The Radical Right in Germany: 1870 to the Present 0582291933, 9780582291935

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The Radical Right in Germany

THEMES IN MODERN GERMAN HISTORY SERIES Already published in this series:

Social Democracy and the Working Class in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Germany STEFAN BERGER Ethnic Minorities in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Germany: Jews, Gypsies, Poles, Turks and Others PANIKOS PANAYI The 1848 Revolutions in German-Speaking Europe HANS JOACHIM HAHN

The Radical Right in Germany 1870 to the Present Lee McGowan

ROUTLEDGE

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LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2002 by Pearson Education Limited Published 2014 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © 2002, Taylor & Francis. The rights of Lee McGowan to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notices Knowledge and best practice in this field are constantly changing. As new research and experience broaden our understanding, changes in research methods, professional practices, or medical treatment may become necessary. Practitioners and researchers must always rely on their own experience and knowledge in evaluating and using any information, methods, compounds, or experiments described herein. In using such information or methods they should be mindful of their own safety and the safety of others, including parties for whom they have a professional responsibility. To the fullest extent of the law, neither the Publisher nor the authors, contributors, or editors, assume any liability for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods, products, instructions, or ideas contained in the material herein. ISBN 13: 978-0-582-29193-5 (pbk) British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A CIP catalogue record for this book can be obtained from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book can be obtained from the Library of Congress Typeset in 1O/13pt Sabon by Graphicraft Limited, Hong Kong

Contents

Acknowledgements Abbreviations and glossary

VB Vlll

1 The far right in German history and politics:

2

3

an introduction

1

Structure of the book Defining the radical right Fascism National Socialism Right-wing radicalism and right-wing extremism Neo-fascism and neo-Nazism The continuity debate

4 5 6 8 8

10

Tracing the origins and rise of the radical right: the Kaiserreich. 1870-1918

16

The historical setting Defining the right in Imperial Germany: a short chronology Membership of the radical right Old and new variants of anti-Semitism Nationalism Germany at war: the ascendant radical right Conclusions

17 20 23 25 29 35 39

Pushing to extremes: the radical right in Weimar Germany. 1919-33

43

The conservative right in the Weimar Republic, 1919-25 Soldiers, revolts and putsches: an emerging militant right Moving to the right: the German National Socialist Workers' Party Aspiring politicians, party organization and propaganda, 1924-28 Competing for power: the forces of the right, 1928-33 Conclusions

9

45 48 53

55 59 65 v

Contents

4

5

6

7

8

9

National Socialist ideology and leadership

69

Nazi ideology Style and leadership Conclusions

70 77 88

Party membership and propensity for violence

93

Social background The role of violence The fall of Rohm Conclusions

96 105 116 118

The extreme right in power: pursuing an ever radicalizing agenda

122

Domestic policy Foreign policy Germany at war, 1939-45 Conclusions

124 132 138 141

The fall, rise and fall of organized right-wing extremism in West Germany, 1945-90

147

Germany under occupation, 1945-49 Resurgence, 1949-52 Stagnation and decline, 1953-64 The rise and fall of the NPD, 1964-72 Fractionalization and radicalization, 1972-84 The third phase, 1984-90 Conclusions

148 150 152 155 159 160 168

Homeland and hate: right-wing extremism and neo-Nazi militancy in unified Germany, 1990-present

173

Stagnation of organized right-wing extremism, 1990-2001 Militant and aggressive extremism: the neo-Nazis Origins and rise of neo-Nazism, 1972-89 The neo-Nazi resurgence: growth and aggression, 1990-2000 Conclusions

174 178 180 189 201

A new millennium for the extreme right?

207

Conclusions

207

Further reading Index vi

214 222

Acknowledgements

Dedicated to the memory of Iris Wratten, 1939-2001. The author would like to express his thanks to Professor Panikos Panayi for his continuous support and his comments on the manuscript. The Publishers are grateful to the following for permission to reproduce copyright material: Table 5.2 from The Nazi Party, published by Harvard University Press and Blackwell Publishers, reprinted by permission of Michael H. Kater (Kater, M. H. 1983); Tables 5.3 and 5.5 from Nazism 1919-1945: A Documentary Reader, Vol. 1: The Rise to Power 1919-1934, edited by J. Noakes and G. Pridham, revised edition 1998, ISBN: 0 85989 598 X, published and reprinted by permission of University of Exeter Press (Noakes, J. and Pridham, G. 1998); Table 7.6 from Sind die Republikaner die funfte Partei? in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, published by Bundeszentrale fur politische Bildung, reprinted by permission of Dieter Roth (Roth, D. 1989).

In some instances we have been unable to trace the owners of copyright material, and we would appreciate any information that would enable us to do so.

vii

Abbreviations and glossary

Alldeutscher Verband ANSINA

Bundesrat Bundestag BVP

BN DA DAF DAG DAP DDP DNVP Dolchsto~legende

DP DReP DRP DVP DVU EndlOsung EU FAP

Freiheitliche P artei Osterreichs FRG Freikorps Fuhrer viii

Pan-German League Aktionfront Nationaler SozialistenlNationale Aktiviste Action Front for National Socialists/ National Activists upper house of parliament in the Federal Republic of Germany lower house of parliament in the Federal Republic of Germany Bayerische Volkspartei Bavarian People's Party Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution Deutsche Alternative German Alternative Deutsche Arbeitsfront German Labour Front Deutsche Aktionsgruppen German Action Groups Deutsche Arbeiterpartei German Workers' Party (forerunner of the NSDAP) Deutsche Demokratische Partei German Democratic Party Deutschnationale Volkspartei German National People's Party stab in the back legend used after 1918 Deutsche Partei German Party Deutsche Rechts-Partei German Right Party Deutsche Reichs Partei German Reich Party Deutsche Volkspartei German People's Party Deutsche Volksunion German People's Union Final Solution European Union Freiheitliche Arbeiterpartei Independent Workers' Party Austrian Freedom Party Federal Republic of Germany Freecorps leader

Abbreviations and glossary

Gau Gauleiter Gestapo Gleichschaltung Grossdeutsch land Grundgesetz H istorikerstreit

Hitlerwelle

HJ

HNG

Kaiserreich KPD Kristallnacht Kulturkampf Lander Landtag Lebensraum Luftwaffe Machtergreifung Mittelstand NPD NS NSBO NSDAP OHL

Ostpolitik

Reich Reichsfeinde

district (one of 35) under the Nazi regime highest ranking regional leader under the Nazis Geheimstaatspolizei State Secret Police co-ordination Greater Germany Basic Law; the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany historians' dispute wave of interest in Hitler in the mid-1970s Hitlerjugend Hitler Youth Hilfsorganisation fur Nationale Politische Gefangene und deren Angehorige Aid Association for National Political Prisoners and their Dependants German Empire of 1871-1918 Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands Communist Party of Germany Crystal Night struggle between the Kaiserreich and the Roman Catholic Church in the 1870s and 1880s individual German states regional parliament under both Imperial and Weimar Germany living space (in East Germany) German air force in the Second World War seizure of power middle class Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands National Democratic Party of Germany Nationale Sammlung National Assembly Nationalsozialistische Betriebszelle Organisation National Socialist Factory Cell Organization Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei National Socialist German Workers' Party Oberste Heeresleitung supreme command during First World War policy of developing relations with the states of eastern Europe primarily under the Willy Brandt governments, 1969-74 empire enemies of the state ix

Abbreviations and glossary

Reichstag Reichswehr REP RM SA 5ammlungspolitik SD 5iegfrieden

SPD SRP SS 5tahlhelm

5tufenplan Yolk Volkisch Volksgemeinschaft VSBD PdA

Waffen-55 Wehrmacht Weltanschauung Weltpolitik WSG

x

lower house of parliament under the Imperial Germany and the Weimar Republic imperial army Republikaner Republicans Reichsmark Sturmabteilung Stormtroopers of the NSDAP cohesiveness policy pursued under Imperial Germany 5icherheitsdienst Security Service total military victory that was promised by the German leadership during the First World War to secure lasting peace and security 50zialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands Social Democratic Party of Germany 50zialistiche Reichspartei Socialist Party of the Reich Schutzstaffel Guard Squadron of the NSDAP Steel Helmet (monarchist paramilitary organization) a plan in stages people national people's community Volkssozialistische Bewegung Deutschlandsl Partei der Arbeit German People's Socialist Movement/Workers' Party military section of the SS German army under the Nazis worldview world policy Wehrsportgruppe Military Sports Group

Chapter 1

The far right in German history and pol itics: an introduction The peoples of Europe at the dawn of a new millennium are arguably more at peace with themselves than at any time in the history of European civilization. In western Europe today the prospect of war after almost 60 years of rebuilding, increasing prosperity and closer European integration since 1945 seems inconceivable. The transformation in interstate relationships and the emergence of a new supranational order under the European Union (EU) is remarkable and stands in marked contrast to the ardent strands of nationalist agendas that bedevilled the continent in the first half of the twentieth century.! Indeed, the entire process of European integration finds its origins in the often hostile, ambitious and destructive tendencies of the most ultranationalist and far right forces that launched two world wars in the first half of the twentieth century. The EU is one of the major success stories of more recent times and has, since the early 1950s, helped to anchor democracy, political stability and economic progress in the west and is now aiming to replicate its success by extending membership to the states of central and eastern Europe. Simultaneously, the economic prosperity and political stability post-1945 have significantly dampened the appeal and success of the far right which encompassed in its most aggressive forms the fascist, National Socialist and falangist movements from the 1920s to the 1940s in Italy, Germany and Spain (until 1975) respectively. The core ideological tenets that came to shape, inspire and drive such far right parties, however, are not limited to this interwar period. On the contrary, their intellectual origins can be traced back to the previous century and these same concepts and visions persist and thrive on the very fringes of acceptability in the political systems of many European states today. Marginalized examples of such far right political parties, associations and organizations can be found across western Europe in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Russia, Spain and, to a lesser extent, in the United Kingdom and Ireland. Time and again across Europe parties from the far right have made spectacular (albeit limited) temporary advances onto the political stage which have given rise to extensive academic debate and engendered widespread public debate and soul searching about the appeal of such groups, their 1

The Radical Right in Germany

nationalist and racist convictions, their hostility towards democratic order and their rejection of the concept of individual human rights. The activities of right-wing extremist parties and organizations have become a particular object of media interest over the last two decades. Their divergence from the norm of everyday politics provides the means for avid sensationalism as extremists threaten to shake the foundations of the established order and test the strength of old taboos. In contemporary society aspects of the far right and its ideology are evident across Europe in many spheres of political and social life. They appear in the form of slogans and graffiti on walls. They are manifest at some political gatherings and evident in election campaigns. They surface in school playgrounds, feature among certain adolescent subcultures and are easily accessible in print, on film and increasingly on the internet. On occasions their continued existence is displayed in acts of violence against persons and property. The histories, durability and impact of such forces after 1945 have varied from state to state. Some general assumptions, however, can be made. First, most case studies of organized right-wing extremism have undergone a series of peaks and troughs that have reflected particular domestic circumstances, as in Germany and discussed later. 2 Second, until the mid-1990s few far right parties ever got close to holding the reins of power, but in more recent years a general rise (albeit modest) in the electoral appeal of the far right across Europe has seen a handful of parties entering into government as the junior coalition partner. Much here, of course, has depended on the state of domestic politics and the specific structure of the electoral system. In Italy both helped first the Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano) or MSI to form part of a short-lived coalition in 1994 and now both the Northern League and the National Alliance (which together received some 5 per cent of the vote) to participate in Silvio Berlusconi's government since 2001.1 Arguably the most visible far right force in government remains the Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs) or FPO which emerged as a serious political force during the 1990s under its charismatic leader, Jorg Haider, and entered government in 2000 to widespread protests both at home and abroad and for a while transformed Austria into the role of a pariah state, even within the EU. In short, the spectre of the far right continues to haunt practically all the nations of both western and eastern Europe. All efforts at explaining why individual extreme right-wing parties have emerged and why they have thrived have led to general agreement on a wide set of variables. These have traditionally encompassed a loss of security with the collapse of an established system of beliefs; a breakdown in law and order; humiliation and offended pride; relative deprivation; disputed borders; general feelings of frustration; and resentment at continued immigration. 4 In practice, the 2

The far right in German history and politics

significance of each of these factors has varied and continues to fluctuate from country to country. That such feelings and prejudices are still capable of generating a significant right-wing extremist potential cannot be disputed and some far right themes such as immigration policy, an anti-EU sentiment and an ardent belief in the strengths of the nation state do clearly strike a chord with a wider public. This reality was evident in a series of elections in the spring of 2002 including the 17 per cent of the vote polled by JeanMarie Le Pen, the leader of the National Front in his campaign for the French presidency in April 2002, the success of Pym Fortuyn's essentially anti-immigration party in the Netherlands in May 2002 and even the much smaller successes of the British National Party in the English council elections where they secured three elected representatives in Burnley in May 2002. Often the forces of the far right provide an appropriate vehicle to express public dissatisfaction about government policy or the lack of distinction between the main political parties across Europe. This book focuses exclusively on the German experience and aims to draw out the themes and elements that have shaped the far right in Germany since unification in 1870. It is arguably, given the excesses of the Hitler years from 1933 to 1945, the most obvious choice for a country study of contemporary right-wing extremism, but it is also one that provides for an interesting examination given the widely different types and forms of political system that have existed in Germany over the course of the last 130 years. Chronologically these range from the imperial autocracy of the Second Empire (1871-1918); to an ill-fated experiment at democracy under the Weimar Republic (1919-33); to the National Socialist dictatorship from 1933 to 1945 which plunged Germany into another world war, military defeat and dismemberment; to the short interregnum of allied and Soviet occupation from 1945 to 1949; to the 'temporary' division of Germany in 1949 into two very different political systems, one (the Federal Republic of Germany) based on the free market and oriented towards western liberal and democratic values whereas the other (the German Democratic Republic) was structured on a command economy basis and looked towards Moscow for support; and, finally, to the reunification of Germany in October 1990. 5 The unification of East and West Germany brought many challenges for the newly enlarged Federal Republic of Germany." While many of these focused on environmental concerns and the necessity of economic restructuring, one largely unanticipated consequence of a unified Germany was an upsurge in the violent activities of the far right that came to tarnish Germany's image internationally and awaken memories of a darker past. The recent spate of right-wing extremist offences in Germany is part of, and the latest stage in, a phenomenon that can be traced back through all these regimes. The existence of the far right continues to raise questions 3

The Radical Right in Germany

about the nature of German society and democracy, but it is not exclusively a German preserve and is an issue that requires careful and urgent consideration across the European Union as the popularity of the far right reflects and is a response to fears among sections of society about issues such as deepening European integration and the wider process of globalization over which they feel they have no control. Degrees of alienation and insecurity among today's traditional blue-collar areas have led some to embark on a desperate search to uncover their own identity and purpose which some have found among the nationalistic and xenophobic sentiment of the far right. This mood was caught by Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, when he argued in April 2002 that Le Pen's surprise election result was a 'necessary shock' that would fortify Europe. 'Le Pen feeds on fears. To fight him we must nourish hope ... (EU) enlargement, for example, represents the end of nationalism and wars in Europe.' This view could be extended to all parties of the far right.

Structure of the book At its core this book seeks to examine the history of the far right in modern Germany in the period from 1870 to the present. It is an ambitious project, but it is a necessary one if we are to understand the development of the extreme right. There already exists a substantial literature on the histories, individuals and parties of the far right for each of these distinct periods covered within this timeframe. In some cases works cover two or occasionally three of these periods. 7 None to date has attempted to provide an account of all five. The book is organized into nine chapters and proceeds on a chronological basis. This chapter provides the backdrop to the study and considers, albeit briefly, definitional approaches to the issue of the far right and the continuity debate in the study of German history. The second chapter focuses on the emergence and radicalization of the far right in Imperial Germany. The following four chapters will centre on the most extreme, and the most successful in electoral terms, variant of the far right in the twentieth century, namely National Socialism (Nazism): chapter 3 traces its rise to power. The succeeding chapter deals with ideology, chapter 5 examines its membership and the use of violence while chapter 6 details the radicalization of government policy in Nazi Germany. The following and final three chapters focus on the post-war world from 1945 to today: chapter 7 accounts for the various rises and falls of organized right-wing extremism after 1945. Chapter 8 explores the reality and nature of militant neo-National Socialism and its predisposition towards acts of terror, confrontations and violence and chapter 9 considers the role of extremism in the new millennium. 4

The far right in German history and politics

This book has two core objectives. First, to trace the far right's origins and development. This takes us from a series of small, vocal pressure groups materializing in the 1870s to its struggle for power in the 1920s; its seizure of government in the early 1930s before turning to chart its denouement and ongoing survival as a minor force on the fringes of politics after 1945. Second, it aims to identify and analyse the common tenets of far right 'ideology', its political objectives and to investigate to what extent it is possible to identify a theme of continuity that runs through these five political orders. How far can our knowledge of the common tenets such as its overt nationalism, degrees of militarism and desires for territorial expansion, antiparliamentarism, authoritarianism and an aversion to, in some instances a hatred of, all foreign influences enable us to portray a degree of continuity in thinking and position despite the political turmoil and changes that have shaped and transformed modern day Germany?

Defining the radical right Before embarking on an examination of the far right in each of these timeframes it is first of all necessary to address and identify what actually constitutes the radical right. Those engaged or interested in the study of the contemporary far right will be familiar with one definitional problem from the very outset. This relates to the variety and number of terms in usage to refer to the far right. These range from right-wing extremism and fascism to neo-fascism and neo-Nazism. Often they are mistakenly assumed to be synonyms and are used interchangeably, particularly in the media. H The rise of the Republikaner in the late 1980s provided clear evidence of a case in point. 9 There has been an explosion in academic material from the late 1980s analysing the nature and identity of right-wing extremism in Germany and beyond. But what is right-wing extremism? This seemingly straightforward question is difficult to answer as an agreed definition does not exist, but there are certain characteristics that could help to define right-wing extremist parties. These relevant criteria could entail an examination of party goals and objectives, organizational structure and tactics, the social composition of the respective movements and their voters and, lastly, a focus on the ideological tenets and beliefs. This final criterion is arguably the most important and is certainly the most useful, but it in turn raises a number of questions: Is it possible to distil core beliefs and objectives? How far have these remained consistent over the course of the last century by the parties on the radical right? Today right-wing extremism is the generally accepted term and is applied to any parties, organizations and individuals whose self-knowledge and 5

The Radical Right in Germany

activities are formed by the majority, if not all, of the following characteristics: nationalism; ethnocentrism; xenophobia, particularly in the guise of anti-Semitism and racism; anti-pluralism; anti-communism; antiparliamentarism; militarism; a law and order mentality; the longing for an authoritarian state under one leader; often a sympathy for conspiracy theories; and the acceptance of violence as a suitable means of political discourse. The role and emphasis of each of these may vary from party to party and movement to movement and authors have placed different emphases on different characteristics. Some have focused on xenophobia and racism, others have concentrated on nationalism while yet others have stressed the need for 'law and order' and demands for strict immigration control. However, a general survey of 26 definitions in three distinct linguistic areas (Dutch, German and English) has revealed that the principal ingredients of right-wing extremism tend to be racism, xenophobia, nationalism, anti-democracy and a belief in the strong state. III To what extent, however, is it possible to draw clear demarcations between the terms of radical right, fascism, neo-fascism, right-wing extremism and neo-Nazism? The overall picture is further complicated by the reality that often different terms are en vogue in different timeframes. This is a salient issue when trying to look at the phenomenon over time as this study does. So, for example, the preferred current term of right-wing extremism is rarely used in the Imperial period to describe the activities of ultra-nationalist groups such as the Pan-German League, whereas contemporary movements are referred to as extremists and neo-Nazis rather than employing such terms as radicals. This section endeavours to address the definitional issues and clarify positions but, it must be emphasized, in a rather general manner as space precludes any lengthy discussion or debate on each term. The origins of the concept of right-wing extremism are found in the study of fascism. As Mudde comments: 'This field of research, which produced an enormous number of publications just after the Second World War, has provided the theoretical framework for research on post-war right-wing extremist parties.' I I

Fascism In historical terms fascism was a nationalistic, authoritarian and illiberal movement that emerged in Italy under its leader Benito Mussolini in the aftermath of the First World War. Fascism was the term chosen by this political force to identify itself and its objectives. Fascism never truly possessed a developed or coherent ideology.12 Indeed, it was largely devoid of the intellectual rigour that enabled communism to flourish long after fascism's 6

The far right in German history and politics

demise. The fascist movement came to power in Italy in 1923 and remained in office until it was overthrown in 1944.1.1 The appeal of fascism lay in its ability to draw on people's emotions and on their resentment, anger and frustration that coloured many sectors of life in the aftershocks of the First World War. This is true of the rise of all three major brands of fascism in interwar Europe in Italy, Germany and Spain respectively. The period after 1919 was marked in all three states by widespread social unrest, a general disillusionment with the political order and, in the case of both Germany and Italy, severe disappointment over territorial losses and the spoils of war. Fascism in Italy pledged to unite all sectors and classes of Italian society into one national force. During its political rise in the early 1920s it drew its support from the military and middle-class groups that were alarmed at the rise of socialism and the social disorder and economic difficulties of the early 1920s. Nationalism lay at the very core and heart of the fascist movement. Mussolini sought not only to promote nationalism throughout the state and so create a common (in terms of language, religion and history) ethnie, but also set out to assimilate and often discriminate against other ethnic groups within the state. This practice was manifest in Mussolini's efforts in Alto Adige (South Tyrol).14 In addition, this classical fascism expressed a deep antipathy for communism and parliamentary politics. It placed considerable emphasis on the necessity of strong leadership and advocated a single-party state. The fascist regime glorified violence and sought to re-establish a new 'Roman Empire' with forays into North Africa. The success of fascism in several European states in the interwar period needs to be understood within its own particular timeframe. Any studies cannot be divorced from the other political forces at this time. Parties on the left (particularly the communists) in both Italy and Germany were swift to denounce fascism as the product of a dying political capitalist order. Fascism was portrayed as the final stage in a class struggle between the working-class movement and monopoly capitalism. In much of this literature from the early 1920s onwards the latter was deemed to have deliberately supported fascism as a means of preserving its own status. Theories about fascism are, for the most part, theories about anti-fascism and ways to defeat it. By fascism Smith understands 'a militaristic movement of obedience to the state and worship of the Leader, carried by a cult of violence for its own sake and an ethic of brutality'Y This is helpful as the term fascism is applied widely today (particularly by those on the left of the political spectrum) to cover 'similar' political and nationalist ethnic movements throughout Europe (and particularly former Yugoslavia) and the wider world. Although there are often clear parallels there are also some striking differences. Most authors apply the label of 'fascism' not only to 7

The Radical Right in Germany

the Italian case, but also extend it to cover German National Socialism which is deemed a variant of the former.

National Socialism National Socialism materialized as a distinct German model of fascism in the 1920s (and is the subject of chapters 3-6 of this book).16 The causes of National Socialism are to be located in the wake of military defeat in 1918, territorial losses, the economic difficulties of the early 1920s and the inability of the new (and by many unwanted) Weimar Republic to instil confidence among the electorate and to secure law and order. Although National Socialism shared much in common with the tenets of fascism vis a vis its position towards communism, parliamentary government and nationalism, its more distinct brand was contained within its strong promotion of racism, anti-Semitism. 17 This led authors in the 1960s to review the homogeneity of fascism and to argue that 'fascist' movements varied in both ideological and geographical terms. IS Nazism also exhibited a fundamental belief in agrarian colonization (Lebensraum) in lands seized by force whose inhabitants were either to be enslaved or exterminated. Whereas Italian fascism favoured linguistic assimilation, Nazism considered assimilation as a privilege and only allowed it for certain racial minorities (such as the French). Assimilation with inferior racial groups was outlawed by the state in preference to a policy that focused first on forcible eviction and later extermination. Increasingly, National Socialism has become bound up and more associated with the role and personality of its leader, Adolf Hitler.

Right-wing radicalism and right-wing extremism In most contemporary individual country case studies the label of rightwing extremism has been attached to all those parties on the far right and has supplanted the earlier use of radicalism that was applied to such forces as the Nationaldemokratsiche Partei Deutschlands in West Germany (see chapter 7) and the Union de Defense des Commerr;ants et Artisans (or the Poujadists) in France by writers in the 1950s and the 1960s.l~ The term extremism carries such negative connotations that most parties on the far right of the political spectrum, such as the Republikaner, have been swift to reject this particular label. The actual problem associated with attempting to accredit labels to particular parties as being either a 'radical' or an extremist force has been a longstanding one that has bedevilled authors and official bodies. The annual reports from the German Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz (the Office for the Protection of the Constitution) altered 8

The far right in German history and politics

the official definition of such a movement and abandoned the term of radicalism for extremism in 1974 stating that: The term extremist takes account of the fact that political activities or organisations are not necessarily hostile to the constitution because they are in general linguistic usage 'radical' ... They are extremist and therefore unconstitutional in the legal sense only if they are directed against the continued existence of our liberal and lawful constitution. 20

The definitional nature of contemporary right-wing extremism has been further clarified to regard such extremists as striving for a totalitarian or at least an authoritarian state, as rejecting the representative parliamentary democracy, finding their motivation in a brand of nationalism that severely restricts the civil liberties of the individual and is directed against international understandings as well as racism. In short, the term radical is no longer regarded as truly reflecting the nature and aims of the far right. Indeed, the connotations of the term radical arguably provide the right with the semblance of operating within the framework of the democratic consensus. Extremism, contrariwise, suggests a group standing on the very edge of the political spectrum and therefore on the verge of, or actually, possessing aims at odds with the constitutional order. This change in terminology has been reflected in most works on the far right in German which have substituted radicalism for extremism.

Neo-fascism and neo-Nazism Neo-fascism and neo-Nazism are phenomena that have become both politically and sociologically significant in the 1980s and 1990s across Europe. 21 As terms both neo-fascism and neo-Nazism can be deployed simply to isolate and identify those political movements that extol the political orientation and convictions of the classical fascism of the interwar period. In the Italian case it is entirely appropriate to label members of the MSI as neo-fascist. However, caution should be applied on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, many studies from the left-wing spectrum have tended to over-exaggerate the influence of right-wing extremism and have been too eager to invent conspiracy theories and hidden alliances between the extreme right and conservatives. 22 The term neo-National Socialism (or more commonly neo-Nazism) proves much more helpful and is applied to those individuals and groups which openly espouse the restoration of the Third Reich. Neo-Nazis deliberately seek a totalitarian state on the basis of the elite - or leader principle after the pattern of the NSDAP. Such a dictatorship runs contrary to all the basic fundamental principles of the German constitution (Grundgesetz). Admittedly, it is open to question whether only those groups which directly 9

The Radical Right in Germany

support and honour National Socialism can legitimately be described as neo-Nazi. For example, many media reports and works have referred to the NPD or the Republikaner as blatant neo-Nazi forces. How far this is the case is the subject of intense debate and in this study only those individuals, groups and organizations which openly promote the values of National Socialism are labelled as neo-Nazis. Although the neo-Nazis represent only a small fraction of organized right-wing extremism in the Federal Republic and an even smaller fraction of the total right-wing extremist potential, their importance far exceeds their apparent numerical insignificance, particularly as they are heavily involved in acts of violence and intimidation. The neo-Nazis, as Ginzel has expressed it, 'are right-wing extremists, but , it would be wrong to classify all right-wing extremists as neo-Nazis, since neo-Nazism is a further form of right-wing extremism where loathing arises from aversion, where violence is advocated in the struggle against democracy and elected governments and where there is a longing for a dictatorship under one leader, based on volkisch racism'.23 Neo-Nazism thus represents the most militant form of extremism albeit, as chapter 8 indicates, the smallest section of the far right. It aspires to a total transformation of the political system whereas right-wing extremists only go as far as seeking, at least in public, to modify the existing democratic institutions. This work will refer to the notions of right-wing extremism and neo-Nazism in its dealing with the post-1945 world and has opted for the term extremism when it handles National Socialism. Prior to 1919 it will opt instead for the terms of far and radical right to refer to the movements in Imperial Germany and in the Weimar years.

The continuity debate The history of the far right III this book's timeframe is a complex one. It covers four distinct systems of government including the period of the most extreme and puissant variant of the radical right in the course of the twentieth century, namely National Socialism. Why this should occur in Germany, how far German culture, history and political development paved the way for the Third Reich and to what extent common strands run through all these regimes have long been hotly contested issues. In retrospect, this raises the question of whether lines of continuity can be drawn across these totally distinct political orders in terms of locating the development of ideological tenets and policy priorities. The continuity debate in German history first became prominent during the course of the Second World War and sought to interpret the rise of Adolf Hitler as the logical outcome of the process of German historical development from the Middle Ages. Authors such as Vermeil regarded the advance 10

The far right in German history and politics

of the far right in the form of National Socialism as reflecting the logic that had come to underpin the German Reich. This was supposedly expressed in a penchant for authoritarian rule, militarism and imperialism. All were deemed to have impacted negatively on and moulded the German character. Vermeil traced the German 'divine mission', which in his opinion was heading for disaster from the Teutonic invasions through to the Germanization of the Holy Roman Empire. It continued with the emergence of the Hanseatic League, the expansion of Prussia, the unification of Germany and the establishment of the Bismarckian state as a sequence of events that ultimately culminated in war. 24 Moreover, the Nazi party itself, according to other authors, drew on ideas and emotions that proliferated in its successor state, the Weimar Republic. These ranged from racism, anti-Semitism, imperialism, nationalism to anti-Marxism, anti-capitalism, ardent opposition to the 1919 peace settlement and a thorough dissatisfaction with the old school and form of politics. Consequently, some have concluded that it is possible to trace the links between the various regimes and the lines of historical continuity from the end of the nineteenth century to the Third Reich. For such writers, Wilhelmine Germany merely constituted a dress rehearsal for the disaster that was to befall Germany between 1933 and 1945. It is argued that the instability and change in political systems in 1919 did not alter the course of foreign policy. This, it is argued, remained constant after 1919 and was driven by the same needs and requirements before the First World War. As such there was very little distinction between the aims of Wilhelm II and those of Adolf Hitler. For such authors, it is all too easy to isolate Germany from the activities of the other colonial powers and describe Lebensraum as an extension of Bismarck's colonial policy and Hitler's pursuit for world domination as another example of German aggression. Nevertheless, this was the approach favoured by the Anglo-Saxon school in the 1940s and 1950s. Its message of an unstable and aggressive race retained its sympathizers for much longer. Indeed, such remnants of anti-German prejudice and sentiments were demonstrated in the now infamous meeting at Chequers in July 1990 between the then British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, and seven distinguished academics and journalists. They had been drawn together to discuss the German psyche and characteristics of the German people in advance of impending German unification. In contrast to seeing a progression and radicalization on the right through the course of modern history, an alternative version of events was presented by historians in the immediate post-1945 environment. Ritter argued that National Socialism appeared as a bolt from the blue and that Hitler's success came as a surprise to most Germans. Up to 1930, he argued, the vast majority of educated Germans thought Hitler's disciples constituted a group of 11

The Radical Right in Germany

loud-mouthed extremists and super-patriots who were without any practical importance. In fact, it has been argued that Hitler merely duped the German people and that this regime and its crimes must be recognized as an aberration in German history. Ritter asserted that the roots of National Socialism lay no earlier than the events of November 1918 and that any concept of a Germany going off the rails prior to this date was completely and utterly unfounded. Ritter regards National Socialism as a purely twentieth-century phenomenon that to a large extent reflected similar developments in other European states. He illustrates how support for the Nazis grew rapidly over the brief period from 1929 to 1933, thus revealing how many of its supporters, even its members, did not hold strong political convictions. In other words, the Hitler regime constituted nothing more than, and should be judged as, a temporary phenomenon. From this perspective, it was possible to deny that the German experience was in any way unique. Indeed, it was only the collapse of the old authoritarian system in 1918 and the sudden transformation of the German state into a liberal democracy that were ultimately to enable Hitler and his followers to challenge successfully for power. Whether, as Childs remarks, the Nazi seizure of power represented the culmination of long-term trends in German politics and society or whether it was the outcome of a series of avoidable accidents is an issue that will continue to excite the passions of historians for generations to come. 25 It is one that can have no definite conclusions. Both these earlier approaches have been rejected and refined by later research from the early 1960s. Fischer's seminal work Griff nach der Weltmacht utterly transformed thinking about Germany's objectives at the beginning of the twentieth century.2h His assertions that, far from stumbling into war, as has often been portrayed, the outbreak of war in August 1914 has to be understood as a deliberate and intended product of German government planning. It was launched to allow Germany to initiate a major expansionary programme and thereby unite the electorate under the German national banner and, in so doing, weaken the appeal of socialism. Simultaneously, it would protect the ruling elites who were resistant to social, economic and political change. Arising from this view the new generation of the 1970s came to place greater emphasis on Germany's domestic politics arena as the reason behind expansionist policy. An understanding of links and themes of continuity between the Imperial, Weimar and Nazi regimes may be understandable, but how do these varying interpretations feed into the post-1945 situation? As Nolte has argued, the age of fascism may have come to an end in 1945, but vestiges of National Socialism continued to persist in West Germany until 1990 and continue to resurface in reunified Germany. Party leaders may have come and gone, political parties may have sprung up and withered quickly, being either consumed 12

The far right in German history and politics

by other forces, proscribed or reconstituted under new banners,27 but respective party programmes reflect the same 'traditional' values and messages of the earlier movements. Nationalism remains the core of all platforms and is followed in varying degrees by a rejection of the established political order, an intolerance towards non-Germans, openly displayed racism and a propensity towards acts of violence. The Federal Republic of Germany may never have been seriously threatened by the resurgence of any organized right-wing extremist force, although three waves of extremism, as chapter 7 illustrates, have sent minor tremors through the political system. The continued existence of the fascist phenomenon still haunts German society and cannot be readily dismissed. Indeed, to what extent right-wing extremist sentiment has been or can ever be eradicated remains doubtful. Electoral returns do not prove highly reliable in providing an accurate means of testing the affinity towards right-wing extremism. Sympathy extends much more widely than votes would otherwise seem to indicate as evidence from opinion polls on a range of traditional right-wing issues such as nationalism and law and order repeatedly illustrates. The point at which this latent support mayor even will ever emerge is difficult to determine. Support tends to develop against the backdrop of economic difficulties or a period of political uncertainty. In such scenarios the far right has proved that it has been able to tap into such disaffection and find itself being seen as a vehicle to demonstrate public protest and unease. Examples include the success of the NPD in the late 1960s and the Republikaner in 1989. Can we discern a continuity of ideas and themes running through the forces of the far right in German history? How has it come to change in the course of the last 130 years? Is it possible to dissociate Germany's drive for domestic stability and foreign expansion with those of her European rivals? To what extent is the German experience unique? Was Germany to pursue a Sonderweg that led to the triumph of the radical right and unleash the Second World War? How far do existing far right movements look back to earlier forms and ideological tenets? Should these parties be proscribed? These are some of the highly pertinent questions that will be addressed in the following chapters.

Notes 1 There is a huge and constantly expanding literature on the institutions and policies of the European Union. For an introduction see Ben Rosamund, Explaining European Integration, Basingstokc, Macmillan, 1999 or Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999, 4th edition. 2 See H. G. Betz, Radical Right- Wing Populism in Western Europe, Basingstoke, 1994 and also Betz, The New Politics of the Right, Basingstoke, 1998; P. H. Merkl and L. Weinberg (eds) The Revival of Right- Wing Extremism, London, 1997.

13

The Radical Right in Germany

3 For an account of the Italian case after 1945 see R. Chiarini, 'The Italian far right: the search for legitimacy' in L. Cheles, R. Ferguson and M. Vaughan (eds) The Far Right in Western and Eastern Europe, London, 1995, 2nd edition, pp. 20-40. 4 Jaroslav Krejci, 'Neo-fascism - west and east' in L. Cheles, R. Ferguson and M. Vaughan, The Far Right in Western and Eastern Europe, p. 6. 5 On the one hand, the Federal Republic of Germany or (West) Germany was constructed as a liberal democracy and market economy with strong links to the United States. In contrast, the German Democratic Republic or East Germany was created by the Soviets as a satellite state with a command economy. 6 This 'reunified' Germany d,id not mirror the geographical and political boundaries of Germany in 1937 (i.e. before Hitler annexed Austria and Czechoslovakia). In 1945 Germany's eastern border was marked by the rivers Oder and Neisse. This led to one-quarter of the 1937 boundaries being transferred to Polish and Soviet administration pending a peace treaty. This decision actually pushed Poland 200 miles westward and was deemed necessary compensation for her territorial losses to the Soviet Union in the east. In J 990 the Kohl government in Germany dropped all claims to the former territories east of the Oder/Neisse line. This was greeted with some relief by the Polish government and outright hostility by all sections of the German far right. 7 See, for example, Panikos Panayi (ed.) Weimar and Nazi Germany, London, 2000. 8 This is particularly true for the period up until the early to mid-1980s. See, for example, P. Wilkinson, The New Fascists, London, 1983. 9 Often the terms selected reflected the political stance of anyone particular author. These divergent views only help to cloud any subjective perception and to hinder the extent position of such a political party. For example, while the greens were swift to characterize the Republikaner as a fascist force, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt fiir Verfassungsschutz) identified the party as merely a radical group on the fringes of the democratic system. Further confusion was added when Franz Schiinhuber, then leader of the Republikaner, portrayed the party as a conservative force. 10 C. Mudde, 'Right-wing extremism analysed', European journal of Political Research, vol. 27, 1995, pp. 203-44. II Ibid., p. 219. 12 For further consideration see M. Kitchen, fascism, London, 1976 and Z. Stern hell, 'Fascist ideology' in W. Laqueur (ed.) Fascism: A Reader's Guide, London, 1975, pp. 325-406. 13 For more recent studies and interpretations of Italian fascism see R. Bosworth, The Italian Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the interpretation of Fascism, London, 1998; M. Stone, The Patron State: Culture and Politics in Fascist Italy, Princeton, New Jersey 1998; P. Morgan, italian Fascism 1919-45, London, 1995. 14 Italy was granted the South Tyrol in 1919 as a territorial reward for joining the American, British and French war effort in the Great War against the Central powers (Germany, Austro-Hungary and Turkey). The region had formerly constituted a part of German-speaking Austria. It was a predominantly German area and the decision to pass it to Rome contradicted the whole principle of self-determination. After 1923 Mussolini opted to attempt to 'Italianize' the area by promoting the use of the Italian language and culture and through a process of resettling Italian speakers into this area. Interestingly, Hitler paid no attention to Rome's efforts. His indifference stands in marked contrast to his involvement and concerns with other German minorities in

14

The far right in German history and politics

15

16

17 18 19

20

21 22

23 24 25 26 27

neighbouring states. The South Tyrol has remained with Italy ever since. For a history see A. E. Alcock, The History of the South Tyrol Question, London, 1970. A. D. Smith, 'The dark side of nationalism: the revival of nationalism in late twentiethcentury Europe' in Cheles, Ferguson and Vaughan, The Far Right in Western and Eastern Europe, p. 18. For significant works on National Socialism see, among others, early classics such as K. D. Bracher, The German Dictatorship, London, 1973; H. Mommsen, 'National Socialism: continuity and change' in W. Laqueur (ed.) Fascism: A Reader's Guide, London, 1979, pp. 151-92; M. Broszat, The German Dictatorshi{J, London, 1973; and I. Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectiues of Interpretation, London, 1985. See J. Hiden, Republican and Fascist Germany: Ideas and Variations in the History of the Weimar Republic, London, 1996. G. L. Mosse, 'Introduction: the genesis of fascism' in W. LIqueur and G. L. Mosse (eds), International Fascism 1920-45, New York, 1966. This was a general trend towards the use of radicalism until the mid-1980s in both English and German works. See for example J. D. Nagle, The National Democratic Party. Right Radicalism in the Federal Republic of Germany, Berkeley, 1970 or W. Kreutzberger, Rechtsradikalismus in der Bundesrepublik, Frankfurt am Main, 1983. The general trend since the mid-1980s has been to opt for the term extremism. See, by means of example, Klaus von Beyme (ed.) Right-wing Extremism in Western Europe, London, 1988 or P. H. Merkl, The Reuiual of Right-wing Extremism in the Nineties, London, 1997. There arc, of course, exceptions to this rule. The Office for the Protection of the Constitution is based in Cologne and operates under the authority of the Federal Interior Ministry. It deals only with internal security affairs and its work encapsulates counterespionage, anti-terrorism and combating extremist political groups and individuals. The BfV is arguably Europe's most publicminded intelligence agency and produces an annual report (at federal level) that accounts for the existence and activities of terrorists and extremists (both leftand right-wing) in Germany. It comprises some 2,500 staff. Its future was initially questioned following the demise of the Warsaw Pact, but its position was temporarily safeguarded by the sudden explosion of right-wing extremist activities in the early 1990s. See its annual reports or 'Street war against the skins', Financial Times, 30 July 1993. Krejci, op. cit. in Cheles, Ferguson and Vaughan, The Far Right in Western and Eastern Europe, p. 1. See, for example, U. Hartman, H. P. Steffen and S. Steffen, Rechtsextremismus bei jugendlichen. Anregungen del' wachsenden Gefahr entgegenzuwirken, Munich, 1985; M. Koelschtzky, Die Stimme ihrer Herren, Cologne, 1986; K. Faller and H. Siebold, Neo-Faschismus, Frankfurt, 1986. G. B. Ginzel, Hitlers (Ur)enkel: Nco-Nazis, Ihre Ideologicn und Aktioncll, Diisseldorf, 1981. E. Vermeil, L'Alicmagne contemporaine, socia Ie, politique et wlturelle, 1890-19S0, Paris, 1952-53 (and quoted in K. D. Bracher, The German Dictatorship). D. Childs, 'The far right in Germany since 1945' in Cheles, Ferguson and Vaughan, The Far Right in Western and Eastern Europe, p. 290. F. Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War, London, 1966. E. Nolte, The Three faces of Fascism: Action Frilllraise, Italian fascism, National Socialism, New York, 1969.

15

Chapter 2

Tracing the origins and rise of the radical right: the Kaiserreich. 1870-1918 Discussions of the radical right in Germany tend most often to focus on the spirit of National Socialism and its leading personalities. This is scarcely surprising given its continued attraction for the general reader and the availability of much film material for the documentary maker. The origins of this dynamic and destructive force espousing the nationalistic, militaristic, anti pluralist and anti-Semitic tenets that have become associated with the radical right begins neither in January 1933 nor in 1919 but can be traced back to the nineteenth century (and even earlier). In this sense it is possible to establish an element of continuity vis a vis ideas over time and across differing political systems in Germany, but such a path must be trodden with care as it is lined with many potential pitfalls. It is all too easy either to oversimplify or over-generalize certain trends and model them into a seemingly convincing continuity thesis that begins with Bismarck, reaches its apex with Hitler and lives on in contemporary German society. The most obvious examples are attempts to use events in the course of German history to maintain that the German psyche displays a clear predisposition to authoritarian values, and episodes to reveal that many of the characteristics of National Socialism, such as for example, anti-Semitism, the 'community of the folk', pan-Germanism and a tradition of militarism, are of a much longer pedigree. The value of such assertions is severely limited as the pick and mix approach, whereby examples are plucked from history to support a particular line of argument while other contrasting episodes are discarded, is severely flawed methodologically. In that sense what is their significance in helping readers fully to comprehend the emergence of what is now classified as the radical right after 1918? Given these deficiencies how are we to account for the appearance of the radical right? This study uses the unification of Germany in 1870 as its starting point and this chapter argues that fully to understand the emergence of Nazism it is necessary to appreciate that many of the seeds were sown in the decades after 1870. The transformation of the right in German politics has to be located against the backdrop of the rapidly changing social, economic and 16

Origins and rise of the radical right

organizational structure of united Germany that came severely to test traditional conservative rule and values. On the one hand, by the early 1880s, the ruling conservative elite was being confronted by demands from below and particularly from the Social Democrats for substantial social and political change to what in reality by the late 1870s was an inherently weakly structured political system. On the other hand, emerging right-wing associations sought to pressurize the conservative governments to radicalize their policy agendas. The latter accounted for a significant expansion of the right's social base, but how and why does this seismic change occur on the right? The answer lies with the position, frustrations and ambitions of the middle class in Germany. The insecurities of this social stratum after 1890 go a long way to explain the rise of the radical right which in turn compelled the older bastions of the conservative right to accommodate the policy agenda and rhetoric of the new right in the first two decades of the twentieth century. How significant such sentiment became within the political system, how it manifested itself and how it came to have repercussions for future events are the issues that lie at the heart of this chapter. This chapter aims to provide an overview of the radicalization process, accounts for the centrality of the middle classes in this process but begins with a short introduction into the political system of the Kaiserreich.

The historical setting The founding of the German Empire on 18 January 1871 established a new colossus that transformed the political landscape of Europe.' This Kaiserreich was not the product of a popular referendum or the final settlement following a revolution. On the contrary, the entire process had been directed exclusively 'from above' and was conceived and executed by Otto von Bismarck, the Minister President of Prussia, to maintain the supremacy of the forces of Prussian conservatism in all matters of state. 2 The realities of this new dispensation were reflected in the unrepresentative nature of its constitution and the limited powers of the Reichstag (imperial parliament). Although technically a federation of 22 states and three city states, the Empire was dominated by Prussia which not only represented the largest state in terms of both territory and population (it accounted for three-fifths of the German mass and three-fifths of its inhabitants), but Prussian values and traditions and, in particular, its ethos of statehood and military capacity overshadowed the entire political system. Not only was the emperor also the king of Prussia and the Reich chancellor also minister president of Prussia, but most imperial laws originated from within the Prussian Landtag (diet). This was highly significant as the form and structure of Prussia's peculiar threeclass voting system, whereby the wealthiest 4 per cent of the population had 17

The Radical Right in Germany

representation equal to the 84 per cent of the population from the largest and poorest class, effectively guaranteed the preponderance of the old ruling and unrepresentative conservative landed class in Prussia at least. The Bismarckian system is best classified, despite the trappings of parliamentary institutions, as an autocratic monarchy under the German emperor. The autocratic nature of this system lay with the emperor's powers alone to appoint and dismiss his chancellors as well as the holders of all other imperial and Prussian offices and his abilities to summon and dissolve the Reichstag and control foreign policy. In short, Bismarck had deliberately created what in hindsight can be seen as an incredibly complex and arguably fragile political order designed to preserve Pruss ian dominance from the very outset. This system might have worked perfectly a century earlier but in a period of rapid industrialization demands were intensifying for economic, social and political change that immediately placed strains on the system. 3 Rather than wooing a new electorate to his creation Bismarck opted to keep the existing forces in check. Consequently, as the Reich developed, both the structure and the public symbols of this new state left many, and particularly a growing middle class, largely dissatisfied. As Pulzer aptly puts it: 'The out and out opponents of the new state were initially few. More seriously, it emerged in the long run that its out and out supporters were also few.,4 With a regime opposed to any radical change or overhaul, its room for manoeuvre was severely limited. To preserve his system Bismarck resorted to frustrating the cohesiveness of the Reichstag's deputies by playing parties off, one against another and by identifying the so-called Reichsfeinde (enemies of the Reich). His decisions were manifest, for example, in the Kulturkampf of the 1870s against the Catholic Centre Party, his efforts to resist the rise of the SPD through the adoption of his anti-socialist laws and his willingness to sacrifice the liberals in favour of wooing the conservatives through his colonial crusades in the 1880s. These, however, were only temporary solutions to an ever growing constitutional dilemma. Effective government as Mommsen explains 'was possible only if the Chancellor could mobilise the full power that the Prussian state government possessed within the system as a counterweight to the other institutions of the Reich'. This was a sizeable challenge for any chancellor. Bismarck managed it through skilful manouevrings, bullying tactics, his dominant personality and total support from Kaiser Wilhelm I (1871-88). In retrospect, the inherent weaknesses of the system only truly surfaced after Bismarck's forced departure in 1890, but the flaws existed from the outset. Although Bismarck cannot be held responsible for the disastrous direction of foreign policy (leading to the encirclement of Germany) after 1890 he must shoulder some of the blame for not correcting some of the weaknesses. 18

Origins and rise of the radical right

The history of the German party political system in this period can be divided into two specific timeframes. The first dates from the founding of the Reich and lasts until around 1890 and has become characterized as Honoratiorenpolitik (politics of the notables) while the second sees the beginnings of what today is deemed mass politics with the emergence of a variety of extra-parliamentary economic and interest groups.s Governing Germany in the second period becomes more difficult given the declining fortunes of the conservatives, the rise of the social democrats and constant interference of Kaiser Wilhelm II (1888-1918) in the machinery of government. 6 The dualistic division created through the constitution between Prussia and the Empire made policy making progressively more difficult for Bismarck's successors. Caprivi's attempts (1890-94) to make modest changes were thwarted by the might of Prussia within the system as the Junkers remained adamantly opposed to any proposal on constitutional and parliamentary reform and, on the contrary, sought to defend its brand of conservatism. To what extent the German Empire was capable of any lasting political change remains open to question. The imperial constitution may in itself not have changed or altered the division of powers during its history, but the conventions of political life had altered almost completely. That the political system survived owed much to a series of government-sponsored initiatives to bind a whole range of groups and interests within the country to the system through the initiation of what became known as a Sammlungspolitik (cohesiveness policy).7 Examples included the rush for colonies in the 1880s, the instigation of Weltpolitik after 1897 and the naval programme after 1905. Policy pronouncements and direction did come to display more belligerent, nationalistic and assertive tones, but the pursuit of such populist policies were largely undertaken as a means of maintaining the traditional patterns of autocratic and largely anti-democratic government and at the expense of confronting some of the new German state's political, economic and social problems. In the short term these attempts at social integration worked but failed to compensate for the fragility of the political system and in the longer term simply could not accommodate the demands for democratic reform from the left and the demands for a much more assertive nationalist and anti-pluralist agenda from the forces of an embryonic radical right. The impact of this sudden political (almost exclusively male) mobilization from both the left and right of the political spectrum cannot be underestimated. It added extra burdens on an already archaic system of government and it threatened to undermine the very fabric of Bismarck's constitutional settlement. Indeed, these interest groups developed virtually in parallel with the political parties and extended across the political spectrum to encompass, for example, powerful economic lobbying associations on the right such as 19

The Radical Right in Germany

the German iron and steel industrialists to the puissant and highly professionally organized and rapidly expanding free trade union movement on the left. By the early 1890s there was clear evidence of a radicalization on the right which became manifest through the emergence of small extraparliamentary, anti-Semitic and nationalist forces, each driven by its own agenda. These groups drew their support primarily from the middle classes and their success should be measured neither by their membership statistics nor by their electoral returns but by their impact on the German political consciousness and society in general. Many of their ideas were incorporated into larger bodies such as the 'pre-fascist' Agrarian League in 1893 and came to epitomize the radicalization and the emergence of the new protest movements or nationale Verbande (pressure groups) on the right of the political spectrum. H But who joined these forces, who constituted the middle classes and how can we explain both the growing mobilization and increasing radicalization? To answer these questions it is necessary first to identify the right.

Defining the right in Imperial Germany: a short chronology The right in Imperial Germany in political science terms constituted the forces of political conservatism, that is the large landowning class, the aristocracy, the bureaucracy and the military. Care must be taken when considering the German right for it was, as Eley argues, far from being a conceptual monolith. On the contrary, it has undergone a series of inventions and reinventions in terms of its sociological, organizational and ideological character between the start of the nineteenth century and 1945. 9 Nazism represents just another example of an ongoing process of dissolution and regrouping on the right. This developed in three ways: 'Convulsively, through a series of protracted crises; progressively, by adjusting to changing conditions and laterally, as a result of the convergence of new social and political forces from different directions.,lo Generally, the conservative right had initially and for the most part of the nineteenth century been resistant to the arrival of new bourgeois civilization. They had been opposed to the demands of the middle-class revolutionaries of 1848, set themselves against all attempts at constitutional reform and practically all aspects of economic rationalization in determined efforts to defend their political supremacy against any new forces for change. The presentation of the fait accompli of unification and the ensuing new political settlement of 1871 was not received with universal enthusiasm by the right and effectively split the conservative or old right into two rival factions. II On the one hand, the Free Conservatives (Reichspartei) totally endorsed the new Bismarckian order. On the other, the Conservative Party 20

Origins and rise of the radical right

(deriving much of its support from monarchists and especially the] unkers, the large estate owners east of the Elbe, army officers, higher civil servants and Protestant clergy), denounced the settlement fearing it would culminate in a deterioration of their own social and political position. To garner their support and to allay their fears over the rise of social democracy and the impact of industrialization, Bismarck introduced a policy of economic protectionism and a series of anti-socialist legislation from 1878. Both moves facilitated a realignment within German conservatism with the new order. Yet, conservatism still represented a loose configuration of interests and ideas and the two main conservative parties would remain distinct political entities for the life of the Kaiserreich. This fragmentation was problematic, prevented the emergence of a single conservative force as in Great Britain and without seeking to appeal to a much wider audience their room for manoeuvre and their future were strictly limited. In electoral terms, the history of both conservative parties was one of inexorable decline as tables 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate. Repeated efforts to seek common ground with the liberal parties against the advancing socialist 'menace' culminated in the formation of the Bismarck orchestrated Kartell bloc in 1887. Although this managed to secure a majority of pro-system parties in the Reichstag and lasted in many regional levels until 1911, it totally failed to salvage the declining fortunes of the conservative parties in the country as a whole. Moves by the conservatives to bolster their strength and public support were initially hampered by their failure to recognize and appreciate the demands from the countryside for reform and their inability to garner new causes. Instead, as disenchantment grew with traditional conservative forces, so a new political fermentation developed among the middle classes and translated into the emergence of a new breed of political operator on the right. The first stirrings of a new and more radical right occurred with the Table 2.1

Seats won in Reichstag elections. 1871-90

Party

1871

1874

1877

1878

1881

Conserva tives Reichspartei National Liherals Centre Party Progressives Social Democrats Anti-Semites Others

57 67 125 63 47 2

22 36 155 91 50 9

40 38 128 93 52

50 28 47 100 115

12

59 57 99 94 39 9

12

28 51 99 74 24

36

34

34

40

45

43

-

-

-

-

-

1884

1887

78

gO 41 99 98 32 11 1 34

-

Others include the minorities: Poics, Danes, Guclphs anu deputies from AlsJCC Lorraine

21

The Radical Right in Germany Table 2.2

Seats won in Reichstag elections. 1890-1912

Party

1890

Conservatives Reichspartei National Liberals Centre Party Progressives Social Democrats Anti-Semites Others

73 20 42 106 76 35 5 40

1893

1898

1903

1907

1912

72

56 23 46 102 49 56

54 21 51 100 36 81

60 24 54 105 49 43 16 43

43 14 45 91 42 110

28 53 96

48 44 16 40

13

11

52

43

13

49

SOllrces: Pinson, K. (1954) Modem German), - Its History and Civilisation, New York, pp. 572-3; Porter, I. H. and Armour, I. D. (1991) Imperial German), 18W)-1918, London, p. III

arrival of anti-Semitic agitators in the 1880s but were quickly followed in the 1890s by a spate of economic and agitational interest groups which assembled around such nationalist issues as the navy, colonies and the defence of German culture. The old right seemed incapable of pulling these issues under its own banner and, thus, failed to mobilize potential new recruits from the wider social strata. Many of these new radical forces may have positioned themselves on the right of the political spectrum, but most were critical opponents of the traditional conservative parties and showed little enthusiasm for joining their ranks. In contrast, by the early 1900s they had forged their own distinctive organizations and pursued their own particular brands of militant nationalism. In effect, and also in response to the inexorable rise of the SPD, the traditional right was compelled to engineer another realignment that in terms of the right's political development was just as significant as the transformation that had occurred a generation earlier. In this latest realignment the conservative right came to terms with the numerous petit bourgeois nationalist associations and organizations such as the Agrarian League and the Pan-German League which they had more or less absorbed by the outbreak of war in 1914. In policy terms this had translated into the adoption of a more nationalist and aggressive rhetoric from the conservatives parties which had now been captured by the radical right. More important, in terms of the right's overall development, the conservatives had essentially endorsed the legitimacy of the radical right and its overall aims. In turn the latter felt increasingly confident openly to challenge the power of the Kaiser, to proclaim the rights of the individual as being subordinate to the needs of the Yolk and even to contemplate the possibility of staging a coup d'etat to combat socialism. How these issues might have developed can only be guessed at as hostilities intervened in 1914. 22

Origins and rise of the radical right

Membership of the radical right Explanations for the radicalization of the right centre largely on the mobilization of the German Mittelstand or petit bourgeoisie at the end of the nineteenth century. Attempts at providing a definitive representative of this stratum is impossible given the complexity and broadness of the term middle class and because it is difficult to generalize about the petit bourgeoisie's political affiliations. 12 Nevertheless evidence does suggest that a substantial part of this stratum formed the core variable that determined the radicalization of right-wing politics. The middle class can essentially be broken down into two component parts. The first comprised the old middle class that encompassed the traditional bourgeoisie of small traders, farmers, small businessmen and artisans who now felt themselves facing new and unwelcome challenges. U Their grievances were most usually linked to the problems confronting the farming community especially falling prices, the customary climatic difficulties and the steady decline of traditional industries. The second comprised the new forces of the middle classes, namely the salaried employees and white-collar workers and included lower grade civil servants, teachers and clerical workers. Despite differences in selfperception both these constituent elements of the middle classes were held together by threads of commonality. These included concerns over the pace of industrialization, the fear of the spread of socialist doctrine, degrees of insecurity and, some argue, cultural pessimism, a general alienation from the political establishment. 14 Space prohibits any detailed analysis of either group, but by dividing these two groups and their political activities under three separate headings it is possible to isolate some of the most salient factors that facilitated the process of radicalization on the right. The traditional rural and small townbased middle class represented one of the earliest examples of a sectoral based protest movement which united in political associations to protect its own interests in the face of rapid industrialization. Although initially only manifest at the local level these forces quickly assumed a regional and on occasions a national dimension through the formation of a range of sectoral, regional and national organizations. Artisans were the best prepared and by 1873 had established the first national body which evolved into the General League of German Artisans in 1882. This was mirrored by the setting up of the Central Committee of the United Guilds in 1884 and the standing conference of the Chambers of Handicraft and Trade in 1900. Although smaller tradesmen fared less well in organizational terms there was clear evidence of a determination on the part of this traditional middle-class cleavage to protect its own interests that marks the beginnings of direct political activity. However, it never led to the emergence of any Mittelstand party

23

The Radical Right in Germany

(although an abortive attempt to this end occurred in Thuringia in 1895). Significantly, one of the few specialist types of party to emerge during the 1880s and the 1890s from this traditional stratum were the small, if vocal anti-Semitic forces which labelled the Jews as unwelcome outsiders. The second element of the petit bourgeoisie comprised the aspirant and newly emergent lower middle classes centred on the expanding bureaucratization of economic and colonial life after the 1880s. According to the 1907 census there were in excess of two million 'private' and a further one a half million such public servants. Less is known about the political leanings of this group, but as with the traders and farmers, these white-collar workers had swiftly moved to establish sectoral organizations. By 1913 some 53 white collar organizations existed. Not all by any standards could be classified as belonging to the radical right. Indeed, they covered the spectrum of political debate from heavily trade union oriented groups to the more radical rightwing and anti-Semitic forces, such as the 148,000 member German National Assistants' Association. The third element of the middle-class electorate was not built around the defence of sectoral interests, but existed essentially after 1890 to promote and champion nationalist sentiment and was, arguably, the most important stream to attract recruits from both these groups of the petit bourgeoisie. In general, the Wilhelmine period heralded the advent of potentially strong and vocal nationale Verbande (national pressure groups) reflecting diverse backgrounds and objectives. The radical right constituted merely one stream and many organizations on the radical right came to express strong nationalist, imperialist and militarist tendencies. They sought to divert voters away from the growing force of the SPD and the mounting domestic problems through recourse to an overtly nationalist agenda and, by so doing, to maintain and win support for the established political system. IS To this extent anti-Semitism became intermingled with anti-Marxist, imperialist and nationalist aspirations of this third element. By the 1890s it is possible to discern a radical right platform espousing the 'traditional' tenets of radical right ideology where degrees of contempt were expressed towards demands for greater democratization and parliamentary democracy, where a clear lack of tolerance was demonstrated for non-Germans within the Reich and where the government was being pressurized into pursuing a much more radical foreign policy agenda. The proponents of these ideas existed on the fringes of the political system, where they sought to influence government policy outcomes and shape debate. Although the absence of a single, nationally based and united radical right party in this timeframe hampers attempts to uncover the levels of popular appeal of such ideas and the degrees of fragmentation and division accounted for minimal electoral impact, the ideas did spread and by 1910 24

Origins and rise of the radical right

had become familiar slogans within German politics. This chapter now turns to explore the two most puissant tenets of the radical right, namely anti-Semitism and nationalism.

Old and new variants of anti-Semitism One of the most common aspects of all far right activities has long been a tendency to focus verbal attacks and engineer physical assault on individuals and property deemed to be 'outsiders' with other supposed loyalties living within national borders. In Imperial Germany the Jews (and to a lesser extent the Poles) became identified as the principal potential enemies by all right-wing agitators. In some ways this seems somewhat surprising for two reasons: first, the German-Jewish population accounted for just under 1 per cent of the German population in the period up to 1914 and, second, the majority by this stage had fully integrated into German society and regarded themselves (in contrast to other national minorities such as the Poles and the Danes) as loyal German citizens. Nevertheless, anti-Semitism became a feature of life in Imperial Germany. Anti-Semitic prejudice was scarcely a new phenomenon. It possessed a long historical pedigree within European culture throughout the second Christian millennium and was founded and defended on primarily religious grounds. It assumed and adopted many forms, degrees and guises of persecution. These ranged from laws, for example, denying the Jews the right to own property, restricting them to certain financial services, forcing them to live in ghettos and occasionally had led to their expulsion from specific countries such as Spain in 1492. 16 The first stirrings of organized political anti-Semitism surfaced in the early 1870s after the economic crash of 1873 and lasted as a feature of the Imperial period to its demise in 1918. In many ways anti-Semitism provided a useful outlet for many who were finding it difficult adjusting to Germany's transformation from an agricultural to an industrial state. 17 Jews represented an easy target particularly as they were heavily active in the banking and commerce sectors that were central to the new process of economic modernization. The history of organized anti-Semitism during this period reveals a picture of numerous small and often locally based associations and organizations. The first were urban, located in Berlin and included most notably the ultra conservative Christlich-Soziale Partei (Christian Socialist Workers' Party) which was founded in 1878 by Alfred Stocker. Stocker was an evangelical pastor and court chaplain whose particular personal crusade sought to win the masses over to Christianity and conservative values and away from republicanism and socialism. Once this initial project had faltered badly among his working-class target audience Stocker refocused his energies on

25

The Radical Right in Germany

the resentments of the disgruntled lower middle classes who along with the peasantry were to become the backbone of these new anti-Semitic forces. Clerks, craftsmen and shopkeepers responded much more enthusiastically to his anti-liberal and increasingly anti-Semitic tirades. ls Stocker's voice was from far being a lone one and the anti-Semitic message came to feature prominently in other small groups including the German People's Association founded by Liebermann von Sonnenberg and Forster in 1881. All sought to attract and bind mass support through a unifying diet of anti-Semitism and all clearly alerted general attention to the 'Jewish Question', which became a feature in many walks of life including the churches, the military, literature, the arts and academia by the mid-1880s. Antipathy and resentment towards the Jews were nurtured initially through religious prejudice and perceptions of the Jews as the murderers of Christ. Stories from medieval folklore such as the alleged Jewish practice of ritually slaughtering Christian children continued to circulate and created highly powerful and negative imagery. In anti-Semitic tracts the Jews were often depicted as revolutionaries, exploitative business people, rootless individuals and subversives all motivated by a plan, such as that propagated by the entirely fictional 'Protocols of Zion', for Jewish world domination. Theodor Fritsch's Handbuch der Judenfrage (Handbook of the Jewish Question) became the 'catechism for all anti-Semites' in this period, in which he portrayed the Jews in a series of extremely negative stereotypical and hideous images. The book was an immediate bestseller. Within seven years it had been reprinted 22 times and had reached its 48th edition by 1943. Anti-Semitic prejudice was not only confined to right-wing agitators but was reflected and made both more credible when cited by eminent German personalities, such as the celebrated historian Heinrich von Treitschke, who declared the Jews to be 'our misfortune' and, more importantly, given a degree of legitimacy through the state's attitude towards its Jewish citizens. By the 1880s Jews were still excluded from public service, including the Prussian Officer Corps, and from many private social clubs and although some, such as Bleichroder (Bismarck's banker), did gain positions of importance, they were the exceptions. Such exclusion and discrimination reinforced perceptions that the Jewish population was different and fed indirectly into schools and the world of education. The late 1870s and 1880s witnessed a significant radicalization of antiSemitic agitation particularly in rural areas and was facilitated by an influx of unassimilated ultra-orthodox Jews fleeing from persecution in Russia and, most significantly of all, culminated in the emergence of a new strain of anti-Semitic argument that pushed anti-Semitism to a new plane and also had lasting and substantial repercussions. Until this point and down the centuries salvation for Germany's (and indeed Europe's) Jews was always possible

26

Origins and rise of the radical right

through assimilation and conversion to Christianity. Most of Germany's Jewish population by the end of the nineteenth century had long assimilated into the majority culture and although most were acutely aware of the degrees of latent anti-Semitism they always knew that the exit route of conversion remained possible. This new pseudo-intellectual strain which blocked this avenue developed from a wide mix of science, literature and fictional writings that focused on the issues of eugenics, race and culture and found particular resonance in certain sections of Germany society. The concept of race theory stemmed from the writings developed in the 1860s by Arthur Gobineau, a French count, and was brought to prominence by Ernst Haeckel's The Riddle of the Universe (1899) and Houston Stewart Chamberlain in his Foundations of the Nineteenth Century (1900). In the former mankind was classified into 'higher' and 'lower' races and in the latter (and more influential) Chamberlain twisted the views of natural selection as put forward by Charles Darwin and applied them to human beings to argue that life was a continual struggle between different races. 19 This biological concept of the 'survival of the fittest' heralded a major transformation in radical right thinking and led to the notion of racial purity and perfection that found its extreme manifestation under Nazism. In essence it characterized racial types. It valued the qualities and promoted the superiority of the European Aryan stock above the peoples of Africa and Asia. It directed a particular disdain to the Slavs who were depicted as a menace of degenerate stock poisoning not only German culture, but ultimately German life and being. Particular hostility was reserved for the Jews who, in anti-Semitic tracts, were now increasingly referred to in common bacteriological language as pests and parasites. This new strain of biological anti-Semitism was skilfully deployed to reinforce the 'traditional' negative stereotypes of the Jewish character and personality which were identified as part and parcel of the Jewish persona. Racial anti-Semitism proclaimed that assimilation and conversion could not change biological codes and, on the contrary, if allowed, threatened to undermine the valuable traits of German culture and society. To prevent such an outcome it was imperative for many anti-Semites to control the menace. Three avenues of exploration were possible, each more radical than the previous one: ghettoization, expulsion or extermination. Dismissed as sheer fantasy by many the realities of the prevailing fragmentation of organized right-wing radicalism and their limited electoral appeal made all three possibilities simply unattainable at that precise moment in time. In hindsight, the electoral activities of the organized anti-Semites impacted only temporarily and marginally on the German political system in the late 1880s and early 1890s while it successfully penetrated specific rural areas, 27

The Radical Right in Germany

parts of the urban electorate and managed to attract many disgruntled middle-class merchants and traders. 20 One of the most prominent figures was Otto Bockel who was elected in the Prussian province of Hessen-Nassau as the first independent anti-Semite of the Antisemitische Volkspartei (AntiSemitic People's Party) to the Reichstag in 1887. His nationwide campaign had mirrored in many respects that of the SPD. He had poured scorn on the Junkers and the Church, demanded universal male suffrage in all state elections and even argued for income taxation. However, his rhetoric diverged significantly from the socialist message on account of its highly anti-Semitic tone. This was well received in rural areas and the early 1890s witnessed the heyday of politically organized anti-Semitism. Indeed, in co-operation with Liebermann's Deutsche anti-semitische Vereiningung, Bockel's party garnered five seats in 1890 and at the next election in 1893 the anti-Semites managed to capture 16 seats and garner some 400,000 votes. However, organized anti-Semitism never constituted a mass political movement. The history of organized anti-Semitism in Imperial Germany is one of various factions that were riven by internal feuds and petty jealousies. Most effectively constituted nothing more than 'one-man bands'. Their inability to co-ordinate activities and to evolve beyond specific local districts and single issues was a significant shortcoming. Although individuals such as Otto Bockel proved the exception and managed successfully to tap into agrarian resentment and to cultivate electoral strongholds, even this example ultimately proved a temporary phenomenon, for once anti-Semitism had been hijacked by the larger and more savvy conservative forces and popular organizations such as the Pan-German League, the forces of politically organized anti-Semitic parties lost their significance as a potential vehicle for political protest and all the main leaders fell into obscurity. Although in organizational terms political anti-Semitism failed to make any serious impact on the political system its implications cannot be so readily dismissed. The anti-Semitic message was to endure and have a more lasting significance beyond the lifespan of the imperial system. The propaganda had been diffused widely within the German right and disseminated to large sections of the electorate. Most significantly, the decision by conservative forces to adopt this message from the 1890s as a means of drawing support away from the anti-Semitic forces, only succeeded in providing anti-Semitism with a cloak of respectability. The anti-Semitic parties, however, must not be judged on either electoral performance or legislative accomplishments. Their actual importance lay elsewhere and principally in the links they enjoyed to the Mittelstand and nationalist movements and 'the way in which their poison spread into mainstream politics'.21

28

Origins and rise of the radical right

Nationalism The spirit of nationalism and the aspiration for a unified German state had featured prominently in most of the 39 German states in the 100 years following the French Revolution. Literature, politics and the arts had all addressed the issue but unification was finally realized not by words but by armed force in 1870. After unification nationalism and patriotism featured as binding forces within German society and owed much to the regime's efforts to foster a 'German identity' for the citizens of the new construct of Imperial Germany. This was necessary as the 'Second Empire' initially lacked many of the elementary symbols of a united people. To achieve this, patriotism was extensively encouraged in the school system. It became associated (particularly in northern Germany with the Hohenzollern dynasty through identification) with national symbols of Germanness, through specific public holidays, the national anthem (only in 1922), the flag (1892), the erection of statues and monuments to former German heroes, through the use of literature, and spread in university lecture halls across Germany. All were designed to make people feel proud of German achievements and German identity. That it worked by and large is not in doubt for by 1914 most citizens conceived of themselves as German (albeit with the notable exception of the Polish minority in the east). An overt and aggressive nationalism is usually a feature of the radical right and by the 1890s evidence already existed of a number of organizations which led the campaign for and pushed successive governments to adopt a much more assertive foreign policy that aspired to territorial acquisitions and greater military potential as befitted a great power. Such groups became more popular and vocal and, in retrospect, played a role in creating distrust abroad and antagonizing Britain, France and Russia, propelling Germany towards a war trajectory in 1914 and influencing government policy in the closing years of the Kaiserreich after 1916. The assertiveness of German nationalist movements in the late 1890s and early 1900s was in part due to the traditional antagonism towards France, a growing rivalry with Britain and a fear of the Slavs in Russia and eastern Europe and in part was also fuelled internally by a need to undermine the looming threat of social democracy and any attempt to move towards a more democratic system. Who were these radical nationalists, where did they come from and why did they come to exert such influence on the German establishment? The key to understanding the rise of politically organized nationalism rests with the decline of the Liberal Party in the late 1870s and early 1880s and its efforts to reverse this trend particularly in the 1890s and beyond. The liberals had constituted the solid preference of the middle-class electorate in pre-unification Germany. They regarded themselves as the representative 29

The Radical Right in Germany

force of the people against governments and in this particular guise had served as an unofficial force of opposition. This factor largely explains their initial strength, but their position as a united political movement was undermined when many of their members opted to become political allies of Bismarck's new Germany and accept his political model. This alliance heralded the onset of a decline in the fortune of the liberals and this was further exacerbated when Bismarck abandoned them in 1879 in favour of an alliance with the conservatives. At this point the liberal movement split into two parties (with the more moderate wing, comprising the liberally minded nobility and middle classes, gravitating towards the right), but neither was able to stop the haemorrhaging of their support as the traditional middle-class support withered substantially in both the towns and the countryside, as table 2.1 illustrated, in favour of more nationalist-oriented forces. By the early 1890s the Liberal Party had dissolved into a series of smaller and locally or regionally specific groups. Liberalism across western Europe at this time was gravitating towards nationalism. 22 Germany was not to prove an exception as the national liberals, by now essentially a regional force across Protestant northern Germany, turned increasingly to nationalism. They became closely intertwined and involved with the flurry of new nationalist associations (nationale Verbande) and organizations that emerged from the late 1880s and were successful in attracting a sizeable minority of supporters from those either alienated from the extant political system or wishing to pressure the system into making certain policy decisions. The Colonial Society was the first such organization to emerge in 1887 and it campaigned for the acquisition of territories overseas to put Germany on a par with her continental neighbours. In reality and as a 'belated nation' there were few remaining opportunities for further colonization, with the exception of parts of southern and central Africa. On acquiring rather barren areas such as German South West Africa in the 1880s the government's enthusiasm rapidly dwindled as the economic benefits such areas offered were extremely limited and as it threatened to damage relations with Great Britain and France. It was nevertheless of psychological and political importance. The Colonial League was quickly followed by a succession of similar style groups that specifically aimed to champion German culture, language and achievement. Of these the most noticeable were the Pan-German League in 1891, the Society for the Eastern Marches in 1894, the Navy League in 1898, the Society for Germandom Abroad (1881), the Imperial League to Combat Social Democracy (1904), the Patriotic Book League (1908) and the Defence League in 1912. Most rapidly developed the machinery of modern political life from dissemination of their own newsletters to regular conference gatherings and meetings across Germany. They attracted much notoriety and, indeed, curiosity. 30

Origins and rise of the radical right

The leaders of the majority of these nationalist organizations were dissatisfied middle-class activists and often former liberals. These aspirant nationalist forces can be subdivided into different categories; for example, some simply represented single-issue pressure groups, whereas others sought to advance Germany and German civilization on all fronts. Some, such as the veterans' associations, were de facto paramilitary organizations while some were nothing more than small fringe political parties. All were linked by a nationalist bond and they quickly emerged as the principal vehicles of radical and nationalist right-wing parties. Despite their often conflicting objectives all demonstrated a 'symptom of escalating political participation, especially on the part of the professional middle class' and the first generation of people who grew up in the Kaiserreich.23 These radical nationalists constituted a new form of political mobilization and although these parties by themselves were relatively small, with the exception of the Navy League, all operated as a useful reservoir for the national liberals in terms of activists and ideologues who helped to promote the nationalist agenda in the press and among the middle-class electorate. Although far removed from constituting a 'mass movement', 'the populism of the nationalist pressure groups made them home to a new kind of radical nationalist', represented significant proportions of public opinion and as such helped to radicalize the agenda of the German right and narrowed the choice and freedom of action for successive governments particularly in the field of foreign affairs. 24 The Navy League provides an excellent case study.25 In 1870 the naval power of the united Germany was negligible, but the growing recognition of the importance of sea power in overall military strategy led Admiral von Tirpitz to orchestrate plans for the development of a sizeable German fleet that were enshrined in the Navy acts of 1898 and 1900. The ambitious policy of a substantially enhanced naval capacity was presented as another means to enhance and reinforce Germany's position as a great power and simultaneously to challenge Britain's supremacy on the high seas. It must be regarded as part of Chancellor Biilow's Weltpolitik initiative launched in 1897 as a means to secure a place in the sun for Germany and also as a means 'to reconcile, pacify, rally, unite, and woo support. It sought to nurture middle class support, to attract the sympathy of the Centre party and to halt the rise of the SPD.' However, it should be noted that although primarily designed for domestic consumption any moves towards a more robust and assertive foreign policy threatened the stability of German relations with the outside world. The plans for a sizeable German fleet played a part in the deteriorating relations between Berlin and London and was one of the factors responsible for pushing the latter rather unexpectedly to conclude an entente with both 31

The Radical Right in Germany

France (in 1902) and Russia (in 1907). Nevertheless, in Germany the idea proved popular with the public and the Navy League quickly developed into a mass movement comprising 330,000 fee-paying members and some 770,000 affiliated members. The rudimentary purpose behind the Navy League was to apply continued pressure on the government to enlarge the size of and upgrade the fleet. The League at the turn of the century was in place to rally all patriotic forces to the support of the Kaiser and his government's naval and world policy, but as with many of these right-wing associations it gradually underwent a radicalization process. By 1908/9 a new generation of radical nationalists had assumed control and advanced a fundamental critique of the government's policy and position. It demanded a much more expansive ship-building plan. This was far from being an isolated case and reflected a growing confidence in the years leading up to August 1914 for radical right associations to challenge the government directly. Some such as the Alldeutscher Verband (Pan-German League) found their agenda being absorbed and pursued by the imperial government during the war. The Pan-German League is the most infamous of all the radical right associations. It was founded in 1891 in furious response to Chancellor Caprivi's abandonment of the colony of Zanzibar (which he swapped with Britain for Heligoland) but soon expanded its programme to incorporate a whole range of ultra-nationalist and expansionist demands. It depicted itself as a force above politics that was intent on upholding the national interest while simultaneously portraying itself as an alternative force of opposition to what it deemed the policies of moderation conducted by the governments both of Bulow (1894-1906) and Bethmann Hollweg (1908-16). Domestically, the Pan-German League opposed all notions of democratic reform and championed the promotion of German culture and tradition. With regard to the latter it complemented the Society for the Eastern Marches. This organization was established in 1894 principally in reaction to Chancellor Caprivi's (1890-94) conciliatory Polish policy to accommodate the Polish minority in German Silesia, West Prussia and Posen. The Society resisted all efforts and any hint of minor concessions with regard to the official use of the Polish language. Instead, it demanded compulsory migration to these parts of Germany and demanded the use of German in all schools. Although the Pan-German League's membership never reached the heights of the Navy League (with some 40,000 members in 1914) it managed to wield considerable influence in government circles. The Pan-German League was dominated largely by conservatives at the outset, but proved particularly attractive to academics and former liberal supporters and large sections of the business community. Once Heinrich Class had assumed the leadership 32

Origins and rise of the radical right

of the Pan-German League in 1908 a noticeable radicalization became apparent as it adopted an extreme form of nationalism and delivered a much stronger anti-Semitic rhetoric. Essentially, Class and his cohort believed that war with Britain was inevitable, even desirable, if Germany were to assume a dominant role in world affairs. The League continued to apply pressure on the government to adopt a much tougher imperialist strategy that aspired to territorial annexation. Class was not only prepared to criticize the government, but significantly also prepared to heap extensive criticism on the role of Wilhelm II. On the one hand, such direct reproach of the Kaiser in his 1912 work, 'Wenn ich der Kaiser ware', reveals the degree to which the Pan-German League felt confident enough to tackle authority, but, on the other, it also reveals the degree to which an emerging radical right found the Kaiser to be an ineffectual leader. The government found itself having to compete with the Pan-German League. As Chancellor Bulow's resistance to any suggestion of a more militant foreign policy came under perpetual attack from both the liberals and the conservatives the Reich government felt compelled after 1911 to embrace a much more imperialist-driven agenda that saw her strengthen her ties with Austria-Hungary and Turkey to alleviate any further political decline. By 1912 Europe had been divided into two armed camps. Mutual distrust, envy and ambition all combined to push Europe into war in 1914 and the radical right in Germany played a significant role in this regard by politicizing issues and stirring up popular discontent. How significant the radical right was in this process has long divided historians. Authors such as Wehler argue that the government of Imperial Germany was more manipulative than earlier historians had assumed and that the elite had attempted to maintain its ascendancy and position through recourse to demagogy and other weapons and policies to be found in the arsenal of mass politics. For Wehler, the primacy of domestic policy was the locomotive that determined foreign policy. Bismarck had attempted to woo the favour of a mass audience through the adoption of a progressive and substantive social security provision, improvements to the education system and by repeated efforts to portray the socialists and the Catholic Church as enemies of the Reich. Despite such efforts large sections of the population remained untouched by growing German prosperity and the attempt to consolidate the masses took its most extreme form in the foreign policy arena from the belated rush for colonies in the 1880s to the outbreak of war in 1914. This brand of 'social imperialism' is appealing. Fischer interpreted the move to war in 1914 as a calculated move to win support for the government and the political system and to thwart the ambitions of the left. 33

The Radical Right in Germany

Wehler's view of the primacy of social policy was far from universally accepted and for many authors was prone to some degree of overexaggeration. 26 Such a thesis is alluring and although it certainly holds some elements of truth, it is arguably too simplistic. An alternative argument places emphasis on the politics 'from below'.n In other words, it stresses the role and significance of localities, regions and activists who although they may not have featured on the national stage or in any of its institutions were nevertheless able to shape political debate and direction. There is much to support their reasoning when the role and the emergence of the radical right, the anti-Semitic demagogues and political mavericks are considered. These individuals and organizations brought certain issues to the fore of public debate, gave them credence and began a process of political mobilization. On occasions, the interests of government and the nationalist extraparliamentary organizations sometimes conveniently overlapped, as proved to be the case with the Navy League and, as such, were warmly greeted by the government (note, further, its efforts to win support from such groups during the 1907 election). On other occasions, interests diverged to such a degree that the government deemed such organizations as both annoying (with prolonged criticism of government inaction, for example, in the second Moroccan exercise of 1911 and even the emperor's bluster) and disruptive. This was particularly the case where its room for manoeuvre in the outside world was strictly limited as, for example, over demands for colonies and the incorporation of other Germans into the Reich. By 1914 the political model of government that Bismarck had established was facing increasing strain and internal turmoil as the forces of the SPD which had become the largest party in the Reichstag after the 1912 elections demanded parliamentary and electoral reform. Bismarck had secured German political unification on his terms and had ensured that power in the new Second Reich remained in the hands of the ruling Prussian elite. Bismarck had neither attempted nor wished even to contemplate the idea of a parliamentary form of government. Yet, herein lay the problem. Germany was changing rapidly in both economic and social terms. In Britain and France, both also undergoing rapid industrialization, the creation of more flexible parliamentary democracies had to a reasonable extent dampened more radical demands for substantial social and political change. Germany, which was far from united in social terms given the freshness of this entity and the number of internal tensions between different societal factions from the powerful vested interests - big landowners, the officer corps, upper strata of the state bureaucracy, the economic ally of puissant upper middle classes and the emerging force of socialism - was far more exposed. 34

Origins and rise of the radical right

The velocity of Germany's economic development in the last quarter of the nineteenth century only intensified the necessity and inevitability of political reform. To understand the origins and constituency of the radical right it is necessary to appreciate the rapidly changing social effects brought about through the process of industrialization. This exposed the problems and competing interests within the German system. There were essentially three broad churches of conflicting opinion on the future shape and direction of the German state during the Empire. The first, in the form of the conservatives and the Prussian parliament, favoured the maintenance of the existing political system. The second, comprising the left liberals and the social democrats, favoured moves towards the democratization of German society. The rise of the radical right, the third forum of conflicting opinion, stems from the disaffection and massive expansion of the middle classes and a drastic radicalization of their ideology and general political style after 1870, but more particularly after 1890. 28 These volkish nationalists came to embody a new strain within German politics. They emerged to espouse what are generally now deemed to be the tenets of contemporary right-wing extremism, i.e. the promotion of an aggressive nationalism, an overt anti-Semitic and racist programme, an ardent belief in militarism and imperialism, an aversion towards socialism and Marxism and rejection of pluralist and democratic political order. Their ideas were to permeate German society and have wide-ranging implications for German history. The ideas of the radical right in twentieth-century Germany originated within the timeframe of Imperial Germany. Ultra-nationalist and racist ideas all helped to consolidate the right, intensify its hatred of opponents both within and outside the Reich and pushed the establishment towards a much more bellicose foreign policy agenda that ultimately led to war in 1914. The greatest impact of the radical right was felt during the Great War itself.

Germany at war: the ascendant radical right Academic debate has long sought to unravel the causes of the First World War and the extent of German culpability for the outbreak of hostilities in August 1914.H The road to war was not preordained and cannot directly be attributed as the end result of German unification. Events could have taken a different course. The reality, however, of 1914 Europe was the existence of two major European power blocs: the triple entente of Great Britain, France and Russia and the triple alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. Existing rivalries between the actors in Europe and abroad from the Boer War (1899-1902) to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in June 1914 had all exacerbated tension and provided the 35

The Radical Right in Germany

backdrop for the sudden and unnecessary descent into war. Fearing that she had the most to lose without war and the most to win upon a successful outcome, Germany was largely responsible for orchestrating war. Debates have raged about German territorial ambitions and whether the war amounted to simple defensive self-preservation or whether it was an offensive quest for European and world supremacy, whether Germany's real enemies lay to the west, or whether they were in the east. War was seen by some Germans, notably government, soldiers, diplomats and, above all, the members of radical right organizations such as the Pan-German League, as a valuable means of advancing German territorial and business interests, a means of quelling internal dissent and thwarting the left, uniting the nation and, of course, maintaining popular approval for the imperial system and the status quo. The outbreak of war certainly unified most of the nation in support of what was generally viewed by the public as a defensive war waged to secure Germany's survival against aggressive foes. Political parties and trade unions all rallied to the cause and led to a political truce (the Burgfrieden) that temporarily suspended differences between the political parties. This euphoria, the gamble of war and the sustainability of the Burgfrieden all rested on a short and victorious campaign based on the Schlieffen Plan that was essentially designed to knock out France quickly.lo The rapid six-week victory did not materialize and the military forces of the combatants became bogged down in the trenches where, despite occasional and sporadic offensives from both sides, they remained for the duration of the four-year war. Whereas stalemate prevailed in the west (and led to eight million casualties on both sides), taking great strides forward in the east Germany soon controlled vast swathes of territory from the Baltic to the Balkans. In terms of domestic activities the concept of the Burgfrieden had proven problematic from the outset for both political extremes and by 1915 this concept of domestic unity was being openly rejected by many on the conservative and radical right who were not prepared to reconcile themselves with the democratic objectives of the SPD and the left's activities in this direction in the Reichstag. To combat the socialists the right resorted to a series of policies that were intended to preserve their model of society and to resist all the SPD's efforts, for example, to abolish Prussia's electoral law. The right's loathing of socialism became intertwined with an upsurge in anti-Semitic rhetoric and propaganda among all sections of the political right. In short, Germany's Jews were continually portrayed and vilified as the founders and the leading advocates of international socialism and as the war progressed and food shortages culminated in higher prices the opportunity was seized by the right, and particularly radical right forces such as the Pan-German League, to blame the Jews in their role as usurers. 36

Origins and rise of the radical right

Throughout the war the Pan-German League pursued a 'solution to the Jewish Question' that primarily involved removing the Jews from their alleged domination of certain industries including the banking, property and publishing sectors. 3l As the war progressed and the stalemate in the west intensified it was hoped that the appointment in August 1916 of Paul von Hindenburg as Chief of the Supreme Command would mark a change in Germany's fortunes. His appointment and that of General Erich Ludendorff to the oberste Heereseleitung (supreme command) or OHL ushered in a marked shift to the right in terms of the ambitious territorial policy objectives both visualized once the Siegfrieden (complete victory) had been achieved. In particular, Ludendorff had embraced many of the tenets of the radical right agenda and had become obsessed with racialist and reactionary doctrines and many of the war aims that the OHL were to pursue were exactly the same as those advocated by the Pan-German League. In terms of leadership Hindenburg and Ludendorff became the effective dictators of Imperial Germany.l2 Their 'dictatorship' had been made possible by the inability of the Kaiser to provide effectual leadership and after 1916 they relegated the Emperor to the sidelines. The OHL were in command of the country both politically and militarily and believed that their survival and that of their world depended on complete and total victory. By the close of 1916 the conservative right had become much closer in style, position and rhetoric to the radical right. Both shared an overt antipathy towards democratic reform and their concept of total military victory was bound up with plans to reinforce the legitimacy of the German political system prior to 1914. To this end the OHL actually mobilized radical right elements and associations within German society to support the aims of complete victory and the planned territorial expansion. 3l The Fatherland Party (VaterlandsPartei) also illustrated the conservative right's shift. Founded by Admiral Tirpitz and Wolfgang Kapp, with Hindenburg's approval in September 1916, this party which was largely led and funded by heavy industry campaigned tirelessly for the Siegfrieden. It proved extremely popular and quickly outstripped the SPD in terms of membership and represents the first prime example of the anti-parliamentary right finding a mass following. With the Kaiser sidelined the one remaining potential obstacle to OHL plans remained the Chancellor, Bethman-Hollweg. Although BethmanHollweg was widely vilified by all sections of the right, as a skilled politician he was aware of the larger picture and the growing unease about the progress of the war especially among the left in German society. To maintain the existing broadbased support across the entire political spectrum for the war effort he opted to inject greater democracy into the system. To this end, he managed to get the Kaiser to agree to initial political reforms, including 37

The Radical Right in Germany

the abolition of the Prussian three-class voting system and was responsible for persuading the Reichstag to introduce equal suffrage in Prussia. These measures and the Chancellor's initial soundings about the possibility of negotiating a compromise peace settlement had outraged the OHL and the radical right and compelled Hindenburg and Ludendorff to demand that the Kaiser replace the Chancellor with one whom they could effectively control. Wilhelm II reluctantly agreed and appointed Georg Michaelis as BethmanHollweg's successor in 1917. The realities of this switch were played down in Germany because if 'the OHL becomes identified by the people with the Pan-Germans, it will be discovered that the Chancellor has been robbed of all freedom of manoeuvre both abroad and home by the generals, then resistance to the system of military rule will commence and spell the beginning of the collapse'. Nevertheless, the OHL were in full control. The OHL had ensured the victory of nationalism over monarchism and of those who advocated the Siegfrieden over those trying to preserve the Burgfrieden. Capable military leaders both Hindenburg and Ludendorff may have been but they lacked the necessary political antennae and knowledge of geopolitics. In 1917 both failed to realize the significance of the Russian Revolution and the excellent opportunity it presented to sue for a compromise peace with London and Paris. Instead, they decided to intensify their war effort, to demand increased production at home, to introduce compulsory labour service and to insist on other sacrifices from an already war-weary and undernourished population and escalated their submarine war against the British which only succeeded in drawing the United States into the coalition against Germany.l4 Despite the collapse of Russia and the huge territorial gains conferred on Germany by the harsh Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 the arrival of the USA had swung the pendulum of victory against Germany. It was against this backdrop that Ludendorff launched the last major German offensive (Operation Michael) in the west in March before American troops had arrived to bolster French and British positions. Although initially successful this push westward had once again failed by July 1918 and an ensuing allied counter-offensive left Germany reeling, signalled the beginnings of the end for the OHL's military ambitions and culminated in Germany's appeal to the USA to help negotiate an end to the war and, thus, preserve the integrity of the Reich and the political system. Although US President Woodrow Wilson agreed to undertake such negotiations his adamant position was that he was only prepared to engage with the representatives of the German people and neither autocrats nor the military were to set the stage for the democratization of Germany. The constitution of the Reich was amended to make the chancellor subject to the Reichstag, a new transitional democratic government under Prince 38

Origins and rise of the radical right

Max von Baden took the reins of power and in October 1918 Germany became a parliamentary monarchy. Wilhelm II, shocked by defeat, demanded Ludendorff's resignation, but was himself forced to abdicate on 9 November 1918 amid public anger, naval mutinies and widespread civil unrest and fled to Holland. Two days later the armistice began. By the end of the war the OHL and the radical right were hardly distinguishable in terms of policy objectives and outlook. Rather than salvaging the Bismarckian order the war which they essentially had orchestrated and mismanaged from blunder to blunder, not only destroyed this system and toppled the Emperor, but also ushered in those actors and ideas that the war had been designed largely to prevent, namely the advance of socialism and the demands for democratic government. The radical right watched as power moved towards the left and into the hands of the social democrats, who, as a constituent assembly, drew up a democratic constitution. For many, including Ludendorff, the radical right agenda may not have been realized but defeat was regarded as a merely temporary setback. Many on the right were quite prepared to let the Social Democrats gain power in the belief that the left would be held responsible by the public for Germany's difficulties in the post-war period, beginning with the Treaty of Versailles and the reparations bill. The environment was being created for the radical right to breathe again and to pursue their ambitions for a second time. Indeed, in this climate, the right intended to blame the left for Germany's defeat and prepare for a revolution from above to restore many of the values and structures of the pre-1914 world.

Conclusions This chapter began by posing the question of continuity between the ambitions of the right in Imperial Germany and its successor regimes. How far can the theoretical origins of National Socialism be traced back to a series of 'intellectual' ideas disseminated during the Kaiserreich? To what extent can themes of continuity be explored through notions of an industry/ government coalition that sought to undermine efforts both to democratize and modernize Germany politically? Did the emergence of numerous radical right, nationalistic, militaristic and essentially proto-fascist associations under the Kaiserreich prepare the ground for later groups to build on? Tracing the evolution of the radical right from 1870 enables us to isolate some of the instrumental facts and ideological tenets that come to shape the progression and character of the extreme right after 1919. The starting point is the serious shortcomings of the political system established by Bismarck for, although pursuing his prime objective of preserving aristocratic and conservative tradition and rules, the system was simply not geared to 39

The Radical Right in Germany

meet the demands of a new aspirant middle class and a more vocal working class. On the contrary, it was largely designed to frustrate any moves towards democratic and parliamentary reform. This had several repercussions for future developments. On the one hand, by resisting and castigating democracy the regime sowed doubts in the minds of many Germans about the desirability of parliamentary and representative governance that came to resonate among a wide audience in the electorate in the 1920s and early 1930s. On the other, it gave rise to the birth and upsurge of a multitude of nationalist associations striving to find and foster a German identity and purpose. This included augmenting criticism of non-Germans and especially to numerous cases of anti-Semitism which flourished in the closing years of the First World War. lS After 1890 we see a radicalization of the far right agenda which, in less than a generation, has been absorbed by the conservative forces as a means of seeking their own survival in electoral terms and a final misguided but intentional effort to resist ongoing pressures for democratic government through recourse to full-scale European war. Military defeat brings about democratic government and the demise of conservative supremacy, but it neither diminishes nor eradicates the agenda of the radical right. Both the anti-democratic sentiment and the nationalist agitation of Imperial Germany provided fertile soil and roots for the next phase of right-wing radicalism which flourishes after 1919 and the descent into political extremism that becomes characterized by intimidation, persecution, murder, war and genocide. It is to these that this study now turns.

Notes 1 For a series of general works on this period of German history see W. Carr, A History of Germany 181S-194S, London, 1987; G. A. Craig, Germany 1866-194.5, Oxford, 1981; G. Mann, The History of Germany since 1789, London, 1968; Wolfgang Mommsen, Imperial Germany 1867-1918: Politics, Culture and Society in an Authoritarian State, London, 1995; Hans Ulrich Wehler, The German Empire, Leamington Spa, 1985. 2 For works on Bismarck see Edward Crankshaw, Bismarck, London, 1981; Erich Eyck, Bismarck and the German Empire, London, 19S0. 3 The population of Germany soared from 30 million in 1870 to 68 million in 1914. A large part of this rise was due to better hygiene and the arrival of new drugs. Germany's economic growth was exacerbated by the flight from the country to the cities, particularly in the industrial belt of the Ruhr valley. The population shifts were substantial. By 1910 two-thirds of all Germans were living in towns with around 20% residing in Germany's 48 cities. 4 Peter Pulzer, Germany 1870-194.5, Oxford, 1997, p. 16. S Brett Fairburn, 'Political mobilisation' in R. Chickering (ed.) Imperial Germany: A Historiographical Companion, London, 1996, p. 306.

40

Origins and rise of the radical right

6 For further details on the Kaiser see Michael Balfour, The Kaiser and his Times, Boston, 1964; J. c. G. Rohl and N. Sombart (eds) Kaiser Wilhelm IT: New Interpretations, Cambridge, 1982; J. c. G. Rohl, Young Wilhelm: The Kaiser's Early Life, 1859-1888, Cambridge, 1998. 7 The middle classes were generally sympathetic to such initiatives and assumed the guise of a junior government partner. In employment terms they benefited from the extension of a now expanding administrative system which led them away from any contemplation of a confrontation with the military. Their support for the government's moves also stemmed from their very real fears of the left. 8 Volker Berghahn, Imperial Germany 1871-1914, Oxford, 1994, p. 228. This organization developed a popular demagogic style, was very well organized and sought to influence public opinion through frequent country-wide tours and numerous pamphlets. It came to establish very close links with the old right and by 1914 had some 330,000 members. For further information see S. R.Tirell, German Agrarian Politics after Bismarck's Fall: The Formation of the Farmers' I"eague, New York, 1951; G. Eley, 'Anti-Semitism, agrarian mobilisation, and the Conservative Party: radicalism and containment in the founding of the Agrarian League 1890-3' in L. E. Jones and J. Retallack (eds), Between Reform, Reaction, and Resistance: Studies in the History of German Conservatism from 1789 to 1945 Oxford, 1993, pp. 187-227. 9 Geoff Eley, Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and Political Change after Bismarck, Yale, 1980, pp. 1-13. 10 Geoffrey Eley, 'The German right, 1860-1945: how it changed' in Geoffrey Eley, From Unification to Nazism: Reinterpreting the German Past, Boston, 1986, pp. 231-53. 11 J. Retallack, Notables of the Right: The Conservative Party and Political Mobilisation in Germany 1876-1918, Boston, 1988. 12 Geoffrey Eley, 'The German right, 1860-1945: how it changed' in Geoffrey Eley, From Unification to Nazism: Reinterpreting the German Past, Boston, 1986, p. 238. 13 F. B. Tipton, 'Technology and industrial growth' in R. Chickering (ed.) Imperial Germany: A Historiographical Companion, London, 1996, p. 64. 14 For further information on the concept of cultural despair see Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair, Berkeley, 1961. This work argues that cultural despair arose from opposition towards the emerging urban and industrial world and contains notions of anti-modernism and romanticism. It is interesting but needs to be approached with caution when examining perceptions of the middle class. Certainly clear dissatisfaction existed in this stratum with the rapid progress, but this was based far more on fears of economic decline and political concerns over the rise of the SPD than any deeper cultural concerns. 15 Among various works see R. Chickering, We Men who feel most German, London, 1984; P. Kennedy and A. J. Nicholls (eds) Nationalist and Racialist movements in Britain and Germany before 1914, London, 1981. 16 For an account of the Jewish-German community in the course of German history see L. Sievers, Juden in Deutschland, Berlin, 1983; 1. Elbogen and E. Sterling, Die Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland, Wiesbaden, 1982. For specific information on the Imperial period see P. Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, New York, 1964; P. Gay, Freud, Jews and Other Germans, Oxford, 1978; M. Kaplan, The Making of the Jewish Middle Class, New York, 1991; W. Hagen, Germans, Poles andJews, Chicago, 1980; R. Blanke, Prussian Poland in the German Empire 1871-1914, Boulder, 1981.

41

The Radical Right in Germany

17 The number of people involved in agriculture declined from 42% to 28% between 1888 and 1907. 18 Pulzer, Germany 1870-1945, p. 39. 19 Geoffrey Field, Evangelist of Race: The Germanic Vision of Houston Stewart Chamberlain, New York, 1981. 20 One of the best sources for the political activities of the anti-Semites can be found in R. S. Levy, The Downfall of the Anti-Semitic Political Parties in Imperial Germany, New Haven, 1975. 21 David Blackbourn, The Long Nineteenth Century, The Fontana History of Germany 1870-1918,London, 1997,p. 439. 22 Wolfgang Mommsen, Imperial Germany 1867-1918: Politics, Culture and Society in an Authoritarian State, London, 1995, pp. 64-5. 23 Pulzer, Germany 1870-1945, p. 66. 24 Brett Fairburn, 'Political mobilisation' in R. Chickering (ed.) Imperial Germany: A Historiograpbical Companion, p. 333. 25 1. N. Lambi, The Navy and German Power Politics, London, 1984. 26 See works cited above, for example, by Eley and Evans. 27 David Blackbourn, The Long Nineteenth Century, The Fontana History of Germany 1870-1918, London, 1997. 28 Geoffrey Eley, 'The German right, 1860-1945: how it changed' in Geoffrey Eley, From Unification to Nazism: Reinterpreting the German Past, p. 117. 29 Volker R. Berghahn, lmperial Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, London, 1993; Roger Chickering, Germany and the Great War 1914-1918, Cambridge, 1998; Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War, London, 1967. 30 See L. C. F. Turner, 'The significance of the Schlieffen Plan' in Paul M. Kennedy (ed.) The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914, London, 1979. 31 See Abraham]. Peck, Radicals and Reactionaries: The Crisis of Conservatism in Wilhelmine Germany, Washington DC, 1978, pp. 186-202. 32 Martin Kitchen, The Silent Dictatorship. The Politics of the German High Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 1916-1918, London, 1976. 33 M. S. Seligmann and R. R. McLean, Germany from Reich to Republic 1871-1918, London, 2000. 34 Lothar Burchardt, 'The impact of the war economy on the civilian population of Germany during the First and Second World Wars' in Wilhelm Deist (ed.) The German Military in the Age of Total War, Leamington Spa, 1985. 35 Jack Werthheimer, Unwelcome Strangers: East European Jews in Imperial Germany, New York, 1987.

42

Chapter 3

Pushing to extremes: the radical right in Weimar Germany. 1919-33 In November 1918 the German population was totally unprepared for defeat in the First World War. On the contrary, it had been led by the governmentcontrolled press and the forces of the right to expect a complete German victory (Siegfrieden) and to reap the material and territorial benefits that would accompany it. The final realization that the war had been lost instigated real dismay, frustration and bitterness across many sections of the German populace, which had made the sacrifices demanded of it by the conservatives after 1916. It may be interesting to speculate whether the outcome for the forces of organized conservatism could have been so very different, had they agreed to introduce the series of far-reaching reforms that would almost certainly have won the backing of the more progressive minded forces to transform Germany into a parliamentary monarchy. Recourse to such action could possibly have prevented the naval mutinies in Kiel and Bremerhaven in October 1918 and the revolutions that rocked Germany and were accompanied by the creation of Bolshevik-style city councils in several major German cities including Berlin, Hamburg and Dresden from November 1918 to early 1919. However, such speculation presupposes that the OHL were minded to move in this direction when the reality was that it was never prepared to tolerate any such move that threatened to undermine its influence and hold on power. The decision to initiate democratic reforms in September 1918 must be regarded merely as a cynical attempt to secure a more lenient peace settlement from the victors. In any case with the belated, sudden and unexpected reality that defeat was imminent the wider public moved to demand more concrete and radical changes to the future structure of German government. Events accelerated rapidly and culminated in the forced abdication of the Kaiser and the end of all the German monarchies. The demise of Imperial Germany marked the second opportunity (after the revolutions of 1848) in German history for the initiation of democratic government. As the majority party in the Reichstag the responsibility for forming the new government of the republic fell on the SPD, the largest 43

The Radical Right in Germany

political force in November 1918, and its pre-eminent role in the new state was confirmed by the outcome of the National Assembly elections in January 1919 (in which it polled 37.9 per cent). With hindsight the short 14-year existence of the new regime has often led to its being portrayed as a temporary and transitory phenomenon and as one which from the outset faced considerable challenges. It certainly did, but these initial difficulties for the new democratic state were not of its own making, but were bequeathed as an enduring and detrimental legacy from Imperial Germany. I These difficulties surfaced in the form of, at best, lukewarm support from the army for the new order; a series of economic and financial problems emanating from the war; an impossibility of meeting the expectations of the German people and an outright rejection of this new government by sections of the electorate on the right of the political spectrum. Against this background it is not surprising that the constitutional settlement for the new Weimar Republic amounted to a compromise, 'which reflected the social and ideological divisions of the country' and which very quickly began to unravel, culminating in Adolf Hitler's coming to power in January 1933. 2 The history of this second attempt at democracy in Germany can be divided into three distinct periods. In the first (from 1919 to 1923) a succession of SPD-Ied governments grappled to tackle the tremendous problems arising from Germany's military defeat in 1918. These included dealing with the sudden demobilization of six million soldiers, mounting debt problems, serious shortages of both food and raw materials, insurrections in West Prussia, an influx of refugees from Alsace-Lorraine and former territories lost to Poland and the onset of political violence. In marked contrast, the second period, from 1924 until 1929, presented as a period of relative stabilization in terms of the economy and political life and a return to normalcy. The so-called 'Golden Years' gave way, however, to the third period, from 1930 to 1933, when Germany was ravaged by economic recession, political life polarized into the extremes of both left and right, ultimately destroying parliamentary democracy, easing moves to authoritarian rule and bringing the radical right under National Socialism to power. In short, Germany experienced three completely different systems of government in fewer than 15 years as the country moved from imperial rule to democratic government and right-wing dictatorship. In each the right underwent a period of radicalization. This chapter accounts for the further radicalization of right-wing politics in Germany during the Weimar Republic. It explores how the forces of the old or conservative right adjusted to a new political order and how they responded to the emergence of a more dynamic, image conscious and popular force on the radical right and places specific emphasis on the emergence of the German National Socialist Workers' Party (Nationalsozialistische 44

Pushing to extremes

Deutsche Arbeiterpartei) that came to dominate Germany, wreak havoc on Europe and become the epitome of right-wing extremism.

The conservative right in the Weimar Republic, 1919-25 This new political entity was conceived at a time of national crisis. Many on the conservative right retained a loyalty to and a nostalgia for the previous order with some even hoping and preparing for the return of an authoritarian regime while a small minority conceived a new and different order based not so much on class distinctions but rather on race. On the one hand, the creation of this new democratic regime represented a decisive break in the continuity of German government as it ushered in a new breed of politician which led to the sequestration of the traditional power and patronage of the old right (comprising the conservative, aristocratic and large landowning circles) in favour of the forces that Bismarck had once labelled as the enemies of the state, namely the catholics (Centre Party), the Social Democratic Party (the SPD), the German People's Party (DVP) and the German Democratic Party (DDP), the heirs of the old progressive tradition. On the other hand, the state administrative structure was maintained and senior civil servants, whose political sympathies lay on the right, remained in their posts and continued to run departments while the more radical plans for a restructuring of the economy were postponed by government. The instability of the early months of the new regime were replicated in the realm of foreign policy post-1918. The first major crisis occurred when the victors presented the German government with a draft version of the Versailles Treaty in May 1919. Any hopes that moves towards a fully fledged democracy might have wrought concessions from France, Great Britain, Japan, Italy and the United States proved illusory and all shades of German opinion reacted unanimously to condemn what they deemed an extremely harsh treaty that did not reflect the spirit of Woodrow Wilson's '14 Points'. The victors were unmoved and essentially presented the treaty as an ultimatum on 16 June 1919. Rather than signing the treaty the Scheidemann government resigned in July as a protest. The impact of this decision was limited and it fell to its successor SPD-Ied government under Gustav Bauer to sign the humbling Treaty of Versailles. 1 The 'Diktat' was designed as a means to protect France, but was strongly resented by the German people and became part of the ammunition used against the SPD by the radical right. 4 It might be interesting to speculate on German demands on France and Britain had Berlin won the war. In reality no German government of that time, irrespective of its political hue or orientation, would have been in any position to refute it. In many ways it became highly ironic 4S

The Radical Right in Germany

that the Versailles Treaty which had been designed to penalize the naked aggression and ambitions pursued by the rulers of Imperial Germany was ultimately to damage the image of the new government and certainly helped to destabilize the new political system. Public anger voiced itself in the elections to the Reichstag of June 1920 where support for the government parties fell sharply, depriving them of their overall majority in parliament which the pro-Weimar coalition would never muster again. The realities of military defeat, revolutions and the imposition of an 'unjust' peace settlement had all contributed to an extremely difficult birth for the Weimar Republic's credentials. Its problems were compounded by diplomatic isolation, the Belgian and French occupation of the Ruhr in 1922123 as a means of extracting German reparations repayments and the effects of the hyperinflation that rocked Germany in the autumn of 1923. The inability of the Weimar regime to counter these problems cast doubts on the democratic experiment in the minds of many Germans and, in the first and final phases of the Weimar Republic, led many to contemplate the political extremes of both right and left. When examining the extent of right-wing opposition to the new republic it is hard not to be struck by the number, range and variety of right-wing politics. The right can be divided under three distinct banners: the first was grouped around the powerful conservative forces of Imperial Germany that were represented politically by the DNVP and the large nationalist veterans' associations such as the Stahlhelm (Steel Helmet). The second comprised the numerous paramilitary groups, such as the Freikorps, that flourished in early post-war Germany and the third constituted the various volkisch groups whose origins lay in the pre-war period and which the NSDAP came to dominate. 5 The reputation of the right had not been seriously tarnished by the outcome of the war. On the contrary, the conservative right had skilfully deflected any criticism and responsibility for their part in preparing and directing (or rather misdirecting) the war effort and instead convinced many Germans through their creation of the Dolchsto{?legende (stab in the back legend) that the reasons for Germany's defeat lay firmly with treachery on the home front. Accordingly, defeat did not diminish the agenda of the right, but actually reinforced their convictions. After 1918, it is generally difficult to see clear blue water between the various groups on the right as all sections were united by a nationalistic fervour, an aversion to the new democracy and varying degrees of anti-Semitism. Such sentiments were reminiscent and essentially an extension of radical right thought that had existed prior to 1914. Germany's defeat in the war unleashed a wave of popular discontent, resentment and instability that fuelled the right's radicalization and popularity, particularly among the middle-class professions. 46

Push i ng to extremes

Given the substantial difficulties in this particular timeframe, the inability of the new regime to garner support was particularly acute in the countryside with both large landowners and small farmers. Opposition on the right towards the new regime also emanated from within the Protestant church and found a particular resonance in the universities. For all of Weimar's brief existence the right lambasted the system and took every available opportunity to decry its faults and inabilities to tackle the wide ranging problems of the Weimar period. Many on the right were firmly convinced that the left-wing and pro-regime parties were almost certain to incur the odium of the people in the early months of their existence. This expectation was encapsulated by the comments of one military plenipotentiary at the OHL who stated that it was widely expected that 'the storm of indignation of the people will fall on them !left-wing parties], and will enable the old order to 'get back in the saddle and continue to govern according to the old recipe'." When such expectations remained unfulfilled others engaged in discussions (certainly taking place by the end of the 1920s and the early 1930s) for the return to an authoritarian system of government and even, possibly, the return of the Hohenzollerns. Politically, the interests of the conservative right after the First World War were represented forcefully in the Reichstag by the Deutsche National Vaterland Partei (German National People's Party) or the DNVP that had arisen from the ashes of the two former conservative parties of Wilhelmine Germany and catered for many of the right-wing forces that had proliferated throughout the Imperial period, namely Junkers, Free Conservatives, AntiSemites, Christian Socialists, Pan-Germans and elements of the minority volkisch movement. Although its strongholds lay primarily to the east of the Elbe it succeeded in the early Weimar years in attracting support across many parts of northern Protestant Germany by positioning itself clearly against the democratic Republic; demanding a diminution of parliament's powers in favour of a more powerful president; renouncing the Versailles Treaty; asserting strong nationalist objectives; displaying elements of antiSemitism and expressing fervent anti-bolshevik sentiments. The realization for many (but by no means universally) in the party that any immediate chance of attaining power was rather improbable, and given its inability to influence Reich policy, encouraged its repositioning and by the mid-1920s the DNVP had matured sufficiently to act pragmatically and join a Reich coalition government in January 1925. Agrarian and industrial interests within the party were particularly prominent in compelling this change in party direction, but this decision to co-operate with the system was also facilitated after the election as Reich President in 1925 of the archconservative Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, who was also an honorary member of the right-oriented Stahlhelm. 7 47

The Radical Right in Germany

Although not a political party as such the Stahlhelm was a significant and indeed the largest nationalist association under Weimar. Its aims comprised the familiar and stereotypical tenets of the nationalist right and it promoted and formed part of a conservative revolution, or intellectual tradition, that encompassed anti-enlightenment, anti-pluralist, anti-liberal and anti-rational aspirations that traced its roots to the writings of Friedrich Nietzche. The right found itself in a political quandary in the Weimar years between those who were prepared to work within the system and those who opposed it outright. In this sense the difficulties within the DNVP over their relationship with the regime were reflected within the Stahlhelm. The prospect of growing political stability on the back of the increasing prosperity of Weimar's second phase was to prove short lived and illusory. The DNVP was never allowed by its more extreme elements, including Alfred Hugenberg, completely to abandon its anti-system credentials which once again came to the fore after 1928 as the emergence of a new wave of economic difficulties heralded the third and final phase of the Weimar Republic. By the late 1920s, however, the DNVP's former position as the voice of the right was in the process of being supplanted by a more dynamic, energetic and uncompromising force that was National Socialism.

Soldiers. revolts and putsches: an emerging militant right The history of the right in the Weimar Republic is one of division and almost constant rancour and one where it proved impossible to unite the moderates and the radicals under a single movement or banner. This reality is not that surprising as this has often been the hallmark of the far right in Germany. The right undergoes a further radicalization in the Weimar period that is characterized by the emergence of a series of organizations and associations which are prepared to use and instigate violence for political purposes. One of the first to appear was the paramilitary-styled Freikorps which seized the initiative presented by the savage reduction of the German army under the Versailles Treaty to become directly involved in skirmishes to defend Germans and German territory against Polish insurrection in Prussia's g eastern provinces. At its height in 1919 the Freikorps was highly influential in conservative circles and boasted some 200,000 members with most being ex-army, especially former young officers. Although Berlin was initially heavily dependent on the power and the abilities of the Freikorps which they paid to serve alongside the limited forces of the Reichswehr (army) to overcome a series of strikes that had been organized by the 'Red Armies' or workers in April 1920 and to topple the Raterepublik (Republic of Traitors) in Munich, the loyalties of the Freikorps and for that matter the army itself could never be taken for granted. 48

Pushing to extremes

The difficulties for the Reich government were brought into focus when Freikorps units participated in the abortive Kapp-Luttwitz putsch against the Reich government in March 1920. This putsch represented the first serious attempt to overthrow the democratically elected government and was led by Wolfgang Kapp, formerly one of the leaders of the Fatherland party and garnered the sympathy of many representatives of the old right, including former high-ranking army officers such as Ludendorff, civil servants and DNVP deputies. Few of these, however, were prepared to risk their political future on so half-baked an adventure and the coup collapsed once it failed to secure a wider support base across the country and following a government-orchestrated general strike that paralysed Berlin. The episode is significant as it underscored the potential threat posed by the German right. The assertiveness of the far right was in evidence in many parts of Germany and particularly acute in Bavaria where, for example, the Bund Bayern und Reich (Bavaria and Reich League) placed growing pressure on the Bavarian authorities to resist compliance with Germany's disarmament obligations and demanded the restoration of the Bavarian royal family and even contemplated the separation of Bavaria from the Reich until the threat posed by bolshevism had been countered. Their nationalist leanings were symptomatic of many right-wing groups and were reflected in a growing militancy that encapsulated the activities of groups such as the Bund Oherland which took part in fighting in the Ruhr and in Upper Silesia and assumed a new stage of escalation when the right-wing terrorist Organization Consul (which comprised mostly young and disaffected ex-officers) assassinated two of the Republic's strongest advocates, namely the Centre Party politician, Matthias Erzberger (who had signed the Versailles Treaty on behalf of the German government), in August 1921 and Walther Rathenau, the Jewish-German Foreign Minister, in June 1922. These more extreme organizations played an instrumental part in militarizing German politics and leaving some 300 people dead in the period between 1918 and 1922. The spiralling violence and growing public outrage towards the activities of the far right pushed the DNVP onto the defensive and led to the prohibition of many radical right parties across Germany except for the state of Bavaria which emerged as a sort of safe haven for the new extremist forces. The sympathy of the Bavarian state reflected the political disposition of Munich's traditional ruling conservative elite which had regained power after the brief interlude of the Munich Soviet Republic in 1919. This experience of the leftist regime intensified prejudices against the Weimar Republic and its democratic credentials within many sectors of the Bavarian state apparatus that looked more favourably on a large number of right-wing organizations which dedicated themselves to preserving law and order. It 49

The Radical Right in Germany

was against this backdrop that the fledgling Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei or the NSDAP was to emerge, flourish and stage the most ambitious and infamous of the right-wing coup attempts in this period on 8 November 1923. That year, 1923, was to prove a difficult one. In economic terms, the monetary system had all but collapsed in the wake of hyperinflation fuelled by the reparation payments and the continued French and Belgian occupation of the rich coal and iron deposits in the Ruhr area. 9 Domestically, there were renewed fears of a communist resurgence after the SPD formed a coalition with the KPD in the two industrial states of Saxony and Thuringia. These events marked the backdrop to Hitler's plans to topple the republican government. The first stage of the plan envisaged the capture of the entire Bavarian political leadership and the second, a march on Berlin to proclaim a new national Reich government, and although the first stage was accomplished successfully the planned coup quickly unravelled on the morning of 9 November when the troops opened fire on the marchers, killing 16 NSDAP members, only narrowly missing Hitler. In retrospect, the aftermath of the beerhall putsch marked a distancing between the forces of the conservative and extreme right. A common opposition to socialism and bolshevism had temporarily united these political forces, but this marriage of convenience had damaged the position and image of the former - certainly in Bavaria where the conservative right had re-established their former power base in 1919. 10 Both the Bavarian People's Party (Bayerische Volkspartei) or BVP and even the Catholic Centre Party which had been prepared to tolerate the activities of the NSDAP and other right-wing extremist groups now adopted a more critical response to these forces. Indeed, Gustav von Kahr, the Bavarian premier, sought to re-emphasize the differences between the two forces and hence vehemently to oppose the NSDAP more strongly than hitherto. The growing attractiveness of the more militant and dynamic right-wing organizations in the 1920s, when coupled with the DNVP's decision to join government coalitions, had come to undermine the DNVP's unity and electoral success. Indeed, its inability or unwillingness in succeeding years to assert a much more radical position culminated in numerous fissions and splits that enabled the NSDAP to assume the guise of the principal rightwing force in Germany. The significance of the DNVP in the rise of the NSDAP should not be underestimated as the former's rhetoric helped, albeit unintentionally, to legitimize the activities and antipathies of a number of fledgling and more violent and extreme right-wing movements. In this chapter the label of right-wing extremism is applied to the multitude and diversity of vOikisch organizations that emerged in the aftermath of the First World War. In terms of commonality the conservative forces and 50

Pushing to extremes

the small volkisch groups shared common tenets of belief: they were highly nationalistic, displayed strong anti-Semitic and anti-Marxist tendencies, were collectively united by their desire to destroy the democratic Republic and restore German pride. The manner in which the message was conveyed to their targeted audiences was remarkably different. Whereas the forces of the conservative right tried to base their arguments on a philosophical level and through the deployment of refined intellectual theories (such as those conveyed by Oswald Spengler and Moeller van den Bruck) which were principallya means to forge and foster solidarity, the proponents of the volkisch right opted for a more direct approach. They focused on simple slogans, made use of friendlfoe dichotomies, stirred up anger and resentment among their target audiences, usually in beer cellars. Their message was essentially a rather crude and bastardized amalgamation of ideas and issues that had become the familiar slogans of the radical right. Whereas before 1914 volkisch nationalism had been of strictly limited appeal to groups such as the Pan-German League (Alldeutscher Verband) and the Eastern Marches Association (Ostmarkenverein) it flourished under Weimar. By 1919 there were some 73 such groups in Germany. Most of these constituted nothing more than local organizations and few were to evolve beyond this level into regional or national parties. Groups were founded and disbanded, reconstituted and dissolved on a regular basis. There was little by way of consistency and such efforts as there were to realize greater cohesion were often impeded by SPD-led state governments, most notably in Prussia where the government had clamped down on these parties on account of their propensity towards acts of violence. There were, it must be noted, some notable exceptions such as the Thule Society and the German Nationalist Protection and Defiance Federation (Deutschvolkischer Schutz- und Trutz-Bund).11 The most distinguishing feature between the conservative and radical right centred on their general membership. Whereas the conservative right attracted a much older and upper-class generation the extreme right in contrast proved far more seductive to the younger generations. Their ranks were often swollen by students, young demobilized officers who were not prepared or could not easily adapt to a post-war world and large elements of the lower middle classes. All feared both the economic and political insecurity as well as the trenchant and ongoing activities of the extreme left. In retrospect, the events and after-effects of the First World War had radicalized German politics. Indeed, the Weimar period heralded the decline and gradual usurpation of the old conservative-styled and led DNVP (as illustrated in table 3.1) by a younger and more militant breed, such as Adolf Hitler, who cared little for a return to the old pre-1914 political order, but rather were intent on creating something totally new. 51

The Radical Right in Germany Table 3.1

Rise of political extremes: KPD and NSDAP, 1928-33

1928

KPD NSDAP Total number of seats

(May)

1930 (Sept)

54 (10.6%) 12 (2.6%)

(13.1%) 107 (18.3%)

89 (14.3%) 230 (37.3%)

66

184

219

77

1932 (July)

1932 (Nov) 100 (16.9%)

1933 (Mar)

(33.1%)

81 (12.3%) 288 (43.9%)

296

369

196

The Hitler putsch marked the end of the first phase of extreme right activity. In itself it may have ended in a fiasco, it may have even appeared an act of lunacy by a group of gangsters and fools, but it merited substantial and much needed publicity. It was ultimately the character and personality, charisma and the oratorical skills of Adolf Hitler that came to set the NSDAP apart from its volkisch rivals. These skills would again resurface at his trial in 1924 when Hitler skilfully portrayed himself as a defender of Germany and a national hero. Despite the serious nature of the charges there existed a mood of general sympathy for Hitler's nationalistic stance in Bavaria where the courts had a tendency to downplay the gravity of radical right activities and to hand down fairly lenient sentences. This predisposition towards the right was reflected in this case and the imposition of a rather modest nine-month incarceration. 12 Hitler made the most of this time to write Mein Kampf as a vehicle for promoting his vision of the future and reconstituted the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) into a more coherent political force. 13 For many authors National Socialism represents merely a continuation of Prussian ideals and objectives, that is a Germany, albeit 'a nation of gifted, vigorous people in which first Bismarck and then Kaiser William II and finally Hitler, aided by many a military caste and by many a strange intellectual', succeeded in inculcating 'a lust for power and domination, a passion for unbridled militarism, a contempt for democracy and individual freedom and a longing for authority, for authoritarianism' .14 There are certainly common tenets with regard to foreign policy objectives and it may be interesting, if unhelpful, to reflect on the course of German foreign policy had the Weimar Republic survived. Nevertheless, commonalities aside, the National Socialist government represented a new form of administration and leadership, one instilled with a clear strategy to establish a rejuvenated, puissant and ethnically pure German state. Such aspirations were to find their realization through euthanasia, murders and extermination programmes, and to culminate in war and further human misery and massive destruction.

52

Pushing to extremes

These events all lay in the future and are considered in subsequent chapters. Few, however, from the perspective of the early 1920s, could have predicted this outcome or the impact and enduring significance this party would have on the three succeeding generations of Germans born after 1945. But who was Hitler and to what extent did this party and its aims constitute a new radical force and further move to the right?

Moving to the right: the German National Socialist Workers' Party The NSDAP emerged from the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (DAP), or the German Workers' Party, that had been established by a Munich railwayman, Anton Drexler, in 1919. Initially it was just one of a number of volkischoriented parties thriving on feelings of injustice, a hatred towards the system and economic hardship and in all probability would have shared the fate of many of its rivals in either being consumed by larger and more active extreme right-wing forces or simply being pushed onto the periphery of insignificance and subsequent dissolution. This fledging party, however, possessed a unique and foremost asset in the form of one individual, Adolf Hitler. Possessed with political genius and his own self-belief and abilities Hitler, almost singlehandedly, through his speeches, his style of rhetoric and the popularity of his slogans, enabled this young party to distinguish itself from all its rivals. He became the star selling point. His use of words, his style of presentation and skilful choreography were geared very much towards his audience, designed to articulate their frustrations and give vent to their resentments and hatreds. He simply outshone all his contemporaries on the right. Adolf Hitler's early and formative years have been well documented and it is not the intention here to provide another narrative of them. ls That said the realities of his early life from his strict family background, his underachievement at school and his failure to pursue his intended career as an artist all certainly stoked his personal resentments against society as a whole. Without the intervention of the First World War his rather aimless existence would in all probability have gone unrecorded and undistinguished. The war transformed his existence. It brought him comradeship, a sense of purpose and a career. Progression through the ranks may have been impeded by his rather humble beginnings, but he did attain the rank of corporal and, most significantly, managed to secure the Iron Cross. In unison with many of his own generation the humdrum realities presented by the post-war world were not reassuring. The prospect of a return to civilian life symbolized an unwelcome reversion to the 'normality' of the pre-1914 period when his life had been dominated by feelings of complete ignominy and a total lack of self-esteem. Hitler wanted to maintain the bonds of camaraderie, loyalty

53

The Radical Right in Germany

and purpose and he was to find his vocation in agitation and opposition towards the new political system. He was not alone. Hitler's career as a right-wing agitator and later dictator formally commenced at the age of 30 with his first public speech to the DAP on 12 September 1919. Although Hitler's initial role was limited to co-ordinating its propaganda and delivering speeches it quickly became apparent that he was a good communicator. There may have been little new in the messages conveyed to his audiences which reflected the customary tenets of the far right, but the style of delivery made the impression. He rapidly understood his abilities and his significance for the party and was prone to staging tantrums and on occasions resignation threats to lay bare his opposition to project and ideas and in particular to any proposed merger with other volkisch groups. By 1921 he had captured the leadership of the NSDAP which he retained until his suicide in April 1945. Once installed he skilfully sought to present the party as a new, vibrant and revolutionary force that could steer Germany on a new and better course to prosperity and success. Some of the core of the NSDAP's later leadership, including Ernst Rohm, Heinrich Himmler and Herman Goring, all joined the party in these early years. Hitler's persona impacted on the political augmentation of the NSDAP. Membership in Bavaria, the stronghold of the Nazi party, and for a while after 1923 the only base, expanded from some 2,000 in 1921 to around 35,000 members by the mid-I920s. This growth also reflected the NSDAP absorption of its rivals. Bavaria was the stage for the first party rally in January 1923 and the location for the very first division of the SA or Sturm-Abteilung (albeit initially called the Gymnastic and Sports Section) in 1921. The SA rapidly surfaced as a familiar feature of the NSDAP's public activities. Its chief purpose was principally to protect party gatherings and disrupt those of other rival parties and anyone who dared criticize the leadership'S decisions. The SA was, in essence, a paramilitary organization and its readiness to engage in acts of violence was arguably a more appealing ingredient for many than the ideology itself. By the spring of 1922 there were some 40 regional NSDAP associations across Germany. The party's programme and ideas found their dissemination in the NSDAP's own weekly newspaper, the Volkischer Beobachter.16 Was this radical right force any different from its competitors? On the one hand, it can be argued that it is misleading to regard National Socialism as a distinctive doctrine. It was neither unique nor innovative in the German political landscape of the 1920s and the 1930s. On the contrary, many of the ideological components of Nazism comprised a hotchpotch of ideas and sentiment that by and large had encapsulated the familiar slogans that had been the focus of the radical right since the Kaiserreich. These were encapsulated in a range of nationalist aspirations for all to see and 54

Pushing to extremes

included: demands for a union of all Germans in a Greater Germany; selfdetermination for the German people; land and colonies; its racist emphasis on 'German blood' as the test for membership of the German state and thus, its rejection of the Jews; the prevention of any further immigration; the expulsion of all those non-Germans who had entered the Reich since 1914; and the notion of common good before individual good. However, on the other hand, the second part of the 25-point party programme proclaimed in a Munich beer cellar (Hofbrauhaus) on 24 February 1920 was distinctive as it espoused a series of more radical and socialist-inspired objectives which placed emphasis on such precepts as the nationalization of all publicly owned companies, the abolition of all monies earned during the war, profit sharing by large companies, the breaking of 'interest slavery' and substantive property and land reform. In short, the party programme constituted a mixture of both nationalist and anti-capitalist aspirations. It remained a minor and arguably fringe party in the early 1920s and although it is highly possible that something called National Socialism could have emerged without Hitler, it is almost certain that without him the particular course of history would have been rather different. The NSDAP's fate became inextricably bound up with Hitler. The party served as a vehicle principally to articulate his visions and aspirations and these ultimately shaped the party's programme in power. His outlook on the world (Weltanschauung) and the ideological platform of the Nazi Party are essentially proclaimed within Mein Kampf.17 In the early 1920s NSDAP agitation and propaganda centred on three predominant issues of anti-Semitism, overt nationalism and anti-capitalism, but only the first two remained clarion cries of the Nazi Party until the very end of its regime. In contrast, the strong anti-capitalist language was deemed counterproductive by Hitler in the medium to longer term and was gradually discarded, its supporters silenced and, in power, abandoned. From the viewpoint of 1924 the prospects of power must have seemed bleak, so how did this right-wing force break into mainstream politics, how far did it pursue an extreme agenda and how did it manage to overcome all other right-wing extremist forces, envelop much of the old right and gain access to the levers of power? In other words, how and what allowed the Weimar system to succumb to the appeal of the extreme right and the force of National Socialism?

Aspiring politicians, party organization and propaganda, 1924-28 With hindsight, the extreme right's ultimate triumph was the sum product of the inability of a succession of Reich governments successfully to thwart a series of crippling economic blows and to tackle public disaffection. Hitler's 55

The Radical Right in Germany

thinking after 1924 was essentially predicated on a gamble that the instability would eventually create the circumstances to challenge the republic. Ultimately the gamble paid off, but the signs at the outset looked far from promising. Hitler's release from prison at the end of 1924 coincided with the beginnings of the second phase of the Weimar Republic's history which saw the man emerge into a seemingly different economic and political landscape. This period saw the stabilization of the Mark, the onset of economic recovery and growth, augmented prosperity and a flowering of culture, particularly in the arts and theatre. In comparison to what preceded and succeeded these years it has often been tempting to label this period as the golden age of the Weimar Republic and certainly during this five-year interlude Weimar gave the impression of a more secure environment not only internally; in the field of foreign policy Germany re-established international acceptance and recognition through the Locarno Pact of 1925 with Britain and France, its acceptance into the League of Nations and the withdrawal of Belgian and French troops from the Ruhr. Moreover, it solved the problem of hyperinflation, put its finances on a firmer footing with the Dawes Plan and obtained international credits amounting to some 25.5 billion RM to rebuild the German economy. To classify this period as a time of inclusive stability, however, is both misleading and precarious for two reasons: first, our knowledge of historical events informs us that this was merely a temporary condition, but more importantly allows us to appreciate the massive problems that floated beneath the surface of Republic itself, specifically the prevalence of weak government, the prevailing view of middle-class circles that the experiment of parliamentary democracy was at best problematic and the precarious foundations on which this success was constructed. Many of the problems that had confronted the Reich from 1919 remained unresolved and unsolved. From an economic perspective the reparations bill continued to constitute a tangible burden and the 'success' of the 1924-28 period was more or less built on American loans. This period was typified by the constant struggle and altercations between the advocates of the Republican order (the SPD, the Centre Party, the DVP and the DDP) and those steadfastly opposed to the Weimar system. The nature of politics was actually undergoing a phase of polarization where the middle was being squeezed by the more militant extremes of National Socialism and communism. This was manifest in the terminal decline of the two liberal parties, the DDP and the DVP respectively. As the antagonists multiplied, the forces defending the Republic became less vocal and, although they managed to maintain their majority in the Reichstag until July 1932, power and influence had already inexorably seeped to the right after 1930.

56

Pushing to extremes

The fortunes of the radical right during the 1924-30 period underwent a complete metamorphosis from a state of despair and crisis to one of prodigious optimism and expectation. At first the upturn and the gradual transformation of the German economy in the mid-1920s severely hampered the electoral appeal of the radical right and relegated the NSDAP and its rivals onto the fringes of irrelevance. With only a handful of deputies returned to the Reichstag in 1924 its early fortunes looked decidedly bleak, particularly given its inabilities to attract the working-class voter away from the clutches of the socialist and communist parties. Yet, this period was used wisely by Hitler to reinvent the party machine and lay the foundations for a national-based party. With hindsight, Hitler's imprisonment should be regarded as an important staging post in the development of National Socialism. It had essentially presented Hitler with the opportunity to reflect on his own objectives and convinced him that the available means of destroying parliamentary democracy lay in pursuing a legal path to power rather than attempting another coup. This task was an ambitious one and necessitated nothing less than the formation and development of a mass party. The first stage in the transformation process commenced with his re-establishment of the NSDAP on 27 February 1925, thereby reversing the prohibition order placed on the party by the Bavarian authorities after the putsch attempt. The second stage centred on reunifying the various factions that had emerged during his period of imprisonment, thwarting the ambitions of other potential rival organizations and individuals while the third stage entailed plans for an expansion of the party's base and activities outside Bavaria. These immediate objectives were not, however, as straightforward as they may have initially appeared, for set against the wider radical right environment the NSDAP constituted just another small fringe party co-existing and competing with other such forces, especially in northern Germany. For example, a coalition of anti-Semitic parties was able to muster 9 per cent of the vote at the May 1924 elections. Given this reality it was absolutely crucial for the NSDAP to distinguish itself from its small volkisch rivals and this in the first instance meant distancing itself from all the others. Accordingly, Hitler pulled the NSDAP from the volkische bloc with which it had contested the 1924 elections and simultaneously undermined Ludendorff's role as the most prominent personality in radical right politics. IS Not only did Hitler manage to hold the NSDAP together upon his release from prison, but he stamped his authority over the rump party, by dictating policy and personnel development through his role as the Fuhrer (leader) and laid the foundations for a truly formidable party machine. Within a few short years Hitler's party had successfully emerged as the main radical right organization, sidelining most of its rivals in the process.

57

The Radical Right in Germany

The reasons for its advance owe much to a series of factors that include the tireless devotion and energies of the party's leading cadre, but also rest with its skill at using propaganda to portray the NSDAP as a revolutionary force, its radical overhaul of the party's structure, the activities of the SA and, of course, the rise and growth of the German Communist Party. Propaganda was the responsibility of Joseph Goebbels and he was highly adept and skilled at using all the latest cinematic, communications and staging techniques to advance the party's image which culminated in the mass rallies of the 1930s. Goebbels also succeeded in differentiating the NSDAP from its rivals by placing an increasing emphasis on its own style of conviction politics and its realization of a new order based on the emotional appeal of a Volksgemeinschaft (national or folk community). The party projected itself as a new and vibrant force that was not intent on returning Germany to a former age where class division predominated, but instead was aspiring to a new and better dawn where political disorder and weak government had been consigned to the past. This new emphasis completely distinguished and divorced the NSDAP's goals from the wishes and desires of the conservative right. This was Hitler's clear intention and represented another overt shift to the right. The reorganization of the NSDAP and especially the emphasis on the regional level is another instrumental factor behind the party's transformation. In the party's lean years of the mid-1920s it was absolutely crucial for the party's development to have in place a series of individual and regional leaders across Germany who could demand local support and push party membership. To this end the party organization was revisited and the territorial units (Gaue) into which the party was organized were redrawn to reflect the Republic's 35 electoral districts in Germany from 1928. It was structured on a purely hierarchical basis with each region (Gau) being headed by a regional chief (Gauleiter) who reported directly back to party headquarters in Munich. These regional leaders assumed responsibility for coordinating and managing all activities at the branch and after 1929 the district levels. Significantly, most of the Gauleiter had grown up in Imperial Germany, had been involved in the First World War and had either fought for the Freikorps or other right-wing border defence units after 1919. Most displayed a reluctance and even showed an inability to merge back into civilian life and found the confrontational activities of the NSDAP (see chapter 5) provided a source of purpose and being. Competition became an integral part of life at the regional and local levels of the NSDAP. Constant challenges and demands to be ever more radical when coupled with little respect for rank and persistent calls for action and deeds ensured that a state of constant rivalry prevailed at these levels. In fact, local party leadership was rather chaotic insofar as the leaders,

58

Pushing to extremes

rather than being appointed had actually just simply assumed control. They were liable to be replaced at any time and were caught up in a continuing struggle of social Darwinist proportions to establish their authority in an individual association. The Fuhrer proved very reluctant to intervene in such disputes, although from time to time his direct intercession was necessary to restore order and was most manifest in 1926 in his personal appointment of Joseph Goebbels as the Gauleiter of Berlin to energize a weak and fractious party. It worked wonderfully well from the party's perspective as in the course of the following four years Goebbels totally reshaped the local party, captured and saved Berlin from the menace of the 'Reds' and transformed the Reich capital into one of the most ardent strongholds of the NSDAP. Hitler proved an asset and although barred from public speaking in most of Germany (in Bavaria until 1927 and in Prussia until 1928) he was still able to address closed meetings. At other times he contemplated ideas of party revitalization and organization although he left the day-to-day running of the party to colleagues as he would policy to his later ministers. 19 This initial period also saw the first attempts to widen appeal by targeting certain professions for the party ranks and led to the formation of a spate of subordinate party organizations designed for doctors, students or teachers, as well as the adoption of party uniforms and symbols and the staging of the first party rallies. An NSDAP student organization, for example, was in existence since 1926 and its membership soared in the late 1920s. 20 Together, adept propaganda, the use of violence and Hitler's own style and dynamism were to prove part of the winning formula and helped to recast the image of the NSDAP as an energetic, revolutionary and distinctive force on the right wing of German politics waiting to seize the initiative when and if it came.

Competing for power: the forces of the right. 1928-33 In spite of all their endeavours the prospects for any imminent electoral breakthrough and advance from the fringes of the political system must have looked decidedly bleak, especially after the very disappointing results and setbacks experienced by the NSDAP in the February 1928 Reichstag elections. On this occasion the party lost over 100,000 votes and polled in total a mere 2.6 per cent of the votes cast. To make matters worse from the perspective of the NSDAP the victors of these elections were the parties of the left which included the communists, who managed to expand their electoral base (see tables 3.1 and 3.2). However, within five years the NSDAP had been propelled to power largely on the back of intense popular frustration and anger that accompanied the aftershocks of world recession. The

59

The Radical Right in Germany Table 3.2 Decline of the pro-Weimar parties and the Conservative Party in the Reichstag. 1928 -33 1928

1930

1932

1932

1933

(May)

(Sept)

(July)

(Nov)

(Mar)

153 (29.8%) 25

BVP

133 (21.6%) 4 (1%) 7 (1.2%) 37 (5.9%) 70 (15.6%) 22

121 (20.4%) 2 (1%) 11 (1.8%) 52 (8.3%) 73 (15%) 20

120 (18.35%) 5

73 (14.2%) 62 (15.2%) 17

143 (24.5%) 20 (3.5%) 30 (4.7%) 41 (7%) 68 (14.8%) 19

Total

375

321

273

279

270

SPD DDP DVP DNVP Centre Party

45

2 -

52 (8%) 73 (13.9%) 18

Sources: Adapted from Peukert, Detlev J. K. (1993) The Weimar Republic, London; Childers, Thomas (1986) The limits of National Socialist mobilisation: the elections of 6th November 1932 and the fragmentation of the Nazi constituency' in idem (ed.) The formation of the Nazi Constituency 1919-1933, London, p. 233

reasons for this rapid and complete transformation of the political landscape centre on the sudden deterioration of the German economy. Behind the apparent prosperity of the mid-I920s the system had been intrinsically fragile. It had been partly built on countless and huge American loans fixed at high interest rates, a reality that was particularly pronounced in the agricultural and industrial sectors. The daily existence for many small companies in this age of big business and in the absence of a rigorous competition law based on the American model was demanding and magnified by the growing pressure for enhanced working conditions and better pay from increasingly vocalized trade unions. The traditional middle-class business community, which had already been ravaged by the 1923 inflation, now confronted with high interest rates and higher contributions towards employees, felt itself under increasing strain. A substantial drop in agricultural prices in 1928 brought added misery to the farming community and this was compounded by the Wall Street Crash of October 1929. These two events unleashed forces that effectively heralded the beginnings of the demise of the Weimar regime.z' Without them it is entirely probable that the political system might well have stabilized and seriously undermined the cohesion and attractiveness of the radical right. With them the outcome was very different as the extremes sought to make political capital out of the difficulties. 60

Pushing to extremes

These events crippled the international markets and the Republic rapidly descended into a state of deep economic and political crisis. Germany was the worst hit of the industrialized nations in the ensuing depression as the Americans recalled their short-term loans and by 1932 unemployment smpassed the six million mark. 22 Bruning's preoccupation with foreign affairs and particularly plans to reduce the reparations bill meant less work was done on the domestic front to calm nerves and address some of the public's mounting difficulties and the government, for example, refused to avail itself of a plan drawn up by the civil service for massive work creation programmes. The disillusionment of the German electorate made itself felt in the final series of elections of the Weimar Republic as support for the liberal and moderate parties crumbled and more and more people rallied to the banners of the NSDAP and the KPD. The final phase of the Weimar regime also ushered in a new escalation of politically motivated violence. As politics entered a period of polarization the fortunes of the conservative and the extreme right were to vary enormously. By the late 1920s the conservative right was still loosely held together under the DNVP despite substantial disagreements and internal divisions. These centred mostly on disagreements over the party's decision to participate in government and most notably were voiced though the publications of the press magnate Alfred Hugenberg. Any aspirations that this pragmatic preference to engage in government might have allowed the conservatives to control and possibly dictate policy development in government proved difficult and their inability to solve the economic crises in the agricultural community (which directly impacted on the landowning conservatives) pushed some conservatives and many more of their supporters to find solace in new and more radical groups such as the formation of the Christlich-nationale Bauern- und Landvolkpartei (Christian National Farmers' and Rural People's Party) in 1928. Other electors, meanwhile, turned towards more radical political parties such as the NSDAP particularly in rural and small farming areas such as SchleswigHolstein. Finally, the loss of nearly one-third of its vote in May 1928 led the DNVP to reconsider its position and to remove itself from government. This decision was greeted as a victory by the more radical wing under Hugenberg who was then finally elevated to the party chairmanship and came to dominate the DNVP. By this stage the disunity on the old right that had severely tested the party led a more moderate wing of the DNVP to form a new party (the People's Conservative Party) in June 1930. Hugenberg responded by forming a new conservative bloc that established ever closer links with the NSDAP. 21 The radicalization of the right was most apparent in the rapid rise of the NSDAP as the economic and political situation deteriorated further. It built on the levels of dissatisfaction and economic misery and denounced 61

The Radical Right in Germany

the Young Plan, the latest international effort to ease Germany's reparations repayments with instalments running all the way until 1988, as an attempt to sell Germany into slavery. By September 1929 the party membership had risen to 150,000 and had reached 850,000 by 1933. The history of these final years of the Weimar Republic has been widely covered and it is not the intention here to provide what would amount to another, but considerably shorter, chronological overview of events up to January 1933. Instead the final section of this chapter considers the relationship and the series of tactical blunders and skilful manoeuvrings between the old right and the radical right that enabled Hitler to secure power. Although both shared much in common in terms of foreign policy aspirations and a strident antipathy for their opponents on the left, the interplay between these forces from 1930 to 1933 was based neither on solidarity nor on mutual understanding, but rather was conducted and designed to advance and facilitate the core objectives of each group. These envisaged the realization of their particular visions of governmental structures and society and both were as compatible as fire and water. Beneath the surface this relationship between the conservative and the radical right was characterized by a state of mutual contempt, but each - albeit very reluctantly needed the other to achieve its political ends. The conservative governments of Heinrich Bruning (March 1930 to June 1932) and Franz von Papen (June to December 1932) harboured the overtly anti-republican and anti-Marxist sympathies of the old right and, although both in the first instance may have sought to restore some greater degree of stability, their more medium-term aspirations centred on the establishment of an authoritarian mode of government, possibly under Bruning's preference for a restored Hohenzollern monarchy or Papen's preference for a government independent of the political parties, where power was invested in the hands of a democratically elected president. 24 In efforts to form pro-government majorities in the Reichstag both the Bruning and Papen governments called early elections in September 1930 and June 1932 respectively whose outcomes not only damaged the electoral position of the DNVP, but marked the advance and long hoped for electoral breakthrough of the National Socialists. The NSDAP share of the vote rose sharply to 18 per cent and translated into 107 (12 in 1928) seats in 1930 and rocketed to 37.33 per cent of the vote in the June 1932 elections to form the largest faction in the Reichstag. Following these last elections and for the first time in the history of the Republic the staunchly antiWeimar parties (of the KPD and the NSDAP) had mustered a majority of all the seats in the Reichstag. In theory, the result meant that Hitler could have formed a majority government in coalition with both the DNVP and the BVP (see tables 3.1 and 3.2). In reality substantial party disagreements 62

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and personality clashes among the right prevented any such alliance from occurnng. The balance between these two forces had altered considerably in the few years after 1929. In retrospect, with the decisive shift in fortunes as the pendulum swung rapidly to the extreme right and given the very short timeframe of this process, it is highly probable that the old right failed to grasp or appreciate the revolutionary elements and dynamics of the new challenge presented by the NSDAP. Certainly, there is insurmountable evidence of the way in which the conservative right casually dismissed the NSDAP and its leaders as mere rabble rousers and simply regarded the NSDAP as a temporary phenomenon whose electoral support would dissipate as quickly as it had grown, once the economic difficulties of the early 1930s had been overcome. 25 This may have been the correct reading as the results of the November 1932 elections appeared to indicate when the NSDAP overall percentage of the vote slipped by over four percentage points, representing a loss of over two million votes and some 34 seats. Incidentally, these elections also recorded a modest revival of the DNVP.26 Positively, the NSDAP remained the largest party, but the election result deprived it of its theoretical majority if in alliance with the other right-wing parties. Whether this downward trend for the NDSAP would have continued is open to debate. History records that developments took another turn when the NSDAP was invited by the conservatives to join a government coalition as the junior partner in January 1933. Instead of combating the NSDAP the old right tried to tame the new party and to harness it for its own shortterm political gains before moving ahead with plans to install some form of authoritarian rule. Papen's government lacked popular support and, significantly, given that his own 'cabinet of barons' did not draw any of its members from the Reichstag and given the old right was unable to persuade the German army to intervene to overthrow the Weimar Republic, needed allies. Its decision to engage with the Nazi Party was also the product of much greater fears, especially held by the business community over the consequences of a KPD-led government after the party's further surge forward and capture of an additional 600,000 votes in the November 1932 elections. The Nazis offered a potential bulwark against the threat posed by the extreme left. 27 From its perspective the extreme right needed the support and political endorsement of the conservative right to legitimize its crusade for power. The rivalry of both the conservative right and the extreme right gave way to co-operation as a political expediency. Both regarded this as merely a temporary state of affairs. The conservative right was firmly convinced that the upturn in the country's economic fortunes would be profitable in electoral terms and be achieved at the expense of the NSDAP whereas Hitler's 63

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decision to co-operate with the conservatives was determined by the fear that the party's popularity was possibly on the slide and represented a significant shift in policy given his earlier ardent opposition towards such a move, but was predicated on his being appointed chancellor. 28 Evidence to support these fears stems from the loss of electoral support for the party in the November 1932 national elections and this worrying trend was confirmed by the fall in support in regional elections in Saxony and Thuringia in November and December 1932.29 In short, the very poor state of the party's finances, internal NSDAP infighting over future political direction (see chapter 4) and the possibility that the tide was turning against the more radical forces were all responsible for persuading Hitler that the chances of the NSDAP attaining power and thereby destroying the Republic were substantially improved in collaboration with the conservatives. Both Papen's and Hindenburg's dismissive assessment of Hitler as an over ambitious proletarian whom they had hired and could control before being squeezed like a little mouse into a corner until he squeaked could not have proved more wrong. 30 Blinded by a belief in their own superiority to govern the majority of the conservative elite, they failed to appreciate the skills and tactical abilities of this 'little corporal'. Ludendorff, one of Hitler's initial but temporary rivals, was one of the few individuals to register doubts and informed Hindenburg at the end of January 1933: 'I solemnly prophesy that this accursed man will cast our Reich into the abyss and bring our nation to inconceivable misery. Future generations will damn you in your grave for what you have done.'" His concern was ignored. The conservatives not only appointed Hitler as Chancellor, but had also paved the way indirectly (in a series of governments from Bruning, via Papen to Kurt von Schleicher from 1930 to 1932) for a fairly smooth transition for the NSDAP into government. 12 To be sure, they need not have offered him the position of Reich Chancellor, but all other political options had been temporarily exhausted. None of the centre parties could muster a majority in the Reichstag and there remained little possibility, or even desirability from the right's perspective, of a left-wing coalition between the SPD and the KPD on account of irreconcilable differences. The option of National Socialist participation in a coalition and conservative-dominated government had seemed the only logical course of action. Indirectly the old right's promotion of both anti-socialist and antidemocratic leanings, which were reflected in the purge of all the supporters of the SPD and all other left-wing parties from the top administrative posts in Prussia and moves to cut back on the Weimar Republic's exemplary social services commitments, including arbitration rights and wage bargaining rights, created an environment that laid the foundations for the Nazi regime's development. Moreover, Bruning's and Papen's style of authoritarian 64

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government which relied more and more on emergency decrees (provided for under Article 48 of the 1919 constitution) effectively undermined the spirit of democracy. In retrospect, the conservative right was duped, outmanoeuvred and swept aside by the extreme right. Its numerical dominance in this coalition government was considerably weaker than it had recognized (particularly given that the other two NSDAP representatives (although a minority in the new 12-member cabinet) held responsibilities for the Prussian police and the Ministry of the Interior) and would deteriorate further with the ailing health of the president. Ironically, as events transpired, the old elite's plan of destroying parliamentary democracy bore fruit but not in the way that many had intended as the forces of the extreme right emerged as the principal beneficiaries.

Conclusions There was nothing inevitable surrounding Hitler's appointment as Chancellor in 1933, even given his leadership of the largest party in the Reichstag. The final reality of Hitler's assuming the role of head of government rested with a decision by the leadership of the conservative right grouped around Hindenburg who, given the inabilities to invigorate the electoral popularity of the DNVP, intended instead to take advantage of the popularity of the NSDAP and planned to use it to steer and direct the new Chancellor towards their goal of the creation of an authoritarian regime. The Weimar system had, in effect, been in a state of terminal decline since Bruning's appointment as Chancellor in 1930 when, in fact, genuine parliamentary government came to an abrupt end. 11 The final years of the Weimar Republic saw a series of conservative governments which were all united in their opposition to the structure and democratic credentials of the Republic and which were all driven by a desire to erect a new authoritarian regime. None possessed a majority in parliament and consequently their hold on power was based on ruling through emergency decrees and the support of the Reich president. Against this backdrop the conservative right's support for the NSDAP must be seen as just another vehicle to assist its objective. The old right must bear a substantial responsibility for bringing Hitler to power, but it should also be emphasized that it was assisted indirectly by the willingness of the liberal parties and the Centre Party to support Hitler's elevation in January 1933 as a means of combating the left and the high levels of political violence. Together these reasons explain why the baton of government passed not to the traditional forces of the old right as in most of central and eastern Europe, but to National Socialism. Nazi propaganda proclaimed January 1933 as a new beginning in the rejuvenation of Germany and the Nazis 65

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immediately set about the construction of a new social and political order where they simply outmanoeuvred the conservative right and removed their influence completely from government. Yet the analysis of why National Socialism emerged victorious must account for the electoral popularity of the NSDAP, which raises a number of questions and it is to these that this study now turns.

Notes 1 For an introduction into the society and politics of the Weimar Republic see, among others, Detlev J. K. Peukert, The Weimar Republic, London, 1993; Helmut Heiber, The Weimar Republic, London, 1993; A. J. Nicholls, Weimar and the Rise of Hitler, London, 1991, 3rd edition; E. Kolb, The Weimar Republic, London, 1988. 2 Richard Bessel, 'Germany from war to dictatorship' in M. Fulbrook (ed.) Twentieth Century Germany: Politics, Culture and Society, 1918-1990, London, 2001. 3 This took place in the very same room where the glory and honour of the German state had been proclaimed almost 50 years earlier. 4 The Versailles Treaty provided for the surrender of all German colonies, the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, the cession of Eupen-Malmedy to Belgium and parts of East Prussia and Silesia to Poland; it ordained Danzig as a free city, pledged Germany to hold a plebiscite in northern Schleswig, validated a special status for the Saar and prohibited a union between Austria and Germany; imposed a huge reparation bill on the new Germany and, arguably most controversially, compelled the same German government to accept sole responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities in 1914. In addition, intent on German demilitarization, the authors of the treaty limited the German army to 100,000 men and attempted to neutralize the German armed forces by forbidding them possession of tanks, aircraft, airships, submarines and sizeable warships. 5 John Hiden, The Weimar Republic, London, 1996, p. 42. 6 From the Bavarian military plenipotentiary's report, 7 October 1918 and quoted in M. Kitchen, Silent Dictatorship, London, 1976, p. 259. 7 The Reich president was elected by direct universal suffrage. Hindenburg obtained 14.6 million votes in contrast to the 13.7 million polled by his socialist challenger, Wilhelm Marx. It is significant to note that had the KPD not insisted on fielding its own candidate, Ernst Thalman (who was to receive almost 2 million votes), the left could have won the presidency. 8 For a substantive account of this force see R. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Post-War Germany 1919-1923, Cambridge MA, 1952. 9 For a comprehensive account of the period of inflation in the early 1920s and attempts by successive governments to counter it see C. Webb, Hyperinflation and Stabilisation in Weimar Germany, Oxford, 1989. 10 E. J. Feuchtwanger, From Weimar to Hitler: Germany 1918-33, Basingstoke, 1995, p.10. 11 The Federation, sponsored by the Pan-German League, was never envisaged as a political party and, despite a rapid growth boasting some 200,000 members by the early 1920s, many of its members were to drift to more politically conscious and active forces, mainly the fledgling Nazi Party.

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Pushing to extremes 12 The leniency was almost certainly expected by Hitler. It has now been proved that Hitler had come before the same judge in 1921. On that occasion he had been charged with inciting his followers to violence against left-wing extremists. At sentence he was condemned to three months in prison, but served just one. 13 This rambling work has undergone several translations and numerous reprints in the United Kingdom. See the recent edition by Pimlico: A. Hitler, Mein Kampf, London, 1998. It still remains a proscribed text in Germany and other central European states, including the Czech Republic. 14 W. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, London, 1960, p. 94. 15 There are numerous works on Hitler covering many aspects of his life. They vary in format and depth. Nevertheless, for two of by far the best and most recent works on Hitler's early years and the creation of the NSDAP see Joachim C. Fest, Hitler, London, 1982; 1. Kershaw, Hitler: Huhris 1889-1936, London, 1998. 16 This racialist newspaper was originally established in 1887 and bought by the party in 1920 with financial support from the Reichswehr. 17 This was written while he was serving the rather lenient nine-month prison sentence for his involvement in the attempted putsch to topple the Bavarian government in Munich in November 1923. Had this proved successful Hitler had planned to stage a march on Berlin. 18 E.]. Feuchtwanger, From Weimar to Hitler: Germany, 1918-33, Basingstoke, 1995, 2nd edition. 19 For two excellent accounts of the party's rise in southern Germany see G. Pridham, Hitler's Rise to Power: The Nazi Party in Bavaria 1925-1933, London, 1973 or J. H. Grill, The Nazi Movement in Baden 1920-1945, Chapel Hill, 1983. 20 Michael Kater has completed numerous studies of the social composition of the professions within the NSDAP. For example see the following: The Nazi Party. A Social Profile of Memhers and Leaders, 1919-1945, Oxford, 1983; 'Physicians in crisis at the end of the Weimar Republic' in Peter D. Stachura (ed.) Unemployment and the Great Depression in Weimar Germany, London, 1986, pp. 49-77; Doctors under Hitler, London, 1989. 21 Political instability was a feature of the Weimar period. In its short existence the Weimar Republic experienced over 20 governments in the course of 14 years. 22 See Peter D. Stachura (ed.) Unemployment and the Great Depression in Weimar Germany, London, 1986. 23 For an overview of the Weimar parties see John Hiden, Repuhlican and Fascist Germany: Themes and Variations in the History of Weimar and the Third Reich, 1918-45, London, 1996, pp. 47-79. 24 The surge of the radical right was also reflected by the 36.8% Hitler obtained in the second round of the April 1932 presidential election. In these presidential elections Hindenburg polled 19.4 million votes, Hitler polled 13.4 million and Thalman (KPD) received 3.7. Hindenburg had appealed to Briining to get the approval of the NSDAP for his (Hindenburg's) candidature. This would have avoided another election. Briining's failure to do so only alienated him from the President and enabled General von Schleicher to move against the Chancellor. 25 Briining's demise was a bitter personal disappointment and failed to appreciate the fact that he had the reparations burden suspended in 1931 and then cancelled completely in 1932. See R. Bessel, 'Germany from war to dictatorship', in M. Fulbrook (ed.) Twentieth Century Germany, London, 2001, pp. 30-1. 26 The DNVP's share of the vote climbed to 8.9%.

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27 See A. E. Rosenhaft, Beating the Fascists: the German Communists and Political Violence, Cambridge, 1983; Conan Fischer, The German Communists and the Rise of Nazism, London, 1991; more generally B. Fowkes, Communism in Germany under the Weimar Republic, London, 1984. 28 The Fiihrer was not going to be satisfied with anything less and had already at a meeting with the President demanded the position of Chancellor on 13 August 1932 which the latter resisted. 29 See Dietrich Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party, 1919-1933, Newton Abbot, 1971, pp. 288-9. 30 See I. Kershaw, Hitler: Hubris 1889-1936, London, 1998, p. 377. 31 Quoted in Kershaw, op. cit., p. 377. 32 For further details see M. Broszat, The Hitler State, London, 1981. 33 Jill Stephenson, 'The rise of the Nazis: Sonderweg or spanner in the works?' in Mary Fulbrook (ed.) Twentieth Century Germany, London, 2001, p. 94.

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Chapter 4

National Socialist ideology and leadership The National Socialist regime came to embody the most extreme and rabid form of the extreme right in modern German history. Its impact on the world has long surpassed its 12-year rule of dictatorship and terror that engulfed one of Europe's most cultured nations and hurled it towards war, defeat and dismemberment. Ever since 1945 continuous attempts have been made in the academic literature to account for the origins and development of the NSDAP, its leaders, reasons for its electoral successes and its years in power. Much of this work has been surrounded by controversy. Indeed the Third Reich 'has now been located within an almost bewildering variety of interpretative frames, many of which seem to be poles apart'. 1 Due to space restrictions this present study cannot elaborate on these works but will devote three chapters to examining some of the key components of the far right in Germany between 1933 and 1945. This chapter focuses on the ideology and leadership behind National Socialism. Many explanations for its rapid rise to power centre on the economic and political disorder of the incumbent regime. Although certainly of prime importance such accounts do not provide an explanation as to why, of the two political extremes on offer, National Socialism emerged as the principal beneficiary in electoral terms over its communist rival. This begs the question of what exactly it was about Nazi ideology and leadership that proved both enticing and receptive to sections of the German electorate. The distinctive slants in approach to Nazism are most explicitly on display in two of the largest selling tomes on the Third Reich by Albert Speer and William Shirer. 2 These are a starting point, but both fail to provide an adequate and reliably objective interpretation of the Third Reich. Despite an assortment of diverse and conflicting conclusions and interpretations the accumulated research suggests that there was nothing particularly unique about National Socialist 'ideology' which constituted a mixture of radical right-wing attitudes and prejudices, that had persisted and developed throughout the previous century and the Second Empire. Nationalism, antiSemitism, an aversion towards the principles of democracy and strains of militarism and authoritarianism unequivocally form part of a common rightwing extremist heritage that runs through both the nineteenth and twentieth 69

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centuries. National Socialism was the only movement throughout this timeframe that secured power and set about translating its beliefs into policy. The answers of how and why rest with its two distinguishing features, namely the role of Hitler's leadership and the Nazis' use of propaganda and presentational techniques. This chapter examines both and concludes with a brief assessment as to what extent the National Socialist period constituted a revolution or mere social reaction.

Nazi ideology Any attempts at providing a coherent account of Nazi ideology proves difficult. Indeed, despite the vast material that continues to accumulate on Nazism there remains precious little in the way of unanimity about Nazi ideology's actual components. Arguments continue to rage over its degrees of consistency and doubts linger as to whether Nazism possessed any form of coherent ideology at all. Certainly, some authors have developed this last theme to suggest that a real ideology as contemporary political science understands the word never existed. Differing political orientations and social perceptions have provided considerably divergent and conflicting theses. Kershaw aptly delineated the complexities when he remarked that: Studies of Nazi ideology have been regarded by some as genuinely revolutionary in content, and branded by others as quintessentially counter-revolutionary. Leading historians have seen Nazism as dynamic nihilism devoid of ideological commitment, and Hitler as an opportunist without principle or ideology seeking power for power's sake, while others have distinguished Nazism from Italian and other forms of fascism on the grounds of its theoretical basis in a doctrine of race and have interpreted Hitler as a politician driven by a remarkably consistent and coherent, if hateful and repulsive ideology.l

Early contemporaneous judgements were often highly dismissive in tone. According to the Rauschning thesis (written in the late 1930s), Nazism represented nothing less than a revolution of nihilism: 4 This movement is totally without ideals and lacks even the semblance of a programme. Its commitment is entirely to action; its crack troops are instinctively geared for mindless action, the leaders choose action on a cold, calculating and cunning basis.

Rauschning's proposItlon that Nazism contained no systematic ideology and his inference that the Nazis merely exploited existing moods and developments to increase their membership, achieve power and then initiate moves to bolder adventures, gave succour to and influenced a generation of historians, most notably Alan Bullock. s There is much to advance the 70

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opportunistic thesis. The notion that ideology was simply a means to woo the masses is enticing and not least because the National Socialist leadership was prepared to sacrifice policy and make adjustments to suit prevailing political needs. In other words, no aspects of the 'doctrine' could be considered as taboo. A close examination of the official documentation and statements from the Nazi Party reveals how far the ideological tenets were often riddled with contradictions and ambiguity. Nazi ideology was highly susceptible to being reshaped and redefined according to the party's needs. Sudden shifts can best be illustrated by use of two leading examples. Of all the points on the programme the right of self-determination for the German people seemed almost absolute. Hitler himself had stated that 'in its capacity as a state, the German Reich must gather all Germans to itself'." His vision of a Greater Germany uniting all Germans led to the Anschluss with Austria and the incorporation of the Sudeten Germans into the Reich. This latter move was followed by the ensuing dismemberment of the Czech state. However, an example of inconsistency between theory and practice was most vividly portrayed by Hitler's acceptance of the allied decision in 1919 to pass the South Tyrol, formerly part of Austria and a predominantly German-speaking region, to Italy. This move rewarded Rome for participating in the First World War on the side of the Triple Entente and yet Hitler ignored the appeals of this region in the face of Mussolini's ardent attempts to 'Italianize' the entire area of the Alto Adige in favour of pursuing good Germano-Italian relations. An even more glaring policy shift occurred when Hitler jettisoned the revolutionary socialist components on the National Socialist programme in order to draw financial support from the German business community. All in all, however, this opportunistic approach grossly underestimates the basic tenets and appeal of Nazism. True, National Socialism was a variant of fascism and, in common with all its fascist peers, possessed a rather thin ideological programme in contrast to the works on communism and liberalism. Indeed, it is also true that much of the 'ideology' was often highly emotive in nature and designed as a propaganda tool, but this was its strength rather than a weakness. To this end it resorted to elementary slogans, deployed the use of party emblems and the staging of mass rallies. The message may have been somewhat vague, but it worked in conjunction with Hitler's abilities, the party's use of the media and the way in which the party seemed capable of tapping into the popular consciousness. Any investigation into Nazi ideology commences with two principal sources of examination: first, the party's 25-point programme of 1920 and, second, Hitler's writings in both Mein Kampf (My Struggle) of 1925 and Das Zweite Buch (The Second Book) of I92S? These two have become standard texts as to the mindset of Adolf Hitler. 8 On an initial examination 71

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Mein Kampf is difficult to read, being worded in a very verbose and dry style; it is badly structured and contains some very dubious sections, most notably that on syphilis. 9 lt repeats time and time again 'the most vulgar prejudices and vulgar lies' and bases most of its arguments 'not on empirical evidence but analogies (usually false ones)'.IO The turgid style and constant repetition explain why the book was exclusively ridiculed and dismissed as the ramblings of a maverick adventurer. Hitler was to confess in the 1930s that had he definitely known he was due to become Reichskanzler he would not have written the book. Conversely, had others known that he would assume this position, many more would have read these works, because behind all the confusion, frustrations and hatreds of its sorrowful author lay the core of an aggressive nationalist conviction that was largely translated into policy in government. Mein Kampf acts as a highly accurate barometer for later developments. With these pages we can uncover Hitler's scorn of the Jews, his enthusiasm for the concepts of social Darwinism and his belief in the necessity of good and effective propaganda. Within its pages we can identify his belief in the necessity of prohibiting interracial marriages, his contempt for bourgeois society and the concepts of democracy and his utter rejection of the Versailles peace settlement. He wanted not only to restore Imperial Germany's borders but also to incorporate all Germans (mainly in Austria) into a new German Reich: Ein Yolk, Ein Reich, Ein Fuhrer. These themes are couched in very general terms. There is little in the way of strategy and planning, but these thoughts are repeatedly developed and expanded over time to produce a level of some consistency which helps to diminish the verdict of Hitler as a mere opportunist. In the early years of the struggle for power, however, the Fuhrer's dictation of policy was not a foregone conclusion as he found himself facing an alternative and more carefully constructed argument from the left wing of the NSDAP. Parties on the radical right usually house a variety of often opposing tendencies within them. These surfaced in the tensions evident within the DNVP between more moderate and the extremist elements, but they were also present in the shape of the extreme right NSDAP and centred mostly on differences between those who wished to downgrade and ignore the parties' original socialist agenda and a more radical minority, including Gregor Strasser and Ernst Rahm, who wanted to pursue and initiate action in this area. This degree of friction stems from the NSDAP's 1920 party programme that encapsulated a mixture of broad ranging socialist and nationalist aspirations. The latter characterized the usual mix of volkisch aims and sentiment, whereas the former reflected the party's ambitions to appeal to the working class in terms of votes and recruitment potential. This emphasis reflects the radical nature of German politics in the immediate aftermath of 72

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the First World War and the determination to portray the NSDAP as a truly revolutionary and progressive force espousing strident nationalistic tones. The Strasser brothers were instrumental in this reworking of Nazi 'ideology', placing particular emphasis on the need for nationalization and the introduction of curbs on private ownership and, in terms of foreign policy, demanded an alliance with the Soviet Union to initiate a war of liberation against the western democracies. This vision proved attractive in the NSDAP's northern associations. Yet the failure of the 1923 putsch and the inability of the party to tap the potential working-class reservoir (which for the most part remained solidly organized behind the KPD and the SPD) compelled the party leadership around Hitler to reconsider its position and strategy in building up its electoral base. Consequently, the politics of opportunism led the party to abandon the anti-capitalist measures which threatened to frighten off potential middle-class support in favour of a much more active pursuit of the party's nationalist credentials. For the small group on the left of the NSDAP this new direction constituted a betrayal of policy, although for his part, Hitler perceived this group as a direct challenge to his own authority. In short, the Fuhrer wanted to weaken and effectively cleanse the NSDAP of these 'bolsheviks', but his room for manoeuvre was circumscribed on account of the Strasser brothers' influence in the North German party. Hitler was an adept enough politician to realize the risks of stoking a degree of alienation by moving against them and opted to tread a more indirect course to weaken the influence of the Strasser brothers. To this end he won Goebbels over to his side by pleading his conviction in the unalterability of the 25 points and promoted Gregor Strasser to the position of head of Nazi propaganda. This was a role Strasser accepted in (what constituted a forlorn) hope of being able to persuade Hitler of his own vision for the future. Hitler's unreceptivity to or disinterest in other perceptions or approaches, no matter how expert these might have been, was evident in his later relations with Hjalmar Schacht, the finance minister (1933-38) and Albert Speer. Otto Strasser was now an isolated figure. Ultimately, the onset of the global economic crisis in the late 1920s enabled Hitler to use his essentially nationalist propaganda to exacerbate middleclass fears while seemingly respecting institutional legality and the principle of free elections. In these contests he demanded restrictions on any anticapitalist agitation, favoured an openness towards conservatism and the Catholic Church and placed the party's emphasis on its anti-Marxist rhetoric. II These moves elicited complaints from Otto Strasser that Hitler was betraying socialism in favour of reaction and tension once again mounted between the wings. It must be remembered that Hitler's position was still not unassailable in the very early 1930s. His failure to defeat 73

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Hindenburg for the presidency in 1932 did offer his opponents an opportunity, although admittedly a small one, to intensify their criticisms of party policy and direction. Indeed, one splinter group around Otto Strasser not only attracted reasonable support from within the party, from Gauleiter in Silesia, Pomerania and Saxony but even flirted with the KPD. This was a crucial time for the NSDAP and opposition towards Hitler intensified with Gregor Strasser's resignation from the NSDAP in the autumn of 1932. This was followed by resignations and the expulsion of several thousand Strasser supporters. Immediately on taking up the reins of power the new Hitler government immediately targeted Strasser and his associates. Arrests swiftly followed, but this leftlright split within the NSDAP remained an ongoing feature until the left wing of the party was practically eradicated in June 1934. Gregor Strasser was one of the victims in the 'Night of the Long Knives' in June 1934 (discussed in chapter 5) while Otto fled Germany but continued to call for action against Hitler and sought a third way between capitalism and socialism. 12 Hitler had emerged triumphant from this internal struggle and in power the Nazis simply abandoned the socialist provisions of the 25-point programme and came to concentrate instead on romantic, nationalistic and highly ambivalent issues. National Socialist ideology was built on opposition to democratic, liberal and humanist values. In this it shared the characteristics of many other radical and extreme right-wing parties, and even large sections of the conservatives. Nazism was constructed on an aggressive nationalism, a revulsion from parliamentary democracy, resolute anti-Marxism, the promotion of the Volksgemeinschaft and racism. All were bound together by the primacy of the German State. Taken together, and with the possible exception of racism, these features can hardly be classed as new or ascribed to being particularly the tenets of Nazi ideology. In electoral terms its success was built on the panic and alienation felt especially by the middle class in the face of a rapidly changing environment and their augmenting fear of a revolution from below under the KPD's theme of 'undiluted class warfare'. Many were enticed by the chauvinistic and imperialistic ambitions of the NSDAP. Interestingly, the policies and meaning of any future National Socialist administration were never explained and remained somewhat vague. The attraction of Nazism was never bound entirely to ideology (or arguably the lack of it), but on the contrary with the style and presentation of the message. This manifested itself in its promotion of the struggle and the role of leadership.13 The NSDAP propaganda machine placed a heavy emphasis on the distinctiveness of the Nazi race doctrine (and thus its distinctiveness from other forms of European fascism).14 The edifice of this new Germany and its 74

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evolution as the capital of the world was to be built uniquely along racial lines, eugenics, sterilization and euthanasia. For the Nazi leadership the world was biologically determined and this was not only appropriate to physical appearance, but was also manifest in the spiritual and psychological sense. The endorsement of racial theory enabled the classification of different races and the identification of primary and secondary branches of which the most gifted was the 'Aryan'. In Mein Kampf Hitler divided the world into three racial groups: the creators of culture, the bearers of culture and inferior peoples or the destroyers of culture. The German people were identified as belonging to the first group and were classified as Aryan. Although this term derives from Indo-European origins, it was never accurately defined by Hitler but quickly came to be associated with the Germans and north Europeans. In essence, Nazi propaganda proclaimed the superiority of the Germanic race, its right to rule and the necessity of preventing sexual relations between the three groups while, in contrast, it condemned those inferior peoples to a state of enslavement and drudgery or even extermination. At the opposite end of the spectrum from Aryan was the Jew. The acceptance and pursuit of racial theory complemented the promotion of an excessive nationalism within the notion of a Volksgemeinschaft for it led logically to the identification of outsiders and those excluded from this national community. Racial theory enabled the Nazis to promote a new strain of anti-Semitism that superseded earlier Christian prejudices of the Jews as well poisoners, butchers of babies and sexual deviants. Now this new strand of biological anti-Semitism classified the Jews as not only an inferior race, but as the counter-race (Gegenrasse) which was intent on destroying and corrupting all the positive values and achievements of the Aryan 'civilization'. Race theory's supposed credibility was immediately evident with the establishing of chairs in race theory in universities across Germany after 1933. It added a new and highly significant twist to modern anti-Semitism. Nazi propaganda came to vilify the Jews and present them as parasites out to destroy individual states while preparing for world domination. It came to identify a list of Jewish crimes that included responsibility for Germany's defeat in 1918, the bolshevik menace that confronted Europe, the Russian Revolution and plans to destroy the creativity and strength of the Aryan race through any deeper social integration and particularly through mixed marriages. Hitler held such 'mixing of the races', in which he included both gypsies and the Poles, as contrary to the rules of nature (sin against the blood) and held firmly to the belief of maintaining pure bloodlines. The simple mythology was helped by several generations of 'patriotic professors and pseudoprophets', and ultimately, all this hatred and venom led directly to the concentration camps. Nevertheless, despite Hitler's strong anti-Semitic

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feelings and those expressed in party documentation in the early 1920s, antiSemitism played 'no more than a secondary role' in the 'transformation from volkisch sect to mass party'. II This is not to deny the significance of the party's anti-Semitic credentials or this common feature among all radical right parties but to recognize the leadership's view that it was an insufficient means to bolster support among the wider electorate. In contrast, the adoption and pursuit of a zealous anti-Marxist rhetoric proved a much more useful aid in terms of both recruitment and impressive electoral returns.!6 For Hitler history had illustrated how life was part of an eternal struggle for survival where only the strongest elements prospered. This struggle was reflected in his ultimate vision for the National Socialist movement that continually necessitated constant action and the pursuit of an ambitious foreign policy and territorial acquisition on Germany's eastern borders. Hitler aspired not only to a Greater German Reich incorporating all ethnic Germans but further territorial acquisition. This was justified on the grounds that the populous German people needed more land in Europe. This was to be realized through the concept of Lebensraum (living space) in the Soviet Union. This aspiration emerged as the cornerstone of Nazi foreign policy, but its realization necessitated the conquest of Russia and the extermination and enslavement of the Slavs. All other policies, and this includes the invasion of France and the war against the UK, were subsidiary and incidental to it. Interestingly, however, the issue of foreign affairs, with the exception of the repeated denunciations of the Versailles peace settlement, was scarcely a feature of Nazi meetings. This is hardly surprising given the economic and social predicament that many Germans were experiencing. Altogether this very brief synopsis of the integral ideas in Mein Kampf raises questions of originality, continuity and sustainability. To conclude it is difficult to identify Nazi ideology as something unique and new to the German political landscape of the 1920s and the 1930s. On the contrary, the ideological components from anti-parliamentarism, anti-Marxism, anti-liberalism, overt nationalism and even the promotion of racism had constituted integral aspects of the radical right's agenda since at least the 1870s. Consequently, to discern Nazism as a distinctive doctrine is simply deceptive. For Hitler himself the masses could not be swayed to the NSDAP's cause through an ideology, but only through action and protest.!7 To this end he conceived of using propaganda as a means to seek to undermine the Republic and the Marxists, to foster resentment especially among the middle classes and to promote extremely vague notions of future action. This propaganda entailed speeches and the use of the new medium of film rather than the pursuit of intellectual argument. In retrospect, that this formula worked is illustrated by the party's surprise breakthrough in 1930, its spectacular results in 1932 and finally its arrival in power in 76

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January 1933. If it is taken that the National Socialist movement was largely void of a coherent ideology, this raises questions about the attraction of the party to the electorate. An examination of both the party's social composition and a profile of its voters will illuminate answers, but central to its success is undoubtedly the role and personality of Adolf Hitler to which this chapter now turns.

Style and leadership More than 100 years after his birth the jury on Hitler's role in policy formulation and direction of National Socialism remains divided over whether he represented a strong dictator and prime mover of policy or whether in contrast he was merely an indecisive and hesitant leader stumbling from one crisis to another. The issue of leadership, so much a common feature of rightwing extremist parties, assumed a very important character in the Nazi struggle for power and party propaganda. The active encouragement by the party of the Fiihrerprinzip culminated in the creation of a Hitler cult within National Socialism in which he was merchandized as hard, ruthless, resolute, uncompromising and radical. Hitler became the personification of National Socialism, but what sort of leader was he in reality and how far did this seemingly dictatorial leadership principle actually exist within the government edifice that was National Socialism? Hitler's role and leadership are subject to diverse interpretations. Historians and political scientists have continually examined and re-analysed the course of events, pored over the somewhat limited documentary materials, spoken with active participants and delved into the personal background of all the leading figures in the NSDAP. 1K When assessing Hitler as an individual and leader, writers often subdivide their interests into two distinct periods. The first centres on his membership of the DAP in 1919 and lasts through the Kampfzeit until the assumption of power in January 1933. The second dates from his usurpation of the German Chancellorship and ended with suicide in a war-ravaged Berlin in April 1945. There can be no doubt that when the Fuhrer wanted something he usually got it. Indeed, Hitler was very much the driving force behind the regime's foreign policy programme and his aggressive intentions quickly became known. A focus on the war years, the Final Solution and the short-lived euthanasia programme however, fails to provide a complete picture of the man himself. These events, of course, cannot be ignored, particularly given a separate school of revisionist historians who seek to plead Hitler's isolation from the evils of the Nazi tyranny. This overview aims to stress the salient aspects of his personality, his style of governance and his attitude towards domestic policy issues.l~

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The task of providing a clear and thorough definition is being aided by the availability of new information from post-communist Russia which should facilitate the process undertaken by a new generation of historians from the early 1980s to assume a much more objective view of the man and the period. This is to be welcomed for it is imperative to establish to what extent one individual could have responsibility for fashioning arguably the 12 worst years in Germany's history and for radically reshaping the map of Europe to the detriment of the former great European powers. Did Hitler assume the guise of driver and determine policy direction, planning and orchestration or did he represent a mere opportunist who was in the right place at the right time and stumbled from crisis to crisis? This debate between the 'intentionalist' and the 'structuralist' interpretations continues to dominate discussions. Before embarking on an assessment of these positions, the next section considers the degree to which the old right had tended to perceive Hitler merely as a tool and a dupe of conservative and big business interests. 2o

Hitler as dupe of the conservative right? German victory in the First World War would have made both the unstable Weimar Republic and the aggressive Third Reich inconceivable. The Imperial system would have been vindicated as a system and under different circumstances history might never have recorded Hitler's name. Events, however, followed a different course, but even then Hitler's Chancellorship proved totally dependent on the initial support of the conservative right. For the old right Hitler and the Nazis simply represented a junior partner and a temporary expedient in their anti-Weimar coalition and in their plans for a return to authoritarian government in the pre-1918 mould. In other words the conservatives were simply prepared to tolerate the NSDAP in the short term. Of the ten cabinet ministers only a further two belonged to the NSDAP. The conservative right's utter miscalculation of Hitler's abilities and intentions was arguably coloured by memories of his failed putsch attempt in 1923 and the awareness of his social background. His early years and background are covered well by Fest, but: there is little to arouse one's interest in the man himself, indeed he is totally submerged in the history of his political movement and the Third Reich.21

Hitler's path to power was far from inevitable, but he seized the initiative when offered. Once in power, however, the old right who actually supported Hitler in his call for fresh elections in March 1933 paid dearly for its underestimation of the 'little corporal'. Hitler quickly outwitted his senior partners and implemented the real political revolution that by 1938 had gradually seen the displacement of the old conservative right. This task 78

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had been greatly facilitated through Hermann Goring's position as interior minister of Prussia, Germany's most important state. Once in charge of the police forces he was able to initiate moves to eradicate all the NSDAP's political opponents, to stop all police initiatives against the SA and the SS and thus help cOQsolidate the party's position. In retrospect, the conservatives were simply duped by Hitler's own opportunism, ambition and real personality that only really came to the fore after Hindenburg's death. Hitler as strategist and master of the Reich

The absence of any credible and coherent ideology gave rise to the early assessments of Hitler's sheer opportunism, but such a portrayal severely underestimated this particular individual. Not until the 1960s did historians begin to revise their perceptions and present Hitler as a more assertive figure driven by ambition and intent on pursuing a particular set of longterm objectives. 22 How he achieved these may have been open to varying degrees of chance, but his negotiating skills, as evident in the 1938 Munich crisis, cannot be overlooked. Bracher has described Hitler as a man with crystalline ideas, as outlined, albeit rather crudely, in his two books, and has identified him as the dominant architect of general policy orchestration. The centrality of Hitler as the unifying force behind National Socialism is demonstrated repeatedly in many attempts to analyse the organization, characteristics and functioning of the Third Reich. It found added support from Hildebrand's thesis of monocratic rather than polycratic rule.21 This theme of dynamic, energetic and strong leadership that was cultivated and skilfully portrayed in the propaganda and newsreels created by the Goebbels propaganda machine was powerful imagery, but did this notion of order and structure typify Nazi rule? The generally perceived image of the Nazi-led government is one of clarity, coherence, discipline and structure. It owes more to illusion and skilful presentation, however, than actual reality as the Nazi administrative machine, particularly with regard to domestic policy matters, was highly disorganized and even chaotic in its management. Indeed, it was highly reminiscent of 'authoritarian anarchy'. Carr argues that: 'a more exact parallel would be with feudal society, where vassals great and small struggled endlessly with each other and with their overlords to establish themselves as the king's chief advisor.'24 The regime certainly defied modern concepts of governance. Moreover as the Weimar constitution was never formally abolished the actual process for most of the Reich's history whereby all legislation and executive power was determined by the Fuhrer remained far removed to all sense and purposes from constituting actual legality. In contrast the Reichstag, a major organ of legal authority under Weimar, was transformed into a rubber-stamping institution. 79

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At an initial glance the Nazi state may have seemed relatively straightforward with Hitler presiding over a Reich government that comprised some 14 ministries in 1935 and where decisions were reached at cabinet level. The reality of policy making was rather more complex. Part of the problem of the complexities of Nazi rule centred on the failure of the Nazi leadership to fuse the party's institutions and the state administration on assuming office. Thus the old institutions of the state existed and competed against the party to serve Hitler's needs. Moreover, although in the very early years of the Reich there was some semblance of cabinet government this system of decision making was gradually dissolved (and particularly after Hindenburg's death).25 Thereafter Hitler's decision to combine the role of Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor and transform himself into the sole authority within the Third Reich sowed even greater confusion. This need not necessarily have been the case, however. Had Hitler shown a strong interest in the responsibilities of individual ministries he could have laid down priorities and cabinet meetings could have established a common approach and means for implementation. Instead, Hitler remained aloof from most of the day-to-day policy formulation and direction and thereby created a vacuum at the very heart of the Nazi government machine. His personal authority was often delegated to subordinates who supposedly initiated and implemented the will of the Fuhrer. This left ministers to define their own agendas and create their own individual fiefdoms, in many cases without reference to their colleagues. The system became a competitive struggle between ministers to both please and meet the wishes of the Fuhrer. These personal fiefdoms were not bound by rules or any legal restraints and as such were left unsupervised largely to develop their own interests and agendas. The only real force that managed to initiate and maintain degrees of contact between the ministries and facilitate their contacts was the head of the Reich chancellery, Hans-Heinrch Lammers. The overall picture of government was further complicated through the creation of specialist government agencies that came to cut across government departments without actually being answerable to the department in question. A further aspect of complexity was provided by the ability of the Gauleiter to have direct access to Hitler and thus bypass his ministers. 2ii In retrospect there was no formal hierarchical structure to the administration of Nazi Germany. All agencies, bodies and ministries were ultimately answerable to Hitler but the system was very much unco-ordinated and unstructured. 27 Such images of bureaucratic confusion have supported those who perceive Hitler as essentially a rather weak leader and have led to the classification of the entire administrative system as a dictatorship without a genuine dictator. Detractors of this thesis argue that Hitler knew exactly 80

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what he was doing by creating such a system and his aim was simply to 'divide and rule' his potential rivals. The opportunist school provides three principal arguments for its assessment of weak leadership. In the first it is argued that Hitler's preference for resisting taking policy decisions so as to remain outside factional politics and delegating these duties to his immediate entourage actually translated into administrative chaos. This view of the resultant perplexity rejects any notion of a skilled and intentional Machiavellian 'divide and rule' strategy in favour of one of general weakness and indecisiveness. The second example of Hitler's weakness, it is often maintained, centres on his inability to prove a decisive influence in all areas and is supported by incidents where his actual wishes were either sidelined or ignored by subordinates. One of the most notable examples was clearly demonstrated by Albert Speer's refusal to lay waste to the German countryside in later 1944. Finally, the opportunists and critics of the strong leadership thesis stress the point that ultimately Hitler was dependent on the forces of the army and big business whom he was unable to control and who (in the early years) were potential threats to his hold on power. 2H This approach, however, largely misses the crucial point that the system was built entirely around the Fuhrer. Hitler's basis for support was built on 'charismatic leadership' and as such he speedily rejected the traditional forms of government and placed his reliance on his own personal authority. He envisaged his role as 'leader of the German people' and deliberately sought to avoid involvement in any policy that could damage his authority or prove both unpopular and divisive. The realities of the bureaucratic chaos certainly engendered confusion and inefficiencies and to comprehend the reasons for this incoherence we need look no further than the personality of Adolf Hitler. An examination of the Fithrer's personality and daily life seems to give support to the opportunist interpretations of Hitler's role. His daily routine showed his disdain and even disinterest in affairs of state and policy issues. Far from being the dynamic and energetic persona often portrayed by the media he was in reality rather lazy and work shy. He always woke late and usually after midday for lunch.2~ Hitler showed little in the way of either interest or enthusiasm for the policy-making processes or the issues of implementation. His frequent jaunts around the country meant he was often absent from the seat of government. In addition, his aversion to putting anything on paper, his inaccessibility even to senior ministers, his disinterest in a whole range of substantial issues extending across the socio-economic realms, his disinterest in 'mundane' daily problems, his unwillingness to intervene to resolve disputes between his colleagues and his particular propensity to become highly enthusiastic about half-baked ideas from his 81

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sycophantic entourage all prevented the development of any rational coherence in government. He expended little energy on government dossiers and was only too prepared to leave the role of transforming and transposing his visions (although less true with regard to foreign policy) into some form of coherent policy to his subordinates. This situation was made more complex and confusion often reigned because Hitler asked different individuals to consider identical problems and priorities. This intensified petty rivalries and jealousies at the heart of the Nazi administration, as different departments and personalities vied to attract Hitler's personal attention and patronage. Herein lay the reasons for the reality of chaotic governance that was typified by overlapping and conflicting spheres of authority between particular ministries and constant internecine quarrels between the party agencies and the state. 10 There were high amounts of duplicity operating at all levels and corruption was widespread. Nevertheless, at its very heart lay Hitler who usurped the entire legal system and law to become the law and force behind National Socialism. On an individual level Hitler was essentially a loner. He had few, if any, close associates or friends. He found it difficult to make friends, but seemed in private to enjoy the company of women. His loyal lover and only true companion, Eva Braun, was kept at a distance in public terms, while he surrounded himself with cronies, party hacks and petty criminals who were loath to criticize him. In office he never led a private life and continued to fantasize about building projects and visions for a new Germany. These included his plans for the architectural rejuvenation of Berlin and its transformation into a new world capital, Germania. At the centre of this scheme he envisaged a new assembly hall rising to 900 feet high and large enough to house 180,000 people. These visions were translated into long monologues to anyone who would listen. Hitler himself, however, was an extremely bad listener and had a tendency to pace up and down constantly fidgeting or looking intensely bored when others spoke. He exhibited little interest in any of the personal and sporting pleasures, although he did display an apparent fondness for Hollywood films and in particular westerns. His supposed love of music was severely restricted to the powerfully emotive Wagner operas and the lesser but more popular operettas such as Die Fledermaus. What livened him were the spectacular events of the Nazi calendar year from anniversaries of the seizure of power on 30 January to commemoration of the fallen in the Munich putsch on 8/9 November 1923. Bonfires, torchlight processions, parades, frequent firework displays and demonstrations were all enthusiastically appreciated and Hitler always took a very meticulous interest in arranging every minute facet down to lighting, uniforms and flags at the Nuremberg rallies. 82

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All these events were visually impressive and lent themselves well to propaganda for both the domestic and international market. The staging of the 1936 summer Olympic Games in Berlin exerted an almost hypnotic impact on the population and the opportunity was seized upon by Goebbels to portray a very positive view of the Reich to the outside world. In the weeks before the arrival of the teams and the spectators the streets and roads were cleaned, repainted and all signs of tension removed. All antiSemitic placards and anti-government graffiti were whitewashed. Hitler's sense of image mirrored his interests in arts and film and in many ways he could be described as a budding actor himself. In all his public and private dealings with adjutants and foreign statesmen he came to employ a whole series of emotions and often engaged in very cleverly constructed and developed, almost hysterical tirades to leave people in awe. Hitler remained obsessive about his position and extremely distrustful of all other forms of institutional loyalty and authority centred on the army, the civil service, the church and even his own cabinet ministers. He effectively wished to preside as an 'absolute monarch' and sought to determine all policy direction while strongly resistant to all efforts to create a clear and coherent line of command. In practice, Hitler loathed cabinet meetings lest he be forced to come down on one side or another and preferred to take the role of a figure above factional party politics. In many instances it proved highly difficult to get the Fuhrer to make decisions. The overall evidence suggests that the Fuhrer regarded any internal bickering as productive from his point of view, safe in the knowledge that he would ultimately be the final arbiter. Partly, any explanation for this seeming chaos owes much to Hitler's tenacity in preserving control over all his colleagues. He preferred them to propose, develop and implement policy, but only with his seal of approval. The operation of a 'divide and rule' strategy, as put forward by the intentionalist school as a means to exert control, demonstrates clear evidence of his pivotal role in shaping policy and carries some considerable weight. Evidence to support it came from Hitler's former press chief, Otto Dietrich, who argued that it was usually manifest in the creation and duplication of offices all trying to control particular sectors and areas. l1 In practice he tended only to intervene when it was clear which side looked certain to win and when the outcome looked certain to prove popular with the public. Hitler was almost obsessed with his own personal popularity. These were hardly the best means to attain a system of effective decision making and occasionally Hitler's celebrated bouts of enthusiasm led him to err. One such case occurred in October 1934 when Robert Ley, the Labour Front leader, persuaded the Fuhrer to sign a decree enhancing the power of the Labour Front vis ii vis the Economics Ministry and the Ministry of 83

The Radical Right in Germany

Labour. Both ministries protested vehemently to Hitler who, aware of the loss of face any decision to revoke the decree would arouse, opted instead never to enact the decree. 12 In short, rivalries were intense and apparent at every level of the political and administrative system in the absence of clear lines of authority. Jurisdictional overlapping and the pursuit of Hitler's patronage sustained this intense antagonism that flourished among the Nazi leadership. Conflicting interests and personality clashes typified the daily state of the Third Reich. For example, Goring's Central Office for the Four Year Plan impinged on the autonomy and responsibilities of the Economics Ministry and, in turn, Goring's office was to be overshadowed by the Army Economics and Armaments Office and the Ministry of Armaments and Munitions. This last ministry was established by Hitler, according to the Goebbels diaries, and eventually superseded the responsibilities of the Economics Ministry under, in particular, Fritz Todt and Albert Speer. The degree of confusion only intensified through his appointments of his own special plenipotentiaries. These were court favourites assigned to handle specific issues and were answerable directly to the Fuhrer himself. Most were active in the arena of foreign affairs and soothed Hitler's distrust of the Foreign Office. In reality, it is simply impossible to know to what extent such appointments were deliberate efforts to sabotage fellow colleagues insofar as he allowed both Goring and Himmler, and later in the war Martin Bormann, to amass substantial fortunes and powers. A reluctance to move against onetime loyalists was evident in his hesitations over the Rohm affair where he had to be practically steered by his two 'loyal' lieutenants Hermann and Heinrich. 13 As a means of maintaining his national and regional authority, close and direct relations were fostered with many Gauleiter. 34 This bond of personalloyalty with the party proved advantageous for both sides and simply overwhelmed other members of the Nazi hierarchy.lS For example, Hitler rejected the rationalization plans for German government put forward by Wilhelm Frick, the Interior Minister, in 1934 which would have brought about greater control to the Reich government by making the Gauleiter answerable to the Interior Ministry. Frick remained undaunted and continued to devise schemes for Reich reform that aimed to secure greater centralization and produce a more efficient administrative form of authority. These schemes which included an attempt to replace the Enabling Act by a new Reich constitution and the institution of a senate to elect Hitler's successor were all in vain. Even the feared Himmler found it immensely difficult to influence the Gauleiter (whose actual positions were worthless as the old federal states had been abolished and functional existence represented another anachronism 84

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of the regime). This relationship and direct line to the Fuhrer ensured that the Gauleiter retained considerable power. Consequently, in the day-to-day running of the Third Reich the Gauleiter and other party officials conducted policy largely as they saw fit and claimed to base their conduct on the Fuhrer's designs and sayings. Partly, the explanation for much of the chaos reflects Hitler's actual approach to the workings of government and even dictatorial government and his distaste for minor matters. Yet, this particular organizational structure, which was of his own making, served Hitler's purposes well and embodied one that he was very reluctant to alter. Reservations from the opportunists' perspective may pertain to the centrality of Hitler's direct involvement in policy development in all spheres. Although it is true that he exerted less interest with regard to domestic and economic policy than he showed towards foreign and racial policy, and that the Nazi regime never developed a consistent social policy, Hitler was not unaware of its importance. Hitler's general lack of enthusiasm, however, has been reflected in numerous biographies that, unfortunately, have tended to underestimate the importance of the socio-economic situation for the individual. In government Hitler feared greatly any signs of social unrest and the haemorrhaging of support. The entire system was geared to respond to public concerns and to court general popularity. Consequently, any degrees of scepticism and distrust among the workers constituted a crisis for the Nazi regime and persisted long after the free trade unions had been disbanded and outlawed. In response the Nazi regime sought to secure popular support through the provision of material goods and, most notably, the car. 16 Indeed, in the darkest days of war the government was unprepared to sacrifice material goods even in the interest of the armamentsled economy. This fear pushed the regime towards a repetition of the Wilhelminian government's 'social imperialism'. This direction reflected Hitler's keen interest, and the goals of territorial conquest and German mastery of the European continent epitomize the most conspicuous of Hitler's objectives. His tirades against the Versailles settlement and his demands for a redrawing of the map of Europe based on self-determination for the Germans became the clarion cry of a generation. These calls were duplicated by all parties on the right of the German political spectrum after 1919 and even if Hitler had not come to power it is highly likely that a conservative administration would have maintained the process of dismantling a post-war settlement that already exhibited by the early 1930s signs of dissolution and decay. This was marked by the isolationist position adopted by the United States of America, the absence of the USSR, continuing differences between France and Britain, Japanese territorial expansion in Korea and China and the victory of fascism in Italy. German foreign policy, no matter of which 85

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political hue, would have been intent on exploiting these differences and filling the vacuum left by the collapse of the old Russian and AustroHungarian empires. Germany was in an enviable position to benefit from this and strengthen her hold and dominance, both economically and politically, across central and eastern Europe. Whether such moves under a different administration would have culminated in a major outbreak of hostilities must remain a subject for conjecture. Hitler did not waste any opportunity in outlining his enthusiasm for territorial expansion to the Reichswehr leadership in early February 1933. This was the main and arguably only area where he exhibited genuine interest. His audience was neither worried nor disturbed by his aspirations. On the contrary, they and the other forces of the old right welcomed the overall necessity of military action if necessary to redraw Germany's eastern borders and supported the drive to overhaul the terms of the Versailles Treaty. They were equally supportive of Hitler's decision to withdraw Germany from the League of Nations which continued to call for German demilitarization. This decision was greeted enthusiastically by the German people and effectively marked the onset of Nazi Germany's expansionist phase. This continued with an attempted coup in Austria in 1934, the Rhineland crisis in 1936, the Anschlu~ with Austria in 1938, the dismemberment and absorption of Czechoslovakia in 1938/39, the two non-aggression pacts with Poland in 1935 and the Soviet Union in 1939 and finally full-scale war with France and the United Kingdom and by 1941 with the USA and the USSR. With knowledge of later events the signing of the non-aggression pacts may appear somewhat strange, but these were calculated moves. The Polish accord was designed to weaken France's alliance system and help Germany breach France's cordon sanitaire and diplomatic isolation and ensured that Poland as a minor ally could be used as a buffer state in the future war against the principal ideological opponent in the east, as embodied by the Soviet Union. This first pact was endorsed despite some vocal opposition from the conservative right while the agreement with Moscow was undertaken as a means to intimidate western democracies and to prevent them from initiating any aggressive actions against Germany. For the Nazi leadership this merely represented a transitory agreement that ended with the invasion of Russia in the summer of 1941. Hitler's determination for war was illustrated by the scale of his territorial ambitions that were vividly outlined in the 1937 Hossbach Protocol. 3 ? As time progressed and diplomatic victories were continually registered Hitler's mastery of foreign affairs increased. In practice, this led him to distance himself from the Aussenpolitisches Amt (Foreign Office) and to make decisions at the Berghof rather than in Berlin. 86

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The historical evidence indicates that Hitler played a decisive role in policy making, but doubts still persist among historians over his objectives and the coherence of his plans. In other words, was the course of action in the field of foreign affairs clearly planned and executed in a step-by-step process; was it nothing more than unbridled opportunism; or was it merely the continuation of the policies and priorities initiated under Weimar? There seems little doubt that Hitler appreciated that his desire for Lebensraum in eastern Europe could bring about war. He was prepared to gamble in the hope that any such wars could be localized through a series of agreements. This was most manifest in his decision, driven by the fear of a renewed twofront campaign, to sign a pact with his major foe in the east and thereby postpone his attack on the Soviet Union, until he had neutralized the western liberal democracies. One of the pitfalls surrounding any biography relates to the danger of overestimating the significance of a particular individual's role in policy making and direction. This generality does not apply for the most part to any consideration of Hitler. 1x Historians generally now accept that his personal convictions provide the greatest insight into the force of Nazism, although other personalities cannot be discounted. To the very end: Hitler remained ... the sole master of the movement which he had himself inspired and which he was, by his personal leadership, to ruin. Neither Rohm nor Himmler, neither the army nor the Junkers, neither high finance nor heavy industry, ever controlled that demonic and disastrous genius, whatever assistance they may at times have given or received, with whatever hopes or credulities they may have solaced their occasional misgivings, their frequent disappointments. 19

Hitler greatly feared losing the momentum of his struggle and was always compelled towards new ideas and plans to renew and reinvigorate the movement. Arguably the entire administrative structure had become so complicated by the late 1930s that it would have required 'a superhuman leader to be aware of its real nature and construction,.40 To this end Hitler may have fallen victim to his own creation. In retrospect, pressurized to maintain its energy and earlier dynamism the leadership found itself being manoeuvred into pursuing ever more radical policies and particularly foreign policy initiatives to divert attention away from internal problems. It is interesting to note that there exists an extremely close relationship between domestic and foreign policy for right-wing extremist and totalitarian regimes. As time passed and as the autonomy of the leader augmented so the beginnings of delusions of grandeur and a diminishing sense of reality began to set in. He became isolated from real events during the second half of the war. He never at any stage visited the front or any of the bombed cities once the fortunes of war had turned against Berlin. His detachment from 87

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events intensified after the July 1944 plot had almost succeeded in killing him and by 1945 the once enigmatic and bombastic Fuhrer had become a shell of his former self. As a virtual hermit he had moved, still accompanied by his cronies, from base to base in the last months of the war, from Rastenberg in East Prussia to the Taunus Hills and finally to the Reich Chancellery. There Hitler clung relentlessly to his great dreams until the very end, like some figure in Wagner's Gotterdammerung, hoping against all odds to secure victory from the clutches of defeat.

Conclusions Hitler became the most extreme, the most anti-Semitic, the most anticommunist and, arguably, the most anti-democratic demagogue to attain political power in modern German history. That the regime suffered from 'polycratic' or fragmented and multi-institutional decision making stemmed much from the way in which National Socialism came to power (its necessity for co-operation with the forces of the old conservative right), the structure of the party and Hitler's own style of leadership.41 Few serious historians have been ready to dismiss Hitler as mad. Individual peculiarities he may have had (these extended from hypochondria, compulsive disorder syndrome to hysterical outpourings). Towards the end of his life as his isolation and megalomania grew so the outcome of his particular brand of conviction politics ironically attained everything that he had so vehemently opposed during his political struggle. Hitler's war concluded with the division of Germany, the implementation of democracy in western Germany, the advance of communism into eastern Europe and eastern Germany and the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. What are we to make of National Socialism? At the outset it is tempting to equate National Socialism with the other brands of fascism and authoritarianism that prevailed in Germany, Italy, Spain and eastern Europe during the interwar period. National Socialism should not be perceived as either just another form of totalitarianism or merely just an extreme brand of fascism for this simply minimizes its true revolutionary aspects. The onset and existence of Nazism truly initiated a major revolutionary change in the nature and structure of the German state and political system. How far this amounted to what has been termed a 'social revolution' remains more debateable. 42 Did it, for example, achieve its aim of creating a genuine Volksgemeinschaft (people's community) that united the German people into a new racial community once the old problems of class and confession had been overcome? The short answer is probably no, but it is difficult to make any decisive conclusions given the short period of National Socialist rule and the onset of war within it. After all, in order to survive in its initial 88

National Socialist ideology and leadership

phase and be in a position to consolidate its hold on the levers of power it was forced to come to terms with certain aspects and the vested interests of the 'old order', principally the army, the churches and big business. The Hitler state never tried to break up the large agricultural estates through any form of land redistribution and as such the large landowners of 1933 remained the large landowners of 1945 and big business was also left largely unscathed, although the government heavily promoted and encouraged the formation of cartels across all sectors of the German economy. This process of cartelization thwarted the spirit of competition, increased profits and maintained the power of the business elites. Moreover this relationship was facilitated by the regime's growing emphasis on rearmament after 1934. The army also represented, for the most part, an ally of the system. They had much in common. The German high command, for example, supported the Nazi's persecution of the left, its emphasis on increased military expenditure, its constant condemnation of the Versailles settlement and Hitler's emphasis on territorial acquisitions and annexation. In contrast the positions of the overwhelming majority of the some 70 million Germans did not alter radically to any great extent. The period continued to witness a flight from the land that led to growing urbanization. This process was essentially generated by the new working opportunities that were available (and many were connected to a rearmament drive) in the cities and towns. While it is also true that wages in the 1930s rose, this owed much more to the principle of pay being directly linked to productivity (the so-called Leistungsprinzip) that rewarded the most productive and generally younger workers, and an increase in the length of the working day. Overall the inequalities of wealth, property ownership and life expectancy were the same in 1945 as they had been in 1933 for both the middle and working classes. Some elements of society fared worse than others during this period including women (discussed in chapter 5) but in more positive terms the regime offered up new opportunities and the possibility of social mobility for certain individuals. The common determinant for upward mobility and the ability to secure enhanced job prospects and wages was essentially membership of the NSDAP or its affiliated organizations. In its own time Nazism was largely ignored as a potential threat and was continually underestimated on account of the lack of any serious ideology and distinct programme. These judgements missed the point for not only did they not appreciate that the Nazi creed was used as mere polemics, they also did not attempt to provide any serious contemplation of what Nazism actually comprised. National Socialism embodied a revolutionary force that restructured German society and effectively eliminated the old aristocracy as a source of power and privilege. In political terms it had been supplanted by Nazism by 1938 and it is noticeable that in its absence there was a shift 89

The Radical Right in Germany

to greater radicalization of its policy agenda. (This will be covered in chapter 6.) Ironically, perhaps the weakening of the old aristocracy would ultimately prove highly beneficial in the moulding and forging of a new democratic Germany (in western Germany) after 1945.

Notes 1 M. Freeman, Atlas of Nazi Germany, London, 1987, p. 1. For a selection of some of the best works on this period see 1. Kershaw, Hitler: Hubris, 1889-1936, London, 1998; by the same author The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives on Interpretation, London, 1989; K. Hildebrand, The Third Reich, London, 1984; J. Hiden and J. Farquharson, Explaining Hitler's Germany, London, 1983; C. Leitz (ed.) The Third Reich: The Essential Readings, London, 1998; Martin Broszat, The Hitler State. The Foundations and Development of the Internal Structure of the Third Reich, London, 1981; Norbert Frei, National Socialist Rule in Germany. The Fuhrer State 1933-45, Oxford, 1983; Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, Nazism 1919-45. A Documentary Reader, Exeter, 1983-88. 2 These works provide two contrasting interpretations of the regime and its times. As might be expected Speer's Inside the Third Reich, London, 1972 represents an insider's, and more sympathetic, account of the Hitler state whereas the second, written by an American journalist stationed in Berlin in the 1920s, adopts a much more critical approach. These are interesting in themselves but need to be accessed alongside the standard academic works. 3 1. Kershaw, 'Ideology, propaganda and the rise of the Nazi Party' in P. Stachura (ed.) The Nazi Machtergreifung, London, 1983, p. 162. 4 Hermann Rauschning was an early member of the NSDAP and served as President of the Danzig Senate from 1933 to 1934. However, disenchantment with Nazi policy, direction and Hitler himself ultimately forced him to flee Germany and settle finally in the United States in 1940. 5 Hermann Rauschning, Revolution of Nihilism, New York, 1939. These views were repostulated in one of the most authoritative and classic works on Hitler and Nazism: see Alan Bullock, Hitler. A Study in Tyranny, Harmondsworth, 1955. 6 A. Hitler, Mein Kampf, London, 1938, p. 156. For works on Hitler and his ideas see also N. Stone, Hitler, London, 1980 and W. B. Smith, Adolf Hitler: His Family, Childhood and Youth, Stanford, 1967. For information on Nazi ideology see W. B. Smith, The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism, London, 1989. 7 Subsequently made into one volume. 8 For other works on Hitler see Ian Kershaw, Hitler, Hubris 1889-1936, London, 1998; by the same author Hitler 1936-1945, London, 2000; William Carr, Hitler: A Study in Personality and Politics, London, 1972; Eberhard Jackel, Hitler in History, 1984; Joachim Fest, Hitler, London, 1974; D. Geary, Hitler and Nazism, London, 1993 (especially chapter 1, 'Hitler: the man and his ideas'); M. Broszat, Hitler and the Collapse of Weimar Germany, Leamington Spa, 1987. 9 In his lifetime some 8 million copies were sold in Germany. How many were actually opened and read is another matter. The aspirations seemed fantastic from a 1920s' perspective and overall it provides only a very loose guide (the anti-Semitism sections apart) for the direction of the NSDAP in power. 10 Geary, Hitler and Nazism, p. 4.

90

National Socialist ideology and leadership

11 P. Moreau, Nationalsozialismus von Links, Stuttgart, 1984, p. 237. 12 These socialist aspirations within the Nazi Party would live on into the Federal Republic of Germany and become the core ideological standpoint of a minority of neo-Nazi groups in the 1980s and the 1990s, including, most noticeably, the Nationalist Front. 13 Ian Kershaw, Hitler, Hubris 1889-1936, p. 165. 14 Klaus Hildebrand, Das Dritte Reich, Munich, 1979. 15 Ian Kershaw, Hitler, Hubris 1889-1936, p. 168. 16 Peter Merkl, Political Violence under the Swastika, Princeton, 1975, pp. 522-3. 17 Hitler's disinterest in the use of ideas as a means of attracting support and his belief in the use of propaganda were already evident in Mein Kampf, especially chapter 6. 18 Once again, this avenue is made possible in the absence of any clear statements of intent. No minutes of Hitler's meetings were kept and much of such documentary evidence that did exist was destroyed in advance of the German surrender in May 1945. These realities have posed substantial difficulties for researchers who have had to rely on the surviving informal tabletalk and the statements of indirect witnesses. 19 For examples, see the works of individuals such as David Irving, one of the most well-known revisionist historians, including Hitler's War, London, 1983 and Goebbels: Mastermind of the Third Reich, London, 1996; also see the publications and journal from the Institute for Historical Review in Los Angeles. 20 Such views have been constantly portrayed by Marxist historians and particularly those who worked under the former East German regime. In the GDR anti-fascism was effectively enshrined as an indispensable pillar of the state's ideology and legitimacy. It was used as a tool to attack the forces of capitalism and imperialism that were epitomized in the then West German State. The Marxist-Leninist interpretation is adopted by, among others, Wolfgang Ruge, Das Ende von Weimar, Monopolkapital und Hitler, Berlin, 1983 and D. Eichholtz and K. Gossweiler (eds) Faschismusforschungen. Position en, Probleme, Politik, Berlin, 1980. 21 See Karl Dietrich Bracher, 'The role of Hitler: perspectives of interpretation' in Walter Laqueur (ed.) Fascism, London, 1975. 22 Andreas Hillgruber was one of the first to commence the reinterpretation. See Hitlers Stategie: Kriegsftihrung und Politik 1940-41, Frankfurt am Main, 1965. 23 See Klaus Hildebrand, 'Monokratie oder Polykratie? Hitlers Herrschaft und das Dritte Reich' in G. Hirschfeld and L. Kettenacker (eds)' Der Ftihrerstaat: Mythos und Realitat. Studien zur Struktur und Politik des Dritten Reiches, Stuttgart, 1981, pp. 73-97. 24 William Carr, Hitler: A Study in Personality and Politics, p. 41. 25 The number of cabinet meetings declined rapidly from 72 in 1933 to only six in 1937 and just one in 1938. Thereafter, they were consigned to memory. 26 Some of the best examples centre on the Reich Labour Service and the Office of the Four Year Plan. These bodies were known as Supreme Reich authorities and were answerable only to Hitler. They possessed the power to issue binding decrees and operated without reference to one another. 27 For works supporting the polycratic nature of Nazi rule see R. Bessel and E. j. Feuchtwanger (eds) Social Change and Political Development in the Weimar Republic, London, 1981; Ian Kershaw, Hitler, London, 1991. 28 I. Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, London, 1991, p. 70. 29 Prior to Hindenburg's death he was the model chancellor. He turned up on time for work and discharged his duties with care and consideration.

91

The Radical Right in Germany

30 Once in power, the prime responsibility for the leadership of the NSDAP fell to Rudolf Hess although the party was to all sense and purposes defunct after March 1933. 31 O. Dietrich, Zwolf Jahre mit Hitler, Cologne/Munich, 1955. 32 Noakes and Pridham, Nazism, vol. 2, Exeter, 1984, pp. 343-5. 33 Both were to pursue, against Hitler's orders, essentially quixotic peace proposals with the Americans in the closing months of the war and in the wake of the rapid advance westwards of the Soviet forces. Both attempts were rebuffed by the Americans who were set on Germany's unconditional surrender. 34 By 1944 there were some 42 Gaue. These varied considerably in size and population. Within the borders of Germany in 1937 they roughly corresponded to Reichstag constituencies. The Gauleiter were Hitler's direct representatives in these regions and after the leading Nazi officials they were the most powerful figures within the Reich. Structurally the Gaue were at the head of four further subdivisions namely the Kreise (districts), the Ortsgruppen (parts of cities, small towns etc.), Zellen (cells) comprising streets and Blocke (blocks) constituting street blocks. For maps of the areas see M. Freeman, Atlas of Nazi Germany, pp. 66-7. 35 There were, in effect, several different forms of territorial organization under the Reich. The Gaue formed the territorial base of the Nazi Party. In addition, each of the Reich government's ministries retained its own administrative system in the regions. For example, the Finance Ministry had 28 administrative districts while the Propaganda Ministry had 38. Added to this were the Supreme Reich agencies and, of course, the armed forces. In reality there was little in the way of co-ordination between these various bodies. It should be emphasized that plans were drawn up on several occasions to bring greater cohesiveness through administrative reform but such efforts were dashed by conflicts, rivalries and jealousies between those bodies involved. 36 A. Speer, Inside the Third Reich, Hanover/London, 1972. 37 The summary of Hitler's speech was minuted by Colonel Hossbach and it fell into American hands in 1945. See chapter 6 for further details. The speech was used at Nuremberg to provide clear proof of Germany's actions but the authenticity has often been questioned. In reality there is now widespread belief that it is factually correct. See H. W. Koch, 'Hitler and the origins of the Second World War' in E. M. Robertson (ed.) The Origins of the Second World War: Historical Interpretations, London, 1982, pp. 158-88. 38 Some psycho-historical 'studies' of Hitler have portrayed him as a psychopath with a disturbed adolescence, physical defects (having only one testicle) and psychic problems; perhaps in this day and age later works will try to identify sexual abuse. Inspect for example R. Waite, Adolf Hitler: The Psychopathic God, New York, 1977. Such accounts of a psychopath may sell very well at airport kiosks but they detract from the subject and do not come anywhere near to supplying sufficient explanations for the rise of Hitler, his assumption of power and the pursuit of policies from 1933 to the collapse of the Third Reich. 39 H. R. Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler, London, 1971, p. 35. 40 Freeman, Atlas of Nazi Germany, p. 51. 41 See Geary, op.cit., pp. 44-6. 42 D. Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution, London, 1966.

92

Chapter 5

Party membership and propensity for violence National Socialism had arisen almost phoenix-like in the space of a few years from one of a number of extreme right volkisch groups to establish itself as the largest political force within German politics and, with the willing connivance of the old right, entered the Reich govn' ment in 1933. The task of identifying the Nazi constituency and thus the reasons for the advance and coming to power of the National Socialists, particularly given what is now known about the Nazi regime in power and the atrocities it committed, have engrossed and preoccupied the careers of many historians ever since. Political scientists too (see chapter 7) have endeavoured to unlock the characteristics that laid the basis for the success of the NSDAP in their efforts to analyse whether such qualities can still be applied as explanations for the surges in support of contemporary right-wing extremism. There is considerable validity for such investigation. The starting point for any study into the social composition of Nazism must be located before the Machtergreifung (seizure of power) in 1933 as party membership after this date became a compulsory requirement for many public and private sector professions and subsequent career progression. In other words, any attempt to analyse the eight million members the party had amassed by 1945 would almost certainly provide a rather ambiguous and deceptive account of the membership base.' Any analysis should focus on the period from the Nazi breakthrough in the September 1930 elections to the further successes in the two national polls of 1932 and, in particular, the July elections where the NSDAP received 37.3 per cent of the vote. During this period the electoral growth was replicated in terms of party membership which rose from 126,523 members in 1930 to 849,009 members by January 1933. 2 The emphasis on the 1932 results as our reference point may seem initially curious given the fact that NSDAP received 43.9 per cent of the vote, its highest ever share, in the March 1933 elections. However, these are generally deemed an unreliable indicator of trends given that they took place against the backdrop of rising intimidation, terror and violent attacks on the NSDAP's opponents and were effectively and deliberately designed by Hitler to attain a majority for the NSDAP at the expense of its opponents, most notably the SPD and the KPD. The new administration skilfully exploited 93

The Radical Right in Germany

its powers and control of the state's police and security forces to impede the activities of rival political forces. The intimidation largely worked and by March 1933 the majority of the KPD's leaders had either been arrested or fled abroad. Nevertheless, even under these circumstances the other main parties not only campaigned vigorously, but performed well at the polls.3 More surprisingly, given these circumstances, the NSDAP only managed to boost its percentage of the vote to 44 per cent. It only just managed to scrape an overall majority in the Reichstag with the aid of the 8 per cent obtained by its conservative partners, the DNVP. Disappointing as this may have been, it nevertheless proved a decisive moment and paved the way for the introduction of the Enabling Act which enabled Hitler to rule without consultation or approval from either the Reichstag or the president and confirmed the right's antipathy toward democratic channels that had been plainly visible since Bruning. The speed of the restructuring process was phenomenal and within six months of arriving in power Germany had been transformed into a one-party state as practically all the forces of opposition to the new order disappeared or were silenced. Only three independent institutions remained, namely the Protestant and Catholic churches and the army. The success of the NSDAP in broadening its base has long prompted attempts to explain its escalating fortunes (see table 5.1). At the time references were made repeatedly to the unfavourable economic and social environment that, following the practical collapse of the German economy, had inflicted substantial degrees of hardship on many industrial workers and wrought havoc in many agricultural communities. This gave rise to the growing perceptions of political uncertainty and alienation from the political system. 4 This sudden change in circumstances upset the fragmentation of the 'milieux' that had ensured a strong and remarkable degree of party political stability from 1871 to 1929. 5 Taken together these factors certainly helped to foster a breeding ground for extreme political forces and contributed to the radicalization of German political life in the early 1930s. Table 5.1

The rise of the NSDAP, 1928-32

Votes cast

1928 1930 1932 (June) 1932 (Nov) 1933

812,000 6.4 13.8 11.7 17.3

% of vote Seats gained Membership (votes in millions and rounded percentages)

2.6 18.3 37.3 33.1 43.9

12 107 230 196 288

95,000 126,523

--

849,009

Sources: Falter, j., Lindcnburger, T. and Schumann, S. (eds) (1986) Wahlen und Abstimmungen in der Weimarer Republik, Munich, p. 44; Freeman, M. (1987) Atlas of Nazi Germany, London; Bracher, K. D. (1982) The German Dictatorship, London

94

Party membership and violence

This process was manifest in the virtually complete disintegration of the liberal parties and the middle-class abandonment of the conservative right. In this short period of three years over two million voters switched their allegiance from the conservatives to their more radical challengers. The main beneficiaries were the NSDAP, but others, and particularly some of the more minor parties, including the Bavarian People's Party (BVP), also polled better. On the one hand, Nazism represented a variety of ideas and grievances many of which were far from original and were consistently espoused by most forces on the right. On the other, it came across as a vibrant force. The NSDAP's advances owed much to the party's reorganization from the mid-1920s and its use of the latest communication techniques. 6 The party machine, as constructed and developed by Gregor Strasser, had become a highly efficient organization and had orchestrated the establishment of various professional sister-party organizations to accommodate the interests of teachers, doctors, jurists, students and civil servants. In other cases the Nazi machine simply infiltrated and, ultimately, assumed the decisive influence over already extant bodies, as was the case, for example, with reference to the Reichslandbund, the main agrarian political organization, by early in 1932 under the leadership of Richard Walter Darn~. Three distinguishing features of National Socialism were its passion, determination and style. It represented a force of dynamism, exhibited a fresh energy which appealed much more directly to the people's hearts through its promotion of a new political system based on the allure of a Volksgemeinschaft and trumped the conservatives' desire to restore the 'old regime'. All in all, the party's anti-capitalist, anti-Marxist and anti-Semitic fervour struck distinctive chords within the wider community as did its nationalism and anti-parliamentarian streaks. The party skilfully came to embody a spirit and political force that was able to exploit popular fears and prejudices and to promise to meet aspirations. Other contemporary commentators ascribed the NSDAP successes on the grounds of a higher degree of electoral participation that increased from 75.6 to 82 per cent. Others who were more damning in their assessments of this particular voting trend described it as 'an uprising of stupidity' of a previously apolitical electorate being duped by the propaganda and style of the NSDAP and personality of Adolf Hitler. All these factors augmented the appeal of the NSDAP, but they still fail to account for the real Nazi constituency. Who voted for this far right force? Can its constituency be established in terms of certain characteristics that encompass class, religion, sex and educational background? The assumption that prevailed for much of the post-war world and well into the 1970s saw Nazism as the vehicle of the lower middle class. Such perceptions were based on theories related to the broader crisis with German capitalism and 95

The Radical Right in Germany

essentially lower middle-class politics and fears, typified by redundancies, income cuts, personal and professional uncertainties and part-time employment which propelled many to seek the more radical solutions promised by the NSDAP. The 'typical Nazi voter in 1932' was presented as 'a middleclass self-employed Protestant who lived either on a farm or in a small community, and who had previously voted for a centrist or regionalist political party strongly opposed to the power and influence of big business and big labour'.R In other words, Nazism has often been interpreted as the preserve of the petit bourgeoisie as epitomized by small shopkeepers, white-collar workers, peasant farmers and ex-servicemen. In retrospecc, substantial research has proved this view to be too simplistic and too narrow. Although it certainly contains elements of truth and it is correct to appreciate the fears and realization for many skilled workers of a decline in their own standard of living, it also portrays some glaring inaccuracies and omissions. Arguably, the most important centres on its failure to recognize that the Nazi constituency was spread across Germany with support emanating from all sectors of German life and particularly after 1930 as illustrated in the studies by Hamilton and Mason on the upper bourgeoisie and the proletarian vote respectively.9 This chapter has two objectives. In the first it aims to present a brief overview of the Nazi electorate, examines the NSDAP's composition under a series of headings that include religious, social, sexual and geographical backgrounds and classifies the NSDAP, given its broad base support among all sections of the population, as the first truly German Volkspartei (national party). The second explores the role of orchestrated and spontaneous violence in the rise of National Socialism and how far it actually constituted a receptor for certain social groups. Both offer the potential for comparison with rightwing extremism post-1945.

Social background To portray Nazism as the creation of a 'predominantly Protestant middleclass rassemblement' may be an exaggeration but it represents a good starting point for any consideration of the attraction of National Socialism. II) Clear evidence that the lower middle class made up a sizeable proportion of the NSDAP's constituency is not hard to find. Their perceptions were coloured dramatically by the events from 1918 onwards and they can be divided into two groups. First, those who had expressed an excessive hostility towards the notion of parliamentary democracy from the outset and, second, those who had been alienated from this particular political system after the economic and political crises of the early and late 1920s. This dissatisfaction of the latter group was displayed by a marked shift towards the right 96

Party membership and violence

in a succession of German elections after 1919. It translated into a twofold increase in the support of the conservative DNVP in the early 1920s and the advance of the small and minor anti-Semitic, monarchist paramilitary, volkisch and other parties belonging to the radical right family, including the NSDAP, which together at the May 1924 elections scored some success and secured 32 seats in the Reichstag. 11 However, the fortunes of these particular parties suffered an almost immediate decline in support that coincided with the improvement in economic fortunes that endured from 1924 to 1929 and which compelled Hitler to initiate a 'reorientation' programme that effectively led the leadership of the party to reassess its potential reservoir of voters. The focus of its recruitment efforts were directed towards the lower middle classes and specifically on the agricultural workers, small farmers, artisans and the owners of small businesses. The creation of such new political and social movements had threatened the traditional forces and organizations of the German Mittelstand with increasing intimidation from their younger members who demanded a more radical approach to society's ills. This process of radicalization led to the creation of many sectoral organizations and was marked most notably in the mainly Protestant areas of northern and eastern Germany. The hopes and aspirations of the middle classes moving towards the right arguably stemmed from the perpetual inability of liberalism to make a more pronounced impact on German society and political life since the 1860s. The attraction of the NSDAP as a credible and alternative political force among the middle class was its potent pro-nationalist stance and, increasingly, its antipathy towards parliamentary democracy, its promotion of the Volksgemeinschaft and the encouragement of a classless Germany. These ideas attracted public sympathy and helped distinguish the Nazi party from its conservative rivals. For its part the Nazi leadership grew increasingly aware of its own pulling power and was content in the short term to co-operate with the conservative right in opposition, for example, both to the 1929 Young Plan and in support of the Harzburg Front. 12 From the perspective of the forces of old conservatism, primarily the DNVP, the new challenges presented considerable problems and internally brought the divisions within the party between the more moderate and radical wings to the fore. The DNVP's descent in the regions stemmed from its perceived inability, despite its participation in the Reich government, to meet the needs of the rural community and accordingly, the once harmonious co-operation between the DNVP and the Reichslandbund disintegrated and led farmers to establish their own sectoral organizations. These difficulties for the DNVP were accentuated by the economic depression and rising unemployment and as the power of the traditional elite rapidly waned 97

The Radical Right in Germany

in these regions support shifted to the NSDAP as a vehicle to voice their anger and frustrations leaving the DNVP reduced to a rump force. The propensity for the upper middle class to vote for the NSDAP was most marked in the larger cities where they achieved ever better election results up until July 1932. The more, however, the DNVP adopted the vocabulary and programme of Nazism, the more they were preparing their own traditional electorate to make the full switch to this younger and more radical rival political force. To this extent, they helped to foster the Nazi message and perhaps unwillingly were to provide latent support for Nazism and ensured that support for the NSDAP programme exceeded their actual share of the vote in either the 1932 or 1933 elections. Nazi rhetoric appealed to different sections of the middle class and for different reasons. Ll The logical starting point for any examination of the Nazi constituency commences with the party's own membership statistics. These were gathered from the local and regional branches, concerned the actual membership records as of 1 January 1935 and were published as the Partei-Statistik of 1935. These established an interesting overall profile which showed that 35.9 per cent of new members between 1930 and 1932 were from lower classes, 54.9 per cent from the middle class and only some 9.2 per cent from the upper class. In terms of the relationship to their proportion of the overall population it is immediately clear from table 5.2 that the lower middle-class and upper-class support for the NSDAP was over-represented. In stark contrast, even in the July 1932 elections the NSDAP working-class vote was heavily under-represented in comparison with their proportion in the population as a whole. Nevertheless, it did exist, albeit in a limited form. The surge in support for the NSDAP was seemingly explained by the disintegration of the traditional middle-class liberal parties. Indeed, in the elections of 1932 only the Bavarian People's Party (BVP) and the Catholic Centre Party managed to maintain their position. This assumption of the NSDAP as essentially a party of the middle class spawned a considerable amount of work on explaining the party's attraction to this group. Table 5.2

Class background

Working class Lower middle class Upper class

Party membership

Population as a whole

35.9% 54.9% 9.2%

54.56% 42.65% 2.78%

Source: Michael H. Kater, The Nazi Party (Oxford, 1983), pp. 12,250

98

Party membership and violence

However, these figures are far from being a perfect source of information, for problems surround their compilation and the varying quality of the material at the local level. First, and significantly, the figures indicated for both 1930 and 1933 only applied to those individuals who were still registered members in January 1935. In other words, the figures did not allow for any lapsed membership and this was certainly a considerable issue for those from a working-class environment. Indeed, many workers left the party's ranks as they were unable to meet the monthly membership fee. Second, the responses were not orchestrated centrally and definitions of class background were prone to substantial variance from region to region. This needs to be borne in mind for as Peukert argues: 'a small businessman might be a door to door salesman; a worker might be a declasse ex-serviceman from a good family, or an east Elbian farm labourer'.14 There is a clear problem with the party's statistics and, according to Feuchtwanger, 'owing to the small size of their samples, and the difficulty of precisely identifying the components of the group, this is statistically treacherous territory, particularly when applied to elections'.15 The problems of an inadequate and water-tight definition were further complicated by such other variables as age, sex, religion and geographical location. Doubts have continually been voiced particularly since the 1970s over the accuracy of these statistics. In Gradually, however, as more and more information on the records of the NSDAP, the SA and the SS becomes available, these records have proved useful and, by the start of the 1990s, had led historians to acknowledge that the NSDAP contained a sizeable working-class element. 17 This realization has focused a renewed interest in the NSDAP's social composition and has led to further research on the profile of party members in specific regional and local branches. In short, earlier assumptions about Nazism being built upon a solely middle-class constituency are being gradually questioned in more and more research monographs. Miihlberger's work, for instance, on the party Gau (district) in South Hanover Brunswick in Lower Saxony is typical in its revelation that a heavy proportion of working-class support and membership existed in the smaller towns. IX Moreover, his work has not only been accepted as factually correct, but has been mirrored in studies of other areas. Falter and others, for example, suggest that as the economic crisis of the early 1930s deepened more and more of the NSDAP's recruits derived from the working class. 19 Indeed, the NSD AP reconcentrated its recruitment efforts on this section of the population after 1928, epitomized by its creation of a Factory Cell Organization (NBSO). Although progress was certainly made and Mason argues that some 3.5 million proletarian votes (that is 25 per cent of its total support) were cast for the Nazi Party in July 1932, it is clear that the majority of organized workers tended to 99

The Radical Right in Germany Table 5.3

Social composition of the NSDAP, January 1933

Those in employment Workers White collar Self-employed: i) Artisans ii) Tradesmen iii) Professions Civil servants Teachers Peasants Others Those not in employment Pensioners Housewives Students Total

267,423 178,922

31.5% 21.0%

66,873 58,838 23,431 44,082 12,902 106,981 31,379

7.9% 6.9% 2.8% 5.2% 1.5% 12.6% 3.7%

14,137 34,010 10,033

1.7% 4.0% 1.2%

849,011

Source: Partei-Statistik of 1935 in Noakes, J. and Pridham, G. (1988) Nazism 1919-45: A Documentary Reader, Vo/l: The Rise to Power 1919-19.14, revised edition, University of Exeter Press, pp. 86-7

maintain their faith with the KPD although the NSDAP enlisted support from former members of both the SPD and even the communist camp. Some were not immune from the appeal of Nazism and those workers who did opt for the NSDAP were mostly the young and those living in small and semi-rural towns or who worked for the municipal and public utilities. Consequently, a re-examination of the NSDAP's membership records necessitates a readjustment of the working-class membership (see table 5.3). The same energy has been exercised with the voting patterns and success of the NSDAP at the elections. Once again early indications of research work have illustrated the higher than earlier imagined support for the Nazi Party. Some 40 per cent of the electorate stemmed from the working classes. In other words, it had some appeal attracting over one-third of its members from this group and after 1930 this element began to weaken the lower middle-class characteristic of the party. However, the NSDAP never made giant successful or longstanding inroads into the working-class unemployed vote which remained mostly loyal to the KPD. In terms of actual party membership the working class always remained under-represented in relation to its actual proportion of the population as a whole, while the middle-class occupations were over-represented. Indeed, figures for the period from 1930 to 1933 illustrate this level of underrepresentation and despite a slight improvement still amounted to roughly 32.5 per cent of the party as opposed to 46 per cent of the population 100

Party membership and violence Table 5.4

Social composition of the Nazi electorate

Election

Denomination Catholic Other

1928

1930

1932

1932

(Ju/)

(Nov)

1933

30 70

20 80

17 83

17 83

24 76

39 14 16 31

41

45

13

15 31

13 13

47 12

47 12

28

27

28

Social group Workers Civil servants Independent and farmers

40 22 37

40 21 39

39 19 42

39 19 42

40 18 42

% of total electorate voting

2

15

31

27

39

Community size

0-5,000 5,000-20,000 20,000-100,000 100,000+

13

13

Source: falter, J. (1991) 'War due NSDAP die erste deutschc Volkspartei?' in Prinz, M. and Zitelmann, R. (eds) Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung, W. Bertclsman Verlag GmbH and Co KG, p. 42

(see table 5.4). Indeed it seems that as the spectre of unemployment came to threaten this group they switched their allegiance to the KPD rather than the NSDAP. In fact, the NSDAP was to become the third largest party to represent the needs of the workers.20 Geographical background and religious affiliation

Research by Noakes and Pridham show that in the high watermark of the July 1932 elections where the NSDAP captured 230 seats the strengths of the party's support lay primarily in the north, where it spread from SchleswigHolstein, Hanover and Mecklenburg, across the plains of Mecklenburg and gained additional strengths in the heavily agricultural and Junkerdominated states of Pomerania and East Prussia by 1932. Indeed, five of the six electoral districts east of the Elbe returned the largest NSDAP shares of the votes, as illustrated in table 5.5. In contrast the party obtained its lowest poll ratings in southern Germany and specifically Lower Bavaria, Swabia, Wiirttemberg and western Prussia. Interestingly, the common theme that seems to explain these regional variations in support centres on the aspect of religious persuasion. In short, the electoral appeal of the NSDAP reflects the religious divide of Germany that ran on essentially a north/south split between Protestantism and Catholicism. The NSDAP polled better in the former than the latter. 101

The Radical Right in Germany Table 5.5

Geographical attraction of Nazism, 1930-33

September

July 1932

November 1932

March 1933

Electoral districts east of the Elbe East Prussia 22.5% Frankfurt an der Oder 22.7% Pomerania 24.3 'Yo Liegnitz 20.9% Breslau 24.2% Oppeln 9.5%

47.1% 48.1% 48.0% 48.0°;;, 43.5% 29.2%

39.7% 42.6% 43.1% 42.1% 40.4% 26.8%

56.5% 55.2% 56.3% 54.0% 50.2% 43.2%

Electoral districts in northern Germany Schleswig-Holstein 27.0% Mecklenburg 20.1% East Hanover 20.6% Hamburg 19.2%

51.0% 44.8% 49.5% 33.7%

45.7% 37.0% 42.9% 27.2%

53.2% 48.0% 54.3% 38.9%

Electoral districts in southern Germany Upper Bavaria/Schwabia 16.3% Lower Bavaria 12.0% Wiirttemberg 9.4% Baden 19.2%

27.1% 20.4% 30.3% 36.9%

24.6% 18.5% 26.2% 34.1%

40.9% 39.2% 42.0% 45.4%

Electoral districts in central Germany Hesse-Nassau 20.8% Hesse-Darmstadt 18.5% 19.3% Thuringia Merseburg 20.5%

43.6% 43.1% 43.4% 42.6%

41.2% 40.2'10 37.1 '10 34.5%

49.4% 47.4% 47.2% 46.4%

Electoral districts in western Germany Westphalia -North 12.2% Westphalia-South 13.9% Cologne-Aachen 14.5'10 Diisseldorf-West 16.8% 14.9% Koblenz Trier

25.7% 27.2% 20.2% 27.0% 28.8%

22.3% 24.8% 17.4% 24.2% 26.1%

34.9% 33.8% 30.1% 35.2% 38.4%

1930

Source: Noakes,.I. and i'ridham, G. (19H8) Nazism 191,)-194.1: A Documentary Reader, Vol 1: The Rise to Power 1919-19.14, revised edition, University of Exeter Press, p. 83

Indeed, in southern Bavaria which was overwhelmingly catholic the NSDAP experienced its greatest setbacks. In many ways the misfortunes of the NSDAP in southern Bavaria are highly ironic given the historical origins and activities of the party and the Bavarian government's tolerance of the NSDAP. In stark contrast in Franconia, in the north of the state, which in religious terms was evenly balanced, the Protestant population opted decisively for the NSDAP. This was, in retrospect, to be seen as a means of distancing themselves from the traditional dominance of Catholicism in this state. The issue of religion in the success or failure of the NSDAP was 102

Party membership and violence

reflected in the party's poor performances in the catholic-dominated regions of western Prussia, centred around Aachen, Cologne, Dusseldorf and Trier and reflected the opposition of the Catholic Church which steered its members towards the Centre Party. Naturally there were clear exceptions insofar as certain catholic regions did record tangible NSDAP returns, as for example in Liegnitz (in Silesia) and in the Palatinate. The deciding factor here seems to have been the proximity of both these regions to some of Germany's most sensitive borders. Silesia had been an open source of conflict with the Poles since 1919 when in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles part of this former German territory had been ceded to Poland. The period from 1919 to 1921 saw massive unrest, Freikorps' involvement and finally a plebiscite which settled the fate of Upper Silesia to Germany's advantage, but did not terminate feelings of unease. In the Palatinate fears persisted of a bellicose France and the dangers of an invasion. The insecurity felt among the populations of these border areas certainly helped to aggravate the political environment, intensify the degree of national consciousness and advance the profile of the NSDAP, in its role as the defender of German interests. So in essence the NSDAP made its initial breakthrough in the small towns and the rural and semi-rural districts of Protestant Germany. It only began to make inroads and gain ground in the larger cities after 1930. The bulwark of support in the early years emanated mostly from the farming community, salesmen and independent artisans of the old middle class and it fared extremely well with those who possessed few if any formal qualifications. The composition and dominance of these groups, however, became less pronounced in the aftershocks of the Wall Street Crash as the party was transformed into a truly national and mass movement. After 1930 it began to poll well in upper middle-class suburbs of Germany's cities including Hamburg and Bremen and the ensuing world recession enticed pensioners and the young, particularly those working in heavy industry in the cities. The NSDAP's portrayal of itself in party propaganda as a young and dynamic Volkspartei proved an enticing and moreover a rather accurate description. It seemed to offer hope and a new prosperous beginning for many after the traumas of the Weimar period, not least in its efforts to unite the German nation by abolishing class distinctions. Evidence now records that it emerged as a very attractive alternative for many disenchanted voters and particularly the unemployed. Falter has estimated that around 13 per cent of the overall working-class unemployed opted for the NSDAP in July 1932 while some 29 per cent voted for the communists. This youth factor is an important one and is not to be underestimated as it equates the NSDAP with the KPD as a seemingly radical and revolutionary force. According to party records membership comprised a younger and aspirant generation 103

The Radical Right in Germany

that embraced newly qualified professionals, university students and civil servants. Indeed, some 42.2 per cent of its members who had joined the party prior to January 1933 were aged between 18 and 30. 21 In stark contrast, the NSDAP's fortunes in the traditional strongholds of the socialists and the communists were less impressive, as they also were in areas with a predominantly catholic population and tradition. These areas remained relatively steadfastly loyal to the Centre Party and its fellow Catholic Party in Bavaria, the BVP. In general, the NSDAP had immense difficulties in attracting support in the cities, but success was attained in certain parts of the cities and usually in the upper middle-class districts. To conclude, recent scholarship has overturned the mistaken beliefs and assumptions that Nazism was the creation and vehicle of the lower middle classes. 22 In general, although the NSDAP drew much of its support from those electors who had voted for the liberal parties it also managed to appeal to the former voters of the SPD, the KPD and the Catholic Centre Party. Its support transcended the class divide and endured in all sections of the German state. Indeed, in the agricultural and semi-rural areas a considerable degree of communal support for the NSDAP existed. Age and sex structure The Nazi constituency was marked by two further characteristics. These were clearly portrayed by the youthfulness of its members and the preponderance of men among its ranks particularly the SA. In many ways, Nazism exuded a downwardly mobile appeal. It proved extremely attractive to the younger sections of the electorate. This is borne out by a close examination of the age structure of its members. In 1930, for example, more than onethird was under the age of 30. By 1933 this percentage had been boosted through the arrival of many more new working-class recruits. Indeed, several of the NSDAP's leading personalities, most notably Martin Bormann, Heinrich Himmler and Albert Speer, epitomized the youthful attraction of the party.23 All three were born at the start of the twentieth century. The next largest grouping within the NSDAP was to be found in the 30-40 age range. This cluster included the majority of the Nazi leadership in 1933 such as Joseph Goebbels, Hermann Goring, Rudolf Hess, Joachim von Ribbentrop and Gregor Strasser. All these leaders reflected the second and, arguably, the most pronounced aspect of Nazism. Essentially, the NSDAP was a male organization, but not exclusively so for despite the conspicuous absence of women in any form of leadership capacity they were present within the party. Admittedly, this presence was a minimal one given their minority within the party membership as a whole. Kater's study on the breakdown of the electorate in terms of sex indicates that only some 7.8 per cent of new members between 1925 and 1932 were 104

Party membership and violence

female. 24 However, he shows how this figure went into steep decline after 1933 in accordance with the Nazi perception of women and only expanded again rapidly in the closing years of the war to account for some 33 per cent of the NSDAP membership.zs Overall in Mein Kampf Hitler viewed women as subordinate to men and they were strongly encouraged to pursue their maternal roles rather than engaging in politics. 26 This view permeated throughout the party and in general women were generally deemed unsuitable for and excluded from party leadership positions. Many believed that women should also be excluded from the workplace. However, and in spite of Nazi ideology, the realities of modern living revealed that many women continued to work. It has been estimated that there were some five million women in paid employment in 1935 and some seven million in 1939 and they really became a fundamental resource in the Nazi war effort after 1942. The party itself remained a male preserve that was bound together by feelings of male camaraderie and an outlook that on occasions bordered on the homoerotic. It was fully committed to a male-dominated society and genuinely opposed to female emancipation. Yet, despite its particular view the party still managed to attract female recruits and, more significantly, female voters. Ironically perhaps, given the party's views on women, or maybe because of the emphasis on motherhood, recent studies have uncovered evidence that reveals that women were more predisposed towards the Nazi party than their male counterparts. Indeed up to one third of all female voters in the November 1932 elections voted for the NSDAP. It is argued that they were attracted by the emphasis the party placed on the family and their opposition towards the new middle-class concept of the 'new woman'.27 In many ways both these characteristics of age and male dominance encapsulated not only the essence of Nazism but also unleashed another example of its dynamism and, for many of its recruits, a much stronger attraction. This lay in the movement's propensity towards violence, which emerged and still today remains an integral aspect of right-wing extremist activity and it is to this theme that this chapter now turns.

The role of violence The early 1930s was marked by violent street confrontation, widespread intimidation and continuous fracas between the National Socialists and their political opponents, most commonly the sympathizers and supporters of both the KPD and the SPD. 28 The instigators of these early exertions were the Sturmabteilung (or SA), 'the strong arm squad of the Nazi Party and they grew very much in line with it,.29 This paramilitary organization was led by Ernst Rahm and it was 'born quite naturally with the first meeting hall brawl ... in 1920'.30 Its role was neatly summarized by Hitler: 105

The Radical Right in Germany What we needed then and need now, was and is not a one hundred or two hundred wrong headed conspirators, but a one hundred thousand and again a one hundred thousand fanatical fighters for our world theory. The work must be done not in secret conventicles, but by powerful massed strokes; the road cannot be cleared for the movement by the dagger, or poison or a pistol, but only by conquering the man in the street. We have to destroy Marxism, so that the future control of the streets may be in the hands of National Socialism now, just as it will be in the future. 31

Rahm, like many of the SA's leadership, had seen active army service during the First World War. Like so many of his colleagues he was representative of a disenchanted community which harboured right-wing sympathies, despised the parliamentary regime and expressed extreme contempt for the bourgeoisie. It was such principal political convictions that propelled him towards active participation with the radical right and saw his involvement initially with the Freikorps, the Eiserne Faust (Iron Fist) and finally the DAP where he was to encounter and to be strongly impressed by Hitler's oratorical abilities. Rahm's involvement was a fortunate break for this fledgling political force because Rahm brought with him direct links to many conservative and army circles. Hitler, too, for his part was fascinated by Rahm's enthusiasm and zeal. The two men became relatively close and would remain so until Hitler opted to sacrifice Rahm, one of his most loyal supporters, for calculated political advantage. In the early 1920s both men were united by their opposition towards Weimar and similar revolutionary aspirations. Dual membership of both the SA and the NSDAP was not obligatory and in practice there was a considerable degree of fluctuation between them. Differences in approach between the two men existed and surfaced after the failed 1923 putsch and over the best means to attain power. Whereas Rahm remained steadfastly convinced of the need for revolution, Hitler had abandoned this approach in favour of a parliamentary attack on the political system. These irreconcilable differences gradually came to the fore once Hitler had re-established himself as the undisputed leader of the NSDAP in 1925. He ignored Rahm's repeated demands for full powers over a reconstituted SA (which had been banned after the putsch) to maintain the NSDAP's and his control over SA activities. This led to Rahm's resignation. Ensuing and increasing tension between the NSDAP and the SA between 1926 and 1931, coupled with the practically uncontrollable activities of the latter, led to Rahm's reinstatement as SA leader in January 1931. Hitler, it should be emphasized, aware of the potential rivalry and dangers of a powerful SA, insisted on remaining the Supreme Commander. Rahm's appointment caused some consternation and incited a degree of jealousy among the NSDAP hierarchy as many disliked Hitler's continued sympathy 106

Party membership and violence

for a man whose open homosexual attachments and debauchery remained tolerated by the Fuhrer in spite of increasing criticism in the media. The SA formed the backbone of the National Socialist movement in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Its activities attracted massive publicity which in turn enticed more and more new recruits seeking escape from daily routines and in search of camaraderie. By the early 1930s the SA had been transformed from a simple paramilitary association into a substantial fighting machine, that had subdivided itself into SA cavalry, naval and flying divisions. Rahm quickly reorganized the 100,000-man SA. He expanded its membership base particularly in eastern Germany. His recruitment strategy targeted mainly the young working class, white-collar employees and impoverished farmers and was determined to ensure the SA's version of the political struggle was promoted by the fist rather than the pen. 32 The SA's growth was nothing less than phenomenal, rising from 450,000 members in 1932 to 700,000 members by January 1933 and to 2.9 million members by August 1934. These figures it should be emphasized excluded the SA reserve forces. In retrospect, after the seizure of power it represented a truly sizeable and puissant force in German society. The SA targeted its efforts primarily on young working-class Germans who had difficulties adjusting to the environment around them. In short, the motivating factor of SA membership, at least for the majority of its members, centred on the arrival at a stage of crisis in an individual's personal development. The SA, and to a lesser extent the NSDAP, embodied both a political outlet and a means of protest against the incumbent system. The recruits were enticed not so much by the ideology, which in any case was rather dilute, but rather by the appeal of the central twin forces of camaraderie and the possibility of engaging in acts of violence. 33 Although the SA served as a protection unit for the NSDAP's key personalities it was engaged from the very outset in perpetrating politically motivated violence. This was directed mostly against its opponents on the left. The SA itself was constructed on quasi-military lines. Its leadership cadre comprised individuals from traditional middle-class backgrounds who were usually war veterans. In stark contrast, the overwhelming majority of its rank and file members emanated from a working-class environment. This social group accounted for more than 50 per cent of its actual membership. Most were bracketed in the 18-35 age group (although reservists, naturally, were older). Violence became the SA's trademark and seriously undermined the Bruning government through continued brutal activities and degrees of intimidation. The levels of this violence reached their peak between 1932 and 1933 when intimidation and terror rained on all opponents of the Nazi cause and ensured that Hitler's conservative allies were never able to consolidate their 107

The Radical Right in Germany

position within the government, as they had intended. The relevant feature of this physical violence was its spontaneity and sporadic nature. Brawls and street battles became common occurrences. One of the worst periods of Nazi violence took place in the run up to the July 1932 Reichstag elections and witnessed 461 political riots in Prussia which caused 24 fatalities and some 400 injuries. 34 The violence created its own dynamism and was accompanied by the rising number of 'fallen martyrs'. This list had steadily climbed from five in 1928, to 15 in 1930 and to 70 in the first six months of 1932.35 Responsibility for local acts of brutality lay at the individual or group level; these were rarely orchestrated by the party, nor were they often condoned by it. By 1933 very few areas of Germany had escaped the attention of the Stormtroopers and on Hitler's assuming power many SA men used their newly won status and the opportunity to take immediate revenge against many of their left-wing opponents. Many of these victims were imprisoned and tortured. 16 However, as the SA's activities became ever more widespread and its public profile increased, doubts intensified over the degree of its reliability and loyalty to the National Socialist cause. Moreover its growth worried not only the traditional armed forces, but actually threatened to undermine and possibly even challenge Hitler's leadership. The possibility for actual rivalry between the SA and the NSDAP centred less on any personality clash between Hitler and Rahm than it did on their respective and differing visions for the future development of Germany and role of the SA. Rahm's reinstatement had not altered his views on the SA's core revolutionary aims, which in contrast to the development of the NSDAP in the later 1920s, continued to espouse heavy anti-capitalist and intense anti-bourgeois traits. To this end the SA leadership intensified its demands for the completion of its German revolution and as Rahm's confidence soared he exerted continuous pressure on Hitler to proceed with the NSDAP's original programme. As Rahm himself argued: The SA and the SS [will] not permit the German revolution to lose its momentum or to be betrayed by the non-fighters halfway to the goal! ... For the brown army is the last defence of the nation, the last bulwark against Communism. If the German revolution fails because of reactionary resistance, because of incompetence and inertia, the German people will be plunged into despair ... That is why the idea that keeping peace is the first duty of the citizen, which today dominates ... the thinking of some people who call themselves National Socialists is a betrayal of the revolution. 17 The problem this posed for the Fuhrer is not to be underestimated. The politics of violence made excellent propaganda for the National Socialist cause. It was designed to mobilize mass support and to capture the streets 108

Party membership and violence

from the KPD's forces. There could have been few people who would not have associated the NSDAP with violence, but this did not really diminish the party's position in either electoral returns or party membership numbers. It was through the use of SA violence that Goebbels had succeeded in transforming Berlin from a KPD stronghold in 1926 to a bastion of the NSDAP by 1929.'x It is significant to note that this right-wing violence was directed neither against state institutions nor industrial and commercial concerns. This course would undoubtedly have been more risky, possibly have led to the proscription of the SA and possibly the NSDAP and, at the very least, damaged the party's respectability with big business, and would have been crushed by the armed forces. Rather, the violence targeted the 'November Criminals', namely those individuals and groups whom they held responsible for their misery under the Weimar Republic. The SA's search for scapegoats had ended with their identification of the SPD, the free trade unions, the KPD, the Jewish community, the Stahlhelm and even by 1933, the NSDAP, as the enemies of the SA. However, the SA leadership carefully managed to steer their members' activities and to focus their attacks on the enemies of National Socialism. Without this directional guidance the SA would have targeted all their opponents and in so doing would have damaged the National Socialist cause and the economic fabric of the state. This did not prevent attacks on certain individuals. Countless acts of violence and intimidation were perpetrated at local level against bankers, industrialists, shop owners, school teachers, members of the Jewish community and in practice anyone who annoyed or angered the local SA group.'~ In essence, SA activities must be located against the background and propaganda of the NSDAP. The Stormtroopers were utilized as the NSDAP's prime weapon against the left-wing forces of social democracy and communism on the road to power. Once this had been attained the offensive against these groups was further intensified particularly, after 22 February 1933 when Hermann Goring promoted some 55,000 members of the SA, the fledgling SS and the Stahlhelm to the positions of an auxiliary police force, to back up the police. This meant that many of those individuals who had spent the preceding months engaged in violent activity were now in charge of maintaining law and order. In reality, this decision enabled the SA not only to continue their activities as before, but, more importantly, to cover their tracks. In retrospect, however, SA violence may be classified under five principal headings.

Anti-socialist and communist activities Given the drift to the two anti-parliamentarian forces of the NSDAP and the KPD after 1928, and given the organizational strengths and capabilities of the Rote Front it was hardly surprising that the Nazis recognized' the 109

The Radical Right in Germany

KPD as their prime enemy. Clashes between supporters of both sides had become familiar features of daily life in the early 1930s as both tried to win their arguments on the streets. The extermination of Marxism, root and branch, had long been one of the central Nazi slogans and the intensity of this hatred was replicated on the part of the KPD. One of the last communist examples of this open hostility was evident in its attempts to stage a general strike in opposition to Nazi activities in January 1933. This failed in ignominy largely because the KPD had failed to ensure the co-operation of either the SPD or the free trade unions. This particular incident reveals the antipathy and intensity of divisions existing on the left of the political spectrum and is one of the prime factors in the ultimate success of National Socialism. The KPD had originated from within the ranks of the SPD during the First World War and despised the SPD's acceptance of Weimar and the SPD's continued belief in the politics of legality. The burning of the Reichstag on 27 February 1933 provided the NSDAP with the excuse to blame the KPD and to foster an atmosphere of tension amid talk of a probable communist counter-revolution. The degree of political uncertainty and fear enabled the Nazis to begin the final stages in the process that would eradicate German democracy. It began with the decree 'for the protection of the Nation and the State' (and is more familiarly known as the Reichstag Fire Decree) which effectively suspended the rule of law in Germany until 1945. In other words, it discontinued most of the basic rights, such as the right of assembly, the freedom of expression and the freedom to form organizations, that had been granted under the Weimar constitution. In their attempts to establish a new political and social system based on a harmonious national community the Nazi leadership was not prepared to tolerate any resistance. Its primary target in February 1933 was the Communist Party. All its leaders and principal functionaries who could be caught were arrested and placed under protective custody until the March elections had passed. Some, including Walther Ulbricht, a future leader of East Germany (1949-71), fled to Moscow where they remained until 1945. This episode and what amounted to an obstruction clearly undermined the KPD's ability to mount an effective election campaign and resulted in only marginally poorer electoral returns. This was in any case purely academic as the KPD's votes were proclaimed invalid at the end of March 1933 by which time the German Communist Party ceased to exist. However, this was merely the beginning. SA activities intensified immediately after these polls and many KPD members and other leading Marxist journalists, newspaper editors and intellectuals were simply seized and imprisoned. By March 1933 some 20,000 people were incarcerated. The majority were KPD activists. As the prison population rapidly grew with ever more political detainees so the requirement for 110

Party membership and violence

new installations became urgent and this prompted the creation of the first concentration camps. With the KPD leaders safely in prison or resident abroad the attention of the Nazi regime switched to the SPD. Many SPD activists had already encountered at first hand the violence and intimidation of the SA. This had dissuaded some party members from continuing activity and led others to flee abroad, including Willy Brandt, a future West German Chancellor (1969-74). Nevertheless, the bulk of the party leadership remained firmly convinced of the necessity of maintaining a legal strategy even when confronted by an NSDAP-dominated Reichstag. Praiseworthy this may have been but it reveals just to what extent the SPD had simply underestimated Nazi determination and intentions. Any lingering doubts were quickly crushed as the Nazi state confiscated all SPD possessions and property in May 1933, prohibited the SPD from all political activities and arrested all its leaders who had not fled the country. Police and SPD party records identify how the SPD and its youth association, the Reichsbanner had become the major target of SA violence. This escalated further after March 1933 when thousands of SPD members were brutally attacked, incarcerated, interrogated and severely beaten. However, it is interesting to note that the actual victims tended not to represent average party members, who stemmed from the working class like the vast majority of the SA's members, but on the contrary, on the party functionaries, who generally emanated from middle-class backgrounds. In other words, the hostility directed towards these particular individuals, who were held directly responsible for social democracy's failure to alleviate the economic and social crises that had engulfed the Weimar Republic and consequently its failure to protect the working class, reflected the make-up of the SA and its members' hatred for bourgeois life. Much of the antagonism was strengthened through Rahm's repeated attacks on middle-class values and society. The free trade union movement which had closely aligned itself to the SPD suffered the same fate. 40 The unions were systematically destroyed after May 1933 when offices were raided, documents were seized, property was destroyed and individuals were arrested and sent to the new 'concentration camps'. The elimination of the once formidable free trade union movement saw the removal of another potential force of opposition to Nazism. As the SA's hostility towards the established political system had intensified since the late 1920s, so its respect for the political and legal institutions of authority dissipated. By the early 1930s SA violence was being enacted against all aspects of authority. The battles against Marxism and socialism were extended to cover all individuals, groups and political parties who defiantly opposed the NSDAP. This heralded a campaign of terror that was to last until the very end of the regime in May 1945. 111

The Radical Right in Germany

Anti-Jewish activities As chapter 4 illustrates, anti-Semitism lay and flourished as one of the central tenets of all radical right parties after 1919. The NSDAP was far from being an exception but it was the fixation on racial anti-Semitism that was to have huge repercussions and condemn all Jewish citizens equally, irrespective of birth or achievements. It simply prevented the long established possibility of social acceptance offered by the churches on conversion to Christianity.41 The termination of this escape route from persecution was succeeded by a series of decrees and laws stripping the Jewish population of its property, civil rights and even citizenship. National Socialism's persistent castigation and demonization of the Jewish community was ultimately to lead to the extermination of six million Jews. Spontaneous violence became very much an integral part of anti-Jewish measures after 1933. Physical attacks and intimidation bore the hallmarks of the SA. Any attempt, however, to label all SA recruits as devout or arguably even latent anti-Semites is proving ever more problematic. Certainly a significant quantity of evidence exists of SA attacks on Jewish individuals, their homes, businesses and even their cemeteries. Such activities were fuelled by and mirrored the party's anti-Semitism. Indeed, party documents openly reveal the difficulties experienced by the SA leadership in many instances to control these excesses. Interestingly, there is another side for at the other extreme the leadership had great difficulty in persuading their members to boycott Jewish shops. Fischer reveals how many SA members simply continued to frequent Jewish-owned firms in spite of repeated efforts to arrest this practice. Even old friendships remained between SA men and Jews. That said, this section, however, extends beyond a mere discussion of SA activity and takes the opportunity to highlight briefly the development of anti-Semitism in the Third Reich. In retrospect, it is possible to classify the Nazi regime's ever more unbridled anti-Jewish measures into four distinct periods. 42 Violence and intimidation were common characteristics of all. The first, from 1933 to 1935, witnessed the first boycotts of Jewish shops and the first in a long series of measures to de-emancipate the Jewish population on 1 April 1933. 41 These included measures prohibiting those of non-Aryan descent continuing in the civil service, restricting Jewish access to universities and insisting on the necessity of licences for all those engaged in self-employment. Put simply, the Nazis were intent on removing the Jewish population from professional life and in particular the areas of law, academia, the civil service, healthcare and dentistry. The second phase, from 1935 to 1938, heralded a further intensification of these measures through the adoption of the Nuremberg laws as proclaimed at the party rally in September 1935. These were subsequently embodied in 112

Party membership and violence

the Reichsburgergesetz (Reich Citizenship Law) and the more infamous Blutschutzgesetz (Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour). In the former the Jewish community was stripped of its nationality and assumed the more inferior position of state dependant and in the latter marriages between Germans and Jews were prohibited and were later punishable by death. The situation further deteriorated when a decree of 14 November 1935 speeded up the removal of Jews from all the public professions. Over 240 anti-Jewish measures had made their way onto the statute books by 1939 and effectively intensified the ever growing isolation of the Jews from the rest of German society. The third phase which lasted from 1938 to 1941 began with the first major pogroms on German soil when shops, schools and even synagogues were set alight across Germany in the Reichskristallnacht (Crystal Night) of 9 and 10 November 1938. The levels of violence, which left over 100 dead and a further 20,000 in prison, had been orchestrated directly by the Nazi leadership and Goebbels in particular, but it had been designed to appear as a spontaneous response to the murder by a Jew of a German diplomat in Paris. The destruction caused by the rioting was estimated at some several hundred million Reichsmarks. More importantly, the events engendered so much revulsion among sections of the general population that it dissuaded Hitler from any repetition. Nevertheless, Goring immediately passed further laws which excluded Jews from the fields of economics and finance, seized their assets, Aryanized Jewish businesses, compelled the Jews to have the letter J stamped in their passports and to adopt the use of the additional first names of Sarah and Israel. By the outbreak of the Second World War the series of anti-Jewish measures had pushed the members of the Jewish community further and further into the ghettos. Surprisingly, of the perhaps 500,000 Jews resident in Germany in 1930 some 375,000 remained in 1939. The emigration route had been spurned by the majority as even by this late stage few could have predicted the barbarity that lay ahead under the cloak of war. Jews were forced to participate in work schemes, were obliged to wear yellow stars on their lapels and were housed in the first ghettos established in L6di and Warsaw in April and October 1940 respectively. The final phase was initiated from 1942 to 1945. It coincided with the invasion of the Soviet Union. Special military units were charged with eradicating the Jews (and also gypsies) from all the newly conquered territories from the Baltic to the Black Sea. So began a campaign of mass executions throughout eastern Europe. The process of extermination scaled new heights when at a meeting of senior officials at Wannsee in January 1942 the programme of the Endlosung (Final Solution) was adopted. This systematic attempt to annihilate European Jewry resulted in massive deportations of Jews from all corners of Hitler's European Reich to the gas chambers of 113

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the death camps at Maidanek, Treblinka, Sobibor and, most infamously, Auschwitz.

The conservative right The SA vehemently loathed the forces of the conservative DNVP and the Stahlhelm. For the rank and file members of the SA the conservatives embodied all those ideals and positions of privilege that they hoped to discontinue. In short, there was little love lost between these groups and the antagonism felt by the SA intensified during 1932 when the DNVP election propaganda not only severely castigated the Nazi Party as something very closely akin to communism but saved particular venom for constant verbal attack on the SA. This degree of acrimony and bitterness spilled over into violent confrontation as the SA began a co-ordinated campaign of disrupting DNVP gatherings and even attacking DNVP members. The tension between these elements of the old right and the extreme right were symptomatic of the real differences and mutual distrust that characterized the leadership of both the DNVP and the NSDAP which remained even after Hitler's acceptance of the Chancellorship from the conservatives and only started to dissipate after the dissolution of the DNVP as a political party in June 1933. It is very difficult and almost impossible to generalize on the relationship between the SA and the Stahlhelm. It varied on a continuum from active co-operation to mutual contempt across the country with much depending on the affinity between local SA and Stahlhelm leaders. Nevertheless, the degree of contacts and co-operation can generally be described as productive until around 1931 when bonds began to disintegrate once the Stahlhelm threw their support behind the DNVP's electoral campaigns for 1932. In retrospect, each group regarded the other as a serious potential rival to its own position. This animosity led once again to minor confrontations which often descended into fights between the two paramilitary associations. Co-existence proved extremely difficult, but ultimately one of the major consequences of the DNVP's demise was the partial absorption of many of the Stahlhelm's younger element (those under 35) into the SA machine proper in the autumn of 1933. However, a second group of the core Stahlhelm, which comprised the older members, remained as an autonomous body and for the most part resisted attempts to have its members form an SA reserve force. It has been estimated that only around half the Stahlhelm had joined the SA by 1935. The existence and continued and active recruitment campaigns of the Stahlhelm throughout 1934 and 1935 infuriated the SA leadership and local SA associations, but Hitler's continued reliance on the forces of the conservative right prevented any moves against the Stahlhelm by the SA. 114

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The Catholic Church One of the major characteristics of the NSDAP's ascent had been its electoral success in mainly Protestant areas and cities. In contrast, its electoral returns in Catholic areas had been for the most part highly disappointing. The relationship between the Catholic Church and the NSDAP was highly problematic particularly given the former's allegiance to Rome. Nevertheless, tensions between the two were eased after the signing of the 1933 Concordat. Indeed, the Church clearly approved the Nazi government's emphasis on the family, tolerated the SA attacks on their left-wing opponents and was content to watch the destruction of the Weimar regime. Problems persisted, however, and arose especially when the Nazi machinery tried to interfere with the Church schools and youth organizations or the Church condemned the regime's short-lived euthanasia programme. The NSDAP found it extremely difficult to sever the links between the Catholic Church and Rome and in general failed to make any significant breakthrough in the south and west of Germany. The strengthening condemnation of Nazism by the Catholic Church focused SA activities on the political parties and youth organizations of catholicism, most notably the Centre Party and the Catholic Male Youth League or K]MV. In retrospect, it becomes clearer that the SA took a keen interest in those organizations that matched its own style of organization and militancy. It sought to dominate totally the paramilitary scene and, thus, to crush all political rivals. Reports of intimidation, clashes and physical aggression were alre~dy in common circulation by the end of the 1920s, but the levels of violence escalated dramatically after 1933 when the SA heightened their attacks on leading individuals and gatherings of the K]MV. Popular priests were arrested, crucifixes were removed from schools and overall a general campaign of interference became the norm. Such assaults and offences littered the media prior to 1933 and ultimately made the difficulties experienced by the party more complex when making inroads into this particular constituency. In many ways SA and later SS policy backfired as it led to protests where the Nazi machinery was often compelled to back down. The NSDAP The inclusion of this last category reflects the extent to which dissension within the NSDAP ranks was still possible in the early 1930s. Prior to gaining power it emanated from the Strasser wing of the party, but after 1933 it stemmed directly from the looming breakdown in relations between Hitler and Rahm. Each man possessed not only rather differing visions over future policy direction in power but had come to embody conflicting interests that were largely irreconcilable. For Hitler the path ahead meant consolidation 115

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and acceptance by the armed forces whereas Rahm advocated stronger revolutionary changes and sought to replace the army with the SA. Many of the rank and file members of the SA had objected strongly to Hitler's involvement with the conservatives and his alliance with big business. This gave rise to feelings of betrayal among many SA members and many became further aggrieved when Hitler failed to initiate substantial social reforms. The increasing tensions between the SA and the party leadership was clearly expressed by one SA colonel at a meeting in Dusseldorf when he bellowed: When the second wave of the revolution comes we won't shoot any more Communists; instead we'll know our duty in purging our own ranks of functionaries and other rubbish. 44

The process of disaffection between the SA and the NSDAP accelerated during 1933 and 1934 to the point where the former's radical demands began to impinge severely on the party's priorities and objectives. It was against this background of a rapidly deteriorating relationship that Hitler, who was already convinced that the SA had outlived its usefulness, finally felt compelled to sanction the elimination of the SA leadership. This served two purposes. On the one hand, it removed a potentially dangerous challenge to the NSDAP and allowed Hitler to maintain his own authority and, on the other hand, it left the Fuhrer free to develop and foster ties with the conservative right and, most importantly, the army.

The fall of Rijhm Although Rahm personally had remained steadfastly loyal to Hitler and the SA had contributed significantly to the profile and rise of the Nazi movement, it had, after January 1933, become at best superfluous, and at worst a potential source of embarrassment for the new administration. Power had tilted the often tetchy relationship between the SA and the NSDAP, which Hitler had skilfully kept from simmering over, substantially in the party's favour. The changed circumstances and potential danger signs were not, however, so skilfully read by the SA's leaders. They still believed that they remained central to the entire Nazi administration's plans. This mistaken assumption became ever less likely as Hitler sought to consolidate his power base within Germany and thus sought to win the approval of the traditional elites. In the first half of 1933, however, the SA continued as before. Membership soared. Violence and intimidation reached new levels and the SA was instrumental in deterring and reducing all forms of internal opposition. The SA leaders had come to expect their reward in some part of government. Many SA members had become dissatisfied and extremely embittered that their efforts had not translated into the tangible 116

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benefits they had expected and Rahm's demands for further action, despite Hitler's emphasis on evolution as opposed to revolution, threatened to trouble the NSDAP's priorities and achievements. Hitler cared little for the dissatisfaction within the ranks of the SA. He was far more concerned with the reactions of the army and big business. Moreover, the SA leadership had made its enemies within the party and none more so than Heinrich Himmler, leader of the fledgling SS who was intent on reducing Rahm's influence. The daily reality that SA thuggery and acts of violence had proven distasteful and repugnant to the middle classes should not be downplayed, for Hitler was always concerned about his and the regime's public popularity. Faced with Rahm's mounting anger, the degree of patronage and corruption within the SA, continuing SA acts of violence and a growing hostility towards the NSDAP, Hitler intervened. The fate of the SA was effectively sealed by its constant desire to initiate a 'second revolution', its continuing programme of intimidation and terror long after the political benefits for Hitler had passed and, most importantly, his proposal for a dissolution of the Reichswehr in favour of a militarily restructured National Socialist people's army. The very notion that the SA should form the core of a new brown German army with Rahm as its supreme commander appalled the army and even Hitler. Indeed, the latter realized the importance of a highly structured and disciplined fighting machine if he were to achieve his longer term foreign policy objectives. In the short term he sought the army's support against the conservative right under Papen in the forthcoming struggle to succeed the rapidly ailing Hindenburg as Reich president. The combination of the offices of chancellor and president would make Hitler all powerful, but his ambition required at least the Reichswehr's passive acceptance of the NSDAP. The magic ingredient to smooth relations between army and the political executive was the silencing of the SA. The Fuhrer would have been in position with the support of the SA to oppose the army had it backed a conservative for the presidency, but such a move was deemed unwelcome as it would have heightened significantly Hitler's reliance on the SA. The SA had simply become a loose cannon for the National Socialist movement. To be sure, Rahm's demands offended the army and therefore ultimately threatened Hitler's own position. As rumours (entirely fabricated) circulated of a possible coup by the SA, Hitler finally opted, after months of hesitation, to use the Schutzstaffel or S5 (which had been technically subordinate to the SA but now under Himmler, who aspired to replace the SA) to dispose of Rahm and to crush the SA leadership in the Night of the Long Knives on 30 June 1934. Few, not even Rahm himself, could have predicted that Hitler would willingly sacrifice one of his oldest and most loyal colleagues. The act from Hitler's perspective was deemed a practical necessity 117

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that overcame any qualms about loyalty, and support for this action was readily forthcoming from the NSDAP leadership, including Goebbels, Goring and Himmler and the leadership of the Reichswehr. Several hundred people were brutally disposed of during this carefully planned operation which was officially described as a state of emergency and this opportunity was also used to settle old scores, including with the former Bavarian State Commissioner Gustav von Kahr who had thwarted Hitler's 1923 putsch and, arguably most importantly, to move against those conservatives, including General von Schleicher, who might have launched a counterrevolution. The army stood back and watched events with muted approval. There were some degrees of revulsion over the murders of leading generals but this was condoned as payment for the solution to the SA problem. In the next few years the SA was stripped of its former trappings of power and all its remaining leading figures were purged. 45 Such was the fate of a once indispensable force.

Conclusions Nazism succeeded by basing its appeal on the problems and weaknesses of the Weimar system and by focusing activities, both its party platform and its propensity towards violence, on a largely volatile constituency. Rahm's removal heralded the beginnings of the end for the SA. The result was welcomed by the army, other leading National Socialists and by Hitler himself, who had been freed from the rival challenge that had always been present under Rahm. After this episode Hitler's position was practically unassailable and the army repaid Hitler for his willingness to sacrifice Rahm and the SA by allowing Hitler to assume the position of Reich President on Hindenburg's death in August 1934 and thereby commandeer the role of 'Fuhrer of the German Reich and People'. The real victors of this process were arguably both Heinrich Himmler and Richard Heydrich who were free to build the SS into an effective police organization to support the Nazi party and Hitler's dictatorship. Indeed, the SS came to pose more of a challenge to the Reichswehr than the SA ever did and its system of operation extended the terror and violence of the Third Reich to an altogether new level between 1934 and 1945.

Notes 1 This represented some 10% of the population. The figure may seem rather small but there are two points to make. First, keeping membership at such a 'low' level was a deliberate ploy by the party to keep its members as an elite within German society.

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2

3

4 5

6 7

8 9 10

11

12

13

The reality of daily life in Germany meant that many millions more were affected by the Hitler State through either membership of other Nazi organizations or the power of the propaganda machine or through the agents of state terror. These should be approached with a degree of caution. Indeed, a total of 1,435,530 membership card numbers had been issued although it is impossible to know whether all numbers prior to this had been used. By means of comparison the KPD had 259,155 paid-up members in December 1931 and the SPD had 1,037,384. In comparison with the 1932 November elections the Centre Party actually attracted some 200,000 more votes to reach the 4.4 million mark. The SPD lost only some 66,000 votes and although the KPD suffered most it still managed to secure 4.8 million votes. For an overview see D. Geary, Hitler and Nazism, London, 1993. See Jill Stephenson, 'The rise of the Nazis' in M. Fulbrook (ed.) Twentieth Century Germany. Politics, Culture and Society, 1918-1990, London, 2001, p. 84. Rainer M. Lepsius, Demokratie in Deutschland, Gbttingen, 1993. Lepsius used the notion of 'milieu' to describe the major political structures that secured this stability. This centred on an entire lifestyle that went beyond simply the main political parties and comprised a range of associated resources and sub-cultures ranging from party newspapers to party leisure facilities and party drinking establishments. There was clearly a milieu based around the SPD, another based around the Centre Party with liberalism and conservatism representing the two other milieux. Detlev J. K. Peukert, The Weimar Republic, London, 1993, p. 237. This issue has become an extensive area of interest for historians. For some of the best work see the following: T. Childers, The Nazi Voter. The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany 1919-33, London, 1983; R. Hamilton, Who Voted for Hitler?, New York, 1982; numerous studies by J. W. Falter, including 'Wer verhalf der NSDAP Zllm Sieg? Neuere Forschungsergebnisse Zllm parteipolitischen und sozialen Hintergrund der NSDAP Wahler', Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 28/29, 1979, pp.3-21. For a characterization of the ideal typical NSDAP voter see S. Martin Lipset, Political Man, New York, 1960, p. 149. Hamilton, Who voted for Hitler?; Tim Mason, Social Policy in the Third Reich. The Working Class and the 'National Community', London, 1993. One of the best accounts of the NSDAP's social composition is to be found in M. H. Kater, The Nazi Party: A Social Profile of Members and Leaders 1919-1945, London, 1983. Despite its ban the NSDAP ran under the banner of the Nationalsozialistische Freiheitspartei (National Socialist Independence Party) in Bavaria and together with other radical parties on the right participated within the Viilkischer Bloc. In October 1931 Alfred Hugenberg organized a rally of national and right-wing opposition to Bruning's 'moderate' government. The setting was Bad Harzburg and it attracted representatives from a variety of groups in both the old and more extreme right, including members of the Hohenzollern family; senior military figures; the leaders of the Stahlhelm; agrarians, Pan-Germans such as Heinrich Class; some prominent industrialists; and members of the NSDAP, headed by Hitler himself. Hugenberg's effort at uniting the right proved wishful thinking, but the event did reinforce Hitler's power and strength and probably for the first time attracted the attention of Hindenburg and other leaders of the old right as potential allies. Conan Fischer (ed.) The Rise of National Socialism and the Working Classes in Weimar Germany, Oxford, 1996, p. 95. 119

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14 Peukert, The Weimar Republic, p. 238. 15 E. J. Feuchtwanger, From Weimar to Hitler. Germany, 1918-33, Basingstoke, 1995, 2nd edition, p. 231. 16 See, for example, works by Martin Broszat including German National Socialism, Santa Barbara, 1966; The Hitler State: Foundation and Development of the Internal Structure of the Third Reich, London, 1981. He for example expressed difficulties when relying on the NSDAP's own figures and its definition of the term worker. 17 One author has argued that the NSDAP was very successful in mobilizing workingclass support and may well have ranked second after the Social Democrats. See G. Schulz, Aufstieg des Nationalsozialismus. Krise und Revolution in Deutschland, Frankfurt am Main, 1975. 18 See D. Miihlberger, 'Germany' in D. Miihlberger (ed.) The Social Basis of European Fascist Movements, London, 1987. By the same author, Hitler's Followers, London, 1981. 19 J. Falter, T. Lindenburger and S. Schumann (eds) Wahlen und Abstimmungen in der Weimarer Republik, Munich, 1986. 20 For further information on who voted for Hitler and in particular the growing tendency to ridicule earlier assumptions that the party was propelled to power solely by the lower middle class see Fischer (ed.) The Rise of National Socialism and the Working Classes in Weimar Germany, Oxford, 1996. 21 See Partei-Statistik, Stand 1, January 1935, 1, 'Mitglieder, Der Reichsorganisationsleiter der NSDAP', Munich, 1935, p. 204. 22 See, for example, Hamilton, Who Voted for Hitler?, 1982; P. Stachura, 'The Nazis, the bourgeoisie and the workers during the Kampfzeit' in Peter D. Sachura (ed.) The Nazi Machtergreifung, London, 1983. 23 Peukert, The Weimar Republic, p. 239. 24 These figures are derived from the Partei-Statistik, pp. 26-30 which states that prior to 1930 women comprised 5.9% of party membership. In the period from September 1930 to January 1933 almost 8% of all new members were female. See Kater, The Nazi Party, pp. 148-53. 25 After 1933 only some 4.4% of all new recruits (average for 1933-36) to the party were female. See Kater, The Nazi Party, p. 15I. 26 Much of the material on women under Nazism is in German such as A. Kuhn and V. Rothe (eds) Frauen im deutschen Faschismus, Diisseldorf, 1982. For further information in English see Adelheid von Saldern, 'Victims or perpetrators? Controversies about the role of women in the Nazi state' in C. Leitz (ed.) The Third Reich, London, 1999, pp. 207-27, which provides a very good overview into the entire debate; C. Koonz, Mothers in the Fatherland. Women, the Family and Nazi Politics, New York, 1987. 27 See Helen L. Boak, 'Our last hope: womens' votes for Hitler', German Studies Review, 12(2), 1989. 28 For excellent accounts of this violence see, among others, R. Bessel, Political Violence and the Rise of Nazism, London, 1981; J. P. Merkl, Political Violence under the Swastika, Princeton, 1975 and by the same author, The Making of a Stormtyooper, Princeton, 1980. For information on the perennial conflict between the forces of the political extremes towards the end of the Weimar period see E. Rosenhaft, Beating the Fascists?, Cambridge, 1983. 29 Taken from M. Freeman, Atlas of Nazi Germany, London, 1987, p. 42.

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30 P. Merkl, 'Approaches to political violence: the stormtroopers 1925-32' in W. J. Mommsen and G. Hirschfeld (eds) Social Protest, Violence and Terror in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Europe, London, 1982, p. 370. 31 A. Hider, Mein Kampf, London, 1938, pp. 216-17. 32 R. Bessel, 'Violence and propaganda: the role of the Stormtroopers in the rise of National Socialism' in T. Childers (ed.) The Formation of the Nazi Constituency, 1919-1933, London, 1986, p. 132. 33 For information on the SA's social composition, its ideology and relationship with the communists see C. Fischer, Storm troopers: A Social, Economic and Ideological Analysis 1925-35, London, 1983. 34 J. Noakes, 'The origins, structure and function of Nazi terror' in N. O'Sullivan (ed.) Terrorism, Ideology and Revolution: The Origins of Modern Political Violence, London, 1986,p. 76. 35 For more information on this subject see Bessel, Political Violence and the Rise of Nazism: The Stormtroopers in Eastern Germany, London, 1984. 36 See Noakes and Pridham, p. 124. 37 W. Michalka, Das Dritte Reich: Dokumente zur Innen- und Aussenpolitik, Munich, 1985, pp. 41-3. 38 Merkl, 'Approaches to political violence', p. 373. 39 See Fischer (ed.) The Rise of National Socialism and the Working Classes in Weimar Germany, pp. 196-9. 40 For an excellent overview of the trade union movement see J. A. Moses, Trade Unionism in Germany from Bismarck to Hitler, 1869-1933,2 volumes, London, 1982 (especially chapter 17, 'Between resistance and submission 1932-33'), pp. 403-33. 41 For a fuller discussion of the persecution of the Jews and the intellectual arguments behind biological anti-Semitism, see H. Krausnick and M. Broszat, Anatomy of the SS State, London, 1982. 42 For a brief account of the phases of anti-Semitism under the Third Reich see W. Hofer (ed.) Der Nationalsozialismus. Dokumente, 1933-45, Frankfurt am Main, 1982 (especially chapter 7, 'Judenverfolgung und Judenvernichtung'), p. 269. 43 The first boycott had been arranged by Goebbels for 1 April 1933 and had been scheduled to last for three days. However, it encountered extreme hostility abroad and this first attempt was reduced to a 24-hour boycott. 44 Fischer, The Rise of National Socialism and the Working Classes in Weimar Germany, p.195. 45 Between 1934 and 1935 SA leaders whose loyalty was in doubt were dismissed in great numbers. For example, over 30% of the leaders were purged in many parts of Germany including East Prussia, Pomerania, Swabia and Cologne-Aachen. For further information see D. Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party 1919-194.5,2 volumes, Newton Abbot, 1971 and 1973.

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Chapter 6

The extreme right in power: pursuing an ever radicalizing agenda In its history National Socialism was forced to embrace two distinct challenges over two separate periods of time. The first covered the years from 1919 to 1933 and focused primarily on the party's efforts at turning itself into a sizeable electoral force intent on attaining power. This ambition was achieved and has given rise to a whole range of explanatory factors for the party's success, breakthrough and rapid advance in the early 1930s including the party's use of propaganda, its promotion of violence, its sheer dynamism, the capabilities of its Fiihrer, the onset of economic recession and, of course, the growing public disaffection over the political instability and uncertainty at the very heart of German governmental structures which had been exacerbated by the dive into economic recession after 1928. If the first challenge were primarily about gaining power the second, and more difficult one, centred on maintaining the momentum, initiating a new 'revolution' and building a new kind of social and political order after 1933. This challenge turned out to be initially more problematic than the first for, once possessed with the responsibility and the means to introduce and make laws, internal divisions and friction arose within different wings of the party over policy direction and especially in relation to its socialist commitments and plans to create a new national army built around the SA. The former were subsequently jettisoned in power by removing its advocates and the latter problem was resolved by eliminating the entire SA leadership. Thereafter, the regime pragmatically moved to consolidate its position by removing its critics and by outlawing all other political organizations and potential rivals, implemented a series of measures that were designed to ensure a firm control over the people and pursued certain policies in the realm of foreign affairs that were designed to rally the public to the Nazi banner and the cause of the Fiihrer. The direction and, ultimately aggressive, intent of Nazi foreign policy displayed echoes of the territorial ambitions of the radical right agenda prior to and during the First World War, albeit a more grandiose and radical version. The period of Nazi rule may have been relatively short-lived but its impact on Germany and Europe was colossal. The regime was only finally toppled by a force of foreign coalition powers which, having been attacked by Nazi 122

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Germany, vowed to destroy the evils of political extremism. The two phases of Nazi history, first in opposition then in government, have drawn and continue to fascinate the wider public far more than most periods of European history outside antiquity. This may be partly explained by the availability of film and documentary materials which continue to cast their spell, but partly also by the way in which the activities of a handful of mostly self-educated individuals managed to overcome the existing political system and almost secure their goal of world domination. As Kershaw notes: 'Despite libraries of books on the Third Reich, the questions posed by the rapid descent, within a few years, of a modern, civilised, economically advanced country into barbarism, war and systematic genocide still demand answers, and will continue to do SO.'1 The Nazi regime has drawn writers, among them academics, journalists and thriller writers, ever since its demise and all have contributed to the amassing of a sizeable amount of material over the course of the last 60 years. Although some of the early material from the 1950s and the 1960s tended to display rather more subjective and negative tones (perhaps not so surprising following the uncovering of the full horror of Nazi brutality in all its grisly detail in the concentration camps), time has allowed for greater objectivity.2 Today works exist that cover practically every conceivable angle of the Nazi regime from studies on key members of the Nazi leadership, to a range of studies on Nazi ideology, economic policy and foreign policy. Others have analysed how relations between the Nazis and key societal actors including the army, the judiciary, the churches and the business community adjusted to the Nazi dictatorship while others have focused their research on the role of women and the position of minorities under the swastika and yet others have examined the regime's use of terror, its descent into war and its war strategies. The angles of research have not been exhausted by this list, which could be extended to cover other aspects and the more subjective accounts contained within the diaries and memoirs of some of the leading protagonists of the time from Joseph Goebbels to Albert Speer (Hitler's architect and Armaments Minister) and from Joachim von Ribbentrop (Foreign Minister from 1938 to 1945) and Franz von Papen (Chancellor in 1932 and Vice-Chancellor to Hitler in 1933). Taken together, all have complemented one another and resulted in an extensive and rich literature that provides excellent coverage of Hitler's Germany. Given the abundance of material the task of trying to summarize the history, politics and policies of the Third Reich is certainly a daunting exercise. It is not the intention here to attempt to do so and rather than providing a strict narrative of events this chapter affords an overview of how the Nazi state translated its plethora of party aspirations into an unstoppable progression of ever more radical policy development. 3 This 123

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commenced with its obsession and notions of racial discrimination and a desire for territorial expansion and ended with genocide and a destructive war that eventually destroyed the same political system. 4 In more recent years when trying to explain the policies and history of the Nazi state historians have referred to a 'cumulative radicalization' that was unleashed at the moment the Nazis assumed power and evokes the notion of a system continually spiralling out of control. Just how the regime sowed the seeds of its own destruction is considered briefly in the three following sections under the distinct headings of domestic policy, foreign policy and Germany at war before turning to contemplate whether anyone or anything could have stopped this process.

Domestic policy The popular mood in January 1933 was celebratory. Nazi propaganda described the change in government as a Wiedergeburt (rebirth) arising from the failings of democracy. It promised a new beginning, strong leadership and national rejuvenation that would re-establish Germany's greatness as an international player on the world stage. It offered the far right in Germany a unique opportunity to implement those policies that reflected and matched its propaganda and views of society. From Hitler's perspective after January 1933 the question that required urgent and immediate resolution was relatively straightforward and centred on how to consolidate his position and maintain his hold on power. The NSDAP was at this point in time still the minor partner in a conservative-dominated cabinet, although it held the key positions in government and from here it successfully engineered the complete takeover of the state apparatus. The starting point for the Nazis lay with their intended suppression of their political opponents of all colours and hues and especially those on the left. The conservatives, too, were eager to proceed against the KPD, but very slow to appreciate Hitler's real intentions towards them. The Reichstag fire on 27 February 1933 provided the pretext for Hitler, aided by the support of leading conservatives, to persuade a somewhat reluctant President Hindenburg to agree to the imposition of draconian emergency legislation provided for under Article 48 of the Weimar constitution. 5 These measures effectively abolished civil liberties across Germany and were initially used to launch a crusade against the communists that culminated in their proscription on 7 March 1933. Bearing in mind Hitler's loathing for the Weimar Republic it is somewhat ironic that he successfully set about dismantling the democratic regime by turning the clauses and rules of the Weimar constitution against itself, a move that went against the very spirit of the constitution that had certainly not been envisaged by its drafters. 124

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The tactics of state terror and intimidation commenced almost immediately and formed the backdrop to the March 1933 elections where the NSDAP and their conservative allies captured 52 per cent of the vote (and 340 of 647 Reichstag seats), which was far from a ringing endorsement and, more importantly, fell well short of the two-thirds majority that was needed to alter the constitution. By the time of the Enabling Act (Ermachtigungsgesetz) of 23 March, when the Centre Party sided with the new regime in the belief that collaboration might bring benefits, only the SPD vainly opposed a law which was passed by 444 votes against 94 and gave Hitler very widt§ ranging legislative functions." In June the SPD was banned and in the next few months all other political parties including the conservative DNVP and the Centre Party dissolved themselves, granting the NSDAP its primary objective of leaving it as the only and undisputed political force in Germany. In elections on 12 November 1933 the Nazi Party and its associates captured 92 per cent of the vote. The rapid Nazi takeover of the entire state apparatus was complemented by the process of Gleichschaltung (co-ordination or Nazification) that aimed to destroy all rival political and social organizations and to replace them with Nazi ones. In short, the Nazi regime sought control and influence over all aspects of German life. The consequences were substantial and displayed clear examples of discontinuity with the two previous political regimes. The federal structure of Germany, as established under Bismarck, was simply terminated in March 1933 while simultaneously at the local level democracy was obliterated after the dissolution of the Lander parliaments. By the end of 1934 all the new provinces were placed under the control of governors (Gauleiter) who were all personally selected by Hitler. Within the regime itself serious discussions within the cabinet practically ceased and the cabinet itself never met after 1938. Under the Nazis the function of the Reichstag was utterly transformed from being a forum for debate and legislation into a venue for announcing new proclamations to the German people. Overall policy priorities and objectives were simply articulated by Hitler. How such policies were to be designed or implemented were not Hitler's immediate concern and he passed such responsibility to his subordinates. In retrospect, Nazism's political opponents had simply underestimated the full extent of Hitler's intent of eradicating parliamentary democracy despite repeated pronouncements to this end and representative democracy was replaced for the remainder of the Nazi regime's existence by recourse to referenda (following the death of President Hindenburg, the remilitarization of the Rhineland and the annexation of Austria) and produced a massive 90 per cent return for the government's position and bolstered and reinforced the regime's popularity both at home and abroad, all to Hitler's advantage 125

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and the detriment of his critics. Hitler had achieved his first objective in power with ease and successfully engineered a dictatorship without any form of hindrance or resistance from the one force that could still have saved Germany from the ambitions of the extreme right, the army. While the army monitored events the Nazi regime turned its attention to another potential source of friction for the new order that was encapsulated in the judiciary and the entire legal system. The significance of the demise of the rule of law under Nazism, as Burleigh argues, has often been underplayed but it forms an essential part of the Nazi domestic agenda. The regime showed complete disdain for the legal system which it subverted by swiftly removing many judges of the Jewish faith and those with SPD leanings from courts across the state. The Nazis did not attempt to replace these individuals with their own members as in Soviet Russia, but did require all judges and lawyers to join the Nazi Party. Most of these new recruits to the party's swelling ranks were far from committed Nazis and maybe this reality explains why few came to occupy any senior position within the new state. Instead, judges were sent on courses on Nazi ideology and physical training and rapidly found their supposed independence undermined. Indeed, by the early 1940s judges across the Reich were being informed in 'judicial letters' of good judgments for the national community and, thus, furthered the degree of political interference. The new weapon deployed by the Nazi regime was state-sponsored violence and intimidation by various security organizations from initially the SA to the SS, the SD (Sicherheitsdienst or Security Service) and the Gestapo. Political interference became routine and pressure was often placed on judges by the police to ensure favoured outcomes. The Nazi state was a dangerous place in which to express anti-system opinions and there are many cases of heavy sentences being handed down to those individuals who were heard being openly critical of Hitler or who dared to question the existence of concentration camps, the actual fate of the SA or the real perpetrators of the Reichstag fire. Most judges were confined to humdrum activities that included resolving disputes between party members and tackling criticisms of the regime, an offence that had been outlawed under several pieces of legislation including, for example, the Law against Malicious Attacks on State and Property and for the Protection of Party Uniforms. Clerics were a particular target of the Nazi authorities and any who questioned or ridiculed the regime had to expect a political response. In many ways the trials of clerics came to resemble 'show trials' in all but name whose sole purpose was to reinforce the new realities of the subordination of the church to Hitler's will. The intimidation of lawyers became a fact of life while brutal interrogation methods were deployed by the police to extract confessions without the 126

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slightest possibility of any action being successfully brought against the police. Defendants disappeared, people died mysteriously in custody and documentation vanished to abet the Nazi's hold of power which was itself facilitated through the creation of some 27 special courts that were specifically designed to deal with a range of such anti-system offences. The legal system was conscripted to regiment life throughout Germany and helped to facilitate the so-called Ausschaltung (forced exclusion) of all political, social and unnatural opponents, criminals and others who dared to insult the Nazi leadership, denigrate the swastika or spread lies about the regime's atrocities. 7 Concentration camps became the principal means to house and detain a wide diversity of opponents and asocial elements that extended from homosexuals to minority religious groups such as Jehovah's Witnesses. In time the nature and purpose of concentration camps evolved to such an extent that they were transformed into the real pioneers of a new sponsored terror. Fear reigned among many such sections of the population as the security forces sought to advance Nazi values in their quest for total obedience and acceptance. The group in society that came to experience the most extreme brand of this exclusion policy was undoubtedly the German-Jewish community. Before 1914, 'anti-Semitism was very much comparable to a stubborn lowgrade infection that did not seriously impair the health of the social body but defied all attempts to cure it'. H For many the anti-Semitic propaganda of Nazism may have been heartily unappetizing and distressing, but such views were far from being seen as in any way unique and were perceived almost as an accepted fact of life and party politicking rather than possessing any form of coherent policy. With hindsight, the National Socialist approach may have shared common characteristics with that of the anti-Semites of the Imperial period, but in government what ultimately came to distinguish the National Socialist approach to the Jewish question was a compulsion not only to exclude the Jewish community from all aspects of daily society or to expel them from the Reich, but ultimately to attempt to eradicate German and European Jewry. The National Socialist emphasis on race doctrine also clearly demarcated Nazism from other forms of European fascism and broke all continuity with previous German and European government philosophies. 9 The regime's anti-Jewish policy represents an excellent illustration of the cumulative radicalization theory. The beginnings of the persecution of the German Jews commenced shortly after Hitler's arrival in power in the form of intimidation and physical assault, window smashing and the plundering of Jewish-owned department stores and was quickly succeeded by a spate of anti-Jewish laws which deprived this section of German society of, for example, their citizenship rights, excluded the Jews from the arts and the theatre and revoked the law of naturalization (on all Jews who had been 127

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awarded German citizenship since 1914). The Nuremberg Laws of 1935 effectively reduced the Jews to second-class citizens, forbade their marriage with non-Jews and even prohibited sexual relations with non-Jews. Jewish possessions and property were confiscated (in 1937) and by the mid-1930s the people of the Jewish faith were systematically purged from all levels of the state bureaucracy, from the judiciary, from the professions, from universities and denied access to higher education. Few at this stage could have predicted the next phase and radicalization of Nazi anti-Jewish policy which, under the cover of war, brought the mass deportations to the concentration camps in eastern Europe, and the decision at Wannsee on the outskirts of Berlin in January 1942 to eradicate European Jewry. The central themes of race and nationalism became interwoven with notions of creating a new and racially pure Germany and culminated in efforts to shape and re-educate Germans into the creeds of eugenics and race theory and the initiation (albeit short-lived) of a euthanasia programme to target the physically impaired and disabled. lo To achieve their supposed blueprint of social control the Nazi regime sought to steer policy thought and development across the population through strict controls of the newspaper and film industries. Moreover, they aimed to foster and promote loyalty to the regime from an early age through the youth movements, to control the judicial system and the farming industry and to protect the Germans from the perversions of what they deemed 'degenerate' art. I I Instead of this the Nazis promoted their own particular visions and values of German art, literature and culture. 12 In general this loss of personal freedom was accepted by the bulk of the population who were enjoying the benefits of economic growth and prosperity. The death of the German President, Paul von Hindenburg, early on in the first half of his second term of office on 2 August 1934, both removed a potential constraint on Nazi ambitions and provided the infant Nazi regime with an excellent opportunity to consolidate its hold on power by enabling Hitler, in direct violation of the Weimar constitution, to assume the powers of the presidency and tighten his grip on the machinery of state power.13 Fortune had once again shone on Hitler and his amalgamation of the roles of President and Chancellor occurred without incident and proved rather unproblematic if the overwhelming majorities for Hitler in a series of plebiscites in 1933 to 1935 are considered. 14 By the end of 1934 Hitler had become the master of his own destiny within the Third Reich. The Fuhrer state had arrived. Although power was quickly consolidated in the absence of any direct challenge to the Nazi regime, some potent sources of protest remained in the form of the business community and in the armed forces. Resistance from both could not be discounted and Hitler desperately needed to win their 128

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endorsement. The army for its part represented a state within a state and its leadership remained firmly a bastion of the old conservative aristocracy and their values. Not only were Hitler's plans to restructure the state dependent on the army's non-involvement, but ultimately Hitler's foreign policy agenda and its objectives were completely unattainable without the German army. Aware of this reality, to appease the army Hitler had been only too willing to sacrifice Ernst Rahm, during the Night of the Long Knives, on 30 June 1934. Some leading conservatives had been suspicious of Hitler's intentions and had attempted to engage the army's opposition to Hitler as early as 1934, but the military elite was simply not interested in staging a Staatsstreich (coup). Many felt obliged by their new oath to the Fuhrer des Deutschen Reiches und Volkes and many actually found the Hitler regime more palatable than any of the other possible combinations. In reality, the army was neither supportive of the Third Reich nor was it ready to exert any opposition towards it. It merely chose to tolerate events and monitor Hitler's moves. There were certainly themes of commonality between National Socialism and the army and these included a common hatred of the Versailles Treaty and support for the rearming of Germany. In principle, the army fully endorsed the adoption of such proactive policies and its limited reservations owed more to a concern not to antagonize either Britain or France and consequently risk the possibility of plunging Germany back into another European or world war. By the mid-1930s there is evidence to suggest that the army's leadership was becoming increasingly uneasy with Nazi priorities and where Germany seemed to be heading. Where open opposition did arise to Nazi expansionist policy within the army, however, as occurred when both General Blomberg and the War Minister Werner Fritsch expressed doubts over Hitler's decision to remilitarize the Rhineland in 1936 and his designs on Czechoslovakia in 1938, Hitler reacted with fury. IS To quell any further such dissension he opted to replace both men with more subservient individuals (in this case by Generals Jodi and Keitel) as well as abolishing the post of war minister and appointing himself as Commander in Chief. 16 Neurath's simultaneous dismissal as Foreign Minister in favour of Hitler's confidant, Ribbentrop, marked the effective end of the old conservative right's influence in government. By 1938 Hitler felt considerably more self-confident in his own position and abilities and was already envisaging transforming his once utopian vision of territorial expansion and a solution to the Jewish problem into attainable policy objectives. It had become clear to all observers by this stage that he was not prepared to tolerate dissent from any quarter, even from within the army, and it was the final realization that Hitler's annexationist 129

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aspirations were almost certain to initiate a European war that reignited elements of frustration and doubt among some of the army's leaders to the direction of government policy. Talk of a possible move against Hitler took place, but its adherents remained wary and rested their hopes on opposition from abroad. When this failed to materialize and Hitler secured his initial triumphs over Austria and Czechoslovakia, the dissidents within the armed forces were pushed onto the defensive where they felt unable to act fearing any effort would be greeted as a further 'stab in the back' legend and ultimately might precipitate civil war. Only in the closing years of the war did they earnestly plot the regime's downfall, but by this stage the allies were not interested in reaching an accommodation but were rather intent on nothing less than the unconditional surrender of GermanyY With internal dissent quelled, the judiciary neutered and the army essentially under control the most pressing concern in the early years was the urgency of restoring economic prosperity to Germany. The Fuhrer showed little in the way of interest in economic or domestic affairs and occupied himself almost exclusively with foreign intrigues. Indeed, the Nazis had arrived in power without any grand economic blueprint but they secured in Hjalmar Schacht an excellent and highly capable individual who as President of the Reichsbank and later head of the Economics Ministry transformed Germany's economic fortunes and ushered in a period of prosperity and optimism that saw wages rise and the return of practically full employment in the period 1936 to 1938. The much publicized drop in unemployment which fell from six to one million between February 1933 and the spring of 1937 rested on the introduction of large and numerous public works schemes such as the building of the autobahns and the discouragement that was shown to women who sought work. lg Many of the new jobs were forms of low paid employment, but they proved a sufficient and successful means to reduce the number of unemployed, boost government credit and, of course, advance the rearmament drive and were also a highly efficient means of getting people off the streets. In addition, a series of government credit and tax relief proposals, and the rearmament drive after 1934, which also involved the introduction of a two-year military service in 1935, boosted economic prosperity. The boom from 1936 to 1938 was, to all intents and purposes, an armaments boom. The German people welcomed the conveyor belt production of the Volkswagen, the road-building programmes, the emphasis on schooling and the fruits of prosperity. Few had any reasons or desire to question or challenge the government's authority, but by 1939 cracks were beginning to appear as the German economy began to suffer from severe shortages of labour, materials and capital. It would certainly be interesting to examine how the regime would have responded to a cycle of boom and bust in the 130

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absence of war but we must remain with actual events. By the late 1930s the potential for resistance to the regime was restricted by this success and the achievements of Hitler's foreign policy. Schacht was not a member of the Nazi Party and would almost certainly have been a significant figure in any conservative government. The Nazi leadership relied on his abilities and experience, but they were not subservient to him or the wider interests of the business world. The links and co-operation was self-serving from both perspectives. The regime sought financial support and both technical and scientific advances whereas business forlornly hoped at best to be able to influence Nazi economic policies and at least to profit from Hitler's territorial ambitions and military conquest. The business community certainly became heavily intertwined with Nazism and the war effort, but largely were driven by their own interests than any affinity for the politics of the regime. They accepted economic planning and willingly agreed to the cartelization of many sectors of German industry, a process that had been occurring in any case since the 1890s, to assist production and profits. Many company balance sheets recorded impressive business profits and this was particularly the case for those involved in the armaments industry where profits soared on average fourfold between 1929 and 1939. 19 It is a misreading of events to argue that business circles managed to determine policy direction as Nazi policy was not dictated by monopoly capitalism and the interests of big business, but driven by Hitler's political goals. 20 These 'co-operating experts and economists were instruments and objects, not originators of this policy'.21 Nevertheless, support from the business community constituted a crucial ingredient in overall policy management. Industry did voice its enthusiasm for expansion into Austria and Czechoslovakia. 22 Many, most notably Krupps and Flick, became directly involved in the plunder, exploitation, destruction and ultimately mass murder policies. It was such close relationship between the Nazis and the business community that led directly to calls after the war for the decartelization, the breakup of large industries and the imposition of a strict competition policy regime. Ultimately Schacht and Hitler pursued contradictory goals. While the former placed economic sustainability before any expansionary projects the latter was driven by the dreams of territorial conquest and was probably largely ignorant of the fundamental role of economics within this process. In short, economics became enmeshed with the overall priorities of politics as the Nazi administration devised a four-year plan to facilitate and accelerate the rearmament programme. 21 Yet, Schacht seems not to have recognized his role and strains between the banker and the Fuhrer intensified and were manifest on occasions as, for example, when Schacht attempted vainly to 131

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control the import of certain raw materials that were of fundamental importance to the rearmament programme. Unlike many others and assured of his own expertise Schacht was one of the few individuals actually to contradict Hitler face to face. It was his own decision to urge Hitler to counter the overheating of the economy and make him aware of the growing balance of payments difficulties, the inflationary pressures and the shortage of both raw materials and labour that directly led to his replacement by the novice in economic affairs, Hermann Goring, in 1937. Territorial expansion, and if necessary war, became the means to break free from these augmenting predicaments and recast images of the events leading up to the First World War.

Foreign policy The short duration of Nazi rule can be divided into two specific periods. The first from 1933 to 1940 is characterized by the initiatives of the new Reich government to consolidate its hold on power and its endeavours to commence the reshaping and restructuring of German society as already discussed. It also includes the regime's first tentative forays into what constituted a clearly more assertive foreign policy agenda in comparison to that undertaken under successive Weimar governments and one which owed more in terms of continuity to the aspirations of Imperial Germany. Here again, the development of Nazi policy provides further support for the cumulative radicalization thesis that ultimately propelled Germany headlong into another full-scale war that engulfed Europe in May 1940. Despite initial huge territorial gains and military successes for the German forces, far greater than could have been imagined in 1914, these efforts ended in yet another German military defeat in May 1945. Assessments of Nazi foreign policy are open to two focal interpretations. The first maintains that the process had been carefully planned and executed from the outset while the second portrays Hitler as a mere opportunist and 'coffee-house dreamer', seizing the chances as they emerged and the head of a regime which stumbled from one crisis to another. 24 The issue of whether the foreign policy of the Nazi regime was simply made on the hoof or the product of a coherent strategy remains a highly pertinent and controversial one. Interestingly, many historians writing in the 1950s and early 1960s spurned any notion of Hitler's operating to a set agenda and instead preferred to portray him as an unscrupulous individual bereft of any talent, who was simply acting as the stooge of other vested interests, most notably the military and big business. 25 It was often argued that it is only 'hindsight that gives some air of consistency' to the regime's policies. 26 In more recent decades the intentionalist debate that has gained the upper hand as conventional wisdom now accepts that Hitler's foreign policies 132

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(and their centrepiece of territorial expansion) were consistent and reflected his fanatical Weltanschauung. Hitler was the architect of Nazi foreign policy and this was his particular fiefdom where he set the tone and style and overrode the views of his own foreign ministers, Konstantin Freiherr von Neurath (1933-38) and Joachim von Ribbentrop (1938-45). Although it is impossible to talk of any particular timetable or timescale, his territorial aims were unambiguous and had been outlined in Mein Kampf. In reality, the difficulty for the Nazi leadership lay in predicting the responses of other states to Germany's intentions. This was the gamble inherent within Hitler's plans. Whether politically correct or not, it is extremely difficult simply to dismiss Hitler's abilities and magnetism. Hitler was a genius, albeit an evil one, intent on establishing, in the first instance, German mastery in Europe and, in the longer term and after his death, global supremacy after a war with the United States. 27 His aspirations were certainly ambitious, but were they attainable? Trevor-Roper has identified a strong degree of consistency in Hitler's plans and has argued against his portrayal as some form of madman plunging from crisis to crisis. 2s On the contrary, Hitler proved adept time and time again in his early years at seizing the opportunity to advance his interests. His plans were carefully thought through and not restricted to the mastery of Europe and the securing of Lebensraum, but also aspired to global supremacy through the infamous three-stage domination plan (Stufenplan). If successful, all would have proved immensely costly in terms of lives, financial resources and economic prosperity.29 One of the key questions underlying any analysis of Nazi foreign policy centres on the degree to which it represented a continuation of traditional German policy objectives or whether it actually embodied true revolutionary change. In short, can we depict lines of continuity in foreign policy from Bismarck to Hitler? There are clearly elements of continuity of purpose. These are evident in the desire for territorial acquisition in eastern Europe and the pursuit of German hegemony in Europe. The Nazi regime in common with its previous Weimar predecessors demanded a revision of the Versailles settlement and the restoration of Germany's 1914 borders. This was their common starting point. It was for the most part also shared within large sections of the conservative right. However, in power the Nazi regime was to prove far more radical, expansionist and aggressive than any of its immediate predecessors and arguably more territorially ambitious than any conservative-led government would have been in the 1930s. Initially, however, the appointment of the conservative Neurath as Foreign Minister had concealed the significant and more radical changes in the approaches of German foreign policy. Neurath's personality, politics and disposition suggested continuity and revisions to Versailles by peaceful 133

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means, whereas in reality the Nazi regime came to embody the pursuit of more aggressive and racist intentions. Overturning the Versailles settlement was only the first stage of an expansive foreign policy whose main objective was the destruction of the Soviet Union. Lebensraum (living space) represented one of the cornerstones of Nazi foreign policy. Its realization, however, necessitated the conquest of Russia and the enslavement of the Slavs. From Hitler's perspective a war between Germany and the Soviet Union was not only inevitable but also a necessity to allow for much needed German expansion. This theme marked a considerable continuity in German ambitions. Already during the 1880s Germany had initiated her campaign for a 'place in the sun' and a drive for overseas colonies. While this mirrored the activities of her continental rivals, it concealed the fact that Germany's real expansive goals lay not in Africa, but in eastern Europe and, more specifically, in Russia. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of 1918 between the Russia and the central powers (which ended Russian participation in the war) had clearly revealed German preferences for the annexation of huge swathes of territory on Germany's eastern borders and these remained as true for the 1940s as they did in 1914. 30 The defeat of the Soviet Union was envisaged as the first step in a military and political crusade that was to end with an almost certain confrontation with the United States if world power status were to be confirmed. 31 The sheer arrogance of this Pax Germanica, an ambitious plan for nothing less than total world domination and one that almost certainly necessitated armed conflict with the other major powers, contained the seeds of the regime's own failure. Foreign policy under the Nazi state falls into three distinct periods. In the first, from 1933 to 1935, the initial cautionary steps of Nazi foreign policy were undertaken. In many ways this opening phase was an opportunity to test reaction from Germany's neighbours to a more assertive foreign policy that was primarily aimed to bring to an end Berlin's isolation and to acquire potential allies (from among Great Britain, Italy, France, the Soviet Union and Poland). The regime also benefited from the distraction of her neighbours from the disruption to the international system caused by a series of events (including the Spanish Civil War, the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, Japan's invasion of Korea and China and British/Soviet tensions over India) in the early 1930s. Policy in this phase can hardly be termed in any way radical. For example, one of the regime's first major decisions was undoubtedly its decision to withdraw Germany from the League of Nations in the autumn of 1933. This move was largely precipitated by the regime's intent to rearm the state, reintroduce military service and expand the German army well in excess of the 100,000 threshold laid down in the Versailles and Locarno (1925) Treaties. France and Great Britain were best placed to thwart Hitler's ambition, but both powers rather than responding angrily 134

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chose instead to monitor events and rather than undermining the Nazi regime only fuelled Hitler's aspirations as to what was possible. The two major failures of this early period centred on the unsuccessful attempt to support a coup against the Austrian government in 1934 and the inability of the Nazi regime to establish its much sought after alliance with Great Britain beyond the somewhat limited 1935 Naval Agreement. The second phase, from 1936 to 1939, heralded a series of major successes for Nazi Germany and each success fortified Hitler's position at home and made opposition more difficult. This phase began very tentatively with the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936. Both Paris and London greeted Hitler's most audacious move to date, and what amounted to another breach of the Versailles settlement, with a degree of indifference. The venture had been loaded with risk and could have incited a full-scale French invasion that would almost certainly have proved the end of the Nazi regime, but Hitler had gambled, and correctly as events transpired, on the degree to which both London and Paris would be prepare to engage. The initiative had caused a degree of concern among the German military elite, not in opposition to the remilitarization of the Rhineland, but out of concern of a possible British and French military intervention. When this failed to materialize the episode was presented as a major coup and popular triumph for Hitler within Germany. This passivity of both Paris and London rested with their preference for an appeasement policy, but this seeming weakness only inspired Hitler further onward. The extent of his aspirations and expansionist ambitions were clearly displayed to the Nazi leadership and the top military and foreign office officials at a secret meeting in the autumn of 1937 where Hitler essentially for the first time in a wider arena made his territorial designs explicit. He argued in the Hossbach memorandum that Germany's economic problems had to be solved by 1943 and that this could be achieved through conquest. 12 Territorial expansion commencing with the subjection of Austria and the destruction of the Czechoslovakian state were presented as the solution to Germany's immediate problems. The plans aroused a degree of concern about foreign reaction but the limited vocal dissent at this meeting from the last bastions of the old conservative right in the forms of Neurath, Blomberg and Fritsch was dismissed and led to their dismissal in subsequent cabinet reshuffles. 11 Under the terms of the Versailles peace settlement the German-speaking rump of the Austro-Hungarian Empire had been prohibited from union with Germany. As someone born in Austria it is perhaps not surprising that Hitler was determined to unite his homeland within a Greater Germany and in any case the union of all Germans in a single state had long been an issue for the radical right and certainly pre-dates Hitler. Initial plans for some 135

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degree of closer union between the Reich and Austria were quickly altered in favour of a complete absorption of the Ostmark. Early attempts at seizing control in 1934 had foundered when Benito Mussolini, the Italian duce, had strongly resisted German intentions. Hitler's setback proved merely temporary and to prevent any reccurrence he courted if Duce and was even prepared to ignore the demands of the overwhelming majority German population of South Tyrol in northern Italy for union with Austria. Hitler bided his time, tried to destabilize the country through his Austrian supporters and finally sent German troops across the border into Austria in 1938. The Anschfu~ once again found the British and the French standing on the sidelines watching another part of the Versailles Treaty being destroyed while Mussolini publicly supported the German move. There is no doubting the popularity of this move throughout the Reich and it was endorsed by the Austrian people in a plebiscite of 16 March when 99 per cent supposedly voted in favour of their absorption into the Nazi state. The focus of Nazi territorial ambitions switched almost immediately to another 1919 creation, the state of Czechoslovakia. Initially, the German excuse for their involvement in Czech affairs centred on their claims to protect the rights of the Sudeten Germans who wanted union with the Reich. The real ambitions of the Nazi regime were again annexationist and amounted to nothing less than the complete dismemberment of the Czech state that Hitler deemed in geographical terms 'the dagger in the back of Germany'.34 To this end, the German government was instrumental in efforts to destabilize the new state and fuelled and intensified the separatist demands. Tensions in the region quickly mounted as the Czech government started to mobilize its troops, but all in vain for, without any external backing, the Czech government was effectively powerless to resist German demands. Although its territorial integrity had in theory been protected as part of an extensive alliance system between the new states of central/eastern Europe and France, the reliability in 1938 was brought to question. War seemed a distinct possibility and was one that the Wehrmacht leadership approached with extreme caution. Nevertheless, these misgivings about the preparedness of the German forces to counter an attack from the western powers were ignored by Hitler, who pressed ahead, ready to engage in conflict if the situation arose. The fact that war was averted in 1938 owed little to Hitler and much more to the truly humiliating eagerness of both Britain and France again to attempt to appease the German leader and the determination of the Italian leader to settle the dispute amicably (at the behest of Goring who wanted to avoid war with Britain). The subsequent Munich Agreement of 29 September 1938 transferred the Sudetenland to Germany and provided for the dissolution of all existing treaties between France and the nations of 136

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central Europe. Germany gained substantially from the accord. She not only secured the possession of key industries and attained strong fortifications but also realized the removal of the state president of Czechoslovakia and ensured the cancellation of Prague's treaty with the Soviet Union. Hitler proved more deceitful than the leaders of both Britain and France had possibly imagined - they simply failed to appreciate the Fuhrer's true intentions. In reality, Hitler felt rather aggrieved by the outcome as it offered from his point of view only a partial solution to the problem; he had favoured a short war to consume Czechoslovakia in one sitting. To overcome his frustrations plans were immediately laid to destabilize the remainder of the rump Czechoslovak state and to dismember it. In March 1939 German troops marched into Prague to the disbelief of both France and Britain. The event represented another huge propaganda coup for Hitler and gave him the aura of nigh invincibility - an aura in which he himself seemed to believe. This incident finally awoke the western powers to comprehend the dangers presented by Nazi Germany to the balance of power in Europe and led to increasing calls from within to abandon their appeasement policy. Hitler's appetite had not been quenched and his attention had already turned to the free city of Danzig and the issue of the Polish Corridor, again essential creations of the Versailles settlement. His goals, however, went much further and sought the destruction of Poland to facilitate the Lebensraum policy. The Polish government's fate vis a vis the Third Reich was effectively sealed when it spurned German suggestions of forming an anti-Soviet alliance. It was an obstruction Hitler vowed to destroy and in one of the regime's most extraordinary decisions, which stemmed directly from the growing unease in both London and Paris about Nazi Germany's ambitions, he initiated and signed a pact with his arch-foe, Joseph Stalin. The Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939 took the whole of Europe by surprise; few could have predicted an agreement between these two states. On the one hand, this pact was designed to dissuade both London and Paris from any interference in Hitler's Polish adventure and included a secret codicil that essentially ensured that, on the other hand, the fourth German and Russian initiative would erase Poland from the European map. It also in the shorter term enabled Germany greatly to reduce the possibility of facing a war on two fronts. The pact and relations between Berlin and Moscow between 1939 and 1941 have engendered much subsequent discussion about their rationale, but this agreement from the German position was primarily a straightforward and pragmatic move to dissuade the Soviets from attacking Nazi Germany in the event of any hostile action undertaken against the regime from both France and Great Britain. Hitler's more medium-term ambitions had not altered and the realization of his Lebensraum policy in the Russian steppes clearly envisaged the military defeat of the Soviet Union and remained the 137

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priority target of Nazi aggression, but it was first of all necessary to crush the west to avoid a war on two fronts. In Hitler's own words: Everything that I undertake is directed against Russia. If those in the West are too stupid and too blind to understand this, then I shall be forced to come to an understanding with the Russians to beat the West, and then, after its defeat, turn with all my concerted force against the Soviet Union. 15

By September 1939 both London and Paris felt compelled to resist any further German aggression and territorial expansion, even if it meant war and the German invasion of Poland threw Europe back into war and heralded the outbreak of the Second World War.

Germany at war, 1939-45 Debate may continue to rage over the degree of German culpability and responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War, but in 1939 the unquestionable aggressor and instigator of the Second World War was Nazi Germany. The decision to strike militarily was a gamble for the Nazi state because Germany was simply not prepared, either militarily or economically, for a full-scale war. 36 Hitler's decision to pursue a strategy where war was increasingly unavoidable reflected a need to maintain the energy and momentum of the Nazi crusade, a conviction in the rejuvenating force of conflict and capabilities of the German people and utter confidence in the superiority of the German war machine. In retrospect, it is now evident that the war led directly to Nazi Germany's downfall, but the outcome was not predestined. Had the Germans been able to knock out their major foes quickly in Europe it is possible that the Nazi regime could have prospered, but the reality given its ambitions were that the odds must have been stacked against Berlin's favour especially if the war endured and Germany's forces became overstretched for she did not have the manpower and industrial capacity to match her opponents. The war began very positively from the German perspective with the short, highly concentrated military confrontations of the Blitzkriege (lightning wars) that involved the use of limited stocks of modern armaments and equipment (including tanks, motorized artillery and fighter planes) that penetrated specific parts of enemy territory rapidly and quickly destroyed the logistics of their opponents. 37 The Blitzkriege were specifically designed to secure rapid military success and were a particular German innovation in response to the memories of the long drawn out and highly costly trench warfare that had endured during the First World War. Crucial to any triumph of this new type of warfare was its ability to shock and demoralize the enemy and it worked successfully while simultaneously reassuring the German people 138

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that a renewed war did not have to mirror the realities of German troops from 1914 to 1918. Rarely has contemporary history witnessed such a speedy and successful military advance as the Nazi campaign directed against the western democracies after 10 May 1940 and all (with the exception of Britain) including France collapsed within six weeks. 1x The German position and its domination further improved when Italy and Romania entered the fray on Berlin's side, Spain offered to enter the war and relations with Japan warmed considerably. In the summer of 1940 only Britain, under the bellicose and devoutly anti-Nazi Winston Churchill, remained a potential thorn for the Reich and one that Hitler was determined to tackle. Germany's superiority in the air at the start of the Battle of Britain in September 1940 could not be translated into a victory and caused Hitler some anguish and frustration, but he was determined not to let it interfere with his designs on the Soviet Union and assumed that once the Soviet Union had capitulated, not only would British compliance and acceptance of German supremacy in Europe ensue, but Japan's position in the Far East would be strengthened and, thus, American interests would be focused on the Pacific and not on Europe. From a power policy perspective the reality of an undefeated Britain and an undimmed Churchill shattered the myth of German invincibility and yet, it was against this backdrop, with Nazi Germany at the height of its powers, that plans for the invasion of Russia (Operation Barbarossa) were drawn up in 1941. The Barbarossa campaign began gloriously enough in July 1941 when the Wehrmacht supported by the Luftwaffe made rapid advances across the Soviet Union and raced towards Moscow. However, the successes were to prove short-lived and failure to capture the Soviet capital in the autumn of 1941 and to force Leningrad's submission heralded the first major setbacks in Germany's war. In retrospect, the spectacular victories on the western front, which owed much to the inability of the French military to appreciate the new German tactics that had been clearly on display in the Nazi attack on Poland, had lulled the German military into a false sense of its own invincibility. It had not taken time to study its own weaknesses and this final Blitzkrieg which had been scheduled as a six-week campaign ended disastrously as the campaign simply overstretched Germany's resources and logistics and her difficulties were compounded by the onset of a severe Russian winter. Taken together these necessitated a change in German military strategy and she quickly found herself becoming bogged down in the type of warfare that had characterized the First World War. The entry of the United States into the war in December 1941 had effectively tipped the balance firmly against Germany and despite promising advances for the German forces into Egypt and the Caucasus at the start of 1942 the tide had already turned against the Third Reich. The German surrenders at 139

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both Stalingrad in February 1943 and North Africa in May 1943 marked the beginnings of the end for the Nazi state. Yet German surrender was still two to three years away. Hitler simply failed to come to terms with the changed circumstances and in proclaiming total war in late 1942 did not appreciate sufficiently that Germany's actual position and the inability of the regime to produce and manufacture at either the same rate or to produce by 1944 weapons of as good a quality as their enemies could, were severely undermining the German war effort. As the war continued Hitler's megalomania intensified and his grip on reality lessened while many of his associates in the party came to realize that the war was essentially lost. None dared tackle the Fuhrer who had effectively isolated himself at his headquarters in East Prussia and, consequently, the war continued with Hitler making sporadic and arbitrary interventions into its conduct while the German armies were largely in retreat across Europe. By 1943 the Germans had been driven out of southern Italy and the successful allied landings in northern France in June 1944 signalled that German defeat was inevitable and it was only its timing that required resolution. The German public was also forced to appreciate the turn of events as the allies intensified their bombing campaigns against German cities. The necessity and morality of the allied bombing campaign has been surrounded in controversy in more recent times, but it did severely affect German morale and in the closing years of the war support among the public for Hitler as their lives deteriorated fell into steep decline. New German weapons, the V1 and V2 rockets, could have transformed the German war effort and opinion, but these arrived much too late to bring any lasting contribution to the German position and by October 1944 the Russians had marched into East Prussia as the USA pushed into western Germany. Yet, still the regime continued and Hitler's frenetic and rabid ramblings grew more intense as his plans began to dissolve around him, particularly after the assassination attempt in July 1944. The failure of this venture meant the continuation of the war for another year to the very end of which Hitler conjured up all sorts of deals and alliances. In reality, Hitler's room for manoeuvre was non-existent as Berlin was disintegrating around him in April 1945. For Hitler it had become a matter of all or nothing. Germany would either emerge victorious or would perish. By the end of the war Hitler's contempt for the German people was clearly evident and he was determined to see to it that Germans did not outlive the shame of defeat. Finally Hitler, almost certainly influenced by Mussolini's fate, committed suicide on 30 April 1945. One of Hitler's final decisions was to select Admiral Donitz as his successor rather than anointing either Goring or Himmler, who, in his eyes, 140

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had disgraced themselves by seeking a peace agreement with the allies in the closing months and weeks of the war. Both men were stripped of all their offices and expelled from the party two days before Hitler's suicide. The responsibility for ending the war fell on Donitz who, on 9 May 1945, declared Germany's unconditional surrender. Hitler's war was over.

Conclusions Given what is now known about the regime and the atrocities it committed in Germany's name, questions continue to be asked about the degree of resistance among the wider population to Hitler's twelve-year dictatorship and why leadings Nazis such as Himmler and Goring remained loyal to Hitler until almost the very end when it had become clear to them that the war was lost. Undoubtedly, Hitler's triumphs abroad and his overall popularity in the country until around 1942 neutered and made any potential opposition difficult, but a general fear surrounding the likely consequences for any individual deemed guilty of participating in any anti-system activities, particularly given the clear absence of any notion of civil liberties, served as a considerable deterrent. Mere suspicion of harbouring anti-government thoughts provided sufficient excuse for arrest and imprisonment. 19 In its efforts to neutralize public opposition the state deployed substantial efforts through the Gestapo to monitor public reaction and opinion. To this end they established a network of informers who fed material back on their colleagues in the workplace or their neighbours. The party tentacles for information extended even into the family unit as children were encouraged to report on the anti-government activities and thoughts of their own parents. Opposition to the regime existed throughout the political spectrum, but it never materialized into a single unified resistance movement. The absence of such a force is not that surprising given the difficulties involved in any such co-operation, the differing priorities and visions post-Hitler between the groups and, of course, the highly salient issues of security, secrecy and trust. Moreover, SS surveillance techniques rapidly developed to uncover and infiltrate such dissident groups and as the decade passed the regime's approach to dissent hardened to the degree that by the end of the 1930s discovery often equated to death. Opposing the regime may have represented an extremely hazardous venture but it existed across many sections of German society: in conservative circles, in the army, among the business community, within the churches, among government officials and sections of the population as a whole. 40 It assumed various forms and guises and included individuals who were prepared to counter and thwart the aims of the regime such as Oskar Schindler, those who were prepared to distribute 141

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anti-regime materials such as the White Rose (a group of students who produced and disseminated anti-regime material in the Munich area) or, most seriously, opponents who were actually prepared to try and assassinate Hitler. In all some 15 attempts were made to assassinate Hitler. These included a plan in September 1938 by senior Wehrmacht officers to have the Fuhrer arrested, tried and shot, a plan to place bombs on Hitler's plane and, most famously of all, the attempt to kill Hitler at his command centre in East Prussia in July 1944. This last incident resulted from an initiative of a small group of high ranking army officers who had grown extremely disillusioned with the Nazi regime, had become horrified by the intensification of the anti-Jewish crusade and fully comprehended the certainty of military defeat which they wanted to see sooner rather than later when more damage and destruction had occurred. The group planned quite straightforwardly to assassinate Hitler before launching a coup to topple the regime and the person assigned with this momentous task was Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg. The events of 20 July 1944 have been well documented elsewhere. 41 Ultimately the plan failed as the bomb which had been placed by the solid leg of the table failed to secure its intended target. Ironically, had the bomb been planted in the concrete bunker (the venue for evening briefings) rather than the wooden building that served as the venue on this occasion, the blast from the explosion would have killed all those inside. As it was, although there were some minor injuries to report, Hitler escaped relatively unscathed, although shaken and with burst eardrums. Hitler's rage was limitless and in the next few days much blood was shed as over 50 of the foremost German general staff army officers were quickly liquidated while scores more were removed from their posts. The failure of the Stauffenberg conspiracy ensured that the war was prolonged for almost another year. Its endurance wrought havoc on many German cities, notably Dresden, Kiel, Mainz and Potsdam and cost the lives of a further 4.8 million soldiers and civilians, a figure that was more than double the number of fatalities in the period from 1933 to July 1944.42 The extreme right in Germany between 1919 and 1945 has become synonymous with National Socialism, but what are we to make of this movement? Was it unique and did the Third Reich mark a distinctive break in German history? Certainly in the 1920s Nazism displayed striking similarities with other right-wing extremist forces. It was far from novel and was largely dismissed. Much of its platform and agenda reflected the popular slogans and sentiment of its times. In its role as a protest and opposition party the trends of continuity with the right in general are clearly discernible. The decisive moment in the NSDAP's history and development, however, is its arrival in power. 142

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Once installed this new regime set about attempting to realize its radical agenda. It is from this point that it is possible to identify breaks in continuity with previous German governments as Hitler's regime underwent a process of 'cumulative radicalization' in practically all possible spheres and, logically, evolved into the most extreme, the most anti-Semitic, the most anti-communist and the most anti-democratic force to attain and hold political power in modern Germany history. In power Hitler's influence on policy development cannot be underestimated. He presided over a system of government which under the Nazis became less and less structured and where he represented the unifying link between the many fragmented parts of the regime. His will alone often drove the development of policy and its direction as subordinates sought to give life to many of his aspirations. The military defeat of Nazi Germany in May 1945 ended the most distinctive and destructive period of German right-wing extremism and culminated in the division of Germany and the abolition of Prussia. The spirit of extremism and vestiges of Nazism, however, have continued to haunt the German political system and it is to these that attention now turns.

Notes 1 Ian Kershaw, 'Hitler and the Nazi dictatorship' in Mary Fulbrook (ed.) Twentieth Century Germany, London, 2001, p. 99. 2 See, for example, the 'classic anti-German text' by A. J. P. Taylor, The Course of Modern German History, London, 1945 (and still being reprinted in the 1990s); also Sir Louis Namier, a stout Germanophobe whose works such as Diplomatic Prelude 1938-1939, London, 1948, and In the Nazi Era, London, 1952, influenced a generation including Walther Hofer, Die Entfesselung des zweifen Weltkrieges, Stuttgart, 1954 and William Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, London 1960. This last has become one of the classic texts on the Third Reich and has enjoyed and still does enjoy considerable success in the English-speaking world. 3 For one of the most recent and excellent accounts see Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich: A New History, London, 2001. 4 For a comprehensive account of this notion see Hans Mommsen, 'Cumulative radicalisation and progressive self-destruction as structural determinants of the Nazi dictatorship' in Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin (eds) Stalinism and Nazism. Dictatorships in Comparison, London, 1997. 5 The Weimar constitution was never formally annulled. 6 The Enabling Law was renewed in 1937 and declared by Hitler as perpetual in 1943. 7 K. D. Bracher, The German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure and Organisation of National Socialism, London, 1982, pp. 435-50. 8 Gordon Craig, The Germans, London, 1984, p. 140. 9 K. Hildebrand, The Third Reich, London, 1984. 10 The euthanasia programme was an excellent example of how policies originated in the Nazi government. The policy was not popular among the population. Opposition and disgust were so pronounced that Hitler ordered the programme to be stopped in 1941. For a fuller account see The Nazis, BBC video, 1998; Burleigh, The Third Reich.

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11 This included the works of Picasso, Matisse and Van Gogh and authors such as Thomas and Heinrich Mann, Heinrich Heine and Stefan Zweig. 12 This mood was epitomized by the opening of the exhibition at the House of German Art in 1937. Hitler was responsible for the selection of the final 900 exhibits. Widely criticized by the foreign press the exhibition became a huge success attracting millions of Germans over the course of the next few years. The exhibition was recently restaged despite widespread opposition in an attempt to come to terms with Germany's immediate past. 13 According to the Weimar constitution on a president's death power was supposed to pass to the president of the High Court of Justice pending new presidential elections. 14 In August 1934 38 million Germans (90% of registered voters) approved Hitler's own elevation to the party state position of Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor with full emergency powers. Only (approximately) 4 million opposed him. 15 These individuals feared that Hitler's radical territorial ambitions would plunge Germany into a war which she was ill prepared to fight. Fortune shone again on Hitler when at exactly this same time rumours began to circulate about both Fritsch (homosexual activities) and Blomberg (married a prostitute). Hitler seized the initiative to dismiss them. Many other possible opponents or at least detractors were pensioned off at the same time in early 1938. 16 Both Blomberg and Fritsch were ridiculed by the Nazi press and fabricated sexual details and activities fostered chiefly by both Goring and Himmler about their personal lives helped to hasten and smooth their departure. 17 A summary is provided by Bracher, The German Dictatorship, pp. 483-94. 18 Again as Geary, Hitler and Nazism, London, 1993, p. 52, carefully states caution must be applied for it is essential to distance oneself from the propaganda of the newsreels. He cited the case of construction and road building and illustrated how investment in road building and housing projects in the mid-1930s was lower than Weimar levels. 19 For works on the economy see Karl Hardach, The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century, London, 1980; K. Borchardt, Perspectives on Modern German Economic History and Policy, Cambridge, 1991. 20 The idea that Hitler was simply following the orders of the landowning and industrial classes which had allowed him to become Chancellor in the first place to break the power of the working class. In the GDR anti-fascism was effectively enshrined as an indispensable pillar of the state's ideology and legitimacy. It was used as a tool to attack the forces of capitalism and imperialism epitomized by the West German state. The Marxist-Leninist interpretation is a real travesty given what we know. See, however, D. Eichholtz, Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1939-1945, Berlin, 1969; Eichholz and K. Gossweiler (eds) Faschismusforschung. Positionen, Probleme, Politik, Berlin, 1980. Too much has been made of contacts between leading Nazis and industrialists. It is frequently the case that industry seeks to secure access to government whatever its hue. Seeking to exert pressure is one thing but actually influencing policy direction is another. 21 Bracher, German Dictatorship, pp. 416-17. 22 For substantial material on this see W. Carr, Arms, Autarky and Aggression, London, 1979; R. J. Overy, 'Germany domestic crisis war in 1939', Past and Present, 116, 1987, pp. 138-68; P. Hiittenberger and K. J. Miiller, Army, Politics and Society in Germany 1933-45, Manchester, 1984.

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23 24 25 26 27

28 29

30

31

32 33 34 35

36

37

38 39

40

R. J. Overy, The Nazi Economic Recovery 1932-1938, Basingstoke, 1982. A. J. P.Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, London, 1961. See Bullock, Hitler, for example. Hans Mommsen, 'National Socialism: continuity and change' in W. Laqueur (ed.) Fascism: A Reader's Guide, Harmondsworth, 1979, p. 177. These ideas which are now commonly held by historians were first given expression in A. Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie, Kriegsfiihrung und Politik 1940-JY41, Frankfurt am Main, 1965, pp. 121-3. The global theme has been developed most notably by K. Hildebrand. Hugh Trevor-Roper, Hitlers Kriegsziele, London, 1971. Hillgruber was the first to argue that Hitler's plan for world domination involved two phases. The first was European hegemony and the second, which would be initiated long after his death when the German Reich extended from the Atlantic to the Urals, would fight the United States and possibly Britain. See A. Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie and Klaus Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, London, 1973. Under the terms of this Treaty the Soviet Union surrendered Ukraine, the Baltic coast, the Caucasus, White Russia, Poland and Finland to Germany. The right's foreign policy ambitions not only sought the return of the territories lost under the Versailles settlement, but coveted the expanse won at Brest-Litovsk. The role of the USA had not been given much consideration in Mein Kampf except with obvious reference to the 1919 peace settlement. In the second book Hitler devotes more space to issues of global mastery and this becomes a familiar theme in his later speeches and pronouncements. He was convinced that the USA could only be defeated by a racially recharged Germany. It was his task to prepare the German people for eventual war with the United States, but only after his death. For the controversy surrounding this see E. M. Robertson, The Origins of the Second World War, London, 1971. See Joachim C. Fest, Hitler, Harmondsworth, 1975, pp. 539-43. Hitler declared that it 'is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future'; see Fest, Hitler, p. 553. This much used quote was to the Swiss Commissioner to the League of Nations in 1939. It must be regarded as a warning to the western powers not to obstruct Germany's intentions. In practice it did not produce the desired responses from either London or Paris. See Carl J. Burckhardt, Meine Danziger Mission JY37-J Y3Y, Munich, 1962, p. 272. Millward rightly argues that the German economy was not geared up for total war until 1942. A. Millward, The German Economy at War, London, 1965. Bernice Carroll, Design for Total War, The Hague, 1968. For an excellent discussion of wartime military strategy see Orner Bartov, 'From Blitzkrieg to total war' in Mary Fulbrook (ed.) Twentieth Century Germany, London, 2001, pp. 121-48. Norway and Denmark had been invaded earlier to prevent the supply of necessary raw materials from Sweden through Norwegian waters. Between 1933 and 1939 some 12,000 Germans were condemned for treason with another 15,000 being added to this list during the war. The supporters of the KPD suffered most under the Nazi regime. It is estimated that around 30,000 members were executed. See D. Geary, Hitler and Nazism, London, 1993, p. 41. The material on the German resistance is rapidly expanding. The first works appeared shortly after the end of the war and include the invaluable work by H. Rothfels,

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Deutsche Opposition gegen Hitler: Eine Wurdigung, Tiihingen, 1969. This sought to highlight the degree of opposition that had existed within Germany to the regime. 41 For full details on all these incidents and more see J. Fest, Plotting Hitler's Death: The German Resistance to Hitler 1933 -45, London, 1997. For some of the best accounts of the July 1944 attempt see P. Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat: Der Kampf der Opposition gegen Hitler, Munich, 1979; F. Nicosia and L. D. Stokes (eds) Germans against Nazism: Nonconformity, Opposition and Resistance in the Third Reich, Oxford, 1990. 42 See Burleigh, The Third Reich, pp. 715-16.

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Chapter 7

The fall, rise and fall of organized right-wing extremism in West Germany, 1945 -90 Post-war German society has been profoundly marked and traumatized by the experience of National Socialism. Vestiges of this now infamous extremist movement and its ideology have prevailed throughout the history of the Federal Republic of Germany. Evidence has been apparent on two levels: at an ideological level a general extremist sentiment, albeit latent, continues to persist in the form of intransigent nationalism, the search for strong leadership and a desire to rehabilitate the Nazi era and, frequently confirmed by opinion poll research findings. These traits are far from unique to Germany and would be replicated across most states in western and central Europe. The second, and probably more important, level centres on the degree to which these sentiments have been pulled together into a political platform and are voiced by political parties and groups. It is this latter element which is the focus of this chapter. The history of politically organized right-wing extremism in West Germany from 1949 constituted some peaks, but mostly troughs. The reasons for the extreme right's decline as an enduring and powerful political force certainly owed much to the enduring strength, stability and structure of the (West) German political system and its acceptance by the mainstream political parties. In retrospect other factors also helped restrict the movement of the extreme right. These included the German economic miracle; the ability of the main constitutional parties to transform themselves into Volksparteien (catch-all parties); the international acceptance of the West German state; the continuing development of a strong political culture and, of course, constant divisions and bitter jealousies among the activists and leaders of the far right. 1 Most important of all, however, any effort by the radical right and right-wing extremist organizations after 1945 to regain political capital and momentum were always going to face the serious handicap from the very outset of the memories and growing evidence of a series of unpalatable acts committed in Germany's name under the Nazi state. Despite everything remnants of the far right remained and the banner of right-wing extremism was successfully hoisted on three occasions in the history of the West German 147

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state. In the first phase (1949-52) it occurred under the Sozialistische Reichspartei (Socialist Party of the Reich) or SRP; in the second, from 1964 to 1969, under the Nationaledemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party) or NPD and in the third, from 1984 to 1990, principally under the guise of the Republikaner, but also a rejuvenated NPD and the Deutsche Volksunion (German People's Union or DVU). This chapter seeks to outline the key developments in the history of right-wing extremist parties in the Federal Republic of Germany by tracing the origins, developments and denouements of each of these forces until 1990. It also seeks to place the situation after 1945 in its broad historical and chronological context by drawing out any parallels and contrasting the ideological tenets with the radical right prior to 1945. This chapter commences, however, with a short account of the period of allied rule in Germany that was instrumental in preventing the chances of any immediate resurgence from the far right.

Germany under occupation, 1945-49 Nazi ambitions and aggression had culminated in over 50 million fatalities worldwide during the Second World War. At the end of the Second World War in May 1945 Germany lay in ruins. The extent of the devastation inflicted on the country had not been known since the aftermath of the Thirty Years War (1618-48).2 Hitler's ultimate military defeat was only made possible through the combined efforts of the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain. Two world wars in under 30 years had led the allies (including, and especially, France) to conclude that Germany was a problem requiring an urgent resolution. The solution posed, and one that stood in complete contrast to events in 1918, centred this time on the occupation and division of Germany. The intended core aim, as laid down in the Potsdam Agreement of August 1945, was to eradicate all traces of National Socialism and militarism. l In essence, this policy centred on the four Ds of demilitarization, decartelization, denazification and democratization. These tasks were the focus of allied energies from 1945 to 1949; however, most were essentially negative in character for they affirmed what the allies sought to do away with and not what they sought to create. Indeed, that all attempts at reaching a common vision for a future democratic Germany failed is scarcely surprising. It was a predictable outcome given the entirely divergent economic and political philosophies between the western democracies of the United States, Britain and France on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other. In the three western zones administered by the United States, Britain and France the objective was to build Germany into a parliamentary democracy. This was to be achieved by a process of establishing democratic institutions 148

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from grassroots local level to nationa.1 level. Their ambitions, however, rested on the readiness of the German people to accept democracy as a desired form of political discourse. The prospects from the outset seemed reasonably favourable given a growing awareness of what atrocities were committed under the Third Reich and this mood was reflected, for example, in a referendum in Saxony on 30 June 1946 when 77.6 per cent voted for the 'dispossession of commercial businesses owned by National Socialists and war criminals,.4 Moreover, the path of establishing a democratic system was greatly facilitated through the introduction of the licensing system which saw the emergence of the new centre right Christian Democratic Union (its core membership coming primarily from the former Centre Party) and the reappearance of the centre left in the shape of the Social Democrats and a collection of smaller liberal and other forces. 5 The licensing laws had, in effect, enabled the western allies to determine the political shape of western Germany in each of their respective zones of occupation and their control of the political environment severely impeded any reorganization of extremist organizations, but it did not destroy such sympathies. Some individuals who actually harboured right-wing extremist sympathies may have been denied a political outlet in which to voice their dissatisfaction and opposition and found themselves being coerced into accepting the newly established democratic order but others responded to the changed circumstances by presenting themselves as forces of conservatism. Although it is certainly the case that in the immediate post-war period, the possibilities for right-wing extremist parties were essentially limited, as former members of the pre-war DNVP experienced, some parties which advocated strongly conservative principles did succeed in acquiring licences." Such ultra-right forces included the Deutsche Konservative Partei (German Conservative Party) and the Deutsche Aufbaupartei (German Reconstruction Party) both founded in 1945. They combined forces in 1946 to create the Deutsche Rechts-Partei (German Right-wing Party) or DRP which sought to align itself in terms of historical continuity with the primary national and conservative forces prior to 1933. It propagated essentially nationalistic and monarchical ideas. To what extent this actually reflected the real values and to what extent it harboured National Socialist values, must remain open to question. Its activities and those of the other small parties on the far right were monitored very carefully by the western allies who were determined to prevent any possible resurgence of organized right-wing extremism or nationalism.? After the end of the war the western allies had expected a degree of substantial resistance from Nazi underground movements and other rightwing guerrilla-style bands on the lines that Nazi propaganda had predicted in the closing months of the war. These genuine fears had impacted on 149

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allied strategy in the closing months of the war and were most manifest in the argument between the Americans and Churchill over the capture of the German capital. The latter wanted all efforts directed towards Berlin while Eisenhower insisted on first moving south-east to prevent the Alps being used as a base for long-term resistance. H This perceived danger never emerged. Efforts to explain why such right-wing opposition never actually materialized rest largely on the decisive military defeat of Nazi Germany and the complete destruction and proscription of the NSDAP. There were few to direct any such resistance force. The leading figures of the Nazi regime had committed suicide, been killed, had escaped abroad or, in the case of many thousands, had been interned. The psychological impact of these events was immense and when combined with Germany's economic plight, her international isolation and her division and occupation there was little incentive to revolt against such totally changed circumstances. On the contrary, many former NSDAP members remained just as pragmatic as they had in the past and were as quick to work with their former enemies in building a new Germany as they had been in advancing their career opportunities under the Nazi regime. Once the so-called right-wing resistance groups had failed to materialize it rapidly became clear that it was not Germany that posed the potential threat to the liberal democracies of western Europe but rather the aspirations of the Soviet Union. The late 1940s not only witnessed the encroaching power of Moscow into eastern Europe, but also heralded the onset of the 'Cold War' and a deterioration in superpower relations that led to the Berlin blockade in 1948/49. The Russians by this stage had no intention of allowing a united and almost certainly western-oriented Germany to exist at its expense and thus thwarted the reunification of Germany. Instead there followed the 'temporary' division of Germany into two rival and ideologically contrasting German states, namely the smaller German Democratic Republic which arose out of the Soviet zone of occupation and, considerably larger in terms of land and population, the Federal Republic of Germany. During this period of allied interregnum the task of trying to gauge the true support for right-wing extremist sympathies was difficult owing to the existence of the licensing laws and it was only with their abrogation that the true strength of this appeal could be more accurately assessed.

Resurgence, 1949-52 The first four years in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany witnessed the first surge in support for organized right-wing extremist parties that echoed the now familiar traits of the far right. They espoused overtly nationalist sentiments, rejected the division and dismemberment of the 150

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German unitary state and were highly critical of the new West German government's move towards closer economic, political and military integration with the western world in the 1950s. There was a considerable potential for these parties and the possibility of major revanchist tendencies in this new republic for in 1950 some 17 per cent of the population was classified as expellees from the lost territories. Unemployment also represented a major factor of social and economic life until the early 1950s and offered the far right a further potential for growth. The overall scenario of potential difficulties for a new system and a recalcitrant right cast shadows of events in 1918/19, but the new Bonn Republic was far removed from the Weimar experiment, both in terms of institutional design and political circumstances. The Federal Republic of Germany comprised a federation of 11 regional states (Lander): Baden-Wiirttemberg, Bavaria, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North-Rhine Westphalia, Rhineland Palatinate, the Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein and West Berlin. All but three were new political creations and most of the new states had formerly been part of powerful Prussia which had now been removed from the map. The designers of the new system had learnt from the failings of the previous effort at democracy in Germany and among other measures to strengthen political stability the new constitution (Basic Law) did not include provisions for emergency legislation and rule by decree and substantially reduced the powers of the presidency. Responsibility for governing Germany was placed in the hands of the largest political bloc in the lower house (Bundestag), following federal elections every four years. The largest block also elected a chancellor who could only be dismissed through a constructive vote of no confidence. Y The constitution provided the states with considerable powers, for example, over broadcasting, education, the health service and the police while the Bund (federation) held exclusive powers in the fields of foreign affairs, defence, citizenship and passports. As well as the institutional design the fortune and stability of the new order were greatly improved by the mainstream political parties and time and time again the radical right has been unable to come anywhere near breaking the new mould of German democracy and government although it has on occasions mildly shaken its foundations. In the campaign for the first federal parliament in 1949 the DRP stood out as the most extreme right-wing group to participate. It had only just succeeded in acquiring a licence and, as such, only fielded candidates in the previous British zone. Nationally, it polled some 1.8 per cent, a rather dismal result but its performance was sufficient to secure it five seats in the Bundestag. Where had this support come from? The potential for right-wing protest clearly existed among the unemployed, the expellees and former NSDAP functionaries and all were ready to vilify the licence system 151

The Radical Right in Germany

and the political order. 10 This albeit limited success for the DRP was swiftly superseded by internal party squabbling over the future course of policy location and direction between the traditional conservatives of the pre1933 mould and the more radical nationalist elements. With the former occupying the key positions in the party hierarchy they moved quickly to expel their inhouse proponents of a more radical and assertive nationalist agenda. The major motivating factor behind the confidence of the more extreme wing within the party stemmed from the decision of the western allies, on the approaching establishment of a West German state, to lift the licensing laws. With hindsight, this move, effectively encouraged the emergence of more extreme political forces and, most notably, the Sozialistische Reichspartei (Socialist Party of the Reich) or the SRP. The SRP was established by those expelled from the DRP. It rapidly assumed the mantle as the primary force in organized extremism during this period and effectively relegated the DRP to a position of secondary importance. The party itself was far more overtly National Socialist in outlook and tone than the DRP had been and the SRP did not attempt to conceal its outright contempt for the Bonn democracy. Its affinity with Nazism was best illustrated in its recognition of Admiral Donitz, Hitler's successor, as the rightful head of state. One of its leading personalities, Otto Remer, was even more explicit and commented that the difference 'between the SRP and the NSDAP lies only in the time period'.l1 In the following years it achieved notable electoral successes particularly in Lower Saxony in May 1951, polling 11 per cent of the votes and in Bremen in the October of that year, receiving 7.7 per cent. The rejectionist position adopted by the SRP towards the Bonn Republic effectively sealed the party's fate and it was outlawed by the Federal Constitutional Court in October 1952 on the grounds that it constituted a subversive organization possessing unconstitutional aims. 12 The banning of the party effectively marked the end of the first upswing in right-wing extremist fortunes in West Germany. This in itself was partly due to the proscription of the SRP, but partly also centred on the rapidly changing economic and political climate within the West German state. By the early 1950s the economic miracle was beginning and overcame certain conditions, such as unemployment, that had initially facilitated the rise of political extremism. Although the DRP gained many former SRP members the cause of organized right-wing extremism declined substantially in the following decade.

Stagnation and decline, 1953 - 64 The gradual decline of organized right-wing extremism reflected the lack of cohesion of the far right which continued to splinter and diffuse. U Of the 152

The fall, rise and fall of organized right-wing extremism

parties which existed in this period the DRP, the Deutsche Partei (German Party) or DP and the Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (League of Expelled and Dispossessed) or BHE are the most relevant. In 1949 the DP was essentially a conservative force which found itself in direct competition with the main centre right force of the CDU (Christian Democratic Union). This competition soon resulted in co-operation, the latter helping the DP over the 5 per cent hurdle at the elections of both 1953 and 1957, increasing dependency on the CDU and in 1960 the absorption of the DP's leadership into the larger force. This left the rump of the party which subsequently merged with the BHE. The BHE was essentially a protest party. It aimed its activities at those who had suffered after the war at allied hands, namely former NSDAP members and some eight million German refugees who had been expelled from their homes and towns that after 1945 were administered by Poland and the Soviet Union. As such a force of non-integration this party failed to obtain a licence and was only able officially to constitute itself in 1950. The party possessed the potential for protest and in 1950 secured 23.4 per cent of the vote in the Land election of Schleswig-Holstein. In the following year it scored a further spectacular success in Lower Saxony where it captured 14.9 per cent of the vote. However, it only just scraped over the 5 per cent hurdle at the 1953 federal elections and opted to form a coalition with the CDU. In retrospect and from the BHE's perspective this was a mistake for it ensured that the smaller party became dependent on the CDU. With its continuing decline and its failure to secure enough votes to gain representation in the 1957 parliament, the BHE later split, with some opting for the ranks of the CDU, while others opted for opposition and the political wilderness. This, as Smith accurately states, leaves us with the impression of the inevitability of the small right-wing parties circling the CDU as satellites and drawing them into an ever tightening orbit. 14 The CDU had become the 'integrating' party which carefully absorbed many of the smaller rightist parties leaving only the more radical ones on the very fringe of the democratic world. In 1961 the remnants of both the DP and the BHE merged to establish the Gesamtdeutsche Partei (All-German Party) or GDP in a vain hope of bringing new life to a waning star. The fortunes of the DRP fared no better during this period. The party had been weakened by the defections to the SRP and in spite of a name change to the Deutsche Reichs-Partei (German Reichs Party) or DRP in 1950 it spent the next decade searching for a definite and distinctive political programme that encapsulated nationalist and neutralist credentials. The party leadership clearly portrayed the links to, and arguably the values of, the NSDAP as its party chairman and three of his deputies had all belonged to the Nazi Party prior to 1933. Nevertheless, disunity over the party's 153

The Radical Right in Germany Table 7.1

Right-wing extremist electoral returns at federal elections. 1949 - 69

Party

1949

1953

1957

1961

DRP DP BHE GDP NPD Total (%)

1.8% 4.0%

1.1% 3.2% 5.9%

1.0% 3.4% 4.6%

0.8%

1965

1969

2.0% 2.0

4.3% 4.3

2.8% 5.8

10.2

9.0

3.6

Source: Smith, G. (1986) Democracy in Western Germany: Parties and Policies in the federal Republic of Germany, Worcester, p. 109

direction led to further internal divisions and the creation of yet another irrelevant minuscule party, the so-called Deutsche Freiheitspartei (German Freedom Party) or DFP in 1961. After its debacle at the 1961 federal elections where its share of the vote dropped to a mere 0.8 per cent, the DRP continued under its new leader Adolf von Thadden and sought to attract other possible right-wing groups as coalition partners by abandoning its neutralist credentials. Throughout its existence the DRP had never amounted to much more than a peripheral party within the West German party system. This fact applies to all such parties, including, for example, the Fatherland Union, the Independent Workers' Party and the Free Social Union, in this period from 1953 to 1964. The electoral decline of the organized right-wing extremist parties is illustrated in table 7.1. The lack of success for the extreme right in electoral terms can best be explained primarily under four headings: the economic situation, the stability and anti-Soviet rhetoric of the Adenauer era, the electoral system and the Basic Law. ls The relevance of the economic miracle in the disinterest shown by the population at large towards organized right-wing extremism has been repeatedly stressed.!6 In effect this boom which dates from the early 1950s to the early 1970s transformed the German economy and secured a period of full employment, growing material prosperity and increasing acceptance of the new Bonn Republic. By the end of the 1950s the West German state comprised three main political forces as represented by the CDU, the SPD and the FDP (Free Democrats or liberals). The combined percentage for these parties at the federal elections in 1957 totalled a convincing 89.7 per cent.!7 Adenauer's style of leadership and his vision was certainly important in laying solid foundations to this new democratic edifice. None more so that his Westpolitik (western integration policy) which saw West Germany engaging in a series of projects from membership of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 to entry into NATO in 1955 as well as his political crusade against communism. He 154

The fall. rise and fall of organized right-wing extremism

essentially gave the bourgeois German exactly what he desired: an 'orderly, smoothly run and combatively anti-Marxist government'Y Another relevant factor that helped contribute to the difficulties of the extreme right lay in the abrogation of Article 131 of the Basic Law in 1951. This opened the floodgates for those officials of the Third Reich to return to similar posts within the Federal Republic and functioned as a neutralizing force by integrating what could have constituted a potential reservoir of far right support into the structure of the Federal Republic. 19 The significance of this move was evident in a parliamentary investigation from 1952 that established that some 34 per cent of officials working within the Foreign Ministry had been members of the Nazi Party. The same findings were replicated in other parts of the public sector including the police, the teaching professions and the judiciary. Finally, the position and influence of all minor parties was seriously undermined by the inclusion of a new provision within the Electoral Law in 1953 that stipulated that parties had to obtain 5 per cent of the national vote or one direct seat (modified to three direct seats in 1957) to achieve representation in the Bundestag. 20 This alteration directly impacted on the extreme right and ensured that between 1954 and 1964 the various parties failed even to reach this mark let alone surpass it, except on one occasion when the DRP succeeded in polling 5.1 per cent (some 90,000 votes) at the state election in the RhinelandPalatinate in 1959. 21 By the early 1960s the fortunes of the right-wing extremist parties had declined rapidly and relegated them to the very fringes of the West German political landscape. This reality seemed to be confirmed by the extremely disappointing performance at the 1961 federal elections and few could have foreseen the resurgence in support and a breakthrough into mainstream politics in the mid- to late 1960s.

The rise and fall of the NPD. 1964-72 Organized right-wing extremism had merely been lying relatively dormant and was far from a defunct force. It needed a cause to relaunch its activities and also a new image. According to the leader of the DRP, Thadden, a new party was the essential building block as it could 'serve as a haven for all the shipwrecked right-wing splinter groups and attract the dissatisfied of all classes in West Germany to whom a strongly nationalist and authoritarian policy would appeal'.22 To realize this dream, rejuvenate the forces of the radical right and in an effort to reverse the downward shift in fortunes the DRP merged with remnants of the DP and the GDP to establish the Nationaldemokratische Partei (National Democratic Party of Germany) or NPD on 28 November 1964. 155

The Radical Right in Germany Table 7.2

Rise of the NPD in Land elections. 1966-68

Election, year

%

Hamburg, 1966 Hesse, 1966 Bavaria, 1966 Schleswig-Holstein, 1967 Rhineland-Palatinate, 1967 Lower Saxony, 1967 Bremen, 1967 Baden-Wiirttemberg, 1968

2 7.9 7.4

5.8 6.9 7

8.8 9.8

Source: Nagle,]. D. (1969) The National Democratic Party: Right Radicalism in the Federal Repuhlic of Germany, Berkeley, pp. 39-66

The beginnings of the party proved inauspicious enough as it only managed to poll some 2 per cent of the vote at the federal elections of 1965 and it appeared that the newly established party was more likely to suffer the same inevitable political failure as had befallen its immediate predecessors since the early 1950s. This fate seemed even likelier following its drubbing at the Hamburg Land elections in March 1966. Contrary to predictions, however, the NPD suddenly blossomed and developed rapidly, albeit temporarily, into an electoral force whose success in the late 1960s threatened to break the new mould of West German politics. The development of the NPD in the 1960s was heralded by the state elections in Hesse in November 1966 and was followed by a series of promising results as seen in table 7.2. The rise of the party proved nothing less than dramatic and in the spring of 1968 the NPD was represented in 7 of the 11 state legislatures. The NPD's percentage of the vote had improved throughout 1967 and in 1968 they polled their best performance in the Baden-Wiirttemberg Land elections. This success was mirrored by a steadily rising membership which had soared from a mere 474 in 1964 to some 28,000 by 1968. Both seemingly promised to herald the party's probable success at the forthcoming federal elections in 1969. 23 The upsurge of this extreme force had both surprised and alarmed many. Herbert Wehner, a prominent SPD politician regarded this advance as an indicator of 'symptoms of crisis in the democracy' while Willy Brandt, the SPD leader, labelled the NPD as 'an opportunist of the Bonn crisis'.24 In effect, two interrelated factors contributed to the NPD's sudden fortunes. The first centred on the first economic downturn of 1966 to 1967 which, although with hindsight, represented 'a mere ripple of instability', saw unemployment rise to top the 700,000 mark after a decade of growth and full employment. 2s Again economic difficulties and individual 156

The fall, rise and fall of organized right-wing extremism

circumstances and uncertainty emerged as potential catalysts for the attractiveness of the extreme right. This economic malaise had political overtones. It accelerated the resignation of the unpopular Christian Democratic Chancellor, Ludwig Erhard (1963-66) and paved the way for the forming of the Grand Coalition (1966 until 1969) between the two largest West German political forces, namely the CDU/CSU and the SPD. From the NPD's perspective this event represented an added boon and provided an excellent opportunity for the party which managed skilfully to market itself as the only true party of 'national opposition' to the Grand Coalition. This potential role was highlighted by the inability of the Freie Demokratische Partei Deutschlands (Free Democratic Party of Germany) or FDP to advance itself as a credible party of opposition. 26 Events in the international arena, such as a renewed assertion of nationalism as a positive force (as for example under de Gaulle's France and Mao's China) may also partly explain the rise of the NPDY Together these circumstances provided for the advance of the NPD and marked the first substantial testing of West Germany's political development. The NPD may have seized the initiative arising from the unfavourable political and economic conditions, but their advance was, in retrospect, merely temporary and is best understood as a form of protest. To this end studies of the NPD's electoral support have indicated that small farmers and blue-collar workers particularly who were experiencing rapid socioeconomic change were most susceptible to the lure of the NPD. In terms of membership the refugee community was also strongly represented among both party members and voters while the middle-class professions provided the backbone of the NPD. In the late 1960s the party experienced a rather high membership turnover which was especially prevalent among the young. In terms of ideology it is interesting that the NPD never published a full-scale programme in the early years in line with the earlier NSDAP, but instead concentrated on stirring slogans and strident charges to elicit maximum publicity. Their main indictments were directed against the so-called Lizenzparteien and the established system as well as against the modernizing sectors of West German society.2s Their outlook depicted the swamping of Germany by Soviet and American influences, challenged superpower imperialism and advocated the right of self-determination for all Germans. It criticized the collective guilt of the German people for the Second World War and stressed a nationalistic policy in accordance with the liberal democratic order. 29 The NPD outwardly declared their support for the democratic order. Anything running contrary to this risked, of course, the possibility of being deemed an unconstitutional force. How genuine the party's approach to parliamentary democracy actually was must be open to considerable doubt. 157

The Radical Right in Germany Table 7.3

NPD's federal electoral results, 1965-80

Year

Votes

%

1965 1969 1972 1976 1980

664,193 1,422,010 207,465 122,661 68,096

2 4.3 0.6 0.3 0.2

Source: Smith, p. lOS; Hellfcld, M. von

(19~7)

Modell Vergangenheit, Cologne, p. 15

It may have projected itself as a conservative force and rejected the neoNazi label but locally it disseminated a far more clearly Nazi message. In retrospect, like so many other groups in the post-war era, it needs understanding at different levels. The significance of this second phase for the radical right really lies in the necessary transition from a replica National Socialist ideology to the selective focus on contemporary issues. This included strong moral tones that were expressed in the form of a cultural backlash against the pluralist society in West Germany and particularly the sex wave and the student movement of the time. The NPD's optimistic expectations of supplanting the FDP to become the third major political force in the country were shattered when the party narrowly missed the desired target of 5 per cent and polled 4.3 per cent (1.4 million votes) (see table 7.3). By comparison the FDP had polled marginally better attracting 1.9 million voters and some 5.8 per cent of the votes cast. It remains rather ironic that the federal elections which had been destined to launch the NPD as the fourth national party actually heralded the imminent collapse of that party. The NPD's failure owes much to the newly improved economic situation, the decision by the CDU and the SPD to dispense with the Grand Coalition, the degree of internal rivalry within the NPD and increasing public identification of the party as an extremist force. 10 It was arguably the arrival of the CDU (for the first time) in its role as major opposition party that really impacted on the NPD's fortunes, for out of government and shorn of federal responsibility the CDU adopted a more nationalist approach. This was particularly manifest in reaction to the new SPD government's policy of rapprochement with the states of central and eastern Europe. Indeed, in subsequent years the CDU captured three-quarters of the NPD's vote. 3 ! Other notable factors cited by the BvS included the lack of charisma within the NPD leadership, the increasing isolation of the NPD and an increasing understanding by the general population of the relationship between right-wing extremism and foreign policy.32 Undoubtedly, the rather negative press and potential damage that the NPD actually caused to West Germany's international image 158

The fall, rise and fall of organized right-wing extremism

deterred many potential supporters and fuelled its opponents' determination to combat right-wing extremism. The electoral success of the NPD evaporated practically as swiftly as it had emerged as table 7.3 illustrates. By the early 1970s organized rightwing extremism had been returned to the margins of political life. So sharp and rapid was this collapse that the NPD found itself incapable of attaining even 0.5 per cent of the votes cast which at the very least would have guaranteed a degree of financial reimbursement for its electioneering expenditure. 33 During the 1970s the party lost most of its seats in the state assemblies and by 1980 possessed only ten local government representatives. 34 Likewise membership, which had been predominantly male (some 90 per cent) nosedived severely from 29,000 in 1969 to a mere 6,000 by 1983. The NPD's failure and decline in the 1970s mark the end of the second phase of organized right-wing extremism in the West German state, but they also play an absolutely crucial role in shaping the development of this force in the 1970s and 1980s by precipitating two new characteristics, namely augmenting fractionalization and radicalization.

Fractionalization and radicalization, 1972-84 The beginnings of this fractionalization process originated in the wake of the NPD 1969 debacle. The internal strife within the movement concerning the future policy and party direction intensified and culminated in the splintering within the ranks of the NPD. This only weakened its credibility more and furthered its decline. One of the most significant developments at this time was the emergence of a force labelling itself the 'New Right' which attempted to provide a more intellectual rationale for the traditional tenets of the radical right. In short, it avowed to break the left-wing monopoly on intellectual debate by developing a coherent and scientifically proven ideology, one which was to be cleansed of historical associations. This process of reinvention led to the apparent rejection of certain fundamental elements long cherished by the 'Old Right' (the NPD). These included, for example, the sanctity of state nationalism and the glorification of Hitler and his regime. In their place, and at the core of the new 'ideology' lay the belief in a Greater Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. This reflected the shift away from the ethnocentrism of the NSDAP or the NPD to ethnopluralism. More interestingly, however, the ideology propagates the struggle for national liberation for all the oppressed peoples in the world. According to the 'New Right', Germans are being oppressed by the forces of American and Russian imperialism and they demand the withdrawal of all these forces. This, together with the participation of the 'New Right' in popular causes (such as environmental protection, the support for the peace movement and the 159

The Radical Right in Germany

concept of a united and neutral Germany), seemed more reminiscent of left of centre movements rather than one that was attributed to the extreme right. The label of 'New Right' is misleading, for in reality its ideology reflects many of the old and traditional components and concepts of the far right. These were merely repackaged and presented in different guises. The support for the environment, for example, conceals the racist elements that are lurking behind the fa~ade. To be sure the 'New Right' adamantly rejected all suggestions of assimilation and mixed marriages as detrimental to the laws of nature and the future of the white race which by the 1970s had supplanted the earlier Nazi concept of the Nordic race. The 'New Right' represented a backward-looking and conservative tradition that discarded the values and ideas of both the Enlightenment and the French Revolution that gave birth to liberalism and communism and their doctrines of universality and the rights of the individual. In contrast the 'New Right' laid emphasis on the importance of individual nations, their cultural heritage and the national community. All these ideological components were woven into the programmes of many of the small forces on the extreme right. The other decisive development in the course of the 1970s centred on the process of radicalization within organized right-wing extremism. The NPD, at its height, had been a party of essentially 'old men' where those under 35 years of age had amounted to a mere 5 per cent of total membership. All power within the party lay in the hands of the former and the NPD's youth wing was largely ineffective in exerting any influence over the party's direction. With its seeming demise many younger members became disillusioned and left its ranks in favour of joining the newly emerging neo-Nazi forces which espoused a more nationalist message and were prepared to endorse violence as a means to continue the struggle. The Actionfront for National Socialists (ANS) and the Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann (Military Sport Group Hoffmann) were undoubtedly two of the most noticeable to emerge from the NPD. These organizations heralded a new stage in the history of rightwing extremism and they and their successors are examined more closely in chapter 8. Overall in the period from 1972 to the late 1980s the forces of organized right-wing extremism were relegated to the fringes of political life. They were, however, far from extinct and emerged again in electoral terms for a third assault on the West German political system in the 1980s.

The third phase. 1984-90 The third surge of support was marked primarily by the breakthrough of the Republikaner Party (Republicans), the revival of the NPD and the success of the Deutsche Volksunion (German People's Union or DVU) between 1987 and German unification in 1990. This upturn in the fortunes of the 160

The fall, rise and fall of organized right-wing extremism

extreme right can be traced back to the results of the second elections to the European Parliament in June 1984. This turning point saw the first real perceivable improvement in the NPD's fortunes for although it only polled 0.8 per cent of the vote this amounted nevertheless to their best performance in a national election since 1969. This upswing was further replicated on several occasions in the following years with the party polling 0.7 per cent in the state election to the Saar in 1985 and obtaining 0.6 per cent of the vote at the January 1987 federal elections. In terms of votes the support for the NPD had trebled since 1980 rising from 68,069 to 226,298 in 1987. This change of fortune owed much to the concerns of some elements in West Germany, principally in relation to the rise of unemployment in the 1980s, unease surrounding the continuing immigration trend and the deepening process of EU integration through the 1986 Single European Act and the drive for economic and monetary union. ls The NPD's prospects remained, however, as distant as at any time in the past decade, as they were not within reach of the 5 per cent hurdle and, despite receiving reimbursements following these results, the NPD remained in financial difficulties. In order to escape from this quagmire of despair and in the search for greater solvency the NPD looked to improve its contacts and relations with the Deutsche Volksunion (German People's Union) or the DVU. The NPD and the DVU were the two main right-wing extremist organizations in 1987. The DVU was the creation of the publishing magnate Dr Gerhard Frey. It too originally sprang from the ranks of the NPD and rose to become the largest right-wing extremist group with some 12,000 members by 1987. 36 Initially the DVU had not been designed to operate as a political party but instead was conceived as an instrument to unite those who were politically oriented towards the nationalistic programmes and ideological viewpoints of the far right. This goal was largely achieved in the 1980s through the DVU's own newspapers, principally the Deutsche National-Zeitung and the Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung, which together by 1987 had a circulation of 130,000 copies. l7 Relations between the DVU and the NPD traditionally had been antagonistic and their decision to co-operate in alternate elections under the banner of the NPD and the DVU/List D (the D stands for Germany) came as a surprise to most observers. This decision must be appreciated as yet another attempt to un{te the fractionalized right into a more coherent body. The move also owes much to the pragmatic nature of the NPD's leadership that regarded co-operation as another means to secure financial support. The first success achieved by this coalition occurred in September 1987 when the List D managed, albeit narrowly, to climb over the 5 per cent mark, in the Biirgerschaftswahlen (elections to the city parliament) in Bremen. For the first time in almost 20 years the extreme right had captured sufficient votes to acquire representation in one of West Germany's 11 Lander.58 The 161

The Radical Right in Germany

cause of the right-wing extremists had been aided by Dr Gerhard Frey, leader of the DVU, who had poured in over two million Deutschmarks to the campaign. 39 This result confirmed the upward trend in right-wing extremist fortunes and, although the far right failed to repeat this result in the few elections of 1988, its electoral performances were better than at any time since the early 1970s. In the state elections in Baden-Wiirttemberg of March 1988, for example, the total vote for the combined extreme right almost surpassed the 5 per cent hurdle, stopping short at 4.5 per cent, a figure which corresponded to 218,490 votes and a fourfold rise from 1984. Of these parties the NPD attained the highest percentage, polling 2.1 per cent, its best result since 1968, with the new force of Republikaner obtaining only 1 per cent. 40 The upward trend in right-wing extremist fortunes in the 1980s was reflected by an increasing rise in the membership of right-wing extremist groups. Statistics for 1988 confirm this, placing membership at some 30;000 individuals in 71 extremist groupings. 41 This represented the largest number of people involved in organized right-wing extremism since 1970 and an increase of 4,800 from the previous year. 42 At the elections to the Berlin senate on 29 January 1989 the Republikaner caused a political sensation by obtaining 7.5 per cent of the vote. The result came as a surprise to the country and not least to the Republikaner itself which had failed to field sufficient candidates to take its elected number of seats in the state government. The Republikaner was a relatively new force and had been formed in Munich in November 1983 by three former staunch Christian Social Union (CSU) members: Franz Handlos, Ekkehard Voigt and Franz Schonhuber. All three had become disillusioned with the CSU after the CSU-led regional government had granted credit totalling some one thousand million Deutschmarks to East Germany. The Republikaner began by making appearances throughout Bavaria, which became the stronghold of the party. Most went unnoticed and unreported until Schonhuber, a former leading journalist of the Bavarian Broadcasting company, gave speeches which flowed in an ever increasing nationalistic vein, attracting people to the party like moths to a light. It was the onset of this more radical and nationalistic stance that ultimately caused both Handlos and Voigt to leave the party in 1985. Their resignations did not effect the party's cause and in the Bavarian state elections of October 1986 the Republikaner notched up its first success by polling some 3.1 per cent. In the course of the following few years the party continued to participate in state elections, obtaining rather mediocre results (Bremen 1987, 1.2 per cent; Baden-Wiirttemberg 1988, 1 per cent; Schleswig-Holstein 1988, 0.6 per cent). The breakthrough came in West Berlin. 43 This success was repeated at the national level in the third European elections of June 1989 in which the forces of right-wing extremism increased their share of the 162

The fall, rise and fall of organized right-wing extremism Table 7.4

The extreme right at the Euro elections, June 1989

Party

1989

Republikaner German People's Union (DVU) I ODp 1 Bavarian Party FAp4

7.1% 1.6% 0.7% 0.3% 0.1%

0.8';10 2 0.3% 0.1%

Total

9.8%

1.2%

I

2 1 4

The The The The

1984

-

-

nyu and the NPn formed an electoral coalition to participate in alternate elections NPD result from 1984 Onp is a right-wing oriented ecological party FAP was the most militant nco-Nazi party in West Germany in the late 1980s

Source: Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 5 July 1989

vote tenfold from that achieved some five years earlier. The percentage comparison is illustrated in table 7.4. In total some 2.7 million people opted for organized right-wing extremist parties at the Euro elections. The key beneficiary of the surge was the Republikaner, which alone accounted for 2,008,629 votes. The strength of this party in the south of the country was confirmed by the higher than average electoral returns, with the Republikaner capturing 8.7 per cent in Baden-Wiirttemberg and an even more impressive 14.6 per cent in Bavaria. 44 Despite their success the performance of the DVU/List D should not be overlooked as they too doubled their share of the vote to attract 444,921 votes. Nevertheless, this was a disappointing result for the DVU which had almost been treating its entrance to the European Parliament as a foregone conclusion, given the success of their coalition allies the NPD at the local government elections in Frankfurt in March. 41 On this occasion the NPD had polled 6.6 per cent of the vote. It seems likely that the NPD success in Frankfurt was a reaction to the results in West Berlin and since the Republikaner only fielded candidates in two constituencies, the NPD became the main beneficiaries. By the end of 1989 the Republikaner had successfully established itself as the leading force on the far right. The ideology of this new political force, as laid down in its 1987 programme largely consisted of populist and right-wing radical slogans which concentrated on a series of predictable and highly political minefields: environmental protection, the future of nuclear energy, the fight against terrorism and above all the foreigner issue. At the heart of the ideology stood their nationalistic fervour that demanded the decriminalization of German history and culture as depicted exclusively in terms of the period of National Socialist rule and dismissed the sole guilt of Germany for the outbreak of the Second World War. Moreover, their demand for a peace 163

The Radical Right in Germany

treaty to re-establish the German Reich 'in all its parts' (and this is taken to refer to the borders of 1937, together with Austria and the Sudetenland) superseded all others. The Republikaner aspired to a neutral and unified Germany that was free from both Nato and the Warsaw Pact and a Germany which, in pursuit of German interests, would abandon the European Community to maintain German sovereignty and prevent an influx of criminals and foreigners. 46 The ideological components of this new political force did not differ greatly from that of either the NPD or the DVU, although it must be stressed that the Republikaner was much more conscious of its image. The party has sought to avoid any statements which could give the government an excuse to initiate court proceedings to ban it and it has also sought to prohibit former members of the NPD and the DVU from joining its ranks and thus appearing to preserve its image as a conservative and respectable political party. To this end, they had adopted blue as their party colour as distinct from the brown accredited to them by their political opponents and in public at least repeatedly denounced all parallels with National Socialism. 47 This supposed predisposition towards the democratic order was the subject of intense debate in the late 1980s as people sought to classify the Republikaner. Did it belong to the conservative camp or did it fit the mould of right-wing extremists? Schonhuber himself typified the problem and was described as a 'political chameleon' who was able to offer everyone something and who could be a democrat to the democrats and appear as a right-wing extremist to rightwing extremists. The development of the extreme right is such that it is now misleading to try to separate the respectable right and the extreme right by some form of Berlin Wall. On the contrary it is far more useful to contemplate these organizations as being ranged on a continuum, i.e. one where the values of some Christian Democrats overlap with some of the more moderate members of the Republikaner which in turn overlap with the more extreme sentiments of either the NPD or the DVU. In such a scenario the Republikaner have been identified as 'a crucial link between established conservatism and the openly anti-democratic extremists on the right'.48 Strictly speaking, it might have appeared that this party could not be described as extremist for, as it so frequently pronounced, it does not explicitly aim at abolishing the constitutional state. The reality was rather different and despite its efforts to distance itself from the label of right-wing extremism, it is to this grouping that its reactionary ideology confines it. Its aggressive nationalistic and anti-foreigner rhetoric of 'Deutschland den Deutschen' (Germany for the Germans) and its 'raus' (out) and 'nein' (no) slogans, such as for example 'raus aus dem Nato' (out of Nato) and 'Nein zum Ausldnderwahlrecht' (No to the franchise for foreigners) are cited as evidence 164

The fall. rise and fall of organized right-wing extremism Table 7.5

Influx of immigrants

Year

Ethnic Germans

Asylum seekers

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

38,459 42,788 78,523 202,673 377,055 397,000 221,995 230,000

74,000 100,000 57,000 103,000 121,300 193,100 256,100 438,200 322,800

-

Source: for figures relating to 1985 to 1989 see imlenpo/itik, 8M!, Issue II, february 1990; for figures for 1990 to 1993 see Childs, D. (1995) 'The far right in Germany since 1945' in Cheles, L., ferguson, R. and Vaughan, M. The Far Right ill Western and Eastern Europe, 2nd edn, London

to demonstrate this particular assertion. The propagation of its visible Auslanderfeindlichkeit (hostility towards foreigners) gained the party notoriety and intensified the pressure on the West German political and social system to tackle the issues of immigration and asylum, but did the party constitute a new lasting force or was it simply a party of protest (see table 7.5)? An initial and brief examination of the profile of the Republikaner voter allows us to ascertain the party's durability. According to one opinion poll the sections of the population where the voting potential was highest for right-wing extremist elements were those with the most basic school leaving qualifications, low grade white-collar workers and officials, CDU and FDP disgruntled voters and those formerly unattached to a political party.49 Just as in the late 1960s, worries about a bleak future had pushed people into opting for the radical slogans of organized right-wing extremism. The Republikaner successfully tapped into these feeling of isolation and alienation to form a potential for protest that cut through classes and social milieux and bridged the gap between traditional conservative values and right-wing extremist sentiment. 5o A closer examination of the background of these voters establishes several defining characteristics on sex, age and religious affiliation. First, the Republikaner support at the 1989 Euro elections was typified by a stronger appeal to men than to women and in particular a predominance of those over 45 years of age. Both of these are seen in table 7.6. The receptiveness of the party to male voters reflects one of the familiar characteristics of organized right-wing extremism that was evident within both the NSDAP and the NPD. 51 However, Republikaner success owed much to its attraction to the youngest age cohort of voters in the 18-24 group. This age group was actually over-represented in terms of its actual size within the population as table 7.6 indicates. Republikaner appeal mirrored the 165

The Radical Right in Germany Table 7.6

Age

Republikaner voters at the Euro elections, 1989

Men Women (total percentage of voters in brackets)

18-24 25-34 35-44 45-59 60+

8.5 10.9 9.4 18.4 17

(5.9) (8.6) (7.4) (13.7) (11.9)

3.8 5.4 5.1 10 11.5

(5.3) (8.1 ) (7.3) (13.7) (18)

Total

64.2

(47.5)

35.8

(52.4)

Total

12.3 16.4 14.5 28.4 28.4 100

(11.2) (16.7) (14.8) (27.4) (30) (100)

Sotlree: Roth, D. (1989) 'Sind die Rcpublikaner die hinfte Partei?', Aus Politik und Zeitgesehiehte, p. 11

experiences of the French Front Nationale and it stood in stark contrast to the traditional pattern of voting for the extreme right in post-war Germany which has always shown the strongest propensity for such sentiment to emanate from the 60+ generation. In part this revealed the degree of frustration of many young Germans who saw their French, British and American counterparts display without any complexes a sense of national identify and national pride that was largely forbidden to them (Germans). This may be true but it obscures the important social causes underlying the upsurge in support for the extreme right that related to job insecurity, the prospects or reality of unemployment and little prospects with minimal or no qualifications to escape their humdrum existence. As a popular protest party in the late 1980s the Republikaner benefited from the 'problems' within the Federal Republic, such as the continuing influx of immigrants (see table 7.5) and the unpopularity of changes to a series of policies from health and taxation to agriculture and pension reform. Immigration was a key and highly sensitive issue that reflected the prevailing public opposition to the 'flood of refugees' swarming into the Federal Republic. These refugees were made up of Aussiedler (ethnic Germans) from eastern Europe, asylum seekers and illegal immigrants. Both groups were widely resented for they (including the Aussiedler) were perceived as foreigners and unwelcome competitors in the job market and in terms of housing and welfare support. As such the issue of immigration and a common perception of linking foreigners with rising crime levels ensured that it became a focal point of right-wing extremist activity and propaganda. For many supporters of both the Republikaner and the DVU the common feeling was one of increasing economic, social and political marginality. Such communities of people felt left behind and indeed also threatened by ongoing technological progress. All their hopes and aspirations seem to have been dashed and their cynicism for political parties and the political system has led them in search of more radical options. 166

The fall, rise and fall of organized right-wing extremism

Schonhuber repeatedly stated that the Republikaner was the 'Partei der kleinen Leute' (party for the small people) i.e. those who possess few qualifications and occupy the lowest paid jobs. The statistical evidence on electoral returns confirmed that this was exactly the power base of the party, as far as those under 50 are concerned, with skilled and unskilled workers in small rural towns and farmers were heavily over-represented in their preference for the party. In the Baden-Wurttemberg elections of 1992, more than 40 per cent of the Republikaner electorate were blue-collar workers, a proportion well above that voting for the SPD in that particular region while only some 67.5 per cent had gone through a basic education. Contrariwise, it remained the more highly educated who were most attracted to the Republikaner in the 50+ age group. In terms of regional success the party performed better in the south and this has further reflected religious disparities which showed the Republikaner proving more enticing to Catholics than Protestants. The initial successes of the Republikaner indicated the degree to which the electorate had apparently overcome its fear of voting for an authentic post-1945 party espousing German nationalism. At the time the prognosis for the Republikaner successfully installing itself as the sixth established federal political party alongside the CDU, the CSU, the SPD, the FDP and the Greens looked promising. 52 As with the NPD, its fate was to be bound up with the outcome of the federal elections scheduled for December 1990. Already, however, before these elections ever took place, the symptomatic weakness of internal rivalries and divisions which seems to afflict rightwing extremist forces had befallen the Republikaner. The second half of 1989 was characterized by divisions and resignations within the party at the regionalleve1. 53 The seriousness of the crisis within the Republikaner party was aptly demonstrated by the decision of its leader, Franz Schonhuber, to step down as party chairman in May 1990 on the grounds that the party had been and was being infiltrated by members and supporters of the NPD. There was certainly truth in his allegations as former NPD members had crossed to the new and more resurgent force of organized right-wing extremism under Schonhuber. This move had been greatly facilitated by the identical ideology and objectives of the new force. Schonhuber's gesture was essentially an attempt to boost his authority and regain the initiative from rivals within the party, by laying his future role on the line. As such his decision was engineered more towards publicity than any real intent and was confirmed by his re-election as party chairman in July 1990. 54 In retrospect the popularity of the Republikaner proved temporary and support dropped sharply throughout 1990 in the run-up to the federal elections. Its appeal started to stagnate and decline in national terms to around the 2 per cent mark. This swift turnaround in its fortunes can be attributed to 167

The Radical Right in Germany

circumstances far beyond the control of the party and primarily to the ability of the incumbent regime under Helmut Kohl to reseize control of the national question following the collapse of the East German communist regime in the autumn of 1989. In short, throughout 1990 the Republikaner became sidelined by political developments and fell increasingly under the popular shadow of the German chancellor. The chances of making any real breakthrough were diminishing rapidly and even in its regional stronghold in Bavaria the party watched its fortunes wane and at the Land elections in Bavaria in October 1990 the Republikaner failed, albeit by the tiniest of margins, to enter the regional parliament after polling 4.9 per cent of the vote. It may be interesting to speculate as to the course of events for the Republikaner had the revolutions of 1989 in central and eastern Europe not taken place, but such hypotheses although interesting to pursue, cannot replace actual events. The sudden reality of East Germany's collapse and the unification of the two German states in October 1990, just two months before the federal elections, directly impacted on the far right in general and sapped its potential for wider appeal. The stakes for the party were certainly high, for failure to surpass the 5 per cent threshold threatened to undermine the party's credibility among the electorate and impact on its future development. Indeed, Smith has accurately pointed out that the history of West Germany has constantly shown how the chances of minor parties being in a position to stage a comeback once they had fallen below the 5 per cent electoral hurdle 'are fairly slim' .55 This reality helps to explain Schonhuber's hostility towards any notion of an alliance with either the NPD or the DVU in 1989, but even this was not sufficient to enable the Republikaner to buck this historical trend and re-emerge as a credible force in a unified Germany.

Conclusions By the end of the Second World War the destructive nature of an aggressive and territorially ambitious nationalism had once again made its indelible mark on European civilization. The end of the war marks a critical juncture in Europe's history. On the one hand, it leads to the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as the world's two new superpowers and relegates the European states to the second division and, on the other, the changed circumstances of the international system push some individuals to pursue ever closer links between the states as a means of avoiding another catastrophe. The emphasis on international co-operation culminates in the creation of a series of meaningful and significant organizations from the United Nations to the European Union and from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 168

The fall, rise and fall of organized right-wing extremism

(GATT) to the Council of Europe. In retrospect 1945 also marks a decisive date in the history of the radical and extreme right in Germany for it now discredits the nationalistic and bellicose aspirations that had become a feature of German political life from the turn of the century. There is no other scapegoat. In other words, the policies pursued by National Socialism and total German military defeat undermined the political activities and aims of the extreme right and the force of nationalism from the outset. Moreover, the causes that had facilitated the rise of the radical right under Weimar were certainly not as pronounced after 1945. On the economic front, West Germany quickly emerged as the leading powerhouse in western Europe. Politically, the legitimacy of the new system was endorsed by the main parties and the wider international community and thus helped secure political stability. The issue of German nationalism, however, has persisted but mostly in the confines of the programmes of the minor right-wing extremist parties. Organized right-wing extremism had undergone three distinct phases of ascendancy in West Germany. All three waves show degrees of commonality in, for example, the location of electoral strongholds in southern and northern Germany and in their ultimate failure to break into the sphere of major federal politics. Indeed, the political system of the (old) Federal Republic of Germany (1949-90) remained resilient to all forces of political extremism, from both the left and the right. Nevertheless, it would have been decidedly foolish for the authorities ever to have dismissed the threat from the extreme right, for, as repeated opinion polls and surveys aptly and repeatedly demonstrated, the sympathy for right-wing extremist sentiment extended far beyond the electoral achievements of the far right. The difficulty which has always confronted the extreme right after 1945 has centred on converting such sympathy into actual votes. The unification of Germany in 1990 posed new economic, political and social problems for Germany. They offered the extreme right the potential for growth and it is to their fortunes in united Germany that this book now turns.

Notes 1 Roberts, 1992, pp. 327-43. 2 For a good account of the conditions and chaos immediately after the war in Germany and the attempts to rebuild German society see A. Grosser, Die Geschichte Deutschlands seit 1945, Munich, 1984, 11th edition. 3 The Potsdam Agreement of August 1945 between the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union confirmed their intention to occupy Germany to seek the complete removal of all vestiges and traces of National Socialism. Their aim was the creation of a new democratic Germany. 4 H. H. Kniitter, Hat der Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik eine Chance< Bonn, 1988, p. 24.

169

The Radical Right in Germany

5 The licensing system was introduced by the western allies and required all political parties to acquire a licence from the appropriate occupying force before they could constitute themselves as a political force. This policy was devised to prohibit the emergence of any extremist parties. 6 The efforts by former members of the DNVP and the NSDAP were rejected on several occasions by both the American and French occupation authorities. The 'conservative' forces fared better in the British zone. See David Childs, 'The Far Right in Germany since 1945' in Cheles, Ferguson and Vaughan (eds) The Far Right in Western and Eastern Europe, London, 1995, 2nd edition. 7 Kniitter, Hat der Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik eine Chance?, p. 36. 8 Attributed to Colonel R. L. Frazier who was responsible for all left- and right-wing extremist activities in the American Zone of occupation from 1945 to 1949 and quoted by Childs, The far right in Germany since 1945', p. 291. 9 In other words a vote of no confidence in the chancellor was possible and could be called and conducted within the lifetime of any parliamentary term. The distinctiveness of this arrangement that was designed to bolster political stability, centred on the need for an immediate agreement on a successor within the Bundestag, should a vote of no confidence be successful. This is extremely difficult and has only occurred once in the history of the Federal Republic, in the autumn of 1982 when Helmut Kohl replaced Helmut Schmidt. 10 For an excellent study into the parties, groups and associations on the extreme right in the first two decades of West Germany's existence see K. Tauber, Beyond Eagle and Swastika, Connecticut, 1967, p. 79. 11 Remer was one of the SRP's foremost personalities. His conviction to the Nazi cause and sympathies for the Nazi regime were never in question. His rise in the army was swift in the final years of the war. He was promoted to the rank of general after the July 1944 plot to assassinate Hitler and played an instrumental role in dealing with the individuals behind the plot. 12 Parties who according to their aims and attitudes aim either to destroy the liberal democratic order as provided by the Basic Law or threaten the very existence of the Federal Republic are deemed to be unconstitutional under Article 21 of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law). The Federal Constitutional Court determines, upon petition, the status of all such parties. Between 1949 and 1990 it only declared two parties as unconstitutional in their existence: the SRP in 1952 and the KPD in 1956. 13 For an analysis of the histories and role of the small right-wing extremist parties in post-war West Germany see S. L. Fischer, The Minor Parties of the Federal Republic of Germany, The Hague, 1974, p. 130. 14 G. Smith, Democracy in Western Germany: Parties and Policies in the Federal Republic, Worcester, 1986. 3rd edition, p. 114. 15 Konrad Adenauer (1876-1967) had been a prominent member of the Centre Party during the Weimar Republic. He served as Mayor of Cologne and presided over the Prussian State Council from 1920 to 1933. He was dismissed from office by the Nazis, briefly imprisoned in 1934 but was reinstated as the Mayor of Cologne in 1945. He helped establish and build the Christian Democratic Union after 1945 and sought much closer ties with the west. He was elected narrowly in September 1949 as West Germany's first Chancellor and served in this post until 1963. 16 A. Klonne, 'Rechtsextreme Tendenzen in der politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik' in M. von Hellfeld (ed.) In Schatten der Krise: Rechtsextremismus, Neofaschismus, Auslanderfeindlichkeit, Cologne, 1986, p. 22.

170

The fall. rise and fall of organized right-wing extremism 17 Smith, Democracy in Western Germany: Parties and Policies in the Federal Republic, p.l09. 18 Fritz Alleman, 'The NPD in perspective', The Wiener Library Bulletin, 21, 1966/67, p.4. 19 Paul Lersch, Die Verkannte Gefahr, Hamburg, 1981, p. 111. 20 Smith, Democracy in Western Germany: Parties and Policies in the Federal Republic, p. 109. 21 Kniitter, Hat der Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik eine Chance?, p. 37. 22 Fischer, The Minor Parties of the Federal Republic of Germany, p. 135. 23 Eva Kolinsky, Parties, Opposition and Society in West Germany, London, 1984, p.263. 24 j. D. Nagle, The National Democratic Party: Right Radicalism in the Federal Republic of Germany, Berkeley, 1969, pp. 42-3. 25 Kolinsky, Parties, Opposition and Society in West Germany, London, 1984, p. 265. 26 The Grand Coalition was formed by the two major political forces represented in the Bundestag, namely the Christian Democrats, its sister party in Bavaria, the Christian Social Union and the Social Democrats. The first two had been in power since the founding of the West German state. This particular coalition lasted for three years from 1966 to 1969 and left the small FDP holding the reins of opposition, a role it was totally unable to fill. 27 Kniitter, Hat der Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik eine Chance?, p. 39. 28 The term of 'licensed parties' was used in a negative manner and referred to those political forces whose origins lay within the period of allied administration from 1945 to 1949. 29 P. Dudek and H. j. jaschke, Entstehung und Entwicklung des Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik, Frankfurt, 1981, p. 300. 30 Childs, 'The far right in Germany since 1945', p. 296. 31 R. Stiiss, 'The problem of right-wing extremism in West Germany', West European Politics, 1988, p. 44. 32 See the Verfassungsschutzbericht for 1968, 1969. 33 According to the electoral law those parties which obtain more than 0.5% of the vote are automatically entitled to reimbursements for campaign costs. This was calculated at 10DM for every vote cast above this threshold. Accordingly, the Republikaner received 16.3 million DM after the 1989 Euro elections while the DVU obtained 3.7 million. These figures were reported in the Frankfurter Rundschau, 20 june 1989. 34 Kolinsky, Parties, Opposition and Society in West Germany, p. 261. 35 Unemployment had risen to 7.9% in February 1989. Although modest in comparison to Italy (10%) and Spain (22%) it caused anxiety in Germany. See Childs, 'The far right in Germany since 1945', p. 297. Migration stemmed from those seeking political asylum and those ethnic Germans (Aussiedler) from the Soviet Union and those from the GDR. 36 Verfassungsschutzbericht for 1987, p. 117. Frey claimed to have some 16,000. The o VU-Liste D had some 2,500 although again Frey claimed it had 6,000. 37 Der Spiegel, 28 March 1988, p. 26. 38 For further information see S. Bulmer, 'Unity, diversity and stability: the efficient secrets behind West German public policy' in S. Bulmer (ed.) The Changing Agenda of West German Public Policy, Dartmouth, 1989. 39 This financial liquidity was substantial and further in evidence in january 1989 when the DVU made national and international headlines by sending some 26 million 171

The Radical Right in Germany

40 41

42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51

52

53

54 55

xenophobic leaflets to homes throughout the country in search of new recruits. This exercise cost some 6 million DM and netted the organization an alleged further 10,000 members. For a full account of the DVU's actions see Der Spiegel, 5 June 1989. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 March 1988. Another minor party within this camp, the Okologisch Demokratische Partei (Ecological Democratic Party) or ODP received 1.4%. The ODP was formed in 1978 and lies in the grey zone between conservatism and right-wing extremism. At its core it seeks to playa role in the environmental question, with its ideas following on from those espoused by the 'New Right', i.e. the propagating of ethno-pluralism, and of the need to preserve the cultural identity by maintaining racial purity. As such this party has been labelled one of 'ecological fascists'. Suddeutsche Zeitung, 5 July 1989. Norbert Lepszy, 'Die Republikaner', Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 6 October 1989, p.3. D. Roth, 'Sind die Republikaner die funfte Partei?' in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 6 October 1989, p. 15. This was proclaimed in Frey's National Zeitung, 10 March 1989. Lepszy, 'Die Republikaner', Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 6 October 1989, p. 7. Claus Leggewie, Die Republikaner, Berlin, 1989, pp. 10-11. M. Minkenburg, 'Cultural change and the far right in East and West Germany', German Politics, 3, 1994, p. 178. C. Leggewie, Die Republikaner, Berlin, 1989, p. 7. N. Lepszy, Die Republikaner, Aus Politik und Geschichte, 6 October 1989, p. 9. It has continued since. In the Baden-Wurttemberg elections of April 1992, for example, one study revealed how the Republikaner polled 10.9% of the vote; an exit poll estimated that 13.7% of the male population had opted for the party in contrast to 7.7% of the female population. See Roth, 'Sind die Republikaner die funfte Partei?', p.7. The greens entered the Bundestag in March 1983 and in so doing ended the rule of the three-party system (CDUlCSU, the SPD and the FDP) that had dominated German politics since the late 1950s. The greens consolidated their position in the 1987 federal elections as the fourth party of German politics and although they failed to leap the 5% hurdle at the 1990 federal elections they made a comeback supplanting the FDP and becoming the third largest party in the German political system in the 1990s. The beginnings of internal division began as early as April 1989 in a welldocumented case concerning the then 19-year-old deputy chairman of the party. Andrea Kliche resigned from her position and argued that the party was being infiltrated by extremists. See Der Spiegel, 24 April 1989. Der Spiegel, 14 July 1990, p. 58. Smith, Democracy in Western Germany: Parties and Policies in the Federal Republic, p. 119.

172

Chapter 8

Homeland and hate: right-wing extremism and neo-Nazi militancy in unified Germany. 1990-present The promise of the late 1980s and the seemingly possible potential of organized right-wing extremism breaking the mould of German politics largely dissipated as quickly as it had appeared. The resurgence of this third wave of extremism was cut short by the unexpected collapse of the German Democratic Republic and the ensuing decision by Helmut Kohl, the then West German Chancellor, to initiate moves to reunite Germany. Kohl managed essentially to capture national fervour and his Christian Democrat-led government won the plaudits and general popular and electoral support for bringing about national (re)unification at the federal elections of December 1990. The process and politics of German unification effectively sapped the energies and appeal of right-wing extremism nationwide and was most manifest in the disappointing showing of the Republikaner in the first federal elections after unification: it polled only 2.1 per cent of the vote. However, the Republikaner did not disappear and has managed to maintain a minor presence in the German political system and on occasions since has recorded sporadic electoral successes. Its continuing survival owes much to the consequences of unification, the continuing deepening of the European integration process and the electoral advances of the left-wing Party of Democratic Socialism in the east of the country. The initial feelings of euphoria after unification rapidly gave way to the harsher realities of restructuring the five new eastern Lander and the degree to which the costs of this process impacted on West Germans. Indeed, the economic difficulties had been severely underestimated and gave way to resentment in the east while the mounting costs associated with the rejuvenation of eastern Germany intensified anger in the west. This negative environment temporarily boosted the anti-system appeal of the far right, particularly in the five new eastern regions. This was evident in a series of election results in the early to mid-1990s.' The most notable took place in the Land elections in Baden-Wurttemberg in April 1992 when the Republikaner staged a minicomeback by capturing 10.9 per cent of the vote and in the DVU's success in the April 1992 elections in Schleswig-Holstein when it secured 6.3 -per 173

The Radical Right in Germany

cent. This registered a significant rise from the paltry 1 per cent attained in 1988 and was very nearly replicated some four years later when the Republikaner polled 9.1 per cent. However, the glimmer of hope for the forces of organized right-wing extremism was merely temporary. In general the parties of the far right have time and again been consistent in failing to sustain and improve on their electoral performances in the medium term. It has been not so much financial difficulties that proved problematic but rather the right's now well established tendency to descend into quarrels about leadership and direction. 2 This chapter begins by providing a brief overview of the largely deteriorating and stagnating fortunes of the three principal right-wing extremist parties, namely the NPD, the DVU and the Republikaner. The first section serves as a short and necessary postscript to the previous chapter, but the main focus of this chapter centres on the activities of the more militant and aggressive variant of the far right that is encapsulated by neo-Nazism. German neo-Nazism has attracted, and still attracts, considerable national and international coverage. Its very existence, albeit on the fringes of the system, continues to cause consternation and shock and allows us to identify threads of continuity in terms of ideology and objectives that cut across contemporary German history and politics. Neo-Nazism draws attention to a now unwelcome past. At its core this chapter aims to provide an overview of contemporary neo-Nazism and has three main objectives: to present a historical account of the political and organizational development of neo-Nazism in West Germany from the early 1970s focusing on the leading groups and individuals who have shaped and developed this movement; the second aims to focus on the extent and range of neo-Nazi criminality and the nature of its violent activities; the third considers the state's response and considers the future for neo-Nazism in the new millennium.

Stagnation of organized right-wing extremism, 1990-2001 At the end of 2001 there were officially 134 political party associations and circles that were labelled as right-wing extremist in political orientation. Together they possessed a combined membership of around 46,200 individuals or approximately a miniscule 0.5 per cent of the entire population. Of these some 33,000 belonged to the three principal forces of the NPD, the DVU and the Republikaner. 1 A general account of these three parties in the 1990s has been one of electoral disappointment given the potential promise of the late 1980s. All were affected by the unexpected reunification of Germany that effectively removed 'at a stroke, one of the key demands of the far right ... not by force and violence but by the peaceful 174

Homeland and hate Table 8.1 Election results for the extreme right at federal and European parliamentary elections. 1990-99

Year

Type

NPD % of vote

D VU % of vote

Rep % of vote

1990 1994 1994 1998 1999

F F E F E

0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4

dns dns dns

2.1 1.9

1.3

3.9 0.4

dns

1.7

E = EUfO elections F = federal dns = did not stand at these elections

demonstrations ... and the diplomacy of democratic politicians'.4 This waning of political support and the complete inability of the extreme right to mount any serious challenge to the established order was clearly recorded by the dismal performances in a series of federal and European Parliament elections that took place from December 1990 to June 1999. At all these national polls the parties of the extreme right individually fell far short of the 5 per cent hurdle as table 8.1 illustrates. Even the more moderate and semi-respectable Republikaner saw their vote tumble in a succession of European parliamentary elections from 7.1 per cent in 1989 to 3.9 per cent in 1994 and to 1.7 per cent in 1999. The DVU ended the 1990s as the most financially secure and in electoral terms the most successful of the parties on the extreme right, securing some occasional triumphs among the disasters. By 1999 it had around 17,000 members.' Gerhard Frey, re-elected in January 2000 as chairman by an overwhelming majority, remains the dominant, authoritarian and financial force behind the DVU and is directly responsible for the production and dissemination of the National-Zeitung, the most widely purchased rightwing extremist publication in Germany.6 This promotes and reflects DVU concerns with the past by playing down the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime and rejecting the notion of German responsibility for the outbreak of war in 1939. 7 It also displays its present anxieties over immigration, the alleged criminal activities of non-EU citizens resident in Germany and does not attempt to conceal its dissatisfaction with liberal democracy.s Frey's papers also voice a fierce anti-Semitic prejudice that focuses on the alleged over-representation of the Jewish community in public life and especially in politics and the media and attack Israel at any given opportunity for its persistent demands for financial compensation for the victims of Nazism. They argue that Tel Aviv is intent on ensuring not only that Germany is never allowed to forget the Holocaust but also in pinning a collective blame 175

The Radical Right in Germany

on all Germans, both past and present. Consequently, these publications have orchestrated a sustained campaign against the erection of monuments to commemorate the Jewish victims of Nazi aggression and more alarmingly have continued to question the extent of the Holocaust, citing 'research findings' from new experts and questioning the reliability of witnesses. 9 By the end of the 1990s the DVU had regional associations in all 16 German states. It has representation in three of Germany's 16 regional parliaments, namely Bremen (6 per cent of the vote in Bremerhaven in June 1999), Brandenburg (5.3 per cent in September 1999) and SaxonyAnhalt (12.9 per cent in 1998). Part of its success owes much to its financial resources and ability to conduct large-scale publicity initiatives at the regional levels. Success is not always guaranteed, however, and at the regional elections in Thuringia in September 1999, the DVU only managed to capture a 'poor' 3.1 per cent of the votes. One of the most notable developments in recent years within the right-wing extremist camp has been the decision by Frey and the Republikaner chairman, Dr Rolf Schlierer, to 'normalize' relations between the two parties. In practice this new working relationship means that the parties as far as possible will now not put up competing candidates at elections and thus risk splitting the far right vote. This agreement has already borne fruit and seen the Republikaner stand aside in Bremen and Brandenburg while the DVU have stood down their candidates in Hesse and Berlin. To what extent this will reverse the declining fortunes of right-wing extremism is debatable. The DVU can point to successes, but these can neither be guaranteed nor sustained as the series of regional election results from 1998 to early 2000 illustrate in table 8.2. The Republikaner's story in the 1990s was one of steady stagnation and decline. Indeed, despite the efforts of its chairman, Dr Rolf Schlierer, to present itself as a conservative force it has never been able to escape the Table 8.2

Regional electoral results. 1998-2000

State, year

Saxony-Anhalt, 1998 Hesse, 1999 Bremen, 1999 Saxony, 1999 Saarland Thuringia, 1999 11 Brandenburg, 1999 Saarland Berlin, 1999 Schleswig-Holstein, 2000

176

NPD % of vote

DVU % of vote

Rep % of vote

dns dns dns 1.5 12 dns 0.2 0.74 dns 0.8 1%17

12.9 10 dns 6 11 dns dns 3.1 5.3 14 dns ls dns dns

dns 2.7 dns 1.5 1.3 0.8 dns 1.3 2.7 11> dns

Homeland and hate

association of being an extremist party. Its actual political orientation is clearly and often displayed by pronouncements from within its own ranks and its own ideological platform which shares much in common with the DVU. The familiar themes of xenophobia and anti-Semitism, efforts to reappraise the past and the customary attacks against the institutions and representatives of the democratic state find repeated expression at party gatherings and in all party documentation and fact sheets. The similarity between the Republikaner and the DVU has arguably culminated directly in closer co-operation between the two. By the end of 1999 membership had fallen to 14,000. This fall can be accounted for by the dismal performance in a series of elections, the party currently only having representation in one regional parliament (Baden-Wurttemberg) and the ongoing internal controversy about party direction and links with other right-wing extremist parties. IX Opposition to Schlierer's leadership is beginning to gather pace as he tries to distance the party from what his critics within the Republikaner see as 'other like-minded patriots'. An alternative leader in the form of Harold Neubauer is certainly highly possible, but whether he or another individual could transform the Republikaner's current fortunes is more debatable and certainly dependent on overcoming the continual internal divisions that have left the party in the political wilderness. The NPD may have recently just celebrated its 37th birthday, but it remains the least important of the three main contemporary extremist forces. The party in recent years has suffered from substantial internal divisions over policy direction and party priorities. This has impacted on the membership, which currently stands at around the 6,000 mark, and there has been a significant dip in its electoral fortunes - in many cases it has fallen far short of the 1 per cent mark (see table 8.2). By the mid-1990s the NPD had become largely an irrelevant force comprising competing and opposing wings within the party. Udo Voigt's narrow election as chairman in 1996 over Gunther Deckert by 89 votes to 86 saw renewed efforts to embark on a new course to unite the party and to broaden its appeal. I9 This was far from being straightforward, but led to the reaffirmation of its socialist agenda including its emphasis on the right to employment and social security, its criticisms of liberal capitalism and its objective of building a new economic and political order based on the Nazi concept of the Volksgemeinschaft. This ambition directly challenges the liberal democratic structures of the Federal Republic, undermines totally the notion of individual human rights and reinforces an overt hostility towards non-Germans living within the national territory.2o Indeed anti-foreigner rhetoric constitutes a fundamental part of the NPD's platform as does its persistent anti-Semitism and attempts to rewrite or reinterpret German history. In this it shares much in common with both the 177

The Radical Right in Germany

DVU and the Republikaner. This current strategy of relaunching the NPD is based on what has become known as the 'three pillars concept'. The first centres on a 'struggle for the streets' and involves the staging of demonstrations and other public events. The second can be described as the 'battle for people's minds' and seeks to persuade people of its message while the third focuses on the 'battle for parliaments', which advocates direct participation in the electoral process. It is still too early to make any assessment of how this has impacted on the NPD's fortunes. Nevertheless it is clear (and is a point conceded by Voigt) that for this task to be successful the party requires greater financial resources and a much more concerted effort to strengthen the party at grassroots level. One of Voigt's more controversial moves in his efforts to unite the various strands of 'national opposition' within Germany has been his decision to establish and foster much closer links with the most extreme variant of right-wing extremism in Germany, the neo-Nazis. This process was facilitated by the arrival of prominent neo-Nazis within the executive committee of the NPD and this new found co-operation has been manifest in, for example, the staging of demonstrations. However, this is a risky strategy. It shifts the party further to the right of the political spectrum and there can be no guarantee that it will restore the NPD's fortunes. On the contrary it is likely to tarnish the party and ultimately destroy any limited credibility that it might otherwise have managed to secure.

Militant and aggressive extremism: the neo-Nazis The neo-National Socialist (or neo-Nazi) groups have co-existed alongside (and often competed with) the forces of organized right-wing extremism since the mid-1970s. In contrast to the far more electoral-conscious activities of the NPD, the DVU and the Republikaner, the neo-Nazi 'movement' has always been explicit in its outright hostility towards the established democratic order and its open espousal for the principles of National Socialism and Hitlerism. In essence the neo-Nazis see themselves as the successors of the NSDAP and strive for the creation of a totalitarian state based on the leadership principle and constructed on a racial agenda that should promote and protect German culture and identity from both Jews and other foreign influences. These aspirations directly contravene Germany's liberal democratic constitution and impinge on such fundamental principles as free speech, free assembly, the independence of the courts, political pluralism and the sovereignty of the people. In statistical terms the forces of German neo-Nazism are relatively small. The official government figures for 2001 indicated that there were in total some 2,800 neo-Nazis, divided among some 20 groups. At first glance such open admiration for the Third Reich, a fondness for parading in Nazi-style 178

Homeland and hate Table 8.3

Overview of right-wing extremist and neo-Nazi membership. 1997-2001

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

DVU Rep NPD Militant right-wing extremists (mostly skinheads) Neo-Nazis

15,000 15,500 4,300 7,600

18,000 15,000 6,000 8,200

17,000 14,000 6,000 9,000

17,000 13,000 6,500 9,700

15,000 11,500 6,500 10,400

2,400

2,400

2,200

2,200

2,800

Total

44,800

49,600

48,200

48,400

46,200

Party

uniforms, staging provocative displays and giving Hitler-style salutes have often brought them ridicule. This initially led to their categorization as a lunatic fringe in the 1970s rather than being perceived as any serious threat to the political or social order. Although in party political terms the neoNazis are largely an irrelevance, their significance in contemporary Germany rests not on electoral representation but their continued dissemination of racial hatred and their persistent inclination towards the staging of provocative marches, their propensity towards acts of violence and, on occasions, acts of terrorism. In other words, their impact extends far beyond the ballot box as their activities in the 1990s and beyond have demonstrated (see table 8.3). The years 1991 and 1992 marked the first major wave of neo-Nazi activity when a spate of high profile, major and violent attacks rocked the newly unified Germany and tarnished Bonn's reputation internationally. The figures relating to right-wing motivated acts of violence for 1991 showed a five-fold increase from the previous year. Widespread media focus and public revulsion occurred against the backdrop of a series of infamous events (discussed later) in Hoyerswerda, in Rostock, in Molln and in Solingen that in turn sparked a wave of national outrage. These incidents, however, represented merely the tip of the neo-Nazi iceberg. Intimidation, verbal abuse, physical assault, attacks on Jewish cemeteries and synagogues had all become standard and remain familiar features of the neo-Nazi repertory. In retrospect, such violence cannot be described as a new phenomenon. It has been a prevailing feature from the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949. For much of this time, however, the violence was relatively sporadic in nature. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify certain peaks in its development. These range from the campaign of anti-Semitic graffiti daubing and the large-scale desecration of Jewish cemeteries in Cologne in 1959 that spread throughout the country in January 1960 to the offences committed under the banner of the Aktion Widerstand (Action 179

The Radical Right in Germany

Resistance) in response to the SPD's Ostpolitik in the early 1970s. However, the spate and scale of these crimes has risen sharply since the 1970s in conjunction with the radicalization process within right-wing extremist circles and particularly through the appearance of the neo-Nazis. But who are these neo-Nazis and how far does violence characterize their activities?

Origins and rise of neo-Nazism, 1972-89 The origins of contemporary German neo-Nazism stem from the collapse of the NPD vote at the federal elections of 1972. This failure culminated in the splintering of the right-wing extremist family that led many, particularly the younger members, to abandon the NPD in favour of the emerging neoNazi groups. Neo-Nazi membership rose sharply from 400 in 1975 to 1,200 by 1980 and took place against the backdrop of the Hitler Welle (Hitler wave) in West Germany when for the first time serious attempts were undertaken to come to terms with and re-examine the Nazi past. This involved open discussions, the publication of new works on the Nazi regime, the birth of a 'nostalgia' industry, considerable media attention, including the televising of such shows as the American mini-series 'Holocaust' in the spring of 1979 and efforts to tackle the entire subject in schoolsY Thirty years after Nazi Germany's collapse the force of National Socialism continued to evoke controversy, interest and debate and to an extent the nea-Nazis themselves were a product of this attention and curiosity. Violence and militancy quickly identified themselves as primary nea-Nazi hallmarks and reflected a dramatic upsurge in right-wing offences, which had climbed from 136 in 1974 to 2,047 by 1982. Neo-Nazism itself was far from being a coherent, nationally based or single movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Rather, it comprised a number of competing groups. Rivalry and fractionalization were and have remained hallmarks of the nea-Nazi scene. The 1970s and early 1980s were marked by a high degree of organizational instability as groups regularly formed, reformed and merged or disbanded or on occasions were even prohibited by the authorities. Indeed the development of this first phase of neo-Nazism in West Germany can best be understood not by tracing the lifespan of these groups but by focusing instead on the leading personalities within neoNazism who managed to transcend such group and party instabilities. 22 The rise of Michael Kuhnen Michael Kiihnen (1955-91) was one of the most notorious figures within West German neo-Nazism and, as Dudek remarks: 'without his persona, his intelligence and his capabilities the nea-Nazi movement would never 180

Homeland and hate

have succeeded in presenting itself as a fundamental opposition factor to be taken seriously.,n His 'career' as a right-wing extremist is fairly representative of many others of his generation. His initial involvement began with the NPD, its Aktion Widerstand (Action Opposition) against Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik, and led to contacts with influential and leading neoNazi personalities, such as Manfred Roeder, the leader and founder of the Deutsche Burgerinitiative (German Citizens' Initiative) or DBI before finally founding a succession of his own neo-Nazi groups in and around the Hamburg area. These included the Freizeit Verein Hansa (Leisure Hansa Association) in 1975; the Sturm 8. Mai (Storm 8 May) and the Aktionfront Nationaler Sozialisten (Action Front of National Socialists or ANS) in November 1977. His primary goal was the lifting of the ban that prohibited the reconstituting of the NSDAP. From the outset Kiihnen appreciated the power of the media and quickly recognized it as indispensable for his cause. For him it served the double function of informing the public of its struggle and helping to recruit new members to the ranks of the ANS, which Kiihnen aimed to transform into a national force within 10 or 20 years. 24 Propaganda material was an essential prerequisite to any such metamorphosis and was sourced from the American-based Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei-Auslands and Aufbauorganisation (National Socialist German Workers' Party/Foreign and Construction Organization) or NSDAP/AO. 25 Its role cannot be underestimated. It was largely responsible for the production of pamphlets and stickers all espousing such slogans as, 'Wir sind wieder da' (We are back again), 'Auslander raus' (Foreigners out) and 'Rotfront verrecke' (Destroy the Reds). It also produced the ANS party broadsheet, the so-called NS Kampfruf(NS Battlecry) which extolled a fervent belief in National Socialism and demanded a sovereign and unified Greater Germany, both free from American and Soviet occupation and based firmly on racist principles. 2li These activities led directly to Kiihnen's expulsion from the Bundeswehrhochschule (army cadet college) in 1977 and propelled him onto the fringes of the political and social system for the remainder of his life. The ANS's activities thereafter rapidly assumed a more violent nature. They included a series of bank raids in northern Germany in 1977 and several minor raids on army bases, stealing guns and ammunition in Cologne and even capturing two machine guns from a Dutch army camp at Fallingbostel in February 1978. Such acts led the BfV to comment for the first time that neo-Nazis were participating 'in acts of a terrorist nature in the pursuit of political goals'Y Six individuals, including Kiihnen, were subsequently arrested and in what became the first trial of right-wing terrorists (in April 1979) were charged with having conspired to bomb both the memorial to the victims of 181

The Radical Right in Germany

the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp and several NATO establishments as well as aspiring to overthrow the government. 2X Kiihnen proved rather more fortunate than his comrades, who were given prison sentences of up to 11 years; he was convicted only of the less serious charges of incitement to racial hatred, the glorification of violence and the spreading of unconstitutional propaganda. Nevertheless, he was sentenced to a 4-year prison term and his incarceration effectively reduced the ANS to a state of dormancy until his release. In retrospect, Kiihnen's temporary removal from the scene did not inflict any lasting damage on the neo-Nazi cause for there were many others who were prepared to raise the banner and promote the concept of National Socialism and vociferously oppose the institutions and parliamentary democracy of the Federal Republic. Some were even prepared to engage in violence to achieve these goals. Roeder. Hoffmann and Busse: the onset of right-wing terrorism. 1980-82

Manfred Roeder's career in right-wing extremist circles dates back to the 1950s. An ardent opponent of democracy he had long firmly supported the use of force and encouraged the direct involvement of neo-Nazi terrorism as a counterweight to the activities of the militant left. 29 He was behind the creation of the Deutsche Aktionsgruppen (German action groups or DAG) which, for a short period of time, represented one of the most active neoNazi terrorist groups. The DAG campaign in 1980 left two foreigners dead, injured two others and caused extensive damage to private and public property. His subsequent arrest led to a trial where he was condemned as the ring leader of a terrorist organization and was sentenced to 13 years in prison in 1982. Karl-Heinz Hoffmann created the self-styled Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann (the Military Sport Group Hoffmann or WSG Hoffmann) in Bavaria in 1974 after his defection from the NPD. The WSG Hoffmann was, in essence, a paramilitary organization run in a strict disciplinarian fashion. 30 Its members resembled soldiers in their appearance and activities: they wore grey and green uniforms and engaged in combat, undertook target practice with guns and conducted manoeuvres in their jeeps and even (pre-war manufactured) tanks. It was these 'war games' in the forests around Nuremberg that attracted substantial media interest and growing official concern. The WSG Hoffmann epitomized, as Hellfeld describes it, the most significant militant neo-Nazi terror grouping in the FRGY Hoffmann, for his part, never tried to disguise his hostility towards the democratic order: 'I'm not interested in today's democracy in Germany. That's why I never [participate] in elections. A democracy is impotent.' On the contrary he called repeatedly for the establishment of an authoritarian state, for 'a dictatorship with the right 182

Homeland and hate

man at the helm can do everything for the people' and restore German pride. u Such activities and philosophy led ultimately to the proscription of the WSG Hoffmann in January 1980 by the Federal Interior Minister on the grounds that it was a 'blatantly aggressive' force. 33 Although this ban was welcomed by many who believed that the government had underestimated for too long the undemocratic nature of such right-wing groups there was still some doubt in other people's minds as to the seriousness of this apparent threat and particularly in Bavaria, where the conservative CSU government under Franz-Josef Strauss continued to stress their harmless nature. 'My goodness, if someone wants to enjoy himself and goes walking on Sundays into the country with a rucksack and in battle dress, then he should be left alone.'34 Attitudes towards the extreme right changed rapidly following West Germany's worst terrorist atrocity when a bomb exploded at the Munich Oktoberfest on 26 September 1980 leaving 13 dead and over 200 injured. After initial suspicions that this might have been the work of left-wing terrorists proved unfounded attention focused on the right. Finally, evidence was uncovered to establish that the perpetrator had been a 21-year-old student, Gundolf Kohler, who was also killed in the explosion, had right-wing extremist sympathies and direct links with the WSG Hoffmann. Any suggestion of WSG Hoffmann involvement, however, could not definitely be proved and the incident was dismissed by the authorities as the work of a crazed individual or loner. In December 1980 the WSG Hoffmann made renewed headlines when the Jewish publisher, Schlomo Lewin, and his girlfriend, Frida Poeschke, were murdered in the Bavarian city of Erlangen. Suspicion once again fell on Hoffmann who had been infuriated by an article by Lewin on the WSG Hoffmann's exploits and activities. Although the murder weapon was indeed uncovered at Hoffmann's home along with 'substantial quantities of explosives', evidence quickly pieced together revealed that the double murder had actually been committed by Uwe Behrendt, a member of the WSG Hoffmann. It is interesting to note that shortly after this episode Hoffmann fled to the Lebanon with 14 associates to train with Arab terrorists, but as the members of the WSG Hoffmann soon tired of their 'training' and the atmosphere of rigid discipline that prevailed, most returned home in 1981." Hoffmann was arrested in June 1981 and in 1986 was sentenced to nine years' imprisonment. After his arrest many of his adherents looked to new leaders for guidance in their struggle. FriedheIm Busse came to provide a focal point for many. Born in 1929, he belonged to an older generation of neo-Nazi advocates and had been involved in right-wing extremist activity since the 1950s traversing the leading political forces of both the DRP and the NPD. On expulsion from the latter on account of his militancy, he established the Partei der Arbeit (Party 183

The Radical Right in Germany

of Work or the PdA) in 1971 and deliberately set out to target other NPD members as possible recruits. Busse, like Kiihnen, Roeder and Hoffmann, had aspired to create an elite force, which would be able to fight and could lead the masses when the decisive moment came. It was the PdA, renamed the Volkssozialistische Partei DeutschlandslPartei der Arbeit (the People's Socialist Movement of Germany/Party of Work or the VSBD/PdA) in 1979, that brought Busse both national and international notoriety. Ideologically, the VSBDJPdA replicated its rival and campaigned for greater national awareness, a revision of the Nuremberg trials, measures against the falsifying of German history, the liberating of Germany from foreign occupation and a staunch hostility against 'bolshevism'. For the VSBD/PdA, the positive attributes were embodied in the concepts of 'race, earth, state, honour and work', while the negative images were encapsulated by the 'Jews, guestworkers, clerical fascists and bolshevists'.36 Interestingly, the group's national liberation rhetoric led Busse to forge links with other similar forces throughout the world. In the summer of 1981 the VSBD/PdA conducted a series of successful bank raids in southern Germany. This campaign ended abruptly when five members of the group were ambushed by the police in October 1981. In an ensuing shootout two VSBD/PdA members were killed and two policemen injured. This incident reinforced the potential danger posed by militant neo-Nazism. Although Busse had not been directly involved in this incident, he was arrested shortly afterwards. While he was incarcerated and awaiting trial in 1983, at which he was sentenced to a six-year prison term for illegal possession of arms and explosives and for receiving stolen goods, action continued. VSBD members were suspected of being behind a bomb that killed one person at a Jewish-owned restaural't in West Berlin in January 1982 to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the Wannsee Conference.'7 The government used this incident to outlaw the VSBD/PdA on 27 January 1982. Some members like Odfried Hepp and Werner Kexel went underground to participate in terrorist activities which initiated a bombing campaign against US bases in West Germany in the autumn of 1982 injuring two American GIs in the process, while others regrouped around the newly reactivated ANS. Kuhnen, the ANS/NA and the FAP: building a national force. 1983-89

On his release in November 1982 Kiihnen immediately set about renewing his neo-Nazi ambitions. One of his first initiatives was the fusing, in January 1983, of the ANS with the two branches of the Nationale Aktivisten (National Activists) in Fulda under Thomas Brehl and in Frankfurt under Arndt-Heinz Marx, to create the Aktionfront Nationaler Sozialisten/ Nationale Aktivisten (Action Front of National Socialists/National Activists 184

Homeland and hate

or ANSINA). This new organization modelled itself on the structure of the SA and operated on a programme that had been devised by Kiihnen and outlined in his manuscript, Die Zweite Revolution. These centred on five slogans: the lifting of the ban outlawing the NSDAP; the repatriation of foreigners; environmental protection; anti-Americanism; and the struggle for an independent, neutral and socialist Germany.38 During 1983 the ANSINA made dramatic headway in its role as the leading neo-Nazi force in the country. It had rapidly amassed a membership of approximately 270 in some 32 local branches before the government proscribed it in December 1983. This decision, however, had not been totally unexpected and Kiihnen had already drawn up contingency plans to thwart the ban. These were initiated almost immediately with the setting up of Leserkreise (readers' circles) centred around the neo-Nazi publication, the New Front (GnNF), as a means of holding the former ANS/NA members together. Kiihnen and his closest associates had concluded that rather than establishing a new group they would move to infiltrate and consume an already extant force. 'Our dream,' Kiihnen stated in 1984, 'is to create a European SA whose activists will fight on the streets as political soldiers for National Socialism to counter alien views and organizations.'39 Their target was the Freiheitliche Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (Independent Workers' Party or FAP). Founded by Martin Pape in Stuttgart in 1979 the FAP essentially constituted a one-man, ultra-conservative fringe party. One of the initial advantages of consuming this force lay in the belief that Kiihnen and his followers could use the ultra-conservative image of the FAP to avoid any charges of anti-constitutional activity and, thus, avoid proscription while its supporters disseminated neo-Nazi propaganda and commemorated National Socialist anniversaries. Successful contacts commenced in early 1984 and despite Pape's efforts the FAP was overrun in the following years by former members of the ANS/NA and Pape was finally removed from all leadership positions and influence in 1988. Events from 1984 not only transformed the party as membership rose and had surpassed 500 by 1987, but the activities of FAP members ensured that the party rapidly became renowned for its militancy. Kiihnen's actvities remained under close police scrutiny and ultimately forced him in spring 1984 to flee to France to avoid having to answer a series of renewed charges. In retrospect, his flight marked the beginning of his ensuing difficulties with his peers which was only intensified by his inability to steer and co-ordinate events from Paris. Moreover media reports of his apparently luxurious lifestyle alienated many of his supporters and stoked the flames of internal rivalry and growing tension. This only intensified further following his expulsion from France in October 1984 and a renewed three-year prison term from January 1985. Kiihnen's 185

The Radical Right in Germany

imprisonment provided the perfect opportunity for his rivals to challenge him and the moment was seized on by Jiirgen Mosler, the leader of the FAP in North-Rhine Westphalia. The issue chosen on which to attack Kiihnen was his apparent readiness to accept and even promote homosexuality within neo-Nazi ranks. The background to the homosexuality debate came to the fore in July 1986 when Michel Caignet, a former ANSINA member openly declared his homosexuality in a French gay magazine and asserted that an initiative should be implemented to attract homosexuals to the struggle. Kiihnen supported Caignet's suggestion, but at a specially convened meeting of some 150 neoNazis in Mainz homosexuality was declared to be incompatible with Nazism and deemed to be an indication of both decadence and perversity. Mosler represented the majority view and described homosexuals as 'the last pieces of dirt'.40 In retrospect, this episode had strengthened Mosler's authority and popularity among the neo-Nazi rank and file and culminated in Mosler's direct leadership challenge to Kiihnen in the form of an internal 'putsch' that effectively split the 'movement' into two opposing factions. Intellectually weaker than Kiihnen, Mosler is unlikely to have succeeded in his putsch with without the backing of Friedheim Busse and Siegfried Borchardt. Borchardt, or SS Siggi, was then the 36-year-old leader of the 'Borussia Front', a militant group of alleged football fans from Dortmund. An unrepentant neo-Nazi sympathizer, Borchardt (who had already served prison terms for incitement to racial hatred, physical assault and disturbing the peace) had by the mid-1980s ensured than the Borussia Front had become renowned for its violence on and around the terraces. Its targets were almost always the Gastarbeiter. Both Busse and Borchardt were jealous of Kiihnen's position and, by backing Mosler, hoped to loosen Kiihnen's grip on the scene while simultaneously forwarding their own interests. The Mosler wing of the 'movement' rapidly emerged as the dominant part and came effectively to control the FAP. Despite events a small band of supporters centred primarily in Hamburg and in the state of Hesse had retained their loyalty to Kiihnen. On his release from prison in March 1988, he sought once more to regain his credibility through the establishment of the Nationale Sammlung (National Assembly). This new political party was initially designed to contest seats in the local elections in Hesse due in March 1989, but in the longer term to operate as a base from which to construct a national force in the spirit of the French Front National under Jean-Marie Le Pen. Langen, a small town with 30,000 inhabitants, was chosen as the 'capital' of the National Assembly. Kiihnen and his supporters aimed to make Langen the first town 'free of all foreigners' in West Germany and hoped that their campaign would serve as an example for others towns and regions across Germany.41 Their electoral 'campaign' 186

Homeland and hate

involved the dissemination of neo-Nazi hate propaganda and descended into a policy of confrontation directed against foreigners resident in Langen. It was the overt and aggressive nature of the Nationale Sammlung's efforts which effectively forced the federal Interior Minister, Friedrich Zimmermann, to proscribe the NS on 9 February 1989. He justified the ban on the grounds of the National Assembly's unconstitutional aims and declared that this step should 'represent an emphatic sign and a clear signal to all other groups that the government would not allow the Republic to become a playground for the neo-Nazis,.42 In short this worked and prevented Kohnen's supporters from standing in the Hesse elections some four weeks later but its effectiveness in the more medium term is more questionable. Indeed, by May 1989, Kohnen had regrouped the National Assembly's former 150 members into a new formation under the title of the Deutsche Alternative (German Alternative or DA). The FAP remained, however, the leading neo-Nazi force in West Germany and excluded, where possible, Kohnen's supporters from all its regional branches. This friction and fractionalization typified the difficulties facing neo-Nazism at the end of the 1980s. The 'movement' was divided into two main opposing camps with a smaller third force built around the so-called Nationalistische Front (Nationalist Front or NF) in Bielefeld. 43 Although much smaller than its two main rivals, with an estimated membership of approximately 50, it provided a somewhat different perspective by placing its emphasis on the original socialist aspirations of the NSDAP and on the thoughts of the Strasser brothers. It was established in 1985 by Meinhof Schonborn, was structured regimentally and based itself on the Waffen SS. It regarded itself as a national liberation movement that aimed to free Germany from the foreign influence and dominance of the western capitalist economies and sought to reunite the German-speaking people of Europe into a single state. Although fractured, the potential of these leading neo-Nazi groups for violence could not be casually dismissed. They were better placed and organized than at any time since the early 1970s. Their very existence and largely hate-filled propaganda when taken together with their readiness to engage in acts of violence and their possession of arms and explosives made the neo-Nazis a force, be they convinced terrorists or psychopathic madmen, that simply could not be ignored. Although direct involvement in acts of terrorism had certainly declined by the end of the 1980s the various neoNazi groups had established a propensity for violence and racial intimidation and abuse. Their activities have been monitored in the annual BfV reports. By 1989, the actual number of recorded acts of violence from the right again showed a marked upward trend to stand at 103. This fell just short of the highest number recorded to date in 1980 and 1981 respectively, although 187

The Radical Right in Germany Table 8.4 Offence

Right-wing extremist offences. 1980- 89 1980

1981

1982

1983

Murder Explosions Arson Robbery Assault Criminal damage

2 6 15 2 27 61

17 4 15 4 24 43

6 5 15 4 11 23

1 9 2 30 39

Sub-total Threats of violence Other

113 123

107 197

64 241

1,530

1,582

Total

1,766

1,856

-

1984

1985

1 1 11

2

1986

1987

1988

1989

- - -- -- - - 1

8

12

12

44 26

11 2 33 21

1 4

41 25

38 30

36 25

52 38

81 214

83 159

69 127

71 134

76 115

73 83

103 102

1,742

1,900

1,472

1,373

1,076

1,256

1,451

1,648

2,047

2,195

1,714

1,569

1,281

1,447

1,607

1,853

Other refers to the dissemination of propaganda, graffiti daubing etc. Compiled from the annual statistics reported by the BN from 19HO to 1989

it represented a fraction of a total of 1,853 'right-wing extremist' offences as table 8.4 illustrates. The FAP alone was responsible for 125 offences nationwide, that included arson, personal assault and the threat of violence. Although a disturbing upward trend, these figures were, in retrospect, a taster for things to come. They should not be seen in total isolation. Any form of comparative study with other states in western Europe would indicate similar-style activities, particularly in Belgium, France and Italy. The rise of the neo-Nazis needs to be placed in the overall context of the German political scene in 1989. By the summer of that year the Republikaner, the DVU and the NPD had all brought the issue of German nationalism, the continuing waves of immigration and debates on the Nazi past to the top of the political agenda. Neo-Nazism was well placed to benefit from these debates. The moves to German reunification in 1989/90 may have sapped the appeal of the Republikaner, but it added new life and impetus to the neoNazi movement as the latter was able to exploit the feelings of uncertainty and anxiety surrounding the economic restructuring process in the new eastern states. Significantly, by the early 1990s the FAP had become so exclusive under Mosler and Busse that it had not only lost members, but had enabled Kiihnen to reseize the initiative and induce a renewed breakaway from the party, the Nationale Offensive (National Offensive). It was Kiihnen and his allies that now led the crusade eastwards. Kiihnen had laid plans under his Arbeitsplan Ost to expand in the former GDR. He himself saw only the beginnings of this process as he succumbed to an AIDS-related illness in the spring of 1991. Nevertheless he had bequeathed to his chosen successor, Gottfried Kiissel, a new party with new cadres and a possible rosy future. 188

Homeland and hate

The neo-Nazi resurgence: growth and aggression. 1990-2000 Unification and its ensuing economic and political problems enabled the stagnating militant neo-Nazi scene in West Germany to flourish by expanding its activities eastward into 'central Germany' .44 Kohnen's efforts at recruiting new members was to prove far more straightforward than might have been previously imagined and culminated in an explosion of neo-Nazi activities in the early 1990s. The initial epidemic of violently xenophobic neo-Nazi activity that took place in the former East Germany may not have been exclusive to these new regions, but its scale surprised many commentators, given that according to the East German regime, right-wing extremist sentiment supposedly had been eradicated within the framework of a socialist state. 45 The reality of the situation in East Germany plainly contradicted the official dogma. Right-wing extremist activities and violence had formed a part of East German life, but all such incidents had been played down. 46 Husbands argues that neo-Nazism was 'a self-generated phenomenon (in East Germany) with its own character -less exclusive, more anarchistic, more violent, less conventionally ideological, more single-mindedly xencphobic and indeed, more widely supported than in the West'.47 In the year preceding the fall of the Berlin Wall rumours of right-wing extremist activity flourished in the west. In the period from January to October 1989 144 court proceedings (against 44 for the whole of 1988) had taken place involving neo-Nazis. The fall of the East German regime only facilitated right-wing extremist and neo-Nazi activities. Statistics on neo-Nazi membership in East Germany in the early 1990s indicate that there were some 2,000, almost twice as many as in West Germany, which had four times the population of its eastern counterpart. They transformed neo-Nazism almost overnight into one of the country's leading political issues and one of the government's foremost and pressing priorities. The upsurge of neo-Nazi violence. 1991-94

The spirit of neo-Nazism came to haunt the German political landscape in the early 1990s as violence, principally against foreigners, erupted across eastern Germany. Such incidents became almost daily routine reports in the press. These 'foreigners' were the most visible and easily accessible foes of neo-Nazi rhetoric and as the incidents of intimidation, arson, physical abuse and even murder rocketed they attracted substantial domestic and international media coverage that often drew unwelcome parallels to the persecution of the Jews in the 1930s. The principal targets were the guestworkers, asylum seekers and asylum hostels in many towns and cities across eastern Germany. At their most extreme they included murder, for example, in Dresden in 189

The Radical Right in Germany

March 1991, when a young Mozambican immigrant was thrown from a tram and fatally wounded, or attacks on asylum-seeker's refuges that occurred, for example, in Leipzig, Rostock, Schwerin, Neubrandenburg and Greifswald. The most notorious incident took place in Hoyerswerda in September 1991 when neo-Nazis and other militants staged a five-night protest, largely undeterred by the police, that culminated in the removal of all foreigners from the town. The 'bussing out' of these individuals was greeted with general enthusiasm by many of the local inhabitants amid neoNazi taunts of 'Deutschland den Deutschen' and 'Auslander raus,.48 In statistical terms the BN recorded 849 acts of violence in 1991. This represented a fivefold increase over the figures for 1990 and almost doubled again to approximately 1,500 (of a total of 2,584 right-wing offences) in 1992. Alone for the years 1991 to 1993 some 23 individuals were killed by right-wing militants. This xenophobic violence has received most publicity and attracted most concern, but it is only part of neo-Nazi repertoire that includes attacks on property such as Jewish cemeteries, acts that are deemed to cause a disturbance of the peace that include provocative marches and other acts that range from the distribution of illegal propaganda to giving the Hitler salute. These incidents of intimidation and violence were not simply confined to the eastern states as the old regions (Lander) proved just as fertile ground for the neo-Nazi crusade. Buoyed by events in the east, a spate of high profile attacks again directed mostly against foreigners and specifically against the Turkish community in Molin and Solingen caused widespread indignation across the nation. In the former in November 1992 attacks on two Turkish homes left three dead and several others injured while an arson attack in Solingen in May 1993 claimed the lives of five more Turkish residents and injured seven others. Alongside this xenophobic violence towards the new immigrant communities older anti-Semitic prejudices remained and continued to feature as an integral aspect of neo-Nazi propaganda. In terms of right-wing offences the targets were mostly either Jewish cemeteries or synagogues. Both possessed a long historical pedigree and again evoked images of events from the 1930s. Such events further intensified the pressure on the government at both the federal and regional levels to act to deter and prevent further neo-Nazi outrages. The objective may have been straightforward but did renewed association proscriptions and new legislation offer the solution that was demanded? Combating neo-Nazism: governmental response, 1992-95

Successive governments in the 1980s were often criticized for their halfheartedness in pursuing and tackling neo-Nazism and of not seeming to take the threat seriously or at the very least underestimating its true potential. 190

Homeland and hate

This was refuted by the administrations concerned, but their reactions to the right were often contrasted with their more severe approach towards left-wing terrorists from the early 1970s onwards. This raises the issue as to whether there were any grounds for comparison. Apart from a series of short-lived right-wing terrorist activities at the start of the 1980s the actuality of a credible 'brown army faction' never looked likely to materialize. 49 Arguably, the key to understanding why the neo-Nazis were never targeted as an equal threat lies with the scope and nature of their targets. Neo-Nazi offences were not directed against the instruments or the officials of the state, against industrialists or bankers, against leading politicians or judges or even against high ranking NATO personnel. Instead neo-Nazi activities were directed largely against foreigners, but also entailed attacks on other hate figures that included Jews, homosexuals, gypsies, prostitutes and other asocial elements. This did not mean that these attacks were not seen as problematic. On the contrary, they were perceived as a quandary and successive Kohl governments did prohibit a series of neo-Nazi groups on account of their xenophobic violence during the course of the 1980s. Part of the difficulty underlying right-wing offences lay in determining the motivation behind such attacks. Certain facts were easily established. The perpetrators of all these crimes, as subsequent arrests and court proceedings elucidated, were for the most part young men under 25 who felt alienated from society and resented the arrival of newcomers whom they perceived as potential rivals for employment and housing. These individuals regarded intimidation and violence as a means of deterring further immigration. Were they, however, all politically motivated? This question constitutes a fundamental issue that has long accompanied discussions of right-wing extremist violence. In the 1980s there was a general tendency to disown racist attacks where the responsibility lay either with a lone individual or with skinheads. This violence was often highly spontaneous in nature and the BN and police were only ready to classify skinhead violence as essentially neo-Nazi-inspired violence where they could determine direct evidence of neo-Nazi membership. This was not always possible and thus diminished the supposed threat. The skinheads have repeatedly shown how they are predisposed towards neo-Nazi rhetoric and eager to engage in violence. However, these undoubtedly aggressive and highly xenophobic individuals are still not officially identified as belonging to the neo-Nazi camp but are accorded a separate section in the annual BN reports. Although there have been frequent calls for bans on neo-Nazi organizations, successive governments have been generally rather reluctant to initiate this weapon and have done so as a means of last resort. There are essentially two reasons for this stance. Experiences from the 1980s brought into question the effectiveness of such bans for although such initiatives 191

The Radical Right in Germany

are generally welcome they have failed so far to eradicate the problem. The history of combating neo-Nazism in Germany has repeatedly shown how official endeavours to proscribe such forces have simply led to a regrouping around other forces. More controversially it also threatened to push these individuals further underground, thus making both detection and police infiltration more difficult. It is often argued that it is more desirable for a democratic state to demonstrate a critical tolerance towards its opponents and actively to engage these people in open discussion and refute their ideas rather than allowing them to fester underground and unchallenged. However, the increasing xenophobic attacks and other ongoing neo-Nazi offences forced a reappraisal of neo-Nazism by the authorities and many sections of the media. The transformed scale of these offences is clearly visible by studying the figures for right-wing motivated violence during the 1980s (as illustrated in table 8.4). This ominous trend was directly responsible for the Federal Interior Ministry's subsequent moves from 1992 to 1995 to issue bans against all the major neo-Nazi groups (see table 8.5). This determination by the central authorities to clamp down on neo-Nazism was also replicated at the regional level. Kohl expressed his grave concern for the first time in June 1991 and his administration equated the violence, the neo-Nazi thuggery and general concerns over Uberfremdung (swamping of German culture) and set about reforming what had effectively constituted Europe's most liberal asylum laws. Since 1992 proscription orders have Table 8.5

Proscription of neo-Nazi groups at federal and regional level.

1980-2000

Group

Banned in

Federal or state

Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann VSBD ANS/NA Nationale Sammlung Nationalistische Front Deutsche Alternative 50 Nationale Offensive Nationaler Block Wiking Jugend FAP Nationale Liste Direkt Aktion/Central Germany Kameradschaft Oberhavel Heide-Heim Blood and Honour Division Deutschland Skinheads Sachsische Schweiz (SSS)

January 1980 January 1982 December 1983 February 1989 November 1992 December 1992 December 1992 June 1993 November 1994 February 1995 February 1995 May 1995 August 1997 February 1998 September 2000 April 2001

Federal Federal Federal Federal Federal Federal Federal Bavaria Federal Federal Hamburg Brandenburg Brandenburg Lower Saxony Federal Saxony

192

Homeland and hate

fallen on the Nationalistische Front, the Deutsche Alternative, the Nationale Offensive, the Wiking Jugend and finally, the FAP in 1995. 51 Given its status as a political party the federal government and the Bundesrat (upper house) had initially petitioned the Federal Constitutional Court for the proscription of the FAP as had the Hamburg Senate with regard to the Nationale Liste. However, the court rejected these motions arguing that both groups could not be regarded as political parties. Consequently, the onus was placed back on the Federal Interior Ministry and the Hamburg authorities which duly banned both groups. Any final suppositions that the state was somehow blind in the right eye as had often been the charge in the past were now being severely undermined as the authorities began earnestly to initiate measures to clamp down on neo-Nazism. The changes stemmed from the ten-point plan put forward to parliament by Rudolf Seiters, the CDU Interior Minister in 1993 and envisaged new legal measures to detain and impose tougher sentences on neo-Nazis and other right-wing extremists. The Bundestag (lower house) approved a swathe of measures to this end in May 1994 which came into operation at the end of that year. This new legislation - the so-called 'Crime Prevention Laws' - is specifically directed against right-wing extremist organizations and anti-foreigner violence. It introduced new criminal laws and toughened existing penalties for a series of anti-democratic activities. The legislation broadened the definition of incitement of violence and racial hatred to include statements defaming whole groups and minorities. It prohibited the use of any Nazi-like flags, emblems, slogans or gestures and added a maximum five-year prison sentence for denying the existence of the Holocaust. This legislation also augmented the penalties for crimes involving actual personal injury and created special anti-extremist police units within the BKA. Finally, it broadened the legal grounds for holding suspected and repeat offenders. It is perhaps still too early to assess how these may have ameliorated the situation, but in general they are regarded to have proved positive and served as potential deterrents. For example, the courts in general now appear to be taking right-wing offences more seriously than in the past and imposing tougher sentences. For example, Michael Peters and Lars Christiansen, the men behind the Molln atrocity, were given a life sentence and ten years respectively. The perpetrators behind the fire bombing of the Lubeck synagogue in 1994 were sentenced to between two and a half and four and a half years. This period also saw the forced removal of many of the pre-eminent neo-Nazi leadership. Two of the most notorious neoNazis, Friedheim Busse and Jurgen Mosler, were handed down a 20-month prison sentence and a suspended sentence respectively for attempting to reconstitute prohibited parties and for incitement to racial hatred. Kuhnen's 193

The Radical Right in Germany

most ardent advocates were likewise arrested, tried and sentenced. In 1995 Christian Worch received a two-year prison sentence for trying to reconstitute the ANS/NA while Thomas Brehl was given one year for the same offence. 52 Gottfried Kiissel had meanwhile been tried by an Austrian court for his involvement with neo-Nazism and was sentenced to a ten-year term. Further progress in combating neo-Nazi forces was secured following the successful extradition of Gary Lauck, leader of the NSDAP/AO, from Denmark in September 1995. 53 In the short term this more aggressive attitude on behalf of the government and a series of court judgements on neo-Nazi perpetrators appear to have had a sobering impact on the neo-Nazi scene. Certainly right-wing violence fell back in the mid-1990s. This decline stems partly from a more determined effort to penalize individuals, results partly from government decisions to outlaw various groups, partly from changes to the asylum laws and partly from a growing awareness that such violence is not accepted among the general population. By the mid-1990s FAP membership had dwindled dramatically following its proscription. Nevertheless, an active core remained and the violence has not diminished. On the contrary, the trend in the late 1990s exposed a renewed upward trend which reflects the restructuring of the neo-Nazi scene post-proscription and the emergence of a generally reinvigorated movement that is gripped with a renewed extremism and new potential targets. Neo-Nazism: restructuring. leadership and the zenith of neo-Nazi violence. 1996-2000

By the late 1990s it was evident that the neo-Nazi forces had been more severely hit by both government bans and the arrests and imprisonment of leading neo-Nazis. In efforts to overcome the problem of future proscriptions and at pains to rejuvenate the neo-Nazi scene a new concept of 'comradeships' (Kameradschaften) was devised and implemented across the country. This entailed the deliberate creation of a series of essentially local or district-based associations instead of opting for the foundation of a new national group. Although this meant that the overwhelming majority of these Kameradschaften would be extremely small it was hoped in the first instance that these groups by their very nature would prove both elusive and secretive. These developments are highly significant and are reminiscent of the attempts by former left-wing terrorist groups in the 1970s to operate as distinct cells which in practice would not only be much more difficult to infiltrate but also might prove less susceptible to government attention. To overcome this self-inflicted fractionalization these groups were in theory to be kept in constant touch with each other's objectives and activities through the use of modern communications and the evolving and 194

Homeland and hate

extensive 'information network' on the web. The internet revolution has been seized on by the international neo-Nazi community to spread its message electronically, to attract new recruits and to extend its influence within society. These sites are blatantly xenophobic in nature and place great emphasis on the concept and acceptability of violence as a political weapon. The net represents another tool in its propaganda war that exists alongside the dissemination of written material, the distribution of hate-filled computer games under the banner of Adolf Hitler Software Ltd and the use of electronic mail to escape state interception and harassment. 54 According to the report for 1997 from the Office for the Protection of the Constitution there were some 330 right-wing extremist websites operating on the internet. The German authorities found themselves increasingly powerless to act as the vast majority were located not within the confines of German law, but were most often based in and produced from the United States. 55 Neo-Nazism possesses its own technical whizzkids and according to one source, right-wing extremist activities on the internet have reached a new highpoint where now the neo-Nazis have even taken to openly displaying the names and addresses of their 'opponents' on the net. This so-called 'black list' includes the names of journalists, politicians and foreigners. Moreover, the director of the Hamburg Office for the Protection of the Constitution maintains that these developments indicate a further intensification of neo-Nazi efforts to engage with their political opponents and raises the danger that some individuals or groups may actually make use of this material and carry out attacks. This is a real danger. This list has also been disseminated in hard copy format and, in a recent edition of the NS pamphlet Wehrwolf uncovered in Berlin, right-wing extremists were encouraged to assail parliamentarians and Jews (Hebraer).56 The 1999 BN report estimated that there are some 150 Kameradschaften in existence. Most comprise groups of around 10 to 15 persons and they are primarily located in northern Germany. However, in practice the efforts of linking the 'comradeships' at a national level has proved immensely difficult to maintain given the level and degree of personal rivalries and political disagreements between various self-styled neo-Nazi leaders. This lack of unity is nothing new and was evident in the inability of the neoNazi movement to engineer a coherent and united commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the death of Rudolf Hess in 1997, one of the most important dates in the neo-Nazi calendar. Nevertheless, their significance should not be downplayed. The effectiveness of each comradeship naturally varies depending on the personalities and skills behind the local leaderships. While many may have stagnated it is clear that some have blossomed and managed to make an impact. These include the activities of the Free Nationalists (Freier Nationalisten) which 195

The Radical Right in Germany

evolved from the successful amalgamation of several comradeships under the leadership of Thomas Wulff, one of the foremost neo-Nazis in Hamburg. The Free Nationalists attracted the attention of the BN by staging demonstrations and most notably one in June 1999 in the state of Mecklenburg-Eastern Pomerania that was directed against NATO involvement in the former Yugoslavia. This reflects an augmenting trend against US imperialism that was a central feature of neo-Nazi militant group such as the VSBD/PdA at the start of the 1980s.57 The Kameradschaft Karlsruhe (in Baden-Wurttemberg) places an emphasis on its struggle within the context of confrontation and political violence and in 1999 arranged a seminar for its members under the title 'From Terrorist to Terrorist' and included speakers from both left and the right of the political spectrum. The Kameradschaft Cera represents another example of an apparently increasing militancy that has seen its publication of photographs of members of the young trade unionists' movement who have actively sought to tackle right-wing extremism. The other principal parties of note according to the 1999 BN report are the Independent People's Bloc (Freiheitlicher Yolks Block or the FVB), the Neonazikreis um Frank Schwerdt (Frank Schwerdt neo-Nazi Circle) and the Kampfbund Deutscher Sozialisten (Defence League of German Socialists or the KDS). All three groups are small in number with approximately 100, 50 and 30 members respectively, but all have been involved in recent years in acts of racially motivated violence and incidents of physical assault that have become almost endemic to Germany in the 1990s. The use of violence as a means of achieving its political ends has long been justified in neo-Nazi publications. In 1999 an edition of the Hamburger Sturm (Hamburg Storm) illustrated the degree to which some neo-Nazi groups perceived themselves as 'national revolutionary cells' engaged in a war against the state and their political opponents. Deluded or not as such aspirations might appear they do pose a problem for arguably the weakest elements within society and remain under careful surveillance. The only current 'nationally' based neo-Nazi organization is the Aid Organization for Political Prisoners and their Dependants (Hilfsorganisation fur Nationale Politische Cegangene und deren Angehorige or the HNG). This group, based in Frankfurt am Main, was established in 1979 and remains active under the leadership of Ursula Muller. It tries to serve as a link to all incarcerated neo-Nazis whom it deems to be political prisoners and seeks to retain their commitment to the struggle by providing them with direct links, information and contacts with their comrades in the outside world. It uses its monthly newsletter, the Nachrichten der HNC, as its vehicle to these ends. lx Although it possessed some 500 members in 1999 (in 1998 it had 450), it has a rather low profile and exerts little in the way of influence 196

Homeland and hate Table 8.6

Right-wing extremist offences, 1990-2000

Year

No. of violent offences

Overall offences

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

309 1,492 2,639 2,232 1,498 837 781 790 708 746 998

1,380

-

7,684 10,561

-

7,896 8,730 11,719 11,049 10,037 15,591

Murders

0 3 17 5 0 0 1 0 0 2 2

on the neo-Nazi scene as a whole. However, it does fulfil a useful task as a prisoners' support service and often provides help in the form of both money and accommodation for individuals on release from prison, but naturally redirects them back to neo-Nazi circles and criminal activity. Neo-Nazi-motivated acts of violence had intensified by the end of the 1990s and the figures for 2000 showed a 33.8 per cent increase from the previous year with acts increasing from 746 to 998. In addition the overall number of right-wing criminal offences showed a marked increase of almost 60 per cent in 2000 (rising from 10,037 in 1999 to 15,591 in 2000). Many of these contravened the laws on propaganda of the penal code and included the dissemination of illicit material, the use of proscribed symbols (including the Hitler salute), the desecration of Jewish cemeteries and the repudiation of Nazi atrocities. 59 Eastern Germany has emerged as the focal point of such neo-Nazi militancy and violence (see table 8.6). Right-wing offences, as table 8.7 illustrates, cover a variety of activities. Most were associated with attacks on foreigners, anti-Semitic targets or political opponents. Most seriously of all, right-wing extremists were directly responsible from 1991 to the end of 2000 for 30 fatalities. These shocking statistics include two cases in 1999. In the first case, in Eschede in Lower Saxony, a man was beaten to death when two drunken skinheads forced their way into his home after he had earlier ridiculed their anti-foreigner sentiments. In the second in Rosenheim in Bavaria three African men were attacked by self-proclaimed right-wing extremists following a dispute over a parking place at a local public house. To all intents and purposes, violence assumes three forms: assaults on foreigners and their residences, attacks on the Jewish community and their property and increasingly unruly street confrontations with their political 197

The Radical Right in Germany Table 8.7

Surge in right-wing offences, 1999 and 2000

Acts of violence

1999

1

2000

Trend +100% +15.4% +38.7% +17.1% +250% -9.2% +33.8%

Fatalities Attempted murder Assault Incendiary attacks Bomb attacks Disturbance of the peace

630 35 2 65

2 15 874 41 7 59

Total

746

998

13

The statistics are derived from the Bundeskriminalamt

opponents and anyone or group who actively ridicules or seeks to undermine right-wing extremism. Xenophobic attacks constitute the largest number of violent offences (approximately some 60 per cent) committed by right-wing extremists. In 2000, 874 such acts were recorded. These have become almost a feature of weekly life in the state of Brandenburg. On 30 March 2000 a 16 year old confronted an Afghan asylum seeker in a telephone box and verbally assaulted him before attacking him. This followed an incident in Wriezen near Berlin on 10 March when a 14-year-old pupil was chased and attacked with baseball bats by a group of young right-wing militants. 60 These incidents must be seen against the backdrop of a campaign to carve out 'foreignerfree' zones across Germany. In 1997 it was claimed that some 25 towns and cities in Germany were essentially 'foreigner free' insofar as foreigners were barred from clubs, cafes, pubs and discos. The government was clearly alarmed by these events but recognized the reality of a situation, mainly in eastern Germany, where it was inadvisable for foreigners and visitors to leave their homes after dark. Violence against foreigners is becoming endemic and it is usually assumed that many attacks on foreigners are never reported and thus the real figures may be higher. For those that are brought to the attention of the police very few result in actual arrests as it proves in many instances impossible to identify the actual perpetrators. Indeed the leaders of the Jewish community often complain that even when people are arrested and brought before the courts few are actually sentenced. The second target of neo-Nazi aggression and hatred centres on a deepseated anti-Semitism. In recent years neo-Nazis have stepped up their criticism and attacks on the Jewish community in their various publications and have renewed old prejudices of Jewish conspiracies and transposed new ones of Jewish efforts to demonize Germany and its people. The neoNazis have targeted leading television and media personalities and often 198

Homeland and hate

provided both contact addresses and telephone numbers for their followers to do with as they please. The increasing anti-Semitic rhetoric is alarming and has almost certainly contributed to the growing number of attacks on Jewish property, such as a firebomb attack on the Erfurt synagogue in April 2000 and a growing number of cases of vandalism (56 in 2000) in Jewish cemeteries. The most infamous incidents involved two separate incendiary bomb incidents which damaged the headstone of the grave of the former head of the Jewish community in Germany, Dr Heinz Galinski, in 1998, and in 1999 the destruction of some 85 headstones in a Jewish cemetery in Nuremberg and the toppling of a further 103 headstones in Berlin-Weissensee. The third principal target of neo-Nazi and skinhead agitators centres on a growing recourse to street confrontations with left-wing militants and other political opponents. These normally centre around neo-Nazi public commemorations (such as Hitler's birthday, the death of Rudolf Hess and the Day of German Unity) which often incite counterdemonstrations. The BN reports 110 such incidents in 1998 (114 for 1997). These street battles are not new and in many ways resemble in nature, although admittedly neither in scale nor scope, the confrontations between the SA and the KPD in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The potential for escalating street violence is a genuine one. For example, a gathering of some 500 neo-Nazis on 27 February 2000 in Erfurt city centre demanded the return of Germany's eastern borders and insisted on the incorporation of the Sudetenland into Germany. Violence between these and left-wing protesters was prevented by a sizeable police presence. Some ten neo-Nazis were arrested for displaying symbols of prohibited organizations. In terms of location most of the acts in 1999 occurred in North-Rhine Westphalia. This is not surprising given that this state is the most populous of the German states. However, per 100,000, the picture is more revealing and indicates that many occur in eastern Germany where less than 20 per cent of the German population lived. Otto Schilly, the then Federal Interior Minister, put this down to pockets of high unemployment. The neo-Nazi scene is essentially youth based (apart from its leaders), where statistics from court cases indicate that the perpetrators are predominantly male, on average 19 years of age, have underachieved at school and often stem from disadvantaged and working-class backgrounds. Both skilled manual and unskilled manual workers and the unemployed appear to be the most receptive to neo-Nazi propaganda and activity. These possess and display aggressive and violent tendencies. Many of these incidents highlight the violent activities of right-wing oriented skinheads. This particular subculture and, especially, its fondness for alcohol and the sentiments and lyrics of its music have been directly responsible for inflaming hatred and 199

The Radical Right in Germany

encouraging the use of violence. Most acts of violence according to the BN (a figure it places at some 85 per cent) were carried out by skinheads. This is a worrying trend given how the number of skinheads continues to rise with each new report. The figures for 1999 show an increase of some 10 per cent on 1998 to 9,000 and almost half of these are resident in the five eastern states. Indeed, according to the BN, the 'skinhead scene is more violent, numerically stronger and in terms of infrastructure more developed than its counterparts in Western Germany'. This is where the majority of violent incidents take place. The perpetrators tend to be younger in the east and much more inclined to acts of violence and militancy. Some two-thirds of all skinheads are under 21 and many of these are as young as 13 or 14 (the so-called Babyskins) and display an intense hatred towards not only foreigners, but also Jews, Gypsies, left-wing militants, homosexuals, prostitutes and the homeless on the streets. 61 In Thuringia alone neo-Nazis and skinheads now number 1,520 (as compared to 1,320 in 1998) while the number of offences has risen by some 5 per cent to 1,118 cases and includes 38 incidents of severe physical assault (25 in 1998). However, the scene is not exclusively a male preserve. Women have participated and still do participate. The Deutsche Frauenfront (German Women's Front or OFF) was formed in 1984 as the female branch grouped around Kohnen's Neue Front (New Front). It possessed, according to official figures, somewhere between 100 and 150 members. Many were connected to male partners within neo-Nazi circles. This party subsequently split along the Mosler/Kohnen division before both new initiatives dissolved at the end of the 1980s. Today, the leading female associations and groups are connected to the skinhead scene and include such groups as the Skingirlfront Deutschland which was established in 1991 and renamed the Skingirlfreundkreis in 1994. It has been estimated that female neoNazis comprise around 20 per cent of the neo-Nazi scene. 62 This overstates their numbers, but there is certainly no doubt of female involvement and participation in neo-Nazi commemorations and acts of violence. Indeed, evidence from the BN illustrates how roughly some 4 per cent of the violent activities with a right-wing background for 1996 are attributable to female skins and neo-Nazis. At the end of the 1990s neo-Nazism was essentially a subculture within contemporary German society. The German state has been able to tackle neo-Nazism successfully. It can never hope to eradicate- it completely as there will always be individuals who are either attracted to the violence and camaraderie or are intent on shocking. They are far from constituting a solely German phenomenon. Neo-Nazism will remain a feature of society and of a highly controversial past. It has never realistically co~e close to undermining the state although it does represent a threat to law and order in 200

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certain areas and, more especially, to certain communities. It is arguably in structural and organizational terms weaker than at any time since its emergence in the mid-1970s. It has lost many of its natural leaders either through defection, death or imprisonment. Manfred Roeder was the last senior figure to be sentenced in the autumn of 1999 for inciting racial hatred, his outright denial of the Holocaust and his assessment of the accepted historical evidence of the death camps as nothing more than 'humbug'.

Conclusions The advance of the Republikaner in the late 1980s and the spiralling neoNazi violence of the 1990s propelled discussions of right-wing extremism to the top of many public and political agendas. Rarely a day seemed to pass without the papers printing some story on this topic which continues to raise concerns, especially internationally, about the state of German society and democracy. Neo-Nazism remains a feature of German life just as National Socialism remains a part of German history. The German neo-Nazis will continue to occupy the fringes of political life for some time to come just as their activities will continue both to shock and fascinate. They represent the residual elements of an overt and aggressive nationalism that can be traced back to Imperial Germany. Just as their predecessors espoused nationalism as a panacea for society's ills so the neo-Nazis promise salvation and deliverance, and in many ways serve as a release valve for some of the most alienated members of modern society. Neo-Nazism is far from being exclusively a German problem, but is an international one fuelled by the problems confronting all modern industrial societies and in particular high unemployment, changing labour markets, growing immigration and the growing degrees of economic and financial insecurity. This popular form of opposition will persist and resurface given the ongoing structural difficulties in the east and the way in which the issue of national identity is being eroded though the ongoing process of globalization and continuing European integration. Both these developments lend themselves to exploitation and popular protest. It is already being felt in Austria, Belgium and Denmark. To what extent the extreme right in unified Germany can capitalize on these remains to be seen. Much will depend on the organization and cohesion of the right and of course, on the response of the other major political parties to rapidly changing social, economic and political milieux. The possibilities of a fourth resurgence of organized right-wing extremism in the Federal Republic of Germany may be relatively high. If it follows the earlier trends, however, it will merely constitute a vehicle for protest rather than form any substantial political force that threatens to undermine German democracy. 201

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Notes 1 German Federal elections and the 16 regional (Land) elections to the regional parliaments (and also local elections) under German electoral laws occur in a regular fouryear cycle. Trying to account for the fortunes of the extreme right in the 1990s in table form would require the display of information and statistics on the three federal elections and over 40 regional elections. Instead table 8.1 has opted to show the results of the three federal elections and selected regional elections where the extreme right made dramatic gains. Table 8.2 will focus more specifically on the electoral performances throughout 1999 and into the early months of 2000. 2 Under German electoral law all parties are entitled to state financial support when they surpass the 1 % mark. This has proven attainable. 3 The membership figures for 1999 (1998 figures in brackets) are as follows: the NPD had 6,000 (6,000); the DVU had 17,000 (18,000) and the Republikaner had 14,000 (15,000). For fuller information see the Verfassungsschutzhericht for 1999. 4 D. Childs, 'The far right in Germany since 1945' in Cheles et al., p. 303. 5 Verfassungsschutzhericht 1999, p. 13. 6 This paper appeared for the first time in September 1999 following the merger of the Deutsche Wochen Zeitung and Deutsche National-Zeitung. It has an estimated readership of some 48,000. 7 A clear example surrounds the reinterpretation of the events leading up to war in 1939. The Frey papers ran a special series over the summer of 1999 to mark the 60th anniversary of war and, against all historical records and evidence, essentially argued that the road to war lay not from Berlin, but rather from London and Washington. According to this new interpretation Hitler was prepared to negotiate until the last possible moment, but was forced into war! 8 The paper whips up antagonism with headlines such as 'Do we have to tolerate these criminal foreigners?' and aspersions that German culture is being undermined by the arrival of hundreds of thousands of newcomers from the Balkans and beyond. 9 Historical revisionism is a growing trend. In recent years these papers have suggested that the actual number of Jews killed in the concentration camps was substantially fewer than the official versions maintain, standing more in the region of 470,000 to 550,000. 10 This vote secured the DVU 16 seats in the regional parliament. Since the election, however, an internal conflict in early 1999 led to the loss of four members from this group. See Verfassungsschutzhericht 1999, p. 60. 11 Taken as an overall result in this region the DVU polled 3% of the votes. However, this region is split into two geographical areas of Bremen and Bremerhaven which are not connected geographically. In the latter the DVU polled 6% and it was this result that entitled the party to one seat in the regional parliament. 12 This election marked the return of the NPD to the regional election campaign in Saxony for the first time since 1990. It polled 29,535 votes. The party membership in Saxony boasts the largest membership figures throughout Germany's 16 regional states. It currently stands at 1,200. 13 All three main right-wing extremist parties participated in this election in September. This election was noteworthy for it revealed the latest attempt by the Rep to raise their profile and appeal by forming an electoral pact with the League of Free Citizens (Bund freier Burger) and the Deutschemark Party (DM-Partei) under the banner of Biindnis 99. This did not prevent the continuing slide in this party's fortunes. The

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14

15

16

17 18

19

20

21

Republikaner polled 0.8% of the cast votes and this translated into 8,762 votes. The NPD fared even worse, although this was the first time that they had opted to stand in this state. In contrast the DVU emerged as the most popular right-wing extremist organization in Thuringia, securing 3.1 % of the vote. This last result reflected the considerable material that had been disseminated by the financially secure DVU. The Republikaner had reached an agreement with the DVU not to stand in this election. This result was another notable triumph for the DVU. It managed to capture 58,225 votes and for the first time managed to secure five seats in the Potsdam regional parliament. Again this result reflected the degree of advertising that had accompanied the DVU campaign which had commenced in the early summer. An agreement reached between the Republikaner and the DVU resulted in the latter's decision on this occasion not to stand in this electoral contest. For the Republikaner the result was again disappointing and they recorded losses from both the Federal election in 1998 and the regional elections in the Saarland in 1994. This amounted to 41,816 votes. The result was a further disappointment for the Republikaner in 1999 and has led to internal discussions over the future direction and course of the party. This 1 % translated into 15,106 votes. The party polled above the 2 % mark in areas such as Molin, Ratzeburg and Uetersen. Schlierer has favoured keeping a distance between the Republikaner and the other parties in an effort to maintain the credibility of the Republikaner as a conservative force. This does not meet with universal approval within the leadership of the Republikaner. That said, Schlierer has accepted the need to eliminate unnecessary competition between the parties where practicably possible. This course of action in itself has also proved popular and the decision by both the Republikaner and DVU to present a combined list of candidates for the elections to the regional parliament in Schleswig-Holstein in February 2000 led to several high-profile resignations from the party. In reality this was the lesser of two evils in so far as an agreement with the DVU was more palatable than one with the NPD. Deckert at the time of this election was serving a two-year prison sentence for inciting racial hatred. The sentence was imposed in 1995 and also prevented Deckert, then incumbent chairman, from actively campaigning for his re-election. The NPD is highly critical of the Federal Republic and its institutions. It castigates this political system as nothing more than an allied creation in the late 1940s which was created to serve and promote non-German interests. By using such terms as the 'licensed parties' and the 'provisional nature of the constitution' the NPD does not try to conceal its animosity. The Hitler Wave or, as Werner Habermehl has more aptly remarked, the Third Reich wave, swept through West Germany in the mid-1970s. The period was so-called because it was marked by an interest in Hitler and National Socialism. This found expression in the availability of Third Reich memorabilia and in a series of television programmes and major books on this subject, including Hitler by Joachim Fest. The interest was not confined to later analysis of this period, but also included original material, such as the publication of Goebbels' diaries and the availability of many of Hitler's speeches on both record and audiotape. According to the Basic Law of West Germany the use of emblems and songs relating to National Socialism was illegal except where this material was necessary for the use of research and other historical purposes. The fascination for this period arguably led to the Hitler diaries' farce in 1982/83.

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The Radical Right in Germany 22 For a fuller discussion of the neo-Nazi groups, parties and individuals see Lee McGowan, 'Remnants of an unwelcome past: neo-Nazism in West Germany in the 1980s', PhD thesis, University of Reading, 1991. 23 Peter Dudek, Jugendliche Rechtextremisten, Cologne, 1985, p. 170. 24 Alwin Meyer and Karl Klaus Rabe, Unsere Stunde, die wird kommen: Rechtsextremismus unter Jugendlichen, Bornheim-Merten, 1980, p. 56. 25 This was run by Gary Rex Lauck from Lincoln in Nebraska. 26 The appearance of the neo-Nazis initiated considerable discussion and a series of books in the late 1970s and early 1980s. These included J. Pomorin and R. Junge, Die Neo-Nazis, Dortmund, 1978; H. M. Broder, Deutschland Erwacht, Cologne, 1978; K. K. Rabe, Rechtsextreme Jugendliche, Bornheim-Merten, 1978. 27 According to the BvS, terrorism is defined as an 'enduring struggle for political goals, which are to be realised through the aid of attacks on people and personal property, particularly by serious criminal offences (above all murder, manslaughter, extortion, arson, causing death through bombs or other acts of violence, which serve in the preparation of these offences),. For details on this incident see the Verfassungschutzbericht 1977, p. 32. 28 Der Spiegel, 3 September 1979, p. 129. 29 He has consistently argued that democracy is simply incompatible with being German: 'Whoever is a German cannot be a democrat and whoever is a democrat cannot be a German.' His contribution to the development of neo-Nazism has been substantial as has his once ardent belief in the use of force as a political weapon. He argued that the right should use the same psychological warfare against the state that had been conducted by the militant left. However, since the early 1980s he has toned down his pronouncements on violence as he steered a closer path to the NPD. For a fuller discussion on Roeder's view in the 1970s and early 1980s see Ginzel, Hitler's (Ur)enke/: Neo-Nazis, [hre lde%gien und Aktionen, Dusseldorf, 1982, p. 49. 30 Discipline played a strong role in the WSG Hoffmann and all members were expected to be loyal to the 'Boss'. There were strict codes of conduct and all those who wished to become members had to undergo strict initiation tests in which physical fitness was pushed to the limits with, for example, 25km runs while carrying rucksacks. Within the group any code violations, such as the consumption of alcohol, resulted in punishment. 31 M. von Hellfeld, Modell Vergangenheit: Rechtsextreme und Neokonservativen Ideologien in der BRD, Cologne, 1987, p. 331. 32 This remark was first reported in an interview for the Italian magazine Oggi in September 1977, but was quoted much more widely. This example can be found in Der Spiegel, 19 November 1984, p. 78. 33 This ban was confirmed by the Federal Constitutional Court which regarded the WSG Hoffmann as deliberately intent on undermining and destroying the constitutional order of the West German state. 34 See Der Spiegel, 20 August 1984, p. 37. 35 For further details of life in this camp see R. Muller, 'Schule des Terrorismus' in W. Benz (ed.) Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik, Frankfurt am Main, 1984. 36 Der Spiegel, 26 October 1981. 37 The Wannsee Conference took its name from a district of Berlin where in January 1942 it was decided to initiate the Final Solution to the Jewish Question in Germany and Europe.

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38 For further information see P. Dudek and H. G. Raschke, Entstehung und Entwicklung des Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Opladen, 1984, p. 343. 39 In an interview in Stern, 12 July 1984, p. 54. 40 For a fuller discussion of this debate over homosexuality see the Deutscher Informationsdienst, Hitler's Enkel und die FAP, 1986. 41 The build-up to this electoral campaign is covered in Der Spiegel, 31 December 1988. 42 Der Welt, 10 February 1989, p. 1. 43 The BN report for 1989 accounted for 23 neo-Nazi groups with a combined total of 1,500 members. It also reported the existence of some 250 neo-Nazi skinheads. 44 For all right-wing extremist parties although the unification process was welcomed it fell short of a permanent settlement in so far as it failed to restore Germany to her 1937 borders (before Hitler's territorial acquisitions). They demanded the inclusion of those territories that had been placed under both Soviet and Polish administration in 1945 and vehemently attacked Helmut Kohl's decision in 1990 officially to recognize the Germano-Polish border. 45 Even under real existing socialism the state had not been immune from neo-Nazism which was largely the preserve of disaffected youths and was loosely organized around several football teams. 46 The East German regime portrayed the existence of neo-Nazism as a characteristic of the western capitalist world. Consequently the Berlin Wall was portrayed by the East Berlin authorities as a defence against right-wing extremism and fascism. For further information see Der Spiegel, 8 January 1990, p. 20. 47 C. T. Husbands, 'Neo-Nazis in East Germany', Patterns of Pre;udice, 26, 1991, pp. 3-17; also 'Militant neo-Nazism in Germany' in Cheles, Ferguson and Vaughan, The Far Right in Western and Eastern Europe. 48 The figures had soared since the late 1980s. See chapter 7. The majority came from Romania and Yugoslavia. To these figures we need to add the number of Aussiedler (ethnic Germans primarily from the former Soviet Union) many of whom knew little of the German language or modern culture and were often as 'alien' as the refugees. Their figures were as follows: 377,055 in 1989; 397,000 in 1990; 221,995 in 1991. 49 In other words the threat from right-wing terrorism never fully materialized in the form of a sustained campaign against the state on the lines of the activities of the Baader Meinhof Group/Red Army Faction during the 1970s and the 1980s. See S. Aust, The Baader-Meinhof Group, London, 1988. 50 The DA perceived itself as the political arm of the GdNF (set up in 1984) and was a loyal Kiihnen vehicle. It was based in Munich and demanded the immediate restoration of the German Reich in its 1937 borders, an instantaneous end to any further immigration and the immediate expulsion of all existing guestworkers and asylum seekers. 51 The NF had been founded by Meinhof Schbnborn in 1985. It concentrated on the left-wing ideals of the early Nazi party as espoused by Gregor Strasser and was centred in Bielefeld with around 130 members. The DA was effectively in the Cottbus area of Brandenburg while the NO was centred in Saxony. 52 Suddeutsche Zeitung, 11 December 1994. 53 Lauck had been the principal supplier of neo-Nazi materials (stickers, posters, pamphlets, etc.) since the mid-1970s. It is estimated that he supplied some 85 % of all neo-Nazi materials in Germany. His extradition was enthusiastically received by the German authorities.

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54 Computer games first appeared at the end of the 1980s. See reports in the annual BN reports for developments in this area and numerous examples of games. See The Times, 7 July 1995. 55 Verfassungsschutzbericht 1999, p. 14. 56 See Frankfurter Rundschau, 30 December 1999. 57 The anti-US message can be traced back to the 1970s. Opposition to NATO military action in former Yugoslavia and especially the participation of German soldiers have become a central theme of all the right-wing extremist parties. This action is condemned as US involvement in European affairs as a means to establish a new world order under American hegemony. 58 It is estimated by the BN that some 600 copies are produced on a monthly basis. 59 Principally articles 86 and 86a of the Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) outlaw the use and spreading of the emblems and flags and the sale of Mein Kampf and other materials relating to the Nazi Party. 60 Frankfurter Rundschau, 31 March 2000. 61 The age factor is the one striking difference in any sociological comparison between the neo-Nazis convicted in the 1980s and those from the 1990s. The average age for the former period was 27 and this stands in stark contrast to the average age of 19 for today. 62 Michael Schmidt, 'Heute gehort uns die Strasse', Der inside Report aus der neo-Nazi Szene, Diisseldorf, 1993.

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Chapter 9

A new millennium for the extreme right? Conclusions This book has sought to trace the fortunes of the radical right from 1870 to the present day. The picture presented has been both a complicated and complex one, characterized by constant organizational change and determined by the momentous political events that have occurred throughout German history in the last 130 years. In this short period Germany has undergone four seismic revolutions that have overtaken and completely transformed incumbent political arrangements, impacted on political forces and settlements before finally bedding down after 1949 to establish (West) Germany's most successful and stable political and democratic creation. The radical right, albeit with varying degrees of electoral fortunes and political successes, has been a constant feature of the four truly divergent regimes from 1870 that have encompassed a practically absolute monarchy, totalitarian dictatorship and parliamentary democracy. Despite the wide ranging fortunes of all forms of the radical right throughout this period there always has been and remains a strict set of ideas and aspirations that binds them. At their core, as indicated in chapter 1 and indeed throughout the book, all these movements, whether they are classified under terms such as the far right, the radical right, the extreme right or even neo-Nazism and irrespective of their own particular timeframe, share common ideological tenets and convictions. These encompass to varying degrees elements of the following: a strident nationalism (with expansionist inclinations), xenophobic and specific anti-Semitic tendencies, an overt hostility towards parliamentary government and a common belief in the needs and rights of the 'community' rather than the individual. Although it is possible to trace a strong degree of continuity of purpose and drive among the far right between 1870 and the present, it is also possible to present the history of the far right in terms of peaks and troughs and to isolate decisive turning points in its evolution and its general electoral decline. The radical right fully emerged into both mainstream German and European politics in the aftermath of the First World War. The seeds, however, were sown in the Imperial period when the politics of the verspatete

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The Radical Right in Germany

Nation unleashed in the efforts to consolidate the new political entity a much greater emphasis on German identity and the qualities of German culture and heritage.' Such promotion also possessed a flipside and enabled, whether intentionally designed or not, the clear identification of 'non-German' traits and cultures within society and the body politic. These 'non-Germans', most notably identified as minorities (including the Jews and the guestworkers of more recent times), were identified as potential problems by the radical right and were frequently used as highly visible scapegoats on whom to lay blame for a wide ranging series of economic and social difficulties from unemployment to poor housing. The identification of outsiders was driven by political ambitions and has continually proved receptive to small sections of society which have felt alienated and abandoned by the political system of the day. The forces of nationalism came to dominate interwar politics and international relations and the ensuing world war, occupations and atrocities ultimately discredited nationalism in western Europe and ushered in a new momentum for closer co-operation and rapprochement between France and West Germany that led to the intergovernmental Council of Europe and the more significant supranational European Coal and Steel Community (that grew into the European Union). The new beginning could not wipe out the past and in Germany the National Socialist experience has cast shadows over all aspects of post-war German society. Indeed, Hitler's Germany may have been a relatively short-lived regime but it came to transform political structures in post-war Germany and, of course, across the entire European continent. The Germans have spent almost 60 years trying to come to terms with Nazism (Vergangenheitsbewaltigung) and its particular ethos, policies and atrocities. The term Vergangenheitsbewaltigung has very broad connotations. Partly, it entails the elimination of all National Socialist influences and the pursuit, capture and punishment of former criminals. This includes the proscription of all National Socialist symbols, emblems and flags and prohibiting the sale of Mein Kampf. Partly, also, it is about coming to terms with events committed in Germany's name under Nazi rule and, in particular, the Holocaust, while simultaneously seeking to keep the memories of these past events alive among the generations of Germans born after 1945. It has often been a long, arduous and painful process that has been carried out very much in the public (and educational) domain since the mid-1970s. Nevertheless, Nazi Germany continues to weave its spell long after its political demise and remains as controversial as ever, both at home and abroad, as authors seek to understand its attraction and apportion blame among various actors. This found particular expression during the Historikerstreit (controversy among historians) of the mid-1980s, which sought to question the uniqueness of National Socialism and its crimes in international history 208

A new millennium for the extreme right?

by trying to compare the activities of Hitler's Germany with those of Stalin's Soviet Union. Ernst Nolte's original essay in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of June 1986 launched a wide ranging debate and critiques on the nature of Nazism that extended far beyond Germany's borders.2 The National Socialist experience has truly affected the national psyche and repeatedly thrown up issues such as collective guilt and the degrees of responsibility among the German people themselves for events under Nazism. The legacy continues not only in academic interpretations but also in the activities of organized far right groups in Germany and beyond and in particular the acts of violence committed by self-style neo-Nazis. The resurgence of racism and violence within unified Germany after 1990, and western Europe as a whole, is disturbing and in the German case has often been seized on by elements of the British tabloid press to castigate the country and deliberately stir up old Nazi prejudices. Although similarities can be drawn to the situation in the late 1920s, the entire economic, political and social fabric of the German state today is radically different from that in the late Weimar period and the levels of violence and anti-system activities, while deplorable, are simply not comparable. History rarely repeats itself and knowledge essentially works against any significant revival. On the one hand, knowledge had imbedded an overwhelming revulsion in Germany and beyond towards National Socialism and this reaction has inevitably severely impeded and restricted the political acceptability and legitimacy of the far right. On the other, knowledge of the past has also led some groups (particularly trade unions and student groups) to campaign vigorously against all aspects of the far right. Knowledge, however, has not destroyed the lure of the far right. For a tiny minority, an awareness of the hostility that neo-Nazism provokes within wider society, has pushed them willingly into neo-Nazi ranks. Neo-Nazism represents and embodies a backward-looking force. The same holds true for right-wing extremism in general. At its core lies the belief in a strident nationalism and the unity of the German people, as defined in its most rabid form under National Socialism, although it pre-dates the onset of the Third Reich. Neo-Nazism actually offers little in the way of anything radically new. The only possible exception to this might be the emphasis that it gives to the environment, but even here there are echoes of the Nazi prominence on the importance of nature and the strengths and values of rural society. The neo-Nazis both possess and display characteristics that are relics and hangovers from former periods in German history. Some 13 years after unification there is still a number of people and small political groups and associations that continue to advocate the cause of Nazism. Many are young and their personal quest for sensation that can be found within neo-Nazism clearly injects a rationale and objective that is 209

The Radical Right in Germany

missing from their everyday lives which is fed by older stalwarts who have carried the same banner for several decades and 'continue to propagate the vicious and dangerous rhetoric of the National Socialist Workers' Party, mixed with their own concept of modern Germany'.l These individuals continue to lambast democracy, the failings of the international system and express an intense hatred towards foreigners and Jews within Germany. In retrospect, it would be naive to assume that organized right-wing extremism would have withered away completely. Pockets of support endure across the country. These people for the most part are living in the past and dreaming of better times while a new generation of far right leaders struggle to rewrite the past, exploit the views of historians for their own purposes and rehabilitate German 'patriots'. The unification process has further revealed the degrees of latent fascist sentiment among sections of former citizens of East Germany. The ongoing economic difficulties in this part of Germany, that have lasted much longer than anticipated, and in other areas of western Germany have certainly helped bolster political extremism, fuel resentment and foster the existence of small neo-Nazi bands which have become the focal instigators behind numerous acts of violence and physical assault principally directed against foreigners that are almost endemic. 4 In the summer of 2000 the potential threat of such extremist elements again resurfaced as a spate of violent attacks that culminated in four further murders in an eight-week period (from May to July 2000) and a bomb attack on a Dusseldorf commuter railway station. The latter incident not only severely injured ten immigrants from the former Soviet Union, five of whom were Jewish, but shocked the wider German public. These incidents formed part of a sudden and dramatic increase in right-wing violence in the period from January to November 2000 and represented a fraction of some 13,753 right-wing criminal offences that were committed in this period. Together these incidents reignited a nationwide debate on right-wing extremism, compelled a renewed debate in parliament (Bundestag) and united the entire political class in their determination to reduce neo-Nazi violence. 5 The stronghold of this violence remains eastern Germany, which accounts for almost 50 per cent of such attacks while housing only 21 per cent of the country's population. As the cases of violence multiplied and the realities of racial intolerance became ever more visible so practically all spectra of German society, from both the left and right of the political system and from trade unions to employers' associations united to intensify their demand for new measures to enable the state to combat organized rightwing extremism with ever more vigour. Many, including Michel Friedman, Vice-President of the Central Council for Jews expressed what many wanted, namely the banning of all right-wing extremist forces such as the NPD and the Republikaner. 210

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By 2000 the government's attitude and approach towards the militant right was undergoing a profound shift, one that contrasted sharply with the earlier tendency in the 1970s and 1980s (and this varied in degrees from regional state to regional state) more casually to dismiss and underestimate the significance of the extreme right. This response reflected successive government concerns that the danger to German internal security stemmed from the activities of the left-wing terrorist groups such as the Red Army Faction and the Revolutionary Cells and the actions of militant foreign nationals who were resident in Germany. Compared to the violence initiated by left-wing groups, the potential of the neo-Nazis, particularly given their choice of target, was often overlooked. In any case the reality that the neoNazi forces were much more open to state surveillance and infiltration also reduced their potential as a primary threat. The days of the neo-Nazis being judged by the state apparatus as merely a nuisance factor have been replaced by a belated realization that the existence of widespread xenophobia poses a serious challenge to domestic security as well as Germany's international image." The federal government signalled in August 2000 that it intends to make it more difficult for the forces of organized right-wing extremism to exploit some of the most basic freedoms guaranteed under the German constitution, such as the freedom of assembly. It is also considering plans to make much greater use of CCTV at railway stations and other public locations and has decided to use border police to help combat organized extremism. In addition it is examining the possibility of closing right-wing extremist internet sites. Despite broad support for a clamping down on the right it will still have to be seen how the courts will respond to any such restrictions on the rights of certain groups and individuals. Moreover it will prove largely impossible for any one country unilaterally to thwart the growth of neo-Nazi and internet sites even if they are supported by national internet providers and to guarantee success will require international action. In the more immediate timeframe, the Schroder government promised to earmark some DM75 million (£25 million) towards what will probably constitute Germany's most formidable assault on the forces of right-wing extremism since the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949. This extends from some modest steps such as the creation of a hotline to report incidents of neo-Nazi thuggery to more substantial moves including the banning of the NPD. Although perfectly understandable as a course of action it has to be understood that such proscriptions are highly unlikely to represent the best means of countering the forces of the extreme right which simply regroup under new names. 7 Moreover, there remains a degree of doubt as to whether the Federal Constitutional Court will authorize any such proscription. 211

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In any case such bans will not prevent the violence that stems from the more militant neo-Nazi 'comradeships' and it is these that must remain the focus of the authorities concerned if the continuing aggression and propensity towards violence is to be curbed. In recent years such determination by the authorities has intensified following a new spate of attacks, the discovery of arms caches (that have included automatic and semi-automatic weapons, shells, mortars and grenades) and growing, albeit slowly, neoNazi membership. It is manifest, for example, by the regional government in North-Rhine Westphalia's proposal to introduce a forced registration at federal level of all right-wing extremists as was introduced to monitor and check the movement of football hooligans prior to the European Football championship in June 2000. The violence, as chapter 8 indicated, is not new and has been very much a constant feature of unified Germany. Indeed, some 50 years after the founding of the Federal Republic it is fundamentally apparent that the extreme right has become a part of Germany's political culture rather than representing some temporary and transitory movement. At the start of the 21st century the ideological objectives of the right, from the rejection of a multicultural society, the re-establishment of an independent national state, to the dissolution of the European Union and an end to globalization, are incredibly dated and really out of place in and divorced from the economic and political realities of the modern world. The forces of the contemporary extreme right represent the shadows and the remainder of earlier movements that developed throughout western Europe in the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries. A focus on very similar ideological tenets does not allow for the changed circumstances in which we now live and as such the extreme right finds it increasingly hard to muster any significant and enduring support. To conclude, the forces of organized right-wing extremism exist and operate on the very fringes of the political system in Germany. This said, it must be stressed that these same aspirations are not completely without resonance among certain groups who feel alienated from today's society and find that by engaging in and with organized right-wing extremism they can vent their frustrations and embarrass the government. This seems unlikely to change for the foreseeable future and as such the extreme right will continue to comprise remnants of a darker and, to many, unwelcome past. Their message may, for the most part, prove distasteful and to many even repulsive, but its continued existence is arguably beneficial insofar as it continues to reveal the dangers of excessive nationalism not only to the German people but to other nations. It continually compels people to confront their own histories and such public education about the excesses of Nazism and its successors is arguably the best means of combating the far right in the 212

A new millennium for the extreme right?

new millennium. The extreme right remains a problem not just for the German authorities, but ultimately for the whole of German society which should not be afraid to debate, confront and challenge recent German history and the forces of contemporary right-wing extremism head on.

Notes

2

3 4

5

6 7

This concept derives from united Germany's sudden and belated arrival on the European and world stage as a Great Power in 1870 and refers to the notions that she needed to demonstrate many of the same qualities and expressions of greatness as her fellow European states. Nolte launched the debate by claiming that the time had come to reconsider the Nazi era and in particular to re-examine the nature and uniqueness of the Holocaust. This was followed by a number of eminent historians arguing for a more positive sense of identity with the German past. For an excellent overview see I. Kershaw, 'Living with the Nazi past: the Historikerstreit and after' in The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, London, 1989, 2nd edition. The number of articles that came to focus on this debate run into the hundreds. For full details of the Historikerstreit see, for example, R. Kosiek, Historikerstreit und Geschichtsrevision, Tiibingen, 1987; R. Kiihnl, Vergangenheit, die nicht vergeht, Cologne, 1987; H. U. Wehler, Entsorgung der deutschen Vergangenheit? Ein polemischer Essay zur 'Historikerstreit', Miinich, 1988. C. Rand Lewis, The Neo-Nazis and German Unification, London, 1996, p. 111. At the time of writing examples of the public costs and potential dangers of right-wing extremist and neo-Nazis gatherings were seen in Frankfurt am Main, Weimar and Eisenach (both in Thuringia), in Tostedt (in Lower Saxony) and Freilassing (in Bavaria). The right-wing extremists were met with a larger number of counterdemonstrators while the police were forced to separate the two sides. In addition, physical attacks on foreigners were reported in Bochum, Deggendorf (in Bavaria) and Rostock (Mecklenburg-East Pomerania). See, for example, the German nightly news Tagesthemen, 6 August 2000. As another example Wolfgang Thierse, the Speaker of the Bundestag, has called for efforts to focus the battle against right-wing extremist sympathies in the five states of Eastern Germany. See edition of Tagesschau, 24 August 2000. CNN.com, 29 July 2000. This point has been emphasized by Lutz Irrgang, the director of the Hesse Office for the Protection of the Constitution.

213

Further reading

Contemporary right-wing extremism in Europe There is a huge and ever growing literature on right-wing extremism in Europe and Germany over the last 130 years. This is particularly the case with National Socialism and Hitler, but recently we have also seen many publications on the situation in modern Europe. The works stem from a wide range of academic disciplines, but most notably history, politics, sociology and anthropology. The literature covers all shades of political opinion and approaches towards the right. This overview presents some of the leading works on the extreme right and is divided up into distinct chronological periods. As a general introduction to the far right in contemporary Europe see the excellent collection of essays provided by L. Cheles, R. Ferguson and M. Vaughan, The Far Right in Western and Eastern Europe, London, 1995, 2nd edition or the work by P. Hainsworth (ed.) The Extreme Right in Europe and the USA, London, 1992, particularly 'Introduction: the cutting edge: the extreme right in post-war Western Europe'. For a global perspective, a good overview is contained within C. O. Maolain's work, The Radical Right. A World Directory, London, 1987. A special issue, albeit now somewhat dated, of the journal West European Politics edited by Klaus von Beyme, 11, April 1988, should also be consulted as a useful introduction to this theme. For a European overview also see Hans-Georg Betz, 'The new politics of resentment: radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe', Comparative Politics, 25, 1993, pp. 413-28. For an interpretation of the ideology of the far right in Europe see C. Mudde, 'Right-wing extremism analysed', European Journal of Political Research, 27, 1995,pp. 203-44. Other works which also contain valuable insights include the European Parliament's Committee of Inquiry into the Rise of Fascism and Racism in Europe: Report on the Findings of the Inquiry, Luxembourg, 1985 and P. Wilkinson, The New Fascists, London, 1983. For some of the best works on some of the larger individual European states the following selected works are strongly recommended. For general introductory works on contemporary right-wing extremism in Germany see W. Benz (ed.) Rechtextremismus in der Bundesrepublik, 214

Further reading

Frankfurt, 1994. This provides a very welcome introduction to some of the core themes and issues of contemporary extremism and includes, for example, chapters on ideology, neo-Nazi publishing houses, youth movements, right-wing rock and Holocaust denial. It also has a very useful chronology of the far right from 1945. For more concise works both E. Zimmermann and T. Saalfeld, 'The three waves of West German rightwing extremism' in H. Merkl and L. Weinberg (eds) Encounters with the Contemporary Radical Right, Boulder, CO, 1993, pp. 50-74 and D. Childs, 'The far right in Germany since 1945' in L. Cheles, R. Ferguson and M. Vaughan, The Far Right in Western and Eastern Europe, London, 1995, 2nd edition, pp. 290-308 are to be highly recommended. See also M. Minkenberg, 'Cultural change and the far right in East and West Germany', German Politics, 3, 1994, pp. 169-92.

Imperial Germany For a series of general works on this period of German history see V. R. Berghahn, Imperial Germany 1971-1914: Economy, Society, Culture and Politics, Providence, RI, 1994; David Blackbourn, The Long Nineteenth Century: The Fontana History of Germany 1780-1918, London, 1997; W. Carr, A History of Germany 1815-1945, London, 1987, 3rd edition; G. A. Craig, Germany 1866-1945, Oxford, 1981; G. Mann, The History of Germany since 1789, London, 1968; Peter Pulzer, Germany 1870-1945: Politics, State Formation and War, Oxford, 1997, p. 16; James Retallack, Germany in the Age of Kaiser Wilhelm II, Basingstoke, 1996; Hans Ulrich Wehler, The German Empire, Leamington Spa, 1985; W. J. Mommsen, Imperial Germany 1867-1918: Politics, Culture and Society in an Authoritarian State, London, 1995. For further details on the Kaiser's life and times see Michael Balfour, The Kaiser and his Times, Boston, 1964; J. c. G. Rohl and N. Sombart (eds) Kaiser Wilhelm II: New Interpretations, Cambridge, 1982; J. c. G. Rohl, The Kaiser and his Court: Wilhelm II and the Government of Germany, Cambridge, 1994. For some of the best work on political parties and political mobilization the following short series of works are invaluable: Brett Fairburn, 'Political mobilisation' in R. Chickering (ed.) Imperial Germany: A Historiographical Companion, London, 1996; Geoff Eley, Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and Political Change after Bismarck, New Haven, 1980. Also S. R. Tirell, German Agrarian Politics after Bismarck's Fall: The Formation of the Farmers' League, New York, 1951; G. Eley, 'Anti-Semitism, agrarian mobilisation, and the Conservative Party: radicalism and containment in the founding of the Agrarian League 18903' in L. E. Jones and J. Retallack (eds) Between Reform, Reaction, and 215

Further reading

Resistance: Studies in the History of German Conservatism from 1789 to 1945, Oxford, 1993, pp. 187-227; J. Retallack, Notables of the Right: The Conservative Party and Political Mobilisation in Germany 1876-1918, Boston, 1988; J. K. Zeender, The German Center Party, Philadelphia, 1976. For works on nationalism and anti-Semitism of the period see R. Chickering, We Men who feel most German: A Cultural Study of the Pan German League, London, 1984; P. Kennedy and A. J. Nicholls (eds) Nationalist and Racialist movements in Britain and Germany before 1914, London, 1981. For an account of the German-Jewish community in the course of German history see L. Sievers, Juden in Deutschland, Berlin, 1983; I. Elbogen and E. Sterling, Die Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland, Wiesbaden, 1982. For specific information on the Imperial period see P. Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, New York, 1964; P. Gay, Freud, Jews and Other Germans, Oxford, 1978; W. Hagen, Germans, Poles and Jews, Chicago, 1980; R. Blanke, Prussian Poland in the German Empire 1871-1914, Boulder, 1981. One of the very best sources for the political activities of the anti-Semites remains R. S. Levy's, The Downfall of the Anti-Semitic Political Parties in Imperial Germany, New Haven, 1975. For some of the 'classic' texts of racial determinism see, for example, Houston Stewart Chamberlain's Grundlagen des 19. Jahrhunderts, Munich, 1899; Theodor Fritsch's Handbuch der Judenfrage, Leipzig, 1944, 49th edition; and Wilhelm Marr, Der Sieg des Judentums iiber das Germanentum, Berlin, 1879, 10th edition; as well as a range of popular literature of the time. For two classic works on the First World War and German ambitions see Volker Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, Basingstoke, 1993, 2nd edition, and Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War, New York, 1967.

Weimar Republic There is still much general work to be done on this short period of German history in English and also in German. Nevertheless, as general background reading the following texts are basic. First, works by John Hiden which include The Weimar Republic, London, 1996, 2nd edition; Republican and Fascist Germany, London, 1996; Germany and Europe, 1919-39, London, 1993, 2nd edition. Also see Edgar J. Feuchtwanger, From Weimar to Hitler, 1918-33, London, 1994; E. Kold, The Weimar Republic, London, 1988; Detlev J. K. Peukert, The Weimar Republic, London, 1991; H. A. Winkler, Weimar 1918-1933, Die Geschichte der ersten deutschen Demokratie, Munich, 1987. 216

Further reading

National Socialism and the Third Reich The literature on this period of German history dwarfs that of all other eras. Again, it should be emphasized that although many works are in German, I have deliberately opted to cite (for the most part) books in English or that have been translated into English. By way of background, the following are extremely useful: E. Eyck, A History of the Weimar Republic, Oxford, 1962-64; A. J. Nicholls, Weimar and the Rise of Hitler, London, 1979, 2nd edition; D. J. K. Peukert, The Weimar Republic, London, 1993; R. von Kreudener (ed.) Economic Crisis and Political Collapse in the Weimar Republic, Oxford, 1990; John Hiden, Republican and Fascist Germany: Ideas and Variations in the History of the Weimar Republic, London, 1996. A useful insight into themes of continuity covering the economy, foreign policy and political parties between Weimar and the Third Reich is contained within P. Panayi (ed.) Weimar and Nazi Germany, London, 2001. On Nazism the best starting point is probably accounts of its leader. For works specifically on Hitler see K. D. Bracher, 'The role of Hitler: perspectives of interpretation' in W. Laqueur (ed.) Fascism, London, 1975; A. Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, Harmondsworth, 1955; W. Carr, Hitler: A Study in Personality and Politics, London, 1979; J. Fest, Hitler, London, 1975.1. Kershaw's, Hitler: Hubris 1889-1936, London, 1998, is an excellent work and this volume provides a definitive account of the Nazi leader until 1936. This is now complemented with a second volume Hitler, 1936-45, London 2001. One of the best insights into Hitler's thinking remains Hitler's Mein Kampf, London, 1998 (in English). A good background to the rise of the NSDAP can be obtained from R. Bessel, Germany after the First World War, Oxford, 1993. Thereafter, as examples of some of the best works that cover the NSDAP from its inception in 1919 to its political demise in 1945 see the following. For works on the NSDAP see M. Kater, The Nazi Party: A Social Profile of Members and Leaders 1919-1945, Oxford, 1983; D. Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party 1919-1945, Newton Abbot, 1971 and 1973. For other detailed analyses see K. D. Bracher, The German Dictatorship: the Origins, Structure and Organisation of National Socialism, London, 1982; Martin Broszat, The German Dictatorship, London, 1973. Also see M. Broszat and N. Frei (eds) Das Dritte Reich im Oberblick. Chronik, Ereignisse, Zusammenhange, Munich, 1989; K. P. Fischer, Nazi Germany: A New History, London, 1995; W. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, London, 1960; J. Hiden and J. Farquharson, Explaining Hitler's Germany. Historians and the Third Reich, London, 1983; Klaus Hildebrand, The Third Reich, London, 1984; 1. Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, London, 1991; Hans Mommsen, 217

Further reading

'National Socialism: continuity and change' in W. Laqueur (ed.) Fascism: A Reader's Guide, Harmondsworth, 1979. For more recent contributions see L. Rees, The Nazis: A Warning from History, London, 1997; Norbert Frei, National Socialist Rule in Germany, 1993. Finally, J. Noakes and G. Pridham, Nazism 1919-45, Volumes 1-4, Exeter, 1983-98 provides a series of documents on the period and serves as a very useful introduction to the theme. Another very useful collection of documents in German is to be found in W. Hofer, Der Nationalsozialismus Dokumente 1933-45, Frankfurt am Main, 1982. For an insider's perspective (and more positive overview) see A. Speer, Inside the Third Reich, London, 1972. For works on domestic policy under the Nazi regime see T. Mason, 'The primacy of politics - politics and economics in National Socialist Germany' in H. A. Turner (ed.) Nazism and the Third Reich, New York, 1972, pp. 175200; A. Millward, The German Economy at War, London, 1965; R. J. Overy, The Nazi Economic Recovery 1932-1938, Basingstoke, 1982; by the same author, War and Economy on the Third Reich, Oxford, 1994. K. Huttenberger and K. J. Muller, Army, Politics and Society in Germany 1933-45, Manchester, 1984. On Nazism and society, see D. Schonbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution: Class and Status in Nazi Germany, 1933-39, London, 1967; P. D. Stachura (ed.) The Shaping of the Nazi State, London, 1978. For works on foreign policy and the war see William Carr, 'National Socialism: foreign policy and Wehrmacht' in W. Laqueur (ed.) Fascism: A Reader's Guide, London, 1976; by the same author, Arms, Autarky and Aggression: A Study in German Foreign Policy 1933-1939, London, 1979; K. Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich. Deutsche Aussenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler 1871-1945, Stuttgart, 1995; A. Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie: Kriegsfiihrung und Politik 1940-1941, Frankfurt am Main, 1965; and Klaus Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, London, 1973. Also H. W. Koch, 'Hitler and the origins of the Second World War: second thoughts on the status of some of the documents' in E. M. Robertson (ed.) The Origins of the Second World War. Historical Interpretations, London, 1982. For works on Hitler, National Socialism and the Jews there is a growing collection of works. Readers should see M. Broszat, 'Hitler and the genesis of the Final Solution' in H. W. Koch (ed.) Aspects of the Third Reich, London, 1987; S. Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the Jewish Question, Princeton, 1984. S. Friedlander, Nazi Germany and the Jews: The Years of Persecution 1933-39, London, 1997 provides an excellent account of persecution up to the outbreak of war while Christopher Browning continues the theme with his study on the lead-up to the Final Solution in The Path to Genocide. Essays on launching the Final Solution, London, 1992. Goetz Aly, The 'Final Solution', London, 1999 elaborates on this theme while 218

Further reading

Orner Bartov (ed.) continues the analysis and discusses the Holocaust's consequences in The Holocaust: Origins, Implementation, Aftermath, London, 2000. For a more controversial account ·of the attitude of the average German to the persecution of the Jews see Daniel Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, New York, 1996. Somewhat older, but fascinating accounts of the new biological codes and anti-Semitism are to be found in H. Krausnick, 'The persecution of the Jews' in H. Krausnick and M. Broszat, Anatomy of the SS State, London, 1968, pp. 1-124 and G. Fleming, Hitler and the Final Solution, Oxford, 1986. The closing weeks and days of the Nazi regime have been reasonably well documented and make for fascinating reading. See, in particular, H. R. Trevor-Roper's The Last Days of Hitler, London, 1971, 4th edition, which provides an excellent portrait of Hitler in the last months of the war.

Right-wing extremism and neo-Nazism in Germany after 1945 By way of introduction to the politics and political system that emerge in Germany after 1945, the following are highly recommended: Klaus Larres and Panikos Panayi (eds) The Federal Republic of Germany since 1949, London, 1996; Gordon Smith, William E. Patterson and Stephen Padgett, Developments in German Politics 2, Basingstoke, 1996; Peter H. Merkl (ed.) The Federal Republic of Germany at Fifty: At the End of a Century of Turmoil, Basingstoke, 1999; Peter Pulzer, German Politics, 1945-95, Oxford, 1995. The volume of material on the radical right has tended to come in spurts that reflect the electoral fortunes of the various right-wing parties. During the late 1960s and the early 1990s there was a marked increase in academic and media interest in this theme which led to the publication of some truly seminal works. Overall, the entire period from 1945 has been covered well. As short introductions the chapter by D. Childs, 'The far right in Germany since 1945' in Cheles, Ferguson and Vaughan (eds) The Far Right in Western and Eastern Europe, London, 1995, and H. H. Knutter, Hat der Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik eine Chance?, Bonn, 1988, serve this purpose very well. For an excellent study of the parties, groups and associations on the extreme right in the first two decades of West Germany's existence see K. Tauber, Beyond Eagle and Swastika, Connecticut, 1967. For information and an analysis of the histories and role of the small right-wing extremist parties in post-war West Germany until the early 1970s, see S. L. Fischer, The Minor Parties of the Federal Republic of Germany, The Hague, 1974. J. D. Nagle The National Democratic Party: Right Radicalism 219

Further reading

in the Federal Republic of Germany, Berkeley, 1969 provides one of the best and authoritative accounts of the NPD in the 1960s. A much shorter account can be found in Fritz Alleman, 'The NPD in perspective' in Wiener Library Bulletin, 21, 1966/67 while R. Kuhnl, R. Rilling and C. Sager, Die NPD. Struktur, Ideologie und Funktion einer neofaschistischen Partei, Frankfurt, 1969 provides a more critical and political analysis. For events in the 1980s and the 1990s see U. Backes and P. Moreau, 'The extreme right', German Comments, 33, January 1994; M. von Hellfeld (ed.) In Schatten der Krise: Rechtsextremismus, Neofaschismus, Auslanderfeindlichkeit, Cologne, 1986; R. Stass, 'The problem of right-wing extremism in West Germany', West European Politics, April 1988; P. Dudek and H. J. Jaschke, Entstehung und Entwicklung des Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik, Frankfurt, 1981. See also H.-G. Jaschke, 'Rechtsextremismus im vereinigten Deutschland - einige Thesen uber Ursachen und Erscheingungsformen', Wehrhafte Demokratie und Rechtsextremismus, Bonn, 1992; Geoffrey K. Roberts, 'Right-wing radicalism in the new Germany', Parliamentary Affairs, 45, July 1992, pp. 327-44; M. Schmidt, The New Reich: Violent Extremism in Unified Germany and Beyond, New York, 1993. More recent interpretations include Uwe Backes and Cas Mudde, 'Germany: extremism without successful parties?', Parliamentary Affairs, 54, July 2000, pp. 457-68; Susan Backer, 'Right-wing extremism in unified Germany' in Paul Hainsworth (ed.) The Extreme Right in Europe and the USA. From the Margins to the Extreme, London, 2000. For works on the Republikaner see, among others, C. Leggewie, Die Republikaner, Berlin, 1989; N. Lepszy, 'Die Republikaner', Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 6 October 1989; D. Roth, 'Sind die Republikaner die funfte Partei?', Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 6 October 1989. A very useful account of this party is to be found in H.-J. Veen, N. Lepszy and P. Mnich, The Republikaner Party in Germany: Right-wing Menace or Protest Catchall?, Westport, CT, 1998. An excellent account is to be found in R. Stass, Politics against Democracy: The Extreme Right in West Germany, Oxford, 1993. While Juergen Falter provides a good analysis of the extremist electorate in Wer wahlt rechts?, Munich, 1994. A shorter but thorough overview is also provided by T. Saalfeld 'The politics of national populism: ideology and policies of the German Republikaner Party', German Politics, 2, 1993. For work on the neo-Nazis the following texts, which are divided into pre- and post-unification, are highly recommended. Some of the best accounts of the neo-Nazi scene in West Germany in the 1970s and 1980s can be found in Peter Dudek, Jugendliche Rechtextremisten, Cologne 1985; Alwin Meyer and Karl Klaus Rabe, Unsere Stunde, die wird kommen: Rechtsextremismus unter Jugendlichen, Bornheim-Merten, 1980; J. Pomorin and R. Junge, Die 220

Further reading

Neo-Nazis, Dortmund, 1978; H. M. Broder, Deutschland Erwacht, Cologne, 1978 and K. K. Rabe, Rechtsextreme Jugendliche, Bornheim-Merten, 1978. For some very useful overviews of the situation in the late 1970s see G. B. Ginzel, Hitlers (Ur)enkel: Neo-Nazis, Ihre Ideologien und Aktionen, Dusseldorf, 1981; for a fuller discussion of the neo-Nazi groups, parties and individuals see L. McGowan, 'Remnants of an unwelcome past: neoNazism in West Germany in the 1980s', PhD thesis, University of Reading, 1991. For the trends in the 1990 see Rand C. Lewis, The Neo-Nazis and German Unification, Westport, CT, 1996. An excellent insight into the East German neo-Nazi scene is to be found in I. Hasselbach, Fuhrer-Ex: Memoirs of a Former Neo-Nazi, London, 1996. For a short review of modern antiSemitism see W. Bergmann, 'Anti-Semitism and xenophobia in the East German Linder', German Politics, 3, 1994. There is a growing literature on why male youths are attracted to neoNazi groups and why they show an active readiness to engage in violence. Much of this remains in German. See, for example, Wilhelm Heitmeyer, Rechtsextremistische Orientierungen bei Jugendlicher. Empirische Ergebnisse und Erklarungsmuster einer Untersuchung zur politis chen Sozialisation, Munich, 1987; Christophe Butterwege, Rechtsextremismus bei Jugendlichen. Politisch-kulturelle Sozialisation, Aggression und Gewalt, Berlin, 1996; Ursula Birsl, Jugendlicher Rechtsextremismus und Gewerkschaften. Lebensverhaltnisse und politische Orientierungen von Auszubildeden, Opladen, 1985. For the 1990s see, among others, C. T. Husbands, 'Neo-Nazis in East Germany: the new danger?', Patterns of Prejudice, 26, 1991, pp. 3-17; by the same author, 'Militant neo-Nazism in Germany' in L. Cheles, R. Ferguson and M. Vaughan, The Far Right in Western and Eastern Europe, London, 1995, 2nd edition. B Schader's work, Rechte Kerle: Skinheads, Faschos, Hooligans, Hamburg, 1992, provides a lively and informative set of observations on today's right-wing extremists. Finally, the weekly news magazines and, in particular, Focus, Der Spiegel (and to a lesser extent Stern) have provided excellent coverage of rightwing activities over the last decade. They are a must and should always be consulted for some of the best accounts of right-wing parties and neo-Nazi outrages. In addition to these the annual reports from the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutzberichte and available online) provide an invaluable insight not only into such activities but also give further information on the active parties and associations as well as compiling official statistics on right-wing violence and publications. They should serve as the best starting point for any investigation into political extremism in Germany. 221

Index

Page numbers in italics denotes table. Action Front for National Socialists see ANS Action Front for National Socialists/ National Activists) (ANSINA) 184-5 Action Resistance 180 Adenauer 154-5 Agrarian League 20, 22 agriculture 60 Aid Organization for Political Prisoners and their Dependants (HNG) 196-7 All-German Party see GDP ANS (Action Front for National Socialists) 160, 181, 182, 184 ANSINA (Action Front for National Socialists/National Activists) 184-5 Anschluz 86, 71, 136 Anti-Semitic People's Party 28 anti-Semitism 24, 36, 40, 46 biological 75 and DVU 175-6 forms of 25 Kaiserreich 25-8 and National Socialism 8, 16 and Nazi regime 75,112-14, 127-8 and neo-Nazism 198-9 and NSDAP 76 politically organized 27-8 racial 27, 112 army 48,89,117,118 assassination attempt on Hitler 142 and Nazi regime 126, 128-9 art and Nazi regime 128 'Aryan' 75 Ausschaltung (forced exclusion) 127 Austria and Anschulz 86, 71, 136 Austrian Freedom Party (FPO) 2 Babyskins 200 Basic Law 151,154,155 Battle of Britain 13 9 Bauer, Gustav 45

222

Bavaria 49,50,52,5~ 102 Bavaria and Reich League 49 Bavarian People's Party see BVP beerhall putsch (1923) 50,52,73,78 Behrendt, Uwe 183 Berlin blockade (1948-9) 150 Berlusconi, Silvio 2 Bethman-Hollweg, Chancellor 37-8 BN 181, 190, 196, 199,200 BHE (League of Expelled and Dispossessed) 153 Bismarck, Otto von 11,17,18,21,30,33, 34,39,52 Bleichroder 26 Blitzkriege 138-9 Blomberg, General 129, 135 Bockel, Otto 28 Boer War 35 Borchardt, Siegfried 186 Bormann, Martin 84, 104 Borussia Front 186 Bracher 79 Brandt, Willy 111, 156, 181 Braun, Eva 82 Brehl, Thomas 184, 194 Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (1918) 38,134 Britain 148 approach to Nazi regime/Hitler 134-5, 136 relations between Germany and 31-2 and Second World War 139 British National Party 3 Bruck, Moeller van den 51 Bruning, Heinrich 61,62,64-5 Bullock, Alan 70 Bulow, Chancellor 31,32,33 Bund 151 Bund Oberland 49 Bundestag 151, 15S Burgfrieden 36, 38 Burleigh 126 business community and Nazi regime 89, 128-9, 131

Index Busse, Friedhelm 183-4, 186, 193 BVP (Bavarian People's Party) 50, 62, 95, 104 electoral record 60, 98 Caignet, Michel 186 Caprivi, Chancellor 19, 32 Carr, William 79 Catholic Centre Party 18,45, 50, 56, 65, 104, 115, 125 electoral record 60, 98 Catholic Male Youth League (K]MV) 115 Catholicism and voting for NSDAP 101-4, 115 CDU (Christian Democratic Union) 149, 153,154 CDU/CSU 157 Centre Party see Catholic Centre Party Chamberlain, Houston Stewart 27 Chambers of Handicraft and Trade 23 Childs, D. 12 Christian Democratic Union see CDU Christian National Farmers' and Rural People's Party 61 Christian Social Union (CSU) 162 Christian Socialist Workers' Party 25 Christiansen, Lars 193 Churchill, Winston 139, 150 Class, Heinrich 32-3 Cold War 150 Colonial Society 30 communism 6-7 Communist Party of Germany see KPD 'community of the folk' 16 concentration camps 111, 127, 128 Conservative Party 20-1 conservative right in Imperial Germany 20-2 conservative right 61, 124, 129 abandonment of by middle class 95 contrast with radical right 50-1 and Hitler 65, 78-9 membership 51 and NSDAP 63-5 relations with radical right during final years of Weimar Republic 62-3 violence towards by SA 114 see also DNVP Consul 49 continuity debate 10-13,39 Council of Europe 169, 208 'Crime Prevention Laws' ·193 CSU (Christian Social Union) 162 Czechoslovakia 71,86, 136, 137

DA (German Alternative) 183, 187 DAP (German Workers' Party) 53, 54, 106 Darre, Richard Walter 95 Darwin, Charles 27 Dawes Plan 56 DDP (German Democratic Party) 45, 56 electoral record (1928-33) 60 Deckert, Gunther 177 Defence League 30 Defence League of German Socialists (KDS) 196 Deutsche anti-semitische Vereiningung 28 Deutsche National-Zeitung 161 Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung 161 DFP (German Freedom Party) 154 Dietrich, Otto 83 DNVP (German National People's Party) 46,47,48,49,63,65,149 demise 114 descent in regions 97-8 disagreements and divisions within 50, 61, 72, 97 electoral results 60, 61 ideology 47 and SA 114 support shifting to NSDAP from 97-8 domestic policy and NSDAP 79, 124-32 Donitz, Admiral 140-1, 152 DP (German Party) 153, 155 Drexler, Anton 53 DRP (German Reichs Party) 149, 151-2, 153-4, 155 Dudek, Peter 180-1 DVP (German People's Party) 45, 56 electoral record (1928-33) 60 DVU (German People's Union) 148, 160, 164, 188 creation of 161 electoral record 173-4 in 19905 175-6 relations with NPD 161 relations with Republikaner 176, 177 DVU/List D 161, 163 economy 35, 56, 152, 169 boom (1936-38) no boom (1950s-70s) 154 collapse of monetary system (1923) 50 deterioration of and crisis 60-1 malaise (1966-67) 156,157 and Nazi regime 130-2 recession (1930-33) 44 upturn in mid 1920s 57

223

Index

Eisenhower, Dwight 150 elections federal (1949-69) 154 federal (1990-99) 175 Land (1966-68) 156 regional (1998-2000) 176 Reichstag see Reichstag see also Euro elections Eley, Geoff 20 Enabling Act (1933) 94,125 Erhad, Ludwig 157 Erzberger, Matthias 49 eugenics 128 Euro elections (1989) 163, 163, 165, 166 (1990-99) 175 European Coal and Steel Community 154, 208 European integration 1, 161, 173, 201 European Union (EU) 1, 169 euthanasia programme 128 Falter,]. 103 FAP (Independent Workers' Party) 154, 185, 186, 187, 188, 193 fascism 6-8, 12, 71 see also neo-fascism Fatherland Party 37,49 Fatherland Union 154 FDP (Free Democratic Party of Germany) 154,157,158 Ferdinand, Archduke Franz 35 Feuchtwanger, E.]. 99 Final Solution 113-14 First World War 12, 33, 35-9,43, 51 causes 35-6 command of Germany by OHL 37, 38 ending 38-9 problems arising from defeat 44 and reputation of the conservative right 46 vilification of Jews during 36-7 see also Versailles Treaty Fischer 12, 33, 112 foreign policy continuity from Bismarck to Hitler 133 and NSDAP 122, 132-8 foreigners violence against by neo-Nazis 198 Forster 26 Fortuyn, Pym 3 France approach to Nazi regime/Hitler 134-5, 136

224

Frank Schwerdt neo-Nazi Circle 196 Free Conservatives 20 Free Democratic Party of Germany see FDP Free Nationalists 195-6 Free Social Union 154 Freikorps 46,48-9, 58, 106 Frey, Dr Gerhard 161, 162, 175, 176 Frick, Wilhelm 84 Friedman, Michel 210 Fritsch, Theodor Handbuch der judenfrage 26 Fritsch, Werner 129, 135 Galinski, Dr Heinz 199 Gauleiter 58, 80, 84-5, 125 GOP (All-German Party) 153, 155 German National People's Party see DNVP General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 169 General Committee of the United Guilds 23 General League of German Artisans 23 geography and voting for NSDAP 101-2 German action groups (DAG) 182 German Alternative see DA German Citizens' Initiative 181 German Conservative Party 149 German Democratic Party see DDP German Empire (1871-1918) see Kaiserreich German Freedom Party (DFP) 154 German National Assistants' Association 24 German National People's Party see DNVP German Nationalist Protection and Defiance Federation 51 German Party see DP German People's Association 26 German People's Party see DVP German People's Union see DYU German Reconstruction Party 149 German Reichs Party see DRP German Women's Front (DDF) 200 German Workers' Party see DAP Gestapo 141 Ginzel 10 Gleichschaltung 125 Gobincau, Arthur 27 Goebbels, Joseph 58, 59, 73, 83, 104, 109, 113, 118, 123 Goring, Hermann 54, 79, 84, 104, 109, 118, 132, 140-1 Grand Coalition (1966-69) 157,158

Index

Haeckel, Ernst 27 Haider, Jarg 2 Hamburger Sturm (Hamburg Storm) 196 Handlos, Franz 162 Hanseatic League 11 Harzburg Front 97 Hepp, Odfried 184 Hess, Rudolf 104, 195 Heydrich, Richard 118 Hildebrand, Klaus 79 Himmler, Heinrich 54,84,87,104,117, 118, 140-1 Hindenburg, President Paul von 37, 38,47, 64,65, 74, 118, 124, 128 Historikerstreit 208-9 Hitler, Adolf 8, 10, 11-12,44,51,53-4, 55-6, 77-88, 126 abilities and oratorical skills 52, 53, 54, 133 absence of unified resistance movement against 141 appointment as Chancellor 64, 65 arguments for week leadership assessment 80-1 and army 130 assassination attempts against 88, 140, 142 background 53-4 and beerhall putsch (1923) 50,52, 73, 78 beliefs 72 committing of suicide 140 and conservative right 64, 65, 78-9 dealing with left of party 73-4 detachment and isolation in later years 87-8 and domestic policy 130 as a dupe of conservative and big business interests 78-9 and foreign policy 86-7, 132-3 imprisonment 57 influence on policy development 143 Mein Kampf 52,55,71-2,75,76,105, 133 and NSDAP 52, 53-4, 55, 57, 59 personality and daily life 81-3 political career 54 and race theory 75 rejection of Versailles Treaty 72, 85, 86 relations with Rahm 115-16 remains aloof from day-to-day policy formulation 80,81, 125 and SA 116, 117-18

and Second world War 87-8, 138, 139, 140 and Soviet Union 137-8 style and leadership 77-88 and territorial expansion 85, 86, 129-30, 131,133,135 trial (1924) 52 use of propaganda 76 view of women 105 vision of a Greater Germany 71, 72, 76 Hitler Wave 180 Hoffmann, Karl-Heinz 182-3 Hollweg, Bethmann 32 Holocaust 175-6,208 Honoratiorenpolitik 19 Hossbach Protocol (1937) 86, 135 Hugenberg, Alfred 48, 61 immigration 3, 165, 165, 166 Imperial Germany see Kaiserreich Imperial League to Combat Social Democracy 30 Independent People's Bloc (FVB) 196 Independent Workers' Party see FAP industrialization 35 interest groups 19-20, 22 internet and neo-Nazism 195 Iron Fist 106 Israel 175 Italian Social Movement see MSI Italy 71, 13 9 fascism in 6, 7, 8 Japan 139 'Jewish Question' 26 Jews 25,208 anti-Semitism during Kaiserreich period 25-8 extermination of 113-14 and Nazi's race theory 75 and Nuremberg Laws (1935) 128 vilification of during First World War 36-7 violence against by neo-Nazis 179, 198-9 violence and intimidation towards by Nazi regime 112-14, 127-8 see also anti-Semitism Jodi, General 129 judiciary and Nazi regime 126-7 Junkers 21,28

225

Index

Kahr, Gustav von 50, 118 Kaiserreich (1870-1918) 16-40 anti-Semitism 25-8 cohesiveness policy 19 conflicting opinion over future shape and direction of German state during 35 defining right in 20-2 dissatisfaction with by middle class 18 domination of by Prussia 17-18 emergence of interest groups 19-20 and First World War 35-9 founding of 17 growth in mobilization and radicalization 19-20 historical setting 17-20 membership of the radical right 23-5 nationalism 29-35 party political system 19 weaknesses 18 Kameradschaft Cera 196 Kameradschaften 194, 195 Kapp, Wolfgang 37,49 Kapp-Luttwitz putsch (1920) 49 Kartell bloc 21 Kater 104 Keitel, General 129 Kershaw,1. 70, 123 Kexel, Werner 184 Kohl, Helmut 168, 173, 192 Kohler, Gundolf 183 KPD (Communist Party of Germany) 50, 63, 74, 94, 124 anti-communist activities by NSDAP against 109-11 rise and growth of 52, 58 Kiihnen, Michael 180-2,184-6,188,189 Kiissel, Gottfried 188, 194 Lammers, Hans-Heinrch 80 Land elections (1966-68) 156 Lauck, Gary 194 Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour 113 Le Pen, Jean Marie 3, 4 League of Expelled and Dispossessed (BHE) 153 League of Nations 56 Germany's withdrawal from (1933) 86, 134 Lebensraum (living space) 8, 11, 76, 87, 134,137 legal system and Nazi rule 126-7 Leisure Hansa Association 181

226

Lewis, Schlomo 183 Ley, Robert 83-4 liberalslliberalism 29-30, 95, 97 Locarno Pact (1925) 56 Ludcndorff, General Erich 37, 38, 39, 49, 57, 64 Marx, Arndt-Heinz 184 Mason 99 Mein Kampf (My Struggle) (Hitler) 52, 55, 71-2, 75, 76, 105, 133 Michaelis, Georg 38 middle class 17,20,21,28,30,31,40,74 abandonment of conservative right 95 and anti-Semitism 26, 28 attacks on values of by Rohm 111 membership of radical right 23-4 and NSDAP 96, 97-8, 104 Military Sport Group Hoffmann (WSG Hoffmann) 160, 182-3 Mittelstand see middle class Mommsen 18 Mosler, Jiirgen 186, 193 MSI (Italian Social Movement) 2, 9 Miihlbergcr, D. 99 Muller, Ursula 196 Munich Agreement (1938) 136-7 Munich Oktoberfest, bomb (1980) 183 Munich Soviet Republic 49 Mussolini, Benito 6, 7, 71, 136 National Activists 184 National Assembly 186-7 National Democratic Party see NPD National Front (France) 3 NationalOffcnsive 188, 193 National Socialism 10,52,54,147, 168, 208-9 causes of 8 characteristics and ideology 16, 69 emergence of 11-12 seen as continuation of Prussian ideals and objectives 52 see also NSDAP National Socialist Gcrman Workcrs' Party see NSDAP National Socialist German Workers' Party/ Foreign and Construction Organization (NSDAP/AO) 181 National-Zeitung (publication) 175 Nationale Liste 193 nationalism 6, 13,40, 169, 208, 209 during Kaiserreich period 29-35 and fascism 7

Index

nationalism (continued) and Navy League 31-2 and NSDAP 74, 75 organizations 30-3 and Pan-German League 32-3 rise of politically organized 29-33 Nationalist front (Nf) 187,193 NATO 154 Naval Agreement (1935) 135 naval mutinies (1918) 43 naval programme 19 Navy acts (1898/1900) 31 Navy League 30,31-2,34 Nazi Party see NSDAP Nazi-Soviet Pact (1939) 137 neo-fascism 9-10 neo-Nazism 9-10,174,178-201,209 acts of violence 179-80, 187-8, 188, 189-90,191,196,197-9,197,198, 209, 210 aspirations 178 bans issued against major groups 192-3, 192 building a national force (1983-89) 184-8 government attitude towards in 2000 211-12 government response to combating of (1992-5) 190-4 and the internet 195 intimidation against Turkish community 190 membership 178, 179 onset of terrorism (1980-82) 182-4 origins 180 restructuring (1996-2000) 194-5 rise of Kiihnen 180-2 rivalry and fractionalization 180, 187 upsurge of violence (1991-94) 189-90 and women 200 Netherlands 3 Neubauer, Harold 177 New Front 200 New Front (publication) 185 'New Right' 159-60 Nietzche, friedrich 48 Night of the Long Knives (1934) 74, 117-18,129 Noakes and Pridham 101 Nolte, Ernst 12,209 NPD (National Democratic Party) 8, 10, 13,148,164,167,188,211 electoral record 156, 158, 163, 180 formation 155

internal divisions 158, 159 and neo-Nazism 178 in 1990s 177-8 relations with DVU 161 revival and upturn in electoral record 160, 161, 162 rise and fall of (1964-72) 155-9 and 'three pillars concept' 178 NS Kampfruf (NS Battlecry) 181 NSDAP (National Socialist German Workers' Party) 9,44-5,46, 53-5, 57-9,69-90, 122-38, 150,208 administrative system 80-1, 87 advance and reasons for appeal 57-8, 61-2, 95, 122 age and sex structure 104-5 and beerhall putsch (1923) 50 class background of members 98-9, 98 competition and rivalry as integral part of 58-9, 80, 84 and conservative right 63-5 and DNVP SO and domestic policy 79, 124-32 electoral record 59, 62, 63, 93-4, 94, 125 emergence of SO, 53 eradication of parliamentary democracy 125 finances 64 foreign policy 122,132-8 and Gauleiter 84-5 geographical background and religious affiliation 101-4 ideology and objectives 11, 54-5, 70-7 internal divisions within 64, 72, 73-4, 115-16, 122 and judiciary 126-7 membership 54,62,93-116 opposition to regime 141-1 party rallies 59 policy making 80 race theory 27, 74-5, 127, 128 re-establishment of (1925) 57 religious affiliations 115 reorganization of and emphasis on regional level 58 rise of due to deterioration of economic situation 61-2 rise of .52 and SA 54,106-7,108,109,115-16, 116-17 seizure of power 12 social background of membership 96-101

227

Index

NSDAP (continued) and violence 105-9 see also Hitler, Adolf Nuremberg Laws (1935) 112-13, 128 occupation (1945-49) 148-50 OHL (oberste Heereseleitung) 37, 38, 39, 43,47 Olympic Games (1936) 83 Operation Barbarossa 139 Pan-German League 6, 22, 28, 30, 32-3, 36-7,51 Pape, Martin 185 Party of Democratic Socialism 173 Party of Work (PdA) (renamed People's Socialist Movement of Germany/Party of Work) 184 Patriotic Book League 30 peace settlement (1919) 11 People's Conservative Party 61 People's Socialist Movement of Germany/ Party of Work see VSDB/PdA Peters, Michael 193 petit bourgeoisie 23, 24, 96 Peukert 99 Poeschke, Frida 183 Poland 32, 103, 137 invasion of by Germany (1939) 138 non-aggression pact with Germany (1935) 86 Potsdam Agreement (1945) 148 Prodi, Romano 4 Protestantism and voting for NSDAP 101-4,115 Prussia 11,17-18,19,38,51 Pulzer, Peter 18 race theory 27, 74-5, 127, 128 Rathenau, Walther 49 Rauschning thesis 70 rearmament programme and Nazi reigme 130, 131 Reich Citizenship Law 113 Reichsbanner 111 Reichsfeinde 18 Reichskristallnacht (1938) 113 Reichslandbund 95 Reichstag 17, 18, 38, 79 burning of (1933) 110,124 elections (1871-1980) 21 elections (1890-1912) 22 elections (1924) 57,97 elections (1928) 59

228

elections (1928-33) 60 elections (1930) 62 elections (1932) 62, 63, 93-4, 98, 101, 105, 108 elections (1933) 125 Fire Decree 110 function of under the Nazis 125 Reichswehr 117, 118 religion and voting for NSDAP 101-4 Remer, Otto 152 reparations 50, 56, 62 Republic of Traitors 48 Republikaner 5,8, 10, 13, 148, 160, 162-8,201 continuing survival of in political system 173 divisions within 167 and DYU 176, 177 electoral record 162-3,173,174,175 establishment 162 fall in support 167-8 ideology 163-5 in 1990s 176-7 profile of voter 165-6, 167 Rhineland crisis (1936) 86, 135 right-wing extremism 2,8-9, 10, 35 (1984-90) 160-8 defining of and characteristics 5-6, 207 fractionalization and radicalization (1972-84) 159-60 government response to in (2000) 211-12 membership 23-5, 51, 179 post 1945 impact 2 reasons for post-war decline 146 reasons for thriving 2-3 resurgence (1949-52) 150-2 rise and fall of NPD (1964-72) 155-9 stagnation of (1990-2001) 174-8 stagnation and decline (1953-64) 152-5 right-wing radicalism 8-9 Ritter J 1-12 Roeder, Manfred 181, 182,201 Rahm, Ernst 54,72,84, 87, 105-7, 108, 111,115,116-18,129 Romania 139 Ruhr occupation of by France/Belgium 46, 50 withdrawal of Belgian/French troops from 56 Russia 38, 86, 134 see also Soviet Union Russian Revolution 38

Index SA (Sturmabteilung) 54, 58, 104, 105-9 activities against SPD III anti-communist activities 110-11 anti-Jewish activities 112 demise of 116-18 elimination of leadership of 122 and Night of the Long Knives 117 and NSDAP 54, 106 and Stahlhelm 114 tensions between party leadership and 115-16 violence towards Catholic Church 115 violence towards conservative right 114 Sammlungspolitik (cohesiveness policy) 19 Schacht, Hjalmar 73, 130, 131-2 Schindler, Oskar 141-2 Schleicher, General von 118 Schlieffen Plan 36 Schlierer, Dr Rolf 176, 177 Schonborn, Meinhof 187 Schonhuber, Franz 162, 164, 167, 168 Second World War 3, 10, 86, 87-8, 132, 138-41,148,168 Seiters, Rudolf 193 Shirer, William 69 Silesia 103 Single European Act (1986) 161 Skingirlfreundkreis 200 skinheads 199-200 Slavs 27,29, 76, 134 Smith, A. D. 7 Smith, Gordon 168 Social Democratic Party see SPD socialism 36, 39 Socialist Party of the Reich see SRP Society for the Eastern Marches 30, 32, 51 Society for Germandom Abroad 30 Sonnenberg, Libermann von 26 South Tyrol 71 Soviet Union 134, 148, 150, 168 non-aggression pact with Germany (1939) 86, 137 relations with Germany 137-8 and Second World War 139 Spain 139 SPD (Social Democratic Party) 18,28,36, 43-4,45,56, 11~ 149, 154 activities/violence against by NSDAP III banning of 125 coalition with CDU/CSU 157 coalition with KPD SO electoral record (1928-33) 60 rise of 22, 24, 34 Speer, Albert 69,73,81,84, 104, 123

Spengler, Oswald 51 SRP (Socialist Party of the Reich) 148, 152 SS (Schutztaffel) 109, 115, 117, 118 Stahlhelm (Steel Helmut) 46,47-8, 109, 114 Stalin, Joseph 137 Stocker, Alfred 25-6 Storm 8th May 181 Strasser, Gregor 72, 73, 74, 95, 104 Strasser, Otto 73, 74 Strauss, Franz-Josef 183 strikes, (1920) 48 student organizations 59 Stufenplan 133 terrorism and neo-Nazis 182-4 Thatcher, Margaret 11 Thule Society 51 Tirpitz, Admiral von 31,37 Todt, Fritz 84 trade unions 20, 24, 111 Treitschke, Heinrich von 26 Trevor-Roper, Hugh 133 Turkey 33 Turkish community and nco-Nazism 190 Ulbricht, Walther 110 unemployment 130,151,156,161 unification (1870) 11, 16, 20, 29 (1990) ], 160, 168, 169, 17], 174, 189, 210 Union de Defense des Commer~ants et Artisans 8 United Nations 169 United States 38, 139, 148, 168 Vergangenheitsbewaltigung 208 Vermeil 10-11 Versailles Treaty ]9,45-6,47,48, 72, 85, 86, 10], 133, 134 veterans' associations 31 violence 117 anti-socialist and communist activities 109-11 deployed against judiciary 126-7 and neo-Nazism 187-8, 188, 189-90, 197-9,197,198 and NSDAP 105-9 and SA 107-8 towards Catholic Church by SA 115 towards conservative right 114 towards Jews 112-14, 127-8

229

Index Voigt, Ekkehard 162 Voigt, Udo 177, 178 vo/kisch groups 46,50-1,57 Vo/kischer Beobachter 54 Volksgemeinschaft 58, 74, 75, 88, 97 von Raden, Price Max 38-9 von Neurath, Konstantin Freiherr 129, 133-4,135 von Papen, Franz 62, 63, 64-5, 123 von Ribbentrop, Joachim 104, 123, 129, 133 von Stauffenberg, Claus Schenk 142 von Thadden, Adolf 154, 155 VSDB/PdA (People's Socialist Movement of Germany/Party of Work) (was Party of Work) 184, 1% Wall Street Crash (1929) 60,103 Wannsee meeting (1942) 113 Wehler 33,34 Wehner, Herbert 156 Weimar Republic (1919-33) 3,11,43-66, 124 beginning of demise of 60 conservative right in (1919-25) 45-8 emergence of militant right 48-53 establishment and challenges faced 43-4 problems faced by and inability to counter 8, 46

230

(1924-28) 55-9 (1928-33) 59-65

Weltanschauung 133 Weltpolitik 19, 31 Westpolitik 154 White Rose 142 white-collar workers 24 Wiking Jugend 193 Wilhelm i, Kaiser 18 Wilhelm II, Kaiser 11, 19,33,37,38,39, 43,52 Wilson, Woodrow 38,45 women 89 and employment 105 and neo-Nazism 200 and NSDAP 104-5 Worch, Christian 194 working class and NSDAP 98, 99-100, 103 and SA 107 Wulff, Thomas 196

Young Plan 62, 97 youth and NSDAP 104 Zimmermann, Friedrich 187 Zweite Buch, Das (The Second Book) (Hitler) 71