The Razor's Edge: Boundaries and Boundary Dispute in Southeast Asia 9789814377645

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The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies was established as an autonomous organization in May 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia. The Institute's research interest is focused on the many-faceted problems of development and modernization, and political and social change in Southeast Asia. The Institute is governed by a twenty-four-member Board of Trustees on which are represented the University of Singapore and Nanyang University, appointees from the government, as well as representatives from a broad range of professional and civic organizations and groups. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it i chaired by the Director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer.

The responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in this publication rests exclusively with the author and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the "'iews or the policy of the Institute or its supporters.

"Copyright subsists in this publication under the United Kingdom Copyright Act, 1911, and the Singapore Copyright Act (Cap. 187). No person shall reproduce a copy of this publication. or extracts therefrom, without the written permiSsion of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore."

THE RAZOR'S EDGE Boundaries and Boundary Disputes in Southeast Asia

by

Lee Yong Leng

Research Notes and Discussions Paper No. 15 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

1980

Frontiers are indeed the razor's edge on which hang suspended the modem issues of war or peace, of life or death for nations (Lord Curzon, 1908).

Historically, the straight line smveyed boundary is really quite a new phenomenon in Southeast Asia. The zones and lines which separate the sovereign states of Southeast Asia have only been a source of dissension since the coming of the Europeans who redrew the political map of Southeast Asia m the nineteenth century. Before they came into the scene, there were only vague spheres of influence which waxed and waned according to the power of the mainland and island kingdoms. During two significant periods of its history when, by sheer coincidence, both mainland and island realms were ruled by powerful kingdoms, the two spheres of influence met roughly at the Kra Isthmus. It was then the nearest thing to the frontier zone, which is a zone of transition. However, frontier zones are fast disappearing and are being replaced by international boundaries on land, which are lines, theoretically without any width, marking the territorial division between states.

Frontiers In political geography, there are two meanings to the term "frontier". There are "settlement frontiers", which are frontiers within a state, dividing the settled and uninhabited parts of a single state. Then there are the "political frontiers" which mark the political division between two states. In the Western world it is possible to distinguish two types of settlement frontiers. Primary settlement frontiers mark the de facto limit of a state's authority as it moves into possession of territory it has acquired. The American frontier of the eighteenth century has always been given as an illustration of the primary settlement frontier. In Southeast Asia, it is not possible to distinguish the primary settlement frontier before the coming of the Europeans. This. was because the Southeast Asian concept of boundaries and political units differed from that of the West. The political units were organized as units of sea rather than units of land. The seas united rather than divided. The early kingdoms looked towards the sea, or expanded outwards to the sea, rather than inland where the mountainous interiors formed the frontiers of the different kingdoms. But they were perceived as mountainous

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borderlands inhabited by less civilized hill tribes and not, as in the West, as frontier zones where there were opportunities for expansion and the acquisition of new territory. The closest parallel of the pnmary settlement frontier of the West in Southeast Asia is best illustrated during the phase of mainland history just before the coming of the Europeans. The southward migration of more vigorous groups of peoples into the Indochina Peninsula, such as the Thais, Burmese and Vietnamese, after the Deutero-Malay and other earlier groups, saw the encroachment of territory by these new peoples. The southward migration into new lands, often by conquest, and the decimating of the earlier peoples like the Chams, Mons and Khmers, illustrate the southward movement of a primary settlement frontier of a kind. It was only in this sense, and during this period, that there was a primary settlement frontier. The coming of the Europeans halted temporarily the southward migration of these more vigorous peoples and their territorial expansion. But, in its place, the European colonization and the introduction of the boundary line saw the inception of the colonial version of the primary settlement frontier in Southeast Asia. In their expansion inland from their coastal footholds, the attempts by the various_ colonial governments to bring the interior under their administrative or military control exemplified the movement of the primary settlement frontier. In some cases, it was done by military or punitive expeditions, and sometimes by private explorers, both making their way inland by way of the major streams of their respective territories. In many ways, it was similar to the westward movement of the American frontier in the eighteenth century or the southward movement of the Indochinese peoples, for it represented not so much an expansion into virgin or no-man's land but rather a movement of stronger forces against weaker and less organized peoples. The main result of this colonization process was the Bakanization of Southeast Asia into many fragmented political units. Once this scramble for territory was over, and the colonial process complete, the primary settlement frontiers disappeared and became entirely historical features. What is left are the secondary settlement frontiers which are found m many Southeast Asian countries today. The many uninhabited or sparsely inhabited areas of Southeast Asia, such as the uplands of mainland Southeast Asia, the interior uplands of Borneo and the uplands of West Irian, are secondary frontiers of their respective countries. These are areas within states

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which, because of the adverse physical environment and lack of adequate finance or technological expertise, have hindered the further extension of land use and settlement. Often the limited range of economic activities available in secondary frontiers is usually reflected in low population densities. However, since the end of the Second World War and the coming of independence for Southeast Asian countries, the secondary frontiers have seen dramatic changes. In contrast to the movement of primary settlement frontiers, and unlike the slow nibbling away of the forest fringes by the pioneer Chinese or individual squatters, the advance of the secondary frontiers is now carefully planned, often involving government agencies. There are numerous examples of this advance of the secondary frontier as seen in the huge land settlement (Federal Land Development Authority [FELDA) )schemes in Peninsular Malaysia and the huge transmigration schemes from Java to the outer islands. The prospecting and exploitation of resources in today's Southeast Asia have also accelerated the opening of the secondary frontier. This is seen in the Asahan Hydroelectric project in Sumatra, where the waters of the mighty Asahan River flowing from Lake Toba to the Straits of Malacca will be harnessed. Unfortunately, in the recent history of Southeast Asia, war has also had a hand in the extension of the secondary frontier. The Vietnam War, and the extension of the war not only into the uplands but also to the hill peoples, have seen the destructive use of the secondary frontier areas of Indochina. The destructive consequences of this penetration into the secondary frontier areas of Indochina as a result of war have left not only physical scars but also social, economic and moral scars that will remain for a long time. In recent years, a new phenomenon has arisen m Southeast Asia which may divert the resources of the various states from moving faster into their secondary frontiers on land. This is the discovery of offshore oil and the consequences of the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference. Southeast Asian states and states elsewhere are now scrambling for parcels of the seas which will provide the resources of the future. 1 The claims to wider territorial seas and many other items of the seas have engaged the energies of many states today. Very much like the kingdoms of old, states today are looking towards the seas. History seems to have come full circle. But unlike the vague spheres of influence of the early Southeast Asian sea kingdoms, today's expansion into the seas is

1 Lee Yong Leng, Southeast Asia and the Law of the Sea, rev. ed. (Singapore: University Press, 1980).

Singapore

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accompanied by the modem maritime boundary line, whether the 12-rnile territorial sea limit or the 200-mile economic zone limit. The marked change that has come about is not just the units of seas as in the indigenous Southeast Asian kingdoms, or just land units of the colonial period, but a combination of both. Political units as from today onwards will be units of land and units of seas, and in some cases, as in days of old, the units of seas will be much larger than the political units on land.

Political Frontiers Theoretically, beyond the settlement frontier lies territory that legally belongs to the state, and this frontier zone can be pressed back until the limits of the state are reached. Theoretically again, beyond the political frontier lies an unclaimed zone and then the territory of another state. However, strictly speaking, political frontiers have given way to boundaries in Southeast Asia. They disappeared when the colonial powers, in their competition for the. various territories in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, delimited boundary lines to separate their areas of sovereignty. l\Iany of these colonial boundaries bore a superficial resemblance to the outlines of earlier indigenous states. This was not because the colonial powers wanted to preserve the older units; rather it was a reflection of the influence exerted by the riverine and sea routes, which had also influenced the earlier patterns. The frontier zone should have disappeared with the establishment of straight line boundaries by the Europeans, yet many borderland areas are still in effect frontier zones. For example, the borderland between Vietnam and Laos and that where Burma, China and Laos meet are very much frontier zones in spite of the boundary seen on maps. The sparse populations of hill tribes in these inaccessible and mountainous areas do not recognize the boundary lines, even if they can see them. Since most of the boundaries are not demarcated or poorly demarcated, and since most of the maps used differ, it is no wonder that the boundary lines drawn during colonial times have not been everywhere accepted by the states of today. The successor states see their boundaries through the maps made by their former colonial masters if it is in their favour; if not, they complain that the maps and treaties were unilaterally drawn by the colonial powers. This has resulted in disputes over the location of boundaries in former frontier zones. For example, the boundary between Thailand and Kampuchea has been the subject of frequent disputes between the two sides; the Sino-Burmese boundary was also not accepted by China, but fortunately this was settled amicably by both sides.

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In island Southeast Asia there are two general areas which share these frontier characteristics because of colonial boundary drawing. The first area is in the mountainous borderlands between East Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak) and Kalimantan (Indonesia) where the Dayaks from time immemorial have been crossing back and forth without being aware of any boundary.2 Except during the Indonesian "Confrontation" period between 1963-66, when Indonesian and British troops were skirmishing with each other, there have not been dispQtes over the boundary. Despite the boundary line, the frontier zone is still there, reflected in the frontier atmosphere and other features of the border settlements on both sides, even in coastal towns such as Tawau in Sabah. Like all the other areas mentioned above, the frontier zone characteristics along the boundary separating West Irian and New Guinea are only too apparent. Mountainous and inaccessible, these frontier areas between the two countries have been a source of worry to the two governments. Tribal groups move back and forth seeing no boundary. 3 The groups of Papuans (Organisi Papua Merdeka [OPM], Free Papuan Movement) who have been fighting the Indonesians for the past few years flee across the border for refuge. The Papuans on the other side see their brethren being pursued. In fact, many people in Papua New Guinea (PNG) sympathize with the aspirations of their "Melanesian brothers" across the border. This is the classic situation which can giVe nse to irredentism. Many of the frontier zones in mountainous areas, such as those in central New Guinea, central Borneo, the Laos-Yunnan-Burma area and the LaosVietnam area, are in a way frontiers of separation because of their inaccessibility. On the other hand, in places where the physical geogr!iphy is not so difficult political frontiers can be easily crossed and contact can be easily made between two groups of peoples. This contact can involve migration, trade, intermarriage and conflict. Certain stretches of the Lao-Thai border, the Thai-Kampuchean border, the Vietnamese-Kampuchean border and the Sino-Vietnamese border would come under this category. Yet it would be wrong to assume that the physical geography of the frontier determines the degree of intercourse between states. Actually, the attitudes and policies of the various state governments would be the more 2 Lee Yong Leng, Population and Settlement in Sarawak (Singapore:

Asia Pacific Press,

1970). 3 It should be noted that to mountain peoples mountains do not necessarily constitute barriers. That mountains are barriers is a concept of lowlanders.

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decisive factor in determining whether it is a frontier of contact or separation. The best .current example of this is the Sino-Vietnamese border. When the Chinese and the Vietnamese were allies fighting American and French imperialism, it was a "frontier,. of friendly separation. However, the moment the Vietnamese sided with the USSR in 1978/79, the attitudes of the Qlinese and Vietnamese changed. The border became a frontier of contact and conflict, which eventually led to the 1979 frontier war between China and Vietnam. This is not the first time that such a situation has developed and it will not be the last time, for, since time immemorial, the situation along the Sino-Vietnamese border has to a large extent been determined by the policies and attitudes of Vietnam's giant neighbour to the north. Another recent example of the change in the attitude and policies of one state affecting the frontier situation was the frontier between Sarawak (East Malaysia) and Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo). Before the Indonesian Confrontation against Malaysia in 1963 the border area was a frontier of separation, a remote area traversed by Dayak tribes and very few others. When Confrontation started in 1963, it became a frontier of contact and conflict between the two states, resulting in a shooting war between British forces and Indonesian troops along the border. At the end of Confrontation, when relations between Indonesia and Malaysia became friendly, there were joint military operations against the communist sanctuaries at the border. This mutual decision reflected the changed attitudes and policies of both sides and perpetuated the frontier of contact -- this time friendly contact between two military forces aimed at flushing out communist terrorists. In other parts of the world, frontiers were generally replaced by boundaries through one of two processes. In some cases the flanking states incorporated the frontier into their territory, until it became necessary to draw a boundary between them. In Southeast Asia, this process was never initiated by the indigenous Southeast Asian states but by the colonial powers during the nineteenth century. Annexation by the colonial powers of frontier land during the nineteenth century was done from a position of strength against the other flanking state which was weak internally. The northward advance of the British into upper Burma and Thailand or the westward advance of the French into Cambodia, Laos and Thailand were illustrations of this process. In the competitiOn between colonial powers, buffer states were created to reduce the chances of conflict between the competing powers. A good example

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of this was Thailand which was allowed to continue to exist as an indigenous state during the period of Anglo-French competition m Southeast Asia. A more recent example was the creation of the buffer states of Laos and Cambodia after the Geneva Conference in 1954. Both states were forbidden to join any military alliance or to request foreign aid in war materials, in the operation of military bases, or from instructional and fighting personnel. Both states were to form buffers between the Soviet- and Chinese-supported North Vietnamese and the American-supported South Vietnamese and Thais. As it turned out, they did not prove to be good buffers for long and the expanding Vietnam War eventually engulfed these two unfortunate states. In 1979, Vietnamese armies were at the Kampuchean-Thai border, eyeball to eyeball with their Thai counterparts across the rather indeterminate boundary, and the chances of conflict became imminent. Hence, like their counterparts elsewhere, buffer states in Southeast Asia, which performed their reluctant role as a physical wedge between two contending powers, have all but disappeared from the political map of today. In their place have come the group of nonaligned states, supposedly standing in betw:een the superpowers and between different ideological worlds. They are the modern buffer states, representing the ideological frontier of today. However, it will be remembered that during the times when the Angkor dynasty held sway over mainland Southeast Asia and Sri Vijaya in island Southeast Asia, or, at a later date, when the Thai kingdom was the dominant power on the mainland and Majapahit dominated island Southeast Asia, the frontier of these two sets of powers hovered around the Kra Isthmus. The "frontier" between the mainland power today (communist states of Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos) and the other grouping of ASEAN states appears to be creeping dangerously close to the Kra Isthmus once again. History may yet come one full circle.

Boundaries Boundaries have replaced political frontiers throughout Southeast Asia, but, as pointed out earlier, there are some inaccessible, mountainous areas where the demarcation of the boundaries is difficult. They sometimes become

. 8 .

areas of overlapping territorial claims, for example, in the Sino-Burmese boundary prior to 1960, the Sino-Vietnamese boundary and the Thai-Kampuchean boundary (Figure 1). Boundary disputes have therefore become an important theme in the politics of Southeast Asia since the coming of the Europeans, a theme that is also closely related to the other important aspect of boundaries here and elsewhere; the evolution of the boundaries that cause the disputes.

The Evolution of Boundaries The evolution of Southeast Asian boundaries did not follow the classical model of an international boundary emerging only after a political frontier had been whittled away by encroachments from either side. This could only happen where there was a long period of historical, continuous, indigenous political power. In Southeast Asia, as pointed out previously, the intervention by E'\Jropean colonial powers created a political discontinuity in the evolution of boundaries from frontiers. Most of the boundaries have therefore not gone through the usual four stages of boundary evolution: allocation or definition, delimitation, demarcation and administration. It would be difficult to find an international boundary in Southeast Asia which has not involved European states directly at some stage of its evolution. All the states were carved out from indigenous kingdoms which had been subdued by the European powers. Hence it was not a matter of selecting a precise boundary to replace an indefinite frontier because the flanking indigenous kingdoms were dissatisfied with an uncertain border. Rather it was political decisions made in European capitals that decided where a boundary should lie. Whether it involved a maritime boundary, like the 1824 London agreement between the British and the Dutch which decided that the British sphere of influence should be north of the Equator and the Dutch sphere in the south or the Anglo-French agreement of 1904, which decided the British and French spheres of influence at the Kra Isthmus and Malay peninsula, it was the economic incentive for expansion in quest of stable and profitable resources and a territorial drive that led to the delimitation of boundaries between two competing colonial powers. 4 4 See Robert L. Solomon, "Boundary Concepts and Practices in Southeast Asia," World Politics, Vol. 23, No. 1 (October 1970), pp. 1-23.

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In the former case, British and Dutch competition led to the delimitation of the present boundaries between Singapore and Indonesia and between Singapore and Malaysia. Under the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 17 March 1824, Britain gained Singapore, Malacca and some depots in India. In return, Britain ceded to the Dutch all British settlements in Sumatra and withdrew objections to Dutch occupation in Belitung. In addition, Britain also agreed not to acquire any territories in Sumatra or the islands of Karimun, Bintan, Batam and the other islands south of Singapore, while the Dutch disclaimed all future interest in possessions on the mainland of Malaya. The curious thing about this agreement is that the boundary was defined by the allocation of islands to the two countries and not by the precise drawing of a maritime boundary. To consolidate its hold on Singapore, Britain persuaded the Sultan of Johore, in a treaty on 2 August 1824, to cede the East India Company forever the island of Singapore, situated in the Straits of Malacca, together with the adjacent seas, straits and islets, to the extent of ten geographical miles from the coast. 5 This second treaty with the Sui tan of J ohore resulted m another litde known fact that, in ceding all the islands within ten miles of Singapore, it was contradicting the first treaty with the Dutch as some of the islands in the Riau archipelago awarded to the Dutch were less than ten miles from Singapore. This contradiction did not lead to any difficulties, and the division agreed in 1824 has been preserved in the boundary recognized by both Singapore and Indonesia. However, on 25 May 1973, Indonesia and Singapore agreed on a more precise boundary separating their territorial waters in the Singapore Strait. This new boundary of 1973 is twenty-four nautical miles long and is defined by six points. It follows fairly closely the course used by large oil tankers passing through the strait. But it is still not a complete boundary and there are still some maritime boundaries to be drawn to complete the division of these waters and the underlying shelf. First, it should be noted that the 1973 boundary agreement refers only to the territorial waters and does not deal with the continental shelf. It cannot be assumed that the present boundary will also be made to apply to the continental shelf. In other words, would Indonesia want to concede an area 5 J.R.V. Prescott, Map of Mainland Asia by Treaty (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1975), p. 410. I gratefully acknowledge the pioneering work of Prescott which has provided me with the details of many of my examples.

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of seabed within its straight baselines. Secondly, the boundary is incomplete on both western and eastern ends. On the west, an extension will have to b¢ drawn, first, between Indonesia and Singapore, then between Indonesia and Malaysia. In drawing this extension it cannot be assumed that Indonesia will follow the median line, especially in view of the recent developments in the Continental Shelf Concept at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Their perception of what the continental shelf constitutes has changed since the first session of the Conference in 1973. On the east, there is a short section of boundary needed between Singapore and Indonesia to carry the line to the boundary between Singapore and Malaysia as it emerges from J ohore Strait. Beyond that tri-junction there is a gap of about twenty-seven nautical miles to the beginning of the continental shelf boundary agreed between Indonesia and Malaysia in October 1969. Singapore's boundary with Johore is defined by the Straits Settlements aJ?-d Johore Territorial Waters (Agreement) Act of 1928. In this Act the contradiction concerning the 1 0-mile limit around Singapore island was resolved by retroceding to the Sultan of J ohore all waters and islands within three nautical miles from the Johore coast; otherwise the 1824 Agreement would have placed all the Johore Strait and certain areas to the southwest and southeast under the control of Singapore even though they were closer to J ohore. In addition, the 1928 Act drew the Singapore-Johore boundary along the deep-water channel of the J ohore Strait. In the final paragraph of Article I which reads The boundary as so defined is appro~imately delineated m red on the map annexed hereunto and forming part of this Agreement. Should, however, the map, owing to alterations in the channels, etc., appear at any time to conflict with the text of this Agreement, the text shall in all cases prevail. This boundary as described above, which makes prov1s1on for the text to prevail over the map in case of changes in the deep-water channel, is still the boundary today between Singapore and Malaysia. In the light of the above agreement the recent call for a hydrographic survey of Johore Strait to demarcate the international boundary between Malaysia and Singapore implies that one party thinks the deep-water channel between the two countries may have changed. If that is so, then the international boundary between Singapore and J ohore will have to be redemarcated. In the latter case of the Anglo-French agreement of 1904, Britain and

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France, in securing their spheres of influence, agreed not to move troops into the core area of Siam, comprising the basins of the rivers which flowed into the Gulf of Siam. Areas west of this core area fell within the British sphere of interest, while the areas to the east were within the French sphere. This was made explicit in the first article of the 1904 declaration which noted "all Siamese possessions on the west of this zone and of the Gulf of Siam including the Malay Peninsula and the adjacent islands, coming under English influence."6 Once their respective spheres of influence were secured the British turned their attention to obtaining the Siam-Malaya boundary to their advantage. Like their negotiations with the French over the Siam-Cambodian boundary, the Siamese were also unable to prevent the more powerful British from acquiring Siamese possessions in the Malay peninsula. The acquisition of these territories by the British was written into the 1899 Boundary Agreement and the 1909 Boundary Treaty. The Boundary Treaty also drew the present Thai-Malaysian boundary line which follows water divides for most of its length except in the east where it runs along the Golok River. The first political decisions on the allocation of territory taken by the colonial powers at the expense of weaker neighbouring states can be further illustrated by other examples from the mainland. The Thai-Burmese boundary north of the Salween-Thaungyin confluence IS a good example. After the annexation of Pegu in 1852 and the Shan states in 1886, the British de~ided to press northward to acquire the series of vassal states in the trans-Salween area to preempt any French encroachment into the area. Before the British acquired these states, the borderland was organized into a number of small vassal states whose allegiance fluctuated according to the strength of the armies of the Burmese or Thai kingdoms. The new boundary line which resulted from this acquisition of territories was not described in a treaty but was delimited on three maps which were exchanged between the British and Thai representatives on 1 7 October 1894. 7 The Indochina/lbai boundary negotiated between the French and the Thais would be another example of allocations made on this basis. The French were even more aggressive than the British in acquiring territories from Thailand. "A quarrel was forced on Thailand in February 1893 by charges of Thai aggression against Annam; Thailand's offer to submit the dispute to arbitration was rejected and in early April 1893 Stung Treng on the 6 Prescott, op.cit., p. 421.

7 Ibid., p. 387.

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Mekong was occupied." 8 From then onwards French pressure and demands on Thailand increased until eventually large chunks of territory west of the Mekong were ceded to France in 1904 and 1907. In the south, France acquired the territories of Battambang, Siem Reap and Sisophon and this resulted in the pushing of the boundary line from the Mekong River (fixed on 3 October 1893) westward to the present boundary at the Dang Rek and Cardamones ranges; in the north the west bank of the Mekong, opposite Luang Prabang and bounded by the Heung and Kop rivers and the western Mekong watershed, was ceded to France and this pushed the boundary from the Mekong river westward to the water divide between the Mekong and the Mae Nam (Figure 2). If the definition or allocation of boundaries in Southeast Asia was a one-

sided affair, the delimitation of the boundaries, which is the second stage of boundary evolution, was equally one-sided. In this exercise the colonial cartographers located the boundaries, selected specific boundary sites and then represented them on maps. Such delimitation of boundaries by the colonial powers in Southeast Asia has been defined by two types of lines. The first consists of straight lines connecting known points or geographical coordinates and these are normally known as geometrical boundaries. A Southeast Asian example of this is the West Irian-Papua New Guinea boundary line, which is a geometrical boundary for most of its length except for a small stretch which follows the River Fly. The second type of boundary is one that follows the features of the physical landscape, normally known as physiographic political boundaries. There are many examples of such boundaries in Southeast Asia, especially those following mountain ranges or divides or rivers. Examples of the former can be seen in the boundary line between Vietnam and Laos which follows the Annamite Chain, or the Kampuchea/Thailand boundary which runs along the Dang Rek and Cardamones ranges, or the Thai/Lao boundary which follows the divide between the Mekong and the Mae Nam rivers, or the Thai/Malaysian boundary which follows a convoluted water divide for most of its length. Examples of river boundaries are best exemplified by the Mekong river boundary between Thailand and Laos or the central section of the Thai-Burmese boundary which coincides with the thalwegs (the deepest parts of the river channels) of the Salween and Thaungyin rivers, or, on a smaller scale, by the River Golok which serves as the boundary line between Thailand and the Malaysian state of Kelantan. Both mountain and river boundaries are not a.s satisfactory as 8 Prescott, op.cit., p. 432

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one would have expected them to be and disputes connected with such boundaries are common. Apart from the inherent weaknesses of physiographic political boundaries, many Southeast Asian boundaries were also not carefully delimited or defined by the colonial cartographers. In the case of the Sino-Vietnamese boundary, the text of the 1894 Convention was not precise, reflecting perhaps a weakness in the geographical knowledge of this hilly and mountainous area. The boundary is identified by streams and the allocation of particular districts. Some parts of the boundary coincide with water divides but they are not specifically named in the 9 text. Such imprecision gives scope for a different interpretation by either side. Imprecision can also arise because some of the so-called joint commissions delimiting the boundaries were very one-sided affairs which delimited the boundary in favour of the stronger party. The demarcation of the boundary between Cambodia and Cochin· China was carried out by a joint commission in the dry seasons of 18 70 and 18 71. In one important sense "joint commission" is a misnomer. The Cambodian delegates were not well prepared for their work, and one of the French representatives reported that as the Cambodians did not seem to understand what had to be done, the Frenchmen had to explain the aims of the mission. In view of this situation there can be no surprise that the final boundary favoured France to a remarkable extent.! 0 Although, in this case, some of the territories were returned to Cambodia, it is not surprising that boundary disputes have arisen today because states do not accept the unfair delimitation or they disagree with the interpretation of the treaty or maps. In the mountainous and inaccessible areas of Southeast Asia, such discrepancies may not have come to light as yet; so many of the original boundary lines allocated by the colonial powers will remain unchanged and unmarked for a long time. However, there is always the possibility that further exploration of the more inaccessible and mountainous areas will reveal that the described boundary does not match what is on the actual landscape. This can give rise to boundary disputes. In the past, the colonial administrations adopted a policy of laissez{ai're towards the faraway boundaries with adjoining states 9

Prescott, op.cit., p. 453.

10

Ibid., p. 466.

. 16 .

and did not have very firm control over the tribal groups living in such areas. Since independence, however, many of the successor states flushed with their new found nationalism, have been more diligent in policing these boundaries. As a result, boundary disputes have cropped up now and then. If delimitation of boundaries has not been wholly successful then it is well-nigh impossible for demarcation to be done in many parts of Southeast Asia. Demarcation is only possible at easy border crossings or in accessible lowland areas where there are population concentrations. Even in such areas, for example, the recent war zones at the Sino-Vietnam Friendship pass near Langson or the Kampuchean-Thai border near Aranyaprathet and Poipet, where demarcation has been done and administered for some time, disputes have arisen partly as a result of the war.

Boundary Disputes There are several kinds of boundary disputes. First, there are positional disputes which can arise because of uncertainties concerning delimitation or demarcation. In other words, there is imperfect boundary evolution. Normally, in such disputes, there is either disagreement over the legal interpretation of some term used in the boundary delimitation, or geographical argument that the line does not properly correspond to the terrain. An example of both aspects of such disputes is provided by the Sino· Burmese boundary. In this sparsely populated political and ethnic marchland, there were no precise boundaries until the British annexed upper Burma and decided to define the boundary line between Burma and China. Although this was delimited by the 1894 and 1897 Conventions and the 1941 Exchange of Notes, the Chinese did not agree to the delimitation of the line that had been defined on the map by the British, especially the two sectors consisting of the hill areas in what is now Kachin State north of Myitkyina and the area of the Wa states east of the Salween in the northern Shan states. In spite of Chinese disagreement, Britain, eventually in 1914, made a unilateral declaration that it would be the boundary. It was contested by China in 1934, and in 1941, when the League of Nations Boundary Commission awarded Britain the line it had claimed. However, in 1946 Kuo Min Tang troops occupied the "Tri