the succession of his young son Amon (642-640) to the throne. It seems likely that in this instance the principle of primogeniture was set aside once again to crown the twenty-two year old ahead of his older brothers, given that the usual age of marriage of the kings of Judah was in the early twenties and Manasseh was forty-five when Amon was born. The reason would seem to be that the dominant pro-Assyrian faction supported Amon, who followed in his father's footsteps, whereas his elder brothers were more inclined toward a pro-Egyptian orientation. Disgruntled palace officials opposed to Amon's policy orientation probably carried out his assassination in 640. With the death of Asshurbanipal in 627, the Assyrian empire began to disintegrate at about the same time that the Medes united and conquered Persia, emerging as a new and growing power on Assyria's eastern frontiers. Babylonia revolted again in 626, this time successfully, and became independent under a Chaldean prince, Nabopolassar. Matters were made even worse by a crisis over the succession to the Assyrian throne that lasted for years. Developments in the Assyrian empire were watched carefully in Judah, where Manasseh's grandson Josiah (640-609) became king when he was only eight because of the assassination of his father Amon. It was during the early years of Josiah's long reign that the prophet Zephaniah, who may well have been a great-great-grandson of Hezekiah and therefore a member of the royal family (Zeph. 1:1), began to predict with confidence the coming downfall of the Assyrian capital Nineveh and the passing of the Assyrian era in world history. "And He will stretch out His hand against the north, and destroy Assyria; and will make Nineveh a desolation" (Zeph. 2:13). Although his initial predictions were predicated on the irruption of the Scythians from the far north into the region, wreaking havoc wherever they passed, he surely understood that their ability to do this was itself a reflection of the decline of Assyrian power, which seemed irreversible. As the perception of growing Assyrian weakness became stronger, its influence in the region declined in tandem with its power, giving rise to a resurgence of national sentiment. "The splendor of Assyria's false gods and of pagan culture had vanished; and in the people of the kingdom of Judah there awoke again a nostalgia for the purity of the national religion that had been defiled by the admixture of

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foreign cults and unchaste customs. With the loosening of Assyria's hold, the pressure of the foreign culture upon the upper classes of the Judean community also lessened." 13 This process took hold over a course of several years during which the schools of the prophets re-emerged as a political force of some consequence. Zephaniah's dire analysis of unfolding geopolitical trends in the region went farther, and he also assured those who would listen of the chaos that was about to strike the land-bridge area, effectively doing away with the petty states in both Cisjordan and well as in Transjordan. He warned that Judah itself was flirting with impending disaster, as a result of its leaders evidently being oblivious to the consequences of their actions. He saw the religious syncretism promoted by Manasseh as well as the prevailing patterns of social injustice as the greatest threats to Judah's ability to weather the coming storm. His contemporary, Jeremiah, also proclaimed this message repeatedly and more expansively. He argued that in the divine scheme of things the perpetration of spiritual and social evils bore serious geopolitical consequences for the offending nation. "For I will call all the families of the kingdoms of the north, saith the Lord; and they shall come, and they shall set every one his throne at the entrance of the gates of Jerusalem, and against all the walls thereof round about, and against all the cities of Judah. And I will utter my judgments against them touching all their wickedness; in that they have forsaken Me, and have offered unto other gods, and worshipped the work of their own hands" (Jer. 1:15-16). This was a message of impending doom that few, other than the prophets, wanted to hear at the time, notwithstanding its prescience. One who did hear, and evidently became inspired to do something about it, was the young king Josiah. During Josiah's reign, the entire Middle East was caught up in a state of violent flux, in which small states like Judah were essentially pawns in larger power struggles. Nonetheless, and recognizing the limitations on their freedom of action, the rulers of the mini-states of the land-bridge area still had to engage in strategies and critical decision making to attempt to ensure their survival, and Josiah was no exception. He could not be impervious to events taking place in the broader region, and he too was stirred to aspire to independence for his nation once again. Josiah thus developed an activist agenda that reflected a radical departure from Judah's supine political posture during the preceding half century. Internally, beginning when he was about sixteen years old, Josiah launched a major cultural and religious reform movement that brought about a national and religious revival that dramatically bolstered the nation's morale and gave it the impetus to recreate its past glories, a clear indication of his desire and intent to break away from the morally debilitating subservience to Assyria. And, making a bold move in this regard, he incrementally imposed religious reforms in the Assyrian province of

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Samaria, formerly the northern kingdom of Israel. Most notably, according to the biblical account, he took the bones of the dead out of the sepulchers at the sanctuary of Bethel and burned them on the altar originally established there by Samaria's first king Jereboam (2 Kings 23:15-16). His defilement of the altar, which he subsequently destroyed, was a symbolic act of profound significance. "It was a public declaration that the old rebellion against the kingdom had been illegitimate, and that the memory of that first rebel was now purged. At the same time, it was a defilement of the altar that may be said to have symbolized the revolt of the Kingdom of Israel against Judah. Thus, by his action at Bethel, Josiah proclaimed the nullification of the Kingdom of Israel as an independent force and declared his intention of restoring the united kingdom of the days of David and Solomon."14 With Assyria unable to respond to this effrontery by a minor vassal because of its preoccupation with more serious challenges, Josiah proceeded to incorporate Samaria into the kingdom of Judah, effectively recreating not the dual monarchy of David but the unified state of Israel as it was in the days of Saul. Josiah's popularity soared; it appeared as though he was inaugurating a new golden age for the people of Israel. Nonetheless, the prophetess Huldah presciently advised the king's ministers that despite the dramatic changes that were taking place the longterm prospects for the nation were bleak, but that Josiah would probably not live to see the forthcoming destruction of his kingdom (2 Kings 22:1520). She clearly foresaw the consequences for Judah of the forces at play in the wider region. Both Babylonia and Egypt were determined to gain control of the land bridge, and there was little if anything that Judah could do to counter the force they could bring to bear on it. As a practical matter, Josiah's claim to the territory of Samaria was of little tangible importance. Nonetheless, as the decline in Assyria's power became increasingly evident, popular resentment in Judah against their foreign oppressor soon reached a boiling point, aptly expressed by the contemporary prophet Nahum: "Ah, city of crime [Nineveh], utterly treacherous, full of violence, where killing never stops! . . . Hosts of slain and heaps of corpses, dead bodies without number—they stumble over bodies. Because of the countless harlotries of the harlot, the winsome mistress of sorcery, who ensnared nations with her harlotries and peoples with her sorcery, I am going to deal with you—declares the Lord of Hosts" (Nahum 3:1-5). The sense and expectation of revolt against Judah's subservience to Assyria was in the air. As already indicated, with the Assyrians effectively having withdrawn from Samaria under the pressure of events elsewhere, Josiah expanded northward into the resulting power vacuum reaching as far as the Galilee. He also expanded southward into the Negev, and westward into northern Philistia, where he regained control of the Via Maris. This last move was

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bound to put Judah on a collision course with an expansionist Egypt, which had its own designs on the land-bridge region. Indeed, typical of the convoluted politics of the Near East, around the year 616 Egypt, still under the rule of Psammetichus I, began aligning itself with Assyria to forestall its replacement by a resurgent Babylonia, at a time when continued Assyrian weakness served Egyptian interests better. That same year, an Egyptian army marched north, passing through the nominally Assyrian province of Samaria unopposed, to assist their new Assyrian allies. To consolidate their control of the region, the new Egyptian-Assyrian entente sought to crush between them the variety of small kingdoms in that region that aspired to full independence, Judah being but one of them. As Assyria became progressively weaker, the Chaldean rulers of Babylonia, with the help of the Medes, who controlled most of Iran, stood poised to strike at the Assyrian heartland. The ancient capital of the country fell to the Medes in 614. Two years later, in 612, the Medes and Babylonians placed the new capital Nineveh, considered to be virtually impregnable, under a siege that lasted only thirteen weeks, a relatively short period as sieges went in antiquity, before its walls were penetrated. The repercussions of the fall of Nineveh were felt throughout the entire Near East. Asshur-uballit (612-605), who had just mounted the Assyrian throne, fled to Haran, the ancient biblical crossroads city in northeastern Syria, which served as the Assyrian administrative center for the western provinces of the empire, where he attempted to mobilize what was left of the once invincible Assyrian army. Having lost its home base in Assyria, the army continued to fight from its new base in Haran. Egypt had committed itself to assist Assyria in an attempt to prop up the regime, but to no avail. Haran fell to a Babylonian-Median alliance force in 610. At this point, when Assyria was in a life and death struggle for its survival, Egypt sensed an opportunity for it to regain its traditional role as a major power in Asia. The new pharaoh Necho II (609-594) entered into a military alliance with Asshur-uballit and took the field in 609 against the Babylonian-Median entente, hoping to retake Haran. With Assyria no longer a threat to its security, Egypt was determined to try to prevent Babylonia from taking Assyria's place as the dominant regional power. Accordingly, it was prepared to join forces with its erstwhile enemy in an effort to tip the regional balance of power in its own favor. However, for Judah under Josiah, as for the other small states of the region, relative territorial security and national independence were possible only when the regional balance of power was such that Egypt, Assyria, and Babylonia were in contention with one another. Josiah thus interpreted the Egyptian-Assyrian alliance as a threat to Judah's independence, and he attempted to prevent Necho from actually joining forces with Assyria against Babylonia. Judah, in effect, had made itself a de facto

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ally of Babylonia, and Josiah became determined not to allow the Egyptian army to follow the same route through Samaria as it did only a few years earlier, before Josiah effectively annexed the former Assyrian province to Judah. The move was broadly popular in Judah, many seeing the Babylonians as a divine instrument for punishing the Assyrians for the hardships they had inflicted on the nation. However, there were also clearer heads that saw the Chaldean rulers of Babylonia as being no better than the Assyrians they were displacing. The prophet Habbakuk spoke of them as "that bitter and impetuous nation, that march through the breadth of the earth, to possess dwelling-places that are not theirs. They are terrible and dreadful; their law and their majesty proceed from themselves . .. They come all of them for violence" (Hab. 1:6-9). Josiah rejected an Egyptian offer to recognize Judah's neutrality as disingenuous and attempted to block the northward advance of Necho's army along the Via Maris at the strategic crossroads of Megiddo, where his forces were overwhelmed and he was fatally wounded in the ensuing battle. The death of Josiah spelled the end of Judah's independence, for all practical purposes. Henceforth, and until the state was destroyed, it was continually subjected to one major power or another. In the immediate aftermath of Josiah's defeat, Judah came within the Egyptian sphere of control. Nonetheless, the political leaders of Judah remained committed to Josiah's pro-Babylonian policy and, in an evident gesture of defiance to Egypt, anointed Josiah's second son Jehoahaz (609), who was similarly committed to his father's policy, to be his successor. Jehoahaz, however, was permitted to reign for only three months before he was deposed and exiled to Egypt for the rest of his life by Necho, who replaced him with his more accommodating older brother Jehoiakim (609598). The latter was willing and able to meet the Egyptian demand for tribute by imposing heavy taxes on the population. Vain and self-serving, Jehoiakim exacerbated the economic crisis in the country by imposing additional taxes to finance a new palace at Beth-hakerem just outside Jerusalem, for which he was publicly reprimanded by the prophet Jeremiah (Jer. 22:13-19). Moreover, Jehoiakim apparently rejected the reforms instituted by his father and once again restored the religious syncretism that the latter had striven to eradicate. This move triggered a negative internal reaction, led by the prophets, that bordered on open insurrection, which was ultimately suppressed by force. The regional situation changed significantly in 605, with the collapse of the Egyptian-Assyrian alliance. As a practical matter, Babylonia was not in a position to easily replace the Assyrian empire with its own. The rise of a powerful Median state on its eastern flank precluded this. As a result, control of the trade routes in the west became even more important to Babylonia than they had been to Assyria. Nebuchadnezzar II (605-562),

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who succeeded to the throne of Babylonia, was determined to establish his absolute mastery of Syria and the eastern Mediterranean coastal region. Thus, while still the crown prince, Nebuchadnezzar undertook the task of re-conquering Syria for Babylonia in 607. For two years, the Babylonian army struggled to establish bridgeheads at other Euphrates crossing points that would enable them to outflank the Egyptian-Assyrian forces ensconced in Carchemish, but to no avail. Finally, in 605, Nebuchadnezzar launched a successful frontal attack on Carchemish, on the upper Euphrates, inflicting a decisive defeat on the combined armies of the Assyrian-Egyptian alliance and taking the city. Nebuchadnezzar completed his conquest of Assyria in 604-603 and, with nothing to stop him, then marched south to Philistia, which was an Egyptian vassal. Ashkelon resisted and was destroyed. In Jerusalem, Jehoiakim panicked, caught in the same dilemma that had plagued his royal forebears who almost consistently chose sides poorly Once again a great foreign policy debate ensued. The king's top advisers, for reasons that were not at all obvious, insisted that Egypt would ultimately prevail against Babylonia and that Judah must therefore remain in its orbit. The opposing view, articulated most forcefully by the prophet Jeremiah, predicted a Babylonian victory in the conflict. "The Lord of hosts, the God of Israel, saith: Behold, I will punish Amon of No, and Pharaoh, and Egypt, with her gods, and her kings; even Pharaoh, and them that trust in him; and I will deliver them into the hand of those that seek their lives, and into the hand of Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, and into the hand of his servants" (Jer. 46:25-26). It was argued therefore that Judah needed to break with Egypt and align itself with what would be the winning side. Although the latter view was surely the more prescient, particularly in view of the major defeat Egypt had already suffered at Carchemish, the people of Judah were more familiar with the Egyptians than with the Babylonians, who tended to be viewed comparatively as barbarians, and the pro-Egypt policy prevailed. For his opposition to this decision and his implicit calls for Jehoiakim's overthrow, Jeremiah was persecuted by the regime and was forced to flee to exile in Egypt, as was another prophet, Uriah ben Shemaiah, who must have been an even greater thorn in Jehoiakim' s side than Jeremiah himself. Uriah was subsequently extradited from Egypt and put to death by the king (Jer. 26:20-23). Powerful friends in Jerusalem saved Jeremiah from a similar fate. In the meantime, with a Babylonian army positioned along the Mediterranean coast, Jehoiakim dutifully paid tribute to Nebuchadnezzar for three years at the same time that he discreetly maintained his connections with the Egyptian government. Then, in 601 the Babylonians advanced on Egypt and were blocked as the result of an indecisive battle fought in Philistia near the Egyptian frontier. When the Babylonians withdrew, Jehoiakim became convinced that Nebuchadnezzar was finished and that

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the time had come to activate his pro-Egyptian policy. As an act signaling his rejection of Babylonian suzerainty, he withheld payment of the annual tribute, the equivalent of a declaration of war. What he failed to understand was that the Babylonian withdrawal was not an acknowledgment of a decisive defeat but only an indication that Nebuchadnezzar needed to rebuild and reequip his armies after the years of continual warfare. It took Nebuchadnezzar about a year to replenish his armies and return to the region. In 599, he launched a campaign to pacify the Arab tribes of the semi-desert areas in the land-bridge region and, at the end of 598, a Babylonian punitive expedition marched into Judah. Jehoiakim evidently died as the Babylonian force approached Jerusalem, the circumstances of his death uncertain and his burial place unknown. Some have speculated that opponents of his pro-Egypt policy may have assassinated him in a last moment effort to appease Nebuchadnezzar. With the expected assistance from Egypt nowhere in sight, Jehoiakim's eighteen-year old son and successor Jehoiachin held out in Jerusalem for about three months before he felt it necessary to surrender. Opening Jerusalem to the Babylonians evidently saved it from destruction and helped preserve Judah as a kingdom, albeit a puppet state. However, as punishment for its government's disloyalty to Babylon, Jehoiachin and some 10,000 of Judah's political, intellectual, and technical elite, presumably those identified as supporters of the pro-Egyptian party, were exiled to Babylonia. Nebuchadnezzar then designated Jehoiachin's twenty-one-yearold uncle Mattaniah, who was probably a known member of the proBabylonian party, as ruler of the kingdom, under the regal name of Zedekiah (597-587). Zedekiah's status was essentially that of a regent because Jehoiachin was still regarded as the legitimate king of Judah by the Babylonians. The reason for this, presumably, was that Jehoiachin might still be allowed to return to Jerusalem if the population sufficiently demonstrated a proBabylonian sentiment and acceptance of Nebuchadnezzar's suzerainty. And, indeed, Zedekiah did demonstrate fealty to Nebuchadnezzar for four years, before the temptation to deviate from that path ensnared him into a course that would prove disastrous. Babylonia became involved in some major wars in Mesopotamia and was forced to withdraw its armies that were stationed in the west. This was interpreted as the beginning of the decline in Nebuchadnezzar's power and an opportunity for the subject nations to free themselves from the Babylonian yoke. Once again, the major agitator was Egypt. It was proposed that Judah and Ammon, Edom, Moab, Sidon, and Tyre form an anti-Babylonian alliance and together repudiate Nebuchadnezzar's suzerainty. Jeremiah vehemently opposed this strategy. The prophet had a perceptive understanding of the significance of the events unfolding so rapidly in the region. He anticipated that Babylonia's rise to regional dom-

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inance would be short-lived, perhaps seventy years, before it would come to an end. He therefore argued that it was in Judah's national interest to remain subject to the Mesopotamian power without challenging it during this relatively brief period. He dreaded the thought of unnecessarily bringing upon Judah the same fate that had struck Israel, destruction and exile. He therefore pleaded with Zedekiah not to get involved in any rebellion against Babylonian hegemony (Jer. 27:12-15). Nonetheless, the idea of independence caught the popular imagination, and a strong pro-rebellion party arose. In the event, Zedekiah did not have the courage to rebel against his Babylonian overlord, but the agitation for such a course of action grew and came to the attention of the Babylonians. Egypt promised to help and ultimately the prorebellion party won out. Two significant events helped set the course that Zedekiah would follow. At the end of 595, rumors circulated regarding a major insurrection involving elements of the army in Babylonia itself, which suggested that Nebuchadnezzar was in serious trouble at home. Then, in 594, the pharaoh Necho of Egypt died and was replaced by Psammetichus II (594-589), a renowned general, suggesting that Egypt was preparing for a forthcoming major war with Babylonia. However, the new pharaoh's attention was diverted to Ethiopia for the next several years, and it was not until the final year of his reign that he redirected his attention to the land bridge. Accordingly, it was not until 589, when Egypt began stirring antiAssyrian sentiment in the land-bridge region, that the war party in Zedekiah's court succeeded in convincing the regent to commit Judah to a rebellion against Babylonia. The betrayal of Zedekiah's commitment to the Babylonian king was roundly condemned by the prophet Ezekiel, who considered it as an affront to God and contrary to the interests of Israel (Ezek. 17:11-21). From Zedekiah's perspective, however, the oath of fealty that he swore was a result of force majeur, and its violation was fully justified both from a religious as well as a nationalist standpoint. Judah's revolt in 589 was predicated primarily on the basis of Egyptian assurances of support. But, as it turned out, Psammetichus II died that same year and was replaced by Hophra as king of Egypt. Although he made similar promises of aid to Zedekiah, a period of transition from one regime to another was not a propitious time for carrying out foreign commitments and it remained to be seen if Egypt would in fact do so. Perhaps for the same reason, it was also at that time that Nebuchadnezzar decided the moment was ripe for an invasion of Judah. Nebuchadnezzar's strategy for the campaign was to first eliminate the principal fortified sites located at strategic points around the country, the last to fall being Azekah and Lachish. The attack on Jerusalem was delayed until it was effectively isolated and cut off from Egyptian help, should such materialize. Accordingly, it was not until some time in the latter part of 588 that Jerusalem came under a siege that lasted for more

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t h a n a year. Then, at a time w h e n the situation w a s b e c o m i n g d e s p e r a t e , it a p p e a r e d that Egypt w a s actually going to h e l p J u d a h , a relief c o l u m n actually a p p r o a c h i n g Jerusalem to e n g a g e the Babylonians. This caused the latter to break off the siege of the capital to meet the Egyptian challenge. Jeremiah w a r n e d t h e m not to rejoice, a r g u i n g that Egypt could not b e d e p e n d e d on. H e a d v i s e d Z e d e k i a h that capitulation to the Babylonian a r m y c o m m a n d e r s w a s the only w a y to save the state, b u t the regent w a s afraid to heed his advice (Jer. 38:17-28) a n d allowed the o p p o r t u n i t y to pass. A s Jeremiah anticipated, the Egyptians soon gave u p the c a m p a i g n a n d w i t h d r e w , leaving J u d a h to its fate. The e n d came soon thereafter. The siege of Jerusalem lasted for t w o years, until 586, before the city r a n o u t of food. Then, as recorded b y Jeremiah, A breach was made in the city, and all the men of war fled, and went forth out of the city by night . . . and they went by the way of the Arabah . . . But the army of the Chaldeans pursued after the king, and overtook Zedekiah in the plains of Jericho; and all his army was scattered from him. Then they took the king and carried him up unto the king of Babylon to Riblah in the land of Hamath; and he gave judgment upon him. And the king of Babylon slew the sons of Zedekiah before his eyes; he slew also all the princes of Judah in Riblah. And he put out the eyes of Zedekiah; and the king of Babylon bound him in fetters, and carried him to Babylon, and put him in prison till the day of his death. (Jer. 52:7-11) A m o n t h later, N e b u c h a d n e z z a r gave orders that all official structures in Jerusalem b e systematically destroyed, including the temple, w h i c h w e n t u p in flames. The k i n g d o m of J u d a h w a s w i p e d off the stage of history. NOTES 1. There are conflicting traditions in 2 Kings 8:18 and 2 Kings 8:26, the first indicating that Athaliah was the daughter of Ahab, the second that she was the daughter of Omri. Many traditional commentators suggest that the distinction between daughter and granddaughter is not always sharp in biblical writing. 2. The literary evidence is discussed at length in Tomoo Ishida, History and Historical Writing in Ancient Israel (Leiden: Brill, 1999), pp. 82-88. 3. Some scholars suggest that Jehoram son of Jehoshaphat and Jehoram son of Ahaziah are one and the same, with Jehoram, king of Judah, taking the throne of Israel following the death of Ahaziah on the basis of his connection to the house of Omri through his wife Athaliah. Presumably, this would account for his having killed some of the "princes of Israel," who were opposed to his takeover, if the phrase is understood literally as referring to members of the house of Omri. For a discussion of this conjecture, see Miller and Hayes, A History of Ancient Israel and Judah (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), pp. 280-82. 4. Adin Steinsaltz, Biblical Images: Men and Women of the Book (New York: Basic Books, 1984), p. 191.

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5. Hanoch Reviv, MiBeit Av leMamlakhah: Yisrael biTekufat haMikra (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1981), pp. 202-3. 6. Shemuel Yeivin, "The Divided Kingdom," in Abraham Malamat (ed.), The World History of the Jewish People, vol. 4-1: The Age of the Monarchies: Political History (Jerusalem: Massada, 1979), p. 157. 7. Ibid., p. 158. 8. Ishida, History and Historical Writing in Ancient Israel, pp. 89-90. 9. D. Winton Thomas, ed., Documents from Old Testament Times (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 67. 10. Leo L. Honor examines all the available sources and argues that it is not unreasonable to assume that "the story of the plague has a true historic basis." See his Sennacherib's Invasion of Palestine: A Critical Source Study (New York: AMS, 1966), pp. 55-61. 11. Herodotus, The Persian Wars, 2:141 (New York: Random House, 1947), p. 188. 12. Josephus, Antiquities of the lews. In Complete Works (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel, 1977) 10:1:5. 13. Simon Dubnow, History of the lews, vol. 1 (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1967), p. 278. 14. Steinsaltz, Biblical Images, p. 199.

CHAPTER 10

The Aftermath

Following the destruction of Jerusalem and the exile of the upper classes to Babylonia, the remainder of Judah's population was permitted to remain in place undisturbed, provided they undertook to uphold the agricultural economy and not to engage in any activities contrary to Babylonian interests. It appears that a Babylonian commander, Nebuzaradan, had almost immediately taken steps to normalize life in the country, including some redistribution of the lands of those members of the upper classes, who had been sent into exile, to those who had previously been without land of their own (Jer. 39:10). It clearly was not Nebuchadnezzar's intention to turn the entire country into a wasteland but rather to permit it to flourish as best it could as a semi-autonomous vassal under his indirect rule. He evidently did not consider Judah of sufficient significance to incorporate it as a province within his growing empire, which would have required an investment of resources incommensurate with the benefits to be derived. Instead, he decided to rely on a local administration drawn from elements within the population known to have been opposed to the pro-Egyptian policies of the previous royal government. Accordingly, as noted by the biblical historiographer, "for the people that were left in the land of Judah, whom Nebuchadnezzar king of Babylon had left, even over them he made Gedaliah the son of Ahikam, the son of Shaphan" (2 Kings 25:22), a known advocate of a pro-Babylonian policy under the previous regime, the country's administrator. Although many translations add the term "governor" when describing Gedaliah's appointment, the Hebrew text does not in fact assign any title to Gedaliah, leaving the character of his appointment undefined. It has been proposed,

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however, that Gedaliah was actually appointed as king of Judah, replacing Zedekiah on the throne, but that his precise role was deliberately left unclear in the biblical texts because he was not a member of the house of David, even though there are a number of textual allusions clearly suggesting that he was in fact given the status of a vassal king by Nebuchadnezzar. 1 Whether as king, governor, or administrator, Gedaliah's appointment "meant no less than that the Babylonians made a serious attempt after the large-scale removal of the nationalists to rebuild autonomous structures— albeit under their supervision—in the devastated land with the help of the reform party," the latter referring in effect to those favoring fealty to Judah's prior commitment to Babylonian suzerainty 2 Gedaliah himself came from a prominent Judahite family, his grandfather Shaphan having served as a high government official under Josiah, two of his uncles were known political leaders during the reign of Jehoiakim, and another uncle was one of the envoys that Zedekiah sent to Babylon. His father Ahikam supported Jeremiah when he was placed on trial for sedition, clearly indicating his pro-Babylonian sentiments. It should come as no surprise that Nebuchadnezzar would seek to reward those who unsuccessfully advocated for accommodation with Babylonia and to place them in charge of Judah's affairs. Jeremiah, who had advocated so strongly against the course of action that led to the destruction of the state and Jerusalem, was singled out and offered the choice of relocating to Babylonia as a protege of Nebuchadnezzar, but he preferred to remain in Judah as a counselor to Gedaliah. With Jerusalem in ruins, Gedaliah moved his headquarters to Mizpah, where Samuel had established a nominal center for the tribal confederacy centuries earlier, prior to the establishment of the monarchy. Under Gedaliah's administration, the work of restoration proceeded apace. Former inhabitants of Judah that had fled the fighting began to return to their villages and to take up their agricultural labors as before. Former soldiers who had found refuge in the mountains rather than surrender now came to Gedaliah, pledging to live peacefully, and were given parcels of land that had been abandoned by those sent into exile. However, among the former army commanders who now came to Mizpah with their surviving troops, there was a descendant of the house of David, a prince named Ishmael ben Nethaniah, who clearly resented the idea of being subject to Gedaliah, someone appointed by the Babylonians, who was not of royal blood. Ishmael, who had returned from refuge with Baalis, king of Ammon, along with others of a like mind, and who appears to have been incited by the Ammonite king for purposes of his own, decided to kill Gedaliah and the officials of his administration, Judahites and Babylonians alike. Gedaliah was forewarned of the conspiracy that was brewing by Johanan ben Kareah, a former army commander who had

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returned to Judah with a sizeable force of veterans under the terms of the Babylonian amnesty, but the governor insisted on trusting the word of Ishmael, to his own detriment. Within a few months of Gedaliah's appointment, the conspiracy was put into motion with Gedaliah's assassination and the abduction of a number of prominent Judahites including the daughters of Zedekiah, who had been left in Gedaliah's care. They were being taken across the Jordan, most probably to Ammonite territory, where they presumably were going to be held as hostages. Johanan ben Kareah pursued Ishmael's band with his own men and succeeded in releasing the captives, but Ishmael and some of his men managed to escape to Ammon. Johanan was now faced by the dilemma of whether to remain in Judah, certain that once Nebuchadnezzar learned of what happened to his appointee he would rain vengeance down on those remaining in Mizpah as well as ravage the country once more. His other option was to seek refuge in Egypt, under the protection of Hophra, Judah's recent ally against Babylonia. Jeremiah urged Johanan not to take the latter step because it would completely demoralize the population of Judah and deprive the nation of the only remaining citizens capable of administering the territory. Johanan, however, remained unpersuaded by Jeremiah and forced the prophet to go along with him and a number of families from Judah into exile in Egypt, where they were permitted to establish a Judahite colony on the banks of the Nile. It turned out that Johanan had a better sense of reality than the prophet. When Nebuchadnezzar learned of what transpired, hundreds more Judahite families were exiled to Babylonia, Judah losing nearly all of its population in some districts. The experiment in self-government under Babylonian oversight encouraged by Nebuchadnezzar had proven to be a failure, a reflection of the power of the nationalist fervor that continued to flourish, notwithstanding the destruction of the kingdom of Judah and its political and spiritual center in Jerusalem. We know nothing of what took place in Judah following Gedaliah's assassination and the further depopulation of the country by Nebuchadnezzar in retaliation. The era of what is often referred to as the First Hebrew Commonwealth, which had lasted for almost half a millennium from Saul to Gedaliah, had definitively come to an end. Nonetheless, the fall and destruction of the ancient Israelite states, described in the preceding chapters, did not bring an end to the Israelite nation. This is because, as briefly indicated earlier in this work, the Israelite nation did not follow the usual historical course of other nations in the ancient world. All of the ancient nations discussed in this work: Amalekites, Amorites, Ammonites, Aramaeans, Assyrians, Babylonians, Canaanites, Edomites, Egyptians, Hittites, Hivites, Hurrians, Jebusites, Midianites, Moabites, Philistines, Phoenicians, and others, vanished off

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the stage of history—only the Israelites survived. I would argue that the principal reason for this is that, as the biblical writers made clear, Israel was formed as a nation before it obtained a territorial provenance. The glue that held the nation together was not the territory from which they came or later found themselves, as was the case with the nations enumerated above as well as with most if not all of the nations that have subsequently appeared on the stage of history. It was not the land in which they settled that created the nation of Israel; it was the nation that set its impression on the land. In other words, Israel was uniquely capable of having emerged and developed as a nation without a land and was therefore able to survive as a nation after its land was taken from it. Other ancient nations did not disappear physically when their states were wiped out—they assimilated into the conquering populations and thus lost their national identities. Although many ancient Israelites followed this course as well, there always remained a significant number that never surrendered their national identity, waiting and praying for the day of national reconstitution in their ancient land. For this reason, the destruction of the ancient Israelite states, considered from a long-term historical perspective, represented nothing more than a temporary break in Israel's national history, that is, the history of how the nation of Israel dealt with its self-determination and political power in the geopolitical context of the ancient world. The loss of the power of national self-determination meant a hiatus in the history of Israel and a transition to the history of the Israelites, that is, the story of how Israelites or Jews fared throughout the centuries of national powerlessness, wherever fortune placed them. Put another way, I am drawing a major distinction between Jewish history and the history of the Jews, the former referring to the political history of the Jewish people as a nation, the latter to the primarily religious and cultural history of the Jews and their survival as individuals or in small dispersed communities. Of course, since the destruction of the kingdom of Judah and the initial exile of a large part of the nation of Israel to Mesopotamia, both histories have evolved simultaneously until this very day. Viewed from the historical perspective noted above, it should come as no surprise that fifty years after Nechadnezzar's victory over Judah, when the Babylonian state was destroyed by Cyrus the Persian, the latter authorized the Israelites who were living in his newly conquered lands in Mesopotamia to return to their homeland, if they so chose, to rebuild their temple in Jerusalem and thus begin the reconstitution of Israel as a national political entity within the context of the new and far-flung Persian Empire. Accordingly, as the history of the Jews in the Mesopotamian diaspora began to unfold, Jewish history in its ancient homeland began once again, facing the same sort of national issues of self-determination and political power that the ancient Israelite states had wrestled with for many

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centuries. The First Hebrew Commonwealth had indeed come to an inglorious end, but only half a century later the first steps toward the creation of the Second Hebrew Commonwealth were taken. The historical process it underwent, within the context of geopolitical upheavals that took place in the Middle and Near East over the next several centuries, including the Macedonian conquest of the entire region under Alexander the Great, nonetheless and against all odds ultimately culminated in the creation of an independent Judaean (Jewish) state some 400 years later. In the first century C.E., the Second Hebrew Commonwealth and Israel's rebuilt temple in Jerusalem were destroyed by the Romans, and the ancient historical process repeated itself. Once again, most of the nation went into exile, even more widespread this time, but nonetheless continued to exist as a nation, albeit dispersed and without access to its ancient homeland, for some 1900 years before it recreated its national political existence as the contemporary independent state of Israel. It is therefore no exaggeration to assert that the nation of Israel is the only nation in world history to have survived as such since its origins in remote antiquity some three and a half millennia ago. The critical question is whether the contemporary leaders of the modern democratic Israelite state have absorbed the survival lessons to be learned from the half-millennium history of their ancient predecessors that ended in political disaster for the nation. NOTES 1. J. Maxwell Miller and John H. Hayes, A History of Ancient Israel and Judah (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), p. 423. 2. Rainer Albertz, A History of Israelite Religion in the Old Testament Period, vol. 1 (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1994), p. 241.

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Selected Bibliography

Ackerman, James S. "Who Can Stand before YHWH, This Holy God? A Reading of 1 Samuel 1-15." Prooftexts 11 (1991), pp. 1-24. Ackroyd, Peter R. The First Book of Samuel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971. . The Second Book of Samuel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. Aharoni, Yohanan. The Land of the Bible: A Historical Geography. Translated by A.F. Rainey Philadelphia: Westminster, 1967. . "The Settlement of Canaan." In Benjamin Mazar, ed., The World History of the Jewish People: Vol. 3: Judges, pp. 94-128. Aharoni, Yohanan, and Michael Avi-Yonah. The Macmillan Bible Atlas. Revised Edition. New York: Macmillan, 1977. Ahlstrom, Gosta W. The History of Ancient Palestine. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993. Albertz, Rainer. A History of Israelite Religion in the Old Testament Period. Vol. 1. Translated by John Bowden. Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1994. Albright, William F. From the Stone Age to Christianity. Second Edition. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1957. . The Biblical Period from Abraham to Ezra. New York: Harper and Row, 1963. Alt, Albrecht. Essays on Old Testament History and Religion. Translated by R. A. Wilson. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967. Anati, Emmanuel. Palestine Before the Hebrews: A History, from the Earliest Arrival of Man to the Conquest of Canaan. New York: Knopf, 1963. Arazi, Meir. Kovetz Maamarim beHeker haMikra. Tel Aviv: Iyar, 1988. Aubin, Henry T. The Rescue of Jerusalem: The Alliance between Hebrews and Africans in 701 BC. New York: Soho, 2002. Avi-Yonah, Michael, ed. A History of Israel and the Holy Land. New York: Continuum, 2001.

254

Selected Bibliography

Baly, Denis. Geographical Companion to the Bible. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963. . The Geography of the Bible. New and Revised Edition. New York: Harper and Row, 1974. Baron, Salo W. A Social and Religious History of the Jews. Vol. 1. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952. Bartal, Aryeh. Malkhut Sha'ul. Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuhad, 1982. Ben-Gurion, David, ed. The Jews in Their Land. Translated by Mordechai Nurock and Misha Louvish. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966. Ben-Sasson, H. H , ed. A History of the Jewish People. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976. Boling, Robert G. Joshua. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1982. Bright, John. A History of Israel. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1959. Buber, Martin. Kingship of God. Third Edition. Translated by Richard Scheimann. New York: Harper and Row, 1973. Cogan, Mordechai, and Hayim Tadmor. II Kings. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1988. Coggins, R. J. The First and Second Books of the Chronicles. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976. Cohen, Abraham. Joshua-Judges. London: Soncino, 1968. Comay, Joan. The Hebrew Kings. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976. Coogan, Michael D., ed. The Oxford History of the Biblical World. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Cooke, G. A. The Book of Judges. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1918. Cornill, Carl H. History of the Peoples of Israel: From the Earliest Times to the Destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans. Translated by W. H. Carruth. Chicago: Open Court, 1899. Daniel-Rops, Henri. Israel and the Ancient World: A History of the Israelites from the Time of Abraham to the Birth of Christ. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1949. De Vaux, Roland. Ancient Israel. 2 Vols. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965. Dorsey, David A. The Roads and Highways of Ancient Israel. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991. Dubnow, Simon. History of the Jews. Vol. 1. Translated by Moshe Spiegel. New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1967. Ehrlich, Ernst Ludwig. A Concise History of Israel. New York: Harper and Row, 1965. Elitzur, Yehuda. "Tokhnit Kibbush haAretz beSefer Yehoshua." In Chaim Rabin, ed., Iyyunim beSefer Yehoshua, pp. 1-11. Elitzur, Yehuda, and Yehuda Kiel. Atlas Daat Mikra: A Compendium of GeographicalHistorical Terms in the Scriptures (Hebrew). Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1993. Feldman, Louis H. "Josephus's Portrait of Ehud." In John C. Reeves and John Kampen, eds. Pursuing the Text: Studies in Honor of Ben Zion Wacholder on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday. Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994, pp. 177-201. Garsiel, Moshe. "HaMahloket bein Shmuel u'vein haAm beSheilat Hamlakhat Melekh beYisrael." Beit Mikra 87 (1981), pp. 325-343. Goldman, S. Samuel. London: Soncino, 1977.

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Gordon, Cyrus H , and Gary A. Rendsburg. The Bible and the Ancient Near East. New York: Norton, 1997. Gottwald, Norman K. The Politics of Ancient Israel. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2001. Graetz, Heinrich. History of the Jews. Vol. 1. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1956. Gray, John. I & II Kings. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963. Grollenberg, Luc. H. Shorter Atlas of the Bible. Translated by Mary F. Hedlund. New York: Thomas Nelson, 1959. Grottanelli, Cristiano. Kings and Prophets: Monarchic Power, Inspired Leadership, and Sacred Text in Biblical Narrative. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Halpern, Baruch. The Constitution of the Monarchy in Israel. Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981. Healy, Mark. Warriors of the Old Testament. London: Brockhampton Press, 1998. Herrmann, Siegfried. A History of Israel in Old Testament Times. Revised and Enlarged Edition. Translated by John Bowden. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981. Hertzberg, Hans Wilhelm. I & II Samuel: A Commentary. Translated by J. S. Bowden. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1964. Herzog, Chaim, and Mordechai Gichon. Battles of the Bible: A Modern Military Evaluation of the Old Testament. New York: Random House, 1978. Hoffmeier, James K. Israel in Egypt: The Evidence for the Authenticity of the Exodus Tradition. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Honor, Leo L. Book of Kings 1: A Commentary. New York: Union of American Hebrew Congregations, 1955. . Sennacherib's Invasion of Palestine: A Critical Source Study. New York: AMS, 1966. Hurlbut, Jesse L. A Bible Atlas: A Manual of Biblical Geography and History. New York: Rand McNally, 1948. Ishida, Tomoo. The Royal Dynasties in Ancient Israel: A Study on the Formation and Development of Royal-Dynastic Ideology. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1977. . History and Historical Writing in Ancient Israel: Studies in Biblical Historiography. Leiden: Brill, 1999. Jagersma, H. A History of Israel in the Old Testament Period. Translated by John Bowden. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983. Kastein, Josef. History and Destiny of the lews. New York: Viking, 1935. Kaufmann, Yehezkel. The Biblical Account of the Conquest of Palestine. Jerusalem: Magnes, 1953. . MiKivshonah shel haYetzirah haMikra'it: Kovetz Maamarim. Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1966. Kraeling, Emil G. Rand McNally Bible Atlas. New York: Rand McNally, 1956. . Historical Atlas of the Holy Land. New York: Rand McNally, 1959. Liver, Jacob. Hikrei Mikra uMegillot Midbar Yehudah. Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1971. Lods, Adolphe. Israel from Its Beginnings to the Middle of the Eighth Century. Translated by S.H. Hooke. New York: Knopf, 1962. Luria, Ben-Tsiyon, Sha'ul uVinyamin: Mehkarim beToldot Shevet Binyamin. Jerusalem: Kiryat Sefer, 1970. . "Malkhut Sha'ul." Beit Mikra, 128 (1992), pp. 24-31.

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, ed. lyyunim beSefer Shmuel. 2 vols. Jerusalem: Ha Mercaz haOlami leTanakh biYerushalayim, 1992. Malamat, Abraham. History of Biblical Israel: Major Problems and Minor Issues. Leiden: Brill, 2001. . "Conquest of Canaan: Israelite Conduct of War According to Biblical Tradition." Encyclopaedia Judaica Year Book, 1975/6. Jerusalem: Keter, 1976, pp. 166-182. . Early Israelite Warfare and the Conquest of Canaan: The Fourth Sacks Lecture. Oxford: Oxford Centre for Postgraduate Hebrew Studies, 1978. . "The Egyptian Decline in Canaan and the Sea-Peoples." In Benjamin Mazar, ed., The World History of the Jewish People. Vol. 3: Judges, pp. 23-38. . "The Last Years of the Kingdom of Judah." In Abraham Malamat, ed., The World History of the Jewish People. Vol. 4-1: The Age of the Monarchies: Political History, pp. 205-221. . "Mekorot Hitzoniyim leFarshat Kibbush haAretz beYemai Yehoshua." In Chaim Rabin, ed., lyyunim beSefer Yehoshua, pp. 187-219. . "Origins and the Formative Period." In H. H. Ben-Sasson, ed., A History of the Jewish People, pp. 3-87. . "The Period of the Judges." In Benjamin Mazar, ed., The World History of the Jewish People. Vol. 3: Judges, pp. 129-162. , ed. The World History of the Jewish People. Vol. 4-1: The Age of the Monarchies: Political History. Jerusalem: Massada, 1979. Maly, Eugene H. The World of David and Solomon. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1965. Martin, James D. The Book of Judges. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. Mazar, Benjamin, ed. The World History of the Jewish People. Vol. 3: Judges. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971. Mazar, Benjamin. "The Exodus and the Conquest." In Benjamin. Mazar, ed., The World History of the Jewish People. Vol. 3: Judges, pp. 69-93. . "The Philistines and Their Wars with Israel." In Benjamin. Mazar, ed., The World History of the Jewish People. Vol. 3: Judges, pp. 164-179. McCarter, P. Kyle, Jr. I Samuel. New York: Doubleday, 1980. . II Samuel. New York: Doubleday, 1984. McKenzie, John L. The World of the Judges. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966. McKenzie, Steven L. King David: A Biography. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Miller, J. Maxwell, and John H. Hayes. A History of Ancient Israel and Judah. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986. Miller, J. Maxwell, and Gene M. Tucker. The Book of Joshua. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974. Milman, Henry Hart. The History of the Jews. London: Routledge, 1878. Myers, Jacob M. I Chronicles. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965. . II Chronicles. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965. Noth, Martin. The History of Israel. 2nd ed. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. Olmstead, Albert T. History of Palestine and Syria to the Macedonian Conquest. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1972.

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Orlinsky, Harry M. Ancient Israel. 2nd ed. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1960. . "The Seer-Priest." In Benjamin Mazar, ed., The World History of the Jewish People. Vol. 3: Judges, pp. 268-279. Paton, Lewis Bayles. The Early History of Syria and Palestine. New York: Scribners, 1905. Payne, David F. Kingdoms of the Lord: A History of the Hebrew Kingdoms from Saul to the Fall of Jerusalem. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1981. Pritchard, James B., ed. The Ancient Near East. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958. Rabin, Chaim, Y Ettinger, H. Gevaryahu, and B. Z. Luria. lyyunim beSefer Yehoshua. Jerusalem: Kiryat Sepher, 1960. Ramsey, George W. The Quest for the Historical Israel. Atlanta: John Knox, 1981. Redford, Donald B. Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. Reviv, Hanoch. MiBeit Av leMamlakhah: Yisrael biTekufat haMikra. Jerusalem: Magnes, 1981. . "The Canaanite and Israelite Periods (3200-332 BQ." In Michael AviYonah, ed., A History of Israel and the Holy Land, pp. 36-113. . "The History of Judah from Hezekiah to Josiah." In Abraham Malamat, ed., The World History of the Jewish People. Vol. 4-1: The Age of the Monarchies: Political History, pp. 193-204. Ricciotti, Giuseppe. The History of Israel. 2 Vols. Translated by Clement Delia Penta and Richard T. A. Murphy. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1958. Robinson, J. The First Book of Kings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972. . The Second Book of Kings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976. Robinson, Theodore H. A History of Israel: From the Exodus to the Fall of Jerusalem, 586 B.C. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948. Rosenthal, Monroe, and Isaac Mozeson. Wars of the Jews: A Military History from Biblical to Modern Times. New York: Hippocrene, 1990. Roux, Georges. Ancient Iraq. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1977. Shemesh, David, ed. Shmuel veSha'ul—HaNavi veHaMelekh. Jerusalem: Kiryat Sefer, 1986. Slotki, Israel W. Chronicles. London: Soncino, 1971. . Kings. London: Soncino, 1971. Smend, Rudolf. Yahweh War and Tribal Confederation: Reflections on Israel's Earliest History. Translated by Max G. Rogers. Nashville: Abingdon, 1970. Soggin, J. Alberto. Judges: A Commentary. Translated by John Bowden. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1981. Speiser, E. A. "The Manner of the King." In Benjamin. Mazar, ed., The World History of the Jewish People. Vol. 3: Judges, pp. 280-287. Steinberg, Joshua. Millon haTanakh. Tel Aviv: Izreel, 1960. Steinsaltz, Adin. Biblical Images: Men and Women of the Book. New York: Basic Books, 1984. Tadmor, Hayim. "The Period of the First Temple, the Babylonian Exile and the Restoration." In H. H. Ben-Sasson, ed., A History of the Jewish People, pp. 9 1 182. Thieberger, Frederic. King Solomon. London: East & West Library, 1947.

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Thomas, D. Winton, ed. Documents from Old Testament Times. New York: Harper and Row, 1961. Voegelin, Eric. Israel and Revelation. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956. Wellhausen, Julius. Sketch of the History of Israel and Judah. 3rd ed. London: Adam & Charles Black, 1891. . Prolegomena to the History of Israel; with a reprint of the article Israel from the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1994. Wood, Leon. A Survey of Israel's History. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1970. . Distressing Days of the Judges. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1975. Wright, George E., and Floyd V Filson, eds. The Westminster Historical Atlas to the Bible. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1945. Yadin, Yigal. "Aspektim Tzvayim veArchiologiyim beTiur Kibbush haAretz beSefer Yehoshua." In Chaim Rabin, ed., lyyunim beSefer Yehoshua, pp. 71-100. Yeivin, Shemuel. The Israelite Conquest of Canaan. Istanbul: Nederlands HistorischArcheologisch Institut in het Nabiye Oosten, 1971. . "The Divided Kingdom." In Abraham Malamat, ed., The World History of the Jewish People. Vol. 4-1: The Age of the Monarchies: Political History, pp. 126179. . "Baiyot haYerushah shel Rishonai Malkhut Beit David." In Ben-Tsiyon Luria, ed. lyyunim beSefer Shmuel, pp. 449-472. . "Mered Avshalom." In Ben-Tsiyon Luria, ed. lyyunim beSefer Shmuel, pp. 281-311.

Index

Aaron, 17, 94, 111, 185-86 Abel-beth-maacah, 158-59, 214 Abiathar, 118, 140-41, 146, 154, 161-63, 167 Abigail, 118, 126, 156 Abijah, prince of Israel, 186 Abijah (Abijam), king of Judah, 189-90 Abimelech, 82-83 Abishag, 166 Abishai, 132, 143, 155, 157-58 Abner, 122, 126-33, 135, 162, 165-67 Abraham, 31 Absalom, 129, 149-62, 165 Achish, 112, 119-20, 126 Achzib, 60 Acre, 30, 37, 171 Adad-nariri III, 210, 225 Adonijah, 160-67 Adoniram, 146 Adoni-zedek (Adoni-bezek), 58 Agag, 114 Ahab, 194-203, 205, 208, 219-20, 222, 224 Ahaz, 212-14, 228-30 Ahaziah, king of Israel, 203, 220 Ahaziah, king of Judah, 205-6, 209, 222, 224

Ahijah (Ahimelekh), 113, 118 Ahijah of Shiloh, 175, 184, 186-87, 192, 201 Ahitophel, 146, 152-55, 164 Ahitub, 94, 113 Ai, 54-57, 60 Aijalon, town, 187; valley, 58-59, 108, 123, 134, 136, 141, 183 Aleppo, 28, 32, 71 Amalekites, 44-45, 47-48, 73-74, 76, 79, 114-15, 119, 126, 129, 249 Amasa, 156-58, 162, 165, 167 Amaziah, 210, 225-27 Amenemopet, 169 Amenhotep II, 35 Amenhotep IV (Akhenaton), 35-36 Ammon(ites), 31, 48, 52, 73-74, 76, 83-86, 99, 105-6, 108, 113, 128-29, 143-44, 154, 161, 168, 183, 196, 212, 225, 228, 233, 243, 248-49 Amnon, firstborn son of David, 149-50 Amon, 237 Amorite(s), 31-34, 42, 44, 48-49, 56, 69, 85, 96, 140, 249 Amos, 19, 38 Amosis I, 33

260

Anatolia, 30, 32, 35, 211, 234 Aphek, in Cisjordan, 30, 88, 120; in Transjordan, 196 Arad, 46, 48, 60, 225 Aramaean(s), 71-72, 114, 143-44, 150, 167, 190-91, 195-96, 202, 205, 209-10, 213-14, 225, 249 Aram-Damascus, 167, 185, 189-91, 194-97, 201-3, 205, 209-14, 222, 225, 229-30 Aram-Naharaim, 70-71 Aram-Zobah, 143-159, 167 Arnon River, 48-50, 73-74, 83, 85, 144, 209 Asa, 189-91, 194, 219 Asahel, 130 Ashdod, 30, 87, 89, 231-32, 236-37 Asher, 60, 66, 77, 80-81 Ashkelon, 52, 87, 212, 214-15, 227, 232-33, 242 Asshurbanipal, 235-37 Asshurnasirpal II, 196 Asshur-uballit, 240 Assyria(ns), 193, 196-98, 202, 209-16, 225, 228-42, 249 Athaliah, 205-6, 219-24 Azariah ben Oded, 191 Azekah, 244 Baalis, 248 Baasa, 187, 189-92 Babylon(ians), 31-32, 67, 211, 215, 231-34, 236-37, 239-45, 247-50 Barak ben Avinoam, 77-78 Bashan, 49, 205, 209 Bathsheba, 150-52, 161, 164, 166 Beeroth, 56, 134, 136 Beersheba, 30, 43, 46, 66, 79, 130 Benaiah, 146, 161-65 Ben-hadad 1,190-91, 195-97, 202, 205; Ben-hadad III, 210 Benjamin, territory, 83, 89, 105, 109, 127, 129, 135,158, 182-83, 191; tribe, 54, 69, 73-77, 89, 94, 103-6, 127-28, 132, 134-35, 141, 157-58, 182 Bethel, 30, 54-57, 97, 185-86, 189, 208, 231, 239 Beth-horon, 187

Index

Bethlehem, 66, 138 Beth-rehob, 143 Beth-shean, 37, 61,106,121-22,188 Beth-shemesh, 210, 214, 226 Byblos, 37, 188,190 Caleb, 44-45, 60, 72 Canaan(ites), 10-11, 29-35, 37-39, 41-43, 45_48, 50-52, 54-62, 65-72, 76-80, 86-88, 96, 107, 112, 116, 121, 139-40, 142, 145-47, 153-54, 164, 169-70, 173, 185-86, 189, 195-96, 198, 207, 222, 249 Chephirah, 56, 134, 136 Chileab, 149 Cisjordan, 38-39, 42, 48, 50-53, 57, 59, 61-62, 65, 71-72, 74, 76, 89-90, 114, 116,119,128, 145, 159,195, 209, 238 Cushan-Rishathaim, 71 Cyprus, 32, 38 Cyrus, 250 Damascus, 31, 49, 61, 83, 143-44, 167, 173, 189,195, 209, 214, 229-30 Dan, city, 185-86, 191, 208; territory, 89, 130; tribe, 66, 77, 89, 96, 127, 185 David, 17, 22, 58, 91, 117-21, 125-47, 149-67, 169-73, 175, 184-85, 187, 189, 193-94, 219, 223, 227, 239; house of, 159-60, 179, 181, 183-84, 187, 191, 198, 208, 213, 222-23, 225, 248 Debir, 60 Deborah, 77-79, 86 Dor, 37, 61, 76; province, 214 Dual monarchy, 137-39, 143, 145-46, 160, 165, 174-75, 179-84,188, 203, 227, 239 Edom(ites), 31, 48, 71, 73, 114, 144, 168-69, 183, 188, 194, 196, 203-4, 212, 214, 220, 222, 225-27, 231, 233, 243, 249 Eglon, city, 58 Eglon, king of Moab, 73-76, 91 Egypt(ians), 9-10, 12, 14, 23-25, 28-39, 42-43, 45, 47, 52, 56, 60-62, 70-72, 86-87, 100, 121, 142, 144,

Index

168-73, 175, 179-80, 182, 185, 187-90, 193, 196, 211-12, 215-16, 231-37, 239-45, 249 Ehud, 75-76, 83, 91, 105 Ekron, 87-88, 96, 138, 232 Elah, 192 Elath, 226-27 Eli, 88, 94, 116, 162 Eliezer ben Dodavahu, 220 Elijah, 198-203, 205, 207-8, 222-23 Elisha, 17-18, 202, 205-7 Ephraim, territory, 59, 61, 75, 83, 91, 98, 109, 120-21, 128, 169, 193; tribe, 44, 50, 61, 72-78, 80-81, 85-89, 94, 127, 185, 187 Esarhaddon, 235 Ethbaal, 194, 198 Ezekiel, 17, 20, 244 Ezion-geber, 171, 187, 203, 220, 222, 227 Gad, prophet, 146 Gad, tribe, 50, 52, 73, 77, 79, 84, 127 Galilee, 59-60, 77-78, 121, 158, 173, 190, 209, 214, 239 Gath, 87, 96, 112, 119, 126, 138, 209 Gaza, 30, 32, 60, 79, 87, 119, 187, 212, 215, 226, 232 Geba, 109 Gedaliah, 247-49 Geshur, 129, 150 Gezer, 52, 169-70, 173, 187 Gibbethon, 187, 192 Gibeah, 30, 74, 105, 191 Gibeath-benjamin, 111-12 Gibeath-shaul, 105, 115 Gibeon, 55-60, 129, 134-36, 140-41, 154, 158, 162-63, 187 Gideon, 80-83, 85-86, 96 Gilead(ites), clan, 50, 73, 84-86, 105; province, 214; territory, 49, 73, 83-84, 99, 103, 105, 122, 127-29, 144r 154-55, 198, 202, 211-12, 214 Gilgal, 49, 52, 54, 57-58, 91, 97, 107, 109-110, 113, 157 Golan, 205 Habbakuk, 241 Hadad, 168-69 Hadadezer, 143

261

Hamath, 167, 197, 210, 215 Hammurabi, 32 Hanani, 191 Hanun, 129, 143-44, 154 Hanunu, 215 Haran, 240 Haroshet-Goiim, 77 Hatshepsut, 34 Hatti, 35-36 Hattusilis III, 37 Hazael, 201-2, 205, 209-10, 225 Hazor, 30, 32, 59, 61, 76-77, 173,182, 191, 197, 214 Hebron, 30, 56, 58, 60, 118, 126, 132-33, 137-39, 153, 179, 225, 233 Heshbon, 48-49 Hezekiah, 230-35, 237 Hiram, 171 Hittites, 30, 35-38, 42, 44, 49, 56, 69, 168, 197, 205, 249 Hivites, 42, 56-58, 69, 89, 134-36, 141, 249 Hophra, 244, 249 Hormah, 60 Hoshea, 215-16 Huldah, 239 Hurrians, 34-35, 67, 139, 249 Hushai the Archite, 154-55 Hyksos, 33 Ibleam, 30, 210 Ijon (Marjayoun), 143, 191, 214 Ir-ganim, 121 Irhuleni, 197 Isaachar, tribe, 66, 77, 187 Isaiah, 212-13, 229-30, 232-33 Ishbaal (Ishboshet), 122, 126-35, 154, 162 Ishmael ben Nethaniah, 248-49 Israel, kingdom of, 127-33, 138-45, 152-53, 157, 159-60, 162, 165, 167, 171,174-75, 179, 181-91, 193-210, 212-16, 219-20, 222, 225-31, 239 Ittai of Gath, 155 Izban, 72 Jabbok River, 49-50, 73-74, 83-85, 188 Jabesh-gilead, 105-7, 113, 122, 129, 137

262

Jabin, 59, 61, 76, 78 Jabneh, 30, 227 Jebusites, 44, 56, 58, 69, 98, 136, 139, 164, 249 Jehoahaz, king of Israel, 209-10 Jehoahaz, king of Judah, 241 Jehoiachin, 243 Jehoiada, 222-25, 228 Jehoiakim, 241-43, 248 Jehoram, king of Israel, 18, 203-7, 210, 219, 222 Jehoram, king of Judah, 205, 219-22, 224 Jehoshaphat, 18, 194, 202-5, 219-21, 227 Jehu ben Hanani, 187, 192, 220 Jehu ben Nimshi, 201-2, 205-10, 222 Jephthah, 84-86, 103 Jerahmeelites, 46, 66 Jereboam, 9,175-76,179-89,191-92, 200-201, 208, 231, 239 Jereboam II, 210-11, 227 Jeremiah, 20, 238, 241-43, 245, 248-49 Jericho, 49, 52-54, 58, 74, 76, 91, 109 Jerusalem, 30, 55-56, 58, 89, 94-95, 109, 118, 129, 136, 138-42, 146, 149, 151-55, 157-59, 162-65, 167, 169, 171-73, 175, 179, 181-85, 187-91, 193, 202, 206, 208, 210, 213-14, 220-24, 226-28, 230-36, 242-45, 247-49 Jethro, 13-14 Jezebel, 194, 198, 200-201, 203, 205-6, 209, 219, 222-23 Jezreel, city, 30, 121, 205-8, 210; valley, 34, 59, 61-62, 76-78, 80, 88-89, 97, 106,116, 119-21, 125, 128, 173, 188, 193, 196, 209, 214 Joab, 129-33, 135, 139, 143-44, 146-47, 151, 155-59, 161-63, 165, 167-69 Joash, king of Israel, 210, 226-27 Joash, king of Judah, 222-24, 228 Johanan ben Kareah, 248-49 Jokneam, 61, 76 Jonah ben Amittai, 210 Jonathan, 109, 111-12, 117, 122, 130, 133, 135, 137 Joppa (Jaffa), 32, 37 Jordan River, 30, 37, 44, 49-52, 54, 59,

Index

73-76, 81, 83, 98, 106-10, 121-22, 128-29, 156-57, 188, 193, 195, 249; valley, 30, 32, 46, 77, 105, 121 Joshua, 44-45, 47, 49-62, 65-66, 69-70, 72, 89, 94, 96, 107-8, 134-36, 147 Josiah, 237-41, 248 Jotham, king of Judah, 228 Jotham, son of Gideon, 82 Judah, kingdom of, 127-33, 138-42, 144-45, 152-53, 156-61, 165, 174-75, 179,183-91,193-94,197, 202, 204, 206-7, 209-10, 212-14, 219-22, 224-45, 247-50 Judah, territory, 30, 60-61, 72, 83, 88, 98, 114, 118-20, 126-28, 132, 190, 202, 222, 233 Judah, tribe, 44, 46, 48, 50, 60, 65-66, 72-74, 77, 88-89, 98, 116, 118-20, 126-27, 137, 182 Kadesh-barnea, 43, 46-47, 49, 60, 227 Kenites, 46, 50, 60, 66 Kenizzites, 46, 50, 60, 66 King's Highway, 30-31, 48, 83, 143-44, 194-95, 211, 213 Kir-hareshet (Kerak), 204 Kiriath-jearim, 56, 89, 113, 134, 136, 140 Lachish, 58, 226, 233, 244 Laish, 89, 185 Lebanon, 28, 30, 59, 171, 173 Libnah, 222 Lugalzagissi, 31 Maacah, Aramaean state, 143 Maacah, wife of David, 129, 191 Machir, 50, 77, 105 Mahanaim, 122, 126, 128, 154-55, 157, 188 Manasseh, king of Judah, 235-38 Manasseh, territory, 105, 114; tribe, 50, 61, 73, 77, 80-82, 84, 105, 127 Mari, 32 Medes, 237, 240 Mediterranean coast, 28-32, 35-39, 42-43, 56, 58-61, 76, 80, 86, 88, 96, 125, 129, 142, 171, 183, 188, 190,

Index

263

196, 209, 211-12, 214, 216, 226-27, 234, 237, 242 Meggido, 30, 34-35, 39, 61, 76, 142, 173, 182, 188, 193, 197, 206, 214, 241 Menahem ben Gadi, 211-12 Merab, 135 Meribaal (Mephiboshet). 133, 135-37 Merneptah, 37-38, 52, 71 Merodach-baladan, 215, 232 Merom, 37, 59-61 Mesha, 203-5 Mesopotamia, 28-32, 34-35, 70, 87, 100, 121, 143-44, 167, 171, 196, 216, 230, 232-33, 243, 250 Micah, 199 Michal, 117, 131-32 Michmas, 109-11, 113 Midianites, 49, 79-81, 85, 91, 106, 249 Mitanni, 34-35 Mizpah, 84, 94-97, 104-5, 112, 191, 248-49 Moab(ites), 18, 31, 37, 48-49, 52, 73-76, 83, 85, 91, 105-6, 113, 129, 144, 168, 183, 194, 196, 203-5, 212, 225, 231, 233, 243, 249 Moses, 10-17, 19, 21, 37, 43-46, 49-51, 56, 60, 66, 69-70, 73, 85, 89, 94, 97-98, 111, 114, 147, 160, 169, 185-86 Mursilis II, 36

Og, 49 Omri, 192-96, 199, 201-3, 205-8, 219-22 Othniel ben Kenaz, 60, 72, 98

Naamah, 161 Nabal, 118, 126 Nabopolassar, 237 Nadab, 186-87 Nahash, 99, 105, 129, 154 Nahum, 239 Naphtali, territory, 214; tribe, 66, 76-78, 80, 190 Naram-Sin, 31 Nathan, 141-42, 146, 161, 163-64 Nebuchadnezzar II, 241-45, 247-50 Nebuzaradan, 247 Necho I, 236-37 Necho II, 240-41, 244 Negev, 13, 33, 46-48, 60, 73, 119, 168, 190, 214, 222, 227-28, 239 Nineveh, 237, 239-40 Nob, 89, 94, 113, 116, 118, 141

Qarqar, 197, 202 Qatanum, 32

Padi, 232 Pekah ben Remaliah, 211-12, 214-15, 229 Pekahiah, 212 Penuel, 188 Perizzites, 56 Persia, 237 Petra, 226 Philistine(s), 38-39, 43, 60-61, 66, 71-73, 76-77, 86-90, 93-99, 104-14, 116-17, 119-22, 125-29, 138-40, 142, 145-46, 155, 168, 173, 183, 187-88, 192, 196, 212, 214-15, 220, 222, 227, 231, 249 Phoenicia(ns), 30, 38-39, 86, 139, 142, 168, 170-71, 193-99, 207-10, 212, 220, 235, 249 Prophet(s), 15-24, 51, 85, 94-95, 99, 107, 110, 113, 115, 140-41, 146-47, 159, 161, 170, 175, 181-82, 184, 186-87, 189, 191-92, 194, 198-202, 205-6, 210, 212, 220, 229-30, 237, 239, 241-43, 249 Psammeticus I, 236-37, 240 Psammeticus II, 244

Rabbath-ammon, 143 Rafia, 37, 216 Ramah, 30, 94, 97, 115, 118, 190-91 Rameses II, 36-37, 43, 47 Rameses III, 38, 71 Ramoth-gilead, 202-3, 205, 207 Red Sea, 28, 144, 169; trade, 171, 187, 203, 214, 220, 222, 227 Rehoboam, 161, 179-82, 184, 188-89 Rephaim, valley, 138-39 Reuben, territory, 114; tribe, 50, 52, 73, 76-77, 79, 127 Rezin, 212-13, 229 Rezon, 167 Rizpah, 130, 135

264

Samaria, city, 193, 195-99, 205, 207-9, 211, 215-16, 226, 234; territory, 30, 50, 215, 239-41 Samson, 88 Samuel, 17-18, 23, 94-104, 106-7, 110-18, 120, 127, 140, 159, 170, 175, 184, 200-201 Sargon, 31 Sargon II, 215, 232 Saul, 17, 95, 103-22, 125-37, 140-41, 145_46, 154, 157-59, 166, 181, 184, 201, 239, 249 Sea People, 38-39, 61, 71, 168 Sennacherib, 232-35 Seti I, 43 Shabuku, 231 Shallum ben Jabesh, 211 Shalmaneser III, 197, 209 Shalmaneser V, 215 Shamgar, 72, 87 Sharuhen, 33 Sheba ben Bichri, 157-59, 165 Shebitku, 233 Shechem, 30, 57, 82-83, 88, 179, 189, 193, 199 Shemaiah, 181, 189 Shiloh, 61-62, 65-66, 86, 88-89, 93-95, 113, 116, 175, 184 Shishak (Sheshonq), 168, 171, 175, 179-80, 182, 187-89 Shobi, 154 Siamun, 168-70, 180 Sidon, 37, 142, 168, 232, 235, 243 Sihon, 49 Simeon, territory, 114, 183; tribe, 33, 66, 77, 98, 127 Sinai, 13, 29, 31, 38, 43, 52, 67, 73, 86, 190 Sisera, 77-78 Solomon, 14, 23, 90, 151, 161-76, 179-83, 185, 187, 189, 191, 194, 198, 203, 208, 231, 239 Succoth, 188, 195 Sumer, 31 Suppiluliumas, 35-36 Syria, 28, 30-32, 34-38, 49, 71, 87, 143, 167, 196, 210-11, 234, 240, 242 Tabrimmon, 189-90, 213 Tadmor (Palmyra), 167

Index

Talmai, 150 Tamar, 149-51 Tanaach, 61, 76, 188 Tantamani, 235-36 Temple of Jerusalem, 8, 141-42, 171-72, 175, 184-86, 188, 190, 214, 223-25, 230-31, 233, 236, 250-51 Thutmosis I, 34 Thutmosis III, 34-35 Tibni ben Ginath, 193 Tiglath-pileser III, 211-12, 214-15, 229-30 Tirhakah, 233, 235 Tirzah, 189, 192-93 Tob, 143 Transjordan, 30-31, 37, 46-53, 72-73, 77, 79, 83, 91, 105-6, 108, 113, 116, 126-27, 129, 137, 143-44, 146, 153-54, 159, 195, 202-3, 205, 209-15, 220, 225, 238 Tubail, 213 Tyre, 37, 60, 142, 171, 188-89, 194, 209, 213, 227, 233, 243 Ur, 31 Urartu (Armenia), 210-11 Uriah ben Shemaiah, 242 Uzziah (Azariah), 226-28 Via Maris (Sea Road), 30, 43, 56, 88, 116, 119, 143, 168, 194, 211, 239 Yaibidi, 215 Yamani, 231 Yamhad, 32 Yarim-lim, 32 Yarmuk River, 49-50, 196 Zadok, 140-41, 146, 154, 161-64 Zebulun, tribe, 77-78, 80-81 Zechariah, 210-11 Zedekiah, 243-45, 248-49 Zephaniah, 237-38 Zerah, 189-90 Ziklag, 119-20, 126 Zimri, 187, 192 Zimri-lim, 32

About the Author MARTIN SICKER is a private consultant and lecturer who has served as a senior executive in the U.S. government and has taught at American University and The George Washington University Dr. Sicker has written extensively in the field of political science and international affairs. He is the author of 22 earlier books, including The Pre-Islamic Middle East (Praeger, 2000) and Between Rome and Jerusalem: 300 Years of Roman-Judaean Relations (Praeger, 2001).