The Reshaping of China-Southeast Asia Relations in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic 9813344156, 9789813344150

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Nian Peng   Editor

The Reshaping of China-Southeast Asia Relations in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic

The Reshaping of China-Southeast Asia Relations in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic

Nian Peng Editor

The Reshaping of China-Southeast Asia Relations in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic

123

Editor Nian Peng National Institute for South China Sea Studies Haikou, China

ISBN 978-981-33-4415-0 ISBN 978-981-33-4416-7 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4416-7

(eBook)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Preface

The current COVID-19 pandemic has heightened uncertainty over the world economy, global geopolitics, social development, and of course, the physical and mental health of individuals. China, the first victim of COVID-19, has launched a “people’s war” against the virus and got “successful victory” in a very short time. The “Chinese aid”, “Chinese model”, and “Chinese experience” originated from the “anti-Covid war” have became a useful policy instrument and political propaganda for China’s “Covid diplomacy”. By implementing the “Covid diplomacy”, China has attempted to improve its national image, increase its soft power, and most importantly, maintain the cordial ties with neighbouring countries as well as the cooperative relations with the great powers. Bordering with China at sea and land, Southeast Asia has become a top priority of China’s “Covid diplomacy”. Meanwhile, the United States (US) has revived a hostile postures towards China after the COVID-19 and thus has competed for influence with China in Southeast Asia and other regions intensively, resulting in a high uncertain geo-economic and geo-strategic landscape in the world. As major partners for both China and the US as well as the main centers of Sino-US power rivalry, the Southeast Asian states have always been faced with an uncertainty in their economic cooperation and political ties with China and the US. Since the outbreak of the COVID-19, the Southeast Asian states have been put in a very difficult position where they avoided displeasing China and accepted China’s aid while coming under increased pressure from the US to take sides. Given the increasingly intense competition between China and the US during/after the COVID-19 pandemic, Southeast Asian states’ room for manoeuvre has been shrinking. Due to the changing dynamics of the great power competition in Southeast Asia during/after the COVID-19 pandemic, the China-Southeast Asia relations would be reshaping in many ways. How has the COVID-19 affected the economic cooperation, political ties, and people-to-people exchanges between China and the Southeast Asian states in the short and long term? How has the Southeast Asian people seen China’s anti-Covid efforts and its “Covid diplomacy”? How has the

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Southeast Asian countries managed their relations with China and the US under the intense Sino-US power rivalry during/after the COVID-19? So far, there is a lack of sufficient discussion on the given questions, especially the insightful observations from Chinese and Southeast Asian scholars. Hence, I drafted a book proposal about the China-Southeast Asia relations in light of COVID-19 in which the above key questions are included, and tried to invite some Chinese and Southeast Asian scholars to contribute for this valuable book. Fortunately, they accepted the invitation with good grace and gave many useful suggestions to improve the proposal. Then, I submitted the revised proposal to the famous Springer Publisher and passed the reviewing process, and finally got a publishing contract. So this book is a joint work of scholars from both China and Southeast Asia, the anonymous reviewers, as well as the editors at Springer. It cannot be completed without their kindly cooperation and assistance. Here, I would like to give my sincere thanks to all the contributors. They are Dr. Aaron Jed Rabena at the Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress, the Philippines; Prof. Chandarith Neak and Mr. Sothearak Sok at Royal University of Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Dr. Chee Leong Lee at National Chengchi University, Taiwan and Prof. Md Nasrudin Md Akhir at University of Malaya, Malaysia; Dr. Myint San at Dawei Special Economic Zone (SEZ), Myanmar; Dr. Tuan Khanh Nguyen and Prof. Nam Tiến Trần at Vietnam National University of Hochiminh City and The University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam; Prof. Nisit Panthamit at Chiang Mai University, Thailand; Researcher Putri Rakhmadhani Nur Rimbawati at Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia and Shanghai Jiaotong University, China; Dr. Xianbai Ji at Renming University of China. It should be highly noted that all the views on this book do not represent the affiliations of the editor and contributors, and all of shortcomings are responsible by authors. I would express my genuine gratitude to the anonymous reviewers whose positive assessment allows this book proposal to be accepted by the Springer. I would thank Mrs. Emily Zhang and Mr. Sivananth at Springer. This book could not be put out soon without their professional publishing service. The warmest thanks are also given to my colleague Miss. Lifu Zhang who offered editing help for the book. Last but not least, this book is financed by The National Social Science Fund of China, thereby it is part of the outcome of the Youth Project of The National Social Science Fund of China (No. 20CGJ048)-The Impacts of Populism in Southeast Asia on South China Sea (SCS) Dispute and Policy Recommendations. September 2020

Nian Peng Deputy Director and Associate Fellow Research Centre for Maritime Silk Road National Institute for South China Sea Studies Haikou, China

Contents

1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nian Peng

2

China–ASEAN Community of a Shared Future Under COVID-19: Dual Influence and Policy Recommendations . . . . . . . . Nian Peng

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The COVID-19 Pandemic and Philippines–China Relations . . . . . . Aaron Jed Rabena

4

Cambodia’s Response to COVID-19 and Its Impacts on Cambodia–China Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chandarith Neak and Sothearak Sok

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Malaysia–China Relations During the Movement Control Order Period and Beyond: Assessment from the Mutual Trust Variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chee Leong Lee and Md Nasrudin Md Akhir Myanmar’s Response to COVID-19 and Its Impacts on China–Myanmar Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Myint San

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Vietnam–China Relations in the Context of the COVID-19: Situation and Prospect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 Tuan Khanh Nguyen and Nam Tiến Trần

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Impacts of COVID-19 on BRI: A Case Study of Thailand . . . . . . . 123 Nisit Panthamit

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Indonesia’s Response to COVID-19: Between Economics, Public Health, and Social Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Putri Rakhmadhani Nur Rimbawati

10 Singapore’s Response to COVID-19 and Its Impacts on Singapore-China Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 Xianbai Ji

Editor and Contributors

About the Editor Nian Peng is the Deputy Director and Associate Fellow of Research Centre for Maritime Silk Road, National Institute for South China Sea Studies (NISCS), China. He holds a Ph.D. in Government and International Studies at Hong Kong Baptist University. His main research interests are in the areas of China-Southeast/South Asia relations, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), maritime security of the Indo-Pacific. He has succeeded in securing a consecutive prestigious funding from The National Social Science Fund of China to support the Youth Project (No. 20CGJ048): The Impacts of Populism in Southeast Asia on South China Sea (SCS) Dispute and Policy Recommendations. He authored two books International Pressures, Strategic Preference, and Myanmar’s China Policy since 1988 (Singapore: Springer Publishing, 2020), Leng Zhan Hou Yin Mian Guan Xi Yan Jiu 冷战后印 缅关系研究 [A Study on Indo-Myanmar Relations after the Cold-War]” (Beijing: Shi Shi Chu Ban She 时事出版 社 [Current Affairs Press], 2017). His refereed articles have been notably published in Asian Affairs, Dong Nan Ya Yan Jiu 东南亚研究 [Southeast Asian Studies], Nan Ya Yan Jiu 南亚研究 [South Asian Studies], Nan Ya Yan Jiu Ji Kan 南亚研究季刊 [South Asian Studies Quarterly]. He also contributes his perspectives to many think tanks and various local and international media outlets such as Asia Centre in France, Institute for Peace and

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Editor and Contributors

Conflict Studies (IPCS) in India, The Diplomat in the US, East Asian Forum in Australia, Lian He Zao Bao 联 合早报 in Singapore, South China Morning Post in Hong Kong, Zhong Guo Ping Lun Tong Xun She 中国评 论通讯社 [China Review Agency] in Hong Kong, CGTN and Global Times in China. e-mail: [email protected]

Contributors Md Nasrudin Md Akhir is the Head of Malaysia-Japan Research Centre and an Associate Professor at the Department of East Asian Studies, University of Malaya, Malaysia. He was appointed as the Head of the Department of East Asian Studies in 2005 and went on to become the Deputy Dean (Research and Development) of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences in early 2010. Following this, he served as the Executive Director of the Asia-Europe Institute, University of Malaya from 2010 to 2015. He was also the Secretary General of the Malaysian Association of Japanese Studies (MAJAS) from 1998 to 2012 and currently is an advisor to MAJAS. Since its establishment in 2005, he has been a member of the Steering Committee of the Japanese Studies Association in ASEAN (JSA-ASEAN). His main research interests include Malaysia-Japan relations, Japan’s foreign policy and East Asian security issues. He is also the author and editor of 14 books and numerous academic articles published locally and internationally. e-mail: [email protected] Xianbai Ji is an Assistant Professor at the School of International Studies, Renmin University of China on the Distinguished Young Scholar Fellowship. He obtained his doctorate in International Political Economy from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore as a Nanyang President’s Graduate Scholar. He works on international economic relations, regionalism, world economic governance, and Southeast Asian affairs. e-mail: [email protected] Tuan Khanh Nguyen is a lecturer at Vietnam National University of Hochiminh City, Vietnam (the University of Social Sciences and Humanities). He holds a M.A. in International Relations at International University of Japan and Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at Vietnam National University of Hanoi. His main research areas are International Relations (IR), Southeast Asian affairs, SCS issue. He authored (co-author and editor) five books, mainly including India and Vietnam in the New International Context (Hochiminh City: Vanhoa-Vannghe Publish House, 2016); The Presence of Powers in South China Sea and the Impacton Vietnam (Hochiminh City: Vietnam National University Press, 2015); Cooperation in the South China Sea from International Relations Perspective, (Hochiminh City: Vanhoa-Vannghe Publish House, 2014). His refered articles have been published in Scientific Journal of Saigon University, Vietnam Journal for Indian and Asian

Editor and Contributors

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Studies, Annals of University of Social Sciences and Humanities of Hochiminh City. e-mail: [email protected] Chee Leong Lee is the Visiting Fellow for Center for Southeast Asian Studies, National Chengchi University (NCCU) and formerly, an Associate Fellow of Institute of China Studies (ICS), University of Malaya. His primary interests are China’s sub-national diplomacy with ASEAN countries, comparative cases of sub-national foreign affairs in the world and Taiwan’s soft power in Malaysia. Prior to his Visiting Fellowship in NCCU, he was sponsored by the Chinese Government as the Visiting Scholar in the School of Politics and Public Administration, Guangxi University for Nationalities. Lee holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Monash University and is the author of commentaries in various Malaysian and international media. e-mail: [email protected] Chandarith Neak is currently Head of Department of International Studies (DIS), Institute of Foreign Languages (IFL). He is also the founding director of Cambodia 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Research Centre at the Royal University of Phnom Penh, Cambodia. His research interests center on BRI, Mekong-Lancang Mechanism and state-society relations in Southeast Asia. e-mail: [email protected] Nisit Panthamit is the Director and Associate Professor of the Center for ASEAN Studies, Chiang Mai University, Thailand. He holds a Ph.D. in Economics at University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, USA, and M.A. and B.A. in Economics at Chiang Mai University. He mainly focuses on International Economics, Chinese Economy, ASEAN Studies and Regional Integration, and Border Studies. His refered articles have been published in Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, International Journal of Trade and Global Markets, JATI-Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, International Journal of Management and Applied Science, Asia-Pacific Journal of EU Studies, Singapore Economic Review, Journal of Economic Integration, Sustainability, Financial Research Letters. e-mail: [email protected] Aaron Jed Rabena is a Research Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress (a Manila-based think tank), Consultant at Caucus Incorporated (a business and government relations consulting firm), and Adjunct Fellow with the Philippine Council for Foreign Relations (PCFR). He previously served as Senior Lecturer at the Asian Center in the University of the Philippines and Visiting Fellow at the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU). He is also a Pacific Forum Young Leader and is an alumnus of the East-West Center (EWC) and the US State Department’s International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP). He received his Ph.D. in International Relations from Shandong University in China. His areas of interest include Strategic Studies, East Asian Geopolitics and Institutional Politics, Political Risk, and Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy. e-mail: [email protected]

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Putri Rakhmadhani Nur Rimbawati is former Executive Secretary and Researcher of ASEAN Studies Center of Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia,as well as a General Manager of Magelang TV, member of PT. Jawa Post Multimedia (JPM),which has anetwork of 33 Jawa Pos Group Television stations in Indonesia. Her main research interests include Intercultural Communication, Health Communication, Media Effects, Children and Woman. She passionate and experienced news anchor and television presenter with more than nine-years working in the Television of Indonesia, and published papers in various academic journals or conference papers, such as “Mainstreaming Human Rights in the Governance of HIV/AIDS Response in Indonesia: A Study of Children with HIV/AIDS in Jakarta and Surakarta”. She is also a Ph.D. Student in New Media Studies, Journalism and Communication at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China. e-mail: [email protected] Myint San is the Vice-Chairman-2 of Dawei SEZ Management Committee, Myanmar and the President of Myanmar Research Center for Economic Development, Yangon. His primary interests are socio-economic development of Myanmar, Myanmar-Thailand relations, and Myanmar-Chin a relations. He holds a Ph.D. in Policy Studies at Aichi Gakuin University, Japan, and M.A. and B.A. in Economics at Nagoya University, Japan and Institute of Economics, Myanmar respectively. His referred articles have been published in Journal of Information and Policy Studies, Journal of Economic Science, Journal of Foreign Affair Studies. e-mail: [email protected] Sothearak Sok is a lecturer at the Department of International Studies of Royal University of Phnom Penh, Cambodia. He teaches ASEAN Studies and Introduction to East and Southeast Asia. Before taking his current position in academia, Mr. Sok worked in financial sector as a Trade Finance Officer with Cambodian Public Bank and later on as a Management Trainee with Prudential Cambodia. e-mail: [email protected] Nam Tiến Trần is a Professor at Vietnam National University of Hochiminh City, Vietnam (the University of Social Sciences and Humanities). His main research areas are Vietnam Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, IR History. He authored (co-author and editor) nine books, mainly including Saigon Regime Diplomacy (1955–1963) (Hochiminh City: Tổng hợp Publishing, 2020), Indochina Communist Party’s Foreign Activities in 1930–1945 (Hochiminh City: Văn hóa-Văn nghệ, 2020), Vietnam Diplomacy and Western Countries during Nguyen Dynasty (1802–1858) (Hà Nội: Social Sciences Publishing House, 2019), The World and South China Sea after the Arbitration Decision (Hochiminh City: Văn hóa-Văn nghệ, 2017). e-mail: trannamtienfi[email protected]

Abbreviations

ACFTA ACSOC ADB AFP AIDS AMF APT ASEAN BN BOC BOI BRI BUCG CAFTA CBCP CCCC CCP CCSA CERP CITIC CMEC CMQIP CNTO COC CONWEP CPC CQ CRCC CREATE CSFTA

ASEAN-China Free Trade Area ASEAN-China Senior Officials’ Consultation Asian Development Bank Armed Forces of the Philippines Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Asian Monetary Fund ASEAN Plus Three Association of Southeast Asian Nations Barisan Nasional Bank of China Board of Investment of Thailand Belt and Road Initiative Beijing Urban Construction Group China-ASEAN Free Trade Area Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines China Communication Construction Company Chinese Communist Party Center for COVID-19 Situation Administration COVID-19 Economic Relief Plan China International Trust and Investment Corporation China-Myanmar Economic Corridor China-Malaysia Qinzhou Industrial Park China National Tourism Office Code of Conduct Confederation of Wearable Exporters of the Philippines Communist Party of China Community Quarantine China Railway Construction Corporation Corporate Recovery and Tax Incentives for Enterprises Act China-Singapore Free Trade Agreement

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xiv

CSRG DAP DBCC DFA DND DOC DOH DORSCON EAMF EBA ECRL EEZ EOs FDA GCQ GDP GMS GQFs GTAP IA IATF-EID ICT IMF JCBC LGUs LMC LMNSE LSSR MCA MCKIP MCO MCP MECQ MGCQ MMEA MOH MOHS MOPFI MOU MPP MREPC MSCI MSDP MSR MTI

Abbreviations

China South Locomotive and Rolling Stock Industry Group Democratic Action Party Development Budget Coordination Committee Department of Foreign Affairs Department of National Defense Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS Department of Health Disease Outbreak Response System Condition East Asian Monetary Fund Everything But Arms East Coast Rail Link Exclusive Economic Zone Executive Orders Food and Drug Authority General Community Quarantine Gross Domestic Product Greater Mekong Sub-region Government Quarantine Facilities Global Trade Analysis Project Infrastructure Asia Inter-Agency Task Force on Emerging Infectious Diseases Information and Communications Technology International Monetary Fund Joint Council for Bilateral Cooperation Local Government Units Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Initiatives Law on the Management of the Nation in State of Emergency Large-Scale Social Restrictions Malaysian Chinese Association Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park Movement Control Order Malayan Communist Party Modified Enhanced Community Quarantine Modified General Community Quarantine Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency Ministry of Health Ministry of Health and Sports Ministry of Planning, Finance and Industry Memorandum of Understanding Multi-Product Pipeline Malaysian Rubber Export Promotion Council Morgan Stanley Capital International Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan Medical Silk Road Ministry of Trade and Industry

Abbreviations

NAP NBC NCR NDA NGAs NGO NIC NTF NYDC ODA OVP PCCC PCR PH PHEIC PHEIs PHILHEALTH PH-PROGRESO PLA PLAN PMI PN PNP POFMA POGOs PPE PSBB RCEP RTFs SARS SCS SDGs SEZ SHN SIP SSTEC STI TCM TPP TSGP UAE UK UMNO UMTA UN

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National Action Plan National Bank of Cambodia National Capital Region New Democratic Army National Government Agencies Non-governmental Organization National Incident Command National Task Force New Yangon Development Company Official Development Assistance Office of the Vice-President Penang Chinese Chamber of Commerce Polymerase Chain Reaction Pakatan Harapan Public Health Emergency of International Concern Philippine Higher Education Institutions Philippine Health Insurance Corporation Philippine Program for Recovery with Equity and Solidarity People’s Liberation Army People’s Liberation Army Navy Purchasing Manager Index Perikatan Nasional Philippine National Police Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act Philippine Offshore Gaming Operators Personal Protective Equipment Pembatasan Sosial Berskala Besar Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Regional Task Forces Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome South China Sea Sustainable Development Goals Special Economic Zone ‘Stay-Home Notice’ Suzhou Industrial Park Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-City Straits Times Index Traditional Chinese Medicine Trans-Pacific Partnership Trans-Sabah Gas Pipeline United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United Malays National Organization Union of Myanmar Travel Association United Nations

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UNCLOS UNSG UP-NIH UPRI US VFA VUA WB WHO WTO WTTC

Abbreviations

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Secretary General of the United Nations University of the Philippines National Institutes of Health UP Resilience Institute United States Visiting Forces Agreement Visa Upon Arrival World Bank World Health Organization World Trade Organization World Travel & Tourism Council

Chapter 1

Introduction Nian Peng

The novel coronavirus disease named COVID-19 which was alleged to be originated in Wuhan city, China, has caused nearly one million deaths and devastated the global economy, the healthcare system and the people’s life of many nations so badly. Both China and the Southeast Asian countries are the main infected areas of the COVID19 pandemic, in which the peak of the current outbreak of COVID-19 in China is over in the mid-March1 while some Southeast Asian states such as the Philippines and Indonesia have faced the worst COVID-19 crisis. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the cumulative COVID-19 confirmed cases in China until March 16 is 81,077 and the total deaths are 3,314. It then increased slowly to 91,041 and 4,746 respectively until September 30.2 Due to the relief of the COVID-19, China advanced resumption of work and production on the premise of effective epidemic containment in an active and orderly manner and normalized the daily life in lowrisk areas since April.3 Nonetheless, there have been four waves of the spread of the COVID-19 since then, mainly including the imported COVID-19 cases from Russia in April in Suifen River along the China-Russia border, the community infection in Beijing in June, the community infection in Dalian and Urumchi in July, and the imported COVID-19 cases from Myanmar in September in Ruili along the ChinaMyanmar border. Recently, Chinese experts have warned of the risk of a new spike in COVID-19 infections this winter, but it would not have the similar severe effects of the COVID-19 in Wuhan.4 1 Xinhua

Net (2020). Disease (COVID-19) Weekly Epidemiological Update (2020), WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard (2020). 3 China Releases Guideline on Advancing Work Resumption amid Epidemic Control (2020). 4 Xie (2020). 2 Coronavirus

N. Peng (B) National Institute for South China Sea Studies, Haikou, China e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 N. Peng (ed.), The Reshaping of China-Southeast Asia Relations in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4416-7_1

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In order to cut down the spread of the virus, China put more stringent rules in place than the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003. The first is the lockdown of the main infected areas, the big cities in particular. For instance, the Wuhan city was blocked for nearly three months (76 days), other huge cities like Beijing was also blocked for more than one month. Secondly, China used extremely coercive methods to prohibit the free flow of goods and people except the daily necessities and the epidemic prevention personnels unless the alert is over. For example, the local governments blocked all the roads, schools, and shopping malls in the cities and villages, and all the citizens and villagers are not allowed to go outside home. Thirdly, severe punishment was applied to publish who violates the anti-Covid rules, jacks up price and conveys fake news and information. Additionally, hundreds of government officials have been held accountable for an inadequate response to the COVID-19 pandemic. According to Chen Yixin, secretary-general of the Commission for Political and Legal Affairs of Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, 654 government officials and staffs in Wuhan were held accountable for an inadequate response to the COVID-19 pandemic, including 10 bureau-level cadres and 144 section-level cadres.5 In the meantime, China mobilized all the resources to initiate a “people’s war” against the virus, and eventually won a stunning victory over the COVID-19. First of all, China established a leading group on coronavirus prevention and control led by Premier Li Keqiang at the end of January 2020 to strengthen the unified leadership and guidance of national prevention and control work. Under this leading group, the central government sent groups to Hubei to direct work on the ground, and mobilized national resources to provide medical personnel and supplies, including protective suits and masks urgently needed in the province. In addition, green passages for material transportation were opened to ensure the supply of necessities for local people, the construction of hospitals for centralized treatment was speeded up, and the hotels were renovated as quarantine areas where the patients with fever were given timely treatment.6 In Addition, all the government officials and staffs, community staffs and villagers, workers and volunteers have actively participated in the fight against the virus, which makes the fight a “people’s war”. Owed to the joint efforts of all the Chinese people, the epidemic situation has been controlled in a very short time, and the probability of further spread is little. Nonetheless, there are still important lessons from the COVID-19 outbreak in China, in which the first one is the ineffectiveness of the early warning mechanism of the major communicable diseases. Actually, China established an early warning mechanism of the major communicable diseases after the SARS outbreak in 2003, while this mechanism failed to function in the COVID-19 pandemic and led to the wide-spread of the COVID-19 in the early days. Given this, the Chinese government initiated the amendment of the law on the prevention and control of communicable diseases in the early October 2020, in order to improve the reporting system for the communicable diseases and reconstruct the system for announcing information on 5 Jie

Mian (2020). Li Chairs Leading Group Meeting on Coronavirus Prevention, Control (2020).

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epidemic situation of the communicable diseases.7 Before that, the Beijing and Shenzhen government issued the mergency regulations on the public health emergencies in order to encourage the citizens to report the potential danger in the public health emergencies.8 These significant changes are perceived as strong protections for the ‘whistleblower’ like Li Wenliang, an ophthalmologist at Wuhan Central Hospital who censured for warning about the initial coronavirus outbreak. Second, the weak public health system in China, the third-tier cities in particular, has contributed to the spread of the virus. In Wuhan, community clinics are not equipped to treat COVID-19 patients, and stories of patients waiting for days for a hospital bed have been commonplace in the past two months.9 For a long time, the Chinese government has been blamed for the insufficient investments in medical services and the failure of the health care reform, which resulted in the high difficulty and high cost of getting medical treatment (‘Kan Bing Nan’ and ‘Kan Bing Gui’) and the rising tensions between doctors and patients in China. In this context, the Chinese government has to mobilize national medical resources including the military medical resource to cope with the fast-growing infected cases in Hubei since the outbreak. Third, the comparatively low level of urban governance in Chinese cities, including the metropolitan cities like Wuhan, once called ‘Chicago of East’, is another big problem during the pandemic. In the early days of the outbreak, both Wuhan and other small and medium-sized cities in Hubei were faced with a desperate shortage of medical resource, relief supplies and daily necessities. Meanwhile, all public transport systems were shut down and the rumors and fake news diffused in the whole city, causing great panic in the society and people’s serious resentment towards the government officials. In that case, Chinese central government replaced both the Party Secretaries of Hubei province and Wuhan on 13 February for under-reporting and incompetence in the early stage of the pandemic. The new municipal and provincial leaders immediately introduced a new governance system, deploying many officials to the neighbourhood level to monitor and enforce the lockdown.10 Under this strong local leadership, the pandemic in Wuhan and Hubei was under speedy control. Finally, the growing concerns over the abuse of public power was raised in Chinese society after the lockdown of cities, communities and villages during the pandemic. Wuhan writer Fang Fang and her ‘Quarantine Diary’ revealed some doubts about government authority of concealing the truth and restricting personal freedom. Even the non-government officials and government staffs such as the security guard in the residential communities got the right to collect individual information and use forces to enforce the law. In spite of the slow development of the COVID-19 pandemic in Southeast Asia in the early days of the outbreak, some ASEAN states such as the Philippines, Indonesia and Myanmar have been experienced the most serious COVID-19 crisis. According to the statistics of WHO, the cumulative COVID-19 confirmed cases in Southeast 7 Jiang

(2020). (2020). 9 China Daily (2020). 10 Chen and Wu (2020). 8 Gao

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Asia until September 30 is 678,287, in which the Philippines ranked No.1 with 309,303 and Indonesia ranked No.2 with 282,724.11 The wide-spread epidemic in Southeast Asia and its complex impacts on China-Southeast Asia relations have attracted rising attentions from China.12 In the early stage of the outbreak of the COVID-19, the Chinese scholars worried that the epidemic in some Southeast Asian countries might be out of control and thus increasing the risk of imported cases due to their weaker public health care systems, poor crisis management capability, as well as the high demand for economic growth. Since the implementation of the strict antiCovid measures in Southeast Asia such as the border restrictions and the travel ban on Chinese citizens, the economic cooperation and social contacts between China and the Southeast Asian states have been adversely affected. As Chinese scholars analyzed, the smooth flow of people and goods between China and Southeast Asian states was disrupted, the supply chain and industrial chain in the region was adversely affected, the market demands and foreign investments in Southeast Asian states were decreased, the implementation of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was delayed and the potential security risk of the BRI projects was increased, and the people to people exchanges were suspended.13 However, Chinese scholars have begun to realize the positive effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the China-Southeast Asia relations since the major achievements of China’s anti-Covid measures and the resumption of work in China at the end of March, as well as the joint actions taken by China and Southeast Asian countries to maintain the trade and investment cooperation and the stability of the supply chain in the early June. They, therefore, concluded that the trade, investment and public health cooperation between China and the Southeast Asian states has been facilitated by the COVID-19 pandemic.14 They also believed that the mutual trust between China and the Southeast Asian nations has been deepened during their joint efforts of fighting against the virus, which is beneficial to the construction of the community of a shared future between China and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).15 In general, China has recognized the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the China-Southeast Asia relations in the early days of the outbreak, but it has become optimistic about the relationship since the joint anti-Covid efforts and the special measures of promoting the economic cooperation between China and Southeast Asian states. Due to the geographical proximity, close economic cooperation and people to people exchanges between China and the Southeast Asian states, the rising risk of imported cases from China has become a main concern for many Southeast Asian states since the reported cases of infection from or having made a recent stop-over in Wuhan in Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam and Malaysia by the end of January. Given this, all the Southeast Asian states except Cambodia have imposed strict border and 11 WHO

Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard (2020). Li (2020), Wang (2020), Lu and Wang (2020), Zhang (2020), Zhong (2020). 13 Zhang and Tang (2020), Luo and Ma (2020). 14 Zhang (2020), Zhong (2020). 15 Luo and Ma 2020. 12 See:

1 Introduction

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travel restrictions on Chinese citizens since the early February, which undermined the bilateral economic cooperation and tourism industry severely. The Southeast Asian countries, Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia which relies heavily on Chinese tourists in particular, therefore have been faced with the dilemma between epidemic prevention and economic growth. Some neighboring countries of China, mainly including Myanmar, Vietnam and Laos, have taken provisional measures to normalize the border trade with China and establish fast track for essential personnel exchanges with the aim to continue the infrastructure projects financed by Chinese companies. In spite of various restrictions, the Southeast Asian states have avoided displeasing or bothering China, notably when it is facing a critical period.16 Conversely, leaders of Southeast Asian nations, including Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen and Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, gave strong diplomatic support and necessary medical assistance to China in the early days of the outbreak of COVID-19 in Wuhan. Even after the US criticized Beijing for concealing the severity of Coronavirus danger, they continued to praise the joint efforts of fighting against the virus by ASEAN and China. Moreover, the Southeast Asian states have received a large number of Chinese medical supplies and agreed to strengthen cooperation with China on public health and economic cooperation. Nonetheless, China’s missteps at the beginning of the pandemic, its lack of transparency, and its acute sensitivity to criticism would not improve trust levels in Southeast Asia.17 In fact, the anti-Chinese sentiments in Southeast Asian states have prevailed in the early days of the outbreak due to the misinformation and misunderstanding about the virus which is believed to originate from China in the region. At the meantime, the rising tensions between China and the claimant states such as Vietnam and Malaysia in the South China Sea (SCS) as well as China’s construction of dams in the Mekong River have disrupted the trust between China and ASEAN. All in all, Southeast Asian states views on their relations with China in the context of the outbreak of the COVID-19 are complicated and mixed, which would impact the China-Southeast Asia relations in the long run. Given this, this book aims to examine the multiple effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on China-Southeast Asia relations from both Chinese and Southeast Asian perspectives. It tries to reveal how has China-Southeast Asia relations been reshaping in light of the COVID-19 and discuss what kind of measures could be taken to push forward China-Southeast Asia relations and thus ensuring the peace and prosperity in the region. The main content of the book is divided into ten parts. In the first parts, Nian Peng briefly introduced the Chinese and Southeast Asian perspectives on the COVID-19 pandemic and its impacts on China-Southeast Asia relations, and the main objective of this book. He also examined the dual influence of the pandemic on the construction of China-ASEAN community of a shared future, and gave some useful policy recommendations on improving China-ASEAN relations in Chap. 2.

16 du

Rocher (2020). (2020).

17 Schwarz

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Aaron Jed Rabena examined the Philippines’ response to the pandemic and the problems in government’s response, analyzed the net impact of the pandemic on the Philippines, and the economic and political influence of the pandemic on PhilippinesChina relations in Chap. 3. Chandarith Neak and Sothearak Sok investigated the COVID-19 situation as well as its impact on Cambodia, and government’s antiCovid measures, depicted Cambodia-China cooperation in fighting against the virus and Cambodian people’s perception on it, analyzed Cambodia’s response to the rising US-China strategic competition during the pandemic, and predicted the future directions of Cambodia-China Relations in Post-COVID era in Chap. 4. Chee Leong Lee and Md Nasrudin Md Akhir examined Malaysia’s responses to the COVID-19 during the Movement Control Order (MCO) period, discussed the immediate impacts of COVID-19 on Malaysia-China relations, and predicted the prospect of the bilateral ties in the post-MCO period in Chap. 5. Myint San focused on Myanmar’s response and emergency measures on dealing with the COVID-19, examined the economic impacts of the COVID-19 on Myanmar and Myanmar-China Relations in Chap. 6. ´ Trân ` carefully examined Vietnam’s antiTuan Khanh Nguyen and Nam Tiên Covid measures, investigated Vietnam-China cooperation on fighting against the COVID-19, and reviewed Vietnam-China relations during the pandemic, especially Vietnam’s response to the fierce US-China power rivalry in Chap. 7. Nisit Panthamit looked back the trade, investment and tourism cooperation between Thailand and China, introduced Thailand’s response to the COVID-19, discussed about the ChinaThailand Cooperation during the coronavirus pandemic, and analyzed how Thailand has managed their relations with the US and China under a sharply increasing USChina rivalry in Chap. 8. Putri Rakhmadhani Nur Rimbawati introduced the COVID-19 situation in Indonesia and government regulations, examined the special role of social media during the pandemic in Indonesia, and analyzed Indonesia-China bilateral relationship amidst the pandemic in Chap. 9. Xianbai Ji documented the on-going development of the COVID-19 pandemic in Singapore and government anti-Covid measures, analyzed the economic toll of the COVID-19 on Singapore and Singapore’s fiscal injection to stabilize the economy, provided a general background of the political and economic relations between Singapore and China, and elaborated on Sino-Singaporean cooperation and mutual assistance in combating the COVID-19 in Chap. 10.

References 654 Government officials and staffs were held accountable in Wuhan during the COVID-19 Pandemic, including 10 bureau-level cadres. Jie Mian. (2020, March 2). https://www.jiemian. com/article/4051360_foxit.html. Chen, X., & Wu, Y. T. (2020, July 14). Weathering COVID-19: Lessons from Wuhan and Milan for urban governance and sustainabiliy. The European Financial Review. https://www. europeanfinancialreview.com/weathering-covid-19-lessons-from-wuhan-and-milan-for-u rbangovernance-and-sustainability/.

1 Introduction

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China releases guideline on advancing work resumption amid epidemic control. The State Council of PRC (2020, April 10). http://english.www.gov.cn/policies/latestreleases/202004/10/content_W S5e8fd97cc6d0c201c2cc09b0.html. China says COVID-19 peak is over. Xinhua Net. (2020, March 12). http://www.xinhuanet.com/eng lish/2020-03/12/c_138870250.htm. Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Weekly Epidemiological Update. WHO. (2020, March 16). https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200316-sitrep-56covid-19.pdf?sfvrsn=9fda7db2_6. du Rocher, S. B. (2020, April 8). What COVID-19 reveals about China-Southeast Asia relations. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/what-COVID-19-reveals-about-china-sou theast-asia-relations/. Gao, Y. (2020, July 30). The second half of the COVID-19 pandemic, two cities issued act on whistleblower. Legal Daily. http://www.legalweekly.cn/fzzg/2020-07/30/content_8262896.html. Jiang, Y. (2020, October 3). Asking for advice on the law on the prevention and control of communicable diseases. China News. http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2020/10-03/9305647. shtml. Lessons from COVID-19 Outbreak. China Daily. (2020, February 17). http://www.chinadaily.com. cn/a/202002/17/WS5e4a077ba3101282172780df.html. Li, C. (2020). Xin Guan Fei Yan Yi Qin Chong Ji Xia De Dong Meng [ASEAN Was Affected by the COVID-19]. Shi Jie Zhi Shi [World Affairs], No. 8. Lu, G., & Wang, Z. (2020). Hou Yi Qin Shi Dai Zhong Guo Yu Dong Meng He Zuo De Qian Jing Yu Tiao Zhan [The Prospects and Challenges of China-ASEAN Cooperation in the Post-COVID-19 Era]. Dang Dai Shi Jie [Contemporary World], No 8. Luo, S., & Ma, W. (2020). Gong Gong Wei Sheng He Zuo Yu Zhong Guo-Dong Meng Ming Yun Gong Tong Ti Gou Jian [Public Health Cooperation and The Construction of China-ASEAN Community of Shared Future]. Guo Ji Zhan Wang [Global Review], No. 4, pp. 70–75. Premier Li Chairs Leading Group Meeting on Coronavirus Prevention, Control. The State Council of PRC. (2020, January 26). http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/news/202001/26/content_WS5e 2d940ec6d01965c603f8b.html. Schwarzc, A. (2020). COVID-19 is increasing strategic uncertainty in Southeast Asia. Atlantic council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/COVID-19-is-increasing-strate gic-uncertainty-in-southeast-asia/. Wang, L. (2020). Xin Guan Yi Qin Ling Dong Nan Ya Gong Ying Lian Bei Gan Ya Li [The Supply Chain in Southeast Asia Was Adversely Affected by the COVID-19]. Zhong Guo Dui Wai Mao Yi [China’s Foreign Trade], No. 4. WHO coronavirus disease (COVID-19) dashboard. WHO. (2020, September 30). https://covid19. who.int/table?tableDay=yesterday. Xie, E. (2020, September 19). Coronavirus: China at risk of a winter spike in infections, experts say. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3102217/cor onavirus-china-risk-winter-spke-infections-experts-say. Zhang, J. (2020). Xin Guan Yi Qin Tui Dong Zhong Guo Yu Dong Meng He Zuo Ti Su Zeng Zhi [China-ASEAN Cooperation Was Facilitated by the COVID-19]. Shi Jie Zhi Shi [World Affairs], No. 13. Zhang, J., & Tang, Q. (2020). Tuo Shan Hua Jie Yi Qin Dui Dong Nan Ya “Yi Dai Yi Lu”Xian Mu De Chong Ji [Properly Neutralizing The Adverse Effects of the COVID-19 on BRI Projects in Southeast Asia]. Shi Jie Zhi Shi [World Affairs], No. 13. Zhong, F. (2020). Yi Qin Zhi Xia, Zhong Guo Yu Dong Meng Jing Mao Guan Xi Ni Shi Fa Zhan [China-ASEAN Economic Ties Rebounded in Light of the COVID-19]. Shi Jie Zhi Shi [World Affairs], No. 13.

Chapter 2

China–ASEAN Community of a Shared Future Under COVID-19: Dual Influence and Policy Recommendations Nian Peng

2.1 Introduction In the past two decades, China and ASEAN has built a solid and vigorous partnership with booming pragmatic trade, economic and cultural cooperation, cordial political ties, and increasing military-to-military exchanges, which paved the way for the construction of China–ASEAN community of a shared future. The widespread COVID-19 pandemic, of course, imposed a complicated and enduring influence on the construction of China–ASEAN community of a shared future. So far, the existing studies have not comprehensively and thoroughly investigated into this subject and have not effectively responded to the following three crucial questions. Is the pandemic promoting or hindering the construction of China–ASEAN community of a shared future? How does the pandemic promote or hinder the construction of China–ASEAN community of a shared future? How do we promote the construction of China–ASEAN community of a shared future under the background of the pandemic? Given this, this chapter examines the dual influence of the pandemic on the construction of China–ASEAN community of a shared future by analyzing a vast amount of data, media news and research reports, and puts forward corresponding policy recommendations to build a closer China–ASEAN community of a shared future. The structure of this chapter is as follows: the first part raises research questions and introduce the main content; the second and third part examines the negative and positive impact of the pandemic on the construction of China–ASEAN Community of a shared future respectively; the fourth part summarizes the main viewpoints of this chapter and puts forward some policy recommendations to promote the construction of China–ASEAN Community of a shared future.

N. Peng (B) National Institute for South China Sea Studies, Haikou, China e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 N. Peng (ed.), The Reshaping of China-Southeast Asia Relations in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4416-7_2

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2.2 Negative Impact of the COVID-19 on China–ASEAN Community of a Shared Future China and ASEAN countries are geographically close with high degree of economic interdependence and frequent people to people exchanges. The pandemic has inevitably had a short-term impact on bilateral economic and trade cooperation, heightened the anti-Chinese resentment among some ASEAN countries, and increased the pressure on ASEAN countries to “take side” between China and the US.

2.2.1 Ongoing Economic Turbulence China has become ASEAN’s largest trading partner for 11 consecutive years, while ASEAN became China’s second largest trade partner in 2019. Due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the logistics is blocked, the work resumption is delayed, and the Spring Festival holiday is extended, all of these factors have led to the decreasing foreign trade in China.1 At the same time, ASEAN countries upgraded quarantine measures and even temporarily closed border trade ports in an attempt to block the import of virus from China, and thus moderating the growth momentum of China–ASEAN trade. In the first two months of 2020, the total volume of bilateral trade between China and ASEAN was 594.113 billion Yuan, down 3.6% year on year.2 However, it has been on the rise since March. From March to June, the total volume of bilateral trade between China and ASEAN increased by 6.1%, 5.7%, 4.2% and 5.6% respectively.3 The main reasons are as follows: the spread of the pandemic in China has been effectively controlled, the resumption of work and production of enterprises has been accelerated, and the trade growth has gradually recovered; China’s demand for intermediate products and manufactured goods has rebounded4 ; the border trade ports have resumed customs clearance, and the border trade has returned to normal; the temporary proposal of Public Health Emergencies of International Concern (PHEIC) automatically lapsed on April 31,5 ASEAN countries have lifted trade restrictions on China, and bilateral trade has returned to normal. 1 China’s 2 General

Central Government (2020). Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China (2020).

3 Ibid. 4 AMRO

(2020). to International Health Regulations, if sure is a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), the Director-General of the World Health Organization shall issue a temporary recommendations according to the procedure, including temporary health restriction measures to states parties, baggage, cargo, containers, vehicles, items, and (or) parcel, which can be revoked at any time according to the procedure. If there is no modification, cancellation, or declaration for three months, temporary recommendations will void automatically three months after publishing. See China News (2020). 5 According

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11

China’s investment in ASEAN has also been affected in the short term due to the spreading pandemic and the anti-epidemic measures in Southeast Asian states. According to the prediction of Thailand Krungthai Research Center, if China’s economic growth drops by 1.0%, the total amount of China’s FDI in ASEAN is expected to drop by about 2.8%, which will directly cause economic losses of about US$ 2.4–3.4 billion in ASEAN, accounting for 0.07–0.11% of ASEAN’s GDP.6 However, with the rapid and effective control of the pandemic in China and the alleviation of the pandemic in Southeast Asia, China’s non-financial FDI in ASEAN countries is still growing. According to China’s Belt and Road Portal, China’s FDI to 54 BRI route countries mainly including Singapore, Indonesia, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Kazakhstan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in the first half of 2020 reached 57.1 billion Yuan, an increase of 23.8% over the same period of last year.7 Yet, China’s oversea engineering contracting projects in ASEAN decreased due to the border closure, flight suspension and the tough quarantine policy imposed by ASEAN states. In the first half of 2020, China signed 2,289 new contracts for oversea engineering contracting projects in 59 BRI route countries, with a newly signed contract value of RMB 424.02 billion, down 1.7% year-on-year; and the completed turnover of RMB 250.12 billion, down 4.4% year-on-year.8 China’s BRI projects in Southeast Asia are facing difficulties in personnel shortage, material shortage, demand reduction and tight capital, and some projects are shut down.9 However, due to the proper pandemic prevention and control measures and financial and policy support, especially accelerating the opening of the “fast lane” for personnel exchanges and “green channel” for logistics between China and ASEAN countries, the overseas investment projects undergoing at present are generally running smoothly on the whole and doesn’t delay due to the outbreak of the pandemic.10 China–ASEAN tourism cooperation has also been severely damaged by the pandemic in a short period of time. At present, China has become the largest tourist source country of ASEAN. Chinese tourists account for more than 20% of ASEAN countries’ foreign tourists. The direct and indirect contribution rate of tourism to ASEAN countries’ GDP is as high as 14 and 30%.11 After the outbreak of the pandemic, the number of Chinese tourists in ASEAN countries has plummeted, and 6 China-ASEAN 7 Zhao

Exposition (2020).

(2020).

8 Ibid. 9 Zhang

and Tang (2020). (2020), Chinese enterprises steadily promote construction of overseas “belt and road” key project thumbed up by local people (2020), The ‘belt and road’ cooperation project has been smoothly promoted. ‘China has injected confidence into Us with actions’ (2020), Development financial support will be provided to high-quality joint belt and road projects and enterprises affected by the pandemic (2020). 11 In 2018, more than 29.6 million Chinese tourists entered ASEAN countries, accounting for 22.95% of the total number of foreign tourists (129 million) in ASEAN. Chinese tourists account for more than 30% of foreign tourists in Cambodia and Vietnam, and nearly 30% in Thailand. See China– ASEAN Center (2020), AMRO (2020). 10 Li

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the tourism industry has been greatly impacted. In the first quarter of 2020, the tourism performance of ASEAN dropped by about 36%, the number of international tourists dropped by about 34%, the hotel reservation rate dropped to a low point, and many reservation itineraries were cancelled.12 In particular, the ASEAN countries with high proportion of Chinese tourists, such as Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia, are mostly affected. On February 6, Vietnam’s Tourism Administration issued a news release saying that the tourism industry is expected to cause losses of US$ 5.9–7.7 billion in the first quarter due to the adverse impact of the pandemic. Among them, the number of Chinese tourists is expected to reduce by 90–100%, which are approximately 1.7–1.9 million person-times (equivalent to the loss of about US$ 1.8–2 billion).13 According to Thailand Tourism Bureau, the number of tourists to Thailand fell 44.3% year on year in February this year, among which the number of Chinese tourists dropped sharply by 85.3%. If the condition of the pandemic continues to deteriorate, the number of tourists in Thailand will decrease by about 9.8 million, or 22%.14 As Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen said, the number of foreign tourists entering Cambodia fell by 60% in February this year, with Chinese tourists falling by 90%.15 Deputy speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines, Johnny Pimentel, said the Philippines are expected to lose 1.2 million Chinese tourists in 2020 due to the travel ban.16 Kamaludin, chairman of the Malaysian Hotel Association, pointed out more than 157,000 hotel room reservations in Malaysia had been cancelled by February 17, resulting in a loss of about 66 million ringgit.17 Indonesia is expected to lose about US$2 billion due to a sharp drop of the Chinese tourists.18 Although most of the ASEAN states have relaxed entry restrictions, resumed some international flights, and lifted the travel ban since July, the tourism sector would not be recovered quickly as these measures are mainly aimed at their own citizens, diplomat and international organizations officials, business people, professional and technical personnel and franchisees, rather than foreign tourists. According to Angela, Vice Minister of Tourism and Innovation Economy of Indonesia, it will take at least five years for ASEAN tourism to return to normal level.19 Therefore, it can be predicted that the China–ASEAN tourism cooperation would still experience the negative impact of the pandemic in the short term.

12 Reddaksi

(2020). Office of the Chinese Embassy in Vietnam (2020). 14 The Bangkok Post (2020). 15 Huang (2020). 16 Oversea China (2020). 17 Ye (2020). 18 Indonesia Window (2020). 19 Reddaksi (2020). 13 Business

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2.2.2 Rising Anti-Chinese Sentiment With China’s rapid rise as a global economic, political and military power, ASEAN countries’ anxiety about China’s rise is also rising simultaneously. According to the questionnaire survey released by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEASYusof Ishak Institute) in January 2020, 71.9% of the people in Southeast Asia are worried about the expansion of China’s economic influence, and 85.4% of them concerned that Southeast Asia become China’s political and strategic sphere of influence.20 The pandemic has magnified ASEAN countries’ fear of China and potential discrimination against Chinese people. As Kristi Govella, an assistant professor from University of Hawaii at Manoa, said: “the widespread political, economic expansion and concerns associated with China have exacerbated some of the xenophobic. These emotions are intertwined with recent concerns about the COVID-19 pandemic”.21 After the outbreak of the pandemic, different forms of discrimination against Chinese appeared in ASEAN countries, and the anti-Chinese sentiment was also on the rise. First of all, fake videos about unsanitary habits of Chinese, especially eating wild animals, were widely spreaded on social media in ASEAN countries, and the Chinese were accused of being the “culprits” of the spread of the COVID-19. This has intensified the anger and resentment against China among the people of some ASEAN countries. Among Twitter users in Thailand, the video of “stop eating bats,” “don’t be surprised that the Chinese have created a new virus,” and that Chinese people eat raw meat were widely distributed.22 Malaysian social media also ridiculed the Chinese by accusing them of eating wild animals that caused the spread of the COVID-19.23 Abdul Halim, an Islamic teacher in Singapore, claimed that Chinese people do not wash their hands after excretion, and their living habits are not as hygienic as Muslims, which is why the virus spreads.24 Indonesia’s What’s app has widely spreaded a rumor that Chinese products can carry and spread the COVID-19, pointing the contradiction to the Chinese mobile phone brand “Xiaomi”, and calling on the public to abandon the “Xiaomi” mobile phone.25 Secondly, the vast majority of the people from ASEAN countries ask the government to impose entry restrictions or issue travel bans to stop Chinese citizens from entering the country temporarily. Since the rapid spread of the pandemic in China in late January, Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam, Myanmar, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia immediately introduced entry restrictions on Chinese citizens, with the exception of Cambodia and Thailand.26 Even so, the Thai 20 Tang

(2020). (2020). 22 Reuters (2020). 23 Sukumaran (2020). 24 Kurohi (2020). 25 Sukumaran (2020), Walton (2020). 26 Among ASEAN countries, Vietnam was the first to announce entry restrictions for Chinese citizens (Jan. 31), Followed by Myanmar (Feb. 1) and Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Laos and Brunei (Feb. 2), and Thailand (Mar. 9). So far, only Cambodia remains open to Chinese citizens. 21 Rich

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government announced on March 9 that more stringent entry measures, including filling in health declaration forms and 14 days of isolation, were adopted for inbound tourists from China, South Korea, Italy and Iran because of concerns about the outbreak of a pandemic in popular tourist attractions visited mostly by Chinese tourists.27 So far, except for Cambodia, all the ASEAN countries have imposed entry restrictions or issued travel bans on China. Thirdly, in some ASEAN countries with anti-China traditions, some hotels and restaurants refuse to offer Chinese accommodation and meals, and some activists also appeal to the Chinese for “going back”. After the outbreak of the pandemic, some Filipinos criticized the Duterte Administration for failing to respond to the pandemic quickly and effectively because it tries to maintain a close relationship with China, and transferred their dissatisfaction to the Chinese living in the Philippines and thus causing an anti-China wave in the country.28 Worrying about the spread of the pandemic, hundreds of Indonesians protested against the entry of 170 Chinese tourists to Indonesia outside the Novotel Hotel in the tourist city of Bukittinggi, and set up roadblocks around the hotel to prevent Chinese tourists from leaving the hotel.29 At the same time, some Indonesian netizens encouraged local people to stay away from Chinese people and Chinese living in Indonesia and their working and living places on social media such as twitter, Facebook and Instagram.30 In central Hoi An, a popular tourist destination in Vietnam, a temporary sign was put up outside the Baguette restaurant called bread box: “sorry, we can’t treat Chinese people!”. The Da Nang Riverside Hotel announced that it would not accept any Chinese guests due to the COVID-19.31 Even in Thailand, where anti-Chinese sentiment is weak, racial hatred speech that calls for Chinese to roll back appears on social media uncommonly.32 The anti-Chinese sentiment triggered by the pandemic has aroused a high degree of vigilance in Southeast Asian countries, prompting countries to use judicial and administrative means to crack down on false news of the COVID-19 and racist words towards Chinese. In the Philippines, where resentment against China is rising rapidly, President Duterte publicly called on the citizens to stop publicizing antiChinese sentiment on social media, stressing that the Chinese should not be blamed for the spread of the COVID-19.33 The Ministry of Justice of the Philippines has also entrusted the National Bureau of Investigation to strictly investigate the fake news of the COVID-19.34 Malaysia’s Media Communications Commission began to review fake information about the COVID-19 on social media. Law enforcement authorities arrested 12 citizens who have spreaded fake news about the COVID-19 and incited racial hatred, and they faced up to two years’ imprisonment and a total 27 The

Star (2020). (2020). 29 The Quarter Bag (2020). 30 Walton (2020). 31 Rich (2020). 32 Sehrlich (2020). 33 Romero (2020). 34 Jalli (2020). 28 Aspinwall

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15

fine of $12000.35 The Ministry of Communications and Information Technology of Indonesia, together with anti-defamation social organizations, searched for and deleted false news related to the COVID-19. The law enforcement authorities arrested six citizens who have spreaded fake news about the COVID-19, and they faced a maximum sentence of six years.36 According to the Computer Crime Act, the Thai government arrested four citizens who have spreaded fake news about the COVID19, and they faced up to five years’ imprisonment.37 In the speech, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong called on all countries to work together to curb antiChinese sentiment.38 Meanwhile, Singapore also cracked down online fake news according to Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA), and the offenders will face up to 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine of US$6,000.39 Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Chun Fuk has signed an administrative decree, imposing a maximum penalty of 20 million Vietnamese Dong on the offenders who spread fake news about the COVID-19 on social media.40 The Cambodia Department of Information and Broadcasting alleged that Facebook users should stop creating and spreading fake news, otherwise they will be severely punished for trying to damage the government’s reputation and make profits.41 Under the deterrence and attack of “severe law and punishment”, the resentment against Chinese in Southeast Asian countries has been curbed timely and effectively.

2.2.3 Increasing Pressure on ASEAN States to “Take Sides” Between China and the US The pandemic has intensified the strategic competition between China and the US, and has also increased the pressures on ASEAN countries to “take sides” between the two great powers. On the one hand, the US spared no effort in criticizing China for failing to inform WHO of the pandemic information in time, concealing the truth of the pandemic, and threatening to hold China to account after the pandemic. This forces ASEAN countries to be wary of cooperation with China. In fact, ASEAN countries are ready to accept more pressure from the US, which includes signing the agreement to blame China for spreading the COVID-19, refusing loans from China, and stopping purchasing the 5G equipment from HUAWEI.42

35 Ibid. 36 Indonesia

arrests six over coronavirus internet hoaxes (2020). over fake news jump across Asia to stem coronavirus ‘Info-demic’ (2020). 38 Wei (2020). 39 Bociaga (2020). 40 The Saigon Times (2020). 41 Hao (2020). 42 Schwarz (2020). 37 Arrests

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On the other hand, the economic recovery of the US has yet seemed to arrive due to the spreading COVID-19 in the country, which has restricted the economic cooperation between the US and ASEAN. Chinese economy bounces back into growth, and thus enhancing China’s influence in Southeast Asia which is mainly exportoriented and relies deeply on foreign investment.43 Given this, ASEAN states are trying to avoid upsetting China when dealing with the pandemic, so as to maintain its close economic relations with China. Moreover, countries that provide “friendly understanding, support and assistance” to China during the outbreak may gain special advantages after the pandemic.44 Therefore, despite the pressure from the US, ASEAN countries will not easily “take side”, but try to strike a balance between the two powers. In addition, the US hyped China to strengthen its military presence in the SCS during the pandemic and encouraged some ASEAN countries to resist China. In US– ASEAN Foreign Ministers video conference on COVID-19 held on April 23 this year, U.S. Secretary of State Pempeo publicly accused China of threatening its neighbors in the SCS and called on them to affix China.45 On July 13, Pompeo issued the so-called SCS statement, fully denying China’s sovereignty, rights and relevant claims over the SCS, and encouraged claimant states to oppose China’s claims.46 Although most of the ASEAN nations have temporarily put aside the SCS dispute due to the actual needs of humanitarian assistance and the common threat of the spread of the pandemic,47 the criticism on China’s assertiveness in the SCS has increased in some claimant states. In January this year, Indonesian protested the illegally fishing of Chinese fishing boats in the waters of Natuna. In April, Vietnam and the Philippines simultaneously accused Chinese Coast Guard vessels of crashing and sinking Vietnamese fishing boats.48 In August, Malaysian Foreign Minister Hishamuddin publicly opposed China’s claims of historical rights in the SCS and accused China of lacking international legal basis for its claims.49 In the mean time, some claimant states accelerated the illegal unilateral actions of oil and gas exploration, and strengthened naval cooperation with the US during the pandemic, which continuously stir up troubles in the SCS and thus adversely affecting the construction of China–ASEAN Community of a shared future.

43 Ibid. 44 du

Rocher (2020). (2020). 46 People’s Daily (2020). 47 Pitlo (2020). 48 Rajagopalan (2020). 49 The Straits Times (2020). 45 Zhang

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2.3 Positive Impact of COVID-19 on the Construction of China–ASEAN Community of a Shared Future Despite the negative impacts, China and ASEAN countries have gradually deepened their mutual trust in the joint fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, which is conducive to the construction of China–ASEAN community of a shared future.

2.3.1 ASEAN Supported China for Fighting Against the COVID-19 ASEAN countries have always actively supported China for fighting against the COVID-19, and the whole Southeast Asia has been portrayed as a strong supporter for China.50 This fully demonstrates the sense of community that China and ASEAN share a same destiny and common weal and woe. Shortly after the outbreak of the pandemic (February 5), Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen paid a special visit to China to “support” China’s “battle against COVID-19”, which made him the first foreign leader visit China during the pandemic. Subsequently, the top leaders of ASEAN countries mainly including Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, ASEAN Secretary General and Defense Secretary General, as well as the diplomatic envoys of ASEAN countries in China, government officials and representatives of industry associations also voiced their support in various forms to support China’s fight against COVID-19. Moreover, some ASEAN countries have provided China with urgently needed anti-epidemic materials and daily necessities under the condition of limited supply. They have interpreted the spirit of the community of a shared future to help each other and share weal and woe through practical actions. For example, the Cambodian Ministry of Defense donated 300,000 medical masks and 1,500 sets of protective suits to China; Vietnam provided medical supplies worth about US$ 500,000; Malaysia donated 8 tons of masks, gloves and other medical materials; and the Myanmar government donated 200 tons of rice.51 With the remarkable achievements made by China in fighting against the COVID-19, ASEAN countries praised China’s antiepidemic actions and fully affirmed China’s important contribution to maintaining

50 Lye

(2020).

51 Due to space limitation, the donation details of local governments, enterprises, social organizations

and individuals of ASEAN countries are not included. In fact, the amount of donations from ASEAN countries to China is large. For example, Thailand’s Zhengda Group donated 30 million Yuan, 20 million Yuan worth of food and medical supplies, and 1.2 million Yuan worth of 33 tons of disinfectant, and hundreds of thousands of dollars and millions of masks and other medical materials from all sectors of the society. See Thai Headlines (2020), Myanmar Chinese Network (2020).

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regional and global public health security.52 The pandemic makes the internalization trend of China–ASEAN “privileged relationship” more and more prominent, and also reflects the acceptance and dependence of ASEAN countries on China’s soft power.53

2.3.2 China’s Assistance to ASEAN in the Fight Against the COVID-19 As the saying goes, “You throw a peach to me, and I give you a plum for friendship”. At the most difficult time for China, ASEAN countries fully supported China’s fight against the virus. After the “strong rebound” of the pandemic in Southeast Asia, China also made every effort to provide material and technical assistance to ASEAN countries, so as to consolidate the foundation of the China–ASEAN community of a shared future. With the emergence of the second confirmed case of COVID-19 in early March this year, the pressure of pandemic prevention and control in Cambodia sharply increased. At this critical moment, China decided to provide COVID-19 detection equipment to help Cambodia fight against the virus more effectively.54 China also urgently provided Cambodia with raw textile materials which are in shortage in the garment industry-Cambodia’s pillar industry.55 Similarly, at the time when the Philippines is facing a shortage of medical supplies and equipment, China has provided urgently needed medical materials such as test kits and protective suits, and actively dispatched medical experts to help the Philippines survive the difficult time of fighting against COVID-19.56 China has also delivered 40 tons of medical supplies to Indonesia, the country mostly affected by the pandemic in Southeast Asia. Similar situations have taken place throughout the whole Southeast Asia. In addition, the Southeast Asian governments have participated in activities organized by Chinese embassies, praising China for providing much-needed medical assistance.57 On August 24, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang announced at the third Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Initiatives (LMC) Leaders’ video conference that a special public health fund would be set up under the framework of the LMC special fund to continuously provide anti-epidemic materials and technical support to the Mekong countries within its ability. China also promised that the new vaccine would be provided to Mekong countries preferentially after it is developed and put into use.58 Before that, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi also announced to give prior consideration to the Philippines’ request of obtaining the new vaccine. 52 Zhang

(2020). Rocher (2020). 54 Li (2020). 55 Mao (2020). 56 Wang (2020). 57 Heydarian (2020). 58 Wang et al. (2020). 53 du

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2.3.3 China–ASEAN Public Health Cooperation In addition to bilateral cooperation on fighting against the COVID-19, China and ASEAN has also actively promoted regional public health cooperation, and thus enriching the connotation of China–ASEAN community of a shared future. On February 20, the first China–ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Special Meeting on the COVID-19 was held in Vientiane, Laos. During the meeting, Wang Yi proposed four cooperation initiatives and said that the fight against the COVID-19 would become another success story of ASEAN–China cooperation.59 Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Retno Marsudi, also proposed to establish a hotline between China and ASEAN to exchange the latest information on the pandemic, to establish an ASEAN–China Health Minister’s special joint workgroup to share virus related information and data, and to establish multinational expert teams and jointly develop and produce vaccines.60 Later, Special ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Summit on COVID-19 via video conference was jointly held in April 14 by China, ASEAN, Japan and South Korea as the situation of the COVID-19 pandemic worsened rapidly. All parties reached a consensus on curbing the spread of the pandemic, improving the level of public health governance, and promoting the recovery of economic development in East Asia as soon as possible.61 Under the new situation that China has made important progress in fighting against the COVID-19 and the pandemic in Southeast Asia continues to spread, the urgency of China–ASEAN public health cooperation is becoming more and more important.

2.4 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations The construction of a community of a shared future between China and ASEAN has been under dual impact from the COVID-19 pandemic. On the one hand, the trade and investment cooperation between China and ASEAN countries in the early stage of the outbreak showed a downward trend in varying degrees, and the tourism cooperation was mostly affected. However, with the gradual alleviation of the pandemic, there are signs of recovery in the field of trade and investment, while the recovery of tourism needs more time. At the beginning of the outbreak of the pandemic, Southeast Asian society’s fear and resentment towards China increased, whilst it declined rapidly after the severe crackdown on the spread of false information in Southeast Asia and China’s remarkable progress in the fight against the pandemic as well as its active assistance to ASEAN states. The pandemic has also intensified the strategic competition between China and the US, and has increased the pressure on ASEAN states to “take sides” between the two great powers. For one thing, ASEAN states have not only been pressured 59 Zhang

(2020). Nusantara (2020). 61 Zheng (2019). 60 Harian

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by the US to alienate them from China, but also been encouraged to resist China in the SCS. For another, ASEAN states highly rely on Chinese economic resource and thus avoiding provoking China. Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, China and ASEAN countries have supported each other and cooperated to fight against the COVID-19, thereby mutual trust was enhanced, traditional friendship was strengthened, and the sense of community of a shared future was deepened. In addition, China and ASEAN also take the pandemic as an opportunity to explore and promote regional public health cooperation, so as to promote China–ASEAN regional cooperation and consolidate the public opinion basis of China–ASEAN community of a shared future. Generally speaking, the pandemic has had a certain degree of negative impact on the construction of China–ASEAN Community of a shared future in the fields of economic cooperation, people-to-people exchange, and maritime disputes in the SCS. Most importantly, it should be highly aware of the serious consequences of U.S. escalating military actions taking against China in the SCS. For instance, the risk of the collision between the U.S. warships and Chinese naval vessels in the SCS, either unexpected or expected, is increasing. Additionally, some claimant states may further enhance maritime cooperation with the US and strengthen policy coordination with each other, and thus to unite against China in the SCS. Nonetheless, the negative impact is gradually decreasing as the trade and investment cooperation between China and ASEAN returned to normal and the anti-Chinese sentiment in Southeast Asia reduced. What’s more, the positive effect of the pandemic on the construction of China–ASEAN Community of a shared future is increasingly prominent due to the joint efforts of fighting against the COVID-19. In the new context of the COVID-19 pandemic, China and ASEAN should seize opportunity to deepen cooperation in the fields of trade and investment, people-topeople exchanges and maritime security, and accelerate the construction of a closer China–ASEAN community of a shared future. First, speed up the construction of “fast lane” for personnel exchanges and “green channel” for logistics during the pandemic between China and ASEAN, and consolidate the rebound trend of bilateral trade and investment. At present, China has opened “fast lane” or “green channel” with some ASEAN countries such as Singapore, Cambodia, Vietnam, Myanmar and Indonesia. In the near future, China should continue to improve the efficiency of customs clearance with these countries, and expand the fast pass to other ASEAN countries such as the Philippines, Malaysia and Laos as soon as possible. Second, the tracking service mechanism of BRI should be perfected during the pandemic in order to ensure the safe and orderly progress of the BRI projects. Although the BRI projects in Southeast Asia have not been postponed extensively since the outbreak of the epidemic, the negative factors such as the reduction of the project financing channel, the risk of default of the project, and the financial difficulties facing by ASEAN countries are indeed present. Therefore, China needs to construct the tracking service mechanism with the aim to assess the sustainability and progress of the BRI projects. It should cancel a number of projects with high risks while providing corresponding financial support for the mega-projects with

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low risks according to the assessment. China should also establish communication and coordination mechanism for BRI projects with ASEAN countries during the pandemic, focusing on solving the problems of work resumption, procurement and transportation of the raw material, delay delivery of projects, and considering appropriate debt relief according to the financial pressure and reasonable demands of ASEAN countries. The third is to improve the stability of the industrial chain and supply chain in the region, and thus consolidating the economic foundation of China–ASEAN community of a shared future. After the outbreak of the pandemic, the global industrial chain and supply chain are narrowed down and localized. China and ASEAN should take the opportunity to enhance the industrial cooperation and construct a more resilient and sustainable industrial chain and supply chain under the BRI and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) framework. Both sides should also take the construction of China–ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) and the significant industrial parks as a platform to deepen cooperation in the fields of medical industry, digital economy, artificial intelligence and 5G technology and tourism industry. Fourth, China should continue to carry out the “Covid diplomacy” and consolidate the political ties and the public opinion foundation of China–ASEAN community of a shared future. China can continue to extend assistance to some ASEAN states with greater pressure on epidemic prevention and control by allocating special funds under the China–ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund and LMC, and give priority to providing vaccines to ASEAN countries. The fifth is to build a public health cooperation mechanism between China and ASEAN, and thus adding new impetus to the construction of China–ASEAN community of a shared future. China should push forward the implementation of the “four initiatives” in the special Ministers’ conference on the COVID-19 and the three consensus reached by the leaders’ special conference, and carry out practical cooperation in the fields of information and experience sharing, joint prevention and control of pandemic, assistance of medical materials, equipment and technology, so as to enhance the regional public health cooperation and build a closer China–ASEAN community with a shared future. Sixth, China and ASEAN should speed up the Code of Conduct (COC) negotiation and jointly safeguard the peace and stability in the SCS. So far, the US has upgraded the military operation in the SCS in order to deter China’s expanding presence in the disputed waters, and supported the unilateral oil and gas exploration conducted by some claimant states, resulting in rising tensions in the SCS. At this critical juncture, China and ASEAN should set out new rules that make SCS a sea of peace, friendship and cooperation by concluding the COC negotiation as soon as possible, and promoted the pragmatic maritime cooperation under the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS (DOC) framework.

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References Anti-Chinese sentiment spreads abroad along with coronavirus. Reuters. (2020, January 30). https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-sentiment/anti-china-sentiment-spreads-abr oad-along-with-coronavirus-idUSKBN1ZT1B6. Arrests over fake news jump across Asia to stem coronavirus ‘Info-demic’. The Straits Times. (2020, February 7). https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/fake-news-arrests-jump-acrossasia-to-stem-coronavirus-infodemic. Aspinwall, N. (2020, February 10). Filipinos turn on Duterte as coronavirus fears spread. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/10/wuhan-china-philippines-tsinoy-filipinos-turn-onduterte-as-coronavirus-fears-spread/. Basic situation of China and China-ASEAN tourism market in 2018. China-ASEAN center. (2020, February 24). http://www.asean-china-center.org/news/xwdt/2020-02/4273.html. Bociaga, R. (2020, February 19). Coronavirus: Black clouds over Singapore. The Diplomat. https:// thediplomat.com/2020/02/coronavirus-black-clouds-over-singapore/. Burma enterprises donated masks to China to fight the COVID-19 pandemic. Myanmar Chinese network. (2020, February 12). http://www.mhwmm.com/ch/NewsView.asp?ID=43923. Chinese enterprises steadily promote construction of overseas “Belt and Road” key project thumbed up by local people. Belt and road portal. (2020, February 29). https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/ hwxw/118793.html. Corona outbreak damages Indonesia’s tourism sector US$2 Billion. Indonesia Window. (2020, February 27). https://indonesiawindow.com/en/corona-outbreak-damages-indonesias-tourismsector-us2-billion/. Coronavirus fears trigger anti-China sentiment across the globe. The quarter bag. (2020, February 2). http://thequarterbag.com/coronavirus-fears-trigger-anti-china-sentiment-acrossthe-globe-national/. Development financial support will be provided to high-quality joint belt and road projects and enterprises affected by the pandemic. Belt and road portal. (2020, March 3). https://www.yidaiy ilu.gov.cn/xwzx/gnxw/118992.htm. du Rocher, S. B. (2020, April 8). What COVID-19 reveals about China-Southeast Asia relations. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/what-COVID-19-reveals-about-china-sou theast-asia-relations/. Hao, J. (2020, March 6). The ministry of news calls for concerted efforts to tackle the ‘fake news’ about COVID-19. Cambodia China Times. https://cc-times.com/posts/8566. Health ministry urges locals to stay alert against fake coronavirus news. The Saigon Times. (2020, March 9). https://en.thesaigontimes.vn/tinbaichitiet/75287/. Heydarian, R. J. (2020, April 20). China’s ‘Mask Diplomacy’ wins over US blame game. Asian Times. http://asiantimes.com/2020/04/chinas-mask-diplomacy-wins-over-us-blame-game/. Huang, R. (2020). Prime Minister Hung Sen: After the end of the pandemic, a large number of Chinese tourists will visit Cambodia. Cambodia China Times. (2020, February 26). https://cctimes.com/posts/8431. In response to Pompeo’s statement on the South China sea, the Foreign Ministry said: ‘The U.S. fear there is no chaos in the South China sea’. People’s daily. (2020, July 14). http://world.peo ple.com.cn/n1/2020/0714/c1002-31783372.html. Indonesia arrests six over coronavirus internet Hoaxes. The Straits Times. (2020, March 10). https:// www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-arrests-six-over-coronoavirus-internet-hoaxe. Indonesia invited China and ASEAN countries to cooperate to fight against COVID-19. Harian Nusantara. (2020, February 21). https://www.qiandaoribao.com/2020/02/21/IndonesiaInvitedCh inaandASEANCountriestoCooperatetoFightagainstCOVID-19/. Jalli, N. (2020, February 10). Combating medical misinformation amid coronavirus outbreak in Southeast Asia. Malaysiakini. https://m.malaysiakini.com/news/510247. KL Rejects Beijing’s Claims in South China Sea. The Straits Times. (2020, August 14). http://www. straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/kl-rejects-beijings-claims-in-s-china-sea.

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Kurohi, R. (2020, February 7). Coronavirus: MHA investigating religious teacher for ‘Xenophobic, Racist’ posts. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/coronavirus-mha-invest igating-religious-teacher-for-xenophobic-racist-posts. Li, X. (2020, February 21). The ministry of commerce: The ‘Belt and Road’ cooperation projects are generally running smoothly on the whole and doesn’t delayed due to the outbreak of the pandemic. China Daily. http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2020/02-21/9099667.shtml. Li, N. (2020, March 9). Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen: China will help Cambodia to detect COVID-19. Cambodia China Times. https://cc-times.com/posts/8594. Lye, L. F. (2020, April 14). COVID-19: China’s shifting narrative and the role of Southeast Asia. Think China. https://www.thinkchina.sg/COVID-19-chinas-shifting-narrative-and-role-sou theast-asia. Mao, P. (2020, March 10). Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen: Thanks to China for easing the urgent need of Cambodian factories. Xinhua net. http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2020-03/10/ c_1125692746.htm. Ministry of commerce: The impact of the pandemic on foreign trade is phased and temporary. China’s Central Government. (2020, February 21). http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-02/21/con tent_5481783.htm. Pitlo, L. B. (2020, March 4). China, ASEAN band together in the fight against coronavirus. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/china-asean-band-together-in-the-fight-againstcoronavirus/. Rajagopalan, R. P. (2020, April 10). The danger of China’s maritime aggression amid COVID19. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/the-danger-of-chinas-maritime-aggressionamid-COVID-19/. Reddaksi. (2020, May 1). Predicted to recover 5 years, ASEAN arranges draft acceleration in tourism recovery. Nusa Daily. https://nusadaily.com/en/news/predicted-to-recover-5-yearsasean-arranges-draft-acceleration-in-tourism-recovery.html. Rich, M. (2020, January 30). As coronavirus spreads, so does anti-Chinese sentiment. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/30/world/asia/coronavirus-chinese-racism.html?_ga= 2.7156658.1238360651.1583983175-1314812505.1569749984. Romero, A. (2020, February 4). Duterte: nCoV to die a natural death. The Philippine Star. https:// www.philstar.com/headlines/2020/02/04/1990292/duterte-ncov-die-natural-death. Schwarz, A. (2020, May 8). COVID-19 is increasing strategic uncertainty in Southeast Asia. Atlantic council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/COVID-19-is-inc reasing-strategic-uncertainty-in-southeast-asia/. Sehrlich, R. (2020, February 5). Anti-China racism rears its ugly head in Thailand. Asian Times. https://www.asiatimes.com/2020/02/article/anti-china-racism-rears-its-ugly-head-in-thailand/. Sukumaran, T. (2020, February 1). If the new coronavirus doesn’t get you in Malaysia, fake, racist news about it might. South China morning post. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/health-enviro nment/article/3048484/if-china-coronavirus-doesnt-get-you-malaysia-fake. Table of the total value of import and export commodities by country (region) from January to February 2020 (RMB). General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China. (2020, March 23). http://www.customs.gov.cn/customs/302249/302274/302277/302276/ 2911148/index.html. Tang, S. M., et al. (2020). The state of Southeast Asia 2020 (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2020). Thailand does the once unthinkable by hindering Chinese tourism. The Star. (2020, March 7). https://www.thestar.com.my/news/regional/2020/03/07/thailand-does-the-once-unthinkableby-hindering-chinese-tourism. Thailand Zhengda group donated another 50 Million worth of property to aid China’s epidemic prevention and control! Thai Headlines. (2020, January 28). https://www.thaiheadlines.com/. The ‘Belt and Road’ cooperation project has been smoothly promoted. ‘China has injected confidence into Us with actions’. Belt and road portal. (2020, March 2). https://www.yidaiyilu.gov. cn/xwzx/gnxw/118870.html.

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The economic and trade relations between China, ASEAN and ASEAN 10 + 3 in the perspective of COVID-19 pandemic. China-ASEAN exposition. (2020, February 28). https://www.sohu.com/ a/376502444_402008. The impact of the coronavirus epidemic on the ASEAN + 3 economies. AMRO. (2020, February 12). https://www.amro-asia.org/the-impact-of-the-coronavirus-epidemic-on-the-asean3-econom ies/. The outbreak of the pandemic has cost an estimated $7 Billion on Vietnam’s tourism industry. Business office of the Chinese embassy in Vietnam. (2020, February 7). http://vn.mofcom.gov. cn/article/jmxw/202002/20200202934506.shtml. The Philippines could lose 1.2 Million Chinese tourists in 2020 because of the travel ban. Oversea China. (2020, February 25). http://www.chinaqw.com/hqly/2020/02-25/246852.shtml. Tourist arrivals plummet 44.3% in February due to coronavirus. The Bangkok post. (2020, March 9). https://www.bangkokpost.com/business/1874939/tourist-arrivals-plummet-44-3-in-februarydue-to-coronavirus. Walton, K. (2020, January 31). Wuhan virus boosts Indonesian anti-Chinese conspiracies. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/31/wuhan-coronavirus-boosts-indone sian-anti-chinese-conspiracies/. Wang, Y. (2020). China is ready to do its best to help The Philippines. Xinhua net, March 5, 2020. http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2020-03/15/c_1125716740.htm. Wang, Z., Yu, W., Hu, L., Wei, Y., & Dong, X. (2020, August 25). Share a common destiny, create a future together: Interpretation of the results of the third Lancang Mekong Cooperation leaders’ meeting. Xinhua net. http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2020-08/25/c_1126407794.htm. Wei, A. C. (2020). China doing its best to contain virus and anti-Chinese sentiments is not helpful, says PM Lee. The Straits Times. (2020, February 1). https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/gov ernment-will-do-what-it-takes-to-protect-singaporeans-against-wuhan-virus-lee. What is public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC). China News. (2020, January 31). http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2020/01-31/9074026.shtml. Ye, Y. (2020, March 3). Malaysia’s tourism industry has been hit by the COVID-19 pandemic, with some of the guides turning to other professions. China News. http://www.chinanews.com/ hr/2020/03-03/9112054.shtml. Zhang, R. (2020, April 23). The United States accused China of taking advantage of the pandemic outbreak to increase its military activities in the South China Sea. Voice of America. https://www. voachinese.com/China-virus-coronavirus-south-sea-20200422/5387464.html. Zhang, J., & Lin, H. (2020, February 12). China-ASEAN novel coronavirus pneumonia special minister was held in Vientiane. Xinhua net. http://www.xinhuanet.com/2020-02/20/c_1125603 475.html. Zhang, J., & Tang, Q. (2020). Tuo Shan Hua Jie Yi Qin Dui Dong Nan Ya “Yi Dai Yi Lu” Xian Mu De Chong Ji [Properly Neutralizing The Adverse Effects of the COVID-19 on BRI Projects in Southeast Asia]. Shi Jie Zhi Shi [World Affairs], No. 13. Zhao, Y. (2020, August 4). In the first half of 2020, China’s investment cooperation with the ‘Belt and Road’ countries increased by 23.8% year-on-year. Belt and road portal. https://www.yidaiy ilu.gov.cn/xwzx/gnxw/141034.htm. Zheng, M. (2020, April 15). Li Keqiang attended special ASEAN Plus Three (APT) summit on novel coronavirus pneumonia 2019 (COVID-19). Xinhua net. http://www.xinhuanet.com//mrdx/ 2020-04/15/c_138976838.htm.

Chapter 3

The COVID-19 Pandemic and Philippines–China Relations Aaron Jed Rabena

3.1 Introduction As the Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic continues to ravage countries all over the world, the Philippines is among those that went to unprecedented levels of crisis mode and faced enormous difficulties in getting the virus under control. The start of the year 2020 was inauspicious for the Philippines as COVID-19 follows the Taal Volcano eruption in Batangas province in January which displaced around 300,000 people. In contrast to the last quarter of 2019 where the Philippines was the second-best economic performer in Southeast Asia, the pandemic dimmed the country’s balance of payments, fiscal position, revenue generation prospects, and derailed the country’s goal to become an upper middle income country by the end of 2020. As was the case in many countries, COVID-19 did not spare famous personalities in the Philippines, celebrities and government officials alike. And as COVID-19 lingers, the crisis and disaster management responses, healthcare systems, political leaderships and control measures of national governments are put to the test and are inevitably compared and contrasted. The success stories and variegated national policy strategies on COVID-19 exemplified by developed and developing countries such as China, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Vietnam and Germany, all demonstrate that government agency transcends political structures—whether democratic or authoritarian. In the Philippines, however, there continues to be critical public discussions about the effectiveness of the Duterte administration’s policy interventions on COVID-19. For instance, there are issues that the Philippine approach has been highly militarized similar to that with Indonesia1 and is said to be among 1 Anindya

(2020). (2020).

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A. J. Rabena (B) Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress, Manila, The Philippines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 N. Peng (ed.), The Reshaping of China-Southeast Asia Relations in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4416-7_3

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the strictest pandemic responses in Southeast Asia2 with the United Nations (UN) sounding the alarm on alleged human rights violations. Others believe that Manila’s approach has been very reactive3 which made support measures on containment and prevention (i.e., active surveillance, contact tracing, early detection, isolation and case management) very challenging. COVID-19 has had far-reaching consequences, apart from public health and retarded economic operations, as trust issues about China’s political system have again been accentuated over allegations of cover-up. This, in turn, has amplified the other political differences between China and the West (i.e., Hong Kong, South China Sea (SCS), Taiwan, Xinjiang). There are also those who say that “mask diplomacy” or the provision of medical supplies to countries affected by COVID-19 has allowed China to “claim global leadership”.4 But while China and the Philippines may have made substantial cooperation on COVID-19 under the framework of the “Health Silk Road,” the pandemic has had knock-on effects on the bilateral ties owing to geopolitical developments in the SCS,5 and various domestic political factors that have harmed China’s image in the Philippines.

3.2 The Philippine Way on COVID-19 The Philippine government’s lines of action on COVID-19 may be classified into executive and legislative actions, which is supplemented by private sector efforts and foreign aid and assistance. Executive actions include Executive Orders (EOs) or policy directives given by the President, and measures undertaken by the relevant government departments and lead agencies. Legislative actions, on the other hand, refers to the enactment of bills granting emergency powers to the President. When COVID-19 was first in China in the end of December 2019, precautionary measures taken by the Philippine government were mainly border monitoring and surveillance, selective quarantine, legislative hearings, and executive consultations. As COVID-19 cases rapidly rose in Wuhan and spread to countries such as Thailand and Japan in mid-January 2020, the Philippines decided to ban all flights to and from Wuhan (January 23, 2020). This subsequently expanded to the denial of Visa Upon Arrival (VUA) applications of tour groups from Wuhan (January 24, 2020) and suspension of VUA for Chinese tourists from Hubei province (January 28, 2020). On January 28, the Department of Health (DOH) convened the Inter-Agency Task Force on Emerging Infectious Diseases (IATF-EID) which led to the issuance of Resolution No. 1, underscoring the need to ensure the safety of and assistance to Filipinos in China. The IATF-EID was created during the time of then President Benigno Aquino III by way of EO No. 168 to serve as a government task force and policymaking body chaired by the Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH). Other executive departments serve as members of the IATF-EID. The COVID-19 3 De

Silva (2020). and Hinshaw (2020). 5 Mangosing (2020). 4 Wen

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National Task Force (NTF) is the operational arm or enforcement body of the IATFEID. The appointed overall head of the NTF, which has various sub-task forces, is Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana, the vice-chair is Secretary of Interior and Local Government Eduardo Ano, and the Chief Implementer in-charge of the National Incident Command (NIC) is Peace Process Secretary Carlito Galvez. All three are retired generals which reflect President Duterte’s political preference for military men as “men of action”. On January 29, 2020, the Philippine Congress summoned DOH Secretary Duque to inquire on the government’s readiness to address COVID-19 and on January 30, 2020, when the WHO declared COVID-19 a “public health emergency of international concern” (PHEIC), the Philippines registered its first case of COVID-19. A day after the Philippines confirmed its first case (a Chinese national who arrived from Wuhan via Hong Kong), the government decided to impose a travel ban—largely due to public pressure—on Hubei province and other infected areas. On February 2, 2020, the travel ban eventually included greater China (including Taiwan) and the Philippines reported the first COVID-19 death of a Chinese national outside of China. Thereafter, the Philippines started the repatriation of Filipinos overseas starting with Wuhan and were given corresponding cash assistance by the government. During this time, the DOH and the WHO in the Philippines began to advise the Philippine public to observe proper hygiene and frequent handwashing to avoid COVID-19 infection. On February 4, 2020, the Philippine Senate conducted a hearing and pointed out the gaps in the DOH’s contract tracing efforts and Secretary Duque’s lack of leadership. Interestingly, it was not until March 6, 2020, that the first case of local transmission (Patient No. 5) was confirmed, which forced the DOH to raise the alert level to “Code Red Sub-level 1” (March 7, 2020). With more than 20 confirmed cases, President Duterte declared a “State of Public Health Emergency” (Proclamation No. 922) across the Philippines (March 9, 2020). A day after, the Metro Manila Council was convened to discuss contingency measures to prevent the rise of COVID19 cases. With COVID-19 already a “pandemic” according to the WHO” (March 11, 2020), Philippine alert level was raised to “Code Red Sublevel 2” (March 12, 2020) and a “Community Quarantine” (CQ) or “partial lockdown” for Metro Manila or the National Capital Region (NCR) and Cainta, Rizal for one months (March 15 to April 14) was announced. This enabled Local Government Units (LGUs) to followsuit and declare their own lockdowns. Under Code Red Sub-level 2, the guidelines for Metro Manila and LGUs (barangay/village, municipal, provincial levels) were: strict enforcement of social distancing, class suspension, restriction of mass gatherings, skeletal workforce (in government), and flexible working arrangements for the private sector. Manila was locked down as it was the epicenter of COVID-19 outbreak in the Philippines tallying more than 50 cases on the day of pronouncement. On March 15, 2020, the General Community Quarantine (GCQ) took effect and all forms of travel to and from Metro Manila were prohibited although select forms of mass transportation in the Capital remained in operation. Checkpoints were established and were manned by the Philippine National Police (PNP) and Armed Forces

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of the Philippines (AFP), including the latter’s reserve force. On the same day, President Duterte declared a “State of Calamity” (Proclamation No. 929) in the Philippines which authorizes the national and local governments to tap their Calamity and Quick Response Funds. A day later, with the number of cases at 100 including eight fatalities, President Duterte announced an Enhanced Community Quarantine (ECQ) or “full lockdown” for the entire island of Luzon (March 17 to April 12). The government employed four levels of risk assessment which varies in the extent of social mobility and type of economic activities that could resume depending on the number of cases in a certain area. The most restrictive being ECQ, followed by Modified Enhanced Community Quarantine (MECQ), GCQ, and Modified General Community Quarantine (MGCQ). Under ECQ, only one person per household is authorized to go out (with quarantine passes) and there were stay at home orders for senior citizens. Curfew violators were dealt with by corporal punishments at the barangay level. According to the University of the Philippines Resilience Institute (UPRI), the ECQ was highly effective in curbing the spread of COVID-19 (ABSCBN, 2020c) and that the public health delivery system was spared from collapse.6 On March 16, 2020, the government rolled out a stimulus package worth P27.1 billion which aims to acquire the needed medical resources and provide relief to people and affected sectors through social protection programs, unemployment benefits, skills upgrading, revival of tourism programs, zero-interest loans (for farmers and fisherfolk), and credit access for Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) and government employees. On March 23, 2020, the landmark bill Republic Act No. 11469 also known as “Bayanihan to Heal as One Act” (Bayanihan Act) was swiftly approved by both houses of Congress and signed into law by President Duterte a day later. The Bayanihan Act provides special powers related to: the crackdown on fake news peddling, penalties for hoarding and profiteering, emergency subsidies to low-income households, the unimpeded flow of donations and health products, guaranteed flow of credit, availability of essential goods, utilization and realignment of government savings for emergency measures, moratoriums on tax and debt payments for firms and households, the takeover of private medical facilities, monetary incentives for frontline health workers, grace period for residential rents, and the expansion of cash grants for dislocated informal workers. By March 24, 2020, the government has designated COVID-19 referral centers and pledged that the state health insurance agency, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH), will shoulder the costs of medication of Filipinos hospitalized for COVID-19. On March 25, 2020, President Duterte approved the 100-day National Action Plan (NAP) or the government’s overall strategy on COVID-19 presented by the IATF-EID. Around this time, the DOH engaged in efforts to recruit more volunteer health workers. In April 2020, the government launched the Public-Private Task Force T3 (Test, Trace, Treat) to intensify anti-Covid-19 measures. This was complemented in July 2020 by the government’s designation of four government officials as “czars” to enhance the country’s T3 capabilities. Notably, the national government 6 Vallejo

Jr. and Ong (2020).

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borrowed a page from Wuhan’s playbook by converting public establishments such as stadiums and convention centers into large-scale medical quarantine, treatment and testing (mega-swabbing) facilities, and some of these were managed by the AFP’s Health Service Command. Also in April 2020, the Duterte administration announced another stimulus, the Philippine Program for Recovery with Equity and Solidarity (PH-PROGRESO) (P1.7 trillion), which was proposed by the Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) and consists of a Four Pillar Strategy, specifically: the provision of emergency support for vulnerable groups (Pillar I), the expansion of medical resources (Pillar II), the enhancement of fiscal and monetary actions (Pillar III), and an economic recovery plan for growth and job creation (Pillar IV). Part of this initiative is the landmark Corporate Recovery and Tax Incentives for Enterprises or (CREATE) bill intended to jumpstart economic activities by lowering corporate income taxes (CITs). PH-PROGRESO was augmented by government efforts of bonds issuances and loans from international financial institutions (e.g., Japan International Cooperation Agency, Asian Development Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, World Bank and Agence Française de Dévelopment).7 Apart from these, the government extended non-medical assistance such as the “Hatid Tulong” (Send Help) Program to help send off locally stranded individuals (LSIs) that got stuck in Metro Manila because of the lockdown. Another is the “Balik Probinsya” (Return to Province) Program which is intended to decongest Metro Manila and decentralize economic growth to rural communities by incentivizing migrant workers to return to their provinces. By May 2020, Metro Manila (including other areas) had transitioned to MECQ and by June 2020 to GCQ. The Office of the Vice President (OVP) under Leni Robredo was remarkably active in the fight against COVID-19. It organized free shuttle services for medical front liners, sourced locally produced Personal Protective Equipment (PPEs), provided free food, donated relief aid and gadgets to local communities, and assisted LSIs. LGUs received both directives and assistance from National Government Agencies (NGAs). The former include the formation of Regional Task Forces (RTFs), and the utilization of Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils and Quick Response Funds; the latter includes the receipt of Bayanihan grants from the national government. LGUs also directly received foreign donations. LGUs have the leeway to be creative in their operational responses. In fact, certain Mayors in Metro Manila stood out and have been seen as future presidentiables (e.g., Mayor Vico Sotto of Pasig and Mayor Isko Moreno of Manila) because of their outstanding COVID-19 management efforts. One example of efforts unique to LGUs is the passage of ordinances (e.g., penalties for not wearing face masks), creation of testing labs, setting up of mobile markets, drive thru testing, cash and relief goods distribution, and the preference to realign jobs affected by the pandemic (conversion of tricycle drivers into delivery riders and public schools into quarantine facilities). Given these, it is interesting to note how the Philippine private and nongovernment sector reinforced the national government’s efforts in combating COVID-19. For example, MSMEs in the food and beverage industry, in appreciation 7 ABS-CBN

News (2020).

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of the heroic efforts of medical front-liners and law enforcement agents manning checkpoints, provided free food and other consumables. Local garment exporters such as the Confederation of Wearable Exporters of the Philippines (CONWEP) have collaborated with the government to locally produce PPEs. The academic community such as the University of the Philippines National Institutes of Health (UP-NIH) had helped develop indigenously made test kits. Philippine Higher Education Institutions (HEIs), particularly the University of the Philippines, Ateneo de Manila University, and De La Salle University have published medical (data analysis and forecasts) and economic policy briefs related to COVID-19.8 Community-based organizations (e.g., Caritas Manila, Samahan ng Nagkakaisang Pantawid Pamilya) provided assistance to frontliners and vulnerable communities while volunteers helped design isolation tents and create websites for charity efforts. Some doctors offered free telemedicine services, and private citizens gave away tablets for poverty-stricken students for their online learning classes. Private companies heeded the plea of the government to provide the salaries of their employees (during ECQ) and advanced bonuses for the same for humanitarian considerations. Numerous corporations have waived rental fees, provided medical supplies, gave moratorium on utilities bills, shouldered the cost of electricity and internet of some quarantine facilities, and arranged free transport services for health workers. Some conglomerates and big companies have also made financial donations to the tune of hundreds of millions (to a billion) pesos, including those by Project Ugnayan, a coalition of 36 firms.9 Moreover, there was a local developer that volunteered to create an online application system to monitor people with symptoms of COVID-19 in behalf of the government. Relatedly, the Philippines was able to receive donations of medical supplies (test kits, polymerase chain reaction machine, ventilators, oxygen concentrators, PPEs, laboratory and medical equipment, face masks, sanitizers) and financial assistance/grants from countries and multilateral organizations such as China, Singapore, US, Japan, France, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Canada, European Union, and Asian Development Bank, among others.

3.3 Problems in Government Response Many say that COVID-19 is the “blackest swan” event that the Philippines had faced since World War II and the cholera epidemic in 1902–04. In view of this, major problems with the Philippine government’s pandemic response are highly evident at the policy and operational levels. At the policy level, there were glaring lapses in three aspects: (1) attitude/orientation; (2) plans and decisions; and (3) communications. This is in spite of the fact DOH Secretary Duque said in February that “it is a question of when, not if” before the virus reaches the Philippines and in saying “yes” 8 See

David et al. (2020); Monsod et al. (2020); Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) (2020); Torneo et al. (2020). 9 CNN Philippines Staff (2020).

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when answering to congressional inquiries whether the Philippines is ready for the pandemic.10 First, the policy attitude of the national leadership was apparent when President Duterte early on repeatedly downplayed the threat of COVID-1911 and when there were lapses in the initial contact tracing efforts of the DOH. This was accompanied by pronouncements by the DOH and WHO in the Philippines until early March, 2020 that masks are only to be worn by people showing COVID-19 symptoms and that proper hygiene and social distancing practices will suffice.12 This is against the backdrop that the Philippines had already registered its first case of COVID-19 in January 2020 and the wearing of face masks were already being practiced in countries such as China, South Korea and Japan. This, as a consequence, made the public more vulnerable and less vigilant than they should be, not to mention that Metro Manila is among the densest urban centers in the world which hosts a large number of informal settlers with poor sanitation. Another factor that reflected the government’s general lack of risk awareness is the failure to strictly observe quarantine protocols evidenced by the number of high-level national (Senators and Congressmen) and local government officials, including members of the IATF-EID itself (e.g., Interior and Local Government Secretary, AFP Chief of Staff) that tested positive for COVID-19. This drew overwhelming public backlash because they had to be prioritized (including their families)—over ordinary citizens—to undergo tests given the limited number of available test kits then. Notable high-profile cases of health protocol violations was a senator who engaged in social activities even if he was already on home quarantine for possible infection of COVID-19 and a high-ranking police officer who hosted a birthday celebration amidst a lockdown. President Duterte refused to denounce them, making the public more indignant of the wanton display of double standards. In addition, at the start of the implementation of the ECQ, some members of state security forces (PNP and AFP) deployed to man checkpoints were only armed with guns and not with face masks. This is an indicator that they were not properly briefed about the dangers of the virus and/or that face masks were scarce. Thus, unsurprisingly, the number of PNP personnel that have been infected have been more than 1,000 with over a dozen deaths as of August 2020. To make matters worse, the country’s health insurance system, PHILHEALTH, which is under the auspices of the DOH, continues to be hounded by accusations of corruption in the wake of the pandemic. The country’s Ombudsman has launched investigations into the DOH for alleged anomalies in the overpriced procurement of medical supplies and equipment, and for the mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic. If in China there were heads that rolled due to the mishandling of the COVID-19 situation, in the Philippines, there were none. Repeated calls and appeals for Secretary Duque to resign by the Senate and the private health sector on account of alleged incompetence and failure of leadership were not heeded by President Duterte. Furthermore, 10 Luna

(2020). and Hutchcroft (2020). 12 It was only until April 1 that the wearing of face masks became mandatory (IATF-EID Resolution No. 18), see Republic of the Philippines Department of Health (2020). 11 Holmes

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criticisms on the Duterte administration’s COVID-19 response have coincided with controversial domestic issues such as the closure of the country’s biggest media company (ABS-CBN) and the passage of a contentious anti-terrorism law. These raised public concerns as to where the national leadership is directing its resources amidst a pandemic thereby triggering a series of protests which some said might have contributed to the transmission of COVID-19. Second, there was policy indecisiveness when the government was not able to immediately ban flights from China and when a “State of Emergency” was only declared a week after Health Secretary Duque had recommended to do so. Another case is the extension of the ECQ two times (April and May 2020), indicating the lack of time frame in getting the virus under control. And even after two months of ECQ, cases continued to rise which put the imposition of an ECQ in question. The difference between the lifting of the lockdown between the Philippines and China is that China did so when it had the virus under control, while that of the Philippines’ is because of the growing pains of a closed economy. Due to the mounting cases after the lifting of the ECQ, medical associations issued a formal letter to President Duterte in August to reimpose ECQ for Metro Manila as the country’s health system was on the brink of collapse. Crucially, the declaration of lockdown or ECQ for Metro Manila on March 15, 2020 showed a clear lack of policy planning because instead of instituting order, it resulted in “pandemonium”.13 This is because on the day of declaration, when the number of cases was already rising, there was a threeday lead time, that is, between the date of announcement (March 12, 2020) and date of effectivity (March 15, 2020). As a consequence, fearing limited access to food supplies and getting stuck in Metro Manila—due in part to lack of policy specifics— the public was forced to go on panic buying (hoarding) and rushed to go back to their hometowns thus congesting bus terminals, airports and seaports. One can argue that the lockdown accelerated, instead of decelerated, the transmission of COVID19 across the country as most cases then were only in Metro Manila. According to the government, the only people exempted from the lockdown are those who work in Metro Manila but live in neighboring areas provided that they have to go through temperature checks at designated checkpoints when returning back for work. Realizing that many members of the workforce in Metro Manila live outside and have to undergo temperature checks, the ECQ was broadened to cover the entire Luzon island on March 17, 2020. Seeing the urgency to lessen economic dependence on Metro Manila, which accounts for 37.5% of Philippine GDP—because of Covid-19—the government decided to carry out the Balik Probinsya Program to help promote development in the countryside. This, however, ended up as a disaster and partly contributed to the proliferation of cases in the provinces because there were no proper coordination with LGUs.14 In fact, after the program was launched, Ormoc and Cebu provinces became new COVID-19 hotspots. Similarly, the government’s Hatid Tulong Program for thousands of LSIs lacked organization as thousands of people were crammed into 13 Aspinwall 14 Jazmin

(2020). (2020).

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a baseball stadium where social distancing measures were disregarded and some were even found to have tested positive for COVID-19.15 The lifting of the ECQ in Metro Manila was disastrous just as it was imposed because while people were allowed to go back to work, the resumption of public transportation was very minimal which forced commuters to crowd terminal stations and wait for long hours causing many to be stranded thus heightening their exposure to COVID-19. Third, faulty policy communication can be observed in the government’s statements that lacked sensitivity to public sentiment and the seeming avoidance of accountability in dealing with COVID-19. Examples of these are President Duterte’s expression that imposing a travel ban on China would be “unfair;” and Secretary Duque’s statements that “there might be serious diplomatic and political repercussions” in implementing a travel ban, “no country anticipated COVID-19”, and that the Philippines “is not late in making orders, but other countries just acted earlier”. Moreover, President Duterte’s press conferences have appeared to be “late night shows” as they were always conducted late into the night and became a platform for him to crack jokes and attack the opposition instead of presenting concrete government action. This approach missed valuable opportunities for the government to educate and make the public realize how grave the situation is. A private lawyer even petitioned the Supreme Court to determine President Duterte’s state of health given his strange behaviors during press conferences. The government had also developed a narrative that Filipinos are “pasaway” (hardheaded) which in a way legitimized state reliance on the use of hard power, instead of medical and science-based solutions. Another issue of great import is government incoherence seen in conflicting statements of key public officials. For instance, in May 2020, Secretary Duque announced that the Philippines had already entered the second wave of COVID-19 infections only to be refuted publicly by the Interior and Local Government Secretary and Presidential Spokesperson. At the operational level, while hospital congestion and overwhelmed public healthcare systems (e.g., critical care capacity, isolation beds, ventilators) are a common sight in many countries, problems in the Philippines, however, are broader in scope which include the lack of healthcare workers,16 medical supplies (surgical masks, PPEs, test kits), test laboratories, and contact tracers.17 These problems were compounded by patients who did not fully disclose their contact/travel history, and issues of red tape with regard to the processing of medical supplies from other countries. All these factors contributed to the Philippines’ very low testing capacity— which lagged behind other ASEAN countries18 —and the country with the highest fatalities of healthcare professionals on COVID-19, causing the WHO to be alarmed. At one point, almost half of the tests results have been delivered after patients have already expired.19 In fact, in May 2020, it is was Philippine Red Cross that 15 Aurelio

and Corrales (2020). (2020). 17 For stats on insufficiency of Philippine healthcare workers, see Yee (2020). 18 Cordero (2020). 19 Sabillo (2020). 16 Magsaysay

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conducted 45 percent of the tests nationwide. Also, the Philippines was reported as the country with the “most number” of cases in Southeast Asia (regional epicenter), “riskiest” or “least safe” country for COVID-19 in the Asia-Pacific with the “highest mortality rate” in August20 and the “lowest recovery rate” in ASEAN.21 The Philippines likewise had the fastest rise in COVID-19 cases in the West Pacific, overtaking China’s figures.22 The situation was so grave that the government banned medical professionals for leaving for abroad. Aside from health concerns, government efforts have been hounded by administrative issues and controversies. First is the lack of coordination between NGAs and LGUs. For example, the national government was not able to coordinate with LGUs the details of quarantine classifications and subsidies that has to be rolled out for the vulnerable.23 In May 2020, only 104 of 1,632 LGUs have completed the first tranche of the Social Amelioration Program (SAP) payout24 due to problems of inaccurate data (varying lists of residents and recipients) and an exercise of patronage politics by some LGUs.25 There was also a case of unrest because relief goods were not properly distributed and has even been dismissed as being instigated by leftist groups.26 The return OFWs posed an additional challenge to public authorities wherein some were subjected to a cumbersome process of testing and quarantine procedures.27 This was aggravated by insufficient coordination between the line agencies (i.e., Department of Labor and Employment, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration) and LGUs in facilitating the return of OFWs.28 Second, there were complications in policy execution or enforcement at the local levels. When the country transitioned to MECQ and GCQ, government monitoring and enforcement also relaxed, especially in malls and markets, and checkpoints have been recalled. This made the public feel confident, prompting a spike in new cases. President Duterte remains popular in the Philippines but various surveys indicate the public was not satisfied with the government’s COVID-19 response. On a May 20, 2020 survey on Telegram (PH Coronavirus Updates Group), an instant messaging app, more than 70% of subscribers were “dissatisfied” with the government’s COVID-19 response. This increased to 78% on June 13, 2020, where respondents became “very unsatisfied” with the government’s COVID-19 response. By June 30, 2020, more than 90% of respondents believe that the country is not winning the war on COVID-19. And because of the government’s mismanagement of COVID-19, the hashtag “OustDuterte” trended on Twitter.

20 Southeast

Asia Covid-19 Tracker (2020). (2020). 22 Yee (2020). 23 Ranada (2020). 24 Ronda (2020). 25 De Silva (2020); Malindog-Uy (2020). 26 Ramos (2020). 27 Gotinga and Tomacruz (2020). 28 Rita (2020). 21 Benjamin

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To be fair with government, at first, the gap between the number of deaths and recoveries was wide; but over time, the rate of recoveries began to outpace the cases of deaths. And by early August 2020, the Philippines had the highest testing capacity in ASEAN. While flawed policy choices and implementation may be blamed on the Duterte administration, issues such as worn out public health and transport system, and the overconcentration of commercial activity in Metro Manila is not his alone but also falls squarely on the shoulders of that of his predecessors. As former Philippine Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales put it, “years of neglect and corruption has led to a broken health care system”.29

3.4 The Net Impact of COVID-19 on the Philippines COVID-19 plunged the Philippines into recession, shrinking by 0.2% in the first quarter and 16.5% the second quarter of 2020—the lowest in history. In the second quarter, FDI net inflows decreased by 68%, unemployment rose to 17.7% or 7.3 million jobless people (April 2020), 5 million Filipinos were pushed below poverty line, and overall trade imports and exports decreased by 31.13% and 24.8%, respectively (June 2020).30 The top 10 Philippine industries that had the most losses from the ECQ were: arts, entertainment and recreation industry (82.3%); travel, hotel and restaurant industry (81.9%); technical repair services (77%); educational services (76.8%); construction (74.6%); motorized vehicles servicing (73.4%); financial and insurance services (71.2%); sports and fitness services (70.4%); real estate (68.6%); and professional, scientific and technical services (67.1%).31 In a data compiled by GZERO Media, the Philippines is found to be the most dependent country on tourism (24.7% of GDP).32 COVID-19 put to a halt as much as 75% of Philippine economic activities and showed how economically dependent the Philippines was on Metro Manila and nearby areas (i.e., CALABARZON region) for economic growth (70% of GDP). COVID-19 also shook a major pillar of the Philippine economy as remittances, which constitute 11% of Philippine GDP, are largely contributed by OFWs (around 10% of Philippine population) who have mostly gone out of work. As of July 2020, the employment of more than 400,000 OFWs have been affected by COVID-19.33 Outstanding debt, mostly foreign borrowings and bond issuances, breached P9 trillion at the end of June 2020. The government’s economic team had to cut the budget for infrastructure for 2020 and 2021 due to the need to prioritize COVID-19 efforts. For the rest of 2020, various multilateral institutions forecast that the Philippine economy will contract by −3.6% (IMF), −1.90% (World Bank), − 29 Nicholls

(2020). (2020); Weirsing and Francis (2020). 31 de Vera 2020. 32 Debinski and Turrisi (2020). 33 Gonzales (2020). 30 Bird

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3.8% (ADB), −6.6% (ASEAN + 3 Macroeconomic Research Office), and −5.50% (DBCC) for 2020.34 Socially, just like congressional and court hearings, classes at both the basic and higher education levels, were forced to migrate online. The country’s most marginalized people particularly those living below poverty line, and informal/contractual workers have been the hardest-hit by COVID-19. In fact, those that suffered from economic dislocation have resorted to begging on the streets or have taken on menial jobs just to get by. The pandemic also “exposed the weaknesses in healthcare and social protection systems—notably inequality in coverage and access”.35 Around 300 hundred small private hospitals are on the brink of closure because of delays in the release of insurance claims of PHILHEALTH, some schools at risk of closing down, and enrolment from Kindergarten to Grade 12 had decreased. Additionally, some of those infected by COVID-19 experienced discrimination from their neighbors. Grocery stores, supermarkets, computer retailers, bike sellers, and online businesses have (as much as 65% increase) were the winners during ECQ. The Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) has classified the Philippines as among the frontier emerging markets best positioned to recover given the resilience of its banking sector and the strength of its foreign exchange reserves.36 A Report by The Economist in May 2020 ranked the Philippines sixth out of 66 emerging economies with highlevels of financial strength taking into account levels of debt-to-GDP ratio, foreign debt, and cost of borrowing.37 Because of these, various international credit ratings agencies have given the Philippines a good score with the S&P affirming a BBB+ long-term credit rating (May 2020), Japan Credit Rating Agency giving the Philippines an ‘A minus’ (June 2020), and Moody’s maintaining its Baa2 rating (July 2020). Philippine economic recovery is expected to be U-shape and grow by 6.1% in 2021.38 The CEO Magazine had also included the Philippines as among the 10 Best Countries to Invest In Post-Covid (ranking 7th).39 The upside of the pandemic is that it forced the government to make adjustments in a positive way. In particular, bike lanes have been arranged due to lack of available public transport. Nurses have been given special risk allowance and salary raise, and there are plans to pass the Nursing Education Act (to improve the education and prospects of those in the nursing profession) and a Bill that would establish permanent quarantine facilities in densely populated areas in the Philippines. Other prospects include the creation of a Medical Reserve Corps, National Disease Prevention Authority, Pharmaceutical Development Center, and Virology Science and Technology Institute. The government also made it a point to prioritize digital socioeconomic connectivity and inclusivity (i.e., Digital Philippines,

34 Weirsing

and Francis (2020). (2020). 36 Vogel (2020). 37 Villanueva (2020). 38 Bird (2020). 39 Pidgeon (2020). 35 Mendez

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Philippine Identification System, and acceleration of the National ID System) and e-governance, among others.

3.5 The Implications of COVID-19 for Philippines–China Relations 3.5.1 Economic Ties The economic impact of COVID-19 on Philippines–China relations should be viewed within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as it serves as China’s main point of reference in fostering cooperation with most countries. In the case of the Philippines, this is most evident in the BRI pillars of policy coordination, trade and investment facilitation, infrastructure development, and people-to-people ties (tourism). In terms of policy coordination and during the COVID-19 outbreak in China, high-level meetings and bureaucratic talks on Chinese Official Development Assistance (ODA) projects had been postponed.40 The extent of the Philippines’ economic partnership with China became clear when COVID-19 wrought havoc in China. For example, the Philippines is the 18th most exposed country to Chinese production disruptions where at least 13 Philippine industries (worth $300.4 million) faced export reduction risks.41 Moreover, the Philippines’ exposure in terms of export goods to China is around 1.6% of GDP which includes the semiconductor industry (accounting for around 40% of Philippine merchandise exports in 2019).42 Similarly, infrastructure projects in the Philippines faced delays as raw materials or key components like steel, where 46.2% of steel imports is sourced from China, incurred supply shortages due to factory shutdowns in China. The slowdown of business operations in China also created market access difficulties for Philippine agricultural (e.g., banana) exports. Despite these, however, China was still the Philippines’ largest trading partner in the first (fourth largest export market, largest import source) and second quarter (second largest export market and largest import source) in 2020. As for people-to-people ties, the Philippine tourism industry sustained huge losses given that China is its second largest tourist market which comprises nearly 20% of total tourist arrivals. Regarding investments, the commercial operations of the telecommunications project with China Telecom was delayed to March 2021 because of reported difficulties in getting the necessary material inputs out of China.43 Although, in August 2020, the China Telecom-partnered project (with Dito Telecommunity) had officially been given a 25-year franchise by the government to operate as the third telecommunications player in the Philippines. Curiously, COVID-19 also caused 40 Rabena 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid.

(2020).

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investment diversions as some multinational companies based in China have opted to move their operations to the Philippines.44 Against this backdrop, it is important to correct notions that there is nothing happening with Chinese investments in the Philippines. Various BRI projects have already commenced and resumed construction such as the two-China funded bridges (Estrella-Pantaleon Bridge and Binondo-Intramuros Bridge) in Metro Manila, Chico River Pump Irrigation Project, and the PhilippineSino Center for Agricultural Technology-Technical Cooperation Program Phase III, among others. Both countries have also agreed to establish a “fast track” lane and a “green channel” to guarantee the steady flow of goods and stability of industrial and supply chains between the Philippines and China. According to Chinese data, Chinese direct investments into the Philippines increased by 82.5% ($18.25 million) in the first five months of 2020 year-on-year, and newly signed projects reached $3.11 billion, a 29.5 increase year-on-year.45 As COVID-19 laid bare the weaknesses of the Philippines’ digital infrastructure, China intends to deepen cooperation with the Philippines in e-commerce, big data, 5G, artificial intelligence and cloud computing.

3.5.2 Bilateral Cooperation During COVID-19 When Wuhan was still reeling from COVID-19 in February 2020, the Philippines is among those that rendered early assistance by donating surgical face masks, protection suits, medical gloves, sanitation products and goggles. A month later, when COVID-19 spilled over to the Philippines, China reciprocated by donating thousands of test kits and other medical supplies which marked China’s “face mask” diplomacy in the Philippines. These contributions of China and its international community work have been construed to be within the ambit of the “Health Silk Road”.46 After giving an initial donation, the Chinese government proceeded to donate multiple batches of medical supplies amounting to millions of masks (surgical and N95) and hundreds of thousands of test kits, face shields, thermometers, medical goggles, gloves, ventilators, and PPEs. The Chinese government even dispatched a group of medical experts (12 doctors and nurses) to the Philippines in March 2020 to provide advise to Philippine health officials. Among their recommendations were on contamination avoidance in hospitals, the expansion of the number of quarantine sites, and the improvement of testing and contact tracing capabilities. They even went so far as to say that the Philippines “can fail” in its war on COVID-19 if limitations on resources are not addressed. Besides from China’s chartered “goodwill flights” to deliver medical supplies to the Philippines, the Philippine government dispatched the Philippine Air Force and Philippine Navy to transport PPEs procured from China. The 44 Crismundo

(2020). (2020). 46 “China and International Community Work: Together to Build Health Silk Road”, National Development and Reform Commission, People’s Republic of China, https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease_ 8232/202004/t20200410_1225524.html. 45 Huang

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Chinese government had additionally donated thousands of kilos of rice to around 500,000 families. The Philippines not only received help from the Chinese Central Government but also from various local governments and private corporations and institutions. The Chinese Embassy, for its part, have donated more than 200,000 “Friendship Bags” which contained food and daily necessities to bus and jeepney drivers in Metro Manila.47 Chinese Consulates across the Philippines, on the other hand, gave an ambulance and medical supplies to Philippine provinces and such as Central Visayas, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Pangasinan, Benguet, Baguio City, Cagayan, Isabela, Quirino, and Santiago City. In distributing medical supplies, the Chinese Embassy had worked with the Mammoth Foundation, the Philippine Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Philippine Zhejiang Chamber of Commerce, and the Davao Fil-Chinese Multi-Sectoral Association Inc. On top of this, Chinese military diplomacy was demonstrated, particularly when the Chinese Ministry of Defense in May 2020 sent medical supplies worth $14 million to the Philippine Department of National Defense (DND). Defense Secretary Lorenzana in the same month also held phone talks with his Chinese counterpart, State Councilor and Defense Minister Wei Fenghe, where epidemic prevention and control, and maintenance of peace and stability in the SCS were discussed. In parallel, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security gave 30,000 “pandemic prevention materials” such as N95 masks and goggles to the PNP. “Sister city diplomacy” was felt when Chinese cities/provinces such as Fujian, Hainan, Nanning, Shandong, Guangzhou, Zhoushan, and Shenyang donated medical supplies to their counterparts cities/provinces of Ilocos Norte, Manila, Cebu, Imus, Davao, and Quezon. Corporate and people-to-people diplomacy was likewise on display when Jack Ma through the Jack Ma Foundation (in partnership with the Manny Pacquiao Foundation) donated 50,000 test kits. Chinese companies such as TikTok, Bank of China (BOC), Vivo and 51 Talk handed out financial assistance, face masks, and smartphones (for frontliners). The renowned Chinese company Huawei was able to release free COVID-19 diagnosis technology for hospitals in Baguio and Negros province. Other private Chinese companies that have been reported by Chinese media that made contributions were Alibaba Foundation, China Energy Engineering Corporation, China Geo-Engineering Corporation, China Information Communication Technology Group, China Railway Design Corporation, China Road and Bridge Corporation, China State Construction Engineering Corporation, China Telecom, Panhua Group, Power Construction Corporation of China, Qingjian Group, State Grid Corporation of China, and Zhejiang Dahua Technology. Political cooperation was also able to push through under the banner of the BRI amidst the pandemic. In fact, the first meeting of China–Philippines Political Parties Belt and Road Consultation Mechanism was held virtually in June 2020. It was presided by the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the CPC and was attended by representatives of the Philippines’ PDP-Laban and Nacionalista political parties. Party-to-Party diplomacy was also noticeable in the CPC sending face masks to the Lakas-Christian Muslim Democrats party which was received by House Majority Leader Martin Romualdez. China’s “vaccine diplomacy” had comparably gained 47 Full

Text: Written Interview with Manila Times by H.E. Amb. Huang Xilian (2020).

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prominence as in June 2020, President Duterte had a phone call with President Xi where the latter assured the former that the Philippines will be a “priority recipient” of COVID-19 vaccine and that Chinese priority infrastructure projects in the Philippines will be completed. The Philippines had been invited to participate in the vaccine clinical trials of the Chinese Academy of Science (Guangzhou Institute of Health), SinoPharm (Wuhan Institute of Biological Products), and Sinovac Biotech. In this regard, the DOH had identified five hospitals for Sinovach Biotech’s vaccine Phase 3 clinical trials. On a related note, the Philippines’ Food and Drug Authority (FDA) had recognized the traditional Chinese medicine “Lianhua Qingwen” as a therapeutic drug for treating COVID-19 patients. In May 2020, the molecular and diagnostic pathology lab by the Chinese company BGI Huo–Yan, which can test 3,000 samples daily, had been formally inaugurated in Pampanga province. And in the 45th Anniversary of Philippines–China diplomatic relations in June 2020, which coincided with the Filipino-Chinese Friendship Day, Sino-Philippine bilateral ties was hailed by the Philippine government to be in a “renaissance.” In commemoration of the diplomatic ties, President Duterte wrote a letter to President Xi stating the need to strengthen non-traditional security cooperation and foster closer bilateral ties. Multilaterally and indirectly, Manila and Beijing had already areas of cooperation (e.g., public health, digital technology, border control coordination) as early as February 2020 when China convened the Special ASEAN-China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) in Vientiane, Laos. This was followed through by a series of online meetings with China: ASEAN-China health experts video conference (March 2020); Special ASEAN Plus Three Summit on COVID-19 (which established the COVID-19 ASEAN Response Fund) (April 2020); ASEAN-China Economic Ministers’ Joint Statement on Combating the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) and Enhancing ACFTA Cooperation (May 2020); and the 26th ASEAN-China Senior Officials’ Consultation (ACSOC) (July 2020).

3.6 Geopolitics of Sino–Philippine Relations Amid COVID-19 While COVID-19 offered opportunities for further cooperation between the Philippines and China, it also presented some challenges. In spite of China’s positive gestures of mask diplomacy, the Philippine public continues to be skeptical of China’s efforts which makes its assistance seem unappreciated. It is important to note that even before COVID-19, China was already unpopular in the Philippines. What COVID-19 did was that it integrated and galvanized the interaction between the previous (i.e., critical international media coverage of China, illegal drugs, misbehaving Chinese nationals, fake and low quality [shanzhai/山寨] goods) and present sources of China’s negative image in the Philippines, namely: (1) China as the known source of COVID-19; (2) security developments in the SCS; and (3) Philippine

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Offshore Gaming Operators (POGOs). All these are correlated and affect President Duterte’s political position and the legitimacy of his China policy. First, COVID-19 exacerbated unfavorable Philippine views of China. When COVID-19 was believed to have stemmed from the consumption of bats and wild animals in Wuhan, the prevailing reaction of Filipinos on social media was “displeasure of Chinese dietary practices and contempt for illegal wildlife trading”.48 Moreover, COVID-19—because of alleged mismanagement of the outbreak and export of defective medical supplies to regions such as Europe—became an added subject for negative international media coverage on China which were previously mostly about “debt trap” and “China threat”. According to an SWS Survey in July, 3 in 5 or 61% of Filipinos believe that China concealed information on the severity of COVID-19 during the early stages of its outbreak in Wuhan.49 There were also notable many Filipinos online who were sympathetic with the death of Dr. Li Wenliang, the COVID19 whistleblower. The SWS survey further revealed that 77% of Filipinos believe that China should be held accountable for its failure to release timely information on COVID-19. Others think that China is culpable for the generation and spread of the virus.50 A Philippine Senator even called on China to pay for the Philippines’ COVID-19 expenses and pointed out irregularities in the purchase, cost and quality of Chinese PPEs.51 Alongside this is Vice President Robredo’s calling out of the Duterte government for buying PPEs from China. Compounding these were seizures by the Bureau of Customs in July 2020 of smuggled fake PPEs and medical supplies/equipment from China, again rekindling the shanzhai image of Chinese goods to many Filipinos. These were followed by incidents of so-called “VIP [Very Important Persons] testing” where incoming Chinese nationals were said to have been prioritized to be tested over returning OFWs.52 Pertinently, it is important to bear in mind that the Philippines is among the countries that drafted a Resolution at the WHO in calling for an independent probe on the WHO’s handling of COVID-19. When Chinese nationals in the Philippines tested positive for COVID-19 in February 2020, “there was public uproar and frustration over the Philippine government’s failure to contain the spread of COVID-19 in the country”.53 The public blamed President Duterte for being indecisive in issuing a travel ban from China, allegedly giving more importance to diplomatic ties with China over the health of Filipinos.54 And as the situation worsened: public discourse in the Philippines teetered between racial prejudices against Chinese people [Anti-Chinese sentiment], and compassion for the public health crisis that China was struggling with. The Filipino-Chinese community, through the Federation of Filipino-Chinese

48 Rabena

(2020). (2020). 50 Contreras (2020). 51 Philippine Daily Inquirer (2020). 52 Gotinga and Tomacruz (2020). 53 Aaron Jed Rabena, “The Implications of COVID-19”. 54 Ibid. 49 Punzalan

42

A. J. Rabena Chamber of Commerce and Industry Incorporated (FFCCCII), cautioned the Philippine public on the dangers of xenophobia against Chinese nationals.55

At the same time, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) have issued “Operatio Imperata” or “obligatory prayers” for those suffering from COVID-19 during the height of the outbreak in Wuhan.56 There were also Filipinos who had expressed admiration for China in building large-scale makeshift hospitals in Wuhan which only took 10 days. Second, from March to July 2020, during the Philippines’ struggle with the pandemic, there were certain developments in the SCS involving China that surprised Manila: the activation of new research stations on Fiery Cross and Subi reefs (March 23, 2020); the Vietnamese boat-sinking incident (April 3, 2020); the establishment of new administrative districts in the Paracels and Spratlys (April 18, 2020); the naming of 80 geographic features and setting-up of mental health service stations (April 20, 2020); report of a Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ship pointing its gun control radar at a Philippine Navy vessel (April 23, 2020); the imposition of a fishing ban (May 1, 2020); and military exercises in the Paracels (July 1–5, 2020). While it is true that China has been doing these activities even before COVID-19, the key difference is that such actions took place in the middle of a pandemic which created a perception of strategic opportunism. A Filipino scholar has argued that as China is engaged with medical diplomacy with the Philippines, it is also maximizing its security interests in the SCS which he calls “China’s two-pronged games against the Philippines”.57 As a result of the developments in the SCS, Manila responded by: publishing a statement of solidarity with Vietnam, filing diplomatic protests (on the creation of research stations and administrative districts, and the pointing of gun control radar) against China, cancelling the suspension of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the US, and issuing strong statements such as calling China’s military exercises “highly provocative” and will be dealt with “harshest response” should the same spillover to Philippine-claimed waters. Thus, on the 4th anniversary of the Arbitral Tribunal Award on the SCS on July 12, 2020 the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) issued a statement calling on China to comply with the ruling, of which China unsurprisingly flatly rejected. Due to the incidents in the SCS, China’s other actions in the Philippines were tainted with malice. For instance, the goodwill music video sponsored by the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines titled “Iisang Dagat” (One Sea) released in April 2020 which highlights Philippines–China cooperation on COVID-19 ended up as a public relations fiasco. A palpable indicator of the public backlash is the number of dislikes (19,000) and likes (200) that it got on Youtube. While the lyrics and melody of the video were good—and the intent of the video benign which is likely a response to the video song dedicated by OFWs in Wuhan in February 2020 in support of Wuhan’s fight against COVID-19—there were nevertheless major problems. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 De

Castro (2020).

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First, the title of the music video was easily associated with the maritime disputes in the SCS. Moreover, the release of the video coincided with incidents in the SCS wherein two days before its release, reports of the gun-pointing incident surfaced and China created new administrative districts.58 Second, the music video contained considerable emphasis on gratitude to China which many Filipinos resented. As one Filipino scholar framed it, “The music in the video was composed by the Chinese ambassador. It is produced by the Chinese Embassy. Thus, it is nothing but a selfcongratulatory form of propaganda”.59 In fact, Filipino artists on the video were tagged as “traitors” on social media. It is in this context that a Philippine government radio program called “Wow China” which is in partnership with China Radio International (CRI) caught the ire of the public. Likewise, when AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Felimon Santos Jr. wrote a letter to the Chinese Ambassador asking for a traditional Chinese medicine, as he was infected with COVID-19, his actions were called “treason” and that of “desperation.” Third, POGOs give China a very bad name in the Philippines because of its association with a range of illegal activities such as kidnapping, human trafficking, cyber fraud, bribery, prostitution, and tax evasion, among others. In this respect, it is important to highlight a common misconception that POGOs are a Chinese-government backed strategy aimed to infiltrate the Philippines. This is false because the Chinese government itself has repeatedly asked the Duterte government to ban POGOs as it is illegal in China; however, the Duterte government refuses to do so because of the economic gains that it could yield for the Philippines. POGOs during COVID-19 became front and center of the Philippine political landscape because during ECQ, there were illegally operating POGOs and workers that were discovered. Aside from this, the government found out about existing illegal clinics/makeshift hospitals and an underground pharmacy, which include Chinese doctors, dedicated exclusively to Chinese nationals who mostly work for POGOs. Even in areas outside Metro Manila such as Pampanga, where 490 Chinese POGO workers and tenants tested positive for COVID-19, there were illegal medical facilities and a warehouse that supplies medicines to an underground Chinese hospital. Most surprisingly, during ECQ, it was exposed that most licensed POGOs have unpaid taxes. This is why when the government expressed that in reopening the economy POGOs should be included, there was a fierce debate and massive outcry from the public. No less than Vice President Robredo questioned why POGOs are getting special treatment over the resumption of Filipino businesses and industries.60 A Filipino senator added that allowing POGOs as a “non-essential industry” to continue operations would lead to the worsening of the POGO situation.61 This implies that, as with the orientation of many other Filipinos, Chinese nationals are carriers of COVID-19 and that POGOs are hubs of COVID-19 carriers. There were even reports that racism prompted some POGO firms to finally leave the Philippines. Exacerbating the social problems presented 58 Palatino

(2020). (2020). 60 CNN Philippines Staff (2020). 61 Domingo (2020). 59 Contreras

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Table 3.1 A Tale of Two Philippine China Policies Diplomatic Rebuke protests of Chinese behavior

Explicit Absence of Confrontational alignment communication attitude in with US at highest levels multilateral security bodies policy

Presence of China’s wolf warrior diplomacy vs. Philippines

Benigno ✓ Aquino

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

X

X

X

X

Duterte

by POGOs are occurrences of misbehaving Chinese nationals62 which contributes to the build-up of a sociocultural barrier that indirectly impacts Philippines–China people-to-people ties, a major component of the BRI. Despite political disruptions arising from COVID-19 and critical Philippine views toward China, the Philippines’ China policy has not yet shifted to that of then President Benigno Aquino (Table 3.1). Because even if the Duterte government has filed diplomatic protests against China and rebuked Chinese behavior in the SCS, it still has not explicitly aligned with US security policy and has avoided to take a confrontational attitude vis-à-vis China in multilateral bodies. In fact, the Duterte government found no reason to ban the Chinese app TikTok—amidst a deteriorating China-US relations—and restricted the Philippine Navy from joining a proposed maritime exercise led by the US in the SCS. Also, there continues to be present official communication at the highest levels (heads of state and senior officials of foreign affairs and defense establishments) of Philippine and Chinese governments, and the Philippines’ thus for not witnessed China’s so-called “wolf warrior” diplomacy such as those that it has exhibited with the US, Australia, UK, or India. Interestingly, in June 2020, China even extended diplomatic support to the Philippines’ human rights situation by telling the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHCR) to respect Philippine sovereignty.63 China being seen in a in a bad light or put on the spot in the Philippines is not all on China. There is also the “Duterte Factor” which causes public opinion towards China to be antipathetic and mistrustful. This is manifest in President Duterte’s periodic expression of special preference for China. A prominent case is his press briefings and public appearances during ECQ when he excessively expressed gratitude to China and President Xi for the assistance that was given the Philippines instead of thanking and assuring medical frontliners.64

62 Rivas

(2020). On the case of a misbehaving Chinese national which trended on social media during lockdown, see Gabriel Pabico Lalu, “Chinese woman in scuffle with Makati traffic enforcers arrested,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 8, 2020, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1303437/enragedchinese-national-arrested-in-makati-may-face-physical-injury-raps. 63 Garcia (2020). 64 Holmes and Hutchcroft (2020).

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3.7 Conclusion Even if the Philippines was the earliest in ASEAN to impose a lockdown, the outcome was unlike that in Wuhan due to structural (i.e., overwhelmed public health system) and agential (e.g., lack of crisis management leadership and policy missteps) factors. And while liberal democracies such as Taiwan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand were able to control their outbreaks, it is noticeable that they are all developed countries unlike the Philippines which has drawbacks unique to a developing country. On a positive note, the Philippines has arguably seen the greatest display of public-private partnership or the Philippine spirit of Bayanihan (teamwork) in recent history. However, it is also because of COVID-19 that the Philippine public developed negative perceptions of China for not only did COVID-19 originate in China, the first cases of infection and fatality of COVID-19 in the Philippines were Chinese nationals. And these coincided with tensions in the SCS and China-related domestic issues which further contributed to China’s unpopularity in the Philippines. To chart a better trajectory for Philippines–China relations, both countries need to institutionalize cooperation in the Health Silk Road. COVID-19 revealed that there are only a few trained/qualified Philippine technical workers that can operate molecular medical facilities such as qPCR machines and medical technologists who have enough training in applied molecular biology and molecular medicine.65 COVID-19 also presents be an opportunity for the Philippines’ National Academy of Science and Technology to engage its counterpart institution/s in China and other countries. As the term of President Duterte draws near, the following questions will most certainly be raised and needs to be addressed: (1) What could be done to reverse the tide of China’s unpopularity in the Philippines and ensure a forward-looking bilateral relations even in a post-Duterte government? (2) What had happened to the investment pledges President Xi made to President Duterte since 2016? (3) Has China refrained from interfering with Philippine maritime activities? and (4) Has China restrained its maritime operations in the SCS? For the Philippines, President Duterte needs to put into context his excessive praise of or special preference for China so as to avoid creating an image of subservience. He also needs to show toughness on tax evading and illegal POGOs, as he has said several times that POGOs are “clean.” China, on the other hand, needs to understand that like them the Philippines has its own domestic audience to consider and thus needs to show strong resolve in asserting national interests. China also has to improve its PR strategy in the Philippines and take into account the implications of its actions in the SCS on Philippine public opinion. Public opinion towards China greatly matters because it impacts both Philippine domestic and foreign policy. This is the reason why there is a default suspicion on Chinese projects (e.g., Fuga Island smart city project) and why President Duterte brought up the SCS Arbitral Award in his meeting with President Xi in 2019. Most significantly, China can accelerate the availability of the COVID-19 vaccine to help improve the overall situation in the Philippines. As for both countries, there is a need to fast-track the negotiations and implementation of investment pledges made by President Xi to 65 Vallejo

Jr. and Ong (2020).

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President Duterte in 2016. Going forward, it is possible that “in the remaining period of President Duterte’s term, health and the economy are the themes that will shape Elections 2022” (Tiquia 2020).

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Yee, J. (2020, June 28). WHO: PH has fastest rise in virus cases in Western Pacific. Philippine Daily Inquirer. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1298503/who-ph-has-fastest-rise-in-virus-cases-inwestern-pacific. Yee, J. (2020, July 28). DOH Working ways to address shortage of healthcare workers. Philippine Daily Inquirer. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1313057/doh-exploringways-to-address-shortageof-health-care-workers.

Chapter 4

Cambodia’s Response to COVID-19 and Its Impacts on Cambodia–China Relations Chandarith Neak and Sothearak Sok

4.1 COVID-19 Situation in Cambodia In late 2019, an unknown type of coronavirus spread throughout Wuhan-capital city of Hubei province, China, which marked the start of a global health catastrophe officially known as COVID-19 pandemic. By the end of August 2020, more than 25 million people around the world contracted the virus, and more than 844,000 people lost their lives.1 During that same period, the number of COVID-19 cases in Southeast Asia was approximately 468,000, with more than 11,000 deaths.2 By the time of writing, the Philippines was reported to have the most cases among countries in the region, whereas Laos had the least. Meanwhile, Cambodia had less than 300 cases and zero death. Although there was belief that the country might have underreported cases, such a thing is impossible in this era of social media. These confirmed cases in Cambodia were discovered in the capital city and 12 other provinces. The country identified the first confirmed case in late January in Preah Sihanouk-a seaside province where many Chinese investment projects had taken place. The patient was a 60-year-old Chinese man who had recently travelled from Wuhan.3 Since then, Cambodia started to register rising number of cases, most of 1 WHO

coronavirus disease (COVID-19) dashboard (2020). (2020). 3 Kimmarita and Khorn (2020). 2 CSIS

The writing of this chapter is assisted by Mrs. Sambath Sreysour Sam Ath and Ms. Setthikun Sun. We are also grateful for the contribution in data collection by Project Team members of the Department of International Studies, Royal University of Phnom Penh, Cambodia. C. Neak (B) · S. Sok Royal University of Phnom Penh, Phnom Penh, Cambodia e-mail: [email protected] S. Sok e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 N. Peng (ed.), The Reshaping of China-Southeast Asia Relations in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4416-7_4

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which are imported. It is worth noting that the spike in daily confirmed cases in Cambodia occurred in March and July. Between March 17 and 22, more than 70 cases were identified. These patients are French tourists who arrived in the country in mid-March and Cambodian citizens who attended a four-day religious gathering in the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.4 On the other hand, the significant jump in July occurred on July 21 and 25. Most of the cases were Cambodian students who returned from study in Russia and Egypt.5 To prevent local transmission of COVID-19, Cambodia imposed various levels of travel restriction. Public transport in the capital such as city buses and water taxis, for instance, was temporarily suspended.6 The government imposed temporary prohibition on inter-provincial travelling and suspended the Khmer New Year holiday to avoid nonessential travelling.7 As the number of cases was increasing, the government moved to implement more extensive measures to cope with the spread. An early-than-usual vacation for all educational institutions was put in place to prevent the spread at schools and universities.8 Businesses with enclosed environment such as gyms, fitness clubs, casinos, cinemas, and karaoke houses were shut down.9 All kinds of public gatherings were banned, and people were advised to stay home and adhere to hygienic practices. Meanwhile, entry into the country was also restricted. Travelers visiting Cambodia were temperature-scanned, quarantined, and tested at border checkpoints and airports. From March to May, foreigners from hard-hit countries such as France, Germany, Iran, Italy, Spain, and the US were denied entry to Cambodia, whereas Cambodian citizens returning from these countries would be admitted to a two-week quarantine.10 Cambodian citizens and government officials were further instructed to avoid traveling to Europe, the US, and Iran. Throughout the country, the government designated and reserved various hotels, guesthouses, and school buildings totaling 3,000 rooms as COVID-19 treating sites, in addition to designated hospitals and healthcare centers.11 The situation of COVID-19 in Cambodia is so far manageable as the number of cases is among the lowest, with neither mortality nor community transmission. All of these resulted from three main underlying factors. First of all, to contain the spread of the virus, Cambodian government has uphold only the best practices of health regulations and measures in testing and tracing. For instance, Cambodia

4 Updates

of COVID-19 in Cambodia (2020). (2020); Niseiy (2020). 6 Sokhean (2020). 7 Bunthan (2020). 8 Announcement about early-than-usual vacation for public and private educational institutions in Phnom Penh and Siem Reap (2020). 9 Nationwide temporary suspension of gyms and fitness centers (2020); Vantha (2020). 10 Travel restrictions issued by the royal government of Cambodia in relation to the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) (2020). 11 Narim (2020). 5 Vantha

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uses only the Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR), which is considered the gold standard in COVID-19 detection, in testing. The resort to alternative and less expensive testing methods is not tolerated due to the high risk of false result. Travelers who enter the country are quarantined and obliged to test for COVID-19 using PCR method. The measure is even stricter for air passengers. If one of the passengers in an airplane is tested positive for COVID-19, all other passengers have to be quarantined for 14 days at designated sites. If nobody in the plane is tested positive, each passenger is still subject to self-quarantine at home monitored by their local authorities.12 This is because the government and Ministry of Health needed to prevent the imported cases from spreading domestically. It is believed that once the community transmission takes place, it will be tremendously hard to contain, given the limited health infrastructure and impossible social distancing at workplace such as garment factories. Thus, the wisest choice is to detect the virus at the points of entry. In addition, Cambodia also possesses effective contact tracing capability. Cambodian Ministry of Health has worked collaboratively with WHO, Pasteur Institute, and US Center for Disease Control and Prevention in conducting swift and comprehensive contact tracing.13 It is required for the people who have tested positive for the virus to provide a list of people or establishments they came into contact with so that potential community transmission in the country can be prevented. So far, health response including detection, quarantine, contact tracing, and treatment is central to the country’s response strategy. Secondly, Cambodian policy makers did not underestimate the extent and potential risk of the outbreak, especially during the early period. It is admirable that the country leaders, especially the Prime Minister, recognized the severity of the outbreak and did not steer into political denial evident in many countries. Instead of arm wrestling with health experts, political leaders in Cambodia follow their advice and suggestion. This allowed for necessary and decisive actions to be implemented early so as to prevent the spread of the virus. Furthermore, the Prime Minister himself is the head the National Committee for Combating COVID19. With the highest level of decision maker at the helm of the committee, necessary measures can be implemented swiftly, and central-regional policy incoherence can be avoided. Last but not least, high level of COVID-19 infection in Cambodia can be avoided because public health has been prioritized over economic agenda. Cambodia bravely moved to restrict entry into the country and impose ban from highly affected countries, although this affected economy, especially tourism sector. Even if some countries were reluctant to impose lockdown and other travel restriction measures in fear that it might affect the economy, Cambodian government believed it needed to sacrifice economic benefits for the safety of the people.

12 Information 13 WHO

(2020).

on Cambodia travel restrictions (2020). works closely with the royal government of Cambodia in the fight against COVID-19

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4.2 Impacts of COVID-19 on Cambodia The COVID-19 outbreak resulted in an unprecedented outlook for Cambodian economy. According to ADB, Cambodia’s annual growth for 2020 would be 2.3%— the lowest since the global financial crisis.14 Within the first half of 2020, the Royal Government of Cambodia’s revenue collected dropped by a slight of 0.7% compared to the same period in 2019.15 Among this, the revenue from import and export decreased by 16%, while interior revenue increased by 12%. This fallout was a result of detriment to vital economic sectors, especially country’s growth drivers: tourism, garment, and construction. The tourism sector, according to ADB’s estimate, would suffer a loss of US$ 850 million in revenue, equivalent to 1.7% of GDP.16 The loss was mainly contributed by the dramatic decline in number of international tourists, specifically Chinese tourists. According to the Ministry of Tourism, tourists visiting Cambodia registered a year-on-year decrease of 52% within the first four months, causing closures of about 3,000 businesses and affecting 45,000 workers employed in the industry.17 According to the State Secretariat of Civil Aviation of Cambodia, by May the number of international flights at the country’s Phnom Penh, Preah Sihanouk, and Siem Reap airports dropped by 96.7%, 98.4%, and 100% respectively.18 Meanwhile, garment and footwear industry was forecast to slow down by 6.5% mainly due to the shortages of raw materials from China and the lack of demand from the US and European markets.19 Moreover, approximately 150,000 workers were made redundant by early July as 400 footwear, garment, and travel goods factories suspended operation.20 On the other hand, the future of the construction sector was uncertain as travel restriction reduced the number of foreigners in the country, who were the main source of high-priced real estate investments.21 According to the forecast by Ministry of Economy and Finance, construction sector will face a negative growth of 5.3% due to the decrease of FDIs, investors’ confidence, and construction demand in tourism sector.22 Besides these sectors, other revenue earners such as rice was also affected as the government ordered the ban of white rice export in order to ensure adequate supply for domestic consumption during this outbreak. As the number of COVID-19 cases kept increasing in March, the government decided to close border and restrict travelling. With the news of border closure, many Cambodians reverted to panic buying and stocking of necessities-most of which are 14 Asian

Development Bank (ADB) (2020). collects $2.95 Billion as fiscal revenue in first half of 2020 (2020). 16 The ASEAN Post (2020). 17 Vantha (2020). 18 Chan (2020). 19 Mccready (2020). 20 400 factories in Cambodia suspend operations, affecting over 150,000 workers due to COVID-19 (2020). 21 Pisei (2020). 22 Bunthoeun (2020). 15 Cambodia

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imported-and products’ price increased dramatically.23 The soaring demands for surgical masks, hand sanitizer, and alcohol, for instance, led sellers to increase the price by 30–100%.24 In contrast, in late April and early May when there was no new confirmed case for several weeks, public behaviors changed. Demands for supplies dropped; people resumed their daily livelihood; some even disregarded the hygienic precautions previously maintained.25

4.3 Measures to Mitigate the Impacts of COVID-19 As mentioned above, the pandemic took its toll not just on human health but on economy as well. Thus, several monetary and fiscal measures were put in place to cope with this backsliding. To sustain liquidity within the economy, the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC)—the country’s central bank-postponed the implementation of Capital Conservation Buffer (measure expected to decrease solvency rate), reduced interest rate on Liquidity Providing Collateralized Operation (NBC’s lending to financial institutions), and lowered interest rate on Negotiable Certificate of Deposits (bank deposits with NBC).26 The interest rate of reserve requirement in domestic currency was also decreased to 7%, allowing the local banks to provide more loans and to enable US$ 1.8 billion in circulation.27 Meanwhile, registered hotels, guesthouses, restaurants, and travel agencies located in the capital and other six provinces were exempt from tax payment from February to July.28 Tax holiday was also provided to factories whose production lines were disrupted by the lack of materials and decline in purchasing orders.29 In addition, the government, through its Agricultural and Rural Development Bank, provided loans with favorable terms to small and medium enterprises to help them survive during this period.30 The government also rolled out emergency salary package for workers in garment and tourism sectors whose jobs were suspended due to the side effects of the pandemic. In particular, the government and employers jointly provided 30% of the minimum wage on a monthly basis.31 Furthermore, the government, through its IDPoor program, provided social assistance in terms of monthly allowance to family living in poverty and vulnerable groups such as the invalids, children under five years of age, the elderly, and

23 COVID-19

lockdown highlights cambodia’s dangerous reliance on imported food (2020). causes rise in consumer price index (2020). 25 Lamy and Sonyka 2020. 26 Chan (2020). The Central Bank announces measures to boost lending. 27 Chan (2020), National Bank of Cambodia to reduce reserve requirement interest rates. 28 Urgent measures of the royal government to support tourism sector, garment sector, and economic growth (2020). 29 Ibid. 30 O’Connell and Thong (2020). 31 Lee (2020). 24 Pandemic

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Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) patients.32 Besides, the government also reduced annual spending of its ministries by 50%33 —except for Foreign Affairs, Commerce, and the cabinet office—so that it could reserve its budget for fighting the pandemic and for post-pandemic recovery. According to the Prime Minister, between US$ 800 million and US$ 2 billion was earmarked to deal with this crisis.34 On legal aspect, the government of Cambodia adopted the Law on the Management of the Nation in State of Emergency (LMNSE) in April 2020. LMNSE is a legal instrument to which the country can refer in times of threats to national security, social order, and the lives of the citizens. It was adopted because Cambodia, until then, had not had any legal provisions with regards to how to manage the country in time of crises like this pandemic. However, the possibility of Cambodia to declare a state of emergency, according to the Prime Minister, was only 0.1% because the government already took effective control over the outbreak, but the country needed this law to prepare for any unexpected things in the future.35

4.4 Cambodia–China Cooperation in Fighting Against COVID-19 4.4.1 Cambodia’s Expression of Solidarity with China Cambodia–China joint effort is an outstanding model of cooperation and an affirmative step toward building an effective method in preventing future health crises. Despite difficult time in combating the pandemic, Cambodia always showed strong support alongside her Chinese counterpart. On February 5, during the early period of the outbreak, Cambodia’s Prime Minister expressed full support by making a special visit to Beijing and made a mutual agreement on strengthening bilateral cooperation.36 Meanwhile, during his routine health check-up in Beijing, King Norodom Sihamoni of Cambodia paid a visit to Chinese Foreign Minister and State Councilor Wang Yi and showed appreciation toward the Chinese government in implementing such effective actions and having the situation under control.37 Amid the coronavirus outbreak in China, Cambodia showed unimpeachable support for China in fighting the virus contagion, which signifies the dubbed ironclad friendship. While many countries were banning flights to and from China and evacuating their nationals,

32 O’Connell

and Thong (2020). PM: Ban of China flights to destroy cambodian economy (2020). 34 Cambodia reserves up to US$2 Billion to solve impacts of COVID-19 (2020). 35 Not the right time to declare a state of emergency yet, Cambodian Prime Minister (2020). 36 China donates medical supplies to Cambodia’s Phnom Penh capital hall for COVID-19 fight. (2020). 37 Wang (2020). 33 Cambodian

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Cambodia, on the other hand, took the opposite approach.38 Prime Minister Hun Sen in a press conference said, “Cancelling flights with China would not be an attack on China. It would be an attack on the Cambodian economy”.39 His decision remained unchanged even after the Ministry of Health announced the country’s first case of COVID-19 identified as a Chinese national. He claimed that the outcomes of banning the flights would bring more economic risks than the spread of the virus.40 According to statistics issued by the Ministry of Tourism (2019), Chinese tourists-numbered 2 million-topped the list of foreign visitors to the kingdom. Therefore, prohibiting planes from China would devastatingly affect the tourism sector, one of the main sources of income to Cambodia. Following this announcement, the Prime Minister made it clear that he had no intention to evacuate Cambodia’s diplomats and students who are staying in China. He expressed his disappointment that many students had returned home to Cambodia, suggesting that the decision would jeopardize the possibility of receiving scholarships from Beijing in the future.41 Cambodia’s decisions not to impose any travel restrictions to Chinese nationals or evacuate Cambodian citizens sent a clear message that they are standing together with Chinese citizens and government.

4.4.2 China’s Assistance to Cambodia Cambodia–China collaboration in combating the pandemic took place in various forms and levels. The effectiveness of China’s responses to counter the outbreak of coronavirus was well known to the world. After successfully keeping the outbreak under control, a team of Chinese medical experts from Guangxi Zhuang was sent to Cambodia within the cooperation framework in healthcare sector. Upon arrival, they shared their experience and provided consultation about the effective measures in containing the pandemic to Cambodian Ministry of Health, along with tons of medical supplies.42 Meanwhile, Chinese Ambassador to Cambodia H.E. Wang Wentian handed over medical supplies to Phnom Penh governor consisting of face masks and protective suits.43 Likewise, China’s Ministry of Defense handed out 16 tons of medical supplies to Cambodia’s Ministry of Defense, comprising of masks, PPE, detection kits, and disinfection gel totally worth US$ 1 million.44 Besides governmental level of mutual assistance, Cambodia also received medical equipment aids from various Chinese corporations and foundations such as Chinese Bacterial 38 Tiezzi

(2020). (2020). 40 Cambodian PM: Ban of China flights to destroy Cambodian economy (2020). 41 Sokhen (2020). 42 Chinese medical experts arrive in Cambodia to help fight outbreak (2020). 43 China donates medical supplies to Cambodia’s Phnom Penh capital hall for COVID-19 fight (2020). 44 Chhen (2020). 39 Ng

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Molecular Medical Laboratory, China Asia Economic Development Association, and Alibaba foundation.45 This showcases the comprehensiveness of the level of cooperation between Cambodia and China during this dire circumstance.

4.5 Cambodia–China Economic Cooperation Amid COVID-19 Amid the headwinds caused by the pandemic on economy, Cambodia–China economic cooperation strengthened-primarily to mitigate macro-economic pressure. Cambodia, which depends heavily on export and foreign capital inflow, was hit hard by the disruption of supply chain, dwindling demand, and global travel restriction. Specifically, Cambodia’s garment, textile, and footwear sector, which represented a combination of US$ 7,351 million of export in 2019,46 faced shortage of raw materials, since 60% of their materials are imported from China.47 This was due to the suspension of work of the suppliers in China as the country was implementing travel restriction measures. This indicated strong interconnectedness of Cambodian and Chinese economies. This obstruction, nonetheless, could cause closure of factories and drown Cambodian workers in unpaid debt as the country had the highest microloan debt per borrower in the world.48 These problems, if not addressed swiftly and sustainably, would eventually create domestic recession and social unrest. This was the role which Cambodia–China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership came to play. In late February, Cambodia’s Prime Minister requested, through Chinese ambassador to the kingdom, Chinese suppliers to look into the possibility of delivering crucially needed raw materials to Cambodian factories through air routes so as to prevent the sector from grinding to a halt. In an instant response to the Prime Minister’s request, suppliers in China shipped containers of materials to Cambodia in March, starting with 60 containers, and more than 1,000 containers arriving six days later.49 This supply of raw materials allowed Cambodia’s garment and footwear industry to stand on its feet at least for some months to come. Nonetheless, to establish a long-term solution and to intertwine the two countries’ economies, Cambodia and China embarked on a more ambitious strategy: Cambodia–China Free Trade Agreement. This initiative will play a complementary role to the existing multilateral free trade agreement between ASEAN and China in fully realizing Cambodia–China trade potential. Bilateral trade between the two countries was US$ 7.4 billion in 2018, and the two countries aimed to reach US$ 10 billion under a free trade agreement.50 So 45 Pusparani

(2020). of Commerce (2019). 47 Narin (2020). 48 Turton and Bopha (2019). 49 Over 1,000 containers with garment raw materials arrive in Cambodia from China (2020). 50 Kunmakara (2020). 46 “Ministry

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far, the negotiations were successfully concluded on July 20.51 The trade negotiations cover goods, investment, technical cooperation, e-commerce, and BRI cooperation. The trade agreement will bring in more investment, enlarge export market, create employment, reduce input cost, and rejuvenate the kingdom’s economy. China will as well benefit from this bilateral agreement as Chinese companies are looking for offshoring and outsourcing opportunities outside China amid the looming trade war between China and the US. Indeed, the negotiation of Cambodia–China FTA could not have come at a better time. It provides crucial impetuses for Cambodia’s postpandemic recovery and bulwarks against Cambodia–EU antagonism. In February 2020, EU decided to partially withdraw Cambodia from Everything But Arms (EBA) trade preference scheme due to the ‘serious and systematic violations’ of human rights principles.52 This withdrawal of roughly 20% of Cambodia’s EBA access was estimated to cost Cambodia EUR 1 billion in tariff.53 In addition, in May 2020 Cambodia was being placed on the draft-proposal blacklist of the European Union as a country with high risk of money laundering and terrorism financing.54 This, if adopted, will cause a knock-on effect and devastating blow to Cambodia’s financial system, investment, and eventually economic recovery. These make Cambodia and China’s economic cooperation even more crucial for the kingdom’s recovery. Besides, the post-COVID-19 recovery of Cambodia will also depend on how quickly the tourism sector, which contributed 32.8% to GDP in 2018,55 can recover. Specifically, it depends on how soon Chinese tourists resume travelling outside of China, since Chinese nationals accounted for 32.6% of tourists visiting Cambodia in 2018.56

4.6 Cambodian People’s Perception on China’s Fight Against COVID-19 The perceptions of leaders are the most important input in directing decision making on foreign policy—more important than pressures in international system and bureaucratic interests.57 Meanwhile, the perceptions of general public also played an important role in influencing foreign policy formulation, especially during the period of distress.58 Therefore, it is imperative that we look at the perceptions of the government leaders and general public when studying the nature and directions of relations between countries. In particular, let us shine the light on how Cambodians—both leaders and general public—have so far perceived China’s fight against COVID-19. 51 Cambodia,

China conclude bilateral FTA negotiations (2020). Commission (2020). 53 Flynn (2020). 54 White (2020). 55 Cambodia Contribution of Travel and Tourism to GDP (% of GDP) (1995–2018). 56 Pisei (2019). 57 Spiegel (1985). 58 Herrmann (1986, p. 841). 52 European

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Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen is no doubt one of the strongest supporters of China’s fight against the pandemic. His gestures conveyed indefinite buoyancy and optimistic appraisal toward China’s efforts as shown through his ‘special visit’ to Beijing amid the outbreak. The Prime Minister, in fact, had previously wanted to pay a visit to Wuhan—the epicenter of the outbreak. Furthermore, the Prime Minister made it clear that Cambodian nationals learning or working in China, especially in Wuhan, would not be evacuated. The decision came amid the fear that doing so would jeopardize not only the two countries’ good relation but also opportunities for Cambodian students to study in China.59 State relations and national interests aside, Prime Minister’s stance on not banning travel from China is the result of his trust in China’s anti-pandemic efforts. That is, the Prime Minister perceived China’s efforts to be effective and reliable. This is in contrast to his perceptions about the western countries’ efforts. He might have believed that the measures implemented by the western countries such as Italy, Germany, Spain, France, and the US were not effective enough in curbing the spread of the virus. That is why, in mid-March, he decided to impose prohibition of entry by foreigners from these countries and instructed Cambodian citizens not to travel there.60 On the other hand, there has not been an unambiguous indicator regarding how Cambodian general public perceive China’s fight against the virus. Nonetheless, the anti-Chinese sensation, which appeared in some countries in Southeast Asia, has not been visible in Cambodia despite the fact that the first confirmed case in the country was a Chinese national. We did not observe any prejudice or resentment towards Chinese nationals or business in the country, at least publicly. There are a few reasons that might explain such phenomenon. First of all, Cambodian people might not view the pandemic spread in the country as the ‘fault’ of China or the Chinese. This is so because most of the confirmed cases in the country were non-Chinese originated. Most of the cases were Cambodian citizens who had travelled to Malaysia or France, while others were foreigners coming from countries other than China. Second, the anti-Chinese sensation might have been neutralized by local media, which tended to avoid spreading information that could be regarded as a blame on China for the spread of the virus. Indeed, while international media outlets such as BBC and Washington Post spread the news about the accusation of Chinese government’s COVID-19 ‘cover-up’ at the early stage of the outbreak, media outlets in Cambodia avoid assimilating such news. Perhaps, they thought doing so would be confronting with the Cambodian government, who tried to maintain good relations with China. Instead, the media outlet projected the news about Chinese assistance to Cambodia in terms of medical and technical assistance for the fight against the virus. This eventually might have shaped the perception of general public towards China, not as a scapegoat to blame for the outbreak but as a victim of the virus and a helpful companion during time of crisis.

59 Ng

(2020). circular on measures for preventing and curbing the spread of COVID-19 (2020).

60 Guiding

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4.7 Cambodia Amidst the US–China Rivalry China–US rivalry has always been looming since the time China became the second economic superpower and thus changing the underlying distribution of power in the international system. As Tunsjø claimed this superpower rivalry has shifted the international order from unipolarity to a new bipolarity. According to him, although China has yet to possess aggregate power equal to that of the US, the country can quickly narrow the gap and stand at the top-ranking tier.61 True or not, we can observe that competition between the two powers is evident in many aspects ranging from military and geopolitics to trade and technology. For the record, China–US clash has concentrated on trade between the two countries. The US under Trump administration has accused China of unfair trading practices and intellectual property theft, whereas China has interpreted this as an attempt to curb its rise as global economic power.62 The gunshots ranged from imposing tariff on each other goods worth billions of dollars to persecuting companies believed to have connection with the other government. On top of this, the problem of territorial sovereignty is also a critical hot spot. The US has perceived China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea as an act of aggression.63 Meanwhile, a new security law of Hong Kong adopted by the National People’s Congress of China prompted the US reactions citing the violation of human rights, Hong Kong’s autonomy, and the ‘one country, two systems’. On the other hand, China perceived the US involvement in Taiwan issue as an act of provocation and interference. As if these were not enough, here comes the COVID-19 blame game. US President Donald Trump scapegoated China for its ‘cover-up’ during the early day of outbreak and accused WHO of collusion with China.64 He even theorized that the virus originated in a laboratory in China and pushed for an independent investigation.65 US allies such as Australia followed suit. As a result, Australia was caught amid the fire and thus facing tensions with China. Beyond rhetoric and diplomatic lashing, China and the US also compete in technical aspect: vaccine. The superpowers are competing in the race for COVID-19 vaccine. Both have invested heavily in research and development with the hope to become the first country to mass-produce the vaccine.66 So the question is how a small country like Cambodia should balance her relations with the two superpowers amid this rivalry. Outright, current Cambodian government deems that relation with China is more favorable and harmonious than that with the US. After all, China is the biggest investor to the country and a generous friend who has provided aids and loans with no string attached. The stance of Cambodian government on the issue of COVID-19 is pretty clear as Cambodian Prime Minister showed solidarity with China 61 Tunsjø

(2018). (2020). 63 Hu (2020). 64 President Donald J. Trump is demanding accountability from the world health organization [Fact Sheet] (2020). 65 Singh et al. (2020). 66 Takad (2020). 62 Tunsjø

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and always praised the efforts of the Chinese government. All of these dates back to the bittersweet relations between Cambodia and the US. Cambodian government has always perceived the US as a hostile force who has always interfered with Cambodia’s political affairs and criticized the country’s human rights records and democracy progress. Let us not forget that the main opposition party in Cambodia was dissolved in 2017 on allegation of collusion and subversion with a foreign country-the US.67 Cambodia, this far, has not enjoyed a good relation the US, let alone stand with it in political drama as contagious as this blame game. However, Cambodia must be smart in balancing her relations with the two countries during this time, at least for the sake of national interest. Let us not forget that the US has, as of May, provided a total of USD 11 million to Cambodia for fighting COVID-19 and for economic recovery process. In addition, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has worked cooperatively with Cambodian Ministry of Health and Pasteur Institute in identifying and tracking the spread of the virus in the country. In short, politics aside, the US is still one of the most important partners during this crisis, not to mention other development assistance the US has been providing to Cambodia for decades. Therefore, although Cambodian government is seen to stand closer to China on this pandemic drama, it has to avoid ‘harassing’ the actions and rhetoric made by the US. In fact, although Cambodia has early on showed solidarity with China, she has avoided showing any opposition or condemnation on allegations made by the US toward China. Unlike, say Australia, Cambodia carefully avoids expressing her support for one side against another. This hedging strategy or active neutral foreign policy has so far proved to be a valuable and effective diplomatic tool to be used now and in the future.68 As a result, we can expect to see more assistance and funding flowing to Cambodia from both sides of the ring.

4.8 Possible Directions of Cambodia–China Relations in Post-COVID Era Ironically, 2020 is the 10th anniversary of Cambodia–China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, and with all these good deeds and harmonious tie-up going on, it does not take a whole lot of efforts to speculate how the future direction of Cambodia–China relations will unfold. It will undeniably strengthen economically and politically. On the one hand, we should witness increase volume of trade between the two countries after the Cambodia–China Free Trade Agreement is signed into effect. For Cambodia, this free trade agreement open a new market for her products as an alternative to European and the US markets. For China, this agreement provide opportunity for Chinese companies to outsource or relocate their production amid China–US trade war. The kingdom, thus, will receive more investment. According to the result of the fifth meeting of China–Cambodia Intergovernmental Coordination Committee 67 Thul

and Lefevre (2017). (2020).

68 Thearith

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which took place in June, both sides further agreed to push for the establishment of one-way or close-loop chartered planes in order to revive tourism industry of the two countries.69 Thus, we expect to see more Chinese tourists visiting Cambodia and vice versa. China also pledged to assist Cambodia in infrastructure development and promised to develop Cambodia’s port-province of Preah Sihanouk into a multipurpose economic zone through its BRI. In short, cooperation with China will play a bigger and more ambitious role in economic recovery of Cambodia in the future. Politically, Cambodia and China pledged to strengthen their cooperation on national defense with possibility of conducting more joint exercises and improvement of military academies and medics. Furthermore, Cambodia is a supporter of China’s notion of community of a shared future in the Asia Pacific and China’s global view in general.70

4.9 Conclusion COVID-19, although affected several aspects of society, undeniably acted as a magnifying glass emanating progressive and strong withstanding relation between Cambodia and China, taking note of the new era of solid and ironclad friendship. Reflecting through the slogan emphasized by Prime Minister Hun Sen “A friend in need is a friend indeed”, Cambodia-China has exchanged endless support and cooperation in response to dealing with this human insecurity. In an effort to express solidary with and confidence in the Chinese government, the Prime Minister made a visit to China, disapproved of the ban of flights to and from China, and rejected the possibility of evacuating Cambodian nationals living in China. China, perceiving authentic concordance, provided Cambodia with expertise and material assistance in the fight against the pandemic and promised to take good care Cambodian citizens living in China. Economically, the countries continued to assist each other in time of this dire situation. The Chinese government, in response to Cambodia’s request, urged its apparel suppliers to provide crucially needed raw materials to Cambodia in order to help prevent the country’s garment industry from a destructive standstill. Ambitiously, the two partners also envisaged a free trade agreement which would help their economies recover after the pandemic, with promises of cheaper input, bigger market, more employment, and more influx of investment. With the goodwill of the governments and harmony among the people, we should see Cambodia and China continue to support each other on various matters and in building a community with a common destiny.

69 China, 70 Xu

Cambodia intergovernmental committee holds meeting via video (2020). (2020).

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References 400 factories in Cambodia suspend operations, affecting over 150,000 workers due to COVID-19. Xinhua net. (2020, July 1). http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-07/01/c_139180683.htm. Announcement about early-than-usual vacation for public and private educational institutions in Phnom Penh and Siem Reap. Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sport. (2020, March 14). https:// www.facebook.com/moeys.gov.kh/posts/3446759655350624?_rdc=2&_rdr. Bunthan, P. (2020, April 11). Cambodia imposes domestic travel restrictions and other measures to limit COVID-19 transmission. Tilleke & Gibbins. https://www.tilleke.com/resources/cambodiaimposes-domestic-travel-restrictions-and-other-measures-limit-COVID-19-transmissi. Bunthoeun, C. (2020, June 23). Construction suffers from low growth. Khmer Times. https://www. khmertimeskh.com/736882/construction-suffers-from-low-growth/. Cambodia, China conclude bilateral FTA negotiations. Khmer Times. (2020, July 22). https://www. khmertimeskh.com/50747200/cambodia-china-conclude-bilateral-fta-negotiations/. Cambodia collects $2.95 Billion as fiscal revenue in first half of 2020. Khmer Times. (2020, July 18). https://www.khmertimeskh.com/50746069/cambodia-collects-2-95-billion-as-fiscalrevenue-in-first-half-of-2020/. Cambodia contribution of travel and tourism to GDP (% of GDP) (1995–2018). https://knoema. com//atlas/Cambodia/topics/Tourism/Travel-and-Tourism-Total-Contribution-to-GDP/Contri bution-of-travel-and-tourism-to-GDP-percent-of-GDP. Cambodia reserves up to US$2 Billion to solve impacts of COVID-19. Office of the Council of the Ministers, (2020, March 10). https://pressocm.gov.kh/en/archives/64510. Cambodia’s preferential access to the European Union market. European Commission. (2020, February 120. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_229. Cambodian PM: Ban of China flights to destroy Cambodian economy. Office of the Council of the Ministers. (2020, January 30). https://pressocm.gov.kh/en/archives/62685. Chan, S. (2020, March 18). National Bank of Cambodia to reduce reserve requirement interest rates. Khmer Times. https://www.khmertimeskh.com/703089/nbc-to-reduce-reserve-requirement-int erest-rates/. The Central Bank announces measures to boost lending. Khmer Times. (2020, March 18). https://www.khmertimeskh.com/702862/the-central-bank-announces-measures-toboost-lending. Chhen, N. (2020, April 26). China delivers plane-load of aid. The Phnom Penh Post. https://www. phnompenhpost.com/national/china-delivers-plane-load-aid. China, Cambodia intergovernmental committee holds meeting via video. Xinhua net. (2020, June 16). http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-06/16/c_139143834.htm. China donates medical supplies to Cambodia’s Phnom Penh capital hall for COVID-19 fight. Xinhua net. (2020, April 21). http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-04/21/c_138996529.htm. Chinese medical experts arrive in Cambodia to help fight outbreak. The Star. (2020, March 23). https://www.thestar.com.my/news/regional/2020/03/23/chinese-medical-experts-arrive-incambodia-to-help-fight-outbreak. COVID-19 lockdown highlights Cambodia’s dangerous reliance on imported food. Khmer Times. (2020, March 27). https://www.khmertimeskh.com/707080/COVID-19-lockdown-highlightscambodias-dangerous-reliance-on-imported-food/. Flynn, G. (2020, February 12). European Union to hit Cambodian exports worth $1 Billion with tariffs in partial EBA suspension. Cambodianess. https://cambodianess.com/article/cambodialoses-1-billion-in-exports-to-eu-in-partial-eba-suspension. GDP growth in Asia and the Pacific, Asian Development Outlook (ADO). Asian Development Bank (ADB). (2020, April). https://data.adb.org/dataset/gdp-growth-asia-and-pacific-asian-dev elopment-outlook. Guiding circular on measures for preventing and curbing the spread of COVID-19. Council of Ministers. (2020, March 16). https://pressocm.gov.kh/archives/64608.

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Herrmann, R. (1986). The power of perceptions in foreign-policy decision making: Do views of the soviet union determine the policy choices of American leaders? American Journal of Political Science, 30(4). Hu, B. (2020, June 12). China-US military confrontation in the South China Sea: fact and fiction. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/china-us-military-confrontation-in-the-south-chinasea-fact-and-fiction/. Information on Cambodia travel restrictions. Ministry of foreign affairs and international cooperation, (2020, August 5). https://www.mfaic.gov.kh/COVID-19. Kimmarita, L., & Khorn, S. (2020, January 27). First case of coronavirus reported in the kingdom. Phnom Penh Post. https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/first-case-coronavirus-reportedkingdom?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=20a40d99995f2e2e612b2026cbd73f6f770f25ff-15926216160-AVrM4LwRAeHw_Mu2AkpqHZU5D20BcMDqOPacUZK-QKdwCVfkv_pvXQvfCW17Bv 5yiB7QqaEaVnNxzBFZUeQJbSntPaIpwJ3X0EiBXn. Kunmakara, M. (2020, January 28) Sitive results’ after first round of FTA negotiations with China. Phnom Penh Post. https://www.phnompenhpost.com/business/positive-results-after-first-roundfta-negotiations-china. Lamy, M., & Sonyka, V. (2020, May 1). People resume normal lives as COVID fears fade. Khmer Times. https://www.khmertimeskh.com/719036/people-resume-normal-lives-as-covidfears-fade/. Lee, P. (2020, May 1). Government support for Cambodian workers during COVID-19 insufficient. GLOBE. https://southeastasiaglobe.com/cambodian-workers-support-COVID-19/. Mccready, A. (2020, March 23). Garment sector: As COVID-19 hits global economy, Cambodian workers face layoffs. GLOBE. https://southeastasiaglobe.com/cambodian-economy-COVID-19/. Narim, K. (2020, March 26). More than 3,000 rooms reserved for coronavirus patients: PM. Khmer Times. https://www.khmertimeskh.com/705888/more-than-3000-rooms-reserved-for-cor onavirus-patients-pm/. Narin, S. (2020, February 26). Hun Sen asks China to air freight raw materials for Cambodia’s garment production. VOA. https://www.voacambodia.com/a/hun-sen-asks-china-to-air-freightraw-materials-for-cambodia-s-garment-production/5305084.html. Nationwide temporary suspension of gyms and fitness centers. Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sport. (2020, April 3). https://www.facebook.com/moeys.gov.kh/photos/a.308228509203 770/3500306703329252/?type=3&theater. Ng, K. (2020, February 1). Coronavirus: Cambodia refuses to evacuate citizens from China as ‘We need to share their happiness and pain’. Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/ world/asia/coronavirus-cambodia-china-evacuation-hun-sen-a9312616.html. Niseiy, S. P. (2020, July 25). More than 20 COVID-19 cases are identified in Cambodia within a week. Cambodianess. https://cambodianess.com/article/more-than-20-COVID-19-cases-are-ide ntified-in-cambodia-within-a-week. Not the right time to declare a state of emergency yet, Cambodian Prime Minister. Office of the council of the ministers. (2020, April 7). https://pressocm.gov.kh/en/archives/65555. O’Connell, C., & Thong, L. K. (2020, June 1). Cambodia update: Additional measures to further support private sector & workers affected by COVID-19 outbreak & to revive the post-COVID-19 economy. DFDL. https://www.dfdl.com/resources/legal-and-tax-updates/cambodia-update-add itional-measures-to-further-support-private-sector-workers-affected-by-COVID-19-outbreakto-revive-the-post-COVID-19-economy/. Over 1,000 containers with garment raw materials arrive in Cambodia from China. Xinhua Net. (2020, March 16). http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-03/16/c_138883724.htm. Pandemic causes rise in consumer price index. Khmer Times. (2020, April 8). https://www.khmert imeskh.com/710643/pandemic-causes-rise-in-consumer-price-index/. Pisei, H. (2019, November 15). Chinese tourists lead international visitors. Phnom Penh Post. https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/chinese-tourists-lead-international-vis itors. Pandemic brings real estate activity to near nil. The Phnom Penh Post. (2020, April 1). https://www.phnompenhpost.com/post-property/pandemic-brings-real-estate-activity-near-nil.

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President Donald J. Trump is demanding accountability from the world health organization [Fact Sheet]. The White House. (2020, April 15). https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/pre sident-donald-j-trump-demanding-accountability-world-health-organization/. Pusparani, I. G. (2020, March 31). Cambodia receives COVID-19 rapid test kits and medical experts from China. Seasia. https://seasia.co/2020/03/31/cambodia-receives-COVID-19-rapid-test-kitsand-medical-experts-from-china. Report on the evaluation of commercial result in 2019 and direction on commercial work in 2020. Ministry of Commerce. 2019. https://www.moc.gov.kh/Portals/0/Docs/TradeInfo/AR% E1%9E%9A%E1%9E%94%E1%9E%B6%E1%9E%99%E1%9E%80%E1%9E%B6%E1% 9E%9A%E1%9E%8E%E1%9F%8D%E1%9E%9F%E1%9E%93%E1%9F%92%E1%9E% 93%E1%9E%B7%E2%80%8B_%E1%9E%94%E1%9E%B6%E1%9E%8F%E1%9E%86% E1%9F%92%E1%9E%93%E1%9E%B6%E1%9F%86%E1%9F%A2%E1%9F%A0%E1% 9F%A1%E1%9F%A9_Final-20191218110231285.pdf. Singh, M., Davidson, H., & Borger, J. (2020, May 1). Trump claims to have evidence coronavirus started in Chinese lab but offers no details. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ 2020/apr/30/donald-trump-coronavirus-chinese-lab-claim. Sokhean, B. (2020, March 26). City bus, water taxi services shut down to prevent spread of coronavirus. Khmer Times. https://www.khmertimeskh.com/706134/city-bus-water-taxi-services-shutdown-to-prevent-spread-of-coronavirus/. Sokhen, S. (2020, January 27). Cambodian students in China raise coronavirus fears. VOD. https:// vodenglish.news/cambodian-students-in-china-raise-coronavirus-fears/. Southeast Asia COVID-19 tracker. CSIS. (2020, September 1). https://www.csis.org/programs/sou theast-asia-program/southeast-asia-COVID-19-tracker-0. Spiegel, S. L. (1985). The other Arab-Israeli conflict: making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Takad, N. (2020, May 20). US and China in all-out race for coronavirus vaccine by autumn. Nikkei Asian Review. https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Coronavirus/US-and-China-in-all-out-race-forcoronavirus-vaccine-by-autumn. Thearith, L. (2020, August 24). Can Cambodia navigate US-China rivalry? AVI commentary, Asian vision institute. https://asianvision.org/archives/publications/avi-commentary-issue-2020-no-28can-cambodia-navigate-us-china-rivalry/. Thul, P. C., & Lefevre, A. S. (2017, November 16). Cambodia’s main opposition party dissolved by supreme court. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cambodia-politics-idUSKBN1D G1BO. Tiezzi, S. (2020, February 6). China and Cambodia: Love in the time of coronavirus. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/china-and-cambodia-love-in-the-time-of-coronavirus/. Tourism in Thailand and Cambodia take a virus hit. The ASEAN Post. (2020, March 24). https://the aseanpost.com/article/tourism-thailand-and-cambodia-take-virus-hit. Travel restrictions issued by the royal government of Cambodia in relation to the novel coronavirus (COVID-19). Ministry of foreign affairs and international cooperation. (2020, March 28). https:// www.mfaic.gov.kh/site/detail/41728. Tunsjø, Ø. (2018). The return of bipolarity in world politics: China, the United States, and geostructural realism. New York: Columbia University Press. The new US-China superpower rivalry. East Asia Forum. (2020, April 4). https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/04/04/the-new-us-chinasuperpower-rivalry/. Turton, S., & Bopha, P. (2019, August 7). Cambodia’s “Reckless” microfinance industry puts economy at risk. Nikkei Asian Review. https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Business-trends/Cam bodia-s-reckless-microfinance-industry-puts-economy-at-risk. Updates of COVID-19 in Cambodia. Communicable Disease Control Department, Ministry of Health of Cambodia. (2020, May 30). http://www.cdcmoh.gov.kh/479-update-on-COVID-19. Urgent measures of the royal government to support tourism sector, garment sector, and economic growth. Ministry of Economy and Finance. (2020, February 25). https://www.mef.gov.kh/mea sures-of-tax.html.

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Vantha, P. (2020, July 21). Ministry of health identifies 26 new cases of COVID-19. Cambodianess. https://cambodianess.com/article/ministry-of-health-identifies-26-new-cases-ofCOVID-19. Cambodia to close KTVs and cinemas. Cambodianess. (2020, March 17). https://cam bodianess.com/article/cambodia-to-close-ktvs-and-cinemas. COVID-19 to delay Cambodia’s tourism targets by 5 years. Cambodianess. (2020, June 29). https://cambodianess.com/article/ COVID-19-to-delay-cambodias-tourism-targets-by-5-years. Wang, Y. (2020, May 9). China-Cambodia friendship sets example for state-to-state relations. CGTN. https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-09/China-Cambodia-hail-bilateral-cooperation-inCOVID-19-fight-QlBrnvaYCs/index.html. White, H. (2020, May 12). Potential EU ‘Blacklisting’ most dangerous threat to local economy. Khmer Times. (2020). https://www.khmertimeskh.com/722121/potential-eu-blacklisting-mostdangerous-threat-to-local-economy/. WHO coronavirus disease (COVID-19) dashboard. WHO. (2020, September 1). https://covid19. who.int/. WHO works closely with the royal government of Cambodia in the fight against COVID-19. WHO. (2020, May 12). https://www.who.int/cambodia/news/detail/12-05-2020-who-works-clo sely-with-the-royal-government-of-cambodia-in-the-fight-against-COVID-19. Xu, W. (2020, July 4). Xi hails community of shared future with Cambodia. China Daily. https:// www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202007/04/WS5effba5ba310834817257252.html.

Chapter 5

Malaysia–China Relations During the Movement Control Order Period and Beyond: Assessment from the Mutual Trust Variable Chee Leong Lee and Md Nasrudin Md Akhir

5.1 Introduction In Malaysia, the COVID-19 pandemic occurred in tandem with the unexpected regime change in the country’s political landscape. Following the unprecedented and historic general election in May 2018 that ended the 61-year rule of Barisan Nasional (BN) government and installed Pakatan Harapan (PH) as the new federal government of Malaysia, the PH administration was abruptly came to an end with the resignation of former prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad on 24 February 2020.1 The second regime change emerged when a new federal government under a new coalition named Perikatan Nasional (PN) came into being after six days of political impasse in Malaysia. In the context of such political situation in Malaysia, this chapter adopts a longitudinal approach in its assessment of Malaysia–China relations for the COVID-19 period and beyond, with the demarcation line taken as the date the Movement Control Order (MCO) was imposed—the Malaysian government’s overarching response against the COVID-19 pandemic—and the period after the termination of the order. Also, the authors for this chapter center their assessments on the variable, namely, the bilateral mutual trust, and seek to uncover the dynamics

1 Lim

(2020).

We would like to express since thanks to Dr. Geetha Govindasamy from the Department of East Asian Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS), University of Malaya for her valuable input and assistance in reviewing the chapter. C. L. Lee (B) National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan e-mail: [email protected] M. N. Md Akhir University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 N. Peng (ed.), The Reshaping of China-Southeast Asia Relations in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4416-7_5

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surrounding such variable in the development of Malaysia–China relations during the MCO period and beyond. Thus, this chapter is organized into three sections. The first section presents Malaysia’s COVID-19 as an evolutionary process in which respective public healtheconomic responses of PH and PN governments to different stages of outbreak, made up the overarching pandemic response for the country. The second section then, discusses the immediate impacts of COVID-19 pandemic on the bilateral relations during the MCO period. Finally, the third section looks at the prospect of Malaysia– China relations in the post-MCO period. In this particular section, the authors provide their assessments based on multi-dimensional factors that continue to build bilateral mutual trust as well as with potential to erode it.

5.2 Malaysia’s Responses to COVID-19 During Pre-MCO and MCO Periods From January 25 until May 3, there are two periods of Malaysia’s overarching response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This former was the date in which Malaysia was confronting the global pandemic that started from the first imported case from Singapore while the latter was the date of the country’s reopening of its economy. Spanned across the previous PH administration and the current PN government, this first major section is devoted into dissecting the country’s public health and economic responses from the two different political regimes.

5.2.1 Public Health Responses Malaysia’s public health responses evolved from early onset and early containment phases into late containment and mitigation phases. It is divided into two periods: pre-MCO period that occurred between January 25 and March 14; and MCO period which started from March 15 until May 3. The former referred to the period of which the PH administration was the federal government responding to the COVID19 pandemic since the first imported case in late January. The latter, meanwhile, occurred during the leadership of current prime minister, Muhyiddin Yassin, who subsequently become Malaysia’s paramount leader following the country’s power crisis from late February to early March. Following the formal announcement of Malaysia’s success in flattening the epidemic curve on April 24, the Muhyiddin administration ended the MCO and restarted the country’s economy through the new conditional MCO since May 4.2

2 Since

June 9, Malaysia has entered into the Recovery MCO (RMCO) phase which is expected to last until August 31, 2020. Unlike the CMCO, interstate travel within Malaysia is allowed.

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Pre-MCO Period (January 25–March 18) From January 25 to February 28, Malaysia reported relatively limited number of COVID-19 cases compared to China which saw the pandemic at its peak in the same period. The first three COVID-19 patients were confirmed to have travelled from Wuhan to Singapore before crossing into Malaysia. These patients were subsequently quarantined in the Sungai Buloh Hospital on January 25.3 By this time, airports and entry points across Malaysia activated an emergency plan by installing thermal scanners at immigration checkpoints as part of tracking the coronavirus outbreak. At the same time on January 27, the PH government imposed its first temporary travel ban on individuals originating from Wuhan city and the Hubei province in China.4 It was on February 3 that the first local case in which a Malaysian was confirmed as a COVID-19 patient after making a recent conference trip to Singapore which was attended by a delegation from China.5 Due to the risk of local transmission, the case prompted the Malaysian government to embark on extensive contact tracing and quarantine measures. Throughout February 2020, the PH administration was confronted with the manageable rise of COVID-19 cases, from Chinese tourists arriving from other provinces, those residing in Malaysia as well as 107 Malaysians evacuated from Wuhan on a special flight.6 With the Chinese government’s imposition of new lockdowns in five cities in Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces, the Malaysian government imposed a travel ban on February 9 onto individuals travelling from these two provinces. But despite all these challenges, the PH administration embarked on an early containment strategy that was geared toward responding to limited COVID-19 cases in the first two months of 2020.7 Less than two weeks after the new PN administration was installed in March, Malaysians were stunned with the unexpected large number of COVID-19 cases within a short period of time involving a religious event as revealed by the Ministry of Health (MOH). The MOH was not aware of the ijtima tabligh event in a Sri Petaling mosque in the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur until the Bruneian Ministry of Health confirmed that its first COVID-19 patient had attended the religious event.8 The director-general of MOH, Datuk Dr Noor Hisham Abdullah expressed difficulties in tracing and identifying 16,000 attendees of the event. This forced the Malaysian government to systematically conduct contact tracing of all those who attended and were exposed to the Bruneian during the religious gathering.9 Consequently, in order to contain the spread of COVID-19 pandemic before it became unmanageable for the authorities, the Prime Minister Muhyiddin was compelled to impose a sudden MCO in Malaysia. 3 First coronavirus cases in Malaysia: 3 Chinese nationals confirmed infected, quarantined in Sungai

Buloh Hospital (2020). imposes ban on Chinese tourists from Wuhan (2020). 5 First case of Malaysian positive for coronavirus (2020), Ahmad (2020). 6 Father and son on Wuhan flight tested positive for coronavirus (2020). 7 Coronavirus: After Hubei, Malaysia blocks travellers from Zhejiang, Jiangsu provinces (2020). 8 Palansamy (2020). 9 Arumugam (2020); Tong (2020). 4 Malaysia

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MCO Period (March 18–May 3, 2020) From March 18 until May 3, Malaysia underwent the most critical period in its pandemic response. On March 16, the MCO was announced to the public, which was intended to flatten the infection curve as its final goal. In other words, it was an all-out measure to reduce the widespread COVID-19 transmission into a level that was controllable for the country’s health authorities. The MCO imposed various measures, mainly including the full ban of mass movements and gatherings across the country, prohibition of overseas travel among Malaysians, entry ban for foreign tourists or visitors into Malaysia, closure of all schools, kindergartens and Montessori centres, all higher education institutions and vocational institutes; and all public and private premises except those involving in essential services.10 With the imposition of MCO, it took around 6 weeks for Malaysia to flatten the infection curve which was formally announced by Noor Hisham on April 26.11 Despite this, Prime Minister Muhyiddin carried on with the MCO with the help of the Royal Malaysian police and military.12 On May 1, the Malaysian government announced the Conditional MCO where most activities were allowed, with the exception of team sports activities, religious gatherings, face-to-face learning in educational institutions and interstate travel (even for Muslim religious holidays/Eid celebration).13

5.2.2 Economic Responses Following the limited outbreak in late January, the Malaysian government had foreseen the COVID-19 impacts on its economy as businesses in the tourism, hotelling and airline industries were affected by China’s travel ban for its citizens from January 25 onwards.14 Given the urgency to respond immediately before its collapse in late February, the PH administration announced an economic stimulus package comprising income tax deferment, tax exemptions for the travel industry and special lending facilities for both small and medium enterprises as well as micro-businesses. Apart from that, those in the COVID-19 response frontline and affected individuals who relied on tourists for their income, were also given payments-special monthly critical allowances for the former while one-off assistance for the latter.15 Altogether, 10 COVID-19:

Movement control order imposed with only essential sectors (2020). and Reduan (2020). 12 Malaysian military to help enforce movement curbs to contain COVID-19 (2020), COVID-19: PKPD Dikuat Kuasa Di Dua Kawasan di Simpang Renggam (COVID-19: Enhanced MCO Enforced in Two Ares in Simpang Renggam) (2020). Enhanced MCO involved full isolation of specific areas and cessation of all activities within the areas. Food and other supplies would be delivered to the residents while medical bases were also established in the areas. 13 Essence of conditional movement control order (2020). 14 Perrett (2020). 15 2020 Economic stimulus package—full speech text (In English) (2020). 11 Rashid

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this first economic stimulus package was worth US$ 4.6 billion (RM 20 billion) but it was never implemented as the PH government collapsed in late February. With the pandemic’s sudden surge leading to the MCO’s implementation in midMay, almost all economic sectors were greatly affected by the pandemic. In response to the unprecedented economic impact from the MCO, the new PN government unveiled a massive stimulus package worth about US$ 57.4 billion (RM 250 billion) on March 27. Known as the Pakej Prihatin (Caring Package), it included the previous stimulus package as announced by Mahathir while at the same time, providing significant monetary aid to the low-income section of the population to support their livelihood and stimulate the economy. Almost every B40 (bottom income earners) and M40 (middle-income earners) individual/family received monetary aid (between US$ 115 and US$ 368) whereas employers (especially the SMEs) gained 3-month wage subsidy for their employees at a monthly rate of US$ 138 (RM 600).16 Other assistance rolled out were free 1 GB internet daily, exemptions of 6-month rental for businesses and one-off payment to students and government pensioners.17 On April 6, the PN government once again, announced another special stimulus package (US$ 2.3 billion or RM 10 billion) that was focused on supporting the enterprises and micro-businesses. In order to avoid massive retrenchment, three measures were ironed out: wage subsidy scheme extended to 6 months; the number of employees covered under the scheme increased according to the categories of workforce; and amount of wage subsidy to be adjusted at higher rate.18 For the employers, a special grant of US$ 6,895 (RM 3,000) was given to each registered SME while micro-businesses could access to additional US$ 2,298 (RM 10,000) loan from the Tekun Nasional scheme. These were on top of additional tax deductions for owners of private premises who willingly reduced at least 30% their rental from April to June.19 In total, the Malaysian government spent a total of US$ 60 billion (RM 260 billion) in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

5.3 Immediate Impacts of COVID-19 Pandemic on Malaysia–China Relations In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, there were two immediate impacts that showcased the prevalence of long-standing mutual trust between Malaysia and China. In this sense, recognition has to be given to past administrations, especially to the Najib administration (2008–2018) that saw wide-ranging intensification of Malaysia–China economic, socio-cultural and military cooperation.20 Equally important is that the previous PH administration under Mahathir’s leadership, had 16 Muhyiddin

unveils RM250bil economic stimulus package (2020).

17 Ibid. 18 Muhyiddin

unveils RM10bil stimulus package for SMEs (Updated) (2020).

19 Ibid. 20 Malaysian

PM aims ‘New Heights’ in bilateral relations for China visit (2016), Tan (2017).

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also demonstrated its non-confrontational approach in re-negotiating controversial projects such as the East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) and gas pipelines with its Chinese counterpart21 -an approach that elevated existing mutual trust between the two countries. In both cases, mutual trust remained a measuring variable for evaluation of long-term Malaysia–China relations. The following section, therefore, examines the COVID-19 pandemic’s immediate impacts to the bilateral relations by unveiling the dynamics of such mutual trust.

5.3.1 Reciprocal COVID-19 Medical Assistance The most significant impact of COVID-19 to Malaysia–China relations is reciprocal COVID-19 medical assistance to overcome the pandemic. This was displayed in two fronts. When the pandemic struck China between December 2019 and February 2020, Malaysians provided medical assistance to the country in a show of solidarity with the Chinese people. Among the first initiative was the Malaysian Non-governmental Organization (NGO), #OpsHarapan, which sent 2.4 tonnes of medical supplies including medical masks, rubber gloves and safety goggles to China after embarking on a four day campaign to collect these materials locally.22 Other governmental and corporate organizations also joined in. For instance, the Sabah government and several local Chinese associations donated US$ 464,000 (RM 2 million) to China from after the state-wide fund-raising campaign. In addition, the Malaysian Rubber Export Promotion Council (MREPC) as well as rubber gloves manufacturers, also dispatched an estimated 18 million medical gloves for healthcare workers in Wuhan.23 Last but not least, a group of multi-racial Malaysian singers also showed their solidarity with the Chinese people by offering psychological and emotional support through a locally-composed Mandarin song, Ni cong bushi yigeren (You Are Not Alone).24 When Malaysia began to experience COVID-19 pandemic from February onwards, China too extended a helping hand. With Malaysia urgently in need of

21 After months of re-negotiation with the Chinese counterpart for the ECRL project, the new deal was eventually signed in April 2019 and it included reduction of project costs (US$ 5 billion), increase local participation, and the 50% sharing of risk by the Chinese project delivery partner, China Communications Construction Company (CCCC). As for the gas pipeline projects (MultiProduct Pipeline (MPP) and Trans-Sabah Gas Pipeline (TSGP)), bilateral re-negotiations are reportedly ongoing as of September 2019 and in which the former PH government was in favour of terminating the two projects. For further information, see: ECRL salient points: RM 1B refund, more locals and CCCC to share risk (2019), and Gov’t still negotiating with China to resolve issue on pipeline projects (2019). 22 NGO #OpsHarapan sends 2.4 tonnes of medical supplies to Wuhan (2020). 23 Sabah govt raised RM 2 million for Wuhan fund (2020), Kaos Jr (2020). 24 Da ma geshou MV xian chang kang yi da qi (MV of Malaysian Singers Singing in Support of Pandemic Battle) (2020).

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masks and medical Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), both the Chinese government and business communities supplied 11 batches of medical PPE to both West and East Malaysia. The Chinese embassy in Kuala Lumpur donated 15,000 masks to Sungai Buloh Hospital. Moreover, an estimated 20,000 masks and medical PPE were dispatched by China to the Malaysian police force as well as to Sabah and Sarawak. Chinese business organizations and NGOs such as the China–Asia Economic Development Association also donated 100,000 masks while medical PPE and test kits were also distributed to four ASEAN countries (including Malaysia) by both Jack Ma Foundation and Alibaba Foundation.25 Meanwhile, Malaysia is also one of the countries that welcomed Chinese medical experts to share their experiences in containing the COVID-19 pandemic.26 After having exchanges with the Chinese medical experts via video conferencing on March 26, the Malaysian government hosted the medical team from Guangdong 23 days later.27 During their stay in Malaysia, the medical team praised the professionalism and dedication of the Malaysian medical establishment. The team was also informed by the Malaysian MOH on the contribution of Dr. Wu Lien-Teh (Wu Liande), a Penang-born Malayan plague fighter who was known for his prominent role in containing the Manchurian Plague in 1910–1 through his development of modern surgical masks as well as the unprecedented quarantine and movement control measures (as adapted by China today).28 Last but not least, the Chinese medical team also welcomed Malaysia’s participation in China’s COVID-19 thirdstage vaccine testing and highlighted the possibility of the vaccine being used earlier in Malaysian hospitals to combat the pandemic.29 From the reciprocal COVID-19 medical assistance during MCO period, it is obvious that the pandemic contributed to the strengthening of mutual trust not just at the governmental level but also, business and grassroot segments of the society.

5.3.2 Online Stigmatization of Chinese Nationals by Malaysian Netizens Whilst the COVID-19 pandemic brought reciprocal medical assistance between Malaysia and China, it also stirred online stigmatization of Chinese nationals among 25 Chinese embassy, companies donate medical supplies to Malaysian hospitals against COVID19 (2020), Lai (2020), Malaysia receives medical devices from China for police (2020), Jack Ma foundation and Alibaba foundation announce donations to four Southeast Asian Countries. (2020), Chan (2020), and China’s consulate general donates 30,000 face masks to Sarawak (2020). 26 Chinese experts to exchange experiences on COVID-19: Health DG (2020). The Malaysian health ministry’s director-general, Noor Hisham emphasized that the Chinese medical team would not come to Malaysia to run its health services. 27 China docs to aid in virus fight (2020), Medical experts from China touch down at KLIA (2020). 28 Zhongguo fangyi zhuanjia chengzan da ma weisheng bu nimen Boleh! (Chinese Epidemic Expert Praises Malaysia’s Health Ministry You All Boleh!) (2020), and Liew (2020). 29 Sin Chew Jit Poh (2020).

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Malaysian netizens. This was evident in the early months of pre-MCO period (January and February) in which Chinese tourists became the source of COVID-19 outbreak in Malaysia. Two days after the first COVID-19 case in the country was announced, some netizens started an online petition demanding the tourism ministry to prioritize the health of Malaysian citizens and ban Chinese citizens from entering the country. Within two days, the petition garnered more than 400,000 signatures as the idea projected within the website was a message of protecting family and children of Malaysia.30 At this point in time, the former tourism minister, Mohamaddin Ketapi pleaded with Malaysian citizens not to discriminate Chinese tourists. Unfortunately, online netizens who feared the risk of COVID-19 transmission from this group of foreign visitors ignored his plea.31 The online stigmatization of Chinese tourists in Malaysia continued unabated. At the same time, there were also incidents of online fake news associated with political messages against Chinese tourists. As pointed out by Zainal Ariffin Omar, President of the Malaysian Public Health Medicine Specialist Association, netizens posing as ‘experts’ were spreading political messages in their Facebook or other social media platforms, with the goal of creating panic among the local online community.32 As an example, Kauthar Rozmal, a prominent netizen compared the Malaysian and the Philippines’ governments treatment of Chinese tourists. While the Filipino government sent back 500 Chinese tourists from Wuhan, the former PH administration refused to do the same.33 By the time Kauthar Rozmal deleted his post, it was shared 3,000 times and several copycat posts had resurfaced with thousands of shares being recorded.34 That said, such online stigmatization of Chinese nationals in Malaysia remained in the virtual world and not on the ground. By magnitude, it was too trivial to erode long-standing mutual trust between Malaysia and China during the pandemic period. With the exceptions of Sabah and Sarawak, Chinese tourists who were not from Hubei, Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces as well as those already in Malaysia, were still allowed to visit Malaysia. Moreover, their presence was largely tolerated by Malaysia’s multi-racial society. Chinese tourists to Malaysia were welcomed until a full travel ban was imposed on foreign travellers by the government on March 18. It is interesting to note that the Malaysian government has never propagated any anti-China discourse during the COVID-19 period, unlike what was happening in the Trump administration later on. While some Malaysians denounced the government for not banning Chinese tourists early on, Putrajaya refused to entertain such notion simply because it valued the long-standing mutual trust that Kuala Lumpur and Beijing had already established. The government’s priority was to overcome the pandemic with internal and external assistance from various countries (including China). As such, it was not surprising that the Malaysian government was willing to 30 Racist?

Malaysians want all Chinese visitors banned (2020). (2020). 32 “Racist? Malaysians Want All Chinese Visitors Banned.” 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 31 Arumugam

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learn from as well as share experiences with Chinese medical experts in combating the spread of COVID-19. As for online stigmatization of Chinese nationals in the Malaysian social media, it was subsequently played down by Putrajaya-indicating the government’s preference for working towards combating a global crisis instead of playing the blame game as embarked by some countries.

5.4 Prospect of Malaysia–China Relations in the Post-MCO Era Given the two narrow impacts during the MCO period, any forecasting of Malaysia– China relations in the post-MCO era should not be confined to these two developments as occurred during the short period of time. Instead, as explained in the Introduction section, evaluation should be made based on the bilateral mutual trust variable and in which in turn, such trust is affected by the multi-dimensional factors coming from political, economy, people-to-people ties and security areas. In total, there are four multi-dimensional factors involved: continuing political ties; enduring economic and people-to-people ties; potential fallout from the SCS dispute; and possible support pressure exerted by the US.

5.4.1 Continuing Political Ties The first mutual trust-building factor for future Malaysia–China relations is the continuing political ties between the two countries. Despite such ties are confined to the small circle of political elites between Malaysia and China, they remained vital for the development of bilateral relations since it is the Malaysian ruling parties and their leaders that traditionally set the priorities of the country’s China policy. As such, their relationships with the Chinese leaders would influence the continuity of mutual trust-building between the political establishment of both countries. After normalization of ties in 1974, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) support for the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) remained a thorny issue for Malaysia– China bilateral relations. In addition to Malaysia’s prioritization of its foreign relations with the United Kingdom (UK) and Western nations in its early years of independence,35 the country’s political ties with China remained contentious until the end of the demise of the MCP in 1989. From the 1990s onwards, political engagements between the CCP and the BN coalition headed by United Malays National Organization (UMNO), began with the first ever visit by a CCP delegation led by Jiang Guanghua, the then Deputy Director of International Department. The CCP delegation met with a number of prominent UMNO leaders at that time: Prime Minister, 35 Jiang

(2002, pp. 21–22), and Akhir (2009, pp. 53–54).

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Mahathir, Finance Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, Secretary-General and Minister of Information, Mohamed Rahmat and Foreign Minister, Abdullah Badawi.36 Mutual trust between both sides began to develop through political exchanges, with UMNO members visiting CCP six times between 1994 and 2016, either individually or in the context of a visiting BN delegation. In contrast, the CCP, visited the Malaysian ruling party almost on annual basis-attending the annual UMNO General Assembly, conducting special meetings with top UMNO leaders (especially former prime ministers, Abdullah Badawi and Najib Razak) and signing of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on party-to-party cooperation. Political mutual trust was cemented between UMNO and CCP when both parties agreed to adhere to a list of principles in the MOU (signed on August 2010) such as jointly working towards a strategic partnership based on mutual respect, equality, and non-interference in internal affairs.37 Despite UMNO losing power in the May 2018 elections, the partyto-party relations continued under the PH government with the CCP delegation paying a high-profile visit to the BN headquarters in June 2019.38 Therefore, it was not surprising that the CCP delegation visited the BN headquarters at a time when former Prime Minister Mahathir was bent on renegotiating megaprojects with the Chinese companies as signed during the tenure of the BN administration. The other BN’s component party which has long-standing relations with the CCP is the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA).39 MCA was relatively a latecomer in institutionalizing ties as only in July 2014 did the party sign its own MOU with the CCP. The MOU detailed the sharing of governing experiences, party cadre training and think tank-media organization exchanges between both parties.40 But more importantly, when President Xi Jinping articulated the BRI in late 2013, MCA took the opportunity to play the key role of being a mediator between the government and China to actively promote the initiative in Malaysia. According to Ngeow, the Director of the Institute of China Studies at the University of Malaya, in order to be relevant, MCA took part actively in BRI negotiations. This was because MCA’s position in BN was relatively weak after the 13th general elections as a result of declining support among Chinese Malaysian voters.41 With regular interactions between MCA and CCP for party cadre training and promotion of BRI activities, the strengthened relationship between the two political parties not only made MCA relevant but also

36 Jiang, “Remembering the ‘Ice-Breaking Trip’ that Established the Relationship between the Ruling Parties of China and Malaysia,” p. 22. 37 Ngeow (2017, p. 69). 38 BN Hargai Sokongan Berterusan Parti Pemerintah China (BN Appreciates the Support by the Chinese Ruling Party) (2019). 39 Two former BN’s Chinese-majority parties, Parti Gerakan Malaysia (Gerakan) and Sarawak United Peoples’ Party (SUPP) also have political ties with the CCP. 40 “Huang jiaquan: mahua zhonggong qian beiwanglu, shenhua jiaoliu li hui liang guo (Ong Ka Chuan: MCA and CCP Signed MOU, Deepening Exchanges and Benefitting Two Countries) (2014). 41 Gong jian yidai yilu, gong hui hezuo yuanjing (Built the “Belt and Road” Together, Drawing a Vision of Cooperation) (2019); Ngeow, “Barisan Nasional and the Chinese Communist Party: A Case Study in China’s Party-based Diplomacy,” p. 74.

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an essential conduit in developing Malaysia–China relations within the context of a rising China. With the re-election of Mahathir as the seventh Malaysian Prime Minister following the watershed elections in May 2018, leaders of the PH’s component parties began building their own political ties with the Chinese counterparts. Although Mahathir was well connected with the Chinese leaderships during his previous premiership, other senior leaders of the PH coalition were not. Chinese leaders too had to re-establish relationship with the new PH government. Beijing spent time building political ties with senior leaders of the administration, including the then Deputy Prime Minister, Wan Azizah, Finance Minister, Lim Guan Eng and Minister of Economic Affairs, Azmin Ali. The Chinese ambassador to Malaysia, Bai Tian, actively sought meetings with these leaders and coordinated official visits of PH leaders to China. Also, particular attention has to be given to the CCP’s effort in building political ties with the Democratic Action Party (DAP)-the PH’s component party which is overwhelmingly dominated by Chinese Malaysian politicians. Therefore, it is not surprising DAP was the first PH’s component party to be invited to China right after the change in government.42 As for the current PN government, political ties with China has been continued with the support of the foreign minister, Hishammuddin Hussein. As an experienced UMNO politician, Hishamuddin has served as full minister under the previous Mahathir, Badawi and Najib administrations. Having built his China ties over the years, his appointment as the Malaysian foreign minister is an advantage for Chinese leaders. In a press conference in March 2020, Hishamuddin indicated that China was perceived as a priority state in Malaysia’s foreign policy agenda, together with Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE).43 In combatting the COVID-19 pandemic, it is common knowledge that Hishamuddin has had close consultation with the Chinese ambassador, Bai Tian and foreign minister, Wang Yi. The close contact was evident when Hishammuddin posted his live phone call to Bai to thank him for the assistance given by the Chinese government, on his Facebook.44 Hishammuddin’s close relations with his Chinese counterparts, it is expected to continue in the foreseeable future for several reasons. As the incumbent foreign minister, his influence is expected to increase compared to past administrations. The reason for this is closely related to Prime Minister Muhyiddin’s fragile government. The Muhyiddin administration is a coalition comprised of multiple parties with the prime minister’s party having the least number 42 Chinese Embassy Holds National Day Reception in Malaysia (2019), Ambassador Bai Tian called on Minister Azmin Ali (2018), Fanghua chu jiaqiang liangguo guanxi, lin guanying: shouxiang ling jiaodai renwu (China Visit More than Strengthening Bilateral Ties, Lim Guan Eng: Prime Minister Delegated Special Tasks For Me) (2019), Malaixiya fu shouxiang shouci fanghua, quebao mazhong guanxi chixu jiaqiang (Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister’s First Visit to China, To Ensure Malaysia-China Relations Continued to be Strengthened) (2019), and Lin jixiang deng ba huojian guohui yiyuan fang hua (Lim Kit Siang and DAP’s Members of Parliament Visit China) (2018). 43 MGTV Live: Hari Pertama Datuk Seri Hishammuddin di Wisma Putra (MGTV Live: First Day of Datuk Seri Hishammuddin in Wisma Putra) (2020). 44 Hussein (2020).

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of seats. Hence in reality, he has lesser control over the whole political partnership. Given this situation, Muhyiddin is constantly confronted with an array of internal and external challenges emanating from his coalition partners. In addition, the prime minister has his hands tied up with by health and economic related issues whereby he needs the support of his coalition partners.45 The Muhyiddin administration is also challenged by the opposition bloc which is attempting to change the government once again. As long as Prime Minister Muhyiddin is constantly challenged, the space is left open for Hishammuddin to play an unprecedented role in setting and implementing his foreign policy priorities without substantial interferences from the prime minister himself unlike past administrations. This bodes well for Malaysia– China relations as Hishamuddin has high regards for Beijing’s status in the current world order.

5.4.2 Enduring Economic and People-to-People Ties The other mutual trust-building factor for future Malaysia–China relations is the enduring economic and people-to-people ties between the two nations. Unlike political ties which is confined to a small circle of top political elites, both economic and people-to-people ties are broader in nature. Whilst enduring economic ties has resulted in mutual trust-building aim at fulfilling collective economic visions of top leaders, the people-to-people ties here refers to continuous solidarity from the grassroots of both societies in dealing with humanitarian issues. Economically, mutual trust between Malaysia and China has been inculcated through three major developments: the 1997 Asian financial crisis; the upgrading of ASEAN–China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) agreement; and domestic economic reforms of the PH administration under Prime Minister Mahathir. In the first financial crisis faced by Malaysia since the end of the Cold War, the 1997 Asian financial crisis contributed to the strengthening of mutual trust between Kuala Lumpur and Beijing. When confronted with the devaluation of major Asian currencies, the then Mahathir administration decided to tether the exchange rate of the ringgit to the rate of RM 3.80 to US$ 1.46 When such a move was criticised heavily by Western countries, China supported the action. Beijing perceived the policy as Malaysia’s show of selfdetermination in responding to the financial crisis. Later, when Mahathir proposed the East Asian Monetary Fund (EAMF) two years after the failure of Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) proposal, China also perceived the idea as being in tandem with its own aspiration for the establishment of East Asian regionalism.47 The shared 45 Azhar

(2020). Of the 114 majority seats PN commanded in the Parliament, Muhyiddin’s party, Parti Pribumi Malaysia (PPBM) occupied lesser number of seats as compared to its coalition partner, BN. The latter is the major party alliance within the coalition with 43 seats (39 from UMNO). 46 Akhir (2000, pp. 81–102). 47 Ng (1999). It is important to note that China agreed to the East Asian Monetary Fund (EAMF) but expressed reservation in the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) as proposed by Japan in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis.

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regionalism agenda brought Malaysia and China closer. As a result of Beijing’s support for Malaysia during the financial crisis, Malaysia returned the favour by supporting China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001.48 Following successful implementation of the ACFTA in 2010, Chinese Premier, Li Keqiang further proposed for the upgrading of the existing free trade agreement with ASEAN.49 In collective search for upgraded cooperation between ASEAN and China, both Prime Minister Najib and his counterpart, Premier Wen Jiabao leveraged on the established mutual trust to develop a new model of bilateral economic cooperation in April 2012.50 Known as “two countries, twin parks” (liang guo shuang yuan), the model of cooperation was first of its kind between China and ASEAN that was aimed to develop industrial clusters within designated industrial parks and zones. As a start, the Malaysia–China Kuantan Industrial Park (MCKIP) and its Chinese equivalent, China–Malaysia Qinzhou Industrial Park (CMQIP), were established by Kuala Lumpur and Beijing to begin attracting local and international investors.51 With the successful implementation of the new model of international cooperation, Thailand and Indonesia were strongly encouraged to form similar partnerships in establishing industrial parks with China in the foreseeable future. In short, the “two countries, twin parks” concept is relied upon by Malaysia and China as the new model of economic cooperation to realize the upgraded FTA between Beijing and its other ASEAN counterparts. The third development in Malaysia–China relations, coincided with the domestic economic reforms undertaken during the PH administration (May 2018–February 2020). As one of Malaysia’s main foreign investors, China was particularly affected by Prime Minister’s Mahathir attempts to renegotiate projects involving China as a direct or partial stakeholder within the context of the BRI. The ECRL, Kuala LumpurSingapore High Speed Rail, Multi-Product Pipeline (MPP) and Trans-Sabah Gas Pipeline (TSGP) projects signed by the previous Najib administration, were subsequently reviewed by the PH government for their compatibility to Malaysia’s national interest and the administration’s call for transparency.52 However, the move by the PH administration ignited concern among the Chinese investors because almost all the megaprojects under review were related to the Chinese companies in Malaysia.53 As a result, many Chinese investors were quite reluctant to continue investing in Malaysia. 48 China,

Malaysia sign WTO deal (2000). ASEAN to accelerate upgraded FTA negotiations (2014). 50 Wen Jiabao meets with Malaysian Prime Minister Najib (2012). 51 Malaysia-China kuantan industrial park on track to achieve investment target: Chairman (2017), and Qinzhou industrial park (Guangxi) development Co. Ltd. (2015). 52 Dr. M: Harapan to review ‘Unbeneficial’ Foreign Projects, May Nix ECRL (2018), Akhir (2018), p. 5. The KL-Singapore HSR is temporarily postponed between Malaysia and Singapore in September 2018. 53 Ximeng zhengfu xin zuofeng, mazhong zong shanghui: zhongzi guanwang (PH Government’s New Governance Style, Malaysia-China Chamber of Commerce: Chinese Investors Adopted Waitand-See Attitude) (2018). 49 “China,

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That said a few months later, Malaysia–China economic ties were revived after the PH administration explained that the reviewing of megaprojects were part of a reform agenda to clean up opaque business practices and not simply targeting of Chinese companies. To encourage more investments from China, the former Deputy Minister of International Trade and Industry, Ong Kian Ming welcomed China to invest in Malaysia’s newly established Industry 4.0 policy which aimed at attracting joint collaborations between Malaysian and international investors in new technological transfer partnerships and smart manufacturing processes.54 Ong pointed out that between 2016 and 2018, China has already become Malaysia’s largest investor in terms of approved manufacturing projects.55 By Ong acknowledging the situation, it was apparent that the PH government was very keen to continue collaborating with the Chinese companies. Among all, the most vivid scene which left a strong impression among Chinese investors was the meeting between Prime Minister Mahathir and Alibaba’s founder, Jack Ma, in June 2018.56 The meeting, which took place in less than 2 months after the change of political regime in Malaysia, significantly dispelled the lingering concerns among Chinese investors, especially in regard to the PH administration’s stance on investments from China. In light of the uncertainty from Chinese investors, the presence of a technology giant like Jack Ma, in Malaysia was an affirmation that both countries trusted each other as economic partners and were willing to venture into the new area of high-technology cooperation. More significantly, in line with Malaysia’s new economic transformation priorities, Premier Li subsequently expressed China’s willingness to integrate Malaysia’s aim of initiating high-technology based cooperation in e-commerce, automotive industry, science and technology as well as financial sector into Beijing’s broader BRI framework.57 Instead of witnessing erosion of relations, the PH administration’s domestic economic reforms saw the government and business players of both countries willing to build a more trusted partnership in the new area of high-technology based economy. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, people-to-people ties was already robust in the context of Malaysia–China relations. For instance, natural disasters have become a common factor in bringing Chinese and Malaysians to jointly assist in relief efforts. During the 2008 Great Sichuan earthquake (or Wenchuan earthquake)58 in China, the deadliest of its kind since the 1976 Tangshan earthquake, Malaysians from all walks of life donated to China’s earthquake victims. The Penang Chinese Chamber of Commerce (PCCC) and Penang Chinese Assembly Hall immediately donated US$ 152,905 to the Chinese embassy in Kuala Lumpur four days after the natural disaster took place in Sichuan.59 Meanwhile, Malaysian singers also performed in

54 Malaysia

aims to draw high-tech Chinese investments (2019).

55 Ibid. 56 Alibaba founder Jack Ma meets Malaysian PM, ‘Surprised’ by Mahathir’s tech knowledge (2018). 57 China

pledges to lift ties to Malaysia to new high (2018). et al. (2008). 59 Malaysia’s PCCC to donate to earthquake victims in China (2008). 58 Tran

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a fund-raising charity night at Mines Resort City that was attended by local citizens in a show of solidarity with the earthquake victims in Sichuan Province. The concert alone managed to collect US$ 2.2 million which was later handed to the then Chinese ambassador, Cheng Yonghua by the charity event’s organizers.60 Following this event, Malaysian relief efforts continued with local companies and associations such as the Al-Bukhary Foundation, Lim Kok Wing University of Creative Technology, Cheng Ho Multi-Culture Education Trust, Berjaya Group, Parkson Co. Ltd., Perfect Co. Ltd. and Malaysia–China Friendship Association, donating a further US$ 1.5 million for the Sichuan Province earthquake victims.61 A similar natural disaster which occurred in the East Coast of Malaysia at the end of December 2014 saw China providing relief assistance to the affected Malaysians. In what was Malaysia’s worst floods in the 43 years, the heavy downpour affected as many as 200,000 people in the states of Terengganu, Kelantan and Pahang. Through the former Chinese ambassador, Huang Huikang, the Chinese government expressed its concerns and solidarity for the victims of the floods in the East Coast.62 While the Chinese embassy donated US$ 14,000 to the three affected East Coast states, the Red Cross Society of China too handed in a donation of US$ 100,000 to its counterpart, the Malaysian Red Crescent Society.63 In addition, Chinese companies in Malaysia such as the China South Locomotive and Rolling Stock Industry Group (CSRG), China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC) and Beijing Urban Construction Group (BUCG) also donated US$ 253,000 and 10,000 candles for the flood victims in the affected areas. Last but not least, the China Enterprises Association in Malaysia and the Chinese organizer of ‘Dynamic Yunnan’ musical show forked out another US$ 14,000 and US$ 9,500 respectively, for the relief efforts in Malaysia’s East Coast states.64 Going beyond the COVID-19 pandemic era, there is little indication that such bilateral economic and people-to-people ties would deteriorate sharply in the near future. Without interference from other external factors, they will only become deeper as China is currently Malaysia’s largest trade partner, investor in the manufacturing sector and third largest source of tourists.65 Malaysia, on the other hand, is China’s second largest investor within ASEAN countries in 2018 and is home to the first

60 Malaysia holds charity night for Sichuan earthquake victims (2008). The organizers of the charity

night were the four Malaysian groups, namely, Associated Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Malaysia (ACCCIM), The Federation of Chinese Associations Malaysia (Huazong), Malaysia-China Friendship Association (PPMC) and Malaysia-China Business Council (MCBC). 61 Malaysia donates $1.5 Mln in materials to China Quake-hit zones (2008). 62 “Huang Huikang dashi chuxi mahua gonghui dong haian shuizai zhenji juankuan ji wuzi yijiao yishi (Ambassador Huang Huikang Attended MCA’s East Coast Flood Relief Fund and Supplies’ Handover Ceremony) (2014). 63 China stands by Malaysia to overcome flood disaster (2015). 64 Ibid. 65 Syahirah (2020), Approved Investments in the Manufacturing, Services and Primary Sectors in 2019 Totalled RM 207.9 Billion (2020), Tan (2020).

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Chinese university campus outside of the mainland.66 That said, the projection of future Malaysia–China relations would be incomplete without accounting the two erosion factors that would threaten bilateral mutual trust in the post-MCO era.

5.4.3 Potential Tensions from the SCS Dispute Besides the political, economic and people-to-people factors that have been explained above, there are also security factors that continue to impact Malaysia–China relations. The most critical is the potential tensions from the long-standing SCS dispute. From the Malaysian government’s perspective, its position is clear and consistent where Kuala Lumpur upholds the sovereignty and territorial integrity of what it claims in the SCS, believes all parties must resolve the dispute peacefully in line with principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982), and recognizes the freedom of navigation in the SCS as guaranteed by international law.67 Coincidentally, the SCS dispute became a national headline in the midst of Malaysia trying to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. On April 16, it was reported that a Chinese maritime vessel tagged a Petronas-operated exploration vessel (West Capella) in an undisclosed site within Malaysian-claimed waters in the SCS.68 As confirmed by Zubil Mat Som, the Director-General of Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), the Chinese survey ship (known as Haiyang Dizhi 8) was actively monitoring oil exploration works by the Malaysian national oil conglomerate, Petronas within Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).69 The news resulted in considerable responses from political as well as societal leaders in the country. It was perceived that China was taking advantage of Malaysia’s concentration on tackling the COVID-19 pandemic. There were mixed reactions from several quarters. In a low-key response to the unexpected news, the Malaysian foreign minister, Hishammuddin Hussein called for calm from all quarters and reaffirmed the country’s commitment in peacefully handling the SCS dispute. In addition, he ensured the public that Malaysia’s communications with the Chinese and American counterparts remained open during this period despite the country being pre-occupied with containing the COVID-19 pandemic.70 That assurance, however, did not resonate with several leaders. As an example, the former foreign minister, Anifah Aman, 66 National bureau of statistics of China (2019), and Xiamen University Malaysia opens in Selangor

for enrolment (2015). statement on South China Sea by YB Dato’ Hishammuddin Tun Hussein (2020). 68 Latiff and Pearson (2020). 69 Noor and Hilmi (2020). 70 Tang (2020). In Hishammuddin’s remark, he highlighted that a non-issuance of public statement did not mean Malaysia had not been working to safeguard its interests and rights in the South China Sea as well as communicating with both the Chinese and American counterparts. 67 Press

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demanded the PN administration object via a diplomatic note to the Chinese counterpart.71 Similarly, the Parti Keadilan Rakyat’s youth leader, Nik Nazmi who is from the opposition camp claimed that the Chinese action was a form of opportunism in the middle of COVID-19 pandemic. Like Anifah Aman, he too demanded for an official protest against Beijing.72 As for societal responses, the most vocal one came from Ronald Benjamin, the Secretary for the Association for Community and Dialogue. who criticized the PN administration’s low-key approach to the incident. He forewarned by not criticizing China, Beijing may one day use economic and military intimidation to dominate the SCS which is potentially rich with oil reserves.73 These nationalistic responses clearly indicate that the SCS dispute is a contentious issue for the country as much as it is for China. The failure to manage the territorial dispute will certainly upset Malaysia–China relations as well as the mutual trust that has been built for decades since normalization of bilateral relations in 1974. The fact that the SCS dispute is a long-standing one shows that it is extremely difficult to deal with an issue which concerns sovereignty and territorial integrity of both countries. Moreover, there is also nationalistic sentiments which can easily be provoked among the local populace whenever an incident occurs in the disputed sea-a contentious issue that has been repeatedly downplayed by Putrajaya and Beijing. For Malaysia, the utility of maintaining a low-key approach in dealing with China on the SCS dispute is contingent upon the magnitude, type and timing of actions of Chinese maritime vessels in the contentious sea. Any amplification by China in the SCS will exert significant pressure on the Malaysian government to re-evaluate its long-standing low-key approach in dealing with maritime issues with Beijing.

5.4.4 Possible Support Pressure from the US The other contentious external factor with potential to derail Malaysia–China relations is the American pressure for Putrajaya to support its Indo-Pacific vision. Despite the signing of the US-China Phase One trade deal in mid-January 2020, it failed to calm the bilateral ties as the COVID-19 pandemic struck the world less than two months later. As coined by Nikkei Asian Review, the global pandemic exposed the deep mistrust between the two powers to the extent that the Trump administration openly designated China as the party responsible for the global health crisis.74 In a myriad of factors involving the pandemic impact on the American economy, President Trump’s re-election strategy and China’s aggressive COVID-19 campaign against the US and the West at large (associating outbreak containment with different governance systems), what understood to be economic-technological frictions during 71 Aman

(2020). statement by YB Nik Nazmi on the issue of Chinese vessels in the South China Seas: The government must take a stand on the Chinese provocation in the South China Sea (2020). 73 Benjamin (2020). 74 Akita (2020). 72 Media

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the trade war, have now been elevated into political and ideological tensions between the two powers.75 As a founding member of ASEAN which is also the claimant in the South China Sea dispute, Malaysia is very much exposed to the pressures coming from the US in gaining third party’s support for its payback strategy against China.76 With the US– China rivalry likely to continue, it is entirely reasonable to expect Washington to keep up the pressure on Southeast Asian countries to go against China. Thus far, in terms of Malaysia–China relations, the Malaysian strategy is rightly perceived by the prominent Malaysian scholar, Kuik Cheng-Chwee, to be a ‘light hedging’ strategy-unlike the ‘heavy hedgers’ adopted by Indonesia and Singapore-characterized by low-key dominance-denial (political hedge) and indirect-balancing (military hedge).77 The dominance-denial refers to the extent to which Malaysian political elites perceived China as a ‘challenge’ instead of a ‘threat’ in which Beijing has to be engaged rather than balanced in accordance to ASEAN-based norms. As for indirect-balancing, the Malaysian political elites throughout successive administrations, have engaged in low-profile military cooperation with the US as part of its aim to mitigate the security risks posed by Beijing.78 As far as political hedging is concerned, there exists mutual trust between Malaysia and China in responding to challenges in bilateral relations. Hishammuddin’s emphasis on open communications with Beijing during the SCS’s tagging incident,79 further confirms that Malaysian political elites continue to pursue lowkey dominance-denial in their dealings with China. By viewing China as a state that prefers engagement instead of confrontation in managing the SCS dispute, Malaysia has successively maintained bilateral consultations. However, with Washington’s pressure for Malaysia to support its Indo-Pacific vision looked ever more probable in the near future, it remained to be seen if Malaysia can continue with its low-key indirect-balancing approach without any significant pressure from the US. By all means, any alteration to low-profile indirect-balancing to high-profile version, or conversion into direct-balancing altogether, would fundamentally erode mutual trust between Malaysia and China.

75 Rushe

(2020), Anita (2020), Croucher (2020), Waterson and Kuo (2020), Wu (2020), and Akita, “Coronavirus Pandemic Pushes US and China into New Cold War.” 76 Fang and Kawanami (2020). 77 Kuik (2015, pp. 18–20). 78 Ibid. 79 Ashley Tang, “Malaysia Calls for Calm and Stability in South China Sea after ‘Tagging’ Incident Involving Chinese, M’sian Vessels”.

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5.5 Conclusion From the assessments of this book chapter, it is shown that the COVID-19 pandemic would not alter Malaysia–China relations during and beyond the outbreak period. During the pandemic period in Malaysia, the negative impact of online stigmatization of Chinese nationals among certain segments of Malaysian society, was far from being able to erode long-standing mutual trust between both countries. As opposed to that, bilateral mutual trust remained strong during the COVID-19 pandemic in which the unprecedented event resulted in reciprocal medical assistance between Malaysia and China to combat the outbreak. The prospect of Malaysia–China relations, however, lied on the existing multidimensional factors that would continue in the post-MCO era. As shown from the past until today, continuing political ties as well as enduring economic and peopleto-people ties, are the two building factors for Malaysia–China mutual trust that we witnessed today. That said, Malaysia–China relations could still face deterioration of ties despite having such strong foundation of mutual trust between both sides. The potential fallout from the South China Sea dispute and possible American pressure for Malaysia to support its Indo-Pacific vision, remained to be the two strong erosion factors which indisputably, had the capacity in eroding long-standing mutual trust between Malaysia and China. With the international order bracing for uncertainties in the foreseeable future, these two erosion factors are important yardsticks for future observations of the bilateral relations.

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Zhongguo fangyi zhuanjia chengzan da ma weisheng bu nimen Boleh! (Chinese Epidemic Expert Praises Malaysia’s Health Ministry You All Boleh!). Lianhe ribao (United Daily). (2020, April 23). https://eunited.com.my/389760/. Accessed May 6, 2020.

Chapter 6

Myanmar’s Response to COVID-19 and Its Impacts on China–Myanmar Relations Myint San

6.1 Introduction The COVID-19 is spreading across the world at alarming speed, which has affected the economic activity in the developing countries in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS). The serious consequences mainly include the temporary decline in domestic consumption and investment, the declines in tourism and business travel, spillovers of weaker demand to other sectors and economies through trade and production linkages, supply-side disruptions to production and trade, and negative effects on health, such as increased disease and mortality as well as shifts in health care spending.1 Although Myanmar has seen a moderate impact from global COVID-19 outbreak, the country’s reliance on international trade including border trade with neighboring countries, investment and technology means it will face near-and medium-term economic challenges including the implementation of BRI and China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). The objective of this chapter is to analyze the situation of COVID-19 pandemic in Myanmar and its impacts on China–Myanmar relations. The main content is divided into seven parts, in which the first part breifly introduced the main objective of this chapter. The next three parts focused on Myanmar’s response to the COVID-19, the economic impacts of the COVID-19 on Myanmar and Myanmar government’s emergency measures. The complicated impacts of the COVID-19 on Myanmar-China Relations and the BRI/CMEC Projects were assessed in Part Five and Six, and the conclusion is made in the final part. 1 Economic

impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on developing Asia (2020).

The views on this book chapter do not represent Dawei SEZ Management Committee and all of shortcomings are responsible by author. M. San (B) Dawei SEZ Management Committee, Dawei, Myanmar e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 N. Peng (ed.), The Reshaping of China-Southeast Asia Relations in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4416-7_6

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6.2 Myanmar Government’s Response to Pandemic After announcing the COVID-19 as global pandemic on March 11 by WHO, the Government of Myanmar responded with a series of meetings facilitated by the Ministry of Health and Sports (MOHS). These meetings eventually led to the formation of the National Central Committee to Prevent, Control and Treat COVID-19 on March 13. The Committee is led by State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and has the responsibility of overseeing the management of preventing the spread of COVID-19 in the country. On March 23, the first positive COVID-19 case was confirmed in Myanmar and the first COVID-related death was announced on March 31. As of July 18, Myanmar had 341 confirmed cases, 6 death, and 276 recovery cases. Compared to other affected countries, Myanmar can still control the virus to some extent due to the restriction on movement and transportation including ordering people to stay at home, shutting down public transport, and prohibiting gathering of five or more people. Moreover, due to its proximity to China, Myanmar’s early response was to curtain the entry of Chinese travels by suspending visa-on-arrival privileges, cancelling flights between some high-risk provinces in China and Myanmar, and setting more restrictive conditions for those were allowed to enter the country.2 To prevent and contain any potential spread of the virus, the government of Myanmar strictly quarantined all returnees from abroad especially from China, Thailand, Malaysia and India and all individuals who were in contact with test-positive patients. In April alone, the government placed almost 48,000 people under mandatory quarantine at (8,300) government-facilitated quarantine under watch for an additional 7 days according to MOHS. On April 6, the Central and regional governments issued a nationwide stay-athome in order to contain the spread and to prevent outbreaks of COVID-19 in the country.3 This was the most radical policy imposed by the government and is termed a “lockdown” of the country. Government urged all citizens to stay at home as much as possible during the Myanmar New Year Holidays (April 10–17). The government announced the closure of schools, public events, large gatherings and religious events until April 30, which was extending to July 15, except bazaars, super markets and other public related services. Several areas including major cities of Yangon, Mandalay and Nay Pyi Taw imposed curfew. On April 6, the government released a statement indicating that people without regular income during the Water Festival and Myanmar New Year (about 10 days) will be supplied with five items of basic food from April 10. Electricity bill up to 150 units per households was exempted for April and exempted an additional 75 units per household from May 1 to 15. Since April 11, all coming travellers including Myanmar citizens will be subject to 21-day facility quarantine and 7-dat home quarantine on their arrival in Myanmar. As part of the medical assistance, two groups of medical experts from China’s Yunnan province and Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) assisted in 2 Government

suspends visa privilege for Chinese, mulls border shutdown (2020). state issue heavy restriction on movement ahead of thingyan (Myanmar New Year) to curb COVID-19 (2020).

3 Myanmar’s

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Myanmar’s prevention, control and treatment measures against COVID-19. Moreover, the government of China made fourth donations for COVID-19 measure to the MOHS in Myanmar on June 8. At the handing over ceremony held in Nay Pyi Taw, the Chinese Ambassador said that this 8 June marks “the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Myanmar”. He also said both nations have established themselves with mutual respect, support assistance and development through hardships and are continuing this support during the COVID-19 pandemic. He said that he hoped this donation, on behalf of the government of China, would support Myanmar’s efforts against the disease and further strengthen the bilateral relations between two countries. The Union Minister said that China has donated medicines, medical and laboratory equipment worth US$ 6.3 million, including this fourth donation to Myanmar. The Minister thanked the government of China for sending medical professionals, providing laboratory training, and making donations for measures against COVID-19 to Myanmar according to Myanmar News Agency on June 9.

6.3 Economic Impacts of COVID-19 on Myanmar The ongoing COVID-19 outbreak has affected Myanmar through numerous channels including sharp declines in domestic demand, lower tourism and business travel, trade and production linkages, supply disruptions and health effects.4 The magnitude of economic impact will depend on how the outbreak evolve, which will remains highly uncertain. There are several channels through which the COVID-19 outbreak will affect economic activity in Myanmar and the world. These include a sharp but temporary decline in domestic consumption and other outbreak-affected economies, and possibly investment if the outbreak affects views on future business activity; declines in tourism and business travel; spillovers of weaker demand to other sectors and economies through trade and production linkages; supply-side disruptions to production and trade (which are distinct from demand-side shocks spilling over through trade and production linkages); and effects on health such as increased disease and mortality as well as shifts in health care spending. According to the study of International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Myanmar’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fall by 41% compared with a normal situation without COVID-19 during the two-week lockdown period, followed by agriculture output declined by 14%, industry output 52%, manufacturing output 40%, construction 82% and services 56% respectively.5 The World Bank (WB) recently said that the global COVID-19 pandemic is dealing a severe below to the Myanmar’s economy and the economic growth could

4 Economic

impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on developing Asia (2020). COVID-19 on Myanmar’s economy: A social accounting matrix (SAM) multiplier approach (2020).

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drop from 6.8 to 0.5% this fiscal year.6 In the finding of WB, the COVID-19 pandemic has interrupted Myanmar’s economic expansion, and while Myanmar is expected to narrowly escape a recession, helped by a strong start to the fiscal year, policy responses, and the limited disease outbreak, the growth recovery is at great risk. The impacts of the crisis transmit through external and domestic channels, and are not evenly distributed across sectors: tourism-related services and transportation activities are highly exposed to the pandemic, while the agriculture and Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sectors have proven relatively resilient. Indeed, the ICT sector is experiencing a surge of activity driven by a sudden increase in telecommuting and e-commerce. Precautionary behavior and travel bans continue to negatively impact wholesale and retail trade, tourism-related services, and transportation, and the service sector (which represents 42% of the economy) growth rate is expected to fall to 1%. Meanwhile, industrial production (36% of the economy) is expected to contract by-0.2% in 2019–20 as lockdown measures restrict access to labor, the closure of the overland border with China disrupts the supply of industrial inputs, and both domestic and international consumer demand remain soft. Agriculture sector (22% of the economy) has proved resilient with growth estimated to slow by less than in other sectors, to 0.7%, thanks to strong crop production offsetting a weakening livestock and fisheries sector. Domestic risks are compounded by heightened external uncertainty, including the possibility of a deeper global recession. While firms in all sectors have been affected by COVID-19, the nature and severity of the pandemic’s impact differ substantially across sectors. Agriculture firms were the most likely to report cash flow shortages and diminished access to credit, reflecting their greater vulnerability to economic crises. Most surveyed firms were not able to adopt new mechanisms to cope with the challenges posed by COVID-19. Slowing economic growth threatens to partially reverse Myanmar’s recent progress in poverty reduction. Urban residents are highly exposed to both the health risks and economic effects of COVID-19. An anticipated decline in international remittances could directly reduce household income, though such remittances are concentrated among non-poor households. Many poor households are especially exposed to the effects of the COVID-19 crisis due to job insecurity, employment in the informal sector, and low savings. According to the study of International Monetary Fund (IMF), Myanmar has seen a sharp decline in exports, remittances, and tourist arrival.7 At the same time, domestic economic activity has been constrained by measures taken to control the spread of the virus. Such disruptions have affected households and businesses. Furthermore, nearly four out of five workers in Myanmar are employed in the informal sector, with limited access to social safety nets. At the same time, gas prices have taken a hit as global oil prices collapsed. Natural gas comprised 40% of exports and 20% of government revenues in fiscal year 2018–19. Social spending, particularly on health, is expected to increase over the medium term. The government intends to raise cash and in-kind transfers to the most vulnerable and at-risk groups in all regions of the 6 Myanmar 7 De

economic monitor June 2020: Myanmar in the time of COVID-19 (2020). and Sanaa (2020).

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country. Proactive monetary and financial sector policies will continue to support the economic recovery while remaining anchored on ensuring macroeconomic and financial stability. As a result, risks to debt sustainability are limited, despite the increase in urgently needed spending. The spending needed to support urgent recovery measures, as well as the decline in revenues, will raise Myanmar’s fiscal deficit and put pressure on funding. However, risks to debt sustainability are limited as both domestic and external debts are relatively low, allowing a scaling up of lower cost external borrowing to support faster and more inclusive growth. According to the Citizen Budget of 2019–2020, domestic debt ratio to GDP was 22.24% while foreign debt ratio to GDP was 14.87%.8 Thus, total debt ratio (domestic and foreign) was 37.11% of GDP respectively.

6.4 Myanmar’s Emergency Measures On 18 March, the Ministry of Planning, Finance and Industry announced the establishment of the COVID-19 Fund as an initial stimulus package to cushion the impact of COVID-19 on the country’s economy. The initial 100 billion Myanmar Kyats (nearly US$70 million or 0.01% of GDP) worth of loans will be managed by the Myanmar Economic Bank. This fund is to provide the affected businesses particularly priority on garment, hotel and tourism as well as small and medium-sized enterprises sectors with the one percent interest rate for one year period. The first group of local business that received the loan was announced by the government on April 28.9 On April 27, the Myanmar government also launched the “Overcoming as One: COVID-19 Economic Relief Plan” (CERP) which includes seven short-term goals to be complete before the end of year. The CERP seeks to mitigate the inevitable economic impact posed by COVID-19 while establishing foundations that will facilitate Myanmar’s rapid economic recovery, using all available policy instruments to the fullest possible extent, and as part of a coordinated whole of nation response. Key features of this plan includes steps to create domestic demand through increasing spending of the government on essential related to health care, critical infrastructure, social infrastructure to cushion the income losses of large sections of people in the formal and informal sector employment, incentives to the private sector to re-engage in production and ensure supply chains. Measures to enhance the liquidity in the system through intervention from the banking sector and the central bank are also envisaged. State Counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi said that this comprehensive Response Plan balances the needs of all stakeholders while leaving no one behind. The CERP consists of 7 Goals, 10 Strategies, 36 Action Plans and 76 Actions.10

8 Citizen

Budget of 2019–2020. (2020), Myanmar unveils $70-Million stimulus package to ease economic blow from virus. 10 Overcoming as one: COVID-19 economic relief plan (2020). 9 Lwin

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The plan is expected to cost a minimum of US$ 2 billion.11 Currently, Myanmar expects to receive around US$ 2 billion from up to five international development partners.12 According to the Ministry of Planning, Finance and Industry (July 17, 2020), Myanmar government will spend Myanmar Kyat 2850 billion or US$ 2.07 billion for the plan. Some experts estimated that Myanmar government will need to spend 5% of GDP for the economic recovery. This plan also includes providing monetary stimulus packages, exemption of tax and fees, easing the strains on banking sector and international trade. For labors and workers, the plan is to provide health care benefits for unemployed workers registered under Social Security Board from six months to one year from the date of unemployment. CERP identified a set of policy measures to promote investment from domestic and foreign investors which would enable expansion of economic activities. Easing of the permits, approvals and licenses for the companies that produce COVID-19 related medical equipment and supplies, supporting PPP model for quick and necessary infrastructure projects, are some of the actions that would bring back the economy on the track. Trade incentives would also enable competitiveness and bring a cushion to the exporters who faced difficulties due to the slump in the demand.

6.5 Impacts of COVID-19 on Myanmar–China Relations Myanmar serves as a land bridge between South Asia and Southeast Asia, in close proximity to large economies such as China and India. China is geographically sharing a long border and has good friendship relations and economic cooperation with Myanmar in the long history. When Myanmar was under the military rule from 1988 to 2011, China consistently supported and protected the military regime in the international diplomatic front. When Myanmar was under the heavy economic sanction imposed by the US and European Union (EU), China was the only country to lend the financial loans with a relatively high interest rate to the ruling government. At that time, the country’s economy was dependent on natural resources and became crony capitalism which created uneven distribution of wealth and a huge gap between the rich and the poor. The people’s perception towards China was getting worse as they felt that their big neighbor took advantages of the country in the most difficult time, by extraction valuable natural resources with cheap prices.13 Also the people did regard China-Myanmar relation as authoritarian-to-authoritarian relation to keep power and oppose the people without mercy. This impression was suddenly emerged in the form of anti-China sentiment along the people, whose voice has become load in the democratic transition in Myanmar after 2011. The social movements against the Chinese projects has increased dramatically when the country has open up the people regained their rights to demonstrate 11 Government

ministries allocate 10pc of budget for COVID-19 fund (2020).

12 Lwin (2020), Myanmar to receive $2B in COVID-19 relief from int’l development organizations. 13 Aung

(2020).

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lawfully under the democratic governance. The major problems of China’s projects are Myitsone Dam project for hydropwer in Kachin State, Lapataung Copper Mine project in Sagaing region, China-Myanmar gas pipeline projects and Kyaukphyu Deep Seaport and SEZ project in Rakhine State etc. China analyzed that these antiChina movements are funded by the Western governments and NGOs but they did not recognize that the root cause was China’s total negligence towards the suffering of the people under the opposition of the military rule. China–Myanmar relation has become complicated along with the political transition in Myanmar and Chinese leaders also had to review their policy and approach to their neighbor, changing the discourse from the government-to-government to people-to-people relation. Since political reform in 2011, Myanmar has been engaged in active participation with regional organizations. China is one of the strategic partners for Myanmar not only in economics but also in politics and international relations including peace process and Rakhine issue. Since 2017, Myanmar has begun to adopt ‘Look East Economic Policy’ and CMEC could serve as the starting point of cooperation. CMEC is set to become the most significant source of investment and support for the country’s economic growth. However, the outbreak of COVID-19 also greatly effects on the economic relations between Myanmar and China including the implementation of CMEC. In addition, since 2016, Myanmar’s civilian-led government also changed its economic policy and China adjusted their approach from emphasizing only on the extraction of natural resources from Myanmar to the proposal of logistic and industrial infrastructure construction that Myanmar needed for its economic development as shown in Table 6.1. With travel and border trade restrictions in place, the impact will be felt in Myanmar’s tourism related services, agricultural exports to China, and in supplychain disruptions to the manufacturing sector, particularly for garment, which account for 13% of exports.14 Tourism is an important source of revenue for Myanmarinternational tourism receipts US$ 2.2 billion in 2019. Since 2017, Myanmar is also promoting the tourism development and giving the special opportunities for Asian countries including China with special visa permission. After achieving the highest number of tourists in 2015, the number tourist declined especially due to the Rakhine crisis in Myanmar and western countries gave the pressure to Myanmar government. In order to response this situation, Myanmar government started to introduce special visa permission for China, Japan and South Korea on October 1, 2018. Importantly, Chinese visitors now comprise a significant share of tourists in Myanmar which was accounted for about 20% of total visitors. According to the Ministry of Tourism, the number of Chinese visitors increased from 62,018 in 2011 to 259, 592 in 2018. Income from hotels, restaurants and transport activities, which are partly support by tourism, represent 16% of GDP and have been significantly impacted by COVID-19. The Tourism Ministry said tourist arrivals in Myanmar are likely to drop 50% this year due to the outbreak. The Union of Myanmar Travel Association (UMTA) said that a total of US$ 800,000 worth of travel bookings have been canceled since late January due to the travel restrictions. Additionally, the aviation and tourism industries 14 Myanmar

economic monitor June 2020: Myanmar in the time of COVID-19 (2020).

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Table 6.1 Myanmar’s perception change and China’s adjustment No. Myanmar’s perception change

China’s adjustment

1

Focusing on infrastructure development

Proposing to construct railway, road and deep seaport

2

Focusing on industrial development

Proposing Special Economic Zone and Border Areas Economic Zones

3

Avoiding large hydropower dam projects

Building solar and gas power plants for electricity generation

4

Pushing more access to the Chinese market beyond Yunnan province

Agreeing to import more agricultural products from Myanmar

5

Reviewing the project contracts to have a fair deal

Accepting to review agreements (e.g. Kyaukphyu project

6

Projects must be Myanmar’s choices in line Accept that China’s projects must be in line with MSDP (Myanmar Sustainable with Myanmar’s development plan Development Plan (2018–2030)

7

Project concession must be through the international tender process

Accept the principle, losing previous privilege of the non-competition process

8

Project finance must be sought via international financial institution

Accept the condition, changing the condition of seeking Chinese loans alone

Source Zaw Aung, Myanmar’s economic cooperation with East Asia: a partnership for sustainable development

have drastically fallen with global travel restrictions. Travel and tourism in Myanmar employs over one million workers or 4.8% of total employment and contributes 4.6% of GDP. Myanmar passenger demand in aviation reduced by 48% between 2019 and 2020, with a revenue impact of over US$ 690 million. Many hotels and tour operators have shuttered since the border restrictions and lockdowns, reducing the 4 million travellers in 2019 to a trickle in 2020.15 Moreover, China is an important economic partner for Myanmar in terms of trade, investment. According to the Myanmar trade data, 36.5% of Myanmar’s export went to China while 31.41% of import came from China in 2017–18.16 The major composition of export products in 2017–18 were natural gas (22.98%), garment (17.6%), beans (6.02%) and jade (5.19%) respectively. On the other hand, the major import items from China were petroleum (19.44%), transport (car) (8.42%), steel and iron (7.25%) and machinery (7.23%) during the same period. In addition to normal trade, border trade is also very important for trade relation between Myanmar and China. According to the border trade data from Ministry of Commerce, Myanmar exported US$ 6,210 million while imported US$ 2,656 million, totaling US$ 8,866 million in 2018. China’s border trade occupied 58.51% of total border trade in 2018. Major border trade areas are Muse, Lwejel, Chin Shwe Haw and Kan Pitette. However, since late May, China has strictly control border gates between Yunnan Province and Myanmar to prevent the future spread of COVID-19. As a result, Myanmar farmers 15 Lim

(2020). Yearbook of Myanmar (2018).

16 Statistical

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and traders have been hurt badly following China’s restrictions and controls on the border. Myanmar government received criticisms from farmers and traders over significant decline in border trade and the Myanmar Consulate in Kunming discussed the issue with Chinese officials. The Consulate raised the issue that Myanmar’s seafood and fruit industries have suffered losses due to the restriction on the border because agricultural exports represent 19% of total export, or 4% of GDP, roughly half of which are sold to China. In Myanmar, the agriculture sector is also the biggest employer, accounting for as much as 78% of the rural labor force. Moreover, the layoffs in the garment manufacturing sector accounted for 500,000 jobs could affect households’ incomes and domestic remittances, especially if China’s supply chain disruptions are prolonged.17 Furthermore, China is one of the important foreign investors in Myanmar. Myanmar achieved the highest Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 2010– 11 and then declined because of low inflow of China investment probably due to Myitsone Dam project problem as well as political instability in Myanmar.18 China occupied the second largest FDI in 2019 which accounted for (25.63%) of total investment after the Singapore (26.59%). Oil and gas are major shares of China’s investment in Myanmar. China also invested pipeline project in Kyauk Phyu SEZ. This pipeline will transmit 22 million tons of crude to China. Myanmar will gain an annual road right fee, transit fee and earn revenue from the use of oil, sea port and oil tankers in relation to pipeline. Moreover, Myanmar has a right to buy two million tons of crude oil annually from the pipeline. In addition, labor migration has long been an important livelihood strategy for the people of Myanmar. There are more than 3 million Myanmar working overseas in Thailand, China, Malaysia and other countries which contribute to a US$ 3.5 billion remittance flow, that has been compromise due to the pandemic. Many have lost their jobs in their country of work and are forced to return home. Over 100,000 migrants have returned to Myanmar between March and June. Returning migrants also face social stigma due to the nature of COVID-19.19 Sending money home provides a measure of social protection. It mitigates the lack of government schemes to sufficiently protect households from exposure to the various social and economic strains associated with a sudden loss of income.20

17 Myanmar

Economic Monitor June 2020: Myanmar in the Time of COVID-19 (2020). Yearbook of Myanmar (2018). 19 Lim (2020). 20 Impact of COVID-19 on Myanmar’s migrants and remittances (2020). 18 Statistical

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6.6 Impacts of COVID-19 on BRI/CMEC Projects The proposal to build the CMEC under the cooperation framework of BRI between two countries was announced by China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi following a meeting with the State Counselor in November 2017. Wang said the economic corridor would enhance investment in development and trade as part of the BRI. Myanmar also welcomed and accepted China’s proposal with three conditions: (1) all the CMEC projects must be in line with Myanmar’s national development plan; (2) Myanmar must have the right to seek assistance from the international financial institutions; (3) all the projects must be opened to the transparent, competitive international tenders.21 Myanmar and China was signed three agreements as part of the BRI.22 The Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation; a MoU on the CMEC Cooperation Plan (2019–2030); and a MoU on the Formulation of the Five-year Development Program for Economic and Trade Cooperation, which aims to enhance cooperation in investment and productivity. Under the MOU, the governments agree to collaborate on projects in a number of sectors including basic infrastructure, construction, manufacturing, agriculture, transport, finance, human resources development telecommunications, and research and technology. The CMEC is aimed to construct basic infrastructure connecting key economic centers in Myanmar. Under the CMEC agreement, the Myanmar government agrees to build three economic border zones in Shan and Kachin states. An agreement on a feasibility study of the Muse–Mandalay Railway Project and a framework agreement for the development of Kyauk Phyu Special Economic Zone were signed; the tender for the New Yangon City Project led by the Yangon Regional Government and the China Communication Construction Company (CCCC) will be participated. China will also provide a grant of 1 billion Yuan (225.39 Billion Kyats, or approximately (US$ 148 million) for socioeconomic development projects under an economic and technical cooperation agreement signed in Beijing. In May, 2019, Myanmar government set out the team to negotiate BRI/CMEC projects by using following measures: (1) seek financing from international financial institutions to implement the projects; (2) invite international tenders to ensure international investment in the projects; (3) choose projects that create mutual benefits for both sides.23 The BRI/CMEC related projects should be not only economically feasible, but also socially and environmentally responsible. Moreover, the higherlevel meeting in 2019 between China and Myanmar also discussed China’s continuing help for Myanmar’s efforts to achieve peace and national reconciliation, ensure border stability and law enforcement, repatriate refugees in Rakhine State, cooperate on international relations, and promote tourism. Chinese President Xi Jinping visited to Myanmar in his first foreign trip on January 17–18, 2019. During his trip, Myanmar signed 33 agreements with China. President Xi called for the “deepening of results-oriented BRI cooperation and to move 21 Lwin

(2019), Government spells out conditions for signing BRI deals with China. (2019), In Myanmar, China’s BRI projects are old wine in a new bottle. 23 Myint (2019). 22 Lwin

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Table 6.2 Ten key agreement between Myanmar and China in 2020 1

Concession Agreement and Stakeholder’s Agreement of Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone and Deep Seaport Project

2

MoU between Yunnan Province and Mandalay Region under the Framework of Joint Building China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC)

3

MoU on accelerating on the Framework Agreement on the China-Myanmar Ruli-Muse Cross Border Economic Cooperation Zone

4

Exchange Letter for the Feasibility Study on the China Aid funded 3-Year Border Area Development Plan

5

MoU on Enhancing Infrastructure Development Cooperation

6

MoU on Conducting Feasibility Study of Myanmar-China Interconnection Project

7

MoU on Human Resource Development Cooperation

8

MoU on the Establishment of the Working Group for the Promoting of Smooth Trade

9

MoU on Promoting Production Capacity and Investment Cooperation

10

Letter of Intent Regarding New Urban Development of Yangon City

Source “State Counsellor, President Xi Jinping Hold Bilateral Talks, Witness Signing 33 Agreements”, State Counsellor Office of Myanmar, http://www.Statecounsellor.org.mm/en/node/ 2762

projects from a conceptual state to concrete planning and implementing in building the CMEC. In addition, during Xi’s visit, the Kyauk-Phyu deep seaport and SEZ, Myanmar–China border economic zones and New Yangon City development were described as the three pillars of the CMEC. As shown in Table 6.2, the ten key agreements out 33 with influence Myanmar–China economic cooperation under CMEC in the next decade. The construction of the China-backed Kyaukphyu deep-sea port will begin soon, as preparations on both the Myanmar and China sides are on track. According to the Ministry of Commerce, the first phase of deep seaport will be implemented with a US$ 1.5 billion.24 The multi-purpose container port of Kyaukphyu is expected to improve transport and logistics and strengthen inter-connectivity as well as spur the local economy. The deep seaport will contribute China, Myanmar and other countries to enhance trade and play an important role in accelerating regional economic integration. The Kyaukphyu SEZ is backbone project under CMEC, which is expected to boost development in China’s landlocked Yunnan province and provide China with direct access to the Indian Ocean, allowing its oil imports to bypass the Strait of Malacca. In November 2018, the Kyaukphyu SEZ Management Committee and the China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) signed a framework agreement for development of Kyaukphyu SEZ. The initial agreement called for a project worth US$ 9–10 billion, but two sides have agreed that the project will start out on a small or medium-size scale. The Myanmar government is ready to sign a framework agreement with China on the establishment of cross-border economic cooperation zones, paving the way 24 Lwin

(2020), Myanmar set to ink pact with China on border cooperation zones.

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for the implementation of Beijing’s grand infrastructure plans in the country as part of the CMEC. It is envisioned as a corridor for transporting goods to and from Yunnan’s Kunming via Myanmar’s Muse along trade routes in Shan State through Mandalay to the Kyaukphyu SEZ in Rakhine State. According to the Ministry of Commerce, the framework will cover a number of major agreements, particularly on the formation of a bilateral joint committee for the implementation of cross-border economic cooperation zones; the assignment of management role for the zones and types of incentives for the investors. The zones are in Kanpiketi town in Kachin State’s Special Region-1 (currently it is under the control of the New Democratic Army (NDA)-Kachin militia; Chin Shwe Haw in Shan State’s Laukkai Township which is part of the Kokang Self-Administrative Zone); and Muse Township in Shan State. Chin Shwe Haw and Muse are already major trading hubs along Myanmar’s border with China’s Yunnan Province. Currently, Kanpiketi does regular trade with China as well. But China wants to prioritize the implementation of Muse economic zone.25 The Yangon government backed New Yangon Development Company (NYDC) signed US$ 1.5 billion framework agreements in 2018 with China’s CCCC to draw up a proposal for the infrastructure. The 20,000-acre New Yangon City Project is also one of the projects under CMEC. However, the project has been a source of controversy due to its flood-prone location and involvement of CCCC. This company has been accused of engaging in corruption and bribery relating to development deals in at least 10 countries in Africa and Asia according to international media reports. CEO of NYDC, Serge Pun, said he is hopeful that the project will commence this year and there will be no change to the project plans, despite Myanmar and China’s economies facing significant slowdown due to the COVID-19 pandemic. He added that they may even accelerate as the CERP offers support for mega-infrastructure projects to mitigate the effects of COVID-19 and it is very important to proceed with BRI projects because one of the major difficulties we will face post COVID-19 is unemployment. Thus, the New Yangon City project will benefit thousands of people by giving them job opportunities.26 With the COVID-19 pandemic past its peak in China, attention has turned the Chinese government’s deployment of “Covid diplomacy”. This term frames how China’s government is sending medical supplies and personnel across the world including to Myanmar to build goodwill and show global leadership in fighting the pandemic. For BRI partners, some view China’s government are using such soft power to push through projects that may not be in the recipient’s best interests.27 In early April, 2020, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced US$ 6.78 million would be provided for 22 Myanmar projects under the Beijing-led LMC. Chinese Ambassador said the 33 agreements signed during President Xi Jinping’s visit in January, 2020 would continue to progress from the planning to implementing stage.28 25 Lwin

(2020), Myanmar set to ink pact with China on border cooperation zones. (2020) NYDC CEO says New Yangon city project will move forward. 27 Bharat (2020). 28 Ibid. 26 Lwin

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During the COVID-19 outbreak period, Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar Chen Hai and Myanmar’s Deputy Minister for Planning, Finance and Industry U Set Aung met to discuss how to move forward on the development of China’s ambitious projects in Myanmar in the context of the CERP. The New Yangon City; Kyaukphyu Deep-Sea Port and SEZ; and China–Myanmar Cross-Border Economic Cooperation Zone projects—all of which were agreed during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Myanmar in January, 2020—were among those discussed at the meeting. Furthermore, President Xi expressed hope that Myanmar would speed up its cooperation with China on implementation of the infrastructure projects during a telephone conversation with Myanmar President U Win Myint in late May.29 When Myanmar government announced its seven-point CERP on April 27 to mitigate the economic impact of COVID-19, one item immediately raised eyebrows among China analysts in the country. It is because the third main objective of CERP is stated as “Easing the Impact on Laborers and Workers” and one of the ways the government intends to achieve this is putting laid-off laborers and returning migrants to work on “Implementation of Labor-Intensive Community Infrastructure Projects” before the end of this year. Since then, speculation has grown that CERP’s third goal is tantamount to a green light for the CMEC projects. Experts are concerned that CERP’s emphasis on reviving the economy will see Myanmar push ahead with the implementation of CMEC projects without properly assessing their risks in terms of conflict sensibility, potential for incurring unsustainable debt and commercial viability. They warned that the country could easily fail into an unstable debt trap due to the enormous investment required the BRI/CMEC projects. The key BRI projects, as they said, are not commercially viable unless interlinked projects are finished, such as the Muse-Mandalay railway project and Shan State’s cross-border cooperation zones. Moreover, those projects could either be delayed or suspended depending on China’s economic situation and the armed conflicts in the ethnic areas in Myanmar.30 The consequence of the virus has morphed from socio-economic considerations to that of questioning geopolitical intent of BRI. Essentially questions are being raised around the transparency and equality of gains pronounced by BRI. Myanmar needs to be aware of the supply chain disruptions particularly awareness of BRI projects labor, equipment and machinery resourcing out of China. With 133 countries having imposed border entry restriction, there have been significant delays in BRI projects in the likes of Indonesia, Malaysia and Cambodia. Scrutiny has shifted to a closer look as to the reason for these delays. China is trying to offer the Medical Silk Road (MSR) as the mechanism by which medical and humanitarian aid is delivered particularly to BRI participant countries. The real test for China is whether the soft diplomacy efforts can sell the BRI message of a shared human destiny. The virus has created conditions that would allow other nations to destabilize China’s effort. Organizations like Quad

29 Lwin (2020), Myanmar COVID-19 recovery plan won’t favor China’s BRI projects, official says. 30 Lwin (2020), Myanmar COVID-19 recovery plan won’t favor China’s BRI projects, official says.

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(US, Australia, India and Japan) can offer alternatives to China and countries like Myanmar will become increasing aware of these alternatives.31 Even as China pushes Myanmar to implement the mega-projects, serious questions are being asked about whether Myanmar can finance them given that its economy has slowed significantly due to COVID-19 and the government has committed to increasing spending on economic stimulus and improving social security and health care in the wake of the outbreak. Moreover, Myanmar added a key condition to the CMEC Cooperation Plan stipulating that China must allow Myanmar to seek financing for the projects from multiple international financial institutions, especially the WB and the ADB, to avoid incurring unsustainable debt obligations to China. Recently, the Ministry of Planning, Finance and Industry (MOPFI) signed an agreement with Singapore’s Infrastructure Asia (IA) under which the latter will help Myanmar identify suitable investors and assess commercial viability-including by inviting international standard tenders-for strategic infrastructure projects listed in the country’s Project Bank. Myanmar government is also planning to add all the BRI projects to the Project Bank to ensure there are screened for commercial viability and adherence to the MSDP. Moreover, it plans to seek more agreements with firms such as IA to consult on the implementation of strategic projects.

6.7 Conclusion Although Myanmar could control attack of the COVID-19, the government needs to prepare second or third wave of the virus. In addition, there are daunting challenges for Myanmar government to solve the socio-economic problems such as health care, social security, unemployment, poverty and economic recovery etc. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is greatly impacted on not only domestic economic activities but also the implementation of mega-infrastructure projects under CMEC. There are many mitigation measures that can help minimize the economic impact of the pandemic. It is important to review them in a timely manner to optimize the opening of essential transport, market and supply chain - when it is safe to do so. The reopening of social and economic activities will be gradual. Currently, the government has issued various guidelines for re-opening of factories, hotels and restaurants, schools and other essential services. Although these are many economic and job opportunities from CMEC by public and private sectors, the policy makers should take into account the cost and risk of these projects including social and environmental impacts. A prosperous economic corridor is expected to be formed along Yunnan-Manadalay-Yangon-Kyaukphyu routes, strengthening China’s already substantial economic ties with Myanmar and contributing to a more integrated regional economy. The economic corridor project is part of Beijing’s broader strategy of investing widely to diversify its sources of imported energy, and to enhance its economic integration with Myanmar. The project 31 Wheeler

(2020).

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also creates many other opportunities between China and the CMEC could serve as the starting point of cooperation. Other cooperation areas include capacity building in economic system reform, agriculture and education. For China, it will bring development opportunities to its economically backward Southwestern provinces, in particular, Yunnan and Sichuan. The project will provide foreign direct investment and its gas exports and other commercial goods. It will also increase Myanmar’s foreign exchange earnings. Nevertheless, the CMEC project comes with many potential risks and challenges including political concerns, different business environment, inconsistent standards, high costs of construction, social and environmental impact, wariness of some people in Myanmar and neighboring countries including India upon China’s growing influence. In addition, the negative impacts of economic cooperations such as illicit trade, human trafficking, and drugs etc. between Myanmar and China also need to eliminate urgently. In order to reduce the risks and challenges of BRI and CMEC projects, it is need to enhance mutual trust, to see conflict sensibility, commercial viability; to search finance from international institutions, to align the technological standards for infrastructure projects, to respect national condition of Myanmar’s condition.

References An updated assessment of economic impact of COVID-19. The Asian Development Bank, Brief No. 133. (2020). https://www.adb.org/publications/updated-assessment-economic-impact-COV ID-19. Assessing the impacts of COVID-19 on Myanmar’s economy: A social accounting matrix (SAM) multiplier approach. IFPRI. (2020, May). https://www.ifpri.org/publication/assessing-impactsCOVID-19-myanmars-economy-social-accounting-matrix-sam-multiplier-0. Aung, Z. (2020, February). Myanmar’s economic cooperation with East Asia: A partnership for sustainable development. Paper presented at the 10th international conference on development alternatives, Yangon, Myanmar. Bharat, S. S. (2020, May 20). Is China deploying COVID-19 diplomacy to speed BRI projects in Myanmar. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/is-china-deploying-COVID-19-dip lomacy-to-speed-bri-projects-in-myanmar/. Citizen budget of 2019–2020. Myanmar ministry of planning, finance and industry. https://www. mopfi.gov.mm/en/blog/47/143/11070. De, J., & Sanaa, N. (2020, July 7). Six charts on Myanmar’s economy in the time of COVID19. IMF. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/07/07/na70720-myanmars-economy-inthe-time-of-covid19-six-charts. Economic impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on developing Asia. The Asian Development Bank, Brief No. 128. (2020). https://www.adb.org/publications/economic-impact-covid19-developingasia. Government ministries allocate 10pc of budget for COVID-19 fund. Myanmar Times. (2020, May 11). https://www.mmtimes.com/news/govt-ministries-allocate-10pc-budgets-COVID-19fund.html. Government suspends visa privilege for Chinese, mulls border shutdown. Myanmar Times. (2020, February 3). https://www.mmtimes.com/news/govt-suspends-visa-privilege-chinesemulls-border-shutdown.html?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=962e4289f44da092e61c50af942308e9caab 1de9-1600141325-0-AZc7i4GRqH0I-b6zNj0uctP5Pv6UK53r2arp1RvXeqLuX25flu4FH70

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ZbXeTzDMqvM0b0Vnb0IZsHYUdAHQ7FWY4Z1TYyQwqF6zgVFNjvwmRe58CZxx4Ko oRtBoLRaRWCJrqjtiAiVBXKJZZla9eSeoBtXJIJRqfkvHLpbp7qttdW7jwA2TAu3ZGtu_Kg8 kpJiD1w_A_0Il65oy3Dw01h18Ma7hli5hpf0hNRIY8-ESdFoyHrQsIJIZiFA8xC0VjZHl6iKj0lmNUpU_m706bT6PbzdGlNhZx5b-baq-txBth8g5e6Yf6rQzj1fYgWLzYa55fNl83lD6X-EJO 54mnG_bRjmbU121L5UH0AVZ2lpk. Impact of COVID-19 on Myanmar’s migrants and remittances. Unlocking public and private finance for the poor (UNCDF). (2020, June 15) https://www.uncdf.org/article/5725/impact-of-COVID19-on-myanmars-migrants-and-remittances. Lim, A. (2020, June 25). Myanmar needs to redefine its COVID-19 stimulus package. Tea Circle Oxford. https://teacircleoxford.com/2020/06/25/myanmar-needs-to-redefine-its-COVID19-stimulus-package/. Lwin, N. (2019, May 30). Government spells out conditions for signing BRI deals with China. The Irrawaddy. https://www.irrawaddy.com/business/govt-spells-conditions-signing-bri-dealschina.html. Lwin, N. (2019, November 8). In Myanmar, China’s BRI projects are old wine in a new bottle. The Irrawaddy. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/in-myanmar-chinas-bri-projects-areold-wine-in-a-new-bottle.html. Lwin, N. (2020, March 19). Myanmar unveils $70-million stimulus package to ease economic blow from virus. The Irrawaddy. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-unveils-70million-stimulus-package-ease-economic-blow-virus.html. Lwin, N. (2020, May 11). Myanmar to receive $2B in COVID-19 relief from int’l development organizations. The Irrawaddy. https://www.irrawaddy.com/specials/myanmar-COVID-19/myanmarreceive-2b-COVID-19-relief-intl-development-organizations.html. Lwin, N. (2020, May 25). NYDC CEO says New Yangon City project will move forward. The Irrawaddy. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/nydc-ceo-says-new-yangon-city-pro ject-will-move-forward.html. Lwin, N. (2020, June 11). Myanmar COVID-19 recovery plan won’t favor China’s BRI projects, official says. The Irrawaddy. https://www.irrawaddy.com/business/myanmar-COVID-19-recoveryplan-wont-favor-chinas-bri-projects-official-says.html. Lwin, N. (2020, August 15). Myanmar set to ink pact with China on border cooperation zones. The Irrawaddy. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/myanmar-set-ink-pact-china-border-cooperationzones.html. Myanmar economic monitor June 2020: Myanmar in the time of COVID-19. The World Bank. (2020, June 25). https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/myanmar/publication/myanmareconomic-monitor-june-2020-myanmar-in-the-time-of-COVID-19. Myanmar’s state issue heavy restriction on movement ahead of thingyan (Myanmar New Year) to curb COVID-19. The Irrawaddy. (2020, April 6). https://www.irrawaddy.com/specials/mya nmar-COVID-19/myanmars-states-issue-heavy-restrictions-movement-ahead-thingyan-curbCOVID-19.html. Myint, U. Thinking, fast and slow on the belt and road: Myanmar’s experience with China. ISEAS Perspective, No. 90. (2019, October 29). https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspe ctive_2019_90.pdf. Overcoming as one: COVID-19 economic relief plan. Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. (2020, April 27). https://www.ccifrance-myanmar.org/en/newsandresources/overco ming-as-one-COVID-19-economic-relief-plan-cerp. Statistical yearbook of Myanmar 2018. Central Statistical Organization (CSO). https://www.cso stat.gov.mm/. The impact and policy responses for COVID-19 in Asia and the Pacific. UN-ESCAP, p. 2. (2020, March 26). https://www.unescap.org/resources/impact-and-policy-responses-COVID-19asia-and-pacific. Wheeler, A. (2020, April 15). COVID-19: Can China offset the long-term socio-economic impact on China’s BRI road initiatives?. Mizzima. https://mizzima.com/article/COVID-19-can-china-off set-the-long-term-socio-economic-impact-chinas-belt-road-initiative.

Chapter 7

Vietnam–China Relations in the Context of the COVID-19: Situation and Prospect ´ Trân ` Tuan Khanh Nguyen and Nam Tiên

7.1 Vietnam’s Response to COVID-19 At the beginning of 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic which started in Wuhan, Hubei, China has created an unprecedented crisis that influenced people’s lives and weakened the worldwide economy, particularly that of Southeast Asia. The outbreak of Covid-19 is not only a medical and health crisis, but also a serious challenge for economic growth, supply chain, and tourist industry in Southeast Asia. The economic growth in the ASEAN region is likely to stop and drop around 3.7% from the projected growth and only reach 1% growth in 2020. In a worse scenario, some ASEAN countries will have to face negative growth.1 Vietnam has been heavily affected by the COVID-19 pandemic due to its long border with China. First of all, the country’s economy is badly damaged. The GDP growth in the first quarter of 2020 is only 3.82%, 5 million workers and 85% businesses meet with adversity, nearly 60% of corporations lack capital and funding and have to cut back their cash flow, the labor force participation rate has dropped to its lowest point in 10 years, and the job deficits rate has reached a climax in 5 years. In April 2020, some manufacturing, trading, and import-export sectors began to experience negative growth. The number of newly-established enterprises decreased for the first time in the period 2015–2020, and the number of enterprises registering to pause their activities has soared. Almost all industries, manufacturing, and service sectors decreased, in which some industries and sectors were stagnant or frozen, with 1 Economic

Impact of COVID-19 Outbreak on ASEAN (2020).

` T. K. Nguyen (B) · N. T. Trân Vietnam National University of Ho Chi Minh City, University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam e-mail: [email protected] ` N. T. Trân e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 N. Peng (ed.), The Reshaping of China-Southeast Asia Relations in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4416-7_7

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almost no production and business activities such as commerce, services, tourism and hospitality, transportation (especially aviation), and entertainment. To revitalize the economy and social welfare, the government proposed 3 groups of solutions with 33 specific objectives in order to make way for production-business, support affected individuals, and some measures to promote disbursing social investment capital, especially public investment capital. Many aiding policies are carried out such as credit packages of 300,000 billion VND, tax support packages of about 180,000 billion VND, social welfare packages of over 62,000 billion VND, electricity bill support packages of 12,000 VND, telecommunications support packages of 15,000 billion VND, and about 20,000 billion VND as an exemption for businesses and people. At the same time, the government put forward 5 comprehensive solutions to stimulate a revived economy, attract investment from domestic and FDI, enhance export and public investment, and encourage domestic spending. Thanks to the pragmatic and drastic policies, Vietnam put an end to the fight against the virus on May 11. When national social distancing was canceled, the Vietnamese students were back to school. Stores and restaurants as well as local markets returned to normal. With the government’s effort taken to account, Vietnam’s economy is severely hit but definitely not in a major crisis. The country’s macroeconomics within 4 months starting from 2020 remains stable, inflation is controlled and has a downward tendency through each month, and export reached up 4.7%, of which the domestic sector increased 12.1%, trade surplus was about US$ 3 billion.2 The GDP growth in the second quarter of 2020 increased by 0.36%, and the first 6 months of 2020 increased by 1.81%. Vietnam, therefore, is one of the few countries with good growth rates in the context of the COVID-19 epidemic which is “cutting down” many large global economies. Vietnam is also one of the first countries to get out of the epidemic, establish a “new normal” state without falling into a state of economic crisis and collapse. The important contents of the domestic economy are balanced and guaranteed. Specifically, Vietnam’s trade surplus reached US$ 4 billion, of which, the domestic export was quite high, up to 11.7%. Total social investment capital in the first 6 months of 2020 at current prices was estimated at 850.3 trillion VND, up 3.4% over the same period in 2019, and equals 33% of GDP, and value-added increased by 2.71%. However, in the first months of 2020, the COVID-19 epidemic has seriously affected commercial and service activities. The service sector in the first 6 months achieved the lowest growth rate of the same period in 2011–2020. Total retail sales of consumer goods and services in the second quarter of 2020 decreased by 5.8% against the previous quarter. The first 6 months of the year were estimated to decrease by 0.8% over the same period in 2019. International visitors to Vietnam were kept tracked at 3,744,500 arrivals, down 55.8% over the same period. The whole country has more than 62,000 newly-established enterprises with registered capital of 697.1 trillion VND and the total number of registered employees is 507,200 employees, down

2 Trong

.

(2020).

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7.3% in the number of enterprises, down 19% in capital registered, and decreased 21.8% in the number of employees compared with the same period last year.3 FDI in May reached more than US$ 1.55 billion, bringing the total amount of FDI into Vietnam after the first 5 months of this year leaped nearly US$ 13.9 billion. Although the total amount of FDI is only 83% in the same period last year, it still increased higher than the previous years.4 In addition, the newly registered capital reached US$ 7.44 billion with 1212 projects and 436 projects registered to increase capital, which increased by 15.2%. But the increase is mainly from large projects that have been submitted and negotiated a long time ago, and the number of newly registered projects and adjusted capital decreased. Since the beginning of the outbreak, the Government of Vietnam has been proactive and flexible in doing everything possible to confront the epidemic, including promptly detecting and quarantining the source of the infection, and collecting data. In fact, preventive measures in Vietnam were in place more than a month before the COVID-19 was declared a global pandemic by WHO. The early, decisive, and transparent actions of the Vietnamese leaders, together with the solidarity of Vietnamese people, have been the key to Vietnam’s success against COVID-19 to date.5 In Vietnam, the coverage was marked with a striking story: every citizen was a soldier fighting a global killer disease-COVID-19 Pandemic.6 The Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc called on every business, every citizen, every residential area to be a fortress to prevent the pandemic.7 With the motto “Fighting the COVID-caused disease is like fighting enemies”, the people were unanimous with the direction of the Party and the Government, preventing the risk of infection from outside, resolutely implementing local isolation, social distancing, focusing on the preventing the epidemic from the inside out and actively treating patients, even “sacrificing economic benefits to protect people’s health”.8 The COVID-19 pandemic is seen as an enemy in public political discourse in Vietnam. Social distancing and handwashing have been described as an indication of patriotism, and this message has been also delivered through popular arts and information campaigns.9 A viral propaganda poster created by artist Le Duc Hiep conveyed the message that staying at home is loving your country demonstrates that people agree with the Government in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic.10 The Guardian reported on how Vietnamese artists drew posters and created postage stamps that conveyed “a clear message of solidarity in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic”.

3 Thành

(2002), V˜u (2020). instance, the first 5 months of 2016 reached US$ 10.1 billion, US$ 12.1 billion (2017), and US$ 9.9 billion (2018). 5 Sang (2020). 6 Jueni (2020). 7 Pham (2020). 8 Môt Viêt Nam trong cuôc chiên ´ v´o,i Covid-19 (2020). . . . 9 Huong (2020). 10 Jueni (2020). 4 For

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Up to July 22, Vietnam had confirmed 408 cases with 746 of the patients had recovered and no deaths recorded.11 From April 16, there were no transmitted cases within the community except the imported cases. This could be considered a big success, showing the unitedness from thought to the action of the Vietnam political system, as well as the power of Vietnamese solidarity. Most of Vietnamese appreciate government policies in the efforts of stopping and pushing back the epidemic, they strictly followed those policies. According to the survey, 62% of Vietnamese said they agreed with the responses from the government to the COVID-19 pandemic.12 It could be said that the fight against COVID had contributed to strengthening solidarity in Vietnamese society. Not only that, many businesses and individuals have conducted difficult-sharing activities with the government, helping those struggling in the pandemic. Moreover, the philanthropists have installed rice ATMs to help the vulnerable in the slowing domestic economy. Since May 16, organizations and individuals in Vietnam and overseas have donated US$ 85.6 million to the Vietnam Fatherland Front to fight against COVID-19. Discourses from the Government of Vietnam expressing concerns in the response to the crisis showed the unique ethical standards of Vietnam. The Vietnam Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc said: “Beside the efforts to deal with far-reaching consequences of the pandemic, countries need to come up with a development plan after COVID-19 whose main focus is to support the businesses restore production and maintain social security, especially those in the vulnerable group, to ensure no one will be left behind”.13 This is the message sent to overseas Vietnamese who want to return to Vietnam. Aviation agencies operated flights to rescue the Vietnamese citizens trapped abroad devastated by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Government of Vietnam also announced to cover all health care bills and expenses for Vietnamese with COVID-19 symptoms, as well as those who spend 14 days in quarantine. The internet and government-run social media platforms have also played an important role in the Vietnam fight against COVID-19. Official government websites and hotlines, Facebook, Instagram, smartphone apps, and text messages have been utilized in every aspect of Vietnam COVID-19 response. A new program called - du lich Viêt Nam (Vietnamese people tour in Vietnam), issued Ngu,`o,i Viê.t Nam di . . by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, is expected to bring the tourism industry back into orbit before COVID-19.

11 According to the news page on acute respiratory infections COVID-19 of the Ministry of Health,

https://ncov.moh.gov.vn/. From the end of July, COVID-19 epidemic burst back in Vietnam from Da Nang city, then spread to some provinces and cities of Vietnam. By the end of August, Vietnam basically controlled the epidemic. As of September 1, Vietnam had a total of 1,044 cases, of which 34 died. The majority of death cases in Vietnam suffered from the aggravation of pre-existing ´ Trang tin vê` dich medical comorbidities after being infected with COVID-19 virus. See BÔ. Y TÊ, . , , ´ ´ bê.nh viêm du`ong hô hâp câp covid-19, https://ncov.moh.gov.vn/. 12 Pham (2020). 13 Vietnamese PM urges countries to further enhance solidarity amid Covid-19 (2020).

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7.2 Vietnam–China Cooperation on Fighting Against the COVID-19 Vietnam has cooperated with China in coping with COVID-19, a common enemy for both sides, ever since its outbreak. Many cross-border meetings between the public health officials of the two countries have been taken. On April 2, Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqing talked over the phone with his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Xuan Phuc. The two Prime Ministers discussed prevention and control measures, emphasized the importance of the bilateral relationship, and affirmed the hope to develop the Vietnam–China comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership relationship towards more practical and greater achievements. Li also expressed support for Vietnam’s effective measures and initiatives in international cooperation and expressed the wish to continue coordinating closely in maintaining trade and investment activities, while preparing to resume tourism, aviation, and people-to-people exchange as soon as the pandemic ends. Both countries have also supported each other materially. On February 8, Ha Giang Provincial Border Guard Command donated over 1000 medical masks and 20 sanitizers to Yunnan. On February 9, an aircraft of Vietnam Airlines transported medical supplies and equipment to China to support the neighbor amidst the pandemic. On February 10, the Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed gratitude to Vietnam for showing firm support and providing medical aid to the Chinese government. Speaking in a regular press conference in Beijing, Geng Shuang, spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that medical gloves, masks, and protective outfits donated by the Vietnamese government have arrived in Wuhan, the outbreak’s epicenter. On February 21, The Vietnam-China Friendship Association of Hanoi handed over 1000 masks to the Chinese Embassy in support of the fight against the COVID-19 outbreak. Chinese Embassy Cultural Counselor Peng Shi Tuan said: “Chinese highly appreciate the support from Vietnam government”.14 On March 8, Dien Bien Provincial Border Guard presented 10000 facial masks to China.15 Compared to other ASEAN countries, such as Cambodia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Laos, and Thailand, Vietnam received limited material support from China. Most of the assistance are mainly from April, the second phase of the COVID19 pandemic in Vietnam. This could be explained by Vietnam’s ability to handle the pandemic on its own, which is more proactive than other countries in Southeast Asia. For instance, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security donated a batch of medical supplies and equipment including masks, goggles, gloves, and protective gear to Vietnamese counterparts in May.16 Although the Chinese state media widely reported the news, Vietnam official media rarely cited this contribution.17

14 Tú

(2020).

15 International

assistance to Southeast Asia: China’s ‘Mask Diplomacy’ (2020). public security ministry donates anti-epidemic supplies to Vietnam (2020). 17 Lye (2020, p. 3). 16 China’s

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7.3 Vietnam–China Relations in the Midst of the COVID-19 When the COVID-19 first broke out in China, the Vietnamese government had carried out some closure measures, such as closing schools, suspending flight and closing border between Vietnam and China. To be more specific, Vietnam orderly canceled all the flights from China on February 1 due to its concerns about the spread of the COVID-19. Only one day after the Trump Administration announced to tighten restrictions with arrivals from China, Vietnam was one of the very first countries to suspend all flights to China. Meanwhile, Vietnam blocked its 1300-km border with China, causing a large impact on Vietnam’s economy. At first, Beijing used to view countries that imposed early travel restrictions on Chinese as “being unfriendly”. Actually, early border closure and flight suspension definitely irritated China, which was criticized by the global public as the cause of the global pandemic.18 As Hanoi had already done, China had reacted negatively to the travel restrictions that Vietnam imposed. Chinese scholar Cheng Hanping even confirmed that China accused Vietnam of ordering a “blockade” against China, which “consistent with the U.S moves”.19 However, China’s view gradually changed due to the outbreak of new types of coronavirus outside Chinese territory. In turn, China also issued travel restrictions for foreign visitors including Vietnam. Therefore, Vietnam’s measures are not necessarily considered a negative strategy by Beijing. Vietnam did not follow the footsteps of U.S. President Donald Trump and French President Emmanuel Macron who criticized China for spreading the virus. Instead, Vietnam has mobilized national resource to contain the pandemic, relied highly on state agencies, and took strictly public health measures. As David Koh said “Generally, Vietnamese respond well to national calls for cooperation if they are sufficiently convinced that there is a national crisis”.20 He added that the Vietnamese government had stuck to positive points to contain the pandemic rather than blaming China as some major countries had done. In April, Vietnam strictly closed the border and banned nationwide flights. In that case, political relations between Vietnam and China switched back to the disputes on the SCS. It can be said that the Vietnam–China relationship may be greatly affected by China’s military and administrative actions. On April 3, Vietnam accused a Chinese Coast Guard ship of intentionally sinking one of Vietnam’s fishing vessels near the Paracel islands, while China insisted that Vietnamese vessel crashed into Chinese ship. At the end of this month, China named 80 geographical features off the disputed SCS including submerged rocks, and established two new administrative districts in the Paracel and Spratly islands. Both Vietnam and China accused each other of taking advantage of COVID-19 to assert sovereignty. Le Dang Doanh, a retired adviser to the Vietnam government, said “The calculations between Vietnam and China are very complicated”, “on one hand, the two sides enjoy a very intense economic exchange, and on the other hand, during the pandemic, 18 Bac

and Murray (2020). (2020). 20 Bac and Murray (2020). 19 Cheng

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Chinese marine patrols have intensified their presence in the East Sea (SCS)”.21 In spite of the fact that the Secretary General of the United Nations (UNSG) called for a global ceasefire to focus on the true fight with Covid-19 on March 23, China has continued to push its military objectives in the SCS. In practice, the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning conducted military exercises to alter this image and to remind that China is still an active and reliable major country for other actors, including regional countries, even Vietnam. The way China had taken advantage of the pandemic to claim its stance and reinforce its territorial sovereignty over the SCS through military operations worsens its national image and is incompatible with the “reassuring” image China tried to show before. Therefore, Vietnam can take advantage of this factor to reaffirm its stance about the SCS and attract global support for its policy. Besides, Vietnam’s achievement in handling the pandemic has created a positive image in the international community and won plaudits from the world. As taking rotating chairmanship of ASEAN in 2020, Vietnam could play a leading role in using ASEAN as a containment factor against China. However, ASEAN is known for the lack of internal cohesion. Some of the member states have intimate relations with China (such as Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand) and could become effective allies in Beijing. Therefore, Vietnam could find difficulty in calling for consensus when it comes to China. However, Vietnam can take advantage of its chairmanship to promote the negotiation of COC. This would be a great project to inspire some sort of consensus among ASEAN member states. This can also be viewed as an indirect confrontation and is leverage for judicious behavior against China’s aggressive actions on the East Sea (SCS). In terms of the economic relations, Vietnam and China faces with a temporary halt at some points due to the adverse impact of the COVID-19. Looking at the bilateral trade balance, Vietnam addresses the trade deficit with China, which makes China become one of the most important trading partners of Vietnam. Trading with China plays an important role in boosting up Vietnam’s GDP. Thus, both Vietnam and China would benefit from the reopening borders and remaining trade when the pandemic is put under control. As soon as the situation returned to normality, Vietnam urgently reopened the border and resumed trade with its largest commercial partner-China. According to the Vietnam General Department of Customs data, in the first two months of 2020, Vietnam–China import-export turnover reached US$ 14.8 billion, which increased by 1%. Considering the first 2 months, Vietnam’s trade deficit with China reached US$ 3.8 billion at the same period with a decrease of 26.5%. The total value of Vietnam’s exports to China reached US$ 5.5 billion, which increased by 16.1%. Some export commodity groups that recorded positive growths include Computers, electronics machinery, and components (reaching US$ 1.4 billion, increased by 36%); phones and accessories (reaching US$ 1.2 billion, increased by 278.3%). There are also groups of export goods that recorded an increase in turnovers such as machinery, equipment, tools, and other components (reaching US$ 220.8 million, increased by 8.1%); iron and steel of all kinds (reaching US$

21 Ibid.

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87.4 million, increased by 1720.4%); rice (reaching US$ 37.1 million, increased by 723.6%).22 However, the Chinese government decided to close some of its important border gates by the end of March in an effort to prevent the spread of COVID-19. From March 30, China’s Guangdong province has strengthened prevention and control strategies. Accordingly, China’s customs strictly managed the drivers from Vietnam, those who drivers from the provinces that had reported infected cases would not be allowed to enter China. Such measures lead to an increase in Vietnam’s backlogged goods at the border gates, which cause great damage to Vietnamese enterprises. By the middle of April, the total import–export turnover of agricultural, forestry, and aquatic products decreased by 6.9%.23 Vietnam and China has taken various measures to promote bilateral trade and improve the business environment via online platforms since May. In order to increase agricultural and food exports to China, Vietnam Trade Promotion Agency has held a series of online conferences with many Chinese enterprises and signed some contracts with them since May. These mainly included an online conference on agricultural and food products with Yunnan, an online conference on construction materials and interior décor with Guangxi, an online conference on agricultural and food products with Shandong, an online conference on agricultural, aquatic, and food products with Chongqing, an online conference on with Zhejiang on consumer goods. According to Vietnam Customs, the total import-export turnover between Vietnam and China by May increased by 2% with US$ 44.35 billion. The total value of Vietnam’s export to China increased by 17.4% with US$ 15.975 billion, and its import from China decreased by more than 5% with US$ 28.375 billion. Although Vietnam’s exports to China increased in the first five months of 2020, the export of some agricultural products decreased. Specifically, fisheries decreased by 2.3%, vegetables and fruits decreased by 29.1%, cashew nuts decreased by 30.9%, rubber decreased by 28.2%.

7.4 Vietnam in the Midst of Intense Sino–American Rivalry Under COVID-19 The COVID-19 pandemic has strained the already stiffening US–China relationship to further spiral. Both the US and China have actively offered medical supply to Southeast Asian states in an effort to pursue support from them. In addition, the US which has criticized China for increasing its military presence and sovereignty claims in the SCS has proactively countered China’s assertive activities in the SCS. In a recent controversial attempt to cement its territorial claims in the disputed waters, China named 25 islands and reefs, as well as 50 undersea features in the SCS. , ,

,,

ij

,

´ nhâ.p khâu gi˜ua Viê.t Nam và . Thi. tru`ong châu Á-châu Phi, Bô. Công Thuong, Tình hình xuât ´ trong 2 tháng d-âu ` n˘am (2020). Trung Quôc 23 Phùng Nguyên (2020). 22 Vu

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China’s extensive maritime claims have created some frictions in the region and led to increasing U.S. military operations. The US has sent two warships to the contested areas and proactively hold joint maritime drills with Australia. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has accused China of taking advantage of the pandemic situation to threaten states involved in the disputed water, and declared that “The South China Sea is not China’s Maritime Empire”.24 On May 7 and the following May 12, the U.S. Navy has sent a pair of coastal warships to patrol in the vicinity of West Capella-a Malaysian-contracted drillship that was involved in a standoff with China.25 Moreover, the US–China strategic competition has escalated beyond the SCS and extended to the Mekong River. Over the past few years, China has long been criticized for its upstream dam management of obtaining hydro-hegemony over the downstream countries. In April 2020, the American-sponsored consulting company Eyes on Earth pointed out Chinese dams that hold back water in the Mekong River were responsible for damaging droughts in the downstream countries. China also initiated a plan of dredging the Mekong River, so as to make way for commercial ships. Such initiative was met with fierce opposition from the locals for damaging the ecosystem and fish species. In an attempt to counter China, the US has enhanced its interference in the Mekong sub-region. Meanwhile, U.S. allies such as Japan and Korea have also accelerated cooperation with the Mekong Basin countries. Although the economic development in the Mekong sub-region has been promoted by the increasing business activities of outside forces, the rising tensions between the US and China posed a challenge to the Mekong Basin countries. Due to the intense Sino–American rivalry, Southeast Asian states have sought to separate the territorial disputes and economic cooperation with China. It should be highlighted that China’s development is of vital importance to Southeast Asian countries. China has become the biggest trading partner of ASEAN as a whole and always among the top 3 to the individual members. Many ASEAN countries are involved in China’s BRI, making China the biggest investor in the region.26 Since Duterte came into office, he tries to set aside territorial dispute on the back-burner 24 U.S. Eambassy in Georgia, “Secretary Pompeo Speech Clip-South China Sea is not China’s Maritime Empire (July 20)”. https://ge.usembassy.gov/secretary-pompeo-speech-clip-south-chinasea-is-not-chinas-maritime-empire-july-20/. 25 However, after the news announced on 13/5, this standoff began to cool off as Chinese ships were moving in a different direction than the drilling ships, which had already completed its itinerary. 26 However, on the contrary of their government, local people are not convinced of China’s action. Polls in the Philippines show that 3 out of 4 Filipinos do not trust China, while some Indonesians have accused China of bringing the virus to their country. Chinese Embassy in Thailand met with angry backlash from the Filipinos after posting a music video on YouTube to highlight China’s efforts to help the Philippines control the pandemic. They argue that the title “One water” of the video is China’s way to claim its territory sovereignty over the disputed water. In Thailand, a cartoon posted on Facebook by the China Embassy that mocks the US’s response to the pandemic has drawn criticism from the Thai people. Some even called it a poor quality propaganda video. Thailand scholar Wasana Wongsurawat from Chulalongkorn University said, “Thais, who oppose the military-backed government, do not buy into the common refrain that China is a good friend of Thailand”. Such discontent stemmed from economic fallout. Fishermen were angry at China taking over their fishing grounds, while the small and medium-sized business owners were dissatisfied with cheap Chinese goods competing amongst theirs over a limited market. Additionally, the fact

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to accede in economic development, although his administration still insists on a hostile attitude toward Beijing’s assertiveness. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei has tried to keep their relationship with China in harmony, and avoided direct friction with Beijing as much as possible. For Vietnam, it was cautious not to let the matter of dispute intertwine with other sectors, though has conducted diplomatical actions taking against Chinese assertiveness in the maritime domain. It is widely said that the COVID-19 has prompted cooperation between ASEAN and China, while the pandemic was spreading along with the wave of anti-Chinese sentiment. In general, Southeast Asian countries expressed great sympathy toward China, in which Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore expressed their support by donating medical supplies to China. A Thailand artist even composed a song to express the solidarity of Thailand and Wuhan. In response, as the virus began to spread beyond the China border, China has provided medical supply and sent experts to Southeast Asian countries to combat the pandemic. The increasing relation of China–ASEAN at multi-levels has demonstrated the urgent need and the benefit of cooperation in times of crisis.27 For Vietnam, pandemic control and economic recovery are the top priorities. It would be better off for Vietnam if the US and China can facilitate valuable cooperation, overcome differences for common interest.28 It is well aware that China and the US are the vital strategic partners to ASEAN, and the turbulence in the relationship between the two superpowers will not yield good prospects for ASEAN. As the rotating President of ASEAN in 2020, Vietnam has been working with the member states to implement a master plan for recovery in post-COVID-19 era. Furthermore, it also attempts to prompt the ASEAN to achieve more solidarity and centrality, promote more conferences with China and the US on anti-epidemic cooperation, ensure supply chains, facilitate trade activities toward global recovery. This cooperation offers both economic interest and dynamic balancing in the China–US–ASEAN triangle relations.

7.5 Conclusion The increasing pressure of the geopolitical and geo-economic competition between the US and China in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic has provided an unprecedented opportunity for ASEAN states to reshape their relationship with China. On one hand, China is very likely to play a bigger role in international affairs,29 and it that Chinese companies are inclined to employ their native labor force also creates dissatisfaction. In March 2020, it was reported that a clash broke out between the protesters and the security forces in Sulawesi, Indonesia, because 49 Chinese workers were sent to work at a nickel mine in the Southeast of this island. See Tan (2020). 27 Marina (2020). ij 28 ASEAN tái kh˘ - nh quyêt ´ tâm xây du.,ng Biêij n Ðông thành vùng biêij n phát triêij n và an toàn ang di . (2020). 29 Tan (2020).

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will be in a tremendously powerful position to shape the world”.30 On the other hand, China is not the only player who set the rule, the US and EU will come out against China’s efforts of changing the present order. Nonetheless, given the fact that the US and EU have been busy coping with the pandemic, China has hardly encountered any resistance from them. Vietnam’s attitude toward China’s assertiveness during the pandemic demonstrates the country’s strategy of “cooperation and opposition” in major-power diplomacy. In practice, Vietnam has proactively cooperated with China on minimizing the adverse impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the eco-social development and promoting ASEAN-China cooperation due to its responsibility of the rotating President of ASEAN in 2020. However, such cooperation has few impacts on the geopolitical competition between China and Vietnam, especially the SCS disputes. There are three suggestions from the Vietnamese side, in which the first one is that Vietnam should continue to pursue a “cooperation and opposition” strategy with China. Secondly, it should try to resolve maritime disputes with the Philippines and Malaysia. Thirdly, it would be better off to establish a lobby group in ASEAN to promote international laws and make peaceful settlement of the disputes in the SCS. Lastly, great powers should be encouraged to maintain and enhance their continuous presence in the region and the continuing engagement between Vietnam and the great powers will contribute to the progress toward a law-binding order in the SCS. To conclude, Vietnam should prepare for the long-term game with China as short-term measures are less likely to yield positive results.

References - nh quyêt ´ tâm xây du.,ng Biên Ðông thành vùng biên phát triên và an toàn. Côngly. ASEAN tái kh˘ang di . (2020, June 26). https://congly.vn/thoi-su/asean-tai-khang-dinh-quyet-tam-xay-dung-bien-dongthanh-vung-bien-phat-trien-va-an-toan-348574.html. Bac, P., & Murray, B. (2020, May 14). Behind Vietnam’s COVID-19 response, deep distrust of China. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/behind-vietnams-covid-19-responsedeep-distrust-of-china/. , , ´ CÂP ´ COVID-19. https://ncov. BÔ. YTÊ´ TRANG TIN VÊ` DI.CH BÊ.NH VIÊM ÐU`ONG HÔ HÂP moh.gov.vn/. Cheng, H. (2020, April 11). Why Vietnam intrudes the South China Sea at this juncture? Global Times. https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1185310.shtml. China’s public security ministry donates anti-epidemic supplies to Vietnam. Xinhua net. (2020, May 12). http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/asiapacific/2020-05/12/c_139051444.htm. Economic impact of COVID-19 outbreak on ASEAN, ASEAN policy brief. (2020, April). https:// asean.org/storage/2020/04/ASEAN-Policy-Brief-April-2020_FINAL.pdf. Huong, L. T. (2020, April 30). Vietnam’s successful battle against Covid-19. Council of Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/blog/vietnams-successful-battle-against-covid-19. International assistance to Southeast Asia: China’s ‘Mask Diplomacy’. CSIS. (2020, May 20). https://www.csis.org/programs/southeast-asia-program/southeast-asia-covid-19-tracker-0. ij

30 South

ij

ij

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Jueni, D. T. (2020, May 12). Vietnam’s war on Covid-19. Journal of International Affairs. https:// jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/vietnam%E2%80%99s-war-covid-19. Lye, L. F. (2020, June 4). China’s COVID-19 assistance to Southeast Asia: Uninterrupted aid amid global uncertainties. Perspective of ISEAS, No. 58, p. 3. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/ uploads/2020/04/ISEAS_Perspective_2020_58.pdf. Marina, K. (2020, June 4). ASEAN must make the best of its new centrality in China’s diplomacy. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/asean-must-make-the-best-of-its-newcentrality-in-chinas-diplomacy/. ´ v´o,i Covid-19. Nhân Dân Diê.n Tuij,. (2020, May 25). https://nha Mô.t Viê.t Nam trong cuô.c chiên ndan.com.vn/megastory/2020/05/25/. Pham, L. (2020, April 10). Why does Vietnam gain international praise for fight against Covid19? Hanoi Times. http://hanoitimes.vn/why-does-vietnam-gain-international-praise-for-fight-aga inst-covid-19-311680.html. ´ gi˜u,a Phùng Nguyên. (2020, April 16). Tìm giaij i pháp g˜o, khó cho thu,o,ng ma.i Viê.t Nam-Trung Quôc ij di.ch Covid-19. Kiêm Toán. http://baokiemtoannhanuoc.vn/thi-truong/tim-giai-phap-go-kho-chothuong-mai-viet-nam-trung-quoc-giua-dich-covid-19-144245. Sang, M. L. (2020, April 30). Containing the coronavirus (Covid-19): Lessons from Vietnam. World Bank Blogs. https://blogs.worldbank.org/health/containing-coronavirus-covid-19-lessonsvietnam. Secretary Pompeo speech clip-South China Sea is not China’s maritime empire (July 20). U.S. Eambassy in Georgia. https://ge.usembassy.gov/secretary-pompeo-speech-clip-south-china-seais-not-chinas-maritime-empire-july-20/. South East-Asia-caught in the middle of a new US-China cold war. The Star. (2020, May 17). https://www.thestar.com.my/news/regional/2020/05/17/south-east-asia—caught-in-the-mid dle-of-a-new-us-china-cold-war. Tan, H. Y. (2020, May 17). How Southeast Asia views growing US-China power play amid the Covid-19 pandemic. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/how-region-views-gro wing-us-china-power-play. ´ ha.’ các nên ` kinh tê´ l´o,n, Viê.t Nam vân ˜ t˘ang tru,oij,ng Thành, G. (2002, July 2). Covid-19 ‘d-ôn du,o,ng. Thê´ Gi´o,i Viê.t Nam. https://baoquocte.vn/covid-19-don-ha-cac-nen-kinh-te-lon-viet-namvan-tang-truong-duong-118642.html. ij ij ´ hô.i dánh Tro.ng, Q. (2020, May 15). Chính phuij báo cáo Uy ban Thu,`o,ng vu. Quôc giá bô sung ij , , ij ´ ´ ´ ` kêt qua thu. c hiê.n kê hoa.ch phát triên kinh tê-xã hô.i n˘am 2019 và tình hình nh˜ung tháng d-âu n˘am 2020. http://quochoi.vn/UserControls/Publishing/News/BinhLuan/pFormPrint.aspx?UrlLis tProcess=/content/tintuc/Lists/News&ItemID=45539. ij ´ di.ch COVID-19 cho Ða.i s´u, quán Trung Tú, A. (2020, February 21). T˘a.ng 1.000 khâu trang chông ´ ´ Quôc ta.i Viê.t Nam. Kinhlê dôlhi.. http://kinhtedothi.vn/tang-1000-khau-trang-chong-dich-covid19-cho-dai-su-quan-trung-quoc-tai-viet-nam-365806.html. Vietnamese PM urges countries to further enhance solidarity amid Covid-19. Vietnam Times. (2020, May 20). https://vietnamtimes.org.vn/vietnamese-pm-urges-countries-to-further-enhance-solida rity-amid-covid-19-20470.html. - ng d-ên ´ kinh tê´ Viê.t Nam thê´ nào? Ðâutu ` , Online. https://bao V˜u, N. (2020, May 5). Covid-19 tác dô . dautu.vn/covid-19-tac-dong-den-kinh-te-viet-nam-the-nao-d121405.html. ´ nhâ.p khâij u gi˜u,a Viê.t Nam và Vu. Thi. tru,`o,ng châu Á-châu Phi, Bô. Công Thu,o,ng, Tình hình xuât ´ ` Trung Quôc trong 2 tháng dâu n˘am 2020. http://vietnamexport.com/tinh-hinh-xuat-nhap-khaugiua-viet-nam-va-trung-quoc-trong-2-thang-dau-nam-2020/vn2531408.html.

Chapter 8

Impacts of COVID-19 on BRI: A Case Study of Thailand Nisit Panthamit

8.1 Introduction The epidemic disease COVID-19 presents great health challenges in the social, political and economic sector across regional states. This chapter investigates the implications of COVID-19 on the policy and governance, and public perception and risk scenarios that have resulted from the engagement, relations, and participation between China and Thailand. Framed by China’s BRI infrastructure connectivity, frontier states have growing exposure and entanglement with China through roads, railways, ports, flows of people, goods, and resources. These affairs are now threatened by the Coronavirus representations and resistance at the national levels. Our investigation of the economic, social, and related context of COVID-19 builds on the urgent contextual knowledge through fact from a situation that occurred in Thailand as well as related views and comments from policymakers, and private and public gathering from literatures, social media evaluation, and TV/print discourse analysis since the transformations caused by the pandemic. This chapter will be described in two phases: (1) researching to build knowledge and understanding of how China–Thailand’s cooperation and relations are being changed and (2) the publics being affected by the long shadow of the COVID-19 epidemic. The relationship between the two nations are still in the same procedure but there has been some delay with the outcome. The outlines of this chapter will be shown into six parts. The first part begins with an introduction with the China–Thailand relationship and part two deals with China–Thailand Relations: Trade, Investment and Tourism. The third part looks at how Thailand responded to COVID-19. The forth part discusses about the China–Thailand Cooperation during the coron-

N. Panthamit (B) Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 N. Peng (ed.), The Reshaping of China-Southeast Asia Relations in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4416-7_8

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avirus pandemic and the fifth part takes a look at how Thailand has managed their relations with the US and China under a sharply increasing US–China rivalry. The conclusion and policy suggestion will be illustrated in part sixth.

8.2 China–Thailand Relations: Trade, Investment and Tourism Thailand is one of the main member states of ASEAN and has established diplomatic relations with China since July 1, 1975. The relations between the two countries are close. There is a regular exchange of visits at all levels with deepening cooperation in all dimensions. The period of 2020 marked the 45th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between these historical nations. The visit of China to Thai royalty is an important part of promoting and strengthening relations and cooperation between the two countries including the promotion of friendship and understanding between the people of the two countries. Economic cooperation is at the core of the Thai–Chinese relationship, which has been strengthened by the enforcement of the ASEAN–China Free Trade Agreement in January 2010 and upgraded in 2019, as well as launching the China-GMS Economic Corridors, which connected the northern/northeastern parts of Thailand with southern China via Laos and Vietnam. The construction of a high-speed rail route is being built for the purpose of connecting Thailand with Laos, and with China. This epidemic may have a greater impact on the Chinese economy compared to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003. China faced more internal and external economic pressure in 2019. After all, China’s economy today is about nine times larger than in 2003, with a total GDP of 11.7 trillion in 2003 and 99 trillion in 2019.

8.2.1 Trade The Board of Investment of Thailand (BOI) in Table 8.1 shows that the composition (category) of Thailand’s main import commodities are from China. Regarding the ranking of China’s main export commodities to Thailand, we can understand the degree of trade between China and Thailand, the distribution of major investment industries, and the need for more investment in certain industries, product type, and accuracy. In 2019, China was Thailand’s No. 1 trading partner (China is the No. 2 export market for Thailand and China is the No. 1 import source for Thailand), while Thailand is the 13th partner (No. 3 in the ASEAN countries) as the 13th import source and the 17th export market in China in 2019. The bilateral trade value is at US$ 79.5 billion, down from 0.9% in 2018. Thai exports to China were valued at US$ 29,172 million, down 3.78% from 2018. Thai imports from China were US$

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Table 8.1 Composition of Thailand’s major imports from China (Category, US$ million) Customs classification

HS CODE

Product category

2019

Last year

Relative ratio%

Ratio%

Type

Chapter

Total

50,980

50,167

1.6

100.0

16

84–85

Electronics

23,293

23,544

−1.1

45.7

15

72–83

Base metals and products

7,566

7,713

−1.9

14.8

6

28–38

Chemical Products

4,183

4,637

−9.8

8.2

7

39–40

Plastic, rubber

2,935

2,909

0.9

5.8

11

50–63

Textiles and raw materials

2,239

2,192

2.2

4.4

17

86–89

Transportation Equipment

1,873

1,649

13.6

3.7

20

94–96

Furniture, toys, miscellaneous products

1,394

1,264

10.3

2.7

18

90–92

Optics, watches, medical equipment

1,394

1,351

3.2

2.7

2

06–14

Plant products

1,233

1,155

6.8

2.4

5

25–27

Mineral products

1,182

350

238.0

2.3

13

68–70

Ceramic; glass

781

765

2.1

1.5

4

16–24

Food, beverage, tobacco

589

498

18.2

1.2

10

47–49

Cellulose pulp; paper

480

442

8.5

0.9

14

71

Precious metals and products

446

482

−7.5

0.9

8

41–43

Leather products; luggage

426

362

17.9

0.8

Other

966

854

13.0

1.9

Source BOI, Thailand

50,327 million. Up 0.85% from 2018, China has a trade balance of US$ 21,155 million increased at 8.01% from 2018.1 China imported important products from Thailand such as hard drives, rubber, integrated circuits, wood, Lcd panel parts, fresh durian, dry cassava and tapioca starch, chemicals, mobile phone parts, and computer parts. One important export 1 Figure

& Publication. THAIBIZCHINA.COM, https://thaibizchina.com/figure-publication/thaichinese/.

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products from China to Thailand are mobile phone, mobile phone parts, computer parts, black carbon, steel, electrical control and distribution equipment, Lcd monitor, air conditioning compressor, dried mushroom, and mushroom herbicide.

8.2.2 Investment In case of investment, China has accumulated investment in Thailand up to the end of 2018 at about US$ 6,000 million. China is interested in investing businesses that use innovation and modern technology such as the new industrial sectors, logistics and electronic commerce. The cumulative investment of Thailand in China at the end of 2018 was approximately US$ 4,270 million. The main industries that Thailand invests in China are forage, cereal, animal farm, motorcycle, hotel, restaurant, and Thai massage. As the end of August 2019, China has accumulated investments in Thailand of up to US$ 6,440 million, while the cumulative investment of Thailand in China is at US$ 4,330 million. China topped the list of economies looking to invest in Thailand for the first time in 2019. A report by the BOI last year confirmed that China overtook Japan as the Southeast Asian nation’s main source of foreign direct investment thanks to the BRI-linked projects that overspilled from the US–China trade war and Thai government incentives.2 China’s “Going Out” policy encourages Chinese companies to expand their production bases to Thailand and other ASEAN member countries from the push factor lead by higher production costs at home. But the pull factor that makes China come into Thailand are derived from several factors: high-speed tracks, the Eastern Economic Corridor, Thailand 4.0 (cars, smart electronics, biotechnology, logistics, and aviation), solar energy, BRI, International Business Center of Bangkok, real estate.3 According to BOI, applications from China, valued at the first three months of 2020 (Jan–Mar), proposed to BOI hit the largest with 56 projects. It was 22% of the total foreign investment proposed to the BOI. The approved project mostly came from China, accounting for 42% of total approved foreign investment to Thailand. Surprisingly, from January 2019 to June 2020, the BOI stated that international and local investors have filed 116 investment promotion applications for food processing and drinks manufacturing projects in Thailand, representing a total value of 18.8 billion Baht (US$ 600 million). In the first half of this year alone, some 5.84 billion Baht worth of investment applications were filed for the sector, despite the impact of COVID-19 on business, thus demonstrating that international food companies have confidence in Thailand’s resilience, and being innovation-focused in the food sector.

2 Jitsiree 3 Seven

(2020). opportunities: Sino-Thai investments (2020).

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8.2.3 Tourism Most interesting is that the Thai and Chinese governments have agreed on having tourism cooperation since August 1993 to promote marketing and international tourism cooperation. However, the Chinese government has allowed Chinese people to travel outside the country under government control; Thailand was the only first group together with Singapore and Malaysia that allowed Chinese people to travel. From that scheme, the number of Chinese tourists traveling to Thailand have been increasing on average every year. In the current field of tourism a great number of Chinese tourists are flowing into the ASEAN countries, especially into Thailand. Since 2014, about 4.6 million Chinese tourists came to Thailand, whereas in 2015 the number of Chinese tourists increased to 7.9 million.4 China ranks as number one of tourist market in Thailand. In 2019, there were 10.98 million Chinese tourists, representing 28% of all foreign tourists. China has established the China National Tourism Office (CNTO) in Bangkok in 2017 to promote tourism cooperation between Thailand and China. However, in the beginning of 2020, the Chinese government attempted to contain the outbreak of coronavirus which is expected to have a detrimental impact on Chinese economic activity and outbound tourists. In late January, several days before Chinese New Year, the Chinese government announced measures to place quarantine in Wuhan and most of the other cities in the Hubei province. The lockdowns included a ban on transportation and all outbound travels, which had an impact on more than 50 million people. The Fear of virus spread across the country had halted the global tourism industry. On the issue of economic activity, by comparing to the similar virus outbreak in 2003 where Chinese citizens suffered from the SARS virus, the Chinese economy slowed from 11.1% to 9.1%. Markets expect the GDP growth to fall from an expected 6% to 4.5% in the first quarter this year, bringing 2020 GDP down to 5.4%. The falling number of tourists from China and other countries would have a damaging impact on the Thai economy. The revenue receipts from foreign tourists in Thailand are accounted for around 10% of the GDP. Based on data from World Travel & Tourism Council’s report (WTTC), the direct and indirect effect of the Thai tourism industry on GDP was at 21.6% of GDP in 2018 and taking 15.9% away in Thai employment. Thai tourism industry relies on income from the spending of Chinese tourist visitors which is 28% of the GDP in 2019. During January 2020 the situation looked very normal, with a slight increase in visitors when compared to the previous year from 3.718 million to 3.810 million visitors (+2.46%).5 Even at the end of January (around 27 January), China halted all group travel both domestically and to other countries. This was decided at a time when there were 4,515 confirmed cases of the coronavirus infection, with 106 casualties. Even without the decrease in Chinese arrivals to Thailand in February 2020 as a result of the Chinese decision, traveling had already been self-restricted since arrivals from most countries had already started to decrease. After that, overall arrivals decreased from 4 Punyaratabandhu 5 Corona

and Swaspitchayaskun (2018). (Covid-19) and tourist arrivals in Thailand (2020).

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3.604 million visitors in February 2019 to 2.062 million visitors in February 2020; a decrease by 42.78% when compared. Chinese arrivals decreased from 1.065 million to 161 thousand visitors (−84.92%). Thailand decided to determine that visitors from certain countries (including China) needed to be self-quarantine for fourteen days when arriving into Thailand, unfortunately leading to a drastic decline of tourist arrivals. On 25 March 2020, Thailand decided to ban all foreigners from entering the country (with very few exceptions), thus resulting in the number of Chinese visitors to be decreased by no less than 94.22%. They were not actually allowed to leave the country since then.

8.3 Response of Thailand to COVID-19 After China reported Thailand has begun screening for direct flights from Wuhan city, China was prepared to open emergency operations center to deal with the situation on January 4, 2020. Thailand, therefore, considered Jan 4, as the first point for dealing with the epidemic “COVID-19”. On March 12, Thailand has established a centerCCSA to manage the situation of the COVID-19. Also, urgent measures were taken in managing such situations, as well as preventing and solving problems of new emerging infectious diseases. On May 14, the announcement of the “Thai Chana (Thai victory)” tracking application, a platform to help prevent disease control, was used for the public to check-into register and get a QR code so that they can be traced. For shop operators it was applied for public scanning to check-in and check-out the density of the crowd or reserve a service queue in order to avoid a lot of people lingering in the store, such as a barber shop. You can also rate the service satisfaction of operators, receive reward points, get discount coupons, and no need to worry about personal information because the system only requires the use of a phone number. To acquire this system the store must get registered on the website. When people use the service, they have to scan the QR code as checking-in and registering the information to the Department of Disease Control which is under the administration of the Public Health Ministry. The application system will know the public density of users in that store and decide whether to use the service or go to another store, and check out when leaving the store every time after checking in: the information will be sent to the Department of Disease Control. This system will be able to track users who go to shops that are at risk which will have a message sent to the mobile phone, and get free inspection services in which all information is confidential. There is no complexity in using it. In addition, the system will require the public to check the operators to comply with the five measures of the era. A rating is considered a good result for the operator to call. Fulfilling all of the above is also regarded as the safety of users, but if any shop does not use this method there must be a notebook for people to register their names when using the service.

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For activities that are relaxed (called Phase 4),6 the government agreed on relaxing economic activities which can organize meetings, training, seminars, exhibitions, ceremonies, banquets, music shows, dance arts, concerts or other activities. Events held in hotels, theaters, meeting rooms, convention centers, exhibition centers, cinemas or other locations must have an area of 4 square meters per person. As for banquets, events, product launches, sport competitions, must have one or more meters of standing per person. The concert must reduce the density of 5 square meters per person. For alcohol consumption or beverages in restaurants, food gardens, food courts, hotels, or general stores they must be permitted by law. In the entertainment area, pubs, karaoke bars and breweries were not allowed to be open. Nursery section such as Child Development Center, Preschool, Special Children Center, Elderly Care Center or other institutions providing welfare had to be monitored with great caution. Centers with small children were divided into 2 square meters per person. Science Center for Education Science Park Science and Culture Center which handle cases of visits in small groups had to ensure that there were no more than 150 people and no more than 50 viewers inside the premises. Exercise activities, health care or recreation by steam bath, herbal steam bath or steam bath in a health establishment, spa or Thai massage establishment also had to be limited in the number of people using the services. The total control of users had to be limited per round in 5 square meters per person. However, the shower places and massage centers were not allowed to be open. As for group exercise in the park, the activity area, public activity area or outdoor sports field were limited to a group of 5 square meters per person for a total of no more than 50 people at the water park, playground, and amusement park, except for the use of players in a temporary installation or player. The tactile surface may be at risk for children to be exposed to the disease. Therefore, places like the Baan Lom ball house were required to arrange 4 square meters of water park per person. Sports stadiums or exercise areas, such as sports fields or for teaching and learning in all sports were asked to comply with the measures. They were allowed to organize competitions and provide television broadcasts of sporting events but forbidden to have audience in the arena. Also, the competition organizer must proceed with the procedures prescribed by the government: game cabinets and coin operated machines located in shopping malls, shopping malls, and community malls were to operate only if the law permitted to do so. Public transportation is permitted across provincial areas. Public buses, airconditioned buses, vans, inter-provincial trains, airplanes must have two separate seats for each passenger, except one seat with a limit of not more than 70%. Long distance public buses stop every 2 h. Registration is tracked by emphasizing the control measures for every activity such as toilets being cleaned on a routine basis and regularly disposal of garbage whereas a mask must be worn at all times by 6 Each

Phase shows a level of easing restrictions on businesses and activities in Thailand, but kept the Emergency Decree in place to maintain controls on all entry-by air, water and land because all recent new Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) confirmed cases were people returning from other countries.

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the service providers and service users. Registration and, confirmation with “Thai Win” Platform should be done every time with the number of caregivers according to disease prevention measures. According to the standard, there is a handwashing point before and after the services.

8.4 China–Thailand Cooperation During the COVID-19 Pandemic The year 2020 marks the 45th anniversary of the establishment of the China–Thailand diplomatic relations. Over the past 45 years, China–Thailand relations have passed through many difficulties together such as the 1997’s Asian financial crisis, pandemics such as SARS, H5N1. And even more solid development during COVID19. Cooperation for both private and government agencies as well as people of both countries. They help and support each other to push forward China–Thailand relations to a new dimension. China and Thailand still understand each other. Despite what irritates the nature of the criticism from scholars and various media sources that happened in the period before COVID-19. However, since COVID-19 has occurred, instead, the relationship between China and Thailand continually moves in a good direction. Because during the epidemic, Thai society is helping each other very well. Several operators have come out to assist those affected by COVID-19, many of whom are Chinese operators. Though China has been accused politically for using this pandemic it to “COVID diplomacy”, but that does not affect the Sino-Thai cooperation. Although COVID19 has affected the progress of the BRI projects between the two countries, some projects had to be interrupted indefinitely. Some businesses have even faced a lack of money-capital problems. During such difficult times, China–Thailand needs to maintain the existing economic ties and try to keep the project ongoing. At the same time, both sides should seize new business opportunities arising from the epidemic, such as the digital economy, and accelerate further cooperation, instead. The obvious cooperation between China–Thailand has been shown with every outlet of news media. The Chinese ambassador in Thailand Yang Xin informed that China will assist Thailand in the fight against the coronavirus pandemic.7 The Chinese government will assist Thailand in providing medical equipment such as the COVID19 test kit, medical mask, N95 mask and personal protective equipment as well as coordinating with the operators to distribute medicines for the treatment of those infected with the COVID-19. Chinese entrepreneurs will export medical supplies to Thailand in response to the needs of the Thai side. Chinese business groups in Thailand and the Chinese people’s friendship organization will collaborate together in donating the medical supplies to the Thai side. Yang Xin also made the offer during a visit with Deputy Prime Minister and Commerce Minister Jurin Laksanawisit at the Government House on March 11. Both sides agreed on an exchange of knowledge 7 China

actively provides assistance to help Thailand in its fight against COVID-19 (2020).

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regarding the disease and its control treatment including screening methods to prevent infected people from boarding flights abroad.8 Moreover, the prompt response by the Prime Minister of Thailand, General Prayut Chan-o-cha said that Thailand would like to thank the Chinese side for their invaluable support to Thailand in the fight against the epidemic. So far, there is not any rising anti-Chinese sentiments in the local communities when compared to other international regions like the US and other European countries. It is the “Thai characteristic” that never made the people hate or bully others in any kind of circumstance (anti-sentiment) towards any foreign matter in a public platform. Thailand is “located in an area that is not a political hot spot” with China. Therefore, it is believed that Thailand and China will join hands to overcome the epidemic in the fight against this epidemic. Nonetheless, Thailand has been aware of China’s effort of expanding its power by implementing the BRI and became more cautious in establishing cooperation with China. Thailand has already had lessons from investment projects in infrastructure and transportation systems in Myanmar and Laos, from which China’s state-owned enterprises benefited the most while the benefit to the inhabitants of these countries was limited.9 Therefore, it is doubtful whether it will be worthwhile to co-invest in accordance with the BRI framework. Macroeconomically, all of Chinese’s investment are welcome if it come as official or obvious no matter what type of player (i.e., government, state-owned enterprise, firm, traveler, and student that the person or group assumes the character in. But microeconomically, the level of trust in its influences still remains unclear. The question about China’s role in host counties is still more on the negative side than positive by looking at the evidence that showed on perception of people from that host country.10 Moreover, the transportation routes development project to be implemented and financially supported by China may be under the control of China’s state-owned enterprises and will not be as beneficial to Thailand and its citizens as to China.

8.5 Thailand Amidst Sino–American Rivalry All this time, some superpowers have watched China expanding influence in Southeast Asia. The more Thai–Chinese have strong ties to diplomatic relations, the more doubts about whether Thailand chose to be a Chinese alliance compare to major superpowers countries like the US. However, Thailand still holds the line of international political neutrality. Office of the National Security Council of Thailandmentioned that China tends to strengthen relations with Thailand in various areas and offer tourists from China to return to Thailand at the first opportunity.11 Thailand should carefully consider their interactions with China. By trying to avoid any 8 ‘Recovering’

China ready to help Thailand beat COVID-19 (2020). and Swaspitchayaskun (2018).

9 Punyaratabandhu 10 Iris

(2018).

11 International

security situation after COVID-19 virus outbreak (2020).

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Chinese conditions or actions that would be binding on Thailand and it affects the stability and interests of the country in the long run, and because most of the countries in East Asian countries have been able to control the outbreak. There is a tendency to invest and increase economic activity in Thailand. Meanwhile, western countries will still need time to resolve this outbreak within their own country. Proper exposure to investment from the foreign business sector should help stimulate the Thai economy in the post-crisis period as the pandemic. It will become a priority pathway for the international community in which Thailand should consider seeking a position and conduct a positive attitude. “Thailand has not a political hot-spot with China”, thereby Thailand may be the only one country that can use the phases “Thai and Chinese are brother” (中泰一家亲) with China. Finally, as a hub of economic and political importance in ASEAN (Carminati, 2020) who agree that “Thailand will have to reassure its powerful partners that it is still a welcoming country for tourists and retirees, as well as for foreign investors”.12 Even though an overview of relations between China and the US at present has not had positive trends, both countries recognize the importance and importance of need to rely on each other, especially in the economy with increased mutual benefits. However, the U.S. government will continue to look at China as a strategic competitor. For Thailand, the strategic position should be determined by maintaining a balanced direction and distance of relations between China and the US in order to protect Thailand’s interests. A consideration should be made as an operation direction in the form of a bridge connecting relations between China and the US which could result in mutual benefits for all parties. In this regard, Thailand should use the strengths of carrying out special relations with China like close relatives as if they were one family, and in conducting special relations like close friends by creating a bridge role that is important to the positive interaction between China and the US. Furthermore, Thailand can position its geographic location to support the economic hub in Southeast Asia by including the strengths of its ability to compromise on issues of security disputes and leading to a peaceful resolution. The pattern of relations between China and the US will be a procedure for creating peace and development for the world and the regions. Both countries should accept differences and respect each other for their role in the participation. To solve problems together under the framework accepted by the world community would be a blessing for economic sustainability and prosperity for the developing nations within the ASEAN community. Through various collaborative mechanisms Thailand will be able to create a role as a cooperative country with both China and the US. Because Thailand is very close, like a family member in the same family as China and having close contact with America’s allies in Southeast Asia the benefits can be maximized in order to maintain the main interests of Thailand and her citizens. A balanced mutual benefit with China and the US will lead to a regional and global interests that upholds peace at the regional and global levels.

12 Carminati

(2020).

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8.6 Possible Directions Between China and Thailand After the Birth of COVID-19 Before the corona virus spread, the Thai economy was highly dependent on goods and tourists from China. This outbreak makes us see the risk of bringing the economy to a single source. After China has banned people from traveling outside of the country to help reduce the outbreak of COVID-19, Thailand’s GDP had been significantly affected. Therefore, Thailand had to use a sibling-like relationship with China when conducting business, as well as make rules that are practical for foreigners to do business, and let investors know about the best practices. Currently, there are many Chinese students who come to learn in Thailand. At the same time, there are multiple Chinese associations that collect information about trade and investment, as well as policies. Such information help meet the investment needs of Chinese companies in Thailand on how to succeed, where to invest, and what type of resources can be utilized to achieve a sustainable business operation, etc. To reinforce the strengths of Thai people who can sell products and services, there should be a culture, university, and teaching community that acts as the foundation for collaborating with China. In other words, a guiding agency is needed, and platform to disseminate information required, and to reach the community level. Every community must be self-developed, maintain its uniqueness and identity, grow with style and independence, as well as including the new generation, be open to new technology, and having a network with other communities in both countries. Here, I proposed guideline or ways in which Thailand can adapt or adjust to the increasing Chinese investment, whereas Thailand remains its mutual dependence while both countries benefit at the same time. By seeking a solution from “crisis” to “cooperation” according to the guidelines “open, learning and seeking mutual benefits”. “Openness” is a significant factor that drives Chinese investors, as well as tourism and multinational corporations. In accordance with the BRI, and using the guidelines for foreign trade investment as a way to reduce production costs, trade and investment bases can be established. Indeed, China has a great influence in the context of today’s world community. Thailand is one of the countries that China is interested in trading, investing and increasing tourism. Blocking the flow of such capitalism and not accepting the coming of Chinese capital in the context of today’s free world society is beneficial for Thailand’s economy. On the other hand, being “closed” or blocking the flow of such capital is not in the country’s best interest. “Learning Literacy” is a mechanism by which, for instance, when we are exposed to an influx of Chinese capital, we have to “learn” the vocabulary, learn the processes, etc. in the context at both global and national scales; for the Chinese capital does not flow to Thailand alone, but also runs all over the world. Thus, we have to learn as much as possible about the procedures, operational guidelines, regulations, laws and trade cultures, customs, prohibitions and practices that govern the world. In addition, understand the implementation of policies and inter-government links (Government to Government: G2G); conducting business transactions, various investments

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between companies (Business to Business: B2B); and the interactions between people (People to People). The approach of Chinese businesses may originally change itself, which is to use only the business organization channels. Nowadays, however, Chinese businesses may use more local community level channels. Through more education, knowledge and understanding, Chinese businesses will be able to know about Thailand’s trade laws, investment and other laws related to business operations better in Thailand. The ultimate goal is to find a right way to invest together in order to achieve legitimate investment trades. Presently, however, there exists some Chinese business practices in Thailand that may not be very legitimate, such as finding a nominee (Thai company) to conduct business together; i.e. by using gaps in the rule of law. Finally, “Mutual benefit” or mutual benefit creation is one that requires solutions to problems or seek creative solutions to manage problems that arise in accordance with the SDGs, where satisfaction is shared by both parties.

8.7 Conclusion The epidemic may have a great impact on the economic growth of Thailand because Thailand relies on trade, investment, and tourism industry from China. The epidemic hindered the travel of Chinese tourists and tourists from other foreign countries, resulting in a substantial decline in Thailand’s tourism revenue, which caused a serious impact on the Thai economy. Act as ASEAN’s member, Thailand and the rest of nine member states have cooperated in terms of regionalization via ASEAN plus one campaign. China’s expanding role is not only in trade and investment but also as the world’s largest outbound tourism market, leading to closer economic ties between geographically adjacent ASEAN and China. However, the new outbreak of the disease is dragging down China’s economy, leading to a slowdown in growth that will affect the economies of ASEAN countries with which China is close to the three main channels: trade, investment and tourism. The severe effect of COVID-19 has severely damaged the global economy as an unstoppable force. China and its neighbors understand that the struggle against the epidemic will require more than their own interest and its own national effects and efforts. Hence, the foreign ministers of ASEAN and China met in Vientiane, Laos on February 20 to discuss joint measures to combat the threat of COVID19. In their joint statement, the eleven countries agreed to step up cooperation in sharing medical and health information, and best practices to enhance emergency preparedness and response. They also underscored the importance of cooperation in risk communication and community engagement to ensure people are promptly and correctly informed, thus thwarting misinformation and fake news. Malaysia has already arrested several people for spreading rumors about the virus and regional leaders spoke against panic and discrimination.

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The meeting also stressed the need to strengthen ASEAN-led and ASEAN–China cooperative mechanisms in combating infectious and communicable diseases, recognizing the varying levels of development of each member country’s public health system. Parties agreed to minimize supply chain disruptions for urgent medical products and to promote research and development for medicines and vaccines. They also highlighted the value of policy dialogue and exchanges to keep abreast on the latest developments in the control and treatment of the virus. These steps may greatly contribute in institutionalizing health cooperation between both sides that can go beyond the present crisis.

References Carminati, D. (2020, September 9). Thailand’s post-pandemic dance between the major powers. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/thailands-post-pandemic-dance-between-the-majorpowers/. China actively provides assistance to help Thailand in its fight against COVID-19. Embassy of China in Thailand. (2020, March 19). http://www.chinaembassy.or.th/eng/gdxw/t1757986.htm. Corona (COVID-19) and tourist arrivals in Thailand. ThaiWebsites.com. (2020, June). https:// www.thaiwebsites.com/corona-Thailand-tourism.asp?__cf_chl_captcha_tk__=0aa064273f9c 2f970cd5ea93744127138df43441-1600247930-0-AZ4upEOJQlvT4QsaFPMVx4014vZKnQ c8MJKun_L3kQP59Hhb8AKnTKvRqRGRdK0C7MZ3k02ZrdB23zL969edRyudTpp5t1jN 80C_bSh8E84fDevtxLFKJZH_azMyKD7cnXWFXxRb876hIVzRItLpipcQMyHydK-Q0rLpk xEJGDyp_Q50ivCnEga5FWrdYXcd3pvWSrY68T0z8pCPPwU7MJelxY6hinU2m8cHuR9 ywFkCOdHkvy11AlR-s7PUaslIHgY2q7uqspnCotci0w32iv0mIPW1Qh-vSLVcH7JupbFhJP rAfBV1g57etFToRMSQExqAN_Zlg-Hq_0kC7BKtVakP3fSsAwAYf4cvP27TLE4yKRT7p yMDu5MmkF_osUPkJMLthkMV5IvyfxqeSCiUVNMUiWJLYF2aK1tz9E-vSepMk0K0MqOPSxIwrg85yMMqUk25jWQwtmZmnklMHOklhFxH2A4A6LpOlcBRH3jo138wkxh5noc7 pz1aL-4z6XUuYSitPmwUyHY_Wjs_jjyLpU3KWqBMqPVuRCyuACGFDYcuxclFlA-Yd0 kbsdOZxt5qoUuczXxN2hRXurSdQKhAK4. Figure & Publication. THAIBIZCHINA.COM, https://thaibizchina.com/figure-publication/thai-chi nese/. International security situation after COVID-19 virus outbreak. Office of National Security Council of Thailand. (2020, July 10). http://www.nsc.go.th/?p=6974. Iris, P. (2018, June 8). China’s belt and road: Bigger than the Marshall plan? ING. https://think.ing. com/articles/china-belt-and-road-bigger-than-the-marshall-plan. Jitsiree, T. (2020, January 24). China becomes Thailand’s top source of foreign investment for first time. South China morning post. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/economics/article/3047489/ china-becomes-thailands-top-source-foreign-investment-first. Punyaratabandhu, P., & Swaspitchayaskun, J. (2018). The political economy of China-Thailand development under the one belt one road initiative: Challenges and opportunities. The Chinese Economy, 51(4), 333–341. ‘Recovering’ China ready to help Thailand beat COVID-19. The Nation Thailand. (2020, March 11) https://www.nationthailand.com/news/30383868. Seven opportunities: Sino-Thai investments. Pugnatorius Research. (2020, January 27). https://pug natorius.com/china/.

Chapter 9

Indonesia’s Response to COVID-19: Between Economics, Public Health, and Social Media Putri Rakhmadhani Nur Rimbawati

9.1 COVID-19 in Indonesia Since the early outbreak in the country, Indonesia has been juggling to synergize the economic and public health also social media interest. Unlike other countries, which straightaway imposed many social restriction measures such as city and national lockdowns, Indonesia was trying not to impose such restrictions immediately. Instead, it tries to downplay the outbreak panic by framing that Indonesia was having the outbreak under control, therefore was still open for business and tourism.1 Beyond that, the Health Minister himself, also made several statements which were seen to initially oversimplify the outbreak, as well as missing in necessary actions to contain the outbreak from getting worse.2 The economic wellbeing of many people is undeniably vital both for the state and the people themselves. However, the decision to not directly execute strict health protocols earlier also has evident consequences. As result, the outbreak cases have been rising significantly day by day since the first case in early March 2020. In addition to the late protocol establishment, the decentralized system in Indonesia also led the central government and regional government to take different steps in providing health security to its people.3 The problem was, the policies were contradictive. There was no unified strategy that could synchronize all layers of government in fighting this pandemic. 1 Lindsey

and Mann (2020). (2020). 3 Interviewed with Adriano, W., Social and Cultural Affairs Counsellor of Indonesian Consulate in Shanghai (2020). 2 McBeth

P. R. N. Rimbawati (B) Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia e-mail: [email protected] Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 N. Peng (ed.), The Reshaping of China-Southeast Asia Relations in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4416-7_9

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In response to this, both the central and regional governments were putting an attempt to flatten the curve by any means. Despite not having national-scaled lockdowns, some of the cities in Indonesia had their regional social restrictions, such as Jakarta, who had Large-Scale Social Restrictions (LSSR) (Pembatasan Sosial Berskala Besar or PSBB). The central government also provided many subsidies both in cash and basic supplies to minimize the economic urgency for the people not to stay home.4 Indonesia also tries to increase the testing capacity to catch up with the WHO standard for national testing rate. Under the metric given by WHO, Indonesia should have tested for about 260,700 people every week, while Indonesia has not been able to pass 100,000.5 Compared to many countries with the largest population in Asia, Indonesia is one of the lowest as mentioned in the Table 9.1. The hard work is unfortunately not yet enough to contain the escalating positive cases. The country could not afford the economic damages caused by prolonged social restriction measures, so the ‘new normal’ concept was introduced to the people, aiming to stimulate more mobility which recovers the economy. Unfortunately, this new concept was not coming with clear and detailed health protocols, which caused many misinterpretations by Indonesian society.6 The most consequential assumption was to see the ‘new normal’ as the end of the crisis, allowing people to gather in mass as usual. It resulted in significantly increasing cases, making Indonesia be one of the Table 9.1 Test rate in Asia

Source Mangi (2020)

4 Purwanto

(2020). Post (2020). 6 Wahyuni (2020). 5 Jakarta

9 Indonesia’s Response to COVID-19 …

139

Table 9.2 Indonesia GDP drop

Source Sihombing (2020)

worst in Southeast Asia.7 Beyond that, the image of Indonesia is also damaged as the country is now banned to be traveled by many countries around the world, which should be the “wake up call” for the government.8 All in all, Indonesia’s approach to focus both on economics and health did not come as expected since it has relatively poor outcomes on both sides. In public health, the health front line workers are overwhelmed by the escalating number of positive cases and the hospital beds are also limited. On the economic side, it left the government with panic, as the recession hit the country as could be seen in Table 9.2. The non-systematic health protocols and the negative economic prospect of Indonesia due to the pandemic have discouraged many investors to further intensify their economic activities in the country.

9.2 Indonesia’s Regulation on COVID-19 Most countries are caught unprepared for the speed and scale of impacts from the COVID-19. Several national regulations have been produced by the government at different levels from the president to ministerial levels during January–March 2020. Table 9.3 (ordered chronologically) summarises the rules and regulations produced to guide national and local response in Indonesia. The Indonesian government has 7 Lindsey

and Mann (2020). (2020).

8 Fachriansyah

Issuing agency

Ministry of Health

National Disaster Management Agency

President of Indonesia

Ministry of Finance

Ministry of Health

Ministry of Finance

National Police (POLRI)

President of Indonesia

President of Indonesia

Date

February 4

February 28

March 13

March 14

March 16

March 16

March 19

March 20

March 20

References

The Presidential Decree (Keppres) 9/2020

The Decision of Head of BNPB 9A/2020

The Decision of MoH HK. 01.07/MENKES/182/2020

Presidential Decree (Keppres) 9/2020

Kapolri Mandate No. MAK/2/III/2020

(continued)

Refocussing on activities, fiscal allocation, President Instruction (Inpres 4/2020) and procurement of goods and services for the acceleration of COVID-19 response

Revision of Keppres on Task Force for Rapid Response to COVID-19

Prohibition of mass gathering or group activity both in public and local environments

Distribution and the use of Shared income MoF Regulation No: 19/PMK.07/2020 grant, fiscal allocation, general allocation grant, special allocation grant, and regional incentives for 2020 fiscal response to COVID-19

The Network of COVID-19 Laboratories

Distribution of Special Grant Allocation The Decision of MoF 6/KM.7/2020 for Infrastructure in Health Sector and Grants for Health Operation for COVID-19 response

Task Force for Rapid Response to COVID-19

Declaration of Special Emergency Situation of COVID-19 Epidemic Disaster in Indonesia

Declaration of COVID-19 as Disease that The Decision of MoH No: can cause plague and its response measures HK.01.07/MENKES/104/2020

Title of regulation

Table 9.3 List of regulations created from February to September 2020

140 P. R. N. Rimbawati

Issuing agency

Ministry of Finance

Ministry of Communication and Information

Village, Regional Disadvantage and Transmigration Minister

President of Indonesia

President of Indonesia

President of Indonesia

Minister of Industry

Ministry of Health

Ministry of Health

Date

March 21

March 23

March 24

March 31

March 31

March 31

April 2

April 3

April 7

Table 9.3 (continued) Title of regulation MoF Regulation No: 23/PMK.03/2020

References

Determination of large-scale social restrictions in the DKI Jakarta province to accelerate the handling of the COVID-19

PSBB guidelines in the context of accelerating the handling of COVID-19

Implementation of Industrial Activities in the COVID-19 Pandemic Emergency Response Period

Big Scale Social Restriction for Accelerating COVID-19 Eradication

Declaration of Community Health Emergency Situation for COVID-19

National Budgeting Policy and the Stability of Budgeting System for COVID-19 Pandemic Disaster and/or Managing Threats for National Economy and/or the Stability Budgeting System

The Village Response for COVID-19 and Cash for work in Villages

(continued)

Minister of Health Decree No. HK.01.07/MENKES/239/Year 2020

Minister of Health Regulation No. 9 of 2020

Decree of the Minister of Industry No 312/2020

Government Regulation No 21/2020

President Decree No 11/2020

Government Regulation in place of Law No 1/2020

Circulated Letter SE 8/2020

Acceleration of socialization of COVID19 Circulated letter SE 2/2020 Prevention at Provincial and District/City levels

Tax incentives for Compulsory Tax Holders affected by COVID-19

9 Indonesia’s Response to COVID-19 … 141

Issuing agency

Minister of Industry

Minister of Industry

Ministry of Administrative Reform and Bureaucratic Reform (PANRB)

Governor of the Special Capital Region of Jakarta Province

Governor of the Special Capital Region of Jakarta Province

Ministry of Health

Date

April 7

April 9

April 9

April 9

April 10

April 11

Table 9.3 (continued) Title of regulation

Industrial Circular Letter (SE) No. 4 of 2020

References

Decree of the Governor of DKI Jakarta No. 380 of 2020

Regulation of the Governor of the Special Capital Region of Jakarta (Pergub DKI) No. 33 of 2020

(continued)

Regarding the establishment of Decree of the Minister of Health Number Large-Scale Social Restrictions in the areas HK.01.07/Menkes/248/2020 of Bogor Regency, Bogor City, Depok City, Bekasi Regency, and Bekasi City, West Java Province to accelerate the handling of COVID-19

The implementation of PSBB in handling COVID-19 in DKI Jakarta Province

Implementation of the PSBB in handling the COVID-19 in the province of DKI Jakarta

Circular prohibiting the State Civil Service SE Minister PANRB Number 46 of 2020 (ASN) and their families to go home during pandemic times. Regarding Restrictions on Out-of-Area Travel Activities for ASN

Guidelines for Submitting Applications for Circular of the Minister of Industry of the Licensing for Implementation of Industrial Republic of Indonesia (Menperin) Number 7 Activities in the Public Health Emergency of 2020 COVID-19

Implementation of Factory Operations in the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency

142 P. R. N. Rimbawati

Issuing agency

Minister of Health

Ministry of Finance

Ministry of Transportation

Director-General of Taxes

Ministry of Finance

Ministry of Finance

Bank of Indonesia

Date

April 12

April 16

April 23

April 24

April 24

April 27

April 29

Table 9.3 (continued) Title of regulation

43/PMK.05/2020

SE-26/PJ/2020

Permenhub No. PM 25 2020

35/PMK.07/2020

Adjustment to the Implementation of several Bank Indonesia Regulations as a result of the COVID-19

22/7/PBI/2020

(continued)

Decree of the Minister of Health Number HK.01.07/Menkes/249/2020

References

Tax incentives for taxpayers affected by the 44/PMK.03/2020 COVID-19

Procedures of the implementation of the budget for the state budget income and expenditure in handling the COVID-19

Procedures for implementing tax administration services that are in force majeure due to the COVID-19

Regarding transportation, control to prevent homecoming activities. The temporary prohibition covers the use of land, rail, sea, and air transportation

Management of transfer to regions and village fund for the 2020 fiscal year in the context of handling the COVID-19 and/or facing threats that endanger the national economy

Regarding the establishment of Large-Scale Social Restrictions in the Tangerang District, Tangerang City and South Tangerang City, Banten Province to accelerate the handling of COVID-19

9 Indonesia’s Response to COVID-19 … 143

Issuing agency

Ministry of Finance

Ministry of Finance

Director-General of Taxes

President of Indonesia

Date

April 29

April 30

April 30

May 4

Table 9.3 (continued) Title of regulation 45/PMK.04/2020

References

The Third amendment to Circular Letter of SE-06/PP/2020 the Head of Tax Court number SE-03/PP/2020 concerning guidelines on adjusting the trial and administrative services during the prevention of COVID-19 spread in the tax court area

Instructions for implementing the Minister SE-29/PJ/2020 of Finance Regulation Number 44/PMK.03/2020 concerning tax incentives for taxpayers affected by the COVID-19

Management of grants from the central 46/PMK.07/2020 government to local governments in the context of handling the COVID-19 and the impact of the COVID-19

Procedure for submitting a certificate of origin or invoice declaration along with customs complementary documents for inspection of the certificate of origin to impose tariffs on imported goods under international treaties or agreements during COVID-19

(continued)

144 P. R. N. Rimbawati

Ministry of Finance

Ministry of Transportation

Ministry of Agriculture Regarding the Implementation of Sacrifice Directorate General of Animal Husbandry and Activities in Situations of Non-Natural Animal Health Disaster Outbreaks COVID-19

President of Indonesia

June 5

June 6

June 8

June 10

Title of regulation

May 9

64/PMK.05/2020

PP 23/2020

References

Income tax facility in the context of handling COVID-19

PP 29/2020 (continued)

Circular Letter of the Ministry of Agriculture, Directorate General of Animal Husbandry and Animal Health Number: 0008/SE/PK.320/F/06/2020

Regarding the Travel Criteria and Circular SE/No. 7 of 2020 Requirements for People in the Adaptation Period for New Habits Towards a Productive and Safe Covid-19 Society issued by the Task Force for the Acceleration of Handling COVID-19 on 6 June 2020

Placement of funds in participating banks in the context of the national economic recovery program

Implementation of the national economic recovery program to support the country’s financial policies for handling the COVID-19 and/or facing threats that endanger the national economy and/or financial system stability and save the national economy

Issuing agency

President of Indonesia

Date

Table 9.3 (continued)

9 Indonesia’s Response to COVID-19 … 145

Issuing agency

Joint Decree Ministry of Education and Culture, Ministry of Religion, Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Home Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia

Ministry of Health

Ministry of Finance

Ministry of Finance

National Disaster Management Agency as Chief Executive of the Task Force for the Acceleration of Handling COVID-19

Date

June 15

June 19

June 22

June 23

June 26

Table 9.3 (continued) Joint Decree of the Minister of Education and Culture, Minister of Religion, Minister of Health, and Minister of Home Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia Number 01/KB/2020 Number 516 of 2020 Number HK.03.01/Menkes/363/2020 Number 440-882 of 2020

References

71/PMK.08/2020

70/PMK.05/2020

Amendments to Circular Number 7 of 2020 Circular Number 9 of 2020 concerning the Criteria and Requirements for Travel of People in the Adaptation Period for New Habits Towards a Productive and Safe Society of COVID-19

The procedures for the government guarantee through a designated guarantee business entity to implement the national economic recovery program

Placement of state money at Commercial Banks in the context of accelerating national economic recovery

(continued)

Health protocols for the community in Decree of the Ministry of Health Number public places and facilities in the context of HK.01.07/Menkes/382/2020 preventing and controlling COVID-19

Guidelines for Implementation of Learning for the 2020/2021 Academic Year and the 2020/2021 Academic Year During the COVID-19

Title of regulation

146 P. R. N. Rimbawati

Ministry of Health

Ministry of Religion

Governor of Bali

Joint Decree of the Ministry of Education and Culture and the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy/Head of the Tourism and Creative Economy Agency

Director-General of Health Services, Ministry Regarding the Limit on the Highest Tariff of Health of the Republic of Indonesia for the Antibody Rapid Test

June 26

June 30

July 1

July 2

July 6

Title of regulation

June 26

References

Circular: 305/GUGASCOVID19/VI/2020

Ministry of Religion Circular Number 18 of 2020

Ministry of Health Circular Number HK.02.01/MENKES/382/2020

(continued)

Ministry of Health Circular Number HK.02.02/I/2875/2020

Regarding Technical Guidelines for the Joint Decree Number: 02/KB/2020 and Prevention and Control of COVID-19 in Number: KB/1/UM.04.00/M-K/2020 the Cultural and Creative Economy Sector in the Determination Period for COVID-19 Public Health Emergencies

Controlling People Travel at the Entrance of the Bali Region in a New Era of Life Adaptation Towards a Productive and Safe Society COVID-19

Organizing Eid Al-Adha Prayers and Slaughtering of Sacrificial Animals in 1441 H/2020 AD Towards a Productive and Safe Society COVID-19

Protocol for monitoring domestic travelers at airports and ports in the context of implementing productive and safe community life against COVID-19

Guidelines for supervising the 75/PMK.09/2020 implementation of the national economic recovery program to support the country’s financial policies for handling the COVID-19 pandemic and/or facing threats that endanger the national economy and/or financial system stability and preserving the national economy

Issuing agency

Ministry of Finance

Date

Table 9.3 (continued)

9 Indonesia’s Response to COVID-19 … 147

Issuing agency

Ministry of Finance

President of Indonesia

Ministry of Finance

Ministry of Manpower

Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform

Ministry of Health

Date

July 6

July 8

July 8

July 10

July 13

July 13

Table 9.3 (continued) Title of regulation

References

Guidelines for the Prevention and Control of COVID-19

Official Travel Activities for State Civil Service Employees in the New Normal Order

Adjustment of the period for social security protection benefits before employment for prospective Indonesian migrant workers during the non-natural disaster of the spread of COVID-19

Procedure for giving interest subsidies/margin subsidies for credit/financing for micro, small business, and medium enterprises to support the implementation of the national economic recovery program

Implementation of the authority of the Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation to implement steps to address financial system stability problems

(continued)

Decree of the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Indonesia Number HK.01.07/MENKES/413/2020

Circular of the Minister of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform Number: 64 of 2020

Permenaker 10/2020

85/PMK.05/2020

PP 33/2020

Amendment of Minister of Finance 83/PMK.04/2020 Regulation number 34/PMK.04/2020 concerning the provision of customs and/or excise facilities as well as taxation facilities of imported goods to handle the COVID-19 pandemic

148 P. R. N. Rimbawati

Issuing agency

Ministry of Finance

President of Indonesia

Deposit Insurance Agency

Ministry of Finance

Ministry of Finance

Director-General of Taxes

Date

July 16

July 20

July 20

July 20

July 28

July 28

Table 9.3 (continued) Title of regulation

References

Perpres 82/2020

Instructions for implementing Minister of Finance Regulation number 86/PMK.03/2020 concerning tax incentives for taxpayers affected by the COVID-19 pandemic

SE-43/PJ/2020

Government guarantee procedures for 98/PMK.08/2020 corporate business actors through a designated guarantee business entity in the context of implementing the national economic recovery program

Requirements and procedures for providing 88/PMK.010/2020 loans from the government to the Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation in the context of facing threats that endanger the national economy and/or financial system

Implementation of Government Regulation PLPS 3/2020 Number 33 of 2020 concerning the implementation of the authority of Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation to implement steps in handling financial system stability problems

Committee for handling COVID-19 and national economic recovery

Tax incentives for taxpayers affected by the 86/PMK.03/2020 COVID-19 pandemic

(continued)

9 Indonesia’s Response to COVID-19 … 149

Issuing agency

Ministry of Health

President of Indonesia

Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia

President of Indonesia

Ministry of Finance

Ministry of Finance

Date

July 28

August 4

August 4

August 4

August 5

August 6

Table 9.3 (continued) Title of regulation

Procedures for managing special accounts in the context of financing in handling the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and national economic recovery

103/PMK.05/2020

Distribution and use of transfers to regions 101/PMK.07/2020 and village funds for the 2020 fiscal year to support the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic and national economic recovery

(continued)

Decree of the Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia Number 719/P/2020

Inpres 6/2020

HK.01.07/MENKES/413/2020

References

Amendment of Government Regulation PP 43/2020 number 23 of 2020 concerning the implementation of the national economic recovery program to support the country’s financial policies for handling the COVID-19 pandemic and/or facing threats that endanger the national economy and/or financial system stability and save the national economy

About Guidelines for Implementing Curriculum in Education Units in Special Conditions of the Minister of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia

Increasing discipline and enforcement of health protocol laws in the prevention and control of COVID-19

Guidelines for the prevention and control of COVID-19

150 P. R. N. Rimbawati

Ministry of Finance

Ministry of Finance

Governor

Governor

Governor

August 6

August 6

August 7

August 19

September 11

September 11

Source Authors, compiled from different sources

Issuing agency

Ministry of Finance

Date

Table 9.3 (continued) Title of regulation

107/PMK.05/2020

105/PMK.07/2020

104/PMK.05/2020

References

Enforcement of Large-Scale Social Restrictions in Handling COVID-19 in the Province of the Special Capital Region of Jakarta

Amendments to Governor Regulation Number 33 of 2020 concerning Implementation of Large-Scale Social Restrictions in Handling COVID-19 in the Province of the Special Capital Region of Jakarta

Governor Decree Number 959 of 2020

Governor Regulation Number 88 of 2020

Discipline and Law Enforcement of Health Governor Regulation Number 79 of 2020 Protocols as Efforts to Prevent and Control COVID-19

Mechanism of implementation and accountability for tax borne by the government in the context of handling COVID-19

Management of national economic recovery loan to local government

Placement of funds in the context of implementing the national economic recovery program

9 Indonesia’s Response to COVID-19 … 151

152

P. R. N. Rimbawati

implemented various policies in the legal, health, and economic fields to tackle the Covid-19 outbreak. The strategies of each area are related to one another. Since the first case was announced, the Indonesian Government has tried to prepare various steps and policies to deal with and prevent the spread of COVID-19. In the health sector, the Ministry of Health has prepared 132 referral hospitals with a capacity of 40,829 beds to focus on dealing with patients. In addition, there were 40,320 specialist doctors on standby to treat patients spread across 2,877 hospitals, both government-owned and private hospitals. The government also ordered 2 million Avigan drugs, following an earlier order for 5 thousand of the same drugs. Apart from Avigan, the government also ordered 3 million Chloroquine. In the field of law, President Joko Widodo has issued Presidential Decree No.11 of 2020 concerning the Stipulation of Public Health Emergencies. The determination of this status is driven by the increasing number of coronavirus cases in Indonesia every day. He also declared the pandemic a national disaster on April 13, which was made with the issuance of Presidential Decree Number 12 of 2020. The Presidential Decree states that national disaster management caused by the coronavirus is carried out by the COVID-19 Handling Acceleration Task Force. The governors, regents, and mayors will become the chairperson of the Task Force for the Acceleration of Handling COVID-19 at the regional level. To reduce the rate of spread of the COVID-19, the government issued Government Regulation Number 21 of 2020 concerning Large-Scale Social Restrictions in the Context of Accelerating Handling of Corona Virus Disease 2019 (Covid-19). The social restriction policy is also supported by four strategies created by the Covid19 Handling Acceleration Task Force to reduce the spread of the pandemic. The first strategy is the mask movement for all. The government continues to campaign for the obligation to wear masks when outside the home or in public spaces. The second strategy is to contact tracing or tracing contacts of positive cases treated using rapid tests. The third strategy is education and preparation of independent isolation on partial tracing results that show positive test results from rapid tests or negative tests with symptoms for self-isolation. The fourth strategy is hospital isolation when independent isolation is not possible, such as when there are clinical signs that require definitive services in the hospital. After three months of Indonesia facing the pandemic, the Task Force for the Acceleration of Handling Covid-19 compiled five stages to get to a productive and safe Indonesia for Covid-19. This stage is a step into a new normal situation that begins with the relaxation of large-scale social restrictions or PSBB. The new normal that the government is campaigning is inseparable from the conditions in the last three months of the pandemic which hit many business sectors and the wheels of the economy. The Ministry of Manpower noted that at least 1.7 million formal and informal workers have been affected by COVID-19. This situation leaves the government faced with a difficult choice, to save the economy without sacrificing public health. Facing these conditions, starting in midMay the government began to urge people to live in peace and side by side with COVID-19. Thus, it is hoped that the activities and productivity of the community will be rolling again while still prioritizing health protocols. In determining whether

9 Indonesia’s Response to COVID-19 …

153

an area can resume productive and safe economic activities, the Task Force used 11 indicators of epidemiology, public health surveillance, and health services as recommended by WHO. One of the conditions for a region to be able to resume productive and safe economic activities is a decrease in the number of cases during the two weeks since its last peak. The reduction target is more than 50% for each region. But in its application, the stages of productive and safe Indonesia for COVID-19 received a test from three aspects. The three aspects are the increase in the number of new cases, the reach of mass tests, and the lack of readiness of the community to undergo a new normal phase.

9.3 Social Media and COVID-19 in Indonesia: Double-Edged Knife As Indonesia has the 4th largest population globally, it proportionally leads to the vast amount of social media users compared to many populous countries around the world. In July 2020, Indonesia is the 3rd largest social media user after China and India with 198.96 million users and projected to rise to 256.11 million in the following 5 years.9 Not only that Indonesia has a relatively huge number of users, but they are also significantly active users. It was recorded that Indonesia has 338.2 million internet connections made using cellphones, 124% of the total population of the country.10 With that number of internet and social media penetration to Indonesia, it could be seen that social media is widely used by diverse demography and spectrum nationwide. It made Indonesian social media is a huge market for many contexts, such as digital marketing for business or political and social campaigns. The high number of social media activities in Indonesia undeniably leads to the rapidly spreading of information and narratives through the platforms. Besides the rise of digital marketing and business marketplaces, this opportunity was taken advantage of by political campaigners to attract more supports from its constituents. It was intensively utilized since the 2014 Indonesian presidential election by both Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto sides to send political messages and broadcasts to its supporters.11 It reflects how powerful social media is to mobilize the mass through the information and message it delivered. However, Indonesian social media users’ characteristics were not fully matured to cope with the rapidly growing information coverage online. The social media users in the country have a minimalist level of literacy to examine and identify which information is reliable to be consumed and shared on the internet. This could have severe consequences and backlashes if that false information leads to violent misconduct 9 Number

of Social Network Users in Selected Countries in 2020 and 2025 (2020). (2020). 11 Irawanto (2019, pp. 1–11). 10 Simanjuntak

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in society. The impact could be even worse during this COVID-19 pandemic, where lives, public health, and the economy is severely at stake. Nowadays, social media are often seen as fast and effective platforms for searching, sharing, and distributing health information among the general population. The usage of social media could come in handy to mobilize the mass to obey health protocols in flattening the curve. In this context, it is even urgent since recovering from a global pandemic require all layers of society to act together in controlling the virus spread. While doctors and health front line workers are working in the hospital, the others should stay home and obey health protocols. During the pandemic, internet usage is rising due to people staying at home. Therefore, social media should be an effective channel to deliver the message to society regarding health protocols and COVID-19 information updates. Also, social media serves to provide an important informal source of data to identify health information that has not been reported to medical officers or health departments and to uncover or share perspectives on any life-threatening health-related issues. That includes important new information, changing regulations, and new findings related to pandemic development. In Indonesia, it led to the rise of COVID-19 social media influencers. Many doctors who are social media savvy gains exponentially new followers and more exposure, especially online. It was because, due to the pandemic, people are demanding continuous information with more engaging, simpler, and understandable language. The prime example of this case in Indonesia is Tirta Mandira Hudhi, or commonly known by the public as “dr. Tirta”, a businessman and a doctor with 1.7 million Instagram followers who campaigns simple but effective message to society to wash their hands properly.12 With millions of followers, the influencer also raised awareness by popularizing the hashtag #IndonesiaTerserah (#WhateverIndonesia), to express his as well as other Indonesians’ frustration with people disobeying health protocols and confusing government policies.13 The pandemic also leads to many creative posts, such as drawings, in social media to better deliver the health campaigns as well as the media to cope with stress during the long lockdowns.14 Other social media mediums such as memes and jokes to spread the information about the virus to engage with the other spectrum of society who is not familiar with medical analysis and data.15 It showed that at one edge of a knife, Indonesian social media is a positive platform for doctors and medical experts to educate society about the pandemic in an effective way. On other hand, digital platforms such as Gojek, Tokopedia, Bukalapak, Halodoc, and Ruangguru have provided facilities and support in working from home, learning from home, and praying or worshiping at home according to their respective fields of service. Gojek and Halodoc have provided facilities for monitoring and checking health from home. While Bukalapak, Tokopedia, Gojek and Grab open opportunities to work from home, Ruangguru facilitates the learning process from home. 12 Widiyani

(2020). (2020). 14 Dyahapsari (2020). 15 Sulistyaningtyas et al. (2020, pp. 52–62). 13 Fachriansyah

9 Indonesia’s Response to COVID-19 …

155

As mentioned earlier, the Indonesian social media demography is diverse. Not all people are bought by the idea that this pandemic exists and dangerous since it significantly affects their economic wellbeing. Even worse, the narrative that this pandemic is a conspiracy even swayed more people in Indonesia. Such conspiracy theories are amplified by celebrities, such as Indonesian Superman Is Dead drummer Jerinx with even more die-hard followers, to validify this ‘alternative truth’ that the pandemic is nothing more than ‘global elites’ agenda to profit from the pandemic.16 Such narratives lead to a march by hundreds in Indonesia’s Bali in rejecting the government’s obligatory rapid tests, accusing the government of taking business advantage of this pandemic. This obviously leads to the lagged progress of flattening the curve as the social distancing was not endorsed. All in all, social media during the pandemic could be a double-edged knife since it could both raise the collective awareness about the COVID-19 as well as to downplay the pandemic by accusing it of a conspiracy. In case of Indonesia, the pandemic has encouraged many doctors to engage in social media to counter the misinformation besides fighting the outbreak in the hospital. On the other side, many public figures with huge followers in the country, such as celebrities and anonymous gossips accounts, also swayed many people to believe in some alternative theory about the pandemic. As social media is a potentially effective means to deliver messages, the Indonesian government should also take part in educating the society about digital literacy, which vital amidst this rapidly growing information era. Both useful information about the COVID-19 and hoaxes as well as hateful comments are similarly easy to get viral in the country with the current level of digital literacy among the society. Therefore, this double-edged knife needs to be well managed by the government as the most powerful authority in the country, especially amidst the crisis.

9.4 Indonesia–China Bilateral Relationship Amidst the Pandemic As the pandemic is now global, international engagement and cooperation both in multilateral as well as bilateral manner are vital. In the context of Indonesia and China, by default the bilateral ties between them are robust. It was reflected during the pandemic as both countries showed supportive gestures towards each other, both in a normative and practical sense. Many economic sectors are jeopardized due to lagged transportation and slowed production as well as minimized consumption. However, Indonesia and China are willing to help each other out during these tough times, especially when economically both countries are reliant on one another.

16 Nugroho

(2020).

156

P. R. N. Rimbawati

9.4.1 Economic Cooperation: Trade and Investment In the context of China–Indonesia relations, Jakarta and Beijing by default have progressive bilateral ties, with the economy as one of the biggest appetites in developing it. With the pandemic, it is attention-grabbing how the economic partnership between the two countries reacts to many unprecedented challenges. Unforeseen obstacles caused by the global outbreak are the real tests for many economies around the world, ranging from multinational companies to small-medium enterprises. Indonesia and China, in an economic sense, need each other. In addition to the fact that China is the second-largest investor in Indonesia after Singapore, China is also awarded many strategic infrastructure projects in Indonesia to boost connectivity and economic growth.17 For Indonesia, China is both the largest source of import as well as the biggest export destination. Therefore, it is habitual for Beijing and Jakarta to maintain this lucrative relationship to keep going. Despite the crisis, in principle, both China and Indonesia are not discouraged to keep on developing economic cooperation even amidst the pandemic. The economic bonds are urgent and beneficial for both countries. However, there are practical things that unprecedentedly hampered the economic activities due to the pandemic, especially on the connectivity and consumption part. The lagged flow of goods and services caused many trades and investment activities to plunge. The Minister Counsellor for Economic and Commercial Affairs of the Chinese Embassy in Indonesia, Wang Liping, stated that several factors lead that to happen.18 First was the travel limitation on the business visa and visa on arrival issuance as well as the PSBB which also decreased the productions. It was reported that 24 Chinese companies in Indonesia stopped their productions during the pandemic. However, Counsellor Wang believed that both countries will resume their economic relationship as it was before. From China’s perspective, the country’s stable Purchasing Manager Index (PMI) throughout 2019 has been significantly dropped by 22 points as reported by China’s National Bureau of Statistics. The number came from the decline of the country’s exports by 2% as well as the dropped number of the good shipping in February, UNCTAD reported.19 As China is one of the top exporters and good suppliers to many countries in the world, the lagged flow of China will have some significant consequences to many economies around the world. Like many other countries in the world, Indonesia also faced similar problems in its trade. The pandemic has led to the significant decrease in international trade activities due to the limitation of connectivity. Despite having a trade surplus during the pandemic, it was not a good kind of surplus. The reason for the surplus was not necessarily because Indonesia was able to export more and import less but rather caused by the inability to import in the usual amount. Between January and May, Indonesia’s imports dropped by 15.5% while the export declined by 5.96%, causing 17 Maulia

(2018). (2020). 19 Global Trade Impact of the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Epidemic (2020). 18 Jaramaya

9 Indonesia’s Response to COVID-19 … Table 9.4 Indonesian commodity rise

157

No

Commodity (export code)

1

Coal (HS 2701)

2

Iron and steel (HS 7202)

196.40

3

Swift’s nest (HS 0410)

189.61

4

Frozen fish (0303)

53.78

5

Tropical food (HS 0804)

22.29

6

Packed fruits (HS 2007)

320.27

7

Canned fish (0305)

92.59

8

Shoes (HS 6403)

24.59

9

Furniture (HS 9404)

10

Processed woods (HS 4409)

11

Electronics (HS 8541)

Increase percentage (%) 74.42

30.87 222.44 14.70

Source Fitriani (2020)

Indonesia to have that ‘surplus’.20 Therefore, an immediate resume of economic activities needs to be done. However, during the pandemic, Indonesia and China’s economic relationship is seen to keep progressing despite both countries’ difficulties in a domestic economic context. Fortunately, in commodities, the trade between Indonesia and China is still growing. In detail, 11 Indonesian commodities showed a significant increase in the first quarter of 2020 as shown by the Table 9.4. Both China and Indonesia did several measures taken to ease the commodities trade activities to stay seamless amidst the pandemic, where many travels are limited or even banned. Despite the good trend in goods, the revenue and economic progress in a service context, such as tourism, is flunked. Chinese tourist is the biggest nonASEAN international tourist in Indonesia. Due to the pandemic, the number of visits by Chinese tourists dropped by 97% in May 2020.21 In response to this challenge, President Joko Widodo stated that among many economic revitalization efforts that Indonesia is making with China, one of them is concerning the international travel between the two countries in which necessary health protocols will be made to facilitate and ease essential business trips and official visits.22 By default, a drastic drop in people mobility has damaged many related sectors like travel and many other service-based industries. In investment, China is positively still the second largest in Indonesia despite the difficulties faced due to the pandemic. It is also seen that the trends will stay positive in the future. Social and Cultural Affairs Counsellor of Indonesian Consulate in Shanghai, Wandi Adriano, stated that Chinese strategic investments in Indonesia are still going and will give a positive perspective impact on Indonesian society. 20 Ing

(2020).

21 Indonesian 22 Wirajuda

tourism buckles as Chinese tourists stop coming (2020). (2020).

158

P. R. N. Rimbawati

He stated that despite the problematic sentiment of Chinese workers taking all the strategic positions and jobs in the project, it will gradually be decreased and finally fully replaced by Indonesian local workers in the future. At first, many positions will be still dominated by Chinese workers since they need to establish the system first, as it is a Chinese-backed project. However, more Indonesians are now starting to work on those projects, showing a progressive trend. Therefore, this shows that Indonesia and China do have a positive prospect for economic cooperation. From the Chinese perspective, Beijing’s ambassador to Jakarta Xiao Qian also showed his confidence that the economic prospect of the two countries on economic cooperation, trade, and investment will stay positive as he trusts the Joko Widodo administration to handle the pandemic.23 Chinese President Xi stated to President Widodo that both China and Indonesia need to collaborate further to seize new industries and business models created by the pandemic. Despite the optimism from both sides, the challenges are still there. First of all, there is a possibility that the running China-backed projects and investments could be stalled for two or three years due to the pandemic.24 Also, the anti-Chinese sentiments are hampering the public support for Chinese investments, especially amidst the pandemic. The entrance of Chinese workers in many projects in Indonesia such as in Morowali during the pandemic has led to many rejections from Indonesian society, damaging the image of China’s investment in the country. However, such things are considered as ‘ripples’ with which China and Indonesia are able to deal with.25 Besides the strong sense that China and Indonesia are mature enough to deal with the negative sentiments of their economic decisions, both countries need each other to economically bounce back after the pandemic. As many other countries around the world, China and Indonesia are struggling economically from trade and investment contractions. By this, the revitalization in both sectors is vital for the recovery. However, if both countries can overcome the obstacles, the bilateral relationship is going to be even stronger since Indonesia will urgently need investment from and economic collaborations with China to boost the economic recovery after the pandemic passes.26 The Indonesian government has established National Economic Recovery and Transformation Taskforce to recover from the economic damage of the pandemic. The taskforce mission to revitalize the economy has led the country to persistently invites Chinese skilled workers to support Indonesia’s industrial and investment projects.27 China and Indonesia’s trade and investment flows are one of the biggest in Southeast Asia, therefore the resume to the full effect is necessary to restore the lost capital during the pandemic.

23 Aini

(2020). (2020). 25 Interviewed with Adriano, W., Social and Cultural Affairs Counsellor of Indonesian Consulate in Shanghai (2020). 26 Rakhmat (2020). 27 Ng (2020). 24 Mulyanto

9 Indonesia’s Response to COVID-19 …

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9.4.2 Political Spectrum: Trust and Sentiments A global pandemic could be a real test to any state political relationships. In a success story, it could fortify political bonds since many countries are suffering similar health security threats, bringing them closer together. Otherwise, the pandemic could be a new tension as one state could fault the others for the outbreak. Bilateral political ties between Indonesia and China fell into the first category. Indonesia–China bilateral relationship had been officially initiated in 1950 during President Soekarno’s administration. However, the relationship was frozen in 1967 as President Soeharto took power replacing President Soekarno, after the 30 September incident in 1965.28 The “New Order” under President Soeharto, which was anticommunist, drove the established relations under President Soekarno’s “Old Order” to be significantly broke down as both countries were not bilaterally related. Due to the Cold War and domestic issues, the relationship was not progressing for decades. The betterment happened 23 years later when the bilateral ties were normalized in 1990. In 1989, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and Indonesian Foreign Minister Moerdiono announced that both countries will resume the diplomatic relationship, followed by the official normalization in August 1990.29 The political bilateral ties are growing ever since. Decades after the diplomatic ties resume, China by default sees Indonesia as a strategic partner in many contexts. In the context of the BRI, Chinese President Xi stated that he is willing to deepen the cooperation with Indonesia to push many strategic partnerships to support BRI.30 It showed that Indonesia is a vital political partner for China. In reverse, Indonesia is actively welcoming and supporting the Initiatives in reciprocal.31 During the pandemic, President Xi also said that China is standing by Indonesia and ready to support in overcoming challenges caused by the pandemic. Indonesia–China political relationship remains positive in facing the pandemic. Since the early outbreak, both state leaders have shown their concerns towards each other. When the cases in Wuhan was rising, President Joko Widodo called President Xi to express its support towards China amidst the sudden outbreak in the country. In response months later in May, Chairman Xi called President Widodo back to show his encouragement for Indonesia who was, at that time, facing the significant escalating number of positive COVID-19 cases. In the Indonesia–China context, these supportive manners reflect the mutual trust between the two, something that is not always present in a bilateral context amidst this pandemic. It was proven in moments where the many countries are working to create and access effective vaccines which in this stage, the number is still very limited. Indonesia was one of the limited countries given access to Sinovac Vaccines made by China. In addition, it was also said that there is also a prospective collaboration between Indonesia’s Kalbe 28 Anwar

(2019, pp. 1–7). (2015). 30 Xi Calls for New Areas in China-Indonesia Cooperation (2020). 31 Mulyanto (2020). 29 Sriyanto

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P. R. N. Rimbawati

Farma and China’s Sinovac Biotech to further research and distribute the vaccines. It depicts that Indonesia is one of the closest and trustworthy partners by China. Further from what Indonesia and China are jointly doing, it is also important to see how Indonesia perceives China’s efforts to domestically handle the virus. Indonesia sees China’s efforts to handle the virus positively and looking up to do the same thing by learning from China.32 China having the outbreak under control in a relatively shorter tie with a lesser case compared to other countries, despite being the first country facing the virus. It built new hospitals and health facilities within approximately a week in an emergency situation. Strict lockdowns were also able to be done in minimizing social interactions and containing the outbreak. Compared to many other countries with a growing number of cases, those were not something ordinarily done to face coronavirus. Subsequent to that, it needs to be noted that every country has different contexts and situations. China has a centralized government which leads to simpler communication and coordination processes to create unified policies, including the execution. Meanwhile, Indonesia has been decentralized in recent decades, which has given partial autonomy to regional governments. Such a system leads to more complicated communication between the central and regional governments, causing the different or sometimes contradictive policies taken by central and regional authorities. Despite the differences, many Indonesian doctors and health workers are learning from Chinese doctors in handling the pandemic through many online seminars.33 Those online meetings and webinars reflect that Indonesia is willing to learn from China. Even though the bond and solidarity were tight among the elites, it did not mean the problem on the grassroots level is absent. By default, even before the pandemic, the anti-Chinese sentiment in Indonesia is still evident in several contexts. In recent years especially after the 2014 presidential election, many have used the anti-Chinese sentiment as the black campaign against then -presidential candidate Joko Widodo to accuse him of being a Chinese-decent with communist affiliation.34 Many have seen Indonesia’s increasing debt to and investment projects from China as the steps are taken to overrun the country through a debt-trap scheme.35 Such sentiments have caused the historical resentments to resurface, aggravating the situations during this pandemic. Seeing that this virus ‘came’ from China, the sentiment became even worse, especially among the people in the grassroots. Many have seen that this racial and hatred tension is as dangerous or even more threatening than the virus itself, such as making statements to expulse Chinese workers from Indonesia.36 Many Indonesians also have linked the ‘Chinese virus’ to the Uyghurs case, stating that the pandemic 32 Interviewed with Adriano, W., Social and Cultural Affairs Counsellor of Indonesian Consulate in Shanghai (2020). 33 Ibid. 34 Khidhir (2018). 35 Tarahita and Rakhmat (2019). 36 Llewellyn (2020).

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was God’s warning to the Chinese government for the mistreatment of the Muslims in Xinjiang.37 Still, in coronavirus context, there is also a small increase of the antiChinese hate speech made by Islamic State- affiliated militants which were feared to leadto an attack while the country is weak.38 Those are some of the challenges that stand within the line of Indonesia and China’s bilateral relations. Despite the tensions in local communities, the cooperation in fighting the pandemic is still going robustly. Since the early of the outbreak, the Chinese government has been assistive to provide necessary access for Indonesia to escort Indonesian citizens from Wuhan, which was the main epicenter of the COVID-19. During the escort process, in reciprocal Indonesia donated masks for people in Wuhan, which the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially thanked Indonesia for. As the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that China will reciprocate other states’ support toward the country, Indonesia got medical supports from Shanghai transported to Jakarta.39 It was an initial stage for further cooperation in fighting the pandemic. Certainly, the cooperation goes beyond the medical supplies exchange between China and Indonesia. Many prospective areas of cooperation also will be advanced amidst the pandemic. During her visit to Hainan Province in late August 2020, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi stated that Indonesia and China have begun the third phase of a clinical trial.40 The joint development of vaccines has been a new flashpoint in the bilateral cooperation as President Xi conveyed his view to President Widodo that this pandemic could open up new opportunities and industries.41 In practice, China provides necessary assistance to produce the vaccines as well as to make them more accessible to one in need. Both countries are on the same page in further developing the well-established tie. Ambassador Xiaio Qian stated that even though the pandemic has slowed down some of the bilateral exchanges and cooperation projects, the long-term prospect of the bilateral relations is not going to be affected.42 Amidst the celebration of the 70th anniversary of Indonesia–China relations, President Joko Widodo thanked China’s support, especially in the vaccine cooperation, and stated that Indonesia is keen to develop further cooperation with China in many strategic sectors.43 The pandemic may jeopardize the practical aspect of the relationship but certainly that it would bounce back stronger in the long run.

37 Rakhmat

and Aryansyah (2020). (2020). 39 Pinandita (2020). 40 Yuting (2020). 41 Xi Calls for New Areas in China-Indonesia Cooperation (2020). 42 Hui and Qianliang (2020). 43 President Xi Jinping Speaks with Indonesian President Joko Widodo on the Phone (2020). 38 Chew

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9.5 Southeast Asian Nations Future Trajectory: COVID-19 and U.S-China Rivalry The US and China are currently competing in a lot of sectors, such as politics, economy, security, and even technological developments. Some even describe the power contest between the US and China as a “new cold war”.44 The rise of China in recent decades does significantly affect the regional and global structure, threatening U.S.-led liberal order and hegemony. The power competition is even sharper under President Trump’s administration, which has more inward-looking foreign policy compared to the previous presidency. Apparently, the pandemic became a new arena for competition. President Trump blames China for the virus caused and stopped funding the WHO for conspiring with China in hiding some facts about the pandemic.45 Chinese officials also accuse the U.S. military to bring the virus into Wuhan, although there is no evidence supporting that.46 Regardless of who is right, the point is the clash is there and expanding, even during the global pandemic. Many regions are affected by these power competitions, including one of the most strategic areas in Asia–Pacific, Southeast Asia. ASEAN, a regional institution that unites Southeast Asian nations, is known to be neutral on the international relations chessboard. The value of impartiality within ASEAN reflects the value of most of the Southeast Asian nations, the members of ASEAN, in conducting its foreign relations, including on US–China rivalry context. For ASEAN, engaging with both the US and China proportionally is the most preferable option.47 Amidst the US– China decoupling, generally no Southeast Asian showed a bold alignment to one side but neutral. In the context of the pandemic, the rivalry is manifested into the battle of “aid diplomacy” in Southeast Asia.48 China approached Southeast Asia closely as it joined the China–ASEAN Foreign Minister’s Meeting on COVID-19 as well as sending ventilators, masks, and experts as an aid to Southeast Asian nations to battle the pandemic. Those help were largely welcomed by Southeast Asian leaders. The US also announced that it would provide US$35.3 million to ASEAN members as emergency assistance to handle the pandemic, such as to build a laboratory to accelerate testing.49 Indeed, Southeast Asian leaders thanked Washington for this support. Foreign Minister Pompeo highlighted this assistance during the foreign ministers’ video meeting but also used this opportunity to exploit China’s SCS positions by pointing out China’s recent maritime activities in the maritime lane during the pandemic. As said, Southeast Asia engages both impartially.

44 Ash

(2020). (2020). 46 Winter (2020). 47 Tay and Wau (2019). 48 Stromseth (2020). 49 Stromseth (2020). 45 Zakaria

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Indonesia also acts neutral in this regional power contention. Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi openly said to the two superpowers that “we do not want to be trapped by this rivalry” but to show that Indonesia, as well as ASEAN, are ready to be a partner.50 As Indonesia’s basic principle in its foreign policy maneuver is “free and active, it employs a hedging strategy in dealing with this rivalry. To be more specific, Indonesia hedges under the economic pragmatism and limited bandwagoning as Indonesia engage with both China’s BRI and the US’ Indo–Pacific Strategy. The trajectory will remain this way as the strategies and agendas from both sides are equally vital to Indonesian economic and strategic interests. Therefore, it is less likely that Indonesia, as well as other Southeast Asian nations to fall into one side and be hostile to the other.

References Aini, N. (2020, May 6). China: Hubungan Ekonomi Dengan Indonesia Kuat Meski Pandemi. Republika. https://republika.co.id/berita/q9v61q382/china-hubungan-ekonomi-den gan-indonesia-kuat-meski-pandemi. Allard, T., & Widianto, S. (2020, September 8). Indonesia to U.S., China: Don’t trap us in your rivalry. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-politics-foreign-minister-idUSKB N25Z1ZD. Anwar, D. F. (2019). Indonesia-China relations: To be handled with care. ISEAS Perspective. Ash, T. G. (2020, June 20). The US and China are entering a new cold war. Where does that leave the rest of us? The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jun/20/ us-china-cold-war-liberal-de. Chew, A. (2020, April 7). Coronavirus: Indonesia sees uptick of anti-Chinese speech by militants on social media. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/people/article/ 3078775/coronavirus-indonesia-warned-be-guard-anti-chinese-terrorism-amid. Dyahapsari, I. (2020, June 25). Creative social media acts in response to COVID-19. CSEAS Newsletter. https://covid-19chronicles.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/post-052-html/. Fachriansyah, R. (2020, September 10). OVID-19 travel ban should be ‘Wake-up Call’ for Indonesia: Lawmakers. Jakarta post. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/09/10/covid19-travel-ban-should-be-wake-up-call-for-indonesia-lawmakers.html. Fitriani, A. (2020, August 14). Hubungan Ekonomi Indonesia-China Makin ‘Mesra’ Meski Di Tengah Pandemik Covid-19. RMOL.ID. https://dunia.rmol.id/read/2020/08/14/448113/hub ungan-ekonomi-indonesia-china-makin-mesra-meski-di-tengah-pandemik-covid-19 Global trade impact of the coronavirus (COVID-19) epidemic. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2020, March) https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditcinf2020d1.pdf? user=1653. Hui, L., & Qianliang, Y. (2020, March 3). Interview: Friendly cooperation between China, Indonesia showcased in joint fight against COVID-19: Chinese ambassador. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Indonesia. http://id.chineseembassy.org/eng/sgdt/t1751479. htm. Indonesia’s COVID-19 testing positivity remains far above WHO standard for ‘New Normal’. Jakarta post, (2020, August 26) https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/08/26/indonesiascovid-19-testing-positivity-remains-far-above-who-standard-for-new-normal.html.

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Sihombing, G. (2020, September 22). Indonesia tips towards recession as consumer spending dwindles. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-22/indonesia-tips-towardrecession-as-consumer-spending-dwindles. Simanjuntak, S. A. (2020, June 17). Media Sosial, Tak Sekadar Jaringan Pertemanan. Kompas. https://bebas.kompas.id/baca/riset/2020/06/17/media-sosial-tak-sekadar-jaringan-pertemanan/. Sriyanto, N. (2015, December 2). 65 years of bilateral relations between Indonesia and China: Strengthening and building constructive relations through people-to-people relations. Center for Political Studies, Indonesian Institute of Science. http://www.politik.lipi.go.id/kolom/kolom-1/ politik-internasional/1034-65-years-of-bilateral-relations-between-indonesia-and-china-streng thening-and-building-constructive-relations-through-people-to-people-relations-volume-1. Stromseth, J. (2020, May 14). US-China rivalry after COVID-19: Clues and early indications from Southeast Asia. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/05/14/ us-china-rivalry-after-covid-19-clues-and-early-indications-from-southeast-asia/. Sulistyaningtyas, T., Jaelani, J., & Suryani, Y. (2020). Power of knowledge and community social class above Covid-19 pandemic information on social media. Jurnal Komunikasi. Tarahita, D., & Rakhmat, M. Z. (2019, May 9). How can Indonesia manage its concerns about BRI investments? The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/how-can-indonesia-manageits-concerns-about-bri-investments/. Tay, S., & Wau, J. (2019, December 3). ASEAN fights to stay neutral in the US–China contest. East Asia forum. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/12/03/asean-fights-to-stay-neutral-in-theus-china-contest/. Wahyuni, S. (2020, May 31). Government’s statements on new normal confusing: Muhammadiyah. Jakarta post. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/05/29/governments-statem ents-on-new-normal-confusing-muhammadiyah.html. Widiyani, R. (2020, March 30). Profil dr Tirta, Ngegas demi Lawan Virus Corona. Wolipop Lifestyle. https://wolipop.detik.com/health-and-diet/d-4958981/profil-dr-tirta-ngegasdemi-lawan-virus-corona. Winter, L. (2020, March 13). Chinese officials blame US army for coronavirus. The Scientist. https:// www.the-scientist.com/news-opinion/chinese-officials-blame-us-army-for-coronavirus-67267. Wirajuda, T. (2020, September 2). President Jokowi and President Xi Jinping to Bolster IndonesiaChina Ties. Kompas. https://go.kompas.com/read/2020/09/02/184913574/president-jokowi-andpresident-xi-jinping-to-bolster-indonesia-china-ties?page=all. Xi calls for new areas in China-Indonesia cooperation. Xinhua net. (2020, September 1). http:// www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-09/01/c_139332426.htm. Yuting, S. (2020, August 23). Indonesian FM praises cooperation with Beijing in COVID19 fight. CGTN. https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-08-23/Indonesian-FM-praises-cooperationwith-Beijing-in-COVID-19-fight-TbqFuiNy2A/index.html. Zakaria, F. (2020, April 17). The U.S. and China’s blame game isn’t saving any lives. The Washington post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/16/us-chinas-blame-game-isntsaving-any-lives/.

Chapter 10

Singapore’s Response to COVID-19 and Its Impacts on Singapore-China Relations Xianbai Ji

10.1 Introduction Millions of confirmed cases were reported in almost all major countries and territories ever since the outbreak of the COVID-19 in the early 2020. The tropical city-state Singapore is among the worst hit countries in the world in terms of the number of confirmed cases per million inhabitants (approximately 8000 as of 10 July 2020) though fatality rate (below 0.1%) was low by international standards. Initially, the development of the coronavirus pandemic in Singapore had a slow start. The government stayed on top of the situation, handling a limited pool of imported and domestically transmitted cases with relative ease. The progression of the pandemic took a sudden turn for the worse in late March and early April 2020 when the highly infectious disease spread intensely among foreign migrant workers, a sizeable occupational group living in close proximity in purpose-built/factory-converted dormitories on the outskirt of Singapore or temporary quarters at construction sites. Contagion within dorms turned out to be the blind spot of Singapore’s otherwise comprehensive policy responses to the COVID-19 outbreak. Singapore subsequently took a two-pronged strategy that mixed social distancing and massive testing to meet the challenge. On the one hand, Singapore quarantined and tested foreign migrant workers in enormous quantities, separating the infected from the healthy and preempting escalating cross infections within dorms. On the other hand, Singapore imposed an island-wide lockdown, known officially as ‘Circuit Breaker’, that lasted over one month between April and June 2020 to cut off community transmission. For all these decisive measures, the pandemic greatly disrupted the Singapore economy which is projected to contract by up to 7% in 2020. In response, Singapore rolled out four stimulus packages to prop up the wobbling economy. Fortunately, in the fight

X. Ji (B) Renmin University of China, Beijing, China e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 N. Peng (ed.), The Reshaping of China-Southeast Asia Relations in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4416-7_10

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against the COVID-19, Singapore did not stand alone. Singapore and China cooperated closely on containing COVID-19 by, for instance, maintaining the openness of international trade and regional supply chains especially for the essential goods. Therefore, as the Chinese word for ‘crisis’ (weiji) suggests, the ‘wei’ (danger) of the pandemic has provided the ‘ji’ (opportunity) for Singapore and China to step up public health cooperation and improve bilateral ties at times strained by geopolitical undercurrents. This chapter offers a preliminary account of the fast-evolving COVID-19 situation in Singapore, which according to analysts is marked by ‘sharp changes measured in weeks, days, and hours’.1 Section 10.2 documents the on-going development of the COVID-19 pandemic in Singapore. The emphasis is placed on policy measures put in place to contain the epidemic. Section 10.3 focuses on the economic toll of the COVID-19 on Singapore and Singapore’s fiscal injection to stabilise the economy. Before elaborating on Sino-Singaporean cooperation and mutual assistance in combating the coronavirus (Sect. 10.5), Sect. 10.4 provides a general background of the political and economic relations between the two countries. Section 10.6 concludes the chapter.

10.2 The Development of COVID-19 Outbreak in Singapore Shortly after China notified the world about a mysterious virus causing pneumonialike symptoms on December 31, 2019, Singapore started to take precautionary measures to cope with potential imported cases of what was then referred to as ‘severe pneumonia’. On the ground, Singapore drew heavily on the experience of combating the SARS epidemic of 2003–2004 to stay alert.2 On January 3, medical teams were deployed at Changi Airport and all inbound passengers arriving on flights from Wuhan were screened for body temperature to detect suspected cases. After a few false alarms, Singapore reported its first confirmed COVID-19 case on January 23, a 66-year-old Chinese national living Wuhan who arrived in Singapore with his family on January 20.3 In anticipation of a surge in incoming travellers for Chinese New Year holidays, Singapore expanded temperature screening at the airport as well as at all land and sea check points thereafter. Upon the detection of the first COVID-19 case, a Multi-Ministry Taskforce on Wuhan Coronavirus was set up. The Taskforce was co-chaired by health minister Gan Kim Yong and national development minister Lawrence Wong with a mandate to spearhead a wholeof-government response to the coronavirus outbreak. On January 27, three student hostels in the National University of Singapore, Nanyang Technological University and Singapore Management University were repurposed to Government Quarantine 1 Tay

and Kevin (2020). (2020, pp. 345–362). 3 The second day face masks, both N95 and surgical, ran out at retail outlets. 2 Woo

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Facilities(GQFs) to accommodate university students returning from overseas. On the same day, the government began reaching out to all recent travellers from Hubei province, quarantining locals at home and those on short-term visas in designated GQFs across the nation.4 It was also announced that from January 29, all new visitors with recent Hubei travel history within the last 14 days, or those with Chinese passports issued in Hubei, would not be allowed entry into or transit through Singapore. Following the travel ban, airlines like Singapore Airlines, Scoot and Jetstar all moved to cut back their flights to and from China. As the total number of coronavirus infections rose slightly in Singapore, the government on February 1 started to hand out four surgical masks (5.2 million masks island-wide) to all Singaporean households5 with priority given to high-risk groups such as rental block and Pioneer Generation6 residents. Realising that the coronavirus might have spread to other parts of China, the authorities expanded the travel restrictions on February 1 to ban all passengers with recent travel history to China in the past 14 days from entering or transiting through Singapore. Imported cases were a primary source of concern until the discovery on February 4 of the first local contraction cluster, Yong Thai Hang health products shop. Four women without recent travel history to China caught the virus via this cluster as some of them served Chinese tourists from Wuhan in the shop. Swiftly on February 7, the government raised the nation’s Disease Outbreak Response System Condition (DORSCON) level from Yellow to Orange. The alert level of DORSCON Orange meant that the COVID-19 situation in Singapore was severe but not yet widespread across the country.7 That said, a wave of panic buying that emptied supermarkets shelves occurred following the DORSCON level revision up. Given the societal perturbation over the coronavirus, the Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong addressed the nation for the first time on 8 February. He reassured the public that Singapore was well positioned to keep infection under control, thanks partly to the prior experience of combating and the public capacity that established in the aftermath of the 2003 outbreak of SARS.8 Importantly, he made clear that Singapore’s strategy was to concentrate finite medical resources on the most vulnerable in the society, advising the rest to either go to general practitioner clinics or stay at home for self-isolation. 4A

S$100 daily allowance was provided to those self-employed under quarantine orders. policy came after a scramble for masks which led to shortages, hoarding, and profiteering behaviours like price gouging and scalping. The distribution, however, raised eyebrows in some corners as many pointed out that the risk of human-to-human transmission was in fact escalated as people flocked to collect masks at Residents’ Committees and Community Clubs. As of writing, Singapore distributed facemasks for four times. 6 In Singapore, Pioneer Generation (建国一代) refers to Singaporean born on or before 31 December 1949 and obtained citizenship before 31 December 1986. They generally enjoy better policy treatment to honour their contributions in the early days of Singaporean nation-building. Singapore became a fully independent republic in August 1965. 7 Singapore used to raise DORSCON level to Orange in 2009 when containing the H1N1 Influenza. 8 For instance, a 330-bed National Centre for Infectious Diseases (NCID) was built after the SARS outbreak to strengthen Singapore’s infectious disease management and prevention capacity. The NCID played a hugely important role in Singapore’s fight against the COVID-19. In the early phases, nearly all confirmed and suspected coronavirus patients were warded in the NCID. 5 The

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From mid-February, the Singaporean Ministry of Manpower began advising employers to allow for work-from-home arrangements. Singapore’s Land Transport Authority for its part distributed four masks to every taxi and private hire car driver on February 10. Grab, Southeast Asia’s biggest ride-hailing platform, suspended its taxi and car sharing services from February 9 to reduce the risk of in-car transmission. Taxi companies also implemented a waiver of cab rental fees should any drivers were to be placed under quarantine. Regarding the usage of facemasks, in keeping with the prevailing advice of the WHO at the time, the official stance of Singapore maintained that masks should only be worn by the sick in their visits to clinics. On February 14, the Ministry of Health (MOH) activated the Public Health Preparedness Clinics scheme, consolidating the country’s primary care clinic resources to deal with the COVID-19 outbreak. Doctors were encouraged to give five days of medical leave for patients with respiratory symptoms. From February 17, the ‘Stay-Home Notice’ (SHN) took effect, disallowing travellers returning from China from leaving home within 14 days of arrival.9 The government’s meeting with local religious leaders was also held, trying to keep religious events and folk activities alike away from the coronavirus. Nevertheless, places of worship proved to be highly prone to coronavirus transmission due to the regularity and intimacy of sustained human interactions. Of the four infection clusters that emerged in February, two were religion-related (i.e. Grace Assembly of God and The Life Church and Missions Singapore). Notably, these two COVID-19 clusters were detected using a novel serological technique to identify the asymptomatic and those who had recovered from earlier infection. It was also first time that antibody tests were used to track coronavirus infection.10 On February 28, it was announced that all political office holders, including President Halimah Yacob, would be taking a one-month pay cut while members of parliament would take a one-month pay cut in allowance.11 The pay cut by officials and parliamentarians was accompanied by a special bonus of up to one-month salary to front line health workers in recognition of their hard work and sacrifice in protecting the health of the country. In early March, Singapore banned all visitors arriving from South Korea, Iran and northern Italy and required all inbound travellers with fever or showing respiratory illness to undergo swab tests. But on March 10, Singapore allowed some 600 passengers, all found to be well, to disembark from the Italian cruise ship Costa Fortuna after being denied by three Thai and Malaysian ports. On the same day, a large and growing cluster linked to a private dinner function at SAFRA Jurong on February 15 became known to the public and the MOH suspended all government-sponsored 9 Following the uncovering of the South Korean infection clusters involving the Shincheonji Church

of Jesus in Daegu and a hospital in Cheongdo, Singapore expanded travel restrictions to the two Korean places from 26 February and returnees from there would have to serve the two-weeks quarantine order. 10 Normile (2020). 11 On 27 March, it was announced that ministers would undertake a three-month instead of the announced one-month pay cut.

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activities for senior citizens for two weeks. The People’s Association, the organisation charged with overseeing grassroots activities, also decided to suspended some group activities such as Qigong, line-dancing and singing for the elderly. On March 12, Prime Minister Lee delivered his second televised address to the nation. The following day, Singapore announced a ban on visitors from Italy, France, Spain and Germany and another ban on new ticketed sports, cultural and entertainment events with crowds of 250 people or more. On March 15, the applicability of the travel ban expanded drastically to incorporate the ASEAN countries (with the exception of Malaysia), Japan, Switzerland and Britain. Three days later, all travellers entering Singapore would be issued a 14-day SHN from 20 March. The government even booked over 7500 hotel rooms for SHN purposes. The Government Technology Agency also developed a smartphone app, ‘TraceTogether’, for voluntary adoption to facilitate contact tracing efforts. The first two cases of death from the coronavirus were reported on March 21, involving a 75-year-old Singaporean woman and a 64-year-old Indonesian man, both with a history of heart disease. Upon the two demises, the first ever comprehensive travel ban was implemented by Singapore on March 23, from when all short-term visitors except those involved in essential industries like healthcare and transport were banned arriving or transiting through the country. Again, due to the social and geographical closeness Singapore and Malaysia, Malaysians with valid work permits and Malaysia-based Singaporeans were exempted from such travel restrictions. Crucially, the travel ban was imposed when Malaysia was taking similarly strict border-control and lockdown measures, sparking fears of food shortages and actual runs on supermarkets in Singapore. Public sentiment did not calm down until the government clarified that Singapore-Malaysia trade would continue. Nevertheless, NTUC Fairprice, the largest Singaporean supermarket chain, had to come up with a list of goods including canned food, eggs, poultry, paper products, cooking oil and frozen meat that would be subject to purchase limit per customer. From March 29, all long-term pass (e.g., student pass and employment pass) holders had to obtain pre-approval from the immigration authority before they could come to Singapore. All primary, secondary and centralised institutes under the Ministry of Education were required to implement Home-Based e-Learning for one day every week. All entertainment outlets were closed and mass gatherings of any sizes cancelled. Thanks to these and other decisive containment efforts, for nearly three months since January, Singapore handled the outbreak with relative ease. The government managed to trace and isolate each person infected with the coronavirus and was held up globally as the ‘near-perfect’ model to emulate.12 The situation, however, took sharp turn in late March as explosive infections of the coronavirus erupted within the foreign migrant workers13 living in cramped and often unhygienic dormitories. The issue surfaced on April 5 when the authorities noticed that of the 120 confirmed 12 Rene Niehus, Pablo M De Salazar, Aimee Taylor, Marc Lipsitch, Quantifying Bias of COVID-19 Prevalence and Severity Estimates in Wuhan, China that Depend on Reported Cases in International Travelers, MedRxiv, https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.02.13.20022707. 13 As of December 2019, around 293 thousand foreigners were employed in the construction industry of Singapore. The majority of the migrant labour came from neighbouring Asian countries such

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cases 32 were migrant workers. Knowing that there might have been surges in cases among migrant workers who live, work and interact in socially crowded settings, the government gazetted two dormitories worst hit by the coronavirus, the S11 Dormitory@Punggol and Westlite Toh Guan, with immediate effectiveness. Over twenty thousand of foreign workers were quarantined for two weeks as a result. This move marked the watershed moment in the fight against the coronavirus. From this moment onwards, Singapore shifted policy attention towards dormitory cases. An Inter-Agency Taskforce to Support Foreign Workers and Dormitory Operators comprising manpower, health, environment, army and police personnel was established within days to lead the governmental efforts to contain dormitory contagion. On April 20, spikes in dormitory cases made Singapore the country with the most COVID-19 cases in Southeast Asia.14 By late April, the work of all foreign workers and their spouses was ceased (and 25 of the 43 dormitories were gazetted as isolation areas at this writing). Massive testing was followed focusing on those with apparent symptoms, a history of close contact with confirmed cases and work in essential industries. Depending on the results of tests, foreign workers were segregated into three groups: the healthy were transferred to temporary accommodations in vacant public institutes (e.g., Northshore Primary School and Home Team Academy), newly constructed dorms (e.g., Changi East), refurbished Housing Board blocks (e.g., Redhill Close and Bukit Merah), unused car parks, indoor sports halls (at Pasir Ris, Jurong West, Clementi and Hougang), resorts (e.g., Cherryloft), floating lodgings converted from floating construction support vessels (e.g., Bibby Progress and Bibby Renaissance) as well as army camps (e.g., Jurong Camp II and Bedok Camp II) provided by the government.15 The workers who were being tested were quarantined in a special swab isolation facility until their test results were available; and those tested positive for the COVID-19 were either hospitalised or sent to GQFs and community care facilities (e.g., Singapore Expo and Changi Exhibition Centre). Notably, besides a team of over 800 doctors drawing from the Army Medical Services and major hospitals who attended to the foreign workers in person, telepresence robots and mobile teleconsultation stations were deployed so as to reduce doctors’ face-to-face communication with the infected. Websites that translate English to Tamil and Bengali were also developed for the medical teams to communicate readily with foreign workers.16 At the same time, Singapore imposed a sweeping nation-wide lockdown to minimise community exposure to the pandemic. Initial measures announced by Prime as Bangladesh, India, China and Myanmar. They tended to live in purpose-built dormitories in rooms with bunk beds for 12–20 men. Together with foreign domestic workers (262 thousand), they formed the bulk of low-waged and low/semi-skilled Work Permit holders (1 million). For a broader discussion on migrant workers and the pandemic, see World Bank (2020). 14 1426 cases were reported on 20 April. This was the highest single-day jump in confirmed COVID19 cases in Singapore. Of the reported, 1371 were foreign worker cases. 15 As of early June, more than 2,000 healthy migrant workers moved into temporary accommodations. 16 David Koh, Migrant Workers and COVID-19, Occupational and Environmental Medicine, Vol. 77, pp. 634–636. https://doi.org/10.1136/oemed-2020-106626.

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Minister Lee during his address to the nation on April 3 kicked in on April 7 from when all non-essential workplaces were shut down. Wearing a mask became compulsory. All schools changed to home-based online learning from April 8. Enhanced SHN was implemented according to which all travellers entering Singapore would serve 14-day self-isolation at dedicated facilities. As the number of unexpected and unlinked infection cases worsened in the days after the declaration of the national lockdown, Singapore tightened and extended the Circuit Breaker regime on April 21. Only one person per family was allowed to go out for a limited period of time and access to popular markets was restricted based on the last digit of national identity card number. Approximately 3000 safe Distancing Ambassadors and Enforcement Officers were dispatched daily in places like wet markets and supermarkets to thin out crowds.17 The public were also encouraged to report those who flouted safe distancing rules through the government app ‘One Service’. Wearable tracking ‘tokens’ were distributed to vulnerable senior citizens who could not use the mobile phone app ‘TraceTogether’. A ‘SpaceOut’ website was developed by Singapore Urban Redevelopment Authority. It tracks real-time crowd levels in malls and xsupermarkets across Singapore, in order to assist the public in making informed choices on where and when to make purchases.18 To prepare for eventually lifting the lockdown, the government ramped up pro-active surveillance and screening for high-risk groups such as pre-school staff and nursing home residents. A few community cases were picked up. The national lockdown was eased firstly on May 5 when Traditional Chinese Medicine(TCM) shops, home-based food businesses and hairdressers and barber shops were allowed to provide basic services to consumers. In terms of sequencing, the Circuit Breaker regime was phased out in three steps from June 1. In Phase 1 (‘Safe Reopening’), basic business, in-person marriage solemnisations events, family visits, religious sites and pre-schools opened. In Phase 2 (‘Safe Transition’), more companies resumed activities and in Phase 3 (‘Safe Nation’), smaller-scale social, cultural, religious and business gatherings would be permitted. Phases 1 and 2 started on 2 June and 19 June, respectively. Phase 3 will last until an effective treatment or vaccine is developed. Singapore additionally re-opened its borders in a managed manner for Singaporeans to conduct essential activities overseas and to allow safe travel for foreigners entering or transiting through Singapore.19 During this threephased lifting process, practising social distancing is a legally binding requirement. In the post-Circuit Breaker period, family, community and workplace cases increased but dorm infections remained the key concern for Singapore though the number of daily reported cases was on a clear downward trend. As of July 10, Singapore reported 609 imported cases, 2027 community cases (infection rate: 0.04%) and 42,977 dorm cases (infection rate: 13.31%). Of the total 45,613 patients, 39,925 completed isolation and 1855 were discharged from hospital. Only 26 died from the disease in Singapore. 17 Justin

(2020). (2020). 19 All inbound travellers had to take a swab test and pay for it. 18 Tanya

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10.3 Economic Impact of COVID-19 on Singapore The economic fall-out of the COVID-19 pandemic is huge for Singapore given its reliance on international trade and global economy. In general, a global crisis like the COVID-19 represents a supply and demand shock as movement restrictions disrupt supply chains and curtail consumer and industrial spending. Singapore’s aviation, tourism, and arts, entertainment & recreation industries have been the most adversely affected and other consumer-facing sectors (e.g., food services,20 retail trade,21 and land transport) have been significantly affected; moderately affected industries in Singapore are largely outward-oriented ones such as manufacturing,22 wholesale trade, information & communications, and financial and professional services as external demand plummet against the backdrop of broken global supply chains.23 The COVID-19 also amounts to a severe financial shock. With regional and international investors taking on a ‘sell-everything’ mode amid a deepening pandemic, Singapore’s benchmark Straits Times Index (STI) was sent into tailspin in February. The STI touched 2233.48 on March 23, the lowest since July 2009. Likewise, Singaporean resident unemployment rate hit 10-year low as of March 2020, at 3.3%.24 The Moody’s, a global credit rating agency, in April downgraded the outlook of Singapore’s banking sector from ‘stable’ to ‘negative’ and the investment worthiness of several Singaporean multinationals including government-linked ones. Singapore’s own Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) also moved to revise down the country’s forecast GDP growth three times in a row between February and May in recognition of the fact that the underlying domestic and global economic conditions continued to deteriorate. As of writing, the MTI was of the opinion that Singapore economy would contract by between 4% and 7% in 2020. To cope with the economic shrinkage and to protect livelihoods, Singapore introduced four expansionary stimulus packages, known officially as ‘budgets’, in the course of the continual combat against the coronavirus. The first budget that Singapore came up with, Unity Budget, was announced in February as the first line of defence to cushion the immediate negative economic outcome arising from the pandemic. The aim was to support frontline health workers and stabilise Singapore economy in the near term. A month later when it was clear that the pandemic 20 According to Singapore Department of Statistics, 529 eateries were closed between February and April 2020. 21 Singapore’s retail sales dropped by 52.1 per cent year on year in May 2020 during the circuit breaker period. This was the biggest year-on-year fall since record-keeping started in 1986. 22 Singapore’s factory mode as captured by the Purchasing Managers’ Index had been the contraction territory for five consecutive months (February to June), pointing to a reduction in size for the manufacturing economy. 23 Christopher Saw, Jonathan Lin, Wong Yu Jie, “Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Singapore Economy”, Ministry of Trade and Industry (MIT), https://www.mti.gov.sg/-/media/ MTI/Resources/Economic-Survey-of-Singapore/2020/Economic-Survey-of-Singapore-First-Qua rter-2020/FA_1Q20.pdf. 24 Singaporean citizen unemployment rate was 3.5 per cent whereas overall unemployment rate stood at 2.4% as of March 2020.

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would drag on for the foreseeable future, Singapore announced a S$48.4 billion Resilience Budget with the view to strengthening economic and social resilience so that speedy recovery is possible when the economy comes out on the other side of the global disaster. The Resilience Budget was more broad-based compared to the Unity Budget, focusing on such COVID-19 relief measures as welfare pay-outs and cash flow support to businesses. Knowing that the Circuit Breaker regime would weigh heavily on economic dynamism and societal morale, Singapore government put forth a Solidary Budget in April to keep the economy going when the entire country was placed under lockdown. It strived to help companies preserve production capacity while tiding families through the difficult period of staying at home. A fourth Fortitude Budget was announced in May. Unlike the previous ones, the Fortitude Budget looked beyond the COVID-19 pandemic with Deputy Prime Minister Heng Swee Keat vowing to avoid the formation of a ‘COVID generation’ of Singaporean workers and students whose life and career prospects are permanently damaged by the pandemic.25 Through the budget, the government hence incentivised business to adapt to a post-COVID-19 global commercial environment and workers to upskill for the future workplace. Notably, of the S$93.2 billion (or around 20% of GDP) Singapore was spending on its four budgets, S$52 billion came from past reserves. The four budgets would push Singapore’s overall budget deficit for Fiscal 2020 to some $74.3 billion (15.4% of GDP)-the highest level since the founding of the Republic of Singapore in 1965. The effectiveness of the budgets will be assessed in future research. In the next section, we turn to the broad background of Sino-Singaporean relations before taking stock of the two countries’ specific cooperative activities on battling the COVID-19 pandemic.

10.4 China-Singapore Political and Economic Relations China and Singapore formally established diplomatic relations on October 3, 1990, but political exchanges between the two countries dating back to the 1970s predated the official recognition of each other.26 Singapore’s first Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam visited China for the first time in 1975, paving the road for the then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew27 to visit China a year later. In November 1978, then Chinese de facto leader Deng Xiaoping embarked on a historic visit to Singapore, after which he spoke highly of Singapore as a good model to emulate for China’s domestic reform and opening up. In 1985, then Singaporean Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Dr Goh Keng Swee was appointed by China as an Advisor to the Chinese government. Even present day, Dr Goh is widely seen as a leading architect of China’s coastal, industrial and urban development. High-level visits and candid face-to-face consultations continued to be frequently arranged in the 1990s 25 Chew

(2020). Swee Hock, Evolution of Singapore-China Economic Relations in Hock and Wong (2014). 27 Lee Kuan Yew eventually visited China 33 times in his life. 26 Saw

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as Lee Kuan Yew became close to former Chinese President Jiang Zemin. Into the 21st century, Xi Jinping visited Singapore before he resumed the post of Chinese President to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations in 2010. Despite the high-profile (paramount-)leader-diplomacy, for a sustained period of time, China-Singapore relations were marred with difficulties in part due to Singapore’s intrinsic sense of insecurity (and the self-preservation-oriented besiege/‘porcupine’ mentality) and China’s insufficient understanding of the world. A set of fundamental misunderstandings towards each other had also come to bear on the occasionally strained relations. On the other hand, China, in view of the fact that Singapore is a Chinese-majority society, expected the Singaporean leadership to invariably sympathise with China in foreign affairs or be supportive of Beijing’s stance on the world stage, notwithstanding the reality that Singapore is a sovereign nation. On the other hand, Singapore positioned itself internationally as if the only viable manifestation of national sovereignty was to prove that Singapore was not the ‘third China’ and could make foreign policy courses not necessarily agreeable to Beijing. Chang indeed notes that Singapore prides itself over a ‘quiet, friendly and firm style of diplomacy’ vis-à-vis China and sees itself as a development mentor that could always work out economic problems for Beijing.28 The resultant two-way mis-judgements, mutual disappointments, cross-purpose engagement and sometimes deliberately brinksmanship behaviours had frustrated the bilateral ties, official or unofficial. Singapore chose to be the last nation in Southeast Asia to normalise its diplomatic relations with China to reassure its Muslim-majority neighbours, Malaysia and Indonesia, that Singapore was not keen on being close to China. Singapore also maintained ‘private’ political and military-to-military relations with Taiwan. In protest, for example, China seized the shipment of nine Terrex infantry carriers that Singapore had shipped through Hong Kong on their return from a training exercise in Taiwan in November 2016, sending a clear if forceful message that Singapore’s long-standing defence ties with Taiwan, currently governed by the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, are no longer tolerable. However, what annoys China most is Singapore’s pro-Washington foreign and security policy. Since its independence in 1965, successive generations of Singaporean leaders have subscribed to the conviction that an endurable and robust presence of the US is the single most important and effective guarantor of regional peace and national security. The belief emanates from Singapore’s ‘besiege’ geopolitical mentality and security outlook as a small ‘red dot’. The preponderance of American power, the logic goes, will prevent Southeast Asia being dominated by China, or for that matter, any other regional powers, be it Japan, India or Indonesia, and alleviate regional geopolitical uncertainty. As such, Singapore spared no effort in institutionalising America’s presence in the region. In 1990, Singapore signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), allowing the US military to use Singaporean facilities. On the basis of the 1990 MOU and its 1998 Addendum, Singapore built the Changi Naval Base which can accommodate U.S. aircraft carriers even if Singapore has no aircraft 28 Chang

(2019).

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carriers of its own. In 2005, Singapore’s relations with the US was transformed with the inking of the Strategic Framework Agreement for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security, making the city-state, as one analyst rightly puts, ‘an unequivocal [treaty] ally of the [US] in everything else but name’.29 The US has since elevated its naval presence in and around Singapore as permitted by these access agreements.30 The extensive defence and security cooperation between Singapore and the US unsettle Beijing as China heavily relies on the Strait of Malacca for international trade and the importation of critical commodities such as oil and gas. Economically, Singapore resorted to the originally 12-party Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to secure US trade leadership in the Pacific Asia though the incumbent U.S. President Trump withdrew from the TPP on his first working day in office on domestic political accounts.31 Singapore’s enthusiastic participation in the US-led TPP campaign that excluded China and publicly stated support for the ‘Rebalance to Asia’ strategy of the Obama administration was among the reasons why China reportedly refuse to invite Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong to attend the inaugural Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in 2017. While Singapore is not a claimant country in regional maritime disputes, Prime Minister Lee’s reference to the ruling by an arbitration tribunal in The Hague rejoindering China’s territorial claims in the SCS as a ‘strong statement’ led to rampant speculation and interpretation that Singapore agreed with the ruling, further driving a wedge between China and Singapore as far as geopolitics was concerned. With the rise of isolationist and protectionist sentiment in the US of which Trump’s political slogan of ‘America First’ is a symptom, Singapore has been pragmatically finetuning its China policy and refrained from further antagonising Beijing on issues of core Chinese interest. As a result, China–Singapore relations have gravitated towards a friendlier state of affairs. In 2019, China and Singapore signed an enhanced Agreement on Defence Exchanges and Security Cooperation to strengthen security trust. In stark contrast to the largely chequered political and diplomatic relations, in line with Singapore’s and China’s respective self-images of a global liberal trading state and the fastest growing developing economy, the two countries are key and intimate trading partners for each other. For Singapore, China is the largest trading partner in goods, accounting for around 13% of its merchandise exchange with the world. For China, Singapore is its 14th largest trading partner, ranking ahead of countries like the UK in terms of trade volume. Singapore is also China’s fourth largest trading partner in ASEAN (after Vietnam, Malaysia and Thailand), representing approximately 15% of China–ASEAN trade, notwithstanding two deep plunges in 2009 (during the Global Financial Crisis) and 2016 (amidst global growth softening), reaching over $100 billion in 2018. Trade flows have been prodigiously dominated

29 See

Seng Tan, Riding the Chinese Dragon: Singapore’s Pragmatic Relationship with China. In Tsunekawa (2009). 30 Lynn (2016). 31 Ji and Rana (2019, pp. 230–255).

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by electrical and industrial machineries, oil and mineral fuels, precision instruments as well as chemical products. Since the entering into force of the China–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (CSFTA) in 2009, Singapore’s modest trade deficits have been turned into persistent trade surplus vis-à-vis China. Notably, the CSFTA marks Singapore as the first Asian economy to sign a comprehensive bilateral FTA with China.32 Thanks to the CSFTA, as of 2018, over 91% of Chinese exports crossed Singaporean borders without paying customs duties. Conversely, close to 84% of Singaporean goods entered into China on a tariff-free basis. The two countries further upgraded the preferential trade pact in October 2019, expanding the scope of free trade in goods while striving to reduce non-tariff barriers to trade in services and mutual investment. For example, a more robust Investor-State Dispute Settlement and simplified customs procedures have been agreed to in the new CSFTA. China has additionally pledged to liberalise its petrochemical, legal, maritime and construction service sectors for Singaporean companies in exchange for greater access to the city-state’s skilled labour market and banking industry. Furthermore, three completely new chapters on competition, environment and e-commerce were attached to the original version of the trade agreement, reflecting different requirements for regulating and facilitating 21st-century international trade. China and Singapore are also the leading members of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a mega-FTA in the making that involves ten ASEAN countries and its Foreign Partners including China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.33 India has opted out at this writing due to domestic and international economic concerns. China-Singapore investment ties are equally strong. Singapore is the fourth largest recipient of Chinese outbound FDI, trailing behind Hong Kong, China, the US and Virgin Islands. Since 2010, Chinese direct investment has been rising by around 10% each year on average. In 2018, Chinese FDI in Singapore amounted to US$ 6.4 billion. This constituted nearly two-thirds of total Chinese investment in Southeast Asia. By the end of 2018, the total Chinese FDI stock in Singapore had reached the level of US$ 50 billion. In terms of sectoral distribution, Singapore’s wholesale and retail trade services, financial and insurance services, energy, real estate and professional services have attracted the brunt of Chinese capital inflow. A recent example is Alibaba’s acquisition of Lazada, a Singapore-based e-commerce company operating in six ASEAN countries. Of late, organic growth is also taking place in the digital, information and telecommunication sector. Conversely, Singapore is China’s second largest source of FDI (with US$ 5.2 billion in actually utilised investment in 2018, up from US$ 4.8 billion a year earlier), and China is Singapore’s largest investment destination worldwide. Total Singaporean investment stock in China as of 2018 amounted to US$ 99.1 billion, ahead of Indonesia (US$ 45.7 billion) and India (US$ 42.9 billion). Singaporean investment presence has been, as expected,

32 Chen

Wen and Zhai Baiquan, Singapore-China Trade and CSFTA in Hock and Wong (2014). Competitive Mega-regionalism: The Trilateral Power Play by the United States of America, China and the European Union, PhD Thesis, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. 33 Ji,

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concentrated so far in the Chinese financial and insurance, real estate and maritime sector. Institutionally, the flourishing Sino-Singaporean economic partnership, which is growing from strength to strength, is underpinned by the deputy-prime ministerial level Joint Council for Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC), launched in November 2003 by the then Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong and the then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. It is remarkable that the JCBC can be formed given the massive economic size asymmetry between the two countries. The JCBC represents an annual opportunity for the two countries to review together the state of bilateral commercial relations while charting out new courses of win-win cooperation. It is simultaneously a yearly recurring mechanism for government officials of various hieratical levels and business leaders from a diversity of backgrounds to network and interact. Indeed as one analyst notes, networks and relationships forged through the JCBC between the policy and business circles of China and Singapore are an ‘essential element’ for the two countries to cultivate ‘strong and lasting relations’.34 Over the years, the breadth and depth of cooperation coordinated by the JCBC has expanded from an initial focus on trade and investment to cover a host of inter-related domains like educational and academic exchange, taxation, banking regulation, currency swap, food and agriculture, capital market, and infrastructure development. Falling under the purview of the JCBC as illustrated are three prominent government-to-government projects, namely, China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (SIP), Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-City (SSTEC) and China-Singapore (Chongqing) Demonstration Initiative on Strategic Connectivity (CCI). Through the SIP, Singapore has played a catalytic role in the industrialisation process of China since 1994. The SIP model is now being exported and replicated by Chinese developers in other countries like Laos, India and Israel. The idea of building the SSTEC was floated by Singapore as a means to share the city-state’s urban design and development experiences with China where rapid urbanisation had posed severe social and environmental sustainability challenges. The SSTEC broke ground in 2008. The CCI, unveiled in 2015, was pursued in part to operationalise China-Singapore BRI cooperation. In particular, it seeks to anchor Chongqing’s status as an international hub for multi-modal logistics in inland China as well as Singapore’s position as a privileged international economic partner. The synchronisation of the New International Land Sea Trade Corridor, a key component of the CCI, with the parallel running Singapore-Nanning and SingaporeKunming economic corridors also diversifies Singapore’s connectivity engagement with different parts of South China. Beginning with the SIP and moving on to the SSTEC and finally the CCI, one sees the following ‘progression’ in the shifting cooperative pattern, from Singapore outsourcing its industry to China via the SIP as the developmental mentor, to Singapore teaming up with China in the SSTEC as an equal partner, and finally to Singapore riding on the opportunities under the CCI that China’s ambitious BRI scheme offers as a major beneficiary. Besides these three large-scale flagship projects, another group of predominately private-sector-driven projects like Wuxi-Singapore 34 Saw

Swee Hock, Evolution of Singapore-China Economic Relations in Hock and Wong (2014).

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Industrial Park, Sichuan-Singapore High-tech Innovation Park, Shenyang Singapore Industrial Park, Guangzhou Knowledge City, Nanjing Singapore Eco High-Tech Island, Ningbo Zhongxin Innov Park, and Sino-Singapore Jilin Food Zone are living testament to the robust bilateral economic partnership between China and Singapore. Prime Minister Lee has in fact praised the private-led project model as a cogent and viable cooperative approach that balances policy and commercial imperatives.35 Under the ambit of the JCBC, there are also eight second-tier councils between Singapore and Chinese regions of Shandong, Sichuan, Liaoning, Zhejiang, Tianjin, Jiangsu, Guangdong and Shanghai. These bodies considerably regularise and buttress Singapore’s connections with provincial authorities and are tasked with dealing with practical problems that arise on the ground when pushing forward joint projects. The existence of these platforms goes a long way in indicating that Singapore is determined to stay relevant to not only national but also local development and modernisation in China.

10.5 China–Singapore Mutual Assistance Amid COVID-19 Pandemic In the 2003 SARS outbreak, China and Singapore had combatted the infection within their borders with little coordination and mutual assistance. But this time neither China nor Singapore has been fighting against the coronavirus alone-the horrifying global pandemic has in fact provided an additional avenue on top of geopolitics and economics for the two countries to strengthen public health cooperation and assist each other, physically, financially and morally, in ways rarely witnessed before. When China’s COVID-19 situation was at its peak in early 2020, the outpouring of Singaporean support was tremendous and unprecedented in some aspects. On February 4, Singapore’s foreign ministry announced that the country would provide a seed funding of S$ 1 million—the highest amount of official foreign emergency aid in recent years—to the worst struck part in China. Singapore also donated medicine, medical supplies, 20,000 COVID-19 diagnostic test kits and three Polymerase Chain Reaction equipment for use in Chinese laboratories. The seed funding from the government by mid-February had helped Singapore Red Cross raise a total of S$ 6 million in public donations from individuals, Signature Consulting, Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation, Business China and others. Over a third of the fund were spent on purchasing and distributing N95 and surgical masks, goggles, face shields, surgical caps, ventilators, respiratory humidifiers, chlorine tablets, and electrocardiography detectors to hospitals and healthcare providers in six cities in Hubei province and seven social welfare homes in Tianjin and Nanning. The remaining funds were used to support other coronavirus-fighting activities such as risk communication (e.g., dissemination of personal hygiene and disease prevention information through infographics, short videos, child-friendly booklets and WeChat posts), 35 Zheng

and Lye (2015).

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community engagement, water, sanitation and hygiene outreach programmes.36 The Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce & Industry mobilised an additional S$ 1.1 million among its members. Singapore state-linked and private corporations like the Government of Singapore Investment Corp, Keppel Corporation, Yihai Kerry, Winning Group and Wilmar International also contributed separately, donating about 68 million yuan in cash and tens of millions of yuan worth of medical supplies for COVID-19 relief operations in China.37 The first tranche of the Singaporean humanitarian assistance reached Wuhan on February 8 via a chartered flight. It was estimated the more than 100,000 Chinese citizens benefited from it in the short term.38 On February 22, Singapore’s defence ministry delivered over 20,000 kilograms of medical supplies including fast test kits and surgical gloves to the PLA for distribution in Chinese military and field hospitals. Dr Ng Eng Hen, the Singaporean defence minister, said that Singapore ought to lend a helping hand to repay the Chinese goodwill of overcoming difficulties in dispatching the Ba Yi Aerobatics Team to perform in the Singapore Air Show, a Singapore-hosted event nearly cancelled because of the coronavirus outbreak. Singaporean President Yacob and Prime Minister Lee wrote letters to Chinese President Xi Jinping on February 24, expressing deep solidarity with China and thanking the Chinese government for facilitating the repatriation of Singaporean nationals and their dependents from Hubei. On April 1, the Chinese deputy foreign minister Luo Zhaohui and Permanent Secretary Chee Wee Kiong of Singapore’s foreign ministry co-chaired the virtual ChinaSingapore Joint Meeting on COVID-19. The two sides especially emphasised the importance of maintaining smooth and open air and sea freight lines. A week later, the two militaries held a similar video conference on April 8 to exchange views on the COVID-19 pandemic and shared the latest diagnostic and treatment good practices. The 2nd China-Singapore Joint Meeting on COVID-19 was held on May 28. The two countries pledged to safeguard connectivity of production and supply chains during difficult times. In the meantime, China donated 600,000 masks to Singapore on May 5. From the late March when the virus swept across several foreign worker dormitories, Chinese and Chinese-funded Singaporean companies began taking active actions to fulfil their social corporate responsibilities. They played a constructive role in the overall disease prevention and control efforts in Singapore.39 They first of all moved to help foreign labours, many of whom were at the grave risk of being laid off or contracting the virus. On the initiative of Chinese Enterprises Association (Singapore), Bank of China, Shanghai Tunnel, Beyond Soft and other business organisations 36 Cindy

(2020). Xin Juan Zeng Nuan Ren Xin! Xin Jia Po Ge Jie Zhu Li Zhong Guo Kang Ji Xin Guan Fei Yan Yi Qin [Caring Donation Warms the Heart! Singapore Helps China Fight COVID-19 Outbreak] (2020). 38 Cindy (2020). 39 Zai Xin Zhong Zi Qi Ye Ji Ji Lv Xing She Hui Ze Ren Zhi Yuan Zhong Guo Gong Min Ji Xin Jia Po Ben Di Yi Qin Fang Kong [Chinese Enterprises in Singapore Actively Fulfill Their Social Responsibilities to Support Chinese Citizens and Local Epidemic Prevention and Control in Singapore (2020). 37 Ai

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collectively donated nearly S$ 20,000 to the Singapore Foreign Worker Settling-in Programme. Shenyang SiaSun (Singapore) donated S$ 80,000 to the Singapore Red Cross. Concurrently, Agricultural Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank, China Merchants Shipping, Wanhe International, and other enterprises donated a large amount of much-needed anti-epidemic materials such as face masks, disinfectants and hand sanitisers to local business groups, residential communities and schools. YOOZOO, a Chinese gaming company, donated S$600,000 worth of laptops to five Singaporean polytechnics to facilitate students’ online learning during the lockdown.40 Besides swapping material favours that, in the words of Chinese media, ‘warmed the hearts’ of the two peoples, Singapore’s assiduity in shaping public narrative about the cause, nature and development of the COVID-19 global pandemic away from anti-China directions went a long way towards improving China’s image and in turn China–Singapore relations at large. It is worth noting that the Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has been hands on in fighting domestic Sinophobia sentiment and stemming the circulation of ethnicity-based disinformation about the coronavirus infection in the cyberspace. In as early as end January 2020, on a visit to the National Centre for Infectious Diseases, Prime Minister Lee publicly dismissed the approach of handling the coronavirus threat as if it was the ‘Chinese virus’ carried only by the Chinese. A week later, attending the Chinese New Year dinner at his Teck Ghee constituency on February 1, Lee reiterated his sympathy for the difficult COVID-19 situation that China found itself in, saying ‘[e]ven though the virus started in Wuhan, it doesn’t respect nationality or race-anybody can be infected and [the outbreak] is a problem that all countries must work together to solve’. He went on to lash out at anti-Chinese racism that also affected some overseas Singaporean in countries like Australia as ‘foolish and illogical’ (愚昧且不合 逻辑的) in Mandarin. Singapore subsequently banned the usage of ‘Wuhan virus’ in all public discourses and investigated an Islamic teacher who linked the coronavirus to China’s religious policies and the allegedly lower-than-Muslim hygiene standards of the Chinese people. In a March interview with the CNN, Prime Minister Lee again railed against the Western call to hold China responsible for the pandemic and made it absolutely clear to the world that the global situation would not have improved if not for the right things China had done internally to combat the virus.41 Singapore’s foreign minister Vivian Balakrishnan stood by Lee’s position and defended China during an interview with Sky News of Australia, a country that has been tirelessly mobilising international pressure on China about the origin of the coronavirus. Balakrishnan urged the world (and Australia) not to ‘politicise the process’ of inquiring into what happened with COVID-19 when the emergency phase is over and called China a ‘dependable’ partner of Singapore.42

40 YOOZOO

donates 600,000 SGD to support Singaporean students’ online studies during coronavirus lockdown. (2020). 41 PM Lee Hsien Loong’s Interview with CNN, Prime Minister’s Office (Singapore) (2020). 42 Kayla (2020).

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10.6 Conclusion The development of the COVID-19 pandemic in Singapore went through two phases. Between January and March, Singapore was the role model for the world regarding infection control. From April, Singapore became a cautionary story as the coronavirus was found to be spreading among its poorly treated foreign domestic workers. Singapore then prioritised dorm cases in its national response to the pandemic. Healthy workers were relocated to new premises, and the sick treated and taken care of. To flatten the curve, Singapore also enacted a national lockdown. Strict safe distancing measures were put in place. The lockdown was lifted in June but community cases rose slightly. The Sino-Singaporean ties are inherently complex. Without exaggeration, the two countries are fierce competitors and ‘foes’ with respect to geopolitics and security but close customers and friends in relation to economics and trade. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, however, suggests that during difficult times like global public health emergencies, the dynamics of economic and humanitarian cooperation prevailed over the impulsion of geopolitical competition. As the US’s closest ally, Singapore did not take side with Washington over the issue of coronavirus disease, but joined hands with Beijing and other affected countries to tackle the common enemy. Both countries’ resolves to bring the COVID-19 under control have been remarkable. With the ardent defence of China and the Chinese by Singaporean leaders including of course Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong himself and mutual material and moral assistance throughout the outbreak period, the relationship between China and Singapore has been improved by the tragic pandemic crisis. Given the COVID-19, the two countries have agreed to incorporate bilateral cooperation in the management of public health crises at future JCBC meetings. The expansion of the mandate of the JCBC as a result of the unique experience of close cooperation in meeting common challenges can be a springboard to jumpstart a new phase of China-Singapore relations. What a way to commemorate 30 years of diplomatic relations by combatting COVID-19 side by side!

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