The Right in Latin America: Elite Power, Hegemony and the Struggle for the State [1 ed.] 0415840708, 9780415840705

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Cannon shines a bright light on the Right, which has continued to adapt and exercise influence outside the gaze of most experts on Latin America. He describes the varied sources – economic, military, transnational, political, and transnational – of elite power in the region in a book that is accessible to the public but will intrigue scholars as well. Daniel Hellinger, Professor of International Relations, Webster Unversity, USA Cannon has provided us with timely analysis and a valuable theoretical framework for understanding contemporary Latin American politics at a time when the Right is resurgent and the region faces renewed crisis and upheaval. William I. Robinson, Professor of Sociology, Global Studies, and Latin American Studies, University of California at Santa Barbara, USA

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THE RIGHT IN LATIN AMERICA

Most current analysis on Latin American politics has been directed at examining the shift to the Left in the region. Very little attention, however, has been paid to the reactions of the Right to this phenomenon. What kind of discursive, policy and strategic responses have emerged among the Right in Latin America as a result of this historic turn to the Left? Have there been any shifts in attitudes to inequality and poverty as a result of the successes of the Left in those areas? How has the Right responded strategically to regain the political initiative from the Left? And what implications might such responses have for democracy in the region? The Right in Latin America seeks to provide answers to these questions while helping to fill a gap in the literature on contemporary Latin American politics. Unlike previous studies, Barry Cannon’s book does not simply concentrate on party political responses to the contemporary challenges for the Right in the region. Rather he uses a wider, more comprehensive theoretical framework, grounded in political sociology, in recognition of the deep social roots of the Right among Latin America’s elites, in a region known for its startling inequalities. Using Michael Mann’s pioneering work on power, he shows how elite dominance in the key areas of the economy, ideology, the military and in transnational relations, has had a profound influence on the political strategies of the Latin American Right. He argues that Left governments, especially the more radical ones, have threatened elite power in these areas, influencing Right-wing strategic responses as a result. These responses, he persuasively suggests, can vary from elections, through street protests and media campaigns, to military coups, depending on the level of perceived threat felt by elites from the Left. In this way, Cannon uncovers the dialectical nature of the Left/Right relationship in contemporary Latin American politics, while simultaneously providing pointers as to how the Left can respond to the challenge of the Right’s resurgence in the current context of Left retrenchment. Cannon’s multifaceted, interdisciplinary approach, including original research among Right-leaning actors in the region, makes the book an essential reference – not only for those interested in the contemporary Latin American Right, but for anyone interested in the region’s politics at a critical juncture in its history. Barry Cannon is a Lecturer in Politics at Maynooth University, Ireland. His research is primarily centred on Latin American politics, with particular expertise on Peru, Venezuela and Central America.

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THE RIGHT IN LATIN AMERICA Elite power, hegemony and the struggle for the state

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Barry Cannon

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First published 2016 by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2016 Taylor & Francis The right of Barry Cannon to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Names: Cannon, Barry. Title: The right in Latin America : elite power, hegemony and the struggle for the state / by Barry Cannon. Description: New York, NY : Routledge, 2016. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2015042491| ISBN 9780415840682 (hbk) | ISBN 9780415840705 (pbk) Subjects: LCSH: Conservatism–Latin America. | Right and left (Political science)–Latin America. | Political culture–Latin America. | Elite (Social sciences)–Political activity–Latin America. | Neoliberalism–Latin America. | Power (Social sciences)–Latin America. | Latin America–Politics and government–1980Classification: LCC JL969.A45 C36 2016 | DDC 320.52098–dc23 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015042491 ISBN: 978-0-415-84068-2 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-415-84070-5 (pbk) ISBN: 978-0-203-76702-3 (ebk) Typeset in Bembo by Taylor & Francis Books

In memory of my dearest friend Susan Howieson – for her courage and determination To Peadar – teacher, mentor, friend – with heartfelt thanks

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CONTENTS

List of tables Abbreviations Acknowledgements 1 2

x xi xiii

Introduction: The Right in Latin America: Elite power, hegemony and the struggle for the state

1

Understanding the Latin American Right: Powerful elites and weak states

8

3

Right-wing policy discourse in Left-led Latin America

29

4

Neoliberalism in Power: Right-oriented state/society complexes in Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru

58

The shifting sands of power in ‘pink tide’ Latin America: Post-neoliberalism and the threat from the Left

92

Coups, ‘smart coups’ and elections: Right power strategies under Left-led governments

116

Conclusion: Right strategies and Left responses

150

5 6 7

Bibliography Index

159 175

LIST OF TABLES

5.1 Countervailing tendencies to neoliberalism in five power clusters 5.2 Latin America’s “new Left”, 1998–2014 5.3 Electoral performance of main Left/Left-of-centre party in most recent general elections 5.4 Level of threat to Right-wing hegemony in Latin America 6.1 Performance of main Right candidate in most recent presidential election 6.2 Threat perception levels as strategy indicators

94 99 100 111 123 141

ABBREVIATIONS

ALBA ARENA Bancosur BRICS CAFTA-DR CELAC CEP CSO FDI FTA FTAA ICSID IFI IMF ISI Mercosur NAFTA NGO OAS OECD PA PAN RN TPP

Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America/ Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America Alianza Republicana Nacionalista/National Republican Alliance Banco del Sur/Bank of the South Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa Central America–Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños/ Community of Latin American and Caribbean States Centro de Estudios Públicos/Centre for Public Studies Civil Society Organization Foreign Direct Investment Free Trade Agreement Free Trade Area of the Americas International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes International Financial Institution International Monetary Fund Import Substitution Industrialisation Mercado Común del Sur/Common Market of the South North American Free Trade Agreement Non-Governmental Organisation Organization of American States Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Pacific Alliance Partido Acción Nacional/National Action Party Renovación Nacional/National Renovation Trans-Pacific Partnership

xii Abbreviations

TTIP UDI UNASUR

Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Unión Demócrata Independiente/Independent Democratic Union Unión de Naciones Suramericanas/Union of South American Nations

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project would not have been possible without the financial assistance afforded to me through the European Union and Irish Research Council-funded Marie Curie/CARA Post-doctoral Fellowship, which I held for three years, between October 2010 and October 2013. As a mobility fellowship it gave me the unparalleled opportunity to pass the first two years at the Institute for Iberoamerican Studies in the University of Salamanca, Spain, and my final year in my home institution, the School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, Ireland. This arrangement was made possible due to the quick support given to the project by Dr John Doyle, the Head of School of Law and Government in DCU (now Dean of Humanities and Social Sciences) and Professor Manuel Alcantara at Salamanca. Support from Professor Peadar Kirby of the University of Limerick was also vital in my securing the scholarship. John Doyle continued to act as my Dublin-based mentor throughout the period of the fellowship, and his guidance and advice were extremely useful and valued throughout its duration. Thanks also to Gary Murphy, now Head of the School of Law and Government and to David Doyle, now in Oxford. Special thanks must also go to Iván Llamazares of the Iberoamerican Institute and the Faculty of Law in Salamanca, who offered me invaluable support – not just as my academic mentor there but also as a friend and colleague. Thanks also to Flavia Friedenberg, Director of the Iberoamerican Institute, who did her utmost to offer me accommodation and make me feel welcome at the Institute. Further colleagues who offered companionship and advice were my dear friend Ana Manzanas, of the University’s English Department, her husband Jésus Benito of the Universidad de Valladolid and Salvador Martí i Puig, now at the University of Girona, with whom I have also had the good fortune to collaborate with since finishing the fellowship.

xiv Acknowledgements

A number of people provided valuable assistance in researching and preparing this book. Dolores Rocca Rivarola, Instituto de Gino Germani, Buenos Aires, Argentina; Gonzalo Alvaréz Fuentes, Universidad Diego Portales and Universidad de Santiago, Chile; Ybiskay González Torres, of the Universidad Simón Bolívar, Caracas, and now in Newcastle University, NSW, Australia; and Adriana Ramirez, Universidad de Salamanca, Spain. Tathiana Montaña, INDEPAZ, Bogotá, Colombia, also provided valuable research support. Many thanks to my PhD student John Brown, who provided excellent research support in Ireland, including compiling a number of the tables provided in this book. I particularly extend my thanks also to all those who participated in interviews, contributing substantial amounts of time answering quite detailed questions. A number of colleagues were kind enough to read drafts of the book and provide invaluable comments on earlier manuscripts, namely Guy Burton, of the London School of Economics; Eduardo Silva at Tulane, New Orleans; UK-based Latin American specialist Grace Livingstone; Christopher Wylde of Richmond University, London; and Peadar Kirby of the University of Limerick, as well as an anonymous reviewer at Routledge. Thanks also are due to the editorial staff at Routledge, especially Michael Kerns for initially agreeing to take on the project, and to Lillian Rand for her positive energy helping shepherd it through the production process. While the comments and suggestions of all these people have helped improve the book enormously, needless to say all opinions and errors within are my own. Since finishing the fellowship I was fortunate enough to secure a position lecturing in Politics in the Department of Sociology at Maynooth. Thanks there to Professor Mary Corcoran as Head of Department and Professor Sean O’ Riain, both of whom have been supportive, and special mentions for my fellow Politics colleagues, Mary P. Murphy, John O’ Brennan, Colin Coulter and Ada Regelmann. Many thanks and best wishes also to Paul Ryan and Mary Benson for their companionship and advice since joining the department. At a personal level I have had much support from my family, especially my sisters Concepta Colhoun and Aurelie Kelly, and friends, including Carol Ryan; Liz Ryan and her husband Bez; friend and colleague Pablo Rojas Coppari; James Leahy and his partner Anderson; Paul Clinton and Mike Tully; friend and neighbour, Arantxa Colomé; my dear friend Mo Hume in the University of Glasgow; Dervla King and her partner Ken Reid; the lovely Julie in Brussels; Nick, Beni and Alma in Spain; Tom in Rome; the Barcelona crew, Ciaran, Aodh and Brian; and Astrid and Matt in Victoria, British Columbia, Canada. Many thanks to Chris Wylde for his support and friendship and mentions too for Jo Jo Nem Singh in Sheffield and Sarah Hunt, now back in Limerick. This book is dedicated to the memory of my dearest friend Susan Howieson in London – for her courage and determination in the face of great odds. An artist and photographer, her image on the front cover of this book, “All Around Me”, depicts construction activity near her home in Shoreditch, London. Most of this construction was for luxury apartments for investors - many from overseas. So the

Acknowledgements xv

image speaks to a number of issues raised in this book - the basis of economic activity and who it benefits, the globalisation of capital, the interconnectedness of global elites etc. It is also dedicated to Peadar Kirby – teacher, mentor, friend – whose initial faith in me at DCU allowed me to start out on this adventure as an academic and so continue to pursue my love for, and interest in, Latin America and its people.

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1 INTRODUCTION: THE RIGHT IN LATIN AMERICA Elite power, hegemony and the struggle for the state

The election, in 1998, of Hugo Chávez to the presidency of Venezuela was the beginning of what many came to term a “pink tide” of Left and Left-of-centre governments sweeping over Latin America. Chávez remained in power until his death in 2013, and during that time most of South America and some countries in Central America elected Left-leaning governments. By 2014 the momentum did not seem to be faltering, with ten countries – Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Nicaragua, El Salvador and, of course, Cuba – having Left-led governments. It is unsurprising then that most academic work on politics in the region has been directed at studying this phenomenon.1 The literature, of course, has varying views on the nature and characteristics of these governments and notes degrees of diversity within them. Nevertheless, a level of consensus exists in so far as these disparate governments are viewed as critical of neoliberal orthodoxy and are prepared to use state power in an attempt to counterbalance the perceived negative social impacts of markets.2 Yet the “pink tide” has not swept all before it. The 2014 elections in Colombia, for example, became, in the final stages, a contest between two candidates on the Right, with the Left barely registering.3 Mexico remained governed by the conservative PAN (Partido de Acción Nacional/National Action Party) throughout most of the period of the “pink tide” until it lost to the erstwhile populist PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional/Institutional Revolutionary Party) in 2013. Yet this seemed only to intensify the neoliberal policies of its predecessor, with the government of Enrique Peña Nieto, for example, opening up the state oil company, PEMEX, to the private sector. Peru, despite having nominally populist (Alan García, 2006–2011) or Left-leaning (Ollanta Humala, 2011–2016) presidents, continued implementing neoliberal policies under its neoliberalised constitution, which had been instituted under President Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000). Chile, after

2 The Right in Latin America

electing Socialist Party President Michelle Bachelet twice (2006–2010; 2014–2018) and an interlude with Right President Sebastián Piñera (2010–2014), maintained its policies favouring neoliberal economic orthodoxy, albeit accompanied by vigorous social policy, containing to some degree the worst excesses of the market. All of these countries have free trade agreements (FTAs) with the United States and are grouped into the Pacific Alliance, a loose intergovernmental body, officially founded in 2012 and favouring free trade and open markets. As the trade bloc’s information brochure reminds us, the Alliance member countries account for 35 per cent of the total GDP of the Latin American and Caribbean region, 50 per cent of its trade and 36 per cent of its population.4 The “pink tide” then has not turned into a tsunami, and a large part of the region remains under Right or Right-leaning rule, or at least heavily influenced by neoliberal orthodoxy. Nor has the Right been dormant within those countries ruled by the Left. All countries have reasonably important Right or Right-of-centre oppositions, which has sometimes led to electoral success, as in Chile in 2010 with the election of Sebastian Piñera (2010–2014), in Panama, with Ricardo Martinelli (2009–2014), and in Guatemala, with retired general Otto Peréz Molina (2012–2015) to name a few. In 2015 the Right gained momentum in the region with wins for Mauricio Macri of PRO (Propuesta Republicana/Republican Proposal) in Argentina and the MUD (Mesa de Unidad Democrática/Democratic Unity Coalition) in Venezuela’s parliamentary elections. And while most Right opposition activity remains within constitutional boundaries, these limits are sometimes stretched, as in the lightning impeachment of Left-of-centre President Fernando Lugo in Paraguay in 2012, or abandoned, as in the failed coup against Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 2002 and the successful overthrow of Manuel Zelaya (2006–2009) in Honduras in 2009. Nor does Right opposition activity always remain within party-based and parliamentary structures, with Argentina, Bolivia and Venezuela all seeing sustained street campaigns aimed at weakening or forcing the removal of sitting Left or Left-leaning presidents. Hence not only has the “pink tide” failed to turn into a tsunami, but the Right continues to try to force back that tide, using fair means and sometimes foul. The Latin American Right, then, remains a force to be reckoned with, but this fact is rarely reflected in the literature. The phenomenon has been understudied in the past with little work dedicated to the subject,5 although there has been something of an upsurge in interest with a number of books and articles being published more recently.6 This book aims to build on this legacy but also to go beyond it. In it I argue that most of the major work on the subject of the Latin American Right approaches the phenomenon from a narrow political science perspective, while finding invariably that Right-wing actors do not conform to theoretical expectations. Furthermore, what is lacking in the literature is an articulation of the Right with the study of elite power. By elites what I mean, following Higley, is “persons who, by virtue of their strategic locations in large or otherwise pivotal organizations and movements, are able to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially”.7 These consist of “prestigious and ‘established’ leaders – top politicians, important

The Right in Latin America 3

businessmen, high-level civil servants, senior military officers”8 and “counterelites” found in trade union and social movement leaderships, among others, although it is the former with whom we are most concerned here. While there is a good, solid tradition of studying elites in Latin America,9 few of those studying the Right have sought to link the former to the latter in a systematic way. Gibson10 comes closest with his concepts of “core constituency” and “non-core constituencies”, whereby “core constituencies” are “those sectors of society that are most important to [a party’s] political agenda and resources” and non-core constituencies are other groups whose support is garnered in the “quest to build an electoral majority”.11 Yet, even here, the main emphasis is on the party political aspect of the Right rather than on its “core constituency”. Hence most scholars of the Latin American Right are left struggling to explain the fact that historically, Latin American elites have rarely used established political parties as the main focus of their power strategies, preferring to use their dominance of the ideological, economic, military and international power networks to maintain their hegemony. Consequently, I argue here that we need a broader, more adaptable framework of analysis, which can take these factors into account in a more systematised and comprehensive manner. For this reason, I adopt Michael Mann’s theories on social power,12 whereby he conceptualises domination of the four networks of power – economic, ideological, political and military – as the primary sources of social power. Following Eduardo Silva,13 I add a fifth, transnational area. These I use as a framework to demonstrate both the extent of elite power in Latin America, and how the Left has challenged this in various countries in the region since coming to power democratically. From there I use it to show how the depth of these challenges can also help inform the types of strategies which the elites use to re-establish their dominance of political power – that is the state – and so counter this hegemonic challenge from the Left. The struggle for control of the state is therefore an essential part of this analysis, but it is not privileged, as Mann’s framework allows us to demonstrate how that struggle is contextualised by elite power in these other key areas. In summary then, this is a book about the sources of domination of Latin American socio-economic elites in the current stage of capitalism, meaning neoliberalism; about the social, economic and political models they favour, meaning socially unequal market societies accompanied by liberal democracies providing state protection for market relations, private property rights, and, therefore, continued elite dominance; about the possibilities for counter-movements to this elite dominance; and about elite strategies to combat those countermovements and re-establish their dominance more fully. Ultimately, this volume seeks to identify more clearly the sources of social power that maintain neoliberal hegemony and so contribute to thinking about how to counter-act this.14 I develop the argument as follows. In Chapter 2, I seek to clarify the nature of the Right in the current context of neoliberalism, identifying its main sources of social power. First, I present the analytical frame in more detail, providing a

4 The Right in Latin America

discussion on the distinction between Left and Right, and agreeing with Bobbio15 in his insistence that it centres on issues of equality. This is fitting considering the high levels of inequality found in the region, not just in terms of class, but also in terms of the gender and ethnic inequalities which intersect with it.16 I argue that this distinction around equality can have class and ideological manifestations and that in the current historical context in Latin America, the key ideological objective for elites is the defence, maintenance and extension of neoliberalism and thus the privileges of the elites, which it favours. I then provide an overview of the main edited works on the Latin American Right,17 arguing that for the most part their institutionalist, pluralist, political science focus leaves them ill-equipped to deal with the broader ideological, class and power issues consistently identified by all of them. Hence, I propose Mann’s framework as a solution to the paradox of an elite that, historically at least, seems little interested in politics, contradicting the main theoretical focus of political science theories examining the Right. In Chapter 3, I examine discourse on key policy issues current in Rightoriented political parties and civil society organisations, uncovering how neoliberal thinking underpins such policy to a wide-ranging degree. Concentrating on the key areas of equality – class, race and gender – and state/market relations, which are the areas where the Right has been challenged most by Left governments in the region, and using material from a wide range of interviews with politicians and civil society actors in four countries – Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela – I find little change of emphasis from neoliberal precepts. There is a rejection of inequalities as an issue in general, but an increased discursive awareness of the need to tackle poverty. The chapter illustrates emphatically the general uniformity of elite thinking around neoliberalism, a fact reinforced by similar studies such as that by Reis on Brazil, among others.18 In Chapter 4, I examine the situation in those countries which are most dominated by neoliberalism, to illustrate empirically how the five sources of social power support the neoliberal project in the region. First, I briefly review earlier writings on Central America where I argued that elite dominance remains relatively intact across all five power areas, with, however, substantial inroads being made by Left governments in El Salvador and Nicaragua.19 In those articles I described these countries as Right-oriented state/society complexes in order to indicate the extent to which neoliberalism and hence elite power dominates both the state and civil society within each of them – in other words most of the power networks identified by Mann. I then examine the situation in four larger countries – Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru – all of them grouped into the relatively new transnational organisation, the Pacific Alliance. Again, I argue that these countries are similarly restricted in terms of departing from neoliberal tenets due to the deep embeddedness of neoliberalism in each power network and the benefits which elites accrue from these policies as a result. In Chapter 5, I return to Mann’s framework to argue that despite this deep embeddedness of neoliberalism across the power structure in most countries, the

The Right in Latin America 5

Right has lost elements of hegemony in some of the power networks under the “pink tide”. I examine the areas of power identified – economic, political, ideological, military, transnational – and using proxy forms of measurement drawn from Right- or liberal-leaning think tank indexes, I illustrate graphically the extent to which Left governments have halted or reversed neoliberalised elite dominance in some of these areas. While the extent of reversal in Left-governed countries varies significantly, the fact that it has been reversed in any manner makes it imperative that elites articulate a response to this challenge at the level of the political, and that the ideological basis of that response remains neoliberalism. Here, I suggest that strategies to regain power vary depending on the level of threat felt by elites from the different Left governments. This argument is developed more substantially in Chapter 6. Here, I depart from schematic and geographically determined typologies20 and instead develop a more open-ended dialectical concept revolving around pragmatic risk assessment. This, I argue, is calculated in terms of the perceived threat felt from the Left to the elite’s key objectives and in terms of popular acceptance or rejection of the different sets of strategic approaches – electoral, mobilisational and extra-constitutional – available. These are explicitly linked back to the extent of neoliberal policy reversal implemented by Left-led governments, although it is also dependent on subjective assessment of threats by elite actors, which can vary from country to country. In Chapter 7, I then summarise findings and assess the prospects for the Left in the context of those. In this way, this volume aims to go beyond orthodox political science approaches, with their relatively exclusive focus on parties and institutions. This approach rather seeks to identify the sources of social power, and analytically integrate these to an analysis of the Right. Yet, this book is not simply a descriptive account of the Latin American Right in the current context of “pink tide” Latin America. It aims also to give the reader a sense of where the Right is going with regard to policy and strategy, so as to assess how it plans to regain the initiative from the Left and hence its traditional hegemony in the region. In this way the aim is not just to help us understand better the nature and intentions of the Latin American Right in the current context, but to do so in a theoretically innovative manner which captures more fully the phenomenon’s complexity.

Notes 1 More recent work on the Left in the region includes: Ellner, Steve (ed.), 2014. Latin America’s Radical Left: Challenges and Complexities of Political Power in the Twenty-First Century. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield; Webber, Jeffrey R. and Barry Carr (eds), 2012. The New Latin American Left: Cracks in the Empire. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield; Chodor, Tom, 2015. Neoliberal Hegemony and the Pink Tide in Latin America: Breaking Up with TINA? Houndmills: Palgrave; Burbach, Roger, Michael Fox and Federico Fuentes, 2013. Latin America’s Turbulent Transitions: The Future of TwentyFirst-Century Socialism. London: Zed; Wylde, Christopher, 2012. Latin America after

6 The Right in Latin America

2 3 4 5

6

7 8 9

10 11 12

13

Neoliberalism: Developmental Regimes in Post-Crisis States. Houndmills: Palgrave; FloresMacías, Gustavo, 2012. After Neoliberalism? The Left and Economic Reforms in Latin America. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Cannon, Barry and Peadar Kirby (eds), 2012. Civil Society and the State in Left-Led Latin America: Challenges and Limitations to Democratization. London: Zed; Sader, Emir, 2011. The New Mole: Paths of the Latin American Left. London: Verso; Levitsky, Steve and Kenneth M. Roberts (eds), 2011. The Resurgence of the Latin American Left. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins; Cameron, Maxwell A. and Eric Hershberg (eds), 2010. Latin America’s Left Turns: Policies and Trajectories of Change. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Cannon, Barry and Peadar Kirby (eds), 2012. Civil Society and the State in Left-Led Latin America: Challenges and Limitations to Democratization. London: Zed, p. 11. Blanco, Silva, 2014. ‘La izquierda se queda fuera de juego en la campaña electoral colombiana’, in El País, 21 May. Available at: http://internacional.elpais.com/interna cional/2014/05/21/actualidad/1400700515_725484.html. Accessed: 10/06/2015 The Pacific Alliance, n.d. Available at: http://alianzapacifico.net/wp-content/uploads/ 2013/07/ABC-ALIANZA-DEL-PACIFICO-PRENSA-INGLES.pdf. Accessed: 10/ 06/2015. See, however, Chalmers, Douglas A., Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza and Atilio A. Borón, 1992. The Right and Democracy in Latin America. New York: Praeger; Middlebrook, Kevin J. (ed.), 2000. Conservative Parties, the Right, and Democracy in Latin America. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press; Romero, José Luis, 1970. El pensamiento de la derecha latinoamericana. Buenos Aires: Paidos. See for example Dominguez, Francisco, Geraldine Lievesely, and Steve Ludlum (eds), 2011. Right-Wing Politics in the New Latin America: Reaction and Revolt. London: Zed; Zibechi, Raúl, 2008. ‘The New Latin American Right: Finding a Place in the World’, in NACLA Report on the Americas, 41(1), January/February, 2008, pp. 13–19; Palau, Marielle (ed.), 2010. La ofensiva de las derechas en el cono sur. Asunción: BASEIS and RLS; Luna, Juan Pablo and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser (eds), 2014. The Resilience of the Latin American Right. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Higley, John, 2008. ‘Elite Theory in Political Sociology’. Available at: http://pap erroom.ipsa.org/papers/view/4036. Accessed: 11/08/2015. Emphasis in original, no page number. Higley, ‘Elite Theory’. See for example: Lipset, Seymour. M. and A. Solari, 1967. Elites in Latin America. Oxford University Press, Oxford; Higley, John and Richard Gunther (eds), 1992. Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press; Bull, Benedicte and Mariel Aguilar-Støen (eds), 2015. Environmental Politics in Latin America: Elite Dynamics, the Left Tide and Sustainable Development. London and New York: Routledge. Gibson, Edward L., 1992. ‘Conservative Electoral Movements and Democratic Politics: Core Constituencies, Coalition Building, and the Latin American Electoral Right’, in Chalmers et al., The Right and Democracy, pp. 13–43. Ibid., p. 28. Mann, Michael, 1986. The Sources of Social Power: Volume 1, A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Mann, Michael, 1993. The Sources of Social Power: Volume 2, The Rise of Classes and Nation States 1760–1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Mann, Michael, 2012. The Sources of Social Power: Volume 3, Global Empires and Revolution, 1890–1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Mann, Michael, 2012. The Sources of Social Power: Volume 4, Globalizations, 1945–2011. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Silva, Eduardo, 2009. Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The Right in Latin America 7

14 I am indebted to Eduardo Silva for helping me to clarify these essential characteristics of the project. 15 Bobbio, Norberto, 1996. Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 16 See for example López Calva, Felipe and Nora Lustig, 2010. Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress? Baltimore, MD: Brookings and UNDP; Blofield, Merike (ed.), 2011. The Great Gap: Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution in Latin America. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press; Huber, Evelyne and John D. Stephens, 2012. Democracy and the Left: Social Policy and Inequality in Latin America. Chicago, IL: University Press. 17 Chalmers et al., The Right and Democracy; Middlebrook, Conservative Parties; Dominguez, Lievesley, and Ludlum, Right-Wing Politics; and Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser, Resilience. 18 Reis, Elisa P., 2011. ‘Elite Perceptions of Poverty and Inequality in Brazil’, in Blofield, The Great Gap, pp. 89–109. 19 Cannon, Barry, 2014. ‘Political Parties: The Right’, in Sánchez-Ancochea, Diego and Salvador Martí i Puig, (eds). Handbook of Central American Governance. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 319–236; and Cannon, Barry, 2014. ‘El poder de la derecha y la influencia permanente de la élite en Centroamérica’. Mesoamérica, 35(56), January–December, pp. 78–105. 20 E.g. Zebichi, ‘The New Latin American Right’.

2 UNDERSTANDING THE LATIN AMERICAN RIGHT Powerful elites and weak states

Introduction What and who is the Latin American Right, and what is their role in and impact on politics in the region? Social scientists have provided a variety of answers to this, with a majority concentrating on the political manifestations of the Right, meaning political parties, elections and democratic institutions. Nevertheless, most also have recognised as problematic the fact that Right political parties are the exception rather than the rule, and even rarer still has been Right-wing accession to political power through the ballot box. Hence, there has been varying treatment of the Right as possessing considerable social power, expressed through the domination by elites of key areas such as business and commerce, the media, international relations and, of course, the military. Yet, for the most part this power is seen, at best, as a strategic resource to obtain political power, meaning control of the state, which is considered paramount. In this chapter I seek to challenge this assumption and argue that in fact, political power achieves paramount importance primarily when it is being used to challenge elite dominance in these other arenas of power. Using Michael Mann’s concept of “social power”, I argue that the Right is the political expression of the elites, and that they dominate the key areas of economic, ideological, and, usually, military power, as well as possessing favoured access to transnational power due to its dominance in these areas. This means that state power has been weak for the most part, as elites can mould, shape and contain political power in most scenarios, even if a dedicated Right-wing party is not in office. Political power therefore has had varied importance in Latin America for elites in comparison to these other sources of power.

Understanding the Latin American Right 9

Nevertheless, as is well known, we have seen a decisive shift to the Left in the region since the turn of the millennium. Since then these Left governments have challenged elite social power to varying degrees, depending on national conditions and the ideological orientation of the party in power. The threat this has posed to elite social power has once again brought the issue of political power to the fore for these groups, prompting them to mobilise their considerable social resources, including contesting elections, in an attempt to regain state power or at least neutralise Left government policy actions. The notion of threat is therefore essential to understanding elite strategies to achieve this. Nevertheless, as also is well known, dominant past strategies such as military coups are less likely in the current historical context. Civil society’s revulsion at the scale of human rights abuses by military regimes, the poor economic performance of the military governments and the subsequent reductions in size of many militaries, among other reasons, have all have made them less feasible as successful strategies in today’s Latin America. Nevertheless, as this book shall emphasise, they have not been abandoned entirely, and in the context of the militarisation of civil issues, such as civil violence and drug trafficking, this could change in the future. That said, their current role has been reduced greatly compared to past eras, prompting Right-oriented elites to be more innovative in their attempts to regain state power. This argument will be developed as follows: First, I will discuss the meaning of the term the Right, arguing that while an ideological characterisation is absolutely central to any definition, it also has important sociological and organisational implications which must also be considered. Hence, following Norberto Bobbio,1 I will argue that the issue of equality is the central axis upon which differences between Left and Right turn, but that these also have important class and ideological implications which cannot be overlooked. Second, I will argue that in Latin America in particular, because of its dramatically high levels of inequality, elites are the “core constituency” of the Right in that region, more so than in Europe or, to a lesser extent, North America. Moreover, in the current historical context, neoliberalism is the hegemonic ideology amongst these groups, as it provides the best guarantee of securing and extending their dominance across the social power spectrum. Third, I argue that this dominance by elites of important sources of social power beyond political power has not been systematically integrated into analyses so far. While most analyses have attempted to take cognisance of this fact, they cannot reconcile the central dichotomy of elites that fail to prioritise the pursuit of political power and the central role that such an aim has in their own analyses. This, I argue, is as a result of the dominance of political science perspectives which, while valuable in themselves, remain limited in their ability to capture the full complexity of elite power in the Latin American region, precisely because of their prioritisation of political power above other sources of power. Instead, I argue that a political sociology approach is better suited to such a task, as it provides an analytical lens which appreciates more fully the complexities

10 Understanding the Latin American Right

of power in the widest sense of the term, offering as a result a more comprehensive and systematic explication and understanding of the Latin American Right. To this end I posit that Mann’s theory of social power provides such a lens as it gives equal consideration to the full range of social power – it’s economic, ideological, military, transnational and political aspects – illustrating how these can interact in different patterns, with some elements more dominant than others during particular historical epochs. Such an analytical framework, I argue, can better help us solve the riddle of powerful Latin American elites and a weak Latin American Right. This discussion will then set the scene for the development of this argument in the subsequent chapters of this book.

Left/Right distinctions, neoliberalism and class Bobbio2 conceptualises Left and Right as a dyad emerging from conflict and polarisation, an antithetical “distinction covering the whole of the political universe”. Left and Right, however, “are not absolute concepts, but historically relative”; that is, they can change over time and space.3 For example, the Left, since its inception in Europe, went from being a movement identified with liberalism, to one identified with democracy and then later with socialism, all without having lost its previous identifications.4 Hence, the content of Left and Right is subject to change, but this is not to say that they are ‘empty signifiers’ which can be filled with any content. Throughout history, the constant theme differing Left from Right has been that of equality: “the distinction between a horizontal or egalitarian principle of society and a vertical or inegalitarian perception of society”.5 The philosophical basis underlying this distinction is the differing notions of what it is to be human, centring on the dichotomy of our being at the same time both equal and unequal: equal as a genus but unequal as individuals.6 This translates politically into the Left view of human beings as more equal than unequal, whereas the Right believe the opposite. Similarly the Left believes that inequality is social, and hence can be eradicated, whereas the Right believes that inequality is natural and so cannot be eradicated. This is not to say that the Left wishes to eradicate all inequalities, nor that the Right wishes to preserve all inequalities. Rather, Bobbio maintains that “simply the former is more egalitarian, and the latter more inegalitarian”.7 Nöel and Thérien,8 building on Bobbio’s work, provide a more detailed and thorough conceptualisation of the dichotomy in their Left and Right in Global Politics. Like Bobbio, they also believe that the central dividing concept between Left and Right is equality, but they draw attention to the long liberal tradition on the Right in favour of individual rights and liberties – of speech, assembly, religion, to hold property, etc. – in other words, legal equality of opportunity but not actual equality of socio-economic outcomes. Hence they maintain that the Right is not more inegalitarian, as Bobbio contends, but simply “differently egalitarian”, due to its historical support for such liberal rights.9 They approvingly

Understanding the Latin American Right 11

cite Ronald Inglehart’s formulation that the core meaning of the distinction “is whether one supports or opposes social change in an egalitarian direction”,10 and it is the emphasis on the social which distinguishes Left and Right, rather than equality per se. Nöel and Thérien also agree with Bobbio on the mutability of the Left/Right cleavage, in that it has, as Marcel Gauchet points out “an indefinite capacity to be enriched and renewed”.11 Echoing Bobbio’s emphasis on moderation, they draw attention to how the Left and Right, through dialogue and conflict, established different consensuses (universal suffrage, for example, or the post–Second World War Keynesian settlement), which nevertheless generate new cleavages. Yet equality or more accurately inequalities remain the central issue around which these new cleavages revolve. Furthermore, while the dichotomy originally emerged in Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it has become essentially globalised as multilateral structures became more developed in the immediate post-World War II period and as a result of current globalisation processes. First, it is global in the sense that it structures and infuses debates and resultant policies on international development and aid regimes – hence structuring North/South dialogue. Second, as democracy becomes more widespread, so too does the conventional Left/ Right cleavage about equality begin to emerge.12 Third, debates around issues of global import are also structured by Left and Right views, such as globalisation itself, multilateralism, international security and the environment amongst others, with issues of equality almost always underpinning these debates. Similarly, it structures academic debate around many of these issues with economistic, individualist perspectives, such as quantitative methodologies or rational choice, tending more to the Right of the political spectrum, while more qualitative, thick, sociologically grounded approaches are framed as being more representative of the Left. Again, like Bobbio, Nöel and Thérien point to the philosophical worldviews that underlie these positions, emanating respectively from Hobbes and Locke on the Right and Rousseau and Marx and Engels on the Left. As a result the Right is fundamentally pessimistic about human nature, “where every man is enemy to every man” (Hobbes) and whereby, as a result the role of the state is to uphold the law in protecting the individual, his liberties and his property from threat of assaults by others – and, interestingly, by the state itself. The Left, on the other hand, sees humankind as intrinsically good, but corrupted by property and its trappings. The role of the state, therefore, is to provide the protections of liberties cited above, but also to provide collective solutions to ameliorate if not extirpate the social ills emanating from this situation.13 Nöel and Thérien, as a result, see this essential debate as “unavoidably inherent in political life and foundational for democracy”.14 It allows a “structured conversation” without which “political debates tend to remain inchoate, and centred on personalities, images and patronage”.15 It is hence, the “core currency of political exchange”, providing “a simple and universal language that helps citizens, politicians and experts make sense of politics”.16

12 Understanding the Latin American Right

Hence, the following conclusions can be made on the Left/Right cleavage, based on this discussion. First, the Left/Right cleavage is the central organising principle of political debate. It has a specific historical trajectory, emerging primarily from differing Enlightenment conceptions of humankind. On the one hand, the Right is placed firmly in the tradition of Hobbes and Locke amongst other liberal thinkers, which emphasises the rights of individuals within a potentially hostile world and limits the role of the state to one of guarantor of those rights, with the state itself being seen as potentially hostile to the individual. Conversely, the Left emerges from the philosophical traditions of Rousseau and of Marx and Engels, which emphasises collective responses, charged to the state, to social ills generated by the structural problems caused by the ownership of property. Nevertheless, the concepts are not static and can change through time and space, but issues around the concept of equality are always at the centre of debate, with the Left being more concerned about equality of outcomes and the Right about equality of opportunity. Furthermore, Nöel and Thérien emphasise the global scope of the Left/Right cleavage, framing global issues and becoming increasingly established as a newly minted cleavage in democratising states. While these accounts of the emergence and value of the Left/Right dichotomy are extremely useful for the present debate, there are a number of important observations to make for its purposes. First, it is of interest to note the differences in the attitude to the state on Left and Right in this context. While the Left usually has a consistently benevolent view of the state’s role in the economy and society, the Right has an at best ambivalent attitude. On the one hand the Right usually mistrusts the state; the role of the law, for example, is as much to protect the individual from the ever encroaching Leviathan state as it is from other individuals or groups. On the other hand, however, the Right has at times embraced an interventionist role for the state. During the period after the Second World War, both Left and Right, in Europe, Latin America and even the United States, agreed on an expanded role for the state in the economy and society, with nationalisations of most key industries, strong industrial policies and an extensive welfare state. Even with neoliberalism, while discourse may centre on the state’s negative ‘leviathan’ nature (‘big government’), neoliberal reformers have consistently used the state as the means to shape “a pro-corporate, freer-trading ‘market order’”.17 Hence Right ideologies can change according to the specific historical epoch and territorial location. Second, the relatively sanguine nature of both discussions is striking if one considers that they are centred on a cleavage which historically arouses such great passion. There is an absence of discussion, in both accounts, on the fundamental role of power and its machinations, with an impression given of an ideological debate between equally weighted sides. This fails to recognise the great power asymmetries between Left and Right – or rather between their respective constituencies – with the most powerful elites, usually associated with the Right, having privileged access to wealth, production and coercion, whereas the social forces on the Left have none of these. Indeed the constituencies and political actors behind

Understanding the Latin American Right 13

both ideological poles are almost invisible, as are the great issues at stake in this conceptual debate. In essence, the accounts suffer from what Chantal Mouffe identifies as “liberalism’s central deficiency in the political field: its negation of the ineradicable character of antagonism”.18Citing Carl Schmitt, she notes how “the other central trait of most liberal thought is the rationalist belief in the availability of a universal consensus based on reason”, while “what antagonism reveals is the very limit of any rational consensus”, as it establishes a ‘we/they’ demarcation as the very essence of the political.19 As the Right in particular defends capitalism as the only workable and morally correct socio-economic organising principle, there are two central antagonisms flowing from that stance, which test the limits of a Liberal rational consensus in the Left/Right dichotomy. First, there is a need to recognise what Dahl20 identifies as the permanent conflict between democracy and market capitalism. As we have seen in the previous discussion, the essential differentiating factor between Left and Right revolves around equality, with the Left more concerned about equality of outcomes and the Right about equality of opportunity. Dahl21 identifies the push towards democracy as developing out of “the logic of equality” (emphasis in original), yet market capitalism, he asserts, goes against this logic in two important ways. First, the permanent conflict between democracy and market capitalism ensures that “each modifies and limits the other”.22 While according to Dahl, market capitalism engenders democracy, that very democracy causes market capitalism to be regulated and controlled – a regulation and control, however, which is being increasingly and successfully resisted by capital.23 Second, “because market capitalism inevitably creates inequalities” on a socioeconomic level, this will equally inevitably generate “inequalities in the distribution of political resources”.24 As a result “some citizens gain significantly more influence over the government’s policies, decisions and actions”, prejudicing political equality “and thus the moral foundation of democracy”.25 The Right’s mostly unquestioning support of market capitalism can limit democracy’s ‘logic of equality’ as much as democracy can limit capital. Dahl hence argues that capitalism is “unfavourable to the development of democracy beyond the level of polyarchy”, that is actually existing democracy,26 and indeed some see it as prejudicial even to that.27 Any study of the Right therefore, must take into account the central antagonism between capitalism and democracy. The central role of antagonism in politics entails analysing a further element which must be considered in any discussion about the Right, and that is class. Class and elite theory are uncomfortable bedfellows. Higley argues, for example, that stable democratic government is dependent on elite consensus, and class struggle can only upset such consensus and therefore endanger democracy.28 Yet Higley here is denying the fundamental role of class struggle in the formation of democracy as the essential fuel which makes and remakes it.29 Elites are essentially class actors, hence the need for, as Miliband puts it, class struggle analysis30 in any consideration of the Right. It is worth quoting Miliband at length on this:

14 Understanding the Latin American Right

[Class struggle analysis] is a mode of analysis which proceeds from the belief that class struggle has constituted the central fact of social life from the remotest past to the present day. The subject matter of class analysis is the nature of this struggle, the identity of the protagonists, the forms which the struggle assumes from one period to another and from one country to another, the reasons for the differences in these forms, and the consequences which flow from these differences; and class analysis is also concerned with the ideological constructs under which the struggle is conducted, and with the ways in which class relations in general affect most if not all aspects of life.31 Hence, Miliband points to the need to examine the Right in a more comprehensive fashion – to enquire into the what (nature, forms and consequences of the struggle); who (the protagonists of the struggle); where (the location in time and space of the struggle) and why (the reasons for these differences) in examinations of the Right/Left dichotomy in any geographical or historical context. Furthermore, this struggle should be viewed in Gramscian terms of hegemony. Every social order, as Mouffe contends “is political and based on some form of exclusion” and it is achieved by what she terms, drawing on Gramsci, “hegemonic practices”.32 These, Mouffe explains, are “articulatory practices through which a certain order is established and the meaning of social institutions is fixed … ”33 It is worthwhile to pause for a moment here, in order to consider more closely Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and the practices used to achieve it. Hegemony for Gramsci is achieved when the mass of people in any given society “consent” to the general socio-economic order imposed on it by the “dominant fundamental group”.34 Hegemony is established, therefore, not simply through the state’s apparatuses of coercive power – the police, military, courts, prisons, etc.35 – but also through “the ‘hearts and minds’ of subordinate classes”.36 A central duality in Gramsci’s theory is that of the state and civil society. The state or “public” political society is, roughly speaking, the force of coercive apparatuses which ensure domination. “Private” civil society (the media, political parties, unions, the family, etc.) is “the terrain in which classes contest for power (economic, political and ideological) and it is here that hegemony is exercised”.37 Despite the emphasis on the coercive elements of the state, control of the state is also necessary to achieve consent in civil society. Hall et al. argue therefore that “the State plays a pivotal role in raising the domination of a particular class alliance over a social formation to the level of consent. This captures precisely the concept of how the state functions to maintain ‘hegemony’ by winning, securing and cementing the ‘consent’ of the dominated classes”.38 In order to achieve this subtle and complex hegemonic task, Gramsci developed theories on strategy which went beyond the mere capturing of the state and its institutions by the hegemonic agents. On the one hand Gramsci developed the concept of a ‘war of manoeuvre’, an all-out frontal attack designed to take control of the apparatuses of the state in one move. On the other hand a ‘war of

Understanding the Latin American Right 15

position’ is a more gradual and subversive strategy to gain control of civil society tackled on its own terms through ideological and political ‘attack’.39 Ransome40 argues that both ‘war of position’ and ‘war of manoeuvre’ strategies can in effect be part of a single overall strategy. Finally, it is important to note with Mouffe that every hegemonic order, once achieved, “is susceptible of being challenged by counter-hegemonic practices, i.e. practices which will attempt to disarticulate the existing order so as to install another form of hegemony”.41 In other words, therefore, a particular social order is neither fixed nor permanent, but subject to a constant hegemonic struggle between contending social forces. This discussion flags important issues which cannot be ignored in any discussion on the Right, in Latin America or elsewhere. First, it identifies the centrality of issues of inequality in the Left/Right cleavage, over time and across space. Policy solutions may change but this central concern is constant; the conception of the role of the state – and the achievement of state autonomy – is more often than not an essential part of that debate. Second, this concern also has profound class consequences: Policies associated with the Left can involve more state intervention to lessen inequalities, while those on the Right seek to lessen state intervention with regard to inequalities, but to increase it with regard to ensuring market dominance. Each policy option has implicit and explicit outcomes in favouring some classes over others, and hence, class and the role of elites should be central to any discussion of the Right. Third, such debates do not remain within state boundaries, but also structure international and global policy-making, giving these an important transnational aspect. Finally, the Left/Right debate takes place within a wider and never-ending struggle for hegemony of either of these fundamental worldviews. While certain consensuses may emerge at particular times, these are rarely fixed and can and will be challenged. With this in mind, we turn now to treatment of the Latin American Right in the established literature to ask how it has managed these wider questions of Left/Right distinctions.

The meaning of the Right in Latin America Chalmers et al.42 briefly trace the history of the Right in the twentieth century in Latin America and note that political parties were not prominent in political expressions throughout that period. During the Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) period, from the 1930s to the 1960s, many segments of the Right had “personal, bureaucratic, and clientelistic ties” to state power,43 which obviated the need for Right political parties in most of the region. However, these national-populist regimes “betrayed”44 their rightist allies by supporting and encouraging “populist, participative corporatism”,45 which threatened elite dominance in favour of popular sectors, particularly as the global crises of the Keynesian model and its Latin American ISI equivalent began to take hold. As O’ Donnell46 shows, the sense of threat felt by elites in the face of popular empowerment in the ISI period led the former groups to turn to the military for

16 Understanding the Latin American Right

support in the 1970s and early 1980s, drawing together an “alliance of technocrats, the military and state-linked businesses”47 to rule the state through “bureaucratic authoritarianism”. This arrangement, however, turned out to be spectacularly unsuccessful, at least in political terms, for a number of reasons, including the unreliability of the military as an ally, especially due to the many human rights abuses committed by them during this period and above all, the end of the Cold War and the eventual disappearance of the threat of the revolutionary Left. As the 1980s progressed therefore sectors of the Right began to embrace democracy and indeed played a “crucial role [in], if not dominated, transitions to democracy” in this period.48 This position also allowed the Right to redefine democracy in the liberal sense of “competitive democratic institutions”, while the equalising, substantive elements of democracy were muted.49 Rightwing sectors, loosened their previous close ties to the state, in favour of a “new emphasis on parties, legislatures and elections”,50 and a separation between state, society and church. The aim, then, was to create a Lockean “night-watchman state”, although this was not always achieved in practice.51 The Latin American Right, then, goes far beyond political parties in this account. Traditionally the main actors on the Right were church hierarchies, the military and socio-economic elites.52 Gibson, in Chalmers et al., includes these as part of the Right, but emphasises an increasing role for the private media, as the new political economy model of neoliberalism causes a distancing from the military and the state.53 The new “core constituency”, then, of the Latin American Right, that is “those actors of society that are most important to its political agenda and resources,”54 are those groups who support the free market and a lessening of state power over market relations. Borón,55 again in the same volume, also points to the importance of these actors and “large firms and powerful think tanks”,56 as opposed to conservative political parties, in Right-wing power structures. Indeed Borón notes a “massive imbalance between the paramount social, economic, and cultural ascendancy of the established powers and their weak expression in the field of competitive politics”.57 This, he maintains, is because elites traditionally dominated the state and through a combination of “fraud, force, of deception and exclusion” could keep popular demands for participation and internal disagreements within dominant sectors under control.58 It was only when faced with a threat, such as communism, or an opportunity, as in the 1980s debt crisis, that the Right organised itself politically. In the latter case, neoliberal ideas became predominant among all political parties, even those normally associated with populism and the centre-left, hence it is “necessary to address our attention to civil society, and more specifically to the role the mass media, and especially television, are playing in shaping the political agenda … ”59 In these accounts, then, it is not Rightist political parties which predominate, but rather the paramount expressions of economic (business groups), ideological (church, media, think tanks, etc.), and military power. These factors condition political power without negating the possibility that political power can also

Understanding the Latin American Right 17

shape and condition these areas of power in turn. In effect, there is no hierarchy between these different sectors of power; indeed, if anything, elites seek harmony between all four of them in favour of the supremacy of their own social power. The problem for the Right then is not how to transform the traditional relationships between these areas of power and the state “into institutionalised and responsible representation”60 as Chalmers et al. state, but rather how this can be done without allowing elite domination in all four areas to be threatened. Yet, throughout the various accounts in the volume, the analytical accent remains invariably on the subsidiarity of these other areas of power to state power; indeed, often they are not recognised as distinct areas of power in their own right, but rather as simply sectional interests which jostle for recognition with other sectional interests, such as labour, to have access to state power. Yet this underestimates the overwhelming weight of elite dominance in these areas of power and its ability to override political power and reorient it to an elite worldview. The literature on the Latin American Right is dominated by a liberal, institutionalist, pluralist perspective which assumes state autonomy, when in fact this has rarely been the case. As such it is insufficiently equipped to analyse the complexities which the vertiginous asymmetries of power present in the Latin American case. Similar difficulties can be found in Conservative Parties, a book on conservatism in Latin America edited by Kevin Middlebrook.61 This volume prioritises the role of conservative political parties in its research focus, but Middlebrook concludes that, in fact, such parties are of minor relevance. Only five countries have had successful conservative political parties – Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico and Venezuela – with all of them having achieved office at some time, with the notable exception of Brazil. For the most part, however, Middlebrook observes in his introduction: “Economic and social elites rarely depend upon political parties as the exclusive means for advancing their policy goals,”62 and in the absence of successful parties, these elites advance their interests through party-mediated clientelism, the “participation of conservative forces in neoliberal policy coalitions led by other parties or political movements”63, and through “conservative hegemony exercised through non-party organisations of civil society”.64 These organisations can be “privately financed schools, universities, and research centres, privately controlled mass media, business associations, and many social and cultural organisations”.65 These can act in a complementary and overlapping manner to political parties and existing corporatist arrangements,66 influencing voting patterns.67 Middlebrook also notes the fact that “elites control capital” without exploring the implications of this fact more fully.68 The key issue then, he concludes, “is the relationship between the political role and electoral performance of conservative parties and the Right’s broader presence in civil society”.69 We have moved on little then from the conclusions of Chalmers et al.,70 and Middlebrook in effect offers few suggestions as to how to untangle the central contradiction between the political science approach to his volume, with its concentration on

18 Understanding the Latin American Right

parties, and his principal finding that such parties do not matter that much except insofar as political science theory says they should. Dominguez, Lievesley and Ludlam71 do recognise this central dichotomy but offer little by way of a coherent theoretical focus to solve it. From the beginning, Lievesley and Ludlam, in their introduction to the volume,72 recognise the wider social and military identity of the Right. They draw our attention to the fact that despite the consolidation of democracy in the region, the Right still has considerable elements of advantage, including the continued threat of military involvement in politics; formidable economic resources “which enable it to exercise political power even when out of office”,73 including dominance of key economic sectors; the support of US-based international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and the IMF; the media; continued control of some state institutions, such as parts of the judiciary; and networks of clientelism, patronage and corruption.74 They also recognise that elements of Right policies retain a broad mass appeal, especially in so-called value issues such as abortion, the family, and same-sex marriage, among others, policies in which they can draw alliances with Catholic and evangelical churches. Moreover, they recognise the importance of connections with the United States, both in terms of military support and funding, and logistical, strategic and other supports for networks of Right-oriented non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Finally, they underline the opportunity for the Right to capitalise on the mistakes of Left governments as they mature in power, losing grassroots support as they reach out to the centre.75 Nevertheless, Dominguez et al. stress that their volume is “not a comparative text in political science or a theoretical intervention”,76 and indeed, the different case studies present a variety of theoretical perspectives and conceptual approaches. This volume then goes furthest from a traditional political science approach to the problematique of the Right in Latin America, emphasising the equal, if not overriding influence of, the power of elites over and beyond politics. Nevertheless, it deliberately refuses to offer a coherent and comprehensive theoretical perspective from which to examine these different parts of Right power as a cohesive, integrated phenomenon. In the latest collected volume on the Right in Latin America, Resilience, edited by Juan Pablo Luna and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser,77 the editors make the most ambitious attempt yet to balance the importance of non-electoral factors with a focus on political parties. They identify three “vehicles” of Rightist political action, which allow “rightist political forces to gain significant leverage in achieving electoral competitiveness and in shaping policy-making in spite of structural constraints they face in the region,”78 which are essentially the lack of an appeal to the poorer majorities within a context of socio-economic inequality. These three strategies are, in effect, two – one consisting of non-electoral activities and the other electoral in its orientation. The first, non-electoral strategy is dependent on having “disproportionate access to economic resources”79 and can include activities such as coups (although these, the editors agree, are less likely in

Understanding the Latin American Right 19

the current context, as previously explained); violence by paramilitaries and selfdefence groups; lobbying by business and morally conservative groups; media; technocratic networks and rightist think tanks; individual powerful businessmen seeking to influence policy, etc.80 The second electoral strategy consists of two sub-strategies (which the authors, nevertheless, analytically separate); that is, one dependent on non-partisan electoral coalitions outside institutionalised politics and often dependent on charismatic personalities; the second, by building strong programmatic political parties. Examples of the first are such neo-populist figures of the 1990s as Alberto Fujimori of Peru or Fernando Collor in Brazil, with a possible contemporary example of Álvaro Uribe in Colombia; examples of the second are Brazil’s traditional conservative parties, the PAN in Mexico (Partido Acción Nacional/National Action Party), ARENA in El Salvador (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista/National Republican Alliance), and RN (Renovación Nacional/National Renovation) and UDI (Unión Demócrata Independiente/ Independent Democratic Union) in Chile. Hence, the editors of Resilience, as in previous volumes reviewed, note the paucity of established Right parties in the region, and the predominance of nonelectoral routes to elite “interest representation”. They note that previous research on democratisation in the region, such as O’Donnell and Schmitter; Rueschemeyer; Stephens and Stephens, among others had focussed on the importance of the Right’s political engagement in a party political manner for the survival and maturity of democratic regimes. Yet they also note the dichotomy that while strong Right-wing parties are the exception rather than the rule in the region, democracy has survived relatively intact since the initial transitions in the 1980s. The strategies outlined illustrate how Right forces manage this dichotomy, illustrating that these forces have adapted to the current democratic context, despite contributing through these strategies to unresolved issues around “low institutional quality”.81 Yet the volume does not provide full answers to the puzzle as to why elites rely on non-electoral strategies to the exclusion, for the most part, of establishing conservative political parties, other than that this can be a time-consuming activity that may also be undone relatively rapidly.82 To be sure, Loxton83 in the same volume, does draw attention to the role of threat from strong leftist challenges in causing authoritarian counter-responses which can eventually be transformed into strong Right electoral parties (i.e. Chile and El Salvador), yet this promising suggestion has little impact on the general conclusions of the editors, who primarily view the wide range of “non-electoral strategies” identified in the volume as ultimately a means of “interest representation” to the state or as strategies aimed at achieving eventual control of the state. Throughout most of these major studies of the Latin American Right then, the state is seen as the ultimate locus of power with little sense of the extensive reach of these “non-electoral strategies” as in fact expressions of profound and extensive social power held by elites. The issue of power then should be central to any

20 Understanding the Latin American Right

analysis, as these elites possess greater social power than any other group in Latin American societies. It is for this reason that we need to look beyond political science perspectives, with their exclusive focus on political power, and in particular on parties and institutions, to properly understand the phenomenon of the Right in its full complexity. Yet we need to achieve this in a more integrated fashion which takes equal cognisance of these important sources of power with that of political power, recognising the full extent of the hegemonic struggle which can go beyond the political and the national. This study, therefore, suggests a broader political sociology perspective, using in particular Michael Mann’s theory on social power as a theoretical framework from which to examine the Latin American Right in the fuller, more comprehensive manner required.

Political sociology, social power and the study of the Right in Latin America Power for Mann84 is essentially divided into distributive and collective forms, which “operate simultaneously and are intertwined”.85 Distributive power exists when a “fixed amount of power can be distributed among participants”,86 that is, the power of A over B. Collective power manifests itself when “persons in cooperation can enhance their joint power over third parties or over nature”.87 Power usually will involve a minority who will control the actions of the majority in the task at hand. Hence, power involves a form of social stratification which will usually be sanctioned by a level of legitimacy “in the laws and norms of the social group in which both operate”.88 Power operates through “multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power”, within a specifically identified territory.89 These networks of power reflect the four sources of social power in any given social formation – ideological, economic, military, and political – and each can develop distinct organisations, that is, “institutional means of attaining human goals”.90 These networks “offer alternative organisational means of social power”,91 none of which has primacy in and of itself, but can develop such primacy at distinct moments in history in different societies, depending on the context found. They can offer alternatives as those involved in the different power networks “possess a degree of autonomous control over their means of power that then further develops relatively autonomously”.92 Each power network, therefore, can develop autonomous organisational logics, which can dominate in specific moments in time and space. Mann defines each power network as Weberian “ideal types” with their particular organisational forms. Ideological power then is “when meaning, norms and aesthetic and ritual practices are monopolised by a distinctive group”.93 Powerful ideologies need to be “highly plausible in the conditions of the time”, even if they serve private interests, if they wish to be “genuinely adhered to”.94 They usually offer “a distinctive sociospatial method of dealing with emergent social problems” (“sociospatially transcendent”),95 while simultaneously “intensifying

Understanding the Latin American Right 21

the cohesion, the confidence, and therefore, the power of an already established social group”96 such as nation or class (its “immanent morale”). Economic power “derives from the satisfaction of subsistence needs through the social organisation of the extraction, transformation, distribution, and consumption of the objects of nature”.97 Economic power directly causes the formation of classes and those “able to monopolise control over production, distribution, exchange, and consumption, that is, a dominant class, can obtain general collective and distributive power in societies”.98 Military power “derives from the necessity of organised physical defence and its usefulness for aggression”.99 Those who dominate military organisation can obtain collective and distributive power,100 not only in the immediate vicinity of a military action, but well beyond those areas through instilling fear. Ideally, in democracies, military power should be subservient to political power, but this is not always the case and it can also remain relatively autonomous from the state, either as a separate entity (paramilitary groups, for example) or even as part of the state (as in established armies). This is particularly of interest in the context of Latin America with its long tradition of military involvement in politics, and indeed the economy, as well as the existence of some guerrilla and paramilitary groups, as in contemporary Colombia. Political power “derives from the usefulness of centralised, institutionalised, territorialised regulation on many aspects of social relations” in other words “state power”.101 Political power is necessarily centralised and territorial and as such is more bounded than the other forms of power.102 It can take despotic or infrastructural forms: Despotic power is when elites “take decisions without negotiation with groups in civil society”,103 while infrastructural power is when states “possess infrastructures penetrating universally throughout civil society, through which political elites can extract resources from, and provide services to all its subjects”.104 In most advanced democracies, state power is despotically weak but infrastructurally strong, that is that states have high levels of command over each network of power, but that this command rests on equally high levels of popular legitimacy. Infrastructural power then “is a two way street”, and “allows civil society parties to control the state”.105 This normally is organised in democracies through political parties which provide states with the required legitimacy to achieve stability. It is important to note that political power is also organised geopolitically; that is when state power is not “reducible to the ‘internal’ power configurations of its component states”,106 but rather are organised either imperially or along multi-state lines. Hence, such power has a transnational element which transcends, but is not entirely autonomous of, nation states. As Silva107 points out, this factor has important consequences for Latin America in particular due to the region’s high dependence on international financial institutions, foreign investment and international markets. In a lecture delivered in Colombia in 2002, Mann applies his theories specifically to the Latin American nation state.108 He assesses the infrastructural power

22 Understanding the Latin American Right

of Latin American states as being somewhere in between the high levels found in the global North (i.e. Europe and North America, as well as the Antipodes) and the very low levels found in sub-Saharan Africa.109 Using Western European states as a model Mann shows how through processes of war, ethnic, regional and class conflict, stable democracies were eventually institutionalised producing “infrastructurally effective states and relatively egalitarian nations”.110 While acknowledging that Latin American states have experienced differentiated national processes, in general these are collectively more similar than those experienced by European states. First, levels of militarism and war were reduced in comparison to Europe, where these developed pressure for fairer and more equitable tax systems. In Latin America the obverse was the case – elites sought greater engagement with the world economy rather than in conducting wars. Large swathes of the population were left untroubled by these processes, and as a result taxation pressure remained low. Latin America today continues to have low levels of taxation, and the better off in particular pay relatively low taxes if at all. Economic development has remained territorially concentrated, with only certain sectors, mostly in urban areas, benefitting. As a result “economic and social integration remained weak”.111 Ethnic differences have remained persistent for a longer period than in Europe also, which in turn reinforce class differences with white elites perceiving themselves as culturally superior to citizens of other races. These meant that “the continent has long possessed unusually steep and deeply entrenched class/caste hierarchies”.112 Whites mostly benefitted from economic development as these groups populated the cities, reinforcing cultural identify with industrialised nations in the West rather than their indigenous compatriots in the interior, or with descendants of African slaves. The combination of both factors reinforced a structural inequality which persists to this day, undermining national solidarity, identity and cohesion. Differences in income between the top sector – that is the top 10 per cent of earners and the next 10 per cent “are twice as high as in the United States”, with the result that “the very rich in Latin America almost live on another planet”.113 Such inequality, therefore, is the region’s “enduring ‘structural crisis’”.114 It subverts national cohesion and allows state capture by elites. Oligarchical power remains as strong as, if not sometimes stronger than, state infrastructural power as a result. Elite resistance to taxation is even greater than that found in the rest of the West, and elites “capture more of the universal social services that do exist”115 such as state controlled tertiary education infrastructures. Finally, local elites’ capturing of state resources allows them to establish patron/client relationships with the poor. The result is that low levels of state infrastructure actually benefit elite power. State infrastructural power remains effectively privatised; collective elite action across the different power networks ensures that it remains so. This situation has been compounded by three more recent processes: neoliberalism, violence, and the US-led “war on drugs”. First, historically low levels of state tax-raising abilities led to more borrowing and thus to the region’s debt crisis

Understanding the Latin American Right 23

in the 1980s. This opened the way for neoliberal restructuring which has, on balance, exacerbated the existing inequalities further. Secondly, violence has become endemic, leading to state repression and the fragmentation of state legal and policing infrastructures.116 Increased violence is as a result of processes of migration from the countryside to the cities, visibilising inequalities more forcefully in urban centres, just as cultural mores are becoming more favourable to egalitarianism. Yet neoliberalism, supported by transnational, mostly US power, reinforces inequalities rather than lessening these. Third, violence has been intensified by the US-led “war on drugs”, which is effectively the export of the failures of that policy in the United States to its southern neighbours. This fails to recognise the fundamental role of inequality and poverty in the creation of the drugs problem, offering repression where either legalisation (a market-based solution) or statist agrarian reforms are necessary.117 This further undermines already over-stretched state coercive and legal capabilities. In sum, the failures of Latin American democracies are located in “a structural crisis of the nation-state”:118 State infrastructures … do not penetrate evenly across state territories. Police and justice infrastructures are undermined by violence. … Taxation and social services infrastructures are undermined by corruption and cronyism. … Law is undercut by violence and bureaucracy by patrimonialism. … Underneath, the nation is divided and weakened by enormous inequalities, greater than anywhere else in the world, also leading to violence, so further undermining state and nation.119 Mann is clear that it is “the level of inequality between the classes [which] generates the main problems”.120 Hence, in order to provide Latin American states with infrastructural power, and develop more democratic societies, increased egalitarian homogeneity must be fostered “through economic, political, military and cultural reform”, which “must be the main task of the 21st century across Latin America”.121 Fairfield122 makes a useful distinction between the structural and instrumental power of business elites which helps further understanding of the elite’s infrastructural power. Structural power, she argues, “is grounded in the ‘structural’ economic position that private-sector agents occupy in capitalist societies”.123 Hence, business elite structural power “depends on the relative weight of the private sector vs. the state in the economy; if the public sector dominates, business’s structural power will tend to be weak”.124 More open economies where capital is more mobile, provides it with greater structural power as businesses can exit jurisdictions at will.125 Such actions can be threatened when investors feel that particular policy actions can threaten business freedoms.126 She cautions, however, that business’s structural power is “a variable that takes on different values (from weak to strong) across policymaking episodes”127 and that while business’s

24 Understanding the Latin American Right

structural power is significant, it is not overwhelming, but will depend on such contexts.128 Structural power must be assessed in conjunction with instrumental power. Instrumental power “stems from political resources that make deliberate actions to influence policy more effective” including direct access to politicians or to state office as well as “organization, money, technical expertise, and media access”.129 These “sources” of instrumental power “help predict when business’s political engagement will be more effective”.130 Fairfield points out that “counter elites” such as trade unions and mass movements also possess structural power, but they do not possess a similar instrumental power. It is the combination of the two which provide business elites with a singular ability to shape policy outcomes,131 although she recognises that popular mobilisations can have countervailing influences on such power.132 In this way, Fairfield’s analysis has important parallels with that presented in this book, as it provides useful additional analytical tools to help understand the extent of the power of elites in Latin America. Nevertheless, this analysis, like most reviewed in this section, fails to articulate such power with the role of the Right in Latin America, despite these important insights.

Conclusion The central issue therefore in order for Latin American states to develop democratically is, according to Mann, the lessening of inequalities, which in turn requires the reduction of oligarchical power in favour of state infrastructural power. Yet as we have seen, elites possess sufficient collective power across each of the four power networks to successfully resist any move towards greater social equalisation, which would, by necessity, involve a lessening of their own power. Moreover, as Fairfield shows, neoliberalism has increased rather than lessened business elite’s structural and instrumental power, using it to reinforce that ideology, both nationally and transnationally, across each of the power networks. In this chapter I have argued that cleavages between Left and Right are centred around issues of equality, with the Right seeing inequalities as natural and therefore not requiring state intervention, while the Left sees these as the result of human action and hence remediable, usually through the action of the state. In other words state infrastructural power needs to be developed in the realm of the social – the provision of universal services in education and health through more centralised, automated and institutionalised tax-raising measures. Such measures, however, are resisted by elites, who stand to lose important quotas of structural and instrumental power if enacted. Moreover, I argue that analyses of the Latin American Right to date fail to capture adequately the complexity of these processes underlying the Left/Right cleavage. Mann’s concept of state infrastructural power and his use of power networks as a conceptual tool from which to examine its development can, I believe, provide greater analytical leverage for examining the phenomenon of the Right in Latin America than more traditional

Understanding the Latin American Right 25

political science approaches. His analytical lens can better capture these complexities and the breadth of elite power more accurately and comprehensively, than attempting to reduce analysis to political power alone. It highlights more forcefully issues of class and hegemony, providing depth and substance to political analysis, often missed in more conventional studies. His theoretical framework has already been used in the study of Latin America, most comprehensively by Eduardo Silva133 in his study of challenges of neoliberalism by social movements during the 1990s, which laid the foundations for the Left turn in the 2000s. Smilde134 also uses Mann to construct his full conflict theory for post-neoliberal Venezuela, which can take account of these wider factors across the range of power networks to better encapsulate political struggle in that country. This book looks to build on these previous efforts, as well as work explicitly dealing with the Right. A first task then, in the following chapter, is to ascertain the nature of the Right’s political project, which will be examined in terms of policy discourse from Right- or liberal-inclined actors. Then in Chapter 4, actual policy terms – using Mann’s theories as a guide – will be examined to show the correlation between such elite attitudes and policy outcomes in those countries most dominated by neoliberalism.

Notes 1 Bobbio, Norberto, 1996. Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 2 Ibid., p. 10. 3 Ibid., pp. 46–47. 4 Ibid., p. 56. 5 Ibid., p. 58. 6 Ibid., p. 66. 7 Ibid., p. 65. 8 Nöel, Alain and Jean-Philippe Thérien, 2008. Left and Right in Global Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9 Ibid., p. 18. 10 Ibid., p. 10. 11 Ibid., p. 12. 12 Ibid., p. 55. 13 Ibid., pp. 21–22. 14 Ibid., pp. 231–232. 15 Ibid., p. 234. 16 Ibid., p. 198. 17 Peck, Jamie, 2010. Constructions of Neoliberal Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 9. 18 Mouffe, Chantal, 2005. On the Political. Abingdon: Routledge, p. 10. 19 Ibid., pp. 11–12. 20 Dahl, Robert A., 2000. On Democracy. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press. 21 Ibid., p. 10. 22 Ibid.

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23 See for example, Krugman, Paul, 2008. The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. London: Penguin; Piketty, Thomas, 2014. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 24 Dahl, On Democracy, p. 177. 25 Ibid., p. 178. 26 Ibid. 27 See Hutton, Will, 2010. Them and Us: Changing Britain, Why We Need a Fairer Society. London: Little, Brown. 28 Higley, John, 2008. ‘Elite Theory in Political Sociology’. Available at: http://pap erroom.ipsa.org/papers/view/4036. Accessed: 11/08/2015. Emphasis in original. 29 See for example Nef, Jorge, and Berndt Reiter, 2009. The Democratic Challenge: Rethinking Democracy and Democratization. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 30 Miliband, Ralph, 1989. Divided Societies: Class Struggle in Contemporary Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 3. 31 Ibid. 32 Mouffe, On the Political, p. 18. 33 Ibid. 34 Gramsci, Antonio, 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks (edited and translated by Hoare, Q. and G. Nowell Smith). New York: International Publishers. 35 Ibid., p. 12. 36 Miliband, cited in Ransome, P., 1992. Antonio Gramsci: A New Introduction. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, p. 132. 37 Hall, Stuart, B. Lumley, and G. McLennan, 1977. On Ideology. London: Hutchinson, p. 47. 38 Ibid., p. 69. 39 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, pp. 234–235. 40 Ransome, Antonio Gramsci. 41 Mouffe, On the Political, p. 18. 42 Chalmers, Douglas A., Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza and Atilio A. Borón, 1992. The Right and Democracy in Latin America. New York: Praeger. 43 ‘Introduction’, ibid., p. 4. 44 Ibid., p. 7. 45 Ibid., p. 4. 46 O’Donnell, Guillermo, 1978. ‘Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State’, in Latin American Research Review, 13(1), pp. 3–38. 47 ‘Introduction’, in Chalmers et al., The Right and Democracy. 48 Ibid., p. 3. 49 Ibid., p. 5. 50 Ibid., p. 7. 51 Ibid., p. 9. 52 Ibid., p. 7. 53 Gibson, Edward L., 1992. ‘Conservative Electoral Movements and Democratic Politics: Core Constituencies, Coalition Building, and the Latin American Electoral Right’, in Chalmers et al., The Right and Democracy, pp. 13–43. 54 Ibid., p. 15. 55 Borón, Atilio, 1992. ‘Becoming Democrats? Some Sceptical Considerations on the Right in Latin America’, in Chalmers et al., The Right and Democracy, pp. 68–98. 56 Ibid., p. 69. 57 Ibid., p. 75. 58 Ibid., p. 88. 59 Ibid., p. 92. 60 ‘Introduction’, in Chalmers et al., The Right and Democracy, p. 4.

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61 Middlebrook, Kevin J. (ed.), 2000. Conservative Parties, the Right, and Democracy in Latin America. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 62 ‘Introduction’, in Middlebrook, Conservative Parties, pp. 1–52, 6. 63 Ibid., p. 41. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid., p. 48. 66 Ibid., p. 42. 67 Ibid., p. 48. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid., p. 290. 70 Chalmers et al., The Right and Democracy. 71 Dominguez, Francisco, Geraldine Lievesley, and Steve Ludlam (eds), 2011. RightWing Politics in the New Latin America: Reaction and Revolt. London: Zed. 72 Lievesley, Geraldine and Steve Ludlam, ‘Introduction: Reaction and Revolt’, in Dominguez, Lievesley and Ludlum, Right-Wing Politics, pp. 1–11. 73 Ibid., p. 3. 74 Ibid., p. 4. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid., p. 5. 77 Luna, Juan Pablo and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser (eds), 2014. The Resilience of the Latin American Right. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 78 Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser, ‘Introduction: The Right in Contemporary Latin America: A Framework for Analysis’, in Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser, Resilience, pp. 1–24, 13. 79 Ibid., p. 14. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid., p. 16. 82 Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser, ‘Conclusion: Right (and Left) Politics in Contemporary Latin America’, in Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser, Resilience, pp. 347–367, 352. 83 Loxton, James, ‘The Authoritarian Roots of New Right Party Success in Latin America’, in Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser, Resilience, pp. 117–141. 84 Mann, Michael, 1986. The Sources of Social Power: Volume 1, A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 85 Ibid., p. 6. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid., p. 7. 89 Ibid., p. 13. 90 Ibid., p. 2, author’s emphasis. 91 Ibid., p. 3. 92 Ibid., p. 15. 93 Ibid., p. 23. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid., p. 24. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid., p. 26. 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid. 102 Ibid., p. 27. 103 Mann, Michael, 2002. ‘The Crisis of the Latin American State’. Paper presented at the University of the Andes, Bogotá, Colombia, to the conference The Political Crisis

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104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134

and Internal Conflict in Colombia, April 10–13. Available at: www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/ faculty/mann/colombia.pdf. Accessed: 10/06/2015, p. 2. Ibid. Mann, Michael, 2008. ‘Infrastructural Power Revisited’, in Studies in Comparative International Development 43, pp. 355–365, 356. Mann, Social Power 1, p. 27. Silva, Eduardo, 2009. Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mann, ‘The Crisis of the Latin American State’. Ibid., p. 3. Ibid., p. 4. Ibid., p. 5. Ibid. Ibid., p. 6. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 10. Ibid., p. 15. Ibid. Ibid., p. 16. Ibid. Ibid. Fairfield, Tasha, 2015. ‘Structural Power in Comparative Political Economy: Perspectives from Policy Formulation in Latin America’, in Business and Politics . ISSN 1469–3569 (In Press). Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/62123/. Accessed: 11/08/2015. Fairfield, ‘Structural Power’, p. 4. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 8. Ibid., p. 9. Ibid. Ibid., p. 10. Ibid. Ibid., p. 11. Ibid., p. 17. Silva, Challenging Neoliberalism. Smilde, David, 2014. ‘From Partial to Full Conflict Theory: a Neo-Weberian Perspective on Post-Neoliberal Venezuela’. Unpublished manuscript. Available at: www.sas.upenn.edu/dcc/sites/www.sas.upenn.edu.dcc/files/uploads/Smilde%20-% 20From%20Partial%20to%20Full%20Conflict%20Theory.pdf. Accessed: 11/06/2015.

3 RIGHT-WING POLICY DISCOURSE IN LEFT-LED LATIN AMERICA

Introduction A central assumption of this study is that elites in general hold neoliberal worldviews and policy preferences. This chapter, therefore, aims to empirically prove that this is the case. Neoliberalism, as understood here, is a set of policy prescriptions – as famously summarised by Williamson’s ‘Washington Consensus’1 – grouped around trade liberalisation, easier foreign direct investment (FDI), and the reduction of direct government and state intervention in the economy in favour of the private sector and the markets.2 It is also, however, as Panizza argues “an ideational frame … a mental structure that shapes the way its holders see the world”,3 in which the market is always held to be the central resolution mechanism of any economic or social problem. Previous studies have indeed shown that Latin American elites do hold such a worldview. Alcántara Sáez,4 in the exhaustive project he leads at the University of Salamanca on Latin American parliamentary elites, finds that Right-wing parliamentary deputies are most inclined to market criteria governing the economy and society, while those who favour state intervention in the economy and society are generally on the Left. However, Martí i Puig and Santiuste Cué5 find that many Left deputies are quite moderate in their opinions on market/state equilibrium, with some even quite tolerant of privatisation. Hence in terms of political elites at least, while some differences emerge, by and large the market is seen as an essential element in framing possible policy options to real world dilemmas. While these studies provide overviews of opinion on policy preferences, they tell us little about the cultural biases which inform these preferences. Reis,6 in her study on the attitudes of Brazilian elite actors to poverty and inequality, underlines the importance of researching this deeper cultural worldview in order to

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better understand the ontological roots of such preferences. Digging deeper into such elite attitudes can help us understand better the conditions under which possible changes in such positions may take place. It is elites, after all, who benefit most from inequality in the region while controlling the material and symbolic resources which need to change in order to create the conditions to lessen inequality there. Unlike the studies mentioned above, Reis includes a wide range of actors in her study – including in politics, public administration, business, and union activities. In her study she finds that while elites agree that poverty and inequality are problems, “they do not view themselves as responsible for contributing to a solution”.7 Some elites express a willingness to contribute on a voluntary basis to improving the condition of the poor, but most were overwhelmingly against paying more taxes to provide better services for them.8 There was a widespread emphasis on educational provision as a means to help the poor to help themselves, but little faith in the state to deliver it to an adequate level, even though most agreed that it was the state’s duty to do so. With regard to inequalities of race or gender, there was recognition of these but a rejection of state action to redress such inequalities, such as affirmative action or quotas. Again the emphasis was on personal effort on the part of members of those groups to improve their position, usually through education. Overall then, she concludes that while elites do have an awareness of social interdependence between social classes, manifesting itself in negative externalities such as violence and insecurity, elites themselves accept little personal responsibility for improving this situation, instead charging it to the state, in which they hold little trust. Reis does not explicitly link such attitudes to neoliberalism, yet the views expressed by her subjects clearly coincide with such Right-wing thinking. The emphasis on personal responsibility and effort, the lack of trust in the state, and the unwillingness to accept state action to redress inequalities all are indicative of Right-wing attitudes and infused with neoliberalism. By this reading, Latin American elites hold neoliberal views not simply as policy preferences, but as deeply held beliefs, shaping their worldviews and, due to their positions of power, the world in which the majority of Latin Americans have to live. In this chapter I seek to provide further proof of this, using material gathered in a series of 63 elite interviews held in four countries – Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela – between November 2011 and February 2012 inclusively. Subjects interviewed were drawn from Right-oriented political parties, major liberaloriented think tanks, business associations, private elite educational institutions, and from the Catholic Church, among others. Interviews were also held with academic analysts who have studied the Right in their respective countries and/or in the region as a whole. Questioning centred on inequality – namely state/market relations, attitudes to inequalities in class, race, and gender – and recommended policy remedies to the problem.

Right-wing policy discourse 31

The chapter presents three main findings, which broadly reflect those of Reis’s study. First, it finds evidence of shifts to more centrist positions with regard to state intervention in terms of poverty relief, hence indicating possible moves towards a consensus on basic social provision between Left and Right. Second, it nevertheless finds that these proposals are bound by ideological rigidities in favour of the supremacy of the market over the state as the key distributive instrument for wealth and social services, with more fundamentalist attitudes to market supremacy being found among many subjects interviewed. Such market prioritisation over social provision could have the potential to block the depth and stability of any consensus found, as disagreements over terms could emerge – over, for example, when a citizen becomes “deserving” or not of state assistance, the nature of such assistance, and the duration of receiving such assistance. Third, there is a prevalent rejection of the possibility of structural inequalities on a class or race basis affecting market participation of these groups, with more nuanced views on gender discrimination. Nevertheless, in all cases there is a generalised rejection of market intervention by the state to remedy discrimination even when it is recognised. Interviews also draw attention to specific conjunctures in each state, reflecting policy debates at the time: education in Chile; same-sex marriage in Argentina; negotiations with the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia/ Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) in Colombia; and the Hugo Chávez government in Venezuela. Despite such differences, however, what is most remarkable in terms of findings on the issues of state/market relations and inequalities is the level of ideological coherence across each of the four countries. The Right’s support for neoliberalism then is not on the defensive – rather these interviews show a clear commitment to neoliberal principles, albeit with some differences in terms of the degrees of support for the poor and differences on socalled valence or value issues. The chapter presents findings on a national basis, synthesised into general trends with quotes used from respondents to illustrate these. Cumulatively, they cohere well with findings I will present in the next chapter, which show increased embedding of neoliberal principles right across the power spectrum.

Argentina First, it is important to note that in Argentina, in the words of analyst Atilio Borón,9 “the expression ‘the Right’ has very negative connotations” associated with the dictatorship of the 1970s and ’80s and the human rights abuses perpetrated by the security forces during that era. Furthermore, much of the political space is taken up by Peronism, in which both the Left and Right have strong factions. Indeed it was the Peronists, under Carlos Saúl Menem (1989–1999), who implemented one of the most radical neoliberal programmes seen in the region in the 1990s. Hence, it is unsurprising that most people interviewed chose to identify themselves ideologically as centre or centre-Right, differentiating

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themselves from the Right. The Right is seen as being much more radical, not just in terms of human rights abuses and the type of ardent nationalism which led to the Falklands War (1982), but also in terms of neoliberalism, viewed widely as having had profoundly negative impacts on the country due to the spectacular economic crash following the Menemist period of liberalisation in the 1990s. Second, subjects interviewed had negative views of the governments of the Kirchners, the late Néstor (2003–2007) and his wife Cristina Fernandéz de Kirchner (CFK) (2007–2015). Subjects accused them of authoritarianism, especially with regard to freedom of the press; arbitrariness in decision-making; “populism” in both their discourse and policy; and, even, by those close to the military, of supporting “terrorism”.10 Third, some subjects questioned the Leftwing credentials of their social and economic policies. One Centre-Right deputy11 pointed to contradictions between the government’s “statist” discourse and its failure to pursue nationalisations, a more progressive taxation system, or a stronger health service. In effect the accusation is that CFK is not fulfilling Peronism’s main programmatic and ideological banner – social justice – despite discourse to the contrary. In interviews it was generally felt that the Argentine state was much too interventionist, and that instead it should be a “neutral” referee between competing private interests, with an efficient justice system central to this role to ensure respect for the law and for contracts – that is, judicial security (seguridad juridica) for the private sector. Socially, there was a consensus regarding the obligation of the state to guarantee access to health, education, justice and security (all of these coincidentally guaranteed by the Argentine Constitution). Further, those close to the Catholic Church show belief in a moral duty to combat poverty. Yet it was generally agreed that the state should only “rescue” those who are vulnerable or those unable to succeed in the market, and such support should be conditional on a return to self-dependence as soon as possible. Hence, for example, a representative of a major agricultural production association12 argues that “Argentina always has been a country with quite a large amount of state intervention in the economy … but if there is one thing that Argentineans manage badly it is state enterprises”. For this respondent the state only has competencies in “security, justice, health and education”, otherwise it should only have some basic regulatory functions, but in general “a free market economy is the best for the economy”.13 Similarly, Tonelli, a PRO party national deputy, states: The State should regulate economic and commercial activities to the extent that they need regulation but not to the extent where it dominates the autonomy and liberty of contract which should exist between individuals and businesses above all when there are stable rules, which everyone knows and which last, and which do not depend on the discretion of State functionaries. 14

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Tonelli also mentioned justice as an area in need of greater independence, and health and education as areas where “without doubt … State investment and presence must be decisive, fundamental and essential”.15 Marcelo Fielder, a director of the powerful SRA (Sociedad Rural de Argentina/ Argentinean Rural Society), representing large agricultural landowners and farmers, states: I believe in the market. The thing is that the State needs to have strong control of the actors in the market. The State must be an arbiter, avoid monopolies, favour competition, investment, and the entry and exit of economic agents. It must not put many obstructions on the creation of businesses and employment. 16 Nevertheless, this does not mean that “social necessities do not move me”, and it is the state that “must supply the immediate necessities of sectors of the population”.17 For Juan Pablo Cannata, communications officer for the Catholic Church’s Opus Dei organisation in Argentina, “civil society” has a role too in the provision of such services and the state can facilitate this by allowing greater tax incentives for market entities to donate to civil society organisations.18 Underlying this demand is, according to Cannata, “the principle of subsidiarity; that is, that when the primary entities have the initiative to resolve problems, they do it more efficiently than the superior entities, that is the State or larger organisations”.19 When questioned, however, if taxes should be raised in order to improve state social services and so reduce inequality, interviewees almost unanimously were against such a proposal, arguing that the tax burden was already very high in Argentina. Rather than higher taxes, what is needed is improved administration and implementation of taxes and public spending – which according to some should be reduced. Hence, the state already has the means to effect redistributive measures; the problem is the wasting of such resources, and the chief recommended remedy is more efficient management of these resources. Cannata, for example, argues that “in Argentina too many taxes are levied, which is common sense, independent of political orientation with respect to the governing party … you can say that now, fifteen years ago, 25 years ago. …”20 Rather “the State needs to be more efficient in the distribution of its resources through its bureaucracies …”.21 Similarly Fielder states that “we pay twice for the same thing: security, health, education. That is to say, the number of state employees has increased a lot without a correlate [improvement] in services.”22 The tax system needs to be reoriented away from salaries and primary (although not luxury) consumption and on to profits. But there should be a very low tax on profits that are re-invested. Marcela Cristini, senior economist with the liberal think tank FIEL argues also that “the rate of tax in Argentina is the highest which Argentina has ever had. It is around 38 per cent of GDP … [and] it is not progressive. … It reaches every corner”.23 Tonelli agrees, arguing that consumption

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taxes should be reduced and taxes on profits should rise.24 Salaverri argues that what is needed is not more taxes but “greater efficacy and efficiency in spending”.25 Interview subjects see personal progress as something which derives from natural talents and personal efforts, and that Argentina is a country where there is sufficient social mobility to reward such talents. What is needed is not new taxation or more state intervention but increased and improved employment opportunities to facilitate such rewards. In general, respondents are in favour of social programmes to help the poor, but not to the extent that they encourage a situation of dependency amongst those who receive them. A recurrent fear is that beneficiaries do not want to work and prefer to take advantage of such programmes, sometimes taking advantage of several of these so as to avoid working. For example, Norberto Peruzzotti, executive director of ADEBA, the association of Argentinean banks, argues that “second generations of some families are receiving benefits”.26 Similarly, Fielder estimates that there are 750,000 to 1,200,000 young people who neither work nor study, and “that is a disgrace because some of them have never seen their parents work, which means they do not have a work ethic … [which joined] with alcohol and drugs leads to delinquency.”27 Hence, social programmes should be finite and have an “exit” which must be work, citing what he accepted were uncorroborated online rumours that “there were people who accumulated benefits of all types … and receive more money than those who work and get up at six in the morning.”28 Moreover, many interviewees believed that these programmes were essentially clientelistic in nature, in favour of particular political parties. Natalia Gambaro, National Deputy for Buenos Aires province with the Federal Peronists, for example, suspects that a vote is “what a government benefit is worth.”29 Salaverri argues that the Universal Child Benefit (Asignación Universal por Hijo), which provides a financial benefit to poorer families that send their children to school, “is really interesting … but Argentina commits the sin of relating political action to those types of ‘perks’ [prebendas]”.30 Members of the Union of Promotions, a group of retired members of the Armed Forces, similarly decried that the Peronists “do not love the poor, they love poverty. Because as long as there are poor people, it is easier to continue with paternalistic schemes of ‘perks’ [prebendas]”.31 “Populism!” exclaimed another.32 Hence in making such comments, the popular sectors of Argentine society, or at least sections of them, are implicitly receiving a double criticism from respondents. On the one hand, those availing of government social programmes are seen as capable of deceiving the state by accruing benefits in order to avoid working, while on the other hand, they themselves are open to deception by governing parties disbursing such benefits in order to get elected. Despite this, however, almost all those interviewed insisted that such social programmes should be tightly focussed on specific needy or vulnerable sectors in order to ensure that those who are capable of work, do work. So for example, Gladys González, a PRO deputy

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in Buenos Aires city parliament, argues that the state “must be present and guarantee access to human rights, to health, education, housing for all citizens. But, in this case, obviously, these need to be focalised policies”.33 But how then to decide who gets what? When does the market step in and the state step out? González agrees that the state must guard against injustices caused by the market to protect those excluded and marginalised by it: But I do not agree that the State should try to interfere in the market and regulate specific questions. Its action needs to be otherwise. … But no, I can’t imagine how. The truth is that I’m unsure if anyone has done it with success. I can imagine that the State must be present to cover those injustices … but the question is a difficult one.34 With regard to ethnic discrimination, this was not seen as a problem by most respondents due to Argentina being regarded as a country of immigrants. By that, respondents meant those who came primarily from Italy and Spain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century and their descendants, not the more recent waves of immigrants from nearby Andean states such as Peru and Bolivia. As a result of the earlier waves of European immigration, Argentina is seen as a relatively ethnically homogenous country. For example, Alejandra Salinas of ESEADE, believed that “Argentina is a country with little racial inequality. You don’t see many Afro-Americans, nor many Asians. Basically Argentina was founded by European immigration, and you can see that from the people in the street, in Buenos Aires, in any province”.35 This immigration is referred to in mythical terms, in the sense that European immigrants – parents or grandparents, no doubt including those of many of the interview subjects – arrived with little in terms of material goods or money and made good of themselves through their own efforts and hard work. Those that did not achieve this were thought not to have done so due to their own inabilities or lack of effort, which harks back to earlier discourses about the vagrant poor, and further justifying the lack of necessity for state intervention to mitigate inequalities. Poverty and inequality hence are perceived by some subjects as personal choices and not as the result of structural imbalances in Argentinean society and economy. Eduardo Sambrizzi, of the Corporation of Catholic Lawyers of Argentina, for example, argues that “Argentina is a country of immigrants. … Many have arrived here and prospered through their own efforts”.36 Three positions regarding the role of women in society, particularly with regard to care of children and the elderly, emerged in interviews. First, a strictly liberal position emerged whereby it was a simple choice for a woman whether she wanted to work or to dedicate her time to her family. Salinas, for example, argues that in contemporary Argentina, “most women can choose to work or to stay at home … to care for the children”.37 In this account, the weight of tradition, the existence of machismo, and economic considerations are excluded. A

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second position, however, does take these factors into account and argues for more state provision of nurseries and playschools, these directed at the poor. Some even advocate extended paternity leave, alongside existing maternity leave rights, in order to allow women to effectively make that choice. Gambaro, for example, argues that working or staying at home can be a matter of individual choice or of cultural conditioning.38 Nevertheless, she admits that poorer women need crèches and playschools to facilitate their ability to make such a choice.39 González argues in favour of the 1991 gender quota laws in Argentina, which require at least 30 per cent of parliamentary members to be women. The state needs to promote gender equity, including increased sharing of responsibility for caring between both parents. This is necessary in order to help preserve “family life, which makes society more healthy, which is what makes us happy”.40 Policy options to achieve this are to provide child care facilities and social protections for poorer women, and to work more closely with business on these issues.41 A third, very minority tendency argues that the natural role of women is to care for others, due to their greater emotional sensibility. Sambrizzi, for example, argues that men “reason more, [while] women are more emotional … more sensitive”.42 This last point ties into more widespread views on the nature and purpose of marriage in the context of the debate on same-sex marriage, which was legalised in Argentina in 2010. Most interviewees expressed the view that marriage can only be between a man and a woman, primarily in order to procreate and raise children, hence declaring their opposition to this law, which was seen as contranatura. For example, Fielder accepts civil unions for same-sex couples, but “marriage is between a man and a woman. … By definition it is between persons of a different gender. This does not mean that [same-sex couples] should not have pension and inheritance rights, but they can attain those through civil unions, not marriage”.43 Tonelli44 agrees with this analysis, while Salinas45 and Cannatta46 suspect that the law is more symbolic than urgent, due to the prominence of gay rights activism in public discourse. Overall, a general picture emerges of the need for state and society to maintain the “well formed” family (familia bien constituida) as an essential social value. Many of these issues were seen in terms of cultural values rather than due to structural impediments. In this respect, education emerges recurrently as an essential tool for the preservation of moral values as well as an aid to material advancement: to preserve family values, to respect social rules and institutions, to resist “populist” tendencies (meaning manipulation by politicians), to promote cultures of caring for the less vulnerable, and to inculcate cultures of work and facilitate access to work and, hence, social mobility, among other benefits. González for example believes that many of these problems are “cultural, and the State must work on them through education, and that … this be maintained over time”.47 Sambrizzi contends that “wealth does not just result from goods but also from education”.48 Salinas points out that classical liberal thinkers such as Isaiah Berlin and Adam Smith “are in favour of public education, in order to facilitate

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peoples’ participation in the market”.49 Members of the Union of Promotions argue that the “only solution” to most of Argentina’s problems, among them populism, indolence, corruption, etc., is “education, and for that reason it will be a slow process, if it happens at all”.50 Education is seen as the most effective social mechanism to achieve greater equality in all aspects of the term, and public education specifically was seen as the ideal agent for such promotion, but never to the extent of restricting availability or access to private education, the existence of which went entirely unquestioned.

Chile In Chile, it is important to draw attention to two important contextual issues. First, as noted, Chile had a Right-wing government from 2010–2014, led by businessman Sebastian Piñera from RN (Renovación Nacional – the National Renovation party) in alliance with the UDI (Unión Demócrata Independiente – Independent Democratic Union). The RN came to power after 20 years of centre-Left Concertación governments – that is, since the return of democracy in 1990. Second, since 2006 the country has experienced one of the greatest popular mobilisations since the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973–1990), with students consistently protesting in favour of free, state-provided education. Both these facts colour many of the replies given by subjects in interviews. The protests eventually led to the return of the Left to power with Socialist Party candidate, Michelle Bachelet, winning a second term in 201351 on a mandate of reducing inequality, especially in education. It is also interesting to note that unlike in Argentina (or to an extent Venezuela), subjects have little problem assuming their ideological position as Right-wing. In Chile, replies to questions on state/market relations and measures needed to tackle inequalities elicited mostly market-based, technocratic responses, with some expressing a need for more social responsibility on the part of business actors. Most identify the market as the main redistributive agent, with the state assuming a subsidiary role. This is made most explicit by Ernesto Silva, a UDI deputy (and briefly leader of that party in 2014/2015), when he says that the state should, “promote and prioritise private initiative … and the State has a role to participate in those things which individuals and intermediate groups are not capable of providing for themselves”.52 Similarly, Lorenzo Figueroa, director of the Catholic Church charity Caritas, explains that the Church believes that it should be “the family, private groups, which, from their own perspective … educate their children, and … when they do not have the capacity … that the State step in”.53 As José Francisco García, public policy coordinator of liberal think tank Liberty and Development (Libertad y Desarrollo) states, if “everything is run by the State [this would] be against Constitutional norms, but also against the freedom of initiative (emprendimiento), freedom of educators to teach as they think best (libertad de enseñanza), and the freedom of parents to educate their

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child”.54 And as Rolf Lüders, an economist at the Catholic University and one of the original “Chicago Boys”, argues, “on efficiency grounds the private sector is better than the public sector and one reason is … that the public sector tends to be somehow restricted [in terms of investment due to] political issues …”.55 Nevertheless, with regard to that final point, Najel Klein, executive director of the Liberty Institute (Instituto Libertad), a liberal think tank close to RN (the then President Sebastian Piñera’s party), insists that the problem of political corruption is not as grave as in Argentina, for instance, and that in general Chilean business and politics is more transparent.56 State activity, therefore, should be directed only at those sectors where the market is incapable of generating wealth and facilitating participation in market activity. In general, state intervention is discouraged, and private, market activity is seen as the main mechanism to ensure more equal distribution of wealth. State services can be improved through better targeting towards those most in need, in education, training and generation of employment, rather than the provision of universalised programmes. Hence, again García argues that, “one has to put together state benefits … focalized on the poorest sectors. … Here liberalism differs from socialism and probably some conservatisms. … State action must be oriented towards the poorest”.57 This must be done, he continues, in order to “guarantee the maximum conditions of equality of opportunity so that the cradle does not define a person’s future”.58 This is necessary, he explains, to have a more socially mobile society “and I would point to the United States as a paradigmatic example of that”.59 Furthermore, efficiency and quality are better assured in such benefits through monitoring and evaluation of programmes. Hence, a number of interviewees argued that third level education in Chile (a continuing subject of great debate in the country) did not necessarily need more funding but rather more quality control. Klein argued that the university should “be audited and that an agency to control quality in state services should be instituted”. 60 Similarly, Jaime Bellolio, deputy director of the Fundación (Foundation) Jaime Guzmán, close to the political party UDI, also in government at that time, contends that “I do not believe in investing more in education without improved quality”.61 Some see state roles in correcting market rigidities, acting as regulator and arbiter. Klein, for example, argues that there is a need for “agreements with the business world …” and that the state should ensure “predictable economic rules to guarantee investor stability … and a respect for the rule of law”.62 All these measures are needed to optimise growth, which, according to Lüders, is the best means to improve income, enhance social mobility and hence reduce inequality: If the guy is poor and doesn’t have enough to live decently, I think society probably has a moral obligation to help, now how do you help the poor the best? Growing income growth; if you have a country which grows very rapidly, then the poor are going to get higher incomes.63

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García believes that the State should help small- and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) particularly as it is these which provide most employment to the poor.64 Increased taxation, however, is not a means to achieve any of these aims. García indeed argues that few would support such an idea as “the evidence has discounted the idea that taxes and tax revenue … help combat inequality … personal taxes are … quite high now”.65 And Klein cites the case of Europe as illustrative of this position as “Europe had a welfare state for quite some time … but the current situation [of crisis] is due to a large degree to excessive spending of which the main element was state spending”.66 And excessive state intervention in the labour market is also seen as negative for equality of opportunities as, according to Silva, there are “too strict labour regulations which can often leave workers without work”,67 especially, he claims, among women and the young. Therefore, higher taxes, greater state spending on welfare and overly regulated labour rules are not seen as effective solutions to inequality and poverty. Nevertheless, there is a much smaller, second tendency, expressed primarily by the Catholic Church, which levels a certain critique at abuses which may emerge from this free-market, socio-economic model. Figueroa, for example, argues against corruption in business and politics, and points to the need for political and economic power and the elites in general to demonstrate greater ethical responsibility towards the poor.68 This includes possible rises in taxes for businesses and an “ethical salary” which goes above the minimum salary. The aim here is to ameliorate the worst excesses of the neoliberal model, providing it with greater legitimacy among lower social sectors. In general regarding state-market balance, while all feel it is necessary to achieve equilibrium between the two, when pressed on providing responses to conflicts between social and economic demands, few go beyond offering existing institutions as a means to respond to them. Eugenio Guzmán, of the University of Development, for example argues that greater social mobility will be achieved through “a system of institutions respecting a strong rule of law and abiding by the law”69 and Klein argues that the present model “has given us stability [and] growth, and has generated opportunity for us”.70 Education, an issue which emerged repeatedly in interviews, is a case in point. Education, as we have seen, has been a key area of conflict in Chile for years, as students repeatedly protest energetically in favour of more comprehensive state coverage and free tuition to university.71 While most of those interviewed welcomed the debate, and while funding for poorer families was recognised as an issue needing addressing, the existing, mostly privatised educational model was deemed to be more than fit for purpose by most interviewees. Rather than being revised in line with student demands, most interviewees argued that it should instead be perfected through greater monitoring and evaluation to help improve quality, as we saw above, with perhaps increased funding for the poorest. Hence, interviewees emphasised the advantage of the existing neoliberalised model of educational provision, and the subsidiary role of the state, despite the fact that

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most Chileans were found in surveys to be in agreement with student demands and expressed low levels of confidence in institutions.72 This was borne out in the 2013 elections when the Socialist Party’s Michelle Bachelet, of the centre-Left New Majority alliance won by over 62 per cent of the vote against the UDI’s candidate Evelyn Matthei, the centre-Right candidate for the incumbent Alliance coalition. President Bachelet has since gone on to introduce legislation to raise corporate taxes to fund free education for all, although not without controversy and resistance.73 In Chile in response to questions regarding recognition of the rights of vulnerable minorities, two points stand out. First, the majority of those interviewed insist that minorities can find sufficient protection from existing legislation and that under no circumstances is additional legislation, in the form of state intervention to favour minority groups, necessary. In other words, recognition of minority rights is only conceivable in juridical terms, and as individuals, not groups. Hence, there is a rejection of measures such as gender quotas, special regimes for ethnic minorities, or same-sex marriage. Moreover, in terms of social mobility, all are agreed that this is, with perhaps some minor difficulties, accessible to all. There is acknowledgement that power needs to be circulated and must be made more accessible to different groups. Guzmán, for example, acknowledges that there is a need to limit elite influence and ensure changes in elite power.74 He recommends that the best way to do this is to have “strong institutions and respect for the law … [with] more transparency, more efficient judicial systems and watchdogs for business to control their actions”.75 Lüders argues that there is no elitist system in Chile, but that politics can be controlled by the very wealthy.76 He recommends a strong democratic system to ensure against this and increased funding to poor areas to ensure greater social mobility, as education and schooling are the main factors which can perpetuate elite power. Silva does not believe that the elites are in control of power – people from all backgrounds, he maintains, have opportunities.77 Increased education and employment and more political competition will ensure that such opportunities are strengthened. Hence in sum, few thought of Chile as an elitist society, but rather, due to its strong institutions, there is a constant circulation of power. Overall, interviewees believed that existing institutions and institutional arrangements guarantee against concentration of power and work in favour of social mobility, but that some changes are needed to secure its improvement. As Klein argues, no politician “is prepared to change the model because that would bring instability and insecurity, it would be to return to 30 years back. …”78 Similar arguments emerge in questions regarding care for children and the elderly, and the role of women with respect to these issues. Overall, there is a recognition that women must be given greater opportunities to participate in the market, yet changes suggested are mostly market based or call for unspecified cultural change. For example, Bellolio suggested publicly provided day care for

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children of poorer mothers and more flexibility in work arrangements, including in hours or possibilities of working at home.79 García also suggested state day care support for poorer mothers, as well as increased educational support for them. 80 However, he categorically ruled out gender quotas to increase female participation in politics and in other areas of national life. Lüders suggested a voucher system to help provide day care for poorer families to help increase the labour participation of women workers.81 Klein suggested a need for a law to ensure equal pay.82 A number of interviewees spoke of the need for cultural change to help overcome gender inequity. Again Klein spoke of a need for a cultural change in employing women in the private sector.83 Riesco also argued for a need to create a culture of appreciation of women’s abilities in the workplace and the need for equal pay.84 Figueroa felt that despite changes in public discourse, a change of roles has not really taken place within the nuclear family.85

Colombia In Colombia, all discussion was framed by the overriding issue of the country’s long-running armed conflict with the FARC guerrillas, which is a key defining factor for explaining factional divisions, strategies, organisational expressions and even core constituencies in the Right in particular. Nevertheless, this definitional role for the armed conflict is intimately bound with wider discussions about how best to achieve economic objectives. Hence, the solution to the armed conflict, the needs of capital and the prospects for social justice are almost indistinguishable in Right discourse emerging from interviews. Further, it is important to note that in Colombia, unlike in the other cases, the Right (and the Left) contains both legal and illegal groups. These two expressions of the Right are not mutually exclusive, however, with degrees of contact between them being noted. Such contacts spring in part from differences among the legal Right on how best to defeat armed groups, primarily the FARC, and so achieve economic objectives. The legal Right then can further be divided between what we can call “institutionalist” and “flexible” strategic currents. The first advocates a stricter respect for institutions and constitutional norms, while the latter sees these more as barriers to effective solutions to armed conflict. These distinct positions are politically defined less by parties than by personalities. Hence the institutionalist wing is led by sitting President Juan Manuel Santos, while the “flexible” wing is led by exPresident Álvaro Uribe (2002–2010). Santos is generally supported by Bogotábased, urban, transnationalised, business elites aiming at positioning Colombia within the globalised economy; Uribe by regional and rural-based interests, representing more traditional economic sectors, mostly landowners and associated industries. This conflict became the defining issue in the 2014 elections in Colombia, as since the field-research period, the Santos government has embarked on a series of peace negotiations with the FARC in Havana, Cuba. Santos narrowly won a second term over the uribiste candidate Oscar Zuloaga,

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hence allowing the negotiations to continue, but with a strengthened uribismo, including the return of the ex-president as senator, which could potentially complicate any peace deal emerging from talks. In Colombia strong levels of agreement emerge on the issue of state/market relations, despite the divisions in the Right previously alluded to. For most subjects interviewed, the role of the state is to promote the best conditions for market activity, either through public investment in services or in terms of regulation, and preferably in alliance with the private sector. Indeed, such a conception of state-market relations is so deeply engrained in public discourse that it is almost marginal to political electoral competition, including on the Left. There may be, at the very least, more social democratic readings of this conception, in the sense that the market be subject to greater degrees of regulation than currently exist, but these are very weak and marginalised. Furthermore, most respondents exclude the possibility of tax rises to fund such constitutionally mandated social provisions, though some would countenance such rises to support state activity in support of the market. In other words, tax rises may be possible but only in terms of achieving economic rewards, not to further more equitable wealth distribution. Hence, for example, José Obdulio Gaviria Veléz, advisor and chief strategist for ex-President Uribe and currently senator for the ex-president’s new party, Democratic Centre, argues that “the policy of President Uribe was to create the conditions to produce wealth, to invest in the country … to increase the GDP of the country and in that way finance social policies”.86 Part of this strategy, paradoxically, was a strengthening of the state. Marcela Prieto and Andrés Molano of ICP (Instituto de Ciencias Políticas/Institute of Political Science) in Bogotá argue that although it seems counter-intuitive, the Right in Colombia, more than other Latin American states, seeks a stronger state.87 Colombia has an exceptionally weak, inefficient state and those on the Right seek that this be remedied through a strengthening of institutions. They cite, for example, the difficulties of establishing a basic right such as the right to property, as property rights in much of Colombia, they argue, are regulated by paramilitaries and guerrilla, and not by the state. Ending the armed conflict and the drug trafficking trade are seen as essential prerequisites for the state to assume its role as arbiter, allowing it to establish and police the clear rules needed for the market to function properly. Uribe’s “democratic security” policy was aimed at achieving this objective, leading to a huge increase in state security forces. Mauricio Romero, of the Javeriana University in Bogotá, estimates that the Colombian State employs around 600,000 security employees, with security taking up approximately 5 per cent of the country’s GDP.88 Yet Uribe’s increasing association with corruption, mafia and paramilitaries began to be seen as a liability to this state institutionbuilding project, the ultimate aim of which is to create, as one member of Conservative Thinking explains, “an ordering, regulating and stabilising [state] which must fulfil this duty … efficiently”, and must, as another member points out,

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“promote a market economy in order to generalise prosperity”.89 Only this can permit the creation of a “welfare state”, which cannot, however, disturb “the liberation of the forces of the prosperity of the market”.90 The state must be “a strong but reduced state which is the only way to guarantee your equality. …”91 Ricardo Correa, an ex-secretary general of ANDI, the Colombian National Association of Industrialists, emphasises that ANDI’s main aim “continues to be economic growth and that this growth creates employment for everyone. …”92 These central tenets are questioned by few in Colombia. Indeed Prieto and Molano93 and members of Conservative Thinking94, both claim that the majority of the population is Right-wing, or at least as Correa phrases it, “have no idea that life could be any different”.95 In this scenario, Left and Right ceases to be about ideological issues and rather becomes based on whether one favours or rejects negotiations with the FARC. In this light, a member of Conservative Thinking asserts that José Manuel Santos, current president of Colombia, is Leftwing due to his pursuing such negotiations.96 Similarly those who seek greater degrees of regulation on the market are viewed as Leftist, even though the aim of such regulations may be to help facilitate greater globalisation, by bringing in better labour standards, for example. Alejo Vargas, of the National University of Colombia, argues that “Santos emerges from the more modern sector of the business class which seeks to insert Colombia among the more modern countries, modern democracies”.97 In this scenario, Uribe is of the Right and Santos the centre-Right. Yet both are in agreement on neoliberalism, “here there is a single mindset. Perhaps those of the centre view it somewhat critically but it is really very marginal”.98 Jorge Rodríguez, then director of CID (Centro de Investigaciones para el Desarrollo/Centre for Research on Development) in the National University, observed that while the 1991 Constitution invokes rights to health, education and housing, most governments of whatever political stripe have “adopted marketbased approaches to attempt to fulfil these constitutional provisions”.99 One member of Conservative Thinking argued, for example, that private sector participation in education needed to be increased as this was the only way to educate people to be competitive, which was the best path to development.100 Correa argues that in the ANDI “there is a perception that labour costs are very high, taxes are very high, and that there are a large amount of regulations to develop business activity”.101 Hence more state intervention to regulate labour, or extract more taxes to fund welfare is regarded as off the agenda. According to Juan Carlos Palau of the Ideas for Peace Foundation, rather “than increasing resources, which are always scarce, its more about how they are spent, how they are managed”, especially with regard to corruption, “which has been devastating”.102 Yet, nonetheless, there are demands which some would see justify tax rises, which again are linked to state-strengthening in order to strengthen the market. As we have seen, security is of fundamental importance and a large amount of resources is spent on this type of activity in Colombia. Additionally, José Félix

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Lafurie of FEDEGAN, the Colombian Federation of Livestock Farmers, believes that “those Colombians that can pay, should pay” for state investment “in security, employment, education, health … decent housing, electricity”, especially in rural areas, helping modernise them.103 Hence, Right-wing thinking around neoliberalism dominates Colombian politics and discourse. The battle between Left and Right is marginal, and the real battle seems to be between different versions of neoliberalism – one more elemental, represented by ex-President Uribe and the other seeking to ground it more in law and institutions with a greater sense of social responsibility, represented by sitting President Santos. Within this it is important to note, as many respondents did, the close relations between Colombia and the United States. Vargas, for example, claims that “Colombia has the strongest attraction to the United States in the entire region”.104 Camilo González of the NGO Indepaz, associates the Uribe Right with that of the Republican neo-conservativism of former US President George W. Bush (2008–2012), while the Santos centreRight is closer to the Democratic Party of President Barack Obama (2012– 2016).105 Thus the difference seems to be between a fundamentalist neoliberalism and a more post-Washington Consensus type neoliberalism. In Colombia equality is also conceived in a purely abstract, juridical sense as it impacts exclusively on the individual. Obdulio argues that opportunities are, in general, open to all, but the problem is clientelism and corruption. AfroColombian groups he says maintain that “there is a lot of discrimination but they do not offer any proof. … I say that they are not denied access to any services”.106 A Conservative Thinking member argues that paying tax for social services for the poor is useful, but “the problem is that [some] people … who receive these subsidies become accustomed to receiving [them] and do not do anything to overcome their situation”.107 Members of the group also argue that the Indigenous communities have a plethora of rights – to land reserves, to free university tuition, to representation in the senate, to exercise their own laws in their territories – and Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities have much power in many regions.108 These are treated as “vulnerable groups … but they are not. … They present themselves as victims”, one member emphasises.109 Quotas for minorities are seen as a poor solution, as they can be counter-productive, increasing rather than decreasing discrimination, as these groups are seen to receive special privileges. As one member states: “There should be no intervention, only equality before the law. … There is no need for privileges or more rights than anyone else”.110 In this respect, minority rights are viewed as a “non-issue” by many elites.111 Social mobility, then, is seen as an individual choice and perfectly achievable by all who choose to pursue it. Nevertheless, some suggested that if they choose not to pursue it, this may be due to particular characteristics of their group, hence in part contradicting the thesis on the non-existence of groups. Mejía, for example, doubted the wisdom of provisions in the 1991 Constitution granting land reserves

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for Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, as these territories are not “for sitting, contemplating the sunset”.112 Instead, he suggests, that inclusiveness is best found through the market. Hence, he says, in agriculture there are “great possibilities, but it has to be an inclusive sector … [in which] all of them must be business people. Consciously they are business people, but they do not know it”.113 This seems to chime with Palau’s assertion that business people “have difficulties in accepting processes of development which incorporate peasant or Afro-Colombian forms of production, of collective ownership”.114 Similarly, many voiced doubts at the wisdom of land distribution programmes for displaced peasants proposed by President Santos, due to the perceived inability of peasants to exploit the land to its full potential. The inference is that these populations are incapable, due to their very natures, of using these lands effectively, lands which are thus “lost to the economy”. Such conceptions are echoed in what would be considered more technocratic respondents. Constitutional provisions protecting minority rights open up, according to one respondent, a “dictatorship of minorities”, whereby “they become groups with their own agendas favouring private interests”.115 This could lead to the possibility of an “ethnodemocracy” on par with Bolivia, led by current (Indigenous) President Evo Morales.116 In general, disquiet about such issues is silenced, according to some respondents, both due to officially sanctioned “political correctness” and to a “Leftist” media, leaving the Right “cornered” (arrinconada) and with little freedom of expression, as one member of Conservative Thinking put it.117 Yet members of the same group, amongst others, do not hesitate to brand those individuals and groups, such as NGOs, in favour of minority or socio-economic rights and/or for a negotiated solution to the armed conflict as “Leftists”, discursively linking these with the guerrilla, whose only objective is to provoke violence, instability and disorder. In sum, generally speaking, a concept of group rights is comprehensively rejected on economic, cultural and political grounds, in favour of an individualised conception of rights, usually linked to an economic rather than social or cultural rationale. Moreover, to argue otherwise can be seen as tantamount to tolerance of criminality and violence while being intolerant of Right-wing common sense.

Venezuela In Venezuela, criticisms with respect to the government of the late President Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) can be summarised in political, social, and economic terms. Politically, the opposition accused the Chávez government of authoritarianism, to the extent that his government was in fact a “Castro-communist” regime with totalitarian intentions. Economically, it was seen as inept, allegedly leading to investment flight; shortages of basic goods; threats to private property, including expropriation; and general economic crisis. Socially, the government was accused of wasting resources, principally the oil rent, on marginally effective social

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programmes in an attempt to shore up popular support. These criticisms are levelled equally, if not more so at the current Bolivarian administration of Nicolás Maduro, who was elected by a very slim margin in April 2013, shortly after Chávez’s premature death the preceding month. Since President Chávez was first elected in 1998, the Venezuelan opposition tried civil disobedience, mass demonstrations, a coup, strikes/lock-outs and a recall referendum to remove him from office. Similar extra-constitutional and violent tactics have been used since Maduro came to power, leading to a large number of deaths of opposition activists, chavistas, passers-by and security forces. None of these tactics succeeded in removing either man from office. The spate of violent protest unleashed by the Opposition in 2013/2014 followed a lengthy constitutionalist period, roughly starting after the failed 2004 recall referendum against Chávez’s mandate and picking up momentum after the loss of the 2006 presidential elections. From thence on, the Opposition concentrated primarily on the electoral route and sought a united political and discursive front through the MUD (Mesa de Unidad Democrática/Democratic Unity Coalition). The MUD portrays itself as centre or indeed centre-Left and has a wide variety of groups and parties from Left to Right as members. As a result in Venezuela we did not target Right-wing groups per se, but rather looked to engage with groups close to the MUD. Furthermore, interviews are augmented by readings of key policy papers, most notably the 2012 Guidelines for a Government of National Unity Programme, (2013–2019). Nevertheless, findings on key issues express broad similarities with those in other countries. In Venezuela, Opposition economic policies aim to develop what Julio Borges, leader of the First Justice party, refers to as a “productive society”, as opposed to the existing oil-based rentier economy.118 This will be achieved by pursuing a double strategy of, on the one hand, using oil rents to stimulate the private sector within the country, while on the other, simultaneously opening up the Venezuelan economy to private investment, both foreign and national. Increased business activity, employment, and tax revenues will lessen the burden of poverty, while increasing non-oil income and lessening state dependence on oil for revenue. State functions will be slimmed down, from the current perceived high levels of interventionism, to that of arbiter, overseer and regulator, seeking to create the conditions necessary for the flourishing of the market, while providing infrastructure and basic public services. The aim then, in the words of the leading liberal politician María Corina Machado, is to create “a strong but restricted state” to bring it closer to “a more pragmatic consideration of the state-citizen (relation) that is not on a left-right axis”.119 To achieve this change from rentism to “productivism”, the Opposition seeks to refrain from being “ideologically pure or closed” but also insists that policy must be fundamentally grounded in “the preservation and guarantee of private property, of economic liberty and of private initiative”.120 To achieve these objectives, one of the first tasks is to reduce the size of the state, which according

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to Borges is “absolutely enormous, oil dominated, bureaucratic, and which has gone about co-opting people’s lives and consciences”.121 This task is envisaged principally as a realignment of the central relationship between the state and the national oil company, PDVSA, keeping the company within state ownership, but making it more autonomous from the state, especially the executive. There is a lack of clarity with regard to privatising other nationalised industries. Opposition policy documents state that there is a need to “establish the preeminence of private ownership over state ownership, especially in those sectors where the historical evidence shows greater efficiency”.122 Yet the meaning of this statement is unclear and in interviews for this study, prominent Opposition politicians expressed differing views. Ismael García of the social-democratic PODEMOS (Por la Democracia Social/For Social Democracy), categorically states, for example, that oil, electricity and water “must be in the hands of government and the State obviously for strategic reasons. They cannot be privatised”.123 On the other hand, Machado argues that “strategic sectors don’t exist, they are businesses full stop”,124 while Borges seems to support Machado’s position, excepting, however, the oil industry, which he says, “seems to me strategic, but we could open up to Venezuelans, to the money which is in other countries to be invested in this country”.125 In terms of social policy, which is seen as complementary to its economic policy, the aim is to create “access to dignified and well-paid jobs, a quality education in a competitive world, and a highly efficient public health and social security system, among others”.126 Again in a notable continuist vein, the Chávez government’s Social Missions will be preserved, although stripped of their supposed clientelistic, demagogic and ideologically discriminatory uses.127 This will involve placing these in the power of their respective ministries128 and decentralising the Health Missions to the state level129 as part of a general decentralisation policy. Moreover, private sector involvement in social provision will be encouraged to help manage “budget restrictions”.130 Therefore, Venezuelan Opposition social policy has several notable characteristics. First, there is a commitment to enact a strong, vigorous social policy to combat poverty. This, however, is less conceived as universal in the widest sense, but rather as targeted at those seen as “most in need … because the state cannot maintain all of society”.131 It is also ultimately oriented at creating opportunities to achieve individual autonomy, as Julio Borges vividly illustrates in this comment on the purpose of the Missions: Supposing that you fall in the river and you don’t know how to swim and you are drowning. The Missions are the lifebelts which are launched so that you can float and save yourself; the difference between the government and us is that we are clear that the final aim is to get you out of the river. For the government the ultimate aim is that you stay floating in the river dependent on the government.132

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Indeed, Borges goes further, arguing that the ultimate aim of social policy is the end of such social supports, which will be achieved through the “productive” economic policies outlined above: In other words the best social policy is that the country does not need social policy. That it goes beyond that level of need. How is that achieved? With the other stage of productivity, investment, diversification of the economy.133 Third, while this task is seen to be primarily that of the state, wide-ranging scope is left open for the private sector in all areas of social policy, both directly and indirectly, which seems to be linked to a policy of decentralising these services to the state and municipal level. Fourth, social, policing and justice services are characterised by an emphasis on “quality” and “efficiency” rather than on supposed partisan criteria, and policies of “depoliticisation” are signalled in all these areas. Chief among the targets for such a policy will be the existing Mission programmes installed by the Chávez government, which while being continued, will nonetheless be tied to other services, “professionalised” and integrated into the pertinent ministries and their existing service provision. Hence, one could summarise Opposition social policy as social market policy in the sense that social services are provided in function of people’s participation in the labour market, which is viewed as the ideal path to achieve individual autonomy equated, in the final analysis, to an absence of the state in social provision. Moreover, while some level of continuity is suggested with an emphasis on poverty and assurances that some of the more important Missions will be maintained, this may be more in appearance than in substance, as suggested here by a representative from a liberal think tank: The opposition is going to have to look again at134 everything to do with the Missions and work on that basis and most probably leave the name of Mission because there are people who are very frightened that they will lose their scholarship.135 Finally, while in policy papers there are sections dealing with ethnic, gender and sexual orientation inequalities, in interviews, respondents generally did not show any great concern or urgency for these. Rather they were regarded by most as non-existent or as demagogic tactics on the part of President Chávez to maintain power. MUD policy guidelines set out under “Culture” call for the promotion of recognition of diversity under a decentralised model.136 Moreover, a programme of demarcation of aboriginal lands should be carried out137 under the auspices of a newly formed Presidential Council for Indigenous Peoples.138 No mention is made, however, of Afro-Venezuelans throughout the entire document. With respect to sexual orientation, there is a promise to “take it on within the context

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of the promotion of human dignity”.139 Finally, with regard to gender equity, there are promises to promote a context conducive to greater gender equity140 through the enforcement of current laws and the “depoliticisation” of existing institutions charged with defending and promoting gender equality,141 as well as through the creation and execution in a participative manner of a long-term National Plan for Equal Opportunities142, the mainstreaming of gender equity into government decision-making processes143 and the promotion of equal female participation in decision-making positions in all of the public powers. In interviews such issues were regarded by some as of secondary importance or as demagogic tactics on the part of President Chávez to maintain power. Various interviewees argued that Venezuela was a mestizo (mixed race) country and for that reason race was not an issue.144 One prominent opposition collaborator, for example, claims that in Venezuela “there is a colour barrier but it is a colour barrier that in not an obstacle to social benefits” and that “the theme of Afro descendants was just revolutionary nonsense”,145 a perspective also expressed by Scharifker.146 The then president of the business federation, FEDECAMARAS, Botti, however, did acknowledge that “black people got fewer opportunities” in Venezuela147 and Scharifker pointed out that there were too few black people in government.148 Maldonado more forcefully argued that the big problem in Venezuela was that most people do not recognise that there is a problem of racism in the country. He points out that Venezuela suffers from being obsessed with aesthetics and “overweight, short, and black people are not considered beautiful. … They have to make much more effort to be successful”. He suggests that affirmative action in employment may be necessary but the most important thing is to improve education in coastal zones, where most Afro-Venezuelans live.149 There is more awareness on gender issues, with Botti150, España151, González152, Machado153 and Maldonado154 all recognising that women have fewer opportunities in many fields than men. Nevertheless, González, then coordinator of the MUD, recognises that the opposition needs to give more thought to gender issues.155 Maldonado also argues that, like racism, many people do not regard it as a problem.156 Indeed, Guijarro argues that gender equality is not a great theme for debate in Venezuela as “we have other more important priorities”.157 Finally, Machado, a prominent opposition politician, is concerned about increasing women’s participation in politics, about teenage pregnancies, and about violence against women, and calls for a “frank discussion about abortion”.158

Conclusion To sum up the discussion, the following can be stated. Ideologically, there is a firm consensus around the subsidiarity of the state to the market. The state’s role is to provide order, both in a security and in a juridical sense; to support the

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development of private enterprise, with infrastructural development, tax breaks and other incentives mentioned; to collaborate where possible with the private sector in the development of such infrastructure; and to act as arbiter and regulator so as to ensure market efficiency. State intervention in the economy – and indeed society – must be kept to a minimum, if it should exist at all. Indeed the state should regard the economy as the preserve of the private sector and ensure its continuance. Further, the state should ensure provision of basic public services – primarily health and education – although not necessarily by the state. Moreover, these services are viewed not in terms of lessening inequality, nor less as universal rights, but rather in terms of facilitating individuals to participate in the market, with employment – in the private sector preferably – seen as the main gateway to achieving this. This viewpoint is in line with orthodox neoliberal policies as promulgated by international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, as well as mainstream political thinking in Europe and the United States.159 Views on inequalities of class, race or gender are for the most part unacknowledged in all four countries, with instead an emphasis on the individual, who with the right guidance, support and personal effort and regardless of race, class or gender, can participate in national life and achieve success to any level. Some respondents, as we have seen, expressed the opinion that indolence among popular sectors or particular ethnic groups may be due to negative influences of their particular class background or ethnicity. In short, such identities are on the one hand not considered by the market as hindrances, but can hinder the individual in his or her intent to participate in the market. Exceptions here are women, who, according to some, may choose not to participate in the market in order to devote time to family. Yet again, however, this is sometimes ascribed to their essential nature, as innately caring and nurturing and not simply to their individual choice. It is to be noted, however, that such gender stereotypes are not generalised as in Argentina and Chile, in particular, there is a general acceptance on the need for action to improve gender equality in the workplace. Nevertheless, policy solutions offered are primarily market based and rarely accept state intervention. There is an often expressed fear of welfare abuse by individuals and families in popular sectors, and calls for effective design of social policy to encourage, incentivise and even force market participation. Meanwhile, education, especially in Argentina, is identified as key to ensure that an equally supposed innate entrepreneurialism predominates in the popular imagination. There is evidence of conservative/liberal distinctions over “value issues” to do primarily with the family – e.g. abortion, same-sex marriage, etc. Yet in essence this is found to be more apparent than real. As there is a generalised rejection of the existence of inequalities, there is, in effect, little moral conviction behind liberal concepts of gender equality, held for example by some more technocratic subjects. How can the state intervene in support of gender equality when equality is fundamentally achievable for all through the market? Furthermore, as women

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are poorly represented in most of the organisations targeted, this would lessen debate on these issues within these organisations. Finally, of the few women presented for interview,160 these expressed conflicting, usually conservative views. In essence, if the market is the great leveller, then it takes precedence over all other issues and considerations. More radical opinions on these issues were expressed by some interviewees in each of the four countries. For example, in Colombia radical viewpoints were voiced with regard to the Left from some respondents, viewpoints which have been shown to have possible lethal consequences, as the many assassinations in Colombia of trade unionists, human rights advocates and community organisers testify.161 In Argentina as noted above, some respondents linked to the military dictatorship claimed both Nestor and Cristina Kirchner supported “terrorists” in their attempts to prosecute human rights abuses. In Venezuela, some minority voices advocated the total dismantling of the Bolivarian state apparatus through the dissolution of the existing Constitution and the privatisation of state enterprises, including the national oil company PDVSA. To date, such attitudes culminated in many, sometimes violent, extra-constitutional strategies to overthrow Bolivarian democracy and exclude its leaders from power.162 While it must be emphasised that these are often minority opinions, nonetheless they are present in public discourse and influence general opinion on these issues. This was seen clearly in a violent campaign by student and other groups taking place in late 2013/early 2014 in Venezuela, led by some prominent Right-leaning politicians, including Maria Corina Machado, who was interviewed for this study. In each country, contradictory opinions emerged over a variety of issues. One important area was the extent of state involvement in social provision. In Argentina and Venezuela, for example, most respondents voiced strong support for state-provided education and health services. Yet simultaneously no one questioned the continued existence of private education and indeed in Venezuela this was positively encouraged. The extent of educational provision was also under dispute by students and other sectors in Chile, yet few of those interviewed here expressed doubts about the structure of the current mixed system. Similarly, differences, too, were detected as to the desired extent of state welfare provision. To what extent should it be provided, and how far should market excesses and instabilities be constrained by the state? One answer, voiced in Chile and Venezuela, is self-restraint on the part of capital, through corporate social responsibility programmes and the application of a more “ethical” capitalism. Nevertheless this could only ever be entirely voluntary and never imposed by the state. Frequently cited in all four cases was the maxim “as much market as possible and as little state as necessary”, yet the very imprecision of this formula denotes the necessity for a certain strain of pragmatism in deciding this balance which can cause friction among the Right in moments of stress (such as in Chile or Colombia). Despite these differences, discourse across the four countries reflects a remarkably coherent view of the type of society required in Latin America. This is

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essentially one where the state serves the interest of the market, ensuring its autonomy and promoting its expansion and power. Within this model state intervention in terms of correcting social problems generated by the market, such as poverty, must be kept to a minimum, be constantly reviewed, and tightly focussed, with the ultimate aim of inserting all people, regardless of their social situation, back into competitive, market relations. In sum, these elite interviews confirm that the main ideological project for those on the Right and centre-Right in Latin America remains neoliberalism, confirming the evidence provided by Reis, as reviewed above. The purpose of the next chapter is to show how this worldview is exercised in practice in the four principal countries in the region where the neoliberal model is strongest – Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. In that chapter I seek to show how neoliberalism dominates each of Mann’s power sectors, reinforcing it as the natural order of things, while simultaneously reducing the space for challenges to that model to emerge.

Notes 1 Williamson, John, 2004. ‘A Short History of the Washington Consensus’. Paper commissioned by Fundación CIDOB for the conference From the Washington Consensus towards a New Global Governance. Barcelona, 24–25 September. Available at: www.iie.com/publications/papers/williamson0904-2.pdf. Accessed: 15/06/2015. 2 Kirby, Peadar, 2003. Introduction to Latin America: Twenty-First Century Challenges. London: Sage, pp. 55–56. 3 Panizza, Francisco, 2009. Contemporary Latin America: Development and Democracy beyond the Washington Consensus. London: Zed, p. 9. 4 Alcántara Sáez, M., 2006, (ed.). Políticos y política en América Latina. Madrid: Fundación Carolina/Siglo XXI. 5 Martí i Puig, Salvador, and S. Santiuste Cué, 2006. ‘La izquierda parlamentaria en América Latina: Nuevas percepciones sobre la democracia y el mercado?’, in Alcántara Sáez (ed.), Políticos y política, pp. 311–343. 6 Reis, Elisa P., 2011. ‘Elite Perceptions of Poverty and Inequality in Brazil’, in Merike Blofield (ed.), The Great Gap: Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution in Latin America. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 89–109. 7 Reis, ‘Elite Perceptions’, p. 11. 8 Ibid. 9 Interview with Atilio Borón, Academic, 21 November 2011, Buenos Aires. 10 Interview with members of Unión de Promociones (UdP), military support group of retired military personnel, 22 November 2011, Buenos Aires. 11 Interview with national Congress PRO (Propuesta Republicana) Party Deputy, Pablo Tonelli, 23 November 2011, Buenos Aires. Note the interview was held before the Argentine government’s expropriation of YPF, the country’s privatised oil company, from Spanish oil company Repsol in April 2012. 12 Interview with Horacio Salaverri, Treasurer of CARBAP, the association of agricultural and livestock producers for Buenos Aires and the Pampa region, 22 November 2011, Buenos Aires. 13 Ibid. 14 Interview with Pablo Tonelli. 15 Ibid.

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16 Interview with Marcelo Fielder, Sociedad Rural Argentina (Argentinean Rural Society), 5 March 2012. 17 Ibid. 18 Interview with Juan Pablo Cannata, Communications Officer for Opus Dei Argentina and Lecturer in Austral University, 21 November 2011, Buenos Aires. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Interview with Marcelo Fielder. 23 Interview with Marcela Cristini, Senior Economist at the Fundación de Investigaciones Económicas Latinoamericanas/Foundation for Latin American Economic Research, 23 November 2011, Buenos Aires. 24 Interview with Pablo Tonelli. 25 Interview with Horacio Salaverri. 26 Interview with Norberto C. Peruzzotti, Executive Director of Associación de Bancos Argentinos, 23 November 2011, Buenos Aires. 27 Interview with Marcelo Fielder. 28 Ibid. 29 Interview with Natalia Gambaro, National Deputy of Buenos Aires, 4 March 2012, Buenos Aires. Gambaro was part of a more Right-of-centre grouping within the Peronist party opposing the ruling Kirchnerist Victory Front grouping, with Alberto Rodríguez Saa, ex-governor of San Luís province, one of its leading lights. 30 Interview with Horacio Salaverri. 31 Interview with members of Unión de Promociones (UdP). 32 Ibid. 33 Interview with Gladys González, Deputy for PRO (Propuesta Republicana) in Buenos Aires city parliament, 24 November 2011, Buenos Aires. 34 Ibid. 35 Interview with Alejandra Salinas, Director of Research, ESEADE Instituto Universitario, 14 November 2011, Buenos Aires. 36 Interview with Eduardo A. Sambrizzi, Vice President, Corporación de Abogados Católicos, 14 November 2011, Buenos Aires. 37 Interview with Alejandra Salinas, Director of Research, ESEADE Instituto Universitario, 14 November, 2011, Buenos Aires. 38 Interview with Natalia Gambaro. 39 Ibid. 40 Interview with Gladys González. 41 Ibid. 42 Interview with Eduardo A. Sambrizzi. 43 Interview with Marcelo Fielder. 44 Interview with Pablo Tonelli. 45 Interview with Alejandra Salinas. 46 Interview with Juan Pablo Cannata. 47 Interview with Gladys González. 48 Interview with Eduardo A. Sambrizzi. 49 Interview with Alejandra Salinas. 50 Interview with members of Unión de Promociones (UdP). 51 Her first preceded that of Piñera, that is, the period 2006–2010. 52 Interview with Ernesto Silva, Deputy UDI National Parliament, 20 December 2011, Valparaíso, Chile. 53 Interview with Lorenzo Figueroa, Director Pastoral Social, Caritas Chile, 16 December 2011, Santiago de Chile.

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54 Interview with José Francisco García G., Public Policy Coordinator, Libertad y Desarrollo, 15 December 2011, Santiago de Chile. 55 Interview with Rolf Lüders, Professor, Universidad Católica, Escuela de Negocios y Administración, 6 December 2011, Santiago de Chile. The “Chicago Boys” were Chilean economists who, through an association agreement between the Catholic University in Santiago and the University of Chicago, were trained under Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger, and later brought in by the Pinochet dictatorship to fashion economic policy for the regime. Lüders was Economy Minister in 1982 and Finance Minister in 1982–1983. Interview delivered in English. 56 Interview with Najel Klein, Executive Director, Fundación Libertad, 1 December 2011, Santiago de Chile. Although this may have been premature as corruption scandals rocked the political establishment in 2015. See stories in The Guardian: Franklin, Jonathan, 2015, ‘Chilean President Rocked by Corruption Allegations against Family Members’, 8 April. Available at: www.theguardian.com/world/ 2015/apr/08/chilean-president-michelle-bachelet-corruption-charges-sebastian-dava los. Accessed: 11/06/2015. Also, Franklin, Jonathan, 2015, ‘Godfathers of Chilean Right Charged with Tax Fraud, Bribery and Money Laundering’, 4 March. Available at: www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/04/chile-right-fraud-bribery-money-la undering-pinochet. Accessed: 15/06/2015. 57 Interview with José Francisco García G. 58 Ibid. 59 There is, however, considerable debate in the United States regarding social mobility, with most studies showing that it lags behind other developed countries. See for example de Parle, Jason, 2012. ‘Harder for Americans to Rise from Lower Rungs’, in New York Times, 4 January. Available at: www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/us/harder-for-america ns-to-rise-from-lower-rungs.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Accessed: 15/06/2015. And Zarroli, Jim, 2014. ‘Study: Upward Mobility No Tougher in US than Two Decades Ago’, in National Public Radio, 23 January. Available: www.npr.org/2014/01/ 23/265356290/study-upward-mobility-no-tougher-in-u-s-than-two-decades-ago. Accessed: 15/06/2015. 60 Interview with Najel Klein. 61 Interview with Jaime Bellolio, Deputy Director, Fundación Jaime Guzmán, 16 December 2011, Santiago de Chile. 62 Interview with Najel Klein. 63 Interview with Rolf Lüders. 64 Interview with José Francisco García G. 65 Ibid. 66 Interview with Najel Klein. At the time of the field research, the European common currency, the euro, was in the throes of a serious crisis which has since abated. 67 Interview with Eduardo Silva. 68 Interview with Lorenzo Figueroa. 69 Interview with Eugenio Guzmán Asterte, Dean, Faculty of Government, Universidad de Desarrollo, 13 December 2011, Santiago de Chile. 70 Interview with Najel Klein. 71 See for example Jara Reyes, René, 2012. ‘State-Civil Society Relations during Student Mobilisations in Chile in 2006 and 2011’, in Cannon, Barry and Peadar Kirby (eds), 2012. Civil Society and the State in Left-Led Latin America: Challenges and Limitations to Democratization. London: Zed, pp. 94–110. 72 See for example, Lagos, Marta, 2011. ‘Chile al Desnudo’. Available at: www.coopera tiva.cl/noticias/site/artic/20111028/asocfile/20111028111806/chile_al_desnudo.pdf. Accessed: 15/06/2015. And Alonso, Nicolás, 2015. ‘Un país desconfiado’, in Que Pasa? 19 March. Available at: www.quepasa.cl/articulo/politica/2015/03/ 19-16498-9-un-pais-desconfiado.shtml. Accessed: 15/06/2015.

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73 See Achtenberg, Emily, 2015. ‘Chilean Students Struggle to Deepen Educational Reform’, in NACLA: Report on the Americas, 3 March. Available at: https://nacla.org/ blog/2015/03/03/chilean-students-struggle-deepen-educational-reforms. Accessed: 15/06/2015. And The Economist, 2014. ‘Reform in Chile: The Lady’s for Turning’, 24 May. Available at: www.economist.com/news/americas/21602681-michelle-bache let-putting-her-countrys-growth-model-risk-ladys-turning. Accessed: 15/06/2015. 74 Interview with Eugenio Guzmán Asterte. 75 Interview with Eugenio Guzmán Asterte. 76 Interview with Rolf Lüders. 77 Interview with Eduardo Silva. 78 Interview with Najel Klein. 79 Interview with Jaime Bellolio. 80 Interview with José Francisco García G. 81 Interview with Rolf Lüders. 82 Interview with Najel Klein. 83 Ibid. 84 Interview with Eduardo Riesco Salvo, Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura, 15 December 2011, Santiago de Chile. 85 Interview with Lorenzo Figueroa. 86 Interview with José Obdulio Gaviria Veléz, Researcher, Centro de Pensamiento Primero Colombia, 18 January 2012, Bogotá, Colombia. 87 Interview with Marcela Prieto, Director, and Andrés Molano, Researcher, Instituto de Ciencia Política, 23 January 2012, Bogotá, Colombia. 88 Interview with Mauricio Romero, Lecturer, Universidad Javeriana, 24 January 2012, Bogotá, Colombia. 89 Focus group with members of Pensamiento Conservador, 19 January 2012, Bogotá, Colombia. This is a discussion group for young Right-wing activists and students, drawn mostly from the private Sergio Arboleda University, linked to the Colombian Conservative Party, with an online discussion blog “A la diestra” (http://aladiestra. blogspot.ie/). 90 Focus group with members of Pensamiento Conservador. 91 Focus group with members of Pensamiento Conservador. 92 Interview with Ricardo Correa, ex-Secretary General of ANDI (Associación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia), 26 January 2012. 93 Interview with Marcela Prieto and Andrés Molano. 94 Focus group with members of Pensamiento Conservador. 95 Interview with Ricardo Correa. 96 Focus group with members of Pensamiento Conservador. 97 Interview with Alejo Vargas, Decano, Facultad de Ciencia Política, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 26 January 2012, Bogotá, Colombia. Indeed Colombia has been invited by the OECD to join that organisation: See OECD, 2013. ‘Global OECD Boosted by Decision to Open Membership Talks with Colombia and Latvia with More to Follow’, 30 May. Available at: www.oecd.org/newsroom/global-oecdboosted-by-decision-to-open-membership-talks-with-colombia-and-latvia-with-more-t o-follow.htm. Accessed: 15/05/2015. 98 Interview with Alejo Vargas. 99 Interview with Jorge Rodríguez, Director, Centro de Investigaciones del Desarrollo, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1 February 2012, Bogotá, Colombia. 100 Focus group with members of Pensamiento Conservador. 101 Interview with Ricardo Correa. 102 Interview with Juan Carlos Palau, Researcher, Fundación Ideas para la Paz, 30 January 2012, Bogotá, Colombia.

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103 Interview with José Félix Lafurie, President, Federación Nacional de Ganaderos (FEDEGAN), 1 February 2012, Bogotá, Colombia. 104 Interview with Alejo Vargas. 105 Interview with Camilo González, President, Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz, 23 January 2012, Bogotá, Colombia. 106 Interview with José Obdulio Gaviria Veléz, Researcher, Centro de Pensamiento Primero Colombia, 18 January 2012, Bogotá, Colombia. 107 Focus group with members of Pensamiento Conservador. 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid. 111 Interview with Ricardo Correa. 112 Interview with Rafael Mejía López, President, Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia (SAC), 26 January 2012, Bogotá, Colombia. 113 Ibid. 114 Interview with Juan Carlos Palau. 115 Interview with Marcela Prieto and Andrés Molano. 116 Ibid. 117 Focus group with members of Pensamiento Conservador. 118 Interview with Julio Borges, leader of Primero Justicia political party, 28 February 2012, Caracas, Venezuela. 119 Interview with Maria Corina Machado, Caracas, 17 February 2012. 120 MUD (Mesa de Unidad Democrática), 2012. Lineamientos para el Programa de Gobierno de Unidad Nacional (2013–2019), 23 January. Available at: www.unidadvenezuela.org/ wp-content/uploads/2012/01/lineamientos2012.pdf. Accessed: 4/04/2012, p. 43. 121 Interview with Julio Borges. 122 MUD, Lineamientos, p. 587. 123 Interview with Ismael García, leader of PODEMOS, Caracas, 28 Februrary 2012. 124 Interview with Maria Corina Machado. 125 Interview with Julio Borges. 126 MUD, Lineamientos, paragraph 43. 127 Ibid., paragraph 42. 128 Ibid., paragraph 390. 129 Ibid., paragraph 879. 130 Ibid., paragraph 370. 131 Interview with Ismael García. 132 Interview with Julio Borges. 133 Ibid. 134 This could also mean ‘change’ due to the ambivalence of meaning of the Spanish word ‘revisar’. 135 Interview with Rocio Guijarro, CEDICE Libertad (Centro de Divulgación del Conocimiento Económico para la Libertad), 8 February 2012, Caracas, Venezuela. 136 MUD, Lineamientos, paragraphs 916–921. 137 Ibid., paragraph 1093. 138 Ibid., paragraph 1094. 139 Ibid., paragraph 1165. 140 Ibid., paragraph 1172. 141 Ibid., paragraph 1173. 142 Ibid., paragraph 1174. 143 Ibid., paragraph 1175. 144 Interviews with Tomas Arias, Academic and Advisor to Maria Corina Machado, 22 February 2012, Caracas, Venezuela; José Vincente Carrasquero, Academic and exAdvisor to presidential candidate Manuel Rosales, 10 February 2012, Caracas,

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145 146

147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162

Venezuela; Alonso Dominguez, Member NGO Liderazgo y Visión, 15 February 2012, Caracas, Venezuela. Interview with Luis Pedro España, Academic and Researcher, Andrés Bello Catholic University (UCAB), 17 February 2012, Caracas, Venezuela. Interview with Benjamin Scharifker, Rector, Universidad Metropolitana, 23 February 2012, Caracas, Venezuela. A more detailed defence of the latter position can be found in Capriles, Colette, 2008, ‘The Politics of Identity: Bolívar and Beyond’, in Venezuela: The Chávez Effect, Harvard Review of Latin America VIII (1), Fall, 2008, pp. 8–10. Interview with Jorge Botti, President, FEDECAMARAS, 13 February 2012, Caracas, Venezuela. Interview with Benjamin Scharifker. Interview with Victor Maldonado, Director, Camara de Comercio, Industria y Servicios, 7 February 2012, Caracas, Venezuela. Interview with Jorge Botti. Interview with Luis Pedro España. Interview with Marino González, Academic/Coordinator MUD Public Policy, 27 February 2012, Caracas, Venezuela. Interview with Maria Corina Machado. Interview with Victor Maldonado. Interview with Marino González. Interview with Victor Maldonado. Interview with Rocio Guijarro. Interview with Maria Corina Machado. Silva, Eduardo, 2009. Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 39. In total only 13 of the 63 people presented for interview were female. See for example the 2011 Human Rights Report for Colombia by Amnesty International. Available at: www.amnesty.org/en/region/colombia/report-2011. Accessed: 30/04/2012. Dominguez, Francisco, 2011. ‘Venezuela’s Opposition: Desperately Seeking to Overthrow Chávez’, in Dominguez, Francisco, Geraldine Lievesley and Steve Ludlam (eds), Right-Wing Politics in the New Latin America: Reaction and Revolt. London: Zed.

4 NEOLIBERALISM IN POWER Right-oriented state/society complexes in Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru

Introduction The turn to the Left in Latin America is generally seen as a result of countermovements by subordinate sectors to the implementation of waves of neoliberal structural adjustment policies in the preceding two decades, often, although not always, by centre or centre-Right governments.1 Left governments got elected on promises of concerted state action to lessen political and social inequality.2 This signals that majorities in Latin America had reached their limits as to how far neoliberalisation of the economy and society could take place, raising problems for those who support such an ideological perspective. Nevertheless, as pointed out in the introduction to this book, quite a number of countries remain under Right governments, or their policies remain very heavily conditioned by neoliberal precepts. Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Peru and most Central American countries remain heavily neoliberalised. Moreover, many of these countries, as we have seen, are now forming a new regional grouping, the Pacific Alliance, to further strengthen such processes. While the previous chapter showed how neoliberal ideas hegemonise elite thinking on issues of equality, this chapter’s main aim is to show how such ideas translate into strengthened elite control over the main sources of social power. These then become hegemonised by neoliberal thinking to such an extent that it becomes extremely difficult for even mildly alternative ideological models to emerge into public discourse and state policy. In this way processes of change are strongly conditioned by neoliberalism, and their parameters generally kept within a Rightoriented political direction (i.e. supportive of the main precepts of neoliberalism), even when that country is led by a Left government.

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I identify countries where such processes take place as Right-oriented state/society complexes. Economically, such countries are characterised by little state-controlled enterprise and low levels of market controlling state intervention, and with high levels of market freedom, corporatisation and transnationalisation of business ownership structures. They are also usually highly open trading regimes, with a large number of free trade agreements (FTAs), most commonly with the United States. FTAs are particularly important as they usually contain legal clauses which inhibit policy change liable to prejudice profit, regardless of its social or environmental benefits. More importantly, these rules are usually governed by courts outside national jurisdictions, often in the United States. Ideological regimes are controlled through highly concentrated and oligopolised media ownership structures which show heavy editorial biases in favour of maintaining and deepening the neoliberal status quo. Networks of liberal and Right-wing think tanks, supporting and espousing neoliberal tenets, are found throughout the region, often established with financial support from transnational organisations. Political regimes show remarkable levels of ideological uniformity in favour of neoliberalism, and even when this is not the case, policy deviance from neoliberal tenets is highly controlled due to the embeddedness of neoliberalism in the other power networks. Militarily these regimes usually maintain alliances with the United States, cooperating with the US in the region, and sometimes beyond, including facilitating US intervention under the banners of the so-called “war on drugs” and “war on terror”. As can be seen by this account, high levels of transnational influence traverse most of these power networks, mostly from the US but also from Europe, and increasingly from China. Each of these power networks will be examined in turn, using four major countries as case studies: Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Here again I find that despite Left-led governments in two of these countries (at the time of writing, Chile and Peru), neoliberalism is so deeply embedded in national power networks that alternative policy options are extremely difficult to implement without fierce elite resistance. It is further argued that with the official establishment of the transnational organisation Pacific Alliance in 2012, grouping the four main countries reviewed, as well as Costa Rica recently joining and Panama currently seeking membership, a longer term project to homogenise this political economy model throughout the Latin American region is a possibility.

Right-oriented state/society complexes: neoliberal hegemony of social power This section will look specifically at how neoliberalism hegemonises social power in the case studies cited above. These processes will be examined in each power network – economic, ideological, military, political and transnational, with examples drawn from each case country. In previous writings,3 I sought to demonstrate these processes in Central America. In the economic power cluster, I

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showed that neoliberalism has enhanced both general elite power vis-á-vis middle and lower sectors, while some elite families have had their fortunes regionalised and transnationalised. In the ideological power cluster ideological space has been occupied through the development of a new network of transnationalised civil society organisations (CSOs), co-optation of many existing elite CSOs, and an unquestioning acceptance of neoliberalism by an elite-owned and -dominated media. Both these sectors provided increased intellectual justification for neoliberalism. In the military cluster, continuity was achieved through the maintenance of core pre-transition military functions, such as intelligence gathering and constitutional roles as guarantor of the existing system. Meanwhile, military power was enhanced through providing the armed forces, especially in the “Northern Triangle” countries of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, with higher profile roles in the US sponsored “war on drugs”, which directly supports neoliberal restructuring by dealing with its negative consequences and suppressing dissent. Politically, I identified three types of party systems: neoliberalisation of the existing stable party systems (Costa Rica and Honduras); the emergence of a new multi-party system dominated by Right-wing ideology (Guatemala); and ideologically polarised party systems (El Salvador and Nicaragua) with dedicated Rightwing parties achieving, until recently, political hegemony over relatively strong Left-wing alternatives. Hence the party spectrums are dominated by neoliberalism in all five Central American countries, with the possible exceptions of the current left governments of the FMLN in Nicaragua and the FSLN in El Salvador, although even in these there are pressures favouring ideological and organisational homogenisation towards the Right. Finally, transnational power traverses all the other power clusters, as evidenced by the role, in all cases, of the United States and the “West” in general in establishing, financing and fostering ideological centres promoting neoliberalism within civil society, in the vast quantities of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flowing into the region, mostly into privatised enterprises and in links made with local companies through takeovers, franchising or association agreements. In effect, therefore, the hegemony of neoliberalism in all five power clusters in the region has created what I call Right-oriented state/society complexes. I mean by this that, first, neoliberalism has formidable collective power in the sense that dominant neoliberalised actors have horizontal linkages across most of the power clusters examined here. Second, as a result, this horizontal strength of neoliberalised elites can ensure them sufficient power to safeguard against counter-hegemonic challenges to their dominance. The confluence of interests around neoliberalism between these power clusters results in a narrowing of space for ideological alternatives to gain traction. While counter-hegemonic challenges can and do emerge, in civil society particularly, the dominance of neoliberalism across the five power clusters restricts their scope to become fully developed alternative ideological models. As a result neoliberalism remains the only political economy game in town, and policy space is restricted within its overall paradigm. As argued

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above, similar tendencies can be detected in some of the larger countries in the Latin American region dominated by neoliberalism, that is Chile, Colombia, Peru and Mexico, as the following sections will seek to demonstrate, yet few countries in the region are exempt from these pressures due to the dominance of neoliberalised elites across the power spectrum.

Economic Power Introduction As we have seen, for Mann, economic power “derives from the satisfaction of subsistence needs through the social organisation of the extraction, transformation, distribution, and consumption of the objects of nature”.4 Such activity directly causes the formation of classes and those “able to monopolize control over production, distribution, exchange, and consumption, that is a dominant class, can obtain general collective and distributive power in societies”.5 In this section I seek to show that in each of the cases under review neoliberalism became the dominant political economy model. This was implanted in each case from the 1970s onwards and no case has undergone an interruption in that process, even in Chile and Peru, where centre-Left governments currently hold power. This has by and large favoured export-oriented sectors, such as mining, or those with links to international circuits of capital, such as in finance, providing these sectors with greater influence in maintaining this model.

Chile Chile, as is well known, was one of the first countries in the world to adopt comprehensive neoliberal reform. Under the dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet, who overthrew the democratically elected, socialist administration of Salvador Allende in 1973, Chile embarked on a draconian neoliberal “shocktherapy” programme, which ensured “the quick liberalisation of most of the economy, including prices, trade, and capital markets”.6 Drawn up by a closed group of technocrats, many of them alumni of the University of Chicago, through its association with the Catholic University in Santiago de Chile – the so-called “Chicago Boys” – this policy caused a severe drop in GDP, prompting a change of course towards a policy of “pragmatic neoliberalism”.7 This brought in wider sections of the business community, to participate in economic policy formulation, leading the country back to growth. By the time of Chile’s transition to democracy after the 1988 referendum which ended military rule, neoliberalism was embedded as the country’s political economy model, a model which the centre-Left governments of the Concertación perfected and deepened over the next twenty years of its rule. Central to this strategy was the technocratisation of policy by these governments. As mentioned

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earlier Pinochet introduced the inclusion of business sectors in policy making processes, and this was extended and broadened by the Concertación. Pinochet included big business conglomerates and the Confederation of Production and Commerce (CPC), the country’s most important business umbrella association, ensuring “the assimilation of the bulk of the business sector into the neoliberal world”.8 By the mid-to-late-1980s, traditional ISI-linked business elites were displaced by those businessmen and landowners who had international economic interests, but also with substantial interests in the domestic market. In other words, the most transnationalised sectors of the economy became the most dominant fraction of economic elites in Chile.9 An essential part of this coalition was exporting groups in the agricultural industry and increasingly in mining. For example, Chilean exports are dominated by primary products, with these products consistently exceeding 80 per cent of total exports every year from 2006–2013.10 Mining represented 19.2 per cent of GDP in 2010 and 65 per cent of total exports, that is, $67.9 billion, of which $40.3 billion was for copper. Foreign investment is crucial to this activity, as FDI in this area represented 38.3 per cent of total investment in 2010.11 This model is rooted in the “pragmatic neoliberal coalition” formed during the dictatorship which, as Silva points out, “survived the transition to democracy”.12

Colombia Neoliberalism is also well entrenched in Colombia’s economic power structure. Neoliberalisation processes began in earnest with the government of César Gaviria (1990–1994), a long-term critic of ISI, an alumnus of the country’s premiere private university, the University of the Andes, and a member of the informal but influential group of neoliberal economists the “Swiss Club” (Club Suizo).13 On achieving the presidency in 1990, Gaviria wasted no time in swiftly passing a whole raft of liberalising measures, including in foreign exchange, the financial sector, taxes, the labour regime, housing, ports, and trade. As Edwards and Steiner point out, the significance of these reforms cannot be emphasised enough, as they transformed Colombia’s political economy model from ISI to a neoliberal one in a matter of days.14 A second wave of reforms introduced in 1992 included pension and health reform, a new central bank charter, a second financial sector reform, decentralisation, and privatisation.15 The subsequent presidencies of Ernesto Samper (1994–1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998–2002), continued with the neoliberalisation of Colombia. For example, between 1986 and 1998, the Colombian state privatised US$5.609 billion worth of assets.16 The government of Álvaro Uribe (2002–2006 and 2006–2010) was characterised by a deepening of the model, focussing on labour liberalisation, the privatisation of ten public entities, including in key sectors such as infrastructure, energy, mining, telecommunications, financial and service sectors and the opening of natural resource extraction to foreign direct investment.17 He negotiated

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an FTA with the United States in 2006, which finally came into effect in 2012, under his successor, Juan Manuel Santos (2010–2014 and 2014–2018). Santos, while ostensibly favouring a more technocratic, metropolitan neoliberalism, as opposed to Uribe’s “land-holding, provincial and Mafioso” brand,18 nevertheless has not moved “one degree from neoliberal norms”.19 However, as we have seen in the previous chapter, Santos’s main focus, unlike his predecessor, is on achieving a peace deal with the Left-guerrillas of the FARC to end the country’s long running internal war, and so secure the “judicial security needed by investors”20 in the country. Colombian exports are increasingly dominated by primary products, with these products increasing from 63.2 per cent of total exports in 2006 to 83.4 per cent in 2013.21 Mining is central to this phenomenon representing 4.9 per cent of GDP, and 23.7 per cent of the country’s exports in 2010.22 In April–June 2011 alone, Colombia received $2.4 billion in mining and energy related FDI out of a total of $3.4 billion.23

Mexico Mexico’s neoliberalisation began with the PRI administrations of Miguel de la Madrid (1982–1988) and of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–1992). During the de la Madrid period between 1983 and 1984, the state divested itself of the bulk of its companies, reducing them from over 1,100 firms to barely more than 200.24 But it was Salinas de Gortari who copper-fastened the reform process, privatising state telecommunications monopoly Telmex and the country’s banks. Between 1988 and 1993, the Mexican state sold companies with a value of approximately US$25 billion, more than one-quarter of the total in the developing world during that time.25 Moreover, Salinas negotiated, with the United States and Canada, the formation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which came into effect on 1 January 1992. Thus, Mexico abandoned its longstanding statist, populist and nationalist regime to become a “state attuned to the world economic model and embracing [its] role as a Third World country in thrall to the great powers, especially the United States, and the multilateral institutions over which Washington always held sway”.26 As Montemayor and Tinker Salas point out, the process set in motion by the de la Madrid presidency and embarked on in earnest during the Salinas de Gortari administration implied a “one-way journey toward neoliberalism, a journey that implied a completely different notion of the country and the maintenance of power for at least three or four presidential terms”.27 This project would liberalise land ownership; the granting of concessions in coastal zones; the privatisation of ports and petrochemical, communications, and water resources; the removal of subsidies and credits for agriculture; and the reform of labour laws, among other measures.28 It would be continued right up to the present by the presidency of Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000), the PAN presidencies of Vicente Fox (2000–2006) and Felipe Calderón (2006–2012) and the current PRI presidency of Enrique

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Peña Nieto (2012–), embracing second generation reforms in education, and in the state oil sector. As Charnock (citing Mark Williams) notes, Mexico was one of the most successful cases of neoliberalisation in Latin America, a region noted for its enthusiastic embrace of it.29 This embrace would be rewarded not just with its membership of NAFTA, but also the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, a precursor to the World Trade Organisation) and eventually as the first developing country to join the OECD.30 Mexico then, like Colombia and Chile, has undergone a consistent and uninterrupted project of neoliberalisation for well over 25 years, despite changes in government, and one that is continuing right into the present. Mexican exports are not as dominated by primary products as the other countries reviewed, with only about a quarter of exports coming from that sector consistently over the years 2006–2013,31 while most exports consist of manufactured products.32 These, however, are primarily assembly plants offering few linkages into the wider economy and poor wages and conditions for workers. Mining activities are important sources of profit, however, with annual production at around US$13.9 billion in 2010 and US$21.1 billion invested in mining from 2007–2012, $9.3 billion of which was invested in 2011–2012. Most of this was driven by foreign investors.33

Peru Peru also has experienced a quarter century of uninterrupted neoliberalism. As in the countries covered above, Peru experienced a sharp dose of neoliberal restructuring under Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000), which laid the basis for continued neoliberal reform programmes throughout all subsequent presidencies, right up to the present Ollanta Humala administration (2011-present). On gaining power in 1990 Fujimori wasted no time in introducing a draconian neoliberal shock-therapy programme, liberating prices, removing subsidies on basic foods, tightening monetary policy, restoring debt repayments, liberalising the foreign exchange rate, deepening trade liberalisation, cutting tariffs, reducing state personnel, implementing labour liberalisation measures, tax and banking reforms, an “aggressive” privatisation programme, and profound agricultural land ownership reforms.34 Despite having wide-ranging decree powers, he carried out a so-called “self-coup” in April 1992, suspending all democratic institutions and ruling in conjunction with the Armed Forces, which remained the mainstay of his regime until he abandoned the presidency in 2000. This allowed him to deepen the neoliberalisation of Peru even further, a process which was copper-fastened in his 1993 Constitution, which guarantees “the subsidiary character of the nation state, the territorial rights of foreign capital, executive privilege, and the centralized power of key ministries such as the Ministry of Economy and Finance”.35 This consistency is underpinned, as Durand emphasises,36 by an extraordinarily firm elite consensus around neoliberalism.

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Fujimori’s successor in the presidency, Alejandro Toledo (2001–2006), an ethnically indigenous, World Bank trained economist, deepened this model even further, playing “to the interests of foreign capital and Peru’s predominantly white and coastal-based commercial, financial, and agro-mineral oligarchy”,37 albeit with an increased social emphasis. The return of Alan García to the presidency (2006–2011), despite his disastrous and corruption-ridden previous administration (1985–1990), continued the implantation of the model, expanding the commodity-exporting market, as well as signing a Free Trade Agreement with the US, which came into effect in 2009.38 Humala, despite campaigning in the 2011 campaign on a centre-Left ticket, causing widespread fear among elites that he would join with the more radical elements of the regional “pink tide”, immediately assuaged such fears by appointing “market-friendly economic managers” to top economic portfolios, albeit with Leftists in positions with social responsibilities in an attempt to lower the country’s glaring inequalities.39 In this way he adopted “a pragmatic approach in keeping with the inclusive neoliberalism pioneered by Toledo”,40 while not undermining the freedom of “Lima’s business elite and agro-mining oligarchy to shape Peru’s economic strategy”.41 The passing of the 2013 “expropriation law”, expediting the granting of land for mining infrastructure projects, would seem to confirm this position.42 Peruvian exports are dominated by primary products, with these products consistently exceeding 80 per cent of total exports every year from 2006–2013,43 while mining investment grew from US$109 million in 2003 to $3.5 billion in 2013,44 underscoring the importance of this activity for the Peruvian neoliberal model.

Conclusion In conclusion, this section has aimed to briefly show how neoliberalism remains ensconced as the dominant political economy model for the four countries under review. In each, the emerging model was introduced under conditions of shock therapy, often under authoritarian conditions, but was continued and deepened, as well as being adapted and changed to suit emerging conditions by each successive government up until the present. Each of the four countries has been dominated by neoliberalism for up to a quarter of a century, benefitting those sectors of the business elites which are export-oriented and therefore the most transnationalised, particularly in the commodities sector, most especially in the extractive industries, but also in agriculture and manufacturing, such as in Mexico with its extensive maquila sector. Yet it was not just business elites who had an interest in continuing and deepening the model, but also those sectors of the elite, many of those close to, or involved with, the business sector, who dominated the ideological apparatus in each state, especially through the media and think tanks.

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Ideological Power Introduction Mann defines ideological power as “when meaning, norms and aesthetic and ritual practices are monopolized by a distinctive group”.45 The ideologies need to be “highly plausible” in order to gain popular legitimacy, if they wish to be “genuinely adhered to”,46 while simultaneously promoting “the cohesion, the confidence, and therefore, the power of an already established social group”.47 In this section, the sources of ideological power in the case countries will be examined. The process of neoliberalisation outlined in the previous section was accompanied by a transformation in each country’s system of ideological power. Here I identify two ways in which this was achieved. First, ideological space was occupied through the development of a network of transnationalised civil society organisations mostly consisting of newly established or co-opted think tanks, private educational institutes and productive associations, sometimes founded and funded with international cooperation funds. Second, the region’s media underwent a process of oligopolisation by Right-wing business elites, providing increased intellectual justification for neoliberalism. This is particularly important, because as Hughes and Prado point out, “media power operates on two levels to maintain inequality: first, by influencing the political and policy-making process, and second, by helping structure societal norms of cultural appropriateness”.48 It is argued here, that the result of these two processes was the formation of a highly concentrated ideological apparatus whose main purpose was to ensure the installation, maintenance and expansion of a neoliberalised and globalised political economy for each country.

Chile In Chile a central part of this strategy was the technocratisation of policy-making circuits, removing these from the sole purview of the state. As mentioned earlier Pinochet introduced the inclusion of business sectors in policy-making processes, and this was extended and broadened by the Concertación. The Concertación drafted members of the country’s dense think tank community into government bureaucracies, including Corporation of Studies for Latin America (CIEPLAN), the Latin American Centre for International Economics and Society (CLEPI), the Latin American Faculty of the Social Sciences (FLACSO) and others. Other Chilean think tanks such as CEP (Centre for Public Studies) and Liberty and Development (Libertad y Desarrollo) are ranked among the top 100 global think tanks outside the US.49 Few of these question the viability of the current political economy model, and many, such as Liberty and Development, strenuously support it.

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This ideological support network for neoliberalism is further strengthened by ideological uniformity in the country’s media.50 The print media is dominated by two media companies: the first and most important is the El Mercurio group, long associated with the Right in the country, and the second is the Copesa group, with close original links to the Pinochet-linked Right political party, UDI. Both, therefore, “manifest a uniformity of political-ideological projects, editorial lines, styles, and news coverage”.51 Equal levels of ownership concentration are seen in the radio market, although here there is stronger international presence. The radio spectrum is dominated by Consorcio Radial Chile, owned by the Spanish Prisa group and the Colombian Caracol Group (itself part-owned by Prisa) and the Ibero-American Radio Chile, owned by the Claxon group, with Venezuelan billionaire Gustavo Cisneros as main shareholder.52 Chile’s television market shows greater levels of ownership diversity than most Latin American countries. Chile has five national television broadcasters and a mixed ownership system. The main television group, Chilevisión, was owned by Sebastian Piñera, until he became president in 2010, after which it was sold to the US-based Turner Broadcasting System. The second largest channel, Megavisión, was part-owned by Mexican group Televisa and Chilean businessman Ricardo Claro,53 but it was passed to the Chilean business group Holding Bethia, owners of department store chain Falabella. TVN (National Television of Chile) is state-owned but self-financing, meaning that it is subject to the same commercial pressures as the other channels. There is also Channel 13, which is owned by the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, and a further private channel, La Red (The Network). Nevertheless, despite this mixed ownership structure, there is a lack of pluralism across “the entire media spectrum in Chile”.54 Emerging from under the dictatorship, the broadcast system in Chile has a “high level of ideological uniformity [with] … a high level of commitment with the neo-liberal model and culturally with a strong conservatism”.55 Media proprietors use the existing ownership structure and lax regulatory framework to prevent easy entry for other actors with possible alternative viewpoints.56 This consistent and persistent ideological projection of neoliberalism, through both think tanks and media among other means, has ensured that “market orthodoxy permeate[s] Chilean society from top to bottom”.57

Colombia In Colombia, Álvaro Uribe forged close links with non-electoral actors to help deepen the neoliberal model, and pursue his war with the FARC, most notably with business and media, themselves closely linked through ownership ties.58 Indeed, the penetration of business, media and politics in Colombia is extraordinary, with some of the most important political families holding key media assets, which in turn help support and are supported by those families’ business interests.59 Indeed, the current president, Juan Manuel Santos, is from an old Bogotá political dynasty, owners of the country’s most widely read and influential

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newspaper, El Tiempo.60 Moreover, Colombia also has extraordinary levels of media ownership concentration, with two companies, Caracol and RCN, effectively dominating radio and television, both with important international investment partners, including Spain’s Prisa Group, owners of that country’s flagship liberal daily El País. Neoliberalisation was central to the ownership concentration strategies of these media groups and hence its continuance and maintenance is of the utmost priority for them. As Bonilla and Narváez Montoya explain, in Colombia “media, political and economic power are essentially one and the same to the extent that the media identify with the same political project that defines corporate interests”.61 Simultaneously, “they are businesses actively defending a political project that can guarantee their development as businesses and even as monopolies”.62 This scenario, they conclude, means that the country’s news agenda is “deeply compromised by the political ambitions of some of the most powerful economic elites in the country. …”63 Playing a subsidiary, but no less important, role in the creation of that news agenda are Colombia’s think tanks. Although less developed than in other similarly sized Latin American countries,64 they nevertheless play a crucial role in “creating a climate of public opinion favourable to getting specific legislation passed”.65 Chief among these are institutes such as Fundesarrollo and the ICP (Instituto de Ciencia Politica/Political Science Institute), both of which are generally favourable to liberal democracy and market freedoms, with the latter having close links to conservative US think tanks, the Heritage Foundation and the Center for International Private Enterprise.66 Fundesarollo in particular is singled out by Edwards as the “intellectual breeding ground of an amazingly large number of those in charge of economic policy”.67 International think tanks, such as the German Konrad Adenauer Foundation, also play an important role, and new party linked think tanks are also emerging such as Álvaro Uribe’s Primero Colombia (Colombia First) institute.

Mexico In Mexico an equally powerful nexus exists between politics, business and the media. The Televisa/TV Azteca duopoly controls “90 per cent of the national, open-air television market”,68 and “Televisa is also a major player in radio and is the dominant magazine publisher in the country”,69 as well as having a “large influential presence across Latin America … and in the United States, where it owns an important network with Univision”.70 This powerful position dictates access and content, as well as commanding considerable power over political advertising.71 Both stations supported the Vicente Fox presidential bid in 200072 and in 2006 Televisa was accused of bias against the PRD’s Leftist candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador.73 Again, in 2012, controversy surrounded the close relationship between the PRI candidate Enrique Peña Nieto and Televisa, sparking off a student protest movement, “#yosoy132”, which attracted considerable support.74

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The media’s support for neoliberalism in general and the PRI in particular may derive from its ownership structures. Carlos Slim, a close friend of ex-President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, and now one of the richest men in the world, bought the privatised telecommunications giant Telmex, during Salinas de Gortari’s administration as seen above. Slim’s Telmex “controls companies which make up the second largest advertising group in the country”,75 “shares several key investors with Televisa and TV Azteca”76 and is also the country’s largest advertiser,77 all of which provide him with considerable power over content and plurality on the airwaves. Another example is Ricardo Salinas Pliego, close friend of Salinas de Gortari’s brother Raúl, who bought privatised state television channels to form TV Azteca, the country’s second TV channel. The Mexican media, then, is plagued with problems around “media access inequality, concentration of ownership, market share and advertising, and regulatory weakness”.78 Peña Nieto did initiate a 2013 media reform, ostensibly to end such monopolistic practices, but recent media outlet transactions seem to belie that objective.79 Media bias towards neoliberalism is further supported by a considerable network of think tanks in the country. In 2013 the country boasted 60, ranking higher in number globally than the Netherlands or Spain.80 Among the most influential are the CISLE (Centro de Investigaciones Sobre la Libre Empresa/Centre for Research on Private Business), the IMCO (Instituto Mexicano para la Competividad/ Mexican Institute for Competitiveness), and the IPEA (Instituto de Pensamiento Estratégico Agora/Institute for Strategic Thinking, Agora) all of which are dedicated to free-market thinking.81 Furthermore, interesting transnational twists emerge in this area, with ex-President Ernesto Zedillo being given leadership of the prestigious US-based think tank, the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization.

Peru Finally, the role of think tanks and the media were crucial in the development and consolidation of neoliberalism in Peru. These helped form an elite consensus around neoliberalism in the 1980s shortly after Peru’s return to democracy. Intellectuals such as Hernando de Soto, Mario Vargas Llosa, and Felipe Ortiz de Zevallos, formed “a network of domestic and external forces, based on their strong connections with other intellectuals, European conservatives, economists and US Republicans, as well as multinational organisations, neoliberal think tanks, the global mass media, and multilateral organisations”.82 This provided a powerful ideological apparatus to propagate and protect the neoliberal model. By the end of the 1980s, most of the main elite organisations were committed to neoliberalism, including the main business peak organisation, CONFIEP83 (Confederación Nacional de Instituciones Empresariales Privadas/National Confederation of Private Enterprise Institutions), a commitment renewed annually by them through the CADE (Conferencia Anual de Ejecutivos/Annual Executives Conference), the powerful annual business conference – a type of mini-Davos for the Peruvian

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elites.84 Powerful think tanks were established, including de Soto’s Instituto Peruano de Economía (Peruvian Economic Institute), Libertad y Democracia (Liberty and Democracy), and the Instituto Apoyo (Support Institute), “which receive generous support from international institutions and corporations”.85 These use a variety of media to “disseminate market ideas and demolish populist and interventionist ideologies”.86 Ideologically, neoliberalism is spread through both the Catholic Church and the country’s media. The Catholic Church came under the sway of conservative elite movements such as Opus Dei and Sodalitium Christianae Vital, with Juan Luis Cipriani rapidly ascending through the hierarchy to become the first Opus Dei cardinal in the world in 2001.87 These organisations hold important elite educational establishments, which provide cadres for the newly neoliberalised business and state institutions.88 The Peruvian media, like most in Latin America, was modelled on the US liberal model, depending on advertising for revenue.89 Both newspaper and television media display a high degree of concentration, with the El Comercio group (ECO), owned by the Miro Quesada family, dominating the market in the current context.90 The media adopted neoliberalism early, providing space for neoliberal intellectuals and propagators in their television and radio programmes, supporting pro-neoliberal electoral candidates and demonising those who oppose it.91

Conclusion This section aims to establish the remarkable levels of elite consensus around neoliberalism. In each case we have seen the establishment of powerful liberal think tanks who support, defend and help extend the existing neoliberal model. These often have crucial links, both through funding and/or through networks with other such think tanks in the United States and Western Europe, as well as in Latin America through regional networks such as RELIAL (Red Liberal de América Latina/Liberal Network of Latin America). These associations provide them with a crucial transnational optic from which to view national contexts. The work of the think tanks is accompanied and amplified through consistently oligopolised media systems, often the result, as in Mexico, of privatisation processes, led by important elite families, with close links to business and politics. These also rarely stray from neoliberal precepts in their editorial outputs and many also have transnational links through ownership, or through trade associations such as the powerful SIP (Sociedad Interamericana de la Prensa/Inter-American Press Society), the pan-hemispheric club for private media owners. Media ownership structures are crucial: “The owners of Latin America’s dominant media are part of broader economic elites that have benefited from the status quo of inequality and tend to share a worldview that normalises the current state of social relations”.92 Hence it is rarely in the interest of media owners to question neoliberalism, and fully in their interests to promote it. Furthermore, Hughes and Prado show how class, race and gender inequalities are reinforced by media in Latin America: “Journalists

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and figures represented in news content were overwhelmingly white males who came from upper economic strata”.93 Finally, in the present account, reference was also made in some cases to the important role of private educational institutions, such as the Catholic University in Santiago, Chile, the University of the Andes in Bogotá, Colombia, and the role of the Catholic Church educational establishment in Peru. No doubt many of the graduates of these colleges went on to staff the businesses, think tanks, and media outlets which so forcefully perpetuate the cycle of inequality existing in the region. Hence, all three elements create an ecosystem of exclusion which is instrumental in the defence and extension of neoliberalism in their respective national territories.

Military Power Introduction Military power, Mann asserts, “derives from the necessity of organised physical defence and its usefulness for aggression”,94 hence those who dominate military organisation can hold significant power within and beyond a specific territory. While in democracies, military power is usually controlled by political power, this is not always achieved in practice. In Latin America, military power traditionally has played an important role in politics, has maintained a significant amount of autonomy from political power, and has been expressed in a variety of irregular or paramilitary armed groups. Since the end of the military dictatorships of the 1970s and ’80s, there has been a significant curtailing of military power in the region, especially in the Southern Cone countries, yet even there, the Armed Forces still preserve substantial quotas of power. This section will review military power in the case countries under review, arguing that in most of them the military still maintains significant autonomy, especially in the context of the USled “war on drugs” and “war on terror”. In this manner the Armed Forces remain as protectors of the existing neoliberal political economy model, in each country and regionally through their associations with the United States.

Chile In Chile, of course, the role of the military in the country’s neoliberal turn cannot be overstated. After all, it was under a military dictatorship, one of the most brutal that the region has seen, that this turn took place. Under the transition, the Armed Forces remained in a powerful veto position with respect to Pinochet’s 1980 Constitution, still in effect in the country today, which bestowed on it many powers. Pinochet himself remained Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces until 1998 and a senator for life until his death in December 2006. Military personnel were protected from prosecution for human rights abuses. The military also were entitled to 10 per cent of all earnings of the state copper

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company CODELCO (Corporación Nacional de Cobre, Chile/National Copper Corporation, Chile), which they managed at their own discretion. Successive Concertación governments have succeeded in curtailing many of these powers and privileges, making Chile “relatively well advanced in developing the institutions for both democratic civilian control and effectiveness” with a particularly effective Ministry of Defence among other elements of civilian control.95 Even access to CODELCO funds have been modified, yet they still provide the Armed Forces with a large degree of autonomy, allowing them to be one of the highest spenders and best equipped forces in the region. For example, Chile spent 2.4 per cent of GDP on the military in 2012, compared to Brazil’s 1.47 per cent and Venezuela’s 1.05 per cent.96 Chile’s military has had a long involvement with the United States, particularly during the Pinochet years, and it cooperates with the “war on drugs” on training Central American police and military personnel and with the US-led anti-drug Operation Martillo (Hammer).97 The Chilean military not only has no reason to question neoliberalism, but rather every reason to protect it.

Colombia Equally, the Colombian military has little reason to question the current politicaleconomy model. Colombian military spending has remained consistently high, especially during the Uribe administrations. Spending on security services rose from 2 per cent of GDP in 1990, the year when Colombia embarked on its neoliberal turn under Gaviria, to 6.35 per cent in 2008,98 the highest in Latin America, with the second largest army in the region.99 Moreover, the close relationship with the United States in the counter-insurgency campaign and in the “war on drugs” gave the Colombian military access to more resources and cutting-edge technology than it would otherwise have had.100 Since the mid-1990s, Colombia has been the largest recipient of US military and police assistance in the Western Hemisphere. In 2000, this aid was grouped into one single programme, called Plan Colombia, by the Clinton administration, involving a transfer in aid of over $5 billion from the United States to Colombia, with the vast majority going to its military and police.101 Under US President George W. Bush, Plan Colombia’s role was expanded beyond anti-narcotics operations to include anti-subversion – in other words Colombia became yet another front line in the United States “war on terror”.102 Moreover, Colombia has increasingly become a central player in the “war on drugs” not only in the wider Latin American region, but also in North America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa and even Australia. WOLA (Washington Office on Latin America) reports, for example, that Colombian forces provided training and advice on antinarcotics strategy to more than 13,000 individuals from 40 countries between 2005 and 2012, and the trend, they maintain, is increasing.103 As a result of such investment, according to Bruneau, Colombia scores high in terms of civilian control and effectiveness of the Armed Forces.104 Yet despite

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this, Colombian Armed Forces policy has had devastating costs in terms of lives, livelihoods and human rights infringements, while ultimately having little success in its main objectives of curtailing drug production and trafficking, and defeating the FARC. With regard to the first, such activities continue in Colombia and have spread to Mexico and Central America, while drugs are still readily available in the United States.105 With regard to the second, at best it achieved a military stalemate with the FARC, ensuring in the end that a political solution had to be found. This realisation has led the current government of President Juan Manuel Santos to launch peace talks with that organisation in 2012. Nevertheless, the war policy has benefitted key power groups: multinational corporations, many of them US based, operating in the extraction and security sectors in Colombia,106 conservative sectors of the dominant classes unwilling to make meaningful economic and political reforms,107 and, of course, the Colombian military.108 Hence, ex-President Uribe, representing many of these groups, remains extremely hostile to his ex-defence minister’s peace initiative.

Mexico Mexico has shown a similar dependence on the United States, as it increasingly moves to the front line of that country’s “war on drugs”. It was the second PAN president, Ernesto Zedillo, who launched this war in Mexico in 2006, shortly after assuming power. Rodríguez Araujo and Scott Fox109 point out, quoting Jorge Castañeda, erstwhile foreign minister for Vicente Fox and well-known academic, that drug consumption was very low in Mexico compared to the US, concluding that Mexico’s entry into the war was largely driven by US rather than Mexican interests. This resulted in much greater powers for the military and security forces, increased military spending,110 and increased cooperation with the United States, including military training. Mexico received the bulk of the $1.4 billion funds attached to the US’s regional anti-drug trafficking Merida Initiative and its successor programme, Beyond Merida.111 This has included the stationing of US policing personnel in the country,112 as well as deep involvement of the military in anti-narcotics operations, a role normally reserved for civilian police forces.113 While the “war on drugs” has helped expand military autonomy, bringing it extra powers and resources, it has been extremely negative for the country’s citizens with “murders, robberies, kidnappings and other crimes [rising] to truly frightening levels, levels that were inconceivable a few years ago”.114 During Calderón’s sixyear term, 60,000 people were killed and 150,000 displaced due to drug-related violence, according to Amnesty International’s 2013 Annual Report.115 The report also notes numerous cases of arbitrary detention and torture and other ill-treatment; excessive use of force and extra-judicial executions; 25,000 enforced disappearances; assassinations of human rights defenders and journalists; violence against women and girls, including rapes and femicides; and abuse of indigenous people, most of these crimes remaining unpunished.

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Peru In Peru the military also adopted neoliberalism quickly after democratisation, forming alliances with the business community to fight Left guerrilla groups, such as Shining Path, which carried out a deadly war against the Peruvian state and civil society in the 1980s and early 1990s.116 The military was crucial to the maintenance of the Fujimori regime, executing the “self-coup” of 1992 and remaining a key element of his supporting coalition, guided and controlled by his corrupt eminence gris Vladimiro Montesinos. For example, in a 1991 decree, Fujimori granted exclusive control of “emergency zones” to the military in the context of the Shining Path War, zones which eventually covered 47 per cent of Peru’s provinces. Moreover in 1995 two amnesty laws granted impunity to members of state security forces for all actions in those areas since 1980.117 Since Fujimori’s departure there has been a reassertion of civilian control of the Armed Forces; increased education for personnel, particularly on human rights; an increased transparency of military spending, accompanied by significant reductions in spending; and, most controversially, increased accounting for human rights abuses during the Shining Path War.118 Yet Shining Path continues to be operational in the interior of the country, with illegal narcotics and insurgency activity increasing, allowing the Armed Forces to regain immunity prerogatives regarding human rights in emergency (i.e. Armed Forces-controlled) areas in exchange for more effective counter-insurgency operations.119 Furthermore, with regard to funding, auditing is largely internal to the Armed Forces, who, along with the Police, receive funding from a “defence fund” linked to profits from the natural gas fields of Camisea, funds which can be spent with little Congressional oversight.120 Moreover, the military has continued to be a central element of the US-led wars on drugs and terror,121 with the US consistently providing military and police funding to Peru, with for example, approximately US$45 million being handed over in 2014, the highest figure in South America apart from Colombia.122 In the face of increasing Shining Path activity and falling popularity, Humala is seeking increased US support for military training and counter-terrorism.123 This includes the stationing of 3,500 US marines in Peru, ostensibly for training purposes, although some suspect that it is to facilitate US intervention in situations of “socio-political convulsion” both in Peru, where anti-mining protests have been common for many years, as well as other countries in the region, most probably Venezuela or the other “Bolivarian countries”.124

Conclusion This section on the military emphasises the following points with regard to the role of the armed forces in protecting and maintaining neoliberalism. First, in three cases – Chile, Colombia and Peru – the military played an important role in the establishment of neoliberalism. In Chile it was the military dictatorship of General

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Augusto Pinochet that implemented the initial structural adjustment to neoliberalism and established it as the country’s political economy model. In Colombia, the Armed Forces – and paramilitary forces – have been essential in dealing with the threat of the FARC, the principal form of resistance to neoliberalism in the country, as well as protecting vital corporate interests. In Peru, the military ruled in tandem with President Alberto Fujimori in the structural adjustment and neoliberal consolidation period. Only Mexico is an exception, where adjustment was achieved entirely through the political system. But even in Mexico, the military is now a fundamental part of the effort to contain the consequences of the preceding decades of neoliberalism. Mexico, since its neoliberal adjustment, has become drawn into the US-led “war on drugs” with the result that the country has become increasingly militarised, with startling similarities to Colombia. Peru has also become involved in the “war on drugs”, although less dramatically than the previous two cases, and even Chile, although to the least extent of the four. As Mercille argues,125 in the context of Mexico, but which can also be extended to Colombia and even Peru, the “war on drugs” is both a consequence and extension of neoliberalisation. First, neoliberalism has displaced thousands of peasants from the land, forcing them into the drugs trade in search of a living; second, it promotes US intervention in protection of its corporate and strategic interests in the countries surveyed, facilitating the suppression of internal dissent against the model; and finally, it has been beneficial for business, including US and indigenous arms and security trades, but also in terms of money-laundering activities. As we have seen, the armed forces in each of the countries surveyed have benefitted handsomely from the neoliberal model, retaining some important quotas of autonomy, despite successes in civilianisation, and maintaining relatively high budgets, even in those countries such as Chile, which are least affected by the drugs trade. The military’s role in the wars on drugs and terror in the region is a consequence of neoliberalism, acts in protection of neoliberalism, and benefits from neoliberalism.

Political Power Introduction Political power for Mann is, in the final analysis, the struggle for and achievement of “state power”.126 It is centralised and territorial, and as such, is more bounded than the other forms of power reviewed.127 State power is at its strongest when it is infrastructurally strong, that is that it has high levels of command over each network of power, but also high levels of popular legitimacy, as in most advanced democracies. State power therefore is normally associated in democracies with political parties and elections. In this section, I will review the main Right political parties in the four cases studied, discussing their ideological orientation, their social bases, and their relationship with Left parties. In it I will argue that while

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party systems differ in terms of ideological diffusion, institutionality and stability, all are dominated by neoliberalism, even when there are strong, well-structured and popular Left alternatives available. This, I argue, is due to the extraordinary infrastructural and instrumental power of elites in each of these cases, which ensure that the state, even when controlled by the Left, does not stray too far from neoliberal tenets.

Chile Unlike many Latin American countries, Chile “has always had a stable, wellsupported right”.128 Chilean politics currently has two Right-wing parties – the UDI and RN – which together contest elections as a coalition option against the centre-Left Concertación. Siavelis sees the main difference between these two parties as emerging essentially from their respective attitudes to the Pinochet dictatorship. UDI was closest to the dictatorship, and its historical leader, Jaime Guzmán, who was assassinated in 1991, was a key advisor to Pinochet and “is considered the most important brain behind the elaboration of Chile’s 1980 Constitution”.129 In essence UDI is “staunchly Catholic, pro-Pinochet, and unyieldingly committed to the neoliberal economic model”.130 With close links to those elements of the business class who benefitted most from the regime, it also designed an effective organisational model which linked elements of these to the poor, establishing, as a result, an electoral base within this group as well.131 RN is “a more moderate option on the right”,132 due to its lack of participation in the military government, which allowed it to maintain a critical distance from the latter in terms of its political and human rights record.133 It seeks to capture centrist voters, with its main base of support among upper and middle class voters.134 Nevertheless, despite these nuanced differences, both UDI and RN share a strong programmatic commitment to neoliberalism, and hence since the return to democracy have contested elections as a Right coalition. Nevertheless, this Right coalition failed to win the presidency from its centreLeft Concertación rivals until 2010, led by RN’s Sebastian Piñera. Concertación governments, however, “consistently took the interests of the right into account”135 negotiating “details of legislation before legislating to assure passage”.136 Initially, this was due to an important array of constitutional instruments, inserted by Guzmán, ensuring the Right’s “fundamental interests”137 remained untouched. Nevertheless, most of these have been whittled away by successive governments, without disturbing the essentially consensual nature of Chilean politics. Yet even now the structural and instrumental power of the elites – the Right’s “core constituency” – to condition and even impede legislation remains undiluted.138 In this way, contemporary Chilean politics is characterised by the “shortening of the ideological distance between political parties” in the country.139 Both Left and Right are “entirely committed to maintaining the same economic policy”,140 with the main differences being around social issues such as abortion and

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divorce.141 This means that in reality, “pro-market policies are so well rooted in Chile that it would be difficult for a serious contender to depart significantly from them”.142

Colombia Colombian politics has been persistently dominated historically by parties “with policy agendas that are closer to the ideological right”.143 Its two main traditional parties, the Liberal and the Conservative Parties, emerged “as elite organisations that fundamentally represented the interests of the most privileged classes and, to a great extent, the landowners of the society”.144 As Colombian society became more differentiated on a class basis, both parties became more inclusive. Nevertheless, political parties representing workers did not develop, with the exception of the PCC (Partido Comunista de Colombia/Colombian Communist Party).145 The PCC, however, was relentlessly persecuted and excluded from electoral competition, which remained the exclusive preserve of the two main parties. The result of this exclusion of the Left was the founding in the 1960s of the guerrilla group, the FARC, and the resulting war between these and the Colombian state led by one or the other, or both, of the main parties has dominated Colombian politics ever since. Nevertheless, as a result of institutional changes brought about by the 1991 Constitution, both the main parties declined, particularly the conservatives, and more space emerged for alternative grouping, including some on the Left. It also resulted in the Colombian party system becoming less institutionalised and more characterised by disparate personalist, electoral vehicles, which nevertheless remain dominated by Rightist ideology.146 The country’s current main political rivals, Álvaro Uribe and Juan Manuel Santos, originally emerged from the same political parties, first the Liberal party and then Uribe’s PSUN (Partido Social de Unidad Nacional/Social Party of National Unity) otherwise known as the “U” Party. As seen above, both these options have programmatically little to differentiate them other than slightly different electoral bases and discourses. Both are equally wedded to neoliberalism as the only possible political economy model for the country. Nevertheless, they differ radically in their attitude to negotiations with the FARC, with Santos’s current administration holding peace talks with that group, these fiercely opposed by Uribe and his CD (Centro Democrático/ Democratic Centre) grouping. The Left meanwhile has been consistently marginalised, largely through discursive association with the FARC, creating a climate favouring assassination of leading trade unionists and Leftist political leaders. Moreover, the country’s political system suffers from chronic abstentionism in elections with 60 per cent failing to vote in the last elections in 2014.147 In those elections the Left supported Santos as the lesser of two evils, hence leaving Colombia dominated, as it has been for quite some time now, by two versions of the Right with little to separate them ideologically.

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Mexico Mexico has one specifically dedicated Right-wing party, the PAN (Partido de Accion Nacional/National Action Party). Founded in 1939, the PAN acted as a form of “official opposition” throughout the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional/Institutionalised Revolutionary Party) dominated authoritarian period of Mexican history. This period finally ended with the election, in 2000, of the PAN’s Vicente Fox to the presidency. Programmatically PAN is essentially economically liberal, Catholic and elitist. It accepts inequalities as “natural and outside the purview of the state”148 and is centre-Right on “public security, morality, and the economy”,149 drawing its support from “urban, literate and wealthy Mexicans”.150 By the time of Mexico’s transition to a competitive democracy, these essential elements of the PAN’s identity became overshadowed by its “pro-democratic credentials”,151 and it was on this platform that Vicente Fox drew sufficient votes from across the political spectrum to win the presidency in 2000. Yet as time wore on, and as the PAN’s Felipe Calderón succeeded Fox in the presidency in 2006, its essentially Rightist identity once again came to the fore, and its democratic credentials became tarnished by the brutality of the bloody “war on drugs” launched by Calderón on assuming the presidency. Since then the PAN’s electoral star has faded, losing to a resurgent PRI under Enrique Peña Nieto in 2012. However, the PRI itself, as seen above, had long abandoned its statist, interventionist, revolutionary nationalism, to become a “technocratic, neoliberalised” party.152 Part of this process was ending the PRI’s monopoly of power, allowing Mexico to become more electorally competitive, while simultaneously ensuring “the continuation of the neoliberal project in unchanging submission to the United States”.153 The elite’s structural and instrumental power was crucial in this respect, with support coming from the country’s premier peak business association, the Business Coordinating Council, the Roman Catholic Church and the main television channels, Televisa and TV Azteca,154 for Fox’s deepening of the neoliberal model.155 Yet the PRI retained impressive veto powers on constitutional change, and the competing political parties – the PAN, and a Left excision of the PRI, the PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrático/Democratic Revolution Party) – did not offer alternative democratic projects, simply reproducing the existing clientelistic structures.156 Hence Mexico became more electorally competitive, but not necessarily more democratic. Moreover, differences between the PRI and the PAN are slight, largely regarding axiological issues, such as abortion.157 Otherwise they cooperate willingly, as was the case against a popular uprising in Oaxaca in 2006 and in facilitating greater private participation in state oil company Pemex in 2013.158 As a result, “neither of the two main parties then have any quarrel with the prevailing economic model”,159 and both are equally prepared to defend it come what may. Even the Left PRD, submerged in internecine strife, accepted the model’s basic premises through its signing of the PRI government

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promulgated Pact for Mexico in 2013.160 Hence, as Rodríguez Araujo and Scott Fox conclude, “there are not enough counterweights to the neoliberal-technocratic regime for it to be neutralised, let alone reversed”.161

Peru Since the presidency of Alberto Fujimori in 1990, Peru has been dominated by neoliberalism. Yet despite a solid elite consensus around this ideological programme, the political arena, since Fujimori’s departure, has displayed inconsistency and instability. The political party system is fragmented, a process accentuated after each election,162 as candidates such as Alejandro Toledo (2001– 2006), Alan García (2006–2011) and sitting president Ollanta Humala present themselves as alternatives to the neoliberal status quo, to end up abandoning their electoral promises and conforming to and deepening the existing model. Nevertheless, Peru does have electoral options which present themselves as programmatically to the Right. In the 2011 elections, the majority of candidates were Right-wing, including the Alianza Gran Cambio (Great Change Alliance) led by ex–World Bank economist and prime minister (under Toledo), Pedro Pablo Kuczynski; Peru Posible (Peru Possible), led by Toledo himself, also, as noted with a World Bank background; Solidaridad Nacional (National Solidarity), led by ex-mayor of Lima, Luis Castañeda Lossio; and, most importantly, Keiko Fujimori’s Fuerza 2011 (Strength 2011). Fujimori outshone her other rivals in those elections, narrowly losing (48.51 per cent) to Ollanta Humala (51.49 per cent) in the second round. According to Meléndez, only she among the Right candidates constructed a discourse which included “increasing state influence and implementing mano dura (iron fist) policies to solve insecurity and disorder problems”.163 The other main Right candidates “were not able to move past an economic-centred platform”.164 Fujimorismo hence, “is the most socially supported Right-wing political organization in the country”.165 Fujimorismo’s reach goes beyond the Lima metropolitan area, to the mountain heartlands of Peru, where many remember her father as an effective president who brought peace and social programmes for the poor. Yet despite Humala narrowly winning the 2011 elections and being the only candidate on the Left of the ideological spectrum, in office he has remained within neoliberal policy parameters. Part of the reason for this is due to a reluctant endorsement from political sectors supportive of neoliberalism, such as Toledo’s Peru Posible.166 Yet it is also, as Adrianzén167 points out, due to the “extraordinary elite consensus” around neoliberalism, which ensures such continuity despite electoral promises to the contrary. The hysterical media and elite reactions to Humala’s 2006 candidacy,168 which he lost, and even against the much less radical discourse he presented in 2011, are indicative of the power of the elite in shaping contemporary Peruvian politics. As a result, despite there being a substantial part of the electorate which supports greater state intervention

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in the economy, especially on social issues,169 the main cleavage in Peruvian politics seems to be around Fujimorismo, which is identified with authoritarianism.170 Hence, Peruvian politics remains dominated by neoliberalism despite substantial demand for change.

Conclusion These brief portraits of Right-wing politics in countries dominated by neoliberalism present us with the following conclusions. First, political systems vary among them, from highly structured, institutionalised, electorally competitive and ideologically polarised systems, with major Left contenders, such as in Chile and Mexico, to relatively inchoate, personalist systems dominated by Right-wing party options, such as Colombia and Peru. In the latter case, furthermore, there is a consistent pattern, even since Fujimori, of candidates campaigning from the Left, but then implementing neoliberal policies in a type of bait-and-switch tactic. Second, even in those party systems where strong Left options exist, they have either not achieved office, as is the case of the PRD in Mexico, or have done but have not challenged the existing neoliberal political economy model, as is the case with the Concertación in Chile. In both cases this can be attributed to elite instrumental power, through the media in particular, but also, in the case of Mexico, as many believe, through fraud. The results in each case are party political universes which are either dominated by Right-wing, neoliberalised party systems (Colombia, Peru) or systems so heavily conditioned by neoliberalism that alternative, heterodox policy options have little chance of being considered, much less executed.

Transnationalisation State power also has an important transnational element which transcends, but is not entirely autonomous of, nation states, a factor that is of particular importance for Latin America due to its dependence on commodities markets, foreign investment and repeated interventions by IFIs in the past.171 Here I will briefly review evidence of transnational involvement in each of the case countries, concentrating specifically on FTAs and relations with multilateral organisations, such as the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD. I will then go on to consider the Pacific Alliance as a new transnational figure which seeks to provide greater support, structure and international reach to the existing neoliberal political economy models in each member country, making it even more difficult for that model to be undone by any future government.

Chile Of all the case countries, Chile is one of the most deeply embedded in transnational, neoliberalised globalisation networks. Chile has the highest number of free trade

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agreements with other countries in the entire region, with the most emblematic of these being that with the United States, which was negotiated by Ricardo Lagos’s Socialist led government in 2003. It also has FTAs with the European Union and China, among many others, making Chile “one of the most open economic systems in the developing world”.172 It has had a close relationship to the IFIs since its turn to neoliberalism, and is regularly trumpeted as a model for the region due to its extreme openness and consistent growth levels. According to the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, Chile is considered the most open economy in the region, with a score of 78.5 (with 100 representing total economic freedom and 0 a total lack of economic freedom), with some of its highest scores under the Open Markets rubric (i.e. trade, investment and financial freedom).173 As a result of this, it became a member of the OECD in 2010, following in the footsteps of Mexico, enjoying honorary “first world” status, despite having one of the highest levels of inequality in the world. Consequently, it would be extremely difficult for any government to decouple Chile from this vast and complex free trade network.

Colombia Colombia, more than other South American states, has extraordinarily close relations with the United States. Colombia was the only Latin American country to participate in the US-led war in Korea in the 1950s,174 and since that date the United States has been deeply involved in Colombia’s internal affairs, including in the war with the FARC. Uribe in particular intensified cooperation joining up with US President George W. Bush’s (2000–2008) “war on terror”, supporting his 2003 invasion of Iraq and hitting out at neighbouring Leftist countries Venezuela and Ecuador through “extraterritorial” actions in those countries aimed at eliminating FARC personnel.175 Such loyalty earned him a Liberty Medal from the White House in 2009.176 While Santos has distanced himself from the more warlike and confrontational aspects of his predecessor, he has not changed Colombia’s “carnal relations with the US”,177 while becoming the darling of the IFIs by obediently following their recipes and consulting with them permanently on policy.178 Both presidents then are “lovers of the free market and free trade agreements”,179 firmly supporting the country’s FTA with the United States, which finally came into force in 2012. As a result, Colombia is considered the second most economically free country in the region (after Chile), according to the 2015 Index of Economic Freedom, with a score of 71.7. Colombia scores highly in all areas (limited government, regulatory efficiency, and open markets) except under rule of law, where issues of property rights and corruption arise.180 Such loyalty to free market principles and engagement with the IFIs also earned the country an FTA with the EU, coming into effect in August 2013, as well as mooted membership of the OECD. This, despite objections to the country’s questionable human rights record; for example, the “false positives” case

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whereby an estimated 3,500 innocent civilians were murdered and passed off as dead guerrillas;181 and the 2006 “parapolitica” scandal revealing extensive connections between politicians, paramilitaries and drug traffickers, including allowing such criminals to act as deputies in Congress.182 Both cases, it should be noted, reflect on Uribe and Santos, as Santos was Uribe’s defence minister when both cases came to light. Such allowances leave askance the reasoning behind inclusion of such human rights abusers in prestigious transnational forums, when countries such as Venezuela, whose human rights record pales into insignificance in comparison, are shunned as pariahs.

Mexico The process of neoliberalisation in Mexico has been well supported by international agencies. The initial turn to neoliberalism was due to Mexico’s debt crisis in the early 1980s, whereby creditors provided debt relief in return for neoliberal restructuring. Chief among these was the United States, especially during the country’s foreign exchange crisis of 1994, the so-called “tequila crisis”, when the peso devalued dramatically to the dollar, resulting in massive capital flight. The United States stepped in and coordinated a $50 billion aid package administered by the IMF with support from the G7 and the Bank of International Settlements, the terms of which involved more neoliberal conditionality. Mexico has been keen in creating a web of free trade agreements, the most notable of which is NAFTA, and has been granted membership of the OECD, the only other Latin American member alongside Chile. The 2014 energy privatisation law introduced by the PRI administration of Enrique Peña Nieto (2012–), will further embed Mexico in US-centred, neoliberalised globalisation processes, as “the production of hydrocarbons will be carried out according to the energy needs of the United States and to the benefit of the large SOC’s [shareholder owned companies] with whom the oil profits will be shared”.183 Mexico, then, is one of the more heavily transnationalised countries in the region, both in terms of trade as in terms of membership of transnational organisations.184 This is reflected in its grading in the Index of Economic Freedom, scoring high in trade freedom and investment freedom, but low like Colombia in property rights and corruption, resulting in an overall score of 66.4 for 2015.185

Peru Transnational support was also crucial to the success of neoliberalism in Peru, and indeed would not have been possible without the consistent and unwavering support of the IFIs and the United States. As mentioned previously, the initial efforts by de Soto and Vargas Llosa received international support and financing, and with the installation of Fujimori in the presidency in 1990, such support intensified, despite the undoubted authoritarianism of his administration after the 1992 self-coup.186 As seen above, the World Bank not only supplied consistent advice

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and guidance to each successive government, but even supplied a president (Alejandro Toledo) and a prime minister (Pedro Pablo Kuczynski). Peru has had an FTA with the United States since 2006, and also has FTAs with Canada, Chile, China, the EU, Japan, South Korea and others. Peru achieves a score of 67.7 in the Index of Economic Freedom, ranking eighth in the regional ranking.187 Again, Peru scores high in terms of trade and investment freedom, but is ranked low in terms of the rule of law.

Pacific Alliance These four leading Latin American powers, dominated by neoliberalism across the five power structures, are now seeking to consolidate this dominance regionally through the Pacific Alliance. Billed as “an emerging model for emerging markets”,188 this alliance was formed by these so-called “Pacific Pumas”189 in 2012 in order to “advance progressively towards the objective of achieving the free circulation of goods, services, capital and people”.190 This will be achieved on the back of their perceived “political and macroeconomic stability [and] embrace of global integration and expanding private consumption”.191 These countries are considerably more transnationalised than Mercosur countries, including Brazil and Argentina. Fuentes and Wynne192 report, for example, that in 2013 Pacific Alliance countries received $85.5 billion in foreign direct investment to Mercosur’s $79.6 billion and overall trade over GDP exceeded 50 per cent in Pacific Alliance countries, as opposed to approximately 25 per cent in Mercosur. Mining is central to their trade strategy, with the four main countries having a portfolio of mining projects estimated at over US$221 billion of investment, according to the president of Peru’s SNMPE (Sociedad Nacional de Minería, Petroleo y Energía/National Society of Mining, Petroleum and Energy), Eva Arias Sologuren.193 On measures such as these, Pacific Alliance (PA) countries are considered a success story by many pro-market transnational figures and organisations, 194 leaving them perfectly poised, according to George195 to “run with the Tigers of the East”, that is, the developed and emerging economies of East Asia, including China. Brushing aside concerns with “systemic corruption, violence, commodity reliance, and inequality”,196 George envisages a “trans-Atlantic triangle” formed by a super-free trade area between the Pacific Alliance, the US and the EU (through the proposed TTIP - Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), allowing them to become strategic partners with the East Asian countries through the USled Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with 11 Asian nations. Furthermore, with the removal of the thorn of Cuba from US–Latin American relations, and weakening Left governments in the region, especially in the key countries of Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela, such an agreement could possibly be extended to other parts of Latin America. With Costa Rica joining in 2013 and Panama on its way to becoming a member, and with Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Uruguay and Paraguay with observer status,197

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the dream of a neoliberalised Western Hemisphere is far from dead. Indeed, according to George’s198 breathless account, it could become part of a neoliberalised Atlantic free trade area, from Kiev to Tierra del Fuego and Alaska, with links across the Pacific to Asia through the US-led Trans Pacific Partnership.

Conclusion: Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru as “Right-oriented state/civil society complexes” In this chapter I have sought to demonstrate that these four case countries dominated by neoliberalism, are also dominated by the Right, limiting change in a socially egalitarian direction. This domination is evident in the five networks of power derived from Mann: economic, ideological, military, political and transnational. In the economic power cluster, neoliberalism has enhanced general elite power vis-á-vis the state, allowing elites greater control of economic policymaking in the states surveyed. In the ideological power cluster space is occupied through the development of a powerful network of transnationalised civil society organisations (CSOs), and a process of oligopolisation of the media by Right-wing business elites, with both these sectors providing increased intellectual justification for neoliberalism and acting as watchdogs against policy deviance by the state. In the military power network, while advances have been made in terms of increased civilian control, budgets still remain high in most of the countries surveyed and the armed forces maintain some level of autonomy, particularly over budgeting and procurement. Such autonomy and military power has been enhanced by higher profile roles in the US-sponsored “war on drugs” and “war on terror”. Politically, countries present differing types of party systems: structured (Mexico, Chile) and inchoate (Colombia, Peru). In the first, both countries present strong Left parties, with a Left-of-centre grouping in power in Chile. Nevertheless, Mexico’s political system is dominated by two parties which are programmatically committed to neoliberalism, the PAN and the PRI, while Chile’s Concertación government supported the existing neoliberal model throughout its first 20 years of government. Both Peru and Colombia’s party systems are dominated by Right-wing parties, and although Peru has an ostensibly Left-wing president in power, he swiftly tacked to the Right, adopting neoliberalism with a view to strengthening the existing model. Finally, transnational power traverses all the other power clusters, as evidenced by the role, in all cases, of the United States and the West in general in establishing, financing and fostering ideological centres promoting neoliberalism within civil society, in the inclusion of these countries in FTA with the more advanced countries, as well as membership of key transnational entities such as the OECD in the case of Mexico and Chile (with Colombia also on path for membership), and very close links with the IFIs. Finally, these countries are the main drivers behind the Pacific Alliance project, which seeks to further strengthen the existing political economy model at the regional and ultimately transnational level.

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In effect, therefore, the hegemony of neoliberalism in all five power clusters in each country indicates these also as Right-oriented state/society complexes, as discussed at the beginning of the chapter with regard to Central America. In each of the countries examined, neoliberalism has formidable collective power in the sense that neoliberal advocates have horizontal linkages across all of the power clusters examined here. The confluence of interests around neoliberalism between elites in each of these power clusters results in a narrowing of space for ideological alternatives to gain traction. Confluences of interests can also aggregate around social conservatism and law and order issues, but neoliberalism will always be privileged. Moreover, it is argued that the creation of the Pacific Alliance aims to further embed this model at the transnational level, linking it up to the main key centres of neoliberalism in North America and Europe and then across to the economies of East Asia, as well as projecting itself as an alternative to existing regional groupings such as ALBA and Mercosur. These agreements will make it even more difficult to deviate from neoliberal tenets and opens up the possibility for their extension across the region. Evidence presented here mirrors discourse among Right-oriented actors presented in the previous chapter. Both provide significant proof that neoliberalism remains the main ideological project among the Right in many countries in the region, with a view to its eventual dominance throughout. Nevertheless, these tenets have been powerfully challenged since the beginning of the millennium. Social movements organised against the deepening of neoliberal processes, especially in terms of greater privatisations in areas such as water. These social movement uprisings led to the renewal or creation of Leftist parties which campaigned against neoliberalism. This “pink tide” of Leftist governments sought at a minimum to ameliorate the worst excesses of the market through concerted social programmes and in some cases even reversing some key neoliberal policies, such as re-nationalisation of some strategic sectors. In this way these governments began to undermine elite power in some of the areas of the power spectrum, as we shall see in the next chapter, prompting a backlash from these elites as they activated their structural and infrastructural power in defence of their privileges and the ideological structure which underpins them.

Notes 1 See for example Silva, Eduardo, 2009. Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2 Cannon, Barry and Mo Hume, 2012. ‘Central America, Civil Society and the “Pink Tide”: Democratization or De-Democratization?’, in Democratization, 19(6), pp. 1039–1064, 1044. 3 Cannon, 2014b, ‘Right in Central America’; Cannon, 2014c. ‘El poder de la derecha y la influencia permanente de la élite en Centroamérica’, Mesoamérica, 35(56), pp. 78– 105. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Flores-Macías, Gustavo, 2012. After Neoliberalism? The Left and Economic Reforms in Latin America. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 166.

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7 Silva, Eduardo, 1993. ‘Capitalist Coalitions, the State, and Neoliberal Economic Restructuring: Chile, 1973–88’, World Politics, 45(4), pp. 526–559. 8 Flores-Macías, After Neoliberalism, p. 167. 9 Silva, ‘Capitalist Coalitions’, p. 550. 10 ECLAC, 2014. Anuario Estadístico de América Latina y el Caribe. Santiago de Chile: ECLAC, p. 102. 11 PwC, 2012. Mining in the Americas. Ottawa: Fraser Institute. Available at: www. pwc.com/en_CA/ca/mining/publications/pwc-mining-in-the-americas-2012-03-en. pdf. Accessed: 17/08/2015, p. 10. 12 Silva, ‘Capitalist Coalitions’, pp. 558–559. 13 Edwards, Sebastian and Roberto Steiner, 2000. ‘On the Crisis Hypothesis of Economic Reform: Colombia 1989–1990’, in Cuadernos de Economía, 37(112), n.p. Available at: www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0717-68212000011200003. Accessed: 11/08/2015. 14 Ibid., n.p. 15 Ibid. 16 Pombo, Carlos and Manuel Ramirez, 2003. Privatization in Colombia: A Plant Performance Analysis. Inter-American Development Bank Research Network Working Paper R-458. Available at: www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubr-458.pdf. Accessed: 11/08/2015. 17 Wills-Otero, Laura, 2014. ‘Colombia: Analyzing the Strategies for Political Action of Álvaro Uribe’s Government, 2002–10’, in Luna, Juan Pablo and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser (eds), 2014. The Resilience of the Latin American Right. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 194–218, 206–207; Rodríguez, Gina Paola, 2014. ‘Álvaro Uribe y Juan Manuel Santos: Una misma derecha?’ in Nueva Sociedad, 254 (November-December), pp. 84–99. Available at: www.nuso.org. Accessed: 12/06/ 2015, p. 92. 18 Rodríguez, ‘Uribe y Santos’, p. 98. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 ECLAC, Anuario Estadístico, p. 102. 22 PwC, Mining in the Americas, p. 2. 23 Ibid. 24 MacLeod, Dag, 2006. ‘Privatization and the Limits of State Autonomy in Mexico: Rethinking the Orthodox Paradox’, Latin American Perspectives ,32(4), pp. 36–64, 37. 25 Ibid. 26 Rodríguez Araujo, Octavio and Lorna Scott Fox, 2010. ‘The Emergence and Retrenchment of a New Political Regime in Mexico’, in Latin American Perspectives, 37(1), pp. 35–61, 44. 27 Montemayer, Carlos and Miguel Tinker Salas, 2006. ‘Which PRI Wants to Win the Election?’, Latin American Perspectives, 33(2), pp. 90–93, 91. 28 Ibid. 29 Charnock, Greig, 2006. ‘Improving the Mechanisms of Global Governance? The Ideational Impact of the World Bank on the National Reform Agenda in Mexico’, New Political Economy, 11(1), pp. 73–98, 74. 30 Ibid. 31 ECLAC, Anuario Estadístico, p. 102. 32 ECLAC, Anuario Estadístico, p. 103. 33 PwC, Mining in the Americas, p. 6. 34 Silva, Challenging Neoliberalism, pp. 237–238. 35 Renique, Gerardo, 2013. ‘Peru: Humala Submits to the United States and the Mining Industry’, NACLA Report on the Americas, 46(3), pp. 12–17, 15.

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36 Durand, Francisco, 2011. ‘A Right for All Seasons? Right-Wing Politics in Contemporary Peru’, in Dominguez, Francisco, Geraldine Lievesley, and Steve Ludlam (eds), Right Wing Politics in the New Latin America, pp. 96–112. 37 Burron, Neil, 2012. ‘Commentary: Ollanta Humala and the Peruvian Conjuncture Democratic Expansion or “Inclusive” Neoliberal Redux?’, Latin American Perspectives, 39(1), pp. 133–139, 134. 38 Ibid., pp. 135–136. 39 Ibid., p. 157. 40 Ibid., p. 139. 41 Ibid. 42 Renique, ‘Peru: Humala Submits to the United States and the Mining Industry’, p. 13. 43 ECLAC, Anuario Estadístico, p. 102. 44 See World Bank, 2013. ‘Making Mining Revenues Deliver on Development in Latin America’. Available at: www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/03/13/ma king-mining-revenues-deliver-on-development-in-latin-america. Accessed: 25/10/2015. 45 Mann, Social Power: Volume 1, p. 23. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Hughes, Sallie and Paola Prado, 2011. ‘Media Diversity and Social Inequality in Latin America’, in Blofield, Merike (ed.), 2011. The Great Gap: Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution in Latin America. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 109–146, 109. 49 McGann, James, 2014. 2013 Global Go-To Think Tank Index Report. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania. Available at: www.ecologic.eu/sites/files/news/ 2014/gotoreport2013_final.pdf. Accessed: 10/06/2015, pp. 28–29. 50 González-Rodríguez, Gustavo, 2008. ‘The Media in Chile: The Restoration of Democracy and the Subsequent Concentration of Media Ownership’, in LugoOcando, Jairo (ed.), 2008. The Media in Latin America. Maidenhead: McGraw Hill and Open University Press, pp. 61–77. 51 Ibid., p. 62. 52 Ibid. Cisneros has important holding in media groups in Venezuela including its largest television station, Venevision, which was at the forefront of the ill-fated coup against President Chávez in 2002. 53 Ibid., p. 64. 54 Ibid., p. 65. 55 Ibid., p. 71, citing Corrales, O. and J. Sandoval, 2005. Concentration of the Media Market, Pluralism and Freedom of Speech. Santiago de Chile: Fundación Chile, p. 2. 56 Ibid. 57 Flores-Macías, ‘After Neoliberalism’, p. 166. 58 Wills-Otero, ‘Colombia: Strategies’, p. 204. 59 Bonilla, Jorge Iván V., and Ancizar Narváez Montoya, 2008. ‘The Media in Colombia: Beyond Violence and a Market-Driven Economy’, in Lugo-Ocando, Media in Latin America, pp. 78–100. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid., p. 95. 62 Ibid., p. 96. 63 Ibid. 64 El Nuevo Siglo, 2013. “‘Think Tanks’: Problemas de peso”. Available at: www. elnuevosiglo.com.co/articulos/10-2013-%E2%80%98think-tanks%E2%80%99-problema s-de-%E2%80%98pesos%E2%80%99.html. Accessed: 12/06/2015. 65 Leal, Diego and David Roll, 2013. ‘Tanques de pensamiento y partidos políticos en Colombia: El caso de las reformas políticas 2003 y 2009’, Ciencia Política 16 (July-

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66 67 68 69 70

71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

December), pp. 89–112. Available at: www.revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/cienciap ol/article/viewFile/41531/43145. Accessed: 12/06/2015, p. 104. Ibid., p. 96. Edwards and Steiner, 2000. ‘On the Crisis’, n.p. Hughes, Sallie, 2009. ‘The Media in Mexico: From Authoritarian Institution to Hybrid System’, in Lugo-Ocando, Media in Latin America, pp. 131–150, 138. Ibid. Doleac, Clement, 2015. ‘Insufficient Media Reforms in Latin America: Urgency to Go Further’, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 19 February. Available at: www.coha.org/ insufficient-media-reforms-in-latin-america-urgency-to-go-further/. Accessed: 17/08/ 2015. Ibid., n.p. Rodríguez Araujo and Scott Fox, ‘Emergence and Retrenchment’, p. 52. Dawson, Alexander, 2011. ‘PAN Para Todos: Elections, Democracy and the Right in Contemporary Mexico’, in Dominguez et al., Right Wing Politics in the New Latin America, pp. 63–78. See Kilkenny, Allison, 2012. ‘Student Movement Dubbed the Mexican Spring’, in The Nation May 29. Available at: www.thenation.com/blog/168099/student-m ovement-dubbed-mexican-spring. Accessed: 12/06/2015. Hughes, ‘The Media in Mexico’, p. 141. Ibid., p. 148. Ibid. Ibid., p. 131. Doleac, ‘Insufficient Media Reforms’. McGann, Think Tank Index Report, p. 21. Ibid. Ibid., p. 100, citing Bromley, Daniel, 1990. ‘The Ideology of Efficiency: Searching for a Theory of Policy Analysis’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 19, pp. 86–107. Durand, ‘A Right for All Seasons’. Adrianzén, Carlos Alberto, 2014. ‘Una obra para varios elencos: Apuntes sobre la estabilidad del neoliberalismo en el Perú’, in Nueva Sociedad, 254 (NovemberDecember 2014), pp. 100–111, 103. Durand, ‘A Right for All Seasons’, p. 103. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 102. Protzel, Javier, 2014. ‘Media Systems and Political Action in Peru’, in Guerrero, Manuel Alejandro and Mireya Márquez Ramírez, (eds), 2014. Media Systems and Communications Policies in Latin America. Houndsmills: Palgrave, pp. 82–99, 88. Ibid., pp. 89–90. Durand, ‘A Right for All Seasons’, p. 103; Adrianzén, ‘Una obra’, p. 111. Hughes and Prado, ‘Media Diversity’, p. 135. Ibid., p. 123. Mann, Michael, 1986. The Sources of Social Power: Volume 1, A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760, p. 26. Bruneau, Thomas C., 2013. ‘Civilians and the Military in Latin America: The Absence of Incentives’, Latin American Politics and Society, 55(4), pp. 143–160, 154. Central Intelligence Agency, 2015. The World Factbook: Brazil. Available at: www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html. Accessed: 12/06/2015. Meyer, P., 2014. Chile: Political and Economic Conditions and US Relations. Congressional Research Report. Available at: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40126.pdf. Accessed: 12/06/2015, p. 16.

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98 Wills-Otero, ‘Colombia: Strategies’, p. 206. 99 Raby, Diana, 2011. ‘Colombia as the Linchpin of US Hegemony in Latin America’, in Dominguez et al., Right Wing Politics in the New Latin America, pp. 78–95, 93. 100 Ibid., pp. 84–85. 101 Amesty International, 2015. ‘U.S. Policy in Colombia’. Available at: www.amnes tyusa.org/our-work/countries/americas/colombia/us-policy-in-colombia. Accessed: 12/08/2015. 102 Richani, Nazih, 2005. ‘Multinational Corporations, Rentier Capitalism, and the War System in Colombia’, Latin American Politics and Society 47(3), pp. 113–144, 132. 103 Isacson, Adam, Lisa Haugaard, Abigail Poe, Sarah Kinosian, and George Withers, 2013. Time to Listen: Trends in U.S. Security Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. Washington, DC: Center for International Policy, Latin America Working Group, Education Fund, and Washington Office on Latin America, p. 22. 104 Bruneau, ‘Civilians and the Military in Latin America’, pp. 154–155. 105 Isaccson et al., Time to Listen, p. 2. 106 Richani, ‘Multinational Corporations’, p. 136. 107 Ibid., pp. 132–133. 108 Ibid., p. 133. 109 Rodríguez Araujo and Scott Fox, ‘Emergence and Retrenchment’, p. 54. 110 Under Calderón military spending increased from 0.4 per cent of GDP in 2006 to 0.6 per cent in 2012. See Knoema, 2015. ‘SIPRI Military Expenditure Database’. Available at: http://knoema.com/SIPRI2014/sipri-military-expenditure-database-19 88-2013?country=1000650-mexico. Accessed: 12/06/2015. 111 Lee, Briana, 2014. ‘Mexico’s Drug War’, in CFR Backgrounders. Available at: www. cfr.org/mexico/mexicos-drug-war/p13689. Accessed: 12/06/2015. 112 Isaccson et al., Time to Listen, p. 10. 113 Ibid., p. 18. 114 Rodríguez Araujo and Scott Fox, ‘Emergence and Retrenchment’, p. 55. 115 Amnesty International, 2013. Annual Report: Mexico 2013. Available at: www.am nestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-report-mexico-2013. Accessed: 12/06/2015. 116 Durand, ‘A Right for All Seasons’, p. 102. 117 Jaskoski, Maiah, 2012. ‘Armed Forces in Democratic Latin America: Military Prerogatives, Contestation, and Mission Performance in Peru’, Armed Forces and Society, 38(1), pp. 70–91, 75. 118 Jaskoski, ‘Armed Forces in Democratic Latin America’. 119 Ibid. 120 Ibid., p. 78. 121 Koven, Barnett S. and Cynthia McClintock, 2015. ‘Cooperation and Drug Policies: Trends in Peru in the Twenty-First Century’, in Zepeda, Roberto and Jonathan D. Rosen (eds). Cooperation and Drug Policies in the Americas: Trends in the Twenty First Century. Lanham, MD and London: Lexington Books, pp. 35–53. 122 Isaccson et al., Time to Listen, p. 20. 123 Baer, Jim, 2015. ‘US Military Presence in Latin America Increasing’, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 1 July. Available at: www.coha.org/u-s-military-presence-in-la tin-america-increasing/. Accessed: 15/08/2015. 124 Whitney, W.T., 2015. ‘US Interventions in Venezuela, Peru and Paraguay’, Counterpunch, 18 March. Available at: www.counterpunch.org/2015/03/18/u-s-interven tions-in-venezuela-peru-and-paraguay/. Accessed: 15/08/2015. 125 Mercille, Julien, 2011. ‘Violent Narco-Cartels or US Hegemony? The Political Economy of the “War on Drugs” in Mexico’, in Third World Quarterly, 32(9), pp. 1637–1653, 1639–1640. 126 Mann, The Sources of Social Power: Volume I, p. 26. 127 Ibid., p. 27.

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128 Siavelis, Peter M., 2014. ‘Chile: The Right’s Evolution from Democracy to Authoritarianism and Back Again’, in Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser, Resilience of Latin American Right, pp. 242–268, 244. 129 Ibid., p. 248. 130 Ibid., p. 249. 131 Ibid., p. 251. 132 Ibid., p. 249. 133 Ibid., p. 253. 134 Ibid., p. 254. 135 Ibid., p. 259. 136 Ibid. 137 Ibid. 138 Fairfield, Tasha, 2015. ‘Structural Power in Comparative Political Economy: Perspectives from Policy Formulation in Latin America’, in Business and Politics. ISSN 1469–3569 (In Press). Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/62123/. Accessed: 11/08/ 2015. 139 Flores-Macías, ‘After Neoliberalism’, p. 167. 140 Ibid., p. 168. 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid. 143 Wills-Otero, ‘Colombia: Strategies’, p. 194. 144 Ibid., p. 196. 145 Ibid. 146 Ibid., p. 203. 147 Rodríguez, ‘Uribe y Santos’, p. 99. 148 Wuhs, Steven T., 2014. ‘Mexico: The Partido Acción Nacional as a Right Party’, in Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser, Resilience of Latin American Right, pp. 219–242, 220. 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid., p. 232. 151 Ibid., p. 227. 152 Rodríguez Araujo and Scott Fox, ‘Emergence and Retrenchment’, p. 55. 153 Ibid., p. 45. 154 Ibid., p. 52. 155 Flores-Macías, After Neoliberalism, pp. 54–55. 156 Olvera, Alberto J., 2010. ‘The Elusive Democracy: Political Parties, Democratic Institutions and Civil Society in Mexico’, in Latin American Research Review, 45, pp. 79–107, 100. 157 Rodríguez Araujo and Scott Fox, ‘Emergence and Retrenchment’, p. 57. 158 Carlsen, Laura, 2014. ‘Mexico’s Oil Privatization: Risky Business’ in Foreign Policy in Focus, 27 May. Available at: www.commondreams.org/views/2014/05/27/mexico s-oil-privatization-risky-business. Accessed: 12/06/2015. 159 Rodríguez Araujo and Scott Fox, ‘Emergence and Retrenchment’, p. 56. 160 Morales Oyarvide, César, 2012. ‘Para una crítica del Pacto por México’ in Nuevatribuna.es. Available at: www.nuevatribuna.es/articulo/america-latina/critica-pacto-m exico/20131024130139097668.html. Accessed: 12/06/2015. The PRD later withdrew its support. 161 Rodríguez Araujo and Scott Fox, ‘Emergence and Retrenchment’, p. 57. 162 Adrianzén, ‘Una obra’, p. 107. 163 Meléndez, Carlos, 2014. ‘Is There a Right Track in Post-Party System Collapse Scenarios? Comparing the Andean Countries’, in Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser, Resilience of Latin American Right, pp. 167–194, 175. 164 Meléndez, ‘Right Track’, p. 176. 165 Ibid.

Neoliberalism in power 91

166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198

Ibid., p. 176. Adrianzén, ‘Una obra’, p. 110. Burron, ‘Commentary’, p. 136. Ibid. Meléndez, ‘Right Track’, p. 177. Silva, Challenging Neoliberalism. Ibid., p. 166. Heritage Foundation, 2015. Index of Economic Freedom. Available at: www.heritage. org/index/. Accessed: 16/08/2015. Raby, ‘Colombia as the Linchpin of US Hegemony in Latin America’, p. 82. Rodríguez, ‘Uribe y Santos’. Ibid., p. 90. Ibid., p. 97. Ibid., p. 95. Ibid. Heritage Foundation, Index. Ibid., p. 88. Wills-Otero, ‘Colombia: Strategies’, p. 205. Hernández, Miguel Reyes, Humberto Morales Moreno, Miguel A. López López, and Jorge Abascal Jiménez, 2014. ‘The Denationalization of PEMEX: Implications and Scope for Mexico’, in Latin American Policy, 5(1), pp. 132–156, 153. Mexico is considered part of North America according to the Heritage Foundation and is not ranked directly with other Latin American countries, although the figures speak for themselves. Heritage Foundation, Index. Durand, ‘A Right for All Seasons’; Adrianzén, ‘Una obra’. Heritage Foundation, Index. The index includes Caribbean countries in the regional ranking, so in fact, in terms of Latin American countries, Peru is fourth in the ranking, just below Uruguay, Colombia and Chile. George, Samuel, 2014. The Pacific Pumas: An Emerging Model for Emerging Markets. Washington, DC: Bertelsmann Foundation. Ibid. Morgenfeld, Leandro, 2013. ‘Alianza del Pacifico: Hacía un Nuevo ALCA?’. Available at: www.marcha.org.ar. Accessed: 12/06/2015. George, Pacific Pumas, p. 7. Fuentes, Juan Pablo and Douglas Wynne, 2014. ‘Why Mercosur Lags the Pacific Alliance: Trade Liberalization Is a Key to Economic Success’, Moody’s Analytics, 16 July. Available at: www.economy.com/dismal/analysis/free/248931. Accessed: 16/08/2015. Minerandina, 2014. ‘Pacific Alliance with Mining Projects Portfolio’, 21 May. Available at: www.minerandina.com/en/pacific-alliance-with-mining-projects-portfolio-for-us221-000-million/. Accessed: 16/08/2015. George, Pacific Pumas, p. 7. Ibid., p. 9. Ibid., p. 45. Nolte, Detlef and Leslie Wehner, 2013. ‘The Pacific Alliance Casts Its Cloud over Latin America’, GIGA Focus, 8. Available at: www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus. Accessed: 12/05/2015, p. 1. George, Pacific Pumas.

5 THE SHIFTING SANDS OF POWER IN ‘PINK TIDE’ LATIN AMERICA Post-neoliberalism and the threat from the Left

Introduction: the Latin American Right and the threat from the Left In previous chapters I have aimed to show that in Right-led countries, or countries whose political economies remained dominated by neoliberalism, it remains extremely difficult to initiate and execute change in an unorthodox direction. Nevertheless, counter-hegemonic challenges have emerged in many countries in the region, some of which had also been dominated quite comprehensively by neoliberalism, such as Argentina or Bolivia. This phenomenon has been dubbed the “pink tide” by analysts and more latterly has been encapsulated in the term “post-neoliberalism”. Wylde, citing Grugel and Riggirozzi, formulates postneoliberalism as “two mutually reinforcing pillars”, a political aim to reclaim the state and through that construct a new consensus around welfare; and, a new economic policy approach aimed at strengthening the state’s ability to manage the market ensuring both growth and equity.1 Hence, according to this reading, departures from neoliberalism should involve a return of the state to these two areas, of welfare provision and in the economy, supported by a more democratic and popularly responsive state. In this chapter I seek to examine the extent to which neoliberalism has been stalled or indeed reversed in those countries in the region now governed by the Left. Such changes will be examined in each of the sources of power identified by Mann, showing that, in many countries, changes in these areas represent a considerable threat to neoliberalism and the elite power which underpins it. The level and intensity of such change varies, however, hence determining the types and levels of strategies for those on the Right seeking to regain state control in order to safeguard and extend the neoliberal project, and hence elite power.

The shifting sands of power 93

Measuring Right retrenchment Which indicators in each of the power clusters identified can be used to measure the retrenchment of the neoliberal project under the Left in Latin America? In the economic power network, market freedom from state intervention is paramount for neoliberals, so processes of nationalisation or renationalisation of key areas of economic activity, and increased controls on market activity would indicate reversals for neoliberalism. In political power, electoral results in favour of the Left are obvious indicators, but another could be reversals or abandonment of key characteristics of polyarchy in favour of alternative types of political institutionality. In the ideological power network, media and think tanks are identified as key tools for propagation of neoliberal tenets, so limits, legal or otherwise, on the strength of private media and the growth and support of alternative state- or community-owned media and think tanks could be indicative of reversals for neoliberalism. An associated measure could be the extent to which classic liberal freedoms are considered threatened in particular polities. In the area of military power, closeness to the United States is usually associated with acceptance of neoliberalism; hence, the reversal or absence of military alliances with the United States, and lack of association with the USsponsored wars on drugs and on terror could be indicative of a rejection and reversal of neoliberalism. Finally, transnational power could be measured in terms of trade agreements, or lack thereof, with the US and diversification towards alternative sources of transnational power. These indicators are summarised in Table 5.1 below, with their respective proxies, which will be discussed presently. Each indicator will be measured through a set of proxies to indicate distance from neoliberal precepts and policy prescriptions, based on indices compiled by a variety of liberal or Right-oriented think tanks. Hence, with regard to economic power, I have used the World Index of Economic Freedom,2 published by the US-based Right-wing think tank the Heritage Foundation. Designed “to help readers track … advancement in economic freedom, prosperity, and opportunity and promote these ideas in their homes, schools, and communities”, this index covers ten “freedoms” grouped into four categories: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Rule of law: property rights and freedom from corruption; Limited government: fiscal freedom, government spending; Regulatory efficiency: business freedom, labour freedom, monetary freedom; and Open markets: trade freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom.

Each “freedom” is graded on a scale from 0 to 100, and then averaged out to create an overall score, with 0 representing total lack of freedom and 100 total freedom. From this countries are rated as free (80–100), mostly free (70–79.9), moderately free (60–69.9), mostly unfree (50–59.9), and repressed (0–49.9). This index equates market freedom with human freedom to a similar degree as neoliberalism.

94 The shifting sands of power TABLE 5.1 Countervailing tendencies to neoliberalism in five power clusters

Indicator/ Cluster

Economy

Politics

Ideology

Military

Transnational

Area

Ownership of key economic sectors; Market freedoms

Elections; Parties; Polyarchic institutionality

Media ownership and control; Think tanks; Liberal freedoms

Military alliances

Trade agreements

Indicator

Nationalisations or increased social control of economic sectors; Increased state or social control of market activities

Left election wins; Reversals of liberal structures of democracy

Increased state or community ownership of media; Increased state regulation of media and/or think tanks; Reversals of freedom of the press and liberal freedoms

Alliances with the US; Distancing from US policy priorities and campaigns

Presence or absence of FTAs with the US

Proxy

World Index of Economic Freedom

Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2014 Democracy Index

Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Index and Report on Press Freedom

Presence of US bases and “quasi-bases”3

FTAs

Source: Author’s own elaboration.

To measure deviations from neoliberal prescriptions in political power, I use the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2014 Democracy Index.4 First produced in 2006, the index is based on 60 indicators grouped into five different categories measuring pluralism, civil liberties, and political culture. The index provides numerical scores and ranking in each of these areas, and based on these, categorises countries as full democracies (8.00–9.99), flawed democracies (6.00–7.99), hybrid regimes (4.00–5.99) and authoritarian regimes (1.00–3.99). The index’s conception of democracy then is based on polyarchy and deviations from its precepts are viewed negatively with a corresponding negative impact on a country’s score. Ideological deviations are measured by two indices provided by Freedom House: their Freedom in the World Index and their Report on Press Freedom.5

The shifting sands of power 95

Founded in the US in 1941, the organisation seeks to advance polyarchic conceptions of freedom in terms of classic civil liberties and press freedom from the state. With regard to its Freedom in the World Index, the organisation seeks to measure the degree of civil liberties and political rights on a global basis. Launched in 1973, it categorises countries on a scale from 1 to 7, as Free (1.0–2.5), Partly Free (2.51–5.5) and Not Free (5.51–7.00). Measures are based on the presence or not of an electoral democracy and the guarantee of civil freedoms. Hence a Free polity is one that satisfies both criteria adequately, whereas a Partly Free polity is one where civil rights may not be considered sufficiently protected, but may have a functioning competitive electoral system. A polity which is considered Not Free is deemed lacking in both categories. Its Report on Press Freedom uses a large set of indicators along three broad categories covering the legal, political, and economic environment. Scores range from 0 (most free) to 100 (least free) and again are classified as Free (0–30), Partly Free (31–60) and Not Free (61–100). Hence, the further the deviations from polyarchic norms, the less free a country is categorised both in terms of general civil liberties and in terms of press freedom. It is important to note that those countries which score badly in these indices may not deviate entirely from neoliberalism per se, in that liberties might be threatened because of, in the case of Colombia and Mexico, for example, the war on drugs and terror, but this is compensated by greater economic freedom and proximity in military and transnational terms with the objectives of the United States. Measures used for military power are based on Bitar’s study of US bases and “quasi-bases” in the region.6 Here, quite simply, the presence of bases or quasibases (i.e. not permanent bases but local bases which permit US use of the facilities including stationing of US personnel), indicates broad proximity to US foreign policy and military objectives, with countries categorised as Allied, Neutral, or Opposed. Similarly, transnational power deviation is measured simply in terms of the existence or not of an FTA with the United States, indicating a similar ideological outlook and legally determined economic links with that country and its corporations. FTAs with the US are characterised by, among other things, the right of multinational corporations to sue governments directly, before an international tribunal, for regulations which may infringe upon their profit-making potential. For example, since 2009 the Canadian/Australian owned mining company Pacific Rim has been suing El Salvador, led by the Leftist FMLN, for more than $300 million after it refused permission to mine for gold due to environmental and legal concerns. The case is being heard at the ICSID (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) of the World Bank, hence removing the decision from the context of any national juridical system.7 Silva, following Mann, argues that collective power reaches an apex when it combines groups from “two or more power clusters”.8 Conversely it could be argued that indicators found across two or more clusters which contradict neoliberal principles would signify a greater level of threat to the neoliberal

96 The shifting sands of power

project. A central argument in this book, developed in more detail in the following chapter, is that the higher the level of threat, the more likely the use of a diversity of strategies to reverse these threats or remove their source entirely (i.e. the government). Hence if negative indicators are found in four or five of the power networks surveyed, this would indicate a higher threat than in only one or two. The following five sections will review the situation in each cluster successively, with an aim to assessing the level of threat felt by the Right to its neoliberal project in the region, which will then be reviewed collectively in the conclusion of the chapter.

Economic Power Stallings and Peres9 find that, despite the advent of the “pink tide”, most of the neoliberal measures carried out in the 1980s and 1990s, in the areas of trade, domestic finance, capital account opening, and taxes have remained largely untouched. Only privatisation has been affected, and then only in a minority of countries. They find three main groupings in the region based around attitudes to neoliberalism, which they identify as conservative, centrist and left. The conservative grouping, comprising Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala and Mexico, do not have an anti-neoliberal discourse;10 the centrist grouping of Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru and Uruguay, have been mildly critical of the social impact of neoliberalism, installing increased government programmes in this area, and a more stringent regulatory framework for some utility companies, amongst other measures. Apart from these, however, neoliberal measures have remained relatively intact. Finally, the left grouping of Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, have strongly critiqued reforms, making changes mostly in the area of privatisations. All have implemented nationalisations, with Venezuela in the lead and Bolivia a close second. Privatisation began to be reversed in these left countries from 2006 onward, and Stallings and Peres estimate that total “nationalisations reached some US$39 billion between 2006 and 2009” or “about one-fifth of the proceeds from privatisations in Latin America in the 1990s. …”11 The vast majority of these, around 80 per cent, took place in the oil and natural gas industries, and the majority of that in one major nationalisation in Venezuela, that of the heavy-oil fields in the Orinoco Belt on 1 May 2007.12 Renationalisations also took place in Bolivia and Ecuador in the area of oil and gas, with Bolivia in particular increasing its revenues for natural gas from 50 to 82 per cent over this period.13 Hence, the extractive industries in particular – that is, mining and the exploitation of hydrocarbons, as well as those related to agri-business and biofuels14 – are a central element of “pink tide” renationalising strategies, despite its “producing new asymmetries and profound inequalities in Latin American societies”,15 a point I return to in Chapter 7 of this volume.

The shifting sands of power 97

These were not the only nationalisations, however. Venezuela also renationalised or nationalised private companies in the areas of telecommunications, cement manufacture, and banking. Bolivia renationalised its largest privatised telecommunications company and also private water companies. Argentina renationalised its post office, its national airline, Aerolineas Argentinas, its regional airline Austral, a privatised water company and the management of pension funds.16 Nationalisations taking place in Venezuela between 2006 and 2009 had a total asset value of 16 per cent of GDP, while in Bolivia nationalisations in the same period exceeded 5 per cent of GDP.17 The relative values of nationalisations in Argentina and Ecuador are, according to the authors, relatively small figures in comparison.18 Nationalisations have continued since Stallings and Peres researched their article. For example, in 2010 Venezuela nationalised some food production plants, a supermarket chain, oil drilling rigs, glass manufacturing and steel manufacturing plants. Bolivia renationalised the majority of its electricity generation and distribution networks in 2010 and 2012 respectively. In that latter year, the government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina renationalised the oil and gas company YPF, eventually agreeing to pay its Spanish owners, Repsol, $5 billion. YPF then went on to purchase a gas distribution company, Metrogas, in Buenos Aires in 2013 and the state renationalised some suburban train services in the same year, after a devastating accident in 2012 caused the deaths of 142 people. Yet despite these important moves, Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela remain the only countries in the region with significant reversals of privatisation.19 No other country has embarked on renationalising companies privatised during the previous reform periods, although it should be noted that privatisation processes were uneven with some countries (such as Argentina) privatising more aggressively than others (such as Uruguay). Flores-Macías, however, points to further measures, apart from nationalisations, which control, intervene in, or contradict the freedom of the market.20 For example, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela all introduced price controls on a variety of goods and services. Venezuela introduced tight exchange controls, as did Argentina in 2011. Ecuador eliminated Central Bank autonomy amongst other far-reaching reforms of the financial sector,21 and in 2012 Argentina changed the mandate of its Central Bank from one centred on inflation to one which must also promote economic growth with social equity, an important departure from orthodox neoliberal tenets.22 Moreover, Argentina, as is well known, and Ecuador, as is not so well known, both defaulted on their sovereign debt. Bolivia and especially Venezuela have implemented thorough land reform programmes. Finally, Venezuela has strongly encouraged cooperative ownership of a wide range of enterprises, a movement also found in Argentina but there without state support.23 It is no surprise then that in the 2015 World Index of Economic Freedom,24 the economies of Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela are considered “repressed”, Venezuela having the lowest ranking in the region, barring Cuba.

98 The shifting sands of power

Yet even Brazil is considered “mostly unfree”, largely due to the extent of state intervention in the economy, a tendency which has always been present in Brazil, but which nonetheless increased under the first presidency of Dilma Rousseff (2010–2014).25 Hence, while Stallings and Peres26 do have a point regarding the continued integrity of most of the neoliberal measures undertaken in previous decades, these abovementioned counter-measures have had important practical implications for market freedoms, and perhaps more crucially, symbolic implications as well. Taken in their totality, they signal quite clearly that, to paraphrase British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979–1990), the market is for turning and in time it may be turned even further. From an elite perspective, then, it is imperative to stop such policy reversal and heterodox experimentation in its tracks, nowhere more so than in Venezuela, which of all the countries in the region has advanced most in that direction, an observation that has not been lost on the Right, not in Venezuela, not in Latin America and not in the United States or Europe. To conclude this section, the countries which display the greatest threat to the neoliberal project are, in descending order, Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina and Ecuador, and to a certain extent Brazil. While there may be some discussion in the order of priority, there is widespread agreement that of all these countries, Venezuela poses the greatest threat, largely because of its oil wealth and its willingness to use this to subsidise and encourage such policy deviance in other countries, as we shall see in the section on transnational power below.

Political Power Political power is measured here first in terms of elections and second in terms of the “quality” of (liberal) democracy. In the first case, if we review the current occupants of presidential seats throughout the Latin American region, we find that the majority of its countries and over 60 per cent of its population are governed by broadly Left or Left-of-centre parties. Among these countries are some of the largest in the region, including Brazil and Argentina, and many of these presidents or their successors have been re-elected a number of times, such as Chávez in Venezuela or ‘Lula’ da Silva in Brazil, currently governed by their respective successors Nicolás Maduro and Dilma Rousseff. While there is much dispute on the degree to which many of these governments can be considered Left or Left-of-centre, particularly with regard to their attitudes to neoliberalism,27 unifying characteristics are democratic innovation to make states more responsive to their citizens and a policy agenda that seeks to lessen poverty and social inequality.28 It can be assumed that those “pink tide” governments which have achieved reelection must have fulfilled these promises at some level. It can also be assumed that it is in these areas that many voters, if not the majorities, also expect Rightwing parties seeking election to aim to satisfy these demands. Hence it is

The shifting sands of power 99

reasonable to assume that these are crucial areas of competition between Right and Left parties in the Latin American region in the present context. The Left, then, is hegemonic in the political sphere in the bulk of the region, and in some countries where it is not, there have been impressive challenges, such as in Honduras and Mexico (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3). This situation is further complicated by profound changes in the conception of democracy in many of the Left-led states. There has been a distancing from liberal concepts of representation and parties towards models aimed at increased popular participation alongside strengthened executives, while “reducing checks and balances and restricting civil and political liberties”.29 This has created a climate of “class-based polarisation TABLE 5.2 Latin America’s “new Left”, 1998–2014

Year

Country

President

Party

Re-election

President

1999

Venezuela

Hugo Chávez

PSUV

2000

Chile

Ricardo Lagos

Socialist

2000, 2006, 2012, 2013 2006, 2013

2003

Brazil

Lula da Silva

2003

Argentina

Néstor Kirchner

Workers Party Justice Party

2007, 2011, 2014 2007, 2011

Nicolás Maduro (from 2013) Michelle Bachelet (2006– 2010) and (2014–2018) Dilma Rousseff

2005

Uruguay Bolivia Honduras

Broad Front MAS Liberal

2010, 2014

2006 2006– 2009 2007

2009, 2014 –

Nicaragua

FSLN

2011

Daniel Ortega

2007

Ecuador

Tabaré Vázquez Evo Morales Manuel Zelaya Daniel Ortega Rafael Correa

Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2011–2015) José Mujica Tabaré Vázquez Evo Morales –

2009

Rafael Correa

2008– 2012

Paraguay

Fernando Lugo

2009

El Salvador

2011

Peru

2014

Costa Rica

Mauricio Funes Ollanta Humala Luis Guillermo Solís

Country Alliance Patriotic Alliance for Change FMLN

–

–

PNP

–

Salvador Sánchez-Cerén –

PAC

–

–

2014

Source: Adapted from Cannon, Barry and Peadar Kirby (eds) 2012, Civil Society and the State in LeftLed Latin America: Challenges and Limitations to Democratization. London: Zed, p. 12.

100 The shifting sands of power

TABLE 5.3 Electoral performance of main Left/Left-of-centre party in most recent general

elections Country

Year

Candidate

Party

Percentage of Vote

Elected

Next Election

Argentina Bolivia

2015 2014

Daniel Scioli Evo Morales

48.66% 61.36%

NO YES

2019 2019

Brazil

2014

51.64%

YES

2018

Chile

2013

Socialist

62.16%

YES

2017

Colombia

2014

PDA

15.23%*

NO

2018

Costa Rica

2014

PAC

77.81%

YES

2018

Ecuador

2013

YES

2017

2014

Alianza PAIS FMLN

57.17%

El Salvador

50.11%

YES

2019

Guatemala

2015

Dilma Rousseff Michelle Bachelet Clara López Obregón Luis Guillermo Solís Rafael Correa Salvador Sánchez Cerén Miguel Sandoval

FPV-PJ MAPIPSP PT

Honduras

2013

Mexico

2012

Nicaragua

2011

Paraguay

2013

Peru

2011

Uruguay

2014

Venezuela

2013

Xiamora Castro De Zelaya Andrés Manuel López Obrador Daniel Ortega Mario Ferreiro Ollanta Humala Tabaré Vázquez Nicolás Maduro

WINAQURNGMAIZ LIBRE

2.11%*

NO

2019

28.75%

NO

2017

PRD

32.39%

NO

2018

FSLN

62.26%

YES

2016

Avanza País Gana Perú FA

5.88%

NO

2018

51.45%

YES

2016

56.63%

YES

2018

PSUV

50.62%

YES

2018

Source: Author’s own elaboration based on relevant Wikipedia entries cross-referenced with relevant entries on www.electionguide.org.

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over the very meaning of democracy”,30 especially in those countries where the balance of power in the identified power clusters has been more radically altered from the pinnacle of the state. For this reason, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2014 Democracy Index classifies Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela as “hybrid” democracies, that is, a mix of liberal and “authoritarian” characteristics.31 Argentina and Brazil are considered as the less onerous “flawed”, that is, fully liberal but with failings in terms of the functioning of its political systems and institutions. This situation, as Raúl Zibechi notes, has thrown the traditional political Right into disarray.32 He identifies three types of Right in Latin America which has emerged from it. First, there are those, mostly in the Southern Cone, where the Left now plays the traditional role of Right parties in its defence of the interests of capital; second, Venezuela, Bolivia and to an extent Ecuador, where Rightwing parties have gone into crisis; and third, Colombia and Mexico, where the traditional Right has taken a notable turn to the ultra-Right, using violence as a means to manage the consequences of neoliberalism. Following Castañeda’s33 famous division of the Left into “Good” and “Bad” we could call these different Rights the “Good”, the “Bad” and the “Ugly”, respectively. In the first scenario, in the Southern Cone countries, “left or progressive forces pursue the same policies as the traditional Right but with more attention to the poor, and supporting education and health care”.34 This helps deepen the neoliberal model and as a result “the Right has been worn out and its policies have been taken over by the progressive left without profound changes”.35 This region is the most stable, but it is a stability linked to “political immobility, to the fact that Right-wing interests are not endangered”.36 Furthermore it is linked to a rotation in hegemonies, with Brazilian hegemony slowly replacing that of the United States, which “is part of the profound change to the very role of the region’s Right wings”.37 Second, in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, “the traditional Right has been beaten by social mobilizations of recent years, and its historic bases of support have gone into crisis”.38 Due to the magnitude of change in these countries – social revolts, Constituyentes (framing processes for new constitutions), and the refounding of new republics, with more socially committed governments of the Left – “the Right has had to find new channels of expression” primarily through civil society.39 Among these have been the media, business groups and intellectuals. In Venezuela these groups took a leading role in the coup against President Chávez in April 2002, while in Bolivia they were deeply involved in the mass campaigns in favour of autonomy for the resource rich media luna (crescent moon) provinces in the east and south of the country in the period 2007–2010. Finally, in Colombia and Mexico a familiar pattern has emerged of the Right being transformed into an ultra-Right allied with the armed forces and paramilitaries. Both are deeply embedded into US neoliberal structures through the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA respectively, and into US-led military structures through wide-ranging security pacts such as Plan Colombia

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and Plan Merida respectively. The militarisation and neoliberalisation of both societies “fractures, dissolves and atomises individuals, [destroying] confidence among neighbours, the old solidarity loyalties and social fabrics” and undermines collectivist responses to social demands, all of these traditional areas of action for the Left.40 These differing reactions of the Right are accompanied by a comprehensive, continent-wide ideological assault being coordinated from overseas against the Left, particularly the Bolivarian Left, which will be discussed more under the section on ideological power below. Here, the important point is that the Right is responding to the hegemony of the Left in different manners, depending on the circumstances in each country. The type of response may be due to a variety of reasons – here it I argue that strategies used depend on the level of threat felt from the Left government, and the degree to which democratic institutionality is respected and adhered to within each national context. These ideas will be explored in a fuller manner in the following chapter on Right power strategies. For the moment, what is important to note is that, first, the Right is experiencing its most concerted challenge from the Left since the armed insurgencies of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 and up until the end of the Central American revolutions in the 1980s. Second, this time the challenge is electoral and democratic. And third, it is in some cases challenging fundamental tenets of liberal republicanism, which despite frequent bouts of authoritarianism, has always been the default option of Latin American elites.41

Ideological Power In the late 1970s and into the 1980s and 1990s, Latin America experienced a twin-fold process of democratisation and neoliberalisation. On the one hand, the majority of the countries in the region ruled by military dictatorships underwent transitions to democratic regimes, based on party competition and elections. In most countries, the parties and governments which emerged from these electoral processes began to implement neoliberal restructuring, with the obvious exception of Cuba. The result was what analysts from the neo-Gramscian school of international relations, such as W.I. Robinson42 and Burron,43 refer to as “neoliberal polyarchies”. Drawing from Robert A. Dahl’s theories of polyarchy, these are a type of low-intensity democracy which includes competitive, party-based elections and indirect citizen participation in policy formation (through “civil society”) within a neoliberalised market economy. Crucial to the formation of these neoliberal polyarchies in the Latin American (and Caribbean) region, were intense and continuous “democracy assistance” programmes. These are programmes aimed at promoting and sustaining polyarchy as the preferred system of government throughout the hemisphere, and, less overtly, ensuring sufficient political and social stability for neoliberal market societies to survive and thrive. It is essentially a joint elite project, financed and

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directed from the United States, Canada and major European states, such as Spain and Germany, often through development aid agencies, state or political party agencies, alongside International Financial Institutes (IFIs) such as the World Bank and the IMF, with other international agencies, such as the UNDP, working in concert with local political, financial and intellectual elites. Robinson identifies “several tiers of policy design, funding, operational activity and influence” in these programmes.44 The highest tier is within the US political, intelligence and military establishment: the White House, the CIA, the State Department, the Pentagon, etc. These identify priority countries for such programmes. The second level consists of quasi-state agencies or private agencies closely tied to the US political and security establishment, principally the USAID (the United States Agency for International Development), and the NED (National Endowment for Democracy). These provide advice and funding to lower order US private agencies in the political, business and trade union establishment, which in turn establish, or intensify relations with and provide funding to a myriad of organisations in the targeted country. These can include organisations in politics, business, labour unions, the media, and civic associations which advocate human rights and women’s, indigenous, LGBT, peasants or other group interests. Of particular interest and utility are “think tanks” with their privileged access to state, political and media agents at a transnational, regional and national level.45 Burron identifies three strategies or forms of democracy promotion tactics.46 The first he terms EMTs (elite mobilisation tactics), which aim to mobilise elite political and social forces to undermine a popular movement or government. The second are PPTs (polyarchy promotion tactics), which aim to “rationalize the functioning of democratic institutions and construct liberal citizens that stabilize neoliberal order”,47 through such initiatives as “strengthening” the political system, parties and civil society organisations supporting it. The third strategy targets grassroots or popular organisations to help ensure these remain within polyarchic structures. Hence these democracy promotion programmes can both aim to provide a stable (polyarchic) political environment for neoliberalism and to foreclose and destabilise alternatives which may emerge in response to the inequalities and poverty generated by neoliberalism.48 Robinson argues that such processes took place in Latin America in two phases.49 The first, in the 1980s, to “promote democracy” by supporting elite-led transitions to polyarchy from dictatorship so as to foreclose more radical, grassrootsled systemic change taking place. The second, in the 1990s, to “consolidate democracy”, meaning institutionalising polyarchy through elite training programmes and “institutional strengthening”, among other initiatives. Both accompanied wide and deep neoliberal restructuring, to differing degrees, in most countries in the region and were designed to protect and sustain the new economic models. This was achieved primarily through the inculcation of such values among citizens as the new “common sense” of the times, and the limiting

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of political choice to parties supporting the new post–Cold War settlement of polyarchy and neoliberalism, also known as the Washington Consensus.50 In the case where challenges to this emerged, by accident or design, campaigns to undermine them resulted, with popular elected governments being branded as “populist” or “authoritarian” by agents supporting neoliberal polyarchy, both within and without specific countries, and on an economic level, through capital flight, among other market disciplines. All these processes were heavily supported by a privatised, elitist and neoliberalised media throughout the region.51 These processes have become starkly evident since the emergence of social movements challenging neoliberalism in the late 1990s, resulting from the deepening inequality and poverty following from such policies and leading to the installation of “pink tide” governments critiquing both the political and economic elements of the post-Cold War settlement.52 Through a wide variety of mechanisms, excluded sectors organised into social movements against neoliberalism, leading to the popular overthrow of governments which supported it in countries such as Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador. These were replaced by governments standing on an anti-neoliberal platform, alongside other newly elected Left governments in Brazil and Venezuela, among others (see previous section on political power above). Yet many of these governments, especially the so-called Bolivarian countries of Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, were subjected to the destabilising democracy promotion programmes. As Burron points out, these governments not only challenge neoliberalism but also polyarchy, seeking to develop alternative, participative modes of governance which go beyond elections and liberal institutions.53 Hence they challenge the two fundamental pillars of the post–Cold War settlement. Various scholars have pointed to sustained campaigns of destabilisation, framed in the language of democracy “protection” and “promotion” against Venezuela,54 Bolivia55 and Honduras during the mandate of President Manuel Zelaya (2005–2009),56 among others. A key tool of such strategies has been the private media. Media in Latin America, as we have seen in the previous chapter, is remarkable both for its high concentration of ownership and its extreme market orientation, encouraging sensationalism and entertainment-led content, rather than serious news coverage and analysis.57 In response to this, and perceived hostility in coverage of many of these centralised private news outlets, Left governments have sought to strengthen state news coverage, diversify ownership and limit bias. Hence Left governments strengthened state broadcasters, including at the regional level with the launch of Telesur, a type of Al Jazeera for the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region. A variety of laws have been introduced by the three Bolivarian governments, and Argentina, to attempt to limit concentration of ownership and increasing control on content.58 Community ownership of media has been especially encouraged in Venezuela, but also in Bolivia and, to a lesser extent, in Argentina.59 While there are questions over the effectiveness of these measures in terms of increased

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democratisation of the media,60 the moves are sufficient to set off alarm bells among elites who most benefit from the existing ownership structures. Such moves have prompted negative evaluations of press freedom by such organisations as Right-wing US think tank Freedom House. In its 2014 Report on Press Freedom it identifies both Ecuador and Venezuela as “not free” in terms of Press Freedom and Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil as “partly free”, with Argentina scoring lowest of the three, followed by Bolivia.61 The curtailing of the freedom of the private media in the region under Left governments and the expansion of state- and community-controlled media presents serious challenges to the ideological hegemony of neoliberalism within Latin America, making it more difficult for the Right to articulate a coherent response to such challenges within existing democratic frameworks. Similarly, Freedom House in its 2014 Freedom in the World Report identifies Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia as “partly free”, although this is also shared by Colombia, Paraguay, Mexico and most Central American nations, barring Costa Rica and Panama. These latter nations, however, are mired in unparalleled violence, which may help explain this similarity, whereby most Left-led countries do not suffer from this problem, except for Venezuela. Nevertheless, Venezuela scores worse than all the others, suggesting that it is its political deviance from polyarchical norms which has prompted such a poor rating.

Military Power Pion-Berlin finds that since democratisation, civil-military relations have improved most in the Southern Cone states of Argentina, Brazil and Chile.62 These states have civil defence ministries, civilianised defence staff and revised defence structures. Argentina and Chile in particular have made notable advances in terms of punishing the human rights violations of previous military regimes, thus significantly reducing impunity for such crimes. Countries where such civilmilitary relations remain problematic are Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Paraguay, due to continued military involvement in politics or strife between sectors of the population and the military.63 Countries such as Colombia and Peru remain somewhere in between these best and worst case examples. Ruhl notes that, in Central America, military influence has also declined with successful moves to subject the military to increased civilian control resulting in, for example, substantial cuts in budgets and personnel.64 Nevertheless, militaries in the Northern Triangle of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador retain significant autonomy, privileges and immunities.65 Moreover, a number of military interventions in Ecuador in 2000, the attempted overthrow of President Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 2002 and the violent overthrow of Manuel Zelaya in Honduras in 2009, all point to the continued threat of military intervention in politics despite these advances.

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With the onset of the US-led wars on drugs and terror, since the 1990s and 2000s, the military has been taking on an increasing role in policing in many parts of the region, which has led to a renaissance in military power. The endemic violence in countries associated with the drugs trade is regarded by analysts as a product of the persistent inequality and poverty, and reduced funding for social welfare and policing, which resulted from neoliberal restructuring.66 Participation in the drugs trade and the use of weapons is also seen as a result of openness in trade and finance brought about by such restructuring.67 Furthermore, mano dura (“iron fist”) policies, violent, draconian and criminalising responses to the “drug threat”, can also be seen as an attempt to repress dissent and opposition to neoliberalism.68 The parts of the region which have participated most fully in the war on drugs have been mostly producer or transit countries in the Andean and Mesoamerican regions. These have been systematised and funded under US-led initiatives such as Plan Colombia (in the Andean Region) and Plan Merida (in the Mesoamerican region). Yet such US-led counter-narcotics initiatives were met with scepticism in the Southern Cone, as countries there were not badly affected by the drugs trade, or at least not in a similar manner, or such measures were not culturally and/or politically acceptable.69 Nevertheless, Brazil has frequently used the military in its counter-narcotics operations, most notably in the run-up to the World Cup in Rio de Janeiro in 2014,70 and the Left FMLN government of Mauricio Funes in El Salvador also used the military in its counter-narcotics programme, as has Venezuela more recently. Overall the risk of a military takeover has reduced significantly since democratisation,71 although high levels of militarisation still exist in Colombia, Mexico, Honduras, and also Guatemala. The space for the Right to appeal to the military to remove governments it disagrees with is smaller therefore than it was in the past, although not entirely closed. Indeed, the Right in particular, and often with the involvement or the encouragement of the United States, has resorted to the use of the military on a number of occasions, since democratisation, as a solution to leadership crises. And it has been mostly Right governments, allied with the United States, which have executed draconian counter-narcotics or counter-terrorist (i.e. insurgency) programmes (although some Left governments have also used the military especially in counternarcotics operations, as noted above), in order to preserve the neoliberal status quo and prevent dissent developing. Bitar, in his study of US bases and “quasi-bases” in the region, underlines the proximity between US-Latin American economic and military cooperation.72 Almost all those countries with Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with the United States have forms of US military bases or quasi-bases on their territories, except Mexico and Nicaragua, although Mexico, as noted previously has substantial numbers of US troops on its soil. Conversely, all those countries grouped in ALBA (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua) do not have such agreements. Similarly, major countries which he classifies as neutral, that is which are

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not in ALBA nor have FTAs with the US, such as Brazil and Argentina, also do not have bases or quasi-bases on their territories, although this is also due to an historical tradition of greater military autonomy in these countries. Nevertheless, such arrangements do not always assure full agreement. Analysts have noted that there is increasing frustration throughout the region with the apparent inefficacy of the war on drugs. Allied countries have pointed to US refusals to reduce drug consumption and curtail arms sales within its borders to justify such scepticism, as both are seen as crucial elements in fuelling the drugs trade and the epidemic levels of violence which have accompanied it in the Latin American region.73 Hence, there is a breakdown of the consensus on criminalisation of drug use in the region, and an opening of discussion in favour of decriminalisation of the consumption of softer drugs. Interestingly positions do not always follow ideological lines – for example, Venezuela opposes decriminalisation while Right-wing President Otto Pérez Molina of Guatemala favours it74 and Left-led Uruguay has become the first country in the world to legalise cannabis production and distribution. Hence the discussion has opened on how to curtail the (privatised) drugs trade and its violent, destabilising consequences, despite US resistance to such measures. In effect, such discussions unmask the pretext of the war on drugs, showing it as an updated form of US intervention in order to protect US interests and those of the Latin American elites,75 one which, however, even those elites closest to the US are beginning to question.

Transnational Power During the initial period of democratisation Latin America began to be affected by the debt crisis which began to develop in the early 1980s. Military and authoritarian governments in the region borrowed heavily on the international markets in the 1970s, only to find interest rates rising dramatically, and unsustainably, in the early 1980s. The result was that most Latin American governments had to rely on the IMF and World Bank to ensure continued access to credit and invariably these loans involved the implementation of structural adjustment policies favouring neoliberal policy options. This led to what became known as the “lost development decade”, with slow or non-existent economic growth and increasing poverty and inequality. Once the Left began to come to power in the 2000s, a top priority for these governments became paying down these loans and moving away from the IMF as a source of credit. This was achieved by almost every one of the Left-led countries, including Argentina and Brazil. This move also opened the way for the search for new sources of credit. Venezuela, riding on the crest of an oil windfall, became one of those for Argentina. China also began to emerge as a major source of credit, as well as a major trading and investment partner. Moreover, Latin American countries themselves sought to institute multilateral sources of credit, such as the Banco del Sur (Bancosur or Bank of the South) founded in 2009. More

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recently still, in 2014 Brazil led the establishment of the BRICS development bank at a summit in Fortaleza, in the northeast of the country. With capital from Brazil and the other emerging powers of Russia, India, China and South Africa, the bank has $100 billion in capital, and is explicitly set up as an alternative to the IMF and the World Bank, which were increasingly seen as too beholden to Western, especially United States, interests and unresponsive to the needs of the developing world, including Latin America. Furthermore, all Latin American and Caribbean countries continue to protest the United States embargo of Cuba, and many, including Brazil, have developed close ties with other so-called pariah states, such as Iran. Latin America, or more specifically South America, has also aimed to lessen United States influence in the region by founding a variety of regional, multilateral institutions. The first of these, and the most enduring to date, is the Market of the South or Mercosur, founded by Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay in 1991, and aimed at increasing trade harmonisation and liberalisation within the region. Venezuela was admitted as a full member in 2012 and Bolivia is also on its way to membership. Following on this the foundation of UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) in 2008, encompassing all independent states in the sub-continent, and led by Brazil, is the next important grouping. This is complemented by the wider ranging CELAC (Council for Latin America and the Caribbean), founded in 2010, which includes all states in the hemisphere minus the United States and Canada and which was set up as a counter-weight to the long-standing Inter-American organisation the OAS (Organization of American States), which is viewed as being too dominated by Washington (where it has its headquarters). Finally, a smaller but symbolic organisation is the Venezuelan-led ALBA (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America/Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America), which aims to explicitly counter-balance neoliberal forms of regionalism and US power in the region, providing substantial economic and social aid through programmes such as Petrocaribe, providing cheap oil to Caribbean countries and Misión Milagro (Miracle Mission) providing health aid, as well as literacy programmes, etc. The formation and institutionalisation of these organisations are not without their problems. As Trinkunas points out, there are differences over threat perceptions, with the Andean and Mesoamerican countries viewing narcotics trafficking and insurgency from different perspectives; with differing views between Bolivarian and more traditional Left and conservative countries over democratisation; and tensions developing around the extent of free trade and liberalisation.76 Nor has Latin America been free of border disputes, the most serious taking place in 2008 and involving Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador, after a fatal Colombian army raid into Ecuadorian territory resulted in the assassinations of a number of leading FARC figures camped just over the border. The Honduran crisis in 2009, with the ousting of Manuel Zelaya as president, and the more recent removal of Fernando Lugo from the presidency of Paraguay in 2012,

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revealed fault lines in the region over the meaning of democracy while pointing once again to the continued involvement of the United States in the region’s affairs. Nevertheless, most of these disputes, and others in Bolivia (2008) were settled by Latin American agents, usually through UNASUR (except in Honduras). Hence, as Trinkunas observes, we are witnessing a waning of US influence in the region and the emergence of a new regional hegemony, at least in South America, centred on Brazil.77 This hegemony, by and large, seeks to carve out an alternative development and diplomatic path for the region, adapting to but subtly seeking to change the existing world power system led by the United States. Trinkunas goes on to assert that Brazilian hegemony does not directly seek to antagonise the United States, but nor does it slavishly adhere to US policy prescriptions.78 Rather its aim is to carve out an independent security and foreign policy which is more suited to Brazil as an emerging world power situated in an underdeveloped region of a rapidly globalising world. In this way, traditional Right-wing attitudes on the key issues of security, development and international relations are directly challenged, as these historically have found more common cause with the United States’ stance on these issues. Yet not all countries are distancing themselves from the United States. As previously noted, many countries have FTAs with the United States, mostly the Central American countries and the Dominican Republic, grouped into CAFTADR, but also such heavyweights as Mexico, Chile, Peru and Colombia. These latter nations have gone on to form the Pacific Alliance, characterised by its closeness to the United States, through the FTAs, and adherence to free-market principles. As argued in the previous chapter, this can be seen as a reduced version of the Free Trade of the Americas Association (FTAA) first mooted in the late 1990s by US President Clinton and finally abandoned in 2005 during the George W. Bush presidency. Yet the FTAA provides a model for Right-wing aspirations to strengthen such transnational links between the region and the United States, especially as such wide-ranging free trade agreements continue to be adopted on a monumental scale globally, such as the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), agreed in October 2015 between the United States and 11 other Pacific Rim countries and the mooted Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) being negotiated between the European Union and the United States.

Conclusion: Right-wing prospects in Left-led Latin America Hence on the basis of the above discussion, we can conclude the following. Overall in the Latin American region, the Left has presented a considerable challenge to Right-wing, neoliberal hegemony. In four countries – Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and, above all, Venezuela – Right-wing hegemony has been reduced to an important degree in each of the five power clusters examined, with each government introducing unorthodox policies contradicting important

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neoliberal tenets around the issues of free markets and/or polyarchy. Yet this challenge has also been felt in a number of other countries, especially in the regional powerhouse Brazil, where there is evidence of a shift in hegemony in each of the five areas, although not to the same intensity as in the abovementioned states. Even in neoliberalised states led by the Left, such as Chile and El Salvador, Right-wing hegemony has been disturbed somewhat, with important shifts in the nature of ideological debate and a strengthened political Left, although this challenge has not translated to any great degree in the important area of the economy. Finally, in a significant number of states, little or no threat to Right-wing neoliberal hegemony has been felt, particularly in key states such as Colombia and Mexico, but also in countries in South America, such as Peru, and in most of the Central American states, including Costa Rica, Honduras and Guatemala, although there are strong Left-of-centre forces in at least Honduras and to a lesser extent Costa Rica. Therefore, to summarise, we can conclude that the threat to Right-wing hegemony is at three levels in the region. In the Bolivarian countries of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and also in Argentina, it can be assessed as from medium to high; in the so-called social democratic Left-led countries of Brazil and Uruguay, and also in Left-led Nicaragua and El Salvador, it can be assessed as low to medium; and, in conservative, neoliberalised states such as Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Paraguay, Guatemala, Honduras, and even Costa Rica, it can be assessed as non-existent to low. These conclusions can be visualised by taking indicating measures mentioned in the discussions above as proxies: levels of Economic Freedom as assessed by the Heritage Foundation under Economic Power; quality of democracies as measured by the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index; Levels of Press Freedom and civil and political freedoms as measured by Freedom House in its Freedom in the World Report;79 Bihar’s assessment of Latin American allies with the United States for Military Power; and, finally, the existence of an FTA with the United States as a proxy for Right-wing dominance in Transnational power. These proxies are summarised in Table 5.4 to help assess the extent of the curtailment of Right-wing power in the five power clusters. It is important to remember, however, that the Right still possesses considerable resources to seek to reverse these threats. It still controls much of the economic and ideological apparatuses in most of the region, including in some of the less threatening Left-led states, such as Brazil, Uruguay and Chile, and indeed in medium-to-high-risk countries such as Argentina and even Venezuela, the latter two key battlefields between Right and Left. And it still retains powerful transnational support from the United States, Canada and Western European states and agencies controlled by them, although this too is threatened by new sources of financial and political support. Yet ultimately the use of such resources must translate into the re-capture of the state, as it is from the apex of the state that such moves can be reversed. This issue of strategies will be expanded on in the next chapter.

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TABLE 5.4 Level of threat to Right-wing hegemony in Latin America Country

Economy (1)

Politics (2)

Ideology (3)

Military (4)

Transnational (5)

Threat

Argentina

Repressed (27)

Flawed

Neutral

No

Medium

Bolivia

Repressed (26)

Hybrid

Opposed

No

Brazil

Flawed

Neutral

No

MediumHigh Low-Medium

Chile

Mostly Unfree (21) Mostly Free (1)

Allied*

Yes

Low

Colombia

Mostly Free (2)

Flawed

Allied*

Yes

Low

Costa Rica

Moderately Free (10) Repressed (25)

Full

Partly Free (51) [2.0] Partly Free (48) [3.0] Partly Free (45) [2.0] Partly Free (31) [1.0] Partly Free (54) [3.5] Free (18) [1.0] Not Free (62) [3.0] Partly Free (41) [2.5] Partly Free (39) [2.5] Partly Free (60) [3.5] Not Free (64) [4.0] Not Free (61) [3.0] Partly Free (52) [3.5] Partly Free (50) [2.0] Partly Free (45) [3.0] Partly Free (44) [2.5] Free (26) [1.0] Not Free (78) [5.0]

Allied*

Yes

Low

Opposed

No

High

Allied*

Yes

Low

Allied*

Yes

Low

Allied*

Yes

Low

Allied*

Yes

Low

Allied

Yes

Low

Opposed

Yes

Allied*

Yes

MediumHigh Low

Neutral

No

Low

Allied*

Yes

Low

Neutral

No

Low

Opposed

No

High

Ecuador Dominican Republic El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela

Moderately Free (16) Moderately Free (12) Moderately Free (17) Mostly Unfree (19) Moderately Free (59) Mostly Unfree (18) Moderately Free (14) Moderately Free (15) Moderately Free (8) Moderately Free (5) Repressed (28)

Flawed

Hybrid Flawed Flawed Hybrid Hybrid Flawed Hybrid Flawed Flawed Flawed Full Hybrid

Note: * Signifies some form of US military bases or quasi-bases on national soil. Bitar, 2014 (http:// web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/FLACSO-ISA%20BuenosAires%202014/Archive/33fec7f3-b8054fff-b7ea-c9f6fe48e1db.pdf). Source: Author’s own elaboration based on the following sources: (1) Heritage Foundation, World Index of Economic Freedom, 2015. It’s important to note that only five countries are considered Free, with even the US considered as only Mostly Free. Figures in brackets are the regional ranking for each country www.heritage.org/index/. Mexico is considered part of North America and is therefore ranked alongside the United States and Canada where it comes third. The figure in brackets is its global ranking. (2) Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index, 2014. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Democracy_Index#mediaviewer/File:EIU_Democracy_Index_2014_green_and_red.png. (3) Freedom House Freedom in the World Report 2014. Press Freedom Score (with numbers in brackets: the higher the number, out of 100, the lower the score) and “Freedom Rating” (the lower the figure, the greater the freedom level, with 7 the lowest possible score). (https://freedomhouse.org/regions/americas#. VOW_7vmsWFU). (4) Allied, Neutral, or Opposed to US. (5) FTA with United States.

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Notes 1 Wylde, Christopher, 2014. ‘State, Economy, and Society in Post-Neoliberalism Argentina: Under Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner’, Unpublished paper prepared for the ISA-FLACSO Annual Conference, Buenos Aires, July. Available at: http://web.isanet. org/Web/Conferences/FLACSO-ISA%20BuenosAires%202014/Archive/9cb69b30-75d7 -4fbe-8073-1d9a150ff5c7.pdf. Accessed: 17/08/2015. 2 The Heritage Foundation, 2015. Index of Economic Freedom, Available at: www.herita ge.org/index/. Accessed: 15/06/2015. 3 Bitar, Sebastian E., 2015. US Military Bases, Quasi-Bases, and Domestic Politics in Latin America. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 4 Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015. Democracy Index 2014: Democracy and its Discontents: A Report from the Economist Intelligence Unit. Available at: www.ifuturo.org/documenta cion/Democracy_Index_2014.pdf. Accessed: 15/06/2015. 5 Freedom House, 2015. Freedom of the Press, 2014. Available at: https://freedomhouse. org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2014#.VYAIbflViko. Accessed: 15/06/2015. 6 Bitar, US Military Bases, Quasi-Bases, and Domestic Politics. 7 See for example, Westervelt, Amy, 2015. ‘Lawsuit against El Salvador Mining Ban Highlights Free Trade Pitfalls’. The Guardian, 27 May. Available at: www.theguardian. com/sustainable-business/2015/may/27/pacific-rim-lawsuit-el-salvador-mine-gold-fre e-trade. Accessed: 22/06/2015. 8 Silva, Eduardo, 2009. Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 33. 9 Stallings, Barbara and Wilson Peres, 2011. ‘Is Economic Reform Dead in Latin America? Rhetoric and Reality since 2000’, in Journal of Latin American Studies, 43(4), pp. 755–786. 10 Ibid. Since their article was published, this has changed at least in the case of Mexico with the 2014 opening of the Mexican state oil company, PEMEX by the PRI government of Enrique Peña Nieto to private capital. Conversely, the advent of a leftwing government in El Salvador, first in 2009 and then in 2014, has brought with it a more critical discourse on neoliberalism. 11 Ibid., p. 767. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid., p. 786. 14 Svampa, Maristella, 2013. ‘“Consenso de los Commodities” y lenguajes de valoración en América Latina’, Nueva Sociedad, 244, March–April, pp. 30–46. Available at: www. nuso.org. Accessed: 18/08/2015, p. 34. 15 Ibid., p. 32. 16 Stallings and Peres, ‘Economic Reform’, p. 789. 17 Ibid., p. 783. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid., p. 769. 20 Flores-Macías, Gustavo A., 2010. ‘Statist vs. Pro-Market: Explaining Left Governments’ Economic Policies in Latin America’, in Comparative Politics, 42(4), pp. 413–433, 415. 21 Weisbrot, Mark, Jake Johnston and Stephan Lefebvre, 2013. Ecuador’s New Deal: Reforming and Regulating the Financial Sector. Washington, DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research. 22 Weeks, John, 2012. ‘Getting Priorities Right: The New Central Bank Law in Argentina’. Available at: www.social-europe.eu/2012/04/getting-priorities-right-the-new-ce ntral-bank-law-in-argentina/. Accessed: 15/06/2015. 23 Yates, Julian S. and Karen Bakker, 2014. ‘Debating the “Post-Neoliberal Turn” in Latin America’, in Progress in Human Geography, 38(1), pp. 62–90. 24 The Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom.

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25 See data in the Index of Economic Freedom, where Brazil’s rating has fallen by almost two points between 2012 and 2015. 26 Stallings and Peres, ‘Economic Reform’. 27 See for example Castañeda, Jorge and Marco A. Morales, (eds), 2008. Leftovers: Tales of the New Latin American Left, Abingdon: Routledge; Lievesley, Geraldine and Steve Ludlam (eds), 2009. Reclaiming Latin America: Experiments in Radical Social Democracy. London: Zed; Peck, Jamie, 2010. Constructions of Neoliberal Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 28 Cannon, Barry and Mo Hume, 2012. ‘Central America, Civil Society and the “Pink Tide”: Democratization or De-Democratization?’ in Democratization, 19(6), pp. 1039– 1064. 29 Smilde, David, 2014. ‘From Partial to Full Conflict Theory: A Neo-Weberian Perspective on Post-Neoliberal Venezuela’. Unpublished manuscript. Available at: www. sas.upenn.edu/dcc/sites/www.sas.upenn.edu.dcc/files/uploads/Smilde%20-%20From% 20Partial%20to%20Full%20Conflict%20Theory.pdf. Accessed: 11/06/2015, p. 29. 30 Ibid. 31 Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015. Democracy Index 2014: Democracy and Its Discontents: A Report from the Economist Intelligence Unit. Available at: www.eiu.com. Accessed: 15/ 06/2015. 32 Zibechi, Raúl, 2008. ‘The New Latin American Right: Finding a Place in the World’, in NACLA Report on the Americas, 41(1), January/February, pp. 13–19, 13. 33 Castañeda, Jorge, 2006. ‘Latin America’s Left Turn’, in Foreign Affairs, 85(3), n.p. 34 Zibechi, ‘New Latin American Right’, p. 18. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid., p. 19. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid., p. 15. 40 Ibid., p. 17. 41 Knight, Alan, 2001. ‘Democratic and Revolutionary Traditions in Latin America’, in Bulletin of Latin American Research, 20(2), pp. 147–186. 42 See Robinson, William I., 1996. Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention and Hegemony. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Robinson, William I., 2003. Transnational Conflicts; Robinson, William I., 2006. ‘Promoting Polyarchy in Latin America: The Oxymoron of “Market Democracy”’, in Hershberg, Eric and Fred Rosen (eds), 2006. Latin America: After Neoliberalism. New York: The New Press, pp. 96–119. 43 For a contemporary version see Burron, Neil A., 2010. ‘Democracy Promotion and the Quest for Regional Order: A Critical View of US and Canadian Democracy Assistance in the Americas’, Unpublished PhD thesis. Available at: https://curve.ca rleton.ca/system/files/theses/31229.pdf. Accessed: 15/06/2015; Burron, Neil A., 2012. ‘Unpacking US Democracy Promotion in Bolivia: From Soft Tactics to Regime Change’, Latin American Perspectives, 39(182), pp. 115–132; Burron, Neil A., 2012. The New Democracy Wars: The Politics of North American Democracy Promotion in the Americas. Farnham: Ashgate. 44 Robinson, ‘Promoting Polyarchy in Latin America’, p. 105. 45 See Scott, James M., 1999. ‘Transnationalizing Democracy Promotion: The Role of Western Political Foundations and Think-Tanks’ in Democratization, 6(3), pp. 146–170; Scott, James M., and Carie A. Steele, 2005. ‘Assisting Democrats or Resisting Dictators? The Nature and Impact of Democracy Support by the United States National Endowment for Democracy, 1990–99’ in Democratization, 12(4), pp. 439–460. 46 Burron, ‘Democracy Promotion and the Quest for Regional Order’, pp. xxix-xxx. 47 Ibid., p. xxix.

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48 Ibid., p. xvi. 49 Robinson, ‘Promoting Polyarchy in Latin America’. 50 See Williamson, John, 2004. ‘A Short History of the Washington Consensus’. Paper commissioned by Fundación CIDOB for a conference From the Washington Consensus towards a New Global Governance, Barcelona, 24–25 September. Available at: www.iie. com/publications/papers/williamson0904-2.pdf. Accessed: 15/06/2015. 51 Lugo-Ocando, Jairo, 2008. ‘An Introduction to the Maquilas of Power: Media and Political Transition in Latin America’, in Lugo-Ocando. The Media in Latin America. Maidenhead: McGraw Hill and Open University Press, pp. 1–13. 52 Silva, Challenging Neoliberalism. 53 Burron, ‘Unpacking US Democracy Promotion in Bolivia’. 54 See, for example: Barry, Tom. 2007. The New Politics of Political Aid in Venezuela. Washington, DC: Americas Program Report and International Relations Center. Available at: www.globalresearch.ca/the-new-politics-of-political-aid-in-venezuela/ 6391. Accessed: 15/06/2015; Cole, N.S. 2007. ‘Hugo Chavez and President Bush’s Credibility Gap: The Struggle against US Democracy Promotion’, in International Political Science Review/Revue internationale de science politique, 28(4), pp. 493–507; Wilpert, G. 2003. Collision in Venezuela, in New Left Review 21, pp. 101–116. 55 Burron, ‘Unpacking US Democracy Promotion in Bolivia’; Bigwood, Jeremy. 2008. ‘New Discoveries Reveal US Intervention in Bolivia’. UpsideDown World, 14 October. Available at: http://upsidedownworld.org/main/content/view/1522/l/. Accessed: 15/ 06/2015; Dangl, Benjamin, 2008. ‘Undermining Bolivia: A Landscape of Washington Intervention’, The Progressive, February. Available at: http://progressive.org/mag_da ngl0208. Accessed: 15/06/2015. 56 Golinger, Eva. 2009. ‘Washington and the Coup in Honduras: Here Is the Evidence’. Postcards from the Revolution, 15 July. Available at: http://www.chavezcode.com/2009/ 07/washington-coup-in-honduras-here-is.html. Accessed: 15/06/2015; Calloni, Stella, 2009. ‘Honduras: A New Screenplay by the CIA and Associates’ Axis of Logic, 9 July. Available at: http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article_56272.shtml. Accessed: 15/06/2015. 57 Macrory, Robbie, 2012. ‘Dilemmas of Democratisation: Media Regulation and Reform in Argentina’. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 32(2), pp. 178–193, 180. 58 These include: the 2004 Law on Social Responsibility of Radio and Television in Venezuela; the 2009 Law on Audiovisual Communication Services in Argentina; the 2013 Communications Law in Ecuador. For discussions on these see the relevant entries in the 2014 Freedom House Report on Press Freedom. 59 For academic discussions on these and on the media in each country see: Macrory, ‘Dilemmas of Democratisation’; Lupien, Pascal, 2013. ‘Attacking the “Bad Left” from Below’, in Latin American Perspectives, 40(190), pp. 226–246; Fuentes-Bautista, Marta and Gisele C. Gil-Egui, 2011. ‘Community Media and the Rearticulation of Civil Society-State Relations in Venezuela’, in Communication, Culture & Critique, 4, pp. 250–274; Grinffiel, Julieta, 2013. ‘Media Laws in Latin America: A Comparison between Argentina and Venezuela’, in Law and Business Review of the Americas 17, pp. 557–582. 60 Doleac, Clement, 2015. ‘Insufficient Media Reforms in Latin America: Urgency to Go Further’, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 19 February. Available at: www.coha.org/ insufficient-media-reforms-in-latin-america-urgency-to-go-further/. Accessed: 17/08/ 2015. 61 Freedom House, 2015. Freedom of the Press, 2014. Available at: https://freedomhouse. org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2014#.VYAIbflViko. Accessed: 15/06/2015. 62 Pion-Berlin, David, 2009. ‘Defense Organization and Civil-Military Relations in Latin America’ in Armed Forces & Society, 35, pp. 562–586, 583. 63 Ibid.

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64 Ruhl, J.M., 2004. ‘Curbing Central America’s Militaries’, in Journal of Democracy, 15(3), pp. 137–151. 65 Peréz, Orlando J. and Rafael Martínez, 2014. ‘The Central American Military: Building Democratic Control in Post-Conflict Societies’, in Sánchez-Ancochea, Diego and Salvador Martí i Puig (eds), 2014. Handbook of Central American Governance. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 182–198. 66 Arias, Enrique Desmond, and Goldstein, Daniel M., ‘Violent Pluralism: Understanding the New Democracies of Latin America’, in Arias, Enrique Desmond, and Goldstein, Daniel M. (eds), 2010. Violent Democracies in Latin America. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, pp. 1–35; Davis, Diane E., ‘The Political and Economic Origins of Violence and Insecurity in Contemporary Latin America: Past Trajectories and Future Prospects’ in Arias, et al. Violent Democracies in Latin America, pp. 35–63. 67 Arias, et al., ‘Violent Pluralism’, p. 17; Mercille, Julien, ‘Violent Narco-Cartels or US Hegemony? The Political Economy of the “War on Drugs” in Mexico’, in Third World Quarterly 32(9), pp. 1637–1653; Corva, Dominic, ‘Neoliberal Globalization and the War on Drugs: Transnationalizing Illiberal Governance in the Americas’, in Political Geography, 27(2), pp. 176–193. 68 Mercille, ‘Violent Narco-Cartels’. 69 Trinkunas, Harold, 2013. ‘Reordering Regional Security in Latin America’, in Journal of International Affairs, 66(2), pp. 83–99. 70 See for example the Associated Press, 2014. ‘Brazil Military Continues Raid on Slums before World Cup’, 5 April. Available at: www.cbc.ca/news/world/brazil-milita ry-continues-raids-on-slums-before-world-cup-1.2599596. Accessed: 15/05/2015. 71 Rittinger, Eric R. and Matthew R. Cleary, 2013. ‘Confronting Coup Risk in the Latin American Left’, in Studies in Comparative International Development, 48, pp. 403– 431, 403. 72 Bitar, Sebastian E., 2013. ‘Quasi-Bases: The US military and Domestic Politics in Latin America’. Unpublished manuscript. Available at: http://web.isanet.org/Web/Con ferences/FLACSO-ISA%20BuenosAires%202014/Archive/33fec7f3-b805-4fff-b7ea-c9 f6fe48e1db.pdf. Accessed: 15/06/2015, pp. 34–35. 73 McGreal, Chris, 2014. ‘Central American Leaders Meet Barack Obama to Criticise US Border Policy’, The Guardian, 26 July. Available at: www.theguardian.com/world/ 2014/jul/26/central-american-leaders-obama-border-policy. Accessed: 15/06/2015. 74 Youngers, Coletta, 2014. ‘A Turning Point for Drug Policy’, in NACLA Report on the Americas, Summer. Available at: https://nacla.org/article/turning-point-drug-policy. Accessed: 15/06/2015. 75 Livingstone, Grace, 2011. ‘The United States of America and the Latin American Right’, in Dominguez, Francisco, Geraldine Lievesley, and Steve Ludlam (eds). RightWing Politics in the New Latin America: Reaction and Revolt. London: Zed, pp. 26–44. 76 Trikunas, ‘Reordering Regional Security’. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 79 Freedom House, 2015. Freedom of the Press, 2014.

6 COUPS, ‘SMART COUPS’ AND ELECTIONS Right power strategies under Left-led governments

Introduction: Right power strategies in historical perspective So far I have established the importance of elites as the “core constituency” for the Right in Latin America; the centrality of neoliberalism as their main ideological project in the current historical context, a project that has been carried out most effectively in those countries grouped into the Pacific Alliance; and, the existence of a counter-hegemonic movement among the countries of the “pink tide”, most notably in the Bolivarian countries, but also in Argentina and even in Brazil, which has at least stalled and in some cases reversed key elements of the neoliberal project, such as privatisations. What strategies can elites use then to combat these counter-hegemonic, post-neoliberal projects led by the Left? When considering elite power strategies in Latin America, most analyses, as we have seen in Chapter 2, highlight the relative paucity of dedicated Right-wing political parties as a principal resource, emphasising rather the need to use other electoral or non-electoral strategies to achieve elite objectives.1 Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser identify three “vehicles … by which the Right has been able to gain political leverage” in the region: non-electoral, non-partisan electoral movements and political parties.2 Non-electoral strategies have first been the staging of coups d’etat by armed forces in league with the Right or the use of paramilitaries, as in Colombia and, second, congressional lobbying by business, media, religious, civil society and other groups, as well as by the armed forces, with “[d]isproportionate access to economic resources” central to this latter strategy.3 In the second vehicle, the Right has used electoral movements to achieve its goals, which are basically coalitions built around charismatic, non-party political personalities, who once in office implement Right-wing, pro-market policies. Examples given are figures such as Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil, or

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Álvaro Uribe in Colombia. Finally, the third vehicle is the building of dedicated Right-wing parties, a relatively rare occurrence, with parties cited such as PAN in Mexico, ARENA in El Salvador, RN and UDI in Chile and smaller Brazilian Rightwing parties. These have all led or at least participated in government, and the largest and most successful, such as the first four, have managed to do so through either “non-programmatic electoral mobilisation (clientelism, personalism, etc.) or programmatic mobilisation of non-distributive divides (e.g., moral conservatism, order and security, economic growth and efficiency, etc.)”.4 This analysis provides a broad view of elite strategies to regain power over the state in the context of the current turn to the Left. Yet while analytically neat, there is insufficient recognition of the degree of overlapping between the different vehicles. As with many political science approaches to the subject, its pluralist, Dahlian perspective is informed by a Parsonian functionalism, whereby each part of the body politic is discreet from the other, with politicians in a neutral space having to satisfy competing claims. In the first vehicle, for example, business groups, media, and civil society groups “lobby” politicians to ensure their favoured policies are adopted. Yet, in practice there is often little differentiation between these groups, especially in Latin America. Individual “politicians” can belong to many groups simultaneously, such as Otto Pérez Molina (2012–2015) of Guatemala, for example, with his background in the military, business and politics, or Sebastian Piñera of Chile (2010–2014), also with a background in business and politics. These people are far from neutral in their aims once in office, and attempt to realise their group and class objectives as closely as possible within the context of national office and its limitations. Furthermore, there is a reification of political parties, as in vehicle three, yet in the absence of these, non-electoral or non-partisan electoral strategies seem a poor second to their formation. Yet, as has been repeatedly pointed out, party formation is the exception rather than the rule in the region, with elites uninterested, unwilling or unable to form parties. This is due, as the authors point out, to the situation of extreme inequality and poverty found there, which makes it difficult to build electorally successful Rightist political parties, which by their nature seek continued elite supremacy. Yet as emphasised here, it is also due to the extent of oligarchical power which elites maintain across the power spectrum, which can help condition the exercise of political power of those who are in office, regardless of their political colour. Here I argue that it is more apt to take a wide-ranging, comprehensive view of the Right in Latin America. Rather than being siloed into discreet sectors whose aim is to seek political representation, the Right should be seen as “diffused throughout civil and political society and. … [simultaneously] located in multiple economic, social and political sites at the national, regional [and international] level”.5 Similarly, political strategies need to be seen from a more comprehensive perspective as a menu of resources which can be activated depending on the strategic circumstances. Furthermore, the aim of such strategies is not just to

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achieve political power, but rather to ensure the conditions for continued elite hegemony over the entire power structure, and in the current context this means the continuation, consolidation and expansion of neoliberalism. In other words, the aim is to create what I have termed here Right-oriented state/society complexes, whereby the objective is not solely to secure political power, but rather to secure neoliberalism across the power spectrum to such an extent that it is largely irrelevant who may gain power at the state level. In the current context, elites need to secure state power to guard against the type of undoing of neoliberalism, which has developed under some of the current Left governments, in order to (re)construct a more secure neoliberal order, as analysed in the previous chapter. Yet, as we have seen, conditions vary from country to country, with the neoliberal project under more severe threat in some than in others. Here I argue that strategies therefore need to be multifaceted, flexible and adaptable to these differing national conditions. They manifest themselves at three distinct levels, each of which can be activated depending on the level of threat perceived to the neoliberal project by elites, and on conditions on the ground. At the first level are electoral strategies, meaning those strategies aimed at gaining state power primarily through electoral means. These can take three forms: through consolidated, dedicated Right-wing parties, such as El Salvador’s ARENA and Chile’s UDI; through populist, personalist electoral vehicles, such as those of Fujimori in Peru or Uribe in Colombia; and, through colonisation of traditional Left, social democratic or centrist parties, such as those that took place during the 1990s with the adoption of neoliberalism by many of the erstwhile populist or social democratic parties.6 It can also include, however, the use of state institutions controlled by opposition parties, including blocking and delaying tactics in the legislature and impeachment proceedings, while if possible, capitalising on scandal and investigative congressional committees etc.7 The second strategic level is mobilisational, by which I mean any activity beyond electoral politics aimed at creating the political, economic and social conditions necessary to facilitate the removal of a Left government, by electoral means or otherwise, and its replacement in power by a candidate and/or party more conducive to the reassertion of neoliberal principles. Here particular actions can include intense, comprehensive, media campaigns against Left presidents and parties, which help create a climate of estrangement between the government and sectors in the population. These aim to create the conditions for sustained popular mobilisations, particularly amongst the middle classes, against Left governments or particular policies adopted by them. Such mobilisations may include work stoppages, lock-outs, blockades, street barricades and violence, activities, indeed, which are normally associated with popular uprisings on the Left. They can also include attempts at economic destabilisation, including capital strikes, and the hoarding or re-selling of essential products.8 Such actions can also be accompanied by coordinated international actions against the Left government, such as economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, “democracy promotion” activities, or

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other such tactics. Finally, the third level is semi- or extra-constitutional strategies, which usually involve the removal of a Left president with the support of all or some of state institutions not controlled by the government, which can also include armed forces involvement The level of strategy can depend on the extent of the perceived threat felt to the neoliberalised power structure, and can be combined in a multilayered, dynamic, relational manner. The higher the threat, the more possible that strategies may arrive to the level of extra-constitutionality. Nevertheless, even here the success of these can be circumscribed by relevant contextual circumstances in each country, such as the readiness of the population to accept such actions. Ideally, the aim is to effect what I call smart coups, whereby Left governments are forced out of office and a new Right-oriented government put in place, with, preferably, relatively little bloodshed and an element of popular and institutional legitimacy. The best example of this strategy was the removal of President Lugo in Paraguay in 2012, whereby the president was removed through legalistic methods, obviating the need for overt military intervention. Other examples were the successful 2009 coup in Honduras against President Manuel Zelaya and the failed 2002 coup against President Chávez in Venezuela, both however, with direct military involvement and with considerable bloodshed. Nevertheless, the other elements – the media campaigns, the mobilisations – were present, and most famously in the Venezuelan case, the economic sabotaging tactics, etc. Moreover, the success or failure of each of these was directly related to the circumstances in each country at the time.

Institutional Power Strategies Political parties in Latin America, of whichever ideological persuasion, have traditionally had weak organisational capabilities and structures. Mainwaring and Scully identify two types of party systems in the region. 9 The first is more institutionalised, as it has stable rules of inter-party competition with widespread acceptance of electoral democracy, with parties well linked into society, and stable internal structures and ideological outlooks. On the other hand, the second type of party system, the inchoate (or non- or weakly-institutionalised) party system has much more fluid parties, which rise and fall rapidly, are often poorly organised, small, and ideologically incoherent. They have weak links to society, which has in turn a weak commitment to electoral democracy. Mainwaring and Scully identified Mexico, Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay and, until recently, Venezuela as the most stable party systems in the region, although more latterly others would add Brazil to that list.10 Middlebrook argues that countries with more institutionalised party systems have had better organised and more successful Right or Right-of-centre parties.11 Hence those countries with the most successful Right parties have been, for example, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela, whereas Argentina, Brazil and Peru

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have had weaker conservative parties. Luna and Rovira Kaltwassser show, however, that this situation has changed somewhat in the current context.12 While they find little ideological difference among Right-wing parties in the region (but distinct differences between Right and Left parties) there are important organisational differences, creating two types of Right political parties. The first type, with emblematic examples such as ARENA in El Salvador and the UDI in Chile, are well organised, with a strong central hierarchy which nonetheless allows for decentralised territorial organisation and hence distinct types of electoral mobilisation. These parties can capture a combined popular support from both upper and lower social sectors, with frequent use of clientelism to support this. The second type of parties they identify, giving examples of the “U” party of ex-President Álvaro Uribe in Colombia and RN in Chile, are territorially centralised almost exclusively in the capital, with vertical decision-making structures. Election campaigns are strongly centred on the candidate as a solution to a specific problem, such as Uribe’s “democratic security” position in Colombia as an answer to that country’s civil war. Nor do these parties have the same recourse to clientelism as the first type. Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser point out, however, that some parties (such as the PAN in Mexico and the Conservative Party in Colombia) can exhibit a mix of these traits, and that while many of the parties in both camps have differing historical backgrounds, all “have a privileged link with business sectors, which coincides with their free-market positions”.13 A third strategy which the Right uses to achieve state power is through the colonisation of parties which have been historically Left, Left-populist, Social Democratic, Christian Democratic and indeed conservative in their ideological orientation. Stokes outlines how during the early years of post-authoritarian democratisation, presidents increasingly adopted neoliberalism despite campaigning to the contrary.14 Many of these came from erstwhile populist parties, which would have traditionally pursued state interventionist policies associated with Latin America’s import substitution industrialisation (ISI) era, such as Carlos Andrés Pérez of AD in Venezuela, Paz Estenssoro and Sánchez de Lozada of the MNR in Bolivia, Carlos Menem of the Peronist Party in Argentina, Salinas de Gortari of the PRI in Mexico, and César Gaviria of the Liberals in Colombia, etc. The result of this has been the steady decline of the existing party structure in most countries in the region, sometimes spectacularly as was the case in Venezuela, with the implosion of the Punto Fijo era party structure and the rise of Hugo Chávez on an anti-party, anti-elite and anti-neoliberal platform. Nevertheless, in a context of Left hegemony, with extremely high, if lessening, levels of inequality and poverty, the challenge for the Right is how to advance the neoliberal project while maintaining adherence to democratic institutionality. As Stokes points out “neoliberalism is hazardous for the Right” as “voters punished [it] when it presided over open capital markets and when it reduced the public sector”.15 In response to this, we find a number of strategies, building on those itemised above.

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There have been some important attempts to build Right or centre-Right party alternatives, most notably the PRO in Argentina.16 While relatively successful on a sub-national level, controlling the Buenos Aires regional parliament, the PRO did not translate this success to the national level until 2015. There have also been examples of new Rightist parties or movements emerging at the sub-national level in Bolivia, with a similar limited appeal.17 Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser also point to the continued prominence in Peru of Alberto Fujimori’s electoral movement, now led by his daughter, Keiko.18 Ultimately, such new parties have fared better than traditional Right or conservative parties, although their continuation remains a moot point in a still highly unstable party system. Non-party electoral vehicles remain a common strategy, particularly emphasising security issues. Wills-Otero points to the emergence of Álvaro Uribe in Colombia on a security ticket promising to combat that country’s FARC guerrilla rebels.19 Despite losing the presidency to his last defence minister, Juan Manuel Santos, in 2010, the ex-president’s movement still retains exceptional influence in Colombian politics and society. A similar example can be found in Guatemala, with the coming to the presidency of ex–army general, Otto Pérez Molina (2012–2015) and his “iron fist” security policies, as well as the ex-comedian Jimmy Morales succeeding him. Security has also been a salient campaigning point in Mexico and Venezuela, among others. A further tactic is to form coalitions of opposition parties, often of differing ideological backgrounds, in order to provide a united front against Left sitting presidents. Pioneered by the UNO coalition against the Sandinistas in the 1990 elections in Nicaragua, a good present-day example is the MUD coalition in Venezuela, consisting of some of the old parties from the Punto Fijo era, and new parties emerging out of that system, as well as parties of a more social-democratic outlook. This tactic has had considerable electoral success in Venezuela, winning some important sub-national territories, as well as a stunning win of 65 per cent in the 2015 National Assembly elections. This has left the opposition with the possibility to remove President Maduro from power through a recall referendum in 2016.20 Yet this strategy has its difficulties, most notably maintaining unity in coalitions with differences on ideology and strategy.21 Smaller scale and much less successful attempts at coalition building have taken place in Bolivia with Jorge Quiroga’s Podemos, and in Ecuador, with Guillermo Lasso’s CREO. Ideological colonisation of existing parties also continues as a live strategy. The 2014 elections in Brazil saw a rush on the part of elites to endorse Socialist Party candidate Marina Silva in her challenge to PT incumbent Dilma Rousseff. Silva enjoyed considerable support among Brazil’s highly oligopolised private media, and each time she surged in the polls, corresponding surges were felt in the Brazilian stock exchange, suggesting endorsement from the country’s financial and business elite, despite her strong background in environmental politics.22 This was hardly surprising, as the Socialist Party was much more to the Right in its economic policies than the PT, promising greater market freedoms and closer

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cooperation with the United States and Western Europe, as opposed to the PTs perceived state interventionist policies and independent foreign policy. For these reasons, important sections of the international press also supported the Rousseff challenger.23 Once Silva was eliminated in the first round, however, she endorsed the candidacy of the more openly Right PSDB candidate Aécio Neves.24 Yet even after his losing the elections, there were attempts to portray him as a reforming democrat, rather than the favourite of the financial markets.25 Finally, the use of institutional strategies to discredit sitting Left politicians is also a favoured strategy, thereby creating conditions of crisis which can favour the removal of a Left leader. Here Right politicians who dominate state institutions blame institutional crises on specific leaders, rather than on the very institutions which they dominate. In tandem, elites use their considerable structural and instrumental power, particularly in the media, to amplify such charges. Examples are situations of corruption in Chile and Brazil in 2015, affecting two Left (and female) presidents, Michelle Bachelet and Dilma Rousseff. In both cases Right politicians were also involved in the corruption scandals, but the emphasis was placed on the alleged culpability of the Left presidents alone – with resulting dramatic drops in their approval ratings in polls, and mass demonstrations in Brazil (see below).

Conclusion Despite this plethora of institutionalised, electoral strategies, results so far have not been inspiring, with Right-wing presidential candidates losing in 11 of the 16 countries surveyed in the region (see Table 6.1 below). Nevertheless, the closeness of some of these losses – particularly in Venezuela in 2013 and in Brazil in 2014, and the wins for Macri in Argentina in 2015 and for the MUD in Venezuela’s 2015 Assembly elections – would indicate, as Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser suggest, that a new anti-incumbent cycle may be beginning.26 Failings in policy delivery, corruption scandals, and internal divisions all weaken support for these governments and provide openings for the Right which can be capitalised upon through use of the strategies outlined above. These possibilities alone ensure that such institutional strategies will remain the most favoured by Right-wing forces supporting neoliberalism. Nevertheless, in the face of continued Left hegemony, which may result in a reduction of the success of such strategies, other non-electoral strategies may be needed to help recover the state for the Right.

Mobilisational strategies Mobilisational strategies involve a variety of activities beyond institutionalised, party-based politics, which nevertheless aim to install opposition parties and presidents in institutionalised power. These can involve media campaigns; popular mobilisations and activities aimed at limiting or impeding production and exchange; and further economic disruptions such as capital strikes or hoarding,

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TABLE 6.1 Performance of main Right candidate in most recent presidential election Country

Year

Candidate

Party

Percentage of vote

Elected (y/ n)

Next election

Argentina

2015

Mauricio Macri

Propuesta Republicana

51.34%

YES

2019

Bolivia

2014

Samuel Dorian Medina

Democratic Unity

24.23%

NO

2019

Brazil

2014

Aécio Neves

PSDB

48.36%

NO

2018

Chile

2013

Evelyn Matthei

UDI/Alliance

37.83%

NO

2017

Colombia

2014

Juan Manuel Santos*

Partido de la U

50.95%

YES

2018

Costa Rica

2014

Otto Guevara

PML

11.34%**

NO

2018

Dominican Republic

2012

Hipólito Mejía

PRD

46.95%

NO

2016

Ecuador

2013

Guillermo Lasso

CREO

22.68%

NO

2017

El Salvador

2014

Norman Quijano

ARENA

49.89%

NO

2019

Guatemala

2015

Jimmy Morales

FCN-Nación

67.44%

YES

2019

Honduras

2013

Juan Orlando Hernández

PNH***

36.89%

YES

2017

Mexico

2012

Enrique Peña Nieto

PRI

39.17%

YES

2018

Nicaragua

2011

Fabio Gadea Mantilla

PLI

31.00%

NO

2016

Panama

2014

Juan Carlos Varela

Panameñista Party

39.1%

YES

2019

Paraguay

2013

Horacio Cartes

ANR-PC

45.45%

YES

2018

Peru

2011

Keiko Fujimori

Fuerza 2011

48.55%

NO

2016

Uruguay

2014

Luis Alberto Lacalle

Partido Nacional

43.37%

NO

2018

Venezuela

2013

Henrique Capriles Radonski

PJ/MUD

49.12%

NO

2018

* Re-elected as president following 2010 victory with 69.1% of votes **Figure shows Round 1 voting. Candidate did not receive enough votes to enter Round 2 of voting *** PNH candidate Porfirio Lobo Sosa won the 2009 elections with 56.56 per cent of votes. Source: Own elaboration based on relevant Wikipedia entries cross-referenced with relevant entries on www.electionguide.org.

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tactics sometimes accompanied with violence. Such activities can be accompanied with international actions, often led by the United States, including sanctions, diplomatic isolation, “democracy promotion” activities or other such tactics. Sometimes these strategies have been combined with forced removal of governments, although this has not always been the case. Instances of mobilisational strategic manoeuvres against Left governments have been experienced in a wide variety of countries in the region, including Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and Venezuela. In Argentina, the so-called paro agrario in 2008 was a particularly tense moment for the government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. Beginning in March that year, agricultural producers revolted against a new tax on exports of agricultural produce being introduced by the government, with regular demonstrations and supply shortages. It quickly escalated into one of the greatest challenges against her government from the Right. Similarly the government of Dilma Rousseff faced the most extensive demonstrations seen in Brazil since democratisation, which created the conditions for her near defeat in the subsequent 2014 elections. Even after the elections, further demonstrations aimed at her impeachment and removal from power took place. Similar tactics, including violence, took place in the rich, gas-producing eastern provinces of Bolivia between 2006–2009, aimed here at secession and at destabilisation of the Left government of Evo Morales. Finally, in Venezuela, student-led demonstrations continued throughout the latter part of the Chávez presidency and right up into the current Maduro administration. In most of these cases we can see evidence of an activation of oligarchical power in many of the networks identified here, including economic, ideological and transnational. Let us look at each process in turn.

Argentina In March 2008, not long after winning the elections in 2007 with a convincing margin, President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner introduced a rise in the export tax, from 35 per cent to 44 per cent, on the extremely profitable agricultural exports sector. Additionally, the new law, once adopted, would have tracked international prices, allowing for a top marginal rate of up to 95 per cent. The measure was viewed as so radical by producers that their usually fractious associations, including small and large landholders, agreed to launch an unprecedented united protest strategy against it. They had two main complaints against the measure: that it was seen as unjust, with the possibility of rising to such a high marginal rate, and that it was arbitrary, the action of an increasingly overweening and authoritarian government.27 The campaign, which would last on and off for up to five months after the announcement of the measure, had both economic and social strategic aims. Economic strategies were aimed at “halting the sale and delivery of agricultural products, primarily meat and grains, to domestic and export markets”.28 Social protest actions included “roadblocks, demonstrations and rallies”29 in the capital and in

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the provinces, with some reaching up to 200,000 in number. The immediate impacts of the campaign were steep price rises and shortages of goods in the cities, causing discontent among city-dwellers. The government mobilised counterdemonstrations and launched an aggressive campaign against the producer associations’ strategy, framing the dispute as a battle between elites and the impoverished, as some of the proceeds of the tax rise would go to social programmes. Hence, the producers were branded as unpatriotic, as being more concerned about their sectional interests than the social programmes which were needed to improve the country. The protesters counter-argued that the economic contribution of their sector was just as crucial for the well-being of the country.30 Eventually the economic, social and political costs became too great for the government to bear. Costs to the economy were high, around one per cent of GDP, with an estimated US$3.4 billion being lost in total earnings.31 Mobilisation among anti-Peronist sectors in the upper- and middle-class areas of Buenos Aires and other cities developed in support of the producers, blaming the government for the shortages and protesting at the perceived authoritarianism of the latter.32 Business groups became increasingly concerned at the disruption in the economy,33 despite the fact that the measure would have benefitted those servicing the national market. The media, including the dominant Clarín group, supported the producers, and launched a “phenomenal political campaign against the government”,34 which was seen by the latter as encouraging and fuelling protests.35 The producers also successfully framed their protest as a contest between a centralising federal government and the provinces, a narrative accepted by many provincial governors, causing a split in the Peronist ranks. The government became increasingly isolated and was forced to allow a vote in Congress on the tax changes, which it lost by one vote, which was cast by Julio Cobos, the government’s then vice president. Not only did the producers win, but their protest heralded a new cycle of antigovernment protests by anti-Peronist groups among the middle and upper classes. Central to these disputes would be the issues of government intervention in the economy and its perceived authoritarianism, issues sharpening as the economy deteriorated in the following years, with high levels of inflation becoming a particular issue.36 As Rzezak argues, the crisis del campo (rural crisis), as it became known, facilitated the articulation of a more united opposition against the government based around such issues,37 and protests would continue as a live oppositional strategy on various occasions against the Fernández de Kirchner administration in subsequent years, ultimately leading to the Right’s Mauricio Macri winning the 2015 elections.

Brazil Over a two month period in June–July, 2013, on the eve of the Confederations Cup, Brazil saw the largest popular mobilisations since its return to democracy in 1985. Started by a small, Left group protesting modestly against public transport fare rises in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, these rapidly escalated into mass events, encompassing

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a whole range of issues and groups and drawing crowds of a million or more in the grand avenues of São Paulo. Initially the demonstrations were dismissed by Right politicians and the Right-wing corporatist media, with Gerardo Alckmin, Rightwing PSDB governor of São Paulo state, branding demonstrators “vandals” and “troublemakers”, and Right-wing journalists labelling them “terrorists”.38 Yet this attitude changed dramatically as military police brutally attacked demonstrators, injuring a number of journalists in the process, and the Rightwing media sensed a perfect opportunity to attack the PT-led federal government.39 From thence on they offered blanket coverage of the protests, emptying these of their radical content and framing them as against the more generic “state inefficiency and corruption”.40 Participation in the marches exploded, with some marches in July reaching over one million people.41 According to Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, by this stage all Brazil was aware of the marches, with only 3 per cent in polls not having heard of them.42 Moreover, the themes of the original marches became subsumed in a cacophony of demands, from same-sex marriage to the return of the military government. Most marchers were young and middle class, organising through social media, although local community groups and workers were often integrated into the multitude, these pursuing their own demands.43 Demonstrators rejected party politics in general but particularly the PT-led administrations of “Lula” da Silva and Dilma Rousseff. This rejection of the PT and the directionless, leaderless nature of the demonstrations allowed the Right to co-opt and manipulate the demonstrations “in order to assert their own agenda”.44 This consisted primarily of undermining and delegitimising the Rousseff administration while promoting the “neoliberal globalising project”.45 Indeed, the media and business elites saw this latest mobilisation as an opportunity to remove the PT from power altogether in the upcoming elections in 2014. With the economy in decline, the demonstrations helped push President Dilma Rousseff’s approval ratings in polls down from a high of 80 per cent before March 201346 to 30 per cent in mid-July of the same year.47 The government did attempt to win back the initiative: fare increases were rescinded, a new participative Public Transport Council was promised, and more money was pledged for public transport and for health.48 Moreover, new laws against corruption were introduced and the government proposed a referendum on political reform. Yet of these initiatives, most were stopped in their tracks by the existing institutionality, itself a product of the elite-led transition to democracy, with its still-firm imprint of the military dictatorship. Congress rejected the referendum proposal as “unfeasible”, while cuts were announced for education and health.49 Hence, in Brazil we see yet another example of mobilisational Right tactics, with the mainstream media playing a central role in promoting mass demonstrations aimed ultimately at removing a Left-government from power, despite its “extraordinary moderation”.50 Furthermore, this move was reinforced by a conservative institutionality, with little sympathy for closer popular participation in

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decision-making processes. The Right’s gamble almost paid off in the elections, with Rousseff barely winning by a mere 3.28 per cent of the vote and the PT losing seats in Congress. This, however, emboldened the same sectors to organise more demonstrations in 2015, with similar demands attended by a similar demographic, some going so far as to call for Rousseff’s impeachment and including a call for the return of the military government.51 Instrumental in the genesis of these protests were the corruption scandals involving the giant, mostly stateowned oil company Petrobras, which was accused of providing kickbacks to politicians in return for favours. This scandal was brought to light by a judicial enquiry known as Lavajato. While the media and elites project these scandals as being entirely the responsibility of Rousseff, many more politicians and elite groups are involved, including the speakers of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, both from the PMDB, and the chief opposition leader and Rousseff’s presidential challenger in the 2014 elections, Aécio Neves of the PSDB.52

Bolivia Bowen points out that of all the countries in the region, Bolivia had one of the most thorough neoliberal transformations, with the Right there becoming even more “dramatically anti-statist” than in other jurisdictions.53 The social backlash amongst sub-altern, particularly indigenous groups, against this situation eventually led to the arrival of Evo Morales, and the MAS to power in 2006, effectively wiping out the old party system derived from the 1950s. New, loose Right-wing electoral coalitions which emerged, such as PODEMOS, failed to consolidate and most Right-wing resistance became centred on the richer, gas- and agricultureproducing regions of the Eastern Provinces – the so-called eastern media luna (crescent moon) provinces of Beni, Pando, Tarija and, above all, Santa Cruz. Here, resistance was spear-headed by Right civil society organisations, mobilising on the basis of regional identity with a strong, racial justification, and led by local business leaders. Bolivia’s largely decentralised state system, inherited from the preceding neoliberal period, granted these provinces large percentages of proceeds from gas sales, allowing Right-wing politicians to build up powerful clientelist bases among the poor in these regions.54 As the MAS consolidated itself in power at the national level, it sought to take greater control of the revenue from gas production, hence threatening the local political dominance of the Right. In response, organisations such as the Pro-Santa Cruz Civic Committee (CCPSC), the Santa Cruz Chambers of Commerce and Industry, and the semi-paramilitary youth group, with close connections to the CCPSC, the Santa Cruz Youth Union (UJC), organised anti-government campaigns to achieve autonomy for these regions, which effectively would have been tantamount to independence. Strategies included mass demonstrations, prolonged hunger strikes, road blockades, business strikes, cutting of gas pipelines, unsanctioned autonomy referendums, and campaigns of violence and intimidation.55 Most of this activity took place

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between 2006 until about 2009, in the lead up to the culmination of the process set in train by the MAS to write and ratify a new Constitution for the country. It was furthermore supported by the Right’s “mobilisation of the country’s print, radio and television media to disseminate misinformation and provoke racist fears”.56 Much of this activity was supported, morally, strategically and financially by the United States.57 From Morales’s emergence as a threat to the established party system in Bolivia, the United States began to invest in “democracy assistance” programmes in the country, much of it supporting Right-wing groups and parties, particularly in the media luna regions.58 As the violence escalated during the autonomist stand-off with the central government, the Morales government became increasingly impatient with US interference. This led to the expulsion of the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) from the Chapare region59 and the then US ambassador, Phillip Goldberg, being asked to leave the country60 due to his having had secret meetings with the prefect of Santa Cruz, Rubén Costas, and the leadership of the CCSPC in 2008.61 These meetings immediately preceded a wave of violence and intimidation in August and September of that year, which culminated in the massacre of thirty indigenous MAS supporters by opposition-linked “hit men”.62 Nevertheless, these strategies failed in the longer term, with the MAS government successfully consolidating itself, winning the referendum on the new Constitution in 2009, and with Morales beating an attempted recall referendum against his rule in 2008 and going on to be re-elected as president in 2010 and again in 2014.

Venezuela In no other country reviewed here have mobilisational tactics been so consistently and so vigorously applied than in Venezuela since the arrival of Hugo Chávez to power in 1999. The period from 2001 to 2006 was marked by a mobilisational strategy on the part of the Venezuelan opposition which has as its high-points the 2002 attempted coup (see below) and a 2002–2003 oil strike.63 While from 2006 onwards, opposition strategies were characterised by moves towards electoral and programmatic unity, mobilisational strategies did not go into abeyance entirely but rather were concentrated primarily among mass mobilisations of students, beginning with demonstrations against the closure of opposition television channel RCTV in 2007. As during the 2001–2006 cycles of protest, the evolving student movement was supported by both the private media within Venezuela and in the United States.64 The RCTV demonstrations were led by student organisations, which initially claimed to be apolitical, avoiding overt identification with the opposition and abjuring violence. Nevertheless, as the movement’s momentum progressed, these characteristics were eclipsed by key, media-promoted figures with affiliations to opposition political parties and the United States political establishment.65 While the main strategy consisted of peaceful demonstrations, guarimbas66 and other

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violent tactics were also used. The student movement did have considerable success in galvanising public opinion and may well have had a bearing on one of the few electoral defeats experienced by the government in a December 2007 referendum on constitutional amendments. While that particular cycle of protests lost momentum due to differences in leadership, a perceived lack of representativity and overt identification with opposition political parties, student protests continued in 2010, again in defence of private broadcasters, and against alleged government encroachment on university autonomy; in 2011 in support of opposition linked “political prisoners”; in 2012 on underfunding in the university sector; and, in 2013 against an alleged media blackout on Chávez’s illness.67 Such mobilisational tactics have once again come to the fore since Hugo Chávez’s demise on 5 March 2013. Despite Chávez’s previous 7 October 2012 win in the presidential election by a wide 11 per cent margin and polls suggesting an ample victory for Nicolás Maduro, Chávez’s preferred successor, the MUD achieved a remarkable 49 per cent of votes cast compared to the PSUV-led coalition’s 50.8 per cent, a mere 1.8 per cent difference.68 On the basis of such a close finish, the MUD candidate, Henrique Capriles, immediately refused to recognise the result, alleging fraud and asking for a recount of the votes “one by one”, signifying a more controversial count of the paper ballots rather than the customary audit of the electronic voting machines used in Venezuelan elections.69 It is notable that the MUD position was supported by the United States, which refused to recognise the Maduro government, while Brazil and many other Latin American countries immediately accepted the results.70 Capriles then went on to encourage supporters to demonstrate in the streets against the alleged fraud, a call amplified in the private media, recalling previous radical strategies.71 This call led to eight PSUV supporters being killed, dozens reported wounded, PSUV offices being set alight, and government representatives and staff being threatened, among other violent incidences.72 Yet Hellinger and Gable report that, simultaneously, key opposition advisers and spokespeople were urging a less radical stance and publicly supporting the legitimacy of the results, although the opposition alleged government advantage in pre-electoral campaigning.73 Possibly as a result of this more moderate approach, as well as government threats of legal retaliation for the violence on Capriles himself, a planned mass opposition demonstration was called off and the street campaign effectively abandoned.74 The suspicions of fraud, nevertheless, did not prevent the opposition participating in the following regional and local elections on 8 December 2013. Whereas previous opposition tactics had possibly led to a surge in support for the opposition among the so-called ni-ni’s (non-party affiliated voters) and dissatisfied government supporters, post-election violence, encouraged by more radical sectors within the opposition, specifically ex-opposition primary presidential candidates María Corina Machado and Leopoldo López, among others,75 may have backfired with a relatively poor performance in these elections.76 Since the December 2013

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elections, reports suggest that the Maduro-led government radicalised even further,77 which may have contributed to the aforementioned radical Right leaders spearheading an opposition street rebellion from early February 2014. Again a large proportion of demonstrators came from student ranks, and protests resulted in several deaths, scores injured, and hundreds arrested.78 This rebellion also heralded a much more aggressive economic campaign involving the hoarding of and illegal selling of food and consumer goods, as well as of foreign currencies, prompting the Venezuelan government to crack down further on such activities and introduce tighter capital controls. The result has been food shortages, foreign exchange shortages, and higher and increasing inflation along with other severe economic problems.79 These events, then, illustrate the continued use of radical mobilisational opposition strategies in Venezuela, alongside institutionalised, electoral strategies, within a continued situation of political polarisation in the post-Chávez era.

Conclusion: mobilisational strategies These brief case studies identify key features of mobilisational strategies. First, these are led by elites as opposed to grassroots members, although the latter may become involved. Second, a wide variety of activity is used, from mass demonstrations to more direct actions such as road blockades, production strikes, etc. Third, almost all cases were accompanied by media campaigns in support of the demonstrators. Fourth, in Bolivia and Venezuela in particular, US support – moral, strategic and financial – was observed. Fifth, in almost all cases, the ultimate aim was the removal of the government, except in Bolivia, where the aim was secessionist, which if it had succeeded would have resulted in a destabilisation of the government. It is important to note nevertheless, that these strategies did not result in the abandonment of electoral strategies but rather accompanied them.

Extra-constitutional strategies The cases of Venezuela (2002), Honduras (2009), Ecuador (2010) and Paraguay (2012) demonstrate clearly that coups are possible, and can succeed if national and international contextual circumstances are right. These coups can build on elements of the mobilisational strategies above, such as media campaigns, a level of popular support for the government’s removal, including demonstrations or other popular mobilisations, and support from the United States. They also can involve complicity of the armed forces and state institutionality, either in whole or in part. Nevertheless, in all instances, there were powerful countervailing factors at the national and regional level, which either impeded or at least made difficult each coup’s success, most notably concerted regional rejection of coup activities and majority rejection of forced removals of democratically elected governments. It is, therefore not simply the wider international context which helps prevent coups in the region, as many analysts insist, but rather stronger popular level

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support for democracy, more organised regional resistance to coups, including even Right-led governments, and “coup-proofing” measures amongst those governments most threatened by coups.80 This latter factor ensures loyalty from the armed forces, the institutions, and the national population, most particularly among the government’s popular bases.81 Nevertheless, as Mares argues, most polities remain vulnerable to coups, with only Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Panama and Uruguay well insulated against them.82 Let us now look at each of these examples in turn, beginning with the most emblematic case of them all, the 2002 coup against President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela.

Venezuela, 2002 The 11 April 2002 coup against President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela was preceded by oil company management staff holding a series of demonstrations, such as work stoppages and marches, in support of “meritocracy” and against the “politicisation” of Petroleos de Venezuela SA (Venezuelan Oil Company; PDVSA).83 These protests quickly became the central focus of a wider opposition protest movement. On this basis, the Trade Union Confederation, the CTV and the Peak Business Confederations, FEDECAMARAS called a one-day work stoppage on Tuesday, 9 April 2002, which was extended to the following day and then declared indefinite on the evening of Wednesday, 10 April.84 It was also announced that a march would be held the following morning from a park in the east of the city to the PDVSA headquarters. The stoppages were a qualified success, but the government declared the strike a failure and showed scenes of normality from around the country in a large number of cadenas.85 The following morning, 11 April, all the major private channels gave nonstop live coverage to the massive march assembling in the wealthy eastern part of the city.86 On arriving at PDVSA headquarters, Carlos Ortega, president of the CTV, directed the march, without warning or permission of the authorities, to the presidential palace Miraflores, in the centre of the capital, in order to “remove Chávez” (“Para sacar a Chávez”). Meanwhile the president was directing a speech to the nation in another cadena, declaring the strike a failure and calling for dialogue. When the march arrived at an overpass close to the presidential palace, surrounded by pro-government demonstrators, shooting began and eventually around 20 people from both groups were killed, with about 100 wounded. The television channels began to split the screens in order to show the presidential cadena and the violence outside the palace. Footage of governing party members firing pistols from the overpass was being repeatedly shown on private television channel Venevision.87 Signals from the television channels were ordered suspended by the government, but they continued to broadcast through cable. By 7 p.m. the Commander in Chief of the Army called on troops not to support the government and by 3 a.m. the General in Chief of the Armed Forces, Lucas Rincón Romero, announced that the president had resigned. Chávez was escorted

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to Army headquarters Fuerte Tiuna (Tiuna Fort), and Pedro Carmona Estanga, president of FEDECAMARAS was declared president of the Republic. The United States, Spain, the United Kingdom and a few other countries immediately declared their support for the new coup-installed government, and it was subsequently found that the United States in particular was deeply involved in the coup.88 On Friday, 12 April, Carmona announced a ten-point decree from Miraflores, which, among other measures, “changed the name of the republic, dissolved the public powers, suspended the sale of oil to Cuba agreed by treaty, allowed raids without judicial orders, suspended the forty-nine Enabling Laws. …89 In other words we were without the rule of law”.90 Raids were executed against government supporters, and in the midst of large hostile crowds and live on television, a number of prominent government ministers and deputies were arrested by local police forces controlled by the opposition. The Cuban embassy was attacked by mobs. Press conferences, called by other government ministers, were not attended by the press, but the message finally got out that the president had not resigned but effectively had been kidnapped. As a result of these raids and the clear authoritarianism of the Carmona decrees, the Army Commander in Chief, Vázquez Velasco, withdrew his support and the coup government began to crumble. By late Friday and early on Saturday, 13 April, government supporters began to gather at Fuerte Tiuna and Miraflores and other points of the city demanding to see the president, whose whereabouts were now unknown, or documentary evidence of his resignation. The main television channels were showing only cartoons and films, and government supporters surrounded the television stations, protesting the absence of news on these latest developments. Rumours were circulating of a pro-Chávez rebellion in Maracay under General Raúl Baduel, which were later confirmed. By Saturday night the state television channel was taken by government forces, the government palace was vacated by Carmona and retaken by government supporters, and the vice president, Diosdado Cabello, was installed as interim president until the president was returned to Miraflores, at around 4 a.m. on Sunday, 14 April. The failure of this attempt to remove Chávez, however, did not stop the Opposition in their attempts to destabilise and overthrow the Bolivarian government with a four-month long oil strike executed by management of PDVSA in late 2002 and early 2003, which while defeated, led to the country losing billions of dollars in economic activity.91 This was followed by an attempt to remove the president through a constitutional recall election which the Opposition also lost and a boycott of the 2005 legislative elections. It was only after the failure of both these strategies that the Opposition began to concentrate on the electoral route, although as mentioned above, middle-class student organisations, funded by the United States and supported by the media, continued their street campaigns.

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Honduras, 2009 In June 2009, President Manuel Zelaya Rosales of Honduras was ousted from office in a coup enacted by economic and political elites in alliance with that country’s armed forces. To most observers, including the members of the Organization of American States (OAS), the EU and large numbers of Honduran citizens, this was a straightforward case of a coup. A de facto government was established by Roberto Micheletti, president of the Congress, and a member of Zelaya’s own Liberal party. Yet, during that period, the official message was clear: A coup had not occurred, rather Zelaya’s expulsion was understood as a case of constitutional succession of powers with Micheletti as interim president. Popular protests were brutally repressed and the de facto regime defied the international community to remain in power until January 2010. Scheduled elections were held in November 2009 which, while severely questioned, allowed the installation of Porfirio ‘Pepe’ Lobo of the Nationalist Party as president of Honduras on 27 January 2010. Honduras hence became one of the most successful coups in the Latin American region, since President Fujimori’s “auto-coup” in Peru in 1992. How did this situation come about? Manuel Zelaya (2005–2009) was the epitome of an oligarchic president, coming from Honduras’s economic and political elite, which, like its neighbours, is dominated by a small number of families who also have key roles in the state. Nonetheless, in the latter two years of his term, Zelaya broke with history and attempted to engage with popularly based social movements and NGOs. Examples of actions in this direction were his holding of regular popular assemblies in the presidential palace, and implementation of measures seen as hostile to business elite interests, such as raising the minimum wage by almost 40 per cent in 2009.92 The most contentious proposal, however, was to hold a referendum, at the same time as the elections in November 2009, on the installation of a Constituent Assembly to redraft the country’s constitution. This was a step too far for the Honduran elite and, in their view, firmly allied Zelaya with Hugo Chávez, leading directly to Zelaya’s overthrow on 28 June 2009. On that day, the head of the armed forces “arrested” (i.e. kidnapped) Zelaya and eventually deposited him in Costa Rica via the US-controlled airbase Palmerola. After the coup, the Honduran state retrenched firmly to its servile position to the oligarchy, while ‘civil society’ became polarised into two main camps. Anticoup groups consisted of supporters of Zelaya, indigenous, peasants, feminists, progressive sections of the Catholic Church, labour unions, LGBT groups, etc. Those supporting the coup were business groups and associated middle class sectors, the media, the church hierarchy, the two main political parties (including the president’s own Liberal party), the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Armed Forces, the police and, crucially, the main institutions of the state. The elitecontrolled mass media93 launched campaigns in support of the coup, encouraging and facilitating marches consisting of middle-class groups, heavily protected by

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the army and police, and framed under a careful rhetoric of national unity, calling themselves the “whites”, supposedly symbolising peace and purity. This stands in stark contrast with media portrayals of the anti-coup groups who were dubbed as “mobs” and “undesirables”. These internal social divisions were further reflected at the international level. Zelaya had taken Honduras into the Venezuelan-led ALBA initiative in 2008 and those countries grouped in ALBA were at the forefront of the defence of the president, sensing that this was part of a wider strategy to defeat the advance of that initiative, with its close alliance with social movements in the region and its rejection of neoliberal conceptions of international cooperation, such as free trade agreements. Conversely, conservative elements within the US establishment, as well as sections of the Miami Cuban and Venezuelan Right were said to be advising the coup plotters.94 The close involvement of the United States in brokering agreements on the coup, including the elections held in November 2009 and its continued defence of the subsequent regimes, underlined Honduras’s political and economic dependence on that state. Meanwhile Brazil, through UNASUR, led the international effort to restore Zelaya to power, even giving him refuge in the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa at one stage, when he did manage temporarily to return. Yet he was not restored to power and only returned definitively after the post-coup regime was well established and Honduras readmitted to international organisations, such as the OAS. This signified only a very partial victory for those international states and entities supporting him.95 Honduras, then, presents most elements of an extra-constitutional Right strategy to restore endangered elite power. These included active support from the media, business and elite groups, international allies, particularly the United States, and close regional allies of the US, such as Canada,96 and the crucial support of the army in executing the coup, which was then generously rewarded with a more direct role in key sectors of the economy, such as telecommunications,97 as well as in the country’s interminable US-sponsored war on drugs. Moreover, this support would have been more difficult to maintain if it were not for the willingness of the country’s institutions, including the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Congress and the Courts, to provide it with a veneer of legality, which was in effect spurious as the then US ambassador Hugo Llorens admitted in a leaked cable.98 Despite this illegality or the many infringements of human rights perpetrated during and after the coup, none of those involved were prosecuted or sanctioned.99 Shortly after the coup in Honduras, President Rafael Correa claimed that he would be next, and this almost became the case in 2010.100

Ecuador, 2010 On 30 September 2010 an uprising among police officers erupted in Quito, ostensibly protesting against a cut in salaries and ranks as part of a process of reorganisation, but ultimately involving the forced detention of the president for

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ten hours; police uprisings throughout the country; the closure of many of the main road arteries in Quito, the capital, by police, and its main international airport by sections of the air force; and the eventual death of nine people, with hundreds wounded, including the president. While the events of that day are interpreted differently, with mainstream media reports and some analysts101 rejecting calling it a coup, most are agreed that the constitutional order in Ecuador was seriously endangered that day. Corcoran provides a number of reasons for such a reading.102 First, he argues that there was a level of coordination between the protests in different cities, suggesting a level of planning which belies the uprising’s supposed spontaneity. Second, this coordination went beyond the police and extended to the air force officers who shut down the main airport. Moreover, police officers attempted to shut down the state TV station, a classic manoeuvre for insurgents. Third, Lucio Gutiérrez, ex-army officer and ex-president (2003–2005), engaged with the media throughout the day, urging the president to resign and for the National Assembly to be closed down, hence opening the way for fresh elections, which under a little-known clause of the Constitution, would have barred Correa from standing.103 In this way a “constitutional transition”, as in Honduras in 2009 (and in Paraguay in 2012, see below), could be claimed, paving the way for the removal of the president. Fourth, direct gunshots at the president’s car, including at the windscreen, indicated intent to kill, again suggesting premeditation and planning. Finally, the violent nature of the uprising and the subsequent deaths resulting from it suggested more than a spontaneous uprising. Different elements within the country’s power networks had an interest in Correa’s removal. The media, dominated by Right-wing, business groups, had long decried Correa’s supposed “authoritarianism”, branding him a “dictator”.104 The Armed Forces, meanwhile, retained and increased autonomy under Correa, functioning as “a state within a state”.105 They therefore do not depend on anyone but themselves and can easily adapt to changes in government.106 “Finance and resource extraction capital were quick to leverage the crisis”,107 alienated from Correa due to a successfully engineered $3.2 billion debt default, and hiking of mining taxes and royalties to fund social programmes. Nor was the United States enamoured of the regime, partially due to such heterodox economic policies, but also for his intention to close the important US Manta airbase in the country and due to accusations of support for the FARC in neighbouring Colombia, a charge happily repeated by Gutiérrez.108 Indeed, Gollinger sees US complicity in the coup due to its deep involvement in dealings with the police force paying for “informants, training, equipment and operation” as part of its so-called war on drugs. 109 Nevertheless, the US did condemn the coup attempt and expressed its support for the government immediately, as did the OAS. More importantly, UNASUR acted decisively, calling a meeting of South American presidents in Buenos Aires on the same day as the events in Ecuador, and declaring unanimously, from both

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Left and Right, that it would not tolerate ruptures in democracy in the region.110 This sent a clear signal that such attempts would carry a heavy political cost.111 Nevertheless, as Diamint again points out, “they did not specifically encourage any measures to impede the defence and security forces from assuming a political role”.112 Hence they did not impede the subsequent successful coup in Paraguay in 2012.

Paraguay, 2012 On 12 and 13 June 2012, both houses of the Paraguayan Congress voted overwhelmingly in favour of President Fernando Lugo’s impeachment. Lugo, an ex-bishop, had been elected in August 2008, not only as the first centre-Left president in the country’s history, but also as the first president that did not emerge from the ranks of the Colorado Party. This party had ruled the country uninterrupted for 61 years, mostly in undemocratic form, most notably under the brutal Alfredo Stroessner dictatorship (1954–1989). Lugo was replaced by his vice president, Federico Franco, from the centre-Right PLRA party, who ruled for ten months until the scheduled elections of 15 August 2013, when he was replaced by Horacio Cartes, thus restoring Paraguay once again to Colorado rule. How and why was Lugo impeached, and to what extent can this be considered a coup d’état? Despite coming to power on a mandate for social change favouring the poor, Lugo’s presidency was hamstrung from the outset by the Colorado party’s continued dominance in Congress and his reliance on the PLRA as his main coalition party. As Lambert points out, both Lugo and the PLRA shared a distaste for the Colorado party but little else, as the PLRA opposed many of Lugo’s flagship social policies.113 This double legislative obstacle – plus interlinked powerful economic, mostly landholding, adversaries – prevented Lugo from achieving the majority of his electoral programme. Specifically, these forces successfully opposed three key promised reforms – the introduction of personal income tax, reforms of the public sector and the judiciary, and land distribution and ownership reforms.114 The media, led by the newspaper ABC Color, which “undertook a concerted campaign to portray the moderate reformist president as associated with the radical left, not only with ‘Bolivarian Socialism’ but also with landless peasant organisations, to highlight Lugo’s (many) personal failing, and to exaggerate the growth of social tensions”115 supported opposition to these reforms. These three forces – Congressional, land-holder, and media opposition – which were in effect undifferentiated, contributed greatly to the erosion of support for Lugo amongst his social base and among the wider public. Violence was the spark which detonated the long-simmering impeachment process. During a police raid on 15 June 2012 to clear landless peasants occupying land in the questioned possession of an ex–Colorado party senator in Curuguaty, 11 peasants and six policemen were killed. This massacre was used as grounds for Lugo’s impeachment, and he was accused of “negligence, ineptitude, and

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incapacity to act decisively”116 to prevent such incidents, seen as indicative of perceived growing insecurity in the country. No evidence whatsoever of Lugo’s involvement in the massacre was presented,117and he was not “given time to prepare his own testimony nor accorded the right of legitimate defence”.118 Furthermore, there were no accusations of “serious malpractice … corruption, theft, abuse of human rights, violations of the Constitution or breach of presidential code”119 which as Szucs points out are the normal grounds for impeachment in Latin America.120 Indeed impeachment on grounds of incapacity was “unprecedented in Latin America”,121 and as such, it “remains clear that political and partisan interests motivated the impeachment”.122 Yet despite these seeming irregularities the impeachment did not violate the 1992 Constitution, which is vague on the grounds for carrying one out.123 International condemnations were swift from some and equivocal from others. The Common Market of the South, MERCOSUR, of which Paraguay is a founding member, alongside fellow members at the time, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, immediately suspended Paraguay as punishment for what Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina called a “parliamentary coup”.124 It also conveniently allowed the other members to finally fully admit Venezuela to the organisation, which had been consistently blocked by the Paraguayan Congress for three years.125 MERCOSUR countries also recalled their ambassadors in protest, as did Venezuela and Bolivia and even Right-led countries such as Colombia and Chile. Paraguay was also suspended from the Brazilian-led UNASUR, composed of all South American countries. Yet the United States was ambiguous in its response to the impeachment, simply insisting on due process, as was Spain, while Canada and Germany both immediately recognised the new government.126 Yet, even the strong regional reaction was tempered by the fact that Paraguay faced no economic sanctions and, once elections were held, was quickly readmitted to the regional fora from which it had been expelled.127 Underlying this entire episode was a confluence of interests crossing the majority of the power networks under study: economic, ideological, political, military and transnational. With regard to the economic and political networks, Paraguay has one of the most unequal concentrations of land in Latin America, with some “80 per cent … in the hands of landowners drawn from army officers, business leaders, and members of the Colorado party”.128 Indeed, almost all Congress members are large landowners, many of whom having acquired their titles illegally or under dubious circumstances during the Stroessner dictatorship and on into Colorado party dominated democratic times.129 Hence there is, even by Latin American standards, a distinct overlapping of interests between the economic, political and indeed military power networks in Paraguay. This is also seen at the ideological level as the Paraguayan media is dominated by five prominent business families with close links to the Colorado party or, to a lesser extent, the PLRA.130 As seen above, the media consistently undermined Lugo at every possible occasion, helping create the conditions for his eventual

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removal. Transnationally and militarily, the United States sought to establish military bases in Paraguay during Lugo’s presidency, a request which Lugo refused.131 Once Lugo was removed, high-ranking officers appointed by him were also removed, and senior figures from the Colorado period, such as General Lino Oviedo, saw these removals as clearing the way for the establishment of the mooted US base.132 Meanwhile, Canada may have quickly recognised the new government as it did not want to disturb negotiations between Rio Tinto Alcan (RTA), a Canadian-based multinational mining giant, and the Paraguayan government to construct a $3.5 billion aluminium-smelter.133 Lugo, then, like Zelaya in Honduras before him, had threatened, however mildly, these many vested interests benefitting handsomely from the existing institutional status quo and thus had to be removed.

Conclusion: Extra-constitutional strategies These examples of extra-constitutional actions to remove sitting Left presidents, therefore, share a number of characteristics. In most cases they build on previous institutional and mobilisational strategies, providing a multilayered, dynamic, relational, and changing strategic approach. These involved demonstrations of some sort (with the exception of Paraguay); media campaigns in all cases against the sitting president; US- and allied-government support (again with the partial exception of Paraguay, at least with regard to the US) with mostly solid regional rejection of the coup; attempts at providing a veneer of institutionality to the removal of the government (except Ecuador with the most successful example being Paraguay); and the direct involvement of all or some elements of the Armed Forces (except Paraguay). In all cases, the aim was to reverse or stall any modifications to the economy and institutionality effected by the sitting Left government, that is, a return to existing threatened models of elite-dominated polyarchy and market freedoms. In each case almost all the power networks were involved: economic interests, often landed; ideological, especially the media; political, not just opposition political parties, but also state institutions; military, even in the case of Paraguay, although not so overtly; and transnational, most notably the United States, but also conservative governments in other parts of the West, such as Canada, Spain, Germany and the United Kingdom. The question remains, however, as to why such strategic diversification takes place in some countries and not in others.

Right-wing strategic diversification and the threat of the Left Zibechi, as we have seen above, argues that the emergence of the “pink tide” has caused three types of reaction from the Right, these largely geographically based.134 In the Andean countries of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, there is crisis in the Right as it sees itself being challenged by powerful social movements

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in alliance with popular governments. In these cases, the traditional Right has been thrown into disarray and replaced by figures from civil society, including from the media, sometimes resorting to extra-constitutional means to gain power. In the Southern Cone, the Right has been supplanted by the Left-of-centre, embracing seemingly successful development strategies, and as a result, the Right finds difficulty in contesting Left parties in government while remaining within constitutional structures in its quest for power. Finally, in two emblematic cases, Colombia and Mexico, the Right puts liberalism under question, while maintaining its hold on power, as at least parts of it embrace pacts with the armed forces, security forces and/or paramilitaries in US-sponsored wars against drug cartels and/or insurgent groups, destroying in the process the social basis of the Left’s possibilities for a counter-hegemonic challenge. All three types of Right are accompanied by a continent-wide ideological offensive being carried out through civil society and led by international organisations and governments with links to local Right entities. While this reading provides a neat analysis, it is problematic in two ways. First, it veers too closely to Castañeda’s normative typology of the Left into “good” and “bad”, suggesting a corresponding “good”, “bad” and “ugly” Right.135 Second, such normative categorisations are further associated with particular geographical areas, compounding problems of classification. As we have seen in this chapter, “bad” Right-type strategies can also emerge in supposed “good” Left countries such as Brazil or Argentina. Despite these reservations, Zibechi’s analysis does suggest the central role of threat as a trigger for the use of different levels of strategy as outlined above, as it shows a dialectic between Right strategic behaviour and Left policy implementation, a point also noted by Loxton.136 Indeed, as pointed out in the Introduction of this volume, O’Donnell137 draws our attention to the historical role of threat leading to elites turning to the military to form the “bureaucratic authoritarian” regimes of the Southern Cone in the 1970s. This element of threat and its relationship to political behaviour has long been noted by political psychology literature, particularly in relation to explaining authoritarian attitudes and behaviour.138 Sales confirms this, contending that “threat can elicit authoritarian responses from the threatened person”,139 in particular when economic conditions are deteriorating.140 Rickert notes increased intolerance of delegitimised groups, such as those on welfare benefits, in such situations.141 However, he stresses the important point that threat is not experienced in a directly personal way, but rather is perceived by those with a preexisting authoritarian disposition as endangering the nation, above all its economy. The threat then is not immediate, but anticipated. Similarly, Feldman and Stenner also emphasise the importance of perception of threat in encouraging authoritarian political positions.142 Moreover, they link these to distance from the perceived ideological positions of politicians identified with the Left. Additionally, they point to the role of the media in generalising

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and shaping such perceptions of threat.143 Furthermore they find, along with Rickert,144 that this reaction is much more pronounced in those with a higher predisposition to authoritarianism, who in turn are more prone to demand the implementation of punitive measures to counter the perceived threat.145 “Authoritarianism is activated when there is a perception that the political or social order is threatened”,146 they observe, provoking a “heightened attachment to the ingroup and an associated rejection of the outgroup”.147 Resulting actions therefore can be harsh, due to the perceived threat to this order, which is perceived as “natural” and even “God-given”,148 and therefore to the “ingroup” who identify with this order. These findings have particular resonance in the current context of “pink tide” Latin America. Not only have some “pink tide” governments departed from the established neoliberal order, some radically so, as confirmed in the previous chapter, but also many of these governments have introduced new, previously excluded groups into the elite, hence threatening the dominance of established elite groups.149 Stevens et al. confirmed many of these findings in their study of Latin American elites, albeit with important national divergences,150 and noted that “right-wing respondents displayed greater confidence in the order-maintaining institutions of government and willingness to consider an authoritarian alternative to democracy”.151 Mares also argues that public perceptions of democracy and its institutions and of the military and its role can influence civilian acceptance of extra-constitutional strategies,152 which, it has been argued here, can be preceded by mobilisational strategies, severely weakening elected Left governments. Hence, threat perceptions to the established order and to elite power, combined with low perception levels of democracy and high levels for order-maintaining institutions, such as the armed forces, could be conducive to mobilisational and extra-constitutional strategies being implemented by elites.153 This hypothesis is tested in Table 6.2, where I combine findings on threat levels from Table 5.4 in the preceding chapter, with Mares’s154 analysis of poll evaluations of democracy and the armed forces, and the incidence of the different strategies as outlined in this chapter. Analysing the table, it is found that where coups or attempted coups took place, there was a correlation between threat levels to the neoliberal order and the vulnerability of the polity as established by Mares.155 Hence in the two successful coup cases of Honduras (2009) and Paraguay (2012), Honduras is given a medium threat level and a moderate vulnerability of the polity score, while Paraguay has a low-medium threat level and high polity vulnerability. Both then have a relative correspondence between threat level and polity vulnerability threats. On the other hand, in terms of the most spectacular unsuccessful coup attempt in Venezuela (2002), it has a high threat level and a low polity vulnerability score. This may explain both the occurrence of the coup and its failure, as it was the extreme threat which elites perceived in Chávez which provoked the coup, while Venezuela’s long democratic tradition may have

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TABLE 6.2 Threat perception levels as strategy indicators Country

Left Government

Threat Level1

Vulnerability of the Polity2

Strategies Used3

Non-Electoral Removal of President

Argentina

Yes

Medium

Very low

Institutional Mobilisational

No

Bolivia

Yes

MediumHigh

Low

Institutional Mobilisational

No

Brazil

Yes

LowMedium

High

Institutional Mobilisational

No

Chile

Yes

Low

Low

Institutional

No

Colombia

No

Low

Moderate

Institutional ExtraConstitutional

No

Costa Rica

No

Low

Very low

Institutional

No

Dominican Republic

No

Low

Moderate

Institutional

No

Ecuador

Yes

High

Moderate

Institutional Mobilisational

Attempted?

El Salvador

No

Low

Moderate

Institutional

No

Guatemala

No

Low

High

Institutional

No

Honduras

Yes4

MediumHigh?5

Moderate

Institutional Mobilisational ExtraConstitutional

Yes

Mexico

No

Low

High

Institutional

No

Nicaragua

Yes

MediumHigh

Moderate

Institutional Mobilisational

No

Panama

No

Low

Low

Institutional

No

Paraguay

Yes6

Moderate?

High

Institutional Mobilisational

Yes

Peru

No

Low

High

Institutional

No

Uruguay

Yes

Low

Very Low

Institutional

No

Venezuela

Yes

High

Low

Institutional Mobilisational ExtraConstitutional

Attempted

Note: 1 From Table 5.4 in Chapter 5. Author’s own assessments of threat levels. 2 Table 3.2 in Mares, ibid., pp. 94-95. Based on an index drawn from Latinobarometro and Americas Barometer, assessing vulnerability of a polity to a “moderating coup”, that is a coup by the military looking to replace one civilian government with another. His assessment includes public attitudes to the extent of military intervention in times of crisis, and trust in government, in the president and in the military. 3 Based on author assessments provided in this chapter. 4 Government of Manuel Zelaya from 2006–2009. 5 In 2009 the elites perceived the situation as dangerous to their interests due to the closeness to ALBA and threat of constitutional change. 6 Government of Fernando Lugo from 2009–2012. Source: Author’s own elaboration from varying sources.

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encouraged the defence of the president by the groups which emerged on the streets to support him, creating a momentum against the coup. The case of Ecuador (2010), with a high threat level and a moderate polity vulnerability score contradicts the theory somewhat, however, this coup lacked popular involvement or previous mobilisational strategies, factors which were in evidence in the other cases. Such a methodology would need further refinement, but nevertheless is richly suggestive in possibilities for explaining the occurrence of coups as related to both perceived elite threat levels and contextual circumstances with regard to the security of the democratic regime. Two hypotheses can be put forward based on this data. First, it can be argued that when a threat level is medium to high, the possibilities of mobilisational strategies being used are heightened. Second, if threat levels are medium to high and polity vulnerability levels are also moderate to high, the possibilities of a successful coup are heightened. The level of Right strategy then can be predicted by the level of perceived threat felt by Right-elites and the level of institutionality found in a particular national context. Such a theoretical approach avoids two pitfalls of previous analysis. First, it brings into one over-arching theory the large variety of Right strategic approaches noted by the literature. This theoretical framework therefore is more flexible in this regard and can transcend limitations of time and space better than geographically based typologies such as that of Zibechi.156 Second, it integrates nonpolitical elites more successfully into analysis than traditional political science approaches, drawing greater attention to the potential of the collective power of elites across the entire power spectrum in challenging the Left. The analysis therefore transcends static political science based approaches, which see power networks as mere subsidiary elements of political activity. Rather, it underlines the parity between each power network in safeguarding the conditions for the preservation and extension of the neoliberal model over and beyond the political. In this way the issue of reification of one specific area of strategic activity is avoided. By concentrating on threat this analysis visibilises the risk that all elites who benefit from neoliberalism run when its primacy is challenged.

Conclusion: Right strategies in Left-led Latin America This chapter has made the following suggestions with regard to conceptualising Right strategies. First, I argue that there is a direct link between Right strategies and the intensity of change to the neoliberal model effected by Left governments in the region. The lower the level of change, the lower the level of threat felt by elites to the neoliberal model, with the opposite also being true. Second, I argue that Right counter-acting strategies can also vary in intensity and widen in terms of actors and activity in response to the level of threat felt. I identify three levels of strategy: institutional, mobilisational, and extra-constitutional. In the first, this is largely contained within existing institutionality in the form of party and electoral activity; in the second, this can be complemented by popular demonstrations,

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investor strikes, media campaigns and a wide variety of mobilisational activities beyond the political power network and into all other networks including the transnational; and, in the third, extra-constitutional level, strategic activity can be further extended to include the removal of the government, including with armed forces involvement but preferably in such a way as to ensure a smooth transition to a new Right-oriented government in what I have called “smart coups”. Third, I argue that these strategies are not exclusive but can be complementary, emerging from the particular conjunctural dynamic. Fourth, I tentatively suggest that the success of these strategies can be directly linked not just to the perception of threat felt by elites but also by the level of vulnerability of the democratic polity existing in a specific state. The higher the level of threat felt by elites and the higher the vulnerability of the polity, the more likely coups will occur, and even be successful. Overall, I suggest that this theoretical approach is more complete than previous, more traditionally political science approaches, as it provides greater flexibility across time and space and greater comprehensiveness in its inclusion of a wider number of actors in a more systematised fashion. Taking these suggestions and observations into account, a final question remains: How should the Left respond to such strategies? The next, concluding chapter will attempt to answer that question, while summarising the book’s main points.

Notes 1 Borón, Atilio, 1992. ‘Becoming Democrats? Some Skeptical Considerations on the Right in Latin America’, in Chalmers, Douglas A., Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza and Atilio A. Borón, The Right and Democracy in Latin America. New York: Praeger, pp. 68–90. Middlebrook, Kevin, 2000. ‘Introduction’, in Middlebrook, Kevin J. (ed.). Conservative Parties, the Right, and Democracy in Latin America. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 5–6. 2 Luna, Juan Pablo and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, 2014. ‘Introduction’, in Luna, Juan Pablo and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (eds), The Resilience of the Latin American Right. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 13. 3 Ibid., p. 14. 4 Ibid. 5 Cannon, Barry, 2014. ‘Political Parties: The Right’, in Sánchez-Ancochea, Diego and Salvador Martí i Puig (eds), Handbook of Central American Governance. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 319–236. 6 Stokes, Susan C., 2001. Mandates and Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 7 Thanks to Eduardo Silva for drawing my attention to this point. 8 Thanks to Grace Livingstone for drawing my attention to this point. 9 Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy R. Scully, 1995. Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 10 Ibid. See also, for example: Weyland, Kurt, Raúl L. Madrid and Wendy Hunter, 2010. Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 11 Middlebrook, ‘Introduction’, in Conservative Parties, pp. 6–7. 12 Luna, Juan Pablo and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, 2011. ‘Las derechas gobernantes en América Latina: hacia una caracterización preliminar’, LASAForum, 42(3), pp. 16–19.

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13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

31 32 33 34 35

36 37 38 39

Ibid., p. 17. Stokes, Mandates and Democracy. Ibid., p. 22. Morresi, Sergio D. and Vommaro, Gabriel, 2014. ‘Argentina: The Difficulties of the Partisan Right and the Case of Propuesta Republicana’, in Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser, Resilience, pp. 319–347. Eaton, Kent, 2014. ‘New Strengths of the Latin American Right: Beyond Parties and Elections’, in Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser, Resilience, pp. 75–94. Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser (eds), Resilience. See also sub-section on Peru in the Political Power section of Chapter 4 in this volume. Wills-Otero, Laura, 2014. ‘Colombia: Analyzing the Strategies for Political Action of Álvaro Uribe’s Government, 2002–10’, in Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser (eds), Resilience, pp. 194–218. Cannon, Barry, 2014. ‘As Clear as MUD: Characteristics, Objectives, and Strategies of the Opposition in Bolivarian Venezuela’, in Latin American Politics and Society 56 (4), pp. 49–70. Ibid. Grandin, Greg, 2014. “Why Brazil’s Elections Matter”, The Nation, October 6. Available at: www.thenation.com/blog/181868/why-brazils-elections-matter. Accessed: 15/06/2015. Ibid. Jimenez Barca, Antonio, 2014. ‘Marina Silva apoyará a Neves en la segunda vuelta de las elecciones’. El País, 12 October. Available at: http://internacional.elpais.com/interna cional/2014/10/12/actualidad/1413131593_653712.html. Accessed: 15/06/2015. Arias, Juan, 2014. ‘Está gestándose en Brasil una oposición política posmoderna?’. El País, 11 November. Available at: http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/ 2014/11/11/actualidad/1415724801_101234.html. Accessed: 15/06/2015. Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser, ‘Conclusion: Right (and Left) Politics in Contemporary Latin America’, in Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser, Resilience, pp. 347–367, 357–359. Fairfield, Tasha, 2011. ‘Business Power and Protest: Argentina’s Agricultural Producers Protest in Comparative Context’, in Studies in Comparative International Development, 46, pp. 425–453, 442. Ibid. Ibid. Rzezak, Hernán Fair, 2008. ‘El conflicto entre el gobierno y el campo en Argentina. Lineamientos políticos, estrategias discursivas y discusiones teóricas a partir de un abordaje multidisciplinar’. Iberóforum: Revista de Ciencias Sociales de la Universidad Iberoamericana, 3(6), pp. 82–106; 85–86. Fairfield ‘Business Power and Protest’, p. 443. Ibid., p. 445. Ibid. Rzezak, ‘El conflicto’, p. 97. Kitzberger, Philip, 2014. ‘Demands for Media Democratisation and the Latin American “New Left”: Government Strategies in Argentina and Brazil in Comparative Perspective’. GIGA Working Paper, No. 261. Available at: www.giga-ham burg.de. Accessed: 16/06/2015, p. 14. Rzezak, ‘El Conflicto’, p. 98. Ibid., p. 101. Conde, Maite and Tariq Jazeel, 2013. ‘Kicking Off in Brazil: Manifesting Democracy’, in Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies: Travesia, 22(4), pp. 437–450, 441. Conde and Jazeel, ‘Kicking Off’, p. 443; Sader, Emir, 2013. ‘First Reflections on the Mass Movement That Has Shaken Brazil’, in Links: International Journal of Socialist Renewal, 22 June. Available at: http://links.org.au/node/3402. Accessed: 16/05/

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40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

66

2015; Saad-Filho, Alfredo, 2013. ‘Mass Protests under ‘Left Neoliberalism’: Brazil, June–July, 2013’, in Critical Sociology, 39(5), pp. 657–669, 659. Saad-Filho, ‘Mass Protests’, p. 659. Ibid. Winters, Matthew S., and Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro (2014). ‘Partisan Protesters and Nonpartisan Protests in Brazil’, in Journal of Politics in Latin America, 6(1), pp. 137– 150, 138. Saad-Filho, ‘Mass Protests’, p. 660. Conde and Jazeel, ‘Kicking Off’, p. 443 Saad-Filho, ‘Mass Protests’, p. 662. Ibid. Ibid., p. 663. Conde and Jazeel, ‘Kicking Off’, p. 445. Ibid. Saad-Filho, ‘Mass Protests’, p. 662 Jimenez Barca, Antonio, 2015. ‘La oposición brasileña maniobra para ponerse al frente de la protesta social’. El País, 18 March. Available at: http://internacional.elpais.com/interna cional/2015/03/17/actualidad/1426620385_776859.html. Accessed: 16/06/2015. Saad Filho, Alfredo, 2015. ‘Brazil: The Debacle of the PT’, MRZine, 30 March. Available at: http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2015/sf300315.html. Accessed: 19/ 08/2015. Bowen, James D., 2014. ‘The Right and Nonparty Forms of Representation and Participation: Bolivia and Ecuador Compared’, in Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser, Resilience, pp. 94–117. Bowen, ‘Right and Nonparty’, p. 103. Ibid.; Tsolakis, Andreas, 2011. ‘Multilateral Lines of Conflict in Contemporary Bolivia’, in Dominguez, Francisco, Geraldine Lievesley, and Steve Ludlam (eds), Right Wing Politics in the New Latin America, pp. 130–148. Kohl, Benjamin, 2010. ‘Bolivia: A Work in Progress’, in Latin American Perspectives 37(172), pp. 107–122, 110. Tsolakis, ‘Multilateral’; Burron, Neil A., 2012. ‘Unpacking US Democracy Promotion in Bolivia: From Soft Tactics to Regime Change’, Latin American Perspectives, 39 (182), pp. 115–132. Tsolakis, ‘Multilateral’, p. 138. Burron, ‘Unpacking US Democracy Promotion in Bolivia’, p. 294. Ibid. Tsolakis, ‘Multilateral’, p. 137. Ibid. Dominguez, Francisco, 2011. ‘Venezuela’s Opposition: Desperately Seeking to Overthrow Chávez’, in Dominguez et al., Right-Wing Politics in the New Latin America, pp. 113–130. Brading, Ryan, 2012. ‘The Anti-Bolivarian Student Movement: New Social Actors Challenge the Advancement of Venezuela’s Bolivarian Socialism’, in Asian Journal of Latin American Studies, 25(3), pp. 23–46. Brading, ‘The Anti-Bolivarian Student Movement’; Ciccariello-Maher, George, 2007. ‘Behind Venezuela’s Student Movement: Who’s Pulling the Strings?’. Available at: www. counterpunch.org/2007/06/09/behind-venezuela-s-quot-student-rebellion-quot/. Accessed: 8/05/2013. For example, one leader, affiliated with the First Justice party, Yon Goicoechea, received a US$500,000 Milton Friedman Prize for Advancing Liberty (Brading, ibid., p. 35). Guarimbas are outbreaks of violence carried out by small groups of people in a variety of localities, usually with a political motivation.

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67 Buxton, Julia. 2014. ‘Venezuela: The Real Significance of the Student Protests’. Available: www.lab.org.uk. Accessed: 27/02/2014. 68 Hellinger, Dan and Dawn Gable, 2013. ‘Caracas Connect, April 2013: Venezuela’s Elections – Photo Finish and a Lingering Controversy’. Available at: www.democra cyinamericas.org/blog-post/caracas-connect-april-2013-venezuelas-elections-photofinish-and-a-lingering-controversy/. Accessed: 17/06/2015. 69 Ibid. 70 Paéz, Ángel. 2013. ‘UNASUR backs Venezuelan President Elect and calls for Peace’. Inter Press Service, 19 April. Available at: www.ipsnews.net/2013/04/una sur-backs-venezuelan-president-elect-and-calls-for-peace/. Accessed 21/06/2013. 71 Hellinger and Gable, ‘Caracas Connect’. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 See for example Venezuela Soberano. 2013. Manifiesto a la Sociedad Democrática Venezolana y a su Fuerza Armada Nacional. Petition published on GoPetition, 9 January. Available at: www.gopetition.com/petitions/manifiesto-a-la-sociedad-dem ocr%C3%A1tica-venezolana-y-a-su.html. Accessed 21/06/2013. 76 The ruling party gained 49 per cent of the vote as opposed to the MUD’s 43 per cent. 77 Meza, Alfredo, 2014. Maduro radicaliza la revolución chavista. El País, 6 January. Available at: http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2014/01/06/actualidad/ 1389034100_568076.html. Accessed: 06/01/2014. 78 For information and commentary on these events and others in Venezuela, see David Smilde’s blog “Venezuelan Policy and Human Rights” for the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) at http://venezuelablog.tumblr.com. 79 Ellner, Steve, 2015. ‘Venezuela: Maduro and the Market’, Alborada Magazine, Issue 1, Spring–Summer. Available at: www.alborada.net/ellner-venezuela-0515. Accessed: 18/08/2015. 80 Rittinger, Eric R. and Matthew R. Cleary, 2013. ‘Confronting Coup Risk in the Latin American Left’, in Studies in Comparative International Development 48, pp. 403–431. 81 Ibid. 82 Mares, David R., 2014. ‘Citizen Security, Democracy and the Civil-Military Relationship’ in Mares, David (ed.), Debating Civil Military Relations in Latin America. Chicago, IL: Sussex Academic Press, pp. 81–100, 98. 83 Earlier in the year the government had appointed a new directorate to the state oil company. Up until then PDVSA had been run as an autonomous business with little government interference; it was in fact a ‘state within a state’. The new appointments were an effort on the part of the government to gain total control of the oil industry from the technocrats. ‘Meritocracy’ meant that promotions could only arise from within the company staff structure. 84 Up until then the opposition had held two national work stoppages and marches on 10 December 2001 and 27 February 2002. These stoppages were in effect lockouts, called by the CTV but with workers receiving their salaries as normal. In this way the business association actively supported the demonstrations against the government, and unsurprisingly, both marches were well attended. The success of these marches led to growing calls for an indefinite strike to be held. 85 Literally, ‘chains’; government broadcasts were required to be emitted by all TV and radio stations at the same time. It was estimated that on Wednesday 10 December, the government broadcast thirty of these cadenas. 86 Organisers estimated over a half million marchers attended. 87 Owned by the powerful businessman Gustavo Cisneros, who also owns Polar Beer Company and Pan Flour Company, among other important enterprises.

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88 Dominguez, ‘Venezuela’s Opposition’; Lievesley, Geraldine, 2011. ‘Unearthing the Real Subversives: The US State, Right-Wing Think Tanks and Political Intervention in Contemporary Venezuela’, in Dominguez et al., Right-Wing Politics in the New Latin America, pp. 44–63; Golinger, Eva, 2007. The Chávez Code: Cracking US Intervention in Venezuela. London: Pluto Press. 89 Enabling Laws are laws made under decree powers given to the president in cases of emergency. Many of these particular laws, passed in late 2001, such as the Land Law, which could lead to confiscation of non-utilised lands in extreme cases, were sources of grievances for the opposition, due to their having been passed without consultation as well as due to the content of some of them, such as the Land Law. 90 López-Maya, Margarita, 2002. ‘Venezuela: Recuento de una semana fatidica para la democracia’ in Observatorio Social de América Latina, 3(7), pp. 23–26, 25. See Carmona Estanga, Pedro, 2002. Decreto de Gobierno Provisional de Pedro Carmona Estanga. Observatorio Social de América Latina, 3(7), pp. 27–28 for the full text of the decree. 91 Cannon, Barry, 2009. Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution: Populism and Democracy in a Globalised Age. Manchester: Manchester University Press; Dominguez, ‘Venezuela’s Opposition’. 92 Cordero, José Antonio, 2009. Honduras: Recent Economic Performance. Available at: www.cepr.net/documents/publications/honduras-2009-11.pdf. Accessed: 17/06/2015. 93 See Cannon, Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution, Chapter 3. 94 Dana Frank, 2012. ‘Honduras: Which Side Is the US On?’, in The Nation, 22 May. Available: www.thenation.com/article/167994/honduras-which-side-us#. Accessed: 30/01/2013. 95 Diamint, Rut, 2014. ‘Latin America and the Military Question Re-Examined’ in Mares, Debating Civil Military Relations in Latin America, pp. 101–128, 106. 96 Gordon, Todd and Jeffrey R. Webber, 2013. ‘Post-Coup Honduras: Latin America’s Corridor of Reaction’, in Historical Materialism, 21(3), pp. 16–56. 97 Diamint, ‘Military Question’, p. 107. 98 Ibid., p. 106. 99 Ibid., p. 106–107. 100 Weisbrot, Mark, 2010. ‘Ecuador’s Correa Haunted by Honduras’ The Guardian, 1 October. Available at: www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/oct/ 01/rafael-correa-ecuador-coup. Accessed: 17/06/2015. 101 See for example De la Torre, Carlos, 2014. ‘The People, Democracy and Authoritarianism in Correa’s Ecuador’, in Constellations, 21(4), pp. 457–466. 102 Corcoran, Michael, 2010. ‘Ecuador Crisis: Media Bias’, in Media Accuracy on Latin America. Available at: nacla.org/mala. Accessed: 17/06/2015, pp. 51–52. 103 Grandin, Greg, 2014. ‘How to Survive a Cop Coup: What Bill de Blasio Can Learn from Ecuador’, The Nation, 21 December. Available at: www.thenation.com/blog/ 193457/how-survive-cop-coup-what-bill-de-blasio-can-learn-ecuador#. Accessed: 17/06/2015. 104 Corcoran, ‘Media Bias’; Grandin, ‘Cop Coup’; Weisbrot ‘Haunted by Honduras’. 105 Diamint, ‘Military Question’, p. 107. 106 Ibid., p. 111. 107 Grandin, ‘Cop Coup’. 108 Corcoran, ‘Media Bias’. 109 Quoted in Weisbrot ‘Haunted by Honduras’. 110 Diamint, ‘Military Question’, p. 108. 111 Ibid. 112 Ibid. 113 Lambert, Peter, 2012. ‘The Lightening Impeachment of Paraguay’s President Lugo’, e-International Relations, 9 August. Available at: www.e-ir.info/2012/08/09/thelightning-impeachment-of-paraguays-president-lugo/. Accessed: 16/07/2015.

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114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130

131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Szucs, Rebecca, 2014. ‘A Democracy’s Poor Performance: The Impeachment of Paraguay’s President Fernando Lugo’, The George Washington International Law Review, 46, pp. 409–436, 430. Diamint, ‘Military Question’, p. 108. Lambert, ‘Lightening Impeachment’. Szucs, ‘Democracy’s Poor Performance’. Ibid., p. 430. Ibid. Ibid. Nickson, Andrew, 2012. ‘Paraguay’s Presidential Coup: The Inside Story’. Open Democracy, 10 July. Available at: www.opendemocracy.net/andrew-nickson/paragua ys-presidential-coup-inside-story. Accessed: 17/06/2015. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Diamint, ‘Military Question’, p. 108. Nickson, ‘Paraguay’s Presidential Coup’. Juste de Arcos, R, L. Soler, M. Ortí Mata, 2014. ‘Media: Actors of References and Power in Paraguay’, Revista Latina de Comunicación Social, 69, pp. 229–247. Available at: www.revistalatinacs.org/069/paper/1010_Quito/13jen.html. Accessed: 16/06/ 2015. Diamint, ‘Military Question’, p. 108. Ibid., p. 109. Nickson, ‘Paraguay’s Presidential Coup’. Zibechi, Raúl, 2008. ‘The New Latin American Right: Finding a Place in the World’, in NACLA Report on the Americas, 41(1), pp. 13–19. Castañeda, Jorge, 2006. ‘Latin America’s Left Turn’, in Foreign Affairs, 85(3), n.p. Loxton, James, 2014. ‘The Authoritarian Roots of New Right Party Success in Latin America’, in Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser, Resilience, pp. 117–141. O’Donnell, Guillermo, 1978. ‘Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State’, in Latin American Research Review, 13(1), pp. 3–38. For example Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., and Sanford, R. N., 1950. The Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harper. Sales, Stephen M., 1973. ‘Threat as a Factor in Authoritarianism: An Analysis of Archival Data’, in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 28(1), pp. 44–57, 44. Ibid., p. 50. Rickert, Edward J., 1998. ‘Authoritarianism and Economic Threat: Implications for Political Behaviour’, in Political Psychology, 19(4), pp. 707–720. Feldman, Stanley and Karen Stenner, 1997. ‘Perceived Threat and Authoritarianism’, Political Psychology 18(4), pp. 741–770. Ibid., p. 761. Rickert, ‘Authoritarianism and Economic Threat’. Feldman and Stenner, ‘Perceived Threat and Authoritarianism’, p. 763. Ibid., p. 766. Ibid. Ibid., p. 767. Bull, Benedicte and Aguilar-Støen, Mariel, 2015. ‘Conclusion: With or against elites? How to Move towards More Sustainable Environmental Governance in Latin America’, in Benedicte Bull and Mariel Aguilar-Støen (eds), Environmental Politics in

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150 151 152 153 154 155 156

Latin America: Elite Dynamics, the Left Tide and Sustainable Development. London and New York: Earthscan from Routledge, pp. 206–213, 207–208. Stevens, Daniel, Benjamin G. Bishin, and Robert R. Barr, 2006. ‘Authoritarian Attitudes, Democracy, and Policy Preferences among Latin American Elites’, in American Journal of Political Science, 50(3), pp. 606–620. Ibid., p. 613. Mares, ‘Citizen Security, Democracy and the Civil-Military Relationship’. Indeed a similar argument is made by Bull and Aguilar-Støen, in ‘Conclusion’, p. 208. Mares, ‘Citizen Security, Democracy and the Civil-Military Relationship’. Ibid. Zibechi, ‘The New Latin American Right’.

7 CONCLUSION Right strategies and Left responses

This book aims to contribute to the growing corpus of work done to date on the Latin American Right while outlining a new approach to the phenomenon which can take better account of its variety in terms of actors and versatility in terms of strategic responses. In doing so, I have aimed to identify the Right both on a conceptual and on an empirical basis; identify its main ideological project and the degree to which it has succeeded in implanting this in the region; to examine counter-movements against the implementation of this project and the extent to which they have been successful in stalling or reversing it; and, from there, identify the main strategies elites are using to counter these reverses and regain the political initiative. In this way I have aimed to uncover the sources of social power underlying the Right in Latin America and in this final chapter I seek to assess to what extent these findings can inform counter-strategies coming from the Left. My argument has been constructed as follows. First, I have argued that most work on the Latin American Right approaches the subject matter from a political science perspective which is ill-equipped to deal with these essential characteristics of variety and versatility. Such work, I argue, is hampered by its theoretical focus on parties and institutions, when the Right historically has relied on neither to secure its aims. As a result, analysts have been left floundering to explain the lack of conformity of Right actors to theoretical expectations, leading to conceptual stretching in an effort to explain this anomaly. I instead argue that a more comprehensive approach is needed, linking the Right with its social bases. In Chapter 1, I suggest a framework derived from Michael Mann’s work on the origins of social power. Mann identifies four networks of power – economic, ideological, political and military – as the primary sources of social power. I have augmented these with a transnational aspect, derived from Silva,1 in order to recognise the

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profound impact of international powers on the political economy of the Latin American region. Mann argues that these power networks are relatively autonomous but overlapping, and that while none has a priori prominence, some will be more dominant than others in different epochs. This I argue is a more flexible theoretical perspective from which to examine the Right, as it widens the notion of power to areas beyond the political. Moreover, I argue that it is particularly useful for the study of the Right, as elites – the Right’s “core constituency”, in Gibson’s term – dominate these sources of power to a much greater extent than social sectors associated with the Left, particularly in Latin America with its vertiginous levels of socio-economic inequality, the highest in the world. I then go on, in Chapter 2, to develop my theoretical conception of the Right/Left cleavage, which I argue, along with Bobbio,2 as effectively centred on issues of equality, or more accurately inequalities, an approach of particular relevance to Latin America due to the already noted high levels of inequality found there. Under this conception, the Right views social inequalities (class, race/ethnicity, gender) as natural and therefore not requiring state intervention, while the Left sees such inequalities as a direct result of human action and hence remediable, normally through state action. I then relate this back to Mann in two ways: first, that central to any such conception are issues of social stratification – that is, class and the inequalities which this embodies; second, that the state, in reducing these inequalities through improving tax collection and providing universal services in areas such as education and health, builds its own infrastructural power, hence increasing its autonomy and thus the autonomy of the political power network from the other networks of power. Mann argues that this reduction in inequalities and strengthening of state infrastructural power is central for the consolidation of democracy in the region.3 Hence, Bobbio’s theory has both class and policy implications which go beyond the political. The increase in state infrastructural power, however, inevitably clashes directly with the oligarchical power of elites – that is, those who dominate the main networks of power as identified by Mann. This elite, oligarchical power, therefore, is the origin of the Latin American Right – its central identity and the source of its strategic capabilities. These groups have considerable distributive and collective power, in Mann’s terminology, to resist increases in state infrastructural power, or when it does develop, to capitalise on it more than other groups, thus ensuring the perpetuation of their dominance. Furthermore, neoliberalism has augmented this dynamic, as it has, on balance, resulted in greater inequality – increasing rather than diminishing elite power and dominance over the main sources of social power. Neoliberalism then is directly correlated with the power of the dominant class and hence of the Right. The Right is fundamentally a classoriented project aimed at copper-fastening the dominance of elites. Such an analysis, I propose, better captures the complexity of the processes underlying the Left/Right cleavage in the context of Latin America as it factors in the breadth of elite power with more accuracy, comprehensiveness and flexibility than most

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analyses to date. The struggle for control of the state is central to this analysis, as it is the main locus of Left/Right struggle, but it is not privileged per se, as it takes place within a wider context of struggle for continued elite dominance of the entire social power spectrum. In the next two chapters (3 and 4), I attempt to draw the connection between elites, neoliberalism and the Right more clearly. Chapter 3 is based on data derived from interviews with representatives from Right-oriented political party and civil society organisations in four countries – Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela – on the key areas of equality – class, race and gender – and state/market relations. Here I present two principal findings. First, that neoliberalism remains the principle guiding ideology by far among these subjects. Second, as would be expected from those identifying with the Right or Right-of-centre, inequalities of race and class are given little significance, with social problems stemming from these being seen primarily as issues for individualised solutions. Gender inequality, however, has wider acceptance, particularly in Argentina, although here there is a reluctance to provide universalised solutions to provision of necessary services such as childcare, with a preference for negotiated solutions with the private sectors. Third, there is, however, an increased discursive awareness of the need to tackle poverty, but again policy solutions should be tightly focussed on the poorest sections of society with the market providing services to the rest of society. I qualify such thinking as broadly in line with post–Washington Consensus type policy recommendations, that is a form of pragmatic neoliberalism which attends to the poor, but not to inequality, while continuing to pursue market liberalisation. These findings, I suggest, broadly correlate to findings in the previous chapter, and illustrate the general uniformity of Right-wing elite thinking around neoliberalism. In Chapter 4, I seek to show how this dominance of neoliberal worldviews among elites manifests itself in practice across the five power structures within four countries dominated by neoliberalism – Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. On the basis of these examinations I make four key conclusions. First, I argue that neoliberalism is hegemonic across all power networks and that elite power in each of these has most benefitted from that hegemony. In other words neoliberal hegemony is equivalent to elite dominance and hence is central to Right policy aspirations. Second, this dominance is further strengthened by the embedding of these structures into wider transnational power structures, most notably with the United States through dense Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), but also with the founding of the Pacific Alliance between the major countries reviewed, with a view to incorporating some of the smaller Central American countries. Third, policy space is severely limited, as a result restricting the room for manoeuvre of Left governments if and when they achieve power – as is the case of Chile and Peru. Hence, I posit that the main objective for the Right is not simply to implement neoliberalism but to create Right-oriented state/society complexes, whereby neoliberal hegemony and elite power are so deeply embedded in national power structures that unorthodox alternatives are difficult to imagine never mind implement.

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Having established that neoliberalism is the dominant ideology among Rightoriented elites both at a discursive level and in specific national contexts, I then go on to measure the extent to which this dominance has been challenged in many Left-led countries. In Chapter 5, I show that neoliberalism has been stalled, and in some cases reversed, in most countries governed by the Left. Using Mann’s power network framework, I show, first, that in the economy network, serious reversals have been effected in the area of privatisations, but also in some cases through state intervention in the economy, curbs on the financial sector, and price controls on essential goods and services, among other measures. Second, in the area of ideological power, private media power has been reversed to some extent by the creation of state- and community-based media and increased legal and other controls on private media outlets. Third, in terms of political power, the Left has governed in most countries in the region for a considerable amount of time in the 2000s, with the Right finding it difficult in some of those countries to contest Left hegemony, such as Bolivia and Ecuador, while in others, such as Venezuela and Brazil the Right has come much closer to achieving power. Fourth, with regard to military power, while those countries dominated by the Right have US bases or proxy-bases, major Left countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, remain neutral, and some, such as Venezuela and other Bolivarian countries, are wary or even hostile. Finally, most Left countries, with the notable exceptions of Chile, El Salvador and Nicaragua, do not have FTAs with the United States, but have instead built up alternative regional and international trade, credit and cooperation bodies. Hence in most Left-led countries neoliberal hegemony has either been tempered or directly challenged to some degree in all of the main power networks, prejudicing in this way elites’ structural and instrumental power resources. The question, then, remains regarding the manner in which elites can respond to this counter-challenge from the Left to their sources of power, and here I identify three levels of strategic challenge. It is at its most intense in the Bolivarian countries of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and also in Argentina, although even here there are differences, with Bolivarian Venezuela the most radical of them all. Next there are low to medium challenges in the more “moderate” countries of Brazil and Uruguay, and also in Left-led Nicaragua and El Salvador. And finally the challenge is practically non-existent in conservative, neoliberalised states such as Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Paraguay, Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica and Chile. Nevertheless, any challenge to neoliberal orthodoxy is a challenge to its hegemony and therefore must be reversed. I argue, however, that the type of challenge mounted by elites to Left governments will vary according to the intensity of neoliberal policy reversal, which is the extent of the challenge to the power of elites. In Chapter 6, I develop this argument in more detail. Here I contend that there are three levels of Right strategic response to the Left – electoral, mobilisational, and extra-constitutional. The first is largely confined to institutionalised electoral competition between established political parties or movements, or the

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use of institutions to discredit and discombobulate Left governments; the second, involves an amplified mobilisation of elite strategic resources beyond the political, including popular mobilisations; and the third can involve the premature removal of Left governments, including by military coup. I then go on to give examples of each in a variety of countries, noting that the greater the extent of the challenge the more diverse the strategic responses. I emphasise, however, that none of these strategies are mutually exclusive or confined to particular countries. Rather, they are dialectically linked to the perception of threat to elite supremacy, and are dynamic, plastic and malleable. In this way I argue that such a theoretical focus can counteract the static geographical analysis or conceptual overstretching found in more orthodox political science studies. It conforms more closely to Bobbio’s conception of the Left/Right dichotomy as a dyad, as it highlights the dialectic nature of Left/Right strategies and policy discourse. And it more directly links these with the class-based nature of each political constituency. To sum up, I have argued in this book that the Right in Latin America is shaped and controlled by the sources of social power to an extraordinary degree. These sources of social power are, in the present conjuncture, dominated by neoliberalism, reducing space for alternative policy constellations to emerge. Where they have done, they have reversed elite social power in many of these power networks to a sufficient degree to alarm elites. These in turn have responded with a wide variety of strategies to counter-act such policy reversals, including electoral, moblilisational and extra-constitutional tactics. How then, based on this assessment, might the Left/Right struggle develop in Latin America in the near to medium term? It can be argued that both are at a cross-road: some of the “pink tide” governments are now into their second decade in power, while in some key countries, such as Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela, the Right has capitalised on voter fatigue with unfulfilled promises or policy failures, gaining electoral momentum as a result. Indeed, what lessons can the Left learn from the Right’s current policy and strategic response to Left hegemony in the political power network? To answer this question we should first review challenges to the Left identified in the literature, before returning to the current study and its implications for Left policy and strategic responses.

Learning from the Right: Left challenges and Right responses The Left faces a variety of challenges at the political, economic, social, ideological, and transnational levels. At the political level, there is an organisational dilemma between what Robinson identifies as “vanguardism” and “horizontalism”,4 or in the words of Levitsky and Roberts “between governing and maintaining grassroots linkages”.5 The problem for Robinson is how “social movements from below achieve control over the organised political left and over what it does and the institutions of the state”,6 while for Levitsky and Roberts,

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governing can only exacerbate such a dichotomy, leading to clientelistic practices and co-optation of social movements.7 A further political challenge is the diversity of opinion within the Left. There is a tension between the continued dominance of neoliberalism in some Left-led countries and their role as harbingers of a new post-neoliberal, indeed socialist, era. Webber and Carr,8 for example, brand more “moderate” countries such as Brazil, Uruguay and even Bolivia, as the izquierda permitida (permitted Left), as opposed to Venezuela’s more radical Leftism. Yet others see such critiques as divisive. For Sader, the main priority is “the anti-neoliberal struggle and the building of post-neoliberal alternatives”,9 and even “moderate” countries are anti-neoliberal, as they “have slowed down the earlier processes of privatization, encouraged the growth of formal employment, and regenerated public administration and services.”10 Similarly Perla, Mojica and Bibler argue that these different strands work together within the same movement, and Webber and Carr’s concept “provides little analytical leverage for understanding current configurations of … political economy”.11 Rather there is a need to “formulate a counterhegemonic narrative around which centre-Left and Left forces can coalesce for progressive change”.12 Or as Burbach et al. term it, a need for “a singular socialist horizon”, which is open but without “divisions that allow the Right to strengthen”.13 A second area of difficulty for the Left is with regard to the economy. Again Robinson points to the difficulty for Left governments of trying to exercise policy heterodoxy within a neoliberalised global economy.14 Ellner15 and Burbach et al.16 go further, drawing attention to the fact that Left governments failed to achieve “take-off” in production, relying instead for the most part on extractivism – exporting raw materials and energy to fund social programmes and state expansion. Levitsky and Roberts also note the possible threat of the end of the extractivist model as the commodities boom of the 2000s draws to a close.17 Svampa notes how this model divides the Left, with extractivism having negative impacts on some rural and indigenous communities, but with positive ones for many urban communities, producing divergences around the benefits and disadvantages of extractivism among Left intellectuals.18 Katz points out how this extractivism is dependent on foreign markets and capital, how it displaces traditional agriculture, undermining food sovereignty, destroys traditional industries and creates over-reliance on tourism and remittances.19 He also notes how the model is promoted by both Left and Right but with important differences in terms of state involvement and distribution of rents.20 Nevertheless, in the context of the slowdown in the demand for commodities,21 there is an even greater need to develop a successful alternative political economy model to extractivism and neoliberalism. A third area of challenge is in the realm of the social. Most analysts note the success of the Left’s social programmes in terms of reducing poverty and inequality. Levitsky and Roberts view it as unlikely that these programmes will be

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rolled back in the case of a return to Right government, a position confirmed to some extent by the present volume.22 Yet Left policy responses in the area of personal security, crime, and law and order have been unsuccessful or undifferentiated from the Right, a key issue for voters which has been successfully capitalised on by many Right challengers.23 And tensions remain between demands for social citizenship and ethnic and multicultural rights,24 particularly exacerbated by the extractive economic model. Ideological challenges remain also, most notably, according to Sader, that Left governments have developed many novel ideas to challenge neoliberalism but not “the means to disseminate such ideas in a way that is adequate to the needs of the political moment [as they] have difficulty competing with the single orthodoxy and its basic prescriptions, which are repeated over and over again by the monopoly media”.25 Similarly, there is a lack of engagement between the academic community and the theoretical possibilities emerging out of post-neoliberal experimentation.26 Transnationally, Sader also points to the absence of strategic allies for the Left forces, which are then “obliged to link up with countries that have some kind of conflict with the US, Russia, Iran, China, and Belarus” rather than a shared ideological outlook.27 Based on evidence in this volume, while the Right may be on the defensive, at least politically, its main characteristics display radically contrasting aspects on most of these fronts. First, the Latin American Right shows a relatively consistent unity of ideological purpose. Evidence presented here underlines the Right’s unity around neoliberalism as an economic, social and political project. While some evidence has been presented showing divergence over the extent of implementation – with more radical elements advocating a return to a more intransigent form of neoliberalism – for the most part there is unity around the concept of market freedom as being the primary means to human liberty and economic development. This is not to argue that this may not change in the future – historical experience shows that elites are capable of being ideologically pragmatic and flexible in order to defend their interests. Nevertheless, evidence presented here demonstrates that in the current historical context the elite’s main ideological project is neoliberalism. Second, the Right displays strategic diversity and flexibility in pursuit of its ideological purpose. As shown here it possesses considerable oligarchic control across the power spectrum, including in countries with Left-led governments, and has repeatedly been prepared to use such power when its interests are threatened. Third, the Right has considerable strategic transnational alliances, in the IFIs, with powerful foreign governments, or at least important elements within their structures, most notably the United States and particularly (although not exclusively) that country’s Republican Party, but also in Europe, especially in Germany and Spain. National Right think tanks have close links with similar, mostly US-based organisations with considerable leverage in the monopolised, private international media. Finally, its discursive insistence on issues such as crime, corruption and

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economic efficiency, chime well with voter concerns, many of which are being worn down by economic uncertainty brought on by the end of the commodities boom and the continuing war on drugs in the more northern countries and beyond. The Left needs to respond to these challenges urgently if its project of building a post-neoliberal order is to continue. It needs to re-establish links with the grassroots in such a way that enhances government; it needs to build a unifying counter-hegemonic narrative, which can attract and engage voters; it needs to exploit divisions in the Right – between radicals and moderates and with regard to differences on social welfare rights and on inequalities; it must assess its own “structural” power and learn to use it effectively – or construct new elements, such as think tanks, alternative media, grassroots discussion and mobilisation – which pertains directly to the Left, rather than the Left-led state; it should pursue a more aggressive transnational strategy, linking up with new Left alternatives in Europe, such as Syriza in Greece or PODEMOS in Spain, augmenting its reflexive capacity and international weight; and it needs to take more seriously issues which the Right capitalises on, such as security/crime, economic efficiency, and corruption, while carving out a space for itself around inequalities of class, gender and ethnicity. Most of all it needs to highlight what it does well, while pointing out flaws in Right arguments and policy positions; simultaneously it needs to produce innovative and effective solutions which further rather than reduce or retract the postneoliberal twin aims of increasing and enhancing the political and social inclusion of the majorities. An important part of that task will be to urgently articulate a new and more vigorous economic model which can leave behind the divisiveness, inequities and environmental dangers of extractivism. Overall, it needs to work relentlessly within the cracks and seams of the current model to continue to foment “interstitial change” as Mann conceptualises it. In this way the Left can learn from and reflect on its own praxis, as Robinson28 recommends, in order to construct a “pragmatic post-neoliberalism” that can counteract the formidable challenge of the Right.

Notes 1 Silva, Eduardo, 2009. Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2 Bobbio, Norberto, 1996. Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 3 Mann, Michael, 2002. ‘The Crisis of the Latin American State’. Paper presented at the University of the Andes, Bogotá, Colombia, to the conference The Political Crisis and Internal Conflict in Colombia, 10–13 April. Available at: www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/facul ty/mann/colombia.pdf. Accessed: 10/06/2015. 4 Robinson, William I., 2014. ‘Foreword: The Global Significance of Latin America’s New Radical Left’, in Ellner, Steve (ed.). Latin America’s Radical Left: Challenges and Complexities of Political Power in the Twenty-First Century. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. vii–xiii, xi.

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5 Levitsky, Steven and Kenneth M. Roberts, 2011. ‘Conclusion: Democracy, Development and the Left’, in Levitsky, Steven and Kenneth M. Roberts (eds), The Resurgence of the Latin American Left. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, pp. 399–429, 421. 6 Robinson, ‘Foreword’, p. x. 7 Levitsky and Roberts, ‘Conclusion’, pp. 421–422. 8 Webber, Jeffery R. and Barry Carr (eds), 2013. ‘Introduction: The Latin American Left in Theory and Practise’, in The New Latin American Left: Cracks in the Empire. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 1–31, 5. 9 Sader, Emir, 2011. The New Mole: Paths of the Latin American Left. London and New York: Verso, p. 142. 10 Ibid., p. 148. 11 Perla, Héctor Jr., Marco Mojica, and Jared Bibler, 2013. ‘From Guerillas to Government: The Continued Relevance of the Central American Left’, in Webber and Carr, Cracks in the Empire, pp. 327–357, 328. 12 Ibid. 13 Burbach, Roger, Michael Fox, and Federico Fuentes, 2013. Latin America’s Turbulent Transitions: The Future of Twenty-First-Century Socialism. Halifax and Winnipeg: Fernwood; London and New York: Zed, p. 158. 14 Robinson, ‘Foreword’, p. xi. 15 Ellner, ‘Concluding Observations: The Twenty-First-Century Radical Left and the Latin American Road to Change’, in Ellner, Latin America’s Radical Left, pp. 271–281. 16 Burbach et al., Turbulent Transitions, p. 156. 17 Levitsky and Roberts, ‘Conclusion’, p. 423. 18 Svampa, Maristella, ‘“Consenso de los Commodities” y lenguajes de valoración en América Latina’, Nueva Sociedad, 244, March–April, p. 30–46. Available at: www.nuso. org. Accessed: 18/08/2015, pp. 44–45. 19 Katz, Claudio, 2015. ‘Dualities of Latin America’ (translated by Margot Olavarria), Latin American Perspectives, 42(4), pp. 1–33. 20 Ibid. 21 See World Bank, 2015. Global Economic Prospects: The Global Economy in Transition. Washington DC: IBRD/World Bank, pp. 131–141. Available at: www.worldbank. org/content/dam/Worldbank/GEP/GEP2015b/ACS.pdf. Accessed: 18/08/2015. 22 Levitsky and Roberts, ‘Conclusion’, p. 424. 23 Ibid., p. 423. 24 Ibid. 25 Sader, The New Mole, p. 157. 26 Ibid., pp. 157–158. 27 Ibid., p. 157. 28 Robinson, ‘Foreword’, p. xi.

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INTERVIEWS

Argentina Atilio Borón, Academic, 21 November, 2011, Buenos Aires. Unión de Promociones (UdP), Association of Retired Military Personnel, 22 November, 2011, Buenos Aires. Horacio Salaverri, Director, Confederación de Asociaciones Rurales de Buenos Aires y la Pampa (CARBAP), 22 November, 2011, Buenos Aires. Pablo Tonelli, PRO (Propuesta Republicana) deputy, Buenos Aires, 23 November, 2011 Marcelo Fielder, Representative, Sociedad Rural Argentina (Argentinean Rural Society), 5 March, 2012. Juan Pablo Cannata, Communications Officer Opus Dei Argentina and Lecturer in Austral University, 21 November, 2011, Buenos Aires.

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Marcela Cristini, Senior Economist, Fundación de Investigaciones Económicas Latinoamericanas (FIEL), 23 November, 2011, Buenos Aires Norberto C. Peruzzotti, Executive Director, Associación de Bancos Argentinos, (ADEBA) 23 November, 2011, Buenos Aires. Natalia Gambero, Peronist National Deputy for Buenos Aires, 4 March, 2012 Gladys González, Deputy for PRO (Propuesta Republicana) in Buenos Aires city parliament, 24 November, 2011, Buenos Aires. Alejandra Salinas, Director of Research, ESEADE Instituto Universitario, 14 November, 2011, Buenos Aires. Eduardo A. Sambrizi, Vicepresident, Corporación de Abogados Católicos (Catholic Lawyers Association), 14 November, 2011, Buenos Aires.

Chile Eduardo Silva, Deputy UDI National Parliament, 20 December, 2011, Valparaíso, Chile. Lorenzo Figueroa, Director Pastoral Social, Caritas Chile, 16 December, 2011, Santiago de Chile. José Francisco García G., Public Policy Coordinator, Libertad y Desarrollo, 15 December, 2011, Santiago de Chile. Rolf Lüders, Professor, Universidad Católica, Escuela de Negocios y Administración, 6 December, 2011, Santiago de Chile. Najel Klein, Executive Director, Fundación Libertad, 1 December, 2011, Santiago de Chile. Jaime Bellolio, Deputy Director, Fundación Jaime Guzman, 16 December, 2011, Santiago de Chile. Eugenio Guzmán Asterte, Dean, Faculty of Government, Universidad de Desarrollo, 13, December, 2011, Santiago de Chile. Eduardo Riesco Salvo, Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura (National Agricultural Association), 15, December, 2011, Santiago de Chile.

Colombia José Obdulio Gaviria Veléz, Researcher, Centro de Pensamiento Primero Colombia, 18 January, 2012, Bógota, Colombia. Marcela Prieto, Director, and Andrés Molano, Researcher, Instituto de Ciencía Política, 23 January, 2012, Bógota, Colombia. Mauricio Romero, Lecturer, Universidad Javeriana, 24 January, 2012, Bógota, Colombia. Pensamiento Conservador, Right/Liberal Youth Discussion Group, Focus Group, 19 January, 2012, Bógota, Colombia. Ricardo Correa, Ex-secretary general of Associación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI), Colombia’s Peak Business association, 26 January, 2012. Alejo Vargas, Dean, Political Science Faculty, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 26 January, 2012, Bogotá, Colombia Jorge Rodríguez, Director, Centro de Investigaciones del Desarrollo (CID), Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1 February, 2012, Bogotá, Colombia. Juan Carlos Palau, Researcher, Fundación Ideas para la Paz, 30 January, 2012, Bogotá, Colombia.

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José Felix Lafurie, President, Federación Nacional de Ganaderos, (FEDEGAN), 1 February, 2012, Bogotá, Colombia. Camilo Gonzaléz, President, Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz, (INDEPAZ), 23 January, 2012, Bogotá, Colombia Rafael Mejía López, President, Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia (SAC), 26 January, 2012, Bogotá, Colombia.

Venezuela Julio Borges, leader of Primero Justicia political party, 28 February, 2012, Caracas, Venezuela. Maria Corina Machado, Independent Presidential Candidate and Congress member, Caracas, 17 February, 2012. Ismael Garcia, leader of Por la Democrácia Social (PODEMOS) political party, Caracas, 28 Februrary, 2012 Tomas Arias, Academic – Advisor to Maria Corina Machado – Caracas, 22 February, 2012; José Vincente Carrasquero, Academic and ex-advisor to Manuel Rosales, Presidential Candidate, 2006, Caracas, 10 February, 2012. Alonso Dominguez, Member NGO Liderazgo y Visión, Caracas, 15 February, 2012. Luis Pedro España, Academic and Researcher, Universidad Católica Andrés Bello (UCAB), Caracas, 17 February, 2012. Bejamin Scharifker, Rector, Universidad Metropolitana, Caracas, 23 February, 2012. Jorge Botti, President, Federación de Cámaras y Asociaciones de Comercio y Producción de Venezuela (FEDECAMARAS), Caracas, 13 February, 2012. Marino González, Academic/Coordinator Mesa de Unidad Democratica (MUD) Public Policy, Caracas, 27 February, 2012. Victor Maldonado, Director, Camara de Comercio, Industria y Servicios, Caracas, 7 February, 2012.

INDEX

Page numbers in bold refer to tables. Afro-Colombian communities 44–5 ALBA (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America/Bolivarian Alliance for Peoples of Our America) 108 ALBA 134 Alcántara Sáez, Manuel 29 Alckmin, Gerardo 126 Amnesty International 73 ANDI (Associación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia/Colombian National Association of Industrialists) 43 anti-government campaigns 127 anti-narcotics operations 73 anti-Peronist groups 125 Araujo, Rodriguez 73, 79 ARENA (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista/ National Republican Alliance) 19 Argentina: introduction 1; mobilisation strategies 124–5; overview 31–7; Rightwing hegemony 109 Arias Sologuren, Eva 83 authoritarian regimes 94, 132, 135, 139–40 Bachelet, Michelle 2, 40, 122 Baduel, Raúl 132 Banco del Sur (Bancosur/Bank of the South) 107 Bellolio, Jaime 38 Bobbio, Norberto 21 Bolivarian Socialism 136

Bolivia: introduction 1; mobilisation strategies 127–8; renationalisations 97; Right-wing hegemony 109 Brazil 1, 17, 125–7 Bush, George W. 44, 72, 81 Business Coordinating Council (Mexico) 78 Cabello, Diosdado 132 Calderón, Felipe 63, 73, 78 Cannata, Juan Pablo 33 Capriles, Henrique 129 Carmona Estanga, Pedro 132 Cartes, Horacio 136 Castañeda Lossio, Luis 79 Catholic Church: Argentina 30, 32–3; Chile 37–9, 61; Honduras 133; Peru 70 Catholic University in Santiago de Chile 61 CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) 108 Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) 68 CEP (Centro de Estudios Públicos/Centre for Public Studies) 66 Chávez, Hugo: introduction 1–5; media coverage 128–9; party platform 120; policy debates 31; protests 131–2; Right entrenchment 105; smart coups 119 Chile: conservative political parties 1, 17; economic power 61–2; ideological

176 Index

despotic power 21 distributive power 20, 21, 61 diversification threats 138–42, 141 Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) 128

power 66–7; military power 71–2; neopopulist figures 19; overview 37–41; political power 76–7; transnationalisation 80–1 Cipriani, Juan Luis 70 Cisneros, Gustavo 67 civil society organisations (CSOs) 60, 84 Clarín group 125 Cobos, Julio 125 CODELCO (Corporación Nacional de Cobre/ National Copper Corporation) 71–2 Cold War 16 collective power 85 Colombia: conservative political parties 1, 17; economic power 62–3; ideological power 67–8; Left-led Latin America 41–4; military power 72–3; political power 77; transnationalisation 81–2 Colombian Armed Forces 72 Colombian Caracol Group 67 Colombian Communist Party (Partido Comunista de Colombia/PCC) 77 colonisation strategy 117 Common Market of the South (Mercado Común del Sur/MERCOSUR) 137 Confederation of Production and Commerce (Confederación de la Producción y del Comerico de Chile/CPC) 62 Confederations Cup 125 Conservative Parties (Middlebrook) 16 Conservative Party of Colombia 120 Consorcio Radial Chile 67 core constituency 3, 9, 16, 41, 75, 116, 151 Corporation of Catholic Lawyers of Argentina 35 Corporation of Studies for Latin America (Corporación de Estudios para Latino Ámerica/CIEPLAN) 66 counter-hegemonic challenges 60, 139 coup d’etat 116–19, 136 Cristini, Marcela 33 Cuba 1, 17 Cuban Revolution (1959) 101 Cué, Santiuste 29

FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia/Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia) 31, 41, 73, 135 Fernado Collor de Mello 19 Fielder, Marcelo 33 Figueroa, Lorenzo 37 financial freedom 81, 93 flawed democracies 94 foreign direct investment (FDI) 29, 60 Fox, Scott 73, 79 Fox, Vicente 63, 73, 78 Franco, Federico 136 Freedom House 105; Freedom in the World Index 94–5 free trade agreements (FTAs): Colombia 81; introduction 2; open trading regimes 59; Peru 65; power struggles 152–3; US military bases and 106–7 Free Trade of the Americas Association (FTAA) 109 Fujimori, Alberto 1–2, 19, 64–5, 79, 116 full conflict theory 25 full democracies 94

Dahl, Robert A. 102 debt crisis (1980s) 16 de la Madrid, Miguel 63 de Mello, Fernando Collor 116–17 democracy promotion 117–18, 124 Democratic Centre (Colombia) (Centro Democrático/ CD) 77 “democratic security” policy 42–3

Gambaro, Natalia 34, 36 García, Alan 65, 79 Garciá, José Francísco 37 GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 64 Gauchet, Marcel 11 Gaviria, César 62, 120 Gaviria Veléz, José Obdulio 42

economic destabilisation 117 economic power: Chile 61–2; Colombia 62–3; Mexico 63–4; neoliberalism and 61–5; overview 21; Peru 64–5; “pink tide” and 96–8 Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2014 Democracy Index 94 Ecuador 1, 109, 134–6 El Salvador 1, 17 EMTs (elite mobilisation tactics) 103 Estenssoro Paz, Victor 120 Estranga, Pedro Carmona 132 extra-constitutional strategies: Ecuador 134–6; Honduras 133–4; Paraguay 136–8; Venezuela 131–2

Index 177

González, Camilo 44 González, Gladys 34–6 Great Change Alliance (Alianza Gran Cambio) 79 Gutiérrez, Lucio 135 Guzmán, Eugenio 39 Guzmán, Jaime 76 Heritage Foundation 68 Heritage Foundation 93, 110 Honduras 133–4 Humala, Ollanta 64, 79 human rights abuses: Argentina 31–2, 51; Chile 71; civil society and 9; Colombia 81; by military 16; Peru 74 hybrid regimes 94 Ibero-American Radio Chile 67 ICP (Instituto de Ciencias Políticas/Institute of Political Science) 42 ICSID (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) 95 ideological power: Chile 66–7; Colombia 67–8; introduction 20; measurement of 93; Mexico 68–9; neoliberalism 66–70; Peru 69–70 Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) 15; substitution industrialisation era 120 Index of Economic Freedom 81, 82 infrastructural power 21, 22–3, 24 Inglehart, Ronald 11 institutional power strategies 119–22 instrumental power 23–4 International Financial Institutes (IFIs) 18, 84, 102 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 18, 50, 80, 103, 107 investment freedom 82, 93 Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira 18, 120, 121 Kaltwasser, Luna 120, 121 Kirchner, Cristina Fernández de (CFK) 32, 51, 97, 124 Konrad Adenauer Foundation 68 Kuczynski, Pedro Pablo 79 Lafurie, José Félix 43–4 Lagos, Ricardo 81 Latin American Centre for International Economics and Society (CLEPI) 66 Latin American Faculty of the Social Sciences (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales/FLACSO) 66

Latin American Right: introduction 1–5, 8–10; Left/Right distinctions and neoliberalism 10–15; meaning of 15–20; study of 20–4; see also Right power strategies Left and Right (Bobbio) 10 Left and Right in Global Politics (Nöel, Therien) 10 Left-led Latin America: Argentina 31–7; Chile 37–41; Colombia 41–4; diversification threats from 138–42, 141; introduction 1–5, 29–31; Right-wing policy discourse 29–31, 154–7; Venezuela 44–9 Left/Right cleavage 10–15, 151–4 Liberty and Development (Libertad y Desarrollo) 37, 66 Liberty Institute (Instituto Libertad) 38 López, Leopoldo 130 Lüders, Rolf 38–9 Lugo, Fernando 2, 107, 136 Luna, Juan Pablo 18 Machado, María Corina 50–1, 130 Macri, Mauricio 2 Maduro, Nicolás 98, 129 Mann, Michael 3–5, 9–10, 20–2, 150–1 market capitalism 13 Martí i Puig, Salvador 29 Martinelli, Ricardo 2 Matthei, Evelyn 40 Menem, Carlos Saúl 31 Mexico: conservative political parties 17; economic power 63–4; ideological power 68–9; military power 73; political power 78–9; transnationalisation 82 Micheletti, Roberto 133 Middlebrook, Kevin 16 Miliband, Ralph 13–14 military power: Chile 71–2; Colombia 72–3; measurement of 93; Mexico 73; neoliberalism 71–4; overview 21; Peru 74; “pink tide” Latin America 105–7 Misión Milagro (Miracle Mission) 108 mobilisational strategies: Argentina 124–5; Bolivia 127–8; Brazil 125–7; introduction 122–4, 123; overview 117; Venezuela 128–30 moderate freedom 93 Molano, Andrés 42 Molina, Otto Pérez 2, 107, 117, 121 Montesinos, Vladimiro 74 Morales, Evo 45, 127, 128

178 Index

mostly unfree scale 93 Mouffe, Chantal 14 MUD (Mesa de Unidad Democrática/ Democratic Unity Coalition) 2, 129 nationalisations 32, 96, 97 Nationalist Party 133 National Plan for Equal Opportunities 49 National Solidarity (Solidaridad Nacional) 79 NED (National Endowment for Democracy) 103 neoliberalism: centrality of 116; economic power 61–5; ideological power 66–70; infrastructural power 22–3, 24; introduction 5, 58–9; Left/Right distinctions 10–15; military power 71–4; political power 75–80; postneoliberalism 25, 92, 155–7; privatisation and 116, 153; social power 59–61; transnationalisation 80–4; see also “pink tide” Latin America Neves, Aécio 122, 127 non-core constituencies 3 non-electoral strategies 19 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 18, 44–5 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 63, 101 Obama, Barack 44 oligarchical power 22, 65, 117, 124, 133, 151 Organization of American States (OAS) 108, 133 Oviedo, Lino 138 Pacific Alliance 2, 4, 59, 83–4 Palau, Juan Carlos 43 PAN (Partido de Acción Nacional/National Action Party) 1, 19, 73, 78, 84, 120 Paraguay 136–8 Parsonian functionalism 117 Peña Nieto, Enrique 1, 63–4, 82 Pérez, Carlos Andrés 120 Peru: economic power 64–5; ideological power 69–70; military power 74; political power 79–80; transnationalisation 82–3 Peru Posible 79 Peruzzotti, Norberto 34 Piñera, Sebastián 2, 76, 117 “pink tide” Latin America: economic power 96–8; introduction 1, 92; military

power 105–7; political power 98–102, 99, 100; Right retrenchment 93–6, 94; threat to Right-wing hegemony 111; transnational power 107–9 Pinochet, Augusto 37, 61, 76 political power: Chile 76–7; Colombia 77; measurement of 93; Mexico 78–9; neoliberalism 75–80; overview 21; Peru 79–80; “pink tide” Latin America 98–102, 99, 100 political sociology 20–4 populism 16, 32 post–Cold War settlement 104 post-neoliberalism 25, 92, 155–7 PPTs (polyarchy promotion tactics) 103 PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional/ Institutionalised Revolutionary Party) 78, 84 Prieto, Marcela 42 privatisation: Bolivia 51; Colombia 62; economic power and 96, 97; Mexico 63, 70, 82; neoliberalism and 116, 153; Peru 65; social movements and 85; tolerance of 29 PRO (Propuesta Republicana/ Republican Proposal) 2, 121 Pro–Santa Cruz Civic Committee (Comité Civico Pro-Santa Cruz/CCPSC) 127, 128 PSUN (Partido Social de Unidad Nacional/ Social Party of National Unity) 77 Quiroga, Jorge 121 radical Leftism 155 RCTV channel 128 Reis, Elisa 29–31 renationalisations 96–7 repressed freedom 93 Resilience (Luna, Kaltwasser) 18 Right power strategies: diversification threats 138–42, 141; extra-constitutional strategies 130–8; institutional power strategies 119–22; introduction 2, 116–19; mobilisation strategies 121–30, 123; see also Latin American Right Right retrenchment 93–6, 94 Right-wing hegemony see “pink tide” Latin America Right-wing policy discourse 29–31, 154–7 Right-Wing Politics (Dominguez, Lievesley, Ludlum) 18 Rio Tinto Alcan (RTA) 138

Index 179

RN (Renovación Nacional/National Renovation party) 37 Robinson, W.I. 102 Rodríguez, Jorge 43 Rousseff, Dilma 98, 121, 126–7 Salinas, Alejandra 35 Salinas de Gortari, Carlos 63, 69 Salinas de Gortari, Raúl 69 Salinas Pliego, Ricardo 69 Sambrizzi, Eduardo 35, 36 same-sex marriage issues 18, 31, 36, 40, 50, 126 Samper, Ernesto 62 Sánchez de Lozada, Gonzalo120 Santa Cruz Chambers of Commerce and Industry 127 Santa Cruz Youth Union (Unión Juvenil Cruceñista/UJC) 127 Santos, Juan Manuel 41, 43, 63, 67, 73 Schmitt, Carl 13 shareholder owned companies (SOCs) 82 Shining Path War 74 Silva, Eduardo 3 Silva, Ernesto 37 Silva, Marina 121 smart coups 119 Smith, Adam 37 SNMPE (Sociedad Nacional de Minería y Energía/National Society for Energy and Mining) 83 Socialist Party 121 social power concept 9–10, 20–4, 59–61 sociospatially transcendent 20 SRA (Sociedad Rural de Argentina/ Argentinean Rural Society) 33 structural power 23–4 Telesur 104 Thatcher, Margaret 98 Toledo, Alejandro 65, 79 trade freedom 93 Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 109

transnationalisation: Chile 80–1; Colombia 81–2; Mexico 82; neoliberalism 80–4; overview 21; Pacific Alliance 83–4; Peru 82–3 transnational power 93, 107–9 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 83 UDI (Unión Demócrata Independiente/ Independent Democratic Union) 19, 37, 76 UNASUR (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas/Union of South American Nations) 108–9 Union of Promotions (Unión de Promociones) 37 Universal Child Benefit (Asignación Universal por Hijo) 34 “U” party 120 Uribe, Álvaro 43, 67, 68, 117, 120, 121 USAID (United States Agency for International Development) 103 US–Colombia Free Trade Agreement 101 Vargas, Alejo 43 Vargas Llosa, Mario 69, 82 Vazquez Velasco, Efraín132 Venezuela: conservative political parties 1, 17; extra-constitutional strategies 131–2; Left-led Latin America 44–9; mobilisation strategies 128–30; renationalisations 97; Right-wing hegemony 109 war on drugs 22, 84 Washington Consensus 29 WOLA (Washington Office on Latin America) 72 World Bank 18, 50, 80, 102, 107 World Index of Economic Freedom 93, 97 Zedillo, Ernesto 63, 73 Zelaya, Manuel 105, 107, 119, 133 Zibechi, Raúl 101 Zuloaga, Oscar 41–2